THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

# PARISIAN PEDAGOGIES:

# THE EDUCATIONAL DEBATE BETWEEN PETER ABELARD, HUGH OF SAINT-VICTOR, PETER LOMBARD, AND JOHN OF SALISBURY

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*Uxori meae carissimae, piro aculeoso,*

*Liberisque meis, quae meam vitam laetificant*

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**Abstract**

The twelfth century in Europe was a long and pivotal century that saw the emergence of new school cultures and intellectual centers. The liberal arts move out of the proprietorship of monasteries and cathedral schools; by the end of the century the Parisian *universitas* or university was forming. The directions that education took in these schools—their practices and their theories—were innovative and experimental.

This is a study of the innovative pedagogical projects of four prominent teachers and thinkers who operated within the quickly growing intellectual milieu of Paris. Peter Abelard and Hugh of Saint-Victor were contemporaries whose teaching was prestigious and sought after. Abelard faced the challenges that beset a teacher without a prestigious master and who sought to open his own school. His solution was to build his reputation by relying upon his talent to answer students' questions through a performative use of dialectical reason in judging the merit of authoritative sources. Abelard's talent reliance tapped into a larger discussion of talent *(ingenium*) among his contemporaries. Hugh viewed the Parisian masters' reliance upon talent as hazardous and disorderly and in response constructed an expansive pedagogical program that encompassed moral and intellectual sides of the student. By detailed discipline (*disciplina)* and curricular teaching (*doctrina*), Hugh presented an alternative to the Parisian trajectory.

Peter Lombard and John of Salisbury were students of Hugh and Abelard respectively. They each imbibed much from their own master and also gained an appreciation of their master's rival. Their own pedagogical thought represents a second

generation's approach, offering diverging syntheses of Abelardian and Hugonic elements within their own original, pedagogical strategies. Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences* aimed to mold the student into a diligent and humble reader who respected and trusted the correct authorities. John viewed the liberal arts from his active diplomatic and administrative career, serving the archbishops of Canterbury, and presented a fusion of Abelardian and Hugonic elements to resolve his persistent worries with excessive talent-reliance among scholars.

## Chapter 1: Introduction:

## The Question of Twelfth-Century Pedagogy

The education of succeeding generations may be said to be the crucial factor in a society's preservation or transformation. Plato called education "the first among the finest gifts that are given to the best men" and left an intellectual legacy that linked education with the character or culture of society.[1] In his classic study of παιδεία or ancient Hellenistic education, Henri-Irénée Marrou claimed, "Education is a collective technique which a society employs to instruct its youth in the values and accomplishments of the civilization within which it exists."[2] Already in antiquity, education was the subject of sharp and evolving debate. Rather than a placid monolith, the sources of Greek and Roman education that professed the liberal arts often constituted persistent tensions between debated visions of liberal education. For example, philosophers countered dominant rhetorical education; Jews and Christians rivaled the Greek and Roman classics with new texts; Christians among themselves varied widely on the proper fusion of classical arts with the wisdom derived from and leading back to the Logos.

Medieval Europe inherited this contested legacy of liberal arts. It was a tradition that not only propounded the vital need for correct and good education but also left many interpretative options for how to constitute that liberal education. The medieval

[1] Plato, *Laws* 644b, "ὡς πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν παραγιγνόμενον," ed. Ioannes Burnet, *Platonis Opera V.1* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907).
[2] Henri-Irénée Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. George Lamb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), xiii.

European tradition of the liberal arts did not and could not simply reproduce the schools and education (*institutio*) of the *imperium romanum*. Instead, medieval teachers and scholars reinvented the liberal arts in accordance with their own material conditions, cultural forms, and intellectual and ethical aims and aspirations. Monks, bishops, and cathedral-school teachers practiced the arts, bending them from imperial service and administration toward a new set of aims and practices, chief among them the reading and writing on sacred scripture.[3] Drawing upon this tradition, medieval masters found themselves supplied with stores of diverse articulated educational ideals, pedagogical methodologies, practical techniques and texts for school exercises. Rather than hindering creativity, these materials allowed medieval pedagogues to synthesize the elements into their own creative innovations. These innovations would transform the educational landscape through the course of the twelfth century in ways that would shape the course of European cultural history.[4] These pedagogical innovations and the debates they sparked deserved careful attention. The present work is a study of the pedagogical debates amid the changing educational landscape of early twelfth-century Paris between four keynote thinkers and teachers: Peter Abelard, Hugh of Saint-Victor, Peter Lombard, and John of Salisbury.

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[3] A classic treatment of monastic culture of liberal arts is Jean Leclercq's. See Jean Leclercq, OSB, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture,* trans. Catharine Misrahi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982). Stephen Jaeger's study of the culture of liberal arts within the cathedral schools is an unmatched treatment. See C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950–1200* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 21–195.

[4] For example, see John Van Engen, "The Twelfth Century: Reading, Reason, and Revolt in a World of Custom," *European Transformations: The Long Twelfth Century*, ed. Thomas F. X. Noble, John Van Engen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 17–44.

* * *

Any discussion of the twelfth-century is fraught with interpretative questions. Scholars have found it a hinge or transitional century for diverse reasons. Rapid changes, crises, and developments occurred in several spheres: new political orders or energy became visible in Germany, France, England, and Iberia; an agricultural revolution fed a reurbanization that in turn spurred commerce and trade; reform ideals stirred programs in monastic, papal, and popular religious aspects; new energy appeared in the schools with a corresponding emergence of vernacular literature.[5] On account of these movements, scholars have often described this era as a renaissance. Though scholars had already been using the term ahead of him, Charles Homer Haskins is responsible for popularizing the notion of the twelfth century as a renaissance (in *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century,* 1927).[6] Haskins opposed the notion of renaissance articulated by Jacob Burkhardt (*Die Geschichte der Renaissance in Italien*, 1867), for whom renaissance was revival of classicism, budding secularity, and the mother of modernity. Haskins' renaissance was inseparable from religious thought and tended toward innovation upon the classics rather than their close adherence.[7]

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[5] For a brief but insightful survey of these and other features, see John Cotts, *Europe's Long Twelfth Century: Order, Anxiety, and Adaptation, 1095–1229* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[6] For a historiographical narrative of the notion of renaissance, see Alex Novikoff, "The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century before Haskins," *Haskins Society Journal* 16 (2005): 104–116; "Introduction," *The Twelfth-Century Renaissance: A Reader,* ed. Alex Novikoff (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), xv–xxii. For Haskins, see *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927); *The Rise of the Universities* (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1923).

[7] For Haskins' divergence from Burkhardt, see Robert Benson and Giles Constable, "Introduction," *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century,* ed. Robert Benson, Giles Constable (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), xx–xxix. Another recent collection that takes a nuanced view toward the

Some have embraced the optimism of Haskins' account in narrower fields. For the rising school culture, Richard Southern offered a strong account and defense of medieval humanism with a distinct character to that of early modern humanism. The humanism of the schools (or "scholastic humanism") had four features: dignity of human nature, introspective inquiry, friendship between humanity and God, and the intelligibility of the natural order.[8] Southern's scholastic humanism bore within it the seeds of its own later dissolution, yet it initiated an intellectual revolution that unfolded a widespread political, social, and doctrinal order for medieval Europe.[9]

Few scholars are willing to discard the notion of this renaissance, but very many have wished to expose the hidden complications and ragged edges apparently occluded by the optimistic outlook.[10] A more pessimistic view of twelfth-century humanism appears in the work of C. Stephen Jaeger. Contrary to Southern's assessment of "scholastic humanism" as a development, Jaeger viewed the twelfth century as a decay and decline from the oral culture of letters and virtue-formation in the tenth- and

changes and shifts that occurred in the twelfth century is *European Transformations: The Long Twelfth Century*, ed. Thomas F. X. Noble, John Van Engen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012).

[8] Richard Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, Volume I: Foundations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 22–35; "Medieval Humanism," *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 29–60.

[9] Southern, *Scholastic Humanism,* I.34–35, 45–57.

More recently Peter Dinzelbacher has offered a stark argument for an optimistic assessment of broad-sweeping twelfth-century trends. Rather than focusing on an aspect (e.g., intellectual or political), Dinzelbacher compared structural or climatic qualities with earlier medieval culture. He summarized his basic claims in this way: "The mental patterns of existence in the early middle ages seem to be characterized rather by a lack of movement, animation, progression, if compared with the following period which, on the contrary, shows rather a tendency to a more dynamic, innovative, progressive mental climate, and so on." See Peter Dinzelbacher, *Structures and Origins of the Twelfth-Century 'Renaissance'* (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 2017), 185.

[10] John Cotts, *Europe's Long Twelfth Century: Order, Anxiety, and Adaptation, 1095–1229* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

eleventh-century cathedral school networks. In Jaeger's view, the twelfth century witnessed a "new learning" that supplanted that old culture by contradicting its charismatic authoritative teachers. Those opposing the "new learning"—such as Hugh of Saint-Victor and Bernard of Clairvaux—are conservatives who sought to freeze the fading old learning in their schools.[11]

It is no wonder that both optimistic elements and pessimistic signs may coexist in a nuanced historical narrative. To view twelfth-century figures as conservators of a fading "old learning" risks reducing their own creative innovations to mere nostalgic holdovers. Hugh of Saint-Victor and John of Salisbury—as this study will show—were not simply products of the "old learning." They presented their own creative and distinctive pedagogies to answer the needs they perceived in their time. Yet the new school culture did witness the passing and fading of certain elements. One account that holds such a nuanced balance is the study of Willemien Otten on the conceptualization of a semidivine *natura* in dialogue with humanity and God. This "theologizing" was not doctrinal but constituted a humanism characterized by a fragile, dialogical, and intimate interaction between humanity, *natura*, and God. This humanism, though, unwound as humanity found itself pitted against *natura*, no longer as allies but assailants.[12]

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[11] C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950–1200* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1994); "Pessimism in the Twelfth-Century 'Renaissance,' " *Speculum* 78.4 (2003): 1151–83.

[12] Willemien Otten, *Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 1–44, especially 3–8. For another measured treatment, see R. N. Swanson, *The Twelfth-Century Renaissance* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1999).

At its most basic, a pessimistic historiographical narrative may be said to place emphasis on something being lost while an optimistic account gives weight to something being added (or at least, its possibility of gain). By their choice in priority, both are evaluative. The present study will avoid strong evaluative judgments—either strong optimism or pessimism. For as complex a phenomenon as the twelfth century presents, a nuanced approach that acknowledges both loss and gain is best. I will not prioritize the twelfth century either by aspects of decline or by dazzling humanistic peaks, both relative to a larger narrative reaching back to previous centuries or looking forward (for example to the Italian renaissance). Rather, this study will focus on creative or innovative pedagogies.

By innovative, I mean the creative efforts to remedy perceived ailments by revising theories and practices. As I will argue, that changing landscape set the stage for teachers to experiment with various pedagogical methods and to struggle among themselves as to whose experimental teaching was superior. Insofar as the focus here is on innovation and experimentation, I must acknowledge an element of optimism may be detected in the framing of the study. However, the emphasis lay upon the change and contrast *among innovators*, one with and against another. The study takes none of the four highlighted thinkers here as the hero, the prized or valorized position.[13] We should avoid any

[13] The reader may doubt this assessment and regard Hugh of Saint-Victor, who alone receives two chapters, as the champion of the narrative. However, Hugh's extra space in treatment is necessary to frame him as reacting to the contemporary culture, not as a conservative holding on to a prior culture, and to give the contours of his career-long pedagogical project, which encompasses nearly all his many writings.

temptation to fall into opposition of novel and innovative approaches against traditional or established means. The study does not aim to pit the innovators against the old familiars. The old narrative that opposes innovative or liberal Abelard against authoritarian or conservative Bernard has not yet been laid to rest. Those in the Parisian milieu, including Abelard, Hugh, Lombard, and John, each innovated in their pedagogical methods. That is, each provided preexisting ideas and practices in a new mixture with their modified ideas and practicies. Despite the rhetorical temptation to characterize oneself as a defender of old ways (in this aspect, John is notable) against callow, meddling upstarts, none of them can be said to represent the 'old ways.' The landscape and school culture they inhabited was already far removed from that of their grandfathers' youth.

Optimistically or not, scholars have long noted this new emerging school culture of the late eleventh and early twelfth century. Indeed, the emerging schools have often been seen as the engine of the "renaissance" of that century. This notion, together with the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century restructuring and reforms of modern universities, made investigation of the origins of the universities attractive. Heinrich Denifle founded the modern study of the medieval universities with his works: *Die Entstehung der Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400* (1885) and his edition of the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (1889–1891).[14] Denifle's focus was on the specifically

[14] Heinrich Denifle, *Die Universitäten des Mittelalters,* Volume I: *Die Enstehung der Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400* (Berlin, 1885); ed. Denifle and E. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis parisiensis* 2 vols. (Paris, 1889–1891).

institutional formation of the *universitas.* In this institutional focus, Hastings Rashdall followed suit, examining the diverse formations of the famous and prominent *studia generalia* and *universitates* of Europe in his monumental *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (1895).[15] Denifle and Rashdall narrated histories of the masters of the *universitas* as they sought to carve out a semiautonomous institutional standing by negotiating between the ecclesiastical and political powers, especially between crown and mitre.[16]

The institutional history has found grounding in the study of the persons and social conditions of the masters and students who comprised the schools. Jacques Le Goff argued that in the masters we find the "birth of the intellectual" in whose social and economic role was an "artisan of the mind" who was a theoretic worker who potentially stood apart from and criticized social norms.[17] Jacques Verger in a similar line has done much to plant the masters and schools in their social, urban, commercial, and political landscapes.[18] Developing an understanding of the social and material conditions of

[15] Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1885).
[16] Gaines Post (†), *The Papacy and the Rise of the Universities* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).
[17] Jacques Le Goff, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages*, trans. T. L. Fagan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 61–64, 23–24, 35–37, 43–46.
[18] See Jacques Verger, *Les universités au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1973); *Culture, enseignement et société en Occident aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1999). For other treatments also informed by social history, see *A History of the University in Europe: Volume 1, Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. Hilde de Ridder-Symoens, Walter Ruëgg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); *Les universités et la ville au Moyen Âge: Cohabitation et tension,* ed. Patrick Gilli, Jacques Verger, Daniel Le Blévec (Leiden: Brill, 2007). Significant work has also appeared that links the changes in school culture to the broader movements for ecclesial reforms during this period. See Giles Constable, *The Reformation of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Van Engen, "The Twelfth Century: Reading, Reason, and Revolt in a World of Custom," *European Transformations: The Long Twelfth Century*, ed. Thomas F. X. Noble, John Van Engen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 17–44.

schools, scholars have shed much light on the techniques, textbooks, and activities in the schools of the later universities.[19] In this light, the schools have attracted attention as sorts of textual communities and the sites of developing cultural forms.[20]

This attention to the material and cultural landscape is most welcome, as is the study of the specific teaching tools and techniques of the universities. In comparison, little attention has highlighted the *pedagogies* that animated the reading and lessons of the schools. Scholarship on the institutional, political, social, and cultural landscapes of medieval learning is invaluable. There is need for the spirit that animates that body: why was each element taught, and for what larger project? What sort of person or skills were the courses inculcating? The schools effectively reformulated and reinvented the liberal arts tradition that stretched back to antiquity—what was their aim or goal in that reinvention?

Yet before proceeding further in the historiographical narrative, we need a moment to define pedagogy. Many things are written for the instruction of another: either a peer writing a peer (such as a letter of admonishment or exhortation), a social superior writing an inferior (such as a teacher or bishop writing to students or a flock), and even an inferior writing to one of superior rank (such as a student writing to the teacher, a

[19] The scholarship in these volumes evinces these perspectives: *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century,* ed. Robert Benson, Giles Constable (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval University,* ed. John Van Engen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000).

[20] *Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe, 1100–1500*, ed. Constant Mews, John Crossley (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011); Alex Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

member of a flock writing to a bishop or a subject to a rule). The great majority of such texts that aim to teach are what we should call *didactic*. They employ rhetorical principles and argumentation as well, as they are able to convey and persuade their reader of particular lessons. Pedagogy, on the other hand, is not only the attempt to teach but also the theoretical and practical discussion about how and what to teach. Didacticism is not the practical aspect of pedagogy, for didacticism presumes both an implicit pedagogical theory and practical techniques. Pedagogy is encompassing not only the theoretical questions (including what ought to be taught, for what ends, and to whom) but also the technical questions behind teaching (including by what means and what methods). Pedagogy, then, is a sort of methodology, a meta-didacticism, that is, not a lesson to be included in the teaching but a discussion about teaching. Adopting this concept of pedagogy as a methodology, in order to examine the pedagogies of the schools it is not sufficient to ask about the content of the lessons but primarily the aims and intentions of the master.

Among those have already treated the pedagogical character of the new schools, the work of Richard Southern and Stephen Jaeger has already come into view here—the former seeing a new humanistic spirit emerge in scholasticism, the latter seeing the humanism of the old learning overcome by scholasticism. Stephen Ferruolo sought the roots of the institution of the Paris university primarily in the developing pedagogical models and ideals of the Parisian masters through the twelfth century.[21] Ferruolo focused

[21] Cf. Stephen Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and their Critics, 1100–1215* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1985).

on key figures' animating ideas as a corrective to the tendency that risks reducing the formation of the *universitas* to a product of political, ecclesial, or economic pressures. The university for Ferruolo was the product of shared "higher educational ideals" among the Parisian scholars.[22]

Ferruolo's focus on the aims and ideas of the masters has much merit. However, as Constant Mews has persuasively argued, a shared intellectual synthesis and community was a never-realized ideal. Rather, "effective learning actually took place within a range of different schools and communities, each keen to develop its own intellectual synthesis."[23] Rather than trying to identify shared educational ideals, Mews drew upon Brian Stock's notion of 'textual communities' to set out a vision of rival, jostling 'communities of learning' competing in the Paris milieu.[24]

Mews' critique is well-taken. Rather than looking for a consensus or synthesis of educational models, curriculum, or ideals, we ought to seek the debates and points of tension that mark off different schools of thought from one another. To clarify the debated points and open questions in any discourse is to shed light on larger programs and stakes at play. If we can recognize the pedagogical questions and recognize the opposed educational position in debate, we can better grasp the animating ideas and aims of the

[22] Ferruolo, *Origins,* 8.
[23] Constant Mews, "Communities of Learning and the Dream of Synthesis: The Schools and Colleges of Thirteenth-Century Paris," *Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe, 1100–1500* ed. C. J. Mews, J. N. Crossley (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2011), 111.
[24] Cf. Brian Stock, *The Implications of Literacy* (NY: Princeton University Press, 1987); Mews, "Communities," 110–11.

teachers—much more than merely pointing to the points wherein they usually happened to agree.

This study conducts such a needed examination of the pedagogical debates. However, to seek out pedagogical debates of the thirteenth century is already too late. Much of the curriculum and institution of the schools have solidified invisibly in the practices of the *universitas.* Particularly for Paris, the pedagogical practices and thought of the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries rely on the pedagogical debates in the formative decades of the late eleventh century and early twelfth century. Yet when Abelard, Hugh, Peter, and John flourished, pedagogical experiments animated the schools. Each of these teachers faced the challenge and opportunity presented by this experimental educational landscape; their innovative pedagogical thought was their response.[25]

The educational landscapes of the tenth and early eleventh centuries are notoriously obscure. Very few written records or reports survive to shine a light on what took place within the classroom or what the teachers sought to accomplish.[26] The schools

[25] Excellent scholarship has highlighted the rhetoric of *antiqui* and *moderni*, which took on greater weight in the mid-twelfth century as masters or teachers sought to differentiate themselves from other perceived groups. See M.-D. Chenu, "Notes de lexicographie philosophique médiévale: Antiqui, Moderni," *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 17.1 (1928): 82–94; *Antiqui und Moderni: Traditionsbewußtsein und Fortschrittsbewußtsein im späten Mittelalter*, ed. Albert Zimmermann, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 9 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974); Hans Robert Jauss, "Modernity and Literary Tradition," *Critical Inquiry* 31.2 (2005): 329–64, 334–39. This treatment has not focused on this dichotomizing rhetoric because it comes to fruition after the main period in question, and because of the threat that it would foreclose the treatment of a figure by predetermining whether they are an *antiquus* or *modernus,* and so making them a partisan.
[26] Stephen Jaeger offered the hypothesis that the dearth of sources results from an oral rather than a written culture that prevailed in the schools. Such an oral culture may have prevailed then, but then again, the twelfth-century school also operated upon orality and many sources survive for those schools. See Jaeger, *Envy of Angels,* 1–7.

maintained by Roman civil magistrates had long since disappeared. Carolingian decrees placed the responsibility of maintaining schools upon bishops and monasteries.[27] Intellectual centers were not yet established. The fame or prestige of individual schoolmasters would shine as a beacon for a time at this or that school, attracting students. After their decease, their school might sink out of sight. Stephen Jaeger has persuasively argued that the prevailing aim of these early schools was the cultivation of *mores,* both morals and manners. Reading, lecturing, and composition evinces the school education as much as the letters that students wrote exhibiting their affection for their former teachers and the discipline imparted by them.[28] While sparse documentation of the early schools makes comparison difficult, twelfth-century innovators will keep an eye toward both the moral and intellectual aspects, each offering their own approach toward integrating the two aspects.

The late eleventh and early twelfth century contain formative decades because of the emergence of a school culture that burst the strictures of existing educational networks. This period witnessed a revitalization in agriculture, reurbanization and growth of towns, and emergence of commercial trades and classes. In the midst of improving material conditions, more opportunities appeared for the young and ambitious to seek education and more possibilities offered to the educated socially mobile

[27] Pierre Riché, *Les Écoles et l'Enseignement dans l'Occident Chrétien de la Fin du Ve siècle au milieu du XIe siècle* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1979), 65–79, 162–86. See chapter 2, section 2 for discussion of these schools.
[28] See Jaeger, *Envy of Angels,* 1–195 (Part I).

employment.[29] The dominant schools had been at monasteries (either internal or external schools) or the schools that bishops were mandated to maintain and supervise. Now with more students seeking masters, masters could set up their schools independent of episcopal jurisdiction. As Richard Southern has pointed out, Paris was a city where the bishop effectively conceded the monopoly on teaching.[30] The result in Paris was the emergence of a cluster of independent schools. Multiple schools—rather than one cathedral school—attracted more students to Paris; conversely, more masters intending to set up their own school might do so at Paris. By this sort of cyclical, self-amplifying pattern, a different school culture emerged in Paris and its environs.

The four thinkers of this study figure prominently in that emerging Parisian school culture in the early decades of the twelfth century: Peter Abelard, Hugh of Saint-Victor, Peter Lombard, and John of Salisbury. Initially, these four had little in common: Abelard was from Brittany, to the east; Hugh from Saxony, to the west; Peter Lombard from Italy, to the south; and John of Salisbury was an Englishman from the north. Yet they all four emigrated to Paris and shared its background: Abelard arrived in the first years of the twelfth century and taught in its schools as a young, ambitious scholar and again in the decade before his death in the 1130s. Hugh arrived sometime later to the Abbey of Saint-Victor just outside of the southern walls of Paris and taught at that increasingly

[29] Jacques Verger furnishes a brief and useful introduction to this social and economic context in *La renaissance du XIIe siècle* (Paris: Cerf, 1996), 39–55. See also Peter Moraw's chapter "Careers of Graduates," *A History of the University in Europe*, ed. Ridder-Symoens, I.244–79.
[30] Richard Southern, "The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres," in *Renaissance and Reform in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert Benson, Giles Constable (MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 113–37.

prestigious school through the 1120s until his death in 1141. Peter Lombard arrived at Saint-Victor in 1134 or 1136 with a letter of introduction from Bernard of Clairvaux and carved out a notable career in that city, culminating in his elevation to the Parisian bishopric. John of Salisbury likewise arrived around 1136 to study at Mont-Sainte-Geneviève and spent twelve years studying and teaching in Paris before departing to serve as secretary to Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury. These four all share the Parisian experience: each was deeply imbued with the new school culture of Paris; each taught in Paris (or outside its walls); for each this Parisian experience was decisive in the formation of their own pedagogical thought.

Not only do the four share this experience of Parisian school culture, their mutual relations make them an apt set for comparison. In the 1130s, then, both Abelard and Hugh were established and prestigious teachers, holding lessons at their schools—Abelard at Mont-Sainte-Geneviève and Hugh at Saint-Victor—when Peter Lombard and John of Salisbury arrived as eager young students. Peter and John were part of a younger generation that sat at the feet of the elder Abelard and Hugh (many of them likely having traveled to Paris expressly to hear them). Peter studied at Saint-Victor under Hugh, and John at Mont-Sainte-Geneviève under Abelard. Their own pedagogical thought bears the marks of their teacher, though without slavishness. Their creativity and innovation appear in their pedagogical revisions, including incorporating or synthesizing elements of the pedagogies of their master's rival: Peter evincing knowledge of Abelard and John of Hugh. This set, then, comprises a group highly apt for a study of pedagogical debate:

Abelard and Hugh represent rival pedagogies, and their two most famous students evince a second generation's evolution of that debate, each now offering their own pedagogy that includes creative synthesis of their teacher's and the other's teacher's thought.

What is at stake in this study of twelfth-century pedagogy? Why should we adopt this approach? The more we recognize the wide variety of pedagogical experimentation in the early twelfth century, the more narratives of triumph or cultural decline dissipate. Abelard, Hugh, Lombard, and John were not caught between a binary of old against new, but in a wider landscape of possibilities.

Secondly, we ought to examine this school culture in terms of its pedagogical shifts. Pedagogy for the twelfth-century masters was not an alien concern or low-priority issue. Instead, it was in the crucible of their teaching and pedagogy that they each developed and refined their thought. The figures of the twelfth century—particularly Abelard, Hugh, and Lombard—have received much attention for their opinions or conclusions on various topics. For example, Abelard is famous on logical and philosophical topics, or on the Trinity, atonement, and others.[31] Yet the presentation and formulations of famous thoughts did not occur in a vacuum. They are not insights

[31] The bibliography on Abelard is extensive, so only two notable recent instances of contemporary scholarship must suffice. These are not singled out for critique—they are excellent and responsible works of scholarship—only useful references for a curious reader. For philosophica,l historical, and contemporary treatments, see John Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions: A Twelfth-Century Philosopher in His Context and Ours* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013); for a contemporary analysis of Abelard's atonement theory, see Nicholas Lombardo, *The Father's Will: Christ's Crucifixion and the Goodness of God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

emerging from abstract or merely theoretical contemplation. Rather, they emerged from the schoolroom. Abelard's, Hugh's, Lombard's, and—to a lesser extent—John's thinking occured in the classroom, where the masters articulated their viewpoints or struggled to answer a question to students' satisfaction. The requirements of teaching drove these masters to develop their thought for effective and excellent presentation and understanding. To appreciate the intellectual innovations of these masters' texts, one must recognize the pedagogical practices that produced them and the pedagogical function intended for them.

Third, this study presents not just an individual teacher in the twelfth century, but the debate among four of its most prominent and interrelated teachers. The pedagogical aspects of each, that is, of Abelard, Hugh, Lombard, and John, have received treatment. However, these treatments are often individual and isolated from their pedagogical milieu. This study springs from the recognition that these four teachers worked in mutual relationship and that their pedagogical thought represents a kind of debate among them. Only by setting them together does that debate appear at last. By recognizing the debate between Abelard, Hugh, Lombard, and John, we can recognize what were the issues at stake *for the masters.* What were the pressing questions they faced and contested? As already discussed, the transitions that occur in the school culture of the twelfth century are pivotal in medieval European history. In these three ways, by looking within the debate that occured within that shifting educational culture, we can have a better understanding of the changing pedagogical character of those schools.

What, then, emerges as the contested points and debated questions? There is significant evidence that the idea of natural or inborn talent or *ingenium* played a prominent role. Talent (a topic discussed under different terms and notions, including φὐσις, or *ingenium,* or *natura*) had already received a place in the classical discourses among philosophers and among rhetoricians.[32] Early twelfth-century thinkers were already discussing *ingenium* in terms of the creative imagination that combined sense perceptions in new ways. Masters at Paris began discussing *ingenium* in terms of humanity's ability to discover truth and as a kind of requisite for success in the increasingly competitive schools. One thinker in particular who championed his own *ingenium* as a way to legitimize his right to teach, and who exercised it in order to win a reputation, attracting students to hear him teaching, was Peter Abelard. Abelard differentiated his teaching from others' teaching by his reliance upon a God-given talent through quick dialectical wit. By his reputation and performance of ingenuous answers, Abelard established a new sort of teaching.[33]

Located quite near to Abelard's school but outside the Paris walls was the new Abbey of Saint-Victor. Abbot Gilduin appointed Hugh master of its school, and Hugh devoted his career to working out a wide-encompassing pedagogical program for the canons and exterior students. Hugh criticized the talent-reliance schools of Paris for haphazard and disordered teaching that produced no progress. Instead, he argued for a thorough plan of reading with mnemonic techniques to retain the principles of what was

[32] See Chapter 2, section 3.
[33] See Chapter 2.

learned. Alongside the student's intellect, he also sought to form their affect through closely regulated discipline aiming toward mutual charity in a pedagogical community. Hugh's last great work was his *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith*, with which he intended to culminate this program, but in the course of composing it, even Hugh found himself liable to tendencies of the Parisian milieu, citing named authorities, proceeding with answering questions, and engaging in dialectical disputation.[34]

Peter Lombard began his career at Paris by staying at Saint-Victor, and he most likely heard Hugh's lessons in his last years. However, Lombard did not commit to Hugh's program. He entered the canonry instead of the cathedral, in the heart of Paris and of its educational center. There he established himself as a prestigious teacher. For his lessons, he devoted himself not to a Hugonic curricular plan but rather to a textbook, his *Four Books of Sentences.* After repeated revisions, his *Sentences* became his standard course. Unlike Hugh and Abelard, Peter did not explain his pedagogical principles—they must be inferred from his practice. His *Sentences* evince a concern for inculcating respect for the authorities and the virtues of diligence, humility, and piety in his readers.[35]

While we know comparably little about Lombard's early career in Paris, John left a detailed account of his diverse teachers and studies for nearly twelve years. After studying with the giants of his time, John then left the schools and occupied himself with administrative and diplomatic duties for the archiepiscopate of Canterbury. John evinced

[34] See Chapters 3–4.
[35] See Chapter 5.

persistent concerns with pedagogy in his earlier writings; these concerns culminated in *Metalogicon.* In *Metalogicon*, John articulated a synthesis of Abelardian pedagogical elements (focus on dialectic and the arts for the refinement of one's talent) with Hugonic themes (necessity of progress and moral formation). For John, however, the liberal arts equip one practically to recognize probable truth and morally to remember virtue and avert from vice.[36]

[36] See Chapter 6.

# Part I

## Chapter 2:

## Peter Abelard and a Teacher's Talent in Early Twelfth-Century Schools

One morning in 1117, a great crowd of Parisians—the "whole city," according to report—gathered outside the house of a popular and famous teacher, Peter Abelard. "It is difficult, rather impossible to express their stunned surprise, their laments that cast them down, their cry that vexed me, their wailing in which they mixed. Clerics especially and most of all my students tormented me with their unbearable laments and wailings."[37] They grieved with Abelard that the previous night he had been attacked by Fulbert, a canon of the cathedral, for a perceived dishonor to his niece Heloise. Abelard and Heloise had a famous love affair and married, but now Fulbert feared that Abelard planned to shunt her off to a convent.[38] As a result of his castration, Abelard gave up his school in the city, put on the habit of a Benedictine monk, and entered the famous and wealthy monastery of St. Denis. This disaster effectively ended Abelard's first period of teaching in an open school in Paris. Though he would resume teaching here and again in his years of monastic misadventures, he would not return to Paris to resume teaching at this old school on Mont-Ste-Geneviève until the early 1130s, almost twenty years later.

Most telling in Abelard's later account of this milestone was the centrality of his humiliation, the damage done to his reputation. "I felt my disgrace more than my wound and I was afflicted more than pain by shame. I realized how my glory had recently shone

[37] Ed. David Luscombe, *The Letter Collection of Abelard and Heloise* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013), *Letter I*.30.
[38] For an account of this affair, see Constant Mews, *The Lost Love Letters of Heloise and Abelard: Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France* (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 29–40; cf. *Historia*, §17–31.

and that in a simple and foul misfortune it was cast down, rather thoroughly extinguished."[39] The scandal of his castration—following as it did upon his illicit affair—dogged his career afterward. His later autobiographical *History of My Calamities* aimed to restore his reputation by self-incrimination and exhibition of repentant humility.[40] Only a few years before (around 1113–14), Abelard had returned to Paris at the height of his reputation and fame. His school teemed with eager students, drawn by the report of his brilliance, to hear his arresting and engaging teaching. Though he retired from the schools, his students were not finished with him and followed him seeking instruction. When he returned to teach openly in his old Parisian school in the 1130s, his lessons were as popular as ever.

A key factor in the success of Master Peter Abelard's school was his careful pedagogical strategy. This chapter will examine the goals and methods of Abelard's pedagogy as a response to the challenges posed by the transitions of twelfth-century schools. First, I shall offer a very brief overview of Abelard's life and career as a contextual foundation for his educational thought. Secondly, the chapter will expand to the larger context of the challenge of legitimacy posed to would-be masters in twelfth century and the role of reputation as a potential solution. Given that Abelard's talent-reliant method stands in front of evolving notions of talent (*ingenium*), I sketch received notions of talent up to Abelard's time. With that heritage in view, I shall then offer an account of how

[39] *Historia*, §30: "Et plus erubescenciam quam plagam sentirem, et pudore magis quam dolore affligerer. Occurrebat animo quanta modo gloria pollebam, quam facili et turpi casu hec humiliata, immo penitus esset extincta."
[40] Michael Clanchy, *Abelard: A Medieval Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 67.

Master Peter described his dependence on inborn talent for wielding dialectic to unlock problems and to answer questions extemporaneously in his schoolroom, as well as the critical principles he theorized for that method. This method of dialectical teaching was in no way inimical to faith but rather fit into Abelard's view of Christian life, even monastic life. Finally, I shall argue that Abelard's deployment of *ingenium* to navigate the schools left a mark on that milieu; contemporaries marked it, and *ingenium* as a human power was a common topic to treat in the schools as well as perceived as a necessary quality for those hoping for scholarly success.

## I. A Controversial Life

Born around 1079, Abelard's family was of knightly rank, but instead of instead of pursuing an aristocratic career, Peter Abelard entered the schools.[41] His first teacher was Roscelin of Compèigne, a figure under disrepute for his trinitarian thought. Later, Abelard sought out William of Champeaux, a famous teacher of rhetoric and dialectic in Paris. Yet Abelard famously disputed with William on several occasions and eventually set up his own schools outside Paris (in Melun, then Corbeil, ca. 1103) in rivalry to William's. He initiated further disputes with William and William's protegés and reported his triumph. He settled into teaching at the Abbey of Mont-Ste-Geneviève. Hitherto, Abelard had specialized in dialectic; in 1113, about a decade after opening his first school, he departed for Laon, where the reputation of its cathedral-school master,

[41] *Historia*, §1; Michael Clanchy's biographical work remains an important discussion for the various aspects of Abelard's life. See *Abelard: A Medieval Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). A newer account is offered in James Burge's *Heloise and Abelard: A New Biography* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).

the venerable Anselm of Laon, drew him to study the sacred page. However, Abelard reported being unimpressed by Anselm, and when Abelard began independent lessons on sacred scripture, Anselm sent Abelard away. Abelard returned to Paris, where he resumed teaching dialectic as well as now topics on the sacred page. Soon after, Abelard began his clandestine love affair with Heloise, a brilliant and well-educated niece of Canon Fulbert. After their discovery, Heloise ended up in the convent at Argenteuil, and Abelard donned the monastic habit and entered the prominent monastery of St. Denis, near Paris. So ended the first period of Abelard's Parisian teaching career (ca. 1103–17).

Peter Abelard embraced the monastic life but had a string of misadventures. In 1121, he was brought before a regional synod, the Council of Soissons, where he was condemned and forced to burn his book, *Theologia Summi Boni* (which he called his "treatment of theology on the divine Unity and Trinity").[42] After a brief monastic imprisonment, he returned to St. Denis. Shortly after, however, he was forced to flee St. Denis after disputing the authenticity of the claim that the prestigious abbey's founder was Dionysius of Athens, converted by the apostle Paul (Acts 17). He later obtained permission to live elsewhere and founded a new oratory to the south near Troyes, which he named Paraclete (after the Holy Spirit). Abelard had resumed teaching in St. Denis and continued to do so at Paraclete to support himself.

After a few years (by 1128), Abelard was elected abbot of St. Gildas-de-Rhuys, an abbey in Brittany. However, his vision of monastic life clashed with those of his monks,

[42] *Historia*, §35: "theologie tractatum de unitate et trinitate divina."

and his abbacy was troubled. It is not clear how long Abelard persisted at St. Gildas, but he abandoned it likely around 1131. In that year, Abelard traveled to meet Pope Innocent II on his visit to France. With Innocent, Abelard confirmed the transfer of the Paraclete to now-Abbess Heloise and her community of nuns, who had been evicted from Argenteuil. In that same year, Abelard likely returned to Paris to begin his last period of formal teaching at Ste, Geneviève in Paris.

The decade of the 1130s was an especially productive time.[43] His writings include his epistolary *History of My Calamities* and the subsequent letters, *Rule*, sermons, and liturgical texts to Heloise and for her sisters at the Paraclete. Back in his magisterial chair, several more *reportationes* emerge from this period. The *Commentary on Romans* likely dates from this period. His *Ethics or Know Thyself* (*Scito teipsum*) and third theology, *Theologia scholarium*, also emerged from this period. This *Theology* prompted William of St. Thierry to begin an investigation into Abelard's theological opinions. After an energetic campaign against him led by Bernard of Clairvaux, the regional Council of Sens (1141) condemned propositions ascribed to Abelard. Abelard appealed to the pope and found refuge on his journey to Rome under the Cluniac reformer, Peter the Venerable. After a short illness, Peter Abelard died on April 21, 1142. He left a legacy of intellectual acuity amid the shifting trajectories of the schools.

[43] Marenbon lays out a nice treatment of these works and the evidence for their authorship and dating. See *Four Dimensions: A Twelfth-Century Philosopher in His Context and Ours* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 28–38; cf. Mews, "On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 52 (1985): 73–134.

Abelard was one of many students and masters, but it was his controversies that transform him into a window onto the transitions of teaching and learning of his time. The records and comments on his controversies allow us to see not only the challenges faced by would-be teachers but also Abelard's own pedagogical strategy for success within his changing milieu. To that milieu in transition and the challenges it posed, we turn in the next section.

## II. Reputation and Rivalry among Masters

Schooling and the processes of education in the early twelfth century were undergoing rapid transitions. Masters such as Abelard caught in these transitions faced the challenges of warranting or legitimizing their teaching in the changing culture of learning. Abelard's response to these challenges was to legitimize his teaching by establishing his reputation for brilliance through practicing contests of questions with rival masters.

Previously, under Carolingian decrees, monasteries were to support external schools and bishops were responsible for maintaining and supervising a master for their cathedral school.[44] These monastic and cathedral schools varied greatly and depended largely upon the supervisor's (abbot or bishop) commitment to the school and the availability of a capable master. Formal credentials for teaching (*licentia docendi*, a license for teaching) would await the latter twelfth century. As a result, bishops, abbots, and

[44]Pierre Riché, *Les Écoles et l'Enseignement dans l'Occident Chrétien de la Fin du Ve siècle au milieu du XIe siècle* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1979), 65–79, 162–186.

canons had to resort to their own means in making their appointments.[45] Once appointed, a schoolmaster (*scholasticus*, *grammaticus*, *magister scholarum*, etc.) might wield great authority in their school or even town.[46] No doubt many anonymous and unremarkable masters left little or no historical mark. However, Master Anselm of Laon, who directed a most prestigious school until his death in 1117, exhibits some of the master's potential. In a contentious episcopal election, the aged Anselm navigated dangerous waters while objecting to an apparently simoniacal election. Yet he maintained an impeccable reputation and appears to have won the trust of the newly elected Bishop Gaudry, who later had Anselm accompany him to England on business.[47] Later, when the citizens of Laon rose and attempted bloodily to establish a commune, many nobles and aristocrats were slain. Anselm and his canons not only escaped unscathed but also met the rioters afterward and gained concessions to bury the victims.[48] The basis of a master's authority might derive in part from ecclesiastical office. However, we should note that at Laon aristocratic and episcopal rank did not save Gaudry and others, while Anselm, master and cathedral dean, even retained influence with the rebellious citizens.

[45] Specifically, Lateran III in 1179. See Nicole Gonthier, *Éducation et Cultures dans l'Europe Occidentale Chrétienne (de XIIe au Milieu de Xve Siècle)* (Paris: Ellipses, 1998), 121–22.
[46] On the vocabulary applied to the masters, see Riché, *Écoles*, 195; on the master's authority, see Riché, *Écoles*, 197.
[47] See Guibert of Nogent, *De vita sua* III.4; cf. *A Monk's Confession: The Memoirs of Guibert of Nogent*, trans. Paul Archambault (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 130–135; cf. Suzanne LeVere, *Out of the Cloister: Scholastic Exegesis of the Song of Songs,* 1100–1250 (Leiden: EJ Brill, 2016), 8–10; cf. C. Warren Hollister, Amanda Frost, *Henry I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 432–33.
[48] Guibert, III.8–10; *Monk's Confession*, 153–63.

Much more effective than office was the fame or reputation of the master.[49] Guibert attributed Anselm's prestige to his learning: "[He was] a light for the liberal arts and tranquil morals for all France and indeed for the Latin world."[50] A school with a respected and capable master went far to legitimize and authorize its students. Stephen Jaeger has argued that the cathedral schools of the tenth and eleventh centuries especially depended upon the authoritative presence of the master to cultivate students in letters and morals. The educated exhibited their refinement through their morals (or manners), their literary ability, and through their attachment to their teacher. [51] The products of monastic and cathedral schools might have retained the prestige of their teachers within smaller intellectual networks. Yet in this era, students and masters rapidly outgrew these prior institutions and networks. As Guibert of Nogent attested (in 1121), during his childhood (ca. 1060s) there was a shortage of teachers even in towns and cities. Even when found, these grammarians, Guibert reported, were incompetent and "could not be compared to the wandering clerics of the present."[52] By contrast, in the 1120s, William of Conches and

[49] Michael Clanchy concluded that rank and fame were both essential for a master's authority: "Academic fame, which attracted international students to his city, and his ecclesiastical offices, which entitled him to discipline the local clergy." See Clanchy, *Abelard*, 73.

[50] Guibert of Nogent, *De vita sua* III.4 (PL 156.912D); "Cum igitur omnes assensum in ejus susceptione dedissent, solus magister Ansellus, vir totius Franciae, imo latini orbis lumen in liberalibus disciplinis, ac tranquillis moribus, ab ejus electione dissentit." Cf. *Monk's Confession*, 130. Abelard likewise acknowledged the prestigious fame of Anselm of Laon (*Historia* 10–11).

[51] Though this account fails to capture the developments of the twelfth century, Stephen Jaeger's *Envy of Angels* gives a compelling reading for these qualities in cathedral schools of the tenth and eleventh centuries. See *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950–1200* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 36–195. For individual portraits of famous masters see Cora Lutz, *Schoolmasters of the Tenth Century* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1977).

[52] Guibert of Nogent *De vita sua*, PL 156.844A–B; "Erat paulo ante id temporis, et adhuc partim sub meo tempore tanta grammaticorum charitas, ut in oppidis pene nullus, in urbibus vix aliquis reperiri potuisset, et quos inveniri contigerat, eorum scientia tenuis erat, nec etiam moderni temporis clericulis vagantibus comparari poterat." Cf. *A Monk's Confession: The Memoirs of Guibert of Nogent*, trans. Paul Archambault (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 14–15.

Richard L'Évêque were overwhelmed in the overabundance of students and quit teaching, as their pupil John of Salisbury reported.[53] As Richard Southern pointed out, the great increase of students and would-be masters at the close of the eleventh century brought along a detachment of masters from communities:

> In brief, it would seem that the most important, or at least the most distinctive, teaching of the [early twelfth century] period had become deinstitutionalized, detached from the corporate schools of the past and attached to a master who taught wherever he could find a place to teach.[54]

The increased students and the expanding scholarly networks detached not only from prior monastic and cathedral institutions but also from former controls. Earlier, bishops were not only responsible for maintaining a master for the cathedral school but alsooften held a *de facto* monopoly on teaching.[55] As Pierre Riché described it, "To teach, one needed in fact permission of the bishop or the schoolmaster."[56] Yet as schools outgrew their capacities, new independent schools arose. Schools were detaching from specific institutions, but bishops, nobles, and magistrates might still retain geographical jurisdiction over cities and towns. Famous teachers, such as Anselm of Laon, whose office and prestige once permitted them to maintain a local, official monopoly, in teaching might find they could do so no longer.[57]

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[53] John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* I.24.124; "impetu multitudinis imperitae victi cesserunt." Ed. J. B. Hall, *Ioannis Sarisberiensis Metalogicon*, CCCM 98 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1991).
[54] Southern, "The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres," in *Renaissance and Reform in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert Benson, Giles Constable (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 114.
[55] Southern, "Schools," 119–20.
[56] Riché, *Écoles*, 197; "Pour enseigner, il faut en fait l'autorisation de l'évêque ou de l'écolâtre."
[57] Anselm seems to have retained control in Laon longer than others. See Southern, "The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres," in *Renaissance and Reform*, 118–23.

The detachment of scholarly networks from institutions made way for a scholar such as Abelard as he sought to embark upon a teaching career. However, such scholars would also face the challenge of legitimacy: how to gain authority to teach, by office, by learning, or otherwise. One might still need to obtain permission from local authorities to set up a school. Gaining authorities' patronage to teach does not appear to have been difficult for Abelard. He was not lacking in powerful friends. As Jacques Verger noted, Abelard spoke openly about his "envious" enemies but "was much more discreet about his friends."[58] Among his patrons was Stephen of Garland, whose collection of offices, including seneschal, made him a powerful figure in Louis VI's royal court.[59] Early in his career, Abelard depended upon Stephen's protection for his first school at Melun and later at the Abbey of Ste. Geneviève, outside Paris.[60]

With his school at Melun, Abelard's practical obstacle might have been cleared. Instead of pressing his scholarly siege of Paris until he emerged the intellectual champion, might he have been content so early?[61] Abelard realized that his scholarly legitimacy depended upon maintaining his reputation for brilliance. The reason is obscure why Stephen of Garland protected Abelard and allowed him to teach so young, but the Breton's reputed quick wit probably played no small role. Such a burnished reputation served a young scholar to gain magisterial appointment by attracting students. Only a

[58] Jacques Verger, "Abélard et les milieux sociaux de son temps," *Abélard en son Temps* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981), 112; "Il s'agit d'indices ténus car si Abélard nous a parlé abondamment et complaisamment de ses ennemis, de ses 'envieux', il a été beaucoup plus discret sur ses amis."
[59] Verger, "Abélard et les milieux sociaux de son temps," 112–13.
[60] *Historia*, §4-5.
[61] Cf. *Historia*, §4–6.

few years before Abelard arrived in Paris, another teacher rose to prominence on the basis of his reputation. Odo of Orléans eminently directed the school of Tournai for five years (1086–92) before giving it up for the monastic life. After his schooling at Toul, the canons of St. Mary's in Tournai appointed him a master on the basis of his reputation:

> By the time [Odo] was a young man, he had achieved such learning that he was considered second to none of the Frenchmen of his time in scholarship. For this reason, he was better suited for the title of 'master' than that of 'student.' . . . He directed [the school of Tournai] . . . and his reputation spread to such an extent that crowds of different clerics came, not only from France, Flanders, and Normandy, but also from distant and remote Italy, Saxony, and Burgundy. Every day they crowded in to listen to him.[62]

Odo's reputation for learning gained him a master's office and crowds of students. Like Anselm of Laon's, Odo's reputation for morals and character bolstered his standing and authority: "Although Master Odo was justly praised everywhere for his learning, his religious propriety was so great that he was no less celebrated and universally famous for this."[63]

As more scholars competed for appointment and students, scholarly fame and reputation grew increasingly important in weighing rival masters. Teachers were appointedfrom student to master, on the basis of their reputation.[64] Yet when prestigious masters rivaled, a further question arose: by what metric could masters compete? How

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[62] Herman of Tournai, *The Restoration of the Monastery of Saint Martin of Tournai*, trans. Lynn Nelson (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 1996) §1, p. 13; See: *Herimanni liber de restauracione monasterii Sancti Martini Tornacensis* ed. Georg Waitz, *MGH SS* 14: 274-317.

[63] Herman of Tournai, *Restoration* 3.16; cf. 3.17.

[64] Nicole Gonthier has observed the crucial role of reputation for teaching: "Dans le première partie du XIIe siècle, ce titre [maÎtre] s'acquiert par la seule réputation scientifique ou technique du bénéficiaire. C'est cette réputation qui fait accourir auprès de tel ou tel clerc lettré des hommes venus de toute l'Europe avides de s'instruire à leurs lumières." See Nicole Gonthier, *Éducation et Cultures dans l'Europe Occidentale Chrétienne (du XIIe milieu de Xve siècle)* (Paris: Ellipses, 1998) 120.

might students compare and judge between rival, well-reputed masters? Master Odo and his rivals in nearby towns presented this conundrum to Odo's students.

> Master Rainbert who lectured . . . in the town of Lille, was jealous, as were a great many other masters who were not the equals of Odard [Odo]. They criticized his lectures, saying that their own were better. Some of the clerks were confused by this and uncertain as to whom they should believe.[65]

On the dialectical question of universals, Odo was a realist and Rainbert a nominalist. Faced with two masters with gleaming reputations, Odo's students were reportedly baffled how to adjudicate between them. Apparently at their wits' end, one of the canons (by the name of Galbert) resorted to divination: "[Galbert] secretly brought in a deformed deaf-mute who was quite famous in the city of his divination. Galbert began to ask him by signs of his fingers and nods of his head in which of the masters it would be better to believe."[66] The diviner reported that Odo was correct and Rainbert lectured "nothing but windy chatter."[67] This outrageous anecdote may reveal a desperation to judge between masters in the absence of dialectical disputation.[68]

Another collision of masters lies behind the work of the late-eleventh-century renowned master Manegold of Lautenbach. Manegold argued with Wolfhelm of Cologne—as reported in *Liber contra Wolfhelmum* (*Praef.* §2)—regarding the

[65] Herman, *Restoration* 2, 14–15.
[66] Herman, *Restoration* 2, 15.
[67] Herman, ibid. 2, 15.
[68] M. B. Pranger analyzed this strange anecdote as an instance of school culture rooted in rhetoric over against practices of dialectical disputations. See M. B. Pranger, "Anselm Misunderstood: Utopian Approaches towards Learning in the Eleventh Century," Ed. Josef Zumr, Vilém Herold, *The European Dimension of St. Anselm's Thinking: Proceedings of the Conference Organized by the Anselm-Society and the Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic* (Prague: Institut of Philosophy, 1993) 163–86.

trustworthiness of pagan philosophers for gaining truth. Their disagreement degenerated into a noisy quarrel, neither able to make progress against the other. Manegold continued the quarrel in writing by attacking Wolfhelm's trust in the philosophers. His approach is notable: rather than a dialectical demolition of his opponent's theses or ideas, the reader finds a rhetorical invective against the philosophers as a whole. The two masters argued but had not a method by which to adjudicate between them.[69]

In this milieu of challenging transitions and opportunity for the well-reputed, young Abelard from Le Pallet faced a disadvantage: he could not depend on the reputation of his first master, Roscelin of Compiègne (ca. 1093–99), to boost his career.[70] Roscelin was condemned as a heretic and tried for tritheism at a council at Soissons in 1092. Later, the renowned Anselm of Canterbury wrote a refutation of Roscelin's views (1098). Abelard may have realized the danger of Roscelin's tattered reputation and so came under William of Champeaux's Parisian school (1100). "Because Roscelin had been his master," Michael Clanchy observed, "he arrived in Paris with an already compromised reputation."[71] Not only did Abelard pass over Roscelin in his *History*, he explicitly distanced himself from his former teacher.[72] From the beginning, the

[69] Manegold von Lautenbach, *Liber contra Wolfelmum*, ed. Wilfried Hartmann, *MGH Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* 8 (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1972), 39–108; cf. Irven Resnick, "Attitudes Toward Philosophy and Dialectic During the Gregorian Reform," *Journal of Religious History* 16/2 (1990): 115–25.
[70] Clanchy, *Abelard*, 37, 68, 75–77.
[71] Clanchy, 68.
[72] Abelard wrote (Letter XIV) to Bishop Gilbert of Paris, offering to publicly debate and refute the trinitarian thought of Roscelin. See Jan Ziolkowski, ed., *The Letters of Peter Abelard: Beyond the Personal* (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 2008), 188–96; a letter from Roscelin to Abelard also survives,

opportunity to advance through the prestige of his master was closed to Abelard; another method was necessary. The young Breton found his tools in dialectics and his ability to excel in the sharp agonism of asking and answering questions (the subject of the next section).

Other masters also began to see the value in questions and answers as a way to distinguish themselves. Writing around 1121, Guibert of Nogent recalled critically his own tutor's defective inability to answer questions or to defend his views. "He could never quite conceptualize, even less render intelligible, what he was saying... And if he uttered something that can only be termed stupid, since he thought all his opinions irrefutable, he would maintain and defend them with blows."[73] Guibert recounted his teacher's failure to teach what he did not himself understand: "There is nothing harder than trying to hold forth about something you yourself don't understand. It is obscure for the speaker, and even more so for the hearer."[74] For such a dissatisfied pupil as the young Guibert, a rival master who could answer effectively was desirable.

Abelard's ability to ask and answer questions would open his way to establish the credibility and legitimacy of his teaching. This path bears an agonistic spirit: one master gains prestige at the expense of another. Two examples illustrate these contests. In a famous case, Abelard studied under and rivaled the venerable Anselm of Laon.[75] Two

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chiding his former student for his rebelliousness. See *Letter to Abelard*, ed. J. Reiners, *Der Nominalismus in der Früscholastik* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1910), 63–80; cf. Clanchy, *Abelard*, 230–31.

[73] Guibert of Nogent, *De vita sua* I.5; *A Monk's Confession: The Memoirs of Guibert of Nogent,* trans. Paul Archambault (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 18.

[74] Guibert, 18–19.

[75] The episode is recounted in the *Historia*, §9–12 (ed. Luscombe).

protégés of Anselm of Laon, Alberic of Rheims and Lotulf the Lombard, reacted antagonistically when Abelard's neglect of Anselm's lesson threatened to cast a pall of disrespect upon their venerable master's reputation. No doubt these emerging scholars had hoped to establish their own reputations for credibility by attaching themselves to a famous and venerable master.[76] When Abelard's scantily prepared lessons on Ezekiel succeeded and drew students, Anselm expelled him as a rival. The episode diminished Anselm's prestige and so won for Abelard the animosity of the students, especially Alberic and Lotulf, who hoped to base their own credibility upon Anselm's and to inherit his school. As Abelard saw it, "Especially those two old opponents, Alberic and Lotulf, who, now that our former masters, William [of Champeaux] and Anselm [of Laon] were dead, were trying to reign alone in their place and succeed them as their heirs."[77] Abelard's reputation gained, but he also won the enmity of Alberic and Lotulf by undercutting the prestige of their master.

In the second place, this same Alberic of Rheims several years later would face another such Abelardian challenger in Walter of Mortagne. Alberic had left Laon and returned to Rheims by 1118, where he gained the post of archdeacon and taught as a master. Some years later, an older Master, Walter of Mortagne—a dialectician and, like Abelard, a student of William of Champeaux—visited Alberic.[78] "But that [Walter of Mortagne], being lively and keen, ruled over his students by his talent, and was often

[76] Jaeger, *Envy*, 189–95.
[77] *Historia*, §36 (ed. Luscombe).
[78] Constant Mews, "Abelard, Heloise, and Discussion of Love in the Twelfth-Century Schools." *Rethinking Abelard: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Babette Hellemans (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 21–24.

disagreeing with [Alberic] who did not answer him a word."[79] By report, Alberic excelled in lecturing and speaking "but not in answering questions."[80] Alberic's anger at his rival grew until Walter decided to withdraw to the monastery of St-Remi. Alberic eventually forced Walter away, back to Laon. Yet Walter won the engagement; his reputation gained while Alberic's declined. Their relative reputations can be judged by the metric of attracting students. "Many followed [Walter], as many of his own as from the students of Alberic."[81] In discussing this incident, John Williams wondered whether this report, some thirty years afterward, might borrow from and depend upon Abelard's accounts in his *History*.[82] This report was written at least thirty years after Abelard's clash with Anselm. A more likely distinct possibility is that the Abelardian method of agonistic ranking of masters according to their ability to ask and answer questions had become widely accepted.

Peter Abelard's thinking and approach did not strike like a bolt from the blue. He did not herald a new culture of learning to contest and supplant that of his teachers. Rather, he responded innovatively to the challenging conditions of his time and hit upon a method to legitimize his own teaching by burnishing his personal reputation through

[79] *Vita Hugonis abbatis Marchianensis*, in *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum* III, ed. E. Martene, U. Durand (Paris, 1717), 1713A: "Verum ille Mauritanensis unus de suis auditoribus ingenio praevalens, utpote argutus & acutus, ei frequenter opponebat, & non respondebat ei verbum."
[80] Ibid., 1712D–1713A: "Sed ut de illo quod ad rem attinet aliquid inferamus, erat homo in lectione satis diffusus, gratus, facundus, sed non adeo in quaestionum solutione."
[81] Ibid. "Et factum est dum iret, secuti sunt eum multi, tam de illius discipulis, quam de suis, qui noverant eum, & venerant eum eo, cum quibus & venerabilis adolescens suus compatriota, & de condiscipulo ante, modo factus discipulus quemadmodum & illi."
[82] John Williams, "The Cathedral School of Rheims in the Time of Master Alberic, 1118–1136." *Traditio* 20 (1964): 93–114, esp. 98.

dialectical asking and answering questions. But this route into scholarly circles had deeper ramifications. After establishing himself as a Parisian teacher, Abelard theorized his practices into a pedagogical method, a *modus operandi* that relied on talent for dialectics to excel in teaching. This pedagogical theorization will be the subject of the next section.

## III. Talented Abelard

Looking back to the beginning of his career, Abelard attributed his success in disputes with rivals to his particular talent. In so highlighting and discussing his own talent, Abelard posited a bold solution to the challenge of legitimizing his school. Abelard turned these reflections on a talent-reliant, dialectical method to flesh out a pedagogical theory, his way of teaching. Before examining his consciously talent-reliant method, the received notions of talent deserve attention. Beginning from classic Greek pedagogical discussions of students, the idea of talent began to take a life of its own. Early medieval writers highlighted admired figures as talented and began to attach to it an aura of authority.

Interest in talent (*ingenium*) had an ample heritage. The term did not hold a prominent place in the *Vulgate* or *Vetus Latina*.[83] Rather, the conceptual frame is the classical triad of what are necessary for learning: nature or talent, exercise, and art

[83] The Clementine Vulgate and Brepols' Vetus Latina Database (Brepols Publishers NV, 2013; accessed 9/20/2013) reveals consistency in the few uses of *ingenium* and related words: *Sapientia* 8.19, *ingeniosus*; I Esdras 8.3, *ingeniosus* (not Vetus Latina); 2 Corinth. 8:8, "non quasi imperans dico: sed per aliorum sollicitudinem, etiam vestrae caritatis ingenium bonum comprobans." This last use, from Paul, seems rather different.

(*natura/ingenium/facultas*; *excercitatio/usus*; *ars/scientia/doctrina*). This triad is rooted in the consonance of Plato and Isocrates: to succeed as an orator, the student needs natural ability (φὐσις) but must add to it practice (or care, μελέτη) and knowledge of speaking (ἐπιστήμη) from a teacher.[84] Variations of this triad spread through rhetorical discussions in Greek literature.[85] Cicero discussed rhetorical education and excellence also by this triad, most explicitly in *De oratore*.[86] During the long, medieval absence of *De oratore,* the motif of talent-practice-art had diffused in other texts, including Cicero's own *De inventione* and Pseudo-Cicero's *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* informing early medieval readers.[87] The Ciceronian use of *ingenium* as a natural power of keen or sharp intelligence, talent, and quick or slow wits echoed widely.[88] In this educational context, talent—be it sharp or dull—lay in the student; the teacher's role was to help with knowledge and by pressing exercises (*doctrina* and *usus*).

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[84] This is the Platonic triad from *Phaedrus* 269d. Isocrates' terms are very similar (*Antidosis* 15.188).

[85]For a discussion of this triad's spread in Greek literature, see Paul Shorey, "Φὐσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη," *Transactions and Proceedings in the American Philological Association* 40 (1909): 185–201.

[86] Especially *De oratore* 1.113–132; on Cicero's discussion of this triad, see Elaine Fantham's *The Roman World of Cicero's* De Oratore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), especially chapter "The Future Orator: Talent, Training, and the Choice of Model," 78-10.

[87] Cicero's *De oratore* was unknown to many for centuries, until its rediscovery in the early fifteenth century. See James Murphy's *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance* (Berkely: University of California Press, 1974), 106–110, 360–61; see Cicero, *De inventione* I.3–8; *Rhetorica ad Herennium* presents an independent and varied account. Initially, *ingenium/natura* seems replaced by imitation among the requisite triad: "Haec omnia tribus rebus adsequi poterimus: arte, imitatione, exercitatione" (*Rhetorica,* I.3). Yet *ingenium* reentered the treatment, particularly to characterize the power of memory (third of the five parts of oratory; e.g. *Rhetorica,* III.16).

[88] For example, vir acerrimo ingenio (*De Oratore*, 2, 74, 298; *De Natura Deorum*, 2, 16, 42), acutum aut retusum ingenium (*De Oratore*, 2, 27, 117; *De Divinatione*, 1, 36, 42), celeres ingenii motus (*De Oratore*, 1, 25, 113), ingenii acies (De Oratore, 3 ,5, 20), as well as illustre ingenium (In Q. Caecilium, 1,1; cf. Ruotger, *Vita: ingenium inlustre*) and ingenii lumen (*Epistolae ad Brutum*, 15, 59).

Medieval readers gained access to this ancient tradition of talent as a raw requisite for the student of oratory through several sources. Quintilian's *Education of the Orator* maintained much of Cicero's views on the prerequisite of natural ability.[89] Isidore of Seville presented this triad neatly: "Skill in speaking consists in three things: nature, teaching [*doctrina*], and practice [*usus*]. Nature in talent [*ingenium*], teaching in knowledge, practice in perseverance."[90] Likewise, Augustine, the one-time imperial rhetor, referred to that classic triad as a trinitarian analogue.[91] Unsurprisingly, Augustine frequently referred to these elements in his book for Christian preachers, *On Christian Teaching*. However, he laid special emphasis on the student's wit: "Since if a sharp and warm talent is present, eloquence will come more easily to those reading and hearing the eloquent speakers than to those following the rules of eloquence. . . . But if such talent is lacking, those rules of rhetoric cannot be grasped."[92] A student ought to cultivate his talent, rather than rely upon reading to suffice. As Peter Brown noted, Augustine

[89] See Elaine Fantham, "The Concept of Nature and Human Nature in Quintilian's Psychology and Theory of Instruction," *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 13.2 (Spring 1995): 125–36; Fantham interacted with and disagreed in part with Freyr Varwig's study, who saw greater differences between Quintilian and Cicero. See *Der rhetorische Naturbegriff bei Quintilian* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1976). See Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 6.2.3; cf. 1.12.2; 2.17.1; 12.2.1–2.

[90] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* II.3.2: "Ipsa autem peritia dicendi in tribus rebus consistit: natura, doctrina, usu. Natura ingenio, doctrina scientia, usus adsiduitate. Haec sunt enim quae non solum in oratore, sed in unoquoque homine artifice expectantur, ut aliquid efficiat."

[91] *De Trinitate* X.4,17; here Augustine correlated the learning triad with the mental triad of *memoria*, *intelligentia*, *voluntas*. Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* 6.2.3.

[92] *De doctrina christiana* IV.3,4: "Quoniam si acutum et fervens adsit ingenium, facilius adhaeret eloquentia legentibus et audientibus eloquentes quam eloquentiae praecepta sectantibus . . . si autem tale desit ingenium, nec illa rhetorica praecepta capiuntur." Cf. *De doct.* II.21; II.55–58, etc.

advocated an "exacting preliminary training" in which students should "learn to prize their own powers of thought, their *ingenium*."[93]

The role of talent (or natural ability) arose from rhetorical discussions, then, in pedagogical terms—what the student needed to learn oratory. While that rhetorical register remains, Augustine also shows us how talent took on a role like that of a faculty of the soul. Apuleius wrote glowingly of the young Plato's *ingenium* and morals, which his master Socrates alone exceeded. Apuleius later discussed *ingenium* as having three potential trajectories—superior, mean, and base— that the teacher must shape.[94] Isidore of Seville also spoke of the talented as having an inner power: "Ingenious, that one has an inner power for producing art as they please."[95] Boethius' *Commentary on Cicero's Topics* highlighted the authority (according to Cicero) people attribute to the talented on account of their past successes:

> For intelligence [*ingenium*] produces credibility, and a great deal of authority is provided by it. In fact, men believe that people whose

[93] See Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 113. Brown referred to Augustine's urging "to spend some time with themselves aside from books and to accustom themselves to dwell in their minds." Cf. *De ordine* I.3: "Et id a me ipsi quoque praeceptum habebant, ut aliquid et praeter codices secum agerent et sese habitare consuefacerent animum." Augustine's remark highlights the essential vivacity and need for *ingenium* with or without the book learning and reading that may not avail in a dispute: "If learning and wealth of instruction fail you, still not yet should your talent be so feeble that, with no effort made, you yield to my meager words and questions." (See *Contra Academicos* 2.17: "Academicos, inquam, nec illi legerant, a quibus primo sententia ista defensa est. Eruditio autem disciplinarumque copia si te deficit, non usque adeo tamen ingenium tuum esse debet inualidum, ut nullo facto impetu paucissimis uerbis meis rogationibusque succumbas.") Cf. Willemien Otten, *From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 133.

[94] Apuleius, *De Platone et ejus dogmate* I.2–3, e.g. "pueri eius acre in percipiendo ingenium," II.3; et passim.

[95] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* X.122: "Ingeniosus, quod intus vim habeat gignendi quamlibet artem."

> intelligence suffices for them to achieve what they planned are people who speak more wisely.[96]

Talent is a formidable power of soul, then, but not necessarily positive. In that negative light, Hilary of Poitiers frequently referred pejoratively to "heretical talent."[97]

As a creative power, though liable to misuse, talent became a favorite quality for early medieval biographers and hagiographers to praise in their subjects. For example, Marbod of Rennes put special emphasis on Licinius' *ingenium*.[98] Sigebert of Gembloux specially highlighted the talented as figures of special merit and admiration, including Dietrich; Bruno; Fulgentius of Ruspe; Odo, first abbot of Cluny; and Abbot Theodore. He even called attention to his own "minor talent" (*ingeniolus*).[99] Talent was especially desirable among scholars, ecclesiastics, and teachers. For the masters of the cathedral schools, talent was an essential trait. Stephen Jaeger has shown that among eleventh-century authors, a "typical constellation" appeared in certain hagiographic literature: "genius [*ingenium*], learning, virtue, and 'useful' administration."[100]

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[96] Boethius, *In Topica Ciceronis Commentarium*, PL 64.1169A: "Nam et ingeniis fides adest, atque ex ea praesto est auctoritas plurima. Eos quippe sapientius loqui homines credunt, quorum ingenium ad expedienda quae proposuerint, sufficit." See *Boethius'* In Ciceronis Topica, trans. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 182; cf. Cicero, *Topica*, §73, 78.

[97] Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, PL 10; IV.3, 131C, haeretici ingenii subtilitas; VI.9, 164A, haereticae artis ingenium; VI.11, 165B, haeretici ingenii artificia; VII.1, 199C; corrupti ingenii artibus haeretica subtilitas; etc. Similarly, Boethius did not see *ingenium* as a self-sufficient power and criticized those who attributed finding arguments to talent alone rather to the knowledge of the dialectical topics (Quod quidem hi qui sunt hujus rationis experte soli prorsus deputant ingenio). See Boethius, *De Differentiis Topicis*, PL 64, 1182D.

[98] *Vita sancti Licinii*, PL 176, 1495–96; cf. Jaeger's discussion of this text in comparison to an earlier *vita* of Licinius (*Envy*, 87–90).

[99] See his praise of Dietrich and Bruno, in MGH SS IV, *Vita Deoderici episcopi Mettensis*, 464.43–465.16. Likewise, Sigebert's *Liber de scriptoribus ecclesiasticis*, 28 (Fulgentius of Ruspe), 124 (Odo, first abbot of Cluny), 170 (Abbot Theodore), as well as his own ingeniolus (171); PL 160.547–88.

[100] Jaeger, *Envy,* 92–93; For example, Othloh of St. Emmeram wrote of Wolfgang of Regensburg (d. 994): "prudenti usus consilio, ut scilicet ingens doctrinae talentum sibi a Deo traditum aliis exhibendo, sicut

Talent had migrated, then, from a quality of a would-be orator to the distinguishing mark of the erudite and the accomplished. A prime example of an ingenious master was Bruno, archbishop of Cologne (925–65), as portrayed by his biographer and pupil Ruotger. Ruotger's *Life of Bruno* (ca. 968–69) was a much-read account of Bruno's life, scholarship, teaching, and political works, written in order to champion the imperial cause.[101] For Ruotger, Bruno exemplified the use of God-given talent for administration of Church and empire, for the cultivation of virtue and learning through his whole career: "The talent [*ingenium*], which he returned with a clean heart, illustrious and polished by continual exercise, to the gift of God, as clearly appeared in his words, did not fail him upon his deathbed."[102] Ruotger's ascription of Bruno's talent to divine endowment had precedent in Macrobius' assertion that Vergil bore "not moral but divine talent."[103] Talent served as a marker not only of the ability of those who wield it but of authority, suggesting guarantee of ideas and works.

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dispensator fidelis fructificaret." See *Vita sancti Wolfgangi episcopi Ratisbonensis, auctore Othlone monacho*, VII, MGH SS IV.528.46–49; for a treatment of Othloh's *Life* see Cora Lutz, *Schoolmasters of the Tenth Century* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1977), 111–16.

[101] Jaeger, *Envy*, 33–47. Jaeger saw in Brun[o] of Cologne something of a type or specimen of the "old learning," but his account freely mixed Ruotger's contemporary vita (written between 965, Bruno's death, and 969, Ruotger's death) with Sigebert of Gembloux's much later description (written ca.1050–1060, a century after Bruno's death; cf. *Vita Deoderici ep. Mettensis*]). See also Henry Mayr-Harting, *Church and Cosmos in Early Ottonian Germany: The View from Cologne* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 13–19; cf. Irene Ott's dating of Sigebert's *Vita Deoderici* in MGH *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum* IV, ed. Irene Ott (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1951), ix–x; For an overview of Bruno's life and career, see Cora Lutz, *Schoolmasters of the Tenth Century* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1977), 103–109.

[102] Ruotger, *Vita* 46, 27–30: "Ingenium, quod mundo corde et iugi exercitatione politum dono Dei reddidit et inlustre, illum, ut liquido apparet in eius verbis, non defecerat in extremis."

[103] Macrobius, *Saturnalia* V.18: "Quam quidem mihi videtur Virgilius non sine quodam praesagio quo se omnium profectibus praeparabat de industria permiscuisse, idque non mortali sed divino ingenio praevidisse."

Returning to Abelard, we find he distinguished himself not only by exercising his abilities but also by theorizing a pedagogical method of talent reliance. Willemien Otten rightly highlighted Anselm of Canterbury as "the example of an early medieval author [who] was guided by his own *ingenium* at least to the same extent, if not far more [than Abelard]."[104] Abelard differed by overt discussion of his (as he saw it) extraordinary ability and a theorization of talent-reliance. [105] Recalling the beginning of his career, Abelard reported, he was "conspicuous in talent [*ingenio*] and quick to letters"; he exchanged Mars for Minerva and found that he "preferred the armor of dialectical arguments to all lessons of philosophy," for which reason he "exchanged the [knight's arms] for these arms and preferred the conflicts of disputations over the trophies of war."[106] Having girded his talent with such armor, Abelard wandered about seeking disputes, "a knight-errant in the schools of philosophy," the "*peripateticus palatinus,*" as his student John of Salisbury later called him.[107] After his first dispute with William of Champeaux, Abelard opened his own dialectical school at Melun, "presuming on the powers of my age from my talent [*ingenio meo*]," the success of which would increase his

[104] Otten, *Paradise*, 132.
[105] See Willemien Otten's discussion of Victor Cousin, as well as of LM de Rijk: *From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 129, 131–32, 182–84; cf. LM Rijk, "Peter Abälard (1079–1142): Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns," *Petrus Abaelardus (1079–1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung*, ed. R Thomas (Trier: Paulinus, 1980), 127–32; cf. M. Clanchy, *Abelard: A Medieval Life* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 85–88.
[106] *Historia*, §2: "ita et ingenio extiti ad litteratoriam disciplinam facilis. . . . Ego vero quanto amplius et facilius in studio litterarum profeci tanto ardentius eis inhesi, et in tanto earum amore illectus sum ut militaris glorie pompam cum hereditate et prerogative primogenitorum meorum fratribus derelinquens, Martis curie penitus abdicarem ut Minerve gremio educarer; et quoniam dialecticarum rationum armaturam omnibus philosophie documentis pretuli, his armis alia commutavi et tropheis bellorum conflictus pretuli disputationum."
[107] Étienne Gilson, preface to *Story of Abelard's Adversities*, trans., J. Muckle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1954), 7. John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, I.5 et passim.

reputation.[108] Abelard attributed his success in dispute and teaching in the agonistic schools to his natural brilliance.

Further, Abelard often put praise of his own *ingenium* in the mouths of others: Geoffrey of Chartres reportedly praised Abelard's *ingenium* at Soissons (*hominis hujus doctrinam, qualiscunque sit, ejusque ingenium*). In his *Dialogue,* the Philosopher twice praised his *ingenii acumen* in discerning the truth, and students after his mutilation pleaded that he exercise his God-given ability by returning to teach theology (*mihi fuerat a Domino talentum commissum*).[109] Here Abelard's talent received a special inflection: it is not a successful career in school that exhibits talent, but talent bears the promise of effective teaching. In this pedagogical positioning, Abelard reported his students' appeal that he teach theology because his talent (*ingenium*) would easily penetrate and grasp its secrets.[110] This pedagogical function of talent points the way to Abelard's understanding of talent and of the ingenious teacher who properly exercised it, particularly in the art of dialectic, which was essential for bringing understanding for students.

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[108] *Historia*, §4: "supra vires etatis de ingenio meo presumens."
[109] *Historia*, §32, 35. Cf. Collationes, trans. J Marenbon, G Orlandi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), Praefatio 4.
[110] Peter Abelard, "Visum illis est, ut multo facilius divine pagine intelligentiam siue sacre fidei rationes nostrum penetraret ingenium quam philosophice abyssi puteos, ut aiunt, exhausisset." See *Theologiae Scholarium*, Praef. 2 in ed. E. M. Buytaert, C. J. Mews, *Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica,* CCCM 13 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1987); Cf. ibid. Praef. 3, "unanimiter postulant ne talentum michi a domino commissum multiplicare differam"; cf. Willemien Otten "Broken Mirrors: Abelard's Theory of Language in Relation to the Augustinian Tradition of Redeemed Speech," ed. C. Nederman, N. Deusen, E. A. Matter, *Mind Matters: Studies of Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual History in Honour of Marcia Colish* (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2009), 82–83.

Abelard's first career as an independent master in Paris closed in 1117, when he entered St. Denis. Although he reported teaching there and at the Paraclete, he did not teach as a schoolmaster again until returning to Paris (around 1133). During these years, Abelard reflected upon his teaching practices and articulated his pedagogy, specifically dependence upon *ingenium* as a vital characteristic. Abelard's retrospective model of ingenious teaching lies scattered through his writings. What was needed was not imperial or ecclesiastical administration and benefaction as in Bruno of Cologne, but rather the dialectical handling of arguments and the reconciliation of authoritative *sententiae*. This Abelardian pedagogy pitted talent (*ingenium*) against practice (*usus*) by answering questioners with reasons, not through long practice but through quick, extemporaneous insight from his *ingenium.*

Writing about twenty years later, Abelard used his collision with Anselm of Laon to distinguish his methodological talent-reliance from the customary teaching of that master.[111] Already an accomplished dialectician and teacher at Mont-Ste-Geneviève, he decided to study divinity. "I went to this elder [Anselm of Laon], for whom rather long practice [*longevus usus*] than talent [*ingenium*] or memory furnished a name."[112] In opposition to Anselm's *longevus usus*, Abelard identified his own method in *ingenium.* Dissatisfied with Anselm's lessons, he conspicuously absented himself. When challenged by fellow students for this slight, Abelard defiantly undertook to lecture on a difficult

[111] Abelard's stay in Laon was around 1113, but he wrote his account in the *Historia* around 1132.
[112] *Historia*, §10: "Accessi igitur ad hunc senem, cui magis longeuus usus quam ingenium vel memoria nomen comparaverat." Cf Horace, "longo cognitus usu," *Tristia* III.5.

passage of scripture. He even refused their urgings to take some days for preparation: "Indignant, I responded that it was not my custom to proceed by practice [*usus*] but through talent [*ingenium*]."[113]

What does this opposition between *longevus usus* and *ingenium* signify? Some have seen here a great rupture or opposition of mysticism against reason, of tradition against anti-traditionalism, or of irrational authority against rational intellectualism. But such narratives draw a too-simple dichotomy, ending up anachronistically with, as Willemien Otten put it, a "Voltaire-like Abelard." Rather than seeing Abelard as an anti-traditionalist, Otten perceived that it was Abelard's "strong conviction that the current interpretation of Christian tenets needed to be overhauled. His aim was to enhance the essence of traditional teaching by adjusting its methods of reception." [114] Abelard reconfigured rather than confronted or threw out contemporary learning culture. His depiction of Anselm as all show without substance was overwrought. As is becoming clearer, the young master likely learned much from Anselm's method of arranging and selecting authorities.[115] Abelard signaled his use of classical and biblical tropes. Since

[113] *Historia*, §11; "Indignatus autem respondi non esse mee consuetudinis per usum proficere sed per ingenium."

