

The withdrawal will not be televised: Examining United States-led “cordial”
military withdrawals from 1958 to 2020

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Abstract

International Relations scholars frequently study the causes and consequences of war, but seldom how states' armed forces operate during peacetime. This thesis addresses this gap by analyzing cordial withdrawals— military withdrawals undertaken by two partner states during peacetime conditions. Its causal factors, and how their importance has shifted from the Cold War unipolar order to the post-Cold War bipolar order are understudied by scholarly literature, which focuses on phenomena and withdrawal cases adjacent to cordial withdrawals, but not on cordial withdrawals themselves. Through archival analysis of 32 cordial withdrawal cases from 1958 to 2020, and a process tracing examination of the 1971 U.S. withdrawal from South Korea, my research found that deploying state factors are the most prevalent factors in cordial withdrawals overall, as said factors have the most direct impact on the deployed forces in question. Furthermore, there was an increase in cordial withdrawals in the post-Cold War period, as the U.S. both had reduced geopolitical competition abroad, and empowered inwards-looking domestic political actors, leading to deploying state factors being that period's leading factors. By contrast, Cold War withdrawals were led by a mix of host and deploying state factors. These findings highlight the importance of cordial withdrawals, particularly as the U.S. seeks to strategically pivot to Asia while reassuring its allies in Europe. Understanding how cordial withdrawals work demonstrates how the U.S. manages commitments and credibility as geopolitical conditions change.

Introduction

In September 2024, the United States announced it would scale down its troop presence in Iraq and move towards a “bilateral security partnership,” including a withdrawal of the remaining U.S. troops in the Middle Eastern state by the end of 2026. This was the conclusion of a negotiations process that began in January 2024 in response to changing U.S. posture in the Middle East, and a subsequent bilateral agreement in which both sides hoped to help alleviate historical distrust of U.S. forces in the region by the Iraqi people.¹ The United States, which has seen its forces present in Iraq from the 2003 invasion onwards, had its two decades of presence in Iraq not marked by a bang, but a very diplomatic whimper.

Three months later, the United States began withdrawing its Marines forces from Okinawa, Japan to Guam. The plan would see a gradual phase out of 9,000 of the 19,000 Marines currently stationed there. This was a move agreed upon by both the Japanese and American government. In contrast, for sectors of Japanese and Okinawan civil society, this was a landmark victory after decades of campaigning against U.S. military presence in the small island since the end of World War II.² The decision for the U.S. to reduce its presence was not led by conflict, but rather a 2012 agreement between Tokyo and Washington. Even in the longstanding relationship between the two states, there was room for restructuring.

Japan and Iraq could not have any more different contemporary relationships with the United States: The former marked by a longstanding alliance with shared political, economic and security interests and bilateral civil society trust; the latter marked by two wars and one occupation in the last five decades, which has morphed into a post-occupation strategic, yet

¹ Copp, Tara, and Qassim Abdul-Zahra. “US Troops Will Leave Some longstanding Bases in Iraq under Deal.” *AP*, 27 Sept. 2024,

<https://apnews.com/article/iraq-us-troops-military-withdrawal-iran-a79aa83dca8f776f87a138bfe5697fa3>.

² Yamaguchi, Mari. “US Marines Start Partial Transfer from Okinawa in Japan to Guam.” *AP News*, 14 Dec. 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/japan-us-military-marines-okinawa-guam-realignment-84ba9050bc77c49ac76a2c4eabdb9ffb>.

cautious, partnership.³ Yet, no matter the differences, in 2024, it was the pen, not the sword, that led to the drawdown of U.S. forces in both countries. Two distinct cases, but with a shared pattern of peacetime military withdrawal, which simultaneously received minimal headlines or analysis on their causal factors. In Iraq and Japan, unlike Afghanistan, these historic withdrawals will not be televised.

From the beginning of the Cold War up through the 21st century, alliance politics have often involved the deployment of military forces into a host country, a staple of the foreign policy of the world's leading military power, the United States. According to the Chicago Council of Foreign Affairs, as of September of 2022, the United States maintained 750 military bases around the world in over 80 different countries.⁴ Yet, foreign military deployments are not a fixed phenomenon. Partial or even full withdrawals of troop deployments are likely to happen as host and deploying state conditions change over time. In many cases, due to the nature of these deployments, these “conditions” mainly come in the form of armed conflict, but not all military withdrawals originate from conflict. One such type are “cordial” withdrawals, which are partial or total withdrawals done between two partner states during peacetime conditions (meaning, the event has no relation to the start or end of an armed conflict), as were the cases in Japan and Iraq. Such withdrawals involve a deploying state, the state with the foreign military presence, and a host state, the state that is hosting the deploying state's forces.

These examples raise important questions involving peacetime military withdrawals. In this thesis I explore the dynamics of cordial withdrawals through two research questions: First,

³ CFR.org Editors. “The U.S.-Japan Alliance.” *Council on Foreign Relations*, 3 May 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-alliance>; Hamasaheed, Sarhang. “Baghdad Is Ready for a New Chapter in U.S.-Iraq Relations.” *United States Institute of Peace*, 25 Apr. 2024, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/baghdad-ready-new-chapter-us-iraq-relations>.

⁴ O'Dell, Hope. “The US Is Sending More Troops to the Middle East. Where in the World Are US Military Deployed?” *The Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, 25 Oct. 2023, <https://globalaffairs.org/bluemarble/us-sending-more-troops-middle-east-where-world-are-us-military-deployed>.

what are the most important causal factors behind cordial withdrawals? Second, how has the relative hierarchy of importance of the causal factors behind cordial withdrawals evolved as geopolitical circumstances have changed? While the current data shows the salience of the effects of political causes, there is a lack of consensus on what factors have the greatest impact on whether a cordial withdrawal is enacted or not, how these factors should be categorized, and how has this relative hierarchy of importance evolved over time. Furthermore, the unaddressed effects of the global transition of international politics from a bipolar system to a unipolar system after the end of the Soviet Union's superpower status in 1989, and its eventual dissolution in 1991, has not been properly addressed yet either.⁵ This raises the importance of not only analyzing cordial withdrawals as a specific phenomena in international relations, but to also dissect its underlying causal factors and conditions.

In this thesis I offer an explanation as to the causes of cordial cordial withdrawals, and the evolution of its causal factors as geopolitical conditions evolve. Cordial withdrawals have a set of causal factors, coming from both the deploying and host factors, that are responsive to the evolution of geopolitical conditions. Hence, in bipolar and unipolar moments we will see deploying and host state causal factors, respectively, having comparatively higher presences in the relative hierarchy of factor importance in each period. Furthermore, in periods of unipolarity, there will be an increased number of cordial withdrawals due to the lack of a peer competitor to balance in the geopolitical theater. Lastly, analysis of both media and government documentation will reinforce the justifications in accepting and rejecting causal factors behind cordial withdrawals.

⁵ Nadkarni, Vidya. "Bipolarism and Its End, From the Cold War to the Post-Cold War World." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. April 30, 2020. Oxford University Press, <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-325>.

To demonstrate these claims, I explore a two-pronged empirical framework: First, an archival analysis of 32 cordial withdrawal cases with the United States as the deploying state through media coverage. Each analyzed case will produce its causal factors and help build the factor hierarchy of importance, both in the pre-1989 and post-1989 buckets (the bipolar and unipolar moments, respectively), and the overall cases combined. Second, a process tracing of U.S. government documentation from the 1971 U.S. cordial withdrawal from South Korea, so as to underscore how government officials think of the factors surrounding cordial withdrawals.

The data from these two stages reveal a mixed image in regards to my argument. Archive analysis found deploying state factors to be the most widely present factors of all cordial withdrawal cases combined, while there was also an increase in cordial withdrawals from the pre-1989 bipolar moment to the post-1989 unipolar moment. However, pre-1989 cases were not primarily driven by either deploying or host state factors, while post-1989 cases were primarily driven by deploying state, not host state, factors. Lastly, process tracing was effective to provide reasoning for both the factors present and absent for the U.S. withdrawal from South Korea in 1971, helping alleviate some of the coverage gaps of the archive analysis stage. In turn, cordial withdrawals are more effectively understood through a two stage analysis process.

Cordial withdrawals matter as they are an understudied part of military policy and international relations, supplanted by the scholarly focus on covering the dynamics of “traditional” conflict related withdrawals. In turn, the argument and evidence touches on a host of questions regarding the aforementioned two topics. While scholarly literature explores the patterns surrounding cordial withdrawals, it does not explore the way distinct factors working at the same time affect their outcome. For instance, Cooley’s literature addresses the existence of peacetime military withdrawals between two allies, but he rather focuses on connecting the

political stability of U.S. basing missions abroad to the status of democracy in the host country alone, without addressing other factors.⁶ Meanwhile, literature on the role of reputation and the security dilemma for military deployments exists (courtesy of Tang and Snyder, respectively), but it has not been applied to peacetime withdrawals.⁷ In turn, this gap in understanding of peacetime withdrawals leaves an even greater gap in understanding of the factors behind cordial withdrawals, and how they have evolved across time.

Furthermore, cordial withdrawals matter because as international relations, geopolitics evolve, so do foreign commitments undertaken by states. This calls for adaptive responses to this phenomenon. After all, history may not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. As detailed by Katagiri and Min, political elites prioritize private signals over public crises, however, this principle has not been studied in the context of peacetime withdrawals such as cordial withdrawals, leaving an information gap for these withdrawals.⁸ Meanwhile, as historical foreign military deployments have had the potential to be an inflammatory political issue, poorly handled withdrawals may bring substantial consequences to the bilateral relationship in question.⁹ An ill-managed or ill-communicated cordial withdrawal may damage the credibility of a deploying state, with repercussions that will continue long after said withdrawal has culminated. This is particularly important for the United States, as it continues its long-awaited strategic “Pivot to Asia,” while seeking to balance, and retain its credibility, towards its historical NATO allies in Europe.¹⁰

⁶ Cooley, Alexander. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*. Cornell University Press, 2008.

⁷ Snyder, Glenn H. “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.” *World Politics (Cambridge University Press)*, vol. 36, no. 4, July 1984, pp. 161–495; Tang, Shiping. “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict.” *Security Studies*, vol. 14, no. 1, Jan. 2005, pp. 34–62.

⁸ Katagiri, Azusa, and Eric Min. “The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach.” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 113, no. 1, Feb. 2019, pp. 156–72. *Cambridge University Press*.

⁹ Yeo, Andrew I. “The Politics of Overseas Military Bases.” *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 15, no. 1, 2017, pp. 129–36. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26314959>.

¹⁰ Blackwill, Robert D., and Richard Fontaine. “Please Stay: Europe and the Pivot.” *Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia*, edited by Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, Oxford University Press, 2024, pp. 106–27, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197677940.003.0007>.

Hence, this thesis hopes to change that gap in military international relations understanding by analyzing the factors that have shaped historical cordial withdrawal. In turn, this will create the tools from which military and political leaders can adequately interpret its causal factors, and respond in a measured manner.

This thesis, including this introduction, proceeds in seven sections. The second section defines what a cordial withdrawal is, and outlines both what a cordial withdrawal is and what it is not. The third section presents the literature review for cordial withdrawals, and the current scholarly gaps. The fourth section establishes the methodology and the empirical framework for both the archive analysis and process tracing stages. The fifth section presents the findings for the archive analysis, its corresponding observations, and its limitations. The sixth section presents the findings for the process tracing stage and its limitations. Lastly, the seventh section concludes this thesis by reflecting on the findings, its implications for modern military international relations, and the future directions for this research.

Cordial withdrawals: an explanation

Provided the novel nature of my research topic, it is important to define what cordial withdrawals are, and define their scope. The withdrawal will not be televised, but it will be explained.

A cordial withdrawal is a partial or complete drawdown of a deploying state's military forces deployed in a host state, undertaken in peacetime conditions. For a troop scale down to be deemed as a "successful" cordial withdrawal, the deploying state's presence in a host state must be reduced by 10% from the year before the withdrawal started to the last year of the decreasing troop level trend. The drawdown period may be as short as one year to any amount of years, provided it meets the 10% threshold at the point when the last year of decreasing troop level

trend arrives. While cordial withdrawals are also characterized by a continuous bilateral relationship before, during and after the withdrawal, they can also happen with or without a bilateral mutual defence treaty.

Peacetime conditions in a cordial withdrawal are classified as a lack of connection with military conflict(s) in the decision making behind the examined withdrawal. Therefore, geopolitical conditions must allow the cordial withdrawal to be a political option, not something driven by inescapable military circumstances.

Additionally, to understand cordial withdrawals, it is valuable to recognize what is *not* a cordial withdrawal. There are three major cases that do not fall under the cordial withdrawal umbrella, as detailed below.

Colonial relationships: In order for a cordial withdrawal to happen, both the host and deploying states must have influence and leverage tools over the outcome of the withdrawal. In particular, the host state must have the autonomy to make its own political decisions, and the deploying state must respect those decisions, even in cases where disagreements persist after negotiations are finalized. This relationship is not possible in a colonial or puppet relationship, where the host state is subservient to the foreign policy of the deploying state. In turn, this is why cordial withdrawals have independent factors for both the host and deploying state. An example of this colonial relationship would be the British withdrawal from Egypt in 1936. While the United Kingdom agreed to withdraw most of its troops from Egypt, barring the Suez Canal, after the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, this was done in a process in which the British retained political control over Egypt.¹¹ Therefore, the Egyptian government did not have any leverage to challenge Britain's military posture over the North African country. While this case would fall outside of

¹¹ "Middle East 1930-1947 – British Troops in Egypt 1930-45." *British Military History*, <https://www.britishmilitaryhistory.co.uk/docs-middle-east-1930-1947-british-troops-egypt-1930-45/>.

the scope of this thesis, given it neither involves the United States nor it happens during the 1958-2020 timeframe, it highlights why colonial relationships are not considered cordial withdrawal cases.

Withdrawals after a conflict ends: If there is an immediate and provable connection of the withdrawal to conflict, this cut off happens regardless of the level of involvement of either the host or deploying state. This fundamentally breaks the peacetime conditions clause of cordial withdrawals. An example of this would be the United States' withdrawal from Thailand from 1973 to 1976. While the United States retained a positive relationship with Thailand before and after the withdrawal, the former's presence in Thailand was explicitly tied to both nations' involvement in the Vietnam War, thus failing the "peacetime" concept of a cordial withdrawal.¹² This "failure" to meet cordial withdrawal's benchmarks can happen even if only one of the host or deploying states is involved at the time the withdrawal happens.

Withdrawals after a hostile coup: A coup that brings in a host state government that is hostile towards the deploying state's presence would rupture the continuous relationship between a host and deploying state, which is supposed to be stable throughout a cordial withdrawal. An example of this would be the United States' withdrawal from Libya from 1969 to 1970. After Muammar Gaddafi came to power through the 1969 Libyan Revolution, Gaddafi moved swiftly to remove U.S. bases from the country. By the end of 1970, virtually all U.S. forces in Libya had left, alongside an end to amicable U.S.-Libya relations.¹³ In turn, an unexpected breakdown in a bilateral relationship due to a coup, while unambiguously a consequence of host state actions,

¹² AP. "New U.S. Pullouts Leave 35,000 Men in Thailand." *The New York Times*, 4 Jan. 1974. *NYTimes.com*, <https://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/04/archives/new-us-pullouts-leave-35000-men-in-thailand-delay-is-unexplained-u.html>.

¹³ Anderson, Raymond H. "Arab Leaders, in Libya, Hail Departure of U.S.: Nasser and Hussein Present for Military Ceremonies at Wheelus Base." *The New York Times*, 21 June 1970, p. 14, *ProQuest*, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/arab-leaders-libya-hail-departure-u-s/docview/118971163/se-2>; Brady, Thomas F. "U. S. IS BEGINNING LIBYAN PULLOUT." *The New York Times*, 3 Oct. 1969, p. 17, *ProQuest*, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/u-s-is-beginning-libyan-pullout/docview/118511720/se-2>.

ruptures the relationship between a host and deploying state, which is supposed to be sustained during a cordial withdrawal.

Literature review

As previously stated, cordial withdrawals are vastly understudied. Existing analysis is rather disparate, with no central piece analyzing cordial withdrawals, but rather analyzing individual factors or cases to analyze a specific factor, with neither scenario analyzing the origin of such factors. Yet, readjustment of military deployments in accordance to the circumstances of the moment are a permanent fixture of military international relations. In turn, cordial withdrawals, a variation of such readjustments, ought to be analyzed as a staple of military international relations. These movements ala cordial withdrawals may go under the public and academic radar, particularly as great powers such as the United States scaled down their foreign commitments after the end of the Cold War. Yet, a decrease of attention does not make those commitments disappear, particularly as the United States still has hundreds of military bases abroad.¹⁴ Analyzing the disparate academia pieces that set theoretical and historical groundwork of cordial withdrawals in turn leads to identifying the factors that impact cordial withdrawals.

Furthermore, theories surrounding cordial withdrawals have evolved throughout time, as existing scholarship and historical developments have built new theories, or re-examined old ones. In some cases, this has left unaddressed contradictions and gaps in international relations academics. This evolution and these challenges are best presented by analyzing key pieces in chronological order. To that end, this literature review focuses on chronologically identifying pieces with relevant analysis on military and bilateral international relations that have

¹⁴ O'Dell, Hope. "The US Is Sending More Troops to the Middle East. Where in the World Are US Military Deployed?"

transferable components for cordial withdrawals. It also identifies the strengths and weaknesses of works that apply those theories to military deployments analysis.

Analysis

Pierre Lellouche and Dominique Moisi wrote the first relevant academic analysis in 1979. In “French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization,” they examine the evolution of French foreign policy in post-colonial Africa, particularly on how France carefully used their military and economic assets to ensure the stability among its local allies, often led by Francophone elites.¹⁵ Therein are also hints of the importance of troop deployments, as Lellouche and Moisi points to the French military’s rep-prioritization of assets from Africa to Europe led to the closure of a multitude of French military bases by the end of the 1960s. Though this article does not focus on bases or withdrawals themselves, this piece establishes how states can re-deploy forces in peacetime conditions to emphasize changing foreign policy objectives, and in turn, placing geopolitical concerns as a factor behind cordial withdrawals.¹⁶ Furthermore, the duo also affirms that some of the success of French policy in the region came from the perception that targeted and successful military interventions such as Shaba II in Zaire in 1978 increased French political prestige and credibility.¹⁷ The relationship between credibility and military presence above would be challenged by later literature, though Lellouche and Moisi outlined the theoretical foundations of geopolitics and credibility in cordial withdrawals.

In 1984, Glenn Snyder introduced his contribution to the field through “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.” Snyder examined both bipolar and multipolar alliance systems, the former which provides the geopolitical context for analyzing cordial withdrawals up to 1989

¹⁵ Pierre Lellouche, and Dominique Moisi. “French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization.” *International Security*, vol. 3, no. 4, Spring 1979.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

due to the Cold War. Snyder asserts that states that are part of an alliance system in a bipolar order have a fear of entrapment, or forced into a commitment or conflict commenced by an allied state, which the other state doesn't want to be involved in. On the other hand, states also fear abandonment of commitments by their allies, particularly when calling upon assistance to respond to a threat.¹⁸ Given the lack of realignment options in a bipolar system, the latter fear of abandonment is unlikely to materialize in said system. As for the post-1989 world, Snyder affirms that in a multipolar system states have greater leeway to disregard, or even renounce, alliance commitments, given the turbulent nature of multipolar systems and their vast opportunities for realignment.¹⁹ While the latter system's dynamics does not translate directly into a unipolar global system (which, as supported by latter literature, is the context in which U.S.-led cordial withdrawals are analyzed in this thesis), it does suggest that in global systems that lack a balancing duopoly, there is greater room for alliance commitments, including foreign deployments, to change or even downsize.

Six years later, in 1990, Taylor, Smith and Mazaar wrote "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970-1990." In this piece, the trio focused on the role of communicating intentions and negotiating postures and U.S. domestic considerations in three American withdrawal efforts in South Korea in 1971, 1978 and 1991. For instance, the trio highlights the importance of domestic military budget cuts in the U.S.'s decision making behind the 1971 and 1991 withdrawals, and the U.S. Congress's enforcing role for such cuts.²⁰ Meanwhile, in the 1978 case clashing interest groups had an important role; human rights interest groups initially swayed President Carter to first announce the withdrawal to honor a campaign promise, but anti-withdrawal interest groups

¹⁸ Snyder, Glenn H. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics."

