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FACING REVOLUTIONARY REALITIES: UNDERSTANDING HIGH-INTENSITY STATE SPONSORSHIP OF NON-STATE ACTORS

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KATHRYN ANN LINDQUIST

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Table of Contents

Abstract	v
Acronyms	vii
List of Tables	viii
List of Figures	x
Acknowledgements	xi
Part I: Explaining HISS	1
Chapter 1: Introduction	2
HISS: More is Different	4
The Landscape: Preoccupations in the Existing Literature	10
Summary of the Revolutionary Realities Theory	15
Research Design and Methodology	17
Summary of Findings	23
Contributions	25
Plan of the Dissertation	26
Chapter 2: Revolutionary Realities: A Theory of High Intensity State Sponsorship of Non-State Actors	32
Introduction	32
Review of Literature: Two Competing Explanations	36
The Revolutionary Realities Theory of HISS	50
Joint Necessity of the Conditions for HISS Adoption	76
Conclusion	84
Part II: Quantitative Evidence	86
Chapter 3: The Patterns and Causes of HISS: Introducing the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset	87
Introduction	87
HISS in the SPFS Dataset	89
Entry Type	114
International Revolutionary Ideology	120
Barriers to Conventional Military Operations Abroad Against Rivals	133
Causal Conditions and HISS Outcomes: A Medium-N Study	142
Conclusion	152
Chapter 4: Revolutionary Realities vs. Alternative Explanations: Statistical Analysis with the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset	155
Introduction	155
Hypotheses: Revolutionary Realities and the Alternatives	157
Methodology	165
Results and Discussion: RR Single Factors and Alternative Explanations	172
Results and Discussion: The Revolutionary Realities Theory, Triple-Interactions	188
Conclusion: Evaluating the Hypotheses	204

Part III: Case Study Evidence 211
Chapter 5: Case Selection, Evidence, and Sources for Qualitative Analysis 212
Case Overviews 212
Case Selection Logics 214
What Constitutes Evidence? 223
Sources 227

Chapter 6: Non-Institutionalized Entry and HISS Adoption in Iran and Sudan 231
Introduction 231
Iran and HISS: Congruency of Necessary Conditions and HISS Outcome 234
Non-Institutionalized Entry and Domestic Political Process in Iran 251
Revolutionary Realities in Sudan 264
Conclusion: The Role of Entry Type in HISS Adoption 279

Chapter 7: Ideology and Sponsorship Patterns in the People's Republic of China and Democratic Kampuchea 282
Introduction 282
China and HISS: Congruency of Necessary Conditions and HISS Outcome 286
Marxism, Maoism, and (Inter)National Liberation as Revolutionary Ideology 298
Democratic Kampuchea: National Chauvinism and Non-Adoption of HISS 313
Conclusion 335

Chapter 8: HISS and Barriers to Conventional Military Operations Abroad in Cuba 337
Introduction 337
Cuba and High-Intensity State Sponsorship Adoption: A Classic Case 341
The Cuban Angolan Operation: When Barriers to Conventional Operations Fall 379
Conclusion: HISS as International Relations 392

Part IV: Extensions and Limitations 398
Chapter 9: HISS Miss: Nicaragua and Non-Adoption of Sponsorship under the Sandinistas 399
Introductions 399
Revolutionary Realities Conditions and HISS Outcome 403
Why Not HISS: Accounting for HISS Non-Adoption in Nicaragua 420
Conclusion: Future Development of the RR Theory 442

Chapter 10: Conclusion 449
Triangulating Conclusion on Revolutionary Realities and Patterns of HISS Adoption 449
Additional Patterns within the Case Studies 456
HISS in the United States: What the Revolutionary Realities Theory Can Reveal 464
Final Thoughts and Directions for Further Research 474

Appendix A: Codebook for the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Database 478

Appendix B: Supplementary Materials for Chapter 3 486
Appendix B.1 HPTG List 486
Appendix B.2 Dependent Variable Specifications and Resultant Observation Summaries 487
Appendix B.3 Additional HISS Internal Validity Assessments 490
Appendix B.4 HISS and Entry Type Coding Notes and Alternative Specifications 491
Appendix B.5 Constructing the International Revolutionary Ideology Scores 493
Appendix B.6 Full Text of the Preamble to the Constitution of Algeria 496
Appendix B.7 Results from Alternative Measures of Ideology Score and HISS 498
Appendix B.8 Constitution Scores Over Time 500
Appendix B.9 Barriers Measures and Alternative HISS Specification 503
Appendix B.10 Non-HISS Years 504
Appendix B.11: Ideology Measurements and South America 505

Appendix C: Supplementary Materials and Robustness Checks for Chapter 4 506
Appendix C.1 Robustness for International Revolutionary Ideology Score 506
Appendix C.2 Robustness and Alternative Specifications for Entry 508
Appendix C.3 Robustness and Alternative Specifications for Democracy 510
Appendix C.4 Robustness and Alternative Specifications for Barriers to Conventional Operations Abroad 511
Appendix C.5 Alternative Capabilities and Capabilities Ratios Test 513
Appendix C.6 Alternative DV and Model Specifications for Revolutionary Realities Triple Interactions (4 Groups+ and No HPTG) 515
Appendix C.7 Alternative DV and Model Specifications for Revolutionary Realities Triple Interactions (5 Year Periods Group Counts) 517
Appendix C.8 Alternative Specification for the Barriers measure in RR Triple Interaction Models 519
Appendix C.9 Duration Dependence in HISS Observations 522
Appendix C.10 Hazard Model Robustness Checks 523
Appendix C.11 Duration Dependence and Testing the Proportional Hazard Assumption 525
Appendix C.12 Hazard Model with Correction for Non-Proportional Ideology Score 527

References 528

Supplementary Materials in External Files (available online)
State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset (Leader-Year)
State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset (Country-Year)

Abstract

States that sponsor non-state armed actors as a central pillar of their foreign policy have long had an out-sized impact on global affairs, but academic research has rarely studied this distinct pattern of state sponsorship. This dissertation asks the question, "Under what conditions do states adopt a policy of high-intensity sponsorship of armed non-state actors (HISS)?" The project identifies HISS states as those that have sponsored a) numerous foreign groups b) groups outside the state's region and c) highly terroristic groups in particular. I argue that HISS constitutes a unique pattern of state sponsorship that is associated with a distinct set of causal factors and mechanisms which are, as yet, not well understood in the academic literature. This dissertation offers a novel account of HISS adoption, the Revolutionary Realities theory. Drawing from the international relations literature on individual state-group linkages and the comparative politics literature on political revolutions, I contend that three, jointly necessary and mutually-reinforcing causal factors lead to state adoption of HISS. These are: non-institutionalized regime entry to power, the espousal of an international revolutionary ideology, and high structural barriers to conventional military operations abroad against rivals.

This research then takes a multi-method approach to testing this theory against the empirical record. I present new quantitative evidence from an original dataset constructed for this research on the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship. Using random effects, general estimating equations, and survival models on these novel data, the dissertation tests hypotheses from the literature against my own theory. In statistical analysis, I find support for correlations between my theory's variables and HISS outcomes and less consistent support for alternative accounts. Seven case studies are then employed to test for congruency of the theory's factors and outcomes and to present process tracing evidence that the theorized causal mechanisms are

operative. In each chapter, I demonstrate the mutually-reinforcing nature of all three factors in leading to a state's adoption of HISS. The case studies also advance claims of joint necessity by focusing more heavily on one individual factor in each comparison case. One case-comparison chapter study is Iran 1979 and Sudan 1989, and the second compares China post-1949 and the Democratic Kampuchea/Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. I then have a within-case study chapter on revolutionary Cuba, which changed its sponsorship pattern over time, relying more heavily on its conventional military apparatus to conduct its internationalist foreign policy after initially adopting HISS in the early 1960s. Finally, a single case study on non-adoption of HISS in Sandinista's Nicaragua, mispredicted by the Revolutionary Realities account, probes the limitations and extensions of theory. Overall, I find that my theory of high-intensity state sponsorship in the post-WWII era even offers insight into the outlier case of US HISS adoption and is broadly consistent with the evidence from a number of cases across time and space.

Acronyms

ARDE	Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COW	Correlates of War
CPK	Communist Party of Kampuchea
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
EPS	Sandinista Popular Army
FAR	Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front
GEE	General Estimating Equations
GMD	Guomingdang
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HISS	High-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors
HPTG	High-Profile, Terroristic Group
ILD	International Liaison Department (China)
IRC	Council for the Islamic Revolution
IRP	Islamic Republican Party
JGRN	Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (Nicaragua)
MENA	Middle East/North Africa
MID	Militarized interstate dispute
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAG	Non-State Armed Group
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
ND	National Directorate (Nicaragua)
NIF	National Islamic Front
OAS	Organization of American States
OPSAAL	Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America
PAIC	Islamic Arab People's Conference
PAIGC	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
PKK	Kurdistan Worker's Party
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PRC	People's Republic of China
RR	Revolutionary Realities
SPFS	State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship
SADF	South African Defense Force
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
TNA	Transitional National Assembly of Sudan
UCDP/PRIO	Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo
UN	United Nations
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

List of Tables

Table 3.1 HISS Measures and the 3 Criteria 101
Table 3.2 HISS Observation, 3-Year Window Counts 103
Table 3.3 HISS Adoption Events 103
Table 3.4 Number of Groups and Other HISS Criteria 105
Table 3.5 HISS and Number of Out-of-Region Groups 107
Table 3.6 HISS and Entry 118
Table 3.7 90th Percentile of International Revolutionary Constitution Scores 125
Table 3.8 Ideology Scores and HISS Outcomes 132
Table 3.9 HISS and Measures of Barriers to Conventional Operations Abroad 138
Table 3.10 HISS and Rivals Measures 139
Table 3.11 HISS and Nuclear-Armed Adversaries (3-Year Moving Window) 140
Table 3.12 HISS Adoptions and Revolutionary Realities Variables from SPFS 145
Table 3.13 HISS Adoptions and Revolutionary Realities Variables, Corrected 146
Table 3.14 Observed and Predicted Cases of HISS from the SPFS Data 150
Table 4.1 Hypotheses and Variable Operationalization 165
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics for Revolutionary Realities Model Variables 170
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics for Alternative Explanation Variables 171
Table 4.4 Results: Radical Leaders and RR Entry and Ideology 173
Table 4.5 Results: Regime Type and Tenure 178
Table 4.6 Results: Rivals Theory 180
Table 4.7 Results: Material Capabilities Theory 181
Table 4.8 Results: RR Barriers to Conventional War, Single Factors 185
Table 4.9 Results: Revolutionary Realities Model 191
Table 4.10 Results: Revolutionary Realities Single Factor Hazard Models 197
Table 4.11 Results: Revolutionary Realities Theory Hazard Models 198
Table 4.12 Summary of Hypotheses, Models, and Results 205
Table 5.1 Case Study Summaries 215
Table 5.2 Case Selection Approach 221
Table 5.3 Key Observable Implications of RR Assessed in Case Studies 226
Table 6.1 Iran and Rival Powers, 1980 and 1985 250
Table 8.1 Excerpts from Selected Fidel Castro Speeches, 1959-1968 353
Table 8.2 Economic and Military Measure of Cuba and the United States, 1960-1980 368
Appendices
Table B.1 HPTGs from START Global Terrorism Database 486
Table B.2a HISS Measures and the 3 Criteria 487
Table B.2b HISS Observations, 5-year Period Counts 487
Table B.2c HISS Observations, 3-year Window Counts and No HPTGs 488
Table B.2d HISS Observations, 3-year Window Counts and No Out-of-Region 488
Table B.2e HISS 3-Year Window, 4 Groups+ 489

Table B.2f HISS 3-Year Window, 3 Groups+ 489
Table B.3 HISS and the # of Out-of-Region Groups 490
Table B.4a HISS and Entry Type 491
Table B.4b HISS and Entry, Alternative Specification (4+ Groups, 3-Year Window) 492
Table B.4c HISS and Entry, Alternative Specification (5 Year Period) 492
Table B.7a Countries with Ideology Scores 1 SD above Mean 498
Table B.7b HISS and International Revolution Scores 499
Table B.7c Correlations between Entry and International Revolutionary Ideology Scores 499
Table B.9 HISS and Nuclear-Armed Adversaries (HISS 5-Year Period 503
Table B.10 Non-HISS Years for HISS-Adopting States 504
Table C.1 Robustness for International Revolutionary Ideology Score 506
Table C.2 Robustness and Alternative Specifications for Entry 508
Table C.3 Robustness and Alternative Specifications for Democracy 510
Table C.4 Robustness and Alternative Specifications for Barriers Factors 511
Table C.5 Alternative Capabilities and Capabilities Ratios Test 513
Table C.6 Alternative DV and Model Specifications for RR Triple Interactions 515
Table C.7 Alternative DV and Model Specifications for RR Triple Interactions, 5-Year 517
Table C.8 Alternative Specification for the Barriers Measure in Triple Interactions 519
Table C.9 Duration Dependence in HISS Observations 522
Table C.10 Hazard Model Robustness Checks 523
Table C.11a Schoenfeld Global Test of Proportional Hazard Assumptions, HModel 10 525
Table C.11b Schoenfeld Global Test of Proportional Hazard Assumptions, HModel 12 525
Table C.12 Hazard Model with Correction for Non-Proportional Ideology Score 527

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 Levels of Sponsorship 5
Figure 2.1 The Revolutionary Realities Theory of HISS 54
Figure 2.2 Ideology's Theoretical and Predicted Effects 67
Figure 2.3 Joint Necessity of Revolutionary Realities' Causal Conditions 83
Figure 3.1 HISS Trends Over Time 109
Figure 3.2 Trends in HPTG Support 110
Figure 3.3 Regional Distribution of HISS Activity 112
Figure 3.4 Revolutionary Realities Factor Summary 114
Figure 3.5 International Revolutionary Constitution Scores over Time 126
Figure 3.6 Average Int'l Revolutionary Score, 1975-2004 127
Figure 3.7 HISS Cases and Int'l Revolutionary Constitution Scores, 1975-2004 128
Figure 4.1 Estimated Survival Function by RR Dummy Variable 202
Figure 4.2 Cumulated Hazard Estimates by RR Dummy Variable 203
Appendices
Figure B.8a Selected Country and Average Constitution Scores 500
Figure B.8b Average International Constitution Scores, 1975-2004 501
Figure B.8c Average International Constitution Scores (with 95% CI), 1975-2004 502

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Part I: Explaining HISS

Chapter 1: Introduction

Whether it was the United States battling communism by propping up the Nicaraguan contras or Greece supporting the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) against its long-time enemy Turkey, over half (54%) of the states in the international system have offered guns, cash, lodging, and diplomatic offices to foreign non-state actors since WWII (Maoz and San-Akca 2012). Scholars have studied many aspects of state and non-state actor interactions, such as the effect of sponsorship on groups themselves (Carter 2012) and the benefits and drawbacks to states that use armed groups as "proxies" abroad (Byman 2005a; Patten 2013). However, some states have demonstrated a particularly high commitment to sponsorship. For Iran, Cuba, Libya, and several others, it became a central pillar of national foreign policy to offer aid, training, and safe haven to dozens of armed groups all across the globe. Even though high-level sponsors have long been a top concern of policymakers as "state sponsors of terrorism,"[1] overall *patterns* of a state's sponsorship are still poorly understood. Scholars simply have not put forth a convincing explanation for the sponsorship policy embraced by this numerically small (<8% of countries in the world) but geopolitically important group of states.

This is a serious mismatch between scholarly literature and the actual role that states which adopt high-level sponsorship policies play in international relations. Despite the fact that these serial sponsors are regional powers at best (and often mere Lilliputians), they have had an

[1] See Anthony Lake. 1994. "Confronting Backlash States" *Foreign Affairs*, (March-April), 45-55. George W. Bush. 2002. "State of the Union Address." Available online at http://stateoftheunionaddress.org/2002-george-w-bush Accessed 15 October 2010.

out-sized impact on the direction of global politics and the foreign policies of great powers. The State Department in the United States, for example, designates certain states "State Sponsors of Terrorism," which carries with it serious economic and legal consequences that disrupt trade and greatly proscribe Washington's future policy choices. Discussions regarding the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal brought major criticism from opponents who consistently cited Iran's status as a terrorist sponsor in their calls to shut down these vital negotiations. Only in recent months have relations between Cuba and the United States, suspended in 1961, begun a tenuous normalization process. Center-stage sponsorship policies have important and lasting ramifications, but, puzzlingly, high-intensity sponsorship has rarely received its own analysis in international relations studies, and what studies there are do not provide a convincing account of what this project terms "high-intensity sponsorship of armed non-state actors" or HISS.

My research fills this gap, asking the question, "Under what conditions do states adopt a policy of high-intensity sponsorship of armed non-state actors (HISS)?"

This dissertation offers a novel theory and new cross-national evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, to explain the causes of this particular pattern of sponsorship in the post-World War II era. The project identifies HISS states as those that have sponsored a) numerous foreign groups b) groups outside the state's region and c) international terrorism or highly terroristic groups in particular. I argue that HISS constitutes a distinct pattern of state sponsorship that is associated with a distinct set of causal factors and mechanisms which are, as yet, not well understood in the academic literature. My theory aims at prediction and argues that, when a set of three jointly necessary conditions is in place, a state adopts HISS. Put briefly, a 1) regime that has entered power through non-institutionalized means, 2) espouses an international revolutionary ideology, and 3) cannot pursue offensive conventional military operations abroad

against rivals is likely to adopt HISS as one of few available means of engaging in an armed, activist, global, anti-status quo foreign policy. These three conditions drive mutually-reinforcing causal processes and make a high-intensity pursuit of non-state actor support both appealing and implementable as national policy.

I. HISS: More is Different

The Usual Suspects among States that Sponsor

One sign that this question – under what conditions do states adopt a policy of high-intensity support for non-state armed actors abroad – requires further exploration is that a handful of states are responsible for an outsized amount of all total global sponsorship activity. Indeed, states engaging in HISS may be skewing our scholarly analysis of other, lower-intensity policies of international sponsorship and related matters. In a number of datasets in which state-group linkages are a quantity of interest, there are often a disproportionate number of dyads, dyad-years, or regime-years that are attributable to the activities of only a handful of states. Out of 412 observations in the non-state armed actor data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, 220 observations involve one of the top ten state sponsors (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). This means that 53% of the activity being analyzed is the activity of just the following states: Libya, Iran, the United States, Pakistan, Sudan, China, Syria, the USSR, Cuba, Iraq, and Thailand. Similarly, in the Maoz-San Akca data, 2,840 dyad-years are identified in the dataset.[2] The top ten sponsors account for 34% of the observations (976 of them), including the following countries: Thailand, the United States, China, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Sudan, India, and Jordan. The bottom 103 states account for 50% of the sponsorship activity captured in the set, while the top 50% is attributable to only 17 different countries.

[2] A dyad here is State A sponsoring Group 1 in a given year. See Maoz and San-Akca 2012.

In what is perhaps the most comprehensive data on foreign sponsorship to date, the same trend appears. In San-Akca's "Non-State Armed Groups" (NAG) data from the Dangerous Companions Project, the top ten supporters are again responsible for fully half (50.11%) of all sponsorship activity. The NAG data notes that, of all 192 states in the world system, there are 95 states that have sponsored a non-state actor at some point between 1945 and 2010 (San-Akca 2016, 68-70.) Again, slightly more than half of the variation driving the statistically results which are generalized to all 95 states comes from the following countries (in descending order of activity): Libya, Russia, Iran, Syria, the Unites States, Thailand, Pakistan, China, Sudan, and Cuba – in short, some of the usual suspects.

Figure 1.1



This survey of results presents a general picture of the empirical distribution of sponsorship activity in the world. A great deal of the global sponsorship activity that researchers

measure is coming from a few states who pursue the policy with high frequency and at high intensity. Even if analysts use good statistical techniques (and they typically do), the data are themselves "skewed," and it is highly plausible that studying all kinds of sponsorship according to the same assumptions and theories will generate biased and even false conclusions. This dissertation focuses on this subset of sponsoring countries, countries which may be engaging in their policies due to different causes and having different effects than the remaining 90% of states that either do not sponsor at all or tend to involve themselves only in a few other countries or conflicts abroad.

I proceed with the current project on the basic premise that, when it comes to sponsorship, More is Different.[3] In particular, a high-intensity policy of non-state actor sponsorship is a policy that is different in kind, rather than merely in scale, from, for example, the Greek government's consistent support of the PKK cited above. HISS is a policy that is not reducible to the sum of its parts nor explained by the laws and properties of its essential components – individual state-group linkages. Rather, I argue that this pattern constitutes a unique analytic category and merits scholarly attention. This is not an assumption of the study; the More is Different lens represents a theoretical starting point to understand an under-studied and under-theorized but hugely impactful phenomenon in international relations.

Sponsorship Patterns - Defining HISS

My definition of the "high intensity state sponsorship of armed non-state actors" (HISS) has three portions. I define a policy of HISS as a state's 1) active and intentional sponsorship of 2) foreign, non-state groups 3) adopted and implemented at a high-intensity level. The threshold of "high intensity" is demonstrated by the 3a) quantity of groups 3b) geographical distribution of

[3] See P. W. Anderson's famous article of this title (1972. "More is Different." *Science 177*(4047), 393-396.)

groups and 3c) nature of groups sponsored. Sponsorship of foreign, non-state groups will be measured and catalogued in this research, and whether states have adopted a policy of sponsorship at a "high" level will be determined based on three criteria – quantity, geographic distribution, and nature of groups.

Definition: 3 Pieces

First, for my understanding of "sponsorship", I consider only active and intentional state sponsorship of non-state armed actors. I look at direct forms of state support for armed non-state actors targeting countries other than the supporting state. Drawing on the most recent literature on these topics, I consider types of state support to include: training, training camps, funds, arms, logistics aid including transshipment of weapons, provision of safe havens, and military advisors.[4] This is in contrast to passive sponsors or unwilling hosts that take no action to stop armed groups from using national resources due to lack of capacity. Despite the importance of safe havens and passive sponsorship in understanding the internationalization of violent political conflict, I do not consider states that are too weak (such as present-day Somalia) to prevent large numbers of groups from using their territory as meaningfully adopting HISS.[5]

The second piece of my definition means that the state must be sponsoring foreign, non-state armed actors. Non-state armed actors are groups that use violence to pursue political objectives.[6] This is meant to be a broad categorization to reflect the very broad range of

[4] This overlaps strongly with San-Akca's definition of "intentional support" (2016, 8-9), though I do not include rhetorical support or allowing groups to maintain offices as sufficient, on their own, to constitute a sponsorship relationship. This is also similar to Carter 2012.

[5] Daniel Byman. 2005. "Passive Sponsors of Terrorism." *Survival 47*(4), 117-144; James Piazza. 2008. "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?" *International Studies Quarterly 52*, 469-488. In San-Akca 2016, this is called "de facto" support.

[6] This is from San-Akca 2016, who notes that, "Defining rebels in terms of both their means and their objectives is useful in generalizing across various types, including ethnic, religious, and national insurgencies; revolutionary movements; and terrorists and guerrilla organizations" (7).

empirical possibilities, from the state's perspective, of sponsorable groups. It includes insurgents and terrorist groups, and so-called 'international terrorists' that are not necessarily clearly based in a particular territory. It excludes the sponsorship of groups operating on a state's own territory such as death squads or militias. It has become the norm in this research agenda to reject the activities of state operatives, even when they are the architects of political violence abroad. I follow this convention in my formal definitions, though it may be worth expanding this conceptualization in future works.

Criterion: #1 Quantity of Groups Sponsored

The third portion of the definition of HISS defines what, precisely, should be considered a "high-intensity" pattern of sponsorship. The first criteria for considering a state as having adopted a policy of high intensity sponsorship in particular is the quantity of groups sponsored. Widespread sponsorship is a feature of the pattern of non-state actor support that this dissertation seeks most to explain. It is also the most striking feature in the data described above. Though I employ a few different operationalizations for the threshold number of groups sponsored when I run my statistical analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, I here define this criterion as having been met when a state sponsors five or more groups, in any combination of "insurgent" or "terrorist." Though it is true that groups differ in size and importance, I would argue that each connection that a state makes with a group is an instantiation of sponsorship. A large number of these connections contributes to, but does not constitute, a high-intensity policy.

Criterion #2: Geographical Distribution of Groups Sponsored

The geographical pattern of sponsorship is another important feature of HISS. In addition to sponsoring a large number of groups, many of the states that seem to be most involved in this policy sponsor groups all around the world. This kind of international

sponsorship pattern is concerning because it apparently violates norms of sovereignty and indicates a high level of involvement in international politics. It becomes a global, rather than a regional, foreign policy and is thus an indicator that sponsorship is a central pillar of state's overall interactions with the world. Therefore, if at least one of the groups that a state sponsors falls outside that group's region, I will consider that state as having met the "geography" criterion.

Criterion #3: Nature of Groups Sponsored

The final criterion is whether a state sponsors what I will call "high-profile, terroristic groups" (HPTGs). HISS states tend to receive policy attention because they are associated with some of the most active and violent groups in the world, non-state actors that target civilians disproportionately and engage in high-profile, mass-casualty attacks. It is often stated that Al-Qaeda would not have been able to launch its 9/11 attacks on the United States without the support of the Afghan Taliban government. The HPTG criterion is essential because such groups are those which are considered to be the most "terroristic" and provoke the greatest international concern. It is also what comes most readily to mind when the topic of 'state sponsorship' comes up, and an explanation that does not consider this a central part of the definition of sponsorship is not accounting for patterns that are of a great deal of normative concern to many researchers and policymakers.

Therefore, an HPTG is a group that disproportionately targets civilians in its violent pursuit of political ends. Groups that have, for example, hijacked commercial airliners, targeted international airports, embassies, or other symbolic/diplomatic targets, and kidnapped and/or killed journalists or aid workers all generate fairly high-profiles for themselves. Ultimately, though, I focus on whether groups have targeted civilians and caused large numbers of non-

combatant casualties. Those that have (according to the best available, extensive databases on terrorist group activity) will be considered HPTGs. If a state sponsors at least one of these groups, that state has met this criterion. My specific operationalization of HPTG is described in further detail in Chapter 3.

As has been noted in countless works in studies of terrorism, terrorist groups, and state sponsorship, all of these terms are highly subjective.[7] Because of this, the definition addressed in this section does not focus on one type (insurgent or terrorist) group to the exclusion of others. Indeed, Daniel Byman, one of the central figures in studies of state sponsorship, concludes that: "This linkage between insurgencies and terrorism has particular implications for why states support terrorists. Indeed, much of the reason many terrorists receive state support is because they are insurgencies."[8] By including this third definitional criterion, I can both include the "state sponsors of *terrorism*" conception in my research while asking the less-charged and perhaps more important question: "Under what conditions to states adopt a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of *non-state actors* abroad?"

II. The Landscape: Preoccupations in the Existing Literature

The existing literature on sponsorship has long focused on a wide variety of different aspects of relations between states and non-state actors, though rarely has anything like HISS, as defined in the previous section, been studied. Some researchers have used a Principal Agent model to explore how agreements between rebels and governments deliver benefits, or incur

[7] Scholars of insurgencies and civil wars, as well as scholars of terrorism, find that many groups classified as "terrorists" are also considered "insurgents" in other literatures. A lengthy legal, practical, and scholarly debate has ensued on this topic (see, among others, Hoffman 2013, Friedrichs 2006, and Ganor 2002. "Terrorism," after all, is a tactic than can be used in a variety of ways and for a wide variety of ends (Walter and Kydd 2006.) Whether it is an effective tactic is up for debate (Abrahms 2006, 2012; Gould and Klor 2010).

[8] See Byman 2005 *Deadly Connections*, 25; emphasis added.

costs, to the parties involved. International relations scholars have also examined the causes of state interventions into civil wars, as well as the effects of support on various international outcomes like civil war duration and regional stability. Finally, there is a small body of research that analyzes the causes of state-group linkages. The former literatures are summarized first, and those works which are most closely related to causal accounts of HISS patterns of sponsorship are addressed in the next section and at length in Chapter 2.

The Principal Agent Model: This research agenda considers the myriad benefits that states can derive from sponsorship and is primarily concerned with the dynamics that take place between states and the groups they sponsor. Following classic econometrics accounts, the state is considered the principal and the non-state actor (either terrorist or insurgent group) is that state's 'agent,' serving the state with varying degrees of efficiency. This does not necessarily explain what causes sponsorship, but rather, catalogues the diverse motivations that could drive a state to offer support to a non-state actor. This is perhaps most clear in Daniel Byman's *Deadly Connections* (2005a, Chapter 2) which focuses on terrorist group sponsorship in particular. He lists three possible motivations for such support: Strategic; Ideology; and Domestic Politics. Strategic concerns encompass weakening or destabilizing a neighbor, projecting power, changing a regime, or shaping the political opposition movements in another country. Ideological motivations include enhancing international prestige and exporting a political system. Domestic motivations are to aid kin or receive military aid for the regime itself – which happens rarely because terrorist groups are often quite weak. Scholars have developed this model in different ways, 'solving' the principal-agent problem at times and, at other times, looking for case evidence that sponsorship fits in this model (Patten 2013; Byman and Kreps (2010) Byman et. al.

2001; Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011; Salehyan 2010.)[9] Notably, this model does not concern itself with "passive sponsors" or "failed state" sponsorship arguments – like my own research, this agenda is concerned with the active policies of states (Byman 2005b).

Causes of State Intervention into Civil Wars: A literature that appeared in response to the global expansion of proxy wars during the late Cold War examines the phenomenon of state interventions into conflicts abroad (for Cold War era interventions, see Duner 1981 and 1983; more recently, Regan 1998, 2000). Often, the intervention in question involves the use of conventional forces, rather than sub-conventional or covert aid, and scholars have tried to assess the logic of both pro-rebel interventions and pro-state intervention by actors like foreign governments (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004, Findley and Teo 2006). Another rich subset of literature examines the role of ethnic identity and cross-national ethnic political ties in accounting for state involvement in wars, separatist movements, and other types of conflict outside of its own borders (Saideman 2001 and 2002; Cederman et al. 2009; Carment and James 2000; Davis and Moore 1997).

Effects of Support and International Responses: Another group of scholars is concerned about the effects of external state support on groups themselves (Carter 2012), civil war conflict behavior (Bob 2005, Staniland 2012) and other international outcomes. Research on a rebel group's conduct towards civilians suggests both that external sponsors mean that groups will have less restraint towards civilians (Weinstein 2007) and yet also that states may be able to rein in the excesses of a group it supports (Salehyan, Siroky, Wood 2014). Outside involvement in

[9] This model represents a critique again the assumption made in some Cold War-era literature that non-state actors have little agency and are mere "proxies" for Great Powers (see Dunér 1981, Innes 2012, especially Bale in Innes 2012). The principal-agent models go a step beyond the "proxy theories" in which states fully control the group they are sponsoring, but it is worth noting that in these theories, a group's successfully accomplishing goals that further the state's agenda is still perceived as the primary purpose of sponsorship.

domestic conflicts is thought to increase both the duration and deadliness of conflicts themselves (Cunningham 2006, 2010; Regan 2002; Balch-Lindsay et. al. 2008; Regan et. al. 2009; Fearon 2004). Other international outcomes like international war and spillover or contagion from civil wars can also be a result of state sponsorship of non-state actors. (Salehyan 2008a; 2008b). Finally, given these diverse effects, many of which are adverse to international law and global stability, some scholars have examined policy tools available to the international community to influence the foreign sponsorship behavior of other states (O'Sullivan 2003; Collins 2004; Pillar 2001; Levitt 2002; and Lake 1994). Thus securities scholars and international relations scholars have examined the internationalization of domestic conflict as well as the potential dynamics of relations between state principals and terrorist or insurgent agents.

Insights on Causes of Sponsorship from Existing Literature

There is, in comparison to these research agendas, a relatively smaller number of works that specifically look at the causes of state sponsorship from the perspective of the state considering adopting a particular pattern of overall sponsorship policy. Two separate, existing literatures offer some insight into international sponsorship in general, though neither is a sufficient account of high-intensity sponsorship patterns. I draw from both literatures to develop my own theoretical account of HISS.

The first explanation comes from international relations scholars. These argue that sponsorship is a feature of many geostrategic rivalries, and states rely on non-state armed actors as to manage their security relations with other states (Byman 2005a, Findley, Piazza, & Young 2012; Bapat 2012). According to this account, sponsorship is especially likely when a state has limited capacity or a rival state has superior militarily capabilities. In such cases, conventional warfare is significantly more costly than sponsoring insurgents or terrorists to attack a rival

nation (Salehyan 2010; San-Akca 2009; 2016). This literature implies that HISS is adopted by states that have many rivals and cannot provide for their own territorial security without external aid. However, this theoretical expectation only partially matches the sponsorship patterns observed empirically. Though states do sponsor non-state actors to enhance their security in some situations, many states also sponsor groups that offer few benefits or do not target geostrategically threatening rivals at all. Also, states with rivals and costly security needs do not always choose to support non-state actors, and HISS states are not systematically those least able to defend their own territories. Though this approach offers a useful explanation for sponsorship in general, it does not fully explain HISS. Additional work is needed to understand what causal impact bilateral rivalries and security imperatives have on a state's overall sponsorship pattern.

The second explanation comes from the comparative politics literature on revolutionary states. This literature emphasizes the role of revolutionary processes and domestic leadership in policy formation. These scholars suggest that leaders who come to power through social revolutions, such as those in Iran or China, are likely to adopt a policy of high-intensity sponsorship. (Sadri 1997; Goldstone1990; Brinton 1965).[10] The most radical revolutionary leaders enthusiastically and indiscriminately use state resources to aid a wide variety of anti-status quo movements, including terrorists and insurgents. HISS states, then, are those that have recently experienced a social or popular revolution, bringing ideologues with a desire to 'spread the revolution' to power.[11] This explanation also fails to fully account for patterns of HISS. Some of the most revolutionary states, such as Cambodia during the reign of the Khmer Rouge,

[10] Among others. Further literature is discussed in Chapter 2. Also, in IR see Walt 1996.

[11] Importantly, an over-simplified version of this explanation has appeared in the idea of "rogue states" and has had a powerful impact on US foreign policy. These "rogue states" are thought to be run by extremist leaders who are inherently belligerent towards the international order. See Bush 2002; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003; Rubin. 1999.

did not engage in HISS, and some states, like Libya, have evinced high levels of sponsorship after coming to power through a run-of-the-mill military coups d'état. To be sure, there is some overlap between revolutions and HISS adoption, but in many ways, this policy is not fully understood in the current literature.

Past research on the topic of non-state actor support has shone light on a number of the individual factors and aspects of the theory I present in Chapter 2, but there has been little attempt to synthesize them and forward an overarching theory of non-state actor support patterns. Though there are some accounts as to why individual states have attempted to spread a revolution, and there are other accounts as why individual state-group linkages occur, there has been little if any systematic assessment of the causal conditions under which a state is likely to adopt a HISS policy.

III. Summary of the Revolutionary Realities Theory

The present project therefore offers a causal theory, which I call the "Revolutionary Realities" theory, of HISS adoption. I agree that international security concerns and non-institutionalized regime change processes are two causal conditions for HISS. To this, I add a third important variable: the normative, internationalist nature of the new regime's ideology (its "international revolutionary ideology"). In particular, this dissertation argues that HISS occurs when three conditions are present: 1) a new regime enters power through non-institutionalized means; 2) its leadership espouses an international revolutionary ideology; and 3) the state faces high barriers to offensive operations against key rivals with its own conventional military apparatus. These are, I argue, jointly-necessarily, mutually-reinforcing causal conditions for HISS adoption.

International revolutionary ideology and non-institutionalized regime change interact to dramatically increase the leadership's preference for, and ability to implement, an active and internationalist foreign policy. New leaders tend to appoint loyalists during the uncertain period of consolidation after a non-institutionalized regime change. Leaders eschew established institutions and actors in favor of constructing new governing organs or placing their own people in charge of agencies. This means that like-minded leaders are making foreign policy with limited institutional barriers and few dissenting opinions. As suggested in the comparative politics literature, one policy that satisfies the leadership's ideological impulses is the global support of "fellow revolutionaries," groups which are typically considered insurgents and terrorists. (That is, unless they win and become governments themselves.)

HISS, though, is only adopted with the addition of the third factor: high barriers to conventional military operations abroad. This context interacts with the revolutionary ideology, encouraging these regimes to choose high-intensity sponsorship for both its revolutionary appeal *and* its low-cost security benefits. If it is militarily weaker than its enemies, then the state is in a difficult position: the ideological posture and potential threat of its adversaries demand an aggressive foreign policy response but conventional military tools are unusable. One solution that appears to leaders to be quite effective is foreign sponsorship. Armed proxies can harass and punish enemies at a low cost, and successful rebels may even become future allied governments. Furthermore, employing non-state actors and terrorists is seen as legitimate when it comes to surviving in a high-stakes, global ideological contest. After a non-institutionalized regime change, leaders can easily adopt the appealing policy of HISS as the law of the land.

To states faced with these "revolutionary realities,"—the reality of structural limitations on foreign policy tools and the revolutionary preference for global revisionism—the policy of

high-intensity sponsorship achieves multiple goals simultaneous. HISS is an active, internationalist, anti-status quo foreign policy in pursuit of revolutionary goals, satisfying the leadership's preferences. Furthermore, using armed non-state actors abroad is one of the only tools available for a state with limited options in addressing security challenges. The mutually reinforcing dynamics of these three causal factors are explored further in the next chapter.

By drawing on the insights of related literatures while addressing the empirical and theoretical shortcomings of each, I have built a theory of necessary conditions which I then test against the empirical record. My theory also lays out some of the mechanisms that would lead the causal conditions posited here to actually make the outcome of HISS adoption happen. However, because this is such a "black hole" topic, the emphasis in much of the research is on the conditions themselves. I make predictions according to my theory as if these were sufficient conditions, but my central argument is about necessity. I do not strongly maintain that these three conditions are sufficient for HISS adoption, a point I return to in Chapter 9 and the conclusion.

IV. Research Design and Methodology

In terms of scope, the Revolutionary Realities theory should apply to the post-WWII period to the present. There are no theoretical reasons, at this stage of research on this topic, that suggest its insights should be limited geographically or according to other political criteria. States as small as Cuba and as large as the USSR have engaged in HISS, and most major regions of the globe have boasted at least one HISS state. Also, it may at first seem like the theory itself does not apply to democracies, as non-institutionalized entry is one of the necessary conditions for HISS adoption. However, this does not mean that democracies are 'out of scope' but rather that the theory predicts that HISS will not be adopted after a power transition that occurs

peacefully and legally, like those following an election in a stable democracy.[12] Given how little theoretical work has been done on this topic, it seems better to determine empirically the limiting factors and failures of the theory in its simplest, broadest form, than to scope out cases from what is already a fairly narrow pool of HISS-adopting states.

This research, then, attempts to assess the validity of its theory by comparing the empirical record to the predictions and expectations of the Revolutionary Realities account. As noted above, though research has been done on closely-related topics, the specific purpose of this study has rarely been pursued, and most research on related topics do not posit specific theories that should apply across states. The means for testing these theories, therefore, are fairly limited, and a major contribution of this research is to utilize cross-national evidence to support my argument about factors that contribute to HISS adoption. One reason for the dearth of strong empirical research in this area is perhaps the limited and contentious nature of available evidence. There are high international stakes for being labelled a state sponsor of terrorism, and states have reason to obfuscate evidence and deny accusations. Additionally, states have reason to accuse rival nations of involvement with non-state actors, perhaps to justify unpopular political and economic measures or to cast blame for domestic struggles on a foreign entity. Thus, it is not even clear whether the bias runs systematically to overestimation or underestimation of states' involvement in HISS. Reliable sources on the subject are thus difficult to find, verify, and trust.

[12] As addressed in the conclusion, the United States is a HISS state in the 1980s. This result is both partially unexpected and yet still partially explained by the theory.

With this empirical challenge in mind, this study employs a mixed-method research design.[13] The available evidence on this phenomenon comes in many forms and must be carefully scrutinized. This research's empirical approach is therefore to leverage a number of different sources of evidence and methodological strategies to examine and test its theory on HISS adoption. The basic purpose of the mixed quantitative and case study design is to triangulate an answer to the research question and to test the various implications of the theory laid out in Chapter 2.[14] The strengths of one approach can compensate for weaknesses in another approach. Though I do not believe that this dissertation will "prove" the theory of Revolutionary Realities, it will demonstrate that it provides a plausible explanation across cases, and in comparison to rival theories a superior explanation, *both* across cases and for individual cases.[15] If the results from the quantitative and case study portions of the analysis are convergent, the main propositions of the research will be reinforced (Jick 1979).

The first portion of the empirical study is a quantitative analysis of a new dataset on states' patterns of support for armed non-state actors abroad. The second portion is a series of case studies. The design here somewhat approximates what Creswell and Clark refer to as an *explanatory design procedure*, as the quantitative data was collected and analyzed and then the case studies were conducted (2007, Chapter 4). The quantitative study partially informed the case selection, for example. However, conclusions from both portions are given equal weight

[13] Creswell and Clark 2007 (especially Chapter 2) suggest that there are a number of reasons why mixed methods might be the preferred approach to social science research. One of these is to leverage a second source or type of data; another is to explain quantitative outcomes. Both are highly relevant here.

[14] See Tarrow (1995) who opines that triangulation-using multiple methods to address the same research problem-is the best way to combine methods.

[15] Comparative analysis of this nature is particularly useful for evaluation of competing theories. See David Collier. 1993.

and serve to mutually inform and reinforce one another in an iterative research process. The ultimate purpose is to triangulate and gain confidence in the dissertation's account of HISS.

Part II "Quantitative Evidence" relies on a new dataset to evaluate the central claims of the theory laid out in full in Chapter 2. This is a unique database designed for use in this dissertation to evaluate each state and each leader's commitment to foreign non-state actor sponsorship. It is also useful for testing general trends and demonstrating that there is such a thing as "high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors" and that this is a policy that is associated with many of the states that common wisdom would suggest.

One central piece of this dissertation is the claim that this theory has a broad scope, and the same conditions for HISS adoption apply across all states in the post-WWII era. To this end, a large-N cross-national study is needed to support the claim of generalizability. In bivariate analysis, I test the proposition that each theorized factor is individually associated with the outcomes and that all three factors in interaction are correlated with HISS as well. I also build a statistical model using a variety of appropriate modeling techniques for the panel data. My theory relies mostly on the language of determinism, as opposed to probabilism.[16] In the quantitative analysis, though, I am obviously dealing with probabilistic claims. To reduce this dissonance, my main quantity of interest is therefore a triple-interacted term that combines all three of the theorized causal factors. This means that unless there is a non-zero value on all factors, the term itself is zero. Put differently, all factors must be present for me to pick up any probabilistic correlation between causes and outcomes, thereby approximating the "joint necessity" posited in the theory. This is one attempt to keep the quantitative portion of the study

[16] See Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

in the same theoretical frame as the rest of the dissertation, to make this a true mixed-methods approach.

This quantitative approach does have several weaknesses. First, the statistical analysis uses a number of proxies that may or may not be strong measures of the concepts in the theory. Furthermore, some key variables and concepts can only be assessed in one dimension or in one way in a statistical study but are, in reality, thick concepts (Coppedge 1999; also Mahoney 2010). Secondly, HISS is a comparatively rare event which is caused by a confluence of hypothesized factors; the results of the statistical analysis therefore are indicative but may be sensitive to variable or model specifications beyond what I have been able to test. Thirdly, the dependent variable itself may be systematically biased, as suggested above. All three of these issues have to do with what is essentially measurement error. Leveraging additional sources is impractical for each of thousands of observations, but in individual cases, measurements can be much more thoroughly documented and confirmed. Finally, the quantitative analysis conducted in this research is only correlative. Further evidence is needed to even partially support the causal claims made in the theory, including the important claim of necessity.

Thus, in Part III, I look more closely at a number of cases to assess the theory of Revolutionary Realities, which asserts that a particular combination of factors is jointly necessary and causes the adoption of HISS. As Bennett and Elman note, qualitative approaches have an advantage when it comes to "studying complex and relatively unstructured and infrequent phenomena that lie at the heart" of the international relations subfield (2007, 171). Case studies are quite useful when the researcher's theory makes a claim about necessary and/or sufficient conditions, and necessary conditions are a particularly valuable lens for examining rare

events.[17] By choosing cases with certain combinations of factors present, I can advance my claim of joint necessity, though the array of cases available does not allow for a perfect systematic test of each condition's necessity (see Chapter 5). Part III relies on six cases: Sudan and Iran; China and Democratic Kampuchea; Cuba (within-case study of two time periods); and, in Part IV, Nicaragua is a seventh case.

One function of the case studies in this research is to verify and validate the measurement of the variables in question – to determine whether there is, in fact, the congruence between conditions and outcomes implied by the correlative quantitative analysis. Congruency method is suitable for this research because the data requirements are significantly lower than for complete process tracing.[18] In many cases, those states that have adopted HISS or were most likely to adopt HISS are also some of the least likely states to allow American researchers full access to relevant archives. Thus much of the causal process is unobserved.[19] Furthermore, HISS occurs based on a number of state/non-state actor connections; there may or may not be clear moments that are the identifiable end of the chain of causal events. On top of that, ideology and beliefs play a central role in this theory. Thus some of aspects of this theory imply processes that are theoretically unobservable.[20]

The Revolutionary Realities theory, however, makes a causal argument that these three conditions jointly *cause* the sitting government of a state to adopt a policy of HISS. Congruence approaches alone cannot demonstrate causality, as they are essentially correlative. The case

[17] See James Mahoney 2003. See also Goertz and Levy 2007a. On rare events, see Harding, Fox, and Mehta 2002.

[18] George and Bennett 2005, see especially Chapter 9 "The Congruence Method." See also Van Evera1997, 55-63.

[19] Causal Process Observations (CPOs) are widely understood to be central to process tracing methods; a dearth of such observations hampers in-depth causal analysis, as detailed information about sequences of key, related events is required. See Collier 2011.

[20] As Checkel describes reading his research on persuasion and decision-making in the EU, "Did I ever actually see somebody persuaded? Did I see a decision-maker change his or her mind?" (2008, 122).

studies therefore go a step further down the road to demonstrating causality by offering evidence of a number of other observable implications of the theorized causal connection between the necessary conditions and the outcome of HISS. As noted above, it is not possible to offer the kind of in-depth process tracing analysis that would provide a thoroughly convincing test of the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS onset. However, I do offer causal process evidence and can identify that some parts of the theorized causal mechanisms are consistently active across cases, and also that they are conspicuously lacking in cases of non-adoption, as expected.

The selection of a particular model, the construction of the dataset, case selection, and sources of evidence are all addressed in their respective places (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). The overall design articulated here, though, explains how this research will approach this difficult-to-study topic of high-intensity state sponsorship. Quantitative analysis with a new dataset demonstrates that the correlations posited in Chapter 2 are present in instances of HISS across time and space. Various quantitative tests are used to increase confidence in this central claim. The case studies serve to improve upon the measurements used in the cross-national analysis and to demonstrate the congruence of outcomes and causal conditions, which are "thick," complex, and difficult to measure. Finally, additional support for the causal nature of the claims in this research is provided by analysis of paired cases and process tracing evidence for some of the observable implications of key proposed causal mechanisms, drawing on the best secondary and primary sources available. Insights from the case studies beyond those that support or fail to support the Revolutionary Realities theory appear in the conclusion chapter.

V. Summary of Findings

I ultimately find that states do adopt a policy of HISS when the three factors of 1) non-institutionalized entry 2) espousal of international revolutionary ideology and 3) inability to

conduct offensive military operations abroad against key rivals all obtain. This result can be found in the quantitative approach in Part II (Chapters 3 and 4) where I test my theory's hypothesis using my novel database on state patterns of sponsorship. I find that my triple-interaction term, which attempts to capture the joint-necessity claim of the theory, is a statistically significant predictor of HISS outcomes. This is despite the fact that some of the measures used are noisy and there are relatively few events of HISS adoption in the dataset, all of which point to the strength of my finding.

I also find, through a series of case studies, high congruency between HISS and the three necessary factors articulated in this dissertation. I am able to account for HISS outcomes in two critical cases – Cuba and Iran – and in only one of the seven cases does the theory fail to accurately predict the outcome. (I would predict HISS in the Nicaraguan case and find that HISS was, in fact, never adopted.) Overall, the Revolutionary Realities theory is better at accounting for HISS outcomes than the radical leadership accounts from the comparative politics literature. Both the alternative theory and my own miss the Nicaragua case, and in two others, I correctly predict adoption (Sudan) and non-adoption (Democratic Kampuchea) where the rival theory misses.

Finally, through case studies, I am able to present some evidence of causality through process-tracing and to support my claim of joint-necessity. I find that a regime's ideological content is extremely important in accounting for HISS; I have a case in which irregular entry and high barriers to offensive conventional war obtain, but the wrong type of ruling ideology is present and HISS is not adopted. I also observe how changing barriers to offensive military operations abroad coincide with changing HISS policies in Cuba, including a use of conventional military tools when those barriers are lowered. Additionally, I find that a particular type of

foreign-policy decision making process and domestic political apparatus emerges following non-institutionalized regime entry in each of the states that adopt HISS. This shows that my causal mechanism leading from the factors of international revolutionary ideology and non-institutionalized regime change are operative. Ultimately, I find that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the claims to causal necessity in my Revolutionary Reality theory; disconfirmatory evidence for sufficiency of these conditions is found in the case on Nicaragua, and other shortcomings regarding formulation are discussed in the conclusion in relation to the American case. Evidence that contradicts my account as a whole is rare.

VI. Contributions

This dissertation makes several important contributions to the literature on state sponsorship and also on revolutionary regimes and ideological motivations in foreign policy. The primary contribution is providing a framework to think about a state's pattern of sponsorship and to consider the proposition that More is Different when it comes to states' policies regarding non-state actors. Though this is a proposition that could ultimately be proven false based on further evidence, by drawing attention to the construct of HISS in the international relations field, this research frames an important and under-explored question that has real-world political effects.

Secondly, this dissertation has assembled the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Database, a new dataset that can be used to study other questions related to the state's use of sponsorship as a foreign policy tool across time and space. This is the only dataset that gives equal weight to each country (sponsor or non-sponsor) in each year. In contrast, many sets are not concerned with *non*-sponsorship at all. Furthermore, other sources of data are based on annual observations of state-group linkages. This means that the more active a state is, the more

heavily that state is weighted, making causes of sponsorship difficult to assess with any external validity. In contrast, the SPFS data allows researchers to compare patterns of sponsorship policies, as embraced by states, across time and space, weighting or including observations by choice rather than by data structure

Another innovation in this dataset is the creation of the ideology measure. I leverage extensive quantitative data on world constitutions (see Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014) to create a cross-national measure of government ideology. In particular, I use variables about the features and language of these documents to generate an "international revolutionariness" score for each country's national constitution. This application of the comparative constitutions project dataset is, to my knowledge, unprecedented, and future researchers may be able to make great use of this tool to measure concepts about states and regimes that were previously wholly unquantifiable.

Finally, my research offers a predictive theory of HISS adoption that can be probed, tested, or expanded upon in individual cases as such information becomes available. I here demonstrate that the broad claim of the dissertation's theory is congruent with the outcome of HISS adoption or non-adoption across time and space during the research period. I have also theorized, but been unable to fully explore, causal mechanisms linking the posited factors in the Revolutionary Realities to HISS. By establishing consistent congruency across cases, I have given other researchers interested in this topic a compelling direction for deeper research on causal processes. To use the favorite metaphor, I have lit up a few lampposts in an otherwise very dark alley under which the drunkard may search in earnest for his keys.

VII. Plan of the Dissertation

The rest of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I present my Revolutionary Realities theory. I review and draw on the existing relevant literature, which includes the international relations literature on state sponsorship and the comparative political literature on revolutions. I argue that HISS is only adopted when three conditions are simultaneously met. First, a regime that has 1) entered power through non-institutionalized means must 2) espouse an international revolutionary ideology. Next, that regime must be 3) unable to carry conventional military conflict to its adversaries. Under these conditions, the sponsorship of a large number of non-state actors on a global scale, including the support of highly terroristic groups, appears to be an ideal policy. HISS both satisfies the preferences of regime leadership for an activist, global, and anti-status-quo foreign policy and is one of the few tools available to pursue it.

The dissertation then turns to presenting empirical evidence. Part II presents quantitative evidence of the theory's main proposition regarding the three necessary conditions using the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset. Chapter 3 introduces the novel State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship (SPFS) dataset developed for this research. In addition to describing the data themselves and the sources and constructions for my variables of interest, this chapter also offers support for two separate claims. The first claim is that there is an empirical pattern of sponsorship that is successfully and meaningfully captured by my dataset's operationalization of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors. The second claim I advance is that the three factors included in the Revolutionary Realities theory are systematically associated with HISS adoption. This is achieved by a series of bivariate tests and statistical demonstrations of my variables of interest as well as a medium-N style analysis that serves as a first cut at the joint necessity claim. I consistently find that HISS is associated with these measures at rates that are

higher than statistical chance would predict, providing one form of quantitative support for the theory as a whole.

In Chapter 4, I test my theory's single hypothesis – that all three factors must be present for HISS onset to occur – against the competing explanations in the literature using random effects models, General Estimating Equations models, and hazard models. I find that my triple-interaction term is statistically significantly correlated with HISS outcomes. Further, I test the alternative hypotheses in the literature on geostrategy and social revolutions and radical leaders. Though there is some support for elements of the geostrategic literature's hypotheses, overall the Revolutionary Realities theory variables yield stronger and more consistent results. These two chapters comprise the quantitative portion of the analysis.

Part III leverages qualitative evidence from six different cases to test the Revolutionary Reality theory of HISS adoption. Chapter 5 presents an overview of the case selection criteria and discusses the kinds of evidence used in the case studies. In Chapter 6, I examine the cases of HISS adoption in Iran, which is a critical case for my theory, and Sudan. First, I seek to demonstrate that my theory can account for the outcome of HISS adoption in both post-1979 Iran and post-1989 Sudan. I provide evidence for the presence of all three of the necessary conditions in my theory, discuss the available evidence that the state did engage in high-intensity state sponsorship during the period of study, and describe and analyze the interactions of the three factors in state foreign policy making. The second purpose of the case comparison study is to show why and how non-institutionalized entry contributes to HISS adoption. Using process tracing evidence, I demonstrate that there is nothing unique to popular movement-based social revolutions in causing HISS; non-institutionalized entry suffices to trigger the domestic political processes that contribute to HISS adoption. I highlight the similarities between the military

coup-type entry of Omar al-Bashir and his subsequent tapping of Hassan al-Turabi in Sudan and the Iranian case of popular revolutionary entry. This helps to refute the "radical leadership" theories of HISS while demonstrating the presence of my own theory's causal mechanisms.

In Chapter 7, the theoretical focus is on the role of ideological content in driving HISS adoption. I examine two more cases, one in which HISS was adopted (China, post-1949 revolution) and one in which it was not (Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-1979 under the Khmer Rouge). Both cases conform to my theory. Whereas China is a classic case of HISS adoption, quite similar to Iran and Sudan, Democratic Kampuchea did *not* have all three of the key factors in place. The entry type and international context were present, but the ideology embraced by the Khmer Rouge, while anti-status quo and extreme, was national chauvinistic, not international revolutionary. There was, therefore, no HISS policy adopted, as the theory expects. I thereby demonstrate that particular ideological content, rather than just an ostensibly "radical" or "communist" worldview, is associated with the activist, internationalist foreign policy of high-intensity state sponsorship.

The Cuban case in Chapter 8 is another critical case for the dissertation's theory. Two different periods are compared in a within-case comparison, to support the claim that Cuba's adoption of HISS is consistent with the Revolutionary Realities account and to further examine the role of high barriers to offensive conventional war abroad in contributing to HISS outcomes. The first period is from 1959-1969, during which time all three necessary conditions were present and Cuba embraced a HISS policy. The second period from 1975-1980, however, was marked by much lower barriers to conventional war abroad, and during that time, the Cuban government conducted major military operations in Angola. Additionally, the Castro regime moved away from HISS around this same time, making its armed forces' involvement overseas a

central pillar of its foreign policy. This corroborates the notion that when states cannot use their own military abroad, they take advantage of other foreign policy tools available in the international system. Though it does not clearly prove the necessity of the barriers to conventional war condition, the within-case comparison reveals a number of processes that are consistent my theory.

The next two chapters constitute Part IV, Extensions and Limitations. In Chapter 9, I examine the case of Nicaragua under the Sandinistas. This case selection is encouraged by a finding in Part II, in which a number of leftist Latin American states did not adopt HISS despite having high values on all three Revolutionary Reality causal factors at some point during the dataset's temporal coverage. In Nicaragua post-1979, all three necessary causal conditions were present. However, the state maintained links with only one non-state actor for a few years in the early 1980s and clearly did not adopt HISS. In the case, I argue that the non-adoption policy can be attributed to Nicaragua's lack of foreign policy independence, due to its small size and the hegemonic activities of the United States. Leadership understood that sponsorship of non-state actors would lead to increased US anti-regime activities, including heightened support of the contra forces and perhaps a direct military invasion of Nicaragua itself. I ultimately argue that this result undermines a sufficiency claim, though not the necessity claim, in the theory and speculate as to whether the Revolutionary Realities account makes a hidden assumption about foreign policy independence.

I conclude this dissertation in Chapter 10. I summarize the insights and evaluate the performance of the Revolutionary Realities theory, triangulating the results from both the quantitative and the qualitative parts of the study. I describe additional insights on the process of HISS adoption gleaned from the case studies, discussing the role of a state's history of foreign-

imposed regimes, the surprisingly unimportant role of sequencing between entry and ideology adoption, and the unusual use of the military as a tool for forwarding ideological goals. Additionally, I address the case of the United States, which adopted HISS under Reagan in 1981. A brief congruency test reveals that the Revolutionary Realities theory is, in fact, consistent with a number of aspects of the American case, even if it does not fully fit this instance of HISS adoption. For instance, though the Regan administration entered power through regular democratic elections, there were major staffing changes at not just the upper-level politicians but also the mid-level bureaucrats in a number of foreign policy-related agencies. This underscores the general portability of the theory and also suggests areas in which further information about causal processes might lead to a better understanding of high-intensity state sponsorship. I close with reflections on directions for future research.

Chapter 2: Revolutionary Realities:
A Theory of High Intensity State Sponsorship of Non-State Actors (HISS)

I. Introduction

This dissertation offers a new, theoretical account of the causes of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state armed actors. It asks the central research question, "Under what conditions do states adopt a policy of HISS?" Though relatively infrequently adopted, this policy and the states that have embraced it have had a major impact on international relations since the end of WWII. Until recently, very few attempts have been made to offer a theoretical account of this particular pattern of sponsorship. In this chapter, I both address the theoretical explanations for HISS that can be extracted from the existing literature and present my own, unique theory of this misunderstood political phenomenon.

As outlined in the previous chapter, there are three criteria for HISS, and all three must be met for a state's pattern of overall sponsorship to be considered "high-intensity." The quantity criterion states that a government must sponsor a large number of groups; the geography criterion calls for at least one of those groups to be operating outside of the state's region; and the HPTG criterion states that the government must be giving support to at least one highly terroristic non-state actor. Though this particular sponsorship pattern has rarely been researched explicitly, there are two existing literatures that address the topic. Both the comparative politics literature on social revolutions and the international relations literature on the support of rebel actors offer some insight into HISS adoption. As discussed below, however, the theories

advanced by these scholars ultimately fail to fully account for high-intensity sponsorship patterns in particular.

Drawing from these literatures, I therefore introduce and lay out my own "Revolutionary Realities" theory of HISS where I argue that there are certain conditions under which states are likely to implement a HISS policy. Stated briefly, the Revolutionary Realities theory claims that HISS is only made into state policy when three mutually-reinforcing, necessary conditions are met. First, a regime that has 1) entered power through non-institutionalized means must 2) espouse an international revolutionary ideology. Next, that regime must be operating in an international security context where 3) the state faces high barriers to carrying conventional military conflict to its foreign adversaries.

Under these conditions, the sponsorship of a large number of non-state actors on a global scale, including the support of highly terroristic groups, appears to be an ideal policy. Because of the content of the international revolutionary ideology, many leadership figures have an interest in pursuing an anti-status quo policy that has global implications. Because it has entered power through non-institutionalized means, the new government is both more likely to rely on pre-existing ideologies and heuristics and also has a much greater opportunity to rebuild or create governing institutions, choose who among them will wield what authority, and generally implement their preferred policies with state resources. In the face of high barriers to conventional military operations against rivals abroad, however, the state can simultaneously do almost nothing outside of its territory to implement its global project of change with its own military forces. The government therefore looks for tools that are available right away: extant armed groups fighting against geopolitical rivals, status-quo powers, and ideologically-identified enemy nations. HISS comes to appear to be a panacea, a policy that may provide short-term

benefits in terms of creating new allies and destabilizing neighborhood rivals while also needling powerful symbolic enemies, satisfying the desire for a globally reaching, anti-status quo foreign policy when the state's own military cannot accomplish the task. Sponsorship programs easily pass through the domestic foreign policy decision-making process involving like-minded and loyalist leaders, who, in turn, can execute the policies via a governing apparatus which is subject to little external oversight, making high-intensity state sponsorship the law of the land. States will thereby embrace a policy in which they support many groups around the world, including the most terroristic of groups, as a policy that is both, in the view of the state's leadership, legitimate and effective in accomplishing multiple state goals all at once.

This is a theory of Revolutionary Realities because, while it recognizes the role of ideas and leadership in foreign policy making, it also takes into consideration the very real security situation and challenges that states face. An example is useful here. In order to understand Castro's support of guerrilla movements throughout the world, it is necessary to acknowledge both the idealism and the highly strategic calculations of the regime. For a *foco* movement to successfully overthrow the government in, say, Guatemala, would be a tremendously positive outcome for the Cuban government: 1) Cuba would have supported a just cause against a single illegitimate government and helped the citizens of another nation; 2) they would have served the vanguard role dictated by an ideology many in the regime genuinely, if not fervently, believe and forwarded the global movement against imperialism and towards international socialism; and 3) they would have replaced a hostile regional rival with a sympathetic ally which, in turn; 4) would give the isolated island nation an additional vote in Cuba's favor in fora like the OAS or the UN and potentially; 5) won military and economic support from the new Guatemalan government or even Soviet bloc countries and allies thus; 6) making a United States invasion, the single greatest

security threat to Cuba, diplomatically and materially more costly to Washington. To ask whether – or insist that – one of these reasons was "more important" or "really caused" the sponsorship policy misses crucial aspects of how the government enacting the sponsorship policy saw the situation and leads to spurious academic conclusions.

The Revolutionary Realities theory thus embraces the notion that all of these logics are potential motivators for sponsorship. The goals is not to account for all of them – a formidable task – but rather to move beyond existing explanations and forward a set of plausible, causal conditions that lead to the actual adoption of HISS. I posit that there are three factors that can trigger at least a number of the most important causal process: non-institutionalized entry, high barriers to conventional military operations abroad, and an international revolutionary ideology. In the example above, the military tools of the state were not capable of changing the governments abroad or striking out, on their own, against the status-quo powers. Equally important is the fact that not all of the above reasons and goods could have been articulated nor their desirability agreed upon without the international revolutionary ideology, and non-institutionalized leadership entry produced the domestic political space for state resources to go to a wide-ranging sponsorship policy. Additionally, the government would not likely have faced isolation, been in such need of allies, and been at odds with powerful nations had it not embraced an international revolutionary ideology and entered power via insurrection. The state, in short, would not have *wanted* (ideology) to do the things it could not do (barriers to conventional war) with its own forces, and, had only some elements of the government wanted to, sponsorship could not have been (non-institutionalized entry) so centrally important to the nation's overall foreign policy and been implemented on such a scale. Thus, a set of identifiable factors mutually reinforce each other and lead to a state's HISS adoption.

The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review the existing literature related to explanations for international sponsorship, extracting the alternative hypothesis for high-intensity state sponsorship suggested therein. In the third section, I lay out my own theory of Revolutionary Realities, identifying and defining the three causal factors. In the fourth section, I dig deeper into the mutually reinforcing aspects of the theory's proposed, jointly-necessary conditions for HISS adoption and draw out key observable implications of my theorized causal mechanisms. The final section concludes and completes Part I of the dissertation.

II. Review of Literature: Two Competing Explanations

There are two recent scholarly literatures on sponsorship that may offer an account for patterns of linkages between state and non-state armed groups. The first literature is in international relations and argues that non-state actors are a tool for managing international security. Sometimes, a government is unable to provide for its security needs with its own resources – whether that be fighting outright in armed conflict or merely responding to numerous international rivals. They therefore support rebel groups abroad that are engaged against other states in order to increase their national security or decrease the threat to that security from the rebels' target government. Though some scholars in the IR field, most notably recent work by Belgin San-Akca with the "Dangerous Companion Project," have begun to pursue more complex, multi-causal theories in their research, such work still relies heavily on these security and rivalry logics.

The second strand of literature that I address is that of comparative revolutions. One of this dissertation's central insights is that the comparative politics literature holds important answers with respect to state sponsorship policies that are otherwise more frequently situated in

the field of international relations. Some revolutionary states in the modern era have adopted a policy that comparativists label "violent export" of their own political system, a policy that often meets all the definitional criteria of HISS in this research. This literature suggests that HISS occurs as a result of revolutionary processes, when certain sets of leaders, many of whom are extremists and ideologues, adopt sponsorship as a means of exporting that state's revolution to the world stage. High-intensity sponsorship is thus the foreign policy of states that have experienced domestic revolutionary upheavals, bringing radical leaders to power through social revolutionary processes.

Ultimately, both the revolutionary foreign policy and international relations literatures that highlight geostrategic aspects of sponsorship have contributed some insights into the causes of state support for non-state actors. However, neither alone is a sufficient account of the empirical patterns or theoretical causal mechanisms of *high intensity* state sponsorship, as distinct from other patterns. This is certainly in part because the geostrategic literature from international relations is not explicitly seeking to explain the same outcome as this research. More often, they are attempting to account for individual state-group linkages, where the DV is a certain state's support for a certain rebel group in a certain country at a certain time. More activity is noteworthy, but More is not Different. The revolutions literature is limited in a different way. The central question for most comparative political science and sociological researchers pursuing that agenda is, "What do revolutions cause?" Scholars are typically analyzing two or three revolutions and are attempting to account for overall foreign policies of new regimes, including military alliances and economic relations as well as support for non-state actors abroad. Though both literatures provide useful frameworks for considering HISS, they

both leave important gaps in accounting for cross-national patterns of sponsorship behavior that my theory in the subsequent section is able to address.

Theories of Sponsorship in International Relations: A Tool of Geostrategy

In the IR literature regarding the causes of state sponsorship of non-state actors, I have grouped existing accounts into two families. The first emphasizes the role material resource constraints on states that make sponsorship of non-state actors a substitute for the use of its own military apparatus. States may either lack military capabilities overall, or they may have overstretched their limited resources. Alternatively, rivals accounts suggest that sponsorship is a means of managing specific international rivalries, in which relations between a state and a particular rival are the theoretical focus of inquiry. Non-state actor support may function as a bargaining chip in relations and may provide a state some security advantages not through direct military actions, as in the first function, but through the ability to win concessions from rivals via the threat of such actions and their escalation.

The first theory in the IR literature is that **material resource constraints** on states lead to sponsorship. Many IR scholars argue that sponsoring insurgencies is a kind of outsourcing of security tasks when states are unable to provide for their own security needs. Most of the theorists and scholars examining sponsorship through the principal-agent lens, as described in Chapter 1, espouse this view. Though many, like Byman, note that there are a number of benefits that may accrue to the sponsoring state, security imperatives are emphasized. States gain security benefits that they otherwise could not provide for themselves, in exchange for the resources they deliver to sponsored groups (Salehyan 2010; Byman 2005a; Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011).

States therefore sponsor groups when the lack the material resources to provide for their security. San-Akca (2009) predicts that states will sponsor insurgencies when they do not have the ability to extract sufficient resources from their states to adequately protect their borders. She also suggests that states might use non-state actors as substitutes for allies.[1] In some recent doctoral work (Kirchnew 2013), the author theorizes that sponsorship is an alternative to both internal and external balancing, representing a third way for states with limited capacity. [2] The theoretical claim of this literature is that states with very limited material capacity, either because they have little to begin with or their armed forces are otherwise occupied, sponsor at very high levels (i.e., adopt HISS).

The **rivals** theory of sponsorship more clearly articulates the role of geopolitics in state sponsorship and emphasizes the function of sponsorship vis-à-vis specific external states. As Gal-Or (1993) put it, state sponsorship of terrorism can be a form of diplomacy. These theories suggest that sponsorship of political opposition, including violent opposition, in a rival or enemy's territory is a common feature of international relations (Salehyan 2009). Sponsorship takes place in order to impose costs upon or gain bargaining leverage over a specific target country. Findley, Piazza, and Young (2012) find that states involved in rivalries experience more terrorist attacks than states with fewer interstate rivalries. Conrad (2011) has a

[1] Much of the literature on alliances in international relations stems from the notion that states are enhancing their own security in seeking allies. See Stephen Walt. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press and Walt 1985. Glenn H. Snyder 1984. "The Security Alliance in Politics," World Politics, Vol 36, No 4 (1984);

[2] This is not unlike David 1991's account of third world countries that adopted great power allies during the Cold War. See also Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Relations.* Reading, Mass.: Addison-Webley. Drawing on Putnam's (1988) notion that leaders must play a two-level game of both international and domestic politics to survive, Robinson (2014) says that a variety of "risky" behaviors in international relations, including foreign sponsorship, can be explained by the shortened time-horizons that some regimes face, overstretched by the multitude of security challenges to both state and regime. In this thinking, state sponsorship occurs when regimes simultaneously face both internal and external threats but lack the resources to address them at the same time. In all cases, states are deriving or at least seeking to derive *security benefits* from their sponsorship of non-state armed actors.

corroborating finding, and he suggests that the theoretical implication is that states use terrorist proxies against rival states. Payne (2011) makes a similar claim, that plausible deniability for sponsorship makes it a less costly and therefore more appealing policy than outright military aggression. Maoz and San-Akca (2012) find evidence that states do tend to sponsor non-state armed actors that target rival nations. They theorize that this support is most likely when states are unsatisfied with the dyad's status quo and believe they can change it in their favor with minimal retaliation. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2010) also find that rivalries play a part, though they suggest that 'transnational constituencies' (i.e. ethnic ties) also explain support.

Rivals theories also take more complex forms when it comes to support for international terrorism. Bapat (2012) and Bapat (2007) specifically suggest that withdrawing or augmenting support from non-state groups in a rival's territory can be a useful and powerful bargaining chip in interstate relations. Withdrawing support can act as a carrot and offering such support can be a 'costly signal' because states cannot guarantee that they will be able to control their sponsored groups once a certain level of support is given. States sponsor groups that put pressure on rival governments, who in turn, offer concessions or are destabilized and can pose less of a threat to the sponsoring state. In these situations, the dynamics between two states is the primary causal factor in sponsorship, as state try to manage threats and get an edge over rivals using a variety of different armed options. The logical extension of this, then, into an account for patterns of high-intensity sponsorship is that the states with the greatest number of rivals should become HISS states.

Finally, some scholars in the international relations field have begun to explore more **complex models of sponsorship**. These are multi-causal and theorize, like the Revolutionary Realities theory will below, that multiple conditions affect sponsorship outcomes. The most

prevalent and thorough-going of these is San-Akca's (2016) in her State Selection Model.[3] She uses a triadic model, and explains both a) intentional support that states give to rebel groups that are targeting a particular country and b) in the Rebel Selection Model, rebel groups' choice of states from which to draw resources without formal state sanction. Like most IR scholars, she is interested in explaining particular state-group linkages at particular times, rather than examining the state's overall tendency towards or policy of sponsorship. However, she does include three factors ("material interests," "domestic incentives," and "ideational affiliation") as possible simultaneous, and at times potentially interacting, causes of state-group linkages. She finds consistent support in her quantitative analysis for these variables' relevance when it comes to individual state-group linkages in this triadic context.

This work, while an important step in thinking about states and non-state groups, is still theoretically underdeveloped. The definition of "material interests" is whether or not a group and a state have a shared enemy or target state – essentially the Rivals theory described above. The 'domestic incentives' variable is simply the state's resource extraction capacity, which San-Akca measures fairly creatively but is ultimately the Material Resource Constraints from above. The final measure in the multi-causal state model is "ideational affinity," which can be *any* ties—cultural, ethnic, religious, or political—that might exist between states or state populations and armed groups. This is drawing mostly on the findings from the literature on ethnic ties creating incentives for state involvement in foreign wars addressed in Chapter 1. The attempt to expand away from purely ethnic ties is laudable, but the affinity conceptualization is too general

[3] Skuldt (2013) brings domestic political survival into the account and theorizes that leaders vulnerable to domestic overthrow via coups *and* facing external military threats turn to terrorist groups and other non-state actors because they do not trust their own armed forces. Congruently, McAllister 2006 "A Habermasian Analysis" encourages a more careful examination of cultural and what he calls "extra-rational motives." He notes that, even though international security concerns can explain a great deal of sponsorship activity, states sometimes also sponsor insurgencies which ultimately comprise that state's security.

to provide much analytic guidance. It largely reduces to "ethnicity plus religion" when identifying non-state actors and national populations, though "leftist" rebel groups are flagged. When comparing states, ideational affiliation is defined simply along a democratic/socialist line.[4] This approach lumps together states—like Democratic Kampuchea and the People's Republic of China—that are quite divergent when it comes to ideational factors relevant to sponsorship (see Chapter 7 of this research). Further, the processes are under-articulated or not explored in this work, though the establishment of the new dataset does offer great prospects for future research. My own theory does identify a similar set of three factors, but each factor is more specific (i.e. non-institutionalized regime entry as opposed to "domestic incentives") and gives ideology and domestic politics overall a far more in-depth treatment.

Hypotheses in the Existing IR Literature

Typically, these explanations all account for individual state-group linkages, but there is a logical extension for patterns of sponsorship, including HISS. States that are very weak, in relative or absolute terms, and/or states with a large number of rivals would need to outsource most of their security tasks and handle a huge number of dyadic relationships with other nations. The proliferation of individual inks would lead to what I call a pattern of high-intensity state sponsorship. This leads to the following hypotheses, which will primarily be tested in the quantitative analysis (Chapter 4).[5]

[4] Interestingly, her research suggests that the much-debated democratic peace theory may apply at the level of sub-conventional conflict, for all that it is fraught at the conventional level. See, Brown et. al (Eds) 1996, Kinsella 2003, and Rosato 2003, and Lipson 2003.)

[5] States should also, according to this theory, tend *not* to sponsor groups that do not provide such benefits and should not target states in which they have few material interests. Sponsorship for purely ideational reasons should be minimal, and when sponsorship is costly (for example, consuming particularly scarce state resources or eliciting harsh military responses from targets) and plausible deniability is difficult, these theories would tend to predict less state sponsorship. These kinds of predictions are not tested directly here, but a number of seeming non-strategic state-group linkages come up in assessments of the HISS policy of individual states in the case studies.

Material Capabilities Theory:
MC1: States with lower absolute military capacity adopt HISS.

MC2: States with lower military capacity then their rivals adopt HISS.

MC3: States experiencing military overstretch adopt HISS.

Rivals Theory:
RIV1: States with high numbers of rivals adopt HISS.

Theories of Sponsorship in Comparative Politics: Social Revolutions and Radical Leaders

The other competing explanation regarding state sponsorship of non-state violent actors is that of **social revolutions and radical leaders**. Only a handful of IR scholars have engaged with the revolutions literature in comparative politics (most relevantly here, Walt 1996), but there is compelling evidence that these events and processes have both international causes and outcomes and can potentially contribute a great deal to our understanding of international behavior (Halliday 1999; Skocpol 1979; Goodwin 2001). Most relevantly, in this research, the literation in comparative politics can make sense of a state's interest in HISS and points towards domestic political factors that give states the ability to adopt a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors.

Unlike the international relations literature, the comparative politics literature on revolutions at times discusses something very much like my HISS dependent variable: the violent export of revolution. The policy that this research identifies as "HISS" is, in this literature, not a means for managing security but rather is a vessel for the spread of revolution itself. This is one of several policies, foreign and domestic, that the revolutions literature seeks to understand in the context of revolutionary processes that occur on the domestic level in states

that experience revolutions.[6] These scholars suggest that certain politically or ideologically radical factions, if they gain power, will seek to export the domestic revolution through violence abroad, often by sponsoring or stirring up anti-government activism in other nations. In this view, HISS is adopted as a result of radical, revolutionary leadership during the course of a social and political revolution. States support revolutionary groups in an effort to spread their own conception and system of politics. The most zealous revolutionaries, when in power, will rather indiscriminately support revolutions abroad, despite the fact that this may drain domestic resources needed for consolidation or such aggressive foreign policies may create enemies abroad. It is this theory that I will compare to my own theory in empirical analyses and from which my theory draws insight.

In theories of social revolutions and radical leadership writ large, a period of rule by 'extremists' and 'radicals' is also sometimes theorized to be an integral stage in the ideal-typical revolutionary process. For some scholars, the French Revolution is the ideal model in which the Reign of Terror and Virtue is seen as one nearly inevitable step in revolutionary events (Goldstone 1998, Brinton 1965). Often because of external or internal threats to the unstable coalition that ousted the previous regime, radicals come into power for a time, preaching ideological purity and willing to use violence against any traitors to the revolution (Halliday 1999). With these leaders in power, ideological projects come to the fore, and the foreign policy of these leaders fervently embraces the violent export of revolution. In these accounts, that is just simply what happens when you have a successful popular, social revolution! In the international relations literature, Walt (1996) also notes in *Revolution and War* that revolutionary

[6] Typically, these scholars are explicitly concerned with "bottom-up" revolutions or social revolutions. This is in contrast to military coups, but does encompass many, if not all, instances in which armed insurgents oust a more conservative sitting government.

states are very likely to attempt to export their ideologies. Though his work is predicting international security conflict in the form of conventional ground wars, he argues that the tendency of revolutionary regimes to attempt to foment radical change abroad is a key part of the international dynamic that promotes conventional war following revolution. In short, all of these authors agree that the beliefs and projects of a radical leadership drive a certain ideologically-oriented set of policies which are adopted as a result of revolutionary processes; domestic political revolution drives HISS.

Particularly, who is in charge of the state apparatus following a popular revolution is the central factor that explains a state's foreign policies. Sadri (1997) examines the Iranian, Cuban, and Chinese revolutions and the subsequent governments' approaches to foreign affairs. His theory suggests that some factions are more radical than others, and that, if the domestic political situation leads to these factions holding power, states are likely to embrace similarly radical foreign policies. In contrast, if the 'pragmatic' faction of leaders is in power, the state is more likely to adopt a conciliatory and rational-strategic foreign policy, which precludes sponsorship of revolution abroad. Sadri's argument emphasizes elite in-fighting and domestic pressures to adopt certain policies after a revolutionary regime change; certain domestic ruling groups – which he broadly labels as "pragmatic" and "radical" – wield more power than others as a result of the transition process. Their preferred policies, then, are enacted. One such policy is the export of the revolution to other states.

The role of ideological beliefs is also addressed as an explanation for the foreign policies in monographs of individual revolutions. Ideologues have a seemingly genuine commitment to the tenants of their ideologies. When revolutions brought them to power, they used the resources of the state to promote radical political change abroad (see works such as O'Sullivan 1986;

Dominguez 1989; Halliday 1999; Ramazani 1987). Though they go into greater depth regarding the beliefs of individual revolutionaries, these studies share a common theme with the above works. HISS is adopted in those moments when these radical leaders, who have real ideological beliefs or must appear to be ideologues, rule the land after a political or social revolution.

An early strain of policy-making and scholarly literature on state sponsorship of terrorism offers a derivative theory of HISS. **Rogue states**, often merely by definition, do not follow the international prohibition on giving aid, succor, and shelter to terrorists and undermining legally sitting regimes through supporting non-state violence (Cline and Alexander 1986; Wilkinson 1986, Coll 1997, Pillar 2001, Henriksen 2001; Mohindra 1993[7], Moore 1997). Rogue state thinking can be seen among Cold War-era politicians, such as Under-secretary of State George Ball in 1984 (see Kegley et. al.1988, 27). Indeed, the Article X "Sources of Soviet Conduct" that set the foundation for Cold War foreign policy in the US was based a similar belief that the USSR could be expect to embrace a certain kind of 'aggressive' stance by virtue of its immutable identity (Kennan 1946). This type of thinking, well-exemplified in Anthony Lake's 1994 Foreign Affairs article "The Backlash States" emerged yet again after 9/11 in President George W. Bush's characterization of "the Axis of Evil" and his administration's explicit concern about rogue states (Bush 2002; see also Litwak 2000). Even in more scholarly literatures, the theory of 'rogue states' appears.[8] Though these authors offer a more evidence-based approach to studies

[7] For example, in Mohindra: "In such [terrorist] games, which fit into the national strategy and serve national aspirations, there can be no final whistle. They have been going on from the beginning of time and will continue till the end of time. There are no ground rules, just objectives to be achieved. The ends will always justify the means. Such are the terrorist games that nations play – and why not?" (1993, 79). Note that this quotation is not from a stirring, policy-oriented conclusion but rather comes in a central chapter, in a section with subheadings like "How Saddam Hussein plays games" and "The game Hitler would have played."

[8] Cline and Alexander (1986) argue that regime type is an important predictor of sponsorship, saying that dictatorial regimes that use "state terror" at home are likely to use terrorism abroad. It is an "illegitimate optional tactic in low-intensity conflict" (ibid, 40). Additionally, "rogue state" status, based on the "rogue state index" is also thought to be a predictor of HISS according to some authors (Caprioli & Trumbore 2003; Rubin 1999). There was even a scholarly push to introduce "rogue states" as a regime type itself, characterized as "hostile (or seemingly hostile)

of rogue state behavior, HISS as an outcome is a foregone conclusion or a definitional criterion of "rogueness." Ultimately, these theories are simply too tautological, post-hoc, or normative to give the analyst much leverage on the conditions under which high level sponsorship occurs. Indeed, 'rogue states' are sometimes thought to "go rogue" because they generally desire to break international norms and support terrorists or employ state terror at home. Terrorists all the way down, it seems.

The flip side of these social revolutions and rogue/radicalism accounts is that stable states and especially **democracies** would not tend to sponsor non-state actors abroad as a central pillar of their foreign policies. Some existing evidence has suggested that democratic regimes do not tend to use sponsorship as a foreign policy tool (O'Brien 1996; San-Akca 2016).[9] If revolutionary leadership and revolutionary processes are responsible for HISS adoption, then states that have not experienced political upheavals and, most importantly, democracies, would not sponsor non-state actors at high levels.

Alternative Hypotheses: Social Revolutions and Radical Leadership

Setting aside the "rogue state" literature, which I do not test empirically, the account from comparative politics yields some fairly clear theoretical predictions about HISS and ultimately generates the following hypotheses, which this research will rest against its own theory in empirical analysis. Like the hypotheses above, these are extracted from a literature that does not theorize extensively about my outcome of interest per se, but does at least discuss the violent

Third World states with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities…bent on sabotaging the prevailing world order" (Klare 1995, 26). This was operationalized by the twin indicators of support for terrorism and nuclear ambition (Caprioli and Trumbore 2005), an exercise in tautological typology rather than explanation.

[9] There is also a related literature on whether democracy and terrorism are related in general see especially Sandler 1995, and whether terrorism is an effective tool against democracies (Pape 2003, 2005).

export of revolution as one of a number of possible foreign policies to emerge as the result of revolutionary turmoil.

SR 1: States that have recently experienced social revolutions are more likely to adopt HISS than states that have not. SR 2: States with a leader recently ousted by domestic popular protest or insurgent groups are more likely to adopt HISS. SR 3: Non-democracies are more likely to adopt HISS than democracies.

Shortcomings in Accounting for HISS in the Existing Literature

These IR theories seem to account for why states sponsor certain groups in certain countries at certain times. However, if sponsorship is so useful, and there so many benefits waiting to be seized at low cost, why would any state *not* sponsor groups? Any state with a regional adversary or that shares a border with another should, it seems, at least consider sponsorship. Yet we know from Chapter 1 both that roughly half of the states in the international system do not sponsor at all and that only a handful of states sponsor at HISS levels. Also, while a great deal of sponsorship is associated with rivalry, many rivalries evince no sponsorship. The IR logic is also sometimes not clearly applicable. A state policy of HISS has frequently and indeed typically led to quite adverse security results, particularly among states that sponsor groups like Al-Qaeda or harbor terrorists like Abu Nidal. Rather than enhancing overall security, the policy of HISS has made states a target of economic sanctions, arms embargoes, and outright military aggression (e.g. O'Sullivan 2003). This is not congruent with the general account from the IR literature which is that states are pursuing strategic benefits from sponsorship. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how security-related IR theories apply to many of the most consequential sponsorship activity in the world. What bargaining leverage did Afghanistan gain

by sponsoring Al-Qaeda and becoming associated with the 9/11 attacks? Were the United States and Afghanistan truly geopolitical "rivals" in the late 1990s in the first place? Similar questions about rivalry and the nature of the benefits gained by sponsorship can be asked about other relations, such as Sudan, which sponsored the IRA against the UK. Thus, while geostrategic explanations offer a sound account for lower levels of primarily regional sponsorship and are increasingly helping us to understand the links between individual groups and states at a given time, there are some empirical and theoretical shortcomings when it comes to explaining the type of policy that forms the focus of this research.

There are two shortcomings in the comparative politics accounts of HISS. Though revolutions-based theories are less tautological than rogue state explanations, with few exceptions (Halliday 1999; 2002) they only theoretically add one additional step to the theoretical causal chain. Why support groups? To spread the revolution. Why spread the revolution? Because you have 'radical' leaders. Indeed, radical leaders are sometimes by construction and definition to be identified as 'radicals,' in contrast to 'moderates,' *because* they hold a belief that the state should, among other things, sponsor and promote revolution elsewhere (Sadri 1997). A vaguely defined "extremist" or "religious" leadership (see Brinton 1965) is the main causal factor for the desire to export revolution. What it is about the revolution and the beliefs of leadership that drives the desire for "violent export" is at best unclear. While these accounts touch upon a number of key factors that I argue *are* ultimately important in explaining high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors, the account in the comparative politics literature both over-predicts and under-explains HISS.

The other shortcoming is revealed in a brief survey of the empirical record. If rogue, recalcitrant, revolutionary, or radical leaders provide the most important impetus for state

sponsorship of non-state actors, why is there only a partial overlap between recognized "social revolutions" and a policy of state sponsorship of non-state actors on a high level? Why also, then, does a state like Sudan, where a mid-level military officer who took power decades after decolonization in merely one that country's half dozen coups, find itself a HISS state after 1989? In contrast, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, one of the most radical regimes in the last fifty years, did almost nothing to sponsor foreign groups. The comparative politics literature does not provide an account that is consistent with HISS adoptions in history.

Ultimately, then, both the *Tool of Geostrategy* and *Revolutionary Leadership* strains of existing literature fails to account for HISS. On empirical grounds, neither explanation fares particularly well, because the predictions of these theories do not seem to account for the patterns that we see in the world. A small number of states are responsible for a lot of global sponsorship and not all of these states experienced true bottom-up social revolutions to bring the sponsoring regime to power. In the next section, I lay out my Revolutionary Realities theory of High Intensity State Sponsorship of armed non-state actors. I account for why a particular pattern of sponsorship emerges from this particular set of causal conditions. I draw on insights from the existing literature while, at the same time, make more narrowly focused claims and draw connections between the specific foreign policy outcome of HISS and certain aspects of the geo-strategic context, ideological orientation of leadership, and the political process of foreign-policy decision making in new regimes.

III. The Revolutionary Realities Theory of HISS

This theory incorporates the insights from the existing literature to help understand the high level of state sponsorship described in the previous chapter. It places the literature on foreign policies of revolutionary states in conversation with the IR literature on sponsorship,

deriving a more complete theory of the conditions under which a particular pattern of sponsorship can be expected. Like the geostrategic literature, this theory predicts that the international security challenge facing states contributes to the adoption of such a policy. Specifically, states adopt HISS when they are unable to carry out conventional military operations against foes abroad. Like the revolutions literature, this theory predicts that non-institutionalized regime change is an important focal point for understanding high-intensity state sponsorship and that certain ideas and beliefs related to revolutionary change are integral in driving sponsorship outcomes.

As discussed in further detail below, this account offers a more serious role for ideas in HISS adoption choices. I argue that political ideology ultimately influences the goals of the state and the leadership's beliefs about which political strategies are legitimate and likely to produce desired outcomes. What I call an international revolutionary ideology increases a state's interest in having an active foreign policy, sets very high stakes for the outcome of their international projects, and views subterfuge, violence against civilians, and the overthrow of sitting enemy governments as legitimate and effective methods for achieving their political ends.

These preferences, in the face of an international context in which the state cannot use its own military to enact change beyond their borders, means that they have no choice but to rely on using existing armed forces in the world—non-state actors abroad. As a result of their non-institutionalized entry to power, these regimes are surrounded by fellow loyalists and ideologues and have control over the relevant foreign policy apparatus. This means that they can implement their policy of sponsorship far and wide, both in conflicts where national security benefits are likely to accrue *and* in riskier ventures or where the primary benefits to the state are more symbolic. There are no domestic roadblocks or contradicting voices to protest the use of

resources that could be spent on other political projects. The Revolutionary Realities theory can thereby offer a theoretically coherent account for the empirical fact that this pattern of sponsorship is relatively rare, does not uniformly follow from domestic revolutions, and does not always (appear to be) delivering strategic benefits to states that choose to adopt it.

In its most basic form, the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS states argues that HISS occurs when three conditions are present: 1) a new regime enters power through non-institutionalized means; 2) its leadership espouses an international revolutionary ideology; and 3) the state cannot use its own conventional military apparatus for offensive operations abroad, especially against key rivals. Under these conditions, HISS is appealing as a type of activist, internationalist, and anti-status quo foreign policy, and it is one of the few tools available for states what are interested in using force in the pursuit of their global agendas. Furthermore, at the domestic level, the regime has the ability to implement a far-reaching sponsorship program, subject to little oversight or feedback from dissenting groups.

The HISS outcome is therefore ultimately driven by mutually reinforcing tendencies among all three factors. International revolutionary ideology and non-institutionalized regime change interact to dramatically increase the leadership's preference for, and ability to implement, an active and internationalist foreign policy. New leaders tend to appoint personal or political loyalists during the uncertain period of consolidation after a non-institutionalized regime change, eschewing established institutional actors in favor of constructing new governing organs or placing their own people in charge of agencies. This means that like-minded leaders, who share similar internationalist, anti-status quo goals, are making foreign policy with limited institutional barriers and few dissenting opinions. In many cases, one policy implied by the ideological

content is the global support of "fellow revolutionaries" – groups often seen as insurgents and terrorists.

The third necessary condition is that of an inability to wage conventional war against enemies abroad. The regime has a preference for an activist, internationalist foreign policy in general and views the use of force as legitimate. The ideological worldview identifies certain forces – often powerful, status-quo nations – as its key rivals. This limits the tools available for engaging with these foes abroad, whether that be in pro-active military ventures or 'aggressive defense' military actions. Thus, one solution that appears to be quite effective for such states is foreign sponsorship. Armed proxies can harass and punish enemies at a low cost, and successful rebels may even become future allied governments. Indeed, the leadership itself came to power through less-than-conventional means and is currently wielding the power of the state. Such means must, therefore, be both legitimate and effective. The result is that state resources are transferred to insurgent terrorist groups, states offer sanctuary and training to such groups, and they generally support their violent political activities around the globe.

These are "Revolutionary Realities" because states have revisionist or anti-status quo aspirations in foreign policy as a result of their ideology *and* they recognize their material limitations and the potential benefits of support for non-state actors abroad. Neither naïve ideologues nor pure realist (nationalist) security-seekers, states are choosing what appears to the best tool available to pursue specific if ideologically-oriented foreign policy goals, shared among like-minded leaders, using a domestic political apparatus they control as a result of non-institutionalized entry to power. They thereby develop a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors as a central pillar of their foreign policy.

Figure 2.1



Condition #1: The Role of International Revolutionary Ideology

I argue that one of the three causal factors leading to HISS adoption is the state's espousal of a political ideology with international revolutionary content. Ideologies can influence the goals of the state's foreign policies, the way the state's leadership perceives the stakes of political events, and what is perceived as legitimate and effective state policy. Scholars have attempted for decades to account for this unwieldy but vital concept in the study of politics.[10] For its definition of "ideology," this research relies on Hamilton (1987):

> "[Ideology is] a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realise, pursue, or maintain" (39).

[10] For one of the earliest attempts to unpack ideology for use in political science, see Sartori 1969. For a review of the various definitions of political ideology and attempts to map it conceptually throughout scholarship, see in particular Gerring 1997, Freeden 2006 (who deems ideology the 'problem child of political analysis') and Knight 2006.

I argue that international revolutionary ideologies contribute to HISS adoption by establishing particular kinds of foreign policy goals, setting the stakes of international political conflict quite high, and making violence at the hands of non-state actors appear to be both efficacious for achieving foreign policy goals and politically legitimate. This leads to a general political preference for an anti-status quo, active foreign policy; HISS is one several policies consistent with this preference and belief of efficacy. In this section, I lay out what an international revolutionary ideology is and how that ideology makes a policy of HISS appealing to state leadership.

Defining an International Revolutionary Ideology

In the realm of political ideologies, revolutionary ideologies are quite potent (Fanon 1961). In his classic *Anatomy of Revolution,* Brinton (1965) insists that the ideas and fervor that drive revolutionary extremists is a kind of religious belief:

> "Under its influence, men work very hard and excitedly in common to achieve…an ideal, a pattern of life not at the moment universally—or even largely—achieved. Religion attempts to close in favor of human hopes the gap between what men are and what men would like to be; at least in its youthful, fresh, and active phase, it will not for a moment admit that such a gap can long exist" (184).

I do here assume that leaders who espouse an international revolutionary ideology are interested in pursuing some ideologically-identified goals. This may either be because they genuinely see them as desirable political projects or because their authority and legitimacy is tied up in the revolutionary ideology or rhetoric that calls for ideological policies. The leadership's powerful

desire to stay in power along with a weak interest in ideology per se among some members can create incentives to pursue revolutionary goals.[11]

The international revolutionary political ideologies this theory argues will contribute to HISS adoption have three important features. I draw heavily and gratefully from Walt's *Revolution and War* in articulating what, for foreign policy and international relations, are the analytically relevant features of revolutionary political ideals. A revolutionary ideology, then, is one which claims to have normative *international application*, which emphasizes a historical political *trajectory and eschatology* in which the revolution represents a new phase of history, and which calls its adherents to *action* to promote its ideals and help realize the desired global, political end state.[12] These patterns can be found in most modern revolutionary ideologies, regardless of context-specific religious, political, or social content. Despite the variations in their content, ideologies have important implications for understanding the policy decisions of those who espouse them (Goldstone 1990, 431). An ideology that does not possess these attributes will not be considered an 'international revolutionary ideology' and, according to this theory, will be unlikely to contribute to HISS, though it may well have revolutionary content or have contributed to an actual and realized domestic revolution.

[11] On the issue of the instrumental adoption of ideology, see Sanín and Wood 2014, especially 213-215. Though I do not claim that all leaders are necessarily fully devoted to the same revolutionary goals and ideals, there are many different circumstances that would encourage leaders to act *as if* they did intellectually embrace revolutionary programs. This, in presence of at least some genuine preference for some ideologically-identified foreign policy projects among some leaders, is sufficient for the causal dynamics presented in this theory.

[12] Walt's three themes of revolutionary ideologies are similar. He argues that 1) "revolutionary groups usually portray opponents as intrinsically evil and incapable of meaningful reform" (25) they see "victory as inevitable" (26) and 3) they have "universal meaning" and "specifically, revolutionary movements often believe that the principles of the revolution are relevant for other societies" (27-28). My theory eliminates the "evil adversaries" component and offers one specific reading of the "victory is inevitable" theme. The third piece is one on which I almost completely agree with Walt, although I fall shy of "universal" as a definitional criterion, preferring "internationalist" instead, the principles are most certainly "relevant for other societies."

First, an international revolutionary ideology will contain an explicit commitment to internationalism on the basis of the applicability of its underlying precepts (Walt 1996, Goldstone 1990, Selbin 1998 in Goldstone Ed. (1998), and Halliday 1999). The ideology's claim about the morality and necessity of its agenda does not stop at national borders. Such ideologies can be seen as far back as the English Revolution and is especially clear in the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.[13] It was not Frenchmen that deserved the change in French social and political structure that the revolutionary movement advocated. Rather, it was *man* and the *citizen* who deserved a new relationship with *his* government.[14] This provides the rhetorical and moral impetus to either spread revolution 'by the sword' or to support those who are already engaged in a comparable struggle, a kind of Huntingtonian clash of civilizations sentiment that transcends some political boundaries while demarcating new ones (1993, 1996). In order to maintain space between this causal factor and the dependent variable, I will assert that only the international applicability of the ideology is necessary.

Revolutionary ideologies also take an *eschatological* view of political history and see the world as moving on a particular historical *trajectory*. As Walt puts it, these ideologies depict revolutionaries as being on the "right side" of the order that will eventually, and inevitably, emerge.[15] Skinner (1965) for example describes the importance of ideological interpretations of

[13] See Frank Maloy Anderson (Ed.) 1908. *The Constitutions and Other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of France, 1978-1907,* pg. 59-61 for an English translation. Available from the Library of Congress digital archives at: https://archive.org/stream/constitutionsoth01ande#page/58/mode/2up

[14] It should be noted that, for example, National Socialism, while it did have certain international applications, was *not* internationalist in the sense meant here. It applied to the German people, as a race, and the German nation; though it sought expansion, it was not believed that the ideals that were important for the German people to espouse were just as applicable or would have the same aggrandizing effect for non-Aryans. Rather it called for German *domination* of all inferior peoples.

[15] This criterion draws from Goldstone (1990) in which he ultimately concludes that eschatological ideologies are behind the revolutions in which former political systems are rejected rather than reformed by the new leadership.

history in the English revolution, noting that the Whig ideology in the English revolution relied on a particular reading of history which led believers to see a continuity and indeed inevitability about the political events that unfolded. This was "a political truth which the whole of English history was claimed to endorse" (175).[16] This impulse in the current era often emphasizes the concept that the new global order the revolution seeks to install; this order can be based on nationalist republicanism (as in the French Revolution) as easily as a world government of the proletariat or an Islamic caliphate—or Western liberal-democratic capitalism, for that matter (Fukuyama 1989, 1992). As many scholars have suggested, participation in a revolutionary movement is a risky business; revolutionary social movements must overcome significant collective action problem in order to mobilize enough people to be politically effective.[17] The belief that history has a purpose and they are moving towards an idealized new form of politics has enormous importance for keeping coalitions together.[18] Though this research does not restrict itself to social revolutions nor does it over-emphasize the belief in "inevitability", I do maintain that a notion of the eschatological nature of history is a definitional component of revolutionary ideologies themselves. In each case, the current international political order is represented as an artifact of the past, a form that history must and will reject in favor of a newer,

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Goldstone sees this as being a primary difference between Eastern and Western revolutions in the early modern world in general; I here take eschatology not to be a factor unique to the Western Judeo-Christian worldview but rather note the theoretical effects on state behavior that such a view, once espoused, is likely to have.

[16] He also adds that "History itself became seen as the embodiment of what was constitutionally proper—not to be quarreled with or altered, except at grave peril" (Skinner 1965, 178).

[17] See, among others, Wood 2003.; Fearon, and Laitin 2003; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Weinstein 2007; Humphreys, and Weinstein 2008; Parkinson 2013; and Staniland 2010.

[18] Most existing discussions of revolutionary ideologies come from the literature on domestic political and social revolutions. One description from Goldstone states that "the main role of ideologies in revolutions is to bring together diverse grievances and interests under a simple and appealing set of symbols of opposition …Puritanism, Liberalism, Communism, and most recently, Islam….Though none of these ideologies of themselves brought down governments, they were crucial in providing a basis for uniting diverse existing grievances under one banner and encouraging their active resolution. (Goldstone 1982, 203) Theda Skocpol also discusses this potential role for revolutionary ideologies—a way of uniting masses and elites into a single project (1979, p. 170)

idealized political order. Most important, the revolutionary polity embodies and represents this new form and takes on a much greater importance in the world than it otherwise might.

Finally, revolutionary ideologies place their adherents in a vital, fighting-vanguard position; they contain an imperative towards *action*. Revolutionaries have a duty to participate in the ongoing work of the revolution towards its further and idealized application. They are called upon to *make* history happen. Belief in the ideology requires not just faith but action and demonstration; the passive ideologue is politically suspect. This, it is worth noting, is part of the reason why it not necessary that all leaders be 'true believers' for revolutionary policies to be adopted. As long as there are some top leaders who are believers—or that appears to be the case—other leaders have some political incentive to act as if they, too, were ideologues, because action itself is so central to the ruling worldview. This is sufficient to lead to HISS policy outcomes if (and only if!) the other two conditions are also present.

