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Abstract

This dissertation examines a few ways in which financialization has reshaped class politics in the United Kingdom and the United States. It bridges two literatures that, despite their overlapping empirical concerns, have rarely been brought into conversation: the study of class, and the study of financialization. The central question is how political alignments traditionally structured by employment-based class relations have been transformed by the growing influence of finance, both as a sector of the economy and as a set of institutions mediating household life. While financialization has been extensively studied in terms of its effects on inequality, debt, and economic stability, its implications for class formation and political behavior remain underdeveloped.

This dissertation addresses that gap through three empirical studies. The first chapter analyzes how employment in FIRE (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) industries correlates with political attitudes. Using large-scale survey data from the UK, I find that FIRE sector employees are more likely to support policies and states of economic affairs that protect financial revenues – including low inflation, low social services spending, high inequality, and low taxes on the rich – than non-FIRE employees with similar income levels. These differences are most pronounced among professionals and managers while being largely absent among non-professionals. I argue that because FIRE sector compensation depends on revenue sources that are especially sensitive to macroeconomic policy, these workers form a latent sectoral interest group with distinct political preferences. These findings suggest that the distribution of employees between FIRE and non-FIRE sectors, not just income, skill, business ownership, or workplace authority, can structure political attitudes in financialized economies.

Chapter two shifts the focus from employment to asset ownership. I examine how political attitudes vary by homeownership status, using data from the General Social Survey. I find that since the mid-1980s, homeowners and non-owners in the US have diverged significantly in their views on redistribution and partisan voting. This divergence is explained largely by a sharp leftward shift among non-owners, particularly non-professional workers and those earning below the median income. Today, attitudinal differences between homeowners and non-owners match or exceed those between traditional employment-based class groups. This chapter makes a theoretical case that the concept of "class" in financialized societies must account for positions in the structure of asset ownership and not just within relations of production, skill, or workplace authority.

Chapter three tests a common hypothesis linking homeownership to political attitudes: that rising home prices reduce support for redistribution by increasing the financial security of homeowners. Using mixed-effects models that combine survey data with housing market data at the state and county level, I find little evidence for this mechanism. While homeowners and non-owners have diverged in their views over time, local variation in home price appreciation does not account for this trend. This result reopens the question of what mechanisms underlie the political effects of homeownership.

Together, these chapters show that financialization has introduced new economic antagonisms, namely between FIRE and non-FIRE workers and between homeowners and non-owners, that cut across traditional class lines but remain rooted in the distribution of economic resources and risks. As a result, older models of class politics that rely solely on occupational categories, employment relations, or income fail to capture the political consequences of

financialized capitalism. The dissertation concludes by arguing for an updated conceptualization of class that incorporates sectoral and asset-based dimensions, and by outlining the implications of these findings for understanding polarization and the future of redistributive politics in advanced capitalist democracies.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my loving and supportive parents, Eugenie and Gregory, and to my late grandfather Hans, who always encouraged me in my intellectual pursuits.

Epigraph

Attempts to determine the ‘genuine’, ‘true’ meaning of historical concepts recur incessantly, but are always incomplete – Max Weber, *The "Objectivity" of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy*

[S]cientific activity is one of construction rather than discovery: construction of models that must be adequate to the phenomena, and not discovery of truth concerning the unobservable – Bas van Fraassen, *The Scientific Image*

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Introduction

This dissertation seeks to bridge two scholarly literatures that have hitherto remained more or less separate. The first is the literature on "class" which, broadly speaking, deals with questions of group formation and conflict on the basis of shared economic circumstances. Scholars debated a number of questions related to this concept over the course of the 20th century, in particular what the appropriate level of aggregation is, whether class is a "real" or "nominal" category, whether it is an object of study or a means of explaining other phenomena, and how it has changed over time. These debates flourished within the academy well into the 1980s and reached the peak of their scientific maturity with seminal works by scholars in the "Analytical Marxist" school, including works by philosophers G.A. Cohen and Jon Elster, political scientists John Roemer and Adam Przeworski, and sociologist Erik Olin Wright.

However, academic excitement over such questions waned beginning in the 1990s as social scientists largely turned away from class and toward questions of culture and discrimination on the basis of ascriptive identity (Chibber, 2022). New research on the subject of class during this period largely argued that class-based differences had disappeared or were disappearing, or that the traditional "big class" groupings identified by prior theorists, including the (Neo-)Marxists, were either not "real" or provided an inadequate grasp on inequality in contemporary economies (Clark and Lipset, 1991; Weeden, and Grusky, 2005). Despite convincing rejoinders to these claims on both empirical and theoretical grounds (Hout, Brooks, and Manza, 1993; Clarke et al., 2004; Wodtke, 2017), most sociologists had moved on from rigorous treatments of class concepts. Practically speaking, "class" today is usually simply equated with income or other continuous measures like "socio-economic status," or is otherwise

flattened into the framework of "intersectionality." Fortunately, this situation has improved somewhat in recent years. Marginal in historical terms but widely publicized unionization campaigns in the US in the last decade, as well as left-wing populist movements like Occupy Wall Street and the Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders campaigns for political office, have prompted some scholars to return to questions of class. Whether this trend continues is an open question.

The second literature this dissertation engages with is the literature on "financialization," which broadly refers to "the shift in the centre of gravity of the capitalist economy from production to finance" (Foster and Holleman, 2010, p. 191) over the past 40-50 years. Firms in the FIRE (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) sector have become increasingly profitable over this period and today account for a plurality of GDP in the United Kingdom and a near plurality in the United States – the two countries I focus on in this dissertation. In addition, the lives of households and individuals are increasingly mediated by financial markets, especially in the realms of housing, savings for retirement, and healthcare. Scholars of financialization have made a number of important theoretical and empirical contributions, including detailed historical accounts of how finance achieved this hegemonic position in advanced economies (Krippner, 2011; Adkins, Cooper, and Konings, 2020) as well as analyses of how financialization impacts economic inequality, economic growth, household and sovereign debt, and economic instability. However, this literature has not thoroughly dealt with how finance's multifaceted influence has fractured or rearranged historically salient, employment-based class political alignments. We might expect that it has, given that financialized capitalism accentuates and generalizes certain

economic antagonisms, such as those between creditors and debtors and between asset owners and non-owners, that interpenetrate but also extend beyond the workplace.

This dissertation is organized into three empirical chapters. In the first chapter, "Class Politics in Financialized Economies: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 1983-2019," I examine the how the uneven distribution of FIRE sector revenues between different kinds of employees affects individual attitudes toward social services spending, inflation, income inequality, and taxes. Using large-scale survey data from the UK, I find that employees in FIRE sector industries are more likely to support policies that, in principle, protect the unique sources of financial revenues than are employees in non-FIRE industries, even after accounting for personal income levels. I hypothesize that this is because the sources of FIRE revenues from which FIRE sector employees' remuneration ultimately derive are sensitive to certain government policies and macroeconomic variables in ways that non-FIRE revenues are not. I also find that an employee's employment-based class position, defined in terms of their workplace authority or professional credentials, significantly moderates these sectoral differences in attitudes. Specifically, attitudinal differences by sector are larger among managers and professional workers than among non-professional workers. I conclude by discussing how these differences may affect class political alignments in financialized economies in light of the fact that finance wields disproportionate influence over the political process in the UK and elsewhere.

In the second chapter, "Locked Out: The Political Economy of American Homeownership, 1985-2022," I extend my analysis outside the workplace and ask whether the increasingly financialized domain of homeownership is also an increasingly important basis of

differences in political attitudes. Using data from the General Social Survey, I track changes in attitudes toward government redistribution and voting for Republican presidential candidates in the US by homeownership status. I find evidence for a substantial divergence in the attitudes of homeowners and non-owners over the past several decades, explained in large part by declining conservative attitudes among non-owners. This divergence is evident not just in the overall population but also among non-professional workers and those earning less than the median income specifically. Furthermore, attitudinal differences by homeownership status largely match or exceed those between the self-employed, managers, professionals, and non-professional workers in the US today. This chapter shows that insofar as a "class" is broadly understood as "a group of people who by virtue of what they possess are compelled to engage in the same activities if they want to make the best use of their endowments" (Elster, 1985, p. 331), assigning persons to classes on the basis of traditional criteria – their occupation, whether they buy or sell labor power, whether they own a business, their income, etc – is increasingly insufficient. Instead, asset ownership outside the employment relation, especially homeownership, must be taken into account.

In the final chapter, "Have Increasing Home Prices Made Homeowners More Conservative? Results from Mixed Models of US States and Counties," I test one common hypothesis linking homeownership to political attitudes, namely that homeowners' support for welfare state redistribution diminishes when home prices in their area rise. Scholars have made this argument on the grounds that homeownership provides the means to smooth over bouts of under/unemployment and changes in consumption needs through home equity credit channels and thereby diminishes homeowners' demands on the welfare state the more home prices

appreciate. Using mixed models fit to survey data of homeowners and non-homeowners matched with their state and county of residence, I confirm the results of the previous chapter – namely that homeowners and non-homeowners have diverged in their attitudes toward welfare state redistribution over the past 40 years in the US – but I find little evidence that this divergence is driven by rising home prices at the state or county levels. This finding re-opens the debate on financialized homeownership and its relation to individual political attitudes, identifying an interesting puzzle for future research: what, if not rapidly increasing home prices, accounts for the divergence in homeowner and non-owner attitudes toward redistribution in the US?

Chapter 1: Class Politics in Financialized Economies: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 1983-2019

Many advanced capitalist economies now generate their wealth primarily through services, in particular financial services, rather than manufacturing. The United States and the United Kingdom are paradigmatic: in 2021, the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sector accounted for about 20% of GDP in the US, the largest share of any sector except for public administration ("Gross Domestic Product (GDP): United States," n.d.). In the UK, FIRE's share of GDP was even higher – about 25% – and greater than any other sector's ("Gross Domestic Product (GDP): United Kingdom," n.d.). Moreover, financial profits have increased over the past several decades in both countries. From 1945 to 1984, financial profits as a proportion of total profits in the US stayed relatively stable, fluctuating between 10 and 15%. However, from 1984 to 2005, this proportion climbed to 40%, experienced a brief decline during the Great Recession of 2007-2009, and quickly bounced back (Lapavitsas 2013:214). In the UK, the financial share of total profits declined from the late 1980s to the late 1990s but grew from 10% to 30% during the 2000s (Lapavitsas, 2013:215).

Krippner (2011) describes this process as "financialization," or a "tendency for profit making in the economy to occur increasingly through financial channels rather than through productive activities" (4). This transformation has been most visible in the US and the UK over the past several decades, leading scholars to distinguish an acute, "Anglo-American" form of financialization from the more restrained financializations of other highly developed economies such as Germany and Japan (Lapavitsas 2013; Green 2015). But while financialization has been most pronounced in the developed West, indicators of finance's sway over the economy,

including asset price volatility and private sector debt ratios, are up even in emerging economies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Karwowski and Stockhammer 2017).

Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011) argue that financialization is "at its core…a system of income redistribution" (538) and estimate that in the US between 1980 and 2008 $5.8 to $6.6 trillion were transferred to the financial sector, approximately two-thirds as profit (553). They argue that these profits consist largely of economic rent, or returns beyond what competitive markets would generate, because they are not well explained by human capital factors such as education and years of experience (551). They also demonstrate spectacular growth in the earnings of employees in the FIRE sector since the 1980s but note that most of this income went to managerial and professional occupations, while non-professional occupations experienced little to no income benefits. In other words, aggregate FIRE sector revenues are not distributed in a "class neutral" manner.

In this study, I hypothesize that individuals whose income derives from FIRE sources are more likely to hold attitudes and support policies consistent with protecting and/or increasing this income. I expect such differences even after controlling for personal income levels because the sources of FIRE sector revenues are sensitive to particular government policies in ways that other industries' revenues are not. Moreover, I hypothesize that managers and professional workers in the FIRE sector are more supportive of such policies than non-professional workers in this sector because financial income disproportionately accrues to the former, and because one's class position not only affects one's present income but also one's "permanent income" (Friedman 1957), or how much one expects to earn and how consistently they expect to earn it over the course of their life. And, even if income is bracketed entirely, "there are still

antagonistic interests over the expenditure and appropriation of labor effort" (Wright 2000:1568) between different classes of workers, especially between managerial and non-managerial employees.

To evaluate these hypotheses, I analyze nationally representative survey data from the British Social Attitudes survey covering 1983-2019. Specifically, I estimate differences in attitudes toward inflation and unemployment, government spending on social services, income inequality, and taxes between FIRE and non-FIRE employees, overall and separately by class. I find FIRE employees are more averse to inflation, less favorable toward government spending on social services, less concerned about income inequality, and less likely to support increases in top tax rates, even after controlling for income levels and a variety of other putative confounders. Furthermore, the weight of the evidence suggests that these differences are larger among employment-based classes that receive disproportionate shares of FIRE sector income – managers and professionals – than among non-professional workers. I argue that these results, which describe how economic attitudes within classes are fractured by sector, are important for the study of the formation of intra-class solidarity and inter-class coalitions in financialized economies, even in the unlikely scenario that the link between FIRE sector employment and attitudes is purely correlational. This is because the FIRE sector has a large and disproportionate influence on such economies and, in turn, their politics.

Background

The Sources of Financial Revenues and Their Distribution

As mentioned, scholars of financialization have argued that FIRE sector revenues largely consist of economic rent. Debates over the origins of economic rent are longstanding, dating back to the classical economists (Smith 1776; Ricardo 1817), and need not detain us here. My specific hypotheses about the political attitudes of financiers, elaborated later, do not strictly depend on whether financial revenues consist of rent but instead posit that such revenues are sensitive to particular policies in ways other sectors' revenues are not. However, since rent-seeking involves zero-sum competition over resources, opportunities for rent-seeking in the FIRE sector may heighten political conflicts between this sector and other sectors of the economy. In particular, while individuals may be able to realize rents based on their ownership of means of production, authority, or skills (Wright 1985), or through micro-level processes of occupational closure (Weeden and Grusky 2005), classes or occupations defined by these criteria may be politically fractured to the extent that individuals in the same class or occupation do or do not benefit from aggregate rents that the industry which employs them is able to secure, possibly as a result of government policies which favor some industries over others. After providing a brief overview of what some of these policies might be, I review the limited literature on how financial revenues are distributed across classes.

Rents emerge under oligopolistic or monopolistic conditions of limited or no competition between producers of a good or service. Owners of real estate are able to obtain rents due to the fact that land is naturally scarce. Financial institutions, on the other hand, exploit the artificial scarcity of money capital, and laws that restrict non-banks bolster the monopolistic position of

banks and other credit institutions in particular. For example, non-bank firms sometimes lend to other firms at interest, but regulations that require them to "segregate" client assets ("Client Money Rules" in the UK) prevent them from employing accounting tricks used by banks to create money "out of thin air." Consequently, banks enjoy a durable competitive advantage over non-bank institutions (Werner 2014). Banks that are "too big to fail" are also shielded from risk by expectations that they will receive a government bailout in the event of financial crisis. This "implicit subsidy" (Noss and Sowerbutts 2012) can in principle be measured, and some estimates place its value at over £100 billion in the UK (Bank of England 2010).

Epstein and Jayadev (2005) demonstrate increases in what they call financial "rentier income" (50) in most OECD countries since 1980. They show that, among other factors, high interest rates, low inflation, and financial liberalization, including the relaxation of capital controls, explain some of these increases. Higher interest rates make credit more expensive, directly benefiting banks and indirectly benefiting other financial institutions that invest in debt securities. Conversely, inflation may in part reduce financial revenues by lowering the real interest rate. Insurers are also adversely affected by inflation as insurance contracts are typically negotiated on relatively fixed terms (D'arcy 2012). Financial liberalization generally entails relaxing restrictions on interest rates and capital flows, expanding investment opportunities for creditors and intermediaries.

I argue that some government policies are *prima facie* more protective of financial revenues than others. It seems reasonable to expect that FIRE sector workers are more opposed to government spending on social services, for example, since demand for the private sector's financialized alternatives to these services in the domains of healthcare, housing, and savings for

retirement would presumably increase if such spending was cut. However, the issue of inflation is more ambiguous. While interest still constitutes a plurality of the income of banks and monetary financial institutions in the UK (Christophers 2022:67), FIRE sector income also consists of fees, capital gains, and other non-interest payments. The incomes of so-called "alt-finance" firms such as hedge funds and private equity firms consist in large part of these non-interest payments, and scholars have suggested that such firms have distinct interests that differ from those of traditional banking and insurance firms as a result (Benquet and Bourgeron 2022). The interests of the real estate sector are also ambiguous with respect to inflation. While real estate investors benefit from inflation when they realize capital gains on real estate that has appreciated in value, landlords are typically hurt by inflation, at least in the short term, as rental agreements are typically negotiated on a year-to-year basis.

Of central importance to the present study is work demonstrating the uneven distribution of FIRE sector revenues between capital and labor on the one hand and between different classes of workers on the other. Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011) demonstrate that in the US financial incomes have been "realized primarily by capital in the banking, insurance, and real estate industries and by employees in the securities industry," with banking profiting the most overall (549). Among FIRE sector employees, professional and managerial workers largely captured this income, while non-professional workers observed little to no increase in income (551). Similarly, Bell and Van Reenan (2013) note that in the UK the pay of "junior occupations such as bank clerks and secretaries has not outperformed that of similar workers in other occupations over this period [1998-2007]," while the pay of financial sector workers in the top income decile has risen (154). If FIRE sector revenues are sensitive to specific policies, this uneven distribution suggests

that class may moderate attitudinal differences between FIRE and non-FIRE employees.

Inter and Intra-class Variation in Political Attitudes

The concept of "class" is a perennially debated topic in popular and social scientific discourse. Among scholars, some common points of disagreement include the appropriate level of aggregation (Weeden and Grusky 2005), the role of "exploitation" (Wright 1985), and whether or not "cultural capital" should be a criterion of class membership (Bourdieu 1984). I follow Wright (2015) and argue that different explananda of interest require different tools, and so these approaches are less competing than they are useful for different research agendas. For example, some scholars argue that class dynamics mostly play out at the "micro" level of the occupation through mechanisms of closure and selection (Weeden and Grusky 2005). Such approaches have proven highly effective at predicting certain individual-level outcomes, such as income and cultural tastes, compared to class schemata that rely on a higher level of aggregation. However, Weeden and Grusky admit their micro-level approach is "not very demanding" since "classes that are fine-tuned to the micro-level agenda do not need to embody antagonistic interests, act collectively on behalf of those interests, or bring about fundamental macrolevel change" (2005:143-144). Indeed, while occupations will often compete with each other for resources, if the researcher is interested in "fundamental macrolevel change" – that is, if the "purpose of 'class analysis'...is to identify the nerve centre of the entire social order with a view to its possible transcendence" (Riley and Brenner 2022) – occupations are likely too small to serve as political subjects capable of bringing about such change.

Approaches which are interested in such explananda are often characterized as "(neo)-Marxist" or "(neo)-Weberian" and rely on a much higher level of aggregation. In this study I

adopt a modified version of Wright's (1985) neo-Marxist class schema for three reasons. First, my outcome of interest is political conflict and cooperation between groups large enough to contest macro-level economic outcomes, such as country-wide rates of inflation, unemployment, and inequality. As such, the micro-classes approach is of little use. Second, the version of Wright's class schema which I adopt, which divides employees into classes based on workplace authority and professional credentials, is more statistically tractable than both micro-class and neo-Weberian approaches that feature a greater number of class positions (Goldthorpe et al. 1987). Authority and credentials are important because their unequal distribution allows certain employees to exploit others (Wright 1985; Roemer 1986), generating antagonisms over production and distribution that may develop into distinct political attitudes. Third, the major class positions identified by Wright closely overlap with those identified by prior research on the differential distribution of financial revenues (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011).