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Taylor Jr., William J., et al. "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970-1990." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer/Fall 1990, pp. 256-86.

within the U.S. government ultimately derailed said withdrawal attempt.²¹ On the other hand, the trio highlights how bilateral communications led by a deploying state can lessen host state resistance, particularly if the deploying state communicates its intentions and envisioned scope of withdrawal effectively, which was an important factor in the successful 1971 and 1991 withdrawals. Notably the trio also shows that U.S. fear of entrapment to a larger war in East Asia was strongly present in the 1971 and 1978 cases, which was matched by South Korea's fear of total abandonment by the United States, thus matching Snyder's bipolar system fears.²²

Conceptually, Taylor, Smith and Mazaar's piece presents a strong model to compare the timeline and factors of its selected withdrawals, in turn leading to organized, and transferable, analysis and explanations on its disparate outcomes. At the same time, the geographically targeted nature of this piece's analysis means that factors not relevant to South Korea are not represented well in this piece, denying their ability to do generalizations on global cordial withdrawal cases. Hence, there is a need for this thesis to explore global cases of cordial withdrawals, backed by factors that are generalizable at that very same global scale.

James Fearon followed in 1997 with "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests." Fearon highlights the need for national leaders to communicate their foreign policy objectives through signals of intent, which are applicable in both continuous national grand strategy and extemporaneous crisis situations.²³ To that end, leaders can use "audience costs" signals, which create the expectation of an action that will result in loss of political capital if not followed through, or "sink costs" signals, which are financially or politically costly *ex ante* actions in the hopes of preempting a potential crisis.²⁴ For instance, French military presence from Africa, as

²¹ Ibid.

²² Snyder, Glenn H. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; Taylor Jr., William J., et al. "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970-1990."

²³ Fearon, James D. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 41, no. 1, Feb. 1997, pp. 68-90.

²⁴ Ibid.

analyzed by Lellouche & Moisi, constituted a “sink cost,” as France placed troops in Africa in the hope of ensuring the stability of their francophone elites, and in turn seeking to prevent a negative outcome for France’s foreign policy objectives.²⁵ Meanwhile, U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s electoral campaign promise to withdraw from South Korea, as analyzed by Taylor, Smith and Mazaar, constitutes an “audience cost,” as Carter’s commitment to publicly expressed course of action (IE, a withdrawal) set him for large political capital loss if it did not succeed—which ultimately happened.²⁶ The goal in either signaling method is to indicate externally the state’s commitment towards objectives in both foreign policy or crisis contexts.

Foreign military deployments constitute a form of sink cost, as troop deployments abroad highlight a specific foreign policy objective that a deploying state’s leadership wants to tackle even before a crisis moment, which exerts a use of political capital.²⁷ In turn, a cordial withdrawal sends a message that the drawbacks of a “sink cost” now outweigh its benefits. This change may result in the realization of Snyder’s abandonment fear, leading to a host and deploying state crisis flashpoint in the process of the cordial withdrawal, as the credibility of a deploying state’s commitment to the defense of the host state now has signals of doubt. Thus, cordial withdrawals need “audience costs” to balance changes in “sink costs” insofar as reaffirming mutual defense commitments. This may come from bilateral negotiations or statements from government officials from either state associated with cordial withdrawals, which could be considered an “audience cost,” although this idea is not explored by Fearon. As such, Fearon’s literature has a gap on whether “audience costs” apply in non-crisis negotiations or statements.

²⁵ Fearon, James D. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs”; Pierre Lellouche, and Dominique Moisi. “French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization”

²⁶ Fearon, James D. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs”; Taylor Jr., William J., et al. “US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970-1990.”

²⁷ Fearon, James D. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.”

In 2004, Thad Dunning followed by writing on foreign aid conditioning in Africa in “Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa.” Dunning argued that the credibility, or the ability to act on a promised action, of U.S. threats of withholding aid in Africa over domestic democratic conditions was limited during the Cold War due to ever-present geopolitical strategic realities.²⁸ However, after the Cold War, threats to conditioning assistance over said conditions became more credible, given a lesser need for the United States to prioritize geopolitical competition due to a lack of a peer competitor. Thus, these threats became more effective in producing desired change in the country hoping to receive said aid, and Dunning attributes this change in prioritization to the post-1989 shift from a bipolar to a unipolar global order after the fall of the Soviet Union.²⁹ While Dunning does not focus on military deployments, geopolitical changes have allowed policymakers to move their policy justifications from almost exclusively geopolitical competition to justifications with stronger public image components. In turn, post-Cold War conditions suggest a change in cordial withdrawal dynamics through the de-prioritization of geopolitical considerations, a premise that is explored further by subsequent literature.

Shiapiang Tang followed up in 2005 with *Reputation, Cult Of Reputation, and International Conflict*, expanding on the definition and application of credibility. Tang discusses the concept of “reputation for resolve,” which is when politicians act in crisis situations not due to the national interest at stake, but to retain a public image of credibility in the face of crisis.³⁰ This puts an applicable and specific “ends” towards the use of credibility: Public perception. Tang goes a step further by pointing out that as reputation for resolve cannot be created through

²⁸ Dunning, Thad. “Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa.” *International Organization*, vol. 58, no. 2, Apr. 2004, pp. 409–23.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Tang, Shiapiang. “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict.” *Security Studies*, vol. 14, no. 1, Jan. 2005, pp. 34–62.

conflict, politicians seek to build such reputation through patterns that reflect strength, and in turn build a cult, or aura, of reputation, reaffirming the importance of a state being perceived as credible.³¹ This clashes with Lellouche and Moisi's analysis that targeted military interventions reinforce a country's, and its political leadership, produce credibility in the international stage, not through a perception of commitment.³² Hence, the literature highlights a clash over the role of credibility in military deployment decision making, and by extension, in cordial withdrawals and their associated deployments.

Notably, Tang's discourse on the perception of credibility has another application for cordial withdrawals: its influence on mutual defence treaties. A reduction of troops by a deploying state, such as the U.S., may be perceived by the host state as a signal that the deploying state no longer intends to honor its pledge to protect its allies. Per Taylor, Smith and Mazaar in "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970-1990," this was a concern privately and publicly raised by the South Korean government during the 1971 and 1978 withdrawals.³³ If the U.S. undertakes a cordial withdrawal without reaffirming its perception of credibility or the relevant mutual defence agreements, it may burn political bridges with the host state. This may make other host states reconsider the credibility of U.S. commitments, and signal competitors of a gap in the balance of power that they may seek to take advantage of. Hence, Tang's work raises the need to balance cordial withdrawals with its impact on an ally's perception of U.S. credibility towards a commitment, and calls for analysis on how mutual defense agreements are affected by cordial withdrawals.

Alexander Cooley's *Base Politics: Democratic change and the U.S. military overseas* in 2008 introduced democracy as a factor in military deployments. Cooley analyses the evolution of

³¹ Ibid.

³² Pierre Lellouche, and Dominique Moisi. "French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization."

³³ Taylor Jr., William J., et al. "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970-1990."

U.S. basing commitments in selected cases in Southern Europe and East Asia, under the lenses that host countries with stable and deeply rooted democratic institutions are the most stable host states.³⁴ Additionally, Cooley finds that a host state's willingness to challenge a basing agreement is negatively correlated with both the host state's dependence on the U.S.'s military presence for political survival and the host state's perception of the basing contract's legitimacy.³⁵ This relationship can be partially explained by Snyder's entrapment: Democratic deploying states, such as the United States, are reluctant to commit themselves to host countries that go against the former's democratic principles than one with shared political models, due to the potential of being forced into a commitment the deploying state does not agree with. Furthermore, host states undergoing a democratic transition often seek for a renegotiated base that moves them away from the legacy of the previous authoritarian regime.³⁶ Lastly, Cooley's exploration of causal factors is inherently limited to analyzing the status of democracy in a host country (in either of his two targeted regions), as opposed to weighing social, political and economic factors separately. Cooley establishes a roadmap to analyze factors contributing to cordial withdrawals, but he limits it to the casual relationship of a host state's regime and two specific geographic areas.

Dunning and Cooley's literature also frame a relationship between geopolitical considerations and host states. Cooley affirms that the U.S. stomach Cold War relationships with authoritarian regimes that were willing to host bases as a part of the U.S.'s anti-communist geopolitical strategy.³⁷ Dunning's analysis backs this, as his analysis shows that the effectiveness of Cold War era threats of conditioning aid over moral considerations was hindered by the U.S.'s

³⁴ Cooley, Alexander. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

choice to prioritize strategic competition with the Soviet Union.³⁸ In both Dunning and Cooley's cases, post-Cold War changes defined the dynamics of conditioning: Whereas Dunning's threats of withholding aid over democratic conditions became credible post-1989, and Cooley's cases such as the U.S. withdrawal from Uzbekistan in 2005 demonstrate that the United States began placing greater consideration to host state democratic conditions, or lack thereof. Furthermore, in cases such as the U.S. withdrawal from Spain in 1990, it was the host state's transitioning democratic regime that challenged the existing base agreements with the U.S. due to the social and political delegitimization of Spain's Francoist regime, which negotiated the bilateral basing agreement at the time Spain democratized.³⁹ Thus, there are major hints that not only do geopolitical considerations and host state regime types have a significant relationship, but that the end of the Cold War redefined the way the United States considered its foreign military deployments.

In 2019, Katagiri and Min followed Cooley by analyzing information reception by political elites in "The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach." The two writers analyzed how U.S. and the Soviet leaders took in information during the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1963, and how political leaders prioritize different types of sources and information coming from their foreign counterparts.⁴⁰ Ultimately, the duo found that leaders prioritize information intake based on material actions, followed by private and then public signals. In turn, material actions such as cordial withdrawals can be seen as credible statements of intent by deploying states to reshape, if not limit, its commitments towards a host state. This once again brings in the credibility dilemma that Fearon and Tang raise, and of particular

³⁸ Cooley, Alexander. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*; Dunning, Thad. "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa."

³⁹ Cooley, Alexander. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*.

⁴⁰ Katagiri, Azusa, and Eric Min. "The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach."

importance to this thesis, how the United States enact cordial withdrawals without breaking the credibility of its defence commitments towards allied host states.

Katagiri and Min also found that political elites view public statements as less credible than private statements. Public statements are meant for multiple audiences, some with no influence on the foreign policy decisions, causing a “noise gap” between the visibility of public statements and their perceived credibility among elites.⁴¹ Meanwhile, private statements are both more targeted towards specific points of contention between the two states, and reflect a stronger resolve from a state for a specific course of action, thus increasing said state’s credibility in the eyes of the other state.⁴² Analyzing private diplomatic communications can bridge the “noise gap” in diplomacy that comes from focusing on abundant, but incomplete, public-facing diplomacy. In turn, while cordial withdrawals have been historically covered through public communication channels such as news media, to understand the way government officials engage with the factors behind such withdrawals, it is even more important to analyze private diplomatic correspondence regarding the bilateral deploying and host state relations that govern cordial withdrawals.

Lastly, Nieman, Martinez Machain, Chyzh and Bell addressed in 2021 the role of geopolitical competition in foreign troop deployments through “An International Game of Risk: Troop Placement and Major Power Competition.” These authors find that great powers deploy “noninvasive troop deployments” in host states in response to either recent or anticipated regional troop deployments by the great power’s competitors, which may threaten the former’s sphere of influence.⁴³ The quartet’s cost-risk analysis of these deployments build on Fearon’s

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Katagiri, Azusa, and Eric Min. “The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach,” Tang, Shiping. “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict.”

⁴³ Nieman, Mark David, et al. “An International Game of Risk: Troop Placement and Major Power Competition.” *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 83, no. 4, Oct. 2021, pp. 1307–21.

“sink cost” signals, from which states use resource-intensive troop deployments as a way to anticipate, or even nullify, potential strategic competition by other great powers, while sharing Snyder’s fear that these deployments may lead to the deploying state being entrapped into a host state’s own conflicts, distracting the deploying state from its primary policy objectives.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the quartet affirms that deploying powers prefer to locate their bases in ideologically aligned states, which are easier to manage in a major power’s sphere of influence.⁴⁵ Like Cooley, this quartet places host state regimes as a factor behind both foreign troop placement and their subsequent withdrawals.

This piece also opens new ways of thinking about the relationship between geopolitics and cordial deployments. In acknowledging the role of geopolitical objectives in foreign deployments, the quartet sets a theoretical framework to “reverse engineer” the logic behind cordial withdrawals. If foreign military deployments occur in order to counter moves by a geopolitical competitor, then when there is no such competition there is no necessity for such military commitment, or in other words, a withdrawal. In a way, the quartet takes on Lellouche and Moisi’s idea that states can re-deploy forces in peacetime conditions to emphasize changing foreign policy objectives a step further, insofar as those adjustments are bound to happen when there is no longer a critical foreign policy objective at stake, and the regional hierarchy of importance evolves.⁴⁶ Therefore geopolitical concerns in cordial withdrawals ought to be interpreted not as the presence of said concerns, but rather as the *change or evolution* of such geopolitical concerns, which permits the cordial withdrawal to happen.

Takeaways

⁴⁴ Fearon, James D. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Snyder, Glenn H. “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”.

⁴⁵ Nieman, Mark David, et al. “An International Game of Risk: Troop Placement and Major Power Competition.”

⁴⁶ Nieman, Mark David, et al. “An International Game of Risk: Troop Placement and Major Power Competition”; Pierre Lellouche, and Dominique Moisi. “French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization.”

Academic literature surrounding cordial withdrawals has adjusted itself in a chronological fashion to establish the factors that shape these withdrawals, often by linking distinct phenomena in international relations with similar forces at play to these withdrawals. Yet, there are significant inconsistencies in the picture and in our understanding of cordial withdrawals. As this research seeks to bring cohesive analysis of cordial withdrawals, its surrounding factors and its evolution, it is important to identify the existing gaps that ought to be bridged.

On one hand, current discussion on credibility has notable gaps. For instance, there is debate over the origin of credibility. Lellouche and Moisi point to successful intervention in military conflict as a possible source of credibility, while Tang categorically discards that as a source of credibility.⁴⁷ Yet, neither of these explanations address how the perception of credibility of a pre-existing defence commitments is sustained as corresponding force deployments are reshaped or downsized. Cordial withdrawals may not be armed standoffs, but for a cordial withdrawal to happen successfully without causing a diplomatic crisis between the host and deploying state, it is important to understand what factors lead to a perception of credibility in the discussions surrounding cordial withdrawals. To that end, Katagiri and Min provide a framework for a relative scale of credibility in bilateral negotiations (from highest to lowest, material actions, private communications, public communications) which has not been applied in the context of studying a set of cases of an specific type of material action, such as cordial withdrawals.⁴⁸ Therefore, this research aims to analyze how private and public diplomatic communications impact a deploying state's image of credibility throughout a cordial withdrawal.

⁴⁷ Pierre Lellouche, and Dominique Moisi. "French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization;" Tang, Shiping. "Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict."

⁴⁸ Katagiri, Azusa, and Eric Min. "The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach."

Furthermore, there are also gaps in the understanding of how geopolitical changes affect foreign military deployments. Dunning described how foreign aid distribution is affected by the presence of a bipolar or unipolar global order, while Cooley emphasizes the role of host state regimes in foreign military deployments.⁴⁹ Yet, neither approach is perfected for cordial withdrawals: The former does not address the type of commitment that a cordial withdrawal involves (troop deployments), while the latter does not address directly how the global geopolitical environment at a given moment affects such deployments. Remarkably, Nieman, Martinez Machain, Chyzh and Bell indirectly propose a framework that is rather the change in geopolitical concerns that may enable troop withdrawals, which I will examine in this thesis by separating cordial withdrawals into Cold War and post-Cold War buckets.⁵⁰ Overall, current understanding of cordial withdrawals and their corresponding geopolitical patterns comes from literature that addresses adjacent phenomena rather than cordial withdrawals directly, raising the need to bridge the gap between geopolitics and military withdrawals.

Additionally, while the literature highlights various political or strategic factors that contribute towards cordial withdrawals, seldom do they discuss factors related to the deploying and host states' domestic politics (such as lobbying efforts and popular movements, respectively) and the pressure they exert on cordial withdrawals. Dunning and Cooley acknowledge the existence of those civil society factors, but they both prioritize analyzing the relationship between the host state's government system and the relevant U.S.-led foreign assets in said host state (foreign aid and military bases, respectively).⁵¹ In turn, while domestic political factors such as lobbying efforts and popular movements have potentially influenced foreign basing politics

⁴⁹ Cooley, Alexander. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*; Dunning, Thad. "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa."

⁵⁰ Nieman, Mark David, et al. "An International Game of Risk: Troop Placement and Major Power Competition."

⁵¹ Cooley, Alexander. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*; Dunning, Thad. "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa."

throughout history, this connection has not been explored in the current literature. Ultimately, all these points combined highlighted the need for a unified study of cordial withdrawals. There is not just the need to analyze the factors behind cordial withdrawal themselves, but also to bridge academic gaps.

Research Methods

I have undertaken various steps to establish a clear scope for the two analysis stages found in this thesis.

Chronologically, my cases are limited to the period from the Cold War to the present day; meaning cases were sought for anywhere between 1945 and 2025. I use this time period because World War II and the start of the Cold War marked the beginning of an uptick of foreign basing that also moved away from colonial, or quasi-colonial dynamics, which as explained in the definitions section, does not meet the cordial withdrawal criteria. While some cordial withdrawal cases have a patron-protégé relationship, and the patron (deploying state) may have more leverage than its protégé (host state) counterpart, this meet the criteria of “cordial withdrawals” as even in imbalance, the host state retains independent foreign policy decision-making power, thus making cordial withdrawals a phenomenon of bilateral relationships in which both states, not one, have some form of leverage. These changes caused by the Cold War’s dynamics have remained true even after the Cold War ended, thus making that time frame ideal for my research.

Geographically, the selected cordial withdrawal cases are limited to cases where the United States was the deploying state. This is because focusing on a singular deploying state helps reduce the number of confounding variables in my analysis, particularly in the political strategy of the deploying state and the relationship between the governments of the deploying and host states. This avoids the variance found in bilateral relationships between different

deploying and host states, which would have been the case with other deploying states that have historically been involved in cordial withdrawals, such as the Soviet Union, India and the United Kingdom. That being said, as the United States has been the state with the most foreign military bases globally since the beginning of the Cold War, this geographical limitation does not reduce my sample size either to a point my findings are not generalizable.⁵²

My units of analysis are states, while my cases are the instances where a state conducts a cordial withdrawal. Both the archive analysis and the process tracing stages analyze the states and the cordial withdrawals, albeit with different data points in mind: be it the period where the withdrawal happened or the way the factors interacted in a specific case. Each cordial withdrawal case has, as backed by historical sources, a deploying state, the host state, a time frame in year(s), a binary indicator of whether there is a mutual defence agreement between the two states, and the factors that surrounded each attempt.

In regards to my cordial withdrawal cases, I am looking at qualitative evidence of the five factors behind cordial withdrawals through archive analysis and process tracing analysis. The factors I am looking at and an example of a data point that satisfies each factor are as follows:

Deploying state factors

Interest groups: Whether there was a group in the deploying state's political system lobbying for an specific outcome regarding the withdrawal. An example of this factor would be an organized lobbying effort for the U.S. congress to close a military base abroad.

Financial concerns: Whether a change in available money has affected the viability or considerations surrounding the existing military mission. An example of this factor would be military officials mentioning immediate U.S. Department of Defense budget cuts.

⁵² O'Dell, Hope. "The US Is Sending More Troops to the Middle East. Where in the World Are US Military Deployed?"

Changing geopolitical concerns: Whether the deploying state deems there is a change or reduction in the strategic interests or threats present in the host state or its surroundings. An example of this factor would be statements from military officials referring to change in importance, or even the total collapse of importance, of the host state towards the United States's strategic objectives at the time.

Host state factors

Popular movements: Whether there is some form of movement in the host state's civil society pushing for the withdrawal of the deploying state's forces. An example of this factor would be organized civilian protests against U.S. presence in the given host country.

Regime type: Whether the ruling regime in the host state affects the sustainability of the deploying state's presence. An example of this factor would be the host state's regime publicly standing against the political principles touted by the U.S., and directly tying such to the latter's basing presence in the host country. Do note that this factor may not be limited to when the deploying and host state have diametrically opposed governing systems, but also politically similar states that have an specific issue with the deploying state's presence (for example, if the host state recently transitioned to a democracy, and is trying to undo a treaty done by a previous authoritarian regime with the deploying state, this counts as a regime type factor).