[114] See Willemien Otten, "Broken Mirrors" in *Mind Matters: Studies of Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual History in Honour of Marcia Colish* (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2009), 81. See also Willemien Otten, *From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 141.

[115] Perhaps the most important recent book on Anselm of Laon as an important and influential scholar is Cédric Giraud's *Per verba magistri: Anselme de Laon et son école au XIIe siècle* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010). Much of recent work on Anselm and the School of Laon examines not only the *Glossa ordinaria* but also the influence upon Gratian's *Decretum.* See John Wei, "Gratian and the School of Laon," *Traditio* 64 (2009): 279–322; John Wei, *Gratian the Theologian* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 60–61, 89–94, 152–-54; Atria Larson, *The Master of Penance: Gratian and the Development of Penitential Thought and Law in the Twelfth Century* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 51–63, 161–62, 176–81, 186–90, etc.

Socrates was disappointed in the elder Protagoras' wisdom, and the young Augustine found the learned Manichee Faustus to be rudimentary, the failure of a famous person to match their renown has been a frequented trope.[116] Closer to Abelard, we have already seen reports of teachers' prolixity without clarity about Guibert's tutor and Alberic of Rheims.[117] Moreover, comparing Anselm to the Lucan Pompey, Abelard portrayed the prestigious teacher to a hollowed-out great but aged oak that once won renown but had declined with age and familiarity.[118]

The crucial difference between Anselmian *usus* and Abelardian *ingenium* is the pedagogical test: *longevus usus* fails in the pedagogical task, while *ingenium* succeeds. We see this critique directly after Abelard introduced Anselm's *longevus usus*:

> If some doubtful person came urging him [Anselm] about some question, he came away more unsure. He [Anselm] was indeed admirable in the eyes of his auditors, but he was nobody in the consideration of questioners. He had a wondrous use of words [*verborum usus*], but his thought [*sensus*] was worthless and devoid of reason. Since he kindled a fire, he filled his home with smoke, but did not clear it with light. His tree seemed full of leaf and remarkable to those looking afar off, but to those coming closer, examining carefully, he was found barren.[119]

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[116] Cf. Plato, *Protagoras*; Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions* V.8–13.
[117] Cf. Guibert of Nogent, *De vita sua* I.5; for Alberic: *Vita Hugonis abbatis Marchianensis* in *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum* III, ed. E. Martene, U. Durand (Paris, 1717), 1713A.
[118] Abelard quoted the lines, "Stat magni nominis umbra / Qualis frugifero quercus sublimis in agro" ("There stands the shadow of a noble name / Like a tall oak in a field of corn"). *Historia*, §10; Lucan, *Pharsalia (De bello civili)* I.135–36.
[119] *Historia*, §10: "Ad quem si quis de aliqua questione pulsandum accederet incertus, redibat incertior. Mirabilis quidem in oculis erat auscultantium, sed nullus in conspectu questionantium. Verborum usum habebat mirabilem, sed sensu contemtibilem et ratione vacuum. Cum ignem accenderet, domum suam fumo implebat, non luce illustrabat. Arbor eius tota in foliis aspicientibus a longe conspicua videbatur, sed propinquantibus et diligentius intuentibus infructuosa reperiebatur."

In Abelard's estimation, Anselm failed the *sine qua non* task of teaching: he failed to answer the questioner, or more precisely, he failed to satisfy the questioner.[120] Instead, whoever came with a question or doubt (*incertus*) would leave only in worse condition (*incertior*). Anselm's *longevus usus* appeared fruitful and gave him a wonderful command of language, but those who questioned and examined more carefully recognized the deception by the lack of *sensus* and reason.

This critique of Anselm is no isolated anecdote but is rather the germ of a consistent idea that carried throughout Abelard's thought. Later, Abelard accused himself of falling into the mode of *usus* rather than *ingenium* when, caught up in his love for Heloise, he lost interest in the schools. The more occupied with pleasure, "the less I could attend to philosophy and give labor to the schools. It was exceedingly tedious to go to or to tarry in the schools."[121] Awake through the nights and at school during the day, Abelard became "negligent and tepid, so that I advanced nothing from talent [*ex ingenio*] but everything by practice [*ex usu*], and I was only a reader of former authors [*recitator pristinorum inventorum*]."[122] Here again, Abelard portrayed his lapse into a

[120] It is worthy to note here that Abelard's portrait of Anselm functions as part of his theorization of his own pedagogy, rather than an impartial account of Anselm's methods. Though the aged teacher did not satisfy the younger, Anselm did allow and answer questions in his *lectiones*. See Valerie Flint, " 'The School of Laon': A Reconsideration," *Recherces de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 43 (1976): 89–111, esp. 108–109; Cf. G. R. Evans, *The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 126–27.

[121] *Historia*, §19: "Et quo me amplius hec voluptas occupaverat, minus philosophie vaccare poteram et scolis operam dare. Tediosum mihi vehementer erat ad scolas procedere vel in eis morari."

[122] *Historia*, §19: "Tediosum mihi vehementer erat ad scolas procedere vel in eis morari; pariter et laboriosum, cum nocturnas amori vigilias et diurnas studio conservarem. Quem etiam ita negligentem et tepidum lectio tunc habebat, ut jam nichil ex ingenio sed ex usu cuncta proferrem, nec jam nisi recitator pristinorum essem inventorum."

The constrast between reasons for understanding (demanding talent) and the pull of the familiar or customary found more formal articulation in Peter Abelard's Philosopher, who saw the role of

method by *usus* rather than by *ingenium* as neglectful laxity, mediocre treatment, and unremarkable reading (or lecturing) of past authors. It is striking that in the oppositions of *usus* and *ingenium,* the reading of past authors appears as a common element of Abelard's criticisms: it mirrors discontent he expressed at Anselm's teaching by merely lecturing on *sententiae* to students:

> Study of this reading, where the salvation of the soul is learned, is indeed most wholesome. But I am very amazed that for the literate the writing itself or glosses are not sufficient for understanding the statements of the saints so that they do not need other instruction.[123]

Reading and commentary alone do not suffice for the Abelardian teacher. Rather, the teacher must be able to illuminate matters of questions rather than puff obscure, loquacious responses.

By contrasting accepted *usus* in teaching and his own ingenious addition, Abelard not only indicated his difference but also his debt to his scholarly milieu. Schools primarily offered lectures on books considered authoritative, from logical Aristotelian works to books of sacred scripture.[124] Lectures entailed three main aspects: first, a master would offer an introduction (*accessus*) to the book as a whole, then read short passages,

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philosophy as critiquing and pushing against custom (*consuetudo*; cf. *Collationes* I.7–12). Similarly, as will be examined in section 5, Abelard's *Rule* for the Paraclete religious prized *ratio* over *conseutudo* in monastic deliberations (*Institutio,* 68–74).

[123] *Historia*, §11: "Accidit autem quadam die ut, post aliquas sententiarum collationes, nos scolares invicem iocaremur. Ubi cum me quidam animo intemptantis interrogasset quid mihi de divinorum lectione librorum videretur, qui nondum nisi in philosophicis studueram, respondi: saluberrimum quidem huius lectionis esse studium ubi salus anime cognoscitur, sed me vehementer mirari quod his qui litterari sunt ad expositiones sanctorum intelligendas ipsa eorum scripta vel glose non sufficiunt, ut alio scilicet non egeant magisterio."

[124] G. R. Evans offers an introduction to the methods and arts of the twelfth-century schools as applied to the study of sacred scripture. See *The Language and Logic of the Bible,* especially 8–10, 27–47.

and offer commentary explaining that passage.[125] Which books and in which order seems to have fallen to the discretion of individual teachers. Masters might move haphazardly between books or topics. For example, Master Odo was lecturing on Boethius' notions of free will until he noticed Augustine's *On Free Choice of the Will* in his library. Odo began lecturing on Augustine to help understand Boethius but soon became fascinated and dropped Boethius.[126] Similarly, after his initial contentions with William of Champeaux, Abelard again attended William's lectures on rhetoric. When Abelard disputed with William on the question of universals, William diverted to concentrate on that topic.[127]

It is difficult to glimpse Abelard's extemporaneous, question-based lessons. This popular teacher seems not to have kept written copies of his lessons, a fact for which he later evinced regret. Writing to his son Astrolabe, Abelard urged:

> Work hard at your composition: without these skills, no-one can hold confidential knowledge. What you say passes away, nor is anything more transient, but what you write remains after you have perished; poets who perish in themselves live on in their writings.[128]

Abelard regretted that he did not write down more of his lessons. Many of his school glosses were only composed in the monastery, after his first Parisian teaching career had

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[125] For these *accessūs*, see "*Accessus ad auctores*" in *Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism, c. 1100–c.1375: The Commentary Tradition*, ed. A. J. Minnis, A. B. Scott (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 12–36; or the tradition stretching back to Hellenistic *paideía* of reading and explanation, see Riché, *Écoles et enseignement*, 247–52.
[126] Herman, *Restoration* 4.
[127] Abelard, *Historia* §6.
[128] Abelard, *Carmen ad Astralabium*, trans. Juanita Ruys in *The Repentant Abelard: Family, Gender, and Ethics in Peter Abelard's* Carmen ad Astralabium *and* Planctus (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 166.945–49; whole lines are as follows: "Scribere scire stude simul ac diccare labora (scilicet sine dictamine et scriptura) / is sine secretum nullus habere potest. / Quod loqueris transit nec plus est labile quicquam, (id est moriente) / quod vero scribis te pereunte manet; / qui pereunt in se vivunt per scripta poete: (scilicet per scripta)." Ruys' text differs somewhat from that of Joseph M. A. Rubingh-Bosscher's. Cf. *Peter Abelard. Carmen ad Astralabium: A Critical Edition*, ed. Joseph Rubingh-Bosscher (Groningen: Kris Repro Meppel, 1987).

ended.[129] As John Marenbon has discussed, much of what remains from Abelard's dialectical and schoolroom materials derive not from Abelard's pen but—partially or wholly—from students' notes and oral reports.[130] Much of what derives from Abelard himself also seems not to have been written down until after he was a monk in St. Denis, after his first Parisian teaching career had calamitously ended.[131] Analyzing in detail Abelard's (and Abelardian) pedagogical works, Jean Jolivet found a multistage method. In some works, Abelard aimed at a more rudimentary goal of to explicating the words and phrases of the text.[132] For example, in *Glosses on 'On Interpretation'* (*Glossae super Peri Hermeneias*), Abelard began with an *accessus* and then proceeded to quote passages of Aristotle's text followed by brief explanations.[133] So far, this matches Abelard's self-description of sometimes teaching according to the accepted way (or, *ex usu*). But as Jolivet argued, Abelard built upon these more basic methods. Moving beyond explanation of words or even the meaning (*sensus*) of the text, Abelard developed an innovative, pedagogical method of producing questions—through comparison and

[129] See Constant Mews' general timeline of Abelard's life and works: "General introduction," *Petri Abaelardi opera theologica*. CCCM 13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987), 21–23

[130] Marenbon's discussion of these many texts with their varied attributions and evidence for Abelardian authorship (or origin in Abelard's school, etc.) offers the most current *status quaestionis*. See *Abelard in Four Dimensions: A Twelfth-Century Philosopher in His Context and Ours* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 26–38.

[131] Marenbon also discussed the likely dating of Abelard's various works. See Marenbon, *Four Dimensions*, 39–44. Cf. Constant Mews, "On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 52 (1985): 73–134; see also *Abelard and His Legacy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 73–134.

[132] Jean Jolivet, *Arts du Langage et Théologie chez Abélard* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J Vrin, 1982), 178–82.

[133] Abelard adopted a form of what Minnis and Scott called the Type C or 'moderna' style *accessus*, explaining the intention, occasion, matter, aim, and title. See *Petri Abaelardi Glossae Super Peri Hermeneias*, ed. Klaus Jacobi, Christian Strub, CCCM 206 (Turhout: Brepols Publishers, 2010), *Prooemium*, pp. 17–23; cf. Minnis and Scott "Accessus," *Medieval Literary Theory*, 12–13; cf. Jolivet, *Arts*, 181.

analysis of diverse authorities—and answering these questions through harmonization and criticism.[134] Peter prefaced his *Theologia scholarium* (*Students' Theology*) explaining his students' request that his lessons switch from philosophical to theological topics.[135] Abelard's three *Theologies* (*Theologia Summi Boni*, *Theologia christiana*, *Theologia scholarium*) were creative products of his lessons, but not the lessons themselves.[136]

A glimpse into Abelard's Parisian school supports the pedagogical expectation of responding to student questions with illuminating answers. In the *Life of Blessed Goswin* (*Vita beati Gosuini*) young and talented Goswin bested Magister Abelard in his own school.[137] At this time students flocked to Ste. Geneviève to hear Abelard, who, the author conceded, "indeed was of proven knowledge and sublime eloquence, but was an author of unheard-of things and one who advanced novelties, seeking to set up his own opinions [*sententias*], an accuser of other approved [authors] [*aliarum probatarum improbator*]."[138] The *Life* clearly disapproved of Abelard and presented him as advancing novelties. Against such, Goswin comes to demand an account: "The venerable youth Goswin capable in powerful in speech as well as penetrating in talent [*ingenii perspicacis*]."[139] Here,

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[134] Jolivet, *Arts*, 183–204.
[135] *Theologia Scholarium*, Praef. 1–8.
[136] Willemien Otten offered a careful analysis of how Abelard's *ingenium* method worked itself out in his *Theologies* (see *Paradise*, 132–63). See also Babette Hellemans, "Abelard and the Poetics of *Ingenium*," *Rethinking Abelard: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Babette Hellemans (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 298–321.
[137] Cf. Clanchy, *Abelard*, 91–92.
[138] ed. Richard Gibbon, S.J. *Ex Vita Beati Gosvini Aquicinctensis Abbatis* in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, tome IV*, Rerum Gallicarum et Francarum Scriptores XIV, (Paris: De l'Imprimerie Impériale, 1806), 442D: "Tunc temporis magister Petrus Abailardus, multis sibi scholaribus aggregatis, in claustro S. Genovefae scholae publicae utebatur: qui probatae quidem scientiae, sublimis eloquentiae, sed inauditarum erat inventor et assertor novitatum; et suas quaerens statuere sententias, erat aliarum probatarum improbator." Cf. Clanchy, *Abelard,* 91–92.
[139] *Vita Gosvini*, 442D: "Quia igitur venerabilis adolescens Gosvinus efficacis erat facundiae, sicut ingenii perspicacis, ut eum super nugis talibus conveniret suaserunt."

then, the ingenious teacher had an ingenious challenger in Goswin, who "ascended the hill of Ste. Geneviève as if David about to struggle in combat with Goliath."[140] Goswin found Abelard engaged in his usual way, "reading and impressing his novelties upon his own students."[141] Goswin tried to interrupt, but Abelard hushed him with a reproach for the disturbance. Yet when Goswin continued to insist, Abelard's own students began clamoring for their teacher to hear and answer the challenger:

> But his students, who knew the youth [Goswin] enough, told him not to fail to answer, and that [Goswin] was a keen disputant, and [they] highly recommended [Goswin's] knowledge. [They said] it was not improper to undertake with [him] the trouble of his way disputing, further, it was most improper to refuse such [a disputant].[142]

At this rebuke—instead of treating the questioning challengers like Alberic or Anselm—Abelard relinquished and allowed Goswin to speak. While this detail may have served the *Life's* rhetorical framing, it confirms the pedagogical expectations of Abelard's classroom: questions and challenges by worthy disputants deserve a hearing and an answer. His students did not loyally shout down the rival in support of their master (like Alberic and Lotulf) but instead rallied to hold their master accountable to their expectation, who acknowledged it by his concession.

In the resulting exchange, Abelard not only lived up to the pedagogical expectation of hearing and answering competent challengers, but also further modeled

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[140] Ibid. 443A: "Ascendit in montem S. Genovefae, quasi David cum Goliath duello conflicturus."
[141] Ibid. 443B; "Cum venisset igitur ad locum certaminis, id est scholam ejus introÏsset, reperit eum legentem, et scholaribus suis suas incultantem novitates."
[142] Ibid. 443C: "Cum autem ei diceretur a scholasticis suis, qui juvenculum satis noverant, ut non omitteret respondere; esse illum disputatorem acutum, et multum ei scientiae suffragari; non esse indecens cum [eo?] ejusmodi subire negotium disputandi, indecentissimum esse talem ulterius aspernari."

the dialectical teacher. For when he found himself in straits, he acknowledged Goswin's point and his own error:

> Now [Abelard] took up the matter, while [Goswin] confirmed [his proposition], and by his confirmations [Abelard] was wholly unable to resist. When the refuges for opposition were closed completely to him by [Goswin], who knew Abelard's cunning, at last Abelard was proven to have asserted what was not in agreement with reason.[143]

The subject matter of the dispute, of which the *Life* gives no indication, is inconsequential. It is the method or form of the dispute that reveals the contentious atmosphere in which Abelard's dialectical pedagogy lived. Unlike Anselm, who was unable to deal effectively with questions, the Abelardian teacher must be constantly ready to account for and support his own views (*novitates*), not only for questioners but also against serious challengers. Nor does such a teacher have recourse to squelching or evading difficult struggles. His own students held Abelard to the expectation that a worthy questioner ought to receive worthy answer. This glimpse into Abelard's school confirms the demanding question-and-answer nature of the *ingenium* method.[144] In the next section, we shall turn to the principles by which such an agonistic teacher could answer questions.

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[143] Ibid. 443C: "Assumente illo, et affirmante isto, et affirmantionibus ejus illo penitus non valente refragari; cum divertendi ei penitus suffugia clauderentur, ab isto qui non ignorabat ejus astutias, tandem convictus est asseruisse se quod non esset consentaneum rationi."

[144] As much as possible, I have tried to avoid calling Abelard's method *disputation* to avoid anachronistically ascribing later scholastic protocols to Abelard's often *ad hoc* pedagogical practices. Alex Novikoff has recently offered an account of Abelard's practices of disputation. However, *pace* Novikoff, that account tends to treat disputation as an abstract practice that may be found in the schoolroom rather than emerging organically from it, and seems to look too quickly to later developments, "anticipat[ing] the Domincan use of disputation in the thirteenth century when mendicant preachers went from town to town disputing openly with heretics and made disputation a formal component of their training exercises." This chapter argues that Abelard's disputation was extemporaneous and performative to resolve whatever questions may arise in the course of *lectiones* (rather than formal, slotted protocols for prepared statements on predetermined questions). See Alex J. Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of*

## IV. Dialectical Harmonization of Authorities

After leaving his school Mont-Ste-Geneviève for the monastery—as already said—Abelard reflected on his teaching. Education was deeply ingrained in his thought. Besides setting down his *glosses* and revising his *Theologies*, Abelard also began work (ca. 1121) on a pedagogical aid: his sentence-collection, *Yes and No* (*Sic et non*).[145] This collection (*collectio sententiarum*, a compilation of opinions of respected authors) not only served as a pool of sentences for his writing, but also provided the site for Abelard to formulate the principles of his talent-reliant pedagogy for harmonizing discrepancies.

The methodological prologue of *Sic et non* sheds light on this peculiar sentence collection: Abelard arranged the opinions of authoritative authors on various questions but as giving contrary answers. Such discrepancies and disagreements were precisely what might incite doubtful and difficult questions from students.[146] But instead of preparing and publishing his solutions to the discrepancies, which another might read or teach without understanding (that is, *per usum*), Abelard chose to set out his critical and hermeneutical principles by which one might proceed (*per ingenium*) in similar difficulties as they arise. The project was not a rationalistic (and anachronistic) challenge to

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*Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance* (Philadelphia: University of Pensylvania Press, 2013), 88, 76–91.

[145] Mews, "General Introduction," *Petri Abaelardi opera theologica*, 22. Peter Abelard, ed. Boyer and McKeon, *Sic et non: A Critical Edition* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976–77), 330–32. See also "The Prologue to *Yes and No*" (trans) Alastair Minnis, *Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism, c. 1100–c.1375: The Commentary Tradition*, ed. A. Minnis, A. B. Scott, D. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 87–100.

[146] Such difficulties arising from opposing or diverging *auctores* was not new. From the mid-tenth century the letter attributed to Gunzo raised the disagreement of the two eminent authors, Plato and Aristotle, on the question of universals. *Epistola ad Augienses*, ed. Karl Manitius, *MGH Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters I* (Weimar: Herman Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1958), 40, 12–17.

orthodoxy in beliefs; rather, it was based in his pedagogy and reformulated method for the talented teacher.[147] The work set out school exercises. As Abelard hoped, learning the principles and resolving discrepancies "may stimulate immature readers to the greatest exercise (*exercitium*) for examining truth and render them keener (*acutiores*) from the examination."[148]

Abelard's approach to questions (in this Prologue) balances conceptually on the tension between poles: the apparent and the true. For examples, Abelard discussed the need to discern the apparent against the real conflict of authors, the received text (possibly corrupted or apocryphal) against the genuine, and within authorities and even with scripture to discern what are not true but only opinions reported or based upon customs.[149] In each of the specific issues, the discernment of the true from the apparent requires the great care and skill of the teacher. Such a difficult office—quoting Jerome on recognizing true from spurious writings—"belongs to great prudence to seek gold in the mud."[150] The teacher must exercise caution and skill, as well as self-conscious doubt, recognizing that not all knots admit of satisfactory interpretation.[151]

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[147] G. R. Evans came to a similar judgment on *Sic et non* as a "book [intended] for the classroom; it is a collection of exercises in reconciliation and clarification." *Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 136. Abelard's utilization of dialectics in no way excluded dependence upon authorities for the faith. He treated the coordination of reason and authority repeatedly in his *Theologies.* Cf. *Theologia christiana* III.1–2, 43–45; *Theologia scholarium* II.14–18, 41, 45.

[148] *Sic et non,* ed. Boyer and McKeon, 330–34:; "Quae teneros lectores ad maximum inquirendae veritatis exercitium provocent et acutiores ex inquisitione reddant."

[149]Abelard largely dealt with apparent conflicts in the first half (*Sic et non*, 1–188) while afterward dealing with real conflicts. For other examples, apocryphal or corrupt texts (54–85), opinions reported in scripture, originating in customs (86–148).

[150] *Sic et non*, 59–62 : "Et grandis esse prudentiae aurum in luto quaerere." Cf. Jerome, Epistle 107.2.

[151] For example, on the origin of Melchisedech in Hebrews 7.3, *Sic et non,* "Quia hoc scilicet nostram notitiam latet quod scriptura non docet" (86–148).

The prudent teacher sifting discrepancies then is like—again following Jerome—a "tested money-changer" who rejects any false coin, but stores up those bearing not the image of Caesar but rather of Christ.[152] In this task, Abelard did not discuss but presupposed the ingenious teacher who reasoned from principles to deal with questions raised on the spot. "For one should not consider," Abelard further quoted Jerome, "not the afore-decided opinion of the teacher, but what ought to be pondered is not the preceded opinion of the teachers but the rationale [*ratio*] of the teaching."[153]

Abelard's interpretive principles theorized practices of questioning and examining, that is, the doubting that is necessary to gain truth. Far from making Abelard a proto-Cartesian, this doubting in order to question and so gain truth was in his eyes a Christian duty and an imitation of Christ's example. For in the exercise for seeking truth, there is a frequent struggle to move between poles—from the apparent to the true—through questioning: "This continual or frequent questioning, then, is defined as the first key of wisdom."[154] Here, then, Abelard introduced his famous principle: "Indeed by doubting we come to inquiry; by inquiring we perceive the truth."[155] To illustrate the skepticism he had in mind, Abelard pointed to Christ's example:

> In consequence of which, the Truth Itself said, "Seek and you will find; knock and it will be opened to you." Who even still, furnishing us morally

[152] Ibid. 321–22; "probatus nummularius."
[153] *Sic et non*, 321–29 : "Quisquis multorum tractorum opuscula legit, debet esse sicut *probatus nummularius*, ut si quis nummus adulter est et figuram Caesaris non habet nec signatus moneta publica, reprobetur; qui autem Christi faciem claro praefert lumine in cordis marsupio recondatur. *Non enim praeiudicata doctoris opinio sed doctrinae ratio ponderanda est.*" Citation from Jerome, *Epistle* 129.11.
[154] Ibid., 333–34: "Haec quippe prima sapientiae clavis definitur assidua scilicet seu frequens interrogatio."
[155] Ibid., 338–39: "Dubitando quippe ad inquisitionem venimus; inquirendo veritatem percipimus."

> with his own example, willed to be found around twelve years old sitting and asking questions in the midst of teachers, exhibiting for us the model of the student through questioning earlier than that of the teacher through preaching, although he was the full and perfect wisdom of God.[156]

The model of the student questioning the teacher is what Christ exhibited and taught. Thus, Abelard framed his pedagogical interpretative exercise according to a Christological model, giving the student an educational *imitatio Christi.* While the Christological model operates for the student who imitates Christ, an enormous burden rests upon the shoulders of Abelard's ingenious teacher, who must handle the questions without fail or delay. Regarding this task, Willemien Otten has shown Abelard's place within the Augustinian heritage of "redeemed speech," such that the incarnation made possible the "concrete overlap between *res* and *verbum*, meaning that all speech . . . he can in theory become transformed into redeemed speech through the (oral) performance of a talented teacher."[157] How is even the most talented teacher to live up to such a task? In the next section, we shall deal with dialectic as the intellectual equipment.

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Abelard's earlier descriptions of the task of logic borrowed much from the Boethian, Ciceronian view of logic as *ratio disserendi* (or rationale for discussing), the parts of which include *inventio*, or discovering arguments, and *judicium*, or judging the merit of

[156] Ibid. 339–43: "Iuxta quod Veritas ipsa 'quaerite' inquit 'et invenietis, pulsate et aperietur vobis.' Quae nos etiam proprio exemplo moraliter instruens, circa duodecimum aetatis suae annum sedens et interrogans in medio doctorum inveniri voluit, primum discipuli nobis formam per interrogationem exhibens quam magistri per praedicationem, cum sit tamen ipsa Dei plena ac perfecta sapientia."
[157] See Otten, "Broken Mirrors," in *Mind Matters: Studies of Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual History in Honour of Marcia Colish,* ed. Cary Nederman, Nancy Van Deusen, E. A. Matter (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2009), 84.

arguments.[158] However necessary *inventio* might be to the Abelardian teacher described above, Abelard was clearly more interested in criterial logic. In the prologue to *Logica nostrorum petitioni,* Abelard explained logic as *ratio disserendi*:

> It is the discrimination of arguments through which [something] is discussed, that is disputed. Logic is not the science of employing arguments or of formulating them, but is discerning and truly judging them, whether of course these are strong, but those weak.[159]

The logician is primarily a judge, one who studies, establishes "firm rules" (*regulae certae*),[160] and then brings these principles to bear as criteria of truth. Mariateresa Beonio-Brocchieri saw in Abelard's various treatments the attempt "to give logical inquiry complete autonomy" by "isolating a rigorous and certain legitimizing criterion for every type of discourse of expression and separating the subjective and psychological aspects."[161] As the means of testing truth from falsehood, logic is then "the general and fundamental method in any investigation because it is the basis of all rules for any type of scientific or true discourse."[162] Dialectics then furnishes the fundamental rule of discourse to every science and so provides the armament to the ingenious teacher not

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[158] The magisterial treatment of Abelard's methods is Jean Jolivet's *Arts de Langage et Théologie chez Abélard* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1981), 263–320, 40–53; cf. C. J. Mews, "Peter Abelard on Dialectic, Rhetoric," in *Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100–1540: Essays in Honour of John O. Ward*, ed. Constant J. Mews, Cary J. Nederman, Rodney M. Thomson (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), 40. Citation from Boethius, *De topicis differentiis*, 1173C1–8.

[159] Peter Abelard, *Logica nostrorum petitioni,* 506.24–28. "Est autem logica Tulli auctoritate diligens ratio disserendi, idest discretio argumentorum per quae disseritur, idest disputatur. Non est logica scientia utendi argumentis sive componendi ea, sed discernendi et diiudicandi veraciter de eis, quare scilicet haec valent, illa infirma sint." See *Dialectica: First Complete edition of the Parisian Manuscript with an Introduction by LM de Rijk,* ed., L. M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1970), xxiv.

[160] Mariateresa Fumagalli Beonio-Brocchieri, *The Logic of Abelard*, trans. Simon Pleasance (Dordrecht: D Reidel, 1970), 14.

[161] Beonio-Brocchieri, 16, 17.

[162] Beonio-Brocchieri, 13.

only for dealing with diverse authorities but also granting a deeper access to the sapiential goal of all the sciences.

Against critics of his dialectical methods, Abelard offered a vigorous defense that revealed this deeper sapiential aim to which dialectical mastery alone gives access.[163] Abelard neutralized the anti-dialectic criticism by showing that since dialectics is a science and since all sciences are good, dialectics cannot be contrary to the faith.[164] He then proceeded to place dialectics preeminently over every other science. For the more a science brings one to recognize the truth, he reasoned, the greater that science. "But this is dialectics, to which all discernment of truth and falsity is so subject that as leader it possesses the supremacy of all philosophy and command of all teaching."[165] Dialectics is preeminent because without it, nothing true can be distinguished from the false; it gives the very power to distinguish truth from falsehood. Here we also note that Abelard framed dialectics practically and pedagogically, as holding the reins for all teaching (*universae doctrinae atque regimen*). For support, Abelard marshaled authorities commending dialectics as necessary for the study of scripture. Chief among these was Augustine, who pronounced dialectics, alongside arithmetic, the chief among the arts because of its power to dissolve difficult questions.[166] Rather than loving beautiful words,

[163] Abelard's defenses of dialectic appear in various iterations: Epistle 13, *Dialectia* (ed. De Rijk), pp. 469–71; *Theologia Summi Boni* II.5–27, 75–80; *Theologia scholarium* II.19–35; the *Theologia christiana* bears a more critical stance toward dialectic as open to abuse (II.116–29).
[164] Abelard, *Dialectica* IV, 469.
[165] *Dialectica* IV, 469.35–470.8; e.g. "Haec autem est dialectica, cui quidem omnis veritatis seu falsitatis discretio ita subiecta est, ut omnis philosophiae principatum dux universae doctrinae atque regimen possideat."
[166] Cf. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* IV.9–10; Abelard, *Theologia schol.* II.34–35.

Abelard followed Augustine in preferring to bring the hearer understanding: the golden key that does not open is useless compared to the wooden key that opens what is shut.[167] 'Opening what is shut' became for Abelard the intent of the teacher.[168] In 'opening,' the teacher's words have value only insofar as they produce understanding and clarity in the hearer.[169] That task is possible only to true dialecticians, for dialectics is—quoting Augustine—the "discipline of disciplines . . . it teaches to teach, it teaches to learn. In it reason shows and opens itself."[170]

Abelard's argument from authority for the validity of dialectics masterfully cut the ground out from under his opponents' feet. He leveraged traditional authorities (especially Augustine and Jerome) to support his pedagogical dependence upon dialectics in the classroom as a route, not only to dissolve knots, but as requisite for understanding and progress toward wisdom. [171] To eschew dialectics was to fail to teach for understanding or, worse, to attempt to teach what one does not understand. Such pseudo-masters fail in their office and fall under the ridicule of Gregory, Jerome, and Augustine.[172]

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[167] Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* IV.11,26; Abelard, *Theologia schol*. II.35.
[168] *Theologia schol.* II.36: "Si vero qui de ea tractaverunt, docere quod intendebant potuerunt, et quod clausum erat aperire."
[169] Ibid. II.48–55.
[170]Quoting Augustine, *De ordine* II.13; cf. Peter Abelard, *Invectiva in quemdam ignarum dialectices, qui tamen eius studium reprehendebat, et omnia eius dogmata putabat sophismata et deceptiones*, in *Petri Abaelardi Opera*. 2 volumes. ed., Victor Cousin (Paris: Aug. Durand, 1849), I.696.1–25. Text also available in *PL* 178, Epistola XIII.352D; *Letters IX–XIV: Edition with an Introduction*, ed. Edmé Smits (Groningen: Bouma's Boekhuis BV, 1983). "Disciplinam disciplinarum quam dialecticam vocant. Haec docet docere, haec docet discere. In hac se ipsa ratio demonstrat atque aperit quae sit, quid velit."
[171] For the authorities marshalled for dialectics, particularly Jerome and Augustine, see: *Theologia schol.* II.19–60.
[172] Ibid. II.45; 48–60, 56–58 on presumptive masters.

The motivation of anti-dialectical critics, for Abelard, is their incapacity for that art. For he saw dialectical acuity—necessary for the teacher ingeniously exercising his students by dealing with questions on discrepancies in *sententiae*, as we have seen—as no ordinary ability. It required a divine gift of talent. While Ruotger saw Bruno sharpen his God-given *ingenium* through vast erudition and exercise that *ingenium* by administration as well as teaching, Abelard saw *ingenium* rather in answering students' questions truly and intelligibly. For while all the arts are in some respect divine in origin,[173] Abelard held that only by an additional divine gift could one be qualified to become a practitioner of dialectics: "They are very few to whom divine grace deems worthy to reveal the secret of this science, nay rather, this treasury of wisdom."[174] In fact, Abelard identified this additional divine gift as the prized *ingenium*, without which all effort and study of dialectics is vain.

> Dialectics alone in its excellence holds that privilege that exercise does not confer it, but rather *ingenium*. For however much time you sweat in its teaching, you spend your effort fruitlessly unless the gift of heavenly grace has furnished your mind with the capacity for such a great secret [as dialectics].[175]

Diligent effort and study reap rewards in every other science, Abelard maintained, but dialectics, the ruling and criterial science over all other sciences, requires a certain mental

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[173] *Dialectica* IV, 469.33–35: "Ex his itaque scientiam omnem, quae a Deo solo est et ex ipsius munere procedit, bonam esse convincimus."
[174] *Dialectica* IV, 470.27: "At vero perpauci sunt quibus huius scientiae secretum, immo sapientiae thesaurum, divina revelare gratia dignetur."
[175] *Dialectica* IV, 471.2–6: "Quae quidem sola id in excellentia sua privilegium tenet, ut non eam exercitium, sed potius conferat ingenium. Quantocumque enim tempore in eius doctrina desudaveris, laborem inaniter consumis, nisi mente tua arcani tanti capacitatem caelestis gratiae munus effecerit." Cf. *Theologia Christiana* III.7.

endowment. Without sufficient *ingenium,* the student labors fruitlessly. Abelard warned some students off dialectics for just this reason; its pursuit is very demanding and its "excessive subtlety consumes the studies and time of many fruitlessly."[176] Against incapacity, the teacher cannot help: "Unless [divine grace] internally built up the mind beforehand, the one who teaches externally beats the air in vain."[177] As Jean Jolivet summarized it: "It is God himself who graciously grants the logician's talent. This idea has the advantage of ascribing to enemies of dialectic an incapacity that is radical and insurmountable."[178] Those without this gift criticize what they do not understand, while Abelard further legitimized his own talent-reliant teaching as exhibiting his divine warrant.

By this special gift, Abelard's model of the ingenious teacher operates on the basis of divine gifting and illumination:

> For why is it that, when a teacher conveys his words to the ears of different students equally, yet these do not understand them equally, except that the *inner teacher* is present to some (but not to others) who teaches those who will it even without sound.[179]

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[176] *Dialectica* IV, 470.31–34: "Sed quia labor huius doctrinae duiturnus ipsos assiduitate legendi fatigat lectores et multorum studia et aetates subtilitas nimia inaniter consumit, multi, nec quidem irrationabiliter, de ea diffidentes ad eius angustissimas fores non audent accedere."
[177] *Dialectica* IV, 471.7–9: "Haec autem divinae gratiae tantum ascribenda est, quae nisi mentem praestruat interius, frustra qui docet aerem verberat exterius." Elsewhere, Abelard discussed the interior gift in terms of illumination from the interior teacher, adopting Augustinian terminology. Cf. *Theologia Christiana* III.30–31: "Nisi eo interius illuminante, qui nisi mentem instruat interius, frustra qui docet aërem verberat exterius." Cf. Otten's discussion of Abelard's comments in *Paradise,*160–63.
[178] Jean Jolivet, *Arts de Langage*, 269: "C'est Dieu même qui accorde gracieusement le talent de logicien. Cette thèse a l'avantage d'attribuer aux adversaires de la dialectique une incompétence radicale et insurmontable."
[179] *Theologia Christiana* III.30 (emphasis mine): "Quid est enim quod, cum alicuius doctoris verba aequaliter ad aures diversorum perferuntur, nec tamen aequaliter ab eis intelliguntur, nisi quod quibusdam praesto est interior magister, quibusdam minime, qui quos vult etiam sine sono docet?" Cf.

Not only must the divine gift furnish the necessary *ingenium,* the 'inner teacher' must also teach one inwardly in order for one to learn or become a master of dialectics. From this privileged position of the divinely-taught, ingenious, dialectical teacher, Abelard undermined his anti-dialectical critics. For many attempt to learn dialectics and fail. Soured by their disappointment, these then turn to berate that pursuit they studied fruitlessly as if it were vain. Abelard likened such to the fabled fox who, unable to reach the fruit, turned away grumbling about their sour taste.[180] Such anti-dialectical criticisms are self-serving: "What they do not understand, they say is foolishness; what they cannot grasp, they judge to be nonsense."[181] By rooting the dialectical teacher's ability in a divine gift, with this strategy Abelard skillfully derided and undermined the anti-dialecticians as incapable, as well as further elevated dialects (and the dialectical teacher), the science which judges truth, whose grasp came only by divine help.

While the Boethian-Ciceronian tradition—as we saw above—ascribed authority to the talented on account of successful undertakings, Abelard greatly deepened ingenious authority. By combining *ingenium* with Augustinian illumination and the inner teacher, Abelard vested his talented teacher with great authority.[182] For it is the ingenious teacher alone who dialectically determines the true and false, who correctly handles and even

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*Theologia Christiana,* ed. E. Buytaert, CCCM 12 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969). Cf. *Theologia 'Summi boni'* II.18–19, ed. E. Buytaert, C. Mews, CCCM 13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987); Otten, *Paradise to Paradigm,* 160–161. Cf. *Theologia Sum. Bon.* II.72–74 for the role of divine illumination of philosophers.

[180] *Invectiva* 695.1–10; cf. Letter 13 (ed Smits); 271.1–8.

[181] *Invectiva* 695.10–696.1; cf. Letter 13 (ed Smits): "Quidquid non intelligunt, stultitiam dicunt, quicquid capere non possunt, aestimant deliramentum."

[182] For background on illuminationism, see Lydia Schumacher's *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 66–103. Schumacher, however, overlooked Abelard's place in the tradition and reception of Augustinian illuminationism.

judges the sentences of authorities. Placing him again in the transitioning school-landscape, Abelard's pedagogy of talent for dialectic warrants the independent teacher. Yet that warrant is not rationalistic. For if truth can only be discerned by dialecticians, and if only divine grace endows the necessary *ingenium* upon very few (*perpauci*), then only very few can discern the truth of reason.[183] This is not opposition to authority but sets up a separate kind of authority, lodged not in civil or ecclesial office but in the personal skill of the ingenious teacher.

## V. Christian Logics

For all the famous master's concern with the technics of dialectical practice, it might be tempting to reduce his teaching to dialectics devoid of moral concern.[184] The student—as he already comes into view—ought to imitate the questioning Christ. In defending dialectics, Abelard returned to this theme, portraying the Christian life as a pentecostal pursuit of truth. In this progress, the student perfects his morals through discerning understanding, progressing toward Wisdom, who, Abelard repeatedly reminded his students, was the second trinitarian Person.[185]

For all Abelard's theorization of talent-reliant teaching, he never placed trust in talent *as such*, but only *ingenium* properly trained as well as morally formed. After all, he

[183] See *Dialectica* IV, 470.26, as quoted above.
[184] Cf. *Envy of Angels,* 229–36; Jaeger selectively read Abelard's *Camen ad Astralabium* to here show the radical disjunct between his 'new learning' and the moral 'old' (229–30) while finding also in the poem Abelard's return to that moral culture: "Abelard came to the ethics of the old learning by betraying them. . . . He argues against himself and warns against his own example" (235).
[185] E.g. *Theologia Sum. Bon.* III.52–86; *Theologia scholarium* III.83–111; for the failure of gratitude, *Theologia chr.* III.21–23.

explicitly narrated his own failings while operating through talent in his *History.* Not only can the talented fail, but their particular failure is pride in their own ability: they ascribe their gift to themselves rather than to God and so blind themselves by pride.[186] "It is one thing by discussion to seek the truth and another by disputation to argue for the sake of display."[187] The admonitions in the later *Carmen* are consistent: "No one may be wise through the keenness of great genius: rather moral and a good life make him so." [188] In writing to his adolescent son, Abelard emphasized the virtues but did not retract his views on talent, including humbly remembering the divine source of one's gifts.[189]

Yet Abelard did not formulate independent regulations to outwardly form his students' morals—as did his contemporary, canon Hugh of Saint-Victor abbey.[190] Rather, Abelard began with Heloise a project of reenvisioning the monastic life as a philosophical life. In effect, this project, which developed in the correspondence between Heloise and Abelard, sought to transpose the culture of learning from the schools into the cloister, specifically, for the nuns of the Paraclete. As both headed Benedictine monastic houses—Abelard as abbot of St. Gildas-de-Rhuys, Heloise as abbess for her sisters at the Paraclete—Heloise pressed the topic by asking Abelard about the history of women

[186] That the talented may be deceived by fallacies, see *Theologia Sum.Bon.* II.5; *Theologia chr.* II.117.
[187] *Theologia chr.* III.15: "Aliud quippe est conferendo veritatem inquirere, aliud disputando contendere ad ostentationem."
[188] *Carmen ad Astralabium* (ed., trans. Juanita Ruys), 55–56: "Ingenii sapiens sit nullus acumine magni:/ hunc pocius mores et bona vita creant."
[189] See *Carmen,* on virtues, e.g., 89–110, 404–440, 477–530, etc; on talent, e.g., 278–279, and the source, 501–524.
[190] For Hugh's reaction and response to the teaching of the Parisian masters, including Abelard, see chapter 3.

religious and how to update the *Rule of Benedict* for women.[191] While Benedict's *Rule* did not enjoin education or even encourage it, in his own *Rule* (within *Letter 8*) Abelard placed the culture of learning at the heart of the Paraclete's monastic life. His prescriptions are tinged with a philosophical distrust for customs; Abelard professed relying "partly on good customs, partly on testimonies of scriptures or the supports of reason."[192] The cloister itself was to be imbued with this reliance upon reason over custom. Citing Cyprian and Gregory VII, Abelard set it down as a rule: "Now we absolutely forbid that custom should ever be set above reason; a practice must never be defended on grounds of custom but only of reason, not because it is usual but because it is good."[193] This principle would entail a radical practice, possibly the disuse of a monastic customary; instead of reliance on custom, all their sisters were to discuss freely in chapter to decide courses of action.[194] But how could such a community be kept in good order?

Discipline was naturally the purview of the abbess (whom Abelard called the deaconess). Benedict's abbot shepherded souls into humility and obedience; Abelard's deaconess was to oversee the educational culture of her cloister.[195] The deaconess, who holds the "preceptorship of religion" (*religionis preest magisterio*) was responsible for

[191] Letter 6, §3–4 (ed. Luscombe).
[192] Letter 8.2 (ed. Luscombe): "Nos itaque partim consuetudinibus bonis, partim scripturarum testimoniis vel rationum nitentes fulcimentis." For Abelard's view that the philosopher distrusts custom, see the strong statement for the figure of the Philosopher in *Collationes* I.7–8.
[193] *Institutio,* 71 (ed. Luscombe); translation adopted from Luscombe. "Omnino enim prohibemus ut numquam consuetudo rationi preponatur nec umquam aliquid deffendatur quis sit consuetudo, sed quia ratio; nec quia sit usitatum, sed quia bonum."
[194] Ibid. 68–70, 72–74.
[195] *Rule of Benedict*, 2–3, 5, 7, 64.

teaching virtue in word but especially in deed.[196] Should an uneducated deaconess be elected, she ought to set herself to teaching practical virtue rather than learned schoolroom disputes, and should avail herself of more educated counsel.[197] However, Abelard's model deaconess was Heloise: in his sermon *On Studies* to the nuns of Paraclete, he urged them "while you can and while you have a mother [Heloise] skilled in these three languages [Latin, Hebrew, Greek], to try to perfect their study" in sacred letters.[198] Heloise embodied the ideal: "an example of virtue and a teacher of letters."[199] In *On Studies* and his *Rule,* Abelard pointed to Jerome's model of learned female religious life as the goal for the Paraclete nuns to cultivate. The center of his learned cloister was reading sacred scripture, that is, reading scripture *with understanding.* Mustered authorities agree reading scripture was the pathway to salvation but—as in Abelard's school—what worth had reading without understand the words?[200] Their contemporary monastic culture's focus on outward show instead of understanding was a diabolical perversion: "What prompting by the Devil brought about the present situation in monasteries whereby there are no studies there on how to understand the Scriptures, but only in training in singing or just in pronunciation without understanding the words?"[201] In this spirit of lettered cloisters, Abelard transposed monastic notions, including silence

[196] *Institutio*, 30; 29.
[197] Ibid. 29;
[198] Letter 9, "On Studies," *The Letters of Heloise and Abelard: A Translation of their Collected Correspondence and Related Writings*, ed. and trans. Mary Martin McLaughlin, Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 204.
[199] Ibid. 206.
[200] *Institutio*, 116–17.
[201] Ibid., 118.

and discretion, into pedagogical modes.[202] This monastic pedagogical reenvisioning was a joint project between Abelard and Heloise. For she seems to have adopted the pedagogical office for studies, as her *Problems of Heloise* shows: she wrote Abelard to ask "as pupils to their teacher" erudite and subtle questions for interpretation of scripture that "came up in the course of our daily studies."[203] Evidently supervising or teaching lessons at the Paraclete, Heloise relayed back to Abelard questions much like what might be aired in his Parisian schoolroom. Given the role of questions in Abelard's classroom, it is not hard to see behind this letter Heloise practicing their joint vision of a pedagogical, learned religious life.

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While Abelard and Heloise were reenvisioning and possibly practicing a monastic-scholastic hybridized life, the Parisian master continued to attract controversy. In his final years, condemned at Sens and taking refuge at Cluny, Abelard penned his *Confession* to Heloise:

> Logic has made me hated by the world. For the perverted . . . say that I am supreme as a logician, but am found wanting in my understanding of Paul. They proclaim the brilliance of my intellect (*acies ingenii*) but detract from the purity of my Christian faith. As I see it, they have reached this judgement by conjecture rather than weight of evidence. I do not wish to be a philosopher if it means conflicting with Paul, nor to be an Aristotle if it cuts me off from Christ. [204]

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[202] *Institutio*, 6–11;89–90.
[203] "*Heloise's Questions* [*Problemata Heloissae]: Forty-Two Questions Posed by Heloise and Answered by Abelard, with an Introductory Letter by Heloise*. *The Letters of Heloise and Abelard*, ed. McLaughlin, Wheeler, 214.
[204] "Odiosum me mundo reddidit logica. Aiunt enim perversi pervententes, quorum sapientia est in perditione, me in logica praestantissium esse sed in Paulo non mediocriter claudicare, cumque ingenii praedicent aciem, Christianae fidei subtrahunt puritatem, quia, ut mihi videtur, opinione potius

Here one might be tempted to see a weary Abelard near his end repenting of his logic and returning to Christ. Rather, Abelard steadfastly rejected his critics' attempt to force a wedge between his intellect and his faith. He refused a disjuncture between Christ who is Wisdom and the liberal arts directed by dialectic. To understand this view, we conclude with the vision offered even in his earlier works that the Christian life involves questioning and philosophical testing.

As early as his *Dialectica* (ca. 1117), Abelard cast logical study as a pious act.[205] It is this pursuit that characterizes the true follower of Christ. Like many subsequent defenders of scholasticism, Abelard argued that the disputatious method is valuable as the only weapon for defending the faith and confuting errors and heretics.[206] By so doing, one acts as a true philosopher and follower of Christ:

> In [that] disputation, when we refute those sophists, we show ourselves dialecticians and as much as we prevail impressively by the truth of arguments, by that much we will be disciples mindful of Christ, who is Truth.[207]

The Christological link is evident in the etymology, for *logica* derives from λὸγος, that is, *Verbum seu Sapientia Dei*, just as 'Christianus' derives from 'Christus'.[208] Since Christ is

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traducuntur ad iudicium quam experientiae magistratu. Nolo, nolo sic esse philosophus ut recalcitratem Paulo. Nolo sic esse Aristoteles ut secludar a Christo." This *Confessio* was reported by his student Berengar of Poitiers. See "The Satirical Works of Berengar of Poitiers," ed. R. Thomson, *Mediaeval Studies* 42 (1980): 117–18. Above I adopted Radice's translation. See "Abelard's Confession of Faith," (trans) Betty Radice, *The Letters of Abelard and Heloise* (NY: Penguin Books, 2003), 211.

[205] The *Dialectica* was probably based on his lectures in ca. 1115–16 and written ca. 1117–18. See John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 46.

[206] Cf. *Dialectica* IV, 470–71; *Invectiva* 697–99 (ed. Smits, Letter 13); *Theologia Christiana*, III.3ff; *Theologia 'Scholarium'* II,.65.

[207] *Invectiva*, 698.2–4: "In qua profecto disputatione, quum illos sophistas convicerimus, nos dialecticos exhibebimus et tanto Christi, qui veritas est, discipuli memores erimus, quanto veritate rationum amplius pollebimus."

[208] This etymological link was expanded in *Theologia scholarium* I.59–63.

Truth, to pursue truth through logical study and disputation is to be a genuine follower of Christ.[209] Christ even modeled dialectics for his followers by preaching and disputing with his opponents.[210] Furthermore, Christ promised to gird his disciples with logical armament, by which they would become the greatest logicians (*summi logici*).[211] The Person of the Holy Spirit—to whom Abelard dedicated Heloise's monastic community—then became the source not only of comfort but also of logical, linguistic illumination. As Peter von Moos put it, "To the founder of the monastery of the Paraclete, the miracle of Pentecost was the decisive entry of God into the human history of language and the point of revaluation of all values in the theory of language."[212] For at Pentecost, Abelard understood Christ's promise consummated in the form of the flaming tongues [Cf. Acts 2]. The fiery aspect symbolized the ardent love for truth that characterizes a philosopher; the form of the tongue showed the linguistic ability.[213] Abelard's dialectical teacher, then, with his fierce disputations, becomes the preeminent path of the philosopher-Christian.

## VI. Conclusion: Talent and the Proto-scholastics

[209] Ibid., 698.3–21: "Cujus etiam amatores tanto verius appellantur philosophi, quanto veriores sint illius sophiae superioris amatores."
[210] Ibid., 699.5–12, citing Paul (1 Cor 1.22) as support.
[211] Ibid., 698: "Profecto post amorem sui, unde veri dicendi sunt philosophi, patenter et illam rationum armaturam eis pollicetur, qua in disputando summi efficiatur logici."
[212] Peter von Moos, "Literary Aesthetics in the Latin Middle Ages: The Rhetorical Theology of Peter Abelard," *Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100–1540: Essays in Honour of John O. Ward*, ed. Constant Mews, Cary Nederman, Rodney Thomson (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), 86–87.
[213] Ibid. 698–699.4: "Haec enim duo maxime ille superni Spiritus adventus in igneis linguis revelatus eis contulit: ut per amorem philosophos, et per rationum virtutum summos efficeret logicos. Unde bene Spiritus in ignis et linguarum specie est demonstratus, qui eis amorem et eloquentiam in omni genere linguarum conferret."

The Peripatetic from Le Pallet provoked both criticism and warm admiration in the schools. He did not cause the changes occuring in the schools or its learning cultures; he charted a bold path through them marked by both grand success and humiliating defeat. His model of the teacher, warranted by talent for dialectical adjudication of truth, stirred the pot of the French and especially Parisian schools. In Abelard's wake, admirers and critics alike had to take account of *ingenium* and comment on its educational role. To conclude, I shall point out Abelard's contemporaries' views of *ingenium* as distinct from Abelard's as well as the emerging school milieu that took *ingenium* both as topic of discussion and as practical equipment for scholarly success.

Abelard's contemporaries who are often associated with Chartres developed *ingenium* as an imaginative power of the soul with creative potential. Winthrop Wetherbee highlighted this developing role of *ingenium* particularly for William of Conches:

> *Ingenium* is a vital link in human consciousness, uniting the highest and basest capacities of will and curiosity. It is closely related to imagination, the power of mind by which things are perceived, and thus to fantasies of all sorts, from the wildest dream to the highest state of vision.[214]

Developing the strands from Apuleius, Isidore, and others, William posited *ingenium*—"the natural power to quickly understand something"—as the first of three powers of the soul that reach after wisdom.[215] William's schema of *ingenium* (for understanding), *ratio*

[214] Winthrop Wetherbee, *Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 94–95.
[215] Ed. L. Nauta, *Guillelmi de Conchis Glosae super Boetium* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999); *In Consolationem* I.pr. 1, p. 19: "Tria sunt quae faciunt perfecte sapientem: ingenium, id est naturalis vis ad aliquid cito intelligendum." Cf. *In Consolationem* II. pr. 2, p. 102. On William of Conches, see Willemien Otten, *Paradise*

(for judging), and memory (for retention) mirrored that of Adelard of Bath. Discussing why some have stronger *ingenium* and others stronger memory, Adelard had adapted Calcidius' more Aristotelian account, replacing *ingenium* with Calcidius' *imaginatio*. *Ingenium* or the phantastical power "understands"; reason judges; memory recalls.[216] Adelard and William melded the rhetorical *ingenium* with an Aristotelian psychological frame to create a rather new role for *ingenium*, a role involving creativity and understanding. This creative, imaginative *ingenium* finds significant roles in the thought of Thierry of Chartres and in other later authors including the (uncertain) *Commentary on the Aeneid*, Bernardus Silvestris (fl. 1130–1150), and Alan of Lille (ca. 1128–1202).[217] *Ingenium* functions in this discourse—similar to the ancient rhetorical tradition—as a natural capacity of the student learning and striving for sapiential goals.[218]

The question arises whether Abelard might have had contact with his contemporaries' notions of *ingenium* before he characterized (around 1132) his own

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*to Paradigm*, 123–27, 136–37; on the background tradition that William and others adapted, see Theodore Silverstein, "The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris," *Modern Philology* 46.2 (1948): 97–98.

[216] Adelard of Bath thus connected the ingenius (*ingenialis*) power to classic φαντασία, or *imaginatio*. See ed. Martin Müller, *Die Quaestiones Naturales des Adelardus von Bath*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters: Texte und Untersuchungen, 31.2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1934), §XVII–XVIII, especially XVII, p. 22: "In cerebro enim utitur phantastico motu, id est ingeniali, rationali etiam, id est iudicio, sed et memoriali, id est recordatione. Prius enim intelligit, deinde, quod intellectum est, iudicat, tertio, ipsum iudicium constantiae commendat."
See: Calcidius, *Commentaire au* Timée *de Platon*, ed. Béatrice Bakhouche (Paris: J. Vrin, 2011). The larger discussion of human powers lies in §208–35; §224 is especially pertinent to Adelard and William.

[217] On this larger and later conversation, see Kathryn Lynch, *The High Medieval Dream Vision: Poetry, Philosophy, and Literary Form* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 34–42. The commentary referred to is ed. Edward Jones, Elizabeth Jones, *The Commentary on the First Six Books of the "Aeneid" of Vergil Commonly Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1977).

[218] For a synthetic account and how *ingenium* as a power of the soul functions in the Platonic ascent, see Peter Ellard's chapter "Illumination: The Soul's Journey into God" in *The Sacred Cosmos: Theological, Philosophical, and Scientific Conversations in the Twelfth-Century School of Chartres* (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2007), esp. 195–203.

teaching as ingenious. Regardless, Abelard significantly transposed the notion in three respects: he transferred the primary locus of *ingenium* from student to teacher—now the *teacher's talent* made education successful, not the teacher's shaping of student talent. Second, as *ingenium* was now the teacher's rather than the student's, its function likewise altered from the ability to understand for oneself into the ability to impart understanding in others. Finally, Abelard never explicitly schematized *ingenium* as a psychological power, as did Adelard of Bath and William of Conches, yet he moved *ingenium* implicitly from the creative imaginative role to a keenness to understand and to wage dialectical dispute. By these three significant shifts, the notion of *ingenium* could be deployed in the proto-scholastic context of Northern France.

Abelard's performance and then theorization of talent-reliance was marked by his contemporaries. Otto of Freising, a student in Paris during Abelard's lifetime, later commented on that master's talent. Otto was critical of Abelard's performance of his talent: he was devoted to studies but "was so arrogant and relied upon his talent alone, that he would scarcely be humbled from his mind's height to listen to his teachers."[219] Otto further remarked Abelard's disrespect to Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux and, while teaching in Paris, noted his great ability for philosophy as well as trifles.[220] Otto's reason for commenting on Abelard was specifically to contrast that poor display of talent with another's: the contemporary master Gilbert of Poitiers. Otto's

[219] Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici imperatoris* I.49: "tam arrogans suoque tantum ingenio confidens, ut vix ad audiendos magistros ab altitudine mentis suae humiliatus descenderet."
[220] Ibid. I.49.

account of Gilbert sandwiches Abelard's, coming before and after.[221] In contrast to Abelard's arrogance, Gilbert functions for Otto as a humble and moral counter-example: Gilbert was also a teacher who cultivated philosophy until old age and who "was accustomed to say many things beyond the common custom of men on account of the magnitude of his subtle talent (*ingenii subtilis*) and the keenness of his arguments."[222] Like Abelard, Gilbert was accused, but instead of a similar condemnation, Otto showed Gilbert vindicated for his morals: "For he from youth submitted to the discipline of great men and trusted more to their influence than to his talent (*suo ingenio*)."[223] Gilbert's ingenious performance excelled Abelard's by his moderation and personal mildness, his prestigious teachers, and his abstention from trifles—in Otto's eyes, all that Abelard lacked.[224]

Possibly following Abelard's example, others after him approached the schools trusting to their talent. Otto himself noted others like Abelard—including famed teacher Thierry of Chartres—had "keen wits applied to arts" (*acuta ingenia*) but inept at other business.[225] Ironically, that same Thierry of Chartres complained against pretenders to talent: "For those pretending talent by detesting study and those professors of household

[221] Ibid., I.48, 52.
[222] Ibid., I.48: "Consuetus ex ingenii subtilis magnitudine ac rationum acumine multa preter communem hominum morem dicere."
[223] Ibid., I.52: "Iste enim ab adolescentia magnorum virorum disciplinae se subiciens magisque illorum ponderi quam suo credens ingenio."
[224] Gilbert was another master who navigated the early twelfth-century schools and held a brilliant reputation, but whose career is much more obscure. See Theresa Gross-Diaz, *The Psalms Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers: From* Lectio Divina *to the Lecture Room* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), esp. 1–25.
[225] Otto, *Gesta* I.49: "Terra [Brittania] clericorum acuta ingenia et artibus applicata habentium, sed ad alia negotia pene stolidorum ferax, quales fuerunt duo fratres Bernhardus et Theodericus, viri doctissimi."

study by dissembling the master, then, such actors armed for fights of empty words follow my camp."[226] Thierry taught at Chartres at some point, but he, too, moved to Paris, where his school flourished in the 1130s and 1140s.[227] His complaint targeted the Parisian milieu—they claim talents but only produce verbiage. Just as Otto saw Thierry as a figure of talent, Thierry saw rivals and students as attempting to proceed by talent. Placing these witnesses alongside the talented St. Goswin and Walter of Mortagne, it becomes clear that a growing milieu saw *ingenium* as the gift needed for learning.

*Ingenium* not only became important equipment for those in the schools, then, but also a topic worthy of dispute. Two proto-scholastic theologies evince the place of talent as a topic. The *Summa sententiarum* (*Summa of Sentences*, ca. 1138) is a compilation that owes much to Hugh of Saint-Victor and probably emerged from the Victorine school.[228] This *Summa* treated *ingenium* as a natural and commonly recognized power of the soul and highlighted it as morally neutral, neither themselves making one just or unjust, "provided neither talent be thought slow nor memory slipping."[229] The *Ysagoge in*

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[226] Thierry of Chartres, *Theodorici Britonis Commentarius super Rhetoricam Ciceronis*, I.prol., p. 49: "Nam simulatores ingenii exsecrando studium et professores domestici studii dissimulando magistrum tum etiam scolastice disputationis histriones inanium verborum pugnis armati tales quidem mea castra secuntur." See Ed. Karin Fredborg, *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres* (Toronto: PIMS, 1988). Cf. Nikolaus Häring, "Chartres and Paris Revisited," *Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis*, ed. J. R. O'Donnell (Toronto: PIMS, 1974), 292–93.

[227] See Fredborg's "Introduction" in *Latin Rhetorical Commentaries*, 8–12.

[228] David Luscombe called it the "the Place de l'Etoile of early twelfth-century theological literature, the point of arrival and of departure and the centre of circulation for many other writings and teachings." See *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 198, 198–213. While some have ascribed *SS* to Otto of Lucca, I find Marcia Colish's argument for a Victorine source persuasive. See "Otto of Lucca, Author of the *Summa Sententiarum*?" *Discovery and Distinction in the Early Middle Ages: Studies in Honor of John J. Contreni,* ed. Cullen Chandler (Kalamazoo: Steven Stofferahn, 2013), 57–72.

[229] *Summa sententiarum*, PL 176.43–174. Somewhat casual mentions occur (ea quae sunt ex ipsa creatione, ut ingenium, memoria, 110A; illa etiam bona naturalia quae adhuc habet anima ut ratio, ingenium,

*Theologiam* (ca. 1148–52) drew from the *Summa sententiarum,* but represented an independent stance between Victorine and Abelardian thought.[230] *Ysagoge* took a more systematic approach, cataloging and describing human powers, beginning with the body and moving into moral questions. Knowledge and virtue seed virtues. The causes of knowledge (in agreement with Adelard and William) are *ingenium*, reason, and memory, the first of which is "a natural power for grasping what is comprehensible."[231] Influence of the *Summa sententiarum* appears in discussion of moral neutrality of *ingenium*, and its failing in "slowness."[232] Finally, like Thierry's complaint of pretenders, both works refer to those holding a different view as "presuming on their talent."[233] It seems evident, then, that in post-Abelardian schools, *ingenium* was both an intellectual topic and a recognized *modus operandi*.[234]

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memoria, et caetera, 112C; cf. 82B). "Ingenium quoque et memoria et caetera similia, nec justum nec injustum constituunt. Siquidem nec tardum ingenium nec labilis memoria imputatur" (102A).

[230] For the dating, see: ed. Arthur Landgraf, *Écrits Théologiques de l'École d'Abélard* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), LIV; despite Landgraf's view that *Ysagoge* is Abelardian, see Luscombe, *School of Abelard*, 236–44.

[231] Ed. Landgraf, *Ysagoge*, I.70: "Scientiarum autem cause virtutum ingenium, ratio, memoria. Et est ingenium naturalis potentia concipiendi comprehensibilia." Cf. I.100.

[232] Ibid., 91, 104: "..corruptio ingenii, quie [est] tarditas."

[233] Clear textual similarity links the two passages. See *Summa* PL 176.54A: "Quidam tamen de ingenio suo praesumentes"; *Ysagoge* III, 251: "Scio tamen nonnullos, qui de suo presumentes ingenio."

[234] German teacher Conrad of Hirsau's *Dialogus super auctores* betrayed the importance of *ingenium* in education and for his readers. He frequently noted the *ingenium* of authors, remarked on the need for the student to sharpen their *ingenium* through exercise, and pointed which books best served to polish the student's *ingenium*. For example, the question arose over Ovid's reading; other authors' "upright reading sharpens our wit and calls us to virtue," but why have young readers risk their mind with adulterated readings ("quorum honesta lectio no ingenio quidem acuit et provocat ad virtutes. . . . Cur ovidianis libris Christi tyrunculus docile summittat ingenium")? See ed. R. B. Huygens, *Accessus ad auctores / Bernard d'Utrecht; Dialogus super auctores / Conrad d'Hirsau: Critique, Entièrement Revue et Augmentée* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 71.5, 72.46, 84.381, 91.600, 97.798, 100.883, 102.944, 103.986, 105.1043, 109.1174–82, 110.1203, 112.1264, (On Ovid) 114.1325–30, 115.1374, 120.1502. Interestingly, Conrad (citing Isidore, *Etymologiae* II.3.2) recalled the rhetorical triad of *natura*, *doctrina*, *usus*, or *ingenium*, *scientia*, *assiduitas* (124.1646–7). Away from Paris in the Rhineland, Conrad somehow still read Parisian texts, particularly Hugh of St-Victor, whose *De sacramentis christianae fidei* I have found him quoting (allowing the *ante post quem* of his

Besides the anonymous *Summa sententiarum* and *Ysagoge*, noted Parisian master Adam of Balsham or de Petit Pont cited *ingenium* as the foundation of dialectic. Adam's *Ars disserendi* (1132) was a logical textbook that began setting out for the student-reader the basis and history of the art and how *his presentation* is superior.[235] The roots of dialectic are knowledge, art, and fluency (*scientia*, *ars*, *facultas*); these derive from the classical three: *ingenium*, practice (*usus*), and art (*ars*). The derivation builds, however: in reverse order, fluency derives from practice, art, and *ingenium*; art derives from practice and *ingenium*; knowledge from *ingenium* alone.[236] Adam paused to work out these mutual relationships whose underlying and *sine qua non* stratum was *ingenium*. This schema set up his brief history of the discipline of dialectics. While the art once flourished, intervening years saw fluency, then art, then knowledge stripped away. *Ingenium* cannot be removed; on that basis, Adam saw that in his time dialectics was being restored.[237] Here Adam highlighted for his student the necessity of *ingenium* for logical study—in itself as well as in the historical moment of recovering that discipline.

Yet while highlighting talent, Adam was also critical of his rival teachers' methods of disorderly teaching. Writing to highlight his own teaching, he declared, "Against these, then, the business we have undertaken will be for teaching the art in this way, so that by

*Dialogus super auctores* to be changed to 1137, when *De sacramentis* was first disseminated). Cf. 123.1595–124.1624; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* (ed. R. Berndt), Prolog. p. 33, 16–34,6.

[235] Cf. Minio-Paluello, "Introduction," in ed. L. Minio-Paluello, *Twelfth Century Logic: Texts and Studies* I (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1956), xxi.

[236] Adam Balsamiensis Parvipontani, *Ars disserendi*, in ed. Minio-Paluello, *Twelfth Century Logic* I, I.2–3: "Tria igitur et quorum et ex quibus initia, sed non ex singulis singulorum: scientie enim disserendi ex ingenio absque ceteris initium, artis autem ex hoc et usu, facultatis autem ex his et arte."

[237] Ibid., I.6–7.

it the comprehension of the art would be *full*, as well as *easy*, [and] exercises according to the art [for] skillful fluency."[238] Advertising his lessons' three features, Adam then expounded each: the exercises will posit examples for how to use the skills. His lessons will be easier, reducing the effort required, in part by the *fullness*. It is here that Adam's rivals fail: "We say 'full comprehension of the art' since we will take care to show the whole way of the art *in order*, lest, in manner of others who grandly explain select matter around the art, we be found never to have taught the art itself."[239] More important than exercises or ease, Adam claims distinction by his promise to teach the whole art itself in order. In this concern for order, Adam echoed another famous Parisian master, Hugh of Saint-Victor—the subject of the next two chapters. Like Adam, Hugh looked at the educational practices of their contemporary Parisians with skepticism. Unlike Adam, who attracted students on the acknowledgement of *ingenium* and promised to hone it, Hugh criticized talent-reliance and articulated a very different pedagogy, centering on memory. Hugh, as well as Peter Lombard and John of Salisbury, found it necessary to deal after Abelard with an emerging scholastic milieu concerned with talent and its potential, and each formulated their own pedagogical project partially in response to that Abelardian practice.

[238] Ibid., I.8: "Erit igitur contra hec a nobis susceptum artis instituende negotium huiusmodi, ut artis ex eo plena sit et facilis cognitio, secundum artem exercitii artificiosa facultas." Emphases are mine.
[239] Ibid., 1.8; " 'Plena artis cognitio' quoniam nos totam artis viam ordine monstrare curabimus ne, more ceterorum circa artem conquisita magnifice explicantes, ipsam artem nusquam docuisse inveniamur." Emphasis on *ordine* is mine.

## Chapter 3:

## Order and Balance:

## Hugh of Saint-Victor's Critique of the Parisian Masters

In late 1111, Peter Abelard visited the schoolroom of his former master, William of Champeaux, and publicly challenged him on the question of universals. Though he later praised William for his accomplishment and reputation in dialectics, Abelard boasted about the confrontration and reported that he forced William to modify his views on universals.[240] That famous confrontation took place in William's school in the nascent Saint-Victor community, outside Paris.[241] William's new community would grow into the famous and influential Saint-Victor Abbey. This chapter will examine the thought of one of the canons of Saint-Victor, the master of its famous school: Hugh of Saint-Victor. We shall see that Hugh of Saint-Victor offered a strong critique of the pedagogical model of dialectical reliance upon talent.

Abelard was far from the only one experimenting with new forms of learning and teaching. The Abbey of Saint-Victor was a house of canons regular, an outgrowth of a larger movement springing from the papal reforms initiated in the eleventh century. The

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[240] Abelard, *Historia calamitatum* §2; Constant Mews has found evidence that William did modify his views on universals, possibly as a result of that encounter. See Constant Mews, "*Logica* in the Service of Philosophy: William of Champeaux and his Influence," *Schrift, Schreiber, Schenker: Studien zur Abtei Sankt Viktor in Paris und den Viktorinern,* ed. Rainier Berndt, S.J. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005), 77–117; see also Y. Iwakuma, "Pierre Abélard et Guillaume de Champeaux dans les premièrs années du XIIe siècle: Une étude préliminaire," *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe siècle,* ed. J. Baird (Paris: Vrin, 1999).

[241] See Constant Mews, "Memories of William of Champeaux: The Necrology and the Early Years of Saint-Victor," *Legitur in Necrologio Victorino: Studien zum Nekrolog der Abtei Saint-Victor zu Paris,* ed. A Loffler, B. Gebert (Munster: Aschendorff Verlag), 78–86; 71–97.

canons regular were reformers of the clergy, specifically the priests who lived and operated in communal chapters, under the jurisdiction of bishops, and attached to prominent churches or cathedrals.[242] The movement emerged in Italy and southern France and enjoyed great success in Northern France in the early twelfth century.[243] When William had been Abelard's master, he was a secular canon teaching in a school connected to the cathedral chapter of the old Notre Dame. He even held held the powerful and prestigious office of archdeacon.

But in 1108, William began a break with this prestigious chapter, renouncing his individual income and eventually moving outside Paris to begin his new community.[244] In this way, William marked himself as part of the reformist party—which Abelard cynically attributed to William's desire for ecclesiastical promotion.[245] The resulting community, whose first abbot was William's student Gilduin, was a house of regular

[242] A classic statement on the canons remains Charles Dereine's "Chanoines," *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Geographie Ecclesiastiques*, vol. 12 (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1953), 359–70. See also Jean Châtillon, "Le crise de l'Église aux XIe et XIIe siècles et les origines des grandes fédérations canoniales," *Le Mouvement Canonial au Moyen Âge: Réforme de l'Église, Spiritualité, et Culture*, ed. Patrice Sicard (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992), 3–46; 34–39; Michel Parisse, "Les Chanoines avant les Chanoines Réguliers," ed. Michel Parisse, *Les Chanoines réguliers: Émergence et expansion (XIe–XIIIe siècles)* (Saint-Étienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 2009), 7–11; see also J. C. Dickinson, *The Origins of the Austin Canons and Their Introduction into England* (London: S. P. C. K., 1950), 13–19.

[243] See Yannick Veyrenche, "Quia vos estis qui sanctorum patrum vitam probabilem renovatis," ed. Michel Parisse, *Les Chanoines réguliers: Émergence et expansion (XIe–XIIIe siècles)*, 29–69. In the same volume, see also Pascal Montaubin, "Les Canoines réguliers et le service pastoral (XIe–XIIIe siècles)," *Les Canoines Réguliers,* 119–157.

[244] See Constant Mews, "Memories of William of Champeaux: The Necrology and the Early Years of Saint-Victor," *Legitur in Necrologio Victorino: Studien zum Nekrolog der Abtei Saint-Victor zu Paris,* ed. A. Loffler, B. Gebert (Munster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2015), 78–86; 71–97; Matthew Doyle's research on Peter Lombard has offered a valuable window in that prestigious canonry that William departed; see Matthew Doyle, *Peter Lombard and His Students* (Toronto: PIMS, 2016).

[245] Abelard, *Historia* §2; shortly afterward, William did receive episcopal promotion to Châlons-sur-Seine and afterward was instrumental in launching Bernard of Clairvaux's abbatial career and collaborated with the papal legate Cuno (Constant Mews, "Memories of William of Champeaux," 78–86).

canons. In only a few years, Saint-Victor became a major house in Paris. It gained prestige and commanded respect from opposed parties, both royally-inclined clergy and reformists. Its patrons included both Capetian monarchs (Louis VI and Louis VII) as well as reformists and popes. It added prestige to the Capetian capital and was also a bulwark of the reformist party, soon gathering a federation of affiliated religious houses in the Order of Saint-Victor.[246]

Among Saint-Victor's lasting contributions was its school culture. The community that Gilduin shepherded developed a vibrant school culture that promoted restoration and reform through learning and education. A prime mover in the Victorine culture was Hugh of Saint-Victor. In his chronicle, Richard of Poitiers (d. ca. 1173) highlighted Abelard and Hugh as the twin lights of Paris in their time:

> Hugh of Saint Victor, a Parisian and philosopher for life . . . was a man of brilliant talent [*ingenium*] and most learned in the *quadrivium.* He had such a memory and knowledge of divine writings that in his time he stood second place to none. . . . Peter Abelard, a most famous peripatetic, [was a] teacher and philosopher for life. . . These two, the luminaries of the Latin world, studied in France.[247]

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[246] For the political situation in Paris, see Robert-Henri Bautier, "Paris au temps d'Abélard," *Abélard en son Temps* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981), 21–77; see also Margot Fassler's account in *Gothic Song: Victorine Sequences and Augustinian Reform in Twelfth-Century Paris* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 187–210.

[247] Richard of Poitiers, *Chronica,* 81: "Hugo de Sancte Victore, vita philosophus, Parisius obit, vir praeclari ingenii et in quadruvio doctissimus. Divinarum autem scripturarum tantam scientiam habuit et memoriam, ut nulli sui temporis secundus extiterit. Reliquid autem ad monimentum sui scripta perplurima, librum scilicet de sacramentis, de Ecclesiaste, de archa Noe, librum qui intitulatur Diascalicon et alia nonnulla opuscula valde utilia..Sequenti anno Petrus Baalardus perhipateticus, doctor famosissimus et vita philosophus, abbas prius, postea Cluniacensis monachus, Cabilonis moritur et in basilica beati Marcelli martyris sepelitur. Unde non post multos dies a suis furtim sublatus, in loco Paraclitus nuncupatur, quem ipse ad legendum iuxta Sequani fluvium construxerat, ubi et monachas posuerat, translatus est. Scripsit autem Baalardus opuscula quaedam, quae pluribus habentur in locis. Haec duo Latinorum luminaria in Francia studuerunt." Waitz, Georg, ed. "Ex Richardi Pictaviensis Chronica," in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores (SS in folio)*, Vol. XXVI (Ex rerum

Yet these twin Parisian lights—alike emigrees to Paris, masters of important schools, and experimenting with educational methods—became rivals, articulating acutely different pedagogical approaches.

Slightly senior to Abelard, Hugh arrived at Saint-Victor Abbey around or soon after 1115 and began teaching there around 1120.[248] Saint-Victor was located quite close to Abelard's sometime-school at Ste-Geneviève Abbey, so Hugh and Abelard spent years teaching as near neighbors.[249] On account of Abelard's famous confrontation with their founder, William, any teacher at Saint-Victor was unlikely to be well-disposed toward the master of Ste-Geneviève. Further, it would be difficult to imagine more contrasting personalities than those of Abelard and Hugh. In contrast to Abelard's brash confidence, Hugh was remarkably self-effacing (he left only a few hints and autobiographical references in his extensive writings).[250]

Yet the rivalry between Abelard and Hugh stemmed not from their differing temperaments nor from lingering resentment. Unlike Abelard's other opponents, Hugh never took action against Abelard or sought condemnation against his ideas. Nor does

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Francogallicarum scriptoribus) (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1882, reprint 1925), 81. Cf. Paul Rorem's reference to Richard of Poitiers comparison in *Hugh of Saint Victor* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 10.
Note: I have provided my own translations for the noted Latin texts. Whenever I choose to adopt another's rendering, that translation is noted.

[248] Jerome Taylor, *The Origin and Early Life of Hugh of St Victor: An Evaluation of the Tradition* (Notre Dame, IN: Medieval Institute, 1957), 67–71. Cf. Dale Coulter, *Per Visibilia ad Invisibilia: Theological Method in Richard of St. Victor (d.1173)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 236–37.