Effects of International Revolutionary Ideology on Policy Decisions – What Ideas Cause

The notion of ideas as a "cause" of international phenomenon has long been explored by constructivist IR scholars (Goldstein 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993).[19] It seems intuitive that ideas can shape the way states interact and, in particular, the goals and motivations of human policy-makers, but it is nonetheless a perennial challenge to theorize about the causal role of ideas. My theory, in addition to accounting for HISS itself, seeks to articulate specifically *when* and *how*, in one instance, ideas matter in international relations by identifying important

[19] My approach in this dissertation does not emphasize constructivism in international relations writ large, nor is it as focused on international norms, culture, or ideas. Rather, this research attempts to get at the more specific question of the causal role of a particular type of political ideology in the case of one foreign policy. Therefore, this work does not go into a review of the extensive literature on social constructivism in international relations. The scholars in the following section—Tully, Converse, Wood, Hassner—provide the more immediate source of my theoretical approach to the issue of political ideologies. For a summary of ideas in the scholarly history of international relations see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. And for good measure, see Wendt 1992, 1999 for one of the more well-known articulations of constructivist IR thinking.

elements in an ideology's content and examining how those can lead to the preference for a certain type of national, political policy. I offer a theoretical proposition, one that may or may not comport with the best evidence available, that, given other conditions (extra-legal regime entry and structural barriers to one type of military foreign policy) international revolutionary ideologies affect political thinking and thereby the tendency to adopt one particular policy: HISS.

To advance this argument, I focus specifically on four effects of political ideology (as defined above) on perception and beliefs. This theory adopts the view that ideology has an effect on 1) preferences over political outcomes 2) the stakes or importance of political outcomes 3) beliefs about political cause and effect and 4) beliefs and perceptions of what is politically legitimate. There is no simple mechanism by which these beliefs translate into political behaviors like advocating for or adopting certain policies. However, the current scholarship on ideology in political science, sociology, and social psychology all suggest that an individual's beliefs and perceptions regarding political preferences, views of legitimacy and political stakes, and perceptions of the causes of political events can be constrained and influenced by ideologies. In the case of international revolutionary ideologies, I argue that this leads to a preference for and belief in the legitimacy and efficacy of an activist, internationalist, and anti-status quo foreign policy among those who espouse ideologies of this type.

1) An international revolutionary ideology influences the **goals** of foreign policy

Ideologies are generally agreed to establish or contribute to the establishment of an actor's preferences. Sometimes, scholars even define ideology as the source of political preferences (Sanín and Wood 2014, Van Djik 2013, Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Indeed, that ideologies make certain political outcomes more appealing than others (regardless of the final effect of such ideas on behavior or policy choice) is at times considered so obvious a claim that it

does not need support. Nonetheless, there is ample support in existing literatures. In the American electorate, for example, strong ideological affiliation tends to be a good predictor of which actual policies a respondent will favor or how a person will vote in an election, though the strength of the prediction varies quite significantly for a number of reasons (e.g. Converse 1964). At the state level, Ugarriza (2009) notes that during Taliban rule of Afghanistan, the governance structure and the content of its political program were tightly linked to the regime's ideological message of a unified, purified Islamic-nationalist state. That ideology influences preferences is not even contested by most realists in international relations (Jervis 1998), who simply warn that states which pursue ideological rather than security-oriented *policies* often do so at their peril (Mearsheimer 2001).[20] It seems quite plausible, then, that some of the preferences of a state will derive from the ideological leanings and projects of key leaders. Examining the content of such ideologies, as I do in this research, should give greater insight into what ideas have political currency among key leaders.

An international revolutionary ideology, then, calls for projects that apply the ideas of the revolution internationally and that take an active role in participating in the progress of world history towards a more desirable end state. As Sadri notes, "The revolutionary state must persist in using its revolutionary values in its foreign relations. They believe that time is working to their advantage and that sooner or later their revolution will spread elsewhere" (1997, 12-13). This leads a preference for policies that challenge the global status quo, is activist in nature and not strictly defensive in orientation, and has a reach that is as geographically broad as the normative

[20] In contrast, some liberal models of international relations suggest that state preferences are the most important cause of behaviors and key to understanding the international system (e.g. Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1997; Frieden 1999). I take a more realist interpretation of this view: preferences matter a great deal but are also constrained by structure, and as a rule, states recognize these constraints.

principles of the ideology itself. The three definitional components of the international revolutionary ideology translate to a preference for an 'activist, internationalist, anti-status quo' foreign policy of some kind or another.

2) An international revolutionary ideology effects perception of **what is at stake**

Ideologies frame political situations, setting preferences not only over outcomes but giving broader meaning to those outcomes. In some cases, ideologies might identify other groups or nations not merely as geopolitical rivals but as existential threats. This can create a high-stakes situation in which triumph over an adversary state or ethnic group is not just desirable but crucial, as defeat means the destruction of one's own group (Straus 2006, Kaufman 2006). Another form of stake-setting is perhaps clearest in the context of the Cold War; the competition between largely capitalist and largely communist blocs of states was widely seen as a fight between Global Capitalism and World Communism. Victory or defeat had world-historical, and indeed moral, consequences that went beyond the preference for one system over the other. Juergensmeyer (2003) also reveals how religion can sometimes convince actors that they are involved in not just a mundane political conflict but a conflict that has eternal and spiritual implications. Success brings with it eternal glory while failure brings eternal damnation. On the micro-level, Hassner (2003) has described the way sacred space affects conflict and bargaining; in disputes over holy places, an outcome other than *total* victory may be completely unacceptable (see also Atran and Axelrod 2008). Ideologies, including politicized religion or religionized politics, can make have a powerful influence on an actor's perception of the stakes of their actions and policies.

The leadership of the state that has embraced an international revolutionary ideology in particular therefore has a perception that the stakes of its foreign policy are extremely high. As

one of a few, or even the sole representative of their ideals on the world stage, the leadership portrays the state and their rule as a symbol and embodiment of their ideals. It is not merely the territory and population of the state that is at stake but the very ideals of the regime and the course of history itself; failure to act leads to a catastrophe of grand historic proportions and ideological projects become a much higher priority.[21] These beliefs about political stakes increase the intensity of the activist portion of the policy when it comes to targeting status quo or reactionary powers. Simply biding time and consolidating at home is unacceptable. Likewise, any threat to the regime is reified to a level that surpasses, even while it contains, other geopolitical concerns.

3) An international revolutionary ideology creates beliefs about **political cause and effect**

Ideology can also dictate beliefs about political cause and effect. Hochschild (2001) explores the complex and likely endogenous relationship between political ideas and values (ideologies) on the one hand and the perception and acceptance of political facts on the other. She finds, for example, that beliefs about the likely effects of changes to immigration policy or the causes of unemployment vary in association with other political values and attitudes. More broadly, Van Dijk's "ideological schema" suggests that one of the fundamental pieces of political ideologies is to lay out not just a group's goals but the activity needed for them to achieve those goals (2013, 178).

This amounts to the connection between political cause and effect, as some activities are thought to be more likely to lead to an achievement or at least partial achievement of the group's

[21] It is important to note that ideologies of all types often paint a stark black-and-white picture of the world and that they need not be "revolutionary" to have some influence on foreign policy. It was, for many growing up in the United States during the Cold War, "better to be red than dead" which is a largely counter-revolutionary stance. Additionally, countries at war employ virulent propaganda against their geo-political enemies – the people of other nations are quickly Satanic devils while God and goodness remain firmly on the side of Our Country (Mearsheimer 2001).

goals. Another example is useful here. The United States would not have viewed the conflict in Vietnam in nearly the same way absent certain ideologically-influenced beliefs about communism and the Domino Theory (Slater 1993; Jervis 1991; Chase et. al. 1996). There was an ideologically-influenced belief that one country's "falling" to communism would cause the collapse of neighboring capitalist states. Conversely, the "Bush Doctrine" adopted a reverse Domino Theory, in which the general theory was that inserting one stable democracy in the Middle East would lead to the proliferation of democracies in the region by virtue of example (Leeson and Dean 2009; Richter 2003). Political ideologies therefore have an effect on what strategies are likely to be considered effective means (military regime change operations in Iraq) for achieving political goals (spreading global democracy and increasingly US security).

International revolutionary ideologies are likely to view efforts at the sub-conventional level as fairly effective at achieving political change. Sanín and Wood 2014 note that Maoists groups tended to consider a long, popular war as the appropriate means for achieving changes to governance (215). This is partly due to the eschatology and trajectory of history content of the ideology, as Walt (1996) would agree.[22] Additionally, symbolic activities are likely to find a lot of traction as a result of revolutionary ideologies. Making symbols the target of a foreign policy can be an effective way or undermining, weakening, or resisting ideological opponents and nudging history forward. If those symbols can be eliminated and replaced with the revolutionary ideology's own symbols, all the better (Brinton 1965; Goldstone 1990). This means that sacking foreign embassies, refusing to recognize extradition requests, burning the flag of enemy nations,

[22] There is also interaction with entry type here. In the recent experience of many revolutionary ideology espousing regimes, old political authorities, be they military dictators, colonial rulers, or monarchs, were ousted from the country by means other than traditional, national military might. Thus in general, these regime leaders are likely to have a belief in the power of small revolutionary bands, of coup-minded, ideological military officers, and incidentally, of the role of a foreign backer, which many likely also had, to resist and topple existing political powers.

and associating one's regime with spectacular terrorist attacks against the previous political order may all be appealing projects for their perceived political efficacy. Support for non-state actors abroad, including those who engage in symbolic political activity and terrorism, is likely to be perceived as effective causes of desired goals like encouraging foreign regime change and undermining the status-quo or reactionary world order.

4) An international revolutionary ideology informs beliefs about **political legitimacy**

Finally, political ideologies have a normative component that shapes beliefs about what is politically legitimate. Tully, addressing Quentin Skinner's *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, notes that ideologies are simultaneously descriptive and evaluative, and he concludes along with Skinner that, "one role of political ideologies is that of 'helping to legitimate social action'" (1983, 495). Though precisely what is and is not legitimate can be manipulated and stretched, there are strong normative constraints that an ideology places on what is acceptable in politics.

Ideology can be particularly powerful when prescribing or proscribing the use of violence.[23] The use of violence in general or against certain targets, such as civilians, in-group members of ethnic or religious communities, and ethnic rivals, may be cast as necessary, legitimate, or even valorous depending on the ideological content (Straus 2006, Drake 1998, Haynes 2005). Similarly, ideologies can mark off certain activities, such as rape during armed conflict, as highly illegitimate (Sanín and Wood 2014; Tully 1983). What is politically

[23] And, as in the point about cause and effect above, violence is also considered likely to be effective. The perceived effectiveness of violent politics often contributes to the perception that such violence is legitimate. Put differently, when non-violent tools are not effective, violence becomes legitimate because the political goals are themselves legitimate.

legitimate and whether certain types of violence are considered as policies are potentially associated with an ideological belief.

International revolutionary ideologies have a particular effect on the perception of political legitimacy. As Goldstone explains, "Revolutionary nationalism seeks to identify supporters of the revolution as patriots and opponents of the revolution – whether external or domestic – as enemies of the nation" (1998, 427). This means that adversaries are not merely adversaries but, indeed, are corrupt and illegitimate actors in the world (Brinton 1965; Goldstone 1998). Many of their political actions are therefore illegitimate, making them legitimate targets. While it may be unacceptable to do violence against a fellow citizen or violate the sovereignty of fellow nations in the world, these activities become legitimate when those individuals or nations represent a corrupt international system and are designated enemies of the state. Furthermore, the internationalism of revolutionary ideologies may well see the nation-state as an inherently illegitimate form of political organization. Supporting a nationalist claimant against a colonial occupier may be labeled as "sponsorship of terrorism" by the occupier, but it is, in the beliefs of the leadership of the state that is sending aid, an activity that is *more* legitimate than sending arms to the legal government of that nation. Such perceptions rest on political ideologies.

HISS Outcomes

I argue that leaders of regimes that adopt HISS are looking for policies that will lead to their desired political ends. Ideology drives leadership preferences towards an internationally active foreign policy which promotes their worldview abroad and satisfies legitimacy constraints, all while recognizing the high political stakes of their policy choices and potential failures. This is what I call an "activist, internationalist, and anti-status quo foreign policy." Often, violence is considered an effective and legitimate tool for achieving political ends. The figure below

illustrates the connection between the theoretical effects of political ideologies in general and my claims regarding the effects of revolutionary ideologies in particular on leadership foreign policy views. It is worth noting that alternative explanations of sponsorship do not articulate the source or causes of the state's preference or foreign policy goals and possible means.

This all means that HISS becomes a potentially very effective and desirable foreign policy tool based on the content of the international revolutionary ideology. There are certain features of that ideology that have an effect on the leadership's preferences and perception of the world. What the leadership wishes to achieve is also colored by ideology, as is the importance of their role and projects in the world, and the belief that a certain policy would be legitimate and

Figure 2.2 Ideology's Theoretical and Predicted Effects



effectively achieve those ends. Supporting groups abroad that are fighting against the old order is appealing, and it is believed that such support will enhance these groups' effectiveness in overthrowing existing governments. Furthermore, the guerrilla tactics and violence employed by these groups is both appealing and legitimate, because it is obviously active, it is in pursuit of an inherently legitimate end, and it is in keeping with the high stakes of the political moment. Thus HISS is a project that is worthy of national resources and is a potentially very potent tool, in the view of those espousing an international revolutionary ideology.

High-intensity state sponsorship is, however, only one of a number of foreign policies that would theoretically be in keeping with the ideology, which has a goal of actively promoting its ideals abroad. Other policies are also consistent with this and fall into the category of "activist, internationalist, and anti-status quo foreign policy." Certainly, one policy would be a military build-up and out-and-out conventional warfare against enemies to remake their political systems. This would increase the territory in which the relevant ideology held sway, likely liberating additional populations and crossing international boundaries, and it is undeniably an active approach to international relations. This is the outcome that Walt (1996) is most interested in, but, as the next section elucidates, it is not an option for all states. Political missionary work and participation in or the creation of international organizations also fit the bill; Castro's Cuba, for example, sent its political activists, teachers, and healthcare workers to a number of countries in Latin America throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Dominguez 1989). Finally, The Soviet Union established the Communist International in 1919, supporting active, legal communist parties in Europe to help them gain power through elections and inter-party politics.

Thus, the ideological worldview does not necessarily lead directly to a sponsorship program. Indeed, it is not even clear that the preferences and beliefs that such an ideology dictates will trump other foreign policy considerations, even if it increases the priority of ideological projects. It certainly not clear, therefore, that any of the policies – be it HISS or conventional war abroad or a latter-day COMMINTERN – will be adopted. Thus ideology alone is not a sufficient condition for the adoption of HISS, as beliefs and perceptions need not translate into any particular political action and may represent only one of several competing projects even in revolutionary regimes. Thus it is only when a certain set of conditions are in confluences that HISS is actually made into state policy. I now examine the next condition.

Condition #2: High Barriers to Offensive Conventional Military Operations Abroad

Facing high barriers to conventional military operations abroad – the inability to take the fight to the enemy using the conventional military apparatus – makes sponsorship of non-state actors in particular a potentially appealing policy. In the face of such barriers, sponsorship of existing armed actors across the world may be the only way to engage, using force, with the rest of the world. The imperative for action and the desire for an activist foreign policy on a global scale means that states without the ability to pursue this agenda with its own forces must find another tool. Because of geography, a military power disparity, or the spectre of nuclear war, carrying a conventional fight to important enemies might be either impossible or so impracticable and risky as to be effectively impossible. If this is the case, HISS becomes one of the remaining tools, perhaps the only remaining tool, that involves the use of offensive (which is to say anti-status quo) force.

States are primarily interested in the most immediate threats to their interest and survival (Waltz 1979, Walt 1987, Mearsheimer 2001). Ideally, a state would like to be able to use its

military apparatus whenever and wherever the course of conflicts and political events abroad might threaten its national interests. Such a state could impose costs on its enemies and deter or punish sub-conventional anti-regime activity. If a state happens to be revisionist minded, it would like to be able to change the status quo and help bring about different political outcomes proactively (Schweller 1994). Circumstances that make conventional war all but impossible to wage puts states in a position where they are unable to take a fight to the enemy with the conventional military tool that they are forced to consider options such as sponsoring non-state actors.[24] When faced with these high barriers to conventional military operations abroad against rivals, one such tool, and one that is usually readily available and does not come with high costs, is the sponsorship of non-state actors.

There are three potential barriers to launching a conventional war against an enemy. The first is simple geography; enemies can be far away. Armies may have to cross another nation's territory to get to their rivals, or oceans may separate a state from its foes. A state may lack the power projection capacity to militarily threaten an enemy that is distant or to reach an enemy with sufficient forces to actually carry out military operations. The second barrier is military power disparity. States may simply have little chance of damaging or hurting the enemy, even if they can reach the rival state with their conventional military apparatus. There are many ways of measuring "military power" or "military effectiveness" (Biddle 2006; Talmadge 2015). The

[24] Non-state armed actors are not the only armed actors who could help a threatened state, and this theory does not theoretically exclude the choice of forming new alliances. In the case studies, it appears to be the case that Walt's points about fear and a lack of information are important in making this avenue a less common and potentially less fruitful one for the new revolutionary regimes under discussion here. Of course, many communist revolutionaries did seek the support of the USSR, and Qaddafi was allegedly willing to turn over Libya, from shore to shore, to Nasser's Egypt when he first took power. However, though these other regimes may well have been "ideological" states, they did not share this revolutionary new regime's worldview and were unwilling to take on all of the enemies that the new regimes identified, especially in offensive military activity. Still, further research on the allies option may be warranted in future projects.

simple formula, however, is that states with poorly trained armed forces and limited or outdated weapons and systems, even if they may be able to defend their territories or capitals, are rarely in the position to launch attacks on those states that have a much greater military capacity.

The third barrier to conventional war is the nuclear barrier. When a target state possesses nuclear weapons, launching a direct, open conventional attack on that state is very risky and potentially extremely costly (Jervis 1990). If both the attacking and defending state have nuclear weapons, the risk of nuclear escalation is all the greater. The use of foreign non-state armed actors as proxies during the Cold War attests to the importance of this barrier to outright conventional war. When these barriers exist, states must pursue other policy options for addressing security threats and dealing with foreign enemy nations.

Non-state actors deliver a needed capability for states that are unable to conduct conventional warfare against their opponents. Non-state armed groups have a military presence on enemy territory, or are willing and able to carry out violent attacks against enemy targets. Increasing the capability of these non-state actors who are pursuing identical or at least non-conflicting political goals helps states overcome barriers of geography. These groups, using clandestine cells or guerrilla tactics, are also better situated to overcome power disparities – terrorism has long been called the "weapon of the weak." Finally, nuclear escalation is not a concern with insurgencies. In this case, non-state actors provide the ability to strike at international targets when the state is most in need of such capabilities and where they would most like to strike. Indeed, if the target in question was a Cold War super power, or the United States in the post-Cold War unipolar era, conventional operations with even very large coalitions

of states would still be a useless approach, making sub-conventional sponsorship one of the only options.[25]

It is worth noting here that this logic is largely the same as that from the IR literature reviewed above. I accept the importance of international rivalry and resource constraints when it comes to a sponsorship policy. What I am more specifically identifying here is not, however, general 'state weakness' but rather an inability to use a specific policy tool—conventional military operations abroad—against key rivals abroad. Structural barriers take this policy off the table and lead states to consider other, similar options (some kind of armed activity abroad) that can target other governments effectively or that run lower risks than sending their own troops. Further, sponsoring groups that are fighting to achieve similar political goals, be they strictly geostrategic or not, is a substitute for this specific, anti-status quo military foreign policy, a connection that alternative explanations do not make explicit.

Condition #3: The Role of Non-Institutionalized Regime Change

The final step is accounting for how the policy of HISS, made highly appealing by ideology and international context, actually gets implemented at the state level. After all, terrorist training camps must be built, arms purchased and clandestinely transferred, resistance leaders flown across the globe, and countless, countless meetings attended in order to get a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship underway. The appealing concept of high-intensity sponsorship becomes implemented as policy that is central to a state's international relations as a result of non-institutionalized regime change. I argue that after such a regime change, there are trends of who is in charge of policy and how those leaders make decisions. These trends can fast-track a policy of wholesale sponsorship, making HISS the law of the land.

[25] On the unipolar nature of the current era, see Brooks and Wohlforth 2008.

How a regime comes to power has important implications for how that state makes its foreign policy. The Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS argues that regimes that have entered power extra-legally are likely to have less experience than other regimes in international affairs and therefore rely on ideologies and will tend to place loyalists in the existing institutions or create a new loyalist-controlled foreign policy apparatus, engaging in a decision-making process that is closed and self-contained.[26] The new policy and decision making apparatus is subject to little oversight, making it easy to implement whatever political projects the leaders desire to pursue.

Regime (In)Experience and Foreign Policy Content

This theory emphasizes non-institutionalized regime change for several reasons. First, leaders that have entered power irregularly are rather less likely to have experience in running the government of a state. This means that they are more likely to rely on the kinds of beliefs about international relations that, depending on the content of those beliefs, promote HISS adoption. Furthermore, these actors are more likely than a government that entered through an institutionalized route to break with policies of the previous regime; they therefore have fewer existing guidelines for conducting foreign relations.

The policies that do come out of a foreign ministry will likely reflect the ideas and projects of those who are placed in charge of it. This is as true in established democracies as revolutionary autocracies; one need look no further than the tenures of American CIA directors

[26] According to existing theories on foreign policy-making, insular decision-making that relies on ideas and does not need to satisfy a diverse set of actors tends to run towards "extreme" policies. The tendency to rely on pre-existing, ideologically-influenced notions of the international arena and a bureaucracy run primarily by loyalists means that there are very few constraints on foreign policy content. Hermann and Hermann (1998) advocate a theoretical approach to understanding foreign policy decision making that both 1) emphasizes certain features of what they call 'decision making units' and 2) predicts some attributes of actual foreign policy outcomes. I embrace their framework here and apply it to new regimes considering the adoption of HISS.

Allen Dulles or William Casey for verification. Lead actors in making foreign policy often bring their own agendas and biases to the fore and some consider particular, aggressive policies ideal (Lai and Slater 2006). As the discussion about belief systems and ideologies above noted, these ideas then play an important role in framing and making foreign policies. Indeed, foreign policy-making relies on a belief system, and these beliefs do not necessarily change at all and certainly do not change quickly even with long governing experience.[27] With only limited exposure to actual foreign governance, then, leaders in regimes that have entered power along non-institutionalized routes rely more than other leaders on pre-existing beliefs and expectations about the international arena.

Decision Making in the New Loyalist Bureaucracy

Regimes that enter power through non-institutionalized routes also typically create their own institutions of rule or re-staff and re-purpose existing ones. Indeed, if the governing apparatus were already suited for them, it is unlikely that they would have entered power irregularly! Restructuring government gives new leaders the opportunity to develop completely new institutions for deliberating on and carrying out policies. This includes the ability to design agencies to carry out pet political projects and to decide what, if any, oversight other institutions have over new agencies. Leaders thus have the opportunity, though they may not use it, to commit government resources to any number of policies.

In many such regimes, leadership positions are distributed to placate or reward certain members of the elite (Svolik 2012). Being a new regime is also a rough business, especially if you've violated the laws of the nation to get to power. There is always the threat of a counter-coup, of coalitions breaking down or new factions breaking away. Those who decide upon

[27] For a review of 'learning' in foreign policy, see Levy 1994.

foreign policy plans of action are therefore surrounded by those whose political outlook is similar or who are eager to appear loyal. Indeed, failure to appear loyal might place their job, status, or their very lives and loved ones at stake. Even top leaders may not press the issue if their outlook or experiences diverge from the perceived party line for fear of reprisal from populist masses or accusations of disloyalty. The leadership is therefore likely to place loyalists in key positions in the government, valuing personal relations and similarity of mindset over expertise in a difficult moment of consolidation.

In many of these regime change cases, the bulk of foreign policy decisions were decided by a handful of people at the top. This is not unlike the concept of having a very small selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2005; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012) that is even more highly susceptible to groupthink (Janis 1972). In foreign-policy making theories, this likely takes the form of one of two categorizations of decision making groups[28]: "predominant leaders" or, if a revolutionary council or military *junta* in in charge, a "single group" (see Hermann, Stein, Sundelius, and Walker 2001 and Hermann, Preston, Korany, and Shaw 2001). Hermann and Hermann (1989) and Hermann (1980) would predict that foreign policy made by self-contained predominant leaders or self-contained single groups would tend to be more extreme. Unwilling to trust the old institutions or members of the old regime, and often interested in pursuing new political directions, insularity is likely. This leads to a strong tendency towards concurrence or the domination of a single viewpoint in decision-making

[28] Even where new regimes created institutions to compete with one another or where a diverse set of viewpoints (Multiple Groups), occurs in foreign policy in general, a HISS policy could be conducted and adopted by relatively small, homogenous groups. Because state sponsorship of foreign armed groups is a relatively small area, there may theoretically be a governing sub-unit that is ultimately responsible for HISS. It could be operating along a different 'chain of command' than other groups, institutions, or persons responsible for making foreign policy. This is empirically the case in Sudan, for example, where a small agency for the export of the revolution (nick-named the Sudanese CIA) could be found in one of Khartoum's suburbs.

processes (Hermann 2001). Once conceived of as a solution to one foreign policy challenge, sponsorship programs accelerate and grow, implemented through new government agencies or a newly loyalist foreign policy apparatus.

This account draws on and expands upon the revolutions' literatures account of foreign policies of states that experienced social revolutions. I do not limit my theory to "revolutionary states," but rather I argue that processes that lead to HISS adoption can begin with any kind of non-institutionalized entry. Further, alternative explanations that note the role of domestic political processes focus on in-fighting and coalition building among political factions. While this is certainly important, such accounts do not explore the institutional dimensions of policy-making or the implications for institutional changes on sponsorship outcomes. This theory identifies the mechanism via which non-institutionalized power transitions of many different types lead to the adoption to foreign policies in general and, specifically, to high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors abroad.

IV. Joint Necessity of the Conditions for HISS Adoption

The central argument of this dissertation is that these Revolutionary Realities, where regimes that have entered power through non-institutionalized pathways espouse an international revolutionary ideology and face high barriers to conventional military operations abroad, lead to HISS adoption. All three conditions are jointly necessary for HISS adoption to occur. This is due to the way that each of these factors mutually reinforces each other, ultimately causing high-intensity sponsorship of non-state actors to be adopted as a central, national foreign policy.

This is summarized in the hypothesis of the project, the Revolutionary Realities Hypothesis:

RR 1: The three conditions of non-institutionalized leadership entry to power, government espousal of an international revolutionary ideology, and the presence of high structural barriers to conventional military operations abroad against rivals are jointly necessary for the adoption of a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors (HISS).

Sufficiency corollary: States in which all three necessary conditions obtain will adopt HISS.

An even stronger version of the theory says that these three are jointly sufficient conditions, and states will in fact adopt HISS under these circumstances. Both approaches are tested and explored in the empirical portions of this research. Here, I discuss some of the ways in which these interactions and mutually reinforcing dynamics occur when all three conditions obtain.

The mode of entry into power and the political ideology of a new regime can have a profound effect on the foreign policies on the table within a state. As we saw above, ideas among leadership are more likely to translate to policy action when small numbers of people are involved in the process.[29] During the period of consolidation after an extra-legal regime change, institutions, personnel, and the subsequent policy processes they undertake will tend to exhibit the features of foreign policy decision-making that emphasize consensus and often lead to more extreme policies. Thus if ideology is shared and the content of that ideology is consistent with sponsorship non-state actors abroad, in terms of leaders' goals and perceptions of legitimacy and effectiveness, the non-institutionalized entry makes it more likely that these particular ideas will play a key role in actual outcomes. This makes it possible for HISS to actually be adopted and implemented as policy by the state, as a solution to its international relations problems and its

[29] As Putnam's Two-Level games theory suggests (1988), managing domestic and international politics is difficult at the best of times.

desire to having a sufficiently active international engagement. Having one unchallenged and shared ideology with a particular content, as well as control of relevant foreign policy institutions, is how the unfiltered, unmitigated, and uncompromised high intensity policy goes from being an ideologically-generated preference among a subset of leaders to a national state policy that is at the core of a nation's global engagement.[30]

Furthermore, the leadership's ideological conception of the world leads it to perceive the state's interests as geographically far-flung and its foreign rivals as numerous and diverse. This means that there are more places and international events of interest to the state, which is still faced with an inherently anarchic international system. There are thus a wide number of events and conflicts that do not immediately threaten the state's security but are still a high priority for the state's government, either because there are perceived to be ideologically-related long-term security implications for the state or because it is genuinely interested in wholly symbolic activity. The state therefore would need proportionately more resources to manage international affairs. All of this means that their own military apparatus may not be sufficient for attaining the goals of the regime (indeed, their rival set is larger and is more likely to contain a variety of powerful enemies.) Yet these are precisely the states that wish to be involved in activist, decisive, and anti-status quo operations abroad *and* are willing to use force as a legitimate tool to achieve their ends. This interest, it should be noted, is on top of the everyday security challenges that face any state and which might be handled with sub-conventional sponsorship by a regime with *any* ideological profile (or none) and highly established foreign policy institutions subject to domestic political oversight.

[30] This echoes strains of Snyder's "Myths of Empire" (1991) theory, though the state in question is not a great power and thus the nature of the 'empire' is different.

Furthermore, scholars of revolutions have long noted that any government that comes to power via non-conventional means and employing anti-status quo rhetoric is greeted warily by the rest of world. States in which these new leaders espouse revolutionary aims often find themselves involved in a range of disputes with neighbors and nations further abroad. Status quo states pressure ideological rivals with anything from canceling foreign aid and debt restructuring deals to outright counter-revolutionary violence from exiles and foreign governments (Walt 1996; Defronzo 2015; Halliday 1999). Indeed, nations that most benefit from the current status quo are likely to see the revolutionary state as a great threat, far greater than the military might of the country in question might warrant. This makes interference with internal politics (i.e. regime change attempts) and international disputes between the nations more likely (Halliday 1999; 2002). As the regimes in potential HISS-adopting states consolidate, the appearance of loyalty is even more dire, and the opinions that a loyalist must express take on a specific content. Decision-makers maintain tighter control over who is and who is not involved, as sub-conventional regime change threats mean that any given political player may be in the employ of foreign enemies. Revolutionary bona-fides may be the only thing standing between a new political elite and exile or death. Thus a new, ideologically-oriented regime is faced with a number of enemies who policies exacerbate the tendency towards Manichean worldviews and insular decision-making.

Furthermore, targeted states may well feel that they must act aggressively abroad—in their own defense. With high barriers to conventional operations in other countries, they turn to any and all non-state actors, sponsoring groups across the world to target and distract foes, replace belligerent regimes with friendly ones, or merely bolster the anti-status quo cause. Beliefs about the efficacy of such operations further encourage regimes, who may overestimate

the likelihood of successfully creating new state government allies through successful revolutions or national liberation movements as a result of HISS.

Thus, all three factors interact and mutually reinforce one another towards HISS adoption by making the policy of high-intensity sponsorship of armed non-state actors both appealing and adoptable. Ideological content influences the state's perception of international affairs and marks out certain enemies and threats, often leading to rivalries with great powers and faraway countries. States conceive of their interests on a geographically and politically broader scale, but barriers to conventional operations abroad mean that, if force is called for in those arenas, the state needs an alternative tool. Thus governments make connections with a large number of groups across multiple continents, partly due to a realistic assessment of the state's own capabilities and limitations and partly due to a belief in the efficacy of such armed movements and their perception of an obligation to act on a scale that is commensurate with the moral application of the international revolutionary ideology. This includes connections with terroristic groups whose cause and tactics are deemed legitimate (enough), given their ends or ideas, to warrant government support. After an irregular entry to power, all of these state-group linkages are easier to get passed at the state level. Decisionmakers tend to prioritize solidarity during the uncertain period of consolidation, minimizing dissent, and they even remake and re-staff the relevant foreign policy institutions, eliminating the bureaucratic brakes found in a more established government. The result is a highly unconstrained policy of state sponsorship of international insurgency and foreign terrorism, a patchwork pattern of alliances and commitments that cannot be explained fully by any one factor, influence, or goal.

Observable Implications

The account above is a thick description of the way I expect my theory to operate in real life, but it falls beyond the capacity of this research to determine whether all of these logics are present in every instance of HISS adoption. This is a complex process and my theory identifies three distinct causal factors; therefore, no attempt is made to fully catalogue *all* observable implications of the theory. Further, some of the process described is difficult to observe directly. There are, however, a number of observable implications that would indicate the Revolutionary Realities theory is at play. I here highlight those implications which are most central and which are not only theoretically observ*able* but may have actually been observed, and are therefore possible to process trace in cases under examination in Parts III and IV. These key observable implications, which are revisited in Chapter 5, will drive the analysis in Chapters 6-9.

Much of the action here, so to speak, is in leaders' heads, but the theory expects that, when all three factors are present, leaders will behave in certain ways and engage in certain political efforts there are observable. Statements from leaders regarding their purpose, motives, and beliefs when it comes to preferences, political cause and effect, and legitimacy will suggest that an interventional revolutionary ideology is having an effect on at least one behavior—public statements regarding the government's political activity. Regime transition processes are also central to my explanations. I expect leaders to be in control of foreign policy institutions and to create either wholly new or parallel institutions for designing and executing international relations. I also expect a core group of leaders who share the international revolutionary ideology to sideline individuals and remove them from positions of influence within the government on the basis of the ideological heterodoxy. If my theory is operating, there should be few institutional places for political dissent in which the top leaders are actually exposed to alternative worldviews.

I further expect states to recognize barriers to conventional war and to not engage directly with their national militaries against enemies that outclass them or are geographically distant. Leaders should also be aware of their own structural limitations, so statements to this effect would also be an observable implication that the theory is in operation. I expect that the definition of friend or foe would be tied to the content of the ideology and identify a wide variety of states as rivals. Similarly, the state leadership should see HISS as a tool for achieving both geo-strategic and more ideological goals. These will be revisited in Chapter 5, as they are most important for the case studies portion of the study.

Non-HISS Outcomes: What Happens with Missing Factors?

The mutually reinforcing nature of these factors means that all conditions must be met for HISS to be adopted. If a single factor is not present, the Revolutionary Realities theory would expect that states would *not* adopt this policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors. If, for example, an international revolutionary-minded government enters power through non-institutionalized means but faced relatively low barriers to conventional war, the theory would expect that state to use its conventional military apparatus abroad rather frequently. Instead of relying on the substitute for armed intervention, that state would be involved in conventional wars and would deploy its military to numerous areas throughout the world. Walt's (1996) argument holds in this case, as one of the assumptions he makes but does not explore or articulate is that conventional war is not off the table for the revolutionary state. In some cases—Revolutionary France, for instance—this was clearly the case, and for others—Iran for example—conventional war against some adversaries and sponsorship against others was the overall outcome. However, while Iran had a conventional option against one of its rivals (Iraq),

Tehran faced high barriers to conventional war abroad with a number of its key adversaries abroad (the United States, Great Britain, Israel) which was why that it ultimately adopted HISS.

Figure 2.3 Joint Necessity of Revolutionary Realities' Causal Conditions



Similarly, HISS is not the outcome if a state's government has entered power through institutionalized pathways. This is because even in relatively small or weak states, there are sufficient policy constraints within the government that sponsorship will not reach HISS-levels. I expect that in well-established states like stable democracies and autocracies have developed career bureaucracies which are likely to push back or drag feet on costly or risky policies. In pluralistic states where political institutions facilitate a power transfer of some kind, multiple stake-holders are involved in policy making. In open democracies and multiparty states, there is a diverse set of ideologies and interests that influence decision-making, even if those holding most levers of the state are from the same party or share an ethnic identity. Ultimately, there are a number of roadblocks to slow down a HISS policy, and, because of its ideological components,

it is difficult to articulate a need for the policy in strictly national interest terms that might persuade an ideationally diverse set of political actors.

Finally, without an international revolutionary ideology, states are not likely to adopt HISS. On the one hand, a state without such an ideology will likely conceive of its interests on a more narrow scale. Thus the overall preference for an internationalist, activist, and anti-status quo foreign policy is unlikely to exist, at least as a high-priority, for any number of central leadership figures or portions of the selectorate. This means that a state will be unlikely to meet the geography and quantity criterion of HISS, even if it does sponsor groups abroad. Also, support for more terroristic groups is less likely without the international revolutionary ideology making such support more legitimate. Non-ideological states threatened by superior enemies may pursue a sponsorship program, but it should be limited in scale and scope, with states managing a few regional rivalries and perhaps supporting groups based on ethnicity.[31]

To account for high-intensity state sponsorship, a rare but important policy and one that is multi-dimensional, all three causal factors must be in place. Only then will the projects inspired by an international revolutionary ideology in a state that cannot use its conventional military apparatus abroad make HISS an appealing policy, and only after a non-institutionalized regime change is the government in the position to create new, loyalist institutions for foreign policy-making, driving groupthink among like-minded leaders and creating the institutional space to implement any given policy. Under these conditions, jointly necessary and mutually reinforcing, HISS is adopted as a central pillar of a state's foreign policy.

V. Conclusion

[31] See Chapter 1 "The Landscape: Preoccupations in the Existing Scholarship."

High intensity sponsorship of non-state armed actors does become a central pillar of states' foreign policies under a certain set of circumstances. These three conditions, of a new, non-institutionalized regime espousing an international revolutionary ideology that cannot perform conventional military operations abroad against adversaries, create a situation in which high-intensity sponsorship is extremely appealing and likely to be implemented. These three factors influence the people in power, the ideas they have, the goals they seek to achieve, the challenges they face, and their understanding of threats and the international arena; they all make HISS appear to be a good answer the security problems they face and a means via which to achieve their ideological goals.

This theory accepts the insights from the existing literature on the strategic benefits of sponsorship and the role of ideas in foreign policy decision-making. It applies existing scholarship to the question of HISS and is a significant theoretical improvement on existing explanations. The Revolutionary Realities theory presented here lays out the connection between a few causal factors, their influence on the politics of states that are at the heart of these policies, and the subsequent appeal and ultimate adoption of HISS itself. The next chapters will test my theory of Revolutionary Realities in a variety of ways and against the existing theories and demonstrate that, while not a perfect explanation, it is fares better than others in accounting for a pattern of high-intensity state sponsorship of terrorist and insurgent groups.

Part II: Quantitative Evidence

Chapter 3: The Patterns and Causes of HISS: Introducing the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset

I. Introduction

The dissertation now turns to the task of offering empirical evidence in support of its theoretical claims about patterns of international sponsorship. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present new, quantitative evidence from the novel State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship (SPFS) dataset constructed for this research. In Chapter 4, I test my theory's central hypothesis—that all three factors must be present for HISS onset to occur—against the competing explanations in the literature using a series of statistical models. In this chapter, I present an introduction to the new dataset itself and then discuss my variables of interest, both the dependent variable and the three factors that cause HISS, according to the Revolutionary Realities theory presented in Chapter 2.

In addition to presenting the dataset and discussing its constructing, Chapter 3 also offers support for two separate claims. The first claim is that there *is* a unique, empirical pattern of sponsorship exhibited by a small number of states. Moreover, my definitional criteria, discussed in Chapter 1, identify a plausible set of HISS countries whose patterns of sponsorship are internally consistent (i.e. definitional criteria reflect real empirical patterns and do not seem arbitrary). To my knowledge, cross-national, quantitative data on trends in high-intensity state sponsorship have never before been collected or analyzed. This simultaneously demonstrates the utility of the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset itself and bolsters my claim that More is Different—HISS is its own, qualitatively distinct and analytically relevant phenomenon that deserves scholarly attention.

The second claim I advance in this chapter is that the three factors included in the Revolutionary Realities theory are correlated with HISS outcomes. I demonstrate this by using a series of simple, bivariate tests as I introduce the three measures of entry type, leadership ideology, and high barriers to conventional military operations abroad against rivals. In each case, HISS is associated with these individual measures at higher rates than statistical chance would predict. Furthermore, I examine the theory's claim that all three conditions are jointly necessary for HISS adoption and find that my Revolutionary Realities theory is consistent with 70-80% of the cases of adoption. In most cases of adoption, states have high values for all three factors, and at least two factors are present for all but two outlier cases. Some of these results, however, also point to meaningful measurement errors in my data, validating the multi-method approach pursued in the research overall.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present and explore my approach to the construction of the dependent variable (high-intensity state sponsorship (HISS) patterns). Once I lay out and defend the operationalization of the HISS dependent variable, I also explore some of this dataset's potential in identifying and quantifying global sponsorship patterns. The SPFS data are able to empirically support the central theoretical assumption of the dissertation as articulated in the first chapter: although rarely adopted by states, there does exist a particular pattern of sponsorship that is a unique "High-Intensity State Sponsorship" policy. Furthermore, I can make several claims about its frequency and temporal and geographical distribution in the post-WWII era that have not before been made or supported with quantitative evidence to this extent.

The third, fourth, and fifth sections return to the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS as presented in Chapter 2. I lay out the construction of the variables that correspond to each of

the three causal factors from my theory. This includes an innovative approach to the challenge of quantifying the concept of "International Revolutionary Ideology." For this, I rely on the Comparative Constitutions Project, a somewhat recently published dataset that codes several hundred features of all national constitutions in the global system since 1800 (Elkins et. al. 2014). I also lay out how I operationalize and quantify the concept of "barriers to conventional war," which is a key cause of HISS onset, and the non-institutionalized entry variable. Furthermore, I examine whether these three variables, as captured is the SPFS dataset, tend to be correlated with HISS. This is primarily done through simple, bivariate analysis of HISS and each factor itself. I find that despite some issues with the reliability of certain measures, HISS tends to be correlated with each separate factor at very high levels.

Finally, in section six, I offer a first, rough correlative test of my theory as a whole by laying out the cases of HISS as they appear in the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset. I compare all the instances of HISS observed in the SPFS dataset and the value of my predicted causal factors against the instances where my theory's variables take on particularly high values and would therefore predict that states adopt HISS. This is a medium-N style case summary and analysis. This provides me with an opportunity to explore some of the strengths and weaknesses of the measurements discussed in the chapter as a whole. It also sets the stage for the more extensive quantitative statistical analysis of my theoretical model and the alterative explanations in Chapter 4.

II. HISS in the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset

State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship: A Novel Dataset

There have been limited attempts at cross-national, quantitative assessment of the causes of a state's pattern of non-state actor sponsorship. Importantly, works have rarely asked about

the particular sponsorship pattern of HISS and have almost never considered the case universe as adoption or non-adoption of sponsorship by states across time. Thus, there has been no extensive dataset appropriate for testing the hypotheses in this research.

Most research to date has captured information on sponsorship in the world without accounting for instances of non-sponsorship. Researchers identify links between a state and a group (Non-State Actor Data from Cunningham et al. 2009; UCDP External Support Data from Högbladh et al. 2011), two states (Cederman et al. 2009), or a state and a conflict (Regan 1996; 1998) over time, leading to data sets structured by dyad-year and limited to the universe of actual sponsoring activity. Though a useful source of information, these sets are not appropriate for testing the circumstances under which states do and do not sponsor terrorists and insurgents abroad.

Recent work from Belgin San-Akca and the Dangerous Companions Project is one partial exception to this trend. Her data is triadic, built around a (potential) sponsoring state, a (potential) target state, and a (potential) non-state actor. In examining potential cases of sponsorship, she does explicitly consider cases of both sponsorship and non-sponsorship. However, it places strong assumptions on the universe of cases, limiting her opportunities for state-group linkages to politically relevant dyads (Maoz 1996, Maoz and Russet 1993, Lemke and Reed 2001). This means that if State B (target) is politically relevant to State A, State A can either sponsor or not sponsor any and all armed groups active against State B. Apart from issues with defining "politically relevant dyads," this structure therefore is likely to miss some of the state-group linkages that are crucial to my definition of HISS and are most puzzling in terms of existing international relations scholarship. San-Akca herself notes that, for instance, Saudi Arabian support for Afghani rebel groups is missed in her data, as Afghanistan is not a politically

relevant state vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.[1] Yet my data finds that Saudi Arabia is, in fact, a HISS state, a major outlier in fact, and that Saudi support for insurgents in Afghanistan contributes to that state reaching definitional thresholds of HISS.

The structural choice of focusing on potential dyads and/or actual instances of sponsorship also leads to a number of problems for quantitative analysis, chief among which is unevenly weighting states with more rivals (or politically relevant opponents) and more heavily weighting those states which are targeted by a larger number of identifiable groups.[2] Further, though the "NAG" dataset has greater temporal coverage about state-group linkages, it is based on the data collected from the source that, too, I ultimately use (the UCDP/PRIO/ACD). Thus critiques leveled at the UCDP data (described below) can also be leveled at a number of other data sets in the field. Future research on HISS state policies should seek to expand the temporal scope of the SPFS data, and these efforts should certainly start by using the data available on the politically relevant dyads that can be found in the NAG for 1945-1975. Further expansion would be required to capture a state's overall sponsorship pattern, but thanks to the work of the CDP team, that task may be accomplishable in a reasonable time frame in the future.

Given the limitations of existing states for pursuing this research agenda, I have developed my own, state-centric dataset that allows for a less biased statistical examination of a state's policies. This research makes use of many of the existing and well-established, if still

[1] See San Akca 2016, 46. The author also notes that, "Instances also exist in which a sponsor assists a rebel group…even though they are located far away from the target. For instance, Cuba provided assistance to the leftist rebels in Angola prior to 1975" (ibid).

[2] My data is not subject to the first critique, as all countries have approximately the same number of observations, although leaders' tenure in power varies. The second critique, that conflicts and sponsorship activity may be over-counted simply by virtue of having more countable, distinct groups in certain places than others is somewhat valid. However, this would come up only in the calculation of my dependent variable, not in the structure of the data itself. This leads to a different type of bias, one that is far more transparent and can be managed with fairly straightforward robustness checks. I use multiple specifications of the dependent variable in my analysis, mitigating the concern that highly non-random distributions of identifiable rebel groups bias my conclusions.

flawed, sources of cross-national data on these related topics to construct the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship (SPFS) dataset.[3] Each of these existing resources, however, contains only some of the information necessary to examine the issue of variations in patterns of state sponsorship, increasing the challenge of constructing a reliable and accurate dataset. One example demonstrates this quite well. The UCDP External Support Project examines, at the conflict-level, which parties in a civil or international war received some kind of third-party support.[4] This includes states receiving support from other states, states receiving support from non-state actors, non-state actors receiving support from other non-state actors, and non-state actors receiving support from external states. Clearly, this fourth subset of data is very useful for the purposes of this project, and the data are sufficiently detailed that annual state-group linkages in these data can be extracted.

However, the UCDP data has one serious drawback: it examines third-party connections only to non-state actors in civil wars and only during active armed conflicts. International terrorist groups are not consistently covered, nor are armed non-state actors that are not party to a civil war measured in the UCDP case universe. Temporally, the data are not collected during periods of "low or no conflict,"[5] ceasefires, or after the formal end of a conflict, regardless of whether the non-state actors is still involved in peace deals, anti-government activism, or low-level violence. This means that its yearly coverage is incomplete, as it is possible that links exist between states and foreign insurgent groups outside of the time period of an ongoing, measured

[3] Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009a, 2009b, Maoz and San-Akca 2012, Bapat 2012, Findley, Piazza, & Young 2012, START 2014, LaFree and Dugan 2007.

[4] Pettersson 2011; Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér 2011.

[5] Gleditsch et. al 2002 and Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017 for the entire armed conflict database from UCDP for more extensive explanation of conflict codings. The set I draw on is Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér 2011 and a full explanation of their set's coverage can be found in the codebook (version 1.0, same citation).

armed conflict. My theory's conception of state-group linkages, however, theoretically encompasses state's support of armed groups during periods of low conflict or with groups not engaged in civil wars. This means that only a portion – and it is not at all clear *what* portion – of a state's sponsorship pattern, and thus the nature of its policy, is shown in the UCDP data.

Still, the UCDP data are currently the most thorough on state/non-state actor ties. My approach to this dataset, then, has been to leverage this and several other existing resources, many of which have been developed by large teams of researchers over several years or even decades.[6] The result is a dataset that contains a much larger picture of a state's foreign sponsorship activities at any given time than is currently available in any other data. The set contains numerous variables, in addition to those emphasized in my analysis, that are of potential interest to scholars studying sponsorship. The codebook for the dataset, as well as the sources for individual variables, appear in Appendix A.

Because I am interested in tracking each state's pattern of sponsorship, the SPFS is state-centric, rather than being based on conflicts or state-actor dyads. This research is just as interested in non-sponsorship as it is in sponsorship, and it is more interested in general state behaviors than individual state-groups links, conflicts, or even rivalry dyads. Additionally, state leadership plays an important role in my own and many competing theories about HISS adoption. For all these reasons, I rely on the Archigos country-leader-year dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009; see also Colgan 2013). I personally argue that both domestic leadership and geostrategic factors contribute to a state's choice of sponsorship policy. Archigos, as a country-leader-year database, therefore has the benefit of being much like a more

[6] The DCP had 2 full time research assistants and 8 coders, and a support staff of 6 for the project website and data display. The NAG is the result of San-Akca's own dissertation project and a four-year Marie Curie International Reintegration Grant. See http://nonstatearmedgroups.ku.edu.tr/index.php.

typical country-year dataset for both sponsoring and non-sponsoring states while also including information about the leader or regime. Having both country and leader/regime-level information built into the dataset provides the researcher with the maximum level of flexibility when it comes to studying sponsorship with the SPFS data. Furthermore, it allows me to test several competing hypotheses with the same dataset.

There are two primary versions of the HISS dataset. The first is the "Leader-Year" set, which contains 5,268 observations over 897 leaders and 164 countries. It covers from 1975 through 2004, with annual observations for each leader.[7] This means that there are sometimes multiple observations per country-year; when one leader ends her tenure in office and another steps in, each leader receives one observation for that country-year. The dataset's 164 countries are all of those countries for which Archigos has leader information. Archigos covers all major states in the international system, excluding only the smallest states.[8] This is a novel set of data that is specifically designed to detect, evaluate, and analyze a state's pattern of sponsorship for foreign, non-state armed actors. As the remainder of the chapter will make clear, it is an abundantly useful tool in assessing cross-national patterns of non-state actor sponsorship. An alternative version of the data is the "Country-Year" set, which contains 4,423 observations from 163 countries,[9] is used to test hazard models in Chapter 4. This set eliminates duplicate country-

[7] The version of Archigos used for this dataset contains information from 1945-2004, but UCDP data for the dependent variable is available only from 1975-2009. Replication datasets for this thesis include all years from 1945-2004, with indicator variables to designate which subsets of the data were used for the analysis. Unless otherwise noted, discussion of the data refers to the years 1975-2004, for which complete data are available.

[8] Country inclusion is based on the List of Independent States (Gleditsch and Ward 2013). Most notably, microstates with populations below 250,000 are excluded from the list, as are dependencies and protectorates. For further details see Gleditsch and Ward 2013, 397-399.

[9] Most of the analyses in subsequent sections and chapters are based on 163 countries, due to the researcher's decision to examine leaders that are in power for at least one full year. There are no leaders in Switzerland that fit this criterion. Each year, there is a new nominal "leader" of the highest governing body in the country; in reality, no one figure wields the most power or serves as effective head of state. This means that Switzerland drops out of the data entirely in many analyses.

years by dropping leaders with fewer than 1 year in power entirely, and treating the leaders that ended the year in office as the leader for the whole year, even if they were not the head of state at the start of the year.

Constructing the DV: HISS Criteria

The SPFS dataset allows the researcher to study many aspects of a state's sponsorship policy in a given year. This includes the number of groups being sponsored, the regional distribution of those groups, the identity of those groups, and whether any of those groups tend to use terrorism or target civilians at high levels. These data therefore can be used to study different types of sponsorship patterns.

The primary dependent variable in this research is a state's employment of a HISS policy. This is a binary outcome variable operationalized according to the definition presented in Chapter 1. For my research, there are three criteria for HISS, and all three must be met for an observation to be coded "1". The quantity criterion states that a government must sponsor a large number of groups; the geography criterion calls for at least one of those groups to be operating outside of the state's region; and the terrorism criterion states that the government must be giving support to at least one highly terroristic non-state actor.

Quantity of Groups Sponsored

The first criterion is the quantity criterion. The data used to assess the number of groups is from the UCDP dataset described above and its database of sponsorship during armed conflicts since 1975.[10] I converted the annual conflict-level data (state/non-state actor dyad—year) to country-year data, ending up with a sum of the unique groups sponsored by each state in each year of the UCDP conflict. This meant combining information from anywhere between one and

[10]See Högbladh et. al. 2011; Cunningham et. al. 2009a, 2009b.

eleven observations for a sponsoring state in a given year. Because this research is interested in yearly counts of groups sponsored, there was no loss of relevant information in collapsing observations from the dyadic UCDP data into a single observation for that country-year. If a sponsoring country-year had, for example, three different dyad-year observations, this meant that the state was sponsoring three different groups in that year. I retained in the master data all of the individual group identifiers for supported groups.[11] This means that future researchers could even focus on different subsets of non-state actors for future analyses of states' sponsorship patterns.

For the primarily specification of the dependent variable, I consider the quantity criterion met if a state supports five or more (5+) groups during a short period of time.[12] The five-group threshold is, necessarily, somewhat arbitrary. There is no sponsorship whatsoever in 85% of observations in the SPFS dataset, and in 95% of the observations, states are sponsoring 0, 1, or 2 groups. Thus the sponsorship of 3 or more groups in a given year is a fairly rare phenomenon. I have therefore also created alternative measures of HISS with both a 3-group and a 4-group threshold (see Table 3.1 and Appendix B.2)

The number of sponsored groups is calculated in the following way. First, if a state is sponsoring five or more than five groups in a given year, each of those groups can clearly be assumed to be unique. Therefore, that country-leader-year receives a 1 for the quantity criterion

[11] This takes the simple form of "group 1, group 2, group 3…" etc. variables for each country-year in the main dataset. Groups are identified by group number, which are from the UCDP Armed Conflict data, available: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ under "Actor Lists." UCDP does not provide citation information for this list.

[12] This is operationalized in two different ways. In addition to the moving 3-year window, I created dummy variables for each five-year period and hand-coded the number of unique groups associated with a state during each, pre-set period. The UCDP data, after all, is *not* structured to address the question of sponsorship patterns but rather to analyze features of internal armed conflicts. If a state is sponsoring 5 or more different groups in a five-year period, it receives a 1 on the quantity criterion for each year in the period. If any one of those years *also* meets the other two criteria, the observation is coded as 1 on the dependent variable over all. This is referred to as the "HISS 5-yr Period" and analyses using this specification appear in Appendices as noted throughout Part II.

of HISS. However, it is worth recalling that the UCDP data does not register state-group linkages during period of ceasefire or negotiations during the course of a conflict. States may still be supporting groups even when the parties in conflict are engaged in negotiations or violence levels have fallen below UCDP-determined thresholds. The UCDP data is thereby likely to tend to underpredict the actual number of groups a state actually has ties with in a given year.

Thus, if a state has associations with five groups over a short period of time, it also meets the quantity criterion. This helps eliminate the possibility that observations are omitted simply because of a temporary cessation of hostilities. The primary measurement of group numbers is based on a hand count of the number of distinct groups a state sponsors in a moving, three-year window ("HISS 3-yr Window" or similar terms refer to this counting mechanism). I count the number of groups sponsored in that year (e.g. 1984), and I look at both the previous year (1983) and the next year (1985) to see if the state is sponsoring any different groups in those years. The count of unique groups sponsored during that three-year period is recorded for the target year (1984). Likewise, the count for 1985 would consider the number of unique groups sponsored over 1984, 1985, and 1986. This means that even if a state is not clearly identified as sponsoring more than five groups involved in active conflicts in one year, it may be exhibiting a high-intensity sponsorship pattern during that year.

Note that this is the only criterion that uses a multi-year window construction. In the 3-year window example above, if a state were sponsoring an out-of-region group in 1983, that would not mean that the geography criterion was satisfied for the year 1984. That group would contribute to the count of the whole window, but only to the geographic distribution of the year in which the link was observed in the original data. This is because, though it is likely that the

UCDP data are systematically under-estimating the number of state/non-state actor ties in a given years, it is not at all clear which individual groups it is missing. I have no reason, a priori, to assume that HPTGs or out-of-region groups in particular are systematically under-reported. This also ensures that an observation year can never be a HISS year if the government is observed as sponsoring 0 groups in the UCDP data.

Geographic Distribution of Sponsorship

The second HISS criterion holds that a state must sponsor outside of its geographic region. Like the Quantity of Groups Sponsored criterion, the Geography of Sponsorship criterion is derived from the UCDP data. The UCDP data includes information on the 1) group receiving sponsorship 2) conflict id and duration 3) conflict location 4) target state and 5) sponsoring state. It is therefore possible to calculate the number of out-of-region groups that a state has sponsored in a given year. Because this dissertation is sponsoring-state (or sending-state) centric, the "state-group dyad—year" format of the UCDP is again collapsed to create aggregate measures of sponsorship activity for each year.

A state must only sponsor one out-of-region group to meet the "Geography of Sponsorship" criterion. If there is a mismatch between the sponsoring state region and the group's location region, this means the group is out of region for the state. Groups do not always target the state in which they are located, but a mismatch between target and group region is rarer and the group location is more theoretically relevant to this research. I identify five broad regions: the Americas, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa/Middle East, and Asia.[13] This

[13] Many researchers include a separate category of "Oceania" but since this category represents very few states in this set (Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji), the effect would be negligible. Furthermore, I do not distinguish subsets like "Southeast Asia" or "Central America" so as to remain as agnostic as possible about what constitutes a state's "region."

criterion is indicated by a dummy variable, though the number of out-of-region groups is also included in the dataset. This is to help future researchers explore or control for the geographic elements of a state's sponsorship pattern using the SPFS Dataset.

Sponsorship of High Profile Terrorist Groups

The definition of HISS used in this research requires that states also sponsor at least one highly terroristic group. I refer to these as High Profile Terroristic Groups (HPTGs). The sources used thus far have focused on insurgent groups. As has been noted by many scholars and was addressed in Chapter 1, there is a great deal of overlap between these two categories (Byman 2005a), but there does seem to remain a set of quite terroristic groups that still receive external support from states. These patterns are, of course, particularly difficult to track because they are much more clandestine; governments are more likely to deny or hide state relationships with controversial and terroristic groups than they are with foreign insurgents.

For this portion of the DV specification, there is a two-step approach. First, I draw on the Global Terrorism Database's extensive catalog of terrorist attacks and use that information to assemble a list of "high profile terrorist groups" (LaFree and Dugan 2007; START 2014). These are the most active and deadly groups in the world. I used selection criteria determined by natural breaks in the GTD data. Ultimately, the majority of attacks in the GTD resulted in no fatalities (52% of all incidents yielded no fatalities) or no wounded persons (70%). About 42% of attacks resulted in no casualties of any kind. Attacks that killed six or more people (and had a known, specific perpetrator[14]) are in the 90th percentile. Because of the temporal scope of the

[14] By "specific perpetrator," I simply mean that the activity be attributable to a specific organization with an appellation. Over half of the 125,087 terrorist attacks in the GTD (as of 2015) are completely unattributed or attributed to generically labeled actors like "masked men" or "Muslims." While perhaps useful for other purposes, this dissertation is interested in identifiable groups that have the potential to receive state sponsorship, and it does not make much sense to include unknown or unclearly identified groups.

SPFS dataset, only observations through 2004 were used, so more recent activity, such as ISIS's since 2011, is not included.

HPTGs are those groups that are significantly more active and more violent than other groups. In this research, HPTGs are named group actors that were responsible for killing over 250 civilians over the course of its existence and for perpetrating at least one attack with over 100 casualties.[15] While the 250 civilian deaths over the group's lifetime helps identify the most violent groups, the latter threshold of victims from a single attack is designed to try to eliminate insurgent groups that kill small numbers of civilians incidentally over the course of a lengthy conflict. While not a perfect tool to eliminate bias, this method results in a list of HPTGs (see Appendix B.1) that contains both the most violent, terroristic insurgent groups *and* high-profile, transnational terrorist groups.

HPTGs that also fought civil wars, such as the LTTE ("Tamil Tigers") and the African National Congress (ANC), appear in the UCDP dataset. For those years in which the UCDP data had already noted a linkage, observations were simply given an "HPTG" indicator value of 1. A number of practical concerns limited the ability of this research to go beyond the UCDP data in identifying state-HPTG linkages. Databases like those from the UCPD are the result of large teams of researchers working for many years and with a great deal of funding. Similarly, the Global Terrorism Database, and related resources from RAND and ITERATE, were assembled by drawing on millions of newspaper reports about terrorism around the world. It would be impossible to replicate these efforts. A single researcher could potentially examine those cases

[15] For the number of casualties in a single attack, this is at about the 99.8 percentile mark. Additionally, before generating this list of group names or summary statistics, several additional constraints are placed on the GTD data. I limited results to only those attacks that target non-military locations, persons, and facilities, and then proceeded to identify groups that met surpassed the group lifetime and single-attack thresholds.

that nearly meet the other HISS criteria to determine if there are HPTG-state linkages that are not covered in the UCDP data. However, for the purposes of the quantitative analysis in Part II of this study, this would serve to bias the results.

Instead, given that this is the criterion a state that is actually practicing HISS is most likely to fail to meet due to measurement error, I have created a specification of the dependent

Table 3.1 HISS Measures and the 3 Criteria

	Quantity	Geography	HPTG	# of Obs; # of Countries
HISS, 3-Year Window Count	5+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	1+ out-of-region groups that year	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	59; 12
HISS, 5-Year Period Count	5+ unique groups in 5 year, pre-set period	1+ out-of-region groups that year	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	73; 14
HISS, no HPTG	5+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	1+ out-of-region groups that year	-	79; 14
HISS, no Out-of-Region	5+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	-	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	71; 12
HISS, 3-Year Window, 4+ Grps	4+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	1+ out-of-region groups that year	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	73; 15
HISS, 3-Year Window, 3+ Grps	3+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	1+ out-of-region groups that year	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	97; 16

variable that does not consider HPTG sponsorship. If a state has ties to 5 or more groups and at least one of those groups is active outside of the state's geographic region, it will be coded as "1" in the "HISS, no HP" variable. This measure is more inclusive than either the 3-year window or 5-year period measure. As some analyses in the next chapter will show, the "HISS, No out of Region" dependent variable tends to result in different outcomes than the full HISS variables,

which, in turn, are more similar to the No HPTG results. Unless explicitly noted, however, and throughout the rest of this chapter, the first variable in the list, "HISS 3-Year Window Count" is what is being examined.

HISS Observed in the SPFS Dataset

A country-leader-year (or country-year) in which a state met all three criteria above was considered to be engaged in HISS. Analysis and results with alternative specifications will be included in Appendix B and/or Appendix C, as noted throughout.[16] This is a binary indicator variable that takes either a 1 or a 0. This is consistent with the theoretical claim that there is one type of "high intensity" sponsorship pattern, and states are either employing such a policy or they are not. The list of countries and leaders which were found to be HISS states for the purposes of the primary analysis in both this chapter and Chapter 4 appears below.

A "gut check" of the list seems to comport with both the trends in the recent literature and the general sense one has of what state are involved in HISS are. Castro's Cuba, Qaddafi's Libya, Revolutionary Iran, Hafiz Assad's Syria, Sudan in the 1990's, and Pakistan all appear here. It is worth pointing out that the United States is also on this list, which may be surprising to some given the HPTG criterion. The US historically supported both UNITA and the contras (ARDE), which appear in the Global Terrorism Database and easily surpass all thresholds to be considered HPTGs. This dissertation's take on the United States' policy of HISS will be taken

[16] For a list of the observations in which HISS levels of sponsorship activity were attained according to the different thresholds/criteria, see Appendix B.2. Additional countries from adjusting the number of groups threshold to 4 and/or using the five-year period count include: Algeria, Egypt, and North Korea. Reducing thresholds to 3 includes South Yemen (Yemen People's Republic) for 2 years. The additional countries picked up by relaxing the HPTG criteria are Egypt (4 years) and Tanzania (1 year). Finally, eliminating the "out of region" requirement includes Algeria on the list. It is noteworthy that Thailand, which was a top ten sponsor from datasets described in Chapter 1, does not achieve HISS status in my data. Though it frequently sponsored up to 3 groups, all were within region.

up in the conclusion; the best evidence suggests that the US did indeed employ this policy during the last decade of the Cold War. I return to this list of years and cases in section six below.

Validity of the HISS Conception: Correlations among HISS Criteria

Further exploration of the HISS variable suggests that the SPFS dataset might be "on to

Table 3.2 HISS Observations, 3-Year Window Counts

Country	Leader	Years
China	Mao Zedong; Deng Xiaoping	1975-1976; 1982-1983
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1977; 1979-1980
Eritrea	Afeworki	1999; 2002
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1979-1981
Iraq	Saddam Hussein	1990
Libya	Qaddafi	1975-1991
Pakistan	Zia	1979
Russia/USSR	Brezhnev	1980
Saudi Arabia	Fahd	1985-1987
Sudan	Al-Bashir	1994-1999
Syria	H. al-Assad	1984; 1988-1991
United States	Ronald Reagan; George H. W. Bush	1982-1992

Table 3.3 HISS Adoption Events

Country	Leader	SPFS Year	Year on State Dept. List
China	Mao Zedong	1975*	-
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1977	1981
Eritrea	Afeworki	1999	-
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1979	1984
Iraq	Saddam Hussein	1990	1979**; 1990
Libya	Qaddafi	1975*	1979**
Pakistan	Zia	1979	-
Russia/USSR	Brezhnev	1980	-
Saudi Arabia	Fahd	1985	-
Sudan	Al-Bashir	1994	1993
Syria	H. al-Assad	1984	1979**
United States	Ronald Reagan; George H. W. Bush	1982	-

* Start of database coverage; adoption was on or before 1975

** Start of State Sponsors of Terrorism list was December 29, 1979

something" when it comes to identifying patterns of state sponsorship. This dataset shows that HISS is associated with several other potentials measures of high-intensity sponsorship – i.e. that the criteria are, indeed, internally correlated with one another. As a whole, states that support 1) an HPTG or 2) an out-of-region group are more likely to support greater numbers of groups overall, even when dropping states that sponsor no groups of any kind. Additionally, states identified as HISS states by the SPFS dataset are also more likely to sponsor a greater number of groups outside of their region. This is true when examining only states that sponsor at least one out-of-region group, which controls for the fact that HISS states are, by definition, sponsors of at least one extra-regional group. These internal correlations help to justify the three criteria used in this research to identify high-intensity patterns of state sponsorship. They also suggest that there are important empirical similarities across the policies themselves, and thus it is worth exploring a unique theoretical explanation for the pattern, rare though it may be.

First, states that tend to sponsor out-of-region groups tend to sponsor significantly more groups overall, and the same holds true for sponsors of HPTGs. Table 3.4 below shows the results of simple T-tests between averages within sub-groups in the data; all tests in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 have p-values of 0.001 or 0.000. Though states, on average, support 0.43, or not even 1 group each year, states that sponsor an HPTG tend to sponsor 2.90 groups per year. States that sponsor out-of-region likewise sponsor 3.41 groups that year, on average. The data also show that HPTG sponsoring and geographic reach go hand-in-hand with larger quantities of group sponsorship—even when only examining states that sponsor at least one group.[17] States

[17] Figures under "Among States that Sponsor 1+ Groups" are about the subset of the data, 886 leader-years, in which there is any international sponsorship at all.

that sponsor any groups at all tend to, on average, sponsor 2.57 groups, or between two and three groups in a given year. If a state sponsors outside of its region, however, it tends to be sponsoring between 3 and 4 groups (3.41) on average. With respect to the nature of the groups supported, states that sponsor at all, but do *not* sponsor HPTGS, sponsor closer to two total groups per year (2.34). In contrast, HPTG-supporting states sponsor almost 3 groups per year, on average (still 2.90).

Table 3.4 Number of Groups and Other HISS Criteria

	Average Number Groups Sponsored	N	*DoF* T-test
UCDP 3-Year Window			
Full Set	0.43	5267	
Out-of-Region	3.41	283	*5265*
No Out-of-Region	0.26	4984	t = -44.54
Sponsors an HPTG	2.51	411	*5265*
No HPTG	0.26	4856	t=-36.15
Both HPTG + Out-of-Region	3.69	186	
<u>Among States that Sponsor 1+ Groups:</u>			
| Sponsor any Groups	2.57	886	
No Out-of-Region | Sponsor Any	2.17	603	
Sponsors Out-of-Region	3.41	283	*884*
			t=-7.61
| Sponsor Any Groups	2.57	886	
No HPTG | Sponsor Any	2.34	530	
Sponsors an HPTG	2.90	356	*884*
			t = -3.52
| Sponsor Any Groups	2.57	886	
Not Both | Sponsor Any	2.27	700	
Both HPTG + Out-of-Region	3.69	186	*884*
			t=-7.58

Finally, states that sponsor HPTGs *and* out-of-region groups sponsor larger numbers of groups than any of the subsets examined thusfar. The average number of groups sponsored by such states is 3.69. This is compared to a 2.27 groups average among sponsoring states that don't sponsor both an HPTG and an out-of-region group. It is worth noting that a single group can be both an out-of-region group and an HPTG, so it is not necessarily the case all 186 observations in which both types are sponsored are, at a minimum, sponsoring 2 groups. Table 3.5 also indicates the statistical significance of the difference between means of these subsets of data. In each case, the number of groups sponsored, on average, is statistically significantly higher among states that sponsor an HPTG, an out-of-region group, or both as compared to states that do not. This is true both when controlling for and when not controlling for any sponsorship at all.

Another way HISS states stand out in the data is in the global reach of the groups they support. For example, Table 3.5 compares the average number of out-of-region groups in various subsets of the data. As Table 3.4 indicated, the average number of groups sponsored is 0.38. Using UCDP measures of each individual group's regional location, the average number of out-of-region groups sponsored by all states in the set is 0.10. This means that states in the data overall sponsor nearly zero out-of-region groups. In contrast, HISS states are sponsoring 3.10 groups outside of their region, on average. This is three total groups above what is average for non-HISS states (0.07 groups). Similar results obtain with the 5-year period data (see Appendix B.3).

Out-of-region sponsorship, of course, is a definitional criterion of HISS. I therefore compare HISS and non-HIS states within the subset of leader-years in which a state supports any out-of-region groups. This totals 283 observations. The non-HISS states that sponsor at least

one out-of-region group sponsor, on average, only 1.55 groups. HISS states, however, support 3.10 out-of-region groups, twice as many. This difference in number of extra-regional groups supported is also statistically significant. If one compares the HISS and non-HISS subsets of the out-of-region sponsoring observations (essentially "controlling" for out-of-region support itself), a simple T-test demonstrates that the two means are different. That is, the difference between

Table 3.5 HISS and Number of Out-of-Region Groups

	Average Number of Out-of-Region Grps	N	*DoF* T-test
UCDP 3-Year Window			
Full Set	0.10	5267	
All Non-HISS Observations	0.07	5208	
HISS observation	3.10	59	*5265*
			t = -45.33
| Any Out-of-Region	1.87	283	
Non-HISS | Out-of-Region	1.55	224	
HISS observation	3.10	59	*281*
			t=-6.05

1.55 and 3.10 with 281 degrees of freedom is t = 6.05. This means that, given these data, there is a 0% chance that HISS and non-HISS states support out-of-region groups at the same rates. In short, *among those states that sponsor groups outside of their region*, HISS states sponsor significantly more out-of-region groups than non-HISS states.

The State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship database thereby seems to offer a fairly internally valid measure of HISS. It certainly captures a great deal of abnormally intense sponsorship activity; about 1.1% of the observations in the dataset exhibit HISS activity.[18]

[18] This is 1.4% for the 5-year period measure, or 73 observations out of 5,268. The 3-year window DV has 59 HISS leader-years.

Sponsorship itself appears in only 16.8% of observations. Out-of-region sponsorship occurs in 5.4% of observations, and HPTG sponsorship in 7.8%. In only 2.7% of leader-years does a state sponsor more than five groups; about 3.5% of observations have more than 4 groups sponsored.

The combined thresholds of at least one high-profile group, a large number of groups overall (five for the UCDP 3-year window data, the primary specification for these analyses), and at least one out-of-region group generate a set of observations that do seem to comport with the concept of HISS central to this dissertation's theory. Each of the three criteria is correlated with the others at fairly high levels. Furthermore, as Table 3.4 shows, the quantity criterion of five or more groups in a short period of time is a difficult threshold to pass. Even among states that sponsor both an HPTG and an out-of-region group, the average number of groups with ties to the state is less than 4. And, perhaps most significantly, HISS states do *all* of these things at higher levels or rates than do states which do *any* of these things individually. The HISS variable's operationalization here thus captures a pattern of overall sponsorship that is consistent with the theoretical conceptualization of this phenomenon.

HISS Trends and Patterns of Sponsorship: Learning from the SPFS Data

Before testing this dissertation's theory about the causes of HISS, I would like to demonstrate some of the insights into HISS that the SPFS dataset can generate. This is the first dataset that allows researchers to explore trends in sponsorship patterns over time and space. In this section, I showcase some of the utility of this dataset using only the HISS variable, a few regional and temporal indicators, and the individual factors used to define HISS. This simultaneously shows what the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship data has to offer and offers further empirical support for the claim that HISS is a distinct and analytically important political phenomenon.

One claim made about "state support for terrorism" is that it is not nearly the concern today, circa 2017, that it once was. In particular, Collins (2014) contends that state sponsored terrorism is in decline overall. He supports his contention with a series of anecdotes and references to qualitative government reports and studies. Using the SPFS dataset, he would have been able to offer this very compelling picture of the trend in state sponsorship for armed actors abroad over time.

Figure 3.1



Figure 3.1 demonstrates that 2-4 states were heavily engaged in high-intensity state sponsorship during the 1980s, but that during the 1990s and the 2000s, state sponsorship was in

decline. The data only begin in 1975 so it would be harder to compare early-Cold War to late- and post-Cold War trends. However, there does seem to be a sharp drop off in the number of states employing a full-blown HISS strategy since the 1980s. Additionally, of the twelve instances of HISS adoptions by state, ten occurred prior to 1989 and only two were in the 1990s. Thus, it may be that HISS adoption is best understood in the context of the Cold War.

Another figure derived from the dataset tells a slightly different story about temporal trends in "terrorism sponsorship" more specifically. Figure 3.2 demonstrates that the number of

Figure 3.2



states supporting a terrorist group (this dissertation's "high profile terroristic group") saw a spike in the 1980s, when around 20 nations had ties to non-state actors that regularly targeted civilians. Like HISS itself, this activity dropped following the end of the Cold War; in the 1990s, around ten states were sponsoring HPTGs. Furthermore, after 9/11, the number of states willing to put

an HPTG on the state payroll was down to between four and six. Namely, the end of the Cold War and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has had effects on states' foreign policies when it comes to international sponsorship of non-state actors. Thus we find that systematic state sponsorship of non-state actors has declined sharply since the 1980s, and individual state-group linkages with terroristic groups have dropped off twice surrounding important global events.

It is also the case that there is a correlation between regime features and HISS activity. In the SPFS dataset, leaders are in power for an average of 12.8 years. However, HISS states see leaders in tenure for an average of almost 23 years total. HISS-adopting leaders like Chairman Mao and Fidel Castro were long-term, personalist dictators, and looking again at the list of leaders in Tables 3.2-3.3 above confirms this trend. Relatedly, the United States is the only state that had an active HISS policy while it was classified as a democracy. This is yet another way in which the US is an outlier in the HISS data; all other states were non-democracies when they adopted and employed HISS.[19] These trends and insights provide cross-national, statistical support for a number of widely held beliefs about the correlation between regime type—for example, personalist dictators and non-democratic regimes—and HISS adoption.

The SPFS database can also help researchers understand the geographic aspects of international sponsorship. For HISS activity in particular, there are clearly regional differences in the trends overall (Figure 3.3). Nations in the Middle East and North Africa are responsible for 59% of all HISS activity on the globe. The United States and Cuba's activity is captured in the "Americas" region, which is the origin point of 25% of international sponsorship activity. Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa each have only one state that sponsors at HISS levels during the

[19] Democracy data from Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.

dataset's coverage period. These are Russia (or the USSR) and Eritrea, respectively. The final 10% of HISS activity originates from Asia, from both China and Pakistan.

There are a number of possible insights and interpretations available for this distribution. One surprising find may be that, contrary to a belief among many policy makers, political and military instability is not sufficient to explain HISS activity.[20] Sub-Saharan Africa's relatively low incidence of HISS suggests that it is more than just regional insecurity that drives international sponsorship that fits a high-intensity pattern. If HISS were a wholly security-oriented policy, one might expect that the geographic areas with the greatest concentrations of

Figure 3.3



weak and failed states, porous borders, and number of ongoing civil or international wars would also be more heavily involved in HISS. Instead, it is only in when the HISS criteria are relaxed

[20] For concerns about international terrorism and failed states and regional instability, see Kranser and Pascual 2005, Cohen 2002, Patrick 2006, Rice 2008.

that an African country other than Eritrea appears in the set – and this is Tanzania in the late 1970s. Almost conspicuously absent is any HISS activity related to the series of wars in the Great Lakes Region of Africa in the 1990s, when multidimensional conflict engulfed Uganda, Zaire/DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. If a "dangerous neighborhoods and low capacity states" story was a consistently strong explanation for high-intensity state sponsorship patterns, we might expect a different regional distribution than that which appears in Figure 3.3.

Another insight is that these results say something more about the data than the real world. Though one might argue that a particular kind of "regional instability" is behind the adoption of HISS by MENA states, that explanation is inconsistent with other regional data and, at best, incomplete as an explanation of HISS. On the other hand, the Middle East is studied more heavily with respect to a number of political and military activities related to international sponsorship patterns. It therefore appears to exhibit the most activity because it is easiest to detect that activity in the wealth of information about sponsorship and terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa. According to this logic, Figure 3.3 may be the result of biased data and data-gathering that detects activity in certain regions more readily than others.

Overall, the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset gives researchers more information about state sponsorship patterns than any existing source. Here, I was able to demonstrate some of the propositions outlined in Chapter 1, namely, that a state policy of sponsorship can fall into a number of potential patterns. As the premise of this dissertation contended, states that meet the criteria for HISS are clearly in the minority and are exhibiting an uncommon and unique but shared pattern of sponsorship. HISS is rare, and there is a fairly consistent profile for it that is well-captured in the SPFS dataset. This research's major project is to assess what factors and theory can best account for the causes of this policy.

It is to that project that this chapter now turns, laying out the variables of interest to the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS and how the SPFS dataset translates these somewhat complex concepts into analyzable variables. In addition to being a general tool for research on the topic, the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship was developed to test hypotheses about which factors tend to be associated most strongly with HISS. In Chapter 2, I laid out a theory as to the causes of HISS onset. This section lays out the operationalization of the three factors I believe lead a state to adopt HISS as a national foreign policy. It also provides some evidence of simple, bivariate correlations between HISS and my theory's variables. This chapter will focus on the variables at the core of my own theory. Chapter 4 will discuss the control variables and measures used to capture alternative explanations, in the context of hypothesis testing and modeling using the SPFS dataset. For the basic test of this theory's hypotheses, the data needed to include information on the set of variables in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4

Revolutionary Realities Factor Summary

1) Entry type (institutionalized vs. non-institutionalized)
2) Ideology (level of international revolutionariness)
3) Barriers to conventional military operations abroad against rivals
    a. Geographic location/distance of rivals
    b. Relative material capabilities
    c. Nuclear weapons

III. Entry Type Measurement

The first factor that I argue is needed for HISS onset is a leader or regime's non-institutionalized entry to power. This leads to an opportunity to create new governing institutions for conducting state affairs and contributes to leadership's reliance on loyalists and

like-minded individuals for executing and conceiving of foreign policy. Non-institutionalized entry theoretically encompasses the vast majority of coups as well as other domestic events like popular movements civil wars that could potentially bring new leaders to power. As described above, the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset is based on the Archigos database of leader characteristics. Archigos includes information on the entry-type of each leader in its set. I use this measure, with small modifications, as a basis for my regime/leader "entry," as it generally comports with my theory's conception.

In Archigos, a leader can enter power one of three ways: through 1) regular means 2) irregular means and 3) via direct foreign imposition. Irregular entry refers only to those situations in which a leader's appointment is not made according to proscribed rules and procedures. This means that when the assassination of a president leads to a vice president assuming the presidency, the vice president's entry is "regular." (The president's *exit*, however, is considered irregular, a point taken up in Chapter 4's alternative explanation section). Entry as the result of a coups d'état is "irregular," but autocracies that place the next-in-line autocrat in power at the death or retirement of a previous leader is "regular." North Korea, for example, does not have an "irregular entry" leader at all in my SPFS dataset. Additionally, Nasser's ascension to power in Egypt is an "irregular" entry, but his rule of *Syria* during the United Arab Republic period is considered "regular" entry. This is because the latter assumption of power was not "in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions" (2-3, ibid). The governments of both countries agreed to the union where Syria, briefly, ceded (titular) political power to Egypt and Nasser.

Guidelines for "foreign imposition" are similarly strict. The Archigos coders note that for direct imposition, "it is not sufficient that another state supports a particular choice of leader

or tries to influence leader selection indirectly," (Goemans et. al. 2009b).[21] Rather, military occupation or overt military international regime change operations result in "foreign imposed" leaders. In my data, I have recoded those cases of "foreign imposition" as 0 (regular). I also have alternatives in which foreign imposition is coded as "missing" and where it is coded as "non-institutionalized entry." As the discussion below and the analysis in Chapter 4 will reveal, there is almost no substantive difference between analyses using these different codings. They affect only 1.5% of the observations.[22]

Only in the case of a few coups does the theoretical concept in the SPFS data base necessitate substantive recodes of the Archigos data. To inform these changes, I relied primarily on the Powell and Thyne data (2011) on coups d'états. Their database is entirely coup-centered, an area in which Archigos' is weak. As the authors noted in the 2009 data release, "In future versions of Archigos, we will provide much finer-grained codings on how leaders entered office" (2011, 2-3). Reading the accounts in the 737 page codebook, it is clear that as laudable as the Archigos research is, there is very little detail when it comes to the specifics of power transitions. Therefore, where the Archigos and Powell/Thyne data disagreed, I performed some of my own research into the episode in question to determine whether the entry was theoretically consistent with my conception.

I typically embraced the Powell/Thyne data codings, but there were some instances in which Powell and Thyne conflicted with this theory's notion of entry. In a few cases, for

[21] This occurs in 151 country-leader-years, out of 5,268 observations in the complete dataset. Over half of these instances are accounted for by the Soviet Union's imposition of leaders in Czechoslovakia and Hungary during the Cold War and Haile Selassie's return to Ethiopia in 1941, following the Italian occupation of the country in 1936. Including a few additional post-war occupations (Japan after WWII, Afghanistan and Iraq after 2001 and 2003 respectively), this accounts for 70% of the 'foreign imposition' data. One imagines that the 2016 US presidential election falls into this "not quite foreign imposed" category.

[22] See Appendix B.4 for a breakdown of the original Archigos entry coding as compared to my HISS variable.

example, a military coup occurred shortly after a democratic election, and a counter-coup returned the democratically elected executive back into power within a year or two. The military leadership orchestrating the coup I coded as non-institutionalized, but when the counter-coup restored the elected leader, I retained Archigos's "regular" entry coding for that leader. The logic here is that a brief seizure of power is not likely to completely interrupt institutional structures, making the entry ultimately institutionalized. Electoral institutions brought the leader to power – it just took him or her a while to get there. Overall, the correlation between the original Archigos data and the SPFS recoded data is 97.6%. In the procedure, 100 observations were modified according to the Powell/Thyne definitions, and of those, a total of 89 remain in the main dataset used for the analysis in Chapter 4.

Non-Institutionalized Entry and HISS

Further exploration into the Entry variable demonstrates that there is some tendency for entry type and HISS to co-vary. The contingency table below shows both the actual count of the observations that fall in each cell (in bold) and the expected counts, based on the overall distribution of the data in each variable (percentages, in italics). Entry and HISS co-vary quite strongly.[23]

It is somewhat noteworthy that there are as many HISS observations without irregular entry here as there are. The theory outlined in Chapter 2 suggests that all three conditions – entry, international revolutionary ideology, and high barriers to conventional conflict – are necessary components. Further exploration of the data provides some additional insight to this seeming contradiction.

[23] This is also the case in alternative specifications of the DV; see Appendix B.4.

Table 3.6 HISS and Entry, Foreign Imposed = 0 (Not Irregular)

3-Year Window

Entry	**HISS Dummy**	0 (No HISS)	1 (HISS)	Total
0 (Regular)	Observed	**3,985**	**21**	**4,006**
	Column %	*76.5%*	*35.6%*	*76.1%*
	Expected	4,521	45	
1 (Irregular)	Observed	**1,223**	**38**	**1,261**
	Column %	*23.5%*	*64.4%*	*23.9%*
	Expected	1,490	14	
Total		**5,208**	**59**	**5,267**
		100%	*100%*	*100%*

χ^2 (1) = 53.65 Pr = 0.000

First, the United States' involvement with HISS accounts for 12 of the 21 observations. This represents fully 57% of the misfit data. A more detailed treatment of the United States appears in the conclusion, but in short, I believe that my theory offers a few insights into US policy with respect to the entry type mechanism even though it does not fully conform to the Revolutionary Realities theory as measured in the SPFS data. While the United States clearly elects new executives through an institutionalized process, some of the institutional factors of non-institutionalized entry may well be at play. The president has a great deal of authority over foreign policy and a great deal of control over who is in charge in agencies such as the CIA and the State Department. Thus the group-think and personal loyalty aspect of my theoretical mechanism may be present even if the binary-coded non-institutionalized regime factor is not technically there.

Additionally, there are a number of institutionalized entry HISS observations that correspond to countries continuing with a policy of HISS that was adopted under a regime that

did enter power irregularly. In the case of China, for example, the policy of HISS first appeared under Mao, following a leadership change of the type predicted by my theory—revolutionary uprising and civil war. Subsequent leadership changes were, however, regularized, which means that there are two additional observations under Deng Xiaoping, whose entry to power was through normalized channels, in which China pursued a HISS policy that it had initially adopted under the previous leader. Omitting the United States and these two observations from China leaves just seven leader-years in the top right cell of Table 3.5 above.

In any event, it is clear from the data that HISS and non-institutionalized entry coincide more frequently than pure chance would predict. The expected counts in each cell indicate that HISS and irregular entry occur 2.5 times more frequently in the actual data than a random distribution could account for. If the two were genuinely independent, there should only be about 14 leader-years, not 38, in which HISS and non-institutionalized entry were both observed. Relatedly, institutionalized entry and HISS coincide about half as often as it should (21 times compared to an expected 45).

Overall, this bivariate examination of the data does represent some preliminary support for the Revolutionary Realities theory in the previous chapter. The type of entry does appear to be related to HISS at much higher rates than chance would suggest. There is comparatively less HISS among states that have relied on established, institutionalized paths to attain power, and, ignoring one or two outliers, there is an exceptionally small number of observations in the top-right corner of Table 3.5—HISS-adopters that have entered power through institutionalized means. Having 0 observations in that cell would, of course, show strong support for my theory's assertion that irregular entry is a necessary condition for HISS, but these data at least show very high levels of coincidence. The claim of necessity is revisited in section six of this chapter.

IV. International Revolutionary Ideology

The second component of the Revolutionary Realities theory, and the most difficult to quantify, is the ideology of the state leadership. In the previous chapter, I argued that it was not merely some kind of extreme agenda that prompted HISS; rather, a specific, ideological vision of the international system contributed to HISS onset. Though case studies will engage in a deeper examination of the ruling party's ideology, for the statistical analysis in the SPFS dataset, I created a proxy measure of this variable using the Comparative Constitutions Project dataset as a basis (Elkins, Ginsburg, & Melton 2014). Theoretically, I contend that when leaders put down a set of ideas and political values into a governing document, they are publicly espousing (but importantly, not necessarily acting on!) that set of ideas and values. Thus, analyzing the content of a constitution can give us a measure of the kinds of political ideas the leadership is claiming to espouse, i.e. its ruling ideology.

The Comparative Constitutions Project data contains information on all constitutions since 1789.[24] These constitutions were read thoroughly by the research team and coded according to roughly 1,270 variables. These mostly refer to the constitution's articulation of the structure of a state's government and the rights, powers, and privileges of citizens and federal authorities. There are, for example, eleven indicator variables that code the rules for the nomination of the chief justice of the state's highest judiciary court. Three variables are used in combination to indicate whether the executive is nominally the head of government, the state, or both.

[24] The project looks at the constitutions of "independent states" only. See Ward and Gleditsch (2013) for the list of the list of independent states used by the Comparative Constitutions Project. These are almost entirely "microstates" like Andorra, "semi-autonomous entities" like Puerto Rico, and various de facto independent entities and states without international recognition like Somaliland in Somalia or Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. Overall, the constitution data greatly overlaps with the Archigos data, which uses a similar set of major states and also tends to leave out microstates and semi-autonomous polities.

In addition to these governance-related minutiae, the coders of this data also included information about content that is plausibly related to the political purpose and ideological orientation of the state. There are, for example, indicators as to whether or not a given constitution mentions God (or any gods) and whether particular religious or ethnic groups are given special privileges or protections under the law. Some constitutions even explicitly mention and condemn (or pardon) the alleged crimes of the previous regimes. These are the kinds of variables I leveraged in this analysis.

In particular, the International Revolutionary Ideology variable relies on seven binary factors in the constitutions dataset. These include: 1) the mention of the legal right to overthrow governments; 2) the obligation of citizens to build the national society; 3) the mention of "solidarity"; 4) the mention of "dignity"; 5) the mention of socioeconomic rights; 6) a reference to the United Nations Treaty Article 45, which pertains to military intervention in nations that are a threat to peace; and 7) the explicit statement of regional or international alliances and loyalties.

Though these concepts do not map perfectly on to the three components of my theory's definition of "international revolutionary ideology," many similarities are present. The obligations entailed in the espousal of UN Charter Article 45, for example, is a "call to action." It also explicitly suggests that governments are only legitimate insofar as they adhere to certain strictures with respect to human rights and blatant military aggression. Inherent in this notion is the one that it is up to *other states* to assess the legitimacy of world governments. Similarly, the belief that a populace has an obligation to "build the national society" is another call to action that evokes calls for change and progress, at least at the domestic level. The "solidarity" element suggests a greater international awareness and, along with "dignity" is consistent with the normative, universalistic tone of revolutionary political ideologies.

"Region" captures a government's commitment to internationalism and recognition of loyalty beyond state boundaries. The "regional loyalties" indicator was particularly enlightening regarding the internationalist ambitions and orientations of the state. Though the variable is a binary indicator, there is also a "notes" section in the original dataset that lists the specific region to which the country considers itself allied. Regions listed included the "Arab nation," the "third world", "socialist states", the "league of Arab states" and the "movement of nonaligned nations" in addition to regions like Africa, the Maghreb, Latin American states, and the European Union.[25] Roughly 20% of the observations in which a constitution referred to any international alliance were explicitly pan-Arab (392 out of 1899 in the Comparative Constitutions dataset). Overall, 65% of the observations (1241 of 1899) in which a country had a constitution that espoused a regional alliance, it was to an entity more generic and geographically broader than an officially recognized organization such as the African Union, the Organization of American States, or the European Union.

Conceptions of historical trajectories or eschatology, on the other hand, are somewhat lacking in this measure. However, if a constitution argues that it is legitimate to overthrow an illegitimate government, there is some evidence that the government sees itself as having a particular place in history. The "right to revolution" clause is also clearly anti-status quo. In short, the combination of these indicators gets at several aspects of my definition of

[25] This additional information about the nature of the regional loyalty led to some recoding choices, in which I rejected the original coders' interpretation. In 289 of the observations, the region specified was either "the British Commonwealth" (or some variation thereon) or was clearly colonialist in nature (i.e. the constitution of Madagascar proclaiming its loyalty to the French community). Also, from 1952 through the present there exists a Danish-Icelandic union, which is enshrined in the Danish constitution and shows up as a "regional alliance" in the Comparative Constitutions data. These were all recoded to 0 for the calculation of the International Revolutionary Ideology score below, as they were not consistent with my understanding of 'international application.'

internationalist ideology and the overall approach represents a promising tool for future studies of governments.

Most importantly, there is no alternative measurement, that I am aware of, which allows for a cross-national comparison of "ideologies" beyond a simple left-right designation.[26] Though "international application," "conception of historical trajectory", and a "call to action" are not perfectly articulated in these seven factors, a combination of them can plausibly measure something like the ideology relevant to this research. The measure creatively leverages high-quality research on comparative constitutions, documents that are meant to articulate not only the rules but also the purpose of government, to assess something about the content of the political ideology that a state is espousing.

Calculating the Variable

This research combines the seven above measures in a latent variable analysis method called "confirmatory factor analysis" to generate the International Revolutionary Ideology Index variable.[27] This approach calculates the covariance of several factors theoretically believed to be strongly associated with an unobserved or unobservable variable. My approach used a maximum

[26] San-Akca 2016 considers ideology, but ultimately this reduces to a socialist/democratic identifier. Notably in the context of this research, it codes Democratic Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge and the People's Republic of China under Mao is the same ideology type – a single-party Communist state. As detailed in Chapter 7, these two countries take on completely different values according to my definition, and, indeed, in my constitutions-based measure. Some new research, however, is promising. The Comparative Manifestos Project datasets (and a few sets based on the project) compare the political platforms of various parties based on textual analysis of party manifestos. The coverage for this dataset, however, is only 56 countries, which are almost exclusively European (including Eastern Europe) and the Anglosphere. Israel, Sri Lanka, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa, and Japan are the only exceptions. This coverage is not currently sufficient for the needs of this research as a measure of ideology (Lehmann et. al. 2015).

[27] See Appendix B.5. I also attempted several alternative specifications that included indicators as to whether or not God or religion in general was invoked in the constitutions, or official state religions were established, but in all cases, the covariance was less than in the model described here. Additionally, the theoretical justification for including the religious element was based on the weak connection between eschatological worldviews and either God or the explicit preference of one religion over another. While not implausible, it is a more tenuous theoretical connection than the other seven factors.

likelihood estimation method, using the variance-covariance matrix as the input matrix, the most typical approach in confirmatory factor analysis (Jackson et. al, 2009). Overall, the results of the analysis suggested that these factors are all related, with goodness-of-fit indicators either just above levels required for a good model fit ($\chi 2$, SRMSR), or just below them (for the RMSEA, Comparative Fit Index, Tucker-Lewis Score).[28] Ultimately, I found that the Cronbach Alpha score when using these seven factors was 0.64. This means that my measurement of the international revolution ideology using these factors is likely to be approximately 64% reliable at predicting the actual, underlying concept of "international revolutionary ideology." In such analyses, a value of 0.7 is generally preferred, but 0.64 is an indication of weak, but not unacceptable, model fit (Jackson et. al 2009).

Finally, using the results of the confirmatory factor analysis (i.e. the measures of factor covariance), I predicted the value of the latent variable, International Revolutionary Ideology Score. The orientation of the government towards international revolutionary ideas is thus a continuous measure, with higher values representing more revolutionary ideologies as captured in constitutions. This measure was then standardized and normed so that constitutions that do not contain any mention of these seven factors were assigned a score of "0."

The International Revolutionary Scores vary from 0 to 6.392. The vast majority of the constitutions in the dataset scored a 0 on this scale; this is 10,675 out of the 15,600 country-years included in the Comparative Constitutions project data. The average score for nearly the entire Constitutions dataset (8,953 out of 1,982 observations) is 0.888. This translates to the country's

[28] SRMSR is "standardized root mean squared residuals" and RMSEA is "root mean squared error approximation." In short, these are all indicators of variation within the model or of the theorized factor "Ideology" that are and are not captured by the covariance of these seven factors, once that covariance is modeled. Additional information on the measures of factor loadings, the results with variances, and various goodness-of-fit statistics for the confirmatory factor analysis can all be found in Appendix B.5.

Table 3.7 90th Percentile of International Revolutionary Constitution Score (1945-2005)

Country	Years	Country	Years
Afghanistan	1980-1984	Guatemala	1945-1953; 1965-2005
Algeria	1996-2001	Haiti	1983-1986
Bangladesh	1972; 1986-2005	Honduras	1957; 1982-2005
Belgium	1994-2005	Iran	1979-2005
Benin	1990-2005	Italy	1967-2005
Bolivia	1994-2004	Mauritania	1991-2005
Bulgaria	1971-1989	Mozambique	1990-2005
Burkina Faso	1991-2005	Nicaragua	1987-2005
Burundi	1992-2005	Niger	1992-2005
Cambodia	1999-2005	Nigeria	1989-2005
Cape Verde	1992-1994	Peru	1979-1987; 2005
Central African Rep.	2004-2005	Portugal	1976-2004
Chad	1996-2005	Rwanda	2003-2005
Colombia	2005	Somalia	1979-2003
Congo	1992-2000	Switzerland	2002
Cuba	1976-2005	Togo	1963-2005
Dominican Republic	1966-1993	Venezuela	1999-2005
Ecuador	1967-1969	Yemen, Arab Republic of	1970-1973; 1994-2005
Equatorial Guinea	1991-2005	Yemen, People's Republic of	1978-1990
Eritrea	1997-2005	Yugoslavia	1974-1991
German Dem. Rep.	1974-1990		

constitution mentioning roughly one of the seven factors mentioned above.[29] It is important to note that these scores are *not* simply a sum of the factors. They are the predicted values of the latent variable associated with all seven factors. There are 59 unique values for this score, each representing a different mix of the factors.

I then explored which countries were most "international-revolutionary" based on this measure. In Table 3.7 is the list of countries and the number of years during the period from

[29] The scoring system weights each factor differently. The factors are weighted, in ascending order (lowest weighted factor first), as follows: obligation to build society; regional or int'l loyalties; socio-economic rights of citizens; UN Article 45; mention of human dignity; right to overthrow governments; and mention of solidarity. Having mention in the constitution of the citizens' obligation to build society, with none of the other six factors present, results in an ideology score of 0.66 whereas mentioning only solidarity results in a score of 1.19.

1946 to 2004 that the country's constitution scores in the top 95th percentile of the data. Countries with observations in which the index for international revolutionary ideology score that are more than 1 standard deviation above the mean are in Appendix B.7.

Constitutions are not independent from one another. Scholars in the field of comparative constitutions have noted that there is a great deal of diffusion of constitutional designs and constitution-making processes across countries.[30] Colonial ties and outright occupation can contribute to the institutions described in a new constitution.[31] Trends in specific language can be found written by states with regional and cultural affinities, such as the "Sharia guarantee clauses" that have been features of constitutions in the Muslim world in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.[32]

Figure 3.5



[30] See Ginsburg Elkins and Blount 2009.

[31] Elkins. Z. Ginsburg, and Melton J. 2008. "Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul…? Constitution-making in Occupied States." *William Mary Law Review 49,* 1139-78.

[32] Lombardi 2013. "Designing Islamic Constitutions: Past Trends and Options for a Democratic Future." 615-645.

Constitutional trends have also occurred over time, and they have done so in a way that is reflected in my measure of international revolutionary ideology There is a distinctive secular trend in the data from 1800 to the present, showing an increase in 'international revolutionariness' of all constitutions over time. Figure 3.5 shows this trend. One possible explanation for this draws on an observation from Ginsburg et al.'s evaluation of the Comparative Constitution Project data, which notes that more constitutions have required a public ratification since the early 1900s. They further note that constitution-making processes which include a public referendum are more likely to include "virtually every category of right" – such as social justice and human rights protections.[33] Since my measure of international revolutionariness includes whether or not the constitution refers to "socioeconomic rights," these

Figure 3.6



[33] Ginsburg et al 2009, 217-218.

Figure 3.7



or other secular trends in constitution writing processes may well account for the measurement's movement over time.

This trend towards higher values on my measure of ideology is modest but clearly present in the time period that the SPFS covers. Figure 3.7 below shows the average constitution scores from 1975 to 2004, with a 95% confidence interval. However, as compared to the number of HISS cases, it is not at all clear that time trends in constitution scores correlate with HISS outcomes. Furthermore, many of the revolutionary constitutions score above 3 points on the index (see Appendix B.8). Still, it is worth pointing out the limitations of this novel measure.

Validity of the International Revolutionary Ideology Variable: Going to the Text

Comparing these scores to the texts of some of the actual constitutions is illustrative of other strengths and limitations of my measure. The full, English text is only available for current

constitutions, and it is in any event not within the scope of this research to conduct in-depth textual analysis of all constitutions used in this dataset. The constitutions, where available, of Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, Sudan, the Democratic Kampuchea, and China will all be examined in case chapters, but I use a few examples of texts from constitutions here.

