@article{Authoritarian:1748,
      recid = {1748},
      author = {Hwang, In Hyee},
      title = {Managing the Threat to Social Stability: Authoritarian  Survival through Selective Welfare Provision in China},
      publisher = {University of Chicago},
      school = {Ph.D.},
      address = {2018-03},
      pages = {155},
      abstract = {China has experienced an unprecedented expansion of social  welfare benefits in the absence of substantive political  reform. Despite the expansion of welfare benefits, access  to such benefits varies widely between and within provinces  in China. What explains the disparity

in the provision of  welfare benefits? What is the political mechanism behind  the selective distribution of benefits in China? Building  upon theories of authoritarian survival and redistribution,  this dissertation argues that in non-competitive  authoritarian regimes like China, the selective provision  of welfare benefits is closely associated with the need to  secure regime survival. In other words, the selective  distribution of benefits is used to target and buy-off  individuals perceived to be potential opponents to the  regime for the purposes of

maintaining regime stability.  By studying the subnational variation of provincial urban  pension coverage and the individual reception of pension  benefits in rural China, I find that local governments  expand pension coverage in order to preempt political  insurgencies that

may arise from China's economic  transition to a market economy. I further find that  specific attributes of collective incidents or unrest  provide a signaling mechanism for the threat to regime  stability, prompting government concessions in the form of  welfare benefits. Finally, I also offer an argument about  how the process of setting up these welfare institutions to  combat social discontent has affected the generation of  social capital, and explain how this may in turn affect the  regime's ability to secure political survival.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/1748},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.1748},
}