@article{Authoritarianism:1570,
      recid = {1570},
      author = {Rashed, Dina Ibrahim},
      title = {Authoritarianism and the Civilianization of Force: Police  Power in Militarized Regimes},
      publisher = {The University of Chicago},
      school = {Ph.D.},
      address = {2017-12},
      pages = {192},
      abstract = {My dissertation investigates the rise of police powers in  militarized regime by asking the following questions: How  can we understand this change in militaries’ political  roles in systems where they traditionally held despotic and  infrastructural power? What factors might prevent the  civilianization of force when elites attempt to implement  the shift? How do civilian institutions of force (police)  support authoritarian regimes? And what are the limits of  their support? I engage with these questions to produce a  theoretically-informed analysis of the dynamics of  leader-institutions of force relations and present a theory  about leader survival and intra-authoritarian transitions.  I identify the rise of police powers as a process of  ‘civilianization of force’ where missions of domestic  control are shifted away from the military and assigned  primarily to the police. The dissertation aims to bring the  police, as a civilian institution of force, into the study  of civil-military relations and state-society dynamics.  My  enquiry into politics of domestic security arrangements is  based on a thorough comparative historical investigation of  Egyptian militarized regimes politics under Nasser, Sadat  and Mubarak.

Chapter 1 introduces the ‘Civilianization of  Force’ theory, underlining the gaps in our knowledge about  leader survival in militarized regimes. Building on  insights about the different levels of threats facing  leaders, I argue that civilianizing force is a strategy  that aims to contain threats from the military beyond just  coups while maintaining the leaders’ autocratic control. As  a strategy that aims to make a shift in officers’  preferences, it is qualitatively different from  counter-balancing which focus on operational tactics for  coup-proofing. 

Chapter 2 examines the militarization of  force under Nasser and how the salience of coup threats  impacted the leader’s choice of coup-proofing measures. The  chapter also examines the impact of external threat on the  militarization of the system. It traces the change in  leader position within the regime to explain its impact on  intra-junta rivalry and leader survival. 

In chapters 3  and 4, I zoom in on non-coup threats from the military and  the leader’s shift to civilianize force and disengage the  military from domestic control. I propose a broader lens  that takes into account the multiple functions and nature  of institutions of force in order to explain these shifts.  I draw upon the empirical accounts of Sadat’s success in  displacing the military from domestic control to argue that  “compensated displacement” is a crucial mechanism within  the civilianizing process. Chapter 4 shows Mubarak’s  efforts to disengage the military and build-up the  institutional capacity of the Ministry of Interior (MoI).  The chapter also discusses the reasons for the regime’s  fall and the break-down of its civilianization of force  process.

Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the MoI’s practices  under Mubarak by tracing the increase in political power of  the MoI’s police force and surveillance department  (Mabaheth Amn alDawla). I adopt a post-Weberian analysis  building on Joel Migdal’s state-in-society approach to  explain the impact of police practices on intra-state and  state-society relations. Chapter 5 focuses on how the  illegal, but regime-condoned, police practices produced  tensions between the judiciary and the MoI especially with  regards to the rigging of parliamentary elections. The  legislature was not only controlled by the executive but  became the battle ground over which the state fought the  state. I argue that the deepening tension about state  practices between the wielders of physical force and  juridical capitals, whose powers should have harmoniously  overlapped, had produced ultimately an incoherent  disintegrating regime. In chapter 6, I turn to scholarship  in organizational theory to discuss the violence of state  agents against apolitical citizens. I probe the  organizational structure of the MoI to show how the illegal  coercive practices by non-commissioned officers reflect  pervasive problems with professionalization and  institutional inequalities within the force.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/1570},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.1570},
}