Missing from this abridged class typology are obviously the owners of capital who are particularly important in neo-Marxist class analysis. While prior research has demonstrated that owners have received a particularly large share of financial revenues, I restrict my analysis to employees for two reasons. First, ownership is dispersed in the form of shares in financial and non-financial institutions, and thus many individuals are both employees and owners. Ownership could be circumscribed to include only those who are self-employed, but there are relatively few self-employed respondents in the BSA and even fewer in the FIRE sector, making estimation imprecise. Second, less theoretical and empirical work has been dedicated to the distinct attitudes of financial employees than to finance capitalists, as I explain later in this section.

Before exploring sectoral differences in class political attitudes, it is important to first

establish that there are in fact inter-class differences in political attitudes in the UK. Critics often point to a decline in class voting over the past several decades as evidence of a decline in the salience of class more generally (Clarke et al. 2004). However, as Evans and Tilley (2017) argue, this is more a function of political parties catering less to working class interests over the past several decades, and this shift at the party level is a result of the declining size of the traditional working class relative to the middle class. As the median voter has become more educated, more salaried, and more white-collar, the Labour Party in particular has largely abandoned its traditional working class base in favor of catering to the interests of an expanding middle class, especially from the 1990s onward. Despite these shifts, Evans and Tilley demonstrate that inter-class differences in attitudes toward core economic issues such as redistribution and privatization have changed very little over the past fifty years. Debates have taken a similar shape in the US, with influential studies claiming to show a decline in attitudinal cleavages by class (Clark and Lipset 1991) or proclaiming the "death of class" entirely (Pakulski and Waters 1995) and others (Hout et al. 1993; Wodtke, 2017) demonstrating stability in class differences.

Critics of class as a means to understand political attitudes are on more solid ground when they emphasize the relative (un)importance of class compared to factors which cross-cut class membership, such as racial identification, gender, and education. For example, while Wodtke (2017) argues forcefully against the "death of class" hypothesis and instead affirms the overall stability in class political attitudes in the US since the 1970s, he acknowledges that "status group [gender and racial] differences, and primarily racial differences, far exceed aggregate ownership-and-authority class differences in partisan identification and voting" (1493). With respect to education, Gethin et al. (2022) analyze data on voting behavior in 21

developed countries, including the US and UK, since 1948. They find that while income has remained a relatively stable predictor of voting behavior, even after taking into account the ideological movements of parties, less educated voters switched from primarily voting for left-wing parties prior to the early 1990s to primarily voting for right-wing parties thereafter.

Another literature suggests that class schemas premised on employment, such as Wright's, are likely cross-cut by differences in asset ownership outside work. For example, Ansell (2014) shows that homeowners in the UK become less supportive of government redistribution when real estate prices appreciate. Similarly, Pagliari et al. (2020) find that asset owners are less supportive of financial sector regulation and more supportive of financial bailouts. Given that more people in the UK are asset owners than are employed in the FIRE sector, the financialization of asset ownership through widespread pension and housing privatization is probably the channel through which financialization has affected political attitudes most expansively. However, given that substantial research has already been conducted in this area, this study focuses specifically on the employment channel while acknowledging that it is not the only, or even necessarily the most important, channel through which financialization affects political attitudes. I explore attitude differences by asset ownership in Chapters 2 and 3.

Prior research has also emphasized how workers are exposed to different levels of risk depending on their occupation and industry of employment. Rehm (2009) shows that those with skills specific to particular industries or firms or who are at greater risk of unemployment are more supportive of government redistribution, suggesting that they perceive such redistribution as a form of insurance against their specific skill investments and/or unemployment risks. Insofar as FIRE sector unemployment rates are lower than those in other industries, or the occupational

distribution of FIRE sector employees skews toward occupations with lower unemployment rates and/or skill specificities, attitudinal differences by FIRE sector employment may be explained in part by differences in these risks rather than sectoral differences in revenue sources as I hypothesize. Furthermore, FIRE sector employees in the UK are overwhelmingly employed in the private sector, and private sector workers are unsurprisingly less likely to support additional taxes and government spending on social services than are public sector workers (Jensen et al. 2009; Tepe 2011).

Unfortunately, little is known about how the political attitudes of individual FIRE sector employees differ from those of non-FIRE sector employees net of differences in public vs. private sector employment, unemployment rates, and skill specificities. There is some evidence that employees in finance were less likely to vote "Leave" in the 2016 Brexit referendum (Alabrese et al. 2019), but this is likely due to the fact that most financial employees in the UK are employed in traditional banking and insurance firms. Benquet and Bourgeron (2022) show that "alt-finance" firms such as hedge funds and private equity firms were in fact more likely to support "Leave" and were highly consequential in bringing about this outcome, but the authors focus on the financial contributions and public statements of firms rather than the views of employees of those firms.

The above overview suggests that in attempting to estimate sectoral differences in attitudes within classes, it is important to at least account for racial/ethnic identification, gender, education, some measure of asset ownership, unemployment rates by industry and occupation, skill specificity, and public vs. private sector employment. As I explain in the Measures and Methods section, I also control for a number of other factors which are likely correlated with

political attitudes and FIRE sector employment, including workplace size (Arndt and Rennwald 2017), age, country of residence within the United Kingdom, and whether or not the respondent lives in London, where much of the UK's financial activity is concentrated.

There is, of course, precedent to the idea that financiers constitute a distinct class "fraction" of the bourgeoisie, most notably in Marx's distinction between "money-capitalists" and "productive" capitalists (Marx 1999[1894]). Marx notes that while productive capitalists and money capitalists both earn profits by owning capital, they do so in distinct ways that can generate conflict between them – for example, conflict over the rate of interest. Christophers (2021), however, has been one of few contemporary scholars to suggest that financial rent-seeking creates antagonisms between different kinds of *employees*, since employees involved in securing financial rents for their employers may enjoy these rents themselves "in the recycled form of salary and bonuses" (13), even if they do not own the assets which generate the rents. Since FIRE sector revenues are likely sensitive to specific economic policies, e.g., toward inflation, attitudes toward these policies may differ between employees whose income includes a financial component and those whose income does not, but little empirical work has substantiated this possibility.

Since FIRE employment as a proportion of total employment is relatively low in the UK and elsewhere, the possibility that FIRE sector employees hold distinct political views may seem inconsequential if the explanandum of interest is political conflict between aggregate classes of managerial, professional, and non-professional employees. However, political attitudes are not only put into practice through voting. Financial interests have disproportionate power to realize political goals through campaign contributions, lobbying, and other forms of political activism.

Lin and Neely (2020:64) show that in the US since the early 1990s the value of campaign contributions by financial institutions grew roughly eight-fold. In 2016 this amounted to roughly $450 million, eclipsing the combined value of contributions from healthcare, labor unions, and energy and natural resources institutions. Likewise, in the UK in 2010, over 50% of Conservative Party funding came from the finance and insurance industries of the city of London alone (Watt and Treanor 2011). And, as Block (1993) famously argued, financiers may not even need to directly pursue political objectives since governments risk severe capital flight if they fail to cater to them.

The above suggests that insofar as FIRE segments of particular classes hold views distinct from non-FIRE segments and have disproportionate power to realize those views, FIRE sector employment may be an important factor affecting the level of solidarity within employment-based classes. In addition, coalitions between FIRE segments of different employment-based classes may be more likely. While a more thorough examination of such processes as they relate to actually existing or historical class formations is beyond the scope of this paper, the analysis of political attitudes presented here offers a starting point for such a project.

Hypotheses

I predict that employees in the FIRE sector are more likely to favor policies that, in principle, protect FIRE sector revenues.

Hypothesis 1: FIRE sector employees should be less favorable toward government spending on social services, more averse to inflation, less concerned about income inequality,

and less supportive of increasing taxes on the rich.

I expect individuals employed in the FIRE sector to be less supportive of government spending on social services since many of these services directly undercut their business (e.g., spending on public healthcare undercuts private health insurance companies). To the extent that government spending on social services increases employment or wages, it may also contribute to the kind of inflation (i.e., in consumer goods) that the FIRE sector is more likely to be opposed to, since the beneficiaries of social services spending are likely to spend more on consumer goods than financial assets.

And while few individuals seem to like inflation (Shiller 1996), I expect individuals employed in the FIRE sector to be even more averse to inflation, on average, than individuals employed in other sectors because a higher rate of inflation means a lower real interest rate, and much of FIRE sector revenue derives from interest payments. I still expect this result despite caveats raised earlier about the ambiguity of inflation for four reasons. First, the survey question I use asks respondents to say whether they think inflation or unemployment is the more important issue, not about how important the issue of inflation is *per se* (see the Measures section). Second, the most commonly reported measures of inflation in the popular and business press either completely exclude financial assets from their "basket" of goods or heavily weight non-financial, consumer goods against such assets. As such, consumer goods inflation is probably the kind of inflation most survey respondents have in mind. At the very least, respondents probably do not have in mind exclusively asset inflation. Third, the available data suggest that although "alt-finance" firms have become increasingly important in recent years, traditional depository institutions and insurance companies still own a majority share of the

assets under management of the financial sector as a whole (Panjwani et al. 2024) and employ more workers than alt-finance firms ("Nomis" 2024). As argued earlier, depository institutions and insurance companies make a plurality of their revenue from net interest payments or relatively fixed insurance contracts, respectively, and these sources are particularly sensitive to inflation. Similarly, while the interests of the real estate sector toward inflation are ambiguous, employees in real estate account for only about 0.06% of the BSA sample used in this study, compared to about 3.6% for finance and insurance. Finally, survey respondents are only asked about their views toward inflation and unemployment from 1983 to 1995, a period in which depository institutions and insurance companies predominated over "alt-finance" firms to an even greater extent than they do today (Benquet and Bourgeron 2022).

I also expect FIRE sector employees to be less bothered by income inequality, not only because they themselves earn more, on average, than non-FIRE sector employees, but because those with very high incomes are more likely to invest in financial markets and to invest larger sums. Inequality may also increase demand for banking and specialized financial products (Ferri et al. 2019). For similar reasons, and because progressive taxation is often combined with social services spending, I also expect FIRE sector employees to be less likely to support increasing taxes on the rich. In other words, policies reducing income inequality and increasing top tax rates negatively affect the incomes of FIRE sector employees in two ways: by deducting from the relatively high incomes they earn directly and by shrinking the revenues which go into paying their relatively high salaries. This double deduction does not apply to the same extent to individuals employed in sectors with above average remuneration but where the ultimate source of revenue in such sectors is not disproportionately accounted for by the spending of other rich

individuals.

Hypothesis 2: Sectoral differences in the above outcomes should be larger among managerial and professional employees than among non-professional employees.

I expect strong evidence for sectoral differences in the political attitudes of employees in managerial and professional positions, since these individuals have captured most of the FIRE income that has not gone to ownership. By contrast, I expect less evidence for a difference in the attitudes of FIRE and non-FIRE segments of non-professional occupations, since they have seen little to no increase in earnings and have little power with which to bargain for a larger share of future earnings (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011).

Measures and Methods

Measures

The British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) is administered every year from 1983 to 2019 except 1988 and 1992, and I pool all the responses over this period. In total there are 55,051 complete cases in the pooled sample, where "complete cases" are respondents with data on all the included covariates but not necessarily on all the outcomes I analyze. This number increases to 76,451 with multiple imputation of missing data (see the Methods subsection). Even with multiple imputation, limitations of statistical power prevent me from testing hypotheses about changes in the effects of FIRE employment over this period, so I leave such analyses to further research (see the Discussion and Conclusion section).

The BSA includes information on self-employment status and occupation, which I use to

construct a three-category class typology of employees consisting of managers, professionals, and non-professional employees. Survey administrators ask questions about the nature of the respondent's work and categorize them according to their "economic position," which includes "self-employed," "manager" (not including foremen), or "other" employee, as well as their "socio-economic group," which includes "professional," "intermediate non-manual," "junior non-manual," "skilled manual," "semi-skilled manual," "unskilled manual," "agricultural worker" or "member of the armed forces." I first exclude all respondents whose "economic position" is "self-employed" and include all remaining "managers" in the manager class. All remaining non-managerial employees whose "socio-economic group" is "professional," or whose ISCO88 major category is 2 or 3 ("Professionals" or "Technicians and Associate Professionals") are included the professional class, and all remaining employees are included in the non-professional class. Here, the professional class roughly corresponds to Goldthorpe et al.'s (1987) "Service Class" (I and II) but excludes managers, administrators, and proprietors.

I categorize respondents as working in the FIRE sector based on their responses to questions about their industry of employment. The BSA uses Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (SIC) codes, and if the respondent's SIC code mentions finance, insurance, or real estate, including constituent activities such as banking and credit intermediation but excluding non-financial "business services" such as accounting and advertising, I categorize them as working in the FIRE sector. It is important to note that some firms, such as large multinationals, cannot be easily categorized into a single industry. It is also possible that some respondents reported the industry of their specific workplace, division, or branch, even if it differs from the "primary" activities of the firm. In the case of respondents who

have FIRE roles within firms or branches that primarily engage in non-FIRE activities, this is not necessarily a problem, since anyone who is taking part in FIRE activities is theoretically sharing in FIRE revenues. Regardless, edge cases like this are probably uncommon. The table below summarizes the cross-classification of complete cases by class and FIRE employment after multiple imputation.

	Non-FIRE	**FIRE**
Managers	8778	818
Professionals	15358	850
Non-Professionals	48846	1801

Table 1.1: Cross-classification of complete cases by FIRE sector employment and class

The outcomes I analyze are measured as follows. For more information on sample sizes and years covered for each outcome, see Table 1.2 in Appendix 1.A. For attitudes toward government spending on social services, respondents are asked: "Suppose the government had to choose between the three options on this card. Which do you think it should choose? (1) Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and social benefits. (2) Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same level as now. (3) Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits." I recode this as 1 if the respondent said "3" (i.e., tax and spend more than current levels) and 0 if they said anything else.

For attitudes toward inflation, the BSA asks: "If the government had to choose between keeping down inflation or keeping down unemployment, to which do you think it should give highest priority?" I code this outcome as a 1 if the respondent said the government should prioritize reducing inflation and a 0 if they said anything else.

For attitudes toward income inequality, the BSA asks respondents the following: "Thinking of income levels generally in Britain today, would you say that the

gap between those with high incomes and those with low incomes is...(1) too large, (2) about right, or (3) too small?" I give respondents a code of 1 for this outcome if they answered "2" or "3" (i.e., income gaps are about right or too small) and 0 otherwise.

Lastly, the BSA asks: "Generally, how would you describe taxes in Britain today? First, for those with high incomes, are taxes...(1) much too high, (2) too high, (3) about right, (4) too low, or (5) much too low?" I code this outcome as 1 if the respondent said "4" or "5," indicating the view that taxes on those with high incomes are too low or much too low, and 0 otherwise.

Methods

I estimate average marginal effects (AMEs) of FIRE sector employment overall and separately by class on the aforementioned outcomes.[1] As all outcomes are binary, I estimate effects using logistic regressions. These models take the following form:

$$log\frac{p_{iq}}{1-p_{iq}}=\eta_i \tag{1}$$

where η_i is a linear predictor that can be expressed as

$$\eta_i=\alpha+\beta F_i+\boldsymbol{\gamma C_i}+\boldsymbol{\delta C_i} F_i+s(T_i)+\boldsymbol{\zeta D_i}. \tag{2}$$

In this expression, F_i is a dummy variable indicating FIRE sector employment, and $\boldsymbol{C_i}$ is a vector of dummy variables capturing class membership. $s(T_i)$ is a thin plate regression spline that allows the relationship between the year of the survey and the outcome to vary flexibly by year, making (1) a Generalized Additive Model (GAM). Including this spline substantially improves fit over models which assume a linear relationship between year and η_i. $\boldsymbol{D_i}$ is a vector of controls

1 Software used to generate the results in this and subsequent chapters is provided in Burchard (2025).

consisting of dummy variables for the respondent's sex, self-identified race/ethnicity, workplace size, employment status, educational attainment, and their country country of residence within the UK, as well as dummy variables indicating whether the respondent owns a home, how urbanized their neighborhood is, whether they work in the private or public sector, and whether or not they live in London. In addition, I include interval variable controls for (logged) real income and its square, age and its square, the unemployment rates of the respondent's occupation and industry of employment in the year of the survey, and the "skill specificity" of the respondent's occupation. Adding dummies for the respondent's occupation does not substantially change the results once controls for occupational unemployment rates and skill specificities are included. See Appendix 1.B for more details on the measurement of the control variables.

There is a substantial amount of missing data on whether respondents work in the public or private sector, how urbanized their neighborhoods are, and their detailed occupational information, which is used to determine their occupational unemployment rates and skill specificities. As such, I multiply impute this information five times using predictive mean matching with the other covariates used in the model as predictors. To impute information on how urbanized a respondent's neighborhood is I also use information on their press association constituency, the population density of their neighborhood, and the proportion of owner-occupied buildings in their neighborhood as predictors. I then combine estimates of coefficients and their standard errors across the five imputed datasets, as well as estimates of the AMEs of FIRE employment and their standard errors, using Rubin's (2009) rules. Since some scholars have expressed skepticism toward logistic regressions (e.g., Ai and Norton 2003; Mood 2009), I also compute results from models that use identity rather than logit link functions (i.e., linear

probability models or LPMs). Estimates of the AMEs of FIRE sector employment that I present in the next section are substantively very similar between both types of models, and I report complete regression tables for both in Appendix 1.C, along with results for linear probability models that exclude real estate from the FIRE category.

AMEs are computed by replicating the data such that in one dataset the FIRE dummy variable is set to 1 and in the other it is set to 0 for each respondent. The average predicted value of the outcome in the first dataset is the average adjusted prediction (AAP) associated with FIRE sector employment, and the average predicted value of the outcome in the second dataset is the AAP associated with non-FIRE sector employment. The difference between these two values is the AME of FIRE sector employment overall. AMEs of FIRE sector employment are computed separately by class by simply averaging over only the respondents that are members of that class when computing the AAPs, rather than averaging over the whole sample. Since the data are also multiply imputed, the above processes are applied to each imputed dataset and estimates are combined from across imputed datasets using Rubin's rules. I report AMEs in the main text for each outcome and the corresponding AAPs in Appendix 1.D.

Due to covariance between the estimated AMEs of FIRE sector employment by class, Hypothesis 2 cannot in general be evaluated simply by inspecting the figures in the following section and seeing whether or not the confidence intervals for managers and/or professionals overlap with those for non-professionals. Therefore, I bootstrap the difference between the AMEs for managers and non-professionals, as well as the difference between the AMEs for professionals and non-professionals, with 100 bootstrap replicates and combine the estimates from different imputed datasets within each bootstrap replicate using Rubin's rules. I report the

standard errors of these bootstrapped distributions and indicate whether or not the estimated class differences are significant at the 5% level in order to evaluate Hypothesis 2.

Results

Government Spending

The figure below shows AMEs of FIRE employment on the likelihood of responding that the government should increase spending on social services.