[249] To see the close proximity of *Sainte-Geneviève* and *Saint-Victor,* see the map 'Les voies héritées de l'Antiqué romaine' in Philippe Lorentz, Dany Sandron, *Atlas de Paris au Moyen Âge: Espace urbain, Habitat, Société, Religion, Lieux de Pouvoir* (Paris: Parigramme, 2006), 17.

[250] Jerome Taylor's *Origins* best analyzed the scarce biographical evidence and testimonies for Hugh. Cf. *The Origin and Early Life of Hugh of St Victor* (cited above).

the reader of Hugh's writings find any personal attacks, not even a single mention of Abelard by name.[251] Instead, Hugh offered a careful critique of the Abelardian pedagogy, specifically of performative reliance upon talent (*ingenium*) to adjudicate apparently conflicting *sententiae* among students (which method we saw in the previous chapter).

It would, after all, be a mistake to surmise from Hugh's modesty that he was a secluded or isolated scholar. Hugh's school drew students with remarkable success even within the increasingly competitive market for teachers at Paris.[252] Besides being a popular and sought-after teacher, Hugh also appears highly attuned to the intellectual landscape of his time.[253] It is partly Hugh's reluctance to ascribe names to the contemporary opinions he discussed that occludes Hugh's awareness and vibrant interaction with the Parisian intellectual milieu. Yet it would be all too easy to read Hugh as if he were an isolated thinker. The result decontextualizes Hugh, lifting him out of history and portraying him merely an interlocutor with past authorities, chiefly Augustine. But this treatment fails to recognize the contemporary concerns that Hugh evinced in handling his sources and that animate his larger project.

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[251] Patrice Sicard, *Hugues de Saint-Victor et son École* (Belgium: Brepols, 1991), 50–51.

[252] Constant Mews recently painted an arresting portrait through Robert of Melun of Hugh and Abelard as the two leading masters of Paris, despite that city's confluence of many independent teachers. See Constant Mews,"Between the schools of Abelard and Saint-Victor in the mid twelfth century: The Witness of Robert of Melun," *L'École de Saint-Victor de Paris: Influence et Rayonnement de Moyen Âge à l'Époque Moderne,* ed. Dominique Poirel (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 121-138.

[253] For example, Dominique Poirel exhibited Hugh's involvement with his theological environs in *Livre de la nature et débat trinitaire au XIIe siécle: Les 'De tribus diebus' de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002).

From his schoolroom in Saint-Victor and from his vantage on the schoolrooms of Paris, Hugh articulated criticism and developed an alternative pedagogical model. Hugh's thought continually bent back to the student's experiences in the midst of restoration through discipline and learning. His more abstract theoretical or theological project ultimately served his practical pedagogical aims as restoration. However, I propose seeing Hugh's theoretical and systematic project as stemming from his fundamental concern for the lived practices dearest to him, those of education. Spanning his extensive writings, Hugh's educational program at Saint-Victor was his central project, and this fundamental concern motivated his pedagogical critique to the educational practices of contemporary Parisian masters.

Hugh's pedagogical concerns here have received much careful and erudite treatment in recent years. Scholarly attention has brought out Hugh's sources and pedagogical purposes for many of his works, not limited to his most notably didactic or curricular works.[254] Perhaps the most extensive, recent treatment has been Franklin Harkins' *Reading and the Work of Restoration* (2009).[255] Harkins' invaluable work supplied a robust description of many facets of Hugh's pedagogical project around the central argument that Hugh propounded and depended upon his students' reading of the

[254] For examples, Patrice Sicard, *Hugues de Saint-Victor et son École* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991); Paul Rorem, *Hugh of St Victor* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009); C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950–1200* (PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); Caroline W. Bynum, "The Spirituality of Regular Canons in the Twelfth Century," *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 22–58.
[255] Franklin Harkins, *Reading and the Work of Restoration: History and Scripture in the Theology of St Victor* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2009).

histories in scripture as a moral remedy and edification.[256] Yet Harkins' account privileged Hugh's historical biblical instruction over other topics and methods, leaving commanding notions (particularly *disciplina*) unintegrated. The present treatment will refer to Harkins' erudite treatments of various points but will present an integrated view of Hugh's pedagogical program that includes but does not overly privilege historical reading.

Abelard's and the growing Parisian interest with *ingenium* or talent was not lost on Hugh. Hugh's reaction was not only to offer a critique of a faulty method, but also to work out and develop a pedagogical method through his long teaching career (beginning around 1120 until his death in 1141). Hugh's method contrasts markedly to the Abelardian method of charismatic and performative dialectics to respond to questions by adjudicating apparently conflicting statements or *sententiae*. On the other hand, the Victorine student, as Hugh would have it, studies and lives according to an *order,* not the perceived vagaries of unguided reason and curiosity.

The concept of *ordo* was fundamental to Hugh's pedagogy. In working out his *ordo* of study and life, Hugh drew upon the Augustinian, Boethian, and Dionysian ideas of the ordered, created cosmos. That grand created order, however, was injured by sin and has need of restoration. For Hugh, the fall into sin was a lapse into chaotic disorder. Living and learning in a properly ordered way becomes a salvific means of undoing the

[256] "Indeed, we will see that, according to Hugh, it is particularly in the history of God's deeds that the student is re-ordered and restored to the image of God in which he was created." For this and Harkins' larger programmatic statement, see *Reading and the Work of Restoration,* 10–12.

fall, of restoring creation. As a result, this chapter will conclude by framing Hugh's view of education with his larger theological narrative of the creation, fall, and restoration. In this way, Hugh grafted his pedagogical method onto a rich narrative of the cosmic and soteriological order.

In this restorative aim, Hugh marked out two persistent poles in human order: the cognitive, which seeks truth, and the affective, which animates virtue and love. Salvific restoration must equally remedy both poles—fostering knowledge and virtue alike. Hence, the educational order that the Victorine master crafted followed this twofold path of human restoration: teaching (*doctrina*) and discipline (*disciplina*). *Disciplina* is the moral order of living to gain virtue; *doctrina* is the multiple ways of learning by which one approaches the divine and highest good through created things and through sacred scriptures. Doctrina remedies the fallen human's ignorance. *Disciplina* remedies the concupiscence in fallen humanity, with its seven capital vices.

Hugh's ordered, restorative pedagogy presents some difficulties for treatment on account of its ever-present balance between the cognitive and affective, between *doctrina* and *disciplina*. That account in several stages will appear in the subsequent chapter. First, I will lay the groundwork for the present tasks by exploring Hugh's critique of the talent-reliant on the grounds that order is necessary for progress. Secondly, I will follow up by indicating the contours of Hugh's idea of order, the fall in disorder, and the twofold human order to be restored by *doctrina* and *disciplina*.

## I. Hugh's Critique of the Parisian Masters

Given Hugh's deep concern for education, the reader finds something puzzling in Hugh's mature work, *On the Vanity of the World.*[257] In this dialogue between a student and a teacher, the interlocutors sketch several tableaux before revealing the vanity of the represented pursuits. These scenes include a merry party on board a pleasure craft at sea, a prosperous merchant caravan, a rich home, and a joyful wedding.[258] Each scene, the interlocutors agree, represent merely "vanity of vanities" amid the transience of temporal life.

At last, the reader finds a positive description of what would seem to be the solution: an industrious school crowded with all levels of students. Some study grammar, others orthography, and others practice disputing with each other. Others have graduated to the quadrivium, calculating with numbers, making music, working out geometric forms, and plotting the stars' courses. Still more have advanced to *physica* and study the natures and properties of all things. The student passed a favorable judgment:

> This should be called a busy leisure or a leisurely business. I think, by your judgment also, it should be valued more than all human activities for the reason that there is nothing transitory, nothing perishable but, through it,

[257] Here I depend upon the credible chronology for which Hugh Freiss argued in "Introduction" to "What Truly Should be Loved?" in *On Love: A Selection of Works on Hugh, Adam, Achard, Richard, and Godfrey of St Victor*, ed. Hugh Feiss (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), 177–78.
[258] *De vanitate mundi* I; PL 176.705c; 706b; 707a; 708a.

> the eternal splendor of wisdom is planted in minds and its root is planted, no more to be uprooted.[259]

Such a positive, even glowing first assessment would seem quite in line with Hugh's reputation for learning and his promotion of the liberal arts. However, the reader comes up short with the teacher's response: "The image of truth deceives you."[260] On the contrary, the two decide that these eager and industrious students of the liberal arts are unfruitful and vain. They have fallen into a snare of souls, cloaked in the semblance of truth, and being foolish and ignorant search out the natures of creation while ignoring their Creator. They give no heed to self-knowledge: whence they came or where the road of life tends. The scholars' vicious way of life (*conversatio*) and unthought-of end alike doom them.[261] Thus, in language reminiscent of Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh of Saint-Victor roundly condemned contemporary students of the liberal arts.[262] Such studies are not merely "vanity of vanities," like the other worldly affairs; they are worse. "If it is as you say," says the student, "these, whose life is wrapped in such delusion that not only others but even they themselves are ensnared by their study, I judge them more wretched than all others."[263]

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[259] *De vanitate* I.710a: "Hoc autem sive otium negotiosum, sive negotium otiosum appellandum sit, cunctis humanis actionibus tuo quoque judicio praeferendum existimo, eo quod nihil transitorium, nihil caducum, sed quod aeternum est sapientiae decus, per id mentibus inseritur, et radix ejus amplius non eradicanda plantatur."
[260] Ibid., 710a: "Imago veritatis fallit te."
[261] Paraphrased from *De van.* I.710a–712a.
[262] For example, Bernard's public sermon *Ad clericos de conversione.* Cf. "On conversion" in *Bernard of Clairvaux: Selected Works* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 65ff.
[263] *De vanitatie* I.710c: "I: Si sic est, ut dicis, omnibus aliis istos miserabiliores judico, quorum vita tanto errore involvitur, ut non solum alii, verum etiam ipsi in studio suo decipiantur."

What is one to make of Hugh castigating students of the liberal arts? There is no evidence of such a turn in his thought against the arts.[264] Is there a contradiction between Hugh's attitude toward the arts as crucial for human restoration and his condemnation of its students as the nadir of vanity? The solution to this puzzle lies in Hugh's consistent critiques of the education around him in Paris.

Hugh's thinking about education was not merely conservativism, the retrenchment of the earlier culture of the cathedral schools.[265] Rather, Hugh reacted with a measured response to the faults and chaos he perceived in contemporary schools. All the benefits of liberal education seemed to come to nothing on account of the teachers' method or lack thereof. As Hugh perceived it, Parisian teachers depended upon personal *ingenium* or talent to answer any difficult questions that may occur. Trusting his talent, as we saw in the previous chapter, Abelard set out principles for the resolution of discrepant *sententiae*, but he left the resolutions themselves to be worked out spontaneously as school exercises. Hugh, by contrast, set store not by the extemporaneous insight of *ingenium* but by long preparation in his *ordo* of reading. For the Victorine, it was not talent itself but the method or order that produced wisdom.

Hugh's criticism of his contemporary educators lies scattered throughout his writings. However, the *Didascalicon* contains the most developed expression of Hugh's

[264] Hugh's *De sacramentis fidei christianae,* one of his final works, still assigned an important role to the study of the liberal arts. Cf. *De sacramentis* (ed. Rainer Berndt), 31.1–34.15.
[265] In this I disagree with C. Stephen Jaeger, who saw Hugh's pedagogy as a modified survival of cathedral education. Cf. "Humanism and Ethics at the School of St. Victor," *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950–1200* (PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 244–68.

methodological critique of talent-reliant and unguided scholars. This book will form the focus of this section. As facets of this critique, I shall also point out the account of learning and the soul in the *Didascalicon* by which Hugh tried to take the weapon out of his opponents' hands by reframing *ingenium* less as a special gift to few but rather as one of the soul's natural endowments. By this reframed view of *ingenium*, Hugh could then set his three necessary elements for study—*ingenium,* exercise, and discipline—into a new, ordered framework.

* * *

The corrupt root, in Hugh's eyes, of those depending upon their personal talent was a failure of humility. By Hugh's portrait, the Parisian schools teemed with pretense at wisdom and the desire to promote their own yet-immature ideas.

> This deceives many, that they wish to appear as sages before their time. Hence they break out into a certain swelling of pride, so that they even now begin both to counterfeit what they are not and to be ashamed at what they are.[266]

As Abelard found Anselm of Laon learned in appearance but a failed teacher in actuality, similarly Hugh criticized those more concerned to appear wise than to be so. As we saw, Anselm came up short according to Abelard's standard of the dialectical teacher as one

[266] Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Didascalicon de Studio Legendi: A Critical Text*, ed. Charles Buttimer (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1939), III.13,62.1–4: "Multos hoc decipit, quod ante tempus, sapientes videri volunt. Hinc namque in quondam elationis tumorem prorumpunt, ut iam et simulare incipient quod non sunt et quod sunt erubescere."
Likewise, in the *Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam,* Hugh criticized those who, concerned with appearances, present themselves by only dealing with a part of an art or discipline instead of the whole. Cf. *Epitome Dindimi in Philosophiam* 3.199 in *Hugonis de Sancto Victore Opera Propaedeutica*, ed. Baron (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966).

who offered his own ideas while lecturing and who produced reasons in answer to students' questions. But Hugh's criticism turned the opposite way: Parisian teachers failed because they too quickly offered their own immature and ungrounded ideas. "[The same fault deceives] many of this new sort who, although they still lack the elementary matters, think it worthy to be interested in nothing but the highest matters."[267] In contrast to these, and to Abelard's emphasis upon ingenious additions to reading, Hugh would recommend the motto: "I prefer to learn modestly what is another's than shamelessly to pour forth my own."[268] In Hugh's assessment, Parisian scholars lack sufficient understanding but arrogantly presume upon their own talent:

> Hence this vice of pride befalls certain ones, because they too carefully consider their own knowledge, and when they seem to themselves to have become something [impressive], they think others, whom they do not know, neither to be nor to be able to be such [as they themselves are]. Hence it is even now that certain peddlers of trifles boast, for what reason I do not know, and glorying they charge the earlier fathers with simplicity. They believe that wisdom was born and will pass away with them. They say that the way of speaking in the divine speech is so simple that it is not necessary to listen to teachers on it, but that *anyone can penetrate sufficiently the secrets of truth by his own talent* [*proprio ingenio*].[269]

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[267] Buttimer, *Didascalicon* III.13,62.5–7: "Eiusmodi multos novi, qui, cum primis adhuc elementis indigeant, non nisi summis interesse dignantur." Similarly, Hugh later criticized those who despise elementary teaching and want to be philosophers immediately. Hugh not infrequently diagnosed this prying into the highest matters as a symptom of other moral failings, such as curiosity, desire of gain, or even for the sake of iniquity. For example, *Didascalicon* VI.3,114.5–1; *Sentenite de divinitate,* Prologue.

[268] Ibid. III.13,62.23–25: "Hinc illud Platonicum aiunt: "Malo aliena verecunde discere, quam mea impudenter ingerere."

[269] Ibid. III.13,63.23–64.3: "Hoc autem tumoris vitium hinc quibusdam accidit, quod suam scientiam nimis diligenter inspiciunt, et cum sibi aliquid esse visi fuerint, alios, quos non noverunt, tales nec esse nec potuisse fieri putant. hinc etiam ebullit, quod nugigeruli nunc quidam, nescio unde, gloriantes, priores patres simplicitatis arguunt, et secum natam, secum morituram credunt sapientiam. In divinis eloquiis ita simplicem loquendi modum esse aiunt, ut in eis magistros audire non oporteat, posse satis quemque proprio ingenio veritatis arcana penetrare." Emphasis is mine.

At the heart of all these maladies—the presumption to grasp the secrets of the scriptures or authorities without instruction, to disagree with the established authors, and to put forth their own views—lay the vain reliance upon one's own *ingenium*.[270]

Hugh struck the heart of this talent-reliant method not by disparaging talent but by charging one to reexamine how the student ought to deploy their talent. "Consider rather what your powers are able to bear. He advances most suitably who advance in the right order [*ordinate*]. Certain ones, while they wish to make a great leap, plunge headlong."[271] Talent presents the temptation for swift advancement but even talent must adhere to order. "Therefore," Hugh continued, "do not hurry too much. You will reach wisdom more quickly by this means [*hoc modo*]."[272] Proceeding by talent alone brings catastrophe.

The dangers of talent and its need for order and discipline set the tone in the preface to the *Didascalicon*. Hugh began the book distinguishing the ungifted (*quos natura ingenio destitutos relinquit*) and the gifted (*quos admodum natura ingenio ditavit*).[273] The ungifted who labor diligently may or may not obtain wisdom, but more importantly, they merit wisdom for their labor. The gifted, on the other hand, have potential, but they differ

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[270] Similarly, Hugh also criticized the effort at autodidacticism, for the reason that attempting without a guide to teach oneself is rather seducing oneself (Cf. VI.4,144).

[271] Ibid. III.13,62.27–63.2: "Considera potius quid vires tuae ferre valeant. Aptissime incedit, qui incedit ordinate. Quidam dum magnum saltum facere volunt, praecipitium incidunt." Cf. *Sententie* 940,145–154, ed. Piazzoni.
It is notable here that Hugh's criticism of those proceeding out of order also falls on authors who do not pay heed to the historical sense of the biblical text but proceed directly to the allegorical. In this Hugh finds another form of that error that attempts to run before one can walk. This criticism would seem to hit other writers besides those of the Parisian masters. Cf. *De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris*, 5.

[272] Ibid. III.13,63.2–3: "Noli ergo nimis festinare, hoc modo citius ad sapientiam pertinges."

[273] Ibid. Praef, 1.18.

in how they deploy that talent. For they do not all have "the same power or will for cultivating their natural sense through exercises and teaching."[274] Many gifted become entangled in the affairs of the world or "yield to vices and pleasures of the body" and, like idle servants, "bury their talent [*talentum*] from God in the earth" and so gain neither wisdom nor the interest of good works.[275] Others face material disadvantages, but even these obstacles do not entirely relieve one of responsibility.

What, then, do the gifted and industrious need for wisdom? Answering this question, Hugh pointed to meditation and reading, but not just any reading. "Three rules are especially necessary for reading: first, that one knows what [*quid*] he ought to read; second, in what order [*quo ordine*] he ought to read; third, how [*quomodo*] he ought to read."[276] It is not sufficient, Hugh argued, just to master grammar and so be able to read—contrary to the Parisians. One must have a method in reading; one must know what (*quid*), the order of reading (*quo ordine*), and the manner or way of reading (*quomodo*). Hugh articulated this tripartite methodology of reading in two divisions, the *quid*, *ordo,* and *quomodo* for the reader of the arts, then for the reader of the scriptures in the six books

[274] Ibid. Praef, 1.20–22: "Non eadem tamen omnibus virtus aut voluntas est per exercitia et doctrinam naturalem sensum excolendi."
[275] Ibid. Praef, 1.22–25: "Nam sunt plerique qui negotiis huius saeculi et curis super quam necesse sit impliciti aut vitiis et voluptatibus corporis dediti, talentum Dei terra obruunt, et ex eo nec fructum sapientiae, nec usuram boni operis quaerunt, qui profecto valde detestabiles sunt." Cf. Matt. 25.25; Hugh recounted the same point from his rare autobiographical comment (Cf. VI.3). Ivan Illich rightly pointed out that Hugh presented talent in moral terms, dividing students into 'moral classes,' then commenting on their respective uses of their talents. Fundamentally, "reading, for Hugh, is a moral rather than a technical activity." See Ivan Illich's *In the Vineyard of the Text: A Commentary to Hugh's* Didascalicon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 75–76.
[276] Ibid., Praef, 2.12–15: "Tria autem sunt praecepta magis lectioni necessaria: primum, ut sciat quisque quid legere debeat, secundum, quo ordine legere debeat, id est, quid prius, quid postea, tertium, quomodo legere debeat."

of the *Didascalicon*.[277] In this way, the *Didascalicon* represents not a conservative compendium or record of consensus on the liberal arts. It is rather a salvo in an ongoing and evolving twelfth-century debate on education.

The *Didascalicon's* method offered a voluminous and demanding curriculum. Hugh was not oblivious to the difficulty of the tasks and depended upon his students' mnemonic training.[278] Yet despite the labor demanded, Hugh believed the thorough, ordered course would still bring progress faster than the presumptuous leap of the talented, who end up sprawled out.[279] Regarding the Parisian schools, Hugh diagnosed the lack of progress to spring from lacking method: "We should say why it is that in such a crowd of students, many of whom are rich in talent [*ingenium*] and vigorous in exercise, so few and rare may be found for whom it turns out that they reach knowledge."[280] Leaving out the "naturally dull and slow in understanding," Hugh illustrated the need for method in a kind of thought experiment:

> This [paucity in progress] especially troubles and it seems worthy to ask why it happens that two [students] matched in talent [*pari ingenio*] and equal in exertion who set out on one [course of] reading, yet do not acquire

[277] While the *Didascalicon* presents an order for both the arts and the sacred scriptures, the *Epitome* reflects this notion in a more limited respect, namely, that there is a necessary order for the study of philosophy. Cf. *Epitome* 3.198, ed. Baron.
[278] Hugh scattered similar techniques through the work; for example, III.11 on memory discussed the technique of *colligendo,* or summarizing. Cf. V.7, VI.3; cf. *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, ed. Carruthers and Ziolkowski (PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 32–70; see Chapter 4.III.b on memory.
[279] *Did.* III.13,62.27–63.2: "Considera potius quid vires tuae ferre valeant. aptissime incedit, qui incedit ordinate. Quidam dum magnum saltum facere volunt, praecipitium incidunt."
[280] Ibid. V.5,103.7–10: "Dicendumque est quid sit quod ex tanta turba discentium, quorum multi et ingenio pollent et vigent exercitio, tam pauci et numerabiles inveniantur, quibus ad scientiam pervenire contingat."

> understanding of it with a similar outcome. One penetrates it quickly; what he seeks he quickly grasps. The other works long but profits little.[281]

Two students of similar ability and effort in the same course arrive at starkly different results. One grasps his goal quickly; the other works longer and gains little. How did Hugh explain the divergence? To which variable did point? Hugh continued:

> But one must know that in any occupation two things are necessary, work of course, and a rationale of the work [*ratio operis*], which are so connected to each other that one without the other is either useless or less effective.[282]

Rationale, or what I have been calling 'method,' comprised of *what, order,* and *how,* is the necessary and even superior factor, without which no amount of genius or labor can make up for its absence. "'Yet prudence is better, as it is said, than strength,' " Hugh continued, "since sometimes even weights that we cannot move by force, we may raise by art."[283]

Here a contrast between an Abelardian model and Hugh's comes into view. Abelard's aim was to deliver substantive answers to any difficult questions of his students. Hugh did not aim primarily at answering difficult questions. Rather, he

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[281] Ibid. V.5,103.11–15: "Hoc maxime movet et dignum quaestione videtur, unde hoc accidat, quod duo pari ingenio et aequali studio uni lectioni intendunt, nec tamen simili effectu eius intelligentiam consequuntur. alter cito penetrat, cito quod quaerit apprehendit. alter diu laborat et parum proficit."
[282] Ibid. V.5,103.15–18: "Sed sciendum est quod in quolibet negotio duo sunt necessaria: opus videlicet, et ratio operis, quae ita sibi connexa sunt, ut alterum sine altero aut inutile sit aut minus efficax."
[283] Ibid. V.5,18–20: "Verumtamen melior, ut dicitur, prudentia est fortitudine, quia et pondera aliquando, quae viribus movere non possumus, arte levamus."
On this chapter (*Did.* V.5), Eileen Sweeney noted that Hugh's metaphor of finding one's way out of the dense woods reflected that of Augustine's in *De doctrina christiana* 1.36.41. Cf. Eileen Sweeney,"Hugh of St Victor: The Augustinian Tradition of Sacred and Secular Reading Revised," in *Reading and Wisdom: The* De Doctrina Christiana *of Augustine in the Middle Ages*, ed. English (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 82n71.

appealed to order and consistency in order to make progress in studies, rather than following the track of questions arising haphazardly. This rhetoric of method is often deployed to some effect: many steps bring progress, but labors in every direction go in circles. Even worse than negligence "is spending many labors in vain," that is, without a methodic course.[284] Hugh did not deny that talent moves one along, just not in progress toward any defined end. In contrast, the Hugonic scheme presses the student on to an end, when one will be "worthy of the name of master." In this way, Hugh's tortoise can claim to beat the impressive and talented hares who "either will not or know not how to keep a suitable way [*congruum modum*] of learning, and for that reason we find many studying but few who are wise."[285]

But Hugh's critique here did not discard the classical concept of *ingenium*. Alongside Hugh's critique, the *Didascalicon* furnished an account of the soul that reframed *ingenium* as a natural endowment for knowledge yet in need of ordering cultivation. In this way, rather than devaluing *ingenium,* the Victorine can claim to give it proper order and exercise.

What Hugh effectively employed, which Abelard lacked, was a cosmic narrative of the soul's descent and restoration that could serve to orient the Victorine student along the soul's journey and work of restoration. The soul's narrative depends upon the fundamental precept of wisdom: 'Know thyself.' This pursuit of self-knowledge looks

[284] Ibid. III.3,53.28–29: "Malum est bonum negligenter agere, peius est in vanum labores multos expendere."
[285] Ibid. III.3,53.23–25: "Scholares vero nostri aut nolunt aut nesciunt modum congruum in discendo servare, et idcirco multos studentes, paucos sapientes invenimus." Cf. V.5.

both backward and forward. Seeking oneself, Hugh first turned his reader to look back to the gift of rationality from divine wisdom, by which humans could formerly behold their origin and their own nature.[286] The human soul has a peculiar character. "An approved view among philosophers," Hugh declared, "asserts that the soul is composed from all parts of nature."[287] The soul gains its ability to understand by this composition, since, as Hugh accepted, "like things are comprehended by like, so that the rational soul, unless it were composed from all, would not at all be able to comprehend all things."[288] Here. then, wisdom first teaches the origin and nature of the human soul as possessing "capacity for all things" and "wonderful power" to understand.[289] Instead of extraordinary talent given by God, as Abelard held, Hugh saw the very makeup of the soul as naturally suited to understand all things. "This is that dignity of our nature which equally all have naturally, but [which] not all equally know."[290]

Already the look back to the soul's universal capacity gestures to the turn *forward* in the maxim *know thyself* to the soul's potential and path. For the soul has not kept itself intact: "For the soul, stupefied by bodily passions and through sensible forms carried off outside of itself, has forgotten what it was and, since it recalls being nothing other, it

[286] Cf. ibid. I.1,4.5–6, 7–8: "Sapientia illuminat hominem ut seipsum agnoscat . . . Immortalis quippe animus sapientia illustratus respicit principium suum."
[287] Ibid., I.1,4.13–14: "Probata apud philosophos sententia animam ex cunctis naturae partibus asserit esse compactam."
[288] Ibid., I.1,5.4–5: "Pythagoricum namque dogma erat similia similibus comprehendi, ut scilicet anima rationalis nisi ex omnibus composita foret, nullatenus omnia comprehendere posset."
[289] Ibid., I.1,5.2: "Mens, quae universorum capax est"; I.1,5.12–13, "ut apertius mirabilem eius [animae] demonstrarent potentiam."
[290] *Did.* I.1,6.3–4: "Et haec est illa naturae nostrae dignitas quam omnes aeque naturaliter habent, sed non omnes aeque noverunt."

believes it is nothing beyond what is seen."[291] Instead of maintaining itself in its gaze upon God, the soul fell into dissolution among material things and images. Hugh mapped this narrative in the fourfold numerical progression of the soul. In the first, the number one symbolizes the soul's "simple essence," reflecting its original unity.[292] Numbers two and three each represent progressive steps down, into the music of the body and then pouring into the bodily senses by which the soul "is scattered through infinite actions."[293] Finally in number four, the soul, "released from the body, returns to the purity of its simplicity," to that unity "which it has earlier forsaken when it descended to rule a human body."[294] Hugh wanted his reader to note this descent and return and so summarized the narrative briefly:

> Now you see clearly enough, I think, how souls degenerate from intellectibles to intelligibles, when they from the purity of simple intelligence, which is darkened by no image of bodies, descend to the imagination of visible things, and when they turned back, they become more blessed when collecting themselves from this division to the simple font of its nature, as if impressed by a certain sign of the best figure, they are brought to union.[295]

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[291] Ibid., I.1,6.4–7: "Animus enim, corporeis passionibus consopitus et per sensibiles formas extra semetipsum abductus, oblitus est quid fuerit, et, quia nil aliud fuisse se meminit, nil praeter quod videtur esse credit."
[292] Ibid., II.4,27.24: "Simplex animae essentia unitate exprimitur."
[293] Ibid., II.4,27.18–20: "Qui solidus numerous est et trina dimensione ad similitudinem corporis extenditur, figurantur dispensanda, per infinitas actiones dissipatur."
[294] Ibid., II.4,20–26: "In quarta autem progressione soluta a corpore ad puritatem simplicitatis suae revertitur . . . qui per octoginta designator, ad unitatem suae simplicitatis redeat, a qua prius discesserat cum ad humanum corpus regendum descendebat."
[295] Ibid., II.5,29.14–19: "Vides nunc satis aperte, ut puto, quomodo animae de intellectibilibus ad intelligibilia degenerant, quando a puritate simplicis intelligentiae, quae nulla corporum fuscatur imagine, ad visibilium imaginationem descendunt rursumque beatiores fiunt, quando se ab hac distractione ad simplicem naturae suae fontem colligentes, quasi quodam optimae figurae signo impressae, componuntur."

In this summary, the soul's powers are on display. From its primal simplicity among the intellectibles, the soul's descent takes place by intellectual degeneration into sensibles.

If the descent was rooted in intellectual deterioration, it is no surprise if the intellect is to be restored. "But we are restored through teaching so that we recognize our nature and so that we learn not to seek outside what we can find within ourselves."[296] In this way, education is fundamentally salvific. One comes to *know thyself* by recognizing one's own nature as well as learning to find the treasures hidden within. With such high promises, Hugh continued, "Thus the greatest solace in life is the pursuit of wisdom [*studium sapientiae*], which, the one who finds it is happy, and who possesses it, is blessed."[297]

Hugh's educational program, then, was medicinal and restorative for the mind and for the mind's powers. As we shall now see, this restoration includes *ingenium.* In this light, we can better understand why Hugh saw the right order and method as so necessary. The Parisian scholars who lacked them thereby lacked the salvific path and proceeded relying upon still-faulty *ingenium*.

So far, we have seen Hugh lay out the soul's powers as natural endowments in need of restoration. For the last part of this section, we will turn to the vital role played by three components: order, exercise, and *ingenium.* Here Hugh closed the circle by

[296] Ibid., I.1,6.7–9: "Reparamur autem per doctrinam, ut nostrum agnoscamus naturam, et ut discamus extra non quaerere quod in nobis possumus invenire."
[297] Ibid., I.1,6.9–11: "Summum igitur in vita solamen est studium sapientiae, quam qui invenit felix est, et qui possidet beatus."

defining *ingenium* as one of the soul's natural powers and so made it subject to his pedagogical project of ordered restoration.

"Three things are necessary for students: *natura,* exercise, and *disciplina*."[298] Hugh paused to explain each before devoting several chapters to them in turn:

> In 'nature' we regard it that one grasps easily what one hears and firmly retains lessons. In 'exercise,' that one cultivates with earnestness and labor the natural sense; in 'discipline' that, living in a praiseworthy way, one unites morals with knowledge.[299]

Dealing with the first, Hugh shifted his terms from '*natura*' to '*ingenium*.' *Ingenium* along with memory are necessary for the student. Without one, "the other can lead no one to perfection."[300] As a harvest only goes to waste without a storehouse, so a memory is necessary to retain what talent reaps: "Talent [*ingenium*] finds and memory guards wisdom."[301]

Yet it is talent that discovers, and here Hugh defined *ingenium* as "a certain power naturally implanted in the soul and effective in itself."[302] Unlike the extraordinary gift-character of *ingenium* for Abelard, Hugh's descended soul has the hidden aptitude for

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[298] Ibid., III.6,57,6: "Tria sunt studentibus necessaria: natura, exercitium, disciplina."
[299] Ibid., III.6,57.6–10: "In natura consideratur ut facile audita percipiat et percepta firmiter retineat; in exercitio, ut labore et sedulitate naturalem sensum excolat; in disciplinam, ut laudabiliter vivens mores cum scientia componat."
[300] Ibid., III.7,57.14–16: "Qui doctrinae operam dant, ingenio simul et memoria pollere debent, quae duo in omni studio et disciplina ita sibi cohaerent, ut si desit alterum, neminem alterum ad perfectum ducere possit."
[301] Ibid., III.7,57.18–19: "Ingenium invenit et memoria custodit sapientiam." The topic of inventional *memoria* has received much recent attention. See Ivan Illich, *Vineyard of the Text,* 35–45, and on the interplay between *ingenium* and *memoria,* see Mary Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 62–65.
[302] Ibid., III.7,57.19–20: "Ingenium est vis quaedam naturaliter animo insita per se valens." Cf. III.12; Hugh likewise pointed out that by exercising humility, one can gain what all are capable of.

higher, intellectible knowledge by its very nature. Yet, *ingenium* needs both an *ordo* and exercise to be properly effective: "Talent proceeds from nature, is aided by use [*usu adiuvatur*], is blunted by excessive labor, and is sharpened by temperate exercise."[303] Talent from nature is insufficient. It requires labor and exercise to sharpen it—but right order, manner of study, and exercise are necessary lest the students dull their wits in their zeal.

Turning to the second element, exercise, we note a particular contrast with Abelard. While Abelard criticized Anselm of Laon for depending upon *longevus usus*, Hugh presented a program that championed ordered *usus* or exercise (*usu adiuvatur . . . temperato acuitur exercitio*) over against spontaneous dependence upon one's own *ingenium* alone. What exercises, then, did Hugh recommend? "There are two things that exercise talent: reading [*lectio*] and meditation."[304] Hugh proceeded to lay out the kinds and means for reading—which topic encompasses most of the *Didascalicon*—and for meditation, which Hugh saw as deliberate, penetrating, and directed thought upon the ideas gathered from reading.[305] Hugh also alluded to the fact that the figures within scripture offer a further kind of exercise, for those with the insight to see them: "While certain less learned do not consider this [signification], they judge there to be no subtlety in the scriptures, where talents [*ingenia*] could be exercised . . . [they turn instead to works

[303] Ibid., III.7,57.20–22: "Ingenium a natura proficiscitur, usu iuvatur, immoderato labore retunditur, et temperato acuitur exercitio."
[304] Ibid., III.7,57.24–25: "Duo sunt quae ingenium exercent: lectio et meditatio."
[305] Cf. ibid., III.10.

of the philosophers]."[306] Finding and dealing rightly with the hidden figures of scripture constitute a further exercise, but one, Hugh cautioned, for matured and restrained minds:

> Still, I want you to know, reader, this pursuit wants not the slow or sluggish of sense but mature talents [*matura ingenia*], which in investigating so restrain subtlety that in discerning they do not lose prudence. This is solid food, and unless it is chewed, it cannot be swallowed.[307]

Mature and practiced talent yields greater fruit in reading the scriptures, but it requires restraint and keeping the right order of prudence. Here, then, we arrive at the Hugh's third component: *discipline.*

Hugh's idea of *disciplina* merits much more than the present scope allows (the following chapter will examine *disciplina* as it entailed the larger education of novices into the moral life of Saint-Victor Abbey, including Hugh's treatment in *Formation of Novices* [*De institutione novitiorum*]).[308] Treating *disciplina* as the third necessary component, we shall limit the present sketch to Hugh's brief words in the *Didascalicon* and so conclude this section. Here Hugh explained a sage's words on discipline: 'Morals adorn knowledge.' And on that account, he also bound the rules of living to the rules of reading,

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[306] Ibid., V.3,97.9–13: "Quod dum quidam minus docti non considerant, nullam in eis esse subtilitatem aestimant, ubi exerceri possint ingenia, et ob hoc ad philosophorum scripturas se transferunt, quia profecto nil aliud ibi concipiunt, nisi solam litterae superficiem."

[307] Ibid., VI.4,117.27–118.2: "Nosse tamen te volo, o lector, hoc studium non tardos et hebetes sensus, sed matura expetere ingenia, quae sic in investigando subtilitatem teneant, ut in discernendo prudentiam non amittant. solidus est cibus iste, et, nisi masticetur, transglutiri non potest."

[308] Jaeger pointed out the peculiarity of Hugh's concept of *disciplina*, though he viewed it largely as a holdover from cathedral school *cultus virtutum* adapted with monastic elements as reactionary 'crisis control' against undisciplined scholars. Cf. *Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950–1200* (PA: University of Philadelphia Press, 1994), 241–42, 256–58. While Hugh certainly reacted to what he perceived among Parisian schools, Hugh's radical reformulation of the central role of *ingenium* can in no way be reduced to the ideals and practices of the cathedral schools with the admixture of monastic themes, as Jaeger had it.
For a broader treatment of *disciplina* in the *Formation of Novices,* see chapter 4, part I.

so that the reader would recognize both the way of life and the rationale of his study [*ratio studii sui*].[309] Discipline, then, linked both the moral way of life (as Hugh sought to inculcate in *De institutione novitiorum*) as well as the method of his study and reading. The student's natural talent, rooted in the soul's simple and spiritual nature, requires the right order in reading and in exercises.

Yet for all his emphasis on the method, Hugh summed up his work near the end of the *Didascalicon* in terms of the need for balance between talent and method:

> Two things I propose to you, reader, that is, order and method [*ordo et modus*], which if you examine diligently, the way of reading will open easily for you. But in the consideration of these, I will neither leave all to your talent [*ingenio tuo*] nor do I promise to satisfy you through my diligence.[310]

Hugh's insistence on *ordo* and *modus* do not prevent him from leaving a place for the free play of one's own ingenuity. Since he is dealing with scriptural reading and interpretation, Hugh reasonably recognized a balance. Not all should be left open, nor should the student be fully contented or satisfied with a predetermined method for interpretation.

Hugh's emphasis on right order of study presents a dramatic contrast to the bold, performative talents of the Abelardian model. Yet, though this account has focused upon *Didascalicon,* Hugh's critique and correlative concern for order seems to have deepened

[309] *Didascalicon* III.12,61.14–17: "Mores ornant scientiam, et ideo praeceptis legendi, praecepta quoque vivendi, adiungit, ut et modum vitae suae et studii sui rationem lector agnoscat."
[310] Ibid., VI.1, 113.4–7; "Duo tibi, lector, ordinem scilicet et modum propono, quae si diligenter inspexeris, facile tibi iter legendi patebit. In horum vero consideratione nec omnia tuo ingenio relinquam, neque per mean diligentiam satis fieri promitto."

and permeated his thought. The next section will explore the ramifications of the notion of *ordo* in Hugh's broader theological thought.

## II. Order: Created, Fallen, Twofold, and to be Restored

Finding or restoring the right order was a widely-held concern in the early twelfth century. Politically and ecclesiastically, imperial, royal, and papal views on the proper order of authority collided and produced friction (since the papal reform movement of the mid-eleventh century).[311] A growing wave of religious reform movements sought to revise or reform the orders of religious life; polemical works circulated that debated the rival orders and championed their own.[312] Order as a theological, philosophical, or spiritual principle often functioned in the thought of those steeped in Neoplatonic and Augustinian texts.[313]

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311 Brian Tierney's anthology to these controversies supplies the best introduction. Cf. ed. Brian Tierney, *The Crisis of Church and State, 1050–1300* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988).

312 Two of the most famous include Bernard of Clairvaux's *Apologia ad Guillelmum* (on the Cistercian over the Cluniac forms of Benedictine life) and *Libellus de diversis ordinibus et professionibus qui sunt in Aecclesia.* For the background of these debates, see M. D. Chenu, "Monks, Canons, and Laymen in Search of the Apostolic Life," in *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century*, trans. Taylor, Little (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 202–238.

313 For example, Honorius Augustodunensis worked out repeatedly the dramatic, liturgical order of the cosmos. See Daniel Yingst, "Towers in the Mud: Honorius Augustodunensis Through the Lens of Pedagogy," dissertation, University of Chicago, 2018. In another tenor, Bernard of Clairvaux also dwelt upon the orders of love and the need to order one's love properly (*De diligendo Deo*, or "On Loving God," in *Bernard of Clairvaux: Selected Works*, ed. G. R. Evans (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1987), 173ff.

Hugh's own concern for order has certainly not escaped scholarly attention. Grover Zinn acutely perceived the profound importance of *ordo* for Hugh in a lived context:

> Order in thought is more than a question of intellectual tidiness for our Victorine canon. It is an existential concern touching the very core of life, whether in the classroom, cloister, or choir. Through the proper ordering of thought in the mind, a beginning of order and stability in life may be effected.[314]

More recently, Franklin Harkins paid careful attention to Hugh's *ordo* as an appropriation of early Augustinian thought.[315] What has not received its proper due is the link from Hugh's order to his standing critique of the disordered Parisian masters. I argue that the central role of *ordo* in Hugh's thought results not from an "existential concern" but rather that the concern sprung from Hugh's perspective on the Parisian schools. Hugh's reading and appropriation of Augustine was no atemporal dialogue but was motivated by his present pedagogical concerns in his Parisian milieu. In short, to Hugh—the master of Saint-Victor, near neighbor of Ste-Geneviève, and interlocutor with his Parisian contemporaries, the need for *pedagogical* order lay at the heart of Hugh's thought. To overlook this practical motivation is to risk misunderstanding the larger project of Hugh's career, with its pedagogical import.

In view of the expansiveness of Hugh's notion of order and the erudite studies that examine it, the present treatment will only attempt a sketch of the range of Hugonic order, beginning with its roots in universal, providential order. Following Hugh's path

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[314] Grover Zinn, "Hugh of Saint Victor and the Art of Memory," *Viator* 5 (1974): 211–34; cf. 219–20.
[315] Cf. Harkins, *Reading and the Work of Restoration,* 62–63, 73–136.

from the will of the creator, order guides the hierarchical disposition of creation and of human order. Created order, however, fell into corruption and disorder—a topic that seemed to fascinate Hugh, who treated the events of Genesis 3 repeatedly among his writings. In a brief excursus, I will suggest that Hugh's developing treatments of the fall evince a deepening concern with the disorderly and arrogant practices of masters.

In the final part of this section and of this chapter, I will sketch the twofold human order, both in its fallen and restorative process. With notable emphasis and consistency, Hugh posited a twofold or dual human order in the balance of cognition and the affect. The mind and will suffer defects from the fall: ignorance and concupiscence, respectively. Hugh's educational program was likewise twofold, offering a restorative path for the mind and the will: supplying teaching (*doctrina*) against ignorance and *disciplina* that includes moral correction, edification, and reordering of love.

*The Universal Order and Disorder*

The origin of all order lies firmly in the will of its creator.[316] In his expositions of creation, Hugh carefully laid out the specific works of each day, since, he argued, the omnipotent God chose to distribute the acts of creation, ordering, and adornment through the six days for a purpose. All could have been created simultaneously. The divine choice to prolong creation was pedagogical: scripture's account of the six days were sacraments

[316] Cf. *Sententie de divinitate*, ed. Piazzoni, II.938,74–91; *De sacramentis* (ed. Rainer Berndt), I.2.8–13, pp. 64–67; *Adnotationes in Pent.* 5.34c.

for humanity's instruction and restoration.[317] Yet this created order has not perdured. This section will conclude by showing that in his accounts of the fall (of Genesis 3), Hugh developed the motif of the first sin as a lapse into disorder, of acting unjustly *beyond measure*.

Especially attentive to the complexity of the order of all things, Hugh discussed not only the divine creation, but also divine regulation and governances over all created things.[318] In *The Three Days,* Hugh marveled successively over the attributes of creation such as multiplicity, immensity, magnitude, beauty, and structure (*compositio*). Order only fit as a subset of structure, a division of beauty—not a notable place among the attributes. However, when he arrived at discussing order, Hugh waxed into an encomium on its concord and harmony that weaves the great attributes (such as immensity, multiplicity, and magnitude) into the whole, beautiful creation. Moving through various parts from the whole universe to the human body, Hugh praised the ordered concord and harmony of each. He summarized, saying, "Thus all nature loves itself and in a certain, wondrous way the concord of many different things and rendered into one fashions one harmony in them all." [319]

[317] Cf. *De sacramentis fidei christianae* (ed. Rainer Berndt) I.1.4,pp. 37ff; *Sententie de div.* III.928.20ff; *Adnotationes in Pent.* 4.33c.
[318] For example, Hugh discussed the five modes of the eternal divine will working in temporal creation: *beneplacitum, operatio, promissio, perceptio, prohibitio. De sacramentis fid.* (ed. Rainer Berndt) I.4.97,1–101,6.
[319] *De tribus diebus* 166–68: "Sic omnis natura se diligit, et miro quodam modo plurium dissimilium et in unum redactorum concordia unam in omnibus armoniam facit." Cf. ibid., "Neque enim minima fiet admiration, si quis diligenter attendat quod sic singulis locis, singulis temporibus, singulis rebus divina providentia causas suas distribuit, ut in nullo penitus rerum ordo perturbetur."

Entirely above the cosmic order stands the Trinity as the primary hierarchy.[320] In the second place is the angelic hierarchy, "having its rank by adoption, participation, and worth from the First both under the First and second to the First, sublime in its likeness."[321] In the third place is the human hierarchy, where it springs from and looks back upon the font of all:

> Therefore, the majesty and command which in the lord and ruler of all is universally, omnipotently, superexcellently, and ineffably adored. Through parts, divisions, ranks, and orders, it was assigned to those, who were made partakers of this grace, co-heirs of this glory, and friends of this majesty, descending from it, looking back to it, and ordered under it, who is the font and cause of all.[322]

Through all runs the creator's wisdom, which unites and harmonizes all:

> The order and arrangement of all things so follows through from the peak to the lowest in the structure of this universe by certain causes and generations of reasons that there is none among them all that are unconnected, able to be separated, or external by nature.[323]

All things are bound together in the design of the creator.

We must remember, however, that Hugh's order was anything but impersonal or mechanistic. Order is christological. For Hugh associated the Son, as second person of the

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[320] *Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelestem S. Dionysii Areopagitae* I.3. 929c (PL 175).

[321] Ibid., I.3.929c–930c: "Adoptione, et participatione, et dignatione, a prima, et sub prima, et ad primam secunda, similitudine sublimis, gradum habens." Cf. Harkins, *Reading and the Work,* 93–94.

[322] *Commentaria* I.3.930c; I.2.927d–928c: "Majestas ergo et imperium, quod in Domino et gubernatore omnium universaliter, et omnipotentissime, et superexcellenter, et ineffabiliter adoratur: in eos qui participes gratiae et gloriae consortes et socii majestatis facti sunt, per partes, et divisiones, et gradus, et ordines distributum est, ab eo descendens et respiciens ad eum, et sub eo ordinatum qui fons et causa omnium."

[323] *De sacramentis fid.*I.2.2,28–2; pp.60–61, ed. Berndt: "Rerum omnium ordo dispositioque a summo usque ad imum in universitatis huius compage. Ita sese causis quibusdam rationumque genituris prosequitur ut omnium que sunt nichil inconexum aut separabile natura externumque inveniatur. Quecunque enim sunt rerum omnium. Aut cause inveniuntur subsequentium effectum esse. Aut effectus precedentium causarum."

Trinity, with wisdom, which manifests in the harmony and order of the universe.[324] "For this entire sensible world is, as it were, a kind of book written by the finger of God . . . to show and in a way signify the invisible wisdom of God."[325] Christ the wisdom of the Father is Hugh's principal of order.[326] Appropriately, the Wisdom that arranges all also acts as the principal restorer of order when it is disrupted in the fall. Relatively early in his teaching career, students at Saint-Victor learned of the two works of God: "All that is, is either from work of creation or from the work of restoration."[327] The former makes and forms the universe; the latter repairs it.

How then did Hugh understand that fall that necessitated the restoration? Hugh took special pains in explaining the nature of that fall.[328] The fall operates for Hugh as the pivot and middle term between these two guiding principles. Restoration takes its cue from creation, whose order it aims to recover. For the remedies must match the malady, and so a precise idea of the malady becomes necessary and determinative. Hugh explicitly recognized the fall's central and determining position: "For [scripture] could not suitably show how humanity is repaired unless first it shows how humanity fell. Nor

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[324] On the attributes: *De sacramentis fid.* (Berndt) I.3.16–20; I.3.87,1ff. For the beauty of the universe, see *Sententie* II.94ff; II.140.

[325] *De tribus diebus* (Poirel), 94–98; I.4.3: "Universus enim mundus iste sensilis quasi quidam liber est scriptus digito Dei, hoc est virtute divina creatus, et singulae creaturae quasi figurae quaedam sunt, non humano placito inventae, sed divino arbitrio institutae ad manifestandam et quasi quodammodo significandam invisibilem Dei sapientiam."

[326] *De tribus II*; cf. "The Three Days" in *Trinity and Creation*, ed. Boyd Coolman, Dale Coulter (New York: New City Press, 2011), 90.

[327] *Sententie*, Prologus 920, 232–33: "Omne quod est, aut est de opere conditionis aut est de opere restaurationis." Cf. "Introduction," by Dale Coulter, in *Trinity and Creation*, VTT1 (New York: New City Press, 2011), 105.

[328] For example, the reader finds Hugh commenting on the events of Genesis 3 in *Adnotationes in Pentateuchon*, *De tribus diebus* , *Sententie de divinitate*, *De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae dialogus, Adnotationes elucidatoriae in quosdam Psalmos*, and *De sacramentis fidei christianae.*

could it suitably show that fall unless first it explains in what way humanity was created by God."[329]

The account in his *Dialogue on the Sacraments of the Natural and Written Law* (1128–29) reframed the event in terms of a disorderly disruption of the natural and mandated precepts of life.[330] The fall finds itself in a framework of established orders that structured the first humans' behavior. "[God], therefore, placed those made outside paradise [Adam and Eve] into paradise, informing them with precepts of life and of discipline."[331] By these two, the precepts of nature and of discipline, God gave dual preparation for the man and woman, one temporal good, the other eternal good. The precepts of nature prescribe a threefold discernment by which one recognizes what are necessary and prohibited to their natures, as well as what one can use or not use.[332] The precept of discipline was the command regarding the trees. If they were obedient to discipline for a certain length of time determined by God, they would ascend directly to the *summum bonum* without death.[333] The serpent aimed its temptations to gluttony, vain glory, and greed against this obedience to discipline that led to beatitude. In this way, then, Hugh framed the fall as

[329] *De sacramentis fid.* Prologus, 32.25–27: "Non enim convenienter ostendere posset qualiter homo reparatus sit. Nisi prius demonstraret qualiter sit lapsus. Neque uero lapsum eius convenienter ostenderet nisi prius qualiter a deo institutus fuerit explicaret."
[330] *De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae dialogus*, in PL 176.23c–28a; for the date of this work, see Feiss' chronology in *On Love* (VTT2, 177–78), wherein he judged that *De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae dialogus* belongs to the years 1128–29.
[331] Ibid., 23c: "Factos igitur extra paradisum in paradiso posuit, informans praeceptis vitae et disciplinae."
[332] Ibid., 23d: "D: Quibus praeceptis informavit Desu hominem . . . ? M: Duobus, id est praecepto naturae, et praecepto disciplinae. Duo namque bona praeparat Deus homini: aliud temporale et aliud aeternum."
[333] Ibid., 24a–c: "Si igitur homo in hac obedientia perstitisset, post tempus definitum a Deo ad illud summum bonum quod in coelis ei praeparatum fuerat, sine mortis dolore transferri debuerat cum omni prole sua in consortio beatorum angelorum aeternaliter victurus."

breaching created bounds of order and as rooted in willful disorder (which was itself the first sin). Humanity was created with two appetites: one for suitable bodily necessities, and the other for justice. This appetite for justice is voluntary and regulates the involuntary desire for necessities. Thus, justice is "measure (*mensura*) in the appetite for suitable," and so the appetite for the just is "the love of measure."[334] The fall, then, is the act of the will against discipline, which "desired something beyond measure" and so ceased to desire justice: They "thus sinned by deserting the appetite for the just."[335] Punishment for this sin is simply retaining the appetite for the suitable, but no longer having justice to regulate this appetite. Humanity is then bound to desires for suitable and necessary things, but without the ability to order or moderate these desires. "One does not sin therefore because it desires something suitable but that it desires it inordinately." Nor can one now restore order for these natural and necessary desires.[336]

Here in the *Dialogue,* we see Hugh's concern for order pressed to the very heart of fallen humanity in need of restoration.[337] The fall occurred through willful disorder, and subsequently all humanity is bound to that chosen disorder, unable to right themselves.

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[334] Hugh has the student ask about the root of the sin: "D: Vellem up ipsam radicem istius peccati explicares: et sicut demonstrati mihi quo ordine patratum sit . . . ?" Describing the appetites, the master replies, "Unum, id est appetitum justi, secundum voluntatem; alterum, id est appetitum commodi, secundum necessitatem" (PL 176.25c–d). Later, the student asks, "Quid est ergo iustitia? M: Mensura in appetitu commodi. D: Quid est appetitus justitiae? M: Amor Mensurae" (26b). Notably, Hugh maintained this view of *iustitia* in his comments on the Psalms: "Iustitia dicuntur, quia nihil inordinatum continent."
[335] Ibid., 26c: "D: Quid ergo voluit ut hoc velle desineret? M: Voluit aliquid extra mensuram. . . . D: Peccavit itaque homo in hoc quod deseruit appetitum justi."
[336] "M: Non ideo peccat quod commudum suum appetit; sed quod inordinate appetit. D: Non potest inordinate non appetere? M: Non potest" (ibid., 27c).
[337] Hugh's earlier, very brief account of the fall in his *Adnotationes in Pentateuchon* (PL 175.39–41) kept to an Augustinian account, describing the first sin as pride (*superbia*). Later, in Hugh's *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* Hugh melded the accounts from the *Annotationes* and the *Dialogus* into a combination of disorderly, unjust will and pride (see *De sacramentis* I.5–7).

Now with a view of the centrality of disorder to the fall, it remains to see what was has been marred: how did Hugh conceive of original order for humanity?

*Twofold Order*

Reading Hugh's work, the reader notices that like Bonaventure's predilection for triads,[338] Hugh has a certain affinity for conceptual pairs in his thought about humanity. This is not to say that Hugh lapsed into reductive binary distinctions. Rather, I hope to show that Hugh consistently aimed to keep a balance between poles—holding different two goods together without sacrificing either. We find this pronounced and markedly consistent theme of balancing pairs involved the mind and love: the human has both a mind for knowing truth and a heart for loving the good. Neither can be sacrificed; both must be maintained, or rather, restored. In this last section, I shall present the doubling pairs in Hugh's account of human nature and restoration. Despite Hugh's use of triadic formulations for the sciences, the soul, and so forth, Hugh consistently returned to this balance of the mind and the heart. His educational program, which is the subject of the next chapter, is founded upon this intended balance and restores both through teaching (*doctrina*) and moral edification in virtue and love (*disciplina*).

Human order, like that of the universe, begins in the will of the creator who made humanity in the "image and likeness"[339] of God. Hugh based his understanding of the

[338] Cf. Wayne Hellmann, *Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure's Theology* (NY: Franciscan Institute Publishers, 2001).
[339] Genesis 1.26.

duality of the human soul upon these terms: "In the soul, the human was the image and likeness of God: image according to reason, likeness according to love. Image according to knowledge of the truth, likeness according to love of virtue."[340] In this reading of Genesis 1.26, Hugh notably diverged from Augustine, who disagreed with the view that 'image' and 'likeness' represented different features of humanity.[341] Here, then, Hugh fixed the two poles of inner human order that, once fallen, his educational program sought to restore, namely, the cognitive and affective, the mind and the will, which respectively seek their perfection in wisdom and love.

By these two poles, the human mind both takes rational cognizance of and also loves and enjoys objects that are true, fine, suitable, and pleasing.[342] Among the four kinds of movement Hugh delineated, the movement of rational creatures takes place in "acts and deliberations" proceeding from the thoughts and will.[343] In this way, spirits change "through cognition and affect," for example, by knowing more or less, or by becoming sad or cheerful.[344] On top of these cognitive and affective motions, a human

[340] *De sac. fid.* I.6.2: "Factus est homo ad imaginem & simillitudinem Dei, quia in anima potior pars erat hominis, vel potius ipse homo erat fuit imago & similitudo Dei. Imago secundum rationem, similitudo secundum dilectionem. Imago secundum cognitionem veritatis, similitudo secundum amorem virtutis." This is a succinct statement, but Hugh already expressed this notion in his *Adnotationes*: "Imaginem Dei ad hominem possumus dicere recognitionem veritatis; similitudinem dilectionem unitatis; quae in utroque scilicet Deo et homine sunt. Ad imaginem Dei factus est homo secundum animam." Cf. *Adnotationes*, PL 175.37c.
[341] Augustine, *De trinitate* VII.6.12; cf. R. A. Markus, " 'Imago' and 'Similitudo' in Augustine," *Revue des Études augustiniennes* 10 (1964): 125–43.
[342] *De tribus* 21.901–911: "Certe mens rationalis una est et generat de se intellectum una unum. Quem nonnumquam, dum conspicit quam subtilis, quam verus, quam conveniens, quam iocundus, mox diligit eum et complacet sibi in ipso."
[343] *De tribus diebus* (Dominic Poirel), I.8.320–324: "Denique motus rationalis, qui est in factis et consiliis."
[344] *De tribus* 20.826–8: "Alteratio spirituum per cognitionem et affectum. Secundum affectum mutantur spiritus, ut nunc tristes nunc hilares; secundum cognitionem, ut nunc minus nunc amplius sapientes."

can also change in more qualitative ways, either by repenting something past or "proposing something disordered for the future."[345]

This disorder, as we have seen, Hugh believed corrupted both sides of the human creature:

> The wholeness of the spiritual nature abides in truth and goodness: when it knows truth and when it loves goodness. Therefore, cognition corrupted by ignorance introduces certain foulness, as it were, to the rational soul. Indeed, love corrupted by concupiscence is a deformity of the soul.[346]

Fallen humanity, then, suffers from ignorance and concupiscence as the corruptions of each side of its nature.[347]

Restoration of two-sided humanity must respect this duality. In the *Dialogue,* Hugh saw the sacraments as twofold remedies for this dual wound. In answer to why God established the way of salvation through sacraments, the teacher responded: "So that humanity be humbled and instructed. One is humbled indeed when, now lying in a lower state, one is compelled to seek one's good, which, when one previously stood, one

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[345] *De tribus* 20.830–31: "Duo vero sunt precipue quae affectum operantis mutare solent, id est sive quia aliquid penitendum fecerit in preterito, sive quia aliquid inordinatum proponat de futuro."

[346] *Super orationem dominicam*, PL 175.774c–d: "Spiritualis autem naturae integritas in veritate et bonitate constat: in veritate, cum cognoscitur; in bonitate, cum amatur. Corrupta ergo cognitio per ignorantiam, animae rationali quasi quamdam foeditatem ingerit; corruptus vero amor per concupiscentiam, animae turpitudo est"; cf. On the two goods of truth and goodness corrupted by ignorance and concupiscence: *Sententie*, Prologus 400–415.

[347] Speaking of the original sin that transmits to offspring, Hugh wrote: "Hoc autem vicium rationis humane duplici corruptione naturam inficit ignorantia scilicet mentem & concupiscentia carnem" (*De sac. fid.* I.7,183.14–15; cf. I.8,194.4–5). It is notable, however, that sometimes Hugh broadened the dichotomy humanity bears and, instead of fixing the basic duality between mind and heart, makes it the basic divide between soul and body. Hence, we see Hugh's occasional breakdown of dual-natured humanity as divine and bodily, for which we need respective restoration of the image and care for bodily necessity. Cf. *Did.* I.7; *Dialogus* 23d, *Sententie* III.81–93. *De sac. fid.* II.2.1; *Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam*, ed. Baron, 176–88.

scorned to take by one's greater state."[348] The sacramental remedies humble human pride that sought its good among lower things. Regarding sacramental instruction: "The sacraments were also established to humanity for teaching (*doctrina*), so that by things done externally, one can recognize what is interiorly delivered."[349] The sacramental remedies humble the pride that ignorant and concupiscent humanity nurtures. Hence, "the sacraments are known to be established for a threefold cause: on account of humbling, instruction, and exercise."[350] Besides dispelling the particular vice of pride as the root of vices, the sacraments thus aim to amend fallen ignorance with teaching and dispel concupiscence with virtue and love.[351]

Education, then, must likewise balance this dual role. Hugh critically noted that some students split the pursuits of learning and virtue and pursue them separately:

> There are two schools and two kinds of students. Some seek virtue, others truth. Yet those who seek *in truth* condemn neither, since virtue is not hateful to lovers of truth nor is truth to be scorned by lovers of virtue.[352]

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[348] *Dialogus* 34c: "M: Ut humiliaretur homo et erudiretur. Humiliaretur quidem dum cogitur nunc jacens in inferiori bonum quaerere; quod prius cum staret, a suo superiori contempsit accipere."

[349] *Dialogus* 34c: "M: Ut humiliaretur homo et erudiretur. Humiliaretur quidem dum cogitur nunc jacens in inferiori bonum quaerere; quod prius cum staret, a suo superiori contempsit accipere. . . . Ad doctrinam etiam sacramenta proposita sunt homini, ut per ea quae exterius aguntur, quid sibi interius exhibeatur possit agnoscere."

[350] *De sac. fid.* I.9,211.6–8ff: "Triplici ex causa sacramenta instituta esse cognoscuntur, propter humiliationem, propter eruditionem, propter exercitationem."

[351]"Reason was to be instructed to greater knowledge [*cognitio*] and virtue to be advanced to greater perfection." *De sac. fid.* I.9,205.6–7: "Humiliatio enim sibi necessaria non fuit, ubi nulla superbia fuit, sed ratio que erudiretur ad maiorem cognitionem & virtus que promoveretur ad maiorem perfectionem." Hugh frequently repeated this notion of the manifold function of the sacraments to humble pride, instruct ignorance, and expell concupiscence. Cf. *De sac. fid.* I.9,211.8–214.23; *Epitome* II.176–180; *Sententie*, Prologus 400–54.

[352]*Adnotationes elucidatoriae in quosdam Psalmos*, PL 177.627b–c: "Duae sunt scholae et duo sunt genera discentium. Alii virtutem quaerunt, alii veritatem. Qui tamen alterum in veritate appetunt, neutrum contemnunt, quia nec virtus odibilis est amatoribus veritatis, nec veritas contemptibilis amatoribus virtutis. Sunt autem qui veritatem quaerere videntur, qui tamen quia non in veritate, et pro veritate, sed pro vanitate eam quaerunt, veritatem sine virtute habere volunt, sed, et veritas non est sine virtute, nec

Neither those virtue-seekers that condemn truth, nor those truth-seekers (who neglect virtue and so gain neither) keep the necessary balance. For "truth is not without virtue nor is there virtue except in truth."[353] Hugh then sought to maintain this vital link—the mutual dependence between learning and living. "But if I still neglect to imitate the good that I know, then I can say that my thinking is right but useless to me."[354] Knowing is good, Hugh continued, but "it is useless to me if I do not derive from it an example of living."[355]

Even right and true thoughts are worthless if unpracticed, for cognition and affect entail each other. "God lives in the human heart in two ways," Hugh elsewhere argued in *On Noah's Ark,* "namely, through knowledge [*cognitio*] and through love." These are not separate but complementary and ultimately mutually dependent. "Yet it is one house, because all who know God love God and none can love God who does not know God."[356] The difference between cognition and love is that the former "erects the structure of faith through cognition but love paints the building through virtue as if by added color. But

virtus nisi in veritate." Emphasis is mine. Notably Hugh made these comments regarding Psalm 118, from which the verse Ps 118.66 will function as a point of departure for Hugh's larger scheme, as will be discussed below.

[353] Ibid.; see also *Psalmos 11.594d:* "Ut in eo non solum doctrinae, sed et discplinae ordinem esse ostendamus."

[354] *De archa Noë* II.5.7–12: "Sed si bonum quod novi adhuc imitari dissimulo, tunc dicere possum quod recta sit cogitatio mea et inutilis, quid bonum est quod de aliis cogito, quod in aliis agnosco, sed inutile est michi, si illud ad exemplum vivendi non traho, quia aliena virtus michi non prodest, si illam quantum possum imitari neglexero."

[355] Ibid.

[356] *De archa Noe* I.3.2–9: "Duobus modis Deus cor humanum inhabitat, per cognitionem videlicet et amorem. Una tamen mansio est, quia et omnis qui novit eum diligit, et nemo diligere potest qui non novit. In hoc tamen differe videtur, quia scientia per cognitionem fidei fabricam erigit, dilectio autem per virtutem quasi colore superducto edificium pingit. Sic autem utrumlibet alteri necessarium esse perspicitur, quia nec splendere potest si non fuerit, nec placere si non splenduerit."

both are found necessary to the other."[357] Here we begin to see the restoration of the image and the similitude: the former by faith, instructed in the truth; the latter by disciplined virtue brings one to enjoy goodness.

Now, since Hugh demands we keep the balance between the poles, how does one proceed? What order—a vital question, as we have seen—shall we keep? We, of course, cannot look for a simplistic answer that would throw the balance and mutual dependence between teaching and discipline. Hugh occasionally suggested various orders, indicating that some fluidity or flexibility enters into the scheme.[358] However, the Victorine seemed to settle on a plan that he linked to Psalm 118. In *On the Ark of Noah,* which Hugh introduced as based upon his oral teaching with his students, he reflects on the need to balance cognition and affect.[359] Of the four arks, the first two are visible and external, namely, Noah's historical ark and the ark of the church that Christ founded. The latter two arks to be built inwardly and invisibly are the ark of wisdom (this "wisdom daily builds in our hearts from continual meditation upon the law of God") and the ark of mother grace (this "mother grace works in us through a league of many virtues in one love".)[360] The invisible, inward arks reflect the two poles of teaching and discipline. The

[357] Ibid. I.3.4–9.
[358] For example, in the *Didascalicon* (V.9.13–17), Hugh set out four steps for perfection: "Lectio sive doctrina, meditatio, oratio, operatio," and afterward a fifth, "contemplatio." Each of these steps persists as important for Hugh, but the order of the steps does not seem to fit easily with any other scheme Hugh mentioned, nor have I found Hugh reverting to this particular scheme elsewhere. That is not to say it is unimportant to Hugh, but that it does not indicate a particular scheme to which Hugh was committed.
[359] *De archa Noe* I.1,3, ed. Sicard. Hugh recounts the origin of the ark project as arising from his students' wish to learn the remedy of human mutability.
[360] *De archa* I.3,17.236–239: "Tertia est quam cotidie sapientia edificat in cordibus nostris ex iugi legis Dei meditatione. Quarta est quam mater gratia operatur in nobis ex confederatione multarum virtutum in una caritate."

ark of wisdom consists in knowledge (*cognitio*); the ark of mother grace consists in virtue.[361] By these two arks, then, Hugh gives us a window into his vision of the larger program of education.

In his treatment on the ark of wisdom, Hugh did not exclude or cut off the growth of virtues or love from gaining wisdom. Wisdom and virtue entail each other, even bleed into each other. "For love is itself wisdom, since through love we taste God and through tasting we know God."[362] Yet Hugh found three steps to mark movement of education in the three stories of the ark: in the first story are the thoughts springing from "meditation of scripture," "the virtues of saints, and the works of God."[363] But, as we have already seen, good thoughts must be made useful. The second story is then to gain virtues: "Virtues, which I have already learned to love and admire in others, I will make mine through the exercise of discipline and the model of right living. Then I can say that the thought of my heart is useful and then I ascend into the second story."[364] Like the second, the ark's third story centers upon the virtues, but here the focus lies upon their internalization: "What I exhibit outwardly in work I might possess inwardly in virtue."[365] The summit of the virtues, like the peak of the ark, is love, "which unites us to God."[366]

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[361] *De archa* I.3,17.240: "Tertia [arca] in cognitione, quarta in virtute."
[362] *De archa* III.2,55.6–8: "Caritas enim ipsa est sapientia, quia per caritatem Deum gustamus, gustando autem cognoscimus, sicut dicit Psalmista: 'Gustate et videte, quoniam suavis est Dominus.'"
[363] *De archa* II.5,40.1–7: "Si ego diligere cepero meditationem Scripturarum et libenter cogitavero de virtutibus sanctorum et de operibus Dei et de aliis quecunque ad emendatione morum sive ad exercitationem mentis pertinent, iam in archa esse cepi."
[364] *De archa* II.5,41.18–21: "Virtutes quas in aliis iam amare et ammirari didici meas faciam per exercitium discipline et formam recte vivendi, tunc possum dicere, quod utilis sit cogitatio cordis mei, et tunc ascendi in secunduam mansionem."
[365] *De archa* II.5,41.25–26: "Hoc est ut quod foris demonstro in opere intus possideam in virtute."
[366] *De archa* II.5,41.31–33.

Hugh summarized these three stories in this way: "In the first story is thought [*cognitio*]; in the second, work [*opus*]; in the third virtue; in the highest is the reward of virtue, the Lord Jesus Christ."[367] Maintaining the balance of cognitive and lived affect, love crowns the ark of wisdom. These steps are not a flippant schematic, but indicate a deeper commitment in Hugh's educational program. To reinforce these three stories (*cognitio, opus, virtus*), Hugh cited and even rearranged the psalm text: "You have these steps where it says in the Psalms [118.66]: 'Goodness and discipline and knowledge.' If you reverse them: 'Teach me knowledge, discipline, and goodness, Lord Jesus Christ!"[368] It is notable that Hugh was so concerned with this scheme that he reversed scriptural order to fit his own scheme.[369]

This knowledge-discipline-goodness program was not haphazard. Instead, Hugh returned to this scheme when explaining various possible meanings of the ark's three stories: "According to activity [*operatio*], the first story is knowledge [*scientia*], the second is discipline, and the third is goodness."[370] Likewise, Hugh seemed to indicate this

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[367] *De archa* II.5,41.36–40: "In prima ergo mansione est cognitio, in secunda opus, in tertia virtus, in supremo premium virtutis: Dominus Iesus Christus. Hos gradus habes in Psalmo ubi dicit: 'Bonitatem et disciplinam et scientiam.' Si convertas: 'Scientiam et disciplinam et bonitatem doce me Domine Iesu Christe.'"
Hugh distinguished education for beginners from the exercises of those progressing (e.g., *Did.* VI.13).

[368] Ibid.

[369] As we will see, Hugh repeats this order in the *Formation of Novices* (Prol., 22–60).

[370] *De archa* IV.9,115.112–113: "Vel secundum operationem: prima mansio est scientia, secunda mansio est disciplina, tertia mansio est bonitas." In the much more elaborate scheme of fifteen steps that Hugh worked out in the figure of the tree of life, the three stories appear in the same relative order: the fourth step is *fides* (*per fides radicat*), the eleventh is *disciplina* (*per disciplinam floret*), the twelfth *virtus* (*per virtutem fructificat*) (*De archa* II.16,54.5–9). We may take faith in the fourth step for *scientia*, since Hugh explained this step as knowledge of spiritual things that teach *contemptus mundi* and trust in inner joys. Faith here is the beginning of wisdom and right learning: "It is faith, therefore, through which wisdom is rooted, since through faith the spirit is strengthened and the affect is supported [*Fides igitur est per quam radicat sapientia, quia per fidem firmatur animus et constabilitur affectus*]" (*De archa* III.5,62.98–99). We see here now

scheme in his clarifying comments in the *Didascalicon.* To avoid confusion between the beginning and advanced students, Hugh wrote: "But before I spoke to the educated, now however to those *to be* educated and beginners in learning [*doctrina*], which is the principle of discipline."[371] Between this basic division of students, the learned and the beginners, Hugh roughly divided the virtues and study respectively. "To the learned the pursuit of the virtues is set out; but in the meantime, the exercise of reading is intended for beginners. Yet let it be so that neither the latter lack virtue nor the former give up reading."[372] Without the schematic presentation, Hugh here laid out the same basic plan: first, *doctrina* for knowledge; second, *discipline* for virtue.

The most definitive expression of this plan occurred when Hugh adopted this scheme in *On the Formation of Novices.* Here Hugh introduced *disciplina* to novices in order to lay out their larger educational path. Speaking to novices who have already "converted through holy desire," Hugh lays out their road:

> No one can come to beatitude except by virtue, and virtue is only truly gained when the discipline of virtue is kept without neglect. For keeping discipline directs the soul to virtue, and virtue conducts the soul to beatitude.[373]

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Hugh's larger ark scheme, even when rounded out with many smaller points, still maintained the contours of his *scientia-disciplina-bonitas* program.

[371] *Didascalicon* V.8.13–15: "Sed ibi locutus sum eruditis, nunc autem erudiendis, et doctrinam quae principium est disciplinae incohantibus."

[372] Ibid., 15–17: "Illis studium virtutum, istis vero interim exercitium lectionis propositium est, sic tamen ut nec hi virtute careant, nec illi prorsus lectionem omittant."

[373] *De institutione novitiorum,* Prologus, 9–13: "Ad beatitudinem autem nemo venire potest, nisi per virtutem, et virtus non alio modo veraciter apprehenditur, nisi disciplina virtutis non negligenter custodiatur. Usus enim discipline ad virtutem animum dirigit, virtus autem ad beatitudinem perducit." Hugh addressed his novices as "de vana conversatione huius seculi, per desiderium sanctum conversi estis" (Ibid., 1–2).

Here *disciplina* is highlighted as the main topic of *Formation*. Yet, based upon Psalm 118.66, knowledge appears as the "principle and foundation, as it were, of holy living."[374] Invoking that authority, Hugh pulled the scheme together:

> Enter his way and run to [Christ]. You will have rest more quickly the quicker you arrive. The way to him is knowledge, discipline, and goodness [*scientia, disciplina, bonitas*]. Through knowledge, one arrives at discipline. Through discipline, one arrives at goodness. Through goodness, one arrives at beatitude.[375]

The tripartite scheme of knowledge-discipline-goodness represents a restorative path encompassing both cognitive and affective poles. It is the path Hugh's students had already begun and that Hugh sought to teach them. As it was already evident in the *Ark* and *Didascalicon,* the parts are not stages to be completed fully before advancing. Rather, they are points of balance. Striving after goodness requires learning and discipline, education both of the cognitive and of the affective sides of the human soul.

*Conclusion*

Let us look back at that classroom of students that initiated this examination. With a better understanding of Hugh's pedagogical principles, we can better recognize why they might deserve their severe judgment. After surveying the great variety of students pursuing different arts and disciplines apparently without a teacher's guidance, the student acknowledged, "Although in all these there is not one form of learning, still there

[374] Ibid., Prolog. 30–33: "Postremo, quia [Psalmista] vidit neminem servare posse disciplinam boni operis, qui non habeat scientiam vere discretionis, hanc quoque sibi dari quasi quoddam fundamentum et principium sancte conversationis postulavit."
[375] Ibid. Prol. 54–58: "Intrate viam eius et currite ad ipsum; tanto citius requiem habebitis, quanto citius pervenietis. Via ad ipsum sunt scientia, disciplina, bonitas; per scientiam itur ad disciplinam, per disciplinam itur ad bonitatem, per bonitatem itur ad beatitudinem."

is one will to make progress."[376] This seems to be Hugh's way of hinting at the disorder of haphazard or autodidactic studies. With Hugh's virulent criticism of disordered education in view, it is only surprising that the vanity of that disorder did not receive more focus in the teacher's harsh judgment. Instead, the teacher interlocutor, as we saw, denounced these students for their one-sided intellectual pursuits: They seek knowledge of natural things but lack self-knowledge. They desire to know creatures but not the creator. "[These studies] snatch away a person's heart and in a way take one away from oneself so that while one is drawn to examine other things which do not matter, one is not at all brought back to examine oneself." [377] All the while, their "way of life" (*conversatio*) and "end" (*finis*) remain in disrepair and neglected.[378] These vain students neglected ordering their life and love through *disciplina* and so forfeited their pursuits in *doctrina.* Thus, the student recognized that the sage must balance both, as we have just seen: "Truly, I admit it is utterly foolish to someone wise who, however wide their eyes are open to other things, yet either cannot foresee or refuse to beware their own ruin."[379] In short, we see that Hugh consistently held that study of the arts brings no profit unless one maintains the proper order of study, which order includes the proper balance of the intellect and the heart.

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[376] *De vanit.* I.709d–710a: "In his autem omnibus licet non una sit discendi forma, una tamen omnibus est proficiendi voluntas, hoc autem sive otium negotiosum, sive negotium otiosum appellandum sit . . . [as quoted above]."
[377] Ibid., 710b: "[Haec studia] rapiunt enim cor hominis et quodammodo extra semetipsum abducunt, ut dum ad alia, quae ad rem non pertinent, consideranda trahitur, ad circumspectionem sui minime revertatur."
[378] Ibid., 710d: "Conversatio quidem, qua nihil turpius, finis vero, quo nihil infelicius esse potest."
[379] Ibid., 710d: "I: Vere fateor quod omnino ineptum est illum sapientem dicere, qui quamlibet ab alia oculum habeat apertum, suum tamen interitum aut praevidere nequeat, aut cavere detrectet."

In closing, we can see Hugh's pedagogical program fitting within the divine work of restoring humanity through teaching and discipline from its twofold fall into disorder, in which it now suffers ignorance and concupiscence. The next chapter will follow up this foundation by mapping out four movements in Hugh's larger plan.

