

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

DIAGNOSING DEVIANCE: PATHOLOGY AND POLEMIC IN THE PASTORAL EPISTLES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVINITY SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

AUGUST 2018

For my beloved wife, Rachel

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Acknowledgments

Many people, organizations, and institutions have aided me during the research for and writing of this dissertation. I am grateful to the faculty and administration of the University of Chicago Divinity School, where I feel fortunate to have studied. In their tenures as Deans of the Divinity School, Richard Rosengarten and Margaret M. Mitchell provided invaluable institutional leadership and helped oversee important initiatives and reforms that made funding available. I am grateful to the Martin Marty Center of the University of Chicago Divinity School, where I was a Junior Dissertation Fellow (2014–2015). The Christian Scholars Foundation generously supported my intellectual endeavors three separate years (2014–2015, 2016–2017, 2017–2018), and I am incredibly grateful for their confidence in me, made manifest in much-appreciated monetary support. An institution to which I owe heartiest thanks is the Disciples Divinity House in Chicago (DDH), its Board of Trustees, and most of all its dean, Kristine Culp. Under the wise and gracious leadership of Dean Culp, the DDH community has flourished and benefitted many a scholar like myself, and I am grateful for the many years of intellectual, spiritual, and financial support. Several churches, including Lakeview Church of Christ in Chicago and Emmaus Lutheran Church in Eugene, Oregon, provided me the opportunity to serve them and try out some of the ideas contained in this dissertation. The faculty members of the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Oregon have graciously granted me library privileges for the last two years and made possible the completion of this project. I am in their debt.

The Divinity School also provided me the opportunity to study with Margaret M. Mitchell in her capacity as a teacher, mentor, and advisor. As will be plain to readers of this study, Prof. Mitchell's wisdom and erudition inspired me in innumerable ways (as well as saved me from countless errors), and her kindness and tireless encouragement never failed to buoy my spirits

throughout the life of this project. I am grateful too for the invaluable feedback and unflagging support of Profs. Hans-Josef Klauck of the Divinity School and Elizabeth Asmis of the University of Chicago Classics Department, teachers from whom I have learned much and who read this dissertation in its entirety and provided invaluable critical feedback. Of course, I take responsibility for all remaining errors and infelicities.

While I gained many excellent colleagues during my tenure at the University of Chicago, I am especially grateful to Matthijs den Dulk (PhD '15) and Jonathan Soyars (PhD '17), who both read and commented on large portions of this dissertation. I feel privileged to have such fine humans and scholars as my colleagues and friends. The Langfords and Brockers, my beloved family, have cheered me on throughout this process and have shown me love in its most unadulterated form. My father, James Langford, who set an example for me by persevering and completing his own dissertation despite significant challenges, laid eyes on every jot and tittle in this long work, and I am grateful for his close reading and many corrections. I am also grateful to my father-in-law and fellow Divinity School alumnus, Mark Brocker (PhD '96), for his bountiful moral support and confidence in me. My wife, Rachel Langford, deserves recognition *summa cum laude*. Her keen editorial eye rendered the argument more cogent and the prose more palatable. Most importantly, she persevered with me throughout, enabling my completion of this dissertation and my degree. For this gift of love and support I am most grateful, and it is to her that I dedicate this work with the deepest affection and care.

Note on Style

In matters of style I have followed first the requirements of the University of Chicago Dissertation Office's "University-Wide Requirements for the Ph.D. Dissertation." In addition, I have observed the recommendations and guidelines contained in the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 16th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). All ancient and modern literature, including periodicals and series, has been cited and abbreviated according to the dictates of the *Society of Biblical Literature Handbook of Style*, 2nd ed. (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014). When this *Handbook of Style* did not contain abbreviations of ancient sources, I have consulted the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth, and Esther Eidinow, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Liddell, Scott, and Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), and G. W. H. Lampe, ed., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). For the works of Galen, I have used the abbreviations of *The Cambridge Companion to Galen*, ed. R. J. Hankinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). For commentaries on the Pastoral Epistles, after an initial full citation I abbreviate by author last name and commentary series. All translations of the Greek New Testament are my own and the Greek text comes from the 28th ed. of the Nestle-Aland *Novum Testamentum Graece*, ed. Barbara and Kurt Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, Carlo M. Martini, and Bruce M. Metzger (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft). With some exceptions, Greek and Latin texts are quoted from the Loeb Classical Library or from the online repositories of critical editions found in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Online* (stephanus.tlg.uci.edu) and papyri.info.

Introduction: Deviance in the Pastoral Epistles

Allegations of sickened derangement,¹ deviance,² demonic influence,³ and putrid infection⁴ may seem incongruous for an author who values gentleness and patience in reproach,⁵ urges the avoidance of bellicosity,⁶ and who proclaims a "savior God" "who wishes all people to be saved."⁷ And yet, this is precisely the paradox we find in the Pastoral Epistles,⁸ three relatively brief New Testament letters attributed to Paul (1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus) that seek to balance polemics and pastoral care, the simultaneous pathologization of deviance and the fervent desire for deviants to "be healthy in the faith" (Titus 1:13). In some ways, this paradox is the by-product of the competing commitments and situation in which the author found himself, for he faced a

¹ 1 Tim 6:3–5.

² Titus 1:10–16.

³ 1 Tim 4:1.

⁴ 2 Tim 2:17.

⁵ 2 Tim 2:24, 4:2. Similarly, the αἰρετικὸς ἄνθρωπος gets two chances before being rejected (Titus 3:10).

⁶ ἄμαχος at 1 Tim 3:3, Titus 1:7.

⁷ 1 Tim 2:4. For God as σωτήρ, see 1 Tim 1:1, 2:3, 4:10; Titus 1:3, 2:10, 3:4. For Jesus Christ as ὁ μέγας θεὸς καὶ σωτήρ, see Titus 2:13.

⁸ The designation "Pastoralbriefe" was first given to these letters by D. N. Berdot in 1703, followed by Paul Anton in 1726 (Dillon T. Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God: An Investigation of the Opponents in 1 and 2 Timothy*, BBRSup 15 [Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2016], 5 n. 28). However, Arland Hultgren cites Thomas Aquinas, *Epistola I. ad Timotheum*, lectio 2 in order to point out that "already in the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) referred to 1 Timothy as 'a pastoral rule, which the apostle [Paul] committed to Timothy'" ("The Pastoral Epistles," in *The Cambridge Companion to St. Paul*, ed. James D. G. Dunn, Cambridge Companions to Religion [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 141 n. 1). Luke Timothy Johnson writes of Aquinas's comments: "1 Timothy is written *quasi pastoralis regula* (as something of a rule of a pastor, 184), whereas 2 Timothy is written with an eye toward *curam pastorem ac pastorale officium* (pastoral care and pastoral office), which is a matter of *curam gregis* (care for the flock, 230)" (*The First and Second Letters to Timothy: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 35A [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001], 13 n. 3). These letters continue to be called by this name, despite calls for the abandonment of the sobriquet by, e.g., Philip H. Towner, *The Letters to Timothy and Titus*, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 88–89; Rüdiger Fuchs, *Unerwartete Unterschiede: Müssen wir unsere Ansichten über "die" Pastoralbriefe revidieren?*, Bibelwissenschaftliche Monographien (Wuppertal: Brockhaus, 2003), 222–27; Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God*, 5–6. Already in 1901, James Moffatt could complain that "the inadequate and misleading title 'pastorals,' under which these writings have suffered for about 90 years, can only be retained (and used as seldom as possible) on the score of convenience" (James Moffatt, *The Historical New Testament: Being the Literature of the New Testament Arranged in the Order of Its Literary Growth and According to the Dates of the Documents*, 2nd and rev. ed. [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1901], 556 n. 1).

particular rhetorical and literary challenge: how could he,⁹ a second- or third-generation adherent to Paul's teachings about Jesus, address the theological and interpretive challenges of his day, some of which were likely generated by readings of Paul's letters that he deemed erroneous and dangerous?¹⁰ How could he respond to the kinds of theological problems he observed in the church of his time, both offering sufficiently strong warnings to demarcate and delineate the problems as he perceived them, and yet also highlighting the salutary efficacy of living in accordance with and believing "the healthy teaching"¹¹ put forward by Paul? I suggest that his depictions of opponents, replete with the language of pathology and health, provided a way to address theological debates and interpretive problems related to the reality of diversity in the emerging Christian movement. This diversity, which our author portrays as morbid deviance, is related to such topics as the nature and continuation of Pauline authority, the contested role of women, elders, and slaves in the church, debates about food and marriage, resurrection, and discipline for the errant, among others.

In this dissertation, I approach the Pastorals with new interpretive insights from the history of medicine, demonology, disability studies, and ancient discourses on the nature of psychopathology in order to pursue the following questions: How does the Pastor construct the image of his opponents? What does this tell us about his modes of argumentation, his rhetorical

⁹ I use the masculine pronoun to refer to the Pastor on the presumption that these letters were written by a male. The sociological realities of ancient paideia, combined with the consistent emphasis on female subordination in these letters, renders a hypothesis of female authorship highly unlikely. "The point of view is androcentric and patriarchal almost to the point of absurdity," as Linda M. Maloney observes ("Pastoral Epistles," in *Searching the Scriptures: A Feminist Commentary*, ed. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Shelly Matthews, and Ann Graham Brock [New York: Crossroad, 1993], 2.361). Richard Pervo corroborates this position, wryly offering what he dubs his "most original discovery: I fear that the PE are rather redolent of patriarchy" ("Romancing an Oft-Neglected Stone: The Pastoral Epistles and the Epistolary Novel," *Journal of Higher Criticism* 1 [1994]: 38).

¹⁰ Similarly, other scholars have argued that at least part of what is at stake for the Pastor is the way in which the Pauline epistolary legacy is interpreted. See, e.g., Michael Theobald, "Glauben statt Grübeln: Zum Anti-Intellektualismus der Pastoralbriefe," *EC* 5.1 (2014): 31.

¹¹ 1 Tim 1:10.

building materials, and his architectural strategy? What is the resulting image of Paul and his delegates Timothy and Titus in their narrated interactions with opponents in the PE? These questions are focused on the depiction of deviance and rectitude, representation and reality, rhetorical power, and its literary instantiations. By addressing the traditional problem of the opponents, but from a new perspective, I aim to reshape the scholarly conversation about the analysis and description of deviance in the Pastorals. I seek to describe the function and nature of pseudepigraphy as a form of Pauline interpretation, but with the critical innovation of viewing the Pastor's intertextual exercises as part of a broader preoccupation with characterizing opponents.

I argue that the Pastor seeks to present "Paul" as a literary physician who diagnoses deviance by employing several argumentative strategies. He characterizes his opponents as morally deviant, identifying them as transgressors of imagined boundaries of theological rectitude. This allows him to draw upon the notion of the demonic as a multifaceted rhetorical tool, whereby he can portray his opponents as compromised individuals who have wandered away from the healthy teaching and been corrupted by demonically inspired doctrines. The Pastor adopts medicalized argumentative topoi from contemporary philosophers and performs a public examination of these opponents, declaring them profoundly incapacitated, psychosomatically compromised individuals who are sickened by the doctrines they advance. This diagnosis serves as a public safety announcement of sorts: those who adhere to their teaching will suffer the same psychic decay. The logical counterpart of the Pastor's efforts to characterize his opponents in this way is his characterization of Paul as a moral *medicus*, one who knows how to remedy such gravely diseased individuals and the ill-effects of their speech. Paul's advice to Timothy is cast by the Pastor as a kind of moral regimen meant to make him strong and prevent even the appearance of evil. By characterizing Paul as one who can weigh in on matters of medical and moral

significance, the Pastor establishes Paul's status as the central arbiter of divine truth, the one whose λόγος is always πιστός, in the dual sense of both "faithful" and "credible."

The thesis of this dissertation is that the single, later generation Paulinist author of 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, and Titus crafted these three intertextually sophisticated pseudepigrapha in an effort to guide the interpretation of the Pauline legacy via creative, pluriform depictions of deviance as threats to the health of the church and its adherents. In order to make this argument, I demonstrate that the author of the Pastoral Epistles draws upon and seeks to supplement an emerging *Corpus Paulinum* in creative and surprising ways in order to present a particular portrait of Paul and his opponents. He attempts to characterize his opponents as demonically inspired, deluded individuals who fail to recognize the truth. This "truth" they fail to grasp is itself distinctively Pauline. That is to say, the issues at hand for the Pastor are cast as perversions of Pauline doctrine, and the Pastor-as-pseudepigrapher seeks to skillfully redirect those misunderstandings of Paul's teaching by creatively re-inscribing the historical-epistolary Paul's¹² terms and themes in a new argumentative form. This new form effectively redirects and attempts to guide the interpretation of Paul's own letters on such crucial topics as dietary restrictions, sex, marriage, and the ways in which Satan can influence thoughts and teachers.

I. Foundational Considerations

A. Authorship and Authenticity Criticism

The author the Pastoral Epistles (PE), whom I refer to as "the Pastor," was a late first- or early second-century CE Pauline devotee and an early Christian author of some talent. I. Howard

¹² I borrow this term from Margaret M. Mitchell to refer to Paul as he is known through the homologoumena, the vehicle of the legacy of the historical Paul (*Paul and the Emergence of Christian Textuality: Early Christian Literary Culture in Context: Collected Essays*, WUNT 2.393 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017], xiii, xv).

Marshall regards the author of the PE as "a person of considerable theological skill."¹³ Similarly, though for a different rhetorical goal (i.e., to cast doubt on the idea that a pseudepigrapher could produce the Pastorals), Luke Timothy Johnson calls him an "artist of considerable imagination" and an "author of considerable literary skill."¹⁴ The author accomplished, I shall argue, something quite remarkable: he not only managed to write his way into an emerging corpus of Pauline texts, but he did so in such a way as to convince a sufficient number, if not all,¹⁵ of his early readers that he was in fact the same Paul as the author of letters that critical scholars now call, with a tip of the hat to Eusebius, the "homologoumena" (ὁμολογούμενα)—the "agreed-upon" letters.¹⁶ And yet, the basic hypothesis of the Pastorals' pseudonymity is no longer as widely agreed upon as it once was.

¹³ I. Howard Marshall, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles*, ICC (London; New York: T&T Clark International, 2004), 88. Contrast the assessment of Gerd Häfner: "Wer einen originellen theologischen Denker sucht, wird sich an eine andere Adresse wenden als an den Verfasser der Briefe an Timotheus und Titus" ("Polemik in den Pastoralbriefen. Formen, Funktionen, Folgerungen," in *Polemik in der frühchristlichen Literatur Texte und Kontexte*, ed. Oda Wischmeyer and Lorenzo Scornaienchi, BZNW 170 [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011], 295).

¹⁴ Johnson calls him "an artist of considerable imagination . . . not a hack who writes the same thing over and over in three segments, but an author of considerable literary skill . . . It is an artistry sufficient to convince critical readers from Origen through Erasmus to Grotius that the same author who wrote Romans also wrote the Pastorals" (AB, 89).

¹⁵ Johnson, AB, 89, quoted above, seems to imply that none but modern scholars, too clever for their own good, have doubted the Pastorals' authenticity. But there is a lively history of doubt and debate regarding these letters. Tatian of Syria (ca. 160 CE) apparently accepted the letter to Titus, but repudiated some of Paul's other letters (see Jerome, *Prologue to Titus* [PL 26:556]). See Collins, NTL, 2. Jerome also alleges that other "heretics" (he mentions Marcion, Basilides, and "all heretics") erased parts of Paul's letters and thought "that some deserved to be rejected in their entirety, namely, those to Timothy, to the Hebrews, and to Titus" (Thomas P. Scheck, *St. Jerome's Commentaries on Galatians, Titus, and Philemon* [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010], 278). The first modern critical doubts about the authenticity of Titus seem to have surfaced around 1792. While Edward Evanson took the letters to Timothy to be authentic, stylistic and historical considerations led him to doubt the authenticity of Titus. See Edward Evanson, *The Dissonance of the Four Generally Received Evangelists and the Evidence of Their Respective Authenticity Examined* (Ipswich: Jermyn, 1792), 267–9, cited by Jermo van Nes, "On the Origin of the Pastorals' Authenticity Criticism: A 'new' Perspective," *NTS* 62.2 (2016): 319.

¹⁶ These include Romans, 1 & 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon. Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.* 3.25) famously delineated four statuses attributed to early Christian literature: "agreed upon works" (τὰ ὁμολογούμενα), "disputed works" (τὰ ἀντιλεγόμενα), "spurious works" (τὰ νόθα), and finally, those which fell so far afoul of what Eusebius considers to be the "apostolic ethos" (τὸ ἥθος τὸ ἀποστολικόν) that they cannot even be dubbed "spurious" but "ought to be avoided as altogether strange and impious" (ὡς ἄτοπα πάντα καὶ δυσσεβῆ παραιτητέον). We should note here that *παραιτεῖν*, used in reference to teachings or people deemed dangerous, is a favorite term of the Pastor (1 Tim 4:7, 5:11; 2 Tim 2:23; Titus 3:10).

Changing of the Tide Regarding Authorship

In 1986, scholars like Lewis Donelson felt they could take the arguments for the pseudepigraphical status of these letters as an established fact and therefore a suitable starting point for analysis.¹⁷ In 2002, Raymond F. Collins could write that "by the end of twentieth century New Testament scholarship was virtually unanimous" in affirming the pseudepigraphical nature of the Pastorals.¹⁸ And yet, in 2007 Michael Theobald acknowledges frankly his surprise regarding the increasing erosion of the long-held critical consensus concerning the Pastorals, namely that they were a coherent corpus of post-Pauline letters written by one author at the end of the first century CE under the influence of Paul's legacy.¹⁹ While even prominent evangelical scholars like I. Howard Marshall have agreed with the critical consensus that these letters are different enough from the homologoumena yet similar enough to each other to have been written by one author who is not the historical-epistolary Paul, other scholars have emphasized differences between the letters in order to argue for different possible authorial scenarios.²⁰

¹⁷ Lewis R. Donelson readily acknowledges his *modus operandi*: "we shall presuppose non-Pauline authorship and shall raid previous scholarship for the enormous grammatical, semantic and history-of-religion contextual resources which have been accumulated over the last hundred years. . . And, while no argument against Pauline authorship shall be articulated, if the reading of the letters presented here is at all persuasive, then a further vindication of the presupposition of non-Pauline authorship will be accomplished" (*Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles*, HUT 22 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986], 2).

¹⁸ NTL, 4. He acknowledges as defenders of Pauline authorship Johnson (AB) and George W. Knight III, *The Pastoral Epistles: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Paternoster, 1992). He comments on the special place of 2 Timothy in twentieth century debates about authorship, especially in the studies of Michael Prior and Jerome Murphy-O'Connor. See Michael Prior, *Paul the Letter-Writer and the Second Letter to Timothy*, JSNTSup 23 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989); Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus," *RB* 98 (1991): 403–18.

¹⁹ Michael Theobald, "Paulus gegen Paulus? Der Streit um die Pastoralbriefe," *TQ* 187.4 (2007): 254.

²⁰ However, Marshall did not consider "pseudonymity" to be the appropriate term to describe the authorial activity of the Pastorals, because of its association with an intent to deceive, which he denies in the case of the Pastorals. He suggests "allonymity" or "allopigraphy" instead (ICC, 83–92). Marshall, a leading evangelical scholar, frankly admits that he cannot reasonably imagine that Paul composed 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, and Titus, at least as they are written, i.e., with the theology and literary style they utilize. He rehearses the major points of discussion, namely, in terms of 1) language and style, 2) historical setting of the author, 3) the recipients, 4) the opposition, 5) the theological and practical instruction, and 6) the picture of Paul ("Prospects for the Pastoral Epistles," in *Doing Theology for the People of God: Studies in Honor of J.I. Packer*, ed. Donald M. Lewis and Alistair McGrath [Downers

Some commentators have reasserted the traditional view that Paul is the author of these three letters.²¹ Johnson, for instance, accuses proponents of the pseudonymity hypothesis of blithely assuming²² rather than arguing the issue of authorship.²³ Recently, scholars have sought to overturn claims that the vocabulary and style in the Pastorals diverge greatly from that of the homologoumena.²⁴ Scholars such as Rüdiger Fuchs have emphasized the differences amongst the Pastorals but maintained an argument for Pauline authorship, arguing that their individual differences do not derive from different authors so much as different real addressees and circumstances.²⁵ This approach undervalues the substantive differences between Pastorals and the

Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996], 138–45). He concludes (146) by acknowledging that the standard arguments against authorship by Paul "cast very strong doubts on the traditional evangelical defense of direct Pauline authorship." Acknowledging candidly the problems that conservative scholars have with the idea of an author deceitfully writing in the name of Paul, he attempts to provide an authorial scenario that could plausibly allow for these letters to be written by someone other than Paul after his death. Marshall attempts to sketch out a theory of non-deceptive non-Pauline authorship. His articulation of the "implicit rubric" (151) presupposed by such a hypothetical author makes clear why such a position is untenable. Marshall gives voice to the imagined rubric: "These letters represent the kind of thing that I think that Paul would have to say to our churches today if here were still alive. Consequently, I have not simply repeated the actual things that he said, but I have had to think how he would have reacted to present circumstances."

²¹ E.g., Johnson, AB; Knight, NIGTC; Heinz-Werner Neudorfer, *Der erste Brief des Paulus an Timotheus*, HTA (Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 2004); Stanley E. Porter, *The Apostle Paul: His Life, Thought, and Letters* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 409–31.

²² Reviewers and critics have rightly identified such rhetoric as an inaccurate stigmatization of the historical-literary investigation undertaken by most critics (see, e.g., Margaret M. Mitchell, review of *The First and Second Letters to Timothy: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, by Luke Timothy Johnson, *JR* 83 [2003]: 116–19; Bart D. Ehrman, *Forgery and Counterforgery: The Use of Literary Deceit in Early Christian Polemics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 201–202].

²³ Johnson, AB, 90, laments: "What makes the present state of scholarship on the Pastorals so disheartening is that the difficulties (which are of a fundamental character) are seldom even acknowledged, and even less frequently engaged. As a result, the conventional wisdom concerning authenticity moves farther and farther from any grounding in evidence and argument, farther and farther from the best and most recent scholarship on Paul himself, and perpetuates itself mainly by force of inertia based on an unexamined majority vote by an increasingly uninformed electorate." Even though he arrives at a different conclusion than Johnson, Douglas Campbell's recent discursive reconsideration of the evidence may restore some of Johnson's faith in the electorate. Ultimately, despite rejecting some standard arguments against authenticity, Campbell concludes that all three are pseudonymous (Douglas A. Campbell, *Framing Paul: An Epistolary Biography* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014], 339–85).

²⁴ Armin Daniel Baum, "Semantic Variation within the Corpus Paulinum: Linguistic Considerations Concerning the Richer Vocabulary of the Pastoral Epistles," *TynBul* 59.2 (2008): 271–92. Unfortunately, I was able to acquire a copy of Jerro van Nes's very recently published monograph at too late a date to engage his argument in this study. See his Jerro van Nes, *Pauline Language and the Pastoral Epistles: A Study of Linguistic Variation in the Corpus Paulinum*, Linguistic Biblical Studies 16 (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

²⁵ Fuchs, *Unerwartete Unterschiede*.

homologoumena and their approach to 1) the problem of deviance, 2) the forms of argument used to address that deviance, and 3) the degree to which the author of the Pastorals exhibits literary dependence upon Paul's own letters. Some have argued that 2 Timothy is either by Paul or contains fragments of Paul's notes,²⁶ whereas 1 Timothy and Titus are from a different hand.²⁷ But this approach unduly minimizes the extraordinary lexical and argumentative coherences between all three of the Pastorals.

Still others have argued that they are written by two or three different authors, with 2 Timothy having the best claim to Pauline authorship and Titus and 1 Timothy coming later.²⁸ Richards sees the PE as "three different texts, arising from three different situations."²⁹ Richards suggests that the implied authors of Titus and 2 Timothy, whom he designates the "Elder" and the "Pastor" respectively, are not the same person and that their two letters are literarily independent.³⁰ He argues that differences in style, epistolary form, letter type, and vocabulary all suggest their independence. While one can appreciate the differences between the two letters, one must reject his much stronger claim that "apart from the customary epistolary units, there is no parallel material between their two letters."³¹ As we shall see below, these letters share a great deal, including material that is absent from 1 Timothy. His Appendix A is inadequate for determining the significance or usage of particular key terms in the Pastorals. For example, the term *ὑγιαίνω* is listed as "special" to Titus because it occurs four times, even though it also occurs twice in both 1 & 2 Tim. Most importantly, the *ways* in which these terms are used is not taken into account, and

²⁶ P. N. Harrison argued that the personalia of Titus and 2 Timothy were "thoroughly Pauline in vocabulary, idiom and style" (P. N. Harrison, *The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles* [London: Oxford University Press, 1921], 7).

²⁷ Prior, *Paul the Letter-Writer*; Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus."

²⁸ William A. Richards, *Difference and Distance in Post-Pauline Christianity: An Epistolary Analysis of the Pastorals*, StBibLit 44 (New York: Lang, 2002).

²⁹ Richards, *Difference and Distance*, 207.

³⁰ Richards, *Difference and Distance*, 208.

³¹ Richards, *Difference and Distance*, 208.

consequently Richards misses the *function* to which they are put in the letters, which is consistent across the three letters. While Richards does not believe his epistolary analysis can decide the question fully, he takes the "Teacher" (the author of 1 Tim) to be yet a third individual who draws upon both Titus and 2 Tim. However, he provides little defense for such a hypothesis, which would need to outline a plausible historical scenario for such a procedure, as well as an accounting of the means and motive for such a procedure.

Recently, Jens Herzer and his student Michaela Engelmann have proposed that all three letters are pseudepigraphical but they derive from different hands from a common Pauline school,³² in the sequence 2 Timothy, Titus, 1 Timothy, with 1 Timothy being literarily dependent upon the other two letters.³³ On the one hand, these approaches attempt to deal with the similarities among the three letters in a more direct way than those who argue for independent, Pauline authorship, but, on the other, to account for that similarity they take recourse to increasingly complex theories of authorship. While these scholars' attention to differences constitutes an important corrective (even if they overstate the degree to which earlier scholarship has ignored these differences), the hypothesis of a single, versatile author who is not Paul still makes the best sense of the data. The treatment of the opponents across all three letters has such commonality of logic, metaphors, topoi, and arguments, that multiple authors are highly unlikely.

Specific proposals for the author of these letters have included, besides Paul,³⁴ Luke,³⁵ Polycarp,³⁶ or even Timothy³⁷ or Timothy and Titus in a coordinated effort.³⁸ Scholars sometimes

³² Jens Herzer, "Fiktion oder Täuschung?: Zur Diskussion über die Pseudepigraphie der Pastoralbriefe," in *Pseudepigraphie und Verfasserfiktion in frühchristlichen Briefen = Pseudepigraphy and Author Fiction in Early Christian Letters*, ed. Jörg Frey et al., WUNT 246 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 489–536.

³³ Michaela Engelmann, *Unzertrennliche Drillinge? Motivsemantische Untersuchungen zum literarischen Verhältnis der Pastoralbriefe*, BZNW 192 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 598–601.

³⁴ Still maintained by many, e.g., Knight, NIGTC, 4–6; Neudorfer, HTA, 32; William D. Mounce, *Pastoral Epistles*, WBC 46 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2000), xlv–xlviii.

hypothesize the existence of a Pauline school to explain the production of the Pastorals.³⁹ This hypothesis has at times been marshaled to protect the Pastorals from the charge of forgery.

Postulating a "Pauline school" of some kind allows for the idea that deutero-Pauline literature could have had an origin in "open pseudepigraphy," the idea that one could write in the name of

³⁵ Though not the first to propose Luke as the author of the PE, S. G. Wilson has represented the position for the last generation of scholarship (*Luke and the Pastoral Epistles* [London: SPCK, 1979]). Wilson carried forward the research of C. F. D. Moule, "The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles. A Reappraisal," *BJRL* 47 (1965): 430–52. Cf. Jerome D. Quinn, "The Last Volume of Luke: The Relation of Luke-Acts to the Pastoral Epistles," in *Perspectives on Luke-Acts*, ed. Charles H. Talbert, Perspectives in Religious Studies (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1978), 62–75; Rainer Riesner, "Once More: Luke-Acts and the Pastoral Epistles," in *History and Exegesis: New Testament Essays in Honor of Dr. E. Earle Ellis for His 80th Birthday*, ed. Sang-Won Son (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 239–58. Ben Witherington III advanced a variation of the thesis by suggesting that Luke "helped" Paul with 1 Timothy and Titus and "composed" 2 Tim (*Letters and Homilies for Hellenized Christians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on Titus, 1-2 Timothy and 1-3 John* [Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006], 65–68). The Lukan theory has been convincingly refuted by, e.g., I. Howard Marshall's review of Wilson's book ("Review of *Luke and the Pastoral Epistles*, by S. G. Wilson," *JSNT* 10 [1981]: 69–74); Jean-Daniel Kaestli, "Luke-Acts and the Pastoral Epistles: The Thesis of a Common Authorship," in *Luke's Literary Achievement: Collected Essays*, ed. C. M. Tuckett, *JSNTSup* 116 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 110–26.

³⁶ Hans von Campenhausen, "Polykarp von Smyrna und die Pastoralbriefe," in *Aus der Frühzeit des Christentums: Studien zur Kirchengeschichte des ersten und zweiten Jahrhunderts* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1963), 197–252. A summary and critique of Campenhausen's position may be found in Paul Hartog, *Polycarp and the New Testament: The Occasion, Rhetoric, Theme, and Unity of the Epistle to the Philippians and Its Allusions to New Testament Literature*, WUNT 2.134 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 228–31. Walter Bauer argued that the Pastorals postdate Polycarp's letter, and that the Pastor in fact alludes to Polycarp's *Philippians* (*Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, ed. Robert A. Kraft and Gerhard Krodel [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971], 224).

³⁷ Richard Bauckham, "Pseudo-Apostolic Letters," *JBL* 107.3 (1988): 469–94. Bauckham suggests that if Timothy were the author (after Paul's death), this might explain the lack of information regarding Titus's life but the "good deal" of information about Timothy (492–94).

³⁸ Philip Carrington suggested that someone from a "school of Timothy" in Ephesus must have taken up authentic Pauline letters to Titus and Timothy and thoroughly edited and adapted them Philip Carrington, "The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles: Dr. Harrison's Theory Reviewed," *ATHR* 21.1 (1939): 32–39.

³⁹ E.g., by analogy with the production of the Socratic epistles, Fiore postulates that the Pastorals too are the product of a school. See Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles*, AnBib 105 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986). Donelson and Huizenga, who also read the Pastorals in conjunction with philosophical pseudepigrapha, do not postulate a school scenario. See Annette Bourland Huizenga, *Moral Education for Women in the Pastoral and Pythagorean Letters: Philosophers of the Household*, NovTSup 147 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 221–33; Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 54–66. Jens Herzer points out that the assumption of a school hypothesis requires also that one assume that different groups developed after Paul's death, given the differences between the pseudepigrapha produced in Paul's name. He argues that the phenomenon of pseudepigraphy is not monolithic and that scholars should adopt a differentiated view of how pseudepigraphy could function letter by letter ("Die Paulusschule und die theologischen Entwicklung in den deuteropaulinischen Briefen," in *Paulus Handbuch*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Horn [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013], 525). James D. Miller argues that a "massive problem" for the school-hypothesis is: "if the Pastorals are the products of a Pauline school, why do they deviate so considerably from the teachings of the master?" (James D. Miller, *The Pastoral Letters as Composite Documents*, SNTSMS 93 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 143). This way of formulating the question neglects the common reality of development and departure between ancient authorities and their successors.

Paul but without any effort to deceive an unwitting readership.⁴⁰ However, the school hypothesis does not always entail an effort to protect the Pastorals from their designation as forgeries. Marco Frenschkowski, noting that there are multiple definitions of a "school," belies this notion of a school that crafted these letters as open forgeries, arguing that if such a school existed, it would have consisted of Paul's former circle of coworkers, the "Missionsteams des Apostels."⁴¹ The "school" he imagines is one mediated by the teacher-student relationship, which seeks to transmit traditions even after the death of the teacher. However, while he allows that the personal notes of the Pastorals may have some connection to historical memory, as it stands, the use of personalia is evidence of an attempt to deceive a readership beyond their circle.⁴² Frenschkowski goes on to suggest that the most plausible scenario for the production of the Pastorals would be that Timothy or Titus or both together wrote them in order to bolster their own authority. He imagines that they could not have easily passed off such a deception in a place like Ephesus, where the question would arise as to why they had not produced such documents earlier. Rather, a more remote place like Crete seems more realistic to him.⁴³ It is hard to see how Crete would be any better than Ephesus, however, for both are ostensible locales to which these letters were sent. Most recently, scholars have rejected the notion that Paul himself would have established any such school, and, citing a lack of evidence, have argued that to depict the groups that persisted

⁴⁰ Merz expressed appropriate caution with regard to the matter: "Wenn auch die präzise Bestimmung der Positionen der Gegnerinnen stark umstritten ist, muss der Grundansatz der Verortung der Pastoralbriefe in einem im innerpaulinischen Traditionsbereich ausgetragenen Kampf um das richtige Verständnis des pln Erbes als der derzeit am besten begründete gelten. Er wird der sorgfältig entfalteten doppelten Pseudonymität der Briefe und ihren gezielt platzierten Personaltraditionen am besten gerecht" (Annette Merz, *Die fiktive Selbstauslegung des Paulus: Intertextuelle Studien zur Intention und Rezeption der Pastoralbriefe*, NTOA 52 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004], 218; cf. 386).

⁴¹ Marco Frenschkowski, "Pseudepigraphie und Paulusschule: Gedanken zur Verfasserschaft der Deuteropaulinen, insbesondere der Pastoralbriefe," in *Das Ende des Paulus: historische, theologische und literaturgeschichtliche Aspekte*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Horn, BZNW 106 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), 253–62; here quoting 259.

⁴² Frenschkowski, "Pseudepigraphie und Paulusschule," 262.

⁴³ Frenschkowski, "Pseudepigraphie und Paulusschule," 263–70.

after Paul's death as "schools" that produced the deuterio-Paulines is unnecessary to account for these literary productions.⁴⁴ All the evidence from Paul's own letters suggests that he sought first and foremost to build ἐκκλησίαι, not schools per se.

The difficulties of determining authorship have prevented some scholars from deciding either way on the matter. In a recent book on Titus, Paul S. Jeon does not take a position regarding authorship "because it is impossible to 'prove' the authenticity of the letter" and because his concern is for the implied author and the implied audience.⁴⁵ Similarly, Dillon Thornton takes a "somewhat 'agnostic' position"⁴⁶ on the authorship of these letters, which he prefers to call, following Luke Timothy Johnson,⁴⁷ "'Letters to Paul's Delegates' or simply 'Pauline Delegates.'"⁴⁸ He very briefly articulates his rationale for taking the letters as being by Paul "or by an early interpreter of Paul," but does not acknowledge the hermeneutical implications of this ambivalence.⁴⁹ There are of course many scholarly decisions to be made in the interpretation of texts like these, and expressing uncertainty or withholding judgment is sometimes necessary. However, indecision regarding authorship is untenable as a basis for historically oriented exegetical scholarship. Too many important determinations hang in the balance to avoid

⁴⁴ Ehrman, *Forgery and Counterforgery*, 172–74, here quoting 174.

⁴⁵ *To Exhort and Reprove: Audience Response to the Chiastic Structures of Paul's Letter to Titus* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2012), 5. Any clear statement on authorship is missing too from George M. Wieland, *The Significance of Salvation: A Study of Salvation Language in the Pastoral Epistles*, Paternoster Biblical Monographs (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006).

⁴⁶ Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God*, 10.

⁴⁷ Luke Timothy Johnson, *Letters to Paul's Delegates: 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus*, New Testament in Context (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996).

⁴⁸ Thornton's dissertation, completed in 2014 at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand, was published two years later. See Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God*, 6.

⁴⁹ The implications of this indecision are nicely illustrated in a 2015 article by Thornton regarding the use of Job in 1 Cor 5:5 and 1 Tim 1:20. Thornton considers it "more likely that we have in these NT texts *one author* repeating his exegesis of Job." He goes on: "It remains possible, however, that instead we have *two authors* exegeting the prologue in the same way" (Dillon T. Thornton, "Satan as Adversary and Ally in the Process of Ecclesial Discipline: The Use of the Prologue to Job in 1 Corinthians 5:5 and 1 Timothy 1:20," *TynBul* 66 [2015]: 138 n. 2). A third option, however, that I shall argue for below in chapter two, is that the Pastor is in fact drawing on Paul's interpretation of Job, and that the Pastor's reading of Job is refracted through Paul's own.

providing a positive working hypothesis regarding authorship.⁵⁰ The decision regarding authorship, as many have pointed out, dramatically affects one's reading strategy and the results achieved.⁵¹

All determinations with respect to authorship are based upon both a selection of data and a set of criteria for its assessment. Which criteria can prove or disprove authenticity? As a matter of historical criticism, reconstructing a plausible scenario in which these letters could have been written by Paul is an inescapable requirement. Most scholars have determined that these letters do not fit within an itinerary of Paul's life as we know it from his agreed upon letters,⁵² while some have argued that there are too many lacunae in our knowledge of Paul's chronology to be certain.⁵³ Other criteria, such as absence of key terms, have played an important role in determining authenticity. For instance, these letters lack certain themes that are deemed central to Paul's thinking, such as the cross of Christ⁵⁴ or justification by faith.⁵⁵ Others have pointed to

⁵⁰ Equally dissatisfying as a basis upon which historically oriented critical scholarship can be conducted is the contention of Claire S. Smith that a determination about authorship does not matter for the purposes of her study (*Pauline Communities as "Scholastic Communities": A Study of the Vocabulary of "Teaching" in 1 Corinthians, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus*, WUNT 2.335 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012], 30). Smith provides a survey of the debate about authorship and candidly acknowledges that she leans toward accepting the Pauline authorship of the Pastorals (31), but examines the teaching terminology of 1 Corinthians alongside that of 1 Tim, 2 Tim, and Titus without acknowledging the possibility that the PE are in fact drawing upon 1 Corinthians.

⁵¹ Michael Prior comments that realizing that "no solid conclusion could be drawn about the meaning of any pericope of the Pastoral Epistles until one had pronounced upon the question of authorship" formed the basis of his study (*Paul the Letter-Writer*, 167). Luke Timothy Johnson also acknowledges this point: "The letters to Paul's delegates seem to require a declaration concerning one's presuppositions concerning the nature of the compositions as a whole before undertaking the examination of any part, because the basic options concerning the historical placement of these letters appear to demand quite different strategies of reading" ("First Timothy 1,1–20: The Shape of the Struggle," in *1 Timothy Reconsidered*, ed. Karl Paul Donfried, Monographische Reihe von "Benedictina": Biblisch-Ökumenische Abteilung 18 [Leuven: Peeters, 2008], 19).

⁵² Raymond Edward Brown, *An Introduction to the New Testament* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 641, 655, 673–74. Brown notes that scholars typically posit a "second career" of sorts for Paul after his imprisonment in Rome recounted in Acts 28:16–31, and that a minority of scholars have argued that 2 Timothy is easier to fit within a chronology of Paul's life based on evidence from Paul's other letters and Acts.

⁵³ Johnson, AB, 65–68; Stanley E. Porter, "Pauline Chronology and the Question of Pseudonymity of the Pastoral Epistles," in *Paul and Pseudepigraphy*, ed. Gregory P. Fewster and Stanley E. Porter, Pauline Studies 8 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 65–88.

⁵⁴ Positive evidence is more persuasive than negative evidence in this regard, for Paul's argumentation is always situational, and no one letter exhausts his theological diversity. The language of the cross and the crucifixion, so

the more developed structure of ecclesial leadership presupposed in the Pastorals (1 Timothy and Titus in particular) to argue that these reflect a later period.⁵⁶ However, arguably the most striking evidence for non-Pauline authorship derives from the use of language by each of these three letters that suggests a close literary relationship with each other and the marked linguistic and rhetorical differences from Paul's letters .

B. Corpus Paulinum, Corpus Pastorale

1. The Pastorals as Letter Corpus?

As we have seen, a central concern in the contemporary debate about the authorship of the Pastoral Epistles is the nature of their relationship to one another. Proponents of the view that the letters are a mini-corpus, conceived of as such, constructed to be read in relationship to one another, and composed by a single author over a relatively brief period of time, point to internal evidence such as similarity in vocabulary and theology, and external evidence such as early canon lists and manuscripts that offer no indication that they ever circulated independently. These letters are furthermore distinguished from Paul's other letters in that they alone purport to be the correspondence between Paul and two of his most prominent envoys.

Peter Trummer is a notable advocate for the mini-corpus theory. He quite reasonably hypothesizes that the Pastorals would have had to be incorporated into an existing corpus of

central to Paul's argument in 1 Corinthians and Galatians, is infrequent in Romans (only *συνεσταυρώθη* at Rom 6:6). That said, the theme of Christ's death and its salvific significance is prominent in Romans (e.g., Rom 3:21–26; 5:6–11; 6:1–11, etc.), which belies simplistic conclusions drawn from lexical statistics.

⁵⁵ While justification by faith is absent, we do find justification by grace (cf. *δικαιωθέντες τῇ ἐκείνου χάριτι* at Titus 3:7) reminiscent of Paul's language at Rom 3:24: *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*. What is perhaps harder to account for are soteriological statements like 1 Tim 2:15—*σωθήσεται δὲ διὰ τῆς τεκνογονίας, ἐὰν μείνωσιν ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀγάπῃ καὶ ἀγιασμῷ μετὰ σωφροσύνης*.

⁵⁶ Fiore, SP, 19–20, actually relies almost exclusively on an assessment of the "development of ecclesiastical structures" as a guide for dating (he locates the PE ca. 80–90 CE, prior to 1 Clem, which he dates to ca. 96–97 CE).

Paul's letters and been a part of a new edition of the corpus, since otherwise by the time of their composition in the late first or early second century they would have attracted suspicion and been rejected outright.⁵⁷ Trummer asserts that the letters should not be conceived of as individual letters, but rather as a letter corpus, a "literary triptych" (*literarisches Triptychon*).⁵⁸ This notion of the Pastorals as a letter-corpus has been pursued in a novel way by Timo Glaser,⁵⁹ who takes up and substantiates Richard Pervo's tentative suggestion that PE constitute an epistolary novel comparable to the letters of Chion of Heraclea, the late-first century author.⁶⁰ Comparisons with

⁵⁷ Peter Trummer, "Corpus Paulinum—Corpus Pastorale: Zur Ortung der Paulustradition in den Pastoralbriefen," in *Paulus in den neutestamentlichen Spätschriften: Zur Paulusrezeption im Neuen Testament*, ed. Karl Kertelge, QD 89 (Freiburg: Herder, 1981), 132–35.

⁵⁸ Trummer, "Corpus Paulinum—Corpus Pastorale," 123, 127. Cf. Jürgen Roloff's comment: "Sie mehr oder weniger gleichzeitig entstanden und in der Form eines dreiteiligen Briefcorpus an die Öffentlichkeit gebracht worden sind" (Jürgen Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, EKKNT 15 [Zürich; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Benziger; Neukirchener Verlag, 1988], 43).

⁵⁹ Timo Glaser, *Paulus als Briefroman erzählt: Studien zum antiken Briefroman und seiner christlichen Rezeption in den Pastoralbriefen*, NTOA 76 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009).

⁶⁰ However, Pervo seems to champion the potential benefits of reading the Pastorals in this manner more than any firm declaration that the Pastorals *are* an epistolary novel. Several considerations mitigate against his suggestion: 1) He admits that Chion's letters constitute the best representative of what might constitute the epistolary novel genre (36) (though he does suggest that the Socratic Epistles are the other "leading candidate" for such a designation [31]), thus leaving the genre fairly ill-defined and without sufficient evidence to define it further; 2) he concedes that the PE are "not very successful" (40) if they are meant to constitute something like Chion's letters; 3) that 2 Timothy forms the primary basis for such a comparison (43), tacitly acknowledging that the letters do not read together as following a narrative line. Furthermore, he suggests that the PE are in fact best read as letters most similar to the Socratic Epistles, but, even then, that the PE do not have the same type of "narrative core" that holds together the Socratic Epistles (45). Even the designation of the letters of Chion of Heraclea by Ingemar Düring (*Chion of Heraclea: A Novel in Letters*, Acta Universitatis Gotoburgensis. Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 57,5 [Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerber, 1951]), on whom Pervo relies, has come into question. C. D. N. Costa casts doubt on the designation *Briefroman* ("epistolary novel") for the letters of Chion, suggesting that they constitute "not so much a novel-in-letters as a roughly maintained narrative line" (*Greek Fictional Letters: A Selection with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], xix). He argues that "the writer cannot have thought he was keeping to a credible chronology. Rather we must think of him as more interested in using the letter-form to explore the *ἦθος*, the character and moral make-up, of a young philosopher with a burning ambition to rid his city of a tyrant" (Costa, *Greek Fictional Letters: A Selection with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary*, xix); Patricia A. Rosenmeyer, *Ancient Epistolary Fictions: The Letter in Greek Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 234–52 on the other hand, considers Chion's letters to be the only representative of the genre, with the caveat that the Alexander Romance might resemble it, but for the lost epistolary core. Other recent research has suggested that we have no fewer than eight complete (and a ninth fragmentary) collections of pseudepigraphic letters that could be considered epistolary novels. See Niklas Holzberg, "Letters: Chion," in *The Novel in the Ancient World*, ed. Gareth L. Schmeling, Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava. Supplementum 159 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 645–53. A thorough review of current scholarship on the ancient epistolary novel is given by Glaser, *Paulus als Briefroman erzählt*, 32–167.

other letter collections, such as the Socratic Epistles⁶¹ and more recently the neo-Pythagorean women's letters, commend their interpretation as a corpus.⁶²

Although there have always been advocates for the view that these letters were not conceived of as a literary corpus, among both scholars who take them to be orthonymous and those who take them to be pseudonymous, over the last two decades there has been a growing chorus of calls to interpret these letters separately. This summons is at times based on a concern that this grouping somehow inhibits analysis of the individual letters⁶³ or that it is predicated upon a theory of composition and relationship of the letters to each other or to the homologoumena that is deemed inaccurate.⁶⁴ The insistence on attention to the letters "on their own terms" or "for their own sake" or the suggestion that "the voice of each should be heard" is also growing.⁶⁵ Proponents of this view sometimes compare the usage of certain terms or themes among the three letters and conclude that the differences between those uses suggests different authors and different settings.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*; Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*.

⁶² Annette Bourland Huizenga makes the Pastorals as letter collection a cornerstone of her comparison with the Pythagorean women's letters. See *Philosophers of the Household*, 221–56.

⁶³ E.g., Michael Prior believes that 2 Tim is authentic, and argues against grouping the PE together for interpretive purposes, saying this obviates the need to situate each letter in its historical context (*Paul the Letter-Writer*, 61). Similarly, Richards finds sufficient difference to merit a re-reading (*Difference and Distance*, 22–24); Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God*, 7 chooses to study the opponents of 1 and 2 Timothy but not Titus on the grounds that "the difference in designation is a factor significant enough to warrant a separate investigation."

⁶⁴ Johnson, AB, 55–90; while rejecting Johnson's assessment that the letters are authentic, Jens Herzer accepts Johnson's critique of the corpus theory ("Abschied vom Konsens? Die Pseudepigraphie der Pastoralbriefe als Herausforderung an die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft," *TLZ* 129 [2004]: 1267–82).

⁶⁵ Wieland, *The Significance of Salvation*, 248.

⁶⁶ E.g., Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus"; Richards, *Difference and Distance*. In a recent article, Herzer argues that the οἶκος θεοῦ in 1 Tim 3:15 and the οἰκία of 2 Tim 2:20 are inconsistent and incompatible with common authorship (Jens Herzer, "Rearranging the 'House of God': A New Perspective on the Pastoral Epistles," in *Empsychoi Logoi—Religious Innovations in Antiquity. Studies in Honor of Pieter Willem van Der Horst*, ed. Alberdina Houtman, Albert de Jong, and Magda Misset-Van de Weg, AGJU 73 [Leiden: Brill, 2008], 545–66). While I think Herzer does not here demonstrate significant difference in the use of the metaphor between 1 Tim and 2 Tim, the more significant lacuna in his argument is a demonstration that the two uses of the metaphor should be the same, or that different uses are incompatible with common authorship.

For instance, in one of the most recent critiques of the corpus theory, Michaela Engelmann finds differences among the three letters incompatible with the theory of common authorship.⁶⁷ For example, Engelmann focuses in on what she regards as the significant differences in meaning and use of εὐσέβεια and cognates in the Pastorals,⁶⁸ and from that concludes that they reflect different situations and authors.⁶⁹ Engelmann is certainly accurate in some of her observations of the differences. For example, the terminology is more prevalent in 1 Timothy, "der längste Past[oralbrief]" (which she also takes to be the latest of the three). Furthermore, only Titus (2:12) and 2 Tim (3:12) use the phrase εὐσεβῶς ζῆν (though we should note that διαγείν ἐν τῇ πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ in 1 Tim 2:2 seems awfully close!). The term εὐσέβεια is not included in a list of virtues to be pursued at 2 Tim 2:22, while it is in 1 Tim 6:11. However, to conclude as Engelmann does (in agreement with Herzer) that the use of εὐσέβεια in 1 Timothy suggests a development in theological conception, from "Lebenshaltung" (as in Titus and 2 Tim) to "die einzuübende Lebenspraxis selbst" (1 Tim) is to draw finer distinctions than these texts really support.⁷⁰ Similarly, Engelmann argues that the concept is more central for 1 Timothy (because of the greater number of instances of the term), and that because the use of 1 Tim 3:16 especially shows evidence of awareness of the term's use "aus paganen Kontexten," this must suggest a different authorial context. While the association of mystery language with piety is unique here in the Pastorals, it is by no means clear that the instances of piety language in 2 Tim or Titus exhibit any

⁶⁷ She addresses many of the terms and concept common to the three Pastorals (e.g., μῦθοι, εὐσέβ-, οἰκός, ἐπιφάν-, etc.).

⁶⁸ Engelmann, *Unzertrennliche Drillinge?*, 345–63.

⁶⁹ Engelmann, *Unzertrennliche Drillinge?*, 362–63. Similarly, Herzer draws a distinction between the concept of εὐσέβεια in 2 Tim and Titus as "Lebenspraxis" and 1 Tim as "Lebenshaltung," with special emphasis on whether the form is a verb or a noun, but this overstates the case ("‘Das Geheimnis der Frömmigkeit’ (1 Tim 3,16): Sprache und Stil der Pastoralbriefe im Kontext hellenistisch-römischer Popularphilosophie—eine methodische Problemanzeige," *TQ* 187 [2007]: 322).

⁷⁰ Similarly, ill-conceived is her contrast of piety and the quiet life in 1 Tim 2:2 and the persecution promised in 2 Tim 3:8 and the claim that "von einer existenziellen Bedrängnis, wie sie der 2Tim unmittelbar mit dem frommen Leben in Verbindung bringt (2Tim 3,12), weiß der 1Tim-Autor nichts mehr" (363).

weaker connections to contemporary discourses on piety. Thus, the uses of εὐσέβεια in the Pastorals do not differ in ways that suggest a difference in authorship or epistolary circumstance. Rather, appeals to εὐσέβεια form a consistent component of the author's argument across all three of the Pastorals, namely as a means of staking a claim regarding the true nature of godly living in a philosophically and religiously competitive imperial setting.⁷¹ Ultimately, the observation of differences can help to highlight particular themes. The εὐσέβεια language is numerically more prominent in 1 Timothy. However, that a change in author and historical setting is required to explain this is not clear. While some scholars have certainly emphasized similarities to the neglect of differences, it is critically important not to downplay the similarities. For example, Richards, who places Titus and 1 Timothy at a remove of up to sixty years, even goes so far as to suggest that "apart from the customary epistolary units, there is no parallel material between" between Titus and 2 Tim.⁷² This is simply not the case, and is evident in Engelmann's own observation that Titus and 2 Tim alone in the New Testament use the phrase εὐσεβῶς ζῆν, among others (see below).

The corpus theory—the hypothesis that the three letters were written together as a mini-corpus by one author and intended to be read together—still has many defenders,⁷³ such as Gerd

⁷¹ This approach to εὐσέβεια in the PE has been advanced most recently by T. Christopher Hoklotubbe, *Civilized Piety: The Rhetoric of Pietas in the Pastoral Epistles and the Roman Empire* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017).

⁷² Richards, *Difference and Distance*, 208.

⁷³ E.g., Korinna Zamfir, *Men and Women in the Household of God: A Contextual Approach to Roles and Ministries in the Pastoral Epistles*, NTOA 103 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 6–10; Huizenga, *Philosophers of the Household*, 221–56. Lone Fatum is representative: "The three letters, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, clearly form a unit both thematically and rhetorically, and they may easily be read and interpreted as one entity" ("Christ Domesticated: The Household Theology of the Pastorals as Political Strategy," in *The Formation of the Early Church*, ed. Jostein Ådna, WUNT 183 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005], 180). Similarly, Friedemann Krumbiegel's study proceeds from the assumption of a unified relationship between the three letters: "einer sachlichen Zusammengehörigkeit der drei Pastoralbriefe" (Friedemann Krumbiegel, *Erziehung in den Pastoralbriefen: Ein Konzept zur Konsolidierung der Gemeinden*, Arbeiten zur Bibel und ihrer Geschichte 44 [Leipzig: Evangelische

Häfner.⁷⁴ Häfner offers a spirited riposte to the critics of the corpus-theory such as Luke Timothy Johnson, W. A. Richards, Fuchs, Towner, Herzer, and others who argue that the corpus-theory ignores the individual character of the three letters.⁷⁵ Häfner points out that the plea for the individual character of the Pastorals presupposes a false dichotomy and need not stand in conflict with the corpus-theory, since one would hardly expect all three letters to be identical in all or even most aspects.⁷⁶ For Häfner, differences in the three letters are not an impediment to their common authorship and the author's design of them as a mini-corpus meant to supplement an emerging Corpus Paulinum.⁷⁷ Michael Theobald is another scholar who rejects the recent trend, arguing instead that the author of the Pastorals builds thematic coherences throughout the three letters,⁷⁸ an important component of which for him is the author's "Israel-Vergessenheit," by which Theobald refers to the absence from the Pastorals of concern for Israel's status or Jerusalem

Verlagsanstalt, 2013], 30. The differences between the letters notwithstanding, he judges the wordfield of the PE capable of being subsumed under the concept of paideia (31–32).

⁷⁴ Gerd Häfner, "Das Corpus Pastorale als literarisches Konstrukt," *TQ* 187 (2007): 259.

⁷⁵ Häfner, "Das Corpus Pastorale als literarisches Konstrukt." Häfner argues that close attention to the polemic of the letters supports the theory of compositional unity (Häfner, "Polemik in den Pastoralbriefen," 324).

⁷⁶ Häfner, "Das Corpus Pastorale als literarisches Konstrukt," 260. The idea that the letters may be read, indeed, should be read, with reference to their individual features even as they are read as a corpus was stressed by Pervo: "Any study of the PE needs to take into account their unity as a collection, the variety among the letters, their double focus upon both private morality and church order, the place they assign to the characterization of Paul, and their interest in narrative and circumstantial detail" (Pervo, "Romancing," 45–46). Similarly, Annette Bourland Huizenga writes, "As with the collected letters of Pythagorean women, my objective is to respect the individual characteristics of each of the Pastorals while providing justifications for interpreting them as a collection within the larger Pauline collection. Indeed it can be shown that they were composed with just such a reading strategy in mind" (Huizenga, *Philosophers of the Household*, 225).

⁷⁷ Cf. the arguments on this matter by Häfner, "Das Corpus Pastorale als literarisches Konstrukt," 260–64. Similarly, as Christoph Schaefer argues, "Stattdessen mag es hilfreicher sein, das individuelle Profil der Einzelbriefe in die Auslegung des Corpus Pastorale als Einheit zu integrieren" ("Judentum und Gnosis?: Die Gegnerpolemik im Titusbrieft als Element literarischer Konstruktion," in *Ein Meisterschüler: Titus und sein Brief. Michael Theobald zum 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Weidemann and Wilfried Eisele, SBS 214 [Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 2008], 60).

⁷⁸ Michael Theobald, *Israel-Vergessenheit in den Pastoralbriefen: Ein neuer Vorschlag zu ihrer historisch-theologischen Verortung im 2. Jahrhundert n. Chr. unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ignatius-Briefe*, SBS 229 (Stuttgart: KBW, Bibelwerk, 2016), 36–42.

as central to Paul's mission. This feature is central to Romans, upon which, Theobald argues (persuasively, in my opinion), that all three of the Pastorals are intertextually dependent.⁷⁹

In this study, I do not assume that the Pastor wrote these letters to convey a particular line of narrative development or a specific story arc.⁸⁰ While some scholars have proposed the sequence Titus, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, or 1 Timothy, Titus, 2 Timothy,⁸¹ little suggests a straightforward narrative progression. What we have, rather, are vignettes, momentary snapshots in a lacunate life of Paul. I do think that the Pastor wove the fabric of these letters with interlocking lexical and thematic threads.⁸² These shared features suggested to many ancient readers, as they have to modern readers, that these letters are of a piece. However, the corpus to which I believe he was most interested in drawing the reader's attention was the emerging Pauline corpus. Interfacing with a body of Pauline letters—expanding, updating, revising, and guiding their interpretation—seems to me to be the most immediate goal of these letters. This does not mean that we should not heed the exhortations of many recent commentators to read these letters

⁷⁹ Similarly, Theobald has argued that the Pastor's polemic against the opponents is not only concerned with the content of their argument, which has always been difficult to surmise in the Pastorals, but the forms of inquiry and debate they use

⁸⁰ However, Paul's soulful soliloquy in 2 Tim 4:6–8 has reasonably drawn scholarly comparisons to testamentary literature (e.g., the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*) and the motif of the sage's end-of-life farewell, and has an air of finality to it that is lacking from Titus or 1 Timothy.

⁸¹ E.g., Jerome D. Quinn, *The Letter to Titus*, AB 35 (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 7; Quinn, "The Last Volume of Luke: The Relation of Luke-Acts to the Pastoral Epistles," 64 n. 7; Richard I. Pervo, *The Making of Paul: Constructions of the Apostle in Early Christianity* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2010), 84. The order of the Pastorals as Titus, 1 Tim, 2 Tim in the Muratorian Canon (59–64) is taken by Quinn as piece of evidence in favor of an original and intended arrangement, but this makes too much of what is really just a comment that there exists one letter to Philemon, one to Titus, and two to Timothy ("The Last Volume of Luke: The Relation of Luke-Acts to the Pastoral Epistles," 64 n. 7). Other scholars have argued for a sequence of 1 Tim, Titus, and 2 Tim, noting that while Titus contains the longest epistolary prescript, 1 Tim 1:12–17 is more of an introduction to Paul as sinner-turned-exemplar, which forms bookends with Paul's farewell in 2 Tim 4:6–8; this also forms an East-West trajectory (Häfner, "Das Corpus Pastorale als literarisches Konstrukt," 273).

⁸² Engelmann suggests that the language of the Corpus Pastorale might still be appropriate, though with the qualification that it was not conceived of as a corpus, but was received as a corpus as a result of the author of 1 Timothy having drawn upon Titus and 2 Tim: "Bedenkt man, dass es sich bei den Pastoralbriefen also nicht um ein konzeptionelles, sondern um ein rezeptionelles Corpus handelt, dann behält auch die Rede vom *Corpus Pastorale* ihre Berechtigung" (Engelmann, *Unzertrennliche Drillinge?*, 600).

as individual letters. However, this appeal is ultimately based upon a false dichotomy or a false choice, as though one could *only* read these letters as a homogenized corpus *or* as fully differentiated texts with their own unique perspective and contribution. Surely the very nature of studying these texts involves reading with multiple frames of reference that are operative in any given moment of scholarly analysis.

Furthermore, in the case of pseudepigrapha that are *designed* to update, revise, and even attempt to control the Pauline literary and theological legacy, and that bear such stark affinities with each other—in terms of shared lexical links, frequent phrases, subject matter, and argumentative topoi—to study any one of the Pastoral Epistles in protracted and deliberate isolation from the others is to truncate the reading process. It might form one preliminary step in the interpretive process, but cannot be the final step, which must involve the entirety of the *Corpus Paulinum*, to varying degrees as the task requires (whether discerning literary relationships, theological developments, differences in ecclesial structure, adaptation of argumentative angles, etc.). My contention is that scholars can and should appreciate both the letters' individual features—generic markers, stylistic quirks, theological emphases, implied situations, ostensible geographic locations—as well as their remarkable similarities.⁸³ Interpreting these in concert with the homologoumena allows us to see the remarkable intertextual techniques of the Pastor and is the only way to begin to surmise the goals and social reasons for such literary procedures.

Consequently, I take it as axiomatic that the Pastor's language, themes, metaphors and agenda cannot (and must not) be understood apart from Paul's own letters. My research reaffirms the post-Pauline production of the Pastorals as three discrete letters that constantly echo and

⁸³ Similarly Pervo, *The Making of Paul*, 84; Ehrman, *Forgery and Counterforgery*, 194.

therefore reinforce each other in a mini-corpus that makes the most sense when read as an augmentation of an existing Pauline letter collection. I consider it most likely that these letters did not circulate as an *independent* corpus, but rather have as their *raison d'être* the expansion and augmentation of an existing Pauline letter corpus. I shall demonstrate that the Pastorals represent a bold attempt to guide the interpretation of the genuine letters of Paul.⁸⁴ Once attached to a body of Paul's letters, it is unclear that they would have circulated separately, and there is no evidence that they did so.⁸⁵

Therefore, while the recent trend in scholarship on the Pastorals to focus on and amplify the differences between these three letters can be a useful heuristic exercise to keep our readings fresh, we should be careful not to lose sight of the striking similarities that have led so many scholars to read them in relationship to each other over the two millennia since they were written. While I welcome the emphasis on interpreting each letter first as a discrete literary entity (surely an important preliminary exercise), having read each letter on its own as a literary unit, I have been struck by the consistent argumentation used for the depiction of opponents, which is in turn a further argument for unitary authorship.

⁸⁴ On this point, see Theobald, "Glauben statt Grübeln: Zum Anti-Intellektualismus der Pastoralbriefe," 8. Theobald points to others who take this approach, namely Lloyd K. Pietersen, *The Polemic of the Pastorals: A Sociological Examination of the Development of Pauline Christianity*, JSNTSup 264 (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 139; Merz, *Die fiktive Selbstausslegung des Paulus*, 208–222. Similarly, Michael Wolter concedes the possibility of such a scenario: "es so gut wie ausgeschlossen sein (dürfte), dass auch die Gegner sich auf Paulus beriefen und es bei dem Konflikt um eine Kontroverse innerhalb des paulinischen Christentums . . . ging" (*Die Pastoralbriefe als Paulustradition*, FRLANT 146 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988], 139.

⁸⁵ At least, they do not seem to have circulated separately as letters or as a mini-corpus. However, 1 Timothy 1:15–16 did enjoy some independent circulation, as one amulet from the 7th century CE suggests (P.Berl. inv. 13977 = GA 0262). This passage is written with non-standard orthography on a single piece of parchment, measuring 12 x 7.5 cm, and meets the following criteria for identifying an amulet: written on one side with a blank verso, a cross, and a possible staurogram. It also contains *nomina sacra*. The *editio princeps* may be found in Kurt Treu, "Neue neutestamentliche Fragmente der Berliner Papyrussammlung," *APF* 18 (1966): 36–37. An improved transcription and the above insights are provided by Brice C. Jones, *New Testament Texts on Greek Amulets from Late Antiquity*, LNTS 554 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 171–75.

2. Linguistic Variation

Scholars have recognized that the Pastorals use a greater diversity of terms per letter than the homologoumena.⁸⁶ Recently, Armin Baum has described this as the "semantic richness of the Pastorals." Baum points out that the other ten letters attributed to Paul uniformly follow the rule that the longer a letter, the more extensive its vocabulary.⁸⁷ However, this is not the case with the Pastorals. "Instead of 535 different words, 1 Timothy should [i.e., given its length relative to other Pauline letters] only contain about 435. We would expect 2 Timothy to contain about 350 different words, rather than 451. And in Titus there should only be about 235 instead of the now 298 different words."⁸⁸ Baum concludes, "Overall, the vocabulary of the three Pastoral Epistles is therefore considerably richer than the vocabulary of the other ten Paulines. And *the semantic inventory of the Pastoral Epistles features a much higher percentage of distinctive words than the rest of the Pauline letters.*"⁸⁹ Contrary to others who have concluded based on stylistical analyses that the lexical variation of the Pastorals is not different than the other Paulines, Baum states categorically: "Those exegetes who deny these stylistic peculiarities of the Pastorals are certainly mistaken in this respect."⁹⁰ While one can agree with that determination, based as it is on

⁸⁶ At times, scholars have even suggested that the Pastorals' koine is more elevated than Paul's (Egbert Schlarch, *Die gesunde Lehre: Häresie und Wahrheit im Spiegel der Pastoralbriefe*, MTS 28 [Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1990], 59).

⁸⁷ Baum, "Semantic Variation within the Corpus Paulinum," 273.

⁸⁸ Baum, "Semantic Variation within the Corpus Paulinum," 275.

⁸⁹ Baum, "Semantic Variation within the Corpus Paulinum," 277, emphasis original. Several clusters of contemporary conversation include linguistic and stylometric analysis as a way of raising doubts about the alleged distance between the style of the *homologoumena* and that of the PE. Baum cites the following scholars: Kenneth Grayston and G. Herdan, "Authorship of the Pastorals in the Light of Statistical Linguistics," *NTS* 6.1 (1959): 1–15; David L. Mealand, "The Extent of the Pauline Corpus: A Multivariate Approach," *JSNT* 59 (1995): 61–92.

⁹⁰ Baum, "Semantic Variation within the Corpus Paulinum," 277. Baum cites (277 n. 10) the following in this regard: John J. O'Rourke, "Some Considerations about Attempts at Statistical Analysis of the Pauline Corpus," *CBQ* 35.4 (1973): 483; Thomas Arthur Robinson, "Grayston and Herdan's 'C' Quantity Formula and the Authorship of the Pastoral Epistles," *NTS* 30.2 (1984): 286; E. Linnemann, "Echtheitsfragen und Vokabelstatistik," *JETH* 10 (1996): 97. Baum attempts (286–87) to contextualize (and, it seems, diminish) the significance of this semantic richness by suggesting that many of the distinctive terms in the Pastorals have "pragmatic synonyms" in the other ten Pauline

demonstrable evidence, Baum goes on to suggest that the differences between the Pastorals and the rest of the letters attributed to Paul indicate that the author of the Pastorals "*has expressed himself more carefully and probably had more time at his disposal than the author (or the authors) of the other ten Paulines.*"⁹¹ The intricate argumentative structures crafted by Paul in letters like Romans and the letters to the Corinthians mitigate against such a hypothesis.

3. Lexical and Thematic Similarities

A striking number of common terms and themes unite these letters with each other and many of these similarities also differentiate them from the authentic letters of Paul.⁹² As we shall shortly observe, it is not the case, as some have suggested, that the grouping of these letters is somehow arbitrary, and that if we considered other groupings (for instance, if the Thessalonian letters were set over and against the rest of Paul's letters), they too would seem less genuinely Pauline.⁹³ While some features are common to only two of the letters, the patterns of commonality mitigate against the hypothesis that 1 Timothy and Titus, for instance, were written by a different author than 2 Timothy. Important connections existing between 1 Timothy and 2 Timothy and not Titus on the one hand, and 2 Timothy and Titus but not 1 Timothy on the other, suggest that while the author of these letters did not always populate each letter with the same elements in all three (even though often he does), he is still the same author. In other words, if one author can be shown to

letters, and that "one could largely free the whole Epistle to Titus as well as the two Epistles to Timothy from their distinct words with the help of the vocabulary of the ten Paulines" (287). The goal would be to make it correlate "in its type-token-ratio to the other ten Paulines" (287), but *why* this would seem a valid exercise for the purpose of understanding the comparative style of the letters is not clear.

⁹¹ Baum, "Semantic Variation within the Corpus Paulinum," 290 emphasis original. Bart Ehrman rightly and soundly rejects this suggestion, since it would be difficult to say that Romans, for instance, was the product of a more rapid and less leisurely pen than 2 Timothy (Ehrman, *Forgery and Counterforgery*, 202–203).

⁹² Recent and accessible recapitulations of the linguistic similarities of these letters, over and against the arguments of those emphasizing their differences, are offered by Häfner, "Das Corpus Pastorale als literarisches Konstrukt," 265–73; Ehrman, *Forgery and Counterforgery*, 195–205. I have selectively drawn upon, augmented, corrected, and supplemented the evidence they put forward.

⁹³ Johnson, AB, 64.

have written 1 Timothy and Titus, and yet again we could show that the same author likely wrote 1 Timothy and 2 Timothy, then Titus and 2 Timothy shall be, similarly, composed by that single author.⁹⁴ However, as we shall see, this logical inference need not stand alone, for there is ample evidence to demonstrate the common authorship of 2 Timothy and Titus. We turn now to some of the most striking examples of lexical and thematic commonalities pertaining to opponents and beyond.

a) Common to 1 Timothy and Titus

Common to 1 Tim and Titus are a number of phrases and themes that distinguish them from 2 Tim. In both letters, Paul introduces himself with a commanding tone, using almost identical phrasing (not found in 2 Tim), κατ' ἐπιταγὴν θεοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν (1 Tim 1:1) and κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν θεοῦ (Titus 1:3).⁹⁵ The common authorship of these two letters is perhaps the least controversial, since many scholars have emphasized the similarities of these two letters in order to separate them from 2 Timothy, which they have viewed as having a more likely claim to coming from the hand of Paul.⁹⁶ Many of the linguistic similarities come from common topics, such as qualifications for church leaders (cf. 1 Tim 3:1–13 and Titus 1:5–9), advice to older men and younger men (cf. 1 Tim 5:1 and Titus 2:2, 6–8), older women and younger women (1 Tim 5:2 and Titus 2:3–5), and slaves (1 Tim 6:1–2 and Titus 2:9–10). For instance, descriptions common to these two letters but not the rest of the New Testament include (in coordination) ἐπεικῆς and

⁹⁴ The same point is made, with appeal to the authorial situation of the epistles of John in the New Testament, by Ehrman, *Forgery and Counterforgery*, 199.

⁹⁵ The full passage from Titus 1:3 (ἐφάνερωσεν δὲ καιροῖς ἰδίους τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ ἐν κηρύγματι, ὃ ἐπιστεύθη ἐγὼ κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν θεοῦ) carries further resonance with Rom 16:26 (φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν διὰ τε γραφῶν προφητικῶν κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ αἰωνίου θεοῦ εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη γνωρισθέντος).

⁹⁶ Michael Prior, *Paul the Letter-Writer*, 167–70 is more certain about Pauline authorship of 2 Timothy than is Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, who writes that there are "hints that 2 Tim is more Pauline than either 1 Tim or Titus, but this does not imply that Paul was in fact its author" (Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus," *RB* 98 [1991]: 418).

ἄμαχος (1 Tim 3:3 and Titus 3:2). Virtues attributed to the ἐπίσκοπος common to these two letters (1 Tim 3:3, 8 and Titus 1:7) and nowhere else in the New Testament include μὴ πάροις, μὴ πλήκτης, and μὴ αἰσχροκερδής.⁹⁷ In strikingly similar terms, 1 Tim 3:2 states that δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἀνεπίλημπτον εἶναι, while Titus 1:7 has δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἀνέγκλητον. Both letters punctuate exhortations to subordinate social groups with similar phrases, such as the exhortation to slaves in 1 Tim 6:1 to consider "their own masters" (οἱ ἴδιοι δεσπόται) worthy of every honor "lest the name of God and the teaching be slandered" (ἵνα μὴ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία βλασφημῇται), and in Titus 2:4–5 for young women to be subordinate to "their own husbands" (οἱ ἴδιοι ἄνδρες) "lest the word of God be slandered" (ἵνα μὴ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ βλασφημεῖται). Likewise, in the Pauline epistolary, only 1 Tim and Titus use the language of κοσμεῖν, in particular to regulate the behavior of women (1 Tim 2:9) and slaves (Titus 2:10). Additionally, only at 1 Tim 5:20 and Titus 1:13 do we find the sequence of the imperative ἔλεγχε with ἵνα following, and never elsewhere in Paul's letters or the New Testament.

Language that pertains to opponents in particular and that is common only to 1 Tim and Titus is less abundant. However, only these two documents in the New Testament refer to γενεαλογίαί to refer to their opponents' teachings, with the descriptor ἀπέρανται applied in 1 Tim 1:4 and μωραὶ ζητήσεις joining the term in Titus 3:9. Only in 1 Tim 1:7 (θέλοντες εἶναι νομοδιδάσκαλοι) and Titus 1:10 (οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς), Titus 1:14 (Ἰουδαῖοι μῦθοι), and Titus 3:9 (μάχαι νομικαί) do we have any indication that particularly Jewish opposition may be in view. Notably, only in 1 Tim 1:4 and Titus 1:14 do we find the language of προσέχειν applied to μῦθοι, with the additional designation, as noted, Ἰουδαῖοι in Titus. While in 1 Tim 1:7 the author uses the term

⁹⁷ Also common to these letters but nowhere else in Paul's letters are the term φιλόξενος (1 Tim 3:2, Titus 1:8), ὅσιος (1 Tim 2:8, Titus 1:8), ἀνυπότακτος (1 Tim 1:9, Titus 1:6, 10).

διαβεβαιοῦσθαι to reference the opponents' boorishness, in Titus 3:8 it is used positively. The term does not appear elsewhere in Paul or the New Testament. Conversely, 1 Timothy uses διαγιν to advocate a particular way of living, while Titus 3:3 uses the term to depict a depraved former life. While more examples could be cited, these should suffice to demonstrate the significant amount of shared vocabulary, approach to opponents, and ecclesial preoccupations.

b) Common to 1 Timothy and 2 Timothy

Besides both being addressed to Timothy in very similar language,⁹⁸ 1 Tim and 2 Tim exhibit commonality of expression and topic. I will highlight here not only themes and phrases pertaining to opponents, but also other features. Only in 1 Tim (1:20) and 2 Tim (2:15, 4:14) do we find opponents explicitly named, a practice foreign to Paul's letters. Only in 1 Tim and 2 Tim do we find reference to the "last days" (cf. ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις ἐνστήσονται καιροὶ χαλεποί at 2 Tim 3:1–2) or the "latter times" (cf. ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς ἀποστήσονται τινες τῆς πίστεως at 1 Tim 4:1; cf. 2 Tim 4:3) as the time of deviance and apostasy. Only in the letters to Timothy does "Paul" warn against αἱ βέβηλοι κenoφωνίαι (1 Tim 6:20 and 2 Tim 2:16), while neither term is used in Paul's letters. The doctrinal deviation of opponents is similarly described with the verb ἀστοχεῖν only here in the NT, at 1 Tim 1:6, 6:21, and 2 Tim 2:18. Only in the two letters to Timothy, and nowhere else in the New Testament, does the language of "being deluded" (τυφοῦσθαι) appear to describe opponents (τετυφωμένοι at 2 Tim 3:4 and τετύφωται at 1 Tim 6:4) or the errant ἐπίσκοπος (τυφωθείς at 1 Tim 3:6). Only in 1 Tim and 2 Tim does the phrase "corrupted in the mind" occur (διεφθαρμένων

⁹⁸ Compare 1 Tim 1:2—Τιμοθέω γνησίῳ τέκνῳ ἐν πίστει, χάρις ἔλεος εἰρήνῃ ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν and 2 Tim 1:2—Τιμοθέω ἀγαπητῷ τέκνῳ, χάρις ἔλεος εἰρήνῃ ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν.

ἀνθρώπων τὸν νοῦν at 1 Tim 6:5 and ἄνθρωποι κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν at 2 Tim 3:8).⁹⁹ While the terminology of συνειδήσις is common to all three letters, the phrase ἐν καθαρᾷ συνειδήσει is present at 1 Tim 3:9 and 2 Tim 1:3 (though it is also the implied opposite of the νοῦς and συνειδήσις that are μεμίανται in Titus 1:15), while καθαρὰ is not used of συνειδήσις in the homologoumena. Similarly, the phrase ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας occurs in 1 Tim 1:5 and 2 Tim 2:22, but never in Paul. The phrase ἐπαγγελία ζωῆς occurs at 1 Tim 4:8 and 2 Tim 1:1 (cf. ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ζωῆς αἰωνίου, ἣν ἐπηγγείλατο ὁ ἀψευδὴς θεός at Titus 1:2), but never in the homologoumena.¹⁰⁰

Positively, Timothy is urged to "guard the (good) deposit" (τὴν παραθήκην φυλάξον) three separate times (1 Tim 6:20, with μου at 2 Tim 1:12 and καλήν at 2 Tim 1:14). The term παραθήκη never occurs in Paul. Timothy is told with an imperative to δίδωκε δὲ δικαιοσύνην (1 Tim 6:11, 2 Tim 2:22) along with other virtues.¹⁰¹ The phrase χάριν ἔχω is used with a dative at 1 Tim 1:12 and 2 Tim 1:3, but never in Paul, or in the rest of the New Testament. At 1 Tim 4:14 and 2 Tim 1:6, the laying on of hands (ἐπίθεσις τῶν χειρῶν) is mentioned in reference to the χάρισμα ἐν σοί, but never in Paul. In both 1 Tim 2:7 and 2 Tim 1:11, the presentation of Paul is remarkably similar: εἰς ὃ ἐτέθην ἐγὼ κῆρυξ καὶ ἀπόστολος, ἀλήθειαν λέγω οὐ ψεύδομαι, διδάσκαλος ἐθνῶν (1 Tim 2:7), and εἰς ὃ ἐτέθην ἐγὼ κῆρυξ καὶ ἀπόστολος καὶ διδάσκαλος (2 Tim 1:11).¹⁰² The phrase

⁹⁹ However, as I will argue below, this bears important resemblance to Paul's own language of the Corinthians' νοήματα being φθαρῆναι in 2 Cor 11:3.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. James 1:12 and 1 John 2:25.

¹⁰¹ There is a similar phrase at Rom 9:30–31 (ἐθνη τὰ μὴ διώκοντα δικαιοσύνην κατέλαβεν δικαιοσύνην), though the differences are stark, for δικαιοσύνη is used to denote not the value righteousness (as in 1 and 2 Tim) so much as "justification," and it is not an exhortation to pursue it alongside other virtues.

¹⁰² The referent of ὃ differs (μαρτύριον in 1 Tim 2:6 and εὐαγγέλιον in 2 Tim 1:10) and 1 Tim 2:7 seems to supplement the "self"-presentation of Paul with language from Romans (cf. ἀλήθειαν λέγω ἐν Χριστῷ οὐ ψεύδομαι in Rom 9:1); the term κῆρυξ, though it does not occur in Paul's letters, is a logical inference for the Pastor to draw, who can read of Paul's activity of κηρύσσειν (1 Cor 1:23, 9:27, 15:11–12 and often) and his κήρυγμα (1 Cor 1:21, 2:4, 15:14; cf. 2 Tim 4:17, Titus 1:3).

παρακολουθεῖν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ is used only in 1 Tim 4:6 (with καλή) and 2 Tim 3:10 (with μου), and nowhere else.¹⁰³

These similarities do not, of course, imply that there are no differences at all between 1 Tim and 2 Tim. There are important differences in tone, subject matter, and epistolary style. Indeed, at times, the differences that do exist are highlighted precisely because the language is so similar otherwise.¹⁰⁴ While these differences are worthy of exploration, they should not distract from the fundamental similarity of exposition that suggests a single non-Pauline author.

c) Common to 2 Timothy and Titus

Though the traits shared by 1 Tim and 2 Tim and 1 Tim and Titus are perhaps sufficient to suggest that the same author is responsible for all three, further evidence comes from the elements common to 2 Tim and Titus. The other option, that the author of 1 Tim used 2 Tim and Titus (so Herzer, Engelmann), does not account for why the author of 1 Tim would have used so many of the features of 2 Tim and Titus that just so happen to distinguish them from the other letters of Paul. I list here some features that are found in 2 Timothy and Titus but not in 1 Timothy (or in Paul's letters), highlighting first and especially the language pertaining to opponents. In Titus and 2 Tim in particular, the activity of the opponents is said to disturb households (Titus 1:11 and 2 Tim 3:6), and the language of "overturning" (ἀνάτρεπεν) is common only to Titus and 2 Tim in the Pauline corpus (Titus 1:11 and 2 Tim 2:18). The verb περιῖσθημι is common to only these two letters, in particular in the imperative form περιῖστασο and applied to the teachings of opponents (Titus 3:9, 2 Tim 2:16). Only in 2 Tim and Titus do we find the

¹⁰³ Furthermore, διδακτικός, describing a desirable quality, is used only here in the NT (1 Tim 3:2, 2 Tim 2:24).

¹⁰⁴ In the case of ἐπιθεσις τῶν χειρῶν, in 2 Tim 1:6 this refers to Paul's hands, while in 1 Tim 4:14 there is mention of the πρεσβυτέριον. In fact, in 2 Tim, there is no discussion of elders (male or female) or elder boards whatsoever.

expression ἐπιθυμίαι . . . ποικίλαι (2 Tim 3:6, and with ἡδοναί intervening at Titus 3:3), and never in Paul. Only 2 Tim 3:8 and Titus 1:6 pick up the description ἀδόκιμοι to refer to opponents, likely (as argued below in chapter 6) drawing on Paul's own language of the ἀδόκιμος νοῦς in Rom 1:28. Similarly, while the language of spatial deviance is a prominent feature of all three of the Pastorals, the use of ἀποστρέφειν with ἀλήθεια is a striking feature shared only by 2 Tim 4:4 and Titus 1:14.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, while the language of controversial inquiries is common to all three, the precise phrase μωραὶ . . . ζητήσεις is common only to 2 Tim 2:23 (along with the adjective ἀπαίδευται) and Titus 3:9.

Of course, there are other phrases beyond the dicta pertaining to opponents that only 2 Timothy and Titus have in common. In Titus and 2 Tim alone do we find the term ὑπομιμνήσκειν (2 Tim 2:14 and Titus 3:1, both times in the imperative mood), and never in Paul. While the phrase "every good work" (πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθόν) occurs in 2 Cor 9:8 and 1 Tim 5:10, only in 2 Tim and Titus is it paired with the language of being "equipped" (πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἐξηρτισμένος at 2 Tim 3:17) or "prepared" (εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἡτοιμασμένον at 2 Tim 2:21 and the virtually synonymous expression πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἐτοίμους at Titus 3:1).¹⁰⁶ The phrase πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων occurs only in 2 Tim 1:9 and Titus 1:2, but nowhere else in Paul's letters or the New Testament. While the language of εὐσέβεια is in fact a special feature of all three of these letters, the formulation εὐσεβῶς ζῆν is used only at Titus 2:12 and 2 Tim 3:12 (though cf. the virtually equivalent phrase βίον διάγειν ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ at 1 Tim 2:2).

¹⁰⁵ The term does occur once in Rom 11:26 in a quotation of Isa 59:20

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Titus 1:16: πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι.

d) Common to All Three

Besides all being addressed to a single delegate of Paul known from the homologoumena, a unique phenomenon in the Pauline epistolary, there is much these letters share that points to common authorship. I shall cite only some of the more generally recognized features held in common by these three letters, a number of which pertain to the depiction of deviance, before concisely presenting my own contribution to this debate in particular.

One characteristic phrase of the Pastorals is the formula *πίστος ὁ λόγος*. While Paul used the predicate of God in the phrase *πίστος ὁ θεός* (1 Cor 1:9, 10:13; 2 Cor 1:18; cf. 1 Thess 5:24), the Pastor punctuates his points with the stereotyped phrase no fewer than five times throughout his letters (1 Tim 1:15, 3:1, 4:9; 2 Tim 2:11; Titus 3:8). This phrase does not occur in Paul. Another important concept unifying the Pastorals is the "recognition of the truth" (*ἐπίγνωσις τῆς ἀληθείας*; 1 Tim 2:4, 2 Tim 2:25, 3:7; Titus 1:1; cf. *ἐπεγνώκοτες τὴν ἀλήθειαν* at 1 Tim 4:3). This phrase does not occur in the homologoumena. The language of piety and impiety, *εὐσέβεια* and its cognates, is used abundantly in the Pastorals (1 Tim 1:9; 2:2, 10; 3:16; 4:7; 5:4; 6:3, 5, 6, 11; 2 Tim 2:16; 3:5, 12; Titus 1:1, 2:12), while Paul uses only the language of "impiety" (*ἀσέβεια, ἀσεβής*) and then only rarely.¹⁰⁷ The language of epiphany (*ἐπιφάνεια* and cognates), if not the logic,¹⁰⁸ is absent from Paul, but abundant in the Pastorals.

Many of the above examples are inseparable from the discourse on opponents in the Pastorals; they are an integral part of the Pastor's argument for his particular vision of theological and behavioral propriety. In addition, the Pastor uses a variety of terms that relate directly to the opponents that are absent from Paul's letters. Only in the Pastorals do we hear reference to

¹⁰⁷ The language is restricted to Rom 1:18, 4:5, 5:6, and 11:26.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Margaret M. Mitchell, "Epiphanic Evolutions in Earliest Christianity," *Illinois Classical Studies* 29 (2004): 183–204.

opponents' teachings or preoccupations as "myths" (μῦθοι at 1 Tim 1:4, 4:7; 2 Tim 4:4, Titus 1:14).¹⁰⁹ Only in the Pastorals are the opponents associated with ζητήσεις (1 Tim 6:4, 2 Tim 2:23, Titus 3:9) or ἐκζητήσεις (1 Tim 1:4). Almost exclusively¹¹⁰ in the Pastorals do we find a preoccupation with the "battles" or "controversies" (μάχαι) that are associated with the opponents (2 Tim 2:23, Titus 3:9). While the opponents engage in "wordy warfare" (λογομαχίαι at 1 Tim 6:4), Timothy is to remind his audience not to λογομαχεῖν (2 Tim 2:14), for it is not befitting a slave of the Lord to do that kind of battle (μάχεσθαι at 2 Tim 2:24). Rather, leaders should be ἄμαχος (1 Tim 3:3, Titus 3:2). Only in the Pastorals do we find the language of denial (ἀρνεῖσθαι), frequently in relation to deviance (1 Tim 5:8; 2 Tim 2:12–13, 3:5; Titus 1:16).¹¹¹ More examples could be adduced.

Lexical and statistical considerations have failed to convince some scholars of the Pastorals' pseudonymity, and, in all likelihood, neither will further evidence that fits these same categories.¹¹² However, what my dissertation may contribute to the present scholarly debate is a further set of observations that a) highlight consistency across the Pastorals and b) difference from the homologoumena. The contention of this dissertation is that well beyond the significant lexical similarities between the three letters (in pairs and together), a common strategy of delegitimization and an approach to deviance is evident across all three letters. To varying degrees, each letter contains elements of the spatializing, demonizing, and pathologizing of deviance, and the interpretation of Paul's letters through fictive self-references. Ultimately, the separation of

¹⁰⁹ While some scholars emphasize the presence of different qualifying terms for these μῦθοι, e.g., Ἰουδαῖοι at Titus 1:14, γραῶδεις at 1 Tim 4:7, these are not sufficient to demonstrate a difference in authorship, especially in the face of so many similarities.

¹¹⁰ The lone exception comes from 2 Cor 7:5: ἔξωθεν μάχαι, ἔσωθεν φόβοι. A potential reference to Paul's engagement in contentious dispute with the imagery of battle comes from the enigmatic 1 Cor 15:32: εἰ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐθηριομάχησα ἐν Ἐφέσῳ.

¹¹¹ Used of "denying impiety" (ἀρνεῖσθαι ἀσέβειαν) at Titus 2:12.

¹¹² Cf. the sober recognition by Johnson, AB, 14: "Few converts are won from one side to other."

discrete criteriological categories—lexical variation, syntax, style, content, themes, argumentative topoi, etc.—is only useful to a point. What is most probative, I argue, is to show the integration of these forms of argument in the Pastor's language, especially as they pertain to his discourse on deviance, and furthermore to articulate the ways in which these forms of argument relate to Paul's own. The following aspects of the Pastor's argumentative procedure have not been fully appreciated by previous scholarship for their prevalence and function in the letters or in their importance for the debate about the Pastorals' depiction of opponents.

First, the Pastorals exhibit a consistent strategy of spatializing deviance,¹¹³ by which I mean that there is a strong pattern of Timothy and Titus being warned to avoid or reject the opponents or their teaching as dangerous (*ἀποστρέφειν*,¹¹⁴ *ἀποτρέπειν*,¹¹⁵ *παρατεῖσθαι*,¹¹⁶ *περιϊστάναι*).¹¹⁷ Similarly, the opponents' deviance is conveyed by bountiful kinetic imagery that serves to vividly illustrate their deviance (*ἀστοχεῖν*,¹¹⁸ *βυθίζειν*,¹¹⁹ *ἐκτρέπειν*,¹²⁰ *ἐμπίπτειν*,¹²¹ *ἐνδύνειν*,¹²² *ἐκστρέφειν*).¹²³ While these examples do not exhaust this language, I highlight them here because these occur in the Pastorals and nowhere else in the homologoumena. The inverse of this strategy may be observed in the Pastor's tendency to signal theological rectitude or fidelity by an individual's proximity to Paul's own person (2 Tim 1:16–17, 4:11–12), with figures being summoned to him (2 Tim 4:9, 20; Titus 3:13), his promises or hopes of visiting soon (1 Tim 3:14, 4:13), or the woeful narration of those who strayed or opposed Paul (2 Tim 4:10).

¹¹³ See chapters 1 and 2.

¹¹⁴ 2 Tim 1:15, 4:4; Titus 1:14. The one exception is Rom 11:26, a citation of Isa 59:20.

¹¹⁵ 2 Tim 3:5.

¹¹⁶ 1 Tim 4:7, 5:11; 2 Tim 2:23; Titus 3:10.

¹¹⁷ 2 Tim 2:16; Titus 3:9.

¹¹⁸ 1 Tim 1:6, 6:21; 2 Tim 2:18.

¹¹⁹ 1 Tim 6:9.

¹²⁰ 1 Tim 1:6, 5:15, 6:20; 2 Tim 4:4.

¹²¹ 1 Tim 3:6, 7; 6:9.

¹²² 2 Tim 3:6.

¹²³ Titus 3:11.

Second, a complementary aspect of the Pastorals' spatializing of deviance is the way in which he demonizes deviance.¹²⁴ This strategy relies upon a strident polemic against the opponents that invokes the category of the demonic, the diabolical, or the Satanic. The Pastor's conjuring of supernatural malevolence as a rhetorical tool is especially pronounced in the language, derived from Paul, of handing opponents over to Satan (ὁ σατανᾶς at 1 Tim 1:20), or the danger of being caught in the snare of the διάβολος, the devil (1 Tim 3:6–7; 2 Tim 2:26). While the adjective διάβολος, used in all three Pastorals (1 Tim 3:11, 2 Tim 3:3, Titus 2:3) but never in the homologoumena, likely has the sense of "slandorous," its repetition in letters that make frequent reference to the archetypical malefactor is notable. The Pastor associates the opponents in 1 Tim 4:1 with the "doctrines of demons" (διδασκαλῖαι δαιμονίων), a memorable, polysemous phrase that, among other things, serves to connect the Pastor's theological opponents with non-human, liminal, and dangerous beings. While the language of Satan or demons does not occur in Titus, the vilification of opponents using spatial imagery and dehumanizing rhetoric is no less pronounced (see esp. Titus 1:10–12). Even though some of these terms occur in only one or two of the letters, when viewed in concert with vocabulary of similar type or function, the coherence of the authorial protocol becomes evident.

A third and final strategy that unifies the Pastorals is the pathologization of deviance, by which I mean that the Pastor routinely uses the imagery of health and sickness to designate theological rectitude or a departure from it.¹²⁵ He also uses this language to visceral effect, to invoke in his readers a psychosomatic reaction that is meant to mirror the danger of the opponents' teachings. Throughout these letters, the vocabulary of health (ὕγιαίνειν and ὑγιής at 1

¹²⁴ See chapters 1 and 2.

¹²⁵ See chapters 3–5.

Tim 1:10, 6:3; 2 Tim 1:13, 4:3; Titus 1:9, 13, 2:1, 8 and never in Paul) and sickness (νοσέειν at 1 Tim 6:4 and never in Paul) is used to describe adherence to or deviation from the Pauline proclamation. This includes a way of approaching deviance as a holistic threat to human health and includes references to both the body and the mind as affected or infected by this deviance.¹²⁶ Corporeal imagery is summoned by the Pastor in the language of gangrene (2 Tim 2:17), itching ears (2 Tim 4:3), and chronic stomach ailments (1 Tim 5:23). The Pastor draws upon a rich vocabulary for the mind (νοῦς) and its corruption (1 Tim 6:3, 2 Tim 3:8). Related concepts are delusion (τετυφῶσθαι at 1 Tim 3:6, 6:4, 2 Tim 3:4), dementia (ἄνοια at 2 Tim 3:9 ἀνόητοι at 1 Tim 6:9 and Titus 3:3), and dullness (μωραί), which indicates mental sluggishness and is used twice to describe the intellectual investigations of the opponents (their ζητήσεις at 2 Tim 2:23 and Titus 3:9). In a particularly interesting example, he describes the conscience of his opponents as cauterized (1 Tim 4:2), a medicalized image that I investigate at length in chapter 7.

The differences between these three letters are not unimportant; they grant insight into particular theological emphases or help us discern the preoccupations of the individual letter under examination (e.g., norms and rules for widows in the church, qualifications for ministry, how to inculcate "appropriate" attitudes toward celibacy in light of Paul's preference for it, etc.). However, the similarities between the three demonstrated above, especially with regard to opponents and the three intertwined strategies I have outlined, demonstrate that these letters derive from one author who is not Paul. The number of connections and similarities between these letters over and against Paul's own letters counsel against positing multiple authors, which requires (for certain scholars) the hypothesis of a multi-stage endeavor that creates more problems than it solves. Such a scenario would require that an initial imitator composed one of

¹²⁶ See chapters 6–7.

the letters first, e.g., 2 Timothy, and a later imitator who had 2 Timothy and a set of Pauline letters wrote Titus, and then an even later, different author wrote 1 Timothy as well, but happened to reproduce an impressive number of stylistic and linguistic features not evident in the homologoumena and yet characteristic of these three letters together. If, as some aver, the Pastorals are actually written by three different pseudepigraphers, then the latest letter to be written (Titus or, on most accounts, 1 Tim) would have had to prioritize the particular features from the earlier two letters that happen to distinguish them from Paul's agreed upon letters. That is to say, they would have had to consciously commit to meticulously modeling 1 Timothy on the particular linguistic and theological idiosyncrasies that distinguish 2 Tim and Titus from the rest of the letters of Paul. If such an author was not aware that, as the great majority of scholars hold, 2 Tim and Titus are themselves pseudonymous, then we would have to suppose that the modeling of 1 Timothy after those letters in particular was coincidental or that he happened to see in them language that was fabulously and coincidentally well-suited to his own authorial agenda. If he was aware that they were pseudonymous, then we would have, theoretically, the only identified instance of a pseudepigrapher preferring known pseudepigrapha to authentic letters for the perpetuation of his vision of the Pauline legacy. The simpler and more economical explanation is that one Pauline imitator wrote all three letters. This constituted, I argue, a bold (and demonstrably successful) attempt to shape the perception of Paul's legacy through fictive compositions that presuppose and exploit the authority of Paul in order to refashion Paul in the likeness of the author's own agenda. What I contribute to existing scholarship on these questions is an in-depth analysis of the Pastor's consistent approach to demonizing and pathologizing deviance throughout the three letters.

4. Pauline Letters as Intertexts for the Pastorals

Though we have evidence of a Pauline corpus circulating without the Pastorals, we do not have evidence of the Pastorals circulating without the Pauline corpus. Practically speaking, they must have been composed and inserted at some point, and most manuscript traditions have them joined together, often alongside Philemon. But, as we shall see in the course of this study, abundant evidence suggests that these texts were written in order to be read in coordination with an existing *Corpus Paulinum*. These are letters that presume a familiarity with Paul as an apostle,¹²⁷ that presume a familiarity with Paul as a letter writer (something that cannot be said for Acts!) as well as some of his epistolary habits, that presume an awareness of Titus and Timothy as envoys of Paul who played an active role in Paul's ministry.¹²⁸ Indeed, without the notion of a *Corpus Paulinum*, much of the work they are trying to accomplish becomes muted. They can certainly be read on their own, and do present a certain vision of Paul, his envoys, the communities they are meant to lead, and the opponents to that process. However, without the *Corpus Paulinum* as a presupposed, interpretive counterpoint and context, much of the Pastor's ingenious intertextual updating would be hard to appreciate. Yes, the Pastor's pronouncements on women's silence might be instructive in their own right (1 Tim 2:9–15), but how much more potent and interesting when read in conjunction with Paul's own (1 Cor 14:33b–35), with which the Pastor is interfacing? Yes, the Pastor's memorable images of a soldier campaigning (ὁ στρατευόμενος), an athlete competing and being crowned (ἀθλητὴς . . . στεφανοῦται), or a laboring farmer (ὁ κοπιῶν γεωργός) are all comprehensible on their own in their context (2 Tim 2:4–6). But how much more powerful when the reader recalls that these same images appear in 1

¹²⁷ 1 Tim 1:1, 2:7; 2 Tim 1:1, 1:11; Titus 1:1.

¹²⁸ Timothy appears in Rom 16:21; 1 Cor 4:17, 16:10; 2 Cor 1:1, 1:19; Phil 1:1, 2:19; 1 Thess 1:1, 3:2, 3:6; 2 Thess 1:1. Titus is mentioned in 2 Cor 2:13; 7:6, 13; 8:6, 16, 23; 2 Cor 12:18; Gal 2:1, 2:3.

Corinthians?¹²⁹ Indeed, the attentive reader receives an exhortation from the Pastor in this same passage: "Understand what I'm saying; for the Lord will give you understanding in everything" (νόει ὃ λέγω· δώσει γάρ σοι ὁ κύριος σύνεσιν ἐν πᾶσιν).¹³⁰ In short, as I shall argue throughout this dissertation, these letters are designed not only to be interpreted with reference to each other, but to be interpreted with reference to an emerging Pauline corpus.

Annette Merz has made this thesis central to a reading strategy that emphasizes the Pastorals as intertextually sophisticated documents.¹³¹ In her 2004 work *Die fiktive Selbstausslegung des Paulus: intertextuelle Studien zur Intention und Rezeption der Pastoralbriefe*¹³² and in later articles,¹³³ Merz develops a sophisticated vocabulary for discussing the phenomena that occur when a pseudepigraphon refers to a genuine letter of an author whose identity is being subsumed. She refers to "fiktive Selbstausslegung," or "fictive self-interpretation" as an umbrella term for a variety of intertextual phenomena, among which are the "Referenztextorientierte" allusions that are oriented toward modifying the text referenced as opposed to primarily expanding the meaning of the text being written (though we note that these are not always distinct). Key to this approach is the observation that the *function* of such allusions, whether veiled or open, may be either to enhance the meaning of the text that makes the allusion

¹²⁹ For the image of a soldier campaigning, see 1 Cor 9:7 (τίς στρατεύεται). For an athlete competing, see 1 Cor 9:25 (ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος . . . ἵνα φθαρτὸν στέφανον λάβωσιν). For a farmer laboring, see 1 Cor 9:7 (τίς φυτεύει ἀμπελῶνα; cf. ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα and the Corinthians as θεοῦ γεώργιον at 1 Cor 3:6, 9]).

¹³⁰ 2 Tim 2:7.

¹³¹ See her book *Die fiktive Selbstausslegung des Paulus*, and her articles "The Fictitious Self-Exposition of Paul: How Might Intertextual Theory Suggest a Reformulation of the Hermeneutics of Pseudepigraphy?," in *The Intertextuality of the Epistles: Explorations of Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas L. Brodie, Dennis R. MacDonald, and Stanley E. Porter (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2006), 113–32; and "Amore Pauli: Das Corpus Pastorale und das Ringen um die Interpretationshoheit bezüglich des paulinischen Erbes," *TQ* 187 (2007): 274–94.

¹³² Merz, *Die fiktive Selbstausslegung des Paulus*.

¹³³ Merz, "The Fictitious Self-Exposition of Paul"; Merz, "Amore Pauli." Merz's work is adopted by Korinna Zamfir and Joseph Verheyden, "Reference-Text-Oriented Allusions," in *Exploring Intertextuality: Diverse Strategies for New Testament Interpretation of Texts*, ed. B. J. Oropeza and Steve Moyise (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2016), 242–53. Zamfir and Verheyden offer a compelling reading of 2 Tim 4:6–8 as an instance of fictitious self-reference to Phil 1:21–25, 30; 2:16–24.

(a "text-orientated" dimension thus being at work) or to extend, modify, or alter the meaning of text quoted (a "reference-text-orientated" dimension), even as this distinction is in practice hard to maintain.¹³⁴ Merz discusses the function of the Pastor's references to Paul's own letters as "Eigentextreferenzen," keeping in mind that by virtue of claiming the persona of Paul, whenever a pseudepigraphical author makes overt and self-conscious references to passages from the *Corpus Paulinum*, s/he is effectively referencing "one's own" text.

Merz has gained allies. Margaret M. Mitchell, in agreement with Merz's approach, offers a complementary reading strategy which emphasizes the Pastorals as exercises in "corrective composition": "The author engages in *self-correction* (though he is not that self) which has in mind *correction* of others (who also make claims on that Pauline self)."¹³⁵ Mitchell's approach builds on but is not identical to Merz's, insofar as she emphasizes the inauguration of the interpretive tradition of Paul's letters by Paul himself within his own letters.¹³⁶ Mitchell argues that this technique adds "to the verisimilitude of authorship by evoking passages the readership will recognize as having come from the historical author,"¹³⁷ and we may conclude that if the pseudepigraphical effort is successfully executed, the historical author and the fictional author are merged in a synthesis that allows, or perhaps necessitates, the audience to reassess "the Apostle's" position on any given topic.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Merz, "The Fictitious Self-Exposition of Paul," 117.

¹³⁵ Margaret M. Mitchell, "Corrective Composition, Corrective Exegesis: The Teaching on Prayer in 1 Tim 2,1-15," in *1 Timothy Reconsidered*, ed. Karl Paul Donfried, Monographische Reihe von "Benedictina": Biblisch-Ökumenische Abteilung. Colloquium Oecumenicum Paulinum 18 (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 44 (emphasis original).

¹³⁶ Mitchell, "Corrective Composition," 44. Cf. Margaret M. Mitchell, "Paul's Letters to Corinth: The Interpretive Intertwining of Literary and Historical Reconstruction," in *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Daniel N. Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen, HTS 53 (Cambridge: Harvard Theological Studies, Harvard Divinity School, 2005), 307–38; Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul, the Corinthians, and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹³⁷ Mitchell, "Corrective Composition," 43.

¹³⁸ As Merz, "The Fictitious Self-Exposition of Paul," 124, nicely puts it: "The fictitious character of this self-presentation is veiled; it can take a whole gamut of forms of allusive intertextuality, from a direct linkage to a

It is common enough today to hear scholars describe the goal of Pauline pseudepigraphers as updating the Pauline message for a new generation, and certainly, this is one function of pseudepigraphy.¹³⁹ But, as emphasized by Merz, Mitchell, and subsequent scholars, this approach does not give due attention to the hermeneutical implications for the interpretation of the precursor texts to which reference is made. If in fact we understand the Pastoral Epistles to be genuine attempts to deceive their readership into thinking that these letters were actually penned by Paul, then we cannot interpret them as though they are simply trying to borrow the authority of the Pauline imprimatur; in some cases, they are attempting a much more ambitious interpretive agenda. They are attempting not only to supplement the *Corpus Paulinum* or update it but in many ways to revise it and control the spectrum of interpretive options countenanced by readers of Paul.¹⁴⁰ As Merz writes, "the fictive reference to 'one's own' text opens to the author of a literary pseudepigraphon all the possibilities which an author himself who refers to his own earlier utterances has, such as reaffirmation, clarification, modification, correction, even up to the point of retraction."¹⁴¹ Merz stresses the idea that the pseudonymous author may attempt through fictive self-references to potentially fix or determine the meaning of the original sayings of Paul,

fictitious self-correction. The simplest case involves the addition of new statements to those already made by the author to whom the Pastorals lay claim: this involves a supplement to the total picture of Paul, but without affecting the substance of the earlier statement. However, as soon as the pseudepigraphical writer has the implied author ('Paul') make statements that do indeed recall orthonymous statements of Paul in terms of their theme or their verbal form, but alter the thrust of Paul's genuine words, we have allusive intertextuality of a kind characteristic of the pseudepigrapha, which necessarily affects the total image the reader has of Paul's message."

¹³⁹ For example, Josef Zmijewski, "Wie diesen, so geht es auch ihm wesentlich darum, das Wort des Apostels zu erhalten, es freilich nun auch grundsätzlicher und allgemeiner zu verstehen und es damit nicht einfach nur zu konservieren, sondern neu für die Kirche seiner Zeit zu aktualisieren" (Josef Zmijewski, "Die Pastoralbriefe als pseudepigraphische Schriften - Beschreibung, Erklärung, Bewertung," *SNTSU* 4 [1979]: 118).

¹⁴⁰ On this point, see Merz, "Amore Pauli," 282.

¹⁴¹ "Die fiktive Eigentextreferenz eröffnet dem Verfasser eines Pseudepigraphons literarisch alle Möglichkeiten, die ein Autor selbst hat, der sich auf frühere eigene Äußerungen bezieht, also etwa Bekräftigung, Präzisierung, Modifikation, Korrektur bis hin zur Retractatio" (*Die fiktive Selbstausslegung des Paulus*, 231).

all without ever having to change the original wording of Paul's own letters.¹⁴² This aspect of the Pastorals is not considered by those arguing for their authenticity, and too quickly dismissed by those emphasizing their differences.¹⁴³

The intertextual relationship between the Pastorals and the other Pauline letters is, furthermore, one of the strongest indicators of non-Pauline authorship. While the extent of the Pauline corpus at the Pastor's disposal is contested, throughout this dissertation I make arguments for the use of at least four letters, namely Romans, 1 & 2 Corinthians, and Philippians. Additionally, my judgment is that the PE evidences interaction with Galatians, and perhaps Philemon (Phlm 11 in 2 Tim 4:11?).¹⁴⁴ The Pauline triad of "faith, love, and endurance" from 1 Thess 1:3 seems to occur in Titus 2:2. Though I find the aggregate of evidence against Pauline authorship—especially evidence pertaining to style, vocabulary, and thematic differences—to be compelling, the intertextual relationship observable between the Pastorals and other letters of Paul is a further argument that a new author is at work. This is not to say that each of Paul's agreed upon letters is hermetically sealed from the others, and so any intertextual evidence must point to a new author. Paul could and did engage in some revising of and allusion to his own arguments in some of his letters. Romans at times picks up themes and specific phrases from Galatians¹⁴⁵ and 1 Corinthians,¹⁴⁶ and the Corinthian Correspondence gives evidence of both

¹⁴² Cf. "Es ist daher prinzipiell mit der Möglichkeit zu rechnen, dass Verfasser pseudonymer Paulusbriefe versuchen, mit dem Mittel der fiktiven Eigentextreferenz die Bedeutung der alludierten pln Originalaussagen neu zu bestimmen, ohne den Wortlaut des Paulustextes selbst verändern zu müssen" (*Die fiktive Selbstausslegung des Paulus*, 234).

¹⁴³ Engelmann's judgment that Merz's reading of the PE in relation to the Pauline letters is "nicht zu beweisen" and "daher spekulativ bleiben muss" seems too easy a dismissal (Engelmann, *Unzertrennliche Drillinge?*, 80).

¹⁴⁴ Additionally, the PE may have access to other texts, such as Luke 10:7 (in 1 Tim 5:18). Gerhard Lohfink, "Die Vermittlung des Paulinismus zu den Pastoralbriefen," *BZ* 32.2 (1988): 169–88 argues that the author certainly knew Romans and probably knew 1 Cor, Gal, and Philippians, and gained other information from oral reports.

¹⁴⁵ The problems of justification and "works of law" (ἔργα νόμου), so prevalent in Galatians (cf. εἰδότες [δὲ] ὅτι οὐ δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ at Gal 2:16), are taken up anew in Romans (cf. λογιζόμεθα γὰρ δικαιοῦσθαι πίστει ἄνθρωπον χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου at Rom 3:27). Paul even summons some of his key

explicit reference to earlier letters (1 Cor 5:7) and continual reinterpretations of those previous missives.¹⁴⁷ However, the Pastor engages in a kind of intertextual reference that is different in scale and strategy. While Paul addressed topics with some similar turns of phrase and with much the same theological content and rhetorical effect (e.g., Gal 2:16 and Rom 3:20, 28), the Pastor utilizes Pauline dicta in novel ways in order to assert interpretive control over the Pauline legacy. In the chapters that follow, we will see further examples of how the Pastor creates intertextual allusions and reappropriations.

5. Crafting Pseudonymous Letters to Individuals

The Pastoral Epistles stand apart from other Pauline letters, for they are the only letters in the Pauline corpus addressed to individuals.¹⁴⁸ If it is agreed that these epistles are pseudepigrapha which actively engage a developing *Corpus Paulinum*, and that they are not addressed to the real individuals Timothy and Titus (i.e.,¹⁴⁹ they are "doubly pseudonymous"),¹⁵⁰ then it must be accepted that the reason for the choice of Timothy and Titus as "recipients" of these letters lies within the Pauline corpus itself as the Pastor knew it.¹⁵¹ The selection of Timothy and Titus in and of itself constitutes a recognition of the primacy of these two figures among the emissaries of

examples (e.g., Abram; cf. Gal 3:6–22 and Rom 4:1–25) and scriptural proofs (e.g., Gen 15:6; cf. Gal 3:6 and Rom 4:3).

¹⁴⁶ The issue of *βρώματα* from 1 Cor 8–10 is taken up afresh in Rom 14:1–15:13.

¹⁴⁷ For a full argument, see Mitchell, *Paul, the Corinthians, and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics*.

¹⁴⁸ Philemon is plainly not addressed to Philemon alone, as Philem 2 illustrates: Apphia and Archippus and the *ἐκκλησία* in Philemon's home are all explicit addressees. Cf. Theobald, *Israel-Vergessenheit in den Pastoralbriefen*, 38 n. 10. While the letters to Timothy may give evidence of a broader audience (cf. 1 Tim 6:21; 2 Tim 4:22), and quite apart from the fact that as pseudepigrapha these letters have a much broader intended audience, the ostensible addressee is Timothy alone (1 Tim 1:2; 2 Tim 1:2; cf. Titus 1:4).

¹⁴⁹ See Mitchell, *Paul, the Corinthians, and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics*.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Werner Stenger's comment that the letters are "doppel pseudonym" (Werner Stenger, "Timotheus und Titus als literarische Gestalten: Beobachtungen zur Form und Funktion der Pastoralbriefe," *Kairos* 16.3–4 [1974]: 253).

¹⁵¹ Zmijewski, "Die Pastoralbriefe als pseudepigraphische Schriften - Beschreibung, Erklärung, Bewertung," 111.

Paul.¹⁵² They are the most frequently mentioned of Paul's envoys, and served as intermediaries between Paul and the nascent communities he had founded.¹⁵³ They travelled back and forth, conveying information and personal messages, and performing essential tasks in Paul's developing network of Christian communities.¹⁵⁴

The fact that these letters were addressed to individuals would have been useful for deflecting suspicion regarding their advent into the growing letter corpus (though the use of plural forms at 1 Tim 6:21 and 2 Tim 4:21 [ἡ χάρις μεθ' ὑμῶν]¹⁵⁵ and Titus 3:15 [ἡ χάρις μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν] may suggest that a broader readership is ultimately envisioned).¹⁵⁶ For scholars who take these letters to be pseudepigraphical, the personalia of the letters are regarded as an elaborate

¹⁵² The prominence of Timothy and Titus is demonstrated by the frequency of their mention in Paul's letters. Paul's other named envoys include Epaphroditus (Phil 2:25, 4:18) and Onesimus (Phlm 10, cf. Col 4:9). The deutero-Paulines add Tychicus to this list (Col 4:7; Eph 6:21), and this figure is known to the Pastor (2 Tim 4:12; Titus 3:12), as well as the author of Acts (20:4). Common to the PE and Acts is also Trophimus (Acts 20:4, 21:29; 2 Tim 4:20). Erastus's role in Paul's ministry (Rom 16:23) is also known to Acts (19:22) and the PE (2 Tim 4:20).

¹⁵³ From time to time the question arises as to why there are three letters in particular. Klauck suggests that the author "chose the number three for effect" (*Ancient Letters and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis*, trans. Daniel P. Bailey [Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006], 324). Pervo alludes to the narrative "rule of three," in which "the first two situations tend to be rather similar (e.g., feet too large for the slipper), raising suspense while at the same time establishing a pattern. The third situation upsets the pattern" (Pervo, "Romancing," 39 n.61). He commented later that "three is . . . a satisfactory and symbolic number, implying a true collection" (*The Making of Paul*, 84). Bart Ehrman argues that to focus on the number three as an argument against pseudepigraphy is nonsensical, and points out that the reason for the numbers of letters in other pseudepigraphical letter corpora is equally inscrutable. Why do we have fourteen letters between Seneca and Paul? Why six Pseudo-Ignatian letters? Etc. See Ehrman, *Forgery and Counterforgery*, 201. However, positive arguments are stronger in this regard. Manabu Tsuji argues more plausibly that the choice of three letters was intentional (though his arguments could also work for more than three letters), serving 1) to give the recent appearance of these letters plausibility as letter collection and not just a correspondence with one person, 2) to illustrate Paul as a writer of personal correspondences with multiple individuals in addition to more public letters to multiple communities, 3) to illustrate that Paul gave consistent instructions regarding church order (thus the similarities between 1 Tim and Titus, 4) to expand the ostensible geographic influence of Paul (from Crete to Ephesus to Rome) "Persönliche Korrespondenz des Paulus: Zur Strategie der Pastoralbriefe als Pseudepigrapha," *NTS* 56 (2010): 253–72.

¹⁵⁴ As demonstrated by Margaret M. Mitchell, "New Testament Envoys in the Context of Greco-Roman Diplomatic and Epistolary Conventions: The Example of Timothy and Titus," *JBL* 111 (1992): 641–62.

¹⁵⁵ The form is identical to the end of Col 4:18.

¹⁵⁶ Jeffrey Reed argues that Timothy alone is the recipient, but fails to reckon with the fact that one can really only prove the positive point, that the letter is crafted as an *address* to Timothy alone; how could we determine that the author meant this letter for Timothy and Timothy only? See "To Timothy or Not? A Discourse Analysis of 1 Timothy," in *Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics: Open Questions in Current Research*, ed. Stanley E. Porter and D. A. Carson, JSNTSup 80 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 90–118.

attempt to effect verisimilitude.¹⁵⁷ Recently, Manabu Tsuji has suggested that the individual address of Timothy and Titus might have been a way to forestall the criticism that these letters were not previously known and should therefore be rejected.¹⁵⁸ John W. Marshall has offered a compelling reading of the dynamics of pseudepigraphy at work in Titus, arguing that inherent to the author's strategy is the letter form itself. By structuring the instructions within the form of personal epistolary correspondence, the Pastor seeks to effect a sort of "dominance" over the readership that is mirrored in the asymmetrical power dynamic between Paul and Titus.¹⁵⁹

The necessity of verisimilitude required the pseudepigrapher to simulate some of the key features of his epistolary exemplars.¹⁶⁰ As Patricia Rosenmeyer points out, "playing the literary

¹⁵⁷ See Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 22–36. Johnson chides Donelson for utilizing the personal notes of the Pastorals as a "demonstration of pseudepigraphy"—a mischaracterization of Donelson's argument and its carefully stated presuppositions and caveats—and offers as a counterargument the following: "several of Paul's undisputed letters contain at least equal amounts of personal information (Galatians, 2 Corinthians, Philemon, Philippians) without thereby being considered inauthentic, whereas the highly disputed Ephesians has no such information" (AB, 66). While Johnson initially acknowledges that these are not the only grounds for a determination that the Pastorals are pseudonymous, he constructs a strawman by suggesting that biographical information in certain letters does not suggest pseudonymity and the probably pseudonymous Ephesians has none, since an appeal to biographical information in the Pastorals cannot be used to support an argument for their pseudonymity.

In a recent monograph, Joram Luttenberger argues that the personalia of the Pastorals should not be considered forged details in service of veiled pseudepigraphy, but a combination of authentic details taken from accurate sources or traditions (*Prophetenmantel oder Bücherfutteral?: Die persönlichen Notizen in den Pastoralbriefen im Licht antiker Epistolographie und literarischer Pseudepigraphie*, Arbeiten zur Bibel und ihrer Geschichte 40 [Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012]). While he considers 1 Timothy to be an instance of literary (i.e., open) pseudepigraphy, he takes Titus and 2 Timothy (with the help of an amanuensis) to be authentic. The title of his book is derived from his conviction that, contrary to all lexica, Bible translations, and most commentaries, the *φαιλόνης* of 2 Tim 4:13 refers to a "container" or a "wrapping of rolls" ("Bücherfutteral"). In her review, Korinna Zamfir thoroughly refutes Luttenberger's argument (*RBL* 3 [2016]), arguing that the papyri he cites do not support his argument, and the literary sources, which he does not consider, serve as counter-evidence to his claim.

¹⁵⁸ Tsuji, "Persönliche Korrespondenz des Paulus," 254–56, 272.

¹⁵⁹ "Initially, I want to conceive of 'dominance' only as the specific social manifestations of dominance that the letter to Titus seeks to create or maintain—men over women, old over young, Gentiles over Jews, clergy over laity, imperial structures over Christians—but by the end of the study I hope to have shown how these specific social structures are connected to, or even dependent on, a more fundamental act of dominance in the letter itself, namely, the duplicitous story it tells" (John W. Marshall, "I Left You in Crete": Narrative Deception and Social Hierarchy in the Letter to Titus," *JBL* 127 [2008]: 789).

¹⁶⁰ The obvious exception to this principle is when pseudepigraphical works are attributed to figures from the distant past who did not leave behind any writings that could serve as exemplars (e.g., Enoch, Socrates, and Jesus). This is the case with any genre, and is not restricted to letters. However, letters, by virtue of their ostensible historical

game" of fictional writing "involved following rules of verisimilitude, and writing a letter was no exception: hence the references in pseudonymous letters to the physical nature of epistolarity: acts of writing or reading, methods of sending, enclosed letters, and epistolary formulas."¹⁶¹

Pseudepigraphic Pauline letters, for example, must sound "Pauline" enough to pass as letters written by the Apostle in tone, ostensible historical setting, theological concepts, vocabulary, and epistolary style. This included, for the Pastor, utilizing some characteristic Pauline epistolary formulae, turns of phrase, and references to companions. The Pastor's creation of verisimilitude relied not only on Paul's own wishes to visit soon (e.g., cf. 1 Tim 3:14 and 1 Cor 4:19) and his greetings from others (e.g., cf. 2 Tim 4:21 and Titus 3:15 with Philem 23–24), but on epistolary commonplaces widely observable in real letters and their fictional counterparts.¹⁶²

All of these criteria would have been known to an educated reader in the Imperial era, for the secondary and tertiary stages of educational curriculum included a variety of "preliminary exercises" (προγυμνάσματα) which trained students to pay close attention to these matters. One aspect of this broader rhetorical curriculum was especially useful in the production of pseudepigrapha, namely, the production of "speeches-in-character" (προσωποποιΐαι). These required a student to compose a speech in the guise of a famous character from antiquity with a set theme (e.g., What would Daphne say upon the murder of her children?), thereby ensuring that the students could produce plausible characterization.¹⁶³ Aelius Theon of Alexandria, who provides the earliest progymnasmata,¹⁶⁴ defines προσωποποιΐα as "the bringing forward of a person

fixity, their occasionality, and the opportunity for deviation from stereotypical greetings and salutations, present the pseudepigrapher with more opportunity for artifice.

¹⁶¹ Rosenmeyer, *Ancient Epistolary Fictions: The Letter in Greek Literature*, 204–209; here quoting 204.

¹⁶² Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 23–43, 54–66.

¹⁶³ Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.29–32.

¹⁶⁴ This consensus position has been recently challenged by Malcom Heath, who proposes that the work is by an independently attested fifth-century rhetorician named Theon ("Theon and the History of the Progymnasmata,"

to whom words are attributed that are indisputably suitable to himself and to the subjects at hand."¹⁶⁵ Theon's discussion is mostly concerned that the student who practices *προσωποποιία* pay attention to the person of the speaker (τό τε τοῦ λέγοντος πρόσωπον),¹⁶⁶ and to say "words that fit" (λόγοι ἀρμόττοντες)¹⁶⁷ the speaker.¹⁶⁸ It is reasonable to assume that our author, who demonstrates ample awareness of a broad range of literary and philosophical conventions, would be trained in the particular exercises of "speeches-in-character," and consequently have the means and the opportunity to craft letters in the name of the Apostle, i.e., "letters in character."¹⁶⁹ If our author's goal was indeed to supplement the Pauline corpus, then he surely would have known that the letter would be scrutinized (at least by well-educated readers) with these factors in mind.

6. Date and Early Reception

The earliest potential use of the Pastorals comes from 1 Clement, typically dated to the late first century CE.¹⁷⁰ However, the direction of influence, if there is one, is difficult to surmise.¹⁷¹ P. N.

GRBS 43 [2002]: 129–60). However, the arguments that James R. Butts adduces for the priority of Theon to Quintillian and the dependence of the latter on the former are not easily overturned ("The Progymnasmata of Theon: A New Text with Translation and Commentary" [Dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1986], 3–6).

¹⁶⁵ Προσωποποιία ἐστὶ προσώπου παρειαγωγὴ διατιθεμένου λόγους οἰκείους ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀναμφοισβητήτως (Theon, *Prog.* 10 [Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 115, lines 10–12]).

¹⁶⁶ Theon, *Prog.* 10 (Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 115, line 23).

¹⁶⁷ Theon, *Prog.* 10 (Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 115, line 27).

¹⁶⁸ That there was a corresponding attention paid to the person to whom one wrote is evident in Demetrius, *Eloc.* 234: "One should also have regard for the person to whom the letter is being written" (στοχαστέον γὰρ καὶ τοῦ προσώπου ᾧ γράφεται). Greek text from

¹⁶⁹ I borrow this designation from Mark Harding, *Tradition and Rhetoric in the Pastoral Epistles*, *StBibLit* 3 (New York: Lang, 1998), 233. Similarly, Hans Josef-Klauck supports the notion that "the author's intention was to write full-scale prosopopoeia or speech in character in the name of Paul" (Klauck, *Ancient Letters and the New Testament*, 325 n. 22).

¹⁷⁰ The dating of this letter is debated (with dates ranging from 69 CE [A. E. Wilhelm-Hooijbergh] to 140 CE [L. L. Welborn]), though Michael W. Holmes opts for the last two decades of the first century CE (*The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English Translations*, 3rd ed. [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007], 35–36). Andreas Lindemann advocates a more traditional dating of 93–96 CE (*Die Clemensbriefe*, HNT 17 [Tübingen: Mohr, 1992], 12). This date in the mid-90s CE is supported also by Bart D. Ehrman, *The Apostolic Fathers*, LCL 24–25 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 25; J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers: Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp. Revised Texts with Introductions, Notes, Dissertations, and Translations.*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981), 348–

Harrison argued that the PE utilized Clement,¹⁷² though Carsten Looks and Donald Hagner argue that Clement utilized the PE.¹⁷³ Andreas Lindemann represents the position that they both utilize common traditions or sources. Polycarp's letter to the Philippians (ca. 135–37 CE?)¹⁷⁴ provides the firmest evidence for the early second century use of 1 Timothy (e.g., 1 Tim 6:7, 10 used at *Phil* 4.1) and 2 Timothy (e.g., 2 Tim 2:12 at *Phil* 5:2).¹⁷⁵ Use of Titus 2:12 (αἱ κοσμικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι) may be indicated by *Phil.* 5.3 (αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ), and Looks considers this "gut möglich bis wahrscheinlich," i.e., "ranging from very possible to probable," but it is not a particularly strong parallel.¹⁷⁶ Paul Hartog has recently addressed the complicated matter of dating Polycarp's *Philippians*,¹⁷⁷ and its potentially multiple components (if one joins a great many twentieth-

56; Robert M. Grant, *Augustus to Constantine: The Rise and Triumph of Christianity in the Roman World* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2004), 164.

¹⁷¹ Michael Theobald argues that *1 Clement* does not use the Pastorals; he suggests that Polycarp's *Philippians*, which he dates between 144 and 156 CE, is the first text to utilize the Pastorals. Thus, he considers the best window for the composition of the Pastorals to be the second quarter of the second century CE. Though he thinks the Ignatian corpus to know the Pastorals, he considers them to be a pseudepigraphical letter corpus, dating after Polycarp (Theobald, *Israel-Vergessenheit in den Pastoralbriefen*, 330–31).

¹⁷² See his list of parallels at Harrison, *The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles*, 177–78. Similarly, Burnett Hillman Streeter, *The Primitive Church, Studied with Special Reference to the Origins of the Christian Ministry; Lectures Delivered on the Hewett Foundation*, Hewett Lectures 1928 (London: Macmillan, 1929), 159.

¹⁷³ Carsten Looks, *Das Anvertraute bewahren: Die Rezeption der Pastoralbriefe im 2. Jahrhundert*, Münchener theologische Beiträge (München: Herbert Utz Verlag, 1999), 80; Donald Alfred Hagner, *The Use of the Old and New Testaments in Clement of Rome*, NovTSup 34 (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 232–36.

¹⁷⁴ The two-letter hypothesis put forward by P. N. Harrison, that the letter we now have consists of two separate letters (chs. 13–14 written ca. 110 CE and chs. 1–12 written ca. 130–135 CE) written by Polycarp to the Philippians and conjoined at a later date, is debated today. See Ehrman, *The Apostolic Fathers*, 328. All of the most likely potential uses of the Pastorals come from chs. 1–12. See Looks, *Das Anvertraute bewahren: Die Rezeption der Pastoralbriefe im 2. Jahrhundert*, 153–87.

¹⁷⁵ "Polycarp seems to demonstrate knowledge of many letters in our present Pauline corpus, including Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, 2 Thessalonians, and 1 and 2 Timothy as well as knowledge of 1 Peter and 1 Clement" (Kenneth Berding, "Polycarp of Smyrna's View of the Authorship of 1 and 2 Timothy," *VC* 53.4 [1999]: 352). Similarly Michael W. Holmes, "Polycarp's *Letter to the Philippians* and the Writings That Later Formed the New Testament," in *Reception of the New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers*, ed. Andrew F. Gregory and C. M. Tuckett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 215–18. Paul Hartog notes that in ECL the term ματαιολογία occurs only in 1 Tim 1:6 (cf. Titus 1:10) and *Phil.* 2.1, that προάγειν and ἐπακολουθεῖν occur together only in 1 Tim 5:24 and *Phil.* 3.3, and other lexical similarities (Hartog, *Polycarp and the New Testament*, 229). These similarities and others led von Campenhausen to suggest that Polycarp wrote the Pastorals or perhaps had someone from his circle write them (Hartog, *Polycarp and the New Testament*, 229; von Campenhausen, "Polykarp von Smyrna und die Pastoralbriefe").

¹⁷⁶ Looks, *Das Anvertraute bewahren: Die Rezeption der Pastoralbriefe im 2. Jahrhundert*, 163–64.

¹⁷⁷ Hartog, *Polycarp and the New Testament*, 148–69.

century scholars in following Harrison's two-letter theory).¹⁷⁸ Hartog argues for a dating of the letter, which he considers a unity, to ca. 115 CE, based on the earlier, Traianic, dating of Ignatius's death. He argues that many of the famous difficulties from chapter thirteen may be ascribed to the Latin translation of the last sentence of *Phil.* 13.¹⁷⁹ Even if the two-letter hypothesis is accepted, Hartog demonstrates that the second letter (1–12) need not be written much later than the first (13–14), and may be dated before 120 CE.¹⁸⁰ After a review of the arguments, Richard Pervo abstains from a final determination regarding the unity of the letter, suggesting that "neither side has put forth a compelling argument at this time."¹⁸¹ However, he does note the trend toward dating Ignatius's death toward the end of Hadrian's reign, ca. 130–135.¹⁸² Since the dating of Polycarp's letter is relative to the dating of the martyrdom of Ignatius, with whose letters Polycarp's *Philippians* seemed to have travelled exclusively in antiquity,¹⁸³ this suggests that Polycarp's letter may then date to the third or fourth decade of the second century CE.¹⁸⁴ Consequently, this serves as a relatively shifting *terminus ante quem* for the Pastorals, which must then be written before roughly 110–130 CE.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁸ P. N. Harrison, *Polycarp's Two Epistles to the Philippians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936). For discussion of Harrison's theory, its reception, and critique, see Hartog, *Polycarp and the New Testament*, 149–61.

¹⁷⁹ The problem regards how one should interpret the request for information regarding Ignatius "et de his qui cum eo sunt" (*Phil.* 13.2). Hartog (preceded by others) reasons that the phrase likely translates a verbless Greek clause καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ, and should thus be read as "and his companions" or "and those with him" (Hartog, *Polycarp and the New Testament*, 161–2). Thus, to put too much weight on the present tense of the Latin *sunt*, which would indicate perhaps that Ignatius is still alive and therefore in conflict with *Phil.* 9 (which seems to indicate that he is dead), is inadvisable.

¹⁸⁰ Hartog, *Polycarp and the New Testament*, 169. Citing similarities between the PE and PolPhil, Pervo suggests that they should be dated closely to each other. He argues that "comparison makes it difficult to attempt to date the PE earlier than 120. Circa 125 is a reasonable date" (*The Pastorals and Polycarp: Titus, 1-2 Timothy, and Polycarp to the Philippians*, Scholars Bible 5 [Salem: Polebridge Press, 2016], 84).

¹⁸¹ Pervo, *The Pastorals and Polycarp*, 77–82, quoting 82.

¹⁸² Pervo, *The Pastorals and Polycarp*, 77. Richard I. Pervo, "Acts in Ephesus (and Environs) c. 115," *Forum* Third Series.4.2 (2015): 146.

¹⁸³ Pervo, *The Pastorals and Polycarp*, 79.

¹⁸⁴ Pervo, *The Pastorals and Polycarp*, 77.

¹⁸⁵ The other complicated factor is their relationship to Acts. Pervo argues that Acts dates to ca. 115 CE, and that the Pastorals know Luke-Acts, which requires a dating for the PE to ca. 125 CE (see Pervo, *The Pastorals and*

Marcion's *Apostolikon*, which included ten letters attributed to Paul, does not contain the Pastorals. Whether he rejected them (as Tertullian suggests [*Marc.* 5.21; PL 2:524]) or whether he simply did not know them is impossible to know with certainty. Irenaeus (ca. 188 CE) found in them plenty of anti-Marcionite polemic, which, in conjunction with Tertullian's comments, has led some scholars to believe that Marcion omitted them because he knew and rejected them. If he did, he would not be the last of the early Christians to reject the letters to Timothy and Titus, for Basilides, Tatian, Theophylact, and others¹⁸⁶ took issue with one or more of the PE.¹⁸⁷ If, however, as Harry Gamble argues, "there is broad agreement that a more or less full collection [of Paul's ten letters] had come into existence by the late years of the first century," then it seems possible that Marcion (active in Rome ca. 137–144 CE)¹⁸⁸ simply was not aware of 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, and Titus.¹⁸⁹ P46 (= P. Chester Beatty 2), the earliest extant collection of Paul's letters (ca. 200CE),¹⁹⁰ does not contain the Pastorals.¹⁹¹ P32 (= P.Ryl. 5), a single page of a papyrus codex

Polycarp, 12; Richard I. Pervo, *Dating Acts: Between the Evangelists and the Apologists* [Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge Press, 2006], 319–21; Pervo, "Acts in Ephesus (and Environs) c. 115," 133–41). However, the relationship of the Pastorals to the Acts of the Apostles remains a complex and debated topic. After considering the significant potential points of contact, Andrew Gregory decides that the evidence does not demonstrate the knowledge of Acts by 2 Timothy (*The Reception of Luke and Acts in the Period before Irenaeus: Looking for Luke in the Second Century*, WUNT 2.169 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 310–11).

¹⁸⁶ In a refutation of "heretics" (who are contrasted with "the Gnostic" [ὁ γνωστικός] who is held fast by faith), Clement of Alexandria refers to "heretics" (οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρέσεων) who reject the letters to Timothy because they have been chastened (ἐλέγχεσθαι) by the words of 1 Tim 6:20–21 (*Strom.* 2.11.52.4–7).

¹⁸⁷ The author of the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* too seems to be drawing upon, and in part refuting, the PE. Matthijs den Dulk argues that the author of the *API* (the "Presbyter") used the PE as a literary source. He argues further that the Presbyter found much to agree with in 2 Tim, but would likely have been at odds with the depiction of Paul in the teachings of 1 Timothy ("I Permit No Woman to Teach except for Thecla: The Curious Case of the Pastoral Epistles and the Acts of Paul Reconsidered," *NovT* 54.2 [2012]: 176–203).

¹⁸⁸ Grant, *Augustus to Constantine*, 84–85; 124. The precise dates are hard to pin down. See Jason D. BeDuhn, *The First New Testament: Marcion's Scriptural Canon* (Salem, OR: Polebridge, 2013), 12–13.

¹⁸⁹ Harry Y. Gamble, *Books and Readers in the Early Church: A History of Early Christian Texts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 59. Similarly, BeDuhn, *The First New Testament*, 31, 227.

¹⁹⁰ The dating of P46 is generally said to be around 200 CE (cf. the NA28 Appendix). The papyrus is listed as belonging to the third century by Georg Maldfeld and Bruce M. Metzger, "Detailed List of the Greek Papyri of the New Testament," *JBL* 68.4 (1949): 366.

¹⁹¹ Codex Vaticanus, the great fourth century codex, does not contain the Pastorals either. David Aune notes that P46, which ends on page eighty-four out of an original one hundred, presently concludes with 1 Thess 5:28 ("The Pastoral Letters: 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus," in *The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament*, ed. David E. Aune,

originating perhaps in Oxyrhynchus and also dating to 200 CE or later,¹⁹² contains part of Titus 1:11–15 on the recto and Titus 2:3–8 on the verso.¹⁹³ Codicological reconstructions of the text of the papyrus, which measured to about 15 x 21 cm,¹⁹⁴ suggest that Titus was preceded by at least one other text, though it is impossible to say which one.¹⁹⁵ While there are no New Testament papyri for 1 and 2 Timothy,¹⁹⁶ 2 Tim 2:19 is referred to directly in an early third century CE gospel commentary recorded on fragments of a papyrus codex.¹⁹⁷

While we cannot know for certain how the earliest readers understood the interrelationship of the Pastorals to one another, Benjamin White suggests that early Christians read them together early on. He argues that while the "Pastoral Epistles" is an "etic designation, a modern heuristic construction, there is evidence that by the late-second and early-third centuries these three texts were already viewed as a thematic group."¹⁹⁸ White demonstrates that Irenaeus

Blackwell Companions to Religion [Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010], 552). Despite Jeremy's Duff's observation that P46 exhibits compressed handwriting and argument that the scribe meant to include the PE but simply ran out of space, Eldon J. Epp has argued persuasively that there simply is not sufficient space to accommodate the Pastorals within the remaining available space (nine pages, if we if imagine that 2 Thess followed 1 Thess; the PE would require eighteen pages at the same line per page rate), even with the increasing rate of text compression. See Jeremy Duff, "P46 and the Pastorals: A Misleading Consensus?," *NTS* 44.4 (1998): 578–90; Eldon Jay Epp, "Issues in the Interrelation of New Testament Textual Criticism and Canon," in *The Canon Debate*, ed. Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2002), 495–502.

¹⁹² For discussion of scholarly opinions and an argument for a third century dating, see Emily Gathergood, "Papyrus 32 (Titus) as a Multi-Text Codex: A New Reconstruction," *NTS* 59.4 (2013): 590–92.

¹⁹³ Kurt Aland and Barbara Aland, *The Text of the New Testament: An Introduction to the Critical Editions and to the Theory and Practice of Modern Textual Criticism*, trans. Erroll F. Rhodes, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 98. P61 (= P. Colt 5) is ca. 700 CE and contains portions of Rom 16, 1 Cor, Phil, Col, 1 Thess, Phlm, and Tit 3:1–5, 8–11, 14–15 (Aland and Aland, *The Text of the New Testament*, 100).

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Gathergood, "Papyrus 32 (Titus) as a Multi-Text Codex," 593 and n. 17. 15 x 20 cm is offered by Larry W. Hurtado, *The Earliest Christian Artifacts: Manuscripts and Christian Origins* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 162.

¹⁹⁵ See the compelling argument of Gathergood, "Papyrus 32 (Titus) as a Multi-Text Codex."

¹⁹⁶ Aland and Aland, *The Text of the New Testament*, 246.

¹⁹⁷ See ll. 132–33 of Inv. no. Egerton Papyrus 3: Παῦλος δὲ ἐν τῇ [β] πρὸς Τιμόθεον λέγει[ι]. ἔγνω[ω κ(ύριο)ς τοὺς ὄν]τα[ς] αὐτοῦ ("Paul says in his second letter to Timothy, 'The Lord knows those who are his'"). See H. Idris Bell and T. C. Skeat, *Fragments of an Unknown Gospel and Other Early Christian Papyri* (London: Published by the Trustees of the British Museum, 1935), 42–51.

¹⁹⁸ Benjamin L. White, "How to Read a Book: Irenaeus and the Pastoral Epistles Reconsidered," *VC* 65 (2011): 125–49. In addition to Irenaeus's programmatic use of the PE in the *Adversus haereses*, White cites Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 2.11; Tertullian, *Marc.* 5.21; and the Muratorian Canon, ll. 60–64 (White, "How to Read a Book," 128 n. 10).

used the Pastorals in his polemic differently than he did the rest of Paul's oeuvre: "Each of the 'Pastoral Epistles' contributes to the polemical characterizations of Irenaeus' opponents in ways that are both consonant with these initial invocations as well as unique within his larger use of the Pauline tradition."¹⁹⁹ White goes on to note that Irenaeus does not tend to draw on the combative language of other letters of Paul that he also knows and draws upon, like 2 Thessalonians and Galatians.²⁰⁰

What is especially striking and noteworthy for our purposes is the fact that Irenaeus utilized to particular effect the Pastor's polemic of pathology, in addition to his other polemical tactics, such as the language of deviation (ἀστοχεῖν) in 2 Tim 2:18 (*Adv. haer.* 1.28.2; 31–33; and *haer.* 5.3.1; fr. gr. 4, 49–51) or the opponents' "taking captive" (αἰχμαλωτίζειν) or "overturning" (ἀνατρέπειν) of the unassuming (*Adv. haer.* prologue to bk. 1).²⁰¹ He used, for example, the following: νοσῶν περὶ ζητήσεις (1 Tim 6:4) with reference to allegorizing opponents (cf. *aegrotans circa quaestiones* at *Adv. haer.* 3.12.11), κεκαυστηριασμένων τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν (1 Tim 4:2) with reference to the Marcosians (*Adv. haer.* 1.13.7; fr. gr. 10), and κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοήν (2 Tim 4:3) with regard to Valentinian speculation (cf. *prurientibus aures* at *haer.* 2.21.2).

Thus, it seems that within the early years of the reception of these letters, early Christian authors were using the Pastorals in dealing with opponents. While this generally well-known,²⁰² my contribution here is to emphasize how the medicalized depictions of opponents proved to be so serviceable and reusable by later writers. Though authors have little control of how their letters

¹⁹⁹ White, "How to Read a Book," 141.

²⁰⁰ White, "How to Read a Book," 146–48.

²⁰¹ White, "How to Read a Book," 144–45.

²⁰² This was an enduring aspect of the interpretation of the Pastorals in the early church and well beyond, as abundantly demonstrated by Jay Twomey, *The Pastoral Epistles Through the Centuries* (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 12–13, *passim*.

are used once they are written,²⁰³ it is not hard to imagine the author of the Pastorals being gratified by this usage.

II. Deviance and Opponents in the Pastoral Epistles

A. Identifying Opponents and the History of Scholarship

1. Analysis of the Study of Opponents in the Pastorals

"Man hat die Pastoralbriefe in verschiedener Hinsicht kritisiert, ein Mangel an Polemik aber wurde ihnen nicht vorgeworfen."²⁰⁴ - Gerd Häfner

The topics of polemic and opponents in the PE have enjoyed the benefits of a revival of scholarly interest in the last fifty years. In 1973, Robert J. Karris published an article that sparked debate concerning the possibility of ascertaining in highly polemical literature any identifiable characteristics of an author's opponents.²⁰⁵ Karris sought to bring redaction criticism, which gained prominence in gospels studies in the two decades preceding Karris' work,²⁰⁶ to bear on the PE.²⁰⁷ He combined the insight of Dibelius and Conzelmann²⁰⁸ that the polemical language of the

²⁰³ As emphasized by Martina Janssen, "Antike (Selbst-)Aussagen über Beweggründe zur Pseudepigraphie," in *Pseudepigraphie und Verfasserfiktion in frühchristlichen Briefen = Pseudepigraphy and author fiction in early Christian letters*, ed. Jörg Frey et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 131–35.

²⁰⁴ Häfner, "Polemik in den Pastoralbriefen," 295.

²⁰⁵ Robert J. Karris, "The Background and Significance of the Polemic of the Pastoral Epistles," *JBL* 92.4 (1973): 549–64. This article is based on his Harvard dissertation, "The Function and Sitz im Leben of the Paraenetic Elements in the Pastoral Epistles" (ThD Thesis, Harvard University, 1971). See esp. 3–39. While this is certainly not the beginning of the conversation about the polemic and opponents of the PE (which arguably began when Irenaeus adapted the Pastor's language to describe his own opponents [Irenaeus, *Adv. haer. Praef.* 1 cites 1 Tim 1:4]), Karris's article serves as a reference point for almost every scholar who broaches the topic, and is thus a fitting entry point for this essay. For a synopsis of the various scholarly assessments of the opponents of the PE up to the time that Karris wrote, see John J. Gunther, *St. Paul's Opponents and Their Background: A Study of Apocalyptic and Jewish Sectarian Teachings*, NovTSup 35 (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 4–5. He lists some nineteen different options.

²⁰⁶ Cf. Robert H. Stein, "Redaction Criticism (NT)," *ABD* 5:647–50.

²⁰⁷ Indeed, Karris seems to think of himself as performing a secondary, restorative redaction upon the Pastor's own redaction of a "schema" (which he defines as "the convergence of items that regularly occur in the presentation of a particular topic" ["Background and Significance," 551 n.10] and considers "traditional to the polemic of the philosophers against the sophists [551]): "Granted that this schema existed and was employed by the author of the

PE is highly stylized and largely dependent upon common stereotypes, with the assumption that only *some* of this language was stereotypical and that if one could isolate the chaff of the "stock charges," the remainder would be the wheat of the *actual* characteristics of the opponents' and their teaching.²⁰⁹ Karris joined many scholars of the twentieth century in concluding that one can find in the portrait of the opponents in the PE a unified picture: "The opponents are Jewish Christians who are teachers of the law (1 Tim 1:7; Titus 3:9; cf. Tit 1:14). They teach Jewish myths (Titus 1:14; cf. 1 Tim 1:4; 4:7; 2 Tim 4:4) and genealogies (1 Tim 1:4; Tit 3:9). They forbid marriage and enjoin abstinence from food (1 Tim 4:3–5). They teach that the resurrection has already occurred (2 Tim 2:18). They may have had significant success among the womenfolk, especially because of their teaching about emancipation (2 Tim 3:6–7; cf. 1 Tim 2:11–15; 5:13; Tit 2:5). These are the results of the application of form and redaction criticism to the polemic of the Pastorals."²¹⁰ Karris joined a majority of scholars in trying to discern particular religious groups

Pastorals, the next question is how the author utilized it, how he redacted it" (556). Luke Timothy Johnson proposes a similar procedure: "If we put together the pieces presented only by 1 Timothy and then *peel away* the characterizations that probably derive from conventional slander, we can posit an opposition that represents an intellectual elite that demands the performance measured by law and asceticism rather than by grace and conscience" (AB, 146, emphasis added). However, as will be argued below, even the language of "conscience" (συνείδησις) has its home in the Pastor's polemical agenda, and thus may not be used to formulate the opponents' actual position.

²⁰⁸ "The Pastorals almost entirely avoid describing the opponents; they only want to combat them, and indeed with the same reproaches which the popular philosopher directs at his opponent" (Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles: A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles*, Hermeneia [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972], 21). Furthermore, "the author frequently uses the same weapons with which the philosophers attacked the sophists" (66).

²⁰⁹ Karris ("Background and Significance," 549, 562) is of the opinion that, in contradistinction to Paul, the Pastor does not pick up the terms of the opponents, but does pick up their "themes" and enters into "theological debate" with them, albeit only once (at 1 Tim 4:1–5). Donelson, on the other hand, does think that "they might well have accepted ζητήσεις, μῦθοι, γενεαλογία, and perhaps even λογομαχία" (*Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 124).

²¹⁰ Karris, "Background and Significance," 562–63. In 1979 Luke Timothy Johnson sought to challenge Karris' analysis of the *function* of the polemical language of 2 Timothy in particular. See Luke Timothy Johnson, "II Timothy and the Polemic Against False Teachers: A Re-Examination," *JReLS* 6 (1979): 1–26. In Karris's words, the reason the author employs the "schema" is that 1) he "wants to disassociate his teaching from that of the heretics," 2) he desires to show "that he alone has the right to and actually does impart the truth, and that he and his disciples alone have the power to teach correctly," and 3) "to cause aversion for his opponents in the minds of his readers and to establish a strong alternative to their view of Pauline tradition" (563–64). While Johnson views his position as being in direct conflict with that of Karris, Benjamin Fiore articulates something close to Johnson's view while crediting Karris: "Karris notes that the Pastorals depart from what he finds in the parallels inasmuch as they oppose not good teaching

against which the author of the Pastorals wrote (sometimes with differentiation).²¹¹ Frequent candidates for the primary groups opposed by the Pastor include Gnostics, Jewish Gnostics,²¹² those who advocated what has been dubbed an "over-realized" eschatology,²¹³ Jewish Christians who interpret allegorically and tend toward asceticism,²¹⁴ and even Ophites.²¹⁵

The following year, Abraham Malherbe argued that "the author of the Pastoral Epistles made frequent use of the language of health and disease in polemic leveled at false teachers and their followers."²¹⁶ Criticizing Karris, Malherbe claimed that he had "studiously avoided dealing

to bad teaching but the good teacher to the bad teacher, good and bad because they follow sound or faulty teaching. Thus, the element of polemic transformed from a consideration of teaching to that of the teacher" (Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*, 196). For Johnson, the depictions of the opponents in 2 Timothy function solely as antitheses to a portrait of the ideal Christian teacher. Presumably, for Johnson this portrait is a composite drawn from the depictions of Paul and Timothy, just as the depictions of the opponents unite to form one grand antithesis to this "ideal" teacher. However, it seems to me that Johnson has conflated a question of rhetorical strategy (do the depictions of the opponents have an inverse lexical and semantic correlation to the depiction of Timothy?) with a question of the author's intended effect in that depiction (How would the audience have read these depictions?). Thus, he unnecessarily reduces the polemic to one particular "function" and too quickly discredits Karris's insights.

²¹¹ This data in part derives from Jerry L. Sumney, "Paul's Opponents," *Oxford Bibliographies: Biblical Studies* (2017), <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195393361/obo-9780195393361-0136.xml>.

²¹² Wolfgang Schenk, "Die Briefe an Timotheus I und II und an Titus (Pastoralbriefe) in der neueren Forschung (1945 - 1985)," in *ANRW* 2.25.4:3404–38; Günter Haufe, "Gnostische Irrlehre und ihre Abwehr in den Pastoralbriefen," in *Gnosis und Neues Testament: Studien aus Religionswissenschaft und Theologie*, ed. Karl-Wolfgang Tröger (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 1973), (esp. Titus). Cf. Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 66–67: "The connection of the Gnostics of the Pastorals with Judaism cannot, therefore, be asserted without qualifications, but it is highly probable."

²¹³ E.g., David C. Verner, *The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles*, SBLDS 71 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983); Philip H. Towner, "Gnosis and Realized Eschatology in Ephesus (of the Pastoral Epistles) and the Corinthian Enthusiasm," *JSNT* 31 (1987): 95–124; Philip Towner, *The Goal of Our Instruction: The Structure of Theology and Ethics in the Pastoral Epistles*, JSNTSup 34 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989). For 1 Timothy in particular: William L. Lane, "1 Tim IV.1–3: An Early Instance of Over-Realized Eschatology?," *NTS* 11.2 (1965): 164–67. For 2 Timothy in particular: Ulrich B. Müller, *Zur frühchristlichen Theologiegeschichte: Judenchristentum und Paulinismus in Kleinasien an der Wende vom ersten zum Zweiten Jahrhundert n. Chr.* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1976); Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus."

²¹⁴ For 1 Timothy and Titus, see, e.g., Müller, *Zur frühchristlichen Theologiegeschichte*; Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus"; Jerry L. Sumney, "Studying Paul's Opponents: Advances and Challenges," in *Paul and His Opponents*, ed. Stanley E. Porter, *Pauline Studies* 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 7–58.

²¹⁵ J. B. Lightfoot, in his collected essays *Biblical Essays* (1904), in an addendum "Additional Note on the Heresy Combated in the Pastoral Epistles" (411–18) to the essay "The Date of the Pastoral Epistles," argues that the heresy is similar to that of the Ophites. He concluded, after a comparison with the evidence from [Hippolytus], *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, that the "heresy" being combatted in the Pastorals "was identical with the heresy of the Ophites, or at least partook largely of an Ophite character" (418).

²¹⁶ Abraham J. Malherbe, "Medical Imagery and the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie*, ed. W. Eugene March and Stuart Dickson Currie (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1980), 19–35.

with the terms describing health and disease."²¹⁷ Malherbe thought that these terms were the key for identifying the opponents that the Pastor had in mind: those who sounded like "rigoristic Cynics."²¹⁸ As one might infer from the fact that he identified the opponents with a particular philosophical group, also central to Malherbe's proposal is his contention that the PE were addressed to "actual situations."²¹⁹ Furthermore, weighing in on the debate about the function of the PE's polemic, Malherbe determined the following:

The use of the medical imagery in the Pastorals is thoroughly polemical. There is no picture, as in the moral philosophers, of the intellectually and morally ill person who will be cured by reason through the application of the drugs, surgery, and cautery of *parresia*. . . . That the "sound words" may bring about the health of the soul is an inference the reader may be tempted to draw, but it is not part of the function to which the images are put. That function is polemical.²²⁰

Thus, for Malherbe, the opponents are decidedly outside the realm of correction or redemption.

Somewhat ironically, the "healthy words" have no healing function to speak of.

A novel proposal concerning the background of the opponents came in 1983 from Dennis Ronald MacDonald. MacDonald, too, latched onto a particular set of terms frequently deemed polemical (*γραῶδεις μῦθοι*), and sought to find behind them real proponents of an alternative tradition about Paul: the author(s) of the *Acts of Paul*, who relied upon the oral traditions of women.²²¹ MacDonald also makes the crucial assumption that one can use the passages which

²¹⁷ Malherbe, "Medical Imagery," 20.

²¹⁸ Malherbe, "Medical Imagery," 24. According to Malherbe, the author of the PE turned "the claims of certain harsh Cynics to be the healers of diseased humanity" back on them. "Contemporary harsh preachers intoned their own superiority as physicians and found cause for their pugnaciousness in the diseased condition of their hearers' minds and souls. The author of the Pastorals, in rebuttal, accused the heretics, as Plutarch did the flatterer, with being diseased of mind and morals. Their verbal battles do not eradicate disease in others, but are the products of their own disease, and will further infect those who, with irrational lusts, will listen to them with itching ears which wait only to be tickled" (30).

²¹⁹ Malherbe, "Medical Imagery," 31.

²²⁰ Malherbe, "Medical Imagery," 30–31.

²²¹ "The author of the Pastoral Epistles . . . stands in this tradition of men who despised 'old wives' tales': 'Avoid the profane tales told by old women' (1 Tim. 4:7). Most interpreters have taken this verse to be nothing more than stock rhetoric used to vilify the theology of the 'false teachers' . . . In this book I shall argue that the author of the

refute false teachers ("fully one fifth")²²² to identify the opponents, albeit with difficulty. In 1986, in a study largely devoted to the kinds of ethical argumentation the author of the PE utilizes, Lewis R. Donelson²²³ too thought one could define the theological agenda of the Pastor vis-à-vis a reconstruction of the opponents' theology.²²⁴ Donelson argues that because the opponents are all negative paradigms, this "suggests that all the portraits should be combined into one picture and that the resultant picture is of the author's own opponents."²²⁵ For Donelson, these opponents may be identified as a single group within the author's church²²⁶ whom the author "knows firsthand."²²⁷ Donelson, along with many scholars, imputes a form of "spiritual enthusiasm" to the opponents, which is then countered by the conservatism of the Pastor.²²⁸ As we shall see, the

Pastoral Epistles wrote in Paul's name in order to counteract the image of Paul as given in stories by old women" (Dennis Ronald MacDonald, *The Legend and the Apostle: The Battle for Paul in Story and Canon* [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983], 14). However, MacDonald also thinks that "Probably it is more nearly correct to think that the Pastoral Epistles oppose false teachers of various kinds: Gnostics (1 Tim 6:20; cf. 1:3–11; 2 Tim. 2:14–19), Jewish Christians (Titus 1:10–16), and perhaps Marcionites" (56).

²²² MacDonald, *The Legend and the Apostle: The Battle for Paul in Story and Canon*, 56. Cf. "Fifty-two verses out of two hundred and forty-two. The passages against false teachers are 1 Tim 1:3–11; 4:1–5, 7–8; 6:3–10, 20; 2 Tim 2:14–19, 23; 3:1–9; 4:3–4; Titus 1:10–16; 3:8–9."

²²³ Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, esp. 116–128.

²²⁴ His expressions of methodological caution notwithstanding (e. g., "it is possible that pieces of this theological system were structured in response to contrary positions held by opponents" [153, cf. 192]), Donelson argues rather robustly that the central tenets of the author's theology are set in contradistinction to his opponents': "To speculation he counterposes the good order of God's plan with its sound teachings; to their lordship Christology he counterposes an epiphany Christology in which Jesus has no immediate or direct contact with the Church; and to their spiritual enthusiasm he opposes a spirit which is dispensed only in baptism and which expresses itself through virtues" (127, cf. 153). However, Donelson's lack of any explication of this "lordship Christology" (indeed, he even admits that "we are perhaps pushing analogies too far in intimating this kind of Lordship Christology for the opponents" [125 n. 28]) or documentation of the opponents' "spiritual enthusiasm" counsels against seeing each and every aspect of the Pastor's theology in direct correlation to an identifiable feature of his opponent's theology. Cf. also 117.

²²⁵ Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 118.

²²⁶ Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 197, 122.

²²⁷ Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 120–21.

²²⁸ Donelson writes that "It is usual to ascribe to the opponents some form of spiritual enthusiasm. The ascription may well be correct" (125). In a footnote to this comment, he writes: "The reason for this nearly ubiquitous tendency is twofold. First, the inchoate hints in the Pastorals link up with the late second and third century debates with gnosticism. . . . Less anachronistic is the tendency to see analogies between the heterodox of the Pastorals to the heterodox in Colossians. When this is done, the detection of spiritual enthusiasm in Colossians is imported into the Pastorals. . . ." (125 n. 27). Why exactly Donelson decides to perpetuate this "anachronistic" tendency to "import" a determination (variously construed by different scholars at that) about the Colossian opponents into a discussion of the Pastorals' opponents is unclear. Philip Towner concludes that "over-realized eschatology" is really the problem at Ephesus, which he takes also to be the problem at Corinth, and probably also at Crete (*Goal of Our Instruction*, 42).

assertion that the opponents displayed a form of "spiritual enthusiasm" must be reassessed in light of the nature of polemic.

In 1996, Michael Goulder identified the opponents in an article entitled "The Pastor's Wolves: Jewish Christian Visionaries Behind the Pastoral Epistles."²²⁹ For Goulder, the opponents are "Jewish-Christians" (243), "charismatics" (244), "Cephas-ites" (255), quasi-gnostic (248), and "visionaries" (250).²³⁰ In addition to appealing to known second-century religious movements like the Barbeliots or the Ebionites (256), Goulder often draws comparisons with the assumed opponents of the Pauline homologoumena.²³¹ Though his article does not focus particularly on the terminology of polemic in the Pastorals, Goulder's methodological approach is a representative example of how many scholars construct an assessment of the opponents: highlight

²²⁹ Michael Goulder, "The Pastor's Wolves: Jewish Christian Visionaries behind the Pastoral Epistles," *NovT* 38.3 (1996): 242–56. Though the term "wolves" (λύκοι) does not occur in the PE (or any of the homologoumena), Acts 20:29 narrates Paul's departure from the Ephesian elders, at which point he warns them of "savage wolves" (λύκοι βαρεῖς) which will come after his departure, both from without and from within their own number, and will not spare the flock. Goulder refers to the opponents several times as "wolves" (242, 252, 256), but nowhere draws out the connection to Acts. Cf. Mt 7:15, 10:16; Lk 10:2; Jn 10:11. Richard Pervo uses the same moniker for the opponents: "[The Pastor] is not an executive who shows much interest in or patience with intellectual approaches, but is rather a proponent of the tried and true, good, old fashioned methods. The church should follow the model of the well-managed Greco-Roman household, envisioned as a healthy organism which functions soundly when each member is performing its proper task in its proper place. The wolves, alas, carry germs" (Pervo, *The Making of Paul*, 86).

²³⁰ Goulder's conclusion is astonishing for its incredible detail: "The wolves are Jewish Christians, and they are as we should expect, keen to press the Law and its traditional interpretations on the Pastor's Gentile congregations. But they are not 'normative' Jews. They are members of a charismatic Christian movement, with a key element the claim to visions of God and his court. Their visionaries have seen the Throne, and have dilated upon the aeons, the extensions of God, to such an extent that the Pastor can imply that they are polytheists. They have traced the relationship between these aeons in a proto-gnostic myth which seems to be similar to the first part of the Barbeliot myth; and they used the word γνῶσις of their experiences. The driving force behind these visions was in part the traditional Ezekiel–Enoch type aspiration to pierce the firmament; and in part it was the quest for a Christology. As with the Barbeliots, one of the primary aeons was called Christ; and as with the Ebionites, he had been quite distinct from the human Jesus, and had possessed him only from the baptism to the crucifixion" ("Pastor's Wolves," 256).

²³¹ Goulder, "Pastor's Wolves," 243–5, 247–8, 251, 254–6. Goulder is struck by the similarities between Paul's and the Pastor's situations (NB: he considers Col and Eph as genuine). Indeed, he even notes at one point that "the Pastor is following his master" (251) in formulating the locution τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον at 1 Tim 3:16. He does not entertain the possibility, however, that the Pastor is recasting Paul's polemic as an interpretive effort in its own right.

what are deemed key terms, map out the theological positions of the *real* opponents being attacked, and draw inferences about them by appeal to better-known groups.²³²

In 1997 Lloyd Pietersen published an article²³³ that he would later develop into a full length monograph.²³⁴ Utilizing insights from the sociology of deviance,²³⁵ Pietersen argued that

²³² Jerry L. Sumney, "Servants of Satan," "False Brothers" and Other Opponents of Paul, JSNTSup 188 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999), 20 offers a critique of such a practice. "Using reconstructions to determine in any way the characteristics of a particular group of opponents violates good historical method by treating the *possibility* a reconstruction presents as a probability or as a historical fact" (emphasis original). Sumney's fuller articulation of his own method (20–32) however contains two major problems: 1) Sumney claims that "the letter genre requires us to interpret letters individually. Letters are by their nature occasional and so we cannot assume that any two letters within a corpus address precisely the same or even related issues, problems, or opponents" (21). This must surely be revised in light of the existence of letter collections which are composed as such and which have as their literary goal an effected similarity to the other letters in a corpus. See, e.g., the discussion of Rosenmeyer, *Ancient Epistolary Fictions: The Letter in Greek Literature*. What is needed, rather, is a determination about the nature of the letter in concert with (and *not* separate from) an examination of the literary depictions of the opponents—we cannot assume that it is "occasional" in the sense of having a straightforward correspondence between authors and recipients' situation. As will be shown below, this has been a major methodological flaw in research concerning opponents in pseudepigraphical literature; this leads to the second point. 2) Sumney decides that "this study will not take a stand on the authenticity of the disputed letters within the Pauline corpus. Such decisions are not necessary for the application of our method and have at times been used to identify the opponents of various letters" (31). While we can agree with Sumney that a letter written after Paul's lifetime does not necessarily supply evidence that the opponents of the PE are gnostics, any assessment about the pseudepigraphical nature of the letters *must* inform a judgment of the opponents. Indeed, Sumney acknowledges the potential insufficiency of his method: "Of course, if it becomes clear that these writings are not letters, then the method being used in this study is not wholly applicable" (254 n. 6). How exactly pseudepigraphical letters should be imagined to address audiences, combat opponents, and function more generally must be taken into consideration. Cf. the recognition of the necessity of this type of inquiry by Trevor W. Thompson, "As If Genuine: Interpreting the Pseudepigraphic Second Thessalonians," in *Pseudepigraphie und Verfasserfiktion in frühchristlichen Briefen*, ed. Jörg Frey et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 471–88.

²³³ Lloyd Pietersen, "Despicable Deviants: Labelling Theory and the Polemic of the Pastorals," *Sociology of Religion* 58.4 (1997): 343–52. Here Pietersen argues that "neither historical-critical reconstructions . . . nor more recent literary solutions have proved satisfactory" (343). Pietersen's criticisms of these two types of scholarship are subject to the same broad critique he himself makes. Regarding "historical-critical work," Pietersen alleges that "the conclusions reached lack any real specificity and, more importantly, have been reached without any detailed consideration of what we now know concerning both first century Judaism and early Gnosticism" (344). Concerning "literary approaches," Pietersen claims that they "fail to provide a convincing description of the opponents" (345). Pietersen thinks that Karris is "on the right lines" (344) in identifying the polemic of the PE as stereotyped, but that Karris is *too* cautious in positing identifiable features of the real opponents (345)! It seems that the authors Pietersen reviews either do not say enough or they say too much. The mean, we are to understand, is found in his own appraisal.

²³⁴ Pietersen, *Polemic of the Pastorals*.

²³⁵ Pietersen (2004) attempts to demonstrate that the polemic of the Pastorals should be understood by using labelling theory, which he admits was popular in the 1960s and 1970s and has since given way to social control theory (though he does not explain the reason for this shift, causing one to wonder not only about its currency amongst sociologists but also about its application to an ancient corpus of letters like the PE). Nevertheless, relying on a five-page article by Harold Garfinkel, "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies," *American Journal of Sociology* 61.5 (1956): 420–24. Pietersen offers a modified synthesis of Garfinkel's "components of public denunciation" (which

"the function of the Pastorals is to provide a literary version of a status degradation ceremony whereby previously influential insiders in the communities addressed are transformed into outsiders."²³⁶ Pietersen argues the following:

By definition a status degradation ceremony involves real actors—these cannot just be actors from the past. In this connection the role of Timothy and Titus in the Pastorals is crucial. Paul is absent (1 Tim 3.14; Tit. 3.12) and so Timothy and Titus are exhorted to tackle the opponents. . . . Consequently, if [the Pastorals] are pseudonymous, the status degradation strategy of the Pastorals can only work if Timothy and Titus are still alive and active in leadership.²³⁷

Pietersen, following Richard Bauckham,²³⁸ thus believes that the Pastorals were written during the lifetime of Timothy and Titus, and that "this requires at least their active collusion in the fiction of Paul's authorship, or even their actual involvement in authorship."²³⁹ But this raises an immediate problem: in Pietersen's model, living denouncers (Timothy and Titus) assume the authorial voice of the now dead Paul, thereby addressing dead opponents (Hymenaeus and Alexander) whom he considers "contemporaries of Paul." In an effort to solve this problem, Pietersen points (again with Bauckham) to passages where false teachers will arise in the future (1 Tim 4.1–3; 2 Tim 3.1–5; 4.3–4), presumably thinking that this will provide the necessary connection to the past required for Timothy and Titus's present opponents to be successfully denounced (by analogy with the past opponents of Paul). However, it is unclear why Pietersen

Garfinkel offered as essential components for a "good" or "successful" denunciation [422; of course the *success* of this effort, if it may be identified as a status degradation *ceremony*, cannot be determined from the text of the PE]). However, he fails to mention that Garfinkel himself noted that "Only some of the more obvious structural variables that may be expected to serve as predictors of the characteristics of denunciatory communicative tactics have been mentioned" (424). One is curious to know which other variables might be included in a fuller articulation of this model, and how those might cohere with the PE.

²³⁶ Pietersen, *Polemic of the Pastorals*, 1. For Pietersen, the opponents are a rival tradition of Paulinists who "advocate a form of spirituality informed by a view of Paul as primarily a thaumaturge." He explains: "In describing Paul as a *thaumaturge* I therefore draw attention to Paul's wonder-working, prophecies, glossolalia and visionary experiences" ("Despicable Deviants," 1).

²³⁷ Pietersen, "Despicable Deviants," 35, emphasis original.

²³⁸ Bauckham, "Pseudo-Apostolic Letters."

²³⁹ Pietersen, *Polemic of the Pastorals*, 35.

needs to postulate such a convoluted situation²⁴⁰—if past opponents can function as literary prototypes for the degradation of current opponents, could not also depictions of *former* associates of Paul like Timothy and Titus function as prototypes for current church leaders?²⁴¹ Certainly, as we noted above, Irenaeus and others deftly recognized that the polemic of the Pastorals could be adapted and re-employed in order to define once more the terms of orthodoxy and heresy for new generations of opponents and church leaders.²⁴²

The turn of the century has brought an increasing amount of attention to the gendered rhetoric of the Pastorals, with important implications for the discussion of deviance. In 2003, Jennifer Glancy argued that "the Pastor and his opponents embody conflicting postures of masculinity and the Pastor seeks to undermine the authority of his opponents by employing invective that would have been widely understood as derisive of his opponents' identities as men."²⁴³ Other recent scholarship has joined Glancy in identifying the rhetoric of masculinity and

²⁴⁰ This lack of clarity in Pietersen's reconstruction of the Pastorals' opponents (via the application of a twentieth century sociological model) and its relationship to an admittedly pseudepigraphical corpus of letters is matched by Pietersen's insistence on discovering at every turn a "thaumaturgical Paul," even when he must assume a high degree of historical accuracy for Luke–Acts' depiction of Paul. For instance, he argues that "Luke presents a thoroughly thaumaturgical Paul at Ephesus," assumes that a similar miracle-hungry frenzy possesses the community at Crete, and then concludes that "It appears highly likely to me that we have in this passage [i.e., Acts 19–20] the background to the problems addressed in the Pastorals" (112–113). Later, in the concluding chapter, Pietersen is more explicit about the relationship between Luke–Acts, the Pastorals, and his central thesis that the author of the Pastorals was fighting "a battle for the memory of Paul" (139) against those who remembered Paul primarily as a thaumaturge. "The main evidence for this proposal comes, admittedly, not directly from the Pastorals, but from Acts 19–20. It is the Paul of Acts 19.11–12 who is presented as a thaumaturge *par excellence* at Ephesus . . . I have also argued that Acts 20.17–38 provides important background information for the setting of the Pastorals" (139). However, in the same breath, Pietersen admits that, "It is, of course, rightly maintained that Acts should not be taken as primary evidence for the epistles. . . I wish to argue similarly for the substantial reliability of Acts 19–20 in connection with Paul at Ephesus" (139).

²⁴¹ Indeed, this is the very claim that 1 Timothy 1:16 (cf. 2 Tim 1:13) makes regarding Paul – that he serves as a "prototype" (ὑποτύπωσις).

²⁴² Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 1.3.7 invokes 2 Tim 3:6; 1.24.3 applies 1 Tim 6:20 to the Simonians; Preface to Book 2.1 to those refuted in book 1; cf. 2.14.7. *Adv. haer.* 2.21.2 applies 2 Tim 4:3 to the Valentinians. See Pervo, *The Making of Paul*, 310 n.168. Cf. the arguments of White, "How to Read a Book."

²⁴³ Jennifer A. Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity in the Pastoral Epistles," in *New Testament Masculinities*, ed. Stephen D. Moore Anderson and Janice Capel, SemeiaSt 45 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 235–64.

effeminacy as an important component of the rhetoric against opponents in the Pastorals.²⁴⁴

Glancy locates the opponents *inside* the community to whom the PE are addressed, and argues that they constitute "an actual rather than a hypothetical challenge."²⁴⁵ Though insightful about the role of conventional male gender norms in the construction of ethical ideals in the Pastorals, Glancy slides too easily between claims about the language of the Pastorals,²⁴⁶ which on her reading inscribes certain (Greek and Roman) protocols of masculinity upon the target audience, and claims about the *actual* behavior or self-understanding of the opponents in question. While more attention could be paid to the various ways in which the ideals of women's and men's ethical behavior differ in the PE,²⁴⁷ her point stands that some of the language of the PE could be seen as indicting the Pastor's opponents for certain unmanly activities or qualities. However, the further claim, that the opponents *actually embody* such qualities and the attendant suggestion (in the form of a rhetorical question) that the opponents "refuse(d) to define themselves as men" or saw

²⁴⁴ Marianne Bjelland Kartzow, "Female Gossipers and Their Reputation in the Pastoral Epistles," *Neot* 39.2 (2005): 255–72; Marianne Bjelland Kartzow, *Gossip and Gender: Othering of Speech in the Pastoral Epistles*, BZNW 164 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009); Robert E. Goss and Deborah Krause, "The Pastoral Letters: 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus," in *The Queer Bible Commentary*, ed. Deryn Guest (London: SCM, 2006), 684–92; Zamfir, *Men and Women in the Household of God*; Manuel Villalobos Mendoza, *When Men Were Not Men: Masculinity and Otherness in the Pastoral Epistles*, Bible in the Modern World 62 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2014).

²⁴⁵ Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity," 250. Glancy cites with approval Jouette Bassler's comment that "Cultural norms control the ethical perspective throughout these letters [i.e., the Pastoral Epistles], making it sometimes difficult to determine which admonitions were given because they were an ethical commonplace, and which reflect concrete problems with the community" (ANTC, 63). Nevertheless, she argues that "because of the Pastor's vehement attacks against those whose words disrupt families and seduce women away from the roles he approves, I agree with scholars of widely varying hermeneutical perspectives who argue that the Pastor addresses what he perceives to be a serious threat within the communities he attempts to guide" (Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity," 250).

²⁴⁶ "Given the conventional use of gendered barbs to dismiss the authority of male speakers, I find it more likely that the author uses such language to stain the image of his male opponents by associating their teaching with (what is characterized as) the prattling of old women. Moreover, in instructing Timothy (a surrogate, I have suggested, for male readers) to guard himself against such old wives' tales by training himself for godliness, the Pastor exhibits anxiety about the effects of what he considers effeminate speech on upright Christian men. In this all-male exchange, the use of gender invective has particular valence as a tool for social regulation" (Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity," 255). Here, Glancy is right to articulate the claim of "effeminate speech" in terms of what *he* (i.e., the Pastor) considers effeminate speech. To suggest that "perhaps the Pastor codified his protocol of masculinity . . . out of visceral anxiety arising from the *affect and behaviors* of other Christian men and women" (260, emphasis added) presumes that the Pastor's hyperbolic depictions of the opponents correlate to their actual demeanor, behavior, and self-understanding.

²⁴⁷ See Huizenga, *Philosophers of the Household*, 329–69.

"themselves as embodying, perhaps in response to the gospel, alternative postures of masculinity"²⁴⁸ is impossible to verify.

Jerry Sumney has argued strenuously for a systematic and cautious approach to studying opponents in Paul's letters, the Pastorals included.²⁴⁹ He divides up passages according to the following criteria: "explicit statements, those in which the author speaks directly about the opponents," "allusions," "statements which seem to address opponents, but are indirect, and so more or less oblique references to them" (he specifies further that allusions only qualify as such if they address "an issue raised in explicit statements or other fairly certain allusions," and "affirmations," which are "statements which neither explicitly refer to opponents nor obviously allude to them."²⁵⁰ Sumney, who claims the designation of "letter" implies that it must be read individually without reference to a corpus, even if it was designed to be read in a corpus, studied these letters individually and found three different sets of opponents, one per letter.²⁵¹ For 1 Timothy, Sumney finds opponents who were formerly part of the community who advocated stricter observance of the Law, but were not Gnostics, had no over-realized eschatology, and were not libertines.²⁵² For 2 Timothy, Sumney finds opponents about whom there is so little information that he can only say that they function as negative, antithetical paradigms and that they have an over-realized eschatology.²⁵³ Sumney argues that in Titus one finds a group of Jewish Christians who have their origin in Crete and advocate interpretations of the Law with which the

²⁴⁸ Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity," 261.

²⁴⁹ Sumney, *Servants of Satan*, 253–302; Sumney, "Studying Paul's Opponents: Advances and Challenges."

²⁵⁰ Sumney, *Servants of Satan*, 23.

²⁵¹ Sumney, *Servants of Satan*, 30–32; 302.

²⁵² Sumney, *Servants of Satan*, 277–78.

²⁵³ He writes that "our portrait of them remains only the faded outline of a vague sketch" (*Servants of Satan*, 289–90).

author disagrees.²⁵⁴ While Sumney refrains from speculations and thus offers a somewhat minimalist portrait of the opponents, one is struck that Sumney maintains that the question of authenticity of historical setting is not essential to the method of reconstruction.²⁵⁵ Especially in light of recent work on pseudepigraphy, this position is untenable, for pseudepigrapha require different reading strategies to discern their purpose, function, and the conditions for their reception, and the matter of opponents is central to those determinations.

More recently, and in keeping with the growing trend to read the letters separately, Jens Herzer proposes three different primary targets for the polemic of the Pastorals, corresponding with three different situations for the letters: 2 Timothy deals with Christians, Titus with Jews, and 1 Timothy with Gnostics.²⁵⁶ He argues that "Jüdische Einflüsse der Gegner, wie sie vor allem für den Tit charakteristisch sind, spielen im 1 Tim als solche keine Rolle mehr."²⁵⁷ One major problem for his thesis is 1 Tim 1:7 and the depiction of the opponents as νομοδιδάσκαλοι. Here Herzer is hard-pressed to explain how this term does not indicate some sort of connection to Judaism. He does not reference the only other occurrences of this term in the NT (Luke 5:17, where the word is paired with Pharisees, and Acts 5:23, where it is used of Gamaliel, identified as a Pharisee), but instead suggests that the teachers here seem to have a negative view of the law (and are therefore not Jewish), since the author in 1:8 emphasizes that the law is good.²⁵⁸ Herzer goes on to suggest that the nature of their interaction with the law is left open.²⁵⁹ Though his particular proposal that there are no Jewish elements in the portrayal of 1 Timothy's opponents is

²⁵⁴ Sumney, *Servants of Satan*, 300–301.

²⁵⁵ Sumney, *Servants of Satan*, 31–32.

²⁵⁶ "Juden im Tit, Christen im 2 Tim und schließlich Gnostiker im 1Tim" (Jens Herzer, "Juden–Christen–Gnostiker: Zur Gegnerproblematik der Pastoralbriefe," *Berliner theologische Zeitschrift* 25.1 [2008]: 166).

²⁵⁷ Jens Herzer, "Was ist falsch an der ‚fälschlich so genannten Gnosis‘? Zur Paulusrezeption des Ersten Timotheusbriefes im Kontext seiner Gegnerpolemik," *EC* 5 (2014): 70.

²⁵⁸ Herzer, "Was ist falsch," 78.

²⁵⁹ Herzer, "Was ist falsch," 87–88.

not compelling, his observation that the Jewish aspects are especially prominent in the opposition in Titus is apt.²⁶⁰ And yet, Herzer's approach suffers from an attempt to correlate too quickly particular aspects of the opposition in a given letter with a broad and falsely delineated religious category. His determination, based on 2 Tim 2:17, that the opposition in 2 Tim is distinctly Christian²⁶¹ presupposes rather than demonstrates a clear distinction between Christian and Jewish or Christian and Gnostic. This approach also downplays other kinds of opposition present in 2 Tim.²⁶²

Engelmann continues the interpretive trajectory of Herzer, and emphasizes some differences between the Pastorals regarding the false teachers, which is one of her arguments for her effort to read the letters as discrete compositions by different authors.²⁶³ However, it is not always the clear that the differences are significant for a determination of whether or not the letters should be read as a corpus or not (as Engelmann avers).²⁶⁴ For instance, she observes that there are no named opponents in Titus, in contrast to 1 and 2 Timothy. The observation is correct, but why this is such a glaring difference is not so clear. Similarly, she notes that only 2 Tim 2:15 uses the word of ἀποστρέφειν with a personal subject, while in 2 Tim 4:4 and Titus 1:14 it connotes a turning away from truth. But this does not account for the fact, as I will demonstrate in ch. 1, that the Pastor uses spatial language with regard to the opponents in all three letters.

More substantively, she reads the γενεαλογίαι in Titus 3:9 as referring to a Jewish approach to

²⁶⁰ Here Herzer follows Christine Gerber, "Antijudaismus und Apologetik: Eine Lektüre des Titusbriefes vor dem Hintergrund der Apologie Contra Apionem des Flavius Josephus," in *Josephus und das Neue Testament: wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen II. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum, 25-28 Mai 2006, Greifswald*, ed. Christfried Böttrich, Torsten Reiprich, and Jens Herzer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 335–63.

²⁶¹ Herzer, "Juden–Christen–Gnostiker: Zur Gegnerproblematik der Pastoralbriefe," 154–56.

²⁶² For instance, there is no indication that "Alexander the bronze-worker" (Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ χαλκεὺς) in 2 Tim 4:14 is Christian or even connected to the opposition represented by Hymenaeus and Philetus. Furthermore, there is nothing distinctively Christian about those "who sneak into houses" in 2 Tim 3:6.

²⁶³ Engelmann, *Unzertrennliche Drillinge?*, 364–432.

²⁶⁴ See her conclusions regarding the modes and language used for argumentation against opponents, for instance (*Unzertrennliche Drillinge?*, 429–32).

genealogies, seen in light of the connection to "legal battles" in Titus 3:9 and the "Jewish myths" of Titus 1:14, but locates the *γενεαλογίαι* of 1 Tim 1:4 within a "gnostizing milieu" on account of their adjective "endless" and the association with *μῦθοι* without the adjective "Jewish."²⁶⁵ While it seems unlikely that these terms in 1 Timothy must be read as reflecting such a milieu, as with Herzer's observations, Engelmann is correct to note the Jewish character of the opponents in Titus. Even so, the conclusion that these differences prove the impossibility of common authorship overstates the differences between the letters. Furthermore, it falsely presumes that these emphases are in fact distinctive and can account for all the details in a given letter.

The most recent treatment of the opponents in 1 Timothy and 2 Timothy (Titus is excluded from his study) comes from the monograph by Dillon Thornton. Any initial professed ambivalence about the author's identity dissolves in the course of the study, for Thornton deals with what "Paul" says and treats the named opponents as real individuals, and says that Paul knows the named opponents "personally" and that they are "men with whom he is acquainted."²⁶⁶ Thornton largely follows the method set out by Sumney, with minor differences in judgment.²⁶⁷ As a result, he presumes that the question of authorship is ultimately not determinative for his study. Because he tacitly assumes these letters' authenticity, he seeks to construct a "composite sketch of the ideology of the opponents in Ephesus."²⁶⁸ He assumes that these two letters were sent to someone in Ephesus, but misses the real import of the problem of pseudonymity.²⁶⁹ In so doing, Thornton elides critical questions of major significance, such as to which letters the author

²⁶⁵ Engelmann, *Unzertrennliche Drillinge?*, 400–408.

²⁶⁶ Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God*, 239.

²⁶⁷ Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God*, 23, 29–31.

²⁶⁸ Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God*, 5.

²⁶⁹ "Whether doubly authentic or doubly pseudonymous, the destination of both letters was most likely Ephesus" (*Hostility in the House of God*, 11–12).

would have had access if he were not Paul,²⁷⁰ or what the circumstances of these letters' reception in Ephesus would have looked like if they were not sent by Paul to Timothy. Perhaps unsurprising given his methodology, Thornton finds a unified group of opponents resident in Ephesus who were an active part of the Christian community there, and 1 and 2 Timothy constitute advice to Timothy or someone in the community for how to deal with these opponents.²⁷¹ He describes their teaching as "an erroneous eschatological position that derived from the complexity of Paul's teaching."²⁷²

Determinations about authenticity are in no way irrelevant to questions about how to reconstruct "opponents," but are rather necessarily interconnected.²⁷³ While, as demonstrated above, most scholars acknowledge that both the portraiture of the opponents and the stereotyped polemic participate in the conventions of Hellenistic philosophical and rhetorical modes of debate,²⁷⁴ too many fail to appreciate the complexity of working with pseudepigraphical texts by describing the opponents of the fictitious Pastoral Epistles as real individuals to whom he is directly responding, or, like Sumney, not taking this factor into consideration at all, as a matter of

²⁷⁰ In what seems like a full embrace of a "synchronic" (his term at 13 n. 15) analysis, Thornton even decides to draw on disputed letters of Paul: "Because I understand 1 and 2 Timothy to be written either by the Apostle Paul or by an early interpreter of Paul, I will draw freely from the full Pauline corpus—undisputed letters and disputed letters—when doing comparative work" (*Hostility in the House of God*, 13). He cites Johnson, AB, 98 for a comparable model.

²⁷¹ (*Hostility in the House of God*, 264–65).

²⁷² Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God*, 265.

²⁷³ A point that Merz also punctuates: "The starting point of every modern theory of the exposition of texts should be the basic insight of form-criticism that each text must be expounded in keeping with the laws governing its literary genre. However, the predominant mode of exposition of the pseudo-Pauline texts and other early Christian pseudepigrapha does not do justice to this principle" ("The Fictitious Self-Exposition of Paul," 113).

²⁷⁴ E.g., Sumney, *Servants of Satan*, 25. However, Marshall, ICC, 43, for instance, argues concerning the charges of immorality, greed, and teaching for money that, "There need be no doubt that this description is based on observation of the opponents, although some scholars have argued that it is nothing more than a stock blackening of character typical of ancient polemic." He cites here Karris, "Background and Significance." and Ceslas Spicq, *Les Épîtres Pastorales*, 4th ed., ÉBib (Paris: J. Gabalda & Cie, 1969), 86–88.

principle.²⁷⁵ Instead of appreciating the attendant complexities of the phenomena of pseudepigraphy and cultivating a more sophisticated hermeneutic, some take recourse to reading strategies developed in studies of the genuine Paulines, such as the technique known as "mirror-reading."²⁷⁶ This technique may indeed be employed to some benefit when examining the homologoumena. However (and this is what many scholars do not take into account), a determination about the authenticity of a text *must* have an impact on scholars assess the relationship between the opponents' depictions and their existence or "realness." However difficult describing the opponents of Paul in Galatians may be, the letter's authenticity, namely, that it was written by Paul and received by the ἐκκλησίαι of Galatia, allows for the crucial

²⁷⁵ A refreshing counter-example to this generality is Andrie du Toit: "The depiction of these opponents is a construct of the author. We should therefore differentiate between the 'encoded opponents' and their real-life counterparts" (404). In conclusion, he writes that, "the bottom line is that vilificatory texts should be approached with much caution, and that every text should be scrutinized individually and within its own linguistic and social context. Every suspected historical clue should be carefully checked and, if possible, double-checked by other evidence. To use these texts naïvely on the informational level is to abuse them" ("Vilification as a Pragmatic Device in Early Christian Epistolography," *BibInt* 75.3 [1994]: 412).

²⁷⁶ John M. G. Barclay argues for tight methodological controls on the practice of "mirror-reading" the polemical portions of the *Corpus Paulinum* in his article ("Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case," *JSNNT* 31 [1987]: 73–93). Barclay articulates three major problems with the endeavor (74–79) followed by four "pitfalls" of the method (79–83). The three major problems are as follows: 1. "Paul is not directly addressing the opponents in Galatians, but he is talking to the Galatians about the opponents" (74). 2. Galatians "is no calm and rational conversation that we are overhearing, but a fierce piece of polemic in which Paul feels his whole identity and mission are threatened and therefore responds with all the rhetorical and theological powers at his command" (75). Along with this problem, Barclay mentions an attendant possibility, "namely that Paul may have seriously misunderstood his opponents" (76). 3. The "linguistic problem of knowing only one partner in a particular conversation" (76). The four pitfalls are as follows: 1. *Undue selectivity* of passages from which to reconstruct the opponents' position. 2. *Over-interpretation* occasioned by assuming that "every statement by Paul is a rebuttal of an equally vigorous counterstatement by his opponents" (79). 3. *Mishandling* (the distorting effects of) polemics. 4. *Latching onto particular words and phrases* as direct echoes of an opponent's vocabulary.

