

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

OTHER THAN HONORABLE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
CITIZENSHIP-FOR-SERVICE, 1918-1965

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ABSTRACT

Non-citizen service members have yet to be welcomed as political members of society with the autonomy and liberty to participate as formal citizens upon enlisting for military service and, in some instances, even after fulfilling service requirements. This claim should come as no surprise to critics that argue immigrants should in fact be pre-political until they've met and satisfied the requirements for incorporation. However, non-citizen service members are not traditional immigrants in the sense that they are surrendering their life to the host country and performing the obligations of citizens while lacking any say in who gets to send them to war, how and when they will be incorporated, and ultimately who will represent and defend their interest. Thus, the practice of enlisting and recruiting non-citizens in the military without immediate recognition as political members in the U.S. challenges and abandons the principles and ideals, like civic virtue and participatory citizenship, inherent in the Citizen-Soldier tradition that have been central in forming and maintaining republics.

This dissertation is characterized by the following questions: What prompted the U.S. to abandon the Citizen-Soldier tradition at the turn of the 20th century? What types of communities would be affected by such a change and how did they respond? More importantly, what can be done to reconcile the inherent principle in the Citizen-Soldier tradition that serving in the military constructed part of the basis for citizenship? Utilizing an observable implications approach, I analyzed archival documents from nine archival sites across the U.S. and Mexico. The archives are broken up into three different groups: Congressional, Organizational, and Mexican archives. I ultimately conclude that the decline in access to citizenship-for-service can be attributed to particular restrictionist racial ideologies members of Congress were committed. Moreover, Mexican American civic organizations committed to a politics of respectability I identify as "brown respectability" failed to support Mexican non-citizen service members in their pursuit at improving their legal status after completing their military service. Thus, the transformation of citizenship-for-service to service-for-citizenship can be attributed to both institutional and community level factors.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At the “Bunker,” veterans meet to engage in camaraderie and discuss matters around fundraising and providing support for other veterans that find themselves traveling to this unique veteran’s office. The Bunker, however, is not located near a veteran’s administration office or hospital or even a military installation. Rather, the Bunker is found in Tijuana, Mexico, as the main staging area for deported veterans advocating for their inclusion and invitation back into the United States. Hector Barajas-Varela started the Bunker in 2013 after being deported in 2004 for firing a gun at a moving vehicle, which resulted in three years of incarceration. Barajas-Varela served six years in the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division and was honorably discharged. Despite Barajas-Varela’s military service record, the state viewed his crime as being eligible for deportation since his criminal sentence exceeded a year. Congress ultimately sets the parameters for what constitutes someone as deportable and most cases are linked to criminal offenses such as, aggravated felonies, felonies, and misdemeanors.

Barajas-Varela stated that he already paid the price and served the time for his crime after being discharged from the military. He further claims that while going through the criminal justice system, the idea of being deported was not a primary concern since he had served in the military.¹ He inaccurately thought that he received legal citizenship after completing his service since legal citizenship was promised by his Army recruiter. Yet, he would find himself in Mexico, away from his family and eleven year old daughter, Liliana, who resides in Los Angeles. Liliana only gets to see her father in person when her family takes her to Tijuana, Mexico. Barajas-Varela and the almost 250 other deported veterans do have a pathway back into the United States, however, that route is only granted when the veteran passes away, since all U.S. military veterans are afforded the right to a burial in a national cemetery.

1. Morrissey, K. 2017. “Deported veteran’s pardon gives hope, but no guarantee.” *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, April 17.

Being separated from family is one of the many sacrifices service members and their families must endure while the sailor, soldier, airperson, or marine is on deployment. This phenomenon increasingly became the case as the U.S. ramped up tactical operations in Iraq leaving some service members to fear for their spouses' well-being during their deployments, especially if their spouse lacked legal American citizenship or permanent residency. Army Specialist Alex Jimenez was not aware that his wife, Yaderlin Jimenez, was in the process of being deported since it came to the attention of immigration officials that Spc. Jimenez was missing in action (MIA) after being ambushed in Iraq on May 12, 2007. According to the Department of Homeland Security, Yaderlin Jimenez entered the country without authorization from the Dominican Republic in 2001 and married Spc. Jimenez in 2004. Spc. Jimenez is the recipient of a Purple Heart and was on his second combat tour in Iraq when he was declared MIA. Prior to his deployment in 2006, Judge Philip J. Montante granted the Jimenez family a temporary reprieve, which put a hold on any deportation proceedings for Yaderlin until Spc. Jimenez returned from his deployment. Due to the uncertainty of Spc. Jimenez's status, the temporary reprieve can be rescinded and Yaderlin Jimenez would be put through deportation proceedings once again.

On March 21st, 2003, the second day of the American invasion of Iraq, Lance Corporal Jose Gutierrez became the first American service member killed in action. Gutierrez's case is unique, not as a result of being the first American casualty during the war, but because he was not a legal American citizen at the time of his death. Gutierrez was an orphan from Guatemala that entered the U.S. through Mexico, became a ward of the state of California, and eventually attained permanent residency on his eighteenth birthday allowing him to enlist in the U.S. Marine Corps. Under the current statute, Gutierrez's family has up to two years from the time of his death to apply for posthumous citizenship. Without family or a sponsor in the country to contend on his behalf, Gutierrez, an American service member, will

not be recognized as an American citizen. Posthumous citizenship granted to non-citizen service members² is a symbolic gesture from the state lacking a genuine invitation to join the larger social and political community these young men and women lost their lives defending.

1.1 The Problem

Despite having stark differences and experiences navigating military service and immigration policy in the narratives above, these stories and the pathways to political membership for Latino immigrant service members and their families are directly shaped by the state. Fear of deportation, the status of service member families, and how non-citizen service members are remembered upon making the ultimate sacrifice and giving their life in a combat zone are symptoms of unstable and constantly changing immigration and naturalization policies. These symptoms have all been forged and applied to non-citizens serving in the military over the development of immigration policies for the last eighty years, predominantly during the New Deal era. The fact that veterans can and do get deported, spouses of service members can and do get deported, and service members killed-in-action go unrecognized as political members by the state they serve is far from the honorable conduct instilled upon every soldier, sea-person, air-person, and marine.

Moreover, failing to incorporate non-citizen service members as political members challenges what we know about the citizen-soldier tradition that has been the foundation to creating and maintaining a republic. Yet, to this day, the U.S. military continues to recruit and enlist non-citizens into the military without a guarantee of acquiring legal citizenship. Acquiring legal citizenship is one of the best measures of political incorporation for any immigrant within any host country. Beyond the material benefits associated with naturalization, becoming a legal citizen also encompasses a psychological and emotional connection

2. Non-citizen refers to people that lack legal American citizenship. This category includes enslaved Blacks, emancipated Blacks, legal permanent residents, and undocumented immigrants. Non-citizen service members are immigrants who either volunteered or were conscripted into military service.

to the host country. For many immigrants with the desire to become American citizens, naturalization entails fulfilling certain requirements to be considered for legal citizenship and consciously accepting the burdens and obligations of enfranchisement. Those obligations range anywhere from paying your taxes on time to serving on a jury or enlisting in the military—a responsibility of citizenship that all non-citizen service members embrace to this day.

There is a prominent narrative in American Political Development illustrating how non-citizens are able to gain legal citizenship by performing their loyalty and embracing the sacrifice of American citizenship, which is largely negotiated on the battlefield. From the American Revolution to the present day, non-citizens have enlisted in the military for various reasons ranging from fleeing and escaping their slave owners during the Revolution to fulfilling a call of duty and exercising their patriotism following the terrorists attacks that struck American soil on September 11, 2001. The U.S. historically extends an invitation to immigrants and non-citizens to fill its military ranks as they prepare to fortify their defense force during each moment of conflict or war. This invitation to participate in the military for non-citizens is traditionally combined with the incentive of acquiring legal citizenship upon enlisting for active duty. Cara Wong and Grace Cho (2010) identified this policy of exchanging one’s service in the military for the incentive of legal American citizenship as “citizenship-for-service.”³ Thus, the process of citizenship-for-service is so ingrained in America’s development that in some cases is considered its own distinct path to naturalization alongside claims to blood and land.

However, prior to America’s involvement in WWII, Congress enacted the 1940 Nationality

3. Cara Wong and Grace Cho coined the term citizenship for service as a corrective to traditional forms of becoming an American citizen through blood or birthplace. They argue that citizenship for service is practiced by the U.S. and should be included as a way of identifying American citizens. I, however, approach citizenship-for-service as process and path to naturalization that carries with it the potential to restrict or extend access to non-citizens. For more on *jus meritum* see: Wong, C. & G. Cho. 2006. “Jus Meritum: Citizenship for Service.” In *Transforming Politics, Transforming America: The Political and Civic Incorporation of Immigrants in the United States*, edited by T. Lee, S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, & R. Ramirez. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Act and single-handedly changed how the incentive of acquiring legal American citizenship for one's service would be administered. The 1940 Nationality Act established a three-year service requirement prior to granting legal citizenship compared to the Act of May 9th, 1918 during WWI, which automatically bestowed legal citizenship upon induction into the military, except for Asians who were determined to be racially unqualified for citizenship despite serving in the military. The eligibility of Asians for naturalization had yet to be determined by the Supreme Court during WWI, however, the consensus throughout the court concluded that Asians were not "white" and therefore excluded from citizenship.⁴ Assumptions over racial nativism throughout WWI advanced a white dominant threshold to the acquisition of citizenship for racial minorities outside of African-Americans—even after being directly recruited for service with the promise of citizenship.

Yet, scholars and the media have paid little attention to the ways in which citizenship-for-service policy has changed and transformed, specifically at the turn of the 20th century. In particular, scholarship on immigrant incorporation in American Political Development fails to explain the outcomes of this transformation and what a change in citizenship-for-service policy means for non-citizen service members, their families, and immigrant incorporation in general. Moreover, there is less of an understanding as to why citizenship-for-service policy changed from one conflict to the next. What was different between WWI and WWII that prompted a statutory change in the provision to grant expedited citizenship-for-service?

A majority of the story around the acquisition of citizenship-for-service is based on the African-American experience. This narrative illustrates a linear trajectory of upward mobility for a majority of African-American service members that performed their loyalty to the state and in exchange secured a place for themselves in America. However, African-American experience in the military is historically rooted in anti-black racism, from the involvement of escaped slaves that fought for the British because then General Washington refused to

4. Salyer, L. E. 2004. "Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service and U.S. Citizenship Policy, 1918-1935." *The Journal of American History*, 847-876.

enlist slaves during the Revolution to a segregated military throughout both world wars. African-American service members and veterans were able to acquire some concessions like challenging and eventually being included in combat roles and occupations in the midst of navigating military service under state sanctioned white supremacy, otherwise known as Jim Crow. Fundamentally, the African-American experience does not apply to other communities of color, in particular racialized immigrants.

When the story of citizenship-for-service is told by historians and political scientists, it is a story that positions the state against immigrant groups and vice-versa. What I will show in this dissertation is that there are obvious tensions within the Mexican-American community around who belongs and who does not belong in the country. Mexican-Americans were concerned about Mexican nationals that migrated to the U.S. to fulfill labor demands and what their presence was doing to the reputation of Mexican-Americans. Mexican-American indigenous organizations during the New Deal era fabricated the difference between the “good” and the “bad” immigrant as a way to buy access to resources and acceptance to institutions through what may be called a politics of respectability. However, Mexican-American communities and organizations were not able to reconcile their demands for deportations and categorical difference with Mexican nationals that were conscripted into the U.S. military due to a joint military agreement between the U.S. and Mexico. More than 15,000 Mexican nationals served in the U.S. military with the promise of securing citizenship for their service.

In an effort to better understand how non-citizens are recruited to shoulder the obligations and responsibilities of an American citizen by serving in the military without a guarantee of legal citizenship in exchange for their service, it is essential to examine the historical economic, social, and political processes that diminished the value of immigrant military service—particularly at the turn of the 20th century. A cursory view of military service for the exchange of American citizenship since the turn of the 20th century denotes a steady decline in access to legal citizenship for non-citizen service members. Table 1 illus-

trates petitions filed for naturalization and naturalizations granted, by civilian and military service members from 1907 to 1946.⁵ The table captures both WWI (1917-1918) and WWII (1940-1946) naturalization statistics for non-citizen service members. Paying close attention to the decennial total between 1911 to 1920 demonstrates that 244,300 non-citizen service members were naturalized after WWI. Yet, when observing the same figure for WWII from 1940 to 1946 we can see that the number of non-citizen service member naturalizations gets cut in half with a total of 127,744 naturalizations granted to military service members. The drop in frequencies for naturalizations between WWI and WWII may be due to the actual number of people serving in the military during both conflicts. However, more than three times as many people volunteered or were conscripted during WWII than served during WWI. According to the Selective Service System, approximately 2.8 million people served during WWI and 10.1 million people served during WWII.⁶ During WWI, close to 9% of the military was comprised of non-citizen service members compared to 1.2% in WWII.

Immigrant admissions between WWI and WWII transformed as immigrant demographics in the military changed from one out of ten service members being an immigrant during WWI to one out of a hundred in WWII. Table 2 highlights the percentage of immigrant admissions between 1911 to 1949. The table demonstrates that European admissions dropped by over 20% in the forty-year period. Yet, throughout these same four decades, Mexican, Central and South American admissions increased gradually. It's important to note that the U.S. instituted immigration quotas beginning in 1921, which was based on the percentage of people from different countries currently residing in the U.S. up to 2%. Meaning, if the highest immigrant population came from Europe prior to the implementation of quotas then

5. Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice. Table 37: Declarations of Intention Filed, Petitions for Naturalization Filed and Aliens Naturalized: Years Ended June 30, 1907 to 1946.

6. Selective Service System, Induction Statistics: <https://www.sss.gov/About/History-And-Records/Induction-Statistics>. WWI (September 1917-November 1918): 2,810,296; WWII (November 1940-October 1946): 10,110,104.

Table 1.1: Petitions for Naturalization Filed and Immigrants Naturalized, 1907 to 1946

Year	Petitions Filed			Naturalizations		
	Civilian	Military	Total	Civilian	Military	Total
1907	21,113	–	21,113	111,738	–	111,738
1908	44,032	–	44,032	25,975	–	25,975
1909	43,141	–	43,141	38,374	–	38,374
1910	55,750	–	55,750	39,448	–	39,448
1907-1910	164,036	–	164,036	111,738	–	111,738
1911	74,740	–	74,740	56,683	–	56,683
1912	95,661	–	95,661	70,310	–	70,310
1913	95,380	–	95,380	83,561	–	83,561
1914	124,475	–	124,475	104,145	–	104,145
1915	106,399	–	106,399	91,848	–	91,848
1916	108,767	–	108,767	87,831	–	87,831
1917	130,865	–	130,865	88,104	–	88,104
1918	105,514	63,993	169,507	87,456	63,993	151,449
1919	128,523	128,335	256,858	89,023	128,335	217,358
1920	166,760	51,972	218,732	125,711	51,972	177,683
1911-1920	1,137,084	244,300	1,381,384	884,672	244,300	1,128,972
1921	177,898	17,636	195,534	163,656	17,636	181,292
1922	153,170	9,468	162,638	160,979	9,468	170,447
1923	158,059	7,109	165,168	137,975	7,109	145,084
1924	166,947	10,170	177,117	140,340	10,170	150,510
1925	162,258	–	162,258	152,457	–	152,457
1926	172,107	125	172,232	146,239	92	146,331
1927	235,298	5,041	240,339	195,493	4,311	199,804
1928	235,328	4,993	240,321	228,006	5,149	233,155
1929	254,799	720	255,519	224,197	531	224,728
1930	111,209	1,942	113,151	167,637	1,740	169,377
1921-1930	1,827,073	57,204	1,884,277	1,716,979	56,206	1,773,185
1931	142,249	3,225	145,474	140,271	3,224	143,495
1932	131,043	19	131,062	136,598	2	136,600
1933	110,604	2,025	112,629	112,368	995	113,363
1934	114,524	2,601	117,125	110,867	2,802	113,669
1935	131,378	–	131,378	118,945	–	118,945
1936	165,559	1,568	167,127	140,784	481	141,265
1937	157,670	7,794	165,464	162,923	2,053	164,976
1938	169,131	6,282	175,413	158,142	3,936	162,078
1939	213,413	–	213,413	185,175	3,638	188,813
1940	276,840	1,188	278,028	232,500	2,760	235,260
1931-1940	1,612,411	24,702	1,637,113	1,498,573	19,891	1,518,464
1941	277,807	–	277,807	275,747	1,547	277,294
1942	341,979	1,508	343,487	268,762	1,602	270,364
1943	338,885	38,240	377,125	281,459	37,474	318,933
1944	275,486	50,231	325,717	392,766	49,213	441,979
1945	172,905	23,012	195,917	208,707	22,695	231,402
1946	110,071	13,793	123,864	134,849	15,213	150,062
1941-1946	1,517,133	126,784	1,643,917	1,562,290	127,744	1,690,034

Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1946. Table 37. Declarations of Intention Filed, Petitions for Naturalization Filed, and Aliens Naturalized: Years Ended June 30, 1907 to 1946.

Table 1.2: Immigration Percentage by Country, 1911-1949

Countries & Region	1911-1920	1921-1930	1931-1940	1941-1949
Europe	76.3%	60.3%	65.9%	53.8%
Asia	3.4	2.4	2.9	3.6
Mexico	3.8	11.2	4.2	6.9
Central America	0.3	0.4	1.1	2.5
South America	0.7	1.0	1.5	2.4

Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1949.
Table 4. Immigration by Country, for decades: 1820 to 1949.

Europeans would be able to gain a larger number of quota immigrants. The change in immigrant admissions and demographics suggests that the demographics concerning military aged males would also change. To what extent, has changing racial demographics influenced a transformation in citizenship-for-service policies?

This dissertation is animated by the following research questions: What are the factors that contributed to the decline in access to citizenship-for-service? What role and tactics do state institutions and civic organizations adopt over time as citizenship-for-service policies become increasingly constrained? What prompted the U.S. to abandon the Citizen-Soldier tradition at the turn of the 20th century? More importantly, what can be done to reconcile the inherent principle in the Citizen-Soldier tradition that serving in the military constructed part of the basis for citizenship? This study focuses on a critical juncture between WWI and the 1965 Hart-Celler Act. Civic organizations, scholars, and social and political elites in the current struggle to associate patriotism with military service as a means of non-citizen incorporation, seem to disassociate the investment in the potential benefit of legal citizenship from the obligation of military service—the contractual labor associated with enlisting or being conscripted and serving in the armed forces.

I associate the transition from non-citizen service members being able to acquire immediate legal citizenship upon enlisting for military service when a majority of immigrants are predominantly white to instituting a three-year service requirement when immigrant

admissions become increasingly less white, as a form of labor repression, in particular as a type of debt peonage historically linked to sharecropping. Some examples associated with sharecropping illustrate how former slaves leased the land of former slave owners and also bought the seed and equipment used to farm the land on some type of credit. In most cases, sharecroppers were in higher debt to the landowner than what the crops were able to produce in profits. The sharecroppers would essentially be coerced in a system of debt peonage and become immobile. Honorably completing three years of service prior to being considered for naturalization, I argue, is a form of paying a debt to the state through labor in the military for the same privilege granted to predominantly white non-citizen service members twenty years earlier.

Furthermore, competing political ideologies from state institutions, policymakers, and civil organizations influence and promote the decline in citizenship-for-service by suppressing, limiting, and ultimately regulating how and when racially marginalized non-citizens can acquire legal citizenship regardless of military service. My argument is developed by employing an American Political Development (APD) lens and historically interrogating the relationship between the fundamental American ideals of the citizen-soldier tradition, citizenship and republicanism. By using archival methods and textual analysis of primary sources, I demonstrate how state institutions, political actors, particularly Members of Congress, and Mexican-American civic organizations mutually assured the destruction of securing legal citizenship in exchange for one's service between 1918 to 1965.

1.2 Beyond the Black/White Binary and Black Military Service

This dissertation challenges long held appeals by APD scholars derived from the imagined success of socially and politically incorporating racially marginalized groups by asking them, and at times forcing them, to serve in the military during periods of crisis. Some scholars highlight periods of hostilities as junctures when marginalized groups, predominantly

African-Americans, are able to take advantage of the call to arms as a way to improve their social and political status.⁷ These junctures of hostilities or war, are in a sense, seen as a type of exogenous rupture in the status quo, producing sentiments of equality, membership, and heightened democracy that were absent prior to the conflict. Instances of prolonged war in the U.S., historically, prompt liberal and conservative political elites and community leaders to renegotiate actualized concessions in exchange for marginalized groups to provide their service in the armed forces. Moving beyond the black/white binary allows us to further question the degree to which republican ideals rooted in the relationship between military service and citizenship do not hold up due to the racial order, they never fully applied to any non-white group and we can see that clearly when we examine non-white and non-black immigrants serving in the military. It becomes clear that republican ideals break down under the racial order when we observe the experiences of immigrants.

Trade-offs like black slaves serving in the Continental Army in exchange for freedom during the American Revolution and Emancipated blacks enlisting and being conscripted in support of a Union victory to abolish slavery, has yet to establish a pathway or form of full incorporation for marginalized and disenfranchised groups willing to perform their loyalty. Offering legal citizenship during periods of hostilities was the country's most valuable concession accessible to non-citizen service members and a practice that, I argue, has eroded since the second world war. According to the APD literature, concessions for marginalized groups during times of war are regarded as signs of a growing and inclusive democracy, which

7. For more on how periods of crisis produce opportunities for inclusion see: Klinker P. A. & R.M. Smith. 1999. *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Krebs, R.R. 2006. *Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Kryder, D. 2000. *Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State During World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Parker, C.S. 2009. *Fighting for Democracy: Black Veterans and the Struggle Against White Supremacy in the Postwar South*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Ramos, H. 1998. *The American G.I. Forum: In Pursuit of the Dream, 1948-1983*. Houston: University of Houston Press; Salyer, L.E. 2004. "Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service and U.S. Citizenship Policy, 1918-1935." *The Journal of American History*, 847-876; Wong, C. & G. Cho. 2006. "Jus Meritum: Citizenship for Service." In *Transforming Politics, Transforming America: The Political and Civic Incorporation of Immigrants in the United States*, edited by T. Lee, S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, & R. Ramirez. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press; and Wong. C. 2007. "Who Fights: Substitution, Commutation, and "Green Card Troops." *Du Bois Review*, 4, 1, 167-188.

found its roots by enfranchising European immigrants dating back to the Civil War.

However, non-white racially marginalized immigrant service members reveal how ideas of expanding democracy, racial egalitarianism, and civic republicanism break down due to the organization and dimensions of the racial order, which are not evident when strictly analyzing African-Americans and their experiences in the military. The state approaches non-citizen military service as a form of indoctrination and socialization that would not be politically possible without the presence of a war or conflict. Yet, racially marginalized non-citizens are presented with military service by the state, more often during times of crisis, as a way to perform their loyalty and respond to the obligations of American citizenship. Political theorist Raymond Rocco highlights these communitarian conceptions of citizenship as “civic republicanism.”⁸

Under this logic, citizens want their government to continue being the guarantor of individual rights, however, there are trade-offs. In order to maintain the scope of rights and privileges, citizens and declarant immigrants must participate and embrace the responsibilities and obligations of protecting the state and its ideals.⁹ Civic republicanism stresses the importance of a “civic” identity, “that is, a type of political identification with, and allegiance to, the fundamental principles and values of governance on which the polity is founded.”¹⁰ Now, this is not by any means the “best” or most efficient form of employing the institution of citizenship, since in 1973 the U.S. ended the draft and no longer coerced its citizens to respond to the military obligations of the state. For the purposes and scope of this project, the idea of civic republicanism resonates with the demands and objectives of the U.S.—to build and develop an American identity grounded on the values of spreading

8. Rocco, R.A. 2014. *Transforming Citizenship: Democracy, Membership, and Belonging in Latino Communities*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

9. Rogers Smith (1993) would argue that civic republicanism is merely a form of “ascriptive Americanism” that gets individually cycled through different combinations of liberalism, republicanism, and ascriptive Americanism. However, the multiple-traditions thesis lacks theoretical precision and does not account for how political ideologies are developed among different forms of immigrant incorporation, in this case through military service.

10. Rocco, R.A. 2014. *Transforming Citizenship*: 50.

democracy, republicanism, and capitalism, that challenged the Axis powers and Communism after WWII. Recently arrived and permanent resident immigrants are expected to adopt the American civic identity and subordinate, or abandon, their cultural or original identity as a gesture of loyalty and allegiance to the host country, especially if immigrants declare to naturalize. Regulating and limiting immigrant admissions was fundamental to the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act. By monitoring immigrant admissions, the Johnson-Reed Act sought to secure the dominance of an American civic identity over all incoming cultures and identities for over forty years.¹¹

1.3 Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and Respectability Politics

The quota system exempted Canadians and Mexicans since all three countries were practicing the policy of being “good neighbors.” Essentially, Canadians and Mexicans could enter the U.S. freely without overstaying their visas. However, in 1928 Democratic Senator Coleman Blease introduced Senate Bill 5094, otherwise known as the “Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929.” According to Ben Gonzalez, S. 5094 intended to criminalize entry without inspection as a misdemeanor punishable with up to one year in prison and reentry without inspection as a felony punishable with up to two years in prison.¹² Gonzalez further claims that S. 5094 targeted Mexican immigration due to emphasizing “Mexican” in the bill more than three times than any other immigrant group. Moreover, House debates over the proposed bill illustrate numerous unsuccessful attempts by immigration restrictionists to amend the Johnson-Reed Act and implement Mexican immigration quotas.¹³ Without much struggle,

11. For more on the Johnson-Reed Act see: Ngai, M.M. 2004. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Tichenor, D.J. 2002. *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

12. Gonzalez, B. 2014. *The Undocumented Threat: Beliefs, Policy Preferences, and the Politics of Immigration*. Dissertation, University of Washington: 45.

13. *Ibid.*, 46.

the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929 passed both chambers of Congress and began the historical linkage between Mexican migrant illegality and criminality.

As a response to immigration quotas, perceptions of criminality, and increasing economic depression, Mexican-Americans created civil organizations, like the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), initially, and later the American G.I. Forum (AGIF), that advanced a particular type of secondary marginalization and respectability politics focused on distancing Mexican-Americans from their cultural and ethnic origins that could potentially exclude or limit their access to dominant resources and institutions. Thus, Mexican nationals were considered pariahs within the Mexican-American community and culturally separate by Mexican-Americans,¹⁴ but the state, federal, and local officials disregarded these legal distinctions and engaged Mexicans as a homogenous group.

According to Benjamin Marquez, LULAC's political ideology was one of assimilation and accommodation where their primary goal was not to restructure the American status quo, but instead they sought to reform society in an effort to enjoy the benefits and resources associated with the white majority. LULAC's membership base consisted of Mexican-American elites and their rosters were mainly filled with doctors, lawyers and businessmen who were interested in securing their economic and social upward mobility. Most LULAC members held that racial discrimination was the detriment of Mexican-Americans outside of class discrimination, which was seen as a completely separate issue. Marquez agrees when he writes, "if prejudice could be done away with, little else in society needed changing. They believed that talent, ability, and fortitude were randomly distributed in any racial group, and those factors alone should determine an individual's social mobility."¹⁵ The type of political ideology LULAC emerged from closely resembles a particular type of civic republicanism, patriotism, and respectability politics, which becomes significant when forming their organi-

14. See: Zamora, E. 2009. "Mexican Nationals in the U.S. Military: Diplomacy and Battlefield Sacrifice." in *Beyond the Latino World War II Hero: The Social and Political Legacy of a Generation*, edited by M. Rivas-Rodriguez & E. Zamora.

15. Marquez, B. 1993. *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization*. Austin: University of Texas Press: 2.

zational goals, directives, and engagement with an increasing Mexican immigrant population.

A test to their loyalty came when the U.S. entered WWII and a majority of LULAC's members joined the military or were conscripted into service. Councils across the country shut their doors as their members began recruit training and prepared for combat tours in Europe or the Pacific. Unexpectedly, awaiting some LULAC members at their respective training sites were the exact group of people they believed increasingly depreciated their social and political existence in the country; Mexican nationals. The U.S. conscripted over 15,000 Mexican nationals during WWII due to the 1943 Joint United States-Mexico Defense Commission. The reciprocal military agreement between the U.S. and Mexico allowed both nations to draft their respective citizens residing within their borders. Although Mexico refrained from drafting Americans during WWII, the U.S., on the other hand, actively enlisted volunteers and conscripted Mexican nationals primarily residing in Texas.¹⁶

Organizations like LULAC and the AGIF advanced an ideology around a claim to whiteness most notably by actively separating their communities from their culture and ethnic origins¹⁷ and developing a politics of respectability to prove their worthiness for access into dominant resources and institutions. The AGIF and LULAC were committed to a form of racialization focused on advancing a civic republican American ideology that sought to raise their positions within the social, political, and economic hierarchies and simultaneously subordinating all other racial and ethnic groups. This type of behavior is best illustrated through Omi and Winant's conception of racial formation, which highlights how racialization operates in both the state level and civil society.¹⁸ Here, the AGIF and LULAC engaged in a racial project seeking to reorganize the social structure and access to mainstream resources and institutions by disassociating their members and respective Mexican-American

16. Zamora, "Mexican Nationals in the U.S. Military: Diplomacy and Battlefield Sacrifice.": 90.

17. See: Marquez, *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization*; Ramos, *The American G.I. Forum: In Pursuit of the Dream, 1948-1983*.

18. Omi, M. & H. Winant. 1994. *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. New York: Routledge.

communities from their ethnic and cultural origins and by extension recent immigrant arrivals. Chris Zepeda-Millan and Sophia Wallace demonstrate how social movements have the capacity to influence Latino racial identity.¹⁹ However, how have social movement organizations influenced the propensity to relinquish racial and ethnic identities? The impact of what may be called a form of “brown respectability politics” is captured through continued adherence to American civic republican ideals of individualism, loyalty, and American cultural dominance. Additionally, civic republican ideals are the hallmark principles that are invoked to rally people together during periods of crisis and respond to the vulnerabilities of marginalized communities.

1.4 Non-Citizen Military Service and the Decline of Citizenship-for-Service

Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, potential non-citizen service members were allowed to use different forms of identification that would verify their legal permanent residency status. After 9/11, however, more stringent security measures were instated and the military currently only allows two forms of identification: the I-551 (green card) or non-citizens would have to file a G-845, which is a formal request to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) to verify their legal permanent residency status.²⁰ Moreover, following 9/11, non-citizen recruits are also required to undergo an Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC) while they are being inducted at their respective military entrance processing stations. The ENTNAC is a comprehensive background check that goes through the Office of Personnel Management and also the FBI, which confirms any prior criminal activity.²¹ This

19. Zepeda-Millan, C. & S. J. Wallace. 2013. “Racialization in times of contention: how social movements influence Latino racial identity.” *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, Vol. 1, Issue 4, 510-527.

20. Hattiangadi, A.U., et al. 2005. *Non-citizens in Today’s Military: Final Report*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analysis: 33.

21. *Ibid.*, 34.

is a similar procedure citizens and naturalized citizens must go through when attempting to acquire a higher security clearance, which also includes a credit and biometrics evaluation for non-citizens.

Consequently, the rigorous vetting process when enlisting non-citizens, established by the Department of Defense to mitigate opportunities for national security threats can and has led some non-citizen service members to misconstrue the personal audit as counting towards the process for naturalization. Additionally, §328 of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) introduced a method to expedite the residency requirement for legal permanent residents from five years to three years if non-citizens serve during peacetime. Meaning, it would allow non-citizens the ability to apply for naturalization sooner, however, it was not a guarantee of citizenship. Hector Barajas-Varela, from the vignette above, is just one of many non-citizen service members that was provided conflicting information that derived from legislation which has not deviated much since the Korean War in order to extract his labor for the benefit of the state. The consequences of misguided information, claiming that non-citizens receive citizenship-for-service seems to be a way for military recruiters to over-promise and then left up to the state to under-deliver. An expedited path to applying for naturalization is not and should not be considered a path to citizenship. Expedited residency requirements stems from legislation that developed during WWII, with the 1940 Nationality Act, where a large mass of European immigrants were invited to take advantage of a demand to serve in exchange for legal citizenship.

The participation of predominantly European immigrant service members during World War I motivated the enactment of the Act of May 9, 1918, which allowed any immigrant the ability to naturalize due to their active duty service—except for Asian immigrants.²² The Act of May 9, 1918 was the first official citizenship-for-service program, however, it restricted Asian veterans from taking advantage of the program, since they did not meet the racial requirements for citizenship consisting of being “white” or “Black.” Meanwhile, Filipinos

22. See: Salyer, “Baptism by Fire.”

were being recruited to work in Hawaiian sugar plantations since Japanese labor was on the decline due to the Gentlemen's Agreement set in place between the U.S. and Japan in 1908. Approximately 25,000 Filipinos eventually migrated to Hawaii as laborers between 1907 and 1919.²³ Asians were actively sought to work in American fields and later don American military uniforms, but were still restricted from reaching social and political parity as legal citizens at the end of the First World War. The time period following the Act of May 9, 1918 to the 1965 Hart-Celler Act is critical to the transformation of citizenship-for-service for three reasons.

First, this timeframe illustrates the extension of the Black and White paradigm in the military to include the experiences, oppression, and discrimination of Asian, Latino, and Native American military service. This is a time period when juridical questions regarding race and deservingness began to intersect with meritorious ideas of membership through military service for other racially marginalized groups. Second, WWI is the first instance where immediate naturalization for military service is legislatively guaranteed with the passage of the Act of May 9, 1918. The practice of immediate citizenship-for-service would ultimately end with the 1940 Nationality Act, which implemented a three-year service requirement. Service requirements are important analytic distinctions from residency requirements, where service requirements focus on an individual's time in active duty service, while residency requirements are concerned with a non-citizen's time in residence within the U.S. These two distinctions do overlap, but can be easily manipulated by immigration officials to argue that some non-citizen service members did not complete their residency requirements while being deployed overseas.

Finally, at the turn of the 20th century, citizenship-for-service policy became increasingly more burdensome and bureaucratic for non-citizen service members that had to navigate the naturalization process while a majority of immigrant troops were actively completing their service overseas. These moments of expanding security measures are associated with sweep-

23. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*, 101.

ing immigration and naturalization legislation stemming from the New Deal era. From the 1940 Nationality Act, to the 1950 Lodge Act, and soon after the 1952 INA, with each execution of immigration legislation reveals how Congress and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) procured the jurisdiction to limit how readily non-citizen service members were able to acquire legal citizenship. The process that we know of today surrounding expedited paths to legal citizenship from military service were cemented between the 1952 INA and the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, which ended the immigrant quota system.

Senator Patrick McCarran from Nevada was the primary author of the 1952 INA and advanced what he believed was a more inclusive piece of legislation since it continued to reinforce the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act and finally granted Asians the ability to immigrate with a quota of 2,000 people per year. The Asian immigrant annual quota, however, encompassed all designated Asian countries except for the Philippines. The 1952 INA implemented both service and residency requirements retroactively beginning with WWI, which further limited access to legal citizenship by enforcing increased bureaucratic and security measures. Furthermore, the 1952 included sections that expedited residency requirements during wartime. Thirteen years later, the Hart-Celler Act of 1965 ended the immigration quota system and implement expedited residency requirements for both peacetime and wartime non-citizen service members.

1.5 Expanding Citizenship-for-Service Literature

I engage the limited literature in APD on military service and rights claims that advance, on one hand, military service as a vehicle for social and political inclusion, and on the other hand, military service as a sufficient condition for acquiring legal citizenship.

1.5.1 *Social and Political Inclusion*

Racially marginalized groups seeking some kind of upward mobility with the ability to improve their social position or legal status through military service is far from novel. Phillip Klinkner and Rogers Smith have written the most thoughtful and carefully researched account surrounding the social and political incorporation of Blacks through military service over time, so I will not repeat it here. They argue that meaningful strides towards racial equality have primarily been achieved when three factors occur: war requiring the mobilization of African-Americans; enemies of the state prompt the country to rally around the flag and advance the nation as inclusive and egalitarian; and when social movement mobilizations pressure political leaders to enact reforms.²⁴ Klinkner & Smith do not attempt to advance a causal argument that positions serving in the military as a pathway for racial inclusivity. Though, they do provide us with the blueprints to test their claims by extending the research beyond the Black and white paradigm.

A more relevant framework for understanding race relations, military service, and policy shifts during the WWII era is provided by Daniel Kryder's *Divided Arsenal*. Kryder demonstrates how wars, specifically WWII, creates contradictions between policies that, on the one hand, offer some kind of relief or upward mobility to oppressed groups, while on the other hand, establishing and reinforcing restrictive racial policies, which include targeted surveillance of Black organizations. He is able to illustrate this dichotomy through an investigation of Blacks in three industries: farm labor, factory workers, and army troops. Kryder tactfully and empirically exposes how presidential management of racial conflict during WWII led to sacrificing policies advancing social and racial inclusion. The current project is able to borrow from Kryder's analysis of Black troops and the depletion of farm labor in order to distinguish non-citizen service members from local economies.

24. Klinkner & Smith, *The Unsteady March*, 4.

1.5.2 *Sufficient Condition for Citizenship*

The literature on military service and rights claims also engages another dimension that advance citizenship-for-service as normative arguments. Sullivan most recently advanced the idea of “earned citizenship” stemming from historical experiences of Southern Texas Mexican civil rights groups like LULAC and the AGIF that fought for equal rights by evoking their military service in WWII.²⁵ Earned citizenship, for Sullivan, situates military service as a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants in order to argue that military service is a sufficient condition for acquiring legal citizenship.

Sullivan further employs Black republicanism as the foundation to the earned citizenship attributed to Black veterans that believed they were already full citizens due to their service overseas.²⁶ He uses the narratives from LULAC and the American G.I. Forum to illustrate how these organizations created a movement based on equal rights while evoking the military service of their members. Yet, Sullivan does not make the linkage between the fight for equal rights by exclusionist organizations like LULAC that, for the most part, consisted of legal citizens and the struggle for non-citizen service members to acquire citizenship during the same period. Earned citizenship is advanced as an argument for contemporary undocumented immigrants, but non-citizens during the WWII era are neglected given that it derives empirical support for the concept during the time period. The notion of earned citizenship can potentially provide us with a lens to interrogate how immigrants come to acquire citizenship-for-service, however, it will require a full examination of the factors that are leading to its decline.

Finally, Plascencia makes a claim for de facto amnesty granted to non-citizen service members through the 1952 INA.²⁷ Plascencia contextually situates the historical role amnesty

25. Sullivan, M.J. 2014. “By right of service: the military as a pathway to earned citizenship.” *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 1-15.

26. *Ibid.*, 2.

27. Plascencia, L.F.B. 2015. “The military gates to US citizenship: Latina/o ‘aliens and non-citizen nationals’ and military work.” *Latino Studies*, Vol. 13, 2, 162-184.

has played in the U.S. and discretion obtained by Congress and the President to grant pardons. He then highlights 8 United States Code 1440, also known as §329 of the INA, to argue that the U.S. has granted immediate naturalization to non-citizen service members, during times of hostilities, regardless of their legal admittance into the country.²⁸ However, Plascencia fails to consider the 1965 amendment to §329 of the INA that retroactively establishes a one-year residency requirement during times of hostilities for all non-citizen service members, solidifying the restriction guaranteeing citizenship-for-service. It is important to recognize this substantial change since only service members who served during times of hostilities could take advantage of these benefits (there are no designated period of hostilities between 1953 and 1965).

This project, more generally, speaks to the civic capacity in marginalized communities, particularly among post-war Mexican-Americans, and highlights how not all organizations built within marginalized communities are progressive and challenge the status quo. This dissertation is an exercise in demonstrating how LULAC and the AGIF were complicit in the decline of citizenship-for-service for the purpose of securing their access to resources and institutions. Additionally, the project addresses theoretically the scope of upward mobility for immigrants during periods of hostilities and demonstrates a gradual contraction of rights over time for non-citizen service members when attempting to naturalize, instead of an expansion of rights that we observe with black service members. Furthermore, this dissertation expands the black/white binary predominantly found in APD literature focused on the ideational development of expanding racial egalitarianism and republicanism through American military service. Studying non-citizen military service helps us to better examine different spheres of the racial order by observing how different hierarchical dimensions work to subjugate non-citizens despite their service.

28. *Ibid.*, 172.

1.6 Data and Methods

The data for this project was collected throughout nine different archival sites in the U.S. and Mexico. I also make substantial use of Congressional archives, hearings, reports, and correspondence. I analyzed the documents using NVivo and MaxQDA to locate and code trends throughout the documents I collected. Utilizing an observable implications²⁹ approach, I asked prior to analyzing the documents, if my theory and hypothesis are correct, what should we expect to see in the real world. I break down the archives into three different groups: Congressional, organizational, and Mexican. The Congressional archives I visited and gathered data are the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. At the Library of Congress, I researched the papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and Congressman Emanuel Celler. Next, I investigated Senator Patrick McCarran's papers, correspondence, and official Senate record at the Nevada Historical Society in Reno, Nevada. The last archive I visited focusing on a member of Congress was for Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. who established the American foreign legion with the 1950 Lodge Act.

The following set of archives focused on Mexican American civic organizations. I gathered data for LULAC at two different sites in Texas. The first was at the Benson Library located on the campus of the University of Texas, Austin. The second site was in the Houston Metropolitan Research Center in Houston, Texas. I was able to locate the papers of the national LULAC presidents including all of the papers for George I. Sanchez who was president during WWII. In Houston, the more useful documents focused on LULAC Council No. 60 located in Houston. I also visited the AGIF archive located on the campus of Texas A&M University in Corpus Christi. While at the AGIF archive, I was able to acquire personal correspondence from AGIF President Hector P. Garcia with members of LULAC.

29. For more on observable implications, see: Valelly, R. M. 2009. "The Reed Rules and Republican Party Building: A New Look." *Studies in American Political Development*, 23, 115-142; and also Rubin, R. B. 2017.³⁰ New York: Cambridge University Press.

I also collected reports, official correspondence with political elites locally, in the state of Texas, and in Congress.

The final set of archives focused on Mexican non-citizen U.S. military members. To get some sense of the process where the Mexican government allowed Mexican nationals to serve in the military, I went to gather data from the Mexican administration that entered in the bilateral agreement with the U.S. Mexican President Manuel Avila Camacho's papers are located in the *Archivo General de la Nacion* (General Archive of the Nation) located in Mexico City, Mexico. I also gathered data down the street from the General Archive at the *Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores* (Secretary of External Relations) where I was able to collect information on the scope of Mexican nationals in the military and the pool of Mexicans the Mexican government was sending to the U.S.

I also engaged indigenous newspaper sources and mainstream media between 1918 to 1965. In particular, I found stories of non-citizen service members in Spanish newspapers like *La Prensa* (The Press), Corpus Christi Caller Times, Tucson Daily Citizen, and the Yuma Sun.

1.7 Chapter Outline

In chapter 2, I outline the rise and decline of citizenship-for-service policy from WWI to the 1940 Nationality Act. I situate how citizenship-for-service policy went from being an inclusionary program enacted by Congress then transformed into a statutory provision and added to immigration and naturalization legislation. This chapter encompasses the history, actors, and resistance to bureaucratically expanding immigration and naturalization legislation under immigration quotas. I consider the three-year probationary service period as a cultural artifact of citizenship-for-service with the purpose of delaying and impeding racially marginalized immigrants from attaining legal citizenship based on their service. The three-year probationary period is a cultural artifact of citizenship-for-service because it is the

mechanism and program used to change citizenship-for-service, meaning acquiring citizenship upon enlisting in exchange for an immigrant's military service, to service-for-citizenship, where non-citizens are now expected to fulfill a three-year probationary period prior to being considered for legal citizenship.

Chapter 3 demonstrates how non-citizen military service shifted from being predominantly filled with European immigrant troops to non-white immigrant troops at the turn of the 20th century. In chapter 4, I situate the social, economic and political environments of Mexican-Americans and Mexican immigrants prior to their involvement in the military. Indigenous resources from each group are utilized such as newspapers, films, radio broadcasts, and cartoons to better understand and analyze how respectability politics among each group was manifesting itself and how those relationships produced particular outcomes for non-citizen service members. I also make use of primary sources from the LULAC archives at the University of Texas, Austin and Houston Metropolitan Research Center. Shifting from white immigrants to non-white immigrants in the military was systematically accompanied with restrictionist immigration laws under immigration quotas and targeted citizenship-for-service recipients by legislatively restricting access to legal citizenship. Here, I am able to highlight how ideas of Mexican Americanness derived from their respective positions in the community and state institutions, specifically in the state of Texas. The chapter begins to draw connections between Mexican American civic organizations (LULAC and AGIF), brown respectability politics, and their relationship to the state during the height of immigration quotas. More importantly, this chapter examines the methods and tactics LULAC and AGIF employed when seeking access to institutions and resources while simultaneously marginalizing Mexican immigrants in Texas.

Chapter 5 borrows from Cathy Cohen's seminal work on secondary marginalization and respectability politics to argue that Mexican American communities advanced a similar ideology that, I argue, is a type of "brown respectability politics," which is also a site of racial identity formation. Brown respectability developed into a political program for Mexican

Americans to renounce their cultural and ethnic connection with Mexican migrants and nationals. The chapter outlines the differences between black and brown respectability politics by focusing on the social and cultural distances between the groups being marginalized and highlights how citizenship status creates a different dimension immigrant groups navigate in American institutions. Moreover, this chapter addresses how the state provoked the performance of respectability politics among black and brown communities during the New Deal era through its targeted social welfare programs, which extended into the Veteran's Administration's education and mortgage programs.