## Chapter 4:

## *Doctrina* and *Disciplina:*

## The Contours of Hugh's Pedagogical Program

Early twelfth-century Paris offered opportunities to masters experimenting in thinking and teaching. While Hugh of Saint-Victor critiqued the teaching methods of his contemporary Parisian masters who took advantage of that latitude, he may have had the opportunity for pedagogical experimentation on a grander scale. Saint-Victor was a well-endowed and vibrant house, the prestige and reforming mission of which attracted both donors and talented novices. Abbot Gilduin evidently supported Hugh, who relatively quickly gained the post of master at Saint-Victor. In his two decades of teaching at Saint-Victor, Hugh developed a holistic pedagogical program for his novices and canons. This program offered a remedy for the ills he saw in the independent schools: whereas Parisian students might approach their subjects haphazardly, Hugh planned an orderly curriculum through which the student would progress. Whereas the Parisian student might only sharpen his wits without moral improvement, Hugh also sought to incorporate the discipline of the regular canons into an affective pedagogy. These two remedies constitute the two poles of Hugh's pedagogy to restore the human twofold order through teaching (*doctrina*) and through discipline (*disciplina*). Teaching corrects ignorance by aiming at wisdom; discipline corrects disordered love and vice by restraining the body and cultivating the heart for love. For each, progress through stages is necessary. Hugh did not attempt to lay out all teaching at once, nor all discipline. The

novice must move through stages in both aspects, in learning and in virtue. Through this staged duality of Hugh's *ordo*—the cognitive and the affective—a balance is likewise necessary: they are distinct routes but mutually dependent; one can gain neither virtue nor wisdom without the other.

Herein lies a challenge for grasping Hugh's staged, balanced pedagogy of intellect and affect. The Hugonic student must learn several lessons gradually and simultaneously. Present scope makes this difficult to articulate. Instead, a formal distinction between *disciplina* and *doctrina* will divide the chapter in half. The first half on *disciplina* will treat the novice's first steps in Hugh's theorization of the regulated life of the canon regular as a bodily discipline to cultivate love. As a second phase of discipline, Hugh's various spiritual texts exhibit his teaching for students progressing in discipline, making their way toward charity. The second half will consider *doctrina*: the formal, curated order of reading for the novice; first, in the earlier curricular works, which set out a method relying upon mnemonic hermeneutical principles for reading sacred scripture. As a second step of this instruction, Hugh attempted in his *Sacraments of the Christian Faith* to offer a mnemonic handbook in brief (a *summa*) of the principles of sacred scripture. Yet Hugh's *Sacraments*, I argue, transmutated in composition and shifted from terse and concise treatments of principles to extended, dialectical disputes on profound and difficult questions. In this transmutation, Hugh's final project veered away from his earlier goals and anticipated the projects of one of his students, Peter Lombard.

This layered, two-step account spans many major works in Hugh's prolific and rich career. While many scholars have discussed the individual didactic, curricular, or pedagogical functions of Hugh's various works, the pedagogical principles and program that may unify and structure these texts—into a staged progression balancing formal instruction with affective cultivation—has yet to emerge.[380] By contrast, this treatment will focus less on individual works and the content of Hugh's teaching in order to highlight the pedagogical methods and tensions running through his program. As a result, much of relevance and interest will not find treatment here, including much of the content of Hugh's teaching *per se,* as the content of a lesson differs from the pedagogical principles animating it.[381]

## I. *Disciplina:* Forming Virtue and Cultivating Love

[380] A few recent treatments stand out: Paul Rorem (*Hugh of Saint Victor* [NY: Oxford University Press, 2009]) paid close attention to various pedagogical functions in several works. Boyd Coolman (*The Theology of Hugh of St Victor: An Interpretation* [Boston: Cambridge University Press, 2010]) presented Hugh's overall program as a means of reforming the soul. Franklin Harkins (*Reading and the Work of Restoration: History and Scripture in the Theology of Hugh of St Victor* [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2009]) presented Hugh's pedagogical program with special emphasis on the historical reading of Scripture. See also Patrice Sicard, *Hugues de Saint-Victor et son école* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991); Dominique Poirel, *Des Symboles et des Anges: Hugues de Saint-Victor et le Réveil Dionysian du XIIe Siècle* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 146–47; Ivan Illich, *In the Vineyard of the Text: A Commentary to Hugh's Didascalicon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals of Medieval Europe, 950–1200* (PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 244–68; Ian Wei, *Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 78–85; Conrad Rudolph, *The Mystical Ark: Hugh of Saint Victor, Art, and Thought in the Twelfth Century* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[381] Pedagogy here refers to teaching about or how to teach, rather than simple didacticism. See the introduction for the discussion of these terms.

The novice at Saint-Victor would eventually undertake Hugh's thorough curricular plan of reading. Reading, of course, never occurs in a vacuum. From his first arrival to his final days, the canon of Saint-Victor lived according to the discipline and spirituality of the abbey. For Hugh, the restraint of bodily disorder was the first step toward cultivating virtue, and so, love. For this reason, Hugh sought to foster an ordered, communal life for his canon scholars. Yet the master of Saint-Victor was not its abbot; he not did institute or govern the customs at Saint-Victor. Their life already had its rule in the so-called *Rule of Augustine*, and specific practices are reflected in the many regulations set out in their customary *The Book of the Order of Saint-Victor* (*Liber Ordinis Sancti Victoris*).[382] Instead of instituting the customs, Hugh set himself to theorize the practices and to articulate the ideal of 'disciplina' for the community.

But Hugh's moral instruction of his canons did not cease after their novitiate. Spiritual writings evince Hugh's continuing investment in his canons' spiritual advancement. Hugh's spiritual writings fit their subject matter: no universal order or structure appears but rather common thematic threads appear. The master exhorts his educated and progressing canons to the contempt for vanities, for wholesome fear, with the final aim of kindling a brighter love.

This section will deal with each task in turn. First will appear Hugh's concept of *disciplina* as the basis of the lived, regimented life of a canon of Saint-Victor, which the

[382] See Luc Verheijen, ed., *La Règle de Saint Augustin* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1967); L Jocqué, L Milis, ed., *Liber ordinis Sancti Victoris parisiensis* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1984).

*Book of the Order* reflects. As a reader of that *Book,* Hugh theorized *disciplina* to describe its many, meticulously described customs (*consuetudines*) as well as working *disciplina* into a vital principle of his larger pedagogical program. As the counterpoint to *doctrina* for the intellect, *disciplina* forms the affect by correcting one's morals, restraining the 'outer' in order to begin reforming the 'inner,' and serving the creation of a pedagogical community of peers. The second section will examine Hugh's various devotional and spiritual writings as continuing pedagogy to spur rhetorically his intermediate, progressing students toward renewed attention to discipline, to greater love of their brother and of God.

a. *Lived Discipline and the* Book of Order

Throughout his writings, Hugh referred to *disciplina* as an essential aspect of the ordered life.[383] Even in the terse description in the *Didascalicon*—emphasizing circumstances for study, such as quiet, poverty, and exile—Hugh made it clear that neglecting *disciplina* would be a grave mistake for anyone seeking knowledge.[384] He went so far as to define discipline as quality that separated heaven, hell, paradise, and the present life: while paradise was a good meant to be improved, and the present world houses those "erring

[383] For example, *Sacraments* I.7.31–32; I.8.12–13; discipline as ordering life is a central theme of *De institutione novitiorum* (as treated later). In *On the Substance of Love* (*De substantia dilectionis*), Hugh took up the theme of ordered against disordered love (see Roger Baron, ed., *Hugues de Saint-Victor: Six Opuscules Spirituels* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1969), 82–89).
In the *Didascalicon,* Hugh's discussion of *disciplina* is equivocal, sometimes referring to it as an academic pursuit, sometimes as a moral way of life (cf. *Didascalicon* I.4 [using both senses in the same short passage], II.30; cf. III.1, III.6, III.12; cf. *De Noë Archa* III.10, IV.20; *Soliloquy de arrha animae* 52).
[384] *Didascalicon* III.12: "Et idcirco summopere cavendum ei qui quaerit scientiam, ut non negligat disciplinam." "Mens, inquit, humilis, studium quaerendi, vita quieta, scrutinium tacitum, paupertas, terra aliena, haec reserare solent multis obscura legend."

and repairing," heaven is the "place of those confirmed as good who dip into the highest gain *through discipline*," while hell belongs to those "confirmed as wicked who irretrievably desert discipline."[385]

This discipline that gained or lost heaven found its own treatment only in Hugh's *Formation of Novices* (*De institutione novitiorum*).[386] *Formation* set numerous rules for novices in several areas, especially in dress, in composure, in speech, and at table.[387] The reader finds quite a voluble Hugh discoursing on the various faults and errors on what may appear to be minutiae. Why did Hugh speak at such length and with such severity against fancy dress or certain ticks of behavior, such as restlessness?[388] The master of Saint-Victor was not being petty or faultfinding. To recognize the significance of Hugh's attention to detail, we must first recognize the context of the instruction mandated in the abbey's intricate customary, the *Book of Order.* In comparison, then, Hugh's *Formation* no longer appears as a pedantic list of misbehaviors but stands out as a theorized treatment of a central concept—*disciplina*—as a vital step in a larger pedagogical process.

*Formation of Novices* was not Hugh's abstract morality lesson but presumed and sprang from practices for receiving and inculcating new novices that appear in the *Book of the Order.* This *Book* was an evolving customary book during the abbacy of Gilduin (d.

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[385] *De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae dialogus,* PL 176 [28B–28C], "Coelum est locus confirmatorum bonorum et per disciplinam ad summam profectum pertingentium. . . . Infernus est locus confirmatorum malorum et disciplinam irrecuperabiliter deserentium." Hugh reiterated this in his later work, *On the Sacraments.* Cf. *De sacramentis* I.8.2.

[386] H Feiss, P Sicard,eds., "De institutione novitiorum," in H Feiss, P Sicard, eds., *L'œuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor I* (Turnhout, BE: Brepols, 1997), 8–114.

[387] *De instit. nov.* 11, 50,486–488: "In habitu, in gestu, in locutione, in mensa, id est, in comestione."

[388] E.g., *De inst.* 542–90; 700.

1155).[389] The *Book* gave a prominent place to the procedures for discerning, accepting, and teaching novices. The first twenty-one chapters mainly deal with the main officers of the house, starting with the abbot and proceeding in descending rank.[390] A second, large portion of the *Book* handles the various functions of the brothers, such as liturgy, labor, and meals. "The Reception and Formation of Novices" and related chapters (§22–24) begin this second part and form the hinge between the two discussions: they transition from the treatment of the officers to the functions of the house, with the officers taking select roles within it.

These 'reception' chapters (§22–24) deal with two problems: how to discern the promising candidates from the ill-intentioned, and how to educate the promising. The *Book* pointed out that the "the wicked, who once admitted do not endure rebuke, are mixed up with the good," and that "the good, left after admission without instruction" suffer grave harm and neglect.[391] The abbot is to take a special hand in the discernment by first examining the candidates before they appear before the whole chapter for approval.

Candidates receive some minor instruction prior to acceptance, but afterward, their formation constitutes a distinct time period apart from the rest of the assembly with the novice-master (*magister novitiorum*) in the school. This training from the novice-master

[389] *Liber ordinis,* Introduction, ix–xi; *Liber ordinis Sancti Victoris parisiensis*, ed. L Jocqué, L Milis (Turnhout: Brepols, 1984); cf. Stephen Jaeger's *Envy of Angels* 247–54.
[390] *Liber ordinis* 1–12, 14–21.
[391] *Liber ordinis* 22, 4–7: "Saepe mali, qui correptionem non paciuntur suscepti, bonisque admixti, graves molestias religioni inferre soleant: et boni, post susceptionem sine eruditione derelicti, grave detrimentum in negligentia religionis sustinere."

as mandated in the *Book* is practical and technical. Once received, novices are in the novice-master's charge, who has them habited and leads them into the school where—outside necessaries—the novice will spend his days. The novice "will be in the novice-school with his master, and there, meanwhile, he will be instructed about things especially necessary about the order and about the things at hand that he ought to know."[392] They discuss very practical matters, such as the different rooms, where to stand and sit, how the novice is to act in each place, and other customs.[393] The *Book* gives specific instructions on these practical lessons:

> In the school, the novice ought to be instructed about bowing, gait, posture, and his every gesture, and how his clothing ought to fit about him in every act, how to compose his limbs orderly, how to have downcast eyes, how to speak low and not hastily, to not utter oaths, to affirm or deny nothing beyond 'Yes' and 'No' or 'Believe me,' how he ought to speak to the abbot or his other masters, how to [speak to] brothers or other fellows, and how to [speak to] inferiors. He also ought to learn the signs by which he may express what is necessary in silence, also places where he may go without permission when he has need, and also times, when what is to be or is not to be done, and when it is permitted and when not.[394]

In these lessons, novice-masters impart the technical customs of the abbey: how to comport his body (*gestus*), how to dress, how to speak to whom (discerning superiors,

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[392] Ibid., 22, 153–56: "In ceteris vero horis iugiter in scola novitiorum erit cum magistro suo, et ibi interim instruetur de his, quae magis necessaria sunt de ordine, et de his, quae eum in praesenti minime oportet ignorare."

[393] Ibid., 156–61.

[394] Ibid., 229–40: "In scola diligenter instruendus est de inclinationibus, de incessu et statu, et omni gestu suo, et quomodo vestimenta sua in omni actione circa se coaptare debeat, et membra sua ordinate componere, oculos demissos habere, submisse et non festinanter loqui, iuramenta non facere, praeter *Est et Non* vel *Credite michi* nichil negare vel affirmare; quomodo ad abbatem vel ceteros magistros suos loqui debeat, quomodo ad fratres vel alios compares, et quomodo ad inferiores. Signa etiam quibus cum fuerit in silentio, quod opus est exprimere possit, loca etiam discere quo ire eum liceat, cum opus habuerit, sine licentia et quo non liceat, sed et tempora, quando quid faciendum est vel non, et quando liceat et quando non liceat."

peers, and inferiors), the expectations of certain places and times, and signs for silent communication.

To cement these lessons, the novice-master will even accompany the novice through the day, walking them through their new way of life.[395] In this way, the novice learns by words as well as by example and by practice.

> Finally, [the master] should teach him so perfectly from all his words and actions that he should press home what one should say and do, not by words alone but also that he personally does and says what he taught, so that [the novice] may know not only by hearing but also become accustomed to good ways and suitable moderation in all words by actions *by doing*. But let the master have the novice read, sing, and chant with a high and low voice, according to the demands of the time, and also at that time have him do and test before hand and become accustomed to all that he will undertake publicly first in private.[396]

The *Book* then enjoins learning the customs (*consuetudines*) by word, example, and practice to their own public performance of the customs. The novice learns a new way of life.

Reminiscent of Hugh's notion, the *Book* frequently to refers to this canonical way of life as *disciplina*.[397] The novice-master oversees a "guarding of *disciplina*" (*custodia disciplinae*) for the period of the novice's instruction.[398] If that master is called away, then

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[395] Ibid., 161–226.

[396] Ibid., 241–48: "Postremo de omnibus actionibus suis et verbis ita perfecte eum instruat, ut non solum verbis insinuet, quae facienda vel dicenda sunt, sed etiam coram se et agere et dicere faciat, quae praeceperit ut non solum audiendo sciat, sed etiam faciendo assuescat bonum modum et competentem mensuram in omnibus verbis et actionibus; sed et legere et cantare, et psallere alta et demissa voce, prout tempora deposcunt, eum ibidem faciat et omnia, quae in publico acturus fuerit, prius in secreto praetemptet et assuescat."

[397] E.g., *Liber ordinis,* 4, 4–8; 20–28; 15, 2–5; 17, 2–5; 18, 7–8, 78–79; 22, 265–67, 274–76, 318–21; 33, 137–38.

[398] *Liber ordinis,* 23, 15–19.

the abbot must set another to guard the novices in *disciplina*.[399] Yet, the *Book's* portrait of discipline differs from Hugh's. Inculcation of discipline does not appear to be explicitly moral or salvific. Nor did the *Book* enjoin for the novice formal education in the liberal, philosophical, or scriptural sciences. The aim seems rather to ensure a good beginning and smooth transition into canonic life.

There can be little doubt that Hugh relied upon, if perhaps not the text of the *Book,* the lived practices reflected in the *Book*.[400] The topics and terminology link his *Formation* explicitly to the *Book*; specifically, its title (*De institutione novitiorum*) links to the key chapter of the *Book* (§22 *De susceptione et institutione novitiorum*). As a deeper comparison, Hugh treated the same topics set out in the *Book* for the novice-master, which included posture and bodily composure (*gestus*), how to dress, how and to whom to speak; learning one's superiors, peers, and inferiors, learning the times and places, and keeping a good and moderate way, and exhibiting proper etiquette at table.[401] Similarly, Hugh divided the topic of *disciplina* into four kinds that reflect the *Book's* prescriptions: dress (*habitus*), bodily composure (*gestus*), speech (*locutio*), and table manners (*in mensa*).[402] Further, like the *Book,* Hugh's *Formation* also enjoined the novice to learn discernment (*discretio*) of times, places, and persons (of higher, equal, and lower rank).[403] The close

[399] *Liber ordinis,* 22, 262–67, 274–76.
[400] The *Book of Order* was largely composed during the abbacy of Gilduin, during Hugh's tenure as master. Since the *Book* was in composition during this period, it cannot be certain whether Hugh was also reading and commenting on a version of the *Book,* but he certainly reflected the way of life in *Formation* that the *Book* depicted. Cf. "Introduction," in *Liber ordinis Sancti Victoris parisiensis,* viii–xi.
[401] *Liber ordinis,* 22, 229–48; 12; 35; 48.
[402] *De instit.* 486–88.
[403] *De instit.* 72ff, 87ff, 106ff, 153ff.

match between the *Book*'s and Hugh's treatment of initiatory instruction show that *Formation* was not abstract or wholly his own invention, but imbedded in the abbey's contextual way of life.

Framed by these existing practices, Hugh's pedagogical purpose for his treatment of *disciplina* in *Formation of Novices* can come into sight. *Formation* was not a rule book filled with Hugh's pedantic regulation but dealt with the customary rules of Saint-Victor. Hugh theorized those lived practices into pedagogical principles for how the novice ought to learn. In this way, *Formation* functions like a *gloss* or commentary on the Victorines' way of life (as reflected in their *Book of the Order*). The next sections will highlight the ways that Hugh recast the content and practices of the *Book* into the pedagogically weighted concept of *disciplina.* In comparison with the *Book's* novice-master, the specific content or technics of the canons' life did not interest Hugh. It was the pedagogical principles that lay behind and animated those specifics that Hugh sought to articulate.

b. *Salvific Discipline*

While Hugh occasionally used *discipline* in different senses, in *Formation* there is less ambiguity.[404] *Disciplina* is the structuring principle of the life of the community. First, *disciplina* is a "good and upright way of life" that not only does no wrong but also avoids

[404] Cf. *Practica geometria,* Praenotanda 6, 27–28; *De grammatica* 19, 55; *Epitome* 196, 204, 207–208, 258, 323; *Did.* III.6, 57,9–10: "In disciplina, ut laudabiliter vivens mores cum scientia componat."

the appearance of wrongdoing.[405] Consistent with his concern for disorder, Hugh defined discipline more technically as a sort of *order*: "Discipline is ordered movement of all the members and a fitting disposition in every condition and action."[406] Whatever is undisciplined is disorderly and out of right measure: it is the "fetter of lust, the prison of wicked desires . . . and strangles every disordered movement of the mind and illicit appetite."[407] By defining the discipline of Saint-Victor as order, Hugh linked the rules and customs of the house to higher theological urgencies, including the novices' very salvation.

The master of Saint-Victor in *Formation* introduced the abbey's disciplined order of life to the novices, whom he addressed as "you who have now entered the school of discipline."[408] Hugh's order concerned not only the novice but the whole community. It functioned to correct bodily or behavioral excesses and faults. Such excesses or defects included wearing dyed, luxurious, or costly clothing; bodily composure that he deemed 'soft,' dissolute, sluggish, or impetuous; as well as other unbecoming ticks such as a gaping mouth, a protruding tongue, contorting lips, rolling eyes, or haughty, raised eyebrows.[409] Further discipline extended toward the canon's behavior at different times, in different places (such as the church), and toward different persons (of various office or

[405] *De instit.* 450–52: "Disciplina est conversation bona et honesta, cui parum est malum non facere, sed studet etiam in his que bene agit per cuncta irreprehensibilis apparere."
[406] *De instit.* 452–55: "Item disciplina est membrorum omnium motus ordinatus et dispositio decens in omni habitu et actione."
[407] Ibid., 456–59: "Disciplina est compes cupiditatis, malorum desideriorum carcer, frenum lascivie, elationis iugum, uinculum iracundie, qua domat intemperantiam, levitatem ligat, et omnes inordinatos motus mentis atque illicitos appetitus suffocate."
[408] *De instit.* 389–90: "Vos autem fratres, qui scholam discipline iam intrastis."
[409] *De instit.* 490ff; 591ff; 760ff.

rank). Hugh compared the disciplined body to the well-ordered city, in which each party keeps to its own tasks. "Until one member claims inordinately another's task for itself, what does this do but disturb the peace of the whole?"[410] As in the *Book,* Hugh called for the task of maintaining discipline—"the guarding of discipline [*custodia disciplinae*]"—for the sake of individual and communal order alike.[411]

The catalogue of faults and prescriptions in *Formation* may seem overwhelming. However—as discussed earlier—Hugh's treatment of discipline differed from the technical concern of the *Book*'s novice-master. Instead of mere technical instruction of regulation, Hugh offered principles of discipline for the novice to learn and apply with discernment. Hugh recast the technical instruction of the novice-master by further analyzing the detailed instruction on particulars (actions for places, times, and persons). Here the reader finds principles for general application. For example, having catalogued a great variety of bodily disorders, Hugh reduced his point to a principle: "Since we have described the faulty gestures, order requires that we now define what is the mode of discipline in all movement [*gestus*]. . . . First, one must carefully watch that each limb keeps to its own function and not seize upon another. . . . One must keep discernment for the actions of your limbs."[412] Elsewhere, Hugh laid out guiding principles for discipline

[410] Ibid., 824–26: "Dum ergo unum membrum alterius membri officium inordinate sibi vendicat, quid aliud quam concordiam universitatis perturbat?"
[411] Ibid., 815, 829.
[412] *De instit.* 747–58: "Quia igitur vitia gesticulationum descripsimus, ordo exigit ut nunc quis sit in omni gestu modus discipline diffiniamus, quod etsi fortasse per singula facere non possumus, magis tamen expedit aliquid inde ad eruditionem dicere quam omnino silere. Primum, ergo, diligenter observandum est ut singula membra suum teneat officium, neque usurpent alienum. . . . Discretio actionum in membris conservanda est."

in differing circumstances: the virtues one ought to practice in every act, discipline to adjust behavior in different places (e.g., between the church and the school) and times (e.g., night or day, festal or fasting times).[413] Hugh's pedagogical reduction to principles relies on the novice's discernment. Principles are only effective when properly applied. Hugh did not shy away from this but laid it upon the novices to discern how to keep discipline in whatever circumstance.[414] Hugh enjoined his student: "One ought to indeed carefully consider and discern as much as he himself can what is and is not permitted, what is and is not fitting, in every act, in every place, in every time, and toward every person."[415] Hugh's novices in training did not surrender their reason and judgment to their teacher; their teacher sought to form the novice's discretion to follow discipline in whatever circumstances would arise.

With his reduction to principles to form discretion, Hugh's theological recasting of novitiate instruction begins to appear. Hugh further underlined discipline by linking it to the urgencies of the salvific economy. Adopting goodness, discipline, and knowledge (from Psalms 118.66), Hugh set before his novices a three-stage path: knowledge by teaching (*doctrina*) is necessary for virtue (through *disciplina*), which leads to goodness (*bonitas*), whose reward is blessedness.[416] Far from merely learning the customs of the

[413] Ibid., 72–169.
[414] In each of the treatments above mentioned, Hugh notably enjoined the reader to discern the times, places; cf. *De instit.* 96–99, 107–108.
[415] Ibid., 68–71: "Debet siquidem diligenter considerare et quantum valet per semetipsum discernere quid liceat et quid non liceat, quid deceat and quid non deceat, in omni actu, in omni loco, in omni tempore, erga omnem personam."
[416] Ibid., 9–41. Psalms 118.66, "Bonitatem, et disciplinam, et scientiam doce me, quia mandatis tuis credidi."

cloister, the novice is treading the path to paradise: "For the discipline of God restores one to the end, since it conducts one to blessedness by fully and perfectly reforming the human through virtue."[417] By discipline one advances toward virtue, by which one aspires to goodness and the beatitude that follows.[418]

A theological worry seems to arise here: by making the mundane tasks of discipline salvific, has Hugh hung salvation upon superficialities? How, one might well ask, does refraining from rolling one's eyes, not dressing in fine clothing, or remembering table manners, contribute to one's eternal reward? Hugh's answer would be that discipline ultimately aims at the heart—turning cupidity into love for God and neighbor—in order to bring about human restoration. Discipline for the body is inseparably linked to the heart, the 'inner' to the 'outer.'[419] Perhaps counterintuitively, Hugh saw discipline of the body as ultimately binding and reforming the vicious disorders of the *mind*: "Discipline is a shackle for cupidity, a prison for evil desires, a bridle for wantonness, a yoke for pride, a chain for anger; it subdues intemperance, binds light-mindedness, and stifles all the disorderly motions and illicit appetites of the mind."[420] Indeed, the master of Saint-Victor certainly saw the root problem to lay in the corrupt mind. Discipline, by preventing the outflow of the vicious mind into bodily

[417] Ibid., 19–21: "Disciplina namque Dei in finem corrigit, quia, plene et perfecte hominem reformans per virtutem, ad beatitudinem perducit."
[418] Hugh set this principle out in the prologue and occasionally reminded his readers of their journey. Cf. 257–60.
[419] Cf. Jaeger, *Envy of Angels,* 256–58, 260–62.
[420] *De instit.* 456–59: "Disciplina est compes cupiditatis, malorum desideriorum carcer, frenum lascivie, elationis iugum, vinculum iracundie, que domat intemperantiam, levitatem ligat, et omnes inordinatos motus mentis atque illicitos appetitus suffocat." Specifically, Hugh argued that the vice of pride can be bridled by wearing humble rather than ornate clothing. See *De instit.* 584–90.

action, is a necessary condition for the mind itself to be reformed. "For just as disordered movement of the body springs from inconstancy of the mind, so also, when the body is bound through discipline, the mind is strengthened to constancy. Little by little, the inner mind is composed to rest when, through guarding discipline, its wicked motions are not permitted to flow out."[421] Discipline is a step toward virtue because it enforces an outer order until the virtuous mind orders the body from within. "There is wholeness of virtue when the parts of the body are ruled orderly by the inner guard of the mind. For it is the inner guard that keeps the outer parts of the body ordered."[422]

By the link of inner and outer, the many practices and customs of Saint-Victor were not mere forms for the novice to learn, trappings distinct from the cultivation of 'inner' virtues. Hugh cast these numerous customs into the salvifically and pedagogically loaded idea of *disciplina* so that now the practices of discipline are themselves vital to that 'inner' cultivation. This salvific recasting of discipline bears practical implications. Defects or failures in bodily practices, no matter how small, indicate moral disorders in the mind. "Let no one consider," Hugh exhorted, "that they fail in a small way, who turn their limbs against discipline to unsightly motions and disorderly gestures, for Scripture would never have rebuked such outer motions of the body so severely in us unless every dishonorable figure and indecent motion of the outer human flowed from the inner

[421] Ibid., 460–64: "Sicut enim de inconstantia mentis nascitur inordinata motio corporis, ita quoque, dum corpus per disciplinam stringitur, animus ad constantiam solidatur. Et paulatim intrinsecus mens ad quietem componitur, cum per discipline custodiam mali motus eius foras fluere non sinuntur."
[422] Ibid., 464–66: "Integritas ergo virtutis est, quando per internam mentis custodiam ordinate reguntur membra corporis. Interior namque est custodia que ordinata servat exterius corporis membra."

corruption of the mind."[423] What seem to be slight offences bear a greater moral significance. There is a two-way street between discipline of the body and the order of the mind: as we have seen, the discipline of the body aids the rectification of the mind. But the order or disorder of the body reflects the condition or virtues of the mind. "The face is a mirror of discipline, for which, as much as the greater guard must be kept, so much the less any sin can be hid that might be in it."[424] Observance of discipline, then, is a gauge for mental restoration in virtue, which, in turn, is central to the ultimate aim of the discipline, which is the pedagogical community fostered by love. To this communitarian aim of discipline we turn in the next section.

c. *Pedagogical Community*

The master of Saint-Victor highlighted discipline, but not for its own sake: salvific discipline forms part of a larger program, including teaching (*doctrina*). Together, *disciplina* and *doctrina* form the two wings of Hugh's pedagogical program:[425] neither will function alone. Hugh's theological recasting of discipline in *Formation* fit his larger pedagogical project by constructing Saint-Victor as a pedagogical community. Specifically, Hugh sought to form a pedagogical community in the respect that canons

[423] Ibid., 737–42: "Nemo igitur deinceps putet parum delinquere eos qui contra disciplinam ad turpes motus et inordinatas gesticulationes membra sua inflectunt, qui nunquam Scriptura tam severe istos exteriores corporis motus in nobis reprehenderet, nisi omnis exterioris hominis inhonesta figuratio et motio indecens ab interiori mentis corruptione manaret." Hugh elsewhere specifies what vices the faults in dress indicate; see *De institutione,* 592–99.
[424] Ibid., 778–80: "Est enim facies discipline speculum cui tanto maior custodia adhibenda est, quanto minus si quid in ea peccatum fuerit celari potest."
[425] I borrow this metaphor from Patrice Sicard, who used it to describe how Hugh's *Didascalicon* and *De institutione novitiorum* functioned complementarily. See "Introduction," in Feiss & Sicard, eds., *L'œuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor I* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 11.

would learn virtue through peer imitation, centered not on a charismatic teacher but on common discipline, and animated by fraternal love.

*Formation of Novices* has attracted significant scholarly attention, including that of Stephen Jaeger's pioneering and erudite study of cathedral school education. Jaeger's reading of *Formation* is fit into a larger narrative of the transition from the 'Old Learning' of the cathedral schools to the 'New' of the dialectical, proto-scholastics, such as Abelard. Jaeger portrayed the 'Old Learning' of tenth- and eleventh-century cathedral school pedagogy as centering around the authoritative teacher of charismatic presence. This charismatic teacher would impart, by a form of "body magic," a *cultus virtutum,* the cultivation of ethics or manners in his students. Teaching was personal, authoritative, intimate, humanistic, and oral.[426] The teacher was himself the curriculum.[427] But Abelard and other proto-scholastics of the 'New Learning' refused to be awed by the moral and refined authority of the teacher. Instead they posed rational questions and contradicted these venerable old teachers, unaccustomed to be so questioned and disputed. These new practices of rational questioning and disputing dispelled the aura of their hitherto authoritative teachers and shattered the moral culture of the 'Old Learning.'

Yet, for Jaeger, the 'Old Learning' did not everywhere disappear. Jaeger pointed to court cultures and twelfth-century humanists as those who sought to preserve this old model. Most notably, Jaeger asserted that the school of Saint-Victor "not only retained

[426] See Jaeger, *Envy of Angels,* 14–15.
[427] Ibid., 76–81.

the pedagogic practice of the eleventh-century schools in the training of novices, [but] it also recorded it in detail."[428] Alongside the *Liber ordinis* and various other letters regarding Saint-Victor, Jaeger found in Hugh's *Formation of Novices* a remarkable preservation of the old learning. Specifically, he argued that Saint-Victor retained the fostering of ethics (*cultus virtutum*) through tight controls on the novices' bodies and manners but especially through the imitation of the teacher, who is the ethical model to whose type the student is pressed as wax against a seal.[429] Jaeger emphasized this "Principle of Imitability" to show that the education Hugh propounded at Saint-Victor was only a cloistered version of the Old Learning from the cathedral schools.[430]

It is beyond doubt that Hugh was deeply invested in the morals of his fellow canons and students. Jaeger's account shed a valuable light upon the cathedral schools as a likely source for Saint-Victor's moral culture. Yet cathedral schools must be balanced with other sources, including the varied monastic tradition, which also gave weight to the outer composure and behavior of the monk.[431]

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[428] Ibid., 245.
[429] Ibid., 10–11, 256–58.
[430] Ibid., 267. Jaeger's account emphasized the refinement of manners: "In the quasi-cloistral atmosphere, it was possible to create an exemplary community as a model and a reproach for worldly men. The founders and early teachers at the school of Saint-Victor superimposed an ethic of gentle, refined, 'courtly and urbane' bearing onto the ideals of the apostolic life: equality of manners and renunciation of possessions."
[431] For example, Benedict's *Rule* laid out policies for dress, the table, journeys, speech or silence. See *Rule of Benedict,* 42, 44, 47–52, 55, 65–67. Caroline Walker Bynum has given a valuable analysis of the spiritualities of monks and canons. Her study *Docere Verbo Et Exemplo* (1979), as well as *Jesus as Mother* (1982), studied the difficult question of whether there is a spirituality among the regular canons, distinct from that of twelfth-century monks. Unlike monks, who generally focused upon the individual monk as a learner, Bynum found that canons went further and exhorted one another to teach one another and so to take responsibility for edifying their fellows. Bynum used Hugh's *Formation* to support her view of canonic spirituality, arguing that Hugh expected each novice canon to aspire to teach his neighbor and fellow canon. See Bynum's *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley:

The central pillar of Jaeger's Old Learning was the authoritative presence of the Teacher, who, by his personal charisma, imparts the ethical training to his students. Yet the pedagogy of Saint-Victor contrasts remarkably with the Old Learning by the radical absence of that charismatic teacher model. In place of the personal charisma of the teacher, Hugh substituted and relied on *disciplina.* The novice-master who appeared in the *Book of Order* imparted technical customs, not thorough or personal moral cultivation (*cultus virtutum*). Hugh focused upon *discipline* and never discussed or made room for a charismatic teacher. In fact, given the extent of Hugh's pedagogical thought, it is remarkable how very little Hugh discussed the role and qualities of the good teacher.[432] In the whole *De institutione novitiorum* I see no clear reference to the teacher, the *magister.*[433] Hugh never enjoined students to love their teacher, nor the reverse. The reader finds no admonishments or punishments to motivate obedience to the teacher, nor calls to imitate or conform to the teacher's likeness. The role of Hugh's teacher is never marked or delineated. The *magister* seems by default to fall into the larger group of the *boni,* the good, or even of the ranking superiors. The teacher imparts discipline (in the

University of California Press, 1982), 22–58; see also *Docere verbo et exemplo: An Aspect of Twelfth-Century Spirituality* (MT: Scholars Press, 1979), especially 41–48. Bynum's and Jaeger's studies, which both used Hugh's *Formation of Novices* as a focus, complement each other by showing the textured sources from which Hugh drew upon in his own project. Further, it should give pause to a tempting reductionist narrative that derives Hugh's project from only one of these sources, ignoring the others.

[432] Hugh is not so silent about the perceived faults of contemporary, rival teachers, as chapter 3 discussed.

[433]In comparison, William of Conches concluded his *De philosophia mundi* with several chapters on pedagogy, largely focusing on the necessary qualities of the teacher. In a very short chapter on the quality of the pupil, William propounded the idea that the student ought to love their teacher like a father, nay, more so, for one comes from the father coarse, but one gains wisdom from the teacher. ("Plus ergo diligendi sunt boni doctores quam parentes.") William, unlike Hugh, evidently positioned a place for the charismatic teacher (as an authority to be loved and venerated) in his pedagogical thought. See *Guillelmi de Conchis Philosophia,* ed. Marco Albertazzi (Lavis: La Finestra, 2010), XXXI, p. 312.

*Book*), and Hugh's novice learns personal discernment to keep discipline according to its principles. In this way, then, Hugh effectively cut out the role of the charismatic teacher whose very presence was the standard, and replaced it with *disciplina*, the salvific and renovating way of life enjoined upon all.

But if Hugh sidelined the teacher, whom does the novice imitate? Imitation does indeed play a key role for Hugh. Imitation was a way of knowledge (*scientia*), which, alongside other means of teaching (*doctrina*), forms a step on the ladder to gaining *disciplina*, which leads to virtue and on to beatitude.[434] But instead of imitating the charismatic teacher, Hugh presents a strikingly different, more egalitarian model of mutual, peer imitation.

Though prescribing imitation, Hugh did not assume age and office necessarily coincided with virtue. Thus, he enjoined the novice to cultivate a twofold discernment (*discretio*), first of rank to whom one owes honor, and second for persons of virtue, whom one should love and imitate.[435] As for discretion of persons by their virtue, the novice should distinguish inferiors, superiors, and peers. Naturally, one does not imitate the first, those of lesser virtue. But surprisingly, neither does Hugh's novice imitate superiors: "We can admire and revere, indeed, the way of life [*conversatio*] of those above us, but we cannot imitate it." Hugh reasoned that such persons "have advanced through long exercise in discipline to such a state that our weakness, however we might strive by love,

[434] *De instit.* 9–41.
[435] *De instit.* 170–87.

still cannot compare [*coaequare*] with their virtue."[436] Rather, instead of presuming to imitate the authoritative heroes of virtue, Hugh laid a more modest path of peer imitation: "Their way of life is on a par with ours whose works are so moderated with our powers that there is nothing in them that exceeds our ability, and yet our devotion finds enough in them which it can imitate."[437] Peers offer models for imitation because their lives have admirable qualities still within our reach. The peer "offers an example of virtue and, by ease of cooperation, admits us into a fellowship [*consortium*] of its exercise."[438] Peer imitation, then, not only is practical but also forms fellowship amongst the canons, striving alongside each other. Hugh's canon, then, takes as a model of moral exercise those whose virtues and weaknesses are proportional to their own; that is, not superiors in virtue but their peers.

This fellowship of humbler peer imitation suggests a parallel with Hugh's sharp critique elsewhere of students presuming to teach and appearing wise.[439] Peer imitation prevents the presumption of aping the wise and virtuous as if they were equals as well as the presumption that one was also already wise and virtuous. Such hasty presumption in students and novices alike betrays the symptoms of pride and desire for honor. Hugh's

[436]*De instit.* 194–99: "Illorum conversatio supra nos est, quam venerari quidem et admirari possumus, imitari autem non valemus. Illorum conversatio superior est, qui per longum exercitium in tantum profecerunt, ut virtutum illorum nostra infirmitas, quamvis incipiat per amorem appetere, per imitationem tamen non valeat coequare."
[437]*De instit.*191–94: "Illorum conversatio quasi par nobis, quorum opera ita nostris viribus contemperantur, ut in eis nichil sit quod possibilitatem nostrum excedat, et tamen devotio nostra satis in eis quod imitari possit inveniat." (Cf. ibid., 199–203).
[438]Ibid., 191–94 "Illorum conversatio par nobis est, que sic nostre infirmitati contemperata est, ut et virtutis exemplum prebeat et cooperandi facilitate in consortium nos sue exercitationis admittat."
[439] E.g., *Didascalicon* III.13.

particular worry with proud and presumptive imitation resurfaces with the metaphor of the seal and wax. Humility ought to prepare the novice as warmth softens wax to receive an image. Yet Hugh's novice practices a kind of *inverse* imitation. For when a seal presses into wax, its protruding parts press more deeply into the wax, while the even parts leave the wax protruding.[440] In this way, the novice should imitate the more visible and sublime examples of virtue secretly and out of sight—like protrusions press wax more deeply. But one imitates the humbler examples openly and visibly. By this form of imitation, Hugh did not intend his novice to become the exact image of his models, but rather, more *humble inversions* of his models of virtue.

In this model of peer and inverse imitation, Hugh's aim was greater than humbling brash novices. By setting up a common discipline and enjoining the novices not to aspire to an honored and visible position but to imitate and revere the virtues of their fellows, Hugh was fostering a community of love and edification. "Therefore, our everyday and constant way of life ought to be with the middle ones who are equal to us, so that, when we find some among them more fervent in good work, we might seek their company and friendship the more avidly."[441] Striving to imitate one another's virtues, the canons are to be bound by fraternal love and concord. "Let there be such care for keeping our peace and concord that in no affair . . . should fraternal love be disturbed."[442] Though this fact

[440] *De instit.* 359–77.
[441]Ibid., 231–35: "Quotidiana igitur et frequens conversation nostra cum mediis et equalibus nobis esse debet, it aut inter eos etiam quoscumque in bono opere ferventiores cernimus, eorum societatem atque familiaritatem avidius appetamus."
[442]Ibid., 235–37: "Cum his vero tanta nobis pacis et concordie servande diligentia sit, ut in nullo unquam negotio, quantum in nobis est, fraternal dilectio perturbetur."

has been overlooked by some, Hugh spoke openly about the *dilectio fraterna* and *amor fraternae caritatis* that reflects the communitarian concerns and focus of the so-called *Rule of Augustine*.

For Hugh's larger pedagogical project, discipline laid the necessary foundation. By going beyond the technical details described in the *Book*, Hugh theorized the myriad customs and regulars for the novices as discipline and sought to inculcate in them the discernment of principles for keeping discipline. Discipline became for Hugh a crucial step in a salvific journey. Rather than elevating a charismatic teacher as model for imitation, Hugh substituted discipline and enjoined peer imitation in an inverse manner. In this reconceptualization of the canonry of Saint-Victor, Hugh laid foundations, or rather, cleared and plowed a field in preparation for sprouting charity in the heart and cultivating a pedagogical community for formal instruction (*doctrina*) and advanced cultivation of love.

## II. *Disciplina 2: Edification in Charity*

Hugh's body of spiritual and devotional writings are diverse and rich.[443] It is commonly acknowledged that they have didactic purposes, but their precise role in

[443] Among these works include the following: H Feiss, P Sicard, eds. *L'oeuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor I* [De virtute orandi. De laude caritatis. De arrha animae] (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997); B. Jollès, ed., *L'œuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor II* [Super Canticum Mariae. Pro Assumptione Virginis. De beatae Mariae virginitate. Egredietur virga, Maria porta] (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000); P. Sicard, ed., *De archa Noë. Libellus de formatione arche*, CCCM, vol 176, Hugonis de Sancto Victore Opera, I (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001); Roger Baron, ed., *Hugues de Saint-Victor: Six Opuscules Spirituels, La Méditation, La Parole de Dieu, La Réalité de l'Amour, Ce qu'il faut aimer vraiment, Les cing Septénaires, Les Sept Dons de 'Esprit-Saint* [contains Latin texts with interfacing French translations] (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1969); *De vanitate mundi* PL176.703–740; *In Salomonis Ecclesiasten homiliae XIX,* PL175,113–256.
Among the translations of these works include *Hugh of Saint-Victor: Selected Spiritual Writings* (London:

Hugh's pedagogy remains unexamined. This section aims to show how the themes of these various spiritual and devotional writings fit into Hugh's larger pedagogical project.

Since present scope demands brevity, only three dominant themes may appear: *contemptus mundi* (contempt for the world), mental edification through images, and commendation of love. Speaking to advancing students, Hugh exhorted fear or contempt for the temporal world in order to redirect love to the divine, and, secondly, by alteration between fearful and delightful images provided refreshment. Finally, Hugh effusively praised love in order to kindle that love in his brother canons and so animate their lives and studies with fraternal affection.

a. Fear and Love in *Contemptus Mundi*

To restore fallen but proud humanity, strong medicine is required. Fear, for Hugh, functioned as bitter medicine to redirect love from transitory to worthy objects, and so necessarily prepare for the latter kindling of love.

Fear and love pair as contrasts in *Praise of the Bridegroom*: Christ the bridegroom speaks in two ways, both in praise for the bride to kindle her love, and in rebuke to the prostitute to strike with fear. Fear complements love; it enlightens with self-knowledge.[444]

Faber, 1962); H Feiss, ed., *On Love: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Adam, Achard, Richard and Godfrey of St Victor* [The Praise of the Bridegroom, On the Substance of Love, On the Praise of Charity, What Truly Should be Loved?, On the Four Degrees of Violent Love, trans. A. B. Kraebel, and Soliloquy on the Betrothal-Gift of the Soul] (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011).

[444] *De amore sponsi ad sponsam*, PL 177.989b–c; trans VTT2, *Praise of the Bridegroom* 6, p. 127.

It is protreptic, leading to love. In *Mystical Ark,* the first ladder proceeds from fear to sorrow and so arrives at love.[445]

To instill illuminating fear, Hugh at times stressed the defective nature of creation. After the overflowing praise of creation in *The Three Days*, the rhetorical about-face in *The Vanity of the World* can be startling: Hugh deplored the world. "O unclean world, unclean world, why have we so loved you?"[446] Yet Hugh soon clarifies: he speaks not about the marvels of God's creation, but "the mutability of the human circuit in this world."[447] By arousing such contempt for the world (*contemptus mundi*), Hugh did not denigrate creation but aimed rhetorically at the ultimate educative goal of kindling love in his students.

By urging this *contemptus mundi*, Hugh sought to reorder readers' love from unsatisfying temporal goods to eternal ones. He stripped the glamor from a cross section of goods: a pleasure craft, profitable caravan, a happy domestic house, a joyful wedding, and even a studious school. None of them abide; each are "vanity of vanities"!

To aid this contempt, Hugh crafted a meditative device in the "ark in the human heart."[448] The image of the ark buoyant above temporal waves focuses meditation upon

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[445] Sicard, *Libellus de form.* IV.53–55; cf. Conrad Rudolph, *The Mystic Ark: Hugh of Saint Victor, Art, and Thought in the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 290–96; *The Mystic Ark*, trans. C. Rudolph, in *The Mystic Ark*, pp. 397ff. *Mystic Ark* V [Note: "Libellus de formatione arche Noë" and "The Mystic Ark" are alternate names for same text from Hugh. Under the former title Sicard edited the text; the latter title is preferred by Conrad Rudolph in his recent monograph (cited). This treatment uses the title that appears in Sicard's edition.]
[446] *De vanitate mundi* PL 176, 703b: "O munde immunde, o munde immunde, quare sic dileximus te?"
[447] Ibid., 705a: "Nam et hoc scire debes, quod mundum hic accipio hanc solummodo speciem divini operis, sed mutabilitatem humanae in hoc mundo conversionis."
[448] *De van.,* 714a.

one's affect: "The human heart raises itself up from these passing and mutable things and gradually collects itself into one."[449] By building and inhabiting the ark, one practices detachment from vanity and redirects love to the divine.

The ark not only served to detach from temporal goods but was also a storehouse for meditative affective delights. Hugh closed the dialogue praising the delights within the ark and exhorting readers to redirect their love through it: "Let us always cultivate our hearts with these [delights]. Let us gladden our mind, let us kindle our devotion [*affectum*]."[450] In this way, the ark offered both detachment and affective refreshment from the strain of discipline. Hugh recognized the value of refreshment amid tedium.[451] Concluding *Vanity*, the teacher planned to lead his students through all the delightful rooms of the ark, surveying the wonders of restoration.[452] In reverse, within the delightful ark, the teacher occasionally surveyed through the window the calamity of the concupiscent flood outside.[453] "For it will be more delightful alternating in turn, now to see as from a kind of outpost those evils we have escaped, now to examine goods we have found and, with our eyes turned back, which we inwardly possess."[454] Alteration

[449] *De van.,* 714b: "Secundum est cor humanum ab his transitoriis et mutabilibus se erigens, et paulatim colligens se in unum ut ubi mutabilibus proximum eat, ibi quasi arca deorsum in fundo latum appareat."
[450] Ibid., 719c: "In eis jugiter exerceamus cor nostrum. Laetificemus animum nostrum, accendamus affectum."
[451] For example, Hugh recognized that one cannot fix one's mind ever on the same contemplative objects. See *Quid vere diligendum sit* I.21–25, in Baron, ed., *Opuscules Spirituels*, pp. 94–96. Similarly, one's attention in mediation may be derailed by distress (*afflictio*), busyness (*occupatio*), or impatience. See *De meditation* VI, VII in Baron, ed., *Opuscules Spirituels*, pp. 56–58.
[452] *De van.,* II.5, 719d–720a.
[453] *De van.,* 720a: "Cumque intrinsecus quae sunt contemplati fuerimus, ego aliquando aperiam fenestram arcae, et alternatim ea, quae foris sunt, respicientes in aquis hujus diluvii oculos mentis renovabimus."
[454] Ibid., 720a: "Magis enim delectabile erit alternis vicibus, nunc ea, quae evasimus quasi de quadam statione, mala prospicere nunc ea quae invenimus et possidemus bona reductis ad interiora oculis considerare."

between 'fear' (*contemptus mundi,* fleeing the vain world) and redirected love (desiring the eternal) offered respite for canons in their difficult progress.[455]

b. Kindling Ordered Love

Here we conclude the discussion of Hugh's higher-level treatment of *disciplina* to articulate the way of life for Saint-Victor. Hugh's investment in his canons extended beyond their initial training. He heard and responded to brothers' concerns about continuing progress in spiritual life and furthermore crafted further teachings to exhort and kindle rightly-ordered and fraternal love, benefitting the community.

The canons' concern for continued spiritual progress and Hugh's investment in his progressing student appears in the *Moral Ark.* This work originated from discussions with the brothers, not in formal study but in the "hour of assembly" (*hora collationis*) when the brothers spoke casually.[456] In this informal, oral teaching, Hugh discussed several points that pleased the brothers.[457] Their questions were not those of novices, but of those with experience. They sought why their hearts were so unstable so as to keep faltering, and what discipline (*qua arte laboris cuiuslibet exercitatione*) would secure their hearts in peace.[458] At issue was not how to begin but how to persist in making progress.

[455] The student in *Vanity* confirmed this by agreeing and amplifying the teacher's remark: "If we strive to remember also our misery and danger and to be warned, we will love the more closely the goods themselves." Cf. *De van.,* 720a–b: "Arctius ipsa bona amabimus, si vicissim miseriae quoque et periculi semper reminisci, semper moneri studuerimus."
[456] Rudolph, *Mystic* 47; cf. Sicard, *Diagrammes médiévaux et exégèse visuelle,* 14–20; cf. *De archa Noë* I.1.
[457] *De archa Noë* I.1, 12–16.
[458] *De archa Noë* I,1, 1–10.

Hugh's student asked about the heart, and so Hugh addressed the heart. Instead of formal instruction, the master offered a series of meditative, conceptual images on which to fix one's mind and to stimulate spiritual desire. The ark itself is a fourfold image (pertaining to senses of reading): the historical Noahic ark, the allegorical ark of the church, the anagogical allegory of the ark of wisdom, and the ark of "mother grace."[459] Despite this schema, Hugh followed the vein of eloquence in line with his affective goals, rather than a predetermined plan. Midway through this scheme, Hugh shifted to a series of images (e.g., three books, three words, three trees, three paradises) and finished the work with an entirely different image (tree of wisdom). Yet Hugh did not wander from his task: "We want the reader to remember that in this treatment we often brought out the same thing in different ways for the sake of a more abundant exercise of teaching, so that the intelligent mind might try every path of knowledge."[460] By these various images, Hugh persevered in answering his students, showing how to secure one's heart in peace. These images were aids to keeping desires fixed to their right object. Elsewhere Hugh reduced ark imagery to its most basic essence as a mnemonic image to guide love.[461]

Student reports (*reportationes*)—such as the *Sentences on Divinity* and the *Little Book on the Formation of the Ark*—portray Hugh's formal teaching.[462] Glimpses of Hugh's

[459] Ibid., I.3ff.
[460] *De archa* IV.9,75–79: "Nam et hoc ammonitum esse volumus lectorem sepe nos eandem rem in hoc tractatu diversis modis protulisse propter affluentiorem doctrine exercitationem, ut omnem scientie viam prudens animus experiatur."
[461] Cf. *What Truly Should be Loved* IV–VII. Summing up much of this thought in this extremely short work, Hugh maintained his pedagogical principle that the memory loves brevity.
[462] Ambrogio Piazzoni, "Ugo di San Vittore 'auctor' delle 'Sententie de divinitate,' " *Studi Medievali* 23:2 (1982); "Sentences on Divinity," trans. Christopher Evans, ed. B. Coolman, D. Coulter, *Trinity and Creation: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard, and Adam of St Victor* (NY: New City Press, 2010); Conrad

informal spiritual teaching appear in *The Moral Ark* as well as other shorter works on love.[463] "Each day we compose a word about love.[464] So saying, Hugh began the brief *Substance of Love,* indicating his predilection and frequency in speaking of love. Further hints at Hugh's informal teaching on love appear in his letters, where he explicitly sought to kindle love. In *The Praise of Love*, Hugh built up the praises of love in a florid encomium so as to kindle wonder and fraternal love in his audience and himself alike.[465] *Soliloquy on the Betrothal-Gift of the Soul* was a letter to Hugh's old canonry, whose stated intention was stirring the affect: to teach "how you ought to excite your hearts to heavenly joys by zeal for spiritual meditations."[466] Hugh sought to inflame love by his words. "Soul" in the dialogue confessed: "Your words have inflamed me. I conceived a love and burn inwardly . . . I am compelled, indeed, by your arguments to love him [the bridegroom] above all."[467]

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Rudolph made a persuasive case for *Libellus* as a *reportatio* in *First, I Find the Center Point: Reading the Text of Hugh of Saint Victor's* The Mystic Ark (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2004), 64–68.

[463] For example, the *Super Canticum Mariae* was also a work requested by the brothers and probably delivered orally in chapter. See B. Jollès, ed., *L'oeuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor II*, *Super Canticum*, prologue, 30–41, p. 26; for a translation, see Harkins' "Introduction" and "Exposition on the Canticle of Mary," in C. Evans, ed., *Writings on the Spiritual Life: A Selections of Works of Hugh, Adam, Achard, Richard, Walter, and Godfrey of St Victor* VTT 4 (Turnout: Brepols, 2013), 416, 428.

[464] *De substantia dilectionis* I.1 (Baron), p. 82 (VTT 2 p. 143): "Quotidianum de dilectione sermonem serimus."

[465] P. Sicard, ed., *De laude caritatis,* L'oeuvre I, 182–207; trans. in VTT 2, 149–68; *De laude* 15, 262–64: "Exhorting others to love, he inflames it within himself and commends love to all [Alios ad caritatem exhortando se ipsum inflammat, caritatem omnibus commendat]."

[466] *Soliloquium Hugonis de arra anime* (ed. Sicard, *L'œuvre* I), 8–9; "Ut discatis ubi vos oporteat verum amorem querere et quemadmodum debeatis corda vestra spiritualium studio meditationum ad superna gaudia excitare." Cf. H. Feiss, OSB, "Introduction," in VTT 2, 183–87. Hugh's *Soliloquy* was a rhetorical *tour de force* in kindling an affective response in his readers. See especially *Soliloquium*, 19, and the final affective confirmation and decision, 71–72.

[467] *Soliloquy* 186–87, 189–190: "Anima: Verba tua inflammaverunt me; concepi ardorem et estuo intus." "Cogor siquidem rationibus tuis illum super omnia diligere."

While these oral exhortations fit within affective pedagogy, Hugh knew he was playing with fire: he spoke about love "lest it should spark in our hearts by chance and, growing into a flame, it blaze with fire, either destroying all or purifying all."[468] The fire of love is essential; it is "the life of the heart, and for this reason it is utterly impossible that a heart would desire to live without love."[469] However, unless it be properly ordered, it will burn and destroy. "For from [the heart] is all that is good and all that is bad. One inner flowing fountain of love pours into two streams. One is cupidity, the love of the world. The other is love of God, charity. The human heart, whence the fountain of love burst out, is in the middle."[470] Whether the heart's love corrupts or purifies wholly depends on its order. "When [that one love] proceeds in a disorderly way . . . it is called 'cupidity.' But when it is ordered, it is called 'charity.' "[471] As with the intellect, so with the heart: if it proceeds in order, it advances well; if it is disorderly, it goes astray and becomes corrupt.

Exhortations to love advanced the affective pedagogy by urging canons to examine their inner thoughts and desires to ensure their proper order and objects. Hugh urged an exercise for self-examination, first briefly reviewing admiring meditations on

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[468] *De substantia dilectionis* I.1–3: "Quotidianum de dilectione sermonem serimus, ne forte scintillet in cordibus nostris et exardescat ignis flammam faciens aut totum consummens aut purgans totum."
[469] *Quid vere diligendum sit* I.1–2: "Vita cordis amor est, et idcirco omnino impossibile est ut sine amore sit cor quod vivere cupit" (ed. Baron), p. 94.
[470] *De substantia* I.3–8: "Ex eo namque totum est quod bonum est, et totum quod malum est ex eo est. Unus fons dilectionis intus saliens duos rivos infundit. Alter est amor mundi: cupiditas; alter est amor Dei: caritas. Medium quippe est cor hominis, unde fons amoris erumpit."
[471] *De substantia* I.32–36: "Invenimus autem hoc aliud non esse praeter amorem, qui cum sit motus cordis secundum naturam singularis et unicus, secundum actionem autem divisus; cum se inordinate movet, id est ad ea quae non debet, cupiditas dicitur; cum vero ordinatus est, caritas appellatur."

creation, then meditation on practicing sacred scripture.[472] The focus rested on the third, meditative self-examination of affect, thoughts, and works. Works must be examined for their intention or relation to the heart, [473] "thoughts . . . that they be clean and *ordered*."[474] Works and thoughts reveal themselves according to their affect. Obviously, then, "one must examine affections, so that they be right and pure, that is, to be directed toward what they ought, and how they ought."[475] The advancing student meditatively discerns the affective root of their works and thoughts.

Having gained knowledge and discipline, then, Hugh's student progresses toward virtuous love by keeping watch that the font of their heart flows orderly. In this way, Hugh's spiritual writings culminate his affective pedagogical project. Within this framework, then, it is not at all surprising to see Hugh echoing his earlier statement on the importance of orderly study for educative progress. They advance best, who advance in an orderly way.[476] Hugh urged his students not to grow weary or impatient but to press on with ordered desire to the goal: "*He advances most rightly, therefore*, who so glows for what is better that he is not disdainful in the good, but let him bear up in what comes first until he take hold of what comes later in its own time."[477] As Hugh argued, an

[472] *De meditatione* I–II (ed. Baron).
[473] *De med.* III.84–85ff: "In operibus considerandum est primum ut bona intentione fiant."
[474] *De med.* III.77–81: "In cogitationibus considerandum ut sint mundae et ordinatae. Mundae sunt quando neque de malis affectionibus generantur, neque malas generant affectiones. Ordinatae sunt quando rationabiliter, hoc est tempore suo, adveniunt."
[475] *De med.* III.66–67: "In affectibus considerandum est ut sint recti, sinceri, hoc est ad it ad quod debent esse, et quomodo debent esse."
[476] *Didascalicon* VI.3: "Sed ut ostendam tibi illum incedere aptissime qui incedit ordinate."
[477] *De med.* III.196–200: "Rectissime ergo incedit, qui sic est fervens ad melius ut in bono fastidiosus non sit, sed sustineat prius, donec posterius tempore suo apprehendat." Emphasis is mine.

ordered education was necessary for progress; so now the master urged his canons to a path of ordered *spiritual* advancement, starting first with bodily discipline moving inward, meditatively to the flowing love of the heart.

## III. *Doctrina 1:* Hugh's Curricular Works

Everywhere, Hugh's thought resists reduction or compartmentalization. The mind is bound to the heart, love to the light of the intellect. While the Hugonic novice followed an affective path from outward discipline to inward charity, he also progressed intellectually along a path, or rather, built up a structure of compounding levels. This intellectual structure of teaching (*doctrina*) cannot be divorced from the disciplined spirit of Saint-Victor. Hugh exhorted his novices on the decorous manner and spirit in which they ought to attend lessons—for example, not with proud contention and verbosity but rather humbly, listening before speaking, and conceding to rather than teaching others.[478]

This first section considers Hugh's formal, curricular and propaedeutic works, including chiefly *On the Three Days, Didascalicon, Epitome of Dindimus for Philosophy, On Grammar, Practical Geometry*, and the *Chronicon*.[479] I shall argue that Hugh's student

[478] Ibid., 268–338.

[479] D. Poirel, ed., *Hugonis de Sancto Victore De tribus diebus* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002); "On the Three Days," trans. H. Feiss OSB, in G. Zinn, H. Feiss OSB, eds., *Trinity and Creation: Exegesis, Theology, and Spirituality from the Abbey of St Victor* (VTT 1) (NY: New City Press, 2011), 61–102; C. Buttimer, ed., *Didascalicon de studio legend: A Critical Text, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin X* (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 1939); "Didascalicon," trans. F. Harkins, in F. Harkins, F. Van Liere, eds., *Interpretation of Scripture: Theory* (VTT 3) (NY: New City Press, 2013), 81–202; for the *Epitome, Grammar,* and *Geometry,* see R. Baron, ed., *Hugonis de Sancto Victore Opera Propaedeutica* (IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966).

required two kinds of literacy. Philosophical study revealed the world as a created sign, like a great book, that led the student to interior self-knowledge, and then to the divine creator. The second literacy was that of sacred scripture, for which Hugh laid out a threefold exegesis, based upon history, building with allegory, and finishing with tropology. Both literacies presuppose ordered study that would reveal the inner harmonization between philosophical and sacred readings—taking the place of Abelardian dialectical resolution of apparent discrepancies among authorities.

Secondly, as a development for these curricular foundations, Hugh enjoined mnemonic pedagogy to assimilate the broad reading into brief hermeneutic principles to guide later reading. Rather than expertise in dialectics, Hugh relied upon this mnemonic craft to reduce the carefully-ordered reading and retain its principles in the memory. The guidance of these mnemonically retained principles would equip the student to judge correctly in questionable matters what was consonant or discordant. The final section of this chapter will examine the last great work of Hugh's pedagogical program in *The Sacraments of the Christian Faith.*

*a. Two Scriptures*

Though not separable, Hugh saw the signs of nature and linguistic signs as two paths into divine truth. Reading natural signs—though porous and informed by sacred scripture—was the realm of philosophy and the arts. This philosophical path to divine wisdom appears in *On Three Days* and the propaedeutic *Epitome of Dindimus for Philosophy.*

Hugh distinguished the order of things in themselves from the order of learning. What is logically prior may be obscure and difficult; what is posterior may be the most accessible.[480] Invisible metaphysical causes are prior, but the alphabet precedes them in the order of learning. In *Three Days*, Hugh set out a program of ascent to divine contemplation and return.[481] This ascent and descent map out the pedagogical and ontological orders respectively. Ascent follows the pedagogical order of knowledge (*ordo cognitionis*), beginning with creatures and moving inward to the incorporeal, rational creature, and then rising to Wisdom.[482] Ontological order of creation (*ordo conditionis*) is descent from divine Wisdom, to the rational creature, and to the corporal creature.[483]

Hugh's pedagogical order of knowledge found precedent in the established tradition that linked scripture and nature as effectively "commensurate sources of revealed truth." [484] Hugh also adopted this method that found warrant in Paul: "Since the

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[480] Hugh frequently followed this principle in his presentation of material, including the order of discovery versus order of learning of the arts. Regarding the different orders for history and of allegory, Hugh explained his principle: "Teaching always ought to take its beginning not from obscure things but from those plain and better known" ("Doctrina semper non ab obscuris sed apertis, et ab his quae magis nota sunt, exordium sumere debet" [*Didascalicon* VI.6.11–13]). Hugh exercised this in ordering the arts, which were prioritized and discovered in a different order, but whose approach should follow the order of learning (*Epitome* III.268–291; *Didascalicon* I.11).

[481] For the dating of *De tribus diebus*, I follow Dominique Poirel's conclusion that Hugh revised this earlier work in 1125. See *Livre de la nature et débat au XIIe siècle. Le 'De tribus diebus' de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 131–54, 458–60. The analysis of *Three Days* functions here not to characterize Hugh's early thought in contradistinction to his later but to illustrate the philosophical itinerary that Hugh charted in his early curricular works.

[482] Hugh of Saint-Victor, ed. D. Poirel, *De tribus diebus* CCCM177 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 1072–1079.

[483] *De tribus diebus* (Poirel), p. 60, 1075–1079.

[484] In this method, Hugh stood upon solid traditional ground, rooted in inherited neoplatonic semiotics from Augustine and Ps-Dionysius. See Willemien Otten, *From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 51–55; "Nature and Scripture: Demise of a Medieval Analogy," *Harvard Theological Review* 88.2 (1995): 257–84, 260–63. Dale Coulter also examined this method closely in the work of Hugh's student, Richard of Saint-Victor. See *Per visibilia ad invisibilia: Theological Method in Richard of St Victor (d.1173)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006).

Apostle said that through visible things in the world are shown the invisible things in God [Rom. 1.20], it is necessary that anyone who desires to arrive at knowledge of invisible things through visible things must first know the visible things themselves."[485] Broadly, Hugh's method *per visibilia ad invisibilia* approached the natural world as a system of signs. "This whole, sensible world is a kind of book, written by the finger of God . . . instituted by the divine will to show and in a certain way to signify the invisible wisdom of God."[486] Created signs can reveal divine wisdom but to read them, one needs the right eyes: "But just as when an illiterate person sees an open book, they see figures but do not know the letters, so a foolish and beast-like person who does not know the things of God sees the outer appearance in such visible creatures, but does not understand the reason."[487] A kind of philosophical literacy is necessary. Hugh again invoked Paul: "The spiritual person, on the other hand, can judge all things [1 Cor. 2.15] because in that outer beauty that they observe, they perceive how wonderful the wisdom of the creator is."[488] Hugh's *Three Days* does not teach that philosophical literacy but charts the path through this semiotic ascent into *invisibilia*, marvels at the divine power,

[485] *De tribus diebus*, 33.15, 532–35: "Nam, cum dicat Apostolus quod, per ea quae visibilia sunt in mundo, manifestantur ea quae invisibilia sunt in Deo, necesse est ut quisquis per visibilia ad agnitionem invisibilium pervenire desiderat, prius ipsa visibilia agnoscat." Hugh echoed this theme in the work. Cf. *De tribus diebus*, 3.1; 5–7: "Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciunter."

[486] *De tribus diebus* IV, 94–98, p. 9: "Universus enim mundus iste sensilis quasi quidam liber est scriptus digito Dei, hoc est virtute divina creatus, et singulae creaturae quasi figurae quaedam sunt, non humano placito inventae, sed divino arbitrio institutae ad manifestandam et quasi quodammodo significandam invisibilem Dei sapientiam."

[487] *De tribus diebus* IV, 98–105, p. 9: "Quemadmodum autem si illiteratus quis apertum librum videat, figuras aspicit, litteras non cognoscit, ita stultus et animalis homo qui non percipit ea quae Dei sunt, in visibilibus istis creaturis foris videt speciem, sed non intelligit rationem."

[488] *De tribus diebus* IV, 99–105, p. 9–10: "Qui autem spiritualis est et omnia diiudicare potest, in eo quidem quod foris considerat pulchritudinem operis, intus concipit quam miranda sit sapientia creatoris." See Hugh's *Miscellanea* I.1 (PL 177.469C–477B).

wisdom, and goodness, and then descends again.[489]The succinct *Three Days,* then, is a programmatic statement, an itinerary. Training for this journey is outlined in his curricular works.

The journey through natural signs begins with self-knowledge. Hence, *Three Days* began with the soul's original impulse for self-knowledge. By this "door and path of contemplation," one seeks self-knowledge first outwardly, then inwardly.[490] Similarly, in Hugh's philosophical compendium, *Epitome of Dindimus for Philosophy*: "For the first inquiry of the person ought to be that one know oneself and recognize that one is created."[491] Self-recognition as a creature prompts one to seek the creator: "Then when [the human] has begun to know oneself, one seeks what made them. Finally, one will begin for exercise to consider also the works of her creator as marvelous."[492] These three investigations constitute philosophy: self-knowledge, the creator, and other creatures. This is Hugh's philosophy, the "love of wisdom . . . [whereby] when truth is tasted, it is

[489] Franklin Harkins discussed Hugh's borrowing of Augustine's semiotic theory, found especially in *De doctrina christiana.* Cf. *Reading,* 150–58.

[490] *De tribus diebus* XVII, 594–97, p. 36: "Ianua contemplationis facta est pariter et via." In the inward search, Hugh adopted the Augustinian route through the soul's three faculties—mind, understanding, love, as distinct and necessarily related but fundamentally unified—as a created, trinitarian sign of and so access to the uncreated Trinity. See *De tribus diebus* XXIff; for a precedent of this inner, psychological, trinitarian journey, see Augustine of Hippo's *De Trinitate,* especially XV.7.

[491] On the dating of the *Epitome,* see Damen van den Eynde, *Essai sur la succession et la date des écrits de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Rome: Spicilegium Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani, 1960), 45, 225; cf. Grover Zinn's "Hugh of St Victor's 'De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris' as an 'Accessus' Treatise for the Study of the Bible," *Traditio* 52 (1997): 111–34.
*Epitome* 92–93 in R. Baron, ed., *Hugonis de Sancto Victore Opera Propaedeutica*: "Nam prima investigatio hominis hec esse debet ut sciat seipsum et agnoscat quod factus est."

[492] *Epitome* 94–97: "Postremo opera quoque factoris sui mirabilia in exercitationem meditari incipiat, ut intelligat et hoc pariter quid sit quod secum et propter se factum est." It is notable that here Hugh has shifted the inquiry of creatures from the first step to the last, perhaps revising the program of the *Three Days.*

desired all the more."[493] Intellect and affect share the precipitating desire for self-knowledge, leading to seeking to read creation about the Creator.

Springing from an inner spark of divine wisdom, philosophy restores wounded human nature. "For while that same light flickered within, shadows also appeared, so that it recognized its evils as arising and knew from these what things should be sought against them."[494] Recognizing its wounds—bodies' weaknesses and necessities—spurs one along the path of philosophy.[495] "For [Wisdom] knew to what evils mortal life would be exposed and the inner and outer things hostile to the original goodness of that nature, liable to corruption, would bear."[496] The evils are three: ignorance, concupiscence, and mortal weakness.[497] Philosophy remedies each. Its four branches include theoretical arts, ethics, logic, and mechanical arts. "These four contain all knowledge."[498] Theoretical and logical arts remedy ignorance; ethics resists concupiscence; and mechanical arts preserve and supply the mortal body.[499] Philosophy's remedial potential highlights Hugh's

[493] *Epitome Dindimi in philosophiam* 66–96: "Philosophia amor sapientiae interpretatur: non ille amor quo perfecte agnita diligitur, sed quo degustata veritas amplius desideratur. Hoc enim desiderium studium movet et concitat mentem apprehendere et eniti in consummationem veritatis. Hinc ergo philosophia est studium sapientie ex desiderio amoris proficiscens, quo cognita est ut queratur perfectius."
[494] Ibid., 171–73: "Hinc ergo excitata, natura per sapientiam querere cepit quod nec potuit totum scire quod amiserat nec ignorare totum quod retinuerat. Eadem namque ipsa, luce intus coruscante, et tenebre vise sunt, ut agnosceret natura mala sua et sciret ex ipsis que forent in contrarium appetenda."
[495] *Did.* I.1.5.
[496] *Epitome* 173–75: "Cognovit ergo quibus malis subiaceret vita mortalis et que foris vel que intus adversa prime bonitati toleret natura corruptioni opnoxia."
[497] *Epitome* 176–179: "Carnem vero infirmitas mortalitatis aggravabat."
[498] *Did.* II.1.21: "Hae quattuor omnem continent scientiam."
[499] See *Didascalicon* I.5; I.11; II.1; *Epitome* 184–234; see also *Epitome* 184–87: "The desire to seek wisdom, so that apprehension of truth would illumine ignorance, that the love of virtue would quench perverse concupiscence, and the desire to seek what is suitable would manage the [body's] weakness" ["Hinc profecta est quam dicunt philosophiam: studium sapientie querendi, ut ignorantiam agnitio veritatis illuminaret, concupiscentiam pravam amor virtutis extingueret, infirmitatem vero studium querendi commodi temperaret"].

optimism. All the arts aim at human restoration and relief: "The end and intention of all human acts and pursuits, which wisdom guides, should look to either restoring the wholeness of our nature or tempering the necessity of defects, to which the present life is subject."[500]

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The first literacy—reading natural signs to ascend to the invisible creator—becomes possible through philosophical education, the end of which is restoring and aiding humanity. Yet the novice at Saint-Victor would have begun an education into the second, that is, sacred scripture, almost immediately, through the liturgical office, instruction from the novice-master, and other reading. While the first was an ascent, the second was a staged construction through three senses: history, allegory, and tropology (or 'morality').[501] These are not options but an ordered progress for reading, laying history's foundation, building with doctrinal allegory, and finishing with decorous tropology. They allow the student to read sacred scripture properly.

Nowhere is Hugh's concern for order more pronounced than in instruction on reading scripture (*Did.* V–VI). Scripture is not for a livelihood, for curiosity, or even solely for knowledge. Sacred scriptures should have a dual aim for knowledge and morals: "Twofold is the fruit of sacred reading, because it either instructs the mind with

[500] *Didascalicon* I.5.3–6: "Omnium autem humanarum actionum seu studiorum, quae sapientiae moderatur, finis et intentio ad hoc spectare debet, ut vel naturae nostrae reparetur integritas vel defectuum, quibus praesens subjacet vita, temperetur necessitas."
[501] Hugh's account comprises *Didascalicon* IV through VI.

knowledge or it equips it with morals. . . . The whole of sacred scripture is directed to this [dual] end."[502] These fruits result from different modes: "Of these, the first, namely knowledge, has more to do with history and allegory, the other, namely instruction in morals, has more to do with tropology."[503] The stages of history, allegory, and tropology are also a progress in restorative knowledge and virtue.

Hugh's emphasis upon *historia* for sacred scriptures has received particular attention.[504] *Historia* for Hugh, as Dale Coulter pointed out, "encompasses both the meaning attached to a series or narration of events (history I)—that is, the narration and explanation of the significance, moral or otherwise, of an event, and the more semiotic 'history II'—"the primary meaning attached to a word, or . . . the referent [the *res*] to which a word points."[505] Students should move step by step, scorning nothing small or unimpressive if it be useful. Hugh's profound commitment to this humble and patient order evoked a rare autobiographical moment. The young Hugh zealously noted and learned the names and words pertaining to education, put rhetorical, dialectical, and sophistical exercises to himself, learned how to construct geometrical figures, kept watch

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[502] Ibid., V.6: "Geminus est divinae lectionis fructus, quia mentem vel scientia erudit vel moribus ornat . . . omnis divina Scriptura refertur ad hunc finem."
[503] Ibid., V.6: "Quorum alterum, id est, scientia, magis ad historiam et allegoriam, alterum, id est, instructio morum, ad tropologiam magis respicit."
[504] The historiography of Hugh and *historia* is expansive. Some of the major works include Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (IN: University of Notre Dame, [1940]); Grover Zinn, " 'Historia fundamentum est': The Role of History in the Contemplative Life according to Hugh of St Victor," in G. Shriver, ed., *Contemporary Reflections on the Medieval Christian Tradition* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1974), 135–58; Richard Southern, "Hugh of St. Victor and the Idea of Historical Development," in R. Bartlett, ed., *History and Historians: Selected Papers of RW Southern* (NY: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 30–47; Franklin Harkins, *Reading and the Work of Restoration: History and Scripture in the Theology of Hugh of St Victor* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2009).
[505] Dale Coulter, *Per Visibilia ad Invisibilia: Theological Method in Richard of St Victor (d. 1173)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 65, 65n10.

for the stars, and tested the harmonic ratios on his lyre strings.[506] This rare report supplies a model for order: I do not say this to boast, Hugh finished, "but to show you that the one who advances the best, advances orderly."[507]Hence, Hugh had no abstract interest in history for itself but enjoined history for the sake of right order of study. Likewise, Hugh castigated students and would-be teachers who "want to philosophize immediately."[508] They scorn the rudiments of biblical history and attempt to leap up to the higher mysteries of allegory but instead lose their footing and fall headlong.[509] History took priority not because of its intrinsic value but because it was the first stage in an orderly path of progress:

> This is what, reader, I propose to you. Here is the field of your labor; well cultivated by your plough it will render to you much fruit. *All deeds are done orderly; proceed in order*. Through the shadow, one comes to the body; learn the figure and you will find the truth.[510]

History in Hugh's analogy is the shadow beyond which one moves. Orderly progress necessitates beginning with the lowest rung and moving upward.

After laying the foundation of history, allegory comes next. Hugh borrowed the construction metaphor from Gregory the Great:

> But just as you see that every building lacking a foundation cannot be steady, so it is also in teaching [*doctrina*]. The foundation and principle of

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[506] *Didascalicon* VI.3; perhaps the fruit of this attention appears in Hugh's highly detailed *De grammatica.*
[507] Ibid., VI.3, p. 115.5–7: "Haec autem non tibi replico, ut mean scientiam, quae vel nulla vel parva est, iactitem, sed ut ostendam tibi illum incedere aptissime qui incedit ordinate."
[508] *Didascalicon* VI.3, p. 114.8–9: "Scio quosdam esse qui statim philosophari volunt."
[509] Ibid., 115.4–9.
[510] *Did.* VI.3, p. 116: "Hoc est ergo, o lector, quod tibi proponimus. Hic campus tui laboris vomere bene sulcatus multiplicem tibi fructum referet. Ordine cuncta gesta sunt: ordine incede. Per umbra venitur ad corpus: figuram disce et invenies veritatem." Emphasis added. On moving from word to concept to the *res*, see *Did.* V.3.