According to Barclay, these problems and pitfalls are mirrored by seven criteria for identifying the content of the opponents' teaching (84–86): 1. *Type of utterance*: a. assertion, b. denial, c. command, d. prohibition. All of these are attended by poles of inference from which one may deduce things about Paul's opinion. 2. *Tone* (Barclay claims that Paul has "a variety of ways" of issuing a statement "with emphasis and urgency" but does not articulate these). 3. *Frequency* as indicator of what is important for Paul. 4. *Clarity* of words and phrases is a prerequisite (however, one may note that this an essential point of debate for scholars!). 5. *Unfamiliarity* – an unfamiliar motif may be a reflection of a particular feature of the situation. 6. *Consistency* – we should assume one opponent unless there is reason to posit more. 7. *Historical plausibility* – lastly we can bring in evidence from "contemporary men and movements" which may corroborate the findings. Barclay follows (86–90) with a summary application of the method as he has defined it and a brief list of results according to the epistemological hierarchy he has borrowed from J. Louis Martyn (from "Certain or Virtually Certain" to "Incredible").

assumption that it addresses a real and particularized set of social and theological problems, even if the historiographical reality is that even in the case of the homologoumena we always have to navigate the exigencies of Paul's one-sided account of the situation.

By contrast, the Pastorals were never *sent* as letters to anyone. Unlike some key passages in the homologoumena that give us some sense of how Paul's letters traveled (Rom 16:1–2; Phil 2:25–30) and were read by a community (1 Thess 5:27), it is not clear that the Pastorals ever circulated 1) as individual letters or 2) independently of a *Corpus Paulinum*.²⁷⁷ With texts of dubious authorship (i.e., pseudepigrapha) or unknown recipients we are thus on thinner ice in terms of what we can know about the opponents of a given text, or how the text really goes about addressing the "real" world. What we can know and say with a degree of probable historical certainty is minimal. The traditional sensibilities of narrative criticism should be employed in reading any text that is actively trading in the currency of epistolary fiction. If there is neither the historical Paul, Timothy, nor Titus behind the Pastor's crafted portraits, it is reasonable to conclude that the highly stylized depictions of the opponents do not necessarily correspond *in a straightforward manner* to real individuals or theological positions.²⁷⁸ However, just as there is surely some author penning these letters, there may indeed be perpetrators of the kind of teaching against which the Pastorals inveigh. The difference is that while we can certainly say that some author wrote the Pastorals, and that these epistles were read and thus participated in shaping the legacy of Paul for Christians in the early second century and beyond, we cannot speak with confidence about the existence (or non-existence) of opponents named Alexander or Hymenaeus

²⁷⁷ Albert Edward Barnett, *Paul Becomes a Literary Influence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), 251.

²⁷⁸ Though all theological argument is necessarily the product of a creative effort, the payoff is a due recognition that the pseudepigrapher is constantly negotiating the portrayal of Paul, Timothy, Titus, and the opponents (just as Paul would have), but at one remove further. Concomitantly, one cannot assume that the pseudepigrapher is simply packaging his own theological and social agenda in the fictive wrappings of Paul's persona. One may reconstruct an implied author, but the actual author is mostly lost to the historical and literary critic.

(for instance),²⁷⁹ nor that the earliest readers would understand them as ciphers for some other real opponent about whom they know.²⁸⁰ Therefore, attention should be focused on the demonstrable (because depicted) qualities attributed to the opponents of the PE and their representative function.

This suggests that we must reconsider the ways in which we can observe the Pastor at work in his construction of opponents, and probe further into what this tells us about his social location, the intellectual world in which his language may be set, and his literary relationship to the homologoumena. His interventions in the reading of Paul are especially important. As Annette Merz puts it, "the basic error of the contemporary hermeneutics of the pseudepigrapha is the refusal to take with true seriousness the claim of these texts to be orthonymous."²⁸¹ We must ask, therefore, how the Pastor addresses the topics of deviance and opponents with one of his eyes turned toward the same matters in Paul's letters. Only through explicit attention to and contrast with Paul's other letters will we be able to assess the nature of the Pastor's creative enterprise.

2. Rhetoric and Reality: Reorienting the Study of Opponents

As we have seen, all readers of the Pastorals, regardless of their analysis of the corpus theory or the question authorship, note the significant attention in these three letters to characterizations of

²⁷⁹ As does, e.g., Thornton, *Hostility in the House of God*, 239.

²⁸⁰ The fact that the Pastor interweaves references to co-workers and opponents who have no literary history in the extant letters of Paul (such as, respectively, Onesiphoros in 2 Tim 1:15, 4:19 and Phygelos and Hermogenes in 2 Tim 1:15) with co-workers who do (such as Prisca and Aquila at 2 Tim 4:19) is, to my mind, a further indication of the ultimately fictive depiction of both opponents and co-workers. Just as surely as the first readers of the PE are not meant to think of the names "Prisca and Aquila" as corresponding to people in their own day, nor can we assume that real individuals named Phygelos and Hermogenes corresponded to opponents of whom they were aware.

²⁸¹ Merz, "Fictitious Self-Exposition," 115.

opponents.²⁸² Judgments about the letters' circumstances of composition and their relationship to each other and to the other Pauline letters all have profound implications for how one interprets opponents in the PE. Is there one group of opponents lurking behind three different letters? Can we sufficiently discern their beliefs in order to locate them within what little is known about the diversity of the developing Christian movements? It is my suggestion that focusing on the language used to construct the depiction of opponents allows us to chart a path between the one extreme of over-emphasizing differences between these three letters and the other of downplaying differences altogether. As we navigate between these two extremes, we need not assume that the teachings opposed constitute one uniform "megaheresy" or that there is one discrete group addressed in each letter, each with a coherent ideology. Similarly, we need not assume that either thematic differences or variations between the letters mean that these letters are written by different authors. The language and arguments the Pastor uses to characterize the opposition suggest an author who crafted three paraenetic Pauline letters at around the same time.²⁸³ He did this in order to address perceived and potential theological aberrance and misinterpretation of Paul in the wider Christian community known to him, perhaps in Asia Minor²⁸⁴ or Rome.²⁸⁵ By

²⁸² Scholars like Lewis Donelson see the battle with opponents as the *raison d'être* for the Pastorals as pseudepigrapha: "Without a doubt it was the battle with heresy which moved our author to pseudonymity" (*Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 59).

²⁸³ By "paraenetic" I mean that these letters exhibit those features typically found in other letters from superiors to their subordinates, in both private and public capacities. Ps. Libanius, *Epist. char.* 5, defines the paraenetic address in letters as follows: "The paraenetic style is that in which we exhort someone by urging him to pursue something or to avoid something. Paraenesis is divided into two parts, encouragement (προτροπή) and dissuasion (ἀποτροπή). Some also call it the advisory style, but do incorrectly, for paraenesis (παράνεσις) differs from advice (συμβουλή). For paraenesis is hortatory speech that does not admit of a counter-statement. . . " (Text and trans. from Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, SBLSPS 19 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1988). Scholars have often recognized these letters as containing paraenetic features. Cf. Pervo, *The Making of Paul*, 84; Jerome D. Quinn, "Paraenesis and the Pastoral Epistles: Lexical Observations Bearing on the Nature of the Sub-Genre and Soundings on Its Role in Socialization and Liturgies," *Semeia* 50 (1990): 189–210; Abraham J. Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1.407–30.

²⁸⁴ Dennis Ronald MacDonald pronounced judgment on the matter with conviction: "they undoubtedly were written from Asia Minor" (*The Legend and the Apostle: The Battle for Paul in Story and Canon*, 54). Arland Hultgren

exploring how the Pastor's language of deviance and opposition carries forward and accents aspects of Paul's writings or reshapes them for his own purposes, and with a view to their interconnectedness, we shall explore how the Pastor's discourse about deviance is both grounded in his reading of a Pauline corpus and reflects some adaptations and extensions of that discourse that are consistent across the three letters.

The question of the epistles' unity has been an integral part of the scholarly conversation regarding opponents, and vice-versa. Scholars have frequently cautioned against assuming that the literary boundaries between the three letters do not matter and all references to opponents can be amalgamated to identify one particular form of deviance.²⁸⁶ However, one may acknowledge

links the Pastorals to Ephesus primarily by establishing connections between the named individuals and the place. He does this for eighteen of the twenty-eight individuals named in the PE (besides Paul himself), and hypothesizes that three more are also connected to Ephesus (*1-2 Timothy, Titus*, ACNT [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984], 21–29). He notes that a potential problem arises if the epistles originate in Ephesus, since Timothy himself is located in Ephesus (1 Tim 1:3), but notes that the problem is resolved within the letters themselves, because Timothy is called away to Rome (2 Tim 4:9, 11, 21), and Titus too is called away from Crete (Tit 3:12) to join Paul in Nicopolis. Arguably, a later generation could read these letters as having been received in Ephesus and Crete, and copies made to be stored in Ephesus (ACNT, 24–25). Hultgren is followed in this judgment by Pervo, *The Making of Paul*, 83 n. 170.

²⁸⁵ Jerome D. Quinn & William C. Wacker lean toward Roman provenance, writing that "the Christian congregations in Rome...were the actual models for the paradigmatic congregations of the PE" (*The First and Second Letters to Timothy: A New Translation with Notes and Commentary*, ECC [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], 22). Andreas Lindemann observes that the absence of the PE from Marcion's canon might serve as counter-evidence to the hypothesis of a Roman origin (*Paulus im ältesten Christentum: Das Bild des Apostels und die Rezeption der paulinischen Theologie in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Marcion*, BHT 58 [Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1979], 149 n. 119).

²⁸⁶ Such warnings have come from both sides of the authenticity debate. This method is strongly condemned by Helmut Koester, who wrote that "the attempts to construct a coherent picture of the heretics that are mentioned in these letters are fundamentally and methodologically wrong" (*Introduction to the New Testament: History and Literature of Early Christianity*, 2nd ed. [New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995], 306). With different assumptions, Johnson, AB, 72–73, points out that study of the opponents has been complicated by the tendency to understand the opponents as a monolith, lurking behind all three letters. He notes that the reliance on polemic is taken to be "uncharacteristic of the authentic Paul," though he considers this observation "only partly true, since 1 Timothy does engage in substantive theological refutation at least four times (1:8–11; 4:3–5, 7–8; 6:5–10)," and Paul too can engage in invective. He cites as examples 2 Cor 11:13–15; Gal 5:12; 6:13; Rom 16:17–18; Phil 3:2, 18–19. This is true, of course, but it misses the point, which is that Paul includes theological refutation *and* invective (though less frequently and extensively), whereas the Pastor utilizes invective and very little theological refutation. However, Johnson does concede that "what is distinctive about the polemic in these letters is its pervasiveness and—especially in 1 and 2 Timothy—the literary function it plays." Curiously enough, though in an earlier article Johnson chides other scholars for considering the Pastorals "en bloc" (5), after his treatment of 2 Tim and the Hellenistic philosophers he deems worthy for comparison, a brief third section of the article deals with 1 Tim and Titus *together* ("II Timothy and the Polemic Against False Teachers," 22–25). He writes, "We must recognize first the obvious and important differences

that slightly different elements are highlighted in each letter without having to conclude that the three letters are completely independent of one another. For instance, there is little in 2 Timothy that suggests "Jewish" opposition per se, though Titus makes explicit reference to "Jewish myths" (Titus 1:14) and to the nefarious activities of "those of the circumcision" (Titus 1:10), and 1 Timothy envisions trouble from "those who wish to be teachers of the law" (1 Tim 1:7). However, this does not mean that the author is responding to dramatically different, real scenarios with each of these letters.²⁸⁷ Rather, the stronger argument is that he produces a diverse portrait of theological opposition, not only across the letters but within particular letters, in order to present a theological foil against which the singularity of Pauline authority can be set. There does not need to be one set of opponents for the three letters, just as there does not need to be one set of opponents in the individual letters. For example, 1 Timothy paints the picture broadly enough that scholars have been able to depict the opponents at times as "Jewish," on the one hand, and a decidedly non-Jewish opposition, namely Marcion, on the other.

Looking at the Pastor as a Pauline reader, we can appreciate that he would have known Paul as a man with many opponents and that controversy and all manner of difficulties had been prominent in his ministry.²⁸⁸ The Pastor learned from the homologoumena that the historical-

between these letters and II Timothy" [22]). In contrast to his later work on the PE, in this article Johnson maintains the distinction between "the author of the Pastorals" and "the Paul of I or II Corinthians" (1) and refers to the writer of the Pastorals as "the author" (4,10). Johnson's contention that 2 Timothy should be studied as literarily distinct from 1 Timothy and Titus can, however, be seen in the title and throughout the article. Häfner, "Das Corpus Pastorale als literarisches Konstrukt," 264 argues that one can indeed derive a consistent picture of one set of opponents. He argues that "[dass] ist es möglich, die verschiedenen Aussagen unter dem Etikett »judenchristliche Gnosis« zu einem Gesamtbild zusammenzufassen." Cf. further his comments at "Nützlich zur Belehrung" (2 Tim 3,16): *Die Rolle der Schrift in den Pastoralbriefen im Rahmen der Paulusrezeption*, Herders biblische Studien 25 (Freiburg: Herder, 2000), 22–41.

²⁸⁷ As proposed by Herzer, "Juden–Christen–Gnostiker: Zur Gegnerproblematik der Pastoralbriefe."

²⁸⁸ As C. K. Barrett memorably put it, "There is no safer historical proposition about Paul than that his career, and the letters through which his career is known to us, were deeply marked by controversy" ("Pauline Controversies in the Post-Pauline Period," *NTS* 20.3 [1974]: 229). He goes on to say that "the Pastorals represent him as engaged in

epistolary Paul used various strategies against opponents, and that no single portrait of opponents can be seen across the homologoumena, but rather a range of different kinds of opposition. The inclusion of theological opponents in these letters is thus very much in line with what we can imagine was an impulse to make these letters seem genuine. Regardless of whatever stark differences the Pastorals may have with Paul's letters, making opponents a central concern in these letters might reasonably be considered an act of attempted verisimilitude. Fictive names are not used merely to feign authenticity but also to indicate a key concept in the Pastorals, namely, that people only have two options with regard to Pauline tradition. These figures can stand as negative examples, like Hymenaeus and Alexander, or as positive examples, like Timothy, Titus, and Onesiphorus.²⁸⁹ This departure from Pauline practice in naming his opponents reveal that the Pastor was not only creating verisimilitude, but also engaging in "self"-emendation and expansion. By adding new techniques to "Paul's" repertoire for dealing with opponents, the Pastor sought to expand the ways in which the "Paul" of the emerging *Corpus Paulinum* could be read.

The opponents of the Pastorals serve a literary function, insofar as they are foils for the ideals set forth by the Pastor.²⁹⁰ But were they "real?" And was the Pastor writing for a "real" situation? This question is often answered in rather simplistic or hyperbolic terms. Some scholars affirm that these texts have in mind real opponents belonging to concrete situations that the Pastorals were meant to address.²⁹¹ Others understand the opponents to play a representative

constant and violent controversy" (240). Barret is correct on this point; however, he downplays the fact that Paul is also a lightning rod for controversy in Acts ("Acts avoids the controversial element in Paul's career").

²⁸⁹ Zmijewski, "Die Pastoralbriefe als pseudepigraphische Schriften—Beschreibung, Erklärung, Bewertung," 115–16.

²⁹⁰ See the recent exploration of the literary function of opponents in Tsuji, "Persönliche Korrespondenz des Paulus."

²⁹¹ Häfner, "Polemik in den Pastoralbriefen," 322; Karris, "Background and Significance," 563 n. 58; Philip H. Towner, *The Goal of Our Instruction: The Structure of Theology and Ethics in the Pastoral Epistles*, JSNTSup 34 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 25, 44–45.

function.²⁹² Those who understand the letters as a unity have frequently drawn together elements from all three letters in order to create one group of opponents. The operative assumption is that even though the Pastor writes three letters to two addressees, the opponents are in fact the same throughout, even though different names are given to the opponents depending on the letter.²⁹³ The tendency to read the opponents as a single group addressed across the three letters has been criticized by those who think that the distinctiveness of each letter must be emphasized, and that the cumulative depiction of opponents in one letter should not be applied to the other two.²⁹⁴ One must agree that a rather odd amalgamation of ideas is applied to the opponents if the letters are read as though the epistolary demarcations of the three letters do not in fact signal appreciable differences. For instance, assuming one discrete group, Michael Goulder concluded from a reading of the letters that the opponents are "Jewish-Christians," "charismatics," "Cephas-ites," quasi-gnostic, and "visionaries."²⁹⁵

Part of the problem with this debate lies in the categories applied to the analysis of the situation as reconstructed. Some scholars, for instance, contrast "historical" or "real situations" and "nonhistorical" or "fictitious" in their depictions of how opponents are present in the

²⁹² Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 65–67.

²⁹³ Andreas Lindemann suggests that the use of so many names in the PE has a literary function: "der Vf wollte Paulus als intensiv tätigen und in vielerlei Verbindungen stehenden Missionar und 'Lehrer der Völker' zeichnen" (*Paulus im ältesten Christentum*, 48).

²⁹⁴ The most thorough critique of the corpus theory to date, including but not restricted to the problem of opponents, may be found in Engelman, *Unzertrennliche Drillinge?*, 10–105.

²⁹⁵ ("Pastor's Wolves," 243, 244, 255, 248, 250). Goulder's conclusion is astonishing for its incredible detail: "The wolves are Jewish Christians, and they are as we should expect, keen to press the Law and its traditional interpretations on the Pastor's Gentile congregations. But they are not 'normative' Jews. They are members of a charismatic Christian movement, with a key element the claim to visions of God and his court. Their visionaries have seen the Throne, and have dilated upon the aeons, the extensions of God, to such an extent that the Pastor can imply that they are polytheists. They have traced the relationship between these aeons in a proto-gnostic myth which seems to be similar to the first part of the Barbeliot myth; and they used the word γνῶσις of their experiences. The driving force behind these visions was in part the traditional Ezekiel–Enoch type aspiration to pierce the firmament; and in part it was the quest for a Christology. As with the Barbeliots, one of the primary aeons was called Christ; and as with the Ebionites, he had been quite distinct from the human Jesus, and had possessed him only from the baptism to the crucifixion" ("Pastor's Wolves," 256).

Pastorals.²⁹⁶ It is too often assumed that "real" opponents must mean one identifiable group with a reconstructable set of beliefs, either in a given letter or for all three together. It is also assumed that "real" is in conflict with the hypothesis that the opponents serve a representative function.²⁹⁷ While some formulations of the paradigmatic function theory do suppose a kind of catch-all approach for whatever heresies might arise,²⁹⁸ it is important to stipulate that "real" opponents need not mean concrete individuals who stand just "behind" the figures of Phygellus or Hymenaeus (2 Tim 2:17). The opposition can be very "real" without imagining that these letters would somehow address that opposition in a direct or immediate way. Theoretical and methodological advances in the study of pseudepigraphic texts would suggest that requiring a simple "yes" or "no" answer for the question of whether the opponents are real is ill-conceived, for one must identify what "real" means in cases like these, and what may be said about the relationship between the rhetorical construction of opponents and their actual beliefs or practices.²⁹⁹

While the Pastor undoubtedly crafts his opponents in such a way as to be plausible to his readers, the "true" identity of the opponents (whether their real names or their particular

²⁹⁶ Towner, *The Goal of Our Instruction: The Structure of Theology and Ethics in the Pastoral Epistles*, 44–45.

²⁹⁷ Häfner argues that such intensive polemic can only be employed to address a real, concrete situation ("Polemik in den Pastoralbriefen," 322).

²⁹⁸ The original formulation of Dibelius-Conzelmann imagines the polemic of the Pastorals as an "apologetisches Vademecum für alle möglichen antignostischen Kämpfe" (*Pastoralbriefe*, 53). Similarly, Helmut Koester suggests that the Pastor "wanted to point to typical phenomena of heresy in general" so that the church leader would be "equipped with the ability to identify heresies of whatever kind" (*Introduction to the New Testament: History and Literature of Early Christianity*, 2.306). Koester goes on to suggest the Pastor "crystallized a variety of criteria" that "rarely describe the contents of heretical teaching but consist of formal categories: disputations, contradictions, and controversies, and the refusal to submit to the demands of a healthy Christian morality" (2.306–307). He concludes by saying that the Pastorals "are designed as a handbook, a manual for the church leader, enabling him to identify dangerous teachings and to reject them without having to enter into costly discussions of subtle theological arguments" (2.307). Ultimately, this fails to appreciate the variety of specific issues presupposed in the Pastorals and at the same time overdetermine the degree to which "criteria" are really "crystallized" by the Pastor. The criteria mentioned are hardly the stuff of a manual or a handbook.

²⁹⁹ Scholars generally do recognize the inherent difficulty in surmising the identity of opponents, especially in the light of polemic. E.g., Sumney, *Servants of Satan*, 25.

associations with other historical movements, such as, e.g., Proto-Montanism)³⁰⁰ in the Pastoral Epistles is lost to us. But this is not because their "true" identity has been shrouded by the artful hand of the Pastor in hyperbolic accusations and the ideological construction of the imagined "other," even though the Pastor's sometimes-alarmist rhetoric has certainly contributed to the historiographical problem. Rather, their true identity is lost to us because they were "real" in such a way that would never yield to traditional methods of historical analysis to begin with. They will never be fully identifiable because there is no solid "they" that can be known. Certainly, real individuals must have presented some kind of identifiable positions with which the Pastor disagreed vehemently. But those individuals were not likely named Alexander, Hymenaeus, or Philetus.³⁰¹ Nor need they have been a coherent group that would have been identifiable by the first readers of the Pastorals. If scholars are correct in hypothesizing that these letters were written into an emerging *Corpus Paulinum*, then the purpose of the opponents, in addition to fitting within a broad effort at Pauline portraiture, would have been exemplary and cautionary. These individuals stand in as the characters in the epistolary drama set out by the Pastor, even if, and this was certainly the case, there were real people with whom the Pastor must have disagreed about the nature of resurrection (2 Tim 2:17), the problem of food and marriage (1 Tim 4:1–5), and how one should relate to "those of the circumcision" (Titus 1:10), to name only a few.

These observations are not a counsel of despair. Rather, they are an attempt to come to terms with the exigencies and epistemological limits of literary-historical research. The Pastor's depictions of opponents still have much to tell us. For instance, they suggest that the people with

³⁰⁰ See J. Massyngberde Ford, "Note on Proto-Montanism in the Pastoral Epistles," *NTS* 17.3 (1971): 338–46.

³⁰¹ Lindemann assumes that real individuals do stand behind these names, even if they need not be alive at the time of writing (*Paulus im ältesten Christentum*, 48 n. 32).

whom the Pastor disagreed must have included other Paulinists,³⁰² a category including but probably not limited to others from the intersecting and ever-widening circles of Christ-believers in the early Roman Empire, those of higher socioeconomic privilege, those who engaged in speculative research, those who thought celibacy preferable, those who found profit in "Jewish myths" or "endless genealogies," if not in the Pastor's polemical designations of them.³⁰³ These depictions signal, via a kind of literary bricolage, what issues were of importance to the Pastor, what kinds of challenges he perceived to face Pauline communities, and what he perceived to be the most effective way for meeting these challenges. The depiction of deviance in the Pastorals can give insight into the theological proclivities and rhetorical capacities of our author, even if it does not reveal as much about the opponents as we might like.³⁰⁴ These letters reveal an author adept at characterizing theological threat and using Paul's own letters as a part of that process. Consequently, while the attempt to identify opponents and their alignment with particular ideas and tendencies of better-known theological groups is the standard approach, the emphasis in this study will be on what the author's rhetoric, the extent of his familiarity with contemporary intellectual and rhetorical culture and medical practice, the ideologies of disease that guide his use

³⁰² Contra Karris, whose insistence on a single, unifying heresy leads him to reject the idea that there are other Paulinists in view, even though he cannot offer any greater precision as to their identity: "The one thing that seems to be certain is that although we do not know much about the exact nature of the heresy and cannot identify it, it is a 'real' heresy, i.e., the elements of the heresy are not concocted and attacked by the author of the Pastorals as possible aberrations of Paul's teaching. Nor are the opponents the fictitious Paulinists who espouse these aberrations" (Karris, "Background and Significance," 563 n. 58).

³⁰³ In a similar vein of argument, Barrett wrote that "Judaism, legalism, mythology, and gnosis are lumped together in a way that suggests rather that the author was concerned to omit no heresy he had heard of than that he wished, or was able, to analyse, sub-divide, and classify. Error was a mark of the last days" ("Pauline Controversies in the Post-Pauline Period," 240–41).

³⁰⁴ Acts offers an analogous situation. We know, for instance, from the homologoumena that Paul had a rocky relationship with Cephas (cf. Gal 2:11–15), but the author of Luke-Acts portrays Paul and Peter in harmony and cooperation, while Paul's opponents are instead Jews who hound him from city to city. This tells us something about the literary and theological proclivities of the author of Luke-Acts. In later literature, the imagined relationship between Peter and Paul becomes a battleground of sorts for competing ideologies and social groups, with some valorizing the former and demonizing the latter (Ps. Clementine *Homilies*), and others portraying Paul as an unparalleled hero, with Peter cast as the distorter of the truth (Marcion).

of medical metaphors, and the nature of his relationship with the authentic letters of Paul can tell us about the depiction of opponents in the Pastoral Epistles.

B. Approach, Contributions, Trajectory

1. The Approach and Contributions of This Dissertation

Scholarship has tended to focus on exegetical analysis of the "opponents passages" in order to convey a comprehensive view of these individuals, their beliefs, and how the Pastor dealt with them.³⁰⁵ By contrast, my dissertation focuses primarily on the modes of portraiture and the rhetoric of deviance that the Pastor utilizes, with an emphasis on his pathologization of deviance that cuts across all three letters with consistent language, topoi, logic, and purpose. I analyze these phenomena in order to discover and describe new aspects of the Pastor's rhetorical strategy that have been previously unappreciated or under-appreciated. Recognizing and reckoning with these literary habits, argumentative tactics, and interpretive procedures builds toward a new understanding of the Pastor and his place in an emerging early Christian literary culture, one that was deeply invested in and influenced by the forms of discourse and literary production of their

³⁰⁵ E.g., Michael Theobald counts seventeen instances of the author referencing opponents, and on his count there is an increase in references as one proceeds from Titus to 1 Tim to 2 Tim (his ordering): "17-mal kommt der Autor in der Brieftrias auf Gegner zuspochen: Tit 1,11b-d; 3,9-11; 1 Tim 1,3f.6f; 1,19f; 4,7a; 6,3-5; 6,10b; 6,20f; 2 Tim 1,15; 2,14-21.23-26; 3,6-9.13; 4,3f.14f. Es fällt auf, dass die Anzahl der Bezugnahmen von Brief zu Brief anwachsen (Tit: 2-mal; 1 Tim: 6-mal; 2 Tim: 7-mal)" ("Glauben statt Grübeln: Zum Anti-Intellektualismus der Pastoralbriefe," 6 n. 5). Cf. the lists of Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 65: "The passages in the Pastorals devoted to the controversy with false teachers are as follows: 1 Tim 4:1-10; 2 Tim 3:1-9; Tit 1:10-16; 1 Tim 1:3-11; 6:3-5, 20f; 2 Tim 2:14, 23; 3:13; 4:3, 4; Tit 3:9-11; in addition to these are a few personal remarks in 1 Tim 1:19, 20; 2 Tim 1:15 and 2:16-18" and that of Karris, "Background," 551 n. 9: "The polemical passages in the Pastorals are: 1 Tim 1:3-11; 4:1-7; 6:3-5, 20-21; 2 Tim 2:14-4:5, Tit 1:10-16; 3:8-9." Sumney, *"Servants of Satan,"* 253-302, surveys the following passages in search of opponents: In 1 Tim, "Explicit Statements" – 1:3-4, 6-7; 4:1-3; 6:20-21; 6:3-5; 1:19b-20; "Allusions" – 1:8-11; 4:4, 7-8; 2:4-7. "Affirmations" – 3:16; 4:10; 1:12-17; 6:6-10. In 2 Tim, "Explicit Statements" – 2:16-18; 2:23-26; 3:1-9; "Allusions" – 2:14-15; 2:20-22; 4:3-4; 3:13; 1:15. "Affirmations" – 2:13. In Titus, "Explicit Statements" – 1:10-14, 16; 3:9-11. "Allusions" – 1:15; 1:9; 2:8; 1:5. "Affirmations" – 3:5. Dillon Thornton follows Sumney in his analysis of "discourse units" containing "explicit" or "implicit language" (*Hostility in the House of God*, 29-30).

time and place. My approach turns the attention toward an assessment of the images of Paul implied and created by the Pastor's depiction of opponents in the PE. I locate these letters within a historical and cultural context that makes sense of the Pastor's rhetoric about opponents, thereby reframing the question of opponents and their identity. Instead of identifying them as gnostics or Jewish missionaries or Marcionites or proto-Montanists, I argue that the Pastor's depictions suggest an alternative perspective on opponents and their identity. These opponents, such as they are, are people with whom the Pastor disagrees about issues like the timing and nature of the resurrection, whether or not to be celibate, whether or not to marry, and whether or not to engage in speculative research. All of these matters are recognizable as debates taking place as a result of or in the shadow of the Pauline epistolary legacy. Importantly, this research puts historical reconstruction on a different footing, because it emphasizes the degree to which these debates are general enough to be recognizable by a variety of early Christian readers and communities. The Pastor's treatment of opponents and the difficulty of pin-pointing them historically is not merely a result of historical vicissitudes and the exigencies of historical research; rather, it is a built-in feature of his literary style. These opponents cannot easily be identified in part because the Pastor's rhetoric does not (and is not designed to) betray a coherent collection of beliefs and practices by which opponents might be identified. That they lack easily identifiable features is a feature, not a glitch, of the Pastor's strategy. Furthermore, the difficulty of identifying these opponents is due to these letters being written into an emerging *Corpus Paulinum*, and not covertly sent as forged missives to be received and unfolded by a puzzled Christ believer somewhere in Asia Minor.

I address the debate about the literary relationship of these letters by emphasizing particular elements of the Pastor's literary and rhetorical artistry that have either received little

attention or have not been sufficiently explained. An analysis of spacial argumentation, demonization, pathologization, Paulinization demonstrates a unified strategy and hence a singular authorial intent across the three letters, despite their particularities.³⁰⁶ I argue that the Pastor brings ancient philosophical and medical discourses about bodily and mental illness to the fore as a way of analyzing early Christian deviance. In the course of the study, I also identify and attempt to correct the scholarly penchant to impose modern categories of body and pathology onto ancient texts and their metaphorical manipulation of those cultural complexes. I shall show that the Pastor's consistent use of categories of body and sickness across the three letters can be seen as a synthesis of ideas from Paul and the broader culture of which he was a part. I maintain these theses have direct bearing on the current state of Pastorals authenticity criticism, pseudepigraphic technique, deuterio-Pauline intertextuality, and the discussion of opponents.

These contributions intersect with a number of traditional topics of concern, as well as some more recent preoccupations. My research into the way the Pastor pathologizes deviance has implication for such questions as identifying theological opponents in epistolary literature, polemic, intertextuality, literary strategies for reading pseudepigraphical texts, the relationship between Paul's letters and deuterio-Pauline letters, theological anthropology, and metaphor analysis. Topics that are less traditional in studies of the Pastorals that are central to my investigation include critical spatial theory, ancient medicine, disability studies, demonology, and Greco-Roman psychopathology. This research demonstrates, with a variety of topical foci, how the Pastor negotiated the literary legacy of Paul and cultural topoi that he felt could help him achieve his rhetorical goal: a picture of theological opposition that was variegated yet compelling,

³⁰⁶ Though the term "demons" occurs only at 1 Tim 4:1, I demonstrate in chapter two that a *logic of demonization* is evident in all three letters. This is perhaps easiest to detect in passages that reference Satan or the Devil, but is no less present in passage like Titus 1:10–16.

alarming yet hopeful. Identifying and studying the Pastor's ways of characterizing opponents is thus builds upon existing research but develops it in fresh directions by drawing upon newer methods of analysis and different source materials.

2. The Trajectory of This Study

In this dissertation I argue that the single, pseudo-Pauline author of the Pastoral Epistles crafts a stigmatizing depiction of his theological opponents by spatializing, demonizing, and pathologizing their alleged deviance in order to provide an authoritative model for how to address unwanted diversity in teaching, community norms, church governance, and the interpretation of Paul's letters in the post-Pauline era. I develop this argument in seven interdependent chapters. In chapter one, "Spatializing Deviance: Staying, Straying, and Satan," I argue that the Pastor's diagnostic frame of mind encompasses a highly ordered approach to the Pauline cosmos. The Pastor's movement metaphors and kinetic imagery locativize the characters of the Pastorals, both human and otherwise, on a kind of ideological and moral map. The satanological and diabolical language figure especially prominently within this spatialized schema. Building upon recent insights and advances in the interpretation of the Pastorals as deliberately intertextual documents, I show that in 1 Tim 1:18–20 the Pastor selectively and creatively appropriates 1 Corinthians 5:1–5 in order to narrate Alexander and Hymenaeus—two named opponents in the Pastorals—being handing over (*παράδιδοςθαι*) by Paul to Satan. In 1 Cor 5:1–5, the historical-epistolary Paul left his readers with some ambiguity about whether someone handed over to Satan could be redeemed or healed. I show that the Pastor crafts this 1 Tim 1:18–20 as an instance of "corrective composition,"³⁰⁷ wherein he attempts to resolve certain ambiguities in his base text (1 Cor 5) in

³⁰⁷ I borrow the phrase from Mitchell, "Corrective Composition."

order to advance a particular and ultimately therapeutic understanding of the pedagogic role of handing over Alexander and Hymenaeus.

Continuing with the same interpretive frameworks developed in chapter one, in chapter two, "Demonizing Deviance: Rethinking the Doctrines of Demons," I argue that the Pastor's allusion to "demonic doctrines" in 1 Tim 4 has three major functions in the Pastorals: locative, polemical, and pathological functions. I demonstrate furthermore that the Pastor's adaptation of Pauline dicta regarding Satan is not an isolated event, but part of a broader attempt by the Pastor to repurpose Pauline texts regarding the demonic in order to address the theological deviance of his opponents. I show that the language of the "demonic," in concert with other key terms and catchphrases in 1 Timothy 4:1–5, is both based and serves to create an intertextual relationship with passages from the homologoumena (chiefly 1 Corinthians 7–10, but also Romans 14) regarding issues of marriage, food, and conscience. The homologoumena serve as sources and inspirations for the Pastor's letters, and once those letters have been inserted into an emerging collection of Paul's letters, the Pastorals then produce new hermeneutical possibilities for the entire corpus.

I argue in chapter three, "Pathologizing Deviance: Toward an Alternative Account of Medical Terminology in the Pastorals," that the language of health and sickness in the Pastorals is central to the Pastor's argument across all three letters and more hermeneutically sophisticated than has been recognized. I argue that concepts of health and disease are not straightforwardly transhistorical notions; they are shaped by local culture and the prevailing ideas about disease etiology and therapy. The Pastor's approach to deviance as pathology involves the incorporation of other ideas and patterns of persuasion. Looking beyond the explicitly medical language allows

us to see that the Pastor's characterizations of vice, pain, progress, and research are all central components of his strategy of pathologizing deviance.

However, the Pastor does not only employ a consistent strategy of pathologizing the deviance of others; he also declares his particular vision of Pauline theology, and those who follow it, to be healthy. Appreciating this fact allows us to take up a major question in research on the Pastorals—whether the author is simply excoriating the deviant, or if his “healthy teaching” might have their restoration to health in view. With appeal to the philosophical discourse regarding verbal therapy I argue that the Pastor's medical language and analogies presume the possibility of doctrinal healing for opponents, and that this is envisioned as a desirable outcome in all three letters.

In the fourth chapter, "Corporealizing Deviance: Bodies in the Pastorals," I demonstrate that the Pastor's body language, explicit and implied, serves as a site for the expression of his theological and polemical agenda. In particular, the Pastor creatively pathologizes his opponents' deviance by likening their teaching to gangrene (2 Tim 2:17) and characterizing their auditors as those who have a pathological itch in the ear and who will not accept the Pauline antidote (2 Tim 4:1–5). I argue that the Pastor's language of disease as a threat to the church presupposes Paul's imagery of the church as the body of Christ. The Pastor presumes, as a fixed piece of Paulinism, the body of Christ imagery of Paul and on that basis he theorizes deviance as a threat to the health of that body. The Pastor extends Paul's body metaphors for polemical purposes, warning not against factions within the community, the normal aim of such medicalized political rhetoric (and also in Paul's adoption and adaptation of it in 1 Cor 12 and Rom 12), so much as doctrinal perversion that threatens the health of the body. The imagery and threat of a diseased body constitute for the Pastor an opportunity to illustrate the visceral consequences of departing from

the body of Pauline teaching and tradition. I argue that a closer examination of the pathological, olfactory, visual, metaphorical, and cultural significances of gangrene in Greco-Roman antiquity suggests an author who capitalizes on the semantic richness of his medical metaphors.

In the fifth chapter, "Avoiding Deviance: Keeping Timothy Healthy," I show how the Pastor crafts a depiction of Paul as a holistic healer, the wise purveyor of protreptic, prophylactic, or remedial advice. I argue that the Pastor's depictions of Paul are built upon the idealized image of the model physician advanced in contemporary medical literature. I compare 1 Tim 4:6–16 with ancient discourses about training in order to demonstrate that the Pastor's depiction of Paul is meant to establish him as an authority in matters pertaining to philosophical regimen. I demonstrate that the Pastor is casting Paul as the kind of expert who can offer prophylactic prescriptions as part of the proper regimen of diet and exercise that will keep Timothy in peak performance for the sake of the gospel. This enables us to see that Paul's advice on remedy for Timothy (1 Tim 5:23) is a continuation of the consistent project of depicting Paul as the ready font of wisdom, in matters both pastoral and medicinal. I propose a reading of 1 Tim 5:23 as an integral part of 1 Tim 5:17–25 (and earlier verses), and not as a digression (as the vast majority of scholars argue). I accomplish this by drawing on ancient physiognomic theory as one contemporary and semi-formalized manifestation of the basic attempt to describe the relationship between the invisible human interior and the visible exterior. On this basis I demonstrate that that 1 Tim 5:23 should be read as part of a larger argument about the perception and consequences of moral error. The result is a portrait of Paul that highlights his medicinal and moral sagacity.

In the sixth chapter, "Deviance as Psychosomatic Disease: The Corrupted Νοῦς," I demonstrate that the Pastor pathologizes the νοῦς in a manner similar to classical, Hellenistic, and

imperial-era medical writers and philosophers whose own medical analogies presuppose certain physicalist attributes of the human mind and person. I analyze the Pastor's depiction of the interior space of the human person in light of contemporary and near-contemporary understandings of mind to demonstrate that he understood this element of the soul in terms of its materiality, rationality, and locality. I offer a corrective to modern scholarship that tends to assume that these cognitive organs are not affected corporeally or that the Pastor's language is purely figurative. Without explicit attention to the materiality of mind and its thinking processes and the effect the body has on the mind and vice-versa, readers of the Pastorals miss out on the significance and force of fascinating claims on the Pastor's part—that the opponents are sick because of their activities and teaching, that good adherents of the Pauline message should avoid their teaching lest they become ill, and the implication that Paul alone is the true guarantor of the teaching that makes one healthy. I also demonstrate that the Pastor's use of psychological terms like νοῦς is an iteration of his tendency to characterize his opponents in recognizably Pauline language.³⁰⁸ That is to say, even as the Pastor uses the language of mind in such a way that demonstrates his participation in the contemporary intellectual milieu, he also writes as "Paul."

In chapter seven, "Deviance as a Crisis of Conscience," I show how the Pastor's language of conscience relies upon a development evident in the Pauline corpus—the characterization of conscience as a permanent component or organ of the soul.³⁰⁹ I argue that that the image of the conscience as an entity that can be subjected to cautery is a logical extension of the notion, found already in the homologoumena, that a conscience can be harmed or feel pain. In this way the

³⁰⁸ The Pastor's reference to his opponents as "people corrupted in the mind" (διεφθαρμένοι ἄνθρωποι τὸν νοῦν [1 Tim 6:5]) and ἀδόκιμοι (2 Tim 3:8; cf. Titus 1:16) echoes Pauline language of those gentiles who are given over εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν and his worry that the Corinthians' φθαρῇ τὰ νοήματα (2 Cor 11:3).

³⁰⁹ The συνείδησις is a distinct, permanent entity that can be subject to harm or defilement or upbuilding (e.g., 1 Cor 8:7, 10, 12) or appealed to as an internal reference point (e.g., Rom 2:15, 9:1; 2 Cor 1:12, 4:2, 5:11).

Pastor's notion of conscience is one that is locative, a site within the human person, comparable to his notions of νοῦς. I further argue that the descriptors attached by the Pastor to the συνείδησις, such as ἀγαθή or καθαρά, are best interpreted as indicating its *rational* operation. To have a "pure conscience" is, as scholars have noted, to have one that is free from knowledge of wrongdoing, but it is also an indication that it has been purged of false beliefs and improper judgments. I offer a complete reexamination of the language and use of cautery in ancient medical literature and to demonstrate that the fascinating imagery of the cauterized conscience in 1 Tim 4:2 is an extension of this characterization of the conscience as an organ of the soul. In contrast to most modern interpretations, I suggest that the "cauterized conscience" does not connote an insensate conscience so much as one that is diseased and has been subjected to the failed (because overly harsh and misguided) therapeutic strategies of the opponents.

III. Conclusion

In order to set the stage for the larger argument of this dissertation, in this introduction I have critically analyzed the state of the question on three intersecting problems related to the study of the Pastoral Epistles: authorship, compositional relationship, and the depiction and reality of opponents in these letters. I have demonstrated critical shortcomings in recent scholarship on these matters, and provided a corrective to the recent tendency to over-emphasize perceived differences amongst the letters and de-emphasize their similarities in an effort to reject the theory of the Pastorals as an epistolary mini-corpus designed and composed to supplement an emerging *Corpus Paulinum*. In turn, I have highlighted productive trends in scholarship that I intend to develop further, especially recent insights into the nature and function of intertextuality in pseudepigraphic literature. I have also made a preliminary case for my own constructive argument

for reading these letters as a corpus unified by the Pastor's distinctive and pervasive argumentative strategies. I have provided the major critical assumptions on which this project relies, the methodological principles that justify the approach taken, and the argumentative trajectory to be followed. We turn now to fill out the central argument of this dissertation, that there is a consistent strategy of pathologizing and medicalizing theological deviance across all three letters. In my first chapter I demonstrate that the author of these letters presumes the same locative approach to theological error, something he inherits in part from Paul, but recasts it in similar ways across the three letters. As a first step, we shall explore the highly ordered Pauline cosmos constructed by the Pastor, as well as the satanic opposition that the Pastor tells us is threatening to destroy it.

Chapter 1. Spatializing Deviance: Staying, Straying, and Satan

I. Placing and Demonizing

A. Introduction

The Pastor's propensity for diagnosing deviance—ascertaining moral malady as he perceives it—is inscribed for all time in the epistolary archive known as the Pastoral Epistles. In his effort to demarcate between what he perceives to be the opponents' activity of "spreading a deviant message" (ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖν)¹ and the "healthy teaching" (ἡ ὑγιαίνουσα διδασκαλία) of Paul, he arranges his literary world in such a way that he cartographically illustrates the moral status—conceived of as either healthy or sick— of individuals and groups by proximity to Paul's own person. His decision to categorize various characters in the letters in this way results in a highly ordered Pauline cosmos.

In this chapter, I argue that the Pastor constructs this diagnostic discourse using two conceptually interdependent argumentative strategies in order to instill in the readers of the Pastorals a visceral reaction to his theological opponents. First, the Pastor crafts a kind of moral geography through kinetic language and metaphors that are applied to the majority of the characters in these letters, whether named or unnamed, friend or foe. With relation to the "true" center of Pauline teaching, the Pastor alternately locates his opponents on the metaphorical outside or suggests that they surreptitiously transgress the boundary that separates truth from falsehood. Similarly, I demonstrate exegetically that the Pastor uses proximity and obedience to Paul and his biddings as an indicator of moral status. The Pastor imbues with positive moral

¹ I owe this translation to Pervo, *The Pastorals and Polycarp*, 31.

significance the movements of those who align with Paul and adhere to the vision of Christian fidelity set forth in the Pastorals. These spatial dimensions are complemented in the Pastorals by frequent reference to temporality, which serves as a further aspect of the Pastor's sketch of the Pauline cosmos.

Secondly, I shall demonstrate that the Pastor utilizes the category of the satanic or diabolical in narrating the deviation of Paul's opponents through a variety of vivid verbal pictures that cast Satan/the devil as a character with whom the opponents are associated. By narrating the opponents' unhealthy departure from the Pauline center in terms of a forced visit to the realm of Satan, the Pastor links the moral geography of the opponents with the mythic positioning of Satan. While scholars have noted the polemical value of associating one's opponents with supernatural forces of evil in the PE,² my contribution is to argue that the language of the devil (and demons, on which see further in Chapter 2) is a constitutive element of the Pastor's medicalized and spatialized depiction of the world. The satanic and the demonic are themselves locative and diagnostic categories (among others) and the references to the demons and the devil in the Pastorals are an extension of the same rhetorical strategy that depicts opponents as dangerous and contagious. Because Paul is the guarantor of the healthy teaching, movement to and away from him is correspondingly healthy or unhealthy.

In concert with these observations about the use of spatial/temporal and satanological categories, I elucidate how the Pastor creatively adapts the Pauline homologoumena. Namely, we

² However, discussion of the devil and demons is not as prominent as one might expect in studies of the polemic of the Pastorals. Robert J. Karris gives no attention to the devil in the PE, and only briefly suggests regarding 1 Tim 4:1 that "it may be that the author is here borrowing from Jewish tradition" (Karris, "Background and Significance," 558). Neither does Mark Harding mention the devilish or the demonic in his section on the polemic of the Pastorals (Harding, *Tradition and Rhetoric in the Pastoral Epistles*, 205–8). Lloyd K. Pieteresen discusses 1 Tim 4:1 as suggesting the opponents are false prophets by virtue of the connection with false spirits, but this is not a focus of his study (*Polemic of the Pastorals*, 142); cf. Johnson, "II Timothy and the Polemic Against False Teachers."

see the Pastor crafting a new, "self"-corrected presentation of Paul. In a self-consciously pseudepigraphic authorial mode, the Pastor removes the opponents from sanctioned space and relegates them to the realm of Satan. With special attention to the appropriation of Paul's own language of "handing over to Satan" in 1 Corinthians 5, I argue that the Pastor draws upon and modifies Paul's language of the satanic in 1 Timothy 1 in an effort to appropriate it and ensure that it was understood to serve ultimately redemptive purposes. The Pastor thereby guides the reading of the Pauline legacy in such a way that Paul's letters may be subsequently read as effecting the painful yet ultimately salubrious re-education of "Paul's" own opponents. These aspects of the Pastorals have not been central to the scholarly discussion to date (though I acknowledge both debts to and departures from previous scholarship below), and I draw attention to them in an attempt to advance the discussion about how the Pastor constructs these three brief letters. I demonstrate what this tells us about his own literary habitus, his relationship to Greek medicine and philosophy, and his particular vision of the Pauline legacy and its significance.

Spatializing Morality: A Locative Framework for the "Satanic" and the "Demonic"

We first orient our inquiry to the problem of the narration of space and place and to the complicated issue of the designation "satanic" or "demonic." These are both native categories used by the Pastor and scholarly constructs that theorize the phenomenon of demonization of opponents. We shall see that the Pastor manipulates spatial categories and movement metaphors in his depiction of the devil and the devil's maleficent agents. A variety of spatially construed polarities are helpful for thinking about the Pastorals. Categories of place/no place,

centripetal/centrifugal, inside/outside, center/periphery,³ and of course liminality are all helpful for interpreting the spatial and moral cosmos of the PE, just as they are for conceptualizing the use of place and space in other ancient literatures.⁴

Indeed, it was not uncommon for philosophers, orators, and novelists in antiquity to attribute moral valence to space, place, and boundaries.⁵ This valence could be positive (e.g., the motif of the *locus amoenus* as a place for erotic fiction⁶ or a philosophy of *eros*)⁷ or negative (e.g., victims of Roman crucifixion taken outside the city walls to well-travelled roads).⁸ This is known in narratological theory as "symbolic space," the way in which space functions as an expression of a certain cultural codes or values.⁹ We find the use of spatial metaphors to convey moral deviation

³ For these binaries and others, see Jonathan Z. Smith, *Map Is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions*, SLJA 23 (Leiden: Brill, 1978).

⁴ For an entrée to the theorizing of space and place in ancient medical literature, see Patricia Anne Baker and Han Nijdam, "Introduction: Conceptualizing Body, Space and Borders," in *Medicine and Space: Body, Surroundings and Borders in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, ed. Karine van't Land, Han Nijdam, and Patricia Anne Baker, Visualising the Middle Ages 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 1–22.

⁵ It was thought, for instance, that different regions had climates peculiar to them, and that these climates had particular and predictable effects on the characters and dispositions of their inhabitants. Cicero writes in *Fat.* 7: "We see the wide difference between the natural characters of different localities; we notice that some are healthy, others unhealthy, that the inhabitants of some are phlegmatic and as it were overcharged with moisture, those of others parched and dried up, and there are a number of other very wide differences between one place and another. Athens has a rarefied climate, which is thought also to cause sharpness of wit above the average in the population; at Thebes the climate is dense, and so the Thebans are stout and sturdy" (Inter locorum naturas quantum intersit videmus: alios esse salubres, alios pestilentes, in aliis esse pituitosos et quasi redundantes, in aliis exsiccatos atque aridos; multaque sunt alia quae inter locum et locum plurimum differant. Athenis tenue caelum, ex quo etiam acutiores putantur Attici, crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani et valentes [Rackham, LCL]). The differences of particular regions and the likelihood of certain illnesses is discussed in terms of the inhabitants' dispositional and physiological relationship to the lands they inhabit in, among others, the Hippocratic treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*. For a recent essay focusing on the degrees and forms of determinism operative in this treatise, see Roberto Lo Presti, "Shaping the Difference: The Medical Inquiry into the Nature of Places and the Early Birth of Anthropology in the Hippocratic Treatise *Airs Waters Places*," in *Medicine and Space: Body, Surroundings and Borders in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, ed. Karine van't Land, Han Nijdam, and Patricia Anne Baker, VMA 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 169–96.

⁶ Concerning Achilles Tatius's second century CE novel *Leucippe and Clitophon* 1.2.1, see Richard P. Martin, "A Good Place to Talk: Discourse and Topos in Achilles Tatius and Philostratus," in *Space in the Ancient Novel*, ed. Michael Paschalis and Stavros A. Frangoulidis (Groningen: Barkhuis, 2002), 147–48.

⁷ On Plato's *Phaedr.* 229b–230d, see Martin, "A Good Place to Talk: Discourse and Topos in Achilles Tatius and Philostratus," 158–60.

⁸ Adela Yarbro Collins, *Mark: A Commentary*, ed. Harold W. Attridge, Hermeneia (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2007), 740. See also her discussion of the location of Jesus's death (728, 737–40).

⁹ In cultivating a narratological theory of space, de Jong writes of four functions of space in literature: a thematic function, when space is a primary feature of the narrative (she suggests city novels or travel stories as examples), a

in the works of ancient novelists,¹⁰ historians,¹¹ and in philosophers such as Seneca¹² and satirists such as Lucian.¹³ J. Z. Smith has productively theorized the relationship between the spatial and the demonic and builds upon the conceptual continuity between the two categories.

In his discussion of the demonic in late antiquity, J. Z. Smith describes "devil worship" (a notion that he recognizes is patently inadequate yet nevertheless serves a useful starting point) as a "term of estrangement applied to others and represents a reduction of their religiosity to the category of the false but not (it is essential to emphasize) to the category of the impotent."¹⁴ Smith continues with an interpretation of the demonic as a "locative category" by working with the taxonomic emphasis of the model advanced by Mary Douglas (and others): "negative valence is attached to things which escape place (the chaotic, the rebellious, the distant) or things found

mirroring function, wherein descriptions of objects or space "mirror or contrast themes of the narrative" (14), a characterizing function, when descriptions of space give us information about a "a person, his milieu, character, or situation" (16), and a symbolic function. According to de Jong, space becomes symbolic "when it becomes semantically charged and acquires an additional significance on top of its purely scene-setting function. Notions, often oppositionally arranged, such as inside versus outside, city versus country, high versus low, become negatively or positively loaded, or are associated with cultural or ideological values" ("Introduction. Narratological Theory on Space," in *Space in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*, ed. I.J.F. de Jong, Mnemosyne Supplements: Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature 339 [Leiden: Brill, 2012], 15).

¹⁰ See Maaïke Zimmerman, who illustrates this point via an examination of the metaphor of the *lubrica via*, the "slippery path," in authors such as Apuleius, Propertius, and later, early church fathers. See her article "On the Road in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," in *Space in the Ancient Novel*, ed. Michael Paschalis and Stavros A. Frangoulidis (Groningen: Barkhuis, 2002), esp. 86–89.

¹¹ T. Rood points out the significance of space in Herodotus' depiction of Candaules' punishment (*Hist.* 1.11.5; 1.12.1), calling it the "moral topography of the punishment" ("Herodotus," in *Space in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*, ed. Irene J. F. de Jong, Mnemosyne Supplements: Monographs on Greek and Latin Language and Literature 339 [Leiden: Brill, 2012], 123). Rood also speaks of "Herodotus' moral geography," a part of which is the geographical uncertainty experienced the further one moves from the certain boundaries of the Aegean. With Greece at the metaphorical center of the imagined world (Delphi was thought to be the *ὀμφαλός*, the "navel" of the world [cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* 4.74]), moving beyond those boundaries is at times indicative of folly, such as Cambyses' unwitting expedition to the "ends of the earth" (*ἐς τὰ ἔσχατα γῆς* [*Hist.* 3.25.1]). Cf. "Herodotus," 131.

¹² For Seneca, "down" is associated with what is morally deleterious, and "up" is related to things good and beneficial. "Tranquility of mind and, once faults have been expelled, perfect liberty await us if we ever escape from these dregs to that sublime and lofty place" (Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando faece in illud evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis erroribus absoluta libertas (*Ep.* 75.18).

¹³ Things of philosophy and its virtues are up above, while pleasures and glories and riches are the things of down below. Similarly, for Lucian, what is "pure and unpolluted" (*καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀκήρατον*) belongs to what is above (*Herm.* 7).

¹⁴ Jonathan Z. Smith, "Towards Interpreting Demonic Powers in Hellenistic and Roman Antiquity," *ANRW* 2.16.1:425.

just outside the place they properly belong (the hybrid, the deviant, the adjacent)."¹⁵ It is a "classificatory marker" that signals situational judgments about what is strange, out of place, out of control.¹⁶ Later he calls it a "taxic indicator" and a "sign of significance."¹⁷ He speaks of a "locative cosmology" in which the demonic is on the periphery, away from the proper realm of the human, the healthy, the sane.¹⁸ This cosmology is fixated on boundaries and the creation and sustaining of domains in which beings and things are to remain. The violation of these boundaries is a rupture that is signified by the language of the demonic.

Following Smith, when I refer to the "demonic" or the "satanic" I identify a relational descriptor utilized by the Pastor in order to convey distance from the truth, God, and the "healthy teaching." It is a label employed by the Pastor to suggest that his opponents are inspired, deluded, and ensnared by the devil (or Satan) and the intermediary beings in his service. The Pastor mobilizes the rhetoric of the diabolic/Satanic/demonic in order to locate his opponents *outside* the healthy realm of "the truth" and "the faith" and moving into the illicit, sick realm of the demonic. This realm of the demonic is not always explicitly placed, however, since the demonic is at times conceived of not as being "somewhere" but is rather *out* of place, i.e., misplaced or displaced. The very idea of being out of place, of being ἄ-τοπος, is imbued with moral significance in ancient Greek literature, as a glance at the standard lexica confirms.¹⁹ Thus, a certain paradox

¹⁵ Smith, "Towards Interpreting Demonic Powers," 429.

¹⁶ Smith, "Towards Interpreting Demonic Powers," 430. Smith goes on to note the malleability of this label, since a given group or society may at one point think of law and order as restrictive and therefore a "repressive imposition of the demonic" or at other times a kind of safeguard and bulwark against it (429). He points out that as with the analogous categories of clean/unclean, with the demonic one is dealing with "situational or relational categories, mobile boundaries which shift according to the map being employed. Demons serve as classificatory markers which signal what is strong and weak, controlled and exaggerated in a given society at a given moment" (430).

¹⁷ Smith, "Towards Interpreting Demonic Powers," 437.

¹⁸ Smith, "Towards Interpreting Demonic Powers," 438.

¹⁹ LSJ, 272 (s.v. ἄτοπος) offers the following meanings: A *out of place, out of the way, 1 unwonted, extraordinary, 2 strange, paradoxical, absurd 3 unnatural, disgusting, foul, monstrous, wicked, wrong, bad, harmful*. BDAG, 149, include "1 pert. to being out of the ordinary, *unusual, surprising*" and "2 pert. to being behaviorally out of place, *evil*,

arises in which the Pastor imagines his opponents as being handed over to or otherwise straying off into the realm of Satan, but this realm is not always explicitly located somewhere. It is itself evocative of the unknown outside, the place that is *out of place*. In this regard it is more productive to think about the transgressive nature of boundary crossing, and to consider the demonic as a liminal space, a category that is meant to suggest notions of in-between-ness and instability. Thus, I do not presume that the Pastor operated with an absolute or fully sketched-out cognitive moral map. Rather, the Pastorals reveal a partially constructed cosmological outlook, one that was still being worked out at the time these letters were being penned, and that would only be more fully developed by later Christian authors with a more analytical and systematic approach.

II. Time, Place, and Space: Movement Language and Kinetic Imagery

A. Mapping the Moral and Spiritual Cosmos through Time and Place

The world of the Pastorals is one that is marked by an idealized sense of order and the desire to maintain proper boundaries.²⁰ The boundaries between the community of God and non-believing "outsiders" (οἱ ἑξωθεν [1 Tim 3:7])²¹ is a concern for the Pastor, but his most prominent concern is the maintaining of boundaries against theological opponents, some of whom are depicted as presently or formerly being a part of the community (1 Tim 1:6, 19–20; 2 Tim 2:18, 3:9–11; Titus 1:9–16, 3:10). The terminology of the Pastor may be mapped out along two different planes, the

wrong, improper." LPGL, 258, offers "*out of place; out of the way; hence 1. obtrusive; 2. outrageous.*" BrillDAG, 332, includes "out of place, strange, unaccustomed, in opportune, extraordinary," "absurd, eccentric, bizarre, senseless," "unnatural disgusting, monstrous," and "bad, wicked, reprehensible."

²⁰ Richard I. Pervo captures the Pastor's position nicely: "The church should follow the model of the well-managed Greco-Roman household, envisioned as a healthy organism which functions soundly when each member is performing its proper task in its proper place" (*The Making of Paul*, 86).

²¹ Here the Pastor's preoccupations match Paul's, whose concern is not οἱ ἑξω but rather οἱ ἕσω (1 Cor 5:12–13).

temporal and the spatial. These two planes are shared by both human and divine actors. Equally important are the ways in which the transitions along these planes and between these arenas, or the departures from them, are conceptualized. It is at times the intermediary or liminal spaces where we find the most suggestive power. That is to say, while it is rhetorically effective to locate an opponent on the far outside, it is sometimes more effective to leave that opponent in limbo and thereby harness the ominous power of suggestion and threat.

The cosmos within which these two planes are situated is ideologically conceptualized. Some of the prominent positive conceptual domains or regions of the map are the true, the virtuous, and the healthy teaching, while falsehood, vice, and sickness constitute the counterparts. Frequently, the Pastor articulates the alternative domains negatively by the simple rejection of these positive locales. This is expressed at times in oppositional antitheses, such as the people against which the law is "set" (*κεῖται* [1 Tim 1:9]), who are indeed many. When the Pastor's point about the abundant number of criminals to whom the law is opposed nears exhaustion, he summarizes the rest as "whatever else is set in opposition to the healthy teaching" (*εἴ τι ἕτερον τῇ ὑγιαίνουσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ ἀντίκειται* [1 Tim 1:10]). This passage highlights the Pastor's diagnostic as simultaneously spatial and medical in its orientation. Furthermore, there is a basic opposition of the opponents to the truth (cf. *οὗτοι ἀνθίστανται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* [2 Tim 3:8]; cf. *οἱ ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι* [2 Tim 2:24]). In contrast with the "unbounded or "endless" (*ἀπέραντοι*) genealogies, our author aims to present *ἡ οἰκονομία θεοῦ ἡ ἐν πίστει* (1 Tim 1:4). This divine economy is ordered according to certain principles,²² but the sheer fact that it is ordered is in some way the constitutive feature, the driving and operative principle.²³

²² The notion of schema and proper organization is evident especially in 1 Tim and Titus. The author's concern for social order as expressed through the control of women is a prominent example. The Pastor idealizes control of

B. Human Actors in Time

The Pastor imbues his letters with conspicuous time-references, and these establish the temporal plane on which the human characters of the Pastorals move. Human actors span the generations in the PE.²⁴ Timothy's multigenerational legacy of fidelity is cited (2 Tim 1:5). Paul's own πρόγονοι are invoked (2 Tim 1:3), Paul represents, especially in 2 Timothy, an elder apostle who seeks to groom his offspring in the faith, Timothy and Titus. Timothy is Paul's "legitimate child in faith" (γνήσιον τέκνον ἐν πίστει [1 Tim 1:2]) and "beloved child" (ἀγαπητὸν τέκνον [2 Tim 1:2]). The future adherents (cf. οἱ μέλλοντες πιστεύειν) to the Pauline legacy may also be glimpsed (1 Tim 1:16).

The Pastor deftly deploys temporality in his campaign against opponents. He names a host of ostensibly contemporary characters whom he depicts as opponents (1 Tim 1:18; 2 Tim 2:17; Titus 1:10–11). However, it is the end times that are traditionally a time for apostasy, and the Pastor pens the foreboding declaration that "in the latter times (ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς) some shall abandon the faith" (1 Tim 4:1). Similarly, he says that "in the last days (ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις) wicked times shall arrive, for there will be people who are lovers of self, lovers of money,

their reproduction (τεκνογονία [1 Tim 2:15]; τεκνογονεῖν [1 Tim 5:14]), their appearance (ἐν καταστολῇ κοσμίῳ [1 Tim 2:9–10]), their voice (ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ [1 Tim 2:11]), and their location in the home (οἰκοδεσπετεῖν [1 Tim 5:14]; οἰκουργοί [Titus 2:5]). The Pastor forewarns against any kicking against the goads or chafing under this yoke by linking such disobedience to the primordial transgression of "the woman": "Adam was not deceived, but the woman, having been utterly deceived, came into transgression" (Ἀδὰμ οὐκ ἠπατήθη, ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἐξαπατηθεῖσα ἐν παραβάσει γέγονεν [1 Tim 2:14]). The dark suggestion is that the sin of the first woman located her, and by extension womankind, in the unruly "place" of transgression. Disciplining that disorderly nature is one goal of ordering the woman's adornment and legislating her place in the divine economy envisioned by the Pastor.

²³ BDAG provide three meanings for οἰκονομία: 1) "management" of a household. Under this first heading they put 1 Cor 9:7 and gloss it as "commission/task"; Col 1:25 is glossed as "divine office"; Eph 3:2 is glossed as "administration." 2) "arrangement, order, plan" under which Eph 3:9 is glossed as "plan" and Eph 1:10 is glossed as "plan of salvation." 3) "training" is given as a third meaning, 1 Tim 1:4 being the only NT passage under this heading. Philodemus' treatise περὶ οἰκονομίας (*De oeconomica*) views the task of "household management" not as a virtue per se but rather as constitutive of a range of virtues exercised in opposition to φιλοχρηματία, which is the "vice responsible for an excessive and harmful devotion to the pursuit of great wealth" (Voula Tsouna, *Philodemus, On Property Management*, WGRW 33 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012], xii).

²⁴ Recently, Geoffrey Smith has suggested that the Pastor anticipates the genealogical approach to heretics that became prevalent in ancient heresy catalogues (esp. in references to "future deviants" [39], who are then read as present for the later readers: 1 Tim 4:1–3, 2 Tim 3:1–5, 4:3–4]). See *Guilt by Association: Heresy Catalogues in Early Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 36–42.

braggarts, haughty, blasphemers, etc. (2 Tim 3:1–5). By doing so, the Pastor effectively populates his literary world with opposition while ensuring that no reader could assume that those days were past. In fact, by assuming a Pauline πρόσωπον and prophesying the ills both past, present, and yet to come, the Pastor renders the past coextensive with the present. Through pseudepigraphy, the Pastor has ostensibly set these letters in the past, rendering Paul a prophet whose voice authoritatively addresses the Pastor's present. Indeed, past, present, and future are somewhat fluid for the Pastor, for he can write of "the last days" and those who "will" be ("lovers of themselves, lovers of money, braggarts," etc. [2 Tim 3:2–5]) and those whom Timothy should avoid (cf. τούτους ἀποτρέπου [2 Tim 3:5]) and then declare that from this same cast of moral reprobates (ἐκ τούτων) there are *already* individuals who are "sneaking into houses and capturing silly women" (2 Tim 3:6).

The lines between past and present and future are further manipulated by likening these people to figures from the past, such as the opponents of Moses Jannes and Jambres (2 Tim 3:8). While the invocation of such historical figures is different from casting opponents as both predicted and present, the result is complementary: Paul's opponents are associated with a timeless threat, one that transcends both history and prediction and is depicted as a clear and present danger. At the same time, the Pastor has effectively rendered the Pauline voice omnitemporal, capable of speaking at all times to all believers and all situations, a degree of adaptability that even the man who would be all things to all people (cf. 1 Cor 9:19–23) could not have anticipated. This is, we should note, an authorial strategy that is concomitant with the hermeneutical consequence facilitated by the formation of a *Corpus Paulinum*.

C. Movement Terms as Moral Markers

One of the most ubiquitous persuasive strategies in the Pastorals is the use of spatial language and movement metaphors to describe deviance from an imagined center, a place of moral and doctrinal rectitude. At times, these verbs of movement incorporate both spatial and temporal components. While the Pastor's ideological construction of "place" and "space" has received some attention of late in literature on Paul and the Pastorals, the kinetic imagery has been almost completely overlooked.²⁵ I argue that the language of place is used with regard to each and every grouping of people in the PE: addressees, members of the *ἐκκλησία*, non-believing "outsiders," former members and opponents, and non-human actors. The effort to articulate a proper "place" for both the faithful and the opponents reveals the Pastor's penchant for narrating morality in spatial terms, thereby creating the limits of moral and doctrinal propriety and locating the opponents and their teaching beyond them. What emerges from these considerations is a morally inflected topography of the Pastor's cosmos, a map that is meant to be both (normatively) descriptive and prescriptive for its readers.²⁶

²⁵ I have come across only two other scholars who put emphasis on this feature. Gerd Häfner mentions the "distancing" effect of the Pastor's language: "Es finden sich in der Gegnerpolemik nicht wenige Verben, die eine liminale *Distanzierung* ausdrücken" ("Polemik in den Pastoralbriefen," 298, emphasis original). Due to the summarizing nature of his overview, his discussion of this phenomenon is too brief to fully articulate its place in the Pastor's strategy. Peter de Villiers associates the language of wandering or turning away in 1 Timothy with the two-ways tradition ("'Empty Talk' in 1 Timothy in the Light of Its Graeco-Roman Context," *Acta Patristica et Byzantina* 14 [2003]: 144–47.

²⁶ The correspondence between map and territory is always a negotiated one. One of J.Z. Smith's insights is that the descriptions of rituals and myths offered by various religious traditions may be understood as maps that attempt to describe territory. Cf. the comments of Sam Gill, "Territory," in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 307–309. The Pastor thus appears as a dogmatic cartographer, one who seeks to control the moral significance of the locations and movements of human beings in the Pauline cosmos by offering highly interested descriptions stated as bald facts.

Those who have paid attention to issues of place and space in the Pastorals have focused on domestic imagery and the role of gender in the Pastorals.²⁷ David Horrell, for instance, discusses the Pastor's localizing of persons and their behavior with the concept of "household,"²⁸ and Korinna Zamfir argues persuasively that the Pastor's gendered approach to ecclesial roles is itself a byproduct of his construal of the ἐκκλησία as οἶκος θεοῦ, ultimately a public space.²⁹ With regard to the use of domestic imagery, the Pastor orders the house of God by legislating the positions and domestic duties of older widows (1 Tim 5:4, 10), younger widows (1 Tim 5:13), married women (1 Tim 2:15; Titus 2:3, 5), overseers (1 Tim 3:4; Titus 1:7), deacons (1 Tim 3:8–10), deaconesses (1 Tim 3:11–13), and slaves (1 Tim 6:1; Titus 2:9–10). The Pastor also seems especially concerned with the place of women, namely in the home, an issue which has drawn attention from Adela Yarbro Collins, who discusses the female body in the Pastorals as a site for social control and the exertion of male power.³⁰ For the Pastor and other moralists,³¹ whether one stays at home or not is an index for female moral propriety.³²

²⁷ Biblical scholars have, in the last twenty years or so, begun to incorporate theoretical approaches to geography and space, as well as critical spatial theories. For introductory reflections and helpful discussions of scholarship to date, see Gert T. M. Prinsloo and Christl Maier, "Introduction: Place, Space and Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean World," in *Constructions of Space V: Place, Space and Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean World*, ed. Gert T. M. Prinsloo and Christl Maier, LHBOT 576 (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013); Patrick Schreiner, "Space, Place and Biblical Studies: A Survey of Recent Research in Light of Developing Trends," *CurBR* 14 (2016): 340–71; Eric C. Stewart, "New Testament Space/Spatiality," *BTB* 42 (2012): 139–50.

²⁸ David G. Horrell, "Disciplining Performance and 'placing' the Church: Widows, Elders and Slaves in the Household of God (1 Tim 5,1-6,2)," in *1 Timothy Reconsidered*, ed. Karl P. Donfried, Monographische Reihe von "Benedictina." Biblisch-Ökumenische Abteilung 18 (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 109–34.

²⁹ Zamfir, *Men and Women in the Household of God*, 85–97.

³⁰ Adela Yarbro Collins, "The Female Body as Social Space in 1 Timothy," *NTS* 57 (2011): 155–75; cf. Gail Corrington Streeter, "Askesis and Resistance in the Pastoral Letters," in *Asceticism and the New Testament*, ed. Leif E. Vaage and Vincent L. Wimbush (New York: Routledge, 1999), 311–13.

³¹ See 1 Tim 5:14 (οἰκοδεσποτεῖν); Titus 2:5 (εἶναι... οἰκουροῦς). Plutarch, *Conj. praec.* (9) 139c says that the "prudent woman" should "stay at home and be hidden when [her husband] is not present" (τὴν δὲ σώφρονα γυναῖκα δεῖ... οἰκουρεῖν δὲ καὶ κρύπτεσθαι μὴ παρόντος). Plutarch, *Quaest. rom.* 288e, says that "like a cube, a woman should be fixed, staying at home, and difficult to move" (δεῖ... τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα καθάπερ τὸν κύβον ἐδραῖον καὶ οἰκουρὸν καὶ δυσμετακίνητον).

³² Bruce J. Malina and Jerome H. Neyrey suggest that gender and geography were constitutive elements of the worldview of many inhabitants of the Roman empire: "The primary way they made sense of their local world was in

The Pastor not only puts members of the church in their proper places, but he also articulates the location of the opponents vis-à-vis those idealized domestic and ecclesial arrangements. This tactic is especially notable at 2 Tim 3:6, where the teaching of the opponents is depicted as a depraved subversion of household boundaries, where the opponents are those who "sneak in" (οἱ ἐνδύοντες) to houses to take "silly little ladies" (γυναικάρια) as prisoners. This metaphor denotes individuals who are destructive in their effects on women in their homes. Conjuring a vivid image of domestic interference that correlates nicely with the one just cited, the Pastor implies in the letter to Titus that by their deviation from the proper teaching, these opponents "overturn whole households by their teaching" (ὅλους οἴκους ἀνατρέπουσιν διδάσκοντες [Titus 1:11]), and the result is upheaval and social unrest. With the heavy emphasis on the house both as a metaphor for God's church and as the "proper" place for women to pursue virtue through loving their husbands and raising their children,³³ the transgression of the domestic threshold becomes an even more egregious violation of proper religious and social boundaries.³⁴

In all three Pastorals, the Pastor repeatedly uses movement metaphors that presuppose place and derive their potency from the idea of transgressing the boundaries that constitute

terms of gender and geography, by viewing spatially situated persons as well as things as male and female" (*Portraits of Paul: An Archaeology of Ancient Personality* [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1996], 17). Cf. Neyrey's more recent essay complicating the simple dichotomy of public and private, "'Teaching You in Public and from House to House' (Acts 20.20): Unpacking a Cultural Stereotype," *JSNT* 26 (2003): 69–102. With regard to the place of women in Corinthian ideologies of space and worship, see Jorunn Økland, *Women in Their Place: Paul and the Corinthian Discourse of Gender and Sanctuary Space*, *JSNTSup* 269 (London: T&T Clark International, 2004). On the conception of female virtue vis-à-vis the home, see Huizenga, *Philosophers of the Household*. Jens Herzer's recent push to abandon the household as an organizing principle in the PE is in my judgment faulty ("Rearranging the 'House of God': A New Perspective on the Pastoral Epistles"). While he valuably points out that οἶκος θεοῦ is predominately a term for the temple in the LXX and that scholars have underestimated the significance of the ἐκκλησία in the PE as a temple, he creates a false dichotomy in the process, pitting "household" against "temple" in a way that obscures the important symbiosis that exists between the terms for the Pastor.

³³ 1 Tim 5:14; Titus 2:4–5. Cf. 1 Tim 2:15.

³⁴ This strategy is not unique to the Pastorals, of course. With reference to the idea of domestic intrusion in particular, we might point out that Plutarch develops the metaphor of invasion in reference to the "busybody" (ὁ πολυπράγμων) who flings the doors open, slips through (διαδύεται) "like a wind [or a spirit?]" (ὡς πνεῦμα), then creeps (διέρπει) through the house looking for debauchery. See *Curios*. 516f–517a.

proper place. These figures of speech, in some cases, constitute what some might wish to call "dead metaphors," i.e., metaphors that have lost their initial vibrancy and the capacity to produce dissonance or tension that living metaphors do for the native speaker's ear—in essence, the force of what makes a metaphor compelling.³⁵ However, while we must certainly recognize that with time "missing the mark of the truth" may not call to mind the vivid imagery of archery or target practice and its positive associations with accuracy, the journey from life to death for a metaphor is never easy to locate in time or usage.³⁶ Furthermore, even "dead" metaphors are still metaphors, and there always remains the potential for resurrection. As they become commonplace, their "initial web of implications"³⁷ becomes more muted, but not impossible to recall. Thus, while some of the figures of speech outlined below might appear to be abstractions, I suggest that their frequency and density of occurrence in these short letters suggests a particular recognizable function in the Pastorals. These turns of phrase conjure a spatialized approach to the moral cosmos. They function as live metaphors insofar as they continue to open up new semantic possibilities by tapping into associative networks of familiar or known subjects.

The Pastor's lexicon of locomotion is rich for such a short amount of text, and it is noteworthy that many of the verbs of movement used in the Pastorals are distinctive to them within the *Corpus Paulinum* (ἀποστρέφειν,³⁸ ἀποτρέπειν, ἀστοχεῖν,³⁹ βυθίζειν, ἐκστρέφειν, ἐκτρέπειν,

³⁵ Soskice outlines three rough guidelines for identifying dead metaphors: 1) dissipation of dissonance produced, 2) it is relatively easy to paraphrase them, and 3) the fading of the relevant model initially invoked by the metaphor (Janet Martin Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985], 73).

³⁶ Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language*, 71–83.

³⁷ Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language*, 73.

³⁸ The lone exception is Rom 11:26, in a quotation of Isa 59:20.

³⁹ The notion of movement is entailed, I would suggest, in the idea of "shooting wide" or "deviating from" conveyed by the term ἀστοχεῖν. Cf. *BDAG*, 146: "to go astray by departing from moral or spiritual standards, *miss, fail, deviate, depart*" (italics original).

ἐμπίπτειν, ἐνδύνειν, περιίτασο and παραιτεῖσθαι).⁴⁰ This strategy of spatially depicting theological deviance is an aspect of the Pastorals that is not absent from the Pauline homologoumena (cf. Gal 1:6; 2:4; 1 Cor 5:5, 13), but is especially pronounced in the Pastorals. This aspect of the Pastorals serves as a further category of evidence suggesting that these letters were penned by a single, post-Pauline author whose strategies of delegitimization and attack are consistent across the three letters.

1. Departing from the Right Place to the Wrong Place

The departure from the ideological space sanctioned by the Pastor is a significant component of his strategy. This departure is imagined by the Pastor in a variety of ways. For instance, it might be marked as prevention of (κωλύειν [1 Tim 4:3]), abstention from (ἀπέχεσθαι [1 Tim 4:3]), or rejection of (ἀπόβλητον [1 Tim 4:4]) divinely sanctioned activities such as marriage (γαμεῖν) or food (βρώματα or κτίσμα [1 Tim 4:3–4]). Alternatively, the Pastor imagines the rejection or departure from the right things as being closely connected to the adherence to the wrong things. The younger widows of 1 Tim 5:12 are said to have "set aside the first faith" (ὅτι τὴν πρώτην πίστιν ἠθέτησαν). Those deemed to be theological deviants⁴¹ who "deviate from" (ἀστοχεῖν)⁴² "love" (1

⁴⁰ The meaning of the term παραιτεῖσθαι in the PE is to "reject" (1 Tim 4:7, 5:11) or perhaps even as strong as "drive out" (suggested by *BDAG*, 764 for Titus 3:10). This "rejection" thus conveys a distancing or keeping at arm's length of unsavory teachings or people.

⁴¹ Cf. *Did. apost.* 15.3, where the communal rebuke of the errant individual (ὁ ἀστοχοῦν) is prescribed and detailed.

⁴² Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 20, gloss it as "to renounce," but only for 1 Tim 1:6; at 1 Tim 6:21 they translate "have fallen away from." Only at 2 Tim 2:18 do they translate as "missed the mark." They say that the "language of the Pastorals has enriched the NT with good Greek expressions" and they point also to ματαιολογία and ματαιολόγος as belonging to higher Koine (20–21).

Tim 1:6), "faith" (1 Tim 6:21), and "truth" (2 Tim 2:18).⁴³ They are thus described as departing from key moral virtues, here depicted as some of the central virtues of Pauline Christianity.

The Pastor's way of narrating moral departure is not unique to Christian sources, of course. The Pastor's contemporary, Plutarch, uses the term ἀστοχεῖν to show deviation from something that is "proper" (ἀστοχεῖν . . . τοῦ πρέποντος),⁴⁴ or to miss the mark (ἀστοχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ).⁴⁵ He can also use the term to describe morally suspect individuals as "akratic": "we call those who miss the mark with regard to meals and sexual pleasures and bouts of drinking . . . akratic" (τοὺς μὲν περὶ ἐδωδὰς καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ πότους ἀστοχοῦντας . . . ἀκρατεῖς προσαγορεύομεν).⁴⁶ Plutarch also uses the term with regards to theological discourse, when Cleombrotus (*Def. orac.* 414f) says that both those who theorize that god is maximally responsible and those who remove responsibility from god altogether "shoot wide of what is moderate and fitting" (ἀστοχοῦσι τοῦ μετρίου καὶ πρέποντος).⁴⁷ By describing them with this term, the Pastor also locates his opponents on the moral periphery, beyond the "fixed target" of "the faith" and its corollaries, intimating that they have crossed the boundary of what is acceptable, perhaps especially with reference to their research and inquiry.⁴⁸ The Pastor expresses concern that individuals may "turn away/outward"

⁴³ The term is derived from στόχος, meaning "erected pillar, post, mark, fixed target." Thus the compound ἀστοχος "missing the target." The denominative στοχάζομαι means "to target, shoot, seek to achieve, guess, conjecture, explore." See Robert Beekes (with the assistance of Lucien van Beek), "στόχος," *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*, Indo-European Etymological Dictionaries Online, ed. Alexander Lubotsky (Brill Online, 2015). Louw & Nida (31.68) define this term as "to go astray as the result of departing from the truth — 'to abandon the truth, to lose one's way.'" The term seems to have been applied especially to intellectual inquiry, both the activity of 'guessing, conjecturing, exploring.' The formation of the verb with the alpha privative constitutes the failure to achieve that goal. Cf. Polybius, *Hist.* 3.21.9–10, which narrates the importance of obtaining accuracy (ἀκρίβεια) concerning the matter of treaties between Rome and Carthage, with the result of an "agreed upon consideration" (τις ὁμολογουμένη θεωρία) of the matters.

⁴⁴ *Galb.* 1059f.

⁴⁵ *Quaest. conv.* 724c., with regard to an archer who refuses to pray to Apollo.

⁴⁶ *Quaest. conv.* 705c. Plutarch says that these are attended by "many diseases and financial destruction" (νόσοι τε πολλὰ καὶ χρημάτων ὀλεθροί).

⁴⁷ *Def. orac.* 414f.

⁴⁸ See further Chapter 3.

(ἐκτρέπειν) "to vain speech" (εἰς ματαιλογίαν [1 Tim 1:6]),⁴⁹ "turn away after Satan" (ὀπίσω τοῦ σατανᾶ [1 Tim 5:15]) or "turn away to myths" (ἐπὶ τοὺς μύθους [2 Tim 4:4]).⁵⁰

At times, the Pastor uses turning imagery to describe a severe, seemingly irremediable instance of deviation. The "factions person" (αἵρετικὸς ἄνθρωπος)⁵¹ at Titus 3:10–11 has "turned aside" or is "perverted" (ἐκστρέφειν). Similarly, the Pastor uses the term ἀποστρέφειν ("turn away") to indicate rejection or movement "away" from. In Titus 1:14 the Pastor prescribes sharp rebuke for the Cretans in order to restore them to good health in "the faith" and prevent them from "devoting themselves to Jewish myths and commands of men who are turning away from the truth" (μὴ προσέχοντες Ἰουδαϊκοῖς μύθοις καὶ ἐντολαῖς ἀνθρώπων ἀποστρεφόμενων τὴν ἀλήθειαν). In 2 Tim 4:4 "Paul" warns of those who "will turn away from the hearing of the truth and will turn to myths" (ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀποστρέψουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς μύθους ἐκτραπήσονται). The "turning" of these people indicates their separation from the locus of truth, and departure out into a space of theological deviance, where "myths" and merely human commandments predominate. Interestingly, two of these three uses of the term ἀποστρέφειν occur with a mention of ἀλήθεια, and the other refers to Paul himself (2 Tim 1:15). Thus, the penchant of the Pastor to identify Paul

⁴⁹ The opposite direction, from vain things to the most high God, may be observed in Odes Sol 11:9: "I turned from vain things to the most high God" (ἐξετράπην τῶν ματαιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ὑψιστον θεόν). BDAG, 311. BDAG notes that this term, in the passive, is a medical *technicus terminus*, used for dislocation. This sense of dislocation is preferred by Aida Besançon Spencer, *1 Timothy: A New Covenant Commentary*, NCCS (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014), 27–28. At least one of the three sources cited by BDAG for this translation (Dioscorides, *Mat. med.* 2.15) does not support the notion of dislocation in the sense of being wrenched, but refers to an "everted or prolapsed anus" (cf. ἔδραν δὲ ἐκτρεπομένην ἢ προπίπτουσαν).

⁵⁰ A nice comparandum to this expression comes from Galen (*SMT* 11.792K). Referring to a well-known treatise by the first-century CE lexicographer and grammarian Pamphilus, Galen writes: "Thus did Pamphilus also produce a treatise *On Plants*. But he turned some away to old-lady myths and some to ridiculous Egyptian charlatanries together with some incantations, which they utter while gathering plants" (οὕτω δὲ καὶ Πάμφιλος ἐποίησατο τὴν περὶ τῶν βοτανῶν πραγματείαν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος μὲν εἰς τε μύθους γραῶν τινὰς ἐξετράπετο καὶ τινὰς γοητείας Αἰγυπτίας ληρώδεις ἅμα τισὶν ἐπωδαῖς, ἃς ἀναιρούμενοι τὰς βοτάνας ἐπιλέγουσι). Cf. the abbreviated form in BDAG, 311: Πάμφιλος εἰς μύθους γραῶν ἐξετράπετο.

⁵¹ The translation "factions" for αἵρετικός is given by BDAG, 28, s.v.

and his message with salvation finds a further iteration here.⁵² For the Pastor, to turn away from truth is to turn away from Paul.

The ominous end-times predictions of the Pastor also depend upon spatially-oriented terminology. "In the latter times some shall fall away from the faith, adhering to deceptive [or wandering] spirits and the doctrines of demons" (ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς ἀποστήσονται τινες προσέχοντες πνεύμασιν πλάνοις καὶ διδασκαλίαις δαιμονίων [1 Tim 4:1]). 2 Tim 3:1 strikes a similar note: "Know this, that in the last days hard times will come" (τοῦτο δὲ γίνωσκε, ὅτι ἐνστήσονται καιροὶ χαλεποί). Likewise, the "advancement" of opponents in the wrong direction is conceived of as occurring in the future: "for they will advance in impiety all the more" (ἐπὶ πλεῖον γὰρ προκόψουσιν ἀσεβείας [2 Tim 2:16]). This comment is conjoined with the warning that the λόγος of these individuals "will have a spread like gangrene" (ὡς γάγγραινα νομὴν ἔξει [2 Tim 2:17]). We will scrutinize the medical aspect of this contagious spread in Chapter 3, but here we can simply note the sense of danger attached to the kinetic spread of this teaching. With an ironic twist, the Pastor can say that they "will not advance further" (οὐ προκόψουσιν ἐπὶ πλεῖον [2 Tim 3:9]), but not much later he returns to the grave warning, "Wicked people and charlatans will advance for the worse" (πονηροὶ δὲ ἄνθρωποι καὶ γόητες προκόψουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον [2 Tim 3:13]).

⁵² Karoline Läger well articulates the centrality of Paul in the Pastor's conception of salvation "Paulus—Paulus allein!—ist für die soteriologische Konzeption der Pastoralbriefe integriert. Als Mittler und Garant der Rettungsbotschaft, die er mit eigener Person verkörpert (1 Tim 1,12–17), wird Paulus selbst zur Botschaft; die 'Paulologie' der Pastoralbriefe tritt der Christologie gegenüber in den Vordergrund. Die Heilsbedeutung *seines* Paulus ist das grundlegende Axiom des Verfassers: *extra Paulum nostrum nulla salus*" (*Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe*, Hamburger theologische Studien 12 [Münster: LIT, 1996], 177). See also Abraham J. Malherbe, "Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners": Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology*, ed. J. G. Van der Watt, NovTSup 121 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 332 who cites Läger approvingly.

2. Staying in the Right or Proper Place

Since his cosmos is ordered in accordance with principles of place, one rhetorical strategy employed by the Pastor is to use language suggesting fixity.⁵³ The Pastor employs architectural terminology in order to convey this principle. For instance, at 1 Tim 3:15 the Pastor argues regarding the οἶκος θεοῦ, which he identifies as the ἐκκλησία θεοῦ ζώντος, that it is a "pillar and pedestal for the truth" (στῦλος καὶ ἐδραῖωμα τῆς ἀληθείας).⁵⁴ In 2 Tim 2:19, the Pastor uses more architectural imagery, when he writes: "Nevertheless, the firm foundation of God stands, having this seal" (ὁ μέντοι στερεὸς θεμέλιος τοῦ θεοῦ ἔστηκεν, ἔχων τὴν σφραγίδα ταύτην). Immediately following in 2 Tim 2:20 is a metaphor concerning the kinds of vessels "in a great house" (ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ οἰκίᾳ). This explicitly construction-oriented language is accompanied by language suggesting certainty (διαβεβαιοῦσθαι), whether it is well-placed (Titus 3:8) or not (1 Tim 1:7).

The Pastor's language of permanence of position contributes to the idealization of fixity and stability. Though the interpretation of the phrase σωθήσεται δὲ διὰ τῆς τεκνογονίας 1 Tim 2:15 is vexed, we can note that permanency and persistence in a set of ideals is indicated by the phrase "if they remain (μεινῶσιν) in faith and love and sanctification with self-control." Similarly, Timothy is urged by Paul: "Attend to yourself and to the teaching, persevere in them" (ἔπεχε σεαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, ἐπίμενε αὐτοῖς [1 Tim 4:16]); "*abide* in requests and prayers night and

⁵³ Here the Pastor follows Paul's example, in language reminiscent of Paul's own. Cf. 1 Cor 15:58 (ἐδραῖοι γίνεσθε, ἀμετακίνητοι) and also Col 1:23 (εἴ γε ἐπιμένετε τῇ πίστει τεθεμελιωμένοι καὶ ἐδραῖοι καὶ μὴ μετακινούμενοι).

⁵⁴ Noteworthy here is that in 1 Cor 15:58 being ἐδραῖος, "steadfast," is associated with being ἀμετακίνητος, "unmoved." On the apparent neologism ἐδραῖωμα, see Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 294–95. Johnson, AB, 231, reads the phrase as a delayed apposition to the phrase πῶς δεῖ ἐν οἴκῳ θεοῦ ἀναστρέφεισθαι. He appeals to 1 Tim 1:7 as a comparable instance of delayed apposition, but the sequence of subordinate substantive participles there does not provide a good comparison for 1 Tim 3:15, and one wonders, if Johnson were correct, why the Pastor did not provide some sort of resumptive adverb (e.g., ὥς), which would have made the comparison clear. Furthermore, reading στῦλος καὶ ἐδραῖωμα as the prescription for "how to live" severs the connection between 3:1–13, 3:14, and 3:15. In context, the instructions of 3:1–13 are the antecedent of ταῦτα, which "Paul" says he is writing (3:14) with the hopes of coming to Timothy quickly, but with cognizance of the possibility of his delay (3:15). It is those instructions that constitute the know-how for behavior in the house of God.

day" (προσμένει ταῖς δεήσεσιν καὶ ταῖς προσευχαῖς νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας [1 Tim 5:5]); "But you *remain* in what you have learned and become convinced of" (σὺ δὲ μένε ἐν οἷς ἔμαθες καὶ ἐπιστώθης [2 Tim 3:14]). Timothy is told, "hold fast to reading, exhorting, teaching" (1 Tim 4:13), and to practice these things (ταῦτα μελέτα), such that he inhabits them: "*be in* these things" (ἐν τούτοις ἴσθι [1 Tim 5:15]). The Paul of 2 Timothy muses that he is "enduring all things" (πάντα ὑπομένειν) for the sake of the elect (διὰ τοὺς ἐκλεκτούς [2 Tim 2:10]).⁵⁵ By virtue of having Paul "endure" or "stand firm," the Pastor imbues Paul with the same qualities of steadiness and permanence as Timothy. In relationship to the truth, their position is unwavering and fixed, and this characterization is used as a complement to the idea of being spatially centered and fixed in place.

3. Coming to the Right Place

In addition to creating a sense of the "right place" through language denoting fixity and stability, the Pastor also uses terms and images that encourage coming to, being placed in, or adhering to that place or thing that represents the Pastor's sense of propriety.⁵⁶ Paul is said to have been "appointed for ministry" (θέμενος εἰς διακονίαν 1 Tim 1:12) and to have been appointed for the gospel as "herald and apostle" (εἰς ὃ ἐτέθην ἐγὼ κῆρυξ καὶ ἀπόστολος 1 Tim 2:7), and also as "teacher" (cf. 2 Tim 1:11, where it is added to the exact same phrase: εἰς ὃ ἐτέθην ἐγὼ κῆρυξ καὶ ἀπόστολος καὶ διδάσκαλος). The laying on of hands (ἐπιθέσις 1 Tim 4:14; 2 Tim 1:6) links to this language of appointment and serves to mark someone as sanctioned, though bestowing this mark of approval should not be done with haste (χεῖρας ταχέως μηδὲν ἐπιτιθέναι [1 Tim 5:22]). The Pastor imagines the "recognition of the truth" as something that one might "come to" (εἰς

⁵⁵ Not dissimilarly, see Phil 1:24–25, where Paul suggests that it was more necessary for him to "remain. . . for you" (ἐπιμένειν. . . δι' ὑμᾶς) and that he "will stay and will abide for all of you" (μενῶ καὶ παραμενῶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν).

⁵⁶ This is in addition to the language of coming to Paul, which is treated as a distinct category below.

ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν [cf. the same phrase at 1 Tim 2:4, 2 Tim 3:7]). Once there, one is meant to stay. This is evident in phrases like "come to the healthy words" (προσέρχεται ὑγιαίνουσιν λόγοις [1 Tim 6:3]), "following in my teaching" (παρηκολούθησάς μου τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ [2 Tim 3:10]), and "cling to the faithful word that accords with the teaching" (Titus 1:9). Timothy is meant to "pursue righteousness" (δίωκε δὲ δικαιοσύνην [1 Tim 6:11; 2 Tim 2:22]), along with other virtues, such as "piety, faith, love, endurance, a gentle disposition"⁵⁷ (1 Tim 6:11) and "faith, love, peace" (2 Tim 2:22). These virtues that one must seek out and follow are located by the Pastor in the teaching of Paul about Jesus Christ, the "deposit" (παραθήκη), the exclusive location of theological rectitude that must be guarded (1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 1:12, 14) like the sacrosanct center of a holy site.

4. Avoiding the Wrong People, Activities, or Things

Language of fleeing or avoiding (non-spatial) conceptual entities such as "lusts" (cf. ἐπιθυμίας φεῦγε [2 Tim 2:22]) serves to reify and spatialize them and locate them in the Pastor's cartographic emplotment of truth and morality.⁵⁸ Speaking of "irrational and harmful lusts" along with the love of money (φιλαργυρία), the Pastor urges Timothy: "flee these things" (ταῦτα φεῦγε [1 Tim 6:11]).⁵⁹ Similarly, perhaps invoking passages like Isa 26:13, the Pastor exhorts: "Let everyone who names the name of the Lord depart from injustice" (ἀποστήτω ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πᾶς ὁ ὀνομάζων τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου [2 Tim 2:19]). Timothy is to "turn away" (ἐκτρέπεσθαι) "depraved babble

⁵⁷ This translation of *πραῦτα* suggested by Frederick W. Danker and Kathryn Krug, *The Concise Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 296.

⁵⁸ Note too that in 1 Tim 5:24 *ἁμαρτίαι* are conceived of as either "going in advance to judgment" or "following upon" (αἱ ἁμαρτίαι πρόδηλοί εἰσιν προάγουσαι εἰς κρίσιν, τισὶν δὲ καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσιν). There are sins on the move, mobile moral malignancies. The term *προάγειν* is used also to describe the *προφητεία* regarding Timothy (1 Tim 1:18).

⁵⁹ Paul only uses the term *φεύγειν* twice. In 1 Cor 6:18 Paul tells his Corinthian audience to "flee porneia" (φεύγετε τὴν πορνείαν), and in 1 Cor 10:14 he tells them to "flee from idolatry" (φεύγετε ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλολατρίας). Porneia and idolatry are often associated and cast as characteristically Gentile pursuits (e. g., Wisd. 14:9–12; *T. Reuben* 4b-8a; Rom 1:22–27; Rev 2:14, 20).

and the antitheses of falsely-called knowledge" (1 Tim 6:20).⁶⁰ Titus is urged: "turn away from (περίστασο) foolish inquiries and genealogies and contentions and legal battles" (3:9). Timothy receives similar exhortations: "turn away from profane, empty blather" (βεβήλους κενοφωνίας περίστασο [2 Tim 2:16]), and "reject foolish and uneducated inquiries" (τὰς δὲ μωρὰς καὶ ἀπαιδέτους ζητήσεις παραιτοῦ [2 Tim 2:23]). The Pastor's goal for Titus's audience is that they "not adhere (μὴ προσέχειν) to Jewish myths and human commandments" (Titus 1:14). That the Pastor places certain people in the same category of teachings and things to be avoided becomes evident when the same vocabulary is applied to both people and things. For instance, the Pastor can urge Titus to "reject a factious⁶¹ person after a first and second admonition" (αἰρετικὸν ἄνθρωπον μετὰ μίαν καὶ δευτέραν νουθεσίαν παραιτοῦ [Titus 3:10]) and Timothy to "reject younger widows" (νεωτέρας δὲ χήρας παραιτοῦ [1 Tim 5:11]) just as readily as he can urge Timothy to "reject the profane old-lady myths" (τοὺς δὲ βεβήλους καὶ γραῶδεις μύθους παραιτοῦ [1 Tim 4:7]).⁶²

5. (In)Subordination

Principles of right place and ordered space predominate in the Pastorals. In several passages, the Pastor conveys this quality of "proper" order through the concept of subordination (the English term being derived from Latin *sub* ["under"] and *ordinatio* ["ordering"], being "placed under"),

⁶⁰ The importance of this term in the structure of 1 Tim is noteworthy, since along with ἀστοχεῖν it is constructed in a chiasmic pattern forming an inclusio at the end of the letter (1:6 ἀστοχήσαντες ἐξετράπησαν... 6:20–21 ἐκτρεπόμενος . . . ἡστόχησαν). Commentators have noted the connections between the beginning and end of the letter (e.g., Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 74, 429–30).

⁶¹ For this translation, see BDAG, 28.

⁶² The παραιτεῖσθαι means "reject," and has the sense of moving away from something. In the NT, this term occurs in this sense of "reject" or "repudiate," i.e., bring about distance between you and it, only in the Pastorals (1 Tim 4:7, 5:11; 2 Tim 2:23; Titus 3:10). See Gustav Stählin, "παραιτέομαι," *TDNT* 1.195. Stählin notes that this term can be used of rejecting something (e.g., P. Oxy. 10.1252 v28 where a magistracy [ἡ ἀρχή] is rejected), or someone. See, for example, Josephus, *Ant.* 7.167, where Amnon orders his servants to send away (παραιτήσασθαι) anyone who came to the door while he made his attempt upon Tamar. Stählin points also to DL 6.82, where we find the story of Monimus of Syracuse, a Cynic philosopher who was a pupil of Diogenes, who feigned madness (μανίαν προσποιηθεὶς) with the result that his owner (δεσπότης) rejected him (παρητήσατο), that is to say, sent him away from his employ.

which conveys a sense of enforced hierarchy. Wives are to be "in complete subordination" (ἐν πάσῃ ὑποταγῇ) at 1 Timothy 2:11, and they are to be "subordinate to their own husbands" (ὑποτασσομένας τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν) at Titus 2:5. In Titus 2:9 slaves likewise are to be "subordinate to their own masters in all things" (δούλους ἰδίοις δεσπόταις ὑποτάσσεσθαι ἐν πᾶσιν). Stated positively, children are also to be "in subordination" (ἐν ὑποταγῇ at 1 Tim 3:4), and stated negatively, they are not to be "insubordinate" (ἀνυπότακτα at Titus 1:6). The category of (in)subordination is expanded to encompass believers and opponents more generally, since we learn in Titus 1:10 that "there are many who are insubordinate" (εἰσὶν γὰρ πολλοὶ [καὶ] ἀνυπότακτοι), and at Titus 3:1 we find the Pastor urging his delegate, "remind them to be subordinate to ruling authorities, to obey authority" (ὑπομίμνησκε αὐτοὺς ἀρχαῖς ἐξουσίαις ὑποτάσσεσθαι, πειθαρχεῖν). The language of προϊστάναί also conveys a notion of control and subordination, and is at home in texts that pertain to the maintenance of an οἶκος.⁶³ Though with an adverb such as καλῶς the term is best translated "rule well" or some such, the etymology of the term suggests being "placed" "before" or "ahead of" or "at the head of" something.⁶⁴ Thus, "having children in subordination" is characteristic of "ruling one's own household well" (ἰδίου οἴκου καλῶς προϊστάμενον [1 Tim 3:4]). Care for God's ἐκκλησία is not possible "if someone does not know how to rule one's own household" (εἰ δέ τις τοῦ ἰδίου οἴκου προστῆναι οὐκ οἶδεν [1 Tim 3:5]).⁶⁵ Deacons are meant to "rule well their children

⁶³ Cf. the use of the term by Philodemus who references "the care and preservation which are appropriate for the one managing according to his manner" (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ τήρησις, ὅση πρέπει τῷ κατὰ τρόπον αὐτοῦ προεστῶτι [*De oec.* 14.9–12]). In 20.39–40 we hear of those "managing money" ([π]ρ[ο]εσ]τῶτες χρημάτων). Malherbe notes that προϊστημι and ἐπιμελέομαι are used extensively in treatises on household management, and are virtually synonymous (Abraham J. Malherbe, "Overseers as Household Managers in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959-2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 [Leiden: Brill, 2014], 1.565–567).

⁶⁴ See the discussion of Marshall, ICC, 331 n. 97.

⁶⁵ Authors of treatises on οἰκονομία presumed that the activities of property management revealed virtue or vice (see Voula Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus* [Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007], 164). Very similar to the idea that one must observe how someone conducts their business before entrusting them with the care of others is the idea expressed in [Isocrates], *Demon.* 35: "Whenever you are about make use of someone as counselor

and their own households" (τέκνων καλῶς προϊστάμενοι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων οἴκων [1 Tim 3:12]). Rewards await for the "elders who have ruled well" (οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι [1 Tim 5:17]). Though the phrase καλῶν ἔργων προϊστασθαι (Titus 3:8, 14) is typically translated "engage in" or simply "do" good deeds, we may just as readily align the term with its other meanings and translate "lead in good deeds." The use of the term in each instance thus draws upon a sense of being out in front of or on top of, being a ruler or a leader.

Domestic intrusion is a further kind of spatial impropriety attributed to the opponents by the Pastor. The Pastor characterizes his opponents as engaging in a kind of kinetic deviance that relies upon idealized notions of domestic space no less than the above discussion of proper ordering of the household. After a lengthy list of moral degenerates who will arise in the last days (2 Tim 3:1–4), in 2 Tim 3:6 the Pastor uses an image of devious burglary for his opponents, who are described as those "who slip into/worm into"⁶⁶ (οἱ ἐνδύνοντες) the houses in order to "take captive little ladies" (αἰχμαλωτίζοντες γυναικάρια)⁶⁷ who have themselves been "heaped up" (σεσωρεύσθαι) with sins.⁶⁸ The force of the innuendo is accomplished by tacit appeal to the notion

concerning your affairs, observe first how he arranges his own. For the one having thought badly about his own household affairs will never counsel well about someone else's" (ὅταν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ μέλλῃς τινὶ συμβούλῳ χρῆσθαι, σκόπει πρῶτον πῶς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ διώκησεν· ὁ γὰρ κακῶς διανοηθεὶς περὶ τῶν οἰκείων οὐδέποτε καλῶς βουλευέσεται περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων).

⁶⁶ The gloss offered by *BDAG*, 333.

⁶⁷ The noun γυναικάριον is a diminutive form of γυνή, and 2 Tim 3:6 constitutes only the second recorded instance of the term in Greek literature (the first being by the 5th BCE comic Diocles (*Frag.* 11). BDF 111.3 suggest that the diminutive is derogatory (though without explanation), and commentators have taken up the suggestion (e.g., Quinn-Wacker, *The First and Second Letters to Timothy*, 725). Epictetus uses the term of Helen, calling her a "lovely little lady" (κομψὸν γυναικάριον) at *Diatr.* 2.22.24. At *Diatr.* 3.22.36–37 the adjective μοιχική ("adulterous") accompanies the term, and again alludes to Helen. At *Diatr.* 2.18.18 the term is used of a temptress. In *Ench.* 7 the term has no derogatory connotations, and is used in conjunction with other diminutives. Marcus Aurelius attaches no particular connotation to it, though in context it does not seem to have a positive or even neutral sense (*Med.* 5.11.1). Irenaeus is the first Christian author to invoke the term, almost certainly as an allusion to 2 Tim (*Haer.* 1.7.5). Origen modifies the term with the adjective εὐεξαπάτητος, indicating perhaps that he understood the diminutive to indicate lesser intelligence (*Cels.* 6.24).

⁶⁸ Cf. 2 Tim 4:3, where "they will heap up teachers for themselves" (ἐαυτοῖς ἐπισωρεύουσιν διδασκάλους). See also Barn. 4.6, where the phrase is used in anti-Jewish polemic (cf. ἐπισωρεύοντας ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν λέγοντας ὅτι ἡ διαθήκη ὑμῶν ὑμῖν μένει).

that the home is a sacrosanct barrier against the immoral world outside. However, the Pastor implicates the women inside these homes as well, suggesting that they are "led" (ἄγεσθαι) by manifold lusts. While ἐνδύνειν suggests a transgression of the domestic threshold, at Titus 1:11 we see the wholesale disruption of the domestic space by those "who overturn entire households" (οἵτινες ὅλους οἴκους ἀνατρέπουσιν).⁶⁹ Here the language of infiltration suggests a transgression of boundaries that intimates a deterioration of the domestic ideal envisioned by the Pastor.⁷⁰

6. Descent

A downward motion, a descent into darkness, as it were, is indicated by the verb ἐμπίπτειν, employed in the Pastorals to warn against falling into the "judgment" (κρίμα) of the διάβολος (1 Tim 3:6), or "into reproach and the devil's snare" (1 Tim 3:7). Just prior to the language of sinking in 1 Tim 6:10 we see that the fate of those who desire wealth is "fall[ing] into temptation and a snare and many irrational and harmful lusts" (1 Tim 6:9). It is of no little consequence that this term for falling has as its object a prepositional phrase in which the devil is prominent (1 Tim 3:6, 7) or implied (1 Tim 6:9). The devil lurks, at least in these phrases, in the moral space imagined as being "down below." For the Pastor, below is one area where the devil's realm of authority is located. The Pastor uses this phrase in particular with regard to appointing a "young man" as bishop, lest he "fall in" (ἐμπίπτειν) to "the judgment of the devil" (1 Tim 3:6), and "reproach and the devil's snare" (1 Tim 3:7). Similarly, "teaching differently" (ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖν) is

⁶⁹ Faith, too, is something that can be "overturned" by the nefarious preaching of the opponents (cf. ἀνατρέπουσιν τὴν τινῶν πίστιν [2 Tim 2:18]).

⁷⁰ Of course, the moral significance of such boundary violations depends upon the objectives of the author. Judith Perkins suggests regarding some of the apocryphal acts that instances in which women's chambers and prisons are depicted as easily penetrated or escaped from indicate the reconstitution of power relations between Christians and society "through their narrative recoding of some of the dominant spatial categories of their culture" ("Social Geography in the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles," in *Space in the Ancient Novel*, ed. Michael Paschalis and Stavros A. Frangoulidis [Groningen: Barkhuis, 2002], 118).

paired with "not applying oneself to" (or "coming toward" [πρὸς+ἔρχεσθαι]) the healthy words of Jesus Christ and the teaching that accords with piety (1 Tim 6:3). The locus of health, truth, and piety are with Jesus Christ, whom Paul proclaims, and everything outside that locus is what constitutes the sick and impious. We see a similar ideological construction of space with the term βυθίζειν. The irrational and harmful lusts "plunge" (βυθίζειν) those who overvalue money into ruin and destruction (1 Tim 6:9). The shipwreck (ναυαγεῖν) of 1 Tim 1:20 is hereby called to mind with a term that indicates sinking.⁷¹ They are plunged down, below the surface. Their motion is not upward towards God, but downward towards the abyss and its destruction.⁷²

7. Aimless Wandering

While many of the examples so far have been concerned with departing from or arriving at some conceptual place, the Pastor also utilizes language in all three letters that suggests a generalized displacement or sense of misguided or unguided wandering. Younger widows in 1 Tim 5:13 are said to be "idle" (ἄργαί), and thus sufficiently unoccupied so as to be "meandering about, house to house" (περιερχόμεναι τὰς οἰκίας).⁷³ However, the most prominent vocabulary of moral meandering is associated with the term πλανᾶν and its cognates. Though the term πλανᾶν may be used in a value-neutral sense, in the Pastorals and in Paul's letters it always indicates aberration.⁷⁴ The negative association with this verb in Paul's letters may have informed the Pastor's own use of it.

⁷¹ The references cited by *LSJ*, 333, s.v., suggest that the term βυθίζειν is often associated with nautical events, such as the sinking of a ship (cf. Sophocles, *Frag.* 552; Diodorus Siculus, *Bib. hist.* 11.18; Babrius 117.1; Plutarch *Caes.* 49), the plunging of a person into the sea (Plutarch, *Vit. aere al.* 8 [831d]), or the letting down of anchors (Themistocles, *In Aristot. phys. paraphr.* 133.20).

⁷² In late antique Greek literature, sober-mindedness (τὸ νῆφον) can be "sunk" by the passions (according to Alciphron [1.13] in the 4th CE) as well as the νοῦς by anger or lust, in Simplicius (6th CE), *in Ph.* 273.11.

⁷³ The verb is used of itinerant exorcists (Acts 19:13) and wandering (because persecuted) prophets (Heb 11:37), or to describe circumnavigation (Acts 13:6, 28:13). Harold W. Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, ed. Helmut Koester, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989), 350 n. 82 notes that in spite of the frequency of the language of motion in Hebrews, this verb occurs only once in that text.

⁷⁴ Cf. also 2 Thess 2:1.

The warning *μὴ πλανᾶσθε*, "do not be led astray," occurs three times in Paul's letters (1 Cor 6:9, 15:33; Gal 6:7), each time accompanied by a threat.

This language is used in all three letters. For instance, in 2 Tim 3:13 "wicked men and charlatans" both lead astray (*πλανᾶν*) and are led astray (*πλανᾶσθαι*). Similarly, "those desiring wealth have been led astray" (*ἀποπλανηθῆναι* [1 Tim 6:10]). In a passage that evokes the notion of a wayward former life, the Pastor uses the term *πλανώμενοι* (Titus 3:3) to describe the epoch before the savior God's kindness and love for humanity (Titus 3:4) appeared. He suggests that this former life was marked an unhealthy mental state (cf. *ἀνόητος*) and consisted of "spending life in vice and envy" (*ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ φθόνῳ διάγοντες*).⁷⁵ These examples illustrate the intersection between spatial deviance and temporality in the Pastor's moral imagination. That which is pre-Christ, such as Paul's violence and blasphemy (1 Tim 1:12, referring to what occurred formerly" [*τὸ πρότερον*]), is imagined as being remedied by another, opposite kinetic event: when "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners" (*ἦλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἁμαρτωλοὺς σῶσαι* [1 Tim 1:15]).

8. Summary

By attending closely to the language of movement, place, and space as applied to opponents and their adherents in the Pastorals, I have demonstrated that the Pastor uses an abundance of spatial and kinetic imagery in each of the three letters to locate his opponents on the outside, beyond the imagined boundaries of truth and propriety. The Pastor suggests with his usage of this kinetic language that by setting themselves up in theological opposition to Paul, his opponents are moving away from the center of truth whenever they do not "come toward" it. The Pastor thereby

⁷⁵ The fact that the *πνεύματα* of 1 Tim 4:1 are described as *πλάνα* is of course related to deception, but their mobility is also suggested; the semantic ambiguity of adjective *πλάνος* suggests that these are spirits that could either lead astray or wander.

constructs a language for theological error and rectitude that maps out in vivid terms the waywardness of those who oppose him. We saw that this strategy of spatializing opponents' deviance is closely coordinated with the pathologizing of deviance. For the Pastor, these strategies are tightly intertwined.

D. The Moral Significance of Travel

1. Introduction

Part and parcel of the Pastor's creation of a morally inflected spatial construct is the Pastor's depiction of the characters' location vis-à-vis the person of Paul. There is a great deal of coming and going in the Pastoral Epistles, both by Paul and to and away from Paul.⁷⁶ In this regard the fact that these letters are sent to two of Paul's most prominent envoys is significant. By selecting Timothy and Titus as addressees, the Pastor extends the careers, as it were, of two individuals who already in the homologoumena were doing a great deal of coming and going.⁷⁷ Similarly, the idea of Paul as a man on the move is an inherent and inherited aspect of Pauline self-portraiture. The Pastor syncs his picture of Paul with the majority of Pauline homologoumena in dubbing Paul an ἀπόστολος (1 Tim 1:1, 2:7; 2 Tim 1:1, 1:11; Titus 1:1). Slightly different is the Pastor's nominalization of a key Pauline activity. The Pastor draws the logical conclusion from all of Paul's "heralding" (κηρύσσειν),⁷⁸ that Paul is in fact a "herald" (κῆρυξ),⁷⁹ a term that is inextricably tied to the movement imagery of imperial processions.⁸⁰ At the same time, Paul's fixity is also presumed

⁷⁶ Pervo, "Romancing," 41.

⁷⁷ On Paul's envoys, see Mitchell, "New Testament Envoys"; Hermann von Lips, *Timotheus und Titus: Unterwegs für Paulus*, Biblische Gestalten 19 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2008).

⁷⁸ Frequently in the *homologoumena*, but never in noun form.

⁷⁹ 1 Tim 2:7, 2 Tim 2:11.

⁸⁰ On the herald motif, see the thorough investigation of Gerhard Friedrich, "κῆρυξ," *TDNT* 3:683–96. Friedrich (692) notes the association made by Epictetus between the Stoic philosopher and the Eleusinian κῆρυξ (cf. *Diss.*

in 2 Tim by virtue of his "chain" (2 Tim 1:16). The result is that, at least in principle, Paul remains at the center of the web in the Pastorals, even though that center can itself shift as Paul moves from one place to another. What follows is a concise exposition of how the Pastor conveys moral status through the language of nearness to or distance from Paul.

2. Constructing Spatial Morality in 1 Timothy

Timothy remains (cf. *προσμεῖναι*) where he is put (in Ephesus) as Paul goes on to Macedonia (1 Tim 1:3). Alexander and Hymenaeus are themselves "placed" by Paul, but they are put away from Paul, handed over (*παραδίδοσθαι*) by him into the realm of Satan, a moral space outside of Paul's good graces (1 Tim 1:20). Just as Paul's desire for Titus to come to him was an indication of his good standing, so too does Paul's desire to come quickly to Timothy (*ἐλπίζων ἐλθεῖν πρὸς σέ ἐν τάχει* [3:14]), though he warns of a potential delay (*ἐὰν δὲ βραδύνω* [3:15]). Similarly, Timothy's patient obedience until Paul comes (*ἕως ἔρχομαι* [4:13]) becomes an index of Timothy's status as a "true son in the faith" (*γνήσιον τέκνον ἐν πίστει* [1:2]).

3. Constructing Spatial Morality in 2 Timothy

Second Timothy offers the greatest number of examples of individuals who come or fail to come to Paul.⁸¹ Some of these individuals seem to derive from Paul's letters,⁸² while others are more

3.21.13–16). Cf. also and the work of Paul Brooks Duff, "Apostolic Suffering and the Language of Processions in 2 Corinthians 4:7–10," *BTB* 21 (1991): 158–65; Paul Brooks Duff, "Metaphor, Motif, and Meaning: The Rhetorical Strategy behind the Image 'Led in Triumph' in 2 Corinthians 2:14," *CBQ* 53 (1991): 79–92. Richard Pervo points to 1 Clem 5:6, 9:4, for the idea that Paul was a herald to the whole world, and the *Acts of Xanthippe and Polyxena* 7, and ch. 8 as well, where the phrase "Paul the Herald of God" appears on his forehead (*The Making of Paul*, 13 n. 53).

⁸¹ This is likely due to the greater number of named individuals in this letter. 2 Tim names some twenty-two individuals: Lois, Eunice, Phygelus, Hermogenes, Onesiphorus, Hymenaeus, Philetus, Demas, Crescens, Luke, Mark, Tychicus, Carpus, Alexander, Prisca, Aquila, Erastus, Trophimus, Eubulus, Pudens, Linus, Claudia. This is in addition to the historical figures like David, Jannes, Jambres, and Moses, and epistolary characters like Paul, Timothy, and Titus.

difficult to account for.⁸³ Early in the letter, the Pastor hits a somber note in Paul's sad song by having him recount his (nearly) utter abandonment: "You know this, that all those in Asia, Phygelus and Hermogenes among them, have turned away from me" (Οἶδας τοῦτο, ὅτι ἀπεστράφησάν με πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, ὧν ἐστὶν Φύγελος καὶ Ἑρμογένης [2 Tim 1:15]). Almost nonchalantly hyperbolic, this passage recounts an entire provincial region's move away from the Pauline center. By contrast, Paul lauds the "house of Onesiphorus," because "when he was in Rome he searched zealously and found me" (γενόμενος ἐν Ῥώμῃ σπουδαίως ἐζήτησέν με καὶ εὑρεν [2 Tim 1:16–17]). Timothy is described as following Paul in his teaching, way of life, and virtues (3:10; cf. 1 Tim 4:6). He is also, like Titus (Titus 3:12), urged to hasten to come to him quickly at 4:9 (σπούδασον ἐλθεῖν πρὸς με ταχέως [4:9]), and once more for emphasis at the end of the letter: "Hasten to come to me before winter" (σπούδασον πρὸ χειμῶνος ἐλθεῖν [4:20]). Paul's request for nearness is an indicator of Timothy's status, just as Demas' departure from Paul is described in moral terms: "For Demas abandoned me because he loved (ἀγαπήσας) the present age [he is not, we may note, among those who "have loved" (ἠγαπηκότες) the Lord's ἐπιφάνεια at 4:8!]⁸⁴ and went to Thessalonica"⁸⁵ (Δημᾶς γάρ με ἐγκατέλιπεν ἀγαπήσας τὸν νῦν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐπορεύθη εἰς Θεσσαλονίκην

⁸² Mark (Phlm 24), Demas (Phlm 24, Col 4:4; cf. APl 3.1), Luke (Phlm 24; cf. APl 14), Prisca and Aquila (Rom 16:3, 1 Cor 16:19), Erastus (Rom 16:23; cf. Acts 19:22), Tychicus (Col 4:7, Eph 6:21, Acts 20:4).

⁸³ Two names are shared with Acts: Trophimus (Acts 20:4), Alexander (Acts 19:33?). The following are not mentioned elsewhere in the NT: Lois, Eunice, Phygelus, Hermogenes (cf. APl 3.1, where he receives the epithet ὁ χαλκεύς, which is attributed to Alexander at 2 Tim 4:14), Onesiphorus (APl 3.2), Hymenaeus, Philetus, Crescens (cf. PolPhil. 14), Carpus, Eubulus, Pudens, Linus.

⁸⁴ Marshall, ICC, 815.

⁸⁵ Why Thessalonica? According to Acts 20:4 and 27:2, Aristarchus is a Thessalonian, and in Philem 24, Demas is mentioned with him. Is it the case that he has gone home to live a more comfortable life (so Marshall, ICC, 815), or does he perhaps continue in the Christian life (so Spicq, ÉBib, 811: Ce n'est pas une perte de la foi . . . mais un manque de fidélité. "This is not a departure from the faith... but a lack of fidelity"). Most commentators read this as a decidedly negative portrayal of Demas, and his role as an opponent of Paul in APl 3.1 suggests that later Christians read it this way as well.

[4:10]).⁸⁶ A similar note is struck when Paul recounts that "at my first defense nobody stood by me, but all abandoned me" (ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μου ἀπολογία οὐδεὶς μοι παρεγένετο ἀλλὰ πάντες με ἐγκατέλιπον [4:16]).

In 4:10 we hear that Crescens has gone to Galatia, and Titus to Dalmatia, though there is nothing to suggest that they are departing on the same terms as Demas. Rather, even though the passage is thick with pathos⁸⁷ and Paul complains that "Luke alone is with me" (4:11), the impression given by the passage is that Paul is still very much in charge of his inter-provincial network of envoys. Those who are in right standing with him (and with the truth, our author would presumably say) are subject to his direction. Timothy is ordered to bring Mark to Paul, since he is "useful to me for ministry" (μοι εὐχρηστος εἰς διακονίαν [4:11]). Mark comes because of his utility and his standing with Paul, just as surely as Tychicus (4:12) is also in service of Paul, perhaps here denoted as the fictional carrier of this second epistle to Timothy.⁸⁸ Poor Trophimus is left sick in Miletus (4:20), though the moral status of his illness is not made clear. Erastus too remained (ἔμεινεν) in Corinth (4:20), presumably at Paul's behest.⁸⁹ Lastly, and quite in contrast to 4:11 where Paul suggests that "Luke alone is with me," Paul sends greetings from several individuals (Eubulus, Pudens, Linus, Claudia) and "all the sisters and brothers with me."

⁸⁶ The rest of 4:10 mentions two others: Crescens goes to Galatia, and Titus to Dalmatia. Without further specification, we cannot presume that in the Pastor's eyes they too have "loved the present age" and thus abandoned Paul.

⁸⁷ Often noted by commentators. See, e.g., Pervo, "Romancing," 42–43.

⁸⁸ At least if we understand Τύχικον δὲ ἀπέστειλα εἰς Ἐφεσον as an epistolary aorist (so Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 806; Marshall, ICC, 818 argues to the contrary; Michel Gourgues leaves the issue open, but his appeal to Theodore of Mopsuestia suggests that he finds the epistolary aorist hypothesis unconvincing) (*Les deux lettres à Timothée. La lettre à Tite*, CbNT 14 [Paris: Cerf, 2009], 342).

⁸⁹ Erastus, presumably the city-treasurer (οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως) of Corinth mentioned in Rom 16:23 and Acts 19:22.

4. Constructing Spatial Morality in Titus

At Titus 1:5 Paul leaves Titus behind (ἀπολείπειν) in Crete so that Titus can "straighten out" (ἐπιδιορθοῦν) remaining matters and go about fulfilling the Apostle's command to appoint elders in every town. This language too suggests that until Paul or his delegates impose order, the situation is "out of order." This implies, of course, that Titus himself would be doing some traveling at Paul's behest (cf. 2 Tim 4:10, where Titus has gone to Dalmatia). But Titus is not meant to stay long in Crete, and Paul orders him to hasten to come to him (σπούδασον ἐλθεῖν πρὸς με [3:12]) in Nicopolis, where he has decided to spend the winter. Before Titus can do that, though, he is to "send Zenas the lawyer and Apollos quickly on" to Nicopolis to aid Paul.⁹⁰ Though named figures do not abound in Titus, the moral status of these few who do is intimated by their obedience to Paul's bidding. Titus the "true child" (τέκνον γνήσιον [1:4]) of Paul goes and comes at Paul's request, and is ordered to send (προπέμπειν) Zenas and Apollos, who are men in Paul's service, on their way with the resources necessary to make their journey on to Paul.⁹¹

5. Summary

In all three letters, then, I argue that we see the Pastor narrating a character's proximity to Paul as a way of communicating their moral status. The flurry of coming and going creates a rather dynamic scene. That dynamic quality is furthered when the Pastor hints at the hope of seeing Paul face to face. The Pastor pointedly creates a kind of tension in the letters by invoking the prospect

⁹⁰ Apollos is mentioned frequently in 1 Corinthians (1:12; 3:4, 22; 4:6; 16:12), and also appears in Acts (18:24; 19:1). Zenas is not mentioned elsewhere.

⁹¹ The term *προπέμπειν* implied financial and other provisions for the travellers. Cf. BDAG, 873. Paul uses the term in this sense as well (Rom 15:24; 1 Cor 16:6, 11; 2 Cor 1:16). Chrysostom anticipates his audience's question "Why does Zenas need help from others if he's a lawyer" by interpreting *Ζηναῖν τὸν νομικὸν* as not referring to a regular lawyer (who would arguably have his own means), but to an expert in the Jewish Law (*Ἀλλὰ νομικὸν ἐνταῦθά φησι τὸν τῶν Ἰουδαϊκῶν νόμων ἔμπειρον* [*Hom. in Tit.* 6, PG 62.696]).

of reunion with the Apostle (1 Tim 3:14, 4:13; 2 Tim 1:4, 4:9, 21; Titus 3:12), while at the same time tempering it with the possibility (in fact, the certainty) that Paul will not quite make it there (cf. "if I delay" [ἐὰν βραδύνω 1 Tim 3:15]). This kind of language seems to be aimed at producing pathos, though of a sort that has no hope of catharsis. It is the yearning produced by the promise of real Pauline presence, but that can only be fulfilled in the reading of "Paul's" letters.

While narrating the comings and goings of these characters does have the effect of creating historical verisimilitude, it also serves to populate the landscape of the Pastorals with a group of characters whose status is denoted primarily with reference to their proximity to Paul, Paul's healthy teaching (cf. "watch yourself and give heed to the teaching" [1 Tim 5:14]), and the circumstances under which they attain that proximity, whether coming, going, or staying. Coming to Paul or Paul's teaching becomes synonymous with coming to a "recognition of the truth" (1 Tim 2:4; 2 Tim 2:25; 2 Tim 3:7; Titus 1:1). While to this point we have been concerned primarily with the Pastor's depiction of Paul's opponents and Paul's followers, we turn now to consider the placement and emplotment of the nonhuman characters in time and space.

III. Placing the Divine and the Devilish

A. Non-human Actors in Space & Time

In order to appreciate properly the range of spatial metaphors used by the Pastor, we need now to attend to the particularly spatial and temporal ways and means by which the Pastor populates the cosmos of the Pastorals with non-human actors. The Pastor's chronology begins when God "saved us and called us with a holy calling" (σώσαντος ἡμᾶς καὶ καλέσαντος κλήσει ἁγία), and grace was given in Christ Jesus "before the times of ages" (πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων [2 Tim 1:9]). Jesus's earthly ministry, while not a major feature of the letters, is in view, both in the language of ἐπιφάνεια, and

also in the noteworthy reference to the confession before Pontius Pilate (1 Tim 6:13).⁹² The prior travels of Paul and his ministry (as narrated by the Pastor) constitute a theme (1 Tim 1:3; 2 Tim 1:6, 15–18, 3:11, 4:10–20; Titus 1:5) and form part of the epistolary background as well. The implied author's present, that is to say the narrative time of the letters, is also much to the fore in the language of the "present age" (ὁ νῦν αἰών), a phrase that occurs in all three letters (1 Tim 6:17, 2 Tim 4:10, Titus 2:12). References to the future (τὸ μέλλον [1 Tim 6:19]) and "eternal life" (1 Tim 1:16, 6:12; Titus 1:2, 3:7)⁹³ round out the temporal awareness of the author.⁹⁴ In sum, God is the "ruler of the ages" (ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων [1 Tim 1:17]), past, present, and future.

The role of Christ the Lord is imagined in more manifestly visible and spatial language. The κύριος is said to have "been present" with Paul (ὁ δὲ κύριός μοι παρέστη [2 Tim 4:17]), and is the instigator of deliverance both past and future (cf. ἐρρύσθη . . . ῥύσεται [2 Tim 4:17–18; cf. ἐρρύσατο at 2 Tim 3:11]). For instance, Christ Jesus is said to have "entered into the κόσμος" (1 Tim 1:15) and was "believed in the κόσμος" (1 Tim 3:16). The person of Christ functions in an intermediary space as μεσίτης, surely relational but also concretized by his incarnation, between God and humanity (cf. μεσίτης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων [1 Tim 2:5]).⁹⁵ By contrast, God remains aloof, a remote dynast "dwelling in unapproachable light" (1 Tim 6:14–15). While God is one "whom no

⁹² The mention is surprising for its singularity (no other references to the people or places of Jesus's life are mentioned), and the fact that it anchors Jesus to a particular historical place and time (Jesus is more often the exalted Christ in the Pastorals).

⁹³ The designation is also applied to "power" (κράτος [1 Tim 6:16]) and "glory" (δόξα [2 Tim 2:10]).

⁹⁴ On the concept of time in the Pastorals, see the recent article by Wilfried Eisele, "Chronos und Kairos: Zum soteriologischen Verhältnis von Zeit und Ewigkeit in den Pastoralbriefen," *EC* 3.4 (2012): 468–89.

⁹⁵ Klostergaard Petersen suggests that the role once played by demons in mediating between the gods and humanity was in Christianity "usurped" by Christ, leaving the demons to do the job of mediating between Satan and humanity. "Christ, the spirit, and to a growing extent the angels were perceived to mediate between the goodness of humans and the excellence of God. Demons, on the other hand, were left to mediate between the evil in the world of humans and the wickedness of Satan" ("The Notion of Demon: Open Questions to a Diffuse Concept," in *Die Dämonen: Die Dämonologie der israelitisch-jüdischen und frühchristlichen Literatur im Kontext ihrer Umwelt = Demons: The Demonology of Israelite-Jewish and Early Christian Literature in Context of their Environment*, ed. Armin Lange, Hermann Lichtenberger, and K. F. Diethard Römheld [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 27).

person has seen nor is able to see" (1 Tim 6:16), Christ by contrast "became manifest in the flesh" and "was seen by angels" (1 Tim 3:16).⁹⁶ This is not to say that God has no direct contact with the world, but God's interventions that might be considered "spatial" are envisioned by the Pastor as occurring in the past, in the act of creation (implied by ἐπλάσθη [1 Tim 2:13]; κτίσμα θεοῦ [1 Tim 4:4]; ὁ ζωογονῶν [6:13]).

Perhaps the most dramatic element of divine interruption into the cosmos is the "appearance" (ἐπιφάνεια) of Christ Jesus (mentioned above), conceived alternately as something that has already occurred (2 Tim 1:10, 4:8) and something that has not yet taken place (1 Tim 6:14; 2 Tim 4:1; Titus 2:13). ἐπιφάνεια, not a term inherited from the Pauline epistolary (which uses παρουσία [1 Cor 15:23; 1 Thess 2:19, 3:13, 4:15, 5:23]),⁹⁷ occurs as a multi-faceted cipher for the arrival of Christ Jesus, whether his initial manifestation in flesh (2 Tim 1:10; cf. 1 Tim 3:16 ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί), or his much-anticipated eschatological reappearance (1 Tim 6:14).⁹⁸ For the purpose of this argument what I wish to emphasize about the ἐπιφάνεια of Christ is that it spatializes and temporalizes the person and work of Christ in the PE. The epiphanic Christ of the PE is one who inhabited the κόσμος, yes, but also one who moved in and out of it, and will someday break into it again. This suggests the temporal aspect of Christ's epiphany as well. In the Pastorals, Christ's ἐπιφάνεια is not fixed solely in the past nor merely anticipated as a future event.

⁹⁶ 1 Tim 3:16 reads like a terse, telescoped narration of Christ's salvific sojourn, from incarnation to ultimate enthronement. The major difficulty for reading 1 Tim 3:16 as a concise succession of moments in salvation history is the final term ἀνελήμφθη, which elsewhere in the passive voice is associated with Jesus's ascension (Mark 16:19; Acts 1:2, 11, 22).

⁹⁷ While it is not a *term* that Paul uses, Margaret Mitchell has argued persuasively that Paul's "epiphanic logic," his attempt to be a walking, talking medium for the divine message of Christ crucified, found further iteration in the Pastoral Epistles, though somewhat paradoxically in the attempt to "codify—from the lips of Paul himself—the essential elements of his theological, catechetical and administrative legacy for all time" ("Epiphanic Evolutions in Earliest Christianity," 199).

⁹⁸ God's χάρις, χρηστότης, and φιλανθρωπία are said to have "appeared" (ἐπεφάνη) at Titus 2:11 and 3:4. χάρις is said to have been given long ago, but "now has been made manifest" (φανερωθεῖσαν δὲ νῦν) through the epiphany of the savior Christ Jesus (2 Tim 1:9–10).

Rather, ἐπιφάνεια describes "the entire history of its mediated revelation through the Pauline proclamation."⁹⁹ By virtue of being grafted into an emerging *Corpus Paulinum*, the Pastorals seek to perpetuate and harness the epiphanic force of Paul's own message of Christ crucified, though in a freshly spatialized and temporalized iteration.

Other divine figures play an important role as well. The "elect angels" reside alongside God and Christ Jesus and are called to witness for a solemn charge to Timothy (1 Tim 5:21). The Holy Spirit, conceived as an entity that may be "poured out richly" (Titus 3:6), takes residence (ἐνοικεῖν) within the human person (2 Tim 1:14), and faith too is something which may "reside" (ἐνοικεῖν) in someone (2 Tim 1:5).¹⁰⁰ Maleficent spirits, discussed in coordination with δαιμόνια below, are described as πλάνη, "wandering" or "deceptive" (1 Tim 4:1), and a "spirit of cowardice" (πνεῦμα δειλίας) is conceived of as something that may be given (or not, as the case may be) to an individual (2 Tim 1:7). In its place, the author suggests that he and his audience have been given a πνεῦμα "of power, of love, and self-control" (δυνάμεως καὶ ἀγάπης καὶ σωφρονισμοῦ). Thus we find the spectrum of ways in which non-human entities interact with human actors, ranging from relative remove to dramatic indwelling.

B. Space, Place, and the Devil

The Pastor applies similar kinetic imagery to the language of the devil and the demonic.¹⁰¹ The Pastor consistently spatializes the figure of the devil and his demons in order to suggest that they

⁹⁹ Mitchell, "Epiphanic Evolutions in Earliest Christianity," 200.

¹⁰⁰ On the Holy Spirit in the PE and the Apostolic Fathers, see I. Howard Marshall, "The Holy Spirit in the Pastoral Epistles and the Apostolic Fathers," in *Holy Spirit and Christian Origins: Essays in Honor of James D. G. Dunn*, ed. Graham N. Stanton, Bruce W. Longenecker, and Stephen C. Barton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 257–69.

¹⁰¹ A word is in order about the terminology of this section. I use the term "demonic" to refer the complex of terms indicating malevolent supernatural forces (ὁ διάβολος, ὁ Σατανᾶς, πνεύματα, δαιμόνια); thus I differentiate

occupy liminal and dangerous places, away from the safe center of Pauline teaching. Thus, the centrality of Paul in the Pastor's scheme of salvation is accented by the distance imagined between Paul's healthy teaching and the dangerous, contagious teaching of the opponents (2 Tim 2:17), who are "caught alive" in the snare of the devil (2 Tim 2:26). In 1 Tim 4:1, the demonic doctrines advocated by opponents are imagined as the problem of the inevitable future, in some unspecified location where Paul will not be (thus the reason for the instruction). The opponents of 1 Tim 1:18–20 are separated from Paul by both distance and allegiance, and the place to which they have been handed over is away from both the community and Paul himself.

One of the most frequently recurring characters in these three letters besides "Paul" and his putative addressees is ὁ Σατανᾶς. "Satan" appears twice in the PE (1 Tim 1:20, 5:15), and his other, more general namesake (which does not appear in the homologoumena), ὁ διάβολος, occurs three times (1 Tim 3:6, 7; 2 Tim 2:26).¹⁰² The devil is potentially in view also at 1 Tim 6:9, where the "snare" (παγίς), modified in its two other occurrences (1 Tim 3:6, 2 Tim 2:26) with "of the devil" (τοῦ διαβόλου), appears.¹⁰³ Though these constitute only five instances, the devil lurks in

between the term demon and the designation "demonic." While malevolent demons are adequately described with the designation "demonic," not everything within the category of "demonic" is, strictly speaking, a "demon."

¹⁰² David J. Downs argues that the prevalence of the supernatural beings in the PE is one indication that "the outlook represented in the Pastorals is thoroughly apocalyptic" (646) and that the Pastorals "provide a vibrant embodiment of the essential ingredients of an apocalyptic worldview" ("Early Catholicism' and Apocalypticism in the Pastoral Epistles," *CBQ* 67.4 [2005]: 646 and 661). Similarly, Raymond F. Collins sees the language of the devil as an indication that the Pastor "considers the times in which he was living as the final times" (Collins, *NTL*, 85). In my judgment, the supernatural agents of the Pastorals should not be taken as evidence for a distinctively apocalyptic worldview so much as interpreted as one of the many literary and theological inheritances from the Pauline letters that are put to new purposes. Similarly, Guy Williams suggests that "we find that in the pseudonymous attempt to create plausibly Pauline letters, spiritual forces were felt to be typical ingredients of his teaching" (*The Spirit World in the Letters of Paul the Apostle: A Critical Examination of the Role of Spiritual Beings in the Authentic Pauline Epistles*, FRLANT 231 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009], 60). Downs also seeks to show that the Pastorals contain elements of imminent eschatology, and that together these constitute evidence of "apocalypticism." However, Downs has not reckoned with the implications of pseudepigraphy for assessing the apocalypticism of the Pastorals. That is to say, if the sense of eschatological urgency is contrived in order to cohere with the imminent eschatology observable in Paul's letters, does the eschatology of the PE reflect the Pastor's own eschatology or his verisimilitudinous attempt to emulate Paul on these matters?

¹⁰³ A possibility suggested by the scribal harmonizations and insertion of τοῦ διαβόλου in D F G 629 it vg^{cl}; Spec.

other passages. For instance, we see at 1 Tim 2:14 that "the woman, having been utterly deceived, came into transgression" (ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἐξαπατηθεῖσα ἐν παραβάσει γέγονεν). The unseen agent of Eve's "utter deception" is "the serpent" (ὁ ὄφις),¹⁰⁴ whose "utter deception" of Eve is also held up by Paul at 2 Cor 11:3¹⁰⁵ as a negative exemplum, a dire warning against the Corinthians' "thoughts" (νοήματα) being corrupted or seduced¹⁰⁶ (φθείρειν) in like manner. The fact that the devil is here associated with the corruption of thoughts is important for this study, since both of these elements also occur in the Pastorals. Though the devil is not explicitly named in 1 Tim 2, he is also present in the mythology presumed in the Pastor's discourse about women and their proper place in worship.

The existence of such oblique references to the devil should inspire sensitivity to other possible references. Thus, I consider it probable that "the opponent" (ὁ ἀντικείμενος) in 1 Tim 5:14 also refers to the devil (or at least a demonic figure).¹⁰⁷ The activity of this "enemy" or "opponent"

¹⁰⁴ Insofar as the Pastor seems to be alluding to Gen 3:1–6.

¹⁰⁵ Foerster asserts that there is no *material* distinction between διάβολος and σατανᾶς in the NT (TDNT 2.73, s.v. διάβολος). The presence of only the latter in the *homologoumena* does suggest that for Paul, at least in 2 Cor, Satan is first and foremost the one who deceives and corrupts. Not until Eph 4:27 and 6:11 does he become διάβολος. Paul's preference for the term σατανᾶς extends even to the point of choosing that term to replace διάβολος when he alludes to Job 2:6 (εἶπεν δὲ ὁ κύριος τῷ διαβόλῳ Ἴδού παραδίδωμί σοι αὐτόν) in 1 Cor 5:5 (παραδοῦναι τὸν τοιοῦτον τῷ σατανᾷ).

¹⁰⁶ Attention to the use of connotations of sexual purity (cf. ἀγνότης at 11:3) and betrothal (cf. ἀρμόζειν at 11:2) of 2 Cor 11 would suggest a translation of "seduced" for φθείρειν in 2 Cor 11:3. The Pastor is perhaps picking up on this nuance in his suggestion that women should not speak because they are somehow akin to Eve who was ostensibly a) formed secondarily and b) susceptible to deception. Notable in this regard is the 4 Macc 18:7–8, where the philosophical Jewish matriarch delivers an eloquent monologue, enumerating ways in which she guarded herself. After saying that prior to marriage she had been a "chaste virgin" (παρθένος ἀγνή), she says: "Neither did a corrupter in a desert, a seducer on a plane, corrupt me, nor did a corrupter, a deceptive serpent (ἀπάτης ὄφις), corrupt me" (οὐδὲ ἔφθειρέν με λυμεῶν ἐρημίας φθορεὺς ἐν πεδίῳ, οὐδὲ ἐλυμήνατό μου τὰ ἀγνὰ τῆς παρθενίας λυμεῶν ἀπάτης ὄφις). For discussion of this passage and further references in the history of interpretation, see Mary R. D'Angelo, "Ευσέβεια: Roman Imperial Family Values and the Sexual Politics of 4 Maccabees and the Pastorals," *BibInt* 11.2 (2003): 155 and n. 63.

¹⁰⁷ Scholars are divided on whether or not this refers to Satan, though Marshall (who is ambivalent on the question) suggests that "most" prefer a human adversary (ICC, 605). Those who interpret the figure as strictly human include: Roloff, EKKNT, 299 and Dibelius & Conzelmann, Hermeneia, 75. Those who favor Satan include: Spicq, *EBib*, 538, Johnson, AB, 268; Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 445–446; Gourgues, CbNT, 193; Collins, NTL, 142; Towner, NICNT, 357, and Gottfried Holtz, *Die Pastoralbriefe*, THKNT 13 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1965), 121. Some scholars feel the distinction between a human opponent and Satan to be unnecessary: "Es ist wohl keine eindeutige Entscheidung zu treffen; beide Bedeutungen spielen mit herein" (Lorenz Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe*,

is said to be *λοιδορία*, "abusive speech," which would be appropriately attributed to *ὁ διάβολος*, the slanderer.¹⁰⁸ Add to this the fact that in the very next verse (1 Tim 5:15) we see that "some have already turned away after Satan," and it seems all the more likely that warning against *ὁ ἀντικείμενος* is meant as a deterrent against the "young women" following "some" of their sisters in their deviation towards Satan. Even if this figure is not identified as the devil, his activities may be said to be in line with those of the devil.¹⁰⁹

Further connections to the demonic exist in the Pastorals. For instance, there are indications that the work of deception and deceit is often (though not exclusively) attributed to the devil in the Pastorals. As already noted, "the woman" was "utterly deceived" (*ἐξαπατηθῆναι*) by the serpent, who is understood by the time of Paul to be synonymous with Satan. Furthermore, the epithet given to the "spirits" in 1 Tim 4:1 is *πλάνα*, "deceptive," and the "some" who follow those spirits and the doctrines of demons are said to turn away "through the hypocrisy of liars" (*ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων* [1 Tim 4:2]). The "liars" (*ψευδολόγοι*) are indeed, in this case, human actors, since it is *their own* consciences that are seared in the very next phrase (*κεκαυστηριασμένοι*

HThKNT 11/2:1-3 [Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder, 1994], 1.242). The usage of the singular participle in later texts refers either to the anti-Christ (2 Thess 2:4), whose *παρουσία* is effected by Satan (2 Thess 2:9), or to the devil himself (1 Clem 51.1; MPol 17.1; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 5.1.5. Eusebius considers martyrdom a contest with unseen demonic forces [cf. the preface to Bk 5, sec. 4]). The plural usage occurs in Exod 23:22 and 2 Macc 10:26 of human opponents, and also in Paul's letters at 1 Cor 16:9 and Phil 1:28, both times referring to human opponents. The shading of the term towards the devilish in 1 Tim is perhaps a further indication of the Pastor's transformation of the opponents into agents of the devil.

¹⁰⁸ Roloff (EKKNT, 299 n. 392) suggests that *λοιδορία* "ist allein menschliches Verhalten" and points to 1 Cor 4:12 and 1 Pet 2:23, 3:9. Marshall, ICC, 604 makes the same point. But this cannot be determinative for identifying the figure *ὁ ἀντικείμενος*, especially in light of contemporary Christian use of the singular form (see note above) and the close proximity to the figure of Satan in 5:15.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Mounce, WBC, 296–97. The verbal form *ἀντικεῖται* is used in 1 Tim 1:10 after a long series of terms meant to convey the extent of moral degeneracy to which the law is opposed, "and whatever else is set in opposition to the healthy teaching" (*καὶ εἴ τι ἕτερον τῇ ὑγιαίνουσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ ἀντίκειται*). An allusion to the devilish may be seen in the adjective *διάβολος*. Though the term *διάβολος* refers to being "slandorous" or "accusatory" and not "devilish" per se, this term occurs in each of the three letters in a litany of other characteristics to be on guard against (Titus 2:3, 1 Tim 3:11, 2 Tim 3:3). In a collection of letters arguing that the devil (*ὁ διάβολος*) is a cosmic reality that poses a threat to communal sanctity, the repetition of the adjective *διάβολος*, even in a list of various moral defects, perhaps suggests to the reader that being *διάβολος* is indicative of a relationship with *ὁ διάβολος*.

τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν).¹¹⁰ This being said, in 1 Tim 4:1–3, the prepositional phrase ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων indicates the means by which the demons wrought their deception. The agents of deception are the deceiving spirits who effect "apostasy" or turning away (cf. ἀποστήσονται in 4:1 and note the spatial metaphor), and in order to accomplish deception they instrumentalize the "hypocritical liars" who have themselves already been deceived.

C. The "Snare" of the Devil

The recurring phrase "judgment/snare of the devil" (κρίμα/παγὶς τοῦ διαβόλου [see 1 Tim 3:6–7; 2 Tim 2:26]) illustrates further the way in which moral or doctrinal error is related to the diabolical in the Pastoral Epistles as well as the fact that the devilish is conceived of in spatial terms. The phrase ἐμπίπτειν εἰς παγίδα(ς) has resonances in the LXX, though the designation τοῦ διαβόλου is unique to the PE.¹¹¹ The potential delusion (cf. τυφωθείς) of the neophyte (νεόφυτος, "newly-planted")¹¹² overseer results in his falling into the "judgment of the devil" (κρίμα τοῦ διαβόλου [1 Tim 3:6]), and into "reproach and the snare of the devil" (ὀνειδισμὸς καὶ παγὶς τοῦ διαβόλου [1 Tim 3:7]).¹¹³ But is this the judgment, reproach, and snare which *affect* the devil (objective genitive) or

¹¹⁰ Marshall, ICC, 539.

¹¹¹ Prov 12:13; Tob 14:10; Sir 9:3; cf. Ps 56:7 LXX. Different verbs of entering into a παγίς occur often in the LXX, especially the Psalms. Similar language of "nets" appears also in literature from Qumran. Cf. CD 4:15 and Hanan Eshel, "The Damascus Document's 'Three Nets of Belial': A Reference to the Aramaic Levi Document?," in *Heavenly Tablets: Interpretation, Identity and Tradition in Ancient Judaism*, ed. Lynn R. LiDonnici and Andrea Lieber, JSJSup 119 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 243–55.

¹¹² BDAG, 669, s.v. νεόφυτος, gives "newly converted," thus interpreting the rich imagery of the "newly planted" overseer in terms of time spent as a believer rather than age per se. The youth of Timothy is not seen to be a liability, though Paul suggests it might be conceived of as such (cf. the injunction to Timothy at 1 Tim 4:12: μηδεὶς σου τῆς νεότητος καταφρονεῖτω). Collins declares that the Pastor is the first to use the term νεόφυτος as a metaphor (NTL, 85), though we should note that in the LXX (Ps 127:3; 143:12; Isa 5:7; Job 14:9) it is used of youths in vivid similes. Adolf Deissmann cites the papyrus fragments BU 563, 565, 566 where the term is used of newly-planted palm trees (*Bible Studies: Contributions, Chiefly from Papyri and Inscriptions, to the History of the Language, the Literature, and the Religion of Hellenistic Judaism and Primitive Christianity*, 2nd ed. [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1903], 220–221).

¹¹³ In my judgment, the problem with a neophyte, as characterized by the Pastor, is not that he will become proud per se (surely a possibility even for seasoned believers), but rather that he would simply be inexperienced and would lack grounding in proper doctrine and therefore be more prone to the deluding influence of the devil. That is to say, he would become deluded by being persuaded by doctrines other than those of the right teaching, the healthy word.

the devil's meting out of judgment and reproach (subjective genitive)?¹¹⁴ If we understand it as an objective genitive, the unfortunate overseer would join the devil in the judgment, reproach, or snare in which he himself is caught. On this reading, the devil fell because of his pride, and thus the overseer too falls because of his pride.¹¹⁵

However, the devil is more often the one who snares than the one who is snared, and in 2 Tim 2:26 the image of the "opponents" (ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι) who are "caught alive by [the devil]" (ἐξωγρημένοι ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ) in his "snare" (παγίς) would suggest that the devil's role is active (cf. also "for his will" [εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου θέλημα]).¹¹⁶ Therefore, it is best to see these genitives as subjective, whereby the devil wreaks judgment upon those he ensnares.¹¹⁷ The precise content of that judgment is difficult to discern, though we have a hint from 1 Tim, where we see that some younger women/widows, who "are subject to judgment because they denied the first faith" (ἔχουσαι κρίμα ὅτι τὴν πρώτην πίστιν ἠθέτησαν [1 Tim 5:12]) are said to have "turned away after Satan" (1 Tim ἐξετράπησαν ὀπίσω τοῦ σατανᾶ [5:15]). Thus, we see that for the Pastor, "rejection"

The immediate context suggests that the concern is one of knowledge (cf. οἶδεν at 3:5) about how to care (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) for the ἐκκλησία. In other words, the issue is not pride so much as proper mental orientation, steadfastness of mind and reliability of character. In this respect, Roloff nicely captures the effect of the agricultural metaphor evoked in the term νεόφυτος: "Der Neubekehrte ist gleichsam noch eine 'schwache Pflanze'" susceptible to the influence of the opponents (EKKNT, 161).

¹¹⁴ Bound to this question is the difficulty surrounding the interpretation of to what exactly the judgment (κρίμα) or παγίς refer. Spicq suggests that the "judgment of the devil" is the judgment of which the devil would be the executioner (ÉBib, 437). Foerster in the TDNT ("διάβολος," 2.81) argues that v. 6 refers to the judgment a calumniator might bring against a newly appointed bishop, and that v. 7 refers to the "more or less well-founded arguments" of the "outside world" in an attempt to snare the head of a community. Somewhat differently, Marshall takes the reference to κρίμα to be the "doom which the devil has contrived for him by tempting him to be proud" (ICC, 483).

¹¹⁵ Interpreters who opt for the objective genitive include Mounce, WBC, 180; Gourgues, CbNT, 125, Knight, NIGTC, 164, and Pieter G. R. de Villiers, "The Vice of Conceit in 1 Timothy: A Study in the Ethics of the New Testament within Its Graeco-Roman Context," *Acta Patristica et Byzantina* 7 (1996): 51. Dibelius, & Conzelmann, Hermeneia, 54 eschew certainty: "But perhaps we have no right to make the alternatives so distinct, since obviously one cannot differentiate clearly between 'condemnation' (κρίμα) and 'snare of the devil' (παγίς τοῦ διαβόλου)."

¹¹⁶ Spicq, *TLNT*, 2.3 n. 5 gives a number of excellent examples of the term ἐμπίπτειν from Greek literature and the papyri. One may fall "into discouragement (Xenophon, Hell. 7.5.6), difficulties (P.Edfou 5, 20), a painful condition (P.Brem. 48, 26; Josephus, Ant. 4.293; 7.322; 10.212; 18.118; Life 46, 409), sickness (P. Col. Zen. 10,2; Pap.Lugd.Bat. XIII, 18, 16; honorific decree of Samos for a physician, second century BC, in J. Pouilloux, *Choix*, n. 14, 15; Josephus, Ant. 13.422; 17.146), folly (P.Tebt. 758, 4)."

¹¹⁷ The subjective genitive interpretation has its supporters: Quinn, & Wacker, ECC, 265; Marshall, ICC, 483; Spicq, ÉBib 437; Roloff, EKKNT, 161.

of the faith is accompanied by judgment, and that judgment is connected with Satan. In the case of 1 Tim 3:6–7, the Pastor characterizes judgment as an immediate effect or consequence of delusion,¹¹⁸ not necessarily some future eschatological punishment. Thus, in 1 Tim 3:6, the "judgment" of the devil is the punishment meted out by the devil once the neophyte has suffered delusion. That delusion is connected by the Pastor in 1 Tim 6:4 (cf. *τεύφωται*) with the absence of knowledge (cf. *μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος*) demonstrated by the opponents who are corrupted in their νοῦς (1 Tim 6:5). Similarly, those who are dubbed *τετυφωμένοι* at 2 Tim 3:4 are soon thereafter connected with those who are *κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν* at 2 Tim 3:8. These connections suggest that the delusion (*τυφωθείς*) of the neophyte in 1 Tim 3:6 is itself connected to this same corruption of mind, to which the "newly planted" individual is inherently susceptible, given the implied weakness of a young plant that has not yet grown strong and resistant to the corrosive and corrupting teaching of the opponents.¹¹⁹

Thus, the reproach (*ὀνειδισμός*) consists, at a minimum, of the opprobrium reserved for those who do not know how to manage the *ἐκκλησία θεοῦ*. The judgment (*κρίμα*) of the devil, however, is intimately connected to the delusion effected upon the neophyte. Therefore, especially in 1 Tim 3:6–7, the devil may be seen as a wily hunter who captures his prey through the deluding teaching of the opponents. By utilizing the metaphor of the snare of the devil in coordination with the language of delusion, the Pastor hereby localizes the concept of mental delusion. It is a "place" of sorts, a mental pit into which someone falls, and is held by a malevolent foe. According to the

¹¹⁸ The present participle at 1 Tim 5:12 suggests the contemporaneity of their "having" judgment with their rejection of the "first" faith.

¹¹⁹ On this point, see Roloff, EKKNT, 161; Oberlinner, HThKNT, 1.127.

Pastor, falling into the "snare" is what happens when one deviates from the truth and becomes a follower of Satan.¹²⁰

D. Handing Over to Satan

The inexorable attraction of the demonic realm is effected in part by Satan and his snare, as seen above. Yet it is also effected by Pauline intervention, for Paul too is involved in the transfer of these opponents to the tutelage of Satan. In 1 Timothy 1:18–20 we find two characters, Hymenaeus and Alexander, who have been "handed over" (παραδοῦναι) to Satan, "in order that they might be taught not to blaspheme." In this passage, we find that Satan occupies the space into which those who have "made shipwreck" of their faith are handed.

18 This command I entrust to you, [my] child Timothy, in accordance with the prophecies which came before to you, in order that in accordance with them you might wage the noble campaign, having faith and a good conscience, which certain individuals, because they rejected it, have made shipwreck of their faith, among whom are Hymenaeus and Alexander, whom I have handed over to Satan in order that they might be taught not to blaspheme.¹²¹

This transfer evokes the language of Job ("the Lord said to the devil, Behold I am handing him over to you" [εἶπεν δὲ ὁ κύριος τῷ διαβόλῳ Ἰδοὺ παραδίδωμί σοι αὐτόν])¹²² and of Paul ("... to hand over such a man to Satan for the destruction of the flesh" [παραδοῦναι τὸν τοιοῦτον τῷ σατανᾷ εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός]).¹²³ In contrast to Job, this handing over does not constitute a test of fidelity,

¹²⁰ Louise J. Lawrence argues that the idea of falling into a pit due to spiritual "blindness" is used as a marker of ultimate demise or punishment (*Sense and Stigma in the Gospels: Depictions of Sensory-Disabled Characters, Biblical Refigurations* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013], 34).

¹²¹ 18 Ταύτην τὴν παραγγελίαν παρατίθεμαί σοι, τέκνον Τιμόθεε, κατὰ τὰς προαγούσας ἐπὶ σὲ προφητείας, ἵνα στρατεύῃ ἐν αὐταῖς τὴν καλὴν στρατείαν 19 ἔχων πίστιν καὶ ἀγαθὴν συνείδησιν, ἣν τινες ἀπώσάμενοι περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐνανάγησαν, 20 ὧν ἐστὶν Ὑμέναιος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος, οὓς παρέδωκα τῷ σατανᾷ, ἵνα παιδευθῶσιν μὴ βλασφημεῖν.

¹²² Job 2:6; cf. 2:7, 9:24, 16:11, 24:14.

¹²³ 1 Cor 5:5. It is worth pointing out that Job LXX never translates רָשָׁע as ὁ Σατανᾶς (σατανᾶς occurs only once in the LXX, in Sirach 21:27, and refers to a human adversary; σαταν occurs twice in one verse, 1 Kings 11:14, and also refers to a human adversary; in 1 Kings 5:18 רָשָׁע is translated with ἐπίβουλος, "plotter."). And Paul never uses the term ὁ διάβολος. This makes Paul's formulation at 1 Cor 5:5 all the more striking, because it suggests that he is interpreting the language of Job through his preferred terminology for this figure. As for the translation of LXX Job,

but rather a consignment of those who have already "made shipwreck of their faith" (περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐναυάγησαν)¹²⁴ to the realm of Satan. This does seem, however, to have a remedial purpose (cf. "in order that they may be taught not to blaspheme"), and does not constitute a final abandonment of these individuals into the realm of Satan.¹²⁵ What it does illustrate is that the Pastor characterizes the theological error of opponents in symbolically spatial terms, and that as they "depart" from the truth, they come into the space of Satan. It is not just one thing that lands them in this space. There seems to be a creative synergy between the opponents' own shipwreck, which implies both immoral volition and inexorable satanic draw, and the "handing over" effected by Paul. But what is the nature of that handing over, for the Pastor, and why does he invoke some of the exact phrasing of 1 Cor 5:5 in crafting his own narration of handing Hymenaeus and Alexander over to Satan in 1 Tim 1:20?

While to this point I have argued that the Pastor constructs a morally inflected literary cosmos for his opponents and protagonists, in which proximity and relationship to Paul (which is dependent on fidelity to Paul's teachings) conveys theological status, we turn now to examine

the author consistently chooses Greek equivalents rather than transliterate. I owe this final insight to a private communication with Claude E. Cox on 15 Apr 2016.

¹²⁴ This imagery is not uncommon in contemporary literature. In Ps. Plut. *Lib. ed.* 4d-e, images of illness and the threat of shipwreck are used to characterize a father who knowingly makes a bad choice of a teacher (διδάσκαλος) for his children. For the ubiquity of shipwreck as a metaphor for moral downfall, see Stelios Panayotakis, "The Temple and the Brothel: Mothers and Daughters in Apollonius of Tyre," in *Space in the Ancient Novel*, ed. Michael Paschalis and Stavros A. Frangoulidis (Groningen: Barkhuis, 2002), 105. He cites the anonymous Latin narrative *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri*, A 40: Salve, quicumque es, laetare: non enim aliqua ad te consolandum ueni polluta, sed innocens uirgo quae uirginitatem meam inter naufragium castitatis inuiolabiliter seruo. For discussion of the complementary image of philosophy as a λιμὴν, a harbor, see Francesca Longo Aurichio, "Philosophy's Harbor," in *Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans*, ed. David Armstrong et al. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 37–42.

¹²⁵ Theodore of Mopsuestia, in his commentary on 1 Tim, understands this passage and 1 Cor 5:5 as instances of excommunication from the church, not intended to be permanent, but with the intended effect of turning the offenders back to the truth. He interprets the "handing over to Satan" as Paul's indication of how bad it is to be apart from the church. As for 1:20, he says that the "ut" (i.e., ἵνα) is not meant to indicate purpose, but rather result, "in accordance with his own peculiar style" (*sed consequenter secundum proprietatem*). Latin text from H. B. Swete, *Theodori episcopi Mopsuesteni in epistolas B. Pauli commentarii: The Latin version with the Greek fragments, with an introduction, notes, and indices* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1880), 2.84. and trans. from Rowan A. Greer, ed., *Theodore of Mopsuestia: The Commentaries on the Minor Epistles of Paul*, WGRW 26 (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010), 547, 549.

those very questions, which are a facet of the Pastor's attempt to craft a cohesive and coherent response to perceived theological threat. I will demonstrate that the Pastor's discourse of the demonic and satanic also relies upon a particular kind of literary strategy that allows him to both interpret Paul in accordance with his own theological agenda and to write as Paul in such a way as to attempt to reconfigure the significance of Paul's own statements about Satan and (in chapter two) demons.

IV. 1 Timothy 1:18–20 and 1 Corinthians 5:1–5

Introduction: Intertextual Analysis

In this section, I continue the argument regarding the function of spatiality and the figure of Satan through an exegetical analysis of one of the Pastor's most overt instances of intertextual borrowing from the letters of Paul. I show that the author of 1 Timothy self-consciously incorporates references to 1 Corinthians into 1 Timothy. While the linguistic indebtedness¹²⁶ to the homologoumena and theological innovation¹²⁷ of the Pastorals have long been topics of research, my goal here is to build upon the approach developed in the work of Annette Merz and

¹²⁶ See Harrison, *The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles*. See also P. N. Harrison, *Paulines and Pastorals* (London: Villiers Publications, 1964), esp. 129–40; Barnett, *Paul Becomes a Literary Influence*, esp. 251–77. Somewhat peculiar is the statement of David Aune: "Given the importance that Paul has for the unknown author, it is striking that there are no clear allusions to the Pauline letters" (*The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric* [Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003], 339. Similarly with regard to 1 Tim 2:14 and 2 Cor 11:3, see the comment of Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 230: "One can affirm the possibility (but no more) that First Timothy knew the text of Second Corinthians." However, Quinn & Wacker deny outright that the PE know of 1 Cor! "One can reasonably infer that the author of the PE did not have access to/had not studied the text of First Corinthians" (ECC, 683). Most recently, Dillon Thornton has quoted Quinn & Wacker's statement (their page 15) that the PE "do not quote the apostle's words" with approbation, suggesting that this judgment regarding the intertextual relationship of the Pastorals and the homologoumena persists (*Hostility in the House of God*, 10–11). I will argue here for the identification of several significant allusions and uses of the homologoumena in the Pastorals.

¹²⁷ Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 67–113; Frances M. Young, *The Theology of the Pastoral Letters*, New Testament Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 122–44; James W. Aageson, *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church*, Library of Pauline Studies (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2008), 1–102.

Margaret M. Mitchell,¹²⁸ discussed in the introduction, who contend that a crucial function of intertextuality has been largely overlooked by scholars,¹²⁹ namely, producing fictive "self"-references as a means of enhancing the meaning of the earlier texts referenced.

Taking my cue from Merz, who primarily builds her case through an analysis of 1 Tim 2:9–15 and 1 Tim 6:1–2, and Mitchell, whose article addresses 1 Tim 2:1–8, I argue that the same authorial phenomenon is at work in 1 Tim 1:18–20, where the Pastor localizes his opponents in the insalubrious realm of Satan (1 Tim 1:18–20). Here, I see the author of the Pastorals making such fictive "self-references" in a bid to guide and control the interpretation of Paul's letter to 1 Corinthians, an attempt that, as the subsequent history of interpretation suggests, was both partly successful and inherently impossible. The purposes to which this act of "self-interpretation" are put are potentially manifold. With regard to 1 Tim 1:18–20, I argue that the Pastor effectively emphasizes one potential interpretation afforded by the syntactical ambiguities in 1 Corinthians 5, even as he creates, perhaps intentionally, further hermeneutical ambiguities.

A. Contextualization of 1 Timothy 1:18–20

A brief contextualization of this passage is in order to set the stage before examining it in detail. Following a brief Pauline (auto)biography or narration of Paul's personal salvation history (1:12–16) and doxology (1:17),¹³⁰ the Pastor gives his "child" Timothy "this command" (*παραγγελία*),¹³¹

¹²⁸ Mitchell, "Corrective Composition."

¹²⁹ See also Zamfir and Verheyden, "Reference-Text-Oriented Allusions."

¹³⁰ Similar mid-letter doxologies may be found in the homologoumena as well (Rom 1:25, 9:5, 11:36; Gal 1:5; 1 Thess 3:13). The practice was not lost on the author of Ephesians (3:21). The designation "King of the Ages" (*Βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων*) occurs in Tob 13:7, 11, and 1 Clem. 61.2.

¹³¹ The term *παραγγελία* does not occur in the LXX, and the use with the cognate verb is different than what we find in Acts 5:28. When a cognate formulation occurs with its noun in the dative case, *BDF* (198.6) suggests that it is an attempt to imitate the Hebrew infinitive absolute. The martial imagery of 1:18 suggests that the term here in 1:18 has a military nuance, such as a command or order issued to soldiers (LSJ A. gives command or order issued to soldiers, Xenophon, *Hell.* 2.1.4, Acts 16:24; *τόπος ἐπιτηδεύματος εἰς π.* for giving the word of command, Polybius, *Hist.*

namely¹³² to "wage the noble campaign."¹³³ Timothy is to do this in accordance with prophecies made about him at some unspecified point in the past (cf. αἱ προάγουσαι ἐπὶ σὲ προφητεῖαι).¹³⁴ The point of alluding to these prophecies and making clear Timothy's present charge in military terms is to reassert the connection between Timothy's former prophetic call and his ongoing duty, to extend the metaphor, to live in service of his commanding general.¹³⁵ While the Pastor's particular terms do not here suggest a terminological interface with 2 Corinthians 10:1–11, Paul's self-presentation as a commanding general there and here are of a piece in terms of rhetorical goal and effect.¹³⁶

6.27.1; generally, order issued by an authority, P.Amh. 2.68.63 [1st CE], etc.). Dibelius & Conzelmann believe that it refers to the "instruction" of right proclamation and the contents of the epistle as a whole (Hermeneia, 32). They see παρατίθημι as referring to the handing over of tradition (32, citing *Herm. sim.* 9.10.6). Marshall argues that the initial phrase of 1:18 is concerned with Timothy's task of battling heretics rather than the teaching that Timothy was to give (ICC, 408). However, this reading supposes a false dichotomy between battling and teaching. Timothy's task is teaching (cf. 4:11), and teaching is highly valued by the Pastor (cf. 5:17). Secondly, the fact that the τέλος of the παραγγελία is "love from a pure heart and a good conscience and an un-hypocritical faith" (1:5) suggests that the παραγγελία cannot be reduced to Timothy's task of fighting heresy alone. Thirdly, it is unclear whether it is appropriate to speak of "battling heresy" at all, given the emphasis placed on Timothy and Titus being non-combative (ἄμαχον [1 Tim 3:3; Titus 3:2]; μὴ λογομαχεῖν [2 Tim 2:14]) and gentle (δοῦλον δὲ κυρίου οὐ δεῖ μάχεσθαι ἀλλ' ἡπιον εἶναι [2 Tim 2:23]).

¹³² Here ἵνα serves to introduce the content of a command. *LSJ*, 830, s.v. ἵνα, B.II.3b. Cf. 2 Cor 8:7, Mark 5:23.

¹³³ Cf. παραγγέλλειν τινὶ σ[τρατεία] κατὰ γῆν in Xenophon, *Hell.* 7.1.13 (from *LSJ*, 1651, s.v. στρατεία). For the use of the cognate accusative in narrating a campaign undertaken by a younger man, cf. Plutarch, *Alc.* 7.3 (ἔτι δὲ μειράκιον ὦν), *Cor.* 3.1 (ἔτι μειράκιον ὦν). Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.34.

¹³⁴ This is perhaps a proleptic reference to the prophecy through which the "charism" (τὸ χάρισμα) mentioned in 1 Tim 4:14 was given. This bestowal of this "favor" happened "in accordance with prophecies" or "through a prophecy," and was accompanied by the laying on of hands by an unspecified elder body (πρεσβυτέριον). The potential discrepancy caused by 2 Tim 1:6, where τὸ χάρισμα comes through the laying on of *Paul's* hands is perhaps to be explained either as referring to the same event but with different emphasis on the primary actor, or to two events (Towner, *NICNT*, 324–25). See also "Excursus: Prophecies about Timothy" (Mounce, *WBC*, 70–72).

¹³⁵ The implied στρατηγός is Paul. Paul is giving the marching orders, and he is the one who claims to have ritually handed Hymenaeus and Alexander over to Satan. Contemporary authors use similar language. Epictetus, for instance, dwells on the implications of the metaphor of one's βίος as a στρατεία (*Diatr.* 3.24.31–37). For him, however, the στρατηγός is god. Obeying the divine στρατηγός is not a momentary task but a lifelong undertaking. "The life of each person is a kind of campaign, and a long and varied one at that!" (στρατεία τίς ἐστίν ὁ βίος ἐκάστου καὶ αὕτη μακρὰ καὶ ποικίλη [*Diatr.* 3.24.34]). In this section Epictetus speaks of one's responsibility to obey the "commands of the general" (τὰ προστάγματα τοῦ στρατηγοῦ [*Diatr.* 3.24.32]). He also likens the student of philosophy to a sailor (ναύτης) who must obey his captain (κυβερνήτης [*Diatr.* 3.24.33]).

¹³⁶ For Paul's use of military language in 2 Cor 10:3–6, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," *HTR* 76 (1983): 143–73. For particular attention to the rhetorical features of 2 Cor 10:1–11 as a general's address to his troops, see Laurie Brink, "A General's Exhortation to His Troops: Paul's Military Rhetoric in 2 Cor 10:1–11 Part 1," *BZ* 49.2 (2005): 191–201; "A General's Exhortation to His Troops: Paul's Military Rhetoric in 2

The mission General Paul calls Timothy to is an ongoing one. The present concern is to eliminate "teaching otherwise" (ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖν [1:3]). His primary task, as articulated earlier in 1 Timothy 1, is to "command certain people not to teach otherwise" (1:3). The goal of this "command" is "love from a pure heart and a good conscience and an unhypocritical faith" (1:5). These three elements constitute a newly minted Pauline triad,¹³⁷ the constitutive pieces of which are echoed throughout the Pastoral Epistles.¹³⁸ This triad of Christian virtues constitutes a normative end towards which Timothy is to "command" all those who are doing otherwise. Timothy is said at 1:19 to have two of these virtues, namely "faith and a good conscience" (πίστις καὶ ἀγαθὴ συνείδησις). The successive movement from listing these virtues to pointing out that some have rejected them is common to both 1:5–6 and 1:19:

1 Tim 1:5–6	1 Tim 1:19
ἀγάπη ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας καὶ συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς καὶ πίστεως ἀνυποκρίτου, <u>ὧν τινες</u> ἀστοχῆσαντες ἐξετράπησαν εἰς ματαιολογίαν	ἔχων πίστιν καὶ ἀγαθὴν συνείδησιν, <u>ἣν τινες</u> ἀπωσάμενοι περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐναυάγησαν
"love from a pure heart and a good conscience and an unhypocritical faith, which some, having not attained it, turned away to meaningless talk"	"having faith and a good conscience, which some, having rejected, have made shipwreck with regards to the faith"

Cor 10:1–11 Part 2," *BZ* 50.1 (2006): 74–89. The Pastor would not have been the first to pick up on Paul's martial tone (cf. Eph 6:10–17), nor the last to imagine Paul as a general. Robert M. Grant has argued that the physical description of Paul in the Acts of Paul and Thecla connotes the image of a stalwart general ("The Description of Paul in the Acts of Paul and Thecla," *VC* 36.1 [1982]: 1–4). Differently, Malherbe adduces evidence to suggest that the depiction of Paul in the Acts of Paul and Thecla instead draws upon popular depictions of Herakles ("A Physical Description of Paul," in *Christians among Jews and Gentiles* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986], 170–75).

¹³⁷ Cf. 1 Thess 1:3, 5:8; 1 Cor 13:13; Col 1:4. The creation of another new triad may be observed in the addition of ἔλεος to χάρις and εἰρήνη in 1 Tim 1:2, 2 Tim 1:2. Not a few mss. read ἔλεος in the greeting of Titus 1:4, likely indicating an attempt to harmonize the formula across the PE. Cf. Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament: A Companion Volume to the United Bible Societies' Greek New Testament*, 4th rev. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994) 584.

¹³⁸ In 1 Tim, ἀγάπη is never mentioned without πίστις in close proximity. Cf. 1:14, 2:15, 4:12, 6:11. The same is true of Titus (2:2) and 2 Tim (1:13, 2:22, 3:10), with the exception of 2 Tim 1:7 (though the term is still fairly close at 2 Tim 1:5).

The juxtaposition of these stark moral contrasts is characteristic of the Pastorals.¹³⁹ The positive goal of Timothy's "commanding" (1:3, 5) are the very attributes that he "has" (1:19), and the ones that the opponents have rejected. At the same time, the fact that Timothy's task of correcting the opponents is characterized as *παραγγέλλειν* (1:3) suggests that the virtuous goal of the *παραγγελία* (1:5) is not restricted to Timothy or those already believing, but extends also to those in error.¹⁴⁰ In other words, I suggest, the educative, redemptive, and corrective aspects of the rite of 1:20 are being forecast already at the beginning of the chapter.

B. 1 Timothy 1:18–20

At 1 Timothy 1:18–20 we see one of the most overt, lexically robust examples of the Pastor's use of Pauline letters. Though some scholars who accept the PE as pseudepigraphical question whether or not 1 Timothy 1:20 makes use of 1 Corinthians 5:5,¹⁴¹ most acknowledge the literary

¹³⁹ The abundant use of antithetic statements and examples suggest the comparison with other paraenetic literature such as the Socratic Epistles. See Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*, 356–441.

¹⁴⁰ The term *παραγγελία* does not occur in the LXX, and the use with the cognate verb is similar to what we find in Acts 5:28, where we have *παραγγελία παραγγέλλειν*. When a cognate formulation occurs with its noun in the dative case, BDF §198.6 suggests that it is an attempt to imitate the Hebrew infinitive absolute. The martial imagery of 1:18 suggests that the term has a military nuance, such as a command or order issued to soldiers (cf. *LSJ*, 1306, s.v. *παραγγελία*, which define the term as *command* or *order* issued to soldiers, citing Xenophon, *Hell.* 2.1.4, Acts 16:24. They offer the phrase *τόπος ἐπιτηδείατος εἰς π[αραγγελίαν]* from Polybius, *Hist.* 6.27.1 and gloss it as for "giving the word of command"; generally, it is an *order* issued by an authority, and for this they cite P.Amh. 2.68.63 [1st CE], etc.). Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 32, believe that it refers to the "instruction" of right proclamation and the contents of the epistle as a whole. They see *παρατίθημι* as referring to the handing over of tradition (32, citing *Herm. sim.* 9.10.6 [87.6]). Marshall argues that the initial phrase of v. 18 is concerned with Timothy's task of battling heretics rather than the teaching that Timothy was to give (ICC, 408). However, this reading supposes a false dichotomy between battling and teaching. Timothy's task *is* teaching (cf. 4:11), and teaching is highly valued by the Pastor (cf. 5:17). Secondly, the fact that the *τέλος* of the *παραγγελία* is "love from a pure heart and a good conscience and an un-hypocritical faith" (1:5), things that believers should be instructed in as well, suggests that the *παραγγελία* cannot be reduced to Timothy's task of fighting heresy alone.

¹⁴¹ E.g., Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 156: "Rather than literary dependence of the latter [1 Tim] upon First Corinthians, these verbal coincidences between the letters sound like quotations or allusions to a formulaic expression of which Paul was aware in the mid-fifties of the first century and which the author of the PE still heard in the mid-eighties." A more likely alternative to literary dependence of 1 Timothy upon 1 Corinthians would be dependence on Job. However, given the precision of lexical correspondence and the fact that the Pastor is trying to

dependence of the former upon the latter.¹⁴² The similarities are striking and consist of five elements: (1) a form of παραδίδοναι (in **bold typeface**) (2) the perceived malefactor(s) as the object (in *italics*), (3) τῷ σατανᾷ as the indirect object (single underlined), (4) a purpose clause introduced with ἵνα (dotted underlined), (5) and a passive voice verb (double underlined).

1 Cor 5:5	1 Tim 1:20
παραδοῦναι τὸν τοιοῦτον τῷ σατανᾷ εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός, ἵνα τὸ πνεῦμα σωθῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ κυρίου.	οὓς παρέδωκα τῷ σατανᾷ, ἵνα παιδευθῶσιν μὴ βλασφημεῖν.
". . . to hand over <i>such a man</i> to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, in order that the spirit <u>might be saved</u> on the Day of the Lord."	". . . <i>whom I handed over</i> to Satan, in order that <u>they might be taught</u> not to blaspheme."

It is worth noting that the phrase παραδοῦναι τῷ σατανᾷ occurs nowhere else in the NT. With few exceptions,¹⁴³ scholars have given relatively little time to explaining the similarities and differences between the two passages or the significance of the literary relationship between them. What I contribute here is an analysis of the appropriation of 1 Corinthians 5:5 in 1 Timothy 1:20 and an argument for what this tells us about the literary and theological ambitions of the Pastor. In particular, I argue that the Pastor aims to guide the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 5 in such a way that favors the possibility of redemption for those who erred in morals or in doctrine. My

produce a Pauline letter (which presupposes his possession of some, and 1 Corinthians is one of the earliest to be attested), literary dependence is more likely. Scholars such as Johnson (AB) and Mounce, WBC, who consider the letters to have been written by Paul or by his amanuensis respectively, unsurprisingly consider the two passages in connection with one another as alternative manifestations of Paul's efforts at discipline through exclusion.

¹⁴² E.g., Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 34; Bassler, *ANTC*, 47.

¹⁴³ David Raymond Smith devotes an entire monograph to 1 Cor 5 and esp. 5:5, yet gives 1 Tim 1:20 brief consideration (only two short pages, 146–8). He argues that it constitutes a "curse" by "Paul" which resulted in physical suffering, and suggests that this suffering was perhaps remedial. See his revised dissertation, *Hand This Man over to Satan: Curse, Exclusion, and Salvation in 1 Corinthians 5*, LNTS 386 (London: T&T Clark, 2008).

argument in this section is that the Pastor invokes 1 Corinthians 5 in 1 Timothy 1 in order (1) to advance the fiction of authenticity by using distinctively Pauline language, (2) to endorse a particular approach to reading 1 Corinthians 5 that reduces the uncertainty introduced by syntactical and semantic ambiguities in that passage, and (3) to project an image of Paul that is simultaneously authoritative and pastoral by silencing the "blasphemy" of his theological opponents via educative exclusion from the community.

C. 1 Corinthians 5:1–5

It is actually reported¹⁴⁴ that *porneia* is among you, that is to say¹⁴⁵ the sort of *porneia* that is not even among the gentiles—of such a kind that some man has his father's wife. 2 And you are puffed up! And should you not rather have been grieved, in order that the one who has done this deed might be removed from your midst? 3 For I, absent in the body but present in the spirit, have already decided as though present with respect to the one who has done this thing in this way, 4 in the name of [our] Lord Jesus, when you and my spirit have all been gathered with the power of our Lord Jesus, to hand over such a one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, in order that the spirit might be saved on the day of the Lord.¹⁴⁶

Discerning the relationship of 1 Timothy 1 to 1 Corinthians 5 does not require committing to a single approach to the complicated passage in 1 Corinthians 5:1–5. Indeed, I will demonstrate that the exposition and consideration of multiple exegetical options is necessary insofar as it brings to our attention those ambiguities which would have faced the Pastor and all readers who followed him. On the contrary, by articulating some of the interpretive choices we can more realistically appreciate the Pastor's hermeneutical challenge: he was in a position of having to

¹⁴⁴ On ἀκούεται as an equivalent of λέγεται, see BDF §322, "Λέγεται would be the equivalent (in meaning) of ἀκούω, so that ἀκούεται in 1 C 5:1 is not surprising."

¹⁴⁵ Here I take καί as epexegetical with BDF §442(9).

¹⁴⁶ 1 Cor. 5:1 "Ὁλως ἀκούεται ἐν ὑμῖν πορνεία, καὶ τοιαύτη πορνεία ἣτις οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, ὥστε γυναῖκά τινος τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχειν. 2 καὶ ὑμεῖς πεφυσιωμένοι ἐστὲ καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἐπενθήσατε, ἵνα ἀρθῇ ἐκ μέσου ὑμῶν ὁ τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο πράξας; 3 ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ, ἀπὼν τῷ σώματι παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, ἤδη κέκρικα ὡς παρὼν τὸν οὕτως τοῦτο κατεργασάμενον. 4 ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ κυρίου [ἡμῶν] Ἰησοῦ συναχθέντων ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ πνεύματος σὺν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ, 5 παραδοῦναι τὸν τοιοῦτον τῷ σατανᾷ εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός, ἵνα τὸ πνεῦμα σωθῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ κυρίου."

navigate a multiplicity of interpretive options, and could not simply respond to a single meaning of the passage. That is to say, the polyvalence of 1 Cor 5 and its substantive and challenging ambiguities were both obstacles to interpretation and an opportunity for the Pastor's creative composition.

In 1 Corinthians 5:1–5, Paul expresses shock and dismay at what he deems the Corinthians' inappropriate response (5:2) to an instance of *πορνεία*, in particular that "some man has his father's wife." This may mean that the man has taken his stepmother as a concubine, or perhaps suggests that he has married her [cf. 5:1]).¹⁴⁷ Paul chastises the Corinthians for being "puffed up" rather than grieved. Despite his absence, Paul declares that he already rendered judgment as though present. Paul then stipulates the appropriate cultic conditions for the transfer ritual to occur, namely the gathering of the liturgical participants, the spiritual presence of Paul (cf. *παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι*), and that all this be done in the name of "our Lord Jesus" (5:4).¹⁴⁸ What becomes clear from the following verses (5:6–8) is that Paul's primary concern is with the defilement and pollution of the church community at Corinth. He uses the metaphor of the

¹⁴⁷ Noteworthy is that *γυνή πατρός* is a LXX designation for a stepmother (Lev 18:8, 11; 20:11; Deut 23:1, 27:20). See discussion at Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 96. There is no consensus on this interpretation, but it is rightly noted that the present tense of the infinitive *ἔχειν* suggests that this was not a one-off instance of impropriety, but rather an ongoing state. On the other hand, both the participles modifying the man in question are aorist (v. 2 *πράξας*; v. 3 *κατεργασάμενον*), raising the possibility that it was a discrete act, now complete. However, if that deed (*ἔργον*) is marriage, then the interpretation holds. This kind of union was forbidden by the *lex Iulia* in Roman Law. Fitzmyer, *1 Corinthians*, 234, cites Gaius, *Institutiones* 1.63: "Likewise [it is not allowed to marry] her who was once to me a mother-in-law or daughter-in-law or stepdaughter or stepmother" (Item eam [uxorem ducere non liquet] quae mihi quondam socrus aut nurus aut priuigna aut nouerca fuit). Martial, *Epigr.* 4.16 records one such violation. "Rumor had it that you were not your stepmother's stepson while she was your father's wife, Gallus. But this could not be proved in your parent's lifetime. Now your father is nowhere, Gallus, and your stepmother lives in your house. Though great Tullius be called back from the shades below and Regulus himself defend you, you cannot be acquitted. For a woman who does not cease to be a stepmother after the father's death never was one" (Privignum non esse tuae te, Galle, novercae rumor erat, coniunx dum fuit illa patris. non tamen hoc poterat vivo genitore probari. iam nusquam pater est, Galle, noverca domi est. magnus ab infernis revocetur Tullius umbris et te defendat Regulus ipse licet, non potes absolvi: nam quae non desinit esse post patrem, numquam, Galle, noverca fuit [Shackleton Bailey, LCL]).

¹⁴⁸ The versification and punctuation of the NA28 suggests that that *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι* belongs with the content of v. 4. Alternative options exist. See Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 97.

church as a "lump" and the offending Christian as "old leaven," a corrupting influence upon the whole lump, for "even a little leaven leavens the whole lump."¹⁴⁹

The most challenging syntactical ambiguity occurs in verses 4 and 5. The two major options afforded by the grammar of these sentences are the following: (1) The Corinthians hand over the individual to Satan. This option assumes that they are the unspecified subject of the infinitive *παραδοῦναι*. On this reading, verses four and five are in indirect discourse, governed by *κέκρικα*, so that we have the idea that Paul has already decided that *they* (i.e., the Corinthians) hand the unnamed offender to Satan for "the destruction of the flesh, so that the spirit might be saved on the day of the Lord" (5:5). Paul renders judgment and is spiritually present for the ritual, but the Corinthians execute it. An alternative reading that would still situate the Corinthians as the primary ritual actors would be to take *παραδοῦναι* as an imperatival infinitive.¹⁵⁰ Either way, the Corinthians hand over the offending individual. The second major option for the syntactical ambiguities of verses 4–5 is that the infinitive *παραδοῦναι* is an infinitive complementary to *κέκρικα* in v. 3. In this case Paul has decided with regard to this individual "to hand" him "over" to Satan. This is the most grammatically plausible, though the difficulty is the relative distance between the verb and the infinitive. While this is the option I have chosen to present in the translation, what is of foremost concern for us is the fact that such a decision has to be made at all. We can reasonably infer that the Pastor too, even as a native speaker of Greek, would have been faced with the choice of how to make sense of the syntax.

¹⁴⁹ The metaphor has its roots in the practice of taking a fermented piece of old, sour dough and mixing it with new dough as a rising agent. Such old leaven could easily become contaminated, however, and was annually destroyed before Passover (Fitzmeyer, *1 Corinthians*, 240–41). This practice sheds light on Paul's statement in 1 Cor 5:7, "For indeed Christ, our *pascha*, has been sacrificed" (*καὶ τὸ πάσχα ἡμῶν ἐτύθη Χριστός*). The fact that the paschal lamb has already been sacrificed makes the Corinthians' delinquency in clearing out the old leaven all the more reprehensible to Paul. Paul goes on to urge that this *πόρνος/πόνηρος* be expelled (1 Cor 5:11, 13).

¹⁵⁰ However, the imperatival infinitive is rare in Paul. BDF §389 isolates Rom 12:15 and Phil. 3:16 as the only occurrences in Paul.

The other major ambiguities of this passage concern the nature of the ritual being described by "handing over to Satan," what exactly is implied by this "destruction of the flesh,"¹⁵¹ and lastly whose πνεῦμα is being saved on the day of the Lord. I will discuss these issues in reverse order. Last things first: the πνεῦμα. Given the predominance of the church-as-body metaphor in the Corinthian Correspondence, some interpreters¹⁵² have suggested that the πνεῦμα of God given to the church (e.g., 1 Cor 3:17, 6:17, 12:13) is the one in view at 1 Cor 5:5.¹⁵³ On this reading, by stating that the πνεῦμα is rendered "healthy" or "saved" or "preserved" (σωθῆναι) at the eschatological day of the Lord by the handing over of this man to Satan, Paul would be indicating that the issue is much larger than the fate of "the one having done this deed" (ὁ τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο πράξας [5:2]), as is already suggested by Paul's address of the entire community in 5:2. If the πνεῦμα does belong to the man, then the implication would perhaps be that this man's ultimate fate is salvation, though redemption on the "day of the Lord" would ominously suggest the man's death as a necessary precursor (cf. 1 Thess 4:13–18). Either way, the contrast of πνεῦμα and σάρξ generates a variety of interpretive options and therefore an ambiguity to be reckoned with by the Pastor.