Finally, the sixth chapter is a normative theory of martial citizenship. Here I attempt to answer what can be done to reconcile the current unjust program of recruiting and enlisting non-citizens in the military without a guarantee of citizenship. Thus, I advance a theory of martial citizenship as sufficient for naturalization. The basis for martial citizenship should not be interfered with by politics or preference. Instead, the basis for martial citizenship should rest on the sacrifice non-citizens are surrendering to the state for the opportunity to be welcomed as a political equal. Through sacrifice, citizen and non-citizen alike learn and live the civic republican principles of patriotism, camaraderie, civic virtue. The U.S. military will be better off when it recognizes immigrants in the military as legal citizens because they will no longer be immigrants, but instead a part of the foundation of what maintains and protects and the republic.

CHAPTER 2

CONSTRAINING ACCESS, GAINING POWER: FROM CITIZENSHIP-FOR-SERVICE TO SERVICE-FOR-CITIZENSHIP

2.1 Citizenship-for-Service at the Turn of the 20th Century

Access to naturalization for non-citizen service members in the U.S. became easier to attain in the midst of WWI. Non-citizen service members during WWI lacked access to becoming naturalized beyond regular naturalization procedures and these unique service members were unable to use their military service as a basis for naturalization. Through the efforts conducted by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, approximately 250,000 immigrants became naturalized citizens and used their military service as the basis for enfranchisement. The naturalizations that occurred during WWI continue to be the largest number of service member naturalizations from any modern U.S. conflict to date. Yet, the legislation that managed to naturalize one out of every ten service members during WWI was the first and last instance where willing non-citizens could walk into a selective service office or recruiting station, enlist for active duty, and become naturalized all in the same day.

Access to naturalization for non-citizen service members became increasingly constrained and restricted immediately prior to America's entrance into WWII. By increasing constraints and restrictions on citizenship-for-service, I am referring to the adoption of a three-year service period historically used to investigate and review Filipino and Puerto Rican service members prior to being considered for naturalization. I consider the three-year probationary service period as a cultural artifact of citizenship-for-service with the purpose of delaying and impeding racially marginalized immigrants from attaining legal citizenship based on their service. The three-year probationary period is a cultural artifact of citizenship-for-service because it is the mechanism and program used to change citizenship-for-service,

meaning acquiring citizenship upon enlisting in exchange for an immigrant's military service, to service-for-citizenship, where non-citizens are now expected to fulfill a three-year probationary period prior to being considered for legal citizenship.

Members of Congress in the House of Representatives with racially exclusive ideologies responsible for reviewing, marking up, and producing naturalization legislation gained and maintained power over naturalization by blocking bills that attempted to expand the racial requirements for citizenship. Not until civic organizations that recognized the merit and value of military service, and what such service represented to the country, proceeded to pressure Congress in 1935 into allowing racially excluded groups to acquire legal citizenship based on their service. Expanding the racial criteria for naturalization, however, came at a cost for marginalized immigrant communities when Congress codified the nationality laws in 1940 and introduced a minimum three-year service requirement that was applied generally to all non-citizens. In an effort to inhibit the expeditious pathway to legal citizenship based on military service, members of Congress gained power over naturalizations by increasing the regulations non-citizen service members had to satisfy. Thus, naturalizations during WWII were cut in half from the previous conflict with five times as many people serving.

The adoption and continued implementation of the artifact of citizenship-for-service continues to have numerous political implications for non-citizens. For instance, according to Congressman Mark Takano, it's estimated that the U.S. has successfully deported over 3,000 U.S. military veterans to their country of origin.¹ Most deported veterans are removed from the U.S. for certain small crimes, such as substance abuse related or non-violent crimes. A large majority of the crimes veterans committed that made them deportable can actually be linked to their active duty service, especially if they served in a combat zone.² Deporting veterans is only one consequence of the artifact of citizenship-for-service. Non-citizen

1. Takano, M. 2018. "Memos to Mark: Deported Veterans." Medium, February 16. <https://medium.com/@repmarktakano/memos-to-mark-deported-veterans-7215fc364e05>.

2. BBC News. 2018. "Deported U.S. Army Veteran blames PTSD for drug conviction." March 26. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43547442>.

service members are vulnerable to deportations because reforming citizenship-for-service to service-for-citizenship removed the ability to grant legal citizenship almost immediately upon enlisting for active duty. Thus, non-citizen service members are no longer guaranteed citizenship based on their military service.

This chapter attempts to accomplish the following: first, to situate the origin of citizenship-for-service in its proper historical context by investigating the critical juncture that transformed the expedited pathway. Second, it identifies and assigns responsibility to the members of Congress that blocked the expansion of access to racially excluded non-citizen service members. Moreover, the chapter also identifies the political actors and the tactics utilized to challenge such exclusions. Finally, this chapter argues that members of Congress with commitments and ideologies to racially exclude non-citizens from access to naturalization managed to gain power over naturalization by increasing the regulations non-citizen service members must satisfy prior to being considered for naturalization. Accordingly, service-for-citizenship coerces non-citizens to provide their life and limbs as collateral for three-years as a way to measure loyalty and patriotism for political membership. Service-for-citizenship no longer has the benefits enjoyed by predominantly white European non-citizens during WWI.

2.2 American Political Development, Race, and Congress

A contribution to the literature in American Political Development (APD) this chapter makes is by situating and locating issues around immigration and naturalization restrictions as racialized processes that can be attributed as part of the partisan “racial realignment” in Congress that scholars ascribe to as influencing Civil Rights victories in the 1960s. If we consider national origins restrictions as part of the larger discursive environment where racial ideologies play a role for members of Congress we can see that the foundations to a partisan “racial realignment” were taking place much sooner than what Eric Schickler has

identified as occurring in the mid to late 1930s.³ The priority would be to expand our analysis beyond black and white cleavages to include other dimensions where race organizes the level of inclusion and exclusion—like citizenship and naturalization. Indeed, Schickler’s narrow consideration of race blatantly disregards questions about elite racial preferences toward immigration restriction, Mexican repatriation, the Bracero program, or the production of Mexican/migrant illegality and their implications for partisan realignment. Although this will not be an exhaustive study that looks at how race and citizenship affect partisan realignment generally, it is a starting point in a larger research agenda that aims to consider how different dimensions of racial difference operate in elite institutions, with specific attention to racially marginalized immigrant populations.

We can examine the different racial ideologies members of Congress were committed to in order to gain a better understanding of their positions on the intersection of race and citizenship. I argue that members of Congress with racial preferences that advocate for and defend conservative norms and republican values incrementally eliminated access to citizenship-for-service by increasing the regulations non-citizen service members had to satisfy in order to be considered for naturalization. Keep in mind that similar racial ideologies can be found across and within political parties. That means that members of Congress can potentially have differing views along party lines, but can and do have similar views on issues concerning race and other forms of political and societal inclusion. Furthermore, this project contends that access to citizenship-for-service became increasingly constrained as the racial demographic of non-citizen service members transitioned from white Europeans during WWI to indigenous Latin American and Asian immigrants, particularly immigrants from Mexico as the country gets closer to WWII. In other words, as the bodies of non-citizen service members became less white members of Congress with attachments to conservatism and republicanism were less likely to support legislation that expanded the racial require-

3. Schickler, E. 2016. *Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-1965*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

ments for citizenship, regardless if they served in the military between the 66th and 71st Congress. Through the racialization of citizenship and naturalization, conservative and republican members of Congress implemented new administrative and legislative technologies in the form of regulations and requirements to suppress access to an expedited path to citizenship for immigrants.

I'm concerned with Congressional decision making and the role racial ideologies played on advancing or blocking citizenship-for-service legislation. More importantly, this chapter seeks to assign responsibility to the actors and ideological commitments that shaped citizenship-for-service into a more difficult pathway for attaining legal citizenship. However, in order to gauge where members of Congress fall on the idea of race and citizenship and military service we also have to consider how members of Congress view questions about race and citizenship generally. This entails examining preferences and beliefs about race and naturalization during this critical juncture.

Literature in political science surrounding congressional decision making tend to point to institutional configurations for the answers. From the committee structure,⁴ house leadership,⁵ to political parties,⁶ formal institutions are the sites that inform policy decision making and ultimately establish law, including naturalization. When other factors are taken into consideration like ideology or individual preferences political scientist continue to neglect the origin of those concepts and how environment and context promote the reproduction of ideologies and preferences.⁷ What is even more revealing about studies at the intersection of Congress and processes of decision-making is that race and racial ideologies are often an

4. See: Gilligan, T.W. & K. Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 287-335; Fenno, R.F. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.

5. See: Degregorio, C. 2010. "Party Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives: Making Theoretical Sense of Ambition and Context." *Congress & the Presidency*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 19-44.

6. Theriault, S.M. 2008. *Party Polarization in Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

7. See: Schickler, E. 2001. *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Mayhew, D.R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

afterthought. As part of this project, I situate race as the fundamental organizing characteristic in American politics that influences and informs the preferences and decisions of individual members of Congress, specifically toward the determination of granting citizenship for immigrant military service.

Although I reject Desmond King and Rogers Smith's claim that there is more than one racial order, they do, however, offer an insightful analysis surrounding congressional development in APD that downplays the impact of racial ideologies in policy decision making.⁸ In particular, they point to Eric Schickler's disjointed pluralism thesis, which claims that various actors, interests, and political conditions drove congressional institutional change instead of any single mechanism of innovation.⁹ Additionally, King and Smith insist that Schickler had the space to thoroughly consider race as a prominent policy interest among his four periods of development—pushing members of Congress to acknowledge their diverse electoral, party, and agenda interests.¹⁰ Furthermore, they challenge Daniel Tichenor on failing to include an analysis of racial constructs in informing the expansive and restrictive historical nature of immigration policy.¹¹

Despite the shortcomings in their two racial orders thesis, King and Smith provide the scaffolding to make the transition from investigating institutions and member preferences through a racial orders lens with “racial institutional orders” as the key organizing mechanism. King and Smith define racial institutional orders as, “ones in which political actors have adopted (often adapted) racial concepts, commitments, and aims in order to help bind together their coalitions and structure governing institutions that express and serve the interest of their architects.”¹² This definition of racial institutional orders assumes that members

8. King, D. S. and R. M. Smith. 2005. “Racial Orders in American Political Development.” *American Political Science Review*, 99, 1, 75-92.

9. Schickler, E, *Disjointed Pluralism*.

10. King & Smith, “Racial Orders in American Political Development.”

11. *Ibid.*, 88.

12. *Ibid.*, 75.

of the same party share the same type of commitments, aims and concepts about race, which are constrained by the party and institution they operate in. Thus, the racial order and racial thinking is guided and organized by the institution/structure and not the other way around.

Furthermore, they neglect to adequately consider how processes of racialization and racial formation are not exclusive to formal institutions and in turn fall into the same trap they caution other scholars to be weary of. A more nuanced and compelling endeavor for APD will contemplate and scrutinize the racial order both at the formal elite and informal local institutional levels. Schickler and Tichenor provide compelling and generalizable roadmaps for the development of institutional change. My objectives in this chapter are significantly less ambitious, however, they offer much needed precision for research on Congressional policy decision making which pays particular attention to racial ideologies and the production of citizenship-for-service policy by considering the factors driving citizenship regimes. Defining and establishing the parameters of incorporation and naturalization, although important in their own right, go beyond institutional configurations such as the committee system, party, and congressional majorities. Instead, I interrogate how members of Congress concluded that citizenship-for-service needed to be more selective and exclusive. In the following sections, I outline the concept of citizenship regimes, provide a method to identify citizenship regimes, and begin to introduce evidence in support of racial ideologies that prompt congressional constraints against access to citizenship-for-service.

2.3 Racial Ideologies and Members of Congress

A central organizing theme throughout this project is that ideologies informed by conservative and republican interpretations of race lead to less access and opportunities for social and political inclusion at the highest levels of government in the U.S. Racial ideologies, according to philosopher Robert Gooding-Williams, encompass all racial representations of

racially classified individuals or groups.¹³ He contends that, “[b]ecause racial classification is pervasive; because, in fact, there are no occasions in American society in which racial classification is not present as a dimension of social interaction, it is possible and even reasonable to read all representations of the individuals or groups present in American society as interpretations of the racial identities which all racial classifications posit.”¹⁴ To put it another way, all depictions of social interactions between individuals and groups can and do make reference to racial identities. Gooding-Williams is making these distinctions and then operationalizes his conception of racial ideology in the context of the Rodney King Jr. beating by four white police officers and the subsequent uprising that transpired in South Central Los Angeles in 1992. I do not disagree with his claim that, “all representations of social life can be read as interpretations of racial identities,”¹⁵ or that they should be. However, it seems as if this understanding of racial classification considers the producers and reproducers of racial categories as agents conscious of interpreting non-white human bodies as inferior and worthy of oppression and these same agents could also similarly view white human bodies as deserving a completely different and less oppressive treatment. This, however, is not the work of ideology.

It is not that representations of racially classified groups apply to every instance of social activity (although in most cases in contemporary America they do). But, instead how representations and interpretations of racially classified groups came to be accepted as inferior and subject to processes of dehumanization to reinforce those portrayals. With this in mind, my views are more in line with historian Barbara Fields that posits race as an ideology, “came into existence at a discernible historical moment for rationally understandable historical reasons and is subject to change for similar reasons.”¹⁶ Fields contends that, “[p]eople are

13. Gooding-Williams, R. 1993. “Look, a Negro!” in *Reading Rodney King, Reading Urban Uprising*, edited by R. Gooding Williams. New York: Routledge: 158.

14. *Ibid.*, 159.

15. *Ibid.*, 159.

16. Fields, B. J. 1990. “Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America.” *New Left Review*: 101.

more readily perceived as inferior by nature when they are already seen as oppressed.”¹⁷ For Fields, this alone does not constitute a process of ideology formation. Indeed, she identifies the production of racial inferiority in the U.S. as the moment when racial mixture between a free white woman and a black slave produced a child. The bi-racial child challenged the slave master’s dominion over their self-proclaimed property.¹⁸

In this case, it was not racial mixture or race that established inferiority—at least not at that moment—instead, it was the act of undermining the slave master and his property that prompted legislation in the colonies prohibiting interactions between slaves and free white people. The thought of having to accept a half-free offspring not only went against the slave master’s expected financial returns but it raised questions around the extent the offspring could be considered free and apart of the larger social and political community. These early laws were meant to discourage free whites from associating with black slaves. Fields argues that once these types of laws got ingrained within the South to the point where they could be considered rituals. As such, these processes acquired the rationale that brought into existence the connections between why distinctions among free whites and black slaves can be interpreted as “natural.” Thus, for slave masters the connection between racial difference and means of production required an innovative technology, in the form of racial ideology, to sustain accumulation and maintain the myth that blacks are naturally inferior and therefore subject to oppression.

What does this discussion on racial ideology mean for how we understand members of Congress, decision-making, and citizenship-for-service legislation. The way I approach members of Congress and their decisions on expanding access to citizenship by serving in the military is by investigating the racial ideologies of members that proactively wrote, shaped, and managed the construction of citizenship-for-service legislation at the turn of the 20th century. It’s imperative to understand and identify the ideological commitments

17. *Ibid.*, 106.

18. *Ibid.*, 107.

responsible for reducing access to forms of social and political inclusion which are a direct threat to maintaining a democratic society. I contend that claims to citizenship based on non-citizen military service are analogous to how racial mixture prompted political elites to reevaluate the level of inclusion and exclusion of bi-racial offspring. I am not suggesting that the plight between non-citizen service members and black slaves is the same by any means. However, I am implying that issues concerning racial inclusion particularly when a privileged status (i.e., free white woman, service member) is involved prompts some legislators to create new legislative technologies to regulate the level of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, in the performance of duties traditionally reserved for white men, Asians, Blacks, and Latinos experienced some of the most oppressive forms of exclusion, discrimination, and segregation while donning American military uniforms during two world wars.

Claims to citizenship based on military service for racially marginalized groups were not met with embrace by political elites, but with questions by members of Congress. The concern most members of Congress invoked against providing legal citizenship to racially excluded veterans focused on what naturalizing undesirable immigrants would do to the American identity. These were not questions about expanding freedoms, but about expanding the imagined community through incorporation and acceptance based on race. The performance of positive behavior in the name of the state by non-citizens met with conclusions of normative racial inferiority by some political elites.

As such, the work of racial ideology I'm most interested in focuses on the extent to which new legislative technologies are introduced by members of Congress that reduce or restrict access to legal citizenship that would otherwise expand racial inclusivity among the larger social and political community. We can observe the work of racial ideology among members of Congress in their writings, speeches, and most importantly in Congressional hearings that pose questions concerning racial inclusion and citizenship. Members of Congress show us their racial ideologies not only when they vote in favor or against some critical piece of legislation (although these can be very important modes of observing ideologies), but more

importantly how they talk and argue about racial issues or ideas that go against how they view their world empirically and normatively. Thus, for my purposes, it is critical to examine the legislation that failed to get a vote and analyze the debates among members of Congress and the communities invested in expanding racial inclusivity for non-citizen service members. In doing so, we will get a much brighter picture into the nuances that emerge from different racial ideologies among members of Congress that go beyond a simple “Yea” or “Nay.”

2.4 Citizenship Regimes: A Process Tracing Approach to Citizenship-for-Service Legislation

Here, I want to explain what the necessary and sufficient conditions are that prompted members of Congress to increase regulations regarding access to citizenship-for-service in the years following the end of WWI and before the U.S. officially entered WWII. To gain a better understanding of what factors were crucial for creating the change in citizenship-for-service policy, I start by uncovering the type of citizenship regimes at play during this conjuncture. Some scholars approach citizenship regimes as political coalitions¹⁹ at an attempt to generalize institutional outcomes. Citizenship regimes, in this case, are more useful in outlining the parameters establishing when and how the juridical status of legal citizenship is provided to non-citizens that performed the duties of citizens. For my purposes, citizenship regimes serve a dual function: as a form of control and regulation and as a site to make claims for greater societal and political inclusion.²⁰ By analyzing racialized citizenship regimes, which focus on the patterns of racial inclusion and exclusion, connections can be made between members of Congress employing specific racial ideologies and their relation to decisions on

19. Tichenor, *Dividing Lines*.

20. Rocco, R. A. 2014. *Transforming Citizenship: Democracy, Membership, and Belonging in Latino Communities*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

naturalization policy.

According to Raymond Rocco, patterns of inclusion and exclusion determine the nature and level of incorporation in institutional sites within both political and civil society.²¹ Meaning, citizenship regimes operate and are informed by actors from the top-down (elected officials, political elites, etc.) and from the bottom-up grassroots level (community organizers, civic organizations, etc.). Multiple citizenship regimes can exist within any state at any one time. Although Congress is ultimately responsible for producing and passing legislation, we must also consider how the communities most affected by changes in citizenship-for-service policy reacted, endorsed, and/or resisted the policy transformation and more importantly, the consequences produced by their response or lack thereof. This latter consideration of community level actors I take up in chapters 3 and 4.

The statutory change from granting legal citizenship that was nearly uncontested by legislators to a bureaucratized version of citizenship-for-service is substantial since non-citizens were once able to become American citizens practically instantaneously. The Act of May 9, 1918 was a form of amnesty for predominantly European immigrants seeking to normalize their citizenship status considering that it did not require prospective non-citizen service members to procure entry authorization documents or proof of five years of permanent residency. Stated another way, the state turned a blind eye to unauthorized immigrants and rather than deporting would be recruits, Congress, as a wartime necessity, provided a direct pathway to citizenship via military service. Who was responsible for citizenship-for-service legislation during this period? What were their positions on who should have access to naturalization, on one hand, and citizenship-for-service, on the other? How did the belief systems of members of Congress influence the transformation of citizenship-for-service policy from the First World War to the Second?

21. *Ibid.*, 70.

2.5 Racial Ideologies, Citizenship Regimes, and Citizenship-for-Service Policy

Borrowing from Daniel Tichenor’s seminal work on the politics of immigration control, I organize competing objectives toward access to naturalization for non-citizen service members and regular access to naturalization based on racial inclusivity and exclusivity along two dimensions. One dimension focuses on the racialized interests toward non-citizen service member naturalizations, with a horizontal continuum that spans from maximum support for racially inclusive access to naturalization by non-citizen service members on the left to maximum support for racially excluding access to naturalization by non-citizen service members on the right. The other dimension focuses on racialized interests toward access to naturalization generally, with a vertical continuum that extends from maximum support for racially inclusive access to naturalization at the bottom to maximum support for racially excluding access to naturalization at the top. Additionally, by organizing competing racial preferences for naturalization between regular naturalizations, on one hand, and naturalizations based on military service, on the other, also reveals the extent critical ideas like merit and deservingness play into the calculus of advancing legislation that expands or restricts access to naturalization.

There is precedence in political science that approaches the study of political ideologies through one or more dimensions in order to locate where members of Congress stand on issues like the economy and race. For instance, DW-Nominate scores popularized by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal look at political polarization in Congress by viewing roll call votes in both chambers.²² Indeed, Poole and Rosenthal state in their book *Ideology and Congress* that one dimension of positions may not be enough to determine the behavior of

22. Poole, K. T. and H. Rosenthal. 2007. *Ideology and Congress*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Poole, K. T. and H. Rosenthal. 1991. “Patterns of Congressional Voting.” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 228-278; Poole, K. T. and H. Rosenthal. 1985. “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis.” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 357-384.

members of Congress.²³ Yet, they conclude that votes in Congress can still be reduced to a single dimension and posit that issues around race are idiosyncrasies that can be explained by concepts like the economy and redistribution in Congressional voting. One of the problematic aspects of DW-Nominate is that Poole and Rosenthal are only observing roll-call votes from members of Congress. Meaning that they are primarily capturing positive cases. We have less of an understanding on bills that did not receive a vote. This project, however, is not on the nature of roll-call voting, but instead on what factors lead members of Congress to make decisions on granting citizenship to racially marginalized communities.

Thus, with this two-by-two configuration we get a crude yet simple way of determining where members of Congress land ideologically on who should receive naturalization. Table 2.1 illustrates the two-dimensional configuration. We can identify four distinctive sets of naturalization preferences and racial ideologies: racial egalitarians, conditional republicans, meritorious republicans, and white supremacists. The political actors and organizations within each naturalization interest and ideological type are not static and change over time. Employing the two-dimensional typology provides the basis to analyze racial ideologies and preferences among decisions to legislatively expand or restrict access to naturalization for racially marginalized non-citizens and non-citizen service members.

Table 2.1: A Two-Dimensional Model of Competing Racial Ideologies in Congress

Naturalizations should be racially...	Citizenship-for-Service naturalizations should be racially...	
	Inclusive	Exclusive
Exclusive	Meritorious Republicans	White Supremacists
Inclusive	Racial Egalitarians	Conditional Republicans

Racial egalitarians support both racially inclusive naturalization policies for immigrants and non-citizen service members. Advocates of racial egalitarian naturalization legislation

23. Poole & Rosenthal, *Ideology and Congress*.

believe that non-citizens from all racial backgrounds willing to adopt American ideals, values, and norms such as equality, civil liberty, and social justice should be allowed to participate in the political arena. From Congressman Adolph J. Sabath during WWI to Congressman Emanuel Celler who spearheaded the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which abolished immigrant admission quotas, they promote racial immigrant inclusion as being part of the hallmark of an American identity. Racial egalitarians made numerous legislative attempts following the end of WWI to expand the revised statuses provision 2169 that limited naturalization to people of white or African descent.²⁴

The exclusion of other races as being unfit for citizenship is what Judith Shklar highlights as one of the shortcomings of American democracy, “because Americans have lived with extreme contradictions for most of their history by being dedicated to political equality as well as to its complete rejection.”²⁵ They can also be found in civic organizations like the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), which managed to retroactively gain citizenship for Asian WWI veterans in 1935. Although the JACL promoted racial egalitarian beliefs, they were against undocumented immigration and routinely encouraged their communities to assimilate to the dominant American culture.

Conditional republicans support exclusive naturalization legislation against non-citizen service members that do not meet the racial criteria for citizenship under the revised statutes provision 2169. They do, however, endorse a racially inclusive naturalization system dependent on adhering to provision 2169. Meaning, non-citizen service members who are not of white or African origin should not be granted the opportunity to naturalize. Any non-citizen service member that does meet the criteria under provision 2169 should be provided the ability to become a citizen. Some notable conditional republicans are Deputy Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, Raymond Crist who provided the expertise for the Act of

24. See: Salyer, L. E. 2004. “Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service and U.S. Citizenship Policy, 1918-1935.” *The Journal of American History*, 847-876; Ichioka, Y. 1977. “The Early Japanese Immigrant Quest for Citizenship: The Background of the 1922 Ozawa Case.” *Amerasia*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1-22.

25. Shklar, J. N. 1991. *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.: 8.

May 9, 1918 during WWI and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. that created the first American foreign legion comprised of European immigrants in 1950. Conditional nativists have a vested interest in keeping naturalization viably open for ethnic European immigrants and refuse to expand the racial boundaries of membership. They made concessions for the inclusion of African-Americans to citizenship, but seek to maintain their dominance in American culture.

Republicanism is the other layer informing this particular citizenship regime. Members of Congress under this type of racial ideology view legislative challenges that undermine the established law or statutes as a form of interference in how they view their everyday life. To put it another way, subverting laws that are meant to be common sense to members of Congress and challenge the status quo is a form of domination for conditional republicans since they view it as an unwanted imposition or interference. For conditional republicans outside of Congress, arbitrary forms of interference would be performed with or without the consent of the individual. Hence, the role of arbitrary interference in identifying conditional republicans. Yet, conditional republicans in Congress do have a say in what will or will not interfere in their lives or the lives of their constituents.

Meritorious republicans endorse a merit-based approach to naturalization. They believe in excluding access to naturalization based on an individual's race and campaign for stricter legislation toward immigrant admissions and naturalization. However, they are also supporters of the civic republican tradition and emphasize the obligation and responsibilities of citizenship, especially military service. Therefore, meritorious republicans, although entirely against expanding the boundaries of racial inclusion, advocate for racially marginalized non-citizen combat veterans to gain access to citizenship. Organizations like the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars founded by WWI veterans introduced and perpetuated the idea of "100% Americanism."²⁶

Yet, the American Legion offered their support for Asian WWI veterans excluded from

26. Salyer, "Baptism by Fire."

taking advantage of the Act of May 9, 1918, which guaranteed legal citizenship to non-citizen service members who were of white or African descent. Through a joint coalition of racial egalitarian and meritorious republican organizations the Nye-Lea Act was passed in 1935 allowing Asian WWI veterans to gain citizenship despite the continued exclusion of Asians from legal citizenship. Some prominent racial patriots in Congress span from Congressman and once Chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization during WWI, John Burnett of Alabama, to Congressman Clarence Lea of California who, on one hand, introduced the Nye-Lea Act in 1935 and, on the other, called for interning Italians, Germans, and Japanese during WWII.

Meritorious republicans and conditional republicans are aligned in their views on blocking and restricting racial inclusion in the U.S. However, meritorious republicans are willing to allow concessions for non-citizens that do not meet the racial requirements for citizenship due to their service and sacrifice in the military. This type of concession is something conditional republicans are not prepared to allow since protecting their idea of freedom as non-domination is more important than expanding racial requirements for citizenship, regardless if non-citizens provided military service to the state or not. For conditional republicans, military service does not have anything to do with what they have already accepted and normalized to be common-sense views in society, their respective communities, and within their legislative institution. To ask conditional republicans to expand or undermine the status quo is a type of direct interference in their lives.

White supremacists are the antithesis to racial egalitarians. They support excluding any racial group, other than whites, from gaining access to naturalization regardless of military service. They view incorporating non-whites into the polity as an assault on American identity. Moreover, white supremacists attempt to derail the gains made by racially marginalized groups- especially blacks-through efforts to remove provisions that provide non-citizen service members a pathway to citizenship. Notable white supremacist leaders in Congress span from Congressman Albert Johnson of Washington who authored the national origins quota

law in 1924 and was a fierce advocate of the eugenics movement to Senator Patrick McCarran of Nevada who zealously ensured the survival of national origins quotas with the passage of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.

2.6 The Committee on Immigration and Naturalization

Before jumping into the core of this chapter, it would be useful to shed some light on the place and space where citizenship-for-service legislation was debated, negotiated, and ultimately shaped into law. The main location where questions surrounding the acquisition of citizenship or procedures for naturalization at the turn of the 20th century took place within the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (COIN). Prior to being a standing committee in the House of Representatives, the COIN was a select²⁷ committee for four years and eventually was upgraded as its own standing committee in 1893 as issues surrounding Chinese Exclusion and questions about race and naturalization became more dynamic and complicated to handle for members of Congress. The COIN would enjoy its position as a standing committee in the House until 1946 when it was reclassified as a subcommittee under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee with the passage of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act. Thus, the COIN assumed all of the jurisdiction concerning matters of citizenship and immigration during this period. Some of the main responsibilities of the COIN were: to oversee the general revision of immigration and naturalization bills and laws; oversight of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization; and managing admissions to legal permanent residency, deportations, and processing naturalization fees. Hence, the jurisdiction of the COIN consisted of measures to restrict immigration from undesirable groups, implementing literacy tests and head taxes, and the establishment of national origins quotas.

27. Select committees were formed to address particular issues or to review certain bills and were disbanded when the committee work was completed.

Legislation focusing on citizenship-for-service was essentially mandated to pass through and eventually be marked up by the members of Congress serving in the COIN. The standing COIN like all other Congressional committees is constrained by the norms of its parent chamber. In this case, the House of Representatives which is vulnerable to partisan influences and manipulation is no exception when it comes to the COIN. Meaning, that partisan divides are a main cause explaining how and why the committee voted on advancing or blocking legislation from going to the House floor. The party that controls the chamber has the power to control the agenda. For instance, Table 2.2 illustrates the number of members of Congress who served on the COIN from the 65th to 76th Congress (1917-1941) by political party. We can see that Democrats controlled the House and the committee during the 65th Congress which sent the Act of May 9, 1918 for a full House vote. Eight years of Democratic control of the House slipped away with the 66th Congress when Republicans again made up the majority. Republicans held control of both chambers of Congress for twelve years from 1919 to 1931. This was a critical period where national origins were established and implemented to regulate the level of immigration coming into the U.S. based on a calculus that reproduced racial and ethnic inequality in the immigration process. We saw more restrictive and exclusive legislation on immigration and naturalization being considered and passed under Republican control of both the House of Representatives and the COIN.

When Democrats reclaimed control of the House and the COIN the environment was viable for advancing legislation that was more inclusive for non-citizens serving in the military. Notably, the Nye-Lea Act was passed in 1935 granting citizenship retroactively to Asian WWI veterans that were excluded from naturalization since they did not meet the racial requirements for naturalization. The Democrats would enjoy majorities in both chambers until 1947. Although partisanship can explain which bills were advanced and blocked in the COIN, we have a less of an understanding as to how and why the COIN moved to increase regulations on citizenship-for-service with the passage of the 1940 Nationality Act when Democrats controlled both the House and the committee itself. Thus, partisanship

Table 2.2: Partisanship and the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 1919-1941

Congress	Democrats	Republicans	Total Members
65th (1917-1919)	9	6	15
66th (1919-1921)	6	9	15
67th (1921-1923)	5	10	15
68th (1923-1925)	7	10	17
69th (1925-1927)	7	10	17
70th (1927-1929)	8	13	21
71st (1929-1931)	7	14	21
72nd (1931-1933)	11	9	20
73rd (1933-1935)	15	6	21
74th (1935-1937)	13	6	19
75th (1937-1939)	15	4	19
76th (1939-1941)	14	7	21

alone does not provide the entire picture around reorganizing how non-citizen service members could acquire citizenship for their military service. We must look into how the COIN handled issues pertaining to race, naturalization, and who the committee believed naturalization was designed for. This includes analyzing committee members' racial preferences for naturalization, on one hand, and racial preferences for citizenship-for-service, on the other.

2.7 The Dominance of Conditional Republicans over Citizenship-for-Service Policy, 1917-1931

Racial exclusionists within both political parties dominated the COIN between the 65th and 71st Congress, which was the critical time period that reduced access to citizenship-for-service for non-citizens. The dominance of conditional republicans can also be seen by the number of bills that failed to either get a vote or marked up. Table 2.3 illustrates the citizenship-for-service bills that were not passed and those that were enacted. We can see that between 1918 and 1931 with the exception of the Act of May 9, 1918, every other proposed citizenship-for-service bill failed to move on further to get a full House vote. This also coincides with conditional republicans controlling the majorities in the COIN.

Access to an expedited naturalization process for non-citizen service members prior to

Table 2.3: Development of Citizenship-for-Service Policy in the COIN, 1918-1940

Year	Legislation	Eligibility for Naturalization	Outcome
1918	H.R. 10694	Numerous expansions	Failed
1918	H.R. 3132	All “white” or “black” immigrants	Enacted
1919	H.R. 6804	Naturalize any non-citizen service member	Failed
1925	H.R. 7177	Naturalize any non-citizen service member	Failed
1926	H.R. 8400	Expand non-quota immigrants to include WWI veterans	Failed
1929	H.R. 97	Filipinos who served in the U.S. Army	Failed
1931	H.R. 6597	Filipinos who served in the U.S. Army	Failed
1935	Nye-Lea Act	Retroactive citizenship for Asian WWI veterans	Enacted
1937	H.R. 84	Turkish and Bulgarian WWI veterans	Failed
1939	H.R. 4167	Extended the Nye-Lea Act	Enacted
1940	Nationality Act	3 years of service	Enacted

WWI did not exist. Early in 1917, Congressional Representative from Illinois and member of the COIN, Democrat Adolph J. Sabath, began devising a way to grant instant naturalization to active non-citizen service members. Sabath enlisted the expertise from the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization’s Deputy Commissioner of Naturalization, Raymond Crist, and their law clerk, A. W. Parker, to formulate the criteria and provisions for immediate naturalizations of non-citizen service members. Close to the war’s end during the winter of

1918, speaking to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Sabath, Crist, and Parker presented fourteen amendments in bill H.R. 10694 to the nationality act of June 29, 1906. H.R. 10694 was a sweeping naturalization bill that also included provisions on extending access to naturalization to residents that believed to already being citizens due to their residence, but were brought to the United States as children. Table 2.4 identifies where members of the COIN fell ideologically when it came to advancing citizenship-for-service legislation during WWI.

As the experts on naturalization, Crist and Parker took the lead in the long process of

Table 2.4: Racial Preferences and Members of the COIN, 65th Congress

Naturalizations should be racially...	Citizenship-for-Service naturalizations should be racially...	
	Inclusive	Exclusive
Exclusive	<u>Meritorious Republicans</u> Raymond Crist	<u>White Supremacists</u>
Inclusive	<u>Racial Egalitarians</u> Adalph J. Sabath (D-IL)	<u>Conditional Republicans</u> Chairman John L. Burnett (D-AL) John E. Raker (D-CA) Albert Johnson (R-WA) Everis A. Hayes (R-CA) James L. Slayden (D-TX)

codifying a path to naturalization for immigrants who served in the military during WWI. The Chairman of the COIN, Democrat John Burnett of Alabama, supported the opportunity to streamline a path to naturalization for non-citizen service members. He was, however, concerned about two questions on the bill amending the 1906 Nationality Act: 1) would access to naturalization for non-citizen service members offer historically excluded groups the opportunity to gain citizenship and 2) would naturalization certificates be granted overseas?

First, the main concern for Burnett was whether or not the amendments to the nationality act would offer a backdoor entrance for groups that were deemed to be ineligible for citizenship, like Asians. Burnett asks in the initial hearing, “[a]re there any Asiatics that are

not eligible for citizenship who are serving in any capacity on ships, and if so, would this bill in its broad terms allow them to come in?”²⁸ Burnett further states, “[i]n any of the different [military] branches mentioned here. I would not want to enlarge the naturalization laws so as to let in those excluded by the general laws by virtue of the fact that they happened to be serving in one of these branches. That should be taken care of if it is not.”²⁹ The Chairman of the COIN is making it clear to the authors of the amendments that a pathway to citizenship for non-citizen service members will be considered and subsequently supported to be turned into law as long as Asians are not allowed to take advantage of the new privilege. Furthermore, Burnett is demonstrating that he is a conditional republican since he is willing to expand and expedite how non-citizen military service members acquire citizenship, but not at the expense of allowing people that are “excluded by the general laws” a reference to the conditional component of the type of republicanism he is committed to.

Burnett does not want to “enlarge the naturalization laws” so as to include Asians as part of the immigrant service member imaginary being created by the committee and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. Furthermore, Sabath, Crist, and Parker were prepared to ensure that although the amendments would in fact repeal parts of the 1906 Nationality Act that were inconsistent with their suggestions, but the updates would not repeal or enlarge section 2169 of the Revised Statutes, which stipulates that naturalization is reserved for immigrants of white or African descent.

Secondly, in the event that a pathway to citizenship for non-citizen service members would be realized, Burnett wanted to ensure that naturalization certificates would only be issued in the United States. Burnett asks Crist, “[t]here is nothing in this bill which permits consular officers abroad to grant naturalization. Is it your opinion, or would you care to express an opinion, that it would not be good policy to allow this naturalization to occur

28. Amendments to the Naturalization Laws: Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, 62nd Cong. 8 (1918).

29. *Ibid.*

abroad through consular officers?”³⁰ The chairman is prompting Crist to devise a rationale to prevent consular officers from naturalizing non-citizen service members abroad. Taken another way, prior to the proposed amendments to the 1906 Nationality Act, non-citizen service members were required to fulfill naturalization provisions like every other immigrant attempting to become naturalized. That entails procuring at least two U.S. citizens to act as witnesses at the naturalization court. Burnett is pointing to the idea that by streamlining access to naturalization non-citizen service members would be overriding protocols meant to screen and evaluate incoming political members. For instance, Asians due to their race were ineligible for naturalization and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization used the Revised Statutes provision to ensure incoming citizens met the racial requirements for naturalization.

Thinking on his feet, Crist responded to Burnett and said, “I think it is a fact that every foreigner in our Army who holds a certificate of naturalization granted by a consul is branded as having been naturalized outside the United States, and if he is captured with that on his person there is but one punishment they will [sic] mete out to him.”³¹ Yet, Crist fails to consider that any individual, immigrant, newly naturalized or citizen, in an American military uniform would meet the same punishment by the enemy-death or imprisonment. Issuing a naturalization certificate to a non-citizen service member overseas would not provide any additional information to what the enemy already knows about a captured U.S. service member or where their loyalty lies. The narrative around how and where non-citizen service members may become naturalized turned into a national security concern when Burnett emphasized that he was glad Crist brought up the concerns around consular offices issuing certificates overseas since he regarded the practice of naturalizing non-citizens overseas as being, “a very dangerous thing.” Essentially, Burnett does not see it in the best interest of the U.S. to circumvent the vetting process for immigrants with the intention to naturalize

30. Ibid., 18.

31. Ibid., 16.

simply because they serve the U.S. in a military capacity.

The non-citizen service member provisions were primarily directed at repealing section 2171 of the Revised Statutes that prevented, so called, “enemy aliens” from naturalizing. German immigrants now had the opportunity to serve the U.S. in the military and the ability to naturalize upon the repeal of section 2171 of the Revised Statutes. Yet, section 2169 of the Revised Statutes was the artifact that Chairman Burnett and the majority of the COIN ensured went unchanged since it could potentially allow Asians or any other racially undesirable non-citizens the opportunity to naturalize.

As such, H.R. 10694 was separated into different bills to secure the passage of the military component, which resulted in the creation of H.R. 3132, “[a]n Act to amend the naturalization laws and to repeal certain sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States and other laws relating to naturalization, and for other purposes.”³² H.R. 3132 otherwise known as the Act of May 9, 1918, allowed for any immigrant serving in the military during WWI to naturalize immediately as long as they were within the parameters of section 2169 of the Revised Statutes, which states that immigrants have to be of “white” or “African” nativity to be considered for citizenship. Immigrants within these boundaries and serving in the military were exempted from procuring arrival documents, proof of residency, witnesses and affidavits, and paying naturalization fees. Non-citizen service members were also granted immediate hearings in naturalization courts. Additionally, the Act of May 9, 1918 included a path for Filipinos and Puerto Ricans residing in their respective U.S. territories to naturalize upon submitting an intent to naturalize and serving at least three years in the military. The three-year service requirement was another artifact of citizenship-for-service that we will see resurface when the pathway gets overhauled in 1940. By artifact, I am suggesting that the three-year military service prerequisite that was directed at non-white service members, Filipinos and Puerto Ricans, was intended to vet non-white and non-black immigrant service members prior to offering them the opportunity to naturalize. A process that was strictly

32. House Resolution 3132, 65th Cong. May 9, 1918.

reserved for non-whites and non-blacks. Although nationals of the United States, Filipinos and Puerto Ricans, had to prove their loyalty with a minimum service requirement that white and black immigrants were spared from.³³

In an effort to bypass hard safeguards on section 2169 of the Revised Statutes, the following year in 1919 Republican Representative John Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts introduced H.R. 6804 which facilitated the naturalization of immigrants who served in the military or naval forces during WWI and were honorably discharged.³⁴ The COIN was completely different from the previous year since Republicans now controlled the House and the power to appoint their own chairman. Republican Congressman Albert Johnson of Washington was appointed chairman—a post he would hold for the following twelve years. Roger’s bill ignored any language that pointed to section 2169 of the Revised Statutes as a way to include all immigrants who served during WWI and not just immigrants that were of either “white” or “African” nativity. Instead, Rogers focused on the service non-citizens provided to the state and concluded that if non-citizens served during the war and were subsequently honorably discharged then naturalization should be provided to those service members. The bill was referred to the COIN where any further attempts to vote on the bill were ended. The COIN would not entertain another citizenship-for-service bill until 1925. Thus, to get an understanding of the racial preferences and direction of the COIN I look at bills and hearings that engage the questions of immigration and naturalization more generally like repealing certificates of arrival for immigration and issuing special acts of Congress for naturalization during the interim time period.

33. Puerto Ricans would not have guaranteed access to citizenship until the passage of the Jones Act in 1920.

34. House Resolution 6804, 66th Cong. June 27, 1919.

2.7.1 Certificates of Arrival

The COIN was a unique committee because its members were more likely to be concerned with their own preferences than the larger party agenda. This was especially true among COIN Democrats who were divided on a majority of issues that came before them. In particular, was the controversial issue of eliminating certificates of arrival that helps reveal how the top Democrats in the COIN differed on their immigration views. Specifically, in the first session of the 67th Congress, representatives Adolph Sabath (D-IL) and John Raker (D-CA) were at odds with each other on the issue of eliminating certificates of arrival for recently arrived immigrants. Certificates of arrival are a way for the Bureau of Naturalization to keep track of incoming immigrants and the certificates are also a prerequisite for naturalization that demonstrate the particular immigrant entered the country with authorization. Sabath introduced H.R. 9 which called for the elimination of certificates of arrival mainly because he saw it as a burden for immigrants to procure when they were attempting to submit their applications for naturalization. Here, Sabath one of the most liberal Democrats in the COIN, establishes himself as someone that is open to creating more ways for immigrants to realize naturalization. We can see where members of the COIN land ideologically in table 2.5.

However, H.R. 9 was met with significant resistance from Republicans and members of

Table 2.5: Racial Preferences and Members of the COIN, 67th-71st Congress

Citizenship-for-Service naturalizations should be racially...		
Naturalizations should be racially...	Inclusive	Exclusive
Exclusive	<u>Meritorious Republicans</u> William F. James (R-MI)*	<u>White Supremacists</u>
Inclusive	<u>Racial Egalitarians</u> Adolph J. Sabath (D-IL) Samuel Dickstein (D-NY) Edith N. Rogers (R-MA)* John J. Rogers (R-MA)*	<u>Conditional Republicans</u> Chairman Albert Johnson (R-WA) John E. Raker (D-CA) John C. Box (D-TX) John L. Cable (R-OH) Richard Campbell
*Not members of the COIN.		

Sabbath's own party, particularly from John Raker. "If, when this certificate of arrival is delivered to the immigrant," Raker states in the committee hearing for H.R. 9, "and its necessity, value, and importance explained to him, if he desires hereafter to become naturalized, and he throws that certificate deliberately away, then, when he applies for naturalization six or seven years afterwards, it does not seem to me that we should shed many tears because such a man could not be naturalized."³⁵ For Raker, specifically following the rules and procedures when attempting to become naturalized are of the utmost importance. Yet, what Raker was not understanding or attempting to understand during the hearing was that recently arrived immigrants did not grasp the importance of certificates of arrival because they had no instruction on institutional procedures. Additionally, most recent arrivals hardly spoke English especially if they descended from Southern or Eastern Europe. Not only are recent arrivals overwhelmed with immigrating to a new country now they are also responsible for critical authorization forms that they will need in five years if they plan to become a political member of society.

On one hand, certificates of arrival were a necessity to distinguish immigrants that entered the country through the proper authorization channels, on the other hand, failure to retain the certificate signals to naturalization officers that they may have an individual attempting to deceive the state. It followed that if the immigrant could not produce a certificate of arrival then the individual was in the country without authorization. Moreover, if a group of people were racially excluded from citizenship and from entering the country in general—like Chinese—then those individuals were always questioned about their authorization in the state. For example, the Chief of the Naturalization Bureau, Richard Campbell, was testifying on behalf of eliminating certificates of arrival because he saw them as unnecessary since there were other ways to verify authorization like ship manifests and the records kept at the ports of entry. Campbell highlighted why using the procurement of certificates of arrival as the standard for validating authorization in the case of Chinese residents. When asked about

35. Hearing: Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, H.R. 9, 67th Cong. (1921).

what being unable to produce a certificate of arrival meant for verifying an immigrant's legitimacy he stated, "[t]he best way I can answer that question is to point to the registration of the Chinese. For three or four years I had charge of the administration of that law, and every Chinese laborer had to produce a certificate of registration. We must have arrested hundreds of men who could not produce their certificates of registration."³⁶ He was then asked if he deported those Chinese men that could not produce certificates of arrival and Campbell responded with, "no." He could not deport a majority of those particular Chinese men because upon further investigation it turned out those men were born in the U.S. and therefore did not have or were not provided certificates of arrival. These Chinese laborers, however, did have birth certificates.