Figure 1.1: AMEs of FIRE employment on the probability of responding that the government should tax and spend more on social services, overall and by class

Overall, while FIRE respondents are about 2 percentage points less likely to say that the government should spend more on social services, there are much larger differences, significant at the 5% level, between FIRE and non-FIRE sector managers and professional workers of about -7 percentage points and -9.5 percentage points, respectively. On the other hand, non-professional workers in FIRE and non-FIRE sectors do not appear to have substantially different attitudes on government spending, and whatever difference there is among this class is very likely smaller than that between FIRE and non-FIRE workers in managerial and professional classes. Indeed, bootstrapping the difference between the AMEs for managers and non-professionals and between the AMEs for professionals and non-professionals indicates that both differences are significant at the 5% level. The estimated difference between the AMEs of FIRE sector employment for managers and non-professionals – about -8.3 percentage points – has a bootstrapped standard deviation of about 1.09 percentage points, and the corresponding difference for professionals and non-professionals – about -10.6 percentage points – has a bootstrapped standard deviation of about 1.2 percentage. In sum, these results provide robust support for Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Looking at the average adjusted predictions (AAPs) of the outcome reveals how substantial these attitudinal differences are for managers and professional workers (see Appendix 1.D). While managers and professional workers in non-FIRE sectors are the two groups most supportive of social services spending, managers and skilled/professional workers in the FIRE sector are two of the least supportive groups and substantially less supportive than both FIRE

and non-FIRE segments of the non-professional class.

Inflation

The figure below shows the AMEs of FIRE sector employment on the probability of responding that the government should prioritize reducing inflation over unemployment.



Figure 1.2: AMEs of FIRE employment on the probability of responding that the government should prioritize reducing inflation over unemployment, overall and by class

The AME of FIRE sector employment overall is approximately 3 percentage points. In other words, those employed in the FIRE sector in the UK are about 3 percentage points more

likely than those employed in non-FIRE sectors to say that the government should give higher priority to reducing inflation over unemployment, consistent with Hypothesis 1. While this difference is insignificant at the 5% level in the overall population and among professional and non-professional employees, the difference between FIRE and non-FIRE segments of the managerial class is significant at the 5% level and about 11 percentage points. In addition, the point estimates for this class and for professional workers are greater than the point estimate for non-professional workers. Bootstrapping the difference between the AMEs for managers and non-professionals and between the AMEs for professionals and non-professionals indicates that the former is significant at the 5% level but not the latter, providing some support for Hypothesis 2. Specifically, the former difference of about 9.4 percentage points has a bootstrapped standard deviation of about 2.3 percentage points, while the latter difference – about 1.4 percentage points – has a boostrapped standard deviation of about 2.9 percentage points. Analysis of the AAPs (see Appendix 1.D) indicates that while FIRE managers are substantially more averse to inflation than non-FIRE managers, managers in general are more averse to inflation than either professionals or non-professionals.

Income Inequality

AMEs of FIRE sector employment on views toward income inequality are shown in the figure below.



Figure 1.3: AMEs of FIRE employment on the probability of responding that income differences are fine as they are now or too small, overall and by class

Those employed in the FIRE sector are about 1.5 percentage points more likely than those employed in non-FIRE sectors to say that income gaps are about the right size or too small, lending support to Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, there is evidence at the 5% level for this difference among managers and professionals but not among non-professional workers. Point estimates for managers and professionals are also considerably larger than for non-professional workers. Bootstrapping the difference between the AMEs for managers and non-professionals and between the AMEs for professionals and non-professionals indicates that both differences

are significant at the 5% level. Specifically, these estimated differences are about 6.8 and 3.8 percentage points and have bootstrapped standard deviations of about 0.99 and 0.66 percentage points, respectively. Together, these results offer some support for Hypothesis 1 and strong support for Hypothesis 2.

Turning once again to the AAPs (see Appendix 1.D), the most notable result is that while professional workers in non-FIRE sectors are among the most opposed to income inequality together with non-professional workers, the views of professional workers in the FIRE sector are more similar to those of managers in non-FIRE sectors than they are to those of non-professional workers. FIRE sector managers, however, are substantially more conservative on this issue than any other group.

Taxes

AMEs of FIRE sector employment on attitudes toward taxes are shown below.



Figure 1.4: AMEs of FIRE employment on the probability of responding that taxes on the rich are too low or fine as they are now, overall and by class

Respondents in the FIRE sector are about 3 percentage points less likely than respondents in non-FIRE sectors to say that taxes on the rich are too low, lending support to Hypothesis 1. There is substantial evidence for this difference among managers and professionals specifically but not among non-professional workers. While the confidence intervals for the three groups appear to overlap substantially, this does not necessarily mean that we must reject Hypothesis 2, since covariance between the estimates needs to be taken into account. Indeed, bootstrapping the

difference between the AMEs for managers and non-professionals and between the AMEs for professionals and non-professionals indicates that both differences are significant at the 5% level. Specifically, these estimated differences are about -6.9 and -6.4 percentage points and have bootstrapped standard deviations of about 1.4 and 1.6 percentage points, respectively. Analysis of the AAPs (see Appendix 1.D) indicates that non-FIRE sector managers and professionals are similar to non-professionals in terms of their attitudes toward top tax rates, but FIRE sector fractions of the managerial and professional classes are considerably more conservative than non-professionals.

Discussion and Conclusion

Large FIRE sector revenues are salient features of many highly developed economies. If the value of aggregate FIRE sector revenues is sensitive to particular economic policies and macro-economic variables, and one's class position moderates one's ability to capture these revenues both at present and in the future, then it is plausible that FIRE sector employment and class interact to variably increase one's support for policies which protect aggregate FIRE sector revenues. This remains plausible even if one rejects the claim that FIRE sector revenues consist in whole or in part of economic rent.

This study is the first of its kind to empirically analyze the political attitudes of employees in the FIRE sector using nationally representative survey data. In so doing, it makes two primary interventions. First, it demonstrates that those employed in the FIRE sector hold distinct views on a number of key economic issues. Specifically, individuals employed in the

FIRE sector systematically favor policies that plausibly protect FIRE sector revenues. Second, it supplements the traditional scholarly focus on differences between financial and non-financial capitalists by demonstrating attitudinal differences between employees in FIRE and non-FIRE sectors, especially managerial and professional employees. In general, there is more robust evidence for differences between FIRE and non-FIRE segments of the managerial and professional classes than between those segments of the non-professional working class. It is important to emphasize that these results by no means follow obviously from the fact that FIRE sector employees earn higher incomes, since personal income levels are controlled for in these models. Instead, they suggest that one's sector of employment and class position are important factors determining one's policy preferences independent of one's income level.

Given that the FIRE sector wields disproportionate influence over the political process in the UK and elsewhere, these results present a challenge to social democratic parties interested in organizing the broad working class. In particular, social democratic policy goals such as prioritizing full employment over inflation targeting, increasing social services spending, reducing economic inequality, and progressive taxation are likely to face opposition from highly influential FIRE sector fractions of the managerial and professional classes, in addition to the usual opposition from ownership.

Limitations

This study has three primary limitations. First, it would ideally include an analysis of changes in the effects of FIRE sector employment on attitudes over time. Financialization is obviously not a static phenomenon but a process that has intensified over the past several

decades. I fit a number of models which include interactions of time period with class and FIRE sector employment, but given the relatively small number of FIRE sector employees in these data the estimates were too imprecise to conclusively demonstrate either a trend or lack of trend in sectoral differences within any class. However, this study still provides a useful cross-sectional analysis of sectoral fracturing within classes over the recent period of financialization. In particular, since the relative shares of FIRE sector revenues and profits have increased over this period, we should expect that attitudinal differences by sector have as well, in particular among managers and professionals. It would follow that the attitudinal differences between FIRE sector and non-FIRE sector individuals estimated in this study are underestimates of those that obtain today, but additional research is needed to confirm this.

Limited sample sizes also produce a lack of precision in the estimates of FIRE employment effects within classes. This difficulty is compounded by problems associated with appropriately categorizing certain jobs as "managerial." As Goldstein (2012) explains, the decision to classify all "executive, administrative and managerial" occupations as "managers," which I make in this study, is a compromise between the "overly constrictive operationalization of managers as top executive teams, and the overly inclusive supervisory/nonsupervisory classification, which includes low-level supervisors and forepersons who are not engaged primarily in management" (279). However, this categorization likely still excludes many individuals with significant workplace authority and includes many individuals, such as low level administrators, with none. Evidence of attitudinal differences by FIRE sector employment (or a lack thereof) for managers should therefore be treated with some skepticism.

Finally, the nature of cross-sectional data makes it difficult to directly estimate causal effects of FIRE sector employment on political attitudes. The BSA measures many factors that influence both FIRE sector employment and political attitudes but obviously not all of them. As such, this study pursues the more modest goal of determining whether attitudinal differences by sector are consistent or inconsistent with a causal effect of FIRE sector employment by controlling for attitudinal differences along other dimensions of social stratification, including income level, region, sex, age, employment status, class, and racial self-identification. However, given the FIRE sector's immense political power, the results of this study are important for the study of the formation of intra-class solidarity and inter-class coalitions in financialized economies even in the unlikely scenario that the link between FIRE sector employment and attitudes is completely non-causal.

Further Research

Opportunities for further research include, on one hand, extending the analysis to effects of employment in variously "financialized" non-financial industries or firms (Krippner 2011) and, on the other hand, deeper analyses of the precise mechanisms that produce political attitudes. Since data on the political attitudes of individuals employed in highly "financialized" non-financial firms is scarce, research in this area is probably difficult absent better data. And while self-interested income protection is likely one of the mechanisms connecting FIRE sector employment and attitudes, it is almost certainly not the only one. For example, it is unlikely that all managers and professionals in the FIRE sector are equally aware of the nuanced effects of economic policy on financial revenues. One possibility is that certain highly influential actors in

or adjacent to the FIRE sector – such as super-rich investors, executives, or even economists and other scholarly commentators – are acutely aware of such effects and establish certain attitudes as cultural norms that others follow. This kind of hierarchical norm-setting may be imbricated in broader processes of workplace socialization. Alternatively, FIRE sector employees may perform different tasks at work than non-FIRE sector employees, and this may account for some of the former's distinct attitudes. Since prior accounts of task-based political preference formation have largely emphasized variations in autonomy and authority (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014), variations which are largely captured by the class and occupational variables controlled for in this study, it seems unlikely that existing task-based accounts explain all of the sectoral variation in attitudes noted here. Nonetheless, one of the tasks of future research is to more rigorously decompose differentials in FIRE sector and non-FIRE sector attitudes into components related to selection, workplace socialization, task variation, and self-interested income protection.

Further research may also analyze differences between different types of FIRE sector employment. Since the sample sizes of these data are fairly limited, I follow prior research in treating the FIRE sector as a relatively coherent block in order to obtain more statistical power. But while there are obvious similarities between these industries, there are also probably important differences, at least with respect to attitudes. While the results of this study are substantively similar when the real estate industry is excluded from the "FIRE" designation (see Appendix 1.C), the BSA is largely unable to account for heterogeneity among different kinds of finance and insurance firms. This is potentially important because an individual's political attitudes may theoretically depend on how their income is variously composed of interest versus capital gains, for example. In the case of inflation, individuals whose income primarily derives

from capital gains benefit from asset price inflation. In addition, their preferences for a certain level of inflation are confounded by their preferences for certain interest rate levels. Since the survey I analyze in this study does not ask respondents about their views on interest rates or the about the precise composition of their income, I am forced to leaved these fascinating matters to future research.

Chapter 2: Locked Out: The Political Economy of American Homeownership, 1985-2022

Asset prices have increased dramatically in developed Western economies in the past four decades, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, otherwise known as the "Anglosphere." From 1980 to 2023, home prices increased at least sixfold in these countries, ranging from about 6.6 times in the United States to 27.5 times in New Zealand ("Analytical House Prices Indicators" n.d.), while the CPI adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average increased an extraordinary 38 times ("Dow Jones" n.d.). A growing body of literature takes these developments to mean that employment is increasingly irrelevant to the class structure of the "asset economy." Writing from Australia, Adkins, Cooper, and Konings (2020) claim that "the key element shaping inequality is no longer the employment relationship, but rather whether one is able to buy assets that appreciate at a faster rate than both inflation and wages" (5). However, they argue that, "given the shared pathways across Anglo-capitalist societies," this dynamic "has relevance well beyond the specifics of the Australian case" (62). Such proclamations dovetail with those of scholars who argue that industrial capitalism, with its focus on profits from commodity production and the buying and selling of labor power, is being or has already been replaced by a mode of production dominated by economic rent (Christophers 2022; Varoufakis 2024).

While Adkins et al. (2020) argue that the "asset economy" needs a new concept of class "analogous to Marxist and Weberian schemes but that identifies asset ownership as the key distributor and driver of life chances" (62), class analysis – especially in its Marxist variants – is not only concerned with life chances but also with how different forms of economic stratification

shape political attitudes (Wright 2015). Though empirical studies remain limited, there is some evidence that homeowners become less supportive of government redistribution when local home prices rise. For example, Ansell (2014) uses panel data from the 2000-2004 American National Election Studies and finds that support for social security declines among homeowners when home prices in their state or Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) increase. He argues that homeownership and redistributive government programs like social security function as substitutes, since homeowners can hedge against income shocks that are otherwise blunted by government transfers. Homeowners have a number of options unavailable to tenants, including taking on renters, selling their homes, or borrowing against home equity.

For scholars interested in the extent to which asset price inflation has given rise to a new form of class politics, examining how the political attitudes of homeowners and non-owners with similar income levels and job characteristics have changed is a logical starting point, since homeownership is more widespread than other forms of asset ownership. Yet despite decades of rising home prices, little is known about how the political attitudes of these two groups have evolved over this whole period. Even if individual homeowners become less supportive of government redistribution as their home values increase, this does not necessarily mean that homeowners as a group have grown more conservative over time, since newer cohorts of homeowners may be less conservative than those they replace. In other words, cohort churn could dilute or even reverse any emergent "class consciousness" among homeowners at the aggregate level.

In this study, I analyze nationally representative survey data on attitudes toward government redistribution and voting for Republican presidential candidates from the General

Social Survey (GSS) spanning 1985-2022 in the US. I find substantial evidence for a divergence in the attitudes of homeowners and non-owners over this period, with homeowners becoming more likely to oppose government redistribution and vote for Republican presidential candidates relative to non-owners. However, this change is driven at least as much by non-owners becoming less conservative as it is by homeowners becoming more conservative. In line with arguments that non-owners have been "locked out" of the housing market in recent decades (Adkins et al. 2020:75), these findings suggest that exclusion from asset ownership may be fueling political radicalization among non-owners. Furthermore, changes in attitudes by homeownership status are not only or even mostly accounted for by changes within upper employment-based classes or income brackets. On the contrary, I find strong evidence for divergence among those in non-managerial, non-professional occupations and among those earning less than the median income, substantiating the longstanding hypothesis in sociological theory that homeownership fragments working class consciousness, albeit some time after this theory was originally articulated. In fact, the weight of the evidence suggests that attitudinal differences between homeowners and non-owners have grown such that they now rival or exceed those between some of the main employment-based classes of Marxist and Weberian class schemata, i.e., business owners, managers, professionals, and non-professional workers.

Taken together, these results substantiate claims that a new kind of class analysis is needed to contend with the logic of asset inflation. Insofar as a "class" is broadly understood as "a group of people who by virtue of what they possess are compelled to engage in the same activities if they want to make the best use of their endowments" (Elster 1985:331), assigning persons to classes on the basis of traditional criteria – occupation, business ownership, skill,

managerial authority, etc – is no longer sufficient. Asset ownership, at least in its most common form in the US, represents a distinct "endowment" and one that is increasingly salient politically.

Background

As mentioned, asset prices generally and home prices specifically increased faster than inflation and wages in the US in the last several decades. The median sale price of homes increased roughly 6.6 times between 1980 and 2023, while the consumer price index and median wage increased roughly 3.8 times and 4.3 times, respectively. Home prices began to diverge beginning in the mid-1980s, dipped briefly in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, and quickly recovered thereafter, continuing to increase faster than wages and inflation into the 2020s.



Figure 2.1: Change in the relative, nominal value of the consumer price index (red), median home sale prices (green), and median wages (blue) in the US, 1980-2023 ("Quarterly New One-Family" n.d.).

Krippner (2011) places this development in the context of a broader "financialization" of the American economy that began in the late 1970s. In her account, interest rate deregulation through the 1980 repeal of "Regulation Q" was particularly decisive, leading to an increase in the volume of credit available, especially for housing. The emerging market for mortgage-backed securities buttressed the increased demand for housing through a decline in lending standards, setting the stage for the sub-prime mortgage crisis that would occur decades later. Scholars have also pointed to reductions in capital gains taxes since the 1980s in the US and elsewhere in the Anglosphere (Adkins et al. 2020), as well as changes in the behavior of central banks, as factors influencing asset price inflation. In particular, "central banks have come to tolerate and even encourage asset inflation, at the same time as they have been intensely vigilant about wage-push inflation" (Goodhart 2001, cited in Adkins et al. 2020:41). One way that central banks encourage asset price inflation is through "quantitative easing" (QE), or the direct purchase of assets from financial institutions with the aim of stimulating economic growth and/or preventing liquidity crises. Such measures are particularly likely to raise the price of real estate since it is naturally scarce. The demand for housing is also relatively inelastic (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005), and its supply is kept scarce by widespread NIMBYism ("Not In My Backyard") among both self-identified "conservative" and "liberal" homeowners (Marble and Nall 2021). Recent research confirms that multiple rounds of QE during the COVID-19 pandemic were partly responsible for increasing real estate prices (Beraldi and Zhao 2023). Whatever the precise weights that should be ascribed to these mechanisms, home price inflation in excess of inflation

in general was a salient feature of the American economy over the last four decades and shows no signs of slowing today.

Scholars interested in the political attitudes of asset owners have typically focused on homeownership because it is more widespread than other kinds of asset ownership and because it constitutes the single largest source of wealth for most people after excluding social security benefits ("Trends in the Distribution of Family Wealth" 2024). Homeownership rates in the US increased substantially over the course of the 20th century, especially in the 1940s and 50s. While fewer than half of households owned their home in 1940, by 1960 about 62% did ("Historical Census" n.d.). Homeownership rates increased rather modestly after 1960 with around 66% owning by 2023 ("Homeownership Rate" n.d.). What accounts for the slight increase in homeownership rates in recent decades despite the fact that home prices have appreciated faster than wages? Homeowners have taken on increasing amounts of debt. By my calculations, the average mortgage debt outstanding per owner-occupied household more than doubled in real terms between 1985 and 2022.[2] Zavisca and Gerber (2016:353) note that low-income households in particular "often overinvest in homeownership and sell at a real loss," and that the "rise of predatory lending and the devastating effects of foreclosure on families call into question whether average wealth gains justify these inequalities in risk and outcome" (Zavisca and Gerber 2016:353).

2 The total mortgage debt outstanding on residential properties was about $1.57 trillion ($4.27 trillion in 2022 dollars) in the first quarter of 1985 and about $14.9 trillion in the first quarter of 2022 ("Mortgage Debt Outstanding" n.d.). In 1985 there were about 86.8 million households ("Total Households" 2024) and the homeownership rate was about 64% ("Homeownership Rate" n.d.), so there were about 86.8 million * 0.64 = 55.55 million owner-occupied households. According to the same sources, in 2022 there were about 131.2 million households and the homeownership rate was about 65.5%, so there were about 131.2 million * 0.655 = 85.94 million owner-occupied households. Therefore, the average mortgage debt outstanding per owner-occupied household was about $4.27 trillion / 55.55 million = $76,867.69 in 1985 (2022 dollars) and about $14.9 trillion / 85.94 million = $173,376.77 in 2022.