¹⁵¹ Many scholars think it refers to the death of the offender, such that Gordon Fee can write that "most scholars understand this phrase to refer at least to physical suffering, and most likely to death itself," though Fee goes on to repudiate this interpretation (*First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 210–13, quotation from 210). Cf. Barrett, *Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 127; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 97 and n. 35, where Alexander Sand and Eduard Schweizer are listed as advocates for this position.

¹⁵² E.g., Fitzmyer, *1 Corinthians*, 240, who lists also Tertullian (*Pud.* 13.24–25 [CCLat 2.1306]), Ambrosiaster, *Ad Cor.* 5.3.3 [CSEL 81.54]. Dale Martin suggests that "no secure boundary separates the offender's body from the church's body" and that the flesh and spirit of both the offender's and the church's body are in view (*The Corinthian Body* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995], 174).

¹⁵³ Musing about what Paul might have had in mind for the man he has consigned to the clutches of Satan, Martin writes: "... It is not difficult to see that Paul views the man's anticipated suffering as inevitably efficacious. And why not? The suffering will bring about the destruction of that corrupting stuff of the body, the sarx. It will purify the life-giving essence that alone can survive into eternity, the pneuma" (*Corinthian Body*, 171). He suggests that it is not the *pneuma* of the man that is of concern, but likely the *pneuma* of the body of Christ. However, he will argue against the value or reality of those boundaries a few pages later (174).

Secondly, we come to the *σάρξ*. Interpreting the destruction of the *σάρξ* is difficult precisely because Paul can elsewhere use this term either as a synonym for *σῶμα* (1 Cor 6:16, 7:28; cf. Rom 9:3, 5; 2 Cor 4:11; Gal 2:20) and therefore referring to the man's body, or as a personified, generalized notion of *σάρξ* to which Paul is so frequently in opposition (Rom 7:5).¹⁵⁴ Yet another interpretation of *σάρξ* would be to understand it as a metonymy for the man's *πορνεία* and the Corinthians' acceptance of—yea boasting about—this man (5:2). In other words, the destruction of the man's *σάρξ* would effect a healthy church body, free of the corrupting influence of the man's *πορνεία* and marked by the communal response deemed appropriate by Paul, in particular grief over transgression. Indeed, Paul's urgent concern with the defiling presence of this individual suggests that the Corinthians' ongoing acceptance of him is as much a part of the problem as his actual transgression.

At any rate, while *σάρξ* may refer to the community's complicity in the situation, it may also refer to the man. Here Paul makes both subtle and more overt references to the Israelite ritual of expurgation evidenced in Deuteronomy (17:7; 19:19; 21:21; 22:21, 24, and 24:7). Our first hint that this man is destined for removal from the community is given in 1 Cor 5:2, where we find the purpose clause "in order that the one who has done this deed might be removed from your midst" (*ἵνα ἁρθῇ ἐκ μέσου ὑμῶν ὁ τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο πράξας*). However, the quote from Deuteronomy (17:7 or 24:7, *καὶ ἐξαρεῖς τὸν πονηρὸν ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν*) in 1 Cor 5:13 is meant to be the final word on the matter: "Remove the wicked man from your midst." This removal is necessary because the man's *πορνεία* represents for Paul a dangerous breach in the bodily boundaries of the church, a hole in the wall that must be repaired by removing the offending member (5:13). However, the destruction of the flesh remains (perhaps deliberately) ambiguous, referring to (1) the man's

¹⁵⁴ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 173.

physical body, (2) the fleshy moral failure of the community in this instance, (3) the "sinful nature" of the man, or (4) some combination of those options. As we will see, it is precisely this interpretive ambiguity that constitutes the opportunity seized upon by the Pastor in the composition of 1 Tim 1:20.

Lastly, then, we come to the handing over of the man to Satan. Exegetes both ancient and modern have typically considered the ritual to have some combination of functions: curse, exclusion, physical suffering, and perhaps even death.¹⁵⁵ The judicial language of "handing over" (παράδιδοναι) someone to receive punishment was fairly common.¹⁵⁶ Adolf Deissmann considered the action Paul calls for in 1 Cor 5 to be "an execration," i.e., "devoting a person to the gods of the lower world."¹⁵⁷ As we have just seen, the mechanism for purifying the community, "unleavening the lump" as it were, is one of communal exclusion (cf. 5:13), described by Paul as "handing over such a man to Satan."¹⁵⁸ What role then does Satan play? How does Satan effect the "destruction" (ὄλεθρος) of the flesh, whatever that flesh may be? One clue may reside in the formula itself, since the language of "handing over to Satan" is reminiscent of Job 2:6, "The Lord said to the devil, 'Behold I am handing him over to you; only preserve his life'" (εἶπεν δὲ ὁ κύριος τῷ διαβόλῳ Ἰδοὺ παραδίδωμί σοι αὐτόν, μόνον τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ διαφύλαξον). It is notable here that just prior to this "handing over," the διάβολος urges God to send forth his hand to "touch his bones and his flesh"

¹⁵⁵ See the discussion of the modern history of scholarship on the passage in Smith, *Hand This Man*, 3–54. Though Smith claims to have "critically surveyed nearly two millennia of reception history" (114), in reality Tertullian (7–11) and John Chrysostom (29–31) are the only two ancient exegetes to receive discussion in his monograph, and besides a five-page foray into the exegesis of John Calvin (38–42), no author before the 20th century is considered.

¹⁵⁶ Collins, NTL, 50, cites the following examples: Antiphon, *Prosecution for Poisoning* 20; Isocrates, *Or.* 17.15; Demosthenes, *1 Steph* 45.61; Mark 1:14, 9:31; Acts 8:3, 12:4.

¹⁵⁷ Adolf Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World*, trans. Lionel R. M. Strachan (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995), 302.

¹⁵⁸ By invoking the exclusionary ritual of Deut 17:7 in v 13, Paul indicates that some sort of expulsion is in view. Adela Yarbro Collins, "The Function of 'Excommunication' in Paul," *HTR* 73.1–2 (1980): 251–63 identifies the literature from Qumran as providing the most pertinent comparative materials. Greek apotropaic rites are also relevant here. See below.

(ἄψαι τῶν ὁσίων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν σαρκῶν αὐτοῦ). If Paul were invoking the Joban story, then at very least intense physical suffering, disease, and loss would characterize the offending man's fate.¹⁵⁹

Non-biblical comparative materials can also help us to identify the interpretive options for what Paul may have had in mind. For instance, similarities exist between the formula used here and curse formulas on lead tablets¹⁶⁰ as well as in the Greek Magical Papyri.¹⁶¹ In those texts we find instances in which individuals are "handed over"¹⁶² to various metaphysical entities (often cthonic and/or Egyptian deities) with the expressed intent that they be physically harmed, and at times even killed.¹⁶³ A good example of a lead tablet (this particular tablet was found rolled up with a nail through it along with four others, all fragmentary but nearly identical) comes from the mid-first century BCE from Rome, of which I will quote the first part:

Good and beautiful Proserpina or Salvia, if you prefer that I call you so, wife of Pluto, snatch away the health, the body, the complexion, the strength, and the faculties of Plotius. Hand him over (*tradas*) to Pluto, your husband. May he not be able to escape this (curse) by his wits. Hand him over (*tradas*) to fevers—quartan, tertian or daily—so that they wrestle and struggle with him. Let them overcome him to the point where they snatch away his soul. Thus I give over (*trado*) to you this victim, O Proserpina or Acherusia if you prefer that I call you so.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ According to Jewett, there was a tendency amongst "older exegetes" (he cites Origen and Augustine alongside Grotius and Godet) to interpret the *σάρξ* of 1 Cor 5 as τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός so as to avoid the "gnostic-dualistic coloring of the usage." He goes on to say that Everling's study of Pauline demonology showed that the kind of condemnation in view in 1 Cor 5:5 in fact resulted in sickness and death. Though Jewett felt that "there is no alternative to conclude that Paul does not appear to have sensed the theological implications of his usage at this point," one solution would simply be to refrain from the conclusion that "Gnostic individualism" and its attendant "physical dualism" is the context within which Paul is operating at all. See Robert Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings*, AGJU 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 124.

¹⁶⁰ Smith, *Hand This Man*, 72–98. For a recent comparative study utilizing this body of evidence to interpret Matt 16:18–19, see Seon Yong Kim, "Ancient Binding Spells, Amulets and Matt 16.18-19: Revisiting August Dell's Proposal a Century Later," *NTS* 62.3 (2016): 378–97.

¹⁶¹ Smith, *Hand This Man*, 103–107.

¹⁶² Smith, *Hand This Man*, 83 nn. 177; 84–88.

¹⁶³ E.g., a *defixio* on a lead tablet dating from the end of the fourth CE, which declares the handing over of one Kardelos to a variety of Egyptian deities for the purpose of suffering for five days and eventual death (John G. Gager, *Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1992], 67–71).

¹⁶⁴ Bona pulchra Proserpina, [P]lut[o]nis uxor, | seive me Salviam deicere oportet, | eripias salutem, c[orpus, co]lorem, vires, virtutes | Ploti. Tradas [Plutoni] viro tuo. Ni possit cogitationibus | sueis hoc vita[re. Tradas] illunc | febri quartan[a]e, t[ertian]ae, cottidia[n]ae, | quas [cum illo l]uct[ent, delucet; illunc] | ev[in]cant, [vincant,]

Roman military rites also furnish comparanda, especially the ancient practice of a general's *devotio hostium*, a handing over of the enemy, their troops, and their territory, to the Di Manes, the gods of the underworld.¹⁶⁵ What this Roman *devotio* has in common with the *defixiones* is the promised destruction of the enemy and their property.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, at Qumran, the opponents of the community, who are described as those who do not maintain proper moral boundaries but rather defile the community of which they are a part and God's covenant, are subject to satanic punishment: "Thus [i.e., death by sword] will be the judgment of all those entering his covenant but who do not remain steadfast in them; they shall be visited for destruction at the hand of Belial."¹⁶⁷ These perpetrators "hope to be healed but the defect sticks (to them)," which suggests that illness and eventual death are visited upon them by Belial, another term for Satan. The mechanism for the suffering or "destruction" of the flesh in 1 Cor 5, then, is perhaps Satan's own capacity to inflict bodily harm, evident also in Paul's writings at 2 Cor 12:7, provided that the thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan, caused Paul physical duress.¹⁶⁸

usq[ue] dum animam | eiu[s] eripia[nt]. Quare ha[nc] victimam | tibi trad[o] Prose[rpi]na, seiv[e] me, | Proserpin[a, sei]ve m[e] Ach[er]u[s]iam dicere oportet (Latin text from LCL 359, *Remains of Old Latin: Archaic Inscriptions*, no. 33.1–14). Trans. and discussion from Gager, *Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World*, 240–42.

¹⁶⁵ Hendrik Simon Versnel argues that the other type of Roman *devotio*, wherein the general would pledge himself and his troops as a self-sacrifice to the gods along with the enemy, was in fact a *consecratio* that was eventually attached to the more ancient and widespread practice of *devotio hostium*, and subsequently was called by the name *devotio* ("Two Types of Roman Devotio," *Mnemosyne* 29 [1976]: 365–410).

¹⁶⁶ We should note that in the case of *defixiones*, the "object" of destruction is at times not an individual, but an amorous connection not favored by the author or purchaser of the *defixio*. Hans-Josef Klauck cites one such instance from a first century BCE Latin *defixio* from a grave on the Via Latin near Rome (CIL I 1012; VI 140), of which I cite a portion: "As a dead person is welcome neither to gods nor to human beings, just so may Rhodine be unwelcome to Marcus Licinius: let her be worth just as much as the dead man who is buried here. Father Pluto, I hand over Rhodine to you, so that she may forever be hated by Marcus Licinius Faustus" (*The Religious Context of Early Christianity: A Guide to Graeco-Roman Religions*, trans. Brian McNeil [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2003]). As Klauck points out, the "condition of death serves as a metaphor for the desired alienation between [Rhodine] and Marcus Licinius Faustus."

¹⁶⁷ CD 8.1–2, 4 (Florentino Garcia Martínez and Eibert J. C Tigchelaar, eds., *The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition*, 2 vols. [Leiden: Brill, 1997]).

¹⁶⁸ Most modern scholars interpret the thorn as some kind of physical ailment, and sometimes put forward various hypotheses for the nature of the ailment (e.g., epilepsy, ophthalmological problem, migraines, recurrent fever, malaria, partial aphasia, etc.). Some, however, interpret the thorn as a temptation, the difficulties associated with

Ultimately, however, the text of 1 Corinthians 5 leaves the fate of the man indeterminate. The offending individual is certainly to be removed from the community, but the nature of the destruction of the flesh, and what results from his handing over to Satan, are not entirely clear. In particular, we are left to wonder if the man's treatment is meant to be remedial, and whether or not his transfer to Satan is permanent, whether he can be redeemed, indeed, whether he will even be alive at the end of his ordeal. Paul has certainly enacted the rhetorical removal of the offending individual from the community into the realm of Satan, and the comparative materials suggest the man's physical harm as well, and perhaps his death, imagined as being brought about by Satan.¹⁶⁹ In the next section, I will argue that early interpreters, beginning with the Pastor, were also faced with the challenge of what to make of these exegetical difficulties. The important distinction regarding the Pastor, of course, is that he interprets *in voce Pauli*, and the result is an act of putative self-interpretation that will ultimately have huge sway on early Christian exegetes and their reading of 1 Corinthians 5.

Paul's travels, or even Paul's expressions of anger. On the modern hypotheses, see Adela Yarbro Collins, "Paul's Disability: The Thorn in His Flesh," in *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature*, ed. Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 172–176. Ancient exegetes also vary in their interpretations, some suggesting that the thorn is a physical ailment (e.g., Tertullian, Gregory Nazianzus, Jerome), while others understand it as a temptation or even the activity of opponents (e.g., Basil of Caesarea, John Chrysostom), whether internal to Paul's communities or outside them. On the ancient interpreters, see "Paul's Disability: The Thorn in His Flesh," 166–172. On Chrysostom in particular, see Margaret M. Mitchell, *The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline Interpretation* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 304–306.

¹⁶⁹ Derek Brown's recent description of the space outside the safety of the ἐκκλήσια as "realm of Satan" is consonant with my own description of the spatial construction of theological rectitude and alterity. However, he creates a false dichotomy when he contrasts the idea of a "realm of Satan" with the notion that Satan functions as an agent in 1 Cor 5:5. "For if to 'hand over' the errant man to Satan means to deliver him to the *realm* of Satan (*Zugriffsbereich des Satans*) and not to Satan himself, then there is little reason to posit any agency of Satan in 1 Cor 5:5" (*The God of This Age: Satan in the Churches and Letters of the Apostle Paul*, WUNT 2.409 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015], 140–51, quoting 148–49, emphasis original). This determination is based in part on his judgment that the "destruction of the flesh" does not suggest any physical harm, but rather suggests the Paul really means that the man's "fleshly self-sufficiency" will be destroyed by virtue of being cut-off from the community (144–45). However, would not self-sufficiency be necessarily *exacerbated* by the removal of community support? One is struck by the degree to which Brown's exegesis relies on the introduction of circumlocutions (e.g., "flesh" becomes "fleshly self-sufficiency" [144] or "'fleshly' pride or lust" [145]) and reading terms as "metaphorical" (144) vs. "literally" (146) (i.e., "destruction" really just refers to removal [145] and "Satan" does not mean Satan as an agent but rather means "realm of Satan" [146–47]).

D. From 1 Corinthians 5 to the Pastorals

Turning now to 1 Timothy 1:18–20, I argue that the Pastor sought to guide the interpretation of 1 Cor 5 through an act of self-interpretation by selectively adapting the language of 1 Cor 5:5 into a new argumentative and epistolary context. Keeping in mind the similarities between the two texts discussed above, let us present the full passage from 1 Timothy and consider the differences between it and 1 Corinthians 5.

18 This command I entrust to you, [my] child Timothy, in accordance with the prophecies that came before to you, in order that in accordance with them you might wage the noble campaign, 19 having faith and a good conscience, which certain individuals, because they rejected a good conscience, have made shipwreck of their faith, among whom are Hymenaeus and Alexander whom I have handed over to Satan in order that they might be taught not to blaspheme.¹⁷⁰

In contrast to the practice of Paul,¹⁷¹ who never directly identifies any of his theological opponents, the Pastor names the offending individuals (who also appear also at 2 Tim 2:17 [Hymenaeus] and 2 Tim 4:14 [Alexander]) instead of their offense.¹⁷² Furthermore, beyond the

¹⁷⁰ 18 Ταύτην τὴν παραγγελίαν παρατίθεμαί σοι, τέκνον Τιμόθεε, κατὰ τὰς προαγούσας ἐπὶ σὲ προφητείας, ἵνα στρατεύῃ ἐν αὐταῖς τὴν καλὴν στρατείαν 19 ἔχων πίστιν καὶ ἀγαθὴν συνείδησιν, ἣν τινες ἀπώσάμενοι περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐναυάγησαν, 20 ὧν ἓστιν Ὑμέναιος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος, οὓς παρέδωκα τῷ σατανᾷ, ἵνα παιδευθῶσιν μὴ βλασφημεῖν.

¹⁷¹ Similarly Ignatius, as seen in *Smyrn.* 5:3: "But their names, because they are faithless (ἄπιστα), it did not seem good to me to record. Indeed, may I not even make mention of them until they should change their minds with regard to the Passion, which is our resurrection!" (τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν, ὄντα ἄπιστα, οὐκ ἔδοξέν μοι ἐγγράψαι. ἀλλὰ μηδὲ γένοιτό μοι αὐτῶν μνημονεύειν, μέχρι οὗ μετανοήσωσιν εἰς τὸ πάθος, ὃ ἔστιν ἡμῶν ἀνάστασις). To explain the Pauline and Ignatian practice, Richard I. Pervo calls attention to the Roman practice of *damnatio memoriae* and the penchant to remove the names of personae non gratae from inscriptions (*The Making of Paul*, 86 n. 125). The tactic of the Pastor, by contrast, presupposes the efficacy of highlighting the deviants' identity as opposed to suppressing it. On the other hand, directly identifying the opponents, precisely because it is not done in Paul's letters or the epistles of Ignatius, for instance, may instead belie the fictive nature of this "opposition" and underscore the Pastor's efforts to create the semblance of a real historical scenario onto which he is projecting a smattering of theological concerns from a later era. Regarding the Pastor's production of names and details, Pervo writes, "this quality gives the PE a vividness and realism that have more in common with narrative fiction than with other early Christian polemic. It suggests that the work has some literary goals. Similar observations may be made about the abundance of personal references in the PE, which surpass those of the church letters in detail and frequency" (Pervo, "Romancing," 42).

¹⁷² While the practice of referencing the names of the ἄγιοι is well known to us from the *homologoumena*, what is "unusual" here is the mention of opponents or former co-workers by name. The negative references are as follows: Hymenaeus and Alexander (1 Tim 2:20), Phygelus and Hermogenes (2 Tim 1:15), Hymenaeus and Philetus (2 Tim 2:17), Demas (2 Tim 4:10), Alexander (now designated the "copper-smith" at 2 Tim 4:14). Besides the use of the proper names of Paul, Timothy and Titus, the PE make positive reference to Timothy's grandmother Lois and mother

"rejection" (cf. ἀπωσάμενοι) of a "good conscience" (ἀγαθὴ συνείδησις), there is no attempt to identify the nature of the offense, nor any attempt to persuade Timothy of the necessity of the handing over. In sharp contrast to the tone of 1 Corinthians 5, where Paul is castigating the Corinthians, the Paul of 1 Timothy situates news of the handing over in his commendation of Timothy. Furthermore, "Paul" does not suggest any role that Timothy or the churches in Ephesus might have in the handing over of Alexander and Hymenaeus. Paul alone acts as judge and jury, and declares *ex post facto* that he has already handed over (cf. παρέδωκα) Hymenaeus and Alexander to Satan.¹⁷³ Given the considerable ambiguities introduced by Paul's syntax in 1 Cor 5:3–5 concerning who was doing what and when, the fact that Paul is now the sole actor is notable. This is in fact in line with the emphasis placed upon Paul as the preeminent apostle throughout the Pastorals. Not only does Paul *act* alone in 1 Timothy, Paul *acted* alone, and the task is now complete.

The explanatory prepositional phrase in 1 Corinthians 5:5 "for the destruction of the flesh" (εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός) is notably absent¹⁷⁴ from the passage, as is the πνεῦμα, because the substance of the purpose clause has changed from "in order that the spirit might be saved on the day of the Lord" (1 Cor 5:5) to "in order that they might be taught"¹⁷⁵ not to βλασφημεῖν" (1 Tim

Eunice (2 Tim 1:5), Onesiphorus (2 Tim 1:16, 4:19), Crescus, Mark, Tychicus (2 Tim 4:10–11), Prisca and Aquila, Erastos, Trophimus, Eubulous and Pudens and Linus and Claudia (2 Tim 4:19–21), Artemas, Tychicus, Zenas, Apollos (Titus 3:12–13). Richard Pervo suggests that "this quality [identifying opponents by name] gives the PE a vividness and realism that have more in common with narrative fiction than with other early Christian polemic. It suggests that the work has some literary goals. Similar observations may be made about the abundance of personal references in the PE, which surpass those of the church letters in detail and frequency" (Pervo, "Romancing," 42).

¹⁷³ Paul's pneumatic presence is also key for 1 Cor 5, but the gathering of the church and the "power" of the Lord Jesus are requisite.

¹⁷⁴ However, we do find the term at 1 Tim 6:9, where "many mindless and harmful desires" (ἐπιθυμίαι πολλαὶ ἀνόητοι καὶ βλαβεραὶ) plunge those who wish to be wealthy "into destruction and ruin" (εἰς ὄλεθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν). Paul envisions "ruin" as the "end" of his opponents at Phil 3:19 (cf. ὣν τὸ τέλος ἀπώλεια).

¹⁷⁵ Though commentators tend to assume (e.g., Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 158; Towner, NICNT, 161; Mounce, WBC, 67) that Alexander and Hymenaeus are the subject of παιδευθῶσιν, it should be mentioned that it is an exegetical possibility that the subject of παιδευθῶσιν is the τινες of 1:19. If this were the case, it might be possible to conceive of

1:20).¹⁷⁶ The βλασφηημ- word group is frequent in the PE, and the basic sense is that of revilement, defamation, or slander (cf. 1 Tim 1:13, 6:1; 2 Tim 3:2; Titus 2:5).¹⁷⁷ Thus, it is somewhat ironic that Alexander and Hymenaeus are handed over to Satan, the chief accuser and reviler, in order to learn not to revile.¹⁷⁸ The content of their alleged offense is in keeping with the depiction of opponents elsewhere in the Pastorals: they are listed as βλάσφημοι at 2 Tim 3:2, and βλασφημῖαι are part of the noxious results of the opponents sickened wrangling in 1 Timothy 6:4. There is concern in the Pastorals that neither the "name of God and the teaching" (τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία [1 Tim 6:1]) nor the word of God (ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ [Titus 2:5]) should be subject to βλαφημεῖσθαι. One gets the sense that βλασφημεῖν occurs especially (though not exclusively; cf. Titus 3:2, which seems to be more general) in the Pastorals to describe speech that seeks to

Alexander and Hymenaeus as an example of sorts for the rest of those who have shipwrecked their faith. Indeed, (and I am indebted to Matthijs den Dulk for pointing this out in private correspondence, as well for editing a portion of an earlier version of this section of the chapter), the named opponents of the PE are also associated with a larger and more ambiguous group of others who have apparently erred as well (2 Tim 2:17, 3:8). In my judgment, these ambiguous others, as well as the general group of those who would believe or are considered to be faithful still (e.g., 1 Tim 1:16; 2 Tim 1:13, 3:12) should be understood as generic categories of the believing and the unbelieving, who are exemplified by the named faithful and the named opponents. Nevertheless, I do not think that Alexander and Hymenaeus are functioning here as a sacrificial example, as if *they* would not "be taught" by their being handed over, while the *τινες* of 1:19 would. This idea is untenable in light of the corrective work that Timothy is to do with regard to those in error already in 1:3–5 and in light of the wish for universal salvation expressed just a few verses later in 1 Tim 2:4. A second further exegetical option is that it is both the *τινες* of 1:19 *and* Alexander and Hymenaeus who are the collective subject of παιδευθῶσιν. However, because there is no explicit signal of a shift in subject, I am inclined to understand the subject of the subordinate purpose clause to be the same as the direct object of the principal clause (οὓς παρέδωκα τῷ σατανᾷ) for which the purpose clause acts as a modifying adverbial sentence (cf. Smyth 2189.3). Alexander and Hymenaeus are explicitly separated from the group for the purpose of "handing over" by the phrase ὧν ἐστὶν Ὑμέναιος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος, and there is no syntactical indication that the reader should revert to the group of 1:19 to find the subject for the purpose clause.

¹⁷⁶ Blasphemy is a frequent topic in the PE, and the basic sense seems to be that of revilement or slander (cf. 1 Tim 1:13, 20; 6:1, 4; 2 Tim 3:2; Titus 2:5, 3:2). Thus, it is somewhat ironic that Alexander and Hymenaeus are handed over to Satan, the chief accuser and reviler, in order to learn not to revile.

¹⁷⁷ Jeremy Hultin notes that the term βλασφημία does not mean "blasphemy" per se. It could be used to describe speech toward gods or humans, and means "defamation" or "slander": "Unlike its English cognate, βλασφημία refers to the charges made against men or gods; it means not 'blasphemy' but 'defamation' or 'slander.' 'Slander' was a natural outgrowth of anger; the word could be used of the abuse that the Cynics doled out" (*The Ethics of Obscene Speech in Early Christianity and Its Environment*, NovTSup 128 [Leiden: Brill, 2008], 61).

¹⁷⁸ It would appear that, just as the ἄγγελος σατανᾶ seems to be in 2 Cor 12:7, Satan is an agent of God here in 1 Cor 5. Satan is elsewhere in Paul's letters characterized as a shape-shifting dissembler and deceiver (μετασχηματίζεσθαι at 2 Cor 11:14, the ὄφεις at 2 Cor 10:3; cf. Gal 5:8), a tempter (περάζειν at 1 Cor 7:5), one who defrauds (πλεονέκτειν at 2 Cor 2:11), and an interrupter of travel plans, perhaps even through illness (1 Thess 2:18). But in 1 Cor 5:5, Satan's legacy as inflictor of punishment is being invoked (cf. ὀλεθρος).

discredit or undermine the Christian message. Paul himself formerly was a βλάσφημος, and this is connected especially to his persecution of and violence against the church and its message (1 Tim 1:13).¹⁷⁹ The fact that he was "shown mercy" (ἐλεηθῆναι), because he "acted in ignorance and without faith" (cf. ἀγνοῶν ἐποίησα ἐν ἀπιστίᾳ), suggest first that Alexander and Hymenaeus are acting similarly, but second it prepares the reader for the possibility that their fate too may be in some way a demonstration of mercy. Paul's pre-conversion stint as a βλάσφημος—and consequently being on Satan's side of the cosmic struggle for a time—lends poignance to the pronouncement that he has handed Alexander and Hymenaeus over to Satan. Indeed, the close proximity of Paul's own self-description as a blasphemer-turned-exemplar of faith (1 Tim 1:13) suggests that they too might be "shown mercy" (1:13). This possibility, that the handing over of Alexander and Hymenaeus is ultimately remedial and not purely punitive, is bolstered by the calculated removal of the Pauline phrase that might lead a reader to expect the possibility of death: "the destruction of the flesh" (ὃλεθρον τῆς σαρκός).

The exact significance of the omission of εἰς ὃλεθρον τῆς σαρκός is difficult to surmise (proving a negative always is), but without it one is much less inclined to imagine that the Pastor has *death* in mind for his opponents.¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, some commentators suggest that 1 Timothy 1:20 retains the same sense of punitive treatment for Alexander and Hymenaeus as was imagined

¹⁷⁹ Pieter G. R. de Villiers considers the fact that Paul is listed as a βλάσφημος as indicative of conceit, and writes that "When Paul therefore describes himself as a blasphemer before his conversion in 1 Tim 1:13, he places himself on the same level as his opponents with their wrong teaching and immoral behaviour" ("The Vice of Conceit in 1 Timothy," 52).

¹⁸⁰ Bertram characterizes the usage in 1 Tim 1:20 as "chastisement" though not "definitive destruction" ("παιδεύω, κτλ.," *TDNT* 5.625). Andreas Lindemann recognizes that the formula is "offenbar schärfer" in 1 Cor 5:5 than in 1 Tim 1:20, but does not comment on why this might be (*Paulus im ältesten Christentum*, 136).

for the offending individual in 1 Corinthians 5.¹⁸¹ Their suggestion depends upon the meaning of the verb παιδεύειν, which may have a sense of "educating," "correcting," or something more martial, like "discipline with punishment" or even "discipline by whipping or scourging."¹⁸² However, the problem for those who wish to hold out for a punitive sense for παιδευθῶσιν here is the fact that the purpose clause ἵνα παιδευθῶσιν has at its object μὴ βλασφημεῖν. With a complementary infinitive dependent upon it, it is difficult to see how παιδευθῶσιν could mean anything but "be *taught* not to do x." In other words, while the sense of "discipline with punishment" may be present in the verb, the infinitive βλασφημεῖν restricts the potential semantic range of παιδευθῶσιν.¹⁸³ The goal of their being handed over is ultimately pedagogic, not destructive in any final sense.

With this act of corrective composition, the Pastor has attempted to restrict the range of interpretive options for readers of 1 Corinthians 5 by locating some of the signature terminology from the passage within a new and fictive context. Furthermore, the Pastor provides a new hermeneutical precedent that could be used to exegete the earlier utterance in 1 Corinthians. While the Pastor could not rewrite 1 Corinthians, he could rewrite parts of it into his new "Pauline" composition, thereby creating an echo chamber within the developing *Corpus Paulinum* that could lead later readers to understand the Pauline practice of "handing over to Satan" as an

¹⁸¹ Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Heremeneia*, 34 argue that in using παιδεύειν here, "clearly the author is thinking more of punishment than education. Since 'Satan' here can only refer to his function as the destroyer of the body and of life, one has to think of sickness or the like."

¹⁸² According to BDAG, 749, s.v. παιδεύειν, this term can be glossed as "educate" (e.g., Acts 7:22, 22:3), "correct, give guidance" (e.g., 2 Tim 2:25), "discipline with punishment" (BDAG places our verse here, and gives also 1 Cor 11:32, 2 Cor 6:9, 1 Clem 56:16, 57:1), or even "discipline by whipping or scourging" (as at Luke 23:16, 22). Johnson, AB, 186 writes that "the verb *paideuein* can mean both to 'discipline' and to 'educate' ([he gives examples from Euripides, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle]); in the ancient world, the two went together (e.g., 1 Cor 11:32; 2 Cor 6:9; 2 Tim 2:25; Titus 2:12; Heb 12:6, 7, 10)."

¹⁸³ Elsewhere, the Pastor modifies the term παιδεύειν with ἐν πραΰτητι (2 Tim 2:25), suggesting that there too education is paramount, not punishment. That said, it may be that the Pastor is trying to clarify the nature of παιδεύειν, i.e., that it is not to be too harsh, but rather gentle. In Titus 2:12, it is ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ that does the activity of παιδεύειν, again emphasizing education or instruction and not punishment.

ultimately educational practice, one that should not be interpreted as potentially entailing death. This seems to have been important for the Pastor, because he regularly seeks to commend a pastoral mode of psychagogy that aims at restoration and redemption, even for "Paul's" opponents.¹⁸⁴ In this new context, in addition to extending the Pauline practice of "handing over to Satan" for a new composition, the Pastor seems to have attempted to alleviate three ambiguities in particular. First, he sought to answer the question of who is involved in the handing over of malefactors to Satan, which is syntactically ambiguous in 1 Corinthians 5. The short answer for the Pastor is that Paul alone is in charge of this. That Paul is the major actor in the act of handing over is an emphasis that matches the more general project of the Pastorals to locate authority and right instruction in the person and teaching of Paul. Second, the Pastor sought to answer the question of the ultimate purpose of the handing over. Whereas in 1 Corinthians it is ultimately unclear whether or not the immoral man must be consigned to Satan for the salvation of his own *πνεῦμα* or that of the church body's *πνεῦμα*, in 1 Timothy the desired effect for Hymenaeus and Alexander in particular is highlighted. If a reader of 1 Corinthians were confused by the ambiguity of the *ἵνα*-clause in 1 Corinthians, a quick glance at 1 Timothy would potentially clarify that the one being handed over is also the one who is the subject of the action that results, whether that is the salvation of the spirit (1 Corinthians) or education (1 Timothy).

Third, the Pastor seeks to answer the question of the effect of the handing over. The Pastor attempts to reorient the "handing over" of 1 Corinthians 5 and its latent ambiguities regarding the destruction of the flesh and salvation of the spirit into a focus on the ultimate concern for

¹⁸⁴ Indeed, just a few lines later the Pastor offers a programmatic designation of God as the one "who wants all people to be saved and to come to a recognition of the truth" (*ὁς πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλει σωθῆναι καὶ εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν*). On the problem of healing and redemption as a theological emphasis in the Pastorals, see chapter 3 below.

education. Those handed over are to learn not to blaspheme, not potentially die. This is not to say that Alexander and Hymenaeus being handed over to Satan does not suggest some insalubrious effects. Dibelius and Conzelmann speculate that the association with Satan must indicate some kind of illness to which they are subjected.¹⁸⁵ This is very likely the case. The main effect of this revision of the handing over in 1 Cor 5:5 is that it does not entail the possibility of death; on the contrary, it holds out hope for repentance and restoration.¹⁸⁶ Satan's role is clarified—for the Pastor, Satan is not to be interpreted as an agent of final destruction, but rather of a calculated pedagogy of pain, designed ultimately to bring about reeducation and a return to the faith.¹⁸⁷ Their "shipwreck" of their faith is cast by the Pastor as the motivating factor for this painful education, though the Pastor likely hopes for a prophylactic effect as well: that his audience appreciate the danger posed to one's health by deviance from the Pauline proclamation. In this regard, the Pastor reconfigures one Pauline concept—that of being handed over to Satan—in such a way that it aligns with another Pauline concept, namely the idea that disease, a satanic thorn in the flesh, can have a pedagogic purpose (2 Cor 12:7). Nevertheless, the Pastor's endeavor to delimit ambiguities and guide the interpretation of the Pauline "handing over" inevitably introduced new ambiguities (What exactly is this process of reeducation? How does Satan help achieve it?). This was the inevitable consequence not only of the mode of communication

¹⁸⁵ Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Heremeneia*, 34.

¹⁸⁶ Roloff, *EKKNT*, 106 makes a similar point about the net result of the change; my argument differs insofar as I draw attention to the function of that change within the intertextual framework for which I have argued.

¹⁸⁷ Bertram, "παιδεύω κτλ.," (*TDNT* 5.625) also considers the possibility: "[This devotio] may consist in sickness or misfortune. It is designed to prevent blasphemy and to lead back to faith, cf. 1 C. 5:5; 2 C. 12:7." Pain was thought to be an effective pedagogue in antiquity, to such an extent that when school children were learning verbal paradigms in Roman-era Egypt, the stem *τυπτ* ("strike") was commonly used for forming the words, indicating what would happen to them if they did not learn well (Raffaella Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001], 65–73, esp. 69). Cribiore references a wax tablet that is preserved which has an Egyptian maxim written four times by a student, undoubtedly as punishment: "Work hard, boy, lest you be thrashed." She notes that the tablet contains two hands, one by the teacher and the other the student (*Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt*, *American Studies in Papyrology* 36 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996], no. 134).

(pseudepigraphical letters are hardly the ideal opportunity to corral hermeneutical possibilities), but also the very nature of literary production. As Plato recognized long ago, to write down one's ideas is render them orphans, without their parent to protect and interpret them.¹⁸⁸ The irony of the Pastor's corrective composition is that he has tried to do for Paul what Paul tried to do for himself but ultimately could not, and now he too has offered his readers a literary composition that ultimately produces fresh interpretive ambiguities even as it tries to clarify earlier ones.

E. Conclusion

I have argued that the Pastor deliberately incorporates and omits certain elements of 1 Corinthians 5:5 in 1 Timothy 1:20 in an effort to guide the interpretation of the complicated passage in 1 Corinthians 5. These elements, viewed together, indicate that the Pastor is both invoking, softening, and correcting Paul's own exhortations with regard to church discipline and sanctity, and that he is creatively adapting them for a new context.¹⁸⁹ This also has the effect of softening the portrait of Paul found in 1 Cor 5 which, arguably, appears to depict Paul as a stern, even ruthless (if death is envisioned) disciplinarian. Whether Paul meant 1 Corinthians 5:5 as a curse that entailed the death (immediate or eventual) of the offending individual, or perhaps as a ritual of exclusion with the eventual goal of the man's restoration (or some combination of those options), the Pastor has adapted the language in an attempt to delimit the possible range of meanings for the reader who wishes to harmonize the Paul of 1 Corinthians and the Paul of 1

¹⁸⁸ *Phaedr.* 275d–e.

¹⁸⁹ As I shall demonstrate further in chapter 3, a further example of the Pastor's impulse to mollify the disciplinarian image of Paul is the use of medical imagery to simultaneously pathologize theological deviance but also to hold out hope for the "healing" of those who engage in it (e.g., 2 Tim 2:17 and 2:25, also with the devil at 2:26; Titus 1:9).

Timothy.¹⁹⁰ Wary of the potential implications of the "destruction of the flesh," the Pastor has carefully excised or simply not replicated this language in favor of a pedagogy that leads these errant individuals to stop "blaspheming" the Pastor's vision of the Pauline gospel. While the handing over of Alexander and Hymenaeus to Satan in the Pastorals is conveyed as a bracing rebuke to them, which may very well entail the kind of bodily harm that one might sustain in shipwreck, it no longer countenances the possibility of their elimination.¹⁹¹ The Pastor's theology is such that he wishes to foreclose any such interpretation of Paul's "handing over." Like the God he depicts, the Pastor "desires for all people to be saved and to come to a recognition of the truth" (πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλει σωθῆναι καὶ εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν [1 Tim 2:4]). That said, there is also present an important corollary, wherein the Pastor's emphasis on "Paul's" pastoral clemency augments the responsibility of the wayward. Alexander's next appearance in these letters (2 Tim 4:14) is accompanied by a sober reminder, heavy with the *gravitas* of Septuagintal (and Pauline!) language: "the Lord shall repay him according to his deeds" (ἀποδώσει αὐτῷ ὁ κύριος κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ).¹⁹²

V. Conclusion & Summary

In this chapter I have argued that spatial metaphors are a pervasive feature of the Pastor's persuasive strategy in the letters to Timothy and Titus. By imbuing spaces and places with moral valence, the Pastor created a narrative world that is endowed with normative expectations for the proper behavior of members of the church. The transgression of those boundaries is also depicted

¹⁹⁰ Theodore of Mopsuestia is one such interpreter who reads these passages together in order to form a synthetic interpretation. See above, 131 n. 125.

¹⁹¹ The fact that later exegetes continued to read the text in this way, i.e., they read 1 Tim in light of 1 Cor rather than the other way around, highlights the ultimate lack of control that any author has over the interpretation of their texts.

¹⁹² See Rom 2:6 (ὁ θεός, ὃς ἀποδώσει ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ); Ps 61:13 LXX (ὅτι σὺ ἀποδώσεις ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ) and Prov 24:12 LXX (ὃς ἀποδίδωσιν ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ.)

with kinetic metaphors of deviance and departure from an idealized center in which Paul stands firmly as sole arbiter of truth and moral propriety. In the Pastor's argument, to deviate from Paul is to deviate from God and God's truth. Correspondingly, I have argued that the Pastor crafts a morally charged articulation of space and place. I demonstrated that by placing certain individuals into this realm of Satan, the Pastor pursued a rhetorical strategy that utilized the demonic or satanic as a locative category, an in-between place that is imbued with negative connotations meant to make readers uneasy and wary. To be in Satan's power has both pathological and spatial implications. It suggests a turn toward sickness (with the hope of ultimate return and healing), as well as a removal from the community, envisioned as clustered around and devoted to the healthy teaching as derived from Paul and communicated through his envoys. This strategy is vividly executed with portrayals of the devil's snare, of turning away after Satan, and of being handed over to Satan. By locating the opponents and those who follow them in the realm of Satan, the Pastor creates a moral map that can serve as a guide to the wise, or a warning to those tempted to stray.

I also argued that 1 Timothy 1:18–20 constitutes one graphic example of the locative function of the satanic: it is utilized as a place of reprimand and rebuke, a place in which one is subjected to a pedagogy of pain. I demonstrated that the Pastor pursues his argumentative campaign against his opponents in part by co-opting not only the epistolary voice and moral authority of the apostle Paul, but also via readily identifiable lexemes and tropes taken from the Pauline epistolary in such a way that the informed reader of Paul's letters could not help but read the two in light of each other. This is an instance, I argued, of Pauline self-interpretation. By harnessing the power of the pseudepigraphon for his own agenda, the Pastor attempted to guide the legacy of reading Paul (1 Corinthians) in light of Paul (1 Timothy). He sought to effect a

corrective composition, one that updated and revised a discrete instance of supernaturalist pastoral correction and made deviance from a good conscience and "the faith" (1 Tim 1:19)—that is, a distinctively Pauline proclamation of the gospel—a highly spatialized and demonized event by connecting it to and revising the Pauline instance of "handing over to Satan" from 1 Corinthians 5.

This fascinating passage, and my way of reading it, may be taken as programmatic for the rest of the present study, for my analysis has highlighted aspects of the Pastor's authorial program that I see at work throughout the Pastorals, which I shall illuminate in subsequent chapters: 1) the creative use of space and place as concepts that are conducive to and productive of the kinds of ideological argumentation favored by the Pastor, 2) the Pastor's propensity to borrow Pauline terms and concepts in such a way that evidences both innovation and an attempt to guide the reading of the reference texts, 3) the studied strategy of portraying opponents as polemically "other" and under the deluding influence of Satan, yet also holding out the hope for their ultimate re-education and restoration, and 4) the mobilization of health and sickness (or, as here, adjacent concepts, such as the sickness intimated by being handed over to Satan) as metaphors for theological rectitude and deviance.

Chapter 2. Demonizing Deviance: Rethinking the Doctrines of Demons

I. Introduction

1 Tim 4:1–5

1 Tim 4:1 Now the Spirit expressly says that in latter times¹ certain individuals will revolt from the faith, adhering to deceptive spirits and the doctrines of demons, 2 taken in by the dissemblance of those who speak falsehoods,² who have been cauterized in their own conscience, 3 preventing marriage, [urging] abstention from foods that God created for enjoyment with thanksgiving for those who are faithful and who acknowledge the truth. 4 For every creation of God is good and nothing received with thanksgiving is to be cast aside, 5 for it is sanctified through God's word and prayer.³

In 1 Timothy 4:1 we find the euphonic⁴ and evocative declaration: "The spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα)⁵

expressly says that in latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to wandering

¹ A similar time is predicted by 2 Tim 4:3–5. Cf. also 2 Tim 3:1.

² For ὑπόκρισις as "pretentious dissemblance," see Richard I. Pervo, *The Pastorals and Polycarp: Titus, 1-2 Timothy, and Polycarp to the Philippians*, Scholars Bible 5 (Salem: Polebridge Press, 2016), 43. For ψευδολόγος as "one who says falsehoods," see BrillDAG, 2399.

³ 1 Tim. 4:1 Τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ῥητῶς λέγει ὅτι ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς ἀποστήσονται τινες τῆς πίστεως προσέχοντες πνεύμασιν πλάνοις καὶ διδασκαλίαις δαιμονίων, 2 ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων, κεκαυστηριασμένων τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν, 3 κωλύοντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων, ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν εἰς μετάλημψιν μετὰ εὐχαριστίας τοῖς πιστοῖς καὶ ἐπεγνωκόσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 4 ὅτι πᾶν κτίσμα θεοῦ καλὸν καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπόβλητον μετὰ εὐχαριστίας λαμβανόμενον. 5 ἀγιάζεται γὰρ διὰ λόγου θεοῦ καὶ ἐντεύξεως.

⁴ Note the repetition of pi followed by a syllable including sigma (an instance of parechesis [cf. Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, § 3037]), as well as the alliterative 2–3–2 pairing of words beginning with τ (x2), π (x3), and δ (x2): τινες τῆς πίστεως προσέχοντες πνεύμασιν πλάνοις καὶ διδασκαλίαις δαιμονίων. Pi alliteration is also evident in 1 Tim 6:17–19, as noted by Abraham J. Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19. Part II," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959-2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1.535–57. For a discussion of other aural effects in the PE, see Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles*, AnBib 105 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986), 21–22. Pi alliteration may be observed in Paul's letters at 1 Thess 1:2—Εὐχαριστοῦμεν τῷ θεῷ πάντοτε περὶ πάντων ὑμῶν μνησιν ποιοῦμενοι ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν ἡμῶν, ἀδιαλείπτως. Similarly, pi alliteration occurs in Hebrews 1:1 and its use there is reminiscent of Homer's *Odyssey* 1.1, as pointed out by Hans-Josef Klauck, *Ancient Letters and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis*, trans. Daniel P. Bailey (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006), 335.

⁵ τὸ πνεῦμα denotes the Holy Spirit, but the medium of speech (λέγειν) is not specified. Scholars have surmised that this is prophetic speech (e.g., Marshall, ICC, 536–38; Roloff, EKKNT, 218–20; Towner, NICNT, 286–88). This puzzling detail is likely less important than the conclusion the reader is left to draw: no matter how the Spirit "said" this, "Paul" is the arbiter of such divine utterances.

spirits and the doctrines of demons (διδασκαλῖαι δαιμονίων)."⁶ This ostensibly prospective warning about what will occur in the eschatological future is actually a retrojected prophecy meant to describe the author's own times. In keeping with a grim, apocalyptic perspective, the latter days are dark and full of terror, and the hallmark element of that time is rampant human deception effected by the nefarious forces of Satan. 1 Timothy 4:1 was undoubtedly meant to inspire gravity and watchfulness from its first audience, and to signal the danger of the teachings warned against here. Modern Pastoral scholarship has appreciated this basic point, and noted several key exegetical elements of the role of demons in 1 Timothy: to associate these teachings with eschatological opposition to God,⁷ to serve as a foil for the apostolic, healthy teaching,⁸ to identify the teachings as arising from the demonic realm,⁹ and to polemicize against opponents with the time-honored strategy of demonization.¹⁰ However, as I shall demonstrate, crucial refinements and additions to each of these observations are provided by a reconsideration of demons in terms of their spatial, polemical, pathological, and intertextual functions.

In this chapter, I argue that δαιμόνια constitute an especially rich semantic and symbolic site for the Pastor. In order to adequately exegete the role of δαιμόνια in the Pastorals, we need to reconsider their ideological, mythological, and philosophical significance in the world of the Pastor. As we have already observed in chapter one, the locative function of the demonic and the

⁶ Scholars often suggest that the fact that the "doctrines" are plural may serve to emphasize that they are in opposition to the one true teaching (see this and other examples given by Egbert Schlarch, *Die gesunde Lehre: Häresie und Wahrheit im Spiegel der Pastoralbriefe*, MTS 28 [Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1990], 65). Of course, it might just as well occur in the plural because there seem to be two teachings in particular that are at stake for the author (1 Tim 4:3). We might note that when contrasting the λόγος that has a gangrenous spread (2 Tim 2:17) and the λόγος ὑγιής (Titus 2:8), the Pastor does not emphasize plurality vs. unity. Rather, the contrast would appear to be the *kind* of λόγος, and presumably its content. Of course, the Pastor can and does use both types of argument.

⁷ E.g., Towner, NICNT, 290; Fiore, SP, 90; Collins, NTL, 113. Risto Saarinen, *The Pastoral Epistles with Philemon & Jude*, BTCB (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2008), 75–76.

⁸ E.g., Gourgues, CbNT, 156; Mounce, WBC, 237.

⁹ E.g., Towner, NICNT, 290; Spicq, ÉBib, 495–96.

¹⁰ E.g., Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 64; Johnson, AB, 239, 245; Luke T. Johnson, "The New Testament's Anti-Jewish Slander and the Conventions of Ancient Polemic," *JBL* 108.3 (1989): 419–41.

satanic are incredibly significant in the overall conception and execution of the Pastor's polemical program. Consequently, I interpret the peculiar phrase "doctrines of demons" (1 Tim 4:1) with reference to Second Temple texts as well as non-Jewish demonological speculations in order to argue that the Pastor's use of δαιμόνια is multivalent and even innovative. While this investigation into the cultural significance of demons is necessary for understanding the Pastor's peculiar phrase, it is not sufficient, for the Pastor is also both a reader of Pauline texts and a writer of them too. Thus, I grant significant attention to in the second half of this chapter to the intertextual relationship of the Pastorals to the genuine letters of Paul. I argue that 1 Timothy 4:1–5 constitutes an attempt to revisit, guide, clarify, and strategically emphasize particular positions that one may read and observe in the range of interpretive options generated by Paul's discussions of marriage, idol-meat, and conscience in 1 Cor 7–10.

II. Demonic Doctrines in Historical Perspective

A. Locating Demons in Antiquity

The curious language of "spirits" (πνεύματα) and "demons" (δαιμόνια) in 1 Timothy 4:1 raises several questions: What are these πνεύματα and δαιμόνια, and are they the same?¹¹ While δαιμόνια

¹¹ Regarding 1 Tim 4:1, Marie E. Isaacs writes: "Here πνεῦμα and δαίμων are closely related and possibly synonymous. This would accord with Septuagintal usage, where πνεῦμα and δαίμων are sometimes associated with false prophecy" (*The Concept of Spirit: A Study of Pneuma in Hellenistic Judaism and Its Bearing on the New Testament*, Heythrop Monographs 1 [London: Heythrop College, 1976], 106). Isaacs may be correct. Foerster, "δαίμων," *TDNT* 2.14, would support her: "The use of πνεῦμα and δαίμων is parallel in the pseudepigraphical and Rabbinic writings." But then we must wonder why the Pastor uses two synonymous terms back to back. Is this simply rhetorical flourish? The related question of whether there is a difference between a δαίμων and a δαιμόνιον certainly depends upon the date of the text using the term. For the authors being discussed here, the substantivized adjective δαιμόνιον does not seem to be markedly different from a δαίμων. Regarding the LXX's avoidance of δαίμων, Foerster suggests that "δαιμόνιον belongs more specifically to popular belief" (12) and speculates that δαίμων is "too closely associated with positive religious elements, whereas δαιμόνιον indicates from the very first the hostile spirits of popular belief" (12). For a useful annotated lexical treatment of cognate terms in early Christian literature, see E. C. E. Owen, "Δαίμων and Cognate Words," *JTS* 32.126 (1931): 133–53.

are equated with πνεύματα in some early Christian documents, they are not in Paul's writings.¹² In fact, Paul's letters refer to δαιμόνια *per se* quite rarely (the term occurs only at 1 Cor 10:20–21), and the term πνεῦμα is reserved almost exclusively for non-demonic πνεύματα or for τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.¹³ The interpretive and definitional difficulties do not begin or end with Paul and the Pastor, of course. Defining what constitutes a "demon" is challenging because the concept of the δαίμων and other supernatural agents takes on many forms and many denominations in the ancient Mediterranean world.¹⁴ Perhaps the most helpful recent proposal regarding a definition of δαίμων has been that of Anders Klostergaard Petersen and others (like Lars Albinus) who advocate an emphasis on *function* when describing references to demons.¹⁵ The sheer variety of potential functions is summarized well by Petersen:

¹² In Matt 8:16, "they brought to him many who were demon possessed, and he cast out the spirits with a word" (προσῆνεγκαν αὐτῷ δαιμονιζομένους πολλούς· καὶ ἐξέβαλεν τὰ πνεύματα λόγῳ); Luke 8:2 would suggest that πνεύματα πονηρὰ καὶ ἀσθενεία are equivalent to δαιμόνια; Luke 8:29 and 9:42 both seem to equate τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκαθάρτον with τὸ δαιμόνιον. On the other hand, Luke 4:33 has a peculiar blend of terms: ἄνθρωπος ἔχων πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου. At Rev 16:14 we find εἰσὶν γὰρ πνεύματα δαιμονίων ποιοῦντα σημεῖα. See the article by Loren Stuckenbruck, who demonstrates this fact regarding the DSS and the Gospels "The Human Being and Demonic Invasion: Therapeutic Models in Ancient Jewish and Christian Texts," in *Spirituality, Theology, and Mental Health: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Christopher C. H. Cook (London: SCM Press, 2013), 94–123.

¹³ One might consider 1 Cor 2:12 as a possible exception, where Paul refers to τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου in opposition to τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ. See the remarks of Isaacs, *The Concept of Spirit*, 105. Isaacs writes that it is only "in the Deutero-Paulines that πνεῦμα is used of the demonic" (106). Rom 11:8 (with allusion to Isa 29:10 ὅτι πεπότηκεν ὑμᾶς κύριος πνεύματι κατανύξεως) is another potentially demonic πνεῦμα: ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμα κατανύξεως. However, these examples are hardly clearcut identifications of δαιμόνια and πνεύματα.

¹⁴ For instance, how to classify the giants of the Enochic tradition is challenging. They are depicted as a hybrid form of flesh and spirit, being as they are the illegitimate offspring of angels and humans (1 En. 6–11 and 15–16; 4Q531 1, line 1). When they die, did they lose their human element and persist as evil spirits, as in Jub. 5:8? 1 En 15:8–9 would seem to confirm this. See Loren T. Stuckenbruck, "Giant Mythology and Demonology: From the Ancient Near East to the Dead Sea Scrolls," in *Die Dämonen: Die Dämonologie der israelitisch-jüdischen und frühchristlichen Literatur im Kontext ihrer Umwelt = Demons: The Demonology of Israelite-Jewish and Early Christian Literature in Context of their Environment*, ed. Armin Lange, Hermann Lichtenberger, and K. F. Diethard Römheld (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 335–336.

¹⁵ Petersen summarizes a point made in the Danish dissertation of Lars Albinus, "Olsgræsk dæmonologi fra beretning til begrundelse: En religionshistorisk undergørelse" (2 vols.; Ph. D. diss., Aarhus University, 1998): "One of the main theses of the dissertation is in fact that the concept of *daimon*—as witnessed by the ancient Greek history of reception—has been used with such plurality of meanings that it is impossible to provide a substantive definition that can account for the semantic versatility of the different uses. Rather than finding the persistent meaning of the concept in the exact differences of its use it should be located in the very nature of its possible conceptual applications as they are mirrored by the different uses" (Anders Klostergaard Petersen, "The Notion of Demon: Open Questions to a Diffuse Concept," in *Die Dämonen: Die Dämonologie der israelitisch-jüdischen und frühchristlichen Literatur im*

Demons may signify both gods and lesser spirits. They may denote mediatory beings either benevolent or malevolent in nature. They may designate deceased souls as well as outbursts of irrationality in the human world. The concept may be used in a personified and in a depersonified sense. It may connote freedom as well as unfreedom. . . . The concept of demon has proven to be a particularly apt category in cases in which humans have negotiated, philosophised, theologised and reflected upon the relationship between the human and the transhuman world—whether that world be ascribed a negative or a positive value. During the course of the concept's history of reception the notion has fulfilled an indispensable discursive function enabling humans to talk about things beyond their own nature.¹⁶

What "discursive function" then, we are led to ask, do the demons of 1 Timothy 4:1 play? I argue that the designation "of demons" had (at least) three significant functions in the Pastor's polemic. First, the designation implies that these "demonic doctrines," by virtue of being demonic, are inherently incapable of cosmic transcendence, belonging instead to sublunar realms. Thus, they fail to relate adequately to the transcendent God of the Pastorals, "who dwells in unapproachable light" (1 Tim 6:16). Second, the designation suggests for polemical purposes that these doctrines are "other" and dangerous, and to be avoided. While this suggestion may seem intuitive, even banal at first glance, the distinctive way in which the Pastor explicitly associates individual doctrines with demons is in fact something of an innovation in the polemical deployment of demons in early Christian religious discourse. Third, the designation suggests that these doctrines are in direct contrast to the "healthy teaching" promulgated by the Pastor. Especially in light of the medical imagery of 1 Tim 4:2—invoked when the Pastor says that his opponents are cauterized in their own consciences—I argue that the Pastor connects the doctrines' demonic status with the sickened status of a diseased conscience. Thus, in what follows, I will make an

Kontext ihrer Umwelt = Demons: The Demonology of Israelite-Jewish and Early Christian Literature in Context of their Environment, ed. Armin Lange, Hermann Lichtenberger, and K. F. Diethard Römheld [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 25).

¹⁶ Klostergaard Petersen, "Notion of Demon," 38–39.

argument regarding the demons of 1 Timothy 4:1 in regard to their location in space and the epistemic status related to that location, their relationship to particular doctrines, and their connection to the polemical function of pathology in the Pastorals.

B. "Demonic" in Spatial Perspective

We turn first to the spatial function of demons. The places δαίμονες were thought to inhabit included almost every conceivable locale. However, there did tend to be more and less likely habitations for δαίμονες in the imaginations of ancient authors. They are frequently associated with deserted places,¹⁷ with the deities who receive cult in temples,¹⁸ and with certain natural elements, such as air or particular bodies of water (including bathhouses).¹⁹ In the Pauline corpus,

¹⁷ The translation of Heb. שָׂעִירִים ("satyrs, goats") in the LXX as δαίμονια results in δαίμονια being found in deserted haunts in Isa 13:21 and 34:14. The Gerasene demoniac lives amongst the tombs (Mk 5:2–3). In the Lukan telling of this story, the demoniac was "driven by the demon to the deserted places" (ἡλαύνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου εἰς τὰς ἐρήμους [8:29]). On the desert as a "dangerous" place where demons reside and their association with desert animals and imagery, see Othmar Keel, "Schwache alttestamentliche Ansätze zur Konstruktion einer stark dualistisch getönten Welt," in *Die Dämonen: Die Dämonologie der israelitisch-jüdischen und frühchristlichen Literatur im Kontext ihrer Umwelt = Demons: The Demonology of Israelite-Jewish and Early Christian Literature in Context of their Environment*, ed. Armin Lange, Hermann Lichtenberger, and K. F. Diethard Römheld (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 214–216; Otto Böcher, *Dämonenfurcht und Dämonenabwehr: ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der christlichen Taufe*, BWA(N)/T 5/10 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970), 65–67.

¹⁸ Insofar as they are identified with foreign deities and are thought to enjoy the smoke of sacrifices made to those foreign deities. It is said in 1 En. 19:1 the "spirits of the angels . . . will lead them into error so that they will offer sacrifices to the demons as unto gods" (OTP 1.23, trans. E. Isaac). 1 Cor 10:20–21 also connects demons with places of sacrifice, i.e., the temples of Corinth. Peter Lampe argues that Paul's major concern with demonic pollution pertains to the ritual sacrifice per se. Once meat is sold in the market (cf. 1 Cor 10:25) or even eaten in a temple dining room (1 Cor 8:10), the threat of demonic pollution has subsided, because the meat itself does not host demons (Peter Lampe, "Die dämonologischen Implikationen von 1 Korinther 8 und 10 vor dem Hintergrund paganer Zeugnisse," in *Die Dämonen: Die Dämonologie der israelitisch-jüdischen und frühchristlichen Literatur im Kontext ihrer Umwelt = Demons: The Demonology of Israelite-Jewish and Early Christian Literature in Context of their Environment*, ed. Armin Lange, Hermann Lichtenberger, and K. F. Diethard Römheld [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 584–99).

¹⁹ Evidence of demons in bathhouses comes primarily from the second century CE and after (cf. Tertulian, *De bapt.* 5; T. Sol. 18:21). See too the later evidence in Gregory of Tours's epitome of Acts Andr., section 5, where demons from the baths seize the son of Gratinus of Sinope, and is delivered by Andrew, and section 27, where Andrew says that the devil lurks in baths and rivers; also Acts John by Ps. Prochorus, ed. Zahn pp. 24–25), discussed by Campbell Bonner, "Demons of the Bath," in *Studies Presented to F. Ll. Griffith*, ed. S. R. K. Glanville and Nora Macdonald Griffith (London: Egypt Exploration Society & Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1932), 203–8. According to Bonner, the association of demons with baths may have its origins in the "ancient Greek beliefs about river-gods, nymphs, and nereids, who may now be friendly, now dangerous, and are always to be approached with caution" (Bonner, "Demons of the Bath," 208). Regarding the nature deities of ancient Greek religion, see Walter

demonic powers (variously denominated) are associated with the air in particular,²⁰ with the cosmos more generally,²¹ or from a temporal perspective as having their rule in the present αἰών.²² What quickly becomes evident in Greek philosophical literature is that the genus δαίμων entailed certain implications for locality, as well as in their material composition and their relationship to reason. Each of these aspects, I argue, is important for considering the significance of how the διδασκαλῖαι of 1 Tim 4:1 may be "of demons" (δαιμονίων). Toward that end, I offer a very brief accounting of demonology in ancient Greek philosophy.

In much of Greek demonology (and specifically of interest here is the Middle Platonic tradition) the proper place of δαίμονες is consistently said to be the air.²³ δαίμονες were frequently associated with the air, both with respect to their material composition and their place of residence. Pythagoras is said to have thought that "all the air is full of souls. And these are called δαίμονες and heroes. And by these are sent to people both dreams and signs of sickness and health,

Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical*, trans. John Raffan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 174–176. Of water deities in particular, Burkert writes that "the idea that rivers are gods and springs divine nymphs is deeply rooted not only in poetry, but also in belief and ritual; the worship of these deities is limited only by the fact that they are inseparably identified with a specific locality. Each city worships its river or spring. The river is accorded a *temenos* and occasionally even a temple, as in the case of the temple to the river Pamisos in Messenia" (174). On the association of water with foreign deities in the Hebrew Bible, see Böcher, *Dämonenfurcht und Dämonenabwehr*, 51–53.

²⁰ Martin Dibelius suggested that demons surreptitiously enjoyed sacrifices by floating in the air ("sie in der Luft auf das Opfern lauern") during the slaughter and burning of the offerings (*Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1909], 69). In Eph 2:2, we find reference to the κατὰ τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος. Later, in the Hermetic tractate *Perfect Discourse* 76, judgment and punishment takes place in the air by a great demon.

²¹ Cf. 1 Cor 2:12; Col 2:8.

²² Eph 2:2 combines the last two elements: "you once lived in accordance with the aeon of this world, in accordance with the ruler of the authority of the air, the spirit now at work in the sons and daughters of disobedience" (ποτε περιπατήσατε κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, κατὰ τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος, τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ νῦν ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν τοῖς υἱοῖς τῆς ἀπειθείας).

²³ The air is not only the domain of δαίμονες, of course. Winds too have their home in the air and are in need of appeasement, often by sacrifice. Burkert discusses the cult of the winds and its importance in ancient Greek society (Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 175).

and not only to people, but also to sheep and the other beasts."²⁴ Xenocrates is said to have placed the δαίμονες below the moon. They are thus "sub-lunar daimones" (ὑποσέληνοι δαίμονες).²⁵ In Plato's cosmology, δαίμονες occupy an intermediary space between God and humans. In *Timaeus* 41a-c, for instance, lower gods who are not fully immortal or indissoluble are responsible for creating the beings of the lower realms.²⁶ Though Stoics reject the notion that δαίμονες serve as intermediaries between gods and humans (this need being obviated by the immanence of the divine pervading throughout the material cosmos), there is some evidence that early Stoics especially placed δαίμονες (insofar as they are ψυχαί) in the sublunar region, since the rarefied air of that space is most consistent with the material composition of δαίμονες. Speaking *in voce Stoicorum*, Sextus Empiricus records the following counterargument to the idea that souls could go down to Hades.

Nor, indeed, is it possible to suppose that souls move downwards; for since they are of fine particles and no less of a fiery than of a vaporous nature, they rather soar lightly to the upper regions. Also, they persist as they are in themselves, and are not (as Epicurus said), "dispersed like smoke when released from their bodies."²⁷ For before that it was not the body that was in control of them, but it was they that were the cause of the body's conjoined existence and, much more, of their own. For having quitted the sphere of the sun they inhabit the region below the moon, and there, because of the pureness of the air, they continue to remain for a long time, and for their sustenance they use the exhalation which rises from the earth, as do the rest of the stars, and in those regions they have nothing to dissolve them. If, then, souls persist, they are the same as demons (δαίμοσιν αὐταί); and if demons exist, one must declare also that gods exist, their existence being in no wise hindered by the preconception about the legendary doings in Hades. (*Math.* 9.71–74)²⁸

²⁴ εἶναι τε πάντα τὸν ἀέρα ψυχῶν ἐμπλεων· καὶ ταύτας δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας ὀνομάζεσθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων πέμπεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τοὺς τ' ὀνείρους καὶ τὰ σημεῖα νόσους τε, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ προβάτοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κτήνεσιν· (Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.* 8.32).

²⁵ Hermann S. Schibli, "Xenocrates' Daemons and the Irrational Soul," *CIQ (New Series)* 43 (1993): 145.

²⁶ They are deemed "gods of gods" (θεοὶ θεῶν) at 41a, though the term δαίμονες is applied as a blanket term at 40d. In Gnostic literature the impulse to assign demons to the creation of different parts of the world and the human person in particular finds new and energetic expression. Cf. Ap. John (NHC II 15.1–19.10).

²⁷ Cf. Lucretius, *Rer. nat.* 3.437.

²⁸ καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἔνεστιν ὑπονοῆσαι κάτω φερομένας· λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ οὔσαι καὶ οὐχ ἥττον πυρώδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις εἰς (72) τοὺς ἄνω μᾶλλον τόπους κουφοφοροῦσιν. καὶ καθ' αὐτάς δὲ διαμένουσι καὶ οὐχ, ὥς ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἀπολυθεῖσαι τῶν σωμάτων καπνοῦ δίκην σκίδνανται. οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερον τὸ σῶμα διακρατητικὸν ἦν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' αὐταὶ τῷ

With the caveat that this might best represent the views of early Stoics, this text suggests that Greek philosophers of a variety of perspectives were prone to conceive of δαίμονες as aery beings whose natural abode was the air of the sublunar regions. Indeed, this is one feature that is remarkably consistent in both elite and non-elite conceptualizations of the demonic.²⁹

For the purpose of comparison with the Pastor's use of demons, the status of δαίμονες and δαιμόνια as intermediary beings (especially prominent in the Middle Platonic tradition), both in terms of location and also function, is particularly notable.³⁰ The Platonic tradition of δαίμονες as such first appeared when Plato proposed a notion of the δαίμονες as intermediate in the affairs between gods and humans in the *Symposium* (202e-203a). There, Diotima and Socrates discuss how Eros, and "δαίμονες many and multifarious" (δαίμονες πολλοὶ καὶ παντοδαποὶ) function as

σώματι συμμονῆς (73) ἦσαν αἵτιαι, πολὺ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ἑαυταῖς. ἔσκηνοι γοῦν ἡλίου γενόμεναι τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην οἰκοῦσι τόπον, ἐνθάδε τε διὰ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος πλείονα πρὸς διαμονὴν λαμβάνουσι χρόνον, τροφῇ τε χρῶνται οἰκεία τῇ ἀπὸ γῆς ἀναθυμιάσει ὥς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρον, τὸ διαλύσόν τε αὐτὰς ἐν (74) ἐκείνοις τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἔχουσιν. εἰ οὖν διαμένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, δαίμοσιν αἱ αὐταὶ γίνονται· εἰ δὲ δαίμονές εἰσι, ῥητέον καὶ θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν, μηδὲν αὐτῶν τὴν ὑπαρξίν βλαπτούσης τῆς περὶ τῶν ἐν ἄδου μυθευομένων προλήψεως (= SVF II, 812; trans. Bury, LCL). See discussion by Keimpe Algra, "Stoics on Souls and Demons: Reconstructing Stoic Demonology," in *Demons and the Devil in Ancient and Medieval Christianity*, ed. Nienke Vos and Willemien Otten, VCSup 108 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 82–83. Algra (87–88) cites evidence from Cicero's *Div.* 1.64 (= fr. 108 EK), which he suggests may go back to Posidonius's *On Heroes and Demons*, that refers to three kinds of divination, one of which is made possible "through what is provided by spirits of which the air is replete (*plenus immortalium animorum*)."

²⁹ Giulia Sfaeneni Gasparro suggests that while philosophical schools applied the notions of the δαίμων and τύχη to new contexts and interpreted their meaning in accordance with particular philosophical systems, nevertheless there was a strong degree of continuity between the understanding of δαίμονες in the popular religious environment of the Hellenistic period. "They stressed the already traditional conception of δαίμονες as intermediate beings so as to turn them into mediators between a transcendent god, far above all material reality, and mankind" ("Daimôn and Tychê in the Hellenistic Religious Experience," in *Conventional Values of the Hellenistic Greeks*, ed. Per Bilde, *Studies in Hellenistic Civilization* 8 [Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1997], 90). Stoic philosophy would, in the opinion of Keimpe Algra, provide an exception to this rule. "Thus, the Platonic conception of demons as mediators would seem to be superfluous in the context of Stoic philosophy: given the latter's conception of an immanent god to which humans are closely connected in view of their own rationality, there was no real need for an intermediary between man and god. Neither did the Stoics need an intermediary to bridge the corporeal and the divine, for the Stoic god was himself corporeal" ("Stoics on Souls and Demons: Reconstructing Stoic Demonology," 76–77).

³⁰ Early on, the term δαίμων was used of deities who were intervening in some capacity on human affairs. In Homer, the term δαίμων is often used of gods who lead humans here or there (cf. Aphrodite leading Helen to the palace of Paris [*Il.* 3.420], or Odysseus being led to Eumaios the swineherd [*Od.* 14.386]), to this course of action or away from it (cf. *Il.* 1.222; 6.115; 23.595;). See Klostergaard Petersen, "Notion of Demon," 35–36.

intermediaries and convey human matters to the gods and divine matters to humans.³¹ The δαίμων and all that is "daimonic" (τὸ δαιμόνιον) is by definition said to be "between mortal and immortal" (μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου).³² Their "capacity" (δύναμις) is described as "interpreting and transmitting human things to gods and things from gods to humans, of the former prayers and sacrifices, of the latter injunctions and recompenses for sacrifices, since it [i.e., τὸ δαιμόνιον] is in the middle (ἐν μέσῳ) of both it fills in the gap, with the result that the whole is itself bound together with itself."³³

Philo, too, adopts and adapts these basic demonological assumptions, though his position is complicated somewhat by his equation of ψυχαί and ἄγγελοι with δαίμονες. Nevertheless, it is clear that he conceives of them as intermediary beings that occupy the air.³⁴ Philo (*Gig.* 6–8) makes the argument that just as every other part of the cosmos has its inhabitants—i.e., the heavens have the stars, the earth has creatures of the land, the sea and rivers have their inhabitants—so too the air (ἀήρ) has its beings: δαίμονες, which he calls "souls that are flying in the air" (ψυχαὶ δ' εἰσὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα πετόμεναι).³⁵ The second-century CE author Apuleius of Madaura offers the most concise statement of the Middle Platonic doctrine of δαίμονες,³⁶ traces of which can be found in authors of

³¹ Diotima's own clairvoyance is suggested at 201d, where Socrates says that she forestalled the plague (λοιμός) and the onset of disease (νόσος) by urging sacrifices some ten years prior. Warnings about coming diseases is one function given to δαίμονες by Pythagoras (DL 8.132). Cf. Klostergaard Petersen, "Notion of Demon," 27, 37.

³² Or "between God and mortal" (μεταξὺ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ). Both formulations are given at 202e. A later Platonist, Plutarch, attributes to his teacher Ammonius the belief that there is a δαίμων responsible for the activities of and the goings on in the sublunary world, that is the air between the moon and the earth (*E Delph.* 393a).

³³ Ἐρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοὺς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς [τῶν θυσιῶν], ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὃν ἀμφοτέρων συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συνδεδέσθαι. *Symp.* 202e.

³⁴ Cf. *Gig.* 16; *Somn.* 141–42.

³⁵ Birds too inhabit the air, of course (cf. *Plant.* 12), but here Philo is exegeting Gen 6:1–2 and thus δαίμονες (=ἄγγελοι) are to the fore (John M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996], 172 n. 2). Cf. *Somn.* 137.

³⁶ On Apuleian demonology, see Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 317–320; Hubert Cancik, "Römische Dämonologie (Varro, Apuleius, Tertullian)," in *Die Dämonen: Die Dämonologie der israelitisch-jüdischen und frühchristlichen Literatur im Kontext ihrer Umwelt = Demons: The Demonology of Israelite-Jewish and Early Christian Literature in*

the Platonic school throughout the Hellenistic and early Imperial periods: "Daemons are beings of genus animate, of mind rational, of spirit passionate, of body aery, of duration eternal (daemones sunt genere animalia, ingenio rationabilia, animo passiva, corpore aeria, tempore aeterna).³⁷ As Dillon demonstrates, Apuleius distinguishes three types of δαίμονες (*De deo Socr.* 15–16):³⁸ (1) the human soul itself as a daemon (cf. *Tim* 90c, *Crat.* 397e–398c),³⁹ (2) souls which have left their bodies, of two kinds (cf. Plutarch, *Def. or.* 416dff) the good (identified with lares), or the bad (identified with larvae, malicious ghosts in *De deo Socr.* 153), and (3) δαίμονες who never enter bodies, who are the most exalted form of daemon (*De deo Socr.* 154); examples include Eros, Hypnos. The essential ambivalence surrounding the function of δαίμονες arises from Plato himself, who at various points identifies a δαίμων as (1) a lower divinity (*Apol.* 27c–e), (2) a departed soul in *Crat.* 397e–398c, and (3) an intermediate spirit in *Symp.* 202d–203a.⁴⁰ What these examples suggest is that especially in contemporary philosophical literature, δαίμονες are often imagined as beings who occupy an intermediary station in terms of their status, materiality, and location in the cosmos.⁴¹

One of the implications of this discussion for an interpretation of 1 Timothy is that this intermediary, spatial aspect of δαίμονες in Greek philosophy suggests a correspondingly limited epistemic status. Thus, for the Pastor, to be "of demons" meant that a διδασκαλία was less than transcendent, both in terms of its cosmic reach and in terms of its epistemic content. Similarly, on

Context of their Environment, ed. Armin Lange, Hermann Lichtenberger, and K. F. Diethard Römheld (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 447–60.

³⁷ *De deo Socr.* 13. Trans. Dillon (*Middle Platonists*, 318).

³⁸ Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 319.

³⁹ The tradition of assigning each soul a δαίμων may be seen in *Phaedr.* 107d and *Resp.* 620d–f, also finds later expression in Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.14.11. See Klostergaard Petersen, "Notion of Demon," 37.

⁴⁰ Frederick E. Brenk, "In the Light of the Moon: Demonology in the Early Imperial Period," in *ANRW* 2.16.3:2085–86. Furthermore, Plato suggests that the soul is assigned a tutelary guide, a δαίμων (*Phaedo* 107d; 108a).

⁴¹ Burkert asserts that the situation is different in archaic and classical Greek thought: "Daimon does not designate a specific class of divine beings, but a peculiar mode of activity" (*Greek Religion*, 180).

the Pastor's model, which posits that truth originates with God and is communicated through Jesus Christ, the intermediary status of the δαιμόνια suggests that they are far below the realm of truth, which flows from God above, who, to quote 1 Tim 6:16, "dwells in unapproachable light" (φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον). That is to say, to be "demonic" meant that these doctrines were of correspondingly lower and decreased epistemic capacity and ultimately belonged to the lower, intermediate, or (sometimes) even earthly realms.⁴² In contrast to the Pauline διδασκαλία, the διδασκαλῖαι of demons are consequently not only false, but also innately and inherently incapable of communicating divine truth. The intermediate role of conveying the message and will of the gods that is played by demons in the Middle Platonic economy of knowledge has been "usurped" by Christ, who is declared in 1 Tim 2:5 to be the one mediator between God and humanity. While angels, who typically play the role of intermediary in the Jewish and Christian traditions, are mentioned in the Pastorals, they function not as communicators of the divine will, but as honorary witnesses to Paul's solemn declarations (1 Tim 5:21) or Christ's resurrection or ascension (1 Tim 3:16). The denomination "of demons" in 1 Tim 4:1 therefore suggests that any knowledge that demons convey is inherently illegitimate, tethered to the lower realms by virtue of their connection to Satan, who is depicted in 1 Timothy as having a trap or a snare, the very image of earth-bound restriction. But to suggest that they are "demonic" also suggests that they are "out of place," or at least out of the "right place." By pairing the "doctrines of demons" with the formulation "wandering"⁴³ or "deceptive" spirits—both possible renderings of the adjective

⁴² This aligns with the basic approach to the fallen nature of demons taken by Palladius in the *Lausiac History*, who teaches that because of pride these demons failed to respect their superiors. They were thus cast down into airy realms. Delusion and delirium are seen as the byproduct of vanity and conceit. Thus, the monks deemed conceited are described as delirious and demonically-influenced. See David Brakke, *Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 137–44.

⁴³ For the idea of an evicted, "unclean spirit" (ἀκάθαρτον πνεῦμα) searching rest in waterless places (ἄνυδροι τόποι) but not finding it, see Luke 11:24–26.

πλάνους—the Pastor suggests that these spiritual beings are conceived of as liminal forces, occupying the space beyond the human but below the divine.

C. "Demonic" in Polemical Perspective

The second function of the demonic in 1 Timothy regards polemical taxonomy. To associate one's opponents with the demonic is an act of classification, an attempt to define and thereby control that which is perceived to be radically other.⁴⁴ Bruce Lincoln suggests that demonization is "the rhetorical construction of those from whom one feels radically estranged, not just as different kinds of people, but as outside the pale of the human and the moral: a polemic act of (re-)classification that legitimates subsequent violence against the demonized other."⁴⁵ To be sure, the polemically interested association of religious opponents with some super-human, malevolent force or forces is a common enough strategy in texts from Second Temple Judaism and beyond.⁴⁶ Whether in Jewish literature deemed "pseudepigrapha"⁴⁷ or Palestinian documents like the texts

⁴⁴ This is evident in the polemical permutation of foreign deities into illegitimate "demons" (δαιμόνια) by Jewish authors. In the LXX, we can see this at Deut 32:17; Pss 95:5, 106:37; Bar 4:7.

⁴⁵ Bruce Lincoln, *Gods and Demons, Priests and Scholars: Critical Explorations in the History of Religions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 39.

⁴⁶ Böcher, *Dämonenfurcht und Dämonenabwehr*, 144–45.

⁴⁷ Cf. the comments of James C. VanderKam: "With apostasy from the Lord as the chief sin, they will make places for false worship and fashion carved images: 'They will sacrifice their children to demons ('agānat) and to every product conceived by their erring minds' (1:11). Already at this early stage in the book a fundamental point emerges, viz. the demons are associated with idolatry, with foreign religious practices which would seduce the Israelites. In that sense one can say that they will sacrifice their children to demons, and only a wholehearted return to the true God will bring about a new age (1:15–18). The association between the demons and the nations with their idols will continue throughout *Jubilees*" "The Demons in the Book of Jubilees," in *Die Dämonen: Die Dämonologie der israelitisch-jüdischen und frühchristlichen Literatur im Kontext ihrer Umwelt = Demons: The demonology of Israelite-Jewish and early Christian literature in context of their environment*, ed. Armin Lange, Hermann Lichtenberger, and K. F. Diethard Römheld (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 340–341. Sib. Or. 3.64–70 contains a passage about how "Beliar" will arise and lead men astray. "Then Beliar will come from the *Sebastenoi* and he will raise up the height of mountains, he will raise up the sea, the great fiery sun and shining moon, and he will raise up the dead, and perform many signs for men. But they will not be effective in him. But he will, indeed, also lead men astray, and he will lead astray many faithful, chosen Hebrews, and also other lawless men who have not yet listened to the word of God" (*OTP*, trans. John J. Collins).

from Qumran,⁴⁸ the practice of associating one's enemies with an arch-villain is common.⁴⁹ Texts like the canonical gospels and the Apocalypse are no exception, and we find Jesus and "the Jews" in the Fourth Gospel trading allegations of diabolical paternity or possession,⁵⁰ or, in the Synoptics, Beelzeboulean empowerment (Matt 12:24, 27; Mark 3:22; Luke 11:15, 18, 19). In the Apocalypse, the Seer alleges that in Pergamum, "where the throne of Satan is" (ὅπου ὁ θρόνος τοῦ σατανᾶ [2:13]), there are some who "hold fast" (κρατοῦντες) both "the teaching of Balaam" (τὴν διδαχὴν Βαλαάμ [connected with eating idol meat and sexual immorality, both common fare in Jewish polemic])⁵¹ and "the teaching of the Nicolaitans" (τὴν διδαχὴν τῶν Νικολαϊτῶν [unspecified content]).⁵²

It is thus fairly common in texts from the time leading up to the Pastorals to associate error with an arch-enemy variously dubbed,⁵³ among other things, Beliar,⁵⁴ Belial, Mastema (Jub 10:8, 11:4–6), Beelzebul (deemed ἄρχων τῶν δαιμόνιων),⁵⁵ Satan, or the Devil. These figures, along

⁴⁸ At 1 QM I,13–16, the "sons of light" will stand in eschatological battle against "Kittim" (i.e., Rome), also dubbed the "sons of darkness," who will be aided by Belial and his army, which includes both men and angels. Cf. "Belial and his lot" and similar formulations at 1 QM I, 1, 5; IV, 12; XI, 8; 1 QS II, 10.

⁴⁹ Nils Dahl traces the idea of the "firstborn of Satan" back to early rabbinic interpretation of Gen 4:1–7. He locates it in early sectarian polemic against Jews, arguing that the association of Cain as liar and murder with his "father" the devil was promulgated in "heresy" polemic against both Jews (as in John 8:37–47 [80]) and other Christians (1 John 3:12; Polycarp 7:1). Cain was thought to be the "firstborn" of the devil, and Jews and others by being connected to Cain were rendered complicit by association (Nils Alstrup Dahl, "Der Erstgeborene Satans und der Vater des Teufels (Polyk 7:1 und Joh 8:44)," in *Apophoreta: Festschrift für Ernst Haenchen zu seinem siebzigsten Geburtstag*, ed. Ute Eickelberg, BZNW 30 [Berlin: Töpelmann, 1964], 70–84).

⁵⁰ John 8:44, Jesus to οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστέ. In response, they say, "Do we not say rightly that you are Samaritan and you have a demon?" (οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἡμεῖς ὅτι Σαμαρίτης εἶ σὺ καὶ δαιμόνιον ἔχεις; [8:48]).

⁵¹ φαγεῖν εἰδωλόθута καὶ πορνεῦσαι (2:14). Cf. 2:20 (Thyataira) where censure is given regarding "the woman Jezebel, who calls herself a prophetess and teaches and deceives my slaves to commit sexually immoral acts and to eat idol-meat" (τὴν γυναῖκα Ἰεζάβελ, ἡ λέγουσα ἑαυτὴν προφῆτιν καὶ διδάσκει καὶ πλανᾷ τοὺς ἐμοὺς δούλους πορνεῦσαι καὶ φαγεῖν εἰδωλόθута).

⁵² Rev 2:15.

⁵³ Philip S. Alexander, "The Demonology of the Dead Sea Scrolls," in *The Dead Sea Scrolls after Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment*, ed. Peter W. Flint and James C. VanderKam (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 341 n. 31.

⁵⁴ Βελιάρ, in the NT only 2 Cor 5:15.

⁵⁵ Matt 12:24.

with others such as the antichrist or false prophets,⁵⁶ are associated with some kind of generalized apostasy (esp. in the end-times), or perhaps with vices or error broadly conceived.⁵⁷ Significant for a Pauline reader like the Pastor, Paul links Satan and doctrinal deviance in 2 Cor 11:13–15, where he identifies rival teachers as "false apostles" (ψευδαπόστολοι) and "the servants of [Satan]" (οἱ διάκονοι [σατανᾶ]). This general association between Satan and theological opposition could hardly have escaped the Pastor's notice, and foreshadows the next step taken by the Pastor.

That next step was the association of particular doctrinal positions with these supernatural malevolent forces.⁵⁸ To my knowledge, 1 Timothy 4:1 offers us the first instance in which demons (δαιμόνια) *per se* are associated with certain teachings, namely the "hindering of marriage" and "keeping away from foods" that form the subject of 1 Timothy 4:3–5.⁵⁹ As a linguistic formulation,

⁵⁶ E.g., 1 John 2:18, 22; 4:1–3; 2 John 7.

⁵⁷ Cf. Jub 7:26–28, where demons lead Noah's progeny astray in the post-diluvian world. In Jub 10:1 "polluted demons" lead them astray, but are also "blinding and killing" Noah's grandchildren. For further discussion of the role of demons in Jubilees, see VanderKam, "The Demons in the Book of Jubilees," 340–247. On the traditions of expecting end-times apostasy and agents of deception variously conceived, see L. J. Lietaert Peerbolte, *The Antecedents of Antichrist: A Traditio-Historical Study of the Earliest Christian Views on Eschatological Opponents*, JSJSup 49 (Leiden: Brill, 1996) though with an unfortunate dearth of discussion regarding the PE. We see that demons are responsible for various kinds of intellectual or moral misdirection as well in pre-Islamic Iran as well. Lincoln writes, "Once free in the world, demons thus break into the bodies of living beings, which they corrupt, corruption being understood as a process of both moral and physical decay. Once inside, they distort a person's sentiments, behaviors, and being in ways consistent with their individual nature (Lust, Greed, etc.)." He goes on to describe the continued production of further demons in a process that sounds to modern ears remarkably like the spread of a virus. "This can then spawn new demons, including some that infect previously unafflicted creatures and others that wait to torment their progenitors in hell. Once unleashed, demons multiply and spread, contaminating ever more people, in whom they reproduce, morph, and spread once more" (Lincoln, *Gods and Demons, Priests and Scholars*, 34).

⁵⁸ Potential examples include 1 John 4:1–3. "False prophets" can be known through a discernment of spirits, namely this: "every spirit which does not confess that Jesus Christ has come in flesh is not from God" (πᾶν πνεῦμα ὃ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν). The author imagines two kinds of people in the world: "children of God and children of the devil" (τὰ τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὰ τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου), though there the test is not doctrinal so much as a generalized test of morality, namely whether one "does sin" or "does justice" and "loves their brother" (3:10). The σοφία rejected by the author of James (3:15) is deemed "earthly, psychical, and demonic" (ἐπίγειος, ψυχικὴ, δαιμονιώδης), but is not associated with a particular teaching. For James, demons are not so much associated with teachings or particular beliefs, thought they are capable of belief (καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια πιστεύουσιν καὶ φρίσσουσιν [2:19]) The reference to τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου at Col 2:8 might connect "the tradition of people" (ἡ παράδοσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων) with something approximating the demonic. BDAG list only one verse, 1 Tim 4:1, for the suggestion that "erroneous instruction" comes from demons (s.v. δαιμόνιον).

⁵⁹ There is also a particular belief associated with the διάβολος at 1 John 4:1–6. Cf. Peerbolte, *Antecedents of Antichrist*, 104–7.

the phrase διδασκαλῖαι δαιμονίων is demonstrably new.⁶⁰ Thus, while to suggest categorical novelty is ill-advised from a history of religions perspective, the Pastor does seem to be doing something that few of his Jewish or Christian predecessors had done before him.⁶¹ And at least part of the significance of this connection lies in the profound impact such a link will have for later demonologies and heresiologies.⁶² It serves as a bridge to the connections between aberrant beliefs and demons in the treatises of Justin and Irenaeus, among others.⁶³ But the significance of this formulation is much more immediate, because it forms an important plank in the Pastor's polemical platform. The connection of these particular διδασκαλῖαι with δαιμόνια is a way to signal their danger, which was perhaps especially acute because the abstention from marriage and food could have the appearance of holiness, a fact attested to by the adoption of these very practices by so many late antique Christians. Lacking the appearance of evil may constitute the precise reason that these particular doctrines earn the ignominious association with demons and deceptive spirits.

⁶⁰ This is suggested by a search of the TLG.

⁶¹ On the perils of the designation "unique," see Jonathan Z. Smith, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity*, Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion 14 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 36–53.

⁶² The tendency to associate demons with false teachings gains momentum in the second century with Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and others. For rich documentation, see Owen, "Δαίμων and Cognate Words."

⁶³ Justin (*1 Apol.* 25.3) says that Christians pity those who believe the tales of the Greek and Roman deities, and says "we know that demons are the source of these stories" (τοῦ δὲ τούτων αἰτίους δαίμονας γνωρίζομεν). He suggests that after the ascension of Christ, demons (οἱ δαίμονες) were responsible for "putting forward certain people who claimed to be gods" (προεβάλλοντο . . . ἀνθρώπους τινὰς λέγοντας ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι θεούς). Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 1.13.3 associates his opponents with demons. On Justin, see Theodoor Korteweg, "Justin Martyr and His Demon-Ridden Universe," in *Demons and the Devil in Ancient and Medieval Christianity*, ed. Willemien Otten and Nienke Vos, VCSup 108 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 145–58. For Clement of Alexandria, see Lars Albinus, "Greek Demons and the Ambivalence of Clemens Alexandrinus," *Temenos* 31 (1995): 7–17. On the association of demons and heresies in ECL, see Owen, "Δαίμων and Cognate Words."

D. "Demonic" in Pathological Perspective

The third function of the designation "of demons" in 1 Timothy 4:1 that I would like to draw attention to is the pathologization of doctrinal deviance implied by linking certain teachings with demons. On the basis of the strong contrast between ἡ ὑγιαينوῦσα διδασκαλία, or "healthy teaching" that is attributed to Paul in the Pastorals, and the διδασκαλαὶ δαιμονίων or "doctrines of demons" that are attributed to his opponents, I argue that the Pastor is harnessing for his own polemical purposes the popular idea that demons could cause disease. Here I set forth briefly the argument that one goal of alluding to "demonic teachings" is to emphasize their dramatic difference from the "healthy teaching" (ἡ ὑγιαينوῦσα διδασκαλία [1 Tim 1:10; 2 Tim 4:3, Tit 1:9, 2:1; cf. 1 Tim 6:3, 2 Tim 1:13]).⁶⁴ Toward that end, I wish to demonstrate that to speak of "healthy" and "demonic" as logical opposites is one readily understandable way of interpreting the reference to the doctrines of demons. While it is widely recognized that the connection between the demonic and the "false" or erroneous is manifest here in the Pastorals, I seek to supplement that observation by demonstrating the connection between the demonic as that which causes illness. While some scholars argue that early Christians predominately viewed disease etiology in terms "natural" causation,⁶⁵ I argue that the threat and perceived reality of demonically induced illness is in fact the basis for the Pastor's contrast of the healthy διδασκαλία with the demonic.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ The fundamental contrast between the two kinds of teaching, i.e., healthy and demonic, is frequently noted by commentators. My contribution is to demonstrate the possibility that the demonic *qua* illness-causing element of the teachings is in view for the Pastor.

⁶⁵ Gary Ferngren has championed the view that Christians by and large believed in "rational medicine" and "natural healing." He defends his use of these terms (*Medicine and Health Care in Early Christianity* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009], 4–6). In an earlier article, Darrel Amundsen & Ferngren seem in part to be attempting to correct the overreaching assessments of Klaus Seybold, Ulrich Mueller, and Otto Böcher, who characterized demonic etiology as the dominate view in the New Testament (Darrel W. Amundsen and Gary B. Ferngren, "The Perception of Disease and Disease Causality in the New Testament," in *ANRW* 2.37.3:2949). However, they may overcorrect when they write that "there is no historical basis for assuming that the peoples of the Roman Empire in general or of Palestine in particular during the first century attributed disease and physical dysfunction to

The first step of that argument is to demonstrate the likelihood that the Pastor associated the demonic with sickness. The belief that demons were a cause for illness is well-represented in this period, and the genuine letters of Paul also contain evidence that suggests a connection between malevolent supernatural foes and illness. At 2 Cor 12:7, Paul attributes describes an unknown physical ailment as a "thorn in the flesh, a messenger of Satan" (σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί, ἄγγελος σατανᾶ). Evidence for the belief that δαίμονες could cause illness may be found in texts

any but an immediate natural causality, except for those relatively rare cases that are specified as being immediately caused by demons or as directly manifesting the presence of invasive demons" (2951). Their following qualifications of this statement highlight the difficulty of substantiating such a broad claim, and I am skeptical that one could demonstrate what the "baseline" etiology was for so many people across time and space. Furthermore, the presumptions of such a position are questionable. On the one hand, according to Amundsen & Ferngren, if there is no mention of divine causation or demonic invasion, then a naturalistic etiology must be presumed. On the other hand, if no naturalistic causality is immediately specified, it is not the case that it is demonic, but rather that it is naturalistic. For them, only the explicit attribution of disease to demonic influence—a phenomenon they argue is exceedingly rare in the New Testament—may be considered evidence for demonic disease etiology. To be even-handed, one would have to abstain from hypothesizing an etiology whenever there were no explicit indications either way. In a later article, Ferngren gives three reasons for arguing that "neither Jesus nor the Evangelists believed that disease was ordinarily caused by demons" ("Early Christian Views on the Demonic Etiology of Disease," in *From Athens to Jerusalem: Medicine in Hellenized Jewish Lore and in Early Christian Literature: Papers of the Symposium in Jerusalem, 9-11 September 1996*, ed. Samuel S. Kottek and H. F. J. Horstmanshoff [Rotterdam: Erasmus, 2000], 185). The first is that, at times, the gospel writers distinguish exorcism and healing. However, passages like Matt 8:16, cited by Ferngren to substantiate this point, in fact suggest that the two activities are intimately related, if not identical, as the full passage 8:16–17 suggests. Secondly, he writes that medical conditions are described in the gospels, including "deafness, muteness, blindness, leprosy, fever, dysentery, a uterine hemorrhage, lameness, paralysis, dropsy, and a withered hand," and that "no immediate causality is given for any of these illnesses" (186). But this is not the case, as his own citation of Matt 12:22 illustrates, where Jesus exorcises and heals a man who is demon-possessed (δαμονιζόμενος) and "blind and deaf/speechless" (τυφλὸς καὶ κωφός), who then speaks and sees (λαλεῖν καὶ βλέπειν). The third and final argument Ferngren offers is that "the symptoms given for diseases or physical impairments are distinguished from the symptoms that are said typically to accompany demonic possession, such as erratic or self-destructive behavior" (186). This final claim simply defines the terms in a way that presumes the desired result. After recognizing that the "moon-struck" boy of Matt 17:15 does in fact exhibit such symptoms, Ferngren concludes that "there seems to be no evidence on which to base the conclusion that any disease described in the Gospels is attributed to demons, unless one categorizes epilepsy as a disease rather than a neurological dysfunction or impairment" (186–87). That is, of course, precisely what Matthew does: "and Jesus rebuked it and the demon went out of him and the child was healed" (καὶ ἐπετίμησεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ ἐξῆλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον καὶ ἐθεραπεύθη ὁ παῖς).

⁶⁶ Ferngren moves too quickly past the evidence of Paul in his claim that "while we find several incidental references to sickness in the Epistles, they do not record a single instance of sickness that is either attributed to demons or healed miraculously" ("Early Christian Views on the Demonic Etiology of Disease," 188). Ferngren cites 2 Cor 12:7–10 to substantiate this point (188 n. 32), not addressing the fact that Paul's "thorn" is qualified as an ἄγγελος σατανᾶ.

from the Second Temple period,⁶⁷ at Qumran,⁶⁸ the gospels,⁶⁹ and from other Greek sources in the first few centuries of the common era.⁷⁰ δαίμονες were sometimes invoked for the nefarious purpose of inflicting ills upon an opponent or a lover in the *Greek Magical Papyri*.⁷¹ At the same time, demons could also be invoked for protective purposes, suggesting that their status was

⁶⁷ When physicians fail, the entrails of a fish are used to cure Tobit's sparrow-dropping-induced ophthalmological woes ([2:10; cf. 11:8–13]), and also to drive out a death-dealing demon (6:14; 8:1–3). While it is the gall that helps one's eyes, it is the heart and liver that, when smoked, cause "a demon or an evil spirit" (δαίμονιον ἢ πνεῦμα πονηρόν) to flee (6:7–9). This special medical advice is given by the angel Raphael (6:16–18), whose name means "God heals." On sickness and demons in Tobit, see Howard Clark Kee, *Medicine, Miracle, and Magic in New Testament Times*, SNTMS 55 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 21–22. See also Jub 10:1, where "polluted demons" are "blinding and killing" Noah's grandchildren. Evidence also comes from 1 En. 15:12–16:1a, where we find that the spirits of giants are responsible for the afflictions of humankind. See Stuckenbruck, "Human Being and Demonic Invasion," 113–14; Ida Fröhlich, "Demons and Illness in Second Temple Judaism: Theory and Practice," in *Demons and Illness from Antiquity to the Early-Modern Period*, ed. Siam Bhayro and Catherine Rider, *Magical and Religious Literature of Antiquity* 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 81–96.

⁶⁸ Alexander, "The Demonology of the Dead Sea Scrolls," 347–348. In the Aramaic document *Genesis Apocryphon* (IQ20.16–29) the afflictions of Pharaoh's household recounted in Gen 12:17 are interpreted as being carried out by demonic forces (Stuckenbruck, "Human Being and Demonic Invasion," 108). On 4Q560, two small Aramaic fragments discussing malevolent beings that enter the body and cause fevers and chills (among other ailments), see Stuckenbruck, "Human Being and Demonic Invasion," 111; David Hamidović, "Illness and Healing through Spell and Incantation in the Dead Sea Scrolls," in *Demons and Illness from Antiquity to the Early-Modern Period*, ed. Siam Bhayro and Catherine Rider, *Magical and Religious Literature of Antiquity* 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 97–110.

⁶⁹ E.g., Mark 5:1–20 // Matt 8:28–34 // Luke 8:26–39; Mark 7:24–30 // Matt 15:21–28; Mark 9:14–29 // Matt 17:14–20 // Luke 9:37–43; Matt 12:22 // Luke 11:14; Matt 9:32–33; Luke 13:10–17; cf. Acts 10:38.

⁷⁰ Plutarch, *Def. orac.* 417d attributes λοιμοί to δαίμονες. For a selection of instances from a wide-ranging collection of texts and time-periods, see Böcher, *Dämonenfurcht und Dämonenabwehr*, 152–56. The extended interrogation of "36 στοιχεῖα" (τὰ τριάκοντα ἕξ στοιχεῖα) at T. Sol. 18 gives evidence of the connection between demons and illness. The translation of the phrase στοιχεῖα phrase at 18.1–2 by D. C. Duling (*OTP* 1.935–87) as "heavenly bodies" is dubious. In T. Sol. 18 Solomon engages the spirits, asking who they are. With one voice, they dutifully respond: "We are thirty-six heavenly bodies, the world rulers of the darkness of this age." They go on to assert Solomon's inability to harm them or lock them up, but acknowledge that God had given him authority of all the "spirits of the air, the earth, and (the regions) beneath the earth" and have accordingly gathered before him. The self-presentation of the demons follows a regular pattern: "I am called X. I do Ymalady. If I hear Z formula (or if it is written on papyrus), I retreat immediately." For more sources from late antiquity, see Christoph Marksches, "Demons and Disease," in *Papers Presented at the Seventeenth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 2015. Vol. 7: Health, Medicine, and Christianity in Late Antiquity*, ed. Jared Secord, Heidi Marx-Wolf, and Christoph Marksches, *StPatr* 81 (Leuven: Peeters, 2017), 11–35.

⁷¹ Cf. *PGMLXXXIX*. 1–27; *CXIV*. 1–14, where demons are associated with muteness and epilepsy; a punitive demon is suggested at *LXX*. 4–25. Demons could be summoned as an assistant (πάρεδρος), for instance in cases of unrequited love (*CI*.1–53). A very frequent use of the δαίμων in the *PGM* is as an assistant (cf. *I*. 42–195; *XII*. 14–95; *LVII*. 1–37). A further example comes from *PGMIV*. 2006–2125, a letter of Pitys to King Ostanēs in response to an enquiry about skull cups. Pitys discusses the power of the dead spirit once it has been sufficiently cajoled and threatened into agreeing to do the conjurer's will: "He attracts and causes one to be ill (κατακλίνει), and he sends dreams and restrains, and he obtains revelations by dreams as well. These are the things which this single spell accomplishes" (ἄγει δὲ καὶ κατακλίνει καὶ ὄνειροπομπεῖ καὶ κατέχει καὶ ὄνειραιτητεῖ ἅμα. ταῦτά ἐστιν, τὰ ἐπιτελεῖ ἡ μόνη πραγματεία. [*PGMIV*. 2069–2072]).

ultimately ambiguous, capable of being manipulated depending on the exigencies of a given situation.⁷² δαίμονες were thought to be responsible for a host of ailments, and the association of "sickness" with the working of demons is not difficult to imagine for the author of the Pastorals. Even if the means by which demons might make people sick are unspecified, the connection in the Pastorals between false teaching and sickness, made explicit at 1 Timothy 6:4 and suggested, among other places, at 2 Timothy 2:17, where the opponents' λόγος has a "spread like gangrene," make the further association between "demonic doctrines" and illness readily comprehensible within the theological program and polemic of the PE. What I am suggesting is that here the Pastor has invoked the language of the demonic to burden the doctrines of his opponents with a variety of negative valences, and that the association of demons with disease is an especially salient one. The implication is that those who adhere to such doctrines are sick, and those who entertain them are in danger of becoming so as well. Thus, by associating these doctrines with demons, the Pastor harnesses a primal and ubiquitous fear of contagious disease for his own polemical purposes. This association also serves to reinforce the conceptual boundary markers that the Pastor has constructed through his spatialized moral discourse. On this schema, the demonic serves as the place of sickness, the space in which disease and delusion run rampant. To go there, i.e., to adhere to these doctrines, is to separate oneself from the healthy space of Pauline teaching.

⁷² David Frankfurter, "Demon invocations in the Coptic magical spells," in *Actes du huitième Congrès international d'études coptes: Paris, 28 juin-3 juillet 2004* (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 453–66. Similarly, emphasizing the liminality of demons and their functional versatility, see his essay, "Master-Demons, Local Spirits, and Demonology in the Roman Mediterranean World: An Afterword to Rita Lucarelli," *JANER* 11 (2011): 126–31.

Excursus: "Demonic" Communication

I have argued that the qualifier "of demons" locates the διδασκαλία of 1 Timothy 4:1 in opposition to the truth. It designates these teachings as having a liminal and nefarious status, being more polemically aligned with opponents, and having a noxious effect on a hearer's health. But the fundamental question of *how* these demonic doctrines are imagined to arise has not been answered. For a late first or early second century reader, what would it mean for a "doctrine" to be inspired by demons? Is the demonic a purely metaphorical category? What might the Pastor have had in mind when he suggests that his opponents were being misled by doctrines of demons? How exactly were they inspired by the doctrines? How did they come to know them or believe them? I propose that at least a partial answer may be found in the contemporary philosophical understanding of δαίμονες—outlined above in this chapter—as intermediary beings who were in charge of relaying communication between the divine and the earthly realms. The answer involves a few components. The first is to recognize the ubiquitous belief that demons had bodies, albeit of very fine, pellucid material. According to Gregory Smith, there was no such thing as a bodiless demon in antiquity.⁷³ Souls and demons and other exceptionally fine substances all had bodies of one kind or another.⁷⁴ That is to say, the demonic is not solely a locative, taxonomic category. Demons were thought to have mass.

⁷³ Gregory A. Smith, "How Thin Is a Demon?," *J ECS* 16 (2008): 479–512. Dyan Elliott traces the gradual disembodiment from the first three centuries CE, during which demons were decidedly corporeal in Christian thought, to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE, when they had ceased to be conceptualized as corporeal entities. Part of the theological rationale for retaining the notion of corporeality was to reserve absolute incorporeality for God alone; furthermore, by assigning them an "aerial" corporeality, this made them subject to the higher element of fire. See Dyan Elliott, *Fallen Bodies: Pollution, Sexuality, and Demonology in the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 127–42.

⁷⁴ Origen discusses the notion of an "incorporeal daimon" (*incorporeum daimoneum*) with reference to an apocryphal treatise (perhaps the *Petri Doctrina*) that suggested that Jesus announced that he was not an incorporeal daimon. Origen argues that it does not mean "incorporeal" per se as though a daimon did not have a body, but rather that the Savior did not have a body like the kind of bodies demons have. Origen suggests that the body of a demon

This material aspect of the demonic body is important because it provided a way to understand a variety of processes that would have been otherwise inexplicable in antiquity. Ancient theories of pneuma allowed for all sorts of fine-bodied mechanisms to work and transactions to take place.⁷⁵ They helped ancient authors to account for how the mind relates to the body and how predictive prophecies are possible. They are also, I would like to suggest, integral in the assumption that demons could take possession of people or otherwise affect their corporeal realities. In short, in order for demons to have or communicate doctrines, they need bodies and a means for communicating with the minds of people.

Plutarch, who provides rich discussions of δαίμονες across a number of treatises,⁷⁶ imagines that the capacity (δύναμις) for foreknowing things to come (τὰ μέλλοντα . . . προγινώσκειν) is inherent to all ψυχαί (which he concedes to Ammonius, his dialogue partner, are equivalent to δαίμονες), on the grounds that it makes no sense that the souls would acquire new faculties simply by virtue of being released from bodies (*Def. orac.* 431e). He concedes that this capacity might be

"is by nature a subtle thing, tenuous as a breath of air, and therefore either conceived as or called 'incorporeal' by most people." Origen goes on to say to the contrary "that he had a solid and palpable body. According to general custom, however, any body that is not of this kind is labeled 'incorporeal' by those who are simpler or less informed" (*Princ.* pref. 8, trans by Smith, "How Thin Is a Demon?," 488. Smith does not discuss the extremely similar phrase found in Ignatius, *Smyr.* 3.2, where Jesus says, "Take hold, feel me and see that I am not an incorporeal demon" (λάβετε, ψηλαφήσατέ με καὶ ἴδετε ὅτι οὐκ εἰμι δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον). For similar language, cf. *Smyr.* 2.1, where Ignatius seeks to insult docetic "unbelievers" (ἄπιστοι) who say that Jesus only "seemed" to suffer by saying, "They are the ones who 'seem' to exist. And just as they think, so also it will happen to them who are incorporeal and daimonic" (αὐτοὶ τὸ δοκεῖν ὄντες· καὶ καθὼς φρονοῦσιν, καὶ συμβήσεται αὐτοῖς, οὓσιν ἀσωμάτοις καὶ δαιμονικοῖς). On Origen's discussion of "incorporeality," see Lawrence R. Hennessey, "A Philosophical Issue in Origen's Eschatology: The Three Senses of Incorporeality," in *Origeniana Quinta: Historica, Text and Method, Biblica, Philosophica, Theologica, Origenism and Later Developments: Papers of the 5th International Origen Congress, Boston College, 14-18 August 1989*, ed. Robert J. Daly, BETL 105 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 374–80.

⁷⁵ Pneuma and its various permutations serve as the cornerstone for an entire school of medicine that flourished in the Imperial era. One practitioner of this tradition, Aretaeus of Cappadocia, held that pneuma was the "bond that holds all things together" and facilitated the movement and function of the various elements or qualities (hot, cold, dry, wet). The harmonious balance of the pneuma and these elements constituted a "good mixture" (εὐκρασία), while its imbalance, known as a "bad mixture" (δυσκρασία), constituted illness. The state of pneuma in those conditions was either τόνος or ἀτονία, respectively. See Steven M. Oberhelman, "On the Chronology and Pneumatism of Aretaios of Cappadocia," *ANRW* 2.37.2:959–66.

⁷⁶ On Plutarch's demonology, see Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 216–225; Frederick E. Brenk, "'A Most Strange Doctrine.' *Daimon* in Plutarch," *CJ* 69 (1973): 1–11.

extremely limited for some (*Def. orac.* 431f). The problem for souls that are still in bodies is that they are mixed up with mortal substance, and though possessing the capacity for foreknowledge are "blinded because of its mixture and confluence with what is mortal" (τυφλοῦται διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ θνητὸν ἀνάμειξιν αὐτῆς καὶ σύγχυσιν [*Def. orac.* 432b]). Individuals who are in a state of purity of body (such as the hour of death when the body is cleansed of impurities) are especially sensitive to prophetic inspiration, and the best seer (μάντις) is the one with sense (νοῦς) who knows how to be "receptive to the experiences of impressions and presentiments" (δεκτικὸν δὲ φαντασιῶν πάθεσι καὶ προαισθήσεων [*Def. orac.* 432c-d]).

With regard to the oracles, Plutarch imagines that the ψυχαί of humans become especially sensitive to the prophetic when they are activated by the right kinds of vapors that emit from the earth.⁷⁷ While the good, bad, and neutral springs (πηγαί) come forth from the earth, the "prophetic flow" (τὸ μαντικὸν ῥεῦμα) is a πνεῦμα "most divine and holy" (θειότατον καὶ ὁσιώτατον).⁷⁸ Plutarch suggests that, just like wine can send fumes (cf. ἀναθυμιαθεῖς) to the head and have peculiar effects, the prophetic current opens (ἀνοίγειν) via "warmth and diffusion" (θερμότητι καὶ διαχύσει) "pathways that give impressions of the future" (πόρους τινὰς . . . φανταστικούς τοῦ μέλλοντος). At *Def. orac.* 432f-433a, Plutarch also hypothesizes about the ill-effects of moisture on the soul's prophetic capacities, suggesting that much like moisture takes away the brightness and sheen of a mirror, "moisture dulls sight and hearing" (ὕγρότης . . . ὅψιν ἀμβλύνει καὶ ἀκοήν). Thus, the dryness that comes from the earth's prophetic vapors is thought to render the πνεῦμα more subtle (cf. λεπτύνειν), resulting in a πνεῦμα that is "aetherial and pure" (αἰθερῶδες καὶ καθαρόν).

⁷⁷ Waters too were sometimes associated with prophetic activity. In a discussion of the remarkable qualities of some rivers, Pliny, *Nat.* 2.106 (232) writes: "In the cave of Apollo of Claros at Colophon there is a pool a draught from which causes marvellous oracular utterances to be produced, though the life of the drinkers is shortened" (Colophone in Apollinis Clari specu lacuna est cuius potu mira redduntur oracula, bibentium brevior vita [Rackham, LCL]).

⁷⁸ *Def. orac.* 432d.

This consideration of demonic inspiration does not require that the Pastor shared the particulars of Plutarchean demonology or pneumatology. However, contemporary theories of demonic inspiration provide compelling and probative comparanda for the enigmatic notion of "doctrines of demons" in 1 Timothy 4:1. While the evidence from the Pastorals is simply too meager to determine with certainty *how* exactly (or if) the Pastor theorized the deceptive capacities of the πνεύματα or the doctrinal deceptions of δαιμόνια, it is quite possible to surmise how a moderately well-educated author such as the Pastor might imagine such things to occur. As is made quite clear at the beginning of the verse in question, for the Pastor, spirits speak (cf. τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ῥητῶς λέγει [4:1]). The question I have sought to answer is how exactly the auditors of such pneumatic or daimonic speech might have heard them.

Having contextualized the Pastor's curious statement about the doctrines of demons within a broader interpretive framework, we turn now to examine the question of how the Pastor's reference to demonic doctrines functions when read as a constitutive component of an emerging Corpus Paulinum. As we did with the Pastor's use in 1 Tim 1:18–20 of the phrase "handing over to Satan" from 1 Cor 5:5 in chapter one above, we turn now to a consideration of 1 Timothy 4:1–5 as an instance of corrective composition, an attempt to guide the meaning of earlier Pauline letters through intertextual self-interpretation.

III. Demonic Doctrines in Pauline Perspective: 1 Tim 4:1–5 and 1 Corinthians 7, 8 & 10

A. Questions and Argument

As we have seen, demons have at least a threefold function in 1 Timothy. The reference to demons in 1 Tim 4:1, by virtue of the cultural valences of δαιμόνια and the Pastor's connection of them to certain proscribed teachings, is polysemous and multifunctional. And yet, this term's

functionality is not exhausted by the above exploration, for the Pastor is not only an early second century CE Greek author, but an early Christ believer and Pauline pseudepigrapher. Therefore, in light of the intertextual function of the satanic that we examined in chapter one, and in light of the fact that the term *δαιμόνια* occurs only here in the Pastorals, and only once in Paul's letters (1 Cor 10:20–21), I propose that the *δαιμόνια* of 1 Timothy 4:1 serve as a lexical connection point, along with other terms in 1 Timothy 4:1–5, with 1 Corinthians. My argument is that 1 Timothy 4:1–5 constitutes an instance of corrective composition, an overt attempt to shape the meaning and interpretation of Paul's arguments in 1 Corinthians regarding marriage (1 Cor 7) and meat sacrificed to idols (1 Cor 8–10). The idea that what the Pastor advocates in 1 Timothy 4:3 reflects a more prescribed, doctrinaire position than Paul's own discourse about food or marriage has been discussed by other scholars,⁷⁹ but to date no one has argued that 1 Timothy 4:1–5 constitutes the Pastor's attempt to guide the interpretation of Paul's previous statements about marriage and food for his audience and to strategically emphasize particular meanings on the spectrum of interpretive options regarding those texts. The fact that this is done in an explicitly polemical context highlights the hermeneutical stakes. Indeed, this is one of only two passages in the Pastorals where we begin to see the substance of the opponents' positions opposed, whether on marriage and food (1 Tim 4:3) or on the resurrection (2 Tim 2:18). Furthermore, it is perhaps the only place in which we see the Pastor engage in theological argumentation per se.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ See Marshall, ICC, 541–42; Roloff, EKKNT, 223.

⁸⁰ Raymond F. Collins remarks that "this is the only time in the Pastoral Epistles that the author identifies a specific issue that he finds troubling and then proceeds to refute it with an explicit, logical argument" (NTL, 114). This does not mean that the Pastor does not exhibit ethical argumentation of other sorts (e.g., enthymemes and paradigms), however, as Lewis Donelson has shown. He argued that "the parenetic style of the Pastorals is in accord with the canons of Greco-Roman ethical argument and that other Greco-Roman ethical documents provide analogies and categories for understanding the eclectic pastiche of material which make up the Pastorals" (*Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles*, HUT 22 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986], 67–113, here 69).

Here my goal is to illuminate the authorial procedures of the Pastor in 1 Timothy 4:1–5 in an effort to articulate what is at stake for him in the proper interpretation of Paul. Paul's image is being contested and the Pastor is seeking to assert hermeneutical control over the interpretive legacy of Paul's letters. I argue that this passage in particular seeks to exert some interpretive control over two specific aspects of Paul's teaching and legacy: the issues of marriage and food, and the resulting image of Paul as a firm, non-prevaricating authority on such matters. My argument proceeds first by establishing that the Pastor is creating an intentional intertextual echo chamber in 1 Timothy 4:1–5 that interfaces primarily (though not exclusively) with passages from 1 Corinthians, especially from 1 Corinthinans 7–10. Second, I argue that the Pastor crafts this passage as an act of fictive authorial representation in response to perceived ambiguities in Paul's own message about food and marriage. That is to say, he continues Paul's legacy of revisiting topics from his own letters (whether explicitly, as in 1 Cor 5:9, or implicitly, as often in Romans) and attempting to guide their interpretation by selectively emphasizing or sublimating certain elements of the original Pauline statements. I argue that the Pastor accomplishes this by the invocation of terms that are either particularly concentrated in certain Pauline passages or so infrequently used by Paul that their inclusion here should be understood as a moment of "self"-reference and "self"-interpretation. I will argue that the clustering of terms in 1 Tim 4:1–5 suggests a relationship with 1 Corinthians in particular, even though the issue of food addressed by the Pastor also receive attention from Paul in Romans 14:1–15:13. Though the Pastor crafts each of his letters as Pauline documents and thus frequently echoes and reproduces Pauline turns of phrase and ideas (this is a Pauline pseudepigraphon, after all), several prominent terms and themes that occur only or almost exclusively in the letters written to Corinth are concentrated in this passage of 1 Timothy. In particular, the following four themes fit that profile, namely demons

(δαιμόνια), συνείδησις, food (βρῶμα), and marriage (γαμεῖν). These are, in turn, accompanied by themes and modes of theological argumentation, such as theological grounding in the idea of God as creator (cf. κτίζειν) and thanksgiving (εὐχαριστία), that are present in 1 Corinthians 10 and also reflected in other parts of Paul's letters.

B. δαιμόνια, εὐχαριστία, and God as Creator

In light of our focus on the demonic doctrines of 1 Timothy 4:1, we turn first to the only place demons occur in the letters of Paul: 1 Corinthians 10:20–21, where he brings to a close (1 Cor 10:14–31) his longer discussion of idolatry, the consumption of things sacrificed to idols, and especially the social implications and ramifications of choices made by the Corinthians.⁸¹ In the specific passage under investigation, 1 Cor 10:18–21, Paul invokes the Jewish notion of demons as associated with polytheistic sacrificial rites⁸² in order to argue that, through the eating of sacrifices, one comes into fellowship with demons (cf. κοινωνοί).⁸³ Paul thereby deftly deploys the demonic as the categorical foil for proper dining behavior, a cosmic danger against which he urges his audience to take care. After drawing again on Israel as an example (cf. 9:8–14), the

⁸¹ This passage represents the culmination of the much longer discussion *περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων*, which begins in 8:1 and concludes in 11:1. My treatment of this much debated swath of Paul's argument will focus on particular aspects that relate to 1 Tim 4:1–5 in particular.

⁸² Jewish texts suggest that foreign deities are illegitimate "demons" (δαιμόνια) at LXX Deut 32:17; Pss 95:5, 106:37; Bar 4:7. The link to Deut 32:17 LXX (*ἔθυσαν δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ, θεοῖς, οἷς οὐκ ᾔδεισαν*) is made clear by Paul at 1 Cor 10:20 (20 *ἀλλ' ὅτι ἃ θύουσιν, δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ [θύουσιν]*). Deut 32:17 LXX is alluded to by Bar 4:7 (cf. *θύσαντες δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ*).

⁸³ Paul argues by analogy with "Israel according to the flesh" that, just as they became "participants in the altar" (*κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου* [1 Cor 10:18]) through eating the sacrifices of the Jerusalem Temple (1 Cor 9:13), so too by eating "what they sacrifice" (*ἃ θύουσιν*) "to demons" (*δαιμονίοις*), one becomes "participants with demons" (*κοινωνοὶ τῶν δαιμονίων*) at 1 Cor 10:19. The logic seems to be that because demons too partake of this sacrifice, one becomes partners with them in partaking of the sacrifice. It is not the sacrifice itself that is dangerous, but the joining in the activity of the demons themselves. As Hans-Josef Klauck explains, "Nur die Dämonen sind für die Korinther bedrohlich, einmal wegen der Umwelt, die eine Konfrontierung mit dem heidnischen Opfermahl unausweichlich macht (während das jüdische im fernen Jerusalem kaum erlebte Realität war), mehr noch wegen der Eigenart der Dämonen, mit denen man anscheinend in personale Gemeinschaft treten kann" (*Herrenmahl und hellenistischer Kult: eine religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum ersten Korintherbrief*, NTAbh 15 [Münster: Aschendorff, 1982], 266).

following punchy contrasts between the demonic and the divine is create a stark contrast, a clear choice.

18 Take a look at Israel according to the flesh. Are not those who eat the sacrifices partners of the altar? 19 What then am I saying? That meat sacrificed to idols is anything or that an idol is anything? 20 [No,] but that what they sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God. I do not want you to become partners of demons. 21 You are not able to drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons, you are not able to partake of the table of the Lord and the table of demons. (1 Cor 10:18–21)⁸⁴

Sacrifice to demons or sacrifice to God (θύειν δαιμονίοις *or* θύειν θεῷ). Drink the cup of the Lord or the cup of demons (πίνειν ποτήριον κυρίου *or* ποτήριον δαιμονίων). Partake of the table of the Lord or the table of demons (μετέχειν τραπέζης κυρίου *or* τραπέζης δαιμονίων).⁸⁵ This is the one time we find demons so named in the authentic letters of Paul.

In light of the fact that demons occur only in 1 Cor 10, it is perhaps unsurprising that demons do not occur often in the Pastorals and hence it is all the more striking that they do. Indeed, it is intriguing that Paul's terms⁸⁶ for the malevolent spirit world, apart from Σατανᾶς and

⁸⁴ 18 βλέπετε τὸν Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα· οὐχ οἱ ἐσθίοντες τὰς θυσίας κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου εἰσίν; 19 Τί οὖν φημι; ὅτι εἰδωλόθυτόν τί ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι εἰδωλὸν τί ἐστιν; 20 ἀλλ' ὅτι ἂ θύουσιν, δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ [θύουσιν]· οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς κοινωνοὺς τῶν δαιμονίων γίνεσθαι. 21 οὐ δύνασθε ποτήριον κυρίου πίνειν καὶ ποτήριον δαιμονίων, οὐ δύνασθε τραπέζης κυρίου μετέχειν καὶ τραπέζης δαιμονίων.

⁸⁵ Dibelius, & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 64 observe that "Paul also saw behind the activity of his opponents in Corinth the work of Satan," but they only point to passages in 2 Cor, making it unlikely that the importance of δαιμόνια is appreciated by them."

⁸⁶ Depending on one's judgment regarding referents human or non-human, Paul's terminology for the spirit world in the *homologoumena* includes: ἄγγελοι, ἀρχαί, ἄρχοντες, δυνάμεις, ἐξουσίαι, Σατανᾶς, στοιχεῖα. See Chris Forbes, "Paul's Principalities and Powers: Demythologizing Apocalyptic?," *JSNT* 23.82 (2001): 61–74. Forbes's spectrum from "concrete" to "sheer poetic abstraction" (62) is fraught, however, since the criteria for the judgments made are not expressed and the content of the designations themselves is never clarified. Useful is the companion article by Forbes ("Pauline Demonology and/or Cosmology? Principalities, Powers and the Elements of the World in Their Hellenistic Context," *JSNT* 24.3 [2002]: 51–73). There Forbes pursues the thesis that Paul's thinking about spiritual forces is less interested in the apocalyptic construals of the spirit world as seen in Jewish apocalyptic literature and more in keeping with the thought of middle Platonists like Philo and Plutarch. Nicola Denzey Lewis helpfully describes Paul's cosmos as a "dynamic politeia" whose denizens include a variety of celestial beings (cf. 8:38–39, 1 Cor 15:24). See her *Cosmology and Fate in Gnosticism and Graeco-Roman Antiquity: Under Pitiless Skies*, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 81 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 55–84. However, I disagree with her suggestion that that "Paul does not use a figure equivalent to Satan in his cosmology," but that "instead, the archons and authorities collectively rule the cosmos until the Eschaton comes" (58).

δαιμόνιον, by and large do not occur in the same senses in the Pastorals.⁸⁷ The one time the δαιμόνια occur in the PE is in 1 Timothy 4:1. When we attend to the full phrase, the "doctrines of demons," we are reminded that the argumentative context of 1 Timothy 4:1–5 is one of erroneous instruction (διδασκαλῖαι) concerning matters important to a religious community, the content of which is deemed by the Pastor to be the bilious byproduct of deceptive intermediary beings. The very mention of διδασκαλῖαι also invokes a comparison with the frequently mentioned ὑγιαينوῦσα διδασκαλία, the healthy teaching, that is so prevalent in the PE (1 Tim 1:10; 2 Tim 4:3; Tit 1:9, 2:1). This strong contrast highlights the fact that this teaching is perceived to be an unhealthy perversion of the truth, the conveyance of which is illustrated by the phrase from 1 Timothy 4:2, "by the dissemblance of those who speak falsehoods" (ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων). The charge of mendacity and an explicitly polemical context regarding topics that feature prominently in Paul's letters indicate that the Pastor was engaged in a battle for control over the proper interpretation of Paul's letters.

As we have already had occasion to note, the very reality of such interpretive ambiguity is in no small part due to Paul's own approach to the pastoral problem at hand, which entailed stating, considering, and responding to the positions of the Corinthians, though not always with clear demarcations of whose position is being stated. His strategy of limited accommodation and

⁸⁷ The "rulers [and] authorities" (ἀρχαὶ ἐξουσίαι) of Tit 3:1, to whom one is to "be subordinate" (ὑποτάσσεσθαι), are certainly human. The asyndetic construction is likely original, as suggested by the similar lack of καί between the infinitives of the same verse. (Cf. Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament: A Companion Volume to the United Bible Societies' Greek New Testament*, 4th rev. [Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994], 586). δύναμις at 2 Tim 1:7 is singular and not negative. If σάρξ is a demonic term for Paul, it is certainly not at 1 Tim 3:16. Similarly, if νόμος is conceived of as a demonic power in Paul's letters, it is not in 1 Tim 1:8 (οἶδαμεν δὲ ὅτι καλὸς ὁ νόμος). Robert Jewett, in his study of Paul's anthropological terms, states that in Galatians it emerges that "σάρξ is both a personal, psychological and a cosmic reality, i.e. it is both the flesh which is circumcised and a power in the old aeon. . . . On the basis of apocalyptic presuppositions, such opposition was thought of as a demonic product of the old aeon. Thus it came that [sic] the σάρξ could be both the material flesh and a demonic power without even implicitly threatening the doctrine of creation as it would on the basis of Hellenistic presuppositions" (*Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings*, AGJU 10 [Leiden: Brill, 1971], 453–54).

qualified compromise also complicates matters. As a result, Paul seems to demonstrate a curious ambivalence about meat sacrificed to idols and the demons that were associated with them in Jewish literature, since he suggests 1) "there is no idol in the world" and "there is no god except One" (1 Cor 8:4), even as he goes on to suggest that 2) there are "so-called gods whether in heaven or on earth" (1 Cor 8:5).⁸⁸ Thus, Paul addresses the ontological reality of idols and meat sacrificed to them as an integral part of any decision about whether to eat food sacrificed to them. These so-called gods perhaps refer to the Greco-Roman deities that Paul derides as being liminally or ambiguously existent.⁸⁹ It is only in 1 Corinthians 10, however, that Paul mentions demons *per se*. There, Paul formulates similar, potentially ambiguous statements when he asks rhetorically 3) "What therefore am I saying, that idol-meat is something or that an idol is something?" (Τί οὖν φημι; ὅτι εἰδωλόθυτόν τί ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι εἰδωλόν τί ἐστιν; [1 Cor 10:19]) with the implied answer being "no," since he denies the existence of other deities. So why urge the Corinthians to avoid the table of demons? Because for Paul, demons do exist, even though they are not themselves gods (1 Cor 10:20): "what they sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons, not to a god" (ἀλλ' ὅτι ἃ θύουσιν, δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ [θύουσιν]). Paul seems to be attempting a compromise that allows him to urge his audience to avoid further division and the idolatrous eating that *could* bring them into contact with real demons, even while granting concessions to those in Corinth who could potentially partake of idol-meat in certain circumstances without causing offense, as

⁸⁸ This apparent ambivalence may derive from the use of Corinthian slogans in 1 Cor 8:1–9. John Fotopoulos argues that Paul sketches out the major components of the argument in 1 Cor 8:1–11:1, interspersing the position of the "Strong" in Corinth with his own initial qualifications and critiques, which he then expands upon in the rest of the letter ("Arguments Concerning Food Offered to Idols: Corinthian Quotations and Pauline Refutations in a Rhetorical *Partitio* (1 Corinthians 8:1-9)," *CBQ* 67.4 [2005]: 611–31). Similarly, see Richard A. Horsley, "Gnosis in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 8:1-6," *NTS* 27.1 (1980): 32–51.

⁸⁹ Lampe clarifies that they are not gods like the God of Israel is God, but refer, from a Jewish perspective, to the "half-gods" or demons of the Greek and Egyptian pantheons (Lampe, "Die dämonologischen Implikationen," 587–88).

well as maintaining his firm commitments to monotheism.⁹⁰ What is significant for this study how later Pauline communities would have had to read this, i.e., presumably without the privilege of direct knowledge of the letters (cf. 1 Cor 5:9, 7:1) or oral reports (1 Cor 1:11, 5:1; cf. 16:7–8) to which Paul was responding in the first place. Exegesis of these passages has yielded no shortage of interpretive solutions.⁹¹ However, for our purposes, what is salutary to note is the existence of these ambiguities, even if they do not derive from Pauline inconsistencies but rather a dialogic engagement with the Corinthians' own positions. Paul's earliest readers, including the Pastor, had to reckon with Paul's apparent contradictions.

By forging a link between the terminology of the demonic in 1 Timothy 4:1 and the question of food restrictions (1 Tim 4:3–5), the Pastor sought to call to mind the interpretive ambiguities afforded by Paul's writings and guide them in a particular direction: to the conclusion that all food is the creation of God (κτίσμα [1 Tim 4:4]) if received "with thanksgiving" (μετὰ εὐχαριστίας [1 Tim 4:3, 4]), and that the danger of demonic defilement comes primarily from those who advocate abstention from food (and marriage). Even these categories of theological appeal, however, are recycled by the Pastor from the discussion in 1 Corinthians 10, where Paul grounds his admonition to "eat whatever is sold in the meat market without making a distinction on account of conscience" (1 Cor 10:25) in an explicit appeal to a theology of creation: "For the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof" (τοῦ κυρίου γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς [1 Cor 10:26]). Similarly, the Pastor's statement that "every creation of God is good" (ὅτι πᾶν κτίσμα θεοῦ καλὸν [1

⁹⁰ Mitchell addresses the potential problem of consistency for Paul as he formulated his "compromise position": "Countering the possible objection of self-contradiction in his treatment of idolatry, Paul remains consistent in his denial of the existence of idols, but shows the danger of cult meal participation by recourse to 'demons.' This compromise position allows Paul to urge the Corinthians to avoid any other cultic associations without theologically having to encroach upon his radical monotheism" (*Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1991], 255–56).

⁹¹ See the review of literature in the work of John Fotopoulos, *Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A Social-Rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1*, WUNT 2.151 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 1–48.

Tim 4:4]) seems to invoke Genesis 1:31, "God saw everything God made, and behold it was very good" (εἶδεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα, ὅσα ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἰδοὺ καλὰ λίαν).⁹² Paul concludes his discourse with a rhetorical question (1 Cor 10:30): "If I partake (μετέχειν) with gratitude, why am I slandered (βλασφημοῦμαι) for what I give thanks (εὐχαριστῶ)?" The Pastor's two-fold reference to "enjoyment with thanksgiving" (μετάλημψις μετὰ εὐχαριστίας [1 Tim 4:3]) and "every creation of God" (πᾶν κτίσμα θεοῦ) being "received with thanksgiving" (μετὰ εὐχαριστίας λαμβανόμενον [1 Tim 4:4]) echoes and calls to mind Paul's final statement in 1 Corinthians 10:30. The Pastor does this in order to increase the lexical and thematic resonances and thereby adequately construct an echo-chamber in which Paul's discourse on food and now "Paul's" discourse on food should be read together.

C. βρῶμα and συνείδησις

While the connection between food and demons, held in common between Paul and the Pastor only in these two passages, is striking, two further terms are held in common by 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 and 1 Timothy 4: βρῶματα and συνείδησις. I shall address them in turn. We turn first to "food." Though they appear elsewhere in Paul's letters, the terms for food, βρῶμα and βρῶσις, occur as objects of contested status solely in 1 Corinthians and in Romans. In Romans 14:1–15:13, Paul discusses βρῶμα/βρῶσις (as well as whether to observe particular days or not [14:5]) in the context of individual relationships, between the "weak" and the "strong," who have serious differences in opinion regarding what is licit and what is not. One eats "everything" (πάντα [Rom

⁹² The Pastor, while following Paul in the form of his theological argument here invokes a different scriptural support for his argument, perhaps seeking a passage that could be taken to encompass not only food as a created good, but also the institution of marriage.

14:2]), the other eats "vegetables" (λάχανα [14:2]).⁹³ Paul himself, as one who has knowledge (cf. οἶδα καὶ πέπεισμαι at 14:14), is convinced that nothing is "defiled" or "common" (κοινός) in and of itself (14:14); indeed, "all [foods] are pure" (πάντα μὲν καθαρά).⁹⁴ Here Paul seems to broaden the issue somewhat in comparison with his prior argument in 1 Corinthians 8–10; it is no longer idol-meat that is under consideration, but whether or not food is κοινόν.⁹⁵ The mention also of the distinction of certain days suggests (14:5–6) that Paul is addressing (at least in part) the question of *kashrut* and the observance of sabbath, as well as vegetarianism of some sort.⁹⁶ But he takes care to formulate his argument in such a way that it is not simply a question of idol-meat or Jewish purity laws.⁹⁷ His concern is community upbuilding (14:19) and love (14:15, 17), not judgment (14:4, 10, 13), in accordance with the "work of God" (14:20) accomplished in Christ (14:9, 15; 15:3, 5).

Our second term is συνείδησις, often translated as conscience or consciousness. συνείδησις is a term that has its highest concentration in all of the letters of Paul in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 with a total count of eight occurrences.⁹⁸ In fact, the connection between food and conscience occurs only here in the homologoumena.⁹⁹ This connection, between food and conscience, is precisely

⁹³ Robert Jewett argues that both designations are hyperbolic, and that Paul here endeavors to create a spectrum "between the uncritical omnivores and the leaf mongers" in which every auditor could place themselves (Robert Jewett assisted by Roy David Kotansky, *Romans: A Commentary*, ed. Eldon Jay Epp, Hermeneia [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007], 838).

⁹⁴ The Pastor will repurpose this phrase polemically in Titus 1:15. See discussion in chapter six below.

⁹⁵ On Romans 14:1–15:3 as an instance of Paul's own creative, "polyphonic" revisiting of the issue addressed in 1 Corinthians 8–10, see Wayne A. Meeks, "The Polyphonic Ethics of the Apostle Paul," *The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics* 8 (1988): 17–29.

⁹⁶ Jewett and Kotansky, *Romans*, 837–8.

⁹⁷ Wayne A. Meeks, "Judgment and the Brother: Romans 14:1–15:13," in *Tradition and Interpretation in the New Testament: Essays in Honor of E. Earle Ellis for His 60th Birthday*, ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne and Otto Betz (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 292.

⁹⁸ Runners up are Romans with three times (2:15, 9:1, 13:5), and three times in 2 Cor (1:12, 4:2, 5:11).

⁹⁹ When the discussion of food comes up in Romans 14, Paul connects it not to the language of conscience—which many scholars believe to have been a term introduced into the debate by the Corinthians—but rather to issues of faith. Scholars who suggest συνείδησις as a Corinthian term include Jacques Dupont, *Gnosis: la connaissance religieuse dans les Épîtres de Saint Paul*, Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis, Dissertationes in Facultate Theologica

the one that we see in 1 Timothy 4 and nowhere else in the *Corpus Paulinum*. In 1 Corinthians 8:4, Paul says, "Now then concerning the food of idol-sacrifices we know that there is no idol in the world and that there is no God but one" (thereby anticipating his argument in 1 Corinthians 10:19). Then in 1 Corinthians 8:7 we find the term βρῶσις, and the argument that those without γνῶσις, who eat idol-meat habitually (cf. τινὲς δὲ τῇ συνηθείᾳ), have a conscience that, because it is not informed by γνῶσις—proper knowledge, here concerning the significance of such sacrifices and their consumption— is weak and consequently becomes defiled. As though anticipating the conclusion that one should simply keep away from such doings, Paul writes, "But food will not bring¹⁰⁰ us to God." In 8:8, Paul says, "Neither if we do not eat do we lack, nor if we do eat do we increase" (οὔτε ἐὰν μὴ φάγωμεν ὑστερούμεθα, οὔτε ἐὰν φάγωμεν περισσεύομεν). He explains that there is no advantage to the individual in eating or abstaining; what matters is how the community is impacted by such choices.¹⁰¹

In light of the connection between food and conscience in 1 Tim 4:2–3, what is of interest for us is Paul's suggestion that those who want to keep away from certain foods (βρῶσις τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων [1 Cor 8:1]; βρῶμα [1 Cor 8:8; 1 Cor 10:3]; κρέα [8:13]) are the ones with a weak conscience. They suffer the defilement of their conscience (ἡ συνείδησις αὐτῶν ἀσθενῆς οὖσα μολύνεται [1 Cor 8:7]; cf. the defilement [μεμιᾶσθαι] of the συνείδησις at Titus 1:16) and the "striking" of their conscience (cf. τύπτοντες αὐτῶν τὴν συνείδησιν ἀσθενοῦσαν [1 Cor 8:12]). In 1

2/40 (Louvain: Nauwlaerts, 1949), 279; Richard A. Horsley, "Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 Corinthians 8–10," *CBQ* 40 (1978): 586; Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 180 and 180 n. 42. The language of judgment (κρίνειν [1 Cor 10:29; Rom 14:3–5, 10, 13] or discernment (ἀναρκρίνειν [1 Cor 10:25, 27]) suggests that similar issues are at stake, even though συνείδησις is absent from Rom 14:1–15:13.

¹⁰⁰ The other distinct possibility is that the verb παρίστημι has the nuance of "bring before God for judgment" (cf. BDAG s.v. 1d and Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 32 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 345]. Fotopoulos argues for this reading, and identifies this as the position of the "Strong" (*Food Offered to Idols*, 216–18).

¹⁰¹ With Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 242.

Corinthians 8:12 we see that the Corinthian sister or brother without γνῶσις suffers damage to their conscience because it is weak, when they see someone with knowledge eating idol-meat in a temple shrine (ἐν εἰδωλείῳ). The Pastor similarly suggests a certain kind of damage done to the conscience—though that damage is much more severe—namely, a cauterizing of it (cf. κεκαυστηριασμένων τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν [1 Tim 4:2]). While the exact relationship of the cauterized conscience and the prohibition of foods (ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων [1 Tim 4:3]) is addressed more fully below,¹⁰² here we can observe that a similar desire to avoid certain foods is linked with a defective or deficient συνείδησις in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 as well as in 1 Timothy 4, even though the Pastor's "cauterization" is certainly a more dramatic image than simply being struck. Nevertheless, for both Paul and the Pastor, those without a proper orientation regarding the consumption of food are said to have a damaged conscience. For Paul this meant that certain self-restricting accommodations (1 Cor 8:13, Rom 14:13, 20–21, and with appeal to common advantage at 1 Cor 10:23) should be made for these individuals on account of their being part of the church, even as he seems also to embrace a fairly lenient approach to such restrictions.

The Pastor draws selectively on Paul's own theological justification for a permissive approach to food in 1 Timothy 4:4–5, where he interprets hesitancy to eat these foods as a failure to recognize that everything created by God is good and should be received with thanksgiving. As we noted above, strikingly similar scriptural language justified Paul's permission to "eat anything sold in the market" (πᾶν τὸ ἐν μακέλλον πολούμενον ἐσθίετε): "For the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof" (τοῦ κυρίου γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς [1 Cor 10:26, using LXX Ps 23:1]). The Pastor has drawn out, through echo and iteration, the aspects of Paul's argument from 1 Cor 8–10 that support his particular argument against his opponents' deviant recommendations regarding

¹⁰² See Chapter 7.

food. In so doing, he has muted the aspects of Paul's broader argument in 1 Cor 8–10 that were less readily applicable. Paul seeks to unify the ἐκκλησία through the deliberative rhetoric of concord and reconciliation,¹⁰³ and seeks to hold together a diversity of viewpoints and considerations in his advice, while the Pastor seeks to warn his audience against what he sees as perfidious deviation from the truth.¹⁰⁴ The rhetorical objective of the Pastor, to marshal Pauline intertexts as a way of recasting the Pauline voice to speak against a certain kind of deviance, accounts for the fundamental differences (and the similarities) with the historical-epistolary Paul's writing in 1 Corinthians and Romans.

A central question for this interpretation regards the precise nature of the comestibles under discussion in 1 Timothy 4. Could βρώματα be taken to refer to idol meat or foodstuffs proscribed by halakhic regulations? Could βρώματα make perfect sense in the absence of such qualifiers?¹⁰⁵ Surely, the answer is yes to both questions. But if βρώματα does make sense without such qualifiers, does this weaken the likelihood of a connection between 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 and 1 Tim 4? I would suggest that the bare term βρώματα in 1 Timothy 4:3 actually makes it more likely that the Pastor is positioning his text as a perpetuation of Paul's own discourse of food sacrificed

¹⁰³ See Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*.

¹⁰⁴ Reflecting upon the connection between 1 Cor and 1 Tim 4 and the question of a damaged conscience may also help elucidate what is otherwise a curious feature of 1 Tim 4, namely the specification τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν at 1 Tim 4:3. As we may observe, in 1 Cor 10 Paul is very careful to specify whose conscience is at stake in 1 Cor 10:29: "I'm not speaking of his own conscience but that of the other person" (συνείδησιν δὲ λέγω οὐχὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου). Paul makes it clear that the whole issue of a weak or wounded conscience is really the problem of those who are concerned about meat sacrificed to idols, even though he also suggests that the law of love should compel those with more gnosis to be considerate of their conscience-afflicted coreligionists. Does the Pastor's phrase τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν serve to link his own discussion in 1 Tim 4 to 1 Cor 10? While this specification as ἰδίαν in and of itself will not bear the weight of too much speculation, in this relatively tight cluster of terms linking back to 1 Corinthians it may indeed constitute a crafted attempt at verbal imitation of Paul, an otherwise grammatically peculiar echo of Paul's clarification of whose συνείδησις is at stake.

¹⁰⁵ In answering this question, we should note that some scholars of the Pastorals have suggested that ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων constitutes Jewish halakah, while others interpret it as reflecting the prohibitions articulated by the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15, which in fact actually concerns both idol-meat and halakhic issues: "to abstain from the pollution of idols and of porneia and of the blood of strangled animals" (ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλισγημάτων τῶν εἰδώλων καὶ τῆς πορνείας καὶ τοῦ πνικτοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἵματος [Acts 15:20]) and "to keep away from meat sacrificed to idols and blood and strangled animals and porneia" (ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων καὶ αἵματος καὶ πνικτῶν καὶ πορνείας [Acts 15:29]).

to idols (1 Corinthians 8–10) and halakah (Romans 14). Without any qualification, ancient readers (and similarly modern ones) are forced to fill in the blank, so to speak, that is left by the absence of a qualifier.¹⁰⁶ That is to say, by introducing a degree of ambiguity in his own text, the Pastor has effectively urged his audience to read these statements in light of other Pauline statements on these matters. At the same time, he rejects outright the more restrictive options (i.e., one should abstain outright from certain foods) that Paul characterized as belonging to those with a "weak conscience" (1 Cor 8:10, or to those who were "weak in faith" per Rom 14:1). For the Pastor, the opponents' admonition to "avoid food" is itself the demonic teaching. This is the paradoxical consequence of this instance of corrective composition—that ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων, a legitimate option endorsed by Paul (albeit with caveats and qualifications—see 1 Cor 8:8, 13; Rom 14:3, 21), has become one of the demonic doctrines. This constitutes a seeming inversion of the logic to which those demons were initially put by Paul in 1 Corinthians. That is to say, while in 1 Corinthians the participation in cultic meals of a certain kind was said to bring one into fellowship with demons (1 Cor 10:20–22), here it is not eating certain foods that is demonic, but rather the rejection of any food created by God that earns that ignominious appellation. For the Pastor, doctrinal rectitude (as defined by him) was to be preserved even at the cost of labeling as a "teaching of demons" a practice that Paul would have at least tolerated as the product of a weak conscience that operated without sufficient γνῶσις. Nevertheless, the Pastor's revision of the historical-epistolary Paul's position does not constitute anything like a wholesale overturning of Paul and his arguments. The Pastor, like Paul, believes that the one's choices regarding food have

¹⁰⁶ A similar instance of a second generation Paulinist who advocates the absolute rejection of food restrictions may also be observed in Col 2:20–21. Indeed, that very passage is a striking example of how Paul's writings could generate sufficient tension within the Pauline legacy to merit the application of corrective composition in order to resolve the interpretive ambiguity created by the perceived disharmony between Paul's ostensible positions on eating of certain foods.

potentially dire, demonic consequences, that health of conscience is at stake in such decisions, and that improper restrictions on eating can potentially place one in conflict with Scripture itself and a theology of creation that affirms the divine sanctioning of eating with thanksgiving.

Ultimately, food and its potential association with demons was for Paul an issue to be negotiated and subordinated to the higher principle of love and up-building (cf. 10:23) of the *ἐκκλησία*, as becomes clear in 10:31, "Therefore whether you eat or whether you drink or whatever you do, do all things for the glory of God."¹⁰⁷ However, I would insist, the ambiguity afforded by Paul's attempt at dual answers in both 1 Cor 8 and 10, as well as the discussion of Romans 14, certainly felt by modern exegetes, was also felt by the Pastor. In Paul's efforts to cultivate the ethical sensibilities of the Corinthians by appealing to their love for neighbor and the higher principle of community upbuilding, the result was that Paulinists could reasonably take a variety of positions when it came to food. They could quite justifiably conclude that one ought not to eat meat sacrificed to idols at all, or they could arguably conclude that eating meat sacrificed to idols afforded no moral injury to themselves (1 Cor 8:4–6, 9:4, 10:27, 31; Rom 14:6, 14), even if it might have negative repercussions for others (1 Cor 8:9–13, 10:28–30; Rom 14:15, 20, 21). It was precisely this ambiguity or interpretive polyvalence that the Pastor sought to resolve, opting for a maximal reading of one's freedom over and against the restrictive interpretation of his opponents who advocate "keeping away from certain foods."

¹⁰⁷ See too Paul's declaration in 1 Cor 8:13, "Therefore if food causes my brother to stumble, I would never eat meat again, lest I cause my brother to stumble" (διόπερ εἰ βρῶμα σκανδαλίζει τὸν ἀδελφόν μου, οὐ μὴ φάγω κρέα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἵνα μὴ τὸν ἀδελφόν μου σκανδαλίσω).

D. "Hindering Marriage"

We turn next to the role of "Paul's" dire warning that "some" will arise who "hinder marriage." In the *Corpus Paulinum* as we now have it, the only times the term γαμεῖν occurs is in 1 Corinthians 7¹⁰⁸ and 1 Timothy (4:3; 5:11, 14). In addition to demons, conscience, and the discussion of food, marriage constitutes a fourth substantive element that is held in common by 1 Corinthians 7–10 and 1 Tim 4:1–5. Though I have drawn forward the question of abstention from certain foods because of its connection with demons in 1 Corinthians 10, the Pastor's emphasis on his opponents as those who "prevent marriage" (κωλύοντες γαμεῖν) is a significant datum amidst the dense thicket of intertextual links common to 1 Timothy 4:1–5 and 1 Corinthians 7–10. In concert with his intertextual efforts regarding food consumption, the Pastor is attempting to advocate a particular interpretation, via corrective composition, of the Pauline tradition regarding marriage, formulated polemically against the position of his opponents. Like his approach to food, Paul's discourse about marriage is sufficiently complicated to give the impression, depending on which passages one might highlight (and the Pastor's selection is instructive in this regard), that he both supports marriage as a potential deterrent to the ill-effects of desire and that he thinks it highly preferable that one avoid it altogether. Similar to the Pastor's position on food, which seems to render all foods acceptable insofar as they are received with thanksgiving, the Pastor seeks to advocate against the interpreters of Paul who would elevate celibacy to the exclusion or denigration of marriage.

Paul's treatment of the issue of marriage and whether it should be avoided or permitted, about which the Corinthians had written to him requesting information (cf. περὶ δὲ ὧν ἐγράψατε [1

¹⁰⁸ The other time Paul references marriage is in 1 Cor 9:5, where he references the apostolic "right" to have a believing "sister" as a wife (along with "eating and drinking").

Cor 7:1]), is marked by Paul's keen awareness of the complexities involved in such advice. He balances between his own practice of celibacy and a host of exigencies wherein marriage is deemed permissible. The term *γαμεῖν* occurs only here in the homologoumena, though Paul references the practice of "taking a [believing] sister as a wife" as an *ἐξουσία* that apostles have in 1 Cor 9:5. Paul's initial salvo on the topic, if one were to read no further, would sound to be very much in support of the opponents in 1 Timothy 4:3: "It is a good thing for a man not to touch a woman" (1 Cor 7:1).¹⁰⁹ The possibility that this is, in fact, a statement of a Corinthian slogan¹¹⁰ increases the potential ambiguity in reading Paul's advice about marriage, and highlights the "polyphonic" effect of the slogan *cum* response approach to these issues.¹¹¹ In his discussion on marriage, Paul does affirm marriage as a legitimate option, since it is "better to marry than to burn" (*κρεῖττον γάρ ἐστιν γαμῆσαι ἢ πυροῦσθαι*), but sees it as less preferable than celibacy (1 Cor 7:7–9, 32). Paul's statements on marriage are pragmatic, and might be characterized as principled resignation to and a safeguard against the rampant human proclivity toward *πορνεία* (cf. *διὰ δὲ τὰς πορνείας*; 1 Cor 7:2). His ambivalent rhetoric and less commanding tone (cf. 7:6) is ultimately the result of his attempts to compromise and mediate complicated social questions about individual behavior and community norms.¹¹² These are, in turn, intimately connected to the boundary issues between the fledgling Corinthian *ἐκκλησία* (the "insiders" [*οἱ ἔσω*; 1 Cor 5:12]) and the

¹⁰⁹ One may recall that the teaching of Paul in the *API* does in fact have a rather deleterious effect upon marriage, since Thecla and other women forsake their marital obligations in service of the gospel.

¹¹⁰ Fitzmyer, *1 Corinthians*, 278.

¹¹¹ The notion of Pauline polyphony refers to the "manyness of the voices" one encounters in reading Paul's epistolary deliberations regarding matters of import to his communities. I apply the term "polyphonic" to 1 Cor 7, though Wayne Meeks originally used it to describe the same phenomenon in 1 Cor 8–10 ("The Polyphonic Ethics of the Apostle Paul").

¹¹² While some have taken Paul's "oscillating argument" as an indication of inconsistency, it is in fact a by-product of his attempts at reconciling competing factions and their various positions (Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 235–37, quote from 235).

κόσμος (1 Cor 5:6, 6:2) it inhabits (i.e., "the outsiders" [οἱ ἔξω; 1 Cor 5:12–13] or "unbelievers" [ἄπιστός; 1 Cor 7:12–15]) that Paul seeks to navigate.

Returning to 1 Timothy, we see that the opponents' ostensible prevention of marriage (κωλύοντες γαμεῖν) is a concern for the Pastor.¹¹³ The term γαμεῖν occurs otherwise in the Pastorals only at 1 Tim 5:11, 14, where remarriage is encouraged. For the Pastor, the prevention or hindrance of marriage is quite in conflict with his vision of domestic order. He makes it abundantly clear that women are to be seen and not heard (1 Tim 2:11), and that their place is in the home where their primary duty is childbearing (1 Tim 2:15), domestic management (1 Tim 5:14; Titus 2:5), and being models of the faith for the next generation (Titus 2:2–8; 2 Tim 1:5). Thus, we find a position adopted by the Pastor that is markedly more pro-marriage than Paul's own. Nobody could ever accuse Paul of being overly enthusiastic about marriage. Indeed, commentators suggest that the position reflected in the phrase κωλύοντες γαμεῖν was itself simply a more robust incarnation of Paul's own reticence regarding marriage.¹¹⁴ The statement in 1 Corinthians 7:1 was taken by later interpreters as an "ascetic ideal,"¹¹⁵ and may very well have inspired the Pastor's opponents in a similar fashion.¹¹⁶ If this is the case, then reading the Pastor's

¹¹³ On this point, Johnson, who assigns the PE to Paul himself, suggests that this would be to take 1 Cor 7:1 literally without attending to the rest of the discussion in that chapter, and points out that a similar position is conveyed in APl 5–6 (AB, 240). He also suggests Colossians 2:21 as a comparable instance of the dual prohibition of food and sex.

¹¹⁴ Johnson, AB, 247: "The practices here advocated, in fact, may have their roots in Pauline example taken further than Paul himself intended, in a fashion similar to the mis-understandings of his teaching with which he had to contend in Corinth, Thessalonica, and Galatia."

¹¹⁵ Fitzmyer, *1 Corinthians*, 278–9.

¹¹⁶ 1 Tim 4:1–4, in coordination with Titus 1:15, were used by anti-ascetic authors, for example in the conflict between Jovinian and Jerome. For 1 Tim 4:3 as Jovinian's favorite verse, see *De castitate* (16). See also Tertullian in his war against the "psychics" who "cite 1 Tim 4:1–2 to justify their dietary habits" Elizabeth A. Clark, *Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 130 n. 140. Irenaeus offers an excellent example of the Pastor's rhetoric of the demonic or satanic being redeployed regarding issues of marriage and meat. *Adv. haer.* 1.24.2 reports regarding Saturninus of Antioch: "They say marriage and generation are from Satan. Many of his followers abstain from meat and lead many astray through simulated continence of this kind" (Nubere autem et generare a Satana dicunt esse. Multi autem ex his qui sunt ab eo et ab

firm rejection of the opponents' position may be read as an instance of corrective composition, an effort to control the interpretation of Paul's legacy by issuing a restatement that attempts to mitigate the troublesome ambiguities afforded by Paul's own attempts at genuine pastoral care and theological debate. For the Pastor, the proper image of Paul to put forward is that of one who rejects as demonically inspired the notion that marriage should be prevented. This is an absolutizing of a particular understanding of Paul, and one that is encoded as authoritatively Pauline through an extended act of fictive self-reference. In 1 Tim 4, not only is a particular version of Paul cast by crafting new words for the apostle, but also by referencing—and in some ways redirecting—specific, key terms in Paul's own treatment of these issues. On my reading, the Pastor accomplishes this by retaining certain features of Paul's own original discourse. He puts some of Paul's own terms toward a very particular articulation of the Pauline message by removing some ambiguities and generating new ones.

IV. Recapitulation and Conclusion

In this chapter I have demonstrated that the language of the demonic is possessed of a high degree of semantic versatility, and illustrated this point by outlining three particular functions of the peculiar phrase "doctrines of demons" in 1 Timothy 4:1. I argued that the "doctrines of demons" should be understood in terms of their potential spatial, polemical, and medical functions.¹¹⁷ In relation to these three functional categories, I made arguments that attempt to move the conversation forward in three ways. Regarding the spatial aspect of the demonic, I

animalibus abstinere, per fictam huiusmodi continentiam seducentes multos [trans. Grant; Latin text from Rousseau ed. SC 264, 324.32–35]).

¹¹⁷ I argue here for multiple semantic functions. Traditional exegesis prefers a singular meaning for a given term, but such an approach is too narrow for terms like *δαιμόνιον*, which had the capacity to evoke a variety of associations, depending on the cultural context and rhetorical function of a given text. While some readers may have understood *διδασκαλίας δαιμονίων* to function in just one of these ways (or some other function I have not illuminated), others would undoubtedly have recognized multiple resonances, whether serially or at once.

showed how ancient demonological speculation typically placed demons in sub-lunar regions, thus situating them as inherently intermediate beings. I suggested that, for the Pastor, this intermediate status would have rendered demonic doctrines inherently incapable of transcendent truth. Regarding the polemical function, I argued that the Pastorals represent a marked development in the practice of aligning opponents with the demonic insofar as they relate the demonic to specifically forbidden beliefs and behaviors. Regarding the medical aspect of the demonic in the Pastorals, I suggested that the notable prevalence of medical imagery and language in the Pastorals, in concert with the ubiquitous belief that demons could cause disease, coalesce to furnish the strong likelihood that these demonic doctrines are meant to convey a risk of sickness or even contagion. These particular aspects of the language of the demonic thus connect to and reinforce similar concepts observable in the rest of the text of 1 Timothy and the other two Pastoral Epistles, namely, that the narrative construction of moral space and the manipulation of the demonic as a locative category are integral components of the Pastor's effort to delegitimize the theological views of his opponents and categorize their teachings as a threat to the well-ordered and healthy church.

I have argued in this chapter that the author of 1 Timothy 4:1–5 has produced a passage that self-consciously refers to 1 Corinthians. I have suggested that the nature of those references may be adequately described using Merz's language as instances of "self-reference" or "self-interpretation" and Mitchell's designation "corrective composition." This revisionary (both in the sense of revising and in the sense visioning anew), corrective attempt to guide the interpretation of Paul's earlier statements also results in a particular image of Paul. The Paul of the Pastorals does not seek to engage particular points of concern of various constituencies in his audience. He is not a politician with multiple, complex objectives that he must hold in tension; he has no

particular community to hold together and yet also to reform, as did the historical-epistolary Paul. His purposes are to promulgate a particular image of Paul and to interpret the image of Paul received from the *Corpus Paulinum*. The Paul of the Pastorals presented in 1 Tim 4:1–5 is uncompromising and declarative, holding forth in confident strains about matters that once caused Paul to undertake a careful rhetorical balancing act: all food is acceptable, as long as it has been sanctified by prayer; marriage should never be forbidden, and serves as a vehicle for God's desired hierarchical pattern of familial life; one's conscience is harmed by denying the proper Pauline teaching (simultaneously asserted and presumed!), and this denial is evidence of demonic distortion. However, by cultivating the image of Paul as one who can assert such things, the Pastor undertook an intricate intertextual effort create lexical and thematic pings with Paul's earlier statements on such matters, thereby creating a selective interpretive counter-statement to other readings of Paul's legacy.

The Pastor crafts this intertextual relationship with 1 Corinthians and Romans in order to address interpretive ambiguities that arise as a result of Paul's own syntax and the complexity of his rhetoric and arguments on issues of food and marriage. We saw that the Pastor invoked a series of terms from Paul's own discussion of food and marriage in 1 Corinthians and Romans in order to make the case that his opponents' views on food and marriage were erroneous and dangerous. By reformulating the argument about food and marriage in terms that deliberately use Paul's own, the Pastor attempted to forge a hermeneutical link between his own composition and Paul's. The result is that the Pastor champions one particular reading of Paul's dicta on food and marriage and demonizes the others. By inserting a new Pauline statement on such matters, later readers inclined to read the Pauline letters together would do so with a revised set of "Pauline" proclamations. With respect to marriage, the Pastor resisted vehemently the curbing or restricting

of nuptials, and condemned in no uncertain terms those who were "hindering" marriage. With regard to food, the Pastor elides the entire discussion of abstention from any sort of food due to another's conscience and demonizes those who would abstain as deeply compromised in their consciences and subject to the deluding influence of demons. He medicalizes the "consciencess" of his opponents and characterizes them as "cauterized"—a striking intensification over Paul's depiction of the "weak" conscience. The Pastor has similarly elevated the rhetorical stakes to address the new, dire circumstances he attempts to address in these letters. We turn now to an examination of how the Pastor pathologizes the deviance of his opponent.

Chapter 3. Pathologizing Deviance: Toward an Alternate Account of Medical Terminology in the Pastoral Epistles

Introduction

Medical language pervades the Pastoral Epistles. More than any letters from Paul, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, and Titus exhibit a consistent preoccupation with and exploitation of medical analogies and imagery. In addition to specific images of illness like the gangrenous spread of the opponents' λόγος¹ or the cauterized consciences of the opponents,² across all three letters the Pastor uses the language of "health" as a descriptor of Paul's words and teaching,³ whether in the formulation "healthy teaching" (ἡ ὑγιαينوῦσα διδασκαλία; 1 Tim 1:10, 2 Tim 4:3, Titus 1:9, 2:1) or in reference to the "healthy words" (ὑγιαίνοντες λόγοι; 1 Tim 6:3, 2 Tim 1:13) or the "healthy word" (λόγος ὑγιής; Titus 2:8). Additionally, in Titus (1:13, 2:2), the Pastor twice employs the phrase "to be healthy in the faith" (ὑγιαίνειν τῇ πίστει). In a manner similar to his use of spatial metaphors and demonological traditions already discussed in chapters one and two, the Pastor utilizes the language of health and sickness to achieve his rhetorical and ideological goals.

In this chapter, I demonstrate the creative ways in which the Pastor draws upon the language of health and sickness, explicit and implied, in order to express his theological and polemical agenda. By likening the words and behaviors of the opponents to a variety of diseased conditions—the only antidote to which is the "healthy teaching" offered by Paul and his chosen delegates—the Pastor employs a host of medical imagery and appeals to an early second-century

¹ See Chapter 4.

² See Chapter 7.

³ Scholars frequently note the contrast between the healthy teaching advocated by the Pastor and the diseased teaching of the opponents. E.g., Luke Timothy Johnson, "II Timothy and the Polemic Against False Teachers: A Re-Examination," *JReIS* 6 (1979): 9–10. Luck, "ὑγιής κτλ.," *TDNT* 8.312; Knight, *NIGTC*, 89.

audience's conceptions of health and therapy and the prevalence and etiology of disease. I demonstrate that the Pastor's pathologizing of deviance draws upon arguments and topoi identifiable in contemporary philosophical literature. I shall show this in several different instances which, though scholars have appreciated them before as a part of the Pastor's invective, have not been fully appreciated in terms of their medical resonances. While scholars have devoted some attention to the problem of how the Pastor draws upon contemporary ideologies of health, I show that these investigations have resulted in flawed or relatively superficial assessments of how the Pastor is negotiating the medical ideas and ideals of the Roman Empire. I show too that an assessment of how the Pastor operates first as a Pauline reader and then as a Pauline writer requires an analysis of how he may have interpreted one particular intersection of health and theology in the historical-epistolary Paul's career: the episode reflected in 1 Corinthians 11:27–30. First, however, we begin with a question that scholarship perhaps takes for granted—the very definition of “health.”

I. Defining Health and Disease

Health and disease, and indeed medicine too,⁴ are fraught concepts. They are not “self-evident” or “monolithic” concepts.⁵ These categories are, to borrow the language of Jessica Wright, “cultural entities, shaped by local values and local biology.”⁶ Theories of how one comes to be healthy or

⁴ “Medicine in the ancient world did not constitute a unified field of knowledge, founded on the acceptance of common assumptions, theories and methods, but was criss-crossed with other theories, often radical ones, about the character of medical knowledge and the roads leading to it” (Guiseppe Cambiano, “Philosophy, Science and Medicine,” in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. Keimpe Algra et al. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 604).

⁵ Philip van der Eijk, “Medicine and Health in the Graeco-Roman World,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Medicine*, ed. Mark Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 26.

⁶ Jessica Wright, “Crazy Talk: The Dangerous Rhetoric of Mental Illness,” *EIDOLON* (2017), <https://eidolon.pub/crazy-talk-7a2c9c575ebf>. Similarly, Darrel Amundsen and Gary Ferngren refer to disease as a

maintains health communicate important details about how health is conceived of by a given author. Is it the positive resting state of the body, the disturbance of which produces sickness, or is it defined as an absence of disease? Is health a relative condition, based on one's age, biological sex, and place of origin, or is it something more universal? These questions, all of which were addressed in various ways by ancient Greeks and Romans, emphasize that what is achieved or maintained or preserved when one says something is "healthy" is not necessarily transcultural or transtemporal. In the late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods, there were numerous competing definitions of "health" (and a variety of medical practitioners who sought to deliver it). While "health" might seem an uncontroversial good, and disease straightforwardly an "ill" (so much so that "ill" serves in the modern world as a common antonym for "good"), the cultural assumptions that are brought to bear upon these terms are not unproblematically transferred from one era to the next.⁷ Different conceptions of health and illness may undergird an author's use of these concepts.⁸ Consequently, an interpretation of the Pastor's deployment of illness and health as metaphorical and theologically interested categories requires the examination, not only of his portrayal of pathologized deviance and his theological presuppositions about the causation of deviance, but also of the building blocks of his conception of health.

"relative concept" shaped by local, historical, and ultimately social concerns and factors ("The Perception of Disease and Disease Causality in the New Testament," 2955–956).

⁷ Valerie M. Hope and Eireann Marshall caution that "what the modern world regards as the standard associations between disease, health, hygiene and death may not have held true in the ancient context" (*Death and Disease in the Ancient City*, Routledge Classical Monographs [London: Routledge, 2000], 1–2). Neither are conceptions of "medicine" (cf. van der Eijk, "Medicine and Health in the Graeco-Roman World," 25).

⁸ Sextus Empiricus testifies to the diversity of ancient assessments: "Health, then, is by some considered to be a good, by others not a good; and of those who suppose it to be a good some have declared it to be the greatest good, others not the greatest; and of those who have said that it is not a good, some have counted it 'a preferred indifferent,' others an indifferent but not 'preferred'" (Οὐκοῦν τὴν ὑγίαν οἱ μὲν νομίζουσιν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντων οἱ μὲν μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ταύτην ἔλεξαν οἱ δ' οὐ μέγιστον, καὶ τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἰπόντων οἱ μὲν ἀδιάφορον προηγούμενον, οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφορον μὲν, οὐ προηγούμενον δέ) (*Adv. Math.* 3.48 [Bury, LCL]).

A. Medical Conceptions of Health

The concept of health as a balance, whether of humors as in the Hippocratic and Galenic traditions, or of other bodily fluids, was prevalent, though not hegemonic.⁹ A variety of humoral theories may be found in the collection of texts attributed to Hippocrates, which date from the classical era well into the Hellenistic period. The classic Hippocratic¹⁰ humoral theory of pathology comes from *Nature of Man* 4:

The human body has within itself blood and phlegm and yellow bile and black bile, and these belong to the nature of the body, and because of these things it suffers pain (ἀλγεί) or is healthy (ὕγιαίνει). It is especially healthy then whenever it has these things in proper measure (μετρίως ἔχῃ) to each other with regard to combination and force and quantity, and especially when they are mixed. Pain occurs (ἀλγεί) whenever there is some lack or excess (τι ἔλασσον ἢ πλέον) of these things in the body and when one is not mixed with all the others.¹¹

Notably, pain is the result of an imbalance of humors. Here the classic emphasis on balance is evident. One finds other four-part theories besides the classic combination of blood, phlegm,

⁹ The four-humor theory was not the only physiological theory that posited a mixture of bodily fluids. Van der Eijk writes that ". . . in some of the pathological writings of the Hippocratic Corpus, bile and phlegm often play the role of pathogenic agents rather than natural constituents; in Aristotelian physiology, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile are classed as 'residues' of nutriment along with other waste products, devoid of any purpose and potentially harmful to health if not disposed of properly; and in Plato's *Timaeus* the picture is yet again different, with further distinctions being made within the category of black bile. Furthermore, several medical schools of thought—especially those of Erasistratus, Asclepiades, and the Methodists—did not adopt a humoral theory at all" ("Medicine and Health in the Graeco-Roman World," 30). The second century BCE physician Asclepiades of Prusa in Bithynia, mentioned by Van der Eijk, believed that health "was the unopposed movement of bodily corpuscles while sickness ensued when pores were blocked by too many particles" (Lily Y. Beck, *Pedanius Dioscorides Anazarbus: De materia medica*, *Altertumswissenschaftliche Texte und Studien* 38 [Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 2005], 2 n. 8); cf. John Scarborough and Vivian Nutton, "The 'Preface' of Dioscorides' 'Materia Medica': Introduction, Translation, and Commentary," *Transactions & Studies of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia* 4.3 (1982): 206–8. For the debate regarding material monism or pluralism in human physiology and pathology and the evidence of Anonymus Londiniensis, see Susan Prince, "The Peripatetic Hippocrates and Other Monists in the Anonymus Londiniensis," in *Ancient Concepts of the Hippocratic: Papers Presented at the XIIIth International Hippocrates Colloquium, Austin, Texas, August 2008*, ed. Lesley Dean-Jones and Ralph Mark Rosen, *Studies in Ancient Medicine* 46 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 99–116.

¹⁰ See Nutton's comments on this treatise in *Ancient Medicine*, 81–86, both regarding its profound influence through the centuries and the ancient debate surrounding it.

¹¹ Τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχει ἐν ἑωυτῷ αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν ξανθὴν καὶ μέλαιναν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἡ φύσις τοῦ σώματος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀλγεί καὶ ὑγιαίνει. ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὅταν μετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κρήσιος καὶ δυνάμιος καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιγμένα ἢ· ἀλγεί δὲ ὅταν τούτων τι ἔλασσον ἢ πλέον ἢ ἡ χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκρημένον ἢ τοῖσι σύμπασιν (Greek text from Jones, LCL; my trans.).

yellow, and black bile. For instance, instead of two kinds of bile, the Hippocratic author of *Diseases* has "bile and water" in addition to blood and phlegm.¹² One also finds the primary internal cause of disease reduced to bile and phlegm (*Diseases I 2; Affections 2*), while secondary causes may be food and drink, and excessive heat or cold (*Diseases I 2*), or, furthermore, moistness, dryness, exertions, wounds, smell, sight, sound, or coitus (*Affections 2*).

Related to the idea of balance but different is the Peripatetic idea that sudden change and difference are what produce disease and corruption. This is predicated upon a theory that prizes the proper states of substances. Sudden changes are thought to be disease-producing because change is inherently volatile. Writing in the Hellenistic period, the Peripatetic author of *Problems* 1 reflects on diversity, volatility, and disease:

But why is change (ἡ μεταβολή) disease-producing (νοσώδης)? Is it because all change, both of season and of age, is volatile (εὐκίνητος)? For the limits are volatile, such as the beginnings and the ends. So, because the forms of nourishment are different (ἕτεραι) they corrupt (φθείρουσιν) each other; for some nourishment has recently grown into (the body), while some has not yet done so. Further, just as varied nourishment (ποικίλη τροφή) is disease-producing (for concoction is then disordered and not uniform), so those who change water are supplied with varied nourishment in what they drink.¹³ (*Problems* 1.15 = 861a1–7 [Hett, LCL])

The middle, we infer, is where things are at their most calm. This clash of the outer limits produces volatile change, and this produces disease and corruption. Difference and variety are seen as productive of disease, while stasis is prized. While it is impossible to know if the Pastor

¹² "Both woman and man have four forms of moisture in the body, from which diseases come (as many sicknesses as do not come from violence): these forms are phlegm and blood and bile and water" (ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ γυνή καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὑγροῦ τέσσαρα εἶδεα ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ νοῦσοι γίνονται, ὁκόσα μὴ ἀπὸ βίης νοσήματα γίνονται· αὐταὶ δὲ αἱ ιδέαι εἰσὶ φλέγμα καὶ αἷμα <καὶ> χολή καὶ ὕδρωψ [*Morb.* 4 1, my trans.]). Cf. the very similar formulation in *Genit.* 3: "There are four kinds of moisture: blood and bile and water and phlegm. A person has these kinds implanted in him or herself, and from them diseases come to be" (εἰσὶ δὲ τέσσαρες ιδέαι τοῦ ὑγροῦ, αἷμα τε καὶ χολή καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ φλέγμα· τοσαύτας γὰρ ιδέας ἔχει συμφυέας ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἐωυτῷ, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων αἱ νοῦσοι γίνονται [my trans.]).

¹³ Διὰ τί δ' ἡ μεταβολή νοσώδης; ἢ ὅτι πᾶσα μὲν ἡ μεταβολή καὶ ὥρας καὶ ἡλικίας εὐκίνητον; εὐκίνητα γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα, οἷον καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ τελευταί. ὥστε καὶ αἱ τροφαὶ ἕτεραι οὔσαι ἀλλήλας φθείρουσιν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρτι, αἱ δ' οὐπω προσπεφύκασιν. ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ ἡ ποικίλη τροφή νοσώδης (ταραχώδης γὰρ καὶ οὐ μία πέψις), οὕτω συμβαίνει μεταβάλλουσιν τὸ ὕδωρ ποικίλη πόματος χρῆσθαι τῇ τροφῇ.

was aware of such a conception of disease, it serves as a useful heuristic point of reference for the interpreter of the Pastor's apprehensions regarding doctrinal difference and his preference for sameness and conformity.

Galen provides an imperial-era conception of health. In his treatise *On the Preservation of Health*, Galen characterizes "hygiene" as the science of maintaining health. While medicine is a single art, it has two parts: therapeutics, on the one hand, which aims to change the state of the body, and on the other hand, "hygiene," which seeks to preserve it.¹⁴ The role of the physician is to be able to preserve health (ὕγεια) when it is present, and effect it when it is absent. Galen says that health "consists in a definite proportion of so-called constituent elements, of warm, cold, moist, and dry, and is fulfilled by the composition of the same organic elements, their quantity, size, and conformation."¹⁵

Elsewhere, Galen says that the things that bring about health are "medicines and remedies" (ἰάματά τε καὶ βοηθήματα) while the things that preserve health are "healthy regimens" (ὕγεινὰ διαιτήματα).¹⁶ For Galen, health (ὕγεια) is the opposite of disease, but not the absence of disease. It is rather a positive state, a proper functioning.¹⁷ In his discussion at *Method of Medicine* 1.5 (= 10.41–42K), Galen says that in accordance with popular discourse, which provides him with a "starting point . . . which is agreed by all," "sickness" and the terms etymologically related to it have to do with when there is damage to the function (ἐνέργεια) of any

¹⁴ Galen, *San. tu.* 1.1. = 6.2K. In Celsus, *Med. Prooemium* 9, we find a division of medicine into three parts: the dietetic (Διατητική), the pharmaceutical (Φαρμακευτική), and surgery (Χειρουργία). Celsus delineates the differences by the primary means of healing: "by food" (*victu*), "by medicines" (*medicamentis*), and "by hand" (*manu*). This tripartite division is observable also in Galen, *Thrsyhb.* 24 = 5.847–9K, where he allows that these are different τέχναι, but in service of the same σκοπός, namely, ὕγεια. Cf. Lieve Van Hoof, *Plutarch's Practical Ethics: The Social Dynamics of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 212 n. 5.

¹⁵ Galen, *San. tu.* 1.1. = 6.2K. (Green trans.)

¹⁶ Galen, *Sect. int.* 1.1 = 1.64K.

¹⁷ Ian Johnston, *Galen On Diseases and Symptoms: Translated with Introduction and Notes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21.

part of the body, and "healthy" is when there is no such damage, but everything is functioning "according to nature." Later he will expand the opposite of health to "disease (νόσος), or affection (πάθος), or whatever you wish, for this makes no difference, at least in this present context."

In his treatise *Differences of Diseases*, Galen establishes alternative definitions, "one functional or physiological and one structural or anatomical. In the first case, the functions of the body are in accord with nature (κατὰ φύσιν). In the second case, the constitution (κατασκευή) 'of the organs by which we function' is in accord with nature."¹⁸ Galen does not clarify what "according to nature" means, but he does seem to think of it in terms of "being in balance" (σύμμετρος) with the four humors, thus achieving a "balanced mixture" (εὐκράσια) of the elements which allows all parts to function "in accordance with nature." This approach accords with the Hippocratic conception of health as the balanced alignment of humors.¹⁹ These descriptions inform our understanding of the health language of the Pastorals. In particular, they highlight the notion that disease is defined as damage to a particular function of the body or mind, whereas health is imagined as the proper, baseline operation of that function. Health is thus aligned with what is natural, while disease is aligned with what is unnatural.

B. Popular Conceptions of Ὑγίεια

Well before the Imperial era, "health" was considered to be one of the chief goods, at least popularly.²⁰ A popular hymn to the goddess Hygieia (Ὑγίεια), the personified virtue of health, was

¹⁸ Johnston, *Galen On Diseases and Symptoms*, 22.

¹⁹ Hippocrates, *Nat. hom.* 4. See discussion by Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 82–83.

²⁰ "Now that health is a good, and the prime good, has been asserted by not a few of the poets and writers and generally by all ordinary folk" (ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὖν, καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον, εἰρήκασι τὴν ὑγίαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν τε ποιητῶν καὶ τῶν συγγραφέων καὶ καθόλου πάντες οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου) (*Adv. Math.* 3.49 [Bury, LCL]). Pythagoras apparently judged the greeting ὑγιαίνειν to be "most suitable for both body and soul, encompassing all human goods" (ψυχῇ τε καὶ σώματι ἁρμοδιώτατον καὶ συνόλως ἅπαντα περιειληφὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀγαθὰ). See Lucian, *Laps.* 5, cited by Robert J. Penella, *The*

composed by Ariphron of Sicyon in the fifth or fourth century BCE, but was inscribed in stone in Epidauros and elsewhere and was still being quoted at dinner parties into the early third century CE: "Hygieia, most honoured of the blessed gods, may I live with you for what is left of my life and may you live with me and favour me! . . . Without you no man prospers."²¹ Health was a much-discussed topic, both popularly and proverbially. Another drinking popular *skolion*, or drinking song, dedicated to Hygieia, is quoted by Athenaeus: "To have Good Health is the best thing for a mortal. Second is to be born handsome in appearance. Third best is to have uncomplicated wealth. The fourth thing is to enjoy our youth with our friends."²² Iconography of the goddess Hygieia was widespread. Emma Stafford relates that "from the fourth century BC onwards Hygieia was present in the form of statues or votive reliefs, and invoked in inscriptions, in sanctuaries of Asklepios all over the Greek world." The goddess Hygieia came to Rome in 292 BCE with the cult of Asclepius, and her worship persisted well into the imperial period.²³ She was frequently associated with the cult of Asclepius, ascendant in the first through third centuries CE, who by the imperial age was by far the most dominant of deities associated with health and healing with some five hundred known sanctuaries.²⁴

Letters of Apollonius of Tyana: A Critical Text with Prolegomena, Translation and Commentary, Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava 56 (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 20.

²¹ Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 15.702a–b, quoted by John Wilkens, "Hygieia at Dinner and at the Symposium," in *Health in Antiquity*, ed. Helen King (London: Routledge, 2005), 137.

²² Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 15.694e, quoted by Wilkens, "Hygieia at Dinner," 138.

²³ The story of Asclepius's summoning and arrival in Rome is mentioned by Livy, *Hist.* 10.47.6–7, and narrated in greater detail by Ovid, *Metam.* 15.626–744. See Emma Stafford, "'Without You No One Is Happy': The Cult of Health in Ancient Greece," in *Health in Antiquity*, ed. Helen King (London: Routledge, 2005), 134.

²⁴ The designation of "healing gods" is something of a category error, since while some gods were especially associated with healing, many gods could and did serve this function. We have evidence of many different gods being petitioned for health and healing (Vivian Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 2nd ed., Sciences of Antiquity [London: Routledge, 2013], 281). On the ubiquity of Asclepius, especially in the first to third centuries CE, see Rene Josef Ruttimann, "Asclepius and Jesus: The Form, Character and Status of the Asclepius Cult in the Second-Century CE and Its Influence on Early Christianity" (ThD Thesis, Harvard University, 1987).

Important evidence about popular notions of health in the Principate comes from inscriptional, numismatic, and literary evidence for the Roman cult of Salus, with whom Hygieia was associated by 180 BCE.²⁵ Salus was a Roman deity, the virtue "health" personified, identified sometimes as a state deity and called Salus Publica, sometimes a personal deity identified simply as Salus, Salus as a Romanized form of the Greek goddess Ὑγίεια, and Salus as the equivalent as the Greek σωτήρ, an important feature of imperial propaganda in the late Republic and early empire.²⁶ The cult of Salus was established as a state cult by 302 BCE at the latest with the dedication of the Quirinal temple,²⁷ with the earliest coin-issue featuring the diademed head of Salus comes from 91 BCE.²⁸ In coinage from 49 BCE, Salus is depicted as a deity leaning against a column and holding a snake, the latter feature being common in Imperial coinage.²⁹ Salus is associated with the recovery of Livia in a coin from 22 or 23 CE,³⁰ as well as other major public figures. As a deified virtue, Salus received cultic worship. Though initially not identified as the Hellenistic deity Ὑγίεια, by the imperial era these deities were at times merged in the religious imagination.

Given the prominence of health, both in civic cultural awareness and in people's everyday experience of embodiment, it is little surprise that health and its attainment was a popular enterprise. Edelstein remarks on the ubiquity of medical knowledge: "In antiquity, everybody was familiar with medicine—it was the only art or science about which everybody knew something; physicians wrote books for the general public; laymen discussed medical problems with their

²⁵ Livy *Hist.* 40.37.1–3. See Stafford, "‘Without You No One Is Happy’: The Cult of Health in Ancient Greece," 134.

²⁶ Martin A. Marwood, *The Roman Cult of Salus*, BAR International Series 465 (Oxford: B.A.R., 1988), 1–2.

²⁷ Livy, *Hist.* 9.43.25 and 10.1.9 (Marwood, *Roman Cult of Salus*, 2).

²⁸ Marwood, *Roman Cult of Salus*, 21.

²⁹ Marwood, *Roman Cult of Salus*, 22.

³⁰ Marwood, *Roman Cult of Salus*, 22.

physicians; in short, medical knowledge was perhaps diffused more widely in Greek and Roman times than in any other period of history."³¹ Even if Edelstein could be shown to have an overly optimistic assessment of Greco-Roman fluency with things medical in comparison with others in history, his comments nonetheless suggest a widespread familiarity with medical practice and its imagery. The Pastor's deployment of the language of health and sickness for his own ideological ends can be thus be read with this ubiquity in mind. The Pastor's use of medical image were part and parcel of a much broader cultural phenomenon. At the same time, the Pastor's health dicta must be read with an awareness of the complexity of ancient Greco-Roman preoccupations, values, and idiosyncrasies. A general awareness of health imagery only takes a reader so far. As we shall see, however, the promulgation of health imagery by philosophers aided in the appropriation of medical metaphors to interpret the kind of social and psychological phenomena that are of ultimate concern to inhabitants of the Roman Empire, including the Pastor and his audience.

C. Health as a Constructed Category

As we have seen, Greco-Roman authors conceived of health in diverse, sometimes competing ways. And yet, each author aligned their sense of health with their basic conceptualizations of physiology and the natural world. Humoral theories depict health as the proper mixture of those humors. Peripatetic understandings of health prioritize the appropriate mean as an index of health, and sudden variation from that mean constitute the disruption of health. Popular understandings of health were impacted by the prevalence of cultic sacralization of health, whether in the sanctuary of Asclepius or the iconography of the imperial cult. These various portrayals of health and how to maintain it depends upon a shared valuation of health as a good

³¹ Ludwig Edelstein, "The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 26 (1952): 311–12.

to be sought. The positive valuation of health and its function as a vehicle for theories and ideologies connected to it are what the Pastor presupposes and exploits. This terminology and the thematics derived from it are doing important ideological and rhetorical work for the Pastor, insofar as they are used to inscribe his own moral and theological vision with a sense of normalcy and normativity. Because that "normalcy" is presumed as a value category and yet not inherently defined, this allows the Pastor to value this language according to his own definitions. The language of healthy words and teachings serves to affirm them as reasonable, natural, correct, and authoritative. By extension, those who pronounce them are adorned with all the conceptual associations that accrued to the cultural construct of the healthy. The Paul of the Pastorals is depicted as the primary purveyor of the healthy words, the one who urges Timothy and Titus to adhere to them and promulgate them. The parallel depiction of the opponents as "sick" (νοσεῖν) completes the rhetorically symmetrical relationship between them.

II. Health and Salvation in the Pastoral Epistles and Paul

A. Healthy Words and Healthy Teaching in the Pastorals

The Pastor's particular way of framing doctrinal rectitude via medical imagery seems to have little precursor in the homologoumena. Nowhere in Paul's oeuvre do we find the term ὑγιαίνειν or its cognates,³² nor do we find the language of νοσεῖν.³³ While Paul uses ἀσθενεῖν and its cognates with some regularity, it is frequently contrasted with the language of power (δυναμεῖν) or strength (ἰσχύειν), which has traditionally suggested to scholars that Paul refers to "weakness" more generally, rather than illness, per se. By contrast, the Pastorals utilize the language of health

³² When these occur in the rest of the NT, they invariably refer to health or healing (e.g., Matt 12:13, 15:31; Mk 5:34; Luke 5:31, 7:10, 15:27, etc.).

³³ This term is a NT hapax in 1 Tim 6:4, though the cognate ἡ νόσος is common in the Gospels.