The notion of being categorized in an inferior race and being in the country without authorization went hand-in-hand for Raker. "There is another condition there that would not exist in the case of the white race," contended Raker, "and that is that the Chinese are so nearly alike that they can substitute or be substituted."³⁷ Here, Raker is making his evaluation of racially marginalized groups and their relationship with naturalization more clearly. He asserts that whites are less likely to commit perjury or fraud against the state because of their race which has created whites to be more individually distinct as opposed to Chinese who, according to Congressman Raker, all look alike. The explicit racism toward Chinese is one matter, but it is a completely different matter when Raker attributes meaning to what he identifies as natural racial distinctions with groups who are not white.

Since Chinese people, for Raker, look alike then they would have the tools to defraud the state when it comes time to petition for naturalization and because they have the tools to undermine immigration and naturalization protocols, then it follows that Chinese will in fact seek to deceive the state. This exchange during the hearing reveals to us that Raker without much evidence to support his claim that Chinese people are better equipped to deceive the

36. Ibid., 10.

37. Ibid., 10.

state than white immigrants and because they supposedly have those capabilities Chinese will in fact seek to undermine the state, we learn that Raker has broader reservations toward eliminating certificates of arrival that go beyond legislative and juridical procedures for naturalization. Raker believes that immigration officers should be looking more closely at non-white immigrant groups and maintaining certificates of arrival as another line of defense against non-whites attempting to deceive the state. Thus, Raker reveals his racial exclusivity and reservations on general concerns over immigration and subsequently naturalization.

Certificates of arrival become even more trivial considering the practice of “nunc pro tunc” certificates. So called nunc pro tunc certificates are pseudo certificates of arrival because they are granted by immigration officers to recently arrived immigrants that did not receive a certificate of arrival when they entered the country, but claim they should have been issued one. Nunc pro tunc certificates of arrival are based on the integrity and the word of the immigrant claiming they entered the country with authorization and are warranted a certificate of arrival. The problem is that an unverified number of immigrants could potentially become naturalized by nunc pro tunc certificates without further investigation as to their origin or how the immigrants entered the country. The only way that an immigrant could request a nunc pro tunc certificate is if they made it into the country. Entering the country could be done in many ways and not just through traditional ports of entry. “[U]nder the ruling of the department,” contends Chief Campbell, “upon his own affirmance that he did enter and he is physically here, and these were the conditions under which he entered; and there is nothing to controvert that.”³⁸ According to Congressman Raker, “[t]hat is clearly an unadulterated, fabricated document; you can not call it anything else.”³⁹ Campbell assures Raker that the way the law is written, certificates of arrival do not get their complete authority from the records found at the port of entry. Instead, both types of certificates are legitimate forms used by naturalization officers to make determinations for naturalization.

38. *Ibid.*, 23.

39. *Ibid.*, 23.

Chief Campbell asserts, “upon the man’s own statement, unsupported by any evidence other than the assumption that he is an honest man and is going to tell the truth. Therefore, I say, in view of that administrative position, I have long felt very doubtful as to whether it paid any sense to require it in those cases where they had complied with the law.”⁴⁰ Campbell continues to make the case that numerous immigrants that attempted to make their way into the country without authorization could easily make their way in through other paths, particularly through Canada or Mexico. Indeed, Campbell states, “if I am a reputable looking man, and I am an Englishman, nobody can tell that I am not American, and when I come in there is no record made if such a man wants to be naturalized, he can tell a “cock and bull” story about his entering at a certain place.”⁴¹ Yet, Campbell is mainly talking about white immigrants. As Congressman Raker demonstrated earlier, non-white immigrants will experience a different type of treatment where they are suspected of being in the country without authorization prior to being approached or asked about their status. The hearing neglected a wider conversation about racially marginalized immigrants primarily since immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe was more of a concern in the aftermath of WWI than migrants coming from Latin America or Asia.

2.7.2 Naturalization by Special Acts of Congress

During the same time the COIN was considering the removal of certificates of arrival in the 67th Congress, members of the COIN were also considering the petition by George A. Huntley, a British immigrant, to be admitted to citizenship by a special act of Congress. Born in 1865, George Huntley emigrated to the U.S. and was trained in medicine at Harvard and managed to establish permanent residence. As part of the American Baptist Foreign Mission, Huntley had been stationed in Hanyang, China for nearly twenty years where he

40. Ibid., 24.

41. Ibid., 24.

is a professor of medicine and Baptist minister. The question before the COIN is whether Congress has the authority to grant citizenship to specific individuals as opposed to directing petitioners for special acts of Congress to stand in traditional lines and procedures for naturalization. The first comment on this question came from Rep. Raker, “I am going to raise an objection to the consideration of this bill, not to be acted upon now by the committee, but on its final action, on the ground that it is not within the power of Congress to grant a special bill naturalizing any individual.”⁴² When asked by Chairman Johnson if a bill of this nature, this being a joint resolution that was already passed in the Senate, should be sent to the House floor for a vote Raker responded, “I think the committee can, in the first place dispose of it.”⁴³ Raker’s main contention with bills attempting to naturalize individuals is that, for him, this was a pursuit to undermine the power given to Congress by Article 1, Section 8 stating Congress can establish a uniform rule for naturalization. When Congress begins to grant individual requests for naturalization then, according to Raker, Congress is producing exceptions to the rule. As a Democrat, Raker’s convictions are about the constitutionality of special acts of Congress and not whether or not supporting special acts of Congress for naturalization are fair or warranted.

Rep. Raker is reminded by his colleagues in the COIN that special cases for naturalization have actually been passed by his chamber. In fact, Chairman Johnson reveals that since he has been in Congress there had been a few cases where individual petitions—primarily from native born women that were married to immigrants to restore citizenship were granted.⁴⁴ Raker proceeds to affirm that although some cases may have slipped by Congress, the Supreme Court had already established the conclusion in the case of *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* that:

42. Hearing: Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, “Naturalization of Individuals by Special Acts of Congress.” 67th Cong. (1921).

43. *Ibid.*, 158.

44. *Ibid.*, 159.

A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of annexation of foreign territory or by authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization act.⁴⁵

This issue of granting citizenship by special acts of Congress came to divide members of the Democratic party in the COIN. Although there were only five Democrats in the COIN in the 67th Congress, Democrats did not support each other on issues that would expand access to naturalization. For instance, the following discussion demonstrates how Rep. Sabath as the most liberal Democrat in the committee has the minority view when it comes to establishing the COIN as inclusive in terms of naturalization:

Mr. Sabath (D-IL): Your contention is that the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule for naturalization?

Mr. Raker (D-CA): Yes.

Mr. Sabath (D-IL): You do not take into consideration that that means a uniform rule as to States and as to people?

Mr. Raker (D-CA): It means that Congress did not think to say that at all.

Mr. Sabath (D-IL): That is what it means, that it shall be uniform as to States and as to people, but it can not take away from Congress the power to legislate.

Mr. Box (D-TX): Has Congress any power that is not given it by the Constitution?

Mr. Sabath (D-IL): No; it has not, but it has the power of naturalization.

Mr. Box (D-TX): Where do you get it?

Mr. Sabath (D-IL): Right here in the Constitution.

Mr. Box (D-TX): But that is "to establish a uniform rule."

Mr. Sabath (D-IL): To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, namely, there shall be no exceptions made as to States or as to people.

Mr. Box (D-TX): I am inclined to take Judge Raker's view of it. I had reached a conclusion that was a matter of policy, but I am indebted to him for this important suggestion.⁴⁶

Here, Rep. Sabath could not mobilize members of his own party to support the idea that the uniform rule clause found in Article 1 could in fact be the authority allowing Congress

45. *Ibid.*, 160.

46. *Ibid.*, 160.

to establish special acts of naturalization to individuals. For Rep. Sabbath, special acts of Congress can and should be granted to individuals if Congress grants the petitions uniformly. Chairman Johnson (R-WA) was also sympathetic to the idea that individual petitions should be granted, but did not want to move forward with allowing special acts of Congress because he sensed that if the COIN allowed individual requests through then it would open the gates for even more requests.⁴⁷

Republicans and a majority of Democrats in the COIN were all on the same page on the issue of allowing special acts of Congress to naturalize specific individuals. The determination was that Congress with all of its power did not have the authority to allow individual requests for naturalization, but Congress could advance a uniform rule of naturalization that applied to all states and to all residents of those states. In a lengthy supplement to the hearing, Rep. John Levi Cable (R-OH) outlined the powers granted to Congress with respect to naturalization: I. Citizenship by Birth; II. Citizenship by Naturalization; III. Citizenship by Treaty; IV. Admission to Statehood in the Union; and V. Naturalization by Special Act.⁴⁸ Although Rep. Cable considered naturalizations by special acts of Congress, he ultimately determined that people seeking special acts of Congress can be directed to any of the four pathways to naturalization he outlined. In fact, under “Citizenship by Naturalization,” Rep. Cable underscores that Congress divided naturalization under the uniform rule into different classes, but has since been repealed.⁴⁹ Since its repeal, Congress proceeded to divide the uniform rule of naturalization to correspond to different classes of people: A. By judicial proceedings in state, federal, and territorial courts; B. Citizenship by marriage; C. Children become citizens by naturalization of parents; D. Soldiers, sailors, and Marines of the World

47. Chairman Johnson made a note during the hearing that all of the individual requests they had received so far had already been vetted and passed in the Senate. He did not want to make COIN the committee that would easily pass individual requests.

48. *Ibid.*, 170.

49. The first being with reference to aliens who had resided within the jurisdiction of the United States a certain length of time; the next as to the children of such persons so naturalized dwelling in the United States; and the third class being children of citizens of the United States born abroad.

War; and E. Citizenship granted to certain Indians.⁵⁰ Thus, according to Rep. Cable, since the uniform rule of naturalization was applied to all persons within the aforementioned designated groups Congress is not expanding their authority.

2.7.3 Citizenship-for-Service During National Origins

Following the end of WWI, the U.S. began implementing immigrant admissions quotas in 1921 with the Emergency Quota Act and then solidified the legislation in 1924 with the Johnson-Reed Act, which restricted the annual number of immigrants that could be admitted to 2% of each country based on the population that resided in the U.S. from foreign countries. Meaning, immigrants from certain countries with the highest immigrant population residing in the U.S. would continue to have a premium when requesting admission compared to other countries with different migration patterns and U.S. residents. Furthermore, the Johnson-Reed Act barred immigrants from specific national origins from the “Asian-Pacific Triangle” like people from Japan, China, and Korea. Immigrant admissions quotas would be the law of the land for the next forty years, restricting, constraining, and targeting who was allowed access to the U.S. until the quota system was repealed in 1965 with the implementation of the Hart-Celler Act.

It is important to keep in mind that the next phase of citizenship-for-service legislation was crafted and advanced under a system of immigrant admissions quotas. The quota laws reinforced ideas of an American imaginary and established racially what type of people would be considered for naturalization in the future. This meant that the recruitment pool of non-citizen service members would also be affected and racially restricted to citizenship candidates that fit the normative criteria for naturalization.

Upon the death of Congressman John Jacob Rogers in 1925, his wife Edith Nourse Rogers campaigned and won the vacant Congressional seat in Massachusetts. Congress-

50. Ibid., 166-167.

woman Rogers was one of the first women to serve in Congress and the first woman to represent Massachusetts in Congress for 35 years. Congresswoman Rogers advocated for the rights of veterans and would later be the driving force behind the creation of the Women's Auxiliary Corps during WWII and Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, otherwise known as the G.I. Bill. As a new member of Congress in 1926 she continued the advocacy and legacy of her husband's work and proposed H.R. 7177, which called for naturalizing immigrants who served in the armed forces during WWI.⁵¹ The Roger's bill had identical language to the initial 1919 H.R. 6804 bill Congressman Rogers presented. The main caveat in H.R. 7177 was that if the bill turned into law, immigrants would have three years to petition for immediate naturalization and take advantage of the expedited path to naturalization. H.R. 7177 was referred to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization for further review and ended its fate.

Two weeks later on January 26, 1926, Congressman Andrew Lawrence Somers introduced H.R. 8400, which sought to amend the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act. In particular, Congressman Somers suggested that the parameters for non-quota immigrants, section 4, subdivision (a), be expanded to include persons who declared their intention to naturalize prior to July 1, 1924 and veterans of WWI.⁵² Non-quota immigrants were persons considered to be exempt from the quota system established to determine immigrant admissions and the criteria for naturalization. Somers was attempting to create a detour for veterans that served during WWI, but were being restricted access to immigrant admissions, on one hand, and barred from naturalization, on the other. I stated before that non-citizen service members were exempt from showing proof of authorized admissions or residency in order to enlist and serve in the military. Predominantly Japanese and Chinese WWI service members answered the call to serve overseas and were later blocked from normalizing their status, restricted from immigrant admissions, and deprived of access to naturalization. The attempt by Somers

51. House Resolution 7177, 69th Cong. January 8, 1926.

52. House Resolution 8400, 69th Cong. January 26, 1926.

to change one aspect of non-quota immigrant parameters would have allowed Asian WWI veterans the ability to remain in the country without fear of deportation. The bill did not attempt to establish a path to naturalization for Asian WWI veterans, however, H.R. 8400 would implement safeguards for veterans of WWI that were outside of established quota and non-quota immigrant criteria. The Somers bill was ultimately defeated when it was referred to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Various attempts were made by different Congressional representatives to expand the parameters of immigrant inclusion in order to admit and naturalize Asian immigrant service members. As the 1920s came to a close another attempt was made by a member of the House of Representatives, but this endeavor was directed at broadening the scope and access of Filipinos serving in the U.S. military as a pathway to citizenship. In an effort to expand the access of Filipinos in the military, Congressman William Francis James of Michigan's 12th District, advanced H.R. 97 seeking again to amend the 1906 Nationality Act, which already facilitated a limited path for Filipinos to use their service as the basis for naturalization by serving in either the Navy, Marine Corps, or Naval Auxiliary Service.⁵³ However, Filipinos needed to demonstrate at least three years of honorable prior to submitting their naturalization applications. Congressman James suggested that the 1906 Nationality Act was incomplete when it came to Filipino service members and proposed that Congress should also include Filipino service in the U.S. Army alone as the basis for fulfilling naturalization requirements. H.R. 97 was referred to the COIN where it would sit without a hearing or vote.

53. House Resolution 97, 71st Cong. April 15, 1929.

2.8 Meritorious Republicans, COIN Realignment, and Unlikely Allies, 1931-1940

In 1931, as one of the first moves as newly appointed Chairman of the COIN, Congressman Samuel Dickstein a Democrat from New York, re-introduced H.R. 97 in the form of H.R. 6597 during the first session of the 72nd Congress. With his authority, Congressman Dickstein pushed for a hearing on H.R. 6597 and procured statements from the War Department. Major William C. Rose of the U.S. Army appeared before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization to provide the War Department's stance on H.R. 6597 in the affirmative.⁵⁴ Major Rose suggested that H.R. 6597 would address the discrimination between Filipinos that served in the Army and Navy during WWI and Filipinos that were, at the time, serving in the Army, the latter of which were denied access to citizenship due to how Filipinos were providing their service in the Army instead of in the Navy. We can get a glimpse of the racial ideologies among those parties invested in citizenship-for-service policy in table 2.6.

Former Chairmen of the COIN Republican Congressman Albert Johnson of Washington,

Table 2.6: Racial Preferences among Members of the COIN and Civic Organizations, 72nd-76th Congress

Naturalizations should be racially...	Citizenship-for-Service naturalizations should be racially...	
	Inclusive	Exclusive
Exclusive	<u>Meritorious Republicans</u> Clarence Lea (D-CA)* Veterans of Foreign Wars Japanese American Citizenship League American Legion Henry B. Hazard* Thomas Shoemaker*	<u>White Supremacists</u> Albert Johnson (R-WA)
Inclusive	<u>Racial Egalitarians</u> Chairman Samuel Dickstein (D-NY) Caroline O'Day (D-NY)	<u>Conditional Republicans</u> William R. Poage (D-TX) Edward H. Rees (R-KS)
	*Not a member of the COIN.	

54. Hearing: Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, H.R. 6597, 72nd Cong. (1932).

and co-architect of the 1924 National Origins Act, opposed any amendment that expanded rights and access to naturalization to non-whites. With regard to the Act of May 9, 1918, Congressman Johnson claimed, “in the emergency of the World War the amendment slipped in to naturalize the Filipinos who served three years.” Revealing that he is in fact a white supremacist and not a conditional republican Johnson further proposed to, “strike out sub-division 7. This is going to be a white man’s country.”

Congressman Johnson suggested that instead of amending the nationality act that Congress should, on the contrary, remove sub-division 7 from the nationality and prevent Filipinos from taking advantage of a pathway to citizenship through military service. Maintaining the U.S. a predominantly white country was the priority for Congressman Johnson and he viewed attempts to gain access for immigrant admissions and naturalizations as a threat to the American identity. Johnson was himself a veteran of the World War and he reduced the service of Filipinos during the war to that of “cooks, bus boys and waiters” as if Filipino service members had any choice in their occupational specialties. The way he approached the current pursuit to change the nationality act was, according to Johnson, a “waste of time” for the committee and for Congress.⁵⁵ Yet, Chairman Dickstein and Major Rose remind the committee that by “striking out” section 4, sub-division 7, they would revoke the citizenship of Filipinos that were recruited from their homeland with the promise of citizenship at the end of their service. This meant that Filipinos who served in the Navy or Marine Corps during WWI, completed three years of honorable service, and became naturalized as a result of that service would ultimately have their legal citizenship nullified.

Congressman Johnson went on to claim that allowing Filipino service members a path to citizenship through military service would result in Filipinos advancing claims for independence. Johnson turned to ideas of national security when his appeals to white superiority failed to mobilize other members of the committee. Chairman Dickstein pressed on and requested that more information needed to be collected and presented to the committee be-

55. *Ibid.*, 4.

fore any decision could be made to proceed with the bill. However, the bill lost momentum among the members and sat within the committee without vote.

2.8.1 1935 Nye-Lea Act

Seventeen years after the end of the World War and through a joint effort in both the Senate and House of Representatives Asian immigrant WWI veterans were granted recognition for their service with legal citizenship. Racial nativism at the turn of the 20th century informed who could be considered for citizenship. Historian Lucy Salyer details how WWI Asian non-citizen service members won their pursuit for citizenship, which resulted in the passage of the Nye-Lea Act that retroactively granted citizenship to Asian non-citizen service members in 1935.⁵⁶ Salyer notes that racial definitions of citizenship remained contested despite setting strict parameters on the inclusion of Asians. For instance, the introduction of the Act of May 9, 1918 facilitated the naturalization of over 250,000 immigrants that served during WWI regardless of the fact that a majority of immigrant service members were considered “enemy aliens” due to their German origins. Yet, people with German origins were not excluded within section 2169 of the Revised Statutes. The question surrounding the definition and parameters of citizenship was further complicated when alternative ideals of citizenship challenged conventional wisdom on citizenship criteria, like military service and, more importantly, what military service from non-citizen service members meant to the country.

Salyer points to the notion of the “warrior ideal” as being the catalyst in transforming the ideological needs of traditional immigrant restrictionists. But, what was different this time around in presenting the warrior ideal to Congress that was absent when similar bills were introduced following the end of WWI? The main component prompting ideological change in Congress outlined by Salyer was the mobilization of predominantly restrictionist and racially nativist civic organizations like the American Legion. Organizations like the

56. Salyer, “Baptism by Fire.”

Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) were instrumental in supporting legislation that mitigated discrimination against Asians. However, it was through the collective mobilization of historically restrictionist organizations that we begin to see Congress struggling to maintain racial barriers to naturalization. Civic Organizations like the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), the California Joint Immigration Committee, and the American Legion lobbied Congress to recognize the “warrior ideal” performed by WWI Asian non-citizen service members. The Washington Post notes that the American Legion instituted the legislative measure which retroactively granted citizenship to over 500 Asian veterans-their “buddies in arms.”

Although racially nativist organizations effectively lobbied Congress, the initial effort to mobilize civic organizations was taken up by a Japanese immigrant that reached the rank of Sergeant Major in the U.S. Army, Tokie Slocum. After the 1925 Supreme Court decision on *Toyota v. United States*, which constructed the legal blockade against Asian non-citizen service members and their pursuit for citizenship, Slocum, a member of the VFW and graduate of Columbia University, advanced a claim for citizenship with his VFW council. Part of Slocum’s finesse with the issue of Asian veteran naturalization was due in part by separating the matter from Asian immigration more broadly and focusing the concern on a “warrior ideal” as the basis for citizenship. The link between military service and citizenship was clear among members of the VFW and the American Legion. Any person willing to bear arms in defense of the country should be recognized as an American citizen. The American Legion, in particular, took this a step further and also advanced a resolution at their first meeting to deport immigrants who refused to serve in the military.⁵⁷

Slocum then sought support from California Congressional Representative and hardline immigration exclusionist, Clarence Lea. Lea introduced the bill in the House of Representatives and Gerald Nye, a U.S. Senator from Slocum’s home state of North Dakota, introduced

57. Salyer, “Baptism by Fire”: 866.

the bill in the Senate.⁵⁸ During the Congressional hearings, along with the VFW and the American Legion, Slocum emphasized both the small number of WWI Asian veterans that would take advantage of retroactive naturalization-about 500 Asian non-citizen service members-and the three-year time limit to seek access to naturalization from the act.⁵⁹ The Nye-Lea Act successfully passed both chambers of Congress and was signed into law on June 24, 1935.

As Salyer keenly notes, the passage of the Nye-Lea Act did not resolve the contradictions between, on one hand, racially excluding particular immigrant groups from admission into the U.S. or naturalization and, on the other hand, military service performed by historically excluded immigrants. Military service up to this point was not recognized by racially nativist political elites as an important qualification for membership and certainly not a viable precondition for legal citizenship. Each of the previous bills advanced by members of Congress sought to make broad changes to the 1906 Nationality Act or challenge the national origins quota process, which were received with little fanfare and struck down swiftly. By advancing modest parameters, working within the white supremacist and racially nativist structure and mobilizing ideologically exclusionist organizations Asian non-citizen service members and their allies were able to make gains for inclusion where these types of efforts were historically silenced.

Following the naturalization victory for Asian non-citizen service members, Congresswoman Caroline O'Day, a Democrat, introduced a bill that would enable designated "enemy aliens" who served in the military during the World War to naturalize in 1937. This measure was mainly brought on by confusing immigration policies the U.S. embraced during and immediately following WWI. Some enemy aliens were actually successful in securing legal citizenship for their military service like German origin immigrants. However, other undesirable Eastern European "enemy aliens" like immigrants from Turkey and Bulgaria were not

58. *Ibid.*, 873.

59. Permit certain resident oriental veterans in armed forces of United States during the World War to apply for citizenship: Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 74th Cong. (1935).

offered the same exceptions as Germans. Turbulent immigration legislation and practices, such as the quota system, confused certain European immigrants with their ability to gain citizenship upon honorably completing military service, which resulted in some non-citizen service members from actively invoking the Act of May 9, 1918. Congresswoman O'Day circulated H.R. 84 during the 1st session of the 75th Congress as an attempt to allow WWI non-citizen service members, specifically those designated as "enemy aliens," the opportunity to benefit from the war measure.⁶⁰ O'Day used and referenced the access provided by the Nye-Lea Act as a way to expand a path to naturalization for immigrants from Turkey and Bulgaria. Nonetheless, H.R. 84 would be directed to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization for additional review, but no further actions were adopted.

2.8.2 To Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States, 1940

At the beginning of 1940, Congress saw fit to reexamine and reorganize the nationality laws based on legislation and judicial rulings that amended the previous nationality act from 1906. From January to June of 1940, the COIN heard testimony from U.S. immigration and naturalization experts and bureaucrats, commissioned reports, and debated the extent to which laws should be revised from their existing legislative mandates. The hearings produced over 700 pages of testimony where we can get a glimpse into the nuances members of the COIN demonstrated in arguing for or against expanding or excluding access to naturalization. Known as H.R. 6127 and then superseded by H.R. 9980 prior to being enacted, the 1940 Nationality Act was intended to streamline the requirements for naturalization instead of having state and naturalization officials depending on the latest piece of legislation from Congress or the following ruling from federal courts to establish how to conduct business. Thus, the 1940 Nationality Act was as much a priority for the Bureau of Naturalization as it was for Congress to get it passed and signed into law.

60. House Resolution 84, 75th Cong. January 5, 1937.

The codification of naturalization laws in 1940 is significant to citizenship-for-service due to four important reasons. First, the 1940 Nationality Act changed the expediency of the citizenship-for-service pathway to naturalization. Non-citizens could no longer enlist or become drafted in the military and receive legal citizenship almost immediately. Non-citizens now had to demonstrate at least three years of service prior to submitting their naturalization applications. Some original benefits such as not requiring a certificate of arrival or proof of residency remained in the new law. But, the access to legal citizenship would be changed and the basis for citizenship-for-service path dependency was established since subsequent laws, specifically, the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act and the 1965 Hart-Celler Act utilized the three-year prerequisite as an artifact of citizenship-for-service in the future.⁶¹

Second, it expanded racial inclusiveness in two ways: by allowing Filipinos to serve in the Army and be recognized for their service in that branch and by including indigenous groups from the Western hemisphere. Up to the 1940 Nationality Act, Filipinos were allowed to serve in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard and upon completion of three years of honorable service Filipino non-citizen service members could apply for naturalization. However, Filipinos were not provided those same naturalization opportunities if they served in the Army. The codification of the naturalization laws also provided for “race indigenous” groups in the Western hemisphere to enlist and naturalize through the revised path. Members of Congress, especially conditional republicans, deferred to section 2169 of the Revised Statutes to restrict naturalization to those of white or African descent. The addition of “race indigenous” allowed for indigenous people in the Western hemisphere to enlist and become naturalized based on their military service. Third, reorganization of citizenship-for-service came in the prelude to WWII. Germany had already invaded Poland and a majority of historians would agree that America’s intervention in the war was imminent. Hence, recon-

61. I argue that the three-year prerequisite established the path dependency of citizenship-for-service since the 1940 Nationality Act created the juncture that set citizenship-for-service in a path of declining access. Subsequent nationality laws that revised citizenship-for-service statutes held onto the three-year prerequisite. The three-year prerequisite is also the mechanism that prevents some non-citizens from achieving naturalization even after honorably serving.

figuring how the over 125,000 non-citizen WWII veterans that achieved naturalization on the basis of their military service was critical for restrictionists and conditional republicans. Finally, the uniform rule of naturalization that introduced the most liberal citizenship-for-service pathway in the 20th century with the passage of the Act of May 9, 1918 was also the same rule that members of Congress used to increase citizenship-for-service regulations since Congress made the three-year prerequisite to be applied uniformly. It's important to keep in mind that increases in regulations to citizenship-for-service transpired simultaneously as some racial groups received concessions.

Chairman Samuel Dickstein (D-NY) oversaw the COIN in the 76th Congress where Democrats enjoyed a majority of 14 to 7. However, the COIN commissioned a subcommittee made up of five members (three Democrats and two Republicans) lead by Rep. William R. Poage (D-TX) to oversee the request for hearings made by organizations and different departments of government. With regard to citizenship-for-service over the course of the hearings, Henry B. Hazard, Director of Research and Education of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), was responsible for writing and compiling all of the different nationality laws and introduced the reorganized nationality act to Congress. Hazard was the person in charge of overseeing the citizenship-for-service section and provided his rationale for its framework to Congress as an expert witness. During the hearing of February 20, 1940, Hazard states, “[t]here has been a change in the way of enlargement during the wartime legislation of May 9, 1918, which permitted, and still permits, a native born Filipino with service of 3 years in the United States Navy, Marine Corps, or United States Coast Guard, to be naturalized after honorable service.”⁶² Hazard is explaining to members of the COIN that in the new iteration of the nationality laws Filipinos will now be able to serve in the Army and gain citizenship based on their honorable service of at least three years in the Army. The member of the COIN with the largest reservations for the changes in citizenship-for-service

62. Hearing: Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, “To revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code.” 76th Cong. (1940).

that include expanding racial restrictions is Rep. Edward H. Rees (R-KS). “Now, then, tell us in a few words,” inquires Rep. Rees, “how are you extending it [racial requirements].”⁶³ Hazard responds, “[b]y making eligible for naturalization descendants of races indigenous to the countries of North and South America.”⁶⁴ Rep. Rees is interested in the groups of people that are at that moment excluded racially from naturalization, which would include all indigenous groups from the Americas. “I just thought in glancing this over that you are making a provision here whereby natives of any country in the Western Hemisphere could become citizens who might not otherwise become citizens,” contended Rep. Rees.⁶⁵ According to Director Hazard, the intention behind choosing the language “races indigenous” was to recognize the restrictions laid out in section 2169 of the Revised Statutes and offer a way to evade the language of “natives.” To use the identifier of “natives” could potentially include people, like Asians that can literally be natives of Mexico or Peru, but cannot become naturalized in the U.S. due to the Revised Statutes. Ultimately, Rep. Rees is not satisfied with the “indigenous” amendment and proceeds to ask, “[w]hat is the occasion for it? Why did you open it up? What happened to cause you to put that word ‘indigenous’ in here—‘people that are indigenous’?”⁶⁶ Hazard then provides his rationale for expanding the racial requirements for citizenship-for-service:

I think it is largely, Mr. Congressman, a matter of principle in connection with our relations with the Latin American countries, as indicating a continuance of our friendly relationship to them. It probably would have a very definite bearing upon strengthening our relations with those countries internationally, while at the same time it would probably result in the naturalization of very few in this country.⁶⁷

During this particular hearing the assistant to the legal adviser of the Department of State, R. W. Flournoy, was present due to also providing testimony over the reorganization

63. *Ibid.*, 66.

64. *Ibid.*, 66.

65. *Ibid.*, 66.

66. *Ibid.*, 67.

67. *Ibid.*, 67.

of the nationality laws. Flounoy used the opportunity to state, “[i]f you ask my opinion as representing the State Department, I think that the State Department favors this for the reasons given by Mr. Hazard, that it will improve our relations with the South American countries.”⁶⁸

Still not satisfied with the idea of expanding citizenship-for-service in becoming more racially liberal, a week later Rep. Rees takes his fight to a similar section of the proposed nationality laws: section 324 (a), a person who has served honorably or with good conduct for an aggregate period of at least three years on board vessels of more than twenty tons burden. “Isn’t that a little more liberal than existing law,” stated Rep. Rees.⁶⁹ At this point, Deputy Commissioner of the INS, Thomas B. Shoemaker, is taking questions from the subcommittee. Shoemaker does not want to give the impression that the proposed section 324 (a) is more liberal than what is already existing law and merely states that the proposed section is the same with the exception of allowing aggregate periods. Rep. Rees’ antipathy to the idea of allowing immigrants to work on vessels and gain citizenship through this path is best illustrated in the excerpt below:

This means that any person, excepting those that are specifically exempted because of race, who is employed on any ship that flies the American flag, whether the ship is a public or private vessel, just so it has its home port in the United States, may be entitled to become a citizen of the United States without complying with the requirement of 5 years’ residence. He does not even have to file a declaration of intention to become a citizen. This ship concern can go out and employ Frenchmen, Germans, Scotchmen, or Italians, or whatever they may be, and those persons will thereby become entitled to become American citizens without the necessity of filing a declaration of intention.⁷⁰

Here is where Rep. Rees demonstrates how he advances a conditional republican ideology by pushing Shoemaker to provide reasons that would give preference through an expedited path to naturalization in exchange for three years of service/employment to an immigrant aboard a private vessel as opposed to an immigrant that is establishing their five years of

68. *Ibid.*, 68.

69. *Ibid.*, 108.

70. *Ibid.*, 109.

permanent residency. “[W]hy are those persons entitled to a preference,” Rep. Rees poses the question, “over the German or the Frenchman or the Italian who comes over here in the regular way and waits for a period of 5 years to become a citizen and is required to go through the regular formalities of a declaration of intention and the hearing on his petition for citizenship?”⁷¹ In a genuine moment, Shoemaker answered, “[t]o further the interests of American shipping, and that was the main purpose designed in giving these people exemptions in seeking to become naturalized, in those vessels of more than 20 tons burden.”⁷²

Rep. Rees highlights the issue that some groups are getting preference over others especially when the individuals in question have not stepped a foot on American soil. Yet, this was the same type of tactic used with Filipino service members. Filipinos were explicitly recruited from the Philippines to serve in the American naval forces with the expectation of acquiring legal citizenship upon completion of three years of military service. Filipinos, however, did not have any other path to becoming naturalized since Asians were racially ineligible for naturalization. The only path to American citizenship for Filipinos was through the battlefield. I am not suggesting that Rep. Rees was taking his condemnation as far as considering the inequality among racially marginalized groups. Rep. Rees’ dissent against Asians being racially included for naturalization is well documented. However, Rep. Rees exposes how expedited pathways to naturalization can and should be reserved to individuals willing to invest themselves in the country. Therefore, he is a conditional republican because he will not expand the racial requirements for naturalization even to those that do demonstrate an explicit investment in the country through life or limb.

Thus, citizenship-for-service had some gains in terms of racial expansions which were supported by Democrats, but resisted by Republicans in the minority. These racial expansions to citizenship-for-service were primarily directed at Filipinos and groups indigenous to the Western Hemisphere. Filipinos were partially granted access to citizenship by serving in

71. *Ibid.*, 109.

72. *Ibid.*, 109.

any military branch, not only if they served in the naval forces. The inclusion of indigenous groups from the Western Hemisphere was meant to be an olive branch to Latin American countries. The expansion was never meant to open the gates for Central and South Americans to enter the U.S. and naturalize on the basis of military service. This is an issue I take up in further detail in the following chapter.

2.9 Conclusion

What I have shown so far is that political parties and the committee structure are only part of the narrative concerning the development and transformation of citizenship-for-service to service-for-citizenship. More revealing are the positions and preferences of members of Congress in the COIN that either supported or blocked citizenship-for-service legislation. What I am identifying as conditional republicans maintained the dominant view on the question of citizenship-for-service. Namely, that citizenship-for-service was not meant to be racially inclusive. The expedited pathway to legal citizenship by performing and addressing the obligations of citizenship were reserved for people that could demonstrate the racial requirements of citizenship. Hence, anyone that was not of white or African descent could not pursue this pathway regardless if they rendered such service to the state. The message conditional republicans delivered when blocking bills that expanded the racial requirements for naturalization through citizenship-for-service is that performing the responsibilities and obligations of citizenship is less important than racial classification. As such, conditional republicans are the guards of and maintain the racial order by ensuring naturalization proceedings stay restrictive and exclusive to whites and blacks. We did not see a movement toward seriously expanding the racial requirements for naturalization based on military service, not even among racial egalitarians in the COIN, until meritorious republicans compelled other members of Congress that military service is a privileged status and such service by immigrants should in fact be recognized by the state. In other words, performing the duties

of citizenship, for meritorious republicans, should supersede racial restrictions to naturalization.

When meritorious republicans like the JACL and the American Legion pushed for retroactive naturalization for WWI Asian service members they were not seeking new privileges, but instead they sought to right the wrongs against Asian service members. Yet, due to continued efforts by racial egalitarians and meritorious republicans to expand the racial requirements for citizenship, Congress saw fit to impose harsher restrictions on immigrants attempting to utilize citizenship-for-service. I call the codification of citizenship-for-service in 1940 harsher restrictions because Congress used the same mechanism to make citizenship-for-service for non-whites, particularly Filipinos and Puerto Ricans, more difficult to acquire because they were suspected of not being loyal to the state due to their race. Thus, the COIN used the racially oppressive artifact of a three-year military service threshold to redefine citizenship-for-service for all immigrants prior to entering the Second World War.

From immediate legal citizenship during WWI to requiring three years of military service prior to naturalization during WWII may not seem like much. It certainly did not seem like a stretch for members of the COIN. However, the oppressive artifact of citizenship-for-service generalized with the 1940 Nationality Act is the juncture that continued to lead citizenship-for-service in a path that incurred more requirements and restrictions over time. What these new hurdles mean for how citizenship-for-service is regulated and managed is that immigrants who are veterans of the U.S. military can potentially be denied naturalization even after honorably serving their three years. It also means that without a guarantee to legal citizenship, non-citizen service members can and do get deported.

Now that we are at a place where we can understand how citizenship-for-service has changed into a more restrictive and more difficult pathway at attaining citizenship, who will be affected by this change in access during WWII and why? How, if at all, did affected groups respond to the change? These are some the questions I take up in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

AMONG THE VALIANT: MEXICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE U.S. MILITARY, 1941-1945

Congress revamped how the US authorized legal citizenship to non-citizen service members prior to America's involvement in WWII. With the new citizenship-for-service system in place, would be immigrant service members would have to demonstrate at least three years of active duty service before submitting naturalization applications. This is a radical change from the previous World War where legal citizenship was granted to non-citizens almost immediately upon enlisting for active duty service. In the midst of an impending war with two fronts, non-citizen service members were essentially asked to prove their loyalty by signing up for the same type of dangerous and rigorous service, but with less incentives and without a guarantee of legal citizenship at the end of their service. Thus, potential applicants for naturalization who served in combat zones during WWII would be in a precarious position dependent upon honorable completion of three years of service.

Yet, not all non-citizen service members experienced the same fate from the drastic citizenship-for-service transformation. Some non-citizen service members, particularly Germans and Italians, were able to secure legal citizenship more efficiently than others. This was the type of outcome Congress supposedly was attempting to avoid. By "streamlining" the process, members of Congress believed that the "undesirable features" of citizenship-for-service were removed with the updated three-year system. Nonetheless, Mexican non-citizen service members were less likely to receive naturalization upon successful completion of their three-year probationary period compared to non-citizen service members classified as "enemy aliens." What are the factors that influenced inequality in naturalization proceedings for non-citizen service members during WWII? To what extent, if at all, did the updated citizenship-for-service system exacerbate discrimination between different racial and ethnic groups? Finally, why were Mexican non-citizens less likely to receive citizenship for their

military service?

One of the central arguments throughout this dissertation is that access to citizenship-for-service became more difficult to attain following the end of WWI due to multiple institutional, social, and political structures. The findings suggest that citizenship-for-service became more difficult to achieve for non-European immigrants, particularly for immigrants originating from Central and South America. Although there are various explanations that help shed light on why citizenship-for-service became a challenge for some and not for others, the outcome is nevertheless the same. For instance, we have to take into consideration that WWII was being fought during the era of immigrant admissions quotas. European immigration was steadily on the decline when the quota system was finally put in place years after the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act was passed. Immigration from Central and South America was incrementally on the rise, but not to the extent that it would supersede European immigration. Moreover, Mexicans were exempt from the quota system entirely and classified as non-quota immigrants.¹ Under those circumstances, Mexican migrants that were needed to continue agricultural work were able to cross the border with little to no restrictions. Even with the absence of immigration restrictions, Mexican non-citizen service members naturalized at significantly lower rates compared to their European peers.

The remainder of the chapter attempts to provide some insight into the guiding research questions. First, I detail how the U.S. mobilized non-citizens to fight in the military during WWII. Next, this chapter highlights how non-European immigrants became overrepresented in the military and ultimately less successful in securing citizenship for their service. Third, I highlight the participation of different categories of Mexicans in the military during WWII and how their self-identification with the category Mexican informed their experiences and political ideologies. Finally, this chapter makes use of transcribed interviews from Mexicans that fought during WWII to provide a narrative to the Mexican categories I identified earlier.

1. Immigrants originating from Canada were also classified as non-quota immigrants.

3.1 Mobilizing Immigrant Military Recruits, 1940-1945

The 1940 Nationality Act was enacted a year after Germany invaded Poland and over a year prior to the Japanese attack on the Naval base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. For the following twelve years, the 1940 Nationality Act set the parameters for who could be admitted as a citizen of the United States and ultimately who would be disqualified from membership. In order for non-citizens to serve in the military after the U.S. declared war on the axis powers, potential non-citizen service members had to navigate the amendments to the Selective Service and Training Act, which was passed in September 1940, a month prior to the Nationality Act.

With a cadre of Colonels overseeing the conscription of troops, the Selective Service System (SSS) concluded in 1941 that inducting immigrants into the U.S. military was a larger problem during wartime. In peacetime, all able-bodied males, citizens or permanent residents, from the ages of 18 to 45 were considered acceptable for conscription. However, the attack by Japan on the Naval base in Pearl Harbor created an urgency to identify and distinguish racial and ethnic groups with origins to co-belligerent nations. These groups predominantly consisted of German, Italian and Japanese citizens and immigrants. German and Italian immigrants, in particular, had some of the highest percentages of enlistments during WWII. Army enlistments during WWII illustrate that in the five-year span during the conflict, German and Italian immigrants accounted for nearly a quarter of all immigrant service members.² Hence, the enormous task of identifying and vetting immigrants that originated from belligerent countries required the full support from the Selective Service.

Yet, classifying racial and ethnic groups that originated from belligerent countries was a practice the SSS was indeed familiar with. The classification of “enemy aliens” during WWII used a similar method for designating immigrants that was also utilized during WWI.³ The

2. Miller, W. B. and R. F. Farrell. 1948. *Immigration and Naturalization Service: Monthly Review*. Department of Justice, October, Vol. 6, No. 4.

3. For more on WWI non-citizen service member classifications see: Ford, N. G. 2001. *Americans All! Foreign-born Soldiers in World War I*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

SSS streamlined the classification system and considered immigrants to be in one of three categories: cobelligerents, neutral, or enemy aliens.⁴ Prior to U.S. involvement in WWII, immigrants who had yet to declare their intention to become a U.S. citizen were deferred from being conscripted into military service and placed in Class IV-C. Table 3.1 illustrates the number of immigrants classified as Class IV-C leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.⁵ The number of Class IV-C almost tripled in the six months between March 1941 and September 1941. Immigrants in Class IV-C could essentially volunteer for military service but were not obligated to do so.

Subsequently, the attack on Pearl Harbor thrust the U.S. into the Second World War

Table 3.1: Deferred Immigrants Classified in Class IV-C, 1941

Date	Number
March 31, 1941	56,614
May 31, 1941	90,776
June 30, 1941	114,428
Sept. 30, 1941	145,864

prompting Congress to amend the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 with specific changes to non-declarant immigrants in Class IV-C. The amendment read: “[E]very other male person residing in the United States, who is between the ages of 18 and 45 at the time fixed for his registration shall be liable for training and service in the land and naval forces of the United States.”⁶ The amendment to the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 further stipulated that, “no citizen or subject of any country who has been or who may hereafter be proclaimed by the President to be an alien enemy of the United States shall be inducted for training and service under this Act unless he is acceptable to the land or naval forces.”⁷ The U.S. military began their mobilization phase and requested that all

4. Selective Service in Wartime. 1943. “Second Report of the Director of the Selective Service, 1941-1942.” Government Printing Office, 216.

5. Source: Selective Service in Wartime. 1943. “Second Report of the Director of the Selective Service, 1941-1942.” Government Printing Office, 244.

6. Public Law 360. 1941. 77th Cong, 1st Sess. Ch. 602, December 20, 1941.

7. Ibid.

hands had to come together and assist in the war effort regardless of previous exemptions. Meaning, immigrants who were protected under the designation Class IV-C no longer had the privilege of being exempted from service. WWII veteran Raul Morin recounts how the draft boards in the early part of the war rarely allowed immigrants, particularly Mexicans, to claim exemption despite the labor shortage being imposed on local communities. “These boards were loaded with Spanish names on their files,” writes Morin, “and very few were ever exempted, reclassified, or found too essential to be drafted. Local rural youths were being drafted so fast in comparison with others, that land owners of large farms and ranches, faced with manpower shortage, voiced stern protests with local draft boards.”⁸

Changing conscription regulations drastically transformed the obligations of non-citizens living, studying, and working in the United States. Non-declarant immigrants, for the most part, had no intentions of relinquishing their nationality or formal loyalty to their country of origin. Yet, non-declarant immigrants were pushed into the war effort in order to fill vital military labor demands.

Going from peacetime to wartime morphed some racially marginalized immigrants popularly regarded as undesirable, criminal, and unassimilable into overnight “patriots.” The U.S. government and local selective service boards attempted to reach immigrant communities in order to recruit service members and present an ideology rooted in American patriotism during a time of crisis. The U.S. government had the ability and power to conscript non-declarant immigrants, but the U.S. military had no use for conscripts that resisted the war effort or failed to buy into American ideals. For instance, the image below is a poster commissioned by the U.S. government in 1942 displaying Uncle Sam’s extended arm and his top hat alongside *un charro* (a Mexican cowboy) extending his arm as well with his *sombrero* (cowboy hat). The poster reads in Spanish as well as in English, “*Americanos Todos*” which translates into English as “Americans All.” Here we have a case where the U.S. government

8. Morin, R. 1966. *Among the Valiant: Mexican-Americans in WWII and Korea*. Alhambra: Borden Publishing Company: 28.

Figure 3.1: Americans All, Let's Fight for Victory




Source: Leon Helguera, “Americans all, let’s fight for victory: Americanos todos, luchamos por la victoria,” HERB: Resources for Teachers, <https://herb.ashp.cuny.edu/items/show/1440>.

is attempting to, literally and figuratively, reach out to Mexican communities by extending a hand to Mexicans and as the picture claims, regard them as Americans. The second line reads: “*Luchamos por la victoria*” which in English means “We fight for victory.” The extended olive branch by the U.S. towards Mexicans residing in the U.S. came when the U.S. military needed to fill their ranks in preparation for the Second World War.