Commentary on the economically burdensome aspects of homeownership and its implications for politics can be traced back to Friedrich Engels' *The Housing Question*, originally published in 1872. Engels writes of homeowners that their "houses and fields are loaded down with mortgages, their harvests belong to their creditors before they are brought in, and it is not they who rule with sovereign power on their "terrain" but the usurer, the lawyer and the bailiff" (1872[1995]). However, Engels further remarks that even if the typical homeowner is not made a capitalist simply by virtue of owning a home, "[t]he worker who owns a little house to the value of a thousand talers is certainly no longer a proletarian" (ibid) either. This is because, as Saunders (1978) argues, "owner-occupation provides access to a highly significant accumulative form of property ownership which generates specific economic interests which differ both from those of the owners of capital and from those of non-owners" (234). Other scholars, largely influenced by Weber's "discussion of classes [as] rooted in the sphere of economic activity as opposed to the relations of production as Marx argued" (Gilderbloom and Markham 1995:1591), consequently posit that homeowners are more politically conservative than non-owners (Rex 1968; Castells 1977), since the former "become parts of the system of capitalist private property relations and thus have a stake in the continuance of the system" (Gilderbloom and Markham 1995:1590). In particular, it is often argued that "political conflict within the working class is heightened and the common class consciousness becomes fragmented" (ibid) with the spread of homeownership.

Until relatively recently, however, little empirical evidence has been brought to bear on this thesis. The earliest empirical studies suggested that while homeownership may encourage voter turnout, it has little to no effect on political attitudes (Gilderbloom and Markham 1995;

Verberg 2000). Research published in the last decade or so indicates stronger evidence for a link between homeownership and conservatism. Ansell (2014) uses panel data from the 2000-2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) and finds a negative effect of increases in home prices at the state and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) levels on homeowner support for social security. Ansell argues that this is because the home acts as a hedge against income losses due to retirement, unemployment, and other events otherwise covered, in part, by the welfare state. Homeowners have a number of options unavailable to tenants in the event of a shortfall in liquidity, including taking on renters, selling their homes, or borrowing against home equity, and these options become more attractive the more the market values of their homes increase or are expected to increase. In turn, government transfers like social security become less important. Additional findings from the UK and several other developed countries indicate that homeowners with more equity in their homes are more opposed to government redistribution than those with less (ibid). André and Dewilde (2016) add additional caveats, arguing that homeownership effects vary across national contexts and age groups. Homeowners in countries where more homes are owned outright, e.g., in much of Southern and Eastern Europe, are more supportive of redistribution than those in countries where mortgage-based homeownership predominates, and older tenants and homeowners are more supportive than their younger counterparts.

Any attempt to assess the changing attitudes of homeowners and non-owners is complicated by additional factors, some of which are fairly specific to the US context. First, home price growth has been heterogeneous across regions of the US and across urban, suburban, and rural areas, and individuals in these areas also have distinct political attitudes (Weakliem and

Biggert 1999; Scala and Johnson 2017). Home prices increased more in the West and Northeast than in the South or Midwest and more in urban and suburban areas than in rural ones. Nevertheless, home prices still increased roughly 6 times from 1980-2023 in the Midwest ("Quarterly New One-Family" n.d.) – the region that saw the least home price growth – and the available data suggest that from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s home price growth in rural areas was only slightly below that in suburban and urban areas (Fuller 2016).

Second, attitudinal differences by asset ownership generally and homeownership specifically are often moderated by income level and employment characteristics. Pagliari, Phillips, and Young (2020) find that asset owners were more likely to support the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 2009 – a major financial sector bailout – than were non-owners and less likely to support the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, but they only observe such differences among middle and upper income earners (672). Similarly, André and Dewilde (2016) find that support for government redistribution diminishes among homeowners and tenants as their income increases. However, they do not present any evidence that support for redistribution among tenants diminishes any more or less rapidly with income than among homeowners, nor that differences in support by homeownership status, overall or by income level, have changed over time. Pratt (1987) finds that homeownership is associated with conservatism in Canada only among white-collar workers while blue-collar workers' political attitudes are tied more to their employment than to their homeownership status. And Harding and Rosenthal (2017) show that when an individual's home increases in value, that individual is more likely to enter into self-employment. Given that the self-employed have distinct political

attitudes (Jansen 2019), attitudinal differences between homeowners and non-owners may vary by self-employment status.

In general, over the same period that home values appreciated, homeowners as a group have changed along other dimensions of social stratification in ways we may expect have affected their political attitudes. The table below summarizes averages of some key demographic variables by homeownership status in 1986 and in 2022 from the General Social Survey ("Get the Data" n.d.).

	Homeowners		Non-owners	
Year	1986	2022	1986	2022
Mean age	49.03	52.49	38.91	42.97
Mean real income	33916.62	49066.14	19867.61	21712.28
Mean birth year	1936.97	1969.51	1947.09	1979.03
Proportion non-professional	0.49	0.46	0.59	0.67
Average years of education beyond high school	0.38	2.65	0.44	1.34
Proportion white	0.90	0.81	0.77	0.59
Proportion East	0.21	0.14	0.19	0.16
Proportion South	0.30	0.42	0.38	0.37
Proportion Midwest	0.30	0.25	0.24	0.19
Proportion Southwest	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.11
Proportion West	0.12	0.13	0.15	0.17

Table 1: Some characteristics of homeowners and non-owners in 1986 and 2022.

Table 2.1 indicates that between 1986 and 2022 the average American homeowner has gotten older, their real income has increased, they're less likely to be a non-managerial, non-professional employee, they've gotten more educated, less white (though only slightly), and have largely moved to the Sunbelt and away from the East coast and Midwest. Over the same period, the average non-owner has also gotten older but remains about 10 years younger than the average homeowner. Their real income has also increased but far less than it has for the average homeowner. By contrast, the average non-owner was *more* likely to be a non-managerial, non-professional employee in 2022 than they were in 1986. They've also gotten more educated but

not as much as homeowners have, and they were less educated than the average homeowner in 2022. The average non-owner has also become substantially less likely to identify as white compared to the average homeowner. Finally, like homeowners, non-owners have largely moved away from the East coast and the Midwest, but unlike homeowners they haven't moved to the (deep) South, instead preferring the West coast and especially the Southwest.

Where does this leave us? To remind the reader, the present study has two main aims, both of which address the broader question of whether asset ownership or employment is the more politically salient basis of economic stratification in the US today. The first is to determine whether or not the political attitudes of American homeowners and non-owners, who are otherwise similar with respect to employment-based class, income level, and other factors that we might expect affect political attitudes, diverged during the era of runaway home price inflation from the mid-1980s to the present. A few of the studies cited above suggest that it is likely homeowners have grown more conservative relative to non-owners, but none have shown this to be the case. Even if findings that individual homeowners become less supportive of certain welfare programs when home prices rise in their area (e.g., Ansell 2014) can be generalized to the entire period in question, political coalitions are mobilized on the basis of group-level characteristics, and homeowners as a group may not have grown more conservative after taking into account cohort churn. For example, insofar as recent homebuyers are more debt-burdened than their predecessors, they may also be less conservative.

And while non-owners have received less attention in the discussion so far, changes in their attitudes likely play a crucial role in this process. The average cost of rent has increased over this period as well, though not quite as rapidly as home prices. Average rental costs in US

cities have more than quadrupled since 1983, outpacing inflation and median wages ("Consumer Price Index" n.d.). Increasing numbers of renters are also moderately or severely cost-burdened, meaning that 30-50% or more than 50% of their income goes to rent, respectively (Colburn et al. 2024). This might further encourage expectations that homeowners have gotten more conservative relative to non-owners, but this needs to be empirically tested.

The second aim is to assess the extent to which changes in attitudes by homeownership status are moderated by employment. While prior research has shown that attitudinal differences between large employment-based classes have remained relatively stable over this period in the US (Wodtke 2017), almost nothing is known about the extent to which political attitudes by homeownership status changed differently within different employment-based classes or whether they have grown larger than those between employment-based classes. Addressing these gaps is important for scholars interested in the extent to which a novel kind of class politics has emerged in economies characterized by home price inflation. It could be the case, for example, that divergent attitudes among homeowners and non-owners in the general population are driven mostly by self-employed and managerial homeowners growing more conservative than non-owners in the traditional working class, in which case homeownership does not so much constitute a novel axis of political differentiation as it accentuates an existing one. While these research questions are primarily historical, the persistence of home price inflation into the present suggests that their relevance to American politics may continue to grow in the years to come.

Data and Measures

I analyze data from the General Social Survey (GSS) covering the period 1985 – the first year that a question about homeownership is asked – to 2022. Surveys are fielded in the following years: 1985-1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years only), 2021, and 2022. The two outcomes I analyze are attitudes toward government redistribution and voting for Republican presidential candidates. While the literature I cite in the previous section primarily focuses on differences in attitudes toward government redistribution, the Republican Party has historically been the major party most opposed to (downward) government redistribution, raising property taxes (which homeowners also tend to oppose (Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen 2015)), and strengthening legal protections for renters. Therefore, we might expect that homeowners and non-owners have diverged in their propensities to vote for Republican presidential candidates. Determining whether or not this is the case helps to reveal the extent to which differences in political attitudes by homeownership status translate to differences in political behavior.

For attitudes toward government redistribution, respondents are asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 7 how much they agree that "Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor," where 1 is "Government should" and 7 is "Government should not."[3] I convert this to a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent answered 5 through 7, roughly indicating mild to strong opposition to government redistribution, and 0 otherwise. As a robustness check, I also fit models that retain the ordinal structure of this variable and report the results in Appendix 2.B (see Figures 2.11 and 2.12).

For voting, respondents are asked who they voted for in the most recent presidential election. I convert this to a binary variable equal to 1 if they said that they voted for the

3 Respondents are not asked this question in 1985.

Republican candidate from that year and 0 if they said that they voted for anyone else. Note that if the survey falls on an election year the GSS does not ask survey respondents who they voted for in that year, so their response about the previous election is recorded.

The main explanatory variable of interest is homeownership. Respondents are asked if they themselves or their family owns or is buying a home, if they pay rent, or if they have some other kind of living arrangement. I create a homeownership dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent said that they themselves or their family owns or is buying a home and 0 if they said anything else.

The other important predictor variable is employment-based class. I use a combination of occupational data and information on self-employment to categorize respondents into classes. The resulting class schema is a simplified version of Wright's (2015) and consists of the following four categories: (1) the self-employed, (2) managerial employees, (3) non-managerial professional and technical employees, and (4) non-managerial, non-professional and non-technical employees. Respondents who report being self-employed are placed in category (1). Respondents who report working for someone else are placed in category (2) if their ISCO-08 occupation code falls under Major Group 1 ("Managers"), category (3) if their ISCO-08 occupation code falls under Major Group 2 or 3 ("Professionals" and "Technicians and Associate Professionals," respectively), and category (4) otherwise.

I use this particular schema not out of a strong theoretical commitment to its particular conceptualization of "class" but because it is parsimonious while still covering most of the employment-based variation in attitudinal differences by asset ownership identified in the literature, including variations across professional and non-professional work and by self-

employment status. In addition, it is has been one of the most influential "Neo-Marxist" class schemas in sociology in recent decades, and as such it is a natural point of comparison. However, I also fit a model with a more fine-grained class schema consisting of (1) employers, (2) self-employed persons without employees, employees in (3) management, business, and financial operations, (4) professions, (5) healthcare support, (6) protective service, (7) food preparation and serving, (8) building and grounds cleaning and maintenance, (9) personal care, (10) sales, (11) administrative support, (12) farming, fishery, and forestry, (13) construction, (14) installation, maintenance, and repair, (15) production, and (16) transportation and material moving. I report results from this model in Appendix 2.B, Figure 6.

Methods

I model each of the outcomes with logistic regressions that take the following general form:

$$log\frac{p_{iq}}{1-p_{iq}}=\eta_{iq}.$$

p_{iq} is the probability that respondent i has a value of one for binary outcome q, and η_{iq} is a linear predictor that can be expressed as either

(1)

$$\eta_{iq}=\beta_{0q}+\beta_{1q}H_i+\boldsymbol{\beta_{2q}C_i}+\beta_{3q}I_i+\beta_{4q}T_i+\beta_{5q}H_iT_i+\boldsymbol{\beta_{6q}C_i}T_i+\beta_{7q}I_iT_i+\boldsymbol{\zeta_q D_i}, \text{ or}$$

(2)

$$\eta_{iq}=\beta_{0q}+\beta_{1q}H_i+\boldsymbol{\beta_{2q}C_i}+\beta_{3q}I_i+\beta_{4q}T_i+\beta_{5q}H_iT_i+\boldsymbol{\beta_{6q}C_i}T_i+\beta_{7q}I_iT_i+\boldsymbol{\beta_{8q}C_i}H_i+\boldsymbol{\beta_{9q}C_i}H_iT_i+\boldsymbol{\zeta_q D_i}.$$

Both models track changes in the attitudes of homeowners and non-owners and control for variables that are likely associated with both homeownership and attitudes, but model (2) allows for heterogeneity in these trends by employment-based class. H_i is a dummy variable indicating homeownership, and $\boldsymbol{C_i}$ is a vector of dummy variables indicating the respondent's four-category employment-based class, with non-managerial, non-professional employees as the reference category. T_i indicates how many years after 1985 the survey was conducted, and I_i is the real income of the respondent. $\boldsymbol{D_i}$ is a vector of control variables for the respondent's marital status, education level, number of children, age, sex, self-identified race, major region of residence within the United States, employment status, and whether they live in an urban, suburban, or rural area. A comparison of many alternative specifications, including generalized additive models (GAMs) with smoothing splines for continuous covariates and models with additional interactions, such as between education and year, suggested few of these more complicated models improved predictive accuracy and none meaningfully altered estimates of differences in attitudes by homeownership. Thus, I focus on results from the relatively simple models shown above. However, since some scholars have expressed skepticism toward logistic regressions, especially for reasons of interpretability (Ai and Norton, 2003; Mood, 2009), I also compute results that use identity rather than logit link functions in models (1) and (2) and report them in Tables 2-5 in the appendix.

In the results section, I report average marginal effects (AMEs) of homeownership over time for each of the political attitudes of interest, as well as average adjusted predictions (AAPs) for homeowners and non-owners separately. AAPs for homeowners and non-owners at time *t* are the responses predicted from model (1) averaged across all observations (regardless of observed

homeownership status) at time time t, adjusted for covariates at their observed values but with the homeownership dummy set to 1 and 0, respectively. The difference between these two values is the AME of homeownership overall at time t. As mentioned, I also present results for how homeowner and non-owner attitudes have changed differently across different employment-based classes. For these results I estimate AMEs using model (2) instead of model (1).

Lastly, I compute absolute kappa indices over time for homeownership and employment-based class with respect to each political attitude. Absolute kappa indices are single number summaries of subgroup differences with respect to an outcome (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Wodtke 2017). They are computed as follows:

$$\kappa = \sqrt{(1/C)\sum_{c=1}^{C}(\pi_c - \bar{\pi}_c)^2}$$

where C is the number of subgroups, π_c is the mean AAP of the outcome for subgroup c (computed using model (1)), and $\bar{\pi}_c$ is the mean of the subgroup means. For homeownership there are two subgroups (homeowners and non-owners) and for employment-based class there are four (the self-employed, managers, non-managerial professional employees, and non-managerial non-professional employees). A larger κ indicates that the subgroups are more polarized with respect to their views on the outcome in question, in this case either attitudes toward government redistribution or Republican voting.

Results

Trends in the Overall Population

Figure 2.2 shows the AMEs of homeownership on the probabilities of opposing government redistribution and voting for Republican presidential candidates in the overall population, adjusted for the controls specified in model (1). Full regression tables are provided in Appendix 2.A, Tables 2.2 and 2.3.



Figure 2.2: Average marginal effects (AMEs) of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates. Confidence intervals are 95%.

Figure 2.2 indicates substantial evidence of a divergence in the attitudes of homeowners and non-owners over this period with respect to both outcomes. In 1986, homeowners and non-owners were basically equally likely to oppose government redistribution, but by 2022 homeowners were about 9.1 percentage points more likely to oppose it. Among voters, homeowners surveyed in 1985 were actually about 4.3 percentage points less likely than non-owners to report voting for the Republican candidate for president, Ronald Reagan, in the 1984 presidential election, but by 2022 homeowners were about 12.3 percentage points more likely

than non-owners to report voting for Donald Trump, the Republican nominee in 2020. Results are substantively similar when the detailed class schema described in the Measures section is used in lieu the four-category class schema (see Appendix 2.B, Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.3 decomposes these trends into AAPs for homeowners and non-owners.



Figure 2.3: Average adjusted predictions (AAPs) by homeownership status of the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates. Confidence intervals are 95%.

Panel A of Figure 2.3 shows that the divergence in attitudes toward government redistribution is explained both by homeowners becoming more likely to oppose it and by non-owners becoming less likely to oppose it. By contrast, Panel B indicates that both groups grew substantially less likely to vote for Republican presidential candidates over the whole period but non-owners did so at a more rapid pace, resulting in homeowners becoming more likely to vote Republican relative to non-owners.

Homeownership, Employment-based Class, and Income

As mentioned, scholars have suggested that asset ownership may interact with employment-based class and/or income to influence individual political attitudes and behavior. The results presented in this section speak to this concern and are produced from model (2) described in the Methods section. Full regression tables are provided in Appendix 2.A, Tables 2.4 and 2.5. Figure 2.4 displays AMEs of homeownership on the two outcomes among just non-managerial, non-professional employees.



Figure 2.4: AMEs of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates among non-managerial, non-professional employees. Confidence intervals are 95%.

There is substantial evidence of divergences with respect to both outcomes, and their magnitudes are very similar to those in the overall population. In other words, homeownership matters for understanding the attitudes of individuals at the bottom of the employment-based class hierarchy and increasingly so. Results are similar for those earning less than the median income (see Appendix 2.B, Figure 2.7).[4] Results for the three other employment-based classes

4 To compute these results, I adjust model (2) to replace the two-way interaction between homeownership and class with a two-way interaction between homeownership and income and the three-way interaction between

are presented in Appendix 2.B, Figures 2.8-2.10. These estimates are too noisy to establish clear evidence of a trend or a lack of trend in attitudes by homeownership status except in the case of voting behavior among professionals, where professional homeowners became more likely to vote Republican over time relative to professional non-owners. However, Table 2.4 in Appendix 2.A indicates that in the linear probability form of model (2) the coefficients associated with the three-way interaction terms are all negative and, in the case of the three-way interaction term between year, homeownership, and professional class status, statistically significant at the 5% level.[5] The same is true of the three-way interaction term between year, homeownership, and managerial class status in the case of voting (see Appendix 2.A, Table 2.5). In other words, attitudes by homeownership status have not only diverged among non-managerial, non-professional workers – they have likely diverged even more within this class than within some others.

How divided are homeowners and non-owners on these issues compared to the employment-based classes? Figure 2.5 below shows the difference in the absolute kappa index for homeownership and the absolute kappa index for employment-based class ($\kappa_H - \kappa_C$) over time with respect to attitudes toward redistribution and voting behavior. A larger difference indicates that homeowners and non-owners are more polarized relative to the self-employed,

homeownership, class, and year with a three-way interaction between homeownership, income, and year.