In the Algerian constitution of 1989 (reinstated in 1996), all three criteria of an international revolutionary ideology are met and the document scores relatively high 3.56 on the ideology variable. Indeed, it reads at times like a quintessentially revolutionary document, opening with, "The Algerian people is a free people, decided to remain free. Its history is a long chain of battles…from the time of the Numidian Kingdom and the epic of Islam to the colonial wars."[34] It also states that "the people has spilled its blood in order to assume its collective destiny." Here, immediately, is the theme of history, destiny, and a march towards progress. The 556-word preamble also refers to, "its commitment to all the just causes of the world," and calls on its citizens to be "worthy inheritors of the pioneers and the builders of a free society." The constitution also refers to the "traditions of solidarity and justice" and situates Algeria in the "Great Maghreb Arab country," as part of the "Mediterranean and African" world, and as a "land of Islam." Regardless of the character of the government itself, the constitution language and the ideology score seem to match up with one another.

This is of course only one example. While the above list contains a number of "revolutionary" countries, including Iran, Nicaragua, and Cuba, the scoring system also clearly captures a lot more than these. A number of successful anti-colonial struggles and independence movements included the rhetoric of international revolution in the resulting constitutions. There are also a disproportionate number of South American and Sub-Saharan African states on this

[34] Preamble Algerian Constitution. See Appendix B.6.

list. There is something about anti-status quo attitudes, loyalty beyond boundaries, and international norms (solidary, socio-economic rights) being captured by this variable, but it is not 100% accurate. Indeed, a number of left-leaning, more democratic-socialist and Marxist states appear in the mix, even though not all of these states espoused the internationalist aspects of Marxism. In fact, it appears that my measure is capturing a great deal of communist/Marxist noise.

An examination of the text of the Venezuelan constitution of 1999 and its preamble helps to make sense of this. This constitution scores a 4.59, somewhat higher than the Algerian document does. I have included nearly all of the text of the preamble here, with the phrases relating to the seven ideological scoring factors highlighted in italics.[35]

> The people of Venezuela, exercising their powers of creation and invoking the protection of God, the *historic example of our Liberator Simon Bolivar* and the heroism and sacrifice of our aboriginal *ancestors and the forerunners and founders* of a free and sovereign nation; *to the supreme end of reshaping the Republic* to establish a democratic, participatory and self-reliant, multiethnic and multicultural society in a just, federal and decentralized State that embodies the values of freedom, independence, peace, *solidarity*, the common good, the nation's territorial integrity, comity and the rule of law for this and future generations; *guarantees the right to life, work, learning, education, social justice and equality, without discrimination or subordination of any kind*; promotes peaceful cooperation among nations and *furthers and strengthens Latin American integration* in accordance with the principle of nonintervention and national self-determination of the people, the universal and indivisible guarantee of human rights, the democratization of imitational society, nuclear disarmament, ecological balance and environmental resources as the common and *inalienable heritage of humanity*;

This text here refers to solidarity; dignity ("without discrimination or subordination of any kind"); the commitment to building society; socio-economic rights; and Latin American

[35] "Venezuela, (Bolivarian Republic of)'s Constitution of 1999." The final clause simply declares that the representatives of the people "hereby ordain the following constitution."

integration. It also refers to Simón Bolívar as a hero and liberator, which is consistent with the right to overthrow unjust governments. This right is expressly protected in Article 350. The progression of history even emerges in the notions of the past and the "inalienable heritage of humanity."

It is not at all clear, however, that the Venezuelan constitution contains more international revolutionary language and truly merits the high scores. The Venezuelan document is more constrained in its commitment to progress and a new era, and overall presents a largely nationalist picture. The rule of law and national sovereignty are significant points of emphasis, as is peaceful cooperation and non-intervention. It is of a different flavor than the Algerian document, or others that will be examined in later chapters. This is undoubtedly a weakness in this particular proxy for government ideology. It is, however, consistently and transparently coded, plausible, and is, I contend, the best available measure of the concept for a project of this scope.

International Revolution Score and HISS Outcomes

I now conduct a simple analysis that compares revolution scores to HISS outcomes. There is little difference in average scores across the different DV specifications. In each case, the average for all observations in the data is around 1.15, which means there is one factor present in the constitution. The average for HISS observations is 1.41 in the three-year window measure and 1.50 in the five-year period measure. A t-test like the ones performed in above sections reveals that these are statistically significantly differences (at the $p < 0.10$ and $p < 0.05$ levels respectively).

Substantively, this is something like one and a half international revolutionary factors, so that HISS states can be expected to have about one half of one additional factor, as compared to non-HISS states. Clearly, this is a modest difference, but given how few HISS observations

Table 3.8 Ideology Scores and HISS Outcomes

HISS (UCDP 3-year Window)				
International Revolutionary Ideology Score				
	Non-HISS Observations	1.15	5200	
	HISS Observations	1.41	59	
	difference	+0.26	*5257*	t = -1.36
				p = 0.92*
HISS (UCDP 5-year Period)				
International Revolutionary Ideology Score				
	Non-HISS Observations	1.15	5187	
	HISS Observations	1.50	73	
	difference	+0.35	*6335*	t = -2.07
				p = 0.98*

* probability true difference in values is greater than 0.

there are, and how skewed the constitution data are (over half of the observations in the data have international revolutionary ideology scores of 0), the statistical significance of the difference of means is noteworthy. On the whole, HISS states are likely to have more international revolutionary ideas in their constitutions than non-HISS states.

A few additional points are worth making about the ideology variable. First, not all countries have constitutions at all times. There are a number of years in which the Comparative Constitutions are missing information. In most cases, this is due to the fact that the constitution was itself suspended. Furthermore, if leaders put information in their constitution, it is probably fair to say that they are espousing those political ideas. However, the *lack* of a political ideology enshrined in a constitution does not necessarily mean that leaders *don't* espouse international revolutionary ideologies. Thus the 0 coding can mean multiple things. Also, amending and

writing constitutions is a time-consuming and often tedious and difficult process. This means that the score on this index may change some number of years after the ruling ideology of the state actually changes. The fact that it performs as well as it does in analysis (both in the sections below and Chapter 4) is impressive, given these potential limitations and the difficulty of measuring something like ideology on a cross-national basis.

V. Barriers to Conventional Military Operations Abroad Against Rivals

The existence of barriers to conventional war is the third of the three conditions necessary for HISS adoption in the Revolutionary Realities theory in this research. In the previous chapter, I suggested that there are three different sources of limitations on country's ability to engage in conventional military conflict with its adversaries abroad. The first was geographic; rivals that are non-contiguous or are located out of the state's region make power projection difficult. The second factor was relative material capabilities. Offensive conventional military operations are particularly difficult and risky against an adversary that outclasses you.[36] Finally, if an enemy has nuclear weapons, engagement in direct militarized conflict can lead to general nuclear war.

Identifying Rivals

All of these barriers to conventional war focus on the distribution and characteristics of a country's adversaries and rivals. To establish which states are engaged in which rivalries, I first use Findley, Piazza, and Young's (2012) data on rivalry. Their data use "politically relevant" dyads, but I restrict myself to those dyads in which there is an actual *rivalry*. This, in the FPY set, draws from the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) data, using only their "enduring rivalry" data. I also go back to the original Klein et. al. data to include the "isolated" rivalry incidents.

[36] For shortcomings on capabilities measures, see Cullen S. Hendrix. 2010. "Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research 47*(3), 273-285.

These isolated rivalries tend to be actual, militarized clashes between two states over a particular issue. In my theory, the features and strength of the adversary engaged (or threatening to engage) in a militarily clash with you dictates the universe of possible responses. Thus factors like whether an adversary is significantly more powerful you or possesses nuclear weapons are important potential drivers of policy in the here-and-now, regardless of whether the rivalry itself is "enduring".

Using the FPY dataset, I first generated measures of a state's rivals each year. This included the identity of the rival, the number of total rivals, the regional locations of rivals (using the five basic region categories above), and whether or not these rivals were contiguous. Because the FPY dataset is in dyad-year format, I had to collapse the data into Side A-Year format, essentially country-year. I therefore generated annual counts of number of rivals, number of out-of-region rivals, and number of non-contiguous rivals. At this time, however, the SPFS dataset does *not* list the identities of each state's various rivals in each given year. Researchers primarily interested in dyadic relations among states should consider some of the dyad-based sets described above, in particular, San-Akca 2016.

I then calculated the relative material capabilities of each state vis-à-vis his rivals each year from COW Material Capabilities, version 4.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). To retain as much information as possible when collapsing the dyad-based FPY data, I calculated not only the average ratios of capabilities but also the maximum and minimum ratios and mean deviation within this set. This means that for each country-year I have several indicators of the strategic situation the state faced vis-à-vis its adversaries. These ratios appear in the FPY dataset as logged values. Logged ratios help make the interpretation of the data somewhat clearer. Capabilities ratios between 0 and 1 in the original data indicate that a state is out-matched by its

adversaries. This ratio is larger than 1 (i.e. 2:1) when the state has a material advantage. In contrast, the *logged* value of these translates to negative numbers when a state is at a disadvantage and positive values when the state has an advantage.

Theoretically, the quantity of most interest in this instance is the "minimum capabilities ratio" which indicates how much of a material advantage or disadvantage a state has against its most powerful foe. There is no requirement that the "minimum capabilities ratio" show that a state is in an inferior position to rivals; it may be substantially more powerful than all of them. In the analyses below and in the following chapter, the minimum capabilities ratio is inverted (multiplied by negative one [-1]) so that *higher* values indicate being *more* outclassed against their strongest rival. Put differently, higher minimum ratios mean higher barriers to offensive military operations against rivals.

Finally, I created two indicators for the nuclear variable. Before collapsing the data, I took a count of the number of nuclear-armed rivals that a state faced each year. I also created a dummy variable, indicating whether any of the state's adversaries had nuclear weapons. For the sake of future research, there is also an indicator as to whether the state itself (i.e. potential sponsoring state) possessed nuclear weapons. These data were hand-coded from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2015).

Barriers Summary

Finally, these three measures are aggregated into a single "Barriers summary" variable. This term is a simple sum of the three of the above factors, where each factor is equally weighted with a maximum of 1 and a minimum of 0. These included: the dummy indicator for nuclear weapons, the percentage of rivals that were non-contiguous, and the minimum capabilities ratio

of a state vis-à-vis its rivals.[37] 'Higher values' for all three factors corresponded to higher barriers to offensive conventional operations.[38]

The two other types of barriers were also included. Having a nuclear-armed rival is either 1 or 0. The geographic component uses the percent non-contiguous rivals; if 75% of a nation's rivals are non-contiguous, this contributes 0.75 to the barriers summary term. The capabilities ratios are handled as follows. If states are more powerful than all of their rivals, or has no rivals, it contributes 0 to the summary term. States that are outclassed at all have a non-zero value, which takes the ratios described above and scales them to be a maximum of 1.

These three values are then summed to form the Barriers Summary variable:

Nuclear Armed + % Non-Contig. Rivals + scaled Minimum Capabilities Ratio = Barriers Summary

The variable ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 3. Theoretically, this is used to get at the notion that there are a number of different potential factors limiting the state's ability to project military power and carry out conventional operations against key rivals. Having a nuclear-armed rival might be sufficient to take conventional military options off the table when electing policies.[39] It is, however, a comparatively rough measure, in particular because of the scaling of the capabilities ratio, which is itself an aggregation of an index. Interpretation of the variable in a substantive way is also rather difficult. The scaling means that going from having

[37] States with only one rival in a year have identical values for the minimum, average, and maximum ratios. Alternative specifications found that the average capabilities ratio was also a relevant factor but it did not perform as well as the minimum capabilities. The maximum disparity proved to be a very weak measure. Alternatives to the nuclear dummy (for example, the number of nuclear-armed adversaries) and the geographic distance measure were also entertained, but the specification here remains the strongest.

[38] This is in contrast to having lower minimum values correspond with higher barriers, while the "higher" values on the nuclear weapons dummy and percent of rivals that are non-contiguous still indicate higher barriers. With the inverted minimum capabilities ratio, "bigger" numbers represent worse ratios from the perspective of the state in question.

[39] It also may not be sufficient. See Chapter 2.

no nuclear-armed rivals to having one should have *exactly* the same effect as simultaneously doing *both* of the following: 1) increasing the percentage of non-contiguous rivals from 25% to this is the case and nor implausible that these value changes would have similar effects on policy outcomes. The barriers summary variable is therefore only one of the measures used to capture the presence and intensity of barriers to a state's ability to carry conventional war to its adversaries. Some of the models in Chapter 4 employ it, and others use individual variables (i.e., percentage of non-contiguous rivals). I also employ a number of security and geostrategy-related variables to test rival and related hypotheses, the sources for which are described in the next chapter. These variables, too, are fully incorporated into the SPFS database for use in future analyses.

Table 3.9 uses the t-test once more to explore how well high barriers to offensive conventional military operations against rivals covary with instances of HISS in the SPFS data. I've calculated the averages on these measures across all observations in the dataset. For the Barriers Summary variable, the average across the whole set is 0.43, and for HISS observations, the average is almost four times that, 1.62. This is a difference of 1.20–and recall that the measure only ranges from 0 to 3. This could be interpreted as HISS states being more likely to have a nuclear-armed rival *and* to have 20% more rivals non-contiguous, as compared to non-HISS states. When limiting the comparison only to those observations in which a state has any rivals at all makes the difference between HISS and non-HISS states smaller (0.84 greater). Still, this is double the average for non-HISS states that have at least one rival.

The percentage of non-contiguous rivals shows a similar trend. Whereas states on average are non-contiguous with around 9% of all of their rivals, HISS states have an average of

Table 3.9 HISS and Measures of Barriers to Conventional Operations Abroad

Variable	Observations	Average	N *DoF*	Significance
Barriers Summary				
	Full Set	0.43	5267	
	Non-HISS Observations	0.41	5208	
	HISS Observations	1.62	59	
	difference	+1.20	*5265*	t = -12.13
				p = 1.00
	Non-HISS | Any Rivals	0.80	2697	
	HISS | Any Rivals	1.64	58	
	difference	+0.84	*2753*	t = -7.14
				p = 1.00
% Non-Contiguous Rivals				
	Non-HISS Observations	9.2%	5208	
	HISS Observations	45.4%	59	
	difference	+36.2%	*5265*	t = -10.75
				p = 1.00
	Non-HISS | Any Rivals	17.7%	2697	
	HISS | Any Rivals	46.2%	58	
	difference	+28.4%	*2753*	t = -6.42
				p = 1.00
Capability Against Most Power Rival (inverse)				
	Non-HISS Observations	0.30	5208	
	HISS Observations	0.95	59	
	difference	+0.65	*5265*	t = -7.20
				p = 1.00
	Non-HISS | Any Rivals	0.58	2697	
	HISS | Any Rivals	0.96	58	
	difference	+0.39	*2753*	t = -3.61
				p = 0.99

45.4% of rivals non-contiguous. Again, the difference shrinks when the analysis is narrowed to leader-years in which a state has at least one rival. About 28% more of HISS states' rivals are not contiguous with the sponsoring state, as compared to non-HISS states that have any rivals. These differences in averages are statistically significant at the highest levels, and there is essentially a 0% chance that HISS states and non-HISS states "really" have the same average

percentage of non-contiguous rivals. Additionally, the relative capabilities index shows that HISS states have greater-than-average disparities vis-à-vis their most powerful rivals, both when controlling for and not controlling for rivalry itself.

Table 3.10 HISS and Rivals Measures

Number of Rivals			
Full Set	1.15	5267	
Non-HISS Observations	1.09	5208	
HISS Observations	6.80	59	
difference	+5.71	*5265*	t = -24.38
			p = 1.00
Non-HISS | Any Rivals	2.10	2697	
HISS | Any Rivals	6.91	58	
difference	+4.81	*2753*	t = -18.09
			p = 1.00
Number of Non-Contiguous Rivals			
Non-HISS Observations	0.29	5208	
HISS Observations	4.08	59	
difference	+3.80	*5265*	t = -24.39
			p = 1.00
Non-HISS | Any Rivals	0.56	2697	
HISS | Any Rivals	4.16	58	
difference	+3.60	*2753*	t = -16.98
			p = 1.00
Number of Contiguous Rivals			
Non-HISS Observations	0.80	5208	
HISS Observations	2.71	59	
difference	+1.91	*5265*	t = -12.62
			p = 1.00
Non-HISS | Any Rivals	1.54	2697	
HISS | Any Rivals	2.76	58	
difference	+1.22	*2753*	t = -7.65
			p = 1.00

It is interesting to note other correlations between measures of rivalry and HISS in the SPFS dataset (see Table 3.10). States have on average just under 7 rivals during the years in

which they are engaged in HISS. This is compared to the average in the set as a whole, which indicates that states typically have only a single rival in any given year. Even controlling for rivalry itself, HISS states have almost 6 additional rivals each year, as compared to non-HISS states and observations. Interestingly, most of this difference is indeed from non-contiguous rivals. Though HISS states have 1-2 additional contiguous rivals, they have an extra 3-4 *non*-contiguous rivals compared to their non-HISS counterparts. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the observation that non-HISS states are likely to have only 0.29 non-contiguous rivals and 0.80 contiguous rivals. This means that states in the data overall have a ratio of 1 to 2.5 non-contiguous to contiguous rivals. Put differently, you tend to have far more disputes with your neighbors than with those countries that don't share a border with you, by a factor of around 2.5. Conversely, HISS states have just under twice as many *non*-contiguous rivals (4.16) as contiguous ones (2.71). This is a factor of 5 off of "normal" states.

Table 3.11 HISS and Nuclear-Armed Adversaries (3-Year Moving Window)

Nuke Dummy	**HISS**	0 (No HISS)	1 (HISS)	Total
0 (No Nuclear Armed Rival)	Observed	**4,151**	**10**	**4,161**
	Column %	*79.7%*	*17.0%*	*79.0%*
	Expected	4,114	47	
1 (Nuclear Armed Rival)	Observed	**1,057**	**49**	**1,106**
	Column %	*20.3%*	*83.0%*	*21.0%*
	Expected	1,093	12	
Total		**5,208**	**59**	**5,267**
		100%	*100%*	*100%*

$\chi 2$ (1) = 138.49 p* = 1.000

Finally, a contingency table reveals that there is a very strong correlation between having a nuclear-armed rival and being a HISS state. The $\chi 2$ here indicates that these variables not independently distributed, and the expected frequencies and percentages in the table clearly demonstrate this. If these two variables were not related, one would expect only 12 observations to fall in the "HISS = 1, Nuclear Rival = 1" box. Instead, fully 49 values do, about four times as many as predicted. Furthermore, in only ten observations does HISS occur when states do not have nuclear-armed rivals. Of these observations, three belong to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s.[40]

Notes on Barriers to Conventional War Abroad in the SPFS Database

It should be noted that these figures are purely correlative and that reverse causality or endogeneity could easily be at play. States that adopt sponsorship policies may gain international attention and pick up new rivals after having implemented HISS. Anti-status quo activity like supporting terrorists and anti-regime activity in neighboring states might lead to a nation that has already adopted HISS to enter into a rivalry with nations like the United States, France, or Great Britain. These states are all nuclear-armed, and these new rivalries would also be with states that are outside of the sponsoring state's region, making non-contiguous rival measures increase as well. While the other measures are somewhat more difficult to make the reverse-causality claim for—a regime must enter power before implementing HISS, for example, which at least takes care of the temporal ordering when it comes to entry type—the international response to extremist policies may be driving the correlations found in this section.[41]

[40] This suggests that in the data, Israel was not considered a "rival" of Saudi Arabia from 1979-1988 in the FPY dataset. This means Saudi Arabia is not considered to have a "nuclear-armed adversary" in the decade following the Camp David Accords, pointing up to misspecifications in the rivalry data.

[41] States that do wish to adopt high intensity, anti-status quo policies may, of course, not be able to use institutionalized pathways to gain power, but this is not the same as saying HISS (the pattern of sponsorship itself) is *causing* a regime to *have entered* power through irregular means. Such issues of correlation are taken up in the case studies in Chapter 4, where the relationship between ideology and entry type is examined in controlled models.

Another shortcoming in the dataset is that while some of the factors theorized here are state-centric, there are other features that are dyadic and *k*-adic.[42] The way that barriers to conventional military operations theoretically operates on HISS should be for states to engage in HISS against those states that they are structurally limited from attacking directly. Indeed, HISS itself as a dependent variable is actually *k*-adic by definition. The State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship data does allow the researcher to access information about each supported non-state actor, via the non-state actor ID numbers. Inquiries into individual cases and years would yield results from the UCDP's data on these conflicts. However, the current set does not account for whether the HISS activity is directed against a certain set of countries (with the exception of the geography criterion), nor whether there were ideological mismatches between those countries, etc. Even if this were feasible for the scale and time of this project, it is not clear, given how rare and difficult to observe HISS actually is, what kind of statistical leverage that would give over the question. Rather, this recognition of the theory's implications further underscores the need for a multi-method approach.

VI. Causal Conditions and HISS Outcomes: A Medium-N Study

At this point, there is some initial evidence for the covariance with HISS onset to each of the individual factors in the theory. However, the theory in the previous chapter made the argument that a "perfect storm" of three jointly necessary causal factors needs to be present for states to implement HISS. This section offers an analysis in which the 1) entry type 2) international revolutionary score and 3) barriers to offensive conventional war are all jointly considered. This is a medium-N style test of my theory, in which each of the HISS cases identified in the DV section above is compared to the values of the three theorized causal factors.

[42] This point is taken up again and at greater length in Chapter 8 on Cuba.

This captures in a rough sense, though without the guarantee of statistical significance or a variety of control variables, whether the patterns I predict with my theory actually do appear in the empirical cases.

Adoption Events

Taken together, a simple examination of the cases of HISS and the values of the primary variables of interest suggests that there is something to be said for the theory outlined in the previous chapter, even while there is some indication of unreliability in certain measures. Table 3.12 uses the values from the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship database for all variables of interest in the year in which HISS was adopted, as the adoption of HISS is the political phenomenon that this dissertation seeks most to explain. There are 12 cases of HISS adoption captured in the data. Results from two cases (China and Libya) indicate that HISS was the policy in those states at the start of the data's temporal coverage, meaning they started on or before that year.

The theory as captured by the raw SPFS data is about 50% accurate. In six cases of adoption, there are non-zero values for the entry and ideology variables and at least two of the three barriers to offensive conventional military operations are present. For six other HISS-adopting states, the values of these factors at the moment of adoption vary rather more. Perhaps the most clearly out-of-step with the theory's prediction is the case of Saudi Arabia. There is no international revolutionary content to the constitution, and the entry of Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud into chief executive/kingship occurred through institutionalized means. Furthermore, there seems to be no reason that the country could not rely on its conventional military apparatus to take an armed struggle to its adversaries. The SPFS data notes that Saudi Arabia had no nuclear-armed rivals and no non-contiguous rivals, with only a small capabilities disadvantage against its

most powerful foes. Similarly, the United States' HISS adoption does not seem to be consistent with the Revolutionary Realities theory. Regular democratic elections bring in new heads of state through institutionalized processes, and the US Constitution is without any mention of the right to overthrow governments, allegiance to international entities, or global solidarity. The US did apparently face high barriers to power projection, with nuclear-armed rivals and a huge percentage of its rivals located at great geographic distance from the homeland. Still, when HISS was adopted under Reagan in 1982, only one of the theoretical factors was in place.

For some other "missed cases" however, the more likely explanation is *measurement error i*n the SPFS database itself, rather than a failure of the theoretical mechanisms. In three cases, this is partially the result of my least reliable measurement: that of international revolutionary ideology. In Iraq, for example, when HISS was adopted, the Ba'th party, led by Saddam Hussein, was in power. The Ba'th movement was heavily characterized by Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism; the word *Ba'th* itself means resurrection or renaissance. Historical accounts of this period in Iraqi history (namely the ascendancy of the Ba'th party in 1968 and Saddam Hussein's subsequent 1979 coup) suggest that the rhetoric of the leading party was more internationalist and revolutionary than a score of 0 would suggest (Bengio 1998; Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett 2001). More likely, the ideology espoused by Hussein government is similar to another Middle Eastern Ba'thist country of the era: Syria. Similarly, Zia ul-Haq's "Islamization" policy in Pakistan during his tenure as leader (1977-1988), though it focused most heavily on Sharia-based domestic policies, did envision Pakistan as the center of a pan-Islamic world (Haqqani 2010). Though it is accurate to say that there was no constitution in Pakistan that had international revolutionary content, additional knowledge about the case itself makes it unlikely that Pakistan in 1979 had an ideology that was wholly nationalist and status-quo. Once

Table 3.12 HISS Adoptions and Revolutionary Realities Variables from SPFS

Country	Leader	Year HISS Adopted	Int'l Revol. Score	Entry Type	Nuclear Rival?	Capabilities against Powerful Rivals	% Rivals Non-Contiguous
China	Mao Zedong	1975*	0.66	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage†	54%
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1977	5.37	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage†	100%
Eritrea	Isaias Afewerki	1999	3.69	**Institutionalized**	**No**	**Small Disadvantage**	**0%**
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1979	3.69	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	40%
Iraq	Saddam Hussein	1990	**0**	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage	38%
Libya	Muammar Qaddafi	1975*	1.70	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	33%
Pakistan	Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq	1979	**0**	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage	0%
Russia/USSR	Leonid Brezhnev	1980	1.56	**Institutionalized**	Yes	Small Advantage	71%
Saudi Arabia	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud	1985	**0**	**Institutionalized**	**No**	**Small Disadvantage**	**0%**
Sudan	Omar al-Bashir	1994	**0**	Non-Institutionalized	**No**	**Small Disadvantage**	**0%**
Syria	Hafez al-Assad	1984	1.70	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	17%
United States	Ronald Reagan	1982	**0**	**Institutionalized**	Yes	Small Disadvantage	94%

Unexpected variable value/case outcome

* HISS adopted in *or before* 1975, the start of the data period.

Table 3.13 HISS Adoptions and Revolutionary Realities Variables, Corrected

Country	Leader	Year HISS Adopted	Int'l Revol. Score	Entry Type	Nuclear Rival?	Capabilities against Powerful Rivals	% Rivals Non-Contiguous
China	Mao Zedong	1975	0.66	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage†	54%
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1977	5.37	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage†	100%
Eritrea	Isaias Afewerki	1999	3.69	*Independence, New Govt*	**No**	**Small Disadvantage**	**0%**
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1979	3.69	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	40%
Iraq	Saddam Hussein	1990	*1.70*	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage	38%
Libya	Muammar Qaddafi	1975	1.70	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	33%
Pakistan	Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq	1979	*>0*	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage	0%
Russia/USSR	Leonid Brezhnev	1980	1.56	**Institutionalized**	Yes	Small Advantage	71%
Saudi Arabia	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud	1985	**0**	**Institutionalized**	*Yes*	**Small Disadvantage**	**0%**
Sudan	Omar al-Bashir	1994	*2.74*	Non-Institutionalized	*Yes*	*Large Disadvantage*	*>0%*
Syria	Hafez al-Assad	1984	1.70	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	17%
United States	Ronald Reagan	1982	*>0*	**Institutionalized**	Yes	Small Disadvantage	94%

Corrected value
Unexpected variable value/case outcome

again, it appears that the measurement instrument for ideology is what is lacking, rather than the empirical correlation between an internationalist, revolutionary ideology and HISS onset.

In the Sudanese case, there are a number of measurement-related anomalies that affect the values in Table 3.12 above. The rivalries data that the SPFS database draws on does not consider the United States to be a rival of Sudan until the year 1998. This is somewhat strange as Sudan was placed on the US State Department's list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1993. If we assume, then, that the United States *is* a rival of Sudan, the value of all three of the barriers to conventional offensive military operations changes. The US is nuclear-armed, it shares no border with Sudan, and the Sudanese military would be at a large disadvantage, not a small one, vis-à-vis the US armed forces. Additionally, Sudan's constitution was suspended from 1989-1997; the constitution adopted in 1998 had an international revolutionary ideology score of 2.74. However, as the case in Chapter 6 will describe in more detail, Omar al-Bashir's government embraced a pan-Islamic ideology, with a great deal of revolutionary content, by late 1989. Though it took some years for this to be reflected in a constitution, it is misleading to say that the Sudanese government had not espoused any kind of international revolutionary ideology prior to 1998. Thus the "revolutionariness" of the governing in 1994, the year it adopted HISS, is in reality, though not in the data, greater than 1.

There are a few other points worth making about the codings in these tables. The first is that governments of new states are, in the Archigos data, coded as institutionalized entry. However, Isias Afewerki in Eritrea is in many ways more reminiscent of a 1959 Castro or a 1949 Mao than, say, a 1964 Leonid Brezhnev, in terms of his mode of entry to power and the governing institutions surrounding him. In Table 3.13, which corrects some of the errors

discussed above,[94] I have noted that the leadership under which HISS was adopted in Eritrea is the first government of a newly independent nation. I also make the case in the Conclusion chapter that the United States executive branch, under Ronald Reagan, has a distinctly internationalist, moral ideology that is broadly consistent with my research's definition of "international revolutionary."[95] Finally, it is more accurate to code Saudi Arabia as having a nuclear-armed rival in 1985: Israel. These changes do not affect the final determination on whether their cases are consistent with my theory; they continue not to be. However, in the case of Eritrea and the United States, it brings two of the three factors online.

Table 3.13 incorporates the changes to the ideology variable and, in Sudan's case, includes the United States as a key rival, the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS adoption fares rather better. Because this exercise is concerned with examining my theory with respect to the empirical record, not merely examining the data themselves, I privilege the results of Table 3.13.[96] With these corrections, eight out of the twelve cases are fully consistent with the theory's hypothesis that all three factors must be present for a state to embrace a policy of high-intensity sponsorship of armed non-state actors abroad. Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Eritrea, and the United States all appear to work against my theory of three jointly necessary conditions. This ultimately brings up the success rate to 66%. Still, in three of these four "missed" cases, two of the three theorized causal factors are present. Furthermore, if one removes the two Cold War

[94] These changes are *not* made in the SPFS database itself, as this would clearly bias my analysis in the following chapter.

[95] The neo-conservative call for "roll-back" in particular is distinctly anti-status quo. See Chapter 10.

[96] Tables 3.12 and 3.13 are meant to be a medium-N style cut at the Revolutionary Realities theory overall. A medium-N approach provides space for looking at a moderate number of cases and assessing the values of relevant factors (see e.g. Gerring and Cojocaru 2016). This would certainly include filling in erroneous data as I do here, which is why I focus on the results of Table 3.13 as final. However, tampering with the data for the large-N analysis of the complete dataset, based on the medium-N exercise, is inappropriate (see fn. 44).

superpowers, which may well have different causal trajectories, given their superpower status and the inherently global reach of their security interests, 80% of the cases of adoption are consistent with my theory.

All HISS Observations and Expected HISS Observations in the SPFS Data

In Table 3.14, I have collected all of the cases of HISS and the years and leaders during which the policy was active. Note that values for variables are averaged across all years in which HISS was observed, within each leader. The exception is for nuclear-armed rivals (any nuclear-armed opponent during the HISS period means that those years are a "yes") and that of the Sudanese ideology score, which simply uses the score of the 1998 constitution for the entire period.[97] Table 3.14 does not, however, contain the 'corrected' values described in Table 3.20, as I am once again summarizing only what appears in the SPFS data.

The table below also includes the leader-years in which HISS was most likely to occur, given the values on the three key independent variables, but when HISS was not observed. These are observations for which all of the following are true: ideology score was greater than 1; entry was non-institutionalized; the state had a nuclear rival; it had a non-zero disadvantage against key rivals; and at least 1% of rivals were non-contiguous. These thresholds were necessarily chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but future users of the data set could easily set their own values.

A key similarity emerges from above the list of so-called 'barking cats'—i.e. observations that are high on IVs but do not exhibit the expected DV. They are overwhelmingly Latin American nations: Ecuador; Guatemala; Haiti; Nicaragua; Panama; and Peru. The only

[97] It is not clear that diving the 2.74 score by five, the number of years in which HISS was observed in Sudan, would yield a meaningful value. In contrast, the percentage of rivals that are non-contiguous with a nation can vary over time and an average is a reasonable snapshot of that value.

Table 3.14 Observed and Predicted Cases of HISS from SPFS Data

Country	*Leader*	*Years*	*Int'l Revol. Score*	*Entry Type*	*Nuclear Rival?*	*Capabilities against Powerful Rivals*	*% Rivals Non-Contig.*
HISS States and Leaders							
China	Mao Zedong	1975-1976	0.66	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage†	49%
	Deng Xiaoping	1982-1983	3.49	Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage	48%
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1977; 1979-80	5.37	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage†	100%
Eritrea	Isaias Afewerki	1999; 2002	3.69	Institutionalized	No	Small Disadvantage	0%
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1979-1981	3.69	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	38%
Iraq	Saddam Hussein	1990	0	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage	38%
Libya	Muammer Qaddafi	1975-1991	1.70	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	38%
Pakistan	Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq	1979	0	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Small Disadvantage	0%
Russia/USSR	Leonid Brezhnev	1980	1.56	Institutionalized	Yes	Parity (+)	71%
Saudi Arabia	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud	1985-1987	0	Institutionalized	No	Small Disadvantage	0%
Sudan	Omar al-Bashir	1994-1999	2.74	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	50%
Syria	Hafez al-Assad	1984; 1988-91	1.70	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	17%
United States	Ronald Reagan	1982-1988	0	Institutionalized	Yes	Parity (-)	93%
	George H. W. Bush	1989-1992	0	Institutionalized	Yes	Parity	96%
Non-HISS States and Leaders, Predicted to be HISS***							
Ecuador	Poveda Burbano	1978-1979	2.98	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	50%
Guatemala	Rios Montt	1982-1983	4.44	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	33%
	Mejia Victores	1983-1984	4.44	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	33%
	Leon Carpio	1992-1994	3.56	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	50%
Haiti	Raoul Cedras	1991-1994	3.02	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	68%
Nicaragua	Daniel Ortega	1987-1988	3.56	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	33%

Table 3.14, continued

Panama	Torrijos Herrera	1976	1.19	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	100%
	Manuel Noriega	1987	1.19	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	100%
Peru	Morales Bermudez	1979-1980	3.94	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	33%
Yugoslavia	Josip Broz Tito	1980	3.94	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	33%

*** Identified based on: Ideology score greater than 1, non-institutionalized entry, having a nuclear rival, having any (not necessarily large) disadvantage against key rivals, and at least 1% of rivals non-contiguous.

other nation that might have been expected to adopt HISS in the Revolutionary Realities theory as captured in the SPFS dataset was Yugoslavia under Tito in 1980. Otherwise, only leftist regimes in militarily weak Latin American nations during the Cold War that are high on all three factors theorized in the previous chapter.[98] However, with the exception of Cuba, Latin American nations did not sponsor non-state actors in large numbers across the world as a central pillar of their foreign policies. This result is of special interest and is taken up again in Chapter 9.

VII. Conclusion

One of the great challenges to testing any theoretical proposition about sponsorship patterns is the historical lack of suitable data for controlled, cross-national comparisons. My own central critique of the existing literature on sponsorship is that it does not consistently predict sponsorship outcomes over time and space. However, such analysis has not generally been possible, as most sources of cross-national data relevant to the subject do not conceive of sponsorship as a general policy choice made by the leaders of nation-states. This research therefore presents a new dataset on patterns of international sponsorship, the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset. It is, at present, the only dataset that allows the researcher to examine and compare the sponsorship patterns of individual states over time.

These data substantiate the claims made in Chapter 1 regarding HISS. HISS is, first and foremost, rare. It occurs in only 60-80 observations out of the 6,000+ for which complete data are available; only 12-14 states have engaged in such a high-level sponsorship policy since 1975. Though some amount of sponsorship is relatively more common (82 of the 164 states in the

[98] This may well be the result of "Marxist noise" driving up ideology scores. See Appendix B.11 for further discussion of this bias and how it is actually good news when it comes to my measure and analysis in Chapter 4.

international system sponsor at least one group, somewhere, at some time or another), these states tend to support between 1 to 2 groups, don't support terrorists, and usually keep their sponsorship within region. By several measures, HISS states are engaged in a more intense and different kind of sponsorship. Even when compared to the subset of those 80 states that sponsor, HISS states sponsor more violent groups, they offer more significant material support to groups, and they are engaged in sponsorship outside of their region at disproportionate levels. The SPFS is able to detect this important pattern of sponsorship.

I also introduced measures of the concepts relevant to this dissertation's theory. One of the broader contributions of this project is the creation of a unique, innovative quantitative measure for state ideology. Though there are some shortcomings, it is, to my knowledge, the only instance of a researcher leveraging quantified constitutional content to measure political ideology. I then proceeded to demonstrate that each of these relevant factors (Entry Type, International Revolutionariness, and Barriers to Conventional War) is disproportionately associated with HISS, as opposed to non-HISS, states. Furthermore, the combination of all three variables gets many of the cases of HISS (66-80%) "right" in the medium-N style analysis where I was able to correct for some of the more obvious measurement errors.

This introduction to the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset has provided merely the first of several cuts at the question of "Under what conditions do states adopt HISS?" As in any theory and novel set of measurements, there are a number of misses. This dissertation will therefore use the next chapter to apply a more sophisticated quantitative approach to the relationship between HISS and my variables of interest, as well as competing explanations. The purpose of this analysis is to provide suggestive evidence that the Revolutionary Realities theory is a valid account of HISS across time and space and that it is superior to existing accounts, such

as they are. I find that, with a few basic controls and the right modeling structure, my theory vastly out-performs alternative explanations to HISS and accounts for even more cases than do the bivariate and naïve correlations approach in this chapter.

Chapter 4: Revolutionary Realities vs. Alternative Explanations: Statistical Analysis with the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset

I. Introduction

This chapter is the second of two chapters devoted to cross-national, quantitative empirical assessment of the Revolutionary Realities theory of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors. Using an original dataset on the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship, I assess the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 to determine whether or not cross-national evidence is consistent with the theory of HISS adoption advanced in this dissertation. The dataset and primary measures associated with the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS were discussed in Chapter 3. In this chapter, I test both my own and the alternative hypotheses from competing explanations in the literature to assess whether my theory performs better than existing scholarly accounts.

The primary purpose of the analysis in this chapter is not to convince readers that my theory is a completely valid, causal account of HISS adoption. Rather, this portion of the dissertation serves to demonstrate that my theory of Revolutionary Realities is a plausible theoretical account of variation in HISS outcomes on the basis of new, original cross-national evidence on sponsorship. It offers one type of evidence and one type of analysis in support of Chapter 2's theory of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors. And, perhaps even more importantly, I seek to demonstrate that my theory offers an account that is more consistently supported by cross-national evidence than are existing, alternative explanations.

Using several different types of models appropriate for the SPFS data, I find that my Revolutionary Realities theory is indeed supported by statistical evidence. The triple interaction term of entry, ideology, and high barriers to conventional operations abroad is a statistically significant predictor of HISS outcomes across three different modeling approaches: random effects models; General Estimating Equations (GEE) models; and hazard models. I further find that many of the alternative hypotheses derived from the literature systematically fail to account for HISS in cross-national analysis. Explanations that emphasize the importance of radical leadership are not consistently born out in the data. Models that test these revolutions hypothesis are also highly sensitive to the inclusion of my own theory's variables—international revolutionary ideology score and entry type. Hypotheses that theorize that rivalry between nations drives HISS are supported in the data. However, there is some indication that the capabilities and geographic distribution of those rivals mitigate the correlation between sheer numbers of rivals and HISS outcomes. Absolute capabilities seem to be associated with HISS in the opposite direction: stronger states adopt HISS overall. Other material resource constraints measures perform only slightly less poorly. In short, though some of the alternative hypotheses are supported in the data, the Revolutionary Realities theory consistently outperforms competing hypothesis when it comes to correlating with HISS outcomes across time and space.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the following section, I re-introduce and explain my operationalization of the hypotheses about HISS from the Revolutionary Realities account and the competing explanations in the literature. In section three, I outline my methodology and model selection choices. There are some limitations and possible sources of error and bias in my dataset, which I address by drawing on best practices in the literature for rare events binary data. In the fourth section, I go on to test the hypotheses from the radical leadership and social

revolution explanations, and then the pure geostrategy explanations. I also test the individual factors from the Revolutionary Realities account and compare the variables most consistent with my logic with similar ones from alternative accounts. Section five tests the complete Revolutionary Realities theory, using both panel data models and hazard models. The final section concludes by summarizing the results from all models and evaluates the hypotheses' performance in the SPFS data.

II. Hypotheses: Revolutionary Realities and the Alternatives

Revolutionary Realities

The primary variables of interest in the Revolutionary Realities theory of high-intensity state sponsorship were introduced in the previous chapter. This dissertation argues that there are three, mutually-reinforcing necessary conditions for HISS adoption. A state whose leadership has 1) entered power via a non-institutionalized route 2) espoused an international revolutionary ideology and 3) faces high barriers to executing a conventional war against its enemies will adopt a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship. The state will do so as a result of the way the three variables interact with one another. New regimes are, for example, more likely to rely on their ideologies and place loyalists in charge of a foreign policy apparatus. Leader's preferences, influenced by ideology, raise the stakes of conflicts, reduce the apparent legitimacy of many regimes abroad, and make an offensive posture more desirable. If, under these circumstances, high barriers make executing offensive policies with a conventional military infeasible, sponsoring non-state actors to undermine, overthrow, or damage the governments of foreign rivals is an appealing solution that regimes are able to adopt through their loyalist-controlled foreign policy apparatus.

This is summarized in hypothesis RR 1, the sole and primary hypothesis of my research:

RR 1: The three conditions of non-institutionalized leadership entry to power, government espousal of an international revolutionary ideology, and the presence of high structural barriers to conventional military operations abroad against rivals are jointly necessary for the adoption of a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors (HISS).

Sufficiency corollary: States in which all three necessary conditions obtain will adopt HISS.

Thus the central theory of this research does not argue that a single *one* of these three factors is sufficient to lead to HISS. Instead, I argue that all three must be present.

This is tested by interacting all three individual measures in models. The resulting "triple-interaction term" is the term of interest in those models, and the lower-order terms are included and controlled for when this measure is used. Further, I also employ a gross indicator dummy variable called "RR Dummy" that simply identifies whether all three factors have non-zero values. The latter is more naïve but is potentially useful as a means of reinforcing findings from the triple interaction itself.

I also test the individual measures of the Revolutionary Realities variables. These are used to assess, especially in comparison to alternative explanations, whether the logic behind my

RRA: States with leaders that have entered power through non-institutionalized pathways are more likely to adopt HISS.

RRB: States that embrace an international revolutionary ideology are more likely to adopt HISS.

RRC: States that face high barriers to offensive conventional military operations against rivals are more likely to adopt HISS.

Also:
RRC1: States with a high percentage of non-contiguous rivals,
RRC2: that have a nuclear-armed rival or
RRC3: are out-classed against key rivals are more likely to adopt HISS.

theory as summarized above is *more* consistent with the SPFS data. My theory draws on insights from this literature and identifies factors that are often similar, but it nonetheless operates according to different logics. This means it is worth directly comparing the performance of my conceptualization of a phenomenon with existing conceptualizations found in the literature. If my variables perform better than those which represent competing explanations, that is yet another kind of support, albeit partial, for my take on HISS.

Alternative Theory #1: Social Revolutions and Radical Leadership

I test the Revolutionary Realities theory against two competing sets of hypotheses from the literature on sponsorship. Though there are very few explicit theories regarding the onset of *high-intensity* sponsorship, two types of hypotheses were extracted from the review in Chapter 2. The first alternative explanation for HISS adoption is that revolutions bring radical leaders to power who ultimately enact their preferred policy. If a state has recently experienced a social revolution or is led by leaders who are radicals or extremists, they are likely to attempt to export that revolution and adopt a HISS policy to achieve that end. A corollary to this explanation and one that is theoretically interesting though not frequently advanced directly is that democracies will not be likely to adopt HISS. This alternative theory regarding social revolutions and radical leadership, articulated in Chapter 2, generated the following hypotheses:

SR 1: States that have recently experienced social revolutions are more likely to adopt HISS than states that have not.
SR 2: States with a leader recently ousted by domestic popular protest or insurgent groups are more likely to adopt HISS.
SR 3: Non-democracies are more likely to adopt HISS than democracies.

The first hypothesis, SR 1, relies on the conception of "social revolution" from the comparative politics revolutions literature. To assess if an ongoing or recent revolutionary event is associated with HISS adoption, I use Goldstone (ed.) *The Encyclopedia on Political Revolutions* (1998) to determine which political events qualify as revolutions.[1] This is a binary variable. For each year of a revolution, and for a period of five years following the revolutionary event, the Goldstone revolutions indicator scores a 1. All other years are 0. In an alternative specification, I consider all years of the regime that enters power during these revolutionary events to be "1"s, and any subsequent leaders are coded 0. These data are only available through 1998, so analyses using them run from 1975-1998.

SR 2 uses native Archigos data about the means via which a leader leaves office to capture another version of the radical leadership theory of HISS. There are a number of political events that may be associated with a leader's departure in the Archigos data on leadership tenure. Two of these – "Leader lost power through domestic popular protest" and "Leader removed by domestic rebel forces" – are quite plausibly associated with the entry of radically different leadership.[2] Importantly, there is also the likelihood that such coalitions—popular protest movements and rebel military forces—contain competing factions and might engage in ideological outbidding as part of that competition. This is precisely the domestic dynamic that proponents of the "radical leaders" theorists, à la Sadri (1997) argue leads to the violent export of revolution. While these events are less clearly radical or revolutionary, as compared to the

[1] Goldstone (Ed.) 1998. Though the work is on "political revolutions," Goldstone's book contains a wide variety of events. Though such events are included in the SPFS data for potential future use, popular social protest movements and failed revolts are not considered revolutions for the purposes of this project. I emphasize revolutionary events as opposed to protest movements to help avoid equating revolutions in which power actually changed hands to those political movements that were successfully put down by leadership or lead to reforms through existing institutions. Fortunately, Goldstone's categorizing clearly indicates which revolutionary events are more consistent with the social revolution conceptualization in the literature.

[2] Goemans 2009b, 2-3.

Goldstone social revolutionary events, it is quite plausibly related to radical leadership. It is another way of conceptualizing the kinds of extreme political breaks that lead to a polity in which revolutionary export becomes the law of the land.

This "revolutionary overthrow" measure is a binary indicator. In the country-leader-year data set, for five years after a popular protest or civil war ends the tenure of a national leader, this variable is coded "1." In all other years, it is coded as 0. As in the Goldstone indicator, an alternative approach coded each observation for the new leader's entire tenure as 1. This would capture any long-term effect of revolutionary overthrow on foreign policy, although the theoretical connection to the literature is somewhat weaker with the expanded version than is the connection with the five-year period version. Recall that enthusiasm for export of the revolution is theorized by many as a 'stage' of the revolutionary process itself, which does not typically last for decades into the new regime.

Finally, the third SR hypothesis tests the theory that regime type is the primary determinant of HISS outcomes. This hypothesis uses the Boix Miller Rosato binary indicator for democracy and non-democracy.[3] I do not include the "rogue regime" measure from the rogue state literature because of endogeneity concerns; support for terrorism is some of the determinants of the rogue state index (Caprioli and Trumbore 2006). It is worth noting that the majority of states that have adopted HISS are non-democracies, and my own theory's entry-type occurs rarely, if ever, in democratic states, so I do expect some overlap in results from entry type and this variable.

Alternative Theory #2: Tools of Geostrategy

[3] Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013. I prefer this to the more common Polity IV measure of regime type (see Marshall and Jaggers 2002) because a) I find the authors' critiques of Polity IV convincing and b) I am interested in a binary concept and would ultimately be reducing the Polity IV measure to a binary based on an arbitrary threshold.

The second set of alternative hypotheses is from the international relations literature, which sees sponsorship as a geostrategic tool to promote a country's security. States with limited material capabilities will rely on sponsorship, rather than their own militaries, to deal with conflict. There is also security-oriented account that says non-state actor sponsorship is the result of international rivalries. This leads to three material capabilities (MC) hypotheses and one rivals (RIV) hypothesis, for which a few different measurements will be used.

MC1: States with lower absolute military capacity adopt HISS.
MC2: States with lower military capacity then their rivals adopt HISS.
MC3: States experiencing military overstretch adopt HISS.
RIV1: States with high numbers of rivals adopt HISS.

The capabilities-related hypotheses are derived from the COW Capabilities dataset. The primary measure for MC1 is the "National Capabilities Index," which is an index generated from six indicators of national material capabilities.[4] Alternative measures are individual components of this index, namely military expenditures and the number of standing forces. To test MC2, this measure combines information from the FPY rivalries dataset to derive (log) capabilities ratios between rivals, just as the Barriers Summary variable does. Whereas the RR theory uses the minimum capabilities ratio in the barriers to conventional war summary variable, I test the proposition that the *average* capabilities ratios are correlated with HISS outcomes. The logic here is that states that are systematically outmatched again enemies (even if the states themselves are not necessarily that weak) need to rely on HISS. Because these measures are once again

[4] These factors are: 1) iron and steel production 2) military expenditures 3) number of military personnel 4) primary energy consumption 5) total population of the country and 6) total urban population. See Singer et. al. 1972 for a detailed explanation of how this index is calculated.

aggregated by year, the SPFS database contains the average, maximum, minimum, and mean deviation of these ratios for each year to provide robustness checks on potential biases in aggregation methods.

Hypothesis MC3 uses data from the Correlates of War project on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (Kenwick et. al. 2013). The primary operationalization of this variable is the number of MIDs in which a state is involved in a given year. Like several other sources used to build the SPFS dataset, the MID data has a dyadic structure. Thus observations were collapsed to the country-year level. The average, maximum, and minimum hostility levels for the year are included for use in future research, though they do not factor into the models in this chapter. Additional variables measure the number of disputes in which the state was the initiator, the number of disputes in which MIDs were initiated against it, and the total number of *new* disputes. Data represent totals for each country year.

Hypothesis RIV1 uses the same rivalry data as does the Barriers to Conventional War Summary described in the previous chapter. It is based on the Findley, Piazza, and Young (2012) data, which is part of the literature that suggests that sponsorship is a feature of international rivalry. It is only the number of rivals that is used to predict HISS adoption in this alternative theory. This suggests that the states with the most rivals adopt HISS, states with fewer rivals would sponsor but not reach HISS thresholds, and states with no rivals would not be involved in sponsorship of all. Several different rival geographic distributions are also examined.

Controls

The SPFS database includes a large number of potential controls and additional variables of interest. The models in the following section only use four controls, apart from time and

duration terms as described in Methodology below. These include: the annual (log) population,[5] (log) country area,[6] a regional indicator for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and a dummy variable for the Cold War. These last two are included on the basis of the demonstrations in Chapter 3, where it was found that a disproportionate amount of sponsorship activity was based in the Middle East/North African region and took place during the period of the Cold War. Logged measures of country size and population are standard controls in the quantitative literature on political violence. Occasional results from naïve models that omit controls can be found in certain Appendices (C.3, Model A). The Table 4.1 offers a summary of the hypotheses and the variables used to test them.[7] The codebook in Appendix A summarizes all of the variables employed here and gives further coding and source information about all of the data used in the models in this chapter.

[5] From Correlations of War National Capabilities Index data.

[6] From the Cross-National Time Series Dataset (Banks and Wilson 2015). Because GDP and GNP are not available for all country-years, and in particular are likely correlated with revolutionary events or, dare I use the term, "rogue" statehood, I elected not to include the CNTS economic measures as controls in my analysis.

[7] Note that none of the models in this chapter use lagged independent variables. Though this is technically a time-series cross-section set, in which lagged variables are often used to account for over time correlations and/or to use past data to account for present events, there are theoretical reasons why the most important independent variables do not make sense to 'lag.' This theory is overwhelmingly concerned with a particular kind of political moment, that is, the transition from one regime or administration to the next, and these temporal aspects of the theory are simply inadequately modeled by times series techniques. The point of lagging variables is to ensure that the theorized cause happens before the effect under study. To achieve this end, however, this dissertation opts to employ a multi-method approach, rather using the best quantitative causal inference approaches available for observational data based on the researcher's availability of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each approach in the context of the current project. Furthermore, given that the theory explicitly creates room for important interactions among the posited causal factors, the issues of temporal ordering and causality are not readily solved even if it can be shown that it is, in fact, last year's figures that drive this year's policies.

In any event, it is not clear which of the measures should even theoretically be lagged. Entry remains constant throughout the panel, and we have already seen how the timing of constitutional adoption may vary with respect to the timing of the embrace of ideology itself. Security and rivalry-based information may be suitable for this, but it is already known that changes in regime bring about changes in international allegiances and the parties involved in disputes (see Chapter 3, section five). Thus lagging rivalry data does little to disentangle the causal story about mode of entry to power, the ideology of the country's leadership, and how international pressures combine to drive HISS. What these analyses aim to do is demonstrate that these sorts of things—HISS, international revolutionary ideology, non-institutionalized entry to power, and high barriers to offensive operations against rivals abroad—all seem to "travel together." I consciously employ the language of correlation throughout this chapter, as drawing direct causal inference is at worst inappropriate and at best specious, given these data.

Table 4.1 Hypotheses and Variable Operationalization

Hypothesis ID	Variable
Social Revolution/Radical Leaders	
SR1	Social revolution
SR2	Revolutionary overthrow of previous government
SR3	Regime Type: Non-Democracy
Material Capabilities: Absolute Capacity	
MC1	Military Expenditures
	Military Personnel
	Military Capabilities Index
Material Capabilities: Relative Capacity	
MC2	Average Capabilities Ratios
MC3	Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes
Geostrategy: Rivals	
RIV1	Total Number of Rivals
	Number of Contiguous Rivals
	Number of Extra-Regional Rivals
	Number of Non-Contiguous Rivals
Revolutionary Realities	
RR 1	All RR Dummy Variable Entry*Int'l Revol Score*Barriers Summ.
RRA	Mode of Entry
RRB	International Revolutionary Ideology Score
RRC	Barriers Summary
RRC1	% Non-Contiguous Rivals
RRC2	Nuclear-armed Rival
RRC3	Relative Capabilities, Minimum

III. Methodology

The country-leader-year SPFS dataset is an unbalanced panel dataset with a binary dependent variable which indicates whether HISS activity is present or absent. The primary analyses for these data therefore employ modeling techniques suitable for longitudinal, panel data with categorical dependent variables. This includes three different approaches. The first is the random effects model with time cubes to model temporal dependency. Secondly, I use

General Estimating Equations (GEE), a semi-parametric approach similar to random and fixed effects models but which relies on less stringent assumptions about the data. Finally, I use hazards models to examine HISS adoption events in particular, rather than HISS activity per se. This last approach is most closely related to my theory, which is explicitly interested in the causes of HISS onset. However, there are some data limitations on my ability to use best practices with hazard models, which is why these should be seen a supplementary to the random effects and GEE models. In addition, I occasionally employ more naïve models, like simple logits or error-clustered logits.

The first model type and the one that appears most frequently in the main text of this dissertation is the random effects model. Researchers with country year (very similar to my leader-year) panel data often use either a fixed effects or random effects model, which rely on maximum likelihood estimation procedures.[8] Random effects modeling takes into account both within-panel and across-panel variation, which means that unlike fixed effects models, panels in which there is no variation on the dependent variable (in this case, leaders that never adopt HISS) are considered in estimation. Given that this is one of the most common and familiar approaches to panel data in the international relations literature, I begin my analysis with these.

Though random effects models are useful for modeling the non-independence of observations within a given leader panel, they do not explicitly model any kind of temporal dependence. This is to say that a random effects model would assume that Castro-1976 is no more or less independent from Castro-1975 than it is from a Castro-1995 observation. This is an unlikely assumption in theory, as states tend to have a certain foreign policy for a period of time,

[8] William Greene. 2002. *Econometric Analysis, Fifth Edition*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Long, J. Scott and Jeremy Freese. 2006. *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables using Stata*. College Station, Texas: Stata Press. Also, Sophia Rabe-Heshketh and Anders Skrondal. 2008. *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling using Stata*. College Station, Texas: Stata Press.

and it is clearly not the case in the data, where HISS does indeed tend to occur in short, recognizable spells. Thus the researcher must make an effort to account for time and duration dependencies.[9] If one examines the SPFS data, there is a clear correlation with HISS policies over time. In particular, whether you had a policy of HISS last year is a fairly good predictor of whether you've adopted a policy of HISS this year. Of the 59 HISS observations in the data, 46 of them (78%) took place a) in the year immediately following another HISS year or b) a leader's entry into the dataset.[10]

This temporal dependence is modeled in the random effects models by including the duration since the last "1" event as terms in the regression itself.[11] I include *t* (the duration since the last HISS event or since the beginning of the panel), as well as t^2 and t^3 in the model. This is the approach recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010) for researchers who are concerned about the presence of time dependency in their binary outcome data, but who do not have strong theoretical priors on the structure of that dependency. As a robustness check, I use time splines as suggested by earlier work from Beck, Katz, and Tucker.[12] Results are substantively quite similar across these approaches.

[9] See Beck, Nathaniel, Katz, Jonathan N., and Richard Tucker (1998). "Taking Time Seriously in Binary Time Series–Cross-Section Analysis." American Journal of Political Science 42(4):1260-1288; Beck, Nathaniel. 2001. "Time Series-Cross Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science 4*, 271-93; and David B. Carter and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. "Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data." *Political Analysis 18*(3), 271-292.

[10] This is either the year 1975—the first observation for leaders that came to power before 1975 and were still in power by that year—*or* the leader's own first year in power, if they came to office 1976-2004. See Appendix C.9 for a table of *t* and number of observations.

[11] I make grateful use of Tucker, Richard (1999). *BTSCS: A Binary Time-Series–Cross-Section Data Analysis Utility*. Version 4.0.4. Cambridge, MA: Harvard. http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~rtucker/programs/btscs/btscs.html

[12] See Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998 and Luke Keele. 2008. *Semiparametric Regression for the Social Sciences*. West Sussex, Eng.: Wiley and Sons Ltd. Additionally, a clarifying exchange about the strengths and drawbacks of these two approaches can be found in *Political Analysis* Vol. 18, No. 3.

Even when carefully accounting for temporal dependence, the random effects panel logits discussed thusfar rely on a number of assumptions about the data that are not likely to obtain in the SPFS dataset. This is partly because the dependent variable takes the value of "1" in a mere 59 observations out of the several thousand being tested.[13] I therefore also adopt a Generalized Estimating Equations model. Though similar to such methods, this approach has some statistical advantages over the more common fixed effects, random effects, and mixed or population-averaged models. It is only a semi-parametric estimation procedure, based on "quasi-likelihoods" rather than maximum likelihood calculations. It is increasingly used on data with clustered observations (for example, a longitudinal set with multiple observations on one subject at multiple times) with categorical dependent variables. It is particularly useful because the researcher is not required to make strong assumptions about the distribution of the outcome variable (which can be difficult to do with rare events like HISS) or the subject-specific parameter, as fixed effects or random effects models do.[14] Rather, it treats variation within subjects as a "nuisance parameter" and attempts to assess population-level effects on the dependent variable of the model inputs (independent variables). Since this dissertation is interested in the universal effect of the variable of interest on the outcome—i.e. various potential causal factors on HISS activity—this marginal or population effect is of primary theoretical interest.

[13] There is a "Rare Events" logit available from King (see Gary King and Langche Zeng. 2001. "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data." *Political Analysis 9*, 137–163. Their method helps to correct the bias in logistic regressions towards event probability estimates that are consistently too small in binary outcome data that represent relatively rare events. However, that approach is not currently compatible with the triple-interactions that I use to test my primary hypothesis. Results of rare events logits from the single-factor tests, however, can be found in Appendix C for a number of the tests in section four. They support the same substantive conclusions about the hypotheses in this chapter as do the models and analysis presented in the main text.

[14] The likelihood calculations in random effects models rely on the assumption that the subject-specific term is drawn from a normal distribution, and it is not at all clear that the individual propensity for HISS adoption is distributed normally. Indeed, it is particularly *unlikely* to be the case when the outcome itself is relatively rare in the data, as it clearly is in this case.

Furthermore, GEE estimates tend to be more consistent and can help when there are many unobserved sources of dependence in the outcome variables.[15] Estimates of the standard errors in particular, since they are based on empirical values derived from the data rather than modeled values, tend to be more accurate. This is especially the case when there are several hundred panels, several thousand observations, and observations are made at regular intervals. Since my data has 897 panels, are based on 5,268 observations, and each observation is measured annually, the GEE technique is likely to perform quite well.[16]

Finally, with these types of models, the researcher is able to assigns a temporal correlation structure, thereby determining the source of within-panel correlation without necessarily assuming a parameter drawn from a particular distribution. In a random or fixed effects model, within-panel dependence of errors is generated by a subject-specific α term, which is either a constant (fixed effects) or is drawn from a normal distribution (random effects, see fn. 14). However, GEE accommodates other correlations which the researcher can choose based on her knowledge of the likely, theoretical sources of correlation in the data—in this case, both within-subject and temporal.

For the GEE analyses in this section, I use a binomial logit model (because I have a binary dependent variable). Since I have annually observed panels, I specified an autoregressive correlation of one period (AR1). This means that observations in 1998 are likely to be correlated

[15] Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008.

[16] See James. Hanley et. al. 2003 "Statistical Analysis of Correlated Data Using Generalized Estimating Equations: An Orientation" *American Journal of Epidemiology 154*(4), 364-375. See also Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008 and Long and Freese 2006. One important drawback of the GEE approach is that, because it does not rely on maximum likelihood calculation, standard, comparative measures of model fit are unavailable. Though Wald statistics still apply, the likelihood ratio test is not valid on the quasi-likelihoods that GEE models calculate. This means that I cannot necessarily say that entire models with my variables of interest perform better than entire models with the variables of interest from competing hypotheses. The results in this chapter are meant to be broadly suggestive, providing a second, deeper cut at the question of the causes of HISS as compared to the previous chapter's final portion.

with observations in 1997, assuming that the panel (i.e. the leader) is the same. The single period means that I believe the effect to be attenuated over time. The observation from two years is correlated with the current year's observation *only through* the correlation with the previous year. If 1998 is similar to 1996, it is only because 1997 was similar to 1996. This is a standard assumption when dealing with longitudinal data. This is not only theoretically consistent with my assertion that HISS is a policy that is adopted and maintained by states for a period of time but is fairly consistent with the observed data. Recall that 78% of HISS observations took place immediately following another HISS year.

Table 4.2 Summary Statistics for Revolutionary Realities Model Variables

Variables	**N**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev**	**Min**	**Max**	**Count** *(x = 1)*
Dependent Variable						
HISS (UCDP 3yr Window, 5+ groups)	5032					59
HISS (UCDP 3yr Window, 4+ groups)	5032					73
HISS (UCDP 5yr Period)	5032					73
HISS (UCDP 3yr, no HPTG)	5032					79
HISS (UCDP 3yr, no Out of Region)	5032					71
Dissertation Theory Variables						
RR Dummy	5032					293
Barriers Summary	5032	0.436	0.773	0	3	
• Nuclear-Armed Rival (dummy)	5032					1075
• % Non-Contiguous Rivals	5032	0.098	0.262	0	1.00	
• Minimum Capabilities Ratio	5032	0.314	0.656	-1.851	2.899	
Entry Type (dummy)	5032					1221
Intl Revol Constitution Score	5032	1.150	1.440	0	6.392	
Controls:						
ln(Population)	5032	9.127	1.525	5.142	14.075	
ln(Area) m2	5032	11.293	1.837	5.476	15.972	
MENA (dummy)	5032					654
Cold War (dummy)	5032					2525

Table 4.3 Summary Statistics for Alternative Explanation Variables

Alternative Theories Variables	N	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max	Count *(x = 1)*
Geostrategy						
# of Rivals	5032	1.173	1.911	0	16	
# of Contiguous Rivals	5032	0.833	1.178	0	7	
# of Non-Contiguous Rivals	5032	0.341	1.279	0	15	
# of Extra-Regional Rivals	5032	0.324	1.079	0	12	
National Capabilities Index	5032	0.007	0.020	0.000	0.183	
Avg. Relative Capabilities	5032	0.147	0.609	-1.851	2.890	
Total MID's, Annual	5032	0.688	1.293	0	27	
Revolutions/Radical Leaders						
Goldstone Revolution, 5yr Window	3877					394
Goldstone, Next Leader	3877					617
ARCHIGOS Revolutionary Overthrow, 5yr Window	5032					199
ARCHIGOS, Next Leader	5032					283

For the models in the following section, I had 5,023 observations over 820 leaders; each leader is its own subject or 'panel.'[17] Because of the single-period auto-regressive correlation structure, the GEE analyses drop the number of observations to 4,966 over 799 leaders. The number of observations in each analysis is included in all results tables in the next section, as are the number of panels, where appropriate. The summary statistics of all variables of interest appear in Table 4.2 and 4.3. Binary variables are summarized by counts of how many observations take the value of 1 (as opposed to 0). There are no non-binary categorical variables in the data.

Alternative Specifications and Robustness

Throughout the tables and discussions below, I refer to Appendix C, in which I have run a number of models with alternative specifications to those discussed in the main text. This includes running different model types as well as relying on different dependent variables, as

[17] See Colgan 2014, who argues rather persuasively that certain leaders have inherent tendencies towards more aggressive policies.

discussed in Chapter 3. Overall, the results from these robustness checks were consistent with the models presented here; if anything, the results in the Appendix may be even more supportive of my Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS as captured in the SPFS data. However, rather than cherry-picking the results based on the number of stars my theory's variables attained, I chose those models that were most closely representative of the theories under examination to appear in the main text.

IV. Results and Discussion: RR Single Factors and Alternative Explanations

RR Single Factors and Social Revolutions/Radical Leadership

The first set of alternative explanations I examine here are those associated with the "Social Revolutions and Radical Leaders" hypotheses. I run analyses using my entry and ideology variables and then compare these to the social revolution and regime type factors that operationalize other accounts in the literature. Though some individual indicators perform well, overall, I find only weak evidence for alternative explanations for HISS in the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset. In contrast, my own theory variables consistently correlate with HISS outcomes.

I first offer a controlled test for the indicators of entry and ideology from my Revolutionary Realities theory variables. Models 1, 2, and 3 below examine these variables individually, using the random effects logit with cubed duration terms as explained above. Hypotheses SR1 and SR2 alternative hypotheses are tested in their "event + 5 years" form in Models 4a and 5a below. Models 4b and 5b use the alternative version of the revolutionary indicator in which the entire next regime is coded as a 1.

Table 4.4 Results: Radical Leaders and RR Entry and Ideology (Random Effects, 3-year Moving Window)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4a	Model 4b	Model 4c	Model 4d	Model 5a	Model 5b	Model 5c
Int'l Revol Ideology Score	0.74*		0.80**				0.74*			
	0.29		*0.30*				*0.31*			
Entry		2.80*	3.11**			2.32*	2.76*			3.48*
		1.16	*1.19*			*1.12*	*1.22*			*1.37*
Archigos Revol. Exit, 5-yrs				1.06						
				1.45						
Archigos Revol. Exit, Next Ldr					3.40*	2.40	1.57			
					1.43	*1.51*	*1.66*			
Goldstone Revol. Events, 5-yrs								0.12		
								1.18		
Goldstone Revol. Events, Next Ldr									2.35*	1.26
									1.17	*1.21*
<u>Controls</u>										
Region: MENA	3.50**	3.13*	2.96*	3.60**	3.55**	3.23**	3.05*	4.22***	4.22***	3.80**
	1.19	*1.23*	*1.21*	*1.19*	*1.16*	*1.20*	*1.23*	*1.28*	*1.31*	*1.28*
Cold War (dummy)	2.15***	1.82**	1.98**	2.01**	1.90**	1.81**	1.97**	1.86**	1.80**	1.79**
	0.66	*0.68*	*0.68*	*0.67*	*0.66*	*0.66*	*0.68*	*0.69*	*0.69*	*0.69*
Area (mi2), logged	1.27**	1.06*	1.43**	0.99*	0.99*	1.11*	1.43**	1.06*	1.06*	1.31*
	0.47	*0.47*	*0.53*	*0.42*	*0.43*	*0.48*	*0.53*	*0.45*	*0.45*	*0.54*
Population, logged	0.39	0.60	0.51	0.52	0.46	0.55	0.48	0.76	0.87	0.98*
	0.40	*0.41*	*0.41*	*0.39*	*0.38*	*0.40*	*0.41*	*0.44*	*0.46*	*0.47*
t	-1.39***	-1.37***	-1.44***	-1.32**	-1.33***	-1.36**	-1.43***	-1.51***	-1.53**	-1.57**

Table 4.4, continued

	0.42	*0.42*	*0.42*	*0.42*	*0.42*	*0.42*	*0.42*	*0.43*	*0.43*	*0.43*
t^2	0.23*	0.23*	0.24*	0.23*	0.22*	0.23*	0.23*	0.26*	0.26*	0.26*
	0.11	*0.11*	*0.11*	*0.11*	*0.11*	*0.11*	*0.11*	*0.10*	*0.10*	*0.10*
t^3	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	0.00	*0.00*	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*
Constant	-31.53***	-20.50***	-35.43***	-28.35***	-28.27***	-30.67***	-35.15***	-31.58***	-32.93***	-38.27***
	6.90	*7.92*	*8.55*	*6.19*	*6.27*	*7.57*	*8.55*	*7.00*	*7.44*	*9.38*
ρ	0.78	0.76	0.76	0.78	0.76	0.75	0.76	0.75	0.73	0.71
N	5032	5032	5032	5032	5032	5032	5032	3877	3877	3877
Panels	820	820	820	820	820	820	820	666	666	666

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

As Table 4.4 shows, the RR variables perform well both on their own and in conjunction with one another. As compared to the individual factor models, the magnitude of the coefficients for both entry and ideology scores are similar and increase in significance between models 1 and2, respectively, compared to Model 3. The substantive impact is also fairly large for the entry variable here; all else being equal, the odds of being a HISS state increase by a factor of 16 with non-institutionalized entry. The size of the impact of international revolutionary ideology score is somewhat more modest; in Model 1, going from a score of 0 to a score of 1.70 makes it about 3.5 times more likely that a state is a HISS state. Furthermore, these factors – entry and ideology – covary with HISS significantly more than chance would predict, which confirms the sub-hypotheses of the Revolutionary Realities theory. Robustness checks confirm the correlation between entry and HISS in a number of reasonable alternative specifications (see Appendix C.2). The relationship between ideology and HISS, however, tends to be weaker in the general estimating equations (see Appendix C.1 as well as section five's discussion of secular trends in the ideology data.)

The competing explanations do not fare quite as well across the board, though there is some weak, inconsistent support for the idea that both social revolutionary events (as captured by Goldstone) and revolutionary overthrow events (as measured by Archigos) are correlated with HISS outcomes. The large caveat here is that these types of events seem to affect HISS outcomes rather further down the line than the original competing theories would expect. In Models 4a and 5a, the correlation between both the Archigos and the Goldstone revolutions and outcomes cannot be distinguished from zero. This means that there appears to be no effect of revolutionary processes during or within the first five years following a social revolution or revolutionary overthrow of a previous government. In fairness, the RR entry variable applies to

the entire next regime, and both Goldstone and Archigos measures of revolution, broad writ, perform better in Models 4b and 5b. In the Goldstone case, the coefficient is similar to the entry variable from Model 2, the Archigos revolutionary overthrow variable has approximately twice the effect that Entry does.[18] However, unlike this dissertation's theory, competing explanations about radical leadership and revolutions tend to theorize that the adoption of an extremist foreign policy is part of the revolutionary process. If these theories are an accurate, general account of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors, one might expect the effects of the revolutionary events to be visible temporally closer to the revolutionary events themselves. These models, then, do not support the limited assertion that extremist foreign policies are a necessary part of revolutionary processes at the time of *or* during the early years of those cataclysmic events. They do, however, more broadly suggest that revolutions are relevant.

More problematic for the radical leadership and pure revolution stories in particular are the results from Models 4c, 4d, and 5c. The RR theory does not deny that revolutionary events are associated with HISS; rather, it simply narrows the focus on the causal impact of two aspects of the complex political phenomenon. Table 4.4 provides support for the theory's focus on ideology and non-institutionalized entry in particular because, when controlling for these factors, the impact of revolutions themselves disappear. The effect of Goldstone revolutionary events, even the long-term effect, disappears when controlling for non-institutionalized entry. It is statistically indistinguishable from 0. The same occurs with the Archigos revolutionary overthrow effect. When controlling for the *entry type* of the new regime alone, the revolutionary events surrounding the overthrow of the previous regime lose significance (Model 4c). When

[18] This is based on the odds ratio, or the impact of a change from 0 to 1 on the variable all else being held constant. Model 4b suggests that this variable increases the chance of HISS by a factor of nearly 30.

both international revolutionary ideology and non-institutionalized entry are controlled for, the point estimate on revolutionary overthrow drops further still. The variation in estimates points to a collinearity issue among HISS, revolutions, and entry type. The stability of the entry measure means that the correlation between HISS and revolutions does not hold when controlling for the effect of entry; put differently, to the extent that revolutions drive HISS outcomes, they do so because revolutions are associated with non-institutionalized entry. The take-away here is not that "revolutions don't matter," because, as Models 4a and 5a demonstrate, there is something going on during these periods or under these leaders that is correlated with HISS outcomes. What the analysis above does suggest, however, is that in order to understand high-intensity patterns of state sponsorship, focusing on the effects of non-institutionalized entry and ideological content of leadership may be a fruitful avenue of further exploration. Revolutions, qua revolutions, seem here to co-vary with HISS *through* their impacts on ideology and entry.[19]

The third hypothesis about revolutions and leadership identifies a correlation between regime type and HISS. I also examine a few other aspects of regimes and leadership in Models 7-9 below in Table 4.5. In Model 9, democracy is negatively correlated with high-intensity state sponsorship with 90% confidence. Additionally, the magnitude of the democracy coefficient is somewhat similar to that of the entry coefficient from Model 2.[20] This is a weaker result than entry above, but it offers some support for hypothesis SR 3. There are a few other points here as well. Leaders that adopt HISS also tend to be in power for longer, both as measured by

[19] If the measures were capturing the same underlying concept, we would expect collinearity, which would take the form of all variables—entry, ideology, and Archigos/Goldstone variables—changing value, as happens in Model 25 in this section. Since some remain entirely stable while others change in coefficient, the interpretation offered in the text above is most likely.

[20] In robustness checks, democracy hovers around significance as it does here. However, including entry type in the model with democracy leads suggests multicollinearity; both estimates shift, with the democracy estimate moving closer to zero and losing significance. The entry variable retains significance but was reduced in magnitude. See Appendix C.3, Model D.

Archigos' number of days in power (logged) and the years in power as calculated by the SPFS data. Finally, there is a gender disparity among HISS leaders. All states that have employed it have been led by males both at adoption and during the years the policy was in place. This is consistent with the picture of HISS states as being led by dictatorial strongmen.

Table 4.5 Results: Regime Type and Tenure (Random Effects, 3-Year Window DV)

Other Regime Factors	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Total Yrs in Power	0.18***		
	0.06		
Tenure in power (logged)		0.96***	
		0.26	
Democracy			-2.56†
			1.39
Controls			
Region: MENA	3.88*	2.84**	3.27**
	1.15	*0.95*	*1.21*
Cold War (dummy)	1.52*	2.15***	1.88**
	0.67	*0.68*	*0.67*
Area (mi2), logged	1.08*	0.79*	0.95*
	0.46	*0.0.36*	*0.46*
Population, logged	0.71	0.51	0.66
	0.42	*0.33*	*0.43*
t	-1.37***	-1.65***	-1.36***
	0.41	*0.42*	*0.42*
t^2	0.22*	0.26*	0.23*
	0.1	*0.11*	*0.11*
t^3	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	0.01	*0.01*	*0.01*
Constant	-32.49***	-30.40***	-28.37***
	7.82	*5.38*	*6.69*
ρ	0.73	0.67	0.78
N	5032	5032	4992
Panels	820	820	810

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Overall, these "radical leadership" theories as tested by the SPFS dataset are at best weakly successful in accounting for the phenomenon of HISS as a pattern of sponsorship. Democracy is negatively correlated with the policy, not coinciding with HISS somewhat more than chance would predict. Among other measures of revolution, there was also some support for the idea that revolutionary overthrow and social revolutionary events are correlated with the next regime's adoption of HISS at some point more than 5 years after transition events. However, in all of these circumstances, the Revolutionary Realities variables of ideology and especially entry type seem to more consistently covary with HISS. When controlling for whether a regime entered power through non-institutionalized means, the independent effects of others aspects of the revolutionary events disappear. Furthermore, the entry variable itself remains consistent, shifting far less as a result of the inclusion of other revolutionary terms. This suggests that focusing on the mechanism of irregular entry—which can include coups and may also theoretically include things like foundational post-colonial governments—may be a fruitful avenue for exploring how, when, and why governments adopt HISS.

RR Single Factors and Alternative Explanations from the International Relations Literature

The geostrategic factors in both the Revolutionary Realities theory and competing explanations were tested next. These hypotheses all posit that aspects of the geostrategic situation are responsible for a high-intensity policy of sponsorship. In this thinking, these structural factors, rather than regime-level factors or revolutionary processes, can account for variation across HISS outcomes.

The models in Table 4.6 examine the number of rivals as well as a number of other rival measures to assess hypothesis RIV1. The results from Model 10 show that having a higher number of rivals is correlated with high-intensity state sponsorship. Having one additional rival

increases the odds of being a HISS state by a factor of 2. Three additional rivals increase the likelihood by nearly 10 times. Interestingly, this appears to be the case regardless of the

Table 4.6 Results: Rivals Theory (Random Effects, 3-Year Window DV)

Rivals and Types of Rivals	xtlogit Model 10	xtlogit Model 11	xtlogit Model 12	xtlogit Model 13	xtlogit Model 14	xtlogit Model 15
Number of Rivals	0.76***				0.75***	0.52*
	0.18				*0.19*	*0.23*
# Non-Contiguous Rivals		0.71***				0.28
		0.19				*0.25*
# Extra-Regional Rivals			0.76***			
			0.21			
# Contiguous Rivals				0.80**	0.05	
				0.28	*0.28*	
<u>Controls:</u>						
Region: MENA	2.88**	4.03***	3.27**	2.46*	2.81*	3.15*
	1.10	*1.14*	*1.08*	*1.23*	*1.18*	*1.17*
Cold War (dummy)	1.06	1.66*	1.61*	1.31*	1.04	1.04
	0.63	*0.65*	*0.65*	*0.65*	*0.64*	*0.64*
Area (mi2), logged	0.57	0.55	0.51	1.06	0.57	0.57
	0.40	*0.38*	*0.40*	*0.46*	*0.41*	*0.41*
Population, logged	-0.39	0.04	0.20	0.10	-0.40	-0.40
	0.45	*0.41*	*0.41*	*0.43*	*0.46*	*0.46*
t	-1.27**	-1.29**	-1.29**	-1.29**	-1.28**	-1.28**
	0.41	*0.41*	*0.42*	*0.42*	*0.41*	*0.42*
t^2	0.22**	0.22*	0.22**	0.22**	0.22**	0.22*
	0.10	*0.1*	*0.10*	*0.10*	*0.10*	*0.01*
t^3	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	0.01	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*
Constant	-15.11**	-18.32***	-19.43***	-26.08***	-15.12**	-15.12***
	5.08	*5.08*	*5.16*	*6.06*	*5.07*	*5.07*
ρ	0.76	0.75	0.76	0.80	0.76	0.76
N	5032	5032	5032	5032	5032	5032
Panels	820	820	820	820	820	820

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.7 Results: Material Capabilities Theory (Random Effects, 3-Year Window DV)

Security/Resource Constraints	xtlogit, 3yr5 Model 16	xtlogit, 3yr5 Model 17	xtlogit, 3yr5 Model 18	xtlogit, 3yr5 Model 19	xtlogit, 3yr5 Model 20
Total # MIDs/Year	0.16† *0.08*				
Relative Capabilities, Avg.		0.29 *0.59*			
Military Expenditure (logged)			0.63* *0.26*		
Military Personnel (logged)				2.80*** *0.70*	
Material Capabilities Index					50.53*** *10.55*
<u>Controls</u>					
Region: MENA	3.21*** *1.07*	3.58*** *1.16*	3.01*** *1.10*	2.16*** *1.08*	4.18*** *1.05*
Cold War (dummy)	1.78** *0.64*	1.91** *0.67*	1.76** *0.64*	1.64* *0.67*	1.84** *0.63*
Area (mi2), logged	0.89* *0.38*	0.94* *0.42*	0.78* *0.37*	1.36** *0.44*	
Population, logged	0.4 *0.36*	0.45 *0.40*	-0.05 *0.43*	-2.27** *0.76*	
t	-1.42*** *0.42*	-1.34** *0.42*	-1.23** *0.41*	-1.21** *0.42*	-1.31** *0.42*
t^2	0.23* *0.11*	0.23* *0.11*	0.20 *0.10*	0.19 *0.11*	0.23* *0.11*
t^3	-0.01 *0.01*	-0.01 *0.01*	-0.01 *0.01*	-0.01 *0.01*	-0.01 *0.01*
Constant	-25.15*** *5.46*	-26.92*** *6.07*	-28.23*** *5.80*	-18.26*** *5.29*	-11.54*** *1.73*
ρ	0.74	0.78	0.75	0.74	0.75
N	5032	5032	4797	4916	5032
Panels	820	820	810	803	820

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

geographic location of those rivals. Both the number of non-contiguous and the number of extra-regional rivals are correlated with HISS to a similar extent as the sheer number of rivals.

More surprising from the perspective of the RR theory, the number of contiguous rivals is highly correlated with high-intensity patterns of sponsorship as well (Model 13). It is, of course, the case that having more contiguous rivals also means that a state has more rivals overall. Model 14 shows that, when controlling for the number of rivals, the number of contiguous rivals loses all significance. And, as the case of entry in Models 4c and 5c above, the estimate for the number of rivals is almost completely unchanged. Thus it appears that the contiguity of the rivals is less relevant than the effect that having more contiguous rivals has on the overall number of rivals. Model 15, by comparison, suggests that there is multicollinearity among the number of rivals, number of non-contiguous rivals, and HISS. The coefficient estimates on *both* rivals measures changes as compared to the models in which each one was tested separately, (Model 10 and 11 respectively). It is clear, then, that more rivals are associated with more HISS. However, there is some evidence that the geographic location of the rivals matters and that contiguous rivals do not correlate as strongly with HISS outcomes.

The remaining hypotheses from the international relations literature have to do with the military capacity of the state, either in absolute terms or relative to other states or security challenges. Hypothesis MC1 does not fare well at all; state weakness is actually *negatively* correlated with HISS outcomes across the board. The expected sign on all the variables of interest in all three of Models 18-20 in Table 4.7 is negative. If weaker states are more likely to adopt HISS, we should see that higher military expenditures, larger numbers of forces, and greater material capabilities would all be correlated with fewer instances of HISS. What we find here is that the very opposite is true; stronger states are more involved in this pattern of sponsorship. Further tests can be found in Appendix C.5. Overall, this means that there is no support for this account in the SPFS data. The average capabilities ratio does not achieve

significance at conventional levels either. Furthermore, the sign here indicates that states that, on average, are stronger than their rivals would actually tend to use HISS more, contrary to MC2's expectations. However, I do find that the number of ongoing militarized interstate disputes is weakly correlated with HISS outcomes in Model 16 above—it is statistically significant with 90% confidence. As compared to rivals, though, the substantive effect of one additional MID on HISS outcomes is much smaller (a 17% increase in odds vs. a 113% increase in odds).

In contrast, the sub-hypotheses for the Revolutionary Realities take on the security imperatives related to HISS were consistently supported by the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship data. In Model 21 (and 21a) in Table 4.8, the barriers summary variable attains the highest levels of statistical significance.[21] This variable ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 3; recall that a state with no nuclear-armed rivals, that has no non-contiguous rivals, and that is equally matched with or more powerful than all of its rivals will have a 0. A state with a nuclear-armed rival, that has one third of its rivals non-contiguous, and is moderately outclassed against its strongest enemy will have a summary value of about 2. This is associated with an increase in the odds of HISS outcomes by a factor of 19.2[2] This is comparable to the covariance between HISS and entry.

The individual measures that contribute to the barriers summary are also tested in Models 22-24. In Models 14 and 15 above, we saw how including both non-contiguous rivals and number of rivals in the analysis changed the coefficients of variables. This theory asserts that it

[21] The results from the General Estimating Equations are included in Model 21a. The results are quite similar, though the magnitude of all of the coefficients and standard errors are reduced; some amount of variation across observations that was attributed to the model covariates and estimated parameters (ρ) in the random effects models is 'eaten up' by the over-time correlation across panels that the GEE model incorporates into assumptions about the data's error structure.

[22] The average value of the barriers summary variable is 0.43. A state with a barriers value of 2, which is two standard deviations above the mean for the dataset, has 10 times greater odds of being a HISS state than a state with the average value on the barrier. It is worth noting that about 50% of the data has a value of 0 on this measure.

is the challenge of pursuing a military option against rivals that drives states to consider and adopt high-intensity state sponsorship. The number of rivals you have, however, is both already shown to covary with HISS and is not as closely linked, theoretically, to the notion of high barriers. I therefore employ the *percent* of non-contiguous rivals, as articulated more fully in Chapter 3. The imperative for an aggressive, forceful option is harder to satisfy when there are very few rivals within easy striking distance. This figure helps to avoid conflating the effect of the geographic distance from a state to its rivals with the sheer number of rivals the state has. Indeed, since the denominator of the percentage term is, in fact, the number of rivals overall, this figure essentially includes both figures in the model without the issue of multicollinearity.

All three "barriers to conventional war abroad" component variables are individually significant, both here and in the models included in Appendix C.4 that use alternative model specifications. In Model 23, it is clear that having a nuclear-armed opponent has a large substantive impact on HISS adoption. A nuclear-armed rival is correlated with a 30 times greater chance of a HISS outcome.[23] Likewise, moving from the average percentage of non-contiguous rivals (10%) to one standard deviation above the mean leads to a nearly doubling of the odds of HISS adoption. Furthermore, the majority of states have no non-contiguous rivals. Comparing that to a state like China, where often 50-60% of its rivalries are with states that do not share its border, and the odds quadruple. Interpreting the relative capabilities coefficient is somewhat more complex, as the figure is a ratio of already-indexed figures, but it does provide

[23] This is consistent with literature on the security-insecurity paradox. Nuclear-armed dyads are more likely to get involved in proxy war, which is the kind of activity that partially contributes to this research's coding of HISS. This is particularly true when considering the source of the non-state actor data; UCDP is concerned overwhelmingly with civil wars, insurgencies, and separatist movements as compared to terrorism.

Table 4.8 Results: RR Barriers to Conventional War, Single Factors (3-Year Window DV)

	Random Effects	GEE	Random Effects	Random Effects	Random Effects	Random Effects
Single Factor, Controlled Models	Model 21	Model 21a	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25
Barriers Summary	1.47***	1.33***				
	0.46	*0.23*				
% Non-Contig Rivals			2.15*			-0.15
			0.96			*1.31*
Nuclear-Armed Rival				3.45**		2.78
				1.17		*1.73*
Relative Capabilities, Min					1.91**	0.65
					0.66	*0.91*
Controls						
Region: MENA	3.59***	2.63***	3.66**	3.57***	3.47**	3.65**
	1.09	*0.41*	*1.20*	*1.03*	*1.14*	*1.22*
Cold War (dummy)	1.78**	0.73***	1.80**	1.91***	1.14*	1.63*
	0.65	*0.49*	*0.64*	*0.66*	*0.65*	*0.65*
Area (mi2), logged	1.04**	0.74***	1.15**	0.90*	1.15**	1.20**
	0.38	*0.16*	*0.41*	*0.37*	*0.42*	*0.44*
Population, logged	0.18	0.22	-0.03	0.30	0.68	0.15
	0.36	*0.18*	*0.39*	*0.36*	*0.38*	*0.47*
t	-1.30***		-1.27**	-1.33***	-1.32***	-1.28***
	0.39		*0.40*	*0.40*	*0.40*	*0.40*
t^2	0.20*		0.20*	0.21*	0.21*	0.20*
	0.10		*0.10*	*0.10*	*0.10*	*0.10*
t^3	-0.01		-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	0.01		*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*

Table 4.8, continued

Constant	-25.70*** *5.53*	-18.90*** *1.83*	-25.82*** *6.00*	-24.48*** *5.36*	-32.25*** *6.87*	-28.26*** *7.49*
ρ	0.71		0.74	0.72	0.75	0.75
Sigma_u	2.84		3.08	2.89	3.11	3.12
N	5032	4986	5032	5032	5032	5032
Panels	820		820	820	820	820

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

an interesting counter-point to the figures associated with Hypothesis GS3 above.[24] Whereas disproportionately involved in HISS. The model indicates that the greater the disparity between a state and its most powerful rival, the greater the odds of HISS.

It is also worth noting that the results from Model 25 tend to corroborate this research's use of the "Barriers Summary" variable. All three factors lose significance and their coefficients are depressed when included in the same model. This again suggests that they co-vary with HISS outcomes *and* each other to a certain extent. This is consistent with the assertion that HISS outcomes are driven by being militarily outclassed, having a nuclear-capable opponent, or being distant from target states because all could contribute to a state's perception that there are high barriers for pursuing military action abroad against rivals.

Once again, then, the Revolutionary Reality sub-hypotheses on the role of barriers to military operations abroad identify factors that tend to be consistently associated with HISS outcomes. Interestingly, explanations about relative material capabilities found very weak support at best in these data, and the hypotheses that emphasize absolute material resource constraints were actually refuted. Stronger states, on average, were more likely to be involved in HISS. The relevant question may well be, "Weak as compared to what?" Rivalry explanations were supported by the data, though there was some indication that contiguous rivals were less relevant, as compared to numbers of rivals overall. Furthermore, the geographic distribution of rivals does appear to be independently significantly correlated with HISS.

It is worth recalling the note in Chapter 3 that outlined the possible reverse causality when it comes to assessing the association between rivalry and high-intensity state sponsorship.

[24] Sussing out the substantive interpretation is perhaps not fruitful, because there are many ways to achieve similar CINC scores. States with populations and large iron ore deposits but relatively small militaries may have higher material capabilities than states with merely a large military. Such indices are useful for comparisons but have less clear meaning, especially after creating a ratio as I have done here, than say the nuclear-armed rival indicator.

Few policies are more likely than HISS to attract the ire of "the international community"—HISS states can quickly pick up new rivals that are geographically distant, nuclear-armed, and militarily powerful. Efforts to disentangle this empirical relationship will appear in the case studies in Parts III and IV.

V. Results and Discussion: The Revolutionary Realities Theory, Triple-Interactions

Random Effects Logits and GEE Models

Though the sub-hypotheses suggest that the logic behind the Revolutionary Realities theory is, indeed, applicable to high-intensity sponsorship, this dissertation has only one core hypothesis—that states must have all three factors present to adopt HISS. This is captured with a naïve "are all values not 0?" dummy variable and the more preferred triple-interaction term, in which higher values on the individual factors yield higher values on the triple interactions. This approach allows me to leverage all of the variation available in the dataset as well as explicitly modeling the impact of individual factors and lower-order interactions.

It is worth noting that for many of the observations in this dataset, both the RR dummy variable and the triple interaction take on the value of 0. This is because each of the three terms can themselves be 0, so the absence of any one factor leads to a 0 value overall. If a leader gained power through institutionalized means, both the dummy variable and the triple interaction will be zero, even if all other factors take on maximum values.[25] This is Part II's attempt to cut at the "jointly necessary conditions" aspect of the hypothesis—observations in which only one or two of the factors are present will not contribute to my variable of interest "being right" in these

[25] Recall that the Barriers Summary variable can take on a non-zero value if *any* of the barriers are present. Thus a state must have no non-contiguous rivals, no nuclear-armed rivals, and no rivals that are more powerful than it. However, a state need not have all three present for the Barriers Summary to be considered "present." Indeed, having no rivals whatsoever is the primary instance in which the Barriers Summary is zero and therefore drives the RR dummy and triple-interaction to zero.

models. Such observations theoretically should correlate with HISS outcomes no more regularly than observations with all three factors missing, and the extent of a single factor's covariance with HISS outcomes does not enter into the analysis.

Model 2 and Models 5 and 5c should be seen as the primary test of my theory's central hypothesis. In Model 2, the variable of interested in the RR Dummy variable, whereas the triple-interaction occurs in Models 5 and 5c. In Model 5, the result of the triple interaction is not statistically significant. This is, however, apparently the result not of a particularly low point estimate for the coefficient on the term, but rather because of a much larger standard error in this model as compared to others.

There are a few notes to make about model selection here. Thusfar, I have chosen to focus primarily on the random effects logits, due to their more central place in the international relations and security literature. This is despite the fact that there are theoretical reasons to prefer the GEE models. As the results included in the Appendix C demonstrate, the GEE models produce very similar estimates across the board for all models tested, and, if anything, tend to give my variables of interest slightly higher statistical significance. However, they also do not show things like duration dependence (as the time cubes do below), and they do not have a ρ value, which conveys useful information about the covariance within panels. It is, of course, assumptions about the distribution of the α parameter related to ρ that my data violate, which is why the GEE might be preferred. Still, rather than switching away from the more conventional models entirely and including only those which show favorable results, I have included Model 5 here and I consider it one, among several, important and legitimate tests of my theory's hypothesis. Additional specifications can be found in Appendix C.6 and C.7—including, for example, the GEE version of Model 2 which corroborate the results shown here in the main text.

With the exception of Model 5 and Model 5d, the Revolutionary Realities theory variable performs well and is consistently related to HISS outcomes. The magnitude on the coefficients should be compared carefully. The RR Dummy variable, for example, only ranges from 0 to 1, whereas the interaction term for all three factors ranges from 0 to 17.23. In Model 2, having all three factors present means that a state is *75 times more likely* to have a HISS outcome than states in which more or more factor is 0. This is a much larger increase in odds than the entry variable or the nuclear-armed opponent; it is also larger than going from an international revolutionary ideology score of 0 to 5. It is, though, similar to going from an ideology score of 0 to 6, nearly the maximum value, and only slightly larger than going from 0 to 3 on the barriers summary variable alone.

Turning to the triple-interaction model, I am able to more clearly identify the effect of interaction as distinct from the effects of individual factors themselves. The estimate for the coefficient on the triple-interaction tends to hover around 1.00. Because this variable can range from 0 to 17.23, going from a 0 to a 4.33 value for the triple interaction would be the same as, in Model 2, going from 0 to 1 on the RR Dummy variable.[26] More importantly, though, this model is able to separate out the effect of the interaction itself, controlling for the individual effects of the components and their lower-order terms.[27] I therefore have support from some model specifications for the central hypothesis of this dissertation—that all three factors, in combination, are correlated with HISS outcomes across time and space.

[26] In other words, $e^{(\text{coeff.} * \text{change in variable value})}$ is, in each case, $e^{(4.33)}$.

[27] Substantive interpretations of the lower order of interaction terms are limited; the point estimates on these coefficients should be not be seen as evidence for or against any of this theory's hypotheses (Braumoeller 2004). Thus I do not engage in any interpretation of the three factors individually as, when the higher-order terms are included, they no longer account for marginal variation in HISS outcomes.

Table 4.9 Results: Revolutionary Realities Model (3-Year Window DV)

Triple Interaction Models	Random Effects	Random Effects	Logit (error clustered by leader, no *t*)	Logit (error clusters by leader)	Random Effects	GEE	GEE	Random Effects (with time splines)
	RR Model 1	RR Model 2	RR Model 3	RR Model 4	RR Model 5	RR Model 5b	RR Model 5c	RR Model 5d
All RR Factors (dummy)		4.33***						
		1.14						
Entry*Revol Score*Barriers Sum			0.93*	1.00*	0.80	1.28**	1.15**	0.79
			0.43	*0.43*	*0.60*	*0.41*	*0.38*	*0.60*
Entry	2.52*		1.97	2.05	3.05	2.08*	2.04*	3.01
	1.05		*1.6*	*1.49*	*1.82*	*0.91*	*0.91*	*1.81*
Intl Revol Score	0.68*		0.41	0.40	1.05*	0.29	0.29	1.03
	0.28		*0.62*	*0.59*	*0.53*	*0.34*	*0.35*	*0.53*
Barriers Summary	1.31**		1.65*	1.48*	1.59	1.51***	1.62***	1.57
	0.49		*0.69*	*0.68*	*0.89*	*0.44*	*0.44*	*0.88*
<u>Controls</u>								
Entry*Revol Score			-1.07	-1.22	-1.06	-1.70*	-1.38	-1.06
			0.82	*0.88*	*1.00*	*0.78*	*0.72*	*1.02*
Entry*Barriers Sum			-0.71	-0.70	-0.46	-0.75	-0.78	-4.20
			0.86	*0.78*	*1.18*	*0.59*	*0.58*	*1.17*
Revol*Barriers Sum			-0.47	-0.4	-0.42	-0.45	-0.51	-0.42
			0.37	*-0.35*	*0.39*	*0.26*	*0.26*	*0.40*
MENA	2.98**	2.73**	2.58***	2.67***	2.92**	2.72***	2.79**	2.92**
	1.11	*1.04*	*0.66*	*0.71*	*1.05*	*0.57*	*0.55*	*1.05*

Table 4.9, continued

Cold War	1.81**	1.67**	1.37***	0.72	1.86**	0.19	0.60	1.92**
	0.67	*0.63*	*1.02*	*0.71*	*0.68*	*0.42*	*0.41*	*0.69*
Area (logged)	1.36**	0.97*	1.04***	0.89***	1.33**	0.75***	0.78***	1.30**
	0.47	*0.39*	*0.23*	*0.21*	*0.45*	*0.19*	*0.19*	*0.45*
Population (logged)	0.22	0.51	0.09	0.21	0.22	0.42*	0.46*	0.23
	0.39	*0.36*	*0.27*	*0.22*	*0.40*	*0.21*	*0.21*	*0.37*
t	-1.42***	-1.34***		-1.71***	-1.43***	-0.35***	spline 1	-2.35***
	0.4	*0.40*		*0.34*	*0.4*	*0.09*		*0.73*
t^2	0.22*	0.21*		0.27***	0.22*		spline 2	47.80*
	0.10	*0.10*		*0.06*	*0.10*			*20.57*
t^3	-0.01	-0.01		-0.01***	-0.01		spline 3	-95.99*
	0.01	*0.01*		*0.00*	*0.01*			*42.80*
Constant	-31.78***	-27.05***	-22.62***	-20.11***	-31.11***	-20.74***	-22.7***	-30.83***
	7.13	*5.68*	*3.64*	*3.54*	*6.76*	*2.48*	*2.45*	*6.75*
Rho	0.71	0.71			0.67			0.67
Sigma_u	2.84	2.81			2.58			2.59
N	5032	5032	5032	5032	5032	4966	4966	5032
Panels	820	820			820	799	799	820

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

All RR Variable Odds ratio for discussion:

Results from alternative specification of the dependent variable (Appendix C.6 and C.7) corroborate this result. Models in which the "No HPTG" dependent variable was used performed well, with the triple interaction achieving significance across all model specifications. This is reassuring, given that the HPTG criterion is the most likely source of error for the HISS variable in the data. Links between states and terrorist groups are more difficult to observe than groups between states and other non-state actors, even insurgent and separatist groups. The model that lowered the quantity threshold to 4 group, rather than 5 groups, during the moving three-year window of time were nearly identical to the models in Table 4.9 below.[28] In the random effects logit, the triple-interaction had a similar point estimate but failed to achieve statistical significance. In the GEE and clustered logit models (like RR Model 5b and RR Model 4 respectively), the triple interaction was significant, as was the RR Dummy variable. Point estimates were in a similar range.

Let's dive into other variables in the models more closely. The time cube variables, which are included in the random effects logits above as well, suggest that HISS is duration dependent. That is to say, the *t* coefficients indicate that more time since last HISS leads to less likelihood of HISS. This is to say that HISS occurs either at the start of a panel (early in a leader's tenure) or shortly after having engaged in HISS previously. Put differently, the greater the time since the last instance of the HISS, the less likelihood there is of a current instance of HISS. The overall significance of the time variables indicates that there is time dependence in

[28] Robustness checks also used different specifications of the barriers to conventional war, where just the percentage of non-contiguous rivals or the minimum relative capabilities were interacted with ideology and entry. Both yield statistically significant results. See Appendix C.8.

the data, and this should be included in the random effects models which do not otherwise take into account temporal correlation.[29] The time splines in Model 5d have a similar interpretation.[30]

The rho values (ρ) in Models 1, 2, and 5 indicate that from 67 to 71% of the total variation in the model is attributable to differences between panels. This means that unobserved heterogeneity across leaders is responsible for a relatively large percentage of the model variance, as opposed to variance within each panel. This makes sense in this data, as there are only a few leaders that adopt HISS, and those that do tend to do so for spells of multiple years. Further, there are likely factors that the model does not control for which influence HISS outcomes.[31] The models in Table 4.9 have lower ρ values overall than the other models in this chapter which is the result of including more factors that co-vary with HISS outcomes.

The controls in these models are also consistently significantly correlated with HISS outcomes. The indicator for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has a high value and tends to co-vary with HISS across all models; this translates to an increase in the odds of HISS outcomes of 13 to 20 times for this region alone. The Cold War is also a strong predictor of HISS activity, showing that the results discussed in Chapter 3 are still present in these controlled models. Note that in the GEE models, this relationship is less pronounced, perhaps because many of the HISS spells take place during the Cold War, and the variation is attributed to temporal correlation, rather than the Cold War period itself. The country's geographic size is also significant in all of the models in Table 4.9; the positive sign indicates that larger states are

[29] Incidentally, given how few HISS observations there are in the data, a table of the first value (*t*) is highly informative. See Appendix C.9.