Methods - Archive Analysis

For the initial archive analysis stage, I compiled data in a "large N analysis" format, meaning developing an archive of cordial withdrawal cases. This approach allows me to pick a large sample that I can analyze in order to provide acceptable generalizations via detection of large scale patterns, helping rule out competing explanations or confounding factors.⁵³ Given the

⁵³ Goertz, Gary, and Stephan Haggard. "Generalization, Case Studies, and Within-Case Causal Inference: Large-N Qualitative Analysis (LNQA)." *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Political Science*, edited by Harold Kincaid

prescribed factors address dynamics found both in deploying and host states, this allows me to look for data that addresses both deploying and host state actions.

I compiled a sample of U.S.-led cordial withdrawals from the beginning of the Cold War to the present. I used Dr. Tim Kane's publicly available dataset, "U.S. Troop Deployments" to identify reductions in U.S. military presence abroad, focusing on cases where troop levels in a country dropped by at least 10%, as defined in my criteria for a cordial withdrawal.⁵⁴ Cases from Dr. Kane's dataset that were confirmed to have "cordial" origins by archival sources encompassed my sample of 32 cases. Then, I used ProQuest's *ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times* and *ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post* archival databases for the newspapers The New York Times and The Washington Post, respectively, to gather source data on the selected cordial withdrawal cases.⁵⁵ Overall, I analyzed 115 news articles, with 60 of those coming from The New York Times and 55 of those coming from The Washington Post. Reviewing these articles the presence of the five possible outlined factors behind a cordial withdrawal, and if detected, were counted in a case's factor count. All factor presence reasoning is found in *Appendix 2 - Archive analysis sources*.

The selected cases are the ones with the most available information to make a case on the factors present. In turn, case selection is based on availability of data, as not every single cordial withdrawal attempt since the Cold War was covered by the media (be it out of lack of reporting, or in some cases, significant amounts of classified information in other cases, and possibly even cordial withdrawal attempts that happened without any press coverage), and thus the selected cases have enough data to make a case about the individual factors in play.

and Jeroen Van Bouwel, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 281–304. *Oxford Academic*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197519806.013.14>.

⁵⁴ Kane, Tim. "U.S. Troop Deployments." *U.S. Troop Deployments*, The American Lyceum. 17 Nov. 2024, <https://www.ustroopdeployments.com/about>.

⁵⁵ *ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2021)*. Proquest, ProQuest LLC; ProQuest, *ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post (1877-2008)*. ProQuest, ProQuest LLC.

Additionally, all selected cases were divided into two buckets: Pre-1989 cases and post-1989 cases, so as to compare factor presence and trends in the bipolar and unipolar global political orders, and in order to analyze how those trends shifted from one period to another. Cordial withdrawal cases that occurred before 1989 were placed in the former bucket, and cases that happened after 1989 in the latter bucket. If a case started before 1989 and ended after 1989, that case was placed in the post-1989 bucket as such cases were ultimately shaped by the geopolitical changes set in 1989.

The archive analysis sample also contains two “unsuccessful” cordial withdrawal cases; South Korea 1978-1981 and Germany 2020. These cases are unsuccessful in both meeting the 10% threshold and ultimately being called off by the U.S. government. The reason for their inclusion is to also offer insights on what factors are in play when a sampled cordial withdrawal does not meet its objective. These two unique cases are noted in blue in the cordial withdrawal data tables.

There were also some special cases in which an otherwise continuous trend of troop quantity decrease in a given case was broken by a “gap” year of slightly increasing numbers. These special cases were studied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the factors and actions reported by the archive sources point towards it being two distinct cases with different factors in play, or a singular case with continuous factors in play. For example, Greece 1985-1988 and Greece 1990-1995 (with a gap year of 1989) were counted separate cases as the former case was governed by domestic political factors, while the latter case was governed by post-Cold War geopolitical changes. On the other hand, the Netherlands 1988, 1990-1995 is a singular case with two decreasing trend periods as both periods were governed by the same causal factors in the form of Missile Reduction Agreements.

Additionally, a confidence level scale was added to all sampled cases. Given the potential incomplete media coverage for some cordial withdrawal cases, be it out of lack of knowledge of classified information or a lack of reporting, not all cases had equal levels of data reliability. Therefore, I designed a confidence level scale to signify the level of certainty I had with the findings in each case—a widely used technique in scientific research used to address concerns on the certainty of a study’s findings.⁵⁶ That being said, the confidence level scale used in this thesis was not expressed numerically, as is the case with most quantitative research, but rather in a four level qualitative scale. Below are the four confidence levels, their explanations, and example data points that lead to each classification.

High confidence level: The archival sources for the given case present conclusive evidence that the cordial withdrawal was caused by the factors specifically mentioned by the articles, and there is no notable confounding phenomena distorting this. Cases with this confidence level have abundant quotes from government officials and explore distinct social, political and geopolitical forces surrounding the case.

Medium confidence level: The archival sources for the given case present strong evidence that ties the troop reduction to the reported factors, but there likely are some confounding factors present, or there are patterns that raise the possibility of a gap of media coverage or of understanding of the factors involved. Cases with this confidence level do not address potential confounding factors such as such as relevant conflict-related developments elsewhere, an unexplained gap in troop reductions in an otherwise continuous decrease pattern, or mentioning, but not elaborating on some important trend involving a given case.

⁵⁶ Siegle, Del. “Confidence Intervals and Levels.” *Neag School of Education, University of Connecticut*, 15 Jan. 2021, <https://researchbasics.education.uconn.edu/confidence-intervals-and-levels/>.

Low confidence level: The archival sources for the selected withdrawal have considerable coverage gaps that are certain to leave an incomplete story of the factors involved in the withdrawal. Examples of such decisive gaps include not directly addressing the causes of the troop withdrawal, relying on anecdotal evidence, or drawing from general information on changing military postures in a region without offering specific analysis on the highlighted country case.

No confidence/no data: There were no archival sources on the selected withdrawal, however, non-archival sources and data from the “U.S. Troop Deployments” datasheet suggests a cordial withdrawal happened during the selected case’s timeframe and location.

Explanations on the level of confidence choices for each case can be found in *Appendix I - Confidence level justifications*.

Methods - Process tracing

I compiled data for the process tracing stage in a “small N analysis” format. This approach best fits with the data and analysis intensive, but case-limited format of process tracing analysis and its corresponding hypothesis testing design.⁵⁷ Overall, the design of small N analysis promotes intense and detail-rich analysis of the given case. This will offer in-depth and complex explanations about the way each causal factor shapes a cordial withdrawal case, and how these interactions are affected when external considerations are applied.

This stage focuses on the South Korea 1971 cordial withdrawal case. Data for this case comes from two government document databases, the “U.S. Troop Reductions and Related Defense Issues, November 1969–February 1971” section from the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian’s *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1*,

⁵⁷ Clipperton, Jean, and Justin Zimmerman. “9 Small N.” Empirical Methods in Political Science: An Introduction, Northwestern University Libraries, 2020. [nulib-oer.github.io, https://nulib-oer.github.io/empirical-methods-polisci/small-n.html](https://nulib-oer.github.io/empirical-methods-polisci/small-n.html).

Korea, 1969–1972 and *The United States and the Two Koreas* archive at ProQuest, which contain declassified U.S government documents covering U.S.-Korea relations during the Nixon administration and the 1901-2001 timeframe, respectively.⁵⁸ Overall, I analyzed 44 documents from *FRUS* and 18 from *The Two Koreas*, for a total of 62 documents, which gives a deep dive of the historical context behind the South Korea 1971 case, and shows the U.S. government’s decision making process behind this case.

My writing for process tracing’s background subsection is largely based on my own writing on said withdrawal in the article “Ensuring Gracefulness in Withdrawals: The dynamics of the Early 1970s American Withdrawal from South Korea,” published in the *Chicago Journal of Foreign Policy* in April of 2024.⁵⁹ This piece in itself is largely based on work I did as a Research Assistant at the University of Notre Dame in the Summer of 2023. Said article and research used the same databases I am using in this thesis for the process tracing stage, which not only makes me familiar with the material, but also helps me understand well the background information that is relevant to this case, and distill the key highlights of the analyzed documents. Meanwhile, my writing for the factor analysis subsection is entirely new work, based on the relevant information from the relevant documents found in the two aforementioned archives. Using direct government documentation will help address information gaps foreseen in the archive analysis stage, be it out of lack of media coverage or government confidentiality, that were present in the archive analysis stage. This will directly address the concerns raised in the

⁵⁸ Lawler, Daniel J., et al., editors. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*. U.S. Troop Reductions and Related Defense Issues, November 1969–February 1971 (Documents 45–88), vol. XIX, Part 1, Office of the Historian, 2009; “The United States and the Two Koreas (1969-2000).” *ProQuest*, ProQuest LLC.

⁵⁹ Leal Mendoza, Juan. “Ensuring Gracefulness in Withdrawals: The Dynamics of the Early 1970s American Withdrawal from South Korea.” *The Chicago Journal of Foreign Policy*, Winter 2024, Apr. 2024, <https://www.cjfp.org/ensuring-gracefulness-in-withdrawals-the-dynamics-of-the-early-1970s-american-withdrawal-from-south-korea/>.

confidence level scale for the archival research stage, and help suggest what is the most effective way to combine archive analysis and process tracing in cordial withdrawal research. A summary of all analyzed documents for this stage can be found in *Appendix 3 - Process tracing sources, South Korea 1971*.

Empirical framework

With all data on the sampled cordial withdrawals now gathered, I now make different arguments in both the archival analysis and the process tracing research stages.

I hypothesize three things. First, in all cordial withdrawal cases overall, there will be an overall higher presence of host state factors (chiefly, financial concerns, interest groups and changing geopolitical considerations) than deploying state factors (popular movement and regime type). Second, there will be a rise in the number of cordial withdrawals after 1989, corresponding to the post-Cold War geopolitical changes in the transition from a bipolar global order to a unipolar global order. Lastly, pre-1989 cordial withdrawals are primarily caused by host state-related factors (excluding changing geopolitical considerations), while post-1989 cordial withdrawals are primarily caused by deploying state-related factors (chiefly, popular movement and regime type) plus changing geopolitical considerations, as the aforementioned changes in post-1989 geopolitics set the circumstances so host state factors could take a more prevalent role in cordial withdrawal decision making, in turn increasing the quantity of cordial withdrawals in the latter time frame. This framework underscores what I investigate and expect to see in each research stage.

In the initial archival analysis stage, I look at the selected archival newspaper entries for the presence of each of the five outlined factors in all 32 sampled cordial withdrawal cases, and categorize relevant segments as evidence for one of the five cordial withdrawal causal factors. I

then outline what factors are present in each sampled cordial withdrawal case, develop graphs that show which factors are the most prevalent in cordial withdrawals overall, and how the results line up both in regards to my initial hypothesis and other data points I raised throughout this document, such as the relationship of Mutual Defence Agreements and deploying state credibility. From this, I can demonstrate which factors are the most important in enacting successful cordial withdrawals.

Within this stage, I will also divide the compiled cordial withdrawal data into two buckets of pre-1989 and post-1989 cases, as the year of 1989 was the inflection point in geopolitical considerations due to the transition from a bipolar global system into a unipolar one after the fall of the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ I will generate graphs that outline how cordial withdrawals and their corresponding factors varied in each bucket, and how this aligns with my initial hypothesis. This configuration helps demonstrate whether there is a quantitative difference of cordial withdrawals before and after 1989, and by extension, define whether the changes in global geopolitics correspond with changes in the relative hierarchy of importance of the factors.

If my hypothesis on cordial withdrawal dynamics is correct, then in this stage we will see multiple things: First, in all cordial withdrawal cases, we will see a slightly higher presence of deploying state factors over host state factors, given the former is the commanding power over the forces in question in cordial withdrawals. Second, after the data is divided into the pre-1989 and the post-1989 buckets, we will see a higher number of cordial withdrawal cases in the post-1989 bucket than the pre-1989 bucket, corresponding with the 1989 transition from a bipolar to a unipolar global order. This is because the United States, the sole remaining superpower, no longer had the Soviet Union as an equal level rival to compete with at the geopolitical scale, lessening the need for many foreign military commitments. Thirdly, the

⁶⁰ Nadkarni, Vidya. "Bipolarism and Its End, From the Cold War to the Post-Cold War World."

pre-1989 bucket will have a higher percentage of cases with deploying state factors, while the post-1989 bucket will have an uptick in the “changing geopolitical concerns” factor plus the host state factors, reflecting an increased importance of host state circumstances after the global transition into a unipolar global order. In this stage, the Independent Variable is the presence of cordial withdrawals’ five factors and the time periods, while the Dependent Variable is the relative hierarchy of importance of the factors for cordial withdrawals and the number of cases.

Next is the process tracing stage. This stage does an in depth examination of a cordial withdrawal case, South Korea 1971, which will show how U.S. government actors operated during said cordial withdrawal case, and how their actions were impacted by the present factors. For this stage, I use a “case study” approach, in which I examine a large number of primary government archival sources to analyze whether the factors I found for said case in the archive analysis stage are both present and play a role in the process of said cordial withdrawal case. This allows me to directly evaluate government records that were not available in the media-based archive analysis stage.

Process tracing is divided into two parts. First, a background subsection detailing developments that surrounded the South Korea 1971 case. Information in this background subsection ranges from its initial causes, the surrounding forces in play, the host state reaction, and the withdrawal’s final outcome. Secondly, I analyze the relevant government documents from the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part I, Korea, 1969–1972* and *The United States and the Two Koreas* archives to outline the presence of cordial withdrawal factors, and confirm or reject the presence of each of the five cordial withdrawal factors in this case. In this stage, I expect to see that the same factors detected for the South Korea 1971 case during the archive analysis stage will be found again in the process tracing

stage. However, there may also be an additional factor found in the process tracing stage which was not found in its archive analysis counterpart, given the information asymmetry that favors government documentation over media coverage. In this stage, the Independent Variable is the geopolitical conditions that changed between the pre-1989 and post-1989 periods, and the Dependent Variables are both the frequency of Cordial Withdrawals and the relative salience of the factors behind cordial withdrawals.

Lastly, the process tracing stage and the archive analysis stage are complementary to each other. The archival stage examines a large sample with limited analysis, while the process tracing stage examines a singular case with in-depth analysis, thus ensuring that using both data-extensive and data-intensive stages both deters potential methodical weaknesses. Ultimately, I will show the strengths and weaknesses of both analysis stages, whether there was any discrepancy between the factors detected in the process tracing stage and its archive analysis counterpart, and outline the most effective framework to analyze cordial withdrawals.

Findings - Archive analysis

With all 115 archive news articles and all 32 cordial withdrawal sampled cases analyzed, it is now permissible to analyze these historical cordial withdrawals and their factors.

Table 1 shows the numerical data of the troop withdrawal percentages in each case, its timespan, and if there is a Mutual Defense Treaty. Meanwhile, Table 2 outlines the factors found in each case, and the confidence level for the data found for each given case.

Data table link: <https://tinyurl.com/CWMilitaryData>

Figure 1 - Cordial withdrawal military data from 1958 to 2020.

Data table link: <https://tinyurl.com/CWFactorsList>

Figure 2 - Cordial withdrawal factor presence breakdown from 1958 to 2020.

Green: Factor found in newspaper sources. Blank: Factor not present in newspaper sources.

The thick black line demarks the division between pre-1989 cases and post-1989 cases.


Discussion - all cases

Figure 3 - Cordial withdrawal factor data from 1958 to 2020.

Figure 3 above confirms the first part of my hypothesis. Deploying state factors — interest groups, financial concerns, changing geopolitical concerns — were the most widely present factors in all 32 sampled cordial withdrawal cases overall, with percentage presence ranging from 53.13% to 68.75%. Meanwhile, the two host state factors, popular movement and regime type, had a presence of 34.38% and 40.63%, respectively. For example, the Iceland 2006-2009 cordial withdrawal happened as the United States prioritized its changing geopolitical interests over the loud requests of the Iceland government to reverse the withdrawal.⁶¹ Overall, this reflects that as a cordial withdrawal involves the forces of the deploying state alone, it is factors and changes within said state that have the most influence on foreign basing outcomes. This is supported by Nieman, Martinez Machain, Chyzh and Bell's literature, as they found that

⁶¹ White, Josh. "U.S. to Remove Military Forces and Aircraft from Iceland Base." *The Washington Post*, Mar 17, 2006.
proquest.com/newspapers/u-s-remove-military-forces-aircraft-iceland-base/docview/2695215043/se-2.

deploying states have historically focused on their own political and strategic concerns, such as geopolitical competitors, in retaining or downsizing a foreign military commitment, rather than prioritizing host factor considerations.⁶² Furthermore Avey, Markowitz and Reardon found in 2018 that U.S.-led peacetime military withdrawals in South Korea (a 1971 cordial withdrawal, and a 2004-2005 non-cordial withdrawal) have found that despite these withdrawals being caused by U.S.-oriented causal factors, these did not lead to greater instability in the host state.⁶³ In turn, cordial withdrawals are not known to cause instability in the host state, thus also allowing the deploying state to prioritize its own factors without worrying of a negative ripple effect in the host state. Overall, cordial withdrawals are more likely to be caused by deploying state factors, and there is literature that helps illuminate the causes of this.

Another important overall trend was the importance of mutual defense treaties and the percentage of troops withdrawn in a cordial withdrawal. Across all cases, countries without a mutual defence treaty (MDT) with the United States were more likely to have almost total cordial withdrawals. 4 out of 7 cases involving states that did not have a MDT with the U.S. at the moment of the withdrawal had over 99% of U.S. troops withdrawn, whereas only 4 out of 25 cases with a MDT had 99%+ of U.S. troops withdrawn. As discussed by Tang, credibility in international relations is backed by tangible actions such as basing or alliance agreements.⁶⁴ Hence, cordial withdrawals in states with a MDT are seldom total withdrawals, as the MDT confirms there is still a credible alliance commitment present, as was the case in post-Cold War NATO cases such as Spain 1990-1994.⁶⁵ On the other hand, cordial withdrawals have no

⁶² Nieman, Mark David, et al. "An International Game of Risk: Troop Placement and Major Power Competition."

⁶³ Avey, Paul C., et al. "Do US Troop Withdrawals Cause Instability? Evidence from Two Exogenous Shocks on the Korean Peninsula." *Journal of Global Security Studies*, vol. 3, no. 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 72–92. *Silverchair*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogx020>.

⁶⁴ Tang, Shiping. "Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict."

⁶⁵ Sciolino, Elaine. "U.S. TO WITHDRAW 72 JET FIGHTERS FROM SPANISH BASE: MADRID IS FIRM ON F-16'S Gonzalez Government Willing to Discuss Continued Use of Other Installations U.S. Will Withdraw 72 F-16

guarantee of retaining a credible deploying-host state partnership if there is no MDT, and in some cases, such as Uzbekistan 2003-2006, the given cordial withdrawal signified the end of a credible U.S. military relationship with that host state.⁶⁶ That being said, this is not a guarantee such a military relationship is destined to fall everytime there is a cordial withdrawal in circumstances without a MDT; it is rather a warning that there is a significantly higher chance of such outcome unfolding.

The pre-1989 and post-1989 buckets

Now, the data from the archival stage can be divided into pre-1989 and post-1989 buckets, as found in the figures below. Figures 4A and 4B represent the two “bucketed” data sets for each time period, respectively. Meanwhile Figures 4C shows the number of cases per bucket. The color table color scheme follows the same key as in the previous section.

Jet Fighters From Base in Spain.” *New York Times*, 15 Jan. 1988, p. A1, proquest.com/historical-newspapers/u-s-withdraw-72-jet-fighters-spanish-base/docview/110634991/se-2.

⁶⁶ White, Josh. “Uzbekistan Senate Says U.S. Troops must Leave: Vote Backs Earlier Government Action.” *The Washington Post*, 27 Aug., 2005, pp. 1. ProQuest proquest.com/newspapers/uzbekistan-senate-says-u-s-troops-must-leave/docview/2605784355/se-2.