5 This is also the case in the logit form of the model. However, interpreting coefficients in logistic regressions is not straightforward because the marginal effect of a unit change in any predictor depends on the values of the other predictors.

managers, professionals, and non-professionals.

Figure 2.5: Difference in the absolute kappa indices for homeownership and employment-based class ($\kappa_H - \kappa_C$) over time with respect to (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates. 95% confidence intervals obtained from bootstrapping the difference 100 times.

Figure 2.5 indicates evidence that homeownership has become an increasingly important political cleavage relative to employment-based class over this period. At the beginning of the period, employment-based classes were more polarized with respect to their attitudes toward redistribution and voting than were homeowners and non-owners, but this pattern reversed in the mid-2000s. Homeowners and non-owners in the US today are more polarized with respect to their attitudes on these topics than are the self-employed, managers, professionals and non-professionals, and the evidence is especially robust with regard to voting behavior.

Robustness Checks

As mentioned in the Data and Measures section, the original form of the redistribution outcome is ordinal, which I convert to binary to indicate any degree of opposition to redistribution. In this section, I describe results from a version of model (1) that retains the ordinal structure of the original variable (see Figures 2.11 and 2.12 in Appendix 2.B). Specifically, the modified model (1) is an ordered categorical model with an identity link function and 7 categories, ranging from 1 (maximum approval for redistribution) to 7 (maximum opposition). The purpose of this exercise is to determine whether modeling the outcome as binary results in information loss that meaningfully alters inferences about homeowners and non-owners' degree of support for redistribution over time. For instance, it may be the case non-owners have become less likely to disapprove of redistribution over time only because they've become more likely to give a neutral response to the survey question, i.e., one where they neither approve nor disapprove of government redistribution. Indeed, the results presented thus far are compatible with a world in which non-owners became *more* likely to disapprove of redistribution in the strongest terms but where this shift was outweighed by an increasing tendency to provide a neutral response.

Figures 2.11 and 2.12 in Appendix 2.B indicate that the evidence of attitudinal divergence by homeownership status presented thus far is robust to this alternative specification. The most notable result is that homeowners became both less likely than non-owners to strongly approve of redistribution and more likely to strongly disapprove of it, but the former shift was larger. Analysis of AAPs separately by homeownership status, shown in the B panels of both figures, indicate that homeowners have not shifted much in their propensity to either strongly approve or strongly disapprove of redistribution: divergent attitudes by homeownership status in both cases

are almost entirely a function of non-owners becoming more likely to strongly approve of redistribution and less likely to strongly oppose it. These results affirm that the changing attitudes of non-owners, which have been given far less attention than the attitudes of homeowners in the empirical literature, are an important part of the changing political economy of homeownership in the US.

I also compute results from models which adjust for changes over time by homeownership status in other variables that are likely associated with both homeownership and attitudes, including birth cohort, region, and settlement type, i.e., whether the respondent lives in an urban, suburban, or rural area. These models consist of model (1) with additional two and three-way interactions between homeownership, time, and these other variables. For example, the model which adjusts for region includes an additional two-way interaction between region and time, an additional two-way interaction between region and homeownership, and an additional three-way interaction between region, time, and homeownership. Birth cohort is a categorical variable consisting of four bins: born before 1945, born between 1945 and 1964, born between 1965 and 1979, and born after 1979. These bins roughly correspond to individuals born before the "Baby Boomer" cohort, the "Baby Boomer" cohort, the "Generation X" cohort, and the "Millennial" and later cohorts, respectively. The region variable consists of five regions: East, Midwest, South, Southwest, and West.

Figures displaying the AMEs of homeownership over time with these additional controls can be found in the Appendix 2.B, Figures 2.13-2.15. Evidence of attitudinal divergence by homeownership status in the overall population is robust to these additional controls, providing support that divergent attitudes are related to homeownership specifically and not merely to

changes among other groups that consist disproportionately of homeowners or non-owners. However, estimates of additional three-way interactions are generally too imprecise to determine whether attitudinal divergences by homeownership status were more or less dramatic within specific cohorts, regions, or settlement types.

Conclusion

This chapter makes makes several contributions to the literature on the political economy of homeownership. First, it shows that homeowners and non-owners in the US have diverged with respect to their attitudes toward government redistribution and with respect to their voting behavior over a period when home prices appreciated faster than inflation and wages in the US. In particular, this divergence appears to largely be a function of a decreasing conservatism among non-owners. Furthermore, growing political differences by homeownership status seem to cut across major employment and income-based class distinctions. While the empirical strategy employed here does not allow for the precise estimation of differences in homeownership trends across these groups in every case, it is at least clear that the attitudes of homeowners and non-owners within the largest employment-based class – non-managerial, non-professional employees – have substantially diverged. Lastly, the weight of the evidence suggests that differences in these attitudes by homeownership status exceed those between large employment-based classes in the US today. This was not the case until relatively recently, however, perhaps explaining why many early empirical studies failed to find a difference in attitudes by homeownership status. The upshot of these findings is that scholars interested in the economic

bases of political contestation at present in the US and possibly the broader Anglosphere will find traditional, employment-based class schemata increasingly inadequate to the task.

Limitations

This study's research design is nevertheless limited in a few important respects. First, changes in the attitudes of homeowners and non-owners likely involve multiple mechanisms that this study is unable to fully disentangle. For example, prior research suggests that persistent homeowners grow more opposed to government redistribution when home prices rise, but some of this change at the aggregate level could be offset or strengthened by cohort churn among homeowners. Insofar as recent homebuyers are less conservative than their predecessors, either due to taking on larger amounts of debt or for other reasons, cohort churn could dilute any increasing conservatism among existing homeowners such that homeowners as a group grow less conservative over time than one would otherwise expect. The opposite could also be the case if wealthier, more conservative individuals increasingly select into homeownership. Research from Redfin indicates that around 36% of "Gen Z" and "Millennial" home buyers planned to pay for down payments with cash gifts from their families in 2024, up from 18% in 2019 (Anderson 2024). Insofar as an increasing proportion of new homebuyers come from family wealth and are more conservative as a result, homeowners as a group may be growing more conservative than we'd expect simply based on our knowledge of how individuals' attitudes shift once they own a home. While homeowners are growing more conservative relative to non-owners, this study is unable to determine how much of this is due to the changing attitudes of persistent homeowners

or how much of that change is offset or strengthened by the changing composition of individuals that enter into or exit homeownership.

However, I suggest that even in the unlikely case that the observed associations between homeownership and attitudes are completely explained by selection into homeownership on the basis of attitudes formed prior to homeownership – that is, even if these results are not in some sense caused by the unique economic advantages of homeownership – they are still important to understanding political shifts in the US over the past several decades. This is because the rapidly diminishing affordability of homeownership and widening attitudinal differences between homeowners and non-owners who are otherwise similar with respect to income, education, sex, age, and other factors have likely combined to at least make homeownership an increasingly conspicuous marker of sociopolitical differentiation, even if it is not a cause. Visible group-level differences are, after all, the bases upon which political coalitions are articulated and mobilized (Tajfel and Turner 2001; Achen and Bartels 2016), especially under conditions of increasing inequality (Stewart, McCarty, and Bryson 2020).

Another limitation is that the use of a simple dummy variable for homeownership masks substantial heterogeneity among homeowners in terms of the quality of their housing, its value, its location, and the equity these homeowners have accrued. Unfortunately, the GSS does not contain such detailed homeownership information. It is possible with restricted GSS data to ascertain the state and county of residence of respondents, and this information could be matched to publicly available home price data to estimate the value of a respondent's home at a particular point in time. This is the approach I take in Chapter 3.

Lastly, the outcome variables selected for this study are noisy and non-exhaustive. Survey questions like the one used to construct the redistribution outcome ask respondents to rate their approval for redistribution on a scale of 1 to 7, but since the "1" on this scale corresponds to "the government should" redistribute income and the "7" corresponds to "the government should not," it is unclear if respondents interpret the numbers in between in more or less the same way. While the fact that the substantive trends documented here do not change whether the outcome is ordinal or binary provides some reassurance that measurement problems are not severe, more precisely worded survey questions would allow for more precise and interpretable estimates.

Future Research

The results of this study also suggest a few lines of further research. First, cross-national comparisons between the US and other Anglosphere economies would be illuminating, especially since home prices have appreciated the least in the US out of this group. While it is plausible that political attitudes by homeownership status have diverged even more in these other countries, this cannot be assumed as other countervailing forces may have been at work over this period. Cross-national differences in the availability of public housing, the financialization of homeownership, housing quality, tenants' legal rights, and the broader distribution of wealth and political power, to name just a few factors, all potentially play a role.

Second, it could be the case that the economic advantages of homeownership are mostly explained by the economic advantages of wealth in general. Indeed, it is unclear why the theory of homeownership and the welfare state as substitutes (Ansell 2014) could not apply to other kinds of asset ownership, such as the ownership of stocks and bonds, especially given that stock

prices have increased even more than home prices in the US over this period. On the other hand, homeownership is likely bound up with specific cultural notions of the "American Dream" and citizenship that make it distinct in the formation of political attitudes. The GSS does not furnish information on other kinds of wealth holdings in enough survey waves, but future research could leverage different data to explore heterogeneity in attitudes across individuals with different forms of wealth.

Third, a fuller understanding of the politics of homeownership requires not only analyses of certain political attitudes and voting behavior but also of the kinds of political *leverage* that homeowners and non-owners can exercise. Even if tenants understand their interests as increasingly opposed to those of homeowners, for example, this does not necessarily mean that tenants will be able to form durable institutions capable of actually realizing those interests. Governments clearly have some interest in home price appreciation insofar as it generates tax revenue, giving homeowners leverage in making demands on the state, which is always more or less constrained by the threat of "capital flight." Tenants have no comparable source of leverage and are also a minority in the US, although a large one. While there is some historical evidence that rent strikes can be effective (Lawson 1984), they also have severe limitations, not least the fact that they have fewer legal protections than other forms of collective action like work stoppages (Gowing 2022). I encourage scholars and policy makers interested in the politics of housing and housing justice to study these questions more closely.

Chapter 3: Have Increasing Home Prices Made Homeowners More Conservative? Results from Mixed Models of US States and Counties

Rapidly rising home prices in some countries in the advanced West over the past several decades have prompted social scientists, journalists, and others to pay closer attention to the political economy of homeownership. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some of this work focuses on how homeownership became highly embedded in the economies of these countries through broader processes of "financialization" (Krippner 2011; Kohl 2018). Most of the recent attention in the academy, the popular press, and policy circles, however, has been focused on how supply-side constraints have pushed housing costs upward. Numerous studies argue that restrictive land-use policies like zoning and other regulatory constraints on new construction pushed up home prices in the US over the past 50 years or so, especially in states like California (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005; Quigley and Raphael 2005; Saiz 2010; Klein and Thompson 2025). Figure 3.1 shows how much home prices have increased in each of the 50 states and DC since 1975 and reveals the disproportionately coastal nature of the phenomenon.



Figure 3.1: Growth in the typical value of single-family homes from 1975-2023 in percentage terms. Data from the Federal Housing Finance Authority.

Demand-side explanations have also been given some attention. In particular, scholars have pointed to rising personal incomes, low interest rates, and the expansion of credit markets and household debt as causes of rising home prices (Mian and Sufi 2014; Geng 2018). Combined with supply-side constraints, some argue that these factors are an integral part of the "growth model" of advanced economies (Wood and Stockhammer 2024), and others have argued that this arrangement constitutes a new "regime" of accumulation that has replaced the "Fordist" one premised on expanding industrial production and employment (Boyer 2000; Fernandez and

Aalbers 2016). Much of this work has remained fairly theoretical or even functionalist, however, lacking rigorous empirical explanations of the various mechanisms by which such a "regime" is brought about or maintained.

Studies narrowly focused on the individual political attitudes of homeowners and non-owners have so far proven more convincing than these more theoretical treatments of accumulation regimes. Hall and Yoder (2022) use administrative data on voter turnout in Ohio and North Carolina to show that homeowners are substantially more likely to participate in local politics, especially when zoning issues are on the ballot. Marble and Nall (2021) show that self-identified "liberal" homeowners are just as likely as their "conservative" counterparts to mobilize against new housing construction in their area despite their differing views on national politics. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Ansell (2014) suggests that rising home prices also encourage economic conservatism among homeowners with respect to issues of national import. To recap, Ansell argues that rising home prices diminish homeowners' demands on the welfare state because homeownership acts as a hedge against unemployment and other misfortunes traditionally blunted by government transfers. Homeowners have a number of options unavailable to tenants in the event of a shortfall in liquidity, including taking on renters, selling their homes, or using them as collateral to take out loans, and these options become more attractive the more the market value of their home increases or is expected to increase. By contrast, government transfers like social security become less important.

Adkins, Cooper and Konings (2020) take this argument even further. For them, "the key element shaping inequality is no longer the employment relationship, but rather whether one is able to buy assets that appreciate at a faster rate than both inflation and wages" (5). This is

because, as mentioned, homeowners can use their homes as collateral to receive a home equity line of credit which, if home prices increase sufficiently rapidly, is effectively unlimited. This credit can be used to enter into other asset markets in addition to providing for immediate consumption. This situation is contrasted with that of non-owners "who are unable to graduate from the short temporal horizons of the commodity economy to the longer speculative horizons of the asset economy" (72). However, Adkins et al.'s account provides precious little detail on how common such remortgaging is among homeowners. Sierminska and Takhtamoanova (2012) find that increases in housing wealth have a positive effect on consumption expenditure through home equity credit and capital gains channels, but this effect is quite small. In the US in 2008, the authors estimate that a 1 per cent increase in housing wealth corresponded to only about a 0.03 per cent increase in consumption spending on average.

In addition, results from studies of the effects of increasing home prices on party politics have been more mixed than the previous chapter may have suggested. While Ansell (2014) finds that right-wing governments respond to housing market booms by pushing for more austerity, Beckmann (2019) finds the opposite. Since homeowners' economic situation improves with rising home prices, *ceteris paribus*, and homeowners constitute a large portion of the right wing's electoral base in most countries, Beckmann hypothesizes that right-wing parties shift to the left with rising home prices since they have greater flexibility with which to target undecided voters and the political center. Beckman finds substantial evidence in support of this hypothesis, and his study has the advantage of covering a longer time period than Ansell's (1970-2014 vs. 1975-2001) and more countries (55 vs. 18). This finding suggests that homeowners themselves may also respond to increasing home prices in more nuanced ways. In principle, it is possible that

home price appreciation pushes some homeowners to the left on welfare state redistribution because such homeowners feel that they can "afford" to change their views.

The above findings also leave open the question of whether or not homeowners and non-owners in aggregate have diverged in their support of welfare state policies over the long home price boom of the past 40 years. Even if every homeowner becomes more conservative by virtue of buying a home and accruing equity in it, processes of cohort replacement or changing selection mechanisms into homeownership may offset or augment this process at the macro level. A recent set of papers by Vaisey and co-authors (Vaisey and Lizardo 2016; Kiley and Vaisey 2020; Ochoa and Vaisey 2024) argue that most population-wide attitude change happens via cohort replacement rather than as a result of individuals changing their views over time, although there is some variation by age and the type of attitude in question (e.g. attitudes toward moral vs. legal issues).

This is made more complicated by the fact that homeowners as group have changed over time with respect to several factors that we might expect to affect political attitudes. Homeownership rates for college graduates, for example, increased by about 10 percentage points in the US between 1960 and 2020, while rates among high-school dropouts declined by about 7 percentage points after a modest increase of about 4 percentage points between 1960 and 1990 (Silles 2020). Homeowners have also gotten older. Between 1985 and 2015, homeownership rates declined for all age groups except for those 65 years of age or greater. Homeowners were also less likely to be married and less likely to have kids in 2015 than they were in 1985 (Goodman and Mayer 2018). Young adults who do manage to enter into homeownership increasingly do so by relying on cash gifts from their families in order to afford

a down payment (Anderson 2024). Insofar as individuals from wealthier families increasingly select into homeownership and such individuals tend to have more conservative views, homeowners may be growing more conservative over time. Furthermore, between 1985 and 2015 homeownership rates increased by about 2.5 percentage points for those identifying as "White," by about 5.8 percentage points for those identifying as "Hispanic," and by about 11.6 percentage points for those identifying as "Asian," while declining by about 1.7 percentage points for those identifying as "Black" (Goodman and Mayer 2018). Insofar as political attitudes differ by self-identified race and the racial composition of homeowners is changing over time, homeowner attitudes will also change over time.

The aim of this study is to determine the extent to which rising home prices in the US at the state and county levels over the past several decades have made homeowners less favorable toward government redistribution and, conversely, whether it has made non-owners more favorable. While Ansell's work suggests this is plausible, his 2014 study focuses on a narrow window of US history before the Great Recession of 2008. In addition, while he identifies an average causal effect of home price increases on homeowner conservatism within this window, it is possible that changes in selection processes and/or cohort turnover have moderated differences between the political attitudes of homeowners and non-owners at the population level, even if every individual homeowner becomes more conservative by buying a home and accruing equity in it. Finally, as the brief literature review above makes clear, the demographic makeup of homeowners has changed in a multitude of ways over the past several decades, making it necessary to control for changes in attitudes across other dimensions of social stratification such as educational attainment, age, income, and racial self-identification.

Data and Methods

Data

Like in the previous chapter, I analyze data from the General Social Survey (GSS) covering the period 1986 to 2022 in the US, and the outcome of interest is once again individual attitudes toward government redistribution. To recap, respondents are asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 7 how much they agree that "Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor," where 1 is "Government should" and 7 is "Government should not." I convert this to a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent answered 5 through 7, roughly indicating mild to strong disapproval of government redistribution, and 0 otherwise.

The main explanatory variables of interest are homeownership – an individual-level predictor – and local home prices, which are measured at either the state-year or county-year level. Respondents are asked if they themselves or their family owns or is buying a home, if they pay rent, or if they have some other kind of living arrangement. I create a homeownership dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent said that they themselves or their family owns or is buying a home and 0 if they said anything else.

Unfortunately, there is no publicly available data on home prices at the state or county level going back to 1986. However, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) does provide Housing Price Indices (HPIs) going back this far for states and counties. The FHFA HPI is computed via a weighted average of repeat sales and refinancings on the same, single-family properties, and represents the growth in single-family home prices typical for some geographic area relative to a base year. To approximate typical home prices at the state and county levels

going back to 1986, I combine these HPI data with publicly available, median sale price data from Redfin. While Redfin does not provide home price data going all the way back to 1986, it does provide such data for the years 2012-2023. Since HPIs for the years 1986-2023 are known, home prices for the years 1986-2011 can be estimated. One obvious disadvantage of this approach is that the FHFA HPI only takes into account single-family homes. Insofar as home prices in general and single-family home prices have changed differently within states and counties, the results of this study may be biased. However, insofar as the two prices are highly correlated, this bias may not be substantial.

Figure 3.2 below plots changes in average levels of the dependent variable – disapproval of redistribution – for homeowners and non-owners at the state level against changes in home prices over the period 1986 to 2022. Specifically, the vertical axis indicates by how much the homeowner and non-owner gap in redistribution disapproval changed between two periods: 1986-2003 and 2004-2022. A positive value indicates that this gap was larger in the first period than in the second, i.e. that homeowners disapproved of redistribution more compared to non-owners in the first period compared to the second, while a negative value indicates the reverse. The horizontal axis indicates by how much in percentage terms the FHFA HPI increased in each state compared to 1986. For example, the increase for Washington state is about 731, indicating that the price of a typical single-family home increased by about 7.31 times between 1986 and 2022 in that state (in nominal terms). Some states are excluded because no respondents from those states were surveyed in either of the two periods.