[30] The time splines here are based on Beck, Katz, and Tucker as mentioned above. In the example here, the knot locations were chosen to be 0, 1, 2, and 11. This is because of the table mentioned in the previous footnote, which showed that the duration values are clustered around 0.

[31] It is worth confirming here that Hausman tests indicated that random effects models are to be preferred over fixed effects models for this data. Additionally, fixed effects would drop the vast majority of the observations from the set, as there are a large number of panels in which the dependent variable does not vary.

involved in HISS. The population term is not significant in most specification—again, in the GEE models, the result is slightly different. Population size is correlated with HISS with 95% confidence in Models 5b and 5c.

In summary, then, the results in Table 4.9 support the hypotheses of the Revolutionary Realities theory. Both cuts on the triple interaction variable tended to correlate highly with HISS in most models, with the notable exception of Model 5, the random effects model used in the rest of this paper and the most commonly used model in literature in the field. There are, however, reasons to prefer GEE models for analyzing the SPFS data, and in Model 5c, the GEE model most similar in specification to Model 5, the triple-interaction term *is* statistically significant at conventional levels.

Hazard Models: HISS Adoption Events

Thus far, the Revolutionary Realities theory has held up well in comparison to competing explanations. HISS does tend to co-vary with the theorized causal factors. Certainly, the evidence in the random effects and GEE models above suggest that these conditions are disproportionally present when a state is engaged in HISS. However, the central claim of this work is that three, mutually-reinforcing, necessary conditions are present in cases of HISS *adoption.* A different type of approach is needed to assess this central claim.

Therefore, I employ hazard models (or survival models) in order to assess how my causal factors correlate with the "risk" of HISS adoption.[32] Several caveats are necessary here. It may seem more natural, given my theory, that I emphasize hazard modeling over and above other types of models. However, HISS is a very rare event. There are only 12 adoption events in the

[32] Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Bradford S. Jones. 2004. *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

event dataset of 820 leaders from 164 countries; further, two of these adoption events took place either in 1975 (the first year of the dataset) or, more likely, prior to that. This means that not only are there a grand total of a mere ten total 'failures' on which to estimate, using a hazard modeling approach drops all activity from China and Libya from my analysis.[33] Though there are no inherent reasons why this type of model cannot be used on relatively rare events, in practice, the paucity of failures makes estimation more difficult and limits the analysis and tools available to me with these particular data.[34]

I use Cox proportional hazard models to examine whether the RR theory variables are, in fact, correlated with an increased risk of adopting HISS. Cox models are semi-parametric models, meaning that the underlying form of the hazard function is not defined. I identify each country, rather than each leader, as a separate panel, meaning that over 6% of my "subjects" experience failure. This reduces the number of observations to 4,423 base country-years, as leader transition years typically result in a double-counting of country years in the main dataset.

[33] Allowing for multiple failures per subject does not solve this problem, as most events occurred in spells. Libya, for example, was also a HISS-adopter in 1976, but this is clearly not an instance of a second adoption 'event.' In that instance, I would essentially be measuring the same theoretical concept as in the previous models.

[34] Using leader panels instead of countries merely exacerbates things. Analysis by leader (those 820 leaders that served more than 1 year in office) leads to an explosion of zeros—models did not converge and efforts to force convergence led to many more dropped observations and meaningless results. This is true, for example, when attempting to include individual or shared frailty terms (see Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2007 and Hougaard 1991). Frailty terms allow the researcher to model the theoretical possibility, and in this case the likelihood, that not all countries are really equally 'at risk' of HISS adoption. However, even regional stratification (suggesting that some regions are more at-risk than others) led to non-convergence in my analysis, as did other approaches to modeling subject-specific heterogeneity.

Techniques to address possible violations of the proportionality assumption were similarly unavailable, though I was able to test for the presence of such violations (see Box-Steffensmeier Reiter and Zorn 2003). According to Schoenfeld tests, the models in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 do not, globally, violate the proportionality assumption, but certain terms, particularly the lower-level interaction terms from H Models 1a and 1c, do appear to be time-dependent. However, interacting an already-interacted term with a time term creates *another* triple-interaction, which is already mathematically unwieldy. This again resulted in non-convergence due to the low frequency of failure events. I have therefore chosen to model without these time interactions. See Appendix C.11 for results of the Schoenfeld tests on H Model 1c, which were representative of all variations on the interaction models I used, and H Model 14.

Table 4.10 Results: Revolutionary Realities Single Factor Hazard Models

	3yr5, single failure; efron for ties, clustered by country							
Hazard Models (HRs reported)	H Model 1	H Model 2	H Model 3	H Model 4	H Model 5	H Model 6	H Model 7	H Model 8
Entry	4.62*	4.11*						
	9.23	*3.82*						
Int'l Revol Score	1.58		1.51					
	0.47		*0.46*					
Barriers Summary	4.02**			4.14***				
	2.04			*1.82*				
Nuclear-Armed Rival					11.76***			3.22
					7.94			*2.92*
% Non-Contig. Rivals						16.39*		3.43
						20.24		*4.26*
Relative Capabilities, Min							5.17***	2.19†
							2.55	*0.97*
Controls								
Region: MENA	11.12**	7.72***	8.67***	18.83**	12.70**	20.39**	12.30***	18.28**
	8.66	*4.72*	*5.56*	*17.68*	*10.57*	*20.74*	*8.64*	*17.10*
Area (mi2), logged	2.33*	1.49	1.70*	2.06**	2.16*	1.67*	2.06*	2.10**
	0.83	*0.48*	*0.45*	*0.57*	*0.69*	*0.39*	*0.64*	*0.60*
Population, logged	1.32	1.80*	1.45	1.24	1.05	1.29	1.88*	1.37
	0.42	*0.46*	*0.37*	*0.29*	*0.20*	*0.36*	*0.51*	*0.34*
Subjects	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
Failure Events	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Time-At-Risk	3974	3974	3974	3974	3974	3974	3974	3974

† p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Table 4.11 Results: Revolutionary Realities Theory Hazard Models

Revolutionary Reality Hazards				
	H Model 9	H Model 10	H Model 11	H Model 12
All RR Factors (Dummy)	7.19**	8.56***		
	5.00	*5.68*		
Entry*Revol. Score*Barriers Sum.			3.29**	6.10†
			1.37	*6.61*
Entry			4.26	3.77
			5.38	*5.52*
Intl Revol Score			1.51	1.64
			0.74	*0.83*
Barriers to Off. Operations Summary			2.43	3.30
			1.49	*2.54*
<u>Lower-Order Interactions</u>				
Entry*Revol Score			0.14*	0.04
			0.12	*0.08*
Entry*Barriers Sum			1.33	1.36
			1.94	*1.35*
Revol*Barriers Sum			0.78	0.82
			0.23	*0.54*
MENA		8.25***		12.37**
		4.77		*10.61*
Area (logged)		1.62†		2.71*
		0.44		*1.12*
Population (logged)		1.66*		1.31
		0.37		*0.54*
Subjects	160	160	160	160
Failure Events	10	10	10	10
Time-At-Risk	3974	3974	3974	3974

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Further observations are dropped by the model (for example, after a country has adopted HISS, it falls out of the risk pool) bringing the 'time at risk' in the models to 3,981 years across 160 subject countries. Errors were clustered by country, and I used the Efron method, generally

more robust with temporal observation units as large as "years," to handle tied failures.[35] I use a single-failure per subject model, based on the 3-year moving window specification of HISS, the primary one used throughout the chapter thusfar. In Tables 4.10 and 4.11 below, hazard ratios are reported. Values between 0 and 1 mean that a factor *decreases* the hazard of HISS adoption and rates above 1 increase the hazard; this is in comparison to a 'baseline hazard,' the underlying propensity towards HISS adoption in the population of states at large.

Most of the models in Table 4.10 confirm the results of the random effects and GEE approaches above. Entry is a significant correlate of HISS adoption, and the barriers to conventional war summary variable also performs well. Having a large percentage of non-contiguous rivals is also a risk factor for HISS. Translating this to the language of risk, the 4.11 estimate on the entry variable suggests that non-institutionalized entry increases the risk of HISS adoption by 60%, which is to say that it leads to 160% of the baseline risk, all else held constant. One must be wary of interpretation here, though, as some figures, such as the 11.76 hazard ratio on the nuclear-armed rival variable, increase the risk of HISS adoption to a (literally) incredible 128,127% *of baseline hazard*. It is important to recall from the discussion of the coefficient on the constants above that HISS, being rare, has quite a low baseline risk of being adopted. This limits the predictive power of the hazard ratios below because individual point estimates say nothing about the *absolute* risk of HISS adoption.

It is also worth noting that, because there are few HISS events, the standard errors are fairly large. Just sticking with the nuclear-armed opponent example, the model is 95% confident that this factor increases the likelihood of HISS by somewhere between 23% and over *one*

[35] See Borucka. 2014. The more common though no more conventional Breslow method, the default in many software packages, is used in a robustness model in Appendix C.10. Results are nearly identical.

trillion percent. Even less extreme results should be treated with caution, as in H Model 12 where going from missing one or more RR factors, to having all three present leads to a 5200% increase in HISS adoption risk. It is tempting to take these results to suggest that my theory is an extremely powerful account of HISS, but it is fairly clear that these estimates are a product of statistics, not politics. What should be noted is that these results look, in many ways, similar to the models above. Relative magnitudes and significance of variables reinforce the results from other analysis. The three barriers to conventional war measures are all independently significant, as in H Models 5-7, and in term collinearity, H Model 8 looks much like Model 25 in Table 4.8 above. Additionally, the MENA region covaries with HISS adoption events in the models below, just as it covaried with all HISS years above.

Leaving interpretations vague, then, the interaction models and the "All RR" naïve dummy variable both perform well when it comes to being correlated with HISS adoption. All of the individual barriers to offensive conventional war abroad were significant with sizable point estimates, as was the barriers summary itself. Keeping in mind that the barriers variable can range from 0 to 3 (rather than the 0 to 1 for the entry variable for example), the magnitude of the barriers summary hazard ratio indicates that it could have an even larger impact on survival times—which is the say, the likelihood of HISS adoption. This, too, is consistent with the magnitude of coefficients in the GEE and random effects models above.

The only Revolutionary Reality factor that performs poorly in this analysis is the international revolutionary ideology score. This does not attain statistical significance on its own in Model 7 or when other terms, interacted or not, are present. Interestingly, the tests for violations of the proportionality assumption indicate with 99% certainty that this variable *does* violate the assumption—i.e. it increases as a function of risk time. This is consistent with the

description in Chapter 3 of their being a secular trend in "international revolutionariness" of constitutions in the world. Because most countries enter the dataset in 1975, the secular trend in increasing constitution scores is, in essence, a time-dependent trend of this measure in the survival time data. Coupled with the overall low rates of HISS adoption, this translates to a) a lack of statistical significance when it comes to ideology increasing the risk of HISS and b) a likely violation of the proportionality assumption in the Cox model. Results (see Appendix C.12) from a variation on Model 7 in which I control for the ideology score's time dependency reveals that this score *is* correlated with HISS outcomes, when appropriate corrections are applied.

The take-away from the hazard analysis can be found in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. When all three RR variables are present, that is to say, each is not zero, HISS is much more likely than when any combination of those factors is zero. The survival function definitely shows an increased tendency towards HISS when states have these factors present, as compared to when even one is missing. The differences in these curves are also statistically significant (see the χ^2 values below Figure 4.1) even though very few adoption events are present in the data. In this chapter's final cut at the SPFS data, I found that the theorized factors that drive HISS in my theory not only tend to be present in a disproportionate number of HISS cases, they are indeed risk factors for the initial adoption of the policy.

Figure 4.1



Log-Rank test: x^2 = 10.58 (p <0.01)
Breslow Test: x2 = 11.26 (p < 0.001)
Cox regression test: LR x^2 = 5.70 (p < 0.05)

Figure 4.2


Cumulative Hazard Estimates (Nelson-Aalen)
Survival (Cumulative)
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0
10
20
30
Analysis Time (Years)
One or More RR Variables Absent
All RR Variables

VI. Conclusion: Evaluating the Hypotheses

Overall, the Revolutionary Realities theory fares quite well in comparison to alternative explanations for HISS. The triple interaction term that represents my theory's hypothesis *is* correlated with HISS, as is the naïve RR Dummy binary indicator for "all factors non-zero". This is true in the GEE models, logits with time cubes, and when using alternative specifications of the dependent variable. Only the random effects model did not show a statistically significant result on the triple interaction term in the main dependent variable, though the RR Dummy variable performed quite well. As described above, however, this is primarily because of the large standard errors in Model 5. There may also be reason to believe that this model makes unrealistic assumptions about the data. Thus the analyses in this chapter do consistently and overwhelmingly, though not perfectly, support my hypothesis, Hypothesis RR 1. Furthermore, individual components of the Revolutionary Realities theory as measured in the SPFS data were consistently statistically significantly correlated with HISS outcomes. This was true of the ideology score, the entry type, and the barriers summary variable. Also, each of the security factors used in the barriers summary was related to HISS outcomes across the board. Further, when including all three values in the same models (Model 25 and H Model 8), the coefficients fluctuate, suggesting multicollinearity among these measures and HISS outcomes. Coefficients for many variables were sufficiently large to suggest that their presence had a large reliable point estimates given limitations in the data, do suggest that HISS adoption and all RR theory factors, including the RR Dummy and triple interaction, are correlated. All seven hypotheses related to the Revolutionary Realities theory found support in various, primary models in the data.

Table 4.12 Summary of Hypotheses, Models, and Results

Hypothesis ID	Variable	Model #	Result
Social Revolution/Radical Leaders			
SR1	Recent social revolution (Goldstone)	5a-5c	Revolutionary event, +5 years: No correlation, cannot reject null hypothesis Revolutionary event, next regime: Correlation in naïve model; no correlation when controlling for Entry type
SR2	Revolutionary overthrow of previous government (Archigos)	4a-4d	Overthrow event, +5 years: No correlation, cannot reject null hypothesis Overthrow event, next regime: Correlation in naïve model; no correlation when controlling for Entry type
SR3	Democracy (BMR)	9	Democracy: Weak negative correlation in naïve model; no correlation when controlling for Entry type (App. C.3, Model D)
Geostrategy: Material Capabilities (Absolute)			
MC1	Military Expenditures	18	Positive correlation; hypothesis that lower military expenditures are correlated with HISS rejected
	Military Personnel	19	Strong positive correlation; hypothesis that fewer military personnel are correlated with HISS rejected
	Military Capabilities Index	20	Strong positive correlation; hypothesis that fewer material capabilities are correlated with HISS rejected
Geostrategy: Material Capabilities (Relative)			
MC2	Average Capabilities Ratios	17	No correlation; cannot reject null hypothesis.
MC3	Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	16	Weak positive correlation; reject null hypothesis with 90% confidence. Small magnitude effect.

Table 4.12, continued

Geostrategy: Rivals			
RIV1	Total Number of Rivals	10	Strong positive correlation
	Number of Contiguous Rivals	13;14	Strong positive correlation; correlation reduced to zero when controlling for total number of rivals
	Extra-Regional Rivals	12	Strong positive correlation
	Number of Non-Contiguous Rivals	11,15	Positive correlation; correlation falls below conventional levels when controlling for total number of rivals
Revolutionary Realities			
RR 1	Entry*Int'l Revol Score*Barriers Summ.	RR5, RR5c, H12	Strong-to-weak positive correlation in most models. Non-significant results but similar point estimates in some random effects models. Strongest correlations in hazard models specifically modeling *adoption.*
	All RR (Dummy)	RR2, H10	Strong positive correlation.
RRA	Mode of Entry	2, H2	Positive correlation
RRB	International Revolutionary Ideology Score	1, H3	Positive correlation
RRC	Barriers Summary	21, H4	Strong positive correlation
RRC1	% Non-Contiguous Rivals	22, H6	Positive correlation
RRC2	Nuclear-armed Rival	23, H5	Strong positive correlation
RRC3	Relative Capabilities, Minimum	24, H7	Strong positive correlation

Note: Hypothesis IDs in **bold** are those that are supported in the models in this chapter.

impact on the odds of HISS adoption, though it is worth recalling that HISS is rare and these odds are fairly small. Additionally, hazard models, though limited in their ability to deliver

In contrast, the variables used to operationalize competing theories of HISS failed to be consistently correlated with that pattern of sponsorship. The most notable exception was the rivals hypothesis (RIV1). Still, the effect of rivalry may be sensitive to the geographic distribution of rivals. The number of contiguous rivals was a significant predictor of HISS when it was the sole rivals measure in the analysis, but when the number of total rivals was also included, it became clear that having many nearby rivals did correlate with HISS outcomes. Secondly, there was weak support for the hypothesis regarding material capabilities as related to military overstretch (MC3). The number of militarized interstate disputes that a state is involved in was weakly correlated with HISS outcomes; it was distinguishable from 0 with 90% confidence. It is worth noting that this may merely be capturing the same information as the rivals measures—states with more rivals likely also have more MIDs. Still, there was support in Model 16 for the theory that states involved in high numbers of military disputes are also disproportionately involved in HISS. In contrast, the first capabilities hypothesis that low overall military capacity led to HISS adoption, MC1, was firmly refuted. HISS states are *not* those states that are weakest in absolute terms or are the most out-matched against a single rival. No correlation was found between average capability ratios and HISS outcomes (MC2).

The Social Revolutions and Radical Leaders hypotheses were also not all that consistently born out in the data. The first two SR hypotheses suggest that HISS is the result of revolutionary processes, and in the models that tested whether or not HISS took place during or shortly after revolutionary events found no correlation. When the time frame was extended to include the entire next regime (Model 4b and 5b), results were significant, but it appears that this

correlation is due primarily to the correlation between these variables and entry type as theorized in my account. When entry or ideology was also included in these models, RR variables retained significance and magnitude and the effect of alternative measures from Goldstone and Archigos became undistinguishable from zero (Model 4c and 5c-d). This suggests that the logic of the RR theory may be operating more consistently than the logic of 'revolutionary processes.' Regime type may also be related to HISS outcomes, although the democracy variable (Model 9) only hovers around conventional levels of significance in the main text and Appendix models. Table 4.12 summarizes the results of all the models run on the SPFS dataset in this section and summarizes the verdict on each of the individual hypotheses.

Ultimately, the alternative explanations were not born out in the data to the same extent as the RR hypotheses. This is not terrifically surprising; as discussed in Chapter 2, I argued that alternative explanations had some theoretical insights into HISS adoption but could not fully account for the phenomenon. Importantly, other theories were able to isolate some of the causes and dynamics but not to consistently explain cross-national and over time variation in HISS adoptions. The evidence presented in the models in this section confirms this general principle. HISS states have not consistently experienced recent social revolutions, they are not all non-democracies, and they are not necessarily those states with the weakest militaries or facing the greatest number of direct international security challenges. The pure geostrategy and pure radical leaders and social revolutions alternative explanations fare poorly in comparison to this dissertation's own theory of HISS adoption.

This chapter has demonstrated the relative strength of the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS. Using the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset, I have shown, through controlled hypothesis testing, that the alternative hypotheses about HISS are either unsupported

or only weakly supported by my data on sponsorship patterns. In contrast, I have shown that my theory's triple interaction term and dummy variable are consistently and statistically significantly associated with HISS out comes and HISS adoption with very few exceptions. Furthermore, when it comes to both revolutionary states and international security contexts, those measures most closely associated with the logic behind my Revolutionary Realities theory are the ones that perform best. In short, this chapter has shown that my theory is broadly plausible as an explanation of HISS and that it is significantly *more* plausible than theories suggested by the recent literature. The Revolutionary Realities theory has identified a combination of factors that are related to HISS across time and space.

The material in Part II has shown that cross-national evidence comports with the expectations of my theory. Put differently, I have not found evidence thusfar that is inconsistent with my account of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors. Of course, statistical correlation is only one type of evidence for the validity of a theory, and the analyses in Part II were not designed to make a case for the three factors' causality. This was a research design choice outlined in more detail in Chapter 1 but, ultimately, I did not believe that it would be possible to gather sufficient (unbiased, complete) observational data in a cross-national database to demonstrate causality for a rare, complex, partially unobservable phenomenon like HISS. Additionally, given that my theory places emphasis on ideological content, it would be difficult to convincingly argue that the Revolutionary Realities account is supported simply be using quantitative analyses, even though the ideology measure derived from the Comparative Constitutions project is, I believe, an innovative and extremely promising approach.

In this largely 'black-hole' field of political science research, Part II's cut at testing the general applicability of the Revolutionary Realities theory using a unique dataset has suggested that it has the potential to explain a great deal about high-intensity state sponsorship. Despite some shortcomings in the measure and the data, I have achieved promising results that my theory is a meaningful account of HISS and is superior, overall, to existing theories. I now move on to a closer examination of individual cases in Part III. I continue my analysis by pursuing both congruency testing to dig deeper into the thick causal factors at work and partial process tracing to demonstrate that the causal factors posited in this dissertation's theory do, in fact, drive HISS adoption outcomes through the theorized mechanisms.

Part III: Case Study Evidence

Chapter 5: Case Selection, Evidence, and Sources for Qualitative Analysis

In this chapter, I more fully articulate the methodology I use in the case study portion of my research. First, I summarize my cases and discuss the method and logic behind my case selection. I then remind readers of some of the key observable implications of my theory and discuss what constitutes evidence for (and against) the Revolutionary Reality account of HISS. Finally, I describe my approach to the sources of evidence I draw on to make my arguments in chapters six through nine.

I. Case Overviews

This dissertation's qualitative portion examines seven cases to test the theory's primary proposition that HISS is adopted only when three jointly necessary conditions are present. In predicting individual cases, I treat my theory as if it were a list of sufficient conditions, though I re-examine this stronger version of the theory in Part IV. I also provide a shorter assessment of an eighth case, the United States, in the conclusion and offer the initial results of a congruency test. In the introductory chapter, I outlined the scope conditions for this research. I expect that my theory should apply, that is, be able to predict and account for HISS adoption, in the post-WWII world. The theory applies at the state level, which is to say that I present a theory as to when *states* adopt a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship. While a fairly uncommon policy overall, there are nonetheless more cases of this pattern of sponsorship than this research can examine in a closer analysis in Part III. The end of Chapter 3 presented a set of potentially viable or useful case study options, as suggested by the quantitative portion of the analysis. I

have used this set of potential cases, as well as general knowledge of the cases and the literature on revolutionary regimes, to choose which states, governments, and events to study more closely.

There are two direct case-comparison studies which examine Iran and Sudan, and China and Democratic Kampuchea, and two single country studies, on Cuba and Nicaragua. The case-comparison chapters rely on the variation one of the factors between the cases to demonstrate the role that individual factor has in HISS adoption. In the case of Iran and Sudan, it is variation between entry type—popular revolution as opposed to a military coup—that highlights the similarities in domestic political processes of *all* types of non-institutionalized entry. In both cases, HISS was adopted, despite the prediction of a pure revolutionary account of high-intensity sponsorship. Also, though this does not constitute a full case, the United States in the Reagan era is examined in the conclusion, as an example of an institutionalized entry case of HISS adoption that nonetheless shows some of the same logics and mechanisms as non-institutionalized cases when it comes to foreign policy-making institutions.

The comparison between China and DK focuses on the differences in the ruling ideology of the governments of Mao and the Khmer Rouge. Whereas Maoism is international revolutionary, the central political ideals of the Khmer Rouge are national-chauvinistic, ultimately emphasizing beliefs in the superiority of the Khmer people as a race. Accordingly, DK does not adopt HISS while China does. Thus while a pure revolutionary theory might overlook this different ideological content, the Revolutionary Realities theory is able to correctly predict and account for this outcome.

The case of Cuba is a within-case study that relies on variation over time on the "barriers to offensive conventional war" factor. Cuba adopted HISS in the 1960's, but in 1975, Cuba used

its conventional military apparatus in 1975 to stage an intervention in Angola in pursuit of its international activist, anti-imperialist foreign policy. This option, however, was not available to the Cuban government throughout the 1960s. Furthermore, Cuba's policy towards Angola in particular switched from clandestine, sub-conventional sponsorship of one rebel group there to outright intervention in the civil war. Cuba thus utilized different policy tools (HISS and conventional military operations abroad) in when they faced different (higher and lower) barriers to war.

Examining Nicaragua in Part IV sheds light on some of the theory's limitations and hidden assumptions. Nicaragua under Sandinista rule seems like it should have followed a path similar to Cuba's, with the adoption of HISS during the first (and ultimately only) decade the FSLN was in power. All three factors were in place. Nicaragua, however, never adopted HISS, though it did offer broad rhetorical support to national liberation movements and, briefly and on rare occasion, material supplies. However, for Nicaragua, sponsorship was an extremely risky policy, as it was the government's alleged support for guerrillas (in particular, 'running guns' or supplying insurgents with weapons) that served as the primary justification for United States opposition to the regime, support for the "contra" forces, and threats of invasion. This case is also used to explore and attempt to account for the empirical finding in Chapter 3; Nicaragua and a number of other leftist governments scored highly on three causal factors but ultimately did not adopt HISS.

II. Case Selection Logics

My theory posits that there are three mutually reinforcing, necessary conditions that drive

Table 5.1 Case Study Summaries

Case & Chapter	Entry Type	Ideology Type	Barriers to Offensive Conventional War	Radical Leadership Prediction	Revolutionary Realities Prediction	HISS Adopted?
<u>Chapter 6</u> Iran post-1979	Non-Institutionalized (Social Revolution)	Intl Revolutionary	High	Yes	**Yes**	**Yes**
Sudan post-1979	Non-Institutionalized (Military coup)	Intl Revolutionary	High	***No***	***Yes***	***Yes***
<u>Chapter 7</u> China post-1949	Non-Institutionalized (Civil War)	Intl Revolutionary	High	Yes	**Yes**	**Yes**
Democratic Kampuchea post-1975	Non-Institutionalized (Civil War)	National Chauvinist	High (vs. imperialists) Low/Moderate (vs. Vietnam)	***Yes***	***No***	***No***
<u>Chapter 8</u> Cuba post-1959	Non-Institutionalized (Armed Popular Revolution)	Intl Revolutionary	High (1960s)	Yes	**Yes**	**Yes**
Cuba 1975 Angola Intervention	Non-Institutionalized (Armed Popular Revolution)	Intl Revolutionary	Low (1975)	***Yes***	***No***	***No***
<u>Chapter 9</u> Nicaragua post-1979	Non-Institutionalized (Armed Popular Revolution)	Intl Revolutionary	High	**Yes**	**Yes**	No
<u>Conclusion</u> United States post-1981	Institutionalized (Election)	International Neo-conservatism	Low (High Domestic)	**No**	**No**	Yes

Accurately predicted by RR Theory and ***Inaccurately Predicted by Alternative Theory***

HISS adoption.[1] One ideal model would be to present cases that tested the necessity of each condition individually, showing that its absence was sufficient to prevent HISS adoption. However, in practice, it is quite difficult to find such cases. Further, I am also interested in comparing my theory to one of the chief competing theories on this subject: that of revolutionary leaders bent on exporting their political system. Thus a few different logics are used in the case selection for various chapters and certain case study methods are leveraged across chapters to continue to build the case for the Revolutionary Realities account.[2]

Crucial Case Studies

Two of the case studies here, Cuba and Iran, should be considered crucial cases for this dissertation's theory (Eckstein 1975; Levy 2002).[3] If I cannot account for the adoption of high-intensity state sponsorship in some of the most high-profile cases, like those of revolutionary Iran and revolutionary Cuba, then my theory is seriously lacking. These are most-likely cases, in which all of the posited necessary conditions are high (Levy 2002). The outcome in question then—HISS—should obtain in these cases, and they should do so according to the logic specified in my theory.[4] Thus the success of my theory's application to these crucial cases means that it has jumped one empirical hurdle.

Method of Difference

[1] On thoughtful explanations of how necessary conditions relate to historical counterfactuals and sufficiency, see Geortz and Levy 2007.

[2] Careful case selection must be driven by the research question and is required for valid analysis and conclusions; see Collier and Mahoney 1996.

[3] Gerring and Cojocaru (2016) prefer to call this an "influential case."

[4] See Mahoney 2003, among many others. It is worth noting that while these two cases are "selected on the dependent variable" to a certain extent, the next chapters of case comparisons are less vulnerable to this accusation – which in any event may not be particularly problematic for analysis, given this research's interest in necessary conditions. See also Collier and Mahoney 1996.

The comparison between China and DK is an example of a most-similar system or Mill's method of difference (Mahoney 2003; Van Evera 1997). The cases have differences in outcome (HISS adoption vs. non-adoption) and are similar with respect to a number of other relevant variables. The economies of both nations were heavily agrarian, technologically and industrially under-developed, and peasant-based, and modernization was one of the political goals of the regime. Both in Cambodia and in China, the popular revolutionary civil war that brought the new regimes to power was peasant-based. They do, however, differ on one of the key conditions in the Revolutionary Reality theory. China and Democratic Kampuchea embraced political ideologies with very different contents. China's ideology was the type the dissertation claims is necessary for HISS. The political ideology of the DK leadership was not. Because several other key factors are the same between these systems, including, importantly, the type of entry and the fact that offensive military operations against certain rivals was limited by structural factors, it is likely that the difference in ideological content drives the divergent outcomes.

It is worth noting that one obvious divergence in this case is overall state size. China is clearly a militarily powerful nation, is more populous, and was likely to be involved in more international affairs in general. Though this may be true, the difference in ideology can still be shown, through closer analysis of the individual cases, to be relevant in how these states saw themselves in the world. Indeed, DK did not see themselves as rulers of a small nation, making the difference in objective state size in China and Cambodia ultimately subordinate to the ideological impact on foreign policy choice. Additionally, the Cuban case further suggests that state size is not, itself, a primary factor in HISS outcomes.

Three-Cornered Test of Alternative Theory

The Sudan and Iran case comparison serves the particular function of refuting the rival theory in the literature that social or popular revolutions lead revolutionaries to spread their political model and that this is the necessary and sufficient condition for HISS.[5] The military coup in the Sundanese case and the mass revolution in the Iranian case fall into the same theoretical category in my theory's coding scheme—that is, non-institutionalized regime entry. However, in the alternative explanation, these two events would fall into very different categories.[6] Elite reshuffling coups should not have the same effect on sponsorship policies as a true social or popular revolution. Furthermore, instead of simply lining up the outcome and predictive variables, I also compare the domestic political processes that enabled HISS adoption in the Iran case to those in the Sudan case. I find that the same kinds of power structures and institutions for the conduct of foreign policy are present in the wake of *both* non-institutionalized entries, and that these structures enabled these governments to pursue a policy of HISS. This chapter, then, demonstrates how the available evidence offers stronger support for this dissertation's theory than other existing accounts.

Method of Agreement

Another reason for doing these seven case studies rests on the logic of the method of agreement or most-different systems. Iran, Sudan, Cuba, and China exhibit a large number of differences.[7] This is true geographically, with cases in the Middle East, North Africa, Latin

[5] See Levy 2002, 442-443.

[6] Depending on the hypothesis (the RR theory or the alternative 'radical leaders/social revolutions' theories) one wishes to examine, these cases can be said to "maximize" the variation on the independent variable of entry type. See Lijphart 1975. It is for this reason that these two "all yes" cases are not quite susceptible to the charge that I am researching two cases with no variance on meaningful IVs or DVs (Collier and Mahoney 2003, especially page 78.) While my theory does not believe that these two entry types (coup and revolution) are different in terms of their causal role on the outcome under examination here, others in the literature have claimed that it is, thus it is worth exploring both cases in the same chapter.

[7] This notion of the method of agreement is summarized well in Mahoney 2003, drawing on Skocpol and Somers 1980. As Mahoney states, "With the method of agreement, the analyst attempts to establish that cases that share a

America, and Asia, and temporally, as these cases span from the 1950s through the 1990s. Differences in cultures, languages, historical contexts, relations with the rest of world, and political experiences abound. The sizes of these states and their military capacities also vary. Indeed, even the ideologies embraced and the means of power transition are diverse across cases according to some measures.

In each of the cases that do adopt HISS, however, there are similarities among the key factors identified in this dissertation's theory. Coups, civil wars, and social revolutions all have one thing in common: they are non-institutionalized forms of entry into power. Thus, I argue and demonstrate, they have similar effects on domestic political processes and ultimately allow for an independent and largely unchecked foreign policy-making apparatus which can be controlled by a small group of like-minded leaders. Similarly, though Maoism and Khomeini-style pan-Islamism may have wildly different theoretical bases, they are both international revolutionary political ideologies that ultimately, in combination with other factors, contribute to HISS adoption. Similarities along key dimensions, with a great deal of variation on others, drive a concurrent policy outcome. This is another reason why all three factors are examined in each case: to make use of the method of agreement while, of course, remaining focused on defending the central claim of three, jointly necessary conditions.

Cases of Non-Adoption

It is also worth noting that there are two studies of negative cases in the coming chapters.[8] Already discussed above is the Democratic Kampuchea case. The Nicaragua case is

common outcome also share common hypothesized causal factors, despite varying in other significant ways" (2003, 341, fn. 3).

[8] For a frequently-referenced discussion on the topic of the importance of negative cases in general, see Geddes 1990. See also Collier and Mahoney 1996, 72-75.

also an instance of non-adoption. Key to selecting nonevent cases for examination is the "possibility principle"; could HISS have been adopted in these cases? In part, this is a judgment about how similar the negative case is to other cases. It is also an assessment on the part of the researcher about whether, given a broader understanding of the political phenomenon in question, the outcome was simply very unlikely to happen.[9] Nicaragua looks in many ways like other instances of HISS adoption, Cuba in particular. The state leadership adopted a similar ideology, the FSLN had contacts with a number of other guerrilla groups, and it maintained the rhetoric of solidarity with global anti-imperialism. Thus its inclusion as a negative case is rather logical. This is particularly true given the quantitative evidence in Chapter 3, where Nicaragua was one of several cases that was predicted to see HISS but where it did not materialize.

Democratic Kampuchea, on the other hand, deserves a bit more rationalization. The Khmer Rouge was only in power for a short time, which means that it perhaps did not have time to implement a foreign policy of its choosing. While the reign of the regime was brief, its radical *domestic* policies were enacted fairly swiftly and with devastating thoroughness. There was time for the politicidal and genocidal activities of the regime, including emptying the cities, collectivizing the economic and social lives of its citizens, and physically eliminating large portions of the population of a number of ethnic and political groups.

Even so, it might be that, in contrast to domestic policies that heavily rely on already-loyal armed forces, forging foreign contacts takes time, and being in charge of the state for only about three and a half years limited the possibilities for sponsorship abroad. This also did not preclude the possibility of HISS adoption, because the Khmer Rouge was already in contact with

[9] Mahoney and Goertz 2004 refer to this concept as the "Rule of Exclusion" but it boils down to a general judgment regarding how the outcome in question comes about and whether or not there are factors in a case that seriously inhibit the chance of the occurrence of that outcome, even *prior* to the expectations in the theory under examination.

Table 5.2 Case Selection Approach

Method of Agreement	Method of Difference	Crucial Cases/ Influential Cases	Three-Corner Test of Alternative Hypothesis	Cases of Non-Adoption	Deviant Cases
Iran (Chapter 6) Sudan (Chapter 6) China (Chapter 7) Cuba (Chapter 8)	China and Democratic Kampuchea (Chapter 7)	Iran (Chapter 6) Cuba (Chapter 8)	Iran and Sudan (Chapter 6)	Nicaragua (Chapter 9) Democratic Kampuchea (Chapter 7)	Nicaragua (Chapter 9) United States (Conclusion)

a number of other states and non-state actors during its anti-regime struggles. Personal contacts between Khmer Rouge leaders and Chairman Mao could plausibly have facilitated a greater involvement in world affairs very quickly, had DK wanted to get involved with HISS activities. Furthermore, a number of communist movements in southeast Asia had close ties to previous iterations of the Khmer Rouge. It was only the increasing racism and xenophobia that led to both a general lack of interest in contact with foreigners and the splintering from some of these allies and potential clients of a DK patron. In short, there was every possibility of DK embracing a sponsorship policy, and it was precisely the factor identified by the theory of revolutionary realities—incorrect ideological content—that can account for why this possibility was not pursued.

Deviant Cases

Finally, this set of seven cases includes one instance of a missed case. The final case study chapter on Nicaragua shows that there are some omitted or unaccounted-for factors that contribute to HISS adoption.[1] I offer a number of explanations as to why Nicaragua did not adopt HISS and what this might say about what the Revolutionary Realities theory overlooks or assumes. Interestingly, the best explanation for non-adoption has to do with external threats to the country or government in question, a concept which other researchers have identified as actually accounting for HISS adoption in some cases (Payne 2011). This also points to the possibility that the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS correctly articulates a number of necessary conditions but that these are still not jointly sufficient conditions.

Another "missed" case—the United States—is more than a shadow case but less than a case study, and it is addressed in the conclusion, bringing the number of total cases up to (nearly)

[1] On deviant cases, see Levy 2002 and Bennet and Elman 2007.

eight. The fact that the United States did engage in high-intensity state sponsorship throughout the 1980s is surprising, given that, according to SPFS dataset, none of the three factors seems to truly be in place. A first cut at evaluating the circumstances under which the United States embarked on HISS, however, suggests that there are similar mechanisms to the ones theorized and shown in the rest of the dissertation at work. This is particularly important because US policy in this area is not usually examined according to the same theories or criteria as the foreign policies of "those" states like Syria, Cuba, or Iran.[2] The Reagan administration, for example, was fairly ideological and certainly top directors of national security, and especially the CIA, held a strong set of normative beliefs about capitalism, communism, democracy, and human freedom. Additionally, though Reagan was clearly elected via institutionalized routes, his top personnel were appointed and had a great deal of freedom to pursue sponsorship policies as part of a foreign policy agenda. Finally, though the United States had the most powerful military apparatus in the world at the time, and many of the states they targeted were, themselves, fairly weak and geographically accessible, after Vietnam, there were fairly high *domestic* political barriers to outright military interventions abroad. Additionally, the true rival of the United States in these conflicts was, in some senses, the nuclear-armed USSR. Thus, what appears to be another clear miss for the theory, then, actually serves to confirm some of its key theoretical insights.

III. What Constitutes Evidence?

Studying HISS empirically can be a challenge, as the actual support of non-state actors is itself largely unobserved and a number of my posited mechanisms are, potentially, unobservable.

[2] There are some exceptions, but the 'spreading the revolution' theories rarely discuss 'spreading democracy' in the same terms, as these theses are focused so heavily on revolutionary domestic political processes and international interactions.

The policy of HISS is a collection of individual policy decisions to covertly aid foreign armed groups, decisions and relations that "add up" to a high-intensity foreign policy. Furthermore, often this policy's very appeal is in its secret, or at least deniable, nature. There are also normative implications of sponsorship, and claims regarding individual cases of support for terrorism and insurgency are often contested. This means that the researcher will rarely find "smoking guns" lying around to directly link a policy of HISS (the outcome of interest here) to its immediate, antecedent causal factors.

Comparative historical analysis has the benefit of allowing the researcher to closely examine a few, key cases to test (or develop) theories about historical processes (Collier 1993; Thelen and Mahoney 2015). The case studies in these chapters seek to provide evidence for the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS in two ways. First, I test each case for congruency between the three causal factors of interest—entry, ideology, and barriers to conventional war abroad--and the outcome (Lieberman 2015 in Thelen and Mahoney 2015; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). Many of the factors I am examining are complex, and we have already seen how measurement error, particularly on the ideology variable, is present in the quantitative assessment.

However, case studies are not merely a means to "code variables" and correct the large-N analysis from Chapters 3 and 4. The true strength of comparative historical analysis lies in the ability to more credibly make causal arguments regarding historical processes. Through process tracing, I can more closely tie my theory's causal factors of interest to the outcome of interest (Falleti and Mahoney 2015). Case study analysis is particularly useful when the theorized causal chain is somewhat complex (Rihoux 2006). In these cases, I can look for the interaction effects of two or all three factors in a more sophisticated way than simply multiplying variable values.

Given that so little work has been done on this topic, my goal in these chapters is provide further evidence, if not irrefutable evidence, that my theory provides a strong, plausible account of the process and factors that lead to HISS adoption.[3]

Fortunately, there are a number of observable implications of my Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS that relate to my causal mechanisms.[4] Were the leaders who came to power through non-institutionalized regime change the same ones who were, in fact, writing and executing policies? Did countries with high barriers to conventional war actually perceive those barriers and attempt to circumvent them? These questions can only be answered with a closer examination of individual cases, and such judgments can be made only on the basis of qualitative evidence. Though no piece of evidence is ever decisive, this provides one more angle on the central research question: under what conditions do states sponsor non-state actors at high intensity?

For example, I predict that entry type and ideology interact to create a situation in which ideological credentials are the crucial criterion for holding positions of any power or influence. If I find evidence that, for example, purges of the bureaucracy took place on ideological grounds, I would have more confidence that my theory is at work. If, in addition, I can identify the institutions that handled foreign policy and had the opportunity to engage in HISS and find that they are narrowly controlled by the top, ruling ideologues, that is even stronger evidence that the Revolutionary Realities theory is in operation. Expression from leaders about the logic and purpose of their policies is another indicator—if leaders describe their activities in a mix of

[3] As Rueschemeyer puts it, "It is hard to deny that such bits of sometimes true theory constitute real advances in knowledge" (2003, 329).

[4] Rueschemeyer 2003, 318. This draws on the well-known notion in comparative historical analysis that a single case is *not* correctly considered a "single observation" in a statistical analysis sense. Also, Mahoney 2003, 363-365 and, of course, KKV (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

ideological and geo-strategic terms, my theory's mechanisms stemming from ideational causes are more likely to be driving the observed outcome of HISS adoption. Key observable implications (for which evidence is most likely to exist) related to the causal mechanisms outlined in Chapter 2 appear in Table 5.3.

Also, I may find that there is evidence against my theory in these cases. If, for example, a new regime leaves the institutions of the previous regime intact or relies heavily on experienced bureaucrats from the previous era but still adopts HISS, this would make my theory of HISS less plausible. I predict that such continued prominence of old-regime actors in a new

Table 5.3 Key Observable Implications of RR Assessed in Case Studies

• Leaders create new or parallel foreign policy institutions overall • Top foreign policy decision-making bodies are small • Top decision-making process are opaque, secretive and/or not open to those with alternative worldviews • Access to power and influence in foreign policy executive agencies is predicated on ideological orthodoxy; • Ideological heterodoxy, especially on foreign policy matters, leads to dismissal • Agencies that are in a position to carry out a HISS policy are headed by ideologues and are subject to limited oversight	• Leader stated preferences, articulation of political legitimacy, and assessments of political cause and effect and stakes are consistent with the content of the international revolutionary ideology • Identification of key rivals is described in ideological terms • Rival set includes a wide variety of global actors • Leaders treat sponsorship policy as a tool for advancing both geo-strategic and highly ideological goals • Leaders are aware of the high barriers to conventional military operations abroad and limitations/danger of using own national troops in direct conflict

government would introduce a different set of ideas into the policymaking process and would likely lead to moderation (a scaling down) in the execution of any sponsorship policy ultimately embraced at the top. In this instance, then, even if they adopt HISS and the entry type factor may take the "right" value, the causal chain leading from the causal factor to the outcome is clearly not in operation.

Other kinds of disconfirmatory evidence might also appear. These include, for example, a consistent mismatch between ideology of the government and leadership and the actual policies, foreign and domestic, adopted by the government. This would suggest that rulers were embracing a rhetoric that did not actually reflect their policy goals or beliefs about political cause-and-effect. Blue-collar populist rhetoric, like that seen in the recent US election, followed by a series of pro-big business and anti-labor cabinet picks and elimination of worker protections would be an example of such a mismatch. Also, if a state does face high barriers to conventional war but engages in both HISS and outright conventional aggression against drastically more powerful neighbors, this would suggest that barriers to conventional war are not influencing the choice of foreign policy in the way I expect. Also, if this sample country uses its conventional military despite high barriers and does not adopt HISS while the other two factors are in place, I would say that the regime's ideology likely overwhelmed its ability to assess its options realistically. Since the Revolutionary Realities theory argues that both ideology and structural limitations contribute to policy determinations, this would be a refutation of my logic *and* incongruent with my theory's expectations of the outcome.

IV. Sources

The sources I employ in the case study are a combination of primary and secondary source materials. As already noted, high-intensity state sponsorship is a somewhat difficult

policy to study. Even if meticulous notes of the relevant meetings and policies existed, the countries that have adopted HISS in the past are not terribly welcoming to foreign, and especially American, scholars going through their archives. In many cases, the current and most recent leadership of those states are part of the same regime, one that has fairly authoritarian or at least monolithic party tendencies. Fidel Castro, for example, passed away only months before this writing. "The Ayatollahs" are still in power in Iran, though they lack the monopoly they once held. And, due in no small part *because* of this very policy of state sponsorship, a number of these states are considered 'rogue' or 'pariah.' Thus extensive archival study of primary sources directly related to non-state actor sponsorship are difficult to come by. Further, there is no reason to assume that these sources would not themselves be systematically biased, putting forth the preferred narrative of the state government, which has incentives to obscure and justify the most relevant aspects of these cases.

Keeping in mind how polarizing the subject of revolutions, terrorists/national liberation movements, and political Islam, communism, and global capitalism, I have selected sources for the historical analysis portions of this research in a manner to reduce such biases (Thies 2002). In terms of secondary sources, I have read a variety of texts from a number of difference authors at different times. Typically, I have not relied on secondary sources written by, for example, former regime members of governments involved. Rather, I cite more heavily from scholars that themselves draw on a wide array of primary sources, such as contemporary newspapers of events and author's interviews in country. For some cases, especially Cuba, some researchers have had access to a great deal of primary source documentation, such as Perio Gleijeses. Also, certain historians and analysts have established reputations for expertise (and bias) on certain topics, and I have kept this in mind while triangulating a variety of different accounts. The Cuban American

National Foundation, for instance, is comprised of Cuban exiles who are heavily anti-Castro and for years lobbied the US government to maintain Cuba's isolation. This is, therefore, not an ideal source when it comes to cataloguing Cuba's involvement in terrorism and insurrection overseas, as the organization for many years had a stake in making the government in Havana appear to be a threat to American interests. On the other hand, Yale historian Ben Kiernan is widely recognized as one of the top authorities on the Khmer Rouge's genocide in Cambodia, and his assessment of the motivations and figures involved is likely to be highly reliable.

In terms of primary source selection, there was a similar standard and approach. Thies (2002) notes that the primary sources often choose the researcher, rather than the other way around (356). A number of random and non-random factors prevent scholars from having access to a truly representative sample of primary sources about the events of interest. This problem is hugely compounded when trying to assess something like state sponsorship of terrorism and non-state actors. US government documents on, for example, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua present one view of not only the motivations behind Managua's policies, but the content of those policies.[5] The paucity of sources from inside the states and governments in these cases, and their likely bias on these topics, means that the best strategy is to review as many sources as there are available and ultimately be fairly circumspect regarding the conclusions I can reach.

In some events, however, the problem is the opposite.[6] When it comes to the political statements, speeches, writings, and manifestos of certain actors, the researcher is spoiled for choice. In these cases, I have a three-step approach. First, I review the works that are most

[5] See Chapter 9, but there is a marked discrepancy between at least some US internal documents on Nicaraguan government support for the FMLN in El Salvador and the findings of the International Court of Justice on that topic. Of course, Regan administration officials often ignored the intelligence reports that did not conform to their expectations. In short, given the highly charged nature of the issues under examination here, relying too heavily on any one of these primary sources is unwise.

[6] As I note in the chapter on Cuba, Castro gave upwards of a thousand speeches, many of which were hours long.

central to my topic—such as support for national liberation movements and the writer's view on the historical situation of the political moment—and those that are most clearly the espoused view of the governments in question. This means that constitutions and published party documents from a sitting government, especially in the first years, are important sources. Second, I read anthologies and compendia of works available in English, taking note that in many cases the publishers were likely to have their own bias and agenda.[7] From this, I identify themes and recurrent ideological notions, even if I do not gain exposure to the full canon from which political leaders may actually have been drawing. Third, I read secondary sources for analysis and summary, to be sure that I have not missed vital insights from the experts on these theories, philosophies, and ideologies. I am therefore at least aware of relevant debates, such as the extent to which Augusto Sandino was himself Marxist,[8] and I can incorporate that into my own summaries and analysis.

In addition to conducting congruency testing on each of the cases, the following chapters also present individual arguments about HISS in general and one of the theory's key factors. These cases studies lead to a richer overall understanding of the conditions under which HISS is adopted and the process by which states decide to and are able to implement HISS. Though there are limitations in the data available on this controversial policy, the following chapters point up the common patterns in HISS adoption and how domestic political, ideational, and international factors reinforce one another in cases where states ultimately do support non-state actors worldwide.

[7] Mao's works, for instance, are published by the Chinese government with permission from the CCP.

[8] General scholarly consensus: he was not.

Chapter 6 - Non-Institutionalized Entry and HISS Adoption in Iran and Sudan

> "In keeping with the principles of governance [wilayat al-'amr] and the perpetual necessity of leadership [imamah], the Constitution provides for the establishment of leadership by a faqih possessing the necessary qualifications [jami' al-shara'it.] and recognized as leader by the people…Such leadership will prevent any deviation by the various organs of State from their essential Islamic duties."
>
> - Preamble, Iranian Constitution, 1979

> "The final straw which reportedly hastened [Minister of Interior] Gen. [Faisal Ali] Abu Salih's resignation was a confrontation that occurred in October 1990 between police and security agents. The police raided a farm in the Khartoum suburb of Halfayia where individuals from six Arab and Islamic countries were covertly undergoing military training under the watchful eye of Sudanese security agencies, but without the knowledge of the police."
>
> - Human Rights Watch Report on the 1991 resignation of Interior Minister in Sudan[1]

I. Introduction

High-intensity state sponsorship is an uncommon policy, one that few states have adopted over the course of history. In Part II, I demonstrated that the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS could plausibly account for HISS outcomes over time and space. The three factors that I claim are necessary for HISS adoption (a regime or leader's non-institutionalized entry to power, the government's espousal of an international-revolutionary ideology, and an international context in which the state is unable to carry a conventional war abroad to its foes) were systematically better predictors of HISS than any other factors. Most importantly, my theory has

[1] From Human Rights Watch. 1996. *Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan.* New York/Washington DC: Human Rights Watch, 129; citing a piece in the pan-Arab daily newspaper *Al Hayat.*

argued that the interaction of these three factors is what leads to HISS. In the multi-variate analysis in Chapter 4, this triple interaction was found to be statistically related to HISS outcomes. I now turn from these cross-national analyses to study individual cases of HISS adoption (and non-adoption) in the post-World War II period.

In this chapter, I examine the cases of Iran and Sudan to make two arguments. First, I seek to demonstrate that the instances of HISS adoption in post-1979 Iran and post-1989 Sudan are congruent with the expectations of my theory. To do this, I show in turn that each state adopted HISS and that, according to secondary and primary source evidence, the three causal factors were present: non-institutionalized entry, international revolutionary ideology, and high barriers to conventional war abroad. I also use process tracing evidence where possible and describe and analyze the mutually-reinforcing aspects of my variables where they had an effect on foreign policy decisions in general and, if evidence is available, on sponsorship decisions in particular. Notably, Iran is a critical case for this research—if my theory's expectations are not aligned with the evidence in one of the most infamous and well-known instances of HISS adoption, it fails a major test. As I show here, however, it passes.

The second purpose of this chapter is to explore the causal role of one of the three factors in my theory: the leadership's mode of entry to power. My theory suggests that, when the other two conditions obtain, non-institutionalized entry creates a political environment where the leadership pursues the foreign policy it wants, using all the resources of the state. Rather than having to advocate within the political system for one particular state-group linkage at a time (consider the Obama administration's efforts to arm suitable nationalist rebels in Syria against ISIS), the government, should it choose to, can pursue a high-intensity sponsorship policy with little to no external oversight. This is because there are no effective foreign policy-related

institutions that are not controlled by loyalists to the new leadership. In an uncertain period of consolidation, dissent is dangerous and many leaders and functionaries agree with and support similar policy goals. Further, leaders tend to rely on the ideas already present in their ideologies as the basis of international relations. Those who do not agree with these ideas are denied access to power. By emphasizing this one factor, I am able to more closely analyze domestic political processes that lead to HISS adoption. Further, I can link those processes to my hypothesized causal factor: entry type.

This chapter is particularly important in refuting the revolutionary leadership theories of HISS, which suggest that social revolutionary processes lead to HISS. In contrast, I demonstrate here that there is nothing unique to popular movement-based social revolutions in causing HISS; non-institutionalized entry suffices to trigger the necessary domestic political processes. In Iran, a massive, popular political uprising led to the fall of the Shah's authoritarian monarchy regime, bringing religious populists, namely Ayatollah Khomeini, into power. In Sudan, one military coup among a number of such coups in the country's modern history ultimately brought Omar al-Bashir, Hassan al-Turabi, and the National Islamic Front to power. These non-institutionalized modes of entry, in conjunction with barriers to conventional war and a particular type of ideology, led to the adoption of HISS in both polities. The new governments in both Iran and Sudan tended to rely on like-minded loyalists, building a novel governing apparatus either in place of or beyond the control of other institutions. Foreign policy was conceived of and executed by ideologically-oriented leaders and the new, inexperienced organizations they controlled. Those with differing opinions were, one way or another, exiled from the state power centers that handled foreign policy and security. Thus, HISS was adopted through similar

domestic-political mechanisms in both cases; processes that can be traced back to *non-institutionalized entry*, not revolutionary overthrow per se.

The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I begin examining the evidence for congruence with the Revolutionary Reality theory in the case of Iran, describing the HISS outcome of the case as well as evidence for the presence of two of the three necessary conditions. Section three examines the process of regime change in Iran, emphasizing the people in charge of, and the changes made to, the major governing institutions and the foreign policy apparatus in particular. Section four lays out the Sudanese case. Because it is not a critical case, I summarize the ideology and barriers factors more briefly, emphasizing the domestic political processes that contributed to its sponsorship policy following the 1989 coup. The Sudan case is also consistent with my theory—HISS was adopted when a military coup but not a popular revolution brought the new regime to power. Furthermore, the processes that my theory argues lead from entry type to HISS adoption appear to have been at work in these cases. Section five summarizes this chapter's findings and concludes.

II. Iran and HISS: Congruency of Necessary Conditions and HISS Outcome

Outcome: HISS Adoption

The Iranian policy of sponsorship for non-state armed actors began to gather speed shortly after the overthrow of the Shah in February 1979. By the middle of the decade, Iran was backing armed movements in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Turkey, and Afghanistan.[2] Iran also paid foreign agents for assassination attempts against Iranian dissidents (achieving at least one success) on US soil.[3] The country soon earned both a spot on the US's list of State Sponsors of

[2] Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009a and 2009b.

[3] Anderson 2002. He relies on data from both ITERATE (Mickolus et al. 2001) and RAND (2015) to identify events in which Iranian state sponsorship was "materially corroborated by multiple and diverse witnesses" (257).

Terrorism (in 1984) and bore a general reputation for using violent, subversive groups throughout the world. Iran consistently denied its involvement in all such activities, even for incidents in which there was a great deal of evidence supporting the accusations.[4] There is documentation, for example, of high-level meetings within Iranian leadership specifically to organize operational support for terrorist missions involving the suicide bombing in Lebanon in 1982.[5] Most who study state sponsorship in depth have identified Tehran's long-time pattern of support for many insurgents, terrorists groups, and individual actions over the years.[6]

In the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship database, Iran is coded as a HISS state from 1979-1981, and, in certain specifications of the dependent variable, again from 1985-1988. It is worth noting again that the SPFS data is biased towards ongoing civil wars and may consistently miss relevant sponsorship activity. I thus draw on a number of other sources. There are, for example, claims in secondary source literatures that Iran provided support to anti-government groups in Malaysia and the Philippines in the early 1980s.[7] Iran was also directly linked to a number of individual terrorist attacks against US targets in Lebanon, Kuwait, the UAE, Turkey, and Greece.[8] It is also worth noting that Iran was involved in terrorist actions carried out by state agents, in particular the assassination and harassment of overseas Iranian foes, in Europe and the United States during the decade as well.[9]

[4] Sick 2003. Additionally, a number of cases of individual victims of violence and kidnapping were brought against the government in Iran, particularly from hostages in Lebanon. See, for example, Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran.

[5] O'Ballance 1996, 75.

[6] Byman 2005; Byman et al. 2001.

[7] Bakhash 1984, 235.

[8] Anderson 2007.

[9] Hiro 1985. See also Byman 2005.

The global reach of Iranian sponsorship is made more apparent when the activities of its closest proxy, Hezbollah in Lebanon, are considered.[10] As one of the most active terrorist groups of the 1980s, Hezbollah conducted a number of attacks against civilians, assisted in airplane hijackings, and engaged in numerous kidnappings. The organization is also responsible for bombing the Israeli embassy in Argentina in 1992, and the organization in turn sponsored other groups around the world.[11] This is a dynamic that is not captured easily in databases but that does show how Iran used sponsorship as a central pillar of its foreign policy.

Thus, the pattern of sponsorship exhibited by Iran in the 1980s fits the definition of "high-intensity states sponsorship of non-state armed actors." It is true that Iran was likely blamed for far more violence and accused of being associated with many more movements than was empirically the case. However, the activities outlined here are some of the most well-documented and more generally agreed upon assertions regarding Iranian policy. Thus while individual accusations of involvement may be biased or false, this research maintains that the Iranian government was still inarguably a massive source of support for non-state actors and a "HISS state" during the period immediately following the 1979 revolution.

Condition 1: International Revolutionary Ideology

The leadership in Iran following the 1979 revolution embraced an ideology that is "international revolutionary" as defined by this research. Not only did the rhetoric and political-religious works and speeches of key leaders like the Ayatollah Khomeini influence the

[10] Takeyh 2006.

[11] Byman 2005. O'Ballance goes on to add that, "The Iranian-backed Hezbollah could indeed be accurately referred to as International Terrorism Inc. as it gathered several individual terrorist groups under its control, head-hunted operators and trained suicide bombers, weaving them into the Western Hostage Saga, dramatic hijacking exploits and terrorist activities against Israel and its supporters and sympathisers, producing such a comprehensive terrorist jamboree as had scarcely been seen before. The paymaster and instigator was Ayatollah Khomeini, operating through Department 15 of the Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry" (1996, 212).

revolutionary movement itself, the government ultimately enshrined many of these principles in the national constitution adopted in 1979. I therefore assert that the government of Iran espoused an international revolutionary ideology in the period following the overthrow of the Shah and during the period in which it implemented a foreign policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors.

In Chapter 2, I outlined three criteria which had to be met in order for a political ideology to qualify as an "international revolutionary ideology." An international revolutionary ideology is a political ideology which 1) claims to have normative international application 2) emphasizes the historical situation of the revolution, which represents a "new phase" in an eschatological history and 3) calls its adherents to action, to help realize this international political end state. Commitments to an ideology with these three components drives HISS by influencing the perceptions, beliefs, and preferences of political leaders, who will desire an activist, international, anti-status quo foreign policy.

The Iranian Constitution of 1979

The Iranian constitution adopted in 1979 commits the nation to a program of Islamic government. As explicated in the constitution's preamble,

> "Our nation, in the course of its revolutionary developments, has cleansed itself of the dust and impurities that accumulated during the taghuti[12] past and purged itself of foreign ideological influences, returning to authentic intellectual standpoints and world-view of Islam. It now intends to establish an ideal and model society on the basis of Islamic norms. The mission of the Constitution is to realize the ideological objectives of the movement and to create conditions conducive to the development of man in accordance with the noble and universal values of Islam."[13]

[12] A note on Arabic and Persian words found in this chapter in is in order. I rely on the spelling and punctuation of the source documents for these translations and transcriptions throughout. In this case, the translated constitution uses *mustad'afun* and *wilayat al-faqih* in the text, so I have employed those same terms and spellings throughout this section.

[13] "Iranian Constitution 1979." Preamble: The Form of Government in Islam. Available ConstituteProject.org.

This is not a series of speeches intended to rouse popular uprisings, nor is it a university lecture on political Islam. It is, rather, a statement of the political purpose and goals of Iran as captured in the very opening of its national constitution.

The revolutionary ideological strain of this language is unmistakable. Firstly, the constitution refers to "noble and universal values of Islam," which indicates the belief that these norms have international application. This language and rhetoric appears throughout the preamble and in several other parts of the constitution. In Article 3 and Article 11, the constitution refers the Islamic Republic of Iran's duty to support Muslims everywhere and to work towards the "political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world."[14] In Articles 152 and 154, the universality of the ideals of the new Iranian government appears once more, in references to the "rights of all Muslims" and the "just struggles of the *mustad'afun* against the *mustakbirun* in every corner of the globe."[15]

There are also hints of the notion of a historical trajectory and global eschatology. In the excerpt of the Preamble, there is a reference to an "impure" past, and the beginning of a new era. In Article 2, the constitution asserts that, "The Islamic republic is a system based on belief in…3. The return to God in the hereafter and the constitutive role in this belief in the course of man's ascent towards God."[16] This notion of the "course" of man's ascent, and the hint of an end-state of the world is explicitly religious, but it is captured in this distinctly political document. Even more clearly, the preamble states that,

> "The aim of government is to foster the growth of man in such a way that he progresses towards the establishment of a Divine order (in accordance with the

[14] Ibid, Chapter 1. Article 11.

[15] Ibid, Chapter X. Article 152; Chapter X. Article 154. The notion of the oppressed (*mustad'afun*) fighting against the oppressors (*mustakbirun*) is a common theme in Iranian political rhetoric at the time. International political Islam considers itself, in many instances, to be the champions of the oppressed.

[16] Iranian Constitution 1979. Chapter I, Article 2. Cl. 3. Available ConstituteProject.org.

> Qur'anic phrase "And toward God is the journeying" [3:28]); and to create favourable conditions for the emergence and blossoming of man's innate capacities, so that the theomorphic dimensions of the human being are manifested (in accordance with the injunction of the Prophet (S)).”[17]

Ultimately, this divine order is the eschatological end-state of the world, and the constitution fully endorses this worldview.

There is also evidence throughout the document of the imperative for action in pursuit of these historically-oriented goals. The preamble praises time and time again the actions of those who stood up against the former Iranian government in pursuit of an “ideal and model society.” It also calls for “the continuation of the struggle,” all of which evokes the notion of the need for action.[18] The political program outlined in the preamble requires the “active and broad participation” of all Iranians.[19] Furthermore, “Each individual will himself be involved in, and responsible for the growth, advancement, and leadership of society.”[20] The overthrow of the previous regime was just the beginning; the international revolutionary ideology requires more activity from its adherents to bring about the idealized political order.

Perhaps the clearest call to action is in the principle of *wilayat al-faqih*.[21] Roughly translated to “rule of the Islamic jurisprudent,” this is a central political philosophy forwarded by

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[17] Ibid. Preamble: The Form of Government in Islam.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid, Preamble: The Wilayah of the Just Faqih. Also, Khomeini 1981. Note that all “Khomeini 1981” references are from a collection of Khomeini’s political writings and speeches entitled *Islam and Revolution,* translated by Hamid Algar. Chief among the texts is a series of lectures collectively referred to “Islamic Government” (*Hukumat-I Islami).* Though the CIA had a translation of this work done in 1978, it was an English translation of the Arabic translation of a student’s transcript of the original Persian lectures. The translator notes that his work is an improvement on the CIA’s efforts and is an “integral and faithful translation of the third edition of the Persian text, published at Najaf in 1391/1971” (26). Because this volume contains Khomeini’s views and appearances across a period longer than a decade (1970-1981), additional information about the date and context of speeches, lectures, and interviews are provided in the footnotes for each individual citation.

the Ayatollah Khomeini in the decades leading up to the revolution. It calls upon the righteous, those who are learned in Islam and who are virtuous, to take the reins of the country and lead. As discussed in further detail below, those who followed Khomeini's ideology and teachings considered those clergy who abstained from political activity to have fundamentally misunderstood Islam. Referring to the accounts in the Qu'ran of the prophet's involvement in the political and social affairs of the community, Khomeini states that such an arrangement is natural and necessary.[22] Those most enlightened and learned in the ways of Islam should guide the community.

It is noteworthy, then, that the Iranian constitution of 1979 whole-heartedly adopts the notion of the rule of the clergy, referring explicitly to the program of political Islam that Khomeini developed. This is well summarized here:

> "The plan of the Islamic government based upon wilayat al-faqih, as proposed by Imam Khumaynî at the height of the period of repression and strangulation practiced by the despotic regime, produced a new specific, and streamlined motive for the Muslim people, opening up before them the true path of Islamic ideological struggle, and giving greater intensity to the struggle of militant and committed Muslims both within the country and abroad."[23]

This mingles all three definitional criteria, and places the Ayatollah Khomeini as the central ideational figure of the new regime.

Khomeini's Writings

Because the post-revolution government of Iran publicly espoused the ideas present in the constitution, and because those ideas clearly derive from and reference Khomeini's political-religious philosophy, it is worth exploring those ideas in further depth. Though the constitution

[22] Khomeini 1981, especially in his introduction to the Najaf lectures on Islamic government.

[23] Iranian Constitution 1979. Preamble: Islamic Government. Available ConstituteProject.org

itself is quite suggestive of the international revolutionary nature of the political ideology, these elements are also consistently and even more clearly present in writings and lectures of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Furthermore, there is some evidence in these writings that this political philosophy shapes how leaders might conceive of the goals and stakes of a new government, as well as the legitimacy and efficacy of various measures and political programs. These are the mechanisms via which Chapter 2 suggested ideology leads to policy preferences and thereby outcomes, and so the writings of Khomeini bear further examination.[24]

Khomeini's political philosophy draws explicitly and heavily on Islam—not only its religious teachings, but its symbols, language, and history. In *Islamic Government,* a work derived from a series of lectures the Ayatollah delivered in Najaf in 1970, Khomeini refers frequently to the historic struggle of Muslims against the rule of tyrants—that is to say, non-Muslim leaders that do not rule using Islamic principles.[25] Khomeini's ideal model is based on the notion that Ali ibn Abi Talib served as both the political and religious leader following the death of the prophet Muhammad.[26] Referred to by Khomeini in these lectures as the "Commander of the Faithful," Ali was the son-in-law of the prophet who, in the Shia tradition, was Muhammad's chosen successor. This blending of temporal and spiritual power is a powerful historic symbol and is frequently referenced in Khomeini's political program for 20th century Muslims.

Expanding on this basic analogy to historical Islam, Khomeini's lectures and speeches on Islamic government then draw several modern parallels. The political program that Khomeini

[24] A thorough and expert examination of revolutionary potential of the writings of a number of important Iranian revolutionary figures can be found in Lafraie 2009.

[25] Khomeini 1981. See, among others, 93-96 and 227. Also, see note in fn. 20 regarding references to this source in this section.

[26] Ibid, with 55-57 and 225 as some examples of this theme.

advocates would "restore the glory of Islam."[27] During the height of the anti-government protests in Iran, Khomeini frequently referred to Reza Shah as "the Pharaoh of our age,"[28] with a clear analogy to the righteousness of Moses in freeing his people from slavery in Egypt. By placing Iran's contemporary political struggle in this meaningful historical context (which is the second definitional criterion of this research's theorized ideology type), Khomeini placed a great deal of powerful, symbolic energy into the movement as a whole.

There are also clear eschatological notes to the ideology. The end goal of this political program is "fulfilling the goals of the prophetic mission and establishing a just order that would result in the happiness of mankind."[29] As he expands in a post-revolutionary interview, Khomeini declares that,

> "In the prophet's view, the world is merely a means, a path by which to achieve a noble aim that man is himself unaware of but that is known to the prophets. They know what the final destiny of man will be if he continues in his unfettered[30] state, and they also know how different it will be if man is tamed and follows the path leading the noble rank of true humanity."[31]

This notion of a 'final destiny' for mankind instills a stronger fervor and commitment to the ideals of the revolution; what might not be sacrificed in pursuit of such a goal? Furthermore, it magnifies the stakes of the political movement as well as its legitimacy.

The constitution has already demonstrated that the Iranian government considered it the duty of all citizens to participate in the political activity of a revitalized nation; Khomeini's writings consistently and clearly incite the clergy in particular to action. In his lectures to

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[27] Khomeini 1981, 301. Message to the Pilgrims, Tehran, Iran. Sept. 12 1980.

[28] Khomeini 1981, 226-227. In Commemoration of the First Martyrs of the Revolution, Najaf, Iran. Feb. 19, 1978.

[29] Khomeini 1981, 37. From his lectures in Islamic Government.

[30] "Unfettered" refers to the notion described earlier in the source text of man as an "unbridled beast" that needs to have its natural appetites and passions "tamed" by the restraints of Islamic government. See fn. 29 for pages.

[31] Khomeini 1981, 330-332. Interview with Khomeini, Jan. 2, 1980.

theological students in Najaf, he calls upon the younger scholars to engage in "propagation and instruction" as one of their key duties. As described above, he castigates those inactive clergy who are unwilling to engage in political activism as negligent in their duties. This is well demonstrated in the following passage, which is worth quoting at length, as it combines several of the themes under discussion here:

> "Are you waiting for the angels to come and carry you on their wings? Is it the function of angels to pamper the idle? The angels spread their wings beneath the feet of the Commander of the Faithful (upon whom be peace) because he was of benefit to Islam: he made Islam great, secured the expansion of Islam in the world and promoted its interests. Under his leadership, a free, vital, virtuous society came into being and won fame; everyone had to bow before its might, even the enemy. But why should anyone bow before you, whose only activity is offering opinions on points of law?"[32]

Because of the explicitly political nature of Khomeini's program, this goes beyond that of a religious instructor guiding younger clergy in spiritual matters. It is a very powerful call to political action.

The goals that the angels will support and the ideas that these students must propagate are those of a revolutionary overthrow of the current government and the establishment of the *wilayat al-faqih*. Khomeini also says time and again that if the Muslim masses are instructed in the ideas that Khomeini articulates, they will all recognize this truth and will resist tyrannical rule. This is a clear "political cause and effect" statement; the action of clergy and people combined will achieve the vitally important goals of this political program. Even the legitimacy of violence is supported in Khomeini's later speeches. In announcing the formation of the Council of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Khomeini says that, "The honorable people of Iran

[32] Khomeini 1981, 142-143. From the Islamic Government lectures. Also, "Prepare yourselves to be of use to Islam; act as the army for the Imam of the Age, in order to be able to serve him in spreading the rule of justice" (148).

must not cease their ardent struggle…they can defend themselves, even if it results in death of their attackers."[33] Because the ideology evokes high-stakes historical parallels and a moral imperative to action, legitimacy logically extends to much a wider and more violent means for the achievement of these ends. Further, this notion of an aggressive defense is consistent with the foreign policy preference for going abroad to improve national defense.

Finally, I have argued that there must be an international or universal moral component to an international revolutionary ideology. This was already mentioned in the Constitution; the theme of internationalism and, indeed, universalism, also appears throughout Khomeini's speeches and writings. Most clearly, he refers to "Muslims" with far, far greater frequency than "Iranians." Indeed, he argues that while nationalism is "unobjectionable," anything that places "barriers" between Muslim communities throughout the world is to be rejected.[34]

Because Muslims live in many countries, the moral implications of Khomeini's statements are therefore international. The statements of what is right and wrong, tolerable and intolerable, holy and sinful, apply (or are said to apply) to all Muslims throughout the world. Multiple examples occur—that it is wrong for a Muslim to avail himself of the legal system of a tyrant and that all Muslims desire to live in a more Islamic society[35]—throughout the constitution and the writings of the Ayatollah. Khomeini refers to Muslims everywhere as his "Brothers and sisters!" In short, the explicit political and social unity of Muslims everywhere is a central goal and rhetorical focus of the ideology.

[33] Ibid, 248. From the declaration of the formation of the Council of the Islamic Revolution, in Paris, January 2, 1979.

[34] Ibid, 302. From Sept. 12 1980 Message to the Pilgrims, issued from Tehran.

[35] Ibid, 94.

Indeed, this normative framework is frequently expanded beyond the Muslim world, particularly after the successful overthrow of the Shah, to encompass all "oppressed peoples" on the globe. In his New Year's message in 1980, Khomeini declared that, "Both superpowers are intent on destroying the oppressed nations of the world, and it is our duty to defend those nations!...Not only does Islam refuse to recognize any difference between Muslim countries, it is the champion of all oppressed people."[36] The monarchical tyrants of the Middle East are cast increasingly as puppets of imperialism (the United States, Great Britain, Israel, and the USSR). Thus, all populations that have been subjected to imperial exploitation are morally significant in the political programs of the Iranian regime under Khomeini.

This ideology easily meets all three criteria for "international revolutionary" and this analysis shows that some of the pathways for influencing policy preferences are present as well. The specifics of Khomeini's work and the constitution help demonstrate why a political leader espousing an international revolutionary ideology might come to the conclusion that HISS is a desirable policy. Support for all "oppressed peoples" in the world, when the reward is a just world, lasting human happiness, and violence is therefore a legitimate tool, can easily take the form of providing weapons and training to those resisting tyranny. Indeed, there is a moral imperative for action to forward the interests of people everywhere. Khomeini states that his program of political Islam "refuse[s] to recognize any difference" across nations of Muslims and oppressed non-Muslims.[37] For leaders to simply pick and choose a few groups to support strategically, here and there, across the world, would not be consistent with this type of ideology. This thereby contributes to the appeal of a "high intensity" policy by ramping up the scope of

[36] Ibid, 286. Message delivered March 21, 1980.

[37] Ibid, 287.

support and legitimizing tactics like insurgency and terrorism. National borders are themselves not morally acceptable divisions, and so foreign policies need not operate according to this convention. Furthermore, with the requirement that oppressed individuals and learned clergy act to support and help their communities, what then should a state government do, when it has access to more resources and the ability to potentially reach significantly greater numbers and affect their struggles in much more material ways? Inaction is even more intolerable from this position of national power. The ideologically-informed foreign policy preferences of leaders who espouse these ideas therefore see great appeal in a HISS program.

Condition 2: Barriers to Conventional Military Operation Abroad.

The second of the three necessary factors here is the high barriers to conventional military operations abroad, which limits the tools available for the state to practice an international, activist foreign policy that employs the use of force. Iran was faced with a number of such limitations on conventional conflict against its assorted external enemies and rivals. Shortly after the revolution, Iraq and Iran engaged in a large-scale conventional war, a grueling affair that would last the rest of the decade, draining the Iranian economy, killing an estimated one million persons, and arraying a startlingly wide set of world powers against Iran. Furthermore, Iran found that it had very few allies in the first years of the revolution, with a particular animus towards, and from, Washington. Iran was committed to pursuing a policy of "neither East nor West" and was also largely opposed to the Middle Eastern monarchies on ideological grounds, yielding quite a portfolio of foreign foes. Thus all three types of barriers discussed in Chapter 2 are present. Iran was militarily outclassed against its enemies, many of whom were geographically distant and several of which were nuclear powers.

The Iran-Iraq War provided one of the most serious obstacles to Iran pursuing conventional war abroad in pursuit of any other foreign policy goals. One account holds that the Iranian military was in a truly dismal state as the Iraqis launched their attack in 1980. The best units (of those remaining after post-revolution purges had eliminated thousands of officers) were on the northern and eastern border (the border with the Soviet Union) or seeking to subdue and control internal uprisings in the Kurdish region. Only a quarter of the fighting units in the military were actually operational, and there were only 120 tanks stationed along the Iran-Iraq border.[38]

As the conflict wore on, international support disproportionately went to Iraq. In a rare Cold War consensus, the Soviet Union *and* the United States both offered aid to Baghdad throughout the 1980s.[39] During the course of the nine-year war, Iran imported just over $5 billion worth of arms, as compared to the nearly $30 billion Iraq received. In 1980 alone, the value of Iraq aircraft imports ($1.5 billion) was over three times the value of Iranian aircraft imports during the entire duration of the conflict ($452 million).[40] An analyst's summary of the military situation for Iran circa 1988 suggested that in terms of disadvantages in both military matériel and economic strength, Iran was seriously struggling to conduct the war and should be expected to lose.[41]

Iran also found itself in an equipment crisis. The Iranian military had been receiving American systems for decades under the Shah. With the growing animosity between Washington and Tehran, a number of orders for spare parts and additional weapons systems were

[38] Bakhash 1984.

[39] SIPRIa and b. "On Screen Output." http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php (July 27, 2016).

[40] These figures and the previous ones also from SIPRI. Values are "trend indicator values" expression in constant 1990 US dollars.

[41] Segal 1988. Segal even goes so far as to predict that Iran would "lose" the war.

cancelled.[42] Though the Iranian government was eventually able to find new suppliers for parts and experts willing to train troops on new system, this process took time.[43] What military strength the nation did possess in the first year or two of the new republic was needed to defend its borders and repel the Iraqi attack. It was simply not conceivable that these scarce military resources could be allocated to other political projects, like an international activist foreign policy using the state's armed forces.

Nor did Iran have general diplomatic support coming from abroad; rather, its enemies multiplied partially as a result of ideologically-influenced dynamics. By the end of 1980, Iran did not find itself with strong allies in any of these centers and was engaged in low-level political hostilities with many nations. The Islamic republic's interactions with three different nation groups (the United States and Great Britain; the USSR; and the Middle East, especially the Gulf state monarchies) show how security concerns and ideology operated together in Iran's relations with the world.

Despite US support for the Shah prior to 1979, it was not inevitable that revolutionary Iran and the United States would become enemies. Several events following the overthrow of the Shah set the two nations firmly against one another. Sometime after his ouster, the Shah sought medical assistance in the United States. Iran wanted him extradited to stand trial for the crimes of his regime. This was a key cause of the student protests in Tehran, the seizure of the US Embassy, and the ensuing hostage crisis. The United States was also involved in a number of anti-regime activities and plots involving the remaining pro-Shah elements of the Iranian armed

[42] Alikhani 2000; he outlines and provides documentation for a number of policies the US implemented against Iran. See also Ganji 2006 for an extensive account of US/Iranian relations during the revolutionary period.

[43] Segal 1988. North Korea actually provided the bulk of military material, largely Soviet-made, after the first few years of the war.

forces. Furthermore, the United States supported Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. For their part, Iranian leaders actively set themselves against the United States and the West, frequently casting the former as the "Great Satan" and a leading enemy of Muslims and oppressed people worldwide.

Iran did not make an ally of the Soviet Union, either. It was the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that led Iranian leadership in general, and Khomeini in particular, to view the East with as much suspicion as the West.[44] Also, as the Iranian revolution consolidated, it accused the communist Tudeh Party in Iran of hosting Soviet spies and supporting anti-regime activity. The party was banned, its members persecuted, and its presence ultimately eliminated from the Iranian political landscape.[45] Though espionage-related concerns were probably not unfounded (a "revolutionary reality" facing Iran), the brutal suppression of the Tudeh in the wake of the non-institutionalized entry of the new regime created further tension between the communist super-power and the fledging Islamic republic.

The Gulf monarchies were particularly concerned with the revolutionary bent of post-1979 Iran. The Ayatollah Khomeini spoke against the corruption of the leaders of Muslim countries, and called for the people to overthrow these false leaders just as the people of Iran had done to Reza Shah.[46] Khomeini frequently used the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the *hajj*, as an occasion to preach his political program, and militant pilgrims were encouraged to spread the

[44] Sadri 1997, 95-96. Khomeini put it somewhat more colorfully in a perfect example of the interaction between ideology and security imperatives: "Be fully aware that the danger represented by the communist powers is no less than that of America; the danger that America poses is so great that if you commit the smallest oversight, you will be destroyed. Both superpowers are intent on destroying the oppressed nations of the world, and it is our duty to defend those nations" (1981, 286). From New Year's Message delivered in Tehran, March, 21 1980.

[45] Hiro 1985, 226-230; Keddie 2006, 254.

[46] See a number of messages to pilgrims in Khomeini 1981.

Table 6.1 Iran and Rival Powers, 1980 and 1985

Country	Military Expenditure* (in thousands $US, current year)		Military Personnel*		GDP**	
	1980	**1985**	**1980**	**1985**	**1980**	**1985**
Iran	3,386,907	14,091,000	305,000	345,000	2,364.55	1,567.86
United States	143,981,000	245,154,000	2,050,000	2,244,000	12,436.16	12,436.16
Great Britain	26,757,385	24,200,000	330,000	334,000	10,004.83	8,538.34
USSR	201,000,000	275,000,000	3,900,000	3,900,000		
Iraq	3,386,780	12,870,000	430,000	788,000	919.88	775.17
Saudi Arabia	19,261,130	17,693,000	79,000	80,000	16,715.96	7,827.01
Israel	5,178,093	4,225,000	196,000	195,000	6,599.30	6,903.58

*From Correlates of War. Singer et al. 1972, updated 2010. ** From the World Bank.

message, network, and make social connections on the *hajj*.[47] Specific events, such as Iranian involvement in the attempted coups in Bahrain, served to further inflame tensions.[48]

With so many enemies, many of which defined by or created on ideological perceptions, it would have been impossible for Iran to truly engage in a global foreign policy with its conventional military apparatus. Table 5.1 above paints a portrait of a rather militarily out-classed Iranian nation. Some adversaries—such as the USSR—loomed menacingly on the border, rather too close for comfort. Some, such as the United States and the other Western enemies—including Israel, an "illegitimate offspring of the great Satan"[49]—were geographically far-off. Iran did not have the capability to project its military power that far afield. And, of

[47] Ramazani 1986, Chapter 6-9.

[48] Ibid, 49-53.

[49] Ramazani 1986, 154

course, the USSR, the United States, and Israel possessed nuclear weapons, making direct confrontation particularly risky. There were, therefore, very high barriers to conventional, offensive operation with all of these enemies and rivals.

III. Non-Institutionalized Entry and Domestic Political Processes in Iran

It is clear that Iran adopted a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship for non-state armed actors around the globe shortly after the events of 1979. It is also clear, from the discussion above, that two of the three factors theorized by the Revolutionary Realities account of HISS were in place for Iran post-1979. The third factor, non-institutionalized entry, has been alluded to throughout. The events of 1979 that ultimately brought the clerics and Ayatollah Khomeini to power were, to put it mildly, extra-institutional. The onus is now on this research to demonstrate that the causal pathways which my theory posits lead from irregular entry to the outcome of HISS are present.

The account below goes into further detail regarding this factor and the effects of the non-institutionalized power transition on who made policy, what institutions or organizations made and executed policy, and what policy ideas were likely to be adopted. I find that these pathways are indeed present. In the wake of the tumultuous power transition, the new leadership began to focus heavily on ideological purity and unity of purpose as the main criteria for access to power, created new institutions or replaced the leadership of existing institution with those like-minded loyalists, and advocated and pursued policies that were consistent with the ideological beliefs of that leadership. Furthermore, those who dissented with the views were denied access to power, and key foreign policy decisions were made by a handful of people at the very top. Though the outcome of HISS itself was an interaction of all three above factors, the "entry type" factor tends to operate very much as my theory predicts.

The Revolution in Brief

Though many elements of the domestic revolutionary movement had an impact on who got into power and what ideas, preferences, and popular supporters those leaders had, this account of HISS does not focus on the Iranian revolution itself. Summarizing the cataclysmic events with breathtaking brevity, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 saw the overthrow of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, by a broad coalition of Iranian social forces, united in opposition to the corrupt and oppressive monarchical government. The Shah underestimated the importance of Islam in Iranian society in general, particularly among the agrarian and urban bazaar classes, and the influence and ambition of the *ulama* (the learned Muslim clerics). Moral and economic corruption in the elite classes had become painfully visible throughout society as a result of the 1970s Iranian oil boom, and though some representative governing institutions existed, they were almost wholly controlled by the Shah's loyalist (and secular) political party.[50]

Different political camps and religious organizations mounted campaigns and protests for reforms of the corrupt system in the 1970s. The Shah clung to rule by increasingly relying on a small circle of domestic elites, his security forces and army, foreign (Western) allies, and of course, forceful repression of internal dissent. Since his exile in 1963 for a previous political challenge to the Shah, one particular cleric, the Ayatollah Khomeini, had become a wildly popular figure, calling for and embodying a new kind of Iranian leader. It was in 1978 that a series of escalating clashes between military forces and protestors took place. These protests and strikes, many of which were called for by Khomeini and played off religious themes of

[50] The *Majlis* in particular, while it had been a potential institution of opposition, was by the late 1970s, not a meaningful avenue through which to contest the monarchy's power.

martyrdom, grew ever-larger and the shah's army grew less and less willing to fire upon demonstrators.

The United States and other former allies seemed content to let the Shah struggle with these domestic issues on his own. Increasingly bereft of support (and without oil revenues to shore up elite support, due to protest-strikes in the oil sector), the Shah finally fled Iran in January 1979. The monarchy tried to leave Shah-pour Bakhtiyar, leader of the secular-nationalist National Front party, in power to forge an agreement for a constitutional monarchy that would ultimately allow the Shah to return. However, on February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini unilaterally ended his exile, arriving in Iran to the take the reins of his movement. Ten days later, Bakhtiyar too fled Iran, and the revolutionary victors began to form a new constitution and government.

The Council of the Islamic Revolution, 1979-1980

Even before his triumphant return to Iran, Khomeini had created a new organization that would serve as the governing apparatus following the Shah's flight. On January 13, 1979, from his exile in Paris, Khomeini founded the Council for the Islamic Revolution (or IRC for "Islamic Revolutionary Council.") This body, whose membership was officially secret, was to become the centerpiece of policy and power in the first days of the new republic.[51]

The Shah's government had employed an elected legislature (the Majlis). Though Khomeini and the IRC left this institution officially intact, it was the revolutionary coalition that appointed a temporary provisional government. The first prime minister of the new republic, Mahdi Bazargan was, particularly in comparison to the ayatollahs, a more liberal and democratically-minded leader, though his anti-Shah credentials were powerful. He quickly

[51] Bakhash 1984, 64-65; Hiro 1985, 122;

became frustrated, however, of the IRC's power and the fact that the revolution was slowly becoming more deeply Islamic and *non*-liberal democratic in character.[52]

Indeed, the IRC took control of several key projects for sketching out the course of the new government. The IRC purged the civil service and senior military of remaining pro-Shah elements, and established a security force loyal to the revolutionary leadership—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[53] The council was also in control of the revolutionary courts as well as the local revolutionary Komitehs that had organized the mass protests during the last year of the Shah's rule. Further, the IRC tasked itself with choosing the group of political, legal, and religious experts who would write the new constitution.[54]

Under this constitution, the power dynamic was to change very little. A popular referendum in March declared, with over 98% of the vote according to government figures, that Iran was to be an "Islamic Republic."[55] Ostensibly, this Islamic constitution called for a separation of powers—legislative, executive, and judicial. The Majlis would remain in place as the legislature, a representative body with membership determined by democratic elections held every four years. A number of individual, liberal rights, such as right to join political parties and access to the judiciary, were protected.[56]

However, Khomeini's principle of rule of the Islamic jurist, described above, was also enshrined in the constitution with the creation of the position of Supreme Leader (*marja-e taqlid*). This individual had expansive powers, including the ability to appoint and dismiss

[52] Cleveland and Bunton 2013, 354.

[53] Bakhash 1984, Chapter 4.

[54] Schirazi Ashgar and John O'Kane (Trans). 1998. *The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic.* London: IB Tauris/St. Martin's Press.

[55] Hiro 1985, 109.

[56] See Iranian Constitution 1979.

judges, members of the Majlis, and the president or other executives if he found a government official to be "politically incompetent" or "in violation of his duties."[57] Ayatollah Khomeini immediately assumed this position. Indeed, there were no other applicants. The power of the leader made it difficult to characterize the branches as "separate" or the government as "democratic." Khomeini himself considered democracy to be un-Islamic.[58]

Furthermore, in order to ensure that the content of Iranian policy was consistent with the constitution and with Islam, the constitution set up a twelve-member Council of the Guardians. Consisting entirely of Islamic jurists, half of this body was to be elected by the Majlis and half was chosen by the Leader.[59] In determining whether a law or policy was consistent with Islam, only the *faqih* chosen by the Leader had a voice. The Council of Guardians took over from the IRC following the Majlis elections in 1980. However, prior to that time, the IRC had already begun ruling—and legislating—the country. They made a number of substantive policy decisions, including foreign policy decisions such as negotiating or cancelling agreements with the US and the USSR and joining the Non-Aligned Movement of nations.[60] They also, as mentioned above, were responsible for founding and organizing the Revolutionary Guards, which were to play a major role in Iranian support for non-state actors, particularly in Lebanon, from that point on.[61]

Competing Institutions, 1979-1980

[57] Hiro 1985, 120.

[58] Khomeini 1981, especially Islamic government lectures and also in interviews following the success of the revolution.

[59] The quotation from the Iranian constitution that opens this chapter discusses this.

[60] Hiro 1985, 158.

[61] See Byman 2005, 87-89 for greater explanation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' role in foreign policy.

As early as 1980, there were two competing systems for conducting the nation's foreign policy. The official government in Tehran, operating first under Bazargan and later Bani Sadr (see below), was strongly in favor of non-alignment and interested in pursuing an independent but not necessarily confrontational foreign policy.[62] Indeed, Bazargan and Muhammad Ali Yazdi, the foreign minister of the Provisional Government, actually met on pleasant terms with the US Nation Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski at an event in Algeria on November 1, 1979. Prior to the hostage crisis, it was not clear precisely what form US-Iranian relations would take. There were powerful historical grievances regarding the role of the US in Iran, but after all, as Yazdi is reported to have once pointed out, "At least Americans believe in God."[63]

However, the coming days made it clear that Bazargan and Yazdi were conducting foreign relations for a vestigial government apparatus that was quickly losing the power struggle domestically. The sacking of the US embassy and the hostage crisis that began November 4th, 1979 demonstrates the provisional government's lack of authority when it came to contesting the will of the IRC, Council of Guardians, and the ayatollahs. Following the United States' admission of the former Shah to America for medical treatment, the US embassy in Tehran was overrun by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line. Though this group was not directly associated with any of the governing parties, Khomeini did praise and support the activists. He, along with many others in Iran, wanted the Shah extradited to Iran to face trial. Bazargan, however, would have preferred to see the hostages returned and some semblance of relations with the United States maintained. He resigned shortly after the crisis began, in protest

[62] Ramazani 1986; Sadri 1997.

[63] Quoted in Sadri 1997, 96.

over the official government's lack of effective power in handling such crucial matters of international relations.

Contemporaneously, Khomeini had personally set-up a separate system on his own, centered out of the city of Qom, a long-time stronghold of clerics and clerical authority in Iran. The foreign policy objectives that Khomeini pursued from his offices outside the capitol focused heavily on forwarding not Iranian national interest per se, but internationalist Islamic interests along the lines articulated in his ideological writings. According to personal interviews conducted by Dilip Hiro in the early 1980s:

> "Khomeini pursued his objective by quietly sending off personal emissaries to foreign countries with specific assignments, and by secretly posting acolytes as personal ambassadors to important Islamic states, and by instructing certain foreign ministry officials to report to him directly. In a way Khomeini was following the tradition of the grand ayatollahs in Qom and elsewhere…But the scale of Khomeini's operations, backed by the power of the Iranian state, was unprecedented."[64]

Much of the Ayatollah's ability to operate an independent, parallel system of governance even from this early stage was thanks to his access to a large pot of funds not controlled by any other government institution.[65] During their rule, the Pahlavi family had set up a personal foundation worth billions. Also, many of the elites who fled Iran during the revolution held a great deal of valuable property, which the IRC soon declared forfeit and confiscated. During the first months of the new regime, these all became the property of a new foundation, the *Bonyad-e Mosta-zefin*—the Foundation of the Dispossessed.[66] This served as an important source of more

[64] Hiro 1985, 133. In fn. 55 (381), Hiro also notes that, "Khomeini had set up similar networks in other ministries and government institutions. For instances, when the Bazargan administration authorized payment for American military spare parts, the managers of the Central Bank refused to issue cheques."

[65] Bakhash 1984, 246.

[66] Keddie 2006, 246; Bakhash 1984, 144.

or less untracked money for those top leaders who had access to the fund. Even four years after the success of the revolution, the foundation that held the major wealth from Iran's oil-boom years under the Shah had still not submitted information about its finances to the government.[67] It is believed that these resources were used to pay for, among other things, Iran's HISS policy.

This parallel system of governance, and the tone and scope of Khomeini's operations, is a primary indication that this was where and how a HISS policy was conceived and executed. (The gun may not be pouring smoke, but it is certainly warm.) Furthermore, it stands to reason that the Grand Ayatollah would not desist from such activities, and would even be able to give them freer rein, when the full power of the state came under control of his loyal backers. This was not far away.

Consolidation: The Islamic Republican Party, 1980 and Beyond

Iran had written its new constitution and held elections for both president and the Majlis by the time 1980 was out. To run in the first legislative election since the Shah's overthrow, several other revolutionary ayatollahs loyal to the Khomeini line had founded their own party—the Islamic Republican Party (IRP).[68] Many of the leaders in this organization, as well as in other key administrative position in government, were former students of the Ayatollah.[69] Their policy preferences were quite closely in line with his ideals; indeed, they were screened and selected for them.

[67] Bakhash 1984, 246. There is little evidence that Khomeini himself indulged in the kind of extravagancies that the Shah's elites did. At the risk of offering a conjecture here, it seems that it would be much more consistent with his character if he used some of these funds to support a growing network of pro-Islam and generally anti-imperialist, anti-government organizations, including insurgents and terrorists abroad.

[68] Among the leaders of this party were Mohammad Beheshti (believed to be one of few men personally close to the Ayatollah), Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (later president of Iran), Mir Hoeein Mousavi (who served first as foreign minister and then prime minister of Iran), and Ali Khamenei (who succeeded Khomeini as supreme leader of Iran).

[69] Keddie 2006, 242.

In the legislative election, the IRP and a number of smaller, revolutionary-Islamic party allies performed well, gaining a combined 130 seats of the 270-member parliament. Though this appears to be less than a strict majority, turmoil in the Kurdish region and other areas led to formally vacant seats, and the legislature had only 234 people. This total dropped further to 220 by the time the newly elected deputies' credentials had been thoroughly investigated by the Council of Guardians, and fourteen more legislators, none of who were IRP members, were declared unfit for office.[70] The IRP and its allies therefore held 130 seats of a now 220-seat body by the time sessions began in July 1980.

In terms of executive power, it became clear within a few years that the Khomeini loyalists were also in charge, despite the fact that executive authority was ostensibly vested in the presidency. Not long after the presidential elections in January of 1980, the new President of Iran, Abolhasan Bani Sadr, probably could easily relate to the former prime minister, Bazargan. Though elected in a nearly 2-to-1 landslide of popular support, Bani Sadr assumed office in February of that year with little governing support in the Majlis or among the ayatollahs.[71] He met with opposition from the Council of Guardians and the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, despite his efforts to play up his revolutionary and ideological bona fides by supporting a "cultural revolution" in 1980. This "revolution" was one in a series of top-down purges of insufficiently revolutionary or Muslim elements in the civil service and universities, which further reduced the ideological pluralism and professional capacity of the state. Bani Sadr's recommendations for appointments of the prime minister and the ruling cabinet were consistently ignored or rejected

[70] Hiro 1985, 157.

[71] In Mahsen Milani's *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution*, Bani Sadr receives the dubious epithet of "A Man of Many Titles and Little Power" (1994, 175-178.) See also Bakhash 1984, Chapter 6.

by the IRP. The PM position was given to Muhammad Ali Rajai, a relatively inexperienced Majlis member with humble origins but impeccable Islamic revolutionary credentials.[72]

Bani Sadr's struggle for effectual leadership was almost certainly due to his unorthodox policy preferences. He did not agree with the clerics on a number of political points, chief among which was handling of the hostage crisis. He spoke out against holding the American diplomats hostage, calling it illegal and unwise.[73] He may have been able to bank on his public popularity had he been successful, but unfortunately, his overtures to the United States to solve the hostage situation were frustrated and ultimately embarrassing. The foreign enemy with whom he had been negotiating in good faith in March of 1980 attempted a military operation on Iranian soil to rescue the hostages that same April.

This was one of many areas in which Bani Sadr directly challenged the policy positions of the IRP, all the while losing what little support and credibility he had. After a year and a half of ineffectual governance and conflict with the clerics, Bani Sadr was politically attacked by the IRP flat-out. Documents gathered by the students holding the US embassy seemed to indicate that Bani Sadr had once spoken with American officials thought to be CIA. In the ideologically-charged climate, it was enough to spark widespread outrage. Charges included treason, shaming the revolution in the eyes of foreigners, leaving Iran vulnerable to enemies militarily, and "discredit[ing] Islam and reinforce[ing] nationalism."[74] Crowds in the street called for his death; instead, Bani Sadr was merely impeached and fled Iran for France. He was replaced by Ayatollah Khamenei, an IRP insider and staunch Khomeini loyalist.

[72] Hiro 1985, 161.

[73] Bakhash 1984, 114.

[74] Ibid, 161.

Bani Sadr's struggle against the clerics and the IRP represented the last serious conflict to the consolidation of Iranian rule by the Khomeinists. Before long, the only other centers of political organization in the country, such as the secular leftists and the communist Tudeh party, would also be disbanded or barred from power in favor of Islamic political organizations. Though there were of course disagreements among leadership throughout the rest of the decade, the major ruling institutions were either formally or effectively run by pro-Khomeini forces from this point on.[75]

Revolutionary Realities, Mutually Reinforcing Dynamics, and the Mode of Entry

I have argued that HISS is adopted when leaders who had entered power through non-institutionalized pathways generate new institutions or fill existing institutions with loyalist supporters. In the Iranian case, this is clearly what happened. The institution that did remain, the Majlis, was quickly brought under control by Khomeini loyalists. The majority of the seats in the Majlis were occupied by members of a brand new party—the Islamic Republican Party—which had not existed prior to February 1979. It quickly removed the parties that had been established under the Shah (in particular the National Front and the Tudeh) from the centers of power. Indeed, the true institutions for governing, including the office of the Supreme Leader, the Council of Guardians, the Revolutionary Guards, and the IRC, as well as the new revolutionary court system, were all newly created.

This account also clearly answers the question of "Who rules?" with "the IRP and the clerics." Top positions in the new institutions of power were handed out on the basis of loyalty to the ayatollahs and the revolutionary cause. The new regime also purged the civil service, the universities, and the army multiple times. Though a popular vote won Bani Sadr presidential

[75] Keddie 2006.

office, the prime minister and cabinet (which included the foreign minister) was wholly chosen by the IRP. And of course, the Supreme Leader was constitutionally obligated to ensure that all such appointments were consistent with Islam and the constitution, which an IRP-appointed council of experts had written!

Ultimately, then, the real power to make policy in general, and foreign policy in particular, rested with a group of Khomeini loyalists and like-minded clerics.[76] This is precisely what my theory would predict. Furthermore, there appears to be an important interaction with the ideological factor here. Candidates for office or heads of departments were assessed not on personal loyalty per se, but rather on their ideological credentials. Liberal democrats and communists were systematically pushed away from power, and only those who were "100% Muslim…and 100 per cent revolutionary" were allowed to run any portion of the government.[77]

This ensured not only the *who* of who held power but also determined what policies were likely to be considered and adopted. Ardent beliefs in Revolutionary Islam were the measure of the man in post-revolutionary Iran; ideological credentials led to political power and access. The secret Council of Guardians was able to vote on whether laws were in contravention of Islam, and the legislatures who wrote those laws were largely Islamic Republican Party members themselves. As such, the analysis above of the true content of the ideology provides a meaningful insight into the kinds of ideas and policies that such activists might favor.

Other mutually reinforcing dynamics are also present. Scholars have noted that Iran's opposition to Israel both strategic and ideological elements to it, and its animosity towards the United States was just as much the result of very realistic security concerns as its anti-

[76] Additionally Ayatollah Montazeri, one of the upper-level clerics who backed the president, quickly lost favor after conflicts between Bani Sadr and Ayatollah Beheshti led to the former's impeachment.

[77] Hiro 1985, 382 attributes this to Khomeini. See Hiro's fn. 48.

imperialistic ideology.[78] Iranian demands during the hostage crisis included the very practical desire that the US agree to refrain from interference in Iranian domestic affairs.[79] Iranian relations in the Gulf post-1979 were based on a similarly complex interaction of internationalist ideology and Iranian perceptions of its security.[80] Support for violent resistance against other Gulf leaders and against Western imperialists took place as Iran attempted to take on all of these opposing states and address its security needs. At least, to address those needs against set of foreign foes as perceived by its new governing elite, who all happened to share a particular ideological vision of the world.

This addition of the third factor, foreign enemies against which one cannot go to war, further reinforced the interaction of ideology and irregular regime entry. Already at war with Iraq, which had the support of a wide range of allies, Iranian fears of these more powerful enemy nations drove the leadership to close ranks against the risk of foreign interference. Ideology set the rules of political behavior, while the need to consolidate the new regime after irregular entry and the fear of a formidable set of external enemies drove suspicion of those whose behavior violated ideologically-oriented rules.