Case	Interest groups	Financial concerns	Changing geopolitical concerns	Popular movement	Regime type	Confidence level
Canada 1958-1978						Medium
Morocco 1959-1966						High
Iceland 1960-1962						High
UK 1962-1965						High
France 1963-1973						High
Spain 1964-1965						High
Turkey 1965-1966, 1968-1970						Medium
Germany 1967-1970						Medium
South Korea 1971						High
Japan/Okinawa 1970-1978						High
Taiwan 1974-1979						Medium
Turkey 1976-1978						Low
South Korea 1978-1981 (<i>Failed attempt</i>)						High
Greece 1985-1988						High

Figure 4A - Cordial withdrawal factor presence pre-1989 (Bipolar moment)

Case	Interest groups	Financial concerns	Changing geopolitical concerns	Popular movement	Regime type	Confidence level
Belgium 1988-1990, 1992-1994						Medium
Netherlands 1988, 1990-1995						Medium
Turkey 1985-1990						Low
Germany 1987-1996						High
South Korea 1989-1993						High
Phillipines 1989-1993						High
UK 1989-1998						Medium
Italy 1990-1993						High
Spain 1990-1994						Medium
Greece 1990-1995						High
Bermuda 1991-1995						High
Panama 1994-1999						High
Uzbekistan 2003-2006						Medium
Iceland 2006-2009						High
Germany 2010-2013						High
Kyrgyzstan 2012-2019						Medium
Saudi Arabia 2014-2016						No confidence/No data
Germany 2020 (<i>Failed attempt</i>)						High

Figure 4B - Cordial withdrawals factor presence post-1989 (Unipolar moment)




Figure 4C - Cordial withdrawal occurrence by bucket.




Figure 4D - Confidence level distribution across pre-1989 and post-1989 buckets

Table 4D shows remarkably similar spread of confidence level distribution across both the buckets, with no confidence level category having a variation of more than 10% with its bucketed counterparts. This shows that the archive analysis successfully acquired consistent data

throughout the entire 1958-2020 timeframe, providing confidence for the results, while remaining within the expected limitations of archive analysis.

Discussion - pre-1989 and post-1989 buckets

Figure 4C above confirms the second part of my hypothesis. There were four more cordial withdrawal cases in the post-1989 period (18), than in the pre-1989 period (14), demonstrating a higher occurrence of cordial withdrawals in the 1989-2020 period over the 1958-1989 period. Furthermore, as shown in figure 4E below, the post-1989 period also corresponds with a significant increase in cases involving the “changing geopolitical concerns” factor; from 42.86% in the pre-1989 bucket to 88.89% in the post-1989 bucket. Indeed, there is a correlation between changing geopolitical considerations and a post-1989 increased quantity of cordial withdrawals. In turn, as the geopolitical changes in 1989 represent the transition from a bipolar to a unipolar global order, this shift correlates with an increased number of cordial withdrawals. This aligns with Cooley’s findings in *Base Politics*, as much of the U.S. basing cases studies he analyzed (chiefly, in Portugal’s Azores Islands, Spain, Italy, the Philippines, South Korea, the latter four cases being cordial withdrawal cases analyzed in this thesis) had significant levels of withdrawals directly tied to post-Cold War geopolitical changes.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Cooley affirms that the United States found itself in a period without an equal level geopolitical rival, leading to a revaluation of its foreign policy through the Global Defense Posture Review, which calls for a more “flexible” approach of basing policies and military deployments while retaining a global network of military partnerships.⁶⁸ As expected with cordial withdrawals, the bilateral relationships between the U.S. and the highlighted host states persisted after the Cold War, but not without certain levels of troop deployment drawbacks.

⁶⁷ Cooley, Alexander. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*.

⁶⁸ Cooley, Alexander. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*.

Thus, Cooley reaffirms the causes of increasing number of cordial withdrawals after a transition from a bipolar to a unipolar global order.




Figure 4E - Percentages of factor presence in the pre-1989 and post-1989 buckets.

Crucially important for this thesis, Figure 4E above compares percentages of cases in which factors were present in pre-1989 and post-1989 cordial withdrawal cases. This figure dispels the third part of my hypothesis; deploying state factors are not the leading factors in the pre-1989 bucket, and host state factors are not the leading factors in the post-1989 bucket. For the pre-1989 bucket, the deploying state factors of “interest groups” and “financial concerns” are not the leading factors behind pre-1989 cordial withdrawals. The factor with the most presence in the pre-1989 bucket was regime type, a deploying state factor, at 57.14%, followed by financial concerns at 50%. These are followed by popular movement, a host state factor, and interest groups, a deploying state factor, tied at 35.71%. This zig-zag pattern demonstrates there is no dominant factor type in the pre-1989 bucket, while unexpectedly, a deploying state factor has the strongest presence in the pre-1989 bucket.

As for the post-1989 bucket, host state factors did not see their presence increase from pre-1989 cases to post-1989 cases. In fact, both “popular movement” and “host regime” decreased in presence; the former modestly so from 35.71% to 33.33%, and the latter significantly so from 57.14% to 27.78%. Conversely, it was the two other deploying state factors, “interest groups” and “financial concerns”, which increased their presence from the pre-1989 bucket to the post-1989 bucket; the former 35.71% to 66.67%, and the latter from 50% to 72.22%. Unipolar conditions do not “unlock” host state factors, but rather take the back seat as deploying state factors are the dominant factors in the post-1989 bucket.

There are multiple ways to explain the failure of this part of my hypothesis. One possible explanation comes from the domestic political effects of Cold War politics. In the Cold War’s bipolar global order, the United States’ domestic politics were particularly tolerant of foreign military commitments and its associated defense spending. Per Witko in “Cold War Belligerence and U.S. Public Opinion toward Defense Spending,” this is due to the widespread domestic support to retain geopolitical competition against the direct geopolitical competitor of the time in the form of the Soviet Union.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Fordham finds in “Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending,” that during the main debate between the two major parties in the United States during the Cold War was not whether to compete geopolitically with the Soviet Union or not, but rather what were the most effective political and military measures to compete.⁷⁰ Hence, if a cordial withdrawal happened during these bipolar conditions, it is more likely it happened because of something in the host state’s government or civil society. Meanwhile, the deploying state, the United States, has to respond to

⁶⁹ Witko, Christopher. “Cold War Belligerence and U.S. Public Opinion toward Defense Spending.” *American Politics Research*, vol. 31, no. 4, July 2003, pp. 379–403. *SAGE Journals*, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X03031004003>.

⁷⁰ Fordham, Benjamin O. “Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending.” *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 64, no. 1, 2002, pp. 63–88. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2691665>.

said development, despite their reluctance to break its greater geopolitical strategy. This was the case in the Turkey 1965-1970 cordial withdrawal, in which while the United States wanted to retain its status quo presence in Turkish bases, strong popular resistance paved the way for the Turkish host government to take a skeptical stance, and limiting U.S. deployments in the country.⁷¹

However, this changes in a unipolar world. As geopolitical competition takes lesser importance in the post-Cold War unipolar world, the United States weighted new factors in deciding strategic foreign policy actions. Dunning affirms this logic as he wrote how the United States put greater emphasis on political, not strategic, considerations in military aid distribution after the Cold War.⁷² These are changes in the considerations behind cordial withdrawals, rooted by a change in the way the United States measures its immediate priorities.

One can also look at how domestic political considerations in the U.S. have changed since the end of the Cold War. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD) budget has changed significantly since 1989. While the Department's 1989 budget of \$321.87 billion has been surpassed annually since 2001, this has not been the case when the budget is accounted as a percentage of the United States's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The DoD's 5.61% share of the nation's 1989 GDP is larger than its GDP share in every following year, with the closest following years being 1990 at 5.61%, 1992 at 4.97%, and 2010 at 4.90%.⁷³ Although the U.S.'s military budget continues growing in absolute terms, it is now a smaller share of the country's GDP, all while inflation of the U.S. dollar keeps growing. This leads to higher scrutiny of

⁷¹ "U.S. Reduces Armed Forces in Turkey, Turns Over Bases: Around the World." The Washington Post, 08 Feb., 1970, pp. 1. *ProQuest*, [proquest.com/newspapers/u-s-reduces-armed-forces-turkey-turns-over-bases/docview/147785320/se-2](https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/u-s-reduces-armed-forces-turkey-turns-over-bases/docview/147785320/se-2).

⁷² Dunning, Thad. "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa."

⁷³ "U.S. Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2025." *Macrotrends*, Macrotrends LLC, <https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/usa/united-states/military-spending-defense-budget>.

military resources, including military deployments abroad and its corresponding strategic objectives, even as the nation's fiscal resources keep growing.⁷⁴ Furthermore, as reported by Fordham and Flynn in their 2022 article "Everything Old Is New Again: The Persistence of Republican Opposition to Multilateralism in American Foreign Policy," since the end of the Cold War there are sectors in the American political establishment that have show an increasing domestic opposition to multilateralism in favor of isolationist policies.⁷⁵ This suggests an increasing prevalence of isolationist interest groups in the American political system, which have advocated for their cause and eventually seeped into party policies, as geopolitical competition becomes a less salient issue.⁷⁶ Eventually, this translates into changes in the military policy of the United States, the sole remaining superpower of the post-Cold War unipolar moment. Thus, the absence of geopolitical competition has enabled both a reduced share of military spending and a more viable political position for isolationist groups. In turn, these factors are the leading causal factors for cordial withdrawals in this post-Cold War period

Limitations

While the archival analysis stage provides a clear picture of the lineup of U.S.-led cordial withdrawals and their factors, there are some important limitations. First, a factor not being highlighted for a given case is not a guarantee that it is not present in said withdrawal itself. It was either not present, or not reported. This is because independent media coverage does not have all information relating to the withdrawal. Some information may only be transmitted privately between deploying and host state governments, or in other cases, the newspaper source may only have covered the developments that they deemed relevant withdrawal, rather than all

⁷⁴ Cooley, Alexander. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*.

⁷⁵ Fordham, Benjamin O., and Michael Flynn. "Everything Old Is New Again: The Persistence of Republican Opposition to Multilateralism in American Foreign Policy." *Studies in American Political Development*, vol. 37, no. 1, Apr. 2023, pp. 56–73. *Cambridge University Press*, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X22000165>.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

developments. In turn, the explanations given by reporters may not be sufficient to explain the full reasoning behind a cordial withdrawal.

Furthermore, public statements from government officials may not provide all reasoning on a cordial withdrawal, but rather just the most salient one for public audiences. As studied by Min and Katagiri, public signals such as public speeches often have minimal impact on the perception of political and military elites in both their respective country and their counterparts' regarding a political event.⁷⁷ In turn, public facing information on a cordial withdrawal has a difficult time explaining all of its possible facets. Therefore, to address these limitations, there is a need for a secondary analysis stage which scrutinizes direct government correspondence regarding cordial withdrawals.

Findings - Process tracing

With the 66 government documents now analyzed, it is now permissible to do an in-depth examination of the cordial withdrawal process and the relevant causal factors behind the South Korea 1971 cordial withdrawal case.

Background - South Korea 1971

The roots for the 1971 U.S. cordial withdrawal from South Korea were laid in Guam on July 25, 1969, when President Richard Nixon announced the Nixon Doctrine, which called for American allies to pick up an increased share of their own defense budgets, while the U.S. would continue honoring its defense agreements with said allies.⁷⁸ This doctrine was well received by the U.S. Congress, as it had concurrently initiated Department of Defense budget cuts from 1969

⁷⁷ Katagiri, Azusa, and Eric Min. "The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach."

⁷⁸ Nixon, Richard. "Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen." The American Presidency Project, 25 July 1969. presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/informal-remarks-guam-with-newsmen.

all the way to the mid-1970s, in response to the nation's diminishing and unpopular involvement in the Vietnam War.⁷⁹

The cordial withdrawal itself was first conceptualized on November 24, 1969, when President Richard Nixon ordered National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to formulate a plan to cut down U.S. military presence in South Korea in half, while leaving only the air and naval forces necessary for a "retaliatory strike."⁸⁰ The initial proposal pushed for the withdrawal to be enacted by the end of Fiscal Year 1970 (FY70). However, a range of limitations, ranging from a lack of time or resources to pull an organized withdrawal of such scale, to possible ramifications in South Korea's domestic politics, made Nixon's team opt instead for the the beginning of the withdrawal to be delayed until FY71.⁸¹ Hence, after a prolonged planning period, the Nixon administration finalized its withdrawal plan in March of 1970 through the National Security Decision Memorandum 48 (NSDM48). This Memorandum called for a withdrawal plan that emphasized three objectives: "1) The withdrawal of 20,000 American troops from South Korea by the end of Fiscal Year 1971 (FY 1971); primarily 18,400 men from the US 2nd Infantry Division and 1,600 men from temporary US Air Force deployments, 2) A modernization aid plan for South Korea's armed forces, mainly through Congress-approved Military Assistance Programs (MAP) worth \$200 million per year for FYs 1971-75, and 3) Consulting with the Park government to ensure the withdrawal is done in the most agreeable and organized manner possible (and thus reaffirm America's continuous commitment to its mutual defense treaty with

⁷⁹ Taylor Jr., William J., et al. "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970-1990."

⁸⁰ "45. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972*, 24 Nov. 1969, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d45.

⁸¹ United States. Department of Defense. Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (Acting). "Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces from the Republic of Korea [Includes Follow-Up Note].", 1969. *ProQuest*, <https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/withdrawal-u-s-ground-forces-republic-korea/docview/1679061998/se-2>.

South Korea).⁸² This plan called for a three month withdrawal planning stage, and a nine month material and manpower withdrawal period in accordance with the three aforementioned policy goals. This plan aimed to placate Congressional pressure to reduce U.S. force commitments abroad without abandoning South Korea by swapping troop presence with cost-saving military aid linked to the withdrawal.⁸³

There were some major challenges to ensure a successful withdrawal. First, the Nixon administration had to work internally to balance the administration's changing security framework vision with the Korean security parameters previously established in the 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 27 (NSSM 27).⁸⁴ This was particularly challenging as the U.S. sought to withdraw all but one battalion from the U.S.-guarded Panmunjom section of the Korean Demilitarized Zone, so as to decrease the chances U.S. forces were caught in the immediate crossfire of a potential conflict between North and South Korea.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff challenged the NSSM 27's assessment that 12 to 14 Korean divisions would be sufficient to hold off a North Korean attack; they believed 20 divisions (18 South Korean, 2 American) might be enough, but recommended 21 divisions (19 South Korean, 2 American).⁸⁶

⁸² Leal Mendoza, Juan. "Ensuring Gracefulness in Withdrawals: The Dynamics of the Early 1970s American Withdrawal from South Korea."; "56. National Security Decision Memorandum 48." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 20 March 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d56>.

⁸³ "55. Draft Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 4. March 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d55>.

⁸⁴ United States Bureau of the Budget. "Korea Program Analysis Study (NSSM-27)." , 1970. *ProQuest*, <https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/korea-program-analysis-study-nssm-27/docview/1679044621/se-2>.

⁸⁵ United States Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary. "NSDM 48: U.S. Programs in Korea [Attached to Forwarding Memorandum; Includes Attachment]". 20 June 1970. *ProQuest*, proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679044296/BE815501503644BEPQ; United States. National Security Council. Staff. "Korea Decisions [Includes Action Memorandum and National Security Decision Memorandum for President Nixon]." 11 Mar. 1970, *ProQuest*, proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679060589/BE815501503644BEPQ.

⁸⁶ "52. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative to the National Security Council Review Group (Unger) to the Chairman of the Review Group (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 17 Feb. 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d52>.

This added a strong sense of urgency to the delivery of MAP assistance to South Korea so they could modernize their armed forces as the U.S. withdrew forces.

The other major challenge came from the South Korean government's response to the withdrawal. Immediately after Nixon publicly announced the withdrawal plan in November of 1969, South Korean President Park Chung Hee expressed his disagreement with the proposal, claiming that South Korea was not ready to face the threat of North Korea alone, and that this withdrawal made conflict in the Korean Peninsula more likely.⁸⁷ This started bilateral negotiations on the details of the withdrawal, starting through South Korean government discussion with the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, William J. Porter. However, the two most important points of negotiations came from a high profile military summit in Honolulu, Hawaii in July of 1970, and Vice-President Spiro Agnew's visit to Seoul in August of 1970.⁸⁸ These high-profile meetings were key to ensure the success of NSDM 48's pillars by hearing the South Korean leadership's concerns with the withdrawal, consult them on how to adequately navigate the withdrawal, develop a military assistance plan that accommodated the most urgent needs of South Korea's armed forces, and to develop a mutually agreeable public statements regarding the withdrawals to both countries' domestic audience.⁸⁹ South Korea's resistance to the withdrawal

⁸⁷ "46. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 25 Nov. 1969, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d46.

⁸⁸ "67. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Department of State." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 23 July 1970, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d67; "71. Backchannel Telegram From the Ambassador to Korea (Porter) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 25 Aug. 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d71>.

⁸⁹ "71. Backchannel Telegram From the Ambassador to Korea (Porter) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*; United States Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary. "NSDM 48: U.S. Programs in Korea [Attached to Forwarding Memorandum; Includes Attachment]". 20 June 1970. *ProQuest*, proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679044296/BE815501503644BEPQ

slowly mellowed as negotiations continued, due to both progress in the negotiations and a lack of cohesion among the South Korean negotiators.

South Korea's final push to drastically alter the course of the withdrawal came through the "Agreed Minutes" document in October of 1970, which called for South Korean input on future American troop force reductions decisions in the peninsula.⁹⁰ This was promptly rejected by the Nixon Administration. The American withdrawal began on February 5, 1971, while the two nations released a joint public statement concurrently, reaffirming their mutual defence treaty commitments, as millions of dollars in MAP aid surged into South Korea.⁹¹ By the end of 1971, a total of 40,740 U.S. troops would remain in South Korea, a decrease of 21.95% from the 52,197 U.S. troops present in South Korea in 1970, and a decrease of 38.77% from the 66,531 U.S. troops present in South Korea in 1969.⁹²

Process Tracing Factor analysis

Interest groups

There is no evidence pointing to interest groups being a causal factor in the South Korea 1971 case. Neither *Foreign Relations of the United States* nor *The Two Koreas* documents mention any organized lobbying groups, or similar organizations, in the United States seeking for an specific outcome regarding this cordial withdrawal.

While the U.S. Congress was particularly important in shaping this cordial withdrawal due to the budget cuts they imposed on the Department of Defense, this is not sufficient evidence

⁹⁰ "74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 26 Oct. 1970, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d74.

⁹¹ "88. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 5 February 1971, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d88; United States Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary. "NSDM 48: U.S. Programs in Korea [Attached to Forwarding Memorandum; Includes Attachment]"

⁹² Kane, Tim. "U.S. Troop Deployments." *U.S. Troop Deployments*, The American Lyceum. 17 Nov. 2024.

to assert the presence of interest groups.⁹³ These cuts were tied with both the United States's dwindling, and unpopular, role in the Vietnam War and the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, not due to the actions of specific groups that lobbied for a congressional position. As framed by Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winthrop Brown in a February 6, 1970 National Security Council meeting, these cuts were "severe budgetary pressures on the Defense Department," and do not hint at pressures catalyzed by organized lobbying groups.⁹⁴

Financial concerns

There is sufficient evidence to place financial concerns as a factor in the South Korea 1971 case. From the early planning stages of the United States' cordial withdrawal, the Nixon administration noted budget limitations, particularly in regards to congressional allocations. As noted in January 29, 1970 in the "MAP and U.S. Force Levels" telegram, Secretary of State William P. Rogers warned that if the global Military Assistant Program budget is cut down from \$425 million to around \$350 million, as envisioned by the Congressional Conference Committee, then the MAP aid set aside for South Korea would have to be reduced from the original \$164 million to \$140 million.⁹⁵ These conversations align with the evolution of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) budget during the 1970-1971 period: Its budget went down from \$628.64 billion in 1970 to \$565.60 billion in 1971, marking a 10.03% decrease in the Department's budget, and overall was a part of the DoD's continuously shrinking budget from a peak of \$709 billion in 1968 to a low of \$487 billion in 1976.⁹⁶ While the leading cause of these budget cuts were

⁹³ "'Data Page: Military expenditure', part of the following publication: Bastian Herre and Pablo Arriagada (2013) - 'Military Personnel and Spending'. *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, 8 July 2024, <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/military-spending-sipri?tab=chart&time=1965..1981&country=~USA>.

⁹⁴ "51. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972*, 6 Feb. 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d51>.

⁹⁵ "49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea" *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972*, 29 Jan. 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d49>.

⁹⁶ "'Data Page: Military expenditure', part of the following publication: Bastian Herre and Pablo

decreasing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War during those years, this also had a direct relationship with America's changing posture in South Korea. Hence, during a March 1970 National Security Council meeting, an exchange between Undersecretary of State David Packard and Secretary of State Rogers led to a proposal which became central to the Nixon administration's withdrawal strategy: As the U.S. Congress would be skeptical to fund the modernization of 18 to 19 South Korean divisions, this ought to be tied to the proposed withdrawal of 20,000 US troops from the peninsula.⁹⁷ This placated congressional wants for military cuts while providing some form of reassurance of commitment to South Korea.

