000001724 001__ 1724
000001724 005__ 20250829130727.0
000001724 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.6082/uchicago.1724
000001724 041__ $$aeng
000001724 245__ $$aThe Point of Equal Access to Justice: On the Duty to, at Times and Provisionally, Pause, Cool Down and Listen
000001724 260__ $$bUniversity of Chicago
000001724 269__ $$a2019-03
000001724 300__ $$a428
000001724 336__ $$aDissertation
000001724 502__ $$bJ.S.D.
000001724 520__ $$aABSTRACT

What is the source of Governments’ commitments in the administration of justice? Why, and when, should Governments pay for private lawyers? Should actual users of legal services be asked to pay for (at least some of) these costs? How should we identify the relevant costs anyways?

Does the protection of equality matter for how we answer these questions? If so, which conception of equality is best suited for understanding its claims in the administration of justice? Which kinds of limits should Governments be authorized to impose on the use of legal services, in order to protect their equal availability?

These are (some of) the central normative questions in the field of access to justice. Their respective answers directly affect the way we should think about many pressing and urgent political questions. 

This essay argues that the comparative best way to think about these questions is to begin by identifying our moral, pre-political interest, which we all share as humans, in protecting the abilities (or behavioral functions) involved in access to justice. Given the kind of beings that we are (responsive to reasons of various kinds, sociable, and having needy and temporal bodies), we are morally interested in our ability to disagree with others in certain qualified ways. This moral interest is what triggers the recognition of a (moral) duty to, at times, and provisionally, pause, cool down, and listen.

We ought to demand that Governments pay for the administration of justice, and even pay (at times at least) for private lawyers, because we recognize as morally binding, for ourselves and for others, the reasonable authority of the duty on our activities and interests. 

This essay further proposes three political principles, which should help one to think well about public intervention the field. We should model public institutions in access to justice as a means to protect people from hierarchical social relations, as a means to protect the epistemic capacities of public institutions, and as a means to express a democratic culture in dispute resolution.
000001724 542__ $$fCC BY-NC-ND
000001724 650__ $$aLaw
000001724 650__ $$aPhilosophy
000001724 653__ $$aAccess to Justice
000001724 653__ $$aCapabilities
000001724 653__ $$aDemocratic cooperation
000001724 653__ $$aProcedural law
000001724 653__ $$aSocial equality
000001724 690__ $$aLaw School
000001724 7001_ $$aSegatti, Marco$$uUniversity of Chicago
000001724 72012 $$aTom Ginsburg
000001724 72014 $$aDavid Strauss
000001724 8564_ $$9713ff738-8980-4c88-9d38-3bb52995a7c6$$ePublic$$s21299419$$uhttps://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/1724/files/Segatti_uchicago_0330D_14695.pdf
000001724 909CO $$ooai:uchicago.tind.io:1724$$pDissertations$$pGLOBAL_SET
000001724 983__ $$aDissertation