Bani-Sadr's impeachment serves as the perfect example of this mutually reinforcing process. First, there was the belief and fear of a very powerful external enemy, and there was a need in the post-revolution consolidation period to ensure that the regime would remain in power to pursue its ideological goals. Indeed, the ideology itself defined the crime that Bani-Sadr committed: promoting nationalism at the expense of Islam. The first elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was ultimately put on trial and barely escaped the country with his life,

[78] Sadri 1997; Takeyh 2006; Byman 2005. The US *was* hoping to prevent the Khomeini regime from consolidating.

[79] Keddie 2006, 252.

[80] Ramazani 1986, especially Chapters 1-2.

as a result of a single piece of evidence that he once had a conversation with a Western official.[81] This makes sense only in light of revolutionary realities.

Though it is difficult to directly observe the decision to implement a HISS policy in particular, there is sufficient evidence in the Iranian case to conclude several key things: 1) my three factors are present, 2) HISS occurred, and 3) my proposed mechanism from non-institutionalized entry to HISS adoption is highly plausible, as there is evidence to support the presence of several key observable implications in this case. Those most likely to believe that an expansive sponsorship program was desirable had exclusive and largely uncontested access to power, and there were few options for embracing an expansive, anti-imperialist foreign policy using traditional military tools. Enemies were identified using a mix of criteria, including whether the country was an actual threat to the country and whether the country represented illegitimate political and moral forces in the world, as outlined in the international revolutionary ideology. Khomeini built a network in Qom for supporting non-state actors (though not necessarily armed non-state actors) as soon as he had access to state resources, and he was able to do so because he and his supporters had sidelined any other contenders for power. Thus, the political circumstances in Iran that flowed from the non-institutionalized transfer of power from the Shah to the revolutionary coalition made it possible for new institutions to emerge and old institutions to be co-opted and repurposed. It was in this context that Iran adopted a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship for non-state actors, and the Revolutionary Realities theory can offer a good explanation as to how and why.

IV. Revolutionary Realities in Sudan

[81] Bakhash 1984. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 lay out in far more detail the saga of Bani Sadr's time as president, as well as the reasons and circumstances surrounding his ultimate political destruction.

Next, I offer an account of the political circumstances surrounding the adoption of HISS by the Sudanese governing in the early 1990s. Despite the seeming variation in mode of entry, the Sudanese regime in 1989, like the Iranian leadership in 1979, entered power not through existing political institutions but through irregular, non-institutionalized pathways. This meant that political power was initially unstable and contested by a number of groups, driving leaders to establish new institutions and to rely on loyalists to form the new governing structures. It also meant that there was very little policy oversight or effective opposition during this period of consolidation, and leaders tended to rely on ideologies, rather than foreign policy experience, as a starting place in international relations. In short, the processes that drove HISS adoption and made the policy domestically politically possible in Sudan look quite similar to those in Iran.

The focus of the analysis in this section is primarily on the mode of entry and the policy making parties and apparatus in Sudan following al-Bashir's 1989 military coup. I seek to show that in different countries, different decades, and seemingly different types of regime change, the fact of non-institutionalized entry has the same effect on domestic political processes relevant to HISS adoption. However, because this theory posits three necessary conditions, I also go through the full congruency test as in the Iranian case, and I find that the causal factors are present and my outcome, HISS adoption, took place as well. Support for armed groups around the world fulfilled the ideological projects of the new regime's leadership, able to enact their preferred policies due to domestic political opportunities created by non-institutionalized entry, all while allowing Sudan to address pressing militarized security threats from southern separatists at home.

Sudan and HISS Adoption

Sudan had adopted a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors by at least 1994 and was likely involved at HISS-levels a few years before. According to the SPFS Database, Sudan was a HISS state from 1994-1999. Other sources suggest an earlier adoption date. The incident described at the chapter opening, involving Sudanese police, parallel security forces, and the training of foreign fighters from six different countries, took place in 1990. Also, Sudan made the United States' State Sponsors of Terrorism list in 1993, accused of providing training grounds and support for terrorists and extremists.

One strong piece of evidence for HISS adoption itself is the fact that Sudan served as a gathering place for a number of Islamist and anti-imperialist groups and thinkers. In April 1991, Hassan al-Turabi hosted an Islamic Arab People's Conference (PAIC) in Sudan, a gathering of a huge number of international Islamic Fundamentalists.[82] Following an Islamic Revolution conference in Iran in October that same year, al-Turabi set about contributing to the greater international effort. Many believe that Sudan began to serve as a training ground and safe haven for fundamentalist groups (including those with terroristic elements) from around the world shortly after this conference.[83] Indeed, this is highly reminiscent of Khomeini's Qom-based network described above. Another PAIC meeting held in Khartoum in June of 1993 included politically active Muslim leaders from Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Qatar as well as western Africa, Malaysia, and even the Philippines.[84] Though this is not direct evidence of material support for armed non-state actors in all of these locations, it is quite likely that Sudan distributed resources

[82] Mantzikos 2010.

[83] Shay 2015.

[84] Most of the authors cited throughout this section note that the Islamic Arab People's Conference was Hassan al-Turabi's attempt to bring both himself and Sudan to the center stage of the world radical/political Islam movement. There is disagreement, however, regarding its precise role in supporting foreign movements and its overall political impact. See Burr and Collins 2010, especially Chapters 3, 6, and 8. See also Taylor and Elbushra 2006, and el-Affendi 2009.

and organized training via this network. Certainly, it is clear that Hassan al-Turabi used state resources on PAIC activities and that his network of political influence, via which there was a clear opportunity to arrange and conduct sponsorship, was global only a few years after the 1989 coup.

Though al-Bashir insisted that the Sudanese government did *not* support terrorists or terrorism, its reputation for such support grew and it was increasingly difficult to deny the factual basis for accusations. The Sudanese government was directly implicated in an assassination attempt against Egypt's Hosni Mubarrak in 1995, and Sudan was also thought to be a least partially supportive of the infamous Al-Qaeda attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998.[85] The suspicion arose from the fact that Osama bin Laden and a number of *mujahidin* from Afghanistan had taken up residence (and sanctuary) outside Khartoum in 1994.[86] They were allowed to operate unmolested until the 1998 attacks.

Sudan did attempt to demonstrate an occasional, apparent intolerance for terrorism under growing pressure and negative international attention. In 1994, the government assisted in extraditing the infamous Carlos the Jackal to French authorities for trial.[87] However, much as in the case of Osama bin Laden, the regime in Khartoum had full knowledge of his presence, and whereabouts, in Sudan since the 1980s, and they did not arrest him until acutely pressured by other nations. As in the case of Iran, many accusations against the Sudanese leadership regarding support for terrorism are probably unfounded.[88] However, the offices and resources of

[85] O'Ballance 2000, 198; Mantzikos 2010, 53.

[86] Gerges 2011, 94. Shay 2005, 44.

[87] O'Ballance 2000, 183.

[88] El-Affendi 2009.

the state of Sudan helped direct many terroristic attacks, hosted training camps, and supported a large number of armed groups around the world. In short, Sudan adopted a HISS policy.

Condition 1: The International Revolutionary Ideology in Brief

The ideological underpinnings of the National Islamic Front party and the cleric Hassan al-Turabi's branch of the Islamic movement in Sudan was indeed "international revolutionary." The NIF could trace the intellectual and political history of its organizing ideology back to the Islamic Liberation Movement founded in 1949 at the University of Khartoum. This organization in turn had many close ties to similar movements founded in Egypt's University of Cairo at the time.[89] Often commonly called the Muslim Brotherhood, the Sudanese portion of this movement called for the expansion of political Islam. Islam, in this ideology, would replace the secular falsehoods of capitalism and communism. Al-Turabi's education and early development of his own Pan-Islamic views took place in the context of this movement.[90]

In terms of the three criteria for international revolutionary ideologies, the Sudanese strand of *ikhwan* as articulated by al-Turabi possessed them all. Al-Turabi saw the world in a transitional phase in history, where the implementation of Islamic law by political authorities was beginning to be necessary, and Islamic movements therefore needed to be revitalized and renewed.[91] The movement should, and would inevitably, spread across all existing borders and unite all peoples and nationalities, making it both history-oriented and internationalist. In terms of the call to action, this ideology did demand a peaceful process of transition whenever possible,

[89] El-Affendi 1991; Hamdi 1998, 15. It is worth noting that citations from Hamdi refer to the 1998 translation of a series of interviews that Hamdi conducted with Hassan al-Turabi in 1987, 1994, 1996, and 1997.

[90] El-Affendi 1991.

[91] Mahmoud 1998.

but "if secular regimes attempt to stand in the way of Islam, then there will be no other choice than for Islam to rise to power through revolution."[92]

A television appearance by al-Turabi in 1995 demonstrates that his ideological vision was even more clearly international revolutionary once in power.[93] Demonstrating the centrality of eschatology and history, al-Turabi states, for example, that "All history goes in cycles. Where is Rome? What happened to it? Where is old Persia…This is history. It moves this country or that one up or down." He further adds that:

> "God's will is manifested by history. History does not develop unless new ideas emerge that rejuvenate it. Existing conditions and old interests and whims always try to extinguish these new ideas because they want to freeze the situation. But fate and history never stop."[94]

This grand historical perspective, and the notion of 'fate' is consistent with my theory's second definitional criterion of international revolutionary ideology.

Al-Turabi's ideology also emphasizes its international normative application. He says, "We know that the growth of an Islamic movement will ignite fires all over the earth, will illuminate the darkness, will wake up the sleeping Muslims in the Arab and African world around us." Furthermore, this "will create a new civilization in history." Put bluntly, "Islam has no borders."[95] As stated as early as 1983, Turabi notes, "One can never stop at any international frontier and say the nation is absolute, an ultimate end in itself."[96]

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[92] Shay 2005, 30-33. This is also visible in al-Turabi's earlier work. In 1983, an English-language book entitled *Voices of Resurgent Islam* presented a series of essays and articles, including a chapter by al-Turabi called "The Islamic State." He notes on this theme of action and struggle that "Whenever religious energy is thus suppressed, it builds up and ultimately erupts in isolated acts of struggle or resistance which are called terrorist by those in power or a revolution" (al-Turabi 1983, 241).

[93] The program was broadcast in Doha, Qatar on March 18, 1995. The program was entitled "Dialogue on an Issue." The transcript, translated into English, is available from the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts of the Middle East, March 27, 1995 (ME/2262MED/14-20). Unless otherwise noted, further quotations are from this transcript.

[94] Ibid; see fn. 93.

[95] Ibid, see fn. 93. Also Hamdi 1998, 74.

[96] Al-Turabi 1983, 242.

This political ideological program also requires massive and active participation by its adherents. In a paper entitled "Priorities for Islamic Movements until 2020," al-Turabi outlines the four stages of Islamic revival, which requires the "mobilization of social forces" in a "war against the forces of evil, be they in the ruling authority or in society as a whole."[97] The movement, and those who comprise it, would be "a pioneer in the structure against persecution and injustice."[98] Those interested in making real this movement, men and, as al-Turabi explicitly notes, women, must work to build a new civilization, through involvement in political action, economic construction, and international mobilization of other Muslims throughout the world.[99]

This outline of the ideology, embraced by al-Turabi, NIF leaders, and most party members, has the hallmarks of an internationalist revolutionary ideology. The pan-Islamic orientation of the movement is clearly internationalist, and the ideology situates Sudan in an eschatological, historical context.[100] The ideology describes a movement (a kinetic term), calling its adherents to political action against corrupt and "evil" forces. Additionally, this ideology did inspire certain preferences and beliefs about politics. The rhetoric of meeting any resistance or oppression with eruptions of force makes clear that in the NIF and al-Turabi's brand of global, revolutionary Islam, violence is a legitimate tool in the pursuit of this political end.

Condition 2: Barriers to Conventional Military Operations Abroad

Sudan, in the bottom 50th percentile of nations, has also prosecuted one of the longest civil wars in history. Once a divided country, the heavily Arab north Sudan and the primarily African southern Sudan finally split in 2013 as a result of their ongoing conflict, and South

[97] From Hamdi 1998, 110.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid, 115-123; discussion of women's role in an Islamic movement towards their own liberation, 119

[100] El-Affendi 1991.

Sudan became its own independent nation. Like the Iran-Iraq war for Tehran, the exigencies of Sudan's civil war absorbed most of the Khartoum government's military resources, taking a conventional struggle against any party other than its own insurgents completely off of the policy table.

Some numbers help to demonstrate the limitations on Sudan's use of conventional force as a foreign policy tool. In 1989, the year of the coup that brought al-Bashir to power, Sudan spent $460 million on its military. In 1992, that figure hit $1.01 billion[101]; that same year, the GDP was only $7.034 billion (2016 US dollars).[102] Its economy ranked 83rd in the world; for comparison, Cuba's GDP in 1992 was just over $22 billion, whereas the United States had a GDP of $6.54 trillion. One other noteworthy figure is that1992 was a particularly serious year for the situation in Sudan. Throughout the 1990's military spending hovered closer to $400 million mark, and GDP to a $10 billion mark.[103] Sudan's support for non-state actors abroad likely achieved HISS levels around 1991-1993, following this abnormally weak economic performance and high military expenditures.

Sudan also lived in a fairly unstable geopolitical neighborhood. The regional conflict for Eritrean separation from Ethiopia was an important external concern, though after 1991, tensions had subsided and in 1993 Eritrea held a successful referendum declaring its independence.[104] Prior to these arrangements, however, Sudan had been backing both Eritrean and Ethiopian armed groups against Mengistu Haile Miriam's government in Ethiopia.[105] Furthermore,

[101] Singer et al. 1972.

[102] The World Bank. 2015. Available: http://data.worldbank.org/country/sudan

[103] Ibid.

[104] Mantzikos 2010, 50.

[105] This was likely in response to the fact that the Ethiopian government was supporting the SPLA in Sudan.

instability, anarchy, and government collapse in Somalia faced the Sudanese regime shortly after the 1989 coup, and an American military presence in Mogadishu exacerbated regime fears of US interference in the internal politics of states in region.[106]

Additionally, Sudan did not have many allies to support it during this period. The United States, nuclear-armed and operating in bordering Somalia yet with a geographically distant homeland, cut off military and development aid to Sudan.[107] Relations with the Middle Eastern monarchies soured, in part because of the growing anti-government rhetoric issuing from an increasingly ideological leadership.[108] This supported a vicious cycle of alienation. Ever in need of military supplies to fight the Southern separatists (all the more threatening to the now-revolutionary Islamic north because of the Christian/animist bent of the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Movement) al-Bashir established relations with Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Islamic regime in Iran.[109] Al-Bashir, in turn, supported Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, further alienating the United States and the Middle Eastern monarchies allied against Saddam for his designs on Kuwait.[110] Thus throughout the early 1990s, the Sudanese regime increasingly turned to what few willing allies they had—primarily Iran and Libya, other so-called "terrorist" states—for aid to the Sudanese economy in general and for the prosecution of the ongoing civil war in particular. As in the Iranian case, Sudan's military could not be spared nor was it suited to pursue an interventionist foreign policy abroad.

Entry to Power

[106] Ibid, 51-52.

[107] Consistent with this dissertation's theory, Sudan *did* sponsor groups to act against US targets in Somalia, overcoming the geographic barrier to conventional war with help from the US itself.

[108] Burr and Collins 2010; Shay 2005.

[109] Mantzikos 2010, 47.

[110] Shay 2005.

Background and the "Revolution of National Salvation" Coup

Sudan has been ruled throughout its fairly short post-independence history by a wide variety of governments, including military *juntas*, communist parties, centrist party coalitions, and right-wing Islamic authorities. The 1980s saw particularly fierce political upheavals. Numeiri, an architect of the 1969 "May Revolution" against Sudan's civilian government of the 1960s, served as the nation's president from 1969 through 1985. Sadiq al-Mahdi, who had attempted to overthrow Numeiri in the past and had also briefly served as Prime Minister in 1966-67, found himself the Prime Minster again, now with the Umma party, following Numeiri's ouster in 1985 and a subsequent round of democratic elections. However, in the face of the ongoing civil war and an economically tumultuous decade, the government was faring poorly only a few years later. The Umma party as well as the democratically-elected president, Ahmad Ali al-Mirghani, were unpopular and increasingly desperate, unable to meet the basic daily needs of citizens in the face of ongoing war and economic downturn.

By the time al-Bashir seized power, many in Sudan felt that "democratic rule" was synonymous with corruption and ineptitude.[111] In 1989, after attempting to lead several ineffectual coalitions, Sadiq and his party were overthrown by Colonel Omar al-Bashir's bloodless June 30 coup. In addition to arresting Sadiq supporters and former regime members in the course of the coup, al-Bashir's cadres also targeted a number of other Sudanese political leaders, including Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the National Islamic Front.[112] The revolutionary

[111] Anderson 1999, 6.

[112] In a scorching review of the 2003 edition of Collins and Burr, El-Affendi states that al-Turabi was, in fact, the mastermind behind the coup (2009, 126). At the time of the coup, he does seem to have received better treatment than other arrested leaders, who found themselves in a special "political" section of Khobar prison: al-Turabi was held under house arrest for much of his imprisonment (Collins and Burr 2010, 55; Anderson 1999, 4). It is rather more likely that the coup had the support of the NIF from the beginning, despite al-Bashir's denials on the issue, and it was certainly the most prominent political organization from the coup on forward (see also Mantzikos 2010.)

council banned all political parties by law. Initially, al-Bashir's coup was popular, and he was able to garner enough foreign aid to address short-term shortages in basic necessities for many citizens in Khartoum.[113] The war with the south remained unresolved, however, and its economic drain made it difficult for al-Bashir to address any of the fundamental problems facing Sudan. Popularity waning, al-Bashir and the plotters faced the need for a broader governing coalition.

Enter Hassan al-Turabi and the National Islamic Front

Leaders in Khartoum had frequently turned to Islam to garner public support or as a means of unifying the north in the conflict against the south. Numeiri and Sadiq al-Mahdi, for example, both incorporated Sharia law into national state policy at one point or another.[114] That it was al-Bashir who thoroughly embraced the strands of Islamic rule and thought, articulated and championed by al-Turabi and a political party known National Islamic Front (NIF), is not something that seemed obvious *a priori*. Indeed, in the very first weeks after the 1989 coup, al-Bashir's rule did not embrace much of a political ideology whatsoever.[115] In addition to giving positions to his co-conspirators, al-Bashir appointed to his revolutionary command council a handful of technocrats and administrative personnel whose major qualification was that they lacked ties to either Numeiri or Sadiq.[116] Though unquestionably authoritarian, this body was not initially packed with international-revolutionary types. Additionally, immediately following the coup, al-Bashir's regime reached out to Western powers and the Arab monarchies to establish diplomatic ties. Many, particularly the Western powers, though, were leery given al-

[113] Anderson 1999; Kok 1996.

[114] Voll 1984 and Anderson 1999, 241.

[115] Shay 2005, 22-23.

[116] Anderson 1999.

Bashir's perceived sympathy for the NIF, the unclear role of the party in the coup in the first place, and the Sudanese government's historical attempts to implement Sharia laws.[117]

Needing broader and stronger domestic support, al-Bashir then did approach al-Turabi, releasing him from prison in late 1989. Al-Turabi had been a player in Sudanese politics throughout the past several decades, serving in the Numeiri regime as attorney general and Minister of Justice during its attempt to implement Sharia Law in 1983.[118] Al-Turabi had found a great deal of support among Islamic political movements for his support for Sharia, founding the National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1983. This party threw its support behind al-Bashir at the start of 1990, acting as the ruling party and taking over many important offices.

Though he attempted to downplay his own influence, al-Turabi and the NIF (later the "Popular National Congress" party) held key positions in the revolutionary government, including the state security apparatus, and had organized the country into various ruling districts headed by loyal party cadres. NIF members also led the "Council of Forty," a somewhat elusive and secretive body which charged itself with the task of ensuring that the regime's policy positions were sufficiently Islamic.[119] By February of 1992, a Provisional National Council was formed and it became clear that Bashir's coup was not about to give way to popular election.[120] The NIF party, which was under the guidance of al-Turabi, was responsible for most of the actual administrative activities of the Sudanese government after 1989.[121]

[117] Burr and Collins 2010, 775-78.

[118] El-Affendi 1991.

[119] Burr and Collins 2010, 11-12.

[120] Shay 2005; Burr and Collins 2010; Kok 1996.

[121] El-Affendi 1991.

Foreign policy in particular was in the hands of al-Turabi sympathizers and the NIF, who founded and operated several new institutions. Al-Turabi set up the Arab and Islamic Bureau, a new government agency which was believed to organize international and national *jihadi* activities.[122] NIF members were also wholly in charge of Al-Amn al Dakhili, the new intelligence service which operated with a great deal of independence. Rather than answering to the revolutionary command council, this body received direction from the NIF party itself.[123] The "Transitional National Assembly"—al-Bashir's wholly appointed, three hundred person council that largely served as a rubber stamp for the government—was also controlled by NIF party members.[124] This body worked primarily on issues of foreign relations. According to its own Speaker, Mohammad Khalifa, its priorities included the Palestinian issue, working against Zionism, and addressing imperialist threats to Iraq, Libya, and the Arab nation as a whole.[125] Thus the institutional apparatus for foreign policy-making (and execution) was especially independent from other government structures and run by loyalists with even less external oversight than other institutions. Their mandates were also explicitly ideologically oriented.

Indeed, there is evidence that those who did not agree with the direction in which the NIF sought to take the country were, one way or another, removed from access to power. In a story that bears striking resemblance to that of Bazargan's departure, Minister of the Interior Faisal Abu Salih resigned in April 1991 apparently because of his frustration over the office's lack of power in the face of NIF interference.[126] Similarly, one of the 1989 coup's other architects was

[122] Mantzikos 2010, 49.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Kok 1996.

[125] Cited in Kok, 1996, p. 143/167.

[126] See the quotation at the opening of the chapter, and also Burr and Collins 210, 87.

expelled from the revolutionary command council, amid rumors (likely unfounded) that he had close ties to the US, the CIA, and Hosni Mubarrak in Egypt.[127] Other dissidents were purged at other levels of government.[128]

By 1994, the US government firmly believed that it was al-Turabi and his party that really controlled the government.[129] There were some tensions between the "Turabi-ists" and other supporters of the al-Bashir government; many in the latter camp were more interested in promoting a nationalist Sudanese agenda, especially with regards to international security, which foreign policy adventurism along HISS lines could easily undermine. There were sometimes parallel and sometimes competing policies in the government with regards to support for radical Islamic internationalist agenda that al-Turabi was pursuing.[130] However, this conflict did not manifest as outright opposition between the top leaders until nearly a decade after the coup, at which point al-Bashir publicly broke with al-Turabi. The break occurred just before 9/11 but not long after potentially lucrative oil wells were established in Sudan, perhaps providing al-Bashir an alternative means of shoring up his rule. During the period under consideration, however, when HISS was the law policy of the land the NIF effectively ran Sudanese foreign affairs in the ways most meaningful to this dissertation.

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[127] Ibid.

[128] Ibid, 88

[129] This was commonly believed. The interviewer from the 1995 Qatar television spot articulates several of these things well. His final question to al-Turabi was, "Despite your constant denials, Sudan and the Arab and foreign worlds see you as the primarily political [force] in Sudan with your aides in charge of political positions. How long will this vagueness last?" Al-Turabi denied that he had any kind of "secret position" (p. 20). He had given a similar response to the interviewer's question regarding political purges: "The [movement] is being accused of laying off a large number of government employees, not for the purpose of economizing but to get rid of those who refused to cooperate with or remained passive, and that you are replacing them with cadres of the National Islamic Front of the Islamic revolution movement...this has caused a brain drain, and many highly qualified people have emigrated and are living in the diaspora " (16). Al-Turabi denied the allegations at the time, but a great deal of evidence suggests he was not being entirely truthful with the interviewer.

[130] Burr and Collins 2010; Mantzikos 2010.

Revolutionary Realities, Mutually Reinforcing Dynamics, and the Mode of Entry

In Sudan, the result of the military coup and elimination of multiparty politics had a profound effect on who made foreign policy. One group of like-minded political leaders who were personally loyal to, and ascribed to the political ideas of, Hassan al-Turabi was able to dictate foreign policy. Through new institutions, like the Arab and Islamic Bureau, the TNA, and a new national intelligence service, these NIF members and associated revolutionaries wrote and executed foreign policies without being constrained by other entities in government.

There is also some indication that ideological credentials were an important qualification for access to power. Indeed, all political parties were formally banned, with the National Islamic Front serving as the state-party only a few years after the coup. Several high-profile government officials, and many more bureaucrats and soldiers, were let go following the coup, replaced by NIF party members. This interaction of ideology and irregular modes of entry played out very similarly for the ayatollahs and the IRP in Iran, despite the clear difference between the "bottom up" and "top down" paths to power in these two cases.

The Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS tells us that it was a combination of mutually reinforcing causal conditions that drove politically relevant process that led to HISS adoption. Those who supported al-Turabi, the NIF, and al-Bashir had control of the vast majority of the levers of power. Many, perhaps most, of those in key positions espoused an international revolutionary ideology. Furthermore, Sudan continued to conduct a costly civil war, despite its general lack of resources and a growing list of enemies abroad. Sudanese leaders simply did not have the capacity to use conventional force in pursuit of the internationalist, active foreign policy called for by its ideology. Instead, it provided other resources—diplomatic protection, networking opportunities at PAIC conferences, training grounds, and safe havens for non-state

actors, who, as al-Turabi put it in 1995, are "called terrorist by those in power."[131] It was an interaction of these key factors that drove HISS adoption, and the domestic political process following the non-institutionalized entry made it possible for leaders to use state resources to achieve their preferred foreign policy goals with little external interference.

V. Conclusion: The Role of Entry Type in HISS Adoption

The cases of both Sudan and Iran provide evidence in support of this dissertation's theory that the interaction of three causal conditions leads to the adoption of high-intensity state sponsorship. I have laid out evidence in both cases that, consistent with the expectations of my theory, 1) all three of my theoretically relevant factors were present and 2) that HISS was enacted as a policy. This chapter then focused more closely on the role of non-institutionalized regime change in creating the domestic political environment in which certain leaders, with certain ideas, were able to apply state resources to their preferred foreign policies.

I found that some of the theoretical causal mechanisms that linked non-institutionalized entry to HISS adoption were also present in both cases, despite the fact that only Iran saw a true social revolution. This, I argue, is contrary to the expectation of competing theories in the literature and yet is accurately accounted for in my theory, which does not grant social revolutions a privileged place in the causal story but rather focuses on the domestic political processes following any extra-legal, non-institutionalized regime change. When a set of leaders enters political power without using the established institutions for doing so, they are faced with a set of challenges. Who will run what aspects of government? How much power should be shared, and with whom? Should new institutions be constructed, or old ones utilized? I have argued that these questions arise in any non-institutionalized power transition. In the cases of

[131] Al-Turabi 1983, 241.

Sudan and Iran, this led to similar outcomes in terms of new governing institutions such as hegemonic, ideologically-oriented political parties and parallel governing structures in which key leaders relied on loyalists to operate with little external oversight.

In conjunction with the presence of high barriers to conducting conventional war abroad against key rivals and the international revolutionary ideology the government espoused, the domestic political circumstances allowed both Iran and Sudan to adopt HISS. The ideology provided the preference for an activist foreign policy with a global reach, one that encouraged oppressed peoples to take greater control of their polities and demanded political action. The international context severely limited both Iran and Sudan's ability to pursue their policies through conventional force of arms. Indeed, the ideology identified (and perhaps created) a number of powerful foreign enemies, against which sub-conventional force was the only available means, certainly given the more immediate conventional military challenges facing both new regimes.

On the surface, one might attribute the policy of HISS to the unicausal mechanism of a "radical leader." In this thinking, one need only look to al-Turabi and Ayatollah Khomeini to have a sufficient cause and explanation for why the "radical" policy of HISS was adopted. However, this explanation over-simplifies or indeed precludes an account of the steps in between. As Chapter 2 put it, training camps must be built and endless meetings arranged for a national policy of global sponsorship to emerge. How and why were these leaders able to pursue their preferred policies using state resources? What institutions and channels did they use to conduct that policy, and why was there no oversight to curb over-zealous support programs, especially in the face of foreign push-back? Though comparative politics literatures do discuss

"radical" leaders and periods of consolidation, they do not explain how and why certain processes and preferences interact to lead to the very specific policy outcome of HISS.

I do not disagree that these leaders were key players in the processes that led to HISS adoption. However, in addition to pointing out that multiple factors were needed to lead to HISS adoption, I also point to a specific set of domestic political processes that enabled such a broad pattern of state sponsorship to emerge as state policy. Leaders that entered power through non-institutionalized pathways created a new set of governing structures for foreign policy. During the period of consolidation, they sidelined political opponents, took new agencies out of the old government hierarchies, and staffed these bodies with like-minded loyalists. Importantly, they had strong pre-conceived notions, derived from a shared ideology, of what policy goals were desirable. With little oversight from other branches of government, these agencies and their leaders—be they the NIF or the IRP, Ayatollah Khomeini or Hassan al-Turabi—had the capacity to make HISS into the national foreign policy of their respective states. Mode of leadership entry thereby plays an important role in the adoption process, though not quite the one that scholars of revolution theorize, as coups have the same domestic political effect, at least when additional causal factors are present. Overall, this is a much more comprehensive and, if the evidence above is any gauge, a much more accurate explanation of how the complex and rare policy of HISS comes to be adopted.

Chapter 7: Ideology and Sponsorship Patterns in the People's Republic of China and Democratic Kampuchea

> "The socialist states have forged indestructible ties of great fraternal friendship among themselves. Our relations are those of co-operation, based on equality and mutual benefit; they are relations of mutual respect and mutual assistance, and their aim is common progress. Marxism-Leninism is the guiding thought in all the socialist countries, and they have a common ideal and goal – the realization of communism."
>
> - Chinese official at the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China[1]

> "Party members have doubled in number, where there were ten there are now twenty. The armed forces muster whole brigades. All the people are in our grasp. We hold full state power, as well as the whole economy…our forces now, compared to 1970, are a thousand times, ten thousand times stronger. From this position we want to build socialism quickly, we want our people to be glorious quickly."
>
> - Communist Party of Kampuchea party journal, June 1976[2]

I. Introduction

The previous chapter took two cases of HISS-adopting states and showed that all three factors suggested by the Revolutionary Realities theory were in place. In both Iran circa 1979 and Sudan circa 1989, the leadership had recently entered power through non-institutionalized pathways. They had also adopted an international revolutionary ideology, and both countries were faced with high barriers to conventional military operations abroad. That chapter focused specifically on the domestic political processes following irregular entry to power that led to

[1] From "Chen Yi: On Present International Situation and Our Foreign Policy" Sept. 25 1956, in Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, *China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence: A Selection of Important Documents,* Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1958, 32.

[2] From "Excerpted Report on the Leading Views of the Comrade Representing the Party Organization at a Zone Assembly" *Tung Padevat* June 1976 in David Chandler, Ben Kiernan, Chanthou Boua (Trans. and Ed.). *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977* New Haven: Yale University SE Asia Studies, 1988, 25. Kiernan states that the speaker was likely Pol Pot himself.

HISS entry. I found that these regimes tended to emphasize loyalty and ideological conformity when choosing who would have the most power and influence to make and execute foreign policy. I also found that new organs of political power in the form of new legislatures, new executive bodies, and new political party organizations were created and operated either wholly independently or in parallel to other political structures. This meant that there was a domestic political environment in which certain policies—in particular, those favored by those who were ideologically similar and who did not have to face oversight from anyone with competing views—could be adopted and pursued.

The theoretical focus in this chapter is *ideological content.* Empirically, this chapter examines two more cases, one in which HISS was adopted (China, post-1949 revolution) and one in which it was not (Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-1979 under the Khmer Rouge). Both cases conform to my theory. Whereas China is a 'classic case,' quite similar to Iran and Sudan, Democratic Kampuchea does not have all three of the key factors in place. The ideology embraced by the Khmer Rouge is anti-status quo and extreme, but it is not an international revolutionary ideology. It borrowed some Marxist concepts but ultimately focused on Khmer superiority, leaving international solidarity by the wayside. HISS, then, is not a particularly attractive policy in this ideological worldview. Furthermore, in keeping with the chauvinistic nationalist tones of the group's ideology, the Khmer Rouge tended to exaggerate DK's military prowess, leading to a national security policy of internal balancing and conventional military engagement with neighboring rivals. Thus both 1) ideology and 2) the interaction between barriers to conventional war and ideology pushed the regime away from adopting high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors, demonstrating how these factors are mutually reinforcing.

Without a careful examination of specific ideological content, the different patterns of sponsorship exhibited by these two countries might be puzzling. Ostensibly, both China and DK adopted a Marxism-Leninism type socialist ideology. Indeed, both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) came to power in popular anti-government uprisings and in the wake of civil war, where the organizing principle of those forces were class-based and touted goals of social equality. However, closer scrutiny of the ideological content reveals that, as suggested in the quotations at the start of this chapter, whereas China's Maoist ideology was international revolutionary, the Khmer Rouge's ideological commitments were highly nationalist and chauvinistic. Mao's Marxism has been correctly considered China-centric, but the overall Maoist ideology was normatively applied internationally, had a profound call to action for its citizens, and emphasized revolutionary China's place in world historical processes. These, in turn, contributed to a desire for an international, activist, anti-status quo foreign policy that matched the definition of HISS patterns.

In contrast, the content of the Khmer Rouge's socialist/Marxist views were highly Cambodia-oriented in normative application, stressing Khmer national power, destiny, and greatness above all else. There were no fraternal ties between ethnic Khmers and downtrodden peasants or workers anywhere in the world or even local camaraderie with communists in bordering Laos or Vietnam, despite shared political histories among the three nations. Indeed, in the Cambodian case, the argument can be made that animosity was directed largely towards domestic others—leading to the genocide and politicide for which the Khmer Rouge is infamous. Of course, in China too, policies driven by Maoist ideology emphasized domestic reforms, and, mass violence and mass death came in both places.[3] However, the normative scope of the

[3] Merely by dint of China's enormous population size, the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution are responsible for far more deaths than the Khmer Rouge. See Valentino 2005.

Khmer Rouge's ideology was limited by DK's own borders and, further, to a subset of persons within those borders. It therefore did not have the same impact on foreign policy as did the ideology of the Maoist leaders in China.

These two cases were chosen for comparison because they represent very similar systems, and they provide a number of contrasts to the cases in Chapter 6 in terms of time period, ideology type, and geography.[4] Chapter 5 reviewed the case selection in greater detail, but it is worth reiterating the most important factor here: the political organizations that came to power both in Cambodia in 1975 and in China in 1949 were Communist Parties in name. Only one, however, led to HISS. This allows me to emphasize that substantive variation in political outcomes is associated with the specific content of the ideologies, and that broad ideological type categories like "socialist" or "leftist" are not sufficient for understanding many significant aspects of the preferences and beliefs of leaders.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I first examine China, performing the congruency test to confirm the presence of two causal factors and the HISS adoption outcome. I then turn to ideology in section three. There, I provide a summary of Marxism-Leninism, highlighting elements that make it "international revolutionary." Maoism and the political ideology of the CCP during the Mao era are then discussed. The fourth section addresses Democratic Kampuchea, the Cambodia state when it was ruled by the Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979. After I provide some context for the political revolution itself, I examine the ideological content as stated in CPK documents. I ultimately conclude that this is inconsistent with my theory's definition of an international revolutionary ideology. I then explore relevant elements of the

[4] For further discussion of the benefits of such "similar systems" research, see methodology and case selection discussion in Chapter 5.

foreign policy that the DK did adopt with respect of conventional war, when it did not adopt HISS, noting that ideology still influences foreign policy options and perceptions. The final section concludes that, consistent with the expectations of my theory, the absence of the ideological factor in the DK case is what led to the diverging HISS outcomes in this comparison.

II. China and HISS: Congruency of Necessary Conditions and HISS Outcomes

Outcome: Chinese Adoption of HISS in the 1950s

China's pattern of sponsorship has, according to some of the best evidence available, reached HISS levels at various times in the post-1949 era. The temporal coverage of the data in the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset makes it difficult to be sure precisely which years saw China embrace HISS, however. According to the MSA data, which does not give specific names of groups, China was sponsoring non-state armed actors in at least three different countries in 1964, and at least five unique groups in 1970. Data from the NAG suggests that by 1961, China was sponsoring six rebel groups across three regions.[5] In 1966 and 1967, China sponsored UNITA, a group that has been designated a high-profile, terroristic group (HPTG) according to this research's definition. Also, China supported the Khmer Rouge in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, and the Khmer Rouge by the early 1970s, was already killing thousands of civilians in the regions it controlled.[6] Further, in 1975 alone (recall that the dataset has the most complete coverage from 1975-2002), China was supporting six different groups in at least four different countries (Myanmar/Burma, Thailand, Rhodesia, and Angola.) This was during Mao's last year in power, but it seems unlikely that support suddenly started up out of the blue in 1975. By the early 1980s, China was sponsoring 10-11 groups each year. These were

[5] Calculated from San-Akca 2016, Appendix 4.

[6] See Ben Kiernan. 2008. *The Pol Pot Regime*, Chapter 3 and Ben Kiernan. 2004. *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, Chapter 7 & Chapter 8.

primarily located in Asia (several groups in both Cambodia and Afghanistan), but the government did support both the PLO's activities against Israel and SWAPO in South Africa.

The data in the above description of China's activity comes from ostensibly primary sources, namely extensive research of reputable journalistic news sources.[7] Most studies of terrorism and state sponsorship do not go back much further than about 1968 or 1970. Other types of evidence can also be leveraged to come to a conclusion about China's support for non-state armed actors. Secondary historical accounts of the 1950-1980 period state rather simply that China prioritized the spreading of its political system around the world.[8] In particular, historical accounts claim that China was, "supporting Communist guerilla and underground movements in a number of Southeastern Asian countries…Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia."[9] Thai groups also received Chinese government support, which is corroborated by the UCDP and thus the SPFS data when it begins measurements in 1975.[10] Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during the 1970s is also well documented.[11]

There is even evidence that China sought to emulate the Soviet Comintern model in Asia, placing itself (or more specifically, the CCP), at the center of Asian revolutionary activity. Even before the completion of the Chinese revolution, the CCP had close contacts with communist parties in the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, India, Malaysia, and Korea as well as various

[7] Information on the UCDP dataset, and the potential biases of these data, were explored in Chap. 3 of this research.

[8] Jürgen Domes. 1985. *The Government and Politics of the PRC,* 242; Marc Blecher. 1986. *China: Politics, Economics and Society*, 209.

[9] Domes 1985, 245.

[10] Blecher 1986, 208-209.

[11] Ben Kiernan notes a visit as early as 1964 by Pol Pot/Saloth Sar to China, where, at a banquet held for the Kampuchean party rebels/visitors, Mao expressed great enthusiasm for the rebel movement and made it clear that the CPK, and its radical leadership, had China's protection (2004, 219-224).

parties in Indochina (current-day Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.)[12] Recently declassified documents from Russian and Chinese archives show that these aspirations were more than just Mao talk. While a formal organization with the title like "Asia Cominform" never materialized, as early as July 1949, the CCP's United Front Work Department was holding seminars and study groups with leaders from a number of communist movements from other countries.[13] Archival evidence also finds that the Institute of Marxism-Leninism soon followed in 1952, offering multiple educational courses for communist cadres from abroad and helping to form a network via which information and large sums of money were frequently transferred from China to communist parties abroad.[14] Once again, these are formal inter-party relations and do not necessarily constitute evidence of direct Chinese support for armed non-state actors in these countries. However, two facts also bear consideration: many groups with which the Chinese had ties had both political party and armed insurrectionary wings. Additionally, guerrilla warfare and revolutionary war tactics formed a central portion of the curriculum both at the 1949 study sessions and the Institute for Marxism-Leninism. This activity suggests that China at least realized a high-intensity type sponsorship pattern when it came to training programs.

Finally, other activity on the international stage is consistent with the notion that China was supporting a number of groups in the pre-1975 time period. There is, for example, no shortage of inspiring statements about armed national liberation coming from Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and even the supposed "realist" Chou Enlai during the first two decades of the CCP's rule in

[12] Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia. 2014. "Leader Transfer in the Asia Revolution: Mao Zedong and the Asian Cominform." *Cold War History 14*(2), 199.

[13] Ibid, 202.

[14] Ibid, 207-209.

China.[15] Though the statements themselves are evidence more of the "independent variable" of ideological content below, the fora in which such statements took place, such as at a 1949 Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian countries and at the Non-Aligned Movement precursor meeting the Bandung Conference, is suggestive.[16] In 1954, the United States also founded SEATO—the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization—in a clear effort to contain the advance of communism in the region. In short, the best data are consistent with claims that China adopted a sponsorship policy under Mao that reached HISS levels sometime during the 1950s.

Condition 1: Entry Type and the Revolutionary Civil War in Brief

Mao Zedong[17] and the CCP came to power in 1949, after achieving victory in a domestic civil war. This clearly fits this theory's definition of "non-institutionalized entry." Furthermore, the CCP developed a number of new institutions, concentrated foreign policy making power in the hands of a few top decisionmakers, and tended to follow Mao's dictums throughout most of the 1949-1976 period. Indeed, not just personal loyalty but ideological orthodoxy was a central focus within the bureaucracy, and failure to espouse the correct revolutionary principles often meant re-education in the countryside—and effective removal from any access to political power. Though not quite as extreme as in revolutionary Iran, there was still little dissent and little oversight in the realm of foreign policy in particular, making it domestically politically possible for China to adopt a policy of HISS.

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[15] A number of documents in *China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence* expresses this rhetorical support. See fn. 1 as well.

[16] Shen and Xia 2014, 202. The Bandung Conference took place in April 1955, and general non-alignment principles have been called "the spirit of Bandung" in a variety of government documents and official statements by the Chinese government, with similar terms and sentiment used throughout the third world during the Cold War.

[17] I use the standard *pinyin* for Chinese names throughout this section, in which Mao's given name is Zedong, not Tse-tung. Note also that Jiang Jieshi is typically recorded in contemporary histories and, indeed, US government documents as "Chiang Kai-shek."

The CCP formally came to power in 1949 upon emerging militarily victorious from a civil war that had begun in 1927. After an ostensible truce between the Nationalists and the Communists during World War II to fight the mutual Japanese enemy, the domestic conflict once again took on central importance after 1945. In 1949, the Nationalist Guomindang army under Jiang Jieshi was finally ousted from the mainland and took sanctuary in Taiwan. That same year, Mao, as head of the Chinese Communist Party, declared the founding of a new polity and renamed the country the People's Republic of China. Though it was not formally recognized by the UN as the legitimate government of China until 1971, the CCP's reign had begun.

In other cases examined in this research, regimes that entered power through non-institutionalized channels tended to dismantle and replace institutions for the former regime. In the case of China circa 1949, there was no need to replace much of anything: the state of perpetual unrest since the first decade of the century meant that there were practically no existing government institutions remaining to dismantle.[18] Personnel, on the other hand, could be and were changed. Counter-revolutionaries quickly became the focus of fierce attacks and internal cleansing, as the new regime consolidated. Many former regime supporters were sent to forced labor camps, and there were more than 100,000 official executions in 1951.[19] By 1952, the CCP had established or refurbished national, provincial, and local institutions of governance, all of which were run by the party.[20] Some cabinet positions were initially given to non-party members, including most notably, the widow of founding Nationalist Sun Yatsen, but these posts brought with them little actual power.[21] Scholars agree that the real levers of authority rested

[18] Maurice Meisner. 1986. *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic,* 73.

[19] James Defronzo. 2015. *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 5e*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Chapter 3.

[20] Meisner 1986, 72.

[21] Ibid, 70.

with the Politburo and particularly with the Standing Committee, which included only a handful of people: Mao, Chou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Chen Yun.[22]

The CCP is often described as being marked by "factionalism" during the Mao years. Though Mao was officially Chairman of the Central Committee from 1945 through 1976, his personal influence and the influence of his supporters ("Maoists") were not in ascendance on the domestic political scene for an uninterrupted 30-odd years.[23] For example, in 1958, Mao was himself sidelined following the rather disastrous Great Leap Forward, an aggressive agricultural collectivization program that Mao pushed for and which resulted in the death of millions from famine.[24] He complained that he was "treated as a dead ancestor" during the early 1960s—a figure from the past to be venerated but not consulted on immediate, worldly matters of state.[25] On the other hand, Maoists conducted a number of purges of the bureaucracy when he first assumed the Chairmanship and, most infamously, upon his return the helm in the mid-1960s, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976. These purges typically took place on the theory that party members and government officials had become "reactionary" or were counterrevolutionaries: in short, on ideological grounds.[26]

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[22] Ibid, 72.

[23] The conflict between "Maoists" and the bureaucracy, or "idealists" and "realists", can perhaps be seen in the shifting menu of domestic policy choices and ideological conflicts. Sadri in particular holds the view that "realists" were often in charge in the Chinese revolutionary era and that the Maoist "idealists" were frequently challenged and blocked (1997, Chapter 3.) Top leaders announced such programs as the "Hundred Flowers" period, during which academic exploration and political expression were to be allowed to "bloom." In Mao's words, "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" (Blecher 1986, 65). Conversely, the Cultural Revolution some years later led to an internal, ideological witch-hunt, where many moderate and centrist leaders found themselves in danger of being sacked or worse. This was largely because Mao decided that the primary contradictions within Chinese society had become of a political-ideological type, and by emphasizing correct ideas, the CCP could reduce growing contradictions between the people and the party itself (Blecher 1986, 66.) These moves from extreme communism to a more moderate, modernizing socialism reflected the projects of different factions in the realm of domestic politics, but rarely extended into foreign affairs.

[24] Blecher 1986, 68-77.

[25] Meisner 1986, 267.

[26] See, for example, Meisner 1986, 185; 170; 131-133.

However, in the realm of foreign policy, the governing structures put into place as early as the mid-1950s were fairly insulated from factional disputes. Decision-making in foreign policy was concentrated at the top of the party.[27] Only a very few people had a final say in foreign affairs, including Zhou Enlai (from 1949-1966 and again from 1971-1974), Liu Shaoqi (from 1949-1966), and Lin Biao (from 1966-1971).[28] Though this has shifted in the post-Mao era, during the period under study here, policy was created at the highest levels, often by Mao personally, and the government institutional apparatus merely carried out these orders.[29] According to one scholar of the Chinese bureaucracy during the period, "During the Maoist era, all decision making bodies were reduced to rubber stamps."[30]

As in other areas of government, new institutions for international relations and foreign policy were created in the vacuum left by China's decades-long civil war. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was founded in December of 1949, just after the PRC itself. It was led in those early days by those who had served as foreign liaisons for the CCP during the civil war years, some of whom had been deeply involved in underground, anti-Jian Jieshi activities.[31] This suggests that those with experience in subterfuge and clandestine anti-government activities had access to a great deal of power over foreign policy design and execution. Another key institution was the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (LSG), founded in 1958, which had only vague responsibilities and was directly subordinate to the CCP Politburo in any event.[32] Though

[27] Lu Ning. 2000, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China, 2e*, 8.

[28] Dates of leaders' place in Mao's "informal nuclear circle" are from Lu 2000, 9. Also included during the Mao era was Deng Xiaoping briefly in 1975 before he lost favor and Hua Guofeng in 1976 just before Mao's death.

[29] Lu 2000, 40. See also A. Doak Barnett. 1985. *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process.* Boulder, CO/London: Westview Press/John Hopkins University for an in-depth examination of the post-Mao changes to foreign policy making in the PRC.

[30] Lu 2000, 19-20.

[31] Lu 2000, 49.

[32] Ibid, 12-13.

graduates from foreign universities with training in foreign affairs were present in the ministry, top posts were typically given to loyalists rather than experts.[33]

The PRC also had a special organization called the International Liaison Department (ILD) within the foreign affairs apparatus for maintaining relations with other communist parties.[34] Though officially used primarily to maintain relations with communist parties that were in office in other states, most importantly in the USSR, it was not formally limited to contacting only those organizations abroad which formally held state power.[35] Notably, the ILD was not housed within the MFA, but was, in fact, answerable only to the Leading Small Group mentioned above, meaning that top CCP leaders had rather direct control over the department.[36] This is all broadly consistent with the Revolutionary Reality's theory about the role of regime change type on HISS adoption. The long-lived Chinese civil war (not to mention the Japanese occupation) had the effect of removing existing governing institutions. Thus, when the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Army formally took control in 1949, they created and staffed entirely new institutions.

Furthermore, there is evidence that the causal mechanisms leading from entry type to HISS adoption were present. Highly concentrated decision-making power in foreign affairs was retained throughout the Mao era, and oversight bodies served largely to rubber stamp or simply carry out directives from Mao and a few chosen advisors. There was even an identifiable organization, like Hassan al-Turabi's Arab and Islamic Bureau[37] or Khomeini's Qom network,

[33] Ibid, 50-54.

[34] Shen and Xia 2014, 206.

[35] Ibid. Lu suggests that, via the ILD, the Chinese government also maintained relations with Cuban revolutionaries, making the geographic reach of Chinese activities even more global.

[36] Lu 2000, 167. See also organizational chart of PRC's foreign affairs bureaucracy in Lu's Appendix A, p. 197.

[37] Or, less directly related to Sudanese state resources, the PAIC (Islamic Arab People's Conference).

that was in a position to support non-state actors and over which a small number of leaders had control. There was little institutional oversight of the ILD in particular and the foreign affairs apparatus in general, one that was in any event staffed largely by loyalists.

Finally, ideology played a key role in determining whether one had access to power.[38] It was unwise to speak "unreformed" thoughts in public in a government where party orthodoxy was a prerequisite and dissent stigmatized. Those who were insubordinate, voiced different opinions than their superiors, or even failed to work hard enough at a state task were, at best, reprimanded, and more often sent for re-education sessions in the countryside.[39] And, with the exception of a few years in the early 1960's, it was the Mao Zedong line of thought that needed to be toed. There is therefore evidence that the mechanisms via which non-institutionalized entry leads to HISS were in operation in the Chinese case.

Condition 2: High Barriers to Conventional Military Operations against Rivals Abroad

Though now the most populous nation on earth and a rising world power, China in the Mao era was still only a regional military power at best.[40] With an increasingly adversarial Soviet Union on one border, an anti-regime force bolstered by the United States only 110 miles off the coast of mainland China in Taiwan, and US/UN troops on the Korean peninsula, the "poor" and "backward" peasant nation, with little industry to speak of, found itself rather unable to fight all of its enemies conventionally. Conflict with the main enemy, the United States, could

[38] Ideology had always been central to the Chinese revolution. Mao's well-known doctrine for insurgency, in which the guerrilla "fish" must swim among the popular "sea" was not conditioned merely on a shared interested among armed forces and rural peasants; it was up to the revolutionary insurgents to spend some time indoctrinating both new fighters and the peasants themselves. The revolutionary fish thus created for themselves ideologically friendly, if not fully radicalized, waters.

[39] Ji Chaozhu. 2008. *The Man on Mao's Right: From Harvard to Tiananmen Square, My Life Inside China's Foreign Ministry.* New York: Random House.

[40] The Rise of China has been much debated. See Mearsheimer and Brzezinski 2005; Ikenberry 2008; and Christensen 2006, among others.

take place only on a very steeply-slanted field, meaning that a global, anti-imperialist foreign policy could not make use of Chinese national troops.

The three barriers to conventional war discussed in Chapter 2 all conspired to limit China's options for carrying a fight to its primary adversaries around the world. The United States in particular was 1) materially militarily superior to China 2) nuclear-armed and 3) geographically distant. In 1951, Chinese military forces did number around 3,000,000, comparable to the 3.25 million of the US.[41] However, PLA troops were poorly equipped, especially in comparison to the United States and the UN forces that were battling on the Korean Peninsula by 1950. Furthermore, US military and defense spending was an order of magnitude larger than China's in 1951—$33.4 billion to $3.1 billion.[42] Perhaps most decisively, in terms of material capacity differentials, the People's Republic of China had practically no navy or air force and no means of logistically supporting its forces outside of Chinese territory.[43] Mutual enmity was high, but China did not have the kind of power projection capability to attack or truly threaten the United States, or "imperialism" more generally, outright.

Geographic limitations were severe as well. However, even when it was given the opportunity to strike directly due to more local proximity of US or imperialist forces—such as during the Korean War and the Strait of Taiwan incidents in 1954 and 1958—the Chinese both embraced the use of military force but also took great pains to avoid direct, formal confrontation. In the 1958 shelling of Jinmen during the second Strait of Taiwan incident, Mao scaled down

[41] From the Correlates of War (COW) data. See Singer and Small 1972. Andrew B. Kennedy. 2012. *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy,* 68-71.

[42] COW, ibid.

[43] Kennedy 2012, 71.

initial plans and carefully directed the attacks to avoid any US casualties.[44] In the Korean War, the Chinese People's Volunteer Force, the military body that actually crossed the Yalu and engaged in the conflict, was organizationally and formally distinct from the People's Liberation Army, the main and official nation military force. The CPVF was created in an effort to forestall direct US military actions against Beijing.[45] Though everyone knew the forces were Chinese, China learned quickly that claiming formal distance from armed actors operating under the auspices of the Chinese government—these were "volunteers," just like in the Spanish civil war!—was a convenient approach when employing military statecraft. This is all very consistent with my theorized causal mechanism, which suggests that states adopt HISS in part because they are aware of the limitations of their own national military capabilities.

In terms of definition enemies and rival, the CCP government started off at odds with the United States in particular due to a mix of both national security and ideological conflicts. As WWII closed and the Chinese civil war resumed, it rapidly became clear to most foreign powers that Mao Zedong's Communist army would triumph over Jiang Jieshi's Nationalists (the Guomingdang or GMD) without high levels of external support, and the latter army may well capitulate even with it.[46] The United States was one of the leading supporters of the Nationalist army, and even offered disproportionate aid to Chiang Kai-shek during the Japanese occupation,

[44] Kuisong Yang and Sheng Mao. 2016. "Unafraid of the Ghost: The Victim Mentality of Mao Zedong and the Two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s." *The China Review 16*(1), 21.

[45] Mao is reported as having said to Kim Il-Sung: "When needed, we can stealthily send you Chinese troops…[Koreans and Chinese] all have black hair, nobody can tell us apart" (Christensen 2011: 46). Chou Enlai also asked for samples of Korean military uniforms in order to make preparation to send support troops. See Michael Sheng. 2014. "Chapter 27: Chinese Intervention" in Michael Boose and James Matray (Eds.) *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Civil War,* 336.

[46] See *United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949* (1949). An assessment by Ambassador John Leighton Stuart on June 7 1947, for example, notes that, "It is obvious that the Government [GMD] face in Manchuria the probability of a military debacle of large proportions…it is probably that the Government's defeat may assume even larger proportions. It seems to lie within the Communists' power either to continue to bleed the Government's strength in Manchuria or to force further government withdrawal" (1949, 240).

despite the fact that Mao and Jiang had formally declared a truce to their internal war and become allies in 1937. This support was hardly secret; Mao requested again and again that the US government to stay out of Chinese internal matters and let the war take its course, which was at the time favorable to CCP forces.[47] Mao was still uninterested in accepting American economic aid for the new government upon victory. Thus US-Chinese relations during the 1950s were based on US fears of communist expansion in East Asia and Chinese fears of a US-sponsored counter-revolutionary strike from the GMD, holed up on the island of Taiwan.

The Sino-Soviet split, which, partly due to ideological differences, grew more pronounced into the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, also severely curtailed Chinese conventional options abroad. Now, Beijing was not only receiving little to no material or technical aid from the Soviets, but the split meant that a 2,700-mile border that had been shared with an allied territory was now the location of possible incursions and disputes with a geopolitical rival.[48] By 1969, a serious border conflict between the USSR and China had erupted, with Soviet equipment clearly out-classing that of the PLA, who promised a "people's war" in response should USSR truly invade any territory. The threat absorbed a great deal of Chinese military capacity. About one quarter of all Chinese troops were stationed along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969.[49]

Though a regional power, China's new government in 1949 was not in a position to pursue an activist, international, and anti-status quo foreign policy using conventional military

[47] See John Gittings. 1974. *The World and China, 1922-1974.* London: Harper and Row.

[48] Soviet technical aid, while not without limitations, was crucial to China's early industrialization and especially China's first Five Year Plan. Over 12,000 Soviet technical experts were sent to China in the 1950s, and at least half as many Chinese citizens received training in the Soviet Union during the same period (Meisener 1986, 120-124). As a result of growing tensions, these experts were all suddenly recalled in the early 1960s.

[49] From COW Material Capabilities database. It is also worth noting that both states also had viable nuclear weapons at the time.

statecraft. Squaring off against militarily superior, nuclear-armed foes was likely to lead not to the accomplishment of concrete goals but major military and political losses for the CCP, and perhaps even a counter-revolutionary, Jiang Jieshi-led government in Beijing at the end of the day. Faced with very real security concerns, revolutionary China was looking for realistic, non-conventional military options when it came to international statecraft. As one expert put it,

> "Throughout the Mao era, the nation's physical security was the primary concern. Incessant wars and threats to Beijing's security on its periphery, from Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina to India and the Sino-Soviet border, led Mao to believe that a major war was inevitable and imminent. As a result, diplomacy was an important instrument…not only did Beijing devote a disproportionately large amount of its resources to foreign aid, but much of it, including military assistance, was provided with no or low interests loans or for gratis."[50]

Indeed, as this analysis suggests, Beijing knew that one available tool was to send not national troops but funds and military equipment to others (states and non-state groups) to advance its foreign policy and security interests. It is worth seeing now whether there is reason to believe that the Chinese government under Mao, according to the government's embraced ideology, would have wanted to pursue the international activist foreign policy that HISS represents. If so, then this case is correctly predicted by the Revolutionary Reality theory.

III. Marxism, Maoism, and (Inter)National Liberation as Revolutionary Ideology

The Chinese Communist Party has been in power since 1949, which is effectively the entire length of study for this research. The party's ideology has certainly shifted over time, but the foundation of that party emerged from the Chinese civil war. That was a struggle largely led, politically and ideologically, by Mao since the infamous Long March. Even today, ideology is a potent force behind Chinese policy, including foreign policy, which is said to follow "Mao's

[50] Lu 2000, 167.

thought," even if in the post-Mao era, those thoughts have been reformed and re-imagined.[51] Maoism is therefore the relevant ideology to study, when considering what the "ruling ideology" of the government of the People's Republic of China might be during the 1949-1976 period.

I argue and demonstrate that Maoism is an international revolutionary ideology, meeting the criteria in this research. Mao's ideological writings and speeches, as well as those adopted by the party, are clearly action-oriented. They actually reject the emphasis in Marxism on material conditions as drivers of revolution and history, focusing instead on the importance of the human will in shaping society. Furthermore, Maoism embraces an eschatological worldview, one that suggests that China's political revolution and the ideals it represents are a contribution to mankind's progress towards a peaceful and egalitarian future order. These are two criteria of an 'international revolutionary' ideology.

In terms of Maoism's internationalism, I take and defend the position that the ideology is inherently internationalist and that the normative basis of the ideology applies around the world. Many consider Mao to have been a stout nationalist—much more the "Socialism in one country" Stalinist than a world-revolutionary Trotskyist.[52] It is true that much of his revolutionary theory focuses on China itself. However, the basic internationalist tendencies of Marxism are retained in Mao's work and writing, which refer time and time again to the "universally valid" theory of contradictions and Marxism-Leninism. Though Mao is deeply interested in applying the universal ideology to the case of China, the ideology itself affirms an internationally valid set of moral claims that does not end at China's borders but rather extends across the globe.

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[51] Chai 2012, "Communist Ideology and Chinese Foreign Policy" in *Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy*. See also the post-Mao book *The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition* by Domes 1985.

[52] For an introduction to and summary of the arguments on this subject, see Nick Knight. 1985. "Mao Zedong and the 'Sinification of Marxism'" in Colin Mackerras and Nick Knight (Eds). *Marxism in Asia,* 83-90.

Marxism as an International Revolutionary Ideology

Marxism is perhaps the classic, modern international revolutionary ideology. Between the theory of historical materialism and the call of "Workers of the world, unite!"[53] all three elements are present: an international normative framework; the historical framing of the current struggle in terms of human social progress; and the imperative for action. This research allocates space for a brief discussion of Marxism here because this ideology is central to Mao thought and will be revisited in the following chapters on Cuba and Nicaragua—the Castro revolutionaries and the Sandinistas both largely follow this ideological tradition.

Marxism, as well as Marxism-Leninism, has several key features relevant to the present research.[54] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels expounded a collection of theories regarding the nature of the social, economic, and political world. They argued that economic activity underlies all of the important aspects of society, and that

> "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes."[55]

This basic tenant, that history is driven by struggles between classes, and classes are themselves linked to economic relations or relations of production, is at the center of most of the later variations and applications of Marxism. In our current era, according to this theory, bourgeoisie

[53] Engels, F., & Marx, K. (1848). The Communist Manifesto. Retrieved September 17, 2016, from http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/61/pg61.html. Text is from the English edition of 1888, edited by Friedrich Engels.

[54] The over-simplification here is necessary for the sake of focusing on the cases at hand and question of this research – this is meant as a brief overview to highlight themes needed for my analysis.

[55] Engels and Marx, Part I.

capitalists own the means of production and exploit the labor of workers, ultimately building and reinforcing political and social systems that legitimize and reproduce the conditions necessary for such exploitation. Also suggested here is that action, indeed disruptive action, is required to change these social, political, and economic relations.

Another feature of Marxism relevant here is the concept of the nation and internationalism. Marxism is inherently internationalist, arguing that the proletarian workers throughout the world have far more in common with each other than they do with the other classes, especially the enemy bourgeoisie class, inside their own "nation." Thus a proletarian revolution is necessarily a worldwide (or at least, highly international) affair, as capitalism as an economic system overall must be eliminated in order for a more equitable set of social relations to truly take hold. This internationalism is intimately tied to the basic tenet of Marxism regarding class relations, though subsequent interpretations and ideologies based on Marxism have tended to emphasize the international aspect to greater or lesser degrees.

Finally, the Marxist conception of history identifies several progressive stages of human relations. Primitive communism, found in ancient hunter-gathered tribal societies, is characterized as a fairly cooperative social state. The next stage is the slave society, in which private property begins to appear; this society ultimately collapses as a result of its own contradictions and flaws. The feudal state came next, ending with a series of revolutions and progressing onto the capitalist state –the current state of at least Marx-era Europe.

From there, Marx imagines two further stages. Next is socialism, the result of the revolution of workers against the bourgeoisie, and then an ideal communist society, in which there is no exploitation and a classless social, economic, and political system emerges all over the world. This is clearly an ideal state, a utopia. What is important to note here is that this

conception in the Marxist ideology's content is highly consistent with my eschatology/historical context criterion. The concrete political movement employing a strongly Marxist ideology views itself as having a very significant place in history, and is responsible for, at least in part, moving the world from a previous state to a more ideal end-state.

Thus Marxism's core principles align well with my definition of international revolutionary ideology. This does not necessarily mean that all ideologies that call themselves Marxist, or as derived from Marxist principles, will also meet the definition. It is worth making the distinction, though, between two the questions of ideological content and government actions and policies. Regardless of the policies actually adopted by governments, this chapter is meant to examine the ideological tenets of Maoism (and then the Communist Party of Kampuchea). Thus even if there is a large gap between a government's proclaimed ideology and its actual activities, it is still possible for me to "code" ideologies as international revolutionary based solely on the former.

Maoism

Internationalism through National Liberation

I revisit the quotation from the opening of the chapter. Even without delving more deeply into Mao's writings, the CCP's sentiments here definitely seem to contain a very strong internationalist normative strain.

> "The socialist states have forged indestructible ties of great fraternal friendship among themselves. Our relations are those of co-operation, based on equality and mutual benefit; they are relations of mutual respect and mutual assistance, and their aim is common progress. Marxism-Leninism is the guiding thought in all the socialist countries, and they have a common ideal and goal – the realization of communism."[56]

[56] Ibid; fn. 1.

However, it is true that China's revolution was highly nationalist—the goal was to regain Chinese autonomy, eroded by the imperialists, and to modernize the nation. Yet, Maoism presents a theoretical view of that struggle that is highly internationalist in nature.

Lenin provides a useful context for fully understanding how a nationalist revolution can be conceived as part of the world communist movement. Those polities that were victims of imperialism, the "colonies and semi-colonies" of the world, could contribute to a disruption of the capitalist system by staging national revolutions against colonial powers.[57] Many colonial nations had agriculture-based economies, with very small populations of the kinds of industrial workers thought to be central to a Marxist-style communist revolution. Furthermore, national liberation – the assertion of national rights against colonial rulers – seems contrary to the movement towards world-wide class consciousness. However, Lenin saw this as a necessary stage for the political and economic development of these colonial and semi-colonial entities, which in turn was key for the success of the global revolution: "It is self-evident that final victory can be won only by the proletariat of all the advanced countries of the world…but we see that they will not be victorious without the aid of the working people of all the oppressed colonial nations, first and foremost, of Eastern nations."[58]

Mao's description of the importance of the Chinese revolution, and the ultimate goal of his political activity, echoes this quite closely. Mao frequently referred to the importance of understanding Marxism-Leninism not in the abstract, but in terms of its specific application to China and the Chinese situation. Noting the universality of the laws of class struggle and the importance of the economic system in social relations, underlying Marxism, Mao sought to

[57] Knight 1985, 31-35.

[58] From Lenin, Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 250. Cited in Mackerras and Knight 1985, 33-34.

scientifically and critically apply the principles to Chinese society. With study, he could discover the most relevant social contradictions and the practical approach for helping China progress to a more ideal, socialist and communist state. Ultimately, as one scholar put it, "The Sinification of Marxism was not a question of the elevation of Chinese realities at the expense of Marxism's universality, but the completion of Marxism as an ideological system."[59] Marxism is the original text, China the translation.

Indeed, Mao's own writing and speeches reveal the basic notion that the moral application of Marxism is universal and others can use Marist principles to understand the specific applications of this universal system to their own particular historical and social contexts.

> "Marxism-Leninism is held to be true not only because it was so considered when it was scientifically formulated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin but because it has been verified in the subsequent practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle. Dialectical materialism is universally true because it is impossible for anyone to escape from its domain in his practice."[60]

Here, not only do we see Mao affirming the universal application of the central notion of Marxism-Leninism, but also putting "revolutionary class struggle" and "revolutionary national struggle" together as part of the same political project.

This statement, that the application of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin's ideas is universal, is found in so many places in Mao's writing that it would be somewhat absurd to suggest that it is superficial lip service to the COMINTERN or an attempt to hide a true,

[59] Knight 1985, 86. In comparison to the tenets of the CPK that will be analyzed below, this relative position of China within the Marxist framework is a crucial note.

[60] Mao Zedong "On Practice" July 197. From the English translation to the second edition of *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung* 1971, 77.

chauvinistic rejection of international communism.[61] Just some examples include: "The Universality of Contradiction," which is the subtitle of part II of Mao's "On Contradiction"[62]; "Marx gave a still more profound, more adequate and more complete elucidation of the universality of contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society in general"[63]; "The law of contradiction in things…is the fundamental law of nature and of society and therefore also a fundamental law of thought"[64]; "What kind of spirit is this that makes a foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every Chinese Communist must learn"[65]; "the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, which reflects the practice of proletarian struggle throughout the world"[66]; "the road to the abolition of classes, to the abolition of state power and to the abolition of parties is the road all mankind must take."[67] The internationalist theme in Mao's work, and its extension of a normative framework over national borders, is hard to plausibly deny.

Furthermore, Mao's discussion of the principal contradictions in society tends to follow the Leninist line that for colonial and semi-colonial countries, nationalist struggles against imperialism are of primary concern.

> "In a semi-colonial country such as China, the relationship between the principal contradiction and the non-principal contradictions presents a complicated picture. When imperialism launches a war of aggression against such a country, all its various classes…can temporarily unite in a national war against imperialism. At

[61] Knight in particular refers to Robert North has holding a fairly cynical interpretation of Mao's Marxist internationalism. Knight 1985, 84 and 92 n. 41.

[62] Mao "On Contradiction." August 1937 in *Selected Reading* 1971, 90.

[63] Ibid, 107.

[64] Ibid, 128.

[65] Ibid, 179. From "In Memory of Norman Bethune" Dec. 21 1939.

[66] Ibid, 314. From "Unite and Fight to Accomplish the Party's Tasks!" April 24, 1945.

[67] Ibid, 372. From "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" June 30, 1949.

> such a time, the contradiction between imperialism and the country concerned become the principal contradiction."[68]

This places nationalism in a world-communist context and casts the former goal as wholly subservient to the latter.

An even more explicit articulation of this role for wars of national liberation in achieving the ultimate global aims of communism appears in Mao's 1938 report to the Central Committee of the CCP. In answer to the question "Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot?" he states that, "Only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and the defeat of invading imperialists will help the people of other countries. When it comes to wars of national liberation, patriotism is actually applied internationalism."[69] Mao here is adopting the Leninist notion that reconciles nationalism and Marxist internationalism in colonial countries.

This international focus is important to Maoism. Indeed, when it comes to a self-aggrandizing national chauvinism, Mao explicitly draws distinctions between such "patriotism" and the Marxist-informed nationalism of a semi-colonial country. He says, "There is a 'patriotism' of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our patriotism. Communists must resolutely oppose the 'patriotism' of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler."[70] Mao further

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[68] Ibid, "On Contradiction" 110. Sadri (1997) makes the case the Chinese foreign policy is highly "practical" and uses this same passage to defend the notion that Mao's ideology built in this type of strategic and flexible thinking that allows for *realpolitik*. Implied, but not emphasized to the extent that I emphasize it here, is the fact that this idea is quite consistent with Lenin's views of colonial and semi-colonial countries and their struggle against imperialism (38-40). I do not mean to mischaracterize Sadri on this, but it is worth noting that policies which are both strategically practical *and* consistent with ideological impulses do little to prove a theory that radical leadership is responsible for policy choices, whereas the overlap provides at least some support for my theory of Revolutionary Realities, which acknowledges that strategic and ideological ends are often inextricably linked.

[69] Ibid, 140. From "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" October 1938.

[70] Ibid, 139.

notes that, "We are at once internationalists and patriots."[71] In this body of political writings, a Communist must be an internationalist, and a Chinese Communist, in this particular historical moment and situation, must also come to the *national* defense of China against imperialist aggressors.

None of this is to say that there is no valid, highly nationalistic reading of Mao's work. Nor do I deny a kind of cultural arrogance in some of Mao's passages. It is equally difficult, however, to completely deny the frequent references to the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism or to overlook the textbook Leninist interpretation that Mao's writings explicitly place on China's struggle for national liberation. The Chinese Communist Party espoused, under Mao, an ideology that is at least ostensibly internationalist in normative application, which satisfies one of the definitional criteria for this research.

Historical Situation of Ideology and Polity

The ideology embraced by Mao and the senior leadership of the PRC also contains themes of eschatology and the progress of history. These notions clearly bear some relation to the Marxist-Leninist ideology described above, in which human societies are said to progress from one stage to another, ultimately ending in an ideal communist state. Mao wrote that, "The October Socialist Revolution ushered in a new epoch in world history as well as in Russian history."[72] Imperialism and capitalism are pillars of the old order, whereas communism, socialism, and above all, the rule of the people, represent the next phase of human history. Mao's writings emphasize the transitionary nature of his contemporary era, a transition that is tied to the growing success of communist and nationalist political movements and the weakness

[71] Ibid, 140.

[72] Ibid, 89. From "On Contradiction."

of capitalism and imperialism. This is the underlying principle of Mao's famous "paper tigers" claim: "All reactionaries are paper tigers… it will be proved that the U.S. reactionaries, like all the reactionaries in history, do not have much strength…the day will come when these reactionaries are defeated and we are victorious."[73] Similarly, other key Chinese leaders reiterate the theme, declaring that, "The days when the Western colonial powers could shape the fate of the Eastern nations at will are gone beyond recall."[74]

This optimistic view of socialist progress was fully embraced in official statements by Mao as the Chairman of the PRC. In a joint statement with Nikita Khrushchev in August 1958, both leaders contended that,

> "The events in the Near and Middle East[75] and in other parts of the world prove that the national liberation movement is an irresistible tide, that the age of colonialism is gone for ever, and that any attempt to maintain or restore colonial rule, which goes against the trend of historical development, is harmful to the cause of peace and is foredoomed to fail."[76]

The idea of an old order crumbling and a new, substantively better order taking shape, is clearly articulated in this message.

There are also hints of how truly ideal the new phase of the world order will be. The peoples of the world (as compared to corrupt and illegitimate governments) are strong and will bring about a new, more peaceful, and ideal era. "The overall outlook for the world is a bright one. Given the solidarity and concerted efforts of the forces of the socialist countries and the

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[73] Ibid, 345-350. From "Talk with Ana Louise Strong," August 1946. The paper tigers thesis echoes a notion by Lenin that imperialism is a "colossus with feet of clay" (see note on page 345 in source).

[74] *China Supports the Arab People's Struggle,* 1958, 35. From Chen Yi "On Present International Situation and Our Foreign Policy." Speech delivered at the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Sept. 25 1956.

[75] This refers directly to the situation in Lebanon and Jordan at the time, when American and British forces were stationed in those countries.

[76] In *China Supports*, 80. From "Communique on Meeting Between Mao Tse-tung and N. S. Krushchov" on August 3, 1958.

forces for peace and democracy the world over, lasting peace for the world and the cause of human progress will eventually triumph."[77] Similar themes of human destiny and mankind's progress can be found throughout other party materials and public statements.[78]

In all these examples, the idea of the destiny and progress of mankind is tied to national liberation movements and popular resistance to imperialist or colonialist forces. The ideology of the ruling party in the PRC depicted a world in which history was on the march. The old order was corrupt and oppressive, whereas the new was to be marked by freedom and equality. This means that national liberation movements are both morally correct and likely to be effective against the governments of the old order. Coupled with the call to action below, it drives a preference for an activist, international foreign policy that continues to move history forward to its more ideal state and resist reactionary backsliding.

Call to Action

Finally, the imperative for action is central to Mao's ideology. Many scholars of China and Maoism have noted the highly "voluntaristic" understanding that Mao had of history.[79] Rather than objective material conditions, it was human consciousness and the "ideas, the wills, and the actions of men" that Mao considered to be the "decisive factor" in history.[80] This is hardly orthodox Marxism, there the emphasis is on the role of material conditions as the

[77] In *China Supports,* 27-28. From "Liu Shao-chi: Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the 8th National Congress of the Party" Sept. 15, 1956.

[78] See also Gittings 1974. There is some evidence that this is "merely" propaganda. As Mao suggests at a regional conference in 1958, "It's a good thing for us when the West gets afraid of making a crisis…All the evidence proves that imperialism has adopted a defensive position, and it no longer has an ounce of offensiveness [that is, towards China and the Soviet Union]… NATO is on the offensive against the forces of nationalism and indigenous communism (and its offensive is especially focused on the intermediate zone of Asia, Africa and Latin America), but towards the socialist camp it is on the defensive unless another Hungarian affair should emerge. How to handle this in our propaganda is another matter, and we must go on saying that it is on the offensive. But we shouldn't be deluded by our own propaganda." Cited in Gittings 1974, 226.

[79] Knight 1985, Chapter 4.

[80] Meisner 1986, 41.

precipitator of social change. Rather, Maoist ideology focuses on the capacity for individuals to consciously and actively take part in history. This means that there is an essential and central place in Maoism for what I have termed the 'call to action.'[81]

An oft-cited parable in Mao's work, the Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains, demonstrates the role of human action and exertion in pursuit of grand goals.[82] In 1945, in a speech at the Seventh National Congress of the CCP, Mao ended with this story: A man whose farmland lived in the shadow of two mountains decided that he and his sons would use their simple hoes to dig up the mountain, so that their land might one day see sunlight and be more productive. The man's neighbor called him foolish and derided them all, saying that they would never successfully remove the mountains. The first man replied that he did not expect to move them in his lifetime, but that his sons and grandsons would continue the labor far into the future. He concluded that, "High as they are, the mountain cannot grow any higher and with every bit we dig, they will be that much lower. Why can't we clear them away?"[83] Not only does this reinforce the themes of the historical worldview—in the end the desired state of the mountains' disappearance shall obtain—but it clearly states the virtue of *action.*[84] Simultaneously, the view of the neighbor, who sneers at taking on a difficult task and takes no action, is to be rejected.[85]

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[81] See Schram 1975, quoted and cited in Knight 1985, 71 and 91 fn. 16.

[82] The memoir of Li Chaozhu, a high-profile translator for Zhou Enlai and occasionally Chairman Mao himself, opens with this story as well, where the author uses it as a metaphor for Chinese progress (2008, xviii-xix).

[83] Mao 1971, 321. From "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains" June 11, 1945. In *Selected Readings*.

[84] Blecher 1986, 38.

[85] This bears a strong resemblance to Ayatollah Khomeini's exhortation against idle scholars: "Why should anyone bow before you?" (Khomeini 1981, 142). Further parallels emerge in the conclusion of the Foolish Old Man's tale. God in heaven saw the conviction and the effort of the man and his sons and ultimately sent down two angels to carry the mountains away. As Khomeini asked, "Is it the function of angels to pamper the idle? The angles spread their wings beneath the feet of the Commander of the Faithful (upon whom be peace) because he was of benefit to Islam" (ibid). The implication is the same: adherents of the ideology must act—and their actions will have fantastic consequences.

As a matter of philosophy, Mao notes the importance of active pursuit of revolutionary goals even in his early writings. In "On Practice," he states, "Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world."[86] Later writings are even more vociferous on the subject: "We stand for active ideological struggle because it is the weapon for ensuring unity within the party and the revolutionary organizations in the interest of our fight. Every Communist and revolutionary should take up this weapon."[87] He further contents that, "Communists should show a high degree of initiation in the national war, and show it concretely, that is, they should play an exemplary vanguard role in every sphere…communists…should set an example in fighting bravely, carrying out orders, observing discipline, doing political work and fostering internal unity and solidarity."[88] There is a great deal of activism required of the true Communist.

Mao also consistently links action and ideas, or theory and practice, in his work. This is what gives his ideology such a voluntarist air. It is worth quoting at length from a 1963 document written up by Mao on the subject of ideas and actions. It incorporates all of the elements of the international revolutionary ideology discussed in this section, beginning with the Marxist-Leninist universal truth continuing into the efficacy of the human consciousness, and ending with the destiny of mankind. Also, it is worth comparing this quotation to the one from the Khmer Rouge at the start of the chapter.

> "Among our comrades there are many who do not yet understand [the dialectical materialist] theory of knowledge….nor do they comprehend that matter can be transformed into consciousness and consciousness into matter...It is therefore

[86] Mao 1971, 76. From "On Practice."

[87] Ibid, 134. From "Combat Liberalism" September 1937.

[88] Ibid, 141. From "Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" October 1938.

> necessary to educate our comrades in the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, so that they can orientate [*sic*] their thinking correctly, become good at investigation and study and at summing up experience, overcome difficulties, commit fewer mistakes, do their work better, and struggle hard so as to build China into a great and powerful socialist country and help the broad masses of the oppressed and exploited through the world in fulfillment of our great internationalist duty."[89]

Though complex and a worthy area for scholarly inquiry, the Maoist strain of Marxism-Leninism adopted by the CCP during the revolutionary period and into the Mao era of the new People's Republic of China has all the markings of an international revolutionary ideology. I therefore consider this variable present in the post-1949 China case.

Revolutionary Realities and HISS Adoption

There has already been a great deal of scholarship on the ideology-inspired policies of the Maoist era in China.[90] I argued here that the three conditions theoretically necessary, in combination, for HISS adoption were all present in China under Mao, from 1949-1976. I also have given evidence that China did adopt such a policy. I ultimately conclude that the domestic political situation, in which Mao and a handful of close allies were able to dictate policy to new institutions such as the ILD, made it possible for the state to adopt a policy of HISS. Then, the political ideology adopted by the regime overall made it appealing to pursue some kind of an active, internationalist foreign policy, one that helped people throughout the world struggle against the previous, capitalist and colonialist world order. Furthermore, China's inability to actually launch conventional wars against many of its key foes, especially the United States,

[89] Ibid, 503-504. From "Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?" May 1963.

[90] E.g. Sadri 1997, Walt 1996. Kennedy 2012 represents a new, well-considered, and serious approach to the general conception that "ideology" is important for understanding Mao's foreign policy.

made policies of sponsorship of other armed actors, including non-state actors, an obvious alternative when it came to using force abroad.

This meant that a policy of HISS was a policy tool realistically available to the state that could achieve a number of strategic and ideological goals (including those strategic goals that were framed ideologically). Given that Mao and his top cadres were in a position to implement HISS, they began to send money to and train anti-government non-state actors across the region and the globe. In sum, the post-1949 China case fits the Revolutionary Realities model of HISS adoption, as all three factors were present, there is evidence of several key cause mechanisms, and the best evidence suggests that Mao's China did support non-state actors at a high intensity.

IV. Democratic Kampuchea: National Chauvinism and Non-Adoption of HISS

There are several reasons that one might expect Democratic Kampuchea (DK)[91] under the Khmer Rouge would also have adopted a policy of HISS. At first glance, there are many similarities to the China case. After all, Pol Pot and his peasant revolutionaries seized power after a large popular uprising, thoroughly dismantling all previous institutions of the state and imposing a new, revolutionary order. It was led by a small, tight-knit group of Khmer "Paris-trained" communist intellectuals. A series of escalating purges, while ultimately contributing to the collapse of the ruling party, crushed internal dissent and ensured ideological orthodoxy. The DK adopted an antagonistic attitude towards many powerful nations, accusing domestic enemies of working for the CIA or the KGB.[92] Last and not least, the regime adopted an extremist

[91] I will use the appellation favored by the ruling parties and constitutions – DK from 1975-1979, the Khmer Republic from 1970-1975, and "Cambodia" or "Kingdom of Cambodia" in the pre-1970 and post-1980 periods. "Cambodians" is also used to refer to all people of all ethnicities inside the borders of the state known variously as DK, KR, and Cambodia. "Cambodia" may also be used to refer to the state in direct quotes, as many US intelligence sources as well as Vietnamese, Thai, and Lao sources use "Cambodia" and "DK" interchangeably.

[92] Kiernan 2008. Numerous Kiernan interviewees, survivors of the Khmer Rouge period, indicate that this was a common charge against individuals who were singled out by cadres for punishment.

ideology, one ostensibly derived from Marxism and, indeed, Maoism itself. The parallels to the Chinese situation are obvious and are made even more obvious through the declaration of policies like DK's "Super Great Leap Forward," which is almost a caricature of the Chinese model.

The rulers of Democratic Kampuchea, however, did not adopt a policy of state sponsorship for non-state actors—and the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS would not expect them to. My theory correctly predicts a non-adoption outcome due to the absence of one of the key factors. Though HISS *could* have been implemented by the new leadership that had entered power irregularly, it was not seen as desirable foreign policy for the DK on the basis of its political ideology. I argue that the difference in outcome between China and Democratic Kampuchea is due to the fact that the Khmer Rouge's motivating ideology was not an international revolutionary one. Though it borrowed language from Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, the ideology adopted by the state did not have a meaningful internationalist bent nor universal normative application. Rather, the CPK advanced an ideological project that was based on ethnic categorization, isolation, and domestic control.[93] In terms of the use of class language, further examination reveals the CPK was attempting to demarcate what were effectively racial groups by using class labels. These race categories did not extend beyond national borders (except to certain pockets of territory claimed to be in the 'historical homeland' of ethnic Khmers, such as Khmer Krom in Vietnam), and there was little sense of social, political, or moral connection outside of DK.

[93] Recent scholarship finds that the Khmer Rouge taught its ideology with intense thought reform sessions leading to mass radicalization, likening the process to a religious conversion not unlike those used by cults, which ultimately led not to revolutionary activity but national terror (Path and Kanavou 2015).

A foreign policy of support for non-state actors around the world, especially of other racial groups, is not consistent with this ideological message. The rhetoric of the CPK frequently encouraged citizens and cadres not to consider the external enemy but to instead focus on the internal one. Thus, it was not imperialist and capitalist (or godless or hegemonic) nations or world systems that were to be struggled against, as in the Iranian, Cuban, and Chinese cases. Struggles in other countries were not only *less* important than the one within Democratic Kampuchean society (the more nationalist interpreters of Maoism would perhaps argue that China saw itself as engaged in the most important among many anti-imperialist struggles), they held no clear moral relevance whatsoever in the CPK's chauvinistic ideological worldview.

Thus one of the three conditions in the Revolutionary Realities theory does not obtain, and I therefore find it no surprise that the Khmer Rouge did not engage in HISS. The state was simply not interested in pursuing an activist, internationalist foreign policy that targeted states quo governments and institutions. Rather, it identified a few, nearby foreign enemies on the basis of race and historical enmity and sought to engage those with its conventional military apparatus. In fact, the chauvinistic worldview of the Khmer Rouge colored the geostrategic situation in which DK found itself in the late 1970s. The regime, constantly concerned about internal enemies, still believed that it had the strength to deal with their chief external enemy, Vietnam. Indeed, the regime launched attacks on the more powerful Vietnam in 1978, precipitating its own military expulsion from Phnom Penh by Vietnamese forces, aided and abetted by revolts in DK's Eastern Zone, only a year later.

Outcome: HISS Non-Adoption

The State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship database finds that the Pol Pot regime did not sponsor any armed non-state actors from 1975-1979, at least not verifiably[94] and at a sufficient, material level to register in either the UCDP or the MSA datasets. It is important to note that, unlike the Chinese case, the UCDP data captures the entire period for the Khmer Rouge's rule. Furthermore, there is evidence that after 1988, the Cambodian government did sponsor one or two regional non-state actors. This was not, however, the policy from 1975-1979.

Leveraging other sources confirms the initial "no HISS" conclusion. Historic accounts of DK during this period suggest that they were, at most, involved in harassing Vietnamese forces on the border and were perhaps supporting Khmer or pro-DK elements within Vietnam. Most accounts suggest that these were actually DK state forces, but if there were any pro-CPK pockets of resistance inside border areas, the Khmer Rouge would likely have aided them.[95] This would amount to only a few groups, however, not the 5+ threshold for this dissertation's definition of HISS. Furthermore, there are no reports, to my knowledge, that the CPK was involved in conflicts outside of its immediate region or that they supported particularly terroristic groups.[96] Events-based terrorism datasets do not indicate that the Khmer Rouge sponsored terrorist attacks outside of DK territory, although CPK troops were involved directly in massacres during fighting

[94] The issue of verifiability may be key to this null result, as may be the fact that the regime fell so quickly. It is worth noting here the Communist Party of Kampuchea is perhaps one of the most secretive organizations ever to come into state power, on par with North Korea. Even information such as the identity of key leaders was not known by outsiders (or most Cambodians for that matter) through 1978-1979. In a strange and ultimately tragic trip that resulted in the mysterious murder of an official, a few Western observers were allowed to visit Democratic Kampuchea about a year before the regime fell. One of the leading experts on the topic – Ben Kiernan – asked a colleague who did make the trip to inquire about "the unnamed ministers of agriculture and rubber plantations" as well as a list of members of the CPK Central Committee (Kiernan 2008, 443). With many basic facts about this period unclear, it should be no surprise that there is little strong evidence for a particularly clandestine type of foreign policy – support for armed non-state actors – available. However, I nonetheless argue that the best current evidence leads to the conclusion that no policy of state sponsorship that fit a HISS pattern was adopted by DK during the Khmer Rouge's time in power.

[95] Kiernan 2008, 441-2.

[96] The fact that the regime was *itself* terroristic and murderous does not satisfy definitional the criteria for HISS.

along the Vietnamese border in 1978. For all that this kind of activity is deplorable and, indeed, a war crime, it does not constitute HISS as defined in the current project.

Condition 1: Entry Type and the Founding of Democratic Kampuchea

The CPK regime in Democratic Kampuchea entered power through non-institutionalized means and implemented sweeping political, social, and economic changes that are likely unmatched in modern history. Suffice to say that new governing institutions were put in place, and the incredible secrecy of the regime, as well as a penchant for murder within the ranks and population, made dissent in this tightly-controlled policy nearly unheard-of. Only a few top leaders had any say in national-level policy, foreign or domestic.

Historian and scholar Ben Kiernan identifies four unique periods in modern Cambodia. The first, from 1863-1954 is the French colonial period; from 1954-1970 are the "Sihanouk years" where Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a key player in the independence movement, served as head of a one-party state. After a 1970 coup d'état, General Lon Nol held power as president until the 1975 military victory by the Khmer Rouge, who were temporarily allied with the deposed Sihanouk. There were also two separate phases of a civil war, first from 1967-1970 and second from 1970-1975.[97] US bombing campaigns inside Cambodia, particularly during 1973, contributed to popular support for communist insurgents in general and also helped the more nationalist and extremist CPK Center faction dominate the movement. Thus by the time General Lon Nol's forces were surrendering the capital, the CPK Center and Pol Pot were in a strong

[97] A key dimension of the political upheavals in post-independence Cambodia was the Vietnam War. One factor that contributed to the success of Lon Nol's coup was Sihanouk's perceived "softness" on Communist insurgents and disorder in the east of the country – along the Vietnamese border. Along the Ho Chi Minh trail and throughout eastern Cambodia, one could find a number of Cambodian, Lao, and Vietnamese communist organizations, many operating with mutual support and messages of solidarity and some, such as the nascent CPK, with a more nationalist orientation.

position to seize the reins of state despite internecine conflicts during the earlier periods of the civil conflict.

On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge forces and the Communist Party of Kampuchea seized Phnom Penh. Purges began immediately; many leaders of the Khmer Republic era were killed or jailed. Over the course of the next four years, having been associated with the Lon Nol armed forces was a crime punishable by beatings, hard labor, starvation, and death.[98] The CPK forcibly evacuated the city of Phnom Penh just shortly after their victory, sending all of the city people out to the countryside.

"Who rules" had a fairly simple answer, at least when it came to matters of central state policy. A very small circle of CPK Central Committee members (the so-called Standing Committee) held all of the major levers of power.[99] Also called *Angkar* ("the Organization"), the party Center was comprised of Saloth Sar (Pol Pot)[100], Long Bunruot (Nuon Chea), and Kim Trang (Ieng Sary), Penh Thuok (Von Vet), Son Sen (Comrade Khieu), and Khieu Samphan (Met Hem).[101] Pol Pot and Nuon Chea, referred to as "brother number 1" and "brother number 2" at times, were the architects of key policies such as the evacuation of the cities and the elimination

[98] Ben Kiernan 2004 and 2008; Michael Vickery 1984 *Cambodia: 1975-1982* Boston: South End; Francois Ponchaud 1978 *Cambodia Year Zero.* London: Allen Lane; and Elizabeth Becker 1986 *When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution.* New York: Simon and Schuster. These scholars all agree that Lon Nol leadership and then soldiers were primary targets. See also fn. 161 below.

[99] Writing in 1978, Ponchaud notes, "Official statements make no mention of a central committee of the politburo of the Angkar…such as one might expect to find in the organizational setup of a Socialist county. Some refugees say that a central committee exists, however." Ponchaud goes on to list the same above, though a "Comrade Yann" is also included. Summarizing the impressions of refugees, he concludes, "This committee is said to make all important decisions" (1978, 178).

[100] Many members of the Organization had aliases. See Kiernan 2008, xx-xxii.

[101] Kiernan 2008, 93. See especially his footnote 97: "Whereas the term *Center* technically invokes the authority of the CPK Central Committee, there is no evidence that such a body met, in plenary session or as a body on any other occasion during the life of DK. The term *Party Center* thus refers to members of the Standing Committee…with national responsibility."

of currency, and though they did not necessarily gain the full support of the committee for such moves, policies went forward regardless.[102]

In January of 1976, a new constitution was drafted.[103] In March of that same year "elections" were held for the Cambodian People's Representative Assembly, ostensibly the new legislature.[104] The Center chose all of the candidates, and the only voters were a small number of urban workers. In an interview with one of the representatives elected to this body, Kiernan found that after a single session of a few hours, in which only Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan talked, the assembly was photographed, dismissed, and then never reconvened.[105] Furthermore, they did not vote on or select any cabinet members, but Pol Pot was announced as having been "elected" the new prime minister and various other members of the Center received cabinet posts. These cabinet members in turn reported to just a few deputy ministers, Von Vet, Ieng Sary, and Son Sen, who acted as super ministers for all aspects of the country's economy, foreign affairs, and national security (respectively).[106]

Personal loyalty and the expression of ideological purity were not only necessary to access power under the Khmer Rouge, they were necessary for survival. For example, Hou Yuon, described as a "prominent revolutionary intellectual" from the pre-DK era, voiced a disagreement with Pol Pot about policies such as evacuating the cities in a May 1975 meeting.

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[102] David Chandler 1999 *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

[103] This document scores a 1.86 on my 'international revolutionariness' variable, which is rather below scores for other HISS states but is clearly not 0. The constitution did not, though, indicate state any regional or international loyalties.

[104] Vickery 1984, 146.

[105] Kiernan 2008, 326-327. Kiernan's assertion is corroborated in primary source documents. In "Decisions of the Central Committee on a Variety of Questions" from 30 March 1976, it states "The Assembly: The assignment of work is as follows: 1. All the Representatives will disperse to live with their people again. 2. The Standing Committee of the Assembly represents the people of Kampuchea" (1988, 7 – see fn. 2). The document then goes on to name Nuon Chea, So Phim, and Mok/Chhit Chhoeun, all *Angkar* higher-ups, as the standing committee members.

[106] Kiernan 2008, 327-328.

He was subsequently sent away for re-education and then ultimately killed.[107] Other leaders, including both Von Vet and Son Sen, once trusted members of the Center, would eventually be killed for disagreeing with policies or trying to protect others who were slated for execution.[108] The party's foreign affairs branch, too, was purged of any cadres who were trained in Hanoi; these were handed over to the new secret police, the *Santebal*, and largely wound up as victims of torture and execution in the Tuol Sleng prison.[109] New members and government workers were routinely exposed to political education sessions to reinforce (or introduce new) party lines.[110]

This is all an extreme variation on the other domestic political processes following non-institutionalized entry we have seen in other HISS cases. The new regime eliminates old governing structures and creates new ones in their place, institutions like legislatures, internal security forces (*Santebal*), and a party apparatus over which the new leaders have a great deal of control. The Representative Assembly in DK bears resemblance to the rubber-stamp Transitional National Assembly in al-Bashir's Sudan, though the assembly in Democratic Kampuchea was not around long enough to even find the ink, much less approve of any laws. In short, it appears that the "entry type" variable in this case is, in fact, consistent with the Revolutionary Realities theory. *Had* the regime wanted to implement a HISS policy, it looks like they would have been capable of doing so. As we shall see below, though, this policy was not appealing, largely because of the regime's espoused ideology.

Condition 2: The Ideology of the Khmer Rouge

[107] Ibid, 33; 59.

[108] Ibid, 392-393. Also Chandler 1999 122-135;

[109] Kiernan 2008, 108.

[110] Ibid, 152-156.

Though the content of the Khmer Rouge's political ideology borrows language from Marxism and is preoccupied with class conflicts, it is *not* an international revolutionary ideology as defined by this research. It is worth noting that, due to the secrecy of the regime, it is difficult to flesh out a full picture of what ideas the CPK espoused or did not espouse. The quotations from primary sources in this research are not from published books of ideological thought, as the works of Mao, Khomeini, and al-Turabi were. Instead, they are from a variety of documents that were found after the CPK fled Phnom Penh, mostly in the prison Tuol Sleng.[111] Additionally, a number of researchers on this period in Cambodian history sought the accounts of refugees from DK, and these interviews and individual testimony helps historians and political scientists grasp the reality inside the obsessively secretive polity. Together, these sources provide evidence about, among many other things, the political ideology of the regime.

Most importantly for this research, the picture that emerges of "Pol Pot Thought" shows that there is little concern with the international, normative context of the events in Cambodia/DK. Themes of racial and ethnic superiority pervade the Khmer Rouge party line about the international context, and a glorious Khmer past outshines concerns for the future progress of world history. In these respects, the ideological preoccupations of the CPK are more reminiscent of Hitler than Lenin or Mao. Further, while there is a call to action component of the ideology, domestic vigilance, rather than political change, is the most strident note in the call. Thus the ruling ideology in DK from 1975-1979 was not international revolutionary. The case for this is laid out below, and the implications for HISS and foreign policy are then explored.

National Chauvinism of the Khmer Rouge Ideology: Limited Normative Scope

[111] Chandler, Kiernan, and Boua (Eds) 1988.

There is one word that is repeatedly used in discussion of ideology of the Khmer Rouge: chauvinism.[112] In DK, race ultimately trumped class. Prior to 1975, Cambodia was believed to be roughly 80% ethnic Khmers, meaning that 20% of the citizens of the Kingdom of Cambodia (1954-1970) were ethnic minorities.[113] The largest minority groups were ethnically Vietnamese, Chinese, and Cham – a Muslim minority. Even if chauvinism was not as extreme in the first part of the 1970s as it was to become at the height of the genocide in 1978, themes of racial purity and the superiority of ethnic Khmers was always a central focus of the CPK.

Though the idea of class divisions permeated what Khmer Rouge documents we have, class was frequently tied into race and ethnicity. For example, "All nationalities have labourers, like our Kampuchean nationality, except for Islamic Khmers [Chams], whose lives are not so difficult." Kiernan notes that, "An image of the archetypal Cham, the small independent fisherman, dominated the Center's view of this entire racial group."[114] Thus there was a racially-focused definition of class. Cham, as a people, were not laborers and were therefore not Khmers, who by their ethnic nature are all morally good proletariat workers. These ethnic minorities, as such, were instead class enemies, bourgeoisie capitalists. According to one former employee of DK's government, "The Chams and the Chinese were capitalists. They had been saying this for years."[115] Under this scheme, information about racial attributes was enough to determine one's economic class, which was in turn all that was needed to determine whether a person was 'good' or 'bad'. The party announced in mid-1976 that, "There are to be no Chams or Chinese or

[112] For example, see Goldstone (Ed.) 1998, 70-71, Vickery takes a slightly different stance but rejects the label "communist" and calls the ideology a mix of "poor-peasantism and anti-Vietnamese racism" (1984, 264, but see for further discussion 253-290.) A review of the question "Was the CPK Marxist?" can be found in Colin Mackerras and Nick Knight (Eds) *Marxism in Asia*, Chapters 1, 9, and 11.

[113] Kiernan 2008, 251. Tellingly, Pol Pot boasted at one point that "99%" of the population was ethnic Khmers.

[114] Kiernan 2008, 260.

[115] Kiernan interview with a female employee from the DK foreign minister. In Kiernan 2008, 267.

Vietnamese. Everyone is to join the same, single, Khmer nationality."[116] Thai persons, too, were equated with anti-socialism and therefore marked as enemies.[117] Thus it was immutable identities, rather than economic relations to production, were to form the basis of "class" divisions in society.

It was on the basis of the notion that blood ties, ethnic ties, and kinship ties were determinative of political loyalties that entire families were killed and disappeared in the 'political' purges of internal enemies. Family history and political affiliation were necessary to determine who was of what class, and "backgrounds" were crucial.[118] Pol Pot warned that, "The old [enemies] who remain in place give birth to new ones, one or two at a time, and so it goes on. The class struggle…continues, and the enemies, for their part, continue to fight."[119] Whereas Marxism notes that material conditions and institutions such as churches and schools reproduce systems of exploitation, for the Khmer Rouge it was a tainted family member that quite literally passed on genetic material that created an exploitative inner nature in individual people.[120] In the case of a former Lon Nol solider, for example, it was not enough to kill the man himself; his children, parents, in-laws, and siblings were not to be trusted either and may also have to be killed.

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[116] Kiernan 2008, 269.

[117] This is particularly the case with Thai persons who "live with the enemy" and "go to be Thai slaves," although this document that presents the Thai case does suggest that the children and grandchildren of Thai persons could potentially be included in the revolution and the state later on, as they have "better elements" than their parents: "If parents have one hundred oppressive elements, their children have only fifty." From "Abbreviated Lessons" Party Center, undated document, in *Pol Pot Plans the Future* 1988, 224.

[118] Pol Pot admonishes cadres: "Don't be afraid to lose one or two people of bad background" in "Report on the General Political Tasks of 1976" Party Center, 20 December 1976 in *Pol Pot Plans the Future* 1988, 185-186.

[119] Ibid, 190. From "Report…General Political Tasks" 20 December 1976.

[120] Ben Kiernan 1985 "Kampuchea and Stalinism" in *Marxism in Asia* (ibid.)

This was reinforced by the strong themes of purity in speeches and ideological material from the CPK Center. For example, in an April 22, 1976 speech, Pol Pot mentioned this frequently: "a revolutionary government purely for the worker-peasants of the pure Communist Party of Kampuchea."[121] He further noted that sharing power with Sihanouk meant that the "red" party would be contaminated by "blue" imperialism. "We would have to divide state power, [and give] some to Sihanouk, that is, there would be red and blue together, not pure red." Purity language, especially with respect to the body politic, the army,[122] and the party[123] is common in CPK documents seized after 1979.

Pol Pot's December 1976 speech at a study session for party cadres reveals another purity theme that emphasized disease, sickness, and infection.