Tying force withdrawals with Military Assistant Program aid was key to the Nixon administration's withdrawal negotiation strategy. As discussed by Ambassador Porter in the August 1970 *Telegram 4044*, the Nixon administration's communicated in the July 1970 Honolulu conference its intention to tie down force drawdowns with military aid to South Korea, and once again a month later by Porter to President Park himself: If aid and drawdowns are not discussed together, it is likely the former will face trouble in the U.S. Congress.⁹⁸ This remained consistent throughout the rest of the negotiations, and ultimately, the finalized February 1971 joint public statement between the U.S. and South Korea had the same framework that Undersecretary of State Packard Secretary of State Rogers first envisioned eleven months earlier: Concurrent funding for a large-scale modernization of the South Korean army with a withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from the peninsula.⁹⁹ Hence, in the South Korea 1971 case,

Arriagada (2013) - 'Military Personnel and Spending'. *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*.

⁹⁷ "55. Draft Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972*.

⁹⁸ "68. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972*, 4 August 1970, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d68.

⁹⁹ "88. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972*.

congressionally-enforced financial considerations led to increases in military aid to South Korea, which still were a significant cost saving measure in face of the U.S. force withdrawals.

Changing geopolitical concerns

The role of the Nixon Doctrine places changes in geopolitical concerns as a factor in the South Korea 1971 case. After the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration sought to reaffirm the U.S.'s commitments in East Asia, in a way that it was digestible for both the more inwards-looking political climate the U.S. had during the early 1970s, and the U.S.'s partners in the region. Hence, as the Nixon administration continued planning the South Korea 1971 cordial withdrawal, so did it underscore the role of the Nixon Doctrine. In fact, during a January 1970 telegram from Secretary of State Rogers to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Rogers emphasized that as pressure for troop withdrawals in South Korea increased, the Nixon Doctrine allowed for these withdrawals to happen in a politically and diplomatically sound manner.¹⁰⁰ This was emphasized through various National Security Council meetings, whereas Secretary Rogers emphasized the importance of keeping South Korean President Park "on board" throughout the process, so as to maintain support for the withdrawal, and by extension, of the Nixon Doctrine.¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, South Korean leaders had accepted this doctrine, but were worried of unforeseen negative political and psychological effects of commencing the withdrawal process before compensatory MAP aid would enter South Korea.¹⁰² Given the Nixon administration's choice to use this withdrawal to legitimize the Nixon Doctrine's call for U.S. allies to pick up a greater share of their self-defence responsibilities, it is no surprise that once the withdrawal formally

¹⁰⁰ "49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*.

¹⁰¹ "55. Draft Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*.

¹⁰² "57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 23 April 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d57>.

commenced in February of 1971, this was concurrent with increased military material aid for South Korea.

Furthermore, the Nixon Administration retained the same messaging strategy with the U.S. Congress regarding the Nixon Doctrine. In the June 12, 1970 “Consultations on Korean Troop Issue” memorandum, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson sought to frame the “withdrawal for modernization aid” scheme to Congress as an important step in implementing the Nixon Doctrine.¹⁰³ The Nixon Doctrine was an effective bridge between Congressional wants for withdrawals, and the administration’s defence strategy, which facilitated the approval of MAP aid for South Korea. Hence, the Nixon Doctrine communicated to both foreign and domestic actors that the United States’ geopolitical considerations in South Korea changed, making this one of the factors behind this cordial withdrawal case.

Popular movement

No document in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* or *The United States and the Two Koreas* archives mention any form of popular movement advocating for the withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Korea before or during the 1971 case. By extension, no document mentions any form of popular movement in favor of retaining U.S. troop presence in the country, either. A possible explanation for this may be the effect of the polarizing 1971 South Korean Presidential election, which pitted President Park in a tough reelection against the dynamic opposition candidate Kim Dae-Jung. As Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore Eliot Jr. reported in the November 1970 “The Korean Presidential Campaign” memorandum, South Korea’s civil society was focused at the time on the nation’s presidential election, not the withdrawal. Eliot Jr. classified the vigorous and large-scale campaigning from both candidates as

¹⁰³ United States. National Security Council. Staff. "Troop Reductions in Korea [Includes Attachment].", 1970. *ProQuest*, proquest.com/government-official-publications/troop-reductions-korea-includes-attachment/docview/1679061022/se-2.

“hotly contested, sensitive, and even disruptive to internal stability. As this one begins to take shape, it appears it will not be an exception [to a history of tense South Korean elections].”¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, neither campaign was willing to politicize the withdrawal: Per the December 1970 “CIA Memorandum on the South Korean Elections,” Park was satisfied with retaining a public atmosphere of U.S.-South Korean bilateral cooperation as larger U.S. military assistance packages arrived to the Korean Peninsula, while on the other hand, Kim Dae-Jung refused to comment about the withdrawal, so as to avoid potentially antagonizing South Korea’s armed forces, which would expose him to “charges of giving aid and comfort to the enemy.”¹⁰⁵ In turn, there are various reasons to connect South Korea’s domestic political landscape in 1971 to the lack of popular movements in relation to this cordial withdrawal case.

Regime type

Host regime hostility to the United State’s presence was also not present in this case. In fact, South Korea’s *opposition* to the withdrawal was one of the most consistent features throughout the negotiation process. This opposition commenced with President Park’s immediate rejection of the withdrawal plan as soon as it was publicly revealed, as he linked the withdrawal with an increased likelihood of conflict in the Korean Peninsula.¹⁰⁶ Park himself summarized his stance to Ambassador Porter as “If United States proceeds to reduce he will not object [to the withdrawal] but he will not cooperate,” an outcome that the Nixon administration hoped to

¹⁰⁴ “77. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger).” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 6 Nov. 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d77>.

¹⁰⁵ “83. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger).” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 23 Dec. 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d83>.

¹⁰⁶ “46. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon.” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*.

avoid.¹⁰⁷ Park's opposition continued throughout the withdrawal, particularly as he sought for defence assurances, increased aid from the U.S., and "consultation" power over future U.S. troop posturing decisions in South Korea, demands that had different levels of enthusiasm from the U.S.¹⁰⁸ While the final joint communique before the withdrawal formally began in February of 1971 did not give in to such demands, Park did manage to extract significant concessions in the form of restitutory aid funding (though not to the levels he originally wanted), and a pre-withdrawal joint statement reaffirming South Korea's and America's mutual defence commitments.¹⁰⁹ In turn, it also cannot be said that Park's demands to restructure, but not stop, the withdrawal were not met at all.

Additionally, South Korea's 1971 presidential election between President Park and opposition candidate Kim Dae-Jung affected how South Korea's government approached this withdrawal. In the withdrawal's early negotiation phase, the U.S. Embassy Seoul reported that Park rejected American offers in no small part due to the potential risk that an agreement (leading to a withdrawal) would weaken his election-oriented domestic audience messaging that the U.S. cannot reduce its forces in South Korea without his consent.¹¹⁰ Yet, this ended up not being a significant issue for the withdrawal or the election, and as described in the "CIA Memorandum on the South Korean Elections," President Park was happy to retain a public perception of bilateral cooperation as the increased aid packages arrived, while Kim Dae-Jung refused to comment about the withdrawal, so to prevent the risk of antagonizing the nation's

¹⁰⁷ "68. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*.

¹⁰⁸ "74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*.

¹⁰⁹ "88. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*.

¹¹⁰ "60. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 1 June 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d60>.

armed forces.¹¹¹ Moreover, the U.S. concluded the electoral process to be rigged against Kim Dae-Jung, which followed the pattern of Park's increasingly authoritarian rule and unfair elections in South Korea.¹¹² However, this was not a concern for the Nixon administration, as the ever present threat of North Korea trumped any possible spats between Seoul and Washington.

The contrast between the U.S.'s democracy and South Korea's authoritarian regime may not have caused bilateral political difficulties, but ironically, it also weakened South Korea's negotiating leverage throughout the withdrawal. Footnote five in the February 1971 "Agreement with the ROKG on U.S. Troop Withdrawal and Korean Military Modernization" memorandum mentions how Ambassador Porter noticed that President Park's stubborn negotiation demands and his strict deadlines for his ministers led to an unexpected effect in which South Korean negotiators lowered their demands down to purely symbolic ones so to meet Park's expectations by the given deadlines, and avoid dreaded confrontations at home or abroad.¹¹³ Authoritarianism in South Korea may not have been a factor in causing the withdrawal, but ironically, it strengthened America's position in these negotiations. In turn, Park's consistent rejection of a withdrawal without guarantees and the lack of impact of either South Korea's election or its authoritarian internal politics point towards the host regime not being a factor in the South Korea 1971 cordial withdrawal case.

Discussion - Process Tracing

¹¹¹ "83. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*.

¹¹² "87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 3 Feb. 1971, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d87>.

¹¹³ "88. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*.

Process tracing reaffirmed the two factors found in the archive analysis stage for the South Korea 1971 case: Financial concerns and changing geopolitical concerns. Hence, archive analysis and process tracing have successfully implemented distinct research frameworks while arriving at the same conclusions, confirming the specific factors behind the South Korea 1971 case. Similarly to archive analysis, there were enough direct statements in the analyzed government documents to confirm the presence of financial concerns and changing geopolitical concerns, as the Department of Defense faced budget cuts and the administration gave more responsibilities to allied host states through the Nixon Doctrine.

Moreover, process tracing was effective at proving why most factors were not only present, but also absent: For the three absent factors (interest groups, host regime and popular movements), there was either a lack of evidence or statements that ruled out the presence of each factor. Furthermore, direct engagement of U.S. government officials with the South Korean government reaffirms what specific points government officials were looking at in negotiating this withdrawal, while discarding the relevance of some public facing events, such as rhetoric associated with the 1971 South Korean Presidential election. Hence, there was a strong emphasis on compensatory military aid, but not on the effects of the presidential election in the cordial withdrawal. This aligns with Katagiri and Min's writing that national leaders prioritize information intake from private communications over public communications, justifying the presence of intensive process tracing in cordial withdrawal analysis.¹¹⁴

Remarkably, my prediction that process tracing would uncover an additional factor beyond the ones found by the corresponding archive analysis process was not correct. While there was no evidence that interest groups within the U.S. were a causal factor for this withdrawal, the evidence presented implies a connection between public opinion, Congress'

¹¹⁴ Katagiri, Azusa, and Eric Min. "The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach,"

stance, and foreign policy outcomes. This is not an unfound connection, as Lutfullah Mangi and James Lindsay explored, respectively, the U.S. Congress' growing responsiveness to public opinion on foreign policy, and the increasing assertiveness Congress has taken on foreign policy, particularly as the Vietnam War reached its most unpopular period in around the same time the South Korea 1971 cordial withdrawal happened.¹¹⁵ Popular opinion does not equate to interest groups, but process tracing shows a probable connection between public opinion and congressional actions which archive analysis alone did not demonstrate.

Cross-referencing data analyzed in process tracing with other archive analysis cases also helps address limitations in the archive analysis stage. For instance, financial concerns was a factor present in the South Korea 1971 case, as not only was it mentioned in multiple documents, but also cross-analyzed with 1968-1976 Department of Defense budget data. Meaning, these budget cuts were applicable for sampled cordial withdrawal cases in that timeframe, yet, the Japan/Okinawa 1970-1978 and Taiwan 1974-1979 archival analysis cases did not mention financial concerns as a factor. This highlights that archival analysis has limitations based on what the media sources focus on. Archive analysis is effective to cover many cordial withdrawal cases in a large sample, but the most effective cordial withdrawal analysis comes when the former is paired with process tracing, as it may help find gap limitations across the sample. Hence, analyzing cordial withdrawals is most effective when integrating both archive analysis and process tracing stage: Each stage helps analyze public and private perspectives, respectively, of cordial withdrawals, ensuring that there is well rounded information for the given case.

¹¹⁵ Lindsay, James M. "Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 107, no. 4, 1992, pp. 607–28. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2152287>; Mangi, Lutfullah. "Role of Congress and Public Opinion in US Foreign Policy Making." *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 48, no. 3, 1995, pp. 39–54. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393527>.

The South Korea 1971 case also underscores the importance of retaining credible defense commitments through cordial withdrawals. One of President Park's most important and consistent negotiation demands was for the United States to reaffirm its defence commitment towards South Korea, especially as the U.S. withdrew some of its forces in the Korean Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjom.¹¹⁶ This was an intensely negotiated point, but eventually South Korea got the reassurances it wanted in the joint communique as the cordial withdrawal's material stage began in February of 1971.¹¹⁷ The host state sought for the deploying state to reaffirm its commitment, and once achieved, bilateral relations between the U.S. and South Korea have remained strong all the way to the present. Furthermore, as reported by Avey, Markowitz and Reardon, their own analysis of this withdrawal found that it did not lead to increased instability in the Korean Peninsula post-withdrawal, demonstrating that a cordial withdrawal with credible commitment reassurances sustains the bilateral relationship in question.¹¹⁸ In turn, successful cordial withdrawals sustain credible strategic partnerships by sending signals reaffirming existing defence comments.

Conclusion

Understanding cordial withdrawals depends on understanding its causal factors, and the evolution of the relative hierarchy of its causal factors in the face of major geopolitical changes. This thesis achieved that, and framed a clear picture on these unique withdrawals.

Archive analysis demonstrated that cordial withdrawals were more influenced by deploying state factors. The United States prioritized its strategic concerns in foreign military

¹¹⁶ "74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part I, Korea, 1969–1972*.

¹¹⁷ "88. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part I, Korea, 1969–1972*.

¹¹⁸ Avey, Paul C., et al. "Do US Troop Withdrawals Cause Instability? Evidence from Two Exogenous Shocks on the Korean Peninsula."

deployments, and in turn, they are more likely to withdraw if they found that their military deployment abroad was undermined by a factor with immediate impact, regardless of the stance of the host state. Cordial withdrawals, and their causal factors, are also impacted by changes in geopolitical conditions. Archive analysis found an increase of cordial withdrawal cases from the pre-1989 period to the post-1989 period. As these two periods signify the Cold War bipolar moment and the post-Cold War unipolar moment, respectively, it shows that cordial withdrawals are more likely to happen as great powers (chiefly, the United States) do not have the immediate task at hand of balancing a geopolitical rival, in turn, lessening the need for military commitments abroad.

On the other hand, the relative hierarchy of importance of cordial withdrawals' factors was also impacted by this polarity shift. Pre-1989 cases were not dominated by either host or deploying state factors, while post-1989 cases were dominated by deploying state factors. Cordial withdrawal cases during bipolar conditions were more prone to be caused by factors that challenged the United States's presence in the host state, although these factors may come from the deploying state, the United States, too. However, this changes decisively in unipolar conditions, as without the need to prioritize balancing a geopolitical competitor, other domestic political forces within the United States took a greater role in influencing, and even downsizing, military commitments abroad. In turn, geopolitical conditions have an important role in both the occurrence of cordial withdrawals and the evolution of its relative hierarchy of factors.

Lastly, the process tracing stage was effective in addressing the media information gaps limitations found in the archive analysis stage. While the process tracing analysis of the South Korea 1971 case detected the same factors as its archive analysis counterpart, process tracing provided more conclusive evidence on both the presence and absence of each factor due to the

relevant official communications and government documentation found in process tracing.

Therefore, process tracing is an effective way to scrutinize specific cordial withdrawal cases that are found through archive analysis processes. Hence, cordial withdrawals are best analyzed through both extensive and intensive mechanisms that address the limitations of its counterpart research method.

Academically, cordial withdrawals is a novel topic within military international relations. This thesis helps better explain how “peacetime” phenomena in military international relations develops. Its conclusions can also be applied to other concepts related to cordial withdrawals such as negotiations processes, signaling to domestic audiences, and the interchangeability of military aid and military deployments by a deploying state in a host country. Additionally, the relative hierarchy of the five factors matters: For instance, as deploying state factors had the largest presence in cordial withdrawals overall, it suggests that for a cordial withdrawal to not damage the deploying state’s commitment credibility, it is important for the deploying state to also provide a signal of reassurance to the host state, such as a treaty reaffirmation statement or compensatory military aid to the host state— an idea strongly reinforced by the South Korea 1971 case used for the process tracing stage. In turn, the combined archive analysis and process tracing research model helps policymakers and scholars alike understand and engage with future iterations of cordial withdrawals without damaging relevant bilateral relations.

Similarly, this thesis has implications for contemporary military policy, particularly that of the United States. Shifts such as the post-Cold War transition from a bipolar to a unipolar global order change strategic military commitments, and it is important to understand the diplomatic implications of troop repositioning efforts. As the United States continues its strategic “Pivot to Asia,” at the cost of Europe’s traditional strategic primacy, the United States has to

walk a fine line between redeploying troops away from Europe and retaining a credible commitment towards its European NATO allies.¹¹⁹ This pivot will likely involve a number of cordial withdrawals of U.S. troops currently stationed in Europe, with the same factors in play as those analyzed in this thesis. The U.S. cannot afford for this geostrategic pivot to damage its alliances elsewhere in the world. In turn, understanding how cordial withdrawals happen will help prevent political crises between allies as the United States's geostrategic considerations evolve.

Finally, this thesis can be the base for even more significant findings through a number of possible future directions. For the archive analysis stage, future research could expand to media archives that include international news sources. Relying exclusively on U.S.-based newspapers may result in a self-selection effect of the media sources focusing primarily on factors that its U.S.-based audiences are most sensitive to. Adding an archive with international sources, especially sources from the cases' respective host states, may provide a more well-rounded coverage of cordial withdrawals' factors in each case in the archive analysis stage.

Future research could take the process tracing model and apply it to a paired case comparison approach. Given this research is limited to only one process tracing case, while at the same time having an archive analysis stage encompassed of cases in two separate time periods, there is much potential to make paired case comparisons across cases that happened during bipolar and unipolar global orders. For example, the South Korea 1971 case could be paired with the South Korea 1991 case, and the Iceland 1960-1962 case could be paired with the 2006 case, and France 1963-1973 with Spain 1990-1994.¹²⁰ The former two pairs retain the same host

¹¹⁹ Blackwill, Robert D., and Richard Fontaine. "Please Stay: Europe and the Pivot."

¹²⁰ Hess, John L. "U.S. Forces in France Begin Their Withdrawal: Colonel Leaves Evreux Air Base--No Ceremony Is Held at the Take-Off." *The New York Times*, 1 July 1966, p. 2; Hoagland, Jim. "Spain Tells U.S. To Remove F16s: Base Talks Reportedly Halted." *The Washington Post*, 24 Dec. 1987; Taylor Jr., William J., et al. "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970-1990;" "U. S. CONFIRMS CUT IN ICELAND FORCES - ProQuest Historical

countries, which ensures consistency in domestic politics dynamics and historical bilateral relationships between the deploying and host country. Meanwhile, the third pair offers a comparison between two Western European countries whose distinct domestic democratic politics facilitated their respective cordial withdrawal cases, albeit with differences shaped by the distinct geopolitical context of each period. Bucketed process tracing pairs could not only give more analysis on direct government actions surrounding cordial withdrawals' factors, but also show how the U.S. government's decision making shifted before and after 1989, giving further explanations as to why the relative hierarchy of cordial withdrawals changes from a bipolar global order to a unipolar one, and stronger policy recommendations for today's policy makers. In turn, this thesis can be seen as the base for future, larger scale studies on cordial withdrawals. Overall, cordial withdrawals is a topic seldom touched by military international relations scholars, and this research develops an understanding of both its historical occurrences and how to ensure they are enacted successfully without damaging bilateral relations. The withdrawal will remain untelevised, but at last, it will be understood.

Newspapers: *The New York Times* - ProQuest." *The New York Times*, 11 Dec. 1959, p. 3.; White, Josh. "U.S. to Remove Military Forces And Aircraft From Iceland Base." *The Washington Post*, 17 Mar. 2006, p. DCA14.

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President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972*, 6 Nov. 1970, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d77>.

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Appendix 1 - Confidence level justifications

The following table justifies how each case was given its respective confidence level. All cases with a “High” level of confidence are put in one section as all cases with said category meet the criteria for the same reasons.