> sacred teaching is history, from which, like honey from honeycomb, the truth of allegory is pressed. Therefore, being about to build, 'first lay the foundation of history, then through the typical signification raise a structure of faith into the citadel of the mind. Finally, through the grace of morality paint over the structure with the most beautiful color.'[511]

Allegorical fabric stands upon history's foundation; tropology urges morality, which decorates the building. Hugh described its contents: "You have in history that by which to marvel at God's deeds; in allegory, that by which to believe his sacraments; in morality [i.e., tropology], that by which to imitate his perfection."[512] Allegory captures the substantive doctrines of faith, such as the tricky topics of the Trinity, creation and human fall, restoration through the progressive sacraments, the incarnation, the church's sacraments, and final things. Handling these thorny matters, Hugh warned that this higher stage "demands not slow or dull faculties, but mature talents."[513] While Hugh exhorted ample effort for history, he urged caution and restraint in allegory—both ordered correctives for contemporary practices. Allegory requires acuity and good sense

[511] *Did*. VI.3, p. 116: "Sed sicut vides quod omnis aedificatio fundamento carens stabilis esse non potest, sic est etiam in doctrina. Fundamentum autem et principium doctrinae sacrae historia est, de qua quasi mel de favo, veritas allegoriae exprimitur. Aedificaturus ergo 'primum fundamentum historiae pone, deinde per significationem typicam in arcem fidei fabricam mentis erige. Ad extremum vero, per moralitatis gratiam quasi pulcherrimo superducto colore aedificium pinge.'" Jerome Taylor identified the source in Gregory the Great's *Letter to Leander* before the *Moralia in Iob* (PL 75.513c); cf. *Didascalicon of Hugh of Saint Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts*, trans. J. Taylor (NY: Columbia University Press, [1961]), 223n9.

[512] *Did*. VI.3, p. 116.26–28: "Habes in historia quo Dei facta mireris, in allegoria quo eius sacramenta credas, in moralitate quo perfectionem ipsius imiteris."

[513] *Did*. VI.4, p. 117.27–118.2: "Nosse tamen te volo, o lector, hoc studium non tardos et hebetes sensus, sed matura expetere ingenia, quae sic in investigando subtilitatem teneant, ut in discernendo prudentiam non amittant. Solidus est cibus iste, et, nisi masticetur, transglutiri non potest. Tali ergo te moderamine uti opportet, ut, dum in quaerendo subtilis fueris, in praesumendo temerarius non inveniaris."

in discerning. This is solid food; unless it is chewed, it cannot be swallowed. Hugh urged moderation that, while sharp in searching, one not be found rash in presumption.[514]

Tropology, finally, received only scant formal treatment; it applies history and allegory for edification and morals. Unlike history and allegory, Hugh offered no corrections for contemporary tropology. Rather, by contrast to his extended guidance for the first two senses, Hugh's succinct comment applied tropological reading to all creation: "In contemplating what God created, we recognize what we must do. All nature speaks of God. All nature teaches humanity. All nature brings forth reason and nothing in the universe is unfruitful."[515]

With the exegetical path in view, we can analyze side by side the two three-step programs of ascent: the philosophical ascent through creature and self-knowledge, and the scriptural ascent from foundational history, to structural allegory, to decorous tropology. However, these dual paths into the signs of creation and sacred scripture present an arduous task before the Hugonic student. The next section will treat Hugh's pedagogical strategy to grapple with this burden.

*b. Mnemonic Hermeneutics*

So far, Hugh's pedagogical approach has diverged significantly from that of Abelard, who relied upon his talent to resolve discrepancies dialectically among authorities.

[514] Ibid.
[515] *Did.* VI.5, p. 123.2–6: "Contemplando quid fecerit Deus, quid nobis faciendum sit agnoscimus. Omnis natura Deum loquitur, omnis natura hominem docet, omnis natura rationem parit, et nihil in universitate infecundum est."

Instead of such reliance upon talented ratiocination, the master of Saint-Victor charted thorough orders of learning. Yet Hugh went further by furnishing his students with techniques to retain the correct principles and build up an inner treasury of knowledge. For this inner reservoir, Hugh adapted mnemonic techniques.[516] Hugh's plan relied upon mnemo-technics not only to lay the first foundation of history but also to lay the allegorical "second foundation" as hermeneutical guidance that would guide and ensure order for the student in subsequent reading.[517] So equipped, Hugh's students would not need to rely on dialectics to resolve ever-new discrepancies but would carry with them a harmonious synthesis ready for recall.

Three things are necessary for students: natural gifting (*natura*), exercise, discipline.[518] That gifting Hugh split into talent (*ingenium*) as well as memory. Memory serves to retain hard-won lessons of study. "Just as talent investigates and finds by dividing, so memory guards [wisdom] by drawing it together."[519] Memory retains by drawing together or reducing the lessons of investigation into a summary. " 'To draw

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[516] Frances Yates's seminal work instigated recent attention to memory. See *The Art of Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). Mary Carruthers has been a major scholar on medieval reception of mnemonic practices and texts. See *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); *The Craft of Thought: Rhetoric, Meditation, and the Making of Images, 400–1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); M. Carruthers, J. Ziolkowski, eds., *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); Grover Zinn, "Hugh of St Victor and the Art of Memory," *Viator* 5 (1974): 211–34.
Janet Coleman supplied careful treatments of memory that place the Roman mnemo-technics in broader perspective as themselves a particular appropriation of prior mnemonic theory. Coleman's medieval treatments of monastic memory and the mnemonics of twelfth-century historiography deserve attention. See *Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[517] Cf. Carruthers' treatment of *inventive* memory in *The Craft of Thought,* 1–5, 19–22, 30–31, 243–46.
[518] *Didascalicon* III.6: "Tria sunt studentibus necessaria: natura, exercitium, disciplina."
[519] *Did.* III.11, p. 60.13–15: "Quod sicut ingenium dividendo investigat et invenit, ita memoria colligendo custodit." Cf. III.7, p. 57.18–19: "Ingenium invenit et memoria custodit sapientiam.".

together' [*colligere*] means to reduce what was either written or disputed at length to a brief and abridged summary [*summa*], which was called an 'epilogue' by the ancients, that is, a brief recapitulation of things said."[520] Memory here functions for Hugh counterintuitively—rather than rote recitation, memory reduces lengthy chains of reasoning to its essential principle. "Every treatment has a principle upon which the whole truth and meaning of the statement rests, and to it all others are referred back. 'Drawing together' means to seek and consider this principle."[521] Memory retains, then, summaries (*summae*) or essential principles rather than discursive chains.

The rationale for reduction to and retention of *summae* was memory's propensity for brevity. "The fountainhead is one and the rivulets many. Why follow the windings of the streams? Grasp the fountainhead and you have the whole. I say this because human memory is dull and rejoices in brevity. If it is divided into many things, it is lesser in each." [522] By ordered reading and retention of principle, then, Hugh's student makes progress: reason's fruits reduce to their principle; memory grasps this principle and produces it at need in subsequent studies. Hence, Hugh counselled, "We ought therefore to draw together something brief and certain in all teaching [*doctrina*] to store these in the treasure chest of memory. On which account, later, when the matter calls for it, what

[520] *Did.* III.11, p. 60.16–19: "Colligere est ea de quibus prolixius vel scriptum vel disputatum est ad brevem quandam et compendiosam summam redigere, quae a maioribus epilogus, id est, brevis recapitulatio supradictorum appellata est." For the use of technical term 'colligere,' see G. Zinn, "Hugh of St Victor and the Art of Memory," *Viator* 5 (1974): 217–219; Carruthers, *Craft of Thought*, 33–34.
[521] *Did.* III.11, p. 60.20–22: "Habet namque omnis tractatio aliquod principium, cui tota rei veritas et vis sententiae innititur, et ad ipsum cuncta alia referuntur. Hoc quaerere et considerare colligere est."
[522] *Did.* III.11, p. 60.22–26: "Unus fons est et multi rivuli, quid anfractus fluminum sequeris? Tene fontem et totum habes, hoc idcirco dico, quoniam memoria hominis hebes est et brevitate gaudet, et, si in multa dividitur, fit minor in singulis."

remains can be derived from them."[523] Reading profits little, if one cannot recall it. Only by storing away today's lessons can one make progress tomorrow.

Not only did Hugh exhort mnemo-technical practices of reduction and retention, but as a careful pedagogue, he produced several *summae* or succinct summaries. Three works—*Practical Geometry, On Grammar,* and the *Epitome*—exhibit Hugh performing these mnemonic principles for his students. The *Practical Geometry* did not offer a new treatment of geometry but was "drawing together old scattered things" from the ancients. It reduced these to three principle branches (altimetry, planimetry, cosmimetry), and presented the matter more accessibly.[524] Though without managing to reduce the subject to so few branches, Hugh did likewise in *On Grammar,* collecting and presenting the twenty-two parts of grammar in its own *summa*:

> You know, as from the beginning, how my narration takes its rule from your question, which wished me to indicate to you only a summary of these matters [*summa rerum*] in a cursory way in order to stimulate and establish the memory. For the foundation of teaching is the description of the whole made brief.[525]

A *summa* only serves its mnemonic function if it is brief. Running through these twenty-two parts, Hugh's dialogue often recalled the need for brevity and postponed deeper

[523] *Did.* III.11, pp. 60.26–61.1: "Debemus ergo in omni doctrina breve aliquid et certum colligere, quod in arcula memoriae recondatur, unde postmodum, cum res exigit, reliqua deriventur."
[524] Ed. Baron, *Practica geometria,* Prol 1–2: "Non quasi novuum cudens opus sed vetera *colligens* dissipata." Cf. *Pract. geo. pren.* 33–35.
[525] *De grammatica* III.229–233: "Vos scitis sicut a principio quomodo ex vestra interrogatione narratio mea legem accipiat, qui vobis summam rerum tantum quasi quodam transcursu ad memoriam excitandam confirmandamque signari voluistis. Fundamentum enim est doctrine descriptio universitatis in brevi conformata."

treatment.[526] "Here it is most suitable to fix our discourse lest the enlarged burden to be carried pass by its mark and cease to be teaching."[527] Prolixity for an introductory *summa* is not merely a nuisance but a failure of teaching.

Hugh drew up another "short *summa*"—sometimes titled *Chronicon*—for biblical and world history. [528] It contained extensive timelines of history, including six days of creation, six ages of restoration (following patriarchs, judges, kings, and priests), secular kingdoms, and followed out the succession of popes and secular rulers from Christ to his present day.[529] For this historical *summa*, Hugh furnished a prologue that further articulated its guiding mnemonic function. Echoing the *Didascalicon,* Hugh exhorted his reader: "Child, wisdom is a treasure and your heart a treasure chest."[530] Do not let hard-won treasures slip through your fingers but store them up in your memory. How can one do so? Hugh's answer is orderly arrangement:

> An arrangement of order is the illumination of knowledge. Arrange and divide each thing to its own place, these separately from those, so that you know what is set here and what there. Confusion is the mother of ignorance

[526] For example, on constructing a *summa,* see *De gramm.* I.127–129; on keeping to this *ratio* of the work and passing over other matters, see IV.1261–1275, XIV.1954–1957.
[527] *De gramm.* III.913–915: "Hic nos maxime sermoni constituere oportet ne metas transeat facturus onus non doctrinam prolixior. Verum enim sic accipite."
[528] Regarding the title, William Green noted that this work is more often named *De tribus maximis circumstantiis gestorum,* or *Chronica,* in the manuscripts. *Chronicon* was Gilduin's, Hugh's abbot and, effectively, posthumous editor. Cf. William Green, "Hugh of St Victor: *De Tribus maximis circumstantiis gestorum*," *Speculum* 18.4 (1943): 484–93, 484–86: "Oportet nos ex omnibus brevem quandam summam colligere quasi fundamentum fundamenti."
[529] Green helpfully digests this data into eleven groups, not all of which are timelines but also include lists of geographical and Hebrew personal names for the readers' reference. Cf. Green, ed., "Hugh: *De Tribus max.*," 492–93.
[530] Ed. Green, "Hugh: *De Tribus max.*," 488.5: "Fili, sapientiae thesaurus est et cor tuum archa."

> and forgetfulness. But discernment illuminates understanding and strengthens memory.[531]

The carefully-ordered memory should like a money-changer's purse have separate places for kinds of knowledge. Only then can memory produce its contents on demand—just as a money changer amazes onlookers by drawing out the precise coinage.[532] By arrangement techniques great stores of information—such as Hugh's chronologies—divide into manageable portions. Three categories for such arrangement include person, place, and time (*persona, locus, tempus*).[533]

By these mnemo-techniques, the student could absorb a great deal of information and reading. Yet the crucial function in Hugh's pedagogy was not rote recall but guiding the student's future reading. *Summae* do not merely supply information; rather, they open up a subject. A well-stocked memory would lay foundational hermeneutical principles to guide one's future reading. Hugh professed this purpose:

> In this treatment, *in which we intend to form readers' beginnings and not to press on much to investigate things*, we judge that much should be laid down solely by authority, especially since a later consideration can amend what imperfection there may be.[534]

Hugh's teaching did not focus on working out aporia or furnishing definitive solutions. Rather, he sought to start beginners on (what he perceived to be) the correct approaches

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[531] Ibid., 10–12: "Dispositio ordinis illustratio est cognitionis. Dispone et distingue singula locis suis, seorsum ista et seorsum illa, ut scias quid ibi et quid ibi collocatum sit. Confusio ignorantiae et oblivionis mater est, discretio autem intelligentiam illuminat et memoriam confirmat."
[532] Green, 488.12–489.13.
[533] Green, 488.13ff.
[534] *De grammatica* IX.1415–1419: "Nos in hac tractatione, in qua principia lectorum formare intendimus nec multum investigationi rerum insistere, multa pro sola auctoritate censuimus esse ponenda, maxime cum hanc imperfectione, si qua fuerit, subsequens consideratio valeat emendare." Emphasis is mine.

and to furnish mnemonic first principles to guide further reading. Hence 'Sosthenes' sought the principles of philosophy: "Hence, considering it from the beginning, we ask that your effort explain to us all these in which is formed the discipline of all the pursuits of philosophy."[535] The *Epitome* compendium of philosophy was not to be "something great that will take explanation with burdensome examination"; rather:

> We undertake only a summary of things [*summa tantum rerum*] to be fixed in the memory. Let [the topics] then come up in their time, since those things will first be assembled, which it is proper to lay down so that the principles of all treatments be ordered. This is so that all—that those who appear to have added something in the pursuits of philosophy to the praises of wisdom thrash out far and wide by manifold rushes of speech—may be drawn up into a kind of summary [*summa quadam*]. Arrange these as certain, attested first principles [*primorida*] of all reasoning in the discussions of philosophy.[536]

Hugh distinguished his pedagogy from others' whose lengthy expositions of rudiments were grandiose but helped the beginner little. Rather than voluminously working out first principles, Hugh laid foundations for the readers to absorb and build upon, resting solely upon authority and to be amended as needed later in more mature consideration.[537]

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[535] Ed. Baron, *Epitome* III.321–326: "Unde nos a principio ipsum considerantes, postulavimus hec nobis universa tua diligentia explicari, in quibus omnium studiorum philosophie disciplina formatur, ut nichil enumeratio pretereat quantum memoria subiicit investigationi proposite. Neque enim contempnendum aliquid estimamus, neque indignum auditu quod cognitioni proficiat iudicari."

[536] *Epitome*, Prol., 21–30: "Neque enim hic magnum aliquid et quod gravi discussione diffinitionem suscipiat exigeris, quanquam et ista aliena non sint, sed summam tantum rerum attingimus ad memoriam consignandam. Venient autem et illa tempore suo, cum prius ista conducta fuerint que pro principiis tractationum omnium ut ordinentur constituere oportet. Hoc est ergo ut universa, que in studiis philosophie hi qui laudibus sapientie addidisse aliquid videbuntur multiplici sermonum discursu longe ac late prosecuti sunt, quasi in summa quadam perstringantur, et hec velut primordia quedam consignata omnium rationum in disputationibus philosophie constituas." Cf. *Practica geometria* Pren.180ff for a similar approach.

[537] Yet some care is necessary as Hugh aimed not to add to the wild fecundity of students' theological, allegorical imagination as he clearly saw it as unbridled and needing proper restraint. As will become

Recognizing the hermeneutical function for mnemonic *summae,* we can return to Hugh's three senses of scriptural reading with new eyes. Beside the three steps (history/foundation, allegory/structure, tropology/décor), Hugh added a further step, a second foundation. Using the masonry analogy, history forms the subterranean foundation. The building rests on the foundation only if it keeps the right lines, according to the mason's plan. To ensure their correct placement, the mason lays a second foundation of guiding stones whose position tracks placement for the remaining stones.

> For [the guiding stones are] like another foundation and the base of the whole building. This foundation both bears what is placed upon it and is born by the first foundation. The whole rests upon the first foundation, but not all are fitted to it. The rest of the stones both rest upon and are fitted to the second. . . . The foundation under the earth, we say, signifies 'history.' The building which is built up suggests allegory. Hence also the basis of this building ought to pertain to allegory. [538]

History—though it may seem contemptible—is the foundation. Allegorical principles, like polished guidestones, fit the pattern as they form a second foundation, which subsequent allegorical readings follow.

Hugh had already discussed the Tychonian rules for reading of scripture.[539] However, these rules primarily alert one to distinction for interpreting biblical imagery—

clear in this section, Hugh's mnemonic principles serve to curb and restrain the student back to what is assured and correct.

[538] *Did*. VI.4, p. 118.29–119.7: "Nam hoc quasi aliud quoddam fundamentum est, et totius fabricae basis. Hoc fundamentum et portat superposita et a priori fundamento portatur. Primo fundamento insident omnia, sed non omni modo coaptantur. Huic et insidunt et coaptantur reliqua. Primum fabrica portat et est sub fabrica. Hoc portat fabricam et non est solum sub fabrica sed in fabrica. Quod sub terra est fundamentum figurare diximus historiam, fabricam quae superaedificatur allegoriam insinuare. Unde et ipsa basis fabricae huius ad allegoriam pertinere debet."

[539] *Did*. V.4, pp. 97–102: Buttimer recognized here that Hugh quoted the seven rules from Isidore, rather than from Augustine, who also reported them.

such as "the Lord and his body" or "letter and spirit"—but they convey little notional content.[540] These are not Hugh's foundation principles for allegory, which mark sacraments. "The building rises with many orders and each [order] has its base. And the sacred page contains many sacraments, each of which have their own principles."[541] The allegorical bases support the superstructure of doctrinal, "sacramental" thought. Hugh listed eight orders of doctrinal mysteries: first, the Trinity; second, creation *de nihilo*; third, humanity's free choice, grace, and sin's origin; fourth, sacraments under natural law; fifth, sacraments under written, Mosaic law; sixth, the incarnation; seventh, sacraments of the New Testament; and finally, resurrection.[542]

By these eight heads, Hugh revealed his idea of the essential sacraments of faith: "Here is the whole of divinity. This is that spiritual building which is raised up high, built out of as many orders as the sacraments it contains. You want to know the bases themselves. The bases of the orders are the principles of the sacraments."[543] Hugh commended these sacramental headings for their hermeneutical building.

> See, you have come to read, you are about to build a spiritual building. The foundations of history are already laid in you. It remains for you to lay the

[540] *Did.* IV.4; Hugh is almost certainly aware of the rules of Tychonius through Augustine's version in *De doctrina christiana* III.30–37. Cf. Pamela Bright, *The Book of Rules of Tychonius: Its Purpose and Inner Logic* (IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).
[541] Ibid., VI.4, p. 119.7–10: "Multis ordinibus consurgit fabrica, et quisque suam basim habet. Et multa sacramenta in divinia pagina continentur, quae singula sua habent principia."
[542] Paraphrased from *Did.* VI.4, p. 119.10–23.
[543] Ibid., VI.4, p. 119.24–27: "Hic est tota divinitas, haec est illa spiritualis fabrica, quae, quot continet sacramenta, tot quasi ordinibus constructa in altum extollitur. Vis etiam ipsas bases agnoscere. Bases ordinum principia sunt sacramentorum."

> bases of the building itself. . . . The very bases of the spiritual work are principles of faith, by which you are initiated.[544]

Allegorical headings served to guide and protect students amid the great forest of opinions and books lest they stray into confusion or error. Do not wade in—Hugh cautioned—to resolve difficult and perplexing matters such as the Trinity yourself. "It would be long and burdensome for you to follow up on all [that has been written about it], since you would perhaps find much in which you were more troubled than edified."[545] Rather, Hugh directed, "first learn briefly and plainly what one must believe by faith about the Trinity, what you ought to profess soberly and believe truly."[546] Leave off disputes and lay down the foundational guiding stones. These hermeneutical principles later allow one to judge the many and obscure opinions.

> What you find plain, add them to the base, if indeed they fit. Interpret doubtful things so that they are not inconsistent. As for the obscure things, unlock them if you can. What you cannot understand, pass over, lest while presuming to attempt what you are unable to do, you rush into the danger of error.[547]

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[544] Ibid., VI.4, pp. 119.27–120.3: "Ecce ad lectionem venisti, spirituale fabricaturus aedificium. Iam historiae fundamenta in te locata sunt: restat nunc tibi ipsius fabricae bases fundare. Linum tendis, ponis examussim, quadros in ordinem collocas, et circumgyrans quaedam futurorum murorum vestigia figis. Linea protensa rectae fidei trames est, ipsae spiritualis operis bases quaedam fidei principia sunt, quibis initiaris."

[545] *Did*. VI.4, p. 120.15–17: "Longum tibi et onerosum est adhuc omnes prosequi, cum multa fortassis invenias, in quibus magis turberis quam aedificeris."

[546] Ibid., VI.4, p. 120.18–20: "Disce prius breviter et dilucide, quid tenendum sit de fide Trinitatis, quid sane profiteri et veraciter credere debeas."

[547] Ibid., VI.4, p. 120.21–27: "Cum autem postea legere coeperis libros, et multa obscure, et multa aperte, multa ambigue scripta inveneris, quae aperta invenis, adiunge basi suae, si forte conveniant. Quae ambigua sunt, ita interpretare ut non discordent. Quae vero sunt obscura, resera si potes. Quod si ad intellectum eorum penetrare non vales, transi, ne, dum praesumere conaris quod non sufficis, periculum erroris incurras."

Hermeneutical principles let one discern among opinions like a mason—who places well-fitted stones, shapes others to fit the base, and passes by stones too rough for their tools—discerns among stones.[548]

The lack of such hermeneutical bases was the crux of Hugh's critique of the disorderly masters. Accepting such a foundation requires humility, as Hugh noted, but it is more safe and stable. The efforts to lay the foundation are not glamorous, but without it all will be uncertain and faulty.

> You see many readers of scriptures who lack a foundation of truth fall into various errors and almost change their views as many times as they review the readings. Again, you see others who are inwardly strengthened by that knowledge of truth can direct any scriptures to harmonious interpretations and can judge what clashes with and what fits sound faith.[549]

This stable, authoritative foundation was Hugh's remedy to the haphazard disorder in Parisian schools.

Hugh's reliance on a structure of knowledge likewise provides his answer to the dialectical attempts to resolves discrepancies among authorities. Having a properly founded, rightly guided allegorical structure allows the student to intuit the right and safe resolution to conundra. To illustrate this, Hugh adapted the anecdote of ancient Pythagoras' teaching. Pythagoras reputedly refused to dispute but mandated silence until the seven-year course of arts was complete. Bearing this mnemonic foundation,

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[548] For this extended masonic analogy, see VI.4, p. 118.9ff.

[549] Ibid., VI.4, p. 121.5–7: "Vides multos scripturas legentes, quia fundamentum veritatis non habent, in errores varios labi, et toties fere mutare sententias, quot legerint lectiones. Rursum alios vides, qui secundum illam veritatis agnitionem, qua intus firmati sunt, quaslibet scripturas ad congruas interpretationes flectere noverunt et quid a fide sana discordet aut quid conveniat iudicare."

Pythagorean students could then operate freely as masters themselves. Whichever text or question was at issue, they could treat or solve it without needing to return searching among books. "Rather they had each [answer] immediately ready in their hearts."[550] To gain harmony among discrepancies, the Abelardian student relied upon dialectical talent, but the Hugonic student relied upon a memory stocked with an orderly and harmonious understanding. Working gradually through the arts, Hugh's student slowly filled their inner treasury with *summae* in harmony so that in the face of questions, they were equipped to discern the concordant from the discordant.

Adopting a Pauline rhetorical theme, Hugh contrasted his pedagogy as imparting the "life-giving spirit" against the teacher who is focused upon "the killing letter."[551] Adherents of the *letter* sought truth without guidance. They spurn the spirit and so they "cannot proceed long without error."[552] Instead, one ought to follow the *letter* but with the right *spirit*. This spirit lets one harmonize with the whole and safeguards from wandering haphazardly after wordy curiosities or from preferring one's own view and attempting to teach oneself. That is only self-seduction.

In this way one gains spiritual discernment: "It is not the literate one but the 'spiritual one who judges all things.' "[553] This aphoristic remark is reminiscent in its

[550] *Did*. III.3, p. 53.17–21: "Ut plane omnes ita in memoria tenerent, ut, quascumque scripturas deinde ad manum sumpsissent, quascumque quaestiones solvendas aut comprobandas proposuissent, ex his regulas et rationes definiendum id de quo ambigeretur folia librorum revolvendo non quaererent, sed statim singula corde parata haberent."
[551] Ibid., VI.4, p. 121.24ff; cf. 2 Corinthians. 3.6.
[552] Ibid., VI.4, p. 122.1–2: "Qui solam sequitur litteram diu sine errore non posse incedere."
[553] Ibid., Vi.4, p. 122.4–5: "Non litteratus, sed spiritualis omnia diiudicat." Cf. 1 Cor. 2.15.

contrast with Abelard's response to the jibes of Anselm of Laon's students: he retorted that a "literate" person should be able to read the scriptures themselves.[554] Hugh placed no confidence that skill in liberal arts (such as grammar) enabled one to read the scriptures. One needed to learn to read, that is, interpret in the right way. As we saw earlier, Hugh posited two kinds of literacy: philosophical, for reading created signs to gain friendship with divine Wisdom; and scriptural, to read sacred scripture safely in its three senses. Only with hermeneutical guides in these further literacies can one read and discern truth aright.

## IV. *Doctrina* 2: The Pedagogical Shifts in *The Sacraments of the Christian Faith*

One of Hugh's last works was *The Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* his last great installment in his larger pedagogical project. It encompassed the sacraments Hugh saw in God's two works, creation and restoration: acts of creation, written law, incarnation, sacraments of the Church, and eschatological topics. Some have found it the first great theological *summa.* Martin Grabmann, a pioneering scholar of scholasticism, described *Sacraments* as "the first great complete system of dogma in the prescholastic period."[555]

[554] Abelard, *Historia calamitatum / Letter I.*11, p. 18; Abelard's quip was, of course, not a summation of his own methods, which are by no means naïve reliance on basic technical skill (see chapter 2).
[555] Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode. Nach den gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen* II (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1909), 259: "das erste groBe vollstandige System der Dogmatik in der Ara der Fruhscholastik."

Subsequently, *Sacraments* has given Hugh a prominent place as a forerunner for scholasticism on account of its vast and apparent systematicity.[556]

However, Hugh did not intend his great final work to launch a new genre, the scholastic *summa*, but to add to his prior pedagogical works, his shorter, summary *summae*. Hugh announced it was a second stage in allegorical biblical learning that built upon historical biblical teaching in accordance with the plan already discussed. Thus, *Sacraments* was not an exhaustive scholastic treatment but a return to his mnemonic hermeneutics to guide students' further reading. He describes *Sacraments* as a *summa,* like his earlier *summae* – not extensive and broadly-sweeping treatments, but brief, succinct handbooks of principles for beginners. *Sacraments* began as a succinct handbook of principles of sacraments from creation to the last things.

On the other hand, conflation of *Sacraments* with later scholastic *summae* is forgivable, for in composition *Sacraments* mutated into an entirely different style of treatment. Instead of austerely restricting treatments to the necessary and succinct, Hugh gradually slipped into prolix, winding disputations. He began raising and handling multiple questions and answers. Finally, the work lapsed into merely compiled *sententiae*. This transformation in composition represented the final yet perhaps incomplete stage of Hugh's teaching. Though evidently keenly equipped with precise powers of argumentation (for *Sacraments* becomes more dialectical as it becomes more contentious),

[556] Cf. Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard* I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 57–58; Paul Rorem, *Hugh of Saint Victor*, 59–60, 67: "This entire treatise is [Hugh's] summary of the biblical doctrine of the history of salvation."

Hugh's *Sacraments* ended up rather differently than intended and from his earlier pedagogical project. Though he started a concise handbook of allegorical principles Hugh bequeathed a massive work that would instead look forward to systematizing projects such as that of his student, Peter Lombard.

### *a. Allegorical Summa*

To recognize what Hugh intended in this self-described *summa*, one must first distinguish it from preconceived scholastic notions of what constitutes a *summa*. However, one must apply Hugh's own concept of the *summa*, and there is a radical gap between Hugh's idea and use of a *summa* and those of the later scholastics.[557] Rather, Hugh theorized a *summa* as a mnemo-technical tool supplying the extracted essential principles of a subject.

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[557] One of the roots of the *summa* as a scholastic genre lay in the juridical schools. As John Baldwin summarized, masters of the Justinian Roman code wrote "systematic and comprehensive treatises which followed the logical order of doctrine rather than literal order." See *The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages, 1000–1300* (IL: Waveland Press, 1997), 74–75. Theological *summae* began to appear mid-twelfth century; Leo Reilly argued that Peter Helias' *Summa super Priscianum* (ca. 1150) was one of the first systematic *summae* for following the exposition of Priscian's grammar; Helias laid out a systematic treatment of all parts of grammar. See *Summa super Priscianum*, ed. Leo Reilly (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993), I:16.
Palemon Glorieux's examination of the *summa* yielded three inter-connected types: first are compilations of encyclopedic collections of texts or topics (2341–2343). Second, *summae* can be very brief compendia that contain only the principal and essential points of a subject ("Un résumé très bref qui retient les traits principaux d'une doctrine ou d'un traité, un compendium. . . . Cette deuxième catégorie d'écrits se caractérise donc par le souci de la brièveté. Elle entend ne retenir dans ses sommes que les éléments essentiels, les traits principaux de la discipline qu'elles résument" [2343]). Third is the systematic *summa*, which combines desire for completion (from the first category of *summae*) with the aim for concision (from the second) and presents material in an original, organic arrangement. These *summae*—characterized by systematization, concision, and completion—emerged out of the first two forms of *summae* and to which the technical term *summa* usually attaches. ("C'est cette troisiéme acception qui, se developpant et se precisant, donnera naissance à ces productions auxquelles on réservera finalement l'appellation technique de sommes" [2341].) Perhaps borrowing from Glorieux, M-D. Chenu narrated the nascence of the systematic *summa* (aiming to "embrace the totality of sacred knowledge," 298) as an evolution from *summa* as *collectio* but neglected to emphasize the compendium *summa*. (Chenu cited Robert of Melun's description of the *summa* as an example of comprehensive, systematic genre; however, as a former student of Saint-Victor, Robert of Melun's description of his *summa* could be read more easily within Hugh's compendious *summa.* Robert began discussing the custom of some to dilate their treatment

We have already seen how Hugh's use and discussion of *summae* fitted his pedagogical method. Hugh's intention for *Sacraments* was to produce a *summa* consistent with his earlier practice of writing *summae.* The already-discussed *Chronicon* was composed during the years that Hugh was also composing *Sacraments*—hence in comparison the last *summa* exhibits no great shift in Hugh's idea of a *summa*.[558] Indeed, Hugh used that technical term to describe *Sacraments*: "I have composed this as a somewhat brief *summa* of all into one course."[559] Pedagogically, it follows upon the previous "compendious book" on history of sacred scripture.[560] *Sacraments* continued that pedagogical project at the second level, that of allegory: "Now I have prepared this [one] for those being introduced to the second instruction which is in allegory, in which

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and why some things must be passed over. "Quid enim summa est, nisi singulorum brevis conprehensio? Ubi ergo singula inexplicata relinquuntur, ibi eorum summa nullo modo docetur. Singulis namque ignoratis, summam sciri impossibile est, siquidem summa est singulorum conpendiosa collectio." See Robert of Melun, ed. Raymond Martin *Œuvres de Robert de Melun* III.1, *Sententie* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense Administration, 1947), *Sententie* I.Pref. p. 3).

Glorieux's three types—collection, compendium, and comprehensive system—remain useful. The argument of this chapter, in brief, is that Hugh's *Sacraments* is an instance of the second, compendious kind of *summa* despite the frequent misapprehension—even by Glorieux—that *Sacraments* belongs to the third sort of *summa* (2246). See P. Glorieux, "Sommes théologiques," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, ed. A. Vacant, et al. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1941), XIV.2341–2364. Cf. M-D. Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century,* trans. J. Taylor, L. Little (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 294–300, esp. 298.

On Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae* as preeminent *summa* and its literary background, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP, *Aquinas's* Summa: *Background, Structure, & Reception*, trans. Benedict Guevin OSB (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 69–71; cf. Mary Franklin-Brown, *Reading the World: Encyclopedic Writing in the Scholastic Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 65–72.

[558] William Green, "Hugo of St. Victor: *De tribus maximis circumstantiis gestorum*," *Speculum* 18 (1943): 484–93.

[559] *De sac*. Prol., p. 31.5–6: "Hanc enim quasi brevem quandam summam omnium in unam seriem compegi."

[560] There has been discussion whether it was the *Chronicon* or his other lectures on Biblical history (*Adnotationes in Penteteuchon*) that Hugh intended here. Cf. Jan van Zwieten, "The Preparation to Allegory: Hugh of St. Victor's 'De Sacramentis' and His Notes on the Octateuch," *Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis / Dutch Review of Church History* 68.1 (1988): 17–22. Yet it should be clear to the reader of the *Adnotationes* that they are not a compendious handbook. Rather, they would appear as *reportationes* of Hugh's lectures on Biblical history. They are detailed and lengthy, giving no indication of Hugh's care for brevity, extraction of principles, or a composition of a handbook.

[book] they will fortify their mind as if upon a kind of foundation of the knowledge of the faith."[561] So far consistent with his earlier model, *Sacraments* furnished the pedagogical second foundation in the allegories of the faith. [562] Hence Hugh called *Sacraments* a "second instruction" following the historical compendium.[563] By this brief *summa* of the whole into one narration, Hugh intended "that the mind of the reader cling to something certain, to which it can fix and strengthen its purpose, lest it be snatched away by various books of writings and diverging readings without order or direction."[564] With characteristic concern for order amid the thicket of books, this allegorical *summa* set a foundation for path for future study.

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[561] Ed. R. Berndt, *Hugonis de Sancto Victore De sacramentis christianae fidei* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2008), Prologus, p. 31.1–4: "Cum igitur de prima erudicione sacrii eloquii que in historica constat lectione compendiosum volumen prius dictassem hoc nunc ad secundam eruditionem que in allegoria est; introducendis preparavi in quo quasi fudamento quodam cognitionis fidei animum stabiliant." For easier reference, I will also cite Roy Deferrari's translation: *Hugh of Saint Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith,* trans. R. Deferrari (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007).

[562] It is worth noting that Hugh's digest of the essential mysteries of the faith evolved since the *Didascalicon.* There he listed eight headings: 1. Trinity; 2. Creation; 3. Human free choice and fall; 4. Sacraments of natural law; 5. Sacraments under Mosaic law; 6. Incarnation; 7. Sacraments of the New Testament; 8. Resurrection. In his *Sentences on Divinity,* Hugh rearranged and modified (subtracting and adding) the list to twelve: 1. Creation; 2. Primordial Causes; 3. Trinity; 4. Will of God; 5. Creation of Angels; 6. Creation of Humanity and Its Instruction; 7. Fall; 8. Restoration of Humanity; 9. Institution of Sacraments; 10. Faith; 11. Sacraments of Natural Law; 12. Sacraments of Written Law up to Christ. In *Sacraments,* Hugh greatly expanded the plan to deal in depth with the new sacraments, consisting of only one base in *Didascalicon*: Book I: 1. Hexameron; 2. Causes of Creations, including primordial; 3. Trinity; 4 Will of God; 5. Creation of Angels; 6. Creation of Humanity; 7. Fall; 8. Restoration of Humanity; 9. Institution of Sacraments; 10. Faith; 11. Natural Law; 12. Written Law; Book II: 1. Incarnation; 2. The Church; 3. Spiritual Power; 4. Sacred garments; 5. Dedication of a church; 6. Baptism; 7. Confirmation; 8. Eucharist; 9. Other sacraments; 10. Simony; 11. Marriage; 12. Vows; 13. Vices and evil works; 14. Confession; 15. Anointing of the sick; 16. End of Humanity; 17. End of the World; 18. Renewal of the World.

[563] See Berndt, ed., *De sac.* Prol. p. 31.1–4.

[564] Ed. Berndt, *De sac.* Prol. p. 31.5–6: "Hanc enim quasi brevem quandam summam omnium in unam seriem compegi, ut animus legentis aliquid certum hereret, cui intentionem affigere & confirmare valeret, ne per varia scriptuarum volumina & lectionum divortia sine ordine et directione raperetur."

In *Didascalicon*, the second foundational "bases" of mysteries were not necessarily written but might be oral.[565] Hugh evidently decided to write that *summa*, but that decision remains pedagogically consistent. *Sacraments,* then, started as a *summa* like previous *summae*. Hugh originally intended not a grand, systematic work—as *summa* usually connotes, from the later scholastic genre—but a succinct, compendium of the allegorical mysteries of the faith.

*b. Transformation of a Summa*

Early on—consistent with the function of a *summa*—Hugh adhered to the brief and ordered treatment. Yet in composition, Hugh's performative priorities shifted. Significant tensions appear in composition, in the comments and explanations he made to his students and to explain his task to his readers. Despite the intention for a compendious *summa*, Hugh progressively adopted a more dialectical and lengthy treatment. Brevity gave way to extended argumentation and profundity. As a second but related shift, Hugh gradually ceased summarizing and instead cited authorities. While starting with brief accounts, Hugh gradually and sporadically lengthened his treatments and began appealing to authorities so that final sections are largely quotations. This piling of opinions or *sententiae* should be highly surprising, for it contradicts the stated intention to lay out brief principles. It marks, as the two later prefaces show, Hugh's own altered attitude toward *Sacraments* as it morphed in composition from a mnemonic compendium into a lengthy treatise that would function more readily as a reference work.

[565] Hugh himself indicated that he had not planned earlier to write this work. See *De sac.* Prologus, p. 23.8.

Hugh recalled his aim and intent through his early treatments. For example, Hugh resisted the temptation to win over skeptics of his view of creation, keeping instead to follow the subject "in order."[566] Though he was liable to digressions, Hugh occasionally acknowledged these excurses while getting back on track. For example, after digressions on light, Hugh wrote, "Meanwhile, let us return now to the fitted course of our plan."[567] Often Hugh referred to his planned order so as to excuse himself for omitting certain topics.[568]

Struggling to maintain the work's order, Hugh evidently strained against students' curiosity and questions.[569] Facing these questions, the master appears to have veered off his intended path in the order, brevity, and method of treatment. Compared with Book I, Book II exhibits a drop-off in Hugh's reminders about proper order.[570]

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[566] *De sac.* I.4 p. 38: "Nos autem secundum propositum cepti nostri rem ordine presequamur." Cf. Deferrari, I.3 p. 9; see also the reminder of pursuing the subjects in their proper order. Cf. *De sac*. I.9 p. 43.10–11; cf. Deferrari, I.7 p. 13; *De sac*. I.4 p. 112.9–12; cf. Deferrari, I.4.26 p. 74. In beginning the second book, Hugh likewise reiterated the aim for an orderly treatment: *De sac.* II.1.1 p. 282.19–22; cf. Deferrari, II.1.1 p. 205; I.5 p. 116.23–24; I.5.6 p. 77.

[567] *De sac.* I.16 p. 50.21: "Nunc interim ad propositi nostri seriem texendam revertamur." Cf. Deferrari, I.14 p. 20; Hugh seemed to acknowledge another digression on the distinction of judgments and his intent to return to the plan in *De sac.* I.8 p. 199.15–17: "His itaque de discretione iudicorum breviter propositis. Nunc ad ipsam narrationis nostre seriem revertamur." Cf. Deferrari, I.8.5 p. 146.

[568] For example, see Hugh's declaration that he had discussed matters "as it had been planned (sicut vobis propositum fuerat)" and that other matters lie beyond the present grasp. (*De sac.* I.4 p. 111.11–14; cf. Deferrari, I.4.25 p. 73). See also *De sac.* I.5 p. 113.11–12; cf. Deferrari, I.5.1 p. 75; *De sac.* I.12 p. 269.18–19; cf. Deferrari, I.12.24 p. 204.

[569]The written record of Hugh's teaching often bears marks of subtextual schoolroom discussion and debate. The same is true of the *Sacraments*. However, in the latter parts of the *Sacraments,* questions and discussions emerge in the text, as Hugh often cited and answered what appear to be student questions. Hugh peppered several passages with student questions and responses, quoting, "But you say to me." For examples, see II.10.3 p. 422.5, 17–18; II.11 p. 432.5; II.11.6 p. 434.19; II.11.6 p. 436.4, 10 (cf. Deferrari, II.10.3 p. 322; II.11.5 p. 331; II.11.6 p. 333, II.11.6 p. 334); *De sac.* II.13 (cf. Deferrari, II.13.10 pp. 386–II.14 p. 401); II.14.6 pp. 525–26 (Deferrari, II.14.6 pp. 412–13); II.14.9 pp. 536–38 (Deferrari, II.14.9 pp. 423–26).

[570] In Book I, seven references appear to Hugh's orderly plan. This does not include frequent comments Hugh made regarding the orders present in two works of God. Cf. *De sac.* I.16 p. 50.21 (cf. Deferrari, I.14 p. 20); I.4 p. 111.11–14 (cf. Deferrari, I.4.25 p. 73); I.5 p. 112.3–12 (cf. Deferrari, I.5.26 p. 74); I.5 p. 113.11–12

Furthermore, in the course of Book II, insistent student questions pushed Hugh off his plan.[571]

Glimpses of Hugh's teaching show him responding carefully to questions: as we saw, *The Moral Ark* constitutes Hugh's elaborate answer to student questions; *Sentences on Divinity* is a student *reportatio* that exhibits questions and answers. Yet Hugh's use of questions in his pedagogical works appears intentional: if the work is not a dialogue, Hugh did not proceed by answering questions. Throughout Hugh's instructional writings (such as *Notes on Genesis, Institutes on the Decalogue, Didascalicon, Practical Geometry*, and *Chronicon*), questions are very rare and generally serve a rhetorical purpose (for example, to anticipate or transition to the next point, to regain the reader's attention).[572] Occasionally, Hugh raised questions on points of ambiguity without furnishing a solution (such as in *Adnotationes* on scripture).[573] Questions do appear in a few of Hugh's *summae*—such as *Grammar*, *Epitome for Philosophy*, and *Dialogue on Sacraments of Natural and Written Law*—which are dialogues utilizing questions to

(cf. Deferrari, I.5.1 p. 75); I.5 p. 116.23–24 (cf. Deferrari, I.5.6 p. 77); I.6 p. 136.3–4 (cf. Deferrari, I.6.1 p. 93); I.8 p. 199.15–17 (cf. Deferrari, I.8.5 p. 146).
By contrast, in Book II, I have found only one explicit reference to the orderly plan that Hugh intended to enact. This reference comes right at the beginning of the Book (*De sac.* II.1.1 p. 282.21–22; cf. Deferrari, II.1.1. p. 205).

[571]Hugh forcefully declared this to be the case in at least one case: the treatment of vows in *De sac.* II.12.

[572] Questions play no significant role in *Didascalicon*, *Practical Geometry*, and *Chronicon*. *Institutiones in decalogum*, which appears to be a kind of *summa* of Hugh's comments on the decalogue, includes questions when a separate spiritual work of Hugh begins, appended to *Institutiones* (cf. PL 176.9–18; 15). In *Adnotationes elucidatoriae in Pentateuchon in Genesim* (PL 175.29–61), Hugh raised only four questions (39D, 40A, 40D, 55A). Cf. "Notes on Genesis," trans. Jan Van Zwieten, *Interpretation of Scripture: Practice: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Andrew, and Richard of St Victor, Peter Comestor, Robert of Melun, Maurice of Sully, and Leonius of Paris,* ed. Frans von Liere, Franklin Harkins, VTT 6 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 71, 72, 73, 98.

[573] *Adnotationes*, 47A–B (*Notes,* Zwieten, 83–84).

motivate exposition.[574] In his pedagogical writings, then, Hugh used question-answer methods deliberately, either in dialogues or else very little either according to his treatment's method.[575]

*Sacraments* breaks this pattern, however, by starting with rare questions but coming to rely on questions. Initially, Hugh maintained the pattern, eschewing questions. Yet gradually through Book I, Hugh began to raise or acknowledge questions (often based on opinions of Parisian contemporaries). In the first half of Book I, only about five questions are raised.[576] Hugh shows reluctance; he cited many possible questions on original sin but doubted the merit of discussing them.[577] The latter part of Book I, however, already differs dramatically with about eighteen passages where questions

[574] Both *Grammar* and *Epitome* are dialogues between teacher Dindimus and student Sosthenes. Sosthenes asked a few opening questions and leading comments in *Grammar*, but largely the work is a digest of grammatical knowledge for memorization. Hugh announced a more dialogical method in *Epitome*, and questions indeed played a greater role. Cf *Epitome,* ed. Baron, lines 34–40, p. 188. The *Dialogue* is also a consistent dialogue between discipulus and magister, where questions guide the exposition. Cf. PL 176.17–42.

[575] This generalization is specific to the genres of Hugh's curricular or pedagogical works. Other works, including spiritual, devotional, homiletic, or other genres naturally fit into his larger pedagogical project and do utilize questions for various functions, but these are not intended here.

[576] Counting questions presents difficulties of categorization, function, and determination in each case. Since examination of Hugh's questions aims at a shifting method, indirect or rhetorical questions are largely discounted. Questions become significant when they exhibit Hugh raising a disputed point in order to answer it, raising an opinion from a student or contemporary in order to treat it, prompting an exposition on the basis of questions, or organization his treatment on the basis of questions.
Note: For brevity and readability, the following notes to Hugh's *Sacraments* will abbreviate Berndt's edition with B and Deferrari's translation with D.
See I.1.16 B(erndt) 50, D(eferrari) 21; I.4.12 B103, D66; I.4.15 B105, D68; I.5.8 B117, D78; I.5.36 B134, D92; 11.

[577] Cf. I.7.25; Hugh elsewhere announced that he skipped many questions; see I.6.3.

crept in—even occasionally tying up treatment.[578] In Book I, then, Hugh shifted in method by increasing use of questions at least threefold.

That shift only sharpened in Book II, which exhibits an even greater leap: Book II of *Sacraments* is flooded with questions. It is unfeasible to list the questions: in over fifty passages, at least a single methodic question appears, though many passages exhibit chains of question and answers in dialectical treatment.[579] In places the questions involve lengthy digressions and sometimes take the shape of a schoolroom dispute: "But you say to me . . . you ask whether . . . you disagree . . . you ask how . . . Thus, you say . . ."[580] Dialectics disrupt the pithy flow of topics. This new way of treatment by dispute appears to have irritated Hugh in places, who often complained about the "many questions" and "great accumulations of words."[581] Once he complains almost with resignation: "There

[578] See I.6.11 B145, D101–102; I.6.15 B147, D104; I.6.24 B155 D109; I.7.10 B173, D124; I.7.12 B175, D126; I.7.25 D132 B183; I.7.28 B184 D134; I.7.30 B187 D136; I.7.35 B190 D138; I.7.37 B191, D139; I.7.38 B192, D140; I.9.5 B218, D161–2 (repeated questioning and argumentation); I.10.7 (ten questions listed for treatment); I.10.6 B232–37, D 173–78 (tied up in questions); I.10.9 B241, D181; I.11.8 B245, D184; I.12.10 B259, D195; I.12.21 B236, D200.

[579] Note: Even this list is a deceptive comparison for the references to Book I. Book II references are very often for *loci*, sometimes lengthy, where multiple questions occur. See II.1.3 B283–84, D207; II.1.3 B284–85, D209–210. II.1.3 B295, D217; II.1.3 B296, D218; II.1.6 B297–303, D219–24 (extended argumentation); II.1.9 B309–316, D230–36; II.1.10 B316–18, D236–38; II.1.11 B319, D238; II.1.11 B324, D242–43; II.1.13 B332, D250; II.6.1 B374–75, D293 (list of ten questions); II.6.2 B375, D283; II.6.2 B378–79, D286; II.6.3 B380, D288; II.6.4 B382, D290; II.6.5 B384, D291; II.6.7 B385–86, D293; II.6.13 B394, D300; II.7.4 B398, D303; II.7.6 B399, D303; II.8.3 B401, D304; II.8.4 B403, D306; II.8.6 B405, D308; II.8.11 B409, D312; II.8.13 B410, D313; II.10.3 B422, D322–23; II.10.4 B422–23; D323; II.11.5 B431–32, D330–31; II.11.6 B434, D333; II.11.11 B446, D344; II.11.13 B461, D357; II.11.19 B474, D369; II.12.1 B475, D369; II.13.7 B490–491, D382–83; II.13.11 B499–503, D390–95 (extended questions and objections); II.13.12 B505–511, D396–401 (extended questions); II.14.1 B512–13, D401–402; II.14.2 B518, D406; II.14.3 B518, D407; II.14.5 B524, D411; II.14.6 B525–26, D412–13; II.14.9 B536–44, D423–30; II.15.3 B546, D431; II.16.2 B549–52, D433–36; II.16.3 B554, D438; II.16.4 B557, D441; II.16.5 B558, D442; II.16.11 B569, D451; II.17.11 B577, D456; II.17.14 B580, D458; II.17.28 B589, D466; II.18.15 B595, D470; II.18.16 B596–97, D470–1.

[580] E.g., II.1.11 B324, D242–43; II.13.7; II.11.5; II.14.9; II.13.11; II.13.12.

[581] See II.16.2; II.1.11; II.6.

are many questions on the part of men. As long as there is life there is questioning."[582] Finishing a long dispute, Hugh asked his students: "What more do you ask?" and again, "What else clearer do you demand?"[583] With these comments, Hugh recognized that his method had shifted drastically from compendious principles to answering many questions.

With the shift to questions came a threat to the intended brevity. Hugh often reminded his reader of the need for concision—especially earlier in Book I.[584] Beyond reminders, Hugh performed pedagogical brevity by extracting and presenting the principle of the matter for the student's retention.[585] Hugh was selective about what he discussed: "As very many things are asked . . . but we think as many complex opinions are useless to treat in this digest. This alone will be enough if we only set out what must be known and taken." [586] The master of Saint-Victor reminded his readers that they read

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[582] See II.14.9.

[583] *De sac.*II.13.11, B498–505, D390–96: "Quid amplius queris?" (503); "Quid manifestius queris?" (505).

[584] Early on, Hugh referred to his "plan of brevity" ("ad propositum brevitatis"; *De sac.* I.1.7 p. 42.10; cf. Deferrari, I.1.6 p. 12) and so cut short that question for brevity's sake (ibid., p. 42.19). Elsewhere, "great sacraments" cannot be explained in the "present digest" ("nec explicabilia presenti adbrevationi"; I.1.25 p. 55.3–4; cf. Deferrari, I.1.23 p. 24). Hugh explained his brevity as serving his pedagogical plan: "I set out the origin and ordering of this sensible world with as brief a discussion as I could, which especially suits beginners, as was our plan" ("Mundi huius sensibilis originem & dispositionem quam brevissimo potui sermone & qui maxime ut propositum nobis fuerat introducendis conveniat explicui" [ibid., I.2.1 p. 59.4–5; cf. Deferrari, I.2.1 p. 28]). See also Hugh's reminders of deliberate brevity in: I.1.18 p. 52.17ff (cf. Deferrari, I.1.18 p. 22); I.3 p. 76.2–3 (cf. Deferrari, I.3.5 p. 43); I.5 p. 123.7–9 (cf. Deferrari, I.5.22 p. 83); I.9 p. 221.10–11, 23–24; (cf. Deferrari, I.10.6 p. 164).

[585] For example, Hugh summarized the discussion before closing the part in *De sacramentis* I.2.22 p. 72.25ff. Also, after a longer discussion, Hugh summarized in final chapters (in *De sac.* I.3 pp. 92–96; cf. Deferrari, I.3.30–31). See also ibid., I.7 p. 171.10ff (cf. Deferrari, I.7.6 p. 123); I.1.10 p. 44.9ff (cf. Deferrari, I.1.9 p. 14); II.11.12 p. 454 p. 9 (cf. Deferrari, II.11.12 p. 350).

[586] "Queruntur autem quam plurima de origine anime quando creata fuit, & unum creata fuit & qualis creata fuit. Nos vero in presenti adbreviatione tam multiplices opiniones persequi supervacuum & infructuosum estimamus, & hoc solum nobis sufficere putamus si tantum que sencienda & afferenda sunt proponimus" (I.6 p. 138.6–9; cf. Deferrari, I.6.3 p. 95). See also I.6 p. 158.26–p. 159.1 (cf. Deferrari, I.6.26 p. 113).

a summary, a mnemonic handbook for basic principles: "But briefly in conclusion, I draw together [*colligimus*] what was said earlier in order to provide understanding of what will be said."[587]

Yet despite his reminders and protests, the shift to answering questions brought into Hugh's intended compendium heightened agonism in how Hugh treated each topic. Brevity—necessary for a mnemonic *summa*—became rare. Though this shift is also gradual, Book II contrasts markedly in tone and style from much of Book I. References to brevity dwindle, and instead Hugh progressively treated questions by lengthy, dialectical argument, but also, increasingly by citing authorities. [588] Similar to increasing questions, Hugh's shifting method appears in his changing use of *auctores* or authorities. Naturally, Hugh's language—as in all his writings—often mirrored or borrowed from the statements of respected fathers or scripture. What shifts is the use of named sources quoted as authorities for support. Through much of Book I, Hugh did not quote any named authorities. Only after over two hundred pages and nearing the first book's end (in I.10) did five named quotations appear.[589] In Book II, however, Hugh quoted by name

[587] *De sac.* I.1.29 p. 58.10–11: "Sed breviter in clausula ipsa supradicta colligimus ad intelligentiam dicendorum comparandam" (cf. Deferrari, I.1.29 p. 27). This use of *colligere* to signal Hugh's practice is no anomaly. Cf. "Now let us collect and draw together what was said" ("Nunc autem congregemus in unum & colligamus que dicta sunt"; ibid., I.4 p. 107.22; cf. Deferrari, I.4.20 p. 70). The verb *colligere* clearly signals Hugh's performance of the same pedagogical mnemonics as set out and practiced in his earlier *summae.*

[588] In contrast to the disciplined adherence to brevity for the digest, Hugh appears more apologetic when mentioning brevity in the second book. See *De sac.* II.9.8.24–25 (cf. Deferrari, II.9.8 p. 318).

[589] For these and other discussion of the sources, I depend upon the apparatus of Fr. Rainer Berndt's edition of *De sacramentis.* For this count, I have considered quotations for which Hugh named the author (accurately or not; some misattribution appears, but it does not change the fact that Hugh intended to cite by name an author for authorization). Several passages include Hugh naming an author for a *sententia*, and then adding on a string of similar *sententiae* for that author indicating the same author with a

one hundred and five authors.[590] Thus, Book II quoted over twenty times the number of Book I's named *auctores* (all of whom occur in roughly its last 15 percent).[591] A shift in method and treatment is unmistakable. That shift reaches its extremity in passages that dominated concatenated named and unnamed quotations.[592] Such piling up of *sententiae* is antithetical to the mnemonic *summa* Hugh intended; such chains of *sententiae*, so ill-suited for memorization, highlight how far Hugh diverged from his original plan of brevity for memorization. Hugh condemned such prolixity in others.[593] In places, Hugh evinced an awareness of his altered method. For example, he cited the demands from his students or opponents. " 'Give authority!' they say to us," regarding sacramental confession.[594] Notably, Hugh acquiesced, giving several passages in which he piled up authorities and disputed over them in order to win over his skeptics.[595] Hugh's compositional method clearly transmuted from a digestive summary of principles, leaving aside named authorities, to a treatment saturated with and explicitly depending upon named authorities.

By answering questions and citing named *auctores,* then, Hugh's brief mnemonic method gradually transmutated into extended dialectical treatment. Earlier, regarding

"likewise [item]." I have counted each such quotation as a separate instance. Five named quotations appear *De sac.* I.10.6 p. 233; I.10.6 p. 236; I.10.7 p. 238–239; I.10.8 p. 240.

[590] Hugh's unnamed sources also become much more frequent (though a count would entail many ambiguities). In short, I count the named sources that occur (often in multiples) on the following pages: *De sac.* (ed. Berndt) pp. 287, 288–95, 297, 312, 315–17, 346, 379–80, 387–88, 403, 411, 425–26, 432–33, 441–49, 453, 456–57, 460, 464–69, 471–72, 504, 506, 515, 533, 554, 556–57, 559, 596.

[591] Specifically, Book 1, pp. 233–69.

[592] For example, II.16.6 B560–II.16.14 B568; II.17.1 B572–II.18.17 B602, ending the work.

[593] For Hugh's criticisms of the Parisians, see chapter 3, section 1.

[594] *De sac.* II.14.1 p. 512.13–14: "Dicunt nobis. Date auctoritatem" (cf. Deferrari, II.14.1 p. 401).

[595] See also II.14.1 pp. 512–17, II.14.3 pp. 518–29 (cf. Deferrari, II.14.1 pp. 401–406; II.14.2–7 pp. 412–16).

creation, Hugh merely alluded to contrary positions for gradual creation, but answered that simultaneity was the pious view, had tropological merit (evoking love for God), and avoided absurdity.[596] Rather than a dialectical back-and-forth, Hugh humbly counselled his reader if unsatisfied to go on to another's and returned to his "order" of topics.[597] But this early treatment contrasted sharply with later ways: toward the end of Book I and where the first *sententiae* appear, Hugh discussed whether the faith altered or not in the past.[598] Unlike brief treatments, here several possible positions arise, as well as rebuttals with contrary *sententiae.* Hugh ultimately passed judgment and rejected the contraries. Contrasting his earlier irenicism, this later more pugnacious stance increased in Book II, with treatments extended by raising and rebutting many contrary positions.[599] Dialectical treatments became progressively more frequent.[600] Likewise, Hugh increasingly relied upon piling up authorities and quotations, which nearly constitute the final sections.[601] Even previously treated topics resurfaced to be treated afresh by this transmuted, rigorous method, including the question whether the Son was sent into time.[602] Later in

[596] *De sac.* I.1.2p36–6p39 (cf. Deferrari, I.1.1p7–5p10).
[597] *De sac.* I.1.4 p. 38.25–26 (cf. Deferrari, I.1.2 p. 9).
[598] *De sac.* I.10 pp. 232–38 (cf. Deferrari, I.10.6 pp. 173–78).
[599] For example, Hugh supplied an extended discussion of Christ's union of body, soul, and Word from various approaches, including conception, life, death and separation, and personal unity. Cf. II.1.8p307–II.1p331 (cf. Deferrari, II.1.8p228–12p249).
[600] Other examples of passages in which Hugh argued dialectically with vim and vigor include the following: on baptism, II.6.4 p. 375–82 (cf. Deferrari, II.6.4 pp. 283–88); on marriage, II.11.4p427–11.6p441 (cf. Deferrari, II.11.4p327–11.6p339); on consent, II.11.12p448–454 (cf. Deferrari, II.11.12p345–51); various controversies on love, II.13.7p489–13.12p511 (cf. Deferrari, II.13.7p381–13.12p401); on remission of sins in confession, II.14.8p529–14.9p544 (cf. Deferrari, II.14.8p416–14.9p430).
[601] Examples of Hugh's piling up of authorities to establish a point include the following: on marriage, II.11.9p444–11.12p454 (cf. Deferrari, II.11.9p342–351); on consanguinity, II.11.14p462–11.16p472 (cf. Deferrari, II.11.14p357–11.16p368); on the final quotations, see II.16.5p559–II.17.23p589 (cf. Deferrari, II.16.5p443–17.27p465).
[602] See I.3p86.18–30; initial treatment of this question received only about twelve lines.

Book II, that question resurfaced to receive extensive treatment, wherein Hugh raised, considered, and rejected several viewpoints in order to establish what ought to be believed.[603] This reoccurrence of a topic acts as a control indicating how much Hugh's method of treatment changed—from giving earlier a succinct paragraph on what ought to be believed to later closely arguing his points and furnishing a lengthy chapter composed almost entirely of *sententiae* (largely of Augustine and Jerome) to authorize his claims. In sum, Hugh's *Sacraments* ended up a very different book than intended when he began.

It may be objected here that Hugh's *Sacraments* was an unfinished work and that in its concluding chapters it represents a rough early version that remained uncompleted. Hugh did tend to revise his works, and his last chapters might have been polished had he lived longer. However, even if Hugh's strength was failing toward the end, the rest of Book II remains a witness to the transformed method. Nor is Book II the product of an enervated author. The features of Book II—lengthy dialectical treatments raising and answering chains of questions, rebutting students' objections with keen argumentation, and deploying authorities—are very strenuous tasks and require a master's full powers of argumentation and erudition. A succinct handbook passing by such thorny patches, no doubt, would have been easier! If indeed *Sacraments* were unfinished or unrealized, such might have been the product. As it stands, Hugh appears in full command of his faculties.

[603] *De sac.* II.1.4p287–295 (cf. Deferrari, II.1.4p210–216).

Finishing the work, Hugh evinced that his work transformed *en route* by its multiple prefaces. Though he had announced his intended brevity in the preface ("I have composed this as a somewhat brief *summa* of all into one course"[604]), in the preface to Book II, Hugh omitted all reference to the intention of brevity or of a compendium of all sacred scripture.[605] Rather, the second book's preface spoke only of the profundity of scripture and explains at length justifying the variety of styles matching the variety of topics. In Book II's preface, focus visibly shifted from a Hugonic *summa* to diverse styles and levels to suit the multitude, and scripture adorned with variety will ornament the faithful with upright living.[606]

The other evocative preface is the first preface. *Sacraments* is odd for having two parallel but distinct and different prefaces.[607] In Berndt's edition, an initial preface

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[604] *De sac.* Prol. p. 31.5–6: "Hanc enim quasi brevem quandam summam omnium in unam seriem compegi." Similarly, just before the first topic of the first book, Hugh repeated this intention to "reduce the whole course of the divine scriptures into a compendium not only by restraining words but also to bring to light every possible way the secrets of its profundity by explanation" (*De sac.* I.1 p. 36.2–4: "Arduum profecto et laboriosum opus crebra vestra precatione flexus aggredior. Universam divinarum scripturarum seriem non solum restringendo ad compendium redigere, sed exponendo quoquomodo profunditatis eius archana in lucem evocare"). In the course of writing, however, Hugh had to sacrifice brevity for profundity.

[605] *De sac.* II.Prefatiuncula, p. 271 (Berndt), (cf. Deferrari, II.prologue, p. 205).

[606]In keeping with this changed attitude, the preface to Book II appears to introduce another word to describe the aim of the work. Rather than the *summa* of the initial preface, here we find a "treatment" or *tractatio* (*De sac.* II.pref, p. 271.5–6 (Berndt), [(cf. Deferrari, II.prol, p. 205]). "Propterea in sacri eloquii tractatione non eadem dicendi forma ubique servanda est quia altiora fidei sacramenta excellentiori et digno sanctis reverenter tractanda sunt." Prior to this, I cannot find any place where Hugh referred to his work in *Sacraments* as a *tractatio*, yet after this preface to Book II, Hugh adopted this descriptor three more times. Hugh referred "earlier in this treatment" ("Superius in ea quam generaliter de sacramentis premisimus tractatione," *De sac.* II.4.1 p. 369.10; cf. Deferrari, II.4.1 p. 279) and "earlier in the treatise on the sacraments" ("Sed nos que superius in tractatu sacramentorum," II.6.7 p. 388.22; cf. Deferrari, II.6.7 p. 295). Finally, about some difficult and ambiguous points, Hugh declared these could await a later treatise ("Quod tamen si fit vel non fit, qua iusticia fiat vel non fiat, alterius tractatus operam expectat," II.14.8 p. 536.19–20; cf. Deferrari, II.14.8 p. 422). Changing his description of his work signals and corresponds with Hugh's tendency to plunge into intense and deep discussion and so reflects the abandonment of his earlier pedagogical aim of furnishing a digest of allegorical mysteries.

[607]*De sac.* I.prologus, p. 23; prologus, p. 31 (cf. Deferrari, I. Preface, pp. 1, 3),

appears (page 23), followed by a list of contents and then by a programmatic preface outlining the pedagogical aim of the work as a *summa* (page 31). Why two prefaces, so close? I suggest that Hugh wrote the second prologue (page 31) first chronologically, indicating the initial aim of the book (consistent with his earlier *summae*). Yet finishing the transmuted *Sacraments*, Hugh later added the second preface that now appears first (page 23). Hence, while the preface speaks of the work according to its plan, the added preface refers to the work as already written (as incorporating earlier texts, as given out for copying before completion, as revised after immature dissemination).[608] Tellingly, the added preface dropped the *summa* language to describe it as a rich and copious text:

> I have divided this work into two books, in order that the division of explanation in such a multitude of topics and long-windedness prevent weariness for readers and may at the same time present a more suitable format for those unable to copy both books or who wish to have a book.[609]

The added preface Hugh acknowledged *Sacraments'* prolixity as the reason for the choice after-the-fact to divide into two volumes.[610] There Hugh even countenanced that the two volumes might circulate independently—so much for the original pedagogical intention of encapsulating the whole into one account! This mnemonic *summa* ballooned into such a massive treatise that copies for reference were necessary.[611]

## V. *Conclusion*

[608] *De sac*. I.prologus, p. 23 (cf. Deferrari, I. Preface, p. 1).
[609] *De sac*. I.prologus, p. 23.14–17 (cf. Deferrari, I. Preface, p. 1): "Sane hoc opus in duos libros distinxi, quatinus in tantum rerum multitudine & prolixitate incisio narrationis legentibus tedium tolleret & simul utrumque scribere non valentibus aut divisum habere volentibus conmodiorem formam exhiberet."
[610] *De sac.* I.prologus, p. 31 (cf. Deferrari, I. Preface, p. 3).
[611] Compare this Added Prologue (I.Prologus, p. 31) with Hugh's Pythagorean anecdote from *Didascalicon* (III.3).

Unlike independent masters in Paris who sought to attract and retain students by their lessons, Hugh had more of a captive audience. Under the supervision of Gilduin, Hugh crafted an ambitious pedagogical program to encompass both poles of the canons' life—intellectual and affective. Hugh's dual approach through *disciplina* and *doctrina* aimed at mutually supporting restorative remedies for humanity. Saint-Victor's strict discipline—as Hugh theorized—restrained the body in order to wither harmful desires and cultivate inner love. Seeking to transform the abbey into a pedagogical community, Hugh's later spiritual writings evince the master evoking or guiding advancing students to kindle fraternal love. While Abelard and Parisian masters prized *ingenium* for dialectical adjudication of discrepant authorities, Hugh assembled curricular plans for philosophical and biblical reading. Not dialectical acumen but orderly reading through Hugh's curated curriculum of the authorities will reveal the harmony of discrepant authorities. To aid that reading, Hugh equipped students with mnemo-techniques and handbook *summae* to stock their memories with hermeneutics to guide later reading. His final book, *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith*, began as such a *summa* for the second foundation of doctrines. However, Hugh veered off the rails of his original plan. He may have succumbed in some respects to the gravitational pull of the Parisians' disputes adjudicating authorities.

That Hugh's *Sacraments* transmuted in composition does not indicate the failure of his larger pedagogical program. After all, the liberal arts culture of the abbey produced

many impressive Victorines, including Richard of Saint-Victor.[612] Yet that transmutation does reveal that the Abbey was not a hermetically-sealed petri dish, but a site of dialogue with the Parisians and many others. Hugh's difficulties in *Sacraments* also highlight the growing need for organizational principles to arrange notionally or pedagogically (for presentation) the growing discourses among the proto-scholastic masters. Peter Lombard, once a student at Saint-Victor, as the next chapter will examine, faced this organizational challenge in a deceptively simple and bold approach in his own theological textbook, *Four Books of Sentences.*

[612] Godfrey of Saint-Victor, arriving in Paris after Hugh's death, still celebrated the Victorine culture of liberal arts in opposition to that of the ambitious but directionless scholars of Paris in his laudatory poem *Fons philosophiae* (written after 1176). See *The Fountain of Philosophy,* trans. Edward Synan (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1972).

## Preface for Part II

Paris and its vicinity developed a magnetism for both masters and students due the number and prestige of its schools. Laon and other towns might flourish with a great school for a time but give way with the decease of a great teacher and lesser prestige of successors. Paris, like Salerno and Bologna, succeeded in attracting a sufficient number of masters and students that its reputation rested on not one or two schools but its entire constellation. As a result, succeeding generations of masters and students studied and taught in the Capetian capital. William of Champeaux had been among an earlier generation of teachers. He had begun teaching around 1094 on the Île de la cité as a master of the old cathedral of Notre Dame—a chair that Abelard and Lombard would later hold. Peter Abelard and Hugh of Saint-Victor represent a slightly later generation: both had gained some prior instruction before arriving in Paris; both were settled there before 1120, and both had died by 1142.

In the mid-1130s, Abelard and Hugh both held forth in their respective schools (Mont-Ste-Geneviève and Saint-Victor). These twin lights shone like beacons, attracting subsequent generations of students to the schools of Paris. Among these crowds were Peter Lombard and John of Salisbury. Both began as pupils with obscure pasts who conducted brilliant careers in the schools and by their merits ended their days as bishops of prestigious cities, respectively, Paris and Chartres. Peter and John can in a way be seen as successors to Abelard and Hugh. Both took one of them as their chief source (Peter learned from Hugh, John from Abelard), but they also appreciated and borrowed from

the rival. Synthesizing key elements from Abelard and Hugh, Peter and John also produced highly important educational works that advanced the pedagogical debates in the Parisian milieu. Yet despite these parallels, Peter and John took very different paths in their careers: Peter was a lifelong master who wrote a textbook for instruction cast in an Augustinian vein but with little methodological theorization. John, on the other hand, taught only briefly and served as secretary for the archbishops of Canterbury, yet he produced what can be considered highly theorized pedagogical thought.

The next two chapters of this study will examine Peter and John as representing two distinct options of instruction available to the pedagogical Parisian milieu, each drawing upon their teachers but also articulating their own directions for education.

## Chapter 5:

## Peter Lombard: Cultivating Readers of Authorities

### I. Introduction

As Hugh of Saint-Victor labored over his final, grand work, *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith*, in the mid-1130s, students continued to stream into Paris' schools. Among them, one in particular arrived at the doors of Saint-Victor Abbey in 1134 or 1136 with a letter of introduction. Peter Lombard bore that letter from no less a patron than Bernard, the energetic abbot of Clairvaux. Bernard's letter gained Peter Lombard entrance into Saint-Victor Abbey, and thus a foothold into Paris, the greatest intellectual center of its time and the scene of his future illustrious and prolific teaching career.[613] Before introducing Peter's later innovative, pedagogical project, a few words are in order on Peter's life, career, and later scholarly reception.

Bernard's letter marks the earliest evidence that Lombard put down roots in Paris, as he embarked on a three-decade-long career of studying and teaching there. Lombard's earlier life and work, however, can only be partially reconstructed.[614] Born around 1095–1100, Peter probably took an arts course (beginning with grammar) at the cathedral school of Novara, in northwestern Italy.[615] Apparently, Peter did not spring from a

[613] Bernard's letter is quoted and cited in note 6.
[614] Doyle's study of Lombard's personal networks and sermons provides the best recent reconstruction of this early career and will guide the present narrative. See Matthew Doyle, *Peter Lombard and His Students* (Toronto, CN: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2016), 13–36.
[615] See Ignatius Brady's treatment in Prolegomena for *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius Brady (Rome: Collegii S Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971) 11*, Doyle, *Peter Lombard*, 16–17.

notable or wealthy family and would have relied upon patrons for his education.[616] One such patron was Uberto, the influential and wealthy bishop of Lucca.[617] As Bernard's letter reported, it was through Uberto's friendship that Peter came under the patronage of the abbot of Clairvaux: "[Uberto], bishop of Lucca, our father and friend, commended to me the venerable man P[eter] Lombard, asking that for the short time that he tarries in France for studies, through my friends I look after his necessary provisions. I did so as long as he was in Rheims."[618] Peter, as appears here, used Bernard's patronage network to study theology at Rheims and to provide for his livelihood while he studied there.[619]

Bernard's introductory letter to Saint-Victor appears then as a hinge in Peter's life, between his earlier studies and his successful Parisian career, following his studies in Rheims, that concluded in a brief tenure as bishop of Paris. As Bernard's letter requested, Gilduin at Saint-Victor seems to have taken on patronage of Lombard, though it is

[616] Brady, 9*–11*, Doyle, 14–16.
[617] Peter's patronage and early studies have been the matter of much controversy on account of their murkiness and the tendency to tie later work to early beginnings. For the best account, see Doyle, *Peter Lombard*, 19–26.
[618] Bernard, Ep. 410, ed. Leclercq, et al., *Sancti Bernardi opera* 8.391: "Dominus Lucensis episcopus pater et amicus noster, commendavit mihi virum venerabilem P. Lombardum, rogans ut ei parvo tempore, quo moraretur in Francia causa studii, per amicos nostros victui necessaria providerem; quod effeci, quandiu Remis moratus est." For the latest and persuasive treatment of the circumstances of this letter, see Matthew Doyle, *Peter Lombard and His Students* (Toronto, CN: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2016), 26–29, 36–37. See also Ignatius Brady's treatment in Prolegomena for *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius Brady (Rome: Collegii S Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), I.8*–9*, 15–16*; cf. Clare Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's* Sentences *and the Development of Theology* (Turnhout, BE: Brepols, 2013), 45–50.
[619] The theological school at Rheims flourished under Master Alberic from 1118 until his departure in 1136. Depending on the dating of Bernard's Letter 410—either in 1134 or 1136—Peter may have had several years under Alberic or only a very brief period. See Brady, 13*–14*; John R. Williams, "The Cathedral School of Reims in the Time of Master Alberic, 1118–1136," *Traditio* 20 (1964): 93–114; Doyle, 28–29.

uncertain for how long.[620] There is no reason to think that Peter became a canon or stayed very long at Saint-Victor (as was thought in the past).[621]

Yet certainly Peter took advantage of his early years in Paris. While not a canon, Brady concluded it was almost "certain that he attended the lessons of Master Hugh."[622] It is without a doubt that Hugh's thought permeated Peter's own theological thinking.[623] It is also highly likely that during these years (specifically, 1136–39) Peter also heard lessons from Abelard.[624] Regardless of whether Peter climbed Mont–Ste-Genevieve to hear Abelard in person, there can be no doubt that Abelard was a chief interlocutor and source that Peter encountered in his own thought and method.[625]

Peter Lombard took a distinctive path. Despite his early Victorine formation standing apart from the Parisian schools, Lombard embraced that school culture, excelled

[620] Bernard only asked that Lombard be given board for a brief period. See Doyle, 28.
[621] Brady, Proleg. 15*, Doyle, 37–38.
[622] Brady, Proleg. 16*, "Quod lectiones Magistri Hugonis frequentaverit, quasi certum videtur." Doyle pointed out that at this time Hugh was taking external students, such as Lawrence of Westminster. See Doyle, 38.
[623] Significant scholarship on the relationship between Lombard's *Sentences* and Hugh's *Sacraments* takes for granted the deep currents that connect the two tomes and rather aims to clarify how—in method and in conclusions—the two works may be distinguished. This is compounded by the presence of another influential text, the *Summa sententiarum*, from which all acknowledge that Lombard also drew extensively. This *Summa sententiarum* so reflects Hugh's thought that it was once attributed to Hugh (and more recently to Otto of Lucca, considered a patron of Lombard). More recently Marcia Colish has persuasively argued that the *Summa sententiarum* is not a product of a cathedral school of northern Italy but a product of a Victorine milieu definitely located in northern France and likely in Paris. See Joseph de Ghellinck, SJ, *Le mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle* (Brussels: Impression Anastaltique Culture et Civilisation, 1969), 185–203; Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), I.57–65; David Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 183–213; R. W. Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), II:141–44; Marcia Colish, "Otto of Lucca, Author of the *Summa sententiarum*?" *Discovery and Distinction in the Early Middle Ages: Studies in Honor of John J. Contreni*, eds. Cullen Chandler, Steven Stofferahn (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2013), 57–70.
[624] Brady pointed out that Abelard was teaching again in Paris through 1136–39 but that he doubted that Peter formally attended his lessons (Brady, Proleg. 16*–17*). Others were more confident that Lombard did hear nearby Abelard. See Philipp Rosemann, *Peter Lombard* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 36.
[625] See Ghellinck, SJ, *Le Mouvement Théologique*, 149–80; Luscombe, *School of Abelard*, 261–80; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, I.47–52.

in it, and though an outsider advanced in rank to become Bishop of Paris. In the early 1140s, Peter transitioned out of the role of student and into that of a full-fledged master. He obtained a prebend in the Church of St. Mary, the old cathedral on the Cité, and opened a school.[626] Through this period, Peter evidently built a reputation as a respected teacher. A coinciding teaching vacuum, as it were, may have been advantageous. In 1141, Hugh of Saint-Victor died; the next year Abelard died and Gilbert of Poitiers left his teaching post at the cathedral (where he had taught since around 1137) to become bishop of Poitiers. As Matthew Doyle put it, "With the departures of the three giants, Hugh, Abelard, and Gilbert, there were certainly students looking for masters."[627] In 1144, as Brady discovered, Peter had begun ascending through the ranks of the cathedral canonry, where he would at last reach the episcopal peak.[628] Peter evidently also found success and respect in teaching, for in that same year, he appeared in a poem alongside other famous scholars:

> We see celebrated theologian Lombard,
> with Ivo [of Chartres], Peter Helias, and Bernard,
> who breathed of balsum and nard,
> and most of them professed Abelard.[629]

[626] Brady, 15*, 20*; Doyle, 40–42.
[627] Doyle, 41.
[628] Brady, 17*, 22*–25*; Matthew Doyle recently presented a useful study of the noble and exclusive cathedral canonry of which Peter found himself an active member (Doyle, 50–80).
[629] Walter Mapes/Gualterius Mappus, *The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes*, ed. Thomas Wright (London, UK: J. B. Nichols & Son, 1841), 27–28; 'Metamorphosis Goliae Episcopi,' 197–200: "Celebrem theologum vidimus Lumbardum;/ cum Yvone, Helyam Petrum, et Bernardum, / quorum opobalsamum, spiratos, et nardum, / et professi plurimi sunt Abaielardum." Thomas Wright counterintuitively supposed the Bernardus mentioned was the Abbot of Clairvaux (pp. 27–28, n198). For the dating see Ignatius Brady, "Peter Lombard: Canon of Notre Dame," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 32 (1965): 280. Cf. Philip Rosemann, *Peter Lombard* (UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 36–37.