> "We cannot locate it precisely. The sickness must emerge to be examined. Because the heat of the people's revolution and the heat of the democratic revolution were insufficient…we search for the microbes within the party without success. They are buried. As our socialist revolution advances, however, seeping into every corner of the Party, the army and among the people, we can locate the ugly microbes…If we wait any longer, the microbes can do real damage." [124]

He further warns that these microbes will "rot society, rot the Party, and rot the army."[125] Though any political ideology might warn of traitors, the CPK's worldview was about purity and infection. This biological, organic sense of the world and the revolution shares very little with the materialism and relations to production underlying Marxism.

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[121] Kiernan 2008, 328.

[122] *Pol Pot Plans* 1988, 129. From "Report of Activities of the Party Center According to the General Political Tasks of 1976" Party Center, 20 December 1976.

[123] Ibid, 7. From "Decisions of the Central Committee on a Variety of Questions" from 30 March 1976.

[124] See Chandler 1999, 129.

[125] Quoted in Kiernan 2008, 336.

Pol Pot's concern was that any lack of political purity, such as economic aid from other countries, meant that, "in one year, ten years, twenty years, our clean society of Kampuchea will become Vietnam"[126] The emptying of Phnom Penh, according to one CPK cadre interviewed by Heder in 1980, was due to such fears. "The main thing was that we could not be assured who the people in Phnom Penh were."[127] As the genocide reached a fever pitch in 1978, Khmer ethnicity was not enough to protect you. There was the ever-looming accusation of being a "Khmer body with a Vietnamese mind."[128] Indeed, daring to hold the belief that, "it was necessary to live together in the world, i.e. with other Parties such as the Vietnamese one, and live together with Sihanouk inside the country" was grounds for condemnation to political prison, torture, and death.[129]

The party's view of its own history was that the Khmer people were self-sufficient, and DK should have no ties whatsoever to other nations.[130] They were not part of a global communist movement or even a wider Indochinese anti-colonial, anti-imperialist resistance project. "Ever since our Party has stood on the standpoint of politics…we did not stand on technology as was the experience [all] over the world, whether in the area of the imperialist Western countries or in the area of revolution. This experience has emerged [in Kampuchea] very long before [it has in the rest of] the world."[131] This, as Kiernan notes, rejects the thought

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[126] From "Examine the Control and Implement the Political Line to Save the Economy and Prepare to Build the Country in Every Field." Document dated Sept. 19, 1975. Cited in Kiernan 2008, 94 fn. 98.

[127] See Heder's interview with a Region 13 cadre, 8 March 1980. Stephen Heder, 1980, *Kampuchea Occupation and Resistance*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University.

[128] Kiernan 2008, 406, among many others.

[129] *Pol Pot Plans the Future* 1988, 218. From "Abbreviated Lesson...Kampuchean Revolutionary Movement." Party Center, undated mimeo.

[130] Self-sufficiency is another theme of the party's ideological writings. As described elsewhere in this chapter, DK refused aid from abroad, saying that they would not be "beggars" or accept international handouts, citing Khmer dignity in addition to the value of self-sufficiency. See Becker 1986, 184.

[131] Document from Tuol Sleng dated 18 August 1978. Quoted in Kiernan 1985.

that either Vietnamese communists or the Chinese government provided any support or a revolutionary model for the CPK. It is, of course, patently false, as many communist leaders in Cambodia had been trained in Hanoi, and the Chinese had both supported the CPK during the civil war and provided DK with massive loan aid as soon as the regime took power.[132] Indeed, the Khmer Rouge rarely if ever offered praise to any other country, political movement, or revolution in the world.[133] Rather, the CPK-led revolution was seen as having been superior to any and all previous political movements.[134] It was definitely superior to the Chinese model (the Chinese still used money after all!) and was uniquely "thorough" in revolutionizing "all fields – politics, consciousness, and organization."[135]

This ultimately led not to an internationalist spirit, but quite the opposite—a rejection of all ties to foreign countries, foreign people, and foreign ideas. One cadre, speaking to defrocked monks in 1976, is reported to have asked these former clerics, "Buddha wasn't born in Cambodia, so why should Khmers follow a religion that came from India?"[136] The sense of Khmer superiority overwhelmed any sense of normative application beyond borders that may have been left over from the CPK's Marxist origins.

<u>History and the Call to Action: Vigilance, Suspicion, and a Return to the Past</u>

[132] To the tune of $1 billion USD in interest-free economic and military aid, the single largest foreign aid offering China had ever made to a single country in its history. See Kiernan 2004, 416.

[133] Chandler 1988 in *Pol Pot Plans*, 180.

[134] Becker notes that long-term plans within the CPK held that by 1990, "Democratic Kampuchea was to have transformed itself into a wealthy, modern country by 1990, and would have done so in total isolation, safe from the vagaries of the world…Cambodia would then emerge as the miracle of the twentieth century." See Becker 1986, 196-7.

[135] *Pol Pot Plans the Future* 1988, 169. From "Summary of the Results of the 1976 Study Session" Party Center, undated mimeo.

[136] Interview with a refugee from Ponchaud 1978, 130.

It is worth noting that the other criteria for "international revolutionary" ideology are somewhat more present in the ideology of the CPK, albeit in ways that also fail to feed any preference for an active, internationalist foreign policy. There is indeed a 'call to action' component to the CPK's ideology, and the Khmer Rouge does consider its place in a historical context. However, national pride and concern for domestic control and purity are visible here, too, and ultimately the combination of elements does not add up to an international revolutionary ideology.

Firstly, like Maoism, the CPK interpretation of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism's "material dialectic" is essentially voluntarist. Put differently, it is not the material conditions of societies that drive political change through historical stages, as in earlier Marxism (see above), but rather human consciousness, will, and effort.[137] In short, "people are the makers of history."[138] As the *Tung Padevat* article on "Sharpen the Consciousness of the Proletarian Class to be as Keen and Strong as Possible" puts it, "We cannot just let something go its own way…Do not put the blame on objective conditions."[139]

This impulse towards action further suggests that action in policy is also desirable. As stated in 1977: "We should attack them [our enemies] without respite on every terrain by taking our own initiatives and by scrupulously following the directions of our party, both in the internal political field and in the field of foreign relations… we must fight the enemy coming from outside in all theatres of operation and in every form."[140] This demonstrates the potential connection between the emphasis on human will in the CPK's ideology and real-world policies.

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[137] Kiernan 1985, 234-239.

[138] *Pol Pot Plans the Future* 1988, 217. From "Abbreviated Lessons."

[139] From the *Tung Padevat*, special issue September-October 1976, p. 94-5, 48. In Kiernan 1985, 239. Furthermore, to "remain observers" would be incorrect, according to this judgement.

[140] From the *Tung Padevat*, the CPK journal, No. 4, April 1977. In Kiernan 2008, 359.

However, the overwhelming preoccupation of the "call to action" in CPK materials is inwardly-looking, calling for vigilance and domestic control. Notes on the party's position on the virtues of such a policy summarizes: "We take measures to bar the way to enemies and we further strengthen and propagate our forces. If we take continuous measures, enemies will not be able to advance, using venom or poison."[141] Pol Pot also states outright in one particularly lucid moment, "Our problem is the interior…the important thing is to guard against [spies] in the interior of the country."[142] This kind of activity requires a Cambodian Gestapo, not a new COMINTERN.

There are also some historical perspectives in CPK ideological material, though they are not eschatological and are heavily influenced by national chauvinism.[143] For example, CPK leaders Son Sen and Khieu Sampan claimed that Democratic Kampuchea was progressing in its revolution at a historically unprecedented pace: "The name of our country will be written in gold letters in world history as the first country that succeeded in communization without useless steps."[144] Kiernan also suggests that, unlike other revolutionary ideologies examined in this research, the historical perspective was actually backwards-looking. Democratic Kampuchea was trying to revive an idealistic past, before Vietnamese influence and the loss of certain territories of the homeland.[145] As one scholar put it in 1978, "The new revolutionary culture

[141] *Pol Pot Plans* 1988, 16. From "Excerpted Report on the Leading Views of the Comrade Representing the Party Organization at a Zone Assembly." *Tung Padevat* June 1976.

[142] Ibid, 191. From "Report…General Political Tasks of 1976."

[143] Becker notes an interesting eschatology that the heavily-Buddhist DK populous might have associated with the Khmer Rouge era: the ending of the *Kali-yuga* or the age of Kali, the demon of strife and discord. A concept imported from Hinduism, the Kali-yuga era is the current and last of four eras of the world. Its ending is said to be marked by such events as the overthrow of social order, the termination of religion, and rule by "cruel and alien" kings (1986, 204). This is not, however, a focus of CPK's own political ideology.

[144] See Nyan Chanda 1986 *Brother Enemy: The War After the War*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 44.

[145] Kiernan 2008, 26-27.

aims to be absolutely, exclusively national, purged of all foreign impurities—even ones that are centuries old. How far back are the Khmers supposed to go, one wonders, to recover their true identity?"[146] This is a reactionary stance and is not quite consistent with the emphasis on a "new phase" of world history and human existence that characterizes a truly international-revolutionary ideology.

Overall, this ideology's emphasis on immutable ethnic identities and Khmer nationalist aspirations limits the policy appeal of solidarity with other groups. The CPK saw Democratic Kampuchea as existing in an isolated vacuum. Prizing self-sufficiency, it saw its political success as the result of its own toil and inherent national greatness. The Center went to great lengths to eliminate ties to the Vietnamese communist party, purging Hanoi-trained cadres just as ruthlessly as former Lon Nol regime supporters. Like China, DK saw itself as a model country for the world.[147] Unlike China, however, it did not see itself as one piece in a larger, fraternal movement against imperialism or capitalism and in pursuit of world communist revolution. Rather, as an expanded version of the quotation at the chapter opening puts it:

> "We are much stronger than before. Party members have doubled in number, where there were ten there are now twenty. The armed forces muster whole brigades. All the people are in our grasp. We hold full state power, as well as the whole economy. Our influence in the outside world is strong. So our forces now, compared to 1970 are a thousand times, ten thousand times stronger. From this position we want to build socialism quickly, we want our people to be glorious quickly."[148]

Ultimately, the political ideology embraced by the CPK does not meet this research's definition of "international revolutionary."

Condition 3: Conventional Operations Abroad: Internal Enemies and Local Threats

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[146] Ponchaud 1978, 134.

[147] Kiernan 2008, 151.

[148] *Pol Pot Plans the Future* 1988, 25. From "Excerpted Report." See also fn. 2 above.

If Democratic Kampuchea had truly identified imperialist or capitalist nations as its most sacred enemy, it would have been militarily outclassed, geographically distant from most foes, and faced a nuclear barrier to conventional operations against them. DK did denounce the United States, the USSR, the British, Vietnam—all and sundry, really, with the exception of China—and against these, Phnom Penh had very few options should they wish to project their struggle globally. Democratic Kampuchea was not well-positioned to exercise military statecraft across the globe, or, indeed, even within Southeast Asia. China did supply DK with funds, military hardware, and some technical experts to train DK forces in its use.[149] Still, US reports on the state of affairs in DK after 1975 believe that, without food imports, the nation was unlikely to be able to feed its own population with domestic production. This was the prognosis even before the Center embarked on its collectivization programs and began shipping thousands of tons of rice to China in exchange for weapons, to avoid the stigma of receiving "aid".[150] The country was simply not in a position to take any kind of military conflict to the outside world, and certainly the capitalist or imperialist world writ large.

However, Democratic Kampuchea was apparently willing to rely on its own domestic military strength to strike where it could. On May 12, 1975, Cambodian forces seized the *Mayaguez,* a U.S. container ship near an island called Puolo Wai Island. US Marines and a helicopter unit, in turn, stormed Puolo Wai Island. The Khmer Rouge forces put up a fierce resistance, but this touched off a fourteen-hour bombing campaign from nearby US forces. This action also included a bombing run against Kimpong Som seaport and Ream naval base on the

[149] Kiernan 2004, 416.

[150] Kiernan 2008, 378-379. The Khmer Rouge refused aid from a number of countries, particularly Western sources, during their rule, and shipped large quantities of rubber, rice, and exotic animals and materials to China. See also Chandler and Kiernan 1988 in *Pol Pot Plans the Future,* xiv.

mainland.[151] Overwhelmed by this show of military power and struck by serious damage to its navy and air force at Ream, the Khmer Rouge ultimately released the civilian crew.[152] The nascent revolutionary power had not fared well in its military adventure against imperialism. To avoid further conflict or reprisals, they blamed the whole affair on a rogue, local unit and denied that any action had been taken by the CPK's government at all.[153]

Perhaps more importantly, DK was slightly less outclassed against its nearest and dearest enemy, Vietnam. Though accurate information about anything inside DK is difficult to obtain, some best guesses suggest that in 1976, DK population was around 7 million and it had perhaps 60,000-70,000 standing armed forces.[154] Vietnam's population, with the reunification under Hanoi, was now technically on the order of 50 million, and they had over 600,000 troops.[155] The primary "other" from the CPK's nationalistic ideological worldview was right across the border and materially exhausted after years of war with the United States. Indeed, following perfect "window of opportunity" logic, Khmer troops made a move against a series of Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Thailand in early May, 1975, only a week after the fall of Saigon.[156] They invaded Phu Quoc Island and Poulo Panjang Island, evacuating the islands' Vietnamese inhabitants, who disappeared completely from record.[157] Vietnamese forces launched a counterattack to drive the Khmer Rouge troops out of these islands, ultimate seizing a

[151] Becker 1986, 209-210.

[152] As described in Nyan 1986, 9-10.

[153] Ibid, 10.

[154] Correlates of War database.

[155] Ibid; correlations of war Material Capabilities database.

[156] Chanda 1986, 12-13. See also Stephen van Evera. 2001. *Causes of War; Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[157] Chanda 1986, 13.

Cambodia island in the pursuit. The CPK sent troops to the border with Vietnam, and the territorial disputes between the two (ostensibly communist) states were on.[158]

From the perspective of the CPK, Democratic Kampuchea *could* potentially rely on its conventional military apparatus when dealing with the outside world. The thinking was that, "No matter how much we may hate our enemies, no how much we may want to defend the country, they will persist with a vengeance and penetrate our territory, if we are weak…but if we are strong, the contemptible people to the west…[and] to the east will be unable to invade us…and we will be in a position to strike back."[159] The prescription was to "strengthen ourselves militarily and economically, in turn, so as to gain mastery."[160] This rhetoric in these internal documents suggests that the CPK saw classic internal balancing and military statecraft against enemies "to the east and to the west" as a valid policy approach.[161] There was no need to sponsor anti-government groups in other countries, because, according to the CPK's worldview, these other countries were not relevant. There was little normative connection between the people of DK and those around the world, and, except for their attempts to infiltrate the population and government of DK, the governments of other countries were not particularly

[158] According to several witnesses of a CPK assembly in May 1975, Pol Pot articulated eight points that were to be the first priorities of the regime, one of which was strengthening border guards against Vietnam (see Kiernan 2008, 55-59.) The list in full is as follows:

1. Evacuate people from all towns.
2. Abolish all markets.
3. Abolish Lon Nol currency and withhold the revolutionary currency that had been printed.
4. Defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice.
5. Execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning the top leaders.
6. Establish high-level cooperatives throughout the country, with communal eating.
7. Expel the entire Vietnamese minority population.
8. Dispatch troops to the borders, particularly the Vietnamese border.

[159] *Pol Pot Plans the Future* 1988, 126-127. From "Preliminary Explanation Before Reading the Plan." Party Center, 21 August 1976.

[160] Ibid.

[161] Mearsheimer 2001.

relevant ideologically. This meant that there was no impetus towards being involved in a highly active, internationalist foreign policy in general and, as such, no need to bring a fight to enemies further afield than Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand. Against these, Khmer nationalist biases considered DK forces an adequate match. Furthermore, all shared a border and none was a nuclear power.[162]

Though Democratic Kampuchea was not in a position to pursue conventional options against the United States or other powerful nations, it did get involved in conventional operations against its neighbors. This demonstrates the way in which the three conditions that cause HISS adoption in the Revolutionary Realities account are mutually reinforcing. Because the regime did not espouse an international revolutionary ideology, it did not count geographically distant super powers among its top enemies. Indeed, the Khmer-first ideology emphasized more local threats. Waging border skirmishes against Vietnam was feasible, if ultimately unwise, and satisfied the preferences of a leadership that did wish to act forcefully against enemies.

High barriers to conventional war abroad against enemies, then, are partially a function of who those enemies are *and* how the ideological worldview of the regime frames the situation. It is, however, worth underscoring the centrality of ideology. The lack of an international revolutionary ideology operated both *directly* on the outcome, to render HISS a non-attractive policy option, *but also through ideology's impact on framing national security issues*. DK saw Vietnam in particular, but not Western imperialism or Soviet hegemony in general, as the most

[162] This is not, however, to say that there was a particularly *rational* belief. Perceptions of the security environment were also filtered through the regime's ideology, which exaggerated DK's prowess even as it emphasized the greatness of the Khmer race and the CPK revolution itself. One passage is particularly telling in this regard: "In military matters, people who pilot our helicopters can't read a great deal. But by cultivating good political consciousness, we all can learn to fly swiftly…Formerly, to be a pilot required a high school education-twelve to fourteen years. Nowadays, it's clear that political consciousness is the decisive factor." Similarly, "As for radar, we can learn how to handle it after studying for a couple of months…we can also learn about navigating ships…we can learn anything at all, and we can learn it swiftly." From "Preliminary Explanation Before Reading the Plan" in *Pol Pot Plans* 1988, 160.

important enemy of the state, and furthermore, the leadership believed that their revolution was so strong that, merely by securing a homogenous, foreign-free population domestically, they would be in a position to take on any outside challengers. There was no need, then, to use a substitute force like non-state actors, especially a foreign non-state actor, against the nation's enemies, for it could rely on its own military apparatus. Indeed, a nationalist Khmer army was the only politically reliable armed entity available.

DK Foreign Policy and the Influence of CPK Ideology

It is therefore not surprising that Democratic Kampuchea did not adopt a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship. Such an internationalist, activist foreign policy would require a great deal more contact with the outside world than anyone with decision-making authority had a preference for. Furthermore, though the ideology invoked the concept of "imperialism" at times, the main themes regarding enemies were typically *inwardly* focused. Concerns about the outside world tainting DK were far more central. Crucially, the general lack of a belief in a worldwide normative connection between events in DK and the peoples or history of the world at large meant that there was little appetite for the kind of activist, international, and anti-status quo foreign policy that HISS represents.

One thing that is particularly notable about the foreign policy that the Democratic Kampuchea did adopt is that they were the first communist state to engage in a full-scale conventional conflict with another communist country: Vietnam.[163] CPK materials emphasize Khmer superiority, even over the most seemingly ideologically similar countries in the world. One slogan that was popular in political study sessions was, "The Organization [Angkar] excels

[163] Previous encounters between the Soviets and the Chinese did not reach thresholds that typically define interstate war, whereas the end result of the Cambodia/Vietnam conflict in this era was a Vietnamese invasion in which they actually seized Phnom Penh.

Lenin and is outstripping Mao!"[164] Indeed, as Kiernan points out, "Communist Vietnam attracted the violence of the CPK rhetoric and action to a much greater extent than capitalist Thailand."[165] This makes sense in light of the materials examined in this chapter, but the animus between these seemingly similarly Marxist/communist/Maoist nations might surprise one who did not look carefully at the ideological content below the leftist labels.

The Revolutionary Realities theory successfully predicts the non-adoption of HISS in the Cambodian case. The key factor of ideology was not in place. Though the regime entered power through non-institutionalized avenues, it did not embrace the kind of international revolutionary ideology that made HISS an appealing policy. Indeed, connection with anti-government groups throughout the world was highly *in*consistent with DK's Khmer-oriented chauvinism, focus on domestic purity, and isolationist tendencies. This meant that, though DK was somewhat anti-imperialist in general, its chief enemy was its local rival and "hereditary enemy" Vietnam.[166] Indeed, DK was much more preoccupied with internal threats, chief among which was the "infiltration" of foreignness, and especially Vietnameseness, into Cambodian society. This touched off a domestic bloodletting of genocidal proportions within DK's own borders, rather than DK involvement in a global, anti-status quo *foreign* policy. The state's ruling ideology simply did not call for it, and, in turn, the material international security circumstances did not (apparently) demand it.

V. Conclusion

High-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors comes about as a result of three factors interacting with one another: non-institutionalized entry to power, international

[164] Kiernan 2008, 148.

[165] Kiernan 1985, 245.

[166] Kiernan 1985.

revolutionary ideology, and high barriers to conventional operations against enemies abroad. This chapter demonstrated how the second factor, ideology, shapes the preferences of a state regarding activist internationalist foreign policies. Furthermore, ideology works not only on its own but also interacts with a state's perception of its own capabilities and the identity of its enemies. Though ostensibly both "Communist" powers, Mao's China and Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea actually embraced very different ideologies. Of the two, only "Mao Zedong Thought" was truly an international revolutionary ideology. This meant that the CCP, after entering power via a civil war and facing up against a worldwide imperialist, capitalist enemy, turned to HISS as a means of pursuing an activist, internationalist, and anti-status quo foreign policy within the material constraints they faced against said status quo powers. For the Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, HISS presented no clear benefits at all. The policy was not embraced by a regime that was far more interested in Khmer national greatness, total societal control, and a vision of reclaiming territory from a Vietnamese "other" that was stolen more than a century ago. This makes it clear that, at least when it comes to understanding HISS, it is necessary to focus on the content of political ideologies, rather than use vague value-laden labels, as two regimes that may have similar labels can take very distinct policy courses.

Chapter 8: HISS and Changing Barriers to Conventional Military Operations Abroad in Cuba

> "When I saw rockets firing... I swore to myself that the Americans were going to pay dearly for what they were doing. When this war is over, a much wider and bigger war will begin for me: the war that I'm going to launch against them. I am aware that this is my true destiny."
>
> -Fidel Castro in a letter to his aide and confidante Celia Sánchez, 1958[1]

I. Introduction

The previous two case-comparison chapters focused on the entry type and ideological content of national leadership and highlighted the role these played in driving HISS adoption outcomes. In this chapter, I turn my attention to the high barriers to offensive conventional military operations abroad in an examination of another crucial case: Cuba. In addition to demonstrating that Cuban HISS adoption is consistent with the expectations of the Revolutionary Realities theory, I employ a with-in case comparison of two different time periods to examine the effect of changing barriers to conventional war on national sponsorship patterns. HISS was adopted in the 1960s when Havana faced high barriers to conventional military activities against key rivals abroad, but when those barriers were absent for operations in Angola in 1975, Cuba elected to use its own national armed forces rather than sponsor rebels long-distance. Though this is not a direct a test of this factor's causal necessity because Cuban had already adopted HISS, the Cuban case is broadly supportive of my theory, suggesting that barriers to

[1] From Rex Hudson. 1988. "Castro's Americas Department: Coordinating Cuba's Support for Marxist-Leninist Violence in the Americas by Rex A. Hudson The Cuban American National Foundation 1988. Available http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/rex-hudson.htm. This document uses the quotation, which is cited in Herbert L. Matthews 1969. *Fidel Castro*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 121.

conventional operations abroad really do limit states that would otherwise consider using their own armed forces in a global foreign policy. This is also one of the best cases available for examining the role of strategic and structural limitations on HISS-related policy choices in greater depth.

This chapter focusing on Cuba and conventional policy options serves two purposes. The Cuban case is a crucial or influential case for the Revolutionary Realities theory; if my theory cannot account for Havana's intense sponsorship activity following the rise of the Castro regime, then it has failed a major test. The congruency testing for Cuba in this chapter does indeed reveal that this is a classic case of HISS adoption. Throughout the 1960s, Cuba and the *fidelistas* were strong supporters of revolutionary groups and armed national liberation movements in the third world. Though the primary geographic focus of their activity was initially Latin America, involvement in places like Algeria, Vietnam, and southern Africa means that Cuban sponsorship patterns definitely took on a high-intensity status in the 1960s. More documentation and research material is available on the Castro regime in Cuba than in many other HISS cases. Therefore, in addition to congruency testing, I am able to offer more evidence that the logic of Revolutionary Realities actually fueled Havana's HISS policy. Drawing on statements from Castro government representatives, the contemporaneous analysis of intelligence officials, and the conclusion of country experts, I find that the explanation for Cuba's support for non-state actors around the world fits quite closely with my theory in a number of ways.

In what is by now an increasingly familiar pattern, the *fidelista* regime came to power through non-institutionalized means and set up new governing structures, particularly in foreign policy, that concentrated power with a group of like-minded loyalists. These leaders shared a political ideology that was international revolutionary, which was made especially clear in 1961

with Castro's announcement regarding his personal belief in Marxism-Leninism.[2] This led to the government foreign policy preference for expansive international involvement and the ability to implement them through state institutions that we have seen in other cases. I argue that the choice to ultimately adopt a HISS policy, rather than employ other foreign policies, was therefore partially determined by restrictions on the Castro regime's use of its own military apparatus overseas. Havana had only limited material capabilities in waging offensive conventional operations abroad, was extremely geographically disadvantaged, and was thoroughly outclassed against its primary adversary, the United States. To influence global politics by undermining the status-quo order and to achieve a better security situation for itself by installing like-minded regimes, HISS appeared to be the best option and was readily adopted.

Having established that Cuba supports my argument regarding the adoption of HISS, I then look at changes to Cuban involvement in global affairs over time. Cuba entered the global fray in Angola's civil war in late 1975 using tens of thousands of its own, national armed forces in conventional military conflicts in Africa. I demonstrate that high barriers to conventional military operations abroad were actually quite low when it came to the opportunity to stage this conventional intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1975-1976. Further, Havana's policy towards the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) actually changed from clandestine international sponsorship, one piece of Cuba's HISS program, to large-scale, conventional military support when these barriers were no longer firmly in place. Indeed, with this new tool available, Cuban sponsorship of non-state actors in the late 1970s only occasionally

[2] This bears resemblance to the Sudan case. Though Fidel Castro was perhaps very clear about his generally revolutionary principles, its specific international and world-historical elements were not as obvious until the new government was in power. Similarly, though Omar al-Bashir was sympathetic to the projects of political Islam and was himself a devout Muslim, it was upon joining with the NIF that the "government espousal of an international revolutionary ideology" condition obtained.

reached HISS thresholds. This shows not only that when one of the three necessary conditions is missing, states do not engage in HISS activities, but also that the policy they do adopt is precisely the one that HISS, in my argument, is a policy substitute *for*—namely, using conventional forces abroad. I gather insights on the motivation and approach to what the Cuban regime itself calls "militant solidarity" with the MPLA in the Angolan case and use it to shed light on the role that barriers to conventional war abroad plays in determining HISS outcomes. The test here does not demonstrate the necessity of high barriers for HISS adoption, because the Angolan intervention actually represents a shift in the sponsorship pattern away from HISS, not a non-adoption of HISS. My account does not attempt to theorize about change over time in the same country. Still, this evidence is at least suggestive that high barriers to conventional war abroad as a foreign policy tool, in conjunction with ideology and entry type, leads to HISS adoption. Certainly, it allows me to examine a number of closely related logics and gain further insight on the role of structural constraints on foreign policy choices by HISS states.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I examine HISS adoption and the three causal factors, finding that the Cuban case is congruent with my theory and its expectations. In section three, I describe the Angolan intervention and show that, while two of the Revolutionary Realities factors were present, there were much lower barriers to conventional war against the South African and imperialist-backed forces fighting in the former Portuguese colony. I am also able to lay out in detail the evolution of the Cuban government's change in policy, from its pre-1975 policy of clandestine support for the MPLA to its decision to send the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) thousands of miles away to fight. In the conclusion section, I examine what the evidence in this chapter has and has not fully demonstrated about

barriers to conventional war in the Revolutionary Realities theory, and what other considerations, questions, and possible shortcomings should be addressed in future research.

II. Cuba and High-Intensity State Sponsorship Adoption: A Classic Case

In the following section, I demonstrate that the Cuban case of HISS adoption is congruent with this theory's expectations. Cuba adopted HISS prior to my database's coverage, but there is still a great deal of evidence that it was, in fact, a HISS state by the early 1960s. After establishing this, I lay out deeper evidence that the Castro regime embraced an international revolutionary ideology and, after non-institutionalized entry to power, built a new, tightly-controlled foreign policy apparatus. I then place a special emphasis on the barriers to offensive conventional war. It is this factor that, I argue, drives the change in policy that leads to the Angolan intervention in 1975. Furthermore, I offer more evidence of Cuba's own motivation and perspective on the conditions under which they adopted HISS, drawing on a greater wealth of primary source documentation and greater agreement among experts on relevant aspects of Cuba's sponsorship policy than are available in other cases. All of this evidence supports the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS adoption, and in particular, demonstrates the role of international, strategic constraints on Cuba's calculus when embracing a sponsorship policy.

Outcome: HISS Adoption in Cuba

Cuba adopted a policy of HISS shortly after Fidel Castro and the M-26-7 organization came to power in 1959, following a series of popular uprisings that overthrew the US-backed military regime under Batista. By 1967-68, Cuba was openly backing a wide number of liberation movements and guerrilla groups in Latin America and beyond.[3] Havana served as a

[3] See Jorge Domínguez. 1989. *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Chapter 5.

training center for leaders of other movements, and Cuban nationals were encouraged to travel to other countries and help guerrillas overthrow sitting governments.[4]

In the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship database, observation of Cuba's activity begins in 1975. Cuba is shown to be sponsoring at HISS levels in 1977 and from 1979-1980. An alternative data source, the Maoz-San Akca (MSA), shows that Cuba was supporting non-state actors in two targets states in 1959, and three target states by 1967. Throughout the post-1959 period, there was always one target state that was outside of the Americas (usually Angola/Portugal, South Africa, or Rhodesia), and the Cubans supported the FARC, which is considered to be a high-profile terroristic group in this dataset. More extensive pre-1975 data from the NAG show Cuba as sponsoring six groups across two continents by 1966, though only identifies three groups as receiving Cuban support in the period from 1959-1965.[5] The "on-going civil war" bias of existing datasets makes it difficult to be sure precisely when Cuba had fully embraced HISS.

There is agreement from a wide variety of alternative sources that Cuba's support for non-state actors abroad was at HISS levels. The Cuban state offered military training, supplies, and advisors (and occasionally Cuban troops) to a number of Latin America insurgents beginning shortly after the Castro regime took power in 1959.[6] By most accounts, this support was broad and undiscriminating, which is to say that any armed national liberation group in Latin America was seemingly eligible to receive Cuban assistance and a number of African

[4] Jorge Domínguez. 1979. "Cuban Military and Security Policies." In Weinstein (Ed.) *Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena.* Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 86-87.

[5] San-Akca 2016, Appendix 4.

[6] Thomas Wright. 2001. *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution: Revised Edition*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger; Domínguez 1989, Chapter 5.

organizations did as well, particularly as the decade progressed.[7] Cuba also supported North Vietnamese forces throughout the 1960s and rather openly beginning in 1966.[8] The year 1966 further saw the founding of the Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL), which was a Cuban Communist Party organization explicitly used to provide training and other forms of material support to national liberation movements on those three continents.[9] Contemporaneous estimates by intelligence services gauged that Cuba had taught somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 rebels the art of guerrilla warfare and/or the political ideals of the revolution by 1965.[10]

Several high-profile incidents also demonstrate this high-intensity sponsorship of non-state actors. Che Guevara, one of the guerrilla leaders of the Cuban revolution and renowned revolutionary in his own right, went on a three-month, eight-country tour of Africa beginning in December 1964, the goal of which was, according to one Cuban official, to contact a number of liberation movements on the continent and figure out how Cuba could best support them.[11] In 1965, he left Cuba to start a *foco* style revolution in Bolivia, in what was designed to be the first of a string of Latin American revolutions.[12] Under pressure from Castro, he renounced all Cuban association, rendering his group a 'non-state' entity despite active support from the Castro

[7] See Jacques Lévesque and Deanna Drendel Leboeuf (Trans). 1978. *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategical Perspectives, 1959-1977.* New York: Praeger. Lévesque points to September 1963 as being a time when "the Cuban press was affirming that conditions in Latin America were increasingly ripe for armed struggle. It even openly admitted that Cuban volunteers were participating in guerrilla activities on the continent" (1978, 96-97.)

[8] Lévesque 1978, 120.

[9] Domínguez 1989, 270-271.

[10] Piero Gleijeses. 2002. *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976.* Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 23.

[11] Gleijeses 2002, 81.

[12] Sadri 1997, 76.

regime.[13] The Cuban government likewise encouraged its citizens to act as "volunteers" to support anti-government groups abroad, adding a veneer of disassociation from the Cuban state while still pursuing a sponsorship policy. In short, classic HISS.

Data from numerous sources about the Cuban revolution and international relations tell a similar tale about Cuban HISS adoption in the 1960s. The high-intensity state sponsorship for non-state actors was almost certainly underway by 1961, when they began to support the FLN in Algeria. Almost immediately upon entering power, then, the Castro government sponsored guerrilla groups and national liberation movements throughout the world. They trained fighters in Havana, provided transportation and weapons for groups, created institutions to organize and legitimize non-state actors, and offered strident rhetorical support at every turn.

It is worth also noting that there was a shift in Cuban sponsorship policy after 1968-69, and after 1969, Cuban activity in this arena was reduced and became more circumspect.[14] Havana was just as likely, during the 1970s, to offer rebel leaders words of caution and temperance as they were to offer weapons.[15] Only small contingents from the most promising Latin American anti-government groups received training in Cuba by 1970.[16] According to the SPFS data described above Cuba's sponsorship pattern met all three definitional components of HISS for 3 different, non-consecutive years during the 1975-1980 period, which is consistent with a narrative of a drop-off in the policy. Thus during the 1970s, Cuba was supporting fewer

[13] Domínguez 1979, 86.

[14] Marifeli Pérez-Stable. 1993. *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 148-151; H. Michael Erisman. 1985. *Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy.* Boulder: Westview Press, 33-36.

[15] Erisman 1985, 90.

[16] Harmer 2013.

groups and committing fewer state resources to HISS; furthermore, support for non-state actors dropped off acutely by the 1980s.[17]

At the same time, there is also evidence that Cuban military forces took on a foreign policy role that expanded in the latter half of the 1970s.[18] In most cases, this was to support non-state actors in struggles against sitting governments. Activity in Africa was the most pronounced, with Cuba sending columns of fighters to Zaire in 1965; Cuban forces were also fighting alongside the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau in 1966.[19] The largest and most well-known intervention of Cuban troops occurred in November 1975, when Cuban sent between 30,000 and 40,000 of its own, uniformed soldiers to fight with the MPLA in Angola. This clearly represents a very different kind of policy from HISS. However, it is equally clear that Cuba was a HISS state by the mid-to-early 1960s; whatever else Cuba may have been doing in foreign policy, they adopted a high-intensity sponsorship policy and pursued it with a great deal of resources and enthusiasm for more than a decade.

Condition 1: Cuban International Revolutionary Ideology

On December 2, 1961, almost three years after the successful overthrow of the Batista government and eight months after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Fidel Castro declared, "I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall be one to the end of my life."[20] This formal espousal of Marxism was reiterated in numerous speeches and included in the 1976 constitution. The previous chapter discussed how Marxism met all three definitional criteria of an international revolutionary

[17] See Tanya Harmer. 2013. "Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967-1975" *Journal of Latin American Studies 45*, 61-89.

[18] Erisman 1985, Chap. 3 and 4; Susan Eva Eckstein. 2003. *Back from the Future: Cuba Under Castro 2e.* New York: Routledge, Chapter 7.

[19] Gleijeses 2002, Chap. 5-10.

[20] Cited in Brenner 1988, 99.

ideology. This section will demonstrate that *fidelismo*, the Cuban nationalist interpretation of Marxism as embraced by the Castro government, also meets this definition.

It is worth noting that, similar to Mao's China and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (see Chapter 9), Cuba's Marxist ideology was highly nationalist. Fidel Castro frequently evoked José Martí, a nationalist Cuban figure who raised a revolt in 1895 to prevent US involvement in Cuba following the collapse of Spanish colonial rule. The identity and power of the Cuban people is a common theme in the Castro government's ideology. Though Castro does not state it as clearly as did Mao—who wrote at length and directly asked the question "Can a communist also be a patriot?"—it is nonetheless clear that Cuban nationalism should be understood as part of a 'first stage' in world revolution. As the discussion and excerpts below reveal, there are also persistent themes of *inter*nationalism and the moral obligation to forward a global socialist and ultimately communist movement. It would be absence of these latter themes, rather than the presence of nationalist themes, that would mean *fidelismo* failed to meet this research's definitional criteria. In fact, the ideology the Cuban government embraced post-1959 was indeed international revolutionary.

Party and State Documents

I begin with an examination of state and party documents. It was not until nearly sixteen years after the successful overthrow of Batista's regime that the victorious leadership formally set down the principles of the Cuban government in a written constitution. Indeed, the Communist Party of Cuba held its first official congress only in 1975. There, the party began to enumerate and articulate the political goals of the party which ruled the Cuban one-party state. The Constitution of 1976 was drafted shortly after this congress, and both of these are worth exploring to assess the content of the ruling ideology that the *fidelistas* formally espoused. This

means that the ideology here can rather clearly be seen to apply to the post-1975 period; the consistency between these documents and Castro's public pronouncements in the first decade of his rule is demonstrated in the next section.

The official position of the Cuban Communist Party rather clearly states the Cuban government's commitment to "proletarian and socialist internationalism." Furthermore, the party's statement suggests that the principles "friendship" and "fraternal friendship" which possess a moralistic tone drive this commitment. Though it does not explicitly state the Marxist arguments of a single, international proletariat, it does evoke similar notions of a normative principle that extends beyond Cuba's national borders.

> "The Draft defines the principles of our country's foreign policy on the basis of proletarian and socialist internationalism; on the principles of friendship and cooperation with the peoples fighting for their sovereignty, progress and development; on Martí's principles of cooperation and progress toward unity with the Latin American and Caribbean countries; and on fraternal friendship, assistance and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."[21]

The statement above also refers to the "progress and development" of other countries. Once again, this seems closely related to the concept of eschatology, that the world is moving from a previous state to a more desirable one, and that Cuba itself has a vital historical role to play. Castro's opening speech at the Congress devotes some 10,000 words to the historical progress of the world, placing Spanish colonialism, the Russian Revolution of 1917, World War II, and Cuba's 1933 independence movement all into a narrative that culminates with the victorious M-26-7 efforts in 1959.[22] The entire text of the event's speeches is around 90,000 words and covers a wide range of topics; the sheer amount of breath that was devoted to the

[21] "First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party" 1976. Collection of Documents. See Section XT Foreign Policy. p 229.

[22] Ibid, Section I. Introduction. Pg. 1-40.

historical narrative makes it is clear that the "progress of history" theme is of central importance to the party's conception of its own political purpose.

The centrality of internationalism is underscored in that same document, which explicitly states that the demands of national liberation movements abroad are more important than Cuban national interests.

> "Cuba's foreign policy has, as its starting point, the subordination of Cuban positions to the international needs of the struggle for socialism and for the national liberation of the peoples. Cuba, which has already proved the strength of its international solidarity by all possible means—blood, work and technical cooperation—will continue to make of this premise the basis of its international attitudes."[23]

The party thereby explicitly privileges non-Cuban interests over those of the Cuban nation, a strong espousal of a moral outlook that transcends national borders.

The importance of action, the third criterion in this dissertation's definition of international revolution ideology, is also embraced in these official documents. In his speech on the main body of the Cuban Communist Party Platform, Castro states, "The thoroughly framed perspectives and tasks outlined in the Platform can only be translated into reality through the united and conscientious action of the Party and the people."[24] Furthermore, it is stated that this platform should "create a solid basis for the organic cohesion, discipline, and single-minded action that should characterize the Revolutionary Party."[25] Stepping back to give greater context and meaning to the imperative for action, Fidel Castro goes on to say that, "Great challenges still await humanity. We live in a period in which it is clearer than ever before that the

[23]Ibid, Section XT. Foreign Policy. P. 239.

[24] Ibid, Section X. The Party. P 219.

[25] Ibid.

revolutionaries, the Communists have a duty to fight in the front ranks with ideas and actions."[26] This last statement blends the historical eschatology criterion and the call to the action. Combined with the international moral application of the ideological underpinnings—socialism and Marxism—it appears that the Communist Party of Cuba embraced an international revolutionary ideology at the time of its first congress.

These ideas are also included in the 1976 constitution. The Preamble states that the Cuban citizens are "GUIDED by the ideology of José Martí, and the sociopolitical ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin."[27] This is supported in Article 1 with the official statement that "Cuba is a socialist state of workers…organized with all and for the good of all…for the enjoyment of political freedom, social justice, individual and collective welfare, and human solidarity."[28]

Furthermore, the adoption of socialism is clearly not simply for the good of Cubans but is, in fact, the morally superior form of social and political arrangement. This is made clear in the Preamble with the assertion that Cubans are:

> "AWARE that all regimes of the exploitation of man by man cause the humiliation of the exploited and the degradation of the human nature of the exploiters; that only under socialism and communism, when man has been freed from all forms of exploitation—slavery, servitude and capitalism—can full dignity of the human being be attained."[29]

This shows that it is because Cubans are *human beings* that the government has embraced the socialist and communist framework of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. This implies that the normative basis for this ideology extends to all human being—both, it is worth noting, those are exploited

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[26] Ibid, Section X. The Party. P. 227.

[27] Emphasis in original. Preamble. "Cuba's Constitution of 1976 with Amendments through 2002." Translated by Pam Falk, Milagras M. Gavilan, and Anna I. Vellve Torras. Available: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=en

[28] Cuba's Constitution of 1976; Chapter 1, Article 1.

[29] Ibid, Preamble.

and those who are exploiting their fellow man. This is a truly universalist statement in a political document about the moral relationship between people, governments, and societies.

The themes of historical progress and the calls to action are somewhat less strident in the constitution than they are in other articulations of Cuban political ideology, but they are nonetheless present. The historical context of the Cuban revolution is once again presented in the opening of the Preamble. Cuban citizens are considered the "heirs and continuators" of "combativity, firmness, heroism and sacrifice fostered by our ancestors."[30] The text continues, listing the historical progression of said ancestors, from Cuban natives, to slaves, to fighters in the wars of independence against Spanish colonialism and then "Yankee imperialism," to the original socialists and Marxists around the world, to all who suffered under Batista, to those who fought alongside José Martí, and finally to the current revolutionaries. The historical context and lengthy account of Cuba's brave lineage goes on to suggest that, as a result of this progression, Cubans have "at last achieved…full dignity of man."[31] This historical context and the implied eschatology moving towards an idealized end-state are in keeping with this research's definition of international revolutionary ideology. Additionally, a number of duties and responsibilities fall to Cuban citizens for an active participation in their country. These include: duty to work (Article 45); defense of the socialist homeland (Article 65); protection of natural resources (Article 27); and duties to one's children and parents (Article 38). All citizens also are required by the constitution to participate in "caring for public and social property, accepting work discipline, respecting the rights of others, observing standards of socialist living and fulfilling

[30] Ibid, Preamble.

[31] The full text states that "WE DECLARE our will that the law of Laws of the Republic be guided by the following strong desire of José Martí, at last achieved: 'I want the fundamental law of our republic to be the tribute of Cubans to the full dignity of man.'" The translation presents some ambiguity, but the notion of an idealized end state, Cuba's historical progress, and the centrality of the revolution towards achieving these idealized ends ultimately stand regardless of how the text is parsed.

civic and social duties" (Article 64). Though these do not have the same tone as a revolutionary call to action, the Cuban citizen is required to be active in society.

Castro's Speeches

Castro's speeches are a particularly fruitful avenue of research to understand the regime's guiding principles, because Castro's government frequently used radio and television platforms to educate the Cuban populace about the activities of the government.[32] Indeed, Fidel Castro often discussed Marxist theory, Jose Martí, and the purpose and context of the Cuban revolution overall. I use these to demonstrate that Cuba embraced an international revolutionary ideology during the period in which it adopted HISS.[33] Propagandistic as they might be, Castro's speeches are the best indicator of the set of political ideals formally espoused by the government.

The content of Castro's speeches confirms the notion that the ideology espoused by the government is international revolutionary and was from the beginning of the post-1959 period. The text of these speeches refers time and again to the human experience and the exploitation of man by capitalists and imperialists. Themes of freedom, human dignity, and independence characterize his descriptions of the world's current and past challenges. Furthermore, as in other examples already discussed in this research, Castro refers to the exploited peoples as all sharing in the same struggle. Cubans, he declares, are brothers to all those in the Americas, Asia, Africa,

[32] It falls beyond the scope of this research to perform a textual analysis on the full body of Castro's oratories. His speeches generally lasted several hours, and he delivered many. In 1959, he spoke almost every other day, and between 1960 and 1962, he "made a public statement two or three times every ten days." After 1966, his addresses occurred regularly every two weeks (Domínguez 1978, 196-199. See also Kenner and Petras (Eds) 1969, xv. In short, there is simply too much material to provide a truly systematic and comprehensive analysis in the context of this research. For further documents, speeches, and interviews see the Latin American Network Information Center's "Castro Speech Data Base." Even this formidable archival resource, it is worth noting, states that "It is not to be construed that this database contains all statements, speeches, and interviews made by Fidel Castro" (LANIC 2015).

[33] In contrast, the amended Constitution of 1940 contributes little to understanding Cuban political activity of the period, despite the fact that it was nominally the active constitution before 1976. See Jorge Domínguez. 1978. *Cuba: Order and Revolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 242.

and even Europe who are oppressed by what he frequently dubs the "monopolists"—companies and a wealthy minority that control huge portions of the world's resources. He also references the "universal theory" in discussions of Marxism at times, which not only evokes Marx himself but also recalls Mao's characterization of the ideology and its particular application in a single country. Overall, this portrayal extends to all humanity, clearly beyond the national border of the small island.

Particularly after 1962, the Marxist theory of the progression of history also figures prominently in the accounts of political events in Cuba. In the Second Declaration of Havana, he makes explicit reference to Marxist historical dialectic of the old, feudal order revolting and giving way to the present capitalist order.[34] He refers to Rousseau, Diderot, and Voltaire and their ideas about individual rights and property as parallel to Marx, Engels, and Lenin and their ideas about socialism.[35] They provided the basis for the progress to the next stage of history.

Also important is action. A number of Castro's speeches castigate the communist movements in Latin America that abandoned armed struggle or that distanced themselves from other groups on the left who were pursuing violent insurrection.[36] Indeed, in the Cuban revolutionary calendar, the year 1968 was officially dubbed "The Year of the Heroic Guerrilla." Furthermore, the oft-cited imperatives of "The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution" and "The country cannot remain on its knees imploring miracles from the golden

[34] Martin Kenner and James Petras (Eds). 1969. *Fidel Castro Speaks.* New York: Grove Press, Inc., 86-88. From "The Second Declaration of Havana" Speech delivered at the Plaza de la Revolución Feb. 4, 1962.

[35] Ibid.

[36] See, for example, the speech delivered at the University of Havana, Mar. 31, 1967 in which Castro editorializes at length on the liberation efforts in Venezuela—which are insipid and, unless stepped up and made much more aggressive and active, are doomed to fail, according to Fidel's thinking. Kenner and Petras (Eds) 1969, 115-135. These comments and speeches by Castro were often criticisms of Moscow which, as a rule, tended to support the leftist political parties working in existing systems in Latin America and did not encourage revolution by supporting armed groups or political parties with armed wings.

Table 8.1 Excerpts from Selected Fidel Castro Speeches, 1959-1968

Speech Title/Description, Date	***Quotation***	**Criteria**
"Economic Problems Confronting Cuba and the Underdeveloped World" Delivered at the General Assembly of the United Nations, Sept. 26, 1960	"All of us, without exception, are actors in a crucial moment of history…as we have had the privilege of being actors in this transcendental moment in history, history will someday judge us for our deeds."[1]	2
	"The case of Cuba is like that of the Congo, Egypt, Algeria, Iran; like that of Panama, which wishes to have its canal; it is like that of Puerto Rico, whose national spirit they are destroying; like that of Honduras, a portion of whose territory has been alienated. In short...the case of Cuba is the case of all underdeveloped, colonialized countries."[2]	1
	"The problems of Latin America are similar to those of the rest of world--to those of Africa and Asia. The world is divided up among the monopolies; the same monopolies we find in Latin America are also found in the Middle East. There, the oil is in the hands of monopolistic companies that are controlled by France, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands--in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, in short in all corners of the world."[3]	1
"Economic Reform: Cuba's Agrarian Reform" Delivered at the National Congress of Cane Co-operatives, August 18, 1962.	"You who have deeply engraved on your mind the memory of that hungry past, the past of suffering and humiliated workers, you would not have thought that the day would come when your children would study in a university or in foreign lands. How could a worker have thought of becoming an administrator, or coming to discuss problems, one of those who are sent from their place of work to discuss with the Ministers, with the government, to express their opinions, to participate actively in the affairs of the country? You who remember that past, I am sure, if you were asked to renounce your position as proletarians to become semi-exploiters, I am sure that you would all say: 'No, we will not renounce our proletarian position. We now, more than ever, wish to be proletarians, because in our hands is the destiny of our country. We wish to change it into a better world, without exploiters of exploited of any kind."[4]	2; 3

[1] In *Castro Speaks,* 20.

[2] Ibid, 30.

[3] Ibid, 31-32.

[4] Ibid, 43.

Table 8.1, continued

	"We will not accomplish it by sleeping in the shade; we will not accomplish it if we are like vagabonds or loafers. Abundance of all that we wish, of all that we need, can be attained only with sweat, with work, and with sacrifice… vagabonds do not progress. [ ] vagabonds will not help us liberate ourselves from want and misery...for the redemption of man, for the elevation of man, for the progress of man."[5]	3
"Counter-Revolution: The Whole Nation on the March, Afraid of Nothing" Speech delivered at the Presidential Palace in Havana, Oct. 26, 1959	"If, with our people's effort's today, with the sacrifices our people are making today, we advance an inch or we advance a mile, is it fair that the efforts which cost us so much sacrifice should be destroyed in a few moments?"[6]	3; 2
	"The people have been oppressed all their lives by powerful interests, by the great landowners. The first right of man is the right to live, the first right of man is the right of bread for his children, the right to live by his own labors, and the right to his own culture. And here--the children who die in the fields without medical assistance don't have rights. The women who die prematurely don't have rights, the families destroyed by starvation don't have rights."[7]	1
	"Those who ignore history, those who have forgotten the history of other peoples, those who have not read of the advancement of humanity, from the Greek epoch until today, are the type who do not know a revolution when they see one. They are the type who try to halt a revolution and they are the type who are always crushed by the people."[8]	2
"Turn Toward Socialism: Cuba's Socialism Proclaimed" Speech delivered May 21, 1961. Note that Castro is here quoting his own speech from his defense at the Moncada trial.	"The country cannot remain on its knees imploring miracles from the golden calf. No social problem is resolved spontaneously."[9]	3

[5] Ibid, 47.
[6] Ibid, 61.
[7] Ibid, 64.
[8] Ibid, 66.
[9] Ibid, 81.

Table 8.1, continued

"The Second Declaration of Havana" Speech delivered in Havana Plaza, Feb. 4 1962.	"What is the history of Cuba but the history of Latin America? And what is the history of Latin America but the history of Asia, Africa, and Oceania? And what is the history of all these peoples but the history of the most pitiless and cruel exploitation by imperialism throughout the world?"[10]	1
	"The general crisis [of imperialism] began with the outbreak of World War I, with the revolution of workers and peasants which overthrew the Czarist empire of Russia and founded, amidst the most difficult conditions of capitalist encirclement and aggression, the world's first socialist state, opening a new era in the history of humanity."[11]	2
	"The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution. It is known that revolution will triumph in America and throughout the world, but it is not for revolutionaries to sit in the doorways of their houses waiting for the corpse of imperialism to pass by. The role of Job doesn't suit a revolutionary."[12]	3
	"No nation in Latin America is weak--because each forms part of a family of 200 million brothers, who suffer the same miseries, who harbor the same resentments, who have the same enemy, who dream about the same better future and who count upon the solidarity of all honest men and women throughout the world."[13]	1
	"This toiling humanity, inhumanly exploited…from the dawn of independence their fate has been the same: Indians, gauchos, zambos, quadroons, whites without property or income, all this human mass which formed the ranks of the 'nation' but never reaped any benefits...their fate has all been the same. But now from one end of the continent to the other they are signaling with clarity that the hour has come, the hour of their redemption. Now this anonymous mass, this America of color, somber taciturn America, which all over the continent sings with the same sadness and disillusionment, now this mass is beginning to enter conclusively into its own history, is beginning to write with its own blood, is beginning to suffer and die for it." [14]	2; 3

[10] Ibid, 86.
[11] Ibid, 89.
[12] Ibid, 104.
[13] Ibid, 105.
[14] Ibid, 105-106.

Table 8.1, continued

"The Role of Armed Struggle: Our people have no other path to liberation than that of armed struggle" Speech delivered at the Chaplin Theater on the 6th Anniversary of the Playa Girón (Bay of Pigs), April 19, 1967	"Our country, our people, and our future are important. But still more important are our 230 million Latin America brothers! All of America is important. The future of this continent is important. But the world is still more important! And if, as someone in the past century--when Marxist ideas had not yet taken root in the minds of hundreds of millions of human beings--said: 'Humanity comes before one's own country,' we internationalist revolutionaries will always say: 'we love our country, we love the welfare of our people, we love the riches that we create with our own hands, but humanity comes before our country!'"[15]	1
Speech delivered at the First Conference of the Organization of Latin American States (OLAS), Aug. 10 1967	"I believe that it is not correct for any revolutionary to wait with arms crossed until all the other people struggle and create the conditions for victory for him without struggle. That will never be an attribute of revolutionaries."[16]	3
"Capitalism and Communist Development: A Hundred and Fifty Years of Accumulated Misery" Speech delivered at the Chaplin Theater on April 19, 1966	"And when we say the Cuban Revolution, we are speaking of the Revolution in Latin America. And when we speak of Revolution in Latin America, we are speaking revolution on a universal scale, the revolution of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and of Europe."[17]	1
"Socialist Consciousness: Communism Cannot be Built in One Country in the Midst of an Underdeveloped World" Speech delivered at the Havana Plaza, May 21, 1966	"We ask ourselves whether, in the midst of a world full of misery, we will be able to think tomorrow only of ourselves, only and exclusively of ourselves, to live in superabundance with our tens of thousands of agricultural engineers, teachers, with our super-developed technology. How will we be able to live in that superabundance...while we see around us other peoples who, by not having the opportunity or the good fortune to make a revolution in the epoch in which we are making ours will, within ten years, be living even more miserably than they are today?...We must not think that our duty is to strive so that one of us may have his own automobile before first concerning ourselves whether or not each family in those countries which are behind us owns at least a plow...our ideal is not wealth. Our principal ideal and our duty must be to help those peoples who were left behind."[18]	1; 3

[15] Ibid, 144.
[16] Ibid, 150.
[17] Ibid, 178.
[18] Ibid, 192.

Table 8.1, continued

Speech delivered at the 6th Anniversary of the CDR, Sept. 28, 1966	"We do not believe in Utopia. We do not believe that this can be done overnight. We do not believe that this consciousness can be developed in just a few years, but we do believe that it will never be created if we do not struggle unceasingly in this direction; if we do not advance incessantly on this path."[19]	2; 3
	"Whenever you hear someone say: 'I don't know,' look upon him with suspicion. Whenever you hear someone say: 'I cannot,' look upon him with suspicion. Whenever you hear someone say: 'It is too much,' look upon him with reservations: what we all have to say is: 'Yes, we can do it. And whatever we don't know we'll learn!' We must say that nothing is too much for us!"[20]	3

Key: Criteria 1 = international moral application; Criteria 2 = historical progress/eschatology; Criteria 3 = call to/imperative for action

[19] Ibid, 204.
[20] Ibid, 208.

calf" belong to Castro (see Table 7.1). There is a need for the people to take action in order to further the progress of history, a universal *human* history, towards a more moral, idealized communist world.

There are numerous examples of these ideas in a wide variety of Castro's speeches and interviews. Some of these are collected in Table 7.1, drawing from a few of Castro's famous addresses (one at the United Nations in 1960 and the Second Declaration of Havana in 1962) as well as those from a number of public May Day celebrations, Bay of Pigs/Playa Girón memorials, and ordinary policy speeches delivered throughout the 1960s. The date and title of the text is listed, then the excerpts themselves. In the far right column, the related definitional criteria are noted.

Drawing from official Cuban documents and Castro's public political, policy, and historical speeches, it is clear that the ruling ideology Havana embraced in post-1959 was international revolutionary. Evidence from different periods throughout 1959-1980 offers a consistent picture of the political ideology. I now turn to the *fidelista* government's mode of entry to power and the Cuban foreign policy-making apparatus in the 1960s and 1970s.

Condition 2: Non-Institutionalized Entry

A New Government in Havana, 1959

Fidel Castro and the *fidelistas* entered power through non-institutionalized means in 1959, after a rural armed insurgency combined with urban mass movements against the sitting government of President Fulgencio Batista. A number of armed and unarmed political and labor groups contributed to the rebellion, and a series of successful military operations against Batista's troops led to the dictator's flight from Cuba on December 31, 1958. Castro's forces

secured the capital city of Havana and were in the position to found a new Cuban government by January 1959.

By 1959, the government of Fulgencio was considered by many peasants and laborers to be a puppet propped up by the United States and a protector of a highly unequal economic system.[1] Batista's government, according the *fidelista* rhetoric, exploited Cuba for the benefit of foreigners and a small, privileged Cuban economic elite.[2] The US had certainly been involved in military interventions in Cuba several times in the early 1900s, each time attempting to protect business interests and maintain the existing, largely capitalist order. To this end, the US had also supported a series of military dictators in Cuba. Another historical point of contention was that the United States had imposed the Platt Amendment on Cuba in 1902, which severely curtailed Cuban autonomy in favor of US interests.[3]

The new government took a more populist tack domestically and sought greater independence from the United States overall. Castro's regime quickly implemented a series of pro-rural reforms and nationalized foreign-owned portions of the sugar industry and the oil industry.[4] From 1959-1961, the revolutionary council sought to maintain positive relations with the US while also consolidating power and beginning to form ties with the Eastern bloc.[5] The USSR offered Cuba markets increasingly favorable rates for its sugar, which the US no longer was willing to buy in late 1960, and the USSR provided much-needed oil subsidies and supplies

[1] Domínguez 1978, Chapter 3 and 4; also Pérez-Stable, notes that, following the 1952 coup, the Batista government curtailed labor rights and expanded management's power over workers (1993, 52-60). Additionally, Domínguez notes that during this same period, agricultural incomes for farm laborers and peasants stagnated.

[2] E.g. "Economic Problems Confronting Cuba and the Underdeveloped World." Speech delivered to the UN General Assembly, New York, Sept. 26, 1960. In *Castro Speaks*, 3-32.

[3] Domínguez 1978, 28-30; Pérez-Stable 1993, 37-39.

[4] Domínguez 1978, 146-147; Levesque 16.

[5] Sadri 1997, 72-75; Richard E. Welch, Jr. 1985. *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 44; Lévesque 1978, 14.

to the Castro government.[6] These closer ties to Moscow antagonized an already-suspicious United States, and moves by both governments led to a rapid deterioration of Washington-Havana relations.[7] Furthermore, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) organized a series of increasingly wild plots to kill or overthrow Castro, including an unlikely assassination attempt via poisoned cigars and culminating in the disastrous Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961.[8] CIA-led efforts at counter-revolution were scaled down but evidence suggests that they continued throughout the next decade.[9]

How Foreign Policy in Cuba Was Made

This history and the early relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States form an important context in which Havana made both its foreign policy and its foreign policy apparatus upon the regime's ascent to power. Having entered power through non-institutionalized means and with an apparent mandate to re-define Cuba's role on the world stage, the *fidelistas* sought to create an entirely new foreign policy approach. The resulting governing structures placed Fidel Castro, his brother Raúl, and a few other loyalists at the top of the foreign policy decision-making apparatus. Furthermore, ideological heterodoxy was frowned upon and grounds for dismissal in many government positions, including and perhaps especially in the foreign policy arena. In short, non-institutionalized entry led to the mechanisms that I have theorized lead to HISS adoption.

[6] Domínguez 1978, 150-151; 157-158.

[7] See Richard Welch, Jr. 1985. Chap. 2-5 for an overview of US-Cuba relations over the course of these first years. Sadri 1997, 74.

[8] Philip Brenner. 1988. *From Confrontation to Negotiation: U.S. Relations with Cuba.* Boulder: Westview Press, Chapter 1.

[9] Font 1996.

At first, there were imprisonments and executions of Batista supporters, particularly among leaders in the armed forces. However, the new government found that it did not actually end up having to decide whether to pursue broad purges of former regime elites—a wave of political emigration made the point moot. Many anti-Castroites and Batista sympathizers simply left the country. The United States was more than willing to accept these political refugees from *fidelista* Cuba, leading to a net emigration of nearly 200,000 Cubans (about 3% of the island's roughly 7 million) between 1960 and 1962.[10] Among these were a disproportionate number of business professionals, managerial staff, and clerks.[11] This weakened domestic opposition for many of the new regime's preferred policies, especially with regards to Cuban economic arrangements but also including foreign policy.

Institutionally, too, there was likely to be little opposition to new directives on international affairs. The 1976 constitution for the Cuban government formed a new legislative body that was officially tasked with broad foreign policy-making powers. In reality, though, the National Assembly had little to do with state decisions in international affairs. The legislature did not meet at all until 1976, was in session only a few days out of the year, and does not appear to have discussed matters of military, foreign, or security policy for its first decade of existence.[12] This echoes the Iranian, Sudanese, and even Kampuchean experience of token legislatures that provide a rubber stamp or a veneer of democratic procedure to highly centralized regimes. In the Cuba case, though, this body did not even exist at the time of HISS adoption.

Furthermore, the Batista-era institutions were ineffectual and their replacements took a long time to professionalize. Largely designed to facilitate good relations between Havana and

[10] Domínguez 1978, 140.

[11] Ibid, 141.

[12] Domínguez 1989, p. 262.

Washington, the Cuban Foreign Ministry circa 1959 was barely capable of carrying out any directives from the top leaders of the Politburo. In the latter half of 1959, the new government eliminated tenure for foreign service employees, dismissing many for "disloyalty" and losing others over the course of the next two years as more Batista-era Cuban officials fled the country.[13] Those diplomats that were active oversees were required to return to Cuba every month for thorough indoctrination into the revolution's political program and were subject to frequent dismissal. Most of the official business of the ministry involved political education of cadres, rooting out traitors, and participating in "productive labor" like agricultural work.[14] A second purge in 1966 resulted in another round of dismissals on ideological grounds.[15] The bureaucracy professionalized only after some time; it was in the mid-1970s before the Foreign Service Institute founded by the post-1959 government graduated its first students.[16] By the 1980s, the Foreign Relations Ministry had finally taken a central role in managing international relations for the Cuba government, a shift which has coincided with the growth and establishment of Communist party influence and members in the ministry.[17]

De facto, foreign policy in post-1959 Cuba was directed by a very small group of Castro's closest allies. Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, and President Osvaldo Dorticós often handled important matters of international affairs personally.[18] Relations with Moscow were, for example, too important to be left to the Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, who did not even travel to

[13] Domínguez 1989, 263.

[14] Ibid. A dairy farm not far from the ministry building was run almost entirely by foreign services employees.

[15] Ibid, 264.

[16] Ibid 264-265. By the 1980s, the ministry had been largely professionalized and most of the high-ranking diplomats were university-educated.

[17] Ibid, 267.

[18] Eckstein 2003, 26-27.

the USSR during his 1960s tenure as supposed head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[19] In some cases, Fidel appointed top confidantes to pet foreign policy projects on an ad-hoc basis. Che Guevara was, at the specific request of Castro, the Cuban envoy on a number of diplomatic missions, including the Africa World Tour mentioned above.[20] Fidel is also known to have been deeply involved with many policy projects, such as planning the details of the Cuban operations in Angola; as García Márquez stated, "There was not a point on the map of Angola he [Castro] could not identify or a jot in the terrain he did not know by heart…he could cite any figure about Angola as it if were Cuba."[21] He took a great deal of personal ownership of foreign policy in the decades under discussion in this research.

Under this handful of top political leaders, several different organizations were founded to coordinate Cuba's relations with national liberation movements. In January 1966, an entirely new body called the Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL) was founded in Havana following the Tricontinental Congress.[22] A Latin-American version (OLAS) was also founded but was re-absorbed into OSPAAL following Che Guevara's death.[23] Both were overseen directly by the Cuban Communist party (under the leadership of Fidel Castro). Additionally, the party maintained direct relations with a number of non-state movements, treating them in diplomatic terms precisely as they did sitting state

[19] Domínguez 1989, p. 254-255.

[20] Gleijeses 2002, especially Chapter 4, 5, and 8.

[21] Márquez 1977, cited in Domínguez 1989, 252.

[22] The founding membership offers further evidence of the HISS dependent variable. In addition to state governments of Syria, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, and North Korea. Non-state entities filled the remainder of the roster: the Vietcong; revolutionary movements from Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, the Congo (Leopoldville); liberation movements from the Portuguese Colonies in Africa; and two moderate movements from Puerto Rico and Chile. Domínguez 1989, 270-271.

[23] Ibid.

governments.[24] Finally, the Interior Ministry, which housed the General National Liberation Department, was in charge of a wide variety of foreign affairs tasks, such as deploying its own elite troops to Angola and providing personnel and logistic support for Guevara's Bolivian venture.[25] This department, called the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), was also in charge of clandestine activities and intelligence gathering abroad.[26]

There is evidence that access to policy-making power was dependent on ideological orthodoxy. In addition to the purges at the Foreign Ministry already discussed, the microfaction affair demonstrated that certain ideological tenets had to be embraced by anyone wishing to remain in Castro's government—or in Castro's Cuba for that matter. In the 1968, a number of high-ranking Communists wanted Cuba to align more closely with Moscow on matters of foreign policy. In particular, this so-called "microfaction" rejected a central belief of Castro's worldview: that armed revolutionary struggle against capitalism was necessary to obtain any true Communist victory (a political cause and effect belief). Like Moscow, the microfaction advocated for better relations with the legal, formal Communist parties in many of the states in which Cuba was already engaged in sponsorship of *armed* anti-government forces. Headed by Aníbal Escalante, a long-time comrade of Fidel Castro, this faction was completely ejected from government in 1968 and many were thrown in jail for their heterodoxy.[27]

In summary, then, the domestic political processes following non-institutionalized entry to power that are predicted by the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS *are* present in the Cuban case. A small group of like-minded leaders were in charge of the foreign policy direction

[24] Ibid, 271

[25] It is worth noting here that the fact that the same bureau coordinated both projects offers some suggestion that the regime saw both conventional and sub-conventional operations as part of the same political project.

[26] Ibid, 272. Gleijeses 2002.

[27] Domínguez 1989, 260.

of the country. A set of party-run institutions and organizations were in place to conduct a HISS policy on a day-to-day basis. There was little oversight. The National Assembly had no real role in foreign policy and the more traditional foreign ministry was ineffective and subject to purges. Finally, ideology and irregular entry mechanisms were mutually reinforcing. Officials that did not adhere to the *fidelista* line were sidelined or simply removed from government, even at the highest levels. This all made it possible for the top leaders, especially Fidel Castro, to write and implement their preferred policy, including HISS.

Condition 3: High Barriers to Offensive Conventional War

As Cuba set to implementing its desired foreign policy, Havana sought a tool that would be able to further those goals. For reasons outlined in Chapter 2, the foreign policy needed to be activist and needed to make an impact on politics across the globe. It also had to be anti-status quo. One theoretical option in such a case is, of course, to employ offensive conventional military operations to change the status quo in other states. However, for Cuba in the 1960s, such a policy would have been exceedingly risky and highly likely to fail. Sponsoring non-state actors, however, was consistent with Cuba's foreign policy goals and desires, and it was within their means. As described above, Cuban did indeed adopt a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors. In this section, I demonstrate that this policy was adopted during a period when Cuba's capacity to conduct conventional military operations abroad was severely limited.

The nation was hampered first by its small size, island location, and under-trained military. Furthermore, the threat of US invasion was serious in the first several years of Castro's tenure in power, as the Bay of Pigs fiasco was to demonstrate in 1961. What military assets the Cubans had available needed to be ready to make a US invasion costly enough that the Western

giant might be deterred. Its primary rival, the United States, was, of course, nuclear-armed, and, as the Cuban missile crisis is likely the closest the world has ever gotten to nuclear conflagration, Castro's government probably saw American nukes as the icing on the "massively outgunned" cake that ruled out any direct military confrontation, however much the regime wanted to confront Washington.

Material Capabilities vis-à-vis the United States and Global Imperialism

The Cuban state faced a huge material capabilities barrier to conventional war against its number one rival, the United States. An island nation, Cuba's 110,000 square miles is, famously, only 90 miles off the coast of Florida and the attendant 3.79 million square miles of the United States.[28] The super power's natural resources, economy, population, level of development, and military strength all dwarfed those of Cuba. By any measure (see Table 7.2), Cuba was outclassed materially by the United States.

A few simple comparisons will suffice to demonstrate this gap. US military expenditures at the height of Havana's own military spending efforts in the 1960s (1968) were greater than Cuba's by a factor of 269. Even if one assumes that "real" spending was approximately double the stated figures, as some statements from Castro and analyses have suggested, US military outlays are still over 100 times that of Cuba's, two full orders of magnitude. Some of the most considered estimates of GDP suggest that the size of the Cuban economy was 0.5% that of the

[28] "Cuba" The World Factbook 2016. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2016; "United States" The World Factbook 2016. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2016.

American economy in 1965.[29] This trend continues into the 1970s when more complete data become available through the World Bank.[30]

Similar results obtain when comparing standing forces. The most Cuba-generous comparison would be in 1961, while Cuban mobilization was still high from its domestic counter-revolutionary activities and the US had not yet stepped up its own campaign in Vietnam.[31] Even in that year, there is an 8.5:1 balance of forces in favor of the United States. By the next year, there is a difference of a factor of ten, and in 1968, official numbers state that there were 32 active American service members for every single Cuban that was in the armed forces. The total population of Cuba is estimated at 8.4 million in that same year, while the United States had 3.55 million *men and women in uniform*. The Vietnam war was, of course, driving these figures and also consuming a great deal of these American military resources, but the margins are nonetheless staggering.

On the one hand, these figures may fail to capture a number of aspects of Cuba's military capacity. Though Cuban government documents and independent researchers found that expenditures in the early 1960s amounted to around 220 million pesos, Castro has cited the figure as somewhat nearer to 500 million pesos.[32] The number of standing forces also fails to account for the large and active military reserve forces and the Army of the Working Youth.[33]

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[29] A great deal of careful thought and effort has gone into assessing the defense budget and economic output of command economies. For work on Cuba in particular, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López. 1985. "Estimating Cuba Gross Domestic Product per Capita in Dollars using Physical Indicators" *Social Indicators Research 16*, 275-300; also Jorge Pérez-López. 1996. "Cuban Military Expenditures: Concepts, Data, and Burden Measures" *Cuba in Transition: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy Annual Proceedings*, 124-144.

[30] The World Bank. 2015. "World Development Indicators: Economy and Growth." available http://data.worldbank.org/topic/economy-and-growth?view=chart. Accessed November 29, 2016

[31] These and other figures on standing forces from the Correlates of War Materials Capabilities Index.

[32] Domínguez 1978, 346.

[33] Domínguez 1978, 347-348. Also, IISS The Military Balance 1965.

Table 8.2 Economic and Military Measures of Cuba and United States, 1960-1980

Year	Total Military Expenditures					Armed Forces Personnel****		GDP	
	Cuba				United States	Cuba	United States	Cuba	United States
	millions pesos*	millions pesos**	millions USD***	millions USD (current)****	millions USD (current)****			billions USD (current)	
1960				175	45,380	46,000	2,306,000		543.3
1961			175	175	47,808	270,000	2,307,000		563.3
1962	247		200	200	52,381	270,000	2,807,000		605.1
1963	214	213	213	200	52,295	80,000	2,700,000		638.6
1964	221	223	221	200	51,213	110,000	2,687,000		685.8
1965	213	214	213	140	51,827	110,000	2,660,000	3.8†	743.7
1966	213		213	230	67,572	110,000	3,090,000		815.0
1967			250	170	75,448	110,000	3,380,000		861.7
1968			300	213	80,732	110,000	3,550,000		942.5
1969			250	186	81,446	140,000	3,460,000		1,020
1970			290	228	77,827	140,000	3,070,000	5.7	1,076
1971			290	290	74,862	140,000	2,720,000	6.9	1,168
1972		365	319	267	77,639	140,000	2,323,000	8.1	1,282
1973				270	78,385	140,000	2,206,000	10.0	1,429
1974		400		282	85,906	140,000	2,146,000	11.4	1,549
1975				326	90,948	120,000	2,098,000	13.0	1,689
1976					91,013	125,000	2,075,000	13.8	1,878
1977				779	100,925	200,000	2,060,000	14.2	2,086
1978			784^	1,032	109,247	210,000	2,060,000	17.8	2,357
1979			841^	1,136	122,279	210,000	2,033,000	19.6	2,632
1980			811^	1,126	143,981	220,000	2,050,000	19.9	2,863

* in current pesos, from Perez-Lopez 1996

** in current pesos, from Dominguez 1978

*** in current dollars, from Dominguez 1978

**** from COW Singer et. al. 1972, updated 2010

^ in current dollars, from Perez-Lopez 1996

† uses Perez-Lopez 1985

All Cuban citizens, (men under fifty and women under forty) have a military reserve classification and are eligible to be called up for training on an annual basis.[1] Still, these differences are negligible vis-à-vis total US capabilities.

Military competence and skill in conventional conflict were also quite low in the new Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). The Batista military apparatus was disbanded as the *fidelistas* took power in 1959, and the FAR, initially consisting largely of the M-26-7 forces that had waged guerrilla operations from the Sierra Maestra, was formed.[2] While many had developed skills in rural insurgent warfare, the force was not a professional state military. New military educational institutions were established in the early 1960s, including a new officers' school program (1961), a war college (1963), military secondary schools (1966), and military technical institutes (1966).[3] These school systems also covered numerous specializations—infantry, artillery, communications—and aimed to develop different service branches (army, navy, air force). However, improvements in the professionalization of the military did not bear noticeable fruit until about 1970, and even then, it was not until the second half of the 1970s that Cuban forces overall were highly trained, professionally structured, and well-educated.[4] Consequentially, this is one reason why a tool that was unavailable in the 1960s became available in the late 1970s.

Nuclear Barrier

Cuba was also up against nuclear-armed powers, thereby making offensive conventional military operations against her enemies a highly risky proposition. In 1960, the United States,

[1] Domínguez 1978, 350.

[2] Eckstein 2003, 28-29.

[3] Domínguez 1978, 351.

[4] Ibid, 352.

the USSR, and Great Britain were in possession of nuclear weapons; China and France were added to the nuclear list as the 1960s drew to a close. If the Castro-led government in Cuba identified the United States as enemy number one, imperialist and capitalist France and the UK were not far behind. With all of these countries outfitted with nuclear defenses, Cuba would have to explore other tools if it wanted to use force to strike at her enemies.

Geographic Distance and Power Projection Capacity

The United States was geographically quite proximate to Cuba, and as such, the geographic barriers to conventional power projection may seem lower in this case than in others. Havana did not, for example, need a blue water navy to access American territory. However, President Kennedy noted in September of 1962 that, "There is no evidence…of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of any other offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance." He then went on to add, "Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issue would arise."[5] Though Cuba did engage in a military build-up the 1960s, its ability to project power was always nominal at best. The vast majority of Cuban military assets were defensive, aimed at protecting the island against *Washington's* possible offensive operations and, at the very least, raising the cost of such an endeavor. Though some of the FAR's assets could technically have reached American targets, in the final analysis, the short geographic distance between the US and Cuba did little to enhance Cuba's effective capacity to initiate offensive operations outside of its own national territory against this particular and most central rival.

Unlike other cases in this dissertation, especially Iran and China, Cuba did not find itself completely at odds with most of the world's powers. Instead, it sought and gained an alliance

[5] U.S., Department of State, *Bulletin,* Volume XLVII, No. 1213 (September 24, 1962), p. 450. (Read to news correspondents on September 4, by Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary.)

with the Soviet Union. In addition to helping keep the island nation afloat economically, the Soviet Union contributed to Cuba's physical security and helped maintain its territorial integrity. It is unknown precisely how much military hardware found its way across the Atlantic at no cost to Cuba, but the Cuban government never paid for weapons from Moscow.[6] An assessment of military assets in 1968 found that Cuba, by that year, had amassed: 300 heavy and medium-weight tanks; 200 armored personnel carriers; 100 assault guns; 30 surface-to-air missiles (Frog-4s); 15-18 submarine chasers; 18 Komar patrol boats equipped with Styx surface-to-surface missiles[7]; 60 MiG-15 and 75 MiG-17 fighter bombers; 20 MiG-19s 45 MiG-21 interceptors; and a full complement of helicopters and transport planes.[8] Technical assistance and military advice was also made available to Havana. Cuba's military hardware supplies increased even further from 1968-1974, when its relations with the USSR grew even closer.

The US mainland was therefore theoretically within range of Cuba's navy and, indeed, its air force. Assessments from 1962 and 1963 note that the Cuban navy was in possession of a handful of naval cruisers, outmoded of course, and of 20-25 more modern Soviet torpedo boats.[9] By 1965, a number of patrol boats equipped with surface-to-surface missiles had been added to the Cuban navy. The Florida Keys were certainly within range of these vessels. Cuban air forces had MiG 17s (a fighter-bomber type) and 19s (an interceptor type) even before the Cuban Missile Crisis was heating up. Additionally, Cuba in 1962 had a small number of IL-28 bombers, a type of Soviet bomber Moscow favored sending to Warsaw Pact allies throughout the Cold War. The IL-28s had, at the time, a 1,500 mile range and an estimated 4,000-lb ordinance

[6] Eckstein 2003, 29; Domínguez 1978, 347-350.

[7] International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1967-1968, 11.

[8] Ibid; Domínguez 1978, 349.

[9] IISS. *The Military Balance 1961-1962*, 8; IISS. *The Military Balance 1962-1963*, 10.

load; however, the fully-assembled aircraft on the island were not in the hands of the Cuban military but rather were Soviet-controlled.[10] Their very presence on the island was a central point of contention leading up to and following the Cuban missile crisis. Though any conventional encounter was bound to be brief and in many ways essentially suicidal, thanks to support from Moscow, Cuba looked like it did potentially have the military capacity to strike at the United States –theoretically.

Still, as the 1960s progressed—and while Cuba was in the process of adopting HISS—its forces were primarily defense-oriented. The Styx missiles mentioned above, for example, could only reach targets less than 15 miles away.[11] Other Cuban surface-to-surface missiles had a range of around 40 miles. Though FAR did have a number of helicopters and larger aircraft for military transport, there were no vessels that would have facilitated a true Cuban amphibious assault. Also, by the end of the decade, Cuba's air force de-emphasized the fighter-bomber type MiGs in favor of interceptors, which have only nominal offensive capacity and are designed specifically for air defense.[12]

Other assets were not as offense-oriented as they appeared. The IL-28s, one of the few aircraft available to Cuba that was theoretically capable of delivering substantial payloads to ground targets, were hardly state-of-the-art offensive machines. As Castro noted of the IL-28s during the crisis itself, "Owing to their limited speed and low flight ceiling, they are antiquated equipment in relation to modern means of antiaircraft defence."[13] In other words, in an actual attempt to bomb the US, the planes would likely be downed by air defense systems before they

[10] IISS. *The Military Balance 1967-1968*, 2; Brenner 1990, 127.

[11] Domínguez 1978, 349.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Brenner 1990, fn. 58.

could deliver their payloads. In any event, the IL-28s had been withdrawn as of December 1962, a key condition in the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis.[14] Thus, while Cuban forces may have looked at least somewhat capable on paper, the armed forces were unlikely to be able to actualize an offensive move against the US mainland. Between the limitation of the assets themselves and the fact that the United States could be expected to have counter-forces mobilized and ready, Cuban power projection capacity was quite low.

Cuban Territorial Defense and a High Demand for the FAR at Home

It is also worth mentioning that though Cuba did receive military support from the USSR and Eastern bloc nations free of charge, Havana understood itself to be on its own in the event of an invasion attempt. There would be no hard guarantees of the island's territorial integrity forthcoming from Cuban allies, and neither a solo US nor a NATO-led action against Cuba would trigger automatic deployment of large numbers of Eastern bloc troops to defend the territory. In a 1968 conversation with a German Democratic Republic official, Castro put the situation thusly:

> "We have no guarantee against imperialist aggression. We don't have twenty divisions to protect us. You can sleep peacefully, even though the West German imperialists are on your border. They will not attack you because if they do, there will be war…you have every guarantee; we have none…The Soviet Union has given us weapons. We are will be forever thankful… but if the imperialists attack Cuba, we can count only on ourselves."[15]

Cuban leadership believed that it was vulnerable to an invasion from the United States. In addition to being prohibitively costly and unlikely to succeed against the US, conventional military operations abroad *of any kind* would also have depleted what defenses the island had to

[14] See Brenner 1990, 136-138

[15] From Gleijeses 2002, 95, citing CIA and GDR government documents.

inflict pain on a would-be attacker. When it came to the use of conventional forces in the 1960s, the best defense, in Cuba's case, was no offense.

Overall, then, Cuba faced high barriers to conventional war. Though Havana was much closer to having the technical capability to assault the US homeland with her conventional military apparatus, the fact remained that the United States was simply too militarily powerful for that to be a viable policy option. Furthermore, the mere presence of nuclear-capable types of missiles and bombers on Cuban soil precipitated a global nuclear crisis in October 1962; the nuclear barrier was clearly active here. Also, even if Cuba was geographically close to her primary rival, her military forces were not designed for amphibious assault or capable of successful air strikes against the US mainland. The reality for revolutionary Cuba was simply that there was no conventional option for a direct strike at the standard-bearer for the ideology's enemy number one with any reasonable chance of success. Finally, given Cuba's precarious national security position, the use of its conventional armed forces for any sizable military action abroad would have seriously impacted its ability to inflict harm on a possible invasion force. (This is all to say nothing of the fact that the key target of such an attack was itself the most likely invader and would have jumped at the excuse to bring its full might down on Havana.)

The country still, however, had a preference for an activist foreign policy, to participate on the global stage, and to challenge the powerful, leading nations of the world order. Facing this reality, then, HISS became an appealing policy choice. It was active, in that liberation movements and other armed groups were engaged in anti-government conflicts. During the 1960s, there were numerous such actors around the globe that Havana could sponsor, thus involving itself in world affairs on a large scale. Further, HISS solved power projection problems, since groups were either already located in the target territory or were in safe havens

in bordering countries. Nuclear escalation is not an issue in domestic civil conflict. By the 1960s few nations possessed them and HISS created a proxy-war situation of US-backed regimes against Cuban-backed rebels in third states. Finally, though the power disparity between non-state actors and targeted state governments meant that success was not terribly likely, Cuba's solution was to improve the capacity of such groups and give them a better chance of fomenting revolutions. Though this policy ultimately proved to be ineffective in actually overthrowing status quo governments abroad, it had a greater chance of success and carried far less risk than Cuba sending its own armed forces directly into the fray.[16] Cuba adopted HISS when all three of these causal factors were present, as the Revolutionary Realities theory would expect.

Facing Revolutionary Realities: Evidence of Cuba's Motivation for HISS

Rarely are scholars, especially Western scholars, granted access to documents and interviews from regimes like those of Castro's Cuba. Indeed, many states that adopted HISS in the past are still ruled by regimes descended from those that led the large-scale, semi-clandestine sponsorship policies: the Assads in Syria, the Ayatollahs in Iran, the CCP in China and, now Raúl Castro in Cuba. However, thanks to dogged researchers, some willing government officials, and the United States' own intelligence services' records, there is a great deal more information and knowledge available about Cuban foreign policy than there is for other cases presented in this dissertation. As such, I draw on what evidence is available to demonstrate that the three factors that I have identified in my research are, in fact part of the calculus of Cuba's leadership, primarily Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl, but a few other top decision-makers as

[16] A number of scholars have suggested Che Guevara's death and revolutionary efforts in Bolivia in 1967 led to a scaling back of Cuban HISS (e.g. Sadri 1997, 77-79). More likely, it was the failure of this *foco* model – of a small band of active rebels creating a revolutionary situation in which the general populace revolts against the government – in general that caused a policy re-evaluation (Harmer 2013). In either case, the Castro government seemed to looking for an effective foreign policy tool and, when non-state actor sponsorship on a massive and fairly indiscriminate scale did not actually deliver many tangible benefits, they changed tact.

well, when committing their state's resources to the policy of HISS. The logic of Revolutionary Realities is supported, and sometimes baldly apparent, in the statements and assessments of Cuba's sponsorship policy.

First, there are accounts from the 1960s that rather clearly link the efforts of the Cuban government to support non-state actors as being a part of the struggle against the existing world order. In particular, the United States and Western imperial powers were considered to the most important enemy. As Che Guevara wrote in 1965 of the Zairean rebel leader Laurent Kabila, "He understood that the real enemy was US imperialism and declared that he was ready to fight against it to the end…I offered him, on behalf of our government, about thirty instructors and all the weapons we could spare."[17] There was a connection between Che Guevara's willingness to offer Cuban aid to rebels in far-distant theaters and the recipient of that aid being engaged in a global fight against US imperialism. This is precisely the logic that the Revolutionary Realities theory believes to be at work. States with certain foreign policy goals, limited by structures of the international system, support non-state actors against rival governments as part of a global conflict against the status quo world order.

When describing the motivation and thinking behind Cuban foreign policy more generally, high-ranking Cuban Communist party members have explicated a logic that is strikingly similar to that which is posited in this research. Victor Dreke was a hero of the Cuban revolutionary war alongside the Castros and served as Che Guevara's number two man during Cuban covert training operations in Africa. He put Cuba's HISS policy thusly:

> "Cuba defends itself by attacking its aggressor. This was our philosophy. The Yankees were attacking us from every side, so we had to challenge them everywhere, along all paths of the world. We had to divide their forces, so that

[17] From Gleijeses 2002, 51. The author draws on Che Guevara's *Pasajes de la guerre revolucionaria: Congo.*

> they wouldn't be able to descend on us (or on any other country) with all their might. Our response had to be bold."[18]

Defense by aggression, the intolerability of passivity, and a scope "along all the paths of the world" suggests the kind of policy that HISS is, according to the Revolutionary Realities theory. Interestingly, without the parenthetical "(or on any other country)," this quotation could be used to support the pure geostrategy account of HISS. Yet with it, Dreke makes it clear that this is not exactly perfect, realist logic at work; Havana did not hope that the United States would invade somewhere else, even though that would temporarily take the pressure off of Cuba. Rather, the goal of Cuba's policy was to tie down Goliath with myriad Lilliputians in arenas throughout the world, simultaneously encouraging global revolution while also making it harder for the US to invade Cuba, due to the division of resources and attention. Put rather more (uncharacteristically) succinctly by Fidel Castro himself, the United States "will not be able to hurt us, if all of Latin America is in flames."[19]

There was also an element of caution, as Cuba kept one eye on its own security and tried to prevent the worst international backlash.[20] The Castro regime was careful to offer only rhetorical support but never material support or training to anti-government groups within the United States itself. As a CIA report noted in 1966, "Fidel has stopped short of any actions that might bring him into conflict with the US."[21] Furthermore, the Angolan intervention described below is not the first time at Cuban troops fought side-by-side with foreign rebels (or foreign sympathetic governments). In previous cases, however, a great deal of effort was expended to

[18] See Gleijeses 2002, 97-98.

[19] Ibid, 21.

[20] As Gleijeses puts it "The Cubans, however, were not suicidal" (2002, 98).

[21] From ibid, 97; author draws upon Central Intelligence Agency documents: CIA, ONE, "Castro, Model 1966," Mar. 24, 1966, p. 5, FOIA 1993/2415. See Gleijeses, p. 423 note 100.

disguise Cuba's role. Cubans in Algeria in 1963 wore spare Algerian uniforms, and FAR volunteers who went to train rebels in Congo/Brazzaville, Zaire, and Guinea Bissau were overwhelming drawn from Cuba's black population, which would draw less attention if seen fighting alongside insurgents in those countries.[22] As mentioned above, Che Guevara formally renounced all ties with the Cuban government before his fateful Bolivia mission. Indeed, up until November 1975, Cuba's support of the MPLA in Angola was characterized by the same clandestine approaches that marked Cuba's overall HISS policy.[23] Though not always effective—it was often an open secret among guerrillas that Cubans were in their midst and logistical complications meant that supplies were often seen being unloaded from Cuban ships in major port cities—this kind of caution was a deliberate part of the government's international efforts to fight what it saw as imperialism everywhere.

In addition to the congruency testing of the presence of factors and expected outcomes, then, these accounts confirm that elements of the logic of the Revolutionary Realities theory are evident in the assessment of intelligence agents and, most importantly, top Cuban officials. There was a mix of genuine commitment to political change and keen awareness of security threats and structural limitations on Cuban's options abroad. As Gleijeses notes, documents on many HISS-related activities, such as summaries or transcripts of meetings, are not available and may not exist.[24] Statements from Cuban decision-makers, either from their letters or in

[22] Ibid, 45; 203. Transportation was always a big issue for Cuba, which often relied on commercial airlines to send experts and small bands of forces to far away countries. Despite attempting to arrange separate flights and stagger the arrival of doctors and military advisors in other countries, there were instances in which nearly a dozen identically dressed, black Cuban men carrying identical luggage found themselves, the only non-Caucasians in sight, waiting for the same flight by a gate at an international airport somewhere in Europe and pretending not to know one another at all.

[23] Even as of September of that year, Castro was insistent: "We must avoid at all costs an armed clash with the Portuguese" (Gleijeses 2002, 261).

[24] Ibid, 8-10.

interviews with scholars like Gleijeses who had unprecedented access to post-1959 Cuban archives, are, then, some of the closest and best sources of evidence as to why HISS was adopted and whether it is plausible that some factors drove those decisions. In this crucial case of HISS adoption, it does appear that the factors of international revolutionary ideological content, high barriers to conventional options abroad, and non-institutionalized entry into power created the conditions and motivated actors to support non-state actors around the globe as a central pillar of national foreign policy.

III. The Cuban Angolan Operation: When Barriers to Conventional Operations Fall

The intervention in Angola serves as within-case variation in the Cuban case, and it allows me to focus more closely on the barriers to conventional military operations abroad and precisely what role it had in driving HISS outcomes. With all three Revolutionary Realities factors in place, Cuba adopted HISS in the 1960s. However, I argue that subsequent variation on just one of the three Revolutionary Reality factors, high barriers to conventional war, is associated with a radically different policy choice for Cuba, at least vis-à-vis Angola and the MPLA. Importantly, the government's espoused ideology was still international revolutionary in content, and, though the Cuban regime was more institutionalized than it had been in the 1960s, foreign policy was still handled by a small group decisionmakers as a result of their irregular entry 15 years prior to the Angolan intervention. Due to a number of circumstances, however, the barriers to power projection and major conventional operations in the Angolan theatre dropped precipitously in late 1975. This means that, holding ideology and entry type constant, Cuba employed HISS, rather than conventional warfare, when barriers to such activities were high, but when barriers were low in Angola, Cuba adopted a very different policy. Indeed, it embarked on a military intervention that is, I have argued in Chapter 2, precisely the tool that

HISS is a substitute *for*. Though not a direct test of my theory's claim of causal necessity, the over-time variation within the Cuban case, and in particular with respect to Havana's Angola policy, offers a corroborating piece of evidence that supports the Revolutionary Reality's account of HISS and the role of high barriers to offensive conventional operations in it.

In the following section, I first describe how the barriers to conventional operations were, in the Angolan case, significantly lower than they were for Cuba against most of its adversaries in most other contexts. Importantly, Cuban leadership also saw the conflict as an opportunity not just to fight in another country but rather to challenge global imperialism, which they perceived as the hand behind South Africa's October 1975 invasion of Angola, Operation Savannah. I also emphasize that it was the Cuban government, rather than the USSR, that was most interested in and committed to military action in Angola when it came to the crucial move to intervene in November 1975. Though this assertion was once contested, and even outright disbelieved among US policymakers, subsequent evidence has proven that Havana, not Moscow, was the driving force behind operations with the MPLA in Angola. The structure presented Havana with an opportunity, and they both recognized it as such and seized it of their own accord. I then demonstrate that the other two Revolutionary Realities factors were in place, and draw on a number of primary sources to once again offer a Cuban perspective on the situation.

Lower Barriers to Conventional Operations in Angola

In November 1975, Cuba shocked the world by initiating Operation Carlota, sending tens of thousands of its own armed forces into Angola.[25] Following the withdrawal of Portuguese

[25] One could argue that the first, pattern-breaking intervention for Cuba into a foreign, conventional war was Havana's support for Syria in the 1973 war. In that case, at least 1,000 Cuban soldiers fought, operating Soviet tanks on the battlefield from November 1973 to May 1974 (see Gleijeses 2002, 226). The Angolan case is chosen for examination here because it a) represents a change in policy towards Angola and the MPLA in specific, a group with which Havana had an existing relationship prior to the events of 1975 and b) was all the larger and more

colonial authorities that year, three main armed factions were vying for control of the newly independent state. Two factions, the FNLA and UNITA, were backed by South African and Zairian forces, which in turn were supported by the United States.[26] Cuba's intervention was on behalf of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the more left-leaning of the competing forces, and it took the form of a large-scale, conventional military operation against the 'imperialist' forces in southern Africa. By some estimates, around 35,000 Cuban troops were in Angola by the close of 1976.[27] Cuban troops likely turned the tide of the war against the South African forces, forestalling a quick victory over the MPLA and perhaps, thereby, contributing to the form the conflict ultimately took: a highly internationalized civil that lasted decades.[28] Further details are not necessary to draw the conclusion that this was decidedly a departure from the kind of sub-conventional tools that HISS represents and a huge shift in Cuba's involvement abroad.

Though Cuba could have continued to supply the MPLA with weapons, training, provisions, and medical care, they instead pursued a policy of outright conventional military intervention in a foreign war. This is because the Angolan intervention took place when a number of factors converged to make conventional military operations in an African theater a possibility. They could be done with acceptable risk, cost, and with a reasonable chance of being militarily effective against their enemies. Cuba had managed to break out of its mid-1960s

spectacular. Many of the same arguments regarding the lower barriers to conventional operations (Soviets once again supplied the tanks that the Cuban battalions operated) shed light on the Syrian intervention as well.

[26] Regular South African forces became involved directly in the conflict in large numbers in October of 1975. The Angolan civil war is a complex and lengthy affair, so I here focus exclusively on Cuba's role and Cuba's view of the conflict.

[27] Stephen Weigert. 2011. *Angola: A Modern Military History, 1961-2002.* New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

[28] Gleijeses 2002, 311-327.

isolation. Economically, it was included in CEMA/COMECON as of 1972.[29] Its relations with Soviet Union had returned to cordial following a dramatic falling-out in 1968. A number of Latin American states, including Mexico, Peru, and Chile, had also initiated relations with Cuba in the wake of the breakdown of the Organization of American States (OAS) sanctions regime initiated by the US in 1962.

In terms of US-Cuba antagonism, the election in the United States of Jimmy Carter, a president intent on pursuing détente overall and perhaps even interested in improving relations with Cuba significantly reduced the immediate threat of invasion of the island nation. Also, the Cold War fatigue in the American public in the aftermath of the Vietnam War meant that, on the domestic level, the United States was unlikely to be able to make a full-out conventional military assault against the *fidelistas* in Cuba. Furthermore, Cuba had received a steady flow of free Soviet arms over the past decade, bolstering the nation's defense and overall capabilities.[30] The professionalization of the Cuban military was also progressing, and, facing an objectively smaller risk of invasion, the increasingly skilled force began to be available for other tasks.

Geography, however, remained a key barrier to any Cuban major overseas military operations. Cuba had sent its own troops abroad before, to Syria in 1973, and, in much smaller numbers, to several other countries throughout the 1960s. However, in each case, there were far fewer troops than in the Angolan intervention, and the heaviest equipment they transported themselves were a handful of smaller artillery units.[31] Cuba, an island nation, simply did not have the capacity to project many of their forces very far abroad. To conduct conventional

[29] See Edward Hewett. 1979. "Cuba's Membership in the CMEA." In Weinstein (Ed.) *Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena*, Philadelphia: Institution of the Study of Human Issues, 51-76.

[30] Levesque 1978, 95.

[31] Erisman 2003, 70.

operations on a large scale in an African theater, especially ground operations with heavy artillery and armor, would have required a much greater transport capacity than the FAR had at its disposal.

Cuban military exploits in Angola, then, were possible because of generous Soviet support for Havana since the revolution and Moscow's willingness to go along with the specific Angola mission in 1975. The vast majority of the weapons and hardware in the Angolan theatre had been delivered by Soviets over the course of the previous months, despite the fact that the MPLA forces did not know how to use much of the equipment.[32] The Cuban forces employed these weapons, rather than attempting to ship their own supplies from home. This meant that not only did Cuba not need to move thousands of tons of matériel, but it did not have to manufacture equipment or take away any such resources from its own defensive forces at home. The USSR also provided a portion of the logistics necessary to transport the large numbers of Cuban troops to the African theatre.[33] Indeed, having an ally proved to be a powerful military asset in Cuba's ability to project forces, and this aid and coordination made it possible for major Cuban-directed conventional operations to take place 7,000 miles away from the island.

With Soviet weaponry and its own competent military, Cuba also stood a much better chance against the combatants in the Angolan Civil War in 1975 than they did in 1960 against the "monopolist" countries themselves. Initially, Cuba's primary target in the conflict was the South African Defense Force (SADF), whose offensive in October threatened to wipe out the

[32] Gleijeses 2002, 366

[33] The first few thousand Cuban troops did arrive in Angola via Cuban-owned transports, but Havana sought aid on this from Moscow. By the end of 1975, Soviet transports were employed (Domínguez 1989, 157-158). Gleijeses has a different perspective, and his analysis suggests that Moscow dragged its feet, and that the Cubans may even have been able to transport all of their troops without much Soviet assistance (365-372). In any event, however, Cuba could neither afford nor transport as much materiel as its 35,000-40,000 troops would have needed, and Soviet support was available with little hesitation after about February 1976.

Cuban's MPLA allies. Other forces arrayed against the MPLA included the FLNA and UNITA, the former of which was already receiving US weapons via Mobutu Sese Seko's government in Zaire and the latter of which was receiving training from the CIA.[34] Though these groups were backed by the United States and a number of other powers, Cuban forces were able to match them. Indeed, after Cuban launched its intervention, the combined MPLA and FAR forces won a few swift and important victories that helped the MPLA maintain its control of the capital, Luanda.[35] The difference in material capabilities between the Cuban forces and their enemies was no longer laughable as this barrier, too, proved to be much lower for Cuba in the Angolan conflict than in the past or in other arenas.

Fighting in sub-Saharan Africa was also way of circumventing the final barrier to conventional operations abroad, the nuclear barrier. Cuban military forces could directly clash with opponents who were well-known to be backed by nuclear powers but with a much lower risk of touching off a nuclear conflagration.[36] Nuclear weapons in the United States homeland were simply not likely to be employed in this distant skirmish, no matter how much Kissinger lamented that US global credibility was on the line.[37]

Thus Angola intervention was possible because a number of barriers to conventional war were much lower for a USSR-supported Cuba to fight in this African theatre. The proxy-war struggle against the US and other Western backers of the anti-MPLA forces made it possible for Cuba to overcome the US nuclear threat. The power disparity was somewhat decreased thanks to Soviet weaponry and Cuba's own professionalization efforts. Also, because it was a proxy

[34] See Gleijeses 2002.

[35] Erisman 1985, 70-71.

[36] This is the stability-instability paradox at work (Snyder 1965, Jervis 1984; Krepon 2003; Rauchhaus 2009).

[37] See Gleijeses 2002, 354-358.

conflict, the sponsors of the anti-MPLA forces were *not* actually US or French troops. The SADF troops that the FAR did face directly were much more on par with Cuban material capabilities; indeed, Cuba proved to have an edge overall and certainly were effective in combat.[38] Soviet largesse once against helped Cuba to overcome the geographic barriers to waging conventional conflict.

To be sure, the circumstances surrounding the Angolan intervention were very specific; barriers in general or directly against the United States did not disappear. Rather, it was a unique opportunity that, due in large part to Soviet aid, removed the barriers to large scale conventional operations. This is perhaps driven home most by the fact that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuban operations in the African theatre withered to almost nothing. After 1991, the island nation was unable to pull off anything like Angola again.

Cuban Agency

Cuba's choice to send its troops to Angola was an active, conscious policy choice made by Havana. The intervention was contemporaneously viewed by some as an instance in which Moscow exploited its Cuban allies and leaned on Castro to provide troops for a USSR-led intervention.[39] Subsequent accounts and historical research have revealed that the opposite was the case: Cuba was deeply interested in the Angolan intervention and took the lead, requesting the materials and aid from the Soviets as outlined above.[40] One Soviet official, when asked how the USSR had managed to convince Cuba to provide troops for Angola, laughed and said that,

[38] Ibid.