Without the presence of the war, Mexicans and Mexican-Americans would experience a different type of response from government officials. Most notably, Mexicans were deported at higher rates compared to any other racial or ethnic group including immigrants classified

Figure 3.2: Percentage of Deportations from the Top 5 Non-Citizen Service Member Racial and Ethnic Groups, 1921-1966



as “enemy aliens.” Figure 3.2 illustrates the percentage of deportations from 1921 to 1966.⁹ The figure illustrates the percentage of deportations among the five largest racial and ethnic groups that became naturalized by serving in the U.S. military. As the figure demonstrates, in 1942 people of Mexican origin accounted for approximately 70% of all deportations during that year. The total number of Germans and Italians account for less than 1% of all deportations in 1942. It makes sense that the U.S. launched a campaign to appeal to Mexicans and their sense of Americanness since a majority of the interactions between Mexicans and the U.S. government involved banishment and removal on top of other forms of state sanctioned repression.

9. The data for the figure were compiled by the author using the Annual Reports from the Secretary of Labor 1921-1935 and the Annual Reports from the Immigration and Naturalization Service 1941-1966. Individual country and nationality data for France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy was not available in the Secretary of Labor reports from 1926-1935, which was instead aggregated as deportations to Europe. The figure displays the aggregated Europe data for the aforementioned years.

3.2 Non-citizens in the U.S. Army, 1940-1945

By the end of the Second World War, over 300,000 non-citizens and naturalized immigrants served in the U.S. Army.¹⁰ The U.S. Army accounted for the majority of enlistments and conscriptions during the war with approximately 8.3 million troops of the total 12.2 million U.S. service members.¹¹ This suggests that a larger majority of non-citizen service members served in the Army and subsequently in the European theater of combat. According to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization in 1948, Watson B. Miller, the main determinants informing the rates of enlistment or conscription of potential non-citizen service members was: age, the number and types of dependents, occupation, and health.¹² The age of the native-born persons compared to foreign-born non-citizens during the war was different since most foreign-born males were much older. Few younger non-citizens and a larger proportion of older non-citizens made up the pool of potential non-citizen service members. In other words, enlistment rates were reversed when accounting for the age of non-citizen service members compared to native born enlistees. Table 3.2 illustrates the number and percentage of native-born white males and foreign-born white males in 1940.¹³ The figures are derived from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) *Monthly Review* in 1948. The table demonstrates that there were four times as many native-born white males than foreign-born white males under the age of 25 prior to U.S. involvement in the war. The 18-25 age group is important since this is where the armed forces primarily and most heavily recruited from. In order for the U.S. to locate a similar population in the 18-25 age group

10. Miller, W. B. and R. F. Farrell. 1948. *Immigration and Naturalization Service: Monthly Review*. Department of Justice, October, Vol. 6, No. 4. Non-citizen service member statistics for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are not readily available.

11. The National WWII Museum. "Research Starters: US Military by the Numbers." US Military Personnel (1939-1945). January 18, 2018. <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-us-military-numbers>

12. Miller, W. B. and R. F. Farrell. 1948. *Immigration and Naturalization Service: Monthly Review*. Department of Justice, October, Vol. 6, No. 4.: 48.

13. Using native-born and foreign-born white males to highlight how age is working toward enlistments and conscription is a useful tool since white immigrants constituted the largest number of immigrants in the U.S. until 1965.

for foreign-born white males the SSS would need to reach into the 18-35 category. In other words, looking simply at age for potential foreign-born recruits suggests that we would find a lower percentage of non-citizens enlisting or being conscripted during the initial U.S. mobilization in WWII since the older age group would have more deferments due to dependents and physical issues.

Yet, Mexican non-citizen service members proved to be an exception to the trends as-

Table 3.2: Age Distribution of White Males by Nativity 18-44 in 1940

Age Group	Native-born white	Native-born white percent	Foreign-born white	Foreign-born white percent
+18 and <25	7,202,523	31.1	143,537	7.7
+18 and <30	11,900,889	51.3	337,184	18.1
+18 and <35	16,131,214	70	680,175	36.4
+18 and <40	19,855,418	85.6	1,210,339	64.8
+18 and <45	23,193,286	100	1,867,121	100

Source: Adapted from Miller, W. B. and R. F. Farrell. 1948. *Immigration and Naturalization Service: Monthly Review*. Department of Justice, October, Vol. 6, No. 4., Table 2.

sociated with age for non-citizen service members in general. The INS conducted their own investigation into the contributions of immigrant service members and found that Mexicans accounted for over 80% of non-citizen service member inductions during WWII.¹⁴ In particular, three states—Arizona, New Mexico and Texas—enlisted non-citizens from thirty-four countries, but the majority of inductees originated from Mexico. On average, the non-citizen inductees were older than native born recruits, but inductees from Mexico were typically two years younger than other non-citizens originating from different countries. Figures detailing the age distribution for Mexican and all other non-citizen service members from Arizona, New Mexico and Texas are found in table 3.3. For the most part, Mexican non-citizen service members provided more inductees within the ideal age range between 20-24 for military induction than non-citizens from other countries. Agricultural labor demands facilitated the

14. Carter, H. and B. Doster. 1951. "Social Characteristics of Aliens from the Southwest Registered for Selective Service During World War II." *Immigration and Naturalization Service Monthly Review*, Vol. 8, No. 7, 88-94.

importation of Mexican labor creating a larger pool of younger migrants during this period, which I will explicate further in the next section. Although Commissioner Miller cites de-

Table 3.3: Age Distribution of Registered Immigrants Acceptable to the Armed Forces from Arizona, New Mexico and Texas During WWII.

Age	Mexican Immigrants	All other Immigrants	Army Inductees
18-19	0.1	6.8	0.9
20-24	22.4	16.1	42.7
25-29	19.8	9.3	82.2
30-34	21	22.4	16
35-39	19.1	15.6	6.8
40-44	14.2	27.8	1.2
45 and over	1.6	2	0.2
Unknown	1.8	0.5	0
Median Year of Age	31.8	34.1	26

Source: Adapted from Carter, H. and B. Doster. 1951. "Social Characteristics of Aliens from the Southwest Registered for Selective Service During World War II." *Immigration and Naturalization Service Monthly Review*, Vol. 8, No. 7, Table 2.

pendents, occupation, and health as factors that influenced the induction of non-citizens into the armed forces, in reality the effect of these characteristics is not known without clearer and more complete data of non-citizen service members across military branches. What we can attribute as an influencing factor of non-citizen induction is the change in legislation that reclassified non-citizens for military service after the attacks on Pearl Harbor. For instance, amendments made in January 1942 to the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 stipulated that non-citizens classified as "enemy aliens," except for Japanese immigrants, could be found acceptable for military service. Non-citizens of certain nationalities prior to being considered for enlistment or conscription were ordered to fill out a form entitled "Alien's Personal History and Statement." Completed forms were sent and used by commissioned officers in their respective military branches to determine if the individual non-citizen was suitable for induction into their branch.¹⁵ The decision to allow "enemy aliens" to enlist in

15. Miller, W. B. and R. F. Farrell. 1948. *Immigration and Naturalization Service: Monthly Review*. Department of Justice, October, Vol. 6, No. 4.: 50.

the armed forces, like Germans and Italians, was similar to the reason to not subject them to internment camps: they comprised a large portion of the U.S. population.¹⁶ Thus, as the land and naval mobilization began, European non-citizens classified as “enemy aliens” were afforded the opportunity to prove their loyalty. This form of relief was not granted to Japanese immigrants or citizens.¹⁷

German and Italian non-citizens were recruited and conscripted in the Army at such a high rate that the only other group to supersede their recruitment were Canadian immigrants. Table 3.4 highlights foreign born troops classified as naturalized or non-citizens in the U.S. Army by country of birth from 1940 to 1945. Soldiers originating from the British Isles and Mexico round out the top five countries represented in the U.S. Army during WWII. The aforementioned five countries constituted approximately 60% of all immigrant service member enlistments in the Army during the conflict.¹⁸ Table 3.5 below shows the number and percentage of the foreign-born population classified as white by country of origin in 1940. Of the foreign-born population residing in the U.S. in 1940, immigrants from Mexico accounted for 3.3% of the U.S. population whereas Mexican foreign-born serving in the U.S. Army during WWII constituted 6.5%.¹⁹ Given their foreign-born population percentage from 1940 foreign-born from Mexico were overrepresented in the U.S. Army by more than double their population in the U.S. Compared to their European contemporaries, foreign-born from Italy made up 14.2% of the total foreign-born population in the U.S. in 1940 yet only 12.8% of those serving in the U.S. Army. Foreign-born from Germany had similar

16. For more on proposals for German and Italian internment in the U.S. see: Fox, S. C. 1988. “General John DeWitt and the Proposed Internment of German and Italian Aliens during World War II.” *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 57, No. 4, 407-438.

17. Japanese immigrants and citizens would be provided the opportunity to enlist from their internment camps in 1944.

18. Miller, W. B. and R. F. Farrell. 1948. Immigration and Naturalization Service: Monthly Review. Department of Justice, October, Vol. 6, No. 4.

19. Social Explorer Tables (SE), Census 1940 Census Tract, County, State and US, Digitally transcribed by Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Edited, verified by Michael Haines. Compiled, edited and verified by Social Explorer. Miller, W. B. and R. F. Farrell. 1948. *Immigration and Naturalization Service: Monthly Review*. Department of Justice, October, Vol. 6, No. 4.

percentages in both the population and the U.S. Army with 10.8% and 10.9%, respectively. The foreign-born from Great Britain were also overrepresented in the U.S. Army with 8.2% serving in the Army compared to 5.8% of the foreign-born British population residing in the U.S.

Given the comparisons between foreign-born serving in the U.S. Army and their respective Census demographics, the data demonstrates that foreign-born immigrants from Mexico served in the U.S. Army at higher rates compared to European immigrants, however, foreign-born service members from Mexico were not granted the same access to naturalization as their European peers. For instance, figure 3.3 highlights the percentage of naturalized vs. non-citizens in the U.S. Army by country of birth between 1940 to 1945. The data comes from the INS and is ordered by the highest percentage of service members that had yet to be naturalized (non-citizens) by country of origin. In other words, the data shows the number of foreign-born soldiers that were able to naturalize while serving in the Army during WWII versus those that remained non-citizens. There is a fifty-point difference between non-citizens serving in the Army originating from Mexico compared to non-citizens from Italy or the U.S.S.R. Namely, Mexicans have the least amount of naturalized service members than any other country or group in the Army during WWII. The next closest country to Mexico's figures is another Latin American country, Cuba, with approximately 60% of Cuban born soldiers remaining non-citizens and 40% were able to naturalize. In other words, the two Latin American countries with substantial foreign-born representation in the Army were also the two groups with non-citizen populations superseding their naturalized population. Virtually all other immigrants originated from European countries and had naturalization percentages that surpassed their respective non-citizen populations. These figures raise questions around why immigrants from Latin American countries were not as successful as their European peers at becoming naturalized while serving in the Army during WWII? Similarly, what type of access and opportunities were available to non-citizen service members when attempting to become naturalized while serving overseas?

Table 3.4: 1940 Census Foreign Born White Population by Country of Origin.

England and Wales	657,335	5.8%
Scotland	279,321	2.5%
Northern Ireland	106,416	0.9%
Eire	572,031	5.0%
Norway	262,088	2.3%
Sweden	445,070	3.9%
Denmark	138,175	1.2%
Netherlands	111,064	1.0%
Belgium	53,958	0.5%
Switzerland	88,293	0.8%
France	102,930	0.9%
Germany	1,237,772	10.8%
Poland	993,479	8.7%
Czechoslovakia	319,971	2.8%
Austria	479,906	4.2%
Hungary	290,228	2.5%
Yugoslavia	161,093	1.4%
Russia	1,040,884	9.1%
Lithuania	165,771	1.5%
Finland	117,210	1.0%
Romania	115,940	1.0%
Greece	163,252	1.4%
Italy	1,623,580	14.2%
Spain & Portugal	110,054	1.0%
Other Europe	64,923	0.6%
Asia	149,909	1.3%
Canada-French	273,366	2.4%
Canada-Other	770,753	6.8%
Newfoundland	21,361	0.2%
Mexico	377,433	3.3%
Cuba	30,534	0.3%
Central America	36,408	0.3%
Other	58,630	0.5%

Source: Social Explorer Tables (SE), Census 1940 Census Tract, County, State and US, Digitally transcribed by Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Edited, verified by Michael Haines. Compiled, edited and verified by Social Explorer.

Table 3.5: Foreign Born in the U.S. Army by Country of Birth, 1940-1945.


Country of Birth	Naturalized	Non-Citizen	Total	Total Percent
All countries	196,781	109,517	306,298	100%
Canada	36,598	19,299	55,897	18.2
Italy	30,343	8,913	39,256	12.8
Germany	18,944	14,452	33,396	10.9
British Isles	17,131	7,905	25,036	8.2
Mexico	4,465	15,487	19,952	6.5
Poland	12,590	4,923	17,513	5.7
U.S.S.R.	10,556	3,093	13,649	4.5
Irish Free State	9,454	3,593	13,047	4.3
China	7,318	1,453	8,771	2.9
Austria	4,304	3,559	7,863	2.6
Czechoslovakia	4,190	1,879	6,069	2
Sweden	3,651	2,155	5,806	1.9
Greece	3,192	2,550	5,742	1.9
Hungary	3,760	1,521	5,281	1.7
Norway	2,790	1,918	4,708	1.5
Yugoslavia	2,224	1,184	3,408	1.1
France	1,894	855	2,749	.9
Romania	1,980	653	2,633	.9
Denmark	1,620	920	2,540	.8
Netherlands	1,440	881	2,321	.8
Cuba	919	1,330	2,249	.7
All other	17,418	10,994	28,412	9.2

Source: Miller, W. B. and R. F. Farrell. 1948. *Immigration and Naturalization Service: Monthly Review*. Department of Justice, October, Vol. 6, No. 4.

3.3 Service Member Naturalizations During WWII

Historically, non-citizens with the intention of becoming naturalized U.S. citizens were required to enter the country with authorization to begin their permanent residency. Non-citizen permanent residents were expected to settle in their state of residence for a minimum of five years prior to submitting their naturalization applications. However, non-citizens serving in the armed forces were merely required to lawfully enter the country and serve honorably for three years in order to apply for naturalization. Thus, non-citizen service members were exempted from establishing permanent residence in order to become naturalized. There are some similarities with WWI citizenship-for-service legislation like waiving

Figure 3.3: Percentage of Foreign Born Naturalized and Non-Citizen in the U.S. Army, 1940-1945.



permanent residency, but for the most part, the new regulations, particularly the three-year service requirement, influenced the time to and possibility of naturalization for non-citizen service members. One unique difference from WWI was the establishment of section 702 of the Second War Powers Act of 1942, which provided non-citizen service members the ability to naturalize on foreign soil.²⁰

Representatives of the INS were sent to the different theaters of combat to perform naturalizations for non-citizens serving overseas during the war.²¹ Prior to his appointment as Commissioner of the INS, Henry Hazard was one of the overseas representatives conducting naturalizations overseas. He underscores how “unorthodox” the surroundings and conditions were for those soldiers, sailors, and Marines becoming American citizens overseas. Hazard

20. Hazard, H. B. 1944. “Our New Citizens of the Armed Forces Overseas.” *Immigration and Naturalization Service Monthly Review*, February, Vol. 1, No. 8. Section 702 of the Second War Powers Act states, “any person entitled to naturalization under section 701 of this act, who while serving honorably in the military or naval forces of the United States is not within the jurisdiction of any court authorized to naturalize aliens.”

21. The designated representatives of the INS performing naturalizations overseas include: T. B. Shoemaker, George W. Tyler, David Scoles, Henry B. Hazard, Albert E. Reitzel, Charles W. Donoghue, Felix W. Graham, and Howard E. Norwood.

recalls, “[T]he work was done in Nissen huts, amid howling blizzards, on lurching ships on the high seas, on hospital sickbeds, in cork forests and on the blazing deserts.”²² He further writes:

I recall an occasion where the applicant and his witnesses at the time of his induction were wearing gas masks because of an air alarm. On the mainland of Italy naturalization hearings had to be shifted from the headquarters offices to subterranean air shelters because of a similar alarm. It may be of interest, by the way, that the first person I naturalized in Sicily proved to be a Sicilian, while the last applicant I naturalized before leaving Africa was a Negro.²³

Additionally, Hazard highlights the difficulties around naturalizing service members, particularly in the Pacific theater of combat. “It was not at all unusual to confer citizenship on men fresh from the battlefields or on men who were about to go into battle. Sometimes the amount of time I had would be suddenly curtailed by the urgency of catching a plane. When that happened, applicants and their witnesses would be notified to appear at the airport,” wrote Hazard.²⁴ Based on the experiences of the naturalization representatives and the quality of the newly naturalized service members, Hazard concluded that as authorities of the INS they had little to fear about the type of influence or effects the newly minted citizens would have on the country.

On the contrary, Hazard believed naturalized immigrant service members would embrace the duties of citizenship on par with their native-born peers in the military.²⁵ Figures for naturalization during WWII are summarized in table 3.6. Approximately one out of seven non-citizen service members were naturalized outside of the U.S. either on a Naval ship or in bases scattered over Europe, Africa, or in the Pacific. Non-citizen service members had to endure the exhaustion of battle while simultaneously waiting for the opportunity to become

22. Hazard, H. B. 1944. “Our New Citizens of the Armed Forces Overseas.” *Immigration and Naturalization Service Monthly Review*, February, Vol. 1, No. 8: 2.

23. *Ibid*, 2.

24. Hazard, H. B. 1945. “My Naturalization Work in the Pacific War Theater.” *Immigration and Naturalization Service Monthly Review*, March, Vol. II, No. 9: 110.

25. Hazard, H. B. 1944. “Our New Citizens of the Armed Forces Overseas.” *Immigration and Naturalization Service Monthly Review*, February, Vol. 1, No. 8: 3.

a naturalized American citizen.

Numerous factors were involved determining which non-citizens were eligible for in-

Table 3.6: U.S. Naturalizations During WWII by Civilian and Military Service, 1942-1946.

	Military in the U.S.	Military Outside U.S.	Civilian	Total
Jan.–June 30, 1942	1,296	–	131,714	131,714
Year ended June 30, 1943	36,049	1,425	281,459	281,459
Year ended June 30, 1944	42,717	6,496	392,766	392,766
Year ended June 30, 1945	17,029	5,666	208,707	208,707
Year ended June 30, 1946	13,159	2,054	134,849	134,849
Total	110,250	15,641	1,149,495	1,275,386

Source: Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1946.

duction. Additionally, there were plenty of opportunities for non-citizens to naturalize in the mainland U.S. and even overseas. To put this into perspective, the U.S. did not allow overseas naturalizations during the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan until 2009 a full eight years since ground forces were introduced in Afghanistan. What was driving the disparity between Mexican non-citizens and all other non-citizens that were fighting during WWII outside of institutional factors? The answer may lie within the group themselves. The next section investigates the different types of Mexicans who fought during WWII and begins to lay out, to what extent, their ideologies influenced their propensity or desire to naturalize.

3.4 Mexicans and U.S. Military Service During WWII

On October 29, 1941, Pedro Aguilar Despart a resident of Los Angeles, California held the draft number “158” in the national draft lottery. This was the same number that President Roosevelt pulled and instantly made Despart the first conscripted service member during WWII.²⁶ Raul Morin’s book *Among the Valiant* is one of the only accounts of Mexicans

²⁶. Morin, R. 1966. *Among the Valiant: Mexican Americans in WWII and Korea*. Alhambra: Borden Publishing Company, 25.

who served in the military during WWII and the Korean War. Originally published in 1963, *Among the Valiant* describes the trajectory of Mexicans and Mexican Americans from being conscripted into service to their role on D-Day and their efforts in the Pacific and Korea. More importantly, Raul Morin was able to provide an insider's perspective since he was also a Mexican-American Army infantryman and rarely saw or heard of the contributions of Mexican service members in mainstream media outlets. The idea to write about the experiences of Mexicans in the U.S. military dawned on him as he spent over thirty months recovering from war wounds in an Army hospital from 1945 to 1947. As the Second World War started to become a distant memory, books and major motion pictures began to take off recalling the gruesome "hell" soldiers, sailors, and Marines endured. However, for Morin, as I'm sure was the case with a number of other Mexican service members, recognized that the service and experiences of Latino service members, particularly of Mexican descent, were blatantly missing from mainstream narratives. Another motivation for covering Mexican and Mexican American experiences during WWII was that upon their return home, most were welcomed into second-class citizenship status. This meant that Mexican and Mexican American WWII veterans returned home after years of defending American democracy to less access to healthcare, education, and social resources regardless of New Deal initiatives such as the Montgomery G.I. Bill.

Thus, focusing on the experiences of Mexicans and Mexican Americans during the Second World War and Korean War became a mission to correct the explicit omission of Mexican service members throughout these conflicts. What Morin actually ended up revealing was the heterogeneity among people of Mexican descent in the United States. Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States were far from a homogenous group and this truth stretched from California to Montana and even in places like Lorain, Ohio. It would be a mistake to claim that all Mexicans and Mexican Americans were the same culturally or ethnically. In reality, and in particular to Mexican Americans, the environment where Mexicans and Mexican Americans resided in significantly influenced their level of incorporation into their

Figure 3.4: Pedro Aguilar Despart became the first draftee of the U.S. Army on October 29, 1941.



Source: Morin, R. 1963. *Among the Valiant: Mexican Americans in WWII and Korea*. Los Angeles: Borden Publishing Company: 26. Public Domain: http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google.

respective communities. However, one characteristic that was common among Mexicans and Mexican Americans was the level of pride, patriotism and loyalty toward honorably serving in the armed forces. One way to distinguish Mexicans and Mexican Americans from where they came from within the U.S. was by the way they talked. For instance, Morin recalls his experiences with new inductees of Mexican descent at the recruitment centers:

One could always tell where they came from by their manner of speech. It was quite easy to distinguish the fast-English-speaking Angelenos from the slow-Spanish-speaking Texan or New Mexican. The *Calo* talk (slang words) of the border habitant from El Paso and Juarez was in contrast to the home-spun Spanish of the Coloradoan or Arizonan. Those that originated from far away localities, where very few of our people live, stood out because their knowledge of Spanish was limited and they much preferred the English language.²⁷

27. Ibid, 29.

Based on some of these distinguishing features, Morin determined that there were at least six types of people of Mexican descent serving in the military during WWII: (1) *Mejicanos*; (2) born and raised in Mexico; (3) biracial Mexicans; (4) “Spanish” Mexicans; (5) *Hispanos*; and (6) Latin Americans.²⁸ *Mejicanos* or American born Mexicans with Mexican parents, were raised and educated in the U.S., however, they appreciated their Mexican heritage and culture. These Mexicans continued to practice the customs and traditions brought by their parents.

Although the American children of Mexican parents were well accustomed to American norms and values, they remained well versed in Mexican culture and preferred to speak more Spanish than English. Mexican Americans with Mexican parents also favored the comradery of other Mexicans and Mexican Americans. *Mejicanos* are the proudest of all the Mexican groups to be associated with being Mexican. They went as far as scorning others who denied their cultural heritage or folks who pretended not to understand Spanish. Another way of looking at *Mejicanos* is as the prelude to who would be identified as *Chicanos* in the latter part of the Civil Rights Movement.²⁹ During WWII, *Mejicanos* were primarily recognized as those that embraced their historical underpinnings from Mexico.

If there was a Mexican American spectrum, those born and raised in Mexico would be at one of the extremes. Mexicans born in Mexico ranged from living their entire adolescent and teenage life in Mexico to being brought to the U.S. at a very young age. Mexicans who spent most of their life in Mexico were well educated in Mexico’s history and understood the origin of most Mexican norms and customs. Many felt and understood the oppression under former Mexican President Porfirio Diaz and could also spot the allure and aesthetic

28. Morin actually identifies seven types of Mexicans, however, he speaks about “Spanish” Americans and Mexicans of Spanish descent that resided in the United States prior to the U.S.-Mexico War in the same way. Therefore, I collapsed the two categories to streamline the typology.

29. Although the origin of the term *Chicano* is still being debated, the *Chicano* identity was the preferred term for U.S. born people of Mexican descent. For more on the origins of the term *Chicano* see: Limon, J. 1981. “The Folk Performance of ‘Chicano’ and the Cultural Limits of Political Ideology.” In *And Other Neighborly Names: Social Processes and Cultural Image in Texas Folklore*, edited by R. Bauman and R. D. Abrahams. Austin: University of Texas Press; Gutierrez, R. A. 1986. “Unraveling America’s Hispanic Past: Internal Stratification and Class Boundaries.” *Aztlan*, 17, 79-102.

Table 3.7: Mexican and Mexican American Identities in the U.S. During WWII.

Identity	Characteristics
<i>Mejicanos</i>	American born Mexicans with Mexican parents.
Mexican Nationals	Born and raised in Mexico and migrated to the U.S.
Biracial Mexicans	Mexican mixed with Europeans or Anglos.
Spanish Mexicans	American born Mexican that were ashamed of being Mexican.
Hispanos	Hailed from central U.S. and proud of their Spanish, not Mexican, roots.
Latin Americans	Born and raised in Texas. Distanced themselves from being labeled Mexican.

of Diego Rivera. Yet, a large percentage Mexicans in the U.S. during WWII left Mexico in search of steady employment and the opportunity to build wealth for their families back in Mexico.

According to Morin, mixed race Mexicans were common ranging from Mexican-Italians to Mexican-blacks and Mexican-Germans. Predominant among mixed raced Mexicans were undoubtedly Mexican-Anglos who spent most of their lives around Mexicans and spoke Spanish fluently. Racially white Mexicans were used to being around other Mexicans in their home towns, but at the induction centers and during their service Mexican-Anglos were continuously being questioned by other Mexicans about their authenticity. The assumption was that since Mexican-Anglos were racially white then they were not actually Mexican. Most Mexican-Anglos originated from Texas.

The following three Mexican groups can be best understood as groups that intentionally distanced themselves from being identified as Mexican. For instance, the “Spanish” were known for being ashamed of being called Mexican. Since they were native-born and raised in America, Spanish-Mexicans rarely felt any connection to Mexico or Mexicans. Their families were wealthy migrants from Spain and resided in the U.S. when the lands still belonged to Mexico. Yet, since Spanish-Mexicans exhibited similar racial and facial features as other people of Mexican descent, they were labeled Mexicans, but advocated for the term Spanish.

Next, were the Hispanos who primarily came from New Mexico and Colorado. The ideology they espoused situated that only those born south of the border could be called Mexican. Hispanos, an ethnic designator which identifies Spain’s historical presence in the

West,³⁰ took pride on the fact that migrants from Spain settled in Santa Fe, New Mexico and Pueblo, Colorado where they originated.

Finally, Latin-Americans hailed mainly from Texas while some originated from the northern and midwestern states. Latin-Americans spent most of their time struggling to prove to their surrounding communities that they were not Mexican. The distancing strategy was meant to neutralize discrimination toward Mexicans that they felt was wrongly carried over to Latin-Americans. Latin-Americans primarily wanted to escape the subordinate status given to Mexicans which they associated with less access to resources and American institutions.

To reduce Mexicans during WWII to a single homogenous group would be a mistake given the diverse characteristics, norms, and ideologies surrounding the different types of Mexicans, their immigrant trajectories, and their preferences about being affiliated with Mexico. Since one type of Mexican or Mexican American does not exist, it makes more sense to recognize people of Mexican descent who fought during WWII as Americans with varying degrees of attachment to a Mexican identity, on one hand, and the Mexican territory, on the other.

To illustrate the dynamics between the different types of Mexicans who fought during WWII I borrow narratives and interviews from the University of Texas U.S. Latino & Latina World War II Oral History Project (VOCES) directed by Historian Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez. The VOCES project has archived over 600 interviews with Latinx members of the armed forces that served during WWII and the Korean War. In the following, I utilize the transcripts of interviews that have been conducted since 1999 to illustrate how people of Mexican descent coincide with the different categories of Mexicans in the U.S. Mexican and Mexican American service members were interviewed about their experiences while serving in the military during WWII. Many of the participants recounted their encounters with discrim-

30. For more on the concept Hispanic, see: Oboler, S. 1995. *Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives: Identity and the Politics of (Re)Presentation in the United States*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Mora, G. C. 2014. *Making Hispanics: How Activists, Bureaucrats & Media Constructed a New American*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

ination, segregation, and racism growing up in the Southwest and while serving on active duty. Most, however, contend that serving in the military was something that they thought was the right thing to do regardless of the explicit racism they endured.

Reaching the eighth grade was an accomplishment Andrew Aguirre was proud of since that surpassed his parent's education. Aguirre was expected to help support his seven siblings by working in the agricultural fields surrounding San Diego, California. He remembers vividly how in school he was chastised by other Mexicans for speaking Spanish. "[L]et's face it, we've been racially picked on since we crossed the border," recounts Aguirre, "[t]hat's why as you get older to learn to assimilate more. But I think that part of the problem was that the Chicanos were their own worse (sic) enemies because everybody was in a barrio. You feel comfortable in your own language and your own culture. So when a person tries to escape the barrio and assimilate into the Anglos, he was picked on."³¹ Griswold del Castillo notes that community pressure to stay within the confines of the cultural group and to not become Anglicized or white established the boundaries of some Mexicans versus other types of Mexicans.³²

Here, Aguirre is demonstrating a connection with the category *Mejicano* since he was born and educated in the U.S. to Mexican immigrant parents. Moreover, Aguirre took pride in both American culture and Mexican culture by continuing to speak Spanish among his peers when it was looked down upon. Thus, Aguirre's experiences demonstrate the tensions between *Mejicanos*, on one hand, and Mexicans that wanted to distance their identity from the culture and people in the territory of Mexico. The social and cultural distancing suggests a type of power relationship transpiring between Mexican Americans who embrace their Mexican culture and Mexicans who assimilate into the anglicized white American culture. *Mejicanos* and native-born Mexicans viewed assimilation as selling yourself out by

31. Aguirre, A. 2001. Interview by Rene Zambrano, videotape recording, San Diego, California, January 22, 2001, U.S. Latino & Latina WWII Oral History Project.

32. Griswold del Castillo, R. 2009. "The Paradox of War: Mexican American Patriotism, Racism, and Memory." In *Beyond the Latino World War II Hero: The Social and Political Legacy of a Generation*, edited by M. Rivas-Rodriguez and E. Zamora. Austin: University of Texas Press.

surrendering and accepting the decision to become *agabachado* (Anglicized).

To put it differently, some *Mejicanos* and native-born Mexicans viewed cultural assimilation and integration as the hegemonic program meant to erase their identity and historical culture for some foreign way of living in America. When *Mejicanos* observe their community members buying into ideas and norms that are attempting to change their culture and livelihood then the membership of Mexicans sympathetic to the change come into question. People that were once allies get turned into what Aguirre contends as, “our own worst enemies.”³³ The famous sociologist Emory Bogardus highlights this tension and contends that, “[b]y becoming citizens they would admit to their fellow-Mexicans that they liked the United States better than Mexico. Their closest friends are among Mexicans and not Americans, and hence they are influenced most by the reactions of Mexicans.”³⁴ Bogardus would later claim that the children of Mexican migrant parents would be conditioned to demonstrate loyalty to America in public and maintain loyalty to Mexico and its culture in private.³⁵ Mexican American children and Mexican migrant children were from an early age socialized into performing certain norms and customs depending on the space and being cognizant of the spectators surrounding them.

As an immigrant child from Mexico, Leno Diaz recalls being only one of two Latinos in his Army Air Corps squadron. Prior to the war, Diaz attempted to enlist in all of the military branches but was denied entry. “I was a Mexican national,” stated Diaz, “that’s why I was not accepted.”³⁶ Despite lacking citizenship or native connection to the U.S., Diaz felt a strong affinity to serve, but also viewed the military as a way to get out of poverty and attain some type of upward mobility. “Although I was not an American citizen, I felt that I wanted

33. Aguirre, A. 2001. Interview by Rene Zambrano, videotape recording, San Diego, California, January 22, 2001, U.S. Latino & Latina WWII Oral History Project.

34. Bogardus, E. S. 1930. “The Mexican Immigrant and Segregation.” *The American Journal of Sociology*, 36, 1:78.

35. Bogardus, E. S. 1940. “Current Problems of Mexican Immigrants.” *Sociology and Social Research*, 25: 172.

36. Diaz, L. F. 2007. Interview by Racquel C. Garza, videotape recording. San Antonio, Texas, April 6, U.S. Latino & Latina WWII Oral History Project.

to go. Living in the ghetto I couldn't get ahead, and that too prompted me to try to be accepted in all the branches," said Diaz.³⁷ He understood well that as an immigrant he did not have to address obligations to the state let alone having to serve in the military during a time of war. "I could've returned to Mexico, but I didn't," recalls Diaz, "That was the coward's way."³⁸ The common practice among Mexican migrants upon hearing that draft boards were conscripting non-declarant immigrants was to travel back to Mexico. Despite Diaz viewing Mexicans that did return to their country of origin as "cowards," some Mexican nationals believed that fighting in WWII was not their war to fight. While, others like Diaz who were not born in the U.S., but raised there viewed their obligations and responsibilities to the state in a different way. As if Diaz embodied what it meant to be an American without necessarily being recognized as a legal member of the social and political community.

For other Mexicans born in the U.S. their connectedness and intimacy with the idea of being Mexican was something they negotiated daily. Take for instance Army Corporal Juan Martinez from Denver, Colorado. Born in 1922, Martinez identified himself as "American" and not Mexican American. After having survived the Battle of the Bulge, Martinez returned home, got married and attended college where he majored in geology at the University of Texas, El Paso due in part because of the education benefits the G.I. Bill provided. Upon relocating to California to find work he and his wife attempted to purchase a home in the city of Victorville. "Prior to buying my house in Victorville," wrote Martinez, "I visited another house and the seller was threatened with [a] suit if he sold it to 'that Mexican.'"³⁹ Martinez further claimed that he, "used to be an American soldier; now I'm a [expletive] Mexican who can't buy houses. I'm American. It just happens that both my parents came from Mexico."⁴⁰

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Martinez, J. 2005. Interviewed by Amanda Maria Morrison. August 31, Apple Valley, California. U.S. Latino & Latina WWII Oral History Project.

40. Ibid.

Martinez seems to fit closely with the category Latin Americans who mostly derive from Texas and placed most of their energies in distancing themselves from Mexicans. Although Martinez considered himself an American, most of his encounters with racism and discrimination brought into question his Mexican identity. According to Martinez, he lacked a Mexican identity since he did not hail from the country. Thus, to engage Martinez as anything other than an American was to relegate him to an inferior racial and ethnic group. Despite having negative encounters in the military and outside in civilian life, Martinez still felt optimistic about race relations in America.

Hailing from Corpus Christi, Texas, Raymond Muñiz recalls attending separate schools from whites prior to enlisting in the military. “It was a two-room school,” stated Muñiz, “one for Anglos, one for Hispanics. They weren’t created the same.”⁴¹ When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Muñiz was still completing high school and was too young to be drafted at the time. Therefore, Muñiz volunteered as soon as he was able to in order to follow in the footsteps of his three older brothers. Knowing that he wanted to join the aviation sector, Muñiz enlisted as a flight engineer as part of the Army’s Air Corps 1103rd unit. As a flight engineer, Muñiz was responsible for ensuring that engines did not overheat and that fuel transfers were done properly. As a native Spanish speaker, Muñiz primarily spoke Spanish at home and among other Latinos in the military that spoke Spanish. He believed that due to his culture he and other Latinos in his squadron were given less time to completely and pass qualifications tests compared to the time limits white service members received.⁴² Despite the episodes of discrimination, Muñiz believed that his service in the military was the best thing he could have done for himself and his family. Muñiz pointed to the benefits he received from the government to go to college. Thus, the benefits, for Muñiz, outweighed the racism and discrimination he experienced while in service.

Muñiz is another example of a *Mejicano* who was born in the U.S. yet embodied what

41. Muñiz, R. 2006. Interview by Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez. June 25, Corpus Christi, Texas, U.S. Latino & Latina WWII Oral History Project.

42. Ibid.

it meant to be a Mexican through practicing Spanish. Muñiz did not view his Mexican background as something that should be hidden. On the contrary, he used his culture to his advantage and the advantage of his unit. For example, he helped Brazilian pilots with their engine problems since they spoke little Spanish and absolutely no English. “They were tickled pink about it [speaking Spanish] because they had a serious problem on one of the engines,” said Muñiz.⁴³ The Brazilian pilots were making runs from Africa to India and Muñiz was able to help troubleshoot their issues due to his communication skills. Keep in mind that people who spoke a language other than English were reprimanded in the military—this still holds true today—especially if the individual was non-European.

Racial tensions were clear between service members regardless of rank. In particular, Carlos Guzman Guerrero who was born in Lockhart, Texas in 1922 recalls a moment when he threw himself in between a white racist platoon sergeant and a black company commander while liberating a German concentration camp in 1945. The white platoon sergeant had been drinking heavily the night before and called the major who happened to be black a, “nigger.”⁴⁴ At this point, the major brandished his weapon pointing it at the sergeant threatening to kill him. Guerrero gets in front of the weapon and says to the major, “I’m not trying to be unrespectable [sic], but he’s a little bit tipsy, a little bit drunk. I don’t think you’ll accomplish anything killing him, we’re fighting in the same war here for the same cause.”⁴⁵ Indeed, Guerrero had another strategy in mind since he did not agree with the sergeant and offered his suggestion to the major, “[w]hy don’t we get through this war? And why don’t you get his phone number or address? And after that, you can go kill him. But don’t kill him here, because we need him.”⁴⁶ Guerrero understood the racial tensions and politics well since the rest of America in the 1940s would not see the insubordination

43. Ibid.

44. Guerrero, C. G. 2001. Interviewed by Antonio Gilb. U.S. Latino & Latina WWII Oral History Project. University of Texas, Austin.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

and disrespect of a field grade officer. Instead, what would be highlighted is that a black man in uniform killed a white man in uniform.

Astutely aware of racism toward Mexicans, Guerrero further recalled instances when he returned home from the war and would not receive service at restaurants. Working as a driver for General K. L. Berry of the U.S. National Guard in 1950, Guerrero was once refused service at Sam's Best Cafe located in Round Rock, Texas. He brought the incident to General Berry's attention and the general threatened to close the cafe if they continued to discriminate against Mexicans. "What the hell did I fight for?" stated Guerrero, "[w]ell, nothing it didn't change discrimination and it's still here, and I guess it will be here till the end of time."⁴⁷ Yet, his admiration for the U.S. was not destroyed because of such incidents of racism and discrimination. "I wasn't mad. I was disappointed. Getting mad ain't going to help," Guerrero insisted.⁴⁸ He believed that he fought for the freedom of the U.S. These were ideas that have been ingrained in Guerrero's belief system since he was a child since he was raised in a military family. His uncle served in the First World War and he had twenty-six brothers and cousins that served in WWII.

Guerrero can be linked with Latin Americans due to being raised in Texas and the generations of family that have settled in the U.S. He did not mention any close affinity to being identified as Mexican other than it being an obstacle navigating everyday life. Although he did not have any negative things to say that would suggest he was attempting to distance himself from being recognized as Mexican, Guerrero was especially proud of serving in the military and wearing the uniform. He dedicated his life to the military, retiring from the Army National Guard in 1982. Guerrero felt a high esteem for representing the U.S. and did not necessarily have a connection to Mexico since his parents were also born and raised in the U.S. This is a situation where we can find varying degrees of Latin Americans with different levels of connectedness identifying with Mexican culture.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

3.5 Conclusion

As shown above, access to legal citizenship from serving in the military became accessible for some immigrants while increasingly more difficult for particular non-citizen service members. Mexican non-citizen service members were less likely to have secured legal citizenship upon completing the probationary period of three years of active military service. Yet, non-citizens classified as “enemy aliens,” such as Germans and Italians, were some of the groups that established the standard for receiving citizenship-for-service. Although Mexican non-citizen service members did not naturalize at similar rates to other racial and ethnic groups, Mexican non-citizens were more ideal candidates for conscription than older European immigrants. Thus, Mexican non-citizens with one of the lowest percentages of the population comprised the 5th largest racial and ethnic group of non-citizen service members.

The reclassification of non-declarant immigrants in Class IV-C was one of the factors that propelled non-citizens with no intentions of donning a military uniform right into harm’s way. Although Mexicans were thought of as draft dodgers and people that found ways to evade service, most likely by relocating back to Mexico, Mexican non-citizen service members demonstrated some of the highest voluntary and conscription figures. Indeed, Mexicans were proud and honored to serve the U.S. during WWII and some even point to the conflict as one that helped guide them to the middle class by utilizing educational benefits.

Despite the INS providing multiple spaces for non-citizens to improve their citizenship status by naturalizing overseas, Mexicans still did not get the same type of access. Does this mean that the INS did not seek out Mexicans to naturalize while in service? Or was this a situation where Mexicans themselves did not want to seek out naturalization? Another possibility is that we need to consider both institutional considerations and the individual agency on behalf of the non-citizen service member to get a better understanding as to why Mexican non-citizen service member naturalizations were so low during a rare period of so-

cial and political advancement for marginalized communities.

CHAPTER 4

IDEATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICANS IN THE U.S., 1910-1930

In this and the following chapter, I argue that we need to gain a broader understanding as to why Mexican American communities, particularly middle class Mexican American communities, neglected or opposed citizenship-for-service policies for Mexican immigrants in the post-WWII era.¹ In chapter 2, I discussed how Japanese American communities mobilized their members to challenge the exclusion of Japanese WWI veterans in order to introduce legislation granting almost immediate legal citizenship upon enlisting for active military service. Through the efforts of the Japanese American Citizenship League (JACL), Japanese Americans mobilized unlikely allies like the Asian Exclusion League and the American Legion to pressure Congress into granting Japanese immigrant veterans recognition as American citizens. To illustrate how and why Mexican American communities were unwilling to advocate on the behalf of Mexican immigrant U.S. service members, we must interrogate why Mexican Americans failed to support Mexican nationals in their pursuit to improve their legal status, as well as determine the factors that regulated and informed Mexican American political engagement in Texas and in the Southwest.

I argue that the development of Mexican American ideologies and subsequent formulation of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the American G.I. Forum (AGIF) was a reaction to the impact of racialization on Mexicans in the U.S. This thesis breaks away from historical conclusions that claim Mexican American organizations came together in the late 1920s to advance an agenda around civil rights. Although advancing a civil rights agenda may be true, the conjuncture of oppressive structural apparatuses being

1. Cathy J. Cohen (1999) makes a similar argument regarding African American communities and their unwillingness to adopt the HIV crisis as an issue affecting black communities. I use a similar framing to discuss how Mexican American communities came to the decision to focus on education and desegregation while completely neglecting others that were outside of what they conceived as feasible victories, on one hand, and issues outside of their ideological scope, on the other.

imposed on Mexican American communities, such as segregation, deportations, repatriation, and criminality, did more to mobilize middle class Mexican Americans than divide them. As Robert Lieberman insists, “[t]he important point is not only where ideas come from or how they cohere or collide but also how they come to be prominent, important, and powerful, even determinative in shaping political behavior and defining political rationality.”² Thus, the racial project informing the image and idea of Mexicans during the Mexican American Generation manifested through four processes of ideational meaning making at the turn of the 20th century: migration and labor; assimilation and Americanization; repatriation; and the production of Mexican migrant illegality.

Scholarship in History and Chicana/o Studies would eventually call “The Mexican American Generation,” the time period between 1930 and 1960, as the conjuncture leading to the development of a Mexican American identity.³ What often gets missed in the scholarship, however, is how identity and racial formations of Mexican American communities frequently produce unique and particular political ideologies.⁴ Specifically, how emerging Mexican American political ideologies during the Mexican American Generation informed and influenced decisions to adopt and confront certain issues and not others. Thus, scholars of the Mexican American Generation have primarily focused on exogenous and structural factors as the main explanations that contributed to the formation of a Mexican American identity.⁵ These explanations, grounded in interrogating structures of domination such as racism, dis-

2. Lieberman, R. C. 2002. “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change.” *American Political Science Review*, 96, 4: 700.

3. For more on the Mexican American Generation see: Garcia, M. T. 1989. *Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, and Identity*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Sanchez, G. J. 1993. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press; Ruiz, V. L. 1998. *From Out of the Shadows: Mexican Women in Twentieth Century America*. New York: Oxford University Press; Gomez, L. E. 2008. *Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race*. New York: New York University Press; Gonzalez, M. G. 2009. *Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the United States*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

4. Research by Ben Marquez on LULAC is an exception.

5. Orozco, C. E. 2009. *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed: The Rise of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement*. Austin: University of Texas Press; Sullivan, M. J. 2014. “By right of service: the military as a pathway to earned citizenship.” *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 1-15; Ngai, M. M. 2004. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

crimination, and segregation, have been powerful tools shedding light on the parallels and effects of state sanctioned white supremacy on Mexican and African American communities during Jim Crow. Yet, what I argue often gets left out of the narrative is the extent to which the individual and collective agency of Mexican American community members and newly formed organizations contributed to what is recognized today as Mexican American political ideologies. How are Mexican American political ideologies being shaped by external shocks and structural factors in the post-war era? Moreover, what does the scope of political possibilities and opportunities look like for Mexican American communities? Finally, how did Mexican Americans determine which issues to pursue collectively from the organizations they built and which ones to neglect?

The following begins to lay out how the idea of Mexicans in the U.S. as criminals and disposable labor developed and was institutionalized by the U.S. state at the turn of the twentieth century. More importantly, this chapter argues that Mexican ideational development—the growth and expansion of the popular narrative of Mexicans in the U.S.—inspired the mobilization and organization of middle-class Mexican Americans to engage in two interdependent strategies: first, countering the narrative that people of Mexican origin are unassimilable, criminal, and disposable. Mexican Americans in Texas and the Southwest that were business people, doctors, and lawyers believed that a majority of negative images surrounding people of Mexican descent stemmed from the presence of Mexican migrant wage workers. Thus, middle-class Mexican Americans not only sought to counter the oppressive narrative, but their ultimate aspiration was to manage and shape an alternative image of Mexicans. One where Mexicans are indeed able to integrate and assimilate into American culture. Second, middle-class Mexican Americans attempted to bring the U.S./Mexico border into their communities by separating and distancing their connections and affiliations with Mexican immigrants and nationals. One of the most effective ways Mexican Americans created a barrier between Mexican migrants was by supporting and adopting policy initiatives that sought to limit Mexican immigrant admittance and ultimately remove Mexican low wage

workers from the country.