(*ὑγιαίνειν*, *ὑγίης*) and related terminology with regularity and to potent effect. Like Paul, the Pastor took part in a culture that was saturated with philosophical commonplaces about medicine and the embodied experience of disease. However, it was the Pastor used these commonplaces in innovative ways to explain the significance of the Pauline message. As I shall demonstrate in this chapter, this language serves multiple purposes. It serves to stigmatize the behavior and teachings of the opponents and to forge (and in some ways even exemplify) the conceptual connection between theological deviance and sickness. The health terminology characterizes teaching or words that are deemed by the Pastor healthy and right, but it also emphasizes the therapeutic capacities of this teaching; it intimates the possibility for the restoration of those who hearken to it. The paraenetic and therapeutic function of this language is perhaps most vividly on display in Titus 1:13, where the explicit goal of Titus's pastoral activity (here "censure") is said to be therapeutic: "Censure them sharply, in order that they might be healthy in the faith" (*ἐλέγχε αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως, ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει*).³⁴ Lastly, the Pastor's robust use of medical imagery serves to idealize the apostle Paul and his ambassadors as those entrusted with the healthy teaching and capable of dispensing the "healthy words about our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Tim 6:3). While in his letters Paul did not make significant use of this language, his pairing of error and illness may have served as inspiration for the Pastor's own amplification of these themes. In the light of the Pastor's propensity to rework sections of Paul's letters (with 1 Corinthians having

³⁴ The idea that censure might lead to moral health is present in Plato, *Gorg.* 480c, where Socrates muses that rhetoric might be useful (*χρήσιμος*) if one were to "accuse himself" (*κατηγορεῖν . . . ἑαυτοῦ*) . . . "in order that he might pay the penalty and be made healthy" (*ἵνα δὴ δίκην καὶ ὑγίης γένηται*). The appeal that some action be taken (typically "take care of yourself/your body" *ἐπιμέλεσθαι σαυτοῦ/σώματος*) "in order that you might be healthy" (*ἵνα/ὅπως ὑγιαίνηις*) is a common feature of private letters in the Hellenistic period. See, e.g., from the collection of Stanislaw Witkowski, *Epistulae privatae Graecae quae in papyris aetatis Lagidarum servantur*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1911), 3.7 = P.Fl.P. 2.11.1 (3rd BCE), 26.32 = P.Lond. 42 (168 BCE), 27.23 = P.Vat. A (168 BCE), 38.22 = P.Par. 46 (152 BCE), 42.14 = P.Goodsp. 4 (middle of 2nd BCE), 44.10 = P.Tebt. 55 (latter half of 2nd CE), 48.20 = P.Amh. 2.39 (103 BCE), 54.20 = P.Grenf. 2.36 (95 BCE), 57.43 = P.Oxy 753 (2 BCE). See also the same formula in OGIS 168.30, a letter from Ptolemaeus X Soter II (116–81 BCE).

received particular attention, as I argued above in the previous chapters), the Pastor's development of medical imagery as an index for theological deviance or rectitude may be read as an active attempt to integrate, highlight, and expand of these ideas from 1 Cor 11. Even though Paul never describes his *opponents* or their teachings as sick, he does suggest, in an important episode in the history of early Christian discourse about health and sickness, that error can lead to sickness and even death, and it is to that enigmatic passage we now turn.

B. Paul as Precursor: Error, Sickness, and Judgment (1 Cor 11:27–30)

27 Consequently, whoever eats the bread or drinks the cup in a manner unworthy of the Lord, shall be liable for the body and the blood of the Lord. 28 But let a person put himself to the test and in this way eat from the bread and drink from the cup. 29 For the one who eats and drinks without discerning the body eats and drinks judgment on himself. 30 For this reason many among you are sick and ailing and a significant number are dead.³⁵

For Paul, illness and sometimes even death are at times the divine consequence of sin and the absence of discernment within the community. At 1 Cor 11:27–32 Paul says that as a consequence of not examining oneself (cf. δοκιμάζειν ἑαυτόν) and eating and drinking without "discerning the body" (διακρίνειν τὸ σῶμα) "many are sick and ill and quite a few have fallen asleep" (πολλοὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἄρρωστοι καὶ κοιμῶνται ἱκανοί). In 11:32 Paul chalks this up to "being judged by the Lord" (κρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου)³⁶ and "educated" (παιδεύεσθαι). The means by which these Corinthians are afflicted with illness and death is not made explicit.

³⁵ 27 Ὡστε ὃς ἂν ἐσθίῃ τὸν ἄρτον ἢ πίνη τὸ ποτήριον τοῦ κυρίου ἀναξίως, ἔνοχος ἔσται τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ κυρίου. 28 δοκιμαζέτω δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτόν καὶ οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄρτου ἐσθιέτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ποτηρίου πινέτω· 29 ὁ γὰρ ἐσθίων καὶ πίνων κρίμα ἑαυτῷ ἐσθίει καὶ πίνει μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα. 30 διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ὑμῖν πολλοὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἄρρωστοι καὶ κοιμῶνται ἱκανοί.

³⁶ Arguably the phrase "by the Lord" could modify either *κρινόμενοι* or *παιδεύμεθα*, or both. Fitzmyer takes it with *παιδεύμεθα* (1 *Corinthians*, 448). I translate it with the former, since the sequence κ. + ὑπό also occurs at 1 Cor 10:29, and in the Corinthian Correspondence Paul typically (though see 1 Cor 2:15, 4:3, 10:9) uses ὑπό plus the genitive of agent *after* the verb (1 Cor 1:11, 4:3, 6:12, 7:25, 8:3, 10:10, 14:24; 2 Cor 1:4, 2:11, 3:2, 5:4, 8:19, 8:20) except when it is within an attributive participle in hyperbaton (1 Cor 2:12) or with an infinitive (2 Cor 1:16, 12:11).

The majority of scholars in the modern era have interpreted 1 Cor 11:30 as referring to physical pathologies and death incurred as a result of failing to "discern the body" of the Lord.³⁷ A recent and notable exception is Illaria Ramelli. Ramelli argues, with appeal to the Alexandrian biblical exegetical tradition on the one hand and middle Platonic and Neostoic comparanda on the other, that Paul's language refers to spiritual sickness and death, not any sort of physical ailment or death.³⁸ She succeeds in showing that some early Christian interpreters read this passage as referring to nonphysical ailments,³⁹ and that the concept of spiritual death was a lively topos employed in the philosophical literature of Paul's contemporaries and successors. However, because her argument does not attend to the exegetical context of the passage, important factors are left unconsidered.⁴⁰

Chief among those factors is the particularity of the situation Paul addresses in 1 Corinthians, namely, a concrete, specific situation in which Corinthian believers have suffered consequences as a result of meal-time malpractice of some kind. Unlike the situation addressed in 1 Cor 11, many of Ramelli's examples from Middle Platonic and Neostoic sources, as well as from Origen and his followers, use the concept of spiritual death to describe a state of vice more

³⁷ Illaria Ramelli shows at length how prevalent the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 11:30 as referring to physical sickness and death is among 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st century commentators ("Spiritual Weakness, Illness, and Death in 1 Corinthians 11:30," *JBL* 130.1 [2011]: 146–49).

³⁸ Ramelli concurs with and builds on the work of Sebastian Schneider, "Glaubensmängel in Korinth: Eine neue Deutung der 'Schwachen, Kranken, Schlafenden' in Kor 11,30," *Filologia neotestamentaria* 9.17 (1996): 3–19. Schneider argues that the language of 1 Cor 11:30 is metaphorical, and pertains to being asleep or sick *in faith*. With reference to the language of Philo, Schneider suggests a hard and fast distinction between metaphors for spiritual illness and physical ailments (Schneider, "Glaubensmängel in Korinth," 10–12). However, the two need not always be so firmly separated.

³⁹ However, she overstates her case with regard to John Chrysostom when she writes that Chrysostom and Theodoret "do not spend a single word on v. 30." She appears to overlook Chrysostom's explicit attention to the matter in *Hom. in 1 Cor.* 28 [*PG* 61.234]. She notes that Chrysostom "specifically commented upon 1 Cor 11:27–34 in *Hom. 27* (*PG* 61:230–32)" but seems to have not read quite far enough, for the commentary is quite explicit at *PG* 61:234. (It seems she may have also miscited the homily in question, since it should be *Hom. 28*, at least for this section.)

⁴⁰ Attention to the argumentative context of the passage comes very belatedly, only in the last three sentences of the essay, as a corroborating element rather than a critical component of her argument. Ramelli, "Spiritual Weakness," 163.

generally. The examples of spiritual death thus serve as a contribution to the concept of spiritual or moral death of the soul, but they do not straightforwardly illuminate 1 Cor 11:30, where Paul is not pontificating on the effects of sin on the soul or the hazards of vice, but rather discussing the rather immediate and local effects of a lack of discernment of the Lord's body (both as the eucharistic body and as the ecclesial body)⁴¹ in the early Christian celebration of the "lordly supper" (κυριακὸν δεῖπνον).⁴² Paul does of course use the language of spiritual death, and he does elsewhere use the language of weakness to refer to a moral state (Rom 6:19). Furthermore, the passages that Ramelli cites from the NT do establish that death is used elsewhere, namely, 1 Tim 5:6 and Rev 3:1–2, to characterize a vice-filled life. However, when Paul uses images of spiritual death, he never uses the language that he uses here: κοιμᾶσθαι. Strikingly, as Ramelli also recognizes, Paul only uses this language as a euphemism for bodily death, and 1 Corinthians provides the majority of those instances (1 Cor 7:39, 15:6, 15:18, 15:20, 15:51; cf. 1 Thess 5:13–15).

The notion that improper eating practices (or perhaps eating without the attendant propriety of critical discernment [cf. διακρίνειν at 1 Cor 11:29]) with reference to the Lord could result in real physical harm is anything but foreign to Paul's letters.⁴³ Indeed, even within the argument of 1 Corinthians, our passage recalls the litany of examples from the Exodus tradition (e.g., Exod 16:4, 14–30, 35; 32:6; Num 20:7–11; 21:16–18; Deut 31:31, etc.) set forth by Paul in 1 Cor 10:1–13. Though his examples include the sickness and death of many Israelites as a result of

⁴¹ On the simultaneity of these two senses, see Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 157; 265 and n. 442; Hans-Josef Klauck, "Eucharistie und Kirchengemeinschaft bei Paulus," *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 49.1 (1986): 7.

⁴² 1 Cor 11:20. The full passage runs from 11:17–34.

⁴³ Furthermore, there is ample evidence from Greco-Roman literature that transgressions at fellowship meals were sometimes followed by divine judgment, including illness and sometimes death. See the discussion of Lanuwabang Jamir, *Exclusion and Judgment in Fellowship Meals: The Socio-Historical Background of 1 Corinthians 11:17–34* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2016), 97–107.

idolatry (1 Cor 10:7), fornication (1 Cor 10:8), "testing" God (1 Cor 10:9), and grumbling (1 Cor 10:10), he begins his examples by appealing to a kind of baptism and consumption of food and drink, "unquestionably viewing it as a type/analogy of the Lord's Supper," to borrow the words of one prominent commentator.⁴⁴ Paul says that the Israelites "ate the same spiritual bread" (τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν βρῶμα ἔφαγον) and "drank the same spiritual drink" (τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν ἔπιον πόμα) and yet most drew God's displeasure, and "they were strewn about in the desert" (κατεστρώθησαν . . . ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ).⁴⁵ Paul is adamant that these experiences of the Israelites were recorded as a typological warning for later readers like the Corinthians (1 Cor 10:6, 11). Paul asserts that each Corinthian believer should take care not to "eat and drink judgment on oneself" (1 Cor 11:29), as he has just illustrated by the example of the Israelites. Thus, the argumentative context of Paul's letter suggests that Paul could and did imagine dire physical consequences for improper responses to divine meals.⁴⁶

But what did Paul mean through this crucial linking of improper meal practices and morbidity? How would the Pastor have interpreted this passage, and how might his reading of it motivated or affected his own employment of health and illness as theologically interested categories? Scholars have debated the meaning of διακρίνειν as well as σῶμα in 1 Cor 11:29, variously interpreting this σῶμα as referring to the Corinthian community, the eucharistic body of

⁴⁴ Gordon Fee, *First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT), 446.

⁴⁵ 1 Cor 10:3–5.

⁴⁶ Weissenrieder demonstrates that, more broadly speaking, the notion that one's visible ailments are self-inflicted, the result of sin or divine displeasure, has ancient biblical origins (Ps 38:4, Ps 117:18 LXX, 2 Chr 26:16–21, 1 Kings 13:4) (Annette Weissenrieder, "Darum sind viele körperlich und seelisch Kranke unter euch" (1 Cor 11,29ff): Die korinthischen Überlegungen zum Abendmahl im Spiegel antiker Diätetik und der Patristik," in *Eine gewöhnliche und harmlose Speise"? Von den Entwicklungen frühchristlicher Abendmahlstraditionen*, ed. Judith Hartenstein [Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 2008], 239).

Christ, or perhaps a combination of the two.⁴⁷ These sense of διακρίνειν too has been debated, with scholars proposing three main interpretations:⁴⁸ 1) discerning the presence of Christ in the meal and therefore its special status, 2) acknowledging the presence of Christ in the ecclesial body, or 3) engaging in self-reflection so as to eat in a worthy manner (cf. 11:24, 27). In a novel argument, Annette Weissenrieder has argued that the term διακρίνειν has been interpreted incorrectly by scholars as pertaining to a legal context and therefore "im Sinne von missachten oder beurteilen."⁴⁹ In this case, she argues, the term means to "differentiate" ("unterscheiden"), in the sense of having discernment whether "to eat too much instead of waiting on others, to get drunk instead of communing with others" (zuviel essen anstatt auf die anderen zu warten, betrunken sind anstatt mit anderen zu kommunizieren).⁵⁰ Weissenrieder argues that the sense of διακρίνειν is really about discerning the relative dietetic value and function of different substances; to this, she connects the idea, derived from ancient discussions of diet and nutrition, that the effects of various kinds of foods depend upon the constitution of the individual. She understands the phrase to refer to the individual's capacity (or lack thereof) to absorb certain nutrients. Applied to the situation with the eucharistic body, she interprets this as a failure to appreciate the healing function of the body and blood of Christ.⁵¹ Thus, for those who do not appreciate what the eucharistic meal is all about (i.e., by analogy with ancient dietetics, its "nutritional" value),

⁴⁷ Weissenrieder, "Darum sind viele körperlich und seelisch Kranke unter euch" (1 Cor 11,29ff)," 250. Cf. Collins, NTL, 439. Dale Martin chooses to interpret τὸ σῶμα in 11:29 as semantically polyvalent, referring to all of the possible referents: the eucharistic substances, the body of Christ, the church as the body of Christ, or the body of the Christian (Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 194–95).

⁴⁸ Here I follow the summation of Fitzmyer, *1 Corinthians* (AB 32), 446.

⁴⁹ Weissenrieder, "Darum sind viele körperlich und seelisch Kranke unter euch" (1 Cor 11,29ff)," 241.

⁵⁰ "Darum sind viele körperlich und seelisch Kranke unter euch" (1 Cor 11,29ff)," 241. She argues that it should instead, in line with some apologists and early church fathers, be interpreted in light of a different semantic field: ancient dietetics. She points to Chrysostom, *Hom in 1 Cor* 28.1, Ignatius, Eph. 20.2, and Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio catechetica magna* 37 ("Darum sind viele körperlich und seelisch Kranke unter euch" (1 Cor 11,29ff)," 241 nn. 6–8).

⁵¹ "Der menschliche Körper ist in der Lage, die heilende Funktion des Leibes und Blutes Christi von anderen nährenden Substanzen zu unterscheiden. Die Wirkung ist aber abhängig von der Konstitution des Menschen" (Weissenrieder, "Darum sind viele körperlich und seelisch Kranke unter euch" (1 Cor 11,29ff)," 254).

evidenced by their lack of waiting for each other and their getting drunk, they do not enjoy the healing effects of the eucharistic body. While the dietetic notion of discerning the relative effect of certain foods upon one's particular bodily constitution has much to commend it, it seems not to account for the fact that Paul casts the problem ultimately as a failure of the community to institute right practices (thus his concluding exhortation: "Consequently, my sisters and brothers, when you come together to eat, *wait for each other*" (ὥστε, ἀδελφοί μου, συνερχόμενοι εἰς τὸ φαγεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐκδέχεσθε), which would seem at odds with the emphasis on individual mental states required in Weissenrieder's solution.⁵²

For the interpretation of the Pastorals and their use of medical imagery, what is especially germane is that error in "discernment" or "differentiation"—most likely intimating both a failure to appreciate the sacrality of the eucharistic meal and a failure to properly assess the benefit to the ecclesial body of eating in such a way that it is built up⁵³—is linked with an experience of pathology that is plotted along a scale of morbidity.⁵⁴ Paul matter of factly states that some are sick (ἀσθενεῖς), some are infirm (ἄρρωστοι), and a good number have died.⁵⁵ Crucially, this is related to social discord in the body of Christ.⁵⁶ This idea, that error could produce disease, serves

⁵² Stephen C. Barton's insight emphasizes this point: "This physical illness in the individual body mirrors both the disorder in the social body and the pollution of the Lord's body"

(Steven C. Barton, "Paul's Sense of Place: An Anthropological Approach to Community Formation in Corinth," *NTS* 32.2 [1986]: 242).

⁵³ Klauck here emphasizes the lack of discernment as a disregard for the community: "Das Fehlurteil über den Leib Christi meint im Grunde dasselbe wie die Mißachtung der Gemeinde Gottes" ("Eucharistie und Kirchengemeinschaft bei Paulus," 7).

⁵⁴ Along with Robertson and Plummer before her, Ramelli notes that Paul is here "constructing a climax," starting with weak/sick (ἀσθενεῖς), moving to a more severe form of illness (ἄρρωστοι), and then to death (κοιμῶνται) (Ramelli, "Spiritual Weakness," 152).

⁵⁵ Some scholars suggest that the terms are synonyms. E.g., Collins says that the two conditions are "essentially synonymous," though he recognizes the crescendo and the implied difference in intensity (NTL, 439). Weissenrieder demonstrates that the two were used to describe ailments of different severities, whether they were applied to the soul or the body. She points (260 nn. 79–81) to Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.23; Philo, *Sacr.* 48; *Post.* 74; *Deus* 65; *Sobr.* 45; Galen, *HVA* 15.553K, 15.805K; *Hipp. aph.* 17.801K.

⁵⁶ Designating discord as a disease in a social body was a topos in political rhetoric (see Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 100 nn. 216; 169 631). Similarly, Martin argues that when Paul uses a topos that links "disharmony

as an important potential precursor to the Pastor's more developed association of error and disease. In a letter that we know the Pastor had on hand and utilized extensively and creatively (1 Corinthians), Paul pathologizes an error of *διακρίνειν*, a cognitive and ethical error with profound social and behavioral implications. Very similarly, the Pastor pathologizes intellectual and moral errors (e.g., 1 Tim 4:1–5, 6:3–5; 2 Tim 2:15–18; Titus 1:9, 13), which he perceives to have profound ecclesial and physiological consequences. At the same time (as we saw in chapter one) the Pastor stops short of the notion that error leads to death. Instead, he persists in extending the hope of healing, even for his opponents (as we shall see below).

III. The "Healthy Teaching" in the PE

A. Scholarly Approaches to the Healthy Teaching

Scholarly discussions of the medical imagery in the Pastorals has focused on several questions. One question is the origin of such discourse: does it derive from popular parlance, or is it at home in contemporary philosophical discussions? Another preoccupation, determined to some degree by Pauline studies and questions about the gospel in the Pauline tradition, regards the degree of fixity or flexibility that may be attributed to the concept of the healthy teaching. Does it suggest that the Pastor imagines the Pauline gospel as a fixed entity, or does it admit of more dynamism, both in terms of content and rhetorical applicability? Does "the healthy teaching" serve as a metonymy for the whole of Christian teaching, or is it more circumscribed? Additionally, there is the question of the role of medical language in relation to the problems of theological deviants

with disease," he makes "what for the philosophers and the rhetoricians was a political metaphor" into "a physiological fact: discord causes disease" (*Corinthian Body*, 196). Martin's discussion of the eucharist as an ambivalent *φάρμακον* (190–94), capable of doing good or harm, is less probative for Paul's language than for Ignatius's (at *Eph.* 20.2). More pertinent is the literature on ancient dietetics, a field of knowledge related to but distinct from drugs and medicaments per se.

and their deviance: is the function of such language strictly polemical, i.e., to define what is and is not "healthy," or does the language suggest a therapeutic function for the Apostle's teaching, such that the opponents and their auditors might be healed if they hearken to the healing words? Last but certainly not least, this language has been examined by some in service of addressing the perennial problem of authorship. Those who deem the letters pseudepigraphical highlight the distinctiveness of this language within the Pauline oeuvre,⁵⁷ those who argue for their authenticity downplay or gloss over this observation,⁵⁸ and those who argue for a multiplicity of deuteropauline authors suggest that there is some diversity in its usage among the PE, or they omit it from discussion entirely.⁵⁹

To date, scholarship has addressed these questions within more general discussions of the Pastorals, typically in commentaries. The exception to this rule is the oft-cited work of Abraham Malherbe, who provides an entrée to the problem in his 1980 article, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles."⁶⁰ In almost four decades since its publication, few articles and no monographs have given sustained attention to the problem of how the medical imagery of the Pastorals

⁵⁷ E.g., Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 25; Saarinen, *BTCB*, 39; Linda M. Maloney, "Pastoral Epistles," in *Searching the Scriptures: A Feminist Commentary*, ed. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Shelly Matthews, and Ann Graham Brock (New York: Crossroad, 1993), 365.

⁵⁸ E.g., Wilhelm Michaelis, *Pastoralbriefe und Gefangenschaftsbriefe: Zur Echtheitsfrage der Pastoralbriefe*, NTF 6 (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1930), 81. Johnson, *AB*, 171, admits it is "striking" that the healthy language is used of teaching only here in Pauline corpus, but does not give an account for why this might be the case.

⁵⁹ E.g., Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus," *RB* 98 (1991): 403–18; Michaela Engelmann, *Unzertrennliche Drillinge? Motivsemantische Untersuchungen zum literarischen Verhältnis der Pastoralbriefe*, BZNW 192 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), does not address the health language as one of her criteria of comparison. Neither does Richards consider the health language in his assessment of the letters' relationship (*Difference and Distance in Post-Pauline Christianity: An Epistolary Analysis of the Pastorals*, StBibLit 44 [New York: Lang, 2002]).

⁶⁰ Abraham J. Malherbe, "Medical Imagery and the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie*, ed. W. Eugene March and Stuart Dickson Currie (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1980), 19–35.

functions, and how it relates to ancient medicine or philosophy.⁶¹ While some special themes have received extensive treatment, such as the οἶκος imagery,⁶² the ἐπιφάνεια language,⁶³ the εὐσέβεια language,⁶⁴ and paideia as an organizing principle,⁶⁵ no comparable attention has been devoted to the health language. Malherbe's article made significant inroads into the contextualization and interpretation of the medical imagery. He situated the explicitly medical language within a plausible interpretive framework through comparison with moral philosophical writings from the Roman Empire. Yet it is marked by an over-determination of the social type of opponent the Pastor had in mind (rigorist Cynics),⁶⁶ and what seems now, in light of the resurgence of interest in medical literature, a striking dearth of attention to ancient medicine per se and the ideologies

⁶¹ Only one article in the intervening time period deals explicitly with one aspect of medical terminology in the Pastorals, namely, that of Annette Weissenrieder, "What Does σωθήσεται δὲ διὰ τῆς τεκνογονίας 'To Be Saved by Childbearing' Mean (1 Timothy 2:15)? Insights from Ancient Medical and Philosophical Texts," *EC* 5 (2014): 313–36.

⁶² David C. Verner, *The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles*, SBLDS 71 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983); Jens Herzer, "Rearranging the 'House of God': A New Perspective on the Pastoral Epistles," in *Empsychoi Logoi—Religious Innovations in Antiquity. Studies in Honor of Pieter Willem van Der Horst*, ed. Alberdina Houtman, Albert de Jong, and Magda Misset-Van de Weg, AGJU 73 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 545–66; Margaret Y. MacDonald, "Beyond Identification of the Topos of Household Management: Reading the Household Codes in Light of Recent Methodologies and Theoretical Perspectives in the Study of the New Testament," *New Testament Studies* 57.1 (2011): 65–90; Korinna Zamfir, *Men and Women in the Household of God: A Contextual Approach to Roles and Ministries in the Pastoral Epistles*, NTOA 103 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013).

⁶³ E.g., see Dieter Lührmann, "Epiphaneia: Zur Bedeutung eines griechischen Wortes," in *Tradition und Glaube: Das frühe Christentum in seiner Umwelt. Festgabe für Karl Georg Kuhn zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Gert Jeremias, Heinz-Wolfgang Kuhn, and Hartmut Stegemann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 185–99; Victor Hasler, "Epiphanie und Christologie in den Pastoralbriefen," *TZ* 33.4 (1977): 193–209; Lorenz Oberlinner, "Die »Epiphaneia« des Heilswillens Gottes in Christus Jesus. Zur Grundstruktur der Christologie der Pastoralbriefe," *ZNW* 71.3–4 (1980): 192–213; Andrew Y. Lau, *Manifest in Flesh: The Epiphany Christology of the Pastoral Epistles*, WUNT 2.86 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996); Margaret M. Mitchell, "Epiphanic Evolutions in Earliest Christianity," *Illinois Classical Studies* 29 (2004): 183–204.

⁶⁴ Mary R. D'Angelo, "Εὐσέβεια: Roman Imperial Family Values and the Sexual Politics of 4 Maccabees and the Pastorals," *BibInt* 11.2 (2003): 139–65; Angela Standhartinger, "Eusebeia in den Pastoralbriefen: Ein Beitrag zum Einfluss römischen Denkens auf das Entstehende Christentum," *NovT* 48.1 (2006): 51–82; Jens Herzer, "'Das Geheimnis der Frömmigkeit' (1 Tim 3,16): Sprache und Stil der Pastoralbriefe im Kontext hellenistisch-römischer Popularphilosophie—eine methodische Problemanzeige," *TQ* 187 (2007): 309–29; T. Christopher Hoklotubbe, *Civilized Piety: The Rhetoric of Pietas in the Pastoral Epistles and the Roman Empire* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017).

⁶⁵ Friedemann Krumbiegel, *Erziehung in den Pastoralbriefen: Ein Konzept zur Konsolidierung der Gemeinden*, Arbeiten zur Bibel und ihrer Geschichte 44 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2013).

⁶⁶ Malherbe zeroes in on Stoics and Cynics in particular in his discussion of medical metaphors. While he recognizes that the language is widespread, he seeks to locate it especially in Stoic and Cynic discourses, and among rigorist Cynics in particular ("Medical Imagery," 24, 26).

of health prevalent in the ancient Mediterranean world. Of most immediate relevance is Malherbe's insistence that the function of the medical language of the Pastorals was solely polemical, and that the author did not intend the language to suggest any capacity for effecting healing for his opponents. Malherbe has recently been criticized for overstating this particular argument,⁶⁷ yet a more comprehensive assessment is needed, and the enduring value of Malherbe's article is indicated by its de facto status as the standard statement on the topic, quoted by many and challenged by few.⁶⁸

One criticism that Malherbe leveled against earlier scholars, that no attempt at a cohesive reading of the imagery had been attempted, is applicable to following scholarship as well. Though Egbert Schlarb published a Marburg dissertation in 1990 entitled *Die gesunde Lehre: Häresie und Wahrheit im Spiegel der Pastoralbriefe*, his research focused much more on the teaching (*Lehre*) aspect of the Pastorals than the semantic and cultural significance of the descriptor "healthy" (*gesunde*).⁶⁹ Paideia is of course a major emphasis in the Pastorals, and the Pastor does use the health language primarily as a way of thinking about faith and teaching. But the kind of body logic presupposed by the Pastor and the ways in which medical analogies operate in contemporary literature did not receive attention in Schlarb's analysis. Indeed, Schlarb seems to understand the

⁶⁷ Martin Winter, "Die 'Pastoralbriefe': Ihr Name im Licht der popularphilosophischen Seelenleitung," *KD* 59.4 (2013): 244–49.

⁶⁸ The latest example of Malherbe's outsized influence comes from the recent monograph by T. Christopher Hoklotubbe. In a brief discussion of the medical imagery utilized in the PE, Hoklotubbe adopts with approval Malherbe's contention that, in spite of the comparison with the therapeutic ambitions of philosophers practicing psychagogy, the Pastor's use of medical imagery only works to characterize the opponents as beyond the reach of this therapeutic treatment (*Civilized Piety*, 185–87).

⁶⁹ Schlarb, *Die gesunde Lehre: Häresie und Wahrheit im Spiegel der Pastoralbriefe*. Similarly Gerd Häfner, "Schriftauslegung und 'gesunde Lehre' in den Pastoralbriefen," in *Die Bedeutung der Exegese für Theologie und Kirche*, ed. Karl Gabriel and Ulrich Busse, *Quaestiones disputatae* 215 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005), 171–98.

designation "gesunde" in the more general sense of "sound,"⁷⁰ and does not investigate medical literature or contemporary use of medical metaphors.

Some scholars explicitly reject the idea that the ὑγιαينوῦσα διδασκαλία is "healthy" at all. Jürgen Roloff, for instance, argues that a direct contrast between notions of healthy and sick is actually lacking, and that instead the author is simply using a widely used term that held meanings different than "healthy" per se, such as "vernünftig," "verständlich," and "sachgemäß."⁷¹ "Dahinter steht die Vorstellung, daß das Gesunde stets das Ausgewogene, der allgemeinen Ordnung Gemäße ist."⁷² Thus Roloff separates the derived, extended sense of ὑγιής and cognates from the primary sense of the term. Philosophers certainly could use the term ὑγιής to mean something like "sound,"⁷³ and this sense of the term is a valid option in the absence of developed medical imagery. However, this does not account for the robust use of medical imagery in the PE, as well as the penchant of the same philosophers Roloff cites (e.g., Dio Chrysostom, Plato, and Philo) to use the term ὑγιής as indicating a rational, "healthy" manner of thinking and living in opposition to the "sick" opposition of their philosophical opponents.⁷⁴ After separating the notion of "reasonable" or "sound" from that of "healthy" with regards to the way the Pastor uses ὑγιαίνειν and ὑγιής, Roloff takes pains to deny that the Pastor is using the term in the sense of "rational," since for him this would entail that the Pastor claimed that his message's legitimacy derived from

⁷⁰ This is evident, for instance, when he couples the term with descriptors like "feste" ("firm") and "vertrauenswürdige" ("trustworthy") (*Die gesunde Lehre: Häresie und Wahrheit im Spiegel der Pastoralbriefe*, 359).

⁷¹ Roloff, EKKNT, 78.

⁷² Roloff, EKKNT, 78.

⁷³ Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.11.28; 2.15.2, 3.9.5; cf. Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 24.

⁷⁴ Philo, *Abr.* 223, 275; *Agr.* 164.5

rationalistic grounds.⁷⁵ Rather, Roloff argues, the Pastor's use of this language is meant to authorize and legitimate the teaching of the apostle Paul.⁷⁶

Andreas Lindemann characterizes the healthy teaching as a formal utterance, removed from the activity of apostolic preaching (and therefore discrete from Paul's concept of the gospel). He makes this point with reference to Philip Vielhauer: "Vielhauer vertritt die These, die 'gesunde Lehre' habe bei den Past denselben Stellenwert wie εὐαγγέλιον bei Paulus."⁷⁷ Lindemann disagrees with this assessment on the grounds that the four uses of the term in the Pastorals have a predominantly formal meaning; whereas the "gospel" in Paul's letters was always strongly associated with the apostolic preaching, in the PE, the "healthy teaching" is not "die Rede," something spoken for the purpose of engaging current situations of conflict (aktuelle Konfliktsituation).⁷⁸ Rather, the Pastor is interested in establishing the legacy of Paul.⁷⁹ Lindemann thus posits a contrast between the real, situational objectives of Paul's proclamations and the allegedly formal—and, one is supposed to infer, "unreal" situations—addressed in the Pastorals with the language of the "healthy teaching." This is a different version of the argument that the healthy teaching does not in fact have any change or remedy as its goal. For instance, Malherbe argues that "the author describes the heretics as beyond cure, and, implicitly, as virtually beyond the methods of care used with people who can still be corrected."⁸⁰

⁷⁵ This is a feature of Dibelius & Conzelmann's treatment as well (Hermeneia, 25).

⁷⁶ "Zentrales Kriterium für die Gesundheit der Lehre ist nämlich nicht ihre Übereinstimmung mit den rational einsichtigen, Kosmos wie Menschenwelt durchwaltenden Gesetzen, sondern ihre Herkunft vom Apostel und ihre Legitimation durch ihn" (Roloff, EKKNT, 78).

⁷⁷ Andreas Lindemann, *Paulus im ältesten Christentum: Das Bild des Apostels und die Rezeption der paulinischen Theologie in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Marcion*, BHT 58 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1979), 142. Lindemann (142 n. 72) cites Philipp Vielhauer, *Geschichte der urchristlichen Literatur: Einleitung in das Neue Testament, die Apokryphen und die Apostolischen Väter*, De Gruyter Lehrbuch (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1975), 232.

⁷⁸ This position resonates with that of Dibelius and Conzelmann, that "the basic terms of the Pastorals are *not* applied to an actual situation" (Hermeneia, 24, emphasis original).

⁷⁹ Lindemann, *Paulus im ältesten Christentum*, 142.

⁸⁰ Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.3:303.

While I do think that the Pastor equates the healthy teaching with the gospel and understands both to derive from and therefore gain their legitimacy from Paul and ultimately from God,⁸¹ I shall show that the Pastor is both drawing on traditional notions of rationality and still utilizing the analogy of health to describe the teaching he advocates. In other words, the Pastor does not imagine that his message is somehow only valid because it comes from Paul; it is valid because it is genuinely connected to and supportive of a healthy and reasonable response to the "living God." Just because truth is grounded in the person of God and of God's messenger does not mean that, for the Pastor, the message is not also "rationally" true. For the Pastor there is no distinction between what is rational and what is divinely true. While it is true that the Pastor does not use the language of the "folly of the cross" (1 Cor 1:18–25), he certainly does employ the same polemic against his opponents that Paul did in this regard: he thinks the true knowledge belongs to God, and his opponents' paltry offerings do not compare to the truth of the gospel as he proclaims it.

Lorenz Oberlinner argues for a two-fold function of the connection between healthy teaching and "being healthy." The first is "a practical component" (eine praktische Komponente) that has a "strong ethical-paraenetic sense" (eine stark ethisch-paränetische Sinnspitze) that forges a strong connection between teaching and salvation. Oberlinner suggests that in this sense the use of *ὁγιαίνειν* has a "dynamischer Charakter." In this sense, it designates what is "frei von Lasten und Übeln" and is the opposite of what is incorrect (1 Tim 1:9), just as whatever is in opposition to it is dubbed "sick" (1 Tim 6:3–4). The second sense, according to Oberlinner, is of a more static character, having become already something of a "slogan" (Schlagwort) designating

⁸¹ A similar approach is taken by Norbert Brox, who characterizes the healthy teaching as the sum total of teaching and praxis derived from Paul (*Die Pastoralbriefe: Übersetzt und erklärt*, RNT 7.2 [Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1969], 107–8).

anything opposed to vice.⁸² Oberlinner argues that while the "healthy teaching" is nowhere concretized per se, it is still not simply equivalent to Pauline tradition, but rather a furthering of it.⁸³ He describes it as both a fundamentally defensive, outward-oriented concept against the false teachers, but also an inward-oriented concept that defines what is acceptable for the community.⁸⁴

Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, in attempt to argue for a different from that of 2 Timothy on the one hand and 1 Timothy and Titus, has claimed a stark contrast between the nature of the "healthy words" or "healthy teaching" terminology in the Pastorals.⁸⁵ He wishes to argue for differences in the use of the *ὑγι-* terminology, which he translates as "to be sound" or "sound" (as an adjective):⁸⁶

For 2 Tim the "words" in question are those of Paul (1:13), whereas for 1 Tim they are those of Christ (6:3).⁸⁷ The single reference to "sound teaching" in 2 Tim 4:3 does not derive from any established usage. It is used simply as a spontaneous antithesis to the unhealthy teaching identified as "myths" (4:4), which is contrary to "the word" (4:2) and "the truth" (4:4; cf. 3:8).⁸⁸

In contrast to 2 Timothy, Murphy-O'Connor avers, in 1 Timothy and Titus the "'sound teaching' has the specific connotation of moral teaching based on the gospel (1:10)." He goes on: "The impression is given that the list of vices in 1:9–10 were forbidden by the 'sound teaching'; the

⁸² Oberlinner, HThKNT, 29.

⁸³ Oberlinner, HThKNT, 29–30.

⁸⁴ Oberlinner, HThKNT, 30.

⁸⁵ Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus," 412–13. While several differences that Murphy-O'Connor highlights are of value, at times he gives so little justification for his assessments (or so many qualifications and caveats) that his case lacks substance. The rhetoric of this article is noteworthy for the repetition of certain binaries that indicate Murphy-O'Connor's basic assumptions about 1 Tim and Tit, on the one hand, and 2 Tim on the others. Notable binaries are "abstractness" vs. "concreteness" (407), "internal" vs. "outward looking and apostolic" (409) "technical" vs. "spontaneous" (413), "fixed" vs. "casual" (413).

⁸⁶ Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus," 412–13. Gourgues, CbNT, 262, cites Murphy-O'Connor with approval in this regard.

⁸⁷ Upon closer examination, this distinction does not hold. These are all Paul's words. In 1 Tim 6:3, the genitive is objective: "healthy words about our Lord Jesus Christ" (*ὑγιαίνοντες λόγοι οἱ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*).

⁸⁸ Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus," 413.

implication is that this expression has an established technical meaning."⁸⁹ The so-called "list of vices" is certainly forbidden by 1 Tim 1:10, but, contrary to Murphy-O'Connor's claim, the author's language suggests that it is meant as a representative sample that is by no means exhaustive. Aware that more could be said, the Pastor concludes his sentence with a catch-all: "and anything else that is set in opposition to the healthy teaching." The "healthy teaching" is not here clearly defined any more than the list is exhaustive.⁹⁰ Rather, the goal is to create a rhetorical contrast between two intentionally adaptable, pliable, and expansive categories, one of which is the "healthy teaching according to the gospel of the glory of the blessed God" and the other which is opposed to it.⁹¹

B. Do Healthy Words Heal?

In addition to questions about the nature of the ὑγι- language—i.e., whether it suggests simply "sound" or if it is imbued with medical connotations—one of the points of debate in studies of the medical imagery is whether or not the "healthy teaching" is *healing* or not. Does it count as therapy, a word that could have salutary effects for those who adhere to it, or is the medical imagery meant only to signal that one side is right and rational, and the other side is wrong and irrational? Put differently, does it make sense to talk about a "healthy teaching" that is only "healthy," i.e., that is described as such because it avoids the disease of heresy, or is it in some

⁸⁹ Murphy-O'Connor, "2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus," 413.

⁹⁰ J. Albert Harrill comments that what the criminals listed in 1 Tim 1:9–10 have in common "is not explained beyond their being antitypes of the 'just person' (*dikaios*)" (*Slaves in the New Testament: Literary, Social, and Moral Dimensions* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006], 119).

⁹¹ Murphy-O'Connor argues for the distinction between the 2 Timothy and 1 Timothy/Titus regarding the "healthy teaching" by analogy with another contrast in usage that he sees between 1 Tim/Tit and 2 Tim: "The impression that 1 Tim and Titus give a fixed value to what is but a casual expression in 2 Tim is reinforced by a parallel situation involving ἐπίγνωσις ἀληθείας 'knowledge of truth'." However, Murphy-O'Connor downplays the extent of the parallel usage, since the phrase occurs in both 1 Tim and in 2 Tim as "to come to a recognition of the truth." Despite his urging that the usage has a "formulaic quality" or a "technical character" in 1 Tim and Tit but not in 2 Tim, one is hard pressed to discern the difference.

sense *effective*, with the power to heal sin and moral error, sickness and delusion? Some scholars have argued that there is no rational therapy envisioned here, no "healing" to be had via the healthy teaching.

For instance, while Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann detect a shift towards rationalism in the Pastorals by contrast with Paul's argumentation, it is *not* in the sense that "the word 'sound,' 'healthy,' is intended to describe the power of the gospel to bring healing and life."⁹² Though Wilhelm Michaelis rejected Dibelius's idea that "the healthy teaching" signaled a connection with philosophical discourse, arguing instead that the teaching was "healthy" because it was free of the disease of heresy, he too denied the idea that the *ὑγιαίνουσα διδασκαλία* had a therapeutic function.⁹³ Following Michaelis, Ulrich Luck writes: "To be avoided is the mistake of thinking that the reference is to the teaching which makes whole, whose goal is health of soul."⁹⁴ For Luck, the healthy teaching's function was to "avert the corrupting influence of the false teachers" (i.e., it was purely polemical), with the result that "explanation in terms of philosophical usage is unnecessary."⁹⁵ Luck claims that the Pastorals have a "non-speculative, pragmatic usage" that is trying to combat a "speculative soteriology" and advocate a "rational and proper life in the world, which as creation is characterised by order and reason."⁹⁶ A similar view is held by Malherbe, who argues that there is no idea that reason through the use of *parresia* will heal the

⁹² Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 24–25, quoting 24.

⁹³ Michaelis, *Pastoralbriefe und Gefängenschaftsbriefe*, 79–85.

⁹⁴ Luck, "ὑγιής κτλ.," *TDNT* 8.312.

⁹⁵ Luck, "ὑγιής κτλ.," *TDNT* 8.312 n. 32. Luck seems here to resist the idea that the Pastorals are especially philosophically inclined, but in so doing fails to appreciate the difference between the Pastorals being influenced by philosophical language, tropes, and forms of argument and ideas (something that is demonstrably true) and the Pastorals engaging in the same sort of sustained theoretical or speculative philosophy that Plato or Aristotle did (which is not evidenced in these letters per se).

⁹⁶ Luck, "ὑγιής κτλ.," *TDNT* 8.312. Luck argued that the other Greek usage of this language was key for interpreting the Pastor's use of the terms. However, he elides the potential values of philosophical comparanda when he says that "Gk.-Hell. usage [of the health language] is not specifically philosophical but represents the average understanding" (Luck, "ὑγιής κτλ.," *TDNT* 8.312 n. 32).

intellectually and morally ill person. The orthodox "do have understanding, but it was not the rationality of the sound teaching that made them so, but rather the apostolic tradition."

According to Malherbe, "that the 'sound words' may bring about health of soul is an inference the reader may be tempted to draw, but it is not a part of the function to which the images are put. That function is polemical."⁹⁷

Insofar as these letters are written as advice to Timothy and Titus, the healing of those who deviate theologically is not the primary goal of the medical imagery of the Pastorals. However, their restoration, along with all humanity, is a recurrent theme. Indeed, Titus is explicitly told to "rebuke them sharply, in order that they might be healthy in the faith" (Titus 1:13).⁹⁸ Importantly, this exhortation pertains not to the believers who might be deceived by errant teaching, but the Pastor's opponents. Some scholars have emphasized this point, arguing that the "healthy teaching" is indeed meant to suggest a kind of teaching or a body of teaching that can have salutary effects on those who hear it.⁹⁹ Towner, for instance, departs from those who view the language of "healthy" as pertaining only to the logic and compelling nature of teaching for virtue, but not indicating that the teaching is health-producing. Towner, rightly in my opinion, sees the "sound teaching" (his translation) as "a way of describing the approved

⁹⁷ Malherbe, "Medical Imagery," 30. Martin Winter criticizes Malherbe's argument, saying "Es trifft nämlich nicht zu, dass die medizinischen Metaphern nur zur polemischen Abgrenzung von den Häretikern, nicht aber zur Beschreibung einer psychagogischen Therapie verwandt werden" ("Die 'Pastoralbriefe,'" 245). Saarinen, BCTB, 247 n. 6, also parts with Malherbe, saying that his approach does not "consider medical language to be primarily 'imagery' and 'metaphors'" but instead contends that "this language serves, in addition to polemics, the aims of diagnostics and therapy."

⁹⁸ Even the infamous *αἰρετικός ἄνθρωπος* of Titus 3:10 is not rejected until "after one, even a second admonishment" (*μετὰ μίαν καὶ δευτέραν νοουθεσίαν*).

⁹⁹ While Marshall does not make the positive argument, that the healthy teaching can heal, he does make the corresponding suggestion that the unhealthy teaching is potentially destructive: "The close relation between correct teaching and authentic Christian conduct throughout the PE (see Excursus 3; cf. 1.13; 2.1–14; 2 Tim 3.10–17) suggests the possibility that the imagery of health and illness does not imply simply that the false teaching is unreliable, irrational or illogical, but that it is palpably destructive in nature, damaging the faith and corrupting the life-style of the one affected (1 Tim 1.4–10; 19b; 4.1–3; 6.3–5; 2 Tim 2.17f.; cf. Quinn, 93–7)." See Marshall, ICC, 169.

apostolic teaching, which is positively health-producing. The implied polemical contrast is that the opponents' 'other' doctrines are infectious, diseased, and capable of destroying the spiritual health of those who come under their influence."¹⁰⁰ Towner is in agreement with previous scholars who understand that "the background of this application [of health language to teaching] is the secular philosophical debates, in which the word group acquired a figurative sense."¹⁰¹ For Towner and others, the argument is that this language is applied figuratively in both philosophical debates and also in the PE. Similarly, Martin Winter has recently argued within a broader look at the paraenetic aspects of the Pastorals that there is evidence in the Pastorals to suggest that the author of the Pastorals utilizes traditional methods of "Seelenleitung," not only with regard to the immediate addressees Titus and Timothy, the communities they lead, but also the "die Häretiker" who are deemed at odds with Paul.¹⁰² However, the arguments of Towner and Winter are made in general terms, and can be supported further by appreciating the extent and ingenuity of the Pastor's medical images and argumentation, what I call the pathologization of deviance in the Pastorals.

Important pieces of exegetical evidence in this debate are the sense of "healthy" and the prevalence of explicitly medical language in the Pastorals. Without these attendant medical images, one might conclude that the sense of "health" had faded, and the process of semantic abstraction had yielded the sense of "sound" with no remnant of the original semantic sense. But the persistence and prevalence of this language in the Pastorals, the mention of γάγγραινα, νοσεῖν, and even τεκνογονεῖν and καυτηριάζειν, all suggest that ὑγιαίνειν is an integral part of the consistently used metaphorical complex of health in the Pastorals. That the "healthy words"

¹⁰⁰ NICGNT, 130.

¹⁰¹ NICGNT, 130.

¹⁰² Winter, "Die 'Pastoralbriefe.'"

(ὕγιαίνοντες λόγοι) are not just "sound" but in fact "healthy" is made clear in 1 Tim 6:3–4, where the author avers that "someone who does not apply oneself to the healthy words . . . is deluded, not knowing anything but is *sick*" (τις . . . μὴ προσέρχεται ὑγιαίνουσιν λόγοις . . . τετύφωται, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος ἄλλ' νοσῶν). Furthermore, if "teaching otherwise" (1 Tim 6:3) and not holding fast to the "healthy words" and the "teaching which accords with piety" means that someone is "sick" (νοσεῖν at 1 Tim 6:4), is not the opposite implied, namely, that those who are holding fast to the healthy words are healthy, and to "come to" (προσέρχεσθαι) these healthy words would be to become healthy? The Pastor cites as an example of this the desire for wealth that wreaks havoc on people, causing them to fall into a snare and many irrational and harmful lusts (1 Tim 6:9). The Pastor strongly implies that if their thinking on wealth could be remedied, they would also be released from the snare and delivered from their irrationality. The "repentance" of those in opposition is to be an explicit goal of Timothy's teaching (2 Tim 2:25). This comes as little surprise, since the universal form of this sentiment is expressed at 1 Tim 2:4, which pronounces that God "wishes for all people to be saved/healed and to come to a recognition of the truth" (πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλει σωθῆναι καὶ εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν). Timothy is told, furthermore, that γραφή is useful, not only for teaching and censure, but for "restoration" (ἐπανόρθωσις), one of the terms used by Galen to describe one of the parts of hygiene,¹⁰³ the art of preserving health.

A further kind of critique—in addition to the exegetical case just made—derives from the convergence of medical and philosophical terminology in the cultural history of ancient Greece and Rome. Namely, the problem with limiting the Pastor's ὑγιαίνειν and ὑγιής language to the sense of "sound," rational, or merely sensible, is that it elides the inherent connections forged through centuries of medicalized discourse in ancient philosophy. The use of ὑγιής and its

¹⁰³ *Thras.* 31 = 5.864K.

derivatives is widespread in medical literature from Hippocrates to Galen and beyond.¹⁰⁴ To be ὑγιής suggested that an argument was right or correct,¹⁰⁵ but this does not preclude the meaning of "healthy." It is not the case that this terminology had lost its primary sense of "healthy," even if it was also used in an extended sense at times.¹⁰⁶ Separating the senses of ὑγιής from each other sets up a false dichotomy that essentially attempts to vivisect the "real" (i.e., healthy) from the "metaphorical" (i.e., rational). A healthy idea was a rational one, and a rational idea was a healthy one, at least in the ancient equation of the two concepts. When applied to a person, it was the marker of an exemplary moral individual.¹⁰⁷ Often, both semantic forces resided coextensively in the terminology of ὑγιής as used by philosophers, whose use of the medical analogy is well-

¹⁰⁴ Nadia van Brock, *Recherches sur le vocabulaire médical du grec ancien: soins et guérison*, Études et commentaires 41 (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1961), 143–71.

¹⁰⁵ The adverbial form ὑγιῶς could be used, for instance, in ancient text criticism to suggest that a text read "correctly" (cf. Eleanor Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship: A Guide to Finding, Reading, and Understanding Scholia, Commentaries, Lexica, and Grammatical Treatises, from Their Beginnings to the Byzantine Period*, American Philological Association: Classical Resources Series [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007], 151, 172. The term ὑγιής was sometimes used as a synonym for ἀληθής: Isocrates, *Antid.* 198 (οὐδὲν ὑγιές οὐδ' ἀληθές); Demosthenes, *3 Aphob.* 5: (ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, οὗτος δ' οὐδὲν ὑγιές εἴρηκεν); *Spud.* 22; Plato, *Phaed.* 69b (οὐδὲν ὑγιές οὐδ' ἀληθές); 89d (ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον); *Phaedr.* 242e; *Resp.* 603b; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. Rom.* 6.29.2; Philo, *Cher.* 127; Galen, *PHP* 4.4.27 (ὑγιής εἶη καὶ ἀληθής ὁ λόγος); Lucian, *Astr.* 2; Sextus Empiricus, *Pyr.* 2.42; Pollux, *Onom.* 4.8 offers an illuminating list of conceptually similar terms: ῥήματα δ' ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπιστῆναι ὡς Πλάτων (Euthyd. 296c?), γινῶναι, γνωρίσαι, θεωρῆσαι, καταθεωρῆσαι, περιθεωρῆσαι, κατανοῆσαι, διασκεψασθαι. ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐκ ἔστι ῥῆμα πλὴν τοῦ δοξάσαι, ᾧ ἴσως προσθετέον τὸ ὀρθῶς δοξάσαι ἢ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ χρῆσασθαι ἢ ὑγιεῖ ἢ ἀληθεῖ ἢ ἀπλανεῖ ἢ ἀσφαλεῖ. At other times, healthy mental faculties enable true statements, as may be seen in Josephus, *Ant.* 8.23, quoting Solomon: "Give to me, Lord, a healthy mind and good understanding, with which I would judge the people, because I have grasped what is true and just" (δός μοι φησί, δέσποτα, νοῦν ὑγιῆ καὶ φρόνησιν ἀγαθὴν, οἷς ἂν τὸν λαὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λαβὼν κρίνοιμι).

¹⁰⁶ Brock, *Recherches*, 169–71.

¹⁰⁷ In *Or.* 77/78, Dio Chrysostom discusses the qualities of a person who is "measured" (μέτριος [30]), "educated" (παιδευμένος [30]), noble (γενναῖος), sober-minded (σώφρων), without ostentation and without delusion (εὐσταλής τε καὶ ἄτυφος), humble and chastened by his own thought (ταπεινός καὶ κεκολασμένος αὐτὸς ὑφ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ διανοίας [26]). He is "healthy in words and in deeds" (ὑγιής μὲν ἐν λόγοις ὑγιής δὲ ἐν ἔργοις [39]). Furthermore, he "cleanses his own mind by reason and tries to render it free from slavery" (λοιπὸν δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν καθαίρει τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πειρᾶται παρέχειν ἀδούλευτον [*Or.* 77/78.40]). Dio concludes (*Or.* 77/78.45) his oration with medical imagery, here in service of the argument that drastic measures must be taken if one's moral sickness is severe: "For far worse than a corrupt and diseased body is a soul which is corrupt, not, I swear, because of salves or potions or some consuming poison, but rather because of ignorance and depravity and insolence, yes, and jealousy and grief and unnumbered desires" (πολὺ γὰρ χεῖρον διεφθαρμένου σώματος καὶ νοσοῦντος ψυχῇ διεφθαρμένη, μὰ Δία, οὐχ ὑπὸ φαρμάκων χριστῶν ἢ ποτῶν οὐδὲ ὑπὸ ἰοῦ τινος διεσθίοντος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τε ἀγνοίας καὶ πονηρίας καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ φθόνου δὴ καὶ λύπης καὶ μυρίων ἐπιθυμιῶν [Crosby, LCL]).

documented.¹⁰⁸ The evidence of the medical imagery in ancient philosophical discourse suggests that therapeutic language was typically put to much more functional purposes: its goal was to heal the errors of judgment, perception, and knowledge that lead to vice. This vice was thought to have tangible effects on the health of the human person. Grief and its effects were described in dramatically physical ways. The same is true of anger and excessive desire. People who were sick with these emotions, these *πάθη*, were at times subjected to medical treatment and care, as the case histories of Galen amply demonstrate.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the healing that the Pastorals offers is the remedy for a vicious, ignorant life in opposition to God. The effects of such living are imagined by the Pastor, as they were by his contemporaries, to have real bodily consequences.

In what follows, I wish to demonstrate that to limit the interpretation of the "healthy language" to the "figurative" is to miss the ways in which philosophers, physicians, and, I argue, the Pastor, understand unhealthy teaching—which is marked by fractious wrangling, excessive inquiry, verbal battles—to be productive of illness. For example, the healthy teaching of the Pastor is, I argue, imagined to be salutary and positively health-producing for those who listen to it. By characterizing the therapy of the soul as a "figurative" use of the medical imagery, scholars have relied upon a false dichotomy that divorces reality from metaphor. One of the reasons modern scholars have been accepting of the dichotomy, I suggest, is that they have imposed modern assumptions about the nature of the soul as an immaterial entity, and neglect ancient

¹⁰⁸ Martha Craven Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Fridolf Kudlien, "Cynicism and Medicine," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 48.3 (1974): 305–19; Werner Jaeger, "Aristotle's Use of Medicine as Model of Method in His Ethics," *JHS* 77 (1957): 54–61; Voula Tsouna, "Epicurean Therapeutic Strategies," in *The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism*, ed. James Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 249–65; Edelstein, "The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine." Edelstein rejected the notion that medicine influenced philosophy, and argues the opposite. He suggests that the greatest gift of medicine to philosophy was the medical analogy, whereby philosophers could utilize the example of the body to narrate the conditions and necessary treatments of the soul to acquire "health," i.e., virtue.

¹⁰⁹ The number of presenting symptoms in the cases Galen discusses that include "emotional" problems such as "grief," "anger," being "in love," or even excessive crying is striking. See "Appendix B: Table of Cases" in Susan P. Mattern, *Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 173–202.

discourses that emphasize cognitive errors as psychosomatic phenomena, pertaining to the unified psychophysical entity of the human person.

Indeed, the whole premise upon which the medical analogy is based is that philosophers serve as physicians for the soul. Just as physicians were expected to effectuate healing of the body, philosophers were expected to be able to bring about healing of the soul.¹¹⁰ William V. Harris comments on the rather robustly optimistic belief among ancient Greeks and Romans that mental disorders, "ranging from what we would call clinical conditions to character flaws, cognitive as well as moral and behavioral failure," could be cured.¹¹¹ I shall show that the very idea of a "healthy teaching" that had no therapeutic efficacy or goal is at odds with the rhetorical purposes to which the medical analogy was typically put in ancient literature. This does not mean that some conditions were not described as unhealable; some were. But in those cases it is made explicit. The general presumption was that philosophical therapy could have some efficacy.¹¹² In ancient psychagogic therapy, the "word" is itself a medium for therapy and healing.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ This point is made succinctly by Musonius Rufus (*Diss.* 3, ll. 19–22, ed. Lutz): "For as there is no merit in the science of medicine unless it conduces to the healing of man's body, so if a philosopher has or teaches reason, it is of no use if it does not contribute to the virtue of man's soul" (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικοῦ λόγου ὄφελος οὐδέν, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς ὑγίαιαν φέρῃ σώματος ἀνθρωπίνου, οὕτως οὐδ' εἴ τινα φιλόσοφος ἔχει ἢ διδάσκει λόγον, οὐδὲν ὄφελος αὐτοῦ, ἐὰν μὴ φέρῃ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης).

¹¹¹ William V. Harris, "Thinking about Mental Disorders in Classical Antiquity," in *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*, ed. William V. Harris, Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition 38 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 14. See further Philip van der Eijk, "Cure and (In)Curability of Mental Disorders in Ancient Medical and Philosophical Thought," in *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*, ed. Harris, 307–38.

¹¹² Christopher Gill, "Philosophical Therapy as Preventative Psychological Medicine," in *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*, ed. Harris, 339–60.

¹¹³ The likening of words to drugs is a venerable tradition in Greek rhetoric. An example from Gorgias (*Enc. Hel.* 15–16) illustrates the ambivalent nature of words as drugs. He could write that some λόγοι are like φάρμακα that draw out humors from the body, some of which stop illness (νόσος) while others stop life. On the late antique reception of this concept, see Wendy Mayer, "Shaping the Sick Soul: Reshaping the Identity of John Chrysostom," in *Christians Shaping Identity from the Roman Empire to Byzantium: Studies Inspired by Pauline Allen*. Edited by Wendy Mayer and Geoffrey D. Dunn, VCSupp, forthcoming; Wendy Mayer, "The Persistence in Late Antiquity of Medico-Philosophical Psychic Therapy" in *Journal of Late Antiquity* 15, ed. Heidi Marx-Wolf and Kristi Upson-Saia, forthcoming (early access granted by author).

Inherent in the health analogy used by the Pastor is the discourse of remedy, the possibility of healing. To imply, as do those who translate the term ὑγιής as "sound,"¹¹⁴ that ὑγιής is just a status indicator misses the analogical force of identifying Paul as an able physician. While there certainly is a polemical function for the medical imagery, it is not the only function. More accurately, the imagery is used to draw a stark contrast between healthy and sick teaching, and simultaneously repel the faithful away from sick teaching (i.e., its apotreptic function) and draw them to healthy teaching (its protreptic function). In the following sections, I will demonstrate first how the ancient philosophical discourse drew upon the tropes of health and sickness and next illustrate the particular and intriguing ways in which the Pastor utilized this established discourse in his efforts to warn his audience against the unhealthy teachings of his opponents.

IV. Philosophy and Health in the Greco-Roman World

A. Philosophers and Health of Body and Soul

The writings of Greco-Roman philosophers provide important resources for understanding ancient ideas of the meaning of health and disease and, crucially for the Pastoral Epistles, the application of those ideas to morality and ethics. The connection between philosophy and medicine derives in part from the ways in which philosophers conceived of their pursuits in the intellectual economy of the Greco-Roman world. Michael Frede explains that "at least into Hellenistic times, the philosophers regarded human physiology and pathology as part of natural philosophy."¹¹⁵ Aristotle (*De sensu* 436a17–22) claimed that natural philosophers frequently discussed the principles of health and disease, a notion that Frede says is born out in the works of

¹¹⁴ The same is true of those discussed above who deny that "healthy" suggests any capacity to effect that state.

¹¹⁵ Richard Walzer and Michael Frede, *Galen: Three Treatises on the Nature of Science* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1985), xx.

Pythagoras, Alcmaeon, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Democritus, and Plato.¹¹⁶ In the *Timaeus*, which was extremely popular in the Hellenistic period and well beyond,¹¹⁷ Plato makes the argument that disease is fundamentally a product of the elements (earth, fire, water, air) that make up the human body transgressing their proper place, either as an excess or deficiency, as a departure from their proper place to an "alien" place, or as a receiving of some inappropriate variation of an element.

The origin of disease (Τὸ δὲ τῶν νόσων ὅθεν) is plain, of course, to everybody. For seeing that there are four elements of which the body (τὸ σῶμα) is compacted,—earth, fire, water and air,—when, contrary to nature, there occurs either an excess (πλεονεξία) or a deficiency (ἐνδεια) of these elements, or a transference thereof from their native region to an alien region (τῆς χώρας μετάστασις ἐξ οἰκείας ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίαν γιγνομένη); or again, seeing that fire and the rest have each more than one variety, every time that the body admits an inappropriate variety (τὸ μὴ προσήκον ἕκαστον ἑαυτῷ προσλαμβάνειν), then these and all similar occurrences bring about internal disorders and disease. (*Tim.* 82a)¹¹⁸

These things are said to bring "factions and sicknesses" (στάσεις καὶ νόσοι). To remain healthy, the body must only allow the proper mixture and balance of substances in the proper order. Anything else will result in manifold and endless diseases and corruptions.

For, as we maintain, it is only the addition or subtraction of the same substance from the same substance in the same order and in the same manner and in due proportion which will allow the latter to remain safe and sound (ὕγιες μένειν) in its sameness with itself. But whatsoever oversteps any of these conditions in its going out or its coming in will produce

¹¹⁶ Walzer and Frede, *Galen: Three Treatises on the Nature of Science*, xx.

¹¹⁷ For its reception in Hellenistic philosophy, see Han Baltussen, "Early Reactions to Plato's *Timaeus*: Polemic and Exegesis in Theophrastus and Epicurus," in *Ancient Approaches to Plato's Timaeus*, ed. Robert W. Sharples and Anne Sheppard, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 78 (London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2003), 49–71. and the other essays in R. W. Sharples and Anne Sheppard, eds., *Ancient Approaches to Plato's Timaeus*, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 78 (London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2003). See also David T. Runia, "Plato's *Timaeus*, First Principle(s), and Creation in Philo and Early Christian Thought," in *Plato's Timaeus as Cultural Icon*, ed. Gretchen J. Reydams-Schils (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 133–51.

¹¹⁸ Τὸ δὲ τῶν νόσων ὅθεν ξυνίσταται, δῆλόν που καὶ παντί. τεττάρων γὰρ ὄντων γενῶν, ἐξ ὧν συμπέπηγε τὸ σῶμα, γῆς πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος, τούτων ἢ παρὰ φύσιν πλεονεξία καὶ ἐνδεια καὶ τῆς χώρας μετάστασις ἐξ οἰκείας ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίαν γιγνομένη, πυρὸς τε αὖ καὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐπειδὴ γένη πλείονα ἐνὸς ὄντα τυγχάνει, τὸ μὴ προσήκον ἕκαστον ἑαυτῷ προσλαμβάνειν, καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα τοιαῦτα στάσεις καὶ νόσους παρέχει. (Bury, LCL).

alterations of every variety and countless diseases and corruptions (ἀλλοιότητας παμποικίλας καὶ νόσους φθοράς τε ἀπείρους παρέξεται). (*Tim.* 82b)¹¹⁹

Arguably, in terms of conceptualizing disease, we could say that disease for Plato constitutes a certain crossing of boundaries, an intrusion of difference into the sameness or conformity of the elements. One anonymous Pythagorean defined health in a different but complementary manner: "Health is the continuation of the form; disease is the corruption of the same" (ὑγίειαν τὴν τοῦ εἶδους διαμονήν, νόσον τὴν τούτου φθόραν).¹²⁰ These sources help fill out the rich tapestry of connotations associated with health. It was not only associated with balance, but also with the maintenance of proper boundaries and a preservation of sameness. It could also be imagined in terms of a "preservation" or "continuation" of form, with disease being signified by corruption and the degradation of form.

B. A Healthy Soul: The Goal of Philosophy

The medical analogy extended to depict the philosopher's task as one of securing the health of the soul. Philosophical ἔλεγχος was crucial to securing the health of the soul in Plato's accounts of Socrates, for instance. The object of philosophy, according to Plato's Socrates in the *Gorgias* (484, 500e), is the "therapy of the soul" (ψυχῆς θεραπεία).¹²¹ Similarly, in the *Sophist*, Plato suggests the essential role of ἐλέγχειν in removing beliefs (δόξαι) that impede learning.

The process of freeing them, moreover, affords the greatest pleasure to the listeners and the most lasting benefit to him who is subjected to it. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food (τροφή) offered to it until

¹¹⁹ μόνως γὰρ δὴ, φαμέν, ταῦτ' ὧν κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀνὰ λόγον προσγιγνώμενον καὶ ἀπογιγνώμενον ἑάσει ταῦτ' ὧν αὐτῶν σῶν καὶ ὑγιᾶς μένειν· ὁ δ' ἂν πλημμελήσῃ τι τούτων ἐκτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἢ προσίον, ἀλλοιότητας παμποικίλας καὶ νόσους φθοράς τε ἀπείρους παρέξεται (Bury, LCL).

¹²⁰ Diels, I, 463, 26 f, cited by Luck, "ὑγιᾶς κτλ.," *TDNT* 8.309 n. 6. He also points (8.309) to the early fifth century BCE natural philosopher Alcmaeon of Croton (see Alcmaeon, D30 [*Early Greek Philosophy*, 5.2, LCL], from Aëtius, 5.30.1), who probably derived his thought from the Pythagorean concept of harmony. He said that "health is the balanced mixture of the qualities" (τὴν δὲ ὑγίειαν τὴν σύμμετρον τῶν ποιῶν κράσιν).

¹²¹ See Jaeger, "Aristotle's Use of Medicine as Model of Method in His Ethics," 54.

all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings (τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίου δόξας ἐξελών), and thus purges him (cf. καθαρόν) and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more. (*Sophist* 230c-d)¹²²

Ludwig Edelstein demonstrates that philosophers valued the medical analogy for a variety of reasons: it illustrated the need for care, maintenance, and supervision, thus legitimating the philosopher's role in the life of the city.¹²³ He remarks that Aristotle articulated the value of the medical analogy by highlighting the necessity of explaining what is invisible by what is visible: "The soul is invisible; knowledge about it is elusive. By comparing the soul to the body, that which is seemingly unreal is translated into comprehensible language." Edelstein regards the true potency of the medical analogy in philosophy to reside in the notion that treatment of the soul, as with the body, often requires drastic and painful intervention. The paradox that one might need to be subjected to cautery and surgery, the burning and cutting of the body, in order to attain health provided, according to Edelstein, a fruitful and indispensable analogy for the painful experience of denying one's natural impulses toward excess and sometimes dramatically correcting excesses that had become habitual.¹²⁴

¹²² νομίζοντες γάρ, ὦ παῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἢ τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν ἢ τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταῦτόν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διανοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἔξειν τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων ὄνησιν, πρὶν ἢ ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίου δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρόν ἀποφύγη καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον, ἅπερ οἶδεν, εἰδέναι μόνον, πλείω δὲ μή (Fowler, LCL).

¹²³ Edelstein, "The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine," 311.

¹²⁴ Edelstein, "The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine," 313–15. One might adduce the following quip from Plutarch to prove the point: "It is as if a sick man, swollen with dropsy, should say, 'Am I then to become thin and empty?' But what else are you going to do, in order to be healthy?" (ὥσπερ εἰ λέγοι πρὸς ἱατρὸν ἄρρωστος ὑδρωπιῶν καὶ ὠδηκῶς "ἰσχνὸς οὖν γένωμαι καὶ κενός;" τί δ' οὐ μέλλεις, ἢν' ὑγιαίνης;) (*Vit. aere al.* 8 [831c]).

C. Virtue and Health, Vice and Disease

Ancient philosophers forged a strong link between virtue (ἀρετή) and health. According to

Plutarch, Ariston of Chios subsumed all virtues under one chief virtue, and called it health (ὕγεια).

Under various circumstances, this virtue was called by different names:

For instance virtue (ἀρετή), when it considers what we must do or avoid, is called prudence (φρόνησις); when it controls our desires (ἐπιθυμία) and lays down for them the limitations of moderation and seasonableness in our pleasures, it is called temperance (σωφροσύνη); when it has to do with men's relations to one another and their commercial dealings, it is called justice (δικαιοσύνη)—just as a knife is one and the same knife, though it cuts now one thing, now another, or as a fire retains its single nature though it operates upon different substances. (Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 440f-441a)¹²⁵

Philo (*Det.* 72–73) makes the point that the equation of virtue and health was commonplace. He

writes that contemporary sophists draw direct connections between virtue and health, even

claiming that "every virtue is most healthy and productive of safety" (τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ὑγιεινότατον τε καὶ σωτήριον), while "licentiousness is diseased" (τὴν ἀκολασίαν νοσερόν).

Sophists are bound to find the powers within them at strife, words running counter to ideas and wishes to words, in absolute and utter discord. They make our ears ache with their demonstrations of the social character of righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), the advantageous nature of moderation (σωφροσύνη), the nobility of self-control (ἐγκράτεια), the great benefits conferred by piety (εὐσέβεια) the power of every kind of virtue (ἀρετή) to bring health and safety. On the other hand they dwell at great length on the unsociability of injustice, on the loss of health entailed by a licentious life, and prove ad nauseam that irreligion makes you a pariah, and that serious harm is occasioned by all other forms of wickedness. And nevertheless they entertain all the time sentiments quite at variance with the things which they say. (Philo, *Det.* 72–73)¹²⁶

¹²⁵ καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις, ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὐκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὀρίζουσα σωφροσύνη, κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους δικαιοσύνη· καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἐν μὲν ἔστιν ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλο διαιρεῖ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει χρώμενον (Helmbold, LCL).

¹²⁶ πεφύκασιν δὲ οἱ σοφισταὶ πολεμίους χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς δυνάμεσι, λόγων ἐνθυμήμασι καὶ βουλημάτων λόγοις ἀντιστατούντων καὶ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς συναδόντων· ἀποκναίουσι γοῦν ἡμῶν τὰ ὅσα, τὴν δικαιοσύνην κοινωνικόν, τὴν σωφροσύνην συμφέρον, τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀστεῖον, τὴν εὐσέβειαν ὠφελιμώτατον, τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ὑγιεινότατον τε καὶ σωτήριον ἀποφαίνοντες, καὶ πάλιν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄσπονδον, τὴν ἀκολασίαν νοσερόν, τὴν ἀσέβειαν ἔκθεσμον, τὴν ἄλλην κακίαν βλαβερώτατον διεξιόντες· καὶ ὅμως τὰ ἐναντία τοῖς λεγομένοις φρονούντες οὐ παύονται (Colson & Whitaker, LCL).

Philo critiques these would-be moralists because he discerns a discrepancy between their words and their deeds, a well-worn topos that is also visible in the Pastorals (e.g., 2 Tim 3:5, Titus 1:16). The contrary association was also made, between vice and disease. For example, Aristotle argued that folly (ἄφροσύνη), cowardice (δειλία), profligacy (ἀκολασία), and ill-temper (χαλεπότης), when occurring in excess (e.g., the depravity of Phalaris, or a slave who killed a fellow slave and ate his liver), should be categorized not as vice per se, but as a "bestial" (θηριώδης)¹²⁷ or "diseased" (νοσηματώδης) condition.¹²⁸

D. Therapy of Error

Ancient medical care gave ancient philosophers of all stripes the language of therapy to describe the practice of psychagogy.¹²⁹ The extent of the applicability of medical metaphors was debated by philosophers. Stoics even differed among themselves,¹³⁰ and Cicero grew weary of the

¹²⁷ Earlier, Aristotle (*Eth. nic.* 7.1.3) mentions the tendency to use the term "bestial" (θηριώδης) (the truly bestial individual being rare, but, when found, he is found among "the barbarians" (οἱ βάρβαροι) to cast dispersion (ἐπιδυσφημεῖν) on people who surpass all others in their vice (κακία).

¹²⁸ *Eth. nic.* 1149a5–8 [7.5.5]; 1149b15–21 [7.6.8].

¹²⁹ For the philosopher as physician, see, e.g., Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.10; Seneca, *Ep.* 75.6–7. For Epictetus's lecture hall as a "surgery," see *Diss.* 3.23, 30–38. The philosophical use of the medical analogy has been the subject of much scholarly interest. See, e.g., Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*; Kudlien, "Cynicism and Medicine"; Jaeger, "Aristotle's Use of Medicine as Model of Method in His Ethics"; Edelstein, "The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine." On psychagogy and Paul, see Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy*, NovTSup 81 (Leiden: Brill, 1995). Abraham Malherbe shows how the tradition of psychagogy among moral philosophers is manifested in 1 Thessalonians, with special reference to 1 Thess 2:7. "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," 303–304; Abraham J. Malherbe, "Gentle as a Nurse": The Cynic Background to I Thess II," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–17.

¹³⁰ See Ian G. Kidd, "Euemptōsia-Proneness to Disease," in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, ed. William W. Fortenbaugh, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 1 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983), 107–13 on the dispute between Chrysippus and Posidonius on the application of the medical analogy. Posidonius framed his critique of Chrysippus as follows: "For this reason too sickness of mind is not like, as Chrysippus had assumed, that sickly bad condition of body by which the body is swept off to fall into random irregular fevers; mental sickness is rather like either physical health with its proneness to disease, or disease itself. For physical disease is a state already sick, whereas Chrysippus' so called disease is more like proneness to fevers." See Galen, *PHP* 294.32ff DeLacy (Kidd, "Euemptōsia-Proneness to Disease," 108). In Kidd's analysis, Posidonius thought that Chrysippus's confusion of the medical analogy was a result of an inexact analogy regarding two crucial points: "First, the absolute distinction between the ideal wise man and everyone else, the *phauloi*, which could not be represented accurately by health and sickness; secondly, a quite different problem, the very complex variation of condition within the range itself of imperfect humans which could not be adequately glossed as sick; and further, that

extensiveness of the analogies, though he too embraced and utilized them.¹³¹ Epicureans beginning with Epicurus adopted a medical model of philosophical therapy. Voula Tsouna observes: "Therapy consists in purging from the soul the elements of moral disease, in putting into the soul the right elements, and often in both. However, from the practical perspective, the important aspect of the therapy is purgatory: the removal of features that cause disturbance and unhappiness rather than the replenishment of whatever knowledge we lack."¹³² This purgative aspect of Epicurean therapy accords with the Pastor's emphasis on "purifying" (ἐκκαθαίρειν) oneself from "profane babblings" (βεβήλῳι κενοφωνίαι) in 2 Tim 2:16.

Cicero reports on the Stoic use of the medical analogy to analyze the problem of error, its degrees, and how it could be treated. He argues that time is of the essence when dealing with false beliefs. If reason (*ratio*) is not brought forth as a remedy, there is increased danger that disease and sickness will result. When those are in turn left to fester and settle in, they become almost impossible to remove. Here Cicero uses the imagery of veins, which distribute the sickness, and vital organs wherein "this evil" (*illud malum*) becomes entrenched.

Whilst there is theoretically a difference between the ailments I am dealing with, in practice at any rate they are combined and their origin is found in lust and delight. For when money is coveted and reason (*ratio*) is not at once applied as a kind of Socratic remedy (*quasi quaedam Socratica medicina*) to cure (*sanare*) the desire, the evil circulates in the veins and fastens on the vital organs (*permanat in venas et inhaeret in visceribus illud malum*), and disease and sickness ensue (*exsistitque morbus et aegrotatio*), things which cannot be plucked out when they are long established (*quae evelli inveterata non possunt*); and for such a disease the name is avarice. . . . and all these sicknesses of the soul (*aegrotationes animi*) originate in a certain fear of the things they avoid and hate. Furthermore they define sickness of soul (*animi aegrotatio*) as an intense belief (*opinio*

the medical analogy used by Chrysippus actually misled the reader about the cause of moral sickness (i.e. *pathe*) and its cure, because his straight analogy between medicine and philosophy, health and moral sanity, suggested a comparison without qualification between physical and mental cures (Galen, *De plac.* 298.27ff, DeLacy, *SVF* 3.471)" (Kidd, "Euemptōsia-Proneness to Disease," 110).

¹³¹ Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.11.27.

¹³² Tsouna, "Epicurean Therapeutic Strategies," 249. See too Voula Tsouna, "Philodemus on the Therapy of Vice," in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. David Sedley, 21 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), 233–58.

vehemens), persistent and deeply rooted (*inhaerens et penitus insita*), which regards a thing that is not desirable as though it were eminently desirable. The product of aversion moreover is defined as an intense belief, persistent and deeply rooted, which regards a thing that need not be shunned as though it ought to be shunned: further this sort of belief (*opinatio*) is an act of judging that one has knowledge where one has none (*iudicatio se scire quod nesciat*). (*Tusc.* 4.11.24–26)¹³³

Sickness of soul consists of an error of judgment or belief regarding whether something is to be desired or avoided.¹³⁴ However, sickness of soul is not only an error of judgment or belief concerning the status of some thing, but is itself the product of a belief that one does indeed *know* something that one does not. This kind of error about what one knows is very much present in the Pastor's discourse of mental insufficiency (e.g., 1 Tim 1:7, 6:5; Titus 1:16).

The ability to heal these diseases of vice is imagined in the language of philosophical ideals like "self-control" (ἐγκράτεια).¹³⁵ For instance, Plutarch gives advice about how to get rid of vice (πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀποτροπὴν), which he calls a νόσημα. It requires self-control and training of oneself. "The greatest factor, however, in ridding ourselves of this affliction (πάθος) is the habit of beginning early to train (γυμνάζειν) and teach ourselves to acquire this self-control (ἐγκράτεια). It

¹³³ Haec, quae dico, cogitatione inter se differunt, re quidem copulata sunt, eaque oriuntur ex libidine et ex laetitia: nam cum est concupita pecunia nec adhibita continuo ratio quasi quaedam Socratica medicina, quae sanaret eam cupiditatem, permanat in venas et inhaeret in visceribus illud malum existitque morbus et aegrotatio, quae evelli inveterata non possunt, eique morbo nomen est avaritia; similiterque ceteri morbi, ut gloriae cupiditas, ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam, quae Graece φιλογυνία dicitur, ceterique similiter morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur. Quae autem sunt his contraria, ea nasci putantur a metu, ut odium mulierum, quale in Μισογύνῳ Atilii est, ut in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone, qui μισάνθρωπος appellatur, ut inhospitalitas est: quae omnes aegrotationes animi ex quodam metu nascuntur earum rerum, quas fugiunt et oderunt. Definiunt autem animi aegrotationem opinionem vehementem de re non expetenda, tamquam valde expetenda sit, inhaerentem et penitus insitam. Quod autem nascitur ex offensione ita definiunt, opinionem vehementem de re non fugienda inhaerentem et penitus insitam tamquam fugienda: haec autem opinatio est iudicatio se scire quod nesciat (King, LCL).

¹³⁴ Ian G. Kidd summarizes how one Stoic, Posidonius, imagined this to occur: "Posidonius sees such false opinions (*pseudeis doxai*) as triggering off an impulse (*hormē*) of an irrational mental power (*dunamis*) to go too far (*pleonazousa*, the normal Stoic definition of *pathos*), which by its emotional pull (*pathetikē holkē*, a phrase coined by Posidonius, F169.91 E.-K.) countermands reason to demand an assent (*sunkatathesis*) and so effects a *krisis* or decision for a particular act (F169.78–84 E.-K.)" (Kidd, "Euemptōsia-Proneness to Disease," 111).

¹³⁵ Plato, *Leg.* 643b, suggests that virtue is conceived of as the capacity to control oneself. "And we agreed long ago that those able to rule themselves (ἄρχειν αὐτῶν) are good (ἀγαθοί), and those who can't are bad (κακοί)" (Καὶ μὴν πάλαι γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ὡς ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν δυναμένων ἄρχειν αὐτῶν, κακῶν δὲ τῶν μὴ).

is, in fact, by habituation that the disease (νόσημα) has come to increase, advancing, as it does, little by little."¹³⁶ Plutarch suggests that the remedy to the disease comes just as the disease itself does—through gradual habituation.

E. Psychosomatic Illness

While ancient authors at times utilize the medical analogy for purely metaphorical purposes, there is evidence to suggest that "sickness of the soul" was not always simply an analogy, for the soul and the body were believed share a certain effective reciprocity. For instance, Maximus of Tyre contrasts the sickness of the soul with the health of the body, but notes that the former spreads to and destroys the latter. He asks his audience to imagine a "soul sick with the disease of pleasure, wasting and withering away" (νοσεῖ ψυχὴ τὴν ἡδονῆς νόσον, τήκεται καὶ μαραίνεται [Or. 7.7]), and uses the specific example of Sardanappalus. "Sardanappalus is sick [i.e., because of ἡδονή]; do you not see how the ailment comes also to his body?" (Σαρδανάπαλλος νοσεῖ· οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα αὐτῷ τὸ κακὸν ἔρχεται; [7.7]). Maximus here reflects the belief, observable also in the Pastorals and in the case histories of Galen, that emotions, in this case pleasure, can cause sickness.

For many ancient philosophers and physicians, emotions did not only have the capacity to cause bodily ailments; rather, emotional ailments were themselves a kind of bodily ailment. Galen's treatment of what we might term mental illnesses follows the same logic of argumentation that he applies to various bodily sicknesses. Galen, at the end of his second book on the causes of symptoms (*De symptomatum causis*) discusses the symptoms involving the "authoritative functions" (ἡγεμονικαὶ ἐνέργειαι) at *On the Causes of Symptoms II*, 7.1–2 (= 7.200–

¹³⁶ Μέγιστον μέντοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀποτροπὴν ὁ ἐθισμός, ἐὰν πόρρωθεν ἀρξάμενοι γυμνάζωμεν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ διδάσκωμεν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐγκράτειαν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ αὐξησις ἔθει γέγονε τοῦ νοσήματος κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς τὸ πρόσω χωροῦντος (*Curios.* 11 = 510d [Helmbold, LCL]).

204K), and creates a three-fold classification of the primary symptoms: 1) destruction of function (ἀπώλεια τῆς ἐνεργείας), 2) damage (βλάβη), and 3) a "turning aside to a difference of form" (εἰς ἑτέραν ἰδέας ἐκτροπήν).¹³⁷ Of the first kind, he mentions dementias (μωρώσεις) and amnesias (λῆθαι). These, says Galen, occur as a consequence of the cooling of the brain, brought about by sudden gathering of phlegm in the cavities of the brain. Of the second kind, the "moderate damages" (αἱ δὲ μέτριαι βλάβαι), Galen lists the "numbnesses of reason and memory" (νάρκαι τοῦ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ τῆς μνήμης), and attributes these to a more gradual, less severe cooling caused by the application or ingestion of cold medicines, or when a cold humor (ψυχρὸς χυμὸς) gathers to the brain.¹³⁸ Of the third kind, "faulty movements of the authoritative capacity" (πλημμελεῖς ὑπάρχουσαι κινήσεις τῆς ἡγεμονικῆς δυνάμεως), also termed deliriums (παραφροσύναι), Galen says that these arise because of abnormal humors or a bad mixture (δυσκρασία) of these in the brain. These are caused not by cold but by heat, sometimes "hot humors" such as yellow bile. Thus, when these deliria are accompanied by fevers, they are called φρενίτιδες, but without them, they are called μανίαι.¹³⁹ In this third category are the "melancholic derangements" (μελαγχολικαὶ παράνοιαι) which produce a variety of "deceitful imaginings" (ὑπουλοὶ¹⁴⁰ φαντασῖαι) all of which, Galen says with a nod to Hippocrates, are related to fear or despair.

Galen presents the notion that various delusions or dementias arise from an imbalance of bodily humors as unremarkable:

It is, at least, not surprising that fears arise through the black bile taking possession of the arche of the rational soul, or depressions or presentiments of death either. For of those

¹³⁷ ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἂν ταύταις τρία τὰ πρῶτα γένη τῶν συμπτωμάτων· ἓν μὲν ἀπώλεια τῆς ἐνεργείας· ἕτερον δὲ βλάβη· τὸ δὲ τρίτον εἰς ἑτέραν ἰδέας ἐκτροπήν (*Caus. symp.* 7.200K)

¹³⁸ αἱ δὲ μέτριαι βλάβαι καὶ οἷον νάρκαι τοῦ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ τῆς μνήμης ἐπὶ βραχυτέρᾳ καταψύξει συμβαίνουσιν (*Caus. symp.* 7.201K).

¹³⁹ καὶ παραφροσύναι δὲ πᾶσαι, πλημμελεῖς ὑπάρχουσαι κινήσεις τῆς ἡγεμονικῆς δυνάμεως, ἐπὶ μοχθηροῖς συνίστανται χυμοῖς ἢ δυσκρασίᾳ τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον (*Caus. symp.* 7.202K).

¹⁴⁰ This term may be applied also to words (cf. Babrius, *Fab.* 44) and to people (cf. LSJ, 1900).

things external to the body, we see nothing so frightening to us as the darkness. Whenever, then, some kind of darkness envelops the rational part of the soul, of necessity a person is always afraid, as he would always be carrying around in the body the reason for his fear. For what happens to us from an external source at a certain time, when the deepest darkness takes hold of the ambient air, so the same thing is stirred up by the melancholic [humours] within and from the body itself, [VII.204K] when either the black bile itself takes hold of the brain, or when some melancholic vapour rises up, just as in the disease called flatulence or hypochondriasis.¹⁴¹

Galen thus describes mental illness as an impairment of the soul's rational faculty, and asserts a striking parity between internal and external causes: just as external, environmental darkness grips us with fear, so too does darkness from black bile or melancholic vapor. The three categories he discusses, each associated with the relative coldness or hotness of particular humors or the color of biles and their effects on the brain, suggest a vivid way of conceptualizing defects of various kinds. It is noteworthy that the language Galen utilizes, that of medical diagnosis, includes various kinds of improper movements or turnings. Medical diagnosis, like its religious counterpart, conceives of health as proper movements and illness as faulty movements (πλημμελεῖς κινήσεις) or a change of form, a turning away from the proper form to another.¹⁴²

F. The Health of the Body and Its Relationship to the Health of the Mind

The belief in psychosomatic reciprocity had important implications for the discourse about therapy and remedy.¹⁴³ In his discussion of the evil eye and extramission theories of vision, smell,

¹⁴¹ τό γε μὴν ἐπὶ τῇ μελαίνῃ χολῇ καταλαμβανούσῃ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς φόβους τε γίνεσθαι καὶ δυσθυμίας καὶ θανάτου προσδοκίας, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος οὐδὲν οὕτως ἡμῖν φοβερόν, ὥς τὸ σκότος. ὅταν οὖν οἷον σκότος τι περιχυθῇ τῷ λογιστικῷ μορίῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀναγκαῖον αἰεὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὥς ἂν αἰεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ φόβου συμπεριφέροντα τῷ σώματι· ὅπερ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔξωθεν γίνεται κατὰ χρόνον τινὰ, βαθυτάτουσκότους καταλαβόντος τὸν πέριξ ἀέρα, τοῦτο τοῖς μελαγχολῶσιν ἔνδοθεν τε καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ὁρμᾶται, καταλαβούσης τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἥτοι τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς αὐτῆς, ἥ τινος ἀναθυμιάσεως ἀτμοῦ μελαγχολικοῦ, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ νοσήματι τῷ φυσῶδει τε καὶ ὑποχονδριακῷ προσαγορευομένῳ (*Caus. sympt.* II, VII.2, 7.203–204K Johnston trans., 264).

¹⁴² See the passage of the *Timaeus* discussed earlier in this chapter.

¹⁴³ See also chapter 6 on this topic.

and sound, Plutarch offers a clear statement on the capacity for the body to be affected by the mind.

Don't you know that the body (τὸ σῶμα) is sympathetically affected (συνδιατίθεναι) when the mind (ἡ ψυχὴ) is subjected to any influence (πάσχειν)? Amorous thoughts (ἐπίνοιαι ἀφροδισίων) will excite the sexual organs; the frenzy of hounds in their struggle with their prey often dims their sight and even blinds them; and pain (λύπαι), greed for gold (φιλαργυρίαι), or jealousy (ζηλοτυπίαι) will cause a man to change colour, and wear away his health. Envy (φθόνος), which naturally roots itself more deeply in the mind (ψυχὴ) than any other passion, contaminates (ἀναμιμπλάναι) the body (σῶμα) too with evil. This is the morbid condition that artists well attempt to render when painting the face of envy.¹⁴⁴

Here Plutarch describes in vivid terms the ill effects that passions have on the body. What is intriguing to note is that in Plutarch's opinion, being healthy in body can actually keeps you from even experiencing μεγάλαι ἐπιθυμίαι: "For the healthy body will not, to any immoderate extent, breed desires that are vehement, intractable, unwonted, and hard to dispossess" (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄγαν τὸ ὑγιαῖνον σῶμα φύσει μεγάλας ἐπιθυμίας οὐδὲ δυσπειθεῖς οὐδ' ἀσυνήθεις οὐδὲ δυσεκβιάστους [*Tu. san.* 127a; Babbitt, LCL]). Keeping the body healthy was at least partially helpful in keeping emotional disease at bay.

This belief is on display in the works of Galen. In his work on hygiene, Galen argues at length regarding the capacity of the mind to be ill-affected by various excessive behaviors.

The habit of the soul (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος) is corrupted (διαφθείρεται)¹⁴⁵ by faulty customs in food and drink and exercise and sights and sounds and music. Therefore the hygienist (τὸν τὴν ὑγιεινὴν μετιόντα) must be skilled in all these, and must not consider that it concerns the philosopher alone to mould the habit of the soul. For to him is assigned above all else

¹⁴⁴ "οὐκ οἶσθ'," ἔφην, "ὅτι πάσχουσ' ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνδιατίθῃσιν; ἐπίνοιαι γὰρ ἀφροδισίων ἐγείρουσιν αἰδοῖα, καὶ θυμοὶ κυνῶν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὰ θηρία γιγνομέναις ἀμίλλαις ἀποσβεννύουσι τὰς ὁράσεις πολλάκις καὶ τυφλοῦσι, λύπαι δὲ καὶ φιλαργυρίαι καὶ ζηλοτυπίαι τὰ χρώματα τρέπουσιν καὶ καταξάινουσι τὰς ἔξεις· ὧν οὐδενὸς ὁ φθόνος ἥττον ἐνδύεσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ πεφυκῶς ἀναμίμπλῃσι καὶ τὸ σῶμα πονηρίας, ἣν οἱ ζωγράφοι καλῶς ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀπομιμεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ φθόνου πρόσωπον ὑπογράφοντες (*Quaest. conv.* 681d-e [Clement & Hoffleit, LCL]).

¹⁴⁵ Green's translation has "impaired" here; I have changed it to corrupted.

the health of the soul (ἡ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγίεια), but to the physician that the body should not easily fall into disease.¹⁴⁶

Integral to Galen's discourse is the notion that balance of the mind, and especially the balance of the humors that are related to it, can be cultivated through proper exercise and diet. Emotions are the immediate byproduct of a disordered life, and constitute the beginning of serious diseases.

For passion, weeping, anger, grief, unnecessary anxiety, and severe insomnia arising from these things kindle fevers and the origins of major diseases are established, just as conversely, an idle mind (ἀργία διανοίας), folly (ἄνοια) and all in all a spiritless soul often produce pallor and atrophies through a weakness (ἀρρώστια) of the innate heat. For it is necessary above all to preserve our innate heat within healthy limits (ἐν ὁροις ὑγιεινοῖς). It is preserved by the occurrence of moderate exercise, not only of the body but also of the soul. Immoderate movements (ἄμετροι κινήσεις) occur in passions, arguments and anger (ἐν διαλογισμοῖς τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμοῖς). Movements that are excessive render the animal more bilious; those that are deficient render the animal more phlegmatic and cold. . . . And every year we make many people, who are diseased in terms of the ethos of the soul (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος), healthy (ὑγιεῖνοι) when we correct the imbalance of movements.¹⁴⁷ (*San. tu.* 1.8 = 6.40–41K)

It is instructive to note that Galen locates the imbalance of bile especially in "immoderate movements in arguments and lusts and anger" (αἱ δ' ἄμετροι κινήσεις ἐν διαλογισμοῖς τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμοῖς), while a deficiency of these produce excess phlegm and coldness.

"Arguments" (διαλογισμοί) and "lusts" (ἐπιθυμίες) are considered by Galen to be the kind of

"immoderate movements" that generate excesses in various humors which in turn cause sickness.

¹⁴⁶ διαφθείρεται δὲ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος ὑπὸ μοχθηρῶν ἐθισμῶν ἐν ἐδέσμασί τε καὶ πόμασι, καὶ γυμνασίοις, καὶ θεάμασι, καὶ ἀκούσμασι, καὶ τῇ συμπάσῃ μουσικῇ. τοῦτων τοίνυν ἀπάντων ἔμπειρον εἶναι χρή τὸν τὴν ὑγιεινὴν μετιόντα, καὶ μὴ νομίζεин, ὡς φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ προσήκει πλάττειν ἥθος ψυχῆς· ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἑτερόν τι μείζον τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγίειαν, ἱατρῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ῥαδίως εἰς νόσους ὑποφέρεσθαι τὸ σῶμα (*San. tu.* 1.8 = 6.40K, trans. Green, with "mind" emended to "soul" for ψυχῇ).

¹⁴⁷ καὶ γὰρ θυμὸς καὶ κλαυθμὸς, καὶ ὀργή, καὶ λύπη, καὶ πλεῖον τοῦ δέοντος φροντίς, ἀγρυπνία τε πολλή ἐπ' αὐτοῖς γινομένη πυρετοὺς ἀνάπτουσι, καὶ νοσημάτων μεγάλων ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸνναντίον ἀργία διανοίας, καὶ ἄνοια, καὶ ψυχὴ παντάπασι ῥάθυμος ἀχροίας τε καὶ ἀτροφίας ἐργάζεται πολλὰς ἀρρώστιας τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμότητος. χρή μὲν γὰρ φυλάττειν παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐν ὁροις ὑγιεινοῖς [6.41] τὴν σύμφυτον ἡμῖν θερμότητα. φυλάττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν συμμέτρων γυμνασίων, οὐ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γινομένων. αἱ δ' ἄμετροι κινήσεις ἐν διαλογισμοῖς τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμοῖς, αἱ μὲν ὑπερβάλλουσαι χολωδέστερον ἀποφαίνουσι τὸ ζῶον, αἱ δ' ἐλλείπουσαι φλεγματικώτερον καὶ ψυχρότερον. . . . καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους δ' ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπους νοσοῦντας ὅσα ἔτη διὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος ὑγιεινοὺς ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἐπανορθωσάμενοι τὴν ἀμετρίαν τῶν κινήσεων (Johnston, LCL).

We will see below that the Pastor, in a similar fashion, characterizes his opponents' excessive intellectual activity as a root cause of various vices.

In his treatise *The Soul's Dependence on the Body* (*Quod Animi Mores Corporis Temperamenta Sequuntur* = *QAM*), Galen reiterates his argument that regimen can greatly affect the acquisition of virtue. He suggests that his opponents should come and allow him to instruct them on their diet, for then their command of ethics would benefit, their intellectual faculties would improve, and their virtue would be affected positively too, due to their greater powers of understanding and memory.

So it would be wise of my opponents—those men who are unhappy at the idea that nourishment has this power to make men more or less temperate, more or less continent, brave or cowardly, soft and gentle or violent and quarrelsome—to come to me even now and receive instruction on their diet. They would derive enormous benefit from this in their command of ethics; and the improvement in their intellectual faculties, too, would have an effect on their virtue, as they acquired greater powers of understanding and memory. Apart from food and drink, I would teach them about winds and mixtures in the ambient air, and places, instructing them which to select and which to avoid.¹⁴⁸

Galen demonstrates how the emotions, the regulation of which were essential to happiness in ancient philosophy, were thought to have physiological ramifications. John Fitzgerald explains that this belief of Galen's was not solely the result of his philosophical principles, but also his practice of medicine.

As a philosopher and ethicist, therefore, Galen was necessarily interested in the emotions, but his activity as a physician also required him to give attention to the emotions, and especially to λύπη. This was because he understood that grief and the other emotions have physiological effects. Basic to Galen's understanding of good health was his theory of the

¹⁴⁸ ὥς σωφρονήσαντες καὶ νῦν γοῦν οἱ δυσχεραίνοντες, τροφήν δύνασθαι τοὺς μὲν σωφρονεστέρους, τοὺς δὲ ἀκολαστοτέρους ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀκρατεστέρους, τοὺς δὲ ἐγκρατεστέρους, καὶ θαρσαλέους, καὶ δειλοὺς, ἡμέρους τε καὶ πρᾶγους, ἐριστικούς τε καὶ φιλονείκους, ἡκέτωσαν πρὸς με μαθησόμενοι, τίνα μὲν ἐσθίειν αὐτοὺς χρή, τίνα δὲ πίνειν. εἷς τε γὰρ τὴν ἡθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὀνήσονται μέγιστα, καὶ πρὸς ταύτη κατὰ τὰς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ δυνάμεις ἐπιδώσουσιν εἰς ἀρετὴν, συνετώτεροι καὶ μνημονικώτεροι γενόμενοι καὶ φιλομαθέστεροι καὶ φρονιμώτεροι. πρὸς γὰρ ταῖς τροφαῖς καὶ τοῖς πόμασι καὶ τοὺς ἀνέμους αὐτοὺς διδάξω, καὶ τὰς τοῦ περιέχοντος κράσεις, ἔτι τε τὰς χώρας, ὁποίας μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι προσήκει, ὁποίας δὲ φεύγειν (*QAM* 10 = 4.808–9K [Singer trans.])

four humours (blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm). These humours or bodily fluids must be in the proper mixture (εὐκρασία) in the human frame for a person to be healthy; if they are not properly mixed (δυσκρασία) and thus not balanced, the consequence of this imbalance is disease and emotional distress.¹⁴⁹

Fitzgerald explains that Galen categorizes λῦπαι, along with exhaustion, insomnia, and worry, as external influences, against which the body, with the four humors well-balanced, is "relatively immune . . . for such bodies 'will automatically be endowed with the best humours of all, and thus will be better able to withstand grief (λύπη), anger, insomnia, worry, rain, drought, plague, and indeed all causes of disease. It is ill-humoured bodies which most readily succumb to such causes, since they are in themselves already near to a state of disease.'"¹⁵⁰

Maintaining balance in the body and the mind was essential for maintaining health in both. The concept of balance underlies much of the Pastor's moral instruction, as is evident not only in his explicit health language but also in his generous use of σωφροσύνη, frequently translated as "moderation," as a desirable virtue.¹⁵¹ He cautions against excess of various kinds (immoderate desires at 1 Tim 5:11, 6:9; 2 Tim 2:22, 3:6, 4:3; Titus 3:3; excessive wine at 1 Tim 3:8, Titus 1:7; emotional excess at 2 Tim 3:2–4; excessive desire for money at 1 Tim 6:9–10; excessive talking at 1 Tim 1:6, 5:13; Titus 1:11), and he castigates community members who "pile up" teachers that can satisfy their immoderate yearnings and desires (2 Tim 4:3). His positive exemplars and idealized lists of behavioral requirements are marked by virtues like of self-control, moderation, and the avoidance of excess or extreme. The Pastor's discourse of health is, similar to the models

¹⁴⁹ John T. Fitzgerald, "Galen's *De Indolentia* in the Context of Greco-Roman Medicine, Moral Philosophy, and Physiognomy," in *Galen's De Indolentia: Essays on a Newly Discovered Letter*, ed. Clare K. Rothschild and Trevor W. Thompson, STAC 88 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 208.

¹⁵⁰ Fitzgerald here cites Galen, *Opt. corp. const.* 3 = 4.743.3-9K ("Galen's *De Indolentia* in the Context of Greco-Roman Medicine, Moral Philosophy, and Physiognomy," 208).

¹⁵¹ Ancient definitions like that of Ps.-Plato emphasize balance as a feature of σωφροσύνη: Σωφροσύνη μετριότης τῆς ψυχῆς περὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένας ἐπιθυμίας τε καὶ ἡδονάς· εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐταξία ψυχῆς πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φύσιν ἡδονάς καὶ λύπας· συμφωνία ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· αὐτοπραγία κατὰ φύσιν· εὐταξία ψυχῆς· λογιστικὴ ὁμιλία ψυχῆς περὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχυρῶν· ἕξις καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων αἰρετικὸς ἐστί καὶ εὐλαβητικὸς ὢν χρή. (*Def.* 411e-412a)

discussed above, undergirded by this principle of balance. Furthermore, he conceives of vice as an exercise in excess, and passages throughout the Pastorals suggest that this vice is characterized with the language of health and sickness. These aspects of the Pastorals render them similar to the kind of moral philosophy examined above and, I argue, provide the basis for a further investigation than has been previously undertaken into the Pastor's indebtedness to these ideas in his depiction of the opponents' vices and aberrant theology.

V. Sick Words, Sick Deeds, Sick Opponents

The Pastor draws upon the medical analogy in multiple ways. Above, we explored the designation "healthy" as applied words and teachings. Below, we shall explore how the Pastor constructs the bodies of the opponents, the body of Christ as the church, and the bodies those who follow the opponents. In chapter four we will examine Timothy's own body and the Pastor's use of it to communicate certain theological ideals and a particular depiction of Paul. In chapters six and seven we will explore in greater detail the Pastor's use of the specifically intellectual organs of the νοῦς and the συνείδησις as sites of disease and decay and theological inflection. Here I demonstrate how the Pastor's polemical program is deeply influenced by the medical analogy. While the existence of the medical analogy in the PE has been widely seen by scholars as a constitutive element of the Pastor's rhetoric, what I contribute here is an appreciation of how the Pastor at times explicitly utilizes and perpetuates the use of the medical analogy and how he at other times presumes a medical analogy as he formulates his criticisms of the various behaviors and words of the opponents and those under their sway. I do this in part by arguing that the Pastor's use of the complaint about excessive research and speculation on the part of his opponents and their

perceived health effects is, as has been insufficiently recognized, also a part of the medical complex.

A. Describing Quality of Speech and Doctrine as Sick

The Pastor attacks the speech of his opponents, though rarely informing readers of what it actually consisted.¹⁵² Through descriptors of "future"¹⁵³ opponents (cf. 2 Tim 3:2; 1 Tim 4:1), we see an emphasis on speech acts: they are "blasphemers" and "slanderers" (2 Tim 3:2–3), and hypocritical liars (cf. ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων in 1 Tim 4:2). Their activity is described as "teaching otherwise" (ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖν 1 Tim 1:3; 6:3), and the objects of their attention, myths and endless genealogies, yield "useless speculations"¹⁵⁴ (ἐκζητήσεις [1 Tim 1:4]; cf. ζητήσεις at 1 Tim 6:4). Moreover, their speech is described as "foolish talk" (ματαιολογία [1 Tim 1:6]; cf. ματαιολόγος [Tit 1:10]). Their "controversies" are deemed "foolish and uneducated" (μωραὶ καὶ ἀπαίδευτοι ζητήσεις at 2 Tim 2:23; cf. μωραὶ ζητήσεις at Tit 3:9).¹⁵⁵ As we shall see below, their λόγος is described as

¹⁵² According to Robert J. Karris, "The Background and Significance of the Polemic of the Pastoral Epistles," *JBL* 92.4 (1973): 553 a focus on verbal disputes and quibbles is one of the seven defining features of the "schema" he argues underlies the Pastor's polemic. While Karris gives a few other ancient examples (553 n. 15), his showcase "parallel" for the philosophical use of polemic against sophists is a text from Clement's *Strom.* 1.2.21.2–3.24.4. What Karris does not point out is that the mass of verbal similarities between the two demonstrates less of a parallel between the Pastor and Clement than a literary dependence upon the Pastor by Clement, which is of import when considering the degree to which later exegetes model their modes of argument on earlier Christian authors, and "Paul" in particular.

¹⁵³ It becomes clear that the Pastor has in mind contemporary persons rather than future ones when he begins to speak of them in the present in 2 Tim 3:6–8. However, he returns to the future tense in 3:9, resuming his "prophecy."

¹⁵⁴ LSJ has simply "research." BDAG tells us that the term is only used in Christian authors. The uncompounded form ζήτησις is more common and denotes inquiry, questioning, research, investigation. In judicial language, it can denote inquiry, suits, or controversies.

¹⁵⁵ The discrediting of an opponent's speech was practiced in school. For instance, the *Progymnasmata* of Theon prescribes the following: "'Contradiction (*antirresis*) is discourse that attacks the credibility of another discourse.' Try to show that the other discourse is obscure, impossible, incredible, deceitful, or inadequate in thought or expression; or, conversely, redundant or lacking vigor, or confused; or that the discourse is contradictory, or departs from what is legal, or unseemly or inexpedient or inopportune; or that the speaker spoke as much against as for himself—what some call turning his argument against himself—, or that the rules of good arrangement are violated, or that the speech was ineffectively delivered" (Trans. by George A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, WGRW 10 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003], 72;); (the Greek text for this

spreading gangrene (2 Tim 2:17), and their speech as a "verbal battle" (λογομαχία [1 Tim 6:4]; cf. λογομαχεῖν at 2 Tim 2:14). The Pastor mentions their "wicked conjectures" (ὑπόνοιαι πονηραί [Tim 6:4]). Indicative of the Pastor's underlying problem with the kind of opponents he depicts is that they are those who "talk back" (οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες [Titus 1:9, 2:9]).¹⁵⁶ The aim of this particular tactic is to depict the opponents' speech as incoherent, irrelevant, and irreverent.¹⁵⁷ The Pastor's depiction of the opponents with these terms is meant to characterize them as depraved and dishonest, as other scholars have recognized. However, I wish to make the further suggestion that the goal of such imagery is to suggest to the audience of the Pastorals that these opponents are in fact sick in a way that transcends merely polemical use of such language; these opponents and those under their sway have indeed been rendered ill through their engagement in excessive research, fractious disputation, and the resulting cultivation of vice.

B. Vice Lists as Symptomologies

The author of the Pastorals exploits a therapeutic conceit also in his use of so-called vice-lists.¹⁵⁸

In the PE, where deviance is depicted as illness and theological rectitude is associated with health,

portion is lost, and the translation is of the Armenian text of Michel Patillon and Giancarlo Bolognesi, eds., *Aelius Théon: Progymnasmata*, Budé., Collection des universités de France [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1997], 111–12).

¹⁵⁶ "Talking back" (ἀντιλέγειν) is described as the disreputable past-time of those who cannot appreciate finely crafted scholarship. Galen, in his treatise *On Black Bile*, praises Rufus of Ephesus for his work *On Melancholy* and, in a comment heavy with suggestion, says about the book that "one might reasonably say that there is nothing lacking for those who listen naturally (κατὰ φύσιν), and don't choose deliberately to contradict in a quarrelsome manner (ἐριστικῶς ἀντιλέγειν)" (καί τις εὐλόγως ἂν φαίη μηδὲν ἐνδεῖν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀκούουσιν, οὐκ ἐριστικῶς ἀντιλέγειν προηρημένοις [Galen, *At. bil.* = 5.104K, my trans.]).

¹⁵⁷ Denouncing logic-chopping was a rhetorical topos (see Seneca, *Ep.* 45.6–10 and Tertullian, *Praesc. haer.* 7, Marcus Aurelius, *Med.* 1.17.9; see Joseph Hugh Crehan, *Embassy for the Christians, The Resurrection of the Dead*, ACW 23 (New York: Newman Press, 1956), 135]. Athenagoras, for example, lambastes "those who reduce syllogisms or explain equivocal terms or trace out etymologies or tell us of synonyms or homonyms, of categories and axioms, of subject and predicate" (*Leg.* 11, trans. Crehan). Johnson, AB, 391, points to Lucian, *Tim.* 9, *Jupp. trag.* 27; Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.1.31; 17.26 to characterize the rivals as those who quarrel over words, quibbles, and contentious wranglings, including obscure jargon.

¹⁵⁸ As J. Albert Harrill points out that 1 Tim 1:9–10 is not a "list of classical vices" so much as a "list of heinous crimes against the law" ("The Vice of Slave Dealers in Greco-Roman Society: The Use of a Topos in 1 Timothy 1:10," *JBL* 118.1 [1999]: 122).

the vice-lists read similarly to a physician's list of symptoms. This may be seen through the convergence of three lines of inquiry: one, into the prevalence of medical imagery in the PE, two, through a recognition that Paul appears as the authoritative purveyor of proper theological and therapeutic advice (see Ch. 4 below), and three, through explicit links between health imagery and the vice-lists crafted by the Pastor himself in each of the Pastorals.

Both vice-lists in 1 Timothy are connected explicitly with the healthy teaching. In 1 Timothy 1, the list of people for whom the law is appointed is set in contrast (cf. ἀντίκειται) to "the healthy teaching that accords with the gospel" (ἡ ὑγιαينوῦσα διδασκαλία κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον): people who are "lawless and insubordinate, impious and sinners, unholy and profane, parricides and matricides, murderers, sexual degenerates, pederasts,¹⁵⁹ human traffickers,¹⁶⁰ liars, perjurers." In 1 Tim 6:4, the one who "teaches otherwise" (ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖ) is explicitly said to be not "adhering to the healthy words" and to be "sick" (νοσεῖν); the sentence culminates in the vice list of 1 Tim 6:5: envy, strife, blasphemies, wicked conjectures, fractious wranglings. As antitheses to the healthy teaching, the vices read as a string of ailments, compounding to present those who exhibit them as morally diseased.

In Titus 1:6–9, the listing of virtues and the corresponding vices to be avoided by the ideal overseer is also framed with reference to "the healthy teaching" (ἡ διδασκαλία ἡ ὑγιαίνουσα).¹⁶¹ The overseer is to be "beyond reproach as a steward of God, neither haughty, nor wrathful, nor given to wine, nor pugnacious, nor in pursuit of shameful gain (ἀνέγκλητον εἶναι ὡς θεοῦ οἰκονόμον, μὴ

¹⁵⁹ On the contested term ἀρσενοκοίτης, which BDAG, 135, glosses as "pederast," see Dale B. Martin, *Sex and the Single Savior: Gender and Sexuality in Biblical Interpretation* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 38–43.

¹⁶⁰ I borrow this translation from Pervo, *The Pastorals and Polycarp*, 33.

¹⁶¹ Quinn, *Titus*, 89 offers an intriguing (if underdeveloped) comment regarding Titus 1:7b: "The list here is more like the ancient physician's list of symptoms for an illness (thus Hippocrates, *Epidemion* 1.19 lists the *orgiloi* among others subject to the plague). A catalog of observable phenomena that de facto signal health or disease is the purpose of such a list; explanation and analysis belong to a later stage."

αὐθάδη, μὴ ὀργίλον, μὴ πάροινον, μὴ πλήκτην, μὴ αἰσχροκερδῆ¹⁶²). The Pastor argues that he must not be marked by these vices "in order that he might be able both to exhort in the healthy teaching and to refute those who talk back" (ἵνα δυνατὸς ᾖ καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῇ ὑγιαίνουσῃ καὶ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας¹⁶³ ἐλέγχειν).¹⁶⁴

While the vice-list of 2 Tim 3:2–4 is not explicitly set in contrast to health imagery, in light of the connection between vice and illness developed by the Pastor, the threat of end-times vices (2 Tim 3:1–9) may be read as an eschatological prognosis, developed by the Pastor to warn against the times of sickness yet to come.¹⁶⁵

1 Now know this: in the last days wicked times shall commence; 2 for there will be people who are lovers of themselves, lovers of money, braggarts, haughty individuals, blasphemers, people disobedient to their parents, ungracious, unholy, 3 heartless, implacable, slanderous, powerless to control themselves, savage, without love for what is good, 4 traitorous, reckless, deluded, lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God, 5 having a form of piety but denying its power. Keep away from these people. (2 Tim 3:1–5)¹⁶⁶

Within the broader context of 2 Tim 3:1–9, this vice list perpetuates the image of the opponents as those who suffer from psychosomatic ailments (cf. τετυφώμενοι, κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν, ἄνοια at 3:8–9). Similarly, the "little women" (γυναικάρια) who follow them are "driven by various lusts" (ἀγόμενα ἐπιθυμίαις ποικίλαις [3:6]).

¹⁶² Ptolemy, *Tetr.* 3.14–15, deals with the nature and passions of the soul and is replete with astrological readings of character and accompanying diagnoses, including madness, wrathfulness, etc. They read very much like medical diagnoses.

¹⁶³ For the use of ἀντιλέγειν to describe philosophical disputation/quarreling between sects, see Lucian, *Herm.* 11 (περὶ ὧν ἐκεῖνοι εἰώθασι ἀντιλέγειν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς).

¹⁶⁴ The vice-list of Titus 3:3 aims to describe the delusion and deception of life before "the goodness and philanthropy of God our Savior appeared" (ἡ χρηστότης καὶ ἡ φιλάνθρωπία ἐπεφάνη τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν θεοῦ). It is thus not explicitly linked to health imagery.

¹⁶⁵ Saarinen, BTCB, 151, rightly suggests that "the list of vices in 3:2–4 is not only slander or a catalogue of vices, but also a diagnostic list."

¹⁶⁶ 2Tim. 3:1 Τοῦτο δὲ γίνωσκε, ὅτι ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις ἐνστήσονται καιροὶ χαλεποί. 2 ἔσονται γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι φίλαντοι φιλάργυροι ἀλαζόνες ὑπερήφανοι βλάβητοι, γονεῦσιν ἀπειθεῖς, ἀχάριστοι ἀνόσοι 3 ἄστοργοι ἄσπονδοι διάβολοι ἀκρατεῖς ἀνήμεροι ἀφιλάγαθοι 4 προδόται προπετεῖς τετυφωμένοι, φιλήδονοι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόθεοι, 5 ἔχοντες μόρφωσιν εὐσεβείας τὴν δὲ δύναμιν αὐτῆς ἡρνημένοι· καὶ τούτους ἀποτρέπου.

These lists sound quite similar to contemporary authors' listings of vice as illness.¹⁶⁷ Cicero recounts the Stoic definition of "sickness of soul" (*animi aegrotatio*) as "an intense belief, persistent and deeply rooted, which regards a thing that is not desirable as though it were eminently desirable" (*opinionem vehementem de re non expetenda, tamquam valde expetenda sit, inhaerentem et pensitus insitam*). He goes on to enumerate subdivisions of "sickness" in a manner that resonates with the enumerations of vices to which an opponent might be subject: "avarice, ambition, love of women, stubbornness, love of good living, intoxication, daintiness and anything similar" (*avaritia, ambitio, mulierositas, pervicacia, ligurratio, vinolentia, cuppedia et si qua similia*).¹⁶⁸ The final clause "and anything similar" (*et si qua similia*) captures the same open-ended conclusion to the list of 1 Tim 1:10, "and anything else" (καὶ εἴ τι ἕτερον) that is contrary to the healthy teaching. Plutarch likens the task of administering moral instruction to the physician's task of treating the sick, symptoms including "slanders . . . rage and envy and malignant dispositions and jealous rivalries with enmity" (βλασφημίαι . . . ὀργαὶ καὶ φθόνοι καὶ κακοήθειαι καὶ ζηλοτυπία μετὰ δυσμενείας). He warns against being "much provoked by their passions and illnesses" (συνεκπικραίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐκείνων πάθεσι καὶ νοσήμασιν), since that "is not rational" (οὐκ εὐλόγως), and not to "get infected with the vices of others" (ἀλλοτρίων ἀναμιμπλάναι κακῶν). Rather, one should be "measured" (μέτριος) and "gentle" (ἥπιος),¹⁶⁹ descriptors that bring to mind the Pastor's own stated ideals for the "slave of the Lord" (δοῦλος κυρίου) in 2 Tim 2:24, that he "not fight" (οὐ μάχεσθαι) but "be gentle toward all" (ἥπιον εἶναι πρὸς πάντας), and for believers in general in Titus 3:2, that they be "non-combative" (ἀμάχους), "moderate" (ἐπιεκεῖς),

¹⁶⁷ Harrill provides the source citations (though without further analysis), commenting that "the Greco-Roman catalogues that stand closest to the one in 1 Timothy [1:9–10] are those occurring in a discussion of either health or the law." Harrill argues, however, that the discussion of law and vice is more pertinent, as in, e.g., Heraclitus, *Ep.* 7 ("The Vice of Slave Dealers in Greco-Roman Society," 122).

¹⁶⁸ Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.11.26 (King, LCL).

¹⁶⁹ *Tranq. an.* 7 (468b-d). Cf. Horace, *Ep.* 1.1.33–40.

"demonstrating all gentleness toward all people" (πᾶσαν ἐνδεικνυμένους πραΰτητα πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

C. Pain (1 Tim 6:9–10)

An important part of the Pastor's depiction of his opponents as diseased by vice is his articulation of the pain they suffer on account of their deviance. The opponents' suffering is poignantly expressed in 1 Tim 6:9–10. This constitutes perhaps the most vivid portrayal of the opponents' bodily suffering as a result of their error.

9 But those who want to be wealthy fall into trial and snare and many irrational and harmful lusts, which plunge people into ruin and destruction. 10 For the love of money, which some have desperately yearned for and have been mislead away from the faith and pierced themselves with many pains, is a root of all evils. (1 Tim 6:9–10)¹⁷⁰

The evils of wealth are a traditional topic in ancient moral discourse.¹⁷¹ Those who have been consumed by the desire for money "have been mislead away from the faith and pierced themselves with many pains" (ἀπεπλανήθησαν ἀπὸ τῆς πίστεως καὶ ἑαυτοὺς περιέπειραν ὀδύναις πολλαῖς).¹⁷² Given the emphasis on a departure from "the faith," this verse conveys the idea that pain and suffering are part of the sickness produced by false teaching and greed (cf. νοσεῖν at 1 Tim 6:3–4). In the Pastor's theologized disease etiology, it is the logical outcome when one ventures away from the

¹⁷⁰ 9 οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι πλουτεῖν ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς πειρασμὸν καὶ παγίδα καὶ ἐπιθυμίας πολλὰς ἀνοήτους καὶ βλαβεράς, αἵτινες βυθίζουσιν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς ὄλεθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν. 10 ῥίζα γὰρ πάντων τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ φιλαργυρία, ἧς τινες ὀρεγόμενοι ἀπεπλανήθησαν ἀπὸ τῆς πίστεως καὶ ἑαυτοὺς περιέπειραν ὀδύναις πολλαῖς.

¹⁷¹ For instance, see [Apollonius], *Ep.* 35, where Apollonius argues that that ἀρετή is opposed to χρήματα. For discussion of the sources, see Korinna Zamfir, "The Love of Money Is the Root of All Evils: Wealth and the Well-to-Do in 1 Timothy," in *The Bible and Economics: The Poor and the Rich in Biblical Texts. International Biblical Conference XXV. 22nd-24th August 2013* (Szeged: JATEPress, 2014), 420–21; Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19. Part II"; Abraham J. Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19. Part I," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959-2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1.507–34.

¹⁷² Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 514, suggest that the plural form ὀδύναι accentuates the fact of the pain, but Hauck, "ὀδὺνη κτλ.," *TDNT* 5.115, argues more convincingly that the term occurs commonly in the plural because this kind of sensation is often felt individually (and, we presume, repeatedly).

healthy teaching, here exemplified by their inordinate and misdirected affection for pecuniary gain.

The discussion of the opponents' deviance in 1 Tim 6:3–10 is helpfully illuminated by the contemporary philosophical discourses on mental illness, of which the love of money is a particular kind.¹⁷³ As we noted above, for Stoics, sicknesses of the soul result from persistent misjudgments.¹⁷⁴ These false opinions might result in a desire for something that is undesirable, or an aversion to something that is in fact desirable. The Pastor highlights what he perceives to be the opponents' misjudgment regarding εὐσέβεια, saying that they think it is a mechanism for monetary gain, a πορισμός (6:6). This "desire to be wealthy" (βουλόμενοι πλουτεῖν) leads to "temptation" (πειρασμός, forming a neat and sonorous contrast with πορισμός), a "snare" (παγίς), and "many irrational and harmful desires" (ἐπιθυμίαι πολλαὶ ἀνοήτοι καὶ βλαβεραί).¹⁷⁵

The mechanics of this process, the means by which this vice sickens and causes pain to the opponents, is expressed in language derived from the medical terminology used by moral philosophers and rhetoricians. Ps.-Longinus, writing in the latter half of the first century CE,

¹⁷³ Malherbe too argues that the application of mental illness imagery to the desire for money derives from contemporary philosophers, such as Plutarch (*Cupid. divit.* 524c–e). Malherbe writes that "the remedy for this malady is the philosopher's psychagogic treatment, by which he soothes the inflammation of the soul and cures it of vices by means of education and reason, as he adapts his ministrations in timely fashion to the varying conditions of the moral patient" (Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19. Part I," 520). And yet, he argues, incorrectly in my judgment, that the imagery of the Pastorals is solely polemical, comparing them to harsh Cynics: "Like the harsh Cynic, [the PE] hold out no prospect for improvement or effective psychagogy" (Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19. Part I," 521). However, this discourse on wealth and its dangers is concluded by Pauline instruction of the kind of admonition (cf. παράγγελλε at 6:17) Timothy is to present to "those who are wealthy in the present age" (οἱ πλούσιοι ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι), which would suggest that even with those corrupted by a love of money, engagement and teaching is possible.

¹⁷⁴ Cicero's discussion in *Tusc.* 4.24 recounts a two-fold distinction between νοσήματα (*morbi*) and ἀρρωστήματα (*aegrotationes*), and the collisions denoting their opposites (*offensiones*). George B. Kerferd argues that Cicero neither combines accounts nor is confused in his recounting of Stoic doctrine, as some readings of the evidence presented by Stobaeus have suggested (George B. Kerferd, "Two Problems Concerning Impulses," in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, ed. William W. Fortenbaugh, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 1 [New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983], 88–93).

¹⁷⁵ 1 Tim 6:9.

writes of the war (πόλεμος) of passions (πάθη) against daily life: "It is the love of money (φιλοχρηματία), that insatiable sickness from which we all now suffer, and the love of pleasure, that enslave us, or rather one might say, sink our ship of life with all hands; for love of gold is a withering sickness, and love of pleasure utterly ignoble."¹⁷⁶ Plutarch writes that "wealth" (ὁ πλοῦτος) "infects (ἐμπέπληκεν) us with a desire (ἐπιθυμία) for gold and silver and ivory and emeralds and hounds and horses, diverting our appetite (ὄρεξις) from the necessities of life to what is difficult, rare, hard to procure, and useless."¹⁷⁷ Similarly, the Pastor imagines that the "love of money" (φιλαργυρία),¹⁷⁸ in concert with excessive desire (cf. ὀρέγεσθαι and ἐπιθυμῖαι), is productive of self-inflicted wounds, an image of which is conjured by the terminology of piercing or puncture (περιπείρειν).¹⁷⁹ The term ὀδύνη is used for intense pain of a variety of kinds,¹⁸⁰ and the use of the phrase produces an image of severe bodily trauma, even though the precise location

¹⁷⁶ ἡ γὰρ φιλοχρηματία, πρὸς ἣν ἅπαντες ἀπλήστως ἤδη νοσοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ φιληδονία δουλαγωγούσι, μᾶλλον δέ, ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις, καταβυθίζουσιν αὐτάνδρους ἤδη τοὺς βίους· φιλαργυρία μὲν <γὰρ> νόσημα μικροποιόν, φιληδονία δ' ἀγεννέστατον (*Subl.* 44.6 [Fyfe rev. Russell, LCL]). Cf. Zamfir, "Love of Money," 420–21.

¹⁷⁷ Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 523f (Einarson & De Lacy, LCL). In the same treatise (524c-e), Plutarch suggests that the "disease" (πάθος) of the man who has more than he needs but still wants more is "insatiable desire" (ἀπληστία) and "love of riches" (φιλοπλουτία). He is sick with "psychic poverty" (πενία ψυχική). This latter passage is discussed by Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19. Part I," 520.

¹⁷⁸ The idea that the "love of money is the root of all evils" is proverbial, and oft-expressed by philosophers and other authors, see Bion the Sophist *apud* Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.* 6.50, Diodorus Siculus, *Bib. hist.* 21.1, Democritus *apud De Gnomologio Vaticano inedito* 265, Apollodorus Comicus in *Philadelph.* frag. 4, Pseudo-Phocylides 42, and Philo, *Spec. leg.* 4.65, *Sib.* 8.17 (cited by Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 85 n. 18). To this list we can add the Cynic Epistle from Diogenes, *Ep.* 50, 22–23, which defines "lust for money" (χρημάτων ἐπιθυμία) as the "cause of every evil" (πάσης κακίας ἐστὶν αἰτία). Similarly, in a progymnastic exercise in invective against wealth (Ψόγος πλούτου), Libanius suggests that the wealth is "the greatest evil for those who have it" (μέγιστον τοῖς ἔχουσι κακόν), and that the "mother of wealth" (μητὴρ πλούτου) is "greed" (πλεονεξία) (*Progymn.* Invective 5.1, 4).

¹⁷⁹ LSJ, 1382, suggests that the term can be used for being put on a spit (Plutarch, *Galb.* 27), being impaled (Diodorus Siculus, *Bib. hist.* 19.84), being pierced with swords and spears (Diodorus Siculus, *Bib. hist.* 16.80), or being hooked like fish (Aelius Aristides, *Noc. Att.* 15.10).

¹⁸⁰ Hauck, "ὀδύνη κτλ.," *TDNT* 5.115. It is commonly used to describe severe and sudden pain due to a wound or bone fracture, and is felt as stabbing, piercing, or cutting. It is also used in Plato's *Protagoras* (354a-b) to describe the pain caused by the physician's surgical cutting, cautery, administration of drugs or treatment by abstaining from food (τάς ὑπὸ τῶν ἱατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεων τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακεῶν καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν γιγνομένας [cited by Hauck, "ὀδύνη κτλ.," *TDNT* 5.115 n. 2]). The terminology of pain here used (ὀδύναι) occurs also by Paul at Rom 9:2 to express his anguish over his fellow Ἰσραηλῖται.

of that pain is not expressed.¹⁸¹ The opponents' piercing of themselves, especially as a result of their *desires* (ἐπιθυμίας), makes sense in light of ancient philosophical-medical discourses about the painful effects of the πάθη.

In much of the philosophical literature leading up to the Imperial period, πάθη and ἐπιθυμίας were often linked to and identified with pains and ailments.¹⁸² Intense, overweening desire, indicated here by both ὀρέγεσθαι and ἐπιθυμίας, constitutes a form of illness more broadly in Greek and Roman culture as well.¹⁸³ For our purposes, what is significant is the corporeality presupposed or conjured here by the Pastor: these opponents cause themselves pain in their very selves. In 1 Tim 6:9 these ἐπιθυμίας are designated as "harmful" or "damaging" (βλαβεραί), a description that is paired by Plutarch with νοσώδη ("sick") to describe πάθη.¹⁸⁴ The tense relationship between body and soul is depicted as a contest between two warring parties, with one or the other gaining the other hand. Either can initiate "lusts" (ἐπιθυμίας) for certain pleasures (ἡδοναί), but in Plutarch's treatise on hygiene, Zeuxippus depicts those that originate with the soul as being especially perverse and harmful.

But when the case is reversed, and the desires descend from the mind to the body (ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα κατιούσας ἐπιθυμίας) and force it to be subservient to the mind's emotions, and to join in their excitements, there is no way to prevent their leaving as a residue the most violent and serious injuries as the aftermath of feeble and evanescent pleasures. Least of all ought the body (τὸ σῶμα) to be stirred to pleasures (πρὸς ἡδονὰς κινητέον) by the mind's desire (ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμία), since such an origin is unnatural (παρὰ φύσιν). Just as

¹⁸¹ In the LXX it is used predominately to describe intense grief of the soul (Gen 44:31; Ps 12:2; 30:10; with θλίψις at 106:39; with λύπη and στεναγμός at Isa 35:10; 51:11. ὁδυνᾶν has the sense of being "sick at heart" (cited by Hauck, *TDNT*, 5.115).

¹⁸² For instance, at *Phaedr.* 231d, those who are afflicted with passion (ἐπιθυμία) are said to be "sick rather than in a right mind" (νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σωφρονεῖν).

¹⁸³ John J. Winkler writes that "the belief runs deeply through ancient medicine, social practice, and literature that intense desire is a diseased state affecting the soul and the body, an illness that up to a point can be discerned and analyzed but that is remarkably difficult to treat" ("The Constraints of Eros," in *Magika Hiera: Ancient Greek Magic and Religion*, ed. Christopher A. Faraone and Dirk Obbink [New York: Oxford University Press, 1991], 222). Winkler here discusses the ill-effects of ἔρως, but the same could be said of the accompanying phenomena of ἐπιθυμίας.

¹⁸⁴ *Curios.* 515c.

tickling the arm-pits so affects the mind as to produce laughter which is not natural, or even mild or happy, but convulsive and harsh, so whatsoever pleasures the body achieves through being prodded and disturbed by the mind are deranging and disturbing and foreign to Nature (ἐκστατικάι καὶ ταρακτικάι αὐται καὶ ἀλλότριαι τῆς φύσεώς εἰσιν).¹⁸⁵ (*Tu. san.* 125c)

In this passage we see a striking similarity with 1 Tim 6:9–10 in terms of how desires and passions are thought to operate in the body and soul. Though this passage from Plutarch does not have as its focus a particular vice, such as φιλαργυρία (1 Tim 6:10), the interior mechanics and relationships between the active elements is much the same. When desires (ἐπιθυμῖαι), described as "feeble and enfeebling"¹⁸⁶ (ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀμαυραί), come from the soul to bother the body they force subservience (ὕπηρετεῖν; cf. δουλεύειν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς at Tit 3:3) to the πάθη and cause the most excessive and greatest harms (βλάβαι; cf. ἐπιθυμῖαι . . . βλαβεραί at 1 Tim 6:10). The resulting image of the opponents is meant to be a deterrent to those foolish enough to follow: they are wracked with pain on account of their excessive desires, sickened by their own mistaken estimations of the value of money.

The treatise by Philodemus, *On Property Management* (περὶ οἰκονομίας), provides some much-needed perspective on how the excessive desire for wealth causes pain. In it, Philodemus attempts to give Epicurean advice on the acquisition and management of wealth.

Indeed, I think that the right management of wealth lies in this: in not feeling distressed about what one loses¹⁸⁷ and in not [trapping oneself on treadmills] because of an obsessive

¹⁸⁵ τὰς δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα κατιούσας ἐπιθυμίας καὶ καταβιαζομένας τοῖς ἐκείνης ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ συνεξάνιστασθαι πάθεσιν οὐδεμία μηχανὴ τὸ μὴ σφοδρότατας βλάβας καὶ μεγίστας ἐφ' ἡδοναῖς ἀσθενέσι καὶ ἀμαυραῖς ἐναπολιπεῖν. ἥκιστα δὲ ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμία σῶμα πρὸς ἡδονὰς κινητέον· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεται. καὶ καθάπερ αἱ τῶν μασχαλῶν ψηλαφήσεις οὐκ ἴδιον οὐδὲ πρᾶον οὐδ' ἴλεων γέλωτα τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχουσιν ἀλλ' εἰκότα σπασμῷ καὶ χαλεπὸν, οὕτω πάλιν ὅσας τὸ σῶμα νυττόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονὰς ἴσχει καὶ ταραττόμενον, ἐκστατικάι καὶ ταρακτικάι αὐται καὶ ἀλλότριαι τῆς φύσεώς εἰσιν (Babbitt, LCL).

¹⁸⁶ For these two glosses, see LSJ, 256, s.v. ἀσθενής, A.3 and 78, s.v. ἀμαυρός A.III.

¹⁸⁷ This is a handy summation of Galen's recently discovered treatise *Peri Alupias*, which deals primarily with how one can unperturbed by loss, in Galen's case, an incredible amount of books, medicines, and rare spices. See the important recent collection of essays in Clare K. Rothschild and Trevor W. Thompson, eds., *Galen's De Indolentia: Essays on a Newly Discovered Letter*, STAC 88 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014).

[zeal] concerning the more and the less. For the pain (πόνος) involved in the [acquisition] of wealth consists both in eking out [a profit for oneself] and in agonizing over one's losses on the grounds that they will bring one directly into pain (ἀλγηδών), whether present or expected. But if one has removed from oneself such difficulties and does not eagerly desire to amass (σωρεύειν) and make one's property as great as possible and, moreover, does not procure for oneself those resources that wealth offers by oneself watching painfully (δυσχερῶς) over one's possessions or [by collecting] them in rich abundance, [as a result of this] a readiness for acquisition would become indistinguishable from one's readiness to share things very much on one's own initiative. (*Oec.* col. 14.23–15.3)¹⁸⁸

One cause of distress arising from the acquisition of wealth pertains to "an exchange of arguments that requires a lot of disputes" (κοινωνήμα λόγων δεόμενον πολλῶν ἀγώνων).¹⁸⁹ In Philodemus's opinion, the wise man (σοφὸς ἀνὴρ) does not engage in such pursuits, because they throw the hedonic calculus awry: they bring more pain than pleasure. Therefore, he will seek to preserve wealth for "toils that are great and are not such as to be exchanged for any quantity of wealth" (μεγάλους ὑπομένειν πό[ν]ους καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀλλακτούς). Philodemus is careful to note, however, that a moderate person (σώφρων ἀνὴρ), "whose way of life is moderate and communal and whose reasoning doctrine is healthy and true" (βίος μέτριός τε καὶ κοινὸς καὶ λόγος ὑγιής καὶ ἀληθινός), does not hesitate to procure for himself the measure of wealth he deems appropriate for himself.¹⁹⁰ The Pastor's depiction of excessive desire for money as a painful enterprise is thus very much at home in the Greco-Roman philosophical discourse of pain, πάθη, and wealth. The immoderate pursuit of wealth, which can entail engagement in pleasure-sapping and pain-producing arguments and disagreements, can cause psychosomatic harm. While the topic of

¹⁸⁸ Τῷ γὰρ μὴ λυ[πε]ῖσθαι τ[ῷ] παραπολλυμέν[ω] μὴδὲ διὰ τὴν ἄκρατον σ[που]δὴν περὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ το[ῦ]λατ[τ]ον ὑφ' αὐ[τ]οῦ ζητρίοις τισὶν ἐ[γκ]εῖσθαι, τούτω[ι] γ' ὁ[ρ]θῶς οἰκο[νο]μεῖσθαι νομίζω τὸν πλοῦ[τ]ον ὁ [γ]ὰρ κατὰ τὴν κτῆ[ι]ν π[ό]νος [κάν] τῷ προ[σφορ]ὰν ἔλκειν ἑαυ[τῷ] γίνετ[αι] καὶ τῷ περὶ τῶν ἐλαττ[ωμάτ]ων ἀγωνιᾶν ὡς εὐθέ[ως] εἰς ἀλγηδόν[α] κ[α]τ[α]στησόντων ἢ παροῦσαν ἢ προσδοκωμένην. Ἄν δέ τις περι[έ]λη[ι] ἑαυτοῦ τὰς τοι[α]ύτας [δ]υσχερείας καὶ μὴ [σ]ωρεύειν ἐπιβάλλ[η]ται καὶ ποιεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν ὅτι μεγίστην, μὴδ' ἦν ὁ πλο[ῦ]τος ἐξουσίαν παρέχει τα[ύ]την παρασκευάζ[η]ται τῷ δ[υ]σχερῶς αὐτὸς [τ]ὰ χρήματα φυλάττειν ἢ συνάγε[ιν] λιπαρῶς, ἀπαρά[λλακτος] γίνοιτ' ἂν διὰ [ταῦτα] ἐτοιμότης τῆς κτήσεως τῇ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ κοινωνούσῃ. (Tsouna text & trans.).

¹⁸⁹ *Oec.* Col. 15.13–14 (Tsouna text & trans.). This may refer, for example, to disputes about contracts or other business negotiations that could become contentious.

¹⁹⁰ *Oec.* Col. 16.8–10 (Tsouna text & trans.).

debate may differ, the excessive nature of these debates and discussions represents the pain with which the Pastor describes his opponents as piercing themselves.

D. Progress as Diagnostic Indicator

Once one recognizes the Pastor's pattern of depicting his opponents as ill, further evidence may be interpreted in concert with the medical imagery. For instance, when he comments on the opponents' failure to make progress (opponents "advance" but not in the right direction [2 Tim 2:16; 3:9, 13]; cf. Timothy's *προκοπή* at 1 Tim 4:15), this is itself part and parcel of the philosophical therapy practiced by contemporaries.¹⁹¹ The discourse of progress and the likening of those making progress to the healthy or those lacking it as sick was important for philosophers and physicians like Galen as well. Galen, critiquing Posidonius, offers a refined list of categories in which the medical analogy is, in his mind, properly applied: "If he were making a correct comparison he should say that the minds of good men are in a similar state to bodies immune to diseases, whether or not there are any such bodies, for the investigation of that question is superfluous to our proposed image; the minds of those who progress in virtue are like robust bodies, the minds of average men like healthy bodies without being robust, those of the majority of imperfect men like bodies sick at a slight cause, minds of men enraged or in a temper or completely settled in some emotion like bodies already sick."¹⁹² In Galen's reformulation, οἱ

¹⁹¹ For Plutarch's diagnosis of moral progress, see Richard A. Wright, "Plutarch on Moral Progress," in *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies (London: Routledge, 2008), 142–6.

¹⁹² ἐχρῆν γάρ, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς εἵκαζε, τὰς μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχὰς ὁμοίως ἔχειν φάναι τοῖς ἀπαθέσι σώμασιν, εἴτ' οὖν ἔστιν τινὰ τοιαῦτα, περιττὸν γὰρ ὡς πρὸς τὴν προκειμένην εἰκόνα διασκέπτεσθαι τοῦτο, τὰς δὲ τῶν προκοπτόντων τοῖς εὐεκτικοῖς, τὰς δὲ τῶν μετρίων ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσι χωρὶς εὐεξίας, τὰς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ φαύλων τοῖς ἐπὶ σμικρᾷ προφάσει νοσοῦσι, τὰς δὲ τῶν ὀργιζομένων ἢ θυμουμένων ἢ ὅλως ἐν πάθει τινὶ καθεστῶτων τοῖς ἤδη νοσοῦσιν (Galen, *PHP* 5.2.8–9 = CMG 5.4.1.2, 1:296, ed. De Lacy). Trans by | Kidd, & Fortenbaugh, 1983 |109 | |zu:882809:FSJV7JKC} Kidd (110) points to Seneca, *Ep.* 72.6–11 for a similar list.

προκόπτοντες is a designation for a particular kind of group within a spectrum of moral progress plotted between poles of robustly healthy and already sick.

In identifying someone as making progress (1 Tim 4:13) or failing to make progress (2 Tim 2:14, 3:7, 3:10), the Pastor is rendering a diagnosis of their moral health. The opponents' "progress in impiety" (2 Tim 2:16) is linked to the medical image of their λόγος having a spread like gangrene (2 Tim 2:17). The opponents' mental illness (ἄνοια) in 2 Tim 3:8 is related to their lack of moral progress (2 Tim 3:7). Timothy is presented as the proper example of moral health when Paul urges him to continue his practice and exercises (1 Tim 4:13, 15), "in order that your progress might be evident to all" (ἵνα σου ἡ προκοπὴ φανερὰ ᾖ πᾶσιν). These simple yet evocative connections in the Pastorals between the discourse of progress and illness or relative health are rooted in ancient philosophical discussions, and would likely have been identifiable as such, at least for the earliest readers familiar with the popularization of philosophical ideas occurring in the marketplaces and lecture halls of the likes of a Dio Chrysostom or an Epictetus. The opponents' backwards progress suggests that the Pastor imagines his opponents as sick indeed, and in desperate need of therapy.

E. Wicked Suppositions

The Pastor characterizes the "wicked conjectures" (ὑπόνοιαι πονηραί)¹⁹³ of the opponents in 1 Tim 6:4 (in addition to φθόνος, ἔρις, διαπαρατριβαί, and βλασφημίαι) as part of the diseased epiphenomena associated with the opponents' verbal combat. The term ὑπόνοια can signify 1) the type of interpersonal slander that we might translate as "insinuation" or "innuendo"¹⁹⁴ or

¹⁹³ BDAG, 1040, offers "suspicion, conjectures."

¹⁹⁴ Marshall, ICC, 641, points to Simpson, 83, for the possible translation "innuendo."

"imputation,"¹⁹⁵ 2) an "opinion or conjecture based on slight evidence" that we might translate as "suspicion" or "conjecture,"¹⁹⁶ or 3) a "covert meaning" or "deeper sense" of a thing that might be accessed via myths or allegories.¹⁹⁷ Scholars have tended to interpret ὑπόνοια πονηραί of 1 Tim 6:4 in the first sense of the term, implying that the opponents engaged in malicious insinuations against "Paul" and his followers.¹⁹⁸ The proximity to βλασφημῖαι has been taken to mean that ὑπόνοιαι should be interpreted as a variation on interpersonal slander. However, I disagree with the notion that these ὑπόνοιαι are meant to be insinuations. Instead, I argue that they should be understood more in line with the second meaning, that of being an "opinion or conjecture based on slight evidence."¹⁹⁹

In favor of this argument is the fact that this mention of ὑπόνοια is sandwiched by phrases suggesting that the rational capacities of the opponents are compromised (6:4 τετύφωται, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος [6:4]; νομιζόντων πορισμὸν εἶναι τὴν εὐσέβειαν [6:5]): "he is deluded, knowing nothing . . . they think that piety is for profit." While the term ὑπόνοια certainly can pertain to

¹⁹⁵ LSJ, 1890, s.v. ὑπόνοια, I.2.

¹⁹⁶ Thus BDAG, 1040.

¹⁹⁷ LSJ, 1890, s.v. ὑπόνοια, II.

¹⁹⁸ Mounce suggests that its association (at least proximity) with βλασφημία suggests that what is constituted here are "the evil suspicions about people that arise because of slanderous statements" (Mounce, WBC, 339); cf. Marshall, ICC, 641. Dibelius & Conzelmann, Hermeneia, 83 have "false suspicions"; Collins, NTL, 156 has "malicious suspicions"; Johnson, AB, 291, has "evil suspicions"; Gourgues, CbNT, 211, "soupçons mauvais"; Neudorfer, HTA, 213, has "üble Verdächtigungen"; Hébert Roux has "les intentions malveillantes" (Hébert Roux, *Les Épîtres Pastorales: Commentaire de I et II Timothée et Tite* [Genève: Éditions Labor et fides, 1959], 96). Somewhat ambiguously, Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 493, translates the phrase as "vicious insinuations" but then suggests that this verse speaks of "human conjectures." We find a representative sentiment in Behm (*TDNT*, 4.1018 s.v., νοέω κ.τ.λ.): "In the list of vices in 1 Tim. 6:4f., which depicts the terrible effects of the pathological penchant of false teachers for debate and wordy warfare, ὑπόνοια πονηραί, alongside βλασφημῖαι, are wicked intrigues and common insinuations which in the disputes, moving from the material aspect to the personal, they raise against their opponents in an attempt to discredit them in every possible way and to magnify themselves."

¹⁹⁹ While the term βλασφημεῖν and its cognates are used in the PE to convey the idea of malicious discrediting (1 Tim 6:1, Tit 2:5, 3:2), it also bears heavy theological freight at other times (1 Tim 1:3, 20; 2 Tim 3:2). Thus, βλασφημῖαι in 1 Tim 6:4 are just as readily understood as illustrating the kinds of erroneous beliefs or statements about God as they are interpersonal slanders. Coming after the stereotyped pair φθόνος and ἔρις does not mitigate this possibility, since the goal of the phrase ἐξ ὧν γίνεται is to suggest the multiplicity of undesirable effects produced by pathological inquiry and "wordy warfare" (Behm's phrase). Thus, while the pairing of βλασφημῖαι with ὑπόνοιαι may suggest a conceptual continuity, I suggest that this continuity pertains to ὑπόνοιαι being misguided and erroneous forms of conjecture rather than malicious slander.

interpersonal insinuations,²⁰⁰ it is also used to convey the idea of sickened conjecture or speculation.²⁰¹ In 1 Tim 6:4, these ὑπόνοιαι are characterized as πονηραί, a term may carry both moral and medical undertones. It was a favorite term to describe demonic spirits and the devil,²⁰² and was also employed in the political rhetoric of ancient Athens and later Roman literature in invective caricatures of those deemed to be of lower status. It pertained not only to low status, but to the moral, social, and physical attributes encoded in such a designation.²⁰³ The term is also associated with disease in the New Testament and well beyond by virtue its connection with the so-called "evil eye" (Matt 6:23; Luke 11:34).²⁰⁴ David Rosenbloom notes the association of the term with disease in medical literature, observing that medical writers used πονηρός "for every sort of diseased condition and sign of disease, linking the term specifically with a lack of purification or purity."²⁰⁵ The "wicked conjectures" of the opponents are depicted by the Pastor as an indicator of his opponents' sickened state.

²⁰⁰ Cf. Demosthenes, *Or.* 48.36, 39.

²⁰¹ *Ep. Arist.* 316; Josephus, *BJ* 1.227; Chrysippus, Fr. 131 (II, 41, 16f. von Arnim): ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπόν[ο]ια καὶ ἡ ἄγ[ν]οια . . . φαῦ[λ]ά ἐστι[ν] sc. for the wise. Cf. Behm, *TDNT*, 4.1018. On balance, while one might interpret both βλασφημίαι and ὑπόνοιαι πονηραί in the sense of the kinds of things the opponents say about those who do adhere to the healthy teaching (cf. 6:3), reading them as explicating the kinds of intellectual deviations that arise from excessive inquiry and verbal battle seems to fit the context better.

²⁰² E.g., Matt 12:45; Luke 7:21, 8:2, 11:26; Acts 19:12, 13, 15. In his discussion of the διάβολος as πονηρός in Ephesians 6:16, Jeffrey R. Asher suggests that the term came to be applied to lower deities in the Hellenistic period, and that "the Judeans used it to refer to inferior and lower status gods who opposed their God and whose influence created physical and moral damage to humans through pollution and sin" ("Missiles, Demagogues, and the Devil: The Rhetoric of Slander in Ephesians 6:16," in *The History of Religions School Today: Essays on the New Testament and Related Ancient Mediterranean Texts*, ed. Thomas R. Blanton, Robert Matthew Calhoun, and Clare K. Rothschild, WUNT 340 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014], 99).

²⁰³ Asher, "Missiles, Demagogues, and the Devil," 96.

²⁰⁴ See Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 681d-e.

²⁰⁵ David S. Rosenbloom, "From *Poneros* to *Pharmakos*: Theater, Social Drama, and Revolution in Athens, 428-404 BCE," *Classical Antiquity* 21.2 (2002): 329. Rosenbloom (329 n. 161) cites as evidence Hippocrates, *Acut.* 15; *Epid.* 5.31; *Sem.* 18; *Aer.* 4.

F. Sickened Searchings, Overzealous Investigations

A significant stratagem used by the Pastor to convey the untoward nature of his opponents' intellectual activity is by making frequent reference to his opponents' "investigations" (ζητήσεις).²⁰⁶ The Pastorals repeatedly depict the opponents as engaged in overzealous investigations, and the term ζητήσεις is used in all three of the Pastorals. At 1 Tim 6:4, ζητήσεις are paired with λογομαχίαι and depicted as the sickening preoccupation of the opponents. Similarly, in the context of a larger section that likens the opponents' speech to a spreading gangrene (2 Tim 2:17), Timothy is warned: "Keep away from foolish and uneducated ζητήσεις, since you know that they beget battles" (τὰς δὲ μωρὰς καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους ζητήσεις παραιτοῦ, εἰδὼς ὅτι γεννῶσιν μάχας). Finally, Titus is warned at Titus 3:9: "Steer clear of foolish ζητήσεις and genealogies and contentions and battles pertaining to law, for they are unuseful and vain (μωρὰς δὲ ζητήσεις καὶ γενεαλογίας καὶ ἔρεις καὶ μάχας νομικὰς περιίτασο· εἰσὶν γὰρ ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ μάταιοι). What is striking about these instances, common to all three letters, is the language of ζητήσεις in coordination with the language of conflict (μάχαι or λογομαχίαι). While there may be different nuances to the subject of debate imagined in each letter, the means of characterizing the verbal activity of his opponents is undeniably uniform. Closely related to the term ζητήσεις is the compounded form ἐκζητήσεις, which occurs only once in the PE, at 1 Tim 1:4. There, it is imagined as the outcome of "adhering to myths and endless genealogies" (προσέχειν μύθοις καὶ γενεαλογίαις). Here, though BDAG glosses the term ἐκζήτησις as "useless speculation,"²⁰⁷ the sense derived for the verb ἐκζητεῖν, which

Michael Theobald has recently argued that the Pastor is at odds with his opponents' basic styles of knowing, not just the contents of that knowing. Instead of accepting traditional forms of knowledge-transmission (with the Pastor as authoritative transmitter), they promulgate alternative modes of inquiry as salutary to a life of faith (Michael Theobald, "Glauben statt Grübeln: Zum Anti-Intellektualismus der Pastoralbriefe," *EC* 5.1 [2014]: 5–34).

²⁰⁷ BDAG, 303.

conveys a sense of seeking or searching, is probably more to the point: myths and genealogies beget ever further questions and investigations.²⁰⁸

The term *ζητήσεις*, however, is not unambiguously negative. It does not suggest behavior that was uniformly condemned in the Greco-Roman world, such as parricide or matricide (cf. 1 Tim 1:9). It could refer to "seeking" more generally, an "examining," a philosophical "inquiry" or "investigation," or a "judicial inquiry."²⁰⁹ It could be used to describe the kind of inquiry that was productive of virtue,²¹⁰ and could be paired with *μάθησις* to suggest "inquiry" alongside learning.²¹¹ However, in the Pastorals, while we could translate the term simply as "investigations," the Pastor likely means to convey something slightly more eristic, like "controversies."²¹² Especially when paired with the language of battle, the Pastor wishes to characterize these investigations as especially associated with the ill effects of argument. These ill effects of strenuous debate are on display in Plutarch's treatise on maintaining good health, where he warns against "argument" (*διάλεξις*): "For argument adds mental struggle (*ἄγων*)²¹³ and vehemence, with the soul joining together with the body in the attack (*ἅμα τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ σώματι συνεπιτιθεμένης*). Now then one must beware of passionate and compulsive yelling and shouting. For irregular projections and exertions²¹⁴ of the breath produce rips and ruptures."²¹⁵ Plutarch's

²⁰⁸ BDAG, 302.

²⁰⁹ See LSJ, s.v. *ζήτησις*, 756.

²¹⁰ Philo, *Det.* 253.

²¹¹ Heraclitus, *Ep.* 1.9–10.

²¹² Similarly, the Cynic Epistles use this language to characterize the intellectual activity of rivals. In the Cynic Epistle of Diogenes, *Ep.* 50, Diogenes mocks the "captious arguments and riddles" (*σοφίσματα καὶ γρίφοι*) of Charmides' pupil Eupolemus as "irksome and contrived investigations" (*αἱ χαλεπαὶ τε καὶ κατησκημέναι ζητήσεις*). Furthermore, Plutarch suggests that one who is "making sufficient progress" (*ικανῶς προκόπτων*) does not quarrel "about investigations" (*περὶ τὰς ζητήσεις*). See *Virt. prof.* 80b-c, also discussed by Malherbe, "Medical Imagery," 29–30.

²¹³ LSJ, 19, s.v. *ἄγων* III.6.

²¹⁴ LSJ, 412, s.v. *διάτασις* II.1.

²¹⁵ ἢ δὲ διάλεξις ἄγωνα καὶ σφοδρότητα προστίθῃσιν, ἅμα τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ σώματι συνεπιτιθεμένης. κραυγὰς μέντοι περιπαθεῖς καὶ σπαραγμώδεις εὐλαβητέον· αἱ γὰρ ἀνώμαλοι προβολαὶ καὶ διατάσεις τοῦ πνεύματος ῥήγματα καὶ σπάσματα ποιοῦσιν (*Tu. san.* 130c-d).

warning here is not so much concerned with the social ills produced by over-zealous debating, but the potential damage done to the body-soul equilibrium. Plutarch warns that one must take care not to engage too vigorously in debate, lest it harm the *πνεῦμα*. This suggests the interpretive possibility that it is not only the *content* of the opponents' teaching that is in view for the Pastor, but the *manner* of speaking suggested by argumentative discussions. This suggests that the insalubrious effects of the opponents' fractious speech are not solely doctrinal, but physical. Argument can literally make you sick, as Plato's estimation that over-study and too much debate can cause bodily illness suggests (*Tim.* 88a).²¹⁶ Thus, I argue that the Pastor's depiction of the opponents as those who engage in excessive argument is meant to convey not only figurative sickness, but physiological impairments as well.

The Pastor also uses images of excessive curiosity to depict those who mislead by the opponents, and presents something of a tragic caricature of these curious individuals, for they cannot satisfy their desire to learn. In 1 Tim 5:13, the term *περίεργοι* is used to deride those younger widows who have "rejected their first faith," and "at the same time are idle as they learn, going around to this house and that—they are not only idle but purveyors of nonsense and are curious, saying what ought not be said" (*ἄμα δὲ καὶ ἀργαὶ μανθάνουσιν περιερχόμεναι τὰς οἰκίας, οὐ μόνον δὲ ἀργαὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ φλύαροι καὶ περίεργοι, λαλοῦσαι τὰ μὴ δέοντα*). The term *περίεργοι* is normally translated as "busybody" or "meddlesome," but the connection to learning (*μανθάνειν*) and the condemnation that they have rejected the first faith suggest that the nuance is one of illicit inquisitiveness.²¹⁷ To connect this depiction to unsanctioned intellectual inquiry makes

²¹⁶ On the *Timaeus* in Plato's account of mental diseases, see Marke Ahonen, *Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy*, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 13 (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2014), 48.

²¹⁷ Lloyd K. Pietersen has argued, unpersuasively, in my opinion, that the term should be translated "those who practise magic" ("Women as Gossips and Busybodies? Another Look at 1 Timothy 5:13," *LTQ* 42.1 [2007]: 19).

better sense of the Pastor's comment that they have "turned away after Satan," which would seem a rather strong statement if what is in view is the merely gossipy gadding about of young widows. The desire to "learn" (μανθάνειν) is also attributed to the deluded "little ladies" (γυναικάρια) of 2 Tim 3:6–7, who are "always learning" (πάντοτε μανθάνοντα) but are never in "able to come to a recognition of the truth" (μηδέποτε εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν δυνάμενα).

These observations suggest that the Pastor is utilizing familiar topoi to depict his opponents as exhibiting all the classic symptoms of overzealous researchers who make themselves sick through frenzied investigations and churlish combat over matters of insignificance. He draws to some degree on the common castigation of ideological opponents as engaged in nonsensical disputation.²¹⁸ If I am correct in describing the Pastor's rhetorical efforts to depict his opponents as a bookish lot, this has implications for our understanding of the image of Paul and his envoys in the Pastorals, who frequently serve as photographic negatives of the opponents. Paul and his envoys may be read as exemplary types of the scholarly life: Paul is the ardent, legitimate scholar who requests that "the scrolls, especially the parchments" (τὰ βιβλία μάλιστα τὰς μεμβράνας [2 Tim 4:13]) be brought to him so that he may continue his learned endeavors. Paul's erudition, suggested by his use of rarer terms and neologisms,²¹⁹ his quotation of pithy proverbs (1 Tim 6:7–8; Titus 1:12), his allusions to arcane biblical passages (1 Tim 5:18–19; 2 Tim 2:19), and his

²¹⁸ Much helpful material is collected by Pieter G. R. de Villiers, "‘Empty Talk’ in 1 Timothy in the Light of Its Graeco-Roman Context," *Acta Patristica et Byzantina* 14 (2003): 136–55, though he restricts the application of his results to 1 Timothy.

²¹⁹ Though such a determination relies upon a first century dating for these letters, the following have been identified as neologisms by Quinn & Wacker, ECC: ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖν (1 Tim 1:3, 6:3); ἐκζήτησις (1 Tim 1:4); ὑπερπλεονάζειν (1 Tim 1:14); ἀντίλυτρον (1 Tim 2:6); ἐδραῖωμα (1 Tim 3:15); συγκακοπαθεῖν (2 Tim 1:8, 2:3); λογομαχεῖν (2 Tim 2:14); ἀφιλάγαθος (2 Tim 3:3); θεόπνευστος (2 Tim 3:16). For ἀνακαίνωσις as a Pauline neologism (Rom 12:2 and Titus 3:5), see Christiane Zimmermann, "Wiederentstehung und Erneuerung (Tit 3:5): Zu einem erhaltenswerten Aspekt der Soteriologie des Titusbriefts," *NovT* 51.3 (2009): 272–95. BDAG, xxi, adds to this list καλοδιδάσκαλος (Titus 2:3), and πρεσβυτέριον (1 Tim 4:14), which is shared also with Luke 22:66 and Acts 22:5. BDAG, xxi, also provides a necessary word of caution: "In the case of most of the words found only in the LXX and our literature, it is highly improbable that they originated in Jewish or early Christian circles." I am in full agreement. Nevertheless, it is notable that so many relatively rare words come from the Pastorals.

penchant for catchy rhetorical devices,²²⁰ are set up in opposition to those who want to be legal scholars (νομοδιδάσκαλοι) but just don't know what they're talking about (1 Tim 1:7, 6:3). Rather, their discourse is punctuated with inanity (ματαιολογία [1 Tim 1:6; cf. Titus 1:10]; κενοφωνίαι [1 Tim 6:20; 1 Tim 2:16]). Paul, the archetype of healthy, reasonable discourse, offers himself as a pedagogical model (1 Tim 1:16) and urges Timothy to do the same (2 Tim 1:13). Timothy, the legitimate, true son (1 Tim 1:2; cf. Titus 1:4) of his Doktorvater, is to keep his nose in the books, the Scripture (γραφὴ at 2 Tim 3:16; cf. 1 Tim 5:18) and the "holy writings" (ἱερὰ γράμματα at 2 Tim 3:15), and to share that learning with others through ἀνάγνωσις (1 Tim 4:13). Paul, Timothy, and Titus thus serve as representatives of true inquiry, of healthy inquiry, in opposition to the sickened and delusional research that leads to endless debates and old-granny myths.²²¹

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that attention to ancient notions of health and sickness allows us to argue forcefully on a pervasive question in Pastorals research, i.e., on whether the medical language and metaphors have a solely polemical function or not. Through an examination of medical, popular, and philosophical notions of health (recognizing that those distinctions are not absolute or stable), I argued that ancient conceptions of health, e.g., as balance, a maintaining of sameness, a positive state, or a maintenance of proper borders or boundaries, must inform our interpretation of the Pastor's ideology of health. Through an exegetical investigation of the health language of the Pastorals, I demonstrated that the Pastor imagines a paraenetic, and therefore therapeutic function for the healthy language. I also argued that the kind of "health" that the

²²⁰ Especially his use of alliteration (e.g., 1 Tim 4:1, 6:17–19). For a discussion of other aural effects in the PE, see Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*, 21–22.

²²¹ Interestingly, 1 Tim 2:13–14 suggests that Paul is an advocate of myth-interpretation, but only those myths of creation and human origins that are deemed licit and then licitly interpreted by the Pastor.

Pastor attempts to locate within the purview of Paul and his delegates is not merely moral, but that the Pastor's notion of health is more expansive than that. For the Pastor, as for many of his contemporaries, "health" is attained through a variety of coordinating and related efforts that pertain to proper behavior and belief. The kind of "healing" that the Pastor imagines Paul to be able to bring is the alleviation of the psychophysical disorders arising from the errant beliefs and behaviors of the theologically deviant. While bodies have to some extent been presumed as a necessary element of the medical paradigm being investigated, we turn now to demonstrate with greater precision and focused attention the role of bodies—those of the opponents and those of the inscribed ecclesial community—in the Pastor's medicalized theological argument in the Pastoral Epistles.

Chapter 4. Corporealizing Deviance: Bodies in the Pastoral Epistles

I. The Body as a Constructed Ideological Site

The Pastor's body language, explicit and implied, serves as a site for the expression of the Pastor's social and ideological commitments. Just as we saw in chapter one that the Pastor engages in locative reasoning on a cosmic scale and geographic proximity to the person of Paul, I shall illustrate here how various parts of the body serve as meaning-rich locations, sites for the Pastor's ideological constructions of teaching and practice as healthy or sick. Attention to the corporeal elements of the Pastorals helps us to focus attention on the embodied logic of the Pastor's agenda. We can see, through a careful gathering of disparate pieces of data, that the Pastor presumes an ideal concept of body—complete, healthy, normative, able, and male—that he leverages against his opponents. The methodological approach I have utilized allows me to emphasize the fact that the Pastor's language of disease threatening the church presupposes Paul's imagery of the church as the body of Christ. Paul used both building imagery and body imagery in order to argue against factionalism in the Corinthian ἐκκλησία.¹ What I demonstrate here is that the Pastor in fact develops both images in his own letters. The Pastor has conspicuously adapted Paul's imagery of the θεοῦ οἰκοδομή (1 Cor 3:10) and developed it in his imagery of the οἶκος θεοῦ (1 Tim 3:15). However, while some scholars² have emphasized the church as a household structure in the Pastorals *over and against* the body of Christ images of Paul, I argue that the Pastor does

¹ Margaret Mitchell demonstrates that the combination of body and building metaphors is present in other deliberative speeches urging concord, as illustrated by Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 23.31, 58–61 (*Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1991], 100 and n. 216, 158 n. 564).

² David C. Verner, *The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles*, SBLDS 71 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983); Lone Fatum, "Christ Domesticated: The Household Theology of the Pastorals as Political Strategy," in *The Formation of the Early Church*, ed. Jostein Ådna, WUNT 183 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 187.

something much more innovative; he presumes, as fixed pieces of Paulinism, not only the building imagery but also the body of Christ imagery of Paul (especially from 1 Corinthians and Romans) and theorizes deviance as a threat to the health of that body.

This constitutes, I argue, an extension of Paul's own utilization of body imagery, a topic that has been thoroughly investigated by scholars to demonstrate the rhetorical significance of that imagery.³ Scholars have also shown how Paul's body imagery is developed and extended by later Pauline documents like Colossians and Ephesians.⁴ Far less attention has been given to the Pastorals, however. While the author of the PE nowhere uses the term *σῶμα*,⁵ he very frequently invokes the body-logic of Paul's earlier letters, but with a decidedly different approach.⁶ Paul frames his discussion of the *ἐκκλησία* as the body of Christ in largely positive terms, identifying various parts of the body with parts of the church (1 Cor 12:12–27; Rom 12:4–5), thereby drawing upon the topos of the body politic that was used to argue for "concord" (*ὁμόνοια*) and against "schisms" (*σχίσματα*).⁷ It is no stretch of the imagination to suggest that the Pastor would have recognized the form and function of Paul's rhetoric, just as surely as did Paul's own readers

³ Work on the concept of the body in 1 Corinthians includes Jerome H. Neyrey, "Body Language in 1 Corinthians: The Use of Anthropological Models for Understanding Paul and His Opponents," *Semeia* 35 (1986): 129–70; Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 157–64; 266–70; Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Karl Olav Sandnes, *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles*, SNTSMS 120 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Michelle V. Lee, *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*, SNTSMS 137 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Timothy A. Brookins, "Paul and the Ancient Body Metaphor: Reassessing Parallels," *Journal for the Study of Paul and His Letters* 6.1 (2016): 75–98.

⁴ George H. van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School: Colossians and Ephesians in the Context of Graeco-Roman Cosmology, with a New Synopsis of the Greek Texts*, WUNT 2.171 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003).

⁵ Though we do have the term *σωματική* at 1 Tim 4:8, on which see chapter four below.

⁶ Mounce, WBC, 41, recognizes that the "use of a metaphor regarding health is consistent with Paul's metaphor of the church as the body of Christ." The question to be answered, of course, is *how* this consonance is worked out by the Pastor, something that Mounce does not explore. More recently, Richard I. Pervo has observed, "Behind this notion of proper hygiene (albeit at some distance) is the Pauline understanding of the church as a body" Richard I. Pervo, "Acts in Ephesus (and Environs) c. 115," *Forum Third Series* 4.2 (2015): 134. Pervo offers the obligatory citation of Malherbe's article (134 n. 52). I aim to examine and reformulate this presumed "distance" between the Pauline metaphor and the Pastor's appropriation of it.

⁷ See esp. Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 157–64.

(which, of course, include the later readers of the Pastorals). The Pastor introduces a concomitant element of political rhetoric by likening his opponents' teaching to a disease that threatens the doctrinal health of his idealized community. In so doing, he extends Paul's body metaphors for polemical purposes, warning against competing factions within the community and the doctrinal perversion that threatens the health of the body.⁸

While this concept of the church as a "corporate" or collective *corpus* is a key element in the Pastor's rhetoric, so too other bodies in the Pastorals are utilized in the argumentative project and subordinated to the Pastor's purposes. Thus, the imagined bodies of males and females are here considered as representative of the kinds of people that constitute the church in the Pastorals. While scholars have addressed the ways in which female bodies are subjected to the hierarchical vision of social and ecclesial rectitude, as well as how Greco-Roman ideals of masculinity are projected onto the male bodies of the Pastorals,⁹ what has not been appreciated is the extent to which the bodies of the opponents and their followers, the church as a body, and the body of Timothy (see chapter five) are evoked synechdochically by reference to various diseased body parts, both explicitly and implicitly. The diseased body constitutes for the Pastor an opportunity

⁸ Paul too utilized the metaphor of the church as Christ's body in his warnings against outside, "foreign" agents disrupting that body's equilibrium. For instance, Paul warns that the Corinthians' bodies (σώματα) were "Christ's members" (μέλη τοῦ Χριστοῦ), and that by "being joined" (κολλᾶσθαι) to a prostitute (πόρνη), Christ's members became identified with a prostitute's (1 Cor 6:15–17).

⁹ Jennifer A. Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity in the Pastoral Epistles," in *New Testament Masculinities*, ed. Stephen D. Moore Anderson and Janice Capel, SemeiaSt 45 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 235–64; Hans-Ulrich Weidemann, "Selbstbeherrschte Hausherren: Beobachtungen zur rhetorischen Funktion des Maskulinitätsideals in den Pastoralbriefen," in *Lukas, Paulus, Pastoralbriefe: Festschrift für Alfons Weiser zum 80. Geburtstag*, ed. Rudolf Hoppe and Michael Reichardt, Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 230 (Stuttgart: KBW Bibelwerk, 2014); Manuel Villalobos Mendoza, *When Men Were Not Men: Masculinity and Otherness in the Pastoral Epistles*, Bible in the Modern World 62 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2014); Jay Twomey, "The Pastor and His Fops: Gender Indeterminacy in the Pastor and His Readers," in *Bible Trouble: Queer Reading at the Boundaries of Biblical Scholarship* (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 283–300; Mary Rose D'Angelo, "Knowing How to Preside over His Own Household': Imperial Masculinity and Christian Asceticism in the Pastorals, Hermas, and Luke-Acts," in *New Testament Masculinities*, ed. Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel Anderson, SemeiaSt 45 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 265–95. On the polemical gendering of speech in the Pastorals, see Marianne Bjelland Kartzow, *Gossip and Gender: Othring of Speech in the Pastoral Epistles*, BZNW 164 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 170–202.

to illustrate, sometimes impressionistically and sometimes vividly, the visceral consequences of departing from Pauline teaching and tradition. For instance, I argue that a closer examination of the pathological, olfactory, visual, metaphorical, and cultural significances of gangrene in Greco-Roman antiquity suggests that the Pastor designed 2 Timothy 2:17 to have a multi-sensory impact on its readers. Furthermore, I show that the Pastor's depiction of auditors as those who have a pathological itch and who will not accept the Pauline antidote (2 Tim 4:1–4) is readily intelligible when we consider the cultural valence of itching, the pathology of immoderate desire, and the notion of the healthy teaching as a medicinal remedy. As Louise J. Lawrence has written, "the diseased body was frequently used to represent faulty ideologies, practices, and politics and belied a heightened schematization of the 'abnormal' body in contrast to the seemingly invisible 'normal' body."¹⁰ In what follows I will build upon this basic premise, and argue that the Pastor accomplishes this schematization not through a systematic articulation of the parts of the body (as does Paul in 1 Cor 12:12–27), but by synecdochic references, identifying particular parts of the body as being subject to disease or, alternatively, in particular need of protection.

II. The Bodies of the Opponents and Those Who Follow Them

A. The Living Dead Body

In chapter one I argued that the Pastor illustrates the relative moral health of his epistolary characters through their proximity or allegiance to Paul. Those who stick close to Paul (e.g., Luke at 2 Tim 4:11) or heed his commands (e.g., Titus at Titus 1:5) are positive examples, while those who reject Paul or his words (e.g., Alexander at 2 Tim 4:14–15) are negative examples. Similarly,

¹⁰ *Sense and Stigma in the Gospels: Depictions of Sensory-Disabled Characters*, Biblical Refigurations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 55.

the quality of the opponents' values and the behaviors they promote may be measured by the depiction of those who embody them. Thus, in the Pastorals, the ecclesial body and the members who comprise it get sicker as they get closer to the opponents, their teaching, and their vices. Just as the opponents are pierced with many pains on account of their inordinate desire for wealth (1 Tim 6:9),¹¹ so too the widow "who lives in the lap of luxury is dead even though she still 'lives'" (ἡ δὲ σπαταλῶσα ζῶσα τέθνηκεν [1 Tim 5:6]). As a kind of profligate zombie, a living-dead pleasure-seeker who stumbles, corpse-like, from one soirée to the next, the widow who lives luxuriously embodies graphically the moral death that the Pastor attributes to avarice, a vice associated primarily with the opponents.¹² While most commentators emphasize the contrast between "spiritual" death and a physical life,¹³ I wish to draw attention here to the hybridity entailed in the locution ζῶσα τέθνηκεν. In some regard, the ill-fated widow is neither alive nor dead, for she is simultaneously both. She inhabits a liminal space, kept from life by virtue of her death-dealing desires for luxury and pleasure, and yet kept equally from death by the stubborn vitalities of embodiment. Depicting her as the living-dead is not, I should note, merely a statement of condemnation or disapproval. It is also a vivid reminder to the readers or auditors of the epistle of what befalls the wanton, the craven, and those who devote themselves to the kind of life that is

¹¹ See Chapter 3.

¹² For the depiction of the opponents as preoccupied with money, see 1 Tim 6:3–19; 2 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:11. On the topic of love of money and 1 Timothy, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19. Part II," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1.535–57; Abraham J. Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19. Part I," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1.507–34; Korinna Zamfir, "The Love of Money Is the Root of All Evils: Wealth and the Well-to-Do in 1 Timothy," in *The Bible and Economics: The Poor and the Rich in Biblical Texts. International Biblical Conference XXV. 22nd–24th August 2013* (Szeged: JATEPress, 2014), 415–28; Gary G. Hoag, *Wealth in Ancient Ephesus and the First Letter to Timothy: Fresh Insights from Ephesiaca by Xenophon of Ephesus*, BBRSup 11 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2015).

¹³ E.g., Marshall, ICC, 588; Towner, NICNT, 342. For rich demonstration of this concept in contemporary philosophical sources, see Ilaria Ramelli, "1 Tim 5:6 and the Notion and Terminology of Spiritual Death: Hellenistic Moral Philosophy in the Pastoral Epistles," *Aev* 84.1 (2010): 243–48.

characteristic of the opponents. The profligate widow thus conjures the ghoulish specter of the reanimated corpse, the half-dead and half-living thing that knows not the concern for others so carefully outlined in 1 Tim 5:5.

B. Bellies

In Titus 1:12, the reader is given notice of the nature of the Cretan opponents faced by Titus:

"Cretans are always liars, wicked beasts, lazy bellies" (Κρηῆτες ἀεὶ ψευῶσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί). This trifecta of characterizations, cast as the proverbial platitude of "one of their own prophets," coalesces three predicates of "Cretans," each capable of evoking a veritable cornucopia of objectionable attributes.¹⁴ Even though this ethnological-moral assessment is cast as the speech of a Cretan prophet and may derive from Epimenides,¹⁵ each of the three barbs has been employed by Paul in his own letters,¹⁶ such that the proverb may be read as a perpetuation of Paul's own polemical proclivities.¹⁷ For now, however, we focus on the last predication: "lazy bellies."¹⁸ The declaration that the opponents *are* "lazy bellies" suggests, via metonymy, that the

¹⁴ The image of the wild animal, for instance, can evoke concerns about a lack of rational capacities, or a lack of social decorum. As Reggie M. Kidd's pithy alliterative phrase "prevaricators, predators, and profligates" suggests, one could also think about the wild animal reference as evoking fears about predators. Kidd argues that a further function of the phrase is that it "sets up the sweeping theological statement at 2:12 about grace coming to teach us to live 'soberly' (i.e., not as bellies), 'justly' (i.e., not as beasts), and 'piously' (i.e., not as liars)" ("Titus as Apologia: Grace for Liars, Beasts, and Bellies," *HBT* 21.1 [1999]: 189, 186).

¹⁵ From the time of Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 1.14.59.2), the saying has been attributed to Epimenides, the 6th BCE poet from Crete. Reggie M. Kidd notes that Titus contains the earliest extant literary evidence of such a quote in this full form ("Titus as Apologia," 189; 193). Cf. Jerome, *Ad Tit.* 7 (*PL* 26.571–2), cited by Rainer Riesner, "Once More: Luke-Acts and the Pastoral Epistles," in *History and Exegesis: New Testament Essays in Honor of Dr. E. Earle Ellis for His 80th Birthday*, ed. Sang-Won Son (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 248.

¹⁶ Paul's opponents marked by falsity: 2 Cor 11:13, 26; Gal 2:4. Paul's opponents as non-human: Phil 3:2 (βλέπετε τοὺς κύνας); 1 Cor 15:32 (if indeed this passage should be understood as indicative of human opposition [cf. κατὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐθηριομάχῃσα]). Paul's opponents as slaves of the belly: Rom 16:18; Phil 3:19.

¹⁷ Later interpreters such as Augustine read Tit 1:12 in tandem with Paul's own belly dicta in Rom 16:18 and Phil 3:19. See Sandnes, *Belly and Body*, 255.

¹⁸ Cretans are not the only group to receive from the Pastor the unflattering designation (ἀργαί). The women of 1 Tim 5:13 are also so dubbed, in addition to being called φλύαροι καὶ περιεργοί. One may note the amusing story preserved by Plutarch (*Cor* 6.3) about how the parts of the body revolted (στασιάζει) against the belly (γαστήρ) on the grounds that it alone was "idle" or "lazy" (ἀργή), but the belly shrewdly pointed out that it was responsible for

Cretans have neglected other aspects of their humanity, and are reducible (in the Pastor's rhetoric, at least) to their basest and most basic impulses. This rhetorical emphasis on "base" urges functions similarly in the previous predicate ("wild beasts"), which suggests that these Cretans are savage and sub-human. They are characterized, or caricatured, by reference to their appetites for food, and likely, by extension, for drink and sex.¹⁹ The goal of such a depiction is to smear the Jewish Cretan opponents by essentializing them, arguing that their most notable attributes are their oversized appetites. They are not only characterized as subservient to their ample bellies—they are rhetorically reduced in such a way as to equate their basest behaviors with most fundamental and truest natures.

While the term ἀργαί here probably does not have a medical nuance per se,²⁰ this does not mean that it does not pertain to the discourse about health. In his treatise on the maintenance of health, Plutarch warns sternly against the notion that "inactivity" (ἀπραξία) or "laziness" (ἀργία) might be productive of ὑγίεια, and argues that it in fact "destroys the goal of health" (τὸ τῆς ὑγείας τέλος ἀπόλλυσι [Tu. san. 135c]). In his treatise on the topic, Galen lists "laziness of mind" (ἀργία διανοίας), alongside "mindlessness" (ἄνοια) and a "sluggish soul" (ψυχὴ ῥάθυμος) as productive of various diseases.²¹ Thus, while the designation of the opponents as "lazy bellies" does not itself suggest, for instance, some kind of digestive disorder, in contemporary medical advice literature

absorbing all nutrients and redistributing them properly. The anecdote is put in defense of the senate's relationship to the people.

¹⁹ Sandnes demonstrates that the belly, in polemical contexts such as these, evokes not only the inability to control one's desire for food, but also for the alcohol and sex that were associated with symposia and the philosophical polemic against them (*Belly and Body*, 57–58; 79–93).

²⁰ Riesner makes the claim that the phrase γαστέρες ἀργαί "also makes use of the language of illness," but he does not supply any supporting evidence or argumentation (Riesner, "Once More: Luke-Acts and the Pastoral Epistles," 248).

²¹ Galen, *San. tu.* 1.8 = 6.40K.

"laziness" is associated with an unhealthy lifestyle, and is thought to be inimical to the pursuit of bodily and mental health.

C. Mouths

The mouths of the opponents are summoned vividly and frequently in the Pastorals. This emphasis is consonant with the Pastor's fixation on what he considers valid and invalid forms of speech. We see this in the comment about the opponents in Titus 1:11, "whom it is necessary to muzzle" (οὓς δεῖ ἐπιστομίξειν), or, with some translational license, "whose mouths one must shut up." The necessity of silencing the opponents' collective "mouth" (στόμα) is related, of course, to what comes out of that orifice. The mouth is a synecdochic representative of the words that come forth from it.²² In Titus 1:12 the content is vague (cf. "teaching what they ought not to" [διδάσκοντες ἃ μὴ δεῖ]); the emphasis is placed rather on halting the poisonous verbal flow, since it is wreaking havoc on the households of Crete (cf. ὅλους οἴκους ἀνατρέπουσιν [1:11]). A similar imperative on stopping up the opponents' oral discharge may be seen at the beginning of 1 Timothy, where Timothy is to command them "not to present divergent teaching" (μὴ ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν).²³ The Pastor has a great deal to say about the kind of oral effluvia produced by the sickened opponents (see above). In these two passages, the utter futility of their speech is highlighted: it is ματαιολογία (1 Tim 1:6) spoken by ματαιολόγοι (Titus 1:10). In marked contrast to being stopped up, the mouths of teachers who "labor in word and teaching," i.e., communicating the Pauline gospel, are by no means muzzled (cf. οὐ φιμώσεις [1 Tim 5:18]) but

²² A point appreciated by Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 2.19.97.2–98.1). In depicting ἀλαζονεία as a vice of the soul from which one must repent, Clement imagines repentance as the reappropriation of the mouth, the heart, and the hands for the good. "For these things are a symbol, the hands of action, the heart of will, and the mouth of speech" (σύμβολον δ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, πράξεως μὲν αἱ χεῖρες, βουλήs δὲ ἡ καρδία καὶ λόγου <τὸ> στόμα).

²³ Cf. the similar gloss offered by Danker, *Concise Lexicon*, 151: "present divergent instruction."

rather are offered a double portion (1 Tim 5:17). Like Hippocratic doctors, who scrutinized the "sonic effluvia" of their patients for the sake of diagnosis and prognosis,²⁴ our author has passed medical judgment on their teaching: it is dangerously ill, and most certainly communicable. As we shall soon see, this point is made memorably and vividly in 2 Tim 2:17, where we read that "their λόγος will have a spread like gangrene." This is one of the more fascinating verbal images of the Pastorals, since it conjures not only the imagined mouth of the opponents, issuing forth a sickening and rapidly spreading λόγος, but also the ecclesial epidermis to be affected by the "spread" (νομή) of the gangrenous speech. This verbal image thus evokes and presupposes the bodily components of multiple actors. The στόμα of the opponents and the σῶμα of the ἐκκλησία are intimately connected. We turn now to examine the nature of the ecclesial epidermis that is subject to this gangrenous spread.

III. The Body of Christ and the Ecclesial Epidermis (2 Tim 2:14–18)

2 Timothy 2:14–18

14 Remind them of these things as you solemnly warn them in the presence of God not to engage in verbal warfare, which is useful for nothing except for the intellectual ruin²⁵ of those who hear it. 15 Hasten to present yourself to God approved, a practitioner²⁶

²⁴ Colin Webster makes the case that Hippocratic authors attended to a variety of verbal phenomena for the purpose of diagnosis and prognosis. He argues that Hippocratic doctors diminish the differences between "the (sonic) *effluvia* of the mouth and those of other bodily outlets, thus bringing verbal output into close conceptual proximity to other types of discharge. Words come to be scrutinized for their quantity, quality and consistency as though they were quasi-*excreta* of the mouth" ("Voice Pathologies and the 'Hippocratic Triangle,'" in *Homo Patiens: Approaches to the Patient in the Ancient World*, ed. Georgia Petridou and Chiara Thumiger, Studies in Ancient Medicine 45 [Leiden: Brill, 2016], 166).

²⁵ BDAG, 528, s.v., καταστροφή, has "state of being intellectually upset to a ruinous degree, *ruin*."

²⁶ The sense of ὀρθοτομεῖν is much debated by commentators. Scholars often see in the language of ἐργάτης and ὀρθοτομεῖν the imagery of a construction worker cutting out a straight path for a road. Knight, NICTC, 411 argues that a growing consensus maintains that the stress is upon ὀρθο- and not on τομέω. He feels that the use of ἐργάτης suggests that the image is of a "worker working with his materials" (412). However, one must also take into consideration that the the sense of ἐργάτης is not in fact limited to the idea of being a worker of the field or of materials. LSJ, 682, s.v. ἐργάτης, indicates that it could also denote a specialized practitioner of an art, such as war (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 4.1.4), law (Lycophron, *Frag. trag.* 1.28, of a judge), or some special branch of surgery, such as

unashamed, delineating the word of truth with surgical precision. 16 Steer clear of profane, empty babblings; for they shall advance in impiety all the more 17 and their speech will have a spread like gangrene. Among these are Hymenaeus and Philetus, 18 who have shot wide of the truth, claiming that the resurrection has already occurred, and they overturn the faith of some.²⁷

A. Literary Context

The lengthy section from 2 Tim 2:14–26 begins with a concern to ameliorate the putrefying damage of the opponents' λόγος (2 Tim 2:17) and culminates in the hope of God's granting "repentance unto recognition of the truth" for the opponents and their sobering up out of the devil's snare (2:25–26). This arc suggests that this selective reworking of Pauline language has as its goal the fashioning of an appropriate theological framework for dealing with theological and intra-ecclesial deviance.

The larger textual unit of which our passage is a part runs from 2:14, with ταῦτα and the imperative ὑπομίμνησκε, to 2:26, with a new section beginning in 3:1, with τοῦτο and the imperative γίνωσκε. The subsections 2:14–21 and 2:22–26 are linked thematically by the explicit concern with theological deviance (2:16–17 and 2:23), its perpetrators (2:17–18 and 2:25–26), and its effect on Timothy's community (2:14, 18 and 2:23), and lexically as well (λογομαχεῖν [2:14], μάχαί [2:23], μάχεσθαι [2:24]; πίστις [2:18, 22], ἀλήθεια [2:15, 25]). The opponents are located

lithotomy (Hippocrates, *Jusi*). Galen references this sort of specialized surgery in a discussion about the tendency among doctors to take their titles from their specialties (which Galen says he has no problem with, but he is quick to note that they are all doctors with the common "goal" [σκοπός] of "health" [ὑγεία]): "Anyway, no one is so foolish or stupid that he would take away the actions mentioned from the medical art and set up some other art for each of them—either herniotomy (as some now call it), or lithotomy, or paracentesis. Even if they say this person is particularly a herniotomist (κηλοτόμος), and this person a paracentesist (παρακεντητής), and this person a lithotomist (λιθοτόμος), they at least call them all doctors" (οὐδεὶς γοῦν οὕτως ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἐμπληκτός ἐστιν, ὃς ἀφαιρήσεται μὲν τῆς ἰατρικῆς τὰς εἰρημένας ἐνεργείας, ἄλλην δέ τινα καθ' ἐκάστην αὐτῶν ἐπιστήσῃ τέχνην ἥτοι κηλοτομικήν, ὡς νῦν ὀνομάζουσιν τινες, ἢ λιθοτομικήν ἢ παρακεντητικήν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τόνδε μὲν τινα κηλοτόμον εἶναι φασί, παρακεντητὴν δὲ τόνδε, λιθοτόμον δὲ τόνδε, πάντας γοῦν ἰατροὺς αὐτοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν [*Thras.* 24 = 5.846–47K; Johnston, LCL]).

²⁷ 14 Ταῦτα ὑπομίμνησκε διαμαρτυρόμενος ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ λογομαχεῖν, ἐπ' οὐδὲν χρήσιμον, ἐπὶ καταστροφῇ τῶν ἀκουόντων. 15 σποῦδαςον σεαυτὸν δόκιμον παραστήσαι τῷ θεῷ, ἐργάτην ἀνεπαίσχυντον, ὀρθοτομοῦντα τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας. 16 τὰς δὲ βεβήλους κενοφωνίας περιῖστασο· ἐπὶ πλεῖον γὰρ προκόψουσιν ἀσεβείας 17 καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν ὡς γάγγραινα νομὴν ἔξει. ὧν ἐστὶν Ὑμέναιος καὶ Φίλητος, 18 οἵτινες περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡστοχῆσαν, λέγοντες [τὴν] ἀνάστασιν ἤδη γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ ἀνατρέπουσιν τὴν τινων πίστιν.

within the community, and two are here named (Hymenaeus and Philetus), along with some sense of their teaching and its effect: "They say that the resurrection has already occurred, and they overturn the faith of some" (2:18).²⁸ In the verses that follow (2:19–21), the Pastor builds a complex intertextual web of allusions, weaving together elements from the Corinthian letters (1 Cor 3:11–13; 2 Cor 4:7), Romans (9:19–23),²⁹ and Septuagintal references (Num 16:5; Sir 35:3; Isa 26:13; Joel 3:5; cf. Lev 24:16), all in order to locate the sickness of the opponents and its effect on the church under the same roof of the "great house" (2:20). The Pastor writes that one can "cleans oneself" from "these things" and become a vessel for honor. The antecedent of "these things" has indeed been understood as the individuals Hymenaeus and Philetus,³⁰ or the vessels for dishonor which imply the false teachers³¹ and presumably others like them, but this obscures the coherence of the metaphor and the promise attached to it. All humans in the "great house" (the church) are vessels, albeit of different material and are used for different purposes by the δεσπότης (2:21), so if the Pastor had wished to indicate the removal of the false teachers themselves he should have urged them to remove the "vessels for dishonor" altogether. But for the Pastor, anyone (τις), upon cleansing, "will be a vessel for honorable use" (ἔσται σκεῦος εἰς τιμὴν).³² The vessel is, so to speak, cleansed (ἐκκαθαίρειν)³³ of its capacity for common use (εἰς

²⁸ This "overturning" (ἀνατρέπειν) is reminiscent of the "overturning" (ἀνατρέπειν) of whole households that Titus 1:11 references.