Case	Confidence level	Reasoning
Any with...	High	<i>Any case with this categorization has abundant backing data and no notable confounding phenomena.</i>
Canada 1958-1973, 1975-1978	Medium	Too large a period for limited coverage found. No explanation on 1974 bump, but given the historical stability of U.S.-Canada relations, likely not too impactful.
Turkey 1965-1966, 1968-1970	Medium	Slight troop increase in 1967, though evidence suggests, but doesn't confirm, it being due to the same withdrawal.
Germany 1967-1970	Medium	One article states the Vietnam War was one of the reasons for this withdrawal.
Taiwan 1974-1979	Medium	1. Difficulty tackling down the effects of Shanghai communique. 2. The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) changes are a bit nuanced for this case: the MDT ended with the U.S. withdrawal, but there is technically still a commitment to defend Taiwan under the Tawian Relations Act.
Turkey 1976-1978	Low	Only indirect information found for this case, as while there is a clear series of event that set U.S.-Turkey relations back, and U.S. activities in bases were hindered, no article specifically connects this to U.S. troop withdrawals. There is also no mention on why US troops left, but anecdotal evidence hints as to why.
Belgium 1988-1990, 1992-1994	Medium	Possibility of the Persian Gulf War distorting data.
Netherlands 1988, 1990-1995	Medium	Possibility of the Persian Gulf War distorting data.
Turkey 1985-1990	Low	No direct information, but rather "accumulated" information from NATO withdrawals in Europe. Even then, nothing touches on the pre 1985-1988 period of withdrawal, before major U.S. withdrawals from continental Europe commenced.
United Kingdom 1989-1998	Medium	Possibility of the Persian Gulf War distorting data.
Spain 1990-1994	Medium	Possibility of the Persian Gulf War distorting data.
Uzbekistan 2003-2006	Medium	The data on this case is good, however, as this cordial withdrawal also marked the end of the working US-Uzbekistan relations, it makes this case close to not meeting the parameters of a cordial withdrawal.
Kyrgyztan 2012-2019	Medium	Possibility of the War in Afghanistan distorting data.
Saudi Arabia 2014-2016	No confidence/No data	Numbers are there, lack of conflict seems to be there, but there are no sources within the archives on this case.

Appendix 2 - Archive analysis sources

This appendix contains articles, divided in case sections, from the *ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times* and *ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post* databases. Each case section contains: A cordial withdrawal case title, a number of articles, and factor explanation based on article(s) sections.

Within each section, each article is given a year and/or month of publication, and a code. For example, “(TAIWAN_1979_NYT_1)” means this is a New York Times article used to explain cordial withdrawal that happened fully, or partially, in the year of 1979, and said article from the NYT is the first one in chronological order. In the factor explanation subsections, that same parenthetical code would indicate the specific article, within the selected cordial withdrawal case, from which that segment originates. Not all segments, or articles, are necessarily quoted in the factor analysis sections.

Canada 1958-1978

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/80-u-s-bases-put-on-list-closing/docview/141544314/sem-2?accountid=14657> (1962) (CANADA_1958_WP_1)
 - “The Defense Department yesterday made public a list of 80 additional base facilities which have been declared surplus under the Kennedy Administration’s drive to eliminate outmoded military installations.”
 - “[Bases] located in 29 States and Canada, the bases or portions of bases cost \$273.8 million originally and when disposed of will save the Government \$5,410,000 a year in maintenance costs, officials said.”
 - “Unlike the original list of 73 bases ordered closed in March, 1961, which eliminated 33,500 jobs, the new closings affect only 682 people. The earlier announcement caused so many repercussions that the Pentagon adopted a policy of making no formal announcements of such actions here. Congressmen are notified of major actions in their areas so they can make local announcements.”
 - “Six U.S. Air Force bases in Canada, built at a cost of \$69 million for the North American Air Defense Command, also will be closed and the stations turned back to Canada.”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/sac-close-canadian-base/docview/142316898/sem-2?accountid=14657> (1964) (CANADA_1958_WP_2)
 - “The last of four U.S. Strategic Air Command refueling bases in Canada is to be closed this summer, Defense Minister Paul Hellyer said today”
 - “Hellyer said the Canadian and United States governments have agreed to end refueling of U.S. aircraft at the Royal Canadian Air Force Base at Namao, near Edmonton.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - “The Defense Department yesterday made public a list of 80 additional base facilities which have been declared surplus under the Kennedy Administration’s drive to eliminate outmoded military installations.” (CANADA_1958_WP_1)
 - “[Bases] located in 29 States and Canada, the bases or portions of bases cost \$273.8 million originally and when disposed of will save the Government \$5,410,000 a year in maintenance costs, officials said.” (CANADA_1958_WP_1)
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - Popular movement
 - Regime type

Morocco 1959-1966

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/u-s-said-agree-leave-morocco/docview/114545689/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Sept 1958) (MOROCCO_1958_NYT_1)
 - “The United States has agreed to the “principle” of progressive evacuation of its important military installations in Morocco, according to authoritative Moroccan sources.”
 - “While Moroccan Government sources privately expressed satisfaction that the United States had agreed to the principle of evacuation of the five bases, Ambassador Charles Woodruff Yost said the United States-Moroccan talks on the bases were still in “a fluid state” and that no ‘decisive step had been taken.’”
 - “...Moroccan sources said that what remained to be determined was how and when the withdrawal would take place. A United States agreement in principle to total evacuation would set a precedent for France and Spain. Each has about 30,000 troops here.”
 - “The bases have been a thorn in United States-Moroccan relations ever since Morocco won independence thirty months ago. The American bases were

established here under the French protectorate by agreement between Washington and Paris without the consent of the Moroccan monarch.”

- “Some well-informed American observers fear the United States evacuation proposal may have come too late. Six months ago the Moroccan Government could have accepted an agreement for progressive evacuation requiring ten to twenty years, these sources said. But now popular opinion and the Moroccan press are so hostile to foreign troops that the Moroccan Government may be forced to reject what Washington considers a reasonable limit.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-affirms-aim-leave-5-bases-held-morocco/docview/114880354/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Oct 1959) (MOROCCO_1963_NYT_2)
 - “The plan to quiet the bases in Morocco and the reduced missile program for Western Europe fitted in with several indications of a contraction of United States military obligations abroad.”
 - “One of the reasons for the cut is the drain on dollars as a result of an unfavorable balance of trade. The Administration has made clear that it is reviewing all of its military expenditures overseas with an eye to cutting dollar costs.”
 - Since obtaining their independence from France, the Moroccans have pressed for evacuation of all foreign forces.”
 - “Today’s statement emphasized that negotiations in Rabat would continue with a view to achieving an agreement regarding withdrawal of United States forces “as soon as possible.”
 - “A strategic factor in the United States’ plan to withdraw at least part of its existing forces overseas is the changing role of manned aircraft in the view of the growing importance of missiles in Western defense. The three major IRBM bases in Europe capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union, as well as shorter range missiles in Europe were cited as consideration in the changing United States attitudes towards the Moroccan bases.”
 - “However, the three major IRBM bases represent a considerably smaller number than originally had been envisioned by the heads of state of the Atlantic Pact countries in December 1957, when they agreed upon the plan.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/us-forces-leave-base-morocco/docview/115054344/sem-2?accountid=14657> (March 1960) (MOROCCO_1963_NYT_3)
 - “The United States Air Force has discreetly evacuated one of its strategic bases here and turned it over to the Moroccan Army without ceremony or fanfare.”
 - “This was the first step toward implementing the agreement concluded last December between President Eisenhower and King Mohamed V for total United States military withdrawal from Morocco by the end of 1963.”

- “The discretion was apparently designed to keep the United States out of a technical dispute between France and Morocco over title to the land occupied by the base at Ben Slimane (formerly called Boulhaut).”
- “The Moroccan Government has been demanding the withdrawal of French troops, stationed here in what Moroccans call a "colonialist sequel" to the former French protectorate. Moroccans have vehemently cited the United States agreement to withdraw as a precedent the French should follow. The transfer at Ben Slimane took place Friday, almost a month ahead of the March 31 deadline for evacuating the first base.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-forces-leave-bases-morocco/docview/116527702/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Sept 1963) (MOROCCO_1963_NYT_4)
 - “...and the last United States Air Force fighting units will leave Morocco Sunday when the Air Force Exchange also will close.”
 - “Also on Jan. 1, the Moroccans will raise their flag over the United States naval-air station of Kenitra (Port-Lyautey), a French base occupied by the United States Navy since November, 1942.”
 - “Since last January, the Air Force has withdrawn all its aircraft and 7,948 military men and dependents. About \$24 million dollars in stores and equipment have been disposed of, 90 per cent to the Department of Defense and the rest in local sales.”
 - “Americans and Moroccans agree that the bases are a heavy liability. When they are empty and unused, about 500 technicians and semiskilled workers are needed to keep utilities like power, water, lighting, sewage and telephones in working order. About 500 guards are needed to stop pilfering and vandalism.”
 - “Another immediate problem is finding new jobs for 4,100 Moroccan employees on the bases, who used to take home an average of nearly \$5 million in wages a year. The Government intends to make them a labor force for its reconversion program, which is still in the study stage.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - “One of the reasons for the cut is the drain on dollars as a result of an unfavorable balance of trade. The Administration has made clear that it is reviewing all of its military expenditures overseas with an eye to cutting dollar costs.” (MOROCCO_1963_NYT_2)
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “A strategic factor in the United States’ plan to withdraw at least part of its existing forces overseas is the changing role of manned aircraft in the view of the growing importance of missiles in Western defense. The three major

IRBM bases in Europe capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union, as well as shorter range missiles in Europe were cited as consideration in the changing United States attitudes towards the Moroccan bases.”

(MOROCCO_1963_NYT_2)

- Popular movement

- “Some well-informed American observers fear the United States evacuation proposal may have come too late. Six months ago the Moroccan Government could have accepted an agreement for progressive evacuation requiring ten to twenty years, these sources said. But now popular opinion and the Moroccan press are so hostile to foreign troops that the Moroccan Government may be forced to reject what Washington considers a reasonable limit.” (MOROCCO_1963_NYT_1)

- Regime type

- “Some well-informed American observers fear the United States evacuation proposal may have come too late. Six months ago the Moroccan Government could have accepted an agreement for progressive evacuation requiring ten to twenty years, these sources said. But now popular opinion and the Moroccan press are so hostile to foreign troops that the Moroccan Government may be forced to reject what Washington considers a reasonable limit.” (MOROCCO_1963_NYT_1)
- Since obtaining their independence from France, the Moroccans have pressed for evacuation of all foreign forces.” (MOROCCO_1963_NYT_2)
- The Moroccan Government has been demanding the withdrawal of French troops, stationed here in what Moroccans call a "colonialist sequel" to the former French protectorate. Moroccans have vehemently cited the United States agreement to withdraw as a precedent the French should follow. The transfer at Ben Slimane took place Friday, almost a month ahead of the March 31 deadline for evacuating the first base.” (MOROCCO_1963_NYT_3)
- “A United States agreement in principle to total evacuation would set a precedent for France and Spain... The bases have been a thorn in United States-Moroccan relations ever since Morocco won independence thirty months ago.” (MOROCCO_1963_NYT_1).

Iceland 1960-1962

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/1-300-u-s-troops-leave-iceland/docview/114798903/sem-2?accountid=14657> (ICELAND_1960_NYT_1)
 - “The Army unit, it was authoritatively learned today, will be assigned to Fort Devens, Mass., where certain Army forces are regarded as committed to the

Atlantic pact. Thus, technically, the removal of the Army forces from Iceland is not viewed as their withdrawal from the Western defense commitments under the pact.”

- “First, it was said, the Army personnel stationed in Iceland had relatively little to do that could not be done by Icelanders or other United States personnel under different arrangements. Withdrawing them to Fort Devens would thus save money”
- “Second, it was said, relations between the United States personnel and the Icelanders have not been harmonious. An incident Sept. 5 forced the withdrawal of the American commander, Brig. Gen. Gilbert L. Pritchard, at the request of the Iceland Government. The incident involved a United States sentry who apparently forced two Icelandic Civil Air Defense officials to lie face down on wet ground while he ascertained their right to enter the base. Yesterday it became known that Negro troops had not been sent to Iceland in deference to objections raised by the government there”
- “It is understood that when Washington first broached the subject of the troop withdrawal to the Icelandic Government, the Icelanders raised objections. The Government appeared to want the Army troops to stay despite its protests from time to time about incidents.”
- “News of the removal of the troops from Iceland is expected to have wide repercussions. Despite repeated denials that the United States will withdraw its ground forces from Europe, dispatches from there now report that European leaders appear to be giving serious thought to the idea.”
- “Only recently, State and Defense Department officials insisted that no troop withdrawals from NATO were contemplated. The subject arose in the wake of Administration efforts to reduce overseas spending.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/u-s-confirms-cut-iceland-forces/docview/114805994/sem-2?accountid=14657>
(ICELAND_1960_NYT_2)
 - “Pentagon officials said that the Army move announced today was a "normal redeployment" that had been considered for two and a half years. They emphasized that it did not constitute a reduction in the United States commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty.”
 - “This was reiterated afterward by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, who said that the existing United States commitments to the treaty forces would be maintained.”
 - “Officials said that the United States would continue to meet its obligations for the defense of Iceland, under a 1951 treaty with Army units now stationed in the United States.”
- The five factors

- Interest groups
- Financial concerns
 - “First, it was said, the Army personnel stationed in Iceland had relatively little to do that could not be done by Icelanders or other United States personnel under different arrangements. Withdrawing them to Fort Devens would thus save money.” (ICELAND_1960_NYT_1)
 - “Only recently, State and Defense Department officials insisted that no troop withdrawals from NATO were contemplated. The subject arose in the wake of Administration efforts to reduce overseas spending.” (ICELAND_1960_NYT_1)
- Changing geopolitical concerns
- Popular movement
- Regime type
 - “Second, it was said, relations between the United States personnel and the Icelanders have not been harmonious. An incident Sept. 5 forced the withdrawal of the American commander, Brig. Gen. Gilbert L. Pritchard, at the request of the Iceland Government. The incident involved a United States sentry who apparently forced two Icelandic Civil Air Defense officials to lie face down on wet ground while he ascertained their right to enter the base. Yesterday it became known that Negro troops had not been sent to Iceland in deference to objections raised by the government there.” (ICELAND_1960_NYT_1)

UK 1962-1965

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/af-close-4-bases-britain-economy/docview/141503333/sem-2?accountid=14657> (UK_1962_WP_1) (June 1961)
 - “Four United States Air Force bases in Britain will be closed and two American combat wings there will be deactivated, simultaneously British and U. S. announcements disclosed yesterday.”
 - “The economic measure- decided on by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara to offset some of the increased military spending ordered by the Kennedy Administration- will not affect United States military strength, Pentagon officials said.”
 - “\$9.2 Million Saving - Nearly 7300 Air Force military personnel will be released for other duties. The closings will take effect between March 1962, and the summer of 1964. An estimated \$9.2 million in annual expenditures will be saved.”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-plans-cuts-af-units-stationed-abroad/docview/141993022/sem-2?accountid=14657> (UK_1962_WP_2) (Oct 1963)
 - “Despite official disclaimers, Pentagon leaders definitely plan a reduction of U.S. military forces in Europe. But it will be Air Force units in Britain, France and Spain, not Army troops in Germany; that will be brought home.”
 - “The near-perfect movement of a composite air strike force from the United States to European bases within nine hours as part of Operation Big Lift not only demonstrated anew the mobility of tactical air power but also pointed the way to further reduction of gold flow losses abroad.”
 - “The fighting united roasts overseas for three-month tours will leave their dependents at home bases and thus cut down on dollars spent abroad...”
 - “B-47 bomber units now are rotated to U.S. bases in Britain and Spain. This will close out some American air bases in England, and reduce activities at U.S. bases in Spain, where three air defense squadrons are based.”
 - “The Air Force chief said that ‘so far as I know, only normal readjustments’ of U.S. tactical air forces in Europe are contemplated. By ‘normal readjustments’, Zuckert said he meant ‘shifting units back and forth,’ and added that he did not care to comment on ‘broad policy aspects.’”
 - “It is known, however, that the Defense Department has definitely decided on some pullback of permanent assigned Air Force units overseas, and reliance on the multibase, rotation plan. Details still have not been spelled to the Air Force.”
 - “Three USAF tactical fighter wings in Britain now are permanently assigned... And two air defense squadrons are in Spain along with B-47 units in Spain and Britain... All are expected to be affected by the Pentagon decision”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-cut-back-b-47s-britain/docview/116604796/sem-2?accountid=14657> (UK_1962_NYT_3) (Nov 1963)
 - “The Pentagon announced today that it would shortly begin cutting back the strategic B-47 bomber forces stationed in Britain.”
 - “The Pentagon, in response to inquiries, denied that the B-47 cutback conflicted with President Kennedy’s statement last week that United States military power in Europe would be maintained. The Pentagon also stressed that the withdrawals of the jet-powered nuclear-armed B-47 bombers from alert duty in Britain would not reduce the United States’ overall nuclear striking power.”
 - “The B-47 reductions are ‘part of the gradual change in the composition of the United States strategic force structure, as Polaris and land-based missiles increase rapidly in numbers’ the Pentagon statement said.”
 - “Administration officials began more than a year ago to talk of ‘phasing out’ the B-47 bombers as obsolescent... At one time the United States had more than

1,200 B-47's, but the total has been reduced to 600 as 'worn out' aircraft were not replaced."

- "Plans to begin cutbacks in Britain were postponed at the time of the Berlin Crisis of 1961... The bombers and tankers now to be withdrawn 'are no longer required for United States air operations from Europe' the Pentagon said."
- "The two B-47 bases to be closed in Britain are at Fairford, in Gloucester, and Greenham Common, in Berkshire. The two remaining 40 B-47 bombers will operate out of the two bases that will continue to be maintained at Brize Norton and Upper Hayford."
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-bomber-force-europe-cut-back-20/docview/141966151/sem-2?accountid=14657> (UK_1962_WP_4) (Nov 1963)
 - "The United States yesterday announced a cutback of about 20 percent in its B-47 nuclear bomber force stationed in Europe."
 - "The Defense Department said 19 of the aging six-jet B-47s will be brought back from Britain by July 1, leaving 80 of the planes in Britain and Spain at least for the time being."
 - "At the same time, 22 propeller-drive KB-50 tanker refueling planes will be retired from service in England."
 - "Giving up 2 bases- Two of four bases used by the Strategic Air Command in Britain will be returned to the Royal Air Force. These are Fairford in Gloucestershire and Greenham Common in Berkshire."
 - "The action, long in the mill, will not mean any reduction in U.S. nuclear striking power covering Europe, the Defense Department said."
 - "The B-47 reduction, the Pentagon said, was made possible by a rapid increase in the number of U.S. polaris missile-firing submarines and in interconnection ballistic missiles."
 - "Authorities are known to be considering some reduction in fighter and other tactical squadrons in Europe... The theory is that such units, equipped with long-distance planes, could be flown to Europe as needed and based at standby fields in France and Germany."
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/2-bases-britain-losing-u-s-tinge/docview/116662572/sem-2?accountid=14657> (UK_1962_WP_5) (Nov 1963)
 - "The Americans are leaving Greenham Common. By next July they will have gone from this air base in the Berkshire countryside and from the base at Fairford in Gloucestershire."
 - "... Vacating them is part of the Air Force's continuing transition from a manned bomber force to missiles."