4.1 Ideational Development of Mexican Origin People in the U.S.

Racial formation projects at the turn of the twentieth century that created the group identified as Mexicans—citizens and non-citizens alike—positioned them as being outside the social and political imaginary of what constitutes an American. This positionality has had enduring effects in almost all aspects of contemporary life for people of Mexican descent and the communities in which they reside. Before interrogating LULAC and the AGIF, I lay out the four ideational processes of meaning making. Next, I illustrate how LULAC and later the AGIF responded to these processes by implementing programs that countered the negative image of Mexicans like forming their constitutions, poll tax drives, and campaigns for claiming whiteness. Finally, I provide an analysis of the development of Mexican American ideologies, particularly a turn to republicanism, that came out from both meaning making processes and reactionary programs.

4.1.1 Migration and Labor

The 1924 Johnson-Reed Act exempted Canadians and Mexicans since the three countries practiced the “good neighbor” policy where each nation would engage in reciprocal beneficial exchanges with each other. Essentially, Canadians and Mexicans could enter the U.S. freely without a limit to their visas. Consequently, a large exodus of Mexicans entered the U.S. after the eruption of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. Historian Richard Griswold del Castillo describes how Mexican Americans were, “[s]uspected of being disloyal to the United States, in part because they were perceived as foreigners, most Mexican Americans lived in the shadows of their barrios, or segregated communities, and in forgotten rural enclaves,

hardly noticed except when needed for low-wage work or subject to the prejudiced watch of law enforcement.”⁶ Indeed, people of Mexican descent were mainly thought of as foreigners and people that were in the country primarily to meet labor demands that white Americans refused to endure. It was the use of workers of Mexican descent that fueled the expansion of agriculture and the increase in farm labor in the Southwest.⁷ For instance, the leading crop that constantly relied on the importation of Mexican wage labor was cotton in the Southwest. The cotton industry in the Southwest was a completely different type of operation than that of the plantation culture in the South. Namely, cotton in the Southwest employed tens of thousands of Mexican migrant laborers and the Southwest cotton industry became the leading employer of wage workers. Compared to black sharecroppers and tenant farmers in the South who had a stake (though, a very small stake) in the land they were cultivating, Mexican wage workers, on the other hand, had no other recourse than to look for work whenever chopping and picking was depleted. Thus, for many Mexican migrants, traveling long distances across the Southwest from one farm to the other was business as usual.

To put it another way, the rise in negative images and the belief that Mexican migrants were a nuisance to American society was amplified by migrants constantly being forced to relocate between work sites. People of Mexican descent, in particular Mexican migrants, saturated the labor markets, with over 85% of railroad work and approximately 75% of all agricultural labor in the Southwest fulfilled by Mexican wage workers.⁸ Historian Mae Ngai found that Mexican, “[m]igrant streams of landless laborers, including families, now followed the seasons of cotton, fruit, and vegetables crops on a year-long search for work at wages as

6. Griswold del Castillo, R. 2009. “The Paradox of War: Mexican American Patriotism, Racism, and Memory.” In *Beyond the Latino World War II Hero: The Social and Political Legacy of a Generation*, edited by M. Rivas-Rodriguez and E. Zamora. Austin: University of Texas Press: 12.

7. Valdes, D. 2009. “Now Get Back to Work: Mexican Americans and the Agricultural ‘Migrant Stream.’” In *Beyond the Latino World War II Hero: The Social and Political Legacy of a Generation*, edited by M. Rivas-Rodriguez and E. Zamora. Austin: University of Texas Press.

8. Nakano Glenn, E. 2002. *Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 152-153.

low as \$1.50 a day.”⁹ Some wage workers were even enticed by the higher wages found in the railroad industry where laborers could find more steady employment. However, due to workers abandoning their agricultural jobs for less precarious work on the railroads, owners of agricultural production had to match their pay depending on the demand for labor.¹⁰ Hence, traveling between agricultural sites, according to some scholars, exacerbated racial discrimination against Mexicans in general. Chicano Historian Mario Garcia notes that, “[t]he presence of wetbacks increased not only labor exploitation but also racial discrimination against all persons of Mexican descent.”¹¹

Migration of Mexicans into the U.S. at the turn of the 20th century came at the most ideal time when American farmers needed more hands to pick their crops, especially cotton in Texas. Entire families would migrate from Mexico that included a father, mother, children and at times the spouses of their children along with their grandchildren. This type of migration suggested that Mexicans were attempting to relocate instead of being nomadic transient migrants. As labor demands increased in Texas cotton fields, so did the level of migration from Mexico. In the same way that whites attempted to fulfill their “manifest destiny” and expand their search for resources and occupy new lands out West using railroads, Mexicans sought economic relief and social mobility by building railroads pointing North toward America.

Neil Foley describes the network of railroads from Mexico to the Texas border as, “the arteries for Mexican migration.”¹² Mexican migrants were attracted to the higher wages offered by cotton farmers. The cotton farmers, on the other hand, appreciated that they

9. Ngai, M. M. 2004. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 131.

10. For more on Mexican wage laborers see: Sanchez, G. J. 1993. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press; Barrera, M. 1979. *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality*. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.

11. Garcia, M. T. 1989. *Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, and Identity*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 52.

12. Foley, N. 1997. *The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in the Texas Cotton Culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 43.

were able to hire entire households to pick their cotton compared to searching for individual hands. Some migrants recruited to work on the railroads even went as far as jumping off trains before reaching their destinations to find work in the cotton fields.¹³ This prompted railroad managers to continue importing Mexican migrant labor to address the labor shortage. Railway officials in Dallas estimated that over 50% of their recruited labor force had quit and moved onto the cotton fields.¹⁴ As the U.S. began to mobilize troops to enter the fighting during WWI, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1917, which imposed a tax and literacy test on new immigrants attempting to enter the country.

Although the 1917 Immigration Act had drastic effects on individuals entering the country with authorization and documentation, it almost certainly had no effect on curtailing Mexican immigration. Thus, anti-immigrant groups such as the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and leaders of the American labor movement pressured Congress to reinstate the restriction on foreign contract labor established in 1885.¹⁵ Anti-immigrant and nativist sentiments fueled the movement to end labor contracts and stop Mexican migrants from taking away jobs from poor white citizens. Leaders of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) believed that there were too many loopholes available for farmers and laborers to exploit. Members of the AFL believed that by removing Mexicans from the country jobs would become more available for Americans. The AFL despised that Mexicans were undercutting their laborers by accepting lower wages regardless if they assumed those positions by chance and not by choice.¹⁶ Yet, immigration authorities were less concerned with Mexican laborers crossing the border and more concerned with the small number of Chinese and

13. Ibid., 44.

14. Ibid., 45.

15. Reisler, M. 1976. *By the sweat of their brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900-1940*. Westport: Greenwood Press: 21-35.

16. Balderrama, F. E. and R. Rodriguez. 1995. *Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press: 113.

Asian immigrants attempting to enter the country from Mexico.¹⁷

Indeed, border patrol agents encouraged and at times facilitated the mass crossing of Mexican nationals into the U.S. When crossing into the country voluntarily no longer sustained labor demands, employers sought relief from the federal government and tapped into the state sanctioned labor importation program that operated between 1917-1921.¹⁸ On top of agriculture, imported laborers from Mexico were allowed to work in railroads, mining, and construction. A key mechanism to ensure that migrant worker wages remained and stayed low was to saturate employers with a larger number of laborers. Gilbert Gonzalez identified that the WWI imported labor program provided employers with an excess of labor facilitating the decline in wages.¹⁹ Growers and owners of production profited substantially from the imported labor program to the extent that the Arizona Cotton Grower's Association reported that migrant laborers helped the association save upwards of \$28 million in picking costs.²⁰ Yet, as labor demands shifted and job opportunities became scarce for migrant workers in the late 1920s, public perception also began to change and looked toward the migrant laborer as a nuisance and public charge.

The demands that the agriculture, railroad, and mining industries were in search of was not necessarily for labor, but instead these dominating industries searched for cheap and low wage labor. Labor was accessible at the turn of the twentieth century, but most Americans would not accept the wages being offered by the three leading industries for the type of arduous work being asked of them. As Mario Barrera contends, “[t]he particular impact of these developments upon Mexican labor and Mexican immigration was conditioned by the

17. For more on targeting Chinese and Asian immigrants at the border see: Romero, R. C. 2012. *The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

18. Gonzalez, G. G. 2006. *Guest Workers or Colonized Labor? Mexican Labor Migration to the United States*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers: 23.

19. Ibid., 33.

20. Ibid., 33.

relative non-availability of other sources of cheap labor during this period.”²¹ To put it in a different perspective, the other immigrant groups with the potential of providing low wage labor were Chinese and Japanese immigrants. At this point, Chinese labor was restricted due to the Chinese Exclusion Act and Japanese labor was also barred due to the Gentlemen’s Agreement between the U.S. and Japan in 1907. Given its proximity to the U.S., Mexico and its nationals became the main source of low wage labor at the turn of the twentieth century. Realistically, Mexican migrants constituted the accessible supply of willing disposable laborers.

Chicano Historian David Montejano notes that, “Mexican residents who were landowners were seen as ‘good citizens’ while the large ‘floating’ population temporarily employed on ranches were seen as sympathizers of the raiders.” Montejano is referring to Mexicans that stole cattle from Anglo farmers in the name of reclaiming property that Mexicans felt were wrongfully stolen in the first place. Montejano is making the link between people with wealth regardless of race being considered “good citizens” while migrants that traveled from one ranch to the other for work were essentially deviant.

The source of the low wage migrant labor stream emanating from Mexico was susceptible to market fluctuations, particularly opportunities stemming from the West and the Midwest. George Sanchez confirms that, “growers in this region [Southwest] went so far as to try to prevent Mexican laborers from purchasing automobiles and prohibiting out-of-state labor recruiters in order to keep their workers both plentiful and immobile.”²² Compared to the wages a Mexican laborer received in Texas, they could potentially make between \$1 to \$1.50 more by making their way to Arizona or California, respectively.²³

Altogether, the location where labor is in demand and the disparate wages across these

21. Barrera, M. 1979. *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality*. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press: 71.

22. Sanchez, G. J. 1993. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press: 66.

23. *Ibid.*, 66.

locations have informed the trajectory of Mexican migrant low-wage laborers. As Montejano mentioned, nomadic Mexican migrants were seen as an inferior caste of Mexicans separate from those with property and wealth. Montejano notes that in early 20th century Texas Mexicans were distinguished from the Spanish elite and other Mexicans with no claim to land in the U.S.²⁴ According to Montejano, “money whitens,” and, “[t]he only problem for upper class Mexicans was that this principle [money whitens] offered neither consistent nor permanent security in the border region.”²⁵

4.1.2 *Assimilation and Americanization*

The Americanization movement can be traced back to the prelude of WWI. According to Sociologist Emory Bogardus, “[w]hen the United States entered the World War, she discovered that large numbers of her immigrant population had not become assimilated, and that even hundreds of thousands of people had lived within her boundaries for years without learning the language of the land.”²⁶ Thus, what was considered a “melting pot”—the idea that all groups of people came together in the U.S. and melted into a single identity—looked more like groups being forced to live amongst each other without a clear commitment to American norms and values.

Desmond King argues that the Americanization movement was guided by keeping the “pure” American identity Anglo-Saxon. Furthermore, King writes, “by the middle and late nineteenth century, American society had developed a strong nativist movement, whose members defined themselves as defenders of a genuine ‘Americanism.’”²⁷ During this period,

24. Montejano, D. 1987. *Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986*. Austin: University of Texas Press: 84

25. *Ibid.*, 85.

26. Bogardus, E. S. 1923. *Essentials of Americanization*. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press: 17.

27. King, D. 2000. *Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 20.

Japanese and Mexican immigrants were not the main concerns threatening the normative American identity, but instead it was the Catholic Irish newcomers. The “pure” Americans feared the Catholic church and Irish immigrants because they were united in their way of life and in the political arena. Whether they were voting for the Democrats or the Whig party, Catholic Irish immigrants signaled that they made their decisions based on the teachings from the church.²⁸

The social and political environment was ripe for anti-Mexican sentiments which infiltrated popular discourse as WWI came to an end. Anti-immigrant sentiments gave energy to a program that would limit the migration of “undesirable” immigrants. The immigrant admissions quota pilot program was launched by Congress in 1921 and rolled out nationally in 1924 with the passage of the Johnson-Reed Act. Named after the architects of the bill, Congressman Albert Johnson and Senator David Reed, the Johnson-Reed Act imposed race-based nativism in the form of limiting immigration from certain countries on the grounds of numerical quotas. The quota system favored immigrants from Northern and Western Europe.²⁹ Legitimacy over the application of the immigrant admissions quota system was derived from incrementally operationalizing a calculus surrounding “national origins.” This meant that although Congress had approved an immigration system where newly admitted migrants would be subject to numerical quotas, it would take another decade before the bill was executed properly. In the meantime, the Johnson-Reed Act required that a board be created and overseen by the commerce, labor, and state departments in order to define the parameters of what constitutes a “national origin.”³⁰

In constructing the idea of “national origins,” the quota board had to make decisions regarding what composed, “inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920.”³¹ More

28. Ibid., 21.

29. Ngai, M. 1999. “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924.” *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 86, No. 1., 67-92.

30. Ngai, M. 2004. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 25.

31. Ibid., 26.

importantly, and similarly to the principles surrounding citizenship regimes, the quota board had to stipulate exactly who was not included in the overall number to be admitted. According to Mae Ngai, the quota board considered three characteristics that automatically excluded immigrants from being considered part of the quota system: aliens ineligible for citizenship; the descendants of slave immigrants; and the descendants of the American aborigines.³² As a result of the racial characteristics that would either deem an immigrant “ineligible for citizenship” or “non-white,” larger quotas ultimately ended up being reserved for immigrants originating from Northern European countries, which meant smaller quotas for people with genuine claims to national origins like African Americans. In other words, since African Americans were considered the descendants of slaves their entire population would not be counted toward the quota calculus which could have reserved a proportion of potential immigrants from Africa. Thus, the idea of “national origins” did more to construct immigration as a prospect reserved for Europeans and ultimately reinforced the notion that America was indeed “the land of immigrants,” but with important caveats for non-whites.

Yet, as the U.S. attempted to figure out the best way to limit “undesirable” immigration into the country through the quota system, the wave of Mexican immigration at the turn of the 20th century had reached its apex. It’s estimated that by 1928 approximately one out of every ten Mexican nationals had migrated to the U.S.³³ Mexicans were overwhelmingly pulled north to the U.S. by Southwestern employers in search of cheap labor. The emphasis here is not necessarily on employers attempting to recruit more labor, but instead on securing laborers that would accept lower wages. The development of Mexican labor in the 1920s is a direct result of the absence of other forms of cheap labor such as Chinese labor. Thus, Mexican immigrants were considered primarily as cheap labor that inhabit what Mario Bar-

32. Ngai actually suggests four characteristics that would exclude potential immigrants from being included in the quota system calculus. I did not count her fourth consideration, which is immigrants from the Western Hemisphere or their descendants, mainly because this category is identifying non-quota immigrants and they were already not going to be counted. Non-quota immigrants are those immigrants particularly from Canada, Mexico, and the South America that could enter the U.S. without being restricted to numerical quotas.

33. Barrera, M. 1979. *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press: 65.

raera has identified as the “colonized class segment.” A colonized class segment is observed when a subordinate class segment is distinguished based on race or ethnicity.³⁴ Mexican immigrants were regarded as not only inhabiting a colonized class segment, but originating from within it. In other words, since Mexican immigrants were actively recruited at the turn of the twentieth century primarily to exploit their labor by paying migrant workers lower wages, agricultural employers believed Mexican immigrants occupied an inferior class of workers and people.

Positioning Mexicans as inferior extended to the children of people of Mexican descent and informed the creation of “Mexican schools.” The first school specifically dedicated to segregate Mexican school children from the dominant white population was established in 1902 in Texas.³⁵ Thus, the Mexican school system emerged and by 1930 over 90% of all schools in South Texas were segregated by both race and ethnicity. Historian David Montejano argues that, “[s]egregated schools were a straightforward reflection of the racial divisions of the farm towns. In the Lower Valley, the towns of Edinburg, Harlingen, and San Benito segregated their Mexican school children through the fourth and fifth grades. There was no need for segregation beyond the fifth or sixth grade because Mexicans rarely ‘get that far.’”³⁶

4.1.3 Repatriation

Widely known as the repatriation campaigns, at a time of severe economic crisis, the voluntary and mostly coercive removal of Mexicans in the U.S. sought to secure jobs for Americans and ultimately retrench welfare spending. Approximately 60% of the almost one million people with Mexican ancestry that were systematically removed and deported to Mexico were

34. Ibid., 101.

35. Montejano, D. 1987. *Anglos and Mexicans: In the Making of Texas, 1836-1986*. Austin: University of Texas Press: 160-161.

36. Ibid., 168.

native born U.S. citizens.³⁷ Therefore, it is inaccurate to claim that U.S. born citizens of Mexican descent were deported to their own land. The lightning deportation raids were conducted so quickly by local officials that they completely disregarded whether or not their actions were lawful. What was apparent to state and local officials was that the economic depression needed a scapegoat. Federal and local governments found a convenient candidate with Mexicans and mounted numerous punitive measures to restrict Mexicans from maintaining their jobs and ultimately from finding work.

Due to the seasonal nature of agricultural work, Mexicans would be one of the first minority groups to experience the effects of the depression. In California, wages fell for agricultural workers from 35 cents an hour in 1928 to 14 cents in 1933.³⁸ Thus, one out of seven Mexicans was unemployed in California by 1930 which was the highest unemployment rate among any racial or ethnic group in the state.³⁹ White citizens in California pressured its state government to protect job opportunities for “Americans” and to limit the presence of Mexicans that drove down competitive wages. In particular, the California state legislature enacted the Alien Labor Act in 1931 prohibiting companies or employers contracted to do work for the state from hiring immigrants.⁴⁰ As a result of the Alien Labor Act, Mexican migrant workers were banned from working on government construction sites, schools, highways, and other state sponsored projects.⁴¹ Unemployment rates increased prompting more claims for economic relief that was primarily reserved for white American laborers. Los Angeles County reported that individual claims for welfare climbed from approximately 19,000 in 1929 to 26,000 in 1930 followed by 42,000 claims in 1931. Subsequently, welfare expenses in Los Angeles tripled during the first few years of the depression from 1.7 million

37. Johnson, K. R. 2005. “The Forgotten Repatriation of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the War on Terror.” *Pace Law Review*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1-26.

38. Sanchez, G. J. 1993. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles*. New York: Oxford University Press: 211.

39. *Ibid.*, 211.

40. *Ibid.*, 211.

41. *Ibid.*, 211.

in 1929 to 4.2 million 1931.⁴² As whites managed to secure state assistance at an increasing rate during the depression Mexicans, on the other hand, experienced a decline in acquiring state welfare benefits. Most notably, 22% of Mexicans secured some type of economic relief in 1929 and that number declined to 13% in 1931.⁴³

One of the main figures responsible for the repatriation campaigns was William N. Doak who had been recently appointed as the Secretary of Labor in 1930 by President Herbert Hoover. Upon taking his post, Doak offered his solution to the growing unemployment rate, which was to remove any and all “aliens” holding jobs that could be performed by white Americans.⁴⁴ According to Doak, there were at least 400,000 immigrants residing in the U.S. at the time of the depression and more than 100,000 were deportable.⁴⁵ Doak immediately began his removal campaign that stretched from Los Angeles to New York City. Although Doak did not single out a particular group, Mexicans were overwhelmingly targeted and affected by the deportation raids. Working closely with local governments, Doak aligned his efforts with one of the cities with the largest known number of undocumented immigrants: Los Angeles. While Doak was launching his national deportation campaign, the city of Los Angeles was already instituting their removal program. Lead by Charles P. Visel who was appointed as the coordinator for the Los Angeles Citizens Committee on Coordination of Unemployment Relief, Visel launched a two-tiered plan to remove Mexicans from competitive jobs and eventually entirely from the city.

First, Visel envisioned public releases through radio and newspapers announcing the deportation campaign. Next, arrests had to be made of Mexican immigrants and the press was invited to cover these particular events.⁴⁶ Part of the rationale for publicizing the deporta-

42. Ibid., 212.

43. Ibid., 212.

44. Hoffman, A. 1973. “Stimulus to Repatriation: The 1931 Federal Deportation Drive and the Los Angeles Mexican Community.” *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 205-219.

45. Ibid., 206.

46. Ibid., 209.

tion campaign was to instill fear among the Mexican community in Los Angeles. According to historian Abraham Hoffman, Visel reached out to Doak to ask for federal aid in the form of a “psychological gesture” with the capability to, “scare many thousand alien deportables out of this district [Los Angeles] which is the result desired.”⁴⁷ The scaring tactics turned out to be successful for the city of Los Angeles which encouraged Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans to consider leaving for Mexico. Yet, fewer than 300 undocumented Mexicans were deported by border patrol for serious crimes.⁴⁸

The scare tactics were so powerful in rousing fear among the Mexican community that local businesses in the Los Angeles area grew increasingly concerned about the likelihood of losing their cheap labor pool. Namely, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce backtracked from their original position which was in support of the repatriation campaign. Thus, local business leaders were more interested in establishing an understanding that in order for the city to thrive, local officials and city leaders needed to drive down social welfare expenses while also safeguarding the flow and maintenance of cheap migrant labor.⁴⁹ The Mexican government ultimately became a resource for Los Angeles officials when Mexico’s representative, Rafael de la Colina, supported “voluntary repatriation.” Although Colina was adamantly against efforts to scare Mexicans into leaving the country, voluntarily leaving was a totally different issue.⁵⁰ Colina suggested that repatriation was probably the best alternative for out of work Mexican migrants. Moreover, given that Mexico was suffering from growing economic constraints following their recent revolution, repatriating Mexican citizens was meant to reignite the Mexican economy. As a result of the mounting pressure to leave the country, many Mexican migrants had to decide to either stay in the U.S. and wait out the economic depression or go back to Mexico with little to show for their experience

47. Ibid., 208.

48. Sanchez, G. J. 1993. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles*. New York: Oxford University Press: 214.

49. Ibid., 215.

50. Ibid., 215.

in America. Choosing to stay, however, would also mean Mexicans would be surrounded by messages from dominant media sources saying that the best thing for both parties, Mexicans on one hand, and the county on the other, would be for Mexicans to leave the home they've built for themselves.

One of the major sources for providing support for repatriation came from mainstream newspapers in the Southwest. For example, a Los Angeles Times headline read, "Aliens Load Relief Roll: Mexican Indigent Burden Heavy."⁵¹ The column is talking about the large number of Mexicans, both citizens and non-citizens alike, that were requesting support from the county's unemployment relief programs. The Los Angeles Times is highlighting that the Superintendent of Charities in Los Angeles found that from the previous year, "about 11.7 per cent of the bureau's responsibility and that of the unemployment relief districts is in caring for Mexican aliens. If the average Mexican alien case receives \$20 a month the financial burden to the taxpayers of the country is \$200,000 a month, or \$2,400,000 a year."⁵² Signaling to the residents of Los Angeles that repatriation of Mexicans would particularly benefit people in search of economic relief, which during the depression was practically all residents. Moreover, newspapers like the Los Angeles Times were making a clear statement that Mexicans were unworthy of receiving relief funds even if Mexican migrants were recruited to work in U.S.

Part of what made the repatriation campaigns successful for local and state governments came from the positive support from the Mexican government. For instance, Mexican Secretary of the Interior, Eduardo Vasconcelos, stated that, "[t]he experiences gained in the United States by these Mexicans should be a valuable asset to Mexico."⁵³ Vasconcelos enthusiastically said on the radio that approximately 200,000 Mexicans had been repatriated

51. Jensen, E. E. 1934. "Aliens Load Relief Roll: Mexican Indigent Burden Heavy." *Los Angeles Times*, March 34.

52. Ibid.

53. Vasconcelos, E. 1932. "Nationals Welcomed by Mexico: Repatriation of former citizens from California benefit, says official." *Los Angeles Times*, December 15: 3.

to Mexico from 1930 to 1931.⁵⁴ On one hand, as Mexican politician, receiving people who originated from the country you represent should be a positive experience for everyone involved. However, on the other hand, the story is also used to show readers that repatriation of Mexicans—regardless of citizenship status—is a positive program that benefits both countries. Yet, what tends to be neglected, either intentionally or unintentionally, is the social, economic, and political well-being of the Mexicans themselves.

4.1.4 *Illegality and Criminality*

The construction of Mexican/migrant illegality and subsequently criminality tends to be linked to the abolition of immigrant admissions quotas.⁵⁵ Anthropologist Nicholas De Genova observes that, “while no other country has supplied nearly as many migrants to the United States as has Mexico since 1965, virtually all major changes in U.S. immigration law during this period have created ever-more severe restrictions on the possibilities for ‘legal’ migration from Mexico.”⁵⁶ The idea of illegality highlights a particular charge by the state, its institutions, and state employees responsible for enforcing policies that identify people who are engaging in a particular type of problematic behavior. To this end, Cecilia Menjivar and Daniel Kanstroom write that, “[a]s a technically precise legal conclusion, forensic illegality always requires legitimate processes and proof.”⁵⁷ These scholars continue stating that charges alone do not warrant the construction of illegality to be placed on an individ-

54. Ibid., 3.

55. For the origins of the construction of migrant illegality see: Ackerman, E. 2012. “What part of Illegal Don’t you Understand?” Bureaucracy and Civil Society in the Shaping of Illegality.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1-23; De Genova, N. P. 2004. “The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant ‘Illegality.’” *Latino Studies*, 2, 2, 160-185.

56. De Genova, N. 2014. “Immigration ‘Reform’ and Migrant ‘Illegality.’” In *Constructing Immigrant ‘Illegality:’ Critiques, Experiences, and Responses*, edited by C. Menjivar and D. Kanstroom, New York: Cambridge University Press: 39.

57. Menjivar, C. and D. Kanstroom. 2014. “Introduction – Immigrant ‘Illegality:’ Constructions and Critiques.” In *Constructing Immigrant ‘Illegality:’ Critiques, Experiences, and Responses*, edited by C. Menjivar and D. Kanstroom, New York: Cambridge University Press: 1.

ual. That is to say, charges brought on an individual are merely conditional given that the individual in question is found to have a connection to some type of “illegal” behavior or conduct. In this case, immigrants in the U.S. who for a number of various reasons, such as overstaying immigrant visas or entering the country without being inspected, get branded with the label “illegal” or “criminal.”

As Menjivar and Kanstroom contend, “It is the conduct that counts, not legal status.”⁵⁸ In other words, it’s not the legal status that is in question, but instead the actions of the individual that create the relationship to illegality in the U.S. What is actually being policed by government agencies are the so-called deviant behaviors of newcomers. Although scholars situate illegality as stemming from the upsurge of migration following the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, instead the origins of illegality can be traced much earlier to the beginning of immigrant admissions.

For instance, in 1928 Democratic Senator from South Carolina Coleman Blease introduced Senate Bill 5094, otherwise known as the “Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929.” According to Ben Gonzalez, S. 5094 intended to criminalize entry without inspection as a misdemeanor punishable with up to one year in prison and reentry without inspection as a felony punishable with up to two years in prison.⁵⁹ Gonzalez further claims that S. 5094 was unquestionably targeted at Mexican migrants due to emphasizing “Mexican” in the bill more than three times than any other immigrant group. Moreover, House debates over the proposed bill illustrate numerous unsuccessful attempts by immigration restrictionists to amend the Johnson-Reed Act and implement Mexican immigration quotas.⁶⁰ Without much struggle, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929 passed both chambers of Congress and began the historical relationship between immigration and criminality.

Also, prior to the 1929 Undesirable Aliens Act measures were already being taken by

58. *Ibid.*, 2.

59. Gonzalez, B. 2014. *The Undocumented Threat: Beliefs, Policy Preferences, and the Politics of Immigration*. Ph.D. Diss. University of Washington: 45

60. *Ibid.*, 46.

the Department of State to curtail unauthorized immigration by establishing the Border Patrol in 1924. In the years following the creation of the border patrol, approximately 15,000 Mexican migrants were deported between 1925 to 1929 which was three times as many deportations that were completed from the previous five years between 1920 to 1924.⁶¹ Despite placing numerical quotas on Mexican immigration, the United States Consular Service focused their efforts and energy on enforcing existing immigration laws, such as administering literacy tests and encouraging repatriation. As Sociologists Nestor Rodriguez and Cristian Paredes put it, “the early social construction of illegality of the Mexican migrant served to de-Mexicanize the Southwest and to make Mexican ‘illegal aliens’ in a previous Mexican homeland.”⁶²

Yet, attaching the label “illegal” to Mexicans is not enough to sustain Mexican migrants as undesirable and “criminal” in popular discourse that we continue to see coming from political elites and mainstream media sources. Delegitimizing Mexicans as undeserving and socially inferior is another way negative images and stereotypes became normalized during the era of immigrant admissions quotas. This racial project in particular involves advancing ideas of Mexicans as being civically demoted—regardless of citizenship status—and unworthy of basic forms of human decency. The purpose of delegitimation, thus, serves to produce images of Mexicans as infiltrating and ultimately threatening the “legitimate” population. The negative images of Mexicans can stem from the general population and they do, but state institutions especially enforcement agencies, like the Border Patrol and local police, in the performance of their duties that involves carrying out the organization’s mission are also simultaneously producing a particular ideology when handling issues pertaining to the detainment and removal of Mexicans in the U.S. What makes detaining and removing Mexicans problematic and a source influencing negative stereotypes of Mexicans in general is

61. Cardenas, G. 1975. “United States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An Historical Perspective.” *Chicano Law Review*, 2, 66-91.

62. Rodriguez, N. and C. Paredes. 2014. “Coercive Immigration Enforcement and Bureaucratic Ideology.” In *Constructing Immigrant “Illegality:” Critiques, Experiences, and Responses*, edited by C. Menjivar and D. Kanstroom, New York: Cambridge University Press: 64.

that immigration enforcement agencies fail to apply the same energy and resources on the U.S.-Canada border that we see on the U.S.-Mexico border.

Rodriguez and Paredes argue that when political elites and enforcement bureaucrats invoke language and stereotypes such as “illegals,” “wetbacks,” or “aliens” they are then able to enforce policies in at least two coercive ways. First, utilizing the term “illegal alien” sanctions enforcement officials to, “handle migrants with a reduced sense of, and care for, the migrants’ humanity, which helps to expedite the processes of arrest and detention and ultimately removal.”⁶³ In other words, enforcement officials are not imposing themselves on members of the social and political community, instead they are encroaching on the mobility of some foreign being. Secondly, identifying undocumented Mexicans as “illegal” helps immigration bureaucracies and agencies promote the need for more resources to locate and remove undesirable Mexicans.⁶⁴ Basically, the framing of Mexicans as some foreign alien underclass provides coercive institutions the agency to conduct themselves in ways that would be inappropriate and downright illegal if perpetrated against members of society.

Under these circumstances, people of Mexican descent in the U.S. since the turn of the 20th century have been simultaneously demanded and outright advocated for by agricultural and industrial economic sectors, on one hand, and racialized, disenfranchised, and relegated to second-class citizenship by segments of the population committed to “pure” Americanization, on the other. The aforementioned processes of meaning making have managed to cement people of Mexican descent as a separate underclass that can be distinguished from other marginalized groups in the U.S. I argue that these processes of meaning making influenced the mobilization of middle class Mexican American organizations in the late 1920s. Organizations like LULAC assembled their members to challenge negative images and stereotypes of Mexican Americans by tactically projecting a counter narrative to notions of low-wage labor, assimilability, and legality.

63. Ibid., 76.

64. Ibid., 76.

4.2 Creating Mexican American Political Ideologies

As a response to immigration quotas, immigrant criminality and increasing economic depression, three Mexican-American organizations, the Order Sons of America, the Latin American League, and the Order Knights of America, joined together and formed LULAC to advance a single and consistent message across the country. In other words, this new reality where Mexicans, regardless of citizenship status, are systematically racialized and marginalized urged community leaders to join their masses. Historians and Political Scientists who study LULAC's development suggest that the organization was created for the purpose of advancing a unified and coherent organizational platform. Yet, given the political context toward restricting immigration and an increasing awareness around a surge of Mexican nationals entering the country without authorization, the new members of LULAC, I argue, came together to distinguish issues important to advancing a particular class of Mexican or what could be understood as the "good immigrant."

In doing so, members of LULAC believed that in order to preserve their economic gains, social status, and continue fighting for civil rights, tough decisions would need to be made concerning the limits of membership and ultimately who LULAC would be representing. For instance, Gutierrez reminds us that when the Mexican organizations came together to debate the possible unification of all the organizations a motion was made to restrict membership exclusively to American citizens. Despite, over 90% of the people in attendance walking out in protest over the motion to grant membership solely to American citizens, LULAC passed the motion as part of unifying the three original Mexican organizations.⁶⁵ Thus, LULAC's first order of business was to divide and set a boundary between Mexican Americans, on one hand, and Mexican immigrants, on the other. Through this separation, the members

65. Gutierrez, D. G. 1995. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 81.

of LULAC believed that if they were going to advance the law abiding Mexican American communities in any sort of way the answer was not going to come from socializing Mexican nationals. Instead, the focus had to be on forging ahead and being on par with the dominant white majority.

According to Benjamin Marquez, LULAC's political ideology was one of assimilation and accommodation where their primary goal was not to restructure the American status quo, but instead they sought to reform society in an effort to enjoy the benefits and resources associated with the white majority.⁶⁶ LULAC's membership base consisted of Mexican-American elites and their rosters were mainly filled with doctors, lawyers and businessmen who were interested in securing their economic and social upward mobility.

It goes without saying, that LULAC was and continues to be a remarkably successful organization that brings Mexican American and Latinx issues into mainstream conversations highlighting concerns around political power, society, and their economic well-being. LULAC set out to, "[To] develop within the members of our race the best, purest, and most perfect type of a true and loyal citizen of the United States of America."⁶⁷ Yet, the question remains, at what cost did it take to convey to the dominant white society that members of LULAC were true and loyal American citizens? We already have a sense from the Chicana/o and historical literature as to why LULAC advanced an assimilationist and integrationist agenda.⁶⁸ To be clear, LULAC developed a more culturally pluralistic perspective during

66. Marquez, B. 1993. *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

67. LULAC News, San Antonio, 1944. Houston Metropolitan Research Center, Mexican American Small Collections, RG1314, 4S/133/G, Box 1, Folder 2.

68. See: Garcia, M. T. 1989. *Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology & Identity*; New Haven: Yale University Press; Gutierrez, D. G. 1995. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Montejano, D. 1987. *Anglos and Mexicans: In the Making of Texas, 1836-1986*. Austin: University of Texas Press; Marquez, B. 2003. *Constructing Identities in Mexican American Political Organizations: Choosing Issues, Taking Sides*. Austin: University of Texas Press; Marquez, B. 1993. *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization*. Austin: University of Texas Press; Kaplowitz, C. A. 2005. *LULAC, Mexican Americans, and National Policy*. College Station: Texas A & M Press; Orozco, C. E. 2009. *No Mexicans, women, or dogs allowed: The Rise of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement*. Austin: University of Texas Press; Olivas, M. A. 2012. *In Defense of My People: Alonso S. Perales and the Development of Mexican American Intellectuals*.

the Chicano Movement as newer Chicanas/os challenged longstanding appeals to integration and assimilation.⁶⁹ But what are some of the consequences that emerged from employing an assimilationist strategy during the era of immigrant admissions quotas?

In the remainder of this section, I argue that LULAC's ideology based on assimilation and integration provided some important educational and political victories for Mexican Americans during a period when foreigners and non-whites were systematically disenfranchised like Japanese internment and the African American experience in the Jim Crow South. Yet, due to LULAC's disposition to favor Americanization and acceptance into white Anglo society, they contributed to efforts intent on prohibiting Mexican immigrants from becoming enfranchised, particularly those that served in the military. In other words, LULAC neglected immigrant mobility issues due to both their passive political stance and hesitancy to raise claims that would tarnish their image among white political elites and they believed citizenship was no longer an issue relevant to Mexican Americans. To recognize and adopt the plight of Mexican migrants in the U.S. was to legitimize the racialized connection between Mexican migrants and Mexican Americans, which was one of the main reasons LULAC was organized in the first place. I analyze different aspects of LULAC's (and later AGIF) tactics to influence their membership pool, respective communities, and ultimately, the dominant ruling class. From their membership code to poll tax drives, LULAC and the AGIF advanced a form of Mexican American respectability constructed to liberate and distinguish "good" Mexicans from so-called undesirable Mexican foreigners.

4.2.1 The LULAC Code

Under the leadership of Ben Garza, Alonso Perales, J.T. Canales, and Mauro Machado, LULAC advanced an ideological message throughout its various councils in the Southwest. The LULAC leadership believed that the Mexican-American community needed to be on the

Houston: Arte Publico Press.

69. For more on LULAC during and following the Chicano Movement see Marquez, *LULAC*, Chapter 4.

same page as mainstream society if they expected to make economic and social gains. As part of the program to educate Mexican-Americans, LULAC printed their principles and values in the monthly LULAC newspaper and presented these ideas as part of a code members had to adhere to. For instance, the LULAC News continues to be one of the most important ways the organization advanced its message of integration and Americanism. In one of the first publications of the LULAC News in 1933, the newspaper highlighted the LULAC Code. The LULAC Code was utilized as a method to police and regulate respectful and professional behavior among its members and the code continued to be printed with each subsequent issue of the LULAC News. Members were expected to become leaders in their community by abiding by and spreading the LULAC Code. The code comprised of eight tenets meant to instill pride, manners, respectability, and republicanism. By republicanism, I am referring to the political ideology that endorses the principles of protecting citizen rights while also requiring citizens to address state obligations and responsibilities. Republicanism for middle class Mexican Americans was the belief system meant to aid citizens in reaching the closest sense of freedom from domination. I provide a more in-depth discussion of republicanism and Mexican Americans in the following chapter. For now, it is important to keep in mind that republicanism was employed front and center as a guide to build opportunities for greater inclusion, integration, and access to resources and institutions among the leading Mexican American organizations.

For instance, the first tenet in the LULAC Code urged its members to, “Respect your citizenship and preserve it; honor your country, maintain its traditions in the spirit of its citizens, and embody yourself into its culture and civilization.”⁷⁰ The main principle LULAC emphasizes is a call for members to respect and preserve their citizenship. This reflects the organization’s insistence on making membership exclusive to citizens, native born or naturalized. The second aspect of the tenet advises members to honor their country and

70. LULAC News, San Antonio, 1933. Houston Metropolitan Research Center, Mexican-American Small Collections, MSS 352.001-026, Box 1/5.

maintain its traditions. For some that are newly naturalized it may be difficult to identify which country to honor and what traditions to maintain. The obvious response is to honor the country that bestowed citizenship on the individual. LULAC viewed citizenship and citizens normatively. Meaning that LULAC was under the assumption that the U.S. recognized people of Mexican descent as its social and political members if they were native born or naturalized citizens. It is this type of committed faith to the ideals of assimilation and Americanization that the LULAC leadership counted on to establish a marker between the “good” Mexican and the undesirable Mexican.

To illustrate, the LULAC Aims and Purposes, the mission of the organization stated, “[t]hat in the interest of the public welfare, we shall seek in every way possible to uphold the rights guaranteed to every individual by our state and national laws and to seek justice and equality of treatment in accordance with the law of the land.”⁷¹ In many ways, the authors of this mission statement sound like conditional republicans that I identified in chapter 2. The authors of LULAC’s mission are careful about not overstepping and potentially signaling to readers that the goal is to reach for something that is not already outlined in the laws of the state or national government. To put it another way, LULAC was seeking to work within the parameters and boundaries of the law. Meaning, the same laws that established segregation between Mexican and white children in schools. In other words, LULAC was playing within a system that was meant to keep non-whites segregated in Texas. By refraining from challenging or even questioning the status quo in their code, LULAC members signaled to political elites, particularly in Southern Texas, that Mexican Americans are eager and willing to participate little to no influence in order to make meaningful and equitable changes for middle class Mexican American communities.

In particular, article 12 of the Aims and Purposes states, “[t]his organization is not a political club but as citizens we shall participate in all local, state and national political

71. Modesto Gomez, Correspondence and Notes, 1945-51. Box 1, Folder 1. Record No. 23171030. Benson Latin American Collection, The University of Texas, Austin.

contests. However, in doing so we shall ever bear in mind the general welfare of our people, and we disregard and abjure once and for all any personal obligation which is not in harmony with these principles.”⁷² As one of the first editors of LULAC News, Felix Valencia reminds and scolds readers in 1932 about embracing the entire article during voting season, “if some took advantage of the spirit of fair play and under the disguise and shadow of the first sentence of Article 12 they ignored and violated essentials of the last sentence of article 12.”⁷³ Essentially, Valencia was reprimanding members who utilized their ability to vote in elections, but failed to vote for candidates sympathetic to LULAC’s mission. The last part of article 12 Valencia is referring to is to keep in mind the welfare of the Mexican American people. Hence, voting for candidates unfriendly and explicitly hostile toward Mexican Americans or for politicians who advocate for importing labor would go against the organization’s mission. According to Valencia, such members should have their memberships cancelled. Although laying a claim to not being a political organization, the editorial board for what was considered the “organ of the League of United Latin American Citizens” consistently reminded members how to use their political power based on LULAC’s ideology.

In writing about a successful year for the organization in 1946, LULAC News editor Star Castillo underscores that, “[t]his success has not been due to miracles or destiny, but to the unprecedented surge of will to work for success. Work has been, and must continue to be, the fundamental base holding up the different columns that are the Aims and Purposes of LULAC, and which in turn main the superstructure of an organization dedicated to the [w]elfare of a people.”⁷⁴ For Castillo and LULAC members alike, working toward success by following the code and advancing the Aims and Purposes of the organization came to mean that LULAC was moving in a positive direction by teaching members of Mexican American communities that they too could see some form of success if they advance the mission.

72. Valencia, F. 1932. “Editorial.” *LULAC News*, Vol. 2, No. 1. Houston Metropolitan Research Center.

73. *Ibid.*, 9.

74. Castillo, S. 1946. “Editorial.” *LULAC NEWS*, Vol. 12, No. 12. Houston Metropolitan Research Center.

Yet, advancing LULAC's mission also meant behaving in particular ways to construct and provide an image of Mexican Americans as loyal and obedient citizens. Hence, the LULAC code prompted members to use their citizenship and maintain it, but with caveats important to the overall image of the organization.

4.2.2 Pay Your Poll-Tax, Maintain Your Citizenship

One of the most important ways for LULACs to use their citizenship was at the ballot box. Poll-tax drives were masqueraded as voting drives by LULAC, particularly in Texas where citizens had to pay a poll-tax in order to vote in primary and general elections. Texas was one of eight states that required a poll-tax in the 1930s and Texas charged its residents \$1.75 to vote.⁷⁵ The poll tax in Texas was implemented as a strategy to challenge the rise of the populist movement at the turn of the twentieth century. Donald Strong notes that in 1892 populists won six electoral college votes in Western states, which provided them the ability to elect eight Congress members.⁷⁶ Although maintaining a tradition of white supremacy in the South was a top priority for Democrats, inhibiting the rise of worthy challengers prompted the prerequisite for the poll tax in Texas in 1902.⁷⁷ The poll-tax equally disenfranchised poor white farmers as well as blacks and Mexicans. Democrats were well aware that the populist movement in Texas was mobilized by poor white farmers and sought to curtail their ascent in state and national politics.⁷⁸

This meant that for LULAC members to respect and preserve their citizenship by voting they would have to abide by the poll-tax. Instead of approaching the poll-tax as an obstacle that could potentially disenfranchise thousands of Mexican origin citizens, LULAC embraced

75. For more on the Texas poll-tax see: Strong, D.S. 1944. "American Government and Politics: The Poll Tax: The Case of Texas." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 38. No. 4, 693-709. The conversion of \$1.25 in 1930 to 2017 would be around \$26.

76. Ibid, 694.

77. Ibid, 695.

78. Martin, R. C. 1933. *The People's Party in Texas: A Study of Third Party Politics*. University of Texas Bulletin, No. 3308.

the poll-tax and actively organized poll-tax drives to encourage Mexican Americans to vote (see figure 4.1).⁷⁹

Figure 4.1: LULAC Poll-Tax Billboard, 1932



Source: League of United Latin American Citizens. *LULAC News* : twenty-five years of community service, periodical, Date Unknown; (texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metaph221891/: accessed June 11, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Houston Metropolitan Research Center at Houston Public Library.

However, prior to providing full support for the poll-tax some council leaders believed that paying to vote was oppressive and that most the states in the country did not have to pay for the right of suffrage. For instance, future LULAC president Modesto Gomez wrote to the El Paso Herald Post in 1934 as president of Council No. 8 urging Texas to remove the poll-tax, “our Council after discussing the disadvantage of the charge made to citizens of our State for the right of suffrage, otherwise, the paying of \$1.75 for a Poll Tax receipt,

79. Gutierrez, D. G. 1995. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 77.

that we may enjoy our cooperation, you, locally and all the Scripps Howard newspapers in the State of Texas to ask that our Constitution be amended that the payment of Poll Tax be eliminated.”⁸⁰ Gomez, working under his own accord and in the capacity as president of a LULAC council went above the national leaders to plead with the mainstream media to influence local politicians. His tactics are telling about how receptive LULAC was to challenging state and national policies. Essentially, by challenging the poll-tax Gomez was not acting in line with the LULAC code.