Master Lombard crowned this career by ordination to become Bishop of Paris in 1159, though his death in 1160 cut his episcopacy to a short span.

In his years of teaching—through the 1140s and 1150s—Lombard produced four main works: his *Sermons*, his *Gloss on the Psalms*, his *Gloss on Paul*, and what will occupy most of our attention, his impressive *Four Books of Sentences.* Peter's *Sermons* have recently received detailed study. These sermons were spread out through his career as a cathedral canon (rather than limited to his episcopal tenure). Matthew Doyle has highlighted the care and reflection behind what were once considered lackluster and dull homilies.[630] Yet, however didactic they are, the sermons do not appear to be pedagogical in a formal sense, that is, outlining or enacting a methodological program of education. Peter addressed educated clergy and articulated spiritual themes that would be unfamiliar to the uneducated. But Lombard did not hold office or rank among his fellow canons, from which he might assemble a pedagogical program by which to instruct them. The canonry of Notre Dame was unreformed and not carefully regulated or disciplinated like that of Saint-Victor.[631]

The *Gloss on the Psalms* (*Glossa in Psalmos*) later enjoyed a high reputation, but it was not initially intended as a teaching text. Peter began the Psalms gloss early, under Master Alberic at Rheims. Its intention was, as Ignatius Brady concluded, "to sing the psalter more wisely in spirit and mind, not for teaching in schools." As it happened, in

[630] Matthew Doyle has given the best recent examination of these sermons, putting them in a rather sympathetic light. See Doyle, *Peter Lombard*, "Chapter Six: The Master: Peter Lombard and His Sermons," 123–164.
[631] Doyle, 128–132; Brady, Proleg. 2.33*.

his last years, Bishop Peter returned to this youthful commentary and began to revise and teach from it.[632] The second gloss, the *Gloss on Paul* (bearing various titles, including *Glossa/Glossatura magna/Collectanea in epistolas beati Pauli*) was a much more mature work, drawing upon a rich array of sources. It was first released in 1148, but Peter frequently revised this text until his death.[633] On account of those revisions, Philipp Rosemann recognized in this work an performative evolution in which Peter gradually hybridized commentary methods with the "systematic" approach he would adopt in his *Sentences*: "The conceptual logic of the subject matter seems gradually to take precedence over the interpretation of the authoritative sources—although the two continue to work hand in hand."[634] The *Gloss on Paul* is pedagogical and the subject of Lombard's lessons, as Rosemann argued. But it was a transitional text and remains immature relative to the *Sentences*. Peter's impressive *Gloss on Paul*, then, will fall outside the present focus, which lies on his last and without doubt most refined *Four Books of Sentences.*

In summary, then, Lombard's *Gloss on Paul* is a transitional and immature text, his *Gloss on Psalms* was not originally intended for teaching, and revisions for teaching did not come to fruition. The center of Peter's pedagogy lies in his *Sentences*, that is, the work he intentionally crafted as the culmination of his teaching and that later became the primary theological textbook for centuries. In the early 1150s, Peter abandoned glosses as a way to treat questions and began composing in the new method and genre of the

[632] Brady, Proleg. 46*, 51*–57*; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 43–44; Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 188.
[633] Brady, Proleg. 61*–81*; Rosemann, 44–45.
[634] Rosemann, 47, 45–48.

sentence-collection. The *Sentences* consists of four volumes, treating theological topics roughly divided under the umbrellas of the Trinity, creation, incarnation, and the sacraments. Four stages of composition are discernible. First, Peter taught the material as a course and then composed it in writing. Secondly, he revised the *Sentences* on the basis of new and more accurate texts that he had encountered in Rome (while accompanying in 1154 the bishop of Paris). Afterward, he he taught the revised *Sentences* in the 1156–57 academic year. Finally, he taught his *Sentences* course again the subsequent year (1157–58) and released its final version with further emendations and marginal comments.

Setting aside his *Sentences*, Lombard turned his attention back to his *Gloss on the Psalms* and began revisions, but was interrupted by his election to the Parisian bishopric and so pulled out of the classroom and away from teaching.[635]

The afterlife of his *Sentences* would have astounded Lombard. Though it competed with other contemporary textbooks (*summae* and sentence-collections), the *Sentences* would become a primary text for theological education from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. Its utilization and influence places it among one of the most read and referenced works of the European Middle Ages.[636] It was a staple of university education; in order to gain a *bachelarius* degree, one would spend a year lecturing on the *Sentences*.[637]

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[635] Brady, Proleg. 122*–129*; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 55. Cf. Artur Landgraf, "Notes de critique textuelle sur les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* (1930), 2:80–99.
[636] Philipp Rosemann seems to have followed up Marcia Colish's suggestion that a history of the reception of Lombard's *Sentences* would fill in many gaps in the theological evolution of the European West (Colish, *Peter Lombard*, I.1) with a short reception history up to the era of the Reformations. See Philipp Rosemann, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's* Sentences (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2007).
[637] Rosemann, *Story of a Great Medieval Book*, 60–62.

For this reason, more commentaries remain on the *Sentences* than on any other text, save only the Bible.[638]

Despite or perhaps because of its common use, many scholars have found little worth in Lombard's *Sentences.* Early scholars of scholasticism, such as the great Martin Grabmann, prized the thirteenth-century scholastic method and looked upon twelfth-century thinkers as precursors in its development. In that perspective, Lombard's work appeared highly deficient when compared to the later *summae,* including Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*.[639] Josef Pieper judged Lombard's work to be "a mediocre book of sentences" whose "somewhat boring solidity" was desirable in a textbook.[640]

Recently, Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences* has received revived appreciation.[641] Joseph de Ghellinck is responsible for the renewed appreciation of Lombard's long-lived book as a milestone in the developing systematization of Christian doctrines and authorities. Though not effulgent with praise, Ghellinck saw Lombard's work as a high point and hinge even in its own time: "In Paris toward 1150 . . . a work

[638] The great project of cataloguing the commentaries on Lombard was undertaken by Friedrich Stegmüller, *Repertorium commentarium in Sententias Petri Lombardi,* 2 vols. (Würzburg: Schöningh, 1947); it has been updated and corrected by more recent efforts. See J. Livesey, "*Lombardus electronicus*: A Biographical Database of Medieval Commentators on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Current Research*, ed. G. R. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 2002), I.1–23; Rosemann, *Story of a Great Medieval Book*, 14.

[639] Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode,* 2 vols. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1875), 2.369–407.

[640] Josef Pieper, *Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy,* trans. Clara Winston & Richard Winston (South Bend, IN: St Augustine's Press, 2001), 95, 97.

[641] For some time, Lombard's reputation suffered in anticipation, as it were, of the more celebrated *summae* of the thirteenth century or in the shadow of the achievements of Abelard or Hugh of Saint-Victor. (The most concise and complete historiography seems to be Matthew Doyle's, in *Peter Lombard*, 4–5.) The instigator of the renewed interest in Lombard is Joseph de Ghellinck, SJ, who argued for Lombard's central place within the theological movement of the twelfth century. See Joseph de Ghellinck, SJ, *Le mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle* (Brussels: Éditions de Tempel, 1948).

[that is, the *Sentences*] came to light whose fame surely exceeds its value, but in which we may see the point of arrival of all previous attempts and at the same time, all later efforts take this work for their point of departure."[642] More recently, Marcia Colish's monumental treatment favorably compared Lombard's *Sentences* to other attempts. She first analytically identified the defects in the perceived systematic projects of predecessors and peers (including Abelard, Hugh of Saint-Victor, the *Summa sententiarum*, and so on) and then argued that Lombard's organization preeminently surpassed their organization.[643] Following in Colish's vein, Philipp Rosemann framed Lombard's contribution as a methodological shift from chronological "story to system" in the presentation of materials.[644] For Colish and Rosemann, Lombard's *Sentences* derives its worth primarily from their systematic, conceptual organization in comparison to previous, deficient attempts.

A more positive evaluation of Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences* is welcome, but to measure it by the standard of successful systemization is less useful. Setting value upon its apparently seamless, abstract systematic organization still maintains the anachronistic standard of the later scholastic *summae*. The very notion of a systematic theology derives from the expansive works of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in conjunction with the

[642] Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, 2: "Vers 1150, à Paris, devenue le centre intellectual de la chrétienté occidentale, après trois ou quatre siècles d'un pénible enfantement théologique, une oeuvre vient au jour, dont la célébrité dépasse assurément la valeur, mais dans laquelle il est permis de voir le point d'arrivée de toutes les tentatives précédentes: en même temps, c'est de cette oeuvre que prennent leur point de depart tous les travaux ultérieurs."
[643] Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard*, I.33–90; cf. Joseph de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, 227–49.
[644] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 8–33.

greater institutional concern with contemporary heresies.[645] Lombard's *Sentences* may be seen as a relatively successful systematic precursor to the later *summae*. But such a retrospective evaluation may not match its aim or function in its own time. Since Master Peter's goal for his *Sentences* was quite different, our expectations require recalibration. Rather than producing an abstractly systematic theology, Lombard crafted a theology course of education for his students. Its contents and method served not as an abstract system but had a practical, pedagogical purpose. Colish, indeed, argued that as a result of the *Sentences'* systemicity they served well in the classroom.[646] But instead of inferring effectiveness in teaching from more perfect but later systemicity, we should derive its conceptual arrangement from its anterior and contemporary pedagogical aim and function. As Guilio Silano put it,

> An appreciation of the importance of teaching seems preferable to the view that the undertaking in which the masters were engaged was the elaboration of systematic theology. For one thing, the expression 'systematic theology' is not a twelfth-century term and would make little sense to the masters; for another, it betrays a degree of abstraction quite foreign to them and may lead us to speak too readily of their doctrine rather than their teaching.[647]

[645] For a recent survey of these developments, see Kevin Madigan, *Medieval Christianity: A New History* (New Haven, MA: Yale University Press, 2015), 174–210.

[646] Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard*, I.77–90. Colish has elsewhere posited that not only its system but also Lombard's method in discerning among authorities and in applying "theological reasoning" served pedagogical functions. In some respect, this is undoubtedly correct. But the simple performance of a task is not thereby pedagogical—or else nearly every text with a classroom use could equally claim to be pedagogical. Pedagogical function also includes a methodology (implicit or explicit) by which to impart the performed skills to others. Colish does not offer an explanation as to how reading Lombard's *Sentences* imparted that skill, as we adjudicate among the various *sententiae* themselves. See Colish, "The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century," *Studies in Medieval Culture* 39 (1997): 1–26, esp. 2, 9–12.

[647] Giulio Silano, "Introduction," in Peter Lombard, *The Sentences: Book I: The Mystery of the Trinity*, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2010), xxiv.

The master of Notre Dame sought to produce a functional instrument for teaching. In this way, the present treatment of the *Sentences* takes as its premise that Lombard first of all served a practical rather than an abstract, conceptual, or theoretical aim. His *Sentences* arose from and hence reflected concrete experience in the classroom, and were meant for use in the classroom.

Having recognized the pedagogical context and aim of *Sentences*, we should reconsider the work's features, such as conceptual arrangement or systemization, for their pedagogical function or character. This pedagogical character is evident in myriad forms—as will be argued later—and occasionally finds acknowledgement.[648] Yet the pedagogical character and method of Lombard's teaching remains to receive treatment (including its relationship to Lombard's milieu, particularly Hugh, Abelard, and John of Salisbury). Studies on Lombard have tended to highlight the relationship between Lombard's theological views and those of his sources and peers.[649] A few have given accounts or insights into Lombard's theological method.[650] Yet a full account of Lombard

[648] For example, Silano occasionally brings out various pedagogical functions in his helpful Introduction. See his "Introduction," *Sentences I*, trans. Silano, xxiii–xxiv, xxxiv, xxxvii–xxxviii. Philipp Rosemann frequently framed the systematization project that he saw as a product of the 'professionalization' of the magisterial role as well as fitting an intellectual culture that was "ready for a full-blown theological system" (Rosemann, *Lombard*, 8–33, esp. 33); cf. Colish, "The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century," 9–12.

[649] For example, David Luscombe handled Lombard's relationship to Abelard and Abelard's school (*School of Abelard*, 261–80), and Marcia Colish's grand study highlighted the strengths of Lombard's positions in relation to contemporary debates (Colish, *Peter Lombard*, passim).

[650] Ghellinck's treatment of Lombard is among the most circumspect in handling Lombard's methods, examining the links between his *modi operandi* and those of Gratian and Abelard (Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, 229–49; 482–97). Others, including Marcia Colish and Philipp Rosemann, prizing the *Sentences*' organization as systematic, have examined the conceptual implications of that organization and its superiority over other contemporaries (Colish, *Peter Lombard*, I.77–90; Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 25–33, 54–70). Others, such as Giulio Silano and Atria Larson, emphasizing the links to the budding works of canonists, especially the *Decretum* of Gratian, have argued that the *Sentences* borrows from and operates like a canonist's casebook. See Giulio Silano, "Introduction" to his translation: Peter Lombard, *Sentences, Book I: The Mystery of the Trinity*, xix–xxx; Atria Larson, *The Master of*

as a pedagogical thinker and attention to the method that animated his instruction and writing are still lacking.

The inattention to his pedagogical method is perhaps understandable. Unlike Hugh, Abelard, or John of Salisbury, Lombard was particularly reticent regarding his use of method. Rosemann has gone so far as to suggest that "Peter quite deliberately avoided the emphasis on methodology that was so typical of some of his contemporaries—people such as Abelard, but also Gilbert de la Porrée."[651] In contrast to the methodological wrangling of fellow masters who specialized in dialectic, Lombard employed similar techniques and methods yet kept them under the surface. Rather than displaying the dialectical gears and semantic wrangling of a twelfth-century schoolroom—which began to seep through in Hugh's *Sacraments*—the *Sentences* intentionally presents a placid surface. Abelard articulated pointed critiques of fellow teachers, and his methods indicate his view of a successful teacher. Hugh prolifically produced works that focus on the progressing student following an ordered path of study and moral formation. By contrast, Lombard performed his pedagogical methods while rarely discussing his underlying methodology. Lombard's pedagogy is largely implicit in his masterwork, and the scholar is left with the difficult task of inferring his principles.

*Penance: Gratian and the Development of Penitential Thought and Law in the Twelfth Century* (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 2015), 315–42.

[651] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 62. Rosemann suggests that Lombard's omission may be on account of his weakness in that area. This study believes and argues that the lack of methodology is a deliberate choice on the part of Lombard.

This chapter examines Peter Lombard's pedagogy in three points. First, Lombard's teaching invested in authorities. Distinct from Abelard and Hugh, Lombard constructed a fourfold path of protective authorities leading through the thicket of contemporary opinions. By this authoritative path, Lombard sought to exhibit a secure orthodoxy by an innovative inversion of common theological method (that moved *per visibilia ad invisibilia*). Secondly, Lombard proceeded through this path by pragmatic and untheorized methods, founded upon questions, in the project of harmonizing apparently discrepant authorities. Finally, while not directly exhorting or regulating moral life, as had Hugh, Lombard's project of arranging authorities required a reader with the right posture and attitude toward those authorities. For that reason, he subtly cultivated readers who would value and emulate humility, piety, and diligence in their studies, modeling themselves on Lombard's constructed ideal reader who alone may truly grasp the truth of matters. By this canon of scholastic virtues, Lombard exhibited that the safety of truth is found not by a precise or correct methodology (like Abelard), nor by an expansive and holistic order (like Hugh), but by the right *reader,* humble, pious, and diligent.

## II. Fortified Path of Authorities

What is first of all evident about Lombard's teaching is its discrete form. *Sentences* represents a relatively compact educational book, whole unto itself and not depending upon other educational texts. Lombard's compactness contrasts with the sprawling

amount of pedagogical texts (curricular, spiritual, disciplinary, and so forth) flowing from Hugh's pen as well as the performative oral lessons and principles of Abelard's classroom. Constructing this compact but wide-ranging educational program, Lombard wove select authorities into a safe and fortified route through the thicket of opinions and topics. To do so, Lombard adopted the Augustinian notions of sign-thing and use-enjoyment for a fourfold path that was at once authoritatively sanctioned as well as innovative, in its inversion of that traditional method. From this view, Lombard does not appear servile toward his authorities but as creatively and deliberatively deploying them.

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Lombard departed Saint-Victor and gained entrance into the very same cathedral canonry that Saint-Victor's founder, William of Champeaux, had departed in his moral conversion. Neither Lombard nor others comment on this transference, but the fact should signal an independence of thought and life in the rising master. Lombard gained much from Hugh and the Victorine school; however, he also chose directions against those of his first Parisian teacher.[652] Lombard gave little highlight to his controversial decisions or views in his *Sentences* in favor of adopting a more tranquil tone.

[652] The antagonism between Saint-Victor and Lombard would reach a climax with Walter of Saint-Victor's *Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae* (1179). See on this Pierre Glorieux, ed., "Le Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae de Gauthier de Saint-Victor," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 27 (1952): 187–335. Dale Coulter suggested earlier tensions between the Victorine and Robert of Melun's schools and the approach of Lombard. See his "Introduction" to Robert of Melun's *Sententiae*, in *Interpretation of Scripture: Theory*, eds. Franklin Harkins, Frans van Liere (NY: New City Press, 2013), 429. Christopher Evans also sees a criticism of Lombard in Richard of Saint-Victor's *De Trinitate*. See *Trinity and Creation: Exegesis, Theology and Spirituality from the Abbey of St. Victor*, eds. Boyd Coolman, Dale Coulter (New York, NY: New City Press, 2011), 200–201.

Behind that tranquil tone of the *Sentences*, Peter gestures at a confused diversity of opinions and topics as well as perceived enemies of truth. Whether or not Peter's negative depictions of school culture are accurate, the depiction serves a rhetorical function to set up a problem for which his pedagogy is a remedy. The reader finds Lombard frequently referring to the diverse chorus of opinions.[653] At times one can even find the mostly calm Lombard resigned at the variety of views, even frustrated: "In so much variety as this, what then is to be held? What is to be said?" "Behold how diversely the authorities speak about observance of affinity!"[654] Worse than the confused babble of opinions, Lombard's preface posed the problem of willful contradiction.[655] Quoting Hilary of Aquitaine, a favored author, Lombard diagnosed "calumny," "contradiction of the envious" who will not to understand, and the "error of impiety" that resists what displeases. "This is what 'the god of this world works in those children of unbelief' (2 Cor. 4.4) who do not submit their will to reason, nor apply themselves to the study of doctrine."[656] With Hilary's

[653] Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius Brady (Rome: Collegii S Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971, 1981), I.197.2; 199; II.57.3; 97; 174.2; 232.2; 242.5; 244.2; III.14.3; IV.101.5; 125.1, 11; 150; 229.4; 238.7; 241.2; 248; see also the recent translation of the four books by Giulio Silano: Peter Lombard, *The Sentences: Books I–4*, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007–2010). For easier citation as well as one more reflective of Lombard's authorship, citations to the *Sentences* will ignore the later added 'distinctions' and merely cite Book, chapter, and article. Silano's translations are a tremendous boon to contemporary scholarship on Lombard, yet I will be offering my own translations unless otherwise noted.

[654] *Sent.* II.232.2: "Quid igitur in hac tanta varietate tenendum? Quid dicendum?" IV.229.4: "Ecce quam varie de affinitatis observatione loquuntur auctores!" See also I.142.2; II.232.2; IV.92.2.

[655] It may be tempting and common to dismiss a prologue laden with tropes. Yet using familiar metaphors and devices does not necessarily undermine the sincerity of the author. I argue that Peter's initial prologue should be read alongside his other rare programmatic statements. Cf. Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse*, 60–61.

[656] *Sent.* I.Prol, 3. The quotation from Hilary of Poitiers (*De Trin.* 10.1–2) is lengthy: "Quamvis non ambigamus 'omnem humani eloquii sermonem calumniae atque contradictioni aemulorum semper fuisse obnoxium. Quia dissentientibus voluntatum motibus, dissentiens quoque fit animorum sensus, ut cum omne dictum veri ratione perfectum sit, tamen dum aliud aliis aut videtur aut complacet, veritati vel non intellectae vel offendenti impietatis error obnitatur ac voluntatis invidia resultet. Quam Deus huius saeculi operatur in illis diffidentiae filiis qui non rationi voluntatem subiciunt, nec doctrinae studium impendunt, sed his quae somniarunt sapientiae verba coaptare nituntur: non veri, sed placiti rationem sectantes. Quos iniqua voluntas non ad intelligentiam veritatis, sed ad defensionem placentium incitat: non desiderantes doceri veritatem, sed ab ea ad fabulas convertentes auditum.

caustic phrases, Lombard set up opponents of the truth who manipulate the wise words to fit what they dream up, to defend their own views and whatever pleases them rather than set themselves to study (*doctrina*): "Their pursuit consists more in seeking what pleases them, than what ought to be taught. . . . Eager for controversy, they struggle without restraint against the truth."[657] Fitting Hilary's words to his own world, Lombard set up opponents that reflect his own idea of heretics. Lombard's account of heresy is surprisingly brief: quoting Hilary, Jerome, Augustine, and Gregory, Lombard's heretic is one who gives "some interpretation of their own" (from Hilary) to a plain authoritative text. They put words in a "disorderly manner" (from Jerome) and so "for the sake of his own glory and preeminence, either gives rise to, or follows, false or new opinions" (from Augustine); to please their audience they "speak their own words, not God's" (from Gregory).[658] Here Lombard eschewed juridical notions of heresy in order to cast a heretic as one who presents his own interpretation, opinion, or words instead of giving place to an authority. Lombard's heretic in effect mutes a sacred authority and usurps it. Against this threat, Lombard's *Sentences* resonates with the later notion of scholastic theology as necessary to refute heretics and defend Scripture and authorities.[659] To this compound

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Quorum professio est magis placita quam docenda conquirere, nec docenda desiderare, sed desideratis doctrinam coaptare. Habent rationem sapientiae in superstitione, quia fidei defectionem sequitur hypocrisis mendax, ut sit vel in verbis pietas quam amiserit conscientia; ipsamque simulatam pietatem omni verborum mendacio impiam reddunt, falsae doctrinae institutis fidei sanctitatem corrumpere molientes, auriumque pruriginem sub novello sui desiderii dogmate aliis ingerentes. Qui contentioni studentes, contra veritatem sine foedere bellant. Inter veri namque assertionem et placiti defensionem pertinax pugna est, dum se et veritas tenet et se voluntas erroris tuetur.' "

[657] *Sent.* I.prol, 3 [cited above].

[658] *Sent.* IV.73; trans. Silano, 68–69.

[659] A recent account of this notion is Alex Novikoff's treatment of the Dominicans' (including Thomas Aquinas') use of disputation in education and preaching to counter Cathar heretics and others. See Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 155–71.

problem—myriad views and willful contradiction—Lombard set up his *Sentences* as a pedagogical remedy.

Peter's remedy took up the form of a sentence-collection, a genre that in the 1130s–1150s had emerged and found popularity in the schools.[660] Gratian and early decretalists followed the tradition of Ivo of Chartres and earlier canon compilations to produce the *Concordance of Discordant Canons*.[661] The school of Anselm of Laon also produced and disseminated sentence-collections.[662] Other sentence-collections circulated the Parisian schools in this time as well: the *Summa sententiarum* from the Victorine milieu, the *Ysagoge ad theologiam* from an Abelardian school, Robert of Melun's *Sententie*, and Robert Pullen's *Sententiarum logicarum libri VIII*.[663] Many of these works are lengthy treatments of many topics. They emerge from schools as attempts by scholars to conveniently arrange the texts, authors, and discourses on many theological topics. As products of maturing schools or second-generation teachers, sentence-collections exhibit the implicit desire to

[660] See Lesley Smith, "Sentence-collections," in *Medieval France: An Encyclopedia*, eds. Grover Zinn, William Kibler (New York: Routledge, 2011), 874; Marcia Colish, "The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century," *Studies in Medieval Culture* 39 (1997): 1–26.
[661] The recent magisterial treatment on the composition of the early recensions of Gratian's *Concordance* or *Decretum* is Anders Winroth, *The Making of Gratian's* Decretum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); on Ivo of Chartres, see Christof Rolker, *Canon Law and the Letters of Ivo of Chartres* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For a more general overview of this period of transitional scholarship, see Michael Hoeflich & Jasonne Grabher, "The Establishment of Normative Legal Texts: The Beginnings of Ius Commune," in *The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140–1239: From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX*, eds. Wilfried Hartmann & Kenneth Pennington (Washington DC: CUA Press, 2008), 1–18.
[662] A recent treatment of sentence-collections emanating from Laon is John Wei, *Gratian the Theologian* (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 2016), 69–100, 148–85; Valerie Flint, " 'The School of Laon': A Reconsideration," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et mediévale* 43 (1976): 89–110; John Wei, "Gratian and the School of Laon," *Traditio* 64 (2009): 279–322.
[663] See *Summa sententiarum,* PL 176.41–174; Colish, "Otto of Lucca, Author of the Summa sententiarum?" *Discovery and Distinction*, 57–70. Luscombe, *School of Abelard*, Chapters VIII–XII; Constant Mews, "Between the Schools of Abelard and Saint-Victor in the Mid-Twelfth Century: The Witness of Robert of Melun," in *L'école de Saint-Victor: Influence et rayonnement du Moyen Âge à l'époque modern*, ed. Dominique Poirel (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 121–38.

bring order or clarity to the increasingly myriad discourses. The genre is difficult to clarify, as there is much latitude in form and methods of treatment: some develop more fluid, explanatory accounts; others hinge upon questions; the amount of authorities' *sentences* varies; organizational principles vary (for example, between historical or chronological narratives or a topical analysis). Varying not just in doctrinal disputes but also in form, methods, and methodologies, these sentence-collections exhibit the pedagogical innovation and experimentation well underway in the schools.[664]

Peter's *Four Books of Sentences* was a sentence-collection that set its own path in its reliance upon authority in the face of confusion and heretic-like contradictors. His teacher, Hugh, had also perceived a disorderly and haphazard scene of learning in the schools that Lombard chose as his own environment. While Hugh had reacted to this turmoil by working out a vast curricular plan by which the student might find order and so make progress, Lombard had a different remedy. Instead of a laborious education plan that promised to reveal underlying harmony among myriad opinions, Lombard took on

[664] Marcia Colish has argued that the masters' attempts to improve topical arrangement are pedagogical advances. To bolster this claim, Colish compares Lombard's systematic order to that of prior sentence-collections, pointing out the deficiencies in Abelard's, Hugh's, Robert of Melun's, and Robert Pullen's organization. Repetition of topic or analysis, delayed definition, and omissions appear to her as organization flaws and so pedagogical deficiencies. Colish's work is very useful and their thoughtful analyses find basis in intuitive ways of thinking. However, there is too quick assumption on her part that systematization is necessarily pedagogically advantageous. Many styles of teaching do not aim for streamlined systematization or organizational clarity. A Socratic style of dialogical dialectics may be highly effective as a pedagogy to accomplish its goals, but would almost certainly employ a great deal of repetition and ambiguity, and contain little organizational clarity. Pedagogical texts can only be judged as beneficial or deficient relative to their own pedagogical goals. Without examination of the pedagogical goals at which Lombard or other sentence-collections aim, one cannot judge whether their systematization or lack thereof give pedagogical advantage. Yet, because Colish as well as Philipp Rosemann have already devoted significant effort and insight to analyzing Lombard's organization and style of treatment, the present analysis has chosen separate lines of analysis for Lombard, including his construction of authority-reliance, his performative avoidance of methodology, and his cultivation of a scholastic virtue set for his readers. See Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 1, "The Theological Enterprise," 33–90; "The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century," *Studies in Medieval Culture* 39 (1997): 1–26. Philipp Rosemann took a similar line regarding systemization; see *Peter Lombard*, 21–33, 45–48, 54–70.

the burden of ordering the authorities himself, saying in the prologue: "With God helping, with much sweat and labor, I have assembled this volume, divided into four books, from the testimonies of truth founded in eternity."[665] Lombard's "testimonies of truth founded in eternity" signal his deployment of authorities that serve to answer certain enemies and manipulators of truth. Against this rising cacophony of controversialists wrangling over words, opinions, and semblances—Hilary's portrait that Lombard characteristically applied to his own time—Lombard's *Sentences* of authorities would provide a bulwark. By that labor and sweat, Lombard sought both to gag and to enlighten: to "close their mouths lest the poison of their wickedness spread" and to "raise the light of truth."[666]

The *Sentences* enacts its remedy through a deployment of authorities. Lombard's sole reliance upon authorities in this way is distinctive and deliberate. Other collections resorted to the traditional mixture of authority and reason, and so they incorporated dialectical arguments against opponents. The *Summa sententiarum* was spare in citing non-Christian authorities, but yet it announced its method as employing both authority and reason in mutual support.[667] Robert of Melun also offered a mixed treatment of authority and reason and included extensive discussion on the use of reason and authority in his *Sententie*.[668] Also in the Victorine milieu, Richard of Saint-Victor later

[665] *Sent.* I.Prologus, 4,14–15: "In labore multo ac sudore volumen Deo praestante compegimus ex testimoniis veritatis in aeternum fundatis in quatuor libris distinctum."
[666] *Sent.* I.Prol.4,11–2: "Horum igitur et Deo odibilem ecclesiam evertere atque ora oppilare ne virus nequitiae in alios effundere queant, et lucernam veritatis in candelabro exaltare volentes, in labore".
[667] *Summa sententiarum*, praefatio; PL 176.42; see also 45d, 68d.
[668] Robert of Melun, *Sententie*, Praef. 18–31; I.1.7; see ed. Raymond Martin, OP, *Œuvres de Robert de Melun.* Tome III, Vol 1 (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1947).

would emphasize the Anselmian hope for reason's capacity in discussion divine matters and announced his use of "credible and necessary reasons" in his account of the Trinity.[669] Abelard advocated using the "dialectical sword" to cut off enemies of the faith and to use arguments (*rationes*) to support and strengthen authority.[670] To meet the objections of "pseudo-dialecticians" on trinitarian points, Abelard proposed "the human arguments, that they desire solely."[671] Philosophy served to shore up and to ground the authorities. Abelard's final *Theologia scholarium* answered his students' request that he defend the Christian faith: the faith "must be fortified certainly by the stronger protections of *arguments* (*rationum*)."[672] As Willemien Otten noted, Abelard did not oppose authority and reason nor seek to "dismiss the tradition" but "rather, he seems actively involved in trying to found it anew by giving it a firm theoretical basis."[673]

By contrast with these mixed methods, without relying upon philosophical or rational arguments, Lombard threw his weight entirely upon Christian authorities. Against his projected opponents, Lombard hailed the "models and the teaching of the ancestors," whose sincere profession denounces "the deceitfulness of venomous

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[669] Richard of Saint-Victor, *On the Trinity*, trans. Ruben Angelici (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011), I.4, p. 75.
[670] Abelard, *Theologia summi boni* II.25; cf. *Theologia summi boni* II.6; *Theo. Sum. Bon.* III.101; *Theologia christiana*, III.1–25; 43, 49–50; 53–55. See *Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica* III: *Theologia 'Summi boni', Theologia 'scholarium,'* ed. E. M. Buytaert, Constant Mews (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987); *Petri Abaelardi Opera theologica: Theologia Christiana. Theologia scholarium Accedunt Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi*, ed. E. M. Buytaert, Constant Mews (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969).
[671] *Theologia summi boni* II.79: "Quas tamen possumus aggrediemur, maxime ut pseudodialecticorum inportunitatem refellamus, quorum disciplinas et nos paululum attigimus atque adeo in studiis ipsorum profecimus, ut deo adiuuante, ipsis in hac re per humanas rationes, quas solas desiderant, satisfacere nos posse confidamus. Habet enim humanas etiam rationes conditor ipse rationis."
[672] *Theologia scholarium* pref. 1: "Quo enim fides nostra, id est christiana, inquiunt, difficilioribus implicita questionibus videtur et ab humana ratione longius absistere, validioribus utique munienda est rationum presidiis, maxime vero contra impugnationes eorum qui se philosophos profitentur."
[673] Willemien Otten, *From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 129–81, here 137.

teaching."[674] Lombard announced his aim "to fortify our faith by the shields of David's tower or rather to show it to be fortified."[675] Rather than needing mustered arguments for defense or support, for Lombard, the authorities defended themselves. Lombard's task was not to defend or make sense of the authorities but to "open the hidden things of theological investigations and hand on a grasp on the sacraments of the church."[676] In this respect, Clare Monagle well observed here that Lombard situated his *Sentences* "as a work of fortification, not building from scratch but rather adding to an already strong firmament."[677] Free of potential adulterants, Lombard's authoritative fortification stretched like a royal highway that offered a safe route between dangers. "Embracing an approach for demonstrating the truth—not mixed with the danger of impious teaching—we take a moderate way between both."[678] By this rhetorical framing, Lombard placed himself not as a fellow controversialist in the fray but as one fortified from dangers in the safe, reasonable path.

[674] *Sent.* I.Prol.4,15–17: "In quo majorum exempla doctrinamque reperies; in quo per dominicae fidei sinceram professionem, vipereae doctrinae fraudulentiam prodidimus."
[675] *Sent.* I Prol. 2,9–13.
[676] *Sent.* I Prol. 2,9–13. The whole quote unparaphrased is as follows: "Quo inardescentes fidem nostram adversus errores carnalium atque animalium hominum Davidicae turris clypeis munire vel potius munitam ostendere, ac theologicarum inquisitionum abdita aperire, necnon et sacramentorum ecclesiasticorum pro modico intelligentiae nostrae notitiam tradere studuimus."
[677] Monagle, *Orthodoxy*, 60. Monagle further insightfully noted that here Lombard cited *Canticle* 4.4 (on the Davidic tower), which Bernard had discussed with florid, erotic language but in Lombard's hands was "transformed into a metaphor for intellectual strength and construction" (ibid.). Monagle's language of conservativism and orthodoxy risks accepting too easily the rhetoric of Bernard, Hugh, and others in that they represent traditional positions over against their opponents, who are innovators. It is more accurate to see spreading branches of experimentation and innovation, each claiming precedents and traditions.
[678] *Sent.* I.Prol.4,17–20: "Aditum demonstrandae veritatis complexi, nec periculo impiae professionis inserti, temperato inter utrumque moderamine utentes. Sicubi vero parum vox nostra insonuit, non a paternis discessit limitibus." Lombard's *temperatum moderamen* may be read as having resonances of Aristotelian ethics. It seems likely that Lombard received currents from that thought, but it does not stand out as a priority in his thought, since Aristotle does not receive mention nor citation and since Lombard only referred in passing to the four cardinal virtues (III.120, III.122).

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How does Lombard show the fortification of the authorities? Appropriately, by adopting an arrangement suggested by a chief authority. As I will show, Lombard's safe route of authorities—through the thickets of confusion and contradiction—took its order from Augustine's notions of sign-thing, use-enjoyment. Following the prologue was its brief methodological statement for the work that articulated Augustine's notions of signs and things, use and enjoyment (*signa* & *res, uti & frui*). Lombard concluded with "this summary [*summa*]":

> Some [things] are to be enjoyed, some to be used, and others are enjoyed and used. Among those to be used, there are some through which we enjoy, such as virtues and powers of the mind which are natural goods. Before we treat signs, all these are to be discussed, and first those things to be enjoyed, namely, the holy and undivided Trinity.[679]

Lombard phrased it more clearly in the prefatory comment before Book IV: "Having treated what pertains to the teaching of *things*, those [things] to be enjoyed, those [things] to be used, and those [things] which are enjoyed and used, let us approach the teaching of *signs*."[680] The order of treatment appears thus: 1. things to be enjoyed; 2. things to be used; 3. things that are enjoyed and used; 4 signs. Each of these received treatment in a book: Book I on the Trinity (1); Book II on creation (2); Book III on incarnation (3); Book IV on sacraments (4).

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[679] *Sent.* I.3.11; " 'Omnium igitur quae dicta sunt ex quo de rebus specialiter tractavimus, haec summa est': quod aliae sunt quibus fruendum, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur; et inter eas quibus utendum est, quaedam sunt per quas fruimur, ut virtutes et potentiae animi, quae sunt naturalia bona. De quibus omnibus, antequam de signis tractemus, agendum est; ac primum de rebus quibus fruendum est, scilicet de sancta atque individua Trinitate."

[680] *Sent.* IV.pref,3–5: "His tractatis quae ad doctrinam rerum pertinent quibus fruendum est, et quibus utendum est, et quae fruuntur et utuntur, ad doctrinam signorum accedamus." Emphasis in translation is mine.

Lombard's fourfold path harkened to Augustine's instruction for teachers. Augustine announced his aim in *On Christian Teaching* (*De doctrina christiana*) to provide a "method of discovery for what is to be understood" (*modus inveniendi quae intellegenda sunt*) as well as a "method for expressing what has been understood" (*modus proferendi quae intellecta sunt*).[681] Book IV argues for the value of rhetorical skill in preaching and presents rhetorical techniques that are desirable for preachers. On the other hand, Books I–III articulate Augustine's "method of discovery" through the notions of sign & thing, use & enjoyment, the sorts of signs, the arts and sciences to study to learn signs, and hermeneutical rules of interpretation. Frederick van Fleteren summarized them as a liberal arts program "helping the Christian reach an *intellectus fidei*":

> [Book] I sets the stage for such a program by sketching a Christian anthropology and a theology of incarnation; book 2 contains a philosphy of signs; in book 3, we find the great principles of the Augustinian hermeneutics.[682]

Briefly, in Book I Augustine dealt with the use-enjoyment distinction and discussed the Trinity as what is to be enjoyed, while love leads through created signs in the journey to that enjoyment. Having charted a journey toward an end, Augustine then argued (in Books II–III) that one must first master signs (specifically, language signs with reference to biblical signification) in order to ascend to things.[683] Mastery of signs required study,

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[681] *De doctrina christiana* I.1; *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense*, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1995). From *Saint Augustine: Opera Omnia CAG*, electronic edition, part II (accessed 11/2/2018).
[682] Frederick van Fleteren, "St Augustine, Neoplatonism, and the Liberal Arts: The Background to *De doctrina christiana*," De doctrina christiana: *A Classic of Western Culture*, ed. Duane Arnold, Pamela Bright (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 14–24, esp. 14–15.
[683] Augustine articulated the notions of *signum*, *res*, *uti*, and *frui* in *De doctrina christiana* I–II. In Book I he largely distinguished *utenda* from *fruenda*, particularly in the question of defining the Trinity as what is to be enjoyed. Book II turned to the delineation of different sorts of *signa*.

for many in reading are "deceived by many compounded obscurities and ambiguities."[684] To set out on this journey, then, one must begin reading, learning what languages are necessary, and honing mastery of linguistic expression and biblical significations.[685]

While Augustine outlined this method of discovery by following the signs back to their signified divinity, many others would attempt to put it into practice by laying out the educational steps it involved more clearly.[686] Hugh of Saint-Victor adopted this rationale of *things* and *signs* and connected it with Paul's phrasing that invisible things have been known through created things (Rom 1.20). Much of Hugh's work considered how to ascend from signs to divine things.[687] In the first parts of the *Sacraments,* Hugh's extensive treatment reflects this ascending order, beginning with creation, the creation of humanity, then God as creator, as Trinity, and so forth.[688] This ascent model fit Hugh's distinction between the order of learning from the order of reason: the former is the way of learning, from the most available and ready to the more obscure and difficult; the latter

[684] *De doctrina* II.7: "Sed multis et multiplicibus obscuritatibus et ambiguitatibus decipiuntur."
[685] *De doctrina* II.14: "Cuius operis et laboris prima obseruatio est, ut diximus, nosse istos libros etsi nondum ad intellectum, legendo tamen uel mandare memoriae uel omnino incognitos non habere. deinde illa, quae in eis aperte posita sunt, uel praecepta uiuendi uel regulae credendi, sollertius diligentiusque inuestiganda sunt; quae tanto quisque plura inuenit, quantum est intellegentia capacior."
[686] A survey of those who adopted this methodology of seeking divine truths by discerning creating signs would be extensive and unnecessary here. One prominent example was Anselm of Canterbury's *Monologion*, which used this method in a chain of reasoning into an understanding of God (see *Monologion* §11). Dale Coulter adopted this methodology as central in his study of the later Victorine, Richard. See *Per visibilia ad invisibilia: Theological Method in Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006).
[687] In brief, Hugh's *Three Days* set up the ascent into the *invisibilia* through the *visibilia*. The *Didascalicon* represents the education necessary into linguistic, created, and sacred signs in order to learn of the divine. In both, the student must begin learning the signs and ascend (in the former, first grammar, logic, rhetoric, the quadrivium, and so on; in the latter, historical sense of scripture, then allegorical, then tropological). See chapter 4, section 3.
[688] Overal, Hugh's treatment in *Sacraments* ascended and descended repeatedly, so to speak, because he took historical bases for its organization rather than simply mapping the ascent from signs to signified, which structure stood behind his pedagogical thought.

is the priority of things in themselves.[689] For his own part, Abelard often cited the Pauline precedent to support the use of philosophers' testimonies to gain insight into the Trinity.

> It is agreeable also to place [after those of the prophets] the testimonies of the philosophers whom the reason itself of philosophy at the time led to the understanding of the one God, whereby—with the Apostle—*the invisible things of God are perceived, understood from the creation of the world through things that were made* (Rom 1.20).[690]

Instead of opening a path to explore created signs himself, Abelard sought a way through verbal *signs* that relied upon conceptual or linguistic similitudes for the divine.[691] In this way, Abelard adapted this Augustinian method to support the legitimacy of philosophers' reason, combining written signs (*scriptum*) with reason (*ratio*).[692] The philosophers' ideas, then, Abelard employed in his own grammatical and dialectical argumentation regarding the Trinity.

In this context, the deployment of the Augustinian ideas of sign-thing, use-enjoyment would seem unremarkable. Yet this apparent self-evidence hides a bold reversal. Lombard, while appearing to follow Augustine, has in actuality flipped that doctor's order. As we saw, Augustine's method requires beginning from the lowest, most accessible *signa* that are for use and proceeding to the highest, invisible *fruendum*, that is,

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[689] Hugh articulated and followed the pedagogical principle of approaching matters from their most accessible point. Hugh explained his principle: "Teaching always ought to take its beginning not from obscure things but from those plain and better known." ("Doctrina semper non ab obscuris sed apertis, et ab his quae magis nota sunt, exordium sumere debet." *Didascalicon* VI.6.11–13.) Hugh exercised this in ordering the arts, which were prioritized and discovered in a different order, but whose approach should follow the order of learning (*Epitome* III.268–291; *Didascalicon* I.11). See chapter 4, section 1.

[690] Abelard, *Theologia scholarium* I.94: "Nunc autem post testimonia prophetarum de fide sancte trinitatis, libet etiam testimonia philosophorum supponere, quos ad unius dei intelligentiam tum ipsa philosophie ratio perduxit, qua iuxta apostolum *invisibilia ipsius* dei *a creatura mundi per ea que facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur*." Emphasise added. See also *Theol. summi boni* II.77; III.67; *Theol. christiana* I.54–58; II.6; 12–13; *Theol. schol.* II.12–13; 60.

[691] Willemnien Otten, *Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism*, 155–58.

[692] Otten rightly observed the Ciceronian warrant for Abelard's thought here. See *Paradise*, 146, 153–54.

the Trinity. Yet Peter's reversed order began with the last known, most obscure thing of enjoyment—the Trinity—and proceeded through enjoyed-things, used-things, enjoyed-and-used things; he then concluded with the most ready and accessible signs (or sacraments). In so doing, the Lombard abandoned Augustine's and Hugh's order of semiotic, ascending learning. Instead, he took the categories defined by the Augustinian method, stripped them of their semiotic progress, and arranged them in what he called the "order of reason," which descended from the highest.[693] Peter confirmed this top-down trajectory in his final comment, summarizing the whole work. Using the image of the enthroned Lord, veiled by seraphim (Isaiah 6.1–2), "the writer [Lombard], being led by the Way [Christ], began from the face of the One Sitting, through the middle parts [has] arrived all the way to the feet."[694] For his "order of reason," then, Lombard gave no indication that, having completed the descent, the student can or ought to be able to reascend, climbing back up. Rather, while appropriating the Augustinian terminology, Lombard's order of reason wholly deconstructed Augustine's method of discovery.[695]

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[693] This phrase, "ordo rationis," stands prominently in the Preface to Book III (III.pref.6–7): "Sic enim rationis ordo postulat, ut qui in primo libro de inexplicabili mysterio summae Trinitatis irrefragabili Sanctorum attestatione aliquid diximus, ac deinde in secundo libro"). This preface is sometimes seen as a methodological rupture and inconsistency in Lombard's work, that his plan of *res* and *signa* has been interrupted and an alternative rationale is given. For example, see Rosemann, *Lombard*, 61–63. But Lombard merely refrained from using the terminology throughout; the top-down order of treatment is consistent and so no methodological rupture appears.

[694] *Sent.* IV.expl,4–7; the whole explicit is here: "Haec de pedibus Sedentis *super solium excelsum*, quos *Seraphin duabus velis velabant* [Isa. 6.1–2], scriptori, etsi non auditori, commemorasse sufficit, qui a facie exorsus Sedentis, per media ad pedes usque Via duce pervenit."

[695] Lombard's treatment, first on God, then creation, then the incarnation, and finally ecclesial sacraments may be seen as following the foundational credal structure, as Professor Rachel Fulton Brown has argued in conversation. There is much to recommend this view. However, two words of caution regarding structural viewpoint: first, while the Nicene-Constantinoplan Creed is structured according to the trinitarian Persons (God the Father, Jesus Christ his only Son, and the Holy Spirit), Lombard gave no indication that his work bore such a trinitarian structure. Rather, the fourfold division of things-signs & used-enjoyed objects does not fit neatly into a trinitarian schema, unless Book I and Book II are combined as a treatment of God the Father and creator; however, Book I does not so much treat the Father singly or specially but rather it treats the three Persons and the shared divine attributes. Second, if Lombard had deliberately chosen this credal structure, it is unclear why he would not have mentioned it to

Lombard's apparent faithfulness to Augustine's *res-signa* notions is often taken as a hallmark of his traditionalism and conservativism.[696] The reality—that Lombard subverted that Augustinian order under the guise of faithfulness—should shake the acceptance of Lombard's conservativism as too easy a reading. By abandoning the Augustinian method of discovery for his own order of reason, Lombard maintained the cloak of the authority but crafted an entirely distinct pedagogical model. Lombard eschewed a method that relied upon the traditional studies of created and linguistic signs and struggling through biblical *loci* in chains of argumentation. Instead, he took for granted his own ability, as master and pedagogue, to assemble the authorities in a beneficial order. Instead of leading a student up, he presumed his understanding of the higher matters and led the student in descending order, starting from things prior by reason but obscure and invisible in themselves. In this respect, Lombard's cloak of conservatism has rather successfully masked his own bold pedagogical innovations.

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Moving from trinitarian head, as it were, to sacramental feet, Lombard's royal, fortified path of authorities covered the four main steps of received, that is, derived from but flipped, Augustinian method, and relied upon authorities rather than rational argumentation. Lombard's order of reason thus presents us with an innovative pedagogical method. One advantage of Lombard's method was its ability to circumvent

recommend his *Sentences* to the reader, given his reliance upon authoritaties among which the creed would enjoy a privileged position.

[696] For examples, see Monagle 61–64; Richard Southern, *Scholastic Humanism*, II.144–45; C. S. Jaeger, "Pessimism in the Twelfth Century 'Renaissance,'" *Speculum* 78 (2003): 1151–52.

difficult questions and so adopt an air of uncontroversial assurance. By diving almost directly into trinitarian questions, Lombard evaded almost entirely the nuanced problem of dealing with linguistic signs, scriptural signs, and natural semiotics of the divine. Thorny questions of epistemology, semantics, dialectics, and their application to interpret sacred scripture were dominant controversial themes of the twelfth century.[697] Robert of Melun penned a methodological preface for his unfinished *Sententie* over fifty pages long.[698] Abelard, Hugh, and John each worked out their methodologies for study and teaching. Yet in stark contrast, beyond the initial discussion of *signa-res* and *uti-frui,* Lombard's students look in vain for formal theories or principles of hermeneutics or interpretation to guide their own reading of sacred scripture. No doubt Lombard had a set of interpretative principles, and occasionally he would point out interpretative subprinciples (for example, regarding the interpretation of particular words).[699] But he did not explain or teach controversial interpretative principles. By choosing not to expose himself to methodological criticism, Lombard could adopt a free hand to proceed with an air of uncontroversial self-evidence.[700] He evaded these methodological questions as if they were fruitless semantic wrangling, rather than carving a path through them.[701] In

[697] For classic treatments of the intellectual movements of this period, see G. R. Evans, *The Language and Logic of the Bible in the Earlier Middle Ages* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Richard W. Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, Vol.1 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995), esp. chapters 1 and 3.
[698] Robert of Melun, *Sententie*, praef., pp. 3–56.
[699] Examples of miniature hermeneutical principles include I.116; I.126.3; I.196.3; I.201; II.267.6–11.
[700] This is not to say that Lombard's *Sentences* did not provoke some controversy, for it certainly did, especially in the articulated views of pneumological charity and the theory of the hypostatic union. It rather showed that Lombard sought to appear uncontroversial. See Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 85–90; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, I.417–38.
[701] Lombard occasionally pointedly remarked on his contemporaries' petty semantic struggles and verbosity; see *Sent.* I.143.8; IV.58.1,3; I.187–88; 203.3–5; II.57.5; I.187; I.6; I.13.2; III.40.3.

this way, Lombard could neatly demarcate his fortified, descending road through his contemporary discord, safe from confusion and venomous contradiction alike.

One might be tempted to see Lombard's omission of thorough methodology as a defect. Rather, we should see here the Master deprioritizing methodology in order to insist upon transmitting the substance of the authorities, the "models and teachings of predecessors" that fortify students against error and heresy.[702] Having left aside the all-too-distracting shell, Peter launched straight into the marrow.

Peter commonly laced his discussion with reminders and comments regarding underlining the need for correct belief. In so doing, Lombard often transposed the treatment from that of intellectual debate into that of belief: "Let us hold without a doubt that . . . ," "It is rightly believed . . . ," "It is not at all to be doubted that . . . ."[703] Within the key of belief and doubt, Lombard allowed for degrees of demands on the reader's belief, some lesser: "it can be believed," some greater: "let us hold firmly and unhesitatingly."[704] Lombard often rooted these exhortations to belief in the authorities that he cited: "authority hands on," "The Catholic Church teaches," "[this] is proven by many testimonies of the saints," and "Truth [Christ] teaches you."[705] In these subtle ways,

[702] *Sent.* I.Prol,4.15–17: "majorum exempla doctrinamque."
[703] *Sent.* II.45: "illud indubitanter teneamus" (see also *Sent.* II.242; III.48; IV.172.3; III.41.4; III.68.8; III.73.3); II.51.2; "recte creditur" (see also *Sent.* II.138.4); II.242, "Praeterea nullatenus ambigendum est" (see also *Sent.* III.48, IV.172.3, etc.). In similar modes, see *Sent.* III.33.2, IV.283.2.
[704] *Sent.* II.132.2, "credi potest" (see also *Sent.* II.242.5); II.181.1, "Id vero inconcusse et incunctanter teneamus" (see also *Sent.* III.71.4).
[705] *Sent.* II.130.6, "cum auctoritas tradat"; II.109.2, Rubric: Sententia catholicae Ecclesiae; "Catholica autem Ecclesia nec simul nec ex traduce factas esse animas docet, sed . . ."; IV.78.1, "Quod . . . pluribus Sanctorum testimoniis probatur" (see also IV.38.4); IV.18, "Veritas docet te . . . ."

Lombard inflected his treatment in terms of belief toward authority and a manifested concern that the student hold what is orthodox.

Throughout the work, Peter's concern with the students' orthodoxy frequently recurs alongside warnings of its contrary, heresy and error. Peter frequently pointed out notable ancient heresies, such as Arianism or the origin of the soul.[706] Heretics appear in type as malicious, calumniators ensnaring the faithful, poisonous, and who proffer "vessels of death."[707] While not all in error are heretics—one who receives the truth but maintains another interpretation—contemporary teachers are the targets of several barbs.[708] Many appear as too clever for their own good, who by their "perplexed verbosity" stray into sophistries and inanities and so devise "new teachings and human fictions."[709] By so straying, some, "glorying in their own interpretation," sabotaged their own efforts, "as searchers, they failed in their searches."[710] By these barbs and tags, the *Sentences* continually reminds the reader of the value of the authorities' road and the dangers that lay for those who stray. Complementary to warnings of perils from heresy and the tangles of error, Lombard frequently larded his discussions with assurances that the reader is on the right road: "See, by these authorities it is found plainly that . . . ," "From this it is plainly gathered (*colligitur*) . . . ," "let it be evident and indubitably

[706] See *Sent.* I.149ff II.109. For other instances, see also *Sent.* I.14.1, I.121, I.144.3, I.143.8, I.145.5, I.149; II.70–.4, II.94.4, II.203, 227.2, III.23.9, III.49.2; IV.72.9; IV.161.
[707] *Sent.* I.143–144, I.121.2; I.187.3; III.49.2, "vasa mortis;" I.105.
[708] On heretics, see especially *Sent.* IV.72; IV.73; IV.107.2.
[709] *Sent.* I.203.3–5; III.40.3: "adversus quorundam perplexam verbositatem"; I.143.8: "Horum doctrinis novis et humanis commentis verbo Hilarii respondeo."
[710] *Sent.* I.187.1: "Quidam tamen, de suo sensu gloriantes"; I.187.7: "His autem illi scrutatores, qui 'defecerunt scrutatores scrutinia."

settled."[711] By these reminders, Lombard characterized his treatment not so much as arguments to be scrutinized, but settled authorities to be respected in safety or doubted to one's own peril.

Lombard, then, wrote in reaction to the perceived cacophony to show a path, fortified against heresy and error that deliberated evaded methodological entanglements in its fourfold order of reason. In short, we can see that Lombard wrote a guide for what he considered right belief in authorities. For Lombard was faced with the same problem as Hugh regarding the ever-growing quantity of sources, topics, and opinions. Hugh had depended upon such mnemo-techniques, as we saw, to form his readers so that they would not need to search through many books for solutions to questions posed to them but would be equipped by their retained principles.[712] It is not difficult to see that *Sentences* was not a work relying on mnemo-technical formation: its size, methods, and myriad authorities and questions would make such reduction and retention impossible. To the same problem, Lombard offered an alternative solution by offering a reference work. Like a casebook or textbook, Lombard intended *Sentences* for repeated consultation on individual topics and questions.[713] The collection of sentences on topics allows that one searching for an answer need not "read through a multitude of books," for this brief

[711] *Sent.* I.193.2: "Ecce his auctoritatibus aperte insinuatur quod" (see also I.196, I.202, II.16.9, et passim); IV.37.3: "Ex his aperte colligitur" (see IV.78.6, et passim). IV.95.8: "Cum igitur ex his aliisque pluribus testimoniis perspicuum fiat et indubitabiliter constet" (see also IV.61.6, IV.264.7, et passim). For similar tags and comments, cf. I.188.3, III.124, IV.33.1, IV.27.3, IV.7, IV.1005; IV.131.4.
[712] For a discussion of Hugh's mnemo-techniques, see chapter 4, section 3 and 4. For the Pythagorean anecdote, see *Didascalicon* III.3.
[713] Rosemann consistently referred to the work as a "textbook" (*Lombard*, 3, 64, 193, etc.), while Silano argued it was a 'casebook' in the manner of Gratian's *Decretum* ("Introduction" I.xix–xxvi).

collection "offers them what is sought without labor."[714] To further facilitate this frequent and topical reference, Lombard deployed a relatively new literary technology: an extensive table of contents listing the chapters and details of their treatment.[715] Peter explained the table as a means to facilitate reference in the prologue: "So that what is sought appears more easily, we have set out the titles by which the chapters of each book are distinguished in advance."[716] As Rosemann noted, this explicit mention evinces the importance this reference function bore in Lombard's eyes.[717] Part of the pedagogical function of *Sentences* includes, then, its repeated and partial rereading: the alumnus may quickly find and review Lombard's selected authorities on individual questions or topics and how Lombard construed them.

Seeing *Sentences* as a reference work of authorities, then, we see that Lombard took a distinctive approach to the pedagogical challenges of his time. Circumventing the controversial questions of methodology, he mapped out a fortified path of authorities in four neat steps, taken from Augustinian method. In contrast to Abelard and Hugh, who explicitly sought to train their students in skills, Lombard offered to equip them with a reference for quickly and easily finding authorities on questions that a student would

[714] *Sent.* I.Prol.5,24–26: "ut non sit necesse quaerenti librorum numerositatem evolvere, cui brevitas collecta quod quaeritur offert sine labore."
[715] On the utilization of finding aides such as tables of contents for school manuscripts, see Mary Rouse and Richard Rouse, "Statim invenire: Schools, Preachers, and New Attitudes to the Page," in *Authentic Witnesses: Approaches to Medieval Texts and Manuscripts* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 191–219. Cf. Wendy Scase, " 'Looke this calendar and then proced': Tables of Contents in Medieval English Manuscripts," in *The Dynamic of the Medieval Manuscript: Text Collections from a European Perspective*, eds. Karen Pratt, Bart Besamusca, Matthias Meyer, Ad Putter (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2017), 287–306.
[716] *Sent.* I.Prol.5,29–30: "Ut autem quod quaeritur facilius occurrat, titulus quibus singulorum librorum capitula distinguuntur praemisimus."
[717] Rosemann, 64: "The table of contents appears such an important feature to Peter himself that he even drew attention to its existence at the end of his preface."

face as well as their right resolution. How Lombard construed and resolved questions is the subject for the next section.

## III. Methodological Questioning

There may be some irony in the fact that while Hugh's response to the perceived disorder of Paris was an expansive methodological pedagogy, his student Peter's response to the chorus of disagreement was quite contrary. The *Sentences*, as argued above, largely pass over methodological reflection and discussion in order to present perceived traditional teaching of the sources. However, despite this theoretical lack, many have found in Lombard's *Sentences* distinct and notable methods in execution and performance.[718] This section will characterize Lombard's untheorized methods on the basis of their performance. Lombard adopted a methodology of questioning in order to present a harmonization of authorities, but by leaving his methods untheorized he could operate with pragmatic flexibility.

As a somewhat experienced student, Peter Lombard attended lessons under Hugh of Saint-Victor starting in the mid-1130s. At that time, Hugh's primary effort was composing and teaching his own large work, *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith.*[719] Hugh intended his *Sacraments* not as a comprehensive or properly systematic treatment but a second-level, allegorical treatment of scripture in a brief compendium or summary

[718] Cf. Ghellinck, *Le mouvement*, 213–49; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, I.77–90; 148–54.
[719] Patrice Sicard concluded that Hugh began Book II of *Sacraments* in 1135. See his *Diagrammes médiévaux et exégèse visuelle: Le 'Libellus de formation arche' de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1993), 119–38.

(a pedagogical *summa*). However, Hugh's *Sacraments* morphed in composition, growing in complexity and dialectical intensity, including named references to authorities so that it ended up looking more like a scholastic *summa*.[720] Reasons for this transformation may be increased pressure from students' questions and increasingly raising and answering objections and contemporary opinions. As seen already with Abelard, questions arose from apparently conflicting *sententiae* or from alternative interpretations of authorities. In the face of these conflicting authorities, Abelard had devised his own dialectical methods for hopefully harmonizing the authorities, or if not, to sift them and carefully adjudicate among them.[721] In analyzing Hugh's *On the Sacraments*, Marcia Colish argued that Hugh suffered by lacking a methodology for handling and adjudicating authorities.[722] This task posed an increasing difficulty and forced *Sacraments* into a shape otherwise than intended. Is it not likely that as a student in Hugh's classroom, Peter Lombard witnessed and recognized the difficult straits in which Hugh found himself? Though written almost twenty years later, Lombard probably geared *Sentences* to handle the difficulties that plagued his former teacher's great work.

Whether or not Lombard's experience with Hugh played a role, when Peter came to write his *Sentences*, he adopted a questioning method. Rather than pass over or omit questions (including objections, contrary views, and contradictory authorities), Lombard set about answering questions. Chapters in the *Sentences* vary widely, from extended

[720] For the treatment on Hugh's final *summa*, see chapter 4, section 4.
[721]For a treatment of Abelard's dialectical methods, see chapter 2, section 4.
[722] Colish, *Peter Lombard*, I.57–65.

treatments to brief statements. Yet by and large, Lombard proceeded by posing a question, explicit or implied, to which he then responded and which he sought to resolve by introducing authority. For example, of the 206 chapters of Book I, about 160 questions are presented for resolution.[723] Instead of seeking to avoid questions, objections, or contrary views, and so risk being rocked and tossed by opposition, Lombard steered into the waves and so could proceed steadily.

By methodically raising and addressing these questions Lombard, was not merely posing hypothetical difficulties but rather navigating the choppy waters of the contemporary school opinions. Lombard often indicated that a question raised was common or usual among the schools. "Here it is usual to ask . . . ," "To this it is often objected thus . . . ," "This is objected by some in this way . . . ." [724] By these phrasings, Peter signaled that he was meeting head-on the common questions and problems of his time.[725] Questions appearing in different phrasing—for example, "it is asked" or "if it is asked"—are also likely pertinent to contemporary discourses.[726] By indicating what were the usual questions, Lombard opens a window into the contemporary and often obscure

[723] This is meant to be an indicative figure rather than a precise accounting. By counting questions in their various phrasings (in which I included questions direct and indirect, raised objections, cited contrary opinions, or contradictory authorities), one gains the palpable sense of the questions that lie behind the text and provide the impetus for the treatment.
[724] *Sent.* I.159: "Hic solet quaeri"; I.172.3: "Ad hoc autem solet opponi sic"; I.176.1: "Hic opponitur a quibusdam ita"; I.188.2: "Solent enim illi scrutatores dicere quod . . . ."
[725] Lombard also marked what he took to be usual questions in the following passages: *Sent.* I.167, I.175, I.199, II.6, II.12, II.16, II.24, II.25, II.43, II.56.3, II.70, II.76, II.81, II.84, II.85, II.96, II.97, II.106; II.110, II.113, II.120.1, III.29, III.32, III.35, III.37, III.73, III.85, III.89, III.109.12, III.111, III.135, III.143, III.147.2, III.149.3, III.159.1, IV.24, IV.32.3, IV.39, IV.40, IV.43, IV.72, IV.97, IV.112, IV.116, IV.150, IV.185, IV.207, IV.241, IV.242, IV.249, IV.251, IV.254, IV.256, IV.257, IV.262, IV.270, IV.274, IV.275, IV.281, IV.282, IV.283, IV.283, IV.288, et passim.
[726] For examples, *Sent.* II.68.3, II.85; II.89, II.114, IV.110, IV.111; see also II.4.5, "Cum ergo quaeritur" ("when it is asked"), et passim.

discourse of proto-scholastics. Analyzing later repeated questions on the Trinity, Fiona Robb has shown that a canon of usual or commonplace questions emerged among the scholastics.[727] Masters rehearsed usual questions and gave their answers in order to equip their students who would be expected to handle these conceptual markers. At Peter's very early stage, we may yet already see him building a canon of standard questions. Peter's students, then, not only gained here answers to questions raised haphazardly or by curiosity but also gained experience of the emergent canon of questions, whose answers would mark them as educated clerics.

That Peter in fact ended up furnishing a set of canonical topics, questions, and opinions to the nascent university is a recognized part of his legacy.[728] That Peter deliberately constructed such a canon for his own students is visible in the care he evinced in selecting his topics. For the Master did not merely compile a catalogue of commonplace questions and answered them, but he also carefully discriminated among them. Some questions Lombard refused to touch as beyond his own limits, or declared beyond human bounds and so it is "not right that we scrutinize them"; others we ought to pass over because the authorities did so.[729] Other questions or views Lombard disdained as "frivolous," or easy but "unworthy of a response."[730] Suspicious of his garrulous peers, Lombard noted that the motive for many questions is curiosity—understood not at all as

[727] Fiona Robb, "The Function of Repetition in Scholastic Theology of the Trinity," *Vivarium* 34.1 (1996): 41–75.
[728] The best reception history of the *Sentences* remains Rosemann's *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's Sentences*.
[729] *Sent.* I.137.2; I.142.2; I.144.1: "His aliisque multis evidenter ostenditur nobis nullatenus licere maiestatem perscrutari"; I.121.3; III.15.1.
[730] *Sent.* I.182.5: "Sed hoc frivolum est." See also III.363; I.203.4: "Quibus facile est nobis respondere, sed indignum responsione videtur quod dicunt."

a praiseworthy quality![731] "It is usual to ask, although with curiosity . . ." Many things are usually asked that are "not useless to know, although sometimes they are asked with curiosity."[732] In instances such as these, Lombard gave grudging inclusion to questions deemed not crucial but useful to know. Some seemingly difficult questions are resolved easily; other questions are useful but are "difficult and perplexing" to answer.[733] In these terse comments, Peter evinced his pedagogical judgment not simply by whether or not to include a problem, but by deciding what status or priority to allot the varying questions. For other questions or objections, he finds neither approval nor refutation, but a sort of respectable inclusion.[734] Within Lombard's emergent canon of questions and topics, then, some hold higher and lower priority. Higher priority may be indirectly signaled by extended treatments; other middling or lower points are abbreviated to what is sufficient.[735] Lombard signaled to his students the points of high pedagogical priority: what is "fitting to know," what is "deservedly asked," what we "must not leap over in silence," and what is a "necessary question."[736]

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[731] For a genealogical account of the shifting moral valuations of the concept of 'curiosity,' see Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (MA: MIT Press, 1985), 229–342ff. Bernard of Clairvaux, early patron of Lombard, included *curiositas* as a step on the degrees of pride. See his *On the Steps of Humility and Pride* X.28–X.38.

[732] *Sent.* III.37: "Solet etiam quaeri, quamvis curiose"; II.110.1: "Solent quaeri plura de prima hominis statu ante peccatum . . . et alia multa, quae non inutiliter sciuntur licet aliquando curiositate quaerantur."

[733] For instances, see *Sent.* I.187; I.95.3; III.74.1; III.17.1–2: "Ex praemissis autem emergit quaestio plurimum continens utilitatis, sed nimium difficultatis atque perplexitatis."

[734] For examples, see *Sent.* II.16.5; II.43; II.174.2; II.217; I.95.3; et passim. Other questions Lombard mentioned but rejected for various reasons as worthless, *Sent.* I.39.3; I.182.5; I.203.3, 4, 5; or as too difficult, I.142.2.

[735] See *Sent.* I.43.5, II.139; IV.85.3; III.24.3; IV.95.6; IV.109.6; IV.237.1.

[736] *Sent.* II.106.1–2: "Illud etiam sciri oportet"; I.35.3, "merito quaeritur." II.269.1, "Hic oritur quaestio non transilienda silentio." I.13.1, "Hic oritur quaestio satis necessaria." See also II.16, II.103.2, II.255, II.269.1, et passim.

Lombard's goal, of course, for this questioning method was to harmonize the apparently discrepant authorities—or rather, to show that the authorities were already in harmony, not to fortify but "rather to show it already fortified."[737] Wherever possible, Lombard aimed to show that discrepancies or contradictions among authoritative authors were only *apparent* and could be read in harmony. "We desire to do away with what seems to be a contradiction of authorities."[738] It would be difficult to count how many questions or *sentences* Lombard discussed and resolved; this is indeed the bread and butter of the *Sentences*.[739]

Abelard and Gratian—an early and magisterial canon law scholar who produced the *Concordance of Discordance Canons*—are ready candidates as sources for Lombard's methods of harmonization.[740] Like Gratian, but unlike Abelard, Lombard was silent on his methodology or principles for that harmonization. Just as Lombard passed over the methodological discussions of semiotics—how to interpret signs to reach the divine things to be enjoyed—so despite this enormous task of harmonization, Lombard nowhere spelled out his methods or principles for resolving questions. Rather, the Master got to business, and the student must infer the untheorized principles from his performance.

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[737] See *Sent.* I.Prol.2,10–11: "munire vel potius munitam ostendere."
[738] *Sent.* I.3.9: "Nos autem, harum quae videtur auctoritatum repugnatiam de medio eximere cupientes." See also *Sent.* II.7.2; III.14.9–10; II.57.5: "Attende, lector, quia videntur dissentire in hac sententia illustres doctores. Ideoque, ut omnis repugnantia de medio tollatur" ("Pay attention, Reader, since the illustrious teachers seem to disagree on this judgment. Therefore, in order to remove all contradiction").
[739] Lombard's aim here has not gone without notice. See Ghellink, *Le mouvement*, 233–44; Rosemann, *Lombard*, 66–70; Colish, *Lombard*, 86–90.
[740] Ghellinck, *Le mouvement*, 203–211, 223–44; Atria Larson, *The Master of Penance: Gratian and the Development of Penitential Thought and Law in the Twelfth Century* (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 2015), 315–42.

It might be tempting to claim that Lombard's *Sentences* aimed to train students to answer questions on their own.[741] However, were that Lombard's intention, he would be a very deficient teacher. We have a sentence-collection that aimed at such a goal: Abelard's *Sic et Non*. Abelard prefaced his collection of discrepant sentences with an explanation of interpretative principles by which one can attempt to harmonize the discrepancies on one's own. Armed with this preface of methods and principles, the Abelardian student should approach the many disagreeing authoritative statements and use them as exercises for resolution.[742] Quite the opposite appears for Lombard; *Sentences* is, in the end, rather the inverse of *Sic et Non*. The latter had a preface spelling out the intended techniques and principles before giving the bare *sententiae*; the former omits the principles and techniques and supplies the *sententiae* that the author has already treated and resolved. Rosemann likewise observed: "Peter quite deliberately avoided the emphasis on methodology that was so typical of his contemporaries [such as Abelard]."[743] Since the Lombardian student has the disagreements and questions answered by the Master but lacks the principles by which to imitate them, we must infer that Lombard did not intend to teach his student how to dialectically resolve disagreements. Rather, Lombard's student is to learn the right, orthodox answers to the usual questions regarding authorities and to refer to them as often as necessary.

[741] Colish, "The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth Century," *Studies in Medieval Culture* 39 (1997): 1–26.
[742] For this treatment of Abelard, see chapter 2, section 4.
[743] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 62–63.

Yet rather than a detriment, Lombard seems to have benefited from his untheorized method by the ability to deploy widely varying approaches to various questions and topics. As an illustration, Rosemann selected a chapter (I.Dist.5,1) as a representative example of how Lombard operated. The chapter posed a question, cited [Ps-]Augustine as an answer, raised apparently opposing points, then "determined" the matter by discussing how various phrases or words are to be interpreted, and concluded with a summary of the point. The style of treatment—"the interplay of pro and con, of *sic et non*"—characterized most of the chapters.[744] Yet it is extremely elastic. Some chapters can be closed with the first authority cited; some questions go through many pages and many chapters. In parts, Lombard's mode of discourse seems to imitated passages of Gratian's *Decretum*, in slowly and thoroughly working out two contrary positions, or in posing a question by imagining a hypothetical scenario (or case, *causa*) and then determining it.[745] The vast majority of questions are concluded with a final summarizing statement that restates the determined point. Occasionally, Lombard left the question open-ended with some unresolved points.[746] In other passages, groups of chapters are very brief, often without a question or a single authority without dialectical opposition

[744] Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 68. Lombard took the Augustinian quote from Fulgentius' *De fide ad Petrum*, which itself paraphrased Augustine's *De fide et symbolo* III.4.

[745] Gratian's *Decretum/Concordia discordantium canonum* contains a section commonly known as *De poenitentia* or *On Penance*, which operates through slow and thorough sifting through rival positions. Much of the *Decretum* (II. Causae 1–36) proceeded by first positing a hypothetical scenario, often very complex, and then posing and answering questions on each part. See Atria Larson, *The Master of Penance: Gratian and the Development of Penitential Thought and Law in the Twelfth Century* (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 2015). For analogous passages in *Sentences*, see I.142; II.133, II.191, 229.2; for effective cases, III.152; III.153; IV.216.4; IV.262.

[746] For example, see *Sent.* I.137.2; I.142.2; I.142.3; I.179.5; II.25; II.57.9–10; II.180.7; II.244.2.

or treatment.[747] Lombard worked with very elastic formats and took full advantage of the flexibility to treat questions just as he wished.

Bearing further witness to his methodic elasticities, Lombard occasionally evinced recourse to two modes of support to warrant his points: authority and reason. Authority is by far most frequent, and Peter notably omitted claims to support or defend the faith by reason. As a discourse and even as a human faculty, reason is hardly discussed at all.[748] And yet, despite the untheorized role of reason, as a way of cognition or of warrant, Peter occasionally inserted it into his methods when expedient. Authority could be cited to trump an opposing view.[749] Yet reason also occasionally emerges as a mode of warrant: "Reason also urges [the point]."[750] Lombard seemed to prefer reason joined to authority. "Reason and authority overcome [these opponents]."[751] Lombard was happy to show or highlight their alignment: "Reason supports and authorities bear witness to this opinion."[752] Making good on this claim, in one passage Peter offered two paragraphs, the first revealing the rational arguments, the second the authorities.[753] Peter occasionally

[747] For example, many of the questions on the angelic creation (*Sent.* II.1–42) are very brief, often only a paragraph. See for example *Sent.* II.5; II.8; II.12.
[748] A very short chapter, citing Augustine only, discussed reason as a human faculty (*Sent.* II.144), and Peter returned to distinguish knowledge, understanding, and wisdom, though referring to these modes of cognition as in grace, rather than a natural condition (III.132–134). Lombard went as far as to quote Ambrose to declare that faith is free from philosophical argument (III.70.3), though this seems to be more an argumentative expedient and directed toward immediate opposition of a point than any sort of universal policy.
[749] For example, *Sent.* III.41.4, 9.
[750] *Sent.* IV.29.8: "Ratio etiam id suadet."
[751] *Sent.* III.112.7: "Quos ratio vincit et auctoritas."
[752] *Sent.* IV.100.5: "Cui sententiae ratio suffragatur et auctoritates attestantur." See also II.16.8.
[753] Peter even placed headings on these paragraphs, calling attention to these dual modes: "He uses reason to prove what he says"; "He proves the same by authorities." See IV.100.6–7: "Ratione utitur ad probandum quod dicit." "Auctoritatibus probat item." Elsewhere, against opponents who claimed a rational basis for their positions, Peter argued they were far from reason as well as from the Church's custom (an authority); see IV.86.6. See also *Sent.* IV.29.7–8; IV.173; IV.178.

hinted at a way of seeing reason and authority as a unitary mode, for example, when he pointed out or urged one to recognize the reason behind the authoritative statements.[754] Yet authority and reason could flex where needed. In general, authority decided the point. Occasionally, Peter also included reason to buttress his point when apparently lacking determinate authorities.[755] By leaving his methods undefined—including the role of reason and its relation to authority—Peter could pragmatically shift from reliance on one, to include the other, or to refer to reason and authority as indistinct, without appearing opportunistic or to clash with his articulated theory for procedure.

As a master and canon at Notre Dame on the Cité, ironically Lombard was firmly ensconced in the schools while he presented a remedy for their confusion and contradiction. The substance of his remedy answered a need for an organized collection presenting the authorities' *sententiae*. Peter did not evince the need to train more dialectically-minded students—dialectic was becoming a favorite occupation of those schools. By eschewing instruction in dialectic methodology, Lombard instead cultivated a reverent attitude toward authority. His fourfold road through common questions from highest to lowest could furnish students and readers with a set of answers from implicitly revealed authorities as already fortified and offering refuge amid discord. Rather than exposing how to judge among the authorities and so elevate oneself above them, Lombard kept his own methodology implicit and maintained attention on the authorities. Although Lombard's concern for authority was motivated by reverence, it may also have

[754] For example, see *Sent.* II.244; III.104; III.69.3: "Hic docetur qua ratione."
[755] For example, see *Sent.* I.177; I.199.8–9; II.22; II.23; II.119.2–3; IV.92.11, 13; IV.174; IV.176.

served a practical need. As Clare Monagle has persuasively argued out, Lombard witnessed or took part in the investigations into Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers for their theological views. As a result, he probably sought to ward off attacks on his own orthodoxy from his peers. To do so, Master Lombard deliberately robed himself in markers of conservatism and orthodoxy by muffling his own voice and presenting authorities as the source of his ideas and the only ones who were speaking. As it happened, despite his innovative methods and some bold theological opinions, Lombard succeeded in becoming a touchstone of perceived orthodoxy in the subsequent decades and even centuries.[756]

## IV. *Forming the Reader*

With the picture emerging of the content of the *Sentences,* the question may well arise whether Lombard's pedagogy was one-sidedly intellectual, to the neglect of moral or affective formation. Did the one-time student of Hugh of Saint-Victor abandon the express pedagogical aim to balance intellect and affect, to cultivate virtue in students? It is plain that unlike Hugh, Lombard did not have the ability to direct and shape the lives of his students, as had Hugh. Lombard's students were not living a shared life of closely regulated discipline in an abbey, nor did he hold a position from which he could direct their life beyond exhortation. As a result, Lombard did not devote separate pedagogical

[756] Clare Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's* Sentences *and the Development of Theology* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 59–66. No doubt, Peter's vindication in the Fourth Lateran Council (Canon 2; 1215) was also a boost for his reputation for sure teaching.

writings to cultivate discipline, virtue, or charity in his students. Instead, he laced his *Sentences* with comments that indicate to his reader the proper virtues of a schoolman, namely, humility, piety, and diligence. This set of Lombard's scholastic virtues stands opposed to the schools' greater fascination with the exercise of talent. Instead of relying on one's talent to claim knowledge of what may lie beyond mortal reach, Lombard aimed to cultivate an attitude and moral posture of humility toward the authorities who should guide one's study. Humility in study stands as the keynote for Lombard's moral cultivation. But rather than expounding principles or engaging in exhortation, Lombard constructed an ideal of his moral and correct reader as characterized by humility as well as piety and diligence. As the following section will show, by so doing Lombard gave a model to which his factual readers would conform themselves in like humility, piety, and diligence. By this idealized reader and by his omission of expert explicit methodological instruction, Lombard signaled the priority of character—that of a moral and assiduous reader—for the attainment of truth over against the contemporary privileging of precise and correct dialectical methods.