²⁹ Compare, e.g., σκεύη ἐλέους ἃ προητοίμασεν εἰς δόξαν (Rom 9:23) with [σκεῦος] εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἡτοιμασμένον (2 Tim 2:21).

³⁰ E.g., Mounce, WBC, 532, Knight, NIGTC, 418, and translations like the TNIV/NIV. See Marshall, ICC, 762 n. 60, for more. Others take the antecedent to refer more generally to the "activities and the teachings associated with the false teachers rather than to the people themselves" (Towner, NICNT, 541; Marshall, ICC, 762; Spicq, ÉBib, 763; cf. Johnson, AB, 397–98). Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 694, take the antecedent to be the "drivel" of 2:16.

³¹ Knight, NIGTC, 418.

³² Cf. the comments of Towner, NICNT, 542, "The cleansing envisaged in v. 21 is such that it allows one to become an implement for honor." This opens up the possibility that the vessels for dishonor set off in v. 20 may be among those who *become* vessels for honor through cleansing.

³³ The resonances with 1 Cor 5:7, a passage discussed above in chapter 1, should also be noted. The compounded form of ἐκκαθαίρειν is used otherwise only at 1 Cor 5:7, a passage that urged the cleansing out the leaven

ἀτιμίαν), and is "rendered holy, useful to the master" (ἡγιασμένον, εὐχρηστον τῷ δεσπότῃ).³⁴ Here, the exhortation seems to be to cleanse oneself from the debates that the false teachers generate (cf. 2:16, 23), but the Pastor holds out the opportunity even for them too to become vessels for honor.³⁵ The very fact that Timothy is given instructions on how to "educate" (παιδεύειν) those who are "set in opposition" (ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι) indicates the Pastor has in mind the possibility of "repentance" (μετάνοια) especially for the opponents.

B. Skin as Site

The ecclesial body presupposed by the Pastor's medical metaphor here is covered with an ecclesial skin. While Greek terms for skin³⁶ does not appear in the PE, it is the necessary correlate of the gangrene that we find in 2 Tim 2:17. While gangrene could penetrate beyond the epidermis to affect subdermal tissue and even bone, the vividness of the imagery presupposes a visible affection of the skin. In 2 Tim 2:17, we hear the Pastor warn: "Steer clear of profane, empty babblings; for

from the lump (i.e., removing the *pornos* from the community). Of course, it should be noted that Paul's metaphorical invocation of the practice of tossing out leaven before Passover implicitly entails cleaning out leaven *from vessels in a house*. The use of ἐκκαθαίρειν in 2 Tim 2:21 is therefore perhaps a creative revision of 1 Cor 3:11–12 and Rom 9:21–22, taking terms from both and reinterpreting the images, and perhaps also evoking a term from 1 Cor 5, a passage not far from the Pastor's mind (as evidenced by 1 Tim 1:20).

³⁴ What is this notion of "honor" and "dishonor" with regard to vessels? Diodorus Siculus (*Bib. hist.* 17.66.5) narrates the story of how an attendant to Alexander took a table belonging to Darius and put it before Alexander's throne so that it served as a footstool. When a eunuch who formerly served Darius is moved to tears at the sight of this, Alexander inquires as to why and the eunuch gives this answer: "I am by nature devoted to my masters and I was grieved at seeing what was most held in honour by your predecessor now become an ignoble piece of furniture" (ὁ δὲ εὐνοῦχος ἔφησε, νῦν μὲν σὸς εἰμι δοῦλος, πρότερον δὲ Δαρείου, καὶ φύσει φιλοδέσποτος ὦν ἡλγηκα ἰδὼν τὸ παρ' ἐκείνῳ μάλιστα τιμώμενον νῦν ἄτιμον γεγὼνός σκεῦος [Oldfather, LCL]).

³⁵ Johnson (AB, 397) argues that the metaphor breaks down here, since vessels cannot cleanse themselves, but then he suggests that the metaphor pervades, since the "cleansing itself" does not mean to clean oneself from physical dirt, but rather unclean moral intentions and attitudes. However, I think the language of "breaking down" is perhaps indicative of a particular notion of metaphor that must be re-examined, namely, that metaphor consists of fixed one-to-one equivalencies. As Janet Soskice argues, metaphor is *not* saying one thing and meaning another. This is what satire and some forms of allegory are. Rather, metaphor is "speaking about one thing in terms which are seen to be suggestive of another" *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 48–49. Thus, a better way to think about this passage is that the metaphor does not so much "break down" as entail a shift in emphasis so as to be suggestive in different ways.

³⁶ E.g., ἐπιδερμῖς, δέρμα, or χρώς.

they shall advance in impiety all the more and their speech (λόγος) will have a spread like gangrene (ὡς γάγγραινα νομὴν ἔξει)." That the λόγος having such a spread (νομή) belongs to the opponents is made clear in the next sentence, when the Pastor goes on to mention to representatives of those who proffer such profane, vacuous speech and consequently "advance" in impiety (cf. "among whom are Hymenaeus and Philetus" [ὧν ἐστὶν Ὑμέναιος καὶ Φίλητος]).³⁷ While several scholars suggest that the language of "progress" or "advancing" (cf. προκόπτειν) is used ironically or sardonically as a contrast to the moral or philosophical sense of progress usually indicated by that terminology,³⁸ it also forecasts the progress or "spread" (νομή) that the gangrenous logos will have.³⁹

C. Scholarship on 2 Timothy 2:17

Commentators on this passage have primarily appreciated two aspects of the pathology of deviance in 2 Tim 2:17, namely, the fact that the Pastor is 1) likening the speech of his opponents to a dangerous medical condition, "gangrene" (γάγγραινα),⁴⁰ that connotes decay,⁴¹ and 2) that he

³⁷ The subject of προκόψουσιν is not expressed, an ambiguity that leads some translations (NRSV, CEB, KJV, ESV, NASB, NCV) to take the plural "profane, empty babblings" as the subject of the verb. However, while the subject is not expressed here but rather made clear only in v. 17, there are reasons to understand the human opponents as the subject: 1) it makes little sense for "profane, empty babblings" to be the antecedent of "their" λόγος, and λόγος is elsewhere in the PE something that is always offered or possessed by people, never by other kinds of words; 2) the term προκόπτειν (2 Tim 3:9, 13) and its cognate προκοπή (1 Tim 4:15) is used of individuals in the PE elsewhere, suggesting this is also the case here.

³⁸ Marshall, ICC, 750, argues that the author uses this term "ironically"; Johnson, AB, 385, deems its use "somewhat sardonic."

³⁹ Note the symmetry of tenses in προκόψουσιν and νομὴν ἔξει.

⁴⁰ The relative absence of γάγγραινα and its cognates from major reference works may in part explain the relative dearth of scholarly exploration of the significance of the disease. It is lacking from, among others, the following: TDNT, TLNT, ABD, OCD, *Der neue Pauly*, and RGG. Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 659, give little attention to the term, relying instead on Spicq and Dibelius & Conzelmann, and suggest that "its meaning is clear, both etymologically (*graein*, 'to eat,' plus the pejorative *aina* suffix." However, Spicq's citation of Pierre Chantraine, *La formation des noms en grec ancien*, Collection linguistique, publiée par la Société de linguistique de Paris 38 (Paris: E. Champion, 1933), upon which Quinn & Wacker rely, is less certain than Spicq, ÉBib, 756, would have us believe, since Chantraine notes that the form itself is uncertain ("le détail de l'étymologie n'est pas clair [109]). Robert Beekes (with the assistance of Lucien van Beek) has recently argued that, although in antiquity the term was compared with

is emphasizing the threat of its spreading.⁴² Some note that the danger is to the healthy parts of the body, which gangrene threatens to consume.⁴³ Scholars have usefully pointed to some medical comparanda, as well as the metaphorical use of spreading diseases in contemporary historians or philosophers.⁴⁴ However, scholarship has not engaged ancient depictions and historical understandings of gangrene as a means of gaining interpretive insight into the nature and function of the medical imagery here employed. Many questions have been left unexplored on the presumption that identifying gangrene as a spreading, corrosive ailment exhausts the significance of this designation.⁴⁵ I argue here that a closer examination of the pathological, olfactory, visual,

γράφειν, "to devour," "this is certainly incorrect. It is most probably a Pre-Greek word (a -vocalism, -αινα, prenasalization?)." Nevertheless, they still define it, with the Hippocratics, as "an illness that eats away the flesh." See Robert Beekes (with the assistance of Lucien van Beek), "γάγγραινα" in: *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*, Indo-European Etymological Dictionaries Online, ed. Alexander Lubotsky (Brill Online, 2015). Chantraine, *La formation des noms en grec ancien*, 108 points out that the suffix -αινα is in fact used "in the formation of a number of names of maladies, and particularly of repugnant maladies" (à former des noms de maladies et particulièrement de maladies répugnantes).

⁴¹ Mounce, ICC, 527; Knight, *NIGTC*, 413;

⁴² Collins, NTL, 232; Marshall, ICC, 751; Johnson, AB, 386; Alfons Weiser, *Der zweite Brief an Timotheus*, EKKNT 16.1 (Düsseldorf: Benziger Verlag / Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2003), 194.

⁴³ E.g., Arichea & Hatton, USBHS, 208; Spicq, ÉBib, 756. Towner contrasts the λόγος τῆς ἀλήθειας of 2 Tim 2:15 with the simple λόγος of the opponents, suggesting that the lack of qualifiers is a "verbal blow directed at its poor quality" (NICNT, 524) and indicates "substandard teaching" (NICNT, 525). However, while diminution is one strategy employed by the Pastor (cf. the lexical diminutive of "woman" [γυνή], "little ladies" [γυναικάρια] at 2 Tim 3:6), here the force of the imagery is to suggest the threatening spread of a serious medical affliction, not a pathetic attempt and failure to teach.

⁴⁴ E.g., Ovid, *Met.* 2.825. Josephus, *Ant.* 17.169 records the painful and gruesome demise of Herod, which included gangrenous genitals (cf. Acts 12:23; *B.J.* 1.656); see also the circumcision and subsequent gangrenous infection and death of Apion recorded by Josephus at *C. Ap.* 2.143).

⁴⁵ This is not to say that later authors have not exploited the correlation between gangrene and heresy as a productive metaphor for theological deviance. Gregory of Nyssa begins his treatise *On the Holy Spirit, Against the Macedonians* by commenting on the danger of not addressing heretical ideas: "But since there is danger lest falsehood prevail over truth through our silence and this seeping sore of heresy, having a great spread as gangrene against the truth, should mutilate the healthy word of faith, it seemed necessary to me to make a response not against the insanity of those who proffer such things contrary to piety, but for the correction of wretched, hasty judgments" (ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ κίνδυνός ἐστι μὴ διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας σιγῆς κατισχύσῃ τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ πολλὴν ἢ σηπεδονώδης αὕτη τῆς αἱρέσεως γάγγραινα νομὴν κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας λαβοῦσα τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα τῆς πίστεως λόγον διαλωβήσῃται, ἀναγκαῖον ἐφάνη μοι μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀφροσύνην αὐτῶν ἀποκρίνασθαι τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ τῆς εὐσεβείας προτεινομένων, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ διορθώσει τῶν μοχθηρῶν ὑπολήψεων). Much later, Thomas Edwards wrote a work of heresiology entitled *Gangraena*, which is devoted to the "errors, heresies, blasphemies and pernicious practices of the sectaries of this time, vented and acted in England" during the 1640s (cited by Jay Twomey, *The Pastoral Epistles Through the Centuries* [Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009], 146).

metaphorical, and cultural significances of gangrene in Greco-Roman antiquity suggests that the metaphorical significance of such an image is greater than has been hitherto appreciated.

D. Ancient Definitions & Depictions

Ulcers of various kinds, including gangrene, were ubiquitous in antiquity. Without antibiotics, ulcers and other skin conditions were a common sight, and would have constituted a large part of a physician's cases.⁴⁶ Occurring both as a result of spontaneous generation and traumatic injuries,⁴⁷ the medical literature contains multiple discussions of ulcers, some superficial and some subcutaneous. There was a more variegated terminology in Greek medical literature⁴⁸ than in Latin, and that terminology, used for sores, ulcers, gangrenes, and abscesses was not always precise.⁴⁹ Celsus notes that "canker" (*cancer*),⁵⁰ of which one kind is gangrene, is divided into various species by the Greeks, though he says that there are not sufficient terms in Latin and thus relies on transliterations (*Med.* 5.26.31b). Whatever its species, it is always marked by spreading and the corruption of its contiguous parts. The first species of canker, "erysipelas" (ἐρυσίπελας) is attended by redness, inflammation, blackening and putrefaction, a foul-smelling discharge of

⁴⁶ Vivian Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 2nd ed., Sciences of Antiquity (London: Routledge, 2013), 29.

⁴⁷ Christine F. Salazar, *The Treatment of War Wounds in Graeco-Roman Antiquity*, Studies in Ancient Medicine 21 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 32.

⁴⁸ There seems to be a continuum of terms designating the different stages of "sepsis and mortification following a wound or other injury," including: σήψις/σηπῆναι/σηπεδών, ἐρυσίπελας, γάγγραινα, σφάκελος, νέκρωσις (Salazar, *Treatment of War Wounds*, 32). Galen attempts to achieve greater terminological clarity (book 3 of *MM* = 10.226K): "A wound, inflammation, gangrene and putrefaction are each separate and able to exist independently in that they are conditions of our bodies contrary to nature, and not things contingent to the conditions of necessity" (ἔλκος δὲ καὶ φλεγμονὴ καὶ γάγγραινα καὶ σηπεδὼν ἕκαστον ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ δύναται συστῆναι, διαθέσεις γάρ τινες εἰσι τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν παρὰ φύσιν, οὐ τὰ ταῖς διαθέσεσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβεβηκότα [Johnston & Horsley, LCL]).

⁴⁹ Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 29. The difference between σφάκελος and γάγγραινα in the Hippocratic authors was debated, even in antiquity. Erotianus, the first century CE grammarian, thought they used it as a synonym for sepsis. Cf. Helen Christopoulou-Aletra and Niki Papavramidou, "The Manifestation of 'Gangrene' in the Hippocratic Corpus," *Annals of Vascular Surgery* 23 (2009): 550.

⁵⁰ In the appendix I (589–92) to the third volume of Celsus's writings in the LCL, W. G. Spencer distinguishes the various conditions for which Celsus uses the term *cancer*, none of which relate to the disease known in modern medicine by the term "cancer." Thus, Spencer's decision to render *cancer* as "canker."

pallid humor.⁵¹ This species occurs in any part of the body. Gangrene (*gangraena*), by contrast, occurs "in body parts that protrude,⁵² that is, among the fingertips, armpits or groin, and generally in elderly people or in those whose body is in a bad condition."⁵³

Thus, while gangrene was demarcated according to the areas of the body it attacked, it was also distinguished by its severity. According to Galen, gangrene was an intermediate condition between severe inflammation (φλεγμονή) and "sphacelus" (σφάκελος). While sphacelus was not treatable, gangrene was treatable.⁵⁴ For Galen, all sores that attack the nearby healthy flesh are "phagedenic."⁵⁵ Phagedena's key characteristics are that it attacks the surrounding parts, causes a necrosis of the flesh by destroying the vascular system in the affected area and the skin's capacity

⁵¹ Cauterization is used for erysipelas (*Med.* 5.26.33c). The purpose of cauterization is to evacuate a noxious humor (*Med.* 5.26.33d). The seepage of humors indicates to Celsus that the area is still unhealthy, since for him "what is healthy is dry when it is burned" (*quod sanum est, siccum est, cum adurit*). For the idea that the dry body is healthy, see, e.g., [Hipp.], *Vict. salub.* 2, where advice is given regarding diet so as to maintain the right amount of dryness in the body. [Hipp.], *Ulcer.* 1, is even more to the point: "For dryness is nearer to health, and moistness to a lack of health. For a lesion is moist, but health is dry" (τὸ γὰρ ξηρὸν τοῦ ὑγιέος ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ὑγρὸν τοῦ μὴ ὑγιέος· τὸ γὰρ ἔλκος ὑγρὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ὑγιὲς ξηρὸν). Cf. *Ulcer.* 4, 10.

⁵² *in prominentibus membris* seems to convey the site at which body parts extend from a larger mass; the fingertips representing a point of differentiation from the hand, the armpit and groin representing the juncture of the arm and the core.

⁵³ hoc in prominentibus membris, id est, inter ungues et alas vel inguina, fereque in senibus vel in is, quorum corpus mali habitus est (*Med.* 5.26.31c; text from Spencer, LCL; my trans.).

⁵⁴ "So then whenever the redness of the swelling above the inflamed affections is extinguished, and the bodies become livid, and the pain seems to have been lessened (since sensation is deadened), and whenever the bodies thus affected become completely without sensation, the ailment is no longer gangrene, but rather they call it sphacelus. For gangrene is intermediate between this sphacelus and a severe inflammation, to the same degree worse than a severe inflammation as it is more moderate than sphacelus. For this is a corruption of the entire essence of the limb that has sphacelus, such that nobody would be able to heal this condition if it had already set in, but if it is still beginning (which is not what sphacelus really is) then it's a severe gangrene getting close to being sphacelus" (ὅταν γοῦν ὑπὲρ τὰ πάθη τὰ φλεγμαίνοντα τό τ' ἐρυθρὸν τῆς φλεγμονῆς ἀπόλλυται, πελιδνῶν γιγνομένων τῶν σωμάτων, ἢ τε ὀδύνη μειωθῆναι δοκεῖ, διότι καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐναρκώθη, καὶ ὅταν γε τελέως ἀναίσθητα γένωνται τὰ οὕτως πάσχοντα σώματα, τὸ πάθος οὐκέτι γάγγραιναν, ἀλλὰ σφάκελον ὀνομάζουσι. μεταξὺ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ σφακέλου καὶ τῆς μεγάλης φλεγμονῆς ἐστὶν ἡ γάγγραινα, τοσοῦτον χειρόν τῆς τηλικαύτης φλεγμονῆς ὅσον μετριώτερον τοῦ σφακέλου. φθορὰ γὰρ οὗτός ἐστι τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας τοῦ σφακελίσαντος μέλους, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν ἰήσαιτό τις αὐτὸν ἤδη συνιστάμενον, ἀλλ' ἔτ' ἀρχόμενον, ὅπερ οὐδὲ σφάκελός ἐστιν ὄντως, ἀλλὰ γάγγραινα μεγάλη πλησίον ἥκουσα σφακέλου [Galen, *Hipp. art.* 18a.687K, my trans.]).

⁵⁵ For Galen, "all sores which attack what is nearby and feed on it, eating the surrounding healthy body, are called *phagedenic*. They call what is composed of both the sore itself and the surrounding swelling a *phagedena*" ("Ὅσα δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπινέμεται καὶ τῶν περὶξ ἄπτεται διαβιβρώσκοντα τὸ περιέχον ὑγιὲς σῶμα, ταῦτα σύμπαντα φαγεδαίνικα προσαγορεύεται· τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετα, τοῦ τε ἔλκους αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ περὶξ ὄγκου, φαγέδαιναν ὀνομάζουσιν [Tum. pr. nat. 13 = 7.727K, trans. Reedy]).

to breath, and, if unchecked, can kill a person.⁵⁶ This also results in damage to the nerves, and the loss of sensation.⁵⁷ Ultimately, gangrene entailed the necrosis of skin and the loss of sensation in that skin, but it could also "eat" deeper into the flesh, even as far as the bone.⁵⁸ One early summation of Galen's definition of gangrene places emphasis on the fact that gangrene was viewed as a "change of the skin (or flesh) contrary to nature to some other condition and a mortification, with an ulcer or apart from an ulcer" (Γάγγραινά ἐστὶ μεταβολὴ τοῦ χρωτὸς τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάστου ἐπὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ νέκρωσις μεθ' ἐλκώσεως καὶ δίχα ἐλκώσεως).⁵⁹ Gangrene thus entails a disease of the skin with a variety of ill effects.

E. Etiology of Gangrene: Wounds and Humors

Ancient Greco-Roman understandings of the etiology of the condition gangrene are significant for interpreting 2 Tim 2:17, insofar as they give us a sense of the cultural significance of gangrene in

⁵⁶ "What is called gangrene follows major inflammations; it is the mortification of the affected part. Unless a person cures it quickly, the afflicted part easily mortifies; and the gangrene attacks the surrounding parts and kills the man. Whenever the mouths of the vessels in the larger veins are completely obstructed and all the pores in the skin are deprived of natural transpiration, the parts thus affected easily mortify. First, the bright color which was present in the inflammations is extinguished; then, the pain and the throbbing leave, not because the condition has ceased, but because sensation is dead" ("Ἐπεταὶ δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις φλεγμοναῖς ἡ καλουμένη γάγγραινα, νέκρωσις τε οὕσα τοῦ πάσχοντος μορίου. καὶ μὴ διὰ ταχέων τις αὐτὴν ἰάσεται, νεκροῦται ῥαδίως τὸ παθὸν οὕτω μόριον, ἐπιλαμβάνει τε τὰ συνεχῆ καὶ ἀποκτείνει τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἰσχυρῶς φραγθῇ κατὰ τὰς μεγίστας φλεγμονὰς τὰ τε στόματα τῶν ἀγγείων, οἳ τε πόροι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὸ δέρμα τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀποστερούμενοι διαπνοῆς, τὰ οὕτω κάμνοντα σώματα νεκροῦνται ῥαδίως. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἀποσβέννυνται τὸ τῆς χροῆς εὐανθές, ὃ συνῆν ταῖς φλεγμοναῖς· ἔπειθ' ἡ ὀδύνη καὶ ὁ σφυγμὸς οἴχονται, οὐ πεπαυμένης δὴ πού τῆς διαθέσεως, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως νεκρωμένης [*Tum. pr. nat.* 8 = 7.720–21K; Reedy trans.]).

⁵⁷ In his second century CE *Onomasticon*, Pollux groups γάγγραινα with a number of other kinds of lesion (*Onom.* 4.206–7): "creeping ulcer" (ἐρπηστικὸν ἔλκος), "eating ulcer" (φαγέδαινα), malignant ulcer (θηρίωμα), and "putrid ulcer" (σηπεδών). Of γάγγραινα, he writes: "Thus is termed the dying part of the limbs with an ulcer or without an ulcer, made white with inflammation and redness, or black and becoming insensate" (οὕτω καλεῖται τῶν μελῶν τὸ νεκρούμενον σὺν ἔλκει ἢ χωρὶς ἔλκους, μετὰ φλεγμονῆς καὶ ἐρυθρήματος ἀπολευκαινόμενον, εἴτα μελαινόμενον καὶ εἰς ἀνασθησίαν μεθιστάμενον).

⁵⁸ For Galen, "phagedena also attacks the underlying parts along with the skin" (ἡ φαγέδαινα δὲ σὺν τῷ δέρματι καὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἄπτεται) (*Tum. Pr. Nat.* 13 = 7.727K, trans. Reedy). Cf. another passage of Galen: "Gangrene is also a mortification of solid bodies, but it does not come to bones. It accompanies great inflammations, being a form of sphacelus but having a special name of its own in addition to the common one" (ἡ δὲ γάγγραινα νέκρωσις καὶ αὕτη τῶν στερεῶν σωμάτων, ἀλλ' οὐτ' ὅσοις ἐπιγίγνεται καὶ ταῖς μεγίσταις ἔπεται φλεγμοναῖς, εἶδος μὲν τι τῶν σφακελῶν ὑπάρχουσα, προσηγορίαν δὲ ἰδίαν ἐξαίρετον ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ κεκτημένη [*Tum. pr. nat.* 11 = 7.726K, trans. Reedy]). The 5th or 6th century CE definition of γάγγραινα by Hesychius (*Lex.* Γ 17) uses φαγέδαινα as a synonym: "A cancerous sore, an eating ulcer, a disease widely diffused in the body" (γάγγραινα· φαγέδαινα· οἱ δὲ καρκίνος, πολυδιάχυτον ἐν τῷ σώματι πάθος).

⁵⁹ [Galen], *Def. med.* 19.449K.

the early imperial period. Trauma, whether from a war wound or other accident, was one of the most likely causes of gangrene in antiquity.⁶⁰ That gangrene was associated with traumatic injuries was central enough to the disease to be included in a definition of it by a late first or early second century CE volume of medical definitions (later falsely attributed to Galen): "Gangrene occurs either because of a preceding blow or when necrosis occurs or as a result of inflammation from surgery" (γίνεται δὲ γάγγραινα ἢτοι πληγῆς προηγησαμένης ἢ νεκρώσεως γιγνομένης ἢ φλεγμονῆς ἐκ χειρουργίας).⁶¹ In his treatment of traumatic injuries (mostly inflicted "by weapons" [*per tela*]⁶²), Celsus notes that bathing a wound without initial cleaning only serves to make it both dirty and wet, which can in turn lead to gangrene.⁶³ As indicated by Ps. Galen, complications following surgery could also lead to the rise of gangrene.⁶⁴ Gangrene was often associated with too much compression of a wound, and exhortations to bandage lightly are common.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Diane Quintal and Robert Jackson, "Gangrene," *The Cambridge Historical Dictionary of Disease*, 137. Cf. Salazar, *Treatment of War Wounds*, 32–34. Diodorus Siculus (*Hist.* 17.103) gives graphic evidence of the onset of gangrene (there σπηδών) to a traumatic injury, this one caused by poison-smeared weapons.

⁶¹ [Galen], *Def. med.* 19.449K. According to Nutton, "The ps. Galenic tract *Medical Definitions* (19, 346–462), written between 70 and 150, has often been considered a Pneumatist work, but although some of its definitions may go back to a Pneumatist source it cannot be properly described as such" (*Ancient Medicine*, 211 n. 31).

⁶² Celsus, *Med.* 5.26.27a.

⁶³ "Bathing, too, while the wound is not yet clean, is one of the worst things to do; for this makes the wound both wet and dirty, and then there is a tendency for gangrene to occur" (Balneum quoque, dum parum vulnus purum est, inter res infestissimas est: nam id et umidum et sordidum reddit, ex quibus ad cancrum transitus esse consuevit) (*Med.* 5.26.28d [Spencer, LCL]).

⁶⁴ In *On Acute Diseases* 3.38, in his treatment of synanche which he defines, following Soranus, as "difficulty in swallowing and acute choking occasioned by a severe inflammation of the throat, or of those parts used in swallowing of food and drink" ([3.5]), Caelius Aurelianus warns against incisions to these inflamed parts because of the severe hemorrhaging they may cause. "Or if a patient happens to avoid a serious hemorrhage, he will still incur cancer and gangrene because of the spread of the inflammation (*vel si forte sanguinis fluorem effugerit quis, cancrum atque gangraenam non effugiet ob augmenta tumoris* [trans. I. E. Drabkin, *Caelius Aurelianus, On Acute and Chronic Diseases* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950)]. Cf. Hippocrates, *Mochl.* 35, where the causes of "gangrene" (there ἀποσφακέλις) are given: "(Causes) of gangrene of the tissues are: constriction in wounds with haemorrhage, compression in fractures of bones, and mortification from bandages" (Ἀποσφακέλις μέντοι σαρκῶν, καὶ ἐν τρώμασι αἰμορροῖς ἀποσφιγθέν, καὶ ἐν ὀστέων κατῆγμασι πιεχθέν, καὶ ἐν δεσμοῖς ἀπομελανθέν [Withington, LCL]).

⁶⁵ See, e.g., the Hippocratic treatise *Frac.* 11 (Withington, LCL): "There may also be lividity and congestion of the large blood-vessels, loss of sensation and gangrene due to compression, and these may occur without necrosis of the bone" (γένοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ φλεβῶν αἰμορροῶν πελιώσιες ναρκώσιες καὶ γαγγραινώσιες ὑπὸ τῆς πίεξις· γένοιτο δ' ἂν ταῦτα ἔξω τοῦ ἄλλου σφακελισμοῦ); later the exhortation, "do not apply strong pressure, but use many bandages" (καὶ ἰσχυρὴν μὲν μὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πίεξιν, ἐν πολλοῖσι δὲ τοῖσιν ὀθονίοισιν).

Thus, gangrene seems to have been associated with trauma, whether surgical or martial. However, those kinds of injuries were only the proximate, or initial cause. But the condition of the body was thought to have an effect on whether or not this would take hold. Galen, *Symp. caus.* 3.1.6 (= 7.211K), expresses the belief that gangrene, along with other kinds of lesions, arise from a distortion or imbalance of humors: "From these unhealthy humours the *erysipelata*, cancers (*karkinos*) and gangrenes (*gangraina*) arise, as do cancerous sores (*phagedaina*), pustules (*anthrax*), herpetic eruptions (*herpes*) and all other such things."⁶⁶ In the absence of germ theory, thinkers like Galen relied upon their (not inconsiderable) understanding of the body to make sense of why some wounds became septic, while others did not. Theorizing the pre-existing imbalance of the humors helps to make sense of this problem. The implication seems to be that the condition of the patient even prior to injury is important for explaining the rise of gangrene. We get a glimpse of similar thinking in Celsus's discussion of gangrene: "If the malady is still not checked, the part between what is sound and diseased ought to be cauterized; and in such a case especially assistance is to be sought, not only from medicaments, but also from a system of diet; for this malady only occurs in a corrupt and diseased body."⁶⁷ What is striking here is Celsus's assumption that gangrene is a malady that only afflicts those who are unhealthy to begin with. Yes, a wound may be sustained by a healthy body, but for Celsus, only a body that is otherwise compromised is susceptible to the development of gangrene: "this malady only occurs in a corrupt and diseased body" (*neque enim id malum nisi corrupti vitiosique corporis est*). This is why even cauterization is not sufficient to effect a remedy. The patient's diet must also be addressed. For

⁶⁶ Galen gives a similar listing at *Tum. pr. nat.* 7.719K: "In addition to these [swellings contrary to nature], there are carbuncles, gangrene, herpes, erysipelas, scirrhi, edemas, cancers, and pneumatoses" (Jeremiah Reedy, "Galen on Cancer and Related Diseases," *Clio Med* 10.3 [1975]: 233–34).

⁶⁷ *Si nihilo magis malum constitit, uri, quod est inter integrum ac vitiatum locum, debet: praecipueque in hoc casu petendum non a medicamentis solum sed etiam a victus ratione praesidium est: neque enim id malum nisi corrupti vitiosique corporis est* (*Med* 5.26.34c; Spencer, LCL).

Celsus and other ancient physicians, aspects of an individual's constitution, as well as environmental factors, play a large role in who gets sick and in what ways illnesses develop. Most ancient medical practitioners considered "diseases" to be pathological processes that were more intimately associated with changes in a particular patient's constitution or lifestyle than having an existence of their own. Symptoms were not the disease itself, but indicators of deeper changes.⁶⁸

F. The Visually Grotesque

Modern inhabitants of developed countries are typically unfamiliar with the gruesome sights that open ulcers would have afforded inhabitants of densely populated urban centers in the ancient Roman Empire, who would likely be intimately acquainted with the visceral experience of seeing and smelling such embodied suffering. The mere mention of gangrene, which may or may not conjure images of putrid, necrotic flesh for us moderns, would likely have summoned a vivid mental image for the readers/auditors of 2 Tim 2. The Hippocratic author of *Mochl.* 35 acknowledges the horrendous appearance of such wounds, noting that "most of them are more frightful than harmful" τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα φοβερώτερα ἢ κακίω). Celsus offers a vivid and gruesome depiction of gangrene that is worth reproducing in full:

The flesh in the wound becomes either black or livid, but dry and shrivelled; the skin near it is for the most part occupied by dusky pustules; then the skin around these becomes either pallid or livid, and usually wrinkled, deficient in sensation: farther away from the wound the skin is inflamed. All these things spread simultaneously, the ulceration into the pustules, the pustules into the pallid or livid part, that into the inflamed part, and that again into the sound flesh. Now together with the above an acute fever arises and great thirst: in some also delirium: others, although in their right minds, nevertheless stammer so that they can scarcely explain their feelings; the stomach begins to be affected: even the breath gets a foul odour. This disorder at its commencement admits of treatment; but

⁶⁸ Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 28–29.

when thoroughly established it is incurable, and most patients die in a cold sweat. (*Med.* 5.26.31c-e)⁶⁹

Celsus's detailed depiction summons images of the concentric lines of an advancing lesion, each successive segment of skin being subject to an earlier phase of the process until one arrives at healthy skin contiguous with the gangrenous lesion. The potential accompanying symptoms indicate the disorder caused to the body's equilibrium; fevers rage, throats are parched, and even the mind is affected, or at least the faculty of speech. The patient's digestive system is thrown awry, and the breath, pungently conveying the internal condition of the patient, piquantly rankles the nose of the would-be examiner.

G. Gangrene as Malodorous Malady

This odiferous aspect of gangrene should not be overlooked. Gangrene, after all, was a smelly ailment. Insofar as it involves the decomposition of flesh, the ancient olfactory sensibilities represented by Theophrastus suggest that the smell associated with such decomposition or "things in a state of corruption" (τὰ διαφθειρόμενα) would be "putridity" (ἡ σαπρός).⁷⁰ Even though we must take care not to impose our modern sensibilities of smell, Theophrastus and Celsus both

⁶⁹ Caro in ulcere vel nigra vel livida est, sed sicca et arida; proxumaque cutis plerumque subnigris pustulis impletur; deinde ei proxima vel pallida vel livida, fereque rugosa, sine sensu est; D ulterior in inflammatione est. Omniaque ea simul serpunt; ulcus in locum pustulosum, pustulae in eum, qui pallet aut livet, pallor aut livor in id, quod inflammatum est, inflammatio in id, quod E integrum est, transit. Inter haec deinde febris acuta oritur ingensque sitis: quibusdam etiam delirium: alii, quamvis mentis suae compotes sunt, balbutiendo tamen vix sensus suos explicant; incipit adfici stomachus; fit foedi spiritus ipse odoris. Atque initium quidem eius mali recipit curationem: ubi vero penitus insedit, insanabile est; plurimique sub frigido sudore moriuntur (Spencer, LCL).

⁷⁰ "Putridity however is a general term, applied, one may say, to anything which is subject to decay: for anything which is decomposing has an evil odour,—unless indeed the name putridity be extended to sourness in wine because the change in the wine is analogous to decomposition. The evil odour of putridity is found in all things, alike in plants in animals and in inanimate things: it attends the decay of things which are not formed directly out of a substance which is decaying: for some things have also the odour of that substance, though it is not found in every case" (Ἡ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς διαφθειρομένοις σαπρότης. ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ σηπόμενον κακῶδες, εἰ μὴ τις τὴν ὀξύτητα λέγει τοῦ οἴνου (3) σαπρότητα τῇ ὁμοιότητι τῆς φθορᾶς. ἐν ἅπασιν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ σαπροῦ κακῶδία καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν ζώοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις· ἐν ἅπασιν δὲ διαφθειρομένοις ὦν μὴ ἡ σύστασις εὐθὺς ἐκ τοιαύτης ὕλης· ἔχει γὰρ ἔνια καὶ τὴν τῆς ὕλης ὁσμὴν, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πάντων γε τοῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ. πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ κακῶδη τὰ ἐκ τῶν σαπρῶν, ὥς οὐδ' οἱ μύκητες οἱ ἐκ τῆς κόπρου φυόμενοι· τὰ δ' ἐκ σήψεως φυόμενα καὶ συνιστάμενα κακῶδη) (*Odor.* 2–3 [Hort, LCL]).

suggest that the putridity of gangrene would have offended the nostrils of even those most accustomed to infected wounds and squalor. Another piece of evidence demonstrates that even doctors, who presumably develop something of a tolerance for such things, make mention of gangrene's malodorous quality. In the characteristically terse case histories from the Hippocratic treatise *Epidemics*, we find the odiferous remnants of gangrene lingering even after many centuries: "Ariston, with a lesion on his toe, had fever and mental confusion. Gangrene ran up to his knee. He died. It was black, rather dry, foul-smelling."⁷¹

Taking this medical context into account, I propose that the suggestion of gangrene in 2 Tim 2:17 entails not only the concern for spreading made explicit by the author, but carries with it an intimation of the repugnance, both visual and olfactory, that adhered to the experience of gangrene in antiquity. The likening of an opponent's teaching to gangrene is an attempt to conjure the visceral sensation of disgust and revulsion experienced when the pungent aroma of a gangrenous wound fills the nostrils. While the malodor of gangrene seems not to have indicated any kind of moral stench in a clinical setting (at least the physicians do not mention any), when used as a simile for impious teaching it becomes weaponized, as it were, for the purpose of suggesting moral repugnance. The putrid stench that attached to the decay of human flesh was associated, for Roman noses, with the mass burial sites, the *puticili* (associated by Varro with the term for rotting, *putescere*) for the impoverished poor of Rome.⁷² Sociologists have observed the cross-cultural phenomenon of stereotyping minority groups through association with foul

⁷¹ Ἀρίστωνι δακτύλου ποδὸς ἡλκωμένου ξὺν πυρετῷ ἀσάφεια· τὸ γαγγραινώδες ἀνέδραμεν ἄχρι πρὸς γόνυ· ἀπώλετο· ἦν δὲ μέλαν, ὑπόξηρον, δυσῶδες (*Epid.* 7.110 [Smith, LCL]).

⁷² David S. Potter, "Odor and Power in the Roman Empire," in *Constructions of the Classical Body*, ed. James I. Porter, Body, in Theory: Histories of Cultural Materialism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 169.

odors.⁷³ Rejection based on such bad smells is a way of odorizing the other, suggesting that moral putridity is associated with corporeal putrescence.⁷⁴ At the same time, in light of the medical imagery evoked by the disease, we should note that attention to smell was a critical tool in the ancient physician's diagnostic toolkit.⁷⁵ Ancient doctors interpreted and diagnosed via olfactory data no less than visual. With this in mind, we can appreciate how the Pastor's moral-medical assessment, that his opponents' teaching reeks of gangrene and is likely to spread upon the church body's epidermis and endanger the flesh below it, is meant to convey an authoritative diagnosis of the ecclesial condition.

H. Treatments and Their Implications for 2 Timothy 2:17

The potential treatments for gangrene serve as an important reminder that the pronouncement of the diagnosis of gangrene was not necessarily a death sentence. We mustn't think that gangrene was automatically regarded as a fatal disease. Indeed, the fact that *it could be stopped and even healed* means that there is the possibility of restoration. Furthermore, amputation was a last resort, and even excision of the affected areas was not the only option. There were other prescriptions, such as herbal remedies⁷⁶ or combinations of legumes with other ingredients.⁷⁷

Dioscorides (fl. ca. 50–79 CE) records a plant called ὀροβός (*Vicia ervillia*), or bitter vetch, for

⁷³ Gale Peter Largey and David Rodney Watson, "The Sociology of Odors," *American Journal of Sociology* 77.6 (1972): 1021–25. "The foul other is immediately and obviously repellant" (Constance Classen, "The Odor of the Other: Olfactory Symbolism and Cultural Categories," *Ethos* 2 [1992]: 158).

⁷⁴ Lawrence, *Sense and Stigma*, 83.

⁷⁵ Jonathan Reinartz, *Past Scents: Historical Perspectives on Smell*, Studies in Sensory History (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2014), 146.

⁷⁶ Celsus, *Med.* 5.20.3 offers an herbal recipe for "foul ulceration and gangrenes in the ears, nostrils and genitals, and their inflammatory complications" (Ad ulcera sordida et nigritiem in auribus, naribus. obscenis partibus, inflammationesque eorum [Spencer, LCL]).

⁷⁷ Pliny reports that lentils, in conjunction with other ingredients, could treat ulcers, gangrene, and other things (*Hist. nat.* 12.145–146). Cf. Kimberly B. Flint-Hamilton, "Legumes in Ancient Greece and Rome: Food, Medicine, or Poison?," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 68.3 (1999): 376. Pliny also records a remedy for ulcers and gangrenes that involved Cyprus ash mixed with weak wine (*Hist. nat.* 34.131).

curing a variety of dermatological ailments, including boils/ulcers and gangrene.⁷⁸ An important first step for treating gangrene, for this first century pharmacologist at any rate, was cleaning (καθαίρει) it with honey, which could "stay spreading ulcers and gangrenes" (νομάς τε ἴστησι καὶ γαγγραινας; cf. ὡς γάγγραινα νομὴν ἔξει at 2 Tim 1:17).

Among the Hippocratics, two approaches to remedy were recommended. A more conservative approach entails keeping the gangrenous part warm and elevated, and putting the patient on a strict diet. The second course of treatment debridement, surgical removal of the infected part below the lesion, since it is there that necrosis ensues most rapidly.⁷⁹ It is important to note that this does not entail amputation, which the Hippocratics never recommend.⁸⁰ Of course, gangrene can occur anywhere in the body, such as the head or ribs. For those, the Hippocratics recommend a number of remedies, including hellebore, oxymel, and trephination of the skull. Cataplasms and bandages could be applied, and a diet consisting only of water was recommended. The vital time frame for survival for those with gangrene in the skull seems to have been three to seven days. If they survived the seventh day, they almost certainly were in the clear. In gangrene of the ribs, when the patient is in pain and the wound mucousy, cauterization was recommended. If the gangrene had not reached the bone, only the flesh would be cauterized

⁷⁸ John M. Riddle, "Ancient and Medieval Chemotherapy for Cancer," *Isis* 76 (1985): 328 n.35. With honey, it cleanses sores (καθαίρει ἔλκη), birthmarks, blemishes, freckles, and the rest of the body; it stays spreading ulcers and gangrenes it softens indurations in the breasts, and it breaks off all around malignant ulcers, carbuncles, and impetigo contagiosa" (καθαίρει δὲ ἔλκη σὺν μέλιτι καὶ φακοὺς καὶ σπίλους καὶ ἐφήλεις καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα, νομάς τε ἴστησι [καὶ σκληρώματα] καὶ γαγγραινας, καὶ σκληρίας τὰς ἐν μαστοῖς μαλάσσει καὶ θηριώδη καὶ ἄνθρακας καὶ κηρία περιρρήττει [*Mat. med.* 2.108.2]). Trans. by Lily Y. Beck, *Pedanius Dioscorides Anazarbus: De materia medica*, *Altertumswissenschaftliche Texte und Studien* 38 (Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 2005), 139].

⁷⁹ Christopoulou-Aletra and Papavramidou, "Manifestation of 'Gangrene,'" 549.

⁸⁰ Christopoulou-Aletra and Papavramidou, "Manifestation of 'Gangrene,'" 550.

but not the bone. Thus, for Hippocratic authors, cauterization and the surgical removal⁸¹ of affected tissues were important elements of their recommended regimen.⁸²

The fact that many cases are quite treatable is emphasized by the Hippocratic authors. While some cases are certainly severe, many are not. "For the rest, in cases of mild character the bones do not come away, nor are they denuded of flesh; but the mortification is more superficial. One should take on these cases, for they are most of them more terrifying than dangerous."⁸³ In these scenarios, the treatment (ἵησις) is described as being "gentle" (πραεῖα).⁸⁴ For these cases, the ailment is seen as eminently healable; thus, severe measures are not called for. Celsus addresses less advanced cases in similar terms. When gangrene is not far spread, venesection is called for, along with very light bandages, cauterization, medicaments, and a balanced diet. Some of Celsus's assumptions about gangrene suggest a notion of pathology that can inform our reading of 2 Tim 2:17 and the ecclesial body. He writes that "gangrene, when not yet widespread, but only beginning, is not very difficult to cure, at any rate in a young subject."⁸⁵ In such cases careful

⁸¹ Ovid, *Metam.* 1.190–91, gives evidence of the occasional necessity of cutting away a diseased part: "With all before having been tried; but an unhealable body part (corpus) must be cut away by knife, lest the healthy part be drawn in to infection" (cuncta prius temptata, sed inmedicabile corpus esne recidendum, ne pars sincera trahatur [my trans.]).

⁸² Christopoulou-Aletra and Papavramidou, "Manifestation of 'Gangrene,'" 550. Concerning gangrene, Nutton reports how John of Ephesus describes the physicians' treatment of a colleague who had severe ulceration or gangrene of the genitals. They surgically removed the diseased area, applied bandages, and inserted a lead tube to allow for urination. This constitutes a form of amputation for gangrene. Cf. Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 189.

⁸³ τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅσα ἡσυχαίως, τὰ μὲν ὅστέα οὐκ ἀποπίπτει οὐδὲ σαρκῶν ψιλοῦται, ἀλλ' ἐπιπολαιότερον. προσδέχεσθαι ταῦτα χρή· τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα φοβερώτερα ἢ κακίῳ (Hippocrates, *Mochl.* 35 [Withington, LCL]).

⁸⁴ "Treatment: gentle, with warmth and strict diet; dangers: haemorrhage, chill; attitudes rather elevated; afterwards, because of collection of pus, on a level, or whatever suits. Haemorrhage supervenes in such cases, also in mortification, and dysentery at the crisis, copious, but of short duration. Patients do not lose their appetites much, nor are they feverish; and there is no reason why one should starve them" (ἡ ἵησις πραεῖα, θερμῇ διαίτῃ ἀκριβεῖ· κίνδυνος αἰμορραγιῶν, ψύχεος· σχήματα δὲ ὡς μὲν ἀνάρροπα, ἔπειτα ὑποστάσιος πύου εἵνεκα ἐξ ἴσου ἢ ὅσα συμφέρει. ἐπὶ τοῖσι τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσι μελασμοῖσιν, αἰμορραγίαι, δυσεντερίαι, περὶ κρίσιν, λαῦροι μὲν, ὀλιγήμεροι δέ. οὐκ ἀπόσιτοι δὲ πάνυ οὐδὲ πυρετώδεις, οὐδέ τι κενεαγγητέον) (Hippocrates, *Mochl.* 35 [Withington, LCL]).

⁸⁵ Gangrenam vero, si nondum plane tenet, sed adhuc incipit, curare non difficillimum est, utique in corpore iuvenili (*Med* 5.26.34a [Spencer, LCL]).

debridement can help.⁸⁶ Moderating diet is thought to be able to "tone up" the bowels and the body in general, a notion that presumes that certain foods are helpful for effecting a change in constitution and condition. The soft must be made firmer, and the wet must become dryer.⁸⁷ The principles of moderation and balance that govern ancient medicine are here on display.

Lastly, and importantly for a reading of 2 Tim 2:17, amputation of a limb is only a final resort."But it still happens sometimes that none of these remedies is effectual, and in spite of everything this canker spreads. In such circumstances there is one sad but solitary remedy to secure the safety of the rest of the body, that is to cut away the limb which is gradually dying."⁸⁸ Gangrene does not in and of itself suggest an unhealable disease any more than it necessarily implies the loss of limb or life. This reading of the ancient evidence regarding gangrene confirms that there is no significant difficulty in identifying the message of theological opponents with a spreading disease and in the same passage commending the possibility of their restoration (2 Tim 2:25). In fact, certain aspects of the Pastor's argument in our passage for how to deal with opponents and their gangrenous message have intriguing echoes in the therapies for gangrene that we have seen, namely, the "cleansing" (καθαίρειν) of gangrenous sores and the "gentle" (πραεῖα) treatment that can be applied to some forms of gangrene. While the Pastor's comment "if therefore someone thoroughly cleanses himself from these things" (ἐὰν οὖν τις ἐκκαθάρῃ ἀπὸ τούτων) likely refers to the plural κενοφωνίαί from 2:16 and not the gangrenous logos per se, the sense that cleansing can have a remedial effect is common to both. Similarly, the gentleness to be exhibited by the "Lord's slave" (δοῦλος κυρίου) in 2 Tim 2:24–25 to the "opponents" (οἱ

⁸⁶ One is to cut away from the part that is affected, up to the point of the healthy tissue (cf. locum male habet, usque eo [sanum corpus] concidere; *Med.* 5.26.34b).

⁸⁷ *Med* 5.26.34c.

⁸⁸ Solent vero nonnumquam nihil omnia auxilia proficere ac nihilo minus serpere is cancer. Inter quae, miserum sed unicum auxilium est, ut cetera pars corporis tuta sit, membrum, quod paulatim emoritur, abscidere (*Med* 5.26.34c-d [Spencer, LCL]).

ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι) is reminiscent of the gentle approach to those afflicted with gangrene. Therapy, in both cases, is what is called for.

I. Implications of the Imagery of Gangrene

One important interpretive implication of the above is that, while severe, gangrene was not necessarily a morbid disease that unequivocally portended the death or destruction of the "entire organism of the church."⁸⁹ It also did not automatically imply amputation, as though the opponents represented the gangrenous limb that had to be cut off from the body of Christ.⁹⁰ It indicates a severe malady, including putrefaction and necrosis, but it also admits of healing. While there is no way to tell, one might even imagine that the image of gangrene calls to mind the fact that most instances of gangrene were due to traumatic injuries, some of which were sustained in war. With the imagery of verbal battle (λογομαχεῖν) very much to the fore (2:14; cf. 2:24, οὐ δεῖ μάχεσθαι) and the need for Timothy to be equipped as a "practitioner" unashamed and well-acquainted with cutting straight with regard to the word of the truth (2:15), one might even suggest that this gangrenous λόγος and its spread is the pathological condition of the ecclesial body that has been wounded by the wordy warfare of the opponents, in danger of septic seepage lest Timothy perform salutary surgery. In the Pastor's usage, it likely communicates the putrefaction of a wound inflicted by the opponents' combative speech, their verbal warfare. While the possibility of such an interweaving of images remains necessarily speculative, we are on firm ground when we suggest that the mention of gangrene suggests that our author attempts to call

⁸⁹ Contra Spicq, *ÉBib*, 756. Chrysostom too reads the imagery of 2 Tim 2:17 as suggesting that it is unhealable (*Hom in 2 Tim* 5 [PG 62.626–27]).

⁹⁰ In a protracted and fascinating application of medical metaphors, the author of the *Apostolic Constitutions* (2.5.41) enumerates a variety of methods of cure, though he ultimately sees gangrene as an incurable disease that represents the member "past repentance" who must be cut off. Jerome Murphy-O'Connor is one who assumes gangrene necessarily indicates that it must be "cut out." Thus, he does not think in terms of amputation, but some sort of excision ("2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus," *RB* 98 [1991]: 416).

to mind (or nose) a smelly reminder of the repugnance of the gangrene with which his readers would have been all too familiar. It also sears onto the mind's eye a powerful visual image of blackened, necrotic tissue that threatens to overtake the ecclesial body, threatening a different healthy segment of the body with each advance. In a striking contrast to Paul, who positively nuanced his own carrying of the marks of Christ in his body and operated with an epiphanic logic whereby his wounds communicated the crucified Christ,⁹¹ the Pastoral depicts the ecclesial body as bearing the necrotic marks of a message turned septic, rotting the flesh of the body of Christ as it advances.

IV. Healthy Teaching and Pathological Itching (2 Tim 4:1–5)

2 Timothy 4:1–5

1 I solemnly charge you, in the presence of God and Christ Jesus, who is going to judge the living and the dead, by⁹² his epiphany and by his reign: 2 Proclaim the word! Be ready when the time is convenient and when it is not⁹³; censure, rebuke, exhort, in all patience and teaching. 3 For there will be a time when they will not tolerate healthy teaching, but on account of their own lusts will pile up teachers for themselves because of their itching ear, 4 and they will turn their ear away from the truth, and will turn to myths. 5 But you, be sober⁹⁴ in everything, put up with the bad, do the work of an evangelist, fulfill your ministry.⁹⁵

⁹¹ For the concept of "epiphanic logic," see Margaret M. Mitchell, "Epiphanic Evolutions in Earliest Christianity," *Illinois Classical Studies* 29 (2004): 183–204.

⁹² BDAG, 233, suggests that the verb διαμαρτύρομαι here governs both the prepositional phrase (ἐνώπιον etc.) and the double accusative construction. One could understand this as accusatives with a verb of swearing (cf. BDF § 149, which does not, however, cite this passage). So too Mounce, WBC, 571 and Larry J. Perkins, *The Pastoral Letters: A Handbook on the Greek Text*, BHGNT (Baylor: Baylor University Press, 2017), 222. Johnson, AB, 427–28, offers "in view of his appearance and his kingdom." Towner, NICNT, 595–600, argues that the purpose of the double construction with the verb is to stack up eschatological symbols: "The combination of elements has the effect of first locating Timothy in the divine presence to hear the charge, with the reference to judgment giving the charge focus; then the following elements of parousia and kingdom serve as the eschatological ground of the charge (perhaps in anticipation of 4:8) and are placed into the accusative case" (597).

⁹³ The phrase εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως has vexed interpreters, and will be discussed further below. Here we note that contrasting pairs are joined asyndetically (BDF § 460.1).

⁹⁴ The contrast is here made between Timothy and his errant audience. His is the path of sobriety, theirs is that of wanton pleasure-seeking.

⁹⁵ 1 Διαμαρτύρομαι ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ μέλλοντος κρίνειν ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς, καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ· 2 κήρυξον τὸν λόγον, ἐπίστηθι εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως, ἔλεγχον, ἐπιτίμησον, παρακάλεσον, ἐν πάσῃ

A. Literary Context

There is a good case to be made that the larger structural unit of which our passage is a part runs from 3:10 to 4:5, framed (3:10, 4:5) and centered (3:14) by the phrase *σὺ δέ*, "but you" or "you, however."⁹⁶ The subject of the preceding verses in 3:1–9 is the latter-days proliferation of vice-prone malefactors (3:1–5) to whom are likened the opponents of the Pastor (3:5–9). What follows in 3:10–17 is a series of exhortations to Timothy, punctuated and substantiated by some generally applicable comments (3:12–13). Immediately following the final second person imperative exhortation of our passage—"But you, be sober in all circumstances" (*Σὺ δὲ νῆφε ἐν πᾶσιν*)—is a soulful soliloquy by the aged Paul. This Pauline "self"-narration (cf. *Ἐγώ* at 4:6) also has bearing on our interpretation of 4:1–5, since the author is still concerned with time (*καιρός*) and one's relationship to it, even using the same verb as in 4:2, though here in the perfect: "the hour of my dissolution has drawn nigh" (*ἐφέστηκεν*). Paul is here presented as a model, presenting perfect awareness of the time he finds himself in. Even as Timothy's athletic contest is underway (2 Tim 2:5; cf. *στεφανοῦσθαι*), Paul's has come to a close, and he's ready for his wreath (*στέφανος* at 2 Tim 4:8).

B. Scholarship on 2 Timothy 4:1–5

There are two primary scholarly arguments I wish to engage regarding this passage. The first is that of Abraham Malherbe, who argues that the Pastor's use of *εὐκαιρῶς ἀκαιρῶς* in 4:2 is oxymoronic and controverts the established sensibility that untimely frank speech was a rhetorical

μακροθυμία καὶ διδαχῇ. 3 Ἔσται γὰρ καιρὸς ὅτε τῆς ὑγιαίνουσας διδασκαλίας οὐκ ἀνέξονται ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἑαυτοῖς ἐπισπῶρεύουσιν διδασκάλους κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοήν 4 καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν ἀκοήν ἀποστρέψουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς μύθους ἐκτραπήσονται. 5 Σὺ δὲ νῆφε ἐν πᾶσιν, κακοπάθησον, ἔργον ποίησον εὐαγγελιστοῦ, τὴν διακονίαν σου πληροφόρησον.

⁹⁶ Robert W. Wall and Richard B. Steele, *1 and 2 Timothy and Titus*, Two Horizons New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 2012), 264.

(and even moral) faux pas and smacked of the harsh practices of Cynicism, and that the very notion that Timothy would administer untimely, harsh criticism suggests that the deluded opponents are beyond any hope of restoration or healing.⁹⁷ This interpretation has proven to be quite influential, and several major commentators have followed Malherbe in this regard.⁹⁸ The other argument I wish to engage is that of Matthijs den Dulk, who has recently argued that the phrase *κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοήν* in 4:3 invokes a rhetorical topos and refers to a desire for auditory pleasure, a tickling of the ears, and does not convey a sense of curiosity or of painful itching or a need for scratching, but rather a desire for pleasure.⁹⁹ Both arguments are well-constructed and offer bountiful comparative materials to think with, and I agree with certain aspects of each. However, in keeping with the broader argument of this chapter, I wish to demonstrate that the author of 2 Timothy uses the imagined body of the church, here the "ears" of those Timothy will be addressing, as a site. The ears of the opponents' auditors constitute a synecdochic location that the Pastor identifies as diseased and in need of and therefore, pace Malherbe, logically subject to remedy and therapy. I argue that this passage seeks to present Timothy as the purveyor of expert therapeutic insight and a bearer of a ready remedy for the deviants' pathological desire for novel and pleasurable insights. I demonstrate, through a reconsideration of this passage with attention to its immediate argumentative context and several key contemporary discourses regarding doctor-patient relationships and near-contemporary articulations of the pathology of desire, that this passage gives further evidence of the Pastor's nimble and nuanced negotiation of psychosomatic affections as indicators of theological and moral status.

⁹⁷ Abraham J. Malherbe, "‘In Season and Out of Season’: 2 Timothy 4:2," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959-2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1.187-96.

⁹⁸ Weiser, EKKNT, 301–2; Towner, NICNT, 600–601; Marshall, ICC, 900–901, has some reservations about Malherbe's conclusions regarding the incurability of the audience, but he accepts the basic premise of his article.

⁹⁹ Matthijs den Dulk, "No More Itch (2 Tim 4.3)," *NTS* 64.1 (2018): 81–93.

C. εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως

In his argument regarding the adverbial phrase from 2 Tim 4:1, εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως, Malherbe demonstrates that attention to καιρός, the time or situation an orator or philosopher found himself in with respect to his audience, was a subject of discussion from the classical period¹⁰⁰ and into the first and second century CE. Malherbe provides important evidence that suggests a concern for timing in speech and especially παρρησία, as well as whether one should engage individuals or groups, was a preoccupation of some of the Pastor's philosophical contemporaries.¹⁰¹ Malherbe shows that in rhetoric and philosophy, the concern to speak εὐκαίρως refers to the right time to speak, whether from the speaker or the audience's perspective. Malherbe suggests that most commentators have been preoccupied "with the person or persons to whom the preaching should be opportune or inopportune."¹⁰² Regarding ἀκαίρως in 2 Timothy, Malherbe suggests that this adverb means that Timothy is exhorted to censure his opponents, even when the time is wrong. However, some caution is needed in accepting Malherbe's argument regarding the adverb ἀκαίρως, for while it can refer to a bad or unseasonable time in particular, it can also simply refer to a general disregard for considerations of timeliness. For instance, Plutarch remarks that "Demades used to say that the Athenians, who were for war ἀκαίρως, never voted for peace without black garments" (ὁ Δημάδης πολεμικοὺς ἀκαίρως τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας ἔλεγε μηδέποτε χειροτονεῖν εἰρήνην ἄνευ μελάνων ἱματίων), i.e., only when they were mourning as a result of military defeat.¹⁰³ The use of ἀκαίρως does not convey the idea that the Athenians made war *only* when the timing was wrong or inconvenient, but rather that they made war any time they wished, without regard for timing.

¹⁰⁰ Plato, *Phaedr.* 271d-272a, presents Socrates as suggesting that ψυχαγωγία requires an understanding of the different forms (εἶδη) of souls and speeches that exist, as well as a diagnosis of εὐκαιρία and ἀκαιρία.

¹⁰¹ Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 65e-74e is especially to the point. See Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 192-93.

¹⁰² Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 187-88.

¹⁰³ *Tu. san.* 126e.

These considerations suggest that the merism *εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως* need not, even when understood against the background of ancient rhetoric and philosophy (as surely it must be), necessarily suggest that Timothy is engaged in a convoluted self-contradiction.¹⁰⁴

Here it is important to note that philosophers were depicted as seizing every opportunity to instruct an audience or individual. While Malherbe emphasizes the sources that suggest keen and necessary concern for speaking *εὐκαιρος*, there is evidence that highlights that the right time for a philosopher is whenever he can get an audience. For instance, a pertinent passage from Maximus is dismissed too readily by Malherbe, who writes: "Maximus of Tyre, on the other hand, says that there is no *καιρός* appropriate to the philosopher's discourse, but he appears to have in mind the social context peculiarly adapted to receiving philosophical instruction."¹⁰⁵ On the contrary, the passage Malherbe cites emphasizes the importance of not hampering the philosopher from speaking whenever he can. There is no single time in life when the philosopher's message is suitable: "[Like the bard] the speaker [*ρήτωρ*] too has his moment, in the packed court-house, and the poet at the Dionysia, when a chorus is required. But philosophical teaching has no single occasion set aside as its own."¹⁰⁶ Maximus draws an analogy to someone who unduly restricts a remarkably versatile soldier: "Whoever refuses to allow the philosopher to seize every opportunity (*ὅστις οὐκ ἄξιόι τὸν φιλόσοπον μηδένα παριέναι καιρὸν λόγου*) to speak seems to me to be doing the same as someone who selects a single station from the whole chancy, fluctuating, unstable business of war, and there confines the versatile soldier who knows how to fight both as hoplite and as archer, and can shoot as effectively on horseback as he can from a

¹⁰⁴ Collins, NTL, 269, explains: "The merism, similar to the Latin *per fas et nefas* or the English 'in fair weather and foul,' is all the more intense because it lacks a connecting particle. The Pastor uses a juxtaposition of two antithetical terms to speak about all times."

¹⁰⁵ *Diss.* 1.3 (cited by Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 190).

¹⁰⁶ . . . καὶ ῥήτορος καιρὸς εἷς, ἐπειδὴν ἀθροισθῇ τὰ δικαστήρια, καὶ ποιητοῦ καιρὸς (εἷς) ἐν Διονυσίοις, ἐπειδὴν χοροῦ δέη· τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ λόγῳ οὐδεὶς ἀποτέμνεται καιρὸς ἴδιος (*Diss.* 1.3; Trapp).

chariot."¹⁰⁷ The goal of such a passage seems to suggest in particular that the philosopher, like the soldier, is expert in a variety of verbal corrections, and hence to impose undue restrictions on his exercise of them is unreasonable. Similarly, Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.38–39 seems not to support Malherbe's particular argument, since it paints a picture of the philosopher who takes whatever chance he can (cf. "whenever he obtains some opportunity" [ὁσάκις ἂν καιροῦ τύχῃ]) to engage people for their moral benefit, whether individually or in groups, sometimes with harsh words and sometimes not.¹⁰⁸ That is to say, this image matches the variety of speech and occasion reflected in 2 Tim 4:1, but involves no contradictions with the tradition of timely speech. Thus, both attunement to the right time to speak and the philosopher's need to be ready at any moment are *topoi* evident in the literature. Consequently, it is unnecessary to interpret 2 Tim 4:2 in such a way that Paul is recommending an acerbic approach to exhortation at odds with the "patience" (*μακροθυμία*) recommended in the same verse.

Perhaps the most important corrective, however, pertains to what we imagine is the referent for the ostensibly oxymoronic *εὐκαιρῶς ἀκαιρῶς*. For Malherbe, it is preaching or exhortation.¹⁰⁹ This interpretive choice constitutes the premise behind all the laudable and fascinating comparative work he offers to illustrate the cultural values around timely and untimely speech and exhortation in the Greco-Roman world. The major difficulty with this interpretation is that it creates enormous and unnecessary difficulties for Malherbe, who is then at pains to explain how the Pastor is both aware of the *topos* of speaking at the most opportune time for the recipient of rebuke and yet allegedly thoroughly disregards it for the sake of demonstrating how hopelessly

¹⁰⁷ παραπλήσιον γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δρᾶν ὅστις οὐκ ἀξιοῖ τὸν φιλόσοφον μηδὲνα παριέναι καιρὸν λόγου, οἷον εἴ τις καὶ ἀνδρὶ δεινῷ τὰ πολέμια, ἀγαθῷ μὲν ὀπλιτεύειν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ ἐκηβολεῖν καὶ ἐφ' ἵππου καὶ ξὺν ἄρματι, ἀποκρίναι καιρὸν ἓνα ἐξελόμενος τῆς ὅλης τοῦ πολέμου χρείας καὶ τύχης, πράγματος οὐχ ἐστῶτος οὐδ' ὡμολογημένου (*Diss.* 1.3 [Trapp. ed. and trans.]).

¹⁰⁸ Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 192.

¹⁰⁹ "Because ἐπίστηθι has no object, the relation of the admonition to the rest of the sentence is unclear, but it seems natural to take it as pointing to the preceding κήρυξον" (Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 187).

deluded his audience is. Much simpler is to acknowledge that the peculiar asyndetic adverbial formulation *εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως* simply modifies the immediately preceding term *ἐπίστηθι* and may be translated thus: "be ready"¹¹⁰ when the time is convenient and when it is not." In other words, this passage does not pertain to untimely rebuke per se, but to the posture of readiness that Timothy is to assume in his ministry duties (cf. 2 Tim 3:17, 4:5), which here are outlined as a variety of different types of exhortation and teaching. Malherbe and others read this passage as though it ran thus: *κήρυξον τὸν λόγον εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως*. But the crucial intervening *ἐπίστηθι* puts a significant buffer here. It places emphasis on Timothy's readiness for the job, not dissimilar from the characterization he received just two verses before: "a man of God, prepared for every good deed" (*ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος, πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἐξηρτισμένος*). However, it is not that Timothy's readiness has nothing to do with his rhetorical activity; rather, he is to demonstrate readiness to apply whatever kind of exhortation is needed. The fact that the Pastor lists *multiple kinds* of corrective speech¹¹¹ in addition to the more general task of "proclaim(ing) the word" (*κήρυξον τὸν λόγον*) suggests a constant readiness and an attunement to the situation before him, not a complete disregard for the task at hand.

¹¹⁰ For this translation, see BDAG, 418.

¹¹¹ Malherbe observes that later patristic exegetes read the different kinds of speech in 2 Tim 4:2 as pertaining to varying degrees of therapeutic intervention: "Theophylact likens rebuke (*ἐπιτίμησις*) to surgery, and exhortation (*παράκλησις*) to milder drugs, while Theodoret likens reproof (*ἐλεγχος*) to surgery, and exhortation to milder measures" (Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 194 n. 41). We can add Ambrose, *Ep.* 41.4, who comments: "Two stern words and one gentle, but stern only that he might soften them. To bodies sick with excess of gall, bitter food and drink taste sweet and, on the other hand, sweet dishes taste bitter. Similarly when the mind is wounded, it sickens under the attentions of an unctuous flattery and is again tempered by the bitterness of correction" (trans. S. L. Greenslade, ed., *Early Latin Theology: Selections from Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose and Jerome*, LCC 5 [SCM, 1956], 541). Similarly, Chrysostom (*Hom. in 2 Tim.* 9.1 [PG 62.651]) views the exhortation *παρακάλεσον* as the physician's medicament (*φάρμακον*) following surgery (*τομή*).

D. "In season and out" and the Philosopher's Therapy

Malherbe allows that the tradition of a physician's discernment of the proper treatment may lie somewhere in the background of the Pastor's phrase *ευκαίρως ἀκαίρως*,¹¹² but he argues against the notion that Timothy's speech is meant by the Pastor to constitute any sort of pastoral therapy for the opponents, even though he acknowledges that the whole point behind a philosopher timing well his rebuke is for its therapeutic value.¹¹³

The persons the author has in mind are not well-meaning individuals who have gone astray and are open to reason and persuasion which would effect their return to the truth. They are obstinate and their unwillingness to endure sound teaching would appear to place them beyond the pale. There seems to be no prospect of amelioration in their condition that could justify that adaptation of speech which is at the heart of the admonition to speak *εὐκαίρως* only. Given the extremity of their condition, Timothy is directed to preach without giving consideration to whether it is opportune or inopportune to do so. That is the thrust of the oxymoron. In this respect the attitude is that of the pessimistic Cynic who flays his deluded audience.¹¹⁴

This interpretation cannot be supported.¹¹⁵ This reading glosses over the fact that in the very same verse (4:2) as the ostensible admonition to lacerate his audience with harsh words, further qualifications for how Timothy is to speak are given: "in all patience and teaching" (*ἐν πάσῃ μακροθυμίᾳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ*).¹¹⁶ The same patient, gentle approach recalls the ideal manner of engaging "opponents" (*οἱ ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι*) already discussed earlier in 2 Tim 2:25, namely, "in

¹¹² Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 189.

¹¹³ Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 193. Malherbe cites Plutarch, *Quomodo adulator*, to make his point: "Frankness should be therapeutic (*θεραπευτικὴ παρηρσία*), and that it can be when, like a physician, the philosopher acts at the correct *καιρός* (73D–74A). As physicians continue their treatment after surgery, so those who use admonition should not abandon people after stinging them with their words (74DE)."

¹¹⁴ Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 196.

¹¹⁵ Malherbe (194) acknowledges the first aspect somewhat dismissively, "notwithstanding the addition of the dangling 'in patience and in teaching,'" and gives no satisfactory explanation of it. See too the similar critique of Malherbe by Martin Winter, "Die 'Pastoralbriefe': Ihr Name im Licht der popularphilosophischen Seelenleitung," *KD* 59.4 (2013): 244–49.

¹¹⁶ Another good option for translation is proposed by Johnson, AB, 429: "with every sort of long-suffering," which captures "the responsive character of this virtue in the process of teaching and preaching." As for the somewhat odd addition of "and teaching," Chrysostom explains that "no ordinary teaching" (*μὴ ἐν τῇ τυχεύσει*) is meant, but rather an extraordinary commitment to the hearer's restoration through patient teaching and exhortation (*Hom. in 2 Tim. 9.1* [PG 62.651]).

gentleness" (ἐν πραΰτητι). How the Pastor's approach to psychagogy should have so completely changed cannot be explained on Malherbe's reading of the text.

E. "Not Putting Up with the Healthy Teaching": Petulant Patients

When the Pastor writes that a *καιρός* will come when "they will not put up with the healthy teaching," (τῆς ὑγιαίνουσας διδασκαλίας οὐκ ἀνέχονται), I argue the Pastor continues the patient-physician conceit, likening the "healthy teaching" to a kind of medicine that a sick patient will not accommodate.¹¹⁷ People not wanting to "put up with" (ἀνέχεσθαι) the healthy teaching sounds very much like patients not wanting to take their medicine.¹¹⁸ This draws upon a topos in philosophical literature that likens the truth to a doctor's drug that patients do not wish to take, or the necessity for the philosopher to rebuke his audience, just like doctors must sometimes administer painful remedies.¹¹⁹ The notion of "tolerating" or "putting up with" (ἀνέχεσθαι) medicine or not is recognizable in literature from this period. Plutarch recalls how some in the early Republican era suggested that the "state was incurable" (ἀνήκεστον εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν) except by monarchy (μοναρχία), and that it was "necessary to put up with this medicine if offered by the

¹¹⁷ Johnson, AB, 436 offers a complementary interpretation, suggesting that "Paul here shows the keen diagnostic ability of Hellenistic moral philosophers, who recognized the ways in which humans resist and repel what is good for them." However, his analysis is cursory and lacks substantiation, drawing attention only generally to the treatise of Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.*

¹¹⁸ Patients then, like patients now, were not always welcoming of "doctor's orders," including the medicines they prescribed. For examples, see Susan P. Mattern, *Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 146–49.

¹¹⁹ In Philodemus's *On Frank Criticism* (ed. Konstan et al.), *παρηγσία* and other forms of admonishment are tolerated (ἀνέχεσθαι) by the would-be wise man if they come from philosophers or scholars (cf. *Parr.* coll. Xa.12, Xb.8, XIIIb.11), but not if they come from one of his pupils (*Parr.* col. XIIb.8). The wise man himself endures the administering of *παρηγσία*, but pleasurelessly (ἀήδως), as one who drinks "wormwood" (ἀψίνθιον) (*Parr.* col. I Ib.8). Similarly, in a comment on 2 Tim 4:1 (*Hom. in 2 Tim.* 9.1 [PG 62.651]), John Chrysostom writes that "if you rebuke without reproofs, you will seem to be insolent, and nobody puts up with it" (ὅν τε γὰρ χωρὶς ἐλέγχων ἐπιτιμῆσης, δόξεις εἶναι θρασὺς, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀνέχεται). For a thorough comparison between Philodemus's therapeutic strategies in *Περὶ Παρηγσίας* and points of similarity and dissimilarity with the Pastorals, see Benjamin Fiore, "The Pastoral Epistles in the Light of Philodemus' 'On Frank Criticism,'" in *Philodemus and the New Testament World*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn Stanfield Holland, *NovTSup* 111 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 271–93.

gentlest of doctors" (τὸ φάρμακον τοῦτο χρῆναι τοῦ πραοτάτου τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀνασχέσθαι προσφέροντος), namely, Pompey.¹²⁰ Galen often uses the term ἀνέχεσθαι to describe the toleration of various medicinal remedies (ἀνέχεσθαι φαρμάκων).¹²¹ In one instance, he advocates an especially painful treatment "for ulcers in the ears" (περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐλκων) "even if it seems unreasonable for the ear to endure these harsh drugs" (εἰ καὶ παράλογον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῶν δριμυτάτων φαρμάκων ἀνέχεσθαι τὸ οὔς).¹²²

In his treatise on how to choose the best physician (*De optimo medico cognoscendo*), preserved only in Arabic, Galen narrates the symbiosis of sycophantic charlatan healers and pleasure-seeking, wealthy patients:

They are not interested in this matter which calls upon them to lend us their ears, even for a while, so that we may instruct them on the indications by which they can recognize the intensity of a disease, whether it is severe or slight, malignant or benign. Some of them spend their lives amassing wealth and seeking positions of power; others indulge in pleasure; and a minority, who take up reading, keep themselves busy by devoting their lives to (the study of) useless traditions of the past and the daily (records of) chronicles which are mostly false. They investigate the etymology of words, and how these were used in the past. (*Opt. med. cogn.* 13.2)¹²³

These sick and wealthy individuals have no desire to learn to discern a truly beneficial physician. Guided by their desire for pleasurable relief, they select smooth, unscrupulous "doctors" who are not, in Galen's estimation, worthy of the name.¹²⁴ Galen laments wealthy patients' lack of interest in finding or heeding good physicians. He writes that they will not lend their ears, since they are preoccupied by the desire for wealth, power, pleasure, or the pursuit of arcane scholarly investigations.

¹²⁰ Plutarch, *Caes.* 28. Cf. Appian, *Hist. rom.* 3.9.2, which relates how a Roman military leader "endured hot drugs" (φαρμάκων ἀνασχέσθαι θερμῶν) in order to resolve an eye disease.

¹²¹ E.g., *Meth. med.* 6.455K, *Ad Glauc.* 11.98K.

¹²² *Comp. med. loc.* 12.609K. For the same treatment, see *MM* 5 (10.356K).

¹²³ CMG Supp. 4, 129; Iskandar trans.

¹²⁴ *Opt. med. cogn.* 1.8–10 (CMG Supp. Or. 4, 45).

F. "According to their own lusts": The Pathology of Desire

An integral part of the presentation of Timothy's audience is the suggestion that they are rejecting the healthy teaching and *heaping up* teachers in accordance with their own *lusts* (κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας).¹²⁵ With the repetition of the σωφ- terminology in combination with the language of ἐπιθυμίας, the author here reminds his readers of what he has just said in 2 Tim 3:6–7: "For from these are those who slip into houses and take captive little ladies that are heaped up¹²⁶ with sins (σεσωρευμένα ἁμαρτίαις), driven by diverse lusts (ἀγόμενα ἐπιθυμίαις ποικίλαις),¹²⁷ always learning and never able to come to a recognition of the truth."¹²⁸ For the Pastor, ἐπιθυμίας are powerful, motivating forces. Excessive desire is associated with those who have little control over themselves.¹²⁹ As we demonstrated above, in the medicalized language of moral philosophy, lusts were interpreted as psychosomatic ailments.¹³⁰ For instance, Plato suggests (*Phaedr.* 231d) that those who are afflicted with passion (ἐπιθυμία) are said to be "sick rather than in a right mind" (νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σωφρονεῖν). Desire itself is indicative of a pathological condition. The phrase κατὰ

¹²⁵ On the one hand, the subject of ἀνέξονται seems to refer to aberrant members of the church insofar as they are heaping up other teachers besides Timothy and Paul (4:3). On the other hand, the eschatological tone (ἔσται γὰρ καιρὸς ὅτε) might suggest some connection to a more general class of wayward individuals who are characteristic of the dark and dismal future when Paul's authority will not be heeded.

¹²⁶ There is a tendency among Greek historians to narrate in garish terms the collection of dead bodies as "heaping up a multitude of corpses" (σεσωρευῆσθαι νεκρῶν πλῆθος [Josephs, *B.J.* 2.30; cf. *B.J.* 2.497, 4.380, 6.259) and those corpses being trampled upon (*B.J.* 5.34, 6.432). Cf. Polybius, *Hist.* 16.8.9; Diodorus Siculus, *Bib. hist.* 2.19.6, 12.62.5, 15.86.5, 16.86.4, 17.34.4. The term is used to refer to cut up animal corpses in the Hippocratic pseudepigraphical letters (*Ep.* 17.2).

¹²⁷ Cf. the similar formulation of Titus 3:3—δουλεύοντες ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς ποικίλαις.

¹²⁸ ἐκ τούτων γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ ἐνδύνοντες εἰς τὰς οἰκίας καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντες γυναῖκάρια σεσωρευμένα ἁμαρτίαις, ἀγόμενα ἐπιθυμίαις ποικίλαις, πάντοτε μανθάνοντα καὶ μηδέποτε εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν δυνάμενα.

¹²⁹ Plutarch's language gives a sense of the imagined relationship between pleasures, desires, and their capacity to affect "those who don't have a grip on themselves" (οἱ μὴ κρατοῦντες ἑαυτῶν): "Moreover, it is well that those who because of pleasures fail in self-control, and give way to their desires or are carried away by them (φερομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν), should be instructed and reminded that pleasures derive most of their satisfaction from the body" (Καὶ μὴν τοὺς γε διὰ τὰς ἡδονὰς μὴ κρατοῦντας ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' ἐγκλίνοντας ἢ φερομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καλῶς ἔχει διδάσκειν καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκειν ὅτι πλεῖστον ἐκ τοῦ σώματος αἱ ἡδοναὶ λαμβάνουσι.) (*Tu. san.* 128c [Babbitt; LCL]).

¹³⁰ See Chapter 3.

τὰς ἰδίαις ἐπιθυμίαις in 2 Tim 4:3 suggests that their piling up (ἐπισωρεύειν)¹³¹ of teachers is borne of a frenzied, impulsive desire to accumulate, a kind of hoarding of instructors that the Pastor deems to be the result of their sick refusal of the healthy teaching.

G. Itching Ears or Ears to Be Tickled or Scratched?

We turn now to a most curious phrase and its role in the argument of this passage: κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοήν. The metonymic reference to ears¹³² here pertains to the audience's willingness to listen or not, but it also helps to build out the bodily portrait of the church. That the "they" who will "not bear" or "put up with" (οὐκ ἀνέξονται) the healthy teaching refers to members of the church and not the opponents per se is suggested by their activity of heaping up teachers, presumably the opponents, for themselves. 2 Tim 4:1–5 reflects a critical juncture in the letter, for it imagines a future eventuality wherein the health of the audience has deteriorated to the point that they are no longer listening to Timothy—who is commanded to hold fast to an "outline of the healthy words" that he has received from the διδάσκαλος Paul (2 Tim 1:11; cf. 1 Tim 2:7)—but are seeking other διδάσκαλοι.¹³³ Timothy's mode of engagement with the church is emphasized in 4:2 for precisely this reason, punctuated by γάρ in 4:3, that a time will come when such pastoral exhortation, denoted by the "hearing of the truth" (τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ ἀκοή) in 4:4, will not be heeded. Nevertheless, Timothy must persevere, his sobriety (cf. νῆφε) and his "work of an evangelist" (ἔργον εὐαγγελιστοῦ) all the more important in light of this looming age of escape to μῦθοι (4:5).

¹³¹ The compound form of the term is rare, and is likely emphatic, or, according to Friedrich Lang, "σωρεύω κτλ," *TDNT* 7.1096 n. 12, a "strengthening."

¹³² Here I translate the term ἀκοή, which can refer to the act or faculty of hearing, as "ears," referring to "the organ w[ith] which one hears" (BDAG, 36).

¹³³ The contrast between a singular "teacher" (Paul) and multiple "teachers" is also drawn by Collins, *NLT*, 270.

The emphasis in 4:3, our primary focus here, is the condition of these errant individuals and their unhealthy pursuit; the Pastor is concerned with their deviance and how to depict it. To do this, the Pastor pathologizes a particular body part that carried certain cultural resonances. In a rhetorical culture that was framed in terms of the contrast between truth and flattery, ears were a metonymic signifier for an audience's capacity for persuasion. Ears represent not only the capacity to hear, but also the willingness of an audience to listen and comply with the speaker's message.¹³⁴ Flattery especially is depicted as a "disease" that pertains to the ears, and one that can "tickle" or "titillate" (γαργαλίζειν) as well.¹³⁵ So then, what is the sense of κνηθόμενοι in our verse? For starters, we observe that the verb κνήθειν, according to BrillDAG and LSJ, typically means "to scratch" in the active voice, and to either "scratch oneself" or "to be provoked or irritated" or, figuratively, "to itch" in the middle voice.¹³⁶ κνήθειν is a derivative form of κνᾶν,¹³⁷ from which the cognate nominal forms are derived,¹³⁸ and holds essentially the same range of meanings, though κνᾶν can at times mean "to tickle."¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Ears and their sensitivity can also be used as a commentary on the value or quality of the words being spoken. For instance, Philo (*Det.* 72) complains that sophists "grate our ears" (ἀποκναίουσι γοῦν ἡμῶν τὰ ὦτα) when they pontificate about the benefit of virtue.

¹³⁵ κολακεία is depicted by Plutarch (*Adul. amic.* 49c) as a νόσημα that afflicts not the poor or obscure but "great . . . houses" (οἵκοι μεγάλοι). κολακεία "infects" (ἀναπιμπλάναι) even true friendship with distrust (*Adul. amic.* 50f). Furthermore, flattery tickles (γαργαλίζειν). Plutarch says that the flatterer holds fast to the ears (τὰ ὦτα) of the lovers of honor (φιλότιμοι) like a tick to a dog (*Adul. amic.* 55e).

¹³⁶ BrillDAG, 1143. LSJ, 964, offers essentially the same range of meanings. BDAG, 550, adds little, but glosses the NT hapax as "itch," a passive with an active sense. BDAG also suggests that "one might transl[ate]: *to have one's ear tickled.*"

¹³⁷ See Robert Beekes (with the assistance of Lucien van Beek), "-κναίω," in *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*, Indo-European Etymological Dictionaries Online, ed. Alexander Lubotsky (Brill Online, 2015).

¹³⁸ According to BrillDAG, 1144, the term κνήσις, deriving from κνᾶν, can mean "scratching," "irritation, itching," or "pleasurable tickling." The last example (Plutarch, *Superst.* 167b) is notable because it pertains to the tickling of the ears (κνήσις ὠτων).

¹³⁹ For this meaning, BrillDAG, 1143 points to Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 61d, which is instructive for the binary established between that which is healthy (τὸ ὑγιαῖνον), fostered by the friend as doctor (ιατρός), and the flatterer (κόλαξ) on the other hand, who "tickles and titillates and seduces" (κνᾶ καὶ γαργαλίζει καὶ ἀναπείθει) that which is "emotional and irrational" (τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλλόγον).

The ambiguity afforded by both the syntax of the phrase *κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοήν* and the sense of *κνήθεσθαι* have produced two general interpretive trends.¹⁴⁰ Many scholars¹⁴¹ and English translations have taken the phrase as connoting itching ears, such as the NRSV: "the time is coming when people will not put up with sound doctrine, but having itching ears, will accumulate for themselves teachers to suit their own desires." The rendering "having itching ears," does not take a stand on whether the circumstantial participle should be read as final (or resultative), but renders it simply coordinate,¹⁴² modifying the subject of "will heap up" (*ἐπισωρεύουσιν*).¹⁴³ Some scholars have opted for the translation "as they scratch their ears."¹⁴⁴ At times, scholars have surmised that painful itching has led Timothy's audience to seek teachers who will provide a healing remedy for their itch.¹⁴⁵

Others have read *κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοήν* as conveying a *desire* for their ears to be tickled,¹⁴⁶ rendering the phrase with a purpose or final clause or otherwise conveying intent, such as "in order to have their ears tickled"¹⁴⁷ or "wanting to have their ears tickled."¹⁴⁸ The association between ears that wish to hear pleasant things and flattery is widespread in literature from this period.¹⁴⁹ One potential problem for the translation of this passage as a final clause, however, is

¹⁴⁰ A third category includes those who avoid the problem altogether, using elliptical and colorless translations like "they will accumulate teachers who say what they want to hear" (Wall, THNTC, 264);

¹⁴¹ E.g., Knight, NIGTC, 455–56; Arichea & Hatton, UBSHS, 241.

¹⁴² Similarly with some form of "having itching ears" as a simple coordinate phrase: ASV, DBY, KJV, NKJV.

¹⁴³ Misleading or confusing translations, because they translate *κνηθόμενοι* as though it modified *διδασκάλους*, include the Douay-Rheims Catholic Bible, which translates "they will heap to themselves teachers having itching ears" and the rather free rendering of Richard Pervo, SB, 69: "will collect droves of teachers who will tickle their ears and pander to their desires."

¹⁴⁴ Collins, NTL, 266.

¹⁴⁵ BDAG, 550, suggests that this is a "fig[ure] of curiosity, that looks for interesting and juicy bits of information. This itching is relieved by the messages of the new teachers."

¹⁴⁶ Marshall, ICC, 803, considers this the better option.

¹⁴⁷ See Den Dulk, "No More Itch (2 Tim 4.3)," 92. Weiser, EKKNT, 298: "um sich die Ohren kitzeln zu lassen"; EDNT 2.301: "The participial phrase probably means 'in order to have their ears *tickled*'" (italics original).

¹⁴⁸ NASB. Fiore, SP, 176 has "will heap up teachers for themselves to tickle their ears."

¹⁴⁹ E.g., Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33 (*1 Tars.*) 15–16; Seneca, *Ep.* 108.6.

the fact that nowhere else in 2 Timothy or the PE is a present circumstantial participle used to convey purpose; rather, the author tends to use ἵνα.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, even in the New Testament as whole, as C. F. D. Moule observes, "it is not easy to find a *Present* Participle certainly used in this sense."¹⁵¹ This is not insignificant, because it is hard to see how to translate the phrase with the explicit language of needing tickling or scratching without rendering it as a final clause. While this does not mean the Pastor could not have done so, it mitigates the likelihood.

A firm proponent of the second interpretive option is Matthijs den Dulk.¹⁵² Den Dulk adduces evidence demonstrating that the concept of "tickling the ears" (γαργαλίζειν, κνᾶν, or κνήσις + ἀκοή/ἀκοαί or οὖς/ῶτα)¹⁵³ is a topos in Greek and Latin literature in the first and second century CE, typically used polemically to suggest a desire for auditory pleasure or entertainment.¹⁵⁴ He argues that the phrase in question suggests a desire for tickling or oratorical titillation, and that the phrase has nothing to do with an itch being scratched or with any sort of curiosity. He even goes so far as to suggest that "when the verb [κνήθειν or κνᾶν] is used not in a strictly medical context but as a figure of speech involving ears that refers to the effect of, or

¹⁵⁰ ἵνα occurs in the PE thirty-three times. The use of the present participle to convey purpose is not common in classical Greek (cf. Smyth § 2065); future is preferred. In Koine Greek, the present participle is more commonly used than the future participle for a final clause, "or an entirely different construction related in meaning" (BDF § 418), but according to BDF § 418(5), "the conjunctive participle is used most frequently to indicate the manner in which an action takes place, what precedes it and what accompanies it (modal and temporal)."

¹⁵¹ Emphasis original. He continues to say that Luke 10:25 (ἀνέστη ἐκπειράζων αὐτόν) "might possibly be claimed as an example (perhaps *stood up to test him*)" (C. F. D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek*, 2nd ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971], 103). In the volume on syntax by Nigel Turner in J. H. Moulton, *Grammar of New Testament Greek* (London, T&T Clark: 1963), 3.157, Luke 7:6 is also suggested as an instance of this phenomenon.

¹⁵² Den Dulk, "No More Itch (2 Tim 4.3)."

¹⁵³ The term κνήθειν, used in 2 Tim 4:3, is fantastically rare during the first two centuries, which accounts for its absence from the materials surveyed here. The exception is a passage from Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 1.3.22), which does use the term to convey a sense of unmanly pleasure and equates κνήθειν and κνᾶν. See Den Dulk, "No More Itch (2 Tim 4.3)," 83.

¹⁵⁴ The major passages from the first and second centuries discussed by Den Dulk are Clement, *Strom.* 1.3.22; Seneca, *Ep.* 75; Lucian, *Sal.* 1–2, *Cal.* 21; Plutarch, *Superstit.* 5 (167b); Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrh. hyp.* 235; Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 34.16 (405). The late antique passages adduced to emphasize that the idiom suggests a pursuit of pleasure are: Hesychius of Alexandria, *Συναγωγή*, K 3101; Chrysostom, *Hom. in 2 Tim.* 9 (PG 62.651); Theodoret, *Comm. in Ep. Pauli* (PG 82.852).

response to, what one hears, I have been unable to identify any instance in surviving Greek and Latin literature from the first two centuries CE where 'itching' is a necessary translation."¹⁵⁵

However, it may be that this way of formulating the argument unduly restricts the potential range of nuances of the terms and phrase in question, which may in fact be related both to itches and to getting those itches scratched.¹⁵⁶ For instance, a passage from Plutarch's treatise on hygiene shows that the phrase *κνησμοὶ καὶ γαργαλισμοί* ("scratches and ticklings") is not only used in the sense of tickling and titillating, but also pertains to relieving itches (*τὰ ψωριῶντα*).¹⁵⁷ The yearning for pleasurable experiences is likened by Plutarch to itches that need to be relieved.¹⁵⁸ The emphasis is placed squarely on the need for continuous attention to the itching sensations, which can be satisfied with scratching or tickling. Elsewhere, Plutarch presents "scratching" (*τὸ κνᾶσθαι*) as the antidote to "the itching in the skin" (*τὸ ψωριᾶν τὴν σάρκα*).¹⁵⁹ The need is not properly for scratching or tickling per se, but rather suggests the necessity of alleviating the itching.

Furthermore, there is evidence that the itching ear was associated with the discourse of persistent desire. One of Martial's epigrams (*Ep.* 14.23) characterizes the earpick (*auriscalpium*)

¹⁵⁵ Den Dulk, "No More Itch (2 Tim 4.3)," 90. He does, however, allow for the possibility that these people's desire for tickling is the result of an itch (93 n. 28).

¹⁵⁶ Lucian, *Bis. acc.* 1 shows that the phrase *κνήσασθαι τὸ οὖς* can certainly mean "scratch the ear." The context of the passage suggests that "not having enough leisure to scratch his ear" (*οὐδ' ὅσον κνήσασθαι τὸ οὖς*) was something of a common phrase (cf. *φασί*).

¹⁵⁷ Plutarch, *Tu. san.* 126a-b. The passage, also cited by Spicq, *ÉBib*, 801, runs as follows: "If the saying of Arcesilaus addressed to the adulterous and licentious appears too bitter, to the effect that 'it makes no difference whether a man practises lewdness in the front parlour or in the back hall,' yet it is not without its application to our subject. For in very truth, what difference does it make whether a man employ aphrodisiacs to stir and excite licentiousness for the purposes of pleasure, or whether he stimulate his taste by odours and sauces to require, like the itch, continual scratchings and ticklings? (*εἰ τοίνυν καὶ πικρότερον φανεῖται τὸ τοῦ Ἀρκεσιλάου πρὸς τοὺς μοιχικοὺς καὶ ἀκολάστους εἰρημένον, "μηδὲν διαφέρειν ὅπισθεν τίνα ἢ ἔμπροσθεν εἶναι κίναιδον," Β οὐκ ἀνάρμοστόν ἐστι τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις. τί γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς διαφέρει σατύρια προσάγοντα κινεῖν καὶ παροξύνειν τὸ ἀκόλαστον ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, ἢ τὴν γεῦσιν ὁσμαῖς καὶ καρυκelaῖς ἐρεθίζειν ὥσπερ τὰ ψωριῶντα κνησμῶν ἀεὶ δεῖσθαι καὶ γαργαλισμῶν;* [Babbitt, LCL]).

¹⁵⁸ A similar, vice-induced yearning for soothing speech to "stroke" (*mulcere*) the ears is associated with vice by Quintilian, *Inst.* 11.3.60.

¹⁵⁹ *Suav. viv.* 1091e.

as the antidote to an ear's itches: "If your ear is plagued by a protracted itch, we give you the instruments apt to such urges" (Si tibi morosa prurigne verminat auris, arma damus tantis apta libidinibus). Here, the urge to scratch the ear is characterized as *libido*, an urge made all the more intense when the itch is "protracted" (*morosa*). This instance suggests the itch as a kind of irritant, a constant desire that is aptly described as urges or desires (*libidines*).¹⁶⁰ Having an itch that needs to be scratched is frequently laden with moral overtones.¹⁶¹ Speaking of false praise, Plutarch urges: "We must be thoroughly on our guard against it and not behave like swine, because of our itch to be scratched and tickled allowing the suitor to handle us as he pleases, and sinking to the ground in subservience to him. For he who gives ear to flatterers is no better than he who allows a leghold to one who would throw him."¹⁶²

Lastly, it is clear that medical discussions of itches are germane to the interpretation of our passage. Indeed, in light of the medical imagery utilized in the rest of 2 Timothy and in this very verse, it makes sense to avoid overly rigid distinctions between medical literature and philosophical or rhetorical uses of medical ideas and imagery. Medical literature can help us to fill

¹⁶⁰ A second or third century CE pseudepigraphic treatise attributed the Peripatetic philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias treats the coexistence of itching (ψωριᾶν) and scratching (κνησθαι) as something of a riddle (similarly being thirsty while drinking), which is taken to demonstrate that pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (λύπη) are not on fact true opposites, but related. This author explains that even when an itch is scratched, it is still painful because the need for scratching persists: ". . . those who itch and are scratched are in pain not because of the scratching, but because there is still a need for being scratched" (οἱ ψωριῶντες καὶ κνῶμενοι οὐ διὰ τὸ κνησθαι λυποῦνται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἔτι δεῖσθαι τοῦ κνησθαι). See [Alexander], *Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις*, 24.25–25.17.

¹⁶¹ Wanting to scratch (κνησιᾶν) the head (ἡ κεφαλὴ), for instance, presupposes having an itch (ψωριᾶν); scratching that itch, as Callicles suggests, is pleasurable (cf. ἡδέως). See Plato, *Gorg.* 494c-e. Scratching such an itch is characterized by Plato as a moral failing that keeps one from truly living a happy life. Plato has Socrates taunt Callicles in *Gorgias* 494c: "First of all, tell me whether a man who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching" (καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπέ, εἰ καὶ ψωριῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνης ἔχοντα τοῦ κνησθαι, κνῶμενον διατελοῦνται τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως [Lamb, LCL]). Furthermore, Plutarch uses the imagery of an itching sore in association with "secret talk" (κρύφιος λόγος), which "scratches" (κνᾶν) an ulcer (ἕλκος). The flatterer (ἐλαφρός) produces the wound through slander (διαβολή). Plutarch describes its lasting effects as scars (οὖλαι) and even gangrenes and cancers (γαγγραιναὶ καὶ καρκινώματα), that have an effect even if the visible sore is healed (*Adul. amic.* 65c-e).

¹⁶² δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι καὶ μὴ πάθος πάσχειν ὥδεις, ὑπὸ κνησμοῦ καὶ γαργαλισμοῦ παρέχοντα χρῆσθαι ῥᾶστα τῷ δεομένῳ, καὶ καταβάλλειν ἑαυτὸν ὑποκατακλινόμενον. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρουσι τῶν τὰ σκέλη τοῖς ὑποσπῶσι παρεχόντων οἱ τὰ ὦτα τοῖς κολακεύουσι παραδιδόντες (*Vit. pud.* 535f [De Lacy & Einarson, LCL]).

out the cultural significance of itching (in the ears and elsewhere) and the need for scratching or tickling. Galen, in his discussion on the causes of symptoms, classes "feeling an itch" (κνηστιᾶν) as something less than a "movement" (κίνησις) like a cough, a sneeze, a hiccup, or a rigor might be. Rather, it is something even more moderate, even more so than the "sensations" (αἰσθήσεις) in sore-like pains.¹⁶³ Galen dubs the symptom of itching a sensation of the "superfluities associated with itching" (περιττώματα κνησμωδῶν). He classes "feeling an itch" as a symptom that one might be able to remedy with a bit of tickling or scratching, at least if it was not too severe a condition.

For itching (κνηστιᾶν) occurs in those who do not wash (οἱ ἀλουτοῦσι), or are filthy (ῥυπῶδες), or have indigestion (ἀπεπτοῦσι), or who eat unwholesome foods (τροφὰς κακοχύμους ἐσθίουσι), and far more certainly in those with psora (ψώραι) or lepra (λέπραι), because the humour (ὁ χυμός) is more copious and thicker in such conditions. And because of this, they scratch (κνῶνται) greatly and more than all those who itch (κνηστιώντων) without such a condition. Nor does scratching very vigorously help them, not even should they excoriate themselves, owing to the distressing humour which filled them remaining in them and, as one might say, being fixed in the skin (ἐν τῷ δέρματι). For this is not scanty or fine, as in those who are merely unwashed and filthy, but very copious and thick, and sometimes also viscid. All such symptoms are, at any rate, born of a bad humour, differing in the nature and magnitude of the cause and, besides these, in quietude and movement. (*Caus. symp.* 2.6.1 = 7.197–98K)¹⁶⁴

Galen's discussion of itching recognizes a range of severities, from the need for excessive scratching to a much lighter need for it.¹⁶⁵ What is important for our purposes is that there was a recognized spectrum of itching and, depending on the cause, the condition could be relieved by a light scratch, or perhaps even a tickle, or yet again might not be relieved even with vigorous

¹⁶³ αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἐλκώδεις κόπους αἰσθήσεις. Johnston translates this as "sensations in the 'wound-like' fatigues" (261).

¹⁶⁴ τοῖς γὰρ ἀλουτοῦσι καὶ ῥυπῶσι καὶ ἀπεπτοῦσι καὶ τροφὰς κακοχύμους ἐσθίουσι κνηστιᾶν συμβαίνει, καὶ πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ψώραις τε καὶ λέπραις, ὅτι πλείων τε καὶ παχύτερος ὁ χυμός ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαθέσεσι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κνῶνται μὲν ἐπὶ πλείον τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπάντων ἄνευ τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως κνηστιώντων· ὀνίνανται δ' οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἂν ἐκδείρῳσιν ἑαυτοὺς κνώμενοι σφοδρότατα, διὰ τὸ μένειν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐμπεπλασμένον τε καὶ, ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις, ἐσφηνωμένον ἐν τῷ δέρματι τὸν λυποῦντα χυμόν. οὔτε γὰρ ὀλίγος οὗτος οὔτε λεπτὸς ἐστίν, ὥς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλουτησάντων μόνον ἢ ῥυπώντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείστος καὶ παχὺς, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ γλίσχρος. ἅπαντα γοῦν τὰ τοιαῦτα συμπτώματα κακοχυμίας ἐστὶν ἔγγονα, διαφέροντα δὲ ποιότητι καὶ ποσότητι τῆς αἰτίας, ἔτι τε πρὸς τοῦτοις ἡσυχίᾳ τε καὶ κινήσει (trans. Johnson).

¹⁶⁵ In a passage also discussed by Den Dulk, "No More Itch," 90, Galen (book 6 of *MM* = 10.437K) warns about an itch (κνήσις) that can crop up if one does not change bandages frequently, leading even to nauseating itching (ἀσωδῶς κνήσεσθαι).

scratching. A scratching or tickling of the ears could even be recommended as a therapy. For instance, the Pastor's near-contemporary Aretaeus of Cappadocia commends scratching the ears (κνησῖς ὠτων)¹⁶⁶ as a soothing treatment for those suffering from a fit of phrenetic delirium, where inducing sleep is the goal. "Gentle rubbing of the feet with oil, patting of the head, and particularly scratching¹⁶⁷ of the temples and ears is an effectual means" (ψηλαφίη ποδῶν εὐαφῆς ξὺν λίπαϊ, ψαῦσις τῆς κεφαλῆς. ἀνυτικὸν δὲ καὶ κνησῖς, μάλιστα κροτάφων τε καὶ ὠτων·).¹⁶⁸ The fact that this is imagined as a therapeutic remedy, and a pleasurable one at that, may suggest that it is imagined by the Pastor as the antithesis of the healthy teaching, the very medicine that his audience will not endure.

H. κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοήν: A Pathological Condition

Ultimately, the choice between the major interpretive options of either "having itchy ears" or "for the ears to be tickled or scratched" is challenging, but ultimately not as stark as it may appear, because the two options are intimately related in the complicated web of ancient Greek and Roman conceptions of inordinate desire, rhetorical pleasure, and philosophical therapy.¹⁶⁹ Furthermore, they both suggest the sense of inordinate desire for pleasurable stimulation.¹⁷⁰ Whether the impetus is characterized as an overweening itch that needs to be scratched, or whether it is a desire for tickling and pleasant stimulation, the result is the same: excessive and

¹⁶⁶ The same phrase used by Plutarch, *Superst.* 5 = 167b, and pointed to by Den Dulk (86–87) to argue rightly that the tickling of ears is pleasurable.

¹⁶⁷ Adam has "stroking;" I have adapted the translation.

¹⁶⁸ Aretaeus, *Cur. acut.* 1.1.14 (Adam trans).

¹⁶⁹ The same is true of some late antique authors who draw on 2 Tim 4:3. For instance, Athanasius (*Frag. var.* 26:1252) writes the following: Πυρετὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπ' αὐτῷ καμίνου ἐνεργέστερος, ἐπειδὴ ἐξεκαίετο τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰς τὴν ἀθέμιτον πρᾶξιν τῆς μοιχείας. Ὁ δὲ κνησμὸς ἦν ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἀφόρητος, διὰ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτὸν τῶν κνηθομένων διδασκάλων τὴν ἀκοήν πρὸς ἀπάτην. Τῶν ἐντὸς δὲ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἀλγηδόνας, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔψαλλεν. Εὐλόγει, ἡ ψυχὴ μου, τὸν Κύριον, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐντὸς μου τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἅγιον αὐτοῦ.

¹⁷⁰ Brox, RNT, 264: "The craving for ear-tickling is an image for the obsession with satisfying an ("ear-itching") curiosity." Similarly, BDAG, 36, s.v. ἀκοή, glosses 2 Tim 4:3 as "*have itching ears* (i.e. they like to have them tickled)."

pathological desire drive the piling up of teachers and satisfaction is sought there, if not achieved.¹⁷¹ Having an itch scratched, as some may well appreciate from personal experience, can be pleasurable,¹⁷² though of course it is not always easy to make an itch go away. In light of the above evidence, we should probably retain the language of the itching ears, but this by no means precludes the contributions of Den Dulk and others who have drawn attention to the topos of ear-tickling and its association with moral turpitude and a pursuit of pleasure over and against a desire for the truth. Rather, these investigations help demonstrate the negative cultural valence attached to the pursuit of oratorical titillation. When we combine this with an appreciation of the Pastor's moral-medical perspective and the consistent pathologizing of desire to portray the effects of rejecting the healthy teaching, this passage appears in a new light as an integral part of the Pastor's strategy.

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrated that the Pastor presumes the Pauline category of the body of Christ but expands and develops it in important ways to include its inherent fragility and susceptibility to disease. One significant conclusion for which I argued is that all of these images are rooted in and presuppose Paul's imagery of the church as the body of Christ. Through close historical-cultural and philological attention to the medical language of the Pastorals on the one hand, and through a close analysis of the Pastorals as creative acts of Pauline self-interpretation on the other, I showed more clearly than previous scholarship the degree to which the Pastor

¹⁷¹ Spicq, *ÉBib*, 801.

¹⁷² Scratching (κνήθεσθαι) an itch is pleasurable, as recognized by Themistius in a fourth-century paraphrase on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* 1. "For not all pleasure is contrary to nature. For instance, the pleasure derived from the scratching of itches is not against nature" (οὐ γὰρ δὴ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν· ἡ γοῦν τῶν ψωριῶντων ἐκ τοῦ κνήθεσθαι ἡδονὴ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν [Wallies 23.3, 96.39–97.1]).

presumes, as a fixed piece of Paulinism, the body of Christ imagery and theorizes deviance as a threat to the health of that body. The Pastor extends Paul's body metaphors for polemical purposes, warning not so much against factions within the community, the normal aim of the body metaphor in political rhetoric, but against doctrinal perversion that threatens the health of the ecclesial body. The imagery and threat of a diseased body constitutes for the Pastor an opportunity to illustrate, sometimes viscerally, consequences of departing from the "deposit" (*παραθήκη*) of Pauline teaching and tradition.

By utilizing images of disease to narrate theological deviance, the Pastor mobilizes cultural associations and stigmas for his own rhetorical purposes. I argued for a polyvalent reading of the gangrene of 2 Tim 2:17, identifying multiple domains of significance—including the olfactory and visual—that the Pastor's memorable imagery would have called to mind (and eye and nose) for the audience. Furthermore, I showed how the ears of theologically errant individuals are presented as metonymies for inordinate desires, instrumentalized within the broader sweep of the Pastor's narrative polemic for the purpose of depicting the potential harm to the body of Christ posed by the teaching and vice of theologically aberrant individuals. In chapter five we continue our investigation of health and illness in the Pastoral Epistles, but with a focus in particular on the images of Paul and Timothy resulting from the Pastor's consistent deployment of medical imagery.

Chapter 5. Avoiding Deviance: Keeping Timothy Healthy

I. Introduction: Establishing Authority

In chapter three, we focused largely on the Pastor's pattern of pathologizing deviance. I argued that the Pastor characterizes the healthy words as capable of remediating that deviance, and demonstrated this feature across all three letters. The Pastor used forms of argument drawn in part from the historical-epistolary Paul and recognizable in the deployment of the health language by contemporary Greco-Roman moralists and physicians. In this chapter, I build on this argument by showing in detail how the Pastor's depiction of Paul commends him as "Paulus medicus," a moral and medical authority. I make this argument through an examination of what I deem a philosophical regimen prescribed for Timothy (1 Tim 4:6–16), and the medical advice to Timothy (1 Tim 5:23) couched within advice about how to manage elders and sinners (1 Tim 5:17–25). I contend that these passages in 1 Timothy allow the Pastor to communicate an idealized portrait of Paul as a holistic healer, the kind of authoritative figure who can address all of Timothy's needs while he trains him to lead the church. The Paul of the Pastorals guides him in the pursuit of good church governance and living in accordance with *εὐσέβεια*, framing these as culturally conditioned rituals of self-care and moral training, which were intimately intertwined as psychosomatic endeavors in the early Empire.

I argue that the Pastor is at pains to depict Paul as a philosopher-physician, i.e., "Paulus medicus," one who knows how to bring about complete health for the individual, whether church leader or theological deviator. I argue that throughout the three letters the

Pastor attributes to Paul, Timothy, and Titus designations that belong to the ideal physician in the Hellenistic period and the early Roman empire. Although scholarship on the PE has engaged the issue of the “images” or “portraits” of Paul in the PE, it has not given sufficient attention to the portrayal of Paul as a man of diagnostic and therapeutic capabilities.¹ I demonstrate this first with a close reading of 1 Tim 4:6–16 alongside ancient discourses about training, to show that the Pastor’s depiction of Paul is meant to establish him as an authority in matters pertaining to philosophical regimen. I demonstrate that Paul’s advice on a bodily remedy for Timothy is a continuation of the project of depicting Paul as the ready font of wisdom, in matters both pastoral and medicinal, which are here seen as intertwined. By addressing these topics, the Pastor cultivates an image of Paul not only as guarantor of the “deposit” (παραθήκη), but as a moral *medicus*. I argue that toward this end, the Pastor invokes a construct about Timothy’s body as in need of sound medical advice in order to perpetuate the Pauline hagiography undertaken in the PE.² Just as we saw above in chapter three that the Pastor utilizes rhetorically the bodies of opponents and the body of Christ in order to demonstrate the Paul alone offers the remedy of the healthy teaching, so too the Pastor presents Paul as the expert capable of readying Timothy’s body through training and healing Timothy’s illness through diagnostic discernment and advice. The

¹ Even Abraham Malherbe, who across numerous articles discusses the self-designation of philosophers as physicians and outlines their philosophical practice as therapy, does not entertain the possibility that the Paul of the Pastorals is being characterized as a physician (“Medical Imagery and the Pastoral Epistles,” in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie*, ed. W. Eugene March and Stuart Dickson Currie [San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1980], 19–35).

² For this characterization of the Pastor’s project, see Raymond F. Collins, “The Image of Paul in the Pastorals,” LTP 31 (1975): 147–73. See also Karoline Läger, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe*, Hamburger theologische Studien 12 (Münster: LIT, 1996), 177 who speaks of the “Paulologie” of the Pastorals.

Pastor scripts his advice to Timothy in order to cultivate an ethos of Pauline authority that sanctions him as the sole source of right teaching and right faith, but also of wisdom concerning moral discernment as it relates to the bodily practices of regimen and diet.³

Paulus Medicus: The Ideal Physician in the Pastorals

The Physician: Ideals and Tasks

Paul does not receive the epithet physician (ἰατρός or *medicus*) very often in early Christian literature before the fourth century CE.⁴ One example, however, comes from a scene in the Acts of Peter, dated to the later second or early third century CE.⁵ Quartus, a prison officer in charge of Paul in Rome, gives him leave to go, but Paul's responds: "If it should be God's will, he himself will reveal it to me" (*Si fuerit voluntas Dei, ipse mihi revelabit*). The text continues: "And while Paul was fasting for three days and seeking from God what would be proper for him, he then saw a vision, the Lord saying to him, 'Paul, arise and be a physician

³ Given the fictive nature of these letters, we should reiterate that there is no individual recipient of this letter named Timothy who is being told to do this or that. Rather, what is being constructed is an idealized portrait of past relationships that is being used for illustrative and exemplary purposes.

⁴ The designation does seem to pick up in the fourth century, as may be seen in the works of John Chrysostom. John calls Paul "the wise physician of souls" (ὁ σοφὸς τῶν ψυχῶν ἰατρός) at *hom. in 2 Cor 4:13* 1 (PG 51.271), cited by Margaret M. Mitchell, "The Archetypal Image: John Chrysostom's Portraits of Paul," *JR* 75 (1995): 33.

⁵ Attention to the use of connotations of sexual purity (cf. ἀγνότης at 11:3) and betrothal (cf. ἀρμόζειν at 11:2) of 2 Cor 11 would suggest a translation of "seduced" for φθείρειν in 2 Cor 11:3. The Pastor is perhaps picking up on this nuance in his suggestion that women should not speak because they are somehow akin to Eve who was ostensibly a) formed secondarily and b) susceptible to deception. Notable in this regard is the 4 Macc 18:7–8, where the philosophical Jewish matriarch delivers an eloquent monologue, enumerating ways in which she guarded herself. After saying that prior to marriage she had been a "chaste virgin" (παρθένος ἀγνή), she says: "Neither did a corrupter in a desert, a seducer on a plane, corrupt me, nor did a corrupter, a deceptive serpent (ἀπάτης ὄφις), corrupt me" (οὐδὲ ἐφθείρεν με λυμεῶν ἐρημίας φθορεὺς ἐν πεδίῳ, οὐδὲ ἐλυμήνατό μου τὰ ἀγνὰ τῆς παρθενίας λυμεῶν ἀπάτης ὄφις). For discussion of this passage and further references in the history of interpretation, see Mary R. D'Angelo, "Ευσέβεια: Roman Imperial Family Values and the Sexual Politics of 4 Maccabees and the Pastorals," *BibInt* 11.2 (2003): 155; 155 nn. 63; 161.

(*medicus*) to those who are in Spain with your body."⁶ This passage offers us one of a handful of instances that explicitly connect the language of physician to Paul's role in healing through proclamation, envisioned here as a full body effort (cf. *corpore tuo*).⁷

The Pastor inaugurates the tradition of Paul as *medicus*. In addition to the abundant, explicit uses of medical imagery examined in chapter three, there is ample evidence suggesting that the Paul of the Pastorals is presented as an authority on matters of body and soul, and that part of this presentation is a casting of Paul's behavior and attributes that partake of the cultural type of the ideal physician in the early Empire. There is significant overlap between the characterization of Paul and his protégés and the ideals for physicians as expressed—both descriptively and prescriptively—in literary sources from the Hellenistic and Imperial periods. The Hippocratic treatise *Physician* (περὶ ἰητροῦ), which is unlikely to have been written prior to 250 BCE, offers advice about appearance, mental comportment, social interactions, and self-control,⁸ much of which is echoed in later authors as well, such as Galen.⁹ While the ideal characteristics of the Hippocratic physician are not unique to them, it is striking how many points of overlap there are with the depiction of Paul found in

⁶ Et jejunans triduo Paulus et petens a domino quod aptum sibi esset, vidit itaque visionem, dicentem sibi dominum: Paule surge et eis qui in Spania sunt corpore tuo medicus esto (Acts Peter 1). Text from Léon Vouaux, *Les actes de Pierre: introduction, textes, traduction et commentaire*, Les apocryphes du Nouveau Testament (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1922). The recent bibliography and information on the *Actus Vercellenses*, the ancient Latin manuscript containing material related to the Greek original of the Acts of Peter, is found in Hans-Josef Klauck, *The Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles: An Introduction* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2008), 81–105.

⁷ The Acts of Xanthippe and Polyxena, which seem to use the Acts of Peter as a source, pick up on the depiction of Παῦλος as an ἰατρός (see 1–2). This text has been dated to the third century CE (J. K. Elliott, ed., *The Apocryphal New Testament: A Collection of Apocryphal Christian Literature in an English Translation* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993], 524).

⁸ Vivian Nutton contends that *The Physician*, *Precepts*, and *Decorum* are "arguably considerably later" than 250 BCE, based on consideration of content and style.

⁹ Vivian Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 2nd ed., Sciences of Antiquity (London: Routledge, 2013), 243.

the PE. Intriguingly, the first criterion for a good physician is looking healthy: "The dignity of a physician requires that he should look healthy, and as plump as nature intended him to be; for the common crowd consider those who are not of this excellent bodily condition to be unable to take care of others (οὐδ' ἂν ἐτέρων ἐπιμεληθῆναι καλῶς)."¹⁰ In the logic of the Hippocratic author of this treatise, an unhealthy doctor is unlikely to inspire confidence in his would-be patients. As noted above, the decorum of medical professionals was not a concern only of physicians in the Hippocratic era or their Hellenistic successors. Galen, too, gave studied reflection to the matter. As Nutton summarizes, "Personal appearance mattered—clean clothes, neat nails, well-trimmed hair cut in a conservative fashion, and a pleasant freshness, unlike Quintus, who once visited a rich patient while smelling of drink, or the unfortunate doctor from Asia whose naturally smelly armpits put patients off."¹¹ Doctors were supposed to be models of health, good hygiene, and good manners, lest they give the lie to the notion that they could bring their patients health.

Similarly, in the PE, Timothy's adherence to the healthy teaching is supposed to enable him to help others (1 Tim 4:16), and if, as I argue below, we understand 1 Tim 5:23–25 as the Pastor's attempt to keep Timothy appearing healthy for the sake of his own pastoral authority, then this fact too gains interpretive resonance when we examine the

¹⁰ Ἰητροῦ μὲν εἶναι προστασίην ὁρῆν <ὡς> εὐχρως τε καὶ εὐσαρκος ἔσται πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ φύσιν· ἀξιοῦνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν οἱ μὴ εὖ διακείμενοι τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ὡς οὐδ' ἂν ἐτέρων ἐπιμεληθῆναι καλῶς (*Med.* 1; Potter, LCL). This was in part also simply an expectation for a proper Greek male. In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (11.8, 12, 19), Isomachus relates to Socrates how he eats a moderate diet and exercises regularly in order to obtain "health and bodily strength" (ὕγιείας τυγχάνειν καὶ ῥώμης σώματος). See Gary B. Ferngren and Darrel W. Amundsen, "Virtue and Health/Medicine in Pre-Christian Antiquity," in *Virtue and Medicine: Explorations in the Character of Medicine*, ed. Earl E. Shelp, *Philosophy and Medicine* 17 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 8.

¹¹ Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 243 nn. 65, citing Commentary 4 on Epidemics VI, 8–10 (CMG 5.10.2.2, 197–207).

characterization of the ideal physician. The Hippocratic guidelines for the ideal physician align with the Pastor's recommendations for his envoys and their appointees in numerous instances.¹² The physician should be prudent (σώφρων), knowing when to exercise silence (τὸ σιγᾶν) and how to conduct an orderly life (βίος εὐτακτος).¹³ Prudence (σωφροσύνη and cognates) is a recurring motif in the Pastor's moral prescriptions (1 Tim 2:9, 3:2; Titus 2:2, 4–6, 12; 2 Tim 2:7), and leading a peaceable and quiet life is high on his wish list (ἡρεμος καὶ ἡσύχιος βίος [1 Tim 2:2]).¹⁴ The character (ἥθος) of the physician is to be good and noble (καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν). Physicians should be knowledgeable and self-controlled when it comes to food (cf. πρὸς τὰς τροφὰς εὐχρηστοὶ καὶ αὐτάρκεες).¹⁵ The ideal physician, like the bishop, should not be αὐθάδης (cf. Titus 1:7). The ideal physician is to be just (δίκαιος) and is to exhibit justice (δικαιοσύνη).¹⁶ Similarly, living "justly" (δικαίως) is an aspiration for the Pastor and his addressees (Titus 2:12), and δικαιοσύνη is to be an object of pursuit for Timothy (1 Tim 6:11, 2 Tim 2:22).

The Hippocratic author emphasizes the importance of the good behavior the physician should display in relationship to his patients. The ideal physician is φιλάνθρωπος and not μισάνθρωπος.¹⁷ Similarly, the Pastor's writes of the epiphany of the healer God's φιλανθρωπία (Titus 3:4), and contrasts the ideal bishop, who is a "lover of good" (φιλάγαθος), with the opponents, who are "lovers of themselves" and "lovers of money" (φίλαυτοι,

¹² [Hipp.], *Med.* 1.

¹³ [Hipp.], *Med.* 1.

¹⁴ Cf. [Hipp.], *Decent.* 3, where physicians are to be "silent in the face of ruin" (πρὸς τὰς ἀναστάσις σιγητικοί).

¹⁵ [Hipp.], *Decent.* 3.

¹⁶ [Hipp.], *Med.* 1.

¹⁷ [Hipp.], *Med.* 1.

φιλάργυροι [2 Tim 3:2]). Reputation (cf. ἔχει πρὸς δόξαν ἀγαθὰ) is important for the physician,¹⁸ as it is for the bishop (1 Tim 3:7; cf. Titus 2:5]). The physician, due to his ready access to women (γυναῖκες), virgins (παρθένοι), and even household possessions (κτήματα), "should therefore conduct himself with self-control with respect to all these things" (ἐγκρατέως οὖν δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔχειν ταῦτα).¹⁹ The ideal bishop should also be self-controlled (ἐγκρατής [Titus 1:8]; in contrast to this, the opponents are ἀκρατεῖς [2 Tim 3:3]), should similarly not be a lover of money (φιλάργυρος [2 Tim 3:2]), and Timothy's behavior toward younger women (νεώτεραι) is to be "as to sisters, in all purity" (ὡς ἀδελφὰς ἐν πάσῃ ἀγνείᾳ [1 Tim 5:2]). Like Timothy, who is to exhort an older man (πρεσβύτερος) "as a father, younger men as brothers, older women as mothers, younger women as sisters in all purity" (1 Tim 5:1–2), so too the physician was exhorted to "consider yourself a brother of your peers, a child of your elders and a father to those younger" (τῶν μὲν ἡλικιωτῶν νόμιζε σεαυτὸν ἀδελφόν, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων παῖδα, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων πατέρα).²⁰

The author of *Decorum* lays out a concise list of desirable attributes for a physician, many of which find comparable qualities in the PE:

The several characteristics are: to be serious, artless, sharp in encounters, ready to reply, stubborn in opposition, with those who are of like mind quick-witted and affable, good-tempered towards all, silent in face of disturbances, in the face of silence ready to reason and endure, prepared for an opportunity and quick to take it,

¹⁸ Cf. [Hipp.], *Decent.* 3.

¹⁹ [Hipp.], *Med.* 1.

²⁰ This address, which contains the words of personified medicine to a would-be physician, derives from the progymnasmata of Libanius. Greek text and translation of Libanius, *Progymn.* 7 (p. 185.3, Förster), along with other passages demonstrating that this language was at home in a variety of social settings, at Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 72. See further Richard M. Ratzan and Gary B. Ferngren, "A Greek Progymnasma on the Physician–Poisoner," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 48.2 (1993): 157–70. See also the recent version Craig A. Gibson, *Libanius's Progymnasmata: Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, WGRW 27 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008).

knowing how to use food and temperate, patient in waiting for an opportunity, setting out in effectual language everything that has been shown forth, graceful in speech, gracious in disposition, strong in the reputation that these qualities bring, turning to the truth when a thing has been shown to be true. ([Hipp.], *Decent.* 3)²¹

They are to be "not over-busy" (ἀπερίεργοι), with which we might contrast the denunciation of those widows who are "over-busy" (περιέργοι) at 1 Timothy 5:13. Physicians are to be generally kind, affable, and "temperate toward all" (εὐκρητοὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας),²² just as Timothy, and every δοῦλος κυρίου, is to be "gentle toward all" (ἡπιος πρὸς πάντας) at 2 Tim 2:24. Physicians are to be "ready for an opportunity and quick to seize it" (πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν εὐθετοὶ καὶ λημματικοί) and "patient in waiting for an opportunity" (ὑπομονητικοὶ πρὸς καιροῦ τὴν ὑπομονήν).²³ Similarly, Timothy is exhorted to be "ready at an opportune time or inopportune time" (ἐπίστηθι εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως; 2 Tim 4:2).

Obviously, the qualities outlined by these texts were not the exclusive domain of the ideal physician; rather, the physician was to comport himself in a morally exemplary manner, and that exemplarity was defined by broadly accepted Greco-Roman values and virtues.²⁴ This does not obviate the value of the comparison, however, for the depiction of Paul as *medicus* does not rely solely on a Venn diagram of overlapping virtues found in medical texts and the Pastorals. Rather, these depictions serve as a fitting complement to

²¹ οἱ τε ἐκάστω σχήματι τοιοῦτοι· ἀδιάχυτοι, ἀπερίεργοι, πικροὶ πρὸς τὰς συναντήσιας, εὐθετοὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀποκρίσιας, χαλεποὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀντιπτώσιας, πρὸς τὰς ὁμοιότητας εὐστοχοὶ καὶ ὁμιλητικοί, εὐκρητοὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας, πρὸς τὰς ἀναστάσιας σιγητικοί, πρὸς τὰς ἀποσιγήσιας ἐνθυμηματικοὶ καὶ καρτετικοί, πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν εὐθετοὶ καὶ λημματικοί, πρὸς τὰς τροφὰς εὐκρηστοὶ καὶ αὐτάρκες, ὑπομονητικοὶ πρὸς καιροῦ τὴν ὑπομονήν, πρὸς λόγους ἀνυστοὺς πᾶν τὸ ὑποδειχθὲν ἐκφέροντες, εὐεπίη χρεώμενοι, χάριτι διατιθέμενοι, δόξῃ τῇ ἐκ τούτων δισχυριζόμενοι, ἐς ἀληθείην πρὸς τὸ ὑποδειχθὲν ἀποτελεσματιζόμενοι (Jones, LCL).

²² [Hipp.], *Decent.* 3.

²³ [Hipp.], *Decent.* 3.

²⁴ A list of desirable qualities in a general in Onosander, *De imperatoris officio* 1 (περὶ αἰρεσέως στρατηγοῦ) provide another good example. See Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, appendix 3, 158–59.

the designation of Paul as a *medicus* that is anchored, as we saw in chapter three, in the depiction of Paul as the promulgator of the "healthy words" that make healthy and the thorough-going use of the medical analogy to describe moral malpractice. The discernment of Paul as a moral *medicus* is a logical inference in light of the cumulative force of the Pastor's rhetoric regarding health and sickness as theological categories. Furthermore, this characterization of Paul is evident, as we shall see below, in the depiction of the Apostle as as a wise purveyor of prescriptions for diet and regimen, diagnostic insight, and medical advice.

II. Training Timothy

A. Timothy's Training in Context (1 Tim 4:6–10)

1 Timothy 4:6–10

4:6 If you enjoin²⁵ these things upon the sisters and brothers you will be a good servant of Christ Jesus, nourishing yourself with the words of the faith and the good teaching that you have followed closely. 7 Keep away from profane old-granny²⁶ myths. Exercise yourself toward piety. 8 For bodily exercise is useful for a little, but piety is useful for everything because it has a promise of life both present and future. 9 Faithful is the word and worthy of all acceptance. 10 For we are laboring and

²⁵ Raymond F. Collins argues that the verb ὑποτίθημι "means to propose a bit of advice or to put forward a hypothesis so that people might examine it and draw from it the necessary consequences" ("LTP," 158).

²⁶ γράωδης. Cf. the comments of Jaqueline Long to the effect that this kind of gendered polemic invokes a "long line of sexually desperate repulsive old women derided by ancient poets, from Greek and Roman comedy to erotic elegy" ("Juvenal Renewed in Claudian's 'In Eutropium,'" *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 2.3 [1996]: 327). See also the useful documentation of Roman stereotypes (often deriving ultimately from Greek literature) by Vincent Rosivach, "Anus: Some Older Women in Latin Literature," *The Classical World* 88.2 (1994): 107–17. Rosivach demonstrates that the stereotype of the older woman is used to suggest sexual aggressiveness, repugnance, superstition, garrulousness, and loathsomeness.

contending for this purpose, because we have hoped upon a living God, who is Savior of all people, especially²⁷ believers.²⁸

1. ἡ σωματικὴ γυμνασία — 1 Timothy 4:7–8 and the Art of Bodily Care: An Issue of

Authority

Body care and self-care, and the right to dispense "expert" advice on such matters, were contentious and potentially lucrative matters in the early Roman Empire. The debate about how to manage the human body, including its exercise, what to eat, and how these things affected the soul, was a central concern of both educated elites and the people who relied upon their expertise. The technologies of self-care²⁹ that were most appropriate or beneficial were a matter of intense discussion, and the status that accrued to recognized authorities was much coveted.³⁰ Gary Ferngren and Darrel Amundsen describe Greeks during the classical era as being especially concerned with the care of the body, with preventative medicine being an important preoccupation. They point to Hellenistic treatises to

²⁷ See the argument of Skeat that *μάλιστα* means "specially" and not "especially." In his phrasing, it runs "that is to say, to all who believe in Him" (J. K. Elliott, ed., *The Collected Biblical Writings of T.C. Skeat*, NovTSup 113 [Leiden: Brill, 2004], 263).

²⁸ 4:6 Ταῦτα ὑποτιθέμενος τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς καλὸς ἔσθι διάκονος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, ἐντρεφόμενος τοῖς λόγοις τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς καλῆς διδασκαλίας ἣν παρηκολούθηκας· 7 τοὺς δὲ βεβήλους καὶ γραῶδεις μύθους παραιτοῦ. Γύμναζε δὲ σεαυτὸν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν· 8 ἡ γὰρ σωματικὴ γυμνασία πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἡ δὲ εὐσέβεια πρὸς πάντα ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν ἐπαγγελίαν ἔχουσα ζωῆς τῆς νῦν καὶ τῆς μελλούσης. 9 πιστὸς ὁ λόγος καὶ πάσης ἀποδοχῆς ἄξιος· 10 εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ κοπιῶμεν καὶ ἀγωνιζόμεθα, ὅτι ἡλπίκαμεν ἐπὶ θεῷ ζῶντι, ὅς ἐστιν σωτὴρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πιστῶν.

²⁹ I allude here to the work of Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot, both of whom were pioneers in theorizing the relationship between the body and its cultivation in ancient philosophy. Michel Foucault, *Care of the Self*, trans. Robert Hurley, Vintage Books ed., vol. 3 of *History of Sexuality* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

³⁰ Zsuzsanna Várhelyi, "Self-Care and Health-Care," in *Religious Dimensions of the Self in the Second Century CE*, ed. Jörg Rüpke and Greg Woolf, STAC 76 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013); Ilsetraut Hadot, "The Spiritual Guide," in *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman*, ed. A. H. Armstrong, trans. Margaret Kirby (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 436–59.

substantiate this point,³¹ but the same may be said of the first and second centuries, when we get treatises from Plutarch, Galen, and later Philostratus, who are concerned with the same problems. This, I suggest, is the context in which we should interpret the Pastor's construction of Paul's advice to Timothy, both regarding his philosophical nourishment, his bodily exercise, and his exercise toward εὐσέβεια.³²

Scholars have tended to exercise themselves with debates regarding the referent of γυμνασία, and the purpose of the gymnastic metaphor.³³ Many scholars argue that the σωματική γυμνασία is meant to refer to the ascetic self-mortification of the opponents, while others see a comparative denigration of gymnastic exercises for the purpose of emphasizing

³¹ They point to the Hippocratic treatises *On Regimen in Health*, *On Diet*, and the treatise on regimen by Diocles of Carystus preserved only in fragments via Oribasius (Fengren and Amundsen, "Virtue and Health/Medicine in Pre-Christian Antiquity," 14).

³² Spicq notes that the contrast of athletic training with mental exercise is a commonplace in ancient philosophical literature ("Gymnastique et morale, d'après I Tim., IV, 7-8," *RB* 54 [1947]: 239). Pfitzner criticizes Spicq, on the grounds that he makes εὐσέβεια into "a virtue which is to be developed to the point of perfection like any Stoic virtue" (Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature*, NovTSup 16 [Leiden: Brill, 1967], 176–77, citing 176). Pfitzner even goes so far as to say that εὐσέβεια "is as little a virtue as is πίστις, describing, as it does, the entire life of the believer over and against God" (177). This is wholly incorrect. The fact that the term pertains to the whole life of a believer does not make it any less a virtue, and εὐσέβεια has a long and venerable place in Greek philosophy, at times being coordinated with δικαιοσύνη or φρόνησις as one of the four cardinal virtues (Plato, *Prot.* 331a, *Gorg.* 507b), and at times even being substituted for it (e.g., Aeschylus, *Sept.* 610). Philo, for instance, emphasizes εὐσέβεια and often brings it into the traditional fourfold canon of virtues. See the abundant documentation in Stephen Charles Mott, "Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion: The Philonic Background of Titus 2:10-14 and 3:3-7," *NovT* 20 (1978): 23–26. See also Collins, *NTL*, 122–26. Εὐσεβεία played an important role in both Jewish literature (e.g., Philo, Josephus, 4 Macc) and Roman civic discourse and imperial ideology. See D'Angelo, "Εὐσεβεία"; Angela Standhartinger, "Eusebeia in den Pastoralbriefen: Ein Beitrag zum Einfluss römischen Denkens auf das Entstehende Christentum," *NovT* 48.1 (2006): 51–82; T. Christopher Hoklotubbe, *Civilized Piety: The Rhetoric of Pietas in the Pastoral Epistles and the Roman Empire* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017).

³³ Spicq suggests that the invocation of the gymnastic metaphor is meant to highlight the intensity of gymnastic exercises as the manner in which Timothy should exercise himself in εὐσέβεια ("Gymnastique et morale," 235–36). He sees it as intimating the notion that Timothy should acquire a robust constitution (ἐξίς) through regular and rigorous training ("Gymnastique et morale," 237).

training toward εὐσέβεια.³⁴ While these issues are important for establishing the argument of the text and are addressed below, I seek to demonstrate that the Pastor is commending in this passage a certain vision of both Paul and Timothy by exploiting the cultural cachet attached to the discourses engaged in by physicians and trainers.³⁵ I thus seek to build on and further the discussion of scholars who have situated the Pastor's behavioral prescriptions within the context of the philosophy and literature of the high Empire.³⁶ In particular, I argue that the Pastor is casting Paul as the kind of expert who can offer prophylactic prescriptions as part of the proper regimen of diet and exercise that will keep Timothy in peak performance for the sake of the gospel. I first ground this argument exegetically through an analysis of 1 Tim 4:6–10 and then analyze and compare

³⁴ Scholars are divided as to whether this term refers to the kind of exercise one might observe in a gymnasium (Holtzmann, 339; Marshall, ICC, 552; Spicq, "Gymnastique et morale"; Standhartinger, "Eusebeia in den Pastoralbriefen," 77–78]. or whether it refers to the ascetic practices of the opponents of 1 Tim 4:1–5 (so, e.g., Fiore, SP, 93; Roloff, EKKNT, 246; Johnson, AB, 249; Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif*, 172–74]. See Marshall, ICC, 551–53 for further discussion. Towner, NICNT, 306, regards the question as open, though suggests that "the ascetic practices of 4:3 are at least obliquely in view . . . perhaps regarded by Paul as an extreme example of the category defined by 'physical exercise'" (306–7). However, it seems odd that the Pastor would grant even moderate value to σωματική γυμνασία if it was meant to stand in for the opponents' prohibitions mentioned in 1 Tim 4:3. Mary Rose D'Angelo only gives passing attention to this passage, suggesting it forms a contrast to the opponents' ascetic practice and offering the evocative translation "strip yourselves for εὐσέβεια" ("Ευσεβεια," 159).

³⁵ Timothy is to be a "type" (τύπος) explicitly at 1 Tim 4:12, just as Paul is to provide a "model" (ὑποτύπωσις) for those to come (1 Tim 2:16).

³⁶ Jennifer Glancy offers many excellent insights in this regard, though gives relatively little attention to the question of Timothy's training as discussed in 1 Tim 4:6–16 (Jennifer A. Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity in the Pastoral Epistles," in *New Testament Masculinities*, ed. Stephen D. Moore Anderson and Janice Capel, SemeiaSt 45 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003], 235–64). In an otherwise richly textured discussion of piety and its cultural significance in the Roman world and in the Pastorals, T. Christopher Hoklotubbe offers relatively little discussion of 1 Tim 4:7–8. Though his monograph deals extensively with εὐσέβεια in 1 Tim, his discussion of 1 Tim 4:7–8 is almost entirely restricted to his comment that "with this admonition the author proffers an alternative training regimen for attaining piety to compete with the ascetic practices promoted by the inscribed apostates" (Hoklotubbe, *Civilized Piety*, 184). However, Hoklotubbe excises the character of Timothy from the passage, translating 1 Tim 4:7 as "train [themselves] in piety." While I certainly agree that ultimately the readers of 1 Tim are the intended audience, this angle of interpretation deletes an essential factor from the exegetical equation and precludes any consideration of how this rhetoric about training toward piety functions within the constructed relationship between Paul and Timothy.

contemporary cultural discourses that give us new insight into the function of this passage.³⁷ My approach emphasizes the resulting depiction of Paul in particular as a philosopher-physician whose advice is encoded in and shaped by the competitive cultural matrix of the Greco-Roman metropolis.³⁸

2. Establishing the Reading in Its Literary Context

We must first situate the details of this text and the interrelationship of the verses to one another.³⁹ Our first verse, 4:6, makes explicit reference to the preceding discussion of food and marriage (4:3–5) with the term "these things" (ταῦτα).⁴⁰ Timothy is depicted as needing

³⁷ Plutarch gives evidence that exercise and diet were a key aspect of that prophylactic remedies (*Sera* 561f): "Therefore, I said, 'it is not a strange deed but a necessary one, not a laughable deed but a useful one we do by apply gymnastic exercises and diets and drugs to the children of epileptics and melancholics and gout-sufferers, not because they are sick, but for the sake of keeping them from getting sick; for the body begotten of a sick body is worthy not of punishment, but of medical treatment and preventative care'" ("Οὐ τοίνυν ἄτοπον," εἶπον, "ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ γελοῖον ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμον πρᾶγμα ποιοῦμεν, ἐπιληπτικῶν παισὶ καὶ μελαγχολικῶν καὶ ποδαгриκῶν γυμνάσια καὶ διαίτας καὶ φάρμακα προσάγοντες οὐ νοσοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τοῦ μὴ νοσῆσαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ πονηροῦ σώματος γινόμενον σῶμα τιμωρίας μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς, ἰατρείας δὲ καὶ φυλακῆς ἄξιόν ἐστιν"). My trans., text from De Lacy & Einarson (LCL). Passage referenced by Richard J. Durling, "Medicine in Plutarch's *Moralia*," *Traditio* 50 (1995): 312.

³⁸ Hoklotubbe has recently demonstrated that philosophers in the early Roman empire sought to augment their own cultural prestige by offering definitions of piety that frequently coopted the language of the mysteries and the epistemic expertise presumed to accompany their administration (Hoklotubbe, *Civilized Piety*, 149–78. He argues that the 1 Tim 3:14–16 and the language of the "mystery of piety" (τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον) may be read as utilizing the same rhetoric to augment his credibility in his own battle with his opponents (Hoklotubbe, *Civilized Piety*, 179–203. For a more concise form of his argument, see his "Great Is the Mystery of Piety: Contested Claims to Piety in the Philo, Plutarch, and 1 Timothy," in *Religious Competition in the Greco-Roman World*, ed. Nathaniel DesRosiers and Lily C. Vuong, WGRWSup 10 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 155–65. I find much in Hoklotubbe's argument to be a complement to my own, even as I seek to establish the point regarding the Pastor's appropriation of cultural prestige with a different set of comparanda (text pertaining to training and remedy) and propose that the Pastor engaged in a creative intertextual endeavor with an emerging *Corpus Paulinum*.

³⁹ Pfitzner sees Paul's exhortations in 1 Tim 4:7–10 as an extension of the polemic against the opponents (Oberlinner, HThKNT, 192–94, follows Pfitzner on this point). Thus, on his reading it constitutes a "rejection of a certain training or exercise propounded by the opponents" and "suggests at the same time the legitimate and necessary training which Timothy must follow in order to oppose and defeat them." Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif*, 172.

⁴⁰ Marshall, ICC, 548; Michael Wolter, *Die Pastoralbriefe als Paulustradition*, FRLANT 146 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 146.

to convey to his congregation this particular understanding of food and fecundity. Timothy is told that "enjoining" (ὑποτίθεσθαι) these things will suggest that he will be a "good servant of Christ Jesus," i.e., that he has been properly initiated in the healthy regimen of Pauline teaching. This is suggested by the language of "nourishing himself" (ἐντρέφόμενος) that is paired with "the words of the faith and of the healthy teaching" (τοῖς λόγοις τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς καλῆς διδασκαλίας). I argue that with this formulation the Pastor is urging a sort of philosophical "diet" consisting of *words*, words of "the faith" (ἡ πίστις) and "the good teaching" (ἡ καλὴ διδασκαλία) in particular.⁴¹ After his brief, creation-oriented commentary on what should be eaten, namely anything created by God and sanctified through prayer, the Pastor progresses to the kinds of verbal food by which Timothy should be nourished. But the Pastor is not only advocating positively for a particular intellectual diet; he's also giving advice about what should *not* be used as nourishment. "Steer clear of the profane old-granny myths" (4:7a). Presumably, a diet consisting of those things would render Timothy defiled and subject to the same gendered slander attached to these myths.⁴² You are what you eat.

The contrast formed between 1 Tim 4:7a and 1 Tim 4:7b supports the reading of this passage as a commentary on the appropriate comportment of Timothy and his readiness to engage in healthy dialogue with his opponents. While 4:7b has at times been taken as

⁴¹ Plutarch, *Aud. poet.* 32e, writes regarding children that "if they be rightly nurtured (ἐντρέφεσθαι) amid poetry, [they] will in some way or another learn to draw some wholesome (χρήσιμον) and profitable (ὠφέλιμον) doctrines even from passages that are suspect of what is base and improper" (Babbitt, LCL). Similarly, Plato discusses the soul being nourished (τρέφεσθαι), helped or harmed by a teaching (μάθημα), at *Protag.* 313c-314b.

⁴² On gendered slander and feminizing as rhetorical techniques in the Pastorals, see Annette Bourland Huizenga, *Moral Education for Women in the Pastoral and Pythagorean Letters: Philosophers of the Household*, NovTSup 147 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 323-24.

introducing a new section,⁴³ reading the two parts of the verse as forming a contrastive pair makes better sense. The contrast formed between the λόγοι of 4:6 and the μῦθοι of 4:7a is between two different kinds of words, delivered in the dietary language of nourishment (ἐντρέφειν)⁴⁴ and avoidance (φυγεῖν).⁴⁵ That is to say, it is cast as the advice of a health expert who issues prophylactic advice on regimen, what to eat, and what not to eat. This forms a fitting complement to the admonition in 1 Tim 4:1–4 to avoid demonic doctrines and to everything "received with thanksgiving" (μετὰ εὐχαριστίας λαμβανόμενον). Having offered a kind of advice about what to be nourished by and what verbal "foods" to avoid, in 4:7b the Pastor moves on to the kind of exercise Timothy should undertake. Here the distinction is made between σωματικὴ γυμνασία and, somewhat curiously, εὐσέβεια. The choice is striking, for the Pastor does not formulate a simple binary by using πνευματικὴ

⁴³ E.g., Johnson, AB, 249.

⁴⁴ ἐντρέφειν can have a sense of nourishing with food or of more general training or rearing. BrillDAG, 706, has for the active "feed (in), raise, cultivate and the passive as "be raised, grow." LSJ, 577, and BDAG, 341, emphasize training. Danker, *Concise Greek Lexicon*, 131, suggests "nurture." Galen, commenting on a passage of the *Timaeus* (87b) that he reads as linking training and nourishment (τροφή) to virtue, argues the point explicitly: "For just as 'training and education' dispel evil, and engender good, so it is with 'nurture'. (And, though the term 'nurture' can be used to mean the whole regimen of a child, not just food, this is definitely not the sense here. For the sentence, 'We should try, etc.' is not an instruction for children but for adults. By 'training' he means the training of the body and also cultural pursuits; by 'education' he means geometry and mathematics; and 'nurture' here can only mean that which is derived from food, gruel, and drink, including wine" (*QAM* 4.813K [trans. Singer]).

Patristic interpreters emphasize the notion of nourishment in this passage. Athanasius, *Mor. et. val. frag.* A (p. 5 in Franz Diekamp, *Analecta patristica*, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 117 [Roma: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1938, repr. 1962]) amends the phrase slightly to "being nourished by the words of truth" (Ἐντρεφόμενοι τοῖς λόγοις τῆς ἀληθείας) and takes this to suggest an inner nourishment, promised by Jesus in John 6. For a full translation of the two fragments of this text, see David Brakke, *Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 310–13. In his exposition of this verse, Chrysostom emphasizes "being nourished" (ἐντρεφόμενος) as a continual practice by likening it to the daily "nourishment" (τροφή) that one eats (*Hom. 1 Tim. 12* [PG 62.559]). Similarly, Chrysostom (*Hom. Act. 4* [PG 60.48]) refers to "healthy doctrines" (ὕγιεα δόγματα) as "nourishment" (τροφή) with which one can be "nourished" (ἐντρέφειν).

⁴⁵ This contrast is of course just one particular instance of the broader opposition between the words and teaching of Paul and his envoys and the opponents and their followers. Within the context of 1 Tim 4, these words are also set in contrast with the demonic doctrines of 4:1.

γυμνασία or some such, but rather εὐσέβεια.⁴⁶ This suggests that just as σωματικὴ γυμνασία is associated especially with bodily health, so too is εὐσέβεια associated with the health of the mind or the soul.⁴⁷ However, this does not necessarily entail that εὐσέβεια has nothing to do with the body, nor that σωματικὴ γυμνασία has nothing to do with the soul. Indeed, εὐσέβεια seems to constitute the kind of healthful enactment of virtue toward which Timothy is to "exercise" himself (4:7),⁴⁸ and it involves the entirety of the human person. It is that state of being that is maximally "beneficial" (ὠφέλιμος),⁴⁹ both for the present life and the future life as well, and entails right comportment before God and in relation to humankind as well.⁵⁰

The Pastor concludes this section with a stereotyped sanctioning of his own prescription

⁴⁶ Pace Marshall, ICC, 553, who regards εὐσέβεια as "spiritual exercise." The designation "spiritual" must be qualified. If Marshall means "not bodily," then the designation must be rejected, for there is no indication that Timothy's enactment of εὐσέβεια does not encompass his bodily comportment.

⁴⁷ Spicq notes that the contrast of athletic training with mental exercise is a commonplace in ancient philosophical literature ("Gymnastique et morale," 239).

⁴⁸ The association between the "healthy words" and the teaching that accords with "piety" is made explicit at 1 Tim 6:3.

⁴⁹ Standhartinger points to Philo, *Det.* 72 (τὴν εὐσέβειαν ὠφελιμώτατον) as an especially close parallel ("Eusebeia in den Pastoralbriefen," 78).

⁵⁰ Towner, *Goal of Our Instruction*, 148, follows Hermann von Lips by noting that in common parlance during the Hellenistic period, εὐσέβεια denoted an attitude of respect towards elders, the deceased, one's country, the ruling authorities, and perhaps masters in the case of slaves. He suggests that it was actually the LXX rendering of *yir'at* (e.g. Isa 11:2, 33:6; Prov. 1:7) with εὐσέβεια that produced the idea of reverence towards God, the "fear of the Lord." This "fear of the Lord" was rooted in the genuine knowledge of the God of Israel, and thus Towner suggests that the emphasis on knowledge is more in line with the Pastorals' use of εὐσέβεια. "Lips discovered that in the Greek speaking world and in the terminology of the popular philosophers *eusebeia* described not just the reverent attitude towards the gods but 'the knowledge' which ensured such reverence; the conduct involved was that which accorded with the will of the gods (or god)" (*Goal of Our Instruction*, 148). We should note, however, with Brent Nongbri and others that εὐσέβεια was not just reverence for the gods, but could also entail right action or respect toward human actors as well. He cites Plato, *Resp.* 615c and Dionysius Halicarnassus, *Rom. Antiq.* 8.44 (*Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013], 4).

(πιστὸς ὁ λόγος) at 4:9, and an exhortation that continues the athletic imagery (4:10) that pervades 1 Tim 4:7–10.⁵¹

Timothy's Training in Cultural Context

The Pastor foregrounds his concern for Timothy's moral health in language that was at home in the various forms of advice literature of his day: "train yourself with a view to piety" (γύμναζε δὲ σεαυτὸν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν [4:7]). Like many philosophers, the Pastor understands the life of virtue to be the most important undertaking, and casts his advice in explicitly athletic language.⁵² Used frequently of training in a state of undress, the term γυμνάζειν was also applied to mental and moral undertakings by contemporary philosophers and moralists.⁵³ Εὐσέβεια, Timothy is told, is "useful" (ὠφέλιμος) for "everything" (πάντα), and has the added promise of "life present and future" (ἡ ζωὴ ἡ νῦν καὶ ἡ μελλοῦσα).⁵⁴ But bodily γυμνασία has its place in the life of faith as well, according to the Pastor.⁵⁵ Using the same term of moderation that we find in 1 Tim 5:23 (ὀλίγος), the Pastor declares that

⁵¹ It also contains language that some, especially Roloff, EKKNT, 240–41, see as a transformation of Col 1:25–29. The most striking parallels are to be found in Col 1:29 (εἰς ὃ καὶ κοπιῶ ἀγωνιζόμενος) and 1 Tim 4:10 (εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ κοπιῶμεν καὶ ἀγωνιζόμεθα).

⁵² Isocrates, in his advice to Nicocles concerning ruling (*Nic.* 11), emphasizes the importance of "training" (γυμνάζειν) the soul (ψυχὴ), even more so than athletes (ἀσκηταί) train the body (σῶμα). In Crates, *Epistle* 3, 14–15, we find an exhortation to Hipparchia: "Let there be care for the soul among you, but for the body whatever is a necessity" (μελέτω ὑμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ὅσον ἀνάγκη).

⁵³ Spicq cites Plato, *Gorg.* 464b and Lucian, *Anach.* 20 ("Gymnastique et morale," 230 n. 2). Ps. Isocrates, *Dem.* 21 writes the following: "Train yourself also with voluntary toils, in order that you might be able to endure involuntary ones. The soul practices self-control with regard to all the things it is shameful to be controlled by: shameful gain, wrath, pleasure, grief" (Γύμναζε σεαυτὸν πόνοις ἐκουσίοις, ὅπως ἂν δύνῃ καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσίους ὑπομένειν. ὅφ' ὧν κρατεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν αἰσχροῦν, τούτων ἐγκράτειαν ἄσκει πάντων, κέρδους, ὀργῆς, ἡδονῆς, λύπης).

⁵⁴ This constitutes an appeal to advantage, a frequent tactic in deliberative rhetoric. Cf. Collins, NTL, 122.

⁵⁵ Even this limited approval of bodily training suggests that the contrast here is not with the ascetic exercises of the opponents of 1 Tim 4:2, demonized as they are.

γυμνασία is "useful for a little" (πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος).⁵⁶ While some scholars have taken this to mean that it is essentially useless,⁵⁷ others suggest (rightly in my opinion) to the contrary that it is characterized here as useful, but to a lesser degree than εὐσέβεια.⁵⁸ Exercise was considered by some as a preventative measure, reducing bouts of illness.⁵⁹ Furthermore, there is a crucial link between bodily exercise and the exercise toward virtue, a fact not rejected by the Pastor's prioritizing of training toward εὐσέβεια.⁶⁰ Galen, in his treatise *On Hygiene*, highlights the importance of proper regimen for the soul's character. "The character of the soul is corrupted by poor habits in food and drink and exercise and things seen and heard and the entirety of music. So then it is necessary for the one pursuing health to be experienced in all these, and not to think that it befits the philosopher alone to fashion the character of the soul."⁶¹ It was an important precaution against the untimely

⁵⁶ The Pastor here agrees with Lucian's character Solon (*Anach.* 6) who argues that exercise (i.e., the activity or πρᾶγμα referred to here) "has a certain not unpleasurable usefulness and accords no small strength to bodies" (ἀλλ' ἔχει τινὰ χρεῖαν οὐκ ἀτερπῆ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀκμὴν οὐ μικρὰν ἐπάγει τοῖς σώμασιν). This aligns with the ultimate goal of civic education: that "citizens be good in their souls and strong in their bodies" (οἱ πολῖται ἀγαθοὶ μὲν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἰσχυροὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα [*Anach.* 20]).

⁵⁷ B. S. Easton, *The Pastoral Epistles* (London: SCM Press, 1947), 145 (cited by Marshall, ICC, 551).

⁵⁸ The Pastor does not here say that it is essentially useless. By contrast, he does say that λογαχεῖν is "useful for nothing" (ἐπ' οὐδὲν χρήσιμον) at 2 Tim 2:14. Scholars who acknowledge its limited value include, e.g., Marshall, 551; Towner, NICNT, 306; Johnson, AB, 249; Collins, NTL, 122. BDAG, 703, suggests "profitable for (a) little (= has some value)."

⁵⁹ See Crates, *Epistle 20*, which urges Metrocles to exercise regularly and to use that habit as an opportunity to recruit young men to the philosophic life. Crates says that once the young men started exercising (γυμνάζειν), they no longer kept getting sick (ἐπινόσως διάγειν [cf. Hippocrates, *Epid.* 1.5]), and they thanked Crates for being the "cause of [their] health" (αἴτιον τῆς υγιείας).

⁶⁰ In his *Protrepticus*, Galen excoriates athletes (οἱ ἀθλοῦντες) that do not attend to the goods of the soul: "To begin with, they are unaware that they *have* a soul, so far are they from understanding its rational nature. Because they are always occupied in the business of amassing flesh and blood, their souls are as it were extinguished in a heap of mire, unable to contemplate anything clearly, mindless as beasts without reason" (τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' εἰ ψυχὴν ἔχουσι γινώσκουσι· τοσοῦτον ἀποδέουσι τοῦ λογικὴν αὐτὴν ἐπίστασθαι. σαρκῶν γὰρ αἰ καὶ αἵματος ἀθροίζοντες πλῆθος ὡς ἐν βορβόρῳ πολλῷ τὴν ψυχὴν (τὴν) ἑαυτῶν ἔχουσι κατεσβεσμένην, οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς νοῆσαι δυναμένην ἀλλ' ἄνουν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις). *Protr.* 11 [CMG 5.1.1, 138.7–11] = 1.27K (trans. Singer).

⁶¹ διαφθείρεται δὲ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος ὑπὸ μοχθηρῶν ἐθισμῶν ἐν ἐδέσμασί τε καὶ πόμασι, καὶ γυμνασίοις, καὶ θεάμασι, καὶ ἀκούσμασι, καὶ τῇ συμπάσῃ μουσικῇ. τούτων τοίνυν ἀπάντων ἔμπειρον εἶναι χρὴ τὸν τὴν υγιεινὴν μετιόντα, καὶ μὴ νομίζειν, ὡς φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ προσήκει πλάττειν ἥθος ψυχῆς. (*San. tu.* 1.8 = 6.40K).

debilitation of the mind which, as the Pastor elsewhere (1 Tim 6:3; 2 Tim 3:8) intimates, was a major hindrance to the exercise of εὐσέβεια.

The emphasis I am placing here on the notion of nourishment and the dietetic aspect of this passage is not discounted by the pervasive athletic imagery, but rather substantiated by it. This is due to the fact that diet and regimen are every bit as much a part of athletic discourse as they are of medical⁶² and philosophical discourse in the early Empire. Philostratus's *Gymnasticus*, though coming later than the other texts here discussed, is an illuminating resource for thinking about the ancient discourse regarding the parameters of medical practice and who had the right to perform them. There were no restrictions to prevent anybody who wished from peddling his healing arts, and Philostratus is eager to carve out a place for the "trainer" among the medical elite and to argue for his ability to care adequately for the athlete. Philostratus presents his treatise as a contribution to scientific knowledge, and participates in the handbook culture that prized such manuals.⁶³ What is perhaps most pertinent for our discussion is that Philostratus says that γυμναστική is a part of medicine and training: "What, then, should one think about the art of athletic training?

⁶² The tradition of dietary remedy in the wider practice of regulating regimen in ancient medicine is strong. Hippocratic treatises include *Nutrient (De Alimento)*, *Regimen in Health (De Salubri Victu)*, *Diet or Regimen (De Victu)*, *Regimen in Acute Disease (De Victu in Acutis)*, *Use of Mineral Waters, Wine and Vinegar (De liquidarum usu)*. Celsus, *Med.* 2.18–33, devotes a section to it. Galen wrote a treatise *On the Properties of Foodstuffs*. For discussion, see Hynek Bartoš, *Philosophy and Dietetics in the Hippocratic on Regimen: A Delicate Balance of Health*, *Studies in Ancient Medicine* 44 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 12–110; Owen Powell, *On the Properties of Foodstuffs: Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3–6. Mark Grant, *Galen on Food and Diet* (London: Routledge, 2000); Mark Grant, *Dieting for an Emperor: A Translation of Books 1 and 4 of Oribasius' Medical Compilations with an Introduction and Commentary*, *Studies in Ancient Medicine* 15 (Leiden: Brill, 1997).

⁶³ He writes in *Gymn.* 1: "Now regarding athletic training, we say that it is a skill, inferior to no other art, such that it can be compiled into notes for those who wish to train" (περὶ δὲ γυμναστικῆς σοφίαν λέγομεν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐλάττω τέχνης, ὥστε εἰς ὑπομνήματα ξυνηθῆναι τοῖς βουλομένοις γυμνάζειν). On the ancient handbook tradition, see J. Albert Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament: Literary, Social, and Moral Dimensions* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 97–103.

What else except to believe that it is a type of wisdom combining both the art of medicine and the art of the paidotribês; it is more comprehensive than the latter, and a part of the former."⁶⁴ Here Philostratus makes the argument that γυμναστική is an art that encompasses a variety of specialities; insofar as the body is concerned, attention to its training and nourishment is given. Throughout the treatise, we find discussions of the kind of food the athlete should or should not partake of, or by which he should be nourished (cf. *Gymn.* 30, 43, 47, 54). Of course, physicians and trainers disputed (διαμφισβητεῖν) who properly had authority on such matters.⁶⁵ Galen represents an alternative perspective, wherein health—and the advice about regimen and diet that support it—is properly the purview of medicine, not gymnastics. These perspectives and preoccupations regarding issues of disciplinary purview, while preserved in elite literature, would not have been unknown by a non-elite populace. They could see the public outgrowth of these debates in the gymnasia and the theatres. The fact that 1 Timothy is addressed, ostensibly, to Ephesus, a bustling metropolis that had all manner of Greek cultural institutions, lends credence to the idea that the Pastor's advice could be read within such a context.

⁶⁴ Τί οὖν χρή περὶ γυμναστικῆς γινώσκειν; τί δ' ἄλλο ἢ σοφίαν αὐτὴν ἡγεῖσθαι ξυγκειμένην μὲν ἐξ ἱατρικῆς τε καὶ παιδοτριβικῆς, οὕσαν δὲ τῆς μὲν τελεωτέραν, τῆς δὲ μόριον (*Gymn.* 4 [König, LCL]). Philostratus explains further: "That is the degree to which the art of training is more comprehensive than the aforementioned skill of the paidotribês. Its relation to the art of medicine is as follows. Doctors cure the illnesses we refer to as catarrh and dropsy and consumption, and the various types of epilepsy, by prescribing irrigations or potions or dressings, whereas athletic training checks such conditions by the use of diet and massage. But if someone has a break or a flesh wound or clouding of the sight in his eyes or a dislocation of one of his limbs, then he needs to be taken to the doctor, for the art of the athletic trainer does not concern itself with problems of those kinds" (τῆς μὲν δὴ προειρημένης ἐπιστήμης ἢ γυμναστικῆς τοσοῦτω τελεωτέρα, πρὸς δὲ γε ἱατρικὴν ὧδε ἔχει· νοσήματα, ὅποσα κατάρρους καὶ ὑδέρους καὶ φθόας ὀνομάζομεν καὶ ὅποσαι ἱεραὶ νόσοι, ἱατροὶ μὲν παύουσιν ἐπαντλοῦντές τι ἢ ποτίζοντες ἢ ἐπιπλάττοντες, γυμναστικὴ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαίταις ἴσχει καὶ τρίψει· ῥήξαντά τι δὲ ἢ τρωθέντα ἢ θολωθέντα τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φῶς ἢ ὀλισθήσαντά τι τῶν ἄρθρων ἐς ἱατροὺς χρή φέρειν, ὥς οὐδὲν ἢ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα [*Gymn.* 4; König, LCL]).

⁶⁵ See Galen, *Thras.* 2 = 5.806K.

Just as there was a strong influence of the medical traditions and its preoccupations upon athletics and philosophy and the agonistic cultures they participated in and perpetuated, so too was there a substantive and observable element of agonism in the practice of medicine. Agonism was a hallmark of medical practice⁶⁶ no less than rhetoric, a point made vividly by Pliny (*Nat.* 29.5.9) when he recalls the epitaph of Thessalus of Tralles at his memorial along the Appian Way, which bore the unsubtle epithet: *ιατρονίκης*, "doctor-conquerer."⁶⁷ A bit later, Pliny comments on, or rather laments, the contentiousness of physicians:⁶⁸ "Hence those wretched, quarrelsome consultations at the bedside of the patient, no consultant agreeing with another lest he should appear to acknowledge a superior. Hence too that gloomy inscription on monuments: 'It was the crowd of physicians that killed me.'"⁶⁹ The "crowd of physicians," all contending for the honor that would

⁶⁶ Faustina makes the comment that Galen "makes war" (*πολεμεῖν*) on the Methodists not with words but deeds. See *Praen.* 12.7 (CMG 5.8.1, 132.7–33 Nutton ed.= 14.663K). Cf. *Praen.* 2.15 (CMG 5.8.1, 78.13 Nutton ed.= 14.609K), where Galen alleges to have no desire to "have a verbal contest" (*ἀμιλλᾶσθαι διὰ λόγων*) with other doctors in the case of Eudemus.

⁶⁷ LSJ, 816, provides "conqueror of physicians," while BrillDAG, 962, has "victor of doctors, i.e., supreme doctor."

⁶⁸ This is further illustrated by Susan P. Mattern, who writes of Galen: "He does not spare his rivals in clinical stories from the harsh polemic that characterizes his work in general, labeling them bandits, villains, spewers of nonsense, or "the Thessalian ass" and denouncing their ignorance (using several different words for this), maliciousness, arrogance, shamelessness, sloppiness, and competitiveness" (*Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008], 73). Mattern show how Galen is both incredibly agonistic in his exchanges with other doctors, and employs a number of tactics, either interrogating them in front of others to expose their ignorance, remaining silent until it is clear that nobody else has the answer and then coming forward with the solution, or laughs at their diagnoses (as they laugh at his in turn [76]). The discourse surrounding the agonistic exchange is an interesting feature of Galen's accounts, because he will at times *deride* the agonistic contentiousness of his rivals, but then he clearly participates and encourages such exchanges all the while. Something similar may be observed in the Pastorals, for the author abuses their contentiousness and seeking of verbal disputes while at the same time spending a fair amount of time castigating them for doing so.

⁶⁹ *hinc illae circa aegros miserae sententiarum concertationes, nullo idem censente, ne videatur accessio alterius. hinc illa infelix monumentis inscriptio, turba se medicorum perisse* (*Nat.* 29.5.11.[Jones, LCL]).

accrue to the one with a successful diagnosis and treatment,⁷⁰ would have been a common enough occurrence,⁷¹ especially at the bedside of the well-to-do. Plutarch alludes to physicians who perform surgeries "in the theaters" (ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις) in order to attract clients.⁷² Galen performed anatomical demonstrations in public, in the form of both dissection and vivisection of animals.⁷³ There is an especially fascinating confluence of medical practice and agonistic rhetorical display in the public medical contests celebrated, for instance, at the hall of muses/Museum (Μουσεῖον) in Ephesus.⁷⁴ These competitions were an important part of the professional medical culture of the city, and served to attract both physicians and patients to the city.⁷⁵ What they help to illustrate for us is the fact that

⁷⁰ Galen challenges rival doctors, whom he calls "sophists," to "come to the contest (ἀθλον) and compete (ἀγωνιζέσθωσαν) with me as though in a stadium; not with words, nor with long-winded nonsense, but with deeds themselves." See *Purg. med. fac.* 2.11.328–30K, cited by Mattern, *Rhetoric of Healing*, 70.

⁷¹ Galen reports that when a large elephant was killed in Rome, a great crowd of doctors gathered to observe the dissection of the heart. Galen predicted that it would have a bone, and was about to demonstrate this as fact and thereby make fools of the physicians who denied it, but was dissuaded by his pupils. See *AA* 10 (K2.619–20). Cf. the public gatherings mentioned at *Opt. med. cogn.* 9.6 (CMG Suppl. Or. IV. Iskandar, 105.4–14) where Galen "performed many anatomical demonstrations before the spectators." These are said to be procedures performed on apes; Galen did not perform human autopsies.

⁷² *Adul. amic.* 71a. See Durling, "Medicine in Plutarch's *Moralia*," 314.

⁷³ See Maud W. Gleason, "Shock and Awe: The Performance Dimension of Galen's Anatomy Demonstrations," in *Galen and the World of Knowledge*, ed. Christopher Gill, Tim Whitmarsh, and John Wilkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 85–114.

⁷⁴ Helmut Engelmann, "Ephesische Inschriften," *ZPE* 84 (1990): 89–94. Regarding these contests, which took place in the second century CE, Nutton explains: "This was an annual competition divided into four classes, συντάγματα, προβλήματα, χειρουργία and ὄργανα - a precise definition is impossible, but the first pair may relate to pharmacology, the latter pair more clearly to surgery and instruments. The names of the winners in each category, and the presiding officials of each years, were engraved around the walls of the Museum" (Vivian Nutton, "Rufus of Ephesus in the Medical Context of His Time," in *Rufus of Ephesus: On Melancholy*, ed. Peter E. Pormann, Sapere 12 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008], 142). On the medical milieu of Ephesus more generally, see Nutton, "Rufus of Ephesus," 139–58 esp. 141–43. Israelowich lists Ephesus (along with Alexandria and Rome) among cities that were famed for their concentration of notable medical professionals. He argues that the city's reputation for medicine was carefully curated, and that the literary productions and public lectures of physicians there were meant to "promote their medical reputations" (Ido Israelowich, *Patients and Healers in the High Roman Empire* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015], 111).

⁷⁵ According to Israelowich, "Another means of attracting physicians and patients into the cities was the regular participation of physicians in festivals and competitions, where they displayed their skills and expertise. Evidence shows that physicians participated in the agones associated with the Grand Asclepieia in Ephesus. An inscription from 153/4 CE records one Cornelius Varinus Demetrius, an archon of the collegium of

the practice of medicine, and the authority to give advice on health and its maintenance, were very much a part of the medical milieu of ancient Ephesus, the ostensible location of Timothy and hence the fictive location to which the pseudepigraphon is addressed.⁷⁶

The Pastor's concern to guide Timothy's intellectual and physical diet (cf. 1 Tim 5:23) is comprehensible within this milieu, for philosophers too competed for the right to give advice on matters of bodily health, often as an extension of their perspective on the soul.⁷⁷ Food and philosophy were depicted by the Pastor's near contemporary, Musonius Rufus, as having an essentially reflexive relationship.⁷⁸ Inordinate attention to the pleasure caused by food (in the form of culinary treatises, disdained by Musonius) only perpetuates the problem as the gourmand eats more and more for the sake of pleasure instead of sustenance. Musonius recognized food as an important aspect of bodily medicine as well, citing the apothegm of Zeno of Citium, who demanded that his doctor prescribe him the same thing that his slave would receive in order to regain health.⁷⁹ Musonius sums up his discussion

physicians, who won the competition. It was not an exceptional event" (*Patients and Healers in the High Roman Empire*, 131).

⁷⁶ Vivian Nutton notes that Ephesus was a major center of medical research and practice. The practical result was the relative ubiquity of healers and physicians. Ephesus itself seems to have seen fewer slave physicians, a greater number of medical families than even Rome had, and much more ready acceptance of healers and their profession ("Rufus of Ephesus," 155). For the inscriptions of doctors in Ephesus, Nutton "Rufus of Ephesus," 141 n. 8 points to Samama, nos. 201–19, with no. 77, p. 337. See Evelyne Samama, *Les médecins dans le monde grec: sources épigraphiques sur la naissance d'un corps médical*, Hautes études du monde gréco-romain (Genève: Droz, 2003).

⁷⁷ Malherbe cites *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 464 (his #39): "Pythagoras, upon seeing an athletic young man putting on a lot of flesh by drinking wine, eating meat, and observing his diet, said, 'Oh, my dear fellow, do stop making your prison so strong!'" (Πυθαγόρας νεανίσκον ἰδὼν ἀθλητικὸν οἶνω καὶ κρεοφαγίᾳ καὶ ἀσκήσει σάρκα πολλὴν ὑποτρέφοντα εἶπεν· „ὦ δαιμόνιε, παῦσαι καθ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιῶν τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἰσχυρόν) in *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook*, LEC 4 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986).

⁷⁸ See *Or.* 18a and 18b.

⁷⁹ Musonius can call food the "medicine of life" (ζωῆς φάρμακον). See *Or.* 18B (Lutz, 118 l.14).

περὶ τροφῆς by saying that "the goal for eating should be to produce health and strength"

(δεῖν σκοπὸν μὲν αὐτῆς ποιεῖσθαι ὑγίειάν τε καὶ ἰσχύν).⁸⁰

Advice about food was an important component of philosophical instruction, because it had the potential to affect one's capacity to think properly.⁸¹ Eating the right food helped the soul to remain light and dry, which in turn allowed the individual to make the right choices about food and everything else. The following was reported regarding Musonius Rufus: "He held that [meat] was a heavy food (κρεῶδη τροφή) and an obstacle to thinking (νοεῖν) and reasoning (φρονεῖν), since the exhalations rising from it, being turbid, darkened the soul. For this reason also the people who make larger use of it seem slower (βραδυτέροι) in intellect (διάνοια)."⁸² He goes on to suggest that just as the gods are nourished (τρέφεσθαι) from "vapors rising from the earth and water" so too should humans "be nourished on food (τροφή) most like that, the lightest and purest (κουφοτάτη καὶ καθαρωτάτη); for thus our souls would be pure and dry (καθαρά τε καὶ ξηρά), and being so, would be finest and wisest, as it seemed to Heraclitus when he said, 'The clear dry soul is

⁸⁰ *Or.* 18b., 120.10–11 (Lutz).

⁸¹ "On the subject of food [Musonius Rufus] used to speak frequently and very emphatically too, as a question of no small significance, nor leading to unimportant consequences; indeed he believed that the beginning and foundation of temperance lay in self-control in eating and drinking" (Lutz trans., *Or.* 18a.4–7). Writing much earlier, Xenophon gives us evidence that the health of body was understood to have an impact on the exercise of the mind. "For in everything that men do the body is useful (χρήσιμον τὸ σῶμα ἐστίν); and in all uses of the body it is very important to keep the body in as optimal condition as possible. Even in the process of thinking (διανοεῖσθαι), where the use of the body seems minimal, everyone knows that grave mistakes can often be traced to bad health (διὰ τὸ μὴ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ σῶμα). And because the body is in a bad condition, loss of memory, depression, bad temper, and insanity (λήθη δὲ καὶ ἀθυμία καὶ δυσκολία καὶ μανία) often assail the mind (διάνοια) so violently as to drive whatever knowledge it contains clean out of it" (*Mem.* 3.12.5–6). Cf. Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* 24.

⁸² εἶναι δὲ ταύτην ἔλεγε καὶ βαρυτέραν καὶ τῷ νοεῖν τι καὶ φρονεῖν ἐμπόδιον· τὴν γὰρ ἀναθυμίασιν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῆς θολωδεστέραν οὖσαν ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ· (*Or.* 18a.20–23, Lutz trans.). A similar exhortation is attributed to Pythagoras regarding dietary suggestions by Iamblichus: "... and he exhorted them to be on guard against whatsoever things were a hinderance to prophecy or to purity of soul and sanctity or to a habit of prudence and excellence" (... καὶ ὅσα δὲ εἰς μαντικὴν ἐνεπόδιζεν ἢ πρὸς καθαρότητα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἀγνείαν ἢ πρὸς σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς ἔξιν, παρήνει φυλάττεσθαι [*Vit. Pyth.* 24, my trans., Deubner ed.]).

wisest and best" (αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη).⁸³ These examples help us appreciate the Pastor's advice regarding exercise—bodily and that toward piety— and nourishment—both verbal and medicinal— as part of an ongoing cultural debate about the relationship between body and mind. Furthermore, they illustrate what the Pastor might have meant when he suggested that γυμνασία was "useful for a little" insofar as they illuminate how his contemporaries conceived of the value and utility of bodily training and regimen for the life of the mind.⁸⁴ By engaging in the discourse about training and regimen, the Pastor co-opts the language and motifs of psychosomatic care and training in order to reorient the reader's perspective on who should be trusted and followed as a guide in such matters. For the Pastor, the answer is straightforward: Paul is the authority, Paul is the authoritative advice-giver.

Thus far we have dealt with texts that help to contextualize the Pastor's advice about nourishment with regard to the "words of the faith," bodily training, and training in εὐσέβεια within the cultural debates of his day. Doing so has helped us to interpret the Pastor's mixture of advice on exercise and the metaphor of nourishment as applied to particular kinds of discourse. The Pastor wants Timothy to be fed by the right kind of λόγοι to avoid partaking of μῦθοι. We have also argued that there was competition among various practitioners of the arts for the authority to dispense wisdom on such matters. The Pastor too makes a bid for the superiority of his own advice: "trustworthy is the word and

⁸³ Or. 18a.25–32, Lutz ed.

⁸⁴ Jacques Jouanna, "Does Galen Have a Medical Programme for Intellectuals and the Faculties of the Intellect?," in *Galen and the World of Knowledge*, ed. Christopher Gill, Tim Whitmarsh, and John Wilkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 190–205.

deserving of all acceptance" (1 Tim 4:9). The Pastor's advice to Timothy regarding *εὐσέβεια* and *ἡ σωματικὴ γυμνασία* can thus be appreciated as an attempt to advocate for a certain answer to the ancient debate about what it means to live well, ostensibly within a bustling city like Ephesus. Consequently, I see this passage as an attempt to establish Paul as the kind of figure who could comment on such things at all. Not only does he stand head and shoulders above his more immediate theological opponents whose views are reflected (however opaquely) in 1 Timothy 4:3; he also takes his place among the ranks of competing physicians, gymnastic trainers, and philosophers who all proffer advice about health, bodily and philosophical, and how to maintain it. 1 Timothy 4:6–10 is an instance of the Pastor's larger project of depicting Paul as a sage (and superior) participant in the contemporary discourses about healthy living. Of course, the Pastor does not only think his advice is worthy of universal acceptance; from his perspective, it is a matter of life both present and future (1 Tim 4:8). It is for this reason (*εἰς τοῦτο*) that, he says, Paul and Timothy should "labor and compete" (*κοπιῶμεν καὶ ἀγωνιζόμεθα* [4:10]).⁸⁵ Establishing Paul's authority in all matters of life and salvation is, from the Pastor's perspective, a matter of affirming hope in the "living God," the "savior of all humanity, especially believers" (4:10).

⁸⁵ This dual phrase comprises a summation of ministry activity. In the PE, as in other Pauline letters (cf. Rom 16:6, 12; 1 Cor 4:12; 9:25; 15:10; 16:16; Col 1:29 is the only other passage to draw the two verbs together), these terms refer to the labor of ministry and the struggle of faithful living. For example, in 1 Tim 5:17, the faithful elders are described as "those who labor in word and teaching" (*οἱ κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ*; similarly, 2 Tim 2:6 uses *κοπιᾶν* to refer to the farmer's faithful work). At 1 Tim 6:12, Timothy is exhorted: "Fight the good fight of the faith" (*ἀγωνίζου τὸν καλὸν ἀγῶνα τῆς πίστεως*). Cf. the similar formulation in 2 Tim 4:7: "I have fought the good fight, I have completed the race, I have kept the faith" (*τὸν καλὸν ἀγῶνα ἡγήνησμαι, τὸν δρόμον τετέλεκα, τὴν πίστιν τετήρηκα*).

B. Timothy's Training (1 Tim 4:11–16)

1 Timothy 4:11–16

11 Command and teach these things. 12 Let no one despise your youthfulness, but be a model for the faithful in word, in way of life, in love, in faith, in propriety.⁸⁶ Until I come devote yourself to reading, exhortation, teaching. 14 Don't be neglectful of the gift in you, which was given to you through prophecy with the laying on of the hands of the council of elders. 15 Practice these things; be in them, in order that your progress might be manifest to all. 16 Keep focused on yourself and the teaching; persist in them;⁸⁷ for by doing this you will keep healthy both yourself and those who listen to you.⁸⁸

Appropriate Exercises and Forms of Speech (1 Tim 4:11–16)

"Bodily exercise" (σωματικὴ γυμνασία) and "exercise toward piety" (γυμνάζειν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν) represent two related but different categories of exercise in the PE. What, we might ask, is entailed in the latter form of exercise, clearly the Pastor's privileged category? The Pastor goes on in 1 Tim 4:11–16 to provide further instruction regarding Timothy's proper exercises, and here again the ancient discourses on training are pertinent, for they too advocate certain kinds of exercise in light of one's professional pursuits and disposition. As noted above, advice varied based on who was giving it and who received it. Looking to the cultural conventions and discourses about habitude typical of the early Empire can help us

⁸⁶ See BDAG, 12. The only other NT instance is at 1 Tim 5:2, though its cognates are common enough: ἀγνός (e.g., 2 Cor 7:11, 11:2; Phil 4:8; 1 Tim 5:22; Titus 2:5) ἀγνότης (2 Cor 6:6, 11:3); ἀγνώς (Phil 1:17).

⁸⁷ BDAG, 374, suggests the antecedent is ταῦτα and τούτοις from 1 Tim 4:15. But these in turn point back to the nouns of 4:12–13.

⁸⁸ 11 Παράγγελλε ταῦτα καὶ δίδασκε. 12 Μηδεὶς σου τῆς νεότητος καταφρονεῖτω, ἀλλὰ τύπος γίνου τῶν πιστῶν ἐν λόγῳ, ἐν ἀναστροφῇ, ἐν ἀγάπῃ, ἐν πίστει, ἐν ἀγνείᾳ. 13 ἕως ἔρχομαι πρόσεχε τῇ ἀναγνώσει, τῇ παρακλήσει, τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ. 14 μὴ ἀμέλει τοῦ ἐν σοὶ χαρίσματος, ὃ ἐδόθη σοὶ διὰ προφητείας μετὰ ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου. 15 ταῦτα μελέτα, ἐν τούτοις ἴσθι, ἵνα σου ἡ προκοπὴ φανερά ᾖ πᾶσιν. 16 ἔπεχε σεαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, ἐπίμενε αὐτοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ ποιῶν καὶ σεαυτὸν σώσεις καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντάς σου.

interpret the Pastor's advice to Timothy. Plutarch's treatise *Healthy Precepts*⁸⁹ illustrates the sort of training that was appropriate for the scholar (φιλόλογος), a category particularly apt for a consideration of the Pastorals, since the activities and training of the scholar and the pastor had much in common.

In his treatise, Plutarch takes up the topic of what exercises befit a scholar (περὶ γυμνασίων φιλολόγοις ἀρμόζοντων [Tu. san. 130a]).⁹⁰ He discusses the daily use of the voice (ἡ φωνή) in speech as an exercise (γυμνάσιον) that results "not only in health but in strength" (οὐ μόνον πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἰσχύν).⁹¹ The movement of the breath (πνεῦμα) in utilizing the voice has, according to Plutarch, a variety of health benefits: "it increases the warmth, thins the blood, clears out (ἐκκαθαίρει) every vein, opens every artery, and does not permit any solidification or coagulation of superfluous fluid to take place like a sediment in the vessels that receive and digest the food."⁹² Plutarch takes these health benefits as evidence for why it is so important for the scholar to get his daily dose of vocal exercise. But, he notes, if this rigorous exercise of the voice is for whatever reason ill-advised (one might already be fatigued, for instance), then "reading or declaiming" (ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀναφωνεῖν)⁹³ is advised: "For reading stands in the same relation to discussion as riding in a

⁸⁹ The English LCL title is *Advice on Keeping Well*, which translates the Latin title (*De sanitate tuenda praecepta*) better than the Greek (ὑγιεινὰ παραγγέλματα).

⁹⁰ Smith cites this passage with reference to 1 Tim 4:7, but offers no comment as to its relevance for comparison ("De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta (Moralia 122B-137E)," in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, ed. Hans Dieter Betz, SCHNT 4 [Leiden: Brill, 1978], 48).

⁹¹ Tu. san. 130b. As noted above, Musonius identifies "health" (ὑγίεια) and "vigor" (ἰσχύς) as the goal of proper eating (Or. 18b. 120.10–11).

⁹² τὸ θερμὸν αὖξει καὶ λεπτύνει τὸ αἷμα, καὶ πᾶσαν μὲν ἐκκαθαίρει φλέβα, πᾶσαν δ' ἀρτηρίαν ἀνοίγει, σύστασιν δὲ καὶ πῆξιν ὑγρότης οὐκ ἔῃ περιττωματικῆς ὥσπερ ὑποστάθμην ἐγγενέσθαι τοῖς τὴν τροφήν παραλαμβάνουσι καὶ κατεργαζομένοις ἀγγείοις (Tu. san. 130b-c).

⁹³ ἀνάγνωσις shows up in two lists of philosophical "exercises" (ἀσκήσεις) provided by Philo: *Her.* 253 and *Alleg.* 3.18–19 (cited by Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 84 nn. 19–20). The first is concise enough to

carriage to active exercise, and as though upon the vehicle of another's words it moves softly, and carries the voice gently this way and that."⁹⁴ According to Plutarch, this movement of the voice is an exercise that merits every bit as much attention and gymnastic care as boxing in the palaestra might. After the strain of focalizing the body's energy in the voice, Plutarch advocates the redistribution of *πνεῦμα* throughout the body via massage, replete with rubbing oil in a warm room (*Tu. san.* 130d).

In both Plutarch's *Health Precepts* and the Pastoral Epistles, there is a concern not only for the *forms* of speech (e.g., reading, declaiming, exhorting, etc.), but also the *kinds of speech* one should tolerate or not (e.g., scholarly arcana, pleasing myths), though in key moments they disagree about what should be avoided and tolerated. Plutarch represents the position of the intellectual elite as being in conflict with the judgments of "anointers/trainers in gymnasia" (*ἀλειπται*) and "physical trainers" (*παιδοτρίβαι*), who are reported to complain that "scholarly talk throughout dinner" (*τὸ παρὰ δεῖπνον φιλολογεῖν*) is likely to "spoil the food" (*τὴν τροφήν διαφθείρειν*) and "weigh down the head" (*βαρύνει τὴν κεφαλὴν* [133b]). Similarly, "dialectic" (*διαλεκτική*) is said to be "headache-producing" and "excessively wearisome" (*κεφαλαλγὲς δὲ καὶ κοπιῶδες ἰσχυρῶς* [133c]).⁹⁵ Plutarch agrees, to a limited extent, that there are certain kinds of talk best avoided. But, unlike the stereotypical

quote in full: For all the elements of practice are food fit for eating, inquiry, examination, reading, listening to instruction, concentration, perseverance, self-mastery, and power to treat things indifferent as indeed indifferent. πάντα γὰρ τὰ τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἐδώδιμα καθέστηκεν, ἡ ζήτησις, ἡ σκέψις, ἡ ἀνάγνωσις, ἡ ἀκρόασις, ἡ προσοχή, ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ἡ ἐξαδιαφόρησις τῶν ἀδιαφόρων (Colson & Whitaker, LCL).

⁹⁴ ὅπερ γὰρ αἰώρα πρὸς γυμνάσιόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πρὸς διάλεξιν ἀνάγνωσις, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ὀχήματος ἀλλοτρίου λόγου κινουῦσα μαλακῶς καὶ διαφοροῦσα πρῶς τὴν φωνήν (130c [Babbitt, LCL]).

⁹⁵ The use of these terms in medical diagnosis is notable (see the references in LSJ, s.v. *κοπιώδης*), since it suggests the confluence between philosophical diagnosis of the physical effects of speech and medical diagnosis.

jocks he mocks, he does think there are forms of intellectual exchange that are entirely beneficial and appropriate for the aiding of digestion. He writes that just as trainers advocate light physical activity after a meal, scholars should hold the following opinion:

We ought not to distract our minds (τὰς ψυχὰς διαφέρειν) after dinner either with business or cares or pseudo-learned disputations (μήτε πράγμασι μήτε φροντίσι μήτε σοφιστικοῖς ἀγῶσι), which have as their goal an ostentatious or stirring rivalry (ἄμιλλα). But many of the problems of natural science are light and enticing, and there are many stories which contain ethical considerations (ἠθικὰς σκέψεις) and the "soul's satisfaction," as Homer has phrased this,⁹⁶ and nothing repellent (ἀντίτυπον). The spending of time over questions of history and poetry (ἐν ἱστορικαῖς καὶ ποιητικαῖς ζητήσεσι) some persons, not unpleasingly, have called a second repast for men of scholarship and culture. There are also inoffensive stories and fables (διηγήσεις ἄλυποι καὶ μυθολογίαι), and it is less onerous to exchange opinions about a flute and a lyre than to listen to the sound of the lyre and the flute itself. (*Tu. san.* 133e-f)⁹⁷

For scholarly types (φιλόλογοι), Plutarch suggests avoiding what he considers to be "pseudo-learned disputations" (σοφιστικοὶ ἀγῶνες). These are forbidden not, it seems, because of their content, but because of their effect on the disputant or auditor. Scholarly arcana, on the other hand, are considered by Plutarch a worthwhile undertaking. This passage demonstrates that the Pastor's preoccupation with which kinds of speech Timothy should permit and which kinds he should "muzzle" (ἐπιστομίζειν [Titus 1:10]) or otherwise squelch has clear analogues in contemporary advice literature. Though Plutarch and the Pastor disagree about the propriety of μυθολογίαι, they agree that contentious, pseudo-intellectual disputes that serve only ostentation and produce only rivalry should be altogether avoided.

⁹⁶ Homer is cited as an authority by Plutarch in this treatise elsewhere at 122c and 126d.