Therefore, over ten years later Gomez now working in the capacity as national publicity chairman does a complete 180 degree turn on his original poll-tax position and writes to the same Herald Post in El Paso to advertise paying the poll-tax. “A little publicity on the following will be appreciated,” writes Gomez, “[a]t the meeting of Lulac Council #132 held on Friday, December the 7th, the following committee was named to do whatever is necessary to encourage the payment of poll taxes by the people of El Paso County. It is the largest committee ever named by the local LULAC Council, and all members are charged with the responsibility of aiding and informing all people on how to pay their poll tax.”⁸¹ At this point, Gomez had already completed his tenure as national LULAC president and advocated for policies that positioned the organization as one that reflected a docile and obedient population. LULAC Council #132 in El Paso, Texas continued to lead the charge advocating for the poll-tax in 1951. “PLEASE PAY YOUR POLL TAX BEFORE JANUARY 31ST, AND PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS AS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN,” stated a leaflet circulated around the council with the locations of where members could pay for their right to vote.

One explanation for failing to challenge the poll-tax is that LULAC ideologists insisted on refraining from presenting themselves as a political organization. Yet, when Texas began

80. Gomez, M. 1934. Correspondence to Wallace Perry. January 27. Box 1, Folder 1. Record No. 23171030. Benson Latin American Collection, The University of Texas, Austin.

81. Gomez, M. 1946. Correspondence to the Herald Post. December 14. Box 1, Folder 1. Record No. 23171030. Benson Latin American Collection, The University of Texas, Austin.

classifying Mexicans as “colored” on their poll-tax receipts, LULAC members started to protest.⁸² Their concerns, however, walked a fine line between emphasizing how Mexican Americans were being placed in an “inferior” category, on one hand, and not disputing the entire system of racial classification, on the other. It was important for Mexican-Americans in LULAC to remain classified as “white” since they believed being associated with blacks or the label “colored” drastically reduced their influence and power with whites. The “gold standard” of assimilation, inclusion, and acceptance into mainstream society, for LULAC members, went hand-in-hand with the images and privileges associated with the white middle-class.⁸³ In 1936, the city health officer of El Paso, Texas, Dr. T. J. McCamant, along with the city registrar implemented the reclassification of Mexicans as “colored” based on the recommendation of the U.S. Census Bureau.⁸⁴

When Texas made the transition to remove Mexicans from being classified as “white” it eliminated not only their perceived status as citizens on par with mainstream society, but the change also erased the boundary that separated Mexicans from blacks. Although racism toward Mexican Americans existed along the Southwest and in Texas during the depression, Mexican Americans felt pride in believing that segregation would not affect their communities because of their claim to whiteness. For example, middle-class Mexican Americans became aware that people of Mexican origin were increasingly being discriminated against and singled out in public spaces. Thus, larger numbers of Mexican Americans started using more neutral and Anglo signification terms to describe themselves, like “Latin American” or “Spanish American.”⁸⁵ The ethnic label distancing tactics did not end there.

82. Marquez, B. 1993. *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 32.

83. Murata, K. 2001. “The (Re)Shaping of Latino/Chicano Ethnicity through the Inclusion/Exclusion of Undocumented Immigrants: The Case of LULAC’s Ethno-politics.” *American Studies International*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 4-33.

84. Garcia, M. T. 1984. “Mexican Americans and the Politics of Citizenship: The Case of El Paso, 1936.” *New Mexico Historical Review*, 59, 2, 188. According to the county health officials, the main issue was the increasing number of infant mortality rates and placing Mexicans as “colored” would substantially lower the number of “white” infant deaths.

85. *Ibid*, 189.

For LULAC, it was one issue to no longer be classified as white, but a larger issue when forced to occupy a category they believed was normatively and empirically inferior. To be black meant having to live under an imposed structure of segregation. LULAC did not have a problem with segregation nor did they challenge the norms and values surrounding the practice of segregation.⁸⁶ That is, until segregation reached their doorstep with racial reclassification. Changing how the state approached Mexicans was the first step Texas took in order to begin legitimately targeting and segregating Mexicans in all aspects of public life.

4.2.3 *A Fragile Claim to Whiteness*

Historians, Chicana/o studies scholars, and critical race scholars have concluded that Mexicans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were legally white yet socially non-white.⁸⁷ Critical race scholar Laura Gomez takes it a step further and suggests that, “Mexican Americans came to occupy a position in the American racial hierarchy that was between white and non-white, or what I have termed ‘off-white.’”⁸⁸ She further contends that situating Mexicans in a place between white and non-white reflects the real position of Mexican Americans as being in the middle of both categories instead of the default notion that Mexican Americans were closer to being white than non-white.⁸⁹ The ambiguity surrounding Mexican claims to whiteness are more apparent when considering the juridical position to-

86. Benjamin Marquez highlights how LULAC members considered prejudice the main obstacle to their advancement and if “prejudice could be done away with, little else in society needed changing” (2). Marquez notes that LULAC members focused on talent, ability, and fortitude as traits that were distributed across racial groups.

87. For more on Mexicans and whiteness see: Martinez, G. A. 1997. “The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and Whiteness.” *Harvard Latino Law Review*, 2; Gomez, L. E. 2007. *Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race*. New York: New York University Press; Gross, A. J. 2003. “Texas Mexicans and the Politics of Whiteness.” *Law and History Review*, 21, 1, 195-205; Garcia, I. M. 2009. *White But Not Equal: Mexican Americans, Jury Discrimination, and the Supreme Court*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.

88. Gomez, L. E. 2007. *Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race*. New York: New York University Press: 84.

89. *Ibid.*, 84.

ward Mexican whiteness.

Ian Haney Lopez reminds us that although a federal court in Texas allowed a Mexican to naturalize in 1897, the court noted that, “[i]f the strict scientific classification should be adopted, he would probably not be classed as white.”⁹⁰ In other words, if it were up to the court the petitioner would not be granted citizenship since they viewed him as being outside of the sufficient conditions for whiteness. What helped the Mexican immigrant was the fact that the U.S. had numerous treaties with Mexico that granted Mexicans citizenship due to its expansion in the Southwest, particularly the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.⁹¹ In this case, recognizing the agreement with another country superseded scientific evidence or common knowledge that Mexicans were racially white. Chinese or Japanese immigrants lacked a historical precedent to whiteness or an understanding with the U.S. that their citizens were to be considered racially white.

There are two important differences between Asian immigrants, on one hand, and Mexican immigrants, on the other, when considering claims to whiteness. First, Mexicans living in the conquered lands of what was once Mexico went through a process of what Laura Gomez identifies as “double colonization.”⁹² That is to say, Mexicans were subjected to colonial projects from both Spanish and American imperial regimes where racial difference regulated individual outcomes and status. Thus, Mexicans had to navigate two versions of the racial hierarchy.⁹³ One in America where whites are on top, blacks are located at the bottom, and Mexicans were somewhere close to the bottom. The other in Mexico where whites are on top, indigenous populations in the bottom, and *mestizos* (mixed Spanish and indigenous blood) were located somewhere in the middle. Navigating two versions of the

90. Lopez, I. H. 2006. *White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race*. New York: New York University Press: 43.

91. *Ibid.*, 44.

92. Gomez, L. E. 2007. *Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race*. New York: New York University Press: 47.

93. Laura Gomez claims that there are two racial hierarchies, but I argue that the American and Mexican racial hierarchies are just different versions of the same hierarchy committed to white supremacy.

racial hierarchy was particularly true for Mexican migrants that traveled to the U.S. for seasonal work and returned back to Mexico once their labor was no longer needed.

The second difference between Asian and Mexican American claims to whiteness is their proximity to the U.S. Mexican migrants were almost entirely unregulated until the establishment of the Border Patrol in 1924. Asian immigrants would have to cross an ocean and spend their savings for the opportunity to work and send funds back home. Mexican migrants were usually in similar situations, but they did not have to worry about entering the U.S. In many cases, agricultural and railroad industries were recruiting Mexican laborers. Asian immigrants, on the other hand, would have to go through extensive vetting processes where a large number of immigrants were deported before having the chance of stepping foot on American soil.⁹⁴

Thus, Mexicans had a historical claim to whiteness that originated not in the U.S., but in Mexico. Due to their proximity to the U.S. and the similarities between the two versions of the racial hierarchy Mexicans attempted to translate their racial identity in Mexico to a comparable identity in the U.S. Let me be clear, I am not suggesting that a historical claim to whiteness constructs Mexicans as white. However, since racial difference was introduced in Mexico because of the Spanish conquest, Mexican elites identified and negotiated an ideal position for their citizens in the newly conquered territories in the U.S. Hence, claiming whiteness juridically through Congressional mandates was much easier for Mexicans than it was for Asian immigrants. This does not mean that a Mexican claim to whiteness was not contested.

Mexicans and Mexican Americans who made claims to whiteness at the turn of the twentieth century in many ways had the claims turned against them. For instance, criminal cases where Mexicans were on trial in the Southwest tended to be decided by all white juries. By all white, I'm referring to Anglo European jurors. When Mexicans raised the alarm about

94. Ngai, M. M. 2003. "The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965." *Law and History Review*, 21, 1, 69-108.

discrimination they were asked how could they be discriminated against when all of the jurors were also white. Due to a claim to whiteness, Mexicans could expect to see no Mexicans deciding their fates on jury trials.

The climax to jury exclusion came down with the Pete Hernandez case from Edna, Texas. Hernandez was on trial for shooting and murdering Joe Espinoza in a bar fight on August 7, 1951. Hernandez claimed he shot Espinoza in self-defense. Two months after the shooting, Hernandez was found guilty of murder by an all Anglo jury.⁹⁵ After losing the appeal, Garcia and Herrera took the case to the Supreme Court. On May 3, 1954, the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren presiding, reversed the murder conviction on the grounds that Mexicans were systematically excluded from juries. Thus, Mexicans' claim to whiteness are historically rooted, but vulnerable to the norms and values of the racial hierarchy.

4.3 Conclusion

Consequently, the four processes of meaning making had a profound impact in shaping the reactions of Mexican Americans. Middle-class Mexican Americans took it upon themselves to take ownership of the broader Mexican American narrative with specific attention to mobilizing the community ideologically, expanding their electoral power within the boundaries of their local power structure, and laying a fragile claim to whiteness to secure access to dominant resources and institutions. In the pages that follow I start to make the connections between middle-class Mexican Americans and their larger strategy of respectability and policy preferences.

95. Garcia, I. M. 2009. *White But Not Equal: Mexican Americans, Jury Discrimination, and the Supreme Court*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press: 36.

CHAPTER 5

ACCESS VS. COMMUNITY: ISSUE MOBILIZATION AND BROWN RESPECTABILITY POLITICS

On the westside of Chicago, Illinois, in the *La Villita* (Little Village) community, Latinx veterans of the U.S. military gather on Tuesday evenings to talk about issues not only important to their respective Latinx communities, but also issues regarding the deportation of veterans, veterans' health care, and paths to citizenship for non-citizen service members. Veterans make up the primary membership of this organization and they are particularly interested in repatriating deported veterans, halting impending veteran deportations, and calling for immediate citizenship for non-citizen service members upon enlisting. This group of veteran organizers are especially unique since they gather as Council No. 5310 of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC). This is the only council of its kind within LULAC and it was formed in March 2017 by Carlos Luna, Mike Palaguachi, Joel Taboada, and Jose Torres to challenge the deportation of non-citizen service member Miguel Perez Jr. A council like No. 5310 was not conceivable as part of LULAC's political agenda sixty years ago when the issue of declining access to citizenship-for-service was being negotiated and voted on in Congress.

Although very important questions that require extensive research agendas, the current chapter is not concerned with what drew LULAC to advocate on behalf of non-citizen service members in the contemporary period or why this moment during the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has marshaled veterans to support non-citizen service members in pursuit of improving their legal status. I am concerned with, however, in answering why LULAC and the American G.I. Forum (AGIF) neglected to support Mexican non-citizen service members in their pursuit of improving their legal status when citizenship-for-service policy was being debated and ultimately restricted in Congress between 1940 to 1965. The 1940 Nationality Act is the critical juncture defining the path-dependent decline in access to citizenship-for-

service. The parameters and regulations for citizenship-for-service were ultimately finalized with the establishment of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act. Due to increased regulations that require non-citizens to establish permanent residency and serve a probationary period in order to utilize service-for-citizenship as a pathway to citizenship, non-citizen service members would no longer have a guarantee to legal citizenship for their military service. A guarantee that was once immediately granted to non-citizen service members by the U.S. during WWI.

Mexican non-citizen service members in the U.S. were some of most affected by the change in regulations since the majority of Mexican non-citizen service members remained non-citizens after the conclusion of WWII compared to other immigrant groups. Yet, middle class Mexican Americans made the decision to denounce Mexican immigrants during this period, to use the framing of Benedict Anderson, as part of their larger imagined community of Mexican American citizens. Being associated with Mexican immigrants for Mexican Americans meant adopting and legitimizing the struggles and issues impacting Mexican immigrants as issues Mexican Americans also shared. Mexican American elites established a normative boundary between Mexican Americans, on one hand, and Mexican immigrants, on the other, which was defined by a commitment to a politics of respectability on the basis of legal citizenship status.

I suggest that the bounded public ideology associated with practicing and performing a politics of respectability, particularly among those with strong affinities to it, are also simultaneously engaging in racial identity formation, which has consequences on how racial groups can make claims on American society. In other words, by engaging in a politics of respectability, practitioners are signaling to white dominated society that they endorse existing social, economic, and political structures. This does not mean that people that engage in respectability politics believe that existing structures are just or fair. It does mean, however, that respectability politics as a bounded public ideology informs and shapes behavior in such a way that a political and racial identity is formed by bringing into the public sphere individual interests, political beliefs, and what is morally valuable to individuals, groups,

and organizations.¹ People and groups that engage in respectability politics are forming an integrationist racial identity where the individual or group are consciously muting their racial difference for the purpose of navigating existing social, economic, and political structures. Thus, LULAC and the AGIF established and intentionally limited their political agenda for the benefit of Mexican Americans at the expense of Mexican immigrants.

I will illustrate below how LULAC's and the AGIF's commitment to a politics of respectability informed their racial identities to the extent that they challenged the presence and continued recruitment of braceros and migrant workers by testifying in front of Congress. The hostile attitude LULAC and the AGIF exhibited toward Mexican migrants demonstrated that they were unwilling to accept Mexican migrants as co-ethnics and campaign for their issues. This chapter is organized in two parts. The first part is concerned with what I identify as "brown respectability" as a site of racial identity formation and theoretically informed by studies conducted on black Americans. In doing so, I hope to better understand what issues get taken up and what gets left behind for Mexican American civic organizations in the post-war era. The second part of the chapter begins to lay out how a politics of respectability exists in Mexican American communities and organizations, how brown respectability influences policy agendas, and why brown respectability limits the political scope and opportunities of Mexican American civic organizations.

1. Marquez, B. 2001. "Choosing issues, choosing sides: constructing identities in Mexican-American social movement organizations." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24, 2, 218-235.

5.1 Part One: A Commitment to Respectability

5.1.1 *Cross-Cutting and Consensus Issues*

Cathy Cohen identifies issues that unequally and directly affect what tends to be some of the most vulnerable populations in a marginalized group as cross-cutting issues.² Additionally, Cohen contends that, “[c]ross-cutting issues tend not only to mobilize one primary identity?but also to engage other primary identities, such as those constructed around gender, sexuality, and class.”³ Cohen is discussing issues important to different segments of black communities and understanding how separate identities from the larger group identity may influence what type of issues become “consensus” issues that affect all members of the black community as opposed to issues that may affect black gay communities or poor and working class blacks. This black issue-oriented framework lends itself to thinking about how other marginalized groups may also approach consensus and cross-cutting issues. Let me be clear, I am not suggesting that we can easily supplant the framework that is specific to black politics and use it to study other marginalized groups. I am, however, suggesting that we can use the fundamentals found in analyzing cross-cutting issues as a point of departure to talk about what may have transpired among other marginalized groups historically.

In this case, how are Mexican Americans defining what is a Mexican American issue and what is not during the era of national origins and in the postwar period. For instance, when discussing Mexican non-citizen service members and their pursuit at improving their legal status we have to consider the role legal citizenship plays among Mexican Americans in this particular time period in determining what legal citizenship means to members of the group. Moreover, we also have to consider how the creation and production of Mexican illegality informs, to what extent, Mexican American communities were willing to adopt Mexican immigrant issues as their own. In doing so, Cohen argues, “cross-cutting issues put into full

2. Cohen, C. J. 1999. *The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 13.

3. *Ibid.*, 14.

view the question of who is ‘worthy’ of support by the larger black community.”⁴ For my purposes, analyzing cross-cutting issues help shed light on why Mexican Americans viewed Mexican immigrant issues as completely outside of the scope of what constituted a Mexican American consensus.

Thus, I argue that Mexican American elites refused to adopt Mexican immigrant issues due to their commitment at countering the popularized narrative of Mexicans in the U.S. as low wage disposable labor, unassimilable, and ultimately illegal through a politics of respectability that scholars have observed in black communities since the turn of the 20th century. By engaging in respectability politics, Mexican American civic organizations, particularly LULAC and the AGIF, simultaneously formed their racial identity to that of an integrationist racial identity. In forming their racial identity, middle class Mexican American civic organizations outlined the extent to which they were willing to challenge existing social, economic, political, and naturalization structures.

5.1.2 Black Respectability Politics as Racial Identity Formation

What types of issues get taken up and what gets left behind when black communities support a politics of respectability? An aspect of respectability politics in black homes and communities at the turn of the twentieth century meant that despite the poverty that many blacks found themselves in, blacks and black women in particular were still expected, by the leaders and managers of their communities, to maintain a home that was immaculate and well-behaved. This depiction of the black home is explicitly gendered. Black women were, and to a large extent continue to be, bounded to a certain space in the private sphere by their community members and dominant society. Due to the dearth of social, economic, and political power in black communities, black Baptist women associated racial progress with

4. Ibid., 14.

assimilation and self-respect.⁵ Historian Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham notes that, “[i]t is not uncommon for oppressed peoples to adopt the values of their oppressors for reasons of their own.”⁶ As a result of their economic and social outcomes, black women associated with the black Baptist church chose to follow and mirror the signals and cues from mainstream white female roles which included how they dressed and behaved in public.

According to political scientist Ben Marquez, “[o]rganizing along the basis of race and ethnicity implies difference from the dominant population and exclusion from social institutions.”⁷ In other words, what transpired among black women associated with the black Baptist church at the turn of the twentieth century was not a situation where black women attempted to organize around their race. Instead, black Baptist women understood well that they were excluded from social and political institutions, yet sought to win the favor of mainstream white women. Accepting the dominant society’s gender roles laid the foundation for cooperation between black and white church groups providing black women access to larger religious and educational institutions.⁸

Black Baptist women were essentially carving out not only their social identity as black women by engaging in respectability politics, but also their political identity given the power relationship between black and white women. As Marquez contends, “[i]dentities provide frames of reference through which political actors can initiate, maintain and structure relationships with other groups and individuals.”⁹ By positioning their social and racial identities as people that assimilate into the mainstream and reproduce the norms and values of the dominant society, black Baptist women situated themselves as a group in support of white

5. Higginbotham, E. B. 1989. “Beyond the Sound of Silence: Afro-American Women in History.” *Gender & History*, 1, 1, 50-67.

6. *Ibid.*, 59.

7. Marquez, B. 2001. “Choosing issues, choosing sides: constructing identities in Mexican-American social movement organizations.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24, 2: 224.

8. Higginbotham, E. B. 1989. “Beyond the Sound of Silence: Afro-American Women in History.” *Gender & History*, 1, 1: 59.

9. Marquez, B. 2001. “Choosing issues, choosing sides: constructing identities in Mexican-American social movement organizations.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24, 2: 225.

dominated society and endorsed existing social structures. Thus, the politics of respectability for black Baptist women was a strategy of survival. A way to manage everyday black life in a political society that reproduced white supremacy.

Ben Marquez, however, would say that black Baptist women at the turn of the twentieth century engaged in a particular type of racial identity formation he has identified as an “integrationist identity.” For Marquez, an integration identity is a form of identity building particular to racial minority organizations filled with members desiring an end to racial discrimination and domination, “but accept social and economic assimilation into the existing structures of society.”¹⁰ Speaking particularly about Mexican American organizations, Marquez contends that a “racial identity” is one where members of an organization seek to end racial domination in all of its forms, yet, also simultaneously cultivate ways to maintain distinctive racial and cultural lines. His third category, a “revolutionary identity” is produced when members of an organization come to the conclusion that reform of current social relations, structures, and institutions is hopeless and, “all avenues of peaceful change are closed.”¹¹ Those that ascribe to a revolutionary identity believe that new social relations need to be built and structures and institutions reorganized in a way that facilitate the inclusion of racial minorities from the outset.

Black people that engage in a politics of respectability are more likely to carve out an integrationist racial identity compared to the other two racial identities outlined by Marquez. This is because the integrationist identity does not critique or challenge existing social or economic structures. For Higginbotham, adherence to an ideology of respectability enabled black women to counter racist images and structures and their contestation was not directed solely at whites. The black Baptist women condemned what they perceived to be negative practices and attitudes among their own people.¹² At the heart of black respectability stands

10. Ibid., 221.

11. Ibid., 221.

12. Higginbotham, E. B. 1993. *Righteous Discontent: The Women's Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 1880-1920*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

a looming contradiction between adherence to a Christian ideology that submits to the rule of law while simultaneously calling for individual autonomy.¹³ The forces at odds with each other during Jim Crow reveal how black Baptist women endured hostile anti-black environments with the impression that blacks deferred to white dominance. However, Higginbotham notes that, “[w]hile deferring to segregation in practice, adherents of respectability never deferred to it in principle.”¹⁴ The essence of Higginbotham’s argument is that black women engaging in a politics of respectability consciously surrendered to Jim Crow and its values, but these same black women did not accept Jim Crow as the “right” or “correct” way for black people to live life and prosper. Although black Baptist women did not accept the existing social and political structures, they certainly did not challenge them. By not accepting the principles and inherent domination of a Jim Crow political system that whites were the dominant class and blacks were subordinate and inferior, the black Baptist women simultaneously engaged in a type of silent protest against Jim Crow’s hegemonic values.

Black women’s dissent toward racist and oppressive structures and norms manifested through practices that imagined blacks as being more dignified than whites. Specifically, Higginbotham points to the manners used by black women when interacting with white people, such as in streetcars and public buses. What surfaced from her research on the Women’s Convention is that black women were instructed to allow whites to engage in flooding public vehicles and claiming all of the seats so that black people would not be able to sit down. Instead of fighting whites for the opportunity to sit down, the Women’s Convention taught its members to demonstrate “superiority” by being quiet, respectful, and permitting whites to engage in impolite behavior. It was important to the black Baptist women to refrain from providing whites with another excuse to continue relegating blacks as inferior and undeserving of equality and justice. Although they were in support of fighting segregation and Jim Crow in the courts, they believed a major part of the war against anti-blackness

13. Ibid., 191.

14. Ibid., 193.

and structural oppression was fought psychologically—in the ways whites perceived blacks as inferior. Thus, the focus for black Baptist women was on changing the hearts and minds of white people by presenting an image of respectable and dignified black people that deserved equality and access to resources and institutions. This meant that black respectability had a fundamental attachment to assimilating with the dominant white majority primarily to survive and then to gain access to resources and institutions.

Assimilating to dominant white American culture through applying the principles of respectability meant discarding attachments to the way black people spoke if they migrated from rural communities, modifying the way people dressed, and changing the way they worshipped God. All in the name of seeking to bring poor blacks on par with the class standards and expectations of the dominant group. Let me be clear, Higginbotham is writing about assimilation in a particular context that focuses on educating poor and rural blacks to adapt to the dominant society for a specific purpose of acquiring social and political power. This type of setting depicts a certain class dimension that blacks are aspiring to and is fundamental in a politics of respectability. However, we also have to keep in mind that processes of assimilation are relevant to its subject, time, space, and context. Since assimilation is also an important aspect of respectability politics it refers to a specific process that seems to be directed at rural and poor blacks, at the turn of the twentieth century, that find themselves engaging white people on an everyday basis.

Through a program where blacks are being educated by black elites and leaders of black communities on the value of public education, economic rights, and the advantage of mobilizing as a group, racial uplift comes to signify an imagined path to inclusion and access to full citizenship and the material benefits associated with membership. Kevin Gaines suggests that since the post-Reconstruction era blacks have portrayed themselves as being in the middle class due to embracing an ideology of racial uplift.¹⁵ Gaines further notes that black

15. Gaines, K. K. 1996. *Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

leaders focused on specific principles, that signaled to the white community that blacks deserved to be recognized and enfranchised, such as advocating for bourgeois ideals, maintaining patriarchal authority, and most importantly, advancing an ethos of self-improvement.¹⁶ The similarities between Higginbotham and Gaines are noteworthy because they are talking about reaching the same liberation goal by appealing to whites with the hope of, at the very least, receiving better treatment.¹⁷ Higginbotham is concerned with black liberation in the form of blacks surviving hostile anti-black societies by patiently demonstrating how black people are more dignified than whites. While, Gaines is involved with black advancement by revealing how predominantly black men acquiesced to the dominant white society by highlighting comparable class backgrounds. Here again, the type of respectability politics highlighted in Gaines' research can also similarly be attributed to black men carving out an integrationist identity. This is mainly because Gaines illustrates how black men promoted their middle-class status signaling to white dominated society that black men endorse the existing economic structures. By doing so, black men who refrain from challenging existing economic and class systems are more likely to call for social and economic advancements within the current economic structure and can potentially fail to link rates of poverty and unemployment as aspects of the existing structure.

In detailing the transformation of respectability politics since the turn of the twentieth-century, Frederick Harris writes, “[w]hat is different about today’s politics of respectability is that it has evolved into a public philosophy that influences policy debates about the *black* poor.”¹⁸ Harris is primarily concerned with how the politics of respectability was adopted by contemporary black elites, like Barack Obama, and turned the survival strategy into—what he argues is—a public philosophy that simultaneously incorporates and promotes the

16. *Ibid.*, 3.

17. The long-term goal of a politics of respectability in black communities is to ultimately gain access to resources and institutions that are exclusively designated for whites.

18. Harris, F. C. 2012. *The Price of the Ticket: Barack Obama and Rise and Decline of Black Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press: 104. Emphasis in the original.

logic of neoliberalism.¹⁹ He carefully makes the connection between, on one hand, state retrenchment on social welfare programs and the state's emphasis on self-help among poor and working-class blacks and, on the other hand, black elites encouraging policymakers to abandon programs supporting the poor by indicating that everyone has the same opportunities to get ahead in this country.

Alarmed with black elites, Harris reveals the explicit yet covert exploitation occurring with some of the most vulnerable populations found within working-class and poor black communities to advance black elites' political gains and agendas. For instance, black politicians, like Barack Obama, enter poor black communities to lecture members on their own individual failings without considering how coercive enforcement agencies, like the police and the prison industry, systematically construct barriers that suppress individual progress.²⁰ The magic of respectability politics is that once it's employed, the offering to members of the dominant group—in the form of policing behavior and norms—removes the responsibility from gatekeepers of resources and institutions and convinces leaders and members of marginalized communities that any suffering or struggles they experience are the product of their own doing. Contemporary black elites and community managers²¹ in black communities essentially buy into the idea that maintaining access to resources and institutions means abandoning populations that impede progress for the entire group. Indeed, Harris writes, “[w]hile black elites were well intentioned in their efforts to uplift the black poor, the politics of respectability *undermined* efforts for blacks to challenge societal barriers that accounted for black subjugation.”²²

19. Ibid., 105.

20. Harris writes about a speech delivered by then Senator Barack Obama before a primary in Texas where Obama scolded the predominantly black audience for being negligent parents and continuing to feed, “our children junk” (100). The point Harris is making is that instead of blaming the crowd for poor dietary choices, the state should facilitate better and inexpensive options for the community.

21. Cohen (1999) identifies that secondary processes of marginalization are exercised by the more privileged members of the community known as the “management” of marginal group members (70).

22. Harris, F. C. 2012. *The Price of the Ticket: Barack Obama and Rise and Decline of Black Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press: 104. Emphasis added.

However, by focusing on the contemporary manifestation of respectability politics, Harris consciously or unconsciously neglects the fact that a politics of respectability has always been since its inception a public philosophy. That is to say, when black Baptist women and middle-class blacks engage in a politics of respectability they are engaging the racial hierarchy in particular ways in the public sphere. Thus, black communities that engage in a politics of respectability have to decide where they stand on issues that may or may not be important to the majority, which can leave out sub-populations from securing access to resources and institutions.

An integrationist racial identity has been the most constant type of identity among blacks that engage in a politics of respectability since the turn of the 20th century. As scholars interested in how marginalized communities and organizations come to pressure the local, state, and federal governments, there is much to be gained by analyzing communities that engage in respectability politics as a type of racial identity formation. Racial identities offer members of marginalized communities the opportunity to demonstrate to what extent they support white dominated society by challenging or endorsing the existing social, economic, and political structures.²³ Blacks that engaged in respectability politics also formed an integrationist identity that was distinct from other types of black identities at the turn of the twentieth century. For instance, groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) adopted a “racial identity” instead of an integrationist identity since they advocated for the progress and recognition of blacks in the U.S. Blacks also adopted revolutionary racial identities under organizations like the Black Panther Party founded in 1966 by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale.

For these reasons, I contend that the study of respectability politics can be expanded to include other marginalized individuals, groups, and organizations if we approach the public ideology as also simultaneously being a site of racial identity formation. As scholars in-

23. Marquez, B. 2001. “Choosing issues, choosing sides: constructing identities in Mexican-American social movement organizations.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24, 2: 220.

terested in understanding how ideology influences political outcomes, respectability politics as racial identity formation can help us figure out what strategies should be employed and which tactics should be avoided in order to pursue specific political outcomes. Hence, I engage the politics of respectability as a basis to assess how the public ideology influences racial identity formation. Evidence of marginalized groups forming racial identities based on the performance of a politics of respectability will reveal the extent to which they are able and willing to make claims on American society.

5.1.3 *Our Identity, What is it?*

We have less of an understanding about how Mexican American civic organizations like LULAC and AGIF racially or ethnically identified. More importantly, what racial identification meant for the types of issues Mexican American civic organizations were prepared to advocate on behalf of. For instance, one of the first Chicano historians to study LULAC, Mario T. Garcia, contends that members of the organization advocated for cultural pluralism:

What is certain, however, is that Lulacers, despite the insistence of later Chicano scholars to the contrary, hoped to achieve some functional balance between mainstream Anglo-American culture and the culture derived from their Mexican roots. As descendants of Latins and Spaniards, Lulacers also claimed “whiteness.” Mexican Americans as “whites” believed no substantive racial factor existed to justify racial discrimination against them.²⁴

Orozco is also under the impression that LULAC advocated and accepted multicultural identities:

Activists did not single out the term “Mexican American” only to identify themselves. Rather, they chose multiple identities, referring to themselves not only as Mexican Americans, but also as Mexicans, Americans, Mexico Texanos, Spanish, Latin American, and La Raza. They did so because they had a hybrid, multicultural, multinational past and present. When they referred to themselves as “Americans,” they acknowledged their place in U.S. society and their national origin and resisted European Ameri-

24. Garcia, M. T. 1989. *Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, & Identity, 1930-1960*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 43.

can racialization. When they referred to themselves as “Mexicans,” they acknowledged their racial, ethnic, and national origin identities.²⁵

This type of identity formation may be true for regular members. However, the leadership in Mexican American organizations during this period had a different take on how the organizations and its members should present themselves in their communities and more importantly to the dominant society. David Gutierrez disagrees with Garcia and Orozco when he writes, “LULAC leaders consciously chose to emphasize the American side of their social identity as the primary basis for organization. Consequently, in pursuit of much-needed reforms they developed a political program designed to activate a sense of Americanism among their constituents.”²⁶ Gutierrez is correct to point to what he calls a program that instilled ideas of Americanism in their members. He is able to conclude that oppressive structures, indeed, inform how Mexican American leaders chose to racially identify: “Both LULAC’s constitution and the LULAC Code emphasized that the best way to rectify the appalling conditions facing Mexican Americans was to organize as American citizens.”²⁷ Similarly, I identify the political “program” as an ideological commitment to a politics of respectability. LULAC and AGIF were not only responding to oppressive structures that suggested Mexicans were of a lower racial and class status, but strategically used the meanings that organized the levels of inclusion and exclusion toward Mexicans to establish and protect the boundaries between Americans of Mexican descent, on one hand, and Mexican immigrants—the true second-class Mexicans—on the other.

We get a glimpse of what LULAC believed to be their identity by analyzing their newspaper the *LULAC News*. In 1947, George J. Garza, who would later be the 20th national LULAC president—printed his essay, “Our Classification ? What is it?” where he lays out

25. Orozco, C. E. 2009. *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed: The Rise of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement*. Austin: University of Texas Press: 223.

26. Gutierrez, D. G. 1995. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 77.

27. Garcia, M. T. 1989. *Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, & Identity, 1930-1960*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 77.

why assuming the identity of a Mexican would serve as the basis for discrimination:

To our illiterate and semi-illiterate fellow Americans we are “Mescins” [sic]; to those more literate we are “Mexicans” with the deep and resonant emphasis on the “xi;” to the respectful but classification-minded Americans we are “Spanish;” to those who would classify themselves as our friends we are “Latin Americans;” to hate-impregnated nimcompoops [sic] we are “damn greasers;” to other similar minded groups we are “peons or piladoes;” and still to others we may be any number of unmentionable and unprintable names or titles. What then shall be our classification,—we of Spanish and Mexican origin who find ourselves Americans with multi-classifications. The undeniable answer is Americans.²⁸

Garza is essentially explaining to LULAC members that moving forward, the identity they should adopt is one where they recognize their racial and ethnic origins, but racial difference should be muted for two reasons: focusing on racial difference will lead to discrimination and assuming an integrationist and American identity will demonstrate that they are loyal and law-abiding citizens that are in the country to reproduce American norms and values. In doing so, Garza is shaping the principles and ideas members should embrace as the strategy to counter discrimination in their communities. This type of racial identity formation informed by a survival strategy of respectability at the national level is also part of the agenda for local LULAC councils. To illustrate how a politics of respectability shaped the racial identity of LULAC members we have to look at the work being done in the local councils to instill and reproduce the ideology.

In particular, the agendas being distributed in the post-war period like in Council No. 132 in El Paso, Texas. In the fall of 1945, the president of the council, Antonio Alvarez, outlined the ideological commitments members should be adopting, “[t]he future growth of this Organization [sic] and its ability to perform a service to its members and LULAC in general depends on the type of program we adopt in the near future.” What Alvarez really means is the council and its members need to perform certain tasks and embody an integrationist American identity. This coincides with the type of political program Gutierrez underlined to trigger members when confronted with situations of discrimination or racializa-

28. Garza, G. J. 1947. “Our Classification – What is it?” *LULAC News*, Vol. 13, No. 11. Houston Metropolitan Research Center, RG 1314, Box 1, Folder 10.

tion to demonstrate an American identity and not some other identity that highlights their ethnic or racial difference. Alvarez proceeded to itemize what tasks members need to do in order to adopt an integrationist ideology and see that the council was being represented in a respectable way:

The LULAC [o]rganization in El Paso, Texas – MUST do several things:

- Make itself be respected by the community
- Have its members make use of poll tax
- Take interest in the community
- Fight discrimination
- Induce other Latin-American[s] to [join] us so we can have a strong group
- Make our [o]rganization so strong that it can defend the interest of all Latin-Americans.
- Make better citizens so we can demonstrate our interest and thereby improve our relations we so little try to have.
- Demand equal consideration on educational matters.²⁹

Garza demonstrates how a politics of respectability is formed to teach members how to adopt and reproduce the ideology and subsequently a racial identity. Most of what Garza presents to his council is largely symbolic without much attention to advancing strategies, for instance, to challenging and fighting discrimination. Yet, the first point for Garza is to make the organization be respected by the community. The issues based on advancing a respectable image of the organization are bounded by sending cues to the dominant society and policing how members utilize their citizenship.

There are also mixed understandings among scholars concerning the issues Mexican American civic organizations took up and the goals they accomplished during the post-war period. For instance, in his examination of LULAC's early policy goals, Benjamin Marquez notes that, “[e]ven at the height of the Great Depression, LULAC activists refrained from criticizing private enterprise or calling for expanded public assistance programs. Whenever these matters were discussed, they were seen as programs established only as temporary

29. Alvarez, A. 1945. “Bulletin.” LULAC, Council No. 132. Houston Metropolitan Research Center, LULAC General Correspondence, 1934-47.

emergency relief measures, and the membership was warned about straying too far from individual self-reliance.”³⁰ David Gutierrez argues that during the systematic removal of Mexican immigrants from the U.S. in the 1950s, LULAC demonstrated their support for the actions taken by federal agencies: “[w]hen the INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] began to apprehend undocumented aliens in Texas during Operation Wetback in the spring of 1954, LULAC, which among Mexican American groups remained the most supportive of the governments anti-Communist and anti-immigrant campaigns, heartily endorsed the agency’s efforts.”³¹ When speaking to the notion of citizenship-for-service and the role organizations like LULAC and the AGIF played in its development, Michael Sullivan contends that, “[t]he AGIF occasionally intervened on behalf of individual non-citizen veterans who faced deportation by providing them with legal assistance. But throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the AGIF lobbied for increased immigration enforcement and an end to the Bracero guest worker program.”³²

Cynthia Orozco, on the other hand, challenges the accounts of Mexican American civic organization scholars, “LULAC members were pro-Raza. They did not respond to a fear that new immigrants would outnumber Mexican Americans, nor were they anti-Mexican. Mexico Texanos broke with Mexicans because they were different.”³³ Political theorist Cristina Beltran characterizes national Mexican American organizations in a similar way as seeking reform. She writes, “[o]rganizations such as the American G.I. Forum, the Pan American Progressive Association, and the League of United Latin American Citizens fought discrimination by encouraging voter turnout and working through the courts.”³⁴ As I noted in

30. Marquez, B. 1993. *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization*. Austin: University of Texas Press: 26.

31. Gutierrez, D. G. 1995. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 165.

32. Sullivan, M. J. 2014. “By right of service: the military as a pathway to earned citizenship.” *Politics, Groups, and Identities*: 9.

33. Orozco, C. E. 2009. *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed: The Rise of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement*. Austin: University of Texas Press: 223.

34. Beltrán, C. 2010. *The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity*. New York:

chapter 4, national Mexican American civic organizations were integrationist organizations that endorsed existing social, economic, and political structures. LULAC or the AGIF did not fight discrimination by encouraging voter turnout, they reproduced the structures of oppression by endorsing poll taxes instead of seeking liberation from the practice of having to pay to cast a vote like we saw with their contemporaries like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).³⁵ Moreover, Beltran continues to mischaracterize the policy agenda LULAC and the AGIF advanced between 1930 to 1960: “A liberal organization [LULAC] that fought on behalf of the poorer segments of the population (including braceros and other migrant workers), LULAC nevertheless restricted its membership to American citizens.”³⁶ LULAC and the AGIF were far from being a liberal organization and they certainly did not advocate on behalf of braceros. On the contrary, LULAC and the AGIF made it their mission to end the Bracero Program in order purge Mexican immigrants from Mexican American communities.

Beltrán’s work on Latinx identity, or lack thereof, has been fundamental in infiltrating a sub-discipline that habitually treats Latinx people as a homogenous monolithic bloc. However, Mexican American organizations in the prelude to Civil Rights movements committed to a politics of respectability impaired the political opportunities for people of Mexican descent living in the U.S. for their own economic and political advancement. In doing so, they traded safe and incremental advancements for a more progressive politics that other minority organizations were advancing at the same time. Therefore, given the politics LULAC and the AGIF were committed to, it is more likely that they embraced a muted racial identity that outlined their political opportunities. One where an attachment to brownness and their cultural and racial origins among national Mexican American civic organizations during this

Oxford University Press: 24.

35. For more on the NAACP and poll taxes see: Browne-Marshall, G. J. 2016. *The Voting Rights War: The NAACP and the Ongoing Struggle for Justice*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

36. Beltrán, C. 2010. *The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity*. New York: Oxford University Press: 24.

period was made invisible—at least, to its members.

5.1.4 *Toward a Concept of Brown Respectability*

Marginalized people or groups that are conscious about their racial difference and power in the racial hierarchy and are also committed to a politics of respectability almost always adopt an integrationist racial identity. Upon choosing to endorse existing social, political, and economic structures, practitioners of respectability politics are simultaneously establishing their racial identity. A politics of respectability, as we understand it emanating from black survival strategies, outlines where practitioners stand on challenging social, economic, and political structures. They endorse existing social and economic structures and refrain from making claims in the public sphere that will highlight their racial or class difference. The hesitancy among blacks to advance claims based on racial difference does not stem from fear, but from their empirical realities at the turn of the 20th century where state sanctioned white supremacy in existing power structures dominated black communities for over a century after the Civil War. Mexican American experiences with white supremacy are far from being similar to black experiences in the U.S. However, Mexican Americans, particularly those in the middle-class, that adopt a politics of respectability share similar characteristics to practitioners in black communities with respect to condoning and endorsing existing social, economic, and political structures.

One of the main components that bounds the public ideology in black respectability stems from class distinctions between the self-identified black middle class, on one hand, and poor and working-class blacks, on the other. We also find, similarly, that class status organizes access in Mexican American communities and civic organizations. As the prominent political historian on LULAC, Ben Marquez, puts it:

LULAC's incentive structure incorporated a specific definition of discrimination as well as a world view that sought to preserve the economic status quo and serve their members' economic interests. LULAC saw itself as defending its ethnic group against discrimination, but at the same time it defined a division within the Mexican American

community, one based on class and income.³⁷

Yet, historian David Gutierrez, in *Walls and Mirrors*, contends that a strict class analysis of LULAC eliminates the organizations initial motivations to lead Mexican American community members, particularly in Texas, at improving their social, economic, and political condition.³⁸ Gutierrez challenges scholars who reduce LULAC and Mexican American communities in Texas in the 1930s and 40s as people primarily concerned with reinforcing their class and political position in the state:

[T]he basic issues facing LULAC—and Mexican Americans generally—were not merely questions of status preservation, self-aggrandizement, or the consolidation and expansion of the political influence of a few individuals. On the contrary, LULAC leaders seemed to believe that the essential challenge facing the Mexican American people was to develop and employ a political strategy that would enable them to organize most effectively for the achievement of meaningful social change. In their opinion this required that Mexican Americans first come to some difficult decisions regarding the boundaries of the community they hoped to organize. If that meant excluding those who had not been born (or naturalized) as citizens of the United States, so be it.³⁹

Class distinctions between members of Mexican American organizations in the post-war period continue to be critical to understanding to what extent organizations like LULAC and AGIF challenged economic structures in Texas and the Southwest. However, what makes brown respectability different from the public ideology practiced in some black communities is that Mexican Americans in pursuit of middle-class mobility produce what Chicana scholar Georgina Guzman calls “affective anemia.” For Guzman, affective anemia is, “understood as a hegemonic de-valorization of immigrant Latina subjects and their labor in the United States that results in apathy and a lack of basic human empathy and mutual human recognition for the underprivileged.”⁴⁰ As a result, Mexican Americans consciously eliminate cultural,

37. Marquez, B. 1993. *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization*. Austin: University of Texas Press: 18-19.

38. Gutierrez, D. G. 1995. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 82.

39. *Ibid.*, 82.

40. Guzmán, G. 2017. “Healing the affective anemia of the university: Middle-class Latina/os, brown affect, and the valorization of Latina domestic workers in Pat Mora’s *Nepantla* poetry.” *Latino Studies*, 15: 459.

social, and political attachments with their co-ethnics to enter the middle-class and gain access to resources and institutions. Thus, as Gutierrez mentioned, defining the community for middle-class Mexican American organizations meant excluding Mexicans that lacked political membership as legal citizens.

Social distancing to the extent of denying issues important to co-ethnics is an area Cohen has explored in her study focusing on the response by black communities to the AIDS epidemic plaguing poor black communities in the 1980s and 90s. She identifies that black community managers and leaders attempted to regulate and shape what they thought was deviant behavior. Cohen writes:

[L]eaders, organizations, and institutions in black communities have consistently attempted to redefine and indigenously construct a new public image or understanding of what blackness would mean. This process of reconstructing or (im)proving blackness involves not only a reliance on the self-regulation of individual black people, but also includes significant indigenous policing of black group members.⁴¹

The policing of immigrant non-citizen co-ethnics is what we fail to see with people and organizations committed to what I identify as “brown respectability.” Indeed, Mexican American civic organizations abandoned their co-ethnics not only because of class differences, but also as a result of Mexican immigrants lacking formal incorporation into the country. As Guzman notes, the pursuit of middle-class mobility for Latinx working class communities, “often goes hand in hand with a shameful disavowal of their working-class [and] racialized identity.”⁴² Although positioning the racial identification of brownness in the concept may initially seem counterintuitive to how I talk about racial identity formation, an attachment to brownness is essentially what is being muted, consciously or unconsciously for Mexican Americans. The racial identifier is meant to distinguish between the different types of respectability politics, but also to highlight what racial and class identity people or orga-

41. Cohen, C. J. 1999. *The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 71.

42. Guzmán, G. 2017. “Healing the affective anemia of the university: Middle-class Latina/os, brown affect, and the valorization of Latina domestic workers in Pat Mora’s *Nepantla* poetry.” *Latino Studies*, 15: 459.

nizations are attempting to make invisible when navigating everyday life and engaging the dominant white population. Thus, Mexican Americans committed to brown respectability as a public ideology and racial identity define their political scope by excluding co-ethnics that carry with them the prevailing nostalgia of the four process of meaning making identified in chapter 4: low wage labor; Americanization and assimilation, repatriation, and the production of Mexican migrant illegality.