[39] An initial explanation for Cuban intervention was Soviet pressure. Subsequent research has led a number of scholars and historians to conclude that Cuba was initially more committed to the Angolan venture than the USSR, once again rendering the "Castro-is-a-Soviet-puppet" false. See Domínguez 1989, Domínguez 1978, Domínguez 1979, Erisman 1985; Levesque 1978; Lowenthal 1979.

[40] This is one of the primary conclusions of Gleijeses, who had access to new primary documentation and archive material from Cuba and the United States.

"the idea for the large-scale military operation had originated in Havana, not Moscow."[41] The Non-Aligned Movement broadly supported the Cuban actions in Angola on the basis of the fact that Cuba was indeed acting independently.[42] Also, in a think piece entitled, "Why Cuba is In Angola (and What's Next)," Abraham Lowenthal, a scholar and area expert notes that, "Most commentators were attributing the Cuban move either to bald Soviet imposition or a reversion by Cuba to the erratic romanticism of the Che Guevara period."[43] However, he concludes that, "Whatever the pressures and cross-pressures, it has become increasingly evident that Cuba's own perceptions and stakes…bear very importantly on Cuba's foreign policy decisions."[44] In his piece, Lownethal thinks through the Angolan intervention from Cuba's perspective and concludes that, in the eyes of their leadership, "Cuba ha[d] a rare opportunity to pursue most of its foreign policy objectives simultaneously."[45]

These conclusions are supported by contemporaneous documentation. For example, a Cuban memo from the FAR's own archives dated January 1976 details a conversation between the Soviet Ambassador and FAR military officials in which Cuban forces asked for Soviet assistance in arranging transportation of personnel and equipment to the Angolan theater.[46] The Cuban official's commentary is particularly telling. In response to the Soviet Ambassador's

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[41] Domínguez 1989, 157-159. See also Gleijeses 2002, 307, where the author notes that Soviet sources corroborate the history on Castro's initiative in the Angolan affair.

[42] Roy Allison. 1988. *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 71.

[43] Lowenthal in Weinstein, ed. 99.

[44] Ibid 100.

[45] Ibid 102. In the original piece, Lowenthal imagines that the intervention will take place at little cost, but in preparing the document for release in the Weinstein edited volume, he amends this, noting that Cuba shows itself willing to pay considerable costs in African interventions; he cites both Angola and the Ethiopian operations that began in 1977 as evidence that cost was likely less relevant than opportunity in Cuba's Africa policy.

[46] From Gleijeses 2002, drawing on January 6, 1976, Memorandum from Cuban Army, "Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador." (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR.) English translation available http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/ See Kornbluh (Ed.) 2002.

offer of ten charter flights to transport Cubans to Angola, the FAR author of the memo wrote, "I told [the Ambassador] that this was very good news for us, especially in light of the United States pressuring many governments not to let us use their airports."[47] This language makes it fairly clear that the Cubans were not being forced into activities in Angola but were rather calling on resources from allies abroad to pursue its own, independent policy. Additionally, sufficient Soviet archive material has been released that the narrative of Havana taking the lead is widely accepted. As one Soviet official put it simply, "Castro acted without prior consultation with Moscow."[48]

From HISSing to Scratching: Cuban Perspectives on the Angolan Situation

Thus Cuba abandoned a covert, sub-conventional sponsorship relationship with the MPLA in favor of a conventional military intervention on behalf of its rebel allies using its own national troops. In this section, I show that the other two factors in my theory were also present *and* that Cuban leadership saw the conflict in Angola not as an important national security threat but rather as an opportunity to pursue its ideologically-oriented foreign policy goals. This means that in the absence of only one factor, the high barriers to conventional military operations against foes abroad, HISS was not the chosen policy. Instead, Cuba pursued its activist, internationalist foreign policy targeting status quo powers using its own military. This supports the overall contention that HISS is adopted as a response to states facing a particular set of Revolutionary Realities.

Prior to the full-scale intervention seen in the fall of 1975, Cuba was supporting the MPLA as part of its HISS policy. An internal memo from 1972, from Commander Manuel

[47] Ibid.

[48] Gleijeses 2002, 307.

Piñeiro Lozada to Raúl Castro outlines the efforts by Cuban representatives of "getting to know the revolutionary movements in [Angola and Mozambique]."[49] Though the short-term purpose of the relations in early 1972 was to provide more targeted aid and learn more about the political and military situation in the region, discussion of the broader purpose of these efforts uses language that perfectly captures the "revolutionary" and "realities" elements of support for non-state actors by Cuba at the time. The memo is thus worth quoting at length:

> "I don't consider it necessary to delineate the strategic importance of these countries, it takes only pointing out that a change in the course of events of the wars that are developing in both countries could signify a change in all the forces in the African continent. For the first time two independent countries in Africa from which a bigger war could be waged would have common borders with the region with the principle investment and the strongest political-military knot of Imperialism in Africa exist: South Africa, Rhodesia, Zaire, and the Portuguese colonies."[50]

The memo goes on to detail the steps that the Vice Minister of the Interior thought best to proceed along, including recommending that Cubans visit the guerrilla camps, learn more about the terrain and conflict, and also, likely for their own propaganda purposes, "shoot a film." Provisions for safe passage of Cubans is discussed, as well as concrete details of the requests for training and arms from the MPLA, which Commander Manuel Piñeiro Losada passes along to Raúl Castro, for him to make a decision regarding next steps in the relationship. The letter paints a picture of strategic and at times almost dull conduct of affairs when it comes to sponsoring a non-state actor that could potentially be a huge benefit in waging that "bigger war" against "the strongest political-military know of Imperialism in Africa." This account outlines the strategic

[49] In Gleijeses 2002. November 22, 1972, Memorandum, "The Shipment of Comrades to Angola and Mozambique," From Major Manuel Piñeiro Lozada to Major Raúl Castro Ruz. (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR Available http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/.

[50] Ibid, English translation

considerations behind a sponsorship relationship that can only be understood with reference to the Cuba's ideologically-inspired foreign policy goals. The pre-1975 support for the MPLA was classic HISS, with a view towards engaging in a larger, and perhaps conventional, war in the future against adversaries defined by the international revolutionary ideology.

When Cuba did intervene using a conventional military option, its activity in Angola was clearly in pursuit of the same ends, even as a different tool (conventional operations against enemies abroad) became available to Havana. In a strict, national security sense, Cubans interests were not at stake in a former Portuguese colony 7,000 miles from Havana. Rather, it was another opportunity to engage in that 'bigger and wider war.' A 1976 Castro speech declared that, "The victory in Angola is the twin sister of the victory at Girón…Angola represents an African Girón."[51] Certainly the action was hailed in the Non-Aligned Movement for, "Frustrating the expansionist and colonialist strategy of South Africa's racist regime and its allies."[52] In addition to whatever material or diplomatic benefits Cuba might have gained for its activities abroad (Cuba was named the head of the NAM in the late 1970s), there was an ideologically-driven purpose to the mission.[53]

Internal documents between Raúl Díaz Arguelles and Raúl Castro reveal that Cuba considered intervention in Angola for the same reasons Castro has expressed in speeches for supporting non-state actors. Indeed, it appears that the very war that the Cubans expected in 1972 was flaring up. After a 1975 meeting with Angolan President Agostinho Neto (also a top MPLA leader), Díaz (Arguelles) noted that,

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[51] Cited in Eckstein 2003, 187.

[52] Cited in Erisman 1985, 76.

[53] Harmer 2013; Eckstein 2003, 1988. Eckstein adds, however, that Cuba would probably have been far better off, especially economically, had it worked to negotiate an end to the US embargo, stating that Cuba's Africa policy makes no sense *absent* ideological motives. 197-200.

> "In general, [Neto] wants to make the situation in Angola a vital issue between the systems of Imperialism and Socialism in order to obtain aid from the whole Socialist Camp. We consider that he is right on this issue since at this point in Angola the sides are clearly defined, the FNLA and UNITA represent the international Imperialist forces and the Portuguese reaction, and the MPLA represents the progressive and nationalist forces."[54]

The letter further concludes that Neto has "the strong support of the people" and that Cuba "must help them directly or indirectly to solve this situation which definitely entails having the people resist against the reactionaries and international imperialists." This shows that Cuban leadership saw FAR activities in Angola in the same global, ideological terms as their involvement with HISS in the 1960s.

Furthermore, Cuban assistance was explicitly rendered on these same terms. This same letter adds that Díaz Arguelles reassured the MPLA "that we knew that the reactionaries and the imperialists would try all possible methods to avoid having the forces of the MPLA take power, since this would mean having a progressive government in Angola." It was, then "based on this situation we brought militant solidarity from the Commander in Chief, our party and government." The 'militant solidarity' line is quite telling. That Cuban officials chose to use this term to account for the purpose of their moves in Angola suggests once again that Havana was interested in and, indeed, eager to use their military apparatus as a part of their foreign policy, the goals of which are sketched out in ideological terms. Furthermore, the timeline of the Cuban intervention in Angola suggests that it followed the South African regular forces' invasion of the country. According to conversation with a US Senator later on, Castro stated that he saw the US's hand in South Africa's aggressive military move, as he did not believe that South Africa "so cautious on such matters, would have sent forces without the complicity of

[54] "Report on Visit to Angola" Letter to the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces from the Head of the Tenth Direction, August 11, 1975. Available: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67. See also Gleijeses 2002.

Kissinger."[55] This means that intervention in Angola with the Cuban national military was an action taken against these imperialist states.

It is also worth noting that the leadership of the armed forces was a key leader from the 1959 transition, in which the institutions of foreign policy creation and executed were formed. Raúl Castro was Minister of the Armed Forces almost before Batista got on his plane on January 1st, 1958, and Fidel's brother held that position until 2008. Thus, as suggested by the non-institutionalized entry mechanism, a key tool for the execution of foreign policy—in this case the military—was under the control and direction of an ideologue and one of Fidel's great confidantes.[56] Coupled with the high level of ideological commitment among members of the FAR to begin with, this made for little resistance to the policy from this important domestic institution.[57]

Indeed, Gleijeses' research and interviews with other Cuban officials about the choice to abandon sponsorship and intervene directly in Angola leads him to the conclusion that, "The decision was made…by Fidel Castro without consultation with the political bureau and probably after speaking with his closest advisers, particularly his brother Raúl."[58] Thus, the ideology of the regime was still highly international revolutionary, and the foreign policy apparatus set up in the 1960s was still operable and still largely in the hands of a small group of top *fidelistas*.

[55] Gleijeses 2002, 306. Interestingly, this logic is precisely the same as that which led the US leadership to assume that the USSR had directed Cuba's own operations in Africa – Havana would never make such a big move without Moscow's support and authorization.

[56] Additionally, though this has not been under much discussion in the dissertation so far, the militaries in many of the countries under consideration in this research were more ideological than the general populace *and* the bureaucracy. Perhaps this is another reason why the military apparatus would be a first-choice tool for some of these regimes, at least after a certain level of control had been established.

[57] Eckstein 2003, 187-188.

[58] Gleijeses 2002, 306.

Indeed, Fidel Castro was deeply involved at the operational level of Angolan affairs, and Raúl Castro had official control of the Cuban military forces that executed the intervention.

This means that only one of the necessary conditions for HISS in the RR theory fell away in the Angolan intervention, and Cuba used a different foreign policy tool in response. Cuba no longer needed to rely on sub-conventional tools and could, in fact, employ its own military arm. Cuba's policy here is consistent with the Revolutionary Realities theory, and the logic that links high barriers to conventional operations abroad to HISS outcomes. Not only did Cuba stop providing clandestine support to the MPLA when these barriers were lowered, in the presence of the other two factors, it *did* adopt the conventional option that those barriers were theoretically preventing the state from pursuing. Though this does not prove that Cuba would have chosen to employ its military in the 1960s in support of liberation struggles around the world, but it does suggest that HISS is a policy option chosen partially in light of the fact that the barriers to such activities are high. This supports the overall Revolutionary Realities theory that three necessary conditions interact to drive HISS outcomes, and that one of those necessary conditions is structural limitations on the state's ability to use its conventional forces in conflicts abroad.

IV. Conclusion: HISS as International Relations

This chapter has clearly demonstrated that Cuba's initial choice to adopt a HISS policy in the 1960s is well accounted for by the Revolutionary Realities theory. Congruency testing of this critical case and additional evidence of the motivation and perspectives of Cuban officials confirm the theory and support this dissertation's central hypothesis. I also made an effort to highlight the importance of the third factor that has not yet been examined closely in case studies, the most 'realities' oriented portion of Revolutionary Realities. From efforts to maintain plausible deniability to the belief that the United States would be distracted if "all of Latin

America is in flames," it does appear that structural limitations to the pursuit of conventional war against its chief adversary was central to Cuba's HISS adoption choice.

The chapter then drew on over-time variation within the Cuba case with respect to one other county and non-state actor, the MPLA in Angola, to further examine my argument regarding the necessity of the barriers to conventional war abroad condition. The change in policy towards Angola does coincide with lower barriers to conventional operations, while the other two factors remained in place. Simplistically, when this one factor went away, HISS was no longer the policy of choice: prima facie evidence for necessity. Slightly less simplistically and even more supportive of my theorized mechanism linking barriers and HISS outcomes, when barriers to conventional operations fell away, HISS was not pursued but a conventional operation was. Finally, I offered Cuban perspectives on the conflict, which demonstrated that its view of the meaning and purpose of its aid to the MPLA had not changed –the tool Cuba used to pursue its policy changed only in conjunction with the lowering of conventional barriers.

It is also worth noting that the Angolan intervention is highly *inconsistent* with competing general views of sponsorship in comparative revolutions literatures or international relations literatures. In alternative accounts, states either a) indiscriminately seek to foment revolution everywhere, regardless of risk or reward or b) would not use their militaries for anything not directly related to their own security.[59] In neither case does the policy change in Angola make sense. As my theory expects, Cuba adopted HISS when its leadership entered power through non-institutionalized paths, embraced an international revolutionary ideology, and

[59] Consider again the two types of revolutionaries in Sadri's account: the radical and the pragmatist. It is not clear that the Angolan intervention fits into either category, as a radical would not have waited for an ideal opportunity and coordinated with Soviets and a pragmatist would likely not have intervened for such a highly ideological motive, or even it did, certainly not on such a massive scale. Sadri himself does not offer much of an account of this move of Cuba's, despite this being one of his title cases.

faced high barriers to conventional operations abroad against its most significant adversary. Yet in 1975 Angola, when the barriers to conventional military operations abroad were much lower, Cuba did not rely on the non-state actor substitute to apply force abroad but could, instead, send its own national military. Thus, my theory can shed light on the Angolan intervention that shocked the world.

One of the central theoretical claims of this research is that high-intensity state sponsorship of foreign non-state actors is a policy used when states wish to pursue the kind of "wider and bigger war" throughout the world that Castro describes in the opening quotation of this chapter, but do not have an offensive conventional military option for doing so. When rational evaluation means that pursuing their global agenda using traditional weapons of war is impossible or deeply unwise, states instead support the activities of non-state actors far and wide. States tend to follow certain patterns that limit and hide their involvement in any given conflict, perhaps by offering only technical advisors or weapons, and above all keeping the government commitments below the level of actually fighting, in their own national uniforms, on the ground in large-scale operations with the supported group. The Cuban case presents a good opportunity to examine changing barriers and the results support this logic overall, even if it cannot present as controlled a test as I was able to on ideology in the previous chapter. For the empirically-minded political scientist, the Real World can be stingy with cases.

This chapter therefore also paves the way to Part IV, the "Extensions and Limitations" portion of the dissertation. To be clear, everything I have presented here is more consistent with my account than alternative accounts, and I do not see disconfirmatory evidence that contradicts my theoretical account about high barriers driving HISS adoption in the first place. HISS certainly appears in the Cuban case to be a substitute for conventional military operations abroad

and awareness of the barriers to such a policy seemed to drive choices both to adopt HISS and then to adopt a different policy in Angola when those barriers changed value. While I maintain that these barriers are a necessary condition, I have not pursued a thorough counter-factual study in this chapter. This is primarily because I am skeptical that a meaningful and sufficiently complete counterfactual can be conceived of in this case. What I truly have examined, then, is change in a policy over time, which is *not* something that my theory explicitly addresses. While it is consistent with my theory's account that, when the value of the barriers variable changes, the policy would also change, the Revolutionary Realities account is truly a theory of policy adoption.

The K-*adic Dynamics of National Foreign Policies*

This chapter also points up to tensions in the directionality of HISS in this research's conceptualization. HISS is a tool adopted by a state to pursue its foreign policy in general terms, making it appear unidirectional. It flows from the state to the rest of the world. In fact, I believe that HISS is more properly conceived of as *k*-adic, the result of an accumulation of myriad dyadic (or triadic) relationships. These relations may be a smaller or larger subset of the state's complete relations with foreign political entities (thus *k*-adic, instead of *n*-adic). Entry type and ideology are features of a single state and regime. However, barriers to conventional war abroad must be understood in terms of the state's structural position in the international system vis à vis some other state or states.

In this chapter, I have argued that HISS was adopted when Cuba faced "high barriers to conventional war abroad", but changes to Cuba's Angola policy over time shows that these barriers are neither universal nor constant. This suggest that, when the ideological and entry factors are in place, HISS is adopted when the state in question is faced with high barriers in

enough potential conflict dyads in which it actually wants to pursue conflict (i.e., the rivals and material capabilities accounts of sponsorship kick in.) The theory's framework can help to predict which dyads might be involved, but it does not fully account for all of the dyadic relations nor the content of all of those relations. Yet, it is still possible and accurate to claim that a country pursued a HISS policy, simply on the basis of knowing about a subset of those relations. Put differently, though I wrote of Cuba "abandoning HISS" in Angola, definitionally, Cuba could not "abandon HISS in Angola" because Cuba-MPLA is a dyad (or Cuba-MPLA-Angola is a triad), and HISS is not a dyadic policy. I have emphasized the state-centricity of the policy in this research and that is not wrong, but deeper examination shows that HISS is not wholly unidirectional.

Additional theoretical development of the conceptualization of HISS is warranted, but this insight does have one particular implication that has already been revealed in this chapter. Even though HISS is adopted when states face high barriers to conventional operations abroad overall, the RR theory actually does not predict that countries will never use their conventional militaries in foreign conflicts. Quite the opposite, in fact. Chapter 2 made HISS appear to be the only option for a state with certain ambitions in a relatively disadvantaged international structural position. However, the Angolan case should be the rule, not the exception: we should expect states that have already adopted HISS to be more involved in international conflicts with their militaries. Acutely aware of barriers, these states should be expected to notice when they fall. They adopted HISS when few options were available, so when another is available, they should abandon the substitute and use their own militaries. If states can battle with the enemy directly, they will not rely on the substitute in that particular dyadic context, even if they have adopted HISS as a policy to engage with global rivals more generally, or on the *k*-adic level.

This is one extension to the Revolutionary Realities theory that this research offers. Others will follow in Part IV.

Part IV: Extensions and Limitations

Chapter 9: HISS Miss:
Nicaragua and the Non-Adoption of Sponsorship under the Sandinistas

> "It is possible to behave in an intelligent manner and still be true to one's principles. It is also possible to be true to one's principles and behave stupidly."
>
> - Tomás Borge, FSLN National Directorate
> October 10, 1980[1]

I. Introduction

The previous three chapters have shown that a number of cases of HISS adoption and non-adoption were consistent with the expectations of the Revolutionary Reality theory. Each chapter has also focused on one of the three factors which I argue are jointly necessary for the adoption of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors across time and space. Most recently, an analysis of Cuban foreign policy in the 1960s demonstrated that high barriers to offensive conventional operations makes HISS the best armed option for states seeking to pursue activist, internationalist, anti-status quo foreign policies. Previous chapters have demonstrated that while the content of the ideology embraced by the state matters a great deal, non-institutionalized entry (coups, revolutions, civil wars) of all stripes can foster the domestic political processes that lead to HISS adoption. In all of these cases, the evidence was supportive of different aspects of my theory's causal operations. Also, in each case, adoption took place

[1] From "Address to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights," in Bruce Marcus (Ed.) 1982. *Sandinistas Speak*. New York: Pathfinder, 100. This is a collection of speeches and documents from leading Sandinista figures, such as Daniel Ortega, Carlos Fonseca, and Tomás Borge. Hereafter, *Sandinistas Speak*, the original author or speaker, and the page number are noted.

when all three of the Revolutionary Realities factors were present and failed to take place when any one was absent.

This research now turns to exploring limitations of the existing theory and extensions to consider for future research. This chapter in particular explores a case of HISS *non*-adoption in Latin America—Nicaragua—that my theory inaccurately predicts. This case was chosen because the quantitative analysis suggested that Nicaragua, among other Latin American countries, had high values on all three factors in the Revolutionary Realities theory. The analysis in this chapter confirms this in the Nicaraguan case. It also confirms the finding from Chapter 3 that Nicaragua did not adopt HISS, despite the presence of these factors. This was one of the few outlier Latin American cases in which the regime was in power long enough to provide a true test case. Though they eventually were ousted from power in 1990 by national elections in which US interference loomed large, the Sandinistas (Sandinista Front for National Liberation or FSLN) were in power for an entire decade. This means that the Sandinistas theoretically had the time to implement a HISS policy had they chosen to do so. They did not.

This chapter examines this deviant case and offers an account for why Nicaragua did not adopt HISS, following the path that Cuba, another small Latin American nation, had lain down two decades before. All three factors, international revolutionary ideology, ascension to power via non-institutionalized means, and nearly monumental barriers to offensive war, were in place in Nicaragua's case. Indeed, Managua did offer broad rhetorical support to national liberation movements and, during 1980 and early 1981, it delivered significant material supplies to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a leftist anti-government group in neighboring El Salvador. However, Nicaragua never adopted HISS, and an examination of the causal mechanisms shows that the process of HISS adoption was somewhat short-circuited by a

number of FSLN choices. This prevented the theorized mutually-reinforcing dynamics from accelerating the state towards HISS.

Why this outcome? I argue that though the Sandinistas may have wanted to pursue a more activist, internationalist policy, they lacked the foreign policy independency to do so. HISS in particular would have had profound negative effects for the government and the state due to the very real risk of military invasion from the United States. Managua's alleged support for guerrillas served as the primary justification for the United States' opposition to the regime and Washington's support for the ARDE or the contra forces. These armed combatants posed a major threat to the stability of FSLN rule in Nicaragua. Support for non-state actors abroad may even have provided sufficient grounds, in the eyes of the American government, for a US invasion of Nicaragua's territory. Just as the high barriers to conventional operations abroad took the use of Nicaragua's own national armed forces off the table, I argue that the threat of US interference and military retaliation took HISS off the table as well. Wary of US interference in Nicaragua from even before the success of their insurrection, the Sandinistas made a realistic evaluation of their policy options and likely came to see that the pursuit of HISS would have enormously exacerbated tensions and threatened the very survival of the regime and integrity of the state.[2] To be sure, this was a structural reality facing the new revolutionary government, but it is not reducible to a barrier to conventional military operations abroad and this therefore a feature of the international security content that is above and beyond what Chapter 2 considered.

[2] The goals of the regime and of the state are not always aligned: for example, many regimes engage in coup-proofing to minimize the risk of domestic-led regime change while sacrificing overall national military effectiveness in the face of foreign attacks (see Quinlivan 1999, Belkin and Schofer 2005, Pilster and Böhmelt 2011). In this particular instance, though, what is good for the regime is good for the state – no US military-imposed regime change. I therefore continue to treat Nicaragua and the FSLN as having a unified view of the threat from Washington.

Examining Nicaragua thereby sheds light on some of the theory's limitations and hidden assumptions. The powerful security concerns of the FSLN trumped the combination mutually-reinforcing factors that lead to HISS adoption. The FSLN chose non-adoption, tamping down on the processes that led to HISS in other cases. This undermines claims of sufficiency, though Revolutionary Realities theory may still correctly articulate the necessary conditions for HISS. One explanation that I explore is that my theory makes a non-trivial assumption that has hitherto been unexplored: states are assumed to have some fairly high level of de facto foreign policy independence. In this case, Nicaragua lacked this independence. The state's already limited options for engaging in any kind of global policy were further curtailed by this external factor and, as I will show in section three below, the Sandinistas ultimately shut down the primary sponsorship link they had and abandoned practically all existing ties with rebels abroad. This insight further suggests that similar processes may be able to account for why other leftist governments in Latin America that were theoretically poised to adopt HISS based on results in Chapter 3 ultimately did not do so. It is possible that the Revolutionary Realities does rely on an assumption of de facto foreign policy independence and, as in Nicaragua, that assumption was violated.

In the next section, I will demonstrate that all three causal factors were present for Nicaragua under the Sandinistas post-1979. It ultimately had an ideologically-inspired preference and the domestic political capacity to implement its chosen foreign policy with no conventional military option for international global activism. Indeed, evidence from the country's support for the FMLN, suggests that some of the Revolutionary Realities logics were at work in Managua's single sponsorship relationship. However, contrary to the expectations of my theory, as the SPFS dataset and other sources show, it never adopted a HISS policy. Section

three goes on to provide case study evidence in support of my account of non-adoption of HISS in Sandinista Nicaragua. In short, I argue that the threat of greater US interference or military action in Nicaragua stopped the Sandinista regime from expanding their sponsorship program to HISS levels. Using evidence from both secondary, historical accounts and a number of primary sources, I am able to make a compelling case that the FSLN chose not to adopt HISS due to the perception that such a policy would expose Nicaragua to escalating US-backed harassment and perhaps a regime-changing invasion. In fact, I draw on over-time variation in Nicaragua's sponsorship of the FMLN to demonstrate that support for non-state actors abroad changed based on Washington's activities and was actively curtailed as a result of concerns over US retaliation. The final section concludes, reflecting further on the possibility of a hidden assumption of de facto foreign policy independence in the Revolutionary Realities theory, as well as other extensions and limitations to my account.

II. Revolutionary Realities Conditions and HISS Outcome

Though all three necessary conditions from the Revolutionary Realities theory were present in the Nicaraguan case, HISS was not adopted. In this section, I lay out the evidence for the congruency test and demonstrate the incongruity between my expectations, according to the stronger, sufficiency-conditions version of the theory, and the actual outcome. I do note in this section some differences in the factors of ideology and entry type between this case and the ideal-typical cases in previous chapters. There is, for example, more ideological plurality in the FSLN's worldview, and there is also more room for dissent and diversity of opinions among decision-makers in Sandinista-era Nicaragua, even though the regime entered power through non-institutionalized means. I could, perhaps, argue that these values are therefore "too low" and the Revolutionary Realities theory correctly predicts the non-adoption of HISS in this case.

However, this approach seems too shallow and places arbitrary thresholds on variables I have been treating as binaries (present or not present) in the research. In binary terms, the factors are definitely present. Further, a "values not high enough" argument denies the researcher the opportunity to learn from missed cases such as this. I do, however, note the variation away from the ideal-typical cases in ideology and some of the aspects of the FSLN's post-entry institution building.

HISS Non-Adoption

Nicaragua did not adopt a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors during the Sandinistas' time in power. From 1979-1990, the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset shows that Nicaragua supported one group, the FMLN, in El Salvador. The government also maintained and formalized relations with the PLO, which had trained some FSLN soldiers in the late 1960s.[3] This means that Nicaragua fails on both the quantity and the geography criteria. Though the FMLN was designated an HPTG based on the Global Terrorism Database, because it was the only group Nicaragua sponsored, this is pattern does not meet the criteria of HISS.

Indeed, as the case study below will describe in more detail, the evidence suggests that the SPFS data might be over-estimating the duration of the connection between Nicaragua and the non-state actor in El Salvador. To start, the MSA data finds that Managua only maintained the connection from 1979-1986. The International Court of Justice found in 1985 that 'substantial' support from the government in Nicaragua, at least in terms of arms trafficking, took place only from 1979-1981. At the end of 1983, the Sandinista government made another strong push to sever all political ties to the FMLN. Evidence for support in the late 1980s, then,

[3] Vanderlaan 1986, 314.

is scant and somewhat contested. Regardless of the timing, however, there is nothing in the SPFS data or in other secondary or primary accounts of the period that show Nicaragua's sponsorship pattern met all three HISS criteria at any point in the nation's history.

Condition 1: International Revolutionary Ideology

Notably, the three definitional criteria of an international revolutionary ideology can be found in the FSLN's guiding works and statements from party leaders. The Sandinista party was inspired by the Cuban revolution, in both a theoretical and a literal sense. The 1959 overthrow of Batista engendered great enthusiasm about, and belief in the prospects for, political change in Nicaragua. The FSLN also admired Che Guevara, and seconded his call in 1966 for "Two, three, many Vietnams!"[4] The same international moral application, emphasis on action, and historical worldview and dedication to progress can be found.

Sandinismo is widely considered to be influenced by a number of important thinkers and actors, though its chief articulator was Carlos Fonseca.[5] The simplest account of *Sandinismo* is that it combines Marxism with the revolutionary myth of Augusto Sandino, a guerrilla insurgent leader that fought against the US Marine occupation of Nicaragua from 1927-1933.[6] Sandino's anti-imperialist nationalism, his heroic and ultimately successful campaign against American armed forces, and his martyrdom at the hands of the first Somoza dictator all serve to make him a powerful symbol in Nicaraguan history. Marxism-Leninism, however, was just as central to the FSLN's understanding of their country's history, and the Sandinistas envisioned the political

[4] Matilde Zimmerman. 2000. *Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 94.

[5] Dennis Gilbert. 1988. *Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution*. New York: Basil Blackwell, 20.

[6] Donald C. Hodges. 1986. *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution.* Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 196. See also Gilbert 1988, 22; and Matilde Zimmerman. 2000. *Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 6.

solution to global capitalism and imperialism as a series of anti-imperialist, national liberation movements, just as described by Lenin.[7] Though somewhat strategic in its pronouncements pre-insurrection, by March 1982, Sandinista leaders were clearly stating that they were Marxist-Leninist.[8]

International Moral Application

The language of "human rights" and "human dignity" permeates the theoretical works of Carlos Fonseca, other Sandinistas, and Nicaragua's 1987 constitution. The constitution refers to human dignity in ten different places, and it states that Nicaragua "bases its international relationships on friendship, complementarity, and solidarity among the peoples."[9] Tomás Borge further declared that, "The political thrust of this revolution and this government is unshakably and irreversibly in favor of human dignity, of human rights."[10] The "Historic Program of the FSLN" from 1969 also contains broad, moral statements that apply internationally. Articles VI and VII, for example, emphasized political equality between men and women as well as between the Atlantic coast indigenous peoples and all other Nicaraguans.[11] These basic statements regarding human relations and human rights and dignity do not apply to Nicaraguans simply because they are Nicaraguans, but because they are human beings. It therefore has a universal moral component.

[7] Zimmerman 2000, p. 6 notes that Fonseca was engaged explicitly in the application of Marxism to Nicaragua. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of Lenin's understanding of nationalist movements in colonial polities.

[8] Hodges 1986 186; 194. Recall that Castro, too, delayed an outright declaration of ideological affinity for Marxism-Leninism for nearly two years after his movement toppled Batista and seized power.

[9] Article 5. Constitution of Nicaragua 1987. Available: ConstituteProject.org, Oxford University Press.

[10] *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 85.

[11] Ibid, 19.

Fonseca found inspiration in anti-imperialist and revolutionary activities around the world, from Vietnam to Algeria to China, Korea, the Congo and, especially, Cuba.[12] Fonseca also referred to "Latin American humanity" in his praise of Che Guevara's writings and speeches on Marxism.[13] Fonseca vowed in 1969 that the Sandinista oath was to be: "Before the image of Augusto Cesár Sandino and Ernesto Che Guevara; before the memory of the heroes and martyrs of Nicaragua, Latin America, and humanity as a whole, before history: I place my hand on the black and red flag that signifies 'Free Homeland or Death.'"[14] This clearly expands the normative application of this ideology to include not only Nicaragua and Nicaraguans by "humanity as a whole."

The political events in Nicaragua were also explicitly seen as being connected to and a part of an international anti-imperialist movement. Jaime Wheelock, one of the foremost Sandinistas and a National Directorate *comandante*, put it this way: "The Nicaraguan Revolution is not just a Nicaraguan one. It is a revolution made by a people who share the problems of many other people like our own."[15] In even clearer terms, "This is a victory of all the revolutionaries in the world."[16] Indeed, Tomás Borge simply stated, "Our revolution has always been international."[17]

Eschatology and Political Progress

The lessons of history and the prospects for a new political order in the future are deeply important to the FSLN political ideology. Often, the historical view is in reference to Augusto

[12] Zimmerman 2000, 157.

[13] Fonseca 1968 in his "Message to Revolutionary Students." Cited in Zimmerman 2000, 108.

[14] Fonseca in *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 42.

[15] In *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 117.

[16] Ibid, 119.

[17] In *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 132.

Sandino himself. His rebellion, for example, demonstrated the potential efficacy of insurgency against imperialism. The FSLN, founded decades later, assumed responsibility for Sandino's unfinished task; in the FSLN view, Sandino appeared too early in (socialist) history, which was why he could not truly, fully emancipate the Nicaraguan people.[18] As Fonseca put it:

> "The national and international conditions that currently prevail make it possible for at least a sector of the Nicaraguan people to initiate armed struggle, conscious that they are trying not simply to achieve a change of men in power, but a change of the system—the overthrow of the exploiting classes and the victory of the exploited classes."[19]

Historical processes and a new idealized era, free of exploitation, loom large in this narrative.

Other Fonseca writings go into great depth on the historical background of Nicaragua's political situation. Like Castro, Fonseca frequently contextualizes the revolution and his group's movements and efforts as one piece in a global, historical narrative. As he puts it, "the direction of the revolutionary movement was fundamentally toward progress."[20]

> "Our goal is to bring to an end a society divided into exploiters and exploited, a society divided into oppressors and oppressed…National independence and the defeat of foreign imperialism are prerequisites for the building of a new world, one full of happiness. In our search for a new world, we are guided by the noble principles developed by Karl Marx. Modern history demonstrates that the principles of Marxism are the compass that orients the most resolute defenders of the poor, of the abused, of oppressed humanity."[21]

Once again, in speaking of history and the progress of humanity, Fonseca refers not to a new government in Nicaragua but a "new world" in which, instead of exploitation and oppression, there is happiness. He also clearly and explicitly credits Marx and embraces the transnational

[18] This analysis and summary from Zimmerman 143-144.

[19] Fonseca "Nicaragua: Zero Hour" in *Sandinistas Speak 1982*, 29.

[20] Ibid, 35.

[21] Quoted in Zimmerman 2000, 103.

spirit of communism by backing out from the view of Nicaragua and referring to the "oppressed humanity."

This new world of happiness is also one of peace and equality. The Historic Program from 1969 states that, "Together with other peoples of the world it will promote a campaign in favor of authentic universal peace."[22] More recently, in 1981, Tomás Borge put it this way: "We are creating a new society in which an individual is not a piece of merchandise, a society in which there are no wolves and lambs, where men do not live off the exploitation of other men."[23] The Sandinistas declare that they are attempting to bring about this ideal end state of the world order.

Call to Action

Finally, *Sandinismo* does require action in pursuit of this exploitation-free world from its dedicated revolutionaries. Fonseca stated in a 1960 that "legal struggle cannot lead to victory" and, more colorfully, that "*papelitos y reunioncitas* (scraps of paper and little meetings)" would not change the social order.[24] He also stated that, "The FSLN was not born at an assembly or a congress, nor did it issue a proclamation announcing its creation…For the Frente, what came first was action."[25] The Sandinista Party would not be "wasting time filling up Saturdays and Sundays with meaningless chatter."[26] Though Fonseca did concede that, "Without organization there can be no action," he was clear and consistent on the point that the movement had "a duty to act."[27]

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[22] *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 20.

[23] *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 133.

[24] Quoted in Zimmerman 2000, 69.

[25] See Zimmerman 74.

[26] Ibid, 86.

[27] Fonseca circa 1964. In Zimmerman 2000, 74.

Other leaders took up this refrain and echoed it from their position in government after the overthrow of Somoza. The FSLN leadership continued to call on the people to take an active role in Nicaragua's government and ongoing revolutionary agenda: "Unless the working class generates and carries through these changes, the revolution will stagnate and rot…[the masses] must always—now and in the future—speak up in a loud, clear voice on their own behalf. They must develop ways of participating and taking initiatives."[28] The passive citizen, in contrast, arrests progress.

Combining the notion of universal morality and the imperative for action, FSLN leaders continued this theme in the early 1980s. Stated Jaime Wheelock, "Each and every brother or sister in each and every country must work tirelessly so that solidarity and material support, economic and financial cooperation, might contribute to breaking through…international reaction."[29] This "brother and sister" rhetoric is similar to that of other international revolutionary leaders and intellectuals, and the call for material contributions across the third world is a concrete action above and beyond rhetorical solidarity.

This kind of activist attitude in the FSLN's ideology can be seen in its association with Che Guevara and Fidel Castro's version of Marxism. According to Fonseca himself, scientific socialism *and* what Hodges labels the "new Marxism" were both influences on *Sandinismo*.[30] Hodges stresses that the central feature of new Marxism is captured by Castro's famous "the duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution," and "Many times, practice comes first and then theory."[31] Like many other international revolutionary ideologies examined here, the

[28] Tomás Borge's speech on the Second Anniversary of the Revolution. In *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 130.

[29] Ibid, 125. Reaction as in "reactionaries" or counter-revolutionary forces.

[30] Fonseca, in Hodges 1986, 174.

[31] Ibid, 174.

Sandinista take on Marxism places far less emphasis on material conditions and far more on revolutionary activity.

Overall, this ideological content meets the all three definitional criteria. Based on this international revolutionary political ideology, leadership embracing this worldview should have a preference for an anti-status quo, activist foreign policy. This preference is actually stated explicitly in the FSLN 1969 Historic Program, where Article XI is directly concerning "Solidarity Among Peoples." In this document, the FSLN declares that it will "put into practice militant solidarity with fraternal peoples fighting for their liberation."[32] As if to clarify, subsection A further states: "[The revolutionary government] will actively support the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against the new and old colonialism and against the common enemy: Yankee imperialism."[33] Thus a HISS policy was certainly theoretically consistent with the Sandinista's political ideology, even if it was not ultimately adopted.

Pluralism in *Sandinismo*

There is, perhaps, a greater set of influences on the Sandinista ideology than in other international revolutionary ideologies examined thusfar. For example, Catholicism played a large role in the FSLN's conception and language of human rights, and the Nicaraguan constitution places substantial weight on both traditionally liberal individual rights like those of voting and free speech and social rights like the right to work, education, and healthcare.[34] At the same time, the most central religious figures associated with the FSLN, such as Ernesto

[32] In *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 21.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid, 267; see also Nicaraguan Constitution of 1987, Article 1.

Cardenal, drew on Christian and Biblical concepts of humanity and combined them with the class-based worldview of Marxism.[35]

Fonseca himself was vehemently against rigid orthodoxy and warned against alienating potential allies in Nicaragua's political movement on the basis of differences in ideology.[36] The revolution itself, and its ultimate triumph in the country, was the most important thing. It is worth noting here that the political ideology, while having clear international revolutionary tendencies, lends a great deal of flexibility to those who espouse *Sandinismo.*[37] Indeed, within the party itself, there was a split into three "tendencies" in the 1970s. The disagreement was more about revolutionary tactics than normative ideological content and was reconciled internally in the final months of the insurrection, but it revealed the presence of, and ability of Sandinistas to tolerate, diverse ideas within the party.[38]

Condition 2: Non-Institutionalized Entry

At the domestic level, the FSLN also did appear to have the latitude to design and implement whatever foreign policy it might have desired as a result of its non-institutionalized entry to power. As in other cases examined, the irregular power transition provided one political actor with the opportunity to re-make national government. The Sandinistas did tolerate opposition in some respects, but there were, from the point of view of the Revolutionary Realities theory, few domestic political roadblocks to HISS adoption. Soon after Somoza fled,

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[35] Hodges 1986, 279. Cardenal was actually defrocked for his views, which were considered too far from proper Catholic teachings, in 1984.

[36] Bruce E. Wright. 1995. *Theory in the Practice of the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Monographs in International Studies, 211.

[37] Wright 1995, 78-79.

[38] The FSLN refers directly to this October 1975 split in its 72 Hour Document, which notes that these diverse tendencies had different "styles, practices, and strategic-tactical concepts." FSLN. 1979. "The 72-Hour Document: Analysis of the Situation and Tasks of the Sandinist People's Revolution." Managua, Sept. 21-23. Reprinted and distributed by the US Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington: Department of State, 16. Hereafter "72 Hour Document."

the power of the state was clearly and tightly in FSLN hands, whose top leaders all tended to agree on the desirability of an active international and anti-imperialist presence.

The Nicaraguan Revolution saw the Sandinistas defeat the Somoza regime in July 1979, after years of a bloody civil war. In the latter half of the 1970s, a number of anti-Somoza groups formed a more united front than had been seen during previous stages of the struggle. Together, despite continued, not insubstantial political in-fighting, the revolutionaries occupied the capital and ultimately forced Somoza to flee and his forces, the *Guardia* (National Guard) which had been the instrument of dictatorial oppression for years, to surrender or disappear.

Who Led, and How Foreign Policy Was Made

The status of political governing institutions in Nicaragua following the exit of the Somoza regime was somewhat like those in China circa 1949: there were hardly any to speak of.[39] The city of Managua had been devastated by an earthquake in 1972, and reconstruction moved at a snail's pace before violence picked up again at the end of the decade. One of the two pillars of the Somoza regime, the *Guardia* (national guard, or the internal security force) was dismantled by the incoming regime; the pillar of US support had evaporated shortly before the rebel victory.[40] It was left for the victors to form a new state government, a task that they

[39] Wright 1995, 93. Tomás Borge himself explained it this way: "You don't have any idea of what these first months after the revolution were like: there wasn't the slightest bit of control over anything. When we founded the Ministry of the Interior, there were six of us; and in the whole country there was no police force, no State Security, no judges, no courts, no Supreme Court, no nothing. All we had were titles: 'You're the minister of the interior'… There was no infrastructure. We didn't even have offices. We didn't have files. We had nothing, absolutely nothing," (*Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 89.)

[40] The FSLN made a very strong effort to prevent any of their cadres from killing former National Guard members who surrendered. They also gave due process to elements of the former regime who were jailed, and the FSLN further rejected the death penalty in Nicaragua at all. See Booth 1985, 195-198 and Tomás Borge in *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 103.

embraced thoroughly; the ruling junta created or restructured 179 public agencies and passed around 600 laws from 1979-1980 alone.[41]

Just prior to successfully overthrowing the Somoza regime, the FSLN attempted to broaden its political appeal and include various elites in the movement. This took the form of the Group of Twelve, which consisted of a number of intellectuals, business leaders, and religious officials that were broadly sympathetic to, though not members of, the FSLN.[42] More conservative and even pro-capitalist elites and business leaders were given a number of top-ranking positions in the new, nascent governing apparatus.[43] The Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto, for example, was both a Sandinista and a Catholic priest of the liberation theology persuasion.[44]

Within the national bureaucracy itself, relatively few technocrats or professional bureaucrats were removed. One estimate was that 90% of the mid-level and low-level government employees were retained by the post-Somoza governing junta.[45] Though ideological education was encouraged within the government, and promotions were more likely to be offered to pro-Sandinista individuals over the next few years, there was still a sizable set of non-ideological bureaucrats.[46] These agencies were controlled at the top by a relatively stable set of cabinet ministers.

However, despite several genuine strains of pluralism in the new Nicaraguan government, the control still rested very much with FSLN party members who had been leaders

[41] Booth 1985,190.

[42] Vilas 1986, 135. Also Walker and Wade 2011.

[43] Vilas 1986, 145-146; see also Pastor 1987, 297.

[44] Hodges 1986, 270.

[45] Booth 1985, 188.

[46] Booth 1985, 188-191; Vanderlaan 1986, 53.

of the armed insurrectionary movement. The five-seat Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN) contained three party members: Daniel Ortega, Sergio Ramírez Mercado, and Moisés Hassán.[47] The Council of State also appeared at first to be a pluralistic co-legislative body, where business associations and opposition political groups held, jointly, more seats than the FSLN.[48] By February 1980, however, a number of new, pro-Sandinista organizations had been formed, many by the party itself, and these bodies sought representation on the Council as well. This brought the total number of seats up to forty-seven (from thirty-three), with nearly all the new seats going to Sandinista allies.[49] The FSLN and the new FSLN-dominated mass organizations therefore held a strict majority.

As these changes made clear, the FSLN party apparatus was, in fact, in charge of major policy decisions. After September 1980, the JGRN, which had already been subordinate to top FSLN leadership in practice, was formally placed under the control of National Directorate of the FSLN. This was a nine-member body, where the three 'tendencies' of the party that developed in the 1970s each had three representatives. It was the clear center of national political power by the end of 1980.[50] Indeed, in April 1980, the two non-FSLN members of the JGRN had resigned, one citing frustration with National Directorate control; interestingly, they were *not* replaced by FSLN party members but with other representatives of the Nicaraguan business sector.[51] The ND, though "reserved for itself the definition of major lines of political economy, military doctrine, agrarian reform, and foreign policy."[52]

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[47] Vilas 1986, 146.

[48] Gilbert 1988, 109.

[49] Vilas 1986, 150.

[50] Gilbert 1988, 110-111.

[51] Ibid, 110; Wright 1995, 94.

[52] In Vanderlaan 1986, 349.

There also is some evidence of a parallel structure of government with respect to foreign relations, one of the observable implications of the causal mechanism linking entry type to HISS outcomes. Bernardino Larios, the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense in August 1979 met with two Venezuelan officials who were offering to provide Nicaraguan with military aid and advisors. Though interested, Larios told the officials that they would need to discuss this with Humberto Ortega, a top Sandinista that was then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Ortega had an answer that was completely contrary to the view of the outsider, civilian minister: Nicaragua had no need for Venezuelan military aid or aides at this time.[53]

Thus in terms of having the power to write and implement policy, it was the FSLN at the helm. Foreign policy agencies controlled by loyalists and the party head a supreme decision making council at the top of the political hierarchy. The irregular mode of entry, and the subsequent opportunity to direct new political development, institutions, and rules meant that the FSLN could, at least in theory, have pursued its preferred foreign policy without much oversight or approval from other political actors. They were, however, involved in the formal government structure in such a way that, as discussed in section three, may have impacted HISS outcomes.

Condition 3: Barriers to Offensive Conventional War

In 1985, an FSLN politician named Bayardo Arce made the following, tongue-in-cheek observation: "Perhaps at no other time in the history of the United States has a country so small and underdeveloped been treated with such importance and hostility. The terms they use to describe us almost make us appear to be a power."[54] That the US made Nicaragua 'almost appear to be a power' points up to the awareness of the Sandinista regime that they faced very

[53] Pastor 1987, 206.

[54] Bayardo Arce, 1984; cited in Gilbert 1988, 61

high barriers to offensive conventional operations abroad. Previous chapter have already laid out basic facts of the US economy and troop levels during the 1980s. Simple figures for Nicaragua paint a fairly bleak picture for the Central American nation. The total population hovered around 2.8-2.9 million, and Nicaragua had some 24,000 people in arms in 1980 and 41,000 in 1982.[55] Military expenditures were roughly 249 million USD in 1982. In comparison, recall that Iran had 240,000 standing forces in 1982, boasted a population of 42 million, and was spending around 15 billion USD annually on is military. The United States was another order of magnitude beyond that, counting its troop levels in the millions, its population in hundreds of millions, and its military budget in the hundreds of billions, reaching a quarter of a trillion dollars in 1985. Even if these figures overlook such things as un-measured Soviet and Cuban aid to the Sandinista regime, this last figure means that the United States was spending *one thousand times* Nicaragua's 1982 military budget annually. Military aggression was not a winning proposition for Managua.

In terms of quality of the military apparatus, the new government was faced with the task of rebuilding the national forces nearly from the ground up. According to a US State and Defense Department report, "The Nicaraguan defense establishment was swept away…The armed forces of Nicaragua must be entirely rebuilt, both its personnel and equipment."[56] The *Guardia* was eliminated entirely (though some joined and organized the Contras), and the EPS (Sandinista Popular Army) took its place. Like the FAR, the EPS's experience was mostly with waging an insurgency; large-scale conventional operations would require additional training. Also, the early challenge for the EPS was to simply establish order in a country devastated by

[55] These and all figures in this paragraph are from COW Singer and Small, unless otherwise noted.

[56] Report from 1981. In Vanderlaan 1986, 271.

war. This included demobilizing fighters to whom the Sandinistas had provided weapons in the final stage of the insurrection but to whom they had not provided much political or military training.[57]

Even before the contra forces of the old Somoza regime and the *Guardia* were receiving external funding from the United States, Nicaragua faced domestic security challenges in the outlying regions. As in Cuba, the solution was one-part popular mobilization. However, training farmers, workers, and students to defend villages on night patrols or to guard important factories is a far cry from carrying out offensive operations. As the need for national defense became more dire during 1982-1983, the Nicaraguan government took a number of additional steps to train, recruit, and draft its citizens for the defense of the nation.[58] This mission not only consumed a large portion of the human and material resources, but the training and goals were always defense-oriented.

Nicaragua sought military material and assistance from outside nations to bolster its capacity. Though the government had initially been sending out feelers for Western arms, by 1981, it was Third World and Eastern bloc states that were willing to supply the Nicaraguans with what they sought.[59] It was also made clear that, though other countries might support Nicaragua's efforts to arm and defend itself, no military aid in the form of the deployment of troops from even Cuba would be forthcoming in the event of an actual foreign (US) invasion.[60]

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid, 273; see also Gilbert Chapter 2 & 3 for extensive explanation of the Sandinista's use of government, party, and mass organizations to facilitate Nicaraguan national defense.

[59] Vanderlaan 1986, 290-299. Vanderlaan presents compelling evidence that Soviet bloc support for Nicaragua tended to come in response to escalations of US involvement in the region, *not* the other way around. As the Reagan policy clarified, to the infamous desire to change the "present structure" of the Nicaraguan government, aid to the Sandinista regime spiked.

[60] Ibid, 300. This is reminiscent of Castro's remark to the East German official: "You have every guarantee, we have none" (see Chapter 8, fn. 104).

Arms, but not alliances, were on offer. Thus Nicaragua's priority and strategy was to improve its own military defense; its capacity for offensive operations was limited.

The National Directorate was, however, firmly in control of the armed forces, and the national army served ideologically-oriented purposes at times. The Ministry of Defense was under Humberto Ortega and the Interior Ministry was run by Tomás Borge and Luis Carrión.[61] All three men were DN *comandantes*. It had long been the plan of the FSLN to retain control of their own insurgent military and to make ideological education a key component of military service.[62] Central to military training was instilling revolutionary values, especially service to the poor and Sandino-style nationalism, with its dose of anti-imperialism.[63] Loyalty to the revolution was paramount.[64] It is true that the FSLN did see their military, or at least their army, as a political revolutionary tool. Upon taking power, the government in Managua initiated a nation-wide literacy campaign of which the army was an integral part. The EPS provided physical protection to party members during the campaign and coordinated supplies and transportation; they were one of the only organizations equipped to do so.[65] As the nation's leading Sandinista militant cadres, veteran soldiers also became teachers and, in many cases, newer and illiterate cadres were students.[66]

Striking out with the EPS, however well they may have been prepared for ideological duties abroad, was not a winning proposition given the material, structural situation for Nicaragua. It was hardly even fathomable; against the United States or even a US-backed proxy

[61] Gilbert 1988, 60. The Sandinista System of Power diagram is especially helpful.

[62] Ibid, 63; Pastor 1987, 199.

[63] Gilbert 1988, 63.

[64] Booth 1985, 261.

[65] Ibid, 272.

[66] Gilbert 1988, 55-57, Vanderlaan 1986, 271-272.

nation, the barriers were simply too high. As Pastor bluntly notes, "The capacity of the United States to undermine [the Sandinista's] revolution was infinitely greater than their capacity to affect U.S. interests."[67] Power projection and offensive capacities strictly limited Nicaragua's use of its military as a tool for international activism. They were almost, but not quite, a power.

Thus there is some evidence that the Sandinistas may have wanted to commit their conventional military apparatus *abroad* in ideological projects in the same way that they were willing to incorporate such missions into the military's domestic activities. Sandinista rhetoric definitely emphasized an interest in global political change and pledged militant solidarity with movements abroad. Certainly, they had created an institutional super-structure to craft and execute policy and had an armed instrument controlled entirely by the DN, one that mixed military skill and ideological commitment.[68] Still, the barriers to do anything abroad with their own military were too high. Nicaragua's military, economy, and indeed geographic location foreclosed such options, and the Sandinistas would have to find another tool. Thus, the conditions for HISS adoption were all present, but in the end, Nicaragua chose a different route.

III. Why Not HISS: Accounting for HISS Non-Adoption in Nicaragua

The theory would predict that the Sandinistas adopt HISS--at least, if the three jointly necessary conditions are sufficient and no unarticulated theoretical assumptions had been violated. Indeed, the Sandinistas used sponsorship as a foreign policy tool at times, notably supporting the FMLN materially and occasionally offering diplomatic support for other groups such as the PLO. Relations with these groups, openly or clandestinely, were definitely on the

[67] Pastor 1987, 203.

[68] This is one of the observable implications of the Revolutionary Realities theory, the way the barriers to conventional war abroad, non-institutionalized power transitions, and ideological content mutually reinforce on another to make HISS an appealing foreign policy.

table and even occasionally pursued. Furthermore, in a number of statements, leaders wished other liberation movements well and emphatically pronounced Nicaragua's solidarity.[69] Yet, as far as a HISS policy, the best evidence shows that Tomás Borge meant it when he declared, "Nicaragua will not export revolution. Our best support for change in Latin America and the world will be to advance our revolution."[70]

This chapter now offers an account for the non-adoption of HISS in the Nicaraguan case. I do so in order to gain new insights about the strengths and shortcomings of the Revolutionary Realities theory. The question of hidden assumptions can be addressed with a better understanding of where, when, and how the process leading from the three causal conditions towards HISS outcomes got off-track. In this case, I ultimately argue that the leadership of the state opted not to pursue HISS because of the United States' extreme disapproval of the policy and its promise of very costly retaliation, an attitude which served to constrain Managua's foreign policy independence. There is, in this case, evidence to corroborate my account of Nicaragua's non-adoption policy and, in particular, her cutting off of relations with the few non-state actors it did support.

The threats and warnings from the US appear to have had the indirect effect of disrupting some of the causal mechanisms in the Revolutionary Realities theory of adoption. Leaders curbed rhetoric and encouraged pluralism, limiting the credible justifications for foreign interference in Nicaraguan affairs. US threats and aggression in the region, like funding the contras, providing large military aid packages to neighboring Honduras, and engaging in military exercises off of both of Nicaragua's coasts also had the direct effect of discouraging any and all

[69] Vanderlaan 1986, 328, e.g.

[70] In Booth 1985, 226.

sponsorship or even the appearance of it from Managua. Instead, Nicaragua sought to enhance its security through allies, and it moderated and then abandoned its support for the FMLN in response to Washington's actions.

Though it may seem like it would be difficult to observe a non-event, it is actually the opposite in this research. Because Nicaragua placed such a high value on maintaining a good reputation and denying Washington's claims of its malicious activity, Managua offered itself up for investigation by international courts, the press, and all kinds of foreign observers. US public interest and upset over executive overreach also meant that many more documents and perspectives were made public—for example, during the Congressional investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal. For Nicaragua, there was a lot to gain in revealing non-adoption, and there is some strong evidence in support of my account of the influence of US on sponsorship decisions.

Background: US-Nicaraguan Relations from the 1850s to the 1990s

From the start, the FSLN was focused on taking Nicaragua out from under the historical boot of the United States, quite aware of the capacity and willingness of Uncle Sam to police Central America. The broad perception, which was corroborated by a great deal of evidence, was that the US had dominated and exploited Nicaragua's industry while manipulating, often directly, its politics. In 1856, William Walker, an American citizen and military operative, actually reigned as president of the so-called Republic of Nicaragua.[71] US Marines had occupied Nicaragua in 1912 and again in 1927. This latter occupation ended only after Augusto Sandino's guerrilla bands put serious strain on the Nicaraguan government and caused enough Marine casualties to make Washington lose enthusiasm for the conflict.[72] These interventions were all

[71] John Booth. 1985. *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 18-20

[72] Ibid, 45.

part of a Washington policy to keep politics "stable" and protect growing US financial interests in the country, from which few Nicaraguans benefitted.[73] Under the US-backed Somoza regime, that number grew smaller and smaller, with only a handful of families who were related to the Somozas benefitting from economic developments and not insubstantial business growth.[74] At the same time, social development indicators on education, literacy, health care, and access to water and electricity were dismal for the vast majority of Nicaraguans.[75]

In short, the goal of the FSLN was to assert national independence and sovereignty and to move clearly and strongly away from the United States on all levels. However, the leadership was also wary of sparking US backlash against Nicaragua, and it stressed frequently that it did not want to follow the "Cuban model" and resulting shift into the Soviet camp. Castro himself offered advice to the Sandinistas, telling them to, "Avoid the early mistakes we made in Cuba, the political rejection by the West, premature frontal attacks on the bourgeoisie, economic isolation."[76] Economically, the FSLN was dedicated to a mixed economy with a large role for the state sector and a substantial private enterprise, so long as the latter contributed to national production and investment.[77]

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[73] US banks had become deeply involved in Nicaraguan economic policy-making by the 1910s, with agreements with the Brown Brothers Bank of New York, for example, stipulating that in exchange for loans, Nicaragua would allow a US agent to run its customs operations. This placed an American official with ties to the banking industry squarely between the Nicaraguan government and one of its primary means of revenue generation, namely, foreign trade (Booth 1985, 32-34.) For contemporaneous US views on the events of the 1910-1912 period, see Thomas W. Walker and Christine J. Wade. 2011. *Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 16-18.

[74] Mary B. Vanderlaan. 1986. *Revolution and Foreign Policy in Nicaragua*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 61-62.

[75] Booth 1985, 86-87.

[76] From Robert A. Pastor. 1987. *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 191. Reported in the *New York Times*, July 9, 1980, p. 10.

[77] See Carlos M. Vilas. 1986. *The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America.* Judy Butler (Trans). New York: Monthly Review Press Center for the Studies of the Americas. Both Vilas and Gilbert 1988 note that "the practice of almost five years indicates that in principle there is no confrontation with large private property as far as it accepts the government's economic policy (Vilas 1986, 158) and that "principled

In international affairs, the party's platform was that of non-alignment. Nicaragua joined the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979 at the international meeting in Havana when Cuba's Fidel Castro was its Chairman. Elements of the leadership were wary that this would prove provocative to a US that saw "non-alignment" as shorthand for "pro-Soviet" and whose relationship with Cuba had only marginally improved over the previous two decades. Additionally, the FSLN's explicit and public rhetoric regarding US imperialism and "thieves" in the national bourgeoisie did little to reassure American observers.[78] These statements included comments about the inevitability of further revolutions and frequent expressions of sympathy for, identification with, and political solidarity towards "national liberation movements" in the underdeveloped world.[79] Furthermore, the FSLN accepted a number of Cuban aides, in both military and development capacities and did forge new economic ties with the Soviet Union.[80]

US actions contributed heavily to the breakdown of relations. As will be examined in depth, one of the key issues from a US perspective was the fear that Nicaraguans would "export revolution," particularly to El Salvador. The victory of Ronald Reagan in the 1980 US election and the end of the Carter administration was a turning point in relations; by the end of 1981, relations had seriously deteriorated and the US Congress began to officially fund the "contras," a group of former *Guardia* members complete with a civilian wing that included a number of more

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entrepreneurs" could expect to retain their private holdings "as long as they continue to produce" (Gilbert 1988, 118; 120).

[78] Pastor contends that anti-American rhetoric and statements like Tomás Borge's "a thief thinks everyone else is like him" (202) made it much more difficult for the US and Nicaragua to overcome mutual suspicions and to ultimately forestall broader conflict as ultimately became embodied in the contra war. Pastor, a member of the National Security Council from 1977-1981, was close to such events….?

[79] At the 1979 Non-Aligned Movement Summit Conference, for instance, Daniel Ortega offered praise and congratulations for the liberation successes of the peoples in Grenada, Iran, Kampuchea, and Uganda. In *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 45.

[80] Pastor 1987, 209; Booth 1985, 263. Pastor also states that Nicaraguan officials did not capitalize on offers of Panamanian assistance in training a new police force; he further suggests that the presence of Cubans already offering such support was the cause (205).

moderate, anti-FSLN Nicaraguan leaders. Throughout the rest of the decade, the contras waged a fairly brutal campaign against the Sandinista government and often the Nicaraguan people in areas they operated, ultimately hoping to remove the FSLN from power and draining the economy along the way. Despite fairly high levels of popular support for the FSLN, the first post-war election in 1990 saw the election not of the Sandinista's Daniel Ortega but of an opposition candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (a former member of the revolutionary *junta* who had resigned in 1980) by a war-weary public.

Early Concerns about International Reactions and Interrupted Causal Mechanisms

Because of Nicaragua's history as well as knowledge of the Cuban experience, the Sandinistas took active measures to forestall US interference, measures that short-circuited the causal pathways outlined in the Revolutionary Realities. It was clearly imaginable to the FSLN that the United States would attempt to influence the outcome of the political upheavals in the 1970s. Thus, part of the reason HISS was not central to Nicaragua's relationship is due to the fact that, despite the new government's non-institutionalized entry, they did not develop a political system in which only FSLN ideologues could be heard. Some Sandinistas noted that they could have held "elections" immediately after their victory and would have won easily, legitimating their rule.[81] By taking advantage of the rebel victory and wave of national public support, the Sandinistas could have rebuilt the country's governing institutions and completely sidelined those with heterodox political views. However, to appear more legitimate and democratic to outside observers, the FSLN had a more pluralistic and deliberative approach to government. Though Sandinistas could have forced through a HISS policy, the presence of a

[81] Wright 1995, 92.

wider variety of influences on political outcomes interrupted the ideology-entry mutually-reinforcing mechanism leading to HISS, as described in Chapter 2.

Nicaraguan leaders had long been aware of the role of international audiences could play in the political events in their own country. In 1979, the FSLN made an assessment of the counterrevolutionary tools that might be available to the United States in the immediate aftermath of Somoza's ouster.[82] Instead, it appeared that the "imperialists" and "reactionaries" would be working through the domestic bourgeoisie and by pulling international finance levers. The clear message was "it is evident that imperialism, after having failed time after time to prevent our [FSLN] victory is now counting on elements who are at its disposal to continue its persistent action to undermine the revolution."[83] Ultimately, the perception of the FSLN during the insurrection and into its first months in power, was that imperialist forces were arrayed against them. They recognized the vulnerability of Nicaragua, economically and militarily, vis-à-vis the United States and what Castro would term "the monopolies."

Thus, the FSLN even in the early days was careful about articulating their Marxist commitments. They were frequently explicit about pluralism and avoided connection with, for example, Cuban or other "Soviet-tainted" sources of external aid for their insurgent activities.[84] An internal FSLN document confirms that the Group of Twelve and other inclusive measures in the early months of the revolutionary government were also, whatever else they may have been,

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[82] They discounted the possibility of external support for former *Guardia* members in the short-term, stating, "The kind of military victory achieved over the dictatorship makes it impossible, for now, from a practical point of view, to organize aggression by the defeated GN (National Guard.)" See FSLN 1979. "The 72 Hour Document," p. 7.

[83] Ibid, 10. The United States had indeed attempted to promote a peace process during the insurrectionary period that would sideline the FSLN, much like they had done in the Cuban revolution twenty years before. See Pastor 1987, Chap 7-9.

[84] Vanderlaan 1986, 30. Fidel Castro has been quoted by a former FSLN leader as saying "The best help I can give you is not to help you at all" during the Sandinista's fight against Somoza. The implication was that the US would see it as an excuse to become involved directly in the conflict and shut the FSLN out from power in the final negotiation. See Booth 1985, 133-134.

tools to "neutralize Yankee interventionist policies."[85] This memo, called the 72 Hour Document, also offers five reasons for pursuing moderate policy choices of the first two months in power, citing as number 3: "Expectation of financial aid from the Western bloc" and as number 4: "The need to eliminate any legitimacy from the imperialism's [*sic*] tactics of undermining our position."[86] The party was clearly concerned about this possibility and in order to protect themselves, they elected to moderate their own influence and play down certain political commitments and projects.

In terms of domestic policies, this led to an interruption of the causal mechanisms that led to HISS in other cases. When the Sandinistas formed new bodies, like the Council of State and the JGRN, they gave real space to opposition figures. Though these were FSLN-dominated organizations, there was an important dimension of pluralism in them all. The Council of State was not a mere rubber stamp organization; it offered substantive input into laws which was often incorporated in the final bills.[87] Most importantly for the theory of Revolutionary Realities, a range of views was presented in these fora, even if the opposition groups did not have a controlling power in all policy making and implementing government organizations. Thus, even if the FSLN had the last word on nearly all important matters, the decision making process itself was *not* insulated from outside perspectives to the same extent in Nicaragua as it was in, say, Iran or Cuba. The FSLN even allowed an independent press to run until it implemented a state of emergency in 1982 in response to growing US support for anti-Sandinista activity inside Nicaragua.[88]

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[85] "72 Hour Document," 5.

[86] Ibid, 8.

[87] Booth 1985, 192.

[88] Booth 1985, 230. Not paint too sanguine a picture of the FSLN, which did prove to have authoritarian tendencies, but the press had truly become a key tool in US anti-regime propaganda by 1982.

Furthermore, the ND conducted itself in a consensus-oriented manner. As described above, there were three "tendencies" in the *Frente* in the 1970s, and the National Directorate gave equal weight to each of these three. I noted before that most of the diversity was in the form of differing opinions on the revolutionary tactics for the Nicaraguan situation, and therefore was not terribly relevant in identifying the political-moral attributes of the ideology as such. However, the 'tactics' of the revolutionary governing were precisely what the ND debated when they decided on what policy to implement with respect to non-state actors. Accounts of the ND emphasized that a great deal of arguing and discussion took place in policy sessions, and that, until all nine *comandantes* reached a consensus, the talking would continue.[89] Different views of the morality and effectiveness of revolutionary tactics could certainly have led to meaningful discussion about the advisability of sponsorship programs and prevented an extreme version of the program from getting off the ground.[90]

This is a clear contrast to other cases, in which only a few top leaders and sometimes only the top figure himself, had the final word on policy. It is interesting to note here that the intellectual founder of the FSLN, Carlos Fonseca, was not on the political scene in post-Somoza Nicaragua. He, along with many other FSLN founding leaders, was killed by the *Guardia* during the course of the insurgency.[91] One wonders what effect this ultimately had on the direction of Nicaraguan policy, as in each of these other cases of HISS adoption, the chief architect of the ideological political program of the new regime was also a top decision-maker. (Who, for

[89] Gilbert 1988, 45-47.

[90] Pastor notes that the Sandinistas were uncertain about the way their relationship with the FMLN in particular should head, noting that the leadership faced "internal and external pressures to help the Salvadoran rebels" (1987, 211).

[91] Zimmerman 2000, 1.

example, would have had been the ultimate decider in Cuba had Fidel Castro died in the final days of the revolutionary fighting?)

Still other aspects of Sandinista policy suggest that giving the US no excuse for intervention was a central piece of their political agenda. Managua initially maintained a free press and promised to hold elections on the first anniversary of the revolution. The FSLN-led government even assumed the foreign debt of the Somoza regime, most of which was in unrecoverable assets and some of which had been used to finance the killing of Sandinistas and their supporters in the final years of the war.[92] The FSLN also incorporated the language of human rights into a number of its public statements, stressing later in its 1987 Constitution that this was a core value of the government.[93]

Thus, though the non-institutionalized entry condition is clearly met in this case, there is not the same evidence of the presence of the mechanisms leading from that condition to HISS adoption. The top leadership continued to expose itself to opposition views, there was diversity of opinion on revolutionary tactics in the top ruling body, and that body itself was larger and more consensus-oriented than the top executives typical in other HISS states. Also, ideological credentials were not the central concern in access to political power; Foreign Minister Father D'Escoto was an active participant in the anti-Somoza struggle and considered himself a Sandinista, but his liberation theological commitments suggest that at least some heterodoxy was acceptable among government ministers. It is clearly a mixed bag. As in other cases, moderates were frustrated by FSLN decision-making authority and sometimes resigned from governing

[92] Vanderlaan 986, 75-76.

[93] Hodges specifically articulates the argument that using this language was an attempt to strategically label a concept that the FSLN truly did embrace –most top Sandinistas had been imprisoned and subject to torture at some point in the two-decade struggle—in terms that would neutralize the United States and gain international support (1986, 267.) See also Tomás Borge's address in *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 85-104.

bodies. Protestors, however, did not call for their blood, and they were typically replaced, at least during the first few years, with other moderates. Thus, even if the Ortega brothers were apt to contradict the defense minister at times, some moderation and general consideration of alternative views were included in policy deliberation, short-circuiting HISS. Most importantly, these efforts at plurality were deliberate moves of a nascent government with a wary eye on how the rest of the world perceived them.

A Defensive Foreign Policy and the Quest for Allies

Managua did involve itself in global affairs but did so with an eye towards defense and security, rather than in pursuit of an activist anti-status quo agenda. The implication for foreign relations then, was that leaders arrived at the consensus that Managua should adopt a "defensive posture." In particular, the country should avoid flamboyant, ideology-driven activities at home or abroad in favor of a more "conservative" stance at least until they were more secure.[94] Even internally, the FSLN made clear that "the objective of the FSLN's foreign policy is to achieve the consolidation of the Nicaraguan revolution as this will help to strengthen the Central American, Latin American, and world revolution."[95] The 72 Hour Document does not fully articulate what that defensive, conservative approach to international relations would look like, but its statements reflect an awareness of the risk that Nicaragua policies could upset powerful foreign countries.

As discussed above, statements of solidarity in favor of national liberation movements and anti-US activities, especially by formerly oppressed groups or nations, were a common theme of Sandinista public statements.[96] However, the regime tried to be very explicit that,

[94] See Pastor 1987, 200; the quoted terms are from the 72 Hour Document, 7.

[95] "72 Hour Document," 13.

[96] Ibid, 31.

though they were asserting national independence and political sovereignty, and they did rhetorically champion asserts of national will against imperialism, they were not adopting a policy of material, international sponsorship of non-state actors. When the question of 'spreading the revolution' arose, the FSLN tried to describe its own struggle in national terms and to emphasize the need for national reconstruction in Nicaragua. Foreign Minister Father Miguel D'Escoto stated in 1983 that, "We believe that, just as we are looking for our own way, every other country has to look for its own way. This is why for us it seems strange that we might be intent on exporting our revolution. A revolution is not an exportable item."[97] Comments from other National Directorate members echoed this: "It is in the face of this [U.S.] domination that our model responds and establishes a vital necessity that independence be our own model, and together with this national independence, the recovery of our natural resources and of the will to develop."[98] This cautious phrasing, perhaps not always convincing, derived from the perceived threat of US intervention, a fear that had been present from the very beginning of their movement.

The policy that Nicaragua did pursue involved forging alliances and good relations with a wide variety of other nations, which served to raise Washington's political and diplomatic costs for its conflictual policies. Nicaragua became a leading member in the OAS, used the United Nations as a forum for complaints against US military aggressions, and, as mentioned, participated actively in the Non-Aligned Movement.[99] In additional to improving regional and third world ties, the FSLN also organized the *Encuentro de Comite´s de Solidaridad con*

[97] In ibid, 27.

[98] Sergio Ramírez, cited in Vanderlaan 1986, 29.

[99] Vanderlaan 1986, 320-327.

Nicaragua, an international solidarity meeting on its own behalf on January 26-31, 1981.[100] In a speech at this event, Jaime Wheelock turned around the international moral application of the country's ruling ideology, calling upon and thanking international supports to help protect the *Nicaraguan regime* against external aggression.[101] This is clearly a strong contrast to the tone, attendants, and goals of Hassan al-Turabi's PAIC conferences.

These measures were designed to improve relations with other actors that might offer diplomatic, economic, or military support. European connections made at events like the solidarity conference turned into new overseas markets for Nicaraguan exports and sources of bilateral aid.[102] The Sandinistas also recast Nicaragua's conflict with the United States as that of north against south, rather than West against East. The Sandinistas called on themes of anti-imperialism, unity with Latin America, and international laws and institutions.[103] By 1985, Nicaragua was making a serious diplomatic charm offensive in South America.[104]

Though it is hard to determine how effective such a policy might have been, it did contribute to some public perception victories for Nicaragua. It is clear that US public opinion was a key factor in Washington's decision-making, and the American public did not have much of a stomach for the contra war.[105] Congress, for example, unanimously passed the Boland Amendment in December of 1982, prohibiting the US government from using any funds for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista regime.[106] Nicaragua also made a case against the

[100] Kim Christiaens. 2014. "Between Diplomacy and Solidarity: Western European Support Networks for Sandinista Nicaragua." *European Review of History 21*(4), 617-634. See in particular pages 623-625.

[101] See *Sandinistas Speak* 113-126.

[102] Booth 1985, 267.

[103] Vanderlaan 1986, 376.

[104] Ibid, 242.

[105] Pastor 1987, 260 notes that by a margin of 2:1 in opinion polls, US voters did not approve of aid to the contras.

[106] Ibid, 241 – could find doc?

United States for its aggressive actions to the International Court in 1984, where it received a judgment in its favor.[107]

All of these likely made it more difficult for the United States to justify an outright military invasion of Nicaragua or more overt regime-change operations. It definitely increased the political costs of such a move. The Sandinistas had already been warned by Cuba to avoid the international isolation Havana experienced in the 1960s. The Sandinista's own experience also included rough relations with Central American governments in 1980, when they were accused to being behind economic and political turmoil in the region as a result of efforts to export their revolution. Managua therefore had yet one more reason to refrain from engaging in a policy of HISS, as sponsoring insurgents and terrorists would be a sure-fire way to alienate potential allies and increase hostility in its own neighborhood. Maintaining good relations, on the other hand, meant that the United States faced higher political costs and Nicaragua had access to more foreign economic and military support.

Credible Consequences: Nicaragua's Sponsorship Attempt and US Policy Response

Even so, the impulse towards sponsorship was strong as a result of the presence of the Revolutionary Realities theory causal factors. As described above, the FMLN was one of the few armed non-state actors that Nicaragua supported. In 1980-1981, the government provided substantial support for the FMLN in El Salvador. The FSLN maintained contacts with the FMLN, provided safe houses on Nicaraguan territory for fighters, and allowed the organization's political arm to open political offices in Managua.[108] Daniel Ortega even delivered a message from the FMLN to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1981.[109]

[107] International Court of Justice. 1986. "Summary of Judgements."

[108] Ibid, 330; Pastor 1987, 246.

[109] Daniel Ortega, in *Sandinistas Speak* 1982, 141.

However, the timing of Nicaragua's various efforts to support the FMLN between 1979 and 1981 is consistent with the notion that the Sandinista government was sensitive to fears of US invasion and/or a Washington policy of regime change. The Sandinistas were clearly willing to say no to the Salvadoran guerrillas at times, explicitly citing the United States and the security of the Nicaraguan revolution at home as the cause.[110] As the Regan administration began to show its true foreign policy zeal, it became unavoidably clear that adopting HISS could easily trigger an invasion of Nicaraguan territory, and all possible ties to any foreign non-state actor were severed. Though ever aware of the possibility that sponsorship would result in backlash and retaliation, it took a series of escalation threats from the US for the leadership in Nicaragua reject all sponsorship outright.

Responding to Washington's Concerns

From the first, the United States was concerned about Nicaragua's potential support for rebels and its becoming "another Cuba," and Washington was consequently willing to impose very high costs on a Sandinista government that failed to heed the warning. In a meeting with President Carter, top US aides, and several members of the JGRN on September 24, 1979, the issues on which the FSLN should toe the line were clearly laid out. Carter listed the top US issues as 1) Nicaragua's non-intervention in the affairs of its neighbors 2) true non-alignment (i.e., Nicaragua should not become a Soviet bloc ally) and 3) democracy and human rights.[111] Though not as threatening as the Reagan administration would be, Carter was direct: Nicaraguan support for armed non-state actors was a "concern" of Washington and might provoke an undesirable response from the nascent government's northern neighbor. Furthermore,

[110] The FMLN did use Nicaraguan territory for political offices, safe houses, and in 1980 to operate an anti-government radio station. See Vanderlaan 1986, 327-332.

[111] Pastor 1987, 206.

compliance and assurances from the FSLN government that Nicaragua was on board with these issues might result in additional, continuing foreign aid and even the restructuring of the country's national debt.[112] Daniel Ortega in turn took the opportunity to reiterate that the Nicaraguan government was not involved in the "radicalization" of the El Salvadoran revolution, signaling Managua's general interest in giving Washington no cause for complaint.[113]

This likely had the effect Carter intended. Prior to September of 1980, the Sandinistas had offered weak material support to the FMLN.[114] They had assisted with political organization and suggested contacts for other sources for arms and had provided some transshipment of weapons from these third countries.[115] However, the FSLN responded to pressure from the US government just days after speaking with Carter.[116] According to guerrilla documents captured from El Salvador, on Sept. 27, 1980, Nicaragua told FLMN liaisons that Managua would not permit further arms shipments, with Nicaragua explicitly citing US government warnings.[117] A delegation of FMLN fighters stated in their report of a trip to Managua that, "The Frente undervalued them and ignored them…the Frente was very conservative and it had a

[112] Ibid, 204-208. The United States had already provided Nicaragua with a generous aid and relief package in the aftermath of the destructive civil war (Pastor 1987, 196).

[113] Ibid, 206.

[114] Pastor characterizes the situation as the FSLN 'putting off' the FMLN representatives' demands for weaponry. "Weak" is necessarily a judgment call here, but the transshipment volume from 1979-June 1980 was less than it was during the Carter lame-duck period. Furthermore, arms delivers were cut off after conversation with a Carter administration official in September 1980. In November 1980, weapons shipments were not only 'resumed' but took on a much larger scale than they previously had. By March of 1981, the arms flow was essentially cut off – a "trickle" and "peanuts" according to US intelligence (see Vanderlaan 1986, 146-148).

[115] Pastor 1987, 219.

[116] At least, the Carter administration's report was unable to conclude that the government Nicaragua was supporting insurgent violence or terrorism beyond its borders. See Pastor 1987, 217.

[117] Pastor 1987, 218, citing the guerrilla document "J." Though the US State Department summary and assessment of these documents has generally been found to be flawed, the documents themselves are considered to be largely authentic. See Pastor note 19, 356.

tendency…to protect the Nicaraguan revolution."[118] Managua appeared to recognize the possible danger to the revolution that supporting non-state armed groups would pose.

A Window of Opportunity, 1979-1981

Indeed, the vast majority of weapons support for the Sandinista government to the FMLN was delivered a few months later, during Carter's lame-duck period, probably according to a "window of opportunity" logic.[119] It was apparently in early November 1980, just after the US election, that the FSLN ultimately approved shipment of the stockpile of weapons from Vietnam to the FMLN. It is not fully clear why this decision was made, but an American diplomat suggests that the Sandinistas were torn on the difficult issue, recognizing both the desire to support the FMLN in what the rebels were calling a "Final Offensive" and knowing that it would take a serious toll on their relations with the United States.[120]

From November 1980 to January 1981, the Sandinista government appears to have bet on a successful revolution in El Salvador as a means of trying to improve its own position vis-à-vis a more hardline Washington. In January of 1981, CIA photographs found that a new airstrip strategically located near the Gulf of Fonseca across from El Salvador had been constructed during December 1980; by the time the photos were taken, it was newly outfitted for sizable cargo planes.[121] Pastor paints the decision as the FSLN giving into a temptation to pursue a number of foreign policy objectives at once; the benefits of success would have been high. The Sandinistas may well have feared that a US intervention was forthcoming under Reagan

[118] Ibid, 219, citing guerrilla document "G."

[119] Van Evera 1998, 2001. Also, Posen 1993 demonstrates how this logic can extend to non-state and sub-state actors. The *fait accompli* logic described below is specifically Explanation F of the cause of war in Van Evera 1998.

[120] Booth 1985, 172; this draws on comments from Lawrence Pezzulo, who was Ambassador to Nicaragua from 1979-1981.

[121] Ibid, 225.

regardless of their behavior, given the incoming president's campaign rhetoric.[122] By presenting the Reagan administration with a *fait accompli* of an FMLN government, the FSLN would have a) created a new ally for itself in the region 2) removed a major point of contention between Washington and Managua regarding FSLN-FMLN ties and 3) divided the new US administration's attention between *two* leftist, Central American republics. It was not quite Cuba's goal of "all of Latin American in flames," but it was certainly a milder version of the logic. And, as for Cuba, the benefits failed to materialize.

Cutting off the FMLN: 1981 and Beyond

By the time Washington had made clear how strongly it opposed the support (and by the time it was clear to the Sandinistas that the FMLN was not on the verge of military victory), Nicaragua massively downgraded and ultimately fully terminated its support. At the end of January 1981, the prospect for US aid was still on the table at the start of the Reagan administration, but, as one of the US/Nicaragua diplomatic go-betweens warned in mid-February, the Sandinistas had one month to shut down the arms pipeline to FLMN.[123] The Sandinistas took action to limit their assistance to the FMLN. They shut down Radio Liberación, the radio station they had allowed the Salvadoran guerrillas to operate on Nicaraguan territory.[124] According to most sources, including US intelligence and the international court, after early in1981 there was little to no support, and certainly no arms in meaningful quantities, entering El

[122] Pastor 1987, 223, 225; Pastor once again cites one of the captured FMLN guerrilla docs to indicate a shift in Nicaraguan attitude as of Nov. 1 1980 that the US was likely to intervene more forcefully regardless of the outcome of the election. Document "K".

[123] Ibid.

[124] Pastor 1987, 232.

Salvador through Nicaragua.[125] As the National Directorate stated, the Sandinistas were not willing to "risk our revolution for an uncertain victory in El Salvador."[126] To this end, then, they curtailed and largely cut off aid to the FMLN, and what arms did trickle through was plausibly and officially attributed, whether it was true or not, to petty illegal arms trafficking of private citizens.

Nonetheless, in March of 1981, the Reagan Administration signed an authorization for the CIA to undertake covert actions in order to interdict arms trafficking to El Salvador. By November 1981, the National Security Council had decided to support the contras, marking the start of the Contra War and official US involvement in violent, Nicaraguan anti-government activities. The explanation and purpose of the expanded mission was the same as in March—the US needed to support local forces to stop arms trafficking from Nicaragua to regional guerrillas.[127] This support turned the contras from counter-revolutionary nuisance to serious threat and challenge the Sandinista government, which needed to spend inordinate resources on military defense from that point forth.

As the conflict between Nicaragua and the United States and her contra proxies grew more heated, the cost of further provocative sponsorship activities became eminently clear: Nicaragua was at risk of invasion. Washington staged a series of military exercises in the region in 1983. These included ongoing, joint ground maneuvers with the armed forces of Honduras, and naval exercises in both the Atlantic and Pacific, off the Nicaraguan coast.[128] Some

[125] International Court of Justice. June 27, 1986. "Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America): Summary of Judgement of 27 June 1986." Available: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?sum=367&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5.

[126] Cited in Pastor 1987, 232.

[127] Booth 262; Pastor 241

[128] Vanderlaan 1986, 145-149.

Honduran sources noted that after joint exercises, the US troops would leave behind heavy equipment, intended for use by the Contras.[129]

Military aid to pro-Washington governments in Central America and the Caribbean also skyrocketed. Honduras received 4 million USD in 1980, 31.3 million in 1982, and 77.5 million in 1984. Combined US economic and military aid to the region in 1986 was more than 600% above 1980 levels.[130] Though Nicaraguan's own military build-up slow began to raise the cost of a direct US military intervention, invasion was always a military possibility for the US. It was merely a matter of how much cost Washington was willing to absorb. For Managua, invasion was a nightmare scenario that the US was signaling that it would consider.

The invasion of Grenada in October 1983 seems to have removed all doubt from Nicaraguan leadership's minds about what the US was willing to do. A leftist government had ruled Grenada since its own 1979 revolution. Political violence and turmoil in the fall of 1983 raised the specter for the US of another Iran hostage crisis, and the US military mounted a full-scale invasion. The Nicaraguan government took a number of diplomatic precautions following the move. The ostensible reason for the Grenada intervention was to protect US citizens living in the country. Hoping to eliminate the excuse for a parallel move against Managua, Nicaraguan officials quickly reassured Washington that there was a detailed plan in place to protect and evacuate all US personnel from the country if the need arose.[131]

Other policy reactions to the invasion, however, clearly demonstrate that the FSLN's desire to prevent a US invasion was behind the regime's *non*-adoption of HISS. Managua finally

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[129] Ibid, 190.

[130] Statistics from Vanderlaan 178-179, 180. Vanderlaan further notes that her numbers systematically underestimate US involvement because they do not account for a number of weapons sales and credits nor do they include any of the Pentagon or CIA budgets for similar or parallel support.

[131] Pastor 1987, 245.

severed *all* official ties, even symbolic ones, with the FMLN following the events in Grenada. The Salvadoran guerrilla command which had held offices in Nicaragua was sent elsewhere.[132] Individual leaders and former guerrillas who had been using safe houses also left, many bound for Mexico.[133] With the threat of invasion so obviously credible, the FSLN rushed to eliminate its association with non-state actors abroad. This was the one affront that the United States had consistently cited in explaining its aggressive policies towards Managua, and the hegemon's continued efforts to maintain political control over the hemisphere meant that Nicaragua had to take sponsorship off of its menu of foreign policy options, entirely and unequivocally. Due to its small size, military weakness vis-à-vis the United States, and location in America's 'back yard,' Nicaragua saw that it was a very real risk of invasion (and military, foreign-imposed regime change) and thus abandoned ties with the non-state actors abroad.

Analysis

The evidence suggests that concern for political and military security (or, put differently regime and state security) is a very plausible explanation for non-adoption of HISS in this case. The FSLN was clearly willing to make a number of compromises to forestall US intervention into Nicaragua. Following Somoza's ouster, for example, the Sandinistas allowed the bourgeoisie to continue a leading role in the state and the economy. Their support for the FMLN fluctuated in conjunction with warnings, threats, and promises from Washington, and they only risked large-scale arms transshipments during Carter's lame duck period, hoping, perhaps unrealistically, to create an ally and divide the incoming Regan administration's attention. Then, after over a year of threatening US military posturing and the dramatic 1983 invasion of

[132] Pastor 1987, 246. Pastor here relies on the account of Roger Fontaine, the Latin American specialist in the National Security Council in 1983.

[133] Ibid.

Grenada, Nicaragua quickly scrubbed the country of all ties to the FMLN and other non-state actors. In short, the FSLN saw an activist, anti-status quo foreign policy of HISS as likely to antagonize the United States and give Washington an excuse to harass, undermine, overthrow, or alienate the new government. Thus despite the seeming genuine interest in furthering world revolution, as explicitly stated in a number of policy programs and leader statements both internally and externally, the FSLN ultimately discovered that the risk to the Sandinista revolution of such an active sponsorship policy was simply too great.

It was a constant awareness of the threat of US interference that led the FSLN to make decisions, both pre- and post-revolution, to forestall and prevent this, decisions which contribute to HISS non-adoption both directly and indirectly. There is evidence that from its inception, the FSLN made many policy choices calculated to prevent foreign interference, primarily from the United States, in Nicaragua's domestic revolutionary process. For example, though Cuban support might have been helpful in shortening the two-decade long struggle against Somoza during which the FSLN was almost eradicated, the FSLN and Castro both feared that such a connection would provide a pretext for greater international involvement in the conflict. There were thus minimal relations between the two. When the insurgent group that made this kind of foreign policy decision ultimately took power, then, they maintained the same interest in precluding US intervention. The National Directorate accepted input from opposition groups in the co-legislative council and tended towards consensus decision-making in its nine-member, top executive body, and moderates appeared on the ruling junta. This interrupted the mutually reinforcing causal mechanisms that led to HISS adoption in other cases. Further, Carter and Reagan both drew very bright lines when it came to a HISS policy. Sponsorship would be seen as a threat to regional security and the United States would respond unfavorably. The fact that a

brief period of heightened FMLN support served to touch off the contra war made it quite clear that supporting non-state actors abroad was one of the riskiest policies Managua could adopt. The threats and warnings from Washington had the direct effect of truly shutting down Nicaragua's sponsorship. Though ultimately not successful in halting US anti-regime efforts, the Sandinistas desire to limit the damage and prevent escalation led the Nicaraguan government to HISS non-adoption in this case.

Not only was HISS risky, increasing the chance that the United States would invade or become more deeply involved with the contras, but it came with a very high opportunity cost. Sponsorship risked alienating potential foreign allies who might otherwise contribute to Nicaraguan security. Nicaragua therefore adopted a more defensive stance, forging ties with other nations and leveraging international organizations, aiming to stay in power and increase the cost to the United States of forcible regime change. One means was of course military, and Nicaragua pursued this, seeking arms abroad and developing its own its domestic capacity to increase the costs of a US invasion and thereby, hopefully, deter it. At the same time, Nicaragua sought to increase the political and diplomatic costs to the United States by gaining allies abroad. Moves like submitting claims to the International Court and holding solidarity conferences in Managua were manifestation of Nicaragua's efforts to strengthen its own reputation and undermine the credibility of the US case for aggressive policies. This defensive, nationalist approach to foreign affairs happened despite the presence of all three causal factors in the Revolutionary Realities theory, and the evidence here suggests that the looming threat from the north is a good explanation as to why and how HISS adoption was short-circuited.

IV. Conclusion: Future Development of RR the Theory

There is one way of looking at the Nicaragua case and claiming that it *is* consistent with my theory. I could say that Nicaragua did not adoption HISS because a) they had a less revolutionary, more pluralist ideology and b) despite the non-institutionalized mode of entry, the Sandinistas allowed a greater diversity of perspectives into their government and actually held elections a few years after the insurrectionary period. Thus by 1985, they had, in effect, taken power in a much more institutionalized manner, meaning that the Revolutionary Realities theory would predict no adoption. In short, I could argue that the necessary variables did not take on sufficiently high values and thus HISS did not, consistent with my theory, occur.

To be sure, this is one explanation. However, I argue and show that these factors were all present in the Nicaragua case. Rather, the "values" on these factors were ultimately driven down by the overwhelming threat to the territorial integrity of Nicaragua and the survival of the regime once in power. This line of thinking, then, says that Nicaragua's failure to adopt HISS was not due to their ideology being insufficiently "extreme." Rather, the Sandinistas assessed their strategic reality and saw that certain elements of their political program ought to be downplayed in order to reduce the threat from abroad. Importantly, the causal factors seemed to rev up the HISS-adopting engine. The EPS was a tool for domestic ideological projects, the FSLN supported one local national liberation movement, and the regime did hold the final authority when it came to decision making. Indeed, the hope that spreading the revolution to El Salvador would take the pressure off of Nicaragua, a very HISS-like logic, was enough for the Sandinistas to risk sponsorship briefly in 1980 and 1981. There were, however, deliberate moves from the government and an active pursuit of a foreign policy, forging alliances and creating general international good will, to which HISS was antithetical. Sandinistas therefore moderated their rhetoric, emphasizing nationalism and a mixed economy, and also attempted to incorporate a

more diverse set of opinions in governing institutions and adopt a largely democratic political system.

The question this chapter then asks is why *didn't* Nicaragua post-1979 become a HISS state, like Cuba did twenty years before? The answer I have offered is that for Nicaragua, the threat of United States military intervention was recognized by leaders to be extremely high, and state sponsorship was a policy that only served to exacerbate the threat. Following Reagan's election, Nicaragua did not have time to wait for new revolutionary governments to overthrow Latin American regimes and embrace Managua's new leadership. The power disparity between the United States and Nicaragua meant that an invasion would ultimately lead to the demise of the Nicaraguan government "in its present form," as Regan once put it. Barring some kind of nuclear-sized military deterrent, Nicaragua needed friends, either by patching up relations with Washington to via other allies and their attendant aid flows, arms deals, training, technical assistance, and whatever anti-United States actions they could offer. Most of all, they needed to take the US threat seriously and toe the bright red "no sponsorship" line that first Carter and then Regan had drawn.

There are a few ways of applying this insight to the Revolutionary Realities theory that could all be explored in future research. It may be that an additional assumption which has previously been overlooked must hold for these three necessary causal factors to be sufficient for actually causing HISS adoption. In order to be adopted as state policy, states must have the foreign policy independence to pursue their chosen programs—including HISS. Put differently, HISS is adopted in the presence of the three factors under analysis as long as a HISS policy does not threaten the survival of the regime or the territorial integrity of the state. It is true that sponsoring non-state actors often inflates tensions between nations. As noted in the introduction

and Chapter 2, states with anti-status quo postures are likely to gain international attention and spur other states to take reactionary measures, up to and including military hostilities.[134] However, in most cases, it does not inspire (or it is not obvious that it will inspire) a credible threat of outright military invasion by foreign countries for the purpose of overthrowing the sponsoring government. When it does, HISS will not occur because HISS, like conventional operations abroad, becomes a fairly obviously losing proposition. If a Revolutionary state lacks de facto foreign policy independence and is sufficiently in touch with Reality, they have an even more limited set of tools with which to engage the world.[135]

If, however, a more developed theory of HISS adoption does not apply to states that lack foreign policy independence, it is natural to wonder when this assumption is likely to hold (or, if you like, precisely what the scope conditions of a more developed theory dedicated to sufficiency conditions, are). This chapter has demonstrated that plausible candidates for assumption-violating states include small or militarily weak Latin American nations. This geographic restriction of the theory's application, of course, would rule out Cuba, which I have demonstrated, *does* comport with my theory. The rhetoric of the United States not wanting "another Cuba" suggests, then, that there is also a temporal dimension to when the assumption of de facto foreign policy independence holds.[136] Latin American states in the late Cold War period

[134] See Walt's *Revolution and War*.

[135] This is especially worth noting, since much of the revolutionary and all of the "rogue state" thinking on this topic suggests that spreading the revolution or being norm-violators is an inherently irrational policy. The Cuban case showed that, while it may have been *risky*, HISS was not clearly inimical to Castro's rule and offered many potential benefits to the island nation.

[136] One cannot help but notice, in studying HISS, that the historical analogy involved in the invective against "another Cuba" is reminiscent of the refrain "no more Munichs" and similarly seems to have enormous rhetorical effect. See Yuen Foong Khong's (1992) *Analogies at War* for the role of historical analogies in US decision making about Vietnam and Record 2007 for a similar analysis of analogies and the 2003 Iraq war.

may be out-of-scope for the Revolutionary Realities theory; there is some evidence for that in this research.

This is only, though, an initial attempt to identify additional assumptions and causal conditions. Though not examined in detail in this research, Afghanistan provides an example that complicates without refuting the notion that de facto foreign policy independence is necessary. In Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s, HISS processes were not merely short-circuited; someone came in and pulled the plug. Under the Taliban, though it clearly supported the terrorist group Al-Qaeda and a few other movements in and outside of the region, Afghanistan did not actually reach the HISS threshold before it was invaded by coalition troops in 2001 as a response to 9/11. The country was on track to become a major sponsor of non-state actors across the world, and the government entered power extra-institutionally while simultaneously espousing an international, anti-status quo ideology. Also, the Taliban was quite weak militarily, which is one of the reasons it sought to connect with Al Qaeda.[137] However, HISS was not adopted in Afghanistan either, quite likely for the simple reason that the government wasn't around long enough to ramp up its activity to that level. Is this a lack of foreign policy independence? A measurement error on the dependent variable? Another temporal (post-9/11) scope condition? What is clear is that the Revolutionary Realities theory has some limitations when it comes to accounting for HISS activity, and further development of this promising theoretical approach is warranted.

Stepping back shows that Nicaragua's non-adoption of HISS is actually consistent with the basic insight of the theory of Revolutionary Realities: neither ideology alone nor the strategic

[137] Daniel Byman. 2005. *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*. New York: Cambridge University Press. See especially Chapter 7.

imperatives of the state alone can account for high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors. The theory in the dissertation emphasized one aspect of the "Realities" considerations facing states, which was that structural impediments to the use of conventional force abroad meant that only some foreign policy tools are available to governments that might wish to pursue an activist, internationalist foreign policy that includes the use of force. The Nicaraguan case suggests that other realities can have an effect on the choice to adopt HISS—and that HISS itself can be off the table for a state that has even one eye on its national security and territorial integrity. Thus, while I believe there is insufficient evidence to formally incorporate the "de facto foreign policy independence" assumption in the Revolutionary Realities theory, it is clear that other processes involving government calculation of risk and perception of foreign policy options can interrupt the causal mechanisms leading from the three factors under research here and HISS outcomes. The fact that ideational, domestic-political, and strategic international factors must all be in place for a state to actually pursue this rare policy, however, *is* more consistent with my theory than with the majority of the existing claims in the literature.

This leads to a final point. The Nicaraguan case puts one more nail in the coffin of the "radical leaders" theories of HISS in the literature. According to Sadri, whose articulation is the most considered and nuanced, attempts to spread the revolution outside of national borders occurs when those with strong ideological inclinations are able to, through domestic political processes following revolutions, maintain control of major portions of government and policy making.[138] However, it is fairly clear that the FSLN had the reins of domestic political power and could have implemented its preferred policy, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs.[139]

[138] Sadri 1997, Chapter 1-2.

[139] Vanderlaan 1986, 56.

The structure of the government would have allowed them to pursue HISS. Furthermore, HISS would be theoretically consistent with the ideology of most of the top Sandinistas. Other factors, though, prevailed, and these ideologically-oriented leaders did not spread their revolution via support for non-state actors. As Tomás Borge put it in 1980, "It is possible to behave in an intelligent manner and still be true to one's principles. It is also possible to be true to one's principles and behave stupidly." The recognition of this distinction is the very essence of Revolutionary Realities.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

I. Triangulating Conclusions on Revolutionary Realities and Patterns of HISS Adoption

This research sought to address the question: Under what conditions do states adopt a policy of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors? It then offered a theory which I have called the "Revolutionary Realities" theory that identified three jointly-necessary, mutually-reinforcing key conditions that lead to HISS adoption: entry to power via non-institutionalized pathways, an international revolutionary ideology, and high barriers to offensive conventional military operations abroad against key rivals.

The research presented here, which used a mixed-methods approach to leverage different kinds of evidence on a hard-to-observe political phenomenon, ultimately supported this theoretical account. From the quantitative analysis using the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship data I was able to find that these factors tend to correlate with HISS adoption across the world from the period 1975-2004. I was also able to confirm this congruence in a number of individual case studies where I more deeply and accurately measured the causal factors of interest. In addition to increasing the validity of the measurement of key conditions and outcomes, these case studies expanded the temporal scope of the analysis to include the 1950s and 1960s with the Chinese and Cuban cases. Finally, I was able to demonstrate that at least part of the causal process linking these posited necessary conditions to the outcome of interest was operative in the cases of HISS adoption.

Conclusions from Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis in Part II was able to demonstrate several aspects of this theory and enhance its validity as an account of HISS across time and space. First, I was able to establish that there is a subset of states that engage in foreign sponsorship of non-state actors at a high level. I also found that these states, all else being equal, tend to sponsor more high-profile terrorist groups, target more governments, and support more groups around the world than other sponsoring states. I thereby presented evidence to support my operationalization and definition of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors. Furthermore, I strengthened the theoretical premise of this entire project, that More is Different when it comes to state sponsorship policies. These empirical trends warrant further and at least partially unique theoretical explanations.

The statistical modeling portion of my quantitative analysis also supported the Revolutionary Realities theory of HISS adoption. The triple-interaction term, which takes on high values only so long as all three necessary conditions are present, was statistically correlated with HISS outcomes at conventional levels of significance. The simplistic RR dummy variable performed similarly well. This was true in a number of different model specifications, including in hazard models, which most closely corresponds with my theory's focus on HISS adoption. Robustness tests in the Appendix showed the same results when a few different thresholds and ranges of variables of interest were considered. This suggested that the presence of these three factors tends to correlate with HISS outcomes, offering one form of support for my theory's validity and its ability to account for HISS.

Furthermore, the competing explanations as operationalized in this research did not consistently correlate well with HISS outcomes in statistical analysis. Some factors, such as

international rivalry and, to a lesser extent, revolutionary transitions and regime factors, did coincide with HISS. However, it was never the contention of this theory that the existing literatures were fundamentally wrong. Typically, the measures most closely related to my theory and its attendant causal mechanisms out-performed related, alternative measures that were more closely connected to the literature's account. In particular, the number of contiguous rivals was not as consistently correlated with HISS as the percentage of rivals that were non-contiguous, and social revolutionary events were not associated with high-intensity sponsorship once my entry variable was included in the analysis. All of this suggests that both the IR and comparative revolutions literatures have identified important factors and processes related to this pattern of sponsorship but are incomplete.