Figure 3.2: Changes in the gap between homeowner and non-owner disapproval of redistribution plotted against changes in home prices over the period 1986 to 2022.

Overall, it appears that states where home prices appreciated more tend to be those where the gap between homeowner and non-owner disapproval of redistribution widened more (or

shrunk less), consistent with Ansell (2014). However, the superimposed correlation line gives equal weight to all represented states, and Figure 3.2 only explores the bivariate relationship between home prices and attitudes (separately by homeownership status). Figure 3.2 also indicates that homeowners and non-owners converged in their attitudes in several states, including in some where home prices increased dramatically like Washington state. In order to get a clearer picture of how changes in home prices at the state and county levels are correlated with changes in individual attitudes toward redistribution, it is necessary to take into account the hierarchical structure of the data with special models and to control for changes in other factors which may affect homeownership and attitudes. My approach to these issues is detailed in the next section.

Methods

I use mixed models with between and within-state differences in the average, (log) real price of homes as predictors and random intercepts at the state-year and state level. These models take the following general form:

$$y_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{ijk} + \beta_2 H_{ijk} + \beta_3 (P_{jk} - \bar{P}_k) + \beta_4 \bar{P}_k + \beta_5 T_{ijk} H_{ijk} + \beta_6 H_{ijk} (P_{jk} - \bar{P}_k) + \beta_7 H_{ijk} \bar{P}_k$$
$$+ \boldsymbol{\zeta_i D_i} + \boldsymbol{\zeta_k \bar{D}_k} + \boldsymbol{\zeta_{jk} (D_{jk} - \bar{D}_k)} + \varepsilon_{ijk} + u_{jk} + v_k$$

$$\varepsilon_{ijk} \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon)$$

$$u_{jk} \sim N(0, \sigma_u)$$

$$v_k \sim N(0, \sigma_v)$$

Where y_{ijk} is a binary outcome indicating whether or not respondent *i* in year *j* and state *k* supports increased government redistribution. The results presented in the next section are not

substantively altered if a logistic regression is used instead of a linear probability model as above. T_{ijk} is the year *i* was surveyed minus 1986 – the first year the survey question about redistribution is asked. H_{ijk} is a dummy variable indicating homeownership. P_{jk} is the average, (log) real price of homes in year j and state k, and $\bar{P}_k$ is the average, (log) real home price in state k over the period 1986-2022. The primary predictor of interest is $P_{jk} - \bar{P}_k$, which represents the "within-state" (i.e., longitudinal) effect of home prices on attitudes toward redistribution, while $\bar{P}_k$ represents the "between-state" (i.e., cross-sectional) effect. Both of these effects are modeled separately for homeowners and non-owners, indicated by their interaction with H_{ijk}.

I also include individual level, between-state, and within-state predictors for a number of controls, indicated by the matrices $\boldsymbol{D_i}$, $\bar{\boldsymbol{D}}_{\boldsymbol{k}}$, and $\boldsymbol{D_{jk}} - \bar{\boldsymbol{D}}_{\boldsymbol{k}}$, respectively. These include, at the individual level, controls for years of education, (log) real income, self-identified "race," age, 16-category class, employment status, marital status, sex, urbanity of the respondent's neighborhood, and number of children. At the state level I control for the average years of education, (log) real income, age, proportion of non-professional, non-managerial workers in the workforce, proportion unemployed, proportion married, proportion living in urban areas, the region of the state (East, South, Midwest, Southwest, and West), and average number of children per individual in that state over the period 1986-2022. At the state-year level I include within-state effects for each of the aforementioned state-level controls, except for region. For example, I include a within-state effect of years of education consisting of the difference between the average years of education in the state-year and the overall state average years of education. The table below summarizes the descriptive statistics for the outcome and each of the predictors.

Variable	Proportions		
Disapproves of Redistribution	No = 0.68, Yes = 0.32		
Homeowner	No = 0.37, Yes = 0.63		
Race	White = 0.79, Black = 0.15, Other = 0.07		
Class	Employer = 0.02, Self-employed (no employees) = 0.09, Manager = 0.1, Professional = 0.19, Healthcare Support = 0.03, Protective Service = 0.02, Food Prep and Serving = 0.05, Building Cleaning and Maintenance = 0.03, Personal Care = 0.02, Sales = 0.08, Administrative Support = 0.15, Agriculture = 0.01, Construction = 0.04, Installation and Repair = 0.03, Production = 0.09, Transportation = 0.05		
Employment Status	Full-time = 0.54, Part-time = 0.11, Unemployed = 0.03, Retired = 0.15, Other = 0.16		
Married	No = 0.5, Yes = 0.5		
Sex	Male = 0.46, Female = 0.54		
Urbanity	Urban = 0.59, Suburban = 0.3, Rural = 0.11		
Region	East = 0.18, Midwest = 0.25, South = 0.36, Southwest = 0.07, West = 0.14		
	Min	**Max**	**Mean**
Real Income	218	155139.9731	33260.92
Age	18	89	46.58
Number of Children	0	8	1.84
Years of Education (0 = 12 years)	-12	8	1.46
Real Income (State Average)	21700.0870506854	48053.4211454656	32679.81
Age (State Average)	39.3555555555556	53.2941176470588	46.7
Number of Children (State Average)	1.36666666666667	2.57101449275362	1.89
Years of Education (State Average)	-0.173838209982788	2.65753424657534	1.15
Proportion Urban (State Average)	0.100840336134454	1	0.6
Proportion Unemployed (State Average)	0.00568181818181818	0.102040816326531	0.04
Proportion Working Class (State Average)	0.35	0.657587548638132	0.52
Proportion Married (State Average)	0.337931034482759	0.677233429394813	0.51
(Log) Real Home Price (State Average)	11.9053313819046	13.517461309709	12.4
Real Income (Within State Change)	-26990.4961454656	64589.0337795344	141.91
Age (Within State Change)	-18.7580359402683	16.6347919216646	0.34
Number of Children (Within State Change)	-1.27586206896552	1.38731884057971	-0.02
Years of Education (Within State Change)	-3.68330464716007	3.71746575342466	0.16
Proportion Urban (Within State Change)	-0.816046966731898	0.749552772808587	0
Proportion Unemployed (Within State Change)	-0.102040816326531	0.278538812785388	0
Proportion Working Class (Within State Change)	-0.35	0.491166077738516	-0.01
Proportion Married (Within State Change)	-0.643356643356643	0.477386934673367	-0.02
(Log) Real Home Price (Within State Change)	-0.573611309199853	0.643407337917473	0.01

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the outcome (redistribution disapproval) and predictors at the individual, state, and state-year level.

The "mixed" structure of the model is accounted for by the random state-year and state level intercepts u_{jk} and v_k. These are assumed to be normally distributed, although mixed effects models are highly robust to violations of this assumption, especially with regard to estimation of the fixed effects, which are of primary interest here (Schielzeth et al. 2020). Models with between and within-group effects as well as random intercepts are sometimes called "correlated random effects" models (Woolridge 2019). Such models have been used to, for example, determine the extent to which individual trust is explained by within and between state (county) differences in inequality (Fairbrother and Marin 2013) and to examine the effect of changing inequality at the country level on individual attitudes toward inequality (Wiesner 2025). While these models account for correlations between observations nested within the same groups and adjust standard errors to reflect this dependency, such adjustments may fail in the presence of autocorrelation (Fairbrother and Marin 2013). Tests for autocorrelation among state-years suggest that it is insubstantial for all but 2 of the 51 states and territories, those being West Virginia and Wisconsin. In those states autocorrelation is mildly significant at the second and first lags, respectively. Since across all states autocorrelation is weak to non-existent, I chose to retain the simplicity of the above model by not modeling autocorrelation explicitly.

Since it may be the case that changes in attitudes are more closely linked to county level rather than state level changes in home prices, I also fit a version of the above model with the same predictors at the county and county-year levels instead of at the state and state-year levels. In addition, I include county and county-year random effects instead of their state and state-year equivalents (i.e., every subscript k in the above specification is interpreted as a county rather than a state). The results I describe in the next section do not substantively change if the analysis

is run at the state or county level, except that, because county data is only available from 1993 onward, estimates are less precise. I provide a full regression table for the county level results in Appendix 3.

Results

The results of the state level mixed model are displayed in the table below. The model was fit using restricted maximum likelihood and the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2025).

Fixed Effects	**Estimate**
Intercept	-0.216 (0.562)
Year – 1986	4.333E-05 (8.120E-04)
Homeowner	-0.628 (0.312)*
(Log) real home price (between-state)	0.005 (0.043)
(Log) real home price (within-state)	-0.025 (0.044)
Years of education – 12	0.010 (0.002)**
(Log) real income	0.043 (0.005)**
Black	-0.130 (0.011)**
Other "race"	-0.076 (0.015)**
Age	0.001 (3.163E-04)**
Self-employed (no employees)	0.008 (0.028)
Manager	0.002 (0.028)
Professional	-0.064 (0.027)*
Healthcare support	-0.018 (0.034)
Protective service	-0.030 (0.038)
Food prep and serving	-0.074 (0.031)*
Building cleaning and maintenance	-0.050 (0.033)
Personal care	-0.039 (0.037)
Sales	-0.021 (0.029)
Administrative support	-0.026 (0.028)
Agriculture	-0.077 (0.049)
Construction	-0.065 (0.032)*
Installation and repair	-0.041 (0.034)
Production	-0.066 (0.029)*
Transportation	-0.070 (0.031)*
Works part-time	0.014 (0.013)
Unemployed	-0.010 (0.021)
Retired	0.015 (0.014)
Other employment situation	0.024 (0.011)*
Married	0.015 (0.009)
Female	-0.072 (0.008)**

Suburban	0.011 (0.009)
Rural	-0.002 (0.015)
Number of children	0.005 (0.003)
Education (within-state)	-0.020 (0.009)*
Real income (within-state)	1.474E-06 (8.317E-07)
Age (within-state)	-0.002 (0.002)
Proportion non-professional (within-state)	-0.114 (0.061)
Proportion unemployed (within-state)	-0.032 (0.163)
Proportion married (within-state)	-0.117 (0.055)*
Proportion urban (within-state)	0.037 (0.024)
Number of children (within-state)	0.044 (0.018)*
Midwest	0.013 (0.017)
South	0.046 (0.016)**
Southwest	0.027 (0.026)
West	0.045 (0.023)*
Education (between-state)	0.015 (0.022)
Real income (between-state)	-2.658E-06 (2.288E-06)
Age (between-state)	-0.005 (0.003)*
Proportion non-professional (between-state)	0.278 (0.188)
Proportion unemployed (between-state)	0.282 (0.663)
Proportion married (between-state)	0.217 (0.160)
Proportion urban (between-state)	0.066 (0.033)*
Number of children (between-state)	0.010 (0.045)
*(Year – 1986) * Homeowner*	0.002 (7.403E-04)**
*(Log) real home price (between-state) * Homeowner*	0.051 (0.025)*
*(Log) real home price (within-state) * Homeowner*	-0.104 (0.051)*
Random Effects	
Intercept (state-year)	0.044326
Intercept (state)	0.001050
Individual error	0.450925

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.2: Mixed-model regression table at the state level.

The relevant parts of Table 3.2 can be interpreted as follows. First, the last three rows of the table indicate that most of the variation in individual attitudes toward redistribution is explained by individual level differences, followed by state-year level differences. Between-state differences account for a relatively minuscule proportion of the total variation.

Second, there is little evidence of between or within-state effects of home prices on the attitudes of non-owners, indicated by the fourth and fifth rows of the fixed effects section, but strong evidence for homeowners, indicated by the last two rows of the fixed effects section. However, while the between-state estimate for homeowners is positive, the within-state estimate is negative. In other words, while homeowners in states with higher average home prices are more likely to disapprove of redistribution, within states there is a negative correlation between increases in home prices above the state average and redistribution disapproval among homeowners. Specifically, a 100% increase in the average home price (i.e. a doubling) above the overall state average is associated with about an 11 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of disapproving of redistribution among homeowners. The results do no substantively change if the analysis is conducted at the county level, although estimates are less precise (see Table 3.3 in Appendix 3). The results are also similar if locales with extreme home price growth like California and DC are excluded from the sample, if nominal home prices are used instead of real home prices, if year dummy variables are used instead of a linear term, or if a random slope model where the "within-state" effect of changes in home prices is allowed to vary randomly by state is fit instead. In the random slope version of the model, the variation in the within-state effect for homeowners across states is not very substantial and strictly negative for all states, ranging from about -0.145 in Texas to about -0.11 in Oregon.

Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that homeowners have still gotten more likely to disapprove of redistribution relative to non-owners over the period, indicated by the third to last row of the fixed effects section. This coefficient, about 0.002, represents the expected residual change in homeowner disapproval, relative to non-owners, of redistribution associated with each

passing year, after accounting for changes in home prices and other controls. To get an idea of how this residual trend affects the relative attitudes of homeowners and non-owners over time while simultaneously accounting for changes in home prices at the state level, we can plot the average adjusted predictions (AAPs) of redistribution support for homeowners and non-owners over time. AAPs are simply the average predicted outcomes for each respondent, accounting for their covariates at their observed values except that their homeownership dummies are set to 1 or 0. These AAPs are shown in the figure below.



Figure 3.3: Changes in the average adjusted predictions of redistribution disapproval over time for homeowners (red) and non-owners (blue). Confidence intervals are 95%.

Figure 3.3 indicates that, on average, individuals who are similar in terms of their educational attainment, income, sex, racial self-identification, state of residence, the year they were surveyed, and other factors but differ by homeownership status diverged in their attitudes toward redistribution over the past several decades. Specifically, homeowners grew more likely to disapprove of it, while non-owners did the opposite. This is the case despite the fact that, as Table 3.2 shows, homeowners tended to disapprove of redistribution *less* the more real home prices in their area appreciated, which happened in every state over this period.

Conclusion

Scholars have hypothesized that rising home prices make homeowners less likely to support redistribution, but none have determined whether this is the case in the US over the long home price boom that began in the 1980s and continues through to the present. I address this gap in the literature by fitting mixed models to survey data on homeowner and non-owner attitudes toward redistribution over the period 1986-2022. These data are matched with survey respondents' states and counties of residence, which are in turn matched with estimates of typical real home prices at these regional levels over time. My methodological approach allows for the decomposition of redistribution attitudes into components explained by individual, state-year, and state level predictors. Specifically, between-state (county) and within-state (county) differences in (log) real home prices predict redistribution attitudes differently for homeowners and non-owners after accounting for individual level controls and between/within-state (county) differences in average levels of these controls.

While I find that homeowners living in states with higher average home prices are more likely to disapprove of redistribution, I do not find substantial evidence that changes in home prices within states predict higher levels of redistribution disapproval among homeowners. In fact, I find the opposite: increases in home prices within states predict decreased disapproval of redistribution among homeowners. The sign of this point estimate is preserved when models are fit to county-level data, but the evidence is less robust. By contrast, there is little evidence that home prices predict the redistribution attitudes of non-owners either cross-sectionally or longitudinally at the state or county levels. This is not to say that changes in home prices have no effect on non-owners' redistribution attitudes, only that such effects cannot be detected with this approach and these data.

Finally, even though the evidence suggests that homeowners become less likely to disapprove of redistribution when home prices in their state or county appreciate over this whole period, I still find that the attitudes of homeowners and non-owners have diverged overall. Specifically, homeowners became more likely to disapprove of redistribution, and non-owners with similar education, income, and demographic characteristics became less likely to disapprove of it. This is a puzzle: what, if not rapidly increasing home prices, accounts for this divergence? Some of the studies cited in the introduction suggest some potential mechanisms, but I leave their empirical verification or refutation to further research. First, it is possible that at the individual level, increases in home prices produce decreased support for redistribution among homeowners but that cohort replacement and/or changing levels of selection into homeownership on the basis of prior political dispositions offset this effect over the period in question. Second, it could be the case that even though homeowners are less supportive of redistribution for the

reasons posited in the literature, increasing home prices benefit them so much economically that they can "afford" to shift their views further to the left. Either way, this study makes clear that the relationship between home prices and homeowner attitudes is not as straightforward as is sometimes claimed, at least in the US, and that further research is needed to grasp the changing political economy of homeownership there.

Conclusion

This dissertation attempts to reconnect two scholarly conversations – one concerning class and the other concerning financialization – that have, for the most part, developed along separate trajectories. It does so by offering both empirical evidence and theoretical reflections on how financialization reshapes the terrain of class politics in contemporary capitalist democracies, with particular attention to the United Kingdom and the United States. Drawing on a range of large-scale survey data, this project shows that financialization is not merely a sectoral reshuffling within capitalism but a transformation that touches everyday life and recalibrates the axes along which political attitudes are formed. Importantly, it calls into question the continued sufficiency of employment-based definitions of class with respect to explaining political attitudes while recognizing that employment-based distinctions are still import in this regard, and it demonstrates that asset ownership – particularly in the form of homeownership – has become a salient political divide in its own right.

To briefly summarize, Chapter One documents how individuals employed in the FIRE sector are systematically more likely to support policy positions that align with the protection of financial revenues, even after accounting for their above average incomes. Moreover, this support is not uniform across employment-based class positions: professionals and managers in FIRE industries are significantly more inclined to adopt these attitudes than their non-professional counterparts. These findings demonstrate that financialized capitalism fragments the British working class not just with respect to professional credentials and workplace authority, as Wright (1985) argued, but also along sectoral lines, further undermining solidarities that might otherwise support redistributive coalitions. It also implies that the influence of finance on class

politics is not reducible to questions of inequality between capital and labor, but includes more nuanced cleavages within labor itself, mediated by the economic logic of financial accumulation.

The second chapter turns from the workplace to the household, investigating how asset ownership outside employment – in this case, homeownership – has become a powerful determinant of political attitudes in the US. The analysis finds that differences in redistributive preferences and voting behavior between homeowners and non-owners have grown over time, particularly among lower-income and non-professional workers. These results complicate some of the traditional class maps used by sociologists. Insofar as the concept of "class" is meant to capture the shared constraints and strategies of individuals given their economic positions, homeownership – which ties individuals to novel forms of credit access, wealth accumulation, and economic security – must be understood as a defining feature of class membership today, at least in the US.

The second chapter leaves open the question of why homeownership has become increasingly determinative of political attitudes, however. The last chapter tests one widely cited hypothesis linking homeownership to political conservatism: the idea that rising home prices reduce demand for redistribution among homeowners by offering an alternative form of economic security. While this chapter confirms the results of chapter two after taking into account changes home prices at the state and county levels – that is, that homeowners and non-owners have diverged in their redistributive preferences – the expected link between rising local home prices and homeowner conservatism does not hold up under scrutiny. This surprising result raises new questions about the underlying mechanisms through which financialized homeownership shapes political attitudes. One the one hand, processes of cohort replacement or

changing levels of selection into homeownership may counteract the conservatizing effects of rising home prices. On the other hand, the key to the politics of homeownership may not lie so much in its material benefits as in the symbolic status it confers, or in how broader institutional processes align asset ownership with particular political imaginaries.