In the remainder of this chapter, I analyze LULAC and the AGIF through their official documents, correspondence, and Congressional testimony. I lay out how brown respectability, as a public ideology and a site of racial identity formation, is an idea scholars have missed when thinking about and researching Mexican American civic organizations in the post-war period. Then, I illustrate how brown respectability has influenced and shaped policy goals for LULAC and the AGIF. Finally, the scope of national political claims are analyzed to demonstrate how issues surrounding Mexican non-citizen service members were outside of the boundaries of Mexican American politics and were not adopted as their own.

5.2 Part Two: Access vs. Community

5.2.1 The Limits of Ethnicity: Citizenship and Brown Respectability, 1941-1948

The leadership in LULAC concluded that one of the main problems plaguing their communities derived from the ever-increasing practice of segregating Mexican children from white children in schools. What was certain about segregating Mexican children was that their facilities, teachers, and staff were inferior to the instruction and care provided to white children in surrounding neighborhoods. Another source that made educational issues the main political agenda for LULAC came from the expertise found in its national leadership. Notably, LULAC's 13th President, George I. Sanchez assumed his post at one of the most

turbulent and transformative periods in LULAC's early history. Sanchez was elected national president of LULAC from 1941-1942. Although LULAC conveyed a passive presence around local political issues, the organization still felt they needed to fight and end school segregation. Let it be clear, LULAC was not attempting to end racial segregation, but instead they focused on ending school segregation against Mexican children, which they viewed as two completely separate issues. For example, at a conference discussing the scope and powers of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice where representatives from minority group organizations were invited to testify in the Winter of 1943, Sanchez is able to lay two claims in his short testimony. First, that Mexican Americans are not illegal aliens. Secondly, Jim Crow is bad for blacks and should not be extended to Mexican Americans:

This question of the aliens that has boon, by argument, ruled out, is very important to us, not to the alien Mexicans in the Southwest, but to the Spanish speaking citizens of the United States who are popularly labeled as aliens and who are subjected then to the discriminatory practices that have been practiced on the alien. Now, while we would not by any extreme stretch of the imagination support Jim Crowism for the Negro, we are particularly susceptible to a Jim Crowism among the Spanish speaking groups, and obviously object vigorously to the extension of Jim Crowism to the Spanish speaking citizens of the United States.⁴³

Sanchez was the first academic to assume the national post. Prior to his election, most of his predecessors were either practicing lawyers or businessmen. Sanchez, on the other hand, received his doctorate in education from the University of California, Berkeley. At the time of his appointment as president, Sanchez was also starting his career as an Assistant Professor at the University of Texas, Austin. There he enjoyed a joint appointment in the Department of Educational Psychology and the Department of History. He came to be respected by his colleagues and the university's administration. Yet, as the events following the attack on Pearl Harbor unfolded, Sanchez found himself advancing a similar, although more reserved, Double V campaign strategy in the same fashion as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Sanchez speaking in the capacity as

43. McNutt, P. V. 1943. "Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings: Conference on Scope and Powers of Committee on Fair Employment Practice." War Manpower Commission. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Records, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, FEPC 23-5.

LULAC President met with state officials in Washington D.C. to argue that the New Deal further placed people of Mexican origin in a state of heightened inequality and isolation.⁴⁴ Additionally, these same officials were unaffected by Sanchez's insistence on creating a commission with a focus on Latin American research that would lead to reform.

These were uneasy times for most officials in government and organizations attempting to advance claims that may lead to more division and polarization during a national crisis was something Sanchez was acutely aware of. Historian Carlos Blanton notes that, "[Sanchez] walked a tightrope in trying to satisfy Mexican Americans' demands for equality on the one hand and avoiding divisiveness that might hamper the war effort on the other."⁴⁵ Thus, when the U.S. State Department announced it planned to address the wartime labor demand by importing laborers primarily from Mexico, Sanchez and his team of LULAC lawyers worked with the Mexican government and managed to blacklist Texas from receiving wartime labor relief from Mexico. In other words, Sanchez and LULAC secretary M. C. Gonzales, who had two roles as a lawyer for LULAC and also the Mexican consulate in San Antonio, persuaded Mexican officials that Mexicans would not be treated humanely in Texas.⁴⁶ The U.S. consulate general appointed to the city of Juarez, Mexico, William P. Blocker, suspected that LULAC played a role in ensuring that Texas was blacklisted. A flood of claims made by the Mexican government outlined how people of Mexican origin were systematically racially discriminated against in the state of Texas.

The State Department became paranoid about the potential Sanchez had to organize not only Mexican American communities in the Southwest but also the leaders of a foreign nation. As a result, the State Department inserted a spy into his research team at the University of Texas, Pauline Kibbe, who would later write a book about Latin Americans in Texas. She was responsible for providing information to William Blocker, specifically about

44. Blanton, C. K. 2014. *George I. Sanchez: The Long Fight for Mexican American Integration*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 72.

45. *Ibid.*, 76.

46. *Ibid.*, 77

Sanchez and his close team of LULAC lawyers.⁴⁷ Kibbe worked for the State Department through the Good Neighbor Commission and wrote reports on Mexican discrimination and segregation.

The State Department used Kibbe to manipulate Sanchez and LULAC. Kibbe threatened to leave her post as a research assistant if Sanchez did not remove M. C. Gonzales from working with the Good Neighbor Commission.⁴⁸ Sanchez and LULAC were pressuring the government to address segregation and discrimination by recruiting the help of Mexico, while the U.S. officially entered the war and started sending troops to Europe and the Pacific. Blanton reminds us that, “LULAC is axiomatically criticized for their caution, one must realize that they were in dangerous positions.”⁴⁹ Yet, continuing to respond to the masses of people that wrote to Sanchez personally about the increasing discrimination Mexicans were facing across the Southwest fueled his more radical position on what the organization could actively be used for. When responding to a member in Los Angeles who was irate about Braceros in California, Sanchez insisted that Mexico’s advocacy on behalf of Mexican American civil rights was more vital than challenging the surge of imported Mexican labor.⁵⁰ Given his stance on Mexican labor and the bracero program, it is unusual to depict Sanchez as an advocate of Mexican migrants. Thus, another way of approaching Texas being blacklisted from receiving Mexican migrant laborers is by analyzing where Sanchez falls on the idea of Mexican migrants in the U.S. and more importantly in Mexican American communities.

I suggest Sanchez was strategic about reaching out to Mexican officials about blacklisting Texas from receiving Mexican laborers. Evidence indicates that Sanchez was more likely to

47. *Ibid.*, 77.

48. *Ibid.*, 77.

49. Although it’s not ideal to have your own government spy on you or the organization that you belong to, the type of state infiltration that occurred with LULAC is minuscule compared to that of Black civil rights organizations, which actually had police and FBI surveillance for the purpose of pursuing criminal charges against the organizations.

50. *Ibid.*, 80.

recommend Mexico refrain from sending their citizens to Texas, not for their protection but for the protection of Mexican Americans in Texas. He managed to convince Mexican officials that Texas would be a detrimental place for Mexican nationals due to racial discrimination against Mexicans. Knowing his political trajectory and racial politics, Sanchez was able to block Mexican laborers from entering Texas until 1947 when the ban was lifted. One of the key moments where Sanchez demonstrates his true beliefs about Mexican immigrants comes when he drafts a report to the Advisory Committee Study of Spanish-speaking People entitled, "Wetbacks: A Preliminary Report." In the report, he argues, "[o]ne of the most serious problems facing the people of Texas is the presence in the state of a very large, but as yet undetermined number of wetbacks—illegal aliens who cross the border from Mexico mainly in search of agricultural employment but who are to be found in many cities of the state and in many non-agricultural jobs." What Sanchez wants to point out is how Mexican immigrants are decimating Mexican American communities:

The condition of the wetback is incredibly bad, but his condition is only one aspect of the problem resulting from the uncontrolled importation of contraband labor. Much more important are the effects on the resident population and their institutions in areas where the wetbacks are concentrated. With an oversupply of cheap, unprotected labor always present, organization of workers is impossible, individual bargaining is futile.⁵¹

Along with presenting this report to the annual LULAC convention in 1950, a copy of the report was presented to David Niles who was the executive assistant to President Truman in 1949. The "Wetback" report would partly influence the execution of "Operation Wetback" in 1953. Sanchez is pointing LULAC members and legislators in general to acknowledge what he believes to be the harm that Mexican immigrants are causing to minority communities. Although seeming to empathize with Mexican migrants and their pursuit for economic mobility, Sanchez demarcates the deserving and undeserving racial minorities when he positions Mexican immigrants impeding Mexican American progress by creating barriers to institutions.

51. LULAC Council No. 60 Papers. 1949. "Preliminary Report on 'Wetbacks.'" Houston Metropolitan Research Center, RG E 21, Box 38, Folder 23.

Sanchez's contradictions on the issue of Mexican immigrants reveal that he was strategic about where, when, and how he addressed Mexican immigrant issues. For instance, Sanchez wanted to distance Mexican migrants from Mexican American communities, but he also endorsed lowering the standards for Mexicans in pursuit of naturalization.⁵² This type of contradiction points to how Sanchez viewed citizenship as the main component separating Mexican Americans from Mexican nationals. Migrants lacking citizenship was a barrier for advancing claims on their behalf. However, streamlining access for permanent residents to acquire legal citizenship and subsequently become another voting Mexican American in Texas and the Southwest was a completely different story. Blanton argues that Sanchez's support for permanent residents in pursuit of legal citizenship should dissuade critics from labeling him a nativist.⁵³ Yet, supporting permanent residents who are already in the country with authorization and denouncing Mexican migrants seeking economic mobility are two entirely different ideas. It is less of a hurdle for Sanchez to support permanent residents even though LULAC did not provide Mexican permanent residents membership. Mexicans who lack authorization in the country, for Sanchez, carried with them the markers a politics of respectability was meant to erase like illegality, low wage labor, and foreignness. Sanchez's brand of Mexican American civil rights would expand beyond LULAC and infiltrate the newly formed AGIF in 1948.

5.2.2 The Rise of the American G.I. Forum and Brown Respectability, 1948-1955

As soon as Sanchez took his post, most LULAC chapters closed down and stopped recruiting members since a large majority of members were either volunteering for military service or were drafted. Thus, George Sanchez assumed the presidency when LULAC had low mem-

52. Blanton, C. K. 2014. *George I. Sanchez: The Long Fight for Mexican American Integration*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 156.

53. *Ibid.*, 157.

bership and hardly any power or recognition to advance claims against the state. When LULAC did begin to expand its membership after the end of the second world war, the organization to Sanchez was no longer a space he considered seriously advocated on behalf of Mexican Americans. Although still an active member of LULAC, Sanchez recognized the untapped potential in new grassroots mobilizations that challenged discrimination and segregation head on. After the war, Sanchez believed Mexican Americans had done their part to protect and defend the democratic ideals of the nation. Yet, the LULAC leadership was hesitant to bring claims against the state since its priority was to rebuild LULAC after its serious decline in membership due to the war.

Sanchez began to use his role as a public intellectual, professor, and community leader to enlist the help from military veterans that were actively making claims against the state surrounding their access to Veterans' Affairs (VA) health and education benefits. This wasn't your ordinary Veterans of Foreign Wars or American Legion type organization. Veterans of Mexican descent came together and organized themselves as the American G.I. Forum (AGIF). The AGIF strategically used their military service as the grounds for making claims for better access to health benefits and educational resources from the VA. The establishment of the AGIF is what rounded out the Mexican American generation with a political ideology that closely linked respectability and civic republicanism.

Sanchez realized the potential that Mexicans with claims to military service had toward advancing what he considered were the goals of middle class Mexican American communities. This is one of the reasons he sought to provide his service to military during the war and immediately after completing his term as LULAC president. However, due to numerous delays in finalizing his commission in his chosen military occupational specialty of intelligence, Sanchez did not get the opportunity to serve the U.S. in a military capacity. He even went as far as requesting to serve at the most junior rank, but was again told there was "no vacancy" for his chosen field.

When the AGIF formally organized, Sanchez did not miss the opportunity to connect

with its president, Hector P. Garcia. Garcia was a medical doctor and served with the Army medical corps as a Major in the European theater of combat during WWII. In one of their early correspondences, Sanchez writes to Garcia highlighting his enthusiasm for their collaboration, “I think you fellows are doing a grand job, and I certainly want to encourage you to keep it up. It would be very wise for all of us to coordinate our strategy in these matters—to choose the best possible techniques, to concentrate on the most fruitful problems, to divide jobs and responsibilities.”⁵⁴ From the perspective of collaboration, it was probably the best thing that could happen for a new Mexican American civil rights organization to be mentored from a well-established Mexican American leader stemming from a well-known organization. The post-World War II period brought on a challenging time for LULAC’s membership and its ideology. This is the period where what it means to be Mexican American was negotiated and defined.⁵⁵ More importantly, the ideational development of Mexican Americans shifted from solely being formed from elite rhetoric to a proliferation of Mexican Americans that adopted the goal of reframing the dominant perception of Mexican Americans.

Thus, LULAC was attempting to rebuild their organization at a time when more organizations claiming to advocate on behalf of Mexicans were forming. The west coast saw the rise of the Community Service Organization in Los Angeles and they worked on issues such as desegregating housing and police brutality primarily in East Los Angeles. Another organization, the Coordinating Council for Latin American Youth (CCLAY) was established and persuaded local leaders that reform was actually beneficial for all involved. The problem LULAC was facing was the possibility of losing members or potential members to other organizations. Sanchez, a former LULAC president, was essentially making friends with the enemy since the AGIF would end up being the second largest Mexican American civil rights organization in the country. Yet, as I mentioned earlier, Sanchez was growing more and more

54. Benson Latin American Collection. The University of Texas at Austin. Record No. 23866736, Correspondence and Subject Files. Box 4, Folder 9, George I. Sanchez Correspondence to Hector P. Garcia, November 18, 1948.

55. Marquez, B. 1993. *LULAC: The Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization*. Austin: University of Texas Press: 41-42.

disillusioned with the possibilities LULAC had to actually create pragmatic change for Mexican Americans. Blanton notes that, “[i]n the early 1950s Sanchez not only merged his own civil rights initiatives with the active and eager AGIF, but also became an honorary member of the organization and took pride in its liberal politics and no-nonsense activism.”⁵⁶ With his influence over Garcia, Sanchez was able to shape the course of AGIF activism at the grassroots level as well as at the political elite level.

For instance, Sanchez sought electoral support for political allies, but he did not ask LULAC, instead he would simply write to Garcia and request that the AGIF members go to the ballot box on behalf of someone Sanchez was vouching for. “Judge Graham Smedley is running again for the State Supreme Court,” writes Sanchez to Garcia in 1952, “He has asked that I write to you and ask for your help in his election. He is my friend, and a very competent man. I hope that you and all your friends will support him *actively*.”⁵⁷ Above all, Sanchez was adamant and particular about which political strategy to advance. For example, Sanchez believed that he could end segregation in schools incrementally by ensuring that his friend, Assistant State Superintendent of Public Instruction Terrel Trimble was able to be elected to office as opposed to passing a new bill that would allow the governor of Texas to appoint the superintendent. Writing in the strictest confidence, Sanchez reaches out to Garcia to persuade him and his AGIF to oppose the bill:

As long as the State Superintendent is elective, the Spanish-speaking people of this state will have a good leader to force him to give us just this kind of cooperation. This is why I think that it is to the best interest of the Spanish-speaking people to oppose the passage of the bill which would make the office of State Superintendent of Public Instruction appointive instead of elective, as at present. You can do a great deal about this issue by doing three things: (1) Bring pressure upon the Corpus Christi superintendent of schools to “lay off” of promoting the legislation calling for the change. (2) Bring pressure to bear on your representative in the legislature—to the same effect. (3) Extend an invitation to Mr. Terrel Trimble to speak on state educational problems

56. Blanton, C. K. 2014. *George I. Sanchez: The Long Fight for Mexican American Integration*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 132.

57. Benson Latin American Collection. The University of Texas at Austin. Record No. 23866736, Correspondence and Subject Files. Box 4, Folder 9, George I. Sanchez Correspondence to Hector P. Garcia, July 24, 1952. Emphasis in the original.

to a meeting of Lulac or the G.I. Forum (or a combined meeting) in Corpus Christi right away. He is our friend and will work with us.⁵⁸

With Hector Garcia at the helm of AGIF and George Sanchez providing strategic political plays to its leadership, the AGIF launched some of the most successful assaults against discrimination and immigration policy. Sanchez was up to his neck with issues regarding the segregation of Mexicans in schools long before the AGIF formed. Sanchez exhibited a certain type of claim to the issues regarding school segregation since he was the leading educational expert surrounding Mexicans in Texas. However, Garcia had a different plan and operational tempo behind establishing the AGIF and that was to make the issues impeding the progress of military veterans and larger Mexican American communities visible to the rest of the country. At various occasions Sanchez would write to Garcia in order to encourage Garcia to tone down what Sanchez considered to be too “emotional,” which would dissuade people, particularly whites, from hearing the substance of the message. Responding to Garcia about an incident with the local draft boards, Sanchez promotes a more respectable and professional outward demeanor when engaging people not affiliated with AGIF:

I believe, however, that you would be more effective if your protests were a little more studied and much less emotional. For instance, I think you did a magnificent job in presenting the health situation before the Good Neighbor Commission. The more that we can do along those calm, solid lines, the better. It is all right to stimulate audiences in large public meetings with a heated and emotional presentation, but I don't think that that technique is a profitable one in printed form.⁵⁹

Sanchez is advancing a particular brand of respectability and conservatism that he himself has attempted to evade. Yet, he is also acting as a manager between the power structure in Texas and Mexican American communities. Sanchez had a number of experiences being a community manager with a more subdued organization, however, this would be his first ex-

58. Benson Latin American Collection. The University of Texas at Austin. Record No. 23866736, Correspondence and Subject Files. Box 4, Folder 9, George I. Sanchez Correspondence to Hector P. Garcia, February 10, 1949.

59. Benson Latin American Collection. The University of Texas at Austin. Record No. 23866736, Correspondence and Subject Files. Box 4, Folder 9, George I. Sanchez Correspondence to Hector P. Garcia, November 18, 1948.

perience with an organization that was more committed to an ideology around republicanism than conservatism.

5.2.3 *The Scope of National Mexican American Politics, 1945-1965*

At the local level, LULAC and AGIF continued to challenge discrimination against people of Mexican descent in the Southwest by focusing on fair employment practices desegregating schools for Mexican children. Most of the national advocacy work between the post-war period and the passage of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act narrowly revolved around stopping the practice of importing Mexican migrant labor, legal and undocumented. This limited scope will help us see that Mexican American civic organizations focused on removing Mexican immigrants from the country and organizations like the AGIF were not in a position to endorse a pathway for their naturalization.

School Segregation

A majority of the victories LULAC is known for stem from their advocacy around desegregating schools for children of Mexican descent. School segregation of Mexican children was institutionalized by establishing separate school buildings for Mexicans and whites. According to Orozco, “[f]rom 1922 to 1932 the number of “Mexican” school districts in fifty-nine counties doubled from 20 to 40 and by 1942 increased to 122.”⁶⁰ It’s a common misconception to say that LULAC advocated for desegregation generally. As mentioned above, LULAC endorsed the power structure of their respective communities, but challenged the idea of segregating Mexican children. Although the LULAC leadership condemned Jim Crow in the South against blacks, segregation against Mexicans in schools challenged their fragile claim to whiteness. Historian Craig Kaplowitz notes that education scholar and former LULAC president George Sanchez insisted that Mexican children were more vulnerable than blacks to systems of oppression like “separate but equal” because Mexicans were technically

60. Orozco, C. E. 2009. *No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed: The Rise of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement*. Austin: University of Texas Press: 31.

“white.”⁶¹

One of the most important judicial victories for LULAC in 1946 comes out of Southern California with *Mendez v. Westminster School District*. Mexican children were not given access to schools with predominantly white children since the district argued that language differences made it especially hard to teach Mexican children that were native Spanish speakers. Yet, the Westminster School District continued segregating Mexican children up to the eight-grade. In an effort to preserve their claim to whiteness, lawyers funded by LULAC argued that under California state law the segregation of school children was illegal, not that the facilities were unequal.⁶² Continuing their momentum after the Mendez victory, LULAC took on another case, but this time in their home state of Texas challenging the Bastrop Independent School District in 1948. The courts concluded in the Bastrop case that Mexican children could in fact be segregated, but only during the early years of elementary school. Mexican children could continue to be segregated if there was evidence that language disparities existed.

Undocumented and Imported Mexican Labor

LULAC during the post-war period rarely entered the national arena to provide testimony to Congress or publicly supported national legislation that went beyond school segregation in the Southwest, particularly in Texas. When LULAC did appear in the Congressional Record it was to show how they endorsed existing social and political structures.⁶³ LULAC was more concerned with state politics. AGIF, on the other hand, became almost militant about testifying in Congress about what they thought was affecting their communities in a negative way. Particularly the issue of extending the Bracero Program. For instance, just

61. Kaplowitz, C. A. 2005. *LULAC, Mexican Americans, and national policy*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press: 45.

62. *Ibid.*, 46.

63. For more on LULAC in Congress see: Schwellenbach, L. B. (WI). “Address by Senator Chavez at Convention of League of United Latin American Citizens.” Congressional Record-Senate (1938) p. 8585. Yarborough, R. W. (TX). “Education Project of League of United Latin American Citizens.” Congressional Record-Appendix (1958) p. A3665; McFarland, E. W. (AZ). “Resolution of League of United Latin American Citizens.” Congressional Record-Senate (1941) p. 6236.

three years after the AGIF was formed, its president Hector Garcia appeared before the Committee of the Whole House to testify in favor of amending the Agriculture Act of 1949. The amendment presented by Rep. Emanuel Celler of New York sought to fine farmers that employed undocumented immigrants.⁶⁴ The issue of contractual and undocumented labor were consistently conflated and Garcia espoused, on behalf of AGIF, what should be done to curtail Mexican laborers of any kind from entering the country:

1. That Congress provide civil and penal punishments for persons who employ wetbacks (Mexicans who enter the United States illegally to find work).
2. There should be no certification of a shortage of domestic labor to bring in braceros (Mexican workers) under contract unless domestic labor has been offered the same wages and working conditions as that required in importing alien workers.
3. Wetbacks should be deported before any contract labor is imported.
4. Alien labor should not be used to suppress wage scales and prevailing wages paid wetbacks should not be considered for any purpose in determining wage levels.⁶⁵

For Garcia, the Bracero Program and undocumented Mexicans challenged the economic mobility of American citizens and particularly those of Mexican origin. Since undocumented and Bracero workers were laboring for pay that drove down wages for everyone else in the agricultural market. He further argued that, “[u]se of imported labor in this area will perpetuate mistakes of previous years when imported labor brought wages and wage rates downward to a point where semislavery (sic) wages prevailed.”⁶⁶ Four years later in 1955, AGIF testified again before the Committee on Agricultural concerning family owned farms. This time the AGIF Chaplain was sent to testify in support of small family owned farms

64. Celler, E. (NY). “Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers.” Congressional Record-House (1951) p. 7254.

65. Ibid., 7262.

66. Ibid., 7262.

to gain protections from the larger farms where most of the Bracero labor is directed to. Rev. Juraschet reminded members of the committee that, “you are aware that in 1953 over a million *molondros* [lazy person] were apprehended, that is, actually caught. Gentlemen, there were that many, at least, who were not caught.”⁶⁷ Rev. Juraschet is recalling “Operation Wetback” where the U.S. attempted to address the issue of undocumented labor in the Southwest by launching detention raids in Mexican communities. He brings up the operation to highlight how the U.S. government addressed the issue actually failed and small family farms along with unskilled Mexican American laborers are paying the price. Yet, Rev. Juraschet did not offer any suggestions on how to properly address the issue other than the state should stand behind small family farms.

AGIF continued their assault on Mexican migrant labor, legal and undocumented, well into the following decade. This time representing AGIF was Bob Sanchez who was the Chairman of the Committee on Migratory Labor which AGIF created to research and provide compelling evidence that the U.S. should shut down the practice of importing foreign labor. Sanchez was, again, on the side of the family farm and showed up to endorse H.R. 11211, which would protect family farms from unfair competition from corporate agriculture. However, Sanchez was more concerned with the secondary provision that sought out to protect employment opportunities for domestic agricultural workers.⁶⁸ Sanchez ardently opposed the consideration of other bills considered that day which would extend the Bracero Program: “Please let my organization go on record also as bitterly opposing H.R. 9871, H.R. 9869, and H.R. 9875.”⁶⁹ However, a year later, Sanchez appeared again to testify about the extension of the Bracero Program with a different perspective on the issue of Mexican labor:

Today I appear here generally in support of the Senator Eugene McCarthy bill, S. 1945, which the Kennedy administration is supporting, but I must qualify our support by

67. Family-Size Farms: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Family Farms, House, 84th Cong. (1955) (Testimony of Rev. E. A. Juraschet).

68. Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower, House, 86th Cong. (1960) (Testimony of R. P. “Bob” Sanchez).

69. *Ibid.*, 153.

saying first that we oppose any extension of the bracero program on the ground that the program, is, in fact, not needed, however; our position is that if the program should be extended, then we would favor a revision of the program by strong amendments to the existing law.⁷⁰

In spite of AGIF's stance against Mexican migrant labor for over a decade, their position on the issue seems to change drastically conceding their stance over the period of less than a year. One explanation for the change comes as a result of the political environment and where AGIF had access. Notably, AGIF along with LULAC participated in mobilizing "Viva Kennedy" clubs across Texas for the election of John F. Kennedy as President in 1960 (see figure 5.1).⁷¹ For his efforts at managing to acquire 85% of the Mexican vote for Kennedy in Texas, Hector Garcia was offered access to elite institutions that members of LULAC only dreamed of.⁷² Indeed, Garcia was offered a cabinet position as Secretary of Agriculture by Kennedy for his help in mobilizing Mexican American communities, but once Kennedy was elected President the position went to Minnesota Governor Orville Freeman. Garcia relates the unfortunate news in a letter addressed to George Sanchez, "[j]ust this short letter to let you know that right after I received your telephone call, I called Washington, D. C. and found out that there was little chance of the appointment for the Secretary of Agriculture."⁷³

Kennedy would continue to string Garcia and the AGIF along during his tenure in the White House. When Johnson was seeking re-election, he called on Garcia personally and they built "Viva Johnson" clubs across his home state of Texas. Garcia was persuaded to

70. Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, 87th Cong. (1961) (Testimony of R. P. Sanchez).

71. Source: Dr. Hector P. Garcia Papers, Collection 5, Box 477, Folder 06. Special Collections and Archives, Mary and Jeff Bell Library, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi. Hector P. Garcia, President of AGIF, appears immediately to the right of John F. Kennedy.

72. Blanton, C. K. 2014. *George I. Sanchez: The Long Fight for Mexican American Integration*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 213. Also see: Kaplowitz, C. A. 2005. *LULAC, Mexican Americans, and national policy*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press: 68-71.

73. Benson Latin American Collection. The University of Texas at Austin. Record No. 23866736, Correspondence and Subject Files. Box 4, Folder 9, Hector P. Garcia correspondence to George I. Sanchez. December 16, 1960.

Figure 5.1: John F. Kennedy with Viva Kennedy Club Leaders



Source: Dr. Hector P. Garcia Papers, Collection 5, Box 477, Folder 06. Special Collections and Archives, Mary and Jeff Bell Library, Texas AM University-Corpus Christi.

support the administration as a tradeoff for access to the administration. The highest post he would reach in government was as an alternate Ambassador to the United Nations in 1967. Garcia changed his position and the claims the organization was making in order to nurture the relationship with the President of the U.S. Although the Bracero Program would officially be dismantled in 1964, AGIF's pursuit of power and access to resources and institutions outweighed the issues they believed to be ruining their communities.

5.2.4 Deported Korean War Veteran, Lost Political Opportunity

Veteran immigration issues as a result of service-for-citizenship emerged for Mexican American civic organizations during the Korean War. The New York Times first reported that on March 14, 1952, Corporal Alberto Gonzales had been deported to Mexico; his country

of origin.⁷⁴ Gonzales served three years in the Army and over a year in the Korean War. He was awarded the Purple Heart for being wounded in his hip and numerous other awards like the Korean Service Medal with five campaign stars.⁷⁵ Gonzales was deported because he entered the country under false pretenses by using the birth certificate of a deceased man to gain entry. AGIF leaders sent their national secretary and lawyer, Richard Casillas, to advocate on behalf of Gonzales with the State Department and immigration service. However, that was the extent of mobilization behind the issue from AGIF, a symbolic gesture of support to a fellow veteran. Representative John E. Lyle of Texas offered to put pressure on the State Department for Gonzales' return and went even further by presenting a bill to Congress that would naturalize Mexican non-citizens who served in the Korean conflict.

H.R. 7252 was introduced by Rep. Lyle in the second session of the 82nd Congress, "To provide for the naturalization of certain Mexican citizens who serve in the Armed Forces during the period of the Korean hostilities beginning June 27, 1950."⁷⁶ This bill further illustrates how Mexican immigrants were being directly affected by the transformation of citizenship-for-service policy in 1940. However, the bill was directed to the Committee on the Judiciary where no further actions were taken. If Gonzales had entered the country before 1924 he would not have to procure a certificate of arrival because entry authorization certificates were waived for willing immigrants during WWI. However, Gonzales entered the country in 1948 and enlisted in the Army soon after. His service record was not enough to keep him in the country or garner support from some of the largest Mexican American civic organizations.

Although AGIF initially provided support for Gonzales' return, AGIF failed to follow through with putting pressure on immigrant enforcement agencies nor took a stand behind the Lyle bill. AGIF did not embrace Gonzales any further because the media was labelling

74. "Hero in Korean War Deported as Wetback; Served in Army 3 Years After Entering U.S." 1952. New York Times, March 15: 2.

75. There were thirteen campaigns total during the hostilities in Korea from 1950 to 1954.

76. H.R. 7252, 82nd Cong. (1952).

him a “wetback” and a criminal for entering the country with fraudulent papers. The negative characterizations of Gonzales went against the momentum AGIF had built around dismantling the Bracero Program and stopping undocumented immigrants from entering the country. Supporting H.R. 7252 for AGIF also went against their commitment to brown respectability since it emphasized a specific racial group; Mexicans. AGIF avoided specific racial identifiers that classified the groups they advocated for beyond language differences such as Spanish speakers. AGIF missed a critical political opportunity to provide access to Mexican non-citizen service members, but how they racially identified based on their political ideology limited the extent of their prospective power. As a result, Mexican non-citizen service members would continue to lack organizational support in pursuit of acquiring legal citizenship based on their service until the next conflict, which by then, service-for-citizenship requirements had already increased in 1965.

5.3 Conclusion

If Mexican American civic organizations like LULAC and AGIF were committed to a progressive style politics where their racial identification was a source of community building and not a liability, we would see the leaders advocating for better working conditions for Braceros in agriculture and making claims on Southwestern states for equitable wages for both migrants and residents. We would also see LULAC and AGIF challenge existing oppressive power structures that advance mechanisms to deter participation in the democratic process like the poll-tax in Texas. Equally important and for my purposes, LULAC and more so AGIF would object to the deportation of Mexican military veterans and pressure state and federal legislators for their speedy return. However, national Mexican American civic organizations in the post-war period devised their political ideologies and racial identify formation in such a way that a progressive politics was not foreseeable until the rise of Chicana/o and Puerto Rican movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s that challenged the Mexican American status quo.

LULAC and AGIF depended on a fragile claim to whiteness to counter discrimination against their respective communities. A claim to whiteness that has never been extended to black communities. Yet, LULAC and AGIF failed to link the source of their racial identity formation—through the four processes of meaning making—as the same power structures that perpetuated segregation, racial discrimination, and a lack of access to resources and institutions. In doing so, LULAC and AGIF risked abandoning their claim to whiteness, the respect they received from local political elites, and their overall identity as loyal and patriotic Americans. If LULAC and AGIF members were not white then they most certainly were not black and challenged attempts at linking the two marginalized groups. Thus, an implication of brown respectability is that the ideology and political program is confined narrowly to the extent that coalitions with other marginalized groups are outside of the scope of political opportunities.⁷⁷ Meaning that adopting issues important to other marginalized groups, especially if they were progressive, as their own goes against the principles of brown respectability: endorse existing social, economic, and political structures and create social and political distance between the enfranchised and non-citizens.

By analyzing racial minority engagement with a politics of respectability as a site of racial identity formation reveals how a commitment to an ideology coerced by oppressive hegemonic power structures in their communities, job markets, and formal institutions coincides with forming a restricted political agenda meant to reinforce oppressive power structures. With LULAC and AGIF bounded to brown respectability, the possibility of adopting citizenship-for-service issues like the deportation of non-citizen service members that stemmed from its transformation in 1940 initially seemed like a cause Mexican American leaders could get behind. However, adopting the issue also meant endorsing the fact that deported veterans broke the law, may be undocumented, and are undertaking a space that could go to American citizens. It was costlier, politically, to pursue the return of a deported war veteran

⁷⁷. For more on LULAC and their engagement with black communities see: Kaplowitz, C. A. 2005. *LULAC, Mexican Americans, and national policy*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press: 90-94.

than to leave them in their country of origin. These issues surrounding non-citizen service members would continue to emerge with each subsequent mobilization and corresponding conflict. For their willful neglect, the same Mexican American organizations that failed to adopt non-citizen service issues are now, seventy years later, advancing efforts to bring national attention to service-for-citizenship and deported veterans.⁷⁸

78. Rocha, R. C. 2017. "Resolution to Support the Plight of U.S. Deported Veterans." League of United Latin American Citizens, LULAC National Convention, July 8.

CHAPTER 6

A THEORY OF MARTIAL CITIZENSHIP

Since the end of WWI, non-citizen service members in the U.S. have been and continue to be pre-political. That is to say, non-citizen service members have yet to be welcomed as political members of society with the autonomy and liberty to participate in the political community as citizens upon enlisting for military service and, in some instances, even after fulfilling service requirements. This claim should come as no surprise to critics that argue immigrants should in fact be pre-political until they've met and satisfied the requirements for incorporation. However, non-citizen service members, particularly those in a republic, are not traditional immigrants in the sense that they are surrendering their life to and performing the obligations of citizens while lacking any say in who gets to send them to war, how and when they will be incorporated, and ultimately who will represent and defend their interest. Thus, the practice of enlisting and recruiting non-citizens in the military without immediate recognition as political members in the U.S. challenges and abandons the principles and ideals inherent in the Citizen-Soldier tradition that have been central in forming and maintaining republics. The Citizen-Soldier tradition is a normative ideal that links civic life in a republic where the people in the republic are recognized as equal members who govern themselves with the military, or historically with militias, to stand as the guards and protectors of liberty and autonomy in civic life.¹ What prompted the U.S. to abandon the Citizen-Soldier tradition at the turn of the 20th century? More importantly, what can be done to reconcile the inherent principle in the Citizen-Soldier tradition that serving in the military constructed part of the basis for citizenship?

Raising these guiding questions does not mean that the Citizen-Soldier tradition is completely just or fair. Let me be clear, the Citizen-Soldier tradition in America historically has been fundamentally exclusionary on gender, sexuality, and race. The purpose of this

1. Snyder, R. C. 1999. *Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition*. New York: Roman & Littlefield Publishers: 15.

project is to add non-citizen service members to the list of excluded groups and think about ways to rectify what has been lost due to the exclusion. In the following, I lay out the challenges to the American Civic-Soldier Tradition that have paved the way to reforming the citizen-soldier by raising claims based on their excluded identities. Next, I make the case for non-citizen service members as another creation of an American underclass. Finally, I illustrate how we can change the exclusions toward non-citizen service members by advancing an idea of martial citizenship by using sacrifice as the basis for incorporating non-citizens.

6.1 Challenges to the American Citizen-Soldier Tradition

6.1.1 *Gender and Sexuality*

According to Political theorist Claire Snyder, “the Citizen-Soldier embodies a commitment to civic republicanism, complete with all its ideals: liberty, equality, fraternity, the rule of law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship.”² Yet, as Snyder notes further, the ideals found in civic republicanism are the exact same ideals that perpetuate exclusion, chauvinism, and ultra-nationalism.³ To put it another way, because it takes participating in politics and serving in the military to be recognized and welcomed as a citizen in a republic engaged in civic republicanism, historically, the role of who has the opportunity to be recognized as a citizen by participating in the two pillars of civic republicanism were assumed to be men. Hence, women are inherently excluded in civic republics as citizens. Republicanism and civic republicanism, in particular, are fundamentally exclusionary on the dimension of gender. Let me be clear, this is not to say that republicanism and more so civic republicanism cannot be transformed into something inclusionary and equitable. On the contrary, the U.S. military just recently lifted its gender ban on all military occupational specialties (MOS), including combat and special forces occupations.

2. Ibid., 19.

3. See Snyder, R. C. 1999. *Citizen- Soldiers and Manly Warriors*, Chapter 1.

The U.S. and its military have exclusively followed the civic republican tradition by calling on men to serve and represent the country during times of crisis, while women have been expected to tend to men in those conflicts as support elements. For instance, not until WWII did women, and black women in particular, have the opportunity to serve in the military and receive full military benefits for their service. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was established in 1942 that mainly recruited black women while the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) was created in 1942.⁴ Although women were allowed to enlist in the military, women had very few occupational opportunities beyond administrative, logistical, and medical military occupational specialties. In other words, assumed gender roles in private and domestic life were translated in the military in similar ways where women were thought of as supporting the war effort, but not actually being an integral and direct part of the mission to defend and protect the country. Some advancements were made during and following WWII, however, the fundamental exclusive nature of civic republicanism was still intact. Men continued to comprise the ideal figure of the Citizen-Soldier.

Incremental changes began to occur when the U.S. escalated the war in Vietnam. During the conflict, more than 263,000 women served in the armed forces between 1964 and 1975.⁵ The Vietnam War witness the first time a woman, CMDR. Elizabeth Barrett, held an operational command in a combat zone.⁶ Following the Vietnam War, women were accepted to the U.S. service academies. However, not much was changing as far as policies to level the playing field between men and women in the military.

In 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that all gender restrictions on mil-

4. Moore, L. B. 1996. *To Serve My Country, To Serve My Race: The Story of the Only African American WACs Stationed Overseas during World War II*. New York: NYU Press: 1.

5. Schwartz, L. S. 1987. "Women and the Vietnam Experience." *Journal of Nursing Scholarship*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 168-173.

6. Granville, A. 2015. "American Women Who Served in Combat Before You Were Born." Task and Purpose, November 11. <https://taskandpurpose.com/american-women-who-served-in-combat-before-you-were-born/>

itary occupational specialties would be lifted starting in January 2016.⁷ For some feminist activists, lifting gender bans in MOSs was a victory challenging the differences between men and women in the military and seeking to align women's policies with that of men. Some feminist activist went as far as arguing that women should be eligible for the draft even if it meant the policy would conscript women in a non-voluntary basis. Yet, for a majority of the women in the military, according to military sociologist Laura Miller, do not want to serve in combat roles.⁸ In her survey of over 900 women in the military, three percent of enlisted women and thirteen percent of women officers said they would like to see women treated exactly like men in the military. While an overwhelming 77% and 71% of enlisted women and women officers, respectively, stated that women who want to volunteer for combat occupations should be allowed to do so.⁹ However, now women have the ability to decide in what way they want to serve the country if they so choose.

Unfortunately, women in the military are not the only source of exclusion from the armed forces. Gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people wishing to don a military uniform without being persecuted for their sexual identity and orientation reached a turning point during the Clinton Administration when then President Clinton announced in 1993 the new policy on LGBTQ people: "Don't ask, don't tell." Meaning, gay, lesbian, and bisexual people could continue serving in the military as long as their sexual orientation was kept from the public or members of their unit. The Department of Defense directive stated that, "persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards or morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."¹⁰ Unit leaders, on the other hand, could no longer initiate investigations of their troops without evidence demonstrating they were engaging in

7. Tilghman, A. 2015. "All combat jobs open to women in the military." *Military Times*, December 3. <https://www.militarytimes.com/2015/12/03/all-combat-jobs-open-to-women-in-the-military/>

8. Miller, L. L. 1998. "Feminist and the Exclusion of Army Women from Combat." *Gender Issues*, 33-63.

9. *Ibid.*, 43.

10. Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C. §654 (1997).

“prohibited” behavior. As professor of Law, Tobias Barrington Wolff contends, “Don’t ask, don’t tell,” is essentially violating gay, lesbian, and bisexual service members’ first amendment constitutional rights by coercing them to, “make involuntary and false affirmations of a heterosexual identity that is not their own.”¹¹ What tends to get overlooked when analyzing the people that serve in the military is that although service members are protected by the U.S. Constitution, there are important caveats to those protections due to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which is the main set of rules and guidelines overseeing the military and its personnel. For instance, service members have broader protections when it comes to a right to counsel, however, there are significantly less protections to lawful searches and seizures and privacy for that matter.¹²

The UCMJ raises service members standards of what “good” behavior and conduct are supposed to look like in order to maintain operational readiness and achieve mission success.¹³ In other words, the UCMJ is the normative set of ideas service members should be abiding by in order to maintain morale among units and more importantly to refrain from engaging in behavior that may have some serious consequences like loss of rank or pay or in extreme cases separation from the military. That would include challenging superior officers. Once in the military, gay, lesbian, and bisexual service members are limited in their ability to bring pressure on senior officials to change oppressive policies. The onus for change in the military comes from outside its ranks through civilians. As political scientist Mary F. Katzenstein reminds us, there is a network of organizations that track and monitor military policy as it affects women and organizations that provides mental health support to gay and lesbian service members.¹⁴ The fight to remove the ban on gay, lesbian, and bisexual service

11. Wolff, T. B. 1997. “Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy.” *Brooklyn Law Review*, Vol. 63, 1141-1211.

12. Hohnsbeen, R. B. 1986. “Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement.” *George Washington Law Review*, Vol. 54, 404-433.

13. Weber, J. S. 2016. “The Disorderly, Undisciplined State of the ‘Good Order and Discipline’ Term.” *Air War College*, February 16.

14. Katzenstein, M. F. 1998. *Faithful and Fearless: Moving Feminist Protest Inside the Church and Military*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 45-46.

members from openly serving in the military was no exception. However, this fight began in the courts.

One of the first victories for lifting the ban on gay, lesbian, and bisexual people serving in the military came in *McVeigh v. Cohen* (1998).¹⁵ With the unfortunate coincidence that the defendant in the case has the exact same name as the Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy R. McVeigh, a Senior Chief in the U.S. Navy had served seventeen years in the Navy and was discharged from the military in 1998 due to him being a gay man. A civilian Navy volunteer, Helen Hajne, received an email through America Online concerning logistics for an upcoming Christmas toy drive. McVeigh was reaching out to get more information about the toy drive when Hajne examined the email search profile and identified the sender as Tim with a marital status as “gay.” This information was brought to the attention of McVeigh’s commanding officer and going with only the internet profile, the Navy launched an investigation into the account and who it belonged to. Naval investigators reached out to America Online to acquire the identity of the user and they complied providing investigators with the proof they needed to commence administrative separation proceedings of McVeigh for “homosexual conduct.”¹⁶ However, the federal district court in D.C. granted an injunction preventing McVeigh’s discharge and found that the Navy violated the principle of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” by carrying out a mission into a service member’s privacy when he had not violated the policy. America Online paid McVeigh damages and McVeigh was later discharged from the Navy with a full pension. McVeigh’s story underscores how lightly gay, lesbian, and bisexual service members had to thread concerning their sexual orientation and the extent to which the military escalated suspicions that someone in their ranks may in fact be gay. The McVeigh case was a victory for gay rights according to the New York Times.¹⁷

15. *McVeigh v. Cohen Decision*. 1998. U.S. District Court, District of Columbia.

16. Seamon, A. A. 1999. “The Flawed Compromise of 10 U.S.C. §654: An Assessment of the Military’s ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy.” *University of Dayton Law Review*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 319-347.

17. Shenon, P. 1998. “Sailor Victorious in Gay Case of On-Line Privacy.” *New York Times*, June 12. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/12/us/sailor-victorious-in-gay-case-of-on-line-privacy.html>

However, the case was not framed by academics and lawyers as a case around gay rights, but as a case about on-line privacy.¹⁸

A similar case transpired in 2006 with *Witt v. Department of the Air Force* where Margaret Witt, a Major, was “honorably” discharged from the Air Force in 2004 for being a lesbian.¹⁹ With the support from the American Civil Liberties Union and Lambda Legal, Witt won her case against the Air Force which granted her discharge with full benefits. The consolation prize for being openly gay or lesbian is a severance package that gay and lesbian service members would have received either way if they continued to serve in the capacity that they had been. Yet, the “distractions” the military was attempting to avoid by implementing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” turned into spectacles when forced military separations were challenged and supported by large civic organizations.

The end of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” came in 2010 when the Log Cabin Republicans, an organization that claims to be the largest representing LGBT conservatives, challenged the constitutionality of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” directly and not any particular discharge. In *Log Cabin Republicans v. United States*, the Log Cabin Republicans had to prove that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was unconstitutional.²⁰ The Log Cabin Republicans claimed that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” violated service members’ first and fifth amendment rights to free speech and due process, respectively. In making its decision that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was indeed unconstitutional, the District Court of California found that the discriminatory policy did not advance the interest of the United States in applying it.²¹ Concurrently, as

18. Nissenbaum, H. 1999. “The Meaning of Anonymity in an Information Age.” *The Information Society*, 15: 141-144; Karafin, C. T. 1998. ”’Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell;’ A Discussion of Employee Privacy in Cyberspace in Light of *McVeigh v. Cohen*, et al.” *Virginia Journal of Law and Technology*, 1522-1687; McTigue, D. M. 1999. “Marginalizing Individual Privacy on the Internet.” *Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law*.