⁹⁷ οὕτως ἡμεῖς οἰησόμεθα δεῖν τὰς ψυχὰς διαφέρειν μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον μήτε πράγμασι μήτε φροντίσι μήτε σοφιστικοῖς ἀγῶσι πρὸς ἄμιλλαν ἐπιδεικτικὴν ἢ κινητικὴν περαιομένους. ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν φυσικῶν προβλημάτων ἐλαφρὰ καὶ πιθανά, πολλὰ δὲ διηγήσεις ἠθικὰς σκέψεις ἔχουσιν καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ "μενοεικές," ὡς Ὅμηρος ἔφη, καὶ μὴ ἀντίτυπον. τὰς δ' ἐν ἱστορικαῖς καὶ ποιητικαῖς ζητήσεσι διατριβὰς οὐκ ἀηδῶς ἔνιοι δευτέρας τραπέζας ἀνδράσι φιλόλογοις καὶ φιλομούσοις προσεῖπον. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ διηγήσεις ἄλυποι καὶ μυθολογίαι, καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐλοῦ τι καὶ λύρας ἀκοῦσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ἐλαφρότερον ἢ λύρας αὐτῆς φθεγγομένης ἀκοῦειν καὶ αὐλοῦ (Babbitt, LCL).

Indeed, Plutarch's reason for permitting μυθολογίαι (they are low-key and enjoyable) might suggest that the Pastor's main problem with μυθολογίαι is not their content per se (though he surely finds that objectionable) but the way in which the opponents orient themselves toward them, namely, as topics for contentious debate. Regardless, Plutarch and the Pastor are unified in their concern to avoid the sort of speech that produces discord at times of social gathering, whether that be the symposium or the place of prayer (cf. 1 Tim 2:8, where the Pastor wants men to pray "without anger and argument" [χωρὶς ὀργῆς καὶ διαλογισμοῦ]). For Plutarch, the main concern is not to engage in the kind of debate that might cause indigestion or otherwise discombobulate the interior comportment of the would-be scholar. For the Pastor, the goal seems to be the kind of "quiet and peaceable life" (ἡρεμος καὶ ἡσύχιος βίος) marked by prayer "without wrath and disputation" (χωρὶς ὀργῆς καὶ διαλογισμοῦ)⁹⁸ that marks the life lived in accordance with θεοσέβεια and εὐσέβεια.⁹⁹

The Pastor's advice to Timothy, "Until I come, devote yourself to reading, exhortation, teaching" (1 Tim 4:13) suggests that these things may be aptly described as the *forms of exercise* that the Pastor imagines are beneficial for Timothy. These passages from Plutarch demonstrate that these forms of exercise would have been recognizable within the corporeal curricula of other professionals competing for authority and status in the marketplace of cultural influence and prestige. The Pastor's exhortation to "practice these things" (ταῦτα μελέτα) at 1 Tim 4:15 confirms that these are the sort of γυμνάσιαι in which Timothy is primarily to exercise himself. Furthermore, Timothy's training is similar to that

⁹⁸ 1 Tim 2:2, 8.

⁹⁹ For θεοσέβεια, see 1 Tim 2:10. For living according to piety, see 1 Tim 2:2, 5:3; 2 Tim 3:12; Titus 2:12.

of the would-be φιλόλογος in Plutarch's advice on regimen when the Paul of 1 Timothy suggests that these practices will have the kind of positive, visible results that are needed to cement his status within the (fictive) Ephesian community: "Practice these things, be in them, in order that your progress (προκοπή) might be visible (φανερὰ) to all."¹⁰⁰ This is an advancement in the kind of virtue most prized by the Pastor—εὐσέβεια—and Timothy's progress is meant to be on full display. In contrast to his opponents,¹⁰¹ who have the presumably visible performance of piety—a "form of piety" (μόρφωσις εὐσεβείας) but not its power (2 Tim 3:5)—Timothy is to have both, for his visible exercises lead not only to visible advancement and improvement, but also the health and preservation of himself and his community: "For by doing this, you will keep healthy both yourself and those who listen to you" (τοῦτο γὰρ ποιῶν καὶ σεαυτὸν σώσεις καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντάς σου [1 Tim 4:16b]).¹⁰² Timothy is envisioned not only as a Pauline protégé, coached and trained in the Pauline gym, but also as a trainer-in-training, so to speak, one who will in turn be tasked with guiding the ἐκκλήσια in the "healthy words about our Lord Jesus Christ and the teaching that accords with piety" (ὕγιαίνοντες λόγοι οἱ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἡ κατ' εὐσέβειαν διδασκαλία

¹⁰⁰ 1 Tim 4:15.

¹⁰¹ Standhartinger demonstrates with reference to Philo (*Plant.* 70; *Det.* 72–73) that the contrast between purported and actual piety is a topos in ancient polemic against opponents ("Eusebeia in den Pastoralbriefen," 78).

¹⁰² Annette Weissenrieder points out that the notion of "saving oneself" is uncommon in the homologoumena (the only qualified instance being Phil 2:12). In 1 Tim, the notion occurs twice, but is gendered in its two instances: Timothy is to save himself (and his hearers) through his teaching (1 Tim 4:16). Women are to save themselves through τεκνογονία (1 Tim 2:15) ("What Does σωθήσεται δε δια τῆς τεκνογονίας 'To Be Saved by Childbearing' Mean (1 Timothy 2:15)? Insights from Ancient Medical and Philosophical Texts," *EC* 5 [2014]: 333). Richard Pervo's translation of the phrase captures nicely the essence of the sentence: "you will keep both yourself and your hearers in good spiritual health" (*The Pastorals and Polycarp: Titus, 1-2 Timothy, and Polycarp to the Philippians*, *Scholars Bible* 5 [Salem: Polebridge Press, 2016], 45).

[1 Tim 6:3]). He will himself be charged with being a practitioner of moral healthcare in Paul's absence.

This way of framing moral advice, I have argued, is very much at home in the contemporary discussions about how one should go about the preservation of bodily and moral health. Furthermore, 1 Tim 4:6–16 sets Paul up as the kind of figure who provides a vision of healthy living that is both similar to and yet inherently at odds with the advice given by other medical and athletic professionals in the early Empire, a fact that has not been sufficiently appreciated by scholars. By anchoring his argument in rhetoric redolent of contemporary competition for status and the authority to dispense advice, the Pastor presents Paul as the logical counterpoint not only to the opponents who are explicitly mentioned, but also the cohort of physician, philosophers, and trainers who proffered similar advice on exercise, diet, and clean living. The Pastor presents a vision of Paul as effortlessly transcending the competitive fray by portraying him as the sole authority to whom Timothy and the ἐκκλησία need to hearken.

III. Timothy's Body as Site (1 Tim 5:17–25)

1 Timothy 5:17–25

17 Let the elders who have presided¹⁰³ well be considered worthy of double honor, especially those who labor in the word and teaching. 18 For the Scripture says, "You shall not muzzle an ox while it is treading," and, "The worker is worthy of his wage." 19 Do not entertain an accusation against an elder, except "in the case of two or three witnesses." 20 Rebuke those who are erring in the presence of all, in order that

¹⁰³ The pairing of προϊστάναι with κοπιᾶν, and the type of admonition regarding respecting leaders, calls to mind 1 Thess 5:12–13. The verb is used similarly at Hermas, *Vis.* 8.3 (2.4.3): οἱ πρεσβύτεροι οἱ προϊστέμνοι τῆς ἐκκλησίας.

the rest too might be afraid. 21 I adjure you in the presence of God and Christ Jesus and the elect angels: guard these things without prejudice, doing nothing in partiality. 22 Lay hands on no one quickly and do not share in the errors of others; keep yourself free of guilt.¹⁰⁴ 23 No longer drink only water, but make use of a little wine on account of your stomach and your frequent ailments. 24 The errors of some people are manifest, going in advance to judgment, but some they follow. 25 Likewise also good deeds are manifest, and it is not possible for those that are otherwise to be hidden.¹⁰⁵

A. Diagnosing Scholarship on 1 Timothy 5:23

1 Timothy 5:23 has provided no shortage of interpretive difficulties for exegetes. In addition to seeming to break the flow of the argument, its significance for the depiction of Timothy and the implications for the situation addressed by 1 Timothy have been debated. In this section, I would like to address two interpretive problems pertaining to 1 Tim 5:17–25, the passage in which 1 Tim 5:23 occurs. The first concerns its thematic coherence and the literary integrity of the compositional structure. The seemingly odd placement of 1 Tim 5:23¹⁰⁶ has been almost universally considered to be an interruption in the flow of the

¹⁰⁴ For this gloss of ἀγνός, see BrillDAG, 17. The sense of "innocent" for ἀγνός is also used at 2 Cor 7:11.

¹⁰⁵ 17 Οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι διπλῆς τιμῆς ἀξιούσθωσαν, μάλιστα οἱ κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ. 18 λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφή· βοῦν ἀλοῶντα οὐ φιμώσεις, καί· ἄξιός ἐστι ἐργάτης τοῦ μισθοῦ αὐτοῦ. 19 κατὰ πρεσβυτέρου κατηγορίαν μὴ παραδέχου, ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ δύο ἢ τριῶν μαρτύρων. 20 Τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας ἐνώπιον πάντων ἔλεγγε, ἵνα καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ φόβον ἔχωσιν. 21 Διαμαρτύρομαι ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν ἀγγέλων, ἵνα ταῦτα φυλάξης χωρὶς προκρίματος, μηδὲν ποιῶν κατὰ πρόσκλισιν. 22 χεῖρας ταχέως μηδενὶ ἐπιτίθει μηδὲ κοινωνεῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀλλοτρίαις· σεαυτὸν ἀγνὸν τήρει. 23 Μηκέτι ὑδροπότηι, ἀλλ' οἶνῳ ὀλίγῳ χρῶ διὰ τὸν στόμαχον καὶ τὰς πυκνάς σου ἀσθενείας. 24 Τινῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ ἁμαρτίαι πρόδηλοί εἰσιν προάγουσαι εἰς κρίσιν, τισὶν δὲ καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσιν. 25 ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ καλὰ πρόδηλα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλως ἔχοντα κρυβῆναι οὐ δύνανται.

¹⁰⁶ A few scholars do try to keep the passage together, with mixed results. The proposal of Arichea and Hatton—who consider v. 23 a "small deviation"—that "the unifying factor is that these [i.e., the contents of 22–25 that "seem to be unrelated to one another"] are all instructions to Timothy, dealing with both his personal and inter-personal problems" (UBSHS, 132) is so broad as to be of little use for the purpose of categorization. I find in Risto Saarinen's BTCT commentary (94–96) a complimentary interpretation, since he takes 5:21–25 as a "consistent and carefully planned literary unit" (96). He sees in this passage four guidelines that are "descriptions of finding a virtuous mean and of making an impartial judgment between two extremes" (95). I concur that moderation is a key element here, though I emphasize the significance of Timothy's illness and Paul's attention to it within the context of error and how to address it in 5:17–25.

passage, and typically described as a "digression,"¹⁰⁷ an "interruption,"¹⁰⁸ or even a misplaced verse originally belonging to another part of 1 Timothy.¹⁰⁹ Luke Timothy Johnson states plainly, "This sentence is altogether mystifying."¹¹⁰ Even Ray van Nestle, who argues tirelessly to demonstrate the cohesion between sentences and larger units of the Pastorals, notes somewhat reluctantly that "5.23 is admittedly a digression."¹¹¹ Though ultimately unsatisfying, one appreciates the candor of scholars such as Richard A. Williams, who acknowledges forthrightly his "side-stepping" of 1 Tim 5:23, since he considers its place in the logic of the passage entirely opaque. "Its place within the logic of the text as it now stands defies explanation, unless perhaps it was a proverb advising a variety of

¹⁰⁷ Raymond F. Collins calls it a "digression on Timothy's well-being" and says that after it, the "Pastor returns to the topic at hand in this pericope, namely, sinners and their sin" (WJK, 150). I. Howard Marshall says that it appears to be a "digression" and would in a modern document be "a footnote or in parentheses" (ICC, 623).

¹⁰⁸ Spicq says that this verse "rompt le développement logique (vv. 20–22, 24–25) et qu'il serait mieux en situation dans la péricope IV; 3–8" (ÉBib, 1.549). Roloff, EKKNT, describes it as "abrupt" ("unvermittelt" [315]) and speaks of it as an "interruption" ("Unterbrechung" [316]), though he does not explain the placement of 1 Tim 5:23 per se. Mounce, though arguing for the structural unity of 1 Tim 5:17–25, says that v. 23 is an "aside" (WBC, 305) that "interrupts the flow of thought" (WBC, 306). Towner says that this verse "is clearly an independent thought that could stand in a random list of advice for healthy living" (NICNT, 375). Oberlinner says that verse comes "überraschend und ohne Vorbereitung" (HTKNT, 261). Joram Luttenberger is in agreement with Oberlinner on this point (*Prophetenmantel oder Bücherfutteral?: Die persönlichen Notizen in den Pastoralbriefen im Licht antiker Epistolographie und literarischer Pseudepigraphie*, Arbeiten zur Bibel und ihrer Geschichte 40 [Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012], 309).

¹⁰⁹ Spicq notes that in the history of interpretation, some have suggested that 1 Tim 5:23 is in fact misplaced, having originally come after 1 Tim 4:5 or 4:7 (143; regarding the first point, Spicq cites James Moffat, *The Historical New Testament*, 2nd ed. [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1901], though without page number). He points out that Ephrem the Syrian is the only one to place 1 Tim 5:23 after 5:25 (143 n. 3). Spicq himself chalks up the poor placement of the verse—along with the badly edited composition of the chapter as a whole—to the old age of the Apostle ("1 Timothée 5:23," in *L'Évangile hier et aujourd'hui. Melanges offerts au Franz-J. Leenhardt* [Genève: Éditions Labor et Fides, 1968], 143).

¹¹⁰ Johnson, AB, 281.

¹¹¹ Ray Van Neste, *Cohesion and Structure in the Pastoral Epistles*, JSNTSup 280 (London: T&T Clark International, 2004), 65. He continues to argue that the passage is "not totally out of place," and points out that scholars have seen a crescendo of commands in 5:22–23 moving from the general to the personal (Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 475), and that 5:23 has also been read as explaining the call to purity in 5:22b.

approaches in dealing with questions of discipline."¹¹² I argue that the general consensus that 1 Tim 5:23 is some kind of digression, aside, parenthetical comment, etc., is in need of reconsideration.

The solution to the problem, I would like to suggest, is not to be found in displacement theories, musings about Paul's old age,¹¹³ or suggestions about it being an impromptu interruption. Nor do purely exegetical insights that highlight thematic continuities or verbal tie-ins¹¹⁴ completely resolve the difficulty of this passage (though these are a necessary first step), for they fail to give a satisfactory explanation for why 1 Tim 5:23 is placed here in particular, and not somewhere else. I propose to resolve the impasse through a recontextualization of the passage in light of contemporary discourses about the interrelationship between one's physical condition, morals, and the bodily signs and actions by which one can judge these things. I refer, in short, to the existence of physiognomically informed discourse among philosophers, physicians, and rhetoricians. The most basic presupposition of physiognomy, that observation of the body could yield information about the soul, was known among the various philosophies, even though the theory and practice of physiognomy per se is a much more complicated topic.¹¹⁵ The concept of psychosomatic mutuality was widespread in the first and second centuries CE. I shall demonstrate that the

¹¹² William A. Richards, *Difference and Distance in Post-Pauline Christianity: An Epistolary Analysis of the Pastorals*, StBibLit 44 (New York: Lang, 2002), 159 n. 76.

¹¹³ Spicq, who considers the Pastorals to be by Paul, suggests that Paul's old might account for the taxic irregularity ("1 Timothée 5:23," 143).

¹¹⁴ Several commentators note the connection between the ἀμαρτίαι of 5:22 and 5:24. E.g., Marshall, ICC, 624; Knight, NIGTC, 240–41; Ben Witherington III, *Letters and Homilies for Hellenized Christians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on Titus, 1-2 Timothy and 1-3 John* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), 1:278.

¹¹⁵ See George Boys-Stone's careful and detailed survey and assessment of the evidence, "Physiognomy and Ancient Psychological Theory," in *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam*, ed. Simon Swain and G. R. Boys-Stones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 19–124.

Pastor's comments about "errors," ailments, and their visibility and public significance evince a semiotic logic that is readily observable in contemporary moralists and medicalists of the early Roman empire. I suggest that the Pastor sought to create an image of Paul as a physician-philosopher who both assumes and resists the basic premise of physiognomy, and argue that these insights form the basis of a reading of 1 Tim 5:23 as intelligible in its immediate literary context.

The second interpretive contribution I wish to make here regards the depiction of Timothy and Paul in this passage. When interpreting 1 Tim 5:23, modern scholars frequently discuss its relationship to ancient discussions about wine,¹¹⁶ the potential contrast with the asceticism of the opponents in 1 Tim 4:3,¹¹⁷ and to a lesser extent the medical discourse surrounding stomach problems and the medicinal qualities and uses of wine.¹¹⁸ Jennifer Glancy takes the study of this passage in a useful direction by focusing on the "protocols of masculinity" presupposed by and inscribed in Paul's advice to Timothy.¹¹⁹ Glancy argues that the advice is well-suited to Timothy, who is envisioned as a young man

¹¹⁶ E.g., Christopher R. Hutson, "A Little Wine': 1 Timothy 5:23 and Greco-Roman Youth," *LIT* 45 (2013): 79–98; Spicq, "1 Timothée 5:23."

¹¹⁷ The assumption that 1 Tim 5:23 serves as a counterbalance to the opponents' asceticism is ubiquitous in modern commentaries. The link between 1 Tim 4:3 and 1 Tim 5:23 surfaces frequently in patristic discussions of when one could or should drink wine. See the sampling of sources discussed by Andreas Merkt, "Reading Paul and Drinking Wine," in *Asceticism and Exegesis in Early Christianity: The Reception of New Testament Texts in Ancient Ascetic Discourses*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Weidemann, NTOA 101 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 69–77; Boudewijn Dehandschutter, "Μηκέτι Ὑδροπότηι: Some Notes on the Patristic Exegesis of 1 Timothy 5:23," *LS* 20 (1995): 265–70; Luttenberger, *Prophetenmantel oder Bücherfütteral?*, 308–13.

¹¹⁸ Spicq notes that "in prescribing wine, St. Paul was in agreement with the unanimous opinion of ancient physicians. They prescribed wine as a tonic, a prophylactic, and a remedy to facilitate digestion, combat anorexia, and suppress stomach-rumblings, especially wine sweetened with honey: wine is a stimulant for the stomach" ("στόμαχος," *TLNT* 2.298–99).

¹¹⁹ Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity."

entering maturity.¹²⁰ Moderate use of wine is appropriate, on Glancy's reading, now that Timothy is advancing beyond the time in life when his naturally fiery constitution would not be overly inflamed by wine.¹²¹ She understands the Pastor's advice to be "consistent with a prophylactic regimen of physical and spiritual hygiene."¹²² Though Glancy rightly situates 1 Tim 5:23 as health advice, by viewing it as a "prophylactic regimen" she seems to understand it as health advice that could be given generally, to any virtue-seeking youth on the cusp of adulthood. But in our passage the advice to drink a little wine and "no longer only water" is characterized not as medicinal prophylaxis but as medicinal remedy. In other words, "Paul" is addressing an (ostensibly) present problem, not warding off a potential one. This is not advice that is generally useful for all young people, but rather a targeted therapeutic prescription aimed at dealing with a present and recurrent ailment. Furthermore, Timothy's age is not the focus of the advice, but rather his ailments. Though Timothy's "youthfulness" (νεότης) is mentioned at 1 Tim 4:12, and a general awareness of the relative age of elders and widows pervades 1 Tim 5:1–16, in 1 Tim 5:17–25 there is no mention of it, no indication that Timothy's youthfulness is in view. What is highlighted by the Pastor, instead, is Timothy's sickness.

What scholars' focus on Timothy and his youthfulness obscures in part is first of all the prominence of his illness in the passage, and secondly what this scene tells us about the

¹²⁰ Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity," 247.

¹²¹ A very similar approach is taken by Hutson, "A Little Wine." Similarly to Glancy, Hutson minimizes the significance of Timothy's stomach ailments and focuses instead on his youthfulness as the key to the passage, even to the point of eliding the crucial phrase: "When seen in light of the stereotype of youth, the admonition 'no longer drink water only, but use a little wine...' might suggest an image of a young man on the threshold of adult privileges and responsibilities" (88).

¹²² Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity," 245.

image of Paul cultivated here. Consequently, what I would like to draw attention to is what this kind of advice suggests about the Pastor's portrayal of Paul in relation to Timothy's ailments and the larger concerns of the passage of which it is an integral part. In particular, I argue that Paul is hereby depicted as physician of both body and soul, an individual of sufficient medical sagacity to make timely diagnoses based on specific symptoms suffered by his patient Timothy.¹²³ Paul is also depicted, insofar as he attempts to provide the means for Timothy not to appear as one afflicted with chronic stomach ailments, as one who takes appropriate measures to protect Timothy's reputation from the stigma that readily attached to those with pathologies of the stomach. Below I show that problems of the interrelationship of signs and symptoms, the causes of disease and their perception or detection, physician's diagnoses and patient experiences help us interpret 1 Timothy 5:17–25.

The relevance of these cultural concepts and modes of analyses does not rely on the assumption that the Pastor is well-versed in or even familiar with the medical treatises that contain the case histories, theoretical reflections on symptomology, or suggestions on diagnosis that comprised an important part of Hellenistic and Roman era scientific

¹²³ This is a point that frequently gets lost in the modern discussions of this passage. However, I find myself in agreement here with Jerome on one particular point regarding the identity of Paul as a physician. He writes the following (*Ep.* 22.8): "Notice the reasons why wine is allowed: it is to cure pain in the stomach and to relieve a frequent infirmity and hardly then. And lest perchance we should indulge ourselves on the ground of illness, Paul recommends that but a little wine should be taken, advising rather as a physician than as an apostle—although indeed an apostle is a spiritual physician. He was afraid that Timothy might be overcome by weakness and might not be able to complete the many journeys that the preaching of the Gospel rendered necessary" (Vide, quibus causis vini potio concedatur: vix hoc stomachi dolor et frequens meretur infirmitas. Et ne nobis forsitan de aegrotationibus blandiremur, modicum praecepit esse sumendum, medici potius consilio quam apostoli—licet et apostolus sit medicus spiritalis—et, ne Timotheus inbecillitate superatus evangelii praedicandi non posset habere discursus (Wright, LCL).

thinking.¹²⁴ Rather, these categories shed interpretive light on the complicated relationship between sign and signified as the Pastor formulates it in our passage. In what follows I outline the ways in which this discourse illuminates the Pastor's portrayal of Paul as someone who has sufficient wisdom in such matters to guide Timothy, schooling him on the appropriate way to negotiate a culture that was obsessed with external appearance, what is signified, and the moral realities that it did or did not accurately reflect.

B. Appearances and Realities

The Theory and Practice of Physiognomy

The assumption that one can infer characterological, ethical, or dispositional traits or other internal truths or realities from external features or indicators, sometimes explicitly referred to as the "craft" or "art" (τέχνη)¹²⁵ of physiognomy, is an important feature of diagnostic culture in the early Empire, especially in the second century CE.¹²⁶ This assumption relies upon the more broadly accepted principle of psychosomatic reciprocity, the notion that the body affects the soul and the soul the body.¹²⁷ Many ancient philosophers and physicians¹²⁸

¹²⁴ For the archaic and classical development of the symptom as a category of inquiry and description, see Brooke Holmes, *The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). For a brief overview of the development of the symptom as a way of characterizing the relationship between the body and the soul from Plato to Galen, see Brooke Holmes, "Disturbing Connections: Sympathetic Affections, Mental Disorder, and the Elusive Soul in Galen," in *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*, ed. W.V. Harris (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 155–63.

¹²⁵ Cf. Adamantius, *Physiogn.* A2.

¹²⁶ Elizabeth C. Evans writes the following: "It is apparent that there existed throughout the second century a fairly widespread interest in the study of this so-called 'science,' an interest which was observable in the latter part of the first century, reached its height in the second century, continued to some extent in the third, and became marked again in the fourth" (Elizabeth C. Evans, "The Study of Physiognomy in the Second Century A.D.," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 72 [1941]: 96).

¹²⁷ Cf. the remarks of Brooke Holmes: "The principle that the body is affected by the mind or, more commonly, the soul had become common by the time Galen was writing in the second century CE. It was

understood aspects of the inner person to be discernible through external signs, just as visible evidence could aid in the diagnosis of internal, invisible conditions.¹²⁹ These ancient principles provide an illuminating context for addressing the Pastor's dealings with the problem of moral errors and how they might be evident or might merely appear to be evident. Evidence for the assumptions and practice of what was at times known as the "science" of physiognomy, whereby one could judge character by being attuned to the basic features of the face, the gait, or any of a myriad aspects of one's physical comportment or deeds, is scattered throughout Greek and Roman literary sources,¹³⁰ and is even represented

often taken as the flipside of another principle—namely, that the mind or the soul is affected by the body" ("Disturbing Connections: Sympathetic Affections, Mental Disorder, and the Elusive Soul in Galen," 147).

¹²⁸ The distinction between the two was, of course, a point of discussion. Galen was of the opinion that the best physician was also a philosopher, and wrote a brief treatise to that effect (*The Doctor is Also a Philosopher* = 1.53–63 K).

¹²⁹ Cf. Galen, *Ars. med.* 3 = 1.313K (Johnson, LCL): "What I must speak of next are the signs. Of these, there are the healthy signs—those that are diagnostic of present health, those that are prognostic of future health, and those that are anamnestic (indicative) of previously existing health. The signs of disease are those that are diagnostic of present disease, those that are prognostic of future disease, and those that are anamnestic (indicative) of previously existing disease" (Περὶ δὲ τῶν σημείων ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἶη ῥητέον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τούτων ὑγιεινὰ μὲν, ὅσα τῆς τε παρούσης ὑγείας ἐστὶ διαγνωστικά, καὶ τῆς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι προγνωστικά, καὶ τῆς προγεγεννημένης ἀναμνηστικά· νοσῶδη δὲ τὰ τε τῆς παρούσης νόσου διαγνωστικά, καὶ τῆς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι προγνωστικά, καὶ τῆς προγεγεννημένης ἀναμνηστικά). The majority of *Ars. med.* (7–22) is taken up with a discussion of signs of various conditions. See also Annette Weissenrieder and Gregor Etzelmüller, "Embodied Inner Human Being: The Relationship between Inner and Outer Self in Ancient Medical and Philosophical Texts and in Paul," *Religion & Theology* 21 (2014): 27–43.

¹³⁰ The classic overview is that of Elizabeth Cornelia Evans, *Physiognomics in the Ancient World*, TAPS 59.5 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1969). For discussions with particular figures or eras in focus, see Simon Swain and G. R. Boys-Stones, eds., *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Maud W. Gleason, "The Semiotics of Gender: Physiognomy and Self-Fashioning in the Second Century C.E.," in *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World*, ed. David M. Halperin, John J. Winkler, and Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 389–416; Elizabeth C. Evans, "Galen the Physician as Physiognomist," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 76 (1945): 287–98; John T. Fitzgerald, "Galen's *De Indolentia* in the Context of Greco-Roman Medicine, Moral Philosophy, and Physiognomy," in *Galen's De Indolentia: Essays on a Newly Discovered Letter*, ed. Clare K. Rothschild and Trevor W. Thompson, STAC 88 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 203–20; Evans, "The Study of Physiognomy in the Second Century A.D."; David Lincicum, "Philo and the Physiognomic Tradition," *JSJ* 44.1 (2013): 57–86.

in the DSS.¹³¹ The assumption that one could determine quality of character from exterior comportment, adornment, and behavior is evident in the practice of ancient rhetorical criticism, i.e., the assessment of rhetorical performances.¹³² A similar logic governs the ways in which some athletic trainers or doctors argue about oncoming diseases and how they are manifest or not.

This does not mean, of course, that the practice of physiognomy was uniform or that it was a universally accepted method of assessment.¹³³ Indeed, some ancient authors are critical of aspects of physiognomic practice or theory.¹³⁴ It is important therefore not to presume homogeneity in starting point or content in ancient Greek and Roman conceptualizations of physiognomy as a science or a knowledge set.¹³⁵ Philosophers and physicians and sophists drew upon, at times tacitly and occasionally explicitly, the basic insight that character can be inferred from physical characteristics in different ways. For instance, Seneca tells Lucilius the following:

¹³¹ See the intriguing case of 4Q186. 4Q561 is another physiognomic text. Cf. 4Q534. Philip S. Alexander, "Physiognomy, Initiation, and Rank in the Qumran Community," in *Geschichte--Tradition--Reflexion: Festschrift für Martin Hengel zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Hubert Cancik, Hermann Lichtenberger, and Peter Schäfer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 1.385-94. Alexander cautions against seeing such a text as "peripheral" (389), and argues that Qumraners used physiognomy as a "test of admission" to the community, just as Pythagoras did according to Aulus Gellius, *Noc. Att.* 1.2 (392).

¹³² Polemo of Smyrna was an orator in the second century CE and the author of one of the best-known manuals on physiognomy from antiquity. See Swain and Boys-Stones, *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam*.

¹³³ For scepticism regarding the practice, see Maximus of Tyre, who calls it a *μαντεία ἀσαφής*, an "uncertain mode of divination" (*Or.* 25.3), asking "what admixture is there with respect to similarity of soul and body?" (*τίς γὰρ ἐπιμείλα πρὸς ὁμοιότητα ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος*). At the same time, his personified images of vice and virtue in *Or.* 14.1 demonstrate that Maximus stereotyped and imbued with value certain aspects of physical comportment, gait, appearance, and voice.

¹³⁴ Pliny, *Nat.* 11.114 (273-74), expresses surprise that Aristotle "not only believed but also published his belief that our bodies contain premonitory signs of our career" (non modo credidisse praescita vitae esse aliqua in corporibus ipsis verum etiam prodidisse [Rackham, LCL]). Nevertheless, he goes on to discuss parts of the theory (11.114 [273-76]). Some skepticism is expressed even those who advocate it: Ps.-Aristotle, [*Physiogn.*] 805b1-19; Galen, *Temp.* 2 = 1.624K.

¹³⁵ Boys-Stones, "Physiognomy and Ancient Psychological Theory," 19-22.

All acts are indications of other things, if they are observed, and it's possible to derive evidence of character even from the smallest things: not only gait (*incessus*) reveals a lewd man, but also a hand movement (*manus mota*) and sometimes a single response (*unum responsum*) and placing a finger on the brow (*elatus ad caput digitus*) and a shifting of the eyes (*flexus oculorum*). A laugh (*risus*) can indicate a reprobate, while expression (*vultus*) and disposition (*habitus*) can indicate a person who is mentally ill. For these things come out through distinctive marks; you will know what sort of person anyone is if you have observed in what way he gives praise and in what way he receives it. (*Ep.* 52.12)¹³⁶

Seneca suggests that not only gait or hand movements, laughter, or facial expressions are significant in determining character, but even a "single answer" can be telling, and one can draw "evidence of character" (*argumentum morum*) "from the smallest things" (*ex minimis*). Elsewhere in his letters to Lucilius, Seneca argues for a connection between style and character, not only in dress, gait, and bearing, but also quality of speech. He connects the manner of movement with the state of the soul and suggests that effeminacy in dress indicates an unmanly character, just as rushing about betrays a madness in the soul, or anger—which itself resembles madness (*Ep.* 114.3).¹³⁷

Authors sometimes even commend something of a reverse physiognomy: depicting a form from characteristics rather than describing characteristics from form. Dio Chrysostom suggests that when he graphically depicts the vices, he engages in a practice similar to that of the physiognomists, who "discern and announce character from form and appearance,

¹³⁶ Omnia rerum omnium, si observentur, indicia sunt et argumentum morum ex minimis quoque licet capere: inpudicum et incessus ostendit et manus mota et unum interdum responsum et relatus ad caput digitus et flexus oculorum. Inprobum risus, insanum vultus habitusque demonstrat. Illa enim in apertum per notas exeunt; qualis quisque sit, scies, si quemadmodum laudet, quemadmodum laudetur, aspexeris.

¹³⁷ See also *Ep.* 114.22: "Therefore, let the soul be cared for, for from the soul comes reason, from the soul comes words, from the soul do we have our disposition, expression, and gait" (Ideo ille [i.e., animus] curetur; ab illo sensus, ab illo verba exeunt, ab illo nobis est habitus, vultus, incessus). See further Annette Weissenrieder, "Interior Views of a Patient: Illness and Rhetoric in 'Autobiographical' Texts," in *Religion and Illness*, ed. Annette Weissenrieder and Gregor Etzelmüller (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2016), 340–41.

while we should derive from characters and deeds the type and form worthy of those [physiognomists]" (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς μορφῆς καὶ τοῦ εἶδους τὸ ἥθος γινώσκουσι καὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων χαρακτῆρα καὶ μορφήν ἀξίαν ἐκείνων σπάσωμεν).¹³⁸ Different still were the insights of Philostratus when he articulates the sensibilities of the ideal athletic trainer, who is not as focused on the discernment of character (though that matters too) as he is other diagnostic assessments, such as basic temperament, disposition, or habits.¹³⁹ In explaining how the trainer should himself be trained in physiognomy so as to be able to anticipate various character defects as well as physical maladies, Philostratus speaks of how certain diseases lay quiet until manifesting later in life, and he insists that the trainer is responsible for identifying these as well. "For these diseases sometimes even withdraw naturally and childhood has concealed them, rendering them unnoticed, but when children advance to being the age of ephebes and then transition to being men and at last their peak is past, these diseases become obvious and manifest, since the blood undergoes changes with the changes of age."¹⁴⁰ The idea that disease will be evident illuminates 1 Tim 5:24–25 (cf. 2 Tim 3:9). Like the Pastor, Philostratus notes that present appearances are not always present realities, but in time diseases, like sins, become evident and manifest for all to see. Cultivating the skills to discern such defects was a key part of the trainer's task, and a similar cultivation of

¹³⁸ 4 *Regn.* 88. Dio, with whom Polemo of Smyrna studied, employs "generous physiognomical invective against effimacy" in *Or.* 33 (cf. 33.39, 52, 64). See Simon Swain, "Introduction," in *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam*, ed. Simon Swain and G. R. Boys-Stones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 11 n. 55, and 190.

¹³⁹ See the comments of Jason König in the preface to the *Gymnasticus*, 365–80, esp. 370 (LCL edition).

¹⁴⁰ ταυτὶ γὰρ τὰ νοσήματα καὶ ξυναποχωρεῖ ποτε τῇ φύσει καὶ παιδία μὲν ὄντα ἀφανῶς ὑποδέδυκε, προϊόντων δὲ ἐς ἐφήβους καὶ μεθισταμένων εἰς ἄνδρας καὶ ἀπιούσης ἀκμῆς δῆλα καὶ φανερά γίνεται μεταβολὴν σχόντος τοῦ αἵματος ἐν ταῖς τῆς ἡλικίας τροπαῖς (*Gymn.* 28).

discernment and scrutiny is evident in the Pastor's advice to Timothy regarding the consideration of charges brought against elders (1 Tim 5:19) and the discernment of errors hidden and already manifest (1 Tim 5:24–25). The Pastor's scrutiny of good or bad "deeds" (ἔργα) and their inevitable unveiling has points of resonance with psychological and physiognomic discourses, which similarly were keen to interpret deeds as indicators of character.¹⁴¹

Importantly, the ability to discern interior realities based on external signs is also very much a part of the good physician's diagnostic tool kit, and one can say that the attempt to discern internal realities from external signs is a task common to both physiognomist, physician, and trainer.¹⁴² Hippocratic treatises like *Airs, Waters, Places* and *Nature of Man* draw deductions regarding character and temperament from climatological considerations, and Galen cites these with approval:¹⁴³ Galen recounts how Hippocrates in *Epidemics* 2.5 utilized certain physical signs to produce diagnoses of psychological characteristics.¹⁴⁴ Aristotle's treatment of how characteristics of both body and soul derive

¹⁴¹ Cf. Adamantius, the epitomist of Polemo's treatise on physiognomy, who commented that he "exercized" (γυμνάζειν) the physiognomic method by applying it to the "deeds" (ἔργα) of those he encountered (*Physiogn.* A1).

¹⁴² Plato, *Leg.* 916a, suggests that a physician (ιατρός) or a trainer (γυμνάστης) should be able to discern a hidden disease, physical or mental, even if it is hard to cure and perduring, and therefore will not be reimbursed for a slave with such a condition. Similarly, at *Gorg.* 464a, Socrates expresses the opinion that a ιατρός or a γυμναστικός should be able to perceive if someone is not healthy. Cited by König, *Philostratus's Gymnasticus*, 372 (with n. 81). Notable is the self-designation as "medicus" of Loxus, one source of an anonymous Latin treatise on physiognomy (*Anon. Lat.* 1). See Boys-Stones, "Physiognomy and Ancient Psychological Theory," 59. Helen King emphasizes that these "signs" are "taught" to doctors, and are thus shaped by local values ("What Is Health?," in *Health in Antiquity*, ed. Helen King [London: Routledge, 2005], 5).

¹⁴³ See *QAM* 8–10 = 4.798–805K.

¹⁴⁴ "So I do not need to mention all the physiognomical statements which we can find in book 2 and book 6 of the *Epidemics*; it will be enough for me to quote as an example these words from him: 'One whose blood-vessel at the arm-bend throbs is crazy and quick-angered; he whose vessel is still is delirious.'" οὐκέτ' οὖν δέομαι τῶν κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον καὶ ἕκτον τῶν ἐπιδημιῶν γεγραμμένων φυσιολογικῶν γνωρισμάτων ἀπάντων

from the mixture of blood is also accepted by Galen,¹⁴⁵ and considered by him to support his particular contention that the individual soul's attributes follow upon the bodily mixtures of its constitutive humors.¹⁴⁶

The ancient practice of diagnosis and prognosis provides a useful comparandum for interpreting the Pastor's language of perspicuity and occlusion. The relationship between the external form or appearance and the "true" or inner reality is discernible in other parts of the PE. The Pastor is much concerned about the cosmetic presentation of women in the church (1 Tim 2:9–10). The contrast is formed between hair-styles, jewelry and rich clothing on the one hand, and the oral profession of *θεοσέβεια* on the other, and its exercise

μνημονεύειν ἀλλ' ἀρκέσει παραγράψαι παραδείγματος ἕνεκα τήνδε τὴν λέξιν αὐτοῦ· ὅς ἂν ἡ φλὲψ ἢ ἐν ἀγκῶνι σφύζῃ, μανικὸς καὶ ὀξύθυμος, ὃ δὲ ἂν ἀτρεμέῃ, τυφώδῃς' (Marquardt, Müller, and Helmreich ([4.803.15])). Text and translation from Robert Alessi, "Bodily Features in the Corpus Hippocraticum: On the Classification of Individuals into Groups," in *Ancient Concepts of the Hippocratic: Papers Presented at the XIIIth International Hippocrates Colloquium, Austin, Texas, August 2008*, ed. Lesley Dean-Jones and Ralph Mark Rosen, *Studies in Ancient Medicine* 46 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 350.

¹⁴⁵ In *QAM*, Galen cites Aristotle's work *History of Animals* with approbation, accepting his basic argument: "For his opinion here is that the construction of the whole body is, in each kind of animal, especially fitted to the characteristics and faculties of that animal's soul. For example, in blooded animals birth comes about from the mother's blood, and the soul's characteristics are dependent on the mixture of that blood, as was made clear in the statements cited above. But the construction of the organic parts of the body, too, is fitted to the soul's characteristics; and, as is consistent with this, there are many indications of the relation between soul characteristics and bodily mixture. Some physiognomic signs indicate bodily mixture directly, without any intermediary. Among these are characteristics of complexions and hair, but also voice and the motion of limbs." βούλεται γὰρ οὗτος τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθεσί τε καὶ δυνάμεσιν οἰκείαν γίνεσθαι τὴν διάπλασιν ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστῳ γένει ζώων. οἷον αὐτίκα τῶν ἐναίμων ἢ γένεσις μὲν ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ τῆς μητρὸς αἵματος, ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ κράσει τούτου τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθη, καθότι καὶ διὰ τῶν προγεγραμμένων ῥήσεων ἀπεφάνητο. τῶν δὲ ὀργανικῶν μορίων ἢ διάπλασις οἰκεία τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθεσι γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο δὴ λοιπὸν οὐκ ὀλίγα πέφυκε περὶ τε ψυχῆς ἡθῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κράσεως. ἕνια δὲ τῶν φυσιογνωμονικῶν ἀντικρύς τε καὶ δι' οὐδενὸς μέσου τὴν κράσιν ἐνδείκνυται. τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὰς χροὰς καὶ τρίχας, ἔτι τε τὰς φωνὰς, καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τῶν μορίων (*QAM* 7 = 4.795K, Singer tr., *Selected Works*, 163).

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Galen's comments at *UP* 11.14 = 2.154 Helmreich, trans. May: "For I have already shown many times, if not throughout the work, that nature makes the form of the body appropriate to the characteristics of the soul" (δέδεικται γὰρ ἤδη πολλάκις, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου, τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθεσιν οἰκεῖον ἢ φύσις ἀπεργαζομένη τὸ τοῦ σώματος εἶδος). Cf. *UP* 1.2 = 1.1–2 Helmreich.

"through good works."¹⁴⁷ The echoes of this contrast resounds in what manifests as one of the Pastor's favorite catchphrases, "every good work" (πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθόν), present in every letter (1 Tim 5:10; 2 Tim 2:21, 3:17; Titus 1:16, 3:1; cf. 2 Cor 9:8, Col 1:10). The recurrent motif of "hypocrisy" (1 Tim 4:2) or the lack thereof (cf. πίστις ἀνυπόκριτος at 1 Tim 1:5 and 2 Tim 1:5) also presumes a discourse of occlusion and transparency, with the former demonized and the latter lionized.

Galen speaks frequently of prognosis as a skill that all physicians should cultivate, and one in which he was especially ascendant.¹⁴⁸ Observation, of course, constitutes the umbrella category for the various types of analysis and assessment in which the good physician would engage.¹⁴⁹ Galen was a thorough medical investigator, and he attended to the subject's various excretions, their intake, their sleep, their pulse,¹⁵⁰ and so forth,¹⁵¹ often

¹⁴⁷ Medical authors like Galen also craft a studied moral contrast between the bad physician's fine jewelry and clothing and the luxury it represents with the virtuous and properly trained physician's exercise of learned prognosis. See Galen, *Praecog.* 1.2 = 14.600K (Nutton ed.), noted by Tamsyn Barton, *Power and Knowledge: Astrology, Physiognomics, and Medicine under the Roman Empire*, The Body, in Theory: Histories of Cultural Materialism (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 146. The rhetorical culture of Asia Minor was such that the doctor's performance, like that of the orator, was subjected to intense scrutiny, a diagnosis of sorts that was used to pronounce the practitioner virtuous or vice-ridden, healthy or sick, honorable or shameful.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. *Praen.* 1, 6–8 (Nutton ed. = 14.601–2K). Cf. Mattern, *Rhetoric of Healing*, 76–80.

¹⁴⁹ This was debated among physicians, of course. Methodists are widely panned, most savagely by Galen, for their alleged belief that the individual's particular circumstances or constitution were diagnostically irrelevant (Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 205). Vivian Nutton argues that this is to paint with too broad a brush. Cf. *Ancient Medicine*, 191–93. Galen (*MMG* 1 = 11.1–5K) provides a contrast, arguing (with appeal to Hippocrates) that a physician needs not only knowledge of common human nature (ἡ κοινὴ ἀνθρώπων φύσις), but also each individual's nature (ἡ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστου). For Galen, this includes not only age and differences in "mixtures" (κράσεις) and "capacities" (δυνάμεις), but also other things pertaining to humans: "colors, heats, states, movements of pulses, customs, practices and habits of the soul" (χροαὶ καὶ θερμασίαι καὶ σχέσεις καὶ σφυγμῶν κινήσεις καὶ ἔθῃ καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθῃ [Johnston, LCL]), not to mention sex, location, seasons, and the conditions of the air (*MMG* 1 = 11.5K). There are observable overlaps with the aspects of the human person attended by the physiognomist. See Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 1 (806a.28–33): movements (κινήσεις), shapes (σχήματα), colors (χρώματα), habits (ἔθῃ) appearing on the face, from hair growth, smoothness of skin, voice (φωνή), the flesh (σάρξ), parts of the body, from the general character (τύπος) of the body.

¹⁵⁰ The pulse was an especial point of pride for Galen, and he was regarded as something of a sorcerer (γόης) due to his impressive feats of prediction, sometimes based on little other diagnostic information than

to the marvel of onlookers and other physicians. The reason for marvel was, of course, Galen's ability to discern the larger physiological problems at hand from the most minute, and indeed invisible, signs given by the body. The careful observation of signs, those that were temporary and those that were perhaps a part of an individual's nature, was common territory for physiognomist,¹⁵² physician, and philosopher alike.

C. Diagnosis and Advice

1. Literary Context of 1 Tim 5:17–25

Before we interpret 1 Timothy 5:17–25 in light of the ideas presented above, we observe that Paul's advice to Timothy regarding how to deal with elders, sinners, and his own stomach ailments (1 Tim 5:17–25) serves as a continuation of the task evident in 1 Tim 4:6–16 to characterize Paul as a sage source of comprehensive, holistic healing and knowledge concerning salvation. The intervening verses include the Pastor's advice about how to deal with those in the church both older and younger than Timothy, both male and female in the church (5:1–2). A (relatively) lengthy treatment of what to do with widows follows, those who are "truly" (ὄντως) widows (5:3, 5, 9–10, 16)¹⁵³ as well as younger widows (5:11–15),

the pulse. See *Praen.* 14.599–605. See his treatise on the pulse, as well as the discussion in Mattern, *Rhetoric of Healing*, 78–79.

¹⁵¹ On the diversity of competition within the medical marketplace of antiquity, especially within cities, see Vivian Nutton, "Healers in the Medical Market Place: Towards a Social History of Graeco-Roman Medicine," in *Medicine in Society: Historical Essays*, ed. Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 15–58.

¹⁵² For the gradation and scoring of signs and their relative importance, see Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 2 (806a19–26); Adamantius, *Physiogn.* A2–3.

¹⁵³ This designation seems not to refer only to age or deeds, which are necessary but not sufficient conditions to qualify someone as a true widow. To be a true widow, in addition to certain age requirements and the appropriate resume (5:9–10), one must have no other family or means of support (5:4–5), but be "alone" (μεμονωμένη).

who are urged to remarry and fulfill a traditional domestic role (5:14). When the Pastor turns his attention to male elders and their treatment, this leads him to a discussion of discipline, sin, and Timothy's own pastoral self-preservation (1 Tim 5:17–25).¹⁵⁴ In the midst of this, he offers some diagnostic and therapeutic advice about Timothy's stomach ailments (1 Tim 5:23). Timothy's own condition is under scrutiny by Paul in 1 Tim 5:23, and advice is given to him. The larger section (5:1–6:2), which constitutes an extended treatment of different social groups (widows, elders, slaves) in the "house of God" (οἶκος θεοῦ), ends with an exhortation to slaves.

2. Timothy's Scrutiny as Diagnostic Practice

The Pastor's insistence upon Timothy's cautious approach to the erring elder (1 Tim 5:19, 21) is consistent with the physician's emphasis upon scrutiny and observation before diagnosis.¹⁵⁵ Throughout the passage, the Pastor toggles between considerations of public and private, interior and exterior, seen and unseen. The Pastor's concern is to help Timothy successfully discern the proper relationship of these binaries as they pertain to topics that might concern the ideal church leader in general, and Timothy in particular.

Invoking a Deuteronomic dictum, utilized already by Paul in 2 Corinthians 13:1, the Pastor urges Timothy not to "entertain an accusation against an elder" without sufficiently

¹⁵⁴ The parameters of the unit are debated. Arguably, one could delimit the section on elders to 5:17–20, in which case "precepts for rebuking sin" is the main focus of 5:21–25, as the analysis of Tim O'Donnell would suggest ("The Rhetorical Strategy of 1 Timothy," *CBQ* 79.3 [2017]: 455–75). However, this seems to deemphasize the thematic and rhetorical connections of this section. 1 Tim 5:17–25 is taken as unit by, e.g., Roloff, *EKKNT*, 304–18; Marshall, *ICC*, 607–26; Gourgues, *CbNT*, 194–206.

¹⁵⁵ The concern not to draw hasty conclusions but to consider a larger body of signs in physiognomic diagnosis is evident in Adamantius, *Physiogn.* B1.

robust testimony regarding the error (1 Tim 5:19).¹⁵⁶ The presumably public display of accusation and Timothy's requisite circumspection about it are a part of the Pastor's studied negotiation of interior and exterior. Timothy is not even to entertain a solitary accusation; the testimony must be robust and multiply attested (5:19). Upon Timothy's discernment of the situation, he only then is to "rebuke" (ἐλέγχειν) those who are erring (οἱ ἁμαρτάνοντες).¹⁵⁷ The attributive participle suggests that Timothy's act of discernment about the elders is complete (i.e., what is true about the elders is that they are indeed in error), and he is to exercise it in the most public manner: "in the presence of all" (ἐνώπιον πάντων [5:20]). Notably, many moral philosophers considered the rebuke of those in error to be a form of philosophical therapy.¹⁵⁸ Public rebuke in particular is imagined as essential, since no errors will remain hidden forever.¹⁵⁹ If read in this light, this form of public therapy is meant to have an effect, not only on the elders but on the communal body: "that the others

¹⁵⁶ This follows immediately on the heels of another quotation, Deut 25:4 in 1 Tim 5:18, that Paul had used in 1 Cor 9:9. It points to the way in which the Pastor weaves together a new tapestry of Pauline dicta, but with novel designs. The connection, if not its significance as argued here, is appreciated by Johnson, AB, 286, who remarks: "The web of intertextuality suggests one of two possibilities. Either it is the same author at work, instinctively citing identical authorities when addressing identical issues, or a later writer is consciously using both the Roman [Johnson has in mind the use of Isa 52:5 in Rom 2:24 and 1 Tim 6:1] and the Corinthian correspondence to address an analogous (or fictional) situation."

¹⁵⁷ Whether this pertains to sinners more generally or elders in particular is debated by exegetes. Collins, NTL, 148–49 suggests that it pertains to sinners, and therefore the imposition of hands in 5:22 relates to a "gesture of forgiveness and reconciliation." Those who see this as a discussion of elders per se consider 5:22 to refer to an ordination or admission to the eldership (e.g., Johnson, AB, 281, 287).

¹⁵⁸ When and how to apply frank criticism received much attention in philosophical literature. Philodemus devotes a treatise to it entitled *Περὶ παρρησίας*. For the term ἐλέγχειν in the context of rebuke (ἐπιπλήξις), see *Parr.* Col. XVlb, and Col. XVIIa for the application of medical imagery to the correction of those who "commit error" (ἁμάρτημα ποιεῖν and ἁμαρτάνειν). Plutarch too gives substantial attention to it at *Adul. amic.* 65e–74e. See further Abraham J. Malherbe, "‘In Season and Out of Season’: 2 Timothy 4:2," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 188–93; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "Plutarch to Prince Philopappus on How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend," in *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, NovTSup 82 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 61–79.

¹⁵⁹ See Philodemus, *Parr.* frag. 40–42; Benjamin Fiore, "The Pastoral Epistles in the Light of Philodemus' 'On Frank Criticism,'" in *Philodemus and the New Testament World*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn Stanfield Holland, NovTSup 111 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 288.

might have fear" (5:20).¹⁶⁰ On the heels of a quotation of Deut 19:15 (LXX) in the previous verse, the Pastor likely envisions the whole assembly, just as in Deut 19:20 (LXX).¹⁶¹ This "fear" or "reverence" (φόβος) is regarded as the healthful effect of Timothy's procedure, the beneficial outcome of Timothy's intervention upon the elders' own sinful sickness.

But Timothy's judgment is not the only public act here. The Pastor's own solemn charge to Timothy is executed in the heavenly throne room, "in the presence of" (ἐνώπιον) God, the anointed Jesus, and the elect angels, who bear their own three-fold witness (5:21). The heavenly court is perhaps invoked because the Pastor's warning addresses Timothy's motives and intentions, which are inherently interior and hidden away. Only a higher court could have the insight to hold Timothy to account: Timothy must make no judgment with prejudice (πρόκριμα) or partiality (πρόσκλισις [5:21]).¹⁶² That is to say, Timothy is to exercise his discernment apart from selfish motivation.

The Pastor's concern for Timothy's care in discernment and partiality (5:21) as well as for his scrupulous attention to not being complicit (5:22) finds further iteration in 5:24–25. While for some (τινες), errors (ἁμαρτίαι) are πρόδηλοι,¹⁶³ right out in the open and

¹⁶⁰ "The rest" (οἱ λοιποὶ) is ambiguous, and could refer either (1) to the other elders, (2) to the church members imagined to be present at such an encounter, or (3) both. For (1), see Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 79; Roloff, *EKKNT*, 311. For (2), see Knight, *NIGTC*, 236–37. For (3), see Towner, *NICNT*, 371–72.

¹⁶¹ "And all the rest will be afraid when they hear, and will not continue still, contrary to the word, to do this evil thing among you" (καὶ οἱ ἐπίλοιποι ἀκούσαντες φοβηθήσονται καὶ οὐ προσθήσουσιν ἔτι ποιῆσαι κατὰ τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ πονηρὸν τοῦτο ἐν ὑμῖν). Cf. Towner, *NICNT*, 371–72, who comments on the allusion.

¹⁶² Collins, *NLT*, 148, comments that the assonance of the π terms emphasizes the importance of the request.

¹⁶³ This language of perspicuity is also observable among the physiognomists: cf. Ps.-Aristotle, *Physiogn.* δῆλον (805a3, 805b21, 27; 809b); Adamantius, *Physiogn.* A2 (πρόδηλος, προδηλοτέρος). Terms relating to visibility (e.g., φανερά) and cognates (e.g., συμφανής, καταφανής), are also present (cf. Ps.Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 808b20, 29; 809b1).

obvious,¹⁶⁴ for others, they "follow" (ἐπακολουθεῖν) them, i.e., they become evident only later (5:24).¹⁶⁵ The same is true, the Pastor avers, of "good deeds" (τὰ ἔργα τὰ καλὰ). For the Pastor, there is an inevitability to the disclosure of deeds, whether good or "otherwise" (ἄλλως). Here is where the ancient contemporary discourses of internal and external, of visible and invisible is especially pertinent for our understanding of this passage. Here we see the Pastor offering diagnostic advice, essentially, to Timothy, whose job is to remain impartial in the midst of his own pastoral decisions about whether to award double honor (i.e., do the elders "rule well"? [5:17]), whether to accept an "accusation" (κατηγορία) against an elder (5:18), whether or not there are people that are "erring" (ἀμαρτάνειν) such they deserve public rebuke (5:20), and so forth.¹⁶⁶ Paul, as moral physician, offers a related commentary on errors and deeds in 5:24–25, which serves to provide diagnostic advice to Timothy, even about errors that have not yet manifested, but will. Here it is critical that Timothy pay attention to the manifestation of sin's symptoms, both those that are "abundantly clear" προδηλοί and the ones that are not easily seen but that will eventually become evident, those that "follow" (ἐπακολουθεῖν) and are (temporarily) "hidden" (κρυβῆναι). This certainty of their eventual appearance recalls the prognostic certainty of Polemo, who argued that he could essentially predict future behaviors, good or bad, based

¹⁶⁴ Marshall, ICC, 625, clarifies: "The point appears to be that some deeds of these people are clearly visible here and now in their character as sins of such enormity that they are certainly going to judgement and dragging their perpetrators after them."

¹⁶⁵ As Raymond Collins puts it, "Sin, as it were, almost sticks to these people (*tisin de kai epakolouthousin*). Our contemporaries might have said it follows them like the plague" (NTL, 150).

¹⁶⁶ Philodemus advocates open, public rebuke (*Parr.* frag. 40), because "there will be no advantage for the one who hides [things]; for not one thing escaped notice" (π[λ]εῖστον ο[ὐ]δὲν ἔσται κρύπτοντος· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἔλαθεν; *Parr.* frag. 41). Text and trans. from David Konstan et al., *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism. Introduction, Translation, and Notes*, SBLTTGR 13 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998). Referenced by Fiore, "Light of Philodemus," 288.

on physiognomic indicators.¹⁶⁷ Galen too gave accurate prognoses and predicted the manifestations of various symptoms with great precision.¹⁶⁸ This seems to belong to the basic conviction shared by other medical practitioners that impending diseases are preceded by signs.¹⁶⁹ The Pastor's way of designating sins as clear and upfront or hidden away may thus be read as a diagnostic designation that can be employed by Timothy as he exercises pastoral care. The general statement "sins of some people" (τινῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ ἁμαρτίαι) is a clue to the gnomic nature of the comment. What is true generally of some people (according to the Pastor)—that their sins precede them to judgment (whether eschatological and divine or contemporary and human)—is meant as generally illuminating advice for Timothy as he makes his diagnosis in a given situation.

Some scholars have understood the culmination of this disclosure of the sins and deeds on errant elders or others to be eschatological.¹⁷⁰ They take κρίσις in 5:24 in the sense of "the final judgment," i.e., the end-of-days winnowing of good and evil.¹⁷¹ How this would fit the context is not clear, however.¹⁷² In a discussion of how and under what circumstances Timothy is to rebuke, lay on hands, or tend to his own ailments, what role

¹⁶⁷ *Physiogn.* 68–70 (Leiden; Hoyland ed.), in Swain and Boys-Stones, *Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam*.

¹⁶⁸ Galen boasted of his ability to predict the future courses of disease and their cures in his *Prognoses* and elsewhere. On the physician as "detective and diviner," see Barton, *Power and Knowledge*, 133–68.

¹⁶⁹ Celsus, *Med.* 2, proem: "Of impending disorders there are many signs, in explaining which I shall not hesitate to make use of the authority of ancient men, and especially of Hippocrates" (instantiss autem adversae valetudinis signa conplura sunt. In quibus explicandas non dubitabo auctoritate antiquorum viorum uti, maximeque Hippocratis) (Spencer, LCL).

¹⁷⁰ E.g., Towner, NICNT, 377–78; Roloff, EKKNT, 317. Marshall, ICC, 625–26, concurs with Roloff, but suggests that the role of this saying might be to give comfort to Timothy if he should unwittingly appoint those who turn out to be sinners.

¹⁷¹ BDAG, 569, suggests that the sense is of "divine judgment." Similarly, Marshall, ICC, 625. Saarinen, BTCB, 96 calls it "eschatological judgment."

¹⁷² Similarly Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 81.

does eschatological judgment have? Furthermore, it seems odd to place so much emphasis on Timothy's act of public rebuke, laying on of hands, and guarding from prejudgment (πρόκριμα) or partiality (πρόκλισις), which inevitably pertain to human judgment, only to switch to a discussion of divine judgment. A more cogent option, perhaps, is to take this as a comment on human judgment, and possibly even Timothy's own act of κρίσις.¹⁷³ It is, after all, Timothy's discernment and responsibility for adjudicating accusations that is the major concern of the passage.

3. Appearing to Be Morally Compromised

We turn now to address the problem of how 1 Tim 5:23 fits within this discourse of error and pastoral care. Above, I noted that 1 Tim 5:23 is almost universally regarded as an interruption in the flow of the argument. However, I argue that instead of an interruption, 1 Tim 5:23 instead reflects the same concern present in 1 Tim 5:17–22 and elaborated in 5:24–25: to prevent Timothy from *appearing to be morally compromised* and associated with those whose "errors" are seen by all. The Pastor's concern that church leaders be above reproach from "those outside" (1 Tim 3:7; cf. 1 Thess 4:12) is here on display, applied to both the elders and to Timothy in his dealings with them. While the nature of the elder's error is not explicit, what to do about them is fairly straightforward. If there is sufficient testimony against them, Timothy is to rebuke them publicly.¹⁷⁴ This pastoral care is aimed

¹⁷³ Knight, NIGTC, 241, argues that the κρίσις "must refer to judgment by humans in order for it to be meaningful in this context."

¹⁷⁴ The fact that Timothy here "censures" (ἐλέγχειν) an elder suggests that we have here a church office and not a simple reference to an aged man, since in 5:1 Timothy is not to "rebuke" (ἐπιπληξαι, a synonym of ἐλέγχειν) an older man. The tension produced by the different exhortations in 5:1 and 5:17–20 is recognized by Malherbe, who thinks that 5:17–20 pertains to a general discussion of elderly persons, regardless of whether

at the errant elders in particular, but is imagined to have a broader impact ("in order that the rest might be afraid"). It is in this context that the Pastor inserts his concern that Timothy should appear to be morally compromised: "Keep yourself pure" (σεαυτὸν ἄγνόν τήρει).¹⁷⁵ But how does the Pastor imagine and articulate this concern as it relates to Timothy?

The first way Timothy could appear to be compromised is through his endorsement of unsavory elders. Throughout the Pastorals the author is concerned that Timothy and Titus and those in their care a) present positive and pious behavior (1 Tim 4:6, 12, 15; 6:14; 2 Tim 1:13, 2:15, 24, 3:10, 14; Tit 2:1) and b) avoid association with its opposite (1 Tim 4:7, 6:11; 2 Tim 2:4, 4:5; Tit 1:7; 3:2).¹⁷⁶ The pastor expresses concern that the sins of errant elders might somehow be communicated to Timothy when he appoints them through the laying on of hands.¹⁷⁷ This concern with getting caught up with the wrong characters and their trespasses, essentially becoming guilty by association in the eyes of the congregation,

they hold church office or not (497). Nevertheless, he contends that the Pastor "remains consistent if he thinks that convicting speech addressed to certain members of the congregation will have a salutary effect on other members" ("How to Treat Old Women and Old Men: The Use of Philosophical Traditions and Scripture in 1 Timothy 5," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959-2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 [Leiden: Brill, 2014], 504). Most other scholars separate the "older men" of 5:1 and the "elders" of 5:17-20: Collins, NTL, 144; Knight, NIGTC, 231; Roloff, EKKNT, 306; Marshall, ICC, 573. Johnson, AB 259-60, finds the distinctions too ambiguous for firm judgment.

¹⁷⁵ That Paul is in fact concerned about Timothy at all is the point under adjudication. Most scholars have thought that the emphasis is on the leadership of the church that Timothy is supposed to relate to, but this approach fails to account for the presence and character of the enigmatic 1 Tim 5:23.

¹⁷⁶ For the function of Timothy and Titus as positive examples in paraenesis, see Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles*, AnBib 105 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986); On concern for appearance to outsiders as a major theme in the PE, see Margaret Y. MacDonald, *The Pauline Churches: A Socio-Historical Study of Institutionalization in the Pauline and Deutero-Pauline Writings*, SNTSMS 60 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 167-70.

¹⁷⁷ The imagery suggests commissioning (at times accompanied by the transfer of the Spirit, as at Acts 8:17-19, 9:17, 19:6) and the phrase ἐπιθεσις χειρῶν is used elsewhere of the πρεσβυτέριον at 1 Tim 4:14 and of Paul at 2 Tim 1:6; cf. Acts 13:3. Reconciliation is also a possibility given the context. Perhaps not far from our minds should be the laying on of hands for healing purposes (Matt 9:18; 19:13, 15; Mark 5:23; 6:5; 7:32; 8:23, 25; 16:18; Luke 13:13; Acts 9:12).

is evident in 5:22. This is, however, something more than guilt by association, and borders on the contagious transfer of culpability, presumably through a lack of discernment of Timothy's part.¹⁷⁸ Any potential failure to exercise diagnostic precision would reflect poorly on Timothy, and could be taken as suggesting his foreknowledge of the elders' moral failings or simply inattention to the presenting symptoms.

This perhaps accounts for the otherwise curiously strong emphasis placed by the author on Timothy's remaining blameless (cf. "I adjure you in the presence of God and Christ Jesus and the elect angels . . . [5:21]). The Pastor makes his preoccupation with appearances quite explicit in 5:24: "the sins of some are abundantly clear" (πρόδηλοι).¹⁷⁹ This concern for what is public is also reflected in the language used to warn against sharing in the sins of others (μηδὲ κοινωνεῖ ἀμαρτίαις ἀλλοτρίαις [5:22]). Timothy's reproof of and separation from "those who are in error" (οἱ ἀμαρτάνοντες) is to be both public and decisive (5:20),¹⁸⁰ so that there should attach to him no hint of impropriety or moral corruption. The Pastor's instruction on elders provides an opportunity to address the problem of error and moral authority and the public or private realities that affect them. I argue that these concerns are communicated in the form of Pauline advice regarding the disciplining of

¹⁷⁸ John Chrysostom appeals to a logic of participatory contagion that works through the laying on of hands. The one who lays hands receives the punishment with those who sin, because he effectively lends his "authority" (ἐξουσία) to their wickedness (πονηρία) through the laying on of hands: "And [Paul] proves the unbearable danger of this sort of transgression, showing that some shall be liable to punishment for the offenses of others with them, for they confer their authority through the laying on of hands to the wickedness" (καὶ τὸν ἀφόρητον τῆς τοιαύτης παρανομίας παρέστησει κίνδυνον, δείξας ὅτι τῶν ἐτέροις πεπλημμελημένων ἕτεροι τὴν τιμωρίαν ὑποστήσονται μετ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, ὅτι τὴν ἐξουσίαν διὰ τῆς χειροτονίας τῇ πονηρίᾳ παρέχονται [Stat. 1.1; PG 49:17]).

¹⁷⁹ Important here is the connection with ἔκδηλος at 2 Tim 3:9, regarding the ἄνοια of the opponents. The fact that their ἄνοια itself is ἔκδηλος is itself worthy of reflection from the perspective of the *visibility* of one's folly, the way in which outward appearance is reflective of internal moral states.

¹⁸⁰ The Pastor's language of ἐνώπιον πάντων calls to mind Paul's public showdown with Peter ἔμπροσθεν πάντων in Gal 2:14.

elders and managing appearances and the expectations of the community. These issues are illuminated, as I argued above, through attention to the rhetoric of occlusion and manifestation and the diagnostic attention to symptoms representative of interrelated cultural discourses regarding physiognomy, philosophy, and medicine.

The second way Timothy might seem (from the Pastor's vantage point) to be morally compromised is by appearing to be chronically ill (1 Tim 5:23). To demonstrate this point requires some explicit attention to warrant, for while many modern readers do not so readily assume that sickness suggests moral failure or sin, many ancient thinkers did.¹⁸¹ Those who do not conform to the bodily ideals of health and vigor were sometimes thought to be compromised in character and morals,¹⁸² and were consequently discriminated against.¹⁸³ Scholarly attention to the stigma attached to illness, especially chronic illness or disability, has been recently reinvigorated by investigations in the emerging field of medical

¹⁸¹ This is evident especially in the notion that injuries and disabilities constituted divine punishment. See, for instance, in NewDocs 6.192–196. See also Mikeal C. Parsons, “His Feet and Ankles Were Made Strong’: Signs of Character in the Man Lame from Birth,” in *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature*, ed. Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 151–64. Of course not all ancients adopted this understanding. Seneca provides us with an example of someone who did not interpret his illness as moral failure, but rather who interpreted his illness as an opportunity to achieve moral progress. See Catherine Edwards, “The Suffering Body: Philosophy and Pain in Seneca’s Letters,” in *Constructions of the Classical Body*, ed. James I. Porter, *Body, in Theory: Histories of Cultural Materialism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 252–68. Plutarch too notes that one can be a philosopher, general, or king even while ill (*San. tu.* 126c). On the economic, military, and aesthetic consequences of disability in Greek antiquity variously construed, see Martha L. Edwards, “Constructions of Physical Disability in the Ancient Greek World: The Community Concept,” in *The Body and Physical Difference: Discourses of Disability*, ed. David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, *The Body, in Theory: Histories of Cultural Materialism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 55–70.

¹⁸² According to Gary Ferngren and Darrel Amundsen, “Given the importance of the body in Greek thought and the belief that physical health provided a paradigm for the harmony of the soul, it was natural to believe that those who are strong and healthy are morally superior to those who are weak and sickly. . . . Since the virtue of the soul and the body were so intimately related, the health of the body mirrored the health of the soul” (“Virtue and Health/Medicine in Pre-Christian Antiquity,” 15).

¹⁸³ See the examples discussed by Christian Laes, “How Does One Do the History of Disability in Antiquity? One Thousand Years of Case Studies,” *Medicina Nei Secoli: Arte e Scienza*.23.3 (2011): 915–25. At

humanities (such as the areas of disability studies and medical anthropology),¹⁸⁴ and the adoption of those disciplinary insights by biblical scholars.¹⁸⁵ The idea that sickness was laden with moral stigma in the early Empire does not surprise the modern reader. The heavy moral stigma attached to disability is evident, for instance, in the question John 9:2, where Jesus's disciples asked whose sin resulted in a man's sight impairment. The expectation of bias against "weakness" as impairment (ἀσθένεια) is similarly on display when Paul showed relief that his ailment, whatever it was, did not result in his rejection by the

¹⁸⁴ Patricia Ann Clark, "The Balance of the Mind: The Experience and Perception of Mental Illness in Antiquity" (Ph.D., University of Washington, 1993); C. F. Goodey, "Mental Disabilities and Human Values in Plato's Late Dialogues," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 74.1 (1992); Martha Lynn Edwards, "Physical Disability in the Ancient Greek World," 1995; C. F. Goodey, "Politics, Nature, and Necessity: Were Aristotle's Slaves Feeble Minded?," *Political Theory* 27.2 (1999): 203–24; C. F. Goodey, "'Foolishness' in Early Modern Medicine and the Concept of Intellectual Disability," *Medical History* 48.3 (2004); C. F. Goodey and M. Lynn Rose, "Mental States, Bodily Dispositions and Table Manners: A Guide to Reading 'Intellectual' Disability from Homer to Late Antiquity," in *Disabilities in Roman Antiquity*, ed. C. F. Goodey, M. Lynn Rose, and Christian Laes (Brill Academic Publishers, 2013), 17–44; Laes, "How Does One Do the History of Disability in Antiquity?"; Christian Laes, "Silent Witnesses: Deaf-Mutes in Graeco-Roman Antiquity," *The Classical World* 104.4 (2010): 451–73; Christian Laes et al., "Approaching Disabilities a Capite Ad Calcem: Hidden Themes in Roman Antiquity," in *Disabilities in Roman Antiquity Disparate Bodies, a Capite Ad Calcem*, ed. Christian Laes and C. F. Goodey, Mnemosyne, Supplements: History and Archaeology of Classical Antiquity 356 (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Jane Hubert, ed., *Madness, Disability and Social Exclusion: The Archaeology and Anthropology of "Différence"*, One World Archaeology 40 (Routledge, 2013); Dan Goodley, *Dis/Ability Studies: Theorising Disablism and Ableism* (London: Routledge, 2014); Christian Laes, ed., *Disability in Antiquity*, Rewriting Antiquity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).

¹⁸⁵ See, e.g., Jeremy Schipper, *Disability Studies and the Hebrew Bible: Figuring Mephibosheth in the David Story*, LHBOTS 441 (New York: T&T Clark, 2006); Johanna Helena Wilhelmina Dorman, "The Blemished Body: Deformity and Disability in the Qumran Scrolls" (Dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2007); Neal H. Walls, "The Origins of the Disabled Body: Disability in Ancient Mesopotamia," in *This Able Body: Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical Studies*, ed. Hector Avalos, Sarah J. Melcher, and Jeremy Schipper (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), 13–30; Kerry H. Wynn, "The Normate Hermeneutic and Interpretations of Disability within the Yahwistic Narratives," in *This Able Body: Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical Studies*, ed. Hector Avalos, Sarah J. Melcher, and Jeremy Schipper (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), 91–101; Saul M. Olyan, *Disability in the Hebrew Bible: Interpreting Mental and Physical Differences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Saul M. Olyan, "The Ascription of Physical Disability as a Stigmatizing Strategy in Biblical Iconic Polemics," in *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature*, ed. Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 89–102; Rebecca Raphael, *Biblical Corpora: Representations of Disability in Hebrew Biblical Literature*, LHBOTS 445 (London: T&T Clark International, 2008); Jeremy Schipper, *Disability and Isaiah's Suffering Servant*, Biblical Refigurations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

communities addressed in Galatians 4:13–14.¹⁸⁶ Commentators occasionally draw attention to the negative reactions people had to those who experienced sudden seizures, noting that spitting (cf. ἐκπτῦσαι at Gal 4:14) was used as an apotropaic measure. Other ailments, such as skin diseases or gynecological problems, were similarly stigmatized.¹⁸⁷ However, it has less frequently been appreciated that narrating Timothy’s sickness might have been a way for the Pastor to signal a concern regarding the appearance of moral deficiency or aberrancy as manifest through a bodily ailment that was widely stigmatized as suggesting akratic or obsessive behaviors. What I demonstrate below is that 1 Tim 5:17–25 is comprehensible as a coherent unit of argument when we interpret the problem of error and pastoral authority (5:17–22, 24–25) and the illness of Timothy (5:23) in light of contemporary discourses of

¹⁸⁶ On the history of interpretation of this verse, see Adela Yarbro Collins, “Paul’s Disability: The Thorn in His Flesh,” in *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature*, ed. Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 165–84. Similarly, Margaret M. Mitchell argues that Paul’s afflictions referenced in 2 Cor 2:16; 4:7–16; 6:9 were taken by the Corinthians to indicate divine punishment, thus undermining his religious legitimacy, and that his goal in the letter of 2 Cor 2:14–7:4 is to demonstrate that his marks and sufferings are in fact his apostolic *bona fides*, proof of his identification with Jesus (“Rhetorical Shorthand in Pauline Argumentation: The Function of the ‘the Gospel’ in the Corinthian Correspondence,” in *Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker*, ed. L Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994], 76, 78–79).

¹⁸⁷ For the stigma attached to skin disease of various kinds, see the above section on gangrene in ch. 3. Cf. also the depiction of the individual with unsightly dermatological problems in Theophrastus, *Char.*, 19. For the stigma attached to infertility and other sexual disabilities in the HB, see David Tabb Stewart, “Sexual Disabilities in the Hebrew Bible,” in *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature*, ed. Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 77; Susan Ackerman, “The Blind, the Lame, and the Barren Shall Not Come into the House,” in *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature*, ed. Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 29–46; Candida R. Moss and Joel S. Baden, *Reconceiving Infertility: Biblical Perspectives on Procreation and Childlessness* (Princeton University Press, 2015); Sarah J. Melcher, “A Tale of Two Eunuchs: Isaiah 56:1–8 and Acts 8:26–40,” in *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature*, ed. Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 117–28; Stewart, “Sexual Disabilities in the Hebrew Bible”; Joel S. Baden, “The Nature of Barrenness in the Hebrew Bible,” in *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature*, ed. Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 13–28; T. M. Lemos, “‘Like the Eunuch Who Does Not Beget’: Gender, Mutilation, and Negotiated Status in the Ancient Near East,” in *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature*, ed. Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 47–66.

exterior presentation and interior disposition, hiddenness and clarity, appearances and reality.

4. What is the Occasion for Timothy's Sickness?

Having situated 1 Tim 5:23 as coherent element of the Pastor's discussion of sin and the image problems that attach to public and private moral failings, we turn our attention now to a more detailed discussion of the logic and significance of the Pastor's characterization of Timothy's stomach ailments. One important question that Timothy's sickness raises is this: Why exactly is Timothy described as being sick?¹⁸⁸ Especially when we consider the pseudepigraphical nature of this letter, why bother to include such advice?¹⁸⁹ Many scholars have not taken the fictive nature of these letters into view when addressing this passage, something that we must surely reckon with. Some commentators have suggested that Paul was urging Timothy to stop drinking only water because it was hurting his stomach,¹⁹⁰ and speculated that perhaps Timothy was abstaining completely to distinguish himself from his opponents.¹⁹¹ However, some of the same scholars also infer from 1 Tim 4:3 that these

¹⁸⁸ For Chrysostom, the question was formulated in terms of consternation as to why Paul did not miraculously heal Timothy. Margaret M. Mitchell, *The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline Interpretation* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 293–94 discusses the eight reasons Chrysostom gives for not miraculously healing Timothy's gastrointestinal ailments.

¹⁸⁹ Spicq took the sheer banality of the advice as evidence for the authenticity of the letter ("1 Timothée 5:23," 143).

¹⁹⁰ Chrysostom understands Timothy's state of frequent ailments to be the result of frequent fasting (*Hom. 16 in 1 Tim.* [PG 62:587]). Cf. *Stat.* 1.3 (PG 49.19): Οὕτως ὑπερεώρα τρυφῆς, καὶ κατεγέλα πολυτελοῦς τραπέζης, ὥς καὶ εἰς ἀσθένειαν ἐμπεσεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἄγαν σκληραγωγίας καὶ ἐπιτεταμένης νηστείας. Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 475–76 suggest that the cause of Timothy's stomach problems is the "administrative pressures" and "management and personnel problems" foisted upon him by Paul.

¹⁹¹ Mounce, WBC, 319. Other scholars suggest he is mimicking his opponents' ascetic practice: Dibelius & Conzelmann, *Hermeneia*, 80–81. Marshall thinks it probable that Timothy is abstaining because of the elders' abuse of wine or perhaps the association of wine with pagan festivals (ICC, 623–24). Brox, RNT, 203 suggests

opponents *are* ascetics, and so must postulate that they are in fact "drunkards" whose asceticism did not forbid alcohol, or who perhaps were simply drinking in spite of their own teachings prohibiting the same.¹⁹² These exegetical twists and turns aside, some form of rigorist asceticism practiced by the opponents is thought to be the relevant corollary to Timothy's own ostensibly excessive ascetic practice. However, for the following three reasons, I am less convinced that the putative occasion for Paul's advice is Timothy's presumed ascetic practice, nor that his ailments are meant to be traced to any such asceticism.

We must keep three things in mind. First, we need not hypothesize that Timothy was taking the path of the rigorist ascetic simply because he had been, to this point in the imagined epistolary narrative, a teetotaler. While drinking only water could be associated with certain dietary restrictions practiced by some philosophers,¹⁹³ there were other reasons to avoid wine in the ancient world, such as a simple concern to avoid intoxication (cf. the admonition against being a *πάροινος* at 1 Tim 3:3 and Titus 1:7, as well as 1 Tim 3:8),¹⁹⁴ or even the concern to keep one's youthful constitution from being inflamed and disordered by alcohol.¹⁹⁵ Given Paul's own stern warnings against drunkards (cf. 1 Cor 5:11; 6:10) and

that a connection between 1 Tim 5:23 and 1 Tim 4:3–5 as anti-gnostic commentary cannot be decided with certainty.

¹⁹² Mounce, WBC, 318.

¹⁹³ For instance, water drinking (ὕδωρ πίνειν) is part of the regimen of the Cynic (cf. Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 9).

¹⁹⁴ A contrast is also formed (at least implicitly) with the instruction at 1 Tim 3:8 that deacons should be "not devoted to much wine" (μὴ οἶνω πολλῷ προσέχοντες) cf. Spicq, "1 Timothée 5:23," 149 n. 4. Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.12.11, advises "using wine in a suitable way" (οἶναρίῳ κομψῶς χρῆσθαι) with a view to training oneself to have the capacity to abstain altogether (ἀποσχέσθαι).

¹⁹⁵ Galen, *QAM* 10 = 8.809K, cites Plato, *Leg.* 666a–c, to the effect that before the age of eighteen, the child (ὁ παῖς) should not drink at all, the young man (νεός) should avoid excess and drunkenness, and up to the age of thirty one should drink only with moderation (γεύεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου). In concert with the practice adopted by Timothy in his ailment, Zeuxippus suggests one must not avoid "drinking water when wine is

statements like "it is good to not eat meat and drink wine" (καλὸν τὸ μὴ φαγεῖν κρέα μηδὲ
 πιεῖν οἶνον [Rom 14:21]), one might even suggest that Paul's own teachings could be—as the
Acts of Paul and Thecla may suggest—motivation enough to abstain, but would not
 necessarily entail the full-blown rigoristic asceticism from which the Pastor is alleged to
 have been trying to save Timothy.¹⁹⁶ One might also abstain for the sake of good health.¹⁹⁷
 The biblical archetype of dietary restraint, Daniel, abstained from the king's luxurious
 foods and wine and thrived on a diet of water (cf. ὑδροποτεῖν at Dan 1:12 LXX) and
 vegetables so as to not be "polluted" (ἀλισγηθῆναι), and this improved his health and
 appearance and that of his companions.¹⁹⁸ Drinking only "pure water" (λιτὸν ὕδωρ) was

present" (ὕδωρ πιεῖν οἶνου παρόντος [*Tu. san.*123b]). At the same time, he is careful to distance his affirmation of propaedeutic abstinence from "showy and sophistic abstentions" (ἐπιδεικτικαὶ καὶ σοφιστικαὶ ἀποσχέσεις) from food and wine and "boasting" (μεγαλαυχία) that accompanies their ostentatious practitioners (*Tu. san.* 123c). Zeuxippus goes on to say that "one must especially guard against gluttonies and drunkenness and luxuries" (μάλιστα δὲ φυλακτέον πλησμονὰς καὶ μέθας καὶ ἡδυπαθείας [*Tu. san.* 123e]). This is in service, however, of being able to eat and drink with appropriate zeal at more opportune times (cf. *Tu. san.* 124a).

¹⁹⁶ There is no explicit polemic against meat or wine in the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, but there might be an indication of ascetic tendencies in the menu mentioned in *API* 25: "And they had five loaves of bread and vegetables and water [and salt]" (εἶχον δὲ ἄρτους πέντε καὶ λάχανα καὶ ὕδωρ <καὶ ἅλας>). On the reception of this passage in early Christian debates about the propriety of wine, see Merkt, "Reading Paul and Drinking Wine." The suggestion of David Horrell, following Andrew McGowan, that Timothy's drinking only water relates somehow to a bread and water eucharistic practice, seems hard to substantiate in the text. David G. Horrell, "Disciplining Performance and 'placing' the Church: Widows, Elders and Slaves in the Household of God (1 Tim 5,1-6,2)," in *1 Timothy Reconsidered*, ed. Karl P. Donfried, Monographische Reihe von "Benedictina." Biblisch-Ökumenische Abteilung 18 (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 126–27. Andrew Brian McGowan, *Ascetic Eucharists: Food and Drink in Early Christian Ritual Meals*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 231–3; Cf. David G. Horrell, "Pauline Churches or Early Christian Churches? Unity, Disagreement, and the Eucharist," in *Einheit der Kirche im Neuen Testament: Dritte europäische orthodox-westliche Exegetenkonferenz in Sankt Petersburg, 24.-31. August 2005*, ed. Anatoly Alexeev, Chrēstos K. Karakolēs, and Ulrich Luz, WUNT 218 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 199–200.

¹⁹⁷ After all, one could die from too much drink. See the undated epitaph from Ephesus recorded in *NewDocs* 6.190: "Asklepiades, son of Anaxippos of Ephesus, having lived twenty-two years, drinking a lot of pure wine in one draught, I the son of Anaxippos died bringing up blood" (Ἀσκληπιάδης Ἀνακίππου Ἐφέσιος εἴκοσι καὶ δύο ἔτη ζήσας πολὺν οἶνον ἀπνευστί ἄκρατον πίνων αἱμμαναγῶν ἔθανον υἱὸς Ἀνακίππου.). Trans. R.A. Kearsley. For discussion of this inscription, and other ancient Greco-Roman evidence for the harmful and sometimes deadly effects of alcohol, see Danielle Gourevitch, "Two Historical Case Histories of Acute Alcoholism in the Roman Empire," in *Disabilities in Roman Antiquity*, ed. C. F. Goodey, M. Lynn Rose, and Christian Laes (Brill Academic Publishers, 2013), 73–87.

¹⁹⁸ Dan 1:3–17.

advocated by Pythagoras for the purpose of "health of body and sharpness of mind" (ὕγεια σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ὀξύς).¹⁹⁹ The physician Diocles of Carystus said that water was helpful for digestion and "stimulates both body and soul."²⁰⁰

Secondly, though it is not an impossible inference, nothing in what "Paul" advises suggests that Timothy's water-only regimen *was the cause* of his ailments;²⁰¹ he simply states that drinking some wine is a healthful remedy. Far from pinning the blame on Timothy's water-drinking or issuing a warning against Timothy's ostensible, previous practice of asceticism, we should read Paul's advice as an intervention into Timothy's (fictive) precarious medical situation in such a way that takes into account the literary

¹⁹⁹ Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.* 8.13. While he did not forbid wine generally, he did recommend abstinence from wine for the most philosophically advanced individuals. After narrating Pythagoras's general advice about food (περὶ τροφῆς), namely the avoidance (ἀπέχεσθαι) of foods that hindered prophecy (μαντική), purity of the soul and sanctity (καθαρότης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἀγνεία), temperance (σωφροσύνη) and a habit of virtue (ἀρετῆς ἕξις), Iamblichus writes: "Specially, however, the most contemplative of the philosophers, who had arrived at the summit of philosophic attainment, were forbidden superfluous food such as wine, or unjustifiable foods, such as was animated, and not to sacrifice animals to the Gods, nor by any means to injure animals, but to observe most solicitous justice towards them" (ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοῖς θεωρητικωτάτοις τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀκροτάτοις καθάπαξ περιήρει τὰ περιττὰ καὶ ἄδिका τῶν ἐδεσμάτων, μήτε ἔμψυχον μηδὲν μηδέποτε ἐσθίειν εἰσηγούμενος μήτε οἶνον ὅλως πίνειν μήτε θύειν ζῶα θεοῖς μήτε καταβλάπτειν μηδ' ὅτιοῦν αὐτά, διασφίζειν δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὰ δικαιοσύνην ἐπιμελέστατα (Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* 24 [Teubner ed.]; Trans. Guthrie).

²⁰⁰ See Athenaeus, *Deipn.* (epitome) 2.25, 46 d (p. 113–14 Desrousseaux). The full quote: "Diocles says that water promotes digestion and causes no flatulence, and that it is moderately cooling and clears sight and least makes the head heavy, and stimulates both the soul and the body." (Διοκλῆς δὲ φησι τὸ ὕδωρ πεπτικὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄφυσον ψυκτικὸν τε μετρ' ὥς ὀξυδερκές τε καὶ ἥκιστα καρηβαρικὸν κινητικὸν τε ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος). Text and trans. from Philip J. van der Eijk, *Diocles of Carystus: A Collection of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary*, 2 vols., *Studies in Ancient Medicine* 22 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 1.382–83, #235. Van der Eijk comments that the lack of distinction between types of water in this quote may be the result the epitomizer's brevity, rather than any lack of awareness on Diocles's part regarding the importance of different kinds of waters for treatment. Cf. the Hippocratic treatises *Aer.* 7–9; *Vit.* 2.52; *Acut.* 62–63, as well as Aristotle, *Nic. eth.* 1142a21–23 (Eijk, *Diocles of Carystus*, 2.411–12).

²⁰¹ Some other exegetes, however, also make this assumption. Chrysostom, *Hom 1 Tim* 16 (PG 62.587–88) writes: "Now if he counsels moderation to a man who had held fast to such a degree of fasting, and made use of water to such an extent, that he was sick, even frequently sick, and that man did not refuse it, how much more ought we not feel annoyance, when we hear admonition from someone" (Εἰ δὲ ἀνδρὶ μέχρι τοσούτου νηστείας προσεσχικότι, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσούτον ὕδατι χρησαμένῳ, ὥς καὶ ἀσθενεῖν, καὶ πυκνῶς ἀσθενεῖν, παραγγέλλει σωφρονεῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναίνεται ἐκεῖνος· πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς, ὅταν ἀκούσωμεν νοθεσίαν παρὰ τινος, οὐκ ὀφείλομεν δυσχεραίνειν).

context of which this verse is a part. This brings us to our third and final consideration: we do well to take seriously the fictive nature of these letters. In other words, we do not know that the historical envoy of Paul named Timothy actually had stomach problems.²⁰² But if there is no sick Timothy actually receiving this sage advice, why include this specific advice? Certainly the creation of verisimilitude is a partial answer, but this does not account for the placement and peculiar nature of 1 Tim 5:23. I argue that something else is afoot.

5. What is the Nature of Timothy's Sickness?

In light of the fictive nature of these letters and the author's interest to communicate certain values and ideals through the verisimilitudes of these letters, we find the most interpretive traction when we focus not on the exact kind of ailments Timothy endured, but rather the role of sickness and its characterizations as meaning-bearing signs. The Pastor here uses the language of ἀσθένεια, a rather generic term that describes a lack of tension or strength in the

²⁰² We must leave open the possibility that the Pastor is here creating an interpretive interface with the *homologoumena*, for in 1 Cor 16:11–12 we have a notice regarding the treatment of Timothy: "If Timothy comes to you, see that he is without fear among you, for he is doing the work of the Lord just like me. Therefore let no one despise (ἐξουθενεῖν) him. Send him on in peace, in order that he might come to me. For I am expecting him along with the brothers." While some scholars have found a reference here to Timothy's ostensible timidity or youthfulness (Fitzmyer, *1 Corinthians*, 622) others have argued the opposite, noting that Timothy is elsewhere a robust figure whose courage is emphasized (Christopher R. Hutson, "Was Timothy Timid? On the Rhetoric of Fearlessness (1 Corinthians 16:10-11) and Cowardice (2 Timothy 1:7)," *BR 42* [1997]: 59). Hutson (61) suggests that the "command 'let no one disdain (ἐξουθενήσῃ) him' calls to mind the exhortation 'Let no one despise (καταφρονεῖτω) your youth' (1 Tim 4:12), and that this has led many exegetes, wrongly in his assessment, to the conclusion that Timothy was therefore timid or fearful on account of his youth. However, a different interpretation is made possible by another text that is called to mind, at least for me, from Gal 4:13–14: "you know that on account of a physical ailment I proclaimed the gospel to you formerly, and you did not despise (ἐξουθενήσατε) nor did you spit at your trial in my flesh." Can we infer from Paul's anticipation that the Corinthians might "despise" Timothy that Timothy had a condition that might allow him, as Paul himself was despised, to be rejected on account of that sickness, and that this somehow accounts for the characterization of Timothy as sick in 1 Tim 5:23?

body (or soul) and can refer to any number of conditions.²⁰³ Too often scholars wish to arrive at a particular diagnosis, but give no attention to the significance of depicting Timothy ill in the first place, and the terms in which the Pastor characterizes does this. One of the most under-emphasized elements of the Pastor's depiction of Timothy in this passage is the fact that Timothy's ailments are described as "frequent" (πυκνά).²⁰⁴ That the term is used in medical diagnosis has been recognized by some scholars.²⁰⁵ What we should first ask, though, is what this designation was meant to signal for ancient readers.

Is Timothy being depicted as having a permanent pathological condition that could be managed but not removed through medicinal means, or a recurrent but healable discomfort?²⁰⁶ Was this an ailment that could be completely removed or simply alleviated temporarily by the use of "a little wine"? Unfortunately, the limited evidence does not allow a definitive statement. In any event, the language of frequentative recurrence suggests that these ailments are being depicted as a difficult case, in need of sage medical treatment.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ In his article on *στόμαχος*, TLNT 2.296–99, Spicq notes that diagnosing Timothy's ailment is almost impossible, since the "lack of vigor" suggested by *ἀσθένεια* is exceptionally generic (297). This does not prevent him from listing several options.

²⁰⁴ Ceslas Spicq, as so often, is the exception to the rule. After listing the various symptoms that could accompany stomach ailments (feeling weak, interruption of sleep or appetite, spasms, chronic pain, acidity), Spicq ponders whether or not Timothy experienced all these. If so, Spicq suggests, "the torpor or indolence provoked by the 'disease of the stomach' corresponds exactly, in the psychological depiction to the obliteration, to the lack of the boldness which seems to have characterized the preferred disciple of St. Paul" ("la torpeur ou l'indolence [*νωθρός*] provoquée par *στομάχου τὸ πάθος* correspondait exactement au plan psychologique à l'effacement, au manque de hardiesse qui semble avoir caractérisé le disciple préféré de saint Paul" ["1 Timothée 5:23," 146 n. 3]).

²⁰⁵ Spicq lists evidence from contemporary medical writers like Aretaeus of Cappadocia and Galen that uses the term *πυκνός* as a term of medical diagnosis (Spicq, "1 Timothée 5:23," 146 n. 3).

²⁰⁶ Early Christian authors such as Chrysostom understood the condition to be perduring. *Hom. 1 Tim. 16* (PG 62.587). Indeed, Chrysostom understands Timothy to be subject to illness (*ἐπινόσος*) in various ways (*ἄλλως*), both in regard to his stomach and "other parts" of his body (*ἄλλα μέρη*).

²⁰⁷ The designation *πυκνός* is used to describe stomach ailments in Aretaeus of Cappadocia's treatment of *chronic* diseases (cf. *Sign. diut.* 1.16.5). That said, it is used to describe acute diseases as well, though the term is more frequent (about two-thirds of the instances of *πυκνός* and cognate terms) regarding chronic diseases.

What is striking, then, is that Paul depicts Timothy, who is otherwise portrayed as hewing closely to the conventional ideals of Greco-Roman masculinity,²⁰⁸ as being afflicted with chronic ailments.²⁰⁹ That they are chronic does not mean they are constant, of course, but that they manifest regularly. In the pathology of Timothy's imagined body, stomach ailments recur often enough to suggest that they are a chronic problem that is in need of attention and remedy, in particular, a "little wine" (οἶνος ὀλίγος).²¹⁰

6. Stigmatizing Stomach Ailments

But *why* does the Pastor designate these stomach problems "frequent"? I suggest that the Pastor's goal was to invoke and address the particular stigmas conveyed by chronic stomach ailments. This serves to particularize the more general theme of this entire passage, beginning especially in 5:20, but implicit already in 5:19: moral error, its appearance and

²⁰⁸ Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity"; Robert E. Goss and Deborah Krause, "The Pastoral Letters: 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus," in *The Queer Bible Commentary*, ed. Deryn Guest (London: SCM, 2006), 687–88.

²⁰⁹ Manuel Villalobos Mendoza, *When Men Were Not Men: Masculinity and Otherness in the Pastoral Epistles*, Bible in the Modern World 62 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2014), 56–59 argues that the Pastor changes his usually negative opinion of wine in Timothy's case because he realizes it will help Timothy's body and his performance of masculinity and virility. The latter seems unlikely, at least in the way that Mendoza has framed the argument, i.e., that heavy drinking connotes manliness for Macedonians and Roman soldiers, and so perhaps also here.

²¹⁰ Wine is praised in Plutarch's treatise *De tuenda sanitate* as the "most useful of drinks" (ποτῶν ὠφελιμώτατος) and the "sweetest of medicines" (φαρμάκων ἡδιστος [*Tu. san.* 132b]). He warns that it should be mixed with water and used on an appropriate occasion. Smith draws a connection between this passage and 1 Tim 5:23, which he considers to be "the only clear instance of medical advice in the NT" Cf. (Smith, "De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta," 34, 49). Spicq marshals evidence to suggest that wine was universally considered to be a stimulant for the stomach, though is careful to note that wine in different mixtures held very different medicinal properties (Spicq, "1 Timothée 5:23," 148). Cf. the ancient discussion regarding whether wine was a refrigerant or was calorific in Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 3.5 (651f-653b). The healing effect of wine (*Mel.* F61–F65) for melancholy is advocated by Rufus of Ephesus, though it is stressed that the patient should only drink "little by little" (*Mel.* F64 §3). Galen, in his commentary on the Hippocratic treatise *Regimen in Acute Diseases*, writes about the attempt to balance the humors through the use of drugs, food, and exercise. Wine played an important part in that regimen, whether it was a little unmixed wine if the patient had a bowel movement, or watery or sweet wine if the patient did not (*Hp.Acut.comm.* 4.79 = 15.868K). See Grant, *Dieting for an Emperor: A Translation of Books 1 and 4 of Oribasius' Medical Compilations with an Introduction and Commentary*, 6.

detection, and how to treat it. By locating the problem to be adjudicated in Timothy's own body, the Pastor illustrates in dramatic fashion the potential problem of appearances. In this manner, the Pastor vividly corporealizes in the case of Timothy the issue that he is addressing in the surrounding verses: the relationship between internal ailments and their external visibility, and how to manage both the appearance and the reality of those ailments.

As I illustrated above, many ailments, and especially disabilities, were stigmatized in antiquity. Chronic stomach problems in particular were stigmatized insofar as they could carry an association with dissolute living or with a melancholic disposition. These options will be explored in order. Discourse about the belly or stomach itself was widely deployed as an opportunity for moralizing,²¹¹ a tendency reflected in these letters by the Pastor's the characterization of Cretans as "lazy bellies" (γαστέρες ἀργαί) at Titus 1:12. The pathology of the stomach was, by extension, also an opportunity for moral disapproval.

The philosophical literature of this period reflects a preoccupation with how to manage stomach ailments, and furthermore reveals some of the attitudes toward indigestion that were prevalent at the time. Eating so as to maintain a constitution that was well-disposed to the philosophical lifestyle was valued.²¹² Avoiding indigestion was an important part of this, not only for the sake of bodily health, but also for the sake of maintaining a sharp mind and not appearing to be an akratic individual. This can be seen clearly in the treatise by Plutarch, *Healthy Precepts*, discussed above.²¹³ One aim of the treatise is to make

²¹¹ See Karl Olav Sandnes, *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles*, SNTSMS 120 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 35–60. 1 Tim 5:23 is not a part of Sandes's study.

²¹² Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity," 245.

²¹³ While some have suggested that the rational reflections on the preservation of health contained in Plutarch's treatise have "no more than occasional contacts" with the approach to health and healing of ECL

an argument for the essentially ethical nature of health maintenance, and the essentially political purpose of such ethical attunement to medicine and health.²¹⁴ The treatise, which post-dates the Emperor Titus's death in 81 CE (cf. *Tu. san.* 123d), acknowledges, in the character of Glaucus the physician, that not all physicians felt that philosophy or ethics had anything to do with a proper discussion "about healthy living" (περὶ διαίτης ὑγεινῆς), the subject of this treatise (*Tu. san.* 122c). But the contention of the other two characters, and especially Zeuxippus, who speaks for the majority of the treatise,²¹⁵ is that the philosopher (φιλόσοφος) can and must "seek out and learn" (ζητεῖν καὶ μαθάνειν) what is needed for his body (*Tu. san.* 122d). He argues that the interdisciplinary duty incumbent upon the philosopher is the preservation of σωτηρία and ὑγίεια in all its forms (*Tu. san.* 122e).

This treatise shares obvious linguistic similarities with the Pastorals, which are similarly replete with the language and cognates of σωτηρία and ὑγίεια.²¹⁶ But more than any

(Smith, "De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta," 41)., I show how the treatise has in common with the PE some of the same sensibilities around kinds of conversation, modes of self-preservation, and the cultivation of virtue. For a comparison with other medical and philosophical treatments of regimen and hygiene, see Jean-Nicolas Corvisier, "Les Préceptes de santé de Plutarque et leur place dans la littérature comparable," in *Thérapies, médecine et démographie antiques*, ed. Jean-Nicolas Corvisier, Christine Didier, and Martine Bellancourt-Valdher, Histoire (Arras: Artois presses université, 2001), 137–56; On the place of this treatise within Plutarch's philosophical ethics, see Lieve Van Hoof, *Plutarch's Practical Ethics: The Social Dynamics of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 211–65.

²¹⁴ See Luigi Sensazono, "Health and Politics in Plutarch's *de Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta*," in *Plutarch and His Intellectual World*, ed. Judith Mossman (Havertown: Classical Press of Wales, 1997), 113–18. Sensazono argues that "health, morality and statecraft are bound together with an indissoluble bond" ("Health and Politics in Plutarch's *de Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta*," 117). Here, we would merely substitute "statecraft" with the politics of community management.

²¹⁵ The majority of the treatise is presented as the teaching of Zeuxippus. Morton Smith argues against the idea that the teaching reflects that of Plutarch himself ("De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta," 33 n.6).

²¹⁶ The pairing is evident in inscriptional and papyrological evidence, which illustrates how "health and salvation" were used in tandem. From 102/103–117 CE, we have a Syrian inscription narrating the prayer of one Cornelius Palma for Trajan's σωτηρία and ὑγεία (*OGIS* 618.2). Cf. ὑγιαίνοντες καὶ σωζόμενοι (*IG* 22.1028.89, 1st BCE; *LSJ*, 1748). Luck (ὑγιής κτλ., *TDNT* 310 n. 16) points out that the magical papyri pair ὑγίεια with σωτηρία and ζωή at *PGM* III.576. The terms ὑγίεια and σωτηρία are used as closely related concepts if not synonyms in P.Sarap. 92, a letter written between 90 and 133 CE.

individual or collective linguistic connections, this treatise offers insight into the debate about what kind of language was appropriate for those aspiring to a philosophical life, modes of exercise most appropriate to intellectuals, the kinds of things one should and should not eat and drink, and who has the best claim to an authoritative statement on these matters. While the the Pastor does differ from Plutarch, this treatise helps us to understand some of the preoccupations of the Pastor and the seemingly stilted combination of concerns about health and morality that we find in 1 Tim 5:22–25 in particular, as well as the advice on bodily exercise in 1 Tim 4:7–8 and the preoccupation with the language of "health" (ὑγίεια) and "salvation/healing" (σωτηρία).

Plutarch's treatise advocates moderation regarding the eating of heavy food and the drinking of wine, as did Musonius Rufus, quoted above. What is especially interesting about this advice is the rationale given for it. Zeuxippus advocates a diet free from meats (κρεά), since they have a dulling effect (cf. ἀμβλύνειν) on the reasoning part of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς . . . τὸ λογικόν [*Tu. san.* 131f-132a]). They are described as producing indigestions (ἀπεψίαι) on account of their heavy residues. These heavy foods are important to moderate because they affect one's pneumatic constitution and one's susceptibility to disease.²¹⁷ In

²¹⁷ Heavy, luxurious foods were known to be bad for one's health. Diogenes of Oinoanda's massive inscription on the side of the town stoa, ca. 120 CE, contains the following maxim, publicly placarded for all to see: "Luxurious foods and drinks ... in no way produce freedom from harm and a healthy condition in the flesh" ([πολυ]τελῆ βρώμα[τα καὶ π]ώματα ... οὐ]δὲν [ἐν]ποιεῖ τῇ]ν ἀβλά[βειαν καὶ ἔ]ξιν [ὑ]γεινήν τῇ σαρ[κί]). Fr. 109 (HK fr. 35 + 34). Text and trans. from Martin Ferguson Smith, *Diogenes of Oinoanda: The Epicurean Inscription*, Istituto Italiano per Gli Studi Filosofici. La Scuola Di Epicuro. Supplemento 1 (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1993). Diogenes, like Timothy, had dire stomach problems, but instead of wine, made use of curdled milk as a remedy. Smith interprets the καρδιακὸν πάθος (Fr. 117.4–11) as "stomach trouble," and notes that there might be a reference to an attack of colic at Fr. 120. For the curdled milk, see Fr. 121.II (Smith, *The Epicurean Inscription*, 35 nn. 2–4; cf. 547 n. 2). Hailing from Oinoanda, a little town in northern Lycia that produced far more significant epigraphic evidence than one might expect from such a small place, Diogenes sponsored the

advocating for consuming light fare, Zeuxippus warns that great masses of food provide, as it were, "substance" and "body" (οὐσία καὶ σῶμα) to outside causes of disease. If, on the other hand, one had "rarified blood and pure pneuma" (αἷμα λεπτὸν καὶ πνεῦμα καθαρὸν), these would be easily dispersed by the body (*Tu. san.* 127c). Plutarch strikes a similar note at 129f, when he says that the residues left in the body by heavy eating and drinking are the "causes of many diseases" (πολλῶν αἰτίων νόσων ἐστί) and that they "add to the other causes matter and force" (προστίθῃσι ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰτίαις ὕλην καὶ δύναμιν [*Tu. san.* 129f]). Excessive food and drink are to be avoided because they beget disease or intensify disease already present, but also because they have an adverse effect on one's reasoning part, which is the part of the soul responsible for making virtuous decisions. The implication seems to be that the presence of disease can be the result of heavy eating or drinking, and that one's capacity for moral decision-making is consequently affected.

This calls for vigilance on the part of the individual who would seek to live a philosophical life. Plutarch believes strongly that the body is capable of giving premonitory signs that can help one to adjust diet, exercise, sleep, or emotion, if only one will observe them. Vigilance and close attention to the signs of things worse to come are therefore the recommendation of Zeuxippus (*Tu. san.* 128f). He thinks it absurd (ἄτοπον at 129a) to pay careful attention (ἐπιμελῶς προσέχειν) to aviary clucks and croaks but not "the movements of the body and tossings and premonitory symptoms" (τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος κινήματα καὶ σάλους καὶ προπαθείας), likening them to the "signs of a storm about to take place soon in oneself"

massive inscription on the side of the town stoa. For the date 120 CE and a thorough consideration of the matter, see Smith, *The Epicurean Inscription*, 35–48.

(σημεῖα χειμῶνος ἐν ἑαυτῷ γενησομένου καὶ μέλλοντος).²¹⁸ Stomach problems in particular are thought to serve as indicators of worse diseases yet to come, as may be seen when Zeuxippus suggests that "most" diseases have stomach ailments (cf. "indigestions and constipation" [ἀπεψίαι and δυσκίνησις]) as "advance messengers and forerunners and heralds" (προάγγελοι καὶ προδρόμοι καὶ κήρυκες [127d]).

This is part of a semiotic theory of bodily illness and its reciprocal relationship with the adverse movements of the soul. According to Plutarch's treatise, movements of the soul have a premonitory power, suggesting that the body is close to illness. Plutarch suggests that irrational and irascible behavior is often a good indicator for bodily illness.

And actually the movements of the soul have revealed that the body is dangerously near disease. For irrational despondencies and fears have often gathered strength with no obvious cause, extinguishing hopes all of a sudden; and they become splenetic with rage and sharp and vexed at trifles, and they shed torrents of tears and are sorely dismayed whenever bad vapors and bitter exhalations,²¹⁹ having combined, mix in "with the circuits of the soul," as Plato says. Wherefore, to whomever such things happen, it is necessary to investigate and take note—if there is no pneumatic cause—that it is a bodily cause requiring some reduction of food or tempering. (*Tu. san.* 129b-c)²²⁰

This statement presupposes an essential connection between bodily affections and those of the soul. Irrational behavior sometimes points to bodily illness, and emotional upheavals

²¹⁸ *Tu. san.* 129a. One must, in his opinion, not only take concern for the food one eats (τροφή) or the exercises (τὰ γυμνάσια), but also sleep and dreams. Disturbances can often suggest an "excess or thickness of bodily fluids or a disturbance of spirit" (πλῆθος ἢ πάχος ὑγρῶν ἢ πνεύματος ταραχή). See *Tu. san.* 129a-b.

²¹⁹ I.e., probably offgasses from bodily humors, as in Galen, *UP* 11.14: ἡ ἐκ τῶν χυμῶν ἀναθυμίασις.

²²⁰ ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα τὸ σῶμα μηνύει πρὸς νόσον ἐπισφαλῶς ἔχειν. ἄλογοι γὰρ ἴσχουσιν ἀθυμῖαι καὶ φόβοι πολλάκις ἀπ' οὐδενὸς φανεροῦ, τὰς ἐλπίδας ἄφνω κατασβεχνόουσιν· γίνονται δὲ καὶ ταῖς ὀργαῖς ἐπίχολοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ μικρόλυποι, καὶ δακρυρροοῦσι καὶ ἀδημονοῦσιν ὅταν ἀτμοὶ πονηροὶ καὶ ἀναθυμιάσεις πικραὶ συνιστάμεναι "ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς," ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀνακραθῶσι "περίοδοις." διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν οἷς ἂν ταῦτα συμπίπτῃ καὶ μνημονεύειν, ἂν μηδὲν ἢ πνευματικόν, ὅτι σωματικόν ἐστὶν αἴτιον ὑποστολῆς τινος ἢ κατακράσεως δεόμενον.

can sometimes have a "bodily cause" (σωματικὸν αἷτιον) rather than a pneumatic one (πνευματικὸν αἷτιον).

What is especially important for the present study is the concern given in Plutarch's treatise to the deleterious effects of bad diet on one's moral reasoning capacities and the importance of avoiding disease and disease-causing behavior. The association between stomach ailments in particular and the appearance (or reality) of dissolute living—rarely, if ever, noted by scholars of the Pastorals—is noteworthy, since it provides a new point of reference with which to interpret the Pastor's advice to Timothy. In this light, the Pastor's advice to Timothy may be read as an admonition to utilize a bit of wine to improve his bodily condition and thereby to avoid the appearance of suffering the effects of dissolute living. Similarly, Galen notes that a moderate amount of wine has an excellent effect on the body. Beginning with a quote from Theognis, he writes as follows: "If one drinks [wine] knowledgeably, it is not a bad thing but a good thing.' For truly, if one should drink in moderation (εἰ συμμέτρως ποθείη), he will digest, circulate food, produce blood, and grow. And with [wine] this will render our soul strong and more gentle and braver (τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ἡμερωτέραν τε ἄμα καὶ θαρσαλεωτέραν); clearly this is achieved through the medium of the mixture that is in the body, which is, once more, through the medium of the humors."²²¹ Galen argues that a moderate amount of wine has a positive effect on both body and soul, producing the complementary qualities of gentleness and bravery. Even though,

²²¹ ἦν δέ τις αὐτὸν πίνῃ ἐπισταμένως, οὐ κακὸν, ἀλλ' ἀγαθόν. ὄντως γὰρ, εἰ συμμέτρως ποθείη, καὶ πέψει, καὶ ἀναδώσει, καὶ αἱματώσει, καὶ θρέψει. μεγάλα δὲ συντελεῖ μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ἡμερωτέραν τε ἄμα καὶ θαρσαλεωτέραν ἐργάζεσθαι, διὰ μέσης δηλονότι τῆς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα κράσεως, ἥντινα ἀνάπαλιν ἐργάζεται διὰ μέσων τῶν χυμῶν (QAM3 = 4.778–9K).

in this fictive scenario, "Paul" knows that Timothy's behavior is aboveboard, even to the point of avoiding alcohol altogether, the implication of this reading would be that Timothy's chronic stomach ailments might be interpreted by others as *signs* of dissolute living, i.e., that he is in fact overindulging, even though he is not. So far from being concerned that Timothy will appear too ascetic, 1 Tim 5:23 could be read as presenting Paul as concerned that because of his stomach ailment, Timothy will *appear* to be suffering the effects of a disordered and immoral life.²²² The concern for the appearance of things and Paul's advice for avoiding any implication of immoral living can be appreciated as being of a piece with the advice in this passage to avoid being associated with the "errors" of others (cf. μηδὲ κοινωνῶναι ἁμαρτίαις ἀλλοτρίαις [5:22]) that are so abundantly obvious (cf. προδῆλοι at 5:24 and 5:25; cf. 2 Tim 3:9) to those who observe the offending party.

The connection between stomach ailments and dissolute living, while not a link immediately drawn by modern readers, is understandable in light of Plutarch's discourse. What is more surprising, however, is the connection drawn by some of the Pastor's contemporaries between stomach ailments and a certain temperament: that of the melancholic. Aretaeus of Cappadocia, a physician writing in the late first century or perhaps the beginning of the second century CE, explained the particular ailments of the

²²² A sick stomach was known to ancient physicians as one of the body parts affected by excessive alcohol. See Gourevitch, "Two Historical Case Histories of Acute Alcoholism in the Roman Empire," 81. The association between sickness and the rhetoric of immorality ("softness" in particular) is evident in Pollux's *Onomasticon* 3.104. Pollux arranged his *Onomasticon* topically rather than lexically, and a brief section on terms for describing the sick individual illustrates the connections between moral weakness, effeminacy, and bodily illness. One could use a number of phrases: he was unwell, he was sick, he was weak, he was made soft, he was ill: Ἐρεῖς δ' ἐπὶ ἀρρώστου ἔκαμεν, ἡρρώστησεν, ἐνόσησεν, ἡσθένησεν, ἐμαλακίσθη, μαλακῶς ἔσχεν· καὶ κάμνων, ἀρρωστήσας, νοσήσας, ἀσθενήσας, μαλακισθεὶς, μαλακῶς ἔχων. τὸν δὲ κάμνοντα Θουκυδίδης [*Hist.* 2.51.6] τὸν πονοῦμενον εἴρηκεν· 'τόν τε θνήσκοντα καὶ τὸν πονοῦμενον ὤκτιζοντο.' τὰ δὲ πράγματα κάματος, ἀρρωστία, νόσος νόσημα, ἀσθένεια, μαλακία.

"stomachic" or "person with stomach ailments" (στομαχικός) with reference to the plight of the melancholic.²²³ Aretaeus begins with a brief description of the stomach: "The stomach is the president of pleasure and disgust, being an important neighbour to the heart for imparting tone, good or bad spirits, from the sympathy of the soul. This is the primary power of the stomach."²²⁴ Immediately obvious is Aretaeus's conviction regarding the sympathetic relationship between ψυχή, the stomach, and what was considered to be the opening to the stomach, the heart.²²⁵ Aretaeus considers the "offspring of pleasure" to be "good digestion, good condition, and good colour of the body" (ἀπότοκοι ἡδονῆς μὲν εὐπεψία, εὐσαρκία, εὐχροία τοῦ σώματος) whereas the "offspring of disgust" (ἀπότοκοι ἀηδίας) are sometimes, in addition to the contraries of pleasure, "depression of spirits, when proper nutrition is wanting; and in melancholic patients, loathing of food" (κοτὲ καὶ ἀθυμία μὴ ἔχων τροφήν, μελαγχολώδεσι δὲ κάποσιτιή). At the end of a long list of symptoms, Aretaeus comments on the effect of bile on the individual:

But if there be bile in bilious persons, they have dimness of sight, and no thirst, even when owing to the food they appear thirsty; are sleepless, torpid, drowsy, not from true sleep, but like those in comatose affections; emaciated, very pale, feeble, relaxed, imbecile, dispirited, timid, inactive, quick to passion, very moody; for such persons

²²³ On the complications of dating Aretaeus, see Steven M. Oberhelman, "On the Chronology and Pneumatism of Aretaios of Cappadocia," *ANRW* 2.37.2:941–59.

²²⁴ Στόμαχος ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀηδίας ἡγεμών· καρδίας καίριον γειτόνευμα ἐς τόνον καὶ θυμόν, ἢ ἀθυμίην, τῆς ψυχῆς ξυμπαθείη· ἥδε στομάχου πρῶτιστα δύναμις (*Sign. diut.* 2.6.1). Trans. Adams. Galen describes the stomach as the first stop for nutriment, from which the stomach produces humors and subsequently nourishes the brain, heart, and liver. See *QAM* 9 = 4.807K. Exposés of erudition regarding the stomach and the basic features of ingestion and digestion are featured as the learned musings of men of letters in their moment of leisure in Aulus Gellius's *Att. noc.* 17.11. Cf. Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 698a–700b (7.1–3), referenced by Aulus Gellius.

²²⁵ On gastropsycho discourses in later early Christian literature, esp. the writings of John Chrysostom and Philoxenus of Mabug, see Chris L. de Wet, "Gluttony and the Preacher's Diet: Regimen, Obesity, and Psycho-Somatic Health in the Homilies of John Chrysostom," in *(Re)Visioning John Chrysostom: New Theories and Approaches*, ed. Chris L. de Wet and Wendy Mayer, Forthcoming.

at times have fallen into a state of melancholy. These mental emotions necessarily attend the affection when in connection with the stomach.²²⁶ (*Sign. diut.* 2.6.4–5)

Areteus describes a situation in which the condition of the soul is very much affected by stomach ailments. He takes it a step further to connect this with melancholy. This is particularly appropriate here because it provides an alternative point of reference for the stigma that could attach to stomach ailments. So far from the glutton whose stomach is wrecked and πνεῦμα becomes impure on account of his heavy eating and drinking, Areteus has in mind the individual whose soul is disordered by his stomach problems.

Areteus seems to posit a reciprocal and reinforcing relationship between the kind of intensive study undertaken by melancholics and the sorts of emotional and bodily ailments they suffer. Areteus takes the chief cause of melancholy to be an abundance of stomach pus, arguing the following:

[Melancholy] is familiar to such persons as from their necessities live on a slender and hard diet (τοῖσι ὑπό τε ἀνάγκης ἐκδεδιγημένοις λεπτῇσι καὶ σκληροτέρῃσι διαίτησι); and to those who, for the sake of education (παιδείῃ), are laborious and persevering; whose portion is the love of divine science, along with scanty food, want of sleep, and the meditation on wise sayings and doings—whose is the contempt of a full and multifarious diet; to whom hunger is for food, water for drink (ὔδωρ ποτόν), and watchfulness in place of rest; to whom in place of a soft couch, is a hammock on the ground without bed-clothes, a mean coverlet, a porous mantle, and the only cover to whose head is the common air; whose wealth consists in the abundant possession and use of divine thought (for all these things they account good from love of learning) (τάδε γὰρ αὐτέοισι ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται ἔρωτι παιδείης); and, if they take any food, it is of the most frugal description, and not to gratify the palate, but solely to preserve life; no quaffing of wine to intoxication (οὐκ ἐπ' οἴνῳ θώρηξις); no recreation; no roving or jaunting about; no bodily exercise nor plumpness of flesh (οὐ σωματῶν ἀσκήσεις, οὐδὲ σαρκῶν περιβολή), for what is there from which the love of learning

²²⁶ ἐπὴν δὲ καὶ χολὴ ᾗ, πικρόχολοι, σκοτώδεις· ἄδιψοι, κῆν ἐπ' ἐδέσμασι διψῆν δοκέωσι. ἄγρυπνοι, νωθροί, νυσταλέοι, οὐχ ὕπνῳ ἀτρεκέϊ, κωματώδεσι ὁμοιοπαθέες, ἰσχυροί, ἔξωχοι, ἀσθενέες, ἔκλυτοι, λειποδρανέες, ἄψυχοι, δειλοί, ἡσύχοι, ἐξαπίνης δ' ὀργίλοι· κάρτα μελαγχολώδεις, καὶ γὰρ ἐξώκειλάν κοτε ἐς μελαγχολίην οἱ τοιοῖδε. τάδε μέντοι τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦ στομάχου ἐνδιδόντος, εἶναι δεῖ τὴν πάθην· Trans. Adam.

(παιδείης ἔρωσ) will not allure one?—from country, parents, brothers, oneself, even unto death.²²⁷ (*Sign. diut.* 2.6.6–8)

He goes on, but this should suffice to convey the kind of results such melancholy-induced stomach problems Aretaeus has in mind.²²⁸ This passage from Aretaeus provides another example of the sort of individual that the Pastor might not want to be associated with Timothy and his stomach ailments. In fact, this kind of individual, who makes himself sick from intensive study and verbal disputation and who yearns to be recognized for intellectual achievement, is recognizable in other parts of 1 Timothy (1:6–7, 6:3–4) and 2 Timothy (2:23–25). This melancholic state is presented by Aretaeus as the result of excesses and imbalances. Their diet is too harsh, their mode of dress and sleep are not conducive to health, they do not exercise, and they drink only water. Aretaeus presents this extreme pursuit of learning as a pathological condition, the overzealous pursuit of an otherwise good thing. As a remedy, Aretaeus suggests "passive exercise, promenades, exercise, vocal training, and foods for easy digestion" (αἰώρη, περίπατοι, γυμνάσια, φωνασκίη, τροφαὶ ἐς πέψιν.²²⁹ In light of such a portrayal, 1 Tim 5:23 may be read as an attempt to keep Timothy from being associated with any number of extremes associated with stomach ailments, whether the dissolute or the hyper-ascetic or the melancholic.

²²⁷ Trans. Adams. ξύνηθες δὲ καὶ τοῖσι ὑπὸ τε ἀνάγκης ἐκδεδιγημένοις λεπτήσιν καὶ σκληροτέρῃσι διαίτησι, ἀτὰρ καὶ τοῖσι ἐς παιδείην πονεῦσι καὶ ἐς τήνδε τλήμοσι, οἷσι θείης μὲν μαθήσιος ποθή, ὀλιγοσιτίῃ δὲ καὶ ἀγρυπνίῃ, καὶ μελεδώνῃ λόγων τε καὶ πρηγμάτων σοφῶν. (7) οἷσι ὑπεροψίῃ μὲν διαίτης ἀδρῆς καὶ ποικίλης, λιμὸς δὲ ἢ τροφή, καὶ ὕδωρ ποτόν, καὶ ἐν ὕπνῳ ἀϋπνίῃ· οἷσι μαλθακῇ μὲν εὐνῇ ἄστρωτος χαμαί, ἀμφίβλημα δὲ εὐτελές, ἀμπεχόνῃ ἀραιή, τὸ δὲ τοῦδε κράνος ὁ κοινὸς ἡῆρ, πλοῦτος δὲ ἐννοίης θείης περιουσίης τε χρήσις. τάδε γὰρ αὐτέοισι ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται ἔρωτι παιδείης. καὶ εἰ προσαίρονται, εὐτελὲς μὲν σιτίον, οὐδὲ ἐς κόρον ἐδωδῆς, ἀλλ' ἐς ζωὴν μοῦνον· οὐκ ἐπ' οἴνῳ θώρηξις, οὐ θυμηδίῃ· οὐ ῥέμβος καὶ περίοδοι, οὐ σωματῶν ἄσκησις, οὐδὲ σαρκῶν περιβολή. τίνος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀπάγοι παιδείης ἔρωσ; (8) πατρίδος, τοκῆων, κασιγνήτων, ἐωυτῶν μέσφι θανάτου.

²²⁸ As a remedy, Aretaeus suggests "passive exercise, promenades, exercise, vocal training, and foods for easy digestion" (αἰώρη, περίπατοι, γυμνάσια, φωνασκίη, τροφαὶ ἐς πέψιν [*Cur. diut.* 2.6.1]).

²²⁹ *Cur. diut.* 2.6.1.

7. Pastorals vs. Homologoumena in the Depiction of Paul

Before we conclude this chapter and continue in chapter six to the Pastor's depictions of the opponents as afflicted with the psychosomatic disease of deviance, we should pause to consider the contrasting depictions of Paul, especially with regard to health and sickness, that the last two chapters have brought into relief. Part of the historical-epistolary Paul's argumentative genius was to invert the social expectations normally associated with a despised, rejected, and crucified individual.²³⁰ Though he once persecuted the nascent ἐκκλησία, perhaps because of its seemingly backward exaltation of a crucified criminal, Paul's letters evidence a dramatic transformation of Paul, resulting in his self-representation as the ambassador of the crucified Messiah.²³¹ Paul adopted and amplified one of the key elements of early Jesus followers' faith, the notion that God had exalted one who had been crushed by the political and religious forces of his time. In 1 Corinthians, Paul casts this "message of the cross" (ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ [1 Cor 1:18]) of "Christ crucified" (Χριστὸς ἐσταυρωμένος) as contrary to both gentile and Jewish cultural sensibilities—"to the Jews, a stumbling block, to the gentiles, madness" (Ἰουδαίοις μὲν σκάνδαλον, ἔθνεσιν δὲ μωρία [1 Cor 1:23]).²³²

Throughout his letters, Paul seeks to construct a critical connection between Christ's suffering and his own. Paul leveraged his own disability and suffering as a part of various

²³⁰ Arthur J. Dewey and Anna C. Miller, "Paul," in *The Bible and Disability: A Commentary*, ed. Sarah J. Melcher, Mikeal C. Parsons, and Amos Yong, Studies in Religion, Theology, and Disability (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2017), 381–82.

²³¹ For example, as ἀπόστολος (e.g., Rom 1:1, 1 Cor 9:1–2), as epiphanic medium for the revealed Christ (Gal 1:15–17), and as μιμήτης (1 Cor 4:6, 11:1). On Pauline self-portraiture and epiphanic logic, see Margaret M. Mitchell, "Epiphanic Evolutions in Earliest Christianity," *Illinois Classical Studies* 29 (2004): 183–204.

²³² For μωρία as "stupidity, madness," see BrillDAG, 1375.

rhetorical appeals he made to his addressees (e.g., 2 Cor 6:3–10, 11:23–33). His physical weakness or sickness in particular is depicted as providing the opportunity for sharing the gospel: "You know that because of a weakness of the flesh I proclaimed the gospel to you" (οἴδατε δὲ ὅτι δι' ἀσθενείαν τῆς σαρκὸς εὐηγγελισάμην ὑμῖν; Gal 4:13). Furthermore, his own bodily suffering provides evidence for his authority: "Finally let nobody give me any trouble; for I bear the marks of Christ in my body" (Gal 6:17). Elsewhere, it is the argumentative fulcrum of his self-defense: even though "the presence of his body is weak" (ἡ δὲ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενής [2 Cor 10:10]), Paul turns the tables on his opponents: "If it's necessary to boast, I shall boast of my weaknesses" (Εἰ καυχᾶσθαι δεῖ, τὰ τῆς ἀσθενείας μου καυχήσομαι [2 Cor 11:30]). Yet elsewhere, Paul makes participation in Christ's sufferings the prerequisite for participation in Christ's glory (Rom 8:17).

In the Pastorals, Paul's theology of the cross, which was at the core of Paul's own appeals to his disabled, weakened, despised, and abused body as evidence of his participation in Christ, is muted. The lack of any reference to the cross of Christ or to Christ as crucified in the PE is a striking difference between the Pastorals and the homologoumena.²³³ Jesus is never, as in Paul's letters, depicted as "the crucified one" (ὁ ἐσταυρωμένος).²³⁴ Furthermore, what served as a key piece of evidence in several Pauline arguments—Paul's own experience of physical inadequacy, ailment, and suffering due to

²³³ Johnson, AB, 70 is only partly correct to point out the absence of σταυρός or σταυροῦν in Romans, since συνεσταυρώθη occurs in Rom 6:6.

²³⁴ 1 Cor 2:2. Jennifer Glancy shrewdly suggests that the emasculation implied by crucifixion in particular may be the cause of this omission: "For the Pastor, the crux of the scandal could have been Jesus' death in a manner unbefitting a man. . . . Jesus' vulnerability to corporal abuse stigmatized him as less than a man, since he was unable to sustain an honorably masculine self-presentation" (Glancy, "Protocols of Masculinity," 262).

illness—is conspicuously absent in the Pastorals' depiction of Paul.²³⁵ Paul is never characterized as weak or ill in the Pastorals. On the rare occasion when Paul is made to mention sufferings (παθήματα), they are external examples of his hearty endurance (2 Tim 3:11–12) and confirmation of his unique identity as "herald and apostle and teacher" (κἡρυξ καὶ ἀπόστολος καὶ διδάσκαλος [2 Tim 1:11; cf. πάσχω at 2 Tim 1:12]). They are aligned with persecutions at the hands of outsiders, not his own disabilities. In this regard, they are reminiscent of the historical-epistolary Paul's *peristasis* catalogue (2 Cor 11:23–30), which notably define Paul's ἀσθένεια in terms of external onslaughts, not sickness or bodily weakness. The Pastor presents Paul as a healthy purveyor of the healthy teaching, an idea that takes on particular force when the PE are compared with the homologoumena. In the Pastorals, Paul is able-bodied and illness-free. And yet, it is not only that Paul is associated with the healthy teaching and that he himself is healthy: he is also characterized as the kind of figure who can guide others to health, whether doctrinal, behavioral, physical, or all three, which seems to be the goal of the Pastorals. The historical-epistolary Paul forged a seamless connection between his experience of suffering and Christ's, even going so far as to say that he was "always carrying about the νέκρωσις of Jesus in the body" (2 Cor 4:10). The Pastor, by contrast, depicts Paul as a man in charge and in control, actively combatting the necrotic spread of gangrene through the body of Christ as a result of his opponents' dangerous speech (2 Tim 2:17).

²³⁵ In their discussion "of the Pauline corpus and disability," Dewey and Miller suggest that "the remarkable insights included in Paul's letters were, to a great extent, frustrated, deflected, and even erased by the later letters" (Dewey and Miller, "Paul," 379). They also point out that Paul's own letters preserve tensions between a theology of weakness and his idealization of the perfected, resurrected body (399–400). We should note, however, that this process is neither uniform nor complete: see Col 1:24–29.

While his more youthful companions grow ill,²³⁶ Paul's vitality is expressed through his confidence and his commanding tone. While the mentions of Trophimus, left behind to convalesce in Miletus (2 Tim 4:20) and Timothy, sick in Ephesus (1 Tim 5:23), do not read as indictments of them per se, they do constitute an implied contrast.²³⁷ The aged Paul is still robust, and hard at work, even from prison in 2 Timothy: "how ceaselessly I make mention of you in my chains, night and day!" (ὡς ἀδιάλειπτον ἔχω τὴν περὶ σοῦ μνείαν ἐν ταῖς δεήσεσίν μου νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας [2 Tim 1:3]). Timothy's ailments and infirmities, unlike Paul's in the homologoumena, are not presented as marks of identification with Christ; rather, they are the object of diagnosis and therapy.²³⁸ The symptomless Paul seeks to render Timothy like himself. Vivified by the healthy teaching, he is a man on the move, with plans to speed on to the next mission site or to the next challenge (1 Tim 3:14; Titus 1:5). Even in his old age, ostensibly at death's door in 2 Timothy, he remains in control of his body, choosing when to release himself to death. He holds forth in confident strains about his present and future conditions (2 Tim 4:6–8). In what seems to be a rewriting of Philippians 2:17, the Pastor removes any of the uncertainty regarding death evidenced there. In 2 Tim 4:6, Paul proclaims with certitude that now is the time: "The time of my departure has drawn nigh" (ὁ καιρὸς τῆς ἀναλύσεώς μου ἐφύεστηκεν).

Just as the sufferings of Christ have been replaced with a focus on his immortality and glorification (2 Tim 1:10), so too have Paul's ailments been supplanted by his glory. As

²³⁶ Trophimus grew ill and was left behind in Miletus (2 Tim 4:20); Timothy too is frequently sick (1 Tim 5:23).

²³⁷ The Pastor, as a reader of Philippians, would have known that sometimes Paul's associates got sick (Phil 2:25–27).

²³⁸ They do not, therefore, appear to be styled as Timothy's thorn in the flesh, a messenger of Satan à la 2 Cor 12:7, pace Spicq, *Ébib*, 549; idem, "1 Timothée 5:23," 150.

the Paul of 2 Timothy says, "What's left for me is the crown of glory" (λοιπὸν ἀπόκειται μοι ὁ τῆς δικαιοσύνης στέφανος [2 Tim 4:8]). This observation stands as a less-frequently appreciated aspect of the Pastorals' argumentative project, which, as noted above, Raymond F. Collins has aptly dubbed "expressions of an emerging Pauline hagiography."²³⁹ In this chapter we have seen that, for the Pastor, "Paul" was a figure to rival not only "Paul's" inscribed opponents, but any other claimant to the status and authority that accrued to the individual who could expertly guide Timothy and the church in matters as diverse as diet and regimen, the remedy of frequent ailments, or the diagnosis of error.

IV. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that 1 Tim 4:6–16 and 1 Tim 5:17–25 should be understood as part of the Pastor's larger project of presenting a certain idealized portrait of Paul. This project included cultivating a set of "healthy" practices that would ensure progress in *εὐσέβεια* (1 Tim 4:6–16) as well as negotiating the sickness of sin and the appearance thereof (1 Tim 5:17–25). In section one, I showed that the characterizations of Paul and Timothy align well, not only with conventional displays of virtue and self-mastery, but also with the kinds of qualities expected of and associated with healthcare professionals in particular. In section two, I demonstrated that the Pastor uses the training motif and its constitutive components as a way to assert certain behavioral and pastoral ideals. I offered a

²³⁹ "Image of Paul," 173. Collins concludes his valuable survey of Paul as apostle, ecclesial authority, and "model Christian" as follows: "The most important [difference from the Pauline homologoumena] consists of the fact that the image of Paul in the Pastorals is characterized by what we have chosen to call Pauline reductionism. He is *the* apostle, *the* norm for Church doctrine and practice, *the* model for Christians to emulate" (173).

reading of 1 Tim 4:6–16 participated in the discourses of contemporary moral-dietary advice-givers that forged a direct link between how one eats, drinks, and exercises (thus 4:8) and how one behaves. I showed that the Pastor's training advice may be interpreted not only in terms of its content, namely, what values it attaches to the forms and kinds of training Timothy was to engage in, but also in terms of its function, namely, what it signals about the kind of figure Paul is. Paul appears as the sole arbiter of apostolic wisdom regarding community leadership and keeping oneself fighting fit in the faith. The Pastor thus carves out a depiction of Paul as an individual who rivals any of the would-be experts on faithful or healthy living, which are thought of as intimately intertwined.

This vision of Paul also includes advice for dealing with elders, those who are faithfully fulfilling their role and those who are not. The interpretive problem arising from 1 Tim 5:23 that I addressed is that Paul seems to be giving medical advice right in the midst of a warning about the danger of being defiled by others, being guilty by association, and then, following in 5:24–25, a warning about the self-evident nature of sins, though some "precede" (προάγειν) and some "follow" (ἐπακολουθεῖν). The exegetical challenge was to understand how it is possible to see these as part of a coherent piece of advice. Thus, I argued that this passage is a unified series of admonitions to Timothy on the treatment of sin and its various real manifestations (i.e., regarding elders) and the appearance of excess (i.e., Timothy), and how the would-be church leader like Timothy should deal with them all. I also argued that what has been obscured by the scholarly focus on whether or not Timothy's ailments are the result of over-zealous ascetic practices is the possibility that the Pastor is here constructing a depiction of Timothy as sick for the purposes of establishing

the authority or stature of Paul as remediator *par excellence*, the one who knows how to heal and tend to all the needs of Timothy and the church, whether physically, pastorally, or theologically. At the same time, "Paul" is also training Timothy, coaching him, and giving him diagnostic pointers. I argued that we find in this passage a combination of the moral and the medical that effectively supplements the complementary depiction of Paul as trainer, spiritual and otherwise, that we get from 1 Tim 4:7–8. There is an attempt by the Pastor to craft an image of Paul as the wise purveyor of protreptic, prophylactic, and remedial advice. The discussion regarding the errors of the elders suggests that a similar logic is at work in the discussion of both the elders' sins and Timothy's ailments—they both can be construed as constituting a threat of moral stain to the pure status that Timothy is supposed to cultivate for the sake of the church (1 Tim 5:1, 22).

The decision to depict Timothy as suffering chronic stomach problems should be understood as part of the Pastor's larger strategy of establishing Paul as an authority who has the capacity to remedy, to make well, to heal illness. Just as Paul is depicted as the one who has the theological know-how to address the theological "health problems" that the opponents (and errant elders) potentially introduce into the community, so too he has the appropriate medical and pastoral know-how to remedy Timothy's own ailments. When one considers the stigmatic significance of stomach ailments in the ancient world, the Pastor's concern to help Timothy avoid being unhealthy or appearing to be so is completely comprehensible. Those who *look* sick were at times suspected of moral failing of one kind or another, as illustrated above. Timothy is depicted as someone who is frequently ill, and his "stomach" is characterized as the primary culprit, though even further health issues may

be in view. For the Pastor, the possibility that Timothy (i.e., the type of Christian exemplar he represents) would appear to be morally compromised is to be avoided. Within the epistolary fiction of the PE, Timothy's character should be "advancing" in εὐσέβεια, not appearing to be marked by the kind of ailments that could indicate dissolute living, relentless research, or combative inquiry, all of which are polemicized against in other parts of the PE as well.²⁴⁰

For those who accept these texts as pseudepigrapha, the real import of this alleged digression (5:23), as well as 1 Tim 4:6–16, is the resulting image, not only of Timothy—who has received the majority of scholarly attention and speculation—but also of Paul. Scholars' preoccupation with what exactly Timothy's training entailed or precisely what ailments Timothy might have had seems less relevant to the task of interpreting these texts as literary fictions per se. What matters is the resulting images of Paul and Timothy produced by these verses.²⁴¹ In other words, Paul gives particular training advice because of the cultural significance it entails. Similarly, Timothy is depicted as being ill for literary and theological reasons, not because the recipient of these letters was Timothy the ailing envoy of Paul. This point, while simple, is worth reiterating precisely because it matters for how we assess the resulting depiction of Paul. By contrast with the bodily ailments of the historical-epistolary Paul, the Paul of the Pastorals is presented as symptomless, unencumbered by illness and able to attend the sickness of others. In addition to the task of depicting Paul as healer or physician, which were ambiguous and multifarious roles in

²⁴⁰ On combative inquiry and relentless research, see 1 Tim 1:4, 6:3–5; 2 Tim 2:24, 3:7; Titus 1:14, 3:9.

²⁴¹ This point is made regarding Timothy by Roloff, EKKNT, 316.

Greek and Roman culture,²⁴² I suggest that the Pastor sought to harness for his beloved apostle the valuable cultural capital associated with the right to give health advice (in all its forms), sought in the ancient world by a variety of healing practitioners, whether trainers, philosophers, or physicians. While the Pastor's most immediate competition was, it would seem from the PE, the kind of people represented by the opponents (as opaque as that designation remains), the Pastor sought to capitalize on the cache of prestige and authority associated with physicians and philosophers by depicting Paul as one of them. He thereby bolstered the image of Paul as the one with the authority to guide the church to a place of health and flourishing. Paul, for the Pastor, is both a diagnostician and a healer.

²⁴² The ambiguous status of healing practitioners in the popular imagination is reflected, for instance, in Pliny's *Nat. hist.* 19.5.11. On the manifold nature of health care providers in the early Roman empire, see Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 254–79. Philo provides a glimpse into one ancient perspective on the diversity of the medical marketplace (*Fug.* 4.27).

Chapter 6. Intellectualizing Deviance: The Corrupted νοῦς as Psychosomatic Disease

I. Introduction

Introduction: Argument Overview

In the following two chapters I argue that the Pastor characterizes the νοῦς and the συνείδησις as the internal, cognitive organs of the human person and that he uses these—especially the νοῦς and συνείδησις of the opponents—as conceptual sites of critique within his polemical program. These internal components form a complement to those external aspects of the body, whether belonging to opponents (chapter 3), the church as the body of Christ (chapter 4), or Timothy's body (chapter 5). I argue that the Pastor's language about these organs presents them as constitutionally and materially affected by the beliefs and behaviors of the opponents (and vice versa). In this chapter, I demonstrate that the Pastor pathologizes the νοῦς and the συνείδησις in a manner similar to classical, Hellenistic, and imperial-era medical writers and philosophers whose own medical analogies presuppose certain physicalist attributes of the human mind and person. The Pastor's depiction of the interior space of the human person, viewed in concert with contemporary and near-contemporary understandings of mind and conscience, suggests that he sought to characterize these elements of the soul in a fashion that would have been intelligible to his contemporaries—i.e., in terms of their materiality, rationality, and locality.

I argue that his depiction of the corrupted and defiled state of the mind and the defiled and cauterized state of the conscience indicate an understanding of the human

interior as a site to expound a polemically inflected diagnosis of perceived theological aberration. I also demonstrate that the Pastor's use of psychological terms is an iteration of his tendency to characterize his opponents in recognizably Pauline language. That is to say, even as the Pastor uses the language of mind and conscience in such a way that demonstrates his participation in the contemporary intellectual milieu, he also writes as "Paul." By expressing his polemic against his opponents using key Pauline turns of phrase, the Pastor creates an interpretive interface between Paul's letters and his own, a further sounding board for the echo chamber of the *Corpus Paulinum*. This allowed for the Pastorals to be "successful" pseudepigrapha (insofar as they passed as genuine Pauline letters and were historically hugely influential on their interpretation). This intertextual strategy also permitted the Pastor to repurpose the apostolic voice of Paul in deploying the concepts of mind and conscience for polemical purposes.

Lastly, in this chapter I offer a corrective to modern scholarship that tends to assume that these cognitive organs are not affected corporeally or that the Pastor's language is purely figurative. Without explicit attention to ancient conceptions of the materiality of mind, its thinking processes, and the effect of the body on the mind and vice-versa, readers of the Pastorals miss out on the significance and force of a fascinating claim on the Pastor's part—that the opponents are sick because of their activities and teaching, that good adherents of the Pauline message should avoid their teaching lest they become ill, and the implication that Paul alone is the true guarantor of the teaching that makes one healthy. Toward this end, I demonstrate that the Pastor's depictions of mind and conscience owe more to the philosophies and physiologies of his contemporaries than has been adequately

appreciated, and that the Pastor has rhetorically reified these interior elements of the human person as sites for his theological and polemical ruminations. I contend that the Pastor's arguments about mind and conscience suggest a reciprocal relationship between body and soul, and that his depiction of the unseen organs of the soul (νοῦς, συνείδησις, καρδία) carries with it at times an implied external and visible manifestation. This principle of psychosomatic reciprocity suggests that the Pastor's description of the diseased and disordered state of the opponents' interior faculties is meant as a complement to the visible and sordid effects of their diseased teaching on the church body discussed in chapter four.

II. νοῦς in Paul's Letters and the Pastorals

1 Timothy 6:3–5, 2 Timothy 3:8–9, and Titus 1:15

6:3 If anyone teaches otherwise and does not adhere to the healthy words of our Lord Jesus Christ and to the teaching that accords with piety, 4 he is deluded, knowing nothing, but rather is sick on account of¹ inquiries and wordy warfare, from which arise envy, strife, blasphemies, wicked suppositions, 5 frictional wranglings² of people thoroughly corrupted in their minds (διεφθαρμένοι ἄνθρωποι τὸν νοῦν) and bereft of the truth, even thinking that piety is a means of gain! (1 Tim 6:3–5)³

3:8 In the same manner that Jannes and Jambres opposed Moses, so also these people are opposed to the truth, people utterly corrupted in the mind (ἄνθρωποι κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν), unapproved with regard to the faith. 9 But they will not

¹ For this meaning of περί + gen., see LSJ A.II.2, "with words which denote care or anxiety, *about, on account of*" (emphasis original).

² For this translation, which emphasizes John Chrysostom's idea of διαπαρατριβαί as the sores acquired by sheep that rub up against one another, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Medical Imagery and the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie*, ed. W. Eugene March and Stuart Dickson Currie (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1980), 23 n. 9. The text referred to is *Hom. 1 Tim.* 17 (PG 62:592); Malherbe's reference (62:392) contains a typo.

³ 6:3 εἴ τις ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖ καὶ μὴ προσέρχεται ὑγιαίνουσιν λόγοις τοῖς τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῇ κατ' εὐσέβειαν διδασκαλίᾳ, 4 τετύφωται, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, ἀλλὰ νοσῶν περὶ ζητήσεις καὶ λογομαχίας, ἐξ ὧν γίνεται φθόνος ἔρις βλασφημίας, ὑπόνοιαι πονηραί, 5 διαπαρατριβαί διεφθαρμένων ἀνθρώπων τὸν νοῦν καὶ ἀπεστερημένων τῆς ἀληθείας, νομιζόντων πορισμὸν εἶναι τὴν εὐσέβειαν (1 Tim 6:3–5).

advance much farther. For their *ἄνοια* will be abundantly clear to all, as was also that of those men. (2 Tim 3:8–9)

All things are pure to the pure. But to those who are defiled and without faith, nothing is pure; on the contrary both their *νοῦς* and their *συνείδησις* are defiled.⁴ (Titus 1:15)⁵

A. *Νοῦς* in the Pastorals in Literary and Intertextual Context

In both of the above passages we find a description of the Pastor's opponents as "corrupted in the mind" (*κατ-/διεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν*) or "defiled" in the mind and conscience. The Pastor has a persistent fixation on the mental states of his opponents and specifically intellectual forms of error.⁶ The term *νοῦς* and its cognates (*ἄνοια*, *ἀνόητος*, *μετάνοια*, *νοεῖν*, *νουθεσία*, *προνοεῖν*, *ὑπόνοια*) occur with some regularity in the PE.⁷ Significantly, in all three of the Pastorals, the three instances of *νοῦς* (1 Tim 6:5, 2 Tim 3:8, Titus 1:15) occur in sections where the Pastor casts aspersions on his opponents' character.⁸

In 1 Timothy 6:5, the Pastor speaks of "the frictional wranglings of men who are thoroughly corrupted in the *νοῦς* and bereft of the truth" (*διαπαρατριβαὶ διεφθαρμένων ἀνθρώπων τὸν νοῦν καὶ ἀπεστερημένων τῆς ἀληθείας*). For the Pastor, these individuals put their mental derangement on full display through their vociferous and contentious debates, here

⁴ 3:8 ὃν τρόπον δὲ Ἰάννης καὶ Ἰαμβρῆς ἀντέστησαν Μωϋσεῖ, οὕτως καὶ οὗτοι ἀνθίστανται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἄνθρωποι κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν, ἀδόκιμοι περὶ τὴν πίστιν. 9 ἀλλ' οὐ προκόψουσιν ἐπὶ πλεῖον· ἡ γὰρ ἄνοια αὐτῶν ἔκδηλος ἔσται πᾶσιν, ὥς καὶ ἡ ἐκείνων ἐγένετο (2 Tim 3:8–9).

⁵ 1:15 πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς· τοῖς δὲ μεμιαμένοις καὶ ἀπίστοις οὐδὲν καθαρὸν, ἀλλὰ μεμιάνται αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνείδησις.

⁶ Cf. Michael Theobald, "Glauben statt Grübeln: Zum Anti-Intellektualismus der Pastoralbriefe," *EC* 5.1 (2014): 5–34.

⁷ *ἄνοια* (2 Tim 3:9); *ἀνόητος* (1 Tim 6:9; Titus 3:3); *νοεῖν* (1 Tim 1:7; 2 Tim 2:7); *νοῦς* (1 Tim 6:5; 2 Tim 3:8; Titus 1:15); *μετάνοια* (2 Tim 2:25); *νουθεσία* (Titus 3:10); *προνοεῖν* (1 Tim 5:8); *ὑπόνοια* (1 Tim 6:4).

⁸ Oberlinner, HThKNT, 1.276 notes that the term *νοῦς* is always used in "connection with the theme of false teaching" (im Zusammenhang der Irrlehrerthematik), and always in a negative sense. He connects this to the fact that "gnostische Missionare" would have advocated an understanding of *νοῦς* as "göttlichen Lichtfunken." This judgment depends, of course, upon the determination that gnostic teaching is the primary concern for the PE.

explicitly characterized as "teaching otherwise" (ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖν) and set in contrast to the "healthy words" (1 Tim 6:3). The Pastor's emphasis on this mental corruption and its symptoms, including delusion (cf. τετύφωται at 1 Tim 6:4)), and ignorance (μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος [1 Tim 6:4]), as a display of public pugilism is intelligible as a continuation of the preceding argument, which showcased the Pastor's preoccupation with the public appearances of elders and Timothy (5:17–25), as well as believing slaves and their "faithful masters" (πιστοὶ δεσπότες).⁹

In 2 Tim 3:8 the Pastor describes his opponents as "people who are utterly corrupted in the νοῦς, disqualified with regard to the faith" (ἄνθρωποι κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν, ἀδόκιμοι περὶ τὴν πίστιν).¹⁰ These individuals are similarly cast as having an adverse relationship to the truth, exemplified by likening them to the Egyptian magicians who opposed Moses (2 Tim 3:8). Their corruption of the mind, characterized here as ἄνοια, is imagined by the Pastor to be so abundantly clear (ἐκδηλος) that "all" (πάντες) will be able to see it (2 Tim 3:9). This passage punctuates the preceding verses (2 Tim 3:1–7), in which the Pastor's end-times vision of vice and profligacy (2 Tim 3:1–5) is gradually revealed to be a present-day warning against these errant individuals and their unwitting and witless victims (3:6–7).

In Titus 1:15, the Pastor writes: "All things are pure to the pure. But to those who are defiled and without faith, nothing is pure; on the contrary both their νοῦς and their συνείδησις are defiled" (πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς· τοῖς δὲ μεμιαμμένοις καὶ ἀπίστοις οὐδὲν

⁹ Note the (from a modern perspective sadly ironic) concern to protect "the name of God and the teaching" (τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία) from disrepute (cf. βλασφημεῖσθαι) at 1 Tim 6:1 at the expense of human freedom and dignity.

¹⁰ Though I discern no semantic differences between the prepositional prefixes (δια- vs. κατα- φθείρειν, "thoroughly" vs. "utterly"), my translation attempts to represent the distinct forms.

καθαρόν, ἀλλὰ μεμίανται αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνείδησις). These terms (νοῦς and the συνείδησις), in conjunction with καρδία, intimate the summation (at least in terms of the Pastor's psychological anthropology) of an individual's intellectual and moral reasoning abilities.¹¹ Those to whom these corrupted or defiled intellectual organs belong are themselves "defiled and without faith." In the letters to Timothy we find similar turns of phrase, but with the notion of "corruption" instead of "defilement."¹² This phrase comes in the midst of a polemic against Jewish Cretans (Titus 1:10–16) whom the Pastor characterizes as "overturning whole households" (ὅλους οἴκους ἀνατρέπειν) perpetuating "Jewish" μῦθοι (Titus 1:14) that have a deluding, sickening effect, such that Titus is told to "rebuke them sharply, in order that they may be healthy in the faith" (ἐλέγχε αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως, ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει [Titus 1:13]).

These passages suggest that the Pastor seeks to vividly bring to mind an extreme distortion of the cognitive organs of the opponents. But what exactly does that entail? How should we understand this repeated theme in the Pastorals? Like λόγος, νοῦς is a term admitting multiple meanings.¹³ BDAG sets out three main categories: 1) the faculty of

¹¹ Cf. the discussion of these terms in conjunction also with καρδία in Hermann von Lips, *Glaube—Gemeinde—Amt: zum Verständnis der Ordination in den Pastoralbriefen*, FRLANT 122 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 53–72; Philip H. Towner, *The Goal of Our Instruction: The Structure of Theology and Ethics in the Pastoral Epistles*, JSNTSup 34 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 154–159.

¹² Pace Saarinen (BTCB, 176) who, by analogy with the discourse on νοῦς in 1 Tim 6:4 and 2 Tim 3:8, glosses μεμίανται in Titus 1:15 as "corrupted." He appeals to Howard Clark Kee's translation of T. Iss. 4.4 (cf. μίανη τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῦ) as justification ("Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs (Second Century B.C.): A New Translation and Introduction," in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, ed. James H. Charlesworth [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983], 1.775–828). However, there is no compelling reason offered by Kee or Saarinen to depart from the established lexicographical consensus.

¹³ LSJ categorizes the term under three headings: (I) "mind, as employed in perceiving and thinking," (II) "act of mind, thought," and (III) "sense, meaning of a word." According to A. Sand in *EDNT*, "νοῦς can indicate the understanding of a matter, the individual capacity to judge, and human views and convictions" (A. Sand, "νοῦς," *EDNT* 2:478–79). He goes on: "The meaning is not univocal. Νοῦς can indicate the

intellectual perception, 2) a way of thinking, and 3) the result of thinking.¹⁴ BDAG mentions the relevant passages from the PE under the second heading. Louw & Nida divide the semantic options into two categories: 1) "the psychological faculty of understanding, reasoning, thinking, and deciding — 'mind'" and 2) "a particular manner or way of thinking — 'way of thinking, disposition, manner of thought, attitude.'"¹⁵ Thus, one common interpretation is that the Pastor is suggesting that the opponents' *understanding* or thought itself is corrupted, thereby interpreting νοῦς not so much as a component of the soul, but as the particular thoughts produced by intellection or perhaps the constellation of beliefs and opinions that we might call a "mind-set."¹⁶

Several echoes of Paul in the Pastoral's language of νοῦς necessitate a consideration of the nature of the Pastor's νοῦς with regard to that of Paul. The key notion of the corruption (δια- or καταφθείρειν) of the νοῦς calls to mind, for instance, the corruption of the thoughts (cf. φθαρῇ τὰ νοήματα) present in 2 Cor 11:3.¹⁷ Furthermore, in Titus 1:15, we see the Pastor

understanding of a matter, the individual *capacity to judge*, and human *views* and *convictions*" (478, italics original). Behm thought that it could refer to "mind" or "disposition," thereby conveying moral attitude and that it may denote "insight" or "inventiveness," "understanding" or "thinking ability" or "capacity of intellectual perception." According to him, it may also suggest the result of mental activity, at times with the participation of the will, and be rendered "thought," "opinion," "judgment," "resolve," or "purpose." When applied to words or statements, it conveys the idea of "meaning" or "significance." These and the following senses may be found in Johannes Behm, "νοῦς," *TDNT* 4:952–53.

¹⁴ Louw & Nida suggest two primary ways of interpreting the term: as "the psychological faculty of understanding, reasoning, thinking, and deciding" (26.14) and as "a particular manner or way of thinking" (30.5). However, the texts from which they derive those definitions do not include the Pastorals, and so it is not clear under which heading they would place those passages.

¹⁵ Louw, & Nida, 324–25; 350. They do not list the instances from the Pastorals, making it impossible to know in which category they would put them.

¹⁶ Knight, *NIGTC*, 252, follows BAGD and calls νοῦς in 1 Tim 6:5 "'attitude, way of thinking' as the sum total of the whole mental and moral state of being." While the Pastor would agree that the thoughts and beliefs of the opponents are altogether wrong-headed, his claim is more targeted, relating to the particular part of the soul in charge of higher order intellection.

¹⁷ Furthermore, the phrase πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς (Titus 1:15), which occurs in the context of a reference to νοῦς and συνείδησις, brings to mind πάντα μὲν καθαρὰ of Rom 14:20.

invoke the language of Romans 14:20 (πάντα μὲν καθαρὰ) when he writes: "All things are pure to the pure" (πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς). How exactly the author of the Pastorals interacts with Paul's anthropological categories more generally and on the matter of νοῦς in particular is a question bedeviled by the fact that while Paul speaks often of ψυχή, πνεῦμα, σὰρξ, and σῶμα as explicit anthropological categories, the Pastor does not.¹⁸ In chapter four above I sought to explain the relative absence of σῶμα as an instance in which the Pastor presumes Pauline categories, most prominently in the case of the somatic metaphor of the "body of Christ." This is merited, I argued, by the prominent use of language and images that presuppose a body of Christ. What I seek to demonstrate in this chapter is how the Pastor uses νοῦς, its corruption, its defilement, and its implied disqualification, and how the Pastor draws upon, presumes, and redirects Paul's discourse of the νοῦς. I demonstrated in chapters one and two that the Pastor integrated as chief ingredients portions of the Corinthian Correspondence and Romans into the Pastorals. It follows that the Pastor was exposed to Paul's early reflections on the νοῦς and its relationship to the body, both individual and ecclesial. It makes sense, therefore, to ask: what would the Pastor have discovered regarding the nature and activity of the νοῦς in his reading of Paul's letters?

¹⁸ The term σὰρξ is used once regarding the incarnation at 1 Tim 3:16. The term πνεῦμα occurs more often, but refers not to the human person (with the exception of 2 Tim 4:22: Ὁ κύριος μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματός σου), but to the Holy Spirit (with the adjective ἅγιον at 2 Tim 1:14; Tit 3:5, and without at 1 Tim 4:1), perhaps a demonic spirit (2 Tim 1:7), and one of ambiguous usage (ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι [1 Tim 3:16]). On this last passage, Marshall argues that "the contrast with 'flesh' strongly suggests that 'spirit' refers to the spiritual mode or sphere of Christ's vindication by God (through his resurrection and exaltation) rather than to the activity of the Spirit, but the association elsewhere in the New Testament of the Spirit with the resurrection of Jesus prevents us from ruling out the possibility that the activity of the Spirit as the agent of vindication is present here" ("The Holy Spirit in the Pastoral Epistles and the Apostolic Fathers," in *Holy Spirit and Christian Origins: Essays in Honor of James D. G. Dunn*, ed. Graham N. Stanton, Bruce W. Longenecker, and Stephen C. Barton [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004], 258–59).

B. νοῦς in 1 Corinthians

Paul uses the term νοῦς¹⁹ almost exclusively in 1 Corinthians (1:10; 2:16; 14:14, 15, 19) and Romans (1:28; 7:23, 25; 11:34; 12:2; 14:5).²⁰ In both letters, Paul draws upon a version of Isaiah 40:13 to speculate about the νοῦς κυρίου, and, in 1 Corinthians, to suggest that the ambiguous κύριος of Isa 40:13 in fact refers to Χριστός. While in Romans Paul uses the quote in a rhetorical question in order to insist that no one can trump the wisdom of God regarding the Jews (as demonstrated in Rom 9–11),²¹ in 1 Corinthians Paul quotes the passage in order to affirm his earlier claim (1 Cor 2:7) that he operates as an arbiter of the wisdom of God. In so doing, he introduces the peculiar phrase νοῦς Χριστοῦ, which seems here to formulate in anthropological terms the access to the revelatory Spirit of God claimed

¹⁹ Robert Jewett offers the following definition: "Νοῦς is the constellation of thoughts and assumptions which makes up the consciousness of the person and acts as the agent of rational discernment and communication" (450). He thinks that 1 Cor 2:16, Rom 1:28, and 2 Th 2:2 and 1 Cor 1:10 (where νοῦς constitutes "an objectifiable, almost spatial reality") are especially good examples of this use. At 378, Jewett describes νοῦς as a "complex of thoughts and assumptions which can make up the consciousness of a person," but he overstates when he suggests that it "is quite different from the purely rational capacity, from the power of judgment and decision which the Greek idea presupposes." Better is this more balanced, summative comment: "Νοῦς for Paul is thus a reality with dual aspects. It is the constellation of thoughts which fills the consciousness. On the other hand it is the agent of self-control and rational communication. These two aspects which may appear to exclude one another were apparently for Paul two sides of the same coin. In his view it was the thoughts and assumptions given in the gospel which produce self-control and rationality. Conversely the rational capacity in his view was based on certain assumptions provided by the gospel" (*Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings*, AGJU 10 [Leiden: Brill, 1971], 379–380).

²⁰ The exception being Phil 4:7, where it is used in the sense of "understanding." Betz argues that Paul seems to assume some relation between νοῦς, καρδιά, and the divine πνεῦμα in Philippians, but that there is no precise articulation of that relationship (Hans Dieter Betz, "The Concept of the 'Inner Human Being' (ὁ ἑσῶ ἄνθρωπος) in the Anthropology of Paul," *NTS* 46.3 [2000]: 326). In the disputed letters of Paul, the term νοῦς occurs at Col 2:18, Eph 4:17, 23, and 2 Thess 2:2. Robert Jewett thinks of νοῦς as an original (i.e., pre-controversy) component of Paul's anthropology (though this in part relies on his early dating of 2 Thess [379]) (*Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 358–401). Differently, Sterling argues that the concept of the νοῦς is introduced by the Corinthians ("Wisdom among the Perfect": Creation Traditions in Alexandrian Judaism and Corinthian Christianity," *NovT* 37.4 [1995]: 372).

²¹ Robert Jewett, assisted by Roy David Kotansky, *Romans: A Commentary*, ed. Eldon Jay Epp, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 718.

by Paul in 1 Cor 2:10–16.²² In this sentence, Paul does not completely identify the two elements, νοῦς and πνεῦμα, as some have suggested.²³ Indeed, by positing their equivalence and thereby imposing a sense of semantic symmetry, scholars flatten the suggestive multivalence of each of the terms πνεῦμα and νοῦς.²⁴ After all, having the πνεῦμα of Christ may entail having the νοῦς—either in the sense of "sense/meaning" or of "mind"—of Christ, but the logical relationship between the πνεῦμα and the νοῦς in 1 Cor 2:10–16 is not clear. Paul may be implying that the two are identical, as many scholars have suggested, but this

²² Paul W. Gooch, "Paul, the Mind of Christ, and Philosophy," in *Jesus and Philosophy: New Essays*, ed. Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 102 suggests that having the mind of Christ is gained "through the work of the Spirit in revealing the things of God. It is an openness to the Spirit that will form in Paul the mind of Christ." This formulation along with the citation of 1 Cor 7:40 as an example of this principle at work suggests that for Gooch, the "mind of Christ" is not so much an entity as a kind of insight that aligns with the proper divine perspective.

²³ Sterling, "Wisdom among the Perfect," 374–5. Perhaps the more persuasive argument that Paul equates νοῦς and πνεῦμα is Sterling's observation (372 n. 59) that the LXX of Isa 40:13 actually does use νοῦς to translate Heb. רוּחַ, "spirit." However, this is not the only time that the Heb. רוּחַ is translated with a term other than πνεῦμα. In fact, of the 378 occurrences of Heb. רוּחַ in the MT, 277 appear as πνεῦμα in the LXX. Cf. Marie E. Isaacs, *The Concept of Spirit: A Study of Pneuma in Hellenistic Judaism and Its Bearing on the New Testament*, Heythrop Monographs 1 (London: Heythrop College, 1976), 10. See Isaacs (10–14) for other instances in which the LXX translates Heb. רוּחַ with a term other than πνεῦμα, including but not limited to ἄνεμος (52x), πνοή (Isa 38:16, Ezek 13:13, Prov 1:23), ψυχή (Gen 41:8, Ex 35:21, Eccles 7:11), θυμός (cf. Job 6:4, 15:13; Zech 6:8; Ezek 39:29), ὀργή (Prov 16:32), φρόνησις (Josh 5:1), and καρδία (Ezek 13:3). Furthermore, with Jewett, we might ask: "If [Paul] meant simply πνεῦμα why didn't he alter the LXX citation as he so often does?" *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 363. Jewett then goes on, however, to suggest that "Paul took over the assumption that 'spirit,' 'wisdom,' and 'mind' were interchangeable" (377). Engberg-Pedersen too suggests that in Stoicism νοῦς and πνεῦμα "could be understood as two words for the same thing" and that Paul's use of νοῦς in 1 Cor 2:16 suggests that he too was aware of this identification. However, his evidence (63 n. 44) for this claim is less than secure, given that the source cited (*SVF* 2.443 from Plotinus) does not in fact equate νοῦς and πνεῦμα, but attributes the characteristic of being "noetic" (ἐννοεῖν) to the πνεῦμα (*Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 63). Elsewhere (20 n. 41), Engberg-Pedersen appeals to *SVF* 2.458, a citation of two passages from Philo, to support his argument that in the Stoic view νοῦς was equivalent to πνεῦμα, but a short time later (25) Engberg-Pedersen acknowledges that Philo "fundamentally understood" νοῦς "in Platonic, immaterial terms." Furthermore, the two passages cited from Philo give no explicit indication that he is reporting the view of the Stoics, making the very inclusion of the passage in *SVF* a dubious choice. For a list of scholars who regard Paul as having identified νοῦς and a gnostic πνεῦμα in 1 Cor 2:16, see Wendell Lee Willis, "The 'Mind of Christ' in 1 Corinthians 2:16," *Biblica* 70.1 (1989): 117 n. 34.

²⁴ Margaret M. Mitchell argues, "Here too, with an assist from Isaiah (40:13), Paul has hurled a multivalent term into the stream of early Christian hermeneutics" (*Paul, the Corinthians, and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 42). At 42 n. 13, Mitchell remarks regarding the suggestion of BDAG that the two are "interchangeable" that "in a confident attempt to regularize Paul's vocabulary, [BDAG] flattens it."

passage may also suggest that the πνεῦμα grants access to the "mind" of Christ or that it grants access as well to the hermeneutical privilege suggested by the idea of "having" the "sense/meaning" of Christ. Looking to a later instance in 1 Corinthians may help clarify the matter.

In 1 Cor 14, Paul's treatment of prophecy in 1 Corinthians makes it clear that, in reference to the human person at least, the νοῦς and the πνεῦμα are distinct (1 Cor 14:14, 15, 19). There Paul refers to τὸ πνεῦμά μου and ὁ νοῦς μου, suggesting that the activities under discussion, praying (προσεύχεσθαι), singing (ψάλλειν), and speaking (λαλεῖν), should be conducted in such a way that both the πνεῦμα and νοῦς of an individual are to be active.²⁵ That Paul places emphasis on the importance of νοῦς being present and active suggests the high value he places upon the rational awareness of the mind in any given situation. Paul does not here elevate the νοῦς above the πνεῦμα,²⁶ but rather argues that both agents should be present and active within the human person.²⁷ Earlier in the letter, at 1:10, Paul had used the term νοῦς in the prepositional phrase ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῖ, perhaps as a circumlocution or

²⁵ Dale Martin has compared Paul with Platonic scientific theories of prophetic inspiration ("Tongues of Angels and Other Status Indicators," *JAR* 59 [1991]: esp. 569–76). However, one must emphasize that the conceptual mapping is not straightforward (a fact recognized by Martin, but perhaps without due emphasis). Plato does not utilize the terminology of πνεῦμα, and for Philo the πνεῦμα active in prophecy is not that of the human being (as in 1 Cor 14:14; cf. 14:32).

²⁶ Pace Fitzmyer, *1 Corinthians*, 516.

²⁷ By "rational" I do not mean to retroject modern dichotomies of rational/irrational in the sense of natural/supernatural. Cf. the warning of Martin, "Tongues of Angels and Other Status Indicators," 569 n. 46. For the idea of these elements as agents rather than abstract forces in the human person, see Martin, "Tongues of Angels and Other Status Indicators," 575. However, I am hesitant to follow Martin's suggestion that Paul is, like Philo and Iamblicus, ascribing a higher status to πνεῦμα than to νοῦς and here is simply eliminating the implicit hierarchy by having both work together side by side because Paul is not speaking, it seems, of the divine πνεῦμα at all here. I also take exception to Martin's claim (576), with appeal to v. 16, that Paul aligns νοῦς with the realm of common sensibility as opposed to esoteric knowledge, since v. 16 does not pertain to the νοῦς at all but to some individual who doesn't know (οὐκ οἶδεν) what a blessing means if it is only spoken ἐν πνεύματι.

functional equivalent of the term *δμόνοια*, "concord."²⁸ Here the term refers less to the intellectual organ possessed by every person, and is more readily understood, especially in light of the synonymous phrase *ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ*, as the result of cognition, "understanding."²⁹ In each scenario in which *νοῦς* seems to refer to an organ of the soul, we find that it is depicted as being in charge of rational reflection and awareness. By contrast with the Pastorals, Paul does not (in 1 Cor) attack opponents with the language of a corruption of mind, even though 1 Cor 1:10 provides the *potential* for such a critique. However, the importance Paul gives the *νοῦς* in various forms of worship and divine speech suggests that a corruption of *νοῦς* would indicate for Paul the disordering of a psychological organ that he views as central to activities that build up the *ἐκκλησία*. It would also constitute a failure to abide "in the same mind" (*ἐν τῷ νοῖ*), and imply that "schisms" (*σχίσματα*) have instead rent the community assunder (1 Cor 1:10). A corrupted *νοῦς*, one may be certain, is the stark opposite of the *νοῦς Χριστοῦ* (1 Cor 2:16).

C. *νοῦς* and *ἀδόκιμος νοῦς* in Romans

Romans would have provided comparatively bountiful material for the Pastor in an investigation into the function of *νοῦς* in Paul's psychological anthropology. The term *νοῦς*

²⁸ Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians*, HUT 28 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1991), 76–80. The two components, *δμό-* ("same") and *-νοια* ("mind"), in addition to the comparative evidence adduced by Mitchell, suggest the identification.

²⁹ This is not to say that there is no relationship between being *ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ νοῖ* and having the *νοῦς Χριστοῦ*. Surely, for Paul the two would go hand in hand. What it comes down to is whether *νοῦς Χριστοῦ* constitutes an objective or subjective genitive. If Paul is claiming to have the understanding of Christ, then 1:10 and 2:16 would seem to be two ways of saying the same thing. But if having the *νοῦς Χριστοῦ* entails having Christ's mind as a particular capacity, then the two relate to a different phenomenon. Because I read 1 Cor 2:6–16 as pertaining primarily to the capacity to know (*γινώσκειν* [2:8, 11, 14, 16]) and to understand (*εἰδέναι* [2:11, 12]), I take *νοῦς Χριστοῦ* as subjective genitive, relating primarily to a capacity, not the results of the operation of that capacity.

forms an integral part of Paul's argument about the moral state of gentiles, and Paul uses it early in Romans (1:28) in the midst of what has been described as a "decline of civilization narrative," a common literary trope in ancient Greek literature that looks to the distant past in order to explain the present.³⁰ This portion of Romans (1:18–32) is not written as an abstract theological statement on human nature or the problem of human depravity per se; it is a tightly wrought narration of the gentile past as an attempt to explain "present" day gentile lack of self-mastery, as evident in their idolatry and debauchery: "And just as they did not consider it good to hold God in recognition, God handed them over to a ἀδόκιμον νοῦν, to do what ought not to be done . . . (καὶ καθὼς οὐκ ἔδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει, παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν, ποιεῖν τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα [1:28]). Paul's mention of the ἀδόκιμος νοῦς is not meant to offer a definition of the term or explain its function. Rather, in Romans 1:19 he portrays it as the consequence of human failure to recognize "what is knowable of God" (τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ), which Paul considers to be "manifest" (φανερὸν). As such, our conclusions about Paul's view of the νοῦς must be tempered, as always, by a recognition of the argumentative context in which this phrase occurs.

Paul declares that the invisible attributes of God are "knowable" (νοούμενα [1:20]), but in spite of knowing God (cf. γνόντες τὸν θεὸν [1:21]), the gentiles in Paul's narrative of decline utterly failed to respond appropriately. Paul depicts the divine derangement of human mental faculties as the consequence of a failure of human religious judgment. For

³⁰ Stanley Kent Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 85.

example, Paul follows the sequence "they became vain . . . their hearts were darkened . . . they became stupefied"³¹ (ἐματαιώθησαν . . . ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ καρδία . . . ἐμωράνθησαν [1:21–22]) with God's "handing over" (παρέδωκεν [1:24]) of these people to the moral consequences of their failings. Those consequences, which include their distortion of the glory of God (cf. ἥλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν), beget further divine handing over (cf. παρέδωκεν [1:26]) until in 1:28, "just as they did not consider it good to hold God in recognition" (καὶ καθὼς οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει), God removed their capacity to test or make moral evaluations by "handing them over to an ἀδόκιμος νοῦς" (παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς . . . εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν) with the result that they do "what ought not be done" (ποιεῖν τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα). Paul argues that God inflicts a punitive mental disability (ἀδόκιμος νοῦς), the *inability* to discern (δοκιμάζειν) the divine will, as the symmetrical result of their *refusal* to discern.³²

With a brief glance forward to Rom 12:2, one could say that in Rom 1:28 Paul is arguing that the νοῦς of the gentiles was rendered incapable of performing one of its central tasks: approving what was God's good, pleasing, and perfect will, that is to say, in the language of Rom 1:28, "what ought to be done." This Pauline characterization of the renewed νοῦς thus serves as a contrast to the dark picture given by Paul of the gentile incapacity to reason or know God. This disabling of that capacity is made manifest in God's "giving over" the gentiles "do what ought not be done" and illustrated by the impressively

³¹ This gloss of ἐμωράνθησαν is suggested by BrillDAG, 1375, s.v. μωραίνω.

³² This does not indicate, however, that these gentiles have lost their faculties altogether, since they are depicted in 1:32 as exercising their own distorted capacities of approval: "They, though recognizing the just decision of God that those who do such things are worthy of death, not only did these things but also give approval to those who do them."

long list of deviant behaviors given in Rom 1:29–31, echoes of which are reproduced by the Pastor in 2 Tim 3:2–4.³³

What exactly ἀδόκιμος means here in Rom 1:28 might be usefully illuminated by Paul's other uses of the term.³⁴ The term ἀδόκιμος is used by Paul elsewhere only in the Corinthian correspondence (1 Cor 9:27; 2 Cor 13:5–7). In 1 Cor 9:27, Paul uses the term to register his concern that he might somehow, having preached to others, himself become ἀδόκιμος. The fact that Paul says that he "buffets" and "leads" his body "as a slave" suggests a kind of testing, especially one to which an athlete or a slave might be put by athletic judges or masters, respectively. The sense is of a judgment rendered on the basis of testing. In 2 Cor 13, Paul responds to the Corinthians' own desire for a δοκιμή ("proof") of Christ speaking in him (13:3) by turning the tables on them: "Test (πειράζετε) yourselves, whether you are in the faith, put yourselves to the proof (δοκιμάζετε). Or don't you recognize with respect to yourselves that Christ is in you? If indeed you are not disqualified (ἀδόκιμοι)! I hope that you know that we are not disqualified (ἀδόκιμοι)." The exhortation suggests that

³³ Rom 1:30–31 and 2 Tim 2:2–3 have the following terms in common, in almost exactly the same sequence, and with the same number of intervening terms: ἀλαζόνες, ὑπερήφανοι (one phrase intervening), γονεῦσιν ἀπειθεῖς (two terms intervening), ἄστοργοι. In Rom 1:30, the first two terms are transposed.

³⁴ Luke Timothy Johnsons translates the term ἀδόκιμος in Rom 1:28 in the active sense of "undiscerning" or "untesting," as in "without the capacity to test" ("Transformation of the Mind and Moral Discernment in Paul," in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and Michael L. White, NovTSup 110 [Leiden: Brill, 2003], 219). On the next page he translates the adjective as "untested," leaving the reader to speculate in which sense, if one is forced to choose, he thinks the term is meant. At any rate, ἀδόκιμος is traditionally understood to mean "unqualified, worthless, base" or "unsatisfactory, unconvincing, disreputable, discredited, reprobate," to give a few glosses from BDAG (21) and LSJ (24), respectively. Similarly, lexical glosses of the corresponding adjective δόκιμος suggests that the status of being δόκιμος is the result of an activity (proving, testing, etc.), and not necessarily a feature of the activity itself (BDAG, 256 gives 1. approved [by test], tried and true, genuine, 2. respected, esteemed, 3. precious). After proving or testing, one is deemed δόκιμος. Collins (NTL, 230) notes that Philo uses the adjective δόκιμος to describe those who are competent in a variety of specialties: craftsmen (*Her.* 158), mathematicians and astronomers (*Opif.* 128), physicians (*Deus* 65; *Spec.* 3.117), and priests (*Spec.* 1.166).

the meaning to be preferred is "disqualified,"³⁵ in the sense of having been tested and found wanting. Thus, both from Paul's other uses of the term and the argumentative context of Romans 1:28, the sense of the ἀδόκιμος νοῦς seems to be that it is a mental organ that has been shown to be lacking, because it did not yield the proper judgment, namely that God should be revered and worshipped. The degraded state of the human νοῦς—its lack of proper judgment—is cast as the result of divine judgment.³⁶

Paul's use of νοῦς in Romans 7, for all its complexity, supports two elements of the discussion to this point: that it is used by Paul as one aspect of the human person among others, and that it is an organ of discernment. In Betz's words, "the νοῦς is the element of the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος that is able to understand the human predicament, but it is neither divine in nature nor ontologically separate from the body."³⁷ Indeed, Paul depicts the νοῦς as being one element among many, each of which is cast as a different agent occupying the crowded space of the body and which are seen as being in conflict with each other. For instance, the "law of God" (νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ), with which the speaker of 7:22 "rejoices together in my inner person," is set in contrast to "another law" (ἕτερος νόμος [7:23]), which is said to be "in my members" (ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου [7:23]). That this "other law" is equivalent to "the law of sin" (ὁ νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας) is suggested by the fact that it too, the law of sin, is said to be "in my

³⁵ With this translation I hope to show the connection between being proven with the result that one is "approved." Testing leads to being "tried and true."

³⁶ I do not concur with Jewett's judgment that νοῦς here constitutes a "super-individual reality." He suggests that "[νοῦς] is the individual's stance of rational discernment which fulfills its purpose by taking cognizance of God. Yet when it fails in that purpose, it becomes the source for evil thoughts and attitudes. Indeed, the use of νοῦς in the singular in connection with the preposition εἰς makes it clear that Paul thought of the 'reprobate mind' as a demonic, super-individual reality to which one who rejected God was given over" (Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 387).

³⁷ Betz, "The Concept of the 'Inner Human Being' (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) in the Anthropology of Paul," 338. Nor, according to Betz, is ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος identical with ψυχή or πνεῦμα (334).

members" ([7:23]). That "the law of my mind" (ὁ νόμος τοῦ νοός μου) is aligned with (but not identical to) "the law of God" (ὁ νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ) becomes clear only in 7:25 where the two appear side by side: "In the mind I am a slave to God's law" (ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῖ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ). Thus, while the "law of God" and the "law of my mind" stand together in opposition to the "other law," i.e., the "law of sin," they are not equivalent.³⁸ For our purposes, what is most important to take away from this hotly debated passage is rather simple: Paul casts the νοῦς as an individual organ of the inner person that is, at its best, aligned with God's law, an alignment that seems to represent the capacity of the νοῦς (though not without some stiff resistance from other agents) to choose and discern what is best, in this case God's law. This role of the νοῦς becomes evident several chapters later in Romans 12.

In Romans 12:2 we see that the "renewal of the νοῦς" is instrumental in a kind of metamorphosis (cf. μεταμορφοῦσθαι) of the human person that has as its aim the activity of "testing/discerning what the will of God is, that which is good and pleasing and complete" (τὸ δοκιμάζειν τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον).³⁹ That the term δοκιμάζειν, which conveys the tasks of critical examination and drawing conclusions based on testing, is used regarding the νοῦς here suggests that Paul's sense of what the νοῦς does in

³⁸ Fitzmyer's translation "the law that my mind acknowledges" obscures the parallelism established by the construction τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός . . . τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἀμαρτίας (*Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, vol. 33 of *The Anchor Yale Bible* [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993], 476).

³⁹ Paul does not use the term νοῦς in 2 Corinthians, but he does use a term that some have understood to be the equivalent of νοῦς, namely ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος. On the scholarly discussion from F. C. Baur (1864) to W. D. Stacey (1956), see Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 391–95. Christoph Marksches, "Innerer Mensch," *RAC*, 18:266–312; Betz, "The Concept of the 'Inner Human Being' (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) in the Anthropology of Paul." Despite the lexical connection in the phrases ἐν τῇ ἀναινώσει τοῦ νοός (Rom 12:2) and ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος ἀνακαινοῦται (2 Cor 4:16), the terms do not seem to be equivalent. In Rom 7:23–25 the νοῦς is not equated with the ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος. This stands in contrast to some representatives of the Platonic tradition, such as Plutarch, who does seem to equate the two concepts of the inner person and the νοῦς (see Marksches, "Innerer Mensch," 271, 274).

terms of its basic functionality is similar to that of the authors discussed above.⁴⁰ Among other functions, the νοῦς is responsible for critical moral and ethical discernment.⁴¹ This passage serves as the counterpart to the utter failure of discernment from Romans 1:28, where it is said of the gentiles that "they did not decide to hold God in recognition" (οὐκ ἔδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει), whereupon God "gave them over to a disqualified mind."

While Paul does not articulate exactly how renewal occurs in the narrative of decline of Rom 1:18–31, we can draw some conclusions from Rom 12:1–2. The "therefore" (οὖν) of Rom 12:1 suggests the renewed mind is related to a proper understanding of God's plan of salvation (11:25–32), even if the particular issue being addressed in Romans 9–11 entails a doxological conclusion that admits the inscrutability of God's ways (11:33–36). Renewal of the νοῦς seems also to include "rational worship" (λογικὴ λατρεία [12:1]), perhaps here envisioned as the antidote to the irrational worship of created things in 1:22–23. For Paul, this "rational worship" (12:1) presupposes gentile baptism and identification with the crucified, buried, and resurrected Christ (Rom 6:1–11). In other words, "walking about in newness of life" (περιπατεῖν ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς [6:4]) made possible by gentile acknowledgment of the risen Christ is the necessary precursor to this "renewal of the mind" (ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοός) to which the Christ believers in Rome are to aspire. Renewal of this most crucial cognitive organ is also achieved in 12:1 through a synergy of human and divine

⁴⁰ For instance, Aristotle identifies the task of the νοῦς as determining "definitions" or "limits" (ὅροι) at *Eth. nic.* 6.8.9 (1142a26–30). Cf. 6.11.4–5 (1143a35–1143b8).

⁴¹ Similarly, the act of discernment implicit in the language of κρίνειν is associated with the νοῦς in Rom 14:5. Paul considers the discernment (κρίνειν) of days to be a matter about which one need only to be "fully convinced" (πληροφορεῖσθω) in one's own mind (ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ νοῷ).

effort, wherein the "sisters and brothers" (ἀδελφοί) "offer" their bodies as a living, holy sacrifice, and this is accomplished "through the mercies of God" (διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν τοῦ θεοῦ). Ultimately, Paul envisions this renewal and metamorphosis of the νοῦς in opposition to conformity to "this age" (ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος). Thus, it seems that in Paul's schema the disordered and disqualified νοῦς has the capacity to be qualified once more, to be renewed and transformed and restored to proper functionality.

E. Paul and the Pastor on νοῦς

The above exposition of the ἀδόκιμος νοῦς in Romans 1:28 has implications for the interpretation of 2 Timothy 3:8. There, the Pastor uses the phrase ἀδόκιμοι τὴν πίστιν (cf. πρὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι [Tit 1:16]) as an explanatory extension of the depiction of the opponents as ἄνθρωποι κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν.⁴² This produces sufficient lexical resonances between Romans 1 and 2 Timothy 3 to raise the possibility that the Pastor is adopting and adapting Paul's language regarding gentiles for his own depiction of opponents. If, as I suggest, the Pastor is in this instance forging an intertextual relationship with Paul's own language of νοῦς, then the corruption of the νοῦς suggests that the opponents are in that same precarious epistemological condition as the gentiles of Romans 1, who were handed over to a self-reinforcing cycle of (a) intellectual incapacitation that leads to (b) sin that leads again to (a) a punishment of intellectual incapacitation, the "disqualified mind" (ἀδόκιμος νοῦς). The cyclical nature of this kind of incapacitation

⁴² Albert Edward Barnett, *Paul Becomes a Literary Influence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), 276 suggests that the "use of ἀδόκιμος in Romans furnishes the closest parallel for that of II Timothy."

suggests that no single directionality of influence may be discerned: these processes are mutually reinforcing.

The case is similar in the Pastorals. Not "adhering to" or "approaching" (προσέρχεσθαι) the "healthy words"⁴³ in 1 Timothy 6:3 suggests that someone is "deluded" (τετυφῶσθαι) and "sick" (νοσεῖν). Without the healing words of "our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Tim 6:4), the Pastor argues, those who are sickened do not realize their need for the medicinal words that Paul offers. This throws them into a vicious cycle, for their vain investigations and word-wars produce "envy, strife, slanders, wicked suspicions, and fractious wrangling" (1 Tim 6:4), the product of a corroded νοῦς that leads, according to the Pastor, to further intellectual debasement: the absurd idea that εὐσέβεια is a means of financial gain (1 Tim 6:5). The opponents are characterized in this way because they have adopted ideas that the Pastor argues have made them ill. Unsurprisingly, the ideas they produce in turn are just as deluded, and are taken as evidence of their mental illness.

By virtue of the corruption of their νοῦς, the Pastor maintains that the opponents in the PE are in need of dramatic intervention if they are to be restored (cf. 2 Tim 2:25). Furthermore, the declaration that ἡ ἄνοια αὐτῶν will become abundantly clear (ἐκδηλος) to all (2 Tim 3:8) suggests further that the Pastor links these descriptions together in a tightly knit blanket of aspersion, cast upon the opponents to indicate that their mental corruption is explained by and related to their failure in the faith. They are "disqualified regarding the faith" in the same way that the gentiles of Romans 1 were disqualified. Just as Paul draws

⁴³ For a similar turn of phrase in Epictetus, see *Diatr.* 3.26.13 (πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν προσελθεῖν) and 4.11.24 (προσελθεῖν φιλοσοφία).

upon anti-Egyptian commonplaces regarding theriomorphic worship in his characterization of the gentile past (Rom 1:23), so too the Pastor produces two Egyptian villains (Jannes and Jambres) as exemplars of opposition (2 Tim 3:8). Just as Paul says of the gentiles that "they perverted the truth of God with the lie and worshipped and served the creation rather than the creator" (1:25), the opponents of 2 Tim 3:8 are "opposed to the truth" (*ἀνθίστανται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*). Whereas Paul used the language of a "disqualified mind" to refer to the gentiles more broadly, the Pastor has redirected that language to characterize his opponents directly.

Thus, the Pastor seems to co-opt, intensify, and particularize Paul's efforts to characterize the gentile mind as "unqualified." This may be observed in the Pastor's adaptation of language from 2 Corinthians 11:3–4. There, Paul worries about the Corinthians' "thoughts" (*νοήματα*) being corrupted (*φθείρεσθαι*) by someone proclaiming "a different Jesus" (2 Cor 11:4). Paul is not explicit that his opponents are responsible for this corruption of the Corinthians, nor does he say that the minds of the opponents themselves are corrupt. However, at 2 Cor 11:3 he likens the corruption of the *ἐκκλησία* to the "utter deception" (*ἐξαπατηθῆναι*) of Eve perpetrated by the "serpent" (*ὄφις*), the chief antagonist of Genesis 3 who is later aligned with the devil or Satan. That Paul's opponents are called "servants of Satan" (*διάκονοι [σατανᾶ]*) just a few verses later (2 Cor 11:15) is a strong indicator that Paul envisions his theological opponents as the perpetrators of a satanic corruption of the Corinthians' minds. Furthermore, Paul suggests the ways in which this corruption of thoughts might occur: "For if someone comes proclaiming another Jesus whom we have not proclaimed, or you receive a different spirit that you did not receive, or a different gospel than what you received, you put up with it well enough" (2 Cor 11:4). By

contrast with this corruption of *the Corinthians'* thoughts—characterized indirectly as deviation from the message Paul had proclaimed—the Pastor seems to localize corruption in the cognitive organ of his opponents. In language strikingly reminiscent of Paul's from 2 Corinthians, the Pastor applies the language of "corruption of mind" and "disqualified" to the faith of his opponents. The resonances with 2 Cor 11⁴⁴ suggest that the Pastor has developed this Pauline idea, in line with tropes from contemporary philosophical and medical discourse, and made it a defining feature of his opponents' psychological portrait.