* * *

The schools of the early twelfth century evinced broad interest in the concept of talent or *ingenium*. *Ingenium* had featured in classical and patristic texts as playing an important role for the student. Abelard, for his part, embraced *ingenium* as a way of legitimizing his teaching (as he lacked a prestigious teacher to guarantee his reputation) and as an explanation for his ability to wield dialectical techniques to harmonize or adjudicate

potential discrepancies. After Abelard, many others shared the interest in *ingenium* as requisite equipment for success in the schools.[757] Hugh of Saint-Victor responded to the reliance on talent by redefining *ingenium* as a natural power, rather than a divine endowment, and by setting out the goal of balancing intellect and affect through an ordered curriculum and disciplined life.[758] John of Salisbury, a contemporary of Lombard, toured the schools and taught briefly as a master. John's later pedagogical writings evince a persistent concern with *ingenium*, particularly with the faults of those masters and students who rely too heavily on talent and yet fail to cultivate their talents or gain a proper education.[759]

Lombard, teaching in the school that William of Champeaux and Abelard once competed over, lived and worked in this same school culture and was likewise fascinated by the role of talent. Yet, his *Sentences* give very little indication of this usual topic or question: in the whole of the *Four Books of Sentences*, Lombard only used the word '*ingenium*' nine times.[760] Without outside knowledge of the context, one would hardly recognize Lombard's near omission of *ingenium*. Some of the questions Lombard handled hint at the discourse about humanity's natural powers of mind and their operation. Though Lombard dipped into natural philosophy only very rarely, *ingenium* appeared in

[757] For this account, see chapter 2, section 4.
[758] See chapters 3 and 4.
[759] For the treatment of John, see chapter 6, sections 1 and 2.
[760] See *Thesaurus Librorum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, Series A: Formae Enumeratio formarum, ed. Jaqueline Harness (New Louvain: Catholic University of Louvain, 1991), 60. The nine instances I have found are in *Sent.* I.32; I.dist34.4; II.18; II.159; II.220; II.235; II.243; II.249.

a triad that also included intellect and memory.[761] Lombard did not commit to a stable set of faculties, however, and elsewhere listed *ingenium* along with reason, will, and "such others" (*ratio, voluntas, et huiusmodi*).[762] Noticing differences in aptitude, Lombard entertained (what he thought was) a usual question on whether souls were once equal in natural gifts from creation. He answered that like the angels, humans naturally have gifts unequally; some were subtler in understanding, remembering, or had "a sharper talent."[763] Sin clouds and vitiates the natural powers, including intellect, *ingenium*, and will, though Lombard addressed a "necessary question" as to why will is called "sin" while intellect and *ingenium* are not.[764] Each question evinces not so much Lombard's own interest—for he omitted a full treatment of human faculties—but the interests of his students and their milieu.

In two instances, Lombard indicated awareness and disapproval of others' reliance upon their *ingenium.* Regarding the manner of the trinitarian Son's generation

[761] See *Sent.* II.18: "Ad quod dici potest, quoniam naturalem habebant dilectionem, ut memoriam, et intellectum, et ingenium, qua Deum et se aliquatenus diligebant, per quam tamen non merebantur." Cf. *Sent.* II.159: "Haec sunt data optima, et dona perfecta, quorum alia sunt corrupta per peccatum, id est naturalia, ut ingenium, memoria, intellectus; alia subtracta, id est gratuita, quamquam et naturalia ex gratia sint: ad generalem quippe Dei gratiam pertinent." Lombard's triad may reflect the triad given in the *Ysagoge in theologiam* as *ratio, memoria, ingenium.* See *Ysagoge* I p. 70: "Scientiarum autem cause virtutum ingenium, ratio, memoria. Et est ingenium naturalis potentia concipiendi comprehensibilia." Also, see *Ysagoge*, I p. 100, in ed. Arthur Landgraf, *Écrits Théologiques de l'École d'Abélard* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934).

[762] Cf. *Sent.* II.243; II.249.

[763] *Sent.* II.220: "Alia aliis sit subtilior et ad intelligendum memorandumque habilior, utpote acutiori ingenio et perspicaciori intellectu praedita."

[764] *Sent.* II.235: "Et tunc per peccatum exspoliatur gratuitis bonis, id est virtutibus, et in naturalibus bonis vulneratur, quae sunt ratio vel intellectus, memoria et ingenium et huiusmodi, quae per peccatum obtenebrantur et vitiantur." Ibid., II.249: "Quae autem homini naturalia sunt, quantumcumque vitientur, bona tamen esse non desinunt, quia non valet vitium bonitatem, in qua Deus eam fecit, penitus consumere, ut verbi gratia, intellectus vel ratio et ingenium ac memoria, etsi vitiis et peccatis obnubilentur et corrumpantur, bona tamen sunt nec peccata nominantur, sicut Augustinus de ratione, quae est imago Dei, in qua facti sumus, evidenter ostendit in XV libro De Trinitate." Lombard answered by distinguishing the senses of *voluntas*; as a natural power it is liable to corruption like *intellectus* and *ingenium*, but the will remains good in proportion to what is not corrupted. *Voluntas*, however, is sometimes seen as the force or act of will that, if disordered, is sin.

from the Father, Lombard judged it ineffable and quoted Ambrose: "It is impossible for me to know the secret of this generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent, not mine only, but also that of the angels."[765] Yet despite this, Lombard reported that some have the audacity to claim it *could* be understood: "Nevertheless, certain ones, presuming on their own talent, say that generation can be understood and other things of the same kind."[766] Lombard is piqued here by a perceived daring to express opinions on the basis of one's own speculation on matters beyond reason's reach. A similar statement occurs in dealing with the question of divine omnipresence. Lombard gave an initial conclusion that God is omnipresent by essence but specifically present in the saints by grace, though understanding of this may be impossible. That conclusion he underlined by Chrysostom's statement that "we say many things [about God] that we are not able to understand."[767] Yet, some make bold to try: "Nevertheless, certain ones presuming to measure immense things by their talent" pass on that divine omnipresence not by essence but because every place and creature "has its being through God."[768] These same presumers go on to make a similar claim: divine omnipresence is intelligible by all things being present to God, who is continually working in and through them.[769] Oddly, Lombard responded and concluded the section not by refuting these claims by argument

[765] *Sent.* I.31: "Mihi enim impossibile est generationis scire secretum. Mens deficit, vox silet, non mea tantum, sed et angelorum."
[766] *Sent.* I.31: "Quidam tamen, de ingenio suo praesumentes, dicunt illam generationem posse intelligi, et alia huiusmodi."
[767] *Sent.* I.166: "Ut enim ait Chrysostomus, *Super epistolam ad Hebraeos*, 'sicut multa de Deo intelligimus quae loqui penitus non valemus, ita multa loquimur quae intelligere non sumus idonei.' "
[768] *Sent.* I.166: "Quidam tamen, immensa ingenio suo metiri praesumentes, hoc ita fore intelligendum tradiderunt . . . per eum habet esse, et omnis locus in quo illud est."
[769] *Sent.* I.166: "Ipsi iidem etiam dicunt ideo Deum ubique dici esse per praesentiam vel per potentiam, quia cuncta loca sunt ei praesentia et quae in eis sunt, nec in eis aliquid operari cessat."

nor trumping them by authority but by pointing where they go wrong: "But although what they claimed in explaining the understanding of things said before *are true*, yet in those words by which we say God is everywhere by essence, we should believe that more is contained that a human living cannot grasp."[770] Though only two instances, these passages are revealing: Lombard's objection to "presuming on one's talent" lies not in an educational or pedagogical fault. In neither case does the presumption amount to heresy or even grave error. Rather, Lombard protested because they strayed from the path of right belief into realms that he took as beyond reach (namely, trinitarian begetting or the understanding of ineffable divine omnipresence). More important to Lombard than proper educational order, consistent methods, or clear methodology was one's attitude in reading and asserting. The talent-reliance that Lombard identified and condemned was the presumption of knowledge that one could have, a presumption that betrayed a lack of humility.

The Lombardian student, then, must be humble. Yet *Sentences* nowhere exhorts to humility or expounds humility as an epistemic necessity. Instead, Lombard presumed his reader would be seeking moral progress, and so by more subtle means he channeled his reader toward a certain virtue set. Just as his methodology is cagey and implicit, so was his moral cultivation. First, Lombard presented himself as a model of humility. Peter's humility is set in relief by contrasts with his contemporaries and their perceived

[770] *Sent.* I.166: "Sed licet haec vera sint, quae asserunt in explanandis intelligentiis praedictorum, in illis tamen verbis, quibus dicitur Deus ubique esse per essentiam, plus contineri credendum est, quod homo vivens capere non valet." Elsewhere, Lombard also warned of presuming to question the words of an authority as they exceed our understanding; see I.164.3.

loquacity and logic-grinding.[771] In contrast to those straying into error, Lombard avowed his reliance upon authorities: "But lest we seem to add something of our own on this matter, let us corroborate what was said with sacred authorities."[772] Unlike those masters fabricating novelties or heretics stubbornly asserting their error, Lombard portrayed himself as adhering to authorities.[773] In further contrast, Peter employed self-deprecating comments, minimizing the "small measure of our intelligence," or stating his preference "to hear from others rather than to teach."[774] Some such comments may appear affected, yet Lombard also manifested humility in remarking on the limits of his own ability to treat questions: "However, this is an intricate question and not to be fully answered by me, as we hasten to other points."[775] Beyond self-deprecation, Peter's humility extended to acknowledging his limits and to learning from his rivals: "If someone can better lay this bare, I do not begrudge it."[776] It is not those who insist upon their ability or correctness who arrive at truth, as Peter modeled himself, but the humble who acknowledge their limits and might learn from others. Peter's humble *persona* functioned effectively to tone down his own authorial voice and to redirect the reader's attention to the cited authorities. This foregrounding of his authorities hid his own creative decisions in treatment behind the authorities that he cited as shields of orthodoxy.

[771]For example, see *Sent.* I.6; I.143.8; I.31.1–2.
[772] *Sent.* I.60.3: "Ne autem in re tanta aliquid de nostro influere videamur, sacris auctoritatibus quod dictum est corroboremus."
[773] See also *Sent.* I.88, I.104.6; I.143.8; I.164.3; for the treatment of heresy, see IV.72–73.
[774] *Sent.* I.156.4: "Ad hoc, iuxta modulum nostrae intelligentiae, ita dicimus." See also II.92; I.179.5; I.190: "In huius questionis solutione mallem alios audire quam docere." See also I.62; II.191.
[775] Ibid., III.109.10: "Verumtamen latebrosa quaestio est haec, nec a nobis plene absolvenda properantibus ad alia." See also IV.60.1; I.149; I.137.2.
[776] *Sent.* IV.35.4: "Si quis hoc melius aperire poterit, non invideo." See also I.132.2; III.15.1; IV.279.7.

By adopting this humble persona, Lombard also favored the closely allied quality of piety. Some matters are difficult to interpret and require a sort of reverence and duty that only humility allows in a reader. Regarding a tricky passage from John Damascene, a superficial reading would find something alien to the faith, "yet it can be understood sensibly; it demands a very pious reader and interpreter."[777] Peter proceeded to coordinate this piety with modeled humility, but he continues: "I would rather listen silently to others in that explanation than by speaking to give occasion for the spiteful to disparage me."[778] To rightly approach certain topics or questions requires more than humility; it requires a pious reverence: "[The mystery of the Trinity] must be treated with modesty and fear."[779] Such articles "must be held with true and pious faith."[780] Pious interpretation of difficult or subtle matters is necessary to retain the safe path.

Lombard goes further than merely seeking to exhibit piety, but he applied this virtue to his ideal reader, who is to interpret piously. The pious reader ought not "wonder or scoff" at points seeming strange nor hold heretical, denigrating opinions.[781] Nor ought one dabble in what is "superfluously vain and harmful curiosity" but rather, quoting Augustine, what "aids the pious and defends against the impious."[782] When an authority speaks in a way that seems heretical or discordant, the pious reader will be "violently

[777] *Sent.* I.80.5: "Haec autem quae hic dicuntur, licet in sermonis superficie aliquid a fide alienum resonare videantur, sane tamen intelligi queunt, piumque lectorem ac intellectorem plurimum efflagitant. In quorum explanatione mallem silens alios audire, quam loquendo malevolis detrahendi occasionem praestare."
[778] *Sent.* I.80.5; see quote above.
[779] *Sent.* I.4.3: "De hac igitur re summa et excellentissima cum modestia et timore agendum est."
[780] Ibid., I.4.1: "Hoc itaque vera ac pia fide tenendum."
[781] Ibid., IV.68.2: "Ne autem mireris vel insultes, si accidentia videantur frangi, cum . . ." For examples of impious heresies, see III.16.4; IV.162.3; II.70.
[782] *Sent.* III.132.4: "Ubi plurimum supervacuae vanitatis et noxiae curiositatis est . . . aliud est scire quomodo hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur." Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV.1.3.

disturbed."[783] Alternatively, on difficult matters piety may not judge quickly but maintains reverence: "yet keeping reverence for things hidden, about which nothing ought to be asserted carelessly."[784] Whenever possible, the reader will interpret according to the perceived faith: "[On these matters] I hand over briefly what I think to the pious reader, so that, having considered the reason of the similitude, . . . they accept an understanding, but a catholic one."[785] Authorities are of little use if one interprets them recklessly or audaciously. Lombard's project in the *Sentences* can only function properly in the hands of the right kind of student: one who reads humbly within bounds and piously according to the faith.

Lombard's pious reader tends toward accepted authorities but, as we can see, also employs judgment. Alongside humility and piety, Lombard's reader must have the quality to ensure their right, 'catholic' judgment in tricky matters, namely, diligence. As with humility and piety, Peter presented himself and his work as a model of diligence. The effort put into the *Sentences* was one way Lombard manifested diligence: "We have diligently enough set out the opinion of those who say . . ."[786] While the *Sentences* does not instruct the novice in the dialectical method itself, it exemplifies the qualities of its

[783] Ibid., III.14.5: "Ubi vehementer moveri possumus quod eam 'genitam' aeternaliter ex Patre dicit." Peter also confessed himself moved by an apparent reading (III.111.4, "Illud vero quod sequitur magis nos movet").
[784] Ibid., II.9.3: "Nos autem quod prius dictum est, pro captu intelligentiae nostrae magis approbamus, salva tamen reverentia secretorum, in quibus nihil temere asserendum est."
[785] Ibid., I.149.2: "De quibus pio lectori breviter trado quod sentio: ut scilicet, ratione similitudinis considerata, ex causis dicendi dictorum intelligentiam assumat, sed catholicam." Elsewhere, Lombard quoted Augustine: "There is another opinion, which seems to be contrary to this unless one has a pious interpreter." See III.127.3: "Est autem alia sententia, quae videtur huic esse contraria, si non habet pium intellectorem." Cf. Augustine, *In Ioannis*, 4.18. Cf. "pie exponendum"; see Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, 233ff.
[786] Ibid., II.242.5: "Satis diligenter eorum posuimus sententiam, qui dicunt . . ."

strenuous, painstaking and often lengthy treatments.[787] In his model, Lombard's diligence took on the special concern for successful teaching: "Do you understand what I say? Pay attention, so that I many explain the matter more diligently."[788] Peter's reference to his own labor founded diligence in studying the authorities as a warrant of safe belief. He stood on the assumption that the authorities were already firm and only due diligence is necessary to recognize their truth. Peter wanted his teaching to be received not as his own creative invention but as passing on the fruits of those painstaking studies.

Yet Master Peter's diligence was not to be asymmetrical—the master doing the labor, the student passively receiving—rather, the reader's response was to pick up the burden where Peter left off. In a notable comment, Peter articulated this reciprocity:

> According to opinions of various sides, I have sufficiently diligently treated the question above without assertion or prejudice. Nevertheless, in such a matter and so difficult to grasp, I do not want the reader to think that our disputation ought to suffice for them. But let him read both other accounts possibly better considered and treated and let him scrutinize those which can disturb [him] on this [matter], with a more vigilant and intelligent mind, if he can, holding this firmly that . . .[789]

[787] See Lombard's comments on his care, depth, and full treatments: *Sent.* II.86.2: "Plenius versantes, clarius faciamus." See also *Sent.* IV.97; III.23.15; II. Prologus.
[788] *Sent.* IV.218.2: "Intelligisne quid dicam? Attende, ut rem ipsam diligentius explanem."
[789] *Sent.* III.25.3: "Satis diligenter, iuxta diversorum sententias, supra positam absque assertione et praeiudicio tractavi quaestionem. Verumtamen nolo, in tanta re tamque ad agnoscendem difficili, putare lectorem istam sibi nostram debere sufficere disputationem; sed legat et alia melius forte considerate atque tractate, et ea quae hic movere possunt vigilantiore at intelligentiore, si potest, mente discutiat; hoc firmiter tenens, quod . . ."

Here Peter's diligent teaching—manifesting also humility and piety—on a difficult point ought to meet the student's active and critical response. Other accounts are to be critically examined (though a baseline of pious belief is urged: "holding firmly that").[790]

In keeping with his methods so far, Peter inculcated a sense of diligence in his reader by frequent references and urgings. Matters are to be "diligently investigated."[791] "One must be careful how this is understood."[792] "It is fitting to inquire diligently here."[793] Narrowing the focus from treatments to individual points, Lombard directly tells the student what specifically was to be "diligently noted."[794] Peter often interjected to stoke his reader's vigilance: "Pay attention diligently!" or "Reader, pay attention."[795] Such a vigilant student, awake to the teacher's careful distinctions, may succeed in understanding. Lombard repeatedly inculcated the idea that this vigilant diligence is requisite for success: "If anyone, then, attends diligently to what is written, it is easy for them to perceive."[796] "Consequently, it is evident to all who diligently and clearly understand that . . ."[797] Repeated conditional phrasings underline that the reader's diligence is a *sine qua non* for understanding: "But if these words are diligently noted . . ."

[790] In several instances, Lombard left questions unresolved, telling the reader that the matter was left to their judgment or diligence. See *Sent.* I.142.2; III.23.2; IV.125.11; II.180.7.
[791] Ibid., II.192: "diligenter investigandum est." See also II.196; II.226; II.140; II.130; II.156.2.
[792] Ibid., I.81.1: "Cavendum est quomodo intelligatur."
[793] Ibid., I.101.1: "Hic diligenter inquiri oportet." See also I.186.1; II.183.5.
[794] Ibid., I.44.5: "Divisio haec notanda est diligenter." See also I.59; I.142; II.242; III.1; III.130; III.132; III.145.1; et passim.
[795] Ibid., I.123.2: "Attende diligenter!" Ibid., I.121.2: "Attende, lector, quoniam." See also I.138.3, I.162; IV.27.4; IV.58.8; II.172.2; IV.27.5; II.40.3; II.52; II.67; II.164; II.225.3; et passim.
[796] Ibid., I.202.2: "Si quis igitur diligenter attendant quae scripta sunt, facile est ei percipere ex malis bona provenire."
[797] Ibid., II.204.3: "Itaque diligenter ac perspicue intelligentibus patet omnes secundum corpora in Adam fuisse per seminalem rationem."

"See, if you pay diligent attention to these words, you find that . . ."[798] As failures in humility and piety sabotage understanding, Lombard likewise identified instances where a lack of diligence produced error.[799] Exhortation to vigilant diligence aligned with Peter's aim to set out a defensible fortification of authorities. To stand against the scoffers, erroneous, and heretics, Peter's student must have wakeful vigilance and laborious diligence. Peter's method of frequent reminders and urgings subtly form the reader—more than a neat prefatory declamation would do.

As should already be clear, diligence stands alongside humility and piety as a requisite virtue of the successful reader. This threefold virtue set constituted the primary engine as well as guarantee of the reader's learning. Frequently, the three coincided in Lombard's comments—though especially piety and diligence: "Let the diligent and pious reader strive to discern what in Scripture . . ."[800] By this repeated reference, Lombard gradually crafted an ideal of the pious and diligent reader: to understand these words, Peter would state, "requires a pious and diligent reader."[801] "Let the pious reader diligently investigate."[802] In his modeling of the pious and diligent reader, Lombard seems to have found precedent in authorities. Ambrose and Leo both model and exhort

[798] *Sent.* III.26.2: "Sed si diligenter notentur verba." Ibid., I.145.5: "Ecce, si haec verba diligenter attendas, invenis Spiritum Sanctum." For these conditionals, see also I.161; I.173.9; II.148; II.238.4; II.247.3; III.14.8; III.109.8; III.129.1; III.149.3; et passim.
[799] Ibid., I.145.4: "Some say this, not understanding with pious diligence" ("Hoc quidem dicunt, non intelligentes pia diligentia Scripturae circumstantiam"). See also IV.56.1.
[800] *Sent.* II.248.2: "Quae diligens ac pius lector in Scriptura, ubi haec occurrerint, discernere studeat."
[801] Ibid., II.130.7: "Quocirca praedicta Augustini verba pium ac diligentem lectorem efflagitant." Ibid., I.142.2: "Investiget ergo diligenter pius lector."
[802] Ibid., I.142.2: "Investiget ergo diligenter pius lector." See also III.38.7; III.46.2; et passim.

these virtues.[803] Particular emphasis lies on Augustine (and Ps-Augustine).[804] Forming his pious and diligent reader out of that venerable authority, Lombard twice cited a particularly useful passage: "Since as Augustine says . . . the prudent, diligent, and pious reader ought to understand *what*, *according to what*, and *on account of what* it is said." " 'Let the prudent and diligent and pious reader understand *what*, *on account of what*, and *according to what* it is said.' "[805]

Lombard might have waxed on admonishing his students to exercise diligence, to believe piously, and to exhibit humility. But such hortatory declamations (save the frequent interjections to vigilance) are noticeably lacking. Peter subtly took a more indirect approach: through exhibiting his own humility and through his frequent but terse remarks, an ideal of the humble, pious, and diligent reader comes to be. Only that reader, as we have seen, may hope to succeed. By frequent reminders, Lombard impressed this ideal reader on the minds of all his readers, a standard for their success or failure. To prove themselves successful students, then, Lombard furnished his students with these tests. For example: did one insist on one's own opinion or submit to learn from others? Did one hold the faith firmly? Did one work assiduously and critically? By so doing, Lombard in the main eschewed direct exhortation in his teaching but erected this model reader to magnetically draw in his students. When Lombard's readers emulated

[803] For example, *Sent.* II.267.9; IV.39.2.
[804] For Augustine speaking of his own diligence: I.95.3, I.182.2; praising diligence: II.255; (Ps-Augustine) IV.108.2; Cf. I.1.1.
[805] *Sent.* III.32.1: "Quia ut Augustinus in I libro *De Trinitate* ait, 'cum de Christo loquimur, quid, secundum quid, et propter quid dicatur, prudens et diligens ac pius lector intelligere debet.' " Ibid., III.73.2: "Quid ergo propter quid et quid secundum quid dicatur, prudens et diligens et pius lector intelligat." Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I.13.28.

that reader in humility, piety, and diligence, Lombard indirectly brought about a kind of cultivation of morals, a moral formation of a Lombardian scholar. In a rare comment addressed to the reader, Lombard confirmed this construction of his reader characterized by the virtue set:

> You have heard, reader, Hilary's word. . . . Once the *dullness of sense and of impiety* has been shaken off, if you *examine diligently* what was set above, and consider the situation of the scriptures themselves, you will be able to perceive in some way the reason and power of what was said, nor will you try to refute that understanding.[806]

The reader Lombard here addressed was not an individual in his schoolroom nor a contemporary master, but an ideal constituted by these virtues suitable to Lombard's scholar. Such a reader, free of impiety and diligently exercised, sees clearly how to interpret scripture, without captious faultfinding of that understanding. Conditionally phrased, it invites the reader to emulate this humble, pious, and diligent reader so to gain the promised understanding.

Echoing Hugh's emphasis on memory, Lombard also urged his students to grasp points in their own memory. "Let the reader diligently attend to the reason for this distinction and hide it in memory's treasury."[807] Yet while Hugh relied upon the guidance of these hoarded principles, and Abelard upon the talented performance of dialectical scrutiny, the decisive factor for Lombard was this threefold virtue set. The humble, pious, and diligent reader would not go gravely wrong. In this way, Lombard's

[806] *Sent.* III.43.5: "Audisti, lector, verba Hilarii, quibus dolorem excludere videtur. Sed si excussa sensus et impietatis hebetudine, praemissis diligenter intendas atque ipsius scripturae circumstantiam inspicias, dictorum rationem atque virtutem percipere utcumque poteris, et intelligentiam arguere non attentabis." Emphasis added.
[807] Ibid., III.29.3: "Cuius distinctionis rationem diligenter lector animadvertat atque in sinu memoriae recondat, ne eius confundatur sensus cum de Christo sermo occurrerit."

pedagogical project hinged upon the modeling of the student rather than its methodology. Yet unlike Hugh's extensive writings on discipline and making spiritual progress toward virtue, Lombard modeled the virtue set in his formal teaching book. His authorial voice performatively modeled humility and piety; his treatments of topics modeled his diligence. By his remarks and addresses to the reader, Lombard did not attempt to form his student readers *directly* (as Hugh's disciplinary or spiritual discourses might have attempted). Rather, Lombard held out a model of the ideal virtuous reader to whom his readers would emulate and model themselves. By this means, alongside the content-heavy quality of the *Sentences* fortifying a path of safe doctrine, Lombard relied upon modeling of intellectual virtues over methodology to keep students—while becoming ever more humble, pious, and diligent—on the right path.

## V. *Conclusion*

Peter Lombard as master of the school connected to Notre Dame cathedral was among the forefront of Parisian teaching. Yet he was hardly alone in producing large theological treatises (part of an emerging genre of large *summae*). Many others connected with the school of Abelard and the school of Saint-Victor were also producing large sentence-collections and treatises. Many of these were evidently trying to adapt Abelardian thought or to synthesize it with Victorine thought.

Lombard took a different, distinctive route. He assembled a structured text of authorities that would present the authorities themselves to students as a safeguard for

their study and belief. Lombard had a great confidence and trust in the received authorities. What was necessary was not to shore up the authorities, to marshal arguments from (pagan) classical philosophy to prop them up or shield them from attacks. Rather, they stand by themselves and, what is more, provide a refuge and remedy against the perceived contemporary mockers and scoffers. While Lombard's attitude may seem conservative and reflective of an older culture, his confident reliance upon authorities does not reflect older patterns. Many older teachers evinced less confidence or interest in authorities as the bulwark. From Anselm of Canterbury to Hugh of Saint-Victor, many scholars hardly cited any authorities when working through highly creative projects. Lombard evinces instead an innovative reaction to the presumption and over-rationalization that he perceived in the schools around him.

Behind his conservative and orthodox appearance, Peter Lombard's pedagogical *Sentences* constituted an innovative step beyond those projects. His *Sentences* inverted the usual Augustinian theological method of approaching the higher through the lower, of moving *per visibilia ad invisibilia*; instead, he began with the highest and most mysterious topics (the Trinity) and proceeded down to the lowest. By so doing, Peter broke with the Augustinian and Victorine customs. However, Peter did not merely acquiesce to what he perceived to be the rising tide of dialectical discord. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Peter eschewed methodological discussion. He offered what he considered a doctrinally safe path through the difficult and disputed theological topics to fortify his students against error and heresy. He manifestly did not seek to train more practitioners of

dialectics to produce their own views. In both ways, then, Peter moved away from both Abelardian and Victorine programs, producing his own distinctive pedagogical project, whose success would ultimately depend not on methodological precision, nor on a well-stocked memory, but upon a humble, pious, and diligent reader. Lombard's ideal student reader, exhibiting humility, piety, and diligence, serves as a model for the following generations of scholastics, many of whom labored, taught, and passed in quiet anonymity in the centuries rolling through the soon-after-emerging university of Paris.

## Chapter 6:

## John of Salisbury: A Neo-Abelardian Synthesis

In the early days of 1164, a small craft crossed the stormy English Channel with a handful of passengers. Landing near Calais, it seemed to one of the passengers, John of Salisbury, that he "felt a gentler breeze [and] the storms of calamity subside."[808] The calamity John foresaw was the growing rift between his leader, Thomas Becket, new Archbishop of Canterbury (d. 1170), and Henry II Plantagenet (d. 1189). Thomas had sent John as one of his *eruditi* across the Channel to prepare for his own looming exile.[809] With very little provision, John depended upon friends' support to travel to Paris. Arriving in Paris, John affectionately reported: "[In Paris] I saw such quantity of food; a people so happy; such respect for the clergy; the splendour and dignity of the whole church; the tasks so diverse of the students of philosophy."[810] This was hardly John's first visit to Paris. As a student, John had long haunted that city of scholars for almost twelve years, beginning in 1136. Starting at Abelard's feet at Mont-Sainte-Geneviève, John had studied with nearly all the great teachers of his time before departing (around 1148).[811] Now, in 1164—nearly three decades since he first arrived, over twenty years since the deaths of Abelard and Hugh, and four years after death of Peter Lombard—John returned and looked upon his *alma mater*.

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[808] John of Salisbury, Ep. 136, *The Letters of John of Salisbury: Volume Two, The Later Letters* (1163-1180), ed. W. J. Millor, SJ, C. N. L. Brooke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 3.
[809] *Letters Vol II*, "Introduction," xx–xxiii.
[810] Ep. 136, *Letters* II, 6–7.
[811] *Metalogicon* II.10 contains John's famous account of his years and teachers. One of the few notable figures living whom John did not hear was Hugh of Saint-Victor.

> [I] saw and marveled at it, as Jacob marveled at the ladder whose summit reached to Heaven, which was the path of angels going up and down. The thrill of this happy pilgrimage compelled me to profess: "Truly the Lord is in this place, and I knew it not (Gen. 28.16)." It came to my mind how the poet said: "A happy thing is exile in such a place as this" (Ovid, *Fasti* I.540).[812]

Given this enthusiasm for the scholastic bustle of Paris, it is strange that John did not reenter that world. He reported in the same letter Becket's intention that he return to teaching as a master in Paris: "You know . . . how when I left you, you advised me to stay at Paris as a scholar merely [*morarer omnino scolasticus*]. . . . So when I left you I had instructions to fix my abode in Paris, and take care to be in every way a scholar among scholars [*et me studerem omnino scolaribus conformare*]."[813] Becket probably thought teaching would remedy John's poverty as well as occupy him lest Henry's suspicions be raised. John might have followed Becket's instructions: he maintained friendships with masters and clergy willing to support and aid, who might have helped John set up as a *magister* in his exile.[814] Yet instead, John spent his exile largely a guest of his friend Abbot Peter of Blois, and he evinced no interest or effort to return to teaching. Why John should hold the schools and education in such warm esteem and yet deliberately avoid them—even when they presented a remedy to his exiled poverty—is a puzzling question in John's life. Answering this question would require exploration of the relation of John's

[812] Ep. 136, *Letters* II, 6–7.
[813] Ep. 136, *Letters* II, 12–13.
[814] John is famous for gaining and maintaining friendships. Among his friends include influential clergy (e.g., Archdeacon Richard in Paris, Ep. 149; Jean Saracen, Ep. 194; Abbot Ernisius of Saint-Victor, Ep. 161) and many masters (e.g., Magister scolarum Richard, Ep. 165–67; Gerard Pucelle, Ep. 297, Ep 185; Master Ralph Niger, Ep. 181; Master Odo, Ep. 271; Richard l'Evêque, Ep. 201).

views on education to the reform projects that occupied his career. That question will not be focus here but it will will resurface in the conclusion of this chapter.

John's fulsome praise of scholastic Paris and his tacit refusal to reenter that world signals his nuanced and tensed pedagogical views of the educational milieu of his day. To find John's articulation of his critiques and appreciations, one must look to his earlier works. In the 1150s, while Peter Lombard was teaching and revising his *Sentences,* John of Salisbury was a busy secretary and bureaucratic agent in the service of Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury. Somehow, despite many duties, John produced the major writings of his life. His two didactic metrical poems, *Entheticus major* (or *Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum*) and *Entheticus minor* (or *Entheticus in policraticum*), both address themselves to John's colleague, then-archdeacon and royal chancellor Thomas Becket.[815] The former poem, *Major*, was likely begun prior but was only polished and finished in the 1150s.[816] The latter poem (*Minor*) functions as a summary, exhortative preface to John's expansive *Policraticus.*[817]

John's *Policraticus or The Frivolities of Courtiers and Footsteps of the Philosophers* is his longest and near encyclopedic work. It addresses Becket with didactic purposes, including denouncing various foolish worldly practices (e.g., hunting, divining the future, necromancy, and so on), examining the virtues of princes and vices of tyrants and

[815] The two *Enthetici* have produced some scholarly discussion, but Jan van Laarhoven has produced the magisterial edition and commentary: *John of Salisbury's* Entheticus Maior and Minor (ed. Jan van Laarhoven) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987).
[816] Van Laarhoven, I.15–16; cf. Cary Nederman, *John of Salisbury* (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2005), 10–11, 17–18.
[817] Van Laarhoven, I.65–71.

tyrannical agents, and turning to the philosophical life and traditional philosophical heroes.[818] John wrote *Policraticus* in the latter half of 1150s, finishing in 1159. Alongside this composition, John simultaneously produced a much more focused and narrow treatment of school culture and pedagogy that he called *Metalogicon*.[819] These two works, *Policraticus* and *Metalogicon*, are clearly intertwined not just in their composition, but also conceptually.[820] In these two works, John largely articulated his educational and pedagogical ideas.

Unlike Abelard, Hugh, and Lombard, John wrote at some distance from the schools. Abelard articulated his pedagogical approach for the talented, dialectical teacher in his school commentaries, *Sic et non*, and letters. Hugh crafted his encompassing pedagogical program for his students at Saint-Victor through various pedagogical and curricular works (*Formation of Novices*, *Didascalicon*, and so on). Peter Lombard performed rather than theorized his teaching in his *Sentences*, tailored and revised for his own lessons. John, by contrast, offered pedagogical ideas that are highly theorized, but he was

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[818] The text of the *Policraticus* was initially but imperfectly edited by Clement Webb: *Ioannis Sariesberiensis episcopi carnotensis Policartici sive de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum libri* VIII. Two vols, ed. Clemens Webb (London: Minerva MGBH, 1909). More recently Keats-Rohan has improved the edition of Books I–IV. See *Ioannis Saresberiensis Policraticus I–IV*, ed. K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Turnhout: Brepols, 1993). Given its varied contents and length, translations have been partial. See *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury: Being the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books, and Selections from the Seventh and Eighth Books of the Policraticus*, trans. John Dickinson (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963); *Frivolities of Courtiers and Footprints of Philosophers: Being a Translation of the First, Second, and Third Books and Selections from the Seventh and Eighth Books of the* Policraticus *of John of Salisbury*, trans. Joseph Pike (New York: Octagon Books, 1972); *Policraticus*, ed. & trans. Cary Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[819] *Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon*, ed. J. B. Hall, K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991); *The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium*, trans. Daniel McGarry (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2009).
[820] The idea that *Metalogicon* and *Policraticus* were intended to be one work has not been born out. See Keats-Rohan, *Policraticus*, xi–xii; Nederman, *John*, 24–25.

not engaged in teaching nor an active member of contemporary school culture. What teaching experience John had was limited: he reported taking on aristocratic students to relieve his poverty while still studying.[821] However, instead of committing to the scholarly life and setting up as magister, John left the schools. Through friends he gained a letter of introduction from Bernard of Clairvaux and entered service with Theobald of Canterbury.[822] Though John continued his personal studies privately, John departed the schools and evinced no more involvement with the schools.

On account of this detached theorization, John's pedagogical critiques and works require awareness of John's rhetorical devices and aims. He was formed and enculturated by the school culture of Paris that was burgeoning during his years of study (1136–47). His reported recollections of those times and his teachers appear to present temptingly a clear window into that exciting but obscure proto-scholastic milieu: Abelard on Mont-Ste-Geneviève, Hugh at Saint-Victor, Gilbert of Poitiers, William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres still teaching, and Lombard a fellow student (who coincidentally also arrived at Saint-Victor in 1136). *Policraticus* is rhetorically keyed as a didactic work to circulate within a small circle and to move its recipient (Becket) toward a philosophic life. A frequent rhetorical device in *Policraticus* is the use of personification and pseudonyms: instead of naming specific persons as objects of his comments, attacks, and critiques, John frequently personified vices or follies and attached pseudonymous, classical names to

[821] *Metalogicon*, II.10.
[822] See Avrom Saltman, *Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury* (London: Athlone Press, 1956), 169–75; Egbert Türk, *Nugae Curialium: Le règne d'Henri II Plategenêt (1145–89) et l'éthique politique* (Geneva: Libraire Droz, 1977), 84–85.

these personifications. *Metalogicon* narrowed the scope to Cornificius and his sect, but rather than recounting a particular movement or person as some have thought, John's Cornificius is rather an amalgamation of various often contradictory tendencies now rhetorically personified into an advantageous opponent for attack. Such devices allowed John to situate himself and his opponents to his best advantage, but without caution this rhetorical charge may skew the resulting picture of the Parisian schools.

Recognizing *Metalogicon's* theoretical link to *Policraticus* and its rhetorical purposes, this chapter shall approach the central themes of John's pedagogical thought. This thought does not cohere into a curriculum, a performative practice, or a holistic program, but rather fuses several themes into a sort of Abelardian-Hugonic synthesis. As one formed in the Parisian milieu, John looked to and relied upon talent (*ingenium*) as a primary instrument for proceeding in scholarly pursuits. *Ingenium* was for John a requisite for dialectical mastery and for intellectual success, but instead of a divine-endowment, *ingenium* was a natural faculty that needed cultivation, exercise, and cooperation with other faculties, especially memory. To his neo-Abelardian method, John fused themes that resonated with Hugh of Saint-Victor's thought. He criticized those who lingered too long or who raced through studies, retaining little. Each extreme disregarded John's notions of moderation and right order of study, which echoed Hugonic thought. For John, the teacher's duty is to support students' progress through studies. Progress means cultivating with reading and exercise but neither delaying to examine every trivial detail nor hastily gaining only trivial knowledge. Finally, as Abelard argued and Hugh

exhorted, John was certain that philosophical education must be useful, that is, to cultivate moral virtue. This conviction found enactment in John's utilization of grammar in a four-stage course that would utilize reading for cultivation of prudence and other virtues through meditation of examples (*exempla*) for imitation or avoidance. John performed this method in his didactic *Policraticus* for Becket and his small circle of friendly readers.

## I. Persistent Questions about Talent

The wrath of the king "jolted" John into writing his main works. *Metalogicon* emerged as an outgrowth from *Policraticus*, handling problems that were raised but not answered in *Policraticus*.[823] In this period of writing (1156–59), John raised questions regarding education, particularly on talent (*ingenium*); however, he did not sufficiently resolve them, and so they gave rise to the rhetorical and pedagogical aims of his *Metalogicon*.

After returning from an embassy to Pope Adrian IV on behalf of Henry II, John perceived that enemies in court, including Bishop Arnulf of Lisieux, had stirred the king's anger against him based on the outcome of that embassy.[824] In this first period of disgrace, the courts were closed to him; John feared banishment. Theobald sent him on another embassy to the Roman curia.[825] During this fearful time of enforced leisure, John

[823] I adopted Cary Nederman's image of John's being jolted into writing. See *John*, 25.
[824] John protests that his service to the king was in no way lacking and indicated that Arnulf was the instigator. See *The Letters of John of Salisbury, Vol 1: The Early Letters (1153–1161)*, ed. W. J. Millor, H. E. Butler, C. H. L. Brooke (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd, 1955), Ep. 18 & 19; Appendix II, 257–258. For John's account of that embassy with the English Adrian IV, see *Policraticus* VI.24.
[825] See Giles Constable, "The Alleged Disgrace of John of Salisbury in 1159," *English Historical Review* 69 (1954): 67–76.

composed consolatory themes: heroes of philosophy, education into philosophy, and the impotence of follies and vices. Between 1156–59, these writings would become the expansive *Policraticus*, worked into a didactic work for Becket.

As Cary Nederman has shown, the composition of the books of *Policraticus* and *Metalogicon* were intertwined and do not match the order into which John later rearranged and edited them. First, John began with the last books: *Poli.* VII.pro–16, 25, and VIII.pro–14, 24–25 (dealing with the "footsteps of the philosophers"), beginning late 1156–mid-1157. Afterward, mid-1157 to late 1158, John composed what would become the earlier portions: Books I–VI (and other interpolated chapters, VII.17–24, VIII.15–23, on the "frivolities of courtiers," the political discussions on prince and tyrant). Only then, when *Policraticus* was mostly drafted, did John write the first half of *Metalogicon* (Books I–II). Finally, John edited, polished, and finished both *Policraticus* and *Metalogicon* in late 1159.[826] By this complex of intertwined composition, John's two distinct works echo each other's aims and concepts.

As the subtitle suggested, Book VII of the *Policraticus* followed the "footsteps of the philosophers." For John, this meant tracing the philosophical tradition from its origins, during which he fell into a lengthy excursus on the faults and proper methods for contemporary philosophical education. He began with the originating figures of ancient philosophy, recounting their careers and schools (including the Platonic

[826] See Nederman's summary of this textual research, *John,* 21–27. Nederman follows the supposition in scholarship that *Metalogicon* III–IV may have been largely composed earlier to this disgrace, in the form of *reportationes* from his school years. Whether or not this supposition is so, those Books were clearly edited and touched up for inclusion into the scheme and themes of *Metalogicon*.

Academics, Stoics, Pythagoras, Ionians, Socrates, Aristotle, and the Peripatetics) before briefly discussing the capacities of reason, the necessity of grace, and the pursuit of the *summum bonum*.[827] From that high trajectory, John digressed to the faults of contemporary students and masters. In this excursus (VII.9–VII.14), we find a breezy discussion, flitting among many complaints and themes that will later become familiar in the *Metalogicon*. John criticized students for too loyally following teachers, teachers for verbosity in expounding trivial matters, masters for Protean slipperiness in dispute, and teachers for having only narrow expertise but pretending to erudition.[828] Next, John turned to who, what, and how to read, the idea that all should be read for its moral usefulness, and three senses of reading (literal, spiritual, and tropological).[829] After comments on true philosophy, John returned to attack the wordy but hollow wisdom of teachers who do not understand and cannot help students understand. Such teaching will not produce progress but only wasted efforts and imposters.[830] John concluded this excursus by giving moral advice to students, echoing Hugh, and quoting Bernard of Chartres' verses on the six keys of knowledge.[831] That excursus is bookended by the final discussion of the

[827] *Policraticus,* VII.1–8.
[828] *Poli.* VII.9.
[829] *Poli.* VII.9–10; John's threefold interpretation is probably drawn from Hugh's *Didascalicon*, of which he echoes and occasionally quotes, though presently no study of their textual relationship appears to have been conducted.
[830] *Poli.* VII.11–12.
[831] *Poli.* VII.13–14. For Bernard's lines, see VII.13.12–14, matching Hugh, *Did.* III.12. They both exposit these keys at some length (VII.13; *Did.* III.13–19). John, however, adds a seventh key from Quintilian (VII.14; cf. *Inst. Ortat.* II.9).

Epicureans' pursuit of pleasure and its hopelessness—themes that would haunt discussion afterward (Book VIII).[832]

This educational excursus is the germ from which the *Metalogicon* grew conceptually. John struck a vein, but instead of following it out in the *Policraticus*—where it did not fit—he planned a new work around it, dealing with its issues face on. One might ask why John did not simply expand this treatment in the *Policraticus?* Space alone could not be preventative, for the *Policraticus* grew expansive anyway. I suggest that John needed to clarify his views on talent or *ingenium* as they related to teaching and learning. *Ingenium* featured largely in the *Metalogicon* as a bastion for his opponent, Cornificius, but even before this, John had frequently deployed and referred to *ingenium*, though sometimes in tensed, even contradictory ways.

As we have seen, *ingenium* had become an important topic among Parisian teachers and pedagogues in the early twelfth century. Abelard joined a chorus of those discussing *ingenium* as a faculty of the soul, but for Abelard *ingenium* functioned differently: he transposed it from the student's context and appealed to it as the necessary equipment for the teacher who would untangle and answer questions intelligibly through dialectical treatment. In the wake of Abelard, many others also looked to *ingenium* as necessary for success in the schools—including John's friend and colleague,

[832] *Poli.* VII.15–16; This reading recalls that chapters of VII were written initially and so treats them as a natural section. Latter chapters of VII (VII.17–25) were written later and largely deal with themes already brought up in *Poli.* I–VI (avarice, abuse of ecclesial properties and liberties, new monastic orders, envy, and so on). The aim is not to expound John's thoughts but to show the conceptual connection between these seeds in the *Policraticus* and the later growth into the *Metalogicon.*

Adam of Balsham (*du Petit-Pont,* Parvipontanus), who explicitly acknowledged *ingenium* as a prerequisite for studying the dialectics in his textbook, *Ars disserendi.*[833] Hugh of Saint-Victor countered that Parisian tendency by demoting *ingenium* to one of the necessary faculties, but emphasized that the parth to success was orderly progress through studies that are married to a life disciplined for virtue.[834]

John's formation in Paris imparted to him this reliance on *ingenium* as a requisite for intellectual prowess. Early in his career as Archbishop Theobald's secretary, John's letters to schoolmasters were relatively rare and usually concerned with ecclesial affairs.[835] In a notable letter to an old friend, Master Ralph of Lisieux, John jocularly complimented Ralph's philosophical qualities: he accused Ralph of "exercising your Lexovian talents [*ingenium illud Lexoviense exeris*] against a friend" in a previous letter and quoted Ralph referring to his own "genius."[836] *Ingenium* (and associated *genius*) appears then in John's early correspondence as a scholarly quality. Throughout John's works, *ingenium* (and related words) especially denotes or signifies admirable and beneficial mental activity, particularly of scholars and philosophers. John frequently referred to mental qualities that clarify or understand in terms related to talent. *Ingenium* (along with

[833] See Chapter 2 for Abelard's use of the notion of *ingenium* and others' attention and concern over *ingenium*; see ed. L. Minio-Paluello, *Twelfth Century Logic: Texts and Studies* I: Adam Balsamiensis Parvipontani *Ars Disserendi* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1956), I.1–10; also see ed. L Minio-Paruello, "The 'Ars disserendi' of Adam of Balsham 'Parvipontanus,' " *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* III.1 (1943): 116–169.
[834] See Chapters 3 and 4 for Hugh's critique of the Parisians and his own pedagogical project.
[835] For example, John wrote to Master Ralph/Radulfus of Sarre, chiding him for taking the imperial side in the short papal schism and seeking to persuade him to back Alexander III (Ep. 124). Theobald also dictated a letter (to Adrian IV) about two masters disputing over control of schools (Ep 56).
[836] Ep. 110, pp. 175–176, 179.

*acumen*, *natura*, and *acuitas*) benefits one or others in tricky situations, such as a courtier seeking to advance.[837] Similarly, John thought magistrates should weigh up the *ingenia* of opposing lawyers and balance them for the sake of justice. He contrasted the different abilities of Quintilian and Seneca.[838] The opposite of ingenuity appears, in John's self-deprecating remarks, to be dullness (*pinguis, obtusus*).[839] John consistently used *ingenium* to mark the extraordinary abilities of the ancients. Aristotle is particularly famous for his intellectual talents (*acumen ingenii*), alongside Quintilian, Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras, Seneca, and various others.[840] The ancients' talents were not incidental: John narrated the origins of philosophy as commonly accepted to derive from particular *talents*: "That the philosophers of the ancients were distinguished for genius [*floruisse ingeniis*] and for the progress they made is . . . a universally accepted view."[841] *Ingenium* was not a passive ingredient, but the agent in John's story: "For talent made a way for itself by study and

[837] *Ingenium* refers to plans or ability and so differs from *prudentia*, which John uses to describe effective decisions and actions in pragmatic affairs. Courtiers advance themselves by numerous methods, including *ingenium* (*Poli.* VIII.11, 751a). Magistrates require *ingenium* to maintain prudent watchfulness (*Poli.* VI.22 p612b). John highlighted an exemplum wherein the *ingenium* of a most prudent woman aided them (*Poli.* VIII.11, 754c, 755a). John quoted Terence on the *ingenium* of the clever slave Gnatho (*Poli.* VIII.3, 716a) as well as Petronius on the ingenuity of appetite: "ingeniosa gula est" (VIII.15, 773d). Cf. John's quotation that associates *ingenium* and *prudentia, Poli.* VI.18, 614b).

[838] *Poli.* V.13p573a; VIII.13p764b.

[839] John often referred to his own or others' *pinguis* or *obtusus* wits: *Poli.* III.8, VII.8. Whoever does not understand, John stated, must be dull and possess *obstusum ingenium* (*Poli.* V.6, 307). Occasionally, John directly linked the two: "Procedo itaque quoniam homo obtusioris ingenii sum" (*Meta.* II.6). See also *Poli.* VIII.8, 737a.

[840] On Aristotle, see III.5, VII.6, 647A, 648A; Quintilian, VI.13; Plato, VII.5; Socrates, VII.5; Pythagoras, VII.5, *Enthet. Minor* 39 (*acumen mentis*); Theopontus, *Poli* VIII.5, 723a; Seneca, *Enthet. Maj.* 81, *Poli.* VIII.13, *Metal.* I.22; Origen, VIII.6 (*philosophus acutissimus et litteratissimus Christianus*); Apollinaris *Poli.* VIII.21; Homer's divine gift (*celestis vates ingenii*), *Poli.* VIII.12, 761a; Leontinus, *Poli* VIII.14, 771c; Nisius, *Metal.* II.8; Julius Caesar, *Poli.* VIII.10.

[841] *Poli.* VII.1, 637d,

exercise to things by nature nearly incomprehensible."[842] Yet they raised their mighty talents in defiance of God as a kind of tower of Babel, and, to adapt the Pauline motif, in professing themselves wise, they became fools (Rom. 1.21–22). "Just so, . . . the philosophers reared on high the structure . . . of their genius [*ingenii sui machina*] in a war against heaven."[843] As the *machina* of their talent might be a building crane, or a siege weapon, the potency of the philosophers was their weakness; they made their *ingenia* into a siege weapon against heaven. *Ingenium,* then, was a tensed notion for John—the source both of accomplishment and downfall.

This tensed notion of *ingenium* as a scholarly quality posed a dilemma for John. In his *Entheticus major*, he also highlighted *ingenium* as a scholar's quality. "What logic can do and why it pleases the wise man" is its guiding question.[844] Here the persona of a "chattering crowd" bustles in to offer a contrary voice. We need not the classics, they say; "We are wise from ourselves, our youth has taught itself. . . . We do not accept this burden of following the words [of the classics]."[845] These chatterers identify as Parvipontani, as crafters of new arts, as crowds who toss away ancients for novelties, as associated with Robert of Melun and Alberic of Rheims. They give voice to positions that John will later attribute to Cornificius:

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[842] Ibid., VII.1: "Ad res enim ex natura fere incomprehensibiles studio et exercitatione viam sibi fecit ingenium, et illorum beneficio plurima publicata sunt posteris quibus gaudemus et miramur inventis." Translation mine.
[843] Ibid., VII.1, 637b.
[844] *Entheticus maj.* 3: "Logicus quid valeat, aut cur placeat sapienti, dicturus." Unless otherwise noted, translations for *Entheticus major* and *minor* are adopted from Jan van Laarhoven.
[845] *Enthet. Maj.* 4: "A nobis sapimus, docuit se nostra iuventus, non recipit veterum dogmata nostra cohors. Non onus accipimus, ut eorum verba sequamur, quos habet auctores Graecia, Roma colit."

> Since all derives from ability [*ingenio*], do not trouble yourself about what you learn beforehand or read later. This school does not care about what method or order is, or what road teacher and student should hold. Therefore, it is more profitable to mix various tongues than to be driven on foolishly in the studies of the ancients.[846]

Rely on *ingenium*, they argue, not on the mastery of arts. If one has *ingenium,* it is better to exercise its use, even if committing grammatical and rhetorical faults, rather than to expend labor on ancients.[847]

By setting up these proto-Cornificians, one might expect John to argue against talent-reliance. But that refutation is not present. Instead, he agreed with the necessity of talent but advocated further study. John began by first of all praising *ingenium* among the requisites: "The powerful nature of intellect quickly masters all [*Ingenii natura potens cito possidet omnes artes*]." However, John immediately added qualifiers: "if the following file goes hand in hand: [hearing, reading books, study, quiet, devotion]."[848] John's answer to the proto-Cornificians is to concede their main point, but to add on the effort and study that they rejected: "If anyone desires to be regarded as outstanding in eloquence, these will undoubtedly give him what he wants: a powerful intellect [*ingenium pollens*], the use of a heart retentive of memory, the wealth of art, the instrument of the voice, and frequent speech."[849] John proceeded to praise the arts, the marriage of Mercury (word) and

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[846] Ibid., 5: "Cum sit ab ingenio totum, non sit tibi curae, quid prius addiscas, posteriusve legas. Haec schola non curat, quid sit modus, ordove quid sit, quam teneant doctor discipulusque viam. Expedit ergo magis varias confundere linguas quam veterum studiis insipienter agi." On Robert and Alberic, see *Entheticus Maior and Minor,* ed. Van Laarhoven, II.264n55b–56.

[847] I take these notions to be central to this proto-Cornifician voice, but they continue on to impugn grammar for its toil, argue against much reading, and learning by reading little—all derivative ideas in this context to their notion of talent-reliance. Like Cornificius later, John charged them (as Sertorius and Sertorians) as motivated by wealth. See *Enthet. Maj.* 6–12.

[848] Ibid., 13;

[849] Ibid.

Philology (reason), and cultivation in reading and morals, but never denied the necessary role of talent.

While John presumed that *ingenium* was a requisite quality for success in learning, the tension with talent-consciousness persisted. Failing to offer sufficient praise shows talent coming up short (*deficit ingenium*).[850] Reason offers assistance to the "genius of words," but grace needs to enable both reason and "the genius of words."[851] Yet at the same time, he offered a picture of talent-reliant teaching: teachers require too much of their students, his opposing personae complain: "It is too toilsome!" Teachers "weigh the intellectual capacities [*ingenii vires pensant*] [of their students], and the teacher gives all the students the amount that suits their own abilities [*viribus apta suis*]."[852] John here approved of talent-conscious masters who sized up their students' abilities in their teaching.

*Entheticus* reveals the roots of John's tensed notion of *ingenium* in pedagogy. John also posed *ingenium* as a problem in his educational excursus on Parisian school culture (*Poli.* VII.9–15), a problem he did not resolve. For looking again at that educational excursus, a driving concern is teachers' failure to cultivate students' talents. "Consider the leading teachers of philosophy," John directs, "mark them carefully." They dwell endlessly on trivial matters and raise questions for dispute "on which to exercise their

[850] Ibid., 23: "Deficit ingenium"; 66: "Deficit ingenium."
[851] Ibid., 17–19; see also John's casual reference the eloquence as the "clever hand [that] follows the mind of its author" (quia mentem auctoris sequitur ingeniosa manus, 87).
[852] Ibid., 26.

talents and waste their life [*ingenium suum exerceant et consumant etatem*]."[853] They do not resolve questions but endlessly cover questions and topics that "even Pythagoras himself"—whom John noted for his talent—"would not be able to clarify."[854] These teachers fail to bring understanding, but by their verbosity show they either do not know how better to teach or "are possibly making a display of their own endowments [*venditant forte ingenia sua*]."[855] Their students gain neither understanding nor knowledge but "accomplish nothing and waste their efforts."[856] On the other hand, teachers who overtax their students "dull their talents and disturb the memories" (*obtundunt ingenia, memoriam turbant*) of beginning students. This complaint shows that John saw teachers as duty-bound to assess and cultivate their students' *talents* properly.[857] We see that John's educational excursus (*Poli.* VII.9–15) raised the problem of *ingenium* (already legible in *Entheticus major*) without resolution. The discussion is shot through with *ingenium*: he criticized certain talent-reliant practices and abuses both of students and of teachers, of those who hasten too quickly, of those who spin out questions needlessly, of great verbal ostentation without understanding, and so on. But John never displaced the centrality of talent in education. John clearly saw *ingenium* as necessary, though no full treatment to the proper role of *ingenium* appears in *Policraticus*.[858] Instead, he soon after began

[853] *Poli.* VII.9, 653b.
[854] *Poli.* VII.12.
[855] *Poli.* VII.12, 666a: "aut enim nesciunt quis sit recte docendi modus aut dissumulatione officii venditant forte ingenia sua."
[856] *Poli.* VII.12: "In his etatem terere nichil agentis et frustra laborantis est."
[857] *Poli.* VII.12, 666a, translation mine.
[858] There is a hint that John may have attempted to work in a fuller treatment of the role of *ingenium*, or natural abilities in education. Shortly afterward (*Poli.* VIII.2), John divided those who pursue glory: first, by virtue, second, by the appearance of virtue (*virtute imagine*), and third, by the support of nature or fortune (*naturae aut fortunae beneficio*). Though without using the familiar words (*ingenium*, *acumen*, and so

composing the *Metalogicon* in order to provide a separate, focused treatment on pedagogy. As a work spinning off the *Policraticus,* the *Metalogicon* dealt with many similar themes but offers a much more full and complete discussion.

Having examined the literary and conceptual prehistory of pedagogical questions that animate *Metalogicon*, the next section will briefly examine the rhetorical motif of the opponent Cornificius in *Metalogicon*.

## II. The Cornifician Question

In view of John's earlier wrestling with talent, the figure of Cornificius gains much clarity, not as a historical individual or party but as a rhetorical invention to amalgamate many of John's critiques into a unified opponent.

The identity or status of Cornificius has troubled scholars, for the question of whom John opposed determines how one reads the *Metalogicon.* Some have seen Cornificius as a particular individual.[859] Others have recognized that Cornificius was not

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on), closer in the terminology of Quintillian, John clearly referred to mental abilities ("*animi bona aut corporis aut naturaliter insita sunt aut studio comparata aut causaliter et casualiter accesserunt.*")
The treatments of progress by virtue and its semblance stand out clearly. John also briefly pointed to the role of fortune (e.g., wealth; perhaps echoing the poverty of his school days). But despite this framing distinction, John nowhere returned to treat the role of *natura* that would necessitate a discussion of the nature and role of *ingenium*. (See *Poli.* 8.2 and subsequent chapters.)

[859] J. O. Ward sketched the older scholarship on the Cornifician question. Mandonnet and De Rijk named Gualo, *magister scolarum* of Paris, as Cornificius; another possibility is a monk Reginaldus. See John O. Ward, "The Date of the Commentary on Cicero's '*De inventione*' by Thierry of Chartres (ca. 1095–1160?) and the Cornifician Attack on the Liberal Arts," *Viator* (1972): 3, 219–273; 222–23. See also Rosemary Tobin, "The Cornifician Motif in John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon*," *History of Education* 13:1 (1984): 1–6; Enrico Tacella, "Giovanni de Salisbury e I Cornificiani," *Sandalion* 3 (1980): 273–313.
Cary Nederman, though he denies Cornificius could be an individual, listed three interesting possibilities for individuals John may have had in mind, including his political enemy Arnulf of Lisieux, and his one-

an individual, but a sect or movement.[860] After all, John clearly referred to the Cornifician sect or party.[861] The trouble in solving this enigma rests in large part in the inconsistency of John's complaints and critiques. As Cary Nederman concluded, "John is quite simply confusing and contradictory about the question of Cornificius' identity."[862] Cornificius and the Cornificians appear old and new, as hasty dilettantes and as pedantic obscurantists; they are motivated by greed, by glory, by fame, and by pride in their own views. They wear religious habits, practice medicine, law, and serve in courts; they now

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time patron, Bernard of Clairvaux. These individuals would only account for certain aspects of the Cornifician amalgam. See Nederman, *John,* 65–68. Recently, David Bloch has argued that Adam of Balsham (*du Petit-Pont; Parvipontanus*), who highlighted the need and role of *ingenium* in his *Ars disserendi* (textbook on dialectic), is the person for whom Cornificius was a pseudonym. Bloch is correct insofar as Adam was part of the Parisian discussion on *ingenium*, but too many other factors disallow the identification of Adam with Cornificius. For example, John clearly loathed Cornificius, but counted Adam as his friend and colleague; Cornificius was variously a courtier, a habited monk, or an aged magister (of the previous generation), but Adam was none of these. Cornificius' main point is that the arts are not worth the labor to learn them, but Adam expected his students (in *Ars disserendi*) to devote much labor to his difficult and elaborate instruction. (See David Bloch, "John of Salisbury, Adam of Balsham, and the Cornician Problem," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 79 (Copenhagen: Saxo Institute, 2010), 7–24).

[860] Accounts depict this movement variously. J. O. Ward himself tried to coordinate the various complaints of many masters to assemble a portrait of the "Cornician Movement," though perhaps not sufficiently weighing the rhetorical coloring of each complaining master. See Ward, "The Date of the Commentary on Cicero's '*De inventione*' by Thierry of Chartres (ca. 1095–1160?) and the Cornician Attack on the Liberal Arts." Pierre Riché also described an "intellectual crisis" of the "Cornicians" beginning in the late eleventh century and reflected in the complaints of many masters. See Pierre Riché, "Jean de Salisbury et le Monde Scolaire du XIIc siècle," *The World of John of Salisbury,* ed. Michael Wilks, Studies in Church History Subsidia 3 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 39–61; 47–55. C. Stephen Jaeger made ample use of John's critiques of the "Cornicians" to separate the "Old Learning" culture from the "New Learning." John is supposed to be a nostalgic advocate of the "Old Learning" attacking the risen wave of the "New Learning," whose chief representative was Abelard. See Jaeger, "John of Salisbury: A Philosopher of the Long Eleventh Century," *European Transformations: The Long Twelfth Century,* ed. Thomas F. X. Noble, John Van Engen (South Bend: Notre Dame Press, 2011), 499–520. As will emerge in this chapter, John was not a product of the bygone cathedral education of *mores* who nostalgically defended it against the dialecticians. Rather John was an affectionate student of Abelard who was formed in the newer, dialectical milieu of Paris (and only knew of the previous generation of teachers such as Anselm of Laon, William of Champeaux, and Bernardus of Chartres by report, not by personal experience, nor did he learn under them). John set about to remedy an Abelardian approach to dialectical education focusing on clarity and understanding by synthesizing it with Hugonic values of moderation, order, and his own views of utility for virtue.

[861] See, e.g., *Meta.* I.2, 4; IV.26.

[862] Nederman, *John,* 66.

attack grammar and elevate dialectic, now they attack rhetoric, and when it serves they attack dialectic. The Cornificians are both too dogmatic and loyal to their teacher and as well as too captious, attacking their teachers, and fascinated by their own or novel opinions.[863] In this myriad of tensed and conflicting qualities, in order to portray a single Cornificius or Cornifician movement, scholars have been forced to be selective, to privilege certain qualities and leave out the contradictories.

'Cornificius' as a rhetorical opponent stands analogous to other rhetorical opponents that John constructed. For John was frequently satirical, attacking the many follies and vices of courtiers, of ecclesiastics, and of tyrants. Yet in these satires, John only rarely named his opponents, preferring to use pseudonyms to typify them.[864] John habitually looked to classics for these names, taking many from Terence and Roman comedies.[865] A particular favorite was the Epicurean (and Epicurus), whom John morphed into the type of the courtier's worldly way of life; the typified Epicurean haunted the *Policraticus*.[866] John occasionally indicated his awareness of the personification as a device to typify a person or quality, for example, Homer's use of Minerva to symbolize prudence.[867]

[863] For John's references and descriptions to the Cornificians, compare *Metalogicon* I.1–6; I.8; I.9; I.10; I.19–20; I.22; II.praef; III.praef; III.10; IV.praef; IV.25–27.
[864] An example of a pseudonym for a specific person is tyrant "Hyrcanus" for either for Henry II or Stephen (*Enthet. Minor*, 86–87).
[865] For example, Gnatho & Gnatians (*Poli* VII.24, VI.27), Thraso (VI.3), and many more for vices (see *Ethet. maj*. 89–93, 100–102, 110–16).
[866] See *Poli.* VII.15; VIII.6; VIII.24–24; V.4; VII.21; *Entheticus minor*, 17.
[867] See VI.22; see also VIII.4; V.17; VIII.1; VIII.3.

These typifying pseudonyms were not mere ornaments for learned readers but served rhetorical purposes. Thrice John wholly invented classical authorities to boost his criticisms against powerful opponents.[868] Pseudonyms might similarly shield John from his opponents' backlash. But even further, these conglomerated pseudonyms for classes of people have the rhetorical advantage of focusing disparate critiques against a single object. For example, the typified Epicureans provided this whipping-post in *Policraticus*.[869] Facing a unified but multiplicitous opponent, John could assume the stance of weaker critic facing the stronger as well as avoid having to continually introduce new opponents and reposition himself against these various, new targets. Peter von Moos placed John's usage within the ancient context of the *fictus interlocutor*:

> [Pseudonymous opponents] might also have the function assigned to a substitute for the 'not available opponent' in the mental exercises or disputative war-games. . . . They are satirical inventions synthesizing certain vices and false opinions, and also stimulating agents for reflection.[870]

The *fictus interlocutor* in classical rhetoric often appeared in a diatribe, a dialogical genre for debate and refutation. In that agonistic context, Martin Hose wrote, "This [fictive] opponent presents in direct speech arguments opposing the presentation of the speaker,

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[868] John famously invented two works by Plutarch. The first was the *Institutio Trajani,* written to the Emperor Trajan; he then proceeded to expound and paraphrase this invented text at length (see *Poli.* V.1ff). The second he called *Archigramaton* (IV.8). He also cited the *sententia* of another wholly invented authority, Caelius Balbus (*Poli.* III.14).

[869] John also denounced other factional opponents, including the Gnathians (VII.24, III.14), Balamites (V.11), and Photinian (VIII.17). Epicureans already cited.

[870] Peter von Moos, *Geschichte als Topik: Das rhetorische Exemplum von der Antike zur Neuzeit und die* historiae *im* 'Policraticus' *Johanns von Salisbury* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1988), 289. Cf. Von Moos,"The Use of *Exempla* in the *Policraticus* of John of Salisbury," in *World of John of Salisbury*, 227.

with whom the speaker debates—successfully of course."[871] John's use of the device did give his fictive *personae* much direct speech, but they nonetheless suited his purpose by presenting John with the rhetorical advantage of picking the grounds of dispute.

John had a prehistory of dealing with the pedagogical problem of *ingenium,* as we have seen. In fact, he had also already deployed the pseudonym Cornificius alongside Lanvinus in *Policraticus* as rival, slandering courtiers.[872] This rendering gives rhetorical advantages of always being a convenient opponent whom John can profitably attack to advance his views.[873] For *Metalogicon,* John redeployed the pseudonym Cornificius now with the many-sided identity as the opponent for those older pedagogical criticisms (previously leveled against Sertorius or unnamed masters). In *Policraticus,* John had complained that his educational enemies were protean, ever-changing shape, in dispute.[874] Suitably for such a protean opponent, then, in *Metalogicon* John crafted his fictive Cornificius as ever-shifting Proteus. Talent only exists within an acting person, so instead of dealing with the questions of talent-reliance abstractly, John invented a talented person as opponent.[875] John's talented and many-shaped Cornificius held many

[871] Martin Hose, "Philospohical Writing: Treatise, Dialogue, Diatribe, Epistle," *A Companion to Greek Literature,* ed. Martin Hose, David Schenker (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 249–50.
[872] Here he evinced much more concern with Lanvinus (I.pro). Various ancient 'Cornificii' appear in ancient literature: as a malicious enemy of Vergil (Donatus, *Life of Vergil,* 46), as a *magnus orator* and contemporary of Cicero (*Ad fam.* 12.17.2), and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (often read by medievals) was sometimes ascribed to a Cornificius (when not attributed to Cicero). See "Q. Cornificius" in *The Fragmentary Latin Poets,* ed. Edward Courtney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 225–27. Cf. Von Moos, *Geschichte als Topik,* 405.
[873] Cary Nederman also noted this parallel. "Cornificius thus is a many-headed beast or a shape-shifter, a protean man, who adopts a range of disguises, yet always begins from the same erroneous and dangerous assumptions about education." See Nederman, *John,* 66.
[874] *Poli.* VII.9,
[875] Thanks to Professor Rachel Fulton Brown for this insight in conversation.

offices and careers (student, master, monk, canon, courtier) and so linked his discussion to the talent-reliant students who might pursue those various offices and careers.

To conclude, then, the personage of Cornificius was an amalgamated, fictive opponent that John constructed for *Metalogicon* for rhetorical advantage. The next section will set this reading in the larger context to show that John used Cornificius to open the opportunity to deal systematically with the topic of *ingenium* with rhetorical advantage against a fictive, extreme opponent.

## III. The Neo-Abelardian Project of the *Metalogicon*

Recognizing Cornificius as a fictive, amalgamated opponent reveals John's rhetorical stance in the *Metalogicon.* For John framed the *Metalogicon* as an occasional work, a reply to recent slanders of Cornificius, as if he were responding to an urgent, occasional need:

> My opponent was goading me on by his almost daily controversies, finally, indignant and objecting, I took up his challenge and determined to strike down his calumnies. . . . Hence I have planned my work to answer his objections. . . . My friends pressed me to compose this work, even if I had practically to throw the words together.[876]

Despite these protestations of urgent need and hasty composition to answer present calumnies—odd in view of the rather technical dialectical discussions the book contains—John did not write the *Metalogicon* to answer new slanders but rather in order to articulate a systematic treatment to his own persistent worry regarding the nature of

[876] *Meta.* I.pro, p. 5 (McGarry).

*ingenium* and its role in education. Cornificius served for John the rhetorical pretext for this treatment, casting him in the sympathetic role of outsider and defender of logic. Instead, John's *Metalogicon* articulates a defense of moderated talent-reliance, what I will call a neo-Abelardian method. John accepted the Abelardian (and Parisian) presumption that talent was necessary equipment for scholarly success but argued that talent must be properly cultivated and trained. John admired his first teacher, Peter Abelard, and like Abelard, John understood dialectic to be the chief art, whose exercise in dispute would discern truth from falsity and would alone allow the teacher to communicate *understanding* to students.

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John is not commonly seen as a disciple of Abelard.[877] His reputation as a "humanist" has tended to cut against associating John with the rising dialecticism of the twelfth century schools. Yet despite John's literary and classicizing reputation, John held in high esteem teachers and friends who were highly dialectical schoolmen, including Abelard. John's connections included Alberic of Rheims, Adam of Balsham, Robert of Melun, Gilbert of Poitiers, and Peter Abelard. In his famous recollection of his twelve years of study (*Metalogicon* II.10), many of these teachers came in for criticism. John was notably loyal to several, including William of Conches, Gilbert, and Abelard.[878] William taught John

[877] See Nederman, *John,* 5–6; for example, David Luscombe's excellent study of Abelardian influence contains only scattered references to John of Salisbury and no treatment of John as an inheritor of Abelardian thought. See *The School of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 52. Being a Platonist and skeptic, John's metaphysical disagreements with Abelard seem to have occluded his methodological, specifically pedagogical, appreciation of Abelard.
[878] *Meta.* I.5; II.10.

particularly in grammar before retiring in the face of the crowds of new students.[879] John regretted that he had little time under Gilbert but composed (later) a lengthy defense of that venerable bishop against the charges leveled at him at the Council of Rheims (1148).[880]

Abelard appears in perhaps the most favorable light. John disagreed with Abelard on specific philosophical and theological points and occasionally criticized his views.[881] Yet John often softened his criticisms: he admitted that Abelard was "ensnared" by nominalism but placed the blame on his teacher, Roscelin.[882] Similarly, John also acknowledged that Abelard (along with Gilbert, Thierry and Bernard of Chartres, and William of Conches) for a time acceded to the foolish whom he sought to oppose.[883] John's admiration and respect are evident. John reported beginning his studies at the school of Mont-Sainte-Geneviève in Paris (1136), where that "Peripatetic of Pallet, a brilliant teacher admired by all, taught."[884] The young John admired his first teacher: "At his feet I learned the elementary principles of this art, drinking in, with consuming avidity, and to the full extent of my limited talents [*ingenioli*], every word that fell from his lips."[885]

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[879] Ibid., I.24.
[880] *Meta.* II.10; for John's defense, see *Ioannis Saresberiensis Historia Pontificalis, John of Salisbury's Memoirs of the Papal Court*, trans. Marjorie Chibnall (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd, 1956), §8–14.
[881] For example, see *Meta.* II.17, III.1, possibly IV.41.
[882] *Meta.* II.17: "In hac autem opinione deprehensus est Peripateticus Palatinus Abaelardus noster."
[883] *Meta.* I.5: "Insipientes itaque facti sunt dum insipientiae resistebant, et erronei diutius habiti dum obviare nitebantur errori." Elsewhere, John criticized Abelard for holding a childish opinion but then pulled the punch by postulating that Abelard held the simple view for the sake of teaching his students clearly—a pedagogical success. See *Meta.* III.1. In a similar vein, John characterized the chattering proto-Cornificians of *Entheticus major* as "verbose [correctors] of Abelard's errors" (I.5: "corrigit errores verbosus hic Abaelardi"), bearing the implication that the members of this crowd are not Abelardians.
[884] *Meta.* II.10: "contulit me ad Perpateticum Palatinum, qui tunc in monte sanctae Genovefae clarus doctor, et admirabilis omnibus praesidebat."
[885] Ibid., trans. McGarry.

Abelard's departure soon after John's arrival was "too hasty."[886] John's famous epithet for his first teacher—Peripatetic of Pallet—suggested he was a modern Aristotle.[887] John explained the nickname in terms of Abelard's reputation in that he "won such distinction in logic over all his contemporaries that it was thought that he alone really understood Aristotle."[888] Abelard seemed to represent for John the best of the schools' success in studies and dialectic. John famously supplied an optimistic image—reportedly from Bernard of Chartres—of moderns seeing further, like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants. In the context of that image, John cited Abelard's saying that a contemporary (*aliquem nostri temporis*) might write a book on dialectic equal to the ancients.[889] Shortly after, John again cited Abelard as a representative of a modern comparable to the ancients.

> Scholars of our own day, drawing inspiration and strength from Aristotle, are adding to the latter's findings many new reasons. . . . We are indebted not only to Themistius, Cicero, Apuleius, and Boethius . . . but also to the Peripatetic of Pallet, and to others of our teachers, who have striven to promote our progress by developing new doctrines as well by elucidating old ones.[890]

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[886] Ibid.: "mihi praeproperus visus est."
[887] Nederman wrote, "The very appellation *Peripateticus Palatinus* that John employs repeatedly reinforces a connection between the 'original' and the 'latter-day' Aristotle, a very great honorific indeed" (*John*, 6).
[888] *Meta.* I.5, trans. McGarry: "et Peripateticus Palatinus qui logicae opinionem praeripuit omnibus coaetaneis suis, adeo ut solus Aristotilis crederetur usus colloquio."
[889] *Meta.* III.4.
[890] *Meta.* III.6, McGarry, 177: "Non tamen huic operi tantum tribuo, ut inanem reputem operam modernorum, qui equidem nascentes et convalescentes ab Aristotile, inventis eius multas adiciunt rationes et regulas, prioribus aeque firmas. . . . Ergo non modo Temistio, Ciceroni, Apuleio, et Boetio, adiectorum habemus gratiam, set Peripatetico Palatino, et aliis preaceptoribus nostris, qui nobis proficere studuerunt, vel in explatione veterum vel in inventione novorum." On John's use of Abelard to typify clarity and the spirit of the twelfth century, Von Moos agreed. See Von Moos, *Geschicte,* 282–83; 266–70.

John's admiration for Abelard raised his first teacher to represent the hope of modern scholars to advance the arts.[891]

Not only did John admire Abelard, but John also evinced reading and adapting Abelardian imagery in his own rhetorical attacks. John's accounts bear verbal links in three ways to Abelard's pedagogical writings. First, Abelard related his disappointment in Anselm of Laon in the contrasts between word and sense, foliage and fruit. "He had marvelous familiarity with words, but it was contemptible in meaning and devoid of reason."[892] Like a great old tree, Anselm was marvelous to behold from afar, but up close he appeared as "unfruitful [*infructuosa*]."[893] John seems to have echoed Abelard's correlation of *verborum-folia* and *sensus-fructus* in his description of Cornificius. "For he was not eloquent but verbose and without the fruit of meaning [*fructus sensuum*], he continuously produces leaves in the wind."[894] Unlike Anselm, Cornificius is not eloquent but wordy; both are unfruitful in that they speak much but furnish no reasonable clarity

[891] In typifying *moderni,* John sometimes included others of his experience, including Adam of Balsham and Gilbert, alongside Abelard. For example, John disapproved of those who rejected notions simply because of their recent origin, from Gilbert, Abelard, or Adam. *Meta.* III.pro: "et illud idem reprobit eo quod a Gilleberto, Abaelardo, et Adam nostro sit prolatum?"
[892] Abelard, *Historia,* §10: "Verborum usum habebat mirabilem, sed sensum contemtibilem et ratione vacuum."
[893] *Historia,* §10: "Arbor eius tota in foliis aspicientibus a longe conspicua videbatur, sed propinquantibus et diligentius intuentibus infructuosa reperiebatur."
[894] *Meta.* I.3: "Siquidem non facundus est sed verbosus, et sine fructu sensuum, verborum folia ventum continue profert." Keats-Rohan noted this passage's likeness (folia in ventum) to that in the *Aeneid* (III.444ff) where Sybil allows her inscribes leaves to blow about in the wind. John's adaptation does seem to meld the Vergilian imagery rather than the Lucan (Pompey as the great tree; *Civil War* I.135–36). The Lucan imagery would already grant too much to Cornificius, to whom John would not even concede eloquence. The shift in imagery does not undermine the correlation of word-leaves and meaning-fruit.