Taken together, these findings challenge both the dominant narratives in contemporary class analysis and the conventional wisdom in financialization studies. On the one hand, they call for a renewed attention to class as a dynamic and evolving construct – one that must account not only for relations of production but also for relations of asset ownership and financial dependence. In so doing they impel scholars to heed Max Weber's warning cited in this dissertation's epigraph, namely that "[a]ttempts to determine the 'genuine', 'true' meaning of historical concepts recur incessantly, but are always incomplete" (Weber 2004[1904], p. 398). As sociologists we must constantly modify and refine our concepts, not because our old concepts fail to capture the "true" nature of social life but because social life is always changing.

This project is, of course, not exhaustive. It leaves open a number of avenues for future research. For instance, further work is needed to understand the political orientations of renters, mortgagors, and outright homeowners across diverse national contexts, inside and outside the Anglosphere. Similarly, questions remain about how class-based solidarities might be rearticulated in financialized societies: can debtors organize across class lines? Can tenants develop collective identities akin to those once fostered in industrial workplaces? These are questions that go beyond the bounds of this dissertation but will be essential for understanding the future of class politics in a world increasingly defined by finance.

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Appendices

Appendix 1.A: Sample Sizes

	N	Years Covered
Spending	65066	1983-1987,1989-1991,1993-2019
Inflation	15708	1983-1987,1989-1991,1993-1995
Income Inequality	58668	1983-1987,1989-1990,1993-1995,1997-2004,2006-2010,2012-2013,2015,2017-2019
Taxes	27291	1983,1986-1987,1989-1990,1994-1996,1998-1999,2001,2006,2009,2016,2019

Table 1.2: Number of respondents with data by outcome

Appendix 1.B: Measurement of Controls

Basic Controls

Race/ethnicity categories are "black," "white," "asian," and "other." Educational attainment is measured in the form of age groups at which the respondent left full-time education. These consist of 15 or younger, 16, 17, 18, 19+, "Still in school," and "Still in college/university." Income is imputed based on the midpoint of the respondent's income bracket and corrected for inflation. The number and bounds of these brackets changes by survey wave. For respondents in the top, open-ended income bracket, a Pareto approximation is used to compute their income. Countries of residence include England, Scotland, and Wales. Employment status includes full-time, part-time, unemployed, other (non-retired), and retired. Detailed information on gender is not available so sex (Male or Female) is used instead. The respondent is listed as owning a home if they own one outright or are paying off a mortgage. Categories for workplace size include no employees, less than 10, 10-24, 25-99, 100-499, and 500+.

Controls for Unemployment Rates and Skill Specificity

Detailed occupations are coded at the ISCO88-2d level and matched with British Labor Force Survey data for each year in order to compute occupational unemployment rates. Industry unemployment rates are computed for each year for the following 15 category industry schema which closely matches the NACE 1 digit level schema used in Rehm (2009), and matched with British Labor Force Survey data for each year.

1. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining

2. Manufacturing
3. Public Utilities
4. Construction
5. Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles
6. Transport and storage
7. Accommodation and food service
8. Information and communications
9. Finance, insurance, and real estate
10. Professional, scientific, and technical services
11. Administration and support services
12. Public administration, defense, and compulsory social security
13. Educational services
14. Health and social work services
15. Other services

Skill specificity is also calculated for each year in the same way as in Rehm (2009), with the modification that "corporate managers" and "managers of small enterprises" in the ISCO88-2d schema are combined into one "managers" category. This is necessary because the British Labor Force Surveys do not provide detailed enough occupational data to distinguish these kinds of managers.

Appendix 1.C: Regression Tables

	Estimate		
Model	Logit	LPM	LPM (no real estate)
Variable			
Intercept	-1.4599	0.1521	0.153
	(0.9139)	(0.2133)	(0.2134)
Professional	0.1575	0.0367	0.0371
	(0.0315)**	(0.0074)**	(0.0073)**
Non-Professional	-0.034	-0.0086	-0.0072
	(0.0298)	(0.007)	(0.007)
FIRE	-0.2977	-0.0691	-0.0653
	(0.0806)**	(0.019)**	(0.02)**
Female	0.0172	0.0044	0.0044
	(0.0185)	(0.0043)	(0.0043)
Left School at 16 yo	-0.015	-0.0037	-0.0037
	(0.0242)	(0.0057)	(0.0057)
Left School at 17 yo	-0.0116	-0.0028	-0.0027
	(0.0343)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Left School at 18	0.0407	0.0095	0.0095
	(0.0338)	(0.0079)	(0.0079)
Left School at 19+	0.0992	0.0232	0.0234
	(0.0306)**	(0.0071)**	(0.0071)**
Still in School	0.2777	0.0643	0.0641
	(0.15)	(0.0354)	(0.0354)
Still in College/University	0.331	0.0778	0.0776
	(0.0784)**	(0.0182)**	(0.0182)**
Black	-0.3742	-0.088	-0.0885
	(0.0602)**	(0.0141)**	(0.0141)**
Asian	-0.7209	-0.1676	-0.1674
	(0.049)**	(0.0112)**	(0.0112)**
Other Race	-0.2941	-0.0695	-0.0695
	(0.0757)**	(0.0178)**	(0.0178)**
Age	0.0617	0.0146	0.0146
	(0.003)**	(0.0007)**	(0.0007)**
Age^2	-0.0006	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0)	(0)	(0)
log(Income)	-0.0458	-0.011	-0.0114
	(0.1786)	(0.0417)	(0.0417)
log(Income)^2	0.0015	0.0004	0.0004
	(0.009)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)
Occupational Unemployment Rate	-0.4531	-0.0916	-0.0947
	(0.2921)	(0.0684)	(0.0684)
Skill Specificity	0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0049)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)
Industry Unemployment Rate	0.0612	0.0718	0.0745
	(0.5059)	(0.1188)	(0.1183)
Workplace < 10 Employees	0.5997	0.144	0.1438
	(0.2139)**	(0.0508)**	(0.0508)**

10-24 Employees	0.6055	0.1452	0.1452
	(0.214)**	(0.0508)**	(0.0508)**
25-99 Employees	0.6152	0.1476	0.1477
	(0.2136)**	(0.0507)**	(0.0507)**
100-499 Employees	0.642	0.1539	0.1541
	(0.2136)**	(0.0507)**	(0.0507)**
500+ Employees	0.6588	0.1578	0.1581
	(0.2139)**	(0.0508)**	(0.0508)**
Scotland	0.1395	0.0323	0.0324
	(0.0293)**	(0.0068)**	(0.0068)**
Wales	0.0964	0.0226	0.0226
	(0.0377)*	(0.0088)*	(0.0088)*
London	0.0092	0.0023	0.0022
	(0.0312)	(0.0073)	(0.0073)
Part-Time	0.1057	0.0249	0.0249
	(0.0285)**	(0.0067)**	(0.0067)**
Unemployed	0.3137	0.073	0.073
	(0.0427)**	(0.0099)**	(0.0099)**
Other Employment Status	0.2523	0.0587	0.0587
	(0.0276)**	(0.0064)**	(0.0064)**
Retired	0.08	-0.0183	-0.0182
	(0.0366)*	(0.0085)*	(0.0085)*
Homeowner	-0.0642	-0.015	-0.0149
	(0.0206)**	(0.0048)**	(0.0048)**
Private Sector	-0.1671	-0.0404	-0.0404
	(0.0225)**	(0.0053)**	(0.0053)**
Suburbs	-0.0784	-0.0182	-0.0181
	(0.0385)*	(0.009)*	(0.0089)*
Small City/Town	-0.1093	-0.0254	-0.0254
	(0.0396)**	(0.0092)**	(0.0092)**
Country Village/Town	-0.1271	-0.0296	-0.0296
	(0.0507)*	(0.0118)*	(0.0118)*
Countryside	-0.2207	-0.0518	-0.0519
	(0.0903)*	(0.0211)*	(0.0211)*
*Professional * FIRE*	-0.1041	-0.0239	-0.0327
	(0.1118)	(0.0262)	(0.028)
*Non-Professional * FIRE*	0.3522	0.0833	0.0743
	(0.096)**	(0.0226)**	(0.0239)**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.3: Regression table for attitudes toward social services spending. Three models are compared: logistic regression (Logit), a linear probability model with the same covariates (LPM), and a linear probability model with the same covariates that excludes employees in real estate (LPM No Real Estate).

	Estimate		
Model	Logit	LPM	LPM (no real estate)
Variable			
Intercept	-1.7325	0.2113	0.2065
	(2.2144)	(0.4847)	(0.4848)
Professional	-0.2137	-0.0452	-0.0447
	(0.0758)**	(0.0164)**	(0.0164)**
Non-Professional	-0.1899	-0.0399	-0.0408
	(0.0689)**	(0.0147)**	(0.0146)**
FIRE	0.6055	0.1106	0.1147
	(0.2221)**	(0.0422)**	(0.0437)**
Female	-0.0414	-0.0085	-0.0087
	(0.0429)	(0.0094)	(0.0094)
Left School at 16 yo	0.1501	0.033	0.0327
	(0.0503)**	(0.0111)**	(0.0111)**
Left School at 17 yo	0.2899	0.0632	0.0631
	(0.0745)**	(0.0161)**	(0.0161)**
Left School at 18	0.2962	0.0643	0.0641
	(0.0812)**	(0.0176)**	(0.0176)**
Left School at 19+	0.0288	0.0064	0.0063
	(0.0726)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Still in School	0.4719	0.0983	0.0983
	(0.6882)	(0.1405)	(0.1405)
Still in College/University	-0.1195	-0.0289	-0.0283
	(0.277)	(0.0613)	(0.0613)
Black	-0.5183	-0.1196	-0.119
	(0.1678)**	(0.0373)**	(0.0373)**
Asian	-0.2695	-0.0613	-0.0611
	(0.1507)	(0.0339)	(0.0339)
Other Race	-0.3213	-0.074	-0.0743
	(0.2761)	(0.0627)	(0.0627)
Age	-0.0363	-0.0076	-0.0076
	(0.007)**	(0.0015)**	(0.0015)**
Age^2	0.0004	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0001)**	(0)	(0)
log(Income)	0.3082	0.0479	0.0493
	(0.4572)	(0.1)	(0.1)
log(Income)^2	-0.0053	-0.0002	-0.0002
	(0.0237)	(0.0052)	(0.0052)
Occupational Unemployment Rate	-0.2363	-0.0374	-0.0345
	(0.6488)	(0.1351)	(0.1351)
Skill Specificity	-0.0588	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.0293)*	(0.0065)*	(0.0065)*
Industry Unemployment Rate	0.8505	0.1938	0.2053
	(1.0524)	(0.2341)	(0.2338)
Workplace < 10 Employees	0.1356	0.0293	0.0292
	(0.2506)	(0.0551)	(0.0551)

10-24 Employees	0.0262	0.0057	0.0054
	(0.251)	(0.0552)	(0.0552)
25-99 Employees	-0.0574	-0.0134	-0.0137
	(0.2497)	(0.055)	(0.055)
100-499 Employees	0.0922	0.0197	0.0195
	(0.2497)	(0.0549)	(0.0549)
500+ Employees	0.0182	0.0037	0.0032
	(0.251)	(0.0552)	(0.0552)
Scotland	-0.1054	-0.0243	-0.0244
	(0.0627)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)
Wales	0.0549	0.0122	0.0122
	(0.0829)	(0.0181)	(0.0181)
London	0.1031	0.0214	0.0216
	(0.0634)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)
Part-Time	0.0303	0.0054	0.0054
	(0.0661)	(0.0147)	(0.0147)
Unemployed	-0.4145	-0.1014	-0.1014
	(0.0822)**	(0.0184)**	(0.0184)**
Other Employment Status	0.2646	0.0581	0.058
	(0.0583)**	(0.0128)**	(0.0128)**
Retired	0.3817	0.08	0.0799
	(0.0766)**	(0.0164)**	(0.0164)**
Homeowner	0.1063	0.0234	0.0232
	(0.0436)*	(0.0096)*	(0.0096)*
Private Sector	-0.0487	-0.0104	-0.0107
	(0.051)	(0.0111)	(0.0111)
Suburbs	0.1595	0.035	0.0349
	(0.1049)	(0.0235)	(0.0235)
Small City/Town	0.1605	0.0351	0.0351
	(0.0889)	(0.0199)	(0.02)
Country Village/Town	0.1627	0.0355	0.0354
	(0.1154)	(0.0257)	(0.0258)
Countryside	0.3352	0.0718	0.0718
	(0.1349)*	(0.0291)*	(0.0291)*
*Professional * FIRE*	-0.4569	-0.0777	-0.1073
	(0.3494)	(0.072)	(0.0766)
*Non-Professional * FIRE*	-0.5229	-0.0918	-0.0863
	(0.2419)*	(0.0471)	(0.0489)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.4: Regression table for attitudes toward inflation. Three models are compared: logistic regression (Logit), a linear probability model with the same covariates (LPM), and a linear probability model with the same covariates that excludes employees in real estate (LPM No Real Estate).

	Estimate		
Model	Logit	LPM	LPM (no real estate)
Variable			
Intercept	12.1287	1.8198	1.8151
	(1.3236)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Professional	-0.3403	-0.0411	-0.0402
	(0.0466)**	(0.0054)**	(0.0053)**
Non-Professional	-0.3013	-0.0362	-0.0356
	(0.0441)**	(0.0051)**	(0.0051)**
FIRE	0.4135	0.0701	0.0866
	(0.1025)**	(0.0141)**	(0.0149)**
Female	-0.0238	-0.0024	-0.0023
	(0.0285)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)
Left School at 16 yo	0.0873	0.01	0.01
	(0.038)*	(0.0041)*	(0.0041)*
Left School at 17 yo	0.0788	0.0093	0.0092
	(0.0528)	(0.0058)	(0.0058)
Left School at 18	0.0018	-0.0001	0
	(0.0524)	(0.0057)	(0.0057)
Left School at 19+	-0.0848	-0.0095	-0.0096
	(0.0477)	(0.0051)	(0.0051)
Still in School	0.0497	0.0068	0.0068
	(0.1882)	(0.0223)	(0.0223)
Still in College/University	-0.0672	-0.0079	-0.0078
	(0.1178)	(0.0133)	(0.0133)
Black	-0.2376	-0.021	-0.0209
	(0.1014)*	(0.0097)*	(0.0097)*
Asian	0.4257	0.0508	0.0508
	(0.064)**	(0.0077)**	(0.0077)**
Other Race	-0.029	-0.0033	-0.0033
	(0.1179)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)
Age	-0.043	-0.0049	-0.0049
	(0.0044)**	(0.0005)**	(0.0005)**
Age^2	0.0004	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)
log(Income)	-2.7788	-0.3286	-0.3277
	(0.2589)**	(0.0301)**	(0.0301)**
log(Income)^2	0.1498	0.0177	0.0176
	(0.013)**	(0.0015)**	(0.0015)**
Occupational Unemployment Rate	-0.3222	-0.0343	-0.035
	(0.5456)	(0.0562)	(0.0562)
Skill Specificity	0.0137	0.0014	0.0014
	(0.0073)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)
Industry Unemployment Rate	1.6562	0.1838	0.1819
	(0.8387)*	(0.0925)*	(0.0921)*
Workplace < 10 Employees	-0.5213	-0.0823	-0.082
	(0.2832)	(0.0397)*	(0.0397)*

10-24 Employees	-0.5034	-0.08	-0.0799
	(0.2834)	(0.0397)*	(0.0397)*
25-99 Employees	-0.5387	-0.0837	-0.0835
	(0.2828)	(0.0396)*	(0.0396)*
100-499 Employees	-0.5905	-0.0894	-0.0893
	(0.2829)*	(0.0396)*	(0.0396)*
500+ Employees	-0.5647	-0.087	-0.087
	(0.2834)*	(0.0397)*	(0.0397)*
Scotland	-0.2474	-0.0237	-0.0237
	(0.0491)**	(0.0049)**	(0.0049)**
Wales	-0.1613	-0.0164	-0.0164
	(0.0619)**	(0.0063)**	(0.0063)**
London	0.1171	0.0141	0.0141
	(0.0461)*	(0.0052)**	(0.0052)**
Part-Time	-0.0398	-0.0031	-0.0032
	(0.046)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)
Unemployed	0.0536	0.0055	0.0055
	(0.0665)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)
Other Employment Status	0.1691	0.0187	0.0187
	(0.0422)**	(0.0046)**	(0.0046)**
Retired	-0.0796	-0.0092	-0.0093
	(0.0568)	(0.0061)	(0.0061)
Homeowner	0.0652	0.0069	0.0069
	(0.0322)*	(0.0034)*	(0.0034)*
Private Sector	0.1309	0.0134	0.0135
	(0.0354)**	(0.0038)**	(0.0038)**
Suburbs	0.0603	0.0064	0.0064
	(0.0595)	(0.0064)	(0.0064)
Small City/Town	0.0547	0.0061	0.0061
	(0.0622)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)
Country Village/Town	0.1042	0.0115	0.0115
	(0.0732)	(0.0079)	(0.008)
Countryside	0.2527	0.0301	0.0302
	(0.1028)*	(0.0119)*	(0.0119)*
*Professional * FIRE*	-0.1132	-0.0337	-0.0508
	(0.1474)	(0.0192)	(0.0204)*
*Non-Professional * FIRE*	-0.45	-0.0748	-0.0944
	(0.1315)**	(0.0167)**	(0.0177)**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.5: Regression table for attitudes toward income inequality. Three models are compared: logistic regression (Logit), a linear probability model with the same covariates (LPM), and a linear probability model with the same covariates that excludes employees in real estate (LPM No Real Estate).