- “No such prophecies [of withdrawal leading to local economic doom] are being issued this time. No community ever really had a dollar honeymoon with the base in Fairford. And, in a real sense, there is no Greenham Common.”
- The five factors
 - Financial concerns
 - “The economic measure- decided on by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara to offset some of the increased military spending ordered by the Kennedy Administration- will not affect United States military strength, Pentagon officials said.” (UK_1962_WP_1)
 - “\$9.2 Million Saving - Nearly 7300 Air Force military personnel will be released for other duties. The closings will take effect between March 1962, and the summer of 1964. An estimated \$9.2 million in annual expenditures will be saved.” (UK_1962_WP_1)
 - “The near-perfect movement of a composite air strike force from the United States to European bases within nine hours as part of Operation Big Lift not only demonstrated anew the mobility of tactical air power but also pointed the way to further reduction of gold flow losses abroad.” (UK_1962_WP_2)
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “The economic measure- decided on by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara to offset some of the increased military spending ordered by the Kennedy Administration- will not affect United States military strength, Pentagon officials said.” (UK_1962_WP_1)
 - “The Pentagon, in response to inquiries, denied that the B-47 cutback conflicted with President Kennedy’s statement last week that United States military power in Europe would be maintained. The Pentagon also stressed that the withdrawals of the jet-powered nuclear-armed B-47 bombers from alert duty in Britain would not reduce the United States’ overall nuclear striking power.” (UK_1962_NYT_3)
 - “Plans to begin cutbacks in Britain were postponed at the time of the Berlin Crisis of 1961... The bombers and tankers now to be withdrawn ‘are no longer required for United States air operations from Europe’ the Pentagon said.” (UK_1962_NYT_3)
 - “The action, long in the mill, will not mean any reduction in U.S. nuclear striking power covering Europe, the Defense Department said.” (UK_1962_WP_4)
 - “The B-47 reduction, the Pentagon said, was made possible by a rapid increase in the number of U.S. polaris missile-firing submarines and in interconnection ballistic missiles.” (UK_1962_WP_4)

- “Authorities are known to be considering some reduction in fighter and other tactical squadrons in Europe... The theory is that such units, equipped with long-distance planes, could be flown to Europe as needed and based at standby fields in France and Germany.” (UK_1962_WP_4)
- “...Vacating them is part of the Air Force’s continuing transition from a manned bomber force to missiles.” (UK_1962_WP_5)
- Popular movement
- Regime type

France 1963-1973

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/de-gaulle-writes-johnson-on-control-bases/docview/117325189/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Mar 1966) (FRANCE_1966_NYT_1)
 - “He [De Gaulle] said then that ‘everything that is French on the ground, in the air and on the seas, and every foreign element stationed in France, must be under the sole control of French authorities.’”
 - “The letter to President Johnson was reported to deal mainly with the problem of American bases.”
 - “The United States has told France informally that it views President de Gaulle’s plans to revamp the organization of the Atlantic alliance with serious concern.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/france-explains-bid-removal-foreign-bases/docview/117289786/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Mar 1966) (FRANCE_1966_NYT_2)
 - “The text made it clear that President de Gaulle is claiming total sovereignty over all French forces and the entire French territory. No installations that are not under exclusively French control will be permitted to remain in the country.”
 - “The text also showed that France does not proper to enter into negotiations about any of her decisions but will merely “discuss” the practical problems arising from the measures she is taking.”
 - “There is virtually unanimous opposition to the French policy in the other NATO countries. While it is recognized that there is no way to prevent General de Gaulle from carrying out his program, there is optimism that the alliance and its integrated command will survive.”
 - “The French Government, it was stated, is ready to discuss the circumstances in which military facilities on French soil could be put at the disposal of the United States in case of a military ‘conflict in which both countries might participate by virtue of the Atlantic alliance.’”
 - “The message to the members of the alliance stated that France did not want to put the alliance in doubt and would not make use of the right to renounce it in

1969 unless there was an unexpected basic change in East-West relations in the meantime.”

- “The memorandum declared the present form of the NATO organization was no longer acceptable to France for the following reasons: -The threat to Europe that had produced the Atlantic treaty no longer had the same ‘immediate and menacing character.’ -France now has a nuclear armament that, naturally, cannot be integrated. -A nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States has replaced the former American nuclear monopoly. -Europe no longer is the center of international crises; most crises occur in Asia.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/rusk-says-france-isnt-vital-nato/docview/117139785/sem-2?accountid=14657> (April 1966) (FRANCE_1966_NYT_3)
 - “Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared in a newspaper interview published today that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could function perfectly well without France.”
 - “‘Naturally, the 14 countries [that with France make up the alliance] representing 450 million people and disposing of massive military firepower, will not be paralyzed by the attitude of France,’ the Secretary declared in the interview.”
 - “The French, in their most recent note, on March 29, served notice that their forces in Germany would be withdrawn from the organization by July 1. Today’s United States answer stated that the Nuclear war-head agreement of Sept. 6, 1960 would cease to exist on the same date since, according to its text, it had been explicitly confirmed to allied forces integrated in the alliance command.”
 - “The American note also said that the United States would comply with the French request to withdraw its military bases from French soil- but not by the deadline of April 1, 1967, suggested in the last French note. To do so, the United States note said, would mean to take “precipitate action” and could jeopardize the security interests of all members of the alliance.”
 - “It stated that one of the five bilateral French-United States agreements on military facilities stipulated that the contracting parties would have to hold consultations on a possible revision during a period of one year before either of them could denounce the agreement on a second year’s notice.”
 - “The note reminded the French government that the ‘financial problems’ involved in the liquidation of United States and allied installations in France had ‘to be taken into account.’”
 - “Questions French Reasons - It raised the question why the French Government had chosen to end its membership in the integrated defense organization unilaterally in spite of the fact that the United States had on many occasions invented specific French suggestions on how to improve the organization.”

- “He [Rusk] criticized France for having failed ‘to make any suggestion for the reform of NATO’ and for ‘having announced her decision without seriously consulting her allies.’”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-forces-france-begin-their-withdrawal/docview/117200784/sem-2?accountid=14657> (July 1966) (FRANCE_1966_NYT_4)
 - “The United States armed forces began their withdrawal from France today, 22 years and 24 days after their landing in Normandy.”
 - “The departure of American troops from France - they number about 30,000 - comes in response to President de Gaulle’s disengagement from the integrated military commands of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”
 - “France earlier this year notified the alliance as a consequence of this policy American forces here under NATO would have to leave by April of next year.”
 - “He said the French had “treated us real fine.” Many French people told me they hate to see us go,” he added.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - Popular movement
 - Regime type
 - “He [De Gaulle] said then that ‘everything that is French on the ground, in the air and on the seas, and every foreign element stationed in France, must be under the sole control of French authorities.’ (FRANCE_1966_NYT_1)
 - “The memorandum declared the present form of the NATO organization was no longer acceptable to France for the following reasons: -The threat to Europe that had produced the Atlantic treaty no longer had the same ‘immediate and menacing character.’ -France now has a nuclear armament that, naturally, cannot be integrated. -A nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States has replaced the former American nuclear monopoly. -Europe no longer is the center of international crises; most crises occur in Asia.” (FRANCE_1966_NYT_2)
 - “Questions French Reasons - It raised the question why the French Government had chosen to end its membership in the integrated defense organization unilaterally in spite of the fact that the United States had on many occasions invented specific French suggestions on how to improve the organization.” (FRANCE_1966_NYT_3)

- “He [Rusk] criticized France for having failed “to make any suggestion for the reform of NATO” and for ‘having announced her decision without seriously consulting her allies.’” (FRANCE_1966_NYT_3)

Spain 1964-1965

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-plans-cuts-af-units-stationed-abroad/docview/141993022/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Oct 1963) (SPAIN_1964_WP_1)
 - “Despite official disclaimers, Pentagon leaders definitely plan a reduction of U.S. military forces in Europe. But it will be Air Force units in Britain, France and Spain, not Army troops in Germany; that will be brought home.”
 - “The near-perfect movement of a composite air strike force from the United States to European bases within nine hours as part of Operation Big Lift not only demonstrated anew the mobility of tactical air power but also pointed the way to further reduction of gold flow losses abroad.”
 - “The fighting united roasts overseas for three-month tours will leave their dependents at home bases and thus cut down on dollars spent abroad...”
 - “B-47 bomber units now are rotated to U.S. bases in Britain and Spain. This will close out some American air bases in England, and reduce activities at U.S. bases in Spain, where three air defense squadrons are based.”
 - “The Air Force chief said that ‘so far as I know, only normal readjustments’ of U.S. tactical air forces in Europe are contemplated. By ‘normal readjustments,’ Zuckert said he meant ‘shifting units back and forth,’ and added that he did not care to comment on ‘broad policy aspects.’”
 - “It is known, however, that the Defense Department has definitely decided on some pullback of permanent assigned Air Force units overseas, and reliance on the multibase, rotation plan. Details still have not been spelled to the Air Force.”
 - “And two air defense squadrons are in Spain along with B-47 units in Spain and Britain... All are expected to be affected by the Pentagon decision”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-bomber-force-europe-cut-back-20/docview/141966151/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Nov 1963) (SPAIN_1964_WP_2)
 - “The United States yesterday announced a cutback of about 20 percent in its B-47 nuclear bomber force stationed in Europe.”
 - “The Defense Department said 19 of the aging six-jet B-47s will be brought back from Britain by July 1, leaving 80 of the planes in Britain and Spain at least for the time being.”

- “The action, long in the mill, will not mean any reduction in U.S. nuclear striking power covering Europe, the Defense Department said.”
- “The B-47 reduction, the Pentagon said, was made possible by a rapid increase in the number of U.S. polaris missile-firing submarines and in interconnection ballistic missiles.”
- “Authorities are known to be considering some reduction in fighter and other tactical squadrons in Europe... The theory is that such units, equipped with long-distance planes, could be flown to Europe as needed and based at standby fields in France and Germany.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - “The near-perfect movement of a composite air strike force from the United States to European bases within nine hours as part of Operation Big Lift not only demonstrated anew the mobility of tactical air power but also pointed the way to further reduction of gold flow losses abroad.” (SPAIN_1964_WP_1)
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “The Air Force chief said that ‘so far as I know, only normal readjustments’ of U.S. tactical air forces in Europe are contemplated. By ‘normal readjustments, Zuckert said he meant ‘shifting units back and forth,’ and added that he did not care to comment on ‘broad policy aspects.’” (SPAIN_1964_WP_1)
 - “It is known, however, that the Defense Department has definitely decided on some pullback of permanent assigned Air Force units overseas, and reliance on the multibase, rotation plan. Details still have not been spelled to the Air Force.” (SPAIN_1964_WP_1)
 - “The action, long in the mill, will not mean any reduction in U.S. nuclear striking power covering Europe, the Defense Department said.” (SPAIN_1964_WP_2)
 - “The B-47 reduction, the Pentagon said, was made possible by a rapid increase in the number of U.S. polaris missile-firing submarines and in interconnection ballistic missiles.” (SPAIN_1964_WP_2)
 - “Authorities are known to be considering some reduction in fighter and other tactical squadrons in Europe... The theory is that such units, equipped with long-distance planes, could be flown to Europe as needed and based at standby fields in France and Germany.” (SPAIN_1964_WP_2)
 - Popular movement
 - Regime type

Turkey 1965-1966, 1968-1970

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/reported-accord-gives-turkey-more-control-over-u/docview/142930147/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Nov 1966) (TURKEY_1970_WP_1)
 - “Turkish officers and officials will visit and ‘control’ United States military bases in Turkey, under an agreement reached with U.S. authorities, a Turkish spokesman said today.”
 - “The agreement is seen as the result of street demonstrations and pressures for changing the status of U.S. bases and American personnel in Turkey. Political parties, as well as writers and students, have joined the demands”
 - “It was also reported the United States will reduce the number of American military personnel dependents stationed there.”
 - “Negotiations are continuing on revision of Turkish-American agreements about the bases, which many Turks consider incompatible with Turkey’s sovereignty.
 - “A Turkish delegation comprising three generals and four Foreign Ministry officials dealing with the agreements this week visited the U.S. at Karamursel.”
 - “... Reportedly, many [U.S. military personnel] will be moved from cities and towns to quarters on the military base areas. The decision is said to have been taken because of growing anti-Americanism displayed in recent riots.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-transfers-base-turkey/docview/143346404/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 1968) (TURKEY_1970_WP_2)
 - “The United States today turned over a \$13-million electronic communications center at Manzalari, 25 miles from Ankara, to Turkish military authorities.”
 - “American Ambassador Parker T. Hart attended the ceremony. The move was a part of a transfer of American bases to Turkey within the NATO framework.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-role-turkey-backed/docview/118800809/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1970) (TURKEY_1970_NYT_3)
 - “Premier Suleyman Demirel today defended the United States military presence in Turkey and said “Nothing that will harm our independence and sovereignty will ever come from the existence of these establishments.”
 - “Dr. Demirel said that what were called American bases by leftists in Turkey were in fact joint defense establishments.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-reduces-armed-forces-turkey-turns-over-bases/docview/147785320/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Feb 1970) (TURKEY_1970_WP_4)

- “The United States has reduced its military forces in Turkey from 23,00 to 7,000 since 1965 and by June will have turned over to Turkey facilities worth \$40 to \$50 million, Premier Suleyman Demirel disclosed yesterday”
- “Demirel said that since 1965, when his Conservative Party came to power U.S. spy flights from Turkish bases over the black Sea bordering the Soviet Union have been prohibited.”
- “The disclosure came as a news conference called by Demirel to defend Turkey’s membership in NATO and agreements with the United States on the presence of American facilities and personnel in Turkey.”
- “Criticism of those relations has been growing among the press and among Turkish intellectuals in recent years.”
- “Demirel said that when the U.S. has completed turning over to Turkish forces two communication facilities outside of Ankara and Istanbul, two Black Sea coast radar stations and a large strategic air base near Izmir on the Aegean Sea, U.S. military personnel in Turkey will number 6,000.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - Popular movement
 - “The agreement is seen as the result of street demonstrations and pressures for changing the status of U.S. bases and American personnel in Turkey. Political parties, as well as writers and students, have joined the demands.” (TURKEY_1970_WP_1)
 - “... Reportedly, many [U.S. military personnel] will be moved from cities and towns to quarters on the military base areas. The decision is said to have been taken because of growing anti-Americanism displayed in recent riots.” (TURKEY_1970_WP_1)
 - “Criticism of those relations has been growing among the press and among Turkish intellectuals in recent years.” (TURKEY_1970_WP_4)
 - “Dr. Demirel said that what were called American bases by leftists in Turkey were in fact joint defense establishments.” (TURKEY_1970_NYT_3)
 - Regime type
 - “Demirel said that since 1965, when his Conservative Party came to power U.S. spy flights from Turkish bases over the black Sea bordering the Soviet Union have been prohibited.” (TURKEY_1970_WP_4)

Germany 1967-1970

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-plans-cut-30-000-gis-europe/docview/143195721/sem-2?accountid=14657> (April 1967) (GERMANY_1967_WP_1)
 - “American forces in West Germany would be cut by about 30,000 men under plans now being worked out by the United States, Britain and Germany.”
 - “The troop-cut decision is part of a mackage now being worked out by the three nations in a series of tripartite talks the last of which is expected to take place later this month in London.”
 - “Involved in the financial arrangements is a plan under which Germany would purchase \$5000 million worth of U.S. Treasury bonds. Germany is also being pressed to pledge that for at least one year beginning next July 1 it will not cash in any of its dollar holdings for gold.”
 - “This latter step... would represent a major gain for the United States in halting at least for a time the outflow of gold from this country.”
 - “At the beginning of the tripartite talks last fall there was some hope that the Soviet Union would agree in negotiations to cut its forces in Eastern Europe if the NATO nations trimmed their forces. But that hope now appears to have been abandoned.”
 - “Instead, it was said here yesterday, the hope now is that the Soviets in time will make their own matching but equally unilateral cuts. Some Soviet troops reportedly have recently been pulled out of Hungary.”
 - “The American troop-cut proposal was reported to have been put by President Johnson to German Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger in a recent letter. Kiesinger was said to have responded that he had no objection.”
 - “Whether the proposed American cut will satisfy Senate critics, however, remains to be seen. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) has pending a resolution calling for “substantial reductions.” He has 43 co-sponsors. Many of the senators believe that four of the six divisions could be brought home, a large cut than that now contemplated.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pinch-vietnam-being-felt-u-s-forces-germany/docview/117699367/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Vietnam causing soldiers to leave -> Is it really cordial?) (May 1967) (GERMANY_1967_NYT_2)
 - “The Seventh Army, responsible if war should come for staying off an attack in the southern part of West Germany, has only 68 per cent of its authorized officers. It has less than 50 per cent of its majors and 65 percent of its captains. It has less than 80 per cent of its authorized sergeants, but 121 per cent of the privates and corporals.”

- “The reason for this shortage of officers and noncommissioned officers can be summed up in one word: Vietnam. Experienced officers and men have been pulled out of the European Theater for duty in Vietnam and in Vietnam-oriented training camps in the United States.”
- “The Soviet and East German troops on the other side of the border have made it easier of late. Until the middle of January, Colonel Anderson said, minor border incidents were a common occurrence... ‘Suddenly, about the middle of January all these harassments stopped,’ he said.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-will-cut-forces-germany-35-000/docview/117650080/sem-2?accountid=14657> (May 1967) (GERMANY_1967_NYT_3)
 - “The redeployed [US and UK] ground and air units will remain committed to NATO, and under a rotation plan they will be periodically assigned to temporary duty in West Germany.”
 - “The redeployment represents the first major withdrawal of United States troops from Europe in 16 years. Last year, because of the demands of the Vietnam War, about 15,000 specialists were temporarily withdrawn from Europe to help train new troops in the United States. They have since been replaced, generally with more inexperienced troops.”
 - “The deployment plans, along with the accompanying financial agreements to offset the future foreign exchange costs to Britain and the United States of stationing forces in West Germany, were jointly announced in Washington, Bonn and London.”
 - “But there remained the political question whether the redeployment would be large enough to satisfy Senate critics... The initial Senate reaction, however, was favorable... Senator Mansfield said that the proposed redeployment ‘is enough for the time being. It is an indication of good faith and of facing up to the realities of 1967.’”
 - “In the tripartite talks, according to officials, considerable discussion focused on whether there had been a lessening of the Soviet military threat. The general conclusion reached in the discussions, according to officials, was that although there might have been a change in Soviet ‘intentions,’ as contended by the British, there had been no change in Soviet military capabilities in eastern Europe.”
 - “When dependents are included, the 35,000-man withdrawal will save the United States about \$100-million in foreign exchange costs.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “Whether the proposed American cut will satisfy Senate critics, however, remains to be seen. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) has

pending a resolution calling for “substantial reductions.” He has 43 co-sponsors. Many of the senators believe that four of the six divisions could be brought home, a large cut than that now contemplated.”

(GERMANY_1967_WP_1)

- “But there remained the political question whether the redeployment would be large enough to satisfy Senate critics... The initial Senate reaction, however, was favorable... Senator Mansfield said that the proposed redeployment ‘is enough for the time being. It is an indication of good faith and of facing up to the realities of 1967.’”

(GERMANY_1967_NYT_3)

- Financial concerns

- “Involved in the financial arrangements is a plan under which Germany would purchase \$5000 million worth of U.S. Treasury bonds. Germany is also being pressed to pledge that for at least one year beginning next July 1 it will not cash in any of its dollar holdings for gold.”

(GERMANY_1967_WP_1)

- “When dependents are included, the 35,000-man withdrawal will save the United States about \$100-million in foreign exchange costs.”

(GERMANY_1967_NYT_3)

- Changing geopolitical concerns

- “The Seventh Army, responsible if war should come for staying off an attack in the southern part of West Germany, has only 68 per cent of its authorized officers. It has less than 50 per cent of its majors and 65 percent of its captains. It has less than 80 per cent of its authorized sergeants, but 121 per cent of the privates and corporals.” (GERMANY_1967_NYT_2)

- “The reason for this shortage of officers and noncommissioned officers can be summed up in one word: Vietnam. Experienced officers and men have been pulled out of the European Theater for duty in Vietnam and in Vietnam-oriented training camps in the United States.”

(GERMANY_1967_NYT_2)

- “The redeployed [US and UK] ground and air units will remain committed to NATO, and under a rotation plan they will be periodically assigned to temporary duty in West Germany.” (GERMANY_1967_NYT_3)

- “The redeployment represents the first major withdrawal of United States troops from Europe in 16 years. Last year, because of the demands of the Vietnam War, about 15,000 specialists were temporarily withdrawn from Europe to help train new troops in the United States. They have since been replaced, generally with more inexperienced troops.”

(GERMANY_1967_NYT_3)

- Popular movement

- Regime type

South Korea 1971

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-troop-cut-south-korea-reported-sought-save/docview/118856879/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 1970) (SK_1971_NYT_1)
 - “A leading Defense Department official said today that strong budgetary pressures were forcing the Administration to seek agreement for the removal of a large part of America's 64,000- man military force from South Korea over two or three years, starting next year.”
 - “To compensate for the projected reduction, Administration officials say they are prepared to seek a special Congressional outlay of about \$1 - billion, spread over five years, to modernize the Korean Army.”
 - “But one source, stating a position that will probably be offered to Congress, declaring that the cost could be more than offset by demobilizing one of the divisions withdrawn from Korea.”
 - “These projected withdrawals would be the first application of the so -called Nixon doctrine aside from Indochina. First enunciated by the President last summer in Guam, the doctrine calls for Asians to shoulder the burden of their own defense and one another's defense, with American material support if necessary.”
 - “The decision to press for reductions of American troops in South Korea is a result of an 18-month study that began during the Johnson Administration and was incorporated into an early Nixon Administration study by the National Security Council.”
 - “The study looked to a gradual reduction of American forces, over five or more years, as South Korean forces were modernized. But heavy budgetary pressures have convinced Administration leaders that they must try to accelerate withdrawals, officials say.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/seoul-protests-u-s-plan-withdrawal/docview/118849638/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 1971) (SK_1971_NYT_2)
 - “A high-ranking aide of President Chung Hee Park accused the United States today of ‘a breach of international faith’ in planning to withdraw troops from South Korea... ‘Now they are talking about pulling their forces out,’ he added, ‘and we are very disappointed.’”
 - “A Washington dispatch printed in The New York Times last Friday quoted a high Defense Department official as saying that budgetary pressures were compelling the Nixon Administration to seek South Korean agreement for withdrawal of a large part of the United States's 64,000 -man force here. It said that secret

negotiations were expected to start in Seoul in a few weeks to work out a withdrawal schedule.”