(*sensum*). Abelard's passage served to distinguish his pedagogy from that of his elder. It is notable that John seems to have echoed it when describing his pedagogical nemesis.

Beyond the notional correlative, John also adapted Abelard's Pauline imagery for failed teaching. In *Dialectica,* Abelard underlined the necessity of *ingenium* within the student; without that internal furnishing, all the efforts to teach dialectic must be fruitless: "the one who teaches externally beats the air in vain [*aerem verberat*]."[895] Abelard repeatedly used this Pauline idiom (1 Cor 9.26: *sic pugno, non quasi aerem verberans*) to indicate the pedagogical failure of a teacher.[896] The Pauline phrase has no pedagogical weight in its context (but rather links to Paul's claim to apostolicity and his self-discipline). Yet John likewise echoed the Abelardian appropriation of the phrase for pedagogical failure. Cornificius—John narrated—was a failed teacher. He "taught for a long time as if beating the air [*aerem verberans docuit nihil*]," teaching nothing.[897] The phrase consistently referred to pedagogical failure. Where John argued the necessity of dialectic in teaching so that words would carry meaning (an Abelardian point), he concluded with this remark: "Those whose words lack sense are 'beating the air' rather than speaking."[898] Abelard repeatedly used this Pauline phrase, and John shows his link with Abelard by mimicking this verbal idiom for pedagogical failure.

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[895] *Dialectica* IV, 471.7–9: "Haec autem divinae gratiae tantum ascribenda est, quae nisi mentem praestruat interius, frustra qui docet aerem verberat exterius."
[896] Cf. *Theologia Christiana* III.30–31: "Nisi eo interius illuminante, qui nisi mentem instruat interius, frustra qui docet aërem verberat exterius." For discussion of Abelard, see Chapter 2, section 4.
[897] *Metalogicon* I.3: "multo tempore aerem verberans docuit nihil scire."
[898] II.4 (McGarry): "Qui enim sine sensu sermonem profert, undique non loquitur sed aerem verberat." See also John's use of the phrase in regard to moral cultivation: "Science naturally precedes the cultivation of virtue . . . it does not struggle in a fight with vices as if 'beating the air' [Ceterum

In the third verbal link, John exhibits not only verbal dependence but also sympathy in adapting Abelard's defense of dialectic against detractors. Abelard's *Letter 13* (*To an Ignoramus in the Field of Dialectic*) defends dialectic against its critics. Their criticism is only carping on account of their own inability to learn the art. Abelard compared them to the fox who, unable to reach the "cherries," turned away grumbling of their sour taste.[899] "What they do not understand, they say is foolishness; what they cannot grasp, they judge to be nonsense."[900] Abelard's rebuttal pulled the rug from the anti-dialecticians. John adapted Abelard's comparison in a very similar context. First, he narrated the careers of prominent masters—many dialecticians, including Abelard himself, Gilbert of Poitiers, Thierry of Chartres, and Bernard of Chartres. These opposed the Cornificians and upheld the arts. In response, Cornificius attacked what he despaired of learning.[901] Thus John had the Cornificians play the same role as Abelard's anti-dialecticians. He also followed Abelard's precedent in undercutting them: "Even so the fox growls at the cherries that he despairs of reaching, and in the words of the rustic proverb, he 'slurs as useless what he cannot have.' "[902] John followed Abelard in adapting

operationem cultumque virtutis scientia naturaliter praecedit, neque enim virtus currit in incertum aut in pugna quam exercet cum vitiis aerem verberat, sed videt quo tendit]." See *Meta.* I.23.

[899] "Mystica quaedam de vulpe fabula in proverbium a vulgo est assumpta. 'Vulpes,' inquiunt, 'conspectis in arbore a vulgo repere in eam coepit ut se inde reficeret. Quo cum pervenire non posset et relapsa decideret, irata dixit: Non curo cerasa; pessimus est eorum gustus." See ed. E. R. Smits, *Peter Abelard, Letters IX–XIV* (Groningen: Bouma's Boekhuis BV, 1983), 271; see Letter 13, "To an Ignoramus in the Field of Dialectic" in *Letters of Peter Abelard: Beyond the Personal*, trans. Jan Ziolkowski (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 175–87. For discussion of Abelard's attack on the critic of dialectic, see Chapter 2, section 4.

[900] *Invectiva* 695.10–696.1: "Quidquid non intelligunt, stultitiam dicunt, quidquid capere non possunt, aestimant deliramentum."

[901] *Meta.* I.5: "culpare coepit quod se posse consequi desperabat."

[902] *Meta* I.5 (McGarry): "Sic vulpes a desperatione cerasa culpat, et ut dici solet rusticano proverbio, quod negatur ducit inutile."

the fable to portray the Cornificians as carping (that the arts are unprofitable). Notably, John echoed his adaptation again, specifically on account of Cornificius' deficient talent: "He does just what one would expect of a feeble-minded sluggard . . . he yaps at what he cannot attain [*quod non potest assequi criminatur*]."[903] Could this be a coincidence—perhaps John and Abelard shared a source? No doubt they did share sources. But the fact that John knew of and adapted Abelard is evident when John quoted Abelard's peculiar version of the fable. The most common version for medieval readers spoke of "grapes [*vulpes alta in vinea uvam adpetebat*]," but John quoted Abelard's very unusual version that substituted "cherries [*cerasa*]."[904] Here, then, we see John exhibit three verbal adaptations of Abelard's writings for his own rhetorical purposes.

Given John's admiration for Abelard and his evident adaptations of his teacher's pedagogical writings, it is unsurprising that he should adapt Abelardian pedagogical methods. Like Abelard, John praised the art of dialectic as the chief and almost defining art for the master. Some have noticed the paradox that, though John stated in the prologue his plan to write a defense of rhetoric, that defense never appears. Instead, save

[903] *Meta.* IV.25 (McGarry): "Nempe quod cuiusque deficientis ingenii est et desidiae quae ad hortamenta virtutis stertere consuevit, quod non potest assequi criminatur."

[904]The classic and common version of the fable appears in the *Fables of Phaedrus*. See "De Vulpe et Uva" in *Fables of Phaedrus* IV.3, ed. & trans. Ben Perry, Loeb Classic Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 436.302–305: "Fame coacta vulpes alta in vinea / uvam adpetebat, summis saliens viribus. / quam tangere ut non potuit, discedens ait / 'Nondum matura es; / nolo acerbam sumere.' / Qui, facere quae non possunt, verbis elevant, / adscribere hoc debebunt exemplum sibi." See Hanna Vámos, "The Medieval Tradition of the Fables of Romulus," *Graeco-Latina Brunensia* 18 (2013): 185–97. Abelard's *cerasa*-version is highly unusual, though I hesitate to call it unique without a systematic survey.

for a brief treatment on grammar, John devoted the bulk of *Metalogicon* to dialectic.[905] Dialectic is the focus of the *Metalogicon*. Like Abelard, John adopted the Ciceronian view of dialectic as the art of judging the true from the false.[906] As the instrument for discerning truth, dialectic comes to play in every other science.[907] In this way, it is the soul of philosophy; it vivifies and organizes the other arts as the soul does the body.[908] As such a central science, masters must have command of logic. Students must learn dialectic for disputation: "One should become well-versed in disputation."[909] John took disputation to be a primary activity of a scholar; he defended disputation for the sake of truth or defeating an opponent from disputing for the sake of reputation or glory.[910]

John's valorization of logic as the chief art extended to its pedagogical role. As we recall, Abelard took the exercise of dialectic as necessary to resolve questions performatively and so bring students to understanding. John, too, thought a teacher must exercise dialectical mastery to be effective for students to gain understanding. Fundamentally, dialectic functions to discriminate truth, necessary to provide understanding. "One more easily discriminates between the true and the false in all instances, and is in a better position to understand and to teach, which constitutes the

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[905] Though Cornificius' position is always switching, early on John indicated that Cornificius denied eloquence ought to be studied (I.1). Grammar appeared in I.13–I.25, while Books II–IV treated *logica* or *dialectica.*

[906] Cf. Cicero, *De oratores* II.257: "videsne Diogenem eum fuisse, qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam verbo Graeco διαλεκτικήν appellaret?" Cf. Abelard, *Dialectica* (ed. De Rijk), 469–70. For discussion of Abelard's notion of dialectic, see Chapter 2, section 4.

[907] *Meta.* II.12.

[908] *Meta.* II.6; II.11; II.13; other sciences without dialectic are hampered; the reciprocal obtains, for John judged dialectic alone (without other sciences) to be useless (*Meta.* II.9).

[909] *Meta.* III.10, trans. McGarry, p. 196: "Itaque assuescendum est disceptationi."

[910] *Meta.* IV.22.

object and office of the philosopher."[911] For John, the philosopher is a teacher equipped with dialectic. Dialectic opens the other sciences (for student and master) by providing "μέθοδοι" or "entrances" to them.[912] Dialectic furnishes the ability to clarify other sciences and allows masters to bring students to understanding. However, merely taking dialectic as subject matter did not guarantee clarity. As Abelard had criticized the venerable Anselm of Laon for eloquent obscurity, so John criticized the prolixity of teachers on dialectic whose teaching failed to clarify.[913]

While John adapted Abelard's notion of the dialectical teacher, John bent this model toward his own pragmatic and skeptical leanings. Abelard discussed dialectical teaching often in terms of questions mostly theoretical and on adjudicating authorities.[914] But John distinguished dialectic from demonstrative logic. The latter applies to reasoning from necessity (as in mathematics), but dialectic concerns probabilities.[915] The realm of dialectic is unstable nature (where demonstrations founder), where it seeks truth in its closest approximation.[916] "To argue is to prove or disprove something that is either doubtful, or denied. . . . If anyone accomplishes this with probability by using the art, he

[911] *Meta.* II.13 (McGarry, 104): "et qui circumstantes attendit rationes, in singulis verum facilius discernit a falso, et habilior redditur ad intelligendum, et docendum quod philosophantis propositum expetit, et officium exigit."
[912] *Meta.* II.13: "Siquidem ars quaelibet suas habet methodos, quas nos figuraliter adviationes, vel aditus possumus interpretari, et inquisitioni succedit inventio."
[913] *Meta.*, II.7; II.17.
[914] A primary source for this description is his proglogue to *Sic et non;* for a treatment, see Chapter 2, section 4.
[915] *Meta* II.13: "Demonstrativae ergo principia necessaria sunt, dialecticae probabilia." Cf. II.3.
[916] *Meta.* II.14: "Vacillat itaque in naturalibus plerumque corporalibus et mutabilibus dico ratio demonstrandi, sed in mathematicis efficacissime convalescit."

achieves the goal of the dialectician."[917] Dialectical reasoning then arms one to discern truth in all studies and the myriad probable matters of life.[918] John distinguished dialectic from similar studies:

> For dialectic neither aspires to the weighty authority of [apodictical] teaching, nor does it become the plaything of political currents. Neither does it seduce by fallacies. Rather it makes inquiry into the truth, using the ready instruments of moderate probability.[919]

By revealing probable truth, dialectic is the surest path to theory and practice, the art and its implementation. As John put it: "Abundant knowledge of probabilities furnishes the readiest *path* into everything."[920] In this way, John adapted the Abelardian notion of the dialectical teacher but aimed it less at resolving questions and more toward opening sciences and probabilistic reasoning.

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While adapting Abelardian notions of dialectical teaching, a primary concern in *Metalogicon* was the clarification of the role of talent/*ingenium* in education. As argued earlier, it was this persistent concern that pushed John to compose *Metalogicon*. Given Abelard's theorization of his performative pedagogy as based in talent, one might expect John to use Cornificius as a screen to attack Abelard on *ingenium.* Yet the contrary is the

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[917] *Meta.* II.4 (McGarry): "Est autem disputare aliquid eorum quae dubia sunt aut in contradictione posita, aut quae sic vel sic proponuntur ratione supposita probare vel improbare. Quod quidem quisquis ex arte probabiliter facit, ad dialectici pertingit metam."
[918] Cf. *Meta.* II.14.
[919] *Meta.* II.3 (McGarry).
[920] *Meta.* II.14: "Scientia itaque probabilium copiosa, expeditissimam ad omnia viam parat." John repeated this affirmation of dialectic as guide to all learning at end of II.15: "Quocirca nullam liberalium disciplinarum utiliorem esse crediderim quam istam [id est, dialecticam], a qua in omnes philosophiae partes facilis et felix processus est. Ad nullam enim scientiam, invenitur infirmus, cui probabilia innotescunt."

case: Cornificius (in part) represents an extreme talent-reliance position. The Cornifician extreme position offers John a target so that he might then articulate a modified, neo-Abelardian talent-reliance. By this rhetorical maneuver, John positions himself as presenting something against the grain, though he primarily adapted and moderated a position that seems rooted in his first teacher's legacy.

Though Cornificius' claims shifted as needed, Cornificius' early, extreme position on talent functions to undercut the value of the arts. John summed up that Cornifician position in this dilemma:

> There is no point in studying the rules of eloquence, which is a gift that is either conceded or denied to each individual by nature. Work and diligence are superfluous where nature has spontaneously and gratuitously bestowed eloquence, whereas they are futile and silly where [nature] has refused to grant it.[921]

Cornificius' position operates on the assumption that talent (the gift of nature) is a necessary condition for success in studies. If one has talent, one will gain eloquence without labor. If one lacks talent, no amount of labor will furnish the desired eloquence. In either case, study of the arts does not furnish eloquence; only one's *ingenium* does. Yet Cornificius' position (as John presented it) was not a logician's trick, but rather represented a pragmatic attack. It is not raw or naked talent that furnishes eloquence, but talent in *use* or put into practice. "Everywhere it is true that 'Practice [*usus*] makes perfect,'

[921] *Meta.* I.6 (McGarry): "Non est ergo ex eius sententia si tamen falso opinio sententia dicenda est, studendum praeceptis eloquentiae, quoniam eam cunctis natura ministrat aut negat. Si ultro ministrat aut sponte, opera superfluit et diligentia. Si vero negat, inefficax est et inanis." Note: John adopted the terminology of the rhetorical tradition (from Cicero, Quintilian, etc.) in refering to natural gifting, talent, as *natura*.

and 'Persevering application surmounts all obstacles,' for assiduous devotion to an art produces the master workman."[922] The Cornificius *persona* represents an attack not on effort or practice as such but on the schools' instruction in the arts as the practice that perfects. A talented youth with ambitions for the court ought not go to the schools to learn eloquence but ought to begin practice. Labor learning rhetoric is a bad investment: "Even though the rules [of eloquence] may be of some help in acquiring eloquence, still they involve more trouble than they are worth, and the return never compensates for the investment."[923] The time and expense of learning rhetoric from reading *auctores* with a master does not pay—argues Cornificius—rather than settting to work relying on one's talent and learning eloquence by practice.

John's response to the Cornifician attack on school instruction and its extreme view of talent-reliance reveals his common ground with the Cornifician position. John shared their assumption that talent was a prerequisite for success in studies.[924] Yet John sought to uphold the value of school-instruction in the arts by a moderated account of talent-reliance. In brief, talents must be cultivated not just by use but properly, through exercises according to the precepts of the arts and overseen by a master. Thus, natural ability is the foundation, but effort is also needed. "Care is . . . not superfluous. Rather it

[922] *Ibid.* (McGarry): "immo ubique locorum verum est, quia usus magistrum reddit. Labor improbus vincit omnia, et assiduitas operis in quavis arte praestantissimum facit opificem."
[923] *Ibid.* (McGarry): "Ad haec et si eloquentiae praecepta proficerent, plus habent laboris quam utilitatis, nec dispendium operae aequa unquam compensabitur retributione mercedis."
[924] John frequently refers to *ingenium* as one of the attributes of a successful scholar or author. For example, John pleads his blunted *ingenium* and refers to the admiration of *ingenium* of others (*Meta.* Prologue; pp. 10.58, 11.72). For Abelard's reference to *ingenium* as a quality necessary for a scholar, see Chapter 2, section 3.

assists nature and makes easier something that is already possible."[925] *Ingenium* and *studium* require each other; effort can cultivate even a minor talent, but talent without effort deteriorates.[926] Raising the stakes, John proceeded to argue that to deny that study would improve natural gifts would condemn not only rhetoric but also all arts and sciences.[927]

Stepping back from the need for exercise in arts, John discussed the theoretical relationship between studies and mental faculties. The arts arose from human ingenuity to expedite and refine practices. Three human faculties brought arts forth: talent/*ingenium*/nature, memory, and reason/*ratio*. Exercises in these arts in turn hone those same faculties.

> This, in short, is how all the arts have originated: Nature, the first fundamental, begets the habit and practice of study, which proceeds to provide an art, and the latter, in turn, finally furnishes the faculty whereof we speak.[928]

Quoting Bernard of Chartres, John assigned functions to *ingenium* (power to discover), *memoria* (power to retain what is discovered), and *ratio* (power to examine what it has gathered).[929] Each faculty (*ingenium*, *memoria, ratio*) quickens and gains strength through

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[925] *Meta.* I.8 (McGarry): "Cura itaque non superfluit, sed naturam iuvat, faciliusque reddit, quod tamen utcumque forte fieri posset."
[926] *Meta.* I.8: "Licet enim natura plerumque dominetur et sit proclivior in alterutro, tamen sicut facile corrumpitur a negligentia, sic a cultura et a cura saepissime mansuescit."
[927] *Meta.* I.9.
[928] *Meta.* I.11 (McGarry): "Et haec quidem est omnium origo artium, ut cum natura praeiacens usum et exercitium studii pepererit, <pariant> usus et exercitatio artem, ars autem eam de qua nunc agitur facultatem."
[929] While John cited Bernard of Chartres as his authority for this treatment (whom John never knew, as Bernard died before John could have studied with him, and whom he likely heard of from his teachers William of Conches and Thierry of Chartres, former students of Bernard), John's treatment is quite similar to that which Hugh gives to *ingenium* and *memoria* in *Didascalicon* III.6, 7, & 11.

the exercises of the arts. Though John notably never treated mnemo-techniques that might improve memory, he speaks at length on the texts and exercises to improve *ingenium* and *ratio*.[930]

That natural powers can be improved by practice and exercise is a notion suffused in John's thought. In his most famous imagery of the modern dwarves sitting upon giants' shoulders, John highlighted not just the potential but the actual advancement "moderns" have wrought through their strengthened *ingenia*:

> Bernard of Chartres used to compare us to dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants [where] we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their gigantic stature.[931]

The dwarven imagery is well-known, but it is often forgotten that Bernard's image serves to illustrate the lengthy quotation from Abelard that immediately precedes regarding the progress of moderns in relation to the ancients. John reported that Abelard claimed the moderns to have surpassed the arts bequeathed by the ancients:

> I recollect that the Peripatetic of Pallet made the observation, which I believe was correct, that it would be easy for one of our own contemporaries to compose a book about this art [logic], which would be at least the equal of any of those written [on the subject] by the ancients in both its apprehension of the truth and the aptness of its wording.[932]

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[930] In this respect, though John recognized the need for mnemo-techniques (e.g., *Meta.* I.20), unlike Hugh, John never described or treated them. Instead, *Metalogicon* II–IV describe in detail the various dialectical exercises and texts to improve the powers of *ingenium* and *ratio.* This further fits the notion that *Metalogicon* was a work aimed at clarifying the specifically pedagogical role of *ingenium*.

[931] *Meta.* III.4 (McGarry): "Bernardus Carnotensis nos esse quasi nanos gigantum umeris insidentes, ut possimus plura eis et remotiora videre, non utique proprii visus a acumine, aut eminentia corporis, sed quia in altum subvehimur et extollimur magnitudine gignatea."

[932] *Meta.* III.4 (McGarry): "Dixisse recolo Peripateticum Palatinum quod verum arbitror, quia facile esset aliquem nostri temporis librum de hac arte componere, qui nullo antiquorum quod ad conceptionem

Contemporaries—according to Abelard and John—can match the achievements of the ancients. But is this not presumptuous? John gave Abelard's explanation:

> He also used to assert that recognition as authorities should be conceded to these earlier authors, whose natural talent [*ingenia*] and originality flourished in fertile luxuriance, and who bequeathed to [an indebted] posterity the fruits of their labors, with the consequence that the very things which several men have expended their whole lives in investigating, and which they have labored and sweated in discovering, can now be quickly and easily learned by one person.

The ancients made discoveries through their own talents and labors; these advances built up the arts that many students may now learn. Moderns' talents are not greater than that of the ancients', but the ancients' arts advance modern talents further than their own capacity could have reached. Unlike Bernard, Abelard's metaphor was not giant-dwarf but patrimony-heir:

> Our own generation enjoys the legacy bequeathed to it by that which preceded it. We frequently know more, not because we have moved ahead by our own natural ability [*non suo quidem precedens ingenio*], but because we are supported by the [mental] strength [*viribus*] of others, and possess riches [*opulenta doctrina*] that we have inherited from our forefathers.

John's understanding (through Abelard and Bernard) of moderns' debt to ancients depended upon the necessary pedagogical relationship. The ancients bequeathed not conclusions or dogmas but arts to master. Their "thought instructs and [their] words

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veri, vel ad elegantiam verbi esset inferior. Sed ut auctoritatis favorem sortiretur, aut impossibile aut difficillimum."

exercise" us.[933] To stand upon the giants' shoulders one must first climb; one sees better and further only after sweating over the arts to cultivate one's own powers.[934]

In sum, John did not repudiate dialectical teaching and talent-reliance but adapted these notions from Abelard and theorized them further. *Ingenium* is no longer a divine endowment (as Abelard had it) but a natural faculty alongside others. It requires training to increase and sharpen its powers. That training occurs in the arts. At this point, though, John synthesized with his method themes from Abelard's one-time rival, Hugh of Saint-Victor. The next section will examine how John melded Hugonic elements to his neo-Abelardian method.

## IV. Synthesis with Hugonic Themes

That Hugh had influence on John may seem strange. John gives no indication that despite starting at nearby Mont-Ste-Geneviève, he ever studied under Hugh at Saint-Victor—perhaps the only prestigious teacher around Paris that John omitted![935] Unlike some of John's heroes, such as Gilbert, Abelard, William of Conches, and Bernard of Chartres, John only rarely mentioned Hugh by name. In a letter to his friend, Peter of Celle, John

[933] *Meta.* III.4: "Utrisque vero habenda est gratia, quoniam et sensus erudit et verba exercent."
[934] John's notion of the modern tradition of ancient arts is similar to Adam's view of the arts that, after flourishing, fell into disuse, and that have been revived by the recent labor and talents. Cf. *Mela.* I.20; Adam of Balsham, *Ars disserendi* (ed. L. Minio-Paluello), §V–VI.
[935] John's famous recollection of his studies (*Meta* II.10) never mentioned Hugh. Perhaps John's coolness toward Hugh owes something to his admiration for Abelard and Hugh's association with Bernard as well as Hugh's critique of the Parisian schools. John may have gotten his position with Archbishop Theobald through a recommendation letter from Bernard of Clairvaux, yet John reserved criticism for that aged campaigner's conduct at the Council of Rheims (*Historia pontificalis*, §7–9). See also Nederman, *John*, 67–68.

requested a copy of Hugh's "expositio" that he knew Peter possessed.[936] John mentioned Hugh only twice by name in the *Metalogicon*: he quoted "magister Hugo" on faith and listed him among those spared by the Cornificians on account of his religious habit.[937] Finally, he cited Hugh as a modern from whose histories he drew for his own continuation in *Historia pontificalis*.[938]

For one thing, Hugh and John disagreed over reading. Hugh's pedagogy largely dismissed poetry and secular histories, while John's learning exulted in reading, meditating, and reporting anecdotes or *exempla* from those poets and historians.[939] Despite their differences and relatively few mentions, John evinced deeper appreciation and sympathetic reading of Hugh. John occasionally exhibited resonance with Hugh by quoting either him or the same source. John and Hugh alike quoted and explicated at

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[936] John evidently believed Peter would know which he meant, for he did not specify. After his death, John bequeathed to his cathedral library at Chartres a copy of *Librum Hugonis super lamentationes Jeremie* (which Clement Webb believed to be *Adnotatiunculae elucidatoriae in Threnos Jeremiae*). That work is a good candidate for the requested *expositio*. See Clement Webb, *John of Salisbury* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1932), 165. Webb cited *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Chartres*, ed. E. Lépinois, L. Merlet (Chartres: Garnier, 1862–65), III.202.

[937] See *Meta* IV.13; I.5. Editor Keats-Rohan noted that the quotation may have come for the pseudonymous *Summa sententiarum* I.1, or *De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae dialogus* (*PL*.176.35), or *De sacramentis christianae fidei* I.10.1.

[938] See ed. Marjorie Chibnall, *John of Salisbury's Memoirs of the Papal Court* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd, 1962), prol.; xxxii; "Inter quos [moderns] magister Hugo canonicus sanctic Victoris Parisiensis fere novissimus floruit, qui ab inicio nascentis seculi usque ad tempus domini Innocentii pape secundi et Christianissimi regis Francorum Ludovici seriem temporum digessit, et variationes regnorum succincta narratione complexus est."

[939] Cf. *Didascalicon* III.3; John's *Policraticus* exhibits his didactic use of *exempla* to provoke meditative reading, recollection, and moral improvement. This didactic use lies outside the present focus on pedagogy (as the Introduction discussed). Didacticism aims to teach a specific lesson to an audience, whereas pedagogical writings (though also having some didactic functions) treat the teaching and educational process. A didactic sermon teaches one, for example, not to lie and cheat; a pedagogical sermon discusses *how* to teach to avoid lying and cheating.
The magisterial treatment of John's *exempla* method is Peter von Moos' *Geschichte als Topik: Das rhetorische Exemplum von der Antike zur Neuzeit und die* historiae im 'Policracticus' *Johanns von Salisbury* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1988).

length what John called the "keys of learning" and Hugh the "form of learning."[940] John owes Hugh for a reference to the "mechanical arts"—an addition Hugh made to the common threefold division of *theorica, practica, logica.*[941] Likewise, in laying out the aid to philosophy and virtue, John echoes Hugh's five steps. Hugh had offered "reading or teaching, meditation, prayer, and performance [*lectio sive doctrina, meditatio, oratio, et operatio*]," followed later by contemplation.[942] John, for his part, transposed this list from the canonry to the schoolroom, giving instead "reading, teaching, meditation, and constancy in work [*lectio, doctrina, meditatio, assiduitas operis*]."[943] Like Hugh, John habitually paired *ingenium* with *memoria* as two chief faculties for study.[944] When one notices the many resonances and echoes of Hugonic thought appearing even without ascription in John's books, the themes that John shared with Hugh begin to stand out.

John's most direct link to Hugh's pedagogy also points to a thematic similarity in their pedagogical thought. In arguing that talent must be properly cultivated by study

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[940] Attributed to a sage (*Didascalicon* III.12) and explicated (III.13–20). John (*Policraticus* VII.13) attributed it to the "old man of Chartres (*senex Carnotensis*)": "Mens humilis, studium quaerendi, vita quieta, scrutinium tacitum, paupertas, terra aliena, haec reserare solent multis obscura legendi." All of John's information about Bernard was secondhand but was more likely from William of Conches or Thierry of Chartres. John even added a seventh key (from Quintilian; *Policraticus* VII.14). Another instance is John's misquotation, possibly following Hugh's misquotation, of Martianus Capella's Parmenides anecdote (*De nuptiis* IV.330). See *Metalogicon* II.2; *Didascalicon* III.2; *Metalogicon* (McGarry), 77n24. Finally, John cited the same definition of *ingenium* that did Hugh. The common source was Isidore's *Etymologies* 10.122. Cf. *Didascalicon* III.8; *Metalogicon* I.11.

[941] *Entheticus major* 32.445–446: "Huic omnes artes famulae; mecanica quaeque dogmata, quae variis usibus apta vides." John further discussed the mechanical arts in *Policraticus* VI.20. Cf. *Didascalicon* II.1: "Philosophia dividitur in theoricam, practicam, mechanicam et logicam."

[942] *Did.* V.9.

[943] *Meta.* I.23.

[944] John frequently mentioned *ingenium* and *memoria* together, though in his more formal theorization he also included *ratio* (*Meta.* I.11–12). For example, see *Meta.* I.24; II.8; IV.3. For Hugh's treatment of *ingenium* and *memoria*, see *Did.* III.6,7, 11 and chapter 4, section 3, b. John did not discuss specific mnemo-techniques for acquiring or building a memory. It may be that these lay beyond his scope in *Metalogicon* to treat *ingenium.*

(as discussed earlier), John summed up his position with a quotation: "Hence a certain singularly wise man—whom I thank for the saying—said, 'Talent proceeds from nature, is helped by practice, is blunted by immoderate work but sharpened by temperate exercise.'"[945] That "wise man" was Hugh, whom John quoted verbatim without naming him.[946] Despite John's reticence to acknowledge Hugh, the quotation touches upon their agreement on the need to temper talent-reliance. Hugh's pedagogical program at Saint-Victor stood in opposition to the education offered in the Parisian schools, which he perceived as haphazard, disorderly, and inhibiting progress. John shared Hugh's concern that talent-reliant teaching failed to help students make progress in their studies. John's prescription to moderate talent-reliance resonated with Hugh's attempted remedy: order and method (*ordo et modus*). Rather than a curricular and disciplinary order—as Hugh laid out—John laid the responsibility upon the individual teacher. This section will examine how John's magister bore the responsibility to teach in the proper order and to maintain moderation in order to properly cultivate students' talents and so see them progress through their studies.

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Hugh crafted a pedagogical program in reactive opposition to the Parisian schools from which John received his education and for which he had affection. Despite these different

[945] *Meta.* I.11: "Unde egregie sapiens quidam, cui dicti habeo gratiam, ait. Ingenium a natura proficiscitur, usu iuvatur, immoderato labore retunditur, et temperato acuitur exercitio."
[946] Despite it being verbatim, I have not found this quotation recognized previously in the critical edition, nor generally in scholarship. See *Did.* III.7: "Ingenium a natura proficiscitur, usu iuvatur, immoderato labore retunditur, et temperato acuitur exercitio."

perspectives, both Hugh and John shared the concern that students in those schools make progress. Central to John's complaints against excessively talent-reliant masters is their pedagogical failure in carrying their students through a whole range of studies. John saw his neo-Abelardian model of dialectical teaching and talent-cultivation as aspects of the remedy. Dialectic brought clarity that allowed a master to furnish students with understanding, necessary for progress.[947] Further cultivating talent through exercise was a requisite: "For progress, two things are necessary: studious practice and a supporting vein of good natural talent."[948] Much of the *Metalogicon* (III–IV) consists of John's introduction of standard logical texts (such as *Categories, On Interpretation*, and *Prior and Posterior Analytics*). For each, he argued how it ought to be taught and the benefits it renders students. He often commended such dialectical texts for the progress they promise.[949] Finally, John's general critique of Parisian masters—including many of his teachers and friends—lies in his famous recollection of his years of studies.[950] Beginning with Abelard, John narrated moving to Alberic of Rheims and then to Robert of Melun for thorough dialectical training. He transferred to William of Conches for grammar,

[947] In *Metalogicon* II.15 (McGarry), John summed up his point: "I am convinced that none of the liberal disciplines has greater utility that this one [dialectic], which serves as an easy and pleasant pathway into all parts of philosophy" (109).
[948] *Meta.* III.10 (McGarry): "Ceterum ut quis veniat ad profectum, sicut studium exercitii, ita et venam laudabilis necesse est subesse ingenii."
[949] For example, see *Meta.* III.1, 3, 9; IV.7.
[950] This recollection (*Meta.* II.10) served rhetorically to advance John's argument, but it has been mined and debated extensively by scholars who have seen it as a window into the schoolrooms of early twelfth-century Paris. See K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, "John of Salisbury and Education in Twelfth-Century Paris from the Account of his *Metalogicon*," *History of Universities* 6 (1986–87): 1–45; Olga Weijers' "The chronology of John of Salisbury's studies in France (*Metalogicon* ii.10)," *The World of John of Salisbury* (Studies in Church History Subsidia 3), ed. Michael Wilks (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994): 109–116; David Bloch, *John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), 1–19.

Richard l'Evêque for review of quadrivium and rhetoric, and finally to Peter Helias for more rhetoric. Pinched by poverty, John began taking students and became colleagues with Adam of Balsham. After teaching for three years, John studied dialectic and theology with Gilbert of Poitiers, and then theology with Robert Pullen and Simon Poissy. John paused at this point in his narration: "I [had] thus spent almost twelve years in various studies."[951] As if to bookend the period, he resolved to return to his beginning at Mont-Ste-Geneviève, where he had left his friends and colleagues who had been engaged in dialectic. "I wanted to confer with them . . . and to estimate our progress by mutual comparison."[952] That comparison served to hammer home John's rhetorical point: "I found them just as, and where, they were when I had left them. They did not seem to have progressed as much as a hand's span."[953] John himself served as the model of progress—moving through the range of disciplines—to counterpoint masters who endlessly tarried "with the same questions whereby they used to stir their students."[954] Rather than a clear window into these schools, John articulated a cutting critique of the masters that educated him but whose lessons fail students.

To remedy the failure in progress, education requires proper order. Masters "pay no attention to proper order in teaching."[955] They pay no attention to the "mind of the author" but try to cover everything at once, rather than in their own place.[956] In isolation,

[951] *Meta.* II.10 (McGarry): "Sic fere duodennium mihi elapsum est, diversis studiis occupato."
[952] Ibid. (McGarry).
[953] Ibid. (McGarry): "Inventi sunt qui fuerant et ubi. Neque enim ad palmum visi sunt processisse."
[954] Ibid. (McGarry): "Quibus urgebant stimulis, eisdem et ipsi urgebantur."
[955] Ibid., II.19 (McGarry): "Deinde quod docendi ordine praetermisso diligentissime cavent ne singula quaeque locum teneant, sortita decenter."
[956] Ibid. (McGarry): "contra mentem auctoris."

logic is sterile, John argued, but coupled with the other arts, it provides a rationale or orderly path through them:

> [Logic] is rational, as we can see from its name what progress in philosophy comes to the one devoid of reason. For although someone has clear reason (what I call virtue of the soul), nevertheless there will be many hindrances in the pursuits of philosophy, if they do not have a plan [*ratio*] for the proposed tasks. That is a 'method,' i.e., a brief plan [*ratio*] that brings forth and speeds facility for what is proposed.[957]

Despite natural ability, one needs a plan of study to avoid roadblocks. Again resonating with Hugh, John had early called this plan for the arts "order and method [*ordo et modus*]":

> Philosophy prescribes that all things should be done with order and has established that there should be a method (*modus*) in all things. She teaches all things in order and transmits the cause and method of reading (*modus legendi*), and in all the arts order is pleasing.[958]

The many topics, texts, and questions of philosophical study require order and a plan (*ratio* or *modus*).

Although John's critique and terminology echoed Hugh's, his prescription differed. Hugh laid out in painstaking detail the authors, texts, and techniques for the student in *Didascalicon*. Though he discussed logical texts, John eschewed Hugh's curricular project. Only grammar and dialectic appear in the *Metalogicon*; rhetoric, the quadrivial arts, and sacred scriptures do not receive comment. Without a curricular

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[957] Ibid., II.5: "Rationalis enim est, ut constet ex nomine, quis ei sit in philosophia processu qui rationis expers est. Licet enim quis perspicacem habeat rationem animae virtutem dico, in philosophiae tamen negotiis ad multa subsistit offendicula, si non habeat rationem, propositi faciendi. Quae quidem est methodus, id est ratio compendiaria propositi pariens et expediens facultatem."

[958] *Entheticus major* 25.325–28 (Van Laarhoven): "Ordine cuncta geri praescribit Philosophia, / et statuit cunctis rebus inesse modum. / Ordine cuncta docet, causamque modumque legendi / tradit, et in cunctis artibus ordo placet." Cf. *Entheticus major* 27.
This phrasing reflects Hugh's prologue to *Didascalicon* where he announced his plan to treat *what* (*quid*), then, *in what order*, and finally *in what method* (*quo ordine et quomodo legendae sint*). See *Did. Praef.*

program, how is the student to know what and how to read? John would answer that knowing and maintaining the *ratio* for study is the responsibility not of students but of masters. John's *Metalogicon* indicts masters (many known to John) for ineffective teaching and lays upon them the burden of proper order and method in teaching. Because his critique lands on teachers rather than students, John did not need to specify minutely the plan or methods of instruction. Instead, John exhorted masters to develop a sense of moderation. The masters' duty to maintain moderation is the keystone to their other pedagogical duties of sharpening talents, pressing students to progress, and keeping the order of studies.

A student of Aristotle, John presumed a virtue ethics that sought the mean. That vices were excesses or deficiencies is everywhere assumed yet rarely stated in the many moral discussions of *Policraticus*.[959] Keeping the mean required discretion, a quality linked to the cardinal virtue of prudence—a moral quality John thought masters ought to impart to students.[960] Masters had to beware excess and deficiency in teaching: as an example of deficiency, early in *Metalogicon* John criticized students who raced through studies and prematurely set up as masters themselves.[961] But much more frequent and

[959] A few exceptions reveal this prevalent understanding: John defined frugality as the mean between prodigality and avarice (*Polic.* VIII.13); he attacked avarice at length, but he also criticized the austerity of Cistercians as failing in the mean (*Polic.* VIII.13). Gluttony is the failure of moderation, that banishes temperance in regards to eating and drinking (*Polic.* VIII.6). The prince must practice moderation (*Polic.* IV.8), which is the essence of virtue (IV.9).
Alongside John's Aristotelian views, which this chapter emphasizes, John also owed debts to Augustine in ethical thinking. For John's reception of Augustine, see Stephen Lake, "John of Salsibury," *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine,* 3 volumes, (ed) Karla Pollmann, Willemien Otten (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), III.1227–29.
[960] *Meta.* IV.12, 14; on discretion, compare *Polic.* VII.9.
[961] For the lazy and dull students of Cornificius who seemed rather than were wise, see *Meta.* I.2; for the *novi doctores* as offspring of Cornificius, see *Meta* I.3.

sharper barbs target teachers' excess. This was the very diagnosis of his colleagues at Ste-Geneviève: "They had progress in one respect merely, they had unlearned measure [*modus*], they knew not moderation. Indeed, to such a degree that their recovery could be despaired."[962] Masters—particularly of dialectic—tend to overly loquacious lessons: "They analyze and press upon tender ears everything that anyone has ever said or done. . . . They frequently come to be unintelligible to their hearers more because of the multiplicity that the profundity of their statements."[963] John saw their unintelligible loquacity as indicating their own poor education: "They compile the opinions of all and copy and report even the sayings or writings from insignificant sources on account of [their] lack of judgment. They publish all because they do not know how to advance the better."[964] Their pedagogical failure of unintelligibility compounds by extending minutiae interminably, delaying progress: dialectical masters must allow their students to put rudiments behind them and advance to more mature studies.[965] Against the immoderate faults of loquacity, indiscriminateness, and prolonged concentration, John referred to his ideal model of instruction in the person of Bernard of Chartres.

Bernard of Chartres (d. ca. 1124)—who was the master of William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, and Richard l'Evêque—was only known to John (who arrived for

[962] *Meta.* II.10: "Profecerant in uno dumtaxat, dedidicerant modum, modestiam nesciebant. Adeo quidem, ut de reparatione eorum posset desperari."
[963] Ibid., II.17 (McGarry): "Quicquid unquam ab aliquo dictum aut fictum est, excutiunt, et teneris ingerunt auribus, ut vitio quod a Cicerone arguitur saepe minus intellecti sint ob rerum multitudinem quam ob difficultatem." For John, inquiring into all matters shows lack of discretion (III.5).
[964] Ibid., II.7: "Compilant omnium opiniones, et ea quae etiam a vilissimis dicta vel scripta sunt ab inopia iudicii scribunt et referunt. Proponunt enim omnia, quia nesciunt praeferre meliora." Cf. II.7–8.
[965] Ibid., IV.29; II.7–8.

studies in 1136) by report.[966] Despite this tenuous connection, John ascribed to Bernard a method of teaching that was his model of careful, moderated exercises aiming at understanding and improvement. Bernard's instruction, according with Quintilian's recommendations, has two main parts: reading and exercise (*lectio* and *exercitatio*). *Lectio*, or reading with comments for students, was standard practice. Bernard's lectures excelled in shaking out (*excutatio*), that is, pointing out the notable features of the text, features that required explanation (such as literary figures), and relations to other disciplines.[967] Bernard aimed not at ostentation but at understanding and so tailored lessons to his students: "He would not teach everything in every part, but would weigh out the measure of his teaching to them according to the measure of their ability at the time."[968] Bernard's discretion regarding his students in turn embodied a lesson in discretion for them. He passed over insignificant things for the better and so imparted in his lectures an example of moderation.[969] *Lectiones* aimed at students' understanding of the text's features and parts, and through them Bernard also prevented over-loquacity and unintelligibility by keeping to proper order, moderation, and clarity.

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[966] See Bernard of Chartres, *Glosae super Platonem of Bernard of Chartres*, (ed.) Paul Dutton (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), 29.

[967] *Meta.* I.24; *excutatio* is an abstraction from John's imperatives: "Auctores excutiat, et sine intuentium risu eos plumis spoliet." "Excute Virgilum aut Lucanum."

[968] *Meta.* I.24: "Ita tamen ut non in singulis universa doceret, sed pro capacitate audientium dispensaret eis in tempore doctrinae mensuram." Compare John underlining the purpose of *lectiones* to facilitate progress by bringing understanding (III.1).

[969] *Meta.* I.24: "Id quoque inter prima rudimenta docebat et infigebat animis, quae in economia virtus, quae in decore rerum, quae in verbis laudanda sint, ubi tenuitas et quasi macies sermonis, ubi copia probabilis, ubi excedens, ubi omnium modus. . . . Superflua tamen fugienda dicebat, et ea sufficere quae a claris auctoribus scripta sunt." Compare John's comments on students over-taxed and over-burdened by excessive exercises: *Meta.* II.19.

Bernard's *lectiones* were not to show off his own genius, according to John, but rather to prepare students for exercises in imitation: texts given treatment "were to serve as models for the boys in their introductory exercises in imitating prose and poetry."[970] John repeated that it was the teacher's duty to cultivate students by exercise.[971] As early as his *Entheticus major,* John described this duty:

> They read much and they teach much and they keep the students from wandering, they urge them to know . . . they weigh the intellectual capacities [*ingenii vires pensant*], and the teacher gives all the students the amount that suits their own abilities.[972]

Even so, John depicted Bernard as examining his students for faults and exhorting them "to rise to real imitation of the authors."[973] Besides exercising their wits in imitation, Bernard also required mnemonic exercise: "He diligently and insistently demanded from each, as a daily debt, something committed to memory."[974] John presented Bernard's method of teaching effectively as three-staged: lecture, exercise in imitation, and exercise in memorization. "Since the memory is strengthened and the talent [*ingenium*] sharpened by exercise, he urged [students] to imitate what they had heard."[975] Bernard's instructions exemplify John's principles of moderated instruction for understanding and cultivation

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[970] *Meta.* I.24; "Quibus autem indicebantur praeexercitamina puerorum in prosis aut poematibus imitandis."
[971] *Meta.* IV.28; as early as *Entheticus major*, John articulated the teacher's duty.
[972] *Entheticus major* 26.351–54: "Multa legunt, et multa docet, prohibentque vagari / discipulos, urgent scire, vel esse domi; / ingenii vires pensant, mensuraque cunctis / a doctore datur viribus apta suis." Here John put this description into the mouth of the crowd of lazy students who complain about such genuine teaching.
[973] *Meta.* I.24 (McGarry, paraphrased): "Ad exprimendam auctorum imaginem modesta indulgentia conscendere iubebat, faciebatque ut qui maiores imitabatur, fieret posteris imitandus."
[974] *Meta.* I.24 (McGarry): "et ex singulis aliquid reconditum in memoria diurnum debitum diligenti instantia exigebat."
[975] *Meta.* I.24: "Et quoniam memoria exercitio firmatur, ingeniumque acuitur, ad imitandum ea quae audiebant, alios admonitionibus, alios flagellis et poenis urgebant."

of talent. Though John's comments on Bernard are relatively brief, the pedagogical model embodies the ideal that John exhorted or criticized other masters.[976]

By heavily emphasizing order and moderation for the sake of progress, then, John melded Hugonic themes into his neo-Abelardian methodology. This fusion represents John's own creative pedagogical synthesis. Yet beyond formal instruction, a final piece remains: moral instruction. John reported that Bernard ended each day with a final meeting that concluded with prayers, psalms, and a commendation. The rationale was that "it is not right to allow any school or day to be without religion," so "subject matter was presented to foster faith, to build up morals, and to inspire . . . good works."[977] These brief remarks point to John's belief that education, to be philosophical, must also be moral. The philosophical life of virtue shall be the topic of the final section.

## V. Philosophy for Virtue

The *Metalogicon* provided the site for John to work out his pedagogical views, that is, the principles that animate and guide the course of teaching toward certain desired ends. So far, our account has largely highlighted John's principles for formal instruction. However, John everywhere makes clear that formal instruction—technical expertise and knowledge—is only part of the desired end. Precisely, technical learning is but the corpse

[976] Moreoever, though Bernard's example was specified for grammar, the principles John used them to illustrate apply as easily to the other arts.

[977] *Meta.* I.24 (McGarry): "Sed quia nec scolam nec diem aliquam decet esse religionis expertem, ea proponebatur materia quae fidem aedificaret et mores, et unde qui convenerant quasi collatione quadam animarentur ad bonum."

if it is not animated, embodied in life. "For although she moulds the tongue and composes deeds, Philosophy above all teaches *living*. To live sincerely is the best part of philosophizing, without which, what is a fluent tongue good for? Nothing."[978] Philosophy is not learned, ultimately, but lived. For philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom "in which consists the distribution of all duties and the profession of the whole life. For as the Stoics said, the art of living rightly is the art of arts."[979] John's insistence that philosophy must be lived finds roots in the classics he loved. Peter von Moos pointed out that John's "link of knowing and doing" sprung from his "avowal of the educational ideal of Cicero and Quintilian, that is, of the inseparability of wisdom and eloquence, philosophy and rhetoric."[980] Pursuit of wisdom must be joined to a pursuit of virtue, a pairing that John saw as integrating life and learning. This final section will examine John's principles for moral education in dialectic for prudential deliberation and his exemplarist method of moral meditation.

John distinguished his principles of his moral education from Abelardian and Hugonic pedagogies by placing it as a secondary, lengthy process. Abelard described the dialectical questioning and discovery of truth itself as an imitation of Christ.[981] Hugh

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[978] *Entheticus major* 80.1249–52 (van Laarhoven): "Nam quamvis linguam formet, componat et actus, / vivere praecipue Philosophia docet. / Vivere sincere pars optima philosophandi est, / qua sine quid prodest lingua diserta? Nihil" (emphasis added).
[979] *Policraticus* V.9: "Etas namque mentis saptientia est in qua omnium officiorum consistit distributio et artificium totius vitae. Ars namque recte vivendi (ut Stoicis placet) ars artium est."
[980] "Solch synkretistisch anmutende Stellen über die Verbindung von Erkennen und Handeln sind wohl weniger bekannt als Johanns humanistische Bekenntnisse zum Bildungsideal Ciceros und Quintilians, d.h. zur Untrennbarkeit von sapientia und eloquentia, Philosophie und Rhetorik oder zu der—für die Exempla-Tradition zentralen—Idee der Überlegenheit der (römischen) Praxis über die (griechische) Theorie." See Peter von Moos, *Geschichte als Topik*, 167.
[981] See chapter 2, section 5.

distinguished formal learning from moral education (*doctrina* and *disciplina*, respectively): the former occurs in regimented curricular study, the latter through the communal life of bodily discipline that restrains vices and so allows charity to grow in the heart. For Hugh, *doctrina* and *disciplina* presupposed each other but did not draw from the same font.[982] John, on the other hand, separated the formation of virtue from formal study: it was not reading and argumentation itself that trained the soul. Yet one's moral improvement arose from the same materials of formal study, specifically from the honing of dialectical discernment of probable truth and from the accounts of virtue and wisdom from classical authors adopted as resources for meditation and imitation.

Virtue for John followed learning: he repeatedly said that reason's exercise in knowledge must precede virtue: "Therefore knowledge precedes the cultivation of virtue, for no one can truly seek that of which he is ignorant; nor can evil be effectively shunned unless it be known."[983] Understanding of desired goals (ultimately the *summum bonum*) and of evils to flee must precede formation of the necessary habits. Self-knowledge, with concomitant recognition of earthly vanity, John acknowledged as necessary for understanding.[984] Formal study, as treated earlier, makes use of dialectic as its instrument in all the arts. Through dialectic, one comes to an understanding of truth.[985]

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[982] Chapter 4 lays out the interplay of *doctrina* and *disciplina* in Hugh's pedagogical program.
[983] *Policraticus* III.1; (Pike) p. 154: "Praecedit ergo scientia virtutis cultum, quia nemo potest fideliter appetere quod ignorat, et malum nisi cognitum sit utiliter non cavetur." See also *Metalogicon* I.23.
[984] *Policraticus* III.2; for John's view of self-knowledge and the theme of repudiating *vanitas mundi*, see *Metalogicon* IV.35, 42; *Policraticus* III.8, et passim.
[985] John summarized this position: "cum eo tendat dialectices tota intentio ut sermonum vim aperiat, et ex eorum praedicatione examinandi veri et statuendi scientiam assequatur. Hoc agit sive dividat, sive definiat, sive colligat, sive ea quae fuerint collecta resolvat" (*Meta.* III.2.72ff).

The truth that interests John, however, is not that of certain, demonstratable proofs, but rather probable truth.[986] Many things do not admit demonstrable proof, but one must deliberate as to the best course of action regardless. Dialectic functions for John as the necessary science to inform the deliberative virtue that is prudence. Drawing upon Cicero, John described the practical necessity of prudence:

> [Its subject matter] is truth. [Avoiding deception], prudence looks to the future, and forms providence; recalls what has happened in the past, and accumulates a treasury of memories; shrewdly appraises what is present, and begets astuteness or discernment. . . . And when it has ascertained the truth, prudence develops into a form of scientific knowledge.[987]

Prudence is John's moral lynchpin, assessing past, present, and future by one's mental store of knowledge and skills. It is the virtue needed most by those active in doubtful affairs of the church or of the realm to which offices many of the students of the Parisian schools were beginning to flock.[988] John's own letters reflect his admiration of *prudentia* in navigating uncertain waters of archiepiscopal or royal concerns.[989] By prudential deliberation, one puts dialectical discrimination of probable truth in service of ethics, or rather in service of living philosophically.[990] John summarized the dialectical-prudence relationship for the philosophical life as he began his defense of dialectic:

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[986] See *Meta.* IV.8; II.14; also discussed earlier in section 3.
[987] *Meta.* IV.12 (McGarry): "Materia enim huius virtutis in qua exercetur veritas est, reliquarum vero domesticae quaedam necessitates. Ne ergo undecumque fallatur, ad futura prospectum intendit, et providentiam format, vel praeterita ad mentem revocans thesaurizat memoriae, vel de praesentibus callet, et astutiae vel calliditatis speciem parit, aut se pariter ad universa diffundit, et ei circumspectio nascitur. Cum autem veritatem fuerit assecuta, in speciem scientiae transit."
[988] On career opportunities and challenges presented by universities, see Richard Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1970), 277–79, 293–94.
[989] For example, see Ep 20; 32; 70; 92 (with sarcasm); 95; 96;.
[990] For John's insistence that dialectic is to be used for other disciplines and for philosophy, see *Meta.* II.9.

> Of all things the most desirable is wisdom, whose fruit consists in the love of what is good and the practice of virtue. Consequently, the human mind must apply itself to the quest of wisdom, and thoroughly study and investigate questions in order to formulate clear and sound judgments concerning each. Logic is exercised in inquiry into the truth. The latter . . . is the subject matter of that primary virtue which is called "prudence."[991]

By harnessing the intellectual powers to make judgments about various questions, prudence becomes "the root of all the virtues."[992] While Hugh of Saint-Victor hoped his canons would develop discretion for applying the principles of discipline in the diverse situations of life (rather than relying on a master of novices), John went a step farther, applying the machinery of dialectical discrimination to clarify prudential deliberation in the many situations of life.

Upon what does this machinery of dialectical prudence work? John repeatedly argued that dialectic is sterile when isolated; to be fruitful, it must work with something else.[993] The material to guide prudence lay in the earlier stage of formal education: grammar. To study grammar, one read classical poets and histories. The direct aim of these readings (*lectiones*) is learning the grammatical figures, tropes, and faults in order

[991] *Meta.* II.1 (McGarry).
[992] Ibid.; it is worth noting that although this may seem a ready appropriation of Aristotelian thought regarding prudence (φρόνησις) and the intellectual virtues (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1143b–1144b), Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* would not circulate in Latin translation for nearly a century after John composed his main works. John relied upon Ciceronian and Boethian sources to assemble his own views on virtues. This fact has also been pointed out by Cary Nederman and John Brückman, "Aristotelianism in John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21 (1983): 203–205, 209. Rather than a source for ethics, Aristotle typified for John a pure dialectician, and he attributed to Aristotle personally virtues and vices accordingly, specifically clarity, incisiveness in argument, and talent, as well as an inordinate love of fame and praise. See *Policraticus* VII.6.
[993] Cf. *Meta.* II.9.

to recognize, understand, and imitate the best writing.[994] By these lessons, grammar alone makes one "literate [*literatus*]" and opens the door to liberal studies.[995]

The direct fruit is the art of grammar. Yet the indirect fruit of grammatical reading surpasses the art through gathering and utilizing *exempla.* In reading the histories and poets, one accumulates a store of examples (*exempla*). Examples (*exampla,* παραδείγματα) are short anecdotal narratives that may point to a moral. *Exempla* as a genre resist easy definition. They include historical anecdotes, artificial anecdotes (such as fables, myths, parables, analogies, and images), and sayings (*dicta, sententiae*).[996] *Exempla* played a role in classical rhetoric to highlight, illustrate, reinforce, and draw analogies in the service of an argumentative point. Throughout his writings, John solidly placed himself within the rhetorical tradition of *exemplum*-usage. In his own *Historia pontificalis*, John gave his purpose in providing *exempla* so that posterity may see the invisible hand of God and "may by examples of reward or punishment be made more zealous in the fear of God and pursuit of justice." Citing the *Distichs of Cato,* he amplified both moral and deliberative functions: "For, as the pagan says, 'The lives of others are our teachers'; and whoever knows nothing of the past hastens blindly into the future."[997] One gathers

[994] *Meta.* I.14–20.
[995] *Meta.* I.24.128–32; I.13.
[996] Von Moos's treatment of the *exemplum*-tradition is magisterial. For classifications among classical sources and their transmission, see *Geschichte als Topik*, 48–69.
[997] *Historia pontificalis* (Chibnall): "ut per ea que facta sunt conspiciantur invisibilia Dei, et quasi propositis exemplis premii vel pene, reddant homines in timore Domini et cultu iustitie cautiores. . . . Nam, ut ait ethnicus [*Disticha Catonis* III.13], *aliena vita nobis magistra est,* et qui ignarus est preteritorum, quasi cecus in futurorum prorumpit eventus." Cf. Von Moos, *Geschicte,* 8–9. John thus cited an *exemplum* (*dictum*) here to support the *exemplum*-method. For other instances of John's exemplum method, see *Ep.* 224 (for the *exempla sanctorum*), cf. Von Moos, *Geschichte,* 1–2.

*exempla*, then, in order to use them later in writing or speech. In this context, John's staged plan for philosophy and virtue receives clarity. The "chief things" for philosophy and virtue are reading, teaching, meditation, and practice (*lectio, doctrina, meditatio, et assiduitas operis* or *exercitio boni operis*).[998] The first two constitute formal study whereby one gathers *exempla* (into memory). Meditation and practice are secondary stages, putting those *exempla* to use for moral and deliberative clarification. Meditation "reaches out farther to what is unknown, and often even rises to the incomprehensible by penetrating . . . even the hidden recesses of questions."[999] Practice is a protracted stage of living the morale of the *exempla*, either by imitating virtue or avoiding vice. Von Moos described this dual function of *exempla*:

> The function of the *exempla maiorum* . . . is the exhortation to imitate moral models. Other *exempla* are meant for warding off. [John's method relied on] imitation or avoidance of good or bad examples and respective consequences: reward or punishment (either in this world or the next).[1000]

By these latter stages of meditation and practice of *exempla* (admirable or cautionary), one gains lifelong resources for moral improvement.

The goal of stocking a mnemonic treasury of *exempla* was the reason for John's insistence upon thorough and devoted grammatical study. In this context, John argued,

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[998] John cited the four stages slightly differently in the subsequent chapter: cf. *Meta.* I.23; I.24.
[999] *Meta.* I.23 (McGarry).
[1000] Von Moos, *Geschichte,* 176: "Die Funktion der im *Policraticus*-Prolog angesprochenen *exempla maiorum* (und zweifellos auch der im Werk selbst häufig verwendeten Geschichten) ist die *exhortatio* zur Nachahmung moralischer Vorbilder. Andere Exempla sind der *dehortatio* gewidmet, sollen abschrecken. Naturgemäß verwendet Johann auch den für die pragmatische Geschichtsschreibung aller Zeiten grundlegenden Prologtopos von der 'Nachfolge und Meidung' guter bzw. Böser Beispiele und von den entsprechenden (entweder diesseitigen oder jenseitigen) Folgen: Lohn bzw. Strafe." Von Moos is explicating here the passage from *Policraticus* prologus, where John explained his *exemplum* method. John quoted Macrobius for this method in *Policraticus* VIII.9; see also III.11; IV.4, 6.

"philology [*Philologia*] comes first," then her sisters that guard against error and confer virtue.[1001] Though he did not explain this *exemplum* method in detail in *Metalogicon*—as I argued earlier, John's purpose in *Metalogicon* was to work out an account of *ingenium* in pedagogy—the reader finds John exercising the exemplary method for his didactic works, such as *Policraticus*. The *Policraticus*, perhaps John's greatest work (with prefatory *Entheticus in Policraticum*), addressed Thomas Becket personally, who was then royal chancellor and prodigal archdeacon of Canterbury. As secretary to Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury, John sought to reclaim the errant Thomas, to coax him away from the lures of the courts, and recruit him to the cause of ecclesiastical rights and reform.[1002] As it was written for particular individuals (for Becket, and to be circulated among John's circle of friends), *Policraticus* was a didactic work that aimed to instruct and influence particular individuals; it is not a pedagogical work but rather a site where a pedagogical technique was performed. That John was able to exhibit so fully his exemplum-method in *Policraticus* evinced his own encyclopedic, grammatical training with William of Conches and others.[1003]

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[1001] *Meta.* IV.20 (McGarry).

[1002] As described earlier (section I), *Policraticus* began as John's exercise in self-consolation, but it morphed in composition and by his editorial work to this instructive purpose. For background on John and Becket, two articles in *The World of John of Salisbury* are good sources. See Christopher Brooke, "John of Salisbury and his world" (1–20), and Anne Duggan, "John of Salisbury and Thomas Becket" (427–38) in *WJS*, Studies in Church History Subsidia 3 (ed. Michael Wilks) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994). For John's intention to inspire reform, see *Policraticus* VI.pro.

[1003] It has been suggested that John's inability to support himself as a teacher was due to his overly burdensome, grammatical demands for his students. See Keats-Rohan, "John of Salisbury and Education in Twelfth-Century Paris," *History of Universities* 6 (1986–7): 25–27.

In the didacticism of *Policraticus,* John yet remained consistent with his four-stage progress (*lectio, doctrina, meditatio, exercitatio*). For John exerted himself to reveal the vanities of courtly pursuits and the merits of philosophical imitation in an expansive work replete with *exempla.* John explained that *exempla* are to be gathered from all:

> The very material which I for the most part use belongs to others, unless it be that whatever has been well said by anyone I make my own, and express, sometimes in paraphrase in my own words, and again, to inspire confidence and carry weight, in the words of the author.[1004]

John selected and intended the material that would best bring about Becket's conversion. John repeatedly reminded that the examples are for imitation.[1005] "Their deeds are so many incentives to virtue; their words so many lessons in morals. Finally, their life, with its record of vices subdued . . . is like an arch of triumph."[1006] By recounting imitable *exempla* with explanations, John effectively offered Becket the *lectio* and *doctrina.* He urged Becket to retain them in memory for meditation: "It is of little profit to have the law in one's wallet if it is not faithfully treasured in the soul. Therefore, it is to be read all the days of his life."[1007] For these dual benefits of deliberative clarity and moral improvement, John posited liberal arts study as necessary for rulers: "It is crystal clear how necessary is a knowledge of letters to princes who are thus commanded to turn over the law of God

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[1004] *Policraticus* I.pro (Pike); referring to using fables for instruction: "Haec quoque ipsa quiblus plerumque utor, aliena sunt, nisi qui quicquid ubique bene dictum est facio meum, et illud nunc meis ad compendium nunc ad fidem et auctoritatem alienis exprimo verbis."
[1005] For example, V.6; IV.6.
[1006] *Policraticus* IV.6 (Dickinson): "Illorum utique gesta virtutum incitamenta sunt. Verba quot sunt, tot institutiones morum. Denique vitam vitiis subiugatis et captivatis quasi arcum triumphalem consecratum posteritati magnificae virtutis titulis erexerunt."
[1007] Ibid., "Legem siquidem habere in mantica parum prodest, nisi fideliter custodiatur in anima. Legenda est ergo omnibus diebus vitae suae." For urgings to meditation, see also *Poli.* IV.6; IV.7; V.6; VI.8.

in daily reading. . . . But plainly he will be hardly able to do so if he is illiterate."[1008] Though Becket had been schooled, John wielded his four-stage progress (like Bernard of Chartres) for philosophy and virtue to urge his student to improvement.

John's exemplum-pedagogy—whether practiced for individuals or for a school—distinguished itself from his dialectical emphasis by appealing less to truth as to affect. John's first lines of *Policraticus* discuss the "most pleasing fruit of letters."[1009] As John paraphrased or altered *exempla*, his aim was not historical or even notional precision but their effect. In this, John's pedagogy holds a tension between the truth-discrimination of dialectic and the secondary, affective aims of grammar. Citing his own examples, John explicitly avoided tedium and sought attractive material.[1010] Translating this to pedagogy, the teacher ought to utilize *exempla* to appeal sweetly to students: "A dutiful teacher urges on his pupils by his affection so that his efforts can take effect." Words that may seem harsh, "love renders sweet."[1011] The use of appealing *exempla* ties into John's view that teachers should deal sweetly with their students. John thought teachers should lecture "sweetly" and acknowledged that others criticized him for being "overindulgent out of charity" in order that students learn their lessons.[1012] In short, John saw the value

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[1008] *Poli*., IV.6: "Ex quibus liquido constat quam necessaria sit principibus peritia litterarum, qui legem Domini cotidie revolvere lectione iubentur. . . . Hoc utique sine difficultate illiteratus non faciet."
[1009] *Poli.* I.pro: "Iocundissimus cum in multis tum in eo maxime est litterarum fructus."
[1010] For example, *Poli.* III.8; VIII.20.
[1011] *Entheticus major* 94: "Provocat affectu discentes officiosus / doctor, ut effectum possit habere labor; / nemo libens audit suspecti verba magistri, / quae licet aspera sint, dulcia reddit amor." On winning over the reader, see *Ethet. maj*., 124.
[1012] *Meta.* III.1: "Littera enim suaviter excutienda est, et non more captivorum acerbe torquenda." Ibid., III.4 (McGarry): "Ceterum si plus iusto, caritati indulgeatur, quae ad prima artis elementa studiosius redes et detrectantes invitat."
Notably, John also went out of his way to add a seventh "key of knowledge" to those handed on by the *dictum* of Bernard of Chartres, namely, love for the teacher. The teacher's duty is to render the

in appealing not only to the intellect through logical precision and clarity but also to the heart.

Yet in recognizing the affective appeal, John also recognized the limits of what education could accomplish in morals. "[Seneca] thought that liberal disciplines do not make a man good. I agree. . . . Knowledge puffs up and only charity makes a man good."[1013] Liberal education does not produce goodness but only plants the seed. "Grammar . . . implants, as it were, the seed [of virtue] in nature's furrow after grace has readied the ground." Grace again is necessary—John reminded the reader—to cultivate virtue's shoots.[1014] John's insistence upon grace propounds the limitation of pedagogy, particularly in morals. Even with an effective pedagogical method, not only must the student elect to learn and improve, but also divine agency must also intervene graciously for the seeds of virtue to sprout and grow.

## VI. Conclusion

John's pedagogical thought sprung from a persistent worry about the role and nature of talent but developed into an articulation of his innovative synthesis of Abelardian and Hugonic elements with a robust role for grammar as moral guide. Unlike the other figures of this study, John spent much of his career away from the schools in an active

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relationship harmonious and so that the students "are glad to listen to those whom they love." See *Poli.* VII.14 (Pike, p. 271).

[1013] *Meta.* I.22: "Sentit hic quod disciplinae liberales virum bonum non faciunt. Ego ei consentio, et de aliis hoc ipsum arbitror. Scientia enim inflat [1 Cor 8.1], sed caritas sola virum facit bonum."

[1014] *Meta.* I.23 (McGarry): "Unde constat quod grammatica quae istorum fundamentum est et radix, quodam modo sementem iacit quasi in sulcis naturae, gratia tamen praeeunte, quae si ei cooperatrix quoque affuerit, in solidae virtutis robur coalescit." For the necessary role of grace in education, see also *Enthetiuc maj.*, §18–19.

life of affairs producing abundant correspondence and other literary texts. By way of conclusion, I shall touch upon a link between John's pedagogical thought and his more famous political and literary reputation and activities in his career. John of Salisbury has been most famous for what scholars have dubbed his humanism. John made this reputation for himself by his classical references, literary refinement, and political theory in *Politcraticus.* This chapter argued that John's *Metalogicon* answered persistent pedagogical worries that surfaced already in *Policraticus.* There would seem to be a connection between his humanistic work and thought and his pedagogical thought—but what is this link? In order to propose an answer, we can also return to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter: why did John not return to teaching when impoverished and in exile with Becket? To suggest an answer to these questions, I will point to the fit between John's pedagogical emphases and the present need to counter the deceptions and moral turpitude of courtly flatterers in John's irenic vision of royal and ecclesial reform.

Though he was rhetorically adept, John's pedagogical attention—as this chapter showed—lay primarily on grammar and dialectic. Grammar by its moral grounding and dialectic by its discernment of probable truth equip the student for practical exegencies. Grammar not only provided the path into the arts but also, more importantly, provided moral formation. Broad reading in histories and poets furnished the student with *exempla* for moral guidance: attractive models for their emulation and cautionary warning against vicious excesses or deficiencies. Studying grammar, then, John envisioned his students

soaking up and retaining in memory a wealth of moral *exempla* that would provide moral guidance for life's narrow straits. Dialectic, likewise, served practical ends throughout life. It equipped one to discern the probable truth in doubtful matters and to detect fallacies and trickery.

Compared to grammar and dialectic, rhetoric was left wanting. Yet when we turn our attention to John's perspective on the courts, we find a rhetorical overabundance flowing from the mouths of sycophantic courtiers. Amidst his criticism of courtly culture, John presented his political vision, in which the Crown's effective and just rule coincides with the good of the spiritual, that is, ecclesiastical, element by adhering to the divinely ordained natural order. The irenicism of John's presentation lies in his clever displacement of authorities and in his evenhanded articulation of both ecclesial and royal complaints. For the former, John eschewed deriving authority from the church, that is, from concilliar or papal canons, but instead displaced his authorities to classical sources of politics, deriving from nature, from the organic, bodily metaphor of the commonwealth. He went so far as to fabricate a letter of Plutarch to Emperor Trajan that detailed the rightly ordered polity from the kingly Head to peasant foot[1015] Pseudo-Plutarch offered John a creative opportunity to formulate a polity in line with his

[1015] The discussion of the letter ascribed to Plutarch for Trajan begins *Policraticus* V.1. Hans Liebeschütz first convincingly argued that John fabricated the letter of Plutarch, in "John of Salisbury and pseudo-Plutarch," *Journal of Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 6 (1943): 33–39. Janet Martin put this into the context of John's broader classicism, in "John of Salisbury as Classical Scholar," *The World of John of Salisbury,* ed. Michael Wilks (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 179–201, here 195–201. In that same volume, Max Kerner published a dissenting view ("Randbemerkungen zur *Institutio Traiani*," 203–206).

reforming vision uner the guise of classical authorities, rather than citing decretals and canons that he had studied with Vacarius at Canterbury.[1016]

Secondly, beside appealing to non-ecclesiastical authorities, John demonstrated sympathy with royalist complaints by airing cutting critiques of the clergy and clerical vices. John satirized many follies and vices in *Policraticus* but consistently paired the vices of courtiers with those of clerics, or rather, frequently showed that not just courtiers but also clerics suffer the same vices. No doubt that vicious pairing partly sprung from the pluralism of secular and sacred offices, that is, individuals mixing civil and ecclesial offices—a practice that John also sought to reform.[1017] John castigated the greed of prelates, who ambitiously grasp after advancement, making themselves into simoniacs, who sniff after new offices and income, and lay out hefty sums in pursuit of exemptions and privileges.[1018] Counterbalancing his frank speech about the prince and the tyrant, John recounted his bold complaint in person to Pope Adrian IV, reporting the oppression of the poor conducted by tyrannical prelates in their dazzling palaces—even pointing out the Roman curia's role in perpetuating and rewarding that corruption.[1019] These vicious clerics parallel the predations of courtiers, but were worse on account of their self-concealment in the vestment of orders—particular the would-be reforming orders of Carthusians, Cistercians, Cluniacs, and canons regular.[1020] John's irenicism, then, did not

[1016] On Vacarius, see Richard Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe* II: The Heroic Age (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 155–166, and Avrom Saltman, *Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury* (London: Athlone Press, 1956), 175.
[1017] *Polic.* VII.17, 20.
[1018] *Polic.* V.16.
[1019] *Polic.* VI.24.
[1020] *Polic.* VII.21–22; cf. VII.24.

exhort the ruler to adhere to an ecclesial gold standard, but posited two dimensions of parallel corruption—courtly and ecclesial—that demanded remedial reforms in accordance with a third authority, which is natural order as understood through reading classical authors, whom he supplied or invented.

In this vision of mutually beneficial reform, where does the source of corruption lie? For John, the particular vices share a source in the corrupting root of abusive rhetoric, that is, in the flatterer (*adulator*). John's treatment of flattery bookends his politics (*Polic.* III–VI); diverse species of flatterers occupy nearly all of Book III and reccur in Book VI to put Socratic frank counsel and self-cultivation into relief. As with the Cornificians, John typified the flatterer through the *persona* of the sycophantic and treacherous slave Gnatho, from Terence's comedy *The Eunuch*. The tribe of Gnathians haunt the courts, royal and ecclesial, spreading contagious corruption.[1021]

The flatterer, then, functioned for John as the source and perpetuator of the predations of the avaricious, ambitious, foolish, and proud, which necessitated reform. Flattery corrupted in a twofold way: by obscuring the truth in deception, and by suggesting and applauding wickedness and thus leading astray. The duality appears from their introduction: "The flatterer is the enemy of all virtue and forms as it were a cataract over the eye," In the latter case, the flatterer blots out truth and reason by gushing words: "He [blinds] keen vision and [puts] out the modicum of light," and he "stops up

[1021] *Policraticus* III almost wholly targets the flatterers, but they frequently recur as the opponents of truth and morals (cf. *Polic.* V.10; VI.27; VI.30; VIII.2–3).

the ears of his listeners that they may not hear the truth. I hardly know anything that can be more disastrous than this."[1022] Sycophantic words drown out the wise and obscure one's own right reason.

Secondly, having beguiled his target, the flatterer commends and applauds his vice and so "[plunges] him blinded by all the deceptions of vanity into degrading vice and down into the bottomless abyss."[1023] In opposition to the frank speech of the true friend, as John repeatedly reminds us, the flatterer following his own vices leads his patrons into destruction. For they "always speak to give pleasure" and so "even when friends are in error [he] bellows 'Bravo! Bravo!' to their undoing."[1024] By this insidious prong—blinding then misleading—John placed flatterers as the root of civic and ecclesial corruption as well as those who prevented its reform. John's reform strategy in *Policraticus,* then, hinges on the effort for officers and prelates such as then-chancellor and archdeacon Thomas Becket to overcome blindness and moral turpitude in order to recognize flattery's threat and to resist it.

There is, then, a fittingness between the needs of reform and the fruits of liberal education to counter the flatterers. As we have seen, John presented the arts as equipping

[1022] Ibid., III.4 (Pike): "Adulator enim omnis virtutis inimicus est et quasi clauum figit in oculo illius cum quo sermonem conserit, eoque magis cavendus est quo sub amantis specie nocere non desinit donec rationis obtundat acumen et modicum id luminis quod adesse videbatur extinguat. . . . Quo quid possit esse perniciosius non facile dixerim."
[1023] Ibid., III.4 (Pike): "Quid vero infidelius est quam eum cui fidem debeas circumvenire verborum blanditiis, ludibrio habitus, gestus transfiguratione, et totius vanitatis, lenocinio excaecatum in sordes vitiorum impellere et praecipitationis abyssum?"
[1024] Ibid., III.4 (Pike): "Hoc siquidem genus hominum omnia loquentium ad voluptatem, ad veritatem nichil. Verba oris eius iniquitas et dolus qui etiam errantibus amicis ad eorum subversionem ingeminat 'Euge, euge.' "

the student with dialectic for discerning probable truth and grammar, the *exempla* of which offer moral guidance and warning through meditation. Against the efforts to blind and deafen through sweet rhetoric and whispering, then, the educated may dialectically sift out the dross and find the practical course in the light of right reason. Against the sweet applause for vice, the educated may find in moral *exempla* counter-models of virtues to imitate and may foresee the downfall awaiting the vicious. John's liberal arts pedagogy, then, by arming the student with dialectic for practical reason and model for moral guidance, fit the perceived needs of his time to enact his vision of civic and ecclesial reform.[1025]

From this fittingness of liberal education to the cause of reform, we may derive our hypothetical answer to our questions as to John's refusal to teach again and as to the link between his pedagogical thought and his larger reformist efforts. Despite poverty and indignity, John saw the schools as preparation for the arena: the cause of reform pressed during Becket's dispute with Henry II. Equipped as he was to shift and determine pragmatic right reason and to proffer needful moral *exempla*, John labored to end the dispute by reconciling Henry and Becket. In keeping with his irenic vision of reform, John

[1025] This view agrees in many respects with what Peter von Moos argued, but presses further into the contextual framing of John's reformist career. Von Moos has also argued that John paused to write the *Metalogicon* in order to work out the method of probable dialectic as the theoretical undergirding for the *exemplum*-method exercised in the *Policraticus.* That explanation of the link is only partial, for, as I have argued, a fuller explanation must also account for the development of his pedagogical thought regarding *ingenium,* broached but immature in *Policraticus.* Furthermore, probable logic is not only part of what John saw as necessary for "public utility" (*Exemplum,* 245–47?) but also the grammatical grounding for the moral function of the *exemplum*-method that he exercised in *Policraticus* (as *Metalogicon* shows). Thus, both John's grammatical and dialectical accounts serve as rationale for the proposed reforming project in *Policraticus* that he hoped would win over Becket. See Peter von Moos, "The Use of *Exempla* in the *Policraticus* of John of Salisbury," *World of John of Salisbury,* ed. Michael Wilks, 245–47; *Geschichte als Topik,* 239–40, 286–309.

waged the conflict by positioning himself not as a partisan of the church against the Angevin crown but as against the untruth and turpitude that plagued them both.

It is no accident, then, that John composed his pedagogical *Metalogicon* side-by-side with his vision for reform in *Policraticus.* John evinces a fitting correlation between the cultivation of the liberal arts and their practical exercise in service of reform. Were the schools to teach as John thought they ought, their arts would prepare talented students to be equal to the difficulties and temptations facing reformers in the world. Recognition of this link between John's reformist humanism and his pedagogy leads us to recast his humanism. A prominent and magisterial scholar has suggested that we should understand John's humanism as "the idea that a human being is meant to achieve, during life, a fair measure of human happiness. It implies, of course, that happiness is to be sought in a human way."[1026] Yet this appears too broad. The aims and means of all of John's writings—his verse satires, his *Policraticus,* the affairs conducted in his letters, and the liberal arts that *Metalogicon* presents—all aim at and promote the cause of overaching reform. John's humanism begins in the liberal arts, which bear the seeds whose cultivation will grow into a maturity capable of dispelling frauds and keeping firm moral guidance as sure remedies for present evils.

[1026] See Cary Nederman, *John*, 42–43. Nederman quoted the definition of Gerald Walsh, S.J., from *Medieval Humanism* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1942), 1. For an account that better captures the reformist quality of John's humanism, see Klaus Guth, "Hochmittelalterlicher Humanismus als Lebensform: Ein Beitrag zum Standesethos des Westeuropäischen Weltklerus nach Johannes von Salisbury," *The World of John of Salisbury,* ed. Michael Wilks, 63–76, here 69–76.

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