The Pastor shares with Paul similar assumptions about the νοῦς and its function. Like Paul, the Pastor understands νοῦς to be a component of the inner person.⁴⁵ Like Paul, the Pastor considers the status of the νοῦς to be an indication of a person's moral standing before God. The "disqualified" (ἀδόκιμος) mind of gentiles who rejected God (Rom 1) can only be restored, as we inferred above, through the kind of transformation and renewal that results in the right approval (δοκιμάζειν) of God's will (Rom 12:2). The right approval articulated by Paul in Rom 12:1–2 that degenerate gentiles might aspire to is logically preceded by the sort of Christ-effected salvation Paul describes in Romans 6. Presumably, for Paul, several stages stand between the disqualified mind and the renewed mind. The possibility of the mind's regeneration is therefore only an inference in Romans, but it is a necessary one. While the Pastorals explicitly include only instances of corrupted or defiled minds, the hope of renewal and refreshing for the opponents' minds is framed not

⁴⁴ These resonances are also on display in 1 Tim 2:13–15, where "Eve/the woman" is similarly "utterly deceived."

⁴⁵ The Pastor makes no mention of the νοῦς Χριστοῦ, precluding speculation on whether or not he understands this as a common possession of the communities to which he writes.

nominally, as the "renewed mind" or some such, but verbally, with the language of "coming to the recognition of the truth" (εἰς ἐπίγνωσις ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν [1 Tim 2:4; cf. 2 Tim 2:25]).

Furthermore, the Pastor, by applying the language of corruption not to the product of the νοῦς, the thoughts (νοήματα), but to the νοῦς itself, intensifies and localizes the problem of intellectual deviance within the human person in language that is at home in the prevailing discourses about mental illness and the corruption of the mind.

F. νοῦς as a Corruptible Organ of the Soul

While some scholars use the language of faculty or mindset, others (rightly, in my opinion) write of the νοῦς as an organ, even if they do not sufficiently emphasize its role in relationship to the body in ancient thinking. Hermann von Lips suggests that "νοῦς correlates as the organ of knowledge—indicating insight, reason, understanding, sense—to the truth as the object of faith and knowledge."⁴⁶ Thus, he suggests that the destruction or the defiling of the νοῦς renders the sufferers incapable of coming to or remaining in the truth.⁴⁷ Jürgen Roloff has suggested that the corruption of the νοῦς entails the disorientation of the "intellectual and moral organ of perception" (geistiges und sittliches Wahrnehmungsorgan) of the human person.⁴⁸ Spicq suggests, with reference to 2 Tim 3:8,

⁴⁶ "νοῦς korreliert als Erkenntnisorgan - Einsicht, Vernunft, Verstand, Sinn bezeichnend—der ἀλήθεια als dem Glaubens—und Erkenntnisgegenstand" (Lips, *Glaube - Gemeinde - Amt*, 55).

⁴⁷ "Die Zerstörung, die Befleckung des νοῦς macht die Betroffenen unfähig, die Wahrheit zu erkennen oder bei der erkannten Wahrheit zu bleiben" (*Glaube - Gemeinde - Amt*, 56). Marshall, ICC, 211 follows Lips in this judgment (regarding Titus 1:15), and suggests (with regard to 2 Tim 3:8) that the mind "is regarded as not functioning properly as the guide to correct belief and moral principles" (779–800). Johnson, AB, 408 notes regarding 2 Tim 3:8 that it renders opponents unable to teach or retain truth.

⁴⁸ "Gemeint ist vielmehr eine totale Korruption ihrer geistig-sittlichen Organe als Folge des durch die vorsätzliche und willentliche Trennung von der kirchlichen Lehre bedingten Orientierungsverlustes: Wie sich von der Wahrheit Gottes trennt, endet zwangsläufig bei 'leerem Geschwätz' (1:6) und in einem Zustand

that the opponents are "radically incapable of exercising a magisterial function, seeing as their faculty of thought and reasoning is corrupted."⁴⁹ These scholars have rightly observed that the corruption of the νοῦς suggests a disorientation of the mental organ responsible for intellectual and moral operations. The resulting image is that of the degeneration and distortion of the primary cognitive organ, the νοῦς.

However, most scholars do not comment on *how* they understand the composition of the νοῦς. One may observe the extent to which the language of sickness (νοσεῖν) in 1 Tim 6:3–5 is understood figuratively as an indication that most scholars understand the corruption of the νοῦς in metaphorical terms.⁵⁰ This is evidenced, at times, by translations

geistiger Willkür und Orientierungslosigkeit" (Roloff, EKKNT, 333. Roloff goes on to suggest that a general suggestion of their insanity is not meant here in 1 Tim 6:5, but rather a mental disorientation that results from separation from the church's teaching.

⁴⁹ "Les faux docteurs ont donc perdu l'esprit, ou mieux: ils sont depuis toujours radicalement incapables (participe parfait passif) d'exercer une fonction magistrale, puisque leur faculté de penser et de raisonner est corrompue, tel un arbre pourri qui ne pourra jamais donner de fruit" (Spicq, ÉBib, 779–80). Spicq's quick move from the Pastor's depiction of the opponents to a statement about the reality of the opponents's faculty of thought elides the important distinction between characterization and reality.

⁵⁰ While some scholars give no indication either way (e.g., von Lips, *Glaube—Gemeinde—Amt*, 55–56), a range of authors may be said to understand the corruption of the mind as purely figurative: 1) Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 492, points to Wis 17:8. "the figurative use here [of νοσεῖν] in the Pastorals is notably similar to the imaginative polemic of Wisdom." That he does not take the phrase "corruption of the mind" as a material phenomenon is further suggested by his translation of the pertinent phrases at 1 Tim 6:5 as "men whose minds are a shambles" (494) and at 2 Tim 3:8 as "numbskulled" (733). 2) Collins, NTL, 155, notes the striking language of 6:4, and says that, "the image is that of a person in terrible physical condition, almost repugnant to look at. These puffed-up people understand nothing at all." However, he does not interpret this being "puffed-up" as a moment of mental illness, a state of mental delusion per se. Furthermore, he does not apply the same "physical" understanding to the phrase "corrupted in the νοῦς," which he translates as "lost their minds" (156). At 96, he writes regarding 1 Tim 6:3–5 that "the Pastor employs medical metaphors to contrast those whose 'faith' is healthy with those whose minds are diseased." Telling is his translation there: "people who have lost their minds." 3) Marshall, ICC, 640 says that in 1 Tim 6:4a, the "author pursues the metaphor inherent in 'healthy words' as he describes the sickness of the false teachers. νοσεῖω, 'to be sick, ailing', can be used literally and figuratively." He opts for the latter. At 641–42 he makes it clear that he takes διαφθείρειν to be figurative, meaning "corrupt, ruin." This suggests he is not taking this to be a material corruption of a material mind, nor an actual sickness. 4) Spicq, ÉBib, 559 notes regarding 1 Tim 6:5, "C'est donc la continuation de la métaphore médicale du v. 4, reprise en clair par le verbe διαφθείρειν." The usage is considered to be metaphorical, and not an actual sickness of the mind. 5) Knight, NIGTC, 251, is explicit: "The false teacher is said to be νοσῶν (the verb is a NT hapax) used here figuratively of having a 'sick' or 'unhealthy craving.'" 6) Roloff, EKKNT, 311 n. 22, says that νοσεῖν is here "used figuratively" ("übertragen

such as "lost their minds"⁵¹ or other such circumlocutions that aim at a rather more colloquial declaration of mental deficiency than is present in the Pastorals. Whether scholars do or do not in fact consider the language to be figurative (though most indications suggest that they do), the almost complete absence of attention to the important question of *how* the mind and its state relate to the body and its experiences suggests the need for exploration and explanation of how the prevailing contemporary discourse of the mind and its relationship to the body might have influenced the Pastor's depiction of the opponents.⁵²

Scholars have noted that this language resonates with the medical imagery so prevalent in the Pastorals.⁵³ However, by and large, the Pastor's language about "the mind" and its corruption has been understood figuratively, without an appreciation of the material significance of such corruption, or the physical or corporeal aspects of νοῦς and its reciprocal relationship with the body more generally. This scholarly characterization of the

gebraucht"). 7) Most recently, Dillon T. Thornton is explicit about his assumptions: "Modifying 'mind,' the term [διαφθείρειν] must be understood in a figurative sense" (*Hostility in the House of God: An Investigation of the Opponents in 1 and 2 Timothy*, BBRSup 15 [Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2016], 78).

⁵¹ See above note.

⁵² These remain unexplored also in the work of Risto Saarinen, one scholar who is attuned to the idea that the Pastor (for him Paul) is here drawing on popular characterizations of mental illness. See his Appendix B on mental disorders and the PE (BTCB, 244–49). His exegesis of 1 Tim 6:3–10, 2 Tim 3:8–9, and Titus 1:10–15 includes explicit and insightful attention to the question of mental illness as a concept with which the PE are working, but he too regards this mental illness as metaphorical: "In keeping with this metaphorical usage, the representatives of false doctrine are described as being ill, in particular with regard to their mental state. My commentary argues that Paul does not do this only for polemical purposes, but he also has a more general aim of presenting a portrayal of healthy and sick minds" (BTCB, 243).

⁵³ This is not to say that scholars have not noticed at all the medical imagery of passages like 1 Tim 6:5 and 2 Tim 3:8. Spicq, *ÉBib*, 559 notes regarding 1 Tim 6:5, "C'est donc la continuation de la métaphore médicale du v. 4, reprise en clair par le verbe διαφθείρειν." Malherbe notes the medical imagery, but gives the phrase only brief attention Cf. "Medical Imagery," 22–23, here citing 23 notes the presence of medical language in 1 Tim 6:4–5, and suggests generally that "the author describes them as intellectually inferior, having diseased minds which produce violent preaching and contaminate those who accept their teaching." Johnson, AB, 293 notes regarding 1 Tim 6:5, "more medical imagery for moral teaching."

mind effectively relegates the corruption of the mind to a figure of speech, thus eliding the significance of the corruption of the νοῦς in the PE as a turn of phrase that for first or second century readers would have been interpreted in light of the prevailing notions of mental corruption. As such, the purely figurative reading of this concept fails to appreciate the rhetorical force of the Pastor's polemic. Part of the interpretive puzzle involves discerning what the Pastor may have meant by his language of corruption.⁵⁴ In terms of the Pastor's construction of his opponents' deviance, just what does this entail? "Corruption" connoted a sense of loss of balance and health in the Hippocratic treatises⁵⁵ and the language of φθείρειν and its cognates refers to destruction through sickness or disease.⁵⁶ The

⁵⁴ Roloff, EKKNT, 333, plausibly sees the greed (Gewinnsucht) of the false teachers as the corrupting factor (especially in light of the concern with money in other parts of 1 Tim 6, namely 6:6–10 and 6:17–19), noting that alleging the profligate pursuit of money draws on a widespread polemical motif against sophists. However, this does not address the critical question of what this corruption connotes. It also does not give an account for the similar phrase from 2 Tim 3:8. While we do find φιλάργυροι at 2 Tim 3:2, this occurs in a piling up of character flaws, and does not seem to tie directly or especially to the language of utter corruption in 2 Tim 3:8.

⁵⁵ For instance, in Aristotle, φθορά can refer to death that occurs through "loss of warmth" (θερμοῦ ἔκλειψις at *Resp.* 17 [478b27–33]) or "lack of blood" (ὀλιγαιμία at *Part. an.* II.5 [651b11]). See Günther Harder, "φθεῖρω κ.τ.λ." in *TDNT* 9.95–96. There was a propensity in ancient Greek philosophy to see φθείρεσθαι as the antithesis of γίγνεσθαι, and this contrast is instructive as we conceptualize the semantic significance of the φθεῖρειν word group (Harder, "φθεῖρω κ.τ.λ." in *TDNT* 9.94–96). Suggestive too are the antithetical pairings of φθεῖρειν with ὠφελεῖν (*Part. an.* II.5 [651b2]), μένειν (*Gen. an.* II.1 [734a7]) and σώζειν (*Eth. nic.* VII.9 [1151a15]). See Harder, "φθεῖρω κ.τ.λ." in *TDNT* 9.95–96. Each of these words or their cognates occur in the PE. In these cases, φθείρεσθαι is the (sometimes final) cessation of health. For instance, in Josephus, *B.J.* 5.383, φθεῖρειν is used for corruption "by every disease" (πάσῃ φθαρεῖσα νόσῳ) in reference to the plagues sent against Egypt. At *B.J.* 3.528–30, Josephus describes the rout of Judean revolutionaries in terms of a great and varied slaughter (πολλή τε . . . καὶ ποικίλη φθορά) resulting in rotting corpses that were "corrupting" (διαφθεῖρειν) the air. At *A.J.* 9.101, διαφθορά is used to describe the result of a gruesome and chronic disease that results in eventual "flowing out" of King Jehoram's bowels. See Harder, "φθεῖρω κ.τ.λ." in *TDNT* 9.100. See 2 Chron 21:15. In Philo, φθορά can be used to describe that corruption that occurs through the defiling contact of sick things with healthy, and dead things with the living (*Deus* 124).

⁵⁶ The author of the Aristotelian *Problems* is explicit about the idea that corruption is caused by an imbalance of substance, especially as a result of the improper mixing of fundamentally different entities. Sudden changes are thought to be disease-producing because change is inherently volatile. In a very Aristotelian moment, the author of *Problems* 1 reflects on how the outer limits of a spectrum are the most extreme. The middle, one infers, is where things are at their most calm. This clash of the outer limits produces volatile change, and this produces disease and corruption. See esp. [*Probl.*] 1.15 (861a1–9).

idea that "corruption" constituted a state of corporeal decay was not restricted to medical writers.⁵⁷

In the Platonic tradition, "corruption" constituted a humoral disruption. In the *Timaeus*, for instance, illnesses are described in terms of the humoral system espoused there as "corruptions" (φθοραί). When the body, which is composed of the elements earth, fire, water, and air (*Tim.* 82a), undergoes drastic fluctuations contrary to nature (παρὰ φύσιν), such as cold to hot, dry to moist, or heavy to light, it no longer "remains healthy" (ὕγιες μένειν). On the contrary, the fluctuations will produce "various alterations and boundless diseases and corruptions" (ἀλλοιότητος παμποικίλας καὶ νόσους φθοράς τε ἀπείρους παρέξεται [82b]). The understanding of disease espoused in the *Timaeus* sees it as essentially retrograde, consisting in the dissolution of corporeal building blocks such as blood, tissue, and bone.

For when all the substances become reversed (παλιναίρετα) and corrupted (διεφθαρμένα), they begin by destroying the blood itself, and then they themselves cease to supply any nourishment to the body; for they move through the veins in all directions and no longer preserve the order of their natural revolutions, being at enmity with themselves because they have no enjoyment of themselves, and being at war also with the established and regular constitution of the body, which they corrupt and dissolve (διολλύντα καὶ τήκοντα). (*Tim.* 82e-83a)⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Indeed, hard and fast distinctions between "philosophical" and "medical" are ill-suited for the literature coming from this period.

⁵⁸ παλιναίρετα γὰρ πάντα γεγονότα καὶ διεφθαρμένα τό τε αἷμα αὐτὸ πρῶτον διόλλυσι, καὶ αὐτὰ οὐδεμίαν τροφήν ἔτι τῷ σώματι παρέχοντα φέρεται πάντη διὰ τῶν φλεβῶν, τάξιν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν οὐκέτ' ἴσχοντα περιόδων, ἐχθρὰ μὲν αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀπόλαυσιν ἑαυτῶν ἔχειν, τῷ ξυνεστῶτι δὲ τοῦ σώματος καὶ μένοντι κατὰ χώραν πολέμια, διολλύντα καὶ τήκοντα (Bury, LCL).

The *Timaeus* goes on to say that this corrosive process is in danger of spreading to "whatever is not yet corrupted" (ὅσον ἂν μὴπω διεφθαρμένον ἤ [83b]).⁵⁹ The application of corruption language either to "belief" (δόξα)⁶⁰ or even "thought" or "understanding" (διάνοια)⁶¹ by philosophers suggests that this language was used to describe the perceived breakdown in rational thought and common sense, at times, as these comparanda suggest, with respect to discourse about the gods. While wrong beliefs about the gods could corrupt, so could vices such as "lust" (ἐπιθυμία) or mind-altering substances like wine.⁶² For instance, in the paraenetic treatise *Ad Demoniacum*, drunkenness is associated with the idea of the

⁵⁹ The *Timaeus* suggests that the employment of drugs is most undesirable, suggesting that if one intervenes "contrary to the appointed time" (παρὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην τοῦ χρόνου) and "corrupts with drugs" (φθείρει φαρμακείαις) one is likely to produce further and more variable disorders (89c).

⁶⁰ Plutarch (*Adol. poet. aud.* 16d) can write about the individual who accepts either a stranger or harmful words of a poet about gods, *daimones*, or virtue that he is "corrupted in his belief" (διέφθαρται τὴν δόξαν). Cf. Aeschylus, *Ag.* 931–32, where speaking "contrary to opinion" (παρὰ γνώμην) is paralleled with γνώμην διαφθείρειν. For this idea as an activity of the "ruler of this age" we can look to Ignatius, *Rom.* 7.1: "The ruler of this age wishes to snatch me away and to corrupt my Godward mind" (Ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου διαρπάσαι με βούλεται καὶ τὴν εἰς Θεόν μου γνώμην διαφθεῖραι). Herm. Sim. 4.7 (53.7) has very similar language: "My understanding will not be corrupted away from the Lord, but will serve him, since I have an understanding that is pure" (οὐ γὰρ διαφθαρήσεται ἡ διάνοια αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου, ἀλλὰ δουλεύσει αὐτῷ ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτοῦ καθαρὰν). This last reference is cited by Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 494. My trans.

⁶¹ Plato, in *Leg.* 887d–888a says regarding those who have not believed the stories about the gods (πειθόμενοι τοῖς μύθοις [περὶ θεῶν]) that they are "so corrupted in understanding" (τοῖς οὕτω τὴν διάνοιαν διεφθαρμένοις) and that one must admonish (νουθετεῖν) and teach (διδάσκειν) them gently (πραῶς) or with gentle words (πραεῖς λόγοι). Hermas, Sim. 4.7 (53.7) has very similar language: "My understanding will not be corrupted away from the Lord, but will serve him, since I have an understanding that is pure" (οὐ γὰρ διαφθαρήσεται ἡ διάνοια αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου, ἀλλὰ δουλεύσει αὐτῷ ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτοῦ καθαρὰν). My trans. Cf. Quinn & Wacker, ECC, 494. One might also consider the indictment against Socrates, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (1.1), the second part of which is that he "does wrong by corrupting the young men also" (ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων). The unstated means of that corruption is of course Socratic philosophy, with perhaps more than a hint of sexual impropriety. Dio Chrysostom hearkens back to and counters this charge by arguing that Socrates was trying to prevent not only the young men but also the elders from being corrupted by "reproaching and προφέρων them" (ὀνειδίζων καὶ προφέρων αὐτοῖς [Or. 43.10]).

⁶² λύπη corrupts at Euripides, *Or.* 398, and ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη do so at Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 6.5 [1140b16–19]. See Harder, "φθείρω κ.τ.λ." in *TDNT* 9.94. In a much later text, Basil of Ancyra (*Virg.* 63) describes the lust of passion (ἐπιθυμία πάθους) as a maddening, irritating impulse that renders the whole νοῦς and body corrupt (cf. φθείρει μὲν ὅλον τὸν νοῦν).

νοῦς being corrupted (cf. ὁ νοῦς ὑπὸ οἴνου διαφθαρεῖ).⁶³ But how does this occur? The answer, at least for some ancient thinkers, would have been psychosomatic in nature. Wine is considered to be a drink that heats up the insides,⁶⁴ thereby distorting the intellectual abilities. This is not a figurative distortion, but rather a highly observable discombobulation of the intellectual organ, resulting in impaired speech, motor skills, and decision-making.⁶⁵ Similarly, in medical discussions of mental illness, wine's distorting effect on the νοῦς is used as an analogue for the distortion occurring in cases of mental illness associated with excessive heat, like mania.⁶⁶

In light of the generous use of medical imagery in the PE (including in close proximity to the use of the phrase in 1 Tim 6:3–5), I would argue that the Pastor's language of corruption, διαφθείρειν and καταφθείρειν,⁶⁷ is best understood in terms of ancient

⁶³ "If possible avoid drinking-parties altogether, but if ever occasion arises when you must be present, rise and take your leave before you become intoxicated; for when the mind is impaired by wine (ὁ νοῦς ὑπὸ οἴνου διαφθαρεῖ) it is like chariots which have lost their drivers; for just as these plunge along in wild disorder when they miss the hands which should guide them, so the soul stumbles again and again when the intellect is impaired (διαφθαρείσης τῆς διανοίας)." Μάλιστα μὲν εὐλαβοῦ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πότοις συνουσίας· ἐὰν δέ ποτέ σοι συμπέσῃ καιρός, ἐξανίστασο πρὸ μέθης. ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ὑπὸ οἴνου διαφθαρεῖ, ταῦτά πάσχει τοῖς ἄρμασι τοῖς τοῦς ἡνιόχους ἀποβαλοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ ἀτάκτως φέρεται διαμαρτόντα τῶν εὐθυνούντων, ἥ τε ψυχὴ πολλὰ σφάλλεται διαφθαρείσης τῆς διανοίας. [Isocrates], *Demon.* 32 (Norlin, LCL). Cf. T. Jud. 14.1–3, here 14.1: "And now, my children, do not get drunk on wine, for wine distorts the mind (διαστρέφει τὸν νοῦν) away from the truth, and inserts lustful wrath and guides the eyes to deception."

⁶⁴ Cf. Plato, *Leg.* 666a-c, *Tim.* 60a. Cf. Marke Ahonen, *Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy*, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 13 (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2014), 60.

⁶⁵ Cf. Lucretius, *Rer. nat.* 3.476–86, who writes that wine "disturbs" (*conturbare*) the soul (*anima*), including bodily functions. Cf. Ahonen, *Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy*, 194.

⁶⁶ See [Aristotle], *Prob.* 30.4, 957a3, where wine disturbs thinking (*διανοεῖν*). Ahonen observes that heat and mental derangement are associated by Aristotle also at *Parts of Animals* 3.10, 672b28–30, where hot fluid rises to "disturb" (*ταράττειν*) the mind (*διάνοια*). Cf. Ahonen, *Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy*, 74.

⁶⁷ Note also that the term ἄφθαρτος is attributed to God in 1 Tim 1:17, ἀφθαρσία occurs at 2 Tim 1:10, and ἀφθορία, a NT hapax, occurs at Tit 2:7 in a phrase that especially points up the contrast between healthy teaching and corruption, since Titus is to offer himself as an example of "incorruption in teaching" (ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ ἀφθορίαν).

conceptions of mental illness, and connoted a dissolution of rarified corporeal structures.⁶⁸

Insofar as the νοῦς is an organ of the soul, the application to it of the language of corruption suggests a kind of disruption or degradation of its substance, and this is illuminated by evidence from both medical and philosophical literature that deal with what we might call psychopathology, the ways in which the soul and its components are sick. This disturbance of corporeal structures is not limited to blood, tissue, and bone, however; rather, it extends to more rarified, pneumatic substances as well, such as the νοῦς. In order to assess the nature of that damage and its import for an interpretation of the Pastorals, we need first to understand the role of νοῦς in ancient discourses about the soul, and how these might have

⁶⁸ Traditionally, the language of corruption (φθείρειν and its more frequently used cognate διαφθείρειν [cf. LSJ, 1928, s.v. φθείρω, A.1] is used in the sense of "ruin, be lost, perish, destroy" and by extension "corrupt, seduce, spoil." Spicq, *TLNT* 2.278–9, s.v. καταφθείρω) notes that in the LXX, we find the term καταφθείρειν used in reference to the land (Gen 6:12–13), its products (Judg 6:4), its fruits or harvests (Wis 16:19, 22), and its trees (Dan 4:14). He notes that in the papyri it may be used of caviar that cannot be sold, a harvest in danger of ruin, and an invasion of grasshoppers that has destroyed everything. He says that it is especially common in describing prisoners who languish or rot in prison (e.g., P.Cair.Zen. 59831; P.Mich. 85,5; P.Tebt. 777, 11). The term is also used in the sense of sexual seduction. See Plutarch, *Mor.* 517f: φθοραὶ γυναικῶν. Stephanie W. Jamison has argued that the general notion of "destroy, perish" does not fit well with some uses of the term, where "scatter, sweep away" is preferable ("Thornless Paths and Others: Vedic anrksara/ Greek φθείρω*," in *Indogermanica et Italica: Festschrift für Helmut Rix zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Gerhard Meiser and Jadwiga Bendahman, Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Sprachwissenschaft 72 [Innsbruck: Institut für Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Innsbruck, 1993], 245–49). She suggests that these derive from a root sense of being "swept away, going off course, wander aimlessly" (φθέρεσθαι). In Hippocratic use, the term ἀποφθείρειν conveyed the sense of "flowing away" when it refers to abortion or miscarriage and διαφθείρειν is used similarly for miscarriage or premature birth of the ἔμβρυα or βρέφος (LSJ I.4 lists the Hippocratic treatises *Aph.* 5.53, *Epid.* 7.73, *Is.* 8.36, and *Mul.* 1.72; similarly, we find in Soranus the simplex φθείρειν used in regard to another term for miscarriage, τὸ συλληθέν at *Gyn.* 1.60.3, 1.61.1.). ("Thornless Paths and Others," 250). In response to Jamison, Jaan Puhvel has recently suggested that the etymology is ultimately related to burning. He points to the etymological explanation attributed to Aristotle regarding "louse" (φθίρ), which viewed it as arising from bodily putrefaction (*Etymologicum Magnum* 792, 40: ἀπὸ φθορᾶς σωματικῆς γινομένη): "To my thinking both *dhghwey*- 'waste away' (cf. Gk. φθίσις, Skt. *kṣiti*-, Lat. *sitis* < *dhghwi-ti*-), *dhghwer*- (Gk. φθείρω, Skt. *kṣflāratī*, Avest. *yzar*-), and *dhghwen*- (Gk. φθόνος 'envy') are root extensions of IE *dheghw*- 'burn'. . . In *dhghwer*- the nominal root form *dheghwr*- is seen in Greek τέφρα » 'ash' and in Latin *febris* 'fever'. The heat of inflammation and the liquefaction of suppuration seem combined in the semantic makeup of *dhghwer*- ("Once More Greek φθείρω," *Indogermanische Forschungen: Zeitschrift für Indogermanistik und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft* 109 [2004]: 233). Whether liquefaction or inflammation serve as the linguistic origin for φθείρειν, for our purposes it is instructive to note this basic etymological association with the *dissolution of structures*, in particular when it relates to various corporeal structures.

shaped the understanding of the Pastor's earliest audiences. For instance, how did mind relate to the body? What does it mean for a *νοῦς* to be healthy at all? What specifically would it mean for it to be corrupted? Is that corruption complete or permanent, or can it be reversed? It is to these questions and more that we now turn.

III. Toward a New Understanding of *νοῦς* in the Pastorals: Ancient Discourses on *νοῦς* and Its Pathology

A. Questions and Argument

In what follows, I argue that the Pastor's language of "corruption" of the opponents' *νοῦς* is best understood as an attempt to conjure for his readers a sense that his opponents were mentally ill, and that their state is related to their teaching. Talk of the "corruption of the mind" is the Pastor's way of communicating that the deleterious state of their mind is observable through their behavior and teachings. This suggests that the Pastor's use of *νοῦς* is more in line with ancient philosophical, medical, and, consequently, physiological notions of *νοῦς* than has been appreciated by scholarship on the Pastorals.⁶⁹ In addition to confirming the recognition that the Pastor's usage reflects the concept of *νοῦς* as a part or organ of the soul with a particular function or functions, I will demonstrate that its "corruption" is best viewed as an allegation of non-figurative mental illness. The alternative to my contention that this corruption of the mind was conceived of by the Pastor as a

⁶⁹ My attempt to think through some of the implications of the Pastor's rhetoric in terms of ancient psychology and the theories of physics (a category of which was human physiology) developed by ancient philosophers aligns to some degree with a recent turn in studies of Paul. Scholars have begun to attempt to reckon not only with the moral or protreptic relevance of ancient philosophy for the study of early Christianity, but also the "physics" of the major philosophical systems prevalent in the early Empire. For discussion, see Stanley Stowers, "Paul and the Terrain of Philosophy," *EC* 6.2 (2015): 141–56.

nonfigurative, bodily affection is that this is a metaphor, a perpetuation of the figurative application of medical analogies that characterized much of Greco-Roman philosophy. Indeed, I wholly agree that the Pastor, like Paul, makes use of metaphors (as well as similes), and that sometimes they are medical, such as the cauterization of the conscience. But the notion that a given instance of language is metaphorical often derives from modern sensibilities about what is and is not conventional or "normal." Thus, the designation "figurative" or "metaphorical" as applied to the corruption of the mind in the Pastorals should and will be challenged in what follows.

I aim to show that the impairment of the *νοῦς* suggests more than a general disapproval of the "thoughts" of the opponents or the claim that their faculty of cognition is impaired in a purely figurative manner. Rather, the Pastor's phrase "the corruption of the mind" (and with other language as well) is redolent of contemporary language for mental illness, and exegesis of these passages suggest that the Pastor harnesses language that often referred to a psychosomatic phenomenon that may be illuminated by ancient evidence regarding the mind and its affections. While others, discussed below, have noted that destruction of the *νοῦς* leaves the opponents incapable of adherence to the faith, what I wish to emphasize through the following exposition is that in the PE the *νοῦς* is thought of as an element of the human person that is subject to processes of corruption, and that this characterization corresponds to ancient Greco-Roman depictions of mental illness that are decidedly psychosomatic. One consequence of this reading of the Pastorals is to move the discussion beyond the scholarly contention that the corruption or defilement of the mind

renders the individual unable to come to or remain in the faith,⁷⁰ and to an assessment of *how* that debilitation occurs, what it means for the body as a whole, and what the resulting image of the opponents is.

Rereading the corruption of the νοῦς in this way yields an appreciation of this designation as an attempt to caricature the opponents as mentally ill. By attending to the physiology of νοῦς, we better grasp the major thrust of the Pastor's argumentation. The Pastor's argument is that the opponents have suffered major damage to the soul and its finely particled constitutive components. Their mental trauma is more than figurative; it has sickened them and corrupted their cognitive organ, and, crucially, the Pastor intimates that this loss of the use of the νοῦς will be evident to his readers. In the Pastor's formulation, this occurs either explicitly (cf. ἐκδηλος at 2 Tim 3:9)—through signaling that the opponents' noisy and fractious wrangling (1 Tim 6:4) is the result of sickness—or by suggesting that the distortion of their mind and conscience is made obvious by their "deeds" (ἔργα). These deeds, in turn, belie their claims of intellectual coherence, especially regarding God (Titus 1:16).

I argue that the author of the PE formulates his polemic against his opponents with several of the basic assumptions shared by representatives of some of the major philosophical and medical traditions of Greek and Roman antiquity. I do not make a claim for literary dependence, as though the Pastor was busy reading Hippocratic treatises or

⁷⁰ Cf. the formulation of Lips, who is right to recognize that the destruction or the defiling of the νοῦς renders the sufferers incapable of coming to or remaining in the truth. "Die Zerstörung, die Befleckung des νοῦς macht die Betroffenen unfähig, die Wahrheit zu erkennen oder bei der erkannten Wahrheit zu bleiben" (*Glaube - Gemeinde - Amt*, 56).

analyzing Aristotle's complicated theories of mind. Rather, I argue, as have some others,⁷¹ that the Pastor's language reflects a moderate awareness of contemporary philosophical and medical ideas that we know were in more general circulation. Examining ancient discussions of the mind and its disturbance grants us the opportunity to reconstruct with greater clarity what the Pastor presumes his audience will understand when he utilizes the ideas and language of mental illness and makes claims about the corruption of the νοῦς.

One particular debate in Pauline scholarship that has direct bearing on the study of the Pastorals is whether Paul regards the νοῦς as a material entity or not, and the appropriate philosophical context (e.g., Platonic, Stoic, or Aristotelian) in which to interpret Paul's anthropological categories.⁷² These debates run the risk of presuming that such distinctions were both clearly delineated and accessible to the non-specialist. In my view, Paul and the Pastor are functionally more eclectic in their adoption and adaptation of contemporary philosophy.⁷³ Furthermore, while there are substantial and important differences in the

⁷¹ Most scholars presume the pertinence of Greco-Roman literature for studying the PE. On the Pastor's familiarity with Greco-Roman literature, hortatory strategies, and moral devices, see, among many, Fiore, SP, 6–7 and Lewis R. Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles*, HUT 22 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986).

⁷² Here I try to avoid the sort of quagmire created by 1) a rigid definition of Platonism or Stoicism and 2) the insistence that one or the other must be "beneath" Paul's thinking. Both are present in the discussion of Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "A Stoic Concept of the Person in Paul?: From Galatians 5:17 to Romans 7:14-25," in *Christian Body, Christian Self: Concepts of Early Christian Personhood*, ed. Clare K. Rothschild, Trevor W. Thompson, and Robert S. Kinney, WUNT 284 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), esp. 108. "Stoicism was a materialist, monistic philosophy. Platonism was immaterialist and dualistic . . . To a Stoic, then, the 'person-making' feature was intimately connected with the body. Not so to a Platonist (or an Aristotelian)."

⁷³ Recent scholarship has turned to different options from Hellenistic psychology in order to explain Paul's complicated account of sin and law in Romans 7. See Emma Wasserman, "The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Revisiting Paul's Anthropology in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology," *JBL* 126.4 (2007): 793–816; Emma Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology*, WUNT 2.256 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Stanley K. Stowers, "Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason," in *Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe*, ed. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 253–86; Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul*; Engberg-Pedersen, "A Stoic Concept of the Person in Paul?" Luke

details between ancient psychologies, there was substantive agreement on some of the basic issues that are most pertinent for our study.⁷⁴ Additionally, even if one could make such deceptively neat labels match with the evidence of philosophical notions of mind and body in the earlier imperial period, authors from whom we have much more evidence, e.g., Philo, Plutarch, and Galen, do not appear to restrict themselves to one system or another.⁷⁵ I argue below that the cumulative weight of the evidence suggests that most philosophically educated individuals accepted in one way or another that the soul (and frequently along with it the *νοῦς*) had some sort of material and symbiotic relationship with the body and its emotions and that the diseased or corrupted state of the mind was seen as a phenomenon with physical implications for the health of the person who was mentally ill. This required some degree of corporeality for the soul, which was most often thought of as an exceedingly fine substance.⁷⁶ This was necessary to account for the capacity of body and soul to interact,

Timothy Johnson looks to Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* in order to interpret Romans 12. Johnson sees a striking similarity in their moral logic. He argues that "in Paul as in Aristotle, the capacity to 'test' or 'estimate' morally derives from the *νοῦς*, not simply intelligence as a capacity, but perhaps something closer to what we would call a 'mind-set,' that is, a moral intelligence that grasps certain fundamental principles or values. In Paul and in Aristotle, The [sic] corruption of the *νοῦς* makes moral discernment impossible rather than simply difficult. In Paul and Aristotle, prudence or discernment involves what is good for the individual but inevitably involves as well what is good for other humans. And in both writers, moral deliberation takes place within a framework that enables it to be measured" ("Transformation," 225).

⁷⁴ This is not to say that there uniformity or any lack of breadth, as the following statement of Christof Rapp suggests: "Whereas the modern critics and successors of Descartes are primarily interested in the possibility of causal interaction, the ancient concept of being common to body and soul is much broader. In addition to causal affections, it comprises relations like mere cooperation, simultaneous affections of body and soul, mere co-variation, epiphenomenal reaction, etc." ("Interaction of Body and Soul: What the Hellenistic Philosophers Saw and Aristotle Avoided," in *Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, ed. R. A. H. King [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006], 187).

⁷⁵ According to David T. Runia, Hans-Friedrich Weiss judged it a matter of taste as to whether one should describe Philo as a Platonizing Stoic or a Stoicizing Platonist (*Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato*, *Philosophia Antiqua* 44 [Leiden: Brill, 1986], 481). See further the discussion in 505–19.

⁷⁶ Cf. Gregory Alan Smith, "Very Thin Things: Towards a Cultural History of the Soul in Roman Antiquity" (PhD, Harvard University, 2005), 10–11; 21–23; Gregory A. Smith, "How Thin Is a Demon?," *J ECS* 16 (2008): 479–512.

and the belief that one could help moderate the health of the soul through various bodily practices, as well as through logotherapy.

B. Physicality & Locality of the Soul

In ancient medicine and philosophy there were various ways of conceiving of the relationship between the soul and the body and the mutual interferences and influences between them. For many authors, both before and during the Pastor's time of writing, the question of the νοῦς was intimately intertwined with their understanding of the soul, whether the soul had parts or not, whether the νοῦς could be localized in the human body, and whether or not the νοῦς was subject to the same material processes as the rest of the soul and body. The authors discussed below illustrate both the diversity of opinions and some of the striking continuities in ancient thinking regarding the mind and its pathology.

The soul, its functions, divisions, and relationship to the body were all common topics of debate amongst both philosophers and physicians in antiquity, as Aristotle reports in his account of pre-Socratic philosophers (*De an.* 403b20–405b31).⁷⁷ What they all agree on was that the soul was distinguished by three attributes: movement, sensation, and

"incorporeality" (κίνησις, αἴσθησις, τὸ ἀσώματον). We should be careful to note that

⁷⁷ The soul was sometimes identified with mind (e.g., Democritus [*De an.* 404a28–32; 405a10]). Anaxagoras thought ψυχή and νοῦς to be different (*De an.* 404b1–7), but he treats them as of one nature, and he treats νοῦς as something that has mass. Fr. B 12. See Gábor Betegh, "On the Physical Aspects of Heraclitus' Psychology with New Appendices," in *Doctrine and Doxography: Studies on Heraclitus and Pythagoras*, ed. David Sider and Dirk Obbink, *Sozomena* 14 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 232. Thales attributed a soul even to stones, insofar as soul is the cause of movement and stones move. Diogenes regarded the soul as being comprised of the finest particles. Heraclitus thinks of it as being the "most incorporeal" (ἀσωματώτατος), and in constant flux. Alcmaeon considered it to be immortal (ἀθάνατος). Others, like Hippo, thought the soul was water, and Critias imagined it to be blood. Aristotle remarks that all the elements, in fact, except for γῆ, have found supporters.

"incorporeal" does not mean "not physical," for from the time of Heraclitus⁷⁸ onward the ψυχή was thought to be physical, and was described, as the doxography of Aristotle illustrates, in terms of physical stuff, whether the physical elements like water, air, or fire, or human elements like blood. Rather, as is made clear from a later formulation of the statement (*De an.* 409b20–21), Aristotle refers to the fineness of the material, that it is "a body that is of the finest particulate or that it is the least corporeal of all (bodies)" (σῶμα τὸ λεπτομερέστατον ἢ τὸ ἀσωματώτατον τῶν ἄλλων). This physicality of soul and mind was an important feature of ancient speculation about the soul.⁷⁹

While one should be careful about overly generalized characterizations, whether pertaining to something as vast and distant as the ancient world or something as vast and more accessible as the modern world, several studies in recent years have demonstrated that many scholars, especially in the study of the genuine letters of Paul, have operated with a rather Cartesian sense of the separation between body and soul, a kind of ontological dualism.⁸⁰ Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the fact that this way of conceiving the relationship between body and soul was foreign to ancient thinkers.⁸¹ They argue that

⁷⁸ Betegh, "Physical Aspects of Heraclitus' Psychology."

⁷⁹ As Betegh notes, "The idea of using 'soul' or 'mind' as mass terms, and the corresponding idea of conceiving soul or mind as stuffs, is quite alien for us. Yet it was not so in archaic and later philosophical texts" ("Physical Aspects of Heraclitus' Psychology," 231). For Homer, the νοῦς represented the truest essence of the human being, which remained constant despite the most dramatic outward changes. See Homer, *Od.* 10.239–40. Beate Gundert, "Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine," in *Psyche and Soma Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, ed. Paul Potter and John P. Wright (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 13. For Homer, it was not linked with the soul, however, but with the body and located in the chest (θυμός, κῆρ), the center of emotions. See Gundert, "Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine," 13.

⁸⁰ Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 1–6, esp. 4; Gregory A. Smith, "Physics and Metaphysics," in *The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity*, ed. Scott Fitzgerald Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 517–18.

⁸¹ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 6; Smith, "How Thin Is a Demon?"; Cf. also Smith, "Very Thin Things."

scholarship has too often retrojected a form of Cartesian dualism onto the ancient evidence. Descartes posited a sense of mind that was almost completely distinct from the body, having no place of its own, though he did concede some attenuated form of interaction to account for bodily motion and the experience of pain. Descartes wrote, "I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists in thinking . . . has no need of place, nor is dependent on any material thing." He equated the "I" with the mind (*mens*) or soul (*animus*), and suggests that it "is wholly distinct from the body."⁸² The assumptions of modern, twentieth and twenty-first century educated individuals are frequently very similar.⁸³ By contrast, most ancient theories of mind posit a finely attenuated materiality, a physical soul that has need of place or extension within the boundaries of the human body.

As might be expected, this ancient emphasis on the physicality and locality of the soul also yielded speculation regarding the particularities of its location. The most common options for the placement of the soul were the head or the heart, and proponents of each option argued vigorously regarding its location.⁸⁴ Though the contours of this debate took

⁸² As quoted in Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 5.

⁸³ Gregory Smith, in a somewhat sarcastic formulation of the modern presumption, writes: "Upon being asked about the physical attributes of the human mind or soul, for example, an ordinary educated modern person will think this a mischievous or nonsensical question. Everyone knows that to describe minds as sharp or slow or brilliant or dull, or hearts as stony or heavy or light, is to speak figuratively, without any danger that people will think you are talking literally about squishy pulsing organs or physical qualities describing objects that can be located, seen, or otherwise measured in three-dimensional space" ("Physics and Metaphysics," 517).

⁸⁴ As noted by Heinrich von Staden, "in the recurrent Greek agon between the heart and the head [as a location for the soul], [Herophilus] sides with the proponents of the brain (Alcmaeon, Democritus, Diogenes of Apollonia, the Hippocratic treatise *Sacred Disease*, Plato, etc.) against the advocates of the heart (Empedocles ['blood around the heart'], Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, etc.)" ("Body, Soul, and Nerves: Epicurus, Herophilus, Erasistratus, the Stoics, and Galen," in *Psyche and Soma Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, ed. Paul Potter and John P. Wright [Oxford: Clarendon, 2002], 87). However, as Phillip van der Eijk points out, for Aristotle the *mind* does not properly have a fixed bodily location, seeing as how, though its operation presumes physiological processes, it is not properly bound to the physical substrate. Philip J. van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical*

shape during the Hellenistic era, it was very much alive still in the second century CE.⁸⁵

Pollux, a second century CE rhetor who is most well-known for his *Onomasticon*,⁸⁶

summarizes several philosophical and medical schemas *en route* to a discussion of their cognates:

The entire human person is composed of soul and body, and the soul is wind or fire or blood or whatever seems appropriate to the sages, and its parts are νοῦς, ἐπιθυμία, and θυμός. And now νοῦς is both the reasoning faculty and the authoritative part of the soul (λογισμὸς καὶ ἡγεμονικόν), whether it is seated in the brain in accordance with Pythagoras and Plato, or, in the cerebellum or the membrane [of the brain], as it seems to many of the doctors, or at the place between the eyebrows, as Straton⁸⁷ says, or in the blood, as Empedocles and Aristotle say, or in the heart, as the Stoa says. Now the heart is manifestly the place of the spirited part, just as the place of the desiderative part is the liver. (*Onom.* 2.226–27)⁸⁸

Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 122, 130.

⁸⁵ Brooke Holmes, "Disturbing Connections: Sympathetic Affections, Mental Disorder, and the Elusive Soul in Galen," in *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*, ed. W.V. Harris (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 149–50.

⁸⁶ Pollux's *Onomasticon* is an early example of the encyclopedic impulse characteristic of the forms and structures of knowing cultivated in the late Republican era and early Principate, as well as in late antiquity. One can compare it to comprehensive works of "natural history" such as that composed by the Elder Pliny, philosophical succession narratives (e.g., that of Diogenes Laertius), grammars (e.g., by Herodian or Dionysius Thrax), and lexica (cf. Suetonius's *περὶ βλασφημιῶν*). Pollux's *Onomasticon* was the kind of reference work one might have reached for in a library. It was organized by topic, and would have been a useful resource for scholars. See Eleanor Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship: A Guide to Finding, Reading, and Understanding Scholia, Commentaries, Lexica, and Grammatical Treatises, from Their Beginnings to the Byzantine Period*, American Philological Association: Classical Resources Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 96.

⁸⁷ Straton of Lampsacus was a third century BCE peripatetic philosopher. According to Christian Wildberg, "Strato's psychology exhibits particular originality. The soul is a pneumatic unit (fr. 108); no part of it is separable or, a possibility Aristotle considered, immortal; Strato explicitly objected to the arguments for the immortality of the soul in Plato's *Phaidōn* (fr. 123). Since the soul is integral, all the psychic processes in the central part of the soul are inseparably linked to one another: without sensory perception there is neither thinking nor feeling." See Christian Wildberg, "Straton," *BNP*, ed. Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider (Brill Online, 2016).

⁸⁸ σύγκειται μὲν δὴ ὁ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα ἢ πῦρ ἢ αἷμα ἢ ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ τοῖς σοφοῖς, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς νοῦς ἐπιθυμία θυμός. καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς καὶ λογισμὸς καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκεφάλῳ κατὰ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Πλάτωνα ἰδρυμένος, εἴτε ἐν παρεγκεφαλίδι ἢ μήνιξι, ὥς πολλοῖς τῶν ἱατρῶν δοκεῖ, εἴτε κατὰ τὸ μεσόφρυον, ὥς ἔλεγε Στράτων, εἴτε περὶ τὸ αἷμα, ὥς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, εἴτε περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὥς ἡ Στοά. θυμοῦ δὲ τόπος ἀντικρυς ἡ καρδία, καθάπερ ὁ περὶ τὸ ἥπαρ τόπος ἐπιθυμίας (my trans.).

Here Pollux privileges a Platonic tripartite division of the soul, and suggests that the placement of the reasoning part varied significantly. However, even the schematization presumed by Pollux represents what van Philip der Eijk has called a "doxographic distortion" (i.e., an overly tidy characterization of what was surely a messier reality), since enumerating locations for the "reasoning faculty" (itself a Stoic designation) represents a mischaracterization of what physicians and philosophers might have been willing to actually affirm and on what terms they could have agreed.⁸⁹ What is clear is that in Pollux's scholarly account of popular theories of the soul, νοῦς was considered to be a particular part or function of the soul responsible for higher-order reasoning and cognitive processes.

The concern to identify the location of the soul and its parts corresponds to the diagnostic efforts of ancient medical practitioners.⁹⁰ Glenda Camille McDonald shows how the "place affected," the "*locus affectus*," was itself of great significance in both the diagnosis and treatment of a variety of ailments, those of a more "psychological" nature

⁸⁹ van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity*, 122. He refers not to Pollux's brief account but to that of Caelius Aurelianus, *On Acute Affections* 1.8.53–6, and his discussion of phrenitis and where earlier theorists had presumed the ruling part of the soul to be.

⁹⁰ In the *Medical Definitions* of Ps.–Galen, we find an iteration of the idea that the psychic faculty of the soul resides in the brain. "The brain houses the psychical faculty and its ruling element (which is the rational part and the mind), the heart houses the spirited part, and the liver the appetitive part" (Ὁ ἐγκέφαλος τὴν ψυχικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ ταύτης τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὅπερ ἐστὶ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ νοῦς, ἡ δὲ καρδία τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἥπαρ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. Ps. Galen's *Def. med.* 467 = 19.459K, my trans). Also noteworthy is the fact that this author equates the rational part of the soul with the νοῦς, and calls it the ἡγεμονικόν. This equation of the νοῦς with the ἡγεμονικόν, a Stoic term, suggests a degree of synthesis and syncretism in less technical accounts of the soul and its components. This author also holds that νοῦς is active in evaluative cognitive processes. For instance, in enumerating a number of factoids about pulses in a question and answer-style, Ps.–Galen discusses the "means for judging the pulses" (κριτήρια) in terms of perception (αἴσθησις), which judges the present matters, and the mind (νοῦς), which judges things past and future" (πόσα κριτήρια σφυγμῶν; δύο· νοῦς καὶ αἴσθησις, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις κρίνει τὰ παρόντα, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τὰ προγεγονότα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα [*Puls. Ant.*] 19.638K, my trans.). From these two accounts we can begin to see just how intertwined the discussion of physiology and philosophy really were.

included.⁹¹ While the Pastor does not tell us *where* in the body he situates the νοῦς, he suggests that it is in fact the location of the problem, it is the site of corruption. This localizing of the affection in the νοῦς suggests that the Pastor's construal of his opponents' error is comparable to a medical diagnosis of symptoms. For the purposes of our argument, it is important to emphasize that "soul" or "mind" are not (typically) incorporeal or immaterial entities. For ancient thinkers, mind has mass, soul has substance, and it is subject to the same processes of generation and degeneration as the rest of the body. Indeed, Aristotle confirms that almost all the early Greek philosophers conceived of thinking in material terms: "For all these authors suppose the process of thinking to be a bodily function (τὸ νοεῖν σωματικόν) like perceiving, and that men both perceive and recognize like by like, as we have explained at the beginning of this treatise."⁹² As noted above, many writers who discuss the topic in antiquity held that the soul was itself some kind of body, insofar as it was made of material stuff.⁹³ The consequence of this understanding of the body and the soul, and along with them the mind, is that physical maladies were understood to impact the mind, just as surely as diseases and emotions (also material, mental phenomena) could impact the body. It is this broad context in which we must interpret the Pastor's medical imagery and the notion of a corruption of the νοῦς. Otherwise,

⁹¹ Of course, not all physicians supposed that one could isolate a particular location for an ailment. The Methodists, for instance, held that diseased conditions occurred generally and affected the entire body. Glenda Camille McDonald, "The '*locus affectus*' in Ancient Medical Theories of Disease," in *Medicine and Space: Body, Surroundings and Borders in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, ed. Karine van't Land, Han Nijdam, and Patricia Anne Baker, VMA 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 63. But on the whole there was a tendency to isolate an ailment to a particular location so as to assess options for treatment.

⁹² πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικόν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπόλαμβάνουσιν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς λόγοις διωρίσαμεν (*De an.* 427a27–427b1 [Hett, LCL]).

⁹³ A notable exception is Aristotle, who understood soul not to be a body but to be the body's nonbodily form. See further Julia Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, HCS 8 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 42.

we move too quickly to the assumption that this claim of the Pastor, i.e., that the opponents are corrupted in the *νοῦς*, operates exclusively at the level of metaphor. This is not the case, but even if it were, it would not be a metaphor that we can readily understand without appreciating the profound interconnectedness of the body and soul in ancient medical and philosophical discourse.

In what follows I demonstrate—first with the Hippocratic treatises and then with representatives of the major philosophical traditions that were active in the time of the Pastor—that while theories of the soul and its disturbance varied in its particulars, there is consistency regarding several elements that help us contextualize the assumptions made by the author of the Pastoral Epistles. The goal is to demonstrate, with reference to some illustrative examples from medical and philosophical literature, that the Pastor's language of "corrupting the *νοῦς*" evokes a discourse of mental illness. In that discourse, the suggestion of mental corruption connotes at times the deterioration of the ultrafine material substance that constituted *νοῦς*, or in the case of the Platonic tradition, a disordering of the parts of the soul such that the *νοῦς*, while immaterial and incorporeal, fails to exercise hegemony. I consider it likely that the author of the Pastorals was strategic in his choice of terms, and that the intended goal was to cause aversion in his readers by conveying the notion that those who deviate from the Pauline tradition are literally ill, diseased in the mind, and this disease is one that is caused by inordinate desires and erroneous beliefs and whose symptoms are observable in the irrational behavior of the opponents.

The texts discussed below provide glimpses into an intellectual and cultural context within which the Pastor's language becomes intelligible as a derisive and scathing

characterization of the mental illness of his opponents. For the Pastor and the authors discussed below, mental illness was a condition accompanied by a wide array of visible and diagnosable behaviors that were recognizable as symptoms of mental illness. Though the following selection proceeds in a roughly chronological manner, these authors are discussed because their ideas had enough of an afterlife to provide us with a rough outline of what kinds of ideas of mind and its pathology the author of the Pastorals could have had access to in an urban context in the early Roman Empire.⁹⁴ No claim of *direct* dependence or influence is implied. Rather, these authors provide a helpful starting point for assessing the range of potential options for how a moderately well-educated author like the Pastor might have expected his polemic of mental illness to be understood by his audience, namely, as pertaining to the corporeal deterioration of pneumatically constructed mind as part and parcel of the overall health of those suffering under such ailments.

C. Hippocratics

Ancient authors frequently theorize the disturbance of the νοῦς as a species of mental illness. This is on vivid display in numerous texts from the Hippocratic corpus. There is a variety of ways in which the Hippocratic authors theorize the soul and its disturbance. Some Hippocratic authors assume the brain to be the center of mental function (e.g., *Diseases III* 2–4) or make it explicit that this is the case (*On the Sacred Disease* 17).⁹⁵ This location for

⁹⁴ F. Gerald Downing argues persuasively that the social and intellectual culture of the early Roman Empire allowed for a relative permeability of ideas between elites and the masses (“A Bas Les Aristos: The Relevance of Higher Literature for the Understanding of the Earliest Christian Writings,” *NovT* 30 [1988]: 212–30).

⁹⁵ See the discussion of Paul Potter, *Hippocrates: Coan Prenotions. Anatomical and Minor Clinical Writings*, vol. 9 of *LCL* 509 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 54.

the mind is mentioned in a discussion of melancholy in the medical papyrus Anonymous of Paris, entitled *On Acute and Chronic Diseases*, which included testimony concerning Hippocrates and some of his successors: "The cause of melancholy. Praxagoras and Diocles say that the affection occurs when black bile congeals around the heart (μελαίνης χολῆς περὶ τὴν καρδίαν) and alters the faculty proper to the soul (ἡ ψυχικὴ δύναμις). Hippocrates says that the affection is completing its course when this [sc. black bile] has advanced to the head and is corrupting the sacred mind in the brain (φθειροῦσα τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἱερὸν νοῦν)." ⁹⁶ In this text we find evidence that black bile, the particular humor that was seen as the primary cause of the eponymous mental disorder μελαγχολία, was thought to effect derangement of the soul. For the physicians Praxagoras of Cos and Diocles of Carystus, this occurs primarily in the heart, while for Hippocrates the corruption of the νοῦς in the brain is the result of black bile ascending to the head. Anonymous treats φρενίτις similarly, explaining with regard to Hippocrates, for instance, that he understands the disease to occur because of blood in the membrane around the brain being "corrupted by bile" (ὕπὸ τῆς χολῆς φθαρῆ). The blood of the brain, where νοῦς is positioned (τετάχθαι), is subject to movement (κίνησις) contrary to nature and produces a disturbance of reasoning. ⁹⁷

For the author of *On the Sacred Disease*, the brain is where the νοῦς resides, and black bile is only one of the humors that could achieve dramatic disruption of the mind,

⁹⁶ Anonymous of Paris, *On Acute and Chronic Diseases* 19. Greek text from Philip J van der Eijk, "Rufus' On Melancholy and Its Philosophical Background," in *Rufus of Ephesus: On Melancholy*, ed. Peter E. Pormann, Sapere 12 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 169 n. 34. My trans. The mention of the "sacred mind" is based on an analogy attributed to Hippocrates by Anonymous in his section on φρενίτις, that the mind is in the brain "just as a sacred statue on the acropolis of the body" (Philip J. van der Eijk, "The Anonymous Parisinus and the Doctrines of 'the Ancients,'" in *Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity*, ed. Philip J. van der Eijk [Leiden: Brill, 1999], 308).

⁹⁷ van der Eijk, "The Anonymous Parisinus and the Doctrines of 'the Ancients,'" 308–9.

located in the brain. In fact, the central importance of the brain is a particularly noteworthy feature of the treatise; the following quotation is representative of the whole:

Men ought to know that from the brain, and from the brain only, arise our pleasures, joys, laughter and jests (αἱ ἡδοναὶ γίνονται καὶ εὐφροσύνη καὶ γέλωτες καὶ παιδιαί), as well as our sorrows, pains, griefs and tears (λύπαι καὶ ἀνίαι καὶ δυσφροσύνη καὶ κλαυθμοί). Through it, in particular, we think, see, hear, and distinguish (τούτῳ φρονέομεν μάλιστα καὶ βλέπομεν καὶ ἀκούομεν καὶ διαγινώσκομεν) the ugly from the beautiful, the bad from the good, the pleasant from the unpleasant, in some cases using custom as a test, in others perceiving them from their utility. It is the same thing which makes us mad or delirious (μαινόμεθα καὶ παραφρονέομεν), inspires us with dread and fear, whether by night or by day, brings sleeplessness, inopportune mistakes, aimless anxieties, absent-mindedness, and acts that are contrary to habit. These things that we suffer (πάσχομεν) all come from the brain, when it is not healthy (ὅταν οὗτος μὴ ὑγιαίνει), but becomes abnormally hot, cold, moist, or dry (θερμότερος τῆς φύσιος γένηται ἢ ψυχρότερος ἢ ὑγρότερος ἢ ξηρότερος), or suffers any other unnatural affection (πάθος παρὰ τὴν φύσιν) to which it was not accustomed. Madness comes from its moistness (μαινόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ ὑγρότητος). When the brain is abnormally moist, of necessity it moves, and when it moves neither sight nor hearing are still, but we see or hear now one thing and now another, and the tongue speaks in accordance with the things seen and heard on any occasion. But all the time the brain is still a man is intelligent. (*Morb. sacr.* 17)⁹⁸

In *On the Sacred Disease*, then, disturbances of mental function are attributed to physical causes such as bile or phlegm affecting the brain (cf. *Morb. sacr.* 18). In this text we can see that the language of health (ὑγιαίνειν) and sickness (πάθος) is used in regard to various humoral fluctuations. When the brain, as home to the νοῦς, is ill, all sorts of perceptual distortions occur. This is explained in almost mechanistic language: excessive moistness

⁹⁸ Εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἡμῖν αἱ ἡδοναὶ γίνονται καὶ εὐφροσύνη καὶ γέλωτες καὶ παιδιαί ἢ ἐντεῦθεν, καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἀνίαι καὶ δυσφροσύνη καὶ κλαυθμοί. καὶ τούτῳ φρονέομεν μάλιστα καὶ βλέπομεν καὶ ἀκούομεν καὶ διαγινώσκομεν τὰ τε αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀηδέα, τὰ μὲν νόμῳ διακρίνοντας, τὰ δὲ τῷ συμφέροντι αἰσθανόμενοι. τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ τούτῳ καὶ μαινόμεθα καὶ παραφρονέομεν, καὶ δείματα καὶ φόβοι παρίστανται ἡμῖν, τὰ μὲν νύκτωρ, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέρην, καὶ ἀγρυπνίαι καὶ πλάνοι ἄκαιροι, καὶ φροντίδες οὐχ ἰκνεύμεναι, καὶ ἀγνωσίαι τῶν καθεστώτων καὶ ἀηθίαι. καὶ ταῦτα πάσχομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου πάντα, ὅταν οὗτος μὴ ὑγιαίνει, ἀλλὰ θερμότερος τῆς φύσιος γένηται ἢ ψυχρότερος ἢ ὑγρότερος ἢ ξηρότερος, ἢ τι ἄλλο πεπόνθῃ πάθος παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ὃ μὴ ἐώθει. καὶ μαινόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ ὑγρότητος· ὅταν γὰρ ὑγρότερος τῆς φύσιος ᾖ, ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, κινευμένου δὲ μήτε τὴν ὄψιν ἀτρεμίζειν μήτε τὴν ἀκοήν, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλα ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν, τὴν τε γλῶσσαν τοιαῦτα διαλέγεσθαι ὅσα ἂν βλέπῃ τε καὶ ἀκούῃ ἐκάστοτε· ὅσον δ' ἂν ἀτρεμήσῃ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος χρόνον, τοσοῦτον καὶ φρονεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος (Jones, LCL).

results in excessive motion, and excessive motion produces distortions of the mind and its perceptual faculties. Similarly, for the author of the Hippocratic treatise *Glands*, if the brain's purgations cannot exit, the buildup of moisture causes the brain to become ill (cf. νοῦσος αὐτῷ). The first harm comes in the form of affections of the nature (πάθη τῆς φύσεως).⁹⁹ The brain becomes irritated and the νοῦς becomes deranged or the γνώμη becomes troubled.¹⁰⁰ Thus, the brain might be affected by excessive temperatures or degrees of moistness, and these effect movement.¹⁰¹ Relative stillness and quietude in the mind, as

⁹⁹ "Secondly, the brain is harmed and is not healthy itself; and if it is irritated, it suffers a great disturbance, the mind is deranged (ὁ νόος ἀφραίνει), and the brain pulls and convulses the whole person, who sometimes becomes speechless and is suffocated; the name of this disease is apoplexy. Other times the fluxion is not made sharp, but the afflux, being great in quantity, causes pain; the reason is disturbed (ἡ γνώμη ταραττεται) and the victim goes about thinking and seeing alien things; one bears this kind of disease with grinning laughter and grotesque visions" (ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλος πῆμα ἴσχει καὶ αὐτὸς οὐχ ὑγιαίνων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν δάκνοιτο, τάραχον πολὺν ἴσχει, καὶ ὁ νόος ἀφραίνει, καὶ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος σπᾶται καὶ ἔλκει τὸν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐ φωνέει καὶ πνίγεται, ἀποπληξίῃ τῷ πάθει τοῦνομα. ἄλλοτε δὲ δριμύ μὲν οὐ ποιεῖται τὸ ρεῦμα, πλῆθος δ' ὃν τὸ ἐμπροσθὸν πονέει τοῦτο, καὶ ἡ γνώμη ταραττεται, καὶ περίεσιν ἀλλοῖα φρονῶν καὶ ἀλλοῖα ὀρέων· φέρων τὸ ἥθος τῆς νοῦσου σεσηρόσι μειδιήμασι καὶ ἀλλοκότοισι φαντάσμασιν [*Glands* 12; Potter, LCL]).

¹⁰⁰ *Glands* 12. See Gundert, "Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine," 26 n. 76.

¹⁰¹ In the Hippocratic treatise *Vict.* I 35, the author expounds at length upon the "intelligence of the soul" (φρόνησις ψυχῆς) and the lack thereof (ἀφροσύνη). The relative acuity of the mind is attributed to the particular blend of fire and water, and their respective dryness, wetness, or density. The particular combination affects all manner of mental abilities, including memory, sense perception, and aptitude for learning. What is notable for our purposes is the assumption of the author that a variety of activities, such as walks, vomiting, unction, and vapor baths can improve or maintain mental health and prevent its degradation (*Vict.* I 35). For the Hippocratic author of this treatise, a principle of balance is operative, for it is the relative mixture and interaction of certain elements that determines stability, but mental function is located in the "passages" (πόροι) of the body wherein the soul makes its revolutions (see Gundert, "Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine," 26. van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity*, 127–8]. Heat or fire in its purest form is said to contain ψυχῆ, νοῦς, and φρόνησις, in addition to "movement, growth, decrease, change, sleep, and walking" (Gundert, "Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine," 17). Thus, the soul requires the right balance of fire, water, and the density of those elements in order to maintain correct perception and thought (Gundert, "Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine," 22–24). The balance of fire and water most conducive to an intelligent soul may in part be achieved through a regulation of exercise and diet.⁴ The Hippocratic author alleges that individuals who are especially moist in their soul suffer from what are deemed irrational or imbecilic behaviors (*Vict.* I 35). See discussion by Philip van der Eijk, "Medicine and Health in the Graeco-Roman World," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Medicine*, ed. Mark Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 33. Yet for other Hippocratic authors, it is the blood that contains intelligence, thought, or mind, and various disturbances or changes to them result in corresponding changes to mental functions. For the author of *Breaths*, for instance, a cooling of the blood in sleep results in a difference of δόξαι ("opinions" or "visions")

in philosophy and in the PE (cf. 1 Tim 2:2, 11), is here associated with sanity and presence of mind, while erratic movement is associated with dysfunction.¹⁰²

These treatises suggest that for the Hippocratic authors there is no concept of mental illness or mental health that might be described as distinct from illness or health in general. The mind's corporeality is a given throughout,¹⁰³ and the cause of mental illness is described in terms of the mind or spirit's physical attributes, such as coarseness or smoothness, moistness or dryness, or the balance or imbalance of humors. While the Hippocratics utilize a diverse vocabulary for a variety of disturbances of the mental function,¹⁰⁴ the psychic and the somatic are intimately related, and disturbance in one results in malfunction of the other.¹⁰⁵ All mental illnesses have physical causes, and all

during sleep; i.e., dreams), while an increase of blood due to drunkenness results in a change of thoughts (φρονήματα) (*Breaths* 14).

¹⁰² In the PE, the silence of the wife in learning (1 Tim 2:11) is aligned with the concept of σωφροσύνη, or sober-mindedness (1 Tim 2:9, 15). In the PE, disorderly violation of the quiet stillness required is seen as arising from the impulses of passion and vice (cf. e.g., Titus 3:1–3). Passions and garulity mark those who are unhealthy (cf. Titus 1:10–13).

¹⁰³ The Hippocratic author who penned the brief treatise *On the Heart* (περὶ καρδίας) allows only a momentary speculation regarding the soul, but it exemplifies the physicalist assumptions made regarding the mind and its corruption or its renewal. After describing the anatomy of the heart in a rather clinical tone (*Cord.* 1–9), the author posits that neither water (ὕδωρ) nor air (φύσα) could permeate the left ventricle of the heart, since its membranes are constructed "more precisely" (ἀτρεκέστερον [*Cord.* 10]). The unstated assumption here is that soul is made of exceedingly fine stuff, and were the membrane too porous, it might not stay put. On the thinness of souls in antiquity, see Smith, "How Thin Is a Demon?" and Smith, "Very Thin Things." The author of *Cord.* suggests that this is rightly so (κατὰ δίκην), since the γνώμη, which "rules the other [part of the] soul" (ἄρχει τῆς ἄλλης ψυχῆς) resides in the left ventricle of the heart (ἐν τῇ λαιῇ κοιλίῃ). The left ventricle was thought by both Eristratus and Galen to be the place where vital pneuma was produced. For this and other similarities between Galen's psycho-physiology and Eristratus', see Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 112. This γνώμη, it is worth pointing out, is nourished by "a pure and luminous bath coming from the distillate of the blood" (*Cord.* 11 [Jones, LCL]). Thus we see that the same function given to νοῦς in the Platonic tripartite conception of the soul is given to γνώμη in this particular Hippocratic account. The very process of thinking is conceived of in a patently physicalist way, such that the author conceives of the soul's cognitive organ as being replenished by blood in the heart.

¹⁰⁴ Chiara Thumiger, "The Early Greek Medical Vocabulary of Insanity," in *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*, ed. Harris, 61–96.

¹⁰⁵ Gundert, "Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine," 29.

treatments, including advice about diet and exercise, are aimed at ameliorating or offsetting these physical causes.¹⁰⁶

D. Plato

In Platonic theories of the soul,¹⁰⁷ which are generally considered to entail the immortality of the soul, the rational part of the soul is affected in a sympathetic relationship to the body. Plato does depict a kind of dualism in some of his writings, such as the *Phaedo*, that suggests a radical difference between the immortal soul and the mortal body. However, in the *Timaeus*, perhaps coming from the latest period of Plato's writing career,¹⁰⁸ Plato explicitly correlates the body and the soul, even going so far as to describe the "living creature" (ζῶον) as the "comingling of both" (ὁ συναμφότερος) the body and the soul (*Tim.*

¹⁰⁶ Van der Eijk, "Medicine and Health in the Graeco-Roman World," 32.

¹⁰⁷ Discerning Plato's notion of the soul and the role of νοῦς is complicated by the fact that in some early dialogues he seems to be reflecting on what Socrates taught. Socrates' own position, deduced from the earliest dialogues in the modern scholarly periodization of Plato's *oeuvre*, ranged from various forms of dualism (*Gorgias*, *Alcibiades I*) to monism (*Charmides*). Plato's own philosophical experimentation on the notion of the soul is reflected in other dialogues. The *Phaedo* suggests a rather antagonistic relationship between body and soul, wherein bodily evils trouble the soul (T. M. Robinson, "The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato," in *Psyche and Soma Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, ed. Paul Potter and Wright, John P. [Oxford: Clarendon, 2002], 42–44). The *Republic*, famously, introduces the notion of a tripartite soul by analogy with the three kinds of natures of people in the city (435b): the reasoning part (λογιστικόν), the spirited (θυμοειδές), and the appetitive (ἐπιθυμητικόν) part, meaning something like "gut desire." See *Resp.* 440e, 441e; cf. 506e. This translation "gut desire" is suggested by Robinson, "The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato," 44. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato posits a new definition of rational soul as "self-moving motion" (245c–246a), a position that he affirms in *Laws* but extends to include all soul (cf. Robinson, "The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato," 52–53). For the νοῦς as ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης, see *Phaedr.* 247d. These movements include 'wish, reflection, foresight, counsel, judgment, true or false, pleasure, pain, hope, fear, hate, love, and whatever kindred, or primary motions there might be" (*Leg.* 897a). Cf. Robinson, "The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato," 53.

¹⁰⁸ Donald J. Zeyl, *Plato's Timaeus. Translated with Introduction* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), xvi–xx. The popularity of the *Timaeus* in antiquity, and its influence on Philo in particular, is the subject of a lengthy monograph: Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato*.

87e). He argues that their impact upon each other is evident most acutely when the body and soul are disproportionate in strength or capacity.

Whenever the soul within it is stronger than the body and is in a very passionate state, it shakes up the whole body from within and fills it with maladies; and whenever the soul ardently pursues some study or investigation (ὅταν εἷς τινὰς μαθήσεις καὶ ζητήσεις ξυντόνως ἦ), it wastes the body; and again, when the soul engages, in public or in private, in teachings and battles of words (μάχαι ἐν λόγοις) carried on with controversy and contention ([δι'] ἐρίδων καὶ φιλονεικίας), it makes the body inflamed and shakes it to pieces (διάπυρον αὐτὸ ποιοῦσα σαλεύει), and induces catarrhs; and thereby it deceives the majority of so-called physicians and makes them ascribe the malady to the wrong cause. (*Tim.* 87e-88a)¹⁰⁹

This is a vivid depiction of the kind of damage associated with excessive verbal disputes.

The soul, troubled by excessive and zealous engagement in contentious debates, has the effect of diluting and rarifying (κατατῆκειν) the bodily humors, such that they flow and mix inappropriately, yielding various maladies that, Plato tells us, are misdiagnosed by physicians who presumably are unaware that their patients have been engaging in these kinds of damaging debates.¹¹⁰ Of particular importance for this study is the ill-effect of public or private disputations, since "teachings and battles of words carried on with controversy and contention . . . make the body inflamed and shake it to pieces, and induces catarrhs." These dramatic effects of logomachy (cf. μάχαι ἐν λόγοις and λογομαχία [1 Tim 6:4], λογομαχεῖν [2 Tim 2:14]) suggest a dynamic relationship between the kinds of philosophical discourse or conversation one engages in and very tangible health results.

¹⁰⁹ . . . ὥς ὅταν τε ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ κρείττων οὔσα σώματος περιθύμῃς ἴσχη, διασείουσα πᾶν αὐτὸ ἐνδοθεν νόσων ἐμπίπλησι, καὶ ὅταν εἷς τινὰς μαθήσεις καὶ ζητήσεις ξυντόνως ἦ, κατατῆκει, διδαχὰς τ' αὖ καὶ μάχας ἐν λόγοις ποιουμένη δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ [δι'] ἐρίδων καὶ φιλονεικίας γιγνομένων διάπυρον αὐτὸ ποιοῦσα σαλεύει, καὶ ρεύματα ἐπάγουσα, τῶν λεγομένων ἰατρῶν ἀπατῶσα τοὺς πλείστους, τὰνάϊτια αἰτιᾶσθαι ποιεῖ (Bury, LCL).

¹¹⁰ T. M. Robinson notes the progression of Plato's thought on the soul-body relationship over the course of his writings by pointing back to the *Gorgias*, wherein the soul and body are described as parallel entities, each with its own separate causes and remedies of sickness, whether somatic or psychic ("The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato," 51).

From this perspective, the statement in 1 Timothy 6:5 that the "fretful wranglings of men thoroughly corrupted in the mind" derive from (cf. ἐξ ὧν) verbal battles (λογομαχίαι) is in keeping with the ancient philosophical discourse about mental illness.

Thus, while the Platonic theory of the soul famously includes the idea of its immortality¹¹¹ and essential divisibility from the body, this does not suggest that the body has no impact on the soul. Quite to the contrary, to be "implanted" (ἐμφυτευθῆναι [*Tim.* 42a]) in the body means that the soul is subject to the "'violent' assaults of the corporeal environment."¹¹² In light of the Cartesian propensity to posit a hard and fast divide between the immortal soul and the mortal body, it is important to note that this is said of the immortal or divine part of the soul (cf. "the immortal principle of soul" ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον [69c], i.e. "the divine part" τὸ θεῖον [69d]), thought to be encased in the head (κεφαλῇ [*Tim.* 44d]).¹¹³ Of the two mortal (θνητὸν) parts of the soul, the "spirited part" (τὸ θυμοειδές, θυμός) is placed in the καρδία (70a-b), while the appetitive part of the soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς [70d]) is placed in the spleen and the liver (70d-72b).¹¹⁴ The activity of the νοῦς, as a part of the upper part of the soul, is not restricted to the head, since it becomes clear in the course of Plato's discussion that "the power of thoughts coming from the mind" (τῶν διανοημάτων ἢ ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ φερομένη δύναμις) can influence the lowest part of

¹¹¹ With less nuance than is found in the *Timaeus*, the *Phaedrus* suggests that all soul is immortal, without distinction between the different parts (245c-e).

¹¹² Francis Macdonald Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1937), 147.

¹¹³ As often when making statements about the soul, Plato stops short of asserting certainty, preferring rather to speak in terms of it being "probable" (εἰκός [72d]). Cf. *Phaed.* 246a, where Plato suggests that to speak of the forms of the soul as they really are is beyond his grasp.

¹¹⁴ This is placed between the midriff and the navel (cf. τοῦτο εἰς τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν τε φρενῶν καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν ὀμφαλὸν ὅρου [70d]). See the discussion of Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, 147.

the soul (71b).¹¹⁵ A certain redemption, or rectification (cf. κατορθοῦν [71e]) of this lower part of the soul, the "vile part" (τὸ φαῦλον), is accomplished through divination (ἡ μαντική), which is said to occur only when someone is not fully "in the mind" (ἐννοῦς).¹¹⁶ The implication of this theory of mantic activity is that the intellectual organ, the highest part of the soul, νοῦς, is affected by both the mundane and the extraordinary, whether "bound" (πεδηθῆναι) by sleep or "changed" (παραλλαγῆναι) by disease or prophetic frenzy. In other words, the disturbance of the mind can be effected by disease, and a mind disturbed can easily lead to more general sickness as well (as seen above in *Tim.* 87e-88a).

E. Aristotle

Aristotle's writings on the soul and its components, though likely removed from the Pastor's immediate awareness, form a part of our consideration of the Pastor's psychology because they posited a type of seamless reciprocity between soul and body that later thinkers would have to come to terms with, if only through the peripatetic ancestors of Aristotle who helped shape the intellectual landscape of the early Empire. Even if the Pastor was not directly aware of Aristotle's widely influential work on the soul, it constitutes yet another major statement that would shape later philosophical and cultural discourses well

¹¹⁵ Cf. 71c-d where a "some breath of gentleness from the intellect" (πραότητός τις ἐκ διανοίας ἐπίπνοια) also has the capacity to calm the lowest part of the soul, housed in the liver.

¹¹⁶ And that God gave unto man's foolishness the gift of divination a sufficient token is this: no man achieves true and inspired divination when in his rational mind (ἐννοῦς), but only when the power of his intelligence (φρονήσεως δύναμις) is fettered in sleep or when it is distraught by disease or by reason of some divine inspiration (ἱκανὸν δὲ σημεῖον ὡς μαντικὴν ἀφροσύνη θεὸς ἀνθρωπίνῃ δέδωκεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐννοῦς ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὕπνον τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως πεδηθεὶς δύναμιν ἢ διὰ νόσον ἢ διὰ τινα ἐνθουσιασμόν παραλλάξας [*Tim.* 71e; Bury, LCL]).

through the second century CE.¹¹⁷ As such, Aristotelian notions of mind and body provide a useful point of comparison in our consideration of the Pastor's own construal of mind, body, and their disturbance.

Aristotle's psychological theory is predicated upon his theory that the body and the soul are not in fact separate entities, but mutually interdependent aspects of the human person.¹¹⁸ This concept of body-soul interaction leads to a "psycho-physical" theory of emotions, one in which emotions are not without effect on the body. For instance, anger produces a burning heat in the region of the heart (*De an.* 403a30–31).¹¹⁹ At the same time, Aristotle's writings display a certain ambivalence on the mind-body problem. Philip van der Eijk has suggested that while "on the whole he seems to present the soul as something

¹¹⁷ Aristotle's *De anima* had a profound impact upon later generations, and all serious philosophers had to come to terms with his understanding of the soul. Galen, for instance, though he at times seems dismissive of Aristotle, is in fact highly influenced by Aristotle's psychology. For discussion, see Ian Johnston, *Galen On Diseases and Symptoms: Translated with Introduction and Notes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 11–14. Aristotle also participated in the ongoing attempt to identify the location of the soul when he locates the authoritative part of the soul not in the head but in the heart, arguing that it needs to be in the middle of the body so as better to impart impulses to the rest of the body (Cf. *Mot. an.* 8–10 = 701b33–703b2, cited by Ahonen, *Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy*, 73 n. 13]. Aristotle was joined by two doctors from the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE, respectively, Praxagoras of Cos and Diocles of Carystus, who both argue that the heart is the primary seat of the mind, and "psychic pneuma" has its origin in the heart. They conclude, for instance, that it is the concentration of phlegmatic humors in the thick artery of the heart that results in epilepsy (van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity*, 134). Furthermore, Diocles attributes an important part to the brain in the activity of sense perception (van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity*, 129 n. 26 cites Diocles frags. 78 and 80 vDE). Troy Martin comments that scholars of ancient medicine differ on Diocles's exact position on the relationship between the heart and the brain in terms of the production and transference and residence of psychic pneuma ("Paul's Pneumatological Statements and Ancient Medical Texts," in *New Testament and Early Christian Literature in the Greco-Roman Context: Studies in Honor of David E. Aune*, ed. John Fotopoulos, NovTSup 122 [Leiden: Brill, 2006], 108 n. 10).

¹¹⁸ We find the clearest statement of his theory in his highly influential treatise *On the Soul* (*De anima*). Matter (ὕλη) and form (μορφή) combine (*De an.* 412a1–413b34), and their mixture has led to the designation "hylomorphic" (van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity*, 173).

¹¹⁹ Though the physiognomic treatise attributed to Aristotle is unlikely to be by him, Ahonen, *Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy*, 72–73 suggests that the connection between bodily and psychological characteristics and especially the discussion of μανία at 4, 808b11–26 would likely have been endorsed by Aristotle.

abstract, a form or pattern . . . on some occasions he seems to be suggesting that it is actually a spatially extended entity which is located somewhere in the body, and *in* which certain things take place."¹²⁰ Van der Eijk suggests that Aristotle's metaphysical proclivities "may have led him to the assumption of an incorporeal and immortal power, the *νοῦς*, which enters the natural soul-body composite 'from outside' (*thyrathen*), and whose activity does not involve a bodily substrate."¹²¹

Aristotle holds that *νοῦς* is itself a phenomenon with no existence apart from the occurrence of thinking (*νοεῖν*). Thus, the parts of the soul are not spatially distinguishable or distributed to different parts of the body as they are in Plato. Rather, they are faculties wherein a number of body parts are coordinate.¹²² It must also be observed, however, that even if, for Aristotle, *νοῦς* is not resident in the soul but only exists when thinking occurs,

¹²⁰ Philip J. van der Eijk, "Aristotle's Psycho-Physiological Account of the Soul-Body Relationship," in *Psyche and Soma Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, ed. Paul Potter and Wright, John P. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 58.

¹²¹ van der Eijk, "Aristotle's Psycho-Physiological Account of the Soul-Body Relationship," 58. At the same time, as Van der Eijk argues, "The overall picture suggests that Aristotle believes that bodily agents can be both impeding and facilitating factors at all levels of "psychic" activity, including the workings of the intellect, that they may engender a certain element of tension in the otherwise so harmonious relation between the soul and the body, and that this imbalance needs to be corrected by a number of dietetic, moral, and educational measures in order to fit the human being for the kind of life that is appropriate to it" ("Aristotle's Psycho-Physiological Account of the Soul-Body Relationship," 60); Julia Annas concedes that Aristotle's theory of a separable *νοῦς* may constitute a "limited exception" to her contention that he, like Stoics and Epicureans, espouses a "physicalist" theory of nature, including the soul *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, 3 n. 5.

¹²² van der Eijk, "Aristotle's Psycho-Physiological Account of the Soul-Body Relationship" 68–69. Aristotle writes: "That part of the soul, then, which we call mind (*νοῦς*) (by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgements) has no actual existence until it thinks. So it is unreasonable to suppose that it is mixed with the body; for in that case it would become somehow qualitative, e.g., hot or cold, or would even have some organ, as the sensitive faculty has; but in fact it has none. It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms, except that this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only in its thinking capacity, and the forms occupy it not actually but only potentially" (*ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἢ ψυχὴ) οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργεία τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι εὐλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποιός τις γὰρ ἂν γίνοιτο, ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμὸς, ἢ καὶ ὄργανόν τι εἶη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δ' οὐθέν ἐστιν. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἢ νοητικὴ, οὔτε ἐντελεχεία ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἶδη [De an. 429a23–30; Hett, LCL]).*

he still seems to grant that the mind can be clouded by physical causes, including disease.¹²³

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we see Aristotle suggest the possibility that the "best part" of the human person, responsible for "ruling and guiding and having cognizance of things noble and divine" (ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων) is, in fact, ὁ νοῦς.¹²⁴ Furthermore, in Aristotle's schema, νοῦς is given the role of discerning by inductive means indemonstrable first principles (ἀρχαί).¹²⁵ νοῦς is said to apprehend "limits" or "definitions" (ὅροι).¹²⁶

¹²³ In his discussion of imagination, Aristotle suggests that animals (τὰ θηρία) are susceptible to the misdirection of imaginations (φαντασίαι) because they "have no mind" (τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν [429a4–9]). For the phrase ἔχειν νοῦν, we find in Aristotle the mention of someone who "has νοῦς" in contrast with a "simpleton or a madman" (ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος), see *Eth. nic.* 3.3.2 (1112a21). Humans, like animals, are susceptible to imagination, not because of the lack of a discerning mind, but because their mind is impaired such that it mistakes imaginations for sensations. Or, as Aristotle puts it, "because the mind is sometimes obscured by emotion, diseases, or sleep" (τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίστε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ). "Since sight is the chief sense, the name φαντασία (imagination) is derived from φάος (light), because without light it is impossible to see. Again, because imaginations persist in us and resemble sensations, living creatures frequently act in accordance with them, some, viz., the brutes, because they have no mind, and some, viz., men, because the mind is temporarily clouded over by emotion, or disease, or sleep. Let this suffice about the nature and cause of imagination" (ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἰσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἰληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίστε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι. ἰδεῖν. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῶα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίστε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι. περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον [*De an.* 429a4–9; Hett, LCL]). On Aristotle's treatment of how sleep affects the mind, see van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity*, 169–205.

¹²⁴ *Eth. nic.* 10.7.1 (1177a12–18).

¹²⁵ *Eth. nic.* 6.6.2 (1141a2–8).

¹²⁶ *Eth. nic.* 6.8.9 (1142a26–30). Cf. 6.11.4–5 (1143a35–1143b8). The close, if problematic, relationship between thought or understanding (διάνοια) and the body is clarified somewhat by *Physics* 247b17–248a2, wherein Aristotle suggests that "the condition of understanding or knowing results (φρόνιμόν τι γίγνεται καὶ ἐπιστήμον) from the soul (ψυχή) coming to a state of stillness out of the turbulence natural to it (ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς παραχῆς) (this is why children cannot acquire knowledge [μυθάνειν] or pass judgements as to things of sense [τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁμοίως κρίνειν] as grown men can, for their bodies are in a state of great turbulence and instability [ἢ παραχῆ καὶ ἢ κίνησις])" (Wicksteed & Cornford, LCL). For Aristotle, the activity of the mind or thought (διάνοια), thus relies in part upon the state of the body. Theodore Tracy maintains that for Aristotle "knowledge is acquired and activated only when the body, and the sensory system in particular, *calms down*, being freed from disturbance and brought to a state of stable equilibrium in all respects, i.e. to a state of maturity, health, sobriety, and moral excellence. Some of these may be produced by natural processes alone; others, like health and moral excellence, may require assistance from the physician and trainer, the moral guide and statesman" (*Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle*, Studies in

Mental health, for Aristotle and his successors, is a combination of physical, psychological, and moral factors. Just as his notion of health is a "good balance" (*συμμετρία* or *εὐκράσια*), so too mental health is the product of a balance (*εὐκράσια*) of the elementary qualities that constitute the human person and particular ratios of heat and cold. Aristotle mentions a variety of material factors that might have an impact upon the exercise of moral virtue and cognitive function, such as "variations in the blood, in the quality of the skin, and even in the size of the heart and the brain being correlated to variations in keenness of perception, thinking, and the stability of one's emotions."¹²⁷ For Aristotle, τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς do not exist apart from the body. "It is probable too that all the affections of the soul exist with the body: anger, gentleness, fear, mercy, courage, still more joy and loving and hating. The body experiences something at the same time as these occur."¹²⁸ The result is a very embodied notion of both the passions and the right thinking that could alleviate them.

Aristotle fits the general pattern that we have observed above, wherein the educative process is integral in producing mental health, and that health is conceived of as a product of proper exercise, nourishment, and acquisition of knowledge. There is a direct relationship between notions of settledness or calmness and understanding, and these were clearly part of the philosophical koine, such that authors like the Pastor (and Paul before him) could appropriate the ideal of calmness and gentleness as being conducive to moral and doctrinal health, whereas fighting and hyperactivity is characterized as the province of

Philosophy 17 [The Hague: Mouton, 1969], 276). Cited by van der Eijk, "Aristotle's Psycho-Physiological Account of the Soul-Body Relationship," 74.

¹²⁷ van der Eijk, "Medicine and Health in the Graeco-Roman World," 34.

¹²⁸ ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα (*De an.* 403a17–19, my trans.).

the sick and deluded. Obviously, the particularities of Aristotle's theory of mind, body, and their interaction cannot be straightforwardly imposed on the PE. But what they can do is illustrate the contours of the discourse about mind and body that would have been the intellectual inheritance of the peripatetic school, and this provides a historical context within which the Pastor's own language about mind and its corruption can be interpreted. In contrast to the modern heirs of Cartesian dualism, quick to understand references to "mind" as being in implicit and material contrast to body, ancient philosophers (including, with the above caveats, Aristotle) and physicians conceived of mind and its disturbance in strikingly bodily language.

F. Physicians and Philosophers in the Hellenistic and Early Imperial Period

Having discussed some of the Hippocratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian theories, all of which had illustrious afterlives that extended through the early Empire, we turn now to two other major philosophical traditions, as well as some medical perspectives, that were popular during the time of the Pastor. During the years that followed Alexander's conquest of the Mediterranean, we begin to see something of a consensus amongst philosophers and physicians about the broad contours of the relationship between body and soul. Heinrich von Staden speaks of a "constellation of convictions concerning soul and body" that was shared by representatives of some of the most prominent philosophical schools (i.e., Epicureans and Stoics) and many physicians of the Hellenistic period.

The belief cluster shared by Hellenistic philosophers and physicians includes, for example, that all psyche is soma but not all soma is psyche; that only what is spatially extended, three dimensional, and capable of acting or being acted upon exists; that the soul meets these criteria of existence; that this corporeal psyche, like the rest of

the body, is mortal and transient; that the psyche is generated with the body; that it neither exists before the body nor exists externally after its separation from the body—that is, the soul does not exist independently of the body in which it exists.¹²⁹

This consensus was in part informed by scientific discoveries. The discovery of the nervous system by the physician Herophilus and the vivisections he performed on both humans and animals allowed him to postulate with greater precision than his predecessors the precise location of the soul's "ruling part." He located it in "the ventricle in the cerebellum [that] exercises most control," the so-called fourth ventricle.¹³⁰ According to Herophilus, the nerves are the "offshoots" (βλαστήματα) of the cerebellum that allow for the psyche to interact with the rest of the human body.¹³¹

The basic convictions described by von Staden are observable in the writings of Epicurus, as well as those of his successors. Epicurus conceived of both body and soul as mutually dependent entities that, when compounded, could be described as an "aggregate" (ἄθροισμα).¹³² Without the soul, which was itself a fine-particled body (σῶμα λεπτομερές), the body was merely a corpse, and without the body, the soul did not exist.¹³³ The soul was a conglomeration of extremely fine atomic particles most similar to πνεῦμα (but not identical

¹²⁹ Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 79. This assessment is affirmed by Christopher Gill, "Psychophysical Holism in Stoicism and Epicureanism," in *Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, ed. R. A. H. King (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), 209.

¹³⁰ Quotation of Galen, *UP* 11, from Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 88. See 88 n. 13 for citations.

¹³¹ According to Rufus of Ephesus, *de nominatione partium hominis* 149–50, cited by Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 88 n. 14. Most ancient commentators also attribute this understanding of the nerves' relationship to the functions of the soul to Erasistratus (c. 320–240 BCE). See Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 92–96.

¹³² Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 86.

¹³³ See *Ep. Herod.* 63–67 (=LS 14A), and excellent discussions thereof in Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves"; and Stephen Everson, "Epicurean Psychology," in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. Keimpe Algra et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 543–46.

with it) "with a certain blending of heat" (θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν).¹³⁴ In contrast to later Epicureans, such as Diogenes of Oenoanda and a scholiast of uncertain date, who argue for a bipartite soul consisting of a rational part (λογικόν) that resides in the chest and an irrational part (ἄλογον) diffused throughout the body, Epicurus held that the soul is a unity that was, presumably, coextensive with the body and not restricted to any one particular place.¹³⁵ While Epicurus does not discuss the νοῦς per se,¹³⁶ Lucretius says the soul (*anima*) and the mind (*animus*) are firmly conjoined,¹³⁷ but that the mind is in the middle region of the chest (*situm media regione in pectoris*), while the spirit spreads out through the rest of the body.¹³⁸

Lucretius gives important evidence for the idea that the pathology of the mind was viewed as connected to the pathology of the body and its treatment. From Lucretius's perspective, the corporeal mind of children was weak and had little intelligence, and a corresponding deterioration of mind could be observed in the elderly, who are characterized as "babbling" (*delirare*), with the intelligence "limping" (*claudicare*) and the mind "tottering" (*labare*).¹³⁹ The mind (*animus*) is subject to diseases, as well as to medicine.¹⁴⁰ This capacity of the mind to be dissolved (*dissolui*) and "penetrated by contagious disease"

¹³⁴ Von Staden is emphatic on this point. Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 83.

¹³⁵ Von Staden points to Diogenes of Oenoanda 37, I, 5–7, and a scholium on Epicurus's *Ep. Herod.* 66 (= Usener 311) ("Body, Soul, and Nerves," 82).

¹³⁶ Long & Sedley argue that this is only a matter of emphasis on Epicurus's part and not one of doctrinal incompleteness at the time of *Ep. Herod.* (= LS 2.66).

¹³⁷ Cf. *Rer. nat.* 3.421–24 (= LS 14F).

¹³⁸ *Rer. nat.* 3.136–40 (= LS 14B).

¹³⁹ *Rer. nat.* 3.445–54.

¹⁴⁰ *Rer. nat.* 3.51–25.

(cf. *penetrant in eum contagia morbi*)¹⁴¹ is used by Lucretius as an argument against the immortality of soul, and helps us to conceive of what the Pastor may have in mind when he speaks of the corruption of the mind. For Lucretius, the dissolution or disturbance of the mind is an accurate, non-figurative description of the kind of mental deterioration that occurs in mental illness or senility. When the Pastor depicts his opponents' teaching as "vain chattering" (ματαιολογία) or likens it to the talk of old ladies (cf. γράῳδεις μῦθοι [1 Tim 4:7], he is drawing upon popular depictions of the elderly and the mentally ill that are represented by Lucretius's characterizations of the diseased mind that leaves people babbling incoherently.¹⁴²

The Stoics, like the Epicureans, held that the soul and its ruling part are corporeal.¹⁴³ They make πνεῦμα central to their exposition of the soul-body relationship, and understand all matter (ὅλη) to be shot through with god, which is also called "an intelligent, designing fire" (νοερόν . . . πῦρ τέχνικον) or a "breath pervading the whole world" (πνεῦμα . . . ἐνδιήκον

¹⁴¹ *Rer. nat.* 3.470–71.

¹⁴² Cf. 1 Tim 1:6; Titus 1:10, 3:9.

¹⁴³ On Stoic psychology, see Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, 37–87; A. A. Long, "Soul and Body in Stoicism," *Phronesis* 27.1 (1982): 34–57; A. A. Long, "Stoic Psychology," in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. Keimpe Algra et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 560–84; Long, "Stoic Psychology." The doxographer Aëtius presents a summary of the early Stoic doctrine of the soul (Aëtius 4.21.1–4; text and trans. from LS 53H = SVF 2.836): "The Stoics say that the commanding-faculty (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) is the soul's highest part, which produces impressions, assents, perceptions and impulses (φαντασίαι καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρμαί). They also call it the reasoning faculty (λογισμός). From the commanding-faculty there are seven parts of the soul which grow out and stretch into the body like the tentacles of an octopus. Five of these are the senses (τὰ αἰσθητήρια), sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch (ὄρασις, ὄσφρησις, ἀκοή, γεῦσις, καὶ ἀφή). Sight is breath (πνεῦμα) which extends from the commanding-faculty to the eyes, hearing is breath (πνεῦμα) which extends from the commanding-faculty to the ears . . . Of the remainder, one is called seed, and this is breath extending from the commanding-faculty to the genitals. The other . . . which they also call utterance (φωνή), is breath extending from the commanding-faculty to the pharynx, tongue and appropriate organs." The octopus imagery is especially associated with Chrysippus by ancient commentators. See Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 103 n. 66.

δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου).¹⁴⁴ The world, like the human person, is a living being. Just as the human individual has a soul, so too does the world, and the two are not materially different. They are both *pneuma* of a sort.¹⁴⁵

The heart, which is thought to form first in the human embryo, serves as the residence of the "ruling part" (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) in Stoic philosophy.¹⁴⁶ Early Stoics such as Chrysippus and Posidonius held that νοῦς pervades the κόσμος, much like ψυχή pervades the human person.¹⁴⁷ According to them, ψυχή¹⁴⁸ is not distributed evenly.¹⁴⁹ ψυχή can be more (μᾶλλον) concentrated, constituting ἕξις, as in the case of bones and nerves, or it can be less (ἧττον) concentrated, constituting νοῦς, as in the case of the τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. In interpreting this passage, it is beneficial to note (with A. A. Long) the Stoic belief that ψυχή itself is comprised of πνεῦμα, and πνεῦμα at differing degrees of tension (τόνος) comprises either ἕξις

¹⁴⁴ See Long & Sedley 46A (= Aëtius 1.7.33, SVF 2.1027). Thomas A. Szlezák put it in this way: "Stoics demanded that humans be completely ruled by the intellect; here, too, the agreement between the human use of reason and divine reasonableness of the world is the guiding idea. Human reason is 'divine' (SVF I 40,5; II 307,24), the (firy) [sic] reason of the cosmos is god (ibid. I 42,7); 'God, nous and *heimarménē* are one' (I 28,22)" ("Intellect," *BNP*).

¹⁴⁵ See, for instance, Galen, *PHP* 3.1.10, quoting Chrysippus to the effect that ψυχή is πνεῦμα σύμφυτον ἡμῖν. There is also a certain symmetry in structure and functionality between the human soul and the cosmic soul insofar as both operate through a ruling part (the ἡγεμονικόν), which resides in the hottest part, the heart or the sun, respectively (Von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 98). His section on Stoics runs from 96–105. Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, 69–70 calls this a "large concession to folk psychology." Not all Stoics held the sun to be the ἡγεμονικόν τοῦ κόσμου. In contrast to Cleanthes, who took the solar position, Chrysippus and Posidonius said that ὁ οὐρανός was the ἡγεμονικόν (Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.* 7.139).

¹⁴⁶ Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.* 7.159. See Long, "Soul and Body in Stoicism," 48–49. Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, 70 n. 78. Annas notes that "later we find Diogenes of Babylon trying to combat some Stoics who did think that the *hegemonikon* was in the head (Philodemus, *Piet.* 15 [= SVF 3. s.v. Diogenes 33])." According to Galen, *Loc. aff.* 3.5, the physician Archigenes also locates the ruling faculty in the καρδιά.

¹⁴⁷ Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.* 7.138. However, the Stoics held that νοῦς was possessed by humans but not by animals (*Med.* 3.16). Marcus, perhaps in an allusion to Christians, somewhat reluctantly affirms that even those who do not believe in the gods and who fail their country and who do everything behind closed doors have νοῦς as a ἡγεμών. Cf. Aristotle, *De an.* 429a4–9, where Aristotle describes animals as not having νοῦς (cf. τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία).

¹⁴⁸ Whether the antecedent of the pertinent sentence in this passage is ψυχή or νοῦς is difficult to determine.

¹⁴⁹ Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.* 7.138–9

or νοῦς.¹⁵⁰ νοῦς is thus imagined as the most rarified form of πνεῦμα, at least on the account of Chrysippus and Posidonius transmitted by Diogenes Laertius. Thus, for earlier Stoics, it seems that the designation νοῦς would characterize the state of πνεῦμα (determined by the degree of tension it had), while the term τὸ ἡγεμονικόν refers to the function of that νοῦς in relation to the rest of the ψυχή.¹⁵¹

This Stoic account of νοῦς, which characterizes the mind as a form of rarified πνεῦμα with a certain amount of tension or tone, is useful for understanding other Stoic accounts of moral disordering as a matter of ἀτονία. In the early Stoa, τόνος was a healthy quality of mind. "Tension" or "tone" (τόνος) suggests the right amount of pliability and strength, finding the middle ground between rigidity and lability. We find in Galen an excerpt from Chrysippus on this matter:

Furthermore, in the case of the body we likewise speak of tensions (τόνοι) which are either "lacking in tension" (ἄτοννοι) or "good tensions," (εὐτοννοι) referring to the way our tendons are when we are or are not able to perform tasks, and in the same way, perhaps, the tension of the mind (ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τόνος) is called a "good tension" (εὐτονία) or a "lack of tension" (ἀτονία). For just as in things which one does by means of tendons, like running, grasping an object, and so forth, there is a constitution which is such as to perform the task and one which is such as to give way because the tendons are slack and yielding, even so, by analogy, there is some such way for the tendons to be in the case of the mind. It is in this connection that we say, metaphorically (κατὰ μεταφοράν), that some people are "without tendon" (ἄνευροι) and others "have tendons" (νεῦρα ἔχειν). One person retreats in the presence

¹⁵⁰ "The basis of this distinction is of course the Stoic concept of πνεῦμα and the different degrees of tension which characterise its movement. Since the soul itself is πνεῦμα, and since ἔξις and νοῦς are both functions of πνεῦμα at different degrees of tension, it was possible for the Stoics to make soul responsible both for the form of the body (bones and sinews etc.) and for specifically psychic attributes" (Long, "Soul and Body in Stoicism," 141).

¹⁵¹ It is noteworthy that later Stoics such as Marcus Aurelius reveal some terminological fluidity regarding the vocabulary of the soul, wherein the νοῦς can be used instead of τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. For instance, νοῦς and λόγος are linked at *Med.* 10.33, and the adjective ἡγεμονικός is used for νοῦς at 12.14. Marcus's discourse at *Med.* 12.3 suggests a rough equivalence between the following terms: νοῦς, ἡ διάνοια, ἡ νοερή δύναμις, and τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Annas suggests that τὸ ἡγεμονικόν replaces νοῦς in Marcus Aurelius, *Med.* 2.2 (*Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*, 55 n. 46).

of what is frightening, another slackens and gives way when rewards or penalties are offered, and there are many similar cases. . . . Therefore, since all the base act this way, retreating and giving way for many reasons, one might say that they perform every action "weakly" and "badly" (ἀσθενῶς καὶ κακῶς). (*PHP* 4.6.5–7,11)¹⁵²

Arguing from analogy with tendons, Chrysippus suggests that the quality of one's thought might be described in terms of its tension, i.e., the degree to which it maintains the appropriate amount of receptivity, teachability, capacity to grasp, and the ability to hold firm concerning right judgments.

This way of conceptualizing mind and its health, as a degree of *τόνος* in *pneuma*, is also evident in medical writers from the so-called Pneumatist school of medicine. One practitioner of this tradition, Aretaeus of Cappadocia, held that *pneuma* was the "bond that holds all things together" and facilitated the movement and function of the various elements or qualities (hot, cold, dry, wet). The harmonious balance of the *pneuma* and these elements constituted a "good mixture" (εὐκρασία), while its imbalance, known as a "bad mixture" (δυσκρασία), constituted illness. The state of *pneuma* in those conditions was either *τόνος* or *ἀτονία*, respectively.¹⁵³

Whereas Chrysippus spoke of a "good tension" or a "lack of tension," Epictetus can speak of tension as a quality or disposition that, when possessed by someone who moves

¹⁵² (5.) "ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως <ὡς> οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος λέγονται τόνοι ἄτονοι καὶ εὐτονοι εἶναι κατὰ τὸ νευρῶδες τῷ δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἀδυνατεῖν ἐν τοῖς διὰ τούτων ἐπιτελουμένοις ἔργοις, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγεται τόνος ὡς εὐτονία καὶ ἀτονία." (6.) καὶ ἐφεξῆς, "ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν δρόμῳ καὶ ἀνθέξει τινὸς καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις ἤδη, ἃ διὰ τῶν νεύρων ἐνεργεῖται, ἔστι τις ἐπιτελεστικὴ κατάστασις καὶ ἐνδοτικὴ, τῶν νεύρων προεκκελυμένων καὶ ἀνειμένων, ἀναλόγως καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον νευρῶδες, καθὼς καὶ κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἀνέυρους τινὰς λέγομεν καὶ νεῦρα ἔχειν." (7.) εἴθ' ἐξῆς ἐξηγούμενος αὐτὸ τοῦτο τάδε γράφει. "ὁ μὲν δειμῶν ἐπιγινόμενων ἀφίσταται, ὁ δὲ κέρδους ἢ ζημίας φερομένης ἐξελύθη καὶ ἐνέδωκεν, ὁ δὲ (8.) καθ' ἑτέρα τοιαῦτα οὐκ ὀλίγα. . . . (11) "διὸ πάντων τῶν φαύλων οὕτω πραττόντων ἀποστατικῶς καὶ ἐνδοτικῶς κατὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀσθενῶς καὶ κακῶς ἕκαστα πράττειν ἂν λέγοιτο" (Galen, *PHP* 4.6.5–7,11 = *SVF* 3.473, from Chrysippus, *On Emotions*, book 4, translated by Margaret. Graver, *Stoicism & Emotion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 211–12].

¹⁵³ See Steven M. Oberhelman, "On the Chronology and Pneumatism of Aretaios of Cappadocia," in *ANRW* 2.37.2:959–66.

from one bad idea to another but acts as though his grasp of the truth were certain, is in fact a most undesirable attribute. It is this kind of situation or individual that Epictetus suggests is beyond helping. "Precisely as in a diseased body, suffering from a flux (ἐν νοσοῦντι καὶ ῥευματιζομένῳ σώματι), the flux inclines now in this direction and now in that. Such is also the sick mind (ἀσθενὴς ψυχή); it is uncertain which way it is inclined, but when vehemence (τόνος) also is added to this inclination and drift, then the evil gets past help and past cure (ἀβοήθητον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον)" (*Diatr.* 2.15.20 [Oldfather, LCL]). When we read that the addition of τόνος to the "inclination" (κλίμα) and "drift" (φορά) renders the person unhealable, we should probably understand τόνος not in terms of "vehemence"¹⁵⁴ so much as an intractability, an overabundance of tension, a lack of the supple pliability that, for instance, a tendon must have in order to properly operate. Epictetus seems to be extending the notion of τόνος to encompass those who are resolute in their error. For Epictetus, such a one is the "wise fool" who has made a firm decision, and is determined to maintain it no matter the consequences.

God forbid that I should ever have for a friend a wise fool! There is nothing harder to handle. "I have decided," he says! Why yes, and so have madmen (οἱ μαινόμενοι); but the more firm (βεβαιότερον) their decision is about what is false, the more hellebore they need. Will you not act like a sick man, and summon a physician? "I am sick, sir; help me. Consider what I ought to do; it is my part to obey you." So also in the present instance. "I know not what I ought to be doing, but I have come to find out." Thus one should speak. No, but this is what one hears, "Talk to me about anything else, but on this point I have made my decision." "Anything else" indeed! Why, what is more important or more to your advantage than to be convinced that it is not sufficient for a man merely to have reached decisions, and to refuse to change? These

¹⁵⁴ A gloss unattested, at any rate, in LSJ.

are the sinews (τόνοι) of madness, not health (οὔτοι οἱ μανικοὶ τόνοι, οὐχ ὑγιεινοί). (*Diatr.* 2.15.14–18)¹⁵⁵

Here we see that Epictetus has a particular kind of situation in mind in which someone might reach this state of being "beyond help or cure." Such an individual is staunchly resolute in decisions that, Epictetus believes, will hasten that individual's demise. He likens this state to madness, and suggests that hellebore, commonly used to treat the insane, is needed all the more. Those who are sick are seen as being not so much indecisive as overly decisive, fixed in their ways regarding beliefs and judgments that are false.¹⁵⁶

Though we can observe some variation in the terminology, what unites the Stoics, Epicureans, and several physicians of this period in their understanding of the mind was their thoroughgoing physicalism.¹⁵⁷ These continuities illustrate some of the basic assumptions shared by ancient thinkers regarding the mind and the ways in which it becomes corrupted or otherwise deranged. The distortions of the mind were conceived of along material lines, such that one's mental laziness could be characterized as ἀτονία, and the "sinews" of the mind could be either "healthy" or "mad." When compared with these writers, the Pastor's notion of the corrupt mind may be seen in a very physicalist sense, wherein the very contours of the mind, as a concentration of pneuma, can be disturbed by humoral imbalances or characterized as having too much or too little tension. These

¹⁵⁵ μή μοι γένοιτο φίλον ἔχειν σοφὸν μωρόν. δυσμεταχειριστότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν. "κέκρικα." καὶ γὰρ οἱ μαινόμενοι· ἀλλ' ὅσῳ βεβαιότερον κρίνουσι τὰ οὐκ ὄντα, τοσοῦτ' ἄλλος ἐλλεβόρου δέονται. οὐ θέλεις τὰ τοῦ νοσοῦντος ποιεῖν καὶ τὸν ἱατρὸν παρακαλεῖν; "νοσῶ, κύριε· βοήθησόν μοι. τί με δεῖ ποιεῖν σκέψαι· ἐμὸν ἐστὶ πείθεσθαι σοι." οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα· "ἀ δεῖ με ποιεῖν οὐκ οἶδα, ἐλήλυθα δὲ μαθησόμενος." οὐ, ἀλλὰ "περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μοι λέγε· τοῦτο δὲ κέκρικα." περὶ ποίων ἄλλων; τί γὰρ ἐστὶ μείζον ἢ προϋργιαίτερον τοῦ πεισθῆναι σε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ κεκριέναι καὶ τὸ μὴ μεταθέσθαι; οὔτοι οἱ μανικοὶ τόνοι, οὐχ ὑγιεινοί (Oldfather, LCL).

¹⁵⁶ In contrast to the reading of *Diatr.* 2.15.20 offered by Stowers, "Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason," 278.

¹⁵⁷ Gill, "Psychophysical Holism in Stoicism and Epicureanism."

distortions of the mind had very tangible, visible manifestations, seen especially in the unyielding and irascible verbal combat of the opponents.

G. Philo

We turn next to Philo of Alexandria, who proves useful as a point of comparison precisely because he, like the Pastor, blends ancient philosophical notions of mind and its corruption in his polemic against his own theological opponents. He is also a useful source because he represents the philosophical eclecticism that characterized many intellectuals in the early imperial era.¹⁵⁸ Though designated a "middle Platonist," Philo of Alexandria can also "utilize the Stoic division of the soul into the ἡγεμονικόν and the seven physical faculties, i.e. the five senses along with the faculties of speech and reproduction (*Opif.* 117; cf. *Agr.* 30)."¹⁵⁹ Philo accepts the bipartite division of the soul in rational (λογικόν) and irrational (ἄλογον) parts, as well as the tripartite division of the soul into λόγος, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία formulated in the *Republic* (*Spec.* 4.92).¹⁶⁰ He also mentions favorably the respective placement of these parts in the head, the chest, and around the navel or the diaphragm (*Spec.* 4.92). The head also serves as the residence of the perceptions (αἱ αἰσθήσεις) and their

¹⁵⁸ On philosophical eclecticism in the late republic and early imperial eras, see Harold Tarrant, "Platonic Interpretation and Eclectic Theory," in *Reading Plato in Antiquity*, ed. Harold Tarrant and Dirk Baltzly (London: Duckworth, 2006), 9–18; Benoît Castelnérac, "The Method of 'Eclecticism' in Plutarch and Seneca," *Hermathena* 182 (2007): 135–63; R. James Hankinson, "Galen's Philosophical Eclecticism," *ANRW* 2.36.5:3505–22.

¹⁵⁹ John M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 174. Antiochus of Aschalon also accepted the basic Stoic structure of the soul (Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 102).

¹⁶⁰ Cf. *Leg.* 2.6; *Spec.* 1.333 (Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 174).

sovereign, the νοῦς (*Spec.* 4.93).¹⁶¹ While Philo thinks of the rational part of the soul as immortal, and the irrational part(s) as mortal (*QG* 3.2), he also makes intriguing distinctions that suggests that the moral status of the soul in question (belonging to a wise person or an evil persn) plays a role in whether it partakes of immortality or not (*QG* 1.16).¹⁶²

Philo's discourse on νοῦς helps us to appreciate the diversity of ancient speculations on the soul, as well as some of their similarities. In an extended interpretation of the nature of prophecy, Philo suggests that the νοῦς is from heaven and resides with the body temporarily (i.e., during life), but can be educated to transcend the body and be reunited to the higher realms of bodiless contemplation.¹⁶³ "Philo pictures the hierarchy of the body elements in several other ways. Philo portrays the νοῦς as the ruling agent over the soul and the body; as the father of the senses, which are its daughters; and as the gentle yet strict father of the soul."¹⁶⁴ Philo's discussion of inspiration includes the idea that the νοῦς is "evicted" (ἐξοικιζέσθαι), as it were, by the divine πνεῦμα in prophecy. We should likely think

¹⁶¹ Elsewhere, Philo imposes this basic division onto the Genesis narrative, utilizing an allegorical interpretation of Adam as the νοῦς and Eve as αἰσθησις or the irrational soul. Cf. *Leg.* 2.24; *Cher.* 58–60 Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 175.

¹⁶² See (Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 177).

¹⁶³ Cf. Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 98 with discussion of *Her.* 274. See also Laura Salah Nasrallah, "An Ecstasy of Folly": *Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity*, HTS 52 (Cambridge: Harvard Theological Studies, Harvard Divinity School, 2003), 36–44 on Philo's "taxonomy of ecstasy."

¹⁶⁴ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 98. A. A. Long quotes Philo (*Leg.* 1.30): "The animal is superior to the non-animal in two respects, impression and impulse. An impression is formed by the approach of an external object which strikes the mind through sensation. Impulse, the close relation of impression, is formed by the tonic power of the mind. By stretching impulse out through sensation, the mind grasps the object and goes towards it, eager to seize and reach it." He then notes, "Philo of Alexandria, the author of this passage, uses the term 'mind' (nous) where a Stoic, in a context about animals in general, would write 'governing part'. Apart from this detail, we can regard his remarks as a reliably succinct account of the way the Stoics take impression and impulse to co-operate, as stimulus and response, in maintaining an animal's life" ("Stoic Psychology," 573). Gregory Sterling notes that the νοῦς and πνεῦμα are frequently associated in Philo's thought ("Wisdom among the Perfect," 376 n. 73).

of suppression or quieting rather than complete vacation of the νοῦς, since Philo's vocabulary for the movement of the νοῦς is in fact an extension of his metaphor for the soul's attachment to earthly things. Philo writes that the "lover of virtue" (φιλάρετος) does not "dwell" (κατοικεῖν) in the body as a homeland, but as a site of sojourn (παροικεῖν), a foreign destination soon to be vacated, while the "wretch" (φαῦλος) does the opposite.¹⁶⁵ At the same time, Philo seems to suggest that the divine πνεῦμα active in prophecy resides in the body of the prophet. Philo distinguishes between the rational part of the soul, identified with divine pneuma, which resides in the arteries, and the nutritive and sense-perceptive parts, identified with the blood, which reside in the veins.¹⁶⁶ Philo's position accords nicely with an accepted medical distinction between arteries and veins.¹⁶⁷ Even as Philo can identify the physical location of the νοῦς, it is also the means by which one accesses the divine.¹⁶⁸ In an allegory of Judah and Issachar as two types of mind, Philo characterizes the Judah νοῦς as "incorporeal" (ἄσώματος) and "immaterial" (ἄυλος), insofar as it is focused on

¹⁶⁵ *Her.* 267–68.

¹⁶⁶ Dillon points to *QG* 2.59 (on Gen 9:4) (Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 175–176).

¹⁶⁷ Gellius, *Noct. att.* 18.10.1–7 (Dillon's reference [*Middle Platonists*, 176 n. 1 to Gellius *NA* xvii 10] seems to contain a typo). The degree to which the difference is thought to be common knowledge is noteworthy, since it gives some indication of what an educated individual such as Aulus Gellius considered to be appropriate to the medical knowledge of learned non-experts (cf. *docti homines*). Gellius goes on to describe how he pursued the reading of medical books in his spare time (18.10.8–11).

¹⁶⁸ This is in large part because of its similarity of composition. All νοῦς is especially fast and light, and seems to be made with the same kind of fiery substance as the stars, which are themselves thought to be endowed with νοῦς. See John M. Dillon, "Asômatos: nuances of incorporeality in Philo," in *Philon d'Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie: actes du colloque international organisé par le Centre d'études sur la philosophie hellénistique et romaine de l'Université de Paris XII-Val de Marne (Créteil, Fontenay, Paris, 26-28 octobre 1995)*, ed. Carlos Lévy and Bernard Besnier (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 99–110. Thinkers in the Platonic tradition continued to develop their theories of νοῦς. See the articulation of νοῦς vis-à-vis the primary philosophical traditions from Plato onward in Mark Reuter, "Plotinus on the Role of Nous in Self-Knowledge" (PhD Diss., University of Toronto, 1994), 20–26. Reuter suggests that the relationship between the particular nous (νοῦς ἕκαστος) and νοῦς the highest part of the psyche is the key to understanding Plotinus's philosophy of the self. He argues that "these two are the same when psyche is 'looking within', i.e., thinking non-discursively, but different when psyche is 'looking without', i.e., thinking discursively" (26).

the contemplation and praise of God, but when the Issachar νοῦς functions engages in functions like listening or reading or eating, it "has need of ὕλη σωματική for its exercise."¹⁶⁹ It is only at death that "the kind of completely purified soul" (τὸ τῆς κεκαθαρμένης ἄκρως γένος) gets to travel to heaven without suffering "dissolution and corruption" (διάλυσις καὶ φθορά).¹⁷⁰

In Philo, the concept of healthy words or teachings, also prevalent in the Pastorals, is rooted in a conception of the soul as being susceptible to various states, influenced or not by passions. For Philo, the soul is healthy when "healthy reasonings" or "healthy words" (οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες λόγοι) are not overpowered by "passions and diseases" (πάθη καὶ νοσήματα [*Abr.* 223]). The characteristic of a well-ordered soul, one that is healthy (ὑγιαίνειν) with regard to its faculties (δυνάμεις), is that the νοῦς is "undiseased and unharmed" (ἄνοσος καὶ ἀπήμων [*Migr.* 119]).¹⁷¹ This same collocation of terminology is observable in 1 Timothy 6:3–5, where the Pastor alleges that "if anyone teaches to the contrary and does not hold fast to the healthy words of our Lord Jesus Christ" (εἴ τις ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖ καὶ μὴ προσέρχεται ὑγιαίνουσιν

¹⁶⁹ *Leg.* 1.82, discussed by Dillon, "Asômatos: nuances of incorporeality in Philo," 108–109.

¹⁷⁰ *Her.* 276.

¹⁷¹ In a vivid analogy (*Migr.* 124), the νοῦς is likened to a central pillar in a house, and God is described as the one who heals the wounds of the soul inflicted by vice. "Let us pray then that, like a central pillar in a house, there may constantly remain for the healing of our maladies the righteous mind in the soul and in the human race the righteous man; for while he is sound and well, there is no cause to despair of the prospect of complete salvation, for our Saviour God holds out, we may be sure, the most all-healing remedy, His gracious Power, and commits it to His suppliant and worshipper to use for the deliverance of those who are sickly, that he may apply it as an embrocation to those soul-wounds which were left gaping by the sword-edge of follies and injustices and all the rest of the horde of vices" (εὐχόμεθα οὖν τὸν ὡς ἐν οἰκίᾳ στῦλον νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν δίκαιον διαμένειν εἰς τὴν τῶν νόσων ἄκρως· τούτου γὰρ ὑγιαίνοντος τὰς εἰς παντελῆ σωτηρίαν οὐκ ἀπογνωστόν ἐλπίδας, διότι οἶμαι ὁ σωτὴρ θεὸς τὸ πανακέστατον φάρμακον, τὴν ἰλεω δύναμιν, τῷ ἰκέτῃ καὶ θεραπευτῇ προτείνας ἑαυτοῦ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν καμνόντων σωτηρίαν ἐπιτρέπει, καταπλάττοντι τῶν ψυχῆς τραυμάτων, ἅπερ ἀφροσύνη καὶ ἀδικία καὶ ὁ ἄλλος τῶν κακιῶν ὅμιλος ἀκονηθεὶς διεΐλεν [*Migr.* 124; Colson & Whitaker, LCL]).

λόγοις τοῖς τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ), that person is "sick" (νοσεῖν) and is aligned with those who are "corrupted in the mind" (διεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν).¹⁷²

Philo understands vice to be an actively destructive agent, wreaking sickness and mental aberrations. He characterizes these traumas as the wounds left by injustice, folly, and the whole host of vices. But God, "the healer/savior" (ὁ σωτήρ), provides the "all-healing remedy" (τὸ πανακέστατον φάρμακον).¹⁷³ Philo imagines the healthy mind as the mainstay of human existence, and with it the power of God that operates as the pharmacological panacea for all soul-trauma. Speaking of Genesis 12:3, Philo says that "if the mind continues free from disease and harm, it has all its subdivisions and capacities in a healthy condition" (ἐὰν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἄνοσος καὶ ἀπήμων διατελῇ, ταῖς περὶ αὐτὸν ἀπάσαις φυλαῖς τε καὶ δυνάμεσιν ὑγιαίνουσας χρῆται).¹⁷⁴ Here, Philo characterizes the healthy mind as that element of the human person that ensures the possibility of receiving healing for the rest of the soul.

For Philo, as for others in Greco-Roman antiquity, corruption of the soul or mind was not always met with therapy.¹⁷⁵ Philo justifies God's destructive deluge by arguing that the soul of those on earth was completely corrupted. He reckons the total destruction of the earth through the flood to be just, "for it was not the case that any one part of the soul was corrupted, so that it might be possible for the other, healthy parts to be saved; on the contrary, no part of the soul was left undiseased or uncorrupted" (οὐ γὰρ ἓν τι μέρος διεφθαρτο τῆς ψυχῆς, ἵνα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑγιαίνουσι σῶζεσθαι δύναιτο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἄνοσον οὐδὲ

¹⁷² 1 Tim 6:3–5.

¹⁷³ *Migr.* 124.

¹⁷⁴ *Migr.* 119 (my trans.).

¹⁷⁵ On the problem of curability and mental illness, see Philip van der Eijk, "Cure and (In)Curability of Mental Disorders in Ancient Medical and Philosophical Thought," in *Mental Disorders in the Classical World*, ed. Harris, 307–38.

ἀδιάφθαρτον αὐτῆς κατελείπετο· [*Conf. Ling.*, 25]). Here the notion of corruption is paired with that of sickness, and both are set in opposition to being healthy (cf. ὑγιαίνειν). Thus, in Philo we see a confluence of terms and ideas that indicate how Philo, another intellectual who was heir to the medically inflected philosophical discourse of the Greco-Roman world, depicts the νοῦς and its corruption. We can see that, similarly to Philo, the Pastor conceives of the health of the mind and the salvation of God as set in opposition to the acts of injustice, folly, and vice that mar his theological opponents.

IV. Reassessment & Conclusion

In the above analysis, we have seen that the relationship between the body and the soul was variously conceived by authors prior to and contemporary with the Pastor, but the two were almost never seen as unaffected by each other. Even in Plato's theory of the soul, the separability of the soul at death did not mean that it was not affected by the body during life, and vice versa. Stated positively, ancient philosophical and medical writers correlate the health or sickness of the soul—and with it the mind (νοῦς)—with that of the body. The νοῦς was thought by almost all of the authors surveyed to be that part of the soul that was responsible for higher-order intellection. For Aristotle, νοῦς in particular is that which is in charge of "intuitive knowledge."¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, what was true of the soul was also true of the νοῦς, namely that it was almost always located *somewhere* within the human person,

¹⁷⁶ F. E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon* (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 37.

most often the head or the thoracic region, and often the *καρδία* itself.¹⁷⁷ In this regard, the fact that the Pastor characterizes the *καρδία* as a *source* of right thinking and proper behavior (love and prayer in 1 Tim 1:5 and 2 Tim 2:22) is perhaps significant.

Scholarship has tended to interpret the Pastor's statements about the "corruption" of the opponents' minds as solely figurative, and without attention to or comment on the compositional nature the *νοῦς*, its pathology, and its relationship to the body. While the Pastor's language of the corruption of the mind is comprehensible as a figure of speech, this view does not adequately appreciate the implications of a psychosomatic understanding of the human person, the ill-effects of erroneous teaching and belief on human health and behavior, and thus the cumulative force of the medical analogy employed so prevalently in the PE. The consequence has been that part of the Pastor's medicalized polemic has been missed. For the Pastor, those who fail to heed the "healthy words" dispensed by Paul are in danger of the same illnesses and derangements that afflict the opponents.

I have demonstrated that ancient philosophical and medical discussions of the soul, its corporeal nature, and the ways in which the soul was subject to disease and therapy illuminate the Pastor's diagnosis of the corrupted *νοῦς* in new and important ways. The

¹⁷⁷ As we noted above, the Hippocratic treatise *On the Heart* (περὶ καρδίας) placed the *γνώμη* in the right ventricle of the heart. Plato places one part of the soul, the "spirited part" (τὸ θυμοειδές, θυμός), in the *καρδία* (Tim. 70a-b). For Aristotle, the heart made the most logical sense as the residence of the soul, since it needed to be centrally located so as to impart impulses to the rest of the body (Mot. anim. 10 [703b13–703b2]; see further Behm, TDNT 3:608). Chrysippus argued that speech could not come from a place other than where reason and thought come from, and since speech came from below, i.e., from the heart (ἐκ τῆς καρδίας), and through the windpipe, so too did reason and thought (Galen, PHP 2.5.14–20). Diogenes of Babylon, a pupil of Chrysippus, is said to have believed that "thought is not therefore in the head, but in the lower places, especially around the heart in a certain way (Galen, PHP 2.5.9–13). Diogenes Laertius (Vit. phil. 7.159) confirms that Stoics in general agreed that the *ἡγεμόνικον*, the most authoritative part of the soul, is the place "in which impressions and impulses occur and whence speech is sent forth" (ἐν ᾧ αἱ φαντασῖαι καὶ αἱ ὁρμαὶ γίνονται καὶ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἀναπέμπεται), and that the *ἡγεμονικόν* is in the *καρδία* (Greek text cited by Behm, TDNT 3:609).

advantage of reading the Pastor's polemical discourse in this context is that we can now appreciate the urgency of the Pastor's warning against the holistic damage to moral and bodily health caused by attending to the dangerous and erroneous doctrines of his opponents. The Pastor castigates the opponents in such a fevered manner because he imagines that the health and sanctity of the ecclesial body and the bodies of the women and men who make it up are in real jeopardy. This is significant because it reveals a more holistic understanding of the mind-body relationship than is commonly appreciated in scholarship on the Pastorals.

The status of the *νοῦς* as a thoroughly embodied entity and the widespread belief of the reciprocity of mind and body suggests that the corruption of the mind in the Pastorals points to a bodily problem in addition to an intellectual one, or better put, intellectual problems *were* bodily problems. To speak of a defect in or pathology or corruption of the *νοῦς* is to suggest a profound impairment of one's rational and moral capabilities.¹⁷⁸ This basic point has been appreciated by other scholars of the Pastorals. Furthering this argument, I have argued is that this language of the corruption of the *νοῦς* should be interpreted as an accusation of non-figurative mental illness, one that suggests a corruption

¹⁷⁸ "The *νοῦς* is the natural reason which, by itself, can know the good and the bad. The conscience is the practical judgment that discerns this action as good or evil and the difference. Now these Judaizing teachers whose exaggerated asceticism and their precepts of food-abstinence St. Paul combats have a spirit defiled by the erroneous doctrines; and their conscience, organ of the moral life, is unfit to accomplish any good action, whatever it may be, *καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι*" (Le *νοῦς* est la raison naturelle qui, par elle-même, peut connaître le bien et le mal. La conscience est le jugement pratique qui discerne telle action comme bonne ou mauvaise et la décrète. Or les docteurs judaïsants, dont S. Paul combat l'ascétisme exagéré et leurs préceptes d'abstinence alimentaire, ont l'esprit souillé par des doctrines erronées; et leurs conscience, organe de la vie morale, est inapte à accomplir quelque bonne action que ce soit, *καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι*") (Ceslas Spicq, "La conscience dans le Nouveau Testament," *RB* [1938]: 71 my trans.).

of the very substance of νοῦς, which was conceived of in ancient medicine and philosophy as constituted by the very fine substance of the soul.

The Pastor focuses on the νοῦς in order to make a particular claim concerning the opponents' capacity for moral reasoning. For him, the opponents are damaged in that aspect of their mental apparatus that was supposed to be able to engage in higher-order cognition, an aspect of which was the ability to perceive divine truth. The implication of the Pastor's language of νοῦς being corrupted is that the opponents are sick men, but not just in the figurative sense of being wrong, as many have argued. The Pastor characterizes his opponents as sick, deranged individuals whose health, both moral and corporeal, is in jeopardy. This is illustrated vividly by the opponents' irascible behavior, as well as their obsessive curiosity that manifests in contentious inquiries and speculations. They are intellectual invalids, and dangerously contagious ones at that, for their ideas and their speech have the capacity to infect the church in such a way that they too can become ill. The Pastor warns his audience against this (for him) very real mental illness as something that had particular causes, specific symptoms, and a grim prognosis. We turn now to continue our examination of the ways in which the Pastor draws upon vivid medical imagery to characterize the damaged intellectual state of his opponents.

Chapter 7. Deviance as a Crisis of Conscience

I. Introduction

It is no exaggeration to say that when New Testament scholars undertake the task of studying *συνείδησις*, they do not prioritize the Pastorals. By and large, the discussion of *συνείδησις* centers on the use of this term and its cognates in the homologoumena, especially in 1 and 2 Corinthians. This is not without good reason. Paul's uses of the term *συνείδησις*, a denominative of the verb *σύννοια*,¹ are extremely curious and the exegetical problems arising from them are thorny.² These difficulties are compounded by the long and winding history of the term *συνείδησις* and the notion of "conscience" in the Western intellectual tradition. It is important to caution that we cannot assume a coherence between ancient notions of *συνείδησις* or *conscientia* with modern notions of conscience.³ For us, cautions Dale Martin,

¹ Paul uses the verbal form once, at 1 Cor 4:4: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἑμαυτῷ σύννοια. The association of the term with knowledge is evident in the components of the compound, which consists of the prefix *συν-* ("with") and *εἶδέναι*, "to know." The Latin *conscientia* is formulated similarly, being a denominative of the verbal form, the prefix *con-* "with" and the verbe *scire*, "to know." Another form, τὸ συνειδός, is also used in Greek literature, but not in the NT. *σύνεσις*, a sometimes synonym, does occur in the NT (including 2 Tim 2:7), but not in the sense of "conscience."

² For thorough surveys of the history of research, see Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 402–421; Hans-Joachim Eckstein, *Der Begriff Syneidesis bei Paulus: Eine neutestamentlich-exegetische Untersuchung zum "Gewissensbegriff"*, WUNT 10 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983), 13–33; P. R. Bosman, "Why Conscience Makes Cowards of Us All: A Classical Perspective," *Acta Classica* 40 (1997): 63–75; Philip Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul: A Conceptual History of the Synoida Word Group*, WUNT 2.186 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 16–47. As Bosman writes, "When Paul takes up the word it fits into a largely traditional conceptual framework with an intricate network of concepts and meanings ready to be activated in the memory of the word's users. These may together be regarded as intrinsic to the meaning of the word. The intrinsic meaning carries multiples semes, which are the product of a protracted linguistic and cognitive evolution influenced by the changing moods of popular mentality. Complicating the issue is the fact that the word's semantic range is always ready to be contextually expanded. Paul adds various new connotations as a result of his unique discourse and the cognitive structure of his world as Jewish-Hellenistic apostle for Christ" (Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 193).

³ Krister Stendahl offered an important corrective in this regard to the discourse arising from interpretations of Rom 7, in which, we should note, *συνείδησις* does not occur ("The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West," *HTR* 56.3 [1963]: 199–215). He argued that Paul did not suffer from a

it "is that part of the self, whether implanted or inculcated by society, that knows the difference between right and wrong" and is "the site of values that constitutes the integrated self and hence a site for the potential destruction of a normally coherent personality."⁴

The term *συνείδησις* is used in the PE a total of six times (1 Tim 1:5, 1:19, 3:9, 4:2; 2 Tim 1:3; Titus 1:15).⁵ As with Paul's use of *συνείδησις*, though to a lesser degree, it has been subject to varying scholarly assessment.⁶ Some scholars, such as Robert Wall, have suggested that the Pastorals' use of *συνείδησις* reflects the "early catholicizing tendency of the post-Pauline position," by which he seems to mean that the notion of the conscience is put in service of institutional concerns and not eschatological ones. He suggests that the conscience in the PE is the discerning faculty that is capable of distinguishing "adequately between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, orthopraxis and heteropraxis."⁷ However, to identify the "'good' conscience" as the one "shaped by the Church's traditions of the historical Paul" and then also to say that "only the conscience which bears witness to apostolic piety and teaching" is capable of distinguishing between "orthodoxy and heterodoxy, orthopraxis and

bad conscience, but had a rather robust one. This is counterevidence, in his mind, to the claim that Paul is the *ἐγώ* of Rom 7, or that his approach to law was a solution to the problem of conscience.

⁴ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 180.

⁵ Though *σύνεσις*, elsewhere in Greek literature an equivalent of *συνείδησις* (see LSJ s.v. *σύνεσις* III and discussion below), occurs at 2 Tim 2:7, it does not there convey the notion of conscience. Rather, it carries the idea of understanding (cf. the preceding phrase, *νόει δὲ λέγω*), and constitutes a gift of God. Cf. Prov. 2:6 (LXX): "For the Lord gives wisdom, and from his presence knowledge and understanding" (*ὅτι κύριος δίδωσιν σοφίαν, καὶ ἀπὸ προσώπου αὐτοῦ γνώσις καὶ σύνεσις*).

⁶ Towner notes the wide variety of assessments: "Definitions range from 'the painful knowledge of one's transgressions and the autonomous agent of such knowledge' (Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms* 459), to 'the critical possibility of freedom in relation to the alternatives posed' (Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles* 20)" (*The Goal of Our Instruction: The Structure of Theology and Ethics in the Pastoral Epistles*, 155 n. 41).

⁷ Robert Wall, "Conscience," ABD 1:1130. This same circularity of reasoning may be attributed to the Pastor as well.

heteropraxis" is liable to the charge of circularity.⁸ It shoots wide of the mark by not situating the term within a plausible historical context. Also at issue for scholars of the PE is the extent to which the Pastorals cohere with Paul's use of *συνείδησις*. Maurer and Trummer think of it as a development of Paul's usage, suggesting with regard to the designations *καθαρά* and *ἀγαθή* that they refer not to an unblemished or pious conscience, but rather the renewal in faith that constitutes Christian existence.⁹ This characterization does not, however, account for the conscience as an integral component of the Pastor's psychological anthropology, the illumination of which is one goal of the presentation below.

Other scholars emphasize a divergence from Paul's usage.¹⁰ Roloff says that for Paul the *συνείδησις* is an "authority judging people's behavior in accordance with previously given norms" (das Verhalten des Menschen anhand vorgegebener Normen beurteilende Instanz), while for the Pastor it is "a state of awareness that appears as an effect of behavior corresponding to previously given norms" (ein Bewußtseinzustand, der sich als Folge des den vorgegebenen Normen entsprechenden Verhaltens einstellt).¹¹ However, the judgment that Paul and the Pastor differ dramatically on the *συνείδησις* depends in part upon a false dichotomy regarding the function of the *συνείδησις*. It is not only a "state of awareness" in the Pastorals and, as I shall demonstrate, contemporary literature depicts the *συνείδησις* with

⁸ One is forced to wonder: Which came first, the goodness of a tradition-shaped conscience that adequately distinguishes right doctrine from false, or the willingness of the conscience to be shaped by church tradition in the first place? Though he misidentifies the adjective *ὕγιής* as a noun "soundness," he is correct in seeing the *συνείδησις* as an important component of the idea of "health" in the PE.

⁹ Here Trummer follows Maurer, *σύνοιδα* κ.τ.λ. in *ThWNT* 7:917.

¹⁰ Trummer suggests that "die nachpln Tradition folgt P bei der Weiterführung dieses grundlegenden ethischen Begriffes und erweitert diesen durch besondere Attribute" (*Die Paulustradition der Pastoralbriefe*, BBET 8 [Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1978], 236).

¹¹ Roloff, EKKNT, 69.

a certain flexibility in its various capacities, and *συνείδησις* has the capacity to be both the judge and the organ that registers awareness of wrongdoing. What is needed is a reconsideration of *συνείδησις* in the Pastorals in light of the authorial strategies of the Pastor and the contours of the emerging discourse about conscience that was blossoming in the imperial period.

In what follows, I demonstrate that the Pastor's language of conscience is a further iteration of his authorial proclivities that we have examined in the preceding chapters. First, it is consonant with his habit of appropriating Pauline terms and arguments for the purpose of characterizing his opponents in particular as rationally disordered individuals. While Paul's discourse of *συνείδησις* appears primarily when he is addressing the sociopolitical problems of the *ἐκκλησία* (e.g., 1 Cor 8:7, 10, 12; 10:25, 27, 28, 29) or suggesting blamelessness (e.g., 2 Cor 1:12, 4:2; Rom 2:15, 9:1), the Pastor puts the discourse of *συνείδησις* toward decidedly polemical purposes (e.g., 1 Tim 1:5, 19, 4:2, Titus 1:15). Second, his use of *συνείδησις* reveals an intertextual dynamic whereby he presumes and builds upon an assumed audience awareness of Paul's letters, 1 and 2 Corinthians especially in the case of the *συνείδησις*, even as he reshapes the possibilities for what these terms mean and do. In the Pastor's argument, his imagery presupposes that the conscience is a fully reified entity within the human person, a process identifiable in but not complete in Paul's letters, and is subject to the same qualifications as the other cognitive organs in the Pastor's schema.¹² Third, he uses the language of *συνείδησις* in such a way that reflects awareness of and an

¹² I.e., just as the *καρδία* can be *καθαρά*, so can the *συνείδησις*; just as the *συνείδησις* can be "defiled," so can the *καρδία*. Just as the *νοῦς* may be described as something defiled, so too the *συνείδησις*.

integrated familiarity with the rhetorical and linguistic conventions of contemporary philosophers. As in the case of other first and second century sources, the descriptors attached by the Pastor to the *συνείδησις*, such as *ἀγαθός* or *καθαρός*, are best interpreted as indicating its *rational* operation. To have a "pure conscience" is, as scholars have noted, to have one that is free from knowledge of wrongdoing, but it is also an indication that it has been purged of false beliefs and improper judgments. Fourth, he draws upon widely dispersed medical concepts and metaphors in his persistent effort to pathologize the deviance of his opponents. I argue that the image of the conscience as an entity that can be subjected to cautery (1 Tim 4:2) is a logical extension of the notion that a conscience can be harmed or feel pain. In this way the Pastor's notion of conscience is one that is locative, a site within the human person, comparable to his notion of *νοῦς*. By reexamining the language and use of cautery in medical literature I demonstrate that the fascinating imagery of the cauterized conscience (*κεκαυστηριασμένοι τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν*) in 1 Tim 4:2 is an extension of this characterization of the conscience as an organ of the soul.

My argument proceeds by first offering a diagnosis of scholarship on *συνείδησις* in the Pauline letters, which has by and large been formulated in relationship to *συνείδησις* in the genuine Pauline epistles and without attention to the intertextual relationships of the Pastorals to them. I then offer specific arguments about each of the Pastor's uses of *συνείδησις* with reference to ancient Greek and Roman discourses on *συνείδησις*, focusing especially on the *συνείδησις* as an organ of the soul that is depicted with forensic imagery. I discuss the significance of a "good" conscience, arguing that this relates primarily to its proper rational functionality. I demonstrate that the language of defilement and purity,

while having important cultic resonances, when applied to the cognitive faculties may also be seen as an indicator of improper or proper functionality. That is to say, the "pure" *συνείδησις* is an operative one, and one that works in particular in coordination with the "pure" or healthy *νοῦς*. This leads to the next section, where I show that the notion of *συνείδησις* as an organ of the soul led some authors to conceptualize it in terms of its capacity to be the subject of or the cause of certain pains or illnesses. While this argument has import for interpreting the imagery of the *συνείδησις* as a component of the soul more generally, it helps to contextualize our reading of 1 Tim 4:2 in particular by illustrating that the Pastor is participating in the widespread practice of applying medical analogies to convey particular ideological points. In order to interpret the peculiar locution "cauterized in the conscience," I illustrate the historical uses of cautery from research into medical writings on cautery to offer a new reading of the cauterized conscience. I argue that the fundamental consequence of interpreting 1 Tim 4:2 with reference to medical practices and imagery is less the desensitization of the *συνείδησις* so frequently suggested in NT scholarship, and more the suggestion of an imbalanced and putrid conscience that has been subjected to a desperate and botched attempt at remedy. Lastly, I show that in the Pastorals the *νοῦς* and the *συνείδησις* function as cognitive organs of the soul that have discrete but mutually interdependent roles. For the Pastor, this interrelationship means that deviance is portrayed a holistic and dangerous disruption of mental health.

II. *συνείδησις* in Paul and the Pastorals

The interpretation of *συνείδησις* in Paul is a vexed topic, and has received no shortage of scholarly attention. The term occurs only in Paul's letters to Corinth and Rome. The high concentration of the instances of *συνείδησις* in the Corinthian Correspondence suggests that it was one of the terms of the debate there, perhaps introduced by Paul's opponents, arising especially in reference to the eating of meat sacrificed to idols.¹³ As Dale Martin maintains, Paul himself does not seem to have a firm theory of *συνείδησις*, any more than he has a monolithic theory of other anthropological categories like *καρδία*, *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, *νοῦς*, *σῶμα*, or *σάρξ*.¹⁴ Rather, Paul picks up the term *συνείδησις* in response to the issues in Corinth, and can set it down just as easily when dealing with food issues in Romans.¹⁵ Critically, Paul's language of *συνείδησις* constitutes an important touchstone for the Pastor's own. I argued above in chapter 2 that in 1 Tim 4:1–5, the Pastor creates a flurry of lexical and topical connections to 1 Cor 8–10 (and Rom 14–15 as well). In what follows I will first offer a brief

¹³ Richard A. Horsley, "Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 Corinthians 8-10," *CBQ* 40 (1978): 586; Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 180. The fact that *συνείδησις* appears in 1 Tim 4:1–5 in a contentious debate about keeping away from certain foods is thus notable. Hans-Josef Klauck floats another possibility, namely that Apollos introduced the term into the debate, but does not consider there to be enough evidence to substantiate this suggestion ("Der Gott in dir" (Ep 41,1): Die Autonomie des Gewissens bei Seneca und Paulus," in *Alte Welt und neuer Glaube: Beiträge zur Religionsgeschichte, Forschungsgeschichte und Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, NTOA 29 [Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1994], 30). While Paul may be responding to the use of *συνείδησις* by the Corinthians in particular, I consider it most likely that he was familiar with the concept as a result of its prominence in the contemporary philosophical milieu. Thus, Hildegard Cancik-Lindemaier: "Aus der hellenistischen sog. Popular- philosophie hat ihn der Apostel Paulus übernommen" ("Gewissen," in *Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe* [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1993], 3.320).

¹⁴ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 181. Paul's lack of a systematic anthropological theory is a prevalent theme in Jewett's work as well (Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*).

¹⁵ This may be seen from the fact that while in 1 Corinthians Paul makes special reference to the *συνείδησις* of the person who is "weak" (*ἀσθενής*), in a comparable discussion of what food to eat in Rom 14:1, Paul seems worried about the person "who is weak in [the?] faith" (*ὁ ἀσθενὴς τῇ πίστει*). However, its persistence in Romans demonstrates that it is not only something he puts down when referencing food issues.

assessment of some of the problems and solutions proposed for Paul's understanding of conscience in the homologoumena, then I shall attend to the question of how the Pastor's discourse of *συνείδησις* interacts with Paul's letters before turning to how the Pastorals compare with the broader ancient discourse about conscience. Several features of the scholarly discussion of *συνείδησις* in Paul since the mid-twentieth century are pertinent for the discussion of *συνείδησις* in the Pastorals. Scholars have been concerned to identify its relationship to "secular" usage, how it fits in Paul's broader anthropology, its relationship to the experience of pain, and how and about what the *συνείδησις* has knowledge.¹⁶

Scholars have focused on the relationship of the *συνείδησις* to the experience of pain. C.A. Pierce thought that the most defining feature of the *συνείδησις* in antiquity was its capacity to cause pain.¹⁷ Pierce wrote that the fundamental connotation of the word group is that a person "is by nature so constituted that, if he overstep the moral limits of his nature he will normally feel pain—the pain called *συνείδησις*. Locomotion in any direction

¹⁶ This constitutes only a subset of scholarly preoccupations, of course; the secondary literature on Paul and *συνείδησις* is vast. See especially the thorough history of research in the 19th and 20th centuries by Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 402–421.

¹⁷ This raises the important question of the fundamental import of theological contexts. Stelzenberger (1961) was particularly concerned to show the deviation of the NT usages from non-Christian usages. He emphasizes the need to contextualize each instance and tends to expect a new meaning in each context (Johannes Stelzenberger, *Syneidesis im Neuen Testament* [Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1961], 33, 36). These contexts, however, are divided along presumed differences in relatively well-developed theological perspectives which are simply too neat and anachronistic to be adequate. He writes that "der Rahmen der syneidesis umgebenden Welt ist von der christlichen völlig verschieden. Hier Naturalismus bzw. Monismus und Pantheismus, dort Monotheismus bzw. Christus-Theologie. Diese prinzipielle Scheidewand verdient aufmerksame Beachtung" ("The framework for syneidesis in the surrounding world is completely different from the Christian world. Here naturalism, monism and pantheism respectively, there monotheism, Christ-theology respectively. This principle barrier deserves careful attention" [my trans.]). See Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 34–37 for further discussion of Stelzenberger. In contrast to Stelzenberger, this study does not presume a necessary or essential difference between "Christian" and non-Christian usage based on particular theological frameworks (*Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 192). Bosman reports that Stelzenberger "isolates six different meanings of the word in Paul: awareness as witness (Rom. 9,1; 2 Cor. 1,12); inner obligation (Rom. 13,5); religious-ethical judgment (1 Cor. 8:10, 12; 1 Cor 10:25, 27–29; 2 Cor. 4:2; 5:11); actual moral conscience (Rom. 2:15); 'good conscience' (1 Cor. 4,4); and 'evil/bad conscience' (1 Cor. 8:7)."

always involves the risk of at some time dashing the foot against a stone . . ."¹⁸ Because, according to Pierce, the *συνείδησις* can be the "'organ' or 'faculty'" in which pain is felt, the absence of *συνείδησις* is equivalent to a "good" conscience. No pain means no conscience.¹⁹ Conscience means pain. Thus, Pierce said, the absence of *συνείδησις* is a "great pleasure" (*ἡδονὴ πολλή*).²⁰ "This absence is classically expressed by *μηδὲν αὐτῷ συνειδέναι*—and it is a good and desirable thing. Thus, to indicate that there is no pain, one must use positive terms with, paradoxically, the term *syneidesis*."²¹ In agreement with Pierce, Dale Martin wrote that in antiquity "[conscience] is a knowledge within the self of past action performed by the subject, a conviction of past misdeeds; and as such it is portrayed as a pain, a disease, or an agent that punishes and inflicts pain" or "may also refer to the organ or faculty of the body or self in which such pain is felt."²² Pierce restricted the *συνείδησις* to a primarily retrospective function, the so-called *conscientia consequens* in opposition to the prospective, guiding function, the *conscientia antecedens*.²³

¹⁸ C. A. Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament: A Study of Syneidesis in the New Testament; in the Light of Its Sources and with Particular Reference to St. Paul: With Some Observations Regarding Its Pastoral Relevance Today*, SBT 15 (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1955), 50.

¹⁹ The fact that the opponents "pierce themselves with many pains" in 1 Tim 6:9 is in tension with his reading of the conscience as desensitized through cauterization, since the pain-causing organ or faculty would thereby be incapacitated.

²⁰ Cited as Antiphanes apud Stobaeus in Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 51 n. 1.

²¹ Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 51.

²² Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 180. Similarly, Jewett argued that *συνείδησις* is used in two ways by Paul: 1) conscience as the agent of knowledge of one's deeds (1 Cor 8:7, 10, 12; Rom 2:15, 9:1) and 2) conscience as the painful knowledge of one's transgression, to be avoided if possible (1 Cor 10:25, 27, 28, 29; Rom 13:5) (*Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 459). Jewett even suggests that at 2 Cor 4:2 and 5:11 *συνείδησις* is identified with *νοῦς*, the agent of rational discernment of external matters (not one's deeds per se), though he characterizes this as a departure from Paul's typical use of the term as a shift "sharply in the direction of the fullblown gnostic idea in an effort to win the [Corinthian] congregation over to his side in the struggle against the invading missionaries" (*Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 459).

²³ Bosman dates the development of *conscientia consequens* and *conscientia antecedens* to seventeenth century Spanish scholasticism. "The dual function of *conscientia*, which had for centuries been inherent in the use of the word, finally found expression in two opposite adjectival qualification: as *conscientia consequens*

Margaret Thrall took issue with Pierce's assertion that the sense of *συνείδησις* in Paul always conforms to the parameters which he sees operating in its "'secular' usage," namely, that conscience is not concerned with prospective action but rather with causing guilt and remorse for actions already done, and is concerned only with one's own behavior and attitudes, not those of others.²⁴ Thrall proceeds to argue that in at least a handful of cases (Rom 13:5, 1 Cor 10:28–29, 2 Cor 4:2, 5:11), Pierce's explanation of *συνείδησις* cannot account for Paul's usage.²⁵ She contends that Paul extends the usage of conscience so that it can provide guidance for future moral action and assess the actions of others. She suggests that Paul may have extended the notion of conscience by analogy with the function of the Law, since the Law could both condemn past actions and give guidance beforehand, as well as enable assessment of someone else's actions.²⁶

In a further critique of Pierce, Hans-Joachim Eckstein argued that the notion of bad feelings or pangs of conscience is insufficient to explain Paul's usage.²⁷ Rather, he suggested that the notion of a neutral moral faculty is needed. For Eckstein, the conscience in Paul aligns very well indeed with the Hebrew notion of *לב* ("heart") and is an ethically neutral entity that judges conduct. Eckstein held that for Paul the trans-contextual, unifying notion of *συνείδησις* was as an inner entity. Thus, unsurprisingly, Eckstein is emphatic that the

(its retrospective function, looking back on moral behaviour) the conscience acts as judge; as *conscientia antecedens* (its guiding and admonishing function during the actual making of moral choices) conscience acts as moral guide and lawgiver" (Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 19). Klauck argues that Seneca's notion of *conscientia* is restricted to the retrospective function (Klauck, "Der Gott in dir" (Ep 41,1), 24).

²⁴ Margaret E. Thrall, "Pauline Use of Syneidēsis," *NTS* 14.1 (1967): 118.

²⁵ Thrall, "Pauline Use of Syneidēsis," 119–25.

²⁶ See also her discussion "The Meaning of *Οἰκοδομέω* in Relation to the Concept of *Συνείδησις*," in *Studia Evangelica 6: Papers Presented at the Third International Congress on New Testament Studies Held at Christ Church, Oxford, 1965. Part 1: The New Testament Scriptures*, ed. F. L. Cross, TUGAL 102 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), 468–72.

²⁷ Eckstein, *Der Begriff Syneidesis bei Paulus*, 311–13.

concept of *συνείδησις* for Paul is not restricted to non-Christians. Rather, it is a neutral moral faculty inherent to all. It is an anthropological concept, not a primarily theological one.²⁸ Thus, over and against Pierce, Eckstein argued that the main function of the *συνείδησις* was not so much to cause pain as to act as judge.²⁹ In other words, Eckstein emphasized its capacity as analytical, discerning element of the human interior.

Paul Gooch countered that a sense of moral or psychological faculty is not necessary at all to interpret the instances of the term in Paul's letters.³⁰ Gooch divides the term conscience into three basic senses: 1) what he calls the "minimal sense" (which amounts to self-awareness, "a conscious knowledge of the self under some description or other"), 2) the "notion of bad feeling," and 3) the notion of the conscience as "internal lawgiver" which he calls "moral conscience"³¹ as its third sense. Gooch emphasized that *συνείδησις* is in fact susceptible to a variety of translational nuances ("conscience" vs. "consciousness"),³² and he employed circumlocutions in order to acquire greater precision of expression and interpretation.³³ For instance, while the translation "bad feeling(s)" suffices for his analysis

²⁸ "Da Paulus zudem die Syneidesis bei Heiden und Gläubigen in gleicher Weise als neutrale—d.h. richtende und bestätigende—Instanz voraussetzt, darf sie auch keinesfalls in einem eingeschränkt negativen Verständnis als das Spezifikum des Heiden, des Menschen *ὑπὸ νόμον* und des homo incurvatus in se bestimmt werden. . . . Für den Apostel ist ἡ συνείδησις kein spezifisch theologischer, sondern ein anthropologischer Begriff, womit jegliche Bestimmung der Instanz Syneidesis als vox dei, als spiritus sacer oder semen divinum ausgeschlossen ist" (*Der Begriff Syneidesis bei Paulus*, 313); similarly, Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 283.

²⁹ Similarly, Marshall, ICC, 217.

³⁰ "Conscience' in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10," *NTS* 33 (1987): 245 n. 5.

³¹ Gooch is rightly careful, however, not to fix the sense of the term to these three notions alone ("Conscience' in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10," 244–45).

³² Horsley, "Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians."

³³ The difficulty of interpreting Paul's use of *συνείδησις* is reflected in the fact that other scholars resort to such circumlocutions or paraphrases as well. A particularly lengthy example is afforded by Thrall in her paraphrase of 1 Cor 8:10: "For if someone should see you, a knowledgeable person, eating a sacrificial meal in an idol's temple, surely, since he is prone to scrupulosity (*ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος*), his capacity for legalistic scruples (*ἡ*

of 1 Cor 10, for his interpretation of 1 Cor 8 Gooch proposes translations that essentially equate the *συνείδησις* with the self.³⁴ The main problem with such circumlocutions is that they resolve some difficulties only to introduce others, namely the identification of *συνείδησις* with the self or with one's feelings. In his final analysis, Gooch thinks that the term "conscience" is inappropriate as a translation for *συνείδησις* in 1 Cor 8 and 10.³⁵ However, Gooch's analysis is done without extensive comparison with contemporary ancient usages of the term, making it difficult to know how he imagines the significance of contemporary concepts of *συνείδησις* for Paul's use of the language, which must play a role in our interpretation.

In agreement with Eckstein, Philip Bosman, in what is the most extensive recent treatment of the topic, argues that Paul is aware of the option for a neutral sense of *συνείδησις*. Bosman enumerates "three aspects of the Pauline use of the substantive *συνείδησις*" as follows: "Firstly, Paul consistently avoids using adjectival qualifications such as *κακή*, *ἀγαθή* or *καθαρά* with the substantive. Secondly, Paul's substantive has evolved to the point where the intrinsic negative association to a *συνείδησις* has all but disappeared into the background. Thirdly, Paul assumes the *συνείδησις* to be a permanent 'component of the

συνείδησις αὐτοῦ) will be increased (*οἰκοδομηθήσεται*), with the result that *he* becomes (in his own eyes) an eater of the consecrated heathen sacrifices (*εἰς τὸ τὰ εἰδωλόθυτα ἐσθίειν*)"

(Thrall, "The Meaning of *Οἰκοδομέω* in Relation to the Concept of *Συνείδησις*," 472).

³⁴ On 10:7—"... and since they are weak they come to feel themselves polluted." On 10:10—"... will not this man, since he is weak, (falsely) regard himself as strengthened to eat idol food?" On 10:12—"In thus sinning against the brothers and wounding their self-estimation because they are weak . . ." ("Conscience' in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10," 250).

³⁵ Gooch, "Conscience' in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10," 252.

soul."³⁶ Speaking of 1 Cor 8:7, he writes that "the *συνείδησις* of the weak is not by definition in a state of pollution. Rather, the weak *συνείδησις* becomes polluted as a result of eating sacrificial meat. The weakness of the *συνείδησις* on the one hand, and its 'defilement' on the other, should be clearly distinguished. Their *συνείδησις* is not weak because it is polluted, but it gets polluted because it is weak, and it is weak because it operates on deficient *γνώσις*. The verb *μολύνεται* describes how the neutral inner entity becomes an *ἀκάθαρτος* *συνείδησις*."³⁷ While Bosman's neat distinction between weakness and pollution may be correct (though how to decide the direction of causality is fraught), his conclusion is not only circular but it also introduces a descriptor that Paul does not: *ἀκάθαρτος*.³⁸

What is important for our purposes about Bosman's reading of the *συνείδησις* in 1 Corinthians is that proper *γνώσις* may be seen to serve as a prophylaxis, as it were, without which the *συνείδησις*, being weak and formerly accustomed (*τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἕως ἄρτι*) to eating of [meat from] an idol as (*ὡς*) idol-meat (*εἰδωλόθυτον*), is defiled.³⁹ Without the knowledge that it is *not* the case that "an idol is something" (*εἰδωλὸν τί ἐστιν* [1 Cor 10:19]), the individual is in fact making an error of judgment, which is then subject to the censure of the *συνείδησις*, here expressed in terms of becoming defiled. As Paul's use of *συνείδησις* later in 1 Cor 10:25–29 suggests, with the right kind of scriptural knowledge, namely that "the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof" (*τοῦ κυρίου γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς* [1 Cor 10:26, quoting Ps 23:1 LXX]), one does not need to make distinguishing judgments (*ἀνακρίνειν*)

³⁶ Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 198. Robert Jewett, similarly, speaks of conscience in Paul as "an autonomous agent" (Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 425).

³⁷ Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 213.

³⁸ As he himself notes (*Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 198).

³⁹ For *γνώσις* as a prophylactic, see Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 186, 189.

"on account of conscience" (διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν). While this phrase seems to refer to the judging faculty of the person eating the food at 1 Cor 10:25 and 10:27, in 1 Cor 10:28–29, Paul makes clear that his concern is for the one whose conscience is in danger of being defiled (to borrow language from 1 Cor 8:7).

Nevertheless, Bosman's ideas that a deficiency in γνῶσις is ultimately the cause of a weak conscience, and that ultimately the capacity for defilement is important to consider with regard to the Pastorals, for the Pastor too had to reckon with how to interpret Paul's statements regarding συνείδησις. In a signal that the Pastor is reading Paul's statements closely, the Pastor also makes knowledge of the truth central to his characterization of συνείδησις, for he writes that those who are "cauterized in their own consciences" (1 Tim 4:2) reject foods that are in fact created for enjoyment and reception "by those who are faithful and have recognized the truth" (τοῖς πιστοῖς καὶ ἐπεγνωκόσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν).⁴⁰ The Pastor makes much of the opponents' ostensible lack of proper knowledge, formulated either as an incapacity to "recognize the truth" (ἐπιγινώσκειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν [1 Tim 4:3; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Tim 2:25, 3:7; Titus 1:1; cf. Rom 10:2) or as the possession of "falsely-called knowledge" (ψευδῶνυμος γνῶσις [1 Tim 6:20]). Apropos is Bosman's comment:

Although Paul does not employ the words λόγος and νοῦς in the same contexts as συνείδησις, the differences in terminology should not obscure a significant degree of overlap in associations to rationality . . . Paul recognises a direct link between knowledge (γνῶσις) and the συνείδησις . . . Deficient knowledge makes a person's συνείδησις oversensitive and therefore vulnerable since there is a greater possibility of his inner harmony being disrupted.⁴¹

⁴⁰ 1 Tim 4:3.

⁴¹ Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 268.

This insight suggests that attention to the precise relationship between *συνείδησις* and the capacity for knowledge, especially the role and function of the *νοῦς* in the Pastorals, is an important piece of the interpretive puzzle. When we note the frequent occurrence of *ἀλήθεια* in the PE, Bosman's insight that for Paul *ἀλήθεια* is the yardstick against which *συνείδησις* measures "conduct, intentions and attitudes" may offer a clue regarding the Pastor's own reading of *συνείδησις* in Paul.⁴² The Pastor too seems to assume that a functioning *συνείδησις* needs a firm grasp of *ἀλήθεια*, as is evident by his portrayal of his opponents as "liars" whose consciences are cauterized.

This analysis of research on the notion of *συνείδησις* in Paul suggests that it has increasingly been depicted as a permanent component of an individual's interior landscape. While I shall demonstrate more fully in the discussion below the Pastor's developments of and connections to Paul's use of *συνείδησις*, here we can highlight several important features. When conceived of as a psychological entity, the *συνείδησις* admits of being described with the language of being defiled (1 Cor 8:7), built-up (1 Cor 8:10), weak (1 Cor 8:7, 12; cf. 8:10), and struck (1 Cor 8:12). The latter two suggest not that the *συνείδησις* itself *is* a disease, but certainly that it is an organ of the human person that was susceptible to harm and weakness and/or sickness, keeping in mind that most productive semantic ambivalence possessed by the *ἀσθενεῖν* word group. I argue that the Pastor develops these aspects of the *συνείδησις*—as an interior entity capable of being healthy or sick—most prominently in 1

⁴² Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 270. *ἀλήθεια* is, in turn, in line with the natural law, the true nature of reality. Final *ἀλήθεια*, however, belongs to God, and the *συνείδησις* can only operate in accordance with what is known. Because *γνώσις* is partial, it must ultimately be subordinate to *ἀγάπη*.

Tim 4:2, where the *συνείδησις* is imagined as an organ of the soul that can be subjected to dramatic surgical intervention.

Furthermore, the forensic metaphor is also well-documented in Paul's language of *συνείδησις*. The *συνείδησις* retains its capacity for judgment of self and others (cf. [ἀνα]κρίνειν at 1 Cor 10:29; 2 Cor 4:2, 5:11; Rom 13:5), though an individual need not "render judgment" (ἀνακρίνειν) on account of *συνείδησις* concerning such things as meat sold in a market (1 Cor 10:25) if one possesses the appropriate perspective, which, as noted above, for Paul is one informed by scripture (1 Cor 10:26). The *συνείδησις* plays the role of co-testifier (cf. *συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως* at Rom 2:15; Rom 9:1), and appears in close proximity at Rom 2:15 to thoughts (*λογισμοί*) that either accuse (*κατηγορεῖν*) or defend (*ἀπολογεῖσθαι*). This aspect of *συνείδησις*, namely, its job in rendering rational assessment of actions, is, I will argue, an integral component of the Pastor's depiction of the *συνείδησις* that is adopted from Paul. The innovation of the Pastor's usage is that applies this to the disordered mental and verbal activity of the opponents.

III. The Pastor's *συνείδησις* amidst Greek and Roman Literature

In what follows, I examine the images and metaphors used by authors around the time of the Pastor with regard to the *συνείδησις* word group in order to argue that the Pastor is in keeping with contemporary intellectual trends when he depicts the *συνείδησις* as an organ of the soul whose forensic and rational capacities are illustrated via medical analogies. The texts examined alongside the Pastorals are largely from the early principate. This is in part due to the nature of the evidence, and the fact that the language of *συνειδός/συνείδησις* in

Greek is comparatively infrequent before the bountiful evidence from Philo's writings.⁴³

There was an important new conversation regarding the self, the ethical and interior disposition of that self, and the role of conscience in the late Republic and early Imperial periods,⁴⁴ and the Pastorals give critical insight into how ideas about conscience were developing in popular usage that was influenced by the discussions in philosophical schools.⁴⁵ In this chapter we shall continue to draw together three different vectors of research (on *συνείδησις* in Paul's letters, on developments in contemporary philosophical literature, and on early imperial medical imagery and practice) in order to arrive at an intertextually aware and culturally attuned interpretation of the role of *συνείδησις* in the Pastor's argument. In what follows I build on the conclusions of previous scholarship on conscience in literature from this period, especially Paul, Philo,⁴⁶ Seneca, Plutarch, and

⁴³ The evidence is such that Klauck can rightly say that "what we have, beginning with the first century BCE, is a more intensified discourse on conscience, which Philo not only participates in, but is even a major exponent of" ("Accuser, Judge and Paraclete—On Conscience in Philo of Alexandria," *Skripten Kerk* 20.1 [1999]: 115).

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Christopher Gill, "Personhood and Personality. The Four-Personae Theory in Cicero, *De Officiis* I," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 6 (1988): 169–99; Klauck, "'Der Gott in dir' (Ep 41,1)," 12–14; Catharine Edwards, "Self-Scrutiny and Self-Transformation in Seneca's Letters," *Greece & Rome* 44.1 (1997): 23–38; Hubert Cancik, "Persona and Self in Stoic Philosophy," in *Self, Soul, and Body in Religious Experience*, ed. Albert I. Baumgarten, Jan Assmann, and Guy G. Stroumsa, *Studies in the History of Religions* 78 (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 335–46; Marcia L. Colish, "Seneca on Acting Against Conscience," in *Seneca Philosophus*, ed. Julia Wildberger and Marcia L. Colish, *Trends in Classics. Supplementary Volumes* 27 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 95–110.

⁴⁵ On the distribution of ideas and the relevance of "elite" philosophical (and other) literature to reconstructing early Christianity, see Downing, "A Bas Les Aristos."

⁴⁶ Bosman outlines three primary aspects of the depiction of conscience (*τὸ συνειδός*) in Philo that are helpful in our own discussion of conscience: 1) Its comparison to an inner court of law, wherein it can play a variety of roles, whether prosecutor, admonisher, witness, judge, or combinations. Philo often connects it with *ἐλεγχος* and *ἐλέγχειν*. 2) Its role as a component of the soul, wherein a bad conscience threatens the ideals of untroubled harmony and inner calm. 3) The inhibiting effect of a bad conscience on one's ability to exercise *παρρησία*, the capacity to speak fearlessly, envisioned as stemming from "a particular sense of equality and freedom, which also entails a personal dignity and moral rectitude" (Philip R. Bosman, "Conscience and Free Speech in Philo," *The Studia Philonica Annual* 18 [2006]: 37–39; last quote from 39). Klauck suggests that Philo's concept of the conscience may be located in a conflation of the idea of conscience as a pedagogue, monitor or convictor (derived from Hellenistic wisdom literature) and the tendency to utilize forensic

other near contemporaries of the Pastor⁴⁷ in order to substantiate the following contentions regarding συνείδησις in the Pastorals: that 1) the Pastor, relying in part on Paul's characterizations, depicts it as an organ of the soul, 2) that his descriptions of it as "good" or "clean" refer not only to its relation to guilt or sin but to its rational functionality, that 3) the Pastor's curious imagery of the cauterized conscience, in keeping with his predecessors and contemporaries, relies upon the metaphor of the conscience as an interior element or organ of the soul, and 4) it constitutes a creative appropriation of widespread medical practices in order to assert the pathological condition of his opponents.

A. συνείδησις as an Element of the Soul

συνείδησις and its associated concepts are often depicted in decidedly forensic language, and the frequent implication of the imagery is that the conscience operates as a component of the individual interior space. Its relationship to the reasoning part of the soul, whether νοῦς or τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, varies according to the author and text under question. The physical manifestations of conscience suggest its status as a component of the soul capable of

metaphors for conscience (abundant in Latin oratory) as judge, advocate, witness, or accuser (114–16): "Philo combines the punishing Furies (cf. Cicero) and the benevolent guardian spirit (cf. Seneca) of Graeco-Roman mythology and philosophy with the personified reproof from Jewish Wisdom literature, and so he creates a concept that helps him to give a visual description to the strict but nevertheless kind guidance God practises on man" ("Accuser, Judge and Paraclete," 116–17). See also Klauck's longer essay, "Ein Richter in eigenen Innern: Das Gewissen bei Philo von Alexandrien," in *Alte Welt und neuer Glaube: Beiträge zur Religionsgeschichte, Forschungsgeschichte und Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, NTOA 29 (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1994), 33–58.

⁴⁷ Marietta argues that συνείδω took on an ethical sense in the Hellenistic period, and that it was often described as a faculty, though she does not clarify how exactly this faculty functions, what its relation to other faculties is, or what the properties of this faculty might be ("Conscience in Greek Stoicism," *Numen* 17 [1970]: 180–81). She argues that in addition to the Ps. Epictetus *Frag.* 97, wherein the συνείδησις is likened to a παιδαγωγός, the following passages refer to συνείδησις as a faculty within: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Thuc.* 8.3, Wis 17:10 and the *Orphic Hymn* 62. For the use of συνείδω as a faculty, she points to Philo, *Opif.* 128, and *Det.* 23.

affecting the visible, exterior physical body. This aspect of the depiction of conscience is present from the very first time the Latin *conscientia* is used. In his analysis of Philo's language of conscience, Klauck draws attention to a resource infrequently discussed in scholarly assessments of conscience in antiquity: the Latin rhetorical tradition.⁴⁸ The first instance of *conscientia* occurs in the rhetorical handbook *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (ca. 88–85 BCE):

For Subsequent Behaviour we investigate the signs which usually attend guilt or innocence. The prosecutor (*accusator*) will, if possible, say that his adversary (*adversarius*), when come upon, blushed, paled, faltered, spoke uncertainly, collapsed, or made some offer—signs of a conscience (*signa conscientiae*). If the accused has done none of these things, the prosecutor will say his adversary had even so far in advance calculated what would actually happen to him that he stood his ground and replied with the greatest self-assurance—signs of audacity, and not of innocence (*signa confidentiae, non innocentiae*). The defendant's counsel, if his client has shown fear, will say that he was moved, not by an awareness of wrongdoing (*conscientia peccati*), but by the magnitude of his peril; if his client has not shown fear, counsel will say that he was unmoved because he relied on his innocence (*innocentia*). (*Rhet. Her.* 2.5.8)⁴⁹

The mention of conscience in a forensic context is different than the conscience being depicted in forensic terms, but the connection drawn by the author of this text between external signs and the internal cause of those signs suggests that the *conscientia* is functioning as an internal organ that registers acute awareness of wrongdoing, though here unwittingly or involuntarily. This internal awareness results in visible, bodily

⁴⁸ Klauck, "Ein Richter in eigenen Innern," 33.

⁴⁹ Consecutio est cum quaeritur quae signa nocentis et innocentis consequi soleant. Accusator dicet, si poterit, adversarium, cum ad eum ventum sit, erubuisse, expalluisse, titubasse, inconstanter locutum esse, concidisce, pollicitum esse aliquid; quae signa conscientiae sint. Si reus horum nihil fecerit, accusator dicet eum usque adeo praemeditatum fuisse quid sibi esset usu venturum ut confidentissime resisteret, responderet; quae signa confidentiae, non innocentiae sint. Defensor, si pertimuerit, magnitudine periculi, non conscientia peccati se commotum esse dicet; si non pertimuerit, fretum innocentia negabit esse commotum (Caplan, LCL, modified).

manifestations, including but presumably not limited to, blushing, going pale, faltering in speech, speaking with trepidation, or even sheer collapse. In other words, conscience manifests psychosomatically. The interpretation of those signs and their cause is what is ultimately at stake in this rhetorical treatise, and the successful defense lawyer will argue that the cause is not "awareness of a wrongdoing" (*conscientia peccati*) but by the duress incurred from being falsely accused. What is primarily noteworthy for our purposes is the connection drawn between the physical aspects of conscience's manifestation. They all suggest a relationship between body and soul, and the erratic changes in color, voice, and stability are seen to indicate a disturbance of the individual's interior state.⁵⁰ Conscience, it seems, affects the body no less than other parts of the soul.

The mind's torment of itself by the awareness of a wrong deed done is given dramatic expression in a passage by the Epicurean poet Lucretius that provides a useful reference point when trying to understand how or why the Pastor might have come up with the striking image in 1 Tim 4:2 that the opponents are "cauterized *in their own consciences*." In his treatise *On the Nature of Things* (*De rerum natura*), it seems that the *mens*, by sheer awareness in itself of a wrongful deed done, is in a state of torment comparable to the mythological Cerberus, Furies, and Tartarus and to the real (even if absent) threat of judicial punishment. Here there is an overlap between the role frequently

⁵⁰ Cf. Philo, *Ios.* 47–48: "No, conscience will take hold of me and not suffer me to look him straight in the face even if I can escape detection . . . not to mention that, even if no other knows of it or reports the knowledge which he shares with me, all the same I shall turn informer against myself through my colour, my look, my voice, convicted as I said just now by my conscience" (τὸ συνειδὸς ἐλλαμβανόμενον ὀρθοῖς ὄμμασιν οὐκ ἔασει προσβλέπειν, κὰν δυνηθῶ λανθάνειν . . . ἔῷ λέγειν ὅτι, κὰν μηδεὶς ἕτερος αἴσθηται ἢ συναισθόμενος μὴ κατείπῃ, μηνυτῆς οὐδὲν ἥττον αὐτὸς γενήσομαι κατ' ἑμαντοῦ τῷ χρώματι, τῷ βλέμματι, τῇ φωνῇ, καθάπερ μικρῷ πρότερον εἶπον, ὑπὸ τοῦ συνειδότος ἐλεγχόμενος [Colson, LCL]).

attributed to the *conscientia* and the *mens* itself,⁵¹ for Lucretius writes that "the mind, aware of what it has done (*mens sibi conscia factis*), terrified before anything can come to pass, applies the goad and scorches itself with whips."⁵² Here the *mens* is "aware in itself" of a deed done, terrified by real punishments such as "red-hot plates" and "firebrands" that might as well have been kindled by fire-belching Tartarus, and visits upon itself the kinds of punishments it fears, simply through self-flagellation.⁵³ Seneca too characterizes the internal torment of *conscientia*, characterizing it both as an active punisher of wrong deeds—"bad deeds are whipped by conscience" (*mala facinora conscientia flagellari*)—but also as experiencing torment, "because perpetual anxiety drives and beats it" (*quod perpetua*

⁵¹ See also 3.827 and 4.1135–36. This passage in Lucretius is cited by David Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 307, along with two passages (*Ep.* 97.15; 105.9) from Seneca, to suggest that Epicureans (and Stoics, presumably) put "constant stress on the pangs of conscience suffered by the guilty sinner" (*The Wisdom of Solomon: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 43 [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979], 307).

⁵² "But in this life there is fear of punishment for evil deeds, fear as notorious as the deeds are notorious, and atonement for crime—prison, and the horrible casting down from the Rock, stripes, executioners, condemned cell, pitch, red-hot plates, firebrands; and even if these are absent, yet the mind, aware of what it has done (*mens sibi conscia factis*), terrified before anything can come to pass, applies the goad and scorches itself with whips, and meanwhile does not see where can be the end to its miseries or the final limit to its punishment, and fears that these same afflictions may become heavier after death. The fool's life at length becomes a hell on earth" (*sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis 1015 est insignibus insignis, scelerisque luella—carcer et horribilis de saxo iactu' deorsum, verbera carnifices robur pix lammina taedae; quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis praemetuens adhibet stimulos torretque flagellis, 1020 nec videt interea qui terminus esse malorum possit nec quae sit poenarum denique finis, atque eadem metuit magis haec ne in morte gravescant. hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita* (*Rer. nat.* 3.1014–1023 [Rouse; rev. Smith, LCL, modified]).

⁵³ From a slightly earlier text, Polybius's *Histories*, we find a similar notion. Commenting on the plot of Zeuxippus and company to assassinate one Brachylles, Polybius (*Hist.* 18.43.13) writes: "For no one is so fearsome a witness nor a frightful an accuser as the *σύνεσις* that dwells in the souls of each person" (*Οὐδείς γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε μάρτυς ἐστὶ φοβερός οὔτε κατήγορος δεινός ὥς ἡ σύνεσις ἢ κατοικοῦσ' ἐν ταῖς ἐκάστων ψυχαῖς*). With a look at Lucretius's contemporary Livy on the same episode, we may note that Zeuxippus is said to have "feared his own *conscientia* more than the judgment of men who knew nothing of the matter" (*suam magis conscientiam quam indicium hominum nullius rei consciorum metuens*). Zeuxippus's slave too is said to have been "struck by conscience" (*conscientia ictus* [*Hist.* 33.28.14]). V. A. Rodgers, "Σύνεσις and the Expression of Conscience," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* X (1969): 250 n. 11. and P. R. Bosman, "Pathology of a Guilty Conscience: The Legacy of Euripides' Orestes," *Acta Classica* 36 (1993): 15 n. 30, who also adds Maurer and Eckstein to the list, consider this passage a gloss, but the Loeb translator (Paton) or his revisers (Walbank & Habicht [209 n. 130]) suggest that Livy (*Hist.* 33.28.10) says that Zeuxippus is plagued by his *conscientia* after the assassination.

illam sollicitudo urget ac verberat).⁵⁴ As in the case of 1 Tim 4:2, this passage provides evidence that particularly dramatic images were used to characterize the relationship of the mind to itself.⁵⁵

The soul is often characterized as having an antagonistic relationship with the conscience, and when this occurs the language of conscience serves frequently to characterize that antagonism as a conflict between two elements of the soul. Employing language that is often used for the role of the conscience, Philo says that the "monitor" (ἐλεγχος) "grows up with" (cf. συμπεφυκώς) and "resides alongside" (cf. συνοικῶν) the soul.

For every soul has for its birth-fellow (συμπεφυκώς) and house-mate (συνοικῶν) a monitor (ἐλεγχος) whose way is to admit nothing that calls for censure, whose nature is ever to hate evil and love virtue, who is its accuser (κατήγορος) and its judge (δικαστής) in one. If he be once roused as accuser he censures, accuses and puts the soul to shame, and again as judge, he instructs (διδάσκειν), admonishes (νουθετεῖν) and exhorts (παραινεῖν) it to change its ways (μεταβάλλεσθαι). And if he has the strength to persuade it, he rejoices and makes peace. But if he cannot, he makes war (πολεμεῖν) to the bitter end, never leaving it alone by day or night, but plying it with stabs and deadly wounds (κεντῶν καὶ τιτρώσκων ἀνίατα) until he breaks the thread of its miserable and ill-starred life. (*Decal.* 87)⁵⁶

One might say that this depiction constitutes an internalizing of the tasks typically attributed to the moral philosopher or, for that matter, the addressees of the Pastorals or the overseers they are to appoint. The "monitor" or "scrutineer" (ἐλεγχος) instructs (διδάσκειν), admonishes (νουθετεῖν), and exhorts (παραινεῖν). So also in the Pastorals, we find

⁵⁴ *Ep.* 97.15. Latin text from Gummere, LCL. The theme of a bad conscience tormenting a wrongdoer may also be seen at *Ep.* 105.7–8, cited by Colish, "Seneca on Acting Against Conscience," 105 n. 39.

⁵⁵ The Stoic terminology of conscience too is often correlated with other terminology for the mind and rationality (Cancik-Lindemaier, "Gewissen," 20).

⁵⁶ ὁ γὰρ ἐκάστη ψυχῇ συμπεφυκώς καὶ συνοικῶν ἐλεγχος, οὐδὲν εἰωθὼς παραδέχεσθαι τῶν ὑπαιτίων, μισοπονήρῳ καὶ φιλαρέτῳ χρώμενος αἰεὶ τῇ φύσει, κατήγορος ὁμοῦ καὶ δικαστὴς ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν, διακινηθεὶς ὡς μὲν κατήγορος αἰτιᾶται, κατηγορεῖ, δυσωπεῖ, πάλιν δ' ὡς δικαστὴς διδάσκει, νουθετεῖ, παραινεί μεταβάλλεσθαι· κἂν μὲν ἰσχύσῃ πείσαι, γεγηθὼς καταλλάττεται, μὴ δυνήθεις δὲ ἀσπονδεῖ πολεμεῖ μήτε μεθ' ἡμέραν μήτε νύκτωρ ἀφιστάμενος, ἀλλὰ κεντῶν καὶ τιτρώσκων ἀνίατα, μέχρις ἂν τὴν ἀθλίαν καὶ ἐπάρατον ζωὴν ἀπορρήξῃ (Colson, LCL).

that instructing (διδάσκειν) is part of Timothy's job description (1 Tim 4:11, 6:2), as is admonishment part of Titus's (νουθεσία at Titus 3:10), and while παραινέειν does not occur, some of its close synonyms do, such as παραγγέλλειν (1 Tim 1:3, 4:11, 5:7, 6:17) and παρακαλεῖν (1 Tim 5:1, 6:2; 2 Tim 4:2; Titus 1:9, 2:6, 15). In effect, Timothy and Titus perform some of the same functions for the community that the conscience does for the soul.

The interplay between internal reproach and divine reproach is well represented by Philo. According to Philo, when one is reproved by conscience (συνείδησις), one should ask God for punishment. By this buffeting (κολάζων), God will, since God is at the same time good, kind, and gentle, straighten out our errors (τὰ ἁμαρτήματα). God will heal (ιάσεται) that individual by sending God's own λόγος, which is a most prudent chastizer (ὁ σωφρονιστὴς ἑλεγχος), into the mind (εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν), resulting in shame-faced and pained repentance.⁵⁷ Earlier in this same treatise, Philo takes some of his exegetical opponents to task, arguing that they are "deceived because they are not able to see clearly the correct way of things" (πεπλανημένοι διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν ὀρθὴν ὁδὸν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐναργῶς ὁρᾶν). In the process of doing so, he declares that "the most fitting designation for an articulate and rational mind" (ἡρθρωμένης καὶ λογικῆς διανοίας οἰκειοτάτη πρόσρησις) is simply ἄνθρωπος. He goes on to explain:

⁵⁷ *Det.* 146 (Colson, LCL): "Let us then, who are convicted by consciousness of our own acts of unrighteousness (οἱ συνειδήσει τῶν οἰκείων ἀδικημάτων ἐλεγχόμενοι), beseech God to punish us rather than let us alone. For if He lets us alone, He will make us servants, not as before, of Himself the gracious One, but of the creation that has no pity; but if He punishes us, He will of His gracious goodness gently and kindly correct our faults, by sending forth into our mind (διάνοια) His own word (λόγος), that reproves and chastens, by means of which He will upbraid it, and make it ashamed of its errors, and so will heal it (αὐτὴν ἰάσεται)." The phrase ὑπὸ τῆς συνειδήσεως ἐλεγχόμενοι occurs in some textual variants (K 579 *pm* *bo*^{pt}) of John 8:9 in the later insertion at 7:53–8:11.

This "man," dwelling in the soul of each of us (οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ κατοικῶν), is discovered at one time as king and governor (ἄρχων καὶ βασιλεὺς), at another as judge and umpire (δικαστὴς καὶ βραβευτής) of life's contests. Sometimes he assumes the part of witness or accuser (μάρτυρος ἢ κατηγοροῦ λαβὼν τάξιν), and, all unseen, convicts us from within (ἐνδοθεν ἐλέγχει), not allowing us so much as to open our mouth, but, holding in and curbing the tongue with the reins of conscience (ἐπιστομίζων ταῖς τοῦ συνειδότος ἡνίαις), checks its willful and rebellious course. This challenger (ἔλεγχος) inquired of the soul when he saw it wandering, "What seekest thou?" (Gen. 37:15). (*Det.* 23–24)⁵⁸

This passage illustrates the fact that the conscience, especially within a given oeuvre as expansive as Philo's, rarely receives a fixed, single image in its depiction.⁵⁹ It is an entity that may be seen to play multiple roles. Thus, any sketch of the conscience must be drawn with soft lines and an appreciation for the term's protean capacities. But the capacity of the conscience to convict is an especially prominent one, and we can further note that very often it is treated as a semipermanent if not fixed component of the interior life. Interestingly, here the psychosomatic effect of the conscience's censure is a paralysis of the tongue.

The conscience does not only reprimand bad actions, whether one's own or another's. It can also be the witness to virtuous actions, as seems to be the case in 2 Tim 1:3, where "Paul" characterizes his service to God and his ceaseless prayer as activities accomplished

⁵⁸ οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ | κατοικῶν τοτὲ μὲν ἄρχων καὶ βασιλεὺς εὐρίσκεται τοτὲ δὲ δικαστὴς καὶ βραβευτής τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀγώνων, ἔστι δ' ὅτε μάρτυρος ἢ κατηγοροῦ λαβὼν τάξιν ἀφανῶς ἡμᾶς ἐνδοθεν ἐλέγχει μηδὲ διαῖραι τὸ στόμα ἑῶν, ἐλλαμβανόμενος δὲ καὶ ἐπιστομίζων ταῖς τοῦ συνειδότος ἡνίαις τὸν αὐθάδη μετὰ ἀφηνιασμοῦ δρόμον 24 γλώττης ἐπέσχεν. οὗτος ὁ ἔλεγχος ἐπύθετο τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡνίκα τὴν πλάνην εἶδεν αὐτῆς· "τί ζητεῖς (Gen 37:15);" (Colson, LCL).

⁵⁹ Klauck argues that "in this passage the challenger or convictor uses conscience as his instrument. But that might change in other contexts" ("Accuser, Judge and Paraclete," 110). Similarly, Colish comments on the range of images used to describe conscience in Roman Stoicism: the roles played by *conscientia* in Seneca's oeuvre: "Conscience is sometimes our judge, censor, or interrogator. Sometimes it is the helmsman piloting the soul through stormy seas. Sometimes our authors use therapeutic imagery, with self-examination as an analgesic, an antibiotic, a palliative, a prophylactic, an upper, a downer, a performance-enhancing drug" (Colish, "Seneca on Acting Against Conscience," 98).

"with a clean conscience." In Cicero's words, "there is no better theatre for virtue than *conscientia*."⁶⁰ The positive use of *conscientia* is especially prominent in Seneca,⁶¹ who can even use the language of deity to describe the concept of conscience at work within a person.⁶² Seneca considers the approval of one's conscience to far surpass even the approval of others.⁶³ The real good derives, says Seneca, "from a good conscience (*ex bona conscientia*), from honorable plans, from right actions, from a contempt for chance occurrences, from a peaceful life and continuous course" (*ex honestis consiliis, ex rectis actionibus, ex contemptu fortuitorum, ex placido vitae et continuo tenore*).⁶⁴

I shall mention a fact by which you may weigh the worth of a man's character: you will scarcely find anyone who can live with his door wide open. It is our conscience (*conscientia nostra*), not our pride, that has put doorkeepers at our doors; we live in such a fashion that being suddenly disclosed to view is equivalent to being caught in the act. What profits it, however, to hide ourselves away, and to avoid the eyes and ears of men? A good conscience (*bona conscientia*) welcomes the crowd, but a bad

⁶⁰ *Tusc.* 2.26.64

⁶¹ "Much emphasis is laid on the positive side of *conscientia*. Good conscience is given the function of a directive, a development not only typical of Seneca but also typically Roman. The given colloquial word with its connotation of fearful condition is made a key-word to help to express the ethical ideals of the author. We have not found an attempt to adapt the normative conception of *conscientia* to the speculative conception of the *observator-custos*" (G. Molenaar, "Seneca's Use of the Term *Conscientia*," *Mnemosyne* 22 [1969]: 180). "Only five of the twenty-five cases of the absolute use refer to bad conscience. A few examples will be given. In *Clem.* I.9 Seneca says about the man for whom there is no way back from crime, that he is both afraid of, and longs, for death, (*si conscientiam suam Plenam sceleyitatis ... adaperuit. Conscientia*, we find, is regarded as a kind of organ of the human personality" (Molenaar, "Seneca's Use of the Term *Conscientia*," 174).