Conclusions from Case Studies

The evidence from the case studies also ultimately supports the central hypothesis of this research. HISS adoption tends to occur in cases when the three posited conditions are present. Indeed, in many cases, these necessary conditions were also sufficient to cause HISS. Using more detailed and accurate measures of the key variables, congruency testing of these cases reinforced the correlative findings in the quantitative study. Furthermore, there is some evidence from causal process analysis that the causal logics leading from my key factors to HISS adoption were operative. Though for reasons described at various places throughout this thesis, extremely close and in-depth causal process tracing was not possible in many of these cases and was not the goal of this research, there is nonetheless overall confirmation of the dissertation's theory from cases.

Specifically, the Revolutionary Realities theory was able to accurate predict five out of six cases of adoption and non-adoption examined (six out of seven if Cuba's substitution away

from HISS is counted in the theory's favor). In each of the four cases in which HISS was adopted, this research also found that all three posited necessary conditions were in fact present. Despite the differences in region, decade, and, indeed, ideological content, across these cases, the insights from the Revolutionary Reality theory of HISS adoption were still applicable. The results of these congruency tests were consistent with the theory. Additionally, Cuba's move from covert sponsorship of the MPLA to outright military intervention in Angola in the with-in case comparison were broadly commensurate with my theory, even though a policy change away from HISS is not the theoretical equivalent of a non-adoption in the first place.

This is a significantly better performance than the alternative theory in the literature, which expects that revolutionary regimes will try to export their political revolution when radicals take control of state policy. In two cases, I was able to predict the outcome of the case better than this theory. In Democratic Kampuchea, I argued that the content of the regime's ruling ideology, while extreme, was inconsistent with my theory's definition of an international revolutionary ideology. Thus, I expected that it would not adopt HISS, although the revolutionary circumstances of its entry and extraordinary domestic political changes it made would have lead those in the "social revolutions and radical leaders" camp to expect a foreign policy that included HISS. Also, in the case of Sudan post-1989, the Revolutionary Realities theory was able to accurately predict that HISS would come to be adopted. Pure revolutionary theories tend not to predict HISS-like global engagement when the regime comes in as a result of a military coup and allies itself with existing political figures. In this case, Hasan al-Turabi was already associated with the NIF, one of the legal, if ideologically-oriented, political parties. The Revolutionary Realities theory, though, considers military coups a kind of non-institutionalized

entry and therefore, because the other conditions also obtained, considered the situation in Sudan ripe for HISS adoption.

Also, one portion of the posited causal pathway from conditions to outcome was consistently identified in each of the cases. The mutually reinforcing dynamics between ideology (which promoted a preference for an international, activist, anti-status quo foreign policy) and entry type tended to lead to a similar set of domestic political decision-making processes and institutions. In many cases, I was able to identify the agencies and actors who were in a position to choose and implement sponsorship policies. Loyalty to the consolidating regime was evaluated based on ideological similarity, and highly concentrated top-down foreign policy decision-making was institutionalized by a group of like-minded ideologues. All of these were the theoretical causal mechanisms that the Revolutionary Realities theory thought would connect these factors to HISS adoption outcomes. Another observable implication of my mechanisms was that states would tend to identify rival and foes in both ideological and geostrategic terms. This, too, was born out in a number of cases.

Showing one of the strengths of the mixed-methods approach, I used the case of Nicaragua to further examine one of the unexpected results in the quantitative analysis. A number of Latin America states had high values on all three causal factors but did not adopt HISS. The analysis of Nicaragua's non-adoption suggested that a concern that the United States would intervene to oust the Sandinista government from power can explain why HISS was never adopted. The United States government clearly communicated to the Sandinistas that sponsorship for revolutions abroad would cause serious trouble between Managua and Washington. Nicaragua was, de facto, not free to adopt a HISS policy. The FSLN even tested this boundary with their support of the FMLN and found that the consequences were indeed

serious: Reagan gave massive support to the ARDE and other contra groups, on the explicit basis of Nicaragua's arms shipments to Central American guerrilla groups. Knowing that sponsorship this was a high-risk policy that jeopardized national *and* regime security, the Sandinistas chose not to adopt a policy of HISS even though all three Revolutionary Realities causal factors were present. Furthermore, the theorized causal mechanism leading from the conditions to HISS adoption did appear to be interrupted and mitigated in this case. Specifically, it seemed, a desire to appear more moderate and to forestall foreign intervention drove the FSLN to increase its tolerance for political pluralism. This exposure to a wider variety of ideas along with consensus-based decision-making diverged from the tightly controlled, top-down foreign policy apparatus seen in cases of HISS adoption. This insight therefore increases my confidence that my proposed causal mechanisms do lead from the causal conditions of ideology and entry type to HISS adoption in other cases.

In terms of identifying jointly necessary conditions, the cases also provided support and important insights. The DK/China case comparison shows that the wrong type of ideology, even in the face of non-institutionalized entry, does not lead to HISS adoption. Though the Khmer Rouge was certainly extreme and did come to power through non-institutionalized pathways, an activist, global foreign policy was not consistent with the nationalistic, chauvinistic ideological content the government espoused. This chapter also identified the role of ideology in shaping the identification of key rivals and thus, of barriers to offensive war against them. It served to underscore the mutually-reinforcing roles of these two conditions. Finally, whereas radical leadership accounts of HISS would predict that DK would attempt to export revolution, the Revolutionary Realities theory corrected predicts its non-adoption.

The Cuba case also helped to demonstrate the importance of the high barriers to offensive conventional operations abroad in accounting for HISS. In the first decade of the Castro regime's rule, the barriers were quite high (and the other two conditions were also met.) It was during this period that HISS was adopted. However, Cuba scaled back its involvement in HISS around the time that it had the option to pursue conventional military operations abroad. Specifically, in Angola, Cuba opted for large-scale military intervention on behalf of its preferred insurgent group, the MPLA, rather than contenting itself with a covert aid program. Furthermore, there is some documentary evidence that Cuba pursued the Angola intervention for the same reason that it pursued HISS: to forward an anti-imperialist, pro-leftist, national liberation foreign policy. Since this is a theory of HISS adoption alone, it is not the perfect test of the necessity of the high barriers factor; Cuba had already embraced sponsorship in the previous decade. But, it does offer support for the dissertation's claim that HISS is one of the few tools available to states lacking an offensive military capacity and states that adopt HISS are substituting foreign actors for their own armed forces. The intensity of HISS support dropped as Cuban opportunities for conventional opportunities abroad expanded, and the FAR's military operations in Africa, not support for revolutions per se, became the central focus of Cuban foreign policy.

One hole in this research design is testing the necessity of the mode of entry into power. Though the six case studies have different modes of entry as defined by the most closely competing theory (popular revolution, civil war, armed insurrection, and military coup d'état), from the perspective of my own theory, they were all non-institutionalized pathways. The brief case explored in the US/Reagan section on this chapter begins to address this gap. Encouragingly, the quantitative evidence does show that irregular entry as I define it is correlated

with HISS outcomes, and it does appear to drive important causal processes related to HISS adoption at the domestic level. Thus while it appears to be a *common* factor across the HISS cases, its status as a causal necessity is not demonstrated in this research. This is one of the shortcomings of focusing on congruency testing and one of the challenges of rigorously testing a theory that posits jointly necessary conditions. Through case comparisons I have only been able to advance claims of causal necessity for some of the factors. Correlations, though, are quite strong, and with further research, sufficient confirmatory evidence may be uncovered.

Overall, and especially compared to other theories in the literature, the Revolutionary Realities theory performed well. The difficulty in obtaining complete and unbiased information and evidence made it hard to "prove" that my theoretical insights provided a strong account of HISS. At the same time, the preponderance of evidence collected and triangulated in this research, both cross-nationally and within the seven individual case studies, all offered one form or another of support for this theory. By cutting at this question in a few different ways, I have been able to demonstrate, with mutually-reinforcing evidence, that the Revolutionary Realities theory is an essentially valid explanation for high-intensity state sponsorship of none-state actors. Future research should focus on developing this theory, which is highly promising and seems to get to the heart of this important, if rare, pattern of international sponsorship.

II. Additional Patterns within the Case Studies

Case study approaches are helpful in elucidating other factors, conditions, boundaries, and similarities across cases, all of which might have explanatory power and be worth pursuing in future research. There were several noteworthy points that emerged from the qualitative analysis in this project that could be used to develop the theory or examine related phenomena more closely.

Revolutions, Ideologies, and Coups: Temporal Dynamics

One theme that emerged in this research is that irregular entry and ideology interact, but they can do so in different ways in different political contexts while still converging in terms of HISS outcome. In Iran, there was a fairly broad coalition of societal forces that overthrew the previous regime. These different groups espoused different ideologies ranging from the pan-Islamic tendencies of the Ayatollahs to secular nationalism. It was through the kind of social revolutionary political processes that so many sociologists, historians, and comparativists have examined that the Khomeinist faction, espousing a particular set of notions, ultimately seized the reins of the state.[1] The ideology held more or less constantly by a central political player or faction became dominant as that faction gained more and more control of the polity itself. The process looks very much like the one posited in other theories, and indeed, the Iran case is one that both Revolutionary Realities and radical leadership theories accurately predict.

However, there are a number of other cases in which the ordering of entry to power and adoption of ideology was actually reversed. In Sudan we saw that, regardless of the actual ideals held by al-Bashir, it was not until some months after the military coup d'état that the National Islamic Front party came to be central to running the state. The military co-conspirators did not publicly announce their intention to ally with the NIF or to change Sudan's political system into something new prior to seizing power. Rather, at the time of coups, they were merely ousting an extremely unpopular and highly corrupt government (and of course, enhancing their own political fortunes in the offing). Not only that, it was months before al-Turabi was released from prison and the NIF brought in to shore-up popular support for the coup's architects. The

[1] Indeed, the political back-and-forth between extremists and moderates continues in the current era (Alexander and Hoenig 2008).

ideology was not embraced and policies based on that ideology were not enacted until well after the irregular power change occurred.

This is not unique to Sudan. The time gap between non-institutionalized power grab and embracing an international revolutionary ideology is even more pronounced in the Libyan case. Libya is another state that engaged in HISS, making support for all kinds of groups worldwide and especially highly terroristic ones, a central feature of Libya's political identity. Though not given a full study here, this is nonetheless another case that seems to broadly adhere to the theory, in terms of congruence of the causal factors and the outcome. A 1969 coup brought Qaddafi to power and ousted the unpopular King Idris, but it was only in 1973 that Qaddafi made the Zwara Declaration, in which he began his crusade to foment revolutionary consciousness in the Libyan people and called for the advancement of Arab unity.[2] Furthermore, Libya was re-titled "Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" only in 1977, eight full years after the coup. Apart from a general loathing of the former king and a preference for Arab unity, Qaddafi and his coconspirators did not have a clear political ideology as they entered power, and it was not the articulation of this ideology that led to a political movement to change the structure of power in Libya.[3] Ideologies, policies, and governing institutions moved in tandem as the new leadership began to run the country and pursue political projects like HISS using the offices of state.

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[2] David Blundy and Andrew Lycett. 1987. *Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company; Brian Davis. 1990. *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger; Mahmoud M. Ayoub. 1987. *Islam and the Third Universal Theory: The Religious Thought of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul/KPI Limited.

[3] One account suggests that Qaddafi was hoping to hand Libya over to Nasser as a step towards true Arab unity, following the successful coup. Mohammad Heikal, an Egyptian journalist and advisor to Nasser, went to Libya on the evening of the coup, where Heikal was "'horrified' by Qaddafi's naivety, sincerity, and intensity. Qaddafi said: 'We have carried out this revolution. Now it is for Nasser to tell us what to do.' Heikal spent most of the time calming down an excited Qaddafi, who repeatedly talked of his visions of Arab unity." See Blundy and Lycett 1987, 62.

Yet another trajectory is seen in Syria. HISS levels of non-state actor support were detected in my dataset in 1982, under Hafez al-Assad. Assad himself came to power seven years after the "Ba'th Revolution of 8 March 1963" in which the Syrian military with many Ba'th Party affiliates overthrew a military dictatorship that lingered after WWII-era colonial overtures by the French and British.[4] A 1966 coup saw the ascension to power of Salah Jadid and his brand of more revolutionary neo-Ba'thism, and it was only in 1970 that Assad supplanted him.[5] Even more interesting is the fact that Jadid was, in many ways, more politically "radical" than Assad and his supporters. Jadid, however, was interested in a massive socialist revolution *within* the country, whereas Assad sought less radical domestic changes while still embracing, and more frequently acting on, outward-looking ideological principles like pan-Arabism and the ideal of Greater Syria.[6] It was under these conditions that HISS was adopted, suggesting a complex interplay of non-institutionalized regime change and domestic politics, ideological commitments, and external international conditions at work in HISS states. Certainly, the timing of relevant events and policy adoption is not consistent, and yet the factors theorized in this research are consistently present across cases.

Further research on the temporal aspects of power changes, ideology espousal, and HISS would yield valuable insight to how the conditions that do appear to be consistently associated with HISS actually operate in some of these more complex cases. If this agenda is of interest, it would be worth carefully laying out more detailed theories of the causal mechanisms and identifying other conditions.

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[4] Robert W. Olson. 1982. *The Ba'th and Syria 1947-1982: The Evolution of Ideology, Party, and State*. Princeton, NJ: The Kingston Press.

[5] Rami Ginat. 2005. *Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: From Independence to Dependence.* Sussex: Sussex Academic Press.

[6] See Daniel Pipes. 1990. *Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition.* New York: Oxford University Press; Robert W. Olson. 1982.

History of FIRC and Anti-Imperialism in HISS States

One condition worth investigating more closely may be a country's historical experience with colonialism and foreign-imposed regime changes. The international revolutionary ideologies that were explored in this research all had a common theme of anti-imperialism. Though the political ideologies described different positive world views, they all identified "imperialism" as not just an adversary, but as a key cause of global inequality and oppression. In the case of Cuba and Nicaragua, anti-Americanism was almost the equivalent of anti-imperialism. In Iran and Sudan, the imperialist powers were both the Western and Eastern super-powers, though the Western bloc nations were typically more vilified. Thus by one way of thinking, the internationalism of these worldviews is actually attributable to the international reach of the imperialist adversary. An ideology that identifies imperialism as a major problem for the world, even with only scant additional content, is well on its way to instilling a preference for an activist, global, anti-status quo among its believers in the post-WWII era.

In many cases, it is also true that colonial and imperial states were directly and intimately involved in the political history of the countries that considered or adopted HISS. Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua all saw more nationalist and popular or democratic leaders overthrown with the assistance of the United States or the United Kingdom, only to be replaced by a despotic strongman who was highly loyal to these foreign powers. In China, the United States had systematically favored Jiang Jieshi's Nationalists against Mao's Communist forces, both during the resistance to the Japanese occupation and even more aggressively in the post-WWII civil war period.[7] Sudan was a colony of Great Britain until 1955.

[7] See State Department. 1949 for extensive documentation of Washington's involvement in the Chinese civil war before, during, and after WWII.

In other cases of adoption, the HISS state also had a past, highly unequal political relationship with colonial or imperialist powers. Syria had a history of foreign-imposed regimes and rule, and foreign interest in Libyan oil helped prop up an unpopular autocratic government until the coup that brought Qaddafi and his inner circle to power. Indeed, despite many of Qaddafi's fairly extreme domestic policies, Western states continued to import and help refine the oil that kept the dictatorial regime monetarily viable.[8] All of these countries experienced high levels of foreign interference in their politics for many years before the regimes that did or seemed likely to implement HISS came to power.

One of the insights of my research into this topic concerns this history. Ultimately, this dissertation hoped to make the case that there are empirical patterns of causal conditions across HISS cases. This is another such condition that appears in many cases, and there are a number of possible effects on the factors and processes of HISS adoption central to this dissertation's theory. A history of colonialism, or particularly high levels of foreign involvement in national politics, may be another condition or a more temporally distant cause of high-intensity state sponsorship. For one thing, it appears to make the kinds of international revolutionary ideologies that leaders embrace (either during anti-government struggles or in the cases of Sudan and Libya, after assuming power) resonate with the masses. The shared history of foreign interference may well make certain kinds of ideologies much more likely to resonate with more people, thus making it possible for charismatic leaders who espouse those ideologies to enter or hold on to power.[9]

[8] Blundy and Lycett 1987.

[9] Max Weber. 1978. *Economy and Society*. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Eds). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Weber's articulation of charismatic authority appears in Part I, Chapter 3.

Furthermore, it may be the case that institutionalized pathways to power are largely closed off in politics that have been exposed to foreign-imposed regime change or have a history of high levels of interference from foreign powers in their domestic politics. This was certainly the situation in Iran and Cuba, the most classic and ideal-typical HISS cases. There were very few avenues for political expression or change, and little chance of achieving meaningful access to power through institutionalized channels. Fidel Castro, for example, considered a career as a Cuban politician before the 1952 Batista coup and even after this event, sent formal, legal petitions to the government, calling for greater political freedom within the existing system.[10] When this failed, armed warfare seemed the best alternative. This historical, national experience with imperialist or hegemonic domination meant that if a group of political actors had a set of ideas that went against the status quo (as embodied by the foreign-backed leader), the only means by which they could plausibly enter power were bound to be non-institutionalized. Once again, this kind of historical experience is tied up with the causal factors posited in this dissertation.

Finally, a history of foreign imposed regime change or high levels of foreign interference with domestic politics could also directly affect the foreign policy preferences of leadership. Chairman Mao's once put it thusly:

> "Make trouble, fail, make trouble again, fail again . . . until their doom—that is the logic of the imperialists and all reactionaries the world over in dealing with the people's cause and they will never go against this logic. This is a Marxist law. When we say 'imperialism is ferocious', we mean that its nature will never change, that the imperialists will never lay down their butcher knives, that they will never become Buddhas, till their doom." [11]

[10] Tad Szulc. 2000. *Fidel: A Critical Portrait.* New York: Harper.

[11] Mao Tsetung. 1961b. "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle" (August 14, 1949), from Selected Works, Vol. IV., 428.

The assertion that imperialists will "never put down their butcher knives" says it well. Many leaders have observed that powerful states were willing to go on the offensive time and time again. This history was somewhat common across a number of key cases in this research. The United States or other powers were constantly working against the individuals or groups who were, despite foreign powers' best efforts, ultimately successful in gaining and holding on to power. These experiences could easily have heightened the appeal of an aggressive, internationalist foreign policy. Merely defending oneself at home would not be sufficient to put off, deter, or punish those actors, in many instances the United States, that had demonstrated in the past a concentrated interest in maintaining a certain kind of political order for the state in question.

Thus history could easily foster the belief that only by actually imposing costs on this kind of adversary would a Cuba, China, or Iran be able to force such powers to retreat or scale back their own aggressive policies. Offensive policies, like the use of conventional militaries, successful overthrow of US-allied regimes, or, barring that, harassment with non-state actors and terrorists, would be required to assert national independence and to pursue domestic economic and political development on the new regime's own terms. Without such a foreign policy, these powerful international actors would once again try to assert control of the nation in question and may ultimately succeed, precisely as they had in the past. In short, it could easily have appeared that the only defense was a good offense.

All of this suggests that this research question is ripe for more thorough-going case study-based qualitative analysis. For an event as rare as high-intensity state sponsorship, it is likely that there are more than three necessary conditions. Furthermore, careful attention to the

historical context and the role that it plays in setting the stage for those necessary conditions would make it possible to pursue in-depth causal analysis and process tracing. Clearly, a history of colonialism or foreign imposed regime change is not a sufficient condition, as a vast number of countries have been exposed to this level of foreign interference and domination. Still, its role in making certain ideologies more resonant with populations, certain processes for power acquisition more likely, and certain foreign policies more appealing could all contribute to adoption of high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors.

III. HISS in the United States: What the Revolutionary Realities Theory Can Reveal

At several points throughout the dissertation, I have noted that the United States would be addressed in the conclusion. The case clearly falls within the scope of the research. Also, the present study remains agnostic on normative questions of whether sponsorship is a "moral" policy and is therefore untroubled by the fact that policies directed by Washington are of the same kind (HISS) as policies directed by Moscow, Tehran, Havana, or Tripoli. I have just discussed some surprising insights from Part III of the research, which focused on additional causal conditions or a narrowing of scope. Now, though, I return to the Revolutionary Realities theory as it is currently formulated, which can indeed explain some of the dynamics at work in the US adoption of HISS.

The SPFS dataset finds that the United States was a HISS state from 1982-1992. As discussed in Chapter 1, US international sponsorship activity accounts for a decent percentage of observations in a number of well-respected and oft-used datasets. It is routinely in the top ten states involved in sponsorship abroad. It is therefore worth discussing the insight that this dissertation's research has to offer on the subject of Washington's HISS activities and adoption.

In this section, I briefly review the ways in which the US case does and does not conform with my theory.

At first glance, the case seems to be quite an anomaly, one that the Revolutionary Reality theory misses almost completely. The United States did adopt HISS in about 1982 and was, by the middle of the 1980s, sponsoring from eight to eleven non-state actors abroad. Target states were as far-flung as Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Iran, and Angola, ultimately spanning every major region in the world, and supported actors included some HPTGs according to this research's measure of such groups. Yet, Ronald Reagan came to power having won a well-regulated, free and fair election in a firmly established democracy. His administration did embrace a strong ideology, one that was based on a Cold War, East-West worldview, but it was *not* "revolutionary" in the sense that we have seen thusfar in the research. Finally, the United States also possesses the world's most power military, with the occasional exception of the Soviet Union depending on how such things are calculated, and Washington could have conceivably taken the fight to any number of these target governments. Indeed, in a number of places, especially Vietnam and the Korean peninsula, and during the Reagan era places like Grenada, the US armed forces were dispatched abroad for such missions. Thus the three, jointly-necessary conditions hypothesis does not appear to hold up well.

A closer examination of the circumstances under which the Reagan administration adopted HISS, though, reveals that the Revolutionary Realities account does have much to offer in terms of understanding the policy's adoption.[12] Firstly, the content of the neoconservative

[12] Contemporaries and historians have labeled a collection of Reagan foreign policy choices "The Reagan Doctrine." I would argue that what I call high-intensity state sponsorship of non-state actors is largely subsumed under this doctrine, but it is not synonymous. The Reagan Doctrine was somewhat broader and tends to also entail the purpose of the policy. I am interested in trying to look at the policy itself (i.e. the pattern of support for non-state actors) and assessing whether the conditions were present. It is not necessary to know what the administration was attempting to accomplish in each case to 'code' the outcome of HISS itself.

ideology that guided much of the administration's foreign policy is rather closer to the definition of international revolutionary ideology than it appears at first blush. Additionally, the policy apparatus that conceived of and carried out the HISS program was much more similar to the apparatus established following non-institutionalized power transfers than, for example, most previous US governments. Like-minded persons and Reagan loyalists were in charge of a number of the relevant bureaus and offices. Finally, there was a key barrier to conventional operations abroad that this dissertation's theory did not consider: the democratic barrier. The voting US public had little appetite for military activity overseas in the wake of the Vietnam War, which presented the Reagan administration with a very real and very high barrier to using its military apparatus. They, like so many ideologically-oriented governments before them, considered the sub-conventional tools at their disposal for achieving their foreign policy goals and, ultimately, embraced HISS.

Neoconservatism and the Strategy of "Rollback"

Known for being strident, for unabashedly embracing American exceptionalism, and for labeling the Soviet Union-led Eastern bloc as the "Evil Empire," the Reagan administration's ideological rhetoric also has several similarities with the international revolutionary ideologies examined in-depth in this research. Though articulating a historical trajectory was less central, there was a moral international application of individual liberty, democracy, and freedom. Furthermore, there was an imperative to action in the neoconservative worldview, which called explicitly for undermining pro-Soviet governments in an attempt to rollback Soviet expansionism, rather than being "passive" and simply aiming to contain Moscow.

There was a universal moral component to the notion of 'spreading democracy' and promoting freedom in the neoconservatism of the 1980s. The concept that all men are created

equal underlies a desire to expand an 'empire of liberty' which respects universal human rights.[13] These rights, according to the doctrine, could only flourish in democratic states, not communist or socialist ones. In an account of conservative internationalism, of which Reagan's foreign policy was one instantiation, historian Nau also cites the founding American myth that all men are created equal as a driving normative force in the ideology.[14] These kinds of universally applicable, moral constructs are indeed inherent in the ideology that many top Reagan officials embraced.

There is also at least the suggestion of historical trajectories in this worldview. Velasco, who studies the neoconservatism that influenced US foreign policy in the Reagan era, notes that this ideology held that communism was the equivalent of totalitarianism, after Hannah Arendt.[15] In contrast to these *total*itarian states, *authori*tarian regimes by strongmen or military governments were more likely to yield to democracy and freedom over time.[16] Though not as clearly an instance of eschatological thinking, the idea was that the United States should play a long game and prefer authoritarianism over communist-type totalitarianism. An ideal political situation would emerge in these countries over time. This suggests that this ideology, upon more thorough and systematic examination, might conform to the theory's definition of 'international revolutionary' after all.

Perhaps most pronounced in Reagan-era neoconservative thinking is the vital importance of action. In some ways, this simply meant not shying away from the use of force, taking

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[13] Jesús Velasco. 2010. *Neoconservatives in U.S. Foreign Policy.* Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 7. Velasco here refers to John Lewis Gaddis's take on Thomas Jefferson's "Empire of Liberty." He notes that neo conservatism draws on this intellectual tradition for its liberty-oriented interpretation of human rights.

[14] Henry R. Nau. 2013. *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 5.

[15] See Hannah Arendt. *The Origins of Totalitarianism.* Originally published 1948.

[16] Jesús Velasco 2010. See Chapter 4, 86-94.

military action or at least making credible threats, to achieve foreign policy goals.[17] The central component, however, was a general rejection of containment, when it came to a global strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Neoconservative circles had long been frustrated with the seemingly reactive policy of preventing communism's spread and instead preferred to 'roll back' communist gains. This meant that the United States would attempt to foment regime change in states that had pro-Soviet, Marxist, and/or leftist governments. Thus whereas containment was about promoting and protecting the status quo, the Reagan administration held a preference for changing existing governments. This means that neoconservatives also had a preference for an anti-status quo, activist foreign policy as a result of their political ideology.

A speech made by President Reagan at the Heritage Foundation in 1983 perhaps sums it up most clearly. He stated that,

> "Throughout the world today the aspirations for freedom and democracy are growing. In the Third World, in Afghanistan, in Central America, in Africa, in Southeast Asia, opposition to totalitarians is on the rise. It may not grab headlines, but there is a democratic revolution underway…the goal in the free world must no longer be stated in the negative, that is, resistance to Soviet expansionism. The goal of the free world must instead be stated in the affirmative. We must go on the offensive with a forward strategy for freedom."[18]

The language used here is reminiscent of many of those documents and speeches examined elsewhere in the dissertation. The desire for offensive action, the moral authority of the free world, even the reference to a democratic revolution are all hallmarks of an international revolutionary ideology. Though this analysis is only a glancing blow, it is clearer upon closer examination that Reagan neo-conservatism takes on international revolutionary aspects.

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[17] Nau 2013.

[18] In James M. Scott. 1996. *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 22.

The Reagan Administration's Homogenous Government vs. Competing Institutions

Though Reagan was democratically elected, and his administration entered government following proper, institutionalized procedures, much of foreign policy was directed by well-known ideologues and only limited viewpoints were aired. The key foreign policy agencies in the United States are the State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.[19] In the 1980s, top positions in the departments of State and Defense were neoconservatives loyal to Reagan.[20]

It is generally understood that the president and the executive branch have a great deal of latitude when it comes to foreign policy; this is particularly the case when it comes to national security policy.[21] This presidential power was highly pronounced under the Reagan administration. Though executive branch agencies answer to the Congress on a number of issues, there was a great deal of foreign affairs policymaking happening without Congress during this period. For example, regarding one office within the State Department, the Human Rights Bureau in the State Department in particular, it was specifically noted that "Congress 'had little influence over how the Bureau was managed.'"[22] This office was, in turn, central to some of Regan's international programs.

Further, many of the leaders of these agencies and department offices shared the same broad, neoconservative viewpoints. It is worth referring to Velasco, a historian of the Reagan administration's foreign policy, at length here: "Three criteria were used to choose these

[19] Scott 1996, 7. Scott's ultimate point is that there are a number of different players when it comes to US foreign policy, but he does support the notion that policy initiative typically rests with these executive branch agencies.

[20] Velasco 2010, 32. Velasco traces the history of a number of Reagan administration officials to neoconservative think tanks; many such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, and Richard Pipes were in the core or the periphery of the movement prior to joining Reagan's government (21).

[21] Chad paper cites include: Wildavsky, 1966, 1989; Moe & Howell, 1999; Schlesinger, 2004; Canes-Wrone, Howell, & Lewis, 2008).

[22] Velasco 2010, 102.

executive branch personnel. 'One, was he a Reagan man? Two, a Republican? And three, a conservative?'" These questions indicate how important loyalty and like-mindedness were in making hiring decisions. Indeed, career civil servants were shuffled around or fired as ideological concerns led to bureaucratic turnover that went much further down the ladder under the Reagan administration than it had in the past.[23] Furthermore, Velasco notes that, "An analysis of the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan White House staffs revealed that Reagan was more conservative than Nixon and Carter, and that 'consensus in the Reagan White House was substantially greater than either the Carter or the Nixon White House.'"[24] Not only that but, "People appointed for jobs received training to sensitize them to Reagan's viewpoints."[25] Indeed, failure to be sufficiently conservative resulted in the dismissal of top officials; in short, ideological orthodoxy was a requirement for holding important positions.[26] This kind of falling-in-line meant that there was a narrower range of viewpoints on foreign policy available to, or sought by, the administration.[27]

This bears some striking resemblance to the cases of Iran, Cuba, and others in Part III. However, there are of certainly a number of relevant institutions that any US administration still has to contend with when seeking to implement a foreign policy. The US Congress is a central one; the executive branch relies on the legislature for all budgeting matters. Furthermore, there

[23] Scott 1996, 18. Scott draws here on I. M. Destler, Leslie Gelb, and Anthony Lake. 1984. *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Un-making of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

[24] Velasco 2010, 102. Velasco draws the analysis of the White House staff ideology from John H. Kessel. 1984. "The Structure of the Reagan White House." *American Journal of Political Science 28*(2), 235.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Scott 1996, 18. For these points Scott refers to Barbara Epstein. 1989. "The Reagan Doctrine and Right-Wing Democracy" *Socialist Review 19*(1), 9-38 and Dario Moreno. 1990. *U.S. Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate*. Miami: Florida International University Press.

[27] Scott notes that there were different interest groups when it came to foreign policy, but most of the opposition voices were in the Congress or other governing institutions, not directly in the State Department or the NSC (1996, 25).

were a number of instances in which the executive wanted a particular policy, but competition between agencies (the CIA and the State Department for example) sometimes interfered with policy implementation.[28] This is a clear contrast to the parallel institutions, nascent, largely weak in their own right and wholly under the control of a small group of leaders, seen in other HISS adoption cases.

This is not to say that Reagan and his administration did not attempt to circumvent such obstacles. The Iran-Contra scandal clearly indicated that some figures within the executive branch were hoping to pursue a policy of support for the contra forces in Nicaragua despite clear Congressional directives to cease.[29] By selling weapons to one party (Iran) and then funneling the funds towards the contras, the CIA did not need to go to Congress for monetary support for the unpopular policy. However, the story was uncovered, Congress held extensive hearings to find those responsible, officials were fired, and the funding program was ultimately abandoned. This all points to the difference that governing institutions make when it comes to policy decision making and implementation. It is simply much, much more difficult to get a HISS policy up and running in a highly-institutionalized government in which groups and individuals with myriad preferences share and compete for political power.

In the case of the United States, then, it is clear that most of the individual state-group linkages that, cumulatively, make up a HISS policy must be argued for, debated, and approved. In many cases, this means a Congressional vote in every case, like the one in September 2014 to arm Syrian rebels. Still, the circumstances under which HISS was implemented in the United States resembled, in some important ways, those in other states under examination here. Like-

[28] Scott 1996, Chapter 1 and 2.

[29] Specifically, the Boland Amendments prohibited the use of any portion of CIA or DOD funds for military purposes in Nicaragua.

minded ideologues tended to head up the most important foreign policy-making and executive agencies, and these loyal administrators and bureaucrats were ultimately the ones who made the United States a HISS state.

Democratic Barriers to Conventional War: Public Opinion and the Vietnam Syndrome

The United States had the capacity to project power nearly anywhere on the globe, and it was likely to be significantly stronger than any opponent, short of the USSR, that it faced. Though the nuclear barrier to outright conflict the Soviet Union meant that wars in, say, Mozambique or Nicaragua were a wiser course, it is not clear that the nuclear barrier prevented US troop involvement in most conceivable overseas operations during the Reagan era. As James Scott notes in his research on the Reagan Doctrine, a number of successful Communist movements in the late 1970s meant that, by the time Reagan arrived in office, there were numerous of potential targets for the anti-status quo rollback foreign policy.[30] None of these Third World targets entailed much risk of nuclear escalation. The United States could therefore have, at least in terms of the three barriers discussed in this research, used its conventional military apparatus in order to pursue its anti-government activities in various target states.

The above discussion clearly indicates that Congress was a potential hindrance on HISS adoption. However, it was perhaps simultaneously a force pushing towards HISS in the Reagan era. The US Constitution reserves for the Congress the duty of declaring war, and overt military operations (as opposed to covert ones) attract a great deal of public attention.[31] When a cause is unpopular, it would be much harder for the US to use its own military than it would be to sell weapons to, train, or provide logistics to non-state groups abroad.

[30] 1996, Chapter 2.

[31] See Lindsey O'Rourke's 2013 dissertation on covert and overt US regime change operations.

This means that, for the United States, there was an additional barrier to conventional war: legislative approval and, related, the support of the American public at large for such a venture. After the costly and hugely unpopular anti-Communist efforts in Vietnam, there was little appetite among Americans for further conventional military operations abroad, and this was certainly the case when it came to 'roll back' of leftist governments in out-of-the-way countries.[32] There are extensive political science literatures on how and to what extent Congress is sensitive to the preferences of the American public, but the point here is that waging offensive conventional military operations meant overcoming a fairly high barrier in the American political system in the 1980s. Ultimately, the presence of this barrier made HISS a much more attractive option even if, by other measures, the United States was well-placed to conduct offensive operations abroad with its conventional military apparatus. Though not a type previously envisioned in the Revolutionary Realities theory, this domestic, as opposed to international, structural barrier to conventional operations could drive HISS adoption according to similar logics.

In summary, then, though it is clearly not a perfect fit, the case of HISS adoption in the United States under Reagan conforms rather well to key Revolutionary Realities theory logics. The ideology only meets some of the definitional criteria laid out in Chapter 2, but it does engender among adherents a preference for rollback, an anti-status quo, global policy that emphasizes the use of force.[33] The Reagan administration's foreign policy team was led and largely run by like-minded ideologues, and indeed, consensus and ideological purity were

[32] Scott 1996, 2.

[33] It is worth noting that, as a super power in a bipolar era, the United States had strategic security interests in more places than did, for instances, Syria, which may account for the high level of global involvement, absent any need to reference ideology. The "pure geostrategy" account crumbles quickly under scrutiny, however, as ideological motives, or at least an ideologically-influenced worldview, are evident in US involvement in world affairs in general and individual projects in particular, like support for the *mujahedeen* in Afghanistan.

central. At the same time, there were still institutional checks and balances in the system which provided oversight to the executive's activity. The barriers to conventional war were high, but they, too, were of an institutional nature. The executive did not have the power to declare war and knew that adventurous military operations would be wildly unpopular; this ultimately stayed Reagan's hand when, say, a Castro in Cuba would not have been required to consider such limitations in the same way.[34] Thus any full accounting of HISS in the US case would have to address the role that institutions played in the story overall. Still, it is worth noting that some of the processes central to the Revolutionary Realities theory seem like they were in play. This further underscores the general portability of the theory as it currently stands.

IV. Final Thoughts and Directions for Further Research

Future research on this topic should be done to verify and expand our understanding of high-intensity state sponsors. There are still a number of avenues for theory development, such as temporal dynamics across factors, the directionality of HISS, and the issue of foreign policy independence. The Revolutionary Realities account is a very useful baseline, but other aspects of the policy's adoption, appeal, and implementation are currently unexplored. What, for instance, is the effect of earlier HISS states on the decisions of later states that have a chance to observe the trajectories of these nations? While Nicaragua was warned by Castro himself not to imitate Cuba's "isolation," the government in Khartoum gained useful allies in Tehran and Tripoli partially in relation to its ideological leanings and aggressive anti-imperialist stance. Is an alliance with other HISS states a potential cause of HISS adoption, or a potential effect?

[34] Charismatic leaders do tend to worry about maintaining a connection with the populace and thus wildly unpopular policies are unwise. However, authoritarian leaders in general do not need to worry about getting approval of a largely rubber-stamp legislature, and the HISS-adopting leaders in the cases in this research were not subject to regular democratic elections that resulted in real changes in power and leadership. Thus Reagan was limited in a way that a Fidel Castro was not.

Indeed, international alliances received very little attention in general in this theory but could be highly relevant when it comes to the foreign policy options available to a nation and therefore to whether, among those options, HISS is appealing enough to be implemented.

Future projects should do additional research and data collection to enhance and expand the State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship dataset. Greater temporal coverage would make it easier to assess the validity of predictive theories like the Revolutionary Realities theories or of future rival accounts. The best place to start would be with the Dangerous Companions Project data. Furthermore, as more data become available from sources like UCDP, START-GTD, or others, it should be incorporated in the SPFS dataset in order to improve its accuracy. More reliable measures of timing, precisely when a state started exhibiting HISS behaviors, would help both quantitative and qualitative researchers. Another, less taxing endeavor might be to include individual state-sponsored acts of terrorism in the data. Though the definition of HISS here has walled-off the use of state-agents, there may be theoretical questions related to HISS that could be explored if more direct state involvement with terrorist acts were also considered.

Finally, it is worth noting one very interesting coincidence between HISS and another phenomenon of great international significance: nuclear weapons acquisition. Definitions of "rogue states" typically include both a state's sponsorship of terrorists and its pursuit of nuclear weapons.[35] Empirically, there does seem to be a correlation: Iran, Iraq, Libya, and China all sought to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear warheads and missiles. Even Cuba, in the form of requesting the installation of Soviet missiles, wanted nukes. Other countries, such as North Korea, where ideology looms large and revolutionary processes founded

[35] See for example Caprioli and Trumbore 2005, "Rhetoric vs. Reality: Rogue States in International Conflict"; Thomas Henrikson. 2001. "The Rise and Decline of Rogue States" *Journal of International Affairs 52*(2), 349-370.

the regime, have gone on to acquire these weapons.[36] Indeed, the international alienation that comes from committing state resources to a global, anti-status quo foreign policy may make nuclear weapons appealing as one of the only means of *internal* balancing against an ever-growing list of foes. Especially if sponsorship of non-state actors generates few, immediate benefits, states may well find a nuclear arsenal particularly appealing. In short, sponsorship and the states that employ it are grave concerns of the international system, and there are many avenues for additional research on this and related phenomena.

States that have employed high-intensity state sponsorship have had a large impact on international relations. This effect is often quite in contrast to their genuine, strategic importance in world affairs or the size of their military or economy. Part of the power of this policy is the fact that it seems to blur lines between war and peace, national and international. Observers, target states, sponsors, and sponsored groups can all project their own narrative onto events—states are at once rogues, threatening global peace, and revolutionary vanguards, ushering in a new era of political development. HISS evokes and indeed embodies competing ideologies about who governs, both nationally and internationally, and what projects those in power should use that power of governance to pursue. And sometimes, such as on September 11, 2001, the cumulative effect of states that are willing to pursue such foreign policies, to harbor and train terrorists and to seek regime change in the hopes of establishing more friendly governments abroad, is ultimately world changing. For this reason, this dissertation has sought to examine the handful of states that have embraced HISS in hopes of gaining a better understanding of the

[36] An interesting doctoral thesis on high-risk foreign policies looks at both nuclear proliferation and state sponsorship of non-state actors, considering them to be pursued based on similar pressures, namely shortened time horizons that increase the regime's tolerance for risk. See Robinson 2013.

complex dynamics that spur these aberrantly important nations to become so deeply and controversially involved in global affairs.

Appendix A: Codebook for State Patterns of Foreign Sponsorship Dataset

Key on Sources:
SPFS indicates a variable that exists only in the SPFS dataset, though it may be derived or calculated from related base sets

SPFS, from ___ = data coded according to source set, with minor arithmetic changes for use in SPFS

[name of other set] = variable values were imported wholesale

Variable	Description	Source
ArchRevol	Indicator of a recent revolutionary overthrow, according to Archigos data. 1 = First five years of new leader after the previous leader left office due to a revolutionary event where Archigos Exitcode = 1, 2, 3, or 4. 0 = All other years Note: Used to test alternative hypothesis regarding 'traditional' revolutions and popular uprisings, so 5-16 are not considered revolutionary events.	SPFS
ArchRevol_nextreg	1 = All observations for the leader that entered power following a Archigos-identified revolutionary event 0 = All other years	SPFS
avg_log_cap_inv	Average material capabilities ratio between state and all rivals, logged and inversed	SPFS
AvgHostLev	average level of hostility across all MIDs/year	SPFS
ccname	Country name	Correlates of War; Archigos
ccode	Unique numerical identifier for each country, ranges 0-999	Correlates of War; Archigos

ccode_5per	5 year window indicators, by country (e.g. Cuba from 1981-1985 is "40 h"); used to calculate the "HISS 5-Year Period" DV	SPFS
ccodeyr2	ccode - year(e.g. "40 1975") is Cuba (COW code 40) in 1975. May be multiple entries for "ccodeyr2" in country-leader-year set.	SPFS
cinc	National Material Capabilities Index	COW Natl Material Capabilities (NMC)
cname_5per	5 year window indicators, by country (e.g. Cuba from 1981-1985 is "Cuba h"); used to calculate the "HISS 5-Year Period" DV	SPFS
cold_war_dummy	0 = not a Cold War year 1= Cold War year	SPFS
democracy	1 = democracy 0 = non-democracy	Miller Boix Rosato
entry	How leader entered power: 0=regular 1=irregular 2=foreign imposition	Archigos
entry_recode_2to0	Entry dummy (foreign-imposed = 0) 1 = leader entered power through non-institutionalized means 0 = leader entered power through institutionalized means or via direct foreign imposition	SPFS
exit	How leader lost power: 1=regular 2=natural death 2.1=retired b/c poor health 2.2=suicide 3=irregular 4=deposed by another state -888=still in power	Archigos

exitcode	Finer coding scheme for exit=3 or exit=4; -999 Missing (currently only before 1919) 0 Leader lost power in a regular manner 1 Leader lost power as a result of domestic popular protest with foreign support 2 . . . without foreign support 3 Leader removed by domestic rebel forces with foreign support 4 . . . without foreign support 5 Leader removed by domestic military actors with foreign support 6 . . . without foreign support 7 Leader removed by other domestic government actors with foreign support 8 . . . without foreign support 9 Leader removed through the threat or use of foreign force 11 Leader removed through assassination by unsupported individual 16 Leader removed in a power struggle within military, short of coup, i.e. without changing institutional features such as a military council or junta 111 Leader removed in an irregular manner through other means or processes	Archigos
goldstone_nextreg	1 = All observations for the leader than entered power following a Goldstone_revtype = 2 event 0 = All other years included in Goldstone	SPFS
goldstone_revname	Name of the Goldstone-identified revolutionary event	SPFS, from Goldstone ed. 1998

goldstone_revtype	0 = no event 1 = mass movements/protests/uprisings (e.g. Civil Rights movt; Chinese cultural revolution) 2 = political revolutions (Khmer Rouge revolution; Cuban revolution)	SPFS, from Goldstone ed. 1998
goldstone_revyrsA	1 = Year when Goldstone_Revtype = 2, plus 5 years additional after end date of event 0 = All other years included in Goldstone	SPFS, from Goldstone ed. 1998
goldstone_revyrsB	1 = Year when Goldstone_Revtype = 1 **or** 2, plus 5 years additional after end date of event 0 = All other years included in Goldstone	SPFS, from Goldstone ed. 1998
grp_1	Numeric identifier of the first group that is receiving the state's sponsorship that year	UCDP
"grp_2" thru "grp_11"	Numeric identifier of the second through eleventh group that is receiving the state's sponsorship that year	UCDP
grps_3yr_2017	Count of unique groups sponsored, using 3 year window calculations	SPFS
hptg_dummy_2017	Dummy variable for whether a state sponsors a high-profile terrorist group in a given year 1 = state sponsors an HPTG that year 0 = state does not sponsor an HPTG that year	SPFS
intreg	region/international organization to which the state owes loyalty, according to the constitution	Comparative Constitutions Project
last_yr_regime	1 = final leader-year observation for a leader 0 = all other leader-years for a leader	SPFS
leader	Name of chief executive/power holder	Archigos
leadid	Unique numerical identifier for each leader	Archigos
lnAreakm	Total area of the state, in km^2 (logged)	World Bank
lnAreasm	Total area of the state, in m^2 (logged)	World Bank
lnGDP	Gross Domestic Product, USD current (logged)	World Bank
lnGNP	Gross National Product, USD current (logged)	World Bank

lnpop	Log (Total Population, thousands)	SPFS
max_log_cap_inv	Maximum material capabilities ratio between state and all rivals, logged and inversed	SPFS
MaxHostLev	maximum level of hostility from all MIDs/year	SPFS, from MID data
mdev_log_cap	Mean deviation of logged material capabilities ratios between state and all rivals	SPFS
milex	Total Military Expenditures (thousands, current USD)	COW NMC data
milper	Military Personnel (thousands)	COW NMC data
min_log_cap_inv	Minimum material capabilities ratio between state and all rivals, logged and inversed	SPFS
MinHostLev	minimum level of hostility from all MIDs/year	SPFS
NewMIDyr	# new Militarized Interstate Disputes	MID data
non_contig_rivs	# of NON-contiguous rivals	FPY + Klein
nuke_dyad_yr	1 = both state and at least 1 rival are nuclear-armed 0 = no nuclear-armed rivals and/or state does not possess nuclear weapons	(NUKE SOURCE)
nuke_state_yr	1 = state itself is nuclear-armed 0 = state is not nuclear-armed	SIPRI
nuke_tgt_yr	1 = state has at least 1 nuclear-armed rival 0 = state has no nuclear-armed rivals	SIPRI
nuke_tgts_num	# of nuclear-armed rival a state has in a given year	SIPRI
num_ann_contigs	# of contiguous rivals	FPY + Klein
num_ann_extrareg	# of extra-regional rivals	FPY + Klein
num_rivals	Total number of rivals	FPY + Klein
NumMIDsInitiated	# of new MIDs/year in which state was initiator	COW, MID data
NumMIDsRecvd	# of new MIDs/year in which state was NOT initiator	COW, MID data

obsid	three-letter country identifier - year of entry for leader (e.g. CUB-1959 is the obsid for all country-leader-years in which Fidel Castro was LEADER)	Archigos
out_reg_dummy_2017	Dummy variable for whether a state sponsors an armed non-state actor outside of its region in a given year 1 = state sponsors an Out-of-Region group that year 0 = state does not sponsor an Out-of-Region group that year	SPFS
out_reg_num_2017	Number of groups a state sponsors that are out of their geographic region. Ranges from 0 to 10.	SPFS
pct_noncontig_rivs	% of rivals that are not contiguous to state	SPFS
power_proj_sum	Scaled measure of barriers to offensive conventional military operations, from min_log_cap_inv, nuke_tgt_dummy, and pct_noncontig_rivs	SPFS
Region_Amers	1 if ccode is 1-199; 0 otherwise	SPFS, from Archigos
Region_Asia	1 if ccode is 700-999; 0 otherwise	SPFS, from Archigos
Region_Euro	1 if ccode is 200-399; 0 otherwise	SPFS, from Archigos
region_intl	0 = no regional alliance mentioned in constitution 1 = allegiance to British Commonwealth, French union, or Danish-Icelandic Union 2 = alligiance to formal regional organization (European Union, Central American Parliament, Organization for African Unity) 3 = allegiance to generic regions (Latin America, the great Arab nation, Africa, etc) 4 = allegiance on explicitly multi-contintental	SPFS

	level (the Third World; Arab and African world; Muslim world)	
Region_MENA	1 if ccode is 600-699; 0 otherwise	SPFS, from Archigos
Region_of_Primary	1 = Americas (ccode 1-199) 2 = Europe (ccode 200-399) 3 = Sub-Saharan African (ccode 400-599) 4 = Middle East/North African (ccode 600-699) 5 = Asia (ccode 700-999)	SPFS, from Archigos
region_panarab	1 = constitution includes regional allegiance reference to "Arab league" or the "Arab nation") 0 = all other observations	
Region_SSAfric	1 if ccode is 400-599; 0 otherwise	SPFS, from Archigos
revol_suspend0	International Revolutionary Ideology score, from analysis of constitutional content	SPFS
TotalMidperYear	Total # of MIDs, including ongoing and new	SPFS
tpop	Total Population (thousands)	COW NMC data
UCDP_5per_uniqgrps	# of unique groups in the 5-year period for that country	SPFS
UCDP_HISS_3yr_3	Alternative Dependent Variable Specification. Quant: 3+ from 3yr window; Geog: 1+ Out-of-Region; 1+ HPTG	SPFS
UCDP_HISS_3yr_4	Alternative Dependent Variable Specification. Quant: 4+ from 3yr window; Geog: 1+ Out-of-Region; 1+ HPTG	SPFS

UCDP_HISS_3yr_5	Primary Dependent Variable Specification. Quant: 5+ from 3yr window; Geog: 1+ Out-of-Region; 1+ HPTG	SPFS
UCDP_HISS_3yr_5noHP	Alternative Dependent Variable Specification. Quant: 5+ from 3yr window; Geog: 1+ Out-of-Region; 0+ HPTG	SPFS
UCDP_HISS_3yr_5noOR	Primary Dependent Variable Specification. Quant: 5+ from 3yr window; Geog: 0+ Out-of-Region; 1+ HPTG	SPFS
UCDP_HISS_5per_2017	Primary Dependent Variable Specification. Quant: 5+ from 5-year period calculations; Geog: 1+ Out-of-Region; 1+ HPTG	SPFS
UCDP_HISS_strt	HISS Adoption events, based on UCDP_HISS_3yr_5	SPFS
upop	Urban Population (thousands)	COW NMC data
year	Year	SPFS
yrs_ldr	Number of years that a leader was in power; partial years "count" as whole years	SPFS

Appendix B: Supplementary Materials for Chapter 3

Appendix B.1 HPTG List

Table B.1 HPTGs from START Global Terrorism Database

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO)
African National Congress (South Africa)	Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)
Al-Qa`ida	National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
Chechen Rebels	New People's Army (NPA)
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) [Nicaragua]	Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from aForeigners (FLLF)	People's Liberation Front (JVP) Sri Lanka
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Hizballah	Shanti Bahini - Peace Force (Bangladesh)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	Shining Path (SL)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	Taliban
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Tawhid and Jihad
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
M-19 (Movement of April 19)	United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	

Appendix B.2
Dependent Variable Specifications and Resultant Observation Summaries

Table B.2a HISS Measures and the 3 Criteria

	Quantity	Geography	HPTG	# of HISS Obs; # of HISS Cntrys
HISS, 3-Year Window Count (3yr5)	5+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	1+ out-of-region groups that year	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	59; 12
HISS, 5-Year Period Count (5per)	5+ unique groups in 5 year, pre-set period	1+ out-of-region groups that year	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	73; 14
HISS, no HPTG (3yr5noHP)	5+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	1+ out-of-region groups that year	-	79; 14
HISS, no Out-of-Region (3yr5noOR)	5+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	-	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	71; 12
HISS, 3-Year Window, 4+ Grps (3yr4)	4+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	1+ out-of-region groups that year	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	73; 15
HISS, 3-Year Window, 3+ Grps	3+ unique groups in 3 year, moving window	1+ out-of-region groups that year	1+ HPTG that year; from GTD and UCDP	97; 16

Table B.2b HISS Observations, 5-year Period Counts

Country	Leader	Years
Algeria	Bitat; Benjedid	1978; 1979-1980
China	Mao Zedong; Deng Xiaoping	1975-1976; 1982-1983
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1976-1980
Egypt	Sadat	1976
Eritrea	Afeworki	1999; 2002
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1979-1980; 1986-1988
Iraq	Hassan al-Bakr; Saddam Hussein	1976; 1990
Libya	Qaddafi	1976-1990
Pakistan	Zia	1979
Russia/USSR	Brezhnev	1980
Saudi Arabia	Fahd	1985-1987
Sudan	Al-Bashir	1994-1999
Syria	H. al-Assad	1984; 1988-1991
United States	Ronald Reagan; George H. W. Bush	1982-1988; 1989-1992

Table B.2c HISS Observations, 3-year Window Counts and No HPTGs

Country	Leader	Years
China	Mao Zedong; Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping	1975-1979; 1982-1983
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1977-1980
Egypt	Sadat; Mubarrak	1979-1980; 1981-1982
Eritrea	Afeworki	1999; 2002
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1979-1981
Iraq	Saddam Hussein	1990
Libya	Qaddafi	1975-1991
Pakistan	Zia	1979
Saudi Arabia	Khalid; Fahd	1978; 1985-1987
Sudan	Al-Bashir	1996-1999
Syria	H. al-Assad	1982; 1984-1991
Tanzania	Nyerere	1979
United States	Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan; George H. W. Bush	1982-1988; 1989-1992

Table B.2d HISS Observations, 3-year Window Counts and No Out-of-Region

Country	Leader	Years
China	Mao Zedong; Deng Xiaoping	1975-1976; 1982-1983
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1977; 1979-1980
Eritrea	Afeworki	1999; 2000; 2002
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini; Rafsanjani	1979-1981; 1992-1996
Iraq	Saddam Hussein	1989-1990
Libya	Qaddafi	1975-1991
Pakistan	Zia; Bhutto Benazir	1979; 1994-1995
Russia/USSR	Brezhnev	1980
Saudi Arabia	Fahd	1985-1987
Sudan	Nimeiri; Al-Mirghani; Al-Bashir	1978; 1988; 1994-1999
Syria	H. al-Assad	1984; 1988-1992
United States	Ronald Reagan; George H. W. Bush	1982-1992

Table B.2e HISS 3-Year Window, 4 Groups+

Country	Leader	Years
Algeria	Bitat; Benjedid	1978; 1979-1980
China	Mao Zedong; Deng Xiaoping	1975-1976; 1982-1983
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1977-1980
Egypt	Sadat	1976
Eritrea	Afeworki	1999; 2004; 2002
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1979-1981
Iraq	Hassan al-Bakr; Saddam Hussein	1976; 1990
Libya	Qaddafi	1976-1991
Pakistan	Zia	1979
North Korea	Kim Il-Sung	1975
Russia/USSR	Brezhnev	1980-1981
Saudi Arabia	Khalid; Fahd	1978; 1985-1987
Sudan	Al-Bashir	1993-1999
Syria	H. al-Assad	1982; 1984-1986; 1988-1991
United States	Ronald Reagan; George H. W. Bush	1982-1988; 1989-1992

Table B.2f HISS 3-Year Window, 3 Groups+

Country	Leader	Years
Algeria	Bitat; Benjedid	1978; 1979-1980
China	Mao Zedong; Deng Xiaoping	1975-1976; 1982-1983
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1976-1988
Egypt	Sadat	1976
Eritrea	Afeworki	1999; 2004; 2002
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1979-1981; 1985-1988
Iraq	Hassan al-Bakr; Saddam Hussein	1976; 1990
Libya	Qaddafi	1976-1991
Pakistan	Zia	1979
North Korea	Kim Il-Sung	1975
Russia/USSR	Brezhnev; Andropov	1980-1982; 1982-1983
Saudi Arabia	Khalid; Fahd	1978; 1985-1987
Sudan	Al-Bashir	1993-1999
Syria	H. al-Assad	1977-1979; 1982; 1984-1991
Tanzania	Nyerere	1979
United States	Ronald Reagan; George H. W. Bush	1982-1988; 1989-1992
Yemen People's Republic (South Yemen)	Ismail	1978-1979

Appendix B.3 Additional HISS Internal Validity Assessments

Table B.3 HISS and the # of Out-of-Region Groups

UCDP 5-Year Period			
Full Set	0.10	5267	
All Non-HISS Observations	0.06	5194	
HISS observation	2.78	73	*5265*
			t = -44.99
| Any Out-of-Region	1.87	283	
Non-HISS | Out-of-Region	1.56	210	
HISS observation	2.78	73	*281*
			t=-5.05

Appendix B.4 HISS and Entry Type Coding Notes and Alternative Specifications

Entry Type Coding Notes

The data used for the analysis in the next chapter does not use the category of "foreign imposition." The Archigos data codes foreign-imposed governments as a "2" merely to communicate information. When it comes to analysis, though, a higher value (2 as opposed to 1) on the entry variable would, in my case, indicate an even more non-institutionalized entry. A single indicator of 0 (does not meet my definition) and 1 (does meet my theoretical definition) is to be preferred.

The contingency table below shows the correlations between HISS and the original Archigos codings to demonstrate that a) none of the foreign imposed coded governments implemented HISS in my data, which, given the rarity of HISS, might have led to substantial impacts on results had that been the case and b) the results are consistent with my re-coded, binary results presented in the main chapter. In any event, I employ robustness checks in the next chapter's analysis to confirm that playing around with the foreign imposition recoding has no substantive effect on the results or conclusions here.

Table B.4a HISS and Entry Type

Entry	**HISS Dummy**	0 (No HISS)	1 (HISS)	Total
0 (Regular)	**Observed**	**3,984**	**27**	**4,011**
	Column %	*76.5%*	*45.8%*	*76.2%*
	Expected	3,966	45	
1 (Irregular)	Observed	**1,150**	**32**	**1,182**
	Column %	*22.1%*	*54.2%*	*22.4%*
	Expected	1,169	13	
2 (Foreign Imposition)	Observed	**74**	**0**	**74**
	Column %	*1.4%*	*0%*	*1.4%*
	Expected	73	1	
Total		**5,208**	**59**	**5,267**
		100%	*100%*	*100%*

χ^2 (1) = 34.95 Pr = 0.000

Table B.4b HISS and Entry, Alternative Specification (4+ Groups, 3-Year Window)

3-Year Window, 4+ Groups

Entry	HISS Dummy	0 (No HISS)	1 (HISS)	Total
0 (Regular)	Observed	**3,978**	**28**	**4,565**
	Column %	*76%*	*38%*	*76%*
	Expected	3,951	56	
1 (Irregular)	Observed	**1,216**	**45**	**1,505**
	Column %	*24%*	*62%*	*24%*
	Expected	1,243	17	
Total		**5,194**	**73**	**5,267**
		100%	*100%*	*100%*

χ^2 (1) = 53.81 Pr = 0.000

Table B.4c HISS and Entry, Alternative Specification (5 Year Period)

5-Year Period

Entry	HISS Dummy	0 (No HISS)	1 (HISS)	Total
0 (Regular)	Observed	**3,979**	**27**	**4,006**
	Column %	*76.6%*	*37.0%*	*76.0%*
	Expected	3,951	56	
1 (Irregular)	Observed	**1,216**	**46**	**1,262**
	Column %	*24.7%*	*63.0%*	*24.0%*
	Expected	1,245	17	
Total		**5,195**	**73**	**6,347**
		100%	*100%*	*100%*

χ^2 (1) = 23.44 Pr = 0.000

Comments: Additional contingency tables confirm the results in the main text; HISS and entry tend to be correlated at far higher levels than chance would predict.

Appendix B.5 Constructing the International Revolutionary Ideology Scores

Score Generating and Summary Statistics for the Structural Equation/Latent Variable Modeling

Measurement: reg_factor_new overthrw_factor buildsoc_factor socecon_factor dignity_factor solid_factor un_art45

Latent: INTL_REV

Structural equation model Number of obs = 8137
Estimation method = ml
Log likelihood = -17759.103

	OIM Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Measurement						
reg_factor_new <-						
INTL_REV	1	(constrained)				
_cons	.1978616	.0044164	44.80	0.000	.1892055	.2065177
overthrw_factor <-						
INTL_REV	.4302172	.0189116	22.75	0.000	.393151	.4672833
_cons	.0485437	.0023825	20.38	0.000	.0438741	.0532133
buildsoc_factor <-						
INTL_REV	.8829461	.038389	23.00	0.000	.8077051	.9581871
_cons	.1876613	.0043284	43.36	0.000	.1791779	.1961447
socecon_factor <-						
INTL_REV	.8817446	.037791	23.33	0.000	.8076757	.9558136
_cons	.1404695	.003852	36.47	0.000	.1329196	.1480193
dignity_factor <-						
INTL_REV	1.607909	.0590684	27.22	0.000	1.492137	1.723681
_cons	.433575	.0054938	78.92	0.000	.4228074	.4443426
solid_factor <-						
INTL_REV	1.637691	.0581566	28.16	0.000	1.523706	1.751676
_cons	.3167015	.005157	61.41	0.000	.3065939	.326809
un_art45 <-						
INTL_REV	.4186874	.0201308	20.80	0.000	.3792317	.458143
_cons	.0518619	.0024583	21.10	0.000	.0470438	.05668
var(e.reg_factor_new)	.1272507	.0022934			.1228342	.131826
var(e.overthrw_factor)	.040364	.0006866			.0390406	.0417324
var(e.buildsoc_factor)	.1279171	.0022168			.1236452	.1323367
var(e.socecon_factor)	.0962771	.0017442			.0929185	.0997571
var(e.dignity_factor)	.1642474	.0034659			.157593	.1711828
var(e.solid_factor)	.1320202	.003036			.1262019	.1381067
var(e.un_art45)	.043657	.0007313			.042247	.0451141
var(INTL_REV)	.0314617	.0018684			.0280048	.0353453

LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(14) = 860.18, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Alpha Test: Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)

Average inter-item covariance: .0291083
Number of items in the scale: 7
Scale reliability coefficient: 0.6448

Factor Analysis and Factor Loadings:

Factor analysis/correlation — Number of obs = 8137
Method: principal factors — Retained factors = 3
Rotation: (unrotated) — Number of params = 18

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	1.44828	1.17759	1.2590	1.2590
Factor2	0.27069	0.26266	0.2353	1.4943
Factor3	0.00803	0.05652	0.0070	1.5013
Factor4	-0.04849	0.08301	-0.0422	1.4591
Factor5	-0.13150	0.03971	-0.1143	1.3448
Factor6	-0.17121	0.05425	-0.1488	1.1960
Factor7	-0.22545	.	-0.1960	1.0000

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 6083.11 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniqueness
reg_factor~w	0.4554	0.2198	-0.0354	0.7431
overthrw_f~r	0.3717	0.3040	-0.0087	0.7693
buildsoc_f~r	0.3982	-0.1562	0.0189	0.8167
socecon_fa~r	0.4398	-0.2586	0.0043	0.7397
dignity_fa~r	0.5463	-0.1509	-0.0384	0.6773
solid_factor	0.5789	0.0036	0.0129	0.6647
un_art45	0.3424	0.1262	0.0685	0.8622

Additional Goodness of Fit Assessments/Statistics

Fit statistic	Value	Description
Likelihood ratio		
chi2_ms(14)	860.182	model vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
chi2_bs(21)	6085.481	baseline vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
Population error		
RMSEA	0.086	Root mean squared error of approximation
90% CI, lower bound	0.081	
upper bound	0.091	
pclose	0.000	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
Information criteria		
AIC	35560.207	Akaike's information criterion
BIC	35707.294	Bayesian information criterion
Baseline comparison		
CFI	0.860	Comparative fit index
TLI	0.791	Tucker-Lewis index
Size of residuals		
SRMR	0.046	Standardized root mean squared residual
CD	0.677	Coefficient of determination

Appendix B.6 Full Text of the Preamble to the Constitution of Algeria

Constitution of Algeria1989, Reinstated 1996

Preamble

The Algerian people is a free people, decided to remain free. Its history is a long chain of battles which have made Algeria forever a country of freedom and dignity. Placed in the heart of the great moments which the Mediterranean has known in the course of its history, Algeria has found in its sons, from the time of the Numidian Kingdom and the epic of Islam to the colonial wars, its heralds of liberty, unity and progress at the same time as the builders of democratic and prosperous states in the periods of grandeur and of peace.

November 1, 1954 was one of the crowns of its destiny, the result of its long resistance to the aggressions directed against its culture, its values and the fundamental components of its identity which are its Arab-ness and Amazighité; the first of November solidly anchored the battles waged in the glorious past of the Nation.

United in the national movement afterwards in the breast of the National Liberation Front, the people has spilled its blood in order to assume its collective destiny in the liberty and recovered cultural identity and to endow itself with authentically popular institutions.

Crowning the people's war by an independence paid for with the sacrifices of its best children, the National Liberation Front restores finally, in all its fullness, a modern and sovereign State.

Its faith in the collective choices has permitted its people to achieve decisive victories, marked by the recovery of national riches and the construction of a State for its exclusive service, exercising its powers in all independence and security against external pressure.

Having always fought for freedom and democracy, the people intends, by this Constitution, to endow itself with institutions based on the participation of citizens in the conduct of public affairs and which realize social justice, equality and liberty of each and all.

In approving this Constitution, the work of its own genius, reflection of its aspirations, fruit of its determination and product of profound social mutations, the people expresses and consecrates more solemnly than ever the primacy of law.

The Constitution is, above all, the fundamental law which guarantees the rights and the individual and collective liberties, protects the rule of free choice of the people and confers legitimacy on the exercise of powers. It helps to assure the juridical protection and the control of action by the public powers in a society in which legality reigns and permits the development of man in all dimensions.

Strong in its spiritual values, deeply ingrained, and its traditions of solidarity and justice, the people is confident of its capacities to work fully for the cultural, social and economic progress of the world, today and tomorrow.

Algeria, land of Islam, integral part of the Great Maghreb Arab country, Mediterranean and African, is honored by the radiance of its Revolution of November 1 and the respect which the country has sought to achieve and preserve by reason of its commitment to all the just causes of the world.

The pride of the people, its sacrifices, its sense of responsibilities, its ancestral attachment to liberty and social justice are the best guarantees of the respect for the principles of this Constitution which it adopts and passes on to future generations, the worthy inheritors of the pioneers and the builders of a free society.

Source: "Algeria's Constitution of 1989, Reinstated in 1996, with Amendments through 2008." From constituteproject.org, available: https://www.constituteproject.org/ontology/Algeria?lang=en

Appendix B.7 Results from Alternative Measures of Ideology Score and HISS

Table B.7a Countries with Ideology Scores 1 SD above Mean

Afghanistan	Ecuador	Niger
Albania	Egypt	Nigeria
Algeria	El Salvador	Pakistan
Angola	Equatorial Guinea	Paraguay
Bahrain	Eritrea	Peru
Bangladesh	Ethiopia	Poland
Belgium	German Democratic Republic	Portugal
Benin	Ghana	Romania
Bolivia	Greece	Rwanda
Brazil	Guatemala	Sao Tome And Principe
Bulgaria	Guinea	Seychelles
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	Haiti	Sierra Leone
Burundi	Honduras	Slovakia
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Hungary	Somalia
Cameroon	Iran (Persia)	Spain
Cape Verde	Iraq	Sudan
Central African Republic	Italy/Sardinia	Surinam
Chad	Kuwait	Switzerland
China	Liberia	Syria
Colombia	Lithuania	Togo
Comoros	Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic Of)	Turkey/Ottoman Empire
Congo	Madagascar (Malagasy)	Uganda
Congo, Democratic Republic Of (Zaire)	Mauritania	Venezuela
Cote D'Ivoire	Montenegro	Vietnam, Democratic Republic Of
Cuba	Morocco	Yemen (Arab Republic Of Yemen)
Czech Republic	Mozambique	Yemen, People's Republic Of
Dominican Republic	Myanmar (Burma)	Yugoslavia (Serbia)
East Timor	Nicaragua	

Table B.7b HISS and International Revolution Scores

HISS (UCDP 5-year Period)				
International Revolutionary Ideology Score				
	Non-HISS Observations	1.15	5187	
	HISS Observations	1.50	73	
	difference	+0.35	*5258*	t = -2.07
				p = 0.98*
HISS (UCDP 3-year Window, 4+ Groups)				
International Revolutionary Ideology Score				
Non-HISS Observations	1.15	5186		
HISS Observations	1.34	73		
difference	+0.19	*5257*	t = -1.12	
			p = 0.87*	

Table B.7c Correlations between Entry and International Revolutionary Ideology Scores

HISS (UCDP 5-year Period)				
International Revolutionary Ideology Score				
	Institutionalized Entry	1.11	3998	
	Non-Institutionalized Entry	1.30	1262	
	difference	+0.19	*5258*	t = -3.98
				p = 1.00*

Appendix B.8 Constitution Scores Over Time

Figure B.8a



Comments: Note that the black lines indicate the average constitution score of that year, within a range of +/- 2 standard deviations.

Figure B.8b


Constitution Int'l Revolutionary Scores, 1975-2005
Average Int'l Revol Score
0
.5
1
1.5
2
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Year

Figure B.8c


Average Int'l Revolutionary Score, 1975-2004
Int'l Revolution Score
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Year (SPFS Data)
Average Score across all Constitutions
95% confidence interval

Appendix B.9 Barriers Measures and Alternative HISS Specification

Table B.9 HISS and Nuclear-Armed Adversaries (HISS 5-Year Period)

Nuke Dummy	**HISS**	0 (No HISS)	1 (HISS)	Total
0 (No Nuclear Armed Rival)	Observed	**4,146**	**15**	**4,161**
	Column %	*78.5%*	*20.6%*	*79.0%*
	Expected	4,103	58	
1 (Nuclear Armed Rival)	Observed	**1,049**	**58**	**1,107**
	Column %	*21.4%*	*79.4%*	*21.0%*
	Expected	1,092	15	
Total		**5,195**	**73**	**5,268**
		100%	*100%*	*100%*

$\chi 2\ (1) = 151.31\ P = 1.000$

Appendix B.10 Non-HISS Years

Table B.10 Non-HISS Years for HISS-Adopting States

Country	Leader	Years	Ideology Score	Entry Type	Nuclear Rival?	Capabilities against Powerful Rivals	% Rivals Non-Contig
Cuba	Fidel Castro	1975-1976, 1978, 1981-2004	5.37	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	100%
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini	1982-1989	3.69	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	44%
Libya	Muammer Qaddafi	1992-2002	1.70	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	92%
Syria	Hafez al-Assad	1976-1983; 1985-1987; 1992-2000	1.70	Non-Institutionalized	Yes	Large Disadvantage	17%

Comments: These are country-leader-year observations in which HISS was not observed but all values of the IVs were high *and* the country had already experienced an adoption event or been identified.

Appendix B.11: Ideology Measurements and South America

It is worth now making an additional note on the international revolutionary ideology variable. In the discussion in the main text on ideology, I noted that this variable takes on a high value when a constitution reflects Marxist/communist ideology. Therefore, it is possible that if there is a correlation between HISS and the International Revolutionary Ideology variable, it is because *Marxist* regimes are more likely to adopt HISS. It could be that my theoretical proposition about the *specific content* of the ideology is incorrect, but my measure of ideology is actually measuring a *different type* of ideology – the one that happens to actually be associated with HISS. In short, my measure is right where my theory is wrong.

Though I do not disagree that my variable for ideology is picking up quite a great deal of socialist "noise," the evidence in the final section does not suggest that my measure correlates with HISS because leftist constitutions correlate with HISS. It seems that just the opposite is the case: HISS is systematically *not* adopted by leftist states, at least in Latin America – see Chapter 3, Table 3.14. This means that it is probably *not* the case that the real driving factor behind HISS adoption is a strong leftist ideology, or else we would expect that states like Iran (whose revolutionary ideology combined Islamic *and* socialistic ideas) would *not* be a HISS state and Peru *would* be.

However, it does also seem that my theory is failing to account something about these Latin American countries. This list suggests that while my three theorized factors may be jointly necessary, they are perhaps insufficient conditions. Perhaps a fourth causal condition is also necessary. Alternatively, given the similar geographic location and time period of the non-adopting states in Table 3.14 in the main text, it seems plausible that there is an additional factor they all share that can prevent HISS adoption. There are many more cases of unexpected non-adoption than unexpected adoption; whereas Saudi Arabia and Eritrea are clearly outliers in the latter list, there are seven countries on the former (After case study analysis, I do not consider the case of the United States to be as clear an outlier. See Conclusion chapter.) See Chapter 9 on Nicaragua for further discussion.

Appendix C – Supplementary Materials and Robustness Checks for Chapter 4

Note: For additional information on the alternative specification of dependent variables, see Appendix B.2.

Appendix C.1 Robustness for International Revolutionary Ideology Score

Table C.1

Model Type	Logits, Leader Clustered Errors	Rare Events Logit	XT GEE	XT GEE	XT Logit	XT Logit	XT Logit	XT Logit	XT Logit	XT Logit
DV	3yr5	3yr5	3yr5	3yr5	3yr4	3yr5noHP	5yr Period	3yr5noOR	HPTG dummy	OR Dummy
	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F	Model G	Model H	Model I	Model J
Revol Score	1.88***	0.35†	0.16	0.13	0.47*	0.79**	0.53*	0.58*	0.20*	-0.01
	0.45	0.20	0.13	0.14	0.22	0.29	0.22	0.26	0.10	0.12
Controls:										
t	-1.78***	-1.83	-0.33		-1.15**	-1.53***	-1.19**			
	0.40	0.38	0.10		0.37	0.39	0.37			
t^2	0.31***	0.31			0.18†	0.28**	0.21*			
	0.09	0.08			0.10	0.11	0.10			
t^3	-0.02**	-0.01†			-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01			
	0.01	0.01			0.01	0.01	0.01			
MENA	2.27***	2.36	2.17	2.15	3.65***	3.90**	4.17***	4.26***	4.49***	4.23***
	0.48	0.54	0.41	0.44	0.95	1.34	0.95	1.24	0.56	0.72
Cold War (dummy)	0.87†	1.06†	0.93	1.15	2.21***	2.55***	2.50***	2.12***	1.10***	1.53***
	0.53	0.64	0.40	0.42	0.61	0.67	0.63	0.51	0.25	0.30
Area (logged)	0.98**	0.99	0.62	0.63	1.06**	1.18*	1.09**	1.33**	0.32*	0.54**
	0.35	0.32	0.17	0.19	0.35	0.48	0.36	0.48	0.16	0.19
	0.18	-0.04	0.41	0.47	0.29	0.72†	0.32	0.47	0.48**	0.74***

Table C.1, continued

Population (logged)	0.22	0.26	0.16	0.18	0.32	0.41	0.31	0.39	0.18	0.21
Constant	-19.57***	-17.05***	-17.41***	-18.98***	-26.37***	-34.25***	-27.19***	-34.27***	-16.67***	-21.64***
	3.25	3.25	1.93	2.09	4.80	7.90	5.02	6.72	1.71	2.69
Rho					0.73	0.80	0.70	0.81	0.83	0.76
Sigma_u					2.99	3.68	2.76	3.69	4.03	3.21

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Comments: In the GEE Models C and D, the international revolutionary ideology variable is not significant. This may be partly due to the increase in the average constitution score over time (see main text).

Model I and Model J use different dependent variables. Model I uses the HPTG dummy as the dependent variable and finds that states with higher ideology scores are more likely to sponsor an HPTG. Model J uses the out-of-region dummy indicator as the dependent variable. Ideology score is not consistently correlated with sponsoring outside of a state's own region.

Appendix C.2 Robustness and Alternative Specifications for Entry

Table C.2

	Logits, Leader Clustered Errors 3yr5 Model A	Rare Events Logit 3yr5 Model B	XT GEE 3yr5 Model C	XT GEE 3yr5 Model D	XT Logit 3yr4 Model E	XT Logit 3yr5noHP Model F	XT Logit 5yr Period Model G	XT Logit 3yr5 Model H
Entry	0.35†	1.83***	1.65***	1.53***	1.97*	2.08*	2.11**	
	0.20	0.45	0.39	0.39	0.81	1.01	0.78	
Entry (Foreign-Imposed = 1)								2.75*
								1.15
Controls:								
t	-1.95***	-1.66***	-0.36***		-1.14**	-1.53***	-1.22***	-1.37***
	0.38	0.40	0.10		0.37	0.39	0.37	0.41
t^2	0.34***	0.27*****			0.18†	0.28**	0.21*	0.23*
	0.08	0.09			0.10	0.11	0.10	0.11
t^3	-0.02**	-0.01*			-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01†	-0.01
	0.01	0.01			0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MENA	2.42***	2.22***	1.94***	2.04***	3.40***	3.80**	3.95***	3.13*
	0.54	0.48	0.40	0.40	0.96	1.27	0.95	1.23
Cold War (dummy)	1.10†	0.83	0.64†	0.86*	1.97**	2.27***	2.17***	1.83**
	0.64	0.53	0.38	0.39	0.62	0.68	0.62	0.68
Area (logged)	1.01**	0.96	0.62***	0.67***	0.94**	0.91*	0.94**	1.07*
	0.32	0.35	0.17	0.18	0.35	0.42	0.35	0.47
Population (logged)	-0.04	0.18	0.54***	0.59***	0.44	0.92*	0.50	0.60
	0.26	0.22	0.16	0.16	0.32	0.42	0.31	0.41

508

Table C.2, continued

Constant	-17.42***	-19.09***	-18.89***	-20.96***	-26.08***	-31.99***	-26.72***	-30.65***
	4.29	4.29	2.08	2.18	4.96	7.11	5.07	7.9
rho					0.72	0.79	0.68	0.76
Sigma_u					2.91	3.57	2.66	3.23
N	5032	5216	4986	4986	5023	5023	5032	5032

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Comments: In Model H, the Entry variable codes as "1" all observations that Archigos coded as "foreign imposed" leaders. This is in contrast to the specification throughout the rest of the models in which a foreign-imposed entry is coded as "0", which is to say "*not non-institutionalized*" or inconsistent with the theory's conception of non-institutionalized or irregular entry.

Appendix C.3 Robustness and Alternative Specifications for Democracy

Table C.3

	XT Logit 3yr5 Model A	XT Logit 3yr5 Model B	Rare Events Logit 3yr5 Model C	XT Logit 3yr5 Model D
Democracy	-4.19***	-3.34*	-1.40	-1.63
	1.31	1.48	0.85	1.37
Entry				2.30*
				1.13
Controls:				
t		-1.44***	-1.93***	-1.38***
		0.41	0.46	0.42
t^2		0.23*	0.33***	0.23*
		0.11	0.10	0.11
t^3		-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01
		0.01	0.01	0.01
MENA				3.02*
				1.24
Cold War (dummy)				1.79**
				0.68
Area (logged)		1.27**		1.04*
		0.49		0.49
Population (logged)		0.20		0.69
		0.37		0.43
Constant	-12.92***	-25.26***	-2.42***	-30.44***
	0.64	6.98	0.50	7.90
rho	0.91	0.79		0.77
Sigma_u	5.65	3.48		3.29
N	4992	4992	4992	4992
Panels (Leaders)	810	810	810	810

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Comments: The democracy variable is significant in Models A and B. Model A is completely naïve – only democracy is included. Model B uses the time cubes as well as the country size (area and population) controls, for which there is very little theoretical justification. In the rare events logit in Model C, the variable is not consistently associated with HISS. Model D includes democracy and entry. The results are similar to the other entry/revolutionary variables in models from the main text.

Appendix C.4 Robustness and Alternative Specifications for Barriers to Conventional Operations Abroad

Table C.4

	Rare Event Logit, SE Clustered by Leader 3yr5 Model A	Logit, SE Clustered by Leader 3yr5 Model B	XT GEE 3yr5 Model C	Rare Event Logit, SE Clustered by Leader 3yr5 Model D	XT GEE 3yr5 Model E	Rare Event Logit, SE Clustered by Leader 3yr5 Model F	XT GEE 3yr5 Model G	Rare Event Logit, SE Clustered by Leader 3yr5 Model H	XT GEE 3yr5 Model I
Barriers Summary	1.36***	1.40***	1.33***						
	0.31	0.31	0.23						
Nuclear-Armed Rival				2.42***	2.01***				
				0.59	0.44				
% Non-Contig Rivals						3.23***	3.46***		
						0.65	0.61		
Relative Capabilities, Min								1.62***	1.34***
								0.34	0.3
<u>Controls</u>									
Region: MENA	2.91***	2.99***	2.63***	2.65***	2.34***	3.38***	3.36***	2.30***	2.20***
	0.63	0.63	0.41	0.62	0.41	0.63	0.53	0.56	0.39
Cold War (dummy)	0.71	0.75	0.73†	0.62	0.79*	0.84	0.79*	0.82	0.97*
	0.71	0.71	0.39	0.64	0.39	0.71	0.39	0.62	0.38
Area (mi2), logged	0.82***	0.84***	0.74***	0.88***	0.72***	0.75***	0.63***	0.97***	0.80***
	0.20	0.2	0.16	0.21	0.17	0.22	0.16	0.26	0.18

Table C.4, continued

Population, logged	0.03	0.03	0.22	-0.15	0.15	-0.04	0.3	0.37*	0.55***
	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.19	0.17	0.16
t	-1.53***	-1.68***		-1.61***		-1.55***		-1.62***	
	0.34	0.34		0.35		0.33		0.36	
t^2	0.23**	0.28***		0.26***		0.23**		0.26***	
	0.07	0.07		0.08		0.07		0.08	
t^3	-0.01†	-0.01**		-0.01*		-0.01†		-0.01*	
	0.00	0		0.01		0.00		0	
Constant	-16.62***	-17.11***	-18.90***	-15.28***	-17.46***	-14.81***	-18.30***	-21.44***	-22.28***
	3.36	3.37	1.83	3.15	1.81	3.28	1.92	4.09	2.23
N	5032	5032	4986	5032	4986	5032	4986	5032	4986

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C.5 Alternative Capabilities and Capabilities Ratios Test

Table C.5

	XT Logit 3yr5 Model A	XT Logit 3yr5 Model B	xtlogit, 3yr5 3yr Window Model C	xtlogit, 3yr5 3yr Window Model D
Relative Capabilities (Max)	0.67		1.51*	0.07
	0.67		0.60	0.56
Mean Deviation of Relative Capabilities	3.17*	4.03**		
	1.44	1.26		
Number of Rivals				0.75***
				0.19
Controls				
Region: MENA	3.01*	3.13*	3.13***	2.87**
	1.27	1.29	1.18	1.11
Cold War (dummy)	1.47*	1.57*	1.47**	1.05
	0.68	0.68	0.66	0.64
Area (mi2), logged	0.95*	1.01*	0.86*	0.57
	0.47	0.47	0.43	0.41
Population, logged	0.12	0.3	0.00	-0.41
	0.46	0.42	0.45	0.47
t	-1.24**	-1.26**	-1.27**	-1.27**
	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.41
t^2	0.23*	0.23*	0.24*	0.22*
	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.1
t^3	-0.01†	-0.01†	-0.01	-0.01
	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Constant	-24.89	-27.51	-22.09***	-15.00***
	7.22	7.25	5.84	5.14

Table C.5, continued

Rho	0.79	0.78	0.79	0.76
Sigma_u	3.49	3.44	3.54	3.22
N	5032	5032	5032	5032
Panels	820	820	820	820

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Comments: These models were run and are presented here to account for the somewhat strange result, shown in Model C, in which the *maximum* capabilities ratio was, apparently, correlated with HISS outcomes. Model C above suggests that the larger *advantages* against *your most powerful rival* is correlated with a higher tendency to get involved in HISS. This was a somewhat mysterious result, though it says less than it might – just because you are engaged in a rivalry with at least one foe that you outclass does not mean that you necessarily have the conventional military tools to deal with your rivals in general. Furthermore, perhaps a smaller country has picked a fight with you as a result of your HISS policy.

Model A and Model D include different measures of the number and array of rivals that states might have in the world. Once again, controlling for the number of rivals (Model D) seems to completely eliminate the "effect" of the maximum capabilities ratio. Model A tells a similar story – having rivals with a wide range of capabilities tends to reduce and render insignificant the effect of that one, maximum ratio value. Note, also, that in Model B it is clear that the mean deviation (which is 0 when you have 0 *or* 1 rival and is larger when you have a combination of very weak and very powerful rivals) is itself correlated with HISS. This makes sense, but it is likely better captured by the fact that having larger *numbers* of rivals also leads to higher mean deviations, by logical necessity. Thus Model D is probably telling the most accurate story about the relationship between these variables and HISS outcomes. Still, this relationship (between both maximum capabilities ratio and mean deviation of capabilities ratios) occurred in enough analyses that it was worth exploring what was driving the correlations in the models.

Appendix C.6 Alternative DV and Model Specifications for Revolutionary Realities Triple Interactions (4 Groups+ and No HPTG)

Table C.6

Model	Logit, SE Clustered by Leader	xtlogit	xtgee	Logit, SE Clustered by Leader	xtlogit	xtgee
DV	noHP	noHP	noHP	4 grps	4 grps	4 grps
	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Entry*Revol Score*Barriers Sum	1.27*	1.21†	1.28*	0.90*	0.72	0.94**
	0.47	0.62	0.56	0.41	0.53	0.31
Entry	2.20	3.50†	3.27*	1.25†	1.31	1.04†
	1.34	1.98	1.60	0.64	1.22	0.61
Revol Score	0.86*	1.51**	0.99*	0.16	0.48	0.03
	0.43	0.54	0.47	0.47	0.35	0.25
Barriers Summary	1.96**	2.44**	1.98**	1.07**	0.98†	1.16***
	0.66	0.90	0.75	0.41	0.59	0.30
<u>Lower-Order Interactions</u>						
Entry*Revol Score	-1.69*	-1.55	-2.23*	-1.00	-0.76	-1.03†
	0.86	1.09	1.11	0.73	0.91	0.58
Entry*Barriers Sum	-1.11	-1.28	-1.63†	-0.38	0.07	-0.31
	0.71	1.24	0.95	0.46	0.90	0.44
Revol*Barriers Sum	-0.70**	-0.79*	-0.61*	-0.31	-0.27	-0.36†
	0.27	0.37	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.21
MENA	2.78***	3.76***	2.64**	2.67***	3.17***	2.69***
	0.84	1.11	0.76	0.65	0.86	0.42
Cold War	1.07***	2.42***	1.43*	0.81	1.93**	0.82*
	0.70	0.69	0.58	0.67	0.62	0.36

Table C.6, continued

Area (logged)	0.69***	1.21**	0.53*	0.77***	1.10***	0.74***
	0.20	0.41	0.25		0.33	0.16
Population (logged)	0.31	0.50	0.74**	0.14	0.10	0.28†
	0.27	0.38	0.29	0.21	0.30	0.17
t	-1.87***	-1.52***		-1.43***	-1.15***	
	0.32	0.34		0.32	0.35	
t^2	0.33***	0.25*		0.21***	0.17†	
	0.01	0.06		0.07	0.10	
t^3	-0.02*	-0.01†		-0.01*	-0.01	
	0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01	
Constant	-19.02***	-34.12***	-23.86***	-16.93***	-25.03***	-19.12***
	3.87	6.77	3.80	3.14	4.57	1.80
Rho		0.72			0.64	
Sigma_u		2.14			2.41	
N	5032	5032	4966	5032	5032	4966
Panels		820	799		820	799

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Comments: Apart from Model E, all of the triple interaction terms are statistically significant at conventional levels when using alternative specifications of the dependent variable. Like RR Model 5 in the main text, Model E is a random effects model, though Model E relaxes the quantity criterion to support for 4 groups during the moving three-year window described in Chapter 3. Similarly, Model B sees a triple interaction term that is significant only at the 90% confidence level, thanks almost entirely to the size of the standard errors in Model B as compared to Models A and C. The point estimate is only slightly smaller.

Appendix C.7 Alternative DV and Model Specifications for Revolutionary Realities Triple Interactions (5 Year Periods Group Counts)

Table C.7

	Logit, SE Clustered by Leader 5 yr period Model A	XT Logit 5 yr period Model B	XT GEE 5 yr period Model C	XT GEE 5 yr period Model D
Entry*Revol Score*Barriers Summ.	0.84	0.74	0.83*	0.66*
	0.47†	0.51	0.35	0.31
Entry	0.60	0.80	0.54	0.29
	0.49	1.06	0.63	0.61
Revol Score	-0.04	0.29	-0.06	-0.07
	0.41	0.36	0.26	0.26
Barriers Summary	0.89†	0.57	0.85**	1.00***
	0.46	0.55	0.31	0.30
<u>Lower-Order Interactions + Controls</u>				
Entry*Revol Score	-0.75	-0.70	-0.74	-0.35
	0.89	0.90	0.64	0.54
Entry*Barriers Sum	-0.02	0.42	0.04	0.09
	0.51	0.82	0.46	0.44
Revol*Barriers Sum	-0.24	-0.20	-0.23	-0.25
	0.31	0.31	0.23	0.23
t	-1.47***	-1.20***	-1.49***	
	0.39	0.36	0.35	
t^2	0.25*	0.20*	0.26*	
	0.11	0.10	0.10	
t^3	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01†	

Table C.7, continued

	0.01	0.01	0.01	
MENA	3.12***	3.44***	3.10***	3.17***
	0.67	0.77	0.46	0.43
Cold War (dummy)	1.42*	2.09***	1.44***	2.20***
	0.70	0.61	0.44	0.44
Area (logged)	0.71***	1.04***	0.71***	0.80***
	0.20	0.31	0.14	0.13
Population (logged)	0.30	0.23	0.30†	0.26†
	0.21	0.27	0.15	0.14
Constant	-18.33***	-24.40***	-18.18***	-20.88***
	3.28	4.47	1.99	1.90
Rho				
Sigma_u				
N	5033	5033	4966	4966

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Comments: Triple interaction models with the 5 year period dependent variable perform similarly, though are slightly less telling of a relationship between this measure of HISS and the triple interaction itself. Model B, the random effects model most like RR Model 5 in the main text, shows the same result – the point estimate is similar, but the larger standard error renders the estimate statistically indistinguishable from 0 at conventional levels. Also like the models in the main text, the GEE models show a significant correlation. These models offer no insights to contradict the substantive conclusions from the main text.

Note also that in Model C, time dependence is *over* estimated by the inclusion of time cubes in the GEE model which already models time dependence in the correlation of error over time. The primary effect in the point estimates seems to be on the Cold War dummy variable and, to a lesser extent, the entry variable. The Cold War correlates with HISS in Model D even more strongly, in terms of coefficient size, in the absence of the theoretically unnecessary time cubes.

Appendix C.8 Alternative Specification for the Barriers measure in RR Triple Interaction Models

Table C.8

	XT GEE 3yr5 Model A	XT GEE 3yr5 Model B	XT Logit 3yr5 no HP Model C	XT Logit 3yr5 no HP Model D
Entry*Revol Score*(*Barrier Measure*)	1.83*	1.21*	3.13*	2.09†
	0.82	0.58	1.53	1.12
Entry	2.28**	0.92	4.60*	1.76
	0.81	0.58	1.79	1.66
Revol Score	0.21	-0.23	1.42**	0.89*
	0.32	0.22	0.52	0.40
Alternative Barrier Measures:				
% Non-Contig Rivals	3.70***		6.39**	
	0.85		2.02	
Relative Capabilities, Min		0.20		1.87
		0.74		1.36
Lower-Order Interactions + Controls				
Entry*Revol Score	-0.37	-1.07	-0.95	-1.81
	0.41	0.63	0.71	1.44
Entry*(Barrier Measure)	-2.07	0.37	-8.38*	-0.42
	1.53	0.88	3.61	1.65
Revol*(Barrier Measure)	-0.96	0.03	-1.73†	-0.85
	0.72	0.40	1.05	0.59
t	-0.34***	-0.38***	-1.56***	-1.61***
	0.09	0.09	0.39	0.39
t^2			0.27**	0.29**
			0.11	0.10

Table C.8, continued

t^3			-0.01*	-0.01*
			0.01	0.01
MENA	2.88***	2.25***	4.19***	3.60**
	0.59	0.48	1.22	1.23
Cold War (dummy)	0.27	0.47	2.33***	2.35***
	0.41	0.41	0.69	0.68
Area (logged)	0.59**	0.81***	1.13**	1.32**
	0.20	0.19	0.44	0.50
Population (logged)	0.53*	0.59**	0.61	0.95*
	0.23	0.18	0.40	0.43
Constant	-19.81***	-21.79***	-34.59***	-38.91***
	2.40	2.63	7.37	8.77
Rho			0.74	0.78
Sigma_u			3.05	3.43
N			5032	5032
Panels			820	820

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Comments: The models in the table above use two different, alternative specifications of the measure of the barriers to conventional military operations abroad. Rather than the barriers summary variable, Model A and C use the percentage of rivals that are not contiguous as the sole measure of high barriers to conventional war. Similarly, Model B and D use only the minimum relative capabilities ratio. The alternative measures of the barriers either a) hover around significance or b) are significant in the triple interaction. Different model specifications (random effects logits and GEE models) are included, as are two different specifications of the dependent variable (primary specification and the one that drops the high-profile terrorist group criterion). This is consistent with results in the main text, though it is not necessarily the case that each of the aspects of the barriers summary variable need be statistically significant in interaction on its own.

Even further robustness tests (results not shown) found that the number of rivals never attained significance in interaction with ideology and entry. Additionally, the sign on the coefficient was negative, with estimates, respectively, at -0.14 to -0.03 in the random effects and GEE models tested (standard errors were, also respectively, 0.18 and 0.08).

Including the "nuclear target dummy" in the interaction led to collinearity issues and the triple interaction term was dropped because one of the interactions (non-institutionalized entry, no nuclear-armed rivals, and a non-0 revolution score "perfectly predicted" HISS *non-adoption*). Because this is the case, the triple term is omitted from the analysis. Additionally, the number of observations dropped to 4,618 and 20 leaders were omitted from analysis. This points up to some of the challenges of the triple interaction term with a binary dependent variable. The interaction calculations partitions the data when categorical variables are used in the interaction. If there is a case – in this case, one of a number of possible combinations of entry, ideology, and nuclear target values – that always results in HISS *or* non-HISS, modeling issues occur. When there are so many zeros in the dependent variable, this is even more likely. Because there are no estimates for set of variable combinations, the overall effect of the interaction cannot be calculated and therefore that covariate – the one that is of primary interest in this case – is dropped along with the perfectly predicted cases.

Appendix C.9 Duration Dependence in HISS Observations

Table C.9

Time Since Last HISS (*t*)	# of Observations	% of Observations
0	46	78.0%
1	2	3.4%
2	4	6.8%
3	2	3.4%
5	2	3.4%
6	1	1.7%
9	1	1.7%
11	1	1.7%

Comments: Duration, or time since last event, is negatively correlated with HISS outcomes throughout the models in the main text. This table shows the actual data for each HISS observation. Note that these are not adoption events but country-years in which HISS activity is present in the SPFS data. For 78% of HISS observations, the most recent HISS event was the previous year. That, or it was the first year that a leader was in power or it was 1975, the first year of the data. Similarly, fully 95% of HISS activity takes place within 5 years of another HISS observation or event, *or* within 5 years of taking office, *or* within five years from the start of the dataset. The former figure – of 78% of events taking place in the year immediately following another HISS year – is the result of HISS activity occurring in spells. The latter figure – 95% of HISS occurring within 5 years – is the product of a number of different factors of the data as well as HISS trends themselves.

Appendix C.10 Hazard Model Robustness Checks

Table C.10

Model	Cluster by Leader Model A	Cluster by Leader Model B	Breslow for Ties Model C
All RR Factors (Dummy)	8.56***		
	5.85		
Entry*Revol Score*Barriers Sum		6.10***	6.43***
		2.73	2.82
Entry		3.77	3.78
		5.23	4.81
Revol Score		1.64	1.64
		0.98	0.97
Barriers Summary		3.30*	3.26*
		1.86	1.73
<u>Lower-Order Interactions</u>			
Entry*Revol Score		0.04***	0.04***
		0.04	0.04
Entry*Barriers Sum		1.36	1.36
		0.98	0.89
Revol*Barriers Sum		0.82	0.82
		0.28	0.23
MENA	8.25***	12.37*	11.72*
	4.81	12.25	11.47
Area (logged)	1.62†	2.71*	2.68*
	0.45	1.17	1.17
Population (logged)	1.66**	1.31	1.21
	0.33	0.47	0.48
Subjects	160	160	160
Failure Events	10	10	10
Time-At-Risk	3974	3974	3974
	778 Leaders	778 Leaders	

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Comments: Overall results are consistent with those shown in the main text. For Model A and Model B, hazard ratios are identical to H Model 10 and H Model 12, respectively, because error clustering does not affect the calculation of point estimates. Note that clustering by leader reduces standard errors by much more in Model B (as compared to H Model 12) than in Model A (as compared to H Model 10). Using the Breslow method to handle ties also leads to shifts in standard errors and, indeed, to many point estimates in Model C (as compared to B or H Model 10). This is again the result of the fact that there are so few adoption events – what ought to

amount to minor variations in under-the-hood calculations can have much larger effects with the SPFS data when using survival analysis models. Though the number of ties is small (two), they represent a large proportion of failure events. I prefer the Efron method and use those results in the main text despite the fact that the Breslow approach gives me results that are more consistent with my theory's expectations.

Appendix C.11 Duration Dependence and Testing the Proportional Hazard Assumption

Table C.11a H Model 10. Results from Global Test (Schoenfeld) of Proportional Hazard Assumptions

	Rho	Chi2	df	P > chi2
All RR Factors	-0.275	0.75	1	0.39
MENA	0.708	4.30	1	0.04
Area (logged)	0.284	1.47	1	0.23
Population (logged)	-0.361	0.48	1	
Global Test		5.78	4	0.22

Comments: The global test reveals that the entire does not violate the assumption of proportional hazards. However, individual terms – in this case, the Middle East/North Africa dummy variable, appears to have a duration-dependent effect on failure.

Table C.11b H Model 12. Results from Global Test (Schoenfeld) of Proportional Hazard Assumptions

```
. stphtest, detail

      Test of proportional-hazards assumption

      Time:  Time
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                |       rho           chi2       df       Prob>chi2
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------
0b.entry_r~0    |         .              .        1             .
1.entry_re~0    |  -0.30659           4.94        1        0.0262
revol_susp~0    |  -0.33363           9.42        1        0.0021
0b.entry_r~e    |         .              .        1             .
1.entry_re~n    |   0.23907           1.57        1        0.2105
power_proj~m    |   0.00405           0.00        1        0.9902
0b.entry_r~_    |         .              .        1             .
1.entry_re~s    |   0.33031           5.96        1        0.0147
c.revol_su~m    |   0.33095           9.03        1        0.0027
0b.entry_r~e    |         .              .        1             .
1.entry_re~n    |  -0.27144           1.39        1        0.2380
Region_MENA     |   0.33743          12.17        1        0.0005
lnAreasm        |   0.31170           9.17        1        0.0025
lnpop           |   0.05344           0.09        1        0.7703
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------
global test     |                    14.69       10        0.1439
------------------------------------------------------------------------

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used.
```

Comments: The results from the Schoenfeld test of H Model 12 suggest that the model overall is not violating the proportional hazards assumption. However, there are even more individual factors here that are likely violating the assumption in terms of that factor, itself, having a duration-dependent effect on outcome (failure). The region variable is once again violating the assumption; we can be 99.99% confident of that. We are also 99% confident that the international revolutionary ideology score is violating that assumption. The likely cause of this is described in the main text in more detail. In addition, other controls and partial interaction terms are potentially in violation of the assumption. For what it is worth, the triple interaction itself (the factor listed immediately above Region_MENA in the table) does not appear, in this model, to itself be duration-dependent.

Appendix C.12 Hazard Model with Correction for Non-Proportional Ideology Score

Table C.12

_t	Robust Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Int'l Revol Ideology Score	31.91	36.51	3.03	0.002	3.39	300.53
MENA	10.37	6.74	3.60	0.000	2.90	37.04
Area	1.74	0.56	1.73	0.084	0.93	3.28
Population	1.58	0.40	1.80	0.072	0.96	2.60
Int'l Revol. Score*ln(*t*)	0.18	0.11	-2.87	0.004	0.06	0.58
Subjects	160					
Failures	10					
Time At Risk	3981					

Comments: Above are the results of the model in which the international revolutionary ideology score is interacted with time to control for the duration dependency of the factor. Theoretically, this should correct for the violating of the proportional hazards assumption, yielding a reliable estimate for the effect of ideology score on the hazard of failure. Interestingly, when the secular trend in ideology scores is corrected for, there appears to be a massive effect of increases in ideology score on the tendency towards HISS adoption. As in discussions in the main text, these numbers should be treated with caution – note the very wide confidence intervals here. It quickly becomes an exercise is absurdity to calculate the effect of an increase in the ideology score by 1 (namely, $e^{31.91}$ roughly 7.22×10^{13}) or 2 points, which is perfectly reasonable given the variable's range from 0 to 6.3, (which would be $e^{(31.91*2)}$ or 5.21×10^{27}, a meaninglessly high value in this context). Thus, again, there are serious limitations to the use of hazard modeling in the current SPFS dataset, but future researchers may be interested in other types of sponsorship outcomes and could potentially apply the appropriate corrections for time-dependency with variables like the ideology score that, as seen in Chapter 3, shows an upward, secular trend towards higher scores over time.

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