19. *Witt v. Department of the Air Force*. 2006. United States District Court Western District of Washington at Tacoma.

20. *Log Cabin Republicans v. United States*. 2010. United States District Court, Central District of California.

21. Feder, J. 2013. ”’Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’: A Legal Analysis.” *Congressional Research Service*, August 6.

the mounting pressure to repeal the policy built up in Washington, then President Obama along with his Defense Secretary Leon Panetta signed the certification lifting the ban on openly serving as gay or lesbian in the military on July 22, 2011. In signing the statement, Obama said, “As of September 20, service members will no longer be forced to hide who they are in order to serve our country.”²²

6.1.2 Racial Exclusions

A frustrated W.E.B. DuBois argued at the close of WWI that, “we [blacks] fought gladly and to the last drop of blood; for America and her highest ideals, for the dominant southern oligarchy entrenched in Washington, we fought in bitter resignation for the America that represents and gloats in lynching.”²³ After providing the basis for a union victory during the Civil War, blacks continued to be segregated in all military branches. Black people were permanently prohibited from enlisting in the Marine Corps. There were few black combat units during WWI and the units that were operational were not adequately trained for combat and primarily lead by white officers. However, a few units were transferred to the French army and served with distinction like the 15th New York and 8th Illinois Infantry.²⁴ Christopher Parker notes that over 370,000 black Americans fought in WWI constituting 13% of conscripted service members yet there was less than 1% of black officers.²⁵ Blacks and black leaders believed that their wartime patriotism would amount to a change in the hostility towards blacks in the Jim Crow South. However, black soldiers returned from war as decorated heroes, but welcomed home in the South with lynching.²⁶ Thus, DuBois’ dis-

22. Bumiller, E. 2011. “Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy. New York Times, July 22. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html>

23. DuBois, W.E.B. 1918. “The Reward.” *The Crisis*, 16, 217.

24. Klinkner, P. A. and R. M. Smith. 1999. *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 113.

25. Parker, C. S. 2009. *Fighting for Democracy: Black Veterans and the Struggle Against White Supremacy in the Postwar South*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 34-35.

26. Francis, M.M. 2014. *Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

illusioned statement is one where hope for change in black communities was fading after WWI. The military, once thought of by DuBois as the institution where blacks could “close ranks” with whites was actually demonstrating that supporting the country in the war effort did not change the condition of the black experience in America. In some cases, blacks in uniform exacerbated the tensions between blacks and whites since whites believed military service was reserved for white people.

The demand for people to serve overseas superseded considerations to restrict blacks from enlisting or being conscripted. Legislation, like the Act of May 9, 1918 can attest to the demand since over 250,000 mostly European immigrants enlisted, became naturalized, and served in combat zones during WWI. Challenges to segregating blacks in the military and restricting blacks from serving in combat roles was yet another struggle that blacks faced when the U.S. entered WWII. In the wake of WWII, Roy Wilkins, editor of the *Crisis*, announced that there was no other issue—except for lynching—that united different classes of black communities other than a more dignified and respectful position in the armed forces if the country entered another conflict.²⁷ Due to racial exclusions and anti-black racism that persisted well into WWII, blacks were not allowed to enlist and serve the country in the manner they wished compared to whites. If blacks wanted to serve in the conflict, they would have to get in line in order to take up a vacancy from any of the four segregated black units.²⁸ When blacks were allowed to perform in combat they did so with courage and skills that outmatched white service members. For instance, the Army’s 761st Tank Battalion, a majority black tank battalion, was consistently used by General Patton to clear the way from France to Germany. For their efforts, one soldier received the medal of honor, eleven others were awarded the silver star, and sixty-nine other black tankers were awarded the bronze star.²⁹

27. Parker, C. S. 2009. *Fighting for Democracy*: 42.

28. *Ibid.*, 45.

29. *Ibid.*, 47.

However, black veterans who returned home were met with similar resistance that black veterans experienced in WWI. Black military service during WWII was not enough to push for integrating the military during the conflict. Integration in the military would not come until black communities organized and challenged the idea of “separate-but-equal” in the prelude to the Korean War. A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds along with other black elites joined to form the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, which unsuccessfully lobbied President Truman and Congress to end segregation in the military.³⁰ Randolph proceeded to form another coalition of Black elites that pledged to “openly counsel, aid, and abet youth, both white and Negro, to quarantine any Jim Crow conscription system,” following the passage of a new Selective Service Act that neglected to end segregation in the Summer of 1948. The new organization was called the League for Nonviolent Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation seeking to coerce then President Truman to unilaterally integrate the military.³¹ A month later on July 26, 1948, under pressure from Randolph’s league, Truman released Executive Order 9981 ending the quota system for potential enlistees with regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. The President’s executive order was a slow response for many units mobilizing for war in Korea. It would take over five years since Truman’s order for the military to be completely integrated.

It would be hard to imagine the reforms mentioned above without the support from allies in the civilian world. Or as Christopher Parker has contended, veterans that use the skills they learned in the military to build an insurgency and challenge gender, sexual orientation, and racial exclusions directly. Actively serving troops are limited in their ability to raise claims against oppressive policies or challenge their superiors for fear of retribution or worst insubordination (a charge outlined as Article 91 in the UCMJ). However, without an organized mass of people making claims based on the identity that is being excluded from the military or the benefits and privileges associated with such service, the policies,

30. Murray, P. T. 1971. “Blacks and the Draft: A History of Institutional Racism.” *Journal of Black Studies*, 57-76.

31. *Ibid.*, 68.

norms, and values in the institution and the people responsible for overseeing the institution are not likely to change. In the remainder of this chapter, I engage the scholars who have operationalized and theorized civic republicanism through the Citizen-Soldier tradition.

6.2 Another American Underclass

Naturalization based on military service or *jus meritum* is characterized by the necessary and sufficient conditions for attaining citizenship. The necessary and sufficient conditions for acquiring citizenship by a martial, or militaristic, claim are transformed during times of peace and times of war. In other words, reaching citizenship-for-service for non-citizen service members is dependent on whether the state is at war or not. Scholars have noted that wars where the U.S. has fought in are large contributing factors to the expansion of civil rights and inclusion of marginalized groups in civil and political society.³² Indeed, as noted above, claims to inclusion based on military service from categorically excluded marginalized groups have managed to secure substantial changes to their positions in the military without having to forfeit who they are anymore. However, how do immigrants that serve in the military without a guarantee of legal citizenship complicate our understanding of an excluded group?

Some critics may argue that non-citizen service members are not an excluded group because they are given the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty and a high standard of patriotism that will be the proof that they are what Bonnie Honig calls the “supercitizen immigrant” and deserving of citizenship.³³ The other type, the undeserving immigrant, is one that comes into the country to take and not give. They take by securing jobs and

32. For more on wars expanding opportunities for inclusion see: Parker, C. S. 2009. *Fighting for Democracy: Black Veterans and the Struggle Against White Supremacy in the Postwar South*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Klinkner, P. A. and R. M. Smith. 1999. *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Tichenor, D. J. 2002. *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Moskos, C. C. 1988. *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community*. New York: The Free Press.

33. Honig, B. 2001. *Democracy and the Foreigner*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 75.

income thought to be for their own benefit and not for advancing the success of the larger community.³⁴ Thus, the supercitizen immigrant that enlists in the military is one that is publicly demonstrating, or performing, to their community that they are in fact givers and not takers. Community members are not able to determine whether other immigrants who fail to demonstrate their patriotism are the deserving or undeserving, the givers or the takers, the “good” or the “bad” immigrant.

Yet, what if giving is not enough to demonstrate eligibility for naturalization? By giving, I’m referring to the sacrifice non-citizen service members endure while giving up years away from their families, time away from advancing their chosen careers, time from doing anything else, and ultimately life and limb. If a non-citizen service member provides what is asked of them in the military and are denied access and inclusion as a political member upon completion of their duties, then what are they? They’re non-citizen U.S. veterans and some with the unfortunate fate as deported U.S. veterans. Another American underclass.

In chapter 2, I illustrated how the transformation of citizenship-for-service to service-for-citizenship created the mechanisms for the production of a veteran underclass with the incorporation of a three-year service probationary period prior to submitting naturalization applications. In doing so, Congress removed any protections to guaranteed citizenship-for-service prompting a dilemma where non-citizen service members could be denied citizenship and could also potentially be deported. The questions are, what can be done to change and stop the creation of another American underclass? Where is such a change going to take place? And who is going to raise the claims for change? I suggest that in order to reconcile the principles of this republic found in the citizen-soldier tradition, the current necessary and sufficient conditions for non-citizen service members must include the performance of obligations and duties as sufficient for such citizenship during both peace and wartime.

34. Ibid., 75-77.

6.3 A Theory of Martial Citizenship

6.3.1 Necessary Condition - Martial Patriotism

In a civic republic like the U.S. that blends liberal and republican thought to represent and protect the interests of its residents and citizens, access to the formal relationship between the state and the individual is usually determined by blood (through parent that is an American citizen) or by land (birthright citizenship and naturalization). The idea of utilizing the military as a pathway to citizenship was introduced after the conditions for citizenship and naturalization were established. However, the citizen-soldier tradition has been practiced even before the colonies ratified the Constitution. Indeed, the idea of having to serve in the military to maintain one's citizenship, otherwise known as martial patriotism,³⁵ has been a staple of American citizenship up until the Nixon Administration introduced the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973.

Cecilia O'Leary contends that, "[a]fter the Civil War, the idealization of heroic male warriors competed with both patriotism's antebellum association with virtuous men and Emancipation's promise that America would live up to its civic ideals."³⁶ The end of the Civil War created an opportunity for nationalists to reimagine what it meant to be a loyal American based on participation and performance in the war.³⁷ The turn of the 20th century witnessed the height of male centered martial patriotism in the U.S. Historian Lucy Salyer contends that during WWI martial patriotism along with racial nativism were the two main concepts that organized access to membership.³⁸ In other words, to raise full citizenship claims one had to either serve in the military or have the preferred racial and gendered characteristics, or both. Yet, I argue, that racial nativism became the deciding factor and

35. For more on martial patriotism see: O'Leary, C. E. 1999. *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Salyer, L. E. 2004. "Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service, and U.S. Citizenship Policy, 1918-1935." *The Journal of American History*, 847-846.

36. O'Leary, *To Die For*, 29.

37. *Ibid.*, 29.

38. Salyer, "Baptims by Fire," 848.

ideology for raising claims to citizenship during WWI and all subsequent conflicts. As I outlined in chapter 2, members of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (COIN) excluded non-citizens from receiving legal citizenship—despite serving in the military during WWI—for failure to meet the racial requirements for naturalization. Although O’Leary argues that ideas of martial patriotism were beginning to change after the Civil War to establish the military as symbols of patriotism and virtuous citizenship. The seeds for racial nativism regarding naturalization were also sown when Congress codified the laws of the nation in what were known as the Revised Statutes in 1875.

Martial patriotism provided more symbolism than substance to racially marginalized groups and immigrants. Yet, the concept of martial patriotism is what mobilized America during the Great War. Salyer reminds us that when WWI started at least one out of every six military aged males was a foreigner who became targets of military recruiters. She states further that:

[T]he government did not leave the soldier to make up his own mind but rather encouraged and at times even demanded that the alien soldier become one-hundred-percent American. In speeches, posters, and most important, in law, the U.S. government made military service the foundation of American citizenship, seeking to turn American citizens into soldiers, and alien soldiers into American citizens.³⁹

She would later argue, however, that access to citizenship for non-citizen service members came with important caveats. Notably, that Asians, although actively recruited for service, were barred from naturalization due to their race; despite their service contributions. Thus, the fundamental contradictions between martial patriotism, on one hand, and racial nativism, on the other, revealed itself when Asian WWI U.S. veterans took the country to court to challenge the state to live up to its republican ideals.

However, instead of living up to its ideals and teachings of martial patriotism since the end of the Civil War, Congress decided to change what martial patriotism meant to citizenship. It was no longer a foundation for citizenship, but a factor that could potentially

39. *Ibid.*, 851.

provide naturalization dependent upon another criteria for membership: racial nativism. In changing what the ideal of martial patriotism meant for citizens and, more importantly, non-citizens, Congress simultaneously changed how non-citizens could use military service as the basis for making claims to citizenship. Thus, martial patriotism became a necessary condition for citizenship, but no longer sufficient for enfranchisement.

Stated differently, the transition from citizenship-for-service to service-for-citizenship was a change that produced more power for the state and created more inequality for non-citizen service members. In doing so, racial nativists and what I identify as conditional republicans reduce the value of military service for immigrants while preserving the symbolism for its citizens.

6.3.2 Sufficient Condition - Performance in a Civic Republic

Mary McThomas advances an almost identical claim to Claire Snyder when she contends, “enlisting in the military is one of the avenues to receiving deferred action under the DACA program and is similarly included in the proposed federal DREAM Act. Yet, military service is asking an individual to potentially sacrifice her life. Such a perilous request cannot be one of the only ways to perform citizenship.”⁴⁰ McThomas goes on to suggest that other types of civic performances should recognize immigrants as members of the political community. Some of these activities include participating in PTA meetings, attending parades and other civic festivals, and sweeping one’s driveway to name a few. The similarities between Snyder and McThomas stem from advancing performance in civic activities as a potential threshold that should provide membership for marginalized groups, women and undocumented immigrants, respectively. Both scholars ground their arguments in theories of gender, in particular through Judith Butler’s⁴¹ notion of performativity. Butler ultimately concludes

40. McThomas, M. 2016. *Performing Citizenship: Undocumented Migrants in the United States*. New York: Routledge: 54.

41. Butler, J. 1990. *Gender Trouble*. New York: Routledge.

that gender is not a natural condition, but instead gender is a historically and socially constructed identity. In other words, gender, like racial categories, is fluid and can change when a human body embraces and adopts specific roles that range from acting “masculine” to acting “feminine” in everyday life.

Snyder directly engages gender and performativity to argue that the detriment to civic republicanism originates from its two main pillars: equal participation in the military and in politics. For Snyder, participating in the military is a prerequisite for both citizenship and masculinity. Thus, “the masculine character of the ideal undermines the participation of female individuals in civic and martial practices because these practices constitute not just citizenship but also masculinity.”⁴² The historical exclusion of females from serving in the military prompts Snyder to question, to what extent, if at all, could civic republicanism resolve its inherent contradiction fueling gender inequality and subsequent lack of recognition as a full member. Snyder suggests that civic identity—like gender identity—is constructed through the idea of performance. She is working under the assumption that civic identities within civic republicanism are pre-political. For instance, a person is not born a citizen, but instead through the performance of civic acts like serving in the military and participating in politics, that person can become accepted as a citizen and member of social and political society. Military service is both a type of performance that promotes the inclusive construction of a citizen while simultaneously excluding females from participating in one of the acts that would recognize them as full and equal citizens.

McThomas, on the other hand, also utilizes Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, but mainly as a point of departure for a new conception of citizenship. She argues that performing gender and performing citizenship are exercised in different ways. “[G]ender binaries,” McThomas asserts, “are called into question by performances that do not enact accepted gendered behaviors and dress. In contrast, performing citizenship relies on the idea that

42. Snyder, R. C. 1999. *Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition*. New York: Roman & Littlefield Publishers: 2.

the performance is the same; what differs, and what can potentially undermine existing categories, is that the unseen difference between similar performers leads to very different circumstances.”⁴³ For McThomas, the main difference between gendered performances and citizenship performances is that in performing gender the performer is being inspected for any irregularities (i.e., physical appearance, behaviors, etc.) concerning their socially assigned role that can be seen publicly. In performing citizenship, according to McThomas, the performer is not in question, but instead the type of performance the individual has chosen to execute.

However, McThomas fails to recognize throughout *Performing Citizenship* that contemporary debates over undocumented immigrants are explicitly visible and continue to be racially profiled by enforcement agencies and local governments. For instance, in 2010 Arizona’s House of Representatives passed one of the most stringent anti-immigration bills known as SB 1070. Although the Arizona immigration law was ultimately deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, if put into practice, SB1070 would have provided police with an unchecked authority to question and intimidate any person who appears or sounds foreign. As such, people performing citizenship, particularly for contemporary undocumented immigrants are more likely to be racialized as undocumented. Moreover, McThomas presents a sanitized version of undocumented migrants which blatantly disregards conversations about racial formation and its relationship to citizenship. Unfortunately, *Performing Citizenship* overlooks three main concepts surrounding the construction of and access to citizenship in America: (1) racialization; (2) illegality; and (3) republicanism.

First, McThomas treats processes of racialization as separate from how the state engages individuals through legal status. In arguing the limitations of liberal theory, McThomas states that structural racism is a characteristic that has already been exposed as one of liberal theory’s critiques. She further states that lacking citizenship is another way that

43. McThomas, M. 2016. *Performing Citizenship: Undocumented Migrants in the United States*. New York: Routledge: 32.

a group is made invisible.⁴⁴ Although McThomas is correct in that legal status is indeed a marker that renders individuals invisible, she neglects the historical connection between race and citizenship. From its inception, citizenship was restricted to wealthy white men. When citizenship rights were expanded with the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments legislators implemented racial restrictions on Chinese immigrants who attempted to enter the country or residents seeking to improve their legal status with the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. Citizenship became increasingly tied to race and nationality during the era of immigrant admissions quotas. The glaring omission of American immigration history alone and how it informs processes of racialization particularly at the turn of the 20th century is fundamental to understanding the contemporary undocumented immigrant debate. The potential political outcomes for undocumented immigrants cannot be fully understood without an adequate account of how race is operationalized in performing citizenship.

Second, for McThomas, the idea of “illegality” is employed without a careful consideration to what constitutes an immigrant as “illegal.” She claims that, “[a]n individual is ‘illegal’ because current policy has deemed them so.”⁴⁵ “[U]ndocumented migrants,” McThomas contends, “are defined in terms of how they stand in relation to the state, hence the strange conception of an individual herself being ‘illegal,’ as opposed to an individual committing an illegal act.”⁴⁶ The emphasis is not on the human body, but instead on the juridical status a particular human body represents in America: either authorized or unauthorized. Yet, Anthropologist Nicholas De Genova reminds us that the production of “illegality” is more than just a juridical status. He himself states, “‘Illegality’ is lived through a palpable sense of deportability, that is the possibility of deportation.”⁴⁷ Writing particularly about the unique impact “illegality” has on Mexican immigrants in the U.S. De Genova asserts, “‘illegality’

44. Ibid., 16.

45. Ibid., 11.

46. Ibid., 16.

47. De Genova, N. 2006. “The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant ‘Illegality.’” In *Latinos and Citizenship*, edited by S. Oboler. New York: Palgrave MacMillan: 62.

provides an apparatus for sustaining Mexican migrants' vulnerability and tractability as workers whose labor power, inasmuch as it is deportable, becomes an eminently disposable commodity."⁴⁸ As a result, reducing "illegality" to a juridical status makes invisible the apparent reality that "illegality" is also the proximity undocumented immigrants inhabit toward detention and deportation. Therefore, a more nuanced description of "illegality" should be taken into consideration when engaging ideas that result in being removed from the state and potentially from family or loved ones.

Finally, McThomas seems to narrow the discussion on the production of patriotism in the civic republican tradition. The main issue, for McThomas, is that civic republicanism is yet another ideology that produces citizenship based on the fundamental relationship between the individual and the state. The connection between the individual citizen and the state leads McThomas to suggest that citizens grow an emotional attachment which can be, "described as a version of patriotism."⁴⁹ The sense of patriotism that citizens may potentially feel toward the state is where McThomas reveals that undocumented migrants may in fact harness and express those same feelings toward the U.S. However, she maintains that since undocumented immigrants exhibit these same feelings of patriotism yet fail to be recognized by the state as citizens that civic republicanism should be transformed to allow for mechanisms that provide undocumented migrants the ability to be recognized as civic nationalist. While this may (or should) be true, McThomas transforms a discussion surrounding rights and responsibilities that are traditionally the parameters of civic republican ideology to one about citizen attachments to the state. More importantly, she misses what civic republicanism brings to republican thought.

Civic republicanism is more than a "duty-based framework" that sparks an emotional attachment to the state. Civic republicanism encompasses the added component of the citizen-soldier tradition where would be citizens must embrace the public sphere through

48. Ibid., 62.

49. McThomas, M. 2016. *Performing Citizenship: Undocumented Migrants in the United States*. New York: Routledge: 24.

participation in the military and in politics. It is important to keep in mind that civic republicanism is not meant to resolve all of the issues between liberal and republican thought. Civic republicanism is at best a compromise between liberal and republican thought that facilitates a space for nation-states to resolve their issues amid differing political attachments and commitments. The citizen-soldier tradition as noted above has given marginalized groups a platform for making claims to full citizenship rights. I contend that the citizen-soldier tradition can also be utilized to make claims on the fundamental principles of citizenship, individuality, and patriotism by racially marginalized non-citizen service members.

In the last decade, there has been a surge of scholarship in political science chronicling the relationship between African American military experience and republicanism.⁵⁰ On one end, scholars have established the scope of citizenship discourse between some inclusive liberal approach to some exclusionary racist ideology.⁵¹ On the other end, are studies that urge scholars to interrogate the utility of inclusionary approaches that seek African American advancement. Ronald Krebs notes that, “the fate of African American claims-making can be understood only if one is sensitive to the differences within the inclusive category—that is, between liberalism and republicanism.”⁵² Christopher Parker similarly contends that an examination of republicanism can reveal how blacks who served in the military during WWII and the Korean War marshalled their military experiences as the basis for claims-making. Indeed, Parker concludes that African American military veterans embraced and adopted a type of republicanism he identifies as “black republicanism,” which should be distinguished from traditional understandings of republicanism. For Parker, black republicanism is, “a

50. For more on the black experience and republicanism see: Philpot, T. S. 2017. *Conservative but Not Republican: The Paradox of Party Identification and Ideology among African Americans*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Parker, C. S. 2009. *Fighting for Democracy: Black Veterans and the Struggle Against White Supremacy in the Postwar South*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Krebs, R. R. 2006. *Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Sullivan, M. J. 2014. “By right of service: the military as a pathway to earned citizenship.” *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 1-15; Parker, C. S. 2007. “When Politics Becomes Protest: Black Veterans and Political Activism in the Postwar South.” *Journal of Politics*, 71, 1, 113-131.

51. Klinkner and Smith, *The Unsteady March*.

52. Krebs, *Fighting for Rights*, 120.

response to the domination that was imposed on black Southerners during the Jim Crow era.”⁵³

Black republicanism is a historically situated concept that attempts to explain how black veterans in the post-WWII era relied on their military training as the catalyst driving black veterans to assume community leadership positions during the Civil Rights Movement. At the heart of black republicanism are the ideas of freedom and domination. Parker is ultimately concerned with white supremacy and how it ravaged and destroyed black mobility and advancement opportunities at the turn of the 20th century through state sanctioned policies that economically exploited and discriminated against blacks in varied ways. Thus, Parker advances a causal model of black militant insurgency during the post-WWII era where blacks that served in the military would later become leaders in the civil rights movement due to their training and experiences in the military that equipped blacks with a more militant variant of republicanism.

What makes black republicanism an ideology created from within the black community and not just another offshoot of traditional republicanism can be better understood by examining black allegiances. Although a majority of African Americans were committed to American political values, white supremacy and domination had done more to drive blacks to create an adjacent society or black public sphere and built a stronger allegiance to. For this reason, black republicanism should not be confused as advancing republicanism. Black republicanism as an ideology is reactive and advances black communities by confronting oppressive structures in society. More specifically, black republicanism attempts to abolish forms of domination imposed on black communities by engaging in practices that challenge sustained beliefs that blacks were inferior. Thus, serving in the military for black republicans, “presented an opportunity for emancipation, a means of securing liberty from an internal enemy that robbed them of their liberty and dominated them in increasingly creative ways.”⁵⁴

53. Parker, *Fighting for Democracy*, 80.

54. *Ibid.*, 83.

In other words, the performance of blacks in the U.S. military not only provided them with skills but also the collateral to make sustained claims to full citizenship rights.

Michael John Sullivan is correct when he writes that Parker's concept, "provides a helpful starting point for interpreting the fight to claim earned citizenship by other disenfranchised minority groups."⁵⁵ Earned citizenship, as Sullivan conceives it is a normative argument suggesting that legal citizenship should be conferred to unauthorized immigrants for their loyalty and service in the military.⁵⁶ The idea of earned citizenship derives its explanatory power from the advocacy middle class Mexican American organizations marshalled in support of non-citizen service members acquiring legal citizenship. In reality, organizations like the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the American G.I. Forum (AGIF) came to support non-citizen service members in the latter period of the Chicano Movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. That is to say, Mexican American civic organizations missed their opportunity to influence and potentially shape how citizenship-for-service should be granted since the criteria for the program was negotiated and ultimately finalized with the passage of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act.

As I mentioned in chapters four and five, the decline in access to citizenship-for-service would go virtually uncontested by Mexican American communities during its critical period of retrenchment. Hence, Sullivan neglects the development of brown respectability in Mexican American communities during the post-WWII era and instead centers his argument on a more progressive position during the Chicano Movement in the early 1970s. In doing so, Sullivan uses the Mexican American experience in WWII as the basis for earned citizenship. Yet, the WWII era is the decisive period where we begin to see a change prompting a decline in access to citizenship-for-service. For WWII non-citizen service members, the support from Mexican American civic organizations is glaringly absent. It seems as if Sullivan is cherry picking moments of high Mexican American military service with periods where Mexican

55. Sullivan, M. J. 2014. "By right of service: the military as a pathway to earned citizenship." *Politics, Groups, and Identities*: 2.

56. *Ibid.*, 1.

American civic organizations demonstrate strong support for non-citizen service members without paying attention to the historical antecedents informing their objection to the presence of Mexican immigrants in the first place.⁵⁷ A more compelling narrative would account for the dynamic development and evolution of Mexican American political ideologies that informed the parameters of Mexican American claims-making in the post-WWII era.

Another point Sullivan introduces is the idea of “*Tejano* republicanism,” which is the author’s attempt at overlaying the black republicanism framework onto the Mexican American experience.⁵⁸ At first glance, black republicanism as a liberating political ideology seems like it can be useful in explaining how other marginalized experiences in the military can lead to building a social and political insurgency. In contrast, middle-class Mexican Americans in the post-WWII period were less likely to make claims for more inclusive civil rights and instead buttressed policies advocating the assimilation and integration of Mexican origin people. The point that is being overlooked here by Sullivan is that the African American experience in the military, particularly at the turn of the twentieth century, is enormously different from what Mexican Americans encountered in the military.

Although African Americans and Mexican Americans alike were segregated in both social and military life, African Americans did not have to prove their identity as Americans. “*Tejano* republicanism” may very well be an ideology adopted by Texas Mexicans. However, the type of republicanism practiced by middle-class Mexican Americans does not coincide or parallel with that of black republicanism due to three important caveats: (1) the directionality of allegiances; (2) Mexican Americans’ claims to whiteness; and (3) brown respectability. If black republicanism centers its allegiance around black communities, then Mexican American republicanism is aligned more with traditional notions of republicanism.

The performance of military service from Mexican immigrants during WWII and the Korean War failed to mobilize Mexican American communities to advocate on their be-

57. To Sullivan’s credit, he does mention how Texas Mexican Americans sought to demarcate themselves from “newcomers” and Mexican migrants that went back to Mexico to evade the military draft.

58. *Tejano* is the Spanish term for Texan.

half. Upon performing the obligations and duties of citizenship in a relationship between the state and the individual, rights are owed to the individual if they are not whole. Just as much as it may be their responsibility to perform the duties of military troops when conscripted, the same principle demands that a conscripted service member be a citizen. When a nation-state undermines the fundamental principles of liberalism or republicanism, historically people have challenged the state for failing to live up to its ideals. When people fail to mobilize and challenge the state, for whatever reasons, when it undermines principles that built the community, then it can be argued that the community is in a state of tyranny.

6.4 Martial Citizenship

When the oppressed fail to be recognized by the state or the people then almost all hope is lost for change. Serving in the military for non-citizens regardless of the circumstances should equate to an invitation to join the social and political community. Access to citizenship-for-service should not be manipulated by elites (racial nativism) or dependent upon local communities that fail to show up (brown respectability) because it undermines the principles and ideals of civic-republicanism and by extension the citizen-soldier tradition. An alternative would be to bar all non-citizens from serving in the military this way no injustice can be further committed. But to entice and manipulate non-citizens through the symbols and commitments of American martial patriotism, then fail to incorporate them as political members is more than unjust. It's a reminder that naturalization in the U.S. continues to maintain racial nativist principles at its core.

A way to reconcile the injustice committed toward non-citizen service members impacted by the states denial of access to immediate citizenship for their military service is to refer back to policy that indeed facilitated and celebrated the principles of the citizen-soldier tradition. I am specifically talking about the Act of May 9, 1918. The basis for martial citizenship should not be interfered with by politics or preference. Instead, the basis for martial citizenship should rest on the sacrifice non-citizens are surrendering to the state for

the opportunity to be welcomed as a political equal. Through sacrifice, citizen and non-citizen alike learn and live the civic republican principles of patriotism, camaraderie, civic virtue. Before any service member enters the military, they are expected to pledge an oath:

I, [enlistees name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the order of the President of the United States and the order of the officers appointed over me, according to the regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.⁵⁹

When non-citizens take this oath it is more of a sacrifice compared to other members of the armed forces because they are essentially stating that they will support and defend the U.S. if they happen to enter into a conflict with their country of origin.

My idea of martial citizenship departs from other notions of performative citizenship detailed above since it centers sacrifice as the basis for citizenship-for-service. Claire Snyder's citizenship of civic practices revolves around other forms civic participation outside of the military to establish the basis for alternative forms of performing citizenship. However, Snyder's narrow focus on the patriarchal nature of martial patriotism leads her to believe that engaging in other forms of civic participation equates to the same type of service one performs in the military. She writes, "[t]he citizenship of civic practices inherent in the Citizen-Soldier tradition requires that individuals participate together in civic practices, if they want to become citizens. Only acting together as citizens can instill in us the affective bonds that form the necessary prerequisite for attending to what we have in common rather than what divides us."⁶⁰ Acting together as citizens can probably create bonds between people, but I argue that it's not being together that creates bonds. Instead, it's the sacrifice one endures with a fellow member of the political community while in uniform and particularly

59. Title 10, U.S. Code; Act of May 5, 1960. The commissioned officer oath is different beginning after the first sentence: "that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God." Title 5 U.S. Code 3331.

60. Snyder, R. C. 1999. *Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition*. New York: Roman & Littlefield Publishers: 9.

the trauma associated with such sacrifice.

You build bonds with other people when you are working for a similar goal under imperfect conditions. This is where fellowship and camaraderie are born. Like studying together with cohort mates for qualifying exams in graduate school and experiencing the results of that time together and also reflecting on the trauma leading up to exams. Donning a military uniform will not build bonds initially when new troops are introduced to their respective units. But, wearing the uniform demonstrates a commitment to advancing a similar goal or mission.

In an interview with AiirSource Military, prior to assuming his position as Secretary of Defense, then Marine Corps General Mattis answered questions from current and former military service members about his perspective and experiences in the military that spanned over 40 years. When asked about the leadership lesson he learned as a general grade officer that he wished he had known as a young company grade officer he wondered what made one company or battalion better than the other. Mattis notes that all enlisted Marines go through the same training regimen in boot camp. “All of them were recruited in America and were quality young men,” he recalls. According to Mattis, what made large units different were the junior leadership, in particular the junior non-commissioned officers:

Earning the trust and respect of your subordinates is critical. You simply have to earn that trust, you have to earn that respect every day, because when it’s all over and done with you’re not going to win any fights as a leader. Your troops are going to win those fights. There was another word I learned to prioritize as I evaluated units and that word was affection. It’s not popularity with all the favoritism that comes with trying to be a popular person as a leader. That’s a road to failure. But, affection that you create in a unit and an affection so strong that the troops will stick by one another, they’ll carry out the mission even in peril. And I bring this one up because I believe that kind of affection brings out self-discipline where people don’t want to let down the unit. And I think that if there is one lesson I learned along the way that the more you can build that kind of affection in a unit when the going gets tough, when people are getting shot down around you, it’ll pull together, it’ll pull through.⁶¹

61. Aiirsource Military. December 2016. “Interview with General James ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis – U.S. Defense Secretary.” YouTube video, 16:36. Posted December 2, 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gueJqRYqXbY>.

Sacrifice for a service member means something much bigger than the individual. It means they will endure hardship for the mission. They will at times forego their place in country or even the opportunity to participate in the political community so that their mates can carry on the mission. We saw a glimpse of this type of sacrifice during the first week of the American invasion of Iraq where the first American casualty was a 22-year-old Guatemalan immigrant, Lance Corporal Jose Gutierrez.⁶² Thus, a martial conception of citizenship will account for sacrifice as the basis for incorporation. In doing so, martial citizenship will begin to rectify the harm done to non-citizens that are not able to naturalize, have been denied naturalization, and repatriate deported U.S. veterans.

62. Honor the Fallen. 2018. *Military Times*. <https://thefallen.militarytimes.com/marine-lance-cpl-jose-gutierrez/256506>

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In July 2002, less than a year had passed since the attacks on 9/11 when then President George W. Bush issued Executive Order (EO) 13269, which established the terrorist attacks as a period of hostility and invoked §329 of the Immigration and Nationality (INA) of 1952. In doing so, Bush proclaimed an expedited path to naturalization for, “aliens and noncitizen nationals serving in an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of the United States during the period of the war against terrorists of global reach.”¹ As the wars in the Middle East continue to this day, EO 13269 has yet to be terminated by subsequent presidents. President Bush was not creating a new pathway for non-citizens serving in the military, but instead summoned the clause in the INA that exempts non-citizen service members from the usual requirements for naturalization. Most notably, the reduction of permanent residency from five years to one year during periods of hostilities. Keep in mind that Bush did not invoke any contemporary immigration or naturalization legislation. He used the tools that were available to him in an effort to drive up military recruitment and enlistments for an impending war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This event is important because it highlights how contemporary service-for-citizenship continues to have its origin in the 1952 INA. The sections in the INA (§328 and §329) that expedite the time to naturalization extends even further to the 1940 Nationality Act since the INA authors relied on the substance of the three-year probationary period as the basis for naturalization in the 1952 INA.² Essentially, Bush invoked the process that reduces a non-citizen service member’s time to apply for naturalization, but again, naturalization is not guaranteed. It sounds good on paper and may even be appealing to some considering the military as a pathway to legal citizenship. However, as I mentioned in chapter 2, citizenship-

1. Exec. Order No. 13269, 3 C.F.R. (2002) reprinted as amended in 8 U.S.C. §1440. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020703-24.html>

2. Report: Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, “Naturalization of Armed Forces Personnel.” 82nd Cong. (1952).

for-service was transformed into service-for-citizenship where non-citizen service members provide their life as collateral in an effort to secure legal citizenship more quickly. This pathway disguises the idea of citizenship as a reward for military service without notifying non-citizens that legal citizenship is not guaranteed. This process is not only unfair to non-citizens risking their lives for the opportunity to become political members, it's unjust.

Hence, I advance a theory of martial citizenship based on personal sacrifice in the military as sufficient for fulfilling the requirements for naturalization. As I argued in chapter 6, an effective way for change in the U.S. military has been through sustained protests and legal challenges from organizations that advance claims based on their excluded gender, sexuality, and race. In other words, any chance at a successful challenge at reforming service-for-citizenship to a process that is more equitable and just (e.g., WWI) will require advancing claims based on the identity of the excluded. In this case, the race, gender, and sexuality of U.S. veterans that are unable to acquire or are denied naturalization.

Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the strategies that are less likely to result in equitable change for non-citizen service members. When Congress changed citizenship-for-service laws in 1940 one of the groups most affected by the change were Mexican immigrants. One in five Mexican immigrants who served in the Army were able to naturalize at the end of WWII, compared to four out of five Italian immigrants or three out of five German immigrants. What failed to occur after citizenship-for-service was transformed into a process with more obstacles at acquiring legal citizenship was a clear and target response from local community that were most affected by the increase in regulations. Mexican American communities in Texas and the Southwest did not raise claims on the state for reform since the change impacted Mexican non-citizen service members. Mexican American communities failed to show support for Mexican immigrants in the same way that Japanese Americans protested on behalf of racially excluded Asian WWI veterans from taking advantage of the Act of May 9, 1918.

Middle class Mexican Americans made the decision to focus on the advancement of

Mexican American communities than adopt issues critical to the survival and advancement of Mexican immigrants. In doing so, Mexican American civic organizations established a particular type of political ideology and program premised on a politics of respectability. Through what I identify as “brown respectability,” middle class Mexican Americans and civic leaders attempted to pull up the U.S.-Mexico border into their communities in an effort to separate the “good” Mexican (U.S. citizens) from the “bad” Mexican (Mexican national).

The concept of brown respectability is a conceptual tool that helps reveal the scope of political opportunities within Mexican communities in the U.S. during what Chicano scholar Mario Garcia calls the, “Mexican American Generation.” Brown respectability departs from the type of respectability politics observed in black communities due to the consideration of formal citizenship. That does not mean that black communities have resolved the struggle between full and secondary citizenship. It does mean, however, that immigrants in Mexican American communities are secondarily marginalized on dimensions of race, class, gender and sexuality with the added dimension of citizenship. Thus, I argue that Mexican American civic organizations neglected the decline of citizenship-for-service as an issue since Mexican non-citizen service members were outside of the scope of their ideology and political program.

Brown respectability can be used to analyze Mexican American communities since the turn of the 20th century. However, much more research and analyzes is needed to try to use the concept with any other Latino sub-group due to differing immigrant trajectories and histories of oppression in the U.S. For instance, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans will have a different relationship to a politics of respectability due to migrating to the U.S. more recently³ as refugees and asylum seekers because they were fleeing civil wars or personal persecution and violence.⁴ In other words, due to the lack of generational residence in the

3. By recent arrivals, I am referring to immigrants that came to the U.S. in large waves after national origin quotas were abolished in 1965.

4. For more on Central American migration to the U.S. see: Abrego, L. J. 2014. *Sacrificing Families: Navigating Laws, Labor, and Love Across Borders*. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Gonzales, A. 2013. *Reform Without Justice: Latino Migrant Politics and the Homeland Security State*. New York: Oxford

U.S there are less established Central and South American communities with U.S. citizens as the majority over an extended period of time and development. For instance, table 7.1 illustrates the top five Latinx subgroups in the U.S. along with the size of their population, percentage of members with legal citizenship, and the percentage that are foreign born. The first two groups due to their population size in the U.S., Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, have lower foreign-born percentages compared to Salvadoran, Cubans, and Dominicans. Part of the reason why scholars should refrain from utilizing brown respectability with groups that recently arrived is because citizens and immigrants alike in these groups are experiencing and navigating relationships to the state concurrently. Meaning, their communities and households are more likely to be mixed citizenship statuses without a clear majority.

In attempting to figure out what factors contributed to a situation where military

Table 7.1: Latinx Origin Profiles, 2015

Latinx Subgroup	Population	Citizenship	Foreign Born
Mexicans	35,758,000	77%	32%
Puerto Ricans	5,371,000	99%	2%
Salvadorans	2,174,000	60%	59%
Cubans	2,116,000	77%	56%
Dominicans	1,866,000	75%	54%

Source: Table adapted from: Flores, A. 2015. "How the U.S. Hispanic Population is Changing." Hispanic origin profiles, 2015. The 14 largest U.S. Hispanic groups by origin. Pew Research Center.

veterans can be and are denied citizenship and veterans can be and are deported, I found, similarly as Cathy Cohen did, that we cannot identify political elites and institutions as the sole culprits in creating inequality. For instance, Megan Ming Francis has contended that we should view the role of black civil rights organizations as critical actors of state development:

The problem with top-down accounts of political change is that they privilege institutions over citizen agency and thus understate the role of civil society and different forms of civic activity. Just as it is important to consider the way institutions shape the development of the American political system, it is just as necessary to take seriously

the role that black civil society via civil rights organizations play in state formation.⁵

Relatedly, I argue that we should look at how civic organizations are also advancing state development when they fail to respond to the state acquiring more power and reducing access to enfranchisement. Civic organizations from racially marginalized groups that abstain or neglect to take up issues that affect their communities are sending signals to the dominant society that they endorse existing power and institutional structures. The support provided by abstaining or failing to challenge the status quo offers political elites and institutions the power to continue advancing similar strategies and goals across institutions and power structures. If change is what needed to advance access to resources and institutions and not just the most privileged segments of particular communities then a more progressive politics based on racially identifying as the excluded structural group is more likely to provide the basis for making such claims. Essentially, the struggle to reform service-for-citizenship to some equitable version of citizenship-for-service requires organizations with an ideology and political program outside of a politics of respectability. What that program is, is the task I set for myself and other scholars interested in what reform to an unjust system of service-for-citizenship can potentially look like.

7.1 Limitations

Although I do attempt to provide an extensive account surrounding the factors that drove the decline in access to citizenship-for-service for non-citizen service members, there are some glaring omissions and limitations to the research presented in this dissertation. First, Congressional development of citizenship-for-service policy after it was codified in the 1940 Nationality Act is missing. The legislative time period between 1940 to 1965 demonstrates how the codified version of citizenship-for-service policy marked a path dependent juncture where subsequent legislation followed the 1940 Nationality Act's three-year probationary

5. Francis, M. M. 2014. *Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State*. New York: Cambridge University Press: 15.

period, most notably in the 1952 INA and the 1965 Hart-Celler Act. This time period also encompasses the development of the American foreign legion with the passage of the 1950 Lodge Act, which sought to recruit non-citizens exclusively from Eastern European countries in exchange for American citizenship after five years of honorable service. The Lodge Act guaranteed citizenship after the completion of five years of service. Yet, the 1940 Nationality Act established that citizenship would no longer be guaranteed for the sake of a uniform rule of naturalization.

Second, confining the project to the trajectory of citizenship-for-service policy between 1918 to 1965 limited the scope of analysis at the community level. Middle class Mexican American civic organizations in the post-war period like the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the American G.I. Forum (AGIF) eventually, during the Vietnam War, become sympathetic to issues impacting the acquisition of legal citizenship for non-citizen service members as Michael John Sullivan notes.⁶ However, setting the parameters up to 1965 allowed for an investigation focused on responses from the community level to the changes in citizenship-for-service policy. As I mentioned in chapter 4, Mexican American civic organizations committed to brown respectability willfully neglected issues concerning Mexican immigrants and by extension Mexican non-citizen service members. When the opportunity did present itself with the Alberto Gonzales case, LULAC and AGIF symbolically stood in solidarity with Gonzales but failed to initiate any substance response to his deportation. From the data I collected, there was a dearth of urgency, or none at all, from Mexican American leaders when it came to the deportations of Mexican veterans. Yet, the advocacy over non-citizen service issues changes during the Chicano Movement, which is outside of the scope of this project.

Third, another aspect that is missing is a larger conversation over Mexican non-citizen service members themselves and their struggle to acquire legal citizenship, which is also a

6. Sullivan, M. J. 2014. "By right of service: the military as a pathway to earned citizenship." *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 1-15.

part of further work to be completed. Mexican non-citizen service members garnered support not from Mexican Americans or the U.S., but from Mexico and their consulates located in the U.S. During WWII, the Mexican government and President Manuel Avila Camacho were under immense pressure from Mexican consulates in the U.S. and the Mexican press to protect the rights of Mexicans residing in the U.S. In an effort to continue the “good neighbor” policy with the U.S., the Camacho administration advised its consulates to invite Mexican nationals to register for the draft and reassure Mexican citizens that serving in the U.S. military would not revoke their Mexican citizenship. Although Mexico was not prepared to engage in full war with the Axis powers, they still supported the war effort and wanted become an important contributor for any post-war plans. At the wars end, Mexican immigrant American veterans would find themselves in naturalization limbo where some hesitated to return back to Mexico and others experienced barriers to naturalization despite honorably serving a foreign flag and meeting service requirements.

Finally, this project does not engage contemporary debates over citizenship-for-service. I omit this connection for two reasons: to situate the political history of citizenship-for-service in its rightful place at the turn of the 20th century and the contemporary period is outside of the time parameters. Attempting to analyze contemporary debates over non-citizen service members and their pursuit of legal citizenship without accounting for the origins is like diagnosing the symptoms of an illness without figuring out where the issue stems from in the first place. Once we have a better understanding for the origins of the decline in access to citizenship-for-service only then can we begin to analyze and think about the symptoms.

7.2 Next Steps

The immediate next steps for this project are to address the limitations outlined above. This involves including at least two more chapters. The first additional chapter will engage citizenship-for-service policy in Congress between 1940 to 1965. Equally important, is an-

other chapter that will engage Mexican non-citizen service members and their pursuit for legal citizenship with the help of the Mexican government. This chapter will also cover to what extent, if at all, Mexican American civic organizations aided or neglected non-citizen service member issues, on one hand, and/or supported Mexican consulates, on the other.

This project will also benefit from expanding the scope to include the Vietnam War and subsequent change in strategies and ideologies among Mexican American communities. Doing so, will provide the space to interrogate the extent brown respectability may have shaped the political ideologies that emerged during the Chicana/o Movement. My hunch is that brown respectability provided a new generation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans an option to resist and challenge norms and ideas of respectability to establish a different survival strategy focused on challenging existing power structures instead of endorsing them.

The larger goal is to examine subsequent large conflicts, like the Vietnam War and Gulf War, and their implications for non-citizen service members in an effort to arrive at contemporary conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan with conceptual tools in hand to better understand how immigrants can serve in the military without a guarantee to legal citizenship.

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