⁶² *Epp.* 41.1, 31.11, 73.16. See Klauck, "Der Gott in dir" (Ep 41,1)," 16–20. Klauck (25–26) rightly resists the overly doctrinaire interpretation regarding *Ep.* 41.1 advanced by Molenaar, who rejects the connection to conscience on the grounds that the term is not there used and that Seneca elsewhere seems to delineate between the human conscience and God (Molenaar, "Seneca's Use of the Term *Conscientia*," 179–80). However, the evidence Molenaar cites (*Ben.* 7.1.1 and *Frag.* 24) is not conclusive, and Klauck's approach to conscience in Seneca is more sensitive to Seneca's procedure as a writer and thinker: "Traditionsgeschichtlich heißt: Seneca greift verschiedene Überlieferungsstränge auf, die er kontextuell zusammenbringt, so daß sie sich gegenseitig erläutern, ohne sie jedoch in einen völlig ausgereiften systematischen Entwurf zu integrieren" (Klauck, "Der Gott in dir" (Ep 41,1)," 25).

⁶³ "No one, I think, rates virtue higher or is more consecrated to virtue than he who has lost his reputation for being a good man in order to keep from losing the approval of his conscience" (Nemo mihi videtur pluris aestimare virtutem, nemo illi magis esse devotus quam qui boni viri famam perdidit, ne conscientiam perderet [*Ep.* 81.20–21; Gummere, LCL]). Cf. *Ep.* 113.32 and *Ben.*

⁶⁴ *Ep.* 23.7

conscience (*mala [conscientia]*), even in solitude, is disturbed and troubled (*anxia atque sollicita*). If your deeds are honourable, let everybody know them; if base, what matters it that no one knows them, as long as you yourself know them? How wretched you are if you despise such a witness (*testes*)! (*Ep.* 43.4–5)⁶⁵

Here we see the theme developed of the *conscientia* as a witness (*testes*) that welcomes the public to examine one's deeds, because they are "respectable" (*honesta*). However, if they are "base" (*turpia*), the bad conscience is troubled and racked with anxiety even in solitude, because of the unsettling awareness of wrongdoing. The image of the house and the open door thus functions as an analogy for the soul, and the *conscientia* stands as a doorkeeper (*ianitor*). If there is nothing foul inside, the doorkeeper welcomes the public in. But if there is wrongdoing, the doorkeeper's troubled state serves as a reproach to the individual. The state of the conscience thus serves as a litmus test for one's actions. It gives clear indications about the moral value of a deed done. It has an indicative, signaling capacity. It is sometimes depicted as an internal and discrete organ of the soul with a defined function, but that function varies depending on the metaphorical complex of which it is a part. The *conscientia* fulfills multiple, and perhaps even contradictory roles, as witness and as judge, as doorkeeper to the soul and as component of the soul.

B. The ἀγαθὴ συνείδησις (1 Tim 1:5–7 and 1:18–20)

We have established that multiple imperial-era authors applied forensic images to the conscience in such a way that highlighted its operation as a kind of organ of the soul. This

⁶⁵ Rem dicam, ex qua mores aestimes nostros: vix quemquam invenies, qui possit aperto ostio vivere. Ianitores conscientia nostra, non superbia opposuit; sic vivimus, ut deprendi sit subito adspici. Quid autem prodest recondere se et oculos 5 hominum auresque vitare? Bona conscientia turbam advocat, mala etiam in solitudine anxia atque sollicita est. Si honesta sunt quae facis, omnes sciant, si turpia, quid refert neminem scire, cum tu scias? O te miserum, si contemnis hunc testem! (Gummere, LCL).

is evidenced by the characterization of conscience as an interior and discrete element of the inner person. Seneca is especially influential in cultivating a rich vocabulary of interiority to describe the function of the conscience.⁶⁶ The conscience has the capacity to function, sometimes antagonistically, in relation to the other parts, and even to affect the body in visible ways, as we saw above in the quotation of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.⁶⁷ A "good" conscience could commend an individual's choices, the product of their will, while a bad conscience will convict the individual and cause duress. *συνείδησις* in the Pastorals may be understood similarly. This is evident in the characterizations of the *συνείδησις* that we find, among other places, in 1 Timothy 1. There the term *συνείδησις* is qualified as *ἀγαθή* twice: at 1 Tim 1:5 and 1:19, where it is also paired with *ἡ πίστις*.⁶⁸ Crucially, the abandonment of a

⁶⁶ Hildegard Cancik, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae morales*, Spudasmata: Studien zur klassischen Philologie und ihren Grenzgebieten 18 (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), 131–35; Cancik, "Persona and Self in Stoic Philosophy," 341–43.

⁶⁷ For Seneca, any effect of *conscientia* on the body would simply be an instance of emotions, which are corporeal, affecting the body: "You will have no doubt, I am sure, that emotions are bodily things (if I may be allowed to wedge in another subject not under immediate discussion), like wrath, love, sternness; unless you doubt whether they change our features, knot our foreheads, relax the countenance, spread blushes, or drive away the blood? What, then? Do you think that such evident marks of the body are stamped upon us by anything else than body? And if emotions are corporeal, so are the diseases of the spirit—such as greed, cruelty, and all the faults which harden in our souls, to such an extent that they get into an incurable state" (Non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint—ut aliud quoque, de quo non quaeris, infulciam—tamquam ira, amor, tristitia, nisi dubitas, an vultum nobis mutent, an frontem adstringant, an faciem diffundant, an ruborem evocent, an fugent sanguinem. Quid ergo? Tam manifestas notas corporis credis inprimi nisi a corpore? Si adfectus corpora sunt, et morbi animorum, ut avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia et in statum inemendabilem adducta [*Ep.* 106.5–6; Gummere, LCL]).

⁶⁸ The close proximity in these two verses to *ἡ πίστις* has led some scholars to draw a connection between a "good" conscience and an adherence to doctrinal rectitude. Cf. Spicq's comment: "La conscience caractérise alors les mœurs et la manière d'être chrétiennes" ("La conscience dans le Nouveau Testament," 67); Lips, *Glaube - Gemeinde - Amt*, 57; Towner, *The Goal of Our Instruction: The Structure of Theology and Ethics in the Pastoral Epistles*, 156–7. Cf. Towner, NICNT, 118. The further suggestion by Towner that conduct is in view is plausible with regard to 1 Tim 3:9, but nothing in 1 Tim 1:5 or 1:19 suggests that behavior per se is in view. Regarding 1 Tim 4:3, Towner writes the following: "Two observations relevant to the meaning of syneidesis can be made: (1) the opponents have rejected the apostolic faith, and (2) the apparent result of this—their false teaching—bears a direct relation to their conduct. It is also reasonable to suspect, as Lips does, that there is some connection between the actual execution of the false teaching and their 'seared conscience'. In sum, this passage implies a causal relation between the condition of their consciences and their

good conscience is characterized in relation to other aspects of the inner person.

Furthermore, there is a clear correlation with the observable behavior of the opponents, including commentary on their mode of speech, which was an indicator of the state of one's conscience, as noted above. In 1 Tim 1:5, the *συνείδησις ἀγαθή*, along with a pure *καρδία* and an unhypocritical or unfeigned faith (*ἀνυπόκριτος*⁶⁹ *πίστις*), are things from which some have "shot wide" or missed as a result of their speculation and turned to "vain" or "empty talk" or "vapid argumentation" (*ματαιολογία*):

5 But the goal of the instruction⁷⁰ is love from a clean heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith, 6 which some, having missed through their conjecture (*ἀστοχεῖν*),⁷¹ turned away to vapid argumentation, 7 wanting to be teachers of the law but not knowing either what they are saying or about what they make such confident assertions. (1 Tim 1:5–7)⁷²

In context, the *συνείδησις ἀγαθή* constitutes one source of *ἀγάπη*, the "goal of the instruction" (*τέλος τῆς παραγγελίας*). It thus serves as a necessary precursor to proper *ἀγάπη*. Its relationship to *πίστις* is somewhat more obscure, since *πίστις* too is listed as a source of

rejection of the faith" (*The Goal of Our Instruction: The Structure of Theology and Ethics in the Pastoral Epistles*, 155).

⁶⁹ The term *ἀνυπόκριτος* occurs only four times in the Pauline corpus. In the homologoumena, it is used exclusively to modify *ἀγάπη* (Rom 12:9, 2 Cor 6:6). In the Pastorals, it is used exclusively to modify *πίστις* (1 Tim 1:5, 2 Tim 1:5).

⁷⁰ I take this *παραγγελία* to make reference back to the content of 1:3; thus not indicating the content of the entire letter, but rather the desired result of Timothy's activity.

⁷¹ The term *ἀστοχεῖν* is derived from *στόχος*, meaning "erected pillar, post, mark, fixed target." "Thus the compound *ἄ-στοχος* 'missing the target.'" The denominative *στοχάζομαι* means "to target, shoot, seek to achieve, guess, conjecture, explore." See Robert Beekes (with the assistance of Lucien van Beek), "*στόχος*," *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*, Indo-European Etymological Dictionaries Online, ed. Alexander Lubotsky (Brill Online, 2015). Louw & Nida (31.68) define this term as "to go astray as the result of departing from the truth — 'to abandon the truth, to lose one's way.'" The term seems to have been applied especially to intellectual inquiry, the activity of "guessing, conjecturing, exploring." The formation of the verb with the alpha privative constitutes the failure to achieve that goal. Polybius, *Hist.* 3.21.9–10 is relevant on this point, since he writes of the importance of obtaining accuracy (*ἀκρίβεια*) concerning the matter of treaties between Rome and Carthage, with the result of an "agreed upon consideration" (*τις ὁμολογουμένη θεωρία*) of the matters.

⁷² 5 τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς παραγγελίας ἐστὶν ἀγάπη ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας καὶ συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς καὶ πίστεως ἀνυποκρίτου, 6 ὧν τινες ἀστοχῆσαντες ἐξετράπησαν εἰς ματαιολογίαν 7 θέλοντες εἶναι νομοδιδάσκαλοι, μὴ νοοῦντες μήτε ἂ λέγουσιν μήτε περὶ τίνων διαβεβαιοῦνται.

love, along with a clean heart. *πίστις* seems to be categorically different, insofar as it is not a component of the inner person's psychology in the same way that *καρδία* and *συνείδησις* are.⁷³ The Pastor may simply be trying to point out that the opponents' rejection of faith is tantamount to the wholesale inner disordering of conscience and heart that has resulted from the speculative conjectures of those who think they know something but, from the Pastor's perspective, really do not. For our purposes, what is striking about this passage is that the rational functions of these internal components of the human person, the conscience and the heart, are characterized as being rejected through intellectual inquiry and speech the Pastor considers to be utterly devoid of reason. From the very outset of this letter, the contest with the opponents is characterized as one in which those who think rightly are of sound mind, while those who do not are disordered in their inner components.

The *ἀγαθὴ συνείδησις* is again paired with *πίστις* at 1 Tim 1:19 and is seen as a possession of Timothy, necessary for his "good campaign."⁷⁴

1:18 This command I entrust to you, [my] child Timothy, in accordance with the prophecies that came before to you, in order that you might wage the noble campaign in accordance with them, 19 having faith and a good conscience, which certain individuals, because they rejected it, have made shipwreck of their faith, among whom are Hymenaeus and Alexander—20 whom I have handed over to Satan in order that they might be taught not to blaspheme. (1 Tim 1:18–20)⁷⁵

Here again a good conscience (though without *καρδία* here) is characterized as something that opponents can "reject" (here using the term *ἀπωθεῖν*). The nature of the relationship to

⁷³ Nevertheless, elsewhere in the Pauline oeuvre, "believing" (*πιστεύειν*) is certainly a central activity of those inner components. Cf. Rom 10:10.

⁷⁴ For a discussion of the spatial and satanological aspects of this passage, see chapter one.

⁷⁵ 18 Ταύτην τὴν παραγγελίαν παρατίθεμαι σοι, τέκνον Τιμόθεε, κατὰ τὰς προαγούσας ἐπὶ σὲ προφητείας, ἵνα στρατεύῃ ἐν αὐταῖς τὴν καλὴν στρατείαν 19 ἔχων πίστιν καὶ ἀγαθὴν συνείδησιν, ἣν τινες ἀπωσάμενοι περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐναυάγησαν, 20 ὧν ἐστὶν Ὑμέναιος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος, οὓς παρέδωκα τῷ σατανᾷ, ἵνα παιδευθῶσιν μὴ βλασφημεῖν.

faith is somewhat easier to discern, since we see that the abandonment of a good *συνείδησις* led to shipwreck *περὶ τὴν πίστιν*. Thus, in the first instance (1 Tim 1:5) the abandonment of a good *συνείδησις* led to a disorientation of speech (*ματαιολογία*) indicative of a defect in rational capacities, while in the latter instance the rejection of a good *συνείδησις* led to shipwreck with regard to the faith. The exact nature of the shipwreck is not fully spelled out, but the need for "education" (*παιδεύειν* [1:20]) suggests that Alexander and Hymenaeus are disordered in their thinking, in particular about faith (*περὶ τὴν πίστιν*). This suggests that the Pastor associates *συνείδησις* not with *πίστις* per se, but rather the performance of cognitive activities necessary for *πίστις*. Without a "good," i.e., properly functioning *συνείδησις*, one cannot attain or maintain either *ἀγάπη* (1:5) or *πίστις* (1:19).

The fact that both of these verses occur in passages that are set up in opposition to opponents (cf. 1 Tim 1:4 and 1 Tim 1:19) illustrates the tendency of the Pastor to reference psychological categories for polemical purposes.⁷⁶ An important takeaway from the above reading of the ancient evidence is the development of the idea, especially pronounced in Paul and articulated similarly in the PE, of the *συνείδησις* as a fixed, internal faculty, and a neutral anthropological component of the human being.⁷⁷ Indeed, the Pastor seems to

⁷⁶ Concerning the use in 1 Tim 1:19, Spicq suggests that a good conscience is the result of the "good fight" undertaken by Timothy. "Cette bonne conscience, qui est la garantie de la foi, est née du souvenir du *τὴν καλὴν στρατείαν* (v. 18) bien accompli; d'avoir conformé sa conduite à la volonté de Dieu" ("This good conscience, which is the guarantee of faith, is produced as a souvenir of the good campaign well-waged; it is a product of having conformed one's conduct to the will of God" [my trans.]) ("La conscience dans le Nouveau Testament," 68).

⁷⁷ "The most significant feature of the *συνείδησις* in Paul is that it acts as a monitor of inner conditions and processes. As inner monitor it registers all the states of the inner person and reports on them in an impartial and reliable manner. . . Paul's *συνείδησις* is an inner entity, a component of the soul . . . In Paul, the *συνείδησις* monitors all kinds of conduct and registers any deviations from the norm of what is right and good, including those of the inner dispositions that drives conduct. The latter inner attitude is the particular field of specialisation of the *συνείδησις*, since it reacts to inner conflict or tension between knowledge of the good,

follow Paul's tendency, especially evident in 1 Cor 8 and 10, by using the *συνείδησις* as an anthropological term⁷⁸ put to theological ends, i.e., to tell a particular kind of story about fidelity to or faith in God, or the lack thereof.⁷⁹ In this way it functions similarly to the use of *συνείδησις* in Paul's letters, though with the important qualification that the context is now explicitly polemical.⁸⁰ While Paul never refers to *συνείδησις* for polemical purposes, the Pastor uses the language of *συνείδησις* almost exclusively to castigate the cognitive deviance that is manifest in behaviors and speech deemed dangerous and disqualifying.

intention and the ultimate behaviour itself" (Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, 265–66). Cf. also the comments of Spicq, who argues that "Paul made *συνείδησις* into the interior faculty for the personal discernment of good and evil, the practical rule of conduct and motive for action. . . He took a *word* that was in the popular vocabulary and whose usage is attested by the papyri, and he distinctively enriched the *concept*, which was elaborated by popular moralizing preaching, and which was directed—above all in Seneca—toward the conscience that we today call 'antecedent' (*conscientia antecedens*)" (*Theological Lexicon of the New Testament*, ed. James D. Ernest [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994], 3.335). Similarly, Marshall, ICC, 218.

⁷⁸ Raymond F. Collins advocates a hybrid anthropology to explain the Pastor's metaphors: "These people are defiled because both their minds and their consciences are defiled. With this affirmation, the Pastor uses the language of Hellenistic anthropology, rather than Paul's Semitic anthropology, to say that the defiled are totally corrupt. These people lack faith because they profess to know God but their actions prove otherwise" (NTL, 336). But Collins fails to note here that both terms are prevalent in Paul's letters.

⁷⁹ Lips suggests that while Paul allowed for diversity of faith and even emphasized the different measures of faith (Rom 12:3) and the divisions of faith (1 Cor 7:17), for the Pastor there was no such understanding. "Für Past dagegen hat der Glaube seine für alle geltende Gestalt: dadurch, dass er primär inhaltlich gefasst wird und als solcher festgelegt ist, kann er nicht individuell variieren" (*Glaube - Gemeinde - Amt*, 71).

⁸⁰ Andreas Lindemann notes that the author of Titus uses Rom 14:14, 20 in Titus 1:15 polemically: "Was bei Paulus paränetisch gemeint war, wird im Titus zu einem Topos der Ketzerbekämpfung" (*Paulus im ältesten Christentum: Das Bild des Apostels und die Rezeption der paulinischen Theologie in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Marcion*, BHT 58 [Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1979], 141 n. 66). Along similar lines, Lips notes that while the defiled conscience in Paul belongs to a community member, for the Pastor it reflects a general assessment against those who no longer belong: "Für Past handelt es sich um die generelle moralische Beurteilung von Leuten, die nicht (mehr) zur Gemeinde gehören" (Lips, *Glaube - Gemeinde - Amt*, 62 n. 122). In the case of Titus 1:15 this is the case. However, I would argue that the boundary lines between community member and those who "no longer belong" are in fact portrayed as being in flux in Titus 1:10–15. "Censure" (ἐλέγχειν) is urged "in order that they might be healthy in the faith" (Titus 1:13; cf. 1:9). Even for those who are "unbelieving" (ἄπιστοι) and defiled in the psychological organs, there remains the hope of redemption. The remedy for the discord between the confessed knowledge of God and the deeds (Titus 1:16) of these "disobedient" (ἠπειθεῖς) individuals is the epiphanic goodness and philanthropy of God (Titus 3:4), which came similarly to "Paul" and others who were once "disobedient" (ἠπειθεῖς) at Titus 3:3.

C. Purity, Defilement, and συνείδησις

In interpreting the way the Pastor constructs appeals to the συνείδησις, particularly the instances in which it is καθαρά or subject to defilement (cf. μεμιάσθαι, Titus 1:15), one faces multiple potential interpretive models, such as cultic or medical.⁸¹ When these terms are attributed to psychological elements such as νοῦς, συνείδησις, and καρδιά, they not only draw upon conventional associations between "pure" and "good" or "dirty" and "bad," but in particular they connote the rational function or irrational dysfunction of those organs. In this respect, "purity," when it pertains to elements of the soul, may function as a category that suggests their capacity to operate freely with respect to the divine and, crucially, to their proper, i.e., rational, operation.⁸² Purificatory measures were undertaken in classical Greece in order to return the soul and its constitutive parts to an undisturbed, placid state,

⁸¹ This does not to exclude the forensic aspect. The language of having a καθαρόν συνειδός can convey the sense of being aware of no wrongdoing. For instance, Josephus writes regarding Herod's son Alexander and his plea for his life before Augustus that "his rhetorical prowess worked for him together with his clear conscience; for he was indeed most clever at speaking" (συνήργει δ' αὐτῷ μετὰ καθαροῦ τοῦ συνειδότος ἡ περὶ λόγους ἰσχὺς· ἦν γὰρ δὴ δεινότατος εἰπεῖν [Josephus, *B.J.* 1.453]). Here the clear conscience suggests an awareness of innocence, and is coupled with another ability, namely the capacity for strong argumentation. In P.Oslo 2 17=Pap.Choix 7, a letter dated to 10 July, 138 CE, we find our first (according to a search of papyri.info, from which the Greek is quoted) papyrological instance of the phrase καθαρά συνείδησις. One Theon, a strategos of the Prosopite nome, questions two men accused of cutting down the vines of a man named Imouthes. They deny the charges. Then he asks them, "If you were in possession of a clean conscience, why, when you had been sought for an investigation of the matter, did you not appear until you were summoned by public notice? (εἰ καθαρὰν εἴχετε συνείδησιν, διὰ τί ζητηθέντες ἐπὶ τῆς διαγνώσεως [τοῦ] πράγματος οὐκ ἐφάνητ[ε] ὥς προγράφητε;). Here the συνείδησις functions as indicator of guilt, but a καθαρά συνείδησις is understood to indicate a lack of awareness of guilt, or perhaps better, an awareness of innocence.

⁸² Though not discussing the various elements of the Pastor's psychology, Malherbe makes the point regarding Titus 2:14 that "pure" can mean "rational" by appeal to Plutarch (*Inim. util.* 87C; *Adul. amic.* 59D; *Rect. rat. aud.* 42C): "The notion of purification is also part of that tradition. According to Plutarch, a person is purified by submitting to reproof and admonition. Philosophy exercises its salutary power as it purifies a person's reason, clearing a foggy and dull mind" ("Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners": Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959-2012*, ed. Carl R. Holladay et al., NovTSup 150 [Leiden: Brill, 2014], 1.447). One can also point to Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.40, who says that the philosopher "purifies his mind with reason" (τὴν διάνοιαν καθαίρει τῷ λόγῳ), "waging battle against pleasures and opinions" (μαχόμενος ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ δόξαις).

their "normal" operating status. Evidence comes in the confluence of medical imagery and the application of "purgatives" in Aristotle's discussions of the cathartic effects of music on the soul.⁸³ Just as purification rites were used in an attempt to heal madness of various kinds, so too can the language of purity be applied in antiquity to the sane or rational functioning of the soul.⁸⁴

The Pastor's language of a corrupted mind, a pure/defiled conscience, and a pure heart is best understood in light of this ancient discourse. The Pastor uses conventional *topoi* known from medical and philosophical literature to depict their proper operation or malfunction. For instance, we see in Epictetus' depiction of the true Cynic (*Diatr.* 3.22.93–96) that the Cynic's "governing part" must "be purer than the sun" (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ καθαρώτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἡλίου), since it is his conscience (τὸ συνειδός) that renders him "able to rebuke certain persons and punish those who err" (ἐπιτιμᾶν τισὶν καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας).⁸⁵ Similarly, as I will demonstrate in what follows, the Pastor appears to reference the νοῦς, συνείδησις, and καρδιά as cognitive organs, and the language of purification suggests the pure, dry, rational functioning of those cognitive organs. While

⁸³ For Aristotle's cathartic theory of tragedy and the idea that it is interpreted in terms of medical purification, see Robert Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 288–89 and 289 n. 39 where he cites Aristotle, *Pol.* 1342a 7–11. There we see that this pertains especially to the therapeutic use of music, and its potential downsides. Noteworthy is the fact that these purges are needed no matter what emotions a particular soul is liable to experience, whether pity (ἔλεος), fear (φόβος) or something else.

⁸⁴ Robert Parker notes that cases of madness were dealt with by attempts at purification, both medical and otherwise (*Miasma*, 208–209, 215).

⁸⁵ While for "kings and tyrants" this power lies in their "bodyguards and arms" (οἱ δορυφόροι καὶ τὰ ὅπλα), for the Cynic this ἐξουσία derives from the pure state of his ruling faculty. The prevalence of the *καθαρ-* stem is notable in this passage. The Cynic's ἡγεμονικόν is "purer than the sun," he "pure when is still asleep" (καθαρὸς μὲν κεκοίμηται) and "sleep leaves him purer" (καθαρώτερον δ' αὐτὸν ἔτι ὁ ὕπνος ἀφῆκεν). See *Diatr.* 3.22.93, 95. This, for Epictetus, is described as *παρρησιάζεσθαι*. See also Philo, *Her.* 1–29, for the significance of the relationship between *παρρησία*, which a pure conscience affords, and the capacity of an individual to have confidence before God (Bosman, "Conscience and Free Speech in Philo," 40–42).

the language of rationality with what is healthy, any deviation from perceived rationality is characterized as sick, dirty, and defiled.

A near contemporary of the Pastor, Philo, helps demonstrate the point that the language of purity, here applied to conscience, often connotes not only cultic blamelessness or propriety, but also intelligence and rationality. Though Philo does not frequently describe the *συνειδός* as *καθαρόν*,⁸⁶ the few instances in which he does are consistent with his more general characterization of the conscience in its forensic capacity as witness to blameless conduct.⁸⁷ The clean conscience also appears in opposition to flattery, delusion, and hypocrisy, since it marks the capacity to speak freely.⁸⁸ One instance in particular helps us to see not only what is meant by a pure conscience, but also for Philo what that pure conscience's relationship is to a pure mind (see further below). Appealing to the allegorical

⁸⁶ The phrase "pure conscience" (*καθαρόν συνειδός*) occurs in Philo at *Legat.* 165; *Prob.* 100; *Praem.* 84; *Spec.* 1.203. Cf. *Ebr.* 12. Klauck suggests that the idea of the "pure conscience" (*καθαρόν συνειδός*) comes by analogy with the notion of a pure heart from, for example, Ps 51:10, but acknowledges that in its thirty-five instances Philo never uses the term *καρδία* in the sense of conscience ("Accuser, Judge and Paraclete," 112–14). It is worth noting that this may be the case simply because the phrase *καθαρά καρδία* is actually exceptionally rare in the LXX. In fact, as an attributive adjective, it occurs only at Gen 20:5, 6, and Ps 50:12. As a predicate adjective, it occurs only at Job 11:13, 33:3. Cf. Ps 23:4 for the phrase *καθαρός τῇ καρδίᾳ*.

⁸⁷ *Legat.* 165 comes in the context of Philo's account of Gaius's own utter delusion about the motivation of the Alexandrians: "Now Gaius had completely deluded himself, not only saying but even thinking that he was a god" (Ὁ δὲ Γάιος ἑαυτὸν ἐξετύφωσεν, οὐ λέγων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰόμενος εἶναι θεός [162]). Philo writes that he thought this because the Alexandrians, who are "clever with regard to flatteries and charlatanries and hypocrisies" (δεινοὶ γὰρ εἰσι τὰς κολακείας καὶ γοητείας καὶ ὑποκρίσεις), kept on using the term *θεός* to describe him. Gaius, being inexperienced regarding their impiety (ἥς [ἀσεβείας] ἄπειρος ὢν [164]), even thought that the Alexandrians' revolutionary proceedings against Jewish places of prayer were done from a conscience that was pure and from unmixed honor for himself" (ἀπὸ καθαροῦ τοῦ συνειδότος καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν ἀκραιφνοῦς τιμῆς [165]). Thus, the phrase here suggests a purity of motivation, a conscience that gave no reproach concerning the undertaking. Gaius's own delusion regarding the matter is noteworthy, since it suggests that the Alexandrians did not have a "pure conscience" at all. At *Prob.* 84, the *ἔθνος* that is great is the one "to whom God is hearkening via their appropriately holy prayers and drawing near to their invocations from a pure conscience" (ὃ ὁ θεός ἐστιν ἐπήκοος ἱεροπρεπεστάτων εὐχῶν καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ καθαροῦ τοῦ συνειδότος κατακλήσεσι συνεγγίζων).

⁸⁸ "For in very truth, fawning and flattery and dissembling, in which the words are at war with the thought, are utterly slavish. But freedom of speech, genuine without taint of bastardy, and proceeding from a pure conscience, befits the nobly born" (τῷ γὰρ ὄντι θωπεία μὲν καὶ κολακεία καὶ ὑπόκρισις, ἐν οἷς λόγοι γνώμαις διαμάχονται, δουλοπρεπέστατα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόθως καὶ γνησίως ἐκ καθαροῦ τοῦ συνειδότος ἐλευθεροστομεῖν εὐγενέσιν ἀρμόττον) (*Prob.* 99 [Colson, LCL]).

maxim that "plain words are symbols of things unclear and obscure" (σύμβολα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ λεχθέντα φανερά ἀδήλων καὶ ἀφανῶν), Philo explains the requirement that a whole-burnt offering be made by appeal to a gendered notion of rationality and irrationality in which the "mind and reasoning" (νοῦς and λογισμός) are male and "perception" (αἴσθησις) is female. "Mind (νοῦς) is of a completely superior *genus* to perception, as man is to woman, and it, being blameless (ἄμωμος) and having been purified with purifications of perfect virtue (καθαρθεὶς καθάρσει ταῖς ἀρετῆς τελείας), is itself the most undefiled and complete sacrifice, completely pleasing to God."⁸⁹ The cleansing agents by which νοῦς attains its appropriately pure status are the "purifications of perfect virtue." The exercise or attainment of virtue, it seems, is what renders νοῦς pure. It is a fundamentally circular exercise, such that the νοῦς, which is by its very nature rational (λογικός [1.201]), becomes more purified (i.e., rational) by its proper functioning. Philo goes on to explain the relationship between the νοῦς and the συνειδός.

For the law desires, first, that the mind of the worshipper should be sanctified (τὸν νοῦν ὡσιῶσθαι) by exercise in good and profitable thoughts and judgements (γνώμῃς ἀγαθαῖς καὶ συμφερούσαις ἐνασκούμενον); secondly, that his life should be a consistent course of the best actions, so that as he lays his hands on the victim, he can boldly and with a pure conscience speak (παρρησιασάμενον ἐκ καθαροῦ τοῦ συνειδότος) in this wise. . . . (*Spec.* 1.203)⁹⁰

On Philo's construction, a certain coordination emerges between the purity of the mind and the purity of the conscience, that of the former being expressed in terms of the exercise of intellectual virtue and the latter in terms of the abstention from any wrongdoing that might

⁸⁹ νοῦς δὲ αἰσθήσεως, ὡς ἀνὴρ γυναικός, καθ' ὅλον γένος ἀμείνων, ὃς ἄμωμος ὢν καὶ καθαρθεὶς καθάρσει ταῖς ἀρετῆς τελείας αὐτός ἐστιν ἢ εὐαγεστάτη θυσία καὶ ὅλη δι' ὅλων εὐάρεστος θεῷ (*Spec.* 1.201).

⁹⁰ (203) βούλεται γὰρ τοῦ θύοντος πρῶτον μὲν τὸν νοῦν ὡσιῶσθαι γνώμῃς ἀγαθαῖς καὶ συμφερούσαις ἐνασκούμενον, ἔπειτα δὲ τὸν βίον ἐξ ἀρίστων συνεστάναι πράξεων, ὡς ἅμα τῇ τῶν χειρῶν ἐπιθέσει δύνασθαι τινα παρρησιασάμενον ἐκ καθαροῦ τοῦ (204) συνειδότος τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν· (Colson, LCL).

have earned "accusation" (κατηγορία) or "blame" (ψόγος). Ultimately, the two must operate together, and their statuses as "pure," though theoretically separate, are functionally intertwined. One cannot have one without the other. The purified νοῦς is a νοῦς in proper working order, "rendered holy by practice in good and beneficial thoughts" (ὡσιῶσθαι γνώμαις ἀγαθαῖς καὶ συμφερούσαις ἐνασκούμενον). The "pure conscience" is the one marked by the freedom of speech afforded by the absence of deeds meriting reproach or censure.

Plutarch's treatise "On the Genius of Socrates" gives further evidence of the νοῦς being described as καθαρός in the sense of being in excellent working order, i.e., as a sensitive rational faculty. Plutarch (*Gen. Socr.* 588d) speaks of Socrates's νοῦς as "pure" (καθαρός) and "active" (ἀπαθής), and notes that it was so "sensitive" (εὐαφής) and "refined" (λεπτός), commingled with σῶμα ever so slightly, that it could hear the "word of the *daimon* without sound" (λόγος . . . δαίμονος ἄνευ φωνῆς). This use of καθαρός suggests that it is imbued not with connotations of cultic purity or medical cleanliness, but rather extraordinary sensitivity, like a sophisticated precision instrument that works best when it is clean of any particulate and perfectly calibrated.⁹¹ In such scenarios, the νοῦς is most sensitive and receptive to divine communication, here in the form of a δαίμων.⁹² Earlier in

⁹¹ Cf. Marcus Aurelius, *Med.* 12.3, where τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, when it is stripped of bodily influences, is described as "the thinking faculty" (ἡ νοερὰ δύναμις) that is καθαρά. It is then that it is said to "live without disturbance and agreeably and graciously with its own δαίμων" (ἀταράκτως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἱλέως τῷ σαντοῦ δαίμονι διαβιῶναι).

⁹² Later in *Gen. Socr.* (591d-e), we see further how Plutarch equates the highest part of the ψυχή, which he says many (οἱ πολλοί) call νοῦς, with a δαίμων. For the idea that the "most authoritative element of our soul" is in fact a δαίμων, we can turn to *Tim.* 90a (Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 212–13). Dillon points further to 30b and 41d of Timaeus, which are useful for interpreting this passage of *Gen. Socr.* and the idea that νοῦς is to ψυχή what ψυχή is to σῶμα. This passage suggests that νοῦς, at least in the case of the elite class of highly rational and virtuous individuals, is at least partly "outside" (ἐκτός) the body, and is thus a δαίμων. The part of the νοῦς submerged in the body is called ψυχή, and it is subject to the corruption (φθορά) of the body. Dillon points out that this separation of νοῦς from the body is influenced at least in part by Aristotle's theory of νοῦς,

the treatise, Plutarch uses the phrase "cleansed of delusion and superstition" (καθαρεύοντα τύφου καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας),⁹³ which suggests that certain beliefs about the divine, which Plutarch considers to be erroneous and ridiculous, can be thought of as defiling the mind, such that it needs purification. If viewed in this context, the notion that the νοῦς and the συνείδησις are "unclean" and "defiled" suggests that they are, to extend the metaphor slightly, like precision instruments ruined by the accretion of sediment or detritus. Beliefs that might be considered ridiculous or harmful constitute that build-up, the detritus that keeps the mind from working properly.⁹⁴

The concern to keep the mental faculties in good working order and depicting such rational operation as "pure" may also suggest in part an awareness of the capacity of the humors to cloud the mind. Aulus Gellius tells of how Carneades used white hellebore (black hellebore being the most common antidote for μανία and also used for a variety of other ailments), to purge his mind in preparation for the difficult intellectual task of philosophical refutation. His goal was that "none of the corrupt humours of his stomach (*ne quid ex*

and that it finds expression in the Hermetic theories (*Corp. herm.* tractates 1 and 10) of the distinctness of νοῦς and ψυχή (*Middle Platonists*, 213).

⁹³ *Gen. Socr.* 579e-f. Galaxidorus laments how difficult it is to find a man "clean of delusion and superstition." Here τύφος does not mean simple pride, but rather a kind of delusion. Cf. 2 Tim 3:2. Similarly, Epicurus (Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 13, 588a [= U 117]) praised Apelles for being "pure from all education" (καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας). This was predicated upon the belief that traditional poetry was fully of deception and corruption, and could muddy the mind, so to speak. Capturing the mindset of Epicurus, Elizabeth Asmis writes that "those who have been infected by the tales of the poets need to 'purify' themselves" ("Basic Education in Epicureanism," in *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, ed. Yun Lee Too [Leiden: Brill, 2001], 215).

⁹⁴ For instance, Epictetus (*Diatr.* 2.21.13, 15) suggests that pupils do not "make progress" (προκόπτειν) because they do not go to school so that they might be "healed" (θεραπεύεσθαι) and to have their "beliefs" (δόγματα) "thoroughly purified" (ἐκκαθαρθείσθαι). Cf. Keith Seddon, *Epictetus' Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes: Guides to Stoic Living* (London: Routledge, 2005), 158. Alternatively, philosophers like Epicurus thought that school was precisely the wrong place to go for right knowledge. Epicurus is said to have praised Apelles for being "pure from all education" (καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας). See Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 13, 588a (= U 117), cited by Asmis, "Basic Education in Epicureanism," 215 n. 32.

corruptis in stomacho humoribus) might rise to the abode of his mind (*ad domicilia usque animi redundaret*) and weaken the power and vigour of his intellect (*et instantiam vigoremque mentis labefaceret*).⁹⁵ The use of hellebore, a common and potent purgative, for the cleansing of mind-altering humors, presupposes the widespread theory of humoral disease etiology and illustrates the capacity of the humors to influence the mind. Thus, the mind influenced by an imbalance of humors is rendered weak (cf. *labefacere*) due to the "corrupting humors" from the stomach.

Hellenistic Jewish authors use similar terminology to discuss a pure or healthy νοῦς or conscience, or its opposite. For instance, Josephus, *Ant.* 8.23, relates the story of how Solomon asked God for wisdom (1 Kgdms 3:9) as follows: "Give me, O Lord, a healthy mind and good prudence (νοῦν ὑγιῆ καὶ φρόνησιν ἀγαθήν), with which I might judge the people, by virtue of having received things true and just."⁹⁶ The healthy νοῦς is obviously one that is in good working order, which Solomon can request from God. A similar expression comes from the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the last portion of which, the Testament of Benjamin, is entitled in some manuscripts "Concerning a Pure Understanding" (περὶ διανοίας καθαρᾶς):

2 The one who has a pure understanding (ὁ ἔχων διάνοιαν καθάραν) in love does not look at a woman for the purpose of πορνεία. For he has no defilement (μιασμός) in his heart, and the spirit of God rests in him. 3 For even as the sun is not defiled (οὐ μιάινεται) when it draws close to dung and filth but rather dries both and drives away the foul odor, so also the pure mind (ὁ καθαρὸς νοῦς) though constrained in the

⁹⁵ *Noc. att.* 17.15.1–2 (Rolfe, LCL).

⁹⁶ δός μοι," φησί, "δέσποτα, νοῦν ὑγιῆ καὶ φρόνησιν ἀγαθήν, οἷς ἂν τὸν λαὸν τάληθῃ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λαβὼν κρίνοιμι" (*Ant.* 8.23). His version is noticeably different from that given in the LXX: "And give to your servant a heart to hear and to judge your people in righteousness, in order to understand the difference between good and evil" (καὶ δώσεις τῷ δούλῳ σου καρδίαν ἀκούειν καὶ διακρίνειν τὸν λαόν σου ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ συνίειν ἀνὰ μέσον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ·).

defilements (ἐν τοῖς μiasμοῖς) of the earth, rather edifies⁹⁷ and is not itself defiled (οὐ μαιίνεται). (T.Benj. 8.2–3)⁹⁸

In this passage, which alludes to the association between ὁ νοῦς and ἥλιος witnessed in Philo and others, we see the idea of "pure understanding" (διάνοια καθαρά)⁹⁹ closely associated with a pure νοῦς, both in opposition to defilement.¹⁰⁰ For this author, the truly pure mind does not become defiled by virtue of being in the world, as it were, but even has the capacity, we infer, to overpower defilement. It is not defiled, and if the analogy with the sun and the manure holds, the purity of the νοῦς is more powerful, even contagious, rendering that which is defiled neutral and harmless.

Regarding the defilement of the συνείδησις in particular (cf. Titus 1:15), one text from contemporary Greek literature deserves special attention due to the precise nature of the lexical correlation. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a historian and literary critic of the

⁹⁷ The use of οἰκοδομεῖν with reference to the proper functioning of the νοῦς may shed light on the use of οἰκοδομεῖν regarding the συνείδησις that is "built up," i.e., strengthened and encouraged to do something without proper γνώσις, in 1 Cor 8:10.

⁹⁸ (2.) ὁ ἔχων διάνοιαν καθαρὰν ἐν ἀγάπῃ οὐχ ὁρᾷ γυναῖκα εἰς πορνείαν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει μiasμόν ἐν καρδίᾳ, ὅτι ἀναπαύεται ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ. (3.) ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος οὐ μαιίνεται προσέχων ἐπὶ κόπρον καὶ βόρβορον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρα ψύγει καὶ ἀπελαύνει τὴν δυσωδίαν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ καθαρὸς νοῦς ἐν τοῖς μiasμοῖς τῆς γῆς συνεχόμενος μᾶλλον οἰκοδομεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ μαιίνεται. For further discussion of συνείδησις in the Pseudepigrapha, see Eckstein, *Der Begriff Syneidesis bei Paulus*, 119–21. The date and provenance of the T.12 Patr. are contested. Recent scholars have spoken of a scholarly trend towards considering these documents as products of the 3rd century CE. Joel Marcus considers the T12P to originate in Syria in the late 2nd or early 3rd century and to reflect a Jewish-Christian heritage that advocates Torah observance ("The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and the Didascalia Apostolorum: A Common Jewish Christian Milieu?," *JTS* 61 [2010]: 596–626). Scholars like David Arthur DeSilva, however, contend based on internal evidence that they reflect a Hasmonian origin, though he notes that external attestation does not appear until the third century CE with Origen, *Hom. Josh.* 15.6 (David Arthur DeSilva, "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs as Witnesses to Pre-Christian Judaism: A Re-Assessment," *Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha* 23.1 [2013]: 23–24).

⁹⁹ Cf. T. Iss. 4.4: καί γε τὰ πνεύματα τῆς πλάνης οὐδὲν ἰσχύουσι πρὸς αὐτόν. οὐ γὰρ εἶδεν ἐπιδέξασθαι κάλλος θηλείας, ἵνα μὴ ἐν διαστροφῇ μίανῃ τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῦ.

¹⁰⁰ The language of διάνοια in T. 12 Patr. contains similar locutions. Cf. T. Benj. 6.7 καθαίρει τὴν διάνοιαν; T. Ash. 6.1 καθαρεύειν τῇ διανοίᾳ. One might also further compare the language of being "wounded/damaged in the διάνοια" (cf. τετρωμένος κατὰ διάνοιαν at Gos. Pet. 7.26) and 2 Macc 3:16, τιτρώσκεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν. Cf. Diod. Sic. 17.112, τετρωμένος τὴν ψυχὴν. Cf. BDAG, 1009.

Augustan era,¹⁰¹ addresses the virtues of Thucydides's historical writing.¹⁰² He writes that Thucydides differed from his predecessors by virtue of his choice of a topic (ὕποθεσις) that was neither too monothematic nor too disparate, and "next insofar as he did not attach to [the topic] anything mythical, nor did he turn aside the narrative for the purpose of deceiving and hoodwinking the many like all those before him did" (ἔπειτα κατὰ τὸ μὴδὲν αὐτῇ μυθῶδες προσάψαι, μὴδ' εἰς ἀπάτην καὶ γοητείαν¹⁰³ τῶν πολλῶν ἐκτρέψαι τὴν γραφήν, ὥς οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ πάντες ἐποίησαν).¹⁰⁴ He then quotes Thucydides' own affirmation of the absence of any mythical element (τὸ μυθῶδες) and assertion of the ultimate utility (cf. ὠφέλιμα) of his work. Dionysius praises Thucydides for taking special forethought for the truth, "neither adding anything that was not right to the affairs nor subtracting, nor taking liberties with the writing, but keeping his purpose blameless and pure from all envy and all flattery" (οὔτε προστιθεὶς τοῖς πράγμασιν οὐδὲν ὃ μὴ δίκαιον οὔτε ἀφαιρῶν, οὐδὲ ἐνεξουσιάζων τῇ γραφῇ, ἀνέγκλητον δὲ καὶ καθαρὰν τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ παντὸς φθόνου καὶ πάσης κολακείας φυλάττων).¹⁰⁵ At the end of what becomes an impromptu encomium of truth and Thucydides's adherence to it, Dionysius writes that "the best thing of all is to not lie willingly and to not defile one's

¹⁰¹ He indicates at *Rom. ant.* 1.7.2 that he arrived in Rome around the cessation of the civil war (ca. 30 BCE), and that he composed the introduction to his lengthy history twenty-two years later, in 7 BCE. Cf. Stanley Frederick Bonner, *The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus: A Study in the Development of Critical Method*, Cambridge Classical Studies 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), 1.

¹⁰² This passage appears often in scholarly footnotes. However, while scholars have noted the occurrence of this phrase, they have only done so in passing, and have not considered the significance of the context in which it appears.

¹⁰³ The pairing is repeated at *Thuc.* 7. For a similar pairing of ἀπάτη and γοητεία, cf. Polybius, *Hist.* 4.20.5.

¹⁰⁴ *Thuc.* 6.

¹⁰⁵ *Thuc.* 7.

own conscience" (κράτιστον δὲ πάντων τὸ μηδὲν ἐκουσίως ψεύδεσθαι μηδὲ μαιίνειν τὴν αὐτοῦ συνείδησιν).¹⁰⁶

The importance of this particular passage is not only that it provides a precise linguistic parallel to our passage in Titus 1, a fact appreciated by many commentators, but that it gives us insight into what exactly the συνείδησις is supposed to do. It is notable that defiling one's conscience is not equivalent to lying, that is, to falsifying what one knows to be true. Rather, the pairing of these two phrases ("lie willingly" and "defile one's conscience") suggests that the idea of the συνείδησις *as a judging entity* is operative. In its capacity as judge, it would serve to convict if someone were to lie willingly, here in terms of telling a falsehood about history. The conjunction of "lie willingly" and "defile one's conscience" suggest that the latter follows from the former, but is not identical to it.¹⁰⁷ If we interpret the willing lie as an intentional act of deception, it does not in fact pertain to the conscience, for the conscience is meant to act as judge and witness regarding such moral actions. However, if the συνείδησις does not perform that role, then it is defiled. The defiled conscience is essentially a conscience that has failed to do its job. Thus, while the willing lie is bad, the conscience in good working order might properly do its job and convict the

¹⁰⁶ Leonhard Sadée argues that this final phrase is the interpolation of a Christian reader (Leonhard Sadée, *De Dionysii Halicarnassensis Scriptis Rhetoricis Quaestiones Criticae* [Strasbourg: Carol I. Truebner, 1878], 214–15). His point that the preceding sentence is a more fitting conclusion to the section (insofar as it recapitulates the topic sentence) is well taken, though I am less convinced by his suggestion that the phrase in question does not refer to any "Greek usage" (*Graecus mos*). Furthermore, the language of keeping the προαίρεσις ἀνέγκλητος and καθαρὰ arguably prepares for the defilement language seen at the end of *Thuc.* 8. While we might expect the form τὸ συνειδός because it is preferred by authors of good literary style, in fact we find, besides verbal and participial formulations, ἡ συνείδησις. Cf. other instances in Dionysius's *Ant. Rom.*: κατὰ τὴν συνείδησιν τῶν πραχθέντων (1.78.1); ἐτάραττε δ' αὐτὸν ἡ συνείδησις (8.1.3); πάσης τ' ἀδίκου καὶ ἀνοσίου συνειδήσεως καθαρὰ (8.48.5); νῦν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς συνειδήσεως ἐλαυνόμενος, ὃ πάσχουσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τὰς ἀνοσίους βουλὰς κατὰ τῶν ἀναγκαιότητων σφίσι ποιησάμενοι (12.3.1).

¹⁰⁷ Similarly in 1 Tim 4:2, the hypocrisy of liars goes unchallenged because the συνείδησις is sick.

person of such a lie. But to have a conscience that is so completely defiled as to be no longer be in working condition would remove the internal safeguard, and presumably the willing lie would never be remedied, leaving Thucydides and his readers in a state worse than ignorance.

I have argued in this section that the language of purity and defilement, though certainly having resonance in cultic contexts, is also used in reference to either the functioning or malfunctioning of a particular organ of the soul. As such, the proper function of a mental organ is its rational operation. To be healthy and pure means that it operates without hindrance.

D. The *καθαρά συνείδησις* (1 Tim 3:9 and 2 Tim 1:3–5)

In light of the above, what then is the significance for the Pastor of the *συνείδησις* being paired with the adjective *καθαρός* (1 Tim 3:9, 2 Tim 1:3)?¹⁰⁸ The first thing to note is that the designation "pure" or "clean" (*καθαρός*) works in concert with equal (e.g., *ἀνέγκλητος*) and opposite descriptors elsewhere, such as *βέβηλος*,¹⁰⁹ *άνόσιος*,¹¹⁰ *βδέλυκτος*,¹¹¹ and of

¹⁰⁸ C. A. Pierce explains the phrase *καθαρά συνείδησις* as a usage of the bodily "organ" metaphor, "but the organ is empty, as the alimentary canal by fasting or purging" (*Conscience in the New Testament*, 51). However, the gloss of *καθαρός* as "empty" is insufficient, not only because it is not a meaning attested by any of the major lexica (LSJ, *BDAG*, *LPGL*, *BrillDAG*), but also because it would seem that the logical opposite is "full" or some such, whereas as what we find in the Pastorals is that it is defiled. He describes it as "implying the removal of stain," suggesting that he does not think the notion of *καθαρός* as empty is the only interpretive option (*Conscience in the New Testament*, 94).

¹⁰⁹ 1 Tim 1:9, 4:7, 6:20; 2 Tim 2:16.

¹¹⁰ 1 Tim 1:9, 2 Tim 3:2.

¹¹¹ Titus 1:16. That the term *βδέλυκτος* and its cognates conveyed a sense of defilement is evident from the association with cult images, idols, or idolatrous practices (cf. Lev 18:30). Cf. *τὸ βδέλυγμα τῆς ἐρημώσεως* at Matt 24:15, Mark 13:14, and the comment of *BDAG* (172) that the phrase "appears to refer to someth. that is abhorred because it defiles a sacred place and causes it to be left desolate." Paul's question in Rom 2:22 links the verbal form with idols (*ὁ βδελυσσόμενος τὰ εἰδωλα ἱεροσυλεῖς*). The perf. pass. participial form *ἐβδελυγμένος*

course μεμιαμμένοι/μεμίανται.¹¹² Secondly, the author of the PE emphasizes a discourse of purity and impurity throughout the letters.¹¹³ For instance, Jesus Christ is he "who gave himself on our behalf, so that he might cleanse (λυτρώσῃται) us from all lawlessness and purify (καθαρίσῃ) for himself a peculiar people, zealous for good works" (Titus 2:14). Salvation occurred, according to Titus 3:5, "through the washing of regeneration (διὰ λουτροῦ παλιγγενεσίας) and the renewal of the Holy Spirit." The conduct of Timothy is to be marked by "purity" (ἀγνεία [1 Tim 4:12, 5:2]), and he is to keep himself "pure" (ἀγνός), a term that is also a quality of older women (Titus 2:5). By contrast, the wretches about whom "Paul" prophesied at 2 Tim 3:2 are said to be "unholy" (ἀνόσιοι), as are those for whom "the law is laid down" (νόμος...κεῖται): namely, "the unholy and impure" (ἀνόσιοι καὶ βέβηλοι [1 Tim 1:9]). This last term, βέβηλος ("impure"), is applied also to the opponents' "myths" (μῦθοι [1 Tim 4:7]), as well as their "empty babblings" (κενοφωνίαι [1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 2:16]).

At times, the Pastor expands the significance of purity and impurity language via creative pairings. For instance, we hear in Titus 1:15 that "to the pure all things are pure" (πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς), with the contrast to this being that "to the defiled and unbelieving, nothing is pure, but both their mind and their conscience are defiled" (τοῖς δὲ

is equivalent to βδελυκτός (BDAG, 173). The adjective is conjoined with ἀκάθαρτος at LXX Prov 17:15. Cf. LXX Job 15:16 ἐβδελυγμένος καὶ ἀκάθαρτος.

¹¹² Titus 1:15.

¹¹³ The application of the cultic or medical terminology of purity or defilement to describe "good" or "bad" was of course not new with the Pastorals. Robert Parker writes that, "this moralization of ritual purity has obvious affinities with the insistence by writers of the fifth and fourth centuries that the modest offerings of a pious disposition are more welcome to the gods than hecatombs slain by the lawless rich. *Katharos* had begun to be used in the same kind of way rather earlier. It had probably long been possible to say that an open and straightforward man had 'a clean mind', and it was standard colloquial Greek to dub a villain *mīaros*, 'dirty'" (*Miasma*, 323). For the clean mind, he cites (323 n. 9) Hesiod, *Theog.* 89, Euripides, *Med.* 660; καθαρῶς = honestly, *Theog.* 198; pure mind of modest woman, *PGM* 901.

μεμιαμμένοις καὶ ἀπίστοις οὐδὲν καθαρὸν, ἀλλὰ μεμίανται αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνείδησις).

Here the Pastor makes an explicit connection between being "faithless/unbelieving" (ἀπίστοι) and being "defiled" (μεμιαμμένοι). The Pastor hereby makes a crucial connection between defilement and unbelief, such that to have faith *is* to be free from defilement, and vice versa. Thus, the Pastor uses the language of purity to denote that which is licit, and the opposite is true for that which is illicit. However, I argue that we can go beyond this basic moral dichotomy through attention to the functionality associated with these moral descriptors. When this language is used of psychological elements in particular, the nuance of being "pure" is such that it conveys the sense of being in flawless working order, and in particular of being rational, rarified and pure enough to partake of the rational.

While some scholars have attempted to draw a distinction between the "good" and the "pure" conscience, it is difficult to demonstrate any functional difference between the two usages.¹¹⁴ Some scholars argue that the Pastor's use of the συνείδησις with adjectival descriptors marks an abrupt departure from Paul.¹¹⁵ Roloff, for instance, places much

¹¹⁴ Arichea & Hatton, UBSHS, 73, suggest the following: "A good conscience enables a person to make good judgment. A clear conscience, on the other hand, is possessed by people who have the conviction that they have done nothing wrong, and whose actions are not motivated by selfish desires." This neat distinction is not supported by contemporary usage. Eckstein writes, "'Bedeutungsmässige Unterscheide lassen sich weder hier noch dort ausmachen, das 'gute', das 'reine' und 'unverletzte Gewissen' sind synonym zu verstehen" (*Der Begriff Syneidesis bei Paulus*, 303). Similarly, Marshall, ICC, 225: "it has to be admitted that in other literature a good conscience appears to be the same as a clean conscience." From a stylistic perspective, the use of ἀγαθή might simply reflect the Pastor's desire to avoid the same adjective in a list where καθαρά is already in use (1 Tim 1:5). Marshall says later (ICC, 491) with regard to 1 Tim 3:9 that if there is a difference, καθαρὸς refers to the cleansing activity of God while ἀγαθός refers to functionality, but καθαρός, as shown above, can also suggest proper operation.

¹¹⁵ Jürgen Roloff in particular: "Demnach ist das Gewissen für die Past keine neutrale anthropologische Grösse, sondern durch Gottes Handeln theologisch qualifiziert" (Roloff, EKKNT, 69) and "Die Differenz zu Paulus besteht demnach primär in der anthropologischen Terminologie..." (Roloff, EKKNT, 70). Roloff thinks of the good conscience or pure conscience as taking the place of Paul's νοῦς renewed through the Spirit in the endtime (Roloff, EKKNT, 70). Roloff makes much of the use of adjectives for συνείδησις by the Pastor: "Das Gewissen ist hier demnach nicht wie bei Paulus das Verhalten des Menschen anhand vorgegebener Normen

emphasis on the presence of positive descriptors of the *συνείδησις* such as *καθαρά* and *ἀγαθά* and the absence of negative descriptors, though this would seem to overlook the negative state of the *συνείδησις* indicated by 1 Tim 4:2 and Titus 1:15.¹¹⁶ For him, the positive modifiers suggest that *συνείδησις* is "theologisch qualifiziert" *in a way that it is not in Paul*. While *συνείδησις* is qualified in a new way in so far it receives theologically loaded designations such as *καθαρά* and *ἀγαθή* (though arguably neither is inherently theological), the *συνείδησις* in Paul can be described with cultic and religiously significant language (*μολύνεται* at 1 Cor 8:7) just as in the PE (*μεμίλνται* at Titus 1:15). Similarly, both Paul and the Pastor can use other language and imagery, such as (arguably) medical imagery in 1 Corinthians 8:12 (*ἡ συνείδησις ἀσθενοῦσα*) or in the Pastorals (*κεκαυστηριάσθαι* at 1 Tim 4:2). Thus, while the Pastor's language of *συνείδησις* does in some regards constitute a development of Paul's, this development does not suggest the kind of shift in basic function alleged by some scholars.

What the Pastor's discourse of *συνείδησις* does suggest is that he imagines it to be crucial for the proper evaluation of the mystery of faith. In 1 Tim 3:9, where *συνείδησις* is yet again associated with *πίστις* (cf. *τὸ μυστήριον τῆς πίστεως*), the use of the term indicates the means, manner, or perhaps the location *in which*¹¹⁷ (cf. *ἐν καθαρᾷ συνειδήσει*) the mystery of faith is held by the deacons (1 Tim 3:8): "Deacons likewise ought to be dignified, not double-talkers, not being devoted to much wine, not fond of shameful gain, but holding the

beurteilende Instanz, sondern ein Bewusstseinszustand, der sich als Folge des den vorgegebenen Normen entsprechenden Verhaltens einstellt" (Roloff, EKKNT, 69).

¹¹⁶ "... beachtlicherweise der negative Gegenbegriff ('schlechtes' bzw. 'beflecktes Gewissen') fehlt" (Roloff, EKKNT, 69).

¹¹⁷ For these functions of *ἐν*, see Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, §§ 1679, 1687a (local), 1687c (instrument, means, cause, manner).

mystery of the faith in a clean conscience." This clean conscience is depicted as the counterpart to behavior, as we have seen earlier, that is associated with a corruption of the mind, namely, excessive use of wine and an over-eagerness for monetary gain. The pure or clean conscience also serves here as an organ of rational activity, insofar as it associated with being rightly disposed to the mystery of the faith. According to the Pastor, this "faith" is characterized by proper cognitive comportment to the "healthy teaching," the gospel as Paul proclaims it.

The prepositional phrase *ἐν καθαρᾷ συνειδήσει* at 2 Tim 1:3 would seem to serve a similar function, though there it refers to Paul's service to God:

3 I give thanks to God, whom I serve as my ancestors did in a pure conscience, as I ceaselessly make mention of you in my prayers day and night, 4 yearning to see you, 5 remembering you with tears in order that I might be filled with joy, having recollection of the genuine faith that was in you, which dwelled first in your grandmother Lois and your mother Eunice, and I am convinced is also in you. (2 Tim 1:3–5)¹¹⁸

Set at the beginning of the second letter to Timothy, Paul's declaration that he serves God "in a pure conscience" suggests a healthy psychological constitution, the result of the kind of right living that is cast as an extension of ancestral piety. Crucially, it forms here a precursor and parallel to the faith that Paul observes in Timothy, which is itself depicted as a perpetuation of ancestral fidelity. Paul's pure conscience, insofar as it can be characterized as a well-tuned instrument of scrutiny, gives credence to the conviction (cf. *πέπεισμαι* at 1:5) that Paul expresses regarding the existence of faith in Timothy.

¹¹⁸ 3 Χάριν ἔχω τῷ θεῷ, ᾧ λατρεύω ἀπὸ προγόνων ἐν καθαρᾷ συνειδήσει, ὡς ἀδιάλειπτον ἔχω τὴν περὶ σοῦ μνείαν ἐν ταῖς δεήσεσίν μου νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας, 4 ἐπιποθῶν σε ἰδεῖν, μεμνημένος σου τῶν δακρύων, ἵνα χαρᾶς πληρωθῶ, 5 ὑπόμνησιν λαβὼν τῆς ἐν σοὶ ἀνυποκρίτου πίστεως, ἣτις ἐνέκησεν πρῶτον ἐν τῇ μάμμῃ σου Λωΐδι καὶ τῇ μητρὶ σου Εὐνίχῃ, πέπεισμαι δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν σοί.

Thus, in these two passages, the "pure conscience" belongs to those who are (i.e., Paul) or should be (i.e., would-be deacons) in right relationship to God. These examples demonstrate that even when the context is not readily "polemical" or directly dealing with opponents, the Pastor still uses these terms in order to sharpen the contrast between "Paul" and his associates and the "others" who would oppose him. By virtue of their "clean conscience," they are without internal self-reproach. Keeping in mind the connection with *παρρησία* that is present in other contemporaneous discourses of *συνείδησις*, they are free from any sort of censure that would keep them from making a bold profession of the mystery of faith or, in Paul's case, declaring a continuity of service between one generation and the next. I have argued thus far that *καθαρός* is used with reference to elements of the human soul in order to convey their proper functionality as organs of the soul. By virtue of being in alignment with the faith, closely associated with the "healthy teaching" in the PE, they also are healthy. The *καθαρά συνείδησις* is one that is not made sick by the distortions of false teaching. These instances of *καθαρά συνείδησις* may consequently be viewed as working in concert with the medical imagery of the Pastorals. It is to the medicalization of the *συνείδησις* that we now turn.

E. *συνείδησις* and *νόσος*

Thus far we have seen that the *συνείδησις* is chiefly characterized in antiquity with forensic language—casting the *συνείδησις* as a judge or witness to wrongdoing. We also argued that the particular terms used to designate the *συνείδησις*, such as "good" or "pure," indicate its status as an organ of the soul that is rational and in good working order. By analogy with

the soul (which can also be pure or clean), this means that the *συνείδησις* is light, rarified, and unencumbered by disordered beliefs about what is right or wrong, which tend to slow down and distort the cognitive operation of the *συνείδησις*. Below I demonstrate that another common characterization of the *συνείδησις* is as a disease or as a diseased entity in the body. This is widely accepted by scholarship. What is potentially more controversial is my argument below: that the peculiar imagery of a cauterized conscience is best understood not as indicating primarily a desensitized conscience but as evincing a graphic image of a diseased and disordered organ of the soul, oozing and imbalanced, and subjected to a failed attempt at therapy. In order to prepare for that argument, I will first illustrate by appeal to some select authors preceding and contemporary with the Pastor that the *συνείδησις* was characterized as a component of the soul and was subject to illness and pain in accordance with the medical analogies popular at that time. I will then argue for a particular reading of "cauterized conscience" by marshaling evidence of the practice of cautery and then draw some interpretive conclusions for the role of this curious medical imagery in the Pastor's polemical program.

The idea that conscience could cause pain gave rise to its characterization as an illness, or as an organ that could experience illness, in a variety of literary genres and time periods. For instance, in his philosophical treatise *Tusculan Disputations* (45 BCE), Cicero can describe those who feel a prick whenever they consider their ill-gotten gains.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ The medical metaphor is not the only one employed in the Pastorals, merely the most pervasive. Others include martial /military (1 Tim 1:6; 1:18; 2 Tim 2:3–4), maritime (1 Tim 1:19), athletic (1 Tim 4:7b–10; 6:12; 2 Tim 2:5), agrarian/agricultural (1 Tim 6:1; 2 Tim 2:6), hunting (1 Tim 6:9; 2:26); architectural (1 Tim 6:19; 2 Tim 2:19), etc.

Similarly, those who are not subject to the pangs of conscience are described as "those who endure disgrace and shame without pain" (*qui ignominiam et infamiam ferunt sine dolore*).¹²⁰ The idea that the conscience could bring affliction is also supported from the papyri.¹²¹ There the term "afflicted" lends itself nicely to the notion of conscience as a punishing entity that holds individuals to account.¹²² The image of the conscience as an afflicting entity, together with the popular use of medical analogies to describe perceived moral malefaction, led some authors to construe the conscience as a punishing entity. For instance, the Wisdom of Solomon (late first century BCE or early first century CE), in one of the only Septuagintal references to συνείδησις,¹²³ depicts the opponents of Israel as

¹²⁰ "As for distress itself (*ipsa aegritudo*), which we have said is to be shunned as an abominable and savage monster, they say it has been provided by nature not without considerable advantage, in order that mankind if guilty of trespass should feel pain (*dolere*) at incurring correction (*castigationes*), censure (*reprehensiones*) and disgrace (*ignominiae*). For escape from the penalty of trespasses seems granted to those who endure disgrace and shame without pain; it is better to suffer the stings of conscience" (*morderi est melius conscientia*) (*Ipsam aegritudinem, quam nos ut taetram et immanem beluam fugiendam diximus, non sine magna utilitate a natura dicunt constitutam, ut homines castigationibus, reprehensionibus, ignominiis adfici se in delicto dolerent. Impunitas enim peccatorum data videtur eis, qui ignominiam et infamiam ferunt sine dolore: morderi est melius conscientia*) (*Tusc.* 4.20.45 [King, LCL]).

¹²¹ P.Mil.Vogl. 1.27, dated to 26 June, 129 CE, is a letter detailing an accounting dispute. The plaintiffs complain that their aunt (on their mother's side) unlawfully seized their possessions, and attribute her flight to the Arsinoite nome because she was "afflicted by συνείδησις" (ὕπὸ συνειδήσεως θλιβομένη) at 1.14. The orthographical errors reflect the pronunciation of this period. Corrected, we would read ὑπὸ συνειδήσεως θλιβομένη. ll. 9–10. See Francis T. Gignac, *A Grammar of the Greek Papyri of the Roman and Byzantine Periods* (Milano: Istituto editoriale cisalpino-La goliardica, 1976), 1.236–8. A very similar phrase is used in another second century CE papyrus dating to 15 May 194, namely P.Ryl.2.116. It is a copy of a petition of one Sarapion concerning his mother's, or perhaps his mother-in-law's misconduct in attempting to deprive him of the possessions he says were left to him in his father's will (διαθήκη). He suggests that she deprived him (ἐνοσφρίσατο) of his possessions, and consequently she was "afflicted in her conscience" (θλιβομένη τῇ συνειδήσει). However, the fact the she and the gymnasiarch went so far as to tear off his very clothing suggests that this "affliction" did not hinder her (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτά μου περιέσχισαν [l. 15]). What the phrase may suggest then is a presumed self-awareness of a misconduct. Put differently, her συνείδησις served as accuser and judge of her actions. There is thus overlap between the notion of the conscience as causing pain and the forensic use of the term.

¹²² P.Oxy. 6.898, a slightly earlier papyrus (June 123 CE), is similarly a petition by a minor against his mother accusing her of fraud. The youth Didymus says of his mother that she "knew in herself that she had snatched away many of my things" (συνειδυῖα ἐαυτῇ! πολλὰ τῶν ἐμῶν ἀνηρπακύνει [ll.20–21]).

¹²³ The term also appears in Eccl 10:20.

wretches shaken by hallucinations (ἰνδάλμασιν ἐκταρασσόμενοι [17:3]) who, so far from being able to heal, cannot even heal themselves: "8 For those who promised to drive off the fears and disorders of a sick soul (δείματα καὶ ταραχὰς . . . ψυχῆς νοσοῦσης) were sick (ἐνόσουν) themselves with ridiculous fear. . . . 10 For wickedness is a cowardly thing, condemned by its own testimony (δειλὸν γὰρ ἰδίῳ πονηρίᾳ μάρτυρι καταδικαζομένη); distressed by conscience (συνεχομένη τῇ συνειδήσει), it has always exaggerated the difficulties.¹²⁴ This passage is an imaginative combination of anti-magical polemic, superstition-ridicule, and medico-philosophical imagery that come together to depict theological opponents as distressed by their own delusion.¹²⁵ The phrase of particular importance is Wisdom of Solomon 17:11, "For cowardly is wickedness condemned by its own witness, and it always adds painful consequences, since it is afflicted by συνείδησις" (δειλὸν γὰρ ἰδίῳ πονηρίᾳ μάρτυρι καταδικαζομένη, αἰεὶ δὲ προσείληφεν τὰ χαλεπὰ συνεχομένη τῇ συνειδήσει). Here the author suggests that the πονηρία of his opponents is not only self-condemned but also a painful affair since συνείδησις serves a restrictive function, chastening the doer of evil.¹²⁶ In the context of this passage, συνείδησις is one of a variety of torments experienced by those who are deluded and sickened with fear and ignorance.

¹²⁴ 8 οἱ γὰρ ὑπισχνόμενοι δείματα καὶ ταραχὰς ἀπελαύνειν ψυχῆς νοσοῦσης, οὗτοι καταγέλαστον εὐλάβειαν ἐνόσουν. . . . 10 δειλὸν γὰρ ἰδίῳ πονηρίᾳ μάρτυρι καταδικαζομένη, αἰεὶ δὲ προσείληφεν τὰ χαλεπὰ συνεχομένη τῇ συνειδήσει: (Wisd 17:8, 10).

¹²⁵ Quinn, & Wacker, ECC, 492 comment that "the figurative use here in the Pastorals is notably similar to the imaginative polemic of Wisdom."

¹²⁶ For similar phrases, see P.Oxy. 3.532. ll.18–25 (2nd CE). There, one Heraclides is reproaching Hatres for not paying him back twenty drachmae. "For indeed I found you then in Paomis and was wanting to show you kindness but you did not remain since you were afflicted by a bad conscience" (καὶ γὰρ ἐν Παώμει τότε σε εὖρον καὶ βουλόμενόν σε φιланθρωπωσαι [corr. form φιλάνθρωπήσαι] οὐκ ἀνέμεινας ὑπὸ κακοῦ συνειδότης κατεχόμενος). Text from papyri.info. See also T.Reu. 4.3: "And until now my conscience constrains me with regard to my sin" (καὶ ἕως νῦν ἡ συνείδησίς μου συνέχει με περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας μου).

Backing up several centuries, we encounter in Euripides's *Orestes* (408 BCE) a generative passage that contributed much to the later development of the concept of conscience as a punishing disease.¹²⁷ Orestes' affliction manifests in bursts of frenzied, psychotic behavior, and in the prologue Electra declares that Orestes' mother's blood drives him to madness (τὸ μητρὸς δ' αἷμά νιν τροχῆλατεῖ μανίαισιν [36–37]; cf. 338), incorporating the notion of punishing Furies (38–45),¹²⁸ here and in later literature called the "Eumenides" (Εὐμενίδας).¹²⁹ Visions of these Furies, described as "three maidens similar to night" (τρῆς Νυκτὶ προσφερεῖς κόρας [408]), afflict Orestes. In vivid, evocative language, Orestes, "killer of [his] wretched mother" (μητρὸς τῆς τάλαιπώρου φονεύς [392]), describes his overwhelming guilt at having killed his mother. When he tells Menelaus that "the *daimon* is rich in evils towards me" (ὁ δαίμων δ' ἐς ἐμὲ πλούσιος κακῶν [394]), Menelaus asks him "what thing do you suffer? What sickness destroys you? (τί χρεῖμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος; 395 cf. 35 ἀγρία συντακεῖς νόσω; 831–833).¹³⁰ Orestes replies (396), cryptically, "σύνεσις,¹³¹ because I know in myself¹³² that I have done terrible things" (ἡ

¹²⁷ Orestes's νόσος is a pervasive theme in the work. See Bosman, "Pathology of a Guilty Conscience"; Wesley D. Smith, "Disease in Euripides' Orestes," *Hermes: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie* 95 (1967): 291–307.

¹²⁸ Bosman notes that the Erinyes, the dog-like creatures of Greek mythology, are often suggested to be "a mythical expression of the phenomenon of conscience" ("Pathology of a Guilty Conscience," 16). For a fuller discussion of the association of the Erinyes with the concept of conscience, see Bosman, "Pathology of a Guilty Conscience," 16–18.

¹²⁹ David Kovacs (ed. and trans. of the Loeb volume) suggests the following in order to explain the seeming contradiction of naming them in light of Electra's earlier pledge not to name the furies (cf. ὀνομάζειν γὰρ αἰδοῦμαι θεὰς [37]): "Possibly Euripides wrote something like 'the goddess of madness,' and 'Eumenides' was a marginal note accidentally incorporated into the text" (417 n. 5).

¹³⁰ The designation νόσος is also given to an "an unbridled tongue" (*Orestes* 10: ἀκόλαστον ἔσχε γλῶσσαν, αἰσχίστην νόσον). Cf. 227–28 νόσος μανιάς.

¹³¹ Whether this should be translated along the lines of awareness or conscience rests upon a determination of when the concept of conscience coalesces as such. Bosman contends that up until the 1st CE, σύνεσις most often retains the meaning "intelligence" or "insight," but from the 1st CE onwards σύνεσις may be used as a synonym for ἡ συνείδησις and τὸ συνειδός (Bosman, "Pathology of a Guilty Conscience," 15).

σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος).¹³² Menelaus is confused in his response, because, in his mind, clarity (τὸ σαφές) about a matter—not the lack thereof— is what is wise (σοφόν). For Menelaus, awareness of a matter should bring relief, not torment. Though Orestes' attempt to clarify is not successful on a dramatical level, it is illuminating for our purposes, for he goes on to connect his awareness or conscience with both the concept of λύπη (cf. 398 "grief especially is what wastes me" [λύπη μάλιστά γ' ἡ διαφθείρουσά με]) and madness (cf. μανίαι [400]). In this generative passage, Euripides fashions a confluence of terms and images that helped shape the notion of the σύνεσις, in addition to being a deranging grief and the pursuit of the Furies, it is also depicted as a disease, a disease that entailed an overwhelming awareness deep within oneself of a wrong done.

Euripides's *Orestes* had a demonstrable influence on subsequent moralists. Later interpreters of this particular passage develop further the idea of the conscience as a malady. Plutarch invokes this passage from Euripides's *Orestes* in his depiction of σύνεσις as a pain or a disease, an afflicting wound.¹³⁴ This image is most vividly expressed by Plutarch in his

¹³² Rodgers notes that σύνοιδα "is not found with the reflexive in Herodotus, but when it was used elsewhere in Greek literature, it appears, like συγγινώσκω (-ομαι) to differ from the non-reflexive uses in indicating that the action of the verb, the 'knowing', is shared not with others but with oneself. It thus comes to mean something like 'to be aware of' or 'conscious of' something about oneself" (Rodgers, "Σύνεσις and the Expression of Conscience," 245).

¹³³ Rodgers wishes to drive a wedge, unsuccessfully in my opinion, between Orestes's "consciousness of the full horror of the deed" and his "awareness of culpability" (250). That Orestes is aware of his own culpability is not only supported by Rodgers' own analysis of the phrase συνειδέναι τι ἑαυτῷ (of which he says the expression in *Orestes* 396 is a "shortened version" [244]), but is also supported by Rodgers's own exposition of the phrase's meaning: "This combination of the expression συνειδέναι τι ἑαυτῷ with anxious foreboding, amounting to what could be termed 'awareness of culpability,' is, as one might expect, most commonly found in the context of the law courts and of the relations between men and gods" (Rodgers, "Σύνεσις and the Expression of Conscience," 248).

¹³⁴ According to Bosman, "Pathology of a Guilty Conscience," 19, Plutarch's normal term is τὸ συνειδός. Cf. *Publ.* 4.5 (ἐλαυνόμενος δὲ τῷ συνειδότι τοῦ πράγματος); *Virt. prof.* 84d (τῷ συνειδότι τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς δακνόμενος); *Sera* 554f (τὸ δὲ συνειδός ἐγκείμενον ἔχων), *Sera* 556b (πῶς ἂν [ἡ ψυχὴ] ἐκβᾶσα τῆς μνήμης τῶν ἀδικημάτων καὶ τὸ συνειδός ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἐκβαλοῦσα καὶ καθαρὰ γενομένη βίον ἄλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς βιώσειεν. This last example is notable for

treatise *On Contentment* (476f-477a) where he argues for the benefit of internal resolutions toward honest behavior. Plutarch writes of the control that one has in moral action:

But while someone is living it is possible to say: "I will not do this; I will not lie, I will not act thoughtlessly, I will not defraud, I will not scheme." For this lies in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν κείμενον) and provides not a small but a great help toward contentment. Even as, to the contrary again, "My conscience (σύνεσις), since I know that I've done something awful," like an ulcer in the flesh (οἶον ἔλκος ἐν σαρκί), the conscience leaves behind in the soul a regret that is always drawing blood and stabbing it. For reason (ὁ λόγος) removes the other pangs of grief (λύπαι), but reason itself produces the regret (μετάνοια) of the soul that is stung with shame and buffeted by itself. For just as those shivering with ague or being burned through with fevers are more troubled and have it worse than those suffering these things from external heat or cold, so also are the pangs of grief (λύπαι) that chance events bring like those things brought from outside. But that line, "There is not other person responsible for the things happening to me but me alone!" spoken in lamentation deep within for deeds done wrong, makes the pain (τὸ ἀλγαινόν) from this lament heavier with disgrace. (*Tranq. an.* 476f-477a)¹³⁵

Drawing upon Euripides, Plutarch likens σύνεσις to an ulcer within the human person, all the more painful and resilient because it comes from within. It is seen to be a function of the painful realizations of reason, something that the ψυχή inflicts upon itself. Plutarch vividly portrays the body racked by fevers and chills, all the worse because they are inescapable, coming from within. This notion of conscience as a component of the soul that wounds itself helps us to contextualize the Pastor's use of συνείδησις by illustrating why one might need to "cauterize" the conscience to begin with. It was thought of as an entity that

the soul's attempt to "become clean" by expunging τὸ συνειδός. For the use with ἐλαύνεσθαι, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. Rom.* 12.3.1: ὑπὸ τῆς συνειδήσεως ἐλαυνόμενος.

¹³⁵ . . . ἀλλ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ζῶντα, "τοῦτ' οὐ ποιήσω· οὐ ψεύσομαι, οὐ ραδιουργήσω, οὐκ ἀποστερήσω, οὐκ ἐπιβουλεύσω." τοῦτο γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κείμενον οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ μέγα πρὸς εὐθυμίαν πάρεστιν. ὥσπερ αὖ τούναντιον ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύννοια δειν' εἰργασμένος, οἶον ἔλκος ἐν σαρκί τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν μεταμέλειαν αἱμάσσουσιν αἶε καὶ νύσσουσιν ἐναπολείπει. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλας ἀναιρεῖ λύπας ὁ λόγος, τὴν δὲ μετάνοιαν αὐτὸς ἐργάζεται δακνομένης σὺν αἰσχύνῃ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κολαζομένης ὑφ' αὐτῆς. ὥς γὰρ οἱ ῥιγοῦντες ἡπιάλους καὶ πυρετοῖς διακαόμενοι τῶν ταῦτα πασχόντων ἔξωθεν ὑπὸ καύματος ἢ κρύους μᾶλλον ἐνοχλοῦνται καὶ κάκιον ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἐλαφροτέρας ἔχει τὰ τυχερὰ τὰς λύπας ὥσπερ ἔξωθεν ἐπιφερομένας· τὸ δὲ οὐ τις ἐμοὶ τῶνδ' ἄλλος ἐπαίτιος, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἐπιθρηγούμενον τοῖς ἀμαρτανομένοις ἔνδοθεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ βαρύτερον ποιεῖ τῷ αἰσχυρῷ τὸ ἀλγαινόν. Greek text from Helmbold, LCL (my trans.).

could both suffer and inflict pain, as an organ of the soul whose function was scrutinizing the very thoughts and deeds and "errors" (τὰ ἀμαρτανόμενα) of a person.

F. The Conscience as Cauterized, Not Branded

None of the other instances of συνείδησις in the PE invite the discussion of the significance of medical imagery or the depiction of the συνείδησις as an organ of the soul capable of pain quite so compellingly as the curious phrase κεκαυστηριασμένων τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν in 1 Tim 4:2. While we discussed this passage in chapter 2 as an instance of intertextual corrective composition, here we focus especially on the significance of the medical imagery:

4:1 Now the Spirit expressly says that in latter times¹³⁶ certain individuals will revolt from the faith, adhering to deceptive spirits and the doctrines of demons 2 through the hypocrisy of those who speak falsely, who have been cauterized¹³⁷ in their own conscience, 3 who prevent marriage, [urging] abstention from food that God created for enjoyment with thanksgiving for those who are faithful and who acknowledge the truth. (1 Tim 4:1–3)¹³⁸

¹³⁶ A similar time is predicted by 2 Tim 4:3–5: "For there will be a time when they will not put up with healthy teaching (ἡ ὑγιαίνουσα διδασκαλία) but in accordance with their own lusts will accumulate teachers for themselves; and because they have itching ears they shall also turn away from the truth in their hearing, and turn away to myths. But you be clear-minded (Σὺ δὲ νῆφε) in everything . . ." Cf. also 2 Tim 3:1.

¹³⁷ Most scholars translate the phrase as a passive with an accusative of respect. So, e.g., Marshall, ICC, 540. Interpreters who opt for the "branding" sense, like Roloff, EKKNT, 217, 221, also take it as passive (so too Knight, NIGTC, 189). Somewhat confusingly, Knight takes the verb as a passive but says that ἰδίαν "emphasizes the self-deception of sin within their own moral evaluator." Are they then the perpetrators of the verbal action or not? Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 91, on the other hand, translates this as a middle voice, i.e., "cauterized their own conscience." His interpretation is guided by his choice regarding the meaning of the verb: "While branding is essentially that to which a man is subjected by another, he might well cauterise himself." This may well be the case with regard to the connotation of the phrase, that those so cauterized are part of a group that did the cauterizing to their own members. However, there are no known instances of the verb being used as a true middle voice, reducing the likelihood that the Pastor uses it that way here.

¹³⁸ 1 Tim 4:1 Τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ῥητῶς λέγει ὅτι ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς ἀποστήσονται τινες τῆς πίστεως προσέχοντες πνεύμασιν ἁπλάνοις καὶ διδασκαλίαις δαιμονίων, 2 ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων, κεκαυστηριασμένων τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν, 3 κωλύόντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων, ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν εἰς μετάλημψιν μετὰ εὐχαριστίας τοῖς πιστοῖς καὶ ἐπεγνωκόσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Scholars suggest two primary interpretations of the reference to *κεκαυστηριάσθαι* in 1 Tim 4:2. The first is that it indicates a cauterization that has rendered the consciences of the opponents insensate.¹³⁹ Other scholars have argued that branding, whether military or criminal, is rather in view.¹⁴⁰ These scholars cite interesting comparanda to support the claim that *branding* of some kind would have been a stigmatizing practice, but the majority of the evidence cited does not utilize the term *κεκαυ(σ)τηριάσθαι*¹⁴¹ at all, casting doubt on the relevance of such data to 1 Tim 4:2. Some scholars have even opted for a combined

¹³⁹ In 1969, Spicq could write that most commentators opt for the interpretation of this as a kind of branding on military deserters, escaped criminals or fugitives, but he himself prefers the ancient medical connotation which implies that something cauterized is insensate (ÉBib, 496–97); cf. Lips, *Glaube - Gemeinde - Amt*. Lips adopts the medical understanding of the term *κεκαυστηριασμένων*, suggesting that this meaning is the clearest. He remarks that if the opponents had an intact conscience, they would have desisted from "Heuchelei und Lügenerei." For Lips, the fact that they do not desist indicates that their conscience has lost its capacity of sensation (59). Similarly Johnson, AB, 240: "To have one's conscience 'seared' or 'burned' is to have it desensitized; it is now covered over with scar tissue." Another interpretive option may be found in Towner, who interprets "seared" in conscience to refer to their own inability to make moral decisions. However, Towner does not explain the nature of the incapacitation: "Not surprisingly, the heretics' moral condition comes under heavy attack. The prophecy of 1 Tim 4.1ff. attributes their activity and doctrines to Satan: *prosechontes pneumasin planois kai didaskaliais daimonion*? But their own part in falling away from the faith and thus providing the outlet for the demonic deception (*en hypokrisei pseudologon*) has left them 'seared in conscience', that is, incapable of making the moral decisions which issue in godly living. This association of the false teachers with the demonic is reminiscent of earlier Paul, who named his opponents in Corinth 'ministers' of Satan (2 Cor 11.15)" (Towner, *The Goal of Our Instruction: The Structure of Theology and Ethics in the Pastoral Epistles*, 27).

To my knowledge, the sole instance from an ancient interpreter of Paul to support this reading comes from Theodoret of Cyrrhus: "And well does he term their teachings 'doctrines of demons,' for those utterances of theirs are truly swollen growths (*κυήματα*). And the statement, 'in the hypocrisy of liars' he has added, since though they apply the Christian appellation to themselves, they openly teach its opposite. He has called them 'cauterized in their own conscience,' thus teaching their resulting loss of feeling. For the place of the cauterized wound, having been rendered dead tissue, loses its prior sensation. Thus having made clear the corruption of the teachings, he also foretells the objectionable behavior of the other customs" (Καλῶς δὲ καὶ διδασκαλίας δαιμονίων τὰ ἐκείνων προσηγόρευσε δόγματα· ἐκείνων γὰρ ἀληθῶς κυήματα ἐκείνα τὰ ῥήματα. Τὸ δὲ, ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων, τέθεικεν, ἐπειδὴ τὴν Χριστιανικὴν ἐναντοῖς ἐπιθέντες προσηγορίαν, ἀντικρὺς ἐναντία διδάσκουσι. Κεκαυτηριασμένους δὲ τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν αὐτοὺς κέκληκε, τὴν ἐσχάτην αὐτῶν ἀναλγησίαν διδάσκων· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ καυτῆρος τόπος νεκρωθεὶς τὴν προτέραν αἴσθησιν ἀποβάλλει. Οὕτως αὐτῶν τὴν διαφθορὰν τῶν δογμάτων δηλώσας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νομίμων τὴν βδελυρίαν προλέγει [*Theodoret of Cyrrhus, interpretatio in xiv epistulas sancti Pauli*, PG 82.812, my trans.]).

¹⁴⁰ Oberlinner, HThKNT, 1.177; Knight, NIGTC, 189.

¹⁴¹ The orthography of this term (both in NT mss. and other Gk lit.) and its cognates varies (with or without the σ), with no appreciable difference in meaning. Cf. Marshall, ICC, 536.

interpretation, suggesting that the image carries a dual valence, resulting in a conscience rendered insensate¹⁴² and branded by Satan (presumably with reference to the demons of 1 Tim 4:1, since there is in fact no reference to Satan in this passage).¹⁴³ In principle, I support the possibility of semantic polyvalence, especially in texts with such a rich abundance of imagery. However, three considerations suggest that the medical imagery of cautery is foremost here, and not that of branding.

Firstly, the rather rare term used in 1 Tim 4:2, *κεκαυστηριάσθαι*, on balance, suggests more readily the language of medical cautery than it does branding.¹⁴⁴ The term *κεκαυστηριάσθαι* and cognate nominal forms like *καυστήρ* or *καυστήριον* or *καυστηρίδιον*, on the other hand, are common in discussions about medicine¹⁴⁵ or passages that utilize medical imagery.¹⁴⁶ Secondly, while *καυστηριάζειν* can be used in a context of the branding of animals,¹⁴⁷ the sources brought forward by scholars to suggest branding of criminals, slaves, runaways, or disobedient slaves do not use the language of *καυ(σ)τηριάζειν*, but instead refer

¹⁴² Mounce thinks the idea of the conscience being rendered insensate to be incongruous with the idea of *ὑπόκρισις*, since a seared conscience cannot distinguish between right and wrong and hypocrisy (cf. 1 Tim 4:2) presumes an awareness of the difference (WBC, 237).

¹⁴³ J. Schneider ("*καυστηριάζομαι*," *TDNT* 3.644–45) interprets the phrase in 1 Tim 4:2 as "men who are branded in the consciences, i.e., who bear the mark of slaves . . . they are secretly the slaves of satanic and demonic powers which make them their instruments" (644), and does not consider the medical interpretation.

¹⁴⁴ In extant Greek literature prior to the Pastor, only Strabo uses the term (in the form *καυστηριάσαι*), and then only once (*Geogr.* 5.1.9). The nominal forms *καυστήρ* and *καυστήριον* refer to cauterizing apparatuses. Cf. s.v. LSJ. BrillDAG, 1105, prefers "to burn or brand with fire" as the main gloss. The paucity of references, however, lead me to deduce the most probable meaning of the term from the predominant use for the nominalized forms from which the denominative verbal form would have been derived: *καυστήριον*.

¹⁴⁵ LSJ, 932 glosses *καυστήρ* as a "cauterizing apparatus." We find the term used mostly in medical texts: Hippocrates, *Haem.* 6, where the result of applying the cautery to a hemorrhoid is that "the veins, having been desiccated, are healthy" (*ὑγιέα τε ξηρανθέντα τὰ φλέβια*); Galen, *Hipp. Epid.* 17b.231K; *SMT* 11.754K; Ps.-Galen, *Int.* 14.782K. Without the *σ*, we find *καυστήρ* used by Galen, *Gloss.* 19.111K, and in *Hippiatr. Berol.* 26. Most recently, BrillDAG, 1105, offers "cauterizing apparatus, cautery" for *καυστήρ* and "burner, cauterization, cauterization scar" for *καυστήρ*.

¹⁴⁶ In later sources: Origen, *C. Cels.* 4.72, *Sel. Psalm.* 12.1160; Origen uses the verbal form *καυστηριάζειν* in a medical analogy: *Hom. Jer.* 12.5, 20.3.

¹⁴⁷ Strabo, *Geogr.* 5.1.9. See to the anonymous *Hippiatr. Berol.* 26.

to the imposition of tattoo marks (στίγματα).¹⁴⁸ While scholars have traditionally¹⁴⁹ understood such passages to refer to branding, tattooing (στίξιν) is almost certainly in view. Tattooing was the much more common way to impose the mark of a slave, a criminal, a soldier, or to denote devotion to a deity.¹⁵⁰ The branding of human beings was incredibly rare in the Greco-Roman world, according to C. P. Jones. The fact that cautery, by contrast, was extremely common increases the likelihood that this was the sense intended by the Pastor in 1 Timothy 4:2. Lastly, the reading of *κεκαυστηριάσθαι* as referring to cautery would fit into the much-developed imagery of medicine in the Pastorals and would supplement the trope of sickness and ailment as indicating moral corruption and ethical dilapidation. While the sudden introduction of a one-off reference to branding or tattooing is certainly not impossible, the Pastor tends to develop thematic tropes with multiple references.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ This especially the case for texts employing the language of στίξιν (e.g., Plutarch, *Pericl.* 26) to impose στίγματα (cf. Herodotus, *Hist.* 2.113). Jones cites the 6th century doctor Aëtius's discussion *περὶ στιγμάτων*, which details the the process of tattooing ("Stigma: Tattooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman Antiquity," *JRS* 77 [1987]: 142–43).

¹⁴⁹ J. Schneider's *TDNT* (3.644–45) article on *καυστηριάζομαι* popularized this interpretation amongst New Testament scholars. Cf. Mounce, *WBC*, 237–38.

¹⁵⁰ Jones, "Stigma," 140–1. Cf. Plato, *Leg.* 854d–e, where a foreigner infected by the disease (νόσος) of temple robbery (συλήσις) receives a mark on his forehead and hands (ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ ταῖς χερσὶ γραφεῖς τὴν συμφορὰν), and he is whipped and cast out of the country. But if a citizen should do this, he is considered incurable, and his punishment is death. Cited by J. Schneider, in his article on *καυστηριάζεσθαι* (*TDNT* 3.645 n. 6), but notably the term *καυστηριάζεσθαι* is not to be found in that text. Similarly Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.* 4.46 (regarding Bion), is cited to support the idea that a slave owner can do what he wants with his slave, and Bion calls his father's mark on his face a "writing on the face" (συγγραφὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου). This is cited by Schneider, *TDNT* 3.645 n. 4. Lucian, *Dea. Syr.* 59, gives evidence of Assyrians being tattooed (στίζονται) on their wrists or necks to denote allegiance to the Syrian goddess Atargatis. See further discussion by Jones, "Stigma," 144.

¹⁵¹ For instance, the Pastor develops references to masculine stereotypes like the soldier (1 Tim 1:18; 2 Tim 2:3–5) and the athlete (1 Tim 4:7–8; 2 Tim 2:5, 4:7–8) as ideals, notably images that are evident in Paul's authentic letters as well (1 Cor 9:7, 24–26; 2 Cor 10:3, 4; Phil 3:12–14). Mary Rose D'Angelo has called these "metaphors that make a claim on the civic life of the empire" (Mary Rose D'Angelo, "Knowing How to Preside over His Own Household": Imperial Masculinity and Christian Asceticism in the Pastorals, Hermas, and Luke-Acts," in *New Testament Masculinities*, ed. Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel Anderson, SemeiaSt 45 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003], 294).

Of course, establishing the medical context as the more likely for interpretation does not in itself suggest the medical interpretation itself, and scholars have put forward other options than mere desensitization as the effect of cauterization. For instance, Malherbe concludes from a reading of Lucian's *Downward Journey* that the phrase "seared in their consciences" from 1 Tim 4:2 suggests the following: "They were still seared with sin, as had Lucian's Cynic before his conversion to philosophy. Therefore, he implied, they were in no condition to heal others. In light of the popularity of the metaphor of cautery, however, his use of the image might perhaps have had an added barb: not only were they themselves still seared by sin, their sinful condition was so extreme that their own consciences had been cauterized."¹⁵² Malherbe's analysis lacks an explicit discussion of what a *συνείδησις* is, making it difficult to assess his statements, but even more important is the absence of an acknowledgment that Lucian does not discuss the *συνείδησις* *per se* as seared at all.

Lucian's dialogue envisions an individual's eschatological judgment before Rhadamanthus as an examination of their naked person for "marks" (*στίγματα*), which in turn serve as indications of deeds done in the past. If one has not committed crimes in life, one may be found to be "immaculately pure and unmarked" (*καθαρὸς ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἀνεπίγραφος* [*Cat.* 25]), as the cobbler Micyllus was. The naked person reveals deeds done but is not, as it were, an indelible ledger. Cyniscus himself still has "three or four very faint and unclear marks" (*τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἀμαυρῶν πάνυ καὶ ἀσαφῶν στιγμάτων*). He recounts how he had been a wicked person (*πονηρός*) on account of his ignorance (*δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν*), and had received his marks then. When he began to philosophize, the traces and signs (*ἴχνη*

¹⁵² Cf. "Medical Imagery," 30.

καὶ σημεία) of his "brandings" (τῶν ἐγκαυμάτων) were immediately "wiped away" or "cut out" (ἐξαλήλιπται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκκέκοπται), with the result that he too became καθαρός.¹⁵³

However, what we do not find here in *The Downward Journey* is the language of conscience, nor the same terminology (καυστηριάζειν) as the Pastorals. Thus, while Malherbe's references to Lucian's treatise help us to see the range of uses to which the imagery of bodily markings could be put, they do not adequately elucidate the sense of being "seared in the conscience" in 1 Tim 4:2.

Nevertheless, recourse to philosophical appropriation of the medical image of cautery can be instructive. The application of the imagery of cautery to a philosophical situation is part of the more general impulse amongst philosophers to draw upon medicine as an analogy for philosophical therapy. The call for cautery is frequently used in philosophical sources or literary criticism¹⁵⁴ as a way of signaling the need for philosophical therapy. It is very often paired with the language of cutting as a metonymic reference to medical practice

¹⁵³ Cf. *Cat.* 24–26. Jones cites this passage too as one of the few references that might possibly countenance human branding in the Roman period, but he views this instance in light of Lucian's other, farcical account of philosophers being branded like cattle (*Pisc.* 46), and concludes that it "can hardly be cited for the branding of humans" (Jones, "Stigma," 154).

¹⁵⁴ The medical analogy was applied not only to the therapy of philosophers, but to the incisive practice of historiography as well. Dionysius of Halicarnassus employs the language of surgery and cautery in order to extol the masterful "examination" (cf. ἐξετάζειν) of "the unseen causes of deeds and those who did them and the passions of the soul, which are not easy for the majority to see" (τὰς ἀφανεῖς αἰτίας τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν πραξάντων αὐτὰς καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἃ μὴ ῥάδια τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰδέναι). He says further that he "unveiled all the mysteries of manifest virtue and unknown vice" (πάντα ἐκαλύπτειν τὰ μυστήρια τῆς τε δοκούσης ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ἀγνοουμένης κακίας) of his subjects. Dionysius says that Theopompus was not being malicious (βάσκανος) but was merely "doing something similar to the doctors who cut and cauterize the corrupted parts of the body, cauterizing and cutting unto a certain depth but taking aim at none of the healthy organs or those functioning naturally (ὅμοιον τι ποιῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς, οἳ τέμνουσι καὶ καίουσι τὰ διεφθαρμένα τοῦ σώματος ἕως βάθους τὰ καυτήρια καὶ τὰς τομὰς φέροντες, οὐδὲν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων στοχαζόμενοι [*Ep. ad Pompeium Geminum* 6, my trans.]). Heraclitus, *All.* 70.4, allegorizes the Cyclops episode in the *Odyssey* and says that Homer "cripples our fierce anger by cauterizing it, as it were, with verbal advice (ὥσπερ εἰ καυτηρίῳ τῇ παραινέσει τῶν λόγων): the name for this anger is Cyclops, he who "steals away" (ὑποκλωπῶν) our power of reasoning (τοὺς λογισμούς)." Trans. by A. Donald Russell and David Konstan, eds., *Heraclitus: Homeric Problems*, WGRW 14 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005).

more generally.¹⁵⁵ To suggest then that an organ of the soul, in this case the *συνείδησις*, has been subjected to a therapeutic measure implies that it was in a diseased state. But what result would that cauterization have had? What is the operative logic in this peculiar formulation?

Most scholars who interpret 1 Tim 4:2 as a reference to cauterization and not branding understand "cauterizing" as having a desensitizing effect on the conscience. This interpretive choice, so ubiquitous that it seems almost reflexive, is in need of challenge and inquiry. Why, for instance, do scholars assume that cautery serves as shorthand for desensitization? To what uses was cautery actually put in the ancient world? Would anyone in the first or second century have concluded that desensitizing was in fact the foremost effect of such cauterization? Relatedly, what is the cultural significance of this imagery? A sufficient answer to these questions requires a brief look at the practice of cautery in antiquity. As I shall show, interpreting the reference to a cauterization of the conscience without an adequate understanding of the historical practice of cautery has led scholars to import modern (and at times simply erroneous) assumptions concerning the significance of this medical imagery.

1. The Historical Practice of Cautery

Cautery was a form of surgery practiced by Hippocratic doctors and the doctors of the Roman Empire after them.¹⁵⁶ A brief description of the uses of cauteries is given by the

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Plato, *Protag.* 354a-b; Seneca, *Ep.* 75.6-7; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 29.4-5; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 87/88.43.

¹⁵⁶ Surveys of the instruments used in cautery may be had in John Stewart Milne, *Surgical Instruments in Greek and Roman Times* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 116-120; Lawrence J. Bliquez, *The Tools of*

Pseudo-Galenic author of *Introduction or Physician*: "We burn with cauteries (καυτήρες), especially for all ulcerations, rheumy eyes, sciatica or even internal conditions. For example, [cauteries]¹⁵⁷ are applied for wasting and splenetic diseases, for shoulder dislocations, for lacrimal fistula (aegilops), for gangrene, or for blood vessels that are being opened during amputation and for other hemorrhagic situations."¹⁵⁸ Despite the wide range of uses of which this author is aware, there is no suggestion that one might use cautery for the purpose of desensitizing, or that desensitizing was the result. What becomes evident from a survey of the evidence is that cautery is rarely accompanied by any discussion of desensitization, the purpose to which so many scholars have concluded the imagery is put in 1 Tim 4:2.

Different kinds of cautery were used for a wide variety of ailments. According to Bliquez, the four most common functions of cautery were: 1) to staunch bleeding, 2) to eliminate diseased tissue, 3) to open ways to other parts of the body, and 4) to produce counterirritation.¹⁵⁹ Cautery was considered to be a last resort due to the inherent risks involved,¹⁶⁰ but it was by no means infrequent. Cauteries had a crucial role in the

Asclepius: Surgical Instruments in Greek and Roman Times, Studies in Ancient Medicine 43 (Leiden: Brill, 2015). The omission of a concerted treatment of the cautery in C. J. S. Thompson, *The History and Evolution of Surgical Instruments* (New York: Schuman, 1942) is curious.

¹⁵⁷ Here the sigmatic version is used: καυστήρες.

¹⁵⁸ καύσει δὲ τῇ διὰ καυτήρων χρώμεθα, ἰδίως μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν νεμομένων ἤδη πάντων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ρευματιζομένων ὀφθαλμῶν, ἰσχίων, ἢ καὶ τῶν ἐντός. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ φθισικῶν παραλαμβάνονται καυστήρες καὶ ἐπὶ σπληνικῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς μασχάλην μελετησάντων ἐκπίπτειν βραχιόνων καὶ ἐπὶ αἰγίλωπος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μελαινομένων, ἢ πριζομένων διὰ τὰ ἀναστομούμενα ἀγγεῖα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλως αἰμορραγούντων (14.782K = PeTitus 19.2). Translation by Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 157.

¹⁵⁹ Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 160. Milne has a very similar comment: "The cautery was employed for almost every possible purpose, as a 'counter-irritant', as a haemostatic, as a bloodless knife, as a means of destroying tumours, &c." (*Surgical Instruments*, 116).

¹⁶⁰ Vivian Nutton writes: "Although cautery, typically with caustic drugs or hot irons, was at times recommended for recurrent headaches ([Hipp], *Diseases* 2), stopping the flow of harmful phlegm and bile

physician's toolkit, as the finds of various instrumentaria demonstrate.¹⁶¹ Concerning cautery, John Stewart Milne notes that "the cautery was employed to an almost incredible extent in ancient times, and surgeons expended much ingenuity in devising different forms of this instrument."¹⁶² Cauteries took a variety of different shapes and, to a lesser extent, materials. The primary material was iron, though one also finds ancient prescriptions that copper alloy cauteries be used¹⁶³ and once that a cautery of gold or silver was used for stopping a hemorrhage of the throat.¹⁶⁴

The prevalence of cautery as a form of surgical intervention for a diverse array of ailments is matched by the equally diverse array of kinds of instruments used for cautery.¹⁶⁵ Though the physical remains of cauteries are limited, the literary sources suggest a wide variety of shapes for the cauteries. Bliquez gives evidence for the following types: razors (ξύραφια), spatula ("the flat of the probe" [δαί τοῦ πλατέος τῆς μήλης]), stylus (γραφίς), cautery applied through a protective tube (αὐλίσκος),¹⁶⁶ a heated tube (cf. διὰ αὐλοῦ

([Hipp. *Internal Affections*), eye problems, or even to fix a dislocated shoulder, it was on the whole considered to be a last resort due to inherent risks involved" (*Ancient Medicine*, 2nd ed., Sciences of Antiquity [London: Routledge, 2013], 93). We observe also that in his discussion of sciatica and psoriasis, after a thorough discussion of the method of cauterization (*Chronic Diseases* 5.1.14–22), Caelius Aurelianus suggests that other treatments are better, because of the considerable distress (*vexatio*) caused to patients. Pliny the Elder (*Nat.* 29.6.13) comments that one doctor's "savagery with cutting and cauterizing" (*saevitia secandi urendique*) earned him the nickname "the butcher" (*carnifex*).

¹⁶¹ See the collections in the appendices of Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*.

¹⁶² Milne, *Surgical Instruments*, 116.

¹⁶³ Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 158.

¹⁶⁴ Milne cites Priscianus, *Logicus*, xxii (*Surgical Instruments*, 116).

¹⁶⁵ Not discussed here are the various drugs that could be used as cauteries, in light of the fact that the term καυστηριάζειν is a denominative from καυτήριον, which suggests that instruments rather than drugs are in view.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Galen, *Gloss.* 19.111K, where he mentions a "copper cautery: a certain vial bored through at the bottom, through which a red-hot small cautery is passed in order to cauterize" (καυτήρα χάλκεον: καλαμίσκον τινὰ τετρημένον κατὰ τὸν πυθμένα, δι' οὗ καίειν ἐστὶ καυτηρίδιον διαφανὲς καθιέν [my trans.]).

θερμανθέντος),¹⁶⁷ triangular or "three-cornered" cautery (τὸ καυτήριον τρίγωνον), needle (βελόνη), lunated cautery (καυτήρ μάλιστα μηνοειδής or μηνοειδές καυτήριον), serrated cautery (cf. *ex cauteriis serratis*),¹⁶⁸ cauteries shaped like knives, nails, bricks, lentils, and the letter gamma, and olivary cauteries (πυρηνοειδές καυτήριον).¹⁶⁹ These types, it should be noted, are in addition to differences in size and other variations of length, width, and sharpness.¹⁷⁰

In light of the ubiquity and variety of cauteries, it stands to reason that some familiarity with the general practice of cautery, if not its range of uses, may be assumed for the author and readership of the Pastorals. References to cautery are frequently paired with references to surgery, with the result that the pairing of "cutting and cautery" (τέμνειν καὶ καλεῖν) is something of a stock phrase used to evoke the physician's task.¹⁷¹ As the phrase "cutting and cautery" would suggest, the term most commonly used is καλεῖν, though one

¹⁶⁷ Soranus, *Gyn.* 2.11.4 Ilberg = 2.6.25–29 BGM.

¹⁶⁸ Caelius Aurelianus, *Chron. Diseases* 1.1.46

¹⁶⁹ Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 166–71.

¹⁷⁰ Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 166. Milne, *Surgical Instruments*, 120 points furthermore to wood dipped in boiling oil (for treating diseases of the liver) and ignited fungi (for the creation of eschars on the stomach).

¹⁷¹ In tragedy, we find ἤτοι κέαντες ἢ τεμόντες at Aes. *Ag.* 849. See also the metonymy employed by Dio Chrysostom, "iron and fire" (cf. δεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ σιδήρου καὶ πυρός) at *Or.* 6.24. We also find the nominalized form of the phrase (καῦσις καὶ τομή) in a list with other treatments (honey, wine, hellebore) at Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 1137a11–17; similarly at Aretaeus, *Cur. diut.* preface to book one. The *Tabula of Cebes* 38 uses the pair to make the point that how the surgery is done is what matters, not the surgery itself. Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fr. 33, col. 6 ll.5–11 (Smith edition), uses cautery and surgery (ἡ καῦσις καὶ ἡ τομή) as a pair to invoke the practice of medicine, using them to represent the "pinnacle of pain" (τὸ τῆς ἀλγηδόνος ἄκρον) that must precede the quick and subsequent onset of pleasure (ἡδονή). The Hippocratic treatise *Physicians* (5) also notes the painfulness of τομή or καῦσις. Concerning treatment for a sudden and unexplained tumor (φῦμα), Aelius Aristides (*Or.* 1.62–63) says that doctors made a number of competing suggestions for treatment (all of which, of course, he refused in deference to the god [cf. 63]): "some said to cut, others to cauterize with drugs, or that an ulcer would surely develop (and) I would die" (οἱ μὲν τέμνειν, οἱ δὲ ἐπικάειν φαρμάκοις, ἢ πάντως δεῖν ὑπόπυον γενόμενον διαφθαρῆναι). John Chrysostom characterizes the doctor's surgery with the two treatments: "Go to a surgery, and see, whenever someone is discovered having a wound, he [the doctor] is cutting and cauterizing him [the patient]" (Ἀπελθε εἰς ἰατρεῖον, καὶ ὄψει, ὅταν εὔρεθῃ τις τραῦμα ἔχων, ἐκεῖνον αὐτὸν τέμνοντα καὶ καίοντα [*Hom. Eph.* 19.4; PG 62.132]).

also finds διακαίειν, ἐρείδειν, ἐπερείδειν, προσφέφειν, προσάγειν, and ἐμβάλλειν.¹⁷² The terminology for the instrument varies as much as the term for the act, though the evidence suggests that the same procedures were performed with instruments that seem to have varied more in name than function. For instance, different terms (Gk. σίδηρος, σιδήριον, καυ(σ)τήρ, καυ(σ)τήριον; Lat. *ferrum*, *ferramentum*, *cauter*, *cauterium*) were used to describe the same tools used in a variety of procedures.¹⁷³

2. Uses of Cautery

There was debate amongst ancient physicians about the extent to which cautery should be used. For instance, in the peripatetic treatise *Problems* 1, we find a series of question-answer reflections on best medical practices: "Which (wounds) should one cauterize and which should one cut? Should all those that have a large opening and do not close be cauterized, so that a scab may form there? For in this way there will not be festering."¹⁷⁴ In *Chronic Diseases* 1.4.143, Caelius Aurelianus observes that Themison would utilize cautery on the skin of the head to reduce epileptic fits, but he considers this method ill-advised.¹⁷⁵ Later in *Chronic Diseases* (3.4.64), Caelius reports that Praxagoras in Book I of his

¹⁷² Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 162. The Latin terms Bliquez identifies are: *figere*, *infigere*, *immittere*, *apponere*, *imponere*, *adurere*, and *transcurrere*. Though cautery is not frequently denoted by καυτηριάζειν, the term we find in 1 Tim 4:2, there is no doubt that the Pastor is referring to the practice by the denominative verb. καυτηριάζειν is, in fact, quite a rare word and seems to be a denominative verb derived from one of the common terms for the instrument used (καυτήρ).

¹⁷³ Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 158.

¹⁷⁴ Ποῖα δεῖ καίειν ἢ ποῖα δεῖ τέμνειν; ἢ ὅσα μὲν ἔχει στόμα μέγα καὶ οὐ ταχὺ συμφύεται, ταῦτα καίειν δεῖ, ὅπως ἡ ἐσχάρα ἐκεῖ πέσῃ; οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται ὑπουλα ([*Probl.*] 1.32=863a10–12 [Hett, LCL]).

¹⁷⁵ Aretaeus of Cappadocia also commends the practice (*Cur. diut.* 1.4). Celsus (*Med.* 3.23.7) advocates the use of cautery in extreme cases of epilepsy. The two points of application of the hot irons are said to allow the noxious humors causing the disease to exit the body. I am grateful to Christine Trotter for pointing out this latter reference.

Treatments prescribed cautery for disease of the liver, and at 3.4.66 he reports the following about Themison (in Book II of Themison's *Chronic Diseases*):

He also holds that wounds should be inflicted on the surface of the liver with drugs or cauteries. And he agrees that, because of the sturdiness of the spleen, certain strong measures, such as strong plasters or cauterization (*ustiones*), are especially appropriate for that organ. In fact, he goes so far as to prescribe puncturing the spleen itself in three or four places with a red-hot cautery (*igneo cautare*), unaware that the use of strong or mild remedies should depend on the severity of the disease and the strength of the patient, not on the nature of the affected part. (*Chronic Diseases* 3.4.66)¹⁷⁶

Here Caelius criticizes Themison (and Praxagoras) for not attending to the full range of factors necessary for diagnosis. One should attend to the "nature of the affected part," of course, but also take into consideration the particular disposition of the patient and the severity of the disease. This ancient debate suggests that cautery was a calculated medical undertaking that forced physicians to consider a variety of factors.

The evidence for the practice of cautery suggests that physician put cauteries to a wide variety of remedial purposes. These instruments were put to widespread use, such as treating the bite of a rabid dog or the spread of a venomous bite, treating ulcers, sores, or wounds, arresting gangrene, aegilops, or the spread of ulcers, stopping hemorrhages, treating breast cancer and tumors, treating anal fistulas and hemorrhoids, creating eschars for arthritis¹⁷⁷ or curing emphysema.¹⁷⁸ Aretaeus of Cappadocia even suggests cautery in the

¹⁷⁶ Trans. I. E. Drabkin, *Caelius Aurelianus, On Acute and Chronic Diseases* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).

¹⁷⁷ Caelius Aurelianus counsels against the use of cautery at the joints because of the swelling (*tumor*) it causes. See *Chronic Diseases* 5.2.43.

¹⁷⁸ See the list with references at Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 162–4.

case of chronic headaches.¹⁷⁹ In short, the use of cautery was extensive, and there are relatively bountiful discussions of that use. To prevent festering, our author says, open wounds should be cauterized. In a further section, the author suggests cautery for flat growths, protuberances, venous regions, and areas without much tissue.¹⁸⁰

What much of the evidence suggests is that physicians used cauterization primarily for the purpose of desiccating overly moist bodily tissues. This is evident in the use of cautery to counteract the corrosive effects of poison. For instance, Philumenus, writing in the late second or early third century CE,¹⁸¹ compiled a treatise on poisonings and their remedies, and extolled the virtues of cautery for dealing with wounds derived from poisonous animals.¹⁸² Cautery is thought of as an effective remedy for the area of the body

¹⁷⁹ In the last of a series of progressive steps attempting to cure cephalaea, Aretaeus suggests the following: "Wherefore, having removed the hair with a razor (and this also is beneficial to the head), we are to burn with heated cauteries, superficially, down to the muscles; or if you wish to carry the burning to the bone, you must avoid the muscles, for the muscles when burnt occasion convulsions" (χρὴ ὧν ἀφαιρέοντα τὰς κόμας ξυρῶ (καὶ γὰρ τόδε κεφαλῇ ὀνηϊστόν) καίειν πυρίῃσι καυτήρων, ἐπιπολῆς μὲν ἐς μύας· ἣν δὲ μέσφι ὁστέου ἐθέλης, ἀπάνευθεν καὶ τῶν μυῶν· μύες γὰρ καυθέντες ἔασι σπασμῶν προκλήσεις [*Cur. diut.* 1.2.11; trans. Adams]).

¹⁸⁰ "Which (wounds) should one cut (τέμνειν) and which should one cauterize (καίειν), and which neither of these, but (one should treat) with drugs (φάρμακα)? Should those in the armpits and groin be treated with drugs? For after surgery, such wounds are sometimes painful (ἐπίπονα) and sometimes dangerous (ἐπικίνδυνα). But one should cauterize (καίειν) flat growths and those having a large protuberance, as well as those in regions that are venous (ἐν φλεβώδεσι) or not fleshy (μὴ εὐσάρκεις). And one should cut those that come together in a sharp point and those that are not in the solid parts" (Ποῖα τέμνειν δεῖ καὶ ποῖα καίειν, καὶ ποῖα οὐ, ἀλλὰ φαρμάκοις; ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς μασχάλαις καὶ βουβῶσι φαρμάκῳ; μετὰ γὰρ διαίρεσιν τὰ μὲν ἐπίπονα, τὰ δὲ ἐπικίνδυνα. καίειν δὲ τὰ πλατέα τῶν φυμάτων καὶ πολὺ πρόβλημα ἔχοντα, καὶ ἐν φλεβώδεσι καὶ μὴ εὐσάρκεις. τέμνειν δὲ τὰ εἰς ὄξυ συνηγμένα καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐν στερεοῖς [*Probl.* 1.34=863a20–24; Hett, LCL]).

¹⁸¹ See Alain Touwaide, "Philumenus," *BNP*, ed. Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider (Brill Online, 2015).

¹⁸² In a section entitled "Concerning cautery for wounds due to poisonous animals" (περὶ καυτήρος τῶν ἐπὶ ἰοβόλων τραυμάτων), Philumenus wrote the following: Burning (καῦσις) is the most efficacious remedy for all poison wounds. For the fire, since it is more vigorous than any other force, both overtakes and prevents the spread of the poison inside, and also destroys the part of it which succumbed (to the poison), and it effects an exceptional foundation for the next therapy, if the ulcer persists further after the detachment of the scab. One must think of this [i.e., cautery] especially in these cases lest within forty days the scarred wounds be too quickly sealed, but rather one must keep close observation for a long time, if possible, if the ulcerations are both suffering from supervening inflammation and get dirt on the surface" (1. ἡ δὲ καῦσις [τὸ] ἀνυσιμώτατον ἐπὶ πάντων <τῶν> ἰοβόλων ἐστὶ βοήθημα· τὸ γὰρ πῦρ, πάσης τῆς ἄλλης δυνάμεως εὐτονώτερον ὑπάρχον, ὁμοῦ μὲν κρατεῖ

injected with poison, especially in burning away the part corrupted by the poison. In another part of the treatise, our author notes that while amputation was preferable for asp bites, cauterizing was a close second for neutralizing the spread of the poison: "Now those who have been stung by asps are helped immediately by amputation, if the part bitten permits it. If not, one must straightaway make an incision all around it and cut away through the depth as far as the bone, in order that the bitten parts and those close to them might depart, and one must eliminate the moistness (ἀνικμαστέον) from the remaining parts with cauterizing apparatuses (καυτήρες)."¹⁸³ The desiccating effect of cautery was also harnessed for the staunching of blood flow during surgery. This hemostatic use of cautery is vividly described in this passage from the sixth-century CE doxographer Aëtius of Amida that narrates the first-century CE Alexandrian doctor Leonides's surgery for breast cancer:

I usually operate in cases where the tumors do not extend into the chest. The procedure is as follows. When the patient has been placed on her back, I incise the healthy area of the breast above the tumor and then cauterize the incision until scabs form and the bleeding is stanchd. Then I incise again, marking out the area as I cut deeply into the breast, and again I cauterize. I do this quite often, incising and then cauterizing to stanch the bleeding. This way the bleeding is not dangerous. After the excision is complete I again cauterize the entire area until it is desiccated. I apply the cauteries the first and second time to check the bleeding, but the last time, after the tumor has been excised, for the complete cure of the disease. (*Iatricorum* 16.49)¹⁸⁴

καὶ κωλύει φέρεσθαι τὸν ἰδὸν ἐσωτέρῳ, ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναλίσκει τὸ κρατηθὲν αὐτοῦ μέρος, τῇ δ' ἐξῆς θεραπεία προκαταβολὴν οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἐργάζεται, παραμενούσης τῆς ἐλκώσεως ἐπὶ πλέον 2. μετὰ τὴν ἔκπτωσιν τῆς ἐσχάρας· ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τούτου φροντιστέον, ὅπως μὴ τάχιον τῶν τεσσαράκοντα ἡμερῶν αἱ οὐλαὶ συγκλεισθεῖεν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πολὺ τὰς ἐλκώσεις τηρητέον, εἰ οἷόν τε, καὶ 3. ἐπιφλεγμαινούσας καὶ ἐπιρρυπαινομένας [*De venenatis animalibus eorumque remediis* 3.1–2; Wellmann, *CMG* 10.1.1, my trans.].)

¹⁸³ βοηθοῦνται δὲ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν πληγέντες συντόμως ἀκρωτηριασμοῦ, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ δηχθὲν μέρος· εἰ δὲ μή, περισαρκιστέον παραχρῆμα καὶ ἐκτμητέον διὰ βάθους μέχρις ὀστέου, ὅπως ὑπεκδράμῃ μὲν τὰ δεδηγμένα μέρη καὶ τὰ τούτοις πλησίον, τὰ δὲ ὑπολειπόμενα τοῖς καυτήρεσιν ἀνικμαστέον (*De venenatis animalibus eorumque remediis* 17.6 = *CMG* 10.1.1, ed. Wellmann, my trans.).

¹⁸⁴ Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ συμπεφυκότων τῷ θώρακι καρκινωμάτων, εἴωθα χρῆσθαι τῇ χειρουργίᾳ· ἔστι δὲ ὁ τρόπος τοιοῦτος· τῆς πασχούσης ὑπτίας ἐσχηματισμένης, ὑπὲρ τὸ καρκίνωμα διαιρῶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ μαστοῦ τὸ ὑγιές, καὶ τὸ διηρημένον ὑποκαίω καυστηρίοις, ἕως ὅτου ἐσχαρωθέντων τῶν σωμάτων ἐπισχεθῇ ἡ αἱμορραγία· εἴτα πάλιν τέμνω,

Cutting and hemostatic cautery go hand in hand for the purpose of neutralizing the danger of blood loss. Cauterization to the point of dessication ensures that the patient does not bleed excessively.

The application of cautery as described in these sources typically depends upon an allopathic understanding of disease and therapy.¹⁸⁵ Cautery is used to remove necrotic tissue, prevent bleeding, neutralize poison, and close open wounds. The goal of any procedure is to curb excess and restore balance in the body, to remedy deficiencies with drugs or, if necessary, invasive procedures such as surgery and cautery. The application of cautery in veterinary treatises confirms this conclusion. In a medieval compilation of veterinary lore from late antique sources (some as early as the second century CE), we find discussions of cautery that further exemplify the range of uses to which it was put. The lateness of this veterinary source does not minimize its value for our study, because it illustrates the consistency of the uses to which cautery was put in antiquity, from the time of the Hippocratics in the fifth century BCE to the time of Hierocles, potentially as late as the fifth century CE. This source relates that the collection of fluid in arthritic joints was

περιχαράσσων ἄμα καὶ βαθυτομῶν τὸν μαστόν, καὶ πάλιν τὰ τετμημένα καίω· καὶ πλειστάκις τοῦτο ποιῶ τέμνων καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καίων πρὸς ἐποχὴν τῆς αἱμορραγίας, καὶ ἔστιν ἀκίνδυνος ἢ αἱμορραγία αὕτη. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν τελείαν ἀποκοπὴν πάλιν ἐπικάω τὰ μέρη τὰ ὅλα ἕως ἀναξηρασμοῦ, τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον πρὸς τὴν τῆς αἱμορραγίας ἐποχὴν, ἔσχατον δὲ μετὰ τὴν τελείαν ἀποκοπὴν τὰ καυτήρια προσάγειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦς πάθους ὅλου ἀνασκευήν· Trans. Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 160 (though he mistakenly cites this as 16.44).

¹⁸⁵ Regarding the peripatetic *Problems*, Nutton writes that "the understanding of disease and therapy is firmly allopathic: one reduces excess and restores deficiency to bring the body back into equilibrium. Herbs and other therapies are thus chosen because they produce particular effects." Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 146. One should note here that the term "allopathic" is used here not with the derogatory sense that it gained in 19th century medicine. Cf. William T. Jarvis, "Misuse of the Term 'Allopathy,'" <https://www.ncahf.org/articles/a-b/allopathy.html>.

remedied with the use of cautery.¹⁸⁶ A case of swollen testicles also merits the use of cautery (καυτηριάζεσθαι), though due caution is given lest the testicles themselves be touched with the hot iron.¹⁸⁷ Equine cysts and boils (no less than human) could also be remedied with the cautery,¹⁸⁸ as we learn from the fourth or fifth century lawyer Hierocles, who seems to have moonlighted as a man of veterinary learning.¹⁸⁹ Aretaeus of Cappadocia, perhaps writing in the first or second century CE, recommends cautery for the removal of pus from the liver.

¹⁸⁶ "If a horse or mule is afflicted with an arthritic disease, it shows these signs: One day after the next, one foot after another goes lame and the joints are distended and they collect fluid. Therefore, you will heal it in this way: draw blood from the pasterns until the point of dripping. And cauterize (καίειν) the joints with straight cauteries (καυτήρια ὀρθά), until water comes out" (Ἐὰν ἵππος ἢ ἡμίονος ἀρθρίτιδι νόσῳ πειράζῃται, <ταῦτα σημεῖα ποιεῖ· μίαν παρὰ μίαν ἡμέραν ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον πόδα χλωαίνει καὶ ὀγκοῦνται τὰ ἄρθρα καὶ ὕγρὰ συνάγει.> θεραπεύσεις <οὕτως> αὐτὸν οὕτως· αἷμα ἀφαίρει ἐκ τῶν μεσοκυνίων <μέχρι στραγγισμοῦ>. καὶ καίει τὰ ἄρθρα καυτηρίοις ὀρθοῖς, ἄχρις οὗ ὕδωρ ἐξέλθῃ [*Hippiatr. Berol.* 2.23, my trans.]).

¹⁸⁷ "Of Hierocles on the same. If the testicles become swollen, let them be bathed with warm water, with a bit of sodium nitrate mixed in, and let them be smeared with a vinegar substance. If they do not submit to this therapy, let blood be drawn from the leg near the testicles. If it does not thus cease, it must be cauterized (καυτηριαζέσθω) through the middle of the "guarded parts"; don't touch the genitals by mistake" (Ἱεροκλέους εἰς τὸ αὐτό. Ἐὰν οἰδήσωσιν οἱ ὄρχεις, καταντλίσθωσαν ὕδατι θερμῷ, νίτρου παραμειγμένου βραχείος, καταχρίεσθωσαν δὲ ὄξους ὕλην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπακούοι ἐν τῇ θεραπείᾳ ταύτῃ, αἷμα ἀφαίρεισθω ἀπὸ τῶν σκελῶν ἐγγὺς τῶν ὀρχεων. εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως παύοιτο, καυτηριαζέσθω διὰ μέσου φυλαττομένων, μὴ τῶν ὀρχεων παράψωνται [*Hippiatr. Berol.* 49.2, my trans.]).

¹⁸⁸ "Concerning cysts - Of Hierocles. Hieronymus counsels one to cauterize (καίειν) cysts and boils with straight cauteries (καυτήρια ὀρθά), until you cauterize through the skin, sparing the membrane, and to squeeze out the moisture so that nothing from it remains. He counsels one to treat the burns with beeswax and olive oil and dough of spelt flour once they have been dissolved together. If there be a sea, [he counsels] to wash in the sea, but if not, bathe with cold water. It pleased some to cauterize (καυτηριάζειν) the cysts with bronze and not iron instruments" (περὶ μελικηρίδων. Ἱεροκλέους. Τὰς μελικηρίδας καὶ τὰς πομφόλυγας καίειν Ἱερώνυμος συμβουλεύει καυτηρίοις ὀρθοῖς, ἕως ἂν διακαύσῃς τὸ δέρμα, τοῦ χιτῶνος φειδόμενος, τὸ ὕγρὸν τε ἐκθλίβειν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὑπολιπεῖν. τὰς δὲ καύσεις θεραπεύειν κηρῷ καὶ ἐλαίῳ καὶ στέατι συντήξαντα αὐτά. κὰν μὲν ᾗ θάλασσα, λούειν τῇ θαλάττῃ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὕδατι ψυχρῷ προσαντλεῖν. ἤρεσε δὲ τισὶ καυτηριάζειν τὰς μελικηρίδας χαλκοῖς καὶ μὴ σιδηροῖς ὀργάνοις. περὶ μελικηρίδων. Ἱεροκλέους. Τὰς μελικηρίδας καὶ τὰς πομφόλυγας καίειν Ἱερώνυμος συμβουλεύει καυτηρίοις ὀρθοῖς, ἕως ἂν διακαύσῃς τὸ δέρμα, τοῦ χιτῶνος φειδόμενος, τὸ ὕγρὸν τε ἐκθλίβειν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὑπολιπεῖν. τὰς δὲ καύσεις θεραπεύειν κηρῷ καὶ ἐλαίῳ καὶ στέατι συντήξαντα αὐτά. κὰν μὲν ᾗ θάλασσα, λούειν τῇ θαλάττῃ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὕδατι ψυχρῷ προσαντλεῖν. ἤρεσε δὲ τισὶ καυτηριάζειν τὰς μελικηρίδας χαλκοῖς καὶ μὴ σιδηροῖς ὀργάνοις [*Hippiatr. Berol.* 77.1]).

¹⁸⁹ Hierocles was a lawyer, possibly writing in the fourth or fifth century, who seems to have composed a work interested in veterinary medicine as something of a hobby; he calls it a παιδιᾶς τρόπον, a "sort of plaything." Cf. Anne Elena McCabe, *A Byzantine Encyclopaedia of Horse Medicine: The Sources, Compilation, and Transmission of the Hippiatrica*, Oxford Studies in Byzantium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 215. That said, it is also of note that the latest authorities cited by Hierocles are the Quintillii of the second century CE. For fuller discussion, see McCabe, *A Byzantine Encyclopaedia of Horse Medicine*, 214–26 on the prooimia.

But if you are reduced to the necessity of making an incision, heat a cautery (καυτήρ) in the fire to a bright heat, and push it down to the pus, for it at the same time cuts and burns: and if the patient survives, there will run out a white, concocted, smooth, not fetid, very thick pus, by which the fever and other bad symptoms are diminished, and altogether the health is restored. (*Sign. diut.* 1.13.4)¹⁹⁰

In each of these examples we see that cautery was used in an attempt to reduce excesses of moisture, not only in human patients but also livestock such as horses.

What is striking is how few of these cauterizations may be said to result in desensitization, the primary aspect of the conscience highlighted by so many scholars concerning cauterization in 1 Tim 4:2.¹⁹¹ Indeed, the fact that scarring from cautery can produce desensitization is only made explicit, to my knowledge, in one text from antiquity. In the fourth century CE text *Chronic Diseases* (3.3.58), Caelius Aurelianus notes that there is debate concerning the application of cautery to diseases of the liver and spleen, since cautery damages the peritoneal membrane.

Moreover, this treatment makes it impossible for the physician to use a number of strong remedies, e.g., mustard plasters, drastic cupping, i.e., that in which the cup is removed with a strong pull, vigorous massage, pitch plasters, and the like. For the scars caused by the cauterization are impervious and devoid of sensation (*cum cicatrices caecitate viae et habitudine torpentes*) and, like the dead tissue, are unable to absorb any of the healing powers of these remedies. (*Chronic Diseases* 3.3.58)¹⁹²

It bears repeating that this almost offhand fourth century CE reference to a lack of sensation is virtually unique in drawing attention to the desensitizing effects of cautery.

¹⁹⁰ ἦν ὧν ἐς ἀνάγκην τομῆς κατῆς κοτέ, καυτήρα ἔμπυρον διαφανέα πυρῶσαι, καὶ διῶσαι μέσφι τοῦ πύου. τωὺτὸ γάρ σοι τέμνει τε καὶ καίει. καὶ ἦν περιγίγνηται, πῦον ἐκρεῦσει λευκόν, πέπον, λεῖον, (5) <οὐ> κακῶδες, ὅτι παχύ. τοῖσδε καὶ πυρετοὶ καὶ τὰ δεινὰ ξυνδιδοῖ, ῥηϊδίως τε ἀλθέζεται πάντα (trans. Adams).

¹⁹¹ It might be used to anesthetize in the instance of relieving a toothache. See Galen, *Comp. med. loc.* 12.861K [Archigenes]). Cited by Bliquez, *The Tools of Asclepius*, 163.

¹⁹² fiet etiam secundo impossibile plurimis atque vehementibus adiutoriis tui medicamentum, ut sinapismo, cucurbitis rapidis forti raptu remotis, fricationibus, dropace, et his similibus, cum cicatrices caecitate viae et hebetudine torpentes, tamquam mortuae vim nullam medicaminum accipiunt (Trans. Drabkin).

Rather, the application of anesthesia was needed before the application of cautery. When desensitization is mentioned, it is not the goal of the procedure, but a preexisting symptom of the patient that needs to be cauterized. The early second century CE physician Rufus of Ephesus, in his description of the use of cautery for melancholy, illustrates the point:

[1] Rufus said: I cauterized someone who suffered from this ailment [melancholy] with a hot knife. [2] I put it onto one of the parts [of his body], but he [the patient] did not feel the fire. [3] He then said: 'Increase the fire', as if it [the knife] were cold, for the sensation had ceased. [4] There were many ulcers on his legs, since the blackness had reached the lower part of the body, because of the frequent motion of the legs.¹⁹³ (*Melanch.* F24)

Here cautery does not render the flesh insensate, since it is already *ins*sensitive. Rather, quite in line with the other uses we have observed thus far, cautery is used to remove infected tissue, to render the seeping and the putrid dry and clean. By and large, cauteries were performed in order to desiccate moist tissue of one kind or another, whether it be necrotic, corroded, seeping, pus or discharge-producing, or whether they are used to stop the flow of blood. The goal of such remedies is to provide a counterbalance, an allopathic response to the excessive wetness associated with these symptoms. While desensitization would have occurred a byproduct of cauterization, the extant discussion of cauterization do not emphasize this point. What they suggest instead is the ubiquity of the practice as an extreme remedy that was utilized in order to remedy an imbalance of fluids, whether to remove poisonous pus, cut away necrotic tissue, or stop blood flow.

¹⁹³ Translated by Peter E. Pormann in Peter E. Pormann, ed., *Rufus of Ephesus: On Melancholy*, Sapere 12 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008).

G. Reorienting the Discussion of the Cauterized Conscience

In light of the evidence just presented, we must take exception to the influential interpretation of C.A. Pierce, who appeals to the *Hippiatrica Berolinensia*, a late antique compilation of equine remedies,¹⁹⁴ in order to make the claim that desensitization is the primary point of the metaphor.¹⁹⁵ He reached this conclusion in his effort to support a reading of the conscience as an ulcer, an organ of affliction. He suggests that the sole use of the passive voice of the verb *καυτηριάζεσθαι* occurs in *Hippiatr. Berol.* 1.28,¹⁹⁶ while in fact it occurs also in 81.1. Pierce finds it of interest that *Hippiatr. Berol.* 96.13 is a "prescription for a causetic [sic] preparation to be used to desensitise (equine) ulcers."¹⁹⁷ The prescription referenced by Pierce does indeed entail a caustic remedy for ulcers, but there is no indication in the text of the *Hippiatr. Berol.* that desensitization *per se* is the goal.¹⁹⁸ Pierce

¹⁹⁴ I cite here from the text in the first volume of *Corpus Hippiatricorum Graecorum*, edited by Eugen Oder and Carl Hoppe (Leipzig: Teubner, 1924). The B recension is extant in ten copies, and the manuscript Phillips 1538 forms the basis of the Teubner text. This particular manuscript dates from the tenth century CE. The bulk of the authors are late antique, ranging from the third century CE to the sixth century CE. For introduction and discussion, see McCabe, *A Byzantine Encyclopaedia of Horse Medicine*, 1–18; 23–27.

¹⁹⁵ "The use here, however, is in any case metaphorical, so that precise definition of the type of cauterisation envisaged is perhaps lost labour; it is the effect of such treatment that matters, and that is always the same—loss of sensitivity in the area treated. The natural interpretation of such metaphorical use is *made callous*; and support is given to such an interpretation by the laboriousness and the amount of importation of ideas in no way warranted by the Greek, involved in the *branding* interpretation" (Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 91–92, emphasis original).

¹⁹⁶ "One liter of donkey's milk, two kouathoi of olive oil, one gram of saffron, two grams of myrrh, a spoon full of celery seed. Having emulcified all these things and mixed it with milk, infuse it also with olive oil. Give also wheat flour with tepid water, but if it is summer, infuse barley flour with cold water. But if [the horse] should have ribs that are stretched taught and the fever does not abate, it is necessary that it be cauterized and in this way to render treatment" (Γάλακτος ὄνείου λίτραν μίαν, ἐλαίου κυάθους δύο, κρόκου γράμμα ἓν, σμύρνης γράμματα β', σελινοσπέρματος κοχλιάριον μεστόν. ταῦτα πάντα λειώσας καὶ συμμίζας τῷ γάλακτι καὶ τῷ ἐλαίῳ ἐγχυμάτισον. δίδου δὲ καὶ ἄλευρον σίτινον μετὰ ὕδατος χλιαροῦ χειμῶνος, εἰ δὲ θέρος ἐστίν, ἀλεύρω κριθίνῳ μετὰ ψυχροῦ ὕδατος ἐγχυμάτισον. εἰ δὲ ἔχοι τὰς λαγόνας τεταμένας καὶ μὴ παύηται ὁ πυρετός, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν καυτηριασθῆναι καὶ οὕτως ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν [*Hipp. Berol.* 1.28, my trans]).

¹⁹⁷ Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 91 n. 4.

¹⁹⁸ Nor, we should note, does the verbal form under question occur. Cf. *Hipp. Berol.* 96.13: ἄλλο ἐπὶ ἐλκῶν καυστικόν. (τ) Χαλκάνθης ὀλκὰς β', στυπτηρίας σχιστῆς γο τὸ ζ', χαλκίτιδος γο α', ἰοῦ ξυστοῦ γο ζ'. ταῦτα κόψας καὶ

seems to have derived this idea (that desensitization is the proper goal of cautery) not from any ancient medical or veterinary text but rather from the *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* under "cauterise," which he cites.¹⁹⁹ The *OED*, in turn, provides this figurative meaning of the term "cauterise" explicitly in reference to 1 Tim 4:2; it appeals to a number of 16th and 17th CE English authorities who mention cauterizing and a lack of feeling, though even they do not agree whether the lack of feeling is a precursor to cauterization or a result thereof.

Pierce constructively advances the discussion of this passage beyond the suggestion of "desensitization" as the purpose of cautery by offering an explanation of *how* the author of the Pastorals "conceives of the work of cauterization to be accomplished": "A single (supposedly) wrong act, according to his master [i.e., the Pastor's master Paul], *wounds* or *defiles* the conscience—smites it and leaves a scar. If this sin be not repented and repudiated, and if other sins be committed, the *conscience* becomes in time all *scar* and no *conscience*. It is when it is thus completely *defiled* that it ceases to be effective in its proper office: it is callous or cauterized."²⁰⁰ The final clause of this quote, however, illustrates the unsubstantiated interpretive move, the simple equation of "cauterized" with "callous," that has dominated the medical interpretation of the phrase *κεκαυτηριασμένοι τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν*. Thus, it is hardly ideal to follow Pierce's discussion on this point, bereft as it is of any substantive investigation into the historical practice of cautery per se. Consequently, we

λειώσας σὺν ὄξει δριμυτάτῳ λευκῷ, ἔψησον ὁμοῦ ἐν χαλκείῳ, ἕως ζέσῃ ἅπαξ, καὶ πάλιν λείου, παρεμβalὼν σμύρνης ὀλκὴν. εἶτα ἀπόθου καὶ χρῶ δι' ὄξους.

¹⁹⁹ While Pierce cited this concise edition (91 n. 6), below I cite the unabridged, online version of the *OED*: "3. *fig.* To 'sear', deaden, render insensible (the conscience, feelings, etc.). In allusion to 1 Tim. iv. 2 *κεκαυτηριασμένων τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν* 'having their conscience seared with a hot iron.'"

²⁰⁰ Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 93, emphasis original.

must reject his suggestion that the "effect" of cautery "is always the same—loss of sensitivity in the area treated. The natural interpretation of such metaphorical use is made callous."²⁰¹ Pierce's argument is ultimately dissatisfying not only because it appeals to the "natural" as a self-evident and unbiased source of hermeneutical authority, but because it is contradicted by the evidence from the extant sources.

The problem is not that the conscience was not conceived of as an ulcer, nor that cautery was not used to treat ulcers, for both are true. What scholars have not addressed in terms of the operative medical imagery is how contemporary paradigms, practices, and accounts of pathology serve as the Pastor's points of reference. The standard characterizations, including Pierce's, do not take into account the broader issues of disease etiology and pathology when interpreting the Pastor's peculiar locution "cauterized in the conscience." In the absence of explicit attention to theories of pathology by the Pastor, we are left to deduce from our knowledge of contemporary medical theories, or even tendencies in common understandings of disease, in order to surmise plausible conceptual referents. We do know that the Pastor seems to ascribe to an allopathic notion of remedy, since in 1 Tim 5:23 we find him offering elsewhere dietary advice that suggests the drinking of a little bit of wine as a counter-measure²⁰² to pains of the stomach.²⁰³ We also know that disease

²⁰¹ Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 90.

²⁰² See chapter three for discussion of the basic and widespread notion of disease as an excess of some kind, and its remedy as the application of an opposite measure.

²⁰³ Regarding the Hippocratic use of dietary prescriptions, Nutton writes, "The therapeutic principles behind the use of diet are the same as those for bleeding and for drugs . . . Given that the sick body is in some way out of balance, it must be brought back into balance either by removing whatever is in excess or by building up whatever is deficient. Cure is thus to be achieved allopathically, by the application of treatments that will have the opposite effect from the present condition. . . . The actions of drugs are seen as contributing

was commonly understood as an excess, and restoring health meant applying remedies to achieve balance. The basic logic of this interpretive approach to the Pastor's metaphor, combined with a knowledge of ancient cautery, allows us to work back from the kind of treatment applied—cauterization—to the general kind of disorder or imbalance implied by the imagery of cauterized conscience.

1. The Overly Wet, Weak, and Leaky συνείδησις

By looking at the historical practice of cautery, I have established a more contextualized and historically plausible conceptual framework for the metaphorical usage of cautery in 1 Timothy 4:2. I suggest that in light of the above evidence the imagery is designed to suggest to readers that the opponents had an extreme imbalance of humors, and cautery was needed because their consciences were overly moist, wet, oozing, or weepy. The conceptual association between wetness, moistness, and weakness is worth remembering in this regard. For instance, the Hippocratic treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*, links cautery with overcoming a moist and weak nature.²⁰⁴ In *Airs, Waters, Places* 20, the author writes about how many Scythian nomads overcome the "the moistness of their nature and their softness" (τὴν ὑγρότητα τῆς φύσιος καὶ τὴν μαλακίην) by having their shoulders, arms, wrists, breast, hips and loins *cauterized* (κεκαυμένοι).²⁰⁵

to the cure of a disease only in so far as they help to restore the balance in concert with other types of therapy and can be related to the requirements of the individual" (*Ancient Medicine*, 97).

²⁰⁴ On pathological wetness and weakness as characteristically female but also tied to environmental factors, see Brooke Holmes, *The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 203–4.

²⁰⁵ The links between moistness and effeminacy, well attested in the ancient medical, philosophical, and rhetorical literature, are also in view for this thinly veiled polemic against the Scythians. See further: "A constitution of this kind prevents fertility. The men have no great desire for intercourse because of the

Excessive moistness features prominently in ancient discourses as a cause of mental disorders as well, as we saw above in chapter five.²⁰⁶ The use of cautery to try to relieve "epilepsy" is a striking instance in which the illness caused by a bad humor is treated with cauteries, though as a last resort. Celsus, who elsewhere pairs epilepsy with *insania* (*Med.* 2.13.3) as chronic, violent diseases without fever, suggests that a burn at the back of the scalp and just above the top vertebra can allow the "pernicious humor" (*perniciosus umor*) to escape and hopefully grant some relief to the patient.²⁰⁷ By invoking cautery, applied to a diseased part of the soul, the *συνείδησις*, the Pastor effectively forged a conceptual link between the moistness associated with these pernicious humors that needed cauterization and the consciences of his opponents.

Important here also is the concern for food and marriage, common to both 1 Corinthians (8–10) and 1 Timothy 4:3, as demonstrated above in chapter 2. However, in 1 Timothy the point of debate was not, as in 1 Corinthians, the effect of eating foods on the conscience (one's own or another's), but rather the complete rejection of certain foods and

moistness of their constitution and the softness and chill of their abdomen, which are the greatest checks on venery. Moreover, the constant jolting on their horses unfits them for intercourse. Such are the causes of barrenness in the men; in the women they are the fatness and moistness of their flesh, which are such that the womb cannot absorb the seed." Πολύγονον δὲ οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι φύσιν τοιαύτην. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς μείζιος γίνεται πολλή διὰ τὴν ὑγρότητα τῆς φύσιος καὶ τῆς κοιλίης τὴν μαλθακότητά τε καὶ τὴν ψυχρότητα, ἀφ' ὧτων ἥκιστα εἰκὸς ἀνδρα οἶόν τε λαγνεύειν· καὶ ἔτι ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων αἰεὶ κοπτόμενοι ἀσθενέες γίνονται ἐς τὴν μείζιν. τοῖσι μὲν ἀνδράσιν αὐταὶ αἱ προφάσεις γίνονται, τῇσι δὲ γυναῖξιν ἥ τε πίότης τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ὑγρότης· οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἔτι συναρπάζειν αἱ μήτραι τὸν γόνον· (*Airs, Waters, Places* 21 [Jones, LCL]).

²⁰⁶ For example, the Hippocratic *Morb. sacr.* 14.2–5; Hippocrates, *Reg.* 1.35, 56–61. The Hippocratic pseudepigraphic letter to Democritus (*Ep.* 19) conveys the belief that *μανία* is caused by excessive moisture in the brain. Galen identifies excessive moisture as an impediment to intelligence at *QAM* 4.782K. A dry soul is considered best by Heraclitus (cf. D-K B 118). For these references, see Ahonen, *Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy*, 11, 14, 175.

²⁰⁷ Celsus includes a grisly anecdote about how some suffering from epilepsy have reportedly found relief by drinking the still warm blood from the slit throat of a gladiator (*Med.* 3.23.7; cf. Pliny, *Nat.* 28.2.4). See Ferdinand Peter Moog and Axel Karenberg, "Between Horror and Hope: Gladiator's Blood as a Cure for Epileptics in Ancient Medicine," *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 12 (2003): 137–43 for discussion and further references.

sexual abstinence and the urging of the same on others (cf. ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων [1 Tim 4:3]). The opponents are not simply wounded in conscience on account of their lack of knowledge, as Paul characterized the συνείδησις in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10. The Pastor's opponents have foolishly become cauterized in their own conscience by virtue of their misguided and bellicose rhetoric, which urged ascetic practices that the Pastor deemed unhealthy (i.e., contrary to the healthy teaching). These harsh remedies, which the Pastor characterizes as cauterization, are in fact the ascetic therapies themselves. According to the Pastor, a harsh, desiccating regimen of drying out the flesh—abstaining from heavy, moist foods like animal sacrifices, or the inherent wetness and moistness of sexual emissions—is what has left the opponents cauterized in the conscience. In ancient physiological theory, one could attempt to counteract an overly moist constitution through particular regimens. "Ascetic" practices such as abstaining from heavy foods and sex (within moderation), were known remedies and recommended by physicians.²⁰⁸ However, these were to be applied in moderation, precisely what the opponents do not have, according to the Pastor.

The result is therefore different from the situation in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10, where the weak or sick conscience was wounded by the awareness of somebody else's eating of heavy meats. In 1 Timothy 4:2, the opponents have wounded their own conscience (ἰδία συνείδησις) by keeping away from certain foods altogether, somewhat ironically through the

²⁰⁸ E.g., according to the Hippocratics, women's wetter nature required a dry diet to counterbalance. See Hippocrates, *Salubr.* 6, cited by Holt N. Parker, "Women in Medicine," in *A Companion to Women in the Ancient World*, ed. Sharon L. James and Sheila. Dillon, Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World. Ancient History (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 120. As discussed in chapter 5, philosophers like Pythagoras, Plutarch, and Musonius Rufus advocate the avoidance of heavy foods to maintain an appropriately dry soul. Galen (*Tu. san.* 5.2) writes that when young men are overly moist, one can at times suspect untimely sexual activity (Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 33).

attempted effort to heal themselves. Similarly, with regard to marriage, they seem to have taken the dictum of 1 Corinthians 7:1, "it is good for a man not to touch a woman," and taken it as an absolute decree for all, thereby disregarding Paul's concessions to the (for him, regrettable) need for and acceptability of marriage in 1 Corinthians 7:6–10.

The phrase "cauterized in their own conscience" thus retains a negative sense, the sense of a therapeutic attempt gone awry, for their cauterization is not evidence of a new healthy state but a reminder of their weakness and their oozing, overly moist, and defective conscience that led them into error in the first place. It may also be meant by the Pastor to invoke a rather visceral image, since cautery often produced unsightly scars.²⁰⁹ The opponents' sickened state is entrenched rather than remedied by these desiccating practices. This is apparent from his abundantly negative evaluation of the opponents and their teaching as misguided by demons and speaking with the insincerity of bald-faced liars. By virtue of not adhering to the "healthy doctrine" but rather to the "doctrines of demons" (1 Tim 4:1) the Pastor seeks to depict the opponents as having suffered a corrosion of their mental faculties. Without those in proper working order, the *συνείδησις* could not fulfill its proper function as an organ of moral judgment.²¹⁰ As I argued in chapter two, emphasizing

²⁰⁹ Pliny the Elder mentions the unsightly scars that occurred as a result of caustics, which were to be employed liberally lest certain epidermal diseases return (*Nat.* 26.3.3).

²¹⁰ My proposal that a cauterized conscience implies a conscience that has been rendered dysfunctional through excessive ascetic practices, and not that it is desensitized, is based on a contextualized reading of the Pastorals, since the terms "healthy" or "unhealthy" do not occur in 1 Tim 4:1–5. Rather, I have argued that the cauterized conscience is one that points to a backstory and is, ultimately, unhealthy. This reading finds some support in later lexica, which tend to gloss *κεκαυτηριασμένος* as "not having a healthy conscience" (*μὴ ἔχων ὑγιᾶ τὴν συνείδησιν*). From the 5th or 6th century CE, Heysichius, *Lex.* K 2041 (has the plural form, while the rest are singular); from the 8th or 9th, Anonymous Lexicographus, *Lex.* K 253; Photius, *Lex.* K 526; in the 10th CE, the *Suda*, K 1234.

the demonic capacity to effect illness of body and soul is one likely factor in the Pastor's ominous declaration that some will adhere "to the doctrines of demons."

2. Rereading the Cauterized Conscience in Context (1 Tim 4:1–5)

When we consider the fact that "cautery" is frequently used in philosophy as the medical analogue for an extreme kind of verbal therapy,²¹¹ signaling the harshest of reproaches, the relationship of this phrase to the surrounding verses becomes clearer.²¹² In the context of the passage in 1 Tim 4:1–5, the cauterized conscience serves as a further description of the liars whose falsity and hypocrisy is evidence of their utter deception (4:2), here caused at least in part by demonic agents (4:1). Emphasizing the demonic capacity to effect illness of body and soul is one result of the Pastor's ominous declaration that some will adhere "to the doctrines of demons" (4:1). These characterizations constitute the Pastor's basic rationale

²¹¹ Cicero, *Off.* 1.136, is cited by Malherbe, "Medical Imagery," 29 n. 56 to make this point, but the conclusions about how cautery functions in the imagery of the Pastor are my own. The passage reads as follows: "It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly—never at all, unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered" (*Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest* [Miller, LCL]). Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.45. "This disease and ailment is more grievous than that of Heracles and requires a far greater and more flaming cautery; and to this healing and release one must summon without demur father or son, kinsman or outsider, citizen or alien" (τοῦτο τὸ νόσημα καὶ τὸ πάθος χαλεπώτερον ἐκείνου καὶ πολὺ μείζονος καὶ λαμπροτέρου δεόμενον ἐμπρησμοῦ· ἐφ' ἣν ἴασιν καὶ ἀπόλυσιν χρὴ παρακαλεῖν ἀπροφασίστως καὶ πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καὶ ξυγγενῇ καὶ ἀλλότριον καὶ πολίτην καὶ ξένον [Crosby, LCL]).

²¹² This is emphasized by Seneca, *Ep.* 75.7: "Why do you tickle my ears? Why do you entertain me? There is other business at hand; I am to be cauterized, operated upon, or put on a diet. That is why you were summoned to treat me! You are required to cure a disease that is chronic and serious,—one which affects the general weal. You have as serious a business on hand as a physician has during a plague" (*Quid aures meas scabis? Quid oblectas? Aliud agitur; urendus, secandus, abstinendus sum. Ad haec adhibitus es. Curare debes morbum veterem, gravem, publicum. Tantum negotii habes, quantum in pestilentia medicus* [Gummere, LCL]).

for rejecting their teachings (perhaps seen as perversions of Paul's own), that entail abstention from food and marriage (4:3). What is more, there is a degree of symmetry between the "cauterizing" of the conscience and the prohibitions enjoined by the opponents. Both can be understood as a case of excess and extremes, wherein the radical rejection of marriage and the advocacy for strict dietary prohibitions is mirrored by the dramatic therapeutic intervention suggested by cautery. The invocation of cautery thus carries with it the association of harshness, bellicosity, and severity that characterizes the opponents elsewhere in the Pastorals (1 Tim 1:4, 6:4; 2 Tim 2:23–25, 4:14–15; Titus 3:9–10).²¹³

The Pastor's rejoinder to these ascetic impulses calls into question the cognitive capacities of those who would advocate such things by pointedly emphasizing their acceptance by those who are "faithful and recognize the truth" (4:3). The acceptance of such food and God-sanctioned marital rites is thus characterized as the reasonable and faithful thing to do. The Pastor bolsters his argument by appealing to the activity of God in creation (4:4) and what is deemed the appropriate posture in receiving these gifts, rendered holy through prayer (4:5): thankfulness (*εὐχαριστία*). The purpose of characterizing the opponents with the vivid imagery of a cauterized conscience is to promote a visceral reaction to their teaching. By suggesting the mental and moral incapacitation of the opponents, who have in desperation even tried to cauterize their own consciences but clearly failed to achieve any therapeutic result, the Pastor creates a pointed contrast between

²¹³ This argument complements one aspect of Malherbe's reading of the situation addressed in the Pastorals, namely the harshness and bellicosity of the opponents, though I differ in my understanding of the purpose of the Pastor's rhetoric, the social situation presumed, and the nature and function of the language of the cauterized conscience. Cf. "Medical Imagery," 30–31.

his position and theirs. Dietary and marital practices deemed erroneous by the Pastor serve as the pretext for a remarkable piece of hyperbolic polemic, spurred by dire eschatological warnings of demonic influence (4:1) and reprobate liars whose cognitive organs are grotesquely diseased (4:2).

What is gained by interpreting the *συνείδησις* and its cauterization in 1 Tim 4:2 from this particular medical perspective is an appreciation for the extent to which the *συνείδησις* is conceived of as an entity that is localized in the body and can be imagined as suffering from the same imbalances, humoral or otherwise, that were thought to cause illness in the body more generally. The result is the depiction of the *συνείδησις* as a feature of the soul that is capable of being sickened just like the rest of the soul. While a cauterized conscience may not be one that is rendered insensate, it is certainly one that is no longer fully functional, incapable of achieving its purpose. For the Pastor, the cauterizing of the conscience—the mental organ of judging something wrong or right—suggests that it has been damaged by the wrong kinds of therapeutic discourse. The operative imagery seems to be that of a weepy, necrotic body part, in need of remedy. In the Pastor’s medically inflected polemic, someone with a cauterized conscience is morally and intellectually impaired, since the *συνείδησις* cannot properly perform its function in judging the actions of the *νοῦς*. When it does render judgment, those judgments are inherently faulty, given the dilapidated, gravely damaged status of the conscience. It has been overly desiccated by the harsh therapies applied to it by the opponents, and has lost its healthful balance. To make such a claim goes beyond saying that the *συνείδησις* is weak or even defiled, but rather that its basic functionality is impaired, that it is incapable of accurately judging actions, thoughts, or

intentions. Thus, the operative imagery of a cauterized conscience is not that it is rendered insensate, but (from the Pastor's perspective) grievously impaired, in need of the healing remedy that only comes by adherence to the "healthy words" of "the Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Tim 6:3).

H. νοῦς and συνείδησις as Cognitive Organs of the Soul (Titus 1:13–16)

In light of chapter 6 regarding νοῦς and the above treatment of συνείδησις, we now address the question of how they relate. Scholars have proposed a variety of options with regard to the interrelationship between the νοῦς and the συνείδησις in the PE. With reference to Titus 1:13, Pierces describes the συνείδησις as the "negative and complementary counterpart" to νοῦς.²¹⁴ He argues that the double καί emphasizes them as a complementary pair, but that the mind is the more readily defiled. The conscience is imagined as "the last line of defense."²¹⁵ "With his conscience—here his capacity to suffer when he transgresses his Divinely-fixed limits—is gone, then all is gone." The problem with this assessment is that both elements are described with the language of defilement (μεμίλνται), and the precedent set by Paul was not that the νοῦς was defiled, but rather the συνείδησις was susceptible to defilement (cf. μολύνεται at 1 Cor 8:7). Thus, Pierce fails here to account for the fact that in Titus, both elements are alike defiled, without particular emphasis on either one. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the συνείδησις is the "negative" counterpart to νοῦς. Rather, συνείδησις is capable of being both ἀγαθή and καθαρά, and seems to work (or not work) in coordination with the νοῦς.

²¹⁴ Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 93.

²¹⁵ Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament*, 94.

In line with the observation that the two seem to work in tandem, Spicq suggests the quality of the νοῦς is that it naturally knows good and bad, and the συνείδησις constitutes the practical judgment between the two. "Le νοῦς est la raison naturelle qui, par elle-même, peut connaître le bien et le mal. La conscience est le jugement pratique qui discerne telle action comme bonne ou mauvaise et la décrète."²¹⁶ Lips too recognized that the state of the νοῦς and the συνείδησις are intimately intertwined. "Der Gedankengang ist dann parallel dem bei νοῦς festgestellten: bei wem der νοῦς ungestört ist, der hält sich zur Wahrheit; bei wem das Gewissen, das Bewußtsein intakt ist, der verbreitet nicht in heuchlerischer Weise falsche Lehren."²¹⁷ The συνείδησις is not an *activity* performed by the human mind or soul, but is rather an organ of the soul that performs certain cognitive operations, depending on its status (i.e., whether it has been corrupted or defiled or not). On my reading, the corruption of the νοῦς must be interpreted in light of the unclean, impure, and formerly leaky state of the συνείδησις or its cauterization. In either scenario, whether the conscience is imagined in light of its pre-cauterized, weepy state or its post-cauterization, overly desiccated state, the

²¹⁶ "The νοῦς is the natural reason which, by itself, can know the good and the bad. The conscience is the practical judgment that discerns this action as good or evil and the difference." He goes on: "Or les docteurs judaïsants, dont S. Paul combat l'ascétisme exagéré et leurs préceptes d'abstinence alimentaire, ont l'esprit souillé par des doctrines erronées; et leurs conscience, organe de la vie morale, est inapte à accomplir quelque bonne action que ce soit, καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι" ("Now these Judaizing teachers whose exaggerated asceticism and precepts of food-abstinence St. Paul combats have a spirit defiled by the erroneous doctrines; and their conscience, organ of the moral life, is unfit to accomplish any good action, whatever it may be, καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι") ("La conscience dans le Nouveau Testament," 71, my trans.). The connection between infection and defilement in the PE has been posited (though not fully argued for) by Spicq, who refers to Titus 1:15 and the term μαινεσθαι in particular to suggest that it describes "la maladie des recherches' des hétérodoxes (*I Tim.* VI, 4, νοσῶν), qui ont l'intelligence infectée (*Tit.* I, 15, μεμλάνται), et dont les erreurs ont toute la nocivité d'une prolifération cancéreuse (*II Tim* II, 17)" (Spicq, *ÉBib*, 117).

²¹⁷ "The line of thought is therefore parallel with the one established regarding νοῦς: in the person whose νοῦς is undisturbed, it adheres to the truth; in the person whose conscience is undisturbed, the awareness is intact, [and] it does not spread false teaching in a hypocritical fashion" (Lips, *Glaube - Gemeinde - Amt*, 59, my trans.).

point remains the same: these opponents are extremists who fail to properly moderate themselves in conduct or belief.

In the Pastorals, the *συνείδησις* is best interpreted as operating in symbiotic conjunction with the *νοῦς*.²¹⁸ These two each play important roles, and interpreting their relationship to one another is crucial for understanding the constellation of medical imagery that pervades the Pastoral epistles. In Titus 1:13–16, these elements of the human interior appear side by side:

13 This testimony is true. For this reason, censure them sharply, in order that they may be healthy in the faith, 14 not adhering to Jewish myths and the commandments of humans who are bereft of the truth. 15 All things are pure to the pure. But to the defiled and unbelieving nothing is pure; rather, both their mind and conscience are defiled. 16 They confess to know God, but they deny it with their deeds, because they are odious and disobedient and unapproved for any good deed. (Titus 1:13–16)²¹⁹

²¹⁸ Though later than the Pastorals, the third century CE orator Philostratus makes the the point that the *νοῦς* and the *σύνεσις* operate symbiotically. The Philostratean instance of the term *σύνεσις*, derived from the Euripidean use discussed above, reveals a conscience that is not the arbiter of moral decisions but rather the judge of those choices which the *νοῦς* is responsible for making (*Vit. Apoll.* 7.14.). There is thus a development of the idea of *σύνεσις*, since it is not so much a function of the reasoning soul as a separate organ within it. On this point see Bosman, "Pathology of a Guilty Conscience," 20. With an allusion to *Orestes* 396 (*δεῖν' εἰργασμένος*), Philostratus says that conscience (*ξύνεσις*) "is what destroys them when they ponder that their doings are evil" (*εἶναι τὴν ἀπολλύσαν αὐτοὺς ἐπειδὴν ἐνθυμηθῶσιν ὡς κακὰ εἰργασμένοι εἰσίν*). If the *νοῦς* selects things that are good (*χρηστά*), then the conscience functions as manager, promoter, and spokesperson, ushering an individual into every hallowed place, every place of repute. On the other hand, if the conflict or division of the mind (*ἡ τοῦ νοῦ στάσις*) leads someone "into foul ways" (*ἐς φαῦλα*), the conscience renders the life of the sufferer a harried existence, driven from the company of upright individuals and pushed to the brink of insanity (*Vit. Apoll.* 7.14.11). Philostratus suggests that in the *Orestes*, the conscience is responsible for producing a "forms" (*εἶδη*) of the Euripidean furies, here termed Eumenides in keeping with *Orestes* 38. It renders them a frightened wreck. The conscience "convicts" (*ἐλέγχειν*) the individual, and the mechanism for that conviction is a dramatic disorientation and discombobulation of the individual's perceptive powers: real things become "dreamlike and evanescent" (*ὄνειρώδη καὶ ἀνεμιαῖα*) while "faint and phantasmal frights" (*ἀμυδράς καὶ φαντασιώδεις πτοίας*) become "true and persuasive" (*ἀληθεῖς . . . καὶ πιθανάς*). What is striking is the way in which the *σύνεσις* is granted the power of perceptual distortion. If the *νοῦς* makes honorable selections, the *σύνεσις* allows for confidence and calm. The tumult of the mind, however, effectively gives license to the *σύνεσις* to wreak havoc on the individual's capacity to interpret reality.

²¹⁹ 13 ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀληθής. δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἔλεγε αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως, ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει, 14 μὴ προσέχοντες Ἰουδαίκοις μύθοις καὶ ἐντολαῖς ἀνθρώπων ἀποστρεφόμενων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 15 πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς· τοῖς δὲ μεμιамμένοις καὶ ἀπίστοις οὐδὲν καθαρόν, ἀλλὰ μεμíanται αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνείδησις. 16 θεὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν εἰδέναι, τοῖς δὲ ἔργοις ἀρνοῦνται, βδελυκτοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀπειθεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι.

We can see in Titus 1:13–16 how the status of the *συνείδησις* (and also the *νοῦς*) correlates with the opponents' relationship to the truth. Titus is to "rebuke them sharply" (*ἐλέγχε αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως*) in light of fact that the Cretan prophet's testimony regarding Cretan degeneracy (1:12) is "true" (*ἀληθής*). "Paul" commands Titus to do this for the stated purpose of their own health in the faith (*ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει*). The Cretans are in danger of "adhering" (*προσέχοντες*) to "Jewish myths and commandments of people turning away from the truth (*ἀλήθειαν*)" (1:14). The Pastor's choice of terms suggests that these are dangerous myths indeed (cf. "adhering to deceptive spirits" [*προσέχειν πνεύμασιν πλάνοις*, 1 Tim 4:1]). However, the possibility of their return to a healthy status is presumed. Titus's skillful censure is the proposed antidote.

Philo provides a text that can help us to discern the relationship between the *νοῦς* and the *συνείδησις*, especially regarding the activity of rebuke or censure in the effort to realign someone with the truth (*ἀλήθεια*). In his treatise *On the Exile and Posterity of Cain*, Philo allegorizes the three cities Peitho, Rameses, and On (Ex. 1:11) as *λόγος*, *αἴσθησις*, and *νοῦς* respectively. Likening Rameses (= *αἴσθησις*) to a moth (cf. *Somn.* 1.77), he explains that the *νοῦς* is "eaten out and gnawed through by each of the perceptions" (*ὅφ' ἐκάστης τῶν αἰσθήσεων νοῦς ἐκβιβρώσκεται καὶ διεσθίεται* [*Post.* 55–56]), suggesting that "the impressions entering unpleasurably beget a life that is grievous and painful" (*αἱ γὰρ ἐπεισιοῦσαι μὴ καθ' ἡδονὴν φαντασίαι λυπηρὸν καὶ ἐπίπονον ἀποτίκτουσι τὸν βίον* [*Post.* 56]). These images suggest an adversarial relationship between the *νοῦς* and the perceptible world, conveyed to the *νοῦς* via perceptions and impressions. Building upon this allegorization of the Egyptian city of On (LXX Ex 1:11), which Philo had earlier (*Post.* 55, 57) identified with *νοῦς* and dubbed

βουνός, "heap," Philo says that the βουνός set up between Jacob and Laban (Gen 31:46–49) was called by Jacob as a witness. It is in this dense allegorical thicket that we find a fascinating and illuminating colloquy of terms.²²⁰ "The wrestler"²²¹ Jacob in his contracts with Laban calls this mound as witness, clarifying the most general principles (δογματικώτατα)²²² that the νοῦς in each person is a witness (μάρτυς), since being in secret it deliberates (βουλευέσθαι), and the συνειδός is a chastizer (ἐλεγχος), impartial and the most truthful of all.²²³ Here we find the νοῦς and the συνειδός working in concert with each other. Too little textual evidence is given to extrapolate too broadly regarding the precise nature of their relationship, but it can be observed that the νοῦς, because of the allegorical framework set up by Philo, functions as μάρτυς, a term more readily attributed to συνειδός by Philo. The συνειδός maintains its traditional role of serving as ἐλεγχος. Here Philo puts special emphasis on the impartiality and truthfulness of the συνειδός, perhaps indicating the qualities with which it operates when functioning in relationship to the deliberations of the νοῦς.

In light of the prominence of the συνείδησις as ἐλεγχος in antiquity (esp. in Philo), it is possible to read Titus's own mandate to rebuke (ἐλέγχειν) as an attempt to do what a defiled conscience cannot. Because the opponents' συνείδησις has been defiled, it cannot operate properly and fulfill its role of rebuking the mind. The tenuous relationship to truth is further emphasized in 1:16: "they claim to know God . . ." (θεὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν εἰδέναι), but

²²⁰ Klauck, "Accuser, Judge and Paraclete," 110 notes that he knows of "nothing in Greek literature" comparable "to this peculiar combination of the several terms."

²²¹ *PGL*, 245, s.v. ἀσκήτης, 3.

²²² *LSJ*, 441, s.v. δογματικός, B.2.

²²³ τὸν βουνὸν τοῦτον ὁ ἀσκητὴς Ἰακώβ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Λάβαν δικαίοις μάρτυρα καλεῖ δογματικώτατα δηλῶν ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ἐκάστῳ μάρτυς ἐστὶν ὧν ἐν ἀφανεί βουλευέται καὶ τὸ συνειδὸς ἐλεγχος ἀδέκαστος καὶ πάντων ἀψευδέστατος (*Post.* 59 [Greek text from Colson & Whitaker, LCL]).

their deeds belie the claim (cf. τοῖς δὲ ἔργοις ἀρνοῦνται). The contrast of words with deeds is of course a standard polemical antithetical pair, but what we must not miss is the Pastor's immediately following emphasis on the relationship between their (falsely) professed knowledge of God and their defiled status: βδελυκτοὶ ὄντες. If we read this as an explanatory causative participle, "since they are detestable/defiled," the phrase highlights the implications of their defiled status: because the νοῦς and the συνείδησις have been defiled, the opponents are incapable of coherence in their claims to know God. Not only are their deeds discordant with their confession, but this is shown to arise directly from their disastrous state of mind and conscience. In language reminiscent of Romans 1, the Pastor goes on to say that they are "disobedient" (ἀπειθεῖς; cf. γονεῦσιν ἀπειθεῖς [Rom 1:30]) and "unapproved for any good work" (πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι; cf. ἀδόκιμος νοῦς [Rom 1:28]).

The use of the various images and metaphors in the Pastorals—the metaphor of cauterization applied to the συνείδησις, along with the imagery of corruption applied to the νοῦς, and the language of defilement applied to both—are formulated in these texts by the Pastor as discrete organs within the human soul. They appear, as in Paul's letters, an established feature of the psychology of the human person. I have argued that roughly contemporary uses of συνείδησις and its cognates provide a number of ways of thinking about the term in the Pastoral epistles, one of which is that it is an organ of the soul that is responsible for rendering judgment on the decisions made by the νοῦς. The result is the depiction of the συνείδησις as a feature of the soul that is capable of being sickened like the rest of the soul, just as it is also capable of being cleansed or made putrid. One thing gained by this analysis is an appreciation of the particular conceptual reference points which make,

I argue, the best sense of the medical imagery of the "cauterized conscience." In keeping with Bosman's arguments about the *συνείδησις* in Paul, I argue that the *συνείδησις* in the PE is depicted as a fixed entity in the human person, a fixed feature of the Pastor's psychology. Like in Paul's letters, it has the capacity to be defiled. Unlike Paul's usage, particular descriptors are now applied to it (*ἀγαθή, καθαρά*), perhaps emphasizing the fact that the negative associations connected to the concept of conscience have been lost and its status is best conveyed by further descriptive terms.

IV. Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that in the Pastor's depiction, the *νοῦς* and *συνείδησις* are best understood as organs of the soul that are integral to the cognitive activities of the life of faith promoted in the Pastorals. I have demonstrated that the activities of both *νοῦς* and *συνείδησις* are primarily cognitive operations, performed by organs of the soul, and that the degree to which these organs are "healthy" and operational is indicated by terms that signal their rational operation, such as *ἀγαθός* or *καθαρός*. I also showed exegetically that for the Pastor, the two elements—*νοῦς* and *συνείδησις*—work (or malfunction) in tandem with one another, and that when one is rendered holy or defiled, so is the other. The implication is that their status is intertwined, and what one suffers, so does the other. This basic point has been appreciated by scholars; my contribution has been to demonstrate that both the *νοῦς* and *συνείδησις* are integral in the creative medicalized polemic of the Pastorals, and that both are used as diagnostic indicators of the sickened state of his opponents' minds. Their pathological state, for the Pastor, is a real one, with dramatic consequences: their deluded

minds produce excessively harsh therapies, which in addition to being demonically inspired, threaten to harm their auditors.

Furthermore, I have argued that the way in which the Pastor depicts the damaged state of the νοῦς and the συνείδησις suggests that he intends to characterize his opponents as mentally infirm, ill as a result of their errant beliefs. I argue that the Pastor's invocation of these terms constitutes an attempt at maintaining continuity with Paul's, but that he develops them as well, primarily by placing greater emphasis on the νοῦς and συνείδησις as the sites of the human person wherein deviance is most profoundly evident. He redirects these terms in service of the "noble campaign" to diagnose and combat, from his perspective, the deluded teachings of his opponents. By pairing and depicting the νοῦς and συνείδησις with overtly medical imagery as elements of the human interior, the Pastor locates them within a spatially construed understanding of mental health as an index of theological rectitude. In his construction of the human person's interior and its constitutive parts, the Pastor borrows and updates Paul's terminology, putting a decidedly medical and spatialized emphasis on it. By cultivating this robust and recurrent theme of the opponents damaged, interior mental organs, the Pastor offers his readers "Paul's" diagnostic insight into the malignant state of his opponents, whose sickness, visibly manifest through their words and deeds (as in 1 Tim 6:3–5 and 2 Tim 3:8–9)—is rampant and dangerous.

In this chapter I also argued that the significance of a diseased συνείδησις and its cauterization has been misunderstood in previous scholarship as an indication of its insensitivity. Rather, I showed that the language of the cauterized conscience, when interpreted in light of ancient medical literature regarding cautery, suggests that the Pastor

was attempting to evoke a morally efficacious blend of disgust and pity for the opponents, whose organ of moral judgment was diseased and in need of remedy. The goal of the medical analogy was not so much to comment on the insensitivity of the conscience as to make a point about the diseased nature of the *συνείδησις* and to highlight the pathological consequences of their excessively harsh teachings. By casting the opponents as people who had been "cauterized in their own conscience," he depicted them as victims of their own ignorant "therapies." In the polemical context of 1 Tim 4:1–5, the implication is that they who adhere to the doctrines of demons, lie, and cannot provide proper remedy to their own disordered conscience can by no means be trusted when they advocate beliefs and practices (i.e., those mentioned in 4:3, abstinence from marriage and certain foods) that are contrary to those sanctioned by God and commended by "Paul."

Conclusion

This investigation of the Pastorals has argued, through detailed exegesis and comparative research in ancient medical and philosophical sources, that the single, post-Pauline author of the Pastorals crafted these three intertextually sophisticated pseudepigrapha in an effort to guide the interpretation of the Pauline legacy via creative, pluriform depictions of deviance as threats to the health of the church and its adherents. A summary of the major arguments supporting this thesis is in order, after which I shall point to some of the methodological implications of this research for the study of the New Testament and other early Christian literature.

In the introductory critical examination of the question of authorship and the epistolary relationship of the Pastorals to each other and to the homologoumena, I demonstrated that the evidence supports the view that these letters are post-Pauline productions of a single pseudepigrapher. I posited that an essential element of historical research into the meaning and function of the Pastorals should be a working hypothesis regarding the questions of authenticity and literary inter-relationship between the three letters. While such determinations should always be subject to the virtuous cycle of further investigation, critical examination, and renewed judgment, they are nevertheless essential as a basis for scholarly discourse about these contested letters. While different types of evidence may contribute to the determination of these letters' authenticity, a substantive set of vocabulary and phraseology unique to the Pastorals within the Corpus Paulinum best illustrates the special relationship of the Pastorals to one another and contribute the

strongest indication of their pseudonymity. I argued that the nature of veiled pseudepigraphy suggests that these letters were not sent as letters to some community or individual, but that they were most plausibly designed to supplement an emerging corpus of Paul's letters. I sought to add to the case in support of this working theory, drawing attention by demonstrating that the Pastor has created three mutually reinforcing argumentative strategies across all three letters: the spatialization, demonization, and pathologization of deviance.

A concomitant and essential implication of this thesis is that that the Pastor used the rhetoric of opposition and deviance in his effort to commend a certain interpretation of Paul and his literary legacy. The Pastor's production of these three Pauline pseudepigrapha involved a sophisticated intertextual procedure which promoted a new reading of the Pauline self and a challenge to alternative readings. As both a reader of Paul's letters and a writer of new Pauline letters, the Pastor sought to guide the reception and interpretation of the emerging Pauline literary corpus. In order to accomplish this work, simultaneously an exercise in producing Pauline portraiture and a critique of other portraits, he drew upon the language, metaphors, and commonplaces of Paul's own letters in order to present his opponents as the representatives of interpretations and practices that he considered dangerous and harmful, and even demonic (chapter 2). The Pastor's interaction with the letters of an emerging Corpus Paulinum was multifarious. On a formal level, he sought to compose letters that possessed sufficient resemblance to Paul's own as to be passable as Pauline letters. This is the first priority for the pseudepigrapher. In light of the historical-epistolary Paul's close relationships with Timothy and Titus and his mode of epistolary

communication as a means of religious argumentation, the Pastor saw fit to craft his own argument as private correspondence with these two trusted envoys.

In terms of content, the Pastor employed key Pauline terms in an effort to create an intertextual relationship, an access point for later readers who would then read the original Pauline writings in light of or in relationship to these later letters. For instance, in chapter 1, I showed how he drew upon the distinctive language of "handing over to Satan" from 1 Cor 5:5 and utilized it in 1 Tim 1:20 in an effort to resolve potential ambiguities over the original function of such language and to commend a certain posture toward the theologically errant. While physical harm is likely presupposed in both uses of the phrase, the Pastor made explicit its redemptive, educative purpose through substitution of key terms (the Pastor omits *εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός*, for instance, from 1 Cor 5:5 and includes *ἵνα παιδευθῶσιν μὴ βλασφημεῖν* in 1 Tim 1:20). He also tacitly presupposed key Pauline concepts and developed them toward new ends. For instance, in chapter 3, I showed that Pastorals' development of the idea that wrong teaching can pose a morbid threat to the church as the body of Christ presupposes Paul's body of Christ (*σῶμα Χριστοῦ*) imagery, even though the terminology of *σῶμα Χριστοῦ* is absent. In other instances, his language reoriented the argumentative function of key anthropological terms like *νοῦς* (chapter 6) or *συνείδησις* (chapter 7), shared in common by Paul and contemporary moralists, and put them toward polemical ends. This was in service of commending a certain image of Paul—one that was at times more in line with the Pastor's vision of Paul as an authoritative standard, and yet also a figure who held out hope for the return and repentance of the errant, characterized here in the language, as I argued, of return and re-entry, of freedom and renewed mental

function after escaping the diabolical snare, and of the restoration of doctrinal and bodily health.

In this dissertation I demonstrated in detail how the Pastor creatively integrated and synthesized philosophical topoi and medical images observable in contemporary sources with the Pauline homologoumena in order to achieve his goals of promoting the Pauline legacy as he has construed it. This study argued that the Pastor was engaged in a synthetic process of composition. While certain letters of Paul seem to be frequently close to hand (and his engagement with them may be understood on a spectrum between oblique allusion and intensive interaction), the Pastor is still, as are all authors, very much negotiating a variety of cultural influences in his writings. I argued that we may observe the Pastor working on multiple levels simultaneously as he synthesizes various sources and balances competing goals, and that in order to ascertain the most probable range of ways in which a text is producing meaning, we must attend to multiple resonances. In my argument regarding the phrase διδασκαλῖαι δαιμονίων in 1 Tim 4:1 (chapter 2), I argued that the Pastor's use of δαιμόνια was doing multiple kinds of work in the argument of his text: (1) that as a part of the Pastor's strategy of spatializing deviance, he associated these doctrines with essentially sub-lunar, air-bound beings who are liminal by nature and locatively subordinate to the God of the Pastorals, who dwells in unapproachable light (1 Tim 6:16), (2) that in its polemical function it served to convey an association with forces of evil, and (3) that in its pathological function it served to convey a threat of illness. Positing such multivalent functionality for a single term is justified, I argued, in light of the especially rich history of meaning that the concept of δαίμων/δαιμόνιον had in antiquity. I went on to

demonstrate that the reference to δαιμόνια is part of a complex of terms and concepts in 1 Tim 4:1–5 (including βρῶμα, συνείδησις, εὐχαριστία, and γαμεῖν). These serve to create an intertextual relationship with 1 Cor 8–10 (and Romans 14–15) and 1 Timothy 4:1–5, first by the Pastor's reference to those earlier passages and secondly by further fostering that intertextual relationship as a context for meaning for both Pauline and the post-Pauline passage.

A further contribution and a constitutive part of my thesis has been to demonstrate that research into medical literature has much to offer to scholars interpreting ancient Christian uses of medical images. I showed how research into the ancient evidence for and cultural attitudes toward certain pathologies and their remedies is essential for adequately interpreting the role of medical imagery in the argumentation of the Pastorals. For instance, in the curious case of the cauterized conscience (1 Tim 4:2), when one attends to the ancient evidence for the practice of cautery, one can appreciate even better the different nuances of the Pastor's invocation of the disease as part of his invective. The practice of cautery, even though it was often a drastic remedy of last resort, was ubiquitous, and most people would have been familiar with it as a treatment designed to desiccate diseased and overly moist tissues (over-saturated with blood, pus, or other humors). Although modern scholars tend to assume that cauterization is intended primarily to desensitize an area, the ancient medical literature does not bear that out. This evidence, combined with the absence of desensitization from medical discussions of cauterization, suggests that the Pastor sought to craft a depiction of his opponents as having diseased cognitive organs that had been overly desiccated through the harsh ascetic practices regarding food and marriage that they

were advocating. This interpretation, arrived at through close examination of ancient medical literature, has the advantage of better explaining than previous solutions have the cohesiveness of the imagery, its connections to the immediate argument of the passage in which it occurs, and its role in the larger argumentative strategy of the Pastor.

Research into medical literature also led me to the determination that the function of the imagery of gangrene in 2 Tim 2:17, especially in light of the Pastor's medicalization of deviance throughout these three letters, has importance beyond the connotation of spreading. In view of the visceral nature of such imagery and ancient readers' familiarity with lesions, I demonstrated that the Pastor, with this vivid, grotesque imagery, sought to achieve an affective response in his readers by associating particular doctrinal beliefs (i.e., that the resurrection had already occurred), with a malodorous and unsightly malady. By implicitly appealing to the "gangrene" of the opponents' teaching, the Pastor harnessed the affective qualities of the olfactory and the visual to cultivate repugnance and disgust. Attention to the somatic aspects of the diseases present in the Pastorals yields new interpretive angles, such as appreciating the degree to which the Pastor continues to use the body as a generative topos of argumentation, just as Paul did. By appealing to the threat of disease, the Pastor presumes but also extends in directions that the apostle had not the metaphors operative in Paul's letters, especially 1 Corinthians, where the "body of Christ" represents the importance of cohesion and collaboration amongst the different "members" of that body, i.e., the individuals or groups that make up the *ἐκκλησία* in Corinth. The Pastor, as was his wont, adapted this metaphor to address the perceived threat of doctrinal deviance.

Attention to the full range of medical imagery across all three of the Pastoral Epistles formed an integral part of my argument that the Pastor depicted deviance as a threat to the health of the church. By attending more carefully to the full range of medical imagery in the PE, I was able to show that that previous scholarship had not adequately accounted for the extensiveness and function of such language in the Pastorals or arrived at faulty conclusions regarding them. In particular, I demonstrated that the Pastor used the language of health and sickness not only for polemical purposes, to characterize his opponents as deluded, sick, and dangerous, but also for the purpose of suggesting the possibility and desirability of their healing and repentance (ch. 3). The Pastor repeatedly displays a keen interest in the possible restoration of opponents, even though this is undoubtedly imagined to occur on his terms, which he considers to be the right and divinely sanctioned terms. Nevertheless, scholarship on the PE has been divided on whether or not the Pastor envisions a possible restoration of his opponents. My study has provided a new angle on this matter, by combining exegetical insights from the Pastorals with comparative analyses of medical literature and the philosophical use of medical topoi in which therapy and remedy were presupposed as the rhetorical aim of such language. Statements expressing God's desire for universal "recognition of the truth" (1 Tim 2:4), a hope for the repentance and return to the "recognition of the truth" and release of opponents from the devil's snare (2 Tim 2:25–26), and the stated purpose of rebuking opponents, namely that they "might be healthy in the faith" (Titus 1:13) all suggest that for the Pastor, the function of the "healthy words" is ultimately to convey a healthy standard to which even the deviant can return.

Research into the cultural significance of illness and its portrayal has the potential to resolve outstanding exegetical questions. In the case of 1 Tim 5:23, I argued, contrary to the majority of existing scholarship, that this instance of health advice is an integral part of "Paul's" counsel to Timothy on how to manage sin and its appearances (1 Tim 5:17–25). After showing how the Pastor depicts his Paul as an authoritative trainer and guide for Timothy in 1 Tim 4:6–16, the episode in 1 Tim 5:17–25 reads as a further iteration of Paul's medical and moral know-how. In particular, the Pastor presents Paul as helping Timothy to navigate the problematic issue of sin, its effects, and the public stigma of stomach sickness as a consequence of sinful living, the very issue on which Timothy is being coached in the surrounding verses. The Pastor's cumulative depiction of Paul is meant to establish him as the wise purveyor of knowledge that leads to holistic healing, both for the church and its members. This particular argument illustrates the value and pertinence of disability studies for scholars of the New Testament, for disability studies seek to identify the rhetorical constructedness of illness instead of locating it solely within individual bodies. The cultural valences of the illnesses and medical procedures that the Pastor draws upon prevalently in these letters are a key part of his rhetorical strategy against his perceived opponents

A significant conclusion of this dissertation that relates to the Pastor's use of medical imagery and topoi is that the Pastor uses the language of mental illness to portray deviance as a holistic threat to mind and body (chs. 6 and 7). He draws upon traditional associations between madness and erratic behavior, disordered speech, and painful emotions in his portrayal of the opposition as psychosomatically disordered. The Pastor's rhetoric is designed to portray the outward, bodily manifestations of the opponents' deviance as the

outwardly expressed consequences of their corrupted and diseased minds and consciences. This aspect of the Pastor's rhetoric has too often been presumed to operate solely at the level of metaphor; however, I marshaled evidence to suggest that many readers would have interpreted this as intimating a physical manifestation of psychic disease. Affections of the soul were interpreted by many of the Pastor's contemporaries as having profoundly visible, physical consequences. The Pastor's characterization of the opponents as excessively combative and curious in their speech and research was meant to conjure a stereotype that presupposed real bodily consequences: the overzealous academic who wears out his body and makes himself sick, driven by his unhealthy pursuit of learning but, as the Pastor avers, always falling short of it, and not really knowing anything. Such an individual, by virtue of his rejection of the healthy teaching, is sick in mind and in body, and the readers are warned to avoid such people, an exhortation that presumes and exploits the stigma attached to mental illness in antiquity and derides opponents as mentally deranged, sick individuals. Here I demonstrated the pertinence of contemporary philosophical and medical discourses on the *νοῦς* and the *συνείδησις* for interpreting the Pastorals.

The fact that these letters were not uniformly rejected as forgeries can be considered a victory for the author's capacity for literary ingenuity and his ability to wear the Pauline *πρόσωπον* convincingly. The Pastor's strategy for pathologizing deviance, which had roots in the Pauline homologoumena and the broader popular medical discourse, was to have a long history of reuse. By the time of Irenaeus and throughout the history of the church, these letters and their polemic—and their pathologizing strategies in particular—were seen as ready resources in the battle against heresy. It is not difficult to imagine the Pastor drawing

satisfaction from the impressive afterlife his use of medical imagery had in the history of interpretation, the documentation and analysis of which constitute an opportunity for further research.

One question facing modern readers of these letters is the degree to which the pathologizing of deviance should have a place in religious and political discourse. The Pastorals attest to the potency of medical metaphors in communicating value and stigma. No one is immune to their effects. My hope is that through the analysis of their multifarious employment in one small but influential corpus of letters, we might continue to interpret the dynamics and effects of such pathologizing strategies and approach their use in contemporary discussions with the appropriate circumspection and care.

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