	Estimate		
Model	Logit	LPM	LPM (no real estate)
Variable			
Intercept	-15.1766	-2.0731	-2.0678
	(1.6964)	(0.313)	(0.313)
Professional	0.2452	0.0463	0.0455
	(0.0545)**	(0.0105)**	(0.0105)**
Non-Professional	0.1309	0.0246	0.0245
	(0.0519)*	(0.0098)*	(0.0097)*
FIRE	-0.423	-0.0767	-0.095
	(0.1496)**	(0.0275)**	(0.0293)**
Female	-0.2275	-0.0435	-0.0436
	(0.0325)**	(0.0062)**	(0.0062)**
Left School at 16 yo	-0.0036	-0.0042	-0.0041
	(0.0406)	(0.0079)	(0.0079)
Left School at 17 yo	-0.0542	-0.0145	-0.0144
	(0.0583)	(0.0112)	(0.0112)
Left School at 18	0.1093	0.0163	0.0166
	(0.0596)	(0.0112)	(0.0112)
Left School at 19+	0.2232	0.0355	0.0356
	(0.0533)**	(0.0101)**	(0.0101)**
Still in School	0.1095	0.0247	0.0244
	(0.3323)	(0.0569)	(0.0569)
Still in College/University	0.0695	0.0195	0.0195
	(0.1556)	(0.0271)	(0.0271)
Black	-0.3351	-0.058	-0.0582
	(0.1166)**	(0.021)**	(0.021)**
Asian	-0.5195	-0.0826	-0.0826
	(0.1036)**	(0.0175)**	(0.0175)**
Other Race	-0.1324	-0.0217	-0.0221
	(0.151)	(0.0263)	(0.0263)
Age	0.0323	0.0061	0.0061
	(0.0054)**	(0.001)**	(0.001)**
Age^2	-0.0003	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0001)**	(0)	(0)
log(Income)	3.0138	0.5045	0.5035
	(0.342)**	(0.0624)**	(0.0624)**
log(Income)^2	-0.1627	-0.0272	-0.0272
	(0.0174)**	(0.0032)**	(0.0032)**
Occupational Unemployment Rate	1.5346	0.2642	0.2626
	(0.6404)*	(0.1156)*	(0.1154)*
Skill Specificity	-0.0093	-0.0017	-0.0017
	(0.0062)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)
Industry Unemployment Rate	-2.9674	-0.5499	-0.5646
	(0.9514)**	(0.185)**	(0.1839)**
Workplace < 10 Employees	0.2459	0.0606	0.0603
	(0.2614)	(0.0548)	(0.0548)

10-24 Employees	0.2412	0.0602	0.0601
	(0.2617)	(0.0548)	(0.0548)
25-99 Employees	0.2979	0.0703	0.0703
	(0.2608)	(0.0547)	(0.0547)
100-499 Employees	0.2906	0.069	0.0691
	(0.2608)	(0.0547)	(0.0547)
500+ Employees	0.3231	0.0753	0.0757
	(0.2615)	(0.0548)	(0.0548)
Scotland	0.2329	0.0445	0.0446
	(0.0507)**	(0.0098)**	(0.0098)**
Wales	0.0056	0.0023	0.0022
	(0.0637)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)
London	0.028	0.0028	0.0028
	(0.0531)	(0.0104)	(0.0104)
Part-Time	-0.0615	-0.0105	-0.0104
	(0.0498)	(0.0094)	(0.0094)
Unemployed	-0.0393	-0.0062	-0.0061
	(0.0727)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)
Other Employment Status	-0.0708	-0.0134	-0.0132
	(0.0469)	(0.0091)	(0.0091)
Retired	0.0666	0.0149	0.015
	(0.0616)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Homeowner	0.0096	0.0015	0.0016
	(0.0352)	(0.0068)	(0.0068)
Private Sector	-0.1385	-0.0276	-0.027
	(0.0396)**	(0.0076)**	(0.0076)**
Suburbs	-0.0936	-0.0168	-0.0166
	(0.0595)	(0.0114)	(0.0115)
Small City/Town	-0.124	-0.0226	-0.0224
	(0.07)	(0.0136)	(0.0136)
Country Village/Town	-0.0891	-0.0164	-0.0161
	(0.0794)	(0.0159)	(0.0159)
Countryside	-0.1175	-0.0219	-0.0218
	(0.1264)	(0.0247)	(0.0248)
*Professional * FIRE*	0.0238	0.0116	0.0246
	(0.2321)	(0.0416)	(0.045)
*Non-Professional * FIRE*	0.3694	0.0674	0.08
	(0.1719)*	(0.0321)*	(0.0341)*

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.6: Regression table for attitudes toward taxes. Three models are compared: logistic regression (Logit), a linear probability model with the same covariates (LPM), and a linear probability model with the same covariates that excludes employees in real estate (LPM No Real Estate).

Appendix 1.D: Average Adjusted Predictions



Figure 1.5: AAPs of responding that the government should tax and spend more on social services, overall, by class, and by FIRE sector employment (blue = FIRE, red = non-FIRE).



Figure 1.6: AAPs of responding that the government should prioritize reducing inflation over unemployment, overall, by class, and by FIRE sector employment (blue = FIRE, red = non-FIRE).



Figure 1.7: AAPs of responding that income differences are fine as they are now or too small, overall, by class, and by FIRE sector employment (blue = FIRE, red = non-FIRE).



Figure 1.8: AAPs of responding that taxes on the rich are too low or fine as they are now, overall, by class, and by FIRE sector employment (blue = FIRE, red = non-FIRE).

Appendix 2.A: Tables

Variable	Estimate (Logit)	Estimate (LPM)
(Intercept)	-1.579 (0.094)**	0.151 (0.019)**
Year	0.003 (0.003)	7.52e-04 (5.81e-04)
Age	0.005 (0.002)**	0.001 (3.15e-04)**
Suburban	-0.003 (0.040)	-9.36e-04 (0.008)
Rural	-0.081 (0.061)	-0.017 (0.013)
Married	0.124 (0.041)**	0.025 (0.008)**
Number of children	0.023 (0.013)	0.005 (0.003)*
Years of education beyond high school	0.054 (0.007)**	0.011 (0.001)**
Self-employed	0.469 (0.095)**	0.104 (0.020)**
Manager	0.375 (0.129)**	0.085 (0.028)**
Professional	0.137 (0.074)	0.027 (0.015)
Homeowner	-0.045 (0.071)	-0.013 (0.014)
Female	-0.322 (0.038)**	-0.067 (0.008)**
Black	-0.777 (0.071)**	-0.136 (0.012)**
Other	-0.509 (0.075)**	-0.098 (0.014)**
Midwest	0.165 (0.057)**	0.032 (0.011)**
South	0.325 (0.053)**	0.066 (0.011)**
Southwest	0.382 (0.080)**	0.079 (0.017)**
West	0.287 (0.061)**	0.057 (0.013)**
Part-time	0.062 (0.059)	0.014 (0.012)
Unemployed	-0.237 (0.108)*	-0.038 (0.020)
Retired	0.056 (0.068)	0.014 (0.014)
Other	0.102 (0.054)	0.022 (0.011)*
Real income	9.94e-06 (1.20e-06)**	2.28e-06 (2.57e-07)**
*Year * Self-employed*	-0.016 (0.005)**	-0.003 (9.71e-04)**
*Year * Manager*	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.001)
*Year * Professional*	-0.007 (0.003)*	-0.001 (7.11e-04)
*Year * Homeowner*	0.013 (0.003)**	0.003 (6.60e-04)**
*Year * Real income*	-2.08e-07 (4.81e-08)**	-4.66e-08 (1.03e-08)**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.2: Regression table for model (1), in both its logit and linear probability model (LPM) forms, applied to attitudes toward government redistribution. Reference categories for categorical variables with more than two categories are as follows: urban/suburban/rural (urban), class (non-managerial, non-professional employee), race (white), region (East), employment status (full-time).

Variable	**Estimate (Logit)**	**Estimate (LPM)**
(Intercept)	-0.336 (0.091)**	0.416 (0.019)**
Year	-0.014 (0.003)**	-0.002 (6.02e-04)**
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-2.39e-04 (2.91e-04)
Suburban	0.098 (0.036)**	0.022 (0.008)**
Rural	0.144 (0.053)**	0.032 (0.011)**
Married	0.186 (0.037)**	0.041 (0.008)**
Number of children	0.058 (0.011)**	0.012 (0.002)**
Years of education beyond high school	-0.027 (0.007)**	-0.006 (0.001)**
Self-employed	0.350 (0.088)**	0.083 (0.019)**
Manager	0.331 (0.115)**	0.078 (0.025)**
Professional	0.300 (0.066)**	0.069 (0.014)**
Homeowner	-0.198 (0.069)**	-0.035 (0.014)*
Female	-0.216 (0.034)**	-0.046 (0.007)**
Black	-2.632 (0.090)**	-0.430 (0.011)**
Other	-0.718 (0.079)**	-0.163 (0.016)**
Midwest	0.218 (0.049)**	0.048 (0.010)**
South	0.621 (0.047)**	0.134 (0.010)**
Southwest	0.440 (0.069)**	0.097 (0.015)**
West	0.025 (0.055)	0.002 (0.012)
Part-time	-0.052 (0.054)	-0.012 (0.011)
Unemployed	-0.089 (0.105)	-0.014 (0.021)
Retired	-0.068 (0.057)	-0.015 (0.012)
Other	0.110 (0.049)*	0.025 (0.010)*
Real income	7.68e-06 (1.05e-06)**	1.75e-06 (2.22e-07)**
*Year * Self-employed*	-0.012 (0.004)**	-0.003 (8.73e-04)**
*Year * Manager*	-0.015 (0.005)**	-0.003 (0.001)**
*Year * Professional*	-0.018 (0.003)**	-0.004 (6.31e-04)**
*Year * Homeowner*	0.022 (0.003)**	0.004 (6.45e-04)**
*Year * Real income*	-2.28e-07 (4.15e-08)**	-5.18e-08 (8.74e-09)**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.3: Regression table for model (1), in both its logit and linear probability model (LPM) forms, applied to voting for Republican presidential candidates. Reference categories for categorical variables with more than two categories are as follows: urban/suburban/rural (urban), class (non-managerial, non-professional employee), race (white), region (East), employment status (full-time).

Variable	**Estimate (Logit)**	**Estimate (LPM)**
(Intercept)	-1.518 (0.102)**	0.164 (0.020)**
Year	-4.35e-04 (0.004)	1.11e-04 (6.65e-04)
Homeowner	-0.140 (0.093)	-0.034 (0.018)
Self-employed	0.427 (0.181)*	0.088 (0.038)*
Manager	0.202 (0.249)	0.042 (0.052)
Professional	-0.050 (0.131)	-0.013 (0.026)
Age	0.005 (0.002)**	0.001 (3.15e-04)**
Suburban	-0.002 (0.040)	-8.72e-04 (0.008)
Rural	-0.082 (0.061)	-0.017 (0.013)
Married	0.122 (0.041)**	0.024 (0.008)**
Number of children	0.023 (0.013)	0.005 (0.003)
Years of education beyond high school	0.054 (0.007)**	0.011 (0.001)**
Female	-0.321 (0.038)**	-0.067 (0.008)**
Black	-0.777 (0.071)**	-0.136 (0.012)**
Other	-0.507 (0.075)**	-0.098 (0.014)**
Midwest	0.166 (0.057)**	0.032 (0.012)**
South	0.327 (0.053)**	0.066 (0.011)**
Southwest	0.383 (0.080)**	0.079 (0.017)**
West	0.286 (0.061)**	0.057 (0.013)**
Part-time	0.062 (0.059)	0.014 (0.012)
Unemployed	-0.234 (0.108)*	-0.037 (0.020)
Retired	0.056 (0.068)	0.014 (0.014)
Other	0.102 (0.054)	0.022 (0.011)*
Real income	9.87e-06 (1.20e-06)**	2.26e-06 (2.58e-07)**
*Year * Homeowner*	0.018 (0.004)**	0.004 (8.43e-04)**
*Year * Self-employed*	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.002)
*Year * Manager*	2.13e-04 (0.012)	-2.49e-04 (0.002)
*Year * Professional*	0.005 (0.006)	7.78e-04 (0.001)
*Homeowner * Self-employed*	0.072 (0.211)	0.027 (0.044)
*Homeowner * Manager*	0.246 (0.288)	0.064 (0.061)
*Homeowner * Professional*	0.268 (0.155)	0.060 (0.031)
*Year * Real income*	-2.04e-07 (4.81e-08)**	-4.54e-08 (1.03e-08)**
*Year * Homeowner * Self-employed*	-0.002 (0.010)	-7.09e-04 (0.002)
*Year * Homeowner * Manager*	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.003)
*Year * Homeowner * Professional*	-0.016 (0.007)*	-0.003 (0.001)*

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.4: Regression table for model (2), in both its logit and linear probability model (LPM) forms, applied to attitudes toward government redistribution. Reference categories for categorical variables with more than two categories are as follows: urban/suburban/rural (urban),

class (non-managerial, non-professional employee), race (white), region (East), employment status (full-time).

Variable	**Estimate (Logit)**	**Estimate (LPM)**
(Intercept)	-0.295 (0.103)**	0.426 (0.021)**
Year	-0.014 (0.004)**	-0.002 (7.28e-04)**
Homeowner	-0.247 (0.094)**	-0.046 (0.019)*
Self-employed	0.102 (0.197)	0.026 (0.042)
Manager	0.203 (0.238)	0.056 (0.050)
Professional	0.292 (0.126)*	0.063 (0.026)*
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-2.53e-04 (2.91e-04)
Suburban	0.096 (0.036)**	0.021 (0.008)**
Rural	0.141 (0.053)**	0.031 (0.011)**
Married	0.186 (0.037)**	0.041 (0.008)**
Number of children	0.057 (0.011)**	0.012 (0.002)**
Years of education beyond high school	-0.026 (0.007)**	-0.006 (0.001)**
Female	-0.217 (0.034)**	-0.046 (0.007)**
Black	-2.635 (0.090)**	-0.430 (0.011)**
Other	-0.721 (0.079)**	-0.164 (0.016)**
Midwest	0.218 (0.049)**	0.048 (0.010)**
South	0.618 (0.047)**	0.133 (0.010)**
Southwest	0.441 (0.069)**	0.097 (0.015)**
West	0.026 (0.055)	0.003 (0.012)
Part-time	-0.053 (0.054)	-0.012 (0.011)
Unemployed	-0.088 (0.105)	-0.014 (0.021)
Retired	-0.064 (0.057)	-0.014 (0.012)
Other	0.112 (0.049)*	0.026 (0.010)*
Real income	7.61e-06 (1.05e-06)**	1.73e-06 (2.22e-07)**
*Year * Homeowner*	0.022 (0.004)**	0.004 (8.70e-04)**
*Year * Self-employed*	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.002)
*Year * Manager*	0.008 (0.011)	8.84e-04 (0.002)
*Year * Professional*	-0.024 (0.006)**	-0.005 (0.001)**
*Homeowner * Self-employed*	0.309 (0.219)	0.070 (0.046)
*Homeowner * Manager*	0.143 (0.269)	0.025 (0.057)
*Homeowner * Professional*	0.017 (0.145)	0.008 (0.030)
*Year * Real income*	-2.26e-07 (4.15e-08)**	-5.13e-08 (8.76e-09)**
*Year * Homeowner * Self-employed*	-0.001 (0.011)	-3.01e-04 (0.002)
*Year * Homeowner * Manager*	-0.025 (0.013)*	-0.005 (0.003)
*Year * Homeowner * Professional*	0.007 (0.007)	9.24e-04 (0.001)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.5: Regression table for model (2), in both its logit and linear probability model (LPM) forms, applied to voting behavior. Reference categories for categorical variables with more than

two categories are as follows: urban/suburban/rural (urban), class (non-managerial, non-professional employee), race (white), region (East), employment status (full-time).

Appendix 2.B: Figures

Figure 2.6: Average marginal effects (AMEs) of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates, controlling for the respondent's 16 category class. Confidence intervals are 95%.



Figure 2.7: Average marginal effects (AMEs) of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates among individuals earning less than the median income in each year. Confidence intervals are 95%.

Figure 2.8: Average marginal effects (AMEs) of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates among the self-employed. Confidence intervals are 95%.



Figure 2.9: Average marginal effects (AMEs) of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates among managerial employees. Confidence intervals are 95%.



Figure 2.10: Average marginal effects (AMEs) of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates among non-managerial professional employees. Confidence intervals are 95%.

Figure 2.11: (A) Average marginal effects (AMEs) of homeownership on and (B) corresponding average adjusted predictions (AAPs) by homeownership status of the probability of responding with maximum agreement ("1") that the government should redistribute income.



Figure 2.12: (A) Average marginal effects (AMEs) of homeownership on and (B) corresponding average adjusted predictions (AAPs) by homeownership status of the probability of responding with maximum disagreement ("7") that the government should redistribute income.



Figure 2.13: AMEs of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates, adjusted for birth cohort fixed effects (born before 1945, born between 1945 and 1964, born between 1965 and 1979, born after 1979), their interaction with homeownership, and their interaction with homeownership and year.



Figure 2.14: AMEs of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates, adjusted for region fixed effects (East, Midwest, South, Southwest, West), their interaction with homeownership, and their interaction with homeownership and year.



Figure 2.15: AMEs of homeownership on the probability of (A) disapproving of government redistribution and (B) voting for Republican presidential candidates, adjusted for settlement type fixed effects (urban, suburban, or rural), their interaction with homeownership, and their interaction with homeownership and year.

Appendix 2.C: Measurement of Control Variables

Race/ethnicity categories are "black," "white," and "other." Educational attainment is measured in years of education completed, which I center around 12. Controls for income refer to the respondent's real household income at the time of survey converted to 1986 dollars. Possible regions of residence include "East," consisting of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; "Midwest," consisting of Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; "South," consisting of Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas; "Southwest," consisting of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico; and "West," consisting of Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii. Work status consists of full-time, part-time, unemployed, retired, and other. Marital status consists of "married" on the one hand and anything else on the other, including those who are widowed, divorced, separated, or have never married. Sex consists of male and female. For information on how father's "socioeconomic index" is measured, see Hout, Smith, and Marsden (2015). Finally, respondents are classified as living in an "urban" area if they live in one of the 100 most populated Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) or in a county with a town of 10,000 or more people; "suburban" if they live in a suburb of one of the 100 most populated SMSAs; or "rural" if they live in a county with no town of 10,000 or more people.

Appendix 3: Regression tables

Fixed Effects	Estimate
Intercept	-0.058 (0.241)
Year – 1986	-0.003 (9.810E-04)**
Homeowner	-0.159 (0.216)
(Log) real home price (between-county)	-0.019 (0.017)
(Log) real home price (within-county)	-0.032 (0.048)
Years of education – 12	0.007 (0.002)**
(Log) real income	0.040 (0.006)**
Black	-0.118 (0.015)**
Other "race"	-0.067 (0.017)**
Age	0.002 (4.083E-04)**
Self-employed (no employees)	0.044 (0.036)
Manager	0.025 (0.035)
Professional	-0.030 (0.034)
Healthcare support	0.037 (0.043)
Protective service	0.006 (0.046)
Food prep and serving	-0.053 (0.039)
Building cleaning and maintenance	-0.054 (0.042)
Personal care	8.711E-04 (0.046)
Sales	-0.007 (0.036)
Administrative support	-0.005 (0.035)
Agriculture	-0.076 (0.065)
Construction	-0.047 (0.040)
Installation and repair	-0.003 (0.043)
Production	-0.029 (0.037)
Transportation	-0.057 (0.039)
Works part-time	0.013 (0.016)
Unemployed	-0.001 (0.026)
Retired	-0.002 (0.017)
Other employment situation	0.025 (0.014)
Married	0.012 (0.011)
Female	-0.080 (0.010)**

Suburban	-0.013 (0.019)
Rural	-0.064 (0.028)*
Number of children	0.005 (0.003)
Education (within-county)	-0.002 (0.007)
Real income (within-county)	2.643E-07 (4.827E-07)
Age (within-county)	1.331E-04 (0.001)
Proportion non-professional (within-county)	-0.029 (0.038)
Proportion unemployed (within-county)	-0.132 (0.092)
Proportion married (within-county)	0.004 (0.039)
Proportion urban (within-county)	-0.013 (0.030)
Number of children (within-county)	0.002 (0.012)
Midwest	0.044 (0.016)**
South	0.076 (0.015)**
Southwest	0.064 (0.023)**
West	0.070 (0.018)**
Education (between-county)	-0.013 (0.009)
Real income (between-county)	9.867E-07 (6.850E-07)
Age (between-county)	0.002 (0.001)
Proportion non-professional (between-county)	0.036 (0.061)
Proportion unemployed (between-county)	0.075 (0.125)
Proportion married (between-county)	0.149 (0.050)**
Proportion urban (between-county)	-0.007 (0.025)
Number of children (between-county)	0.006 (0.016)
*(Year – 1986) * Homeowner*	0.002 (0.001)
*(Log) real home price (between-county) * Homeowner*	0.012 (0.018)
*(Log) real home price (between-county) * Homeowner*	-0.068 (0.060)
Random Effects	
Intercept (county-year)	0.051616
Intercept (county)	0.018621
Individual error	0.453740

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.3: Mixed-model regression table at the county level.