- “These sources added, however, that strong protests by the South Korean Government had persuaded the Nixon Administration to postpone the start of the withdrawal until next year.”
- “President Park, in a statement June 8 replying to questions from a group of Opposition politicians, declared that maintenance of the current strength of United States forces in Korea was necessary to meet the threat posed by the Communist regime in North Korea”
- “‘To reduce your forces now is to invite danger for us,’ he asserted. ‘The next five years are crucial for us, the years when the possibility that Premier Kim II Sung [of North Korea] will act against us is greatest,’”
- “But an indication of the seriousness with which the Government regards the reported withdrawal plans was the fact that the Blue House aide warned that an American pull out might lead many poor South Koreans to consider switching their allegiance to the Communists of North Korea.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/seoul-chief-terms-u-s-troops-vital/docview/118912774/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 1970) (SK_1971_NYT_3)
 - “President Chung Nee Park said today that the continued presence of American troops in South Korea was ‘absolutely necessary’ until this country has built up its own capability to defend itself against Communist aggression.”
 - “‘I understand’ President Park said, ‘that the talk of troop reduction came up in the course of studies for a global cutback on America’s overseas bases in accordance with the so-called Nixon Doctrine, which is not limited to Korea.’”
 - “Mr. Park called on the South Korean people and the military forces to discard any excessive dependence on outside help and to make maximum efforts to build up ‘a self-reliant defense capability.’”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-cut-korea-force-up-40-pct/docview/147920081/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Formal announcement) (July 1970) (SK_1971_NYT_4)
 - “The United States has formally notified South Korea that it intends to make ‘some reduction’ in American forces stationed in that country since the end of the Korean War 17 years ago.”
 - “Porter said the cut related to both the administration’s world-wide base and force level study and to the Nixon Doctrine.”
 - “Officials reported Rogers had said that any decision on the timing of a pullout and on the number involved will be made in the light of the firm U.S. resolve wholly to meet its treaty commitments to the Republic of Korea and only after full consultation and discussion.”

- “Talk in Washington of a Korean force cut has been heard for several years but current budget pressures are thought to be the chief motivating force for action now. Both the review of the Fiscal Year 1971 budget, for the year which began July 1, and for Fiscal 1972 make military manpower cuts inescapable.”
- “Judging by word from Seoul, the Korean capital, such a cut would produce a Korean decision to call home some or all of the 50,000-man force now in South Vietnam.”
- “Park warned that North Korea, which invaded the South in 1950 and is now engaged in border forays plus violent propaganda, has completed preparation for another war.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/koreans-soften-stand-on-cutback/docview/117965448/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Aug 1970) (SK_1971_NYT_5)
 - “The South Korean Government is prepared to start serious talks on United States plans to withdraw about one third of its troops as soon as “iron-clad assurances” have been provided for modernizing the South Korean armed forces.”
 - “When it was first disclosed, about two months ago, that the United States intended to make large reductions in its forces here, the Korean Government announced strong opposition to any cuts, at least until 1976, when the country's next economic development plan would be expected to increase its ability to carry a larger defense burden. There were even warnings that the 19-member Cabinet, led by Premier Chung Il Kwon, might resign if the United States persisted in its withdrawal plan.”
 - “At the conference with United States officials on defense problems on July 21 and 22 in Honolulu, the Korean delegation would only talk about modernization plans, not force reductions.”
 - “Since that time, senior American and Korean generals have been meeting to draw up list of military equipment that Seoul considers essential for its defense against North Korea.”
 - “The American bargaining strategy here has been to insist that price tags be disregarded in discussions, and that the focus instead be placed on what equipment is absolutely necessary to replace some of the World War II and Korean war weapons that constitute the bulk of South Korea's armament.”
 - “Once a modernization plan has been agreed on, military and diplomatic sources here expect the two countries will start serious discussions on American troop cuts, which United States officials hope to complete by June 30.”
 - “He declined to amplify, but other sources said South Korea would prefer that the United States, in any withdrawal, pull out two brigades from one division and one brigade from the other, allowing South Korean brigades to replace them, under American command.”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-will-hold-up-korean-pullouts/docview/119240072/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1971) (SK_1971_NYT_6)
 - “President Nixon has directed the Defense Department to delay Indefinitely plans for troop withdrawals from South Korea beyond the 20,000 men scheduled to be removed by June, according to Administration sources.”
 - “The sources said that some ranking Defense Department and Army officials had been eager to continue the reductions, primarily for budgetary reasons.”
 - “But since then, according to informed sources, State Department officials have argued that further cuts in the near future might give Asians the impression that the United States was making a hasty retreat from the Far East despite its pledge to fulfill its commitments there.”
 - “A quick second round of troop cuts in Korea, officials added, might have caused serious political problems in South Korea, where national elections are scheduled this spring.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - “A leading Defense Department official said today that strong budgetary pressures were forcing the Administration to seek agreement for the removal of a large part of America's 64,000- man military force from South Korea over two or three years, starting next year.” (SK_1971_NYT_1)
 - “The study looked to a gradual reduction of American forces, over five or more years, as South Korean forces were modernized. But heavy budgetary pressures have convinced Administration leaders that they must try to accelerate withdrawals, officials say.” (SK_1971_NYT_1)
 - “Talk in Washington of a Korean force cut has been heard for several years but current budget pressures are thought to be the chief motivating force for action now. Both the review of the Fiscal Year 1971 budget, for the year which began July 1, and for Fiscal 1972 make military manpower cuts inescapable” (SK_1971_NYT_4)
 - “The sources said that some ranking Defense Department and Army officials had been eager to continue the reductions, primarily for budgetary reasons.” (SK_1971_NYT_6)
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “These projected withdrawals would be the first application of the so-called Nixon doctrine aside from Indochina. First enunciated by the President last summer in Guam, the doctrine calls for Asians to shoulder

the burden of their own defense and one another's defense, with American material support if necessary.” (SK_1971_NYT_1)

- “‘I understand’ President Park said, ‘that the talk of troop reduction came up in the course of studies for a global cutback on America’s overseas bases in accordance with the so-called Nixon Doctrine, which is not limited to Korea.’” (SK_1971_NYT_3)
- Popular movement
- Regime type

Japan/Okinawa 1970-1978

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-is-pondering-what-do-with-weapons-on-okinawa/docview/117887809/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Sept 1970) (JAPAN_1972_NYT_1)
 - “The Nixon Administration is having trouble deciding what to do with the hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons that must be moved off Okinawa before the island reverts to Japanese control in 1972.”
 - “One thorny question being debated is whether the weapons should be moved back to the United States or redistributed to existing storage sites on Guam, in South Korea and on Taiwan.”
 - “Some officials, particularly in the Defense Department, would prefer to move them as far forward as possible to counter any loss of deterrent power in relation to Communist China and North Korea arising from American troop withdrawals from Asia.”
 - “Other officials, notably in the State Department, maintain that the stationing of additional nuclear weapons on the rim of Asia could create more problems than they solved.”
 - “Knowledgeable officials say President Nixon must resolve the entire issue fairly soon because of the many months thought necessary to negotiate new basing arrangements if the weapons are to be moved to South Korea or Taiwan and because of the preparations necessary.”
 - “Formally, the United States does not acknowledge that it has nuclear weapons on Okinawa-or in Korea or on Taiwan, for that matter-but officials concede that potential enemies have little doubt where such weapons are because of the odd-shaped concrete and earthen storage ‘iglaos,’ characteristically protected by three barbed-wire fences and manned by special troops, in which they are stored.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/atomic-arms-ban-on-okinawa-asked/docview/119280297/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Japanese want Okinawa nuke ban) (June 1971) (JAPAN_1972_NYT_2)

- “A major battle over ratification may develop in the Senate. There appears to be little dispute about the merits of the treaty, but some Southern Senators may attempt to hold up ratification to force Japan to impose additional restraints on her textile exports to this country.”
- “Under the provisions of the treaty, the United States no longer will be able to launch air or ground military operations from Okinawa without Japanese Government approval.”
- “The agreement also obliquely prohibits the United States from storing nuclear weapons on the island after reversion without Japanese consent.”
- “The official, who under the rules of the briefing cannot be identified, confirmed that Japan was compensating the United States for the expense of removing ‘nuclear weapons’ from Okinawa.”
- “He also said that prior consultation would be required before United States aircraft or submarines carrying nuclear weapons could be put into Japanese ports or airports temporarily.”
- “Japan is to provide \$320-million in compensation to the United States over the next five years for the civilian and military facilities being turned over under the agreement.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historic-al-newspapers/okinawa-islands-returned-u-s-japanese-rule/docview/119419973/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Okinawa transferred) (Nov 1971) (JAPAN_1972_NYT_3)
 - “Premier Eisaku Sato’s governing Liberal-Democratic party and two moderate opposition parties adopted a resolution today calling for a ban on nuclear weapons on Okinawa.”
 - “The three-party resolution also demanded that the Japanese Government impose limits on American use of United States military facilities on Okinawa after it and the other islands of the Ryukyu chain are returned to Japanese rule in 1972 by the United States. The resolution was adopted unanimously by the House of Representatives special committee on Okinawa affairs.”
 - “Japanese leftists have been demonstrating almost daily this month against the American-Japanese agreement on Okinawa’s reversion because it would allow United States forces to stay on the island and does not specify that American nuclear weapons be removed.”
 - “Premier Sato has said that nuclear weapons will be gone by the time the island is returned to Japanese rule. Other limits on United States bases also are envisioned since the American-Japanese security treaty-which regulates bases in Japan-will apply to Okinawa after it is returned.”
 - “About 60,000 workers demonstrated in Tokyo today in a continuing protest against the reversion treaty. The police said they arrested one person for possession of a fire bomb.”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pact-okinawa-return-signed/docview/119269532/sem-2?accountid=14657>
(Okinawa pact signed- no nukes in island) (May 1972) (JAPAN_1972_NYT_4)
 - “The return of Okinawa to Japan after 27 years of American rule was celebrated at colorful ceremonies here this morning and hailed as marking a new phase in friendly relations between Japan and the United States.”
 - “This morning’s ceremonies, heavily guarded against possible disruption by political factions that object to the continued presence of United States military bases on Okinawa...”
 - “Secretary of State William P. Rogers marked the reversion today by sending a letter to Japan’s Foreign Minister, Takeo Fukuda, giving assurance that the islands were being turned back to Japan free of nuclear weapons.”
 - “In agreements with the Japanese Government, American officials are committed to consult first with Japanese authorities before moving any United States forces from Japan into combat.”
 - “From now on, without consulting Japan, the United States will not be able to fly B-52 bombers from Okinawa to strike Communist forces in Indochina...”
 - Mr Agnew read a proclamation... ‘the fulfillment of a long held aspiration of the people of Japan and the people of Okinawa to be reunited.’”
 - “The continued major American military presence on Okinawa has caused critics of the United States and opponents of the Sato Government in Japan and Okinawa to protest the terms of the Okinawa transfer.”
 - “Tens of thousands of demonstrations were expected to turn out in Tokyo today to express opposition to the terms of the Okinawa reversion and to the facilities that American bases in Japan and Okinawa provide for military operations in Indochina.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “A major battle over ratification may develop in the Senate. There appears to be little dispute about the merits of the treaty, but some Southern Senators may attempt to hold up ratification to force Japan to impose additional restraints on her textile exports to this country.”
(JAPAN_1972_NYT_2)
 - Financial concerns
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - Popular movement
 - “About 60,000 workers demonstrated in Tokyo today in a continuing protest against the reversion treaty. The police said they arrested one person for possession of a fire bomb.” (JAPAN_1972_NYT_3)

- “The continued major American military presence on Okinawa has caused critics of the United States and opponents of the Sato Government in Japan and Okinawa to protest the terms of the Okinawa transfer.” (JAPAN_1972_NYT_4)
- “Tens of thousands of demonstrations were expected to turn out in Tokyo today to express opposition to the terms of the Okinawa reversion and to the facilities that American bases in Japan and Okinawa provide for military operations in Indochina.” (JAPAN_1972_NYT_4)
- Regime type
 - “Premier Eisaku Sato’s governing Liberal-Democratic party and two moderate opposition parties adopted a resolution today calling for a ban on nuclear weapons on Okinawa.” (JAPAN_1972_NYT_3)
 - “The three-party resolution also demanded that the Japanese Government impose limits on American use of United States military facilities on Okinawa after it and the other islands of the Ryukyu chain are returned to Japanese rule in 1972 by the United States. The resolution was adopted unanimously by the House of Representatives special committee on Okinawa affairs.” (JAPAN_1972_NYT_3)

Taiwan 1974-1979

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-has-removed-combat-aircraft-based-on-taiwan/docview/120376004/seam-2?accountid=14657> (June 1975) (TAIWAN_1979_NYT_1)
 - “The United States has quietly withdrawn its last combat aircraft based in Taiwan and plans to cut the size of the remaining American military force there by 30 per cent to 2,800 men by the end of this month, a ranking State Department official said today.”
 - “The phase-out is taking place in conformity with the pledge made by the United States to Peking during former President Richard M. Nixon’s visit in February, 1972, the official said.”
 - “In the Shanghai communiqué issued at the close of that visit, the United States said its ‘ultimate objective’ was the withdrawal of all American forces and the closing of all military installations on Taiwan.”
 - “There were no American combat aircraft on Taiwan at the time of the Shanghai communiqué, but in November 1972, two squadrons—a total of 36 planes—of F-4 Phantom fighterbombers were flown in for temporary assignment.”
 - “The number of American personnel in Taiwan had remained at 4,500 to 5,000 in recent months, and there had been some speculation that, because of the need to

show American firmness in Asia in the wake of the Vietnam turnover, the Americans would suspend the phase-out.”

- “But the decision to cut the total of Americans to 2,800 indicated, the official said, that plans are going ahead. He said that the United States still planned, over the long-run, to withdraw its entire military contingent.”
- “The Peking leaders are believed here to have shown moderation following the American setbacks in Vietnam and Cambodia, and are reported to have counseled North Korea to act with restraint and not to try to unify Korea by military means.”
- “Chinese officials have told visitors lately of their displeasure over the slow pace in the ‘normalization’ of Peking-Washington relations, but there have been no signs yet that the Ford Administration is ready to switch diplomatic ties to Peking away from Taiwan.”
- “Moreover, because of conservative support in this country for Taiwan, many State Department officials doubt that Mr. Ford would risk alienating conservative Republicans on the approach of the Presidential race by dropping support for Taiwan.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-continue-withdrawal/docview/146527980/sem-2?accountid=14657> (March 1976) (TAIWAN_1979_WP_2)
 - “A government spokesman said yesterday the United States would continue to withdraw troops from Taiwan in accordance with the 1972 Shanghai agreement signed by Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai and President Nixon.”
 - “State Department spokesman John Trattner neither confirmed nor denied a report in yesterday’s Boston Globe that President Ford had promised Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping last year that the U.S. troop level on Taiwan would be cut in half. (Other sources, however, confirmed that President Ford did assure Peking’s leaders of the step-by-step cutback in force levels on Taiwan)”
 - ““We are going to continue the process of reducing troop level on Taiwan consistent with the principles adopted in the Shanghai Communique, but I do not want to get into a timetable of reductions,” Trattner said.”
 - “...The United States and Taiwan have a mutual defense treaty dating back from 1954.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-reported-cutting-taiwan-force-sharply/docview/146864000/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 1978) (TAIWAN_1979_WP_3)
 - “The Carter administration is planning a significant cut in the size of the U.S. military force on Taiwan in the next four months, according to American servicemen on the island - a step that is seen as a signal of U.S. interest in closer relations with Peking.”

- “Any major acceleration of the pace of U.S. military reductions here would come on the heels of White House national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's recent visit to Peking.”
- “Brzezinski strongly endorsed normalization of relations with Peking during the trip. He also made several statements sharply critical of the Soviet Union that appeared to signal his interest in using stronger ties with Peking to counter Soviet moves in Africa and elsewhere.”
- “Servicemen Taiwan say an unusual number of enlisted men and officers have been told recently they will be leaving in the next few months, before their normal rotation dates. Co-workers have been told there will be fewer replacements and that their units, mostly engaged in communications, maintenance, housekeeping and entertainment work, must get with smaller staffs.”
- “‘The best way to think of this is a gradual decrease which has been going on for five years and is continuing to go on,’ he said. ‘Right now all the future holds is continued reduction. Right now it is about 1,000 and you can project it out as far as you want.’”
- “The U.S. government has rarely made any formal announcements of its successive military reductions on Taiwan. Servicemen on the island say those privy to personnel plans report that a 40 per cent reduction is tentatively scheduled for Oct. 1, but they do not know if that plan is final.”
- “In the Shanghai communique negotiated by President Nixon and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, the United States said “it reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.”
- “Peking has demanded that Washington withdraw all military forces, close its embassy and abrogate its defense treaty with Taiwan before Peking will agree to full diplomatic relations. U.S. officials are reluctant to do this without some sort of guarantee that China will not try to conquer the island by force once Washington has severed its formal relations with the island.”
- “There have been no American combat units on the island since 1975, but Taiwan's half million active duty troops are thought to be well trained and there is a much larger ready reserve. China has more aircraft and submarines than Taiwan, but its surface navy remains inferior for what could be intense fighting in the Taiwan Strait.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-trims-military-forces-on-taiwan-half-year/docview/146929417/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Nov 1978) (TAIWAN_1979_WP_4)

- “In a sign of its continued interest in normalization of relations with Peking, the Carter administration had reduced the number of American military personnel on Taiwan to 750, about half the size of the U.S. force one year ago.”
- “Although the administration has not yet announced any decision to cut all formal ties with Taiwan, as demanded by Peking, the steady military reduction this year marks a significant change from policy in 1977, when troop levels were kept roughly stable.”
- “U.S. officials in recent days have sought to deflate rumours that the United States plans to cut all ties with Taiwan and extend full diplomatic realtors to mainland China early next year. Several U.S. senators have indicated that they are opposed to ending the U.S. mutual security treaty with Taiwan and have insisted Carter consult with them before taking that step, which is a key Peking demand.”
- “Chinese Communist party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping was also reported Thursday as predicting only gradual progress toward full diplomatic relations with the United States. Japan's Kyodo news agency said Teng told Japanese journalists in Peking that the ‘Taiwan lobby’ in Washington was a problem and that Peking would not hurry in negotiating normalization.”
- “Both China and the United States have sought to increase exchanges and make progress on other issues while leaving aside the Taiwan problem for the time being. Two U.S. Cabinet members, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger and Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland, have visited China this month....”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-taiwan-conclude-talks-open-discord/docview/146870386/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Dec 1978) (TAIWAN_1979_WP_5)
 - “The United States and Taiwan ended two days of negotiations in Taipei yesterday in open disagreement on the basis for their future relations.”
 - “The unsuccessful conclusion of bilateral talks came just three days before the United States is scheduled to officially recognize Peking as the sole government of all of China and withdraw its diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China government on Taiwan.”
 - “President Chiang Ching-kuo, in a final meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and a U.S. diplomatic team, insisted that ‘government to government level mechanisms’ must be set up to continue relations between Taipei and Washington, and that the United States must provide security assurances ‘of a legal nature’ to replace the Mutual Defense Treaty that is being terminated.”
 - “Saying that there is ‘no agreement’ on government-level relations, a State Department official told reporters here that the issues in contention are ‘highly complex’ and will have to be thrashed out over a period of time.”

- “Earlier in the day, Shen said goodbye at his embassy to Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who denounced the switch in U.S. diplomatic relations and charged President Carter with ‘lying, thumbing his nose at the Constitution and the U.S. Congress, and selling out Taiwan,’ Shen said, ‘All I want to say is that I’m very sad.’”
- “The departure from Taipei of the U.S. party headed by Christopher was hastier. For security reasons, the departure time of the group was not announced in advance, and what was described as the ‘abrupt’ departure surprised some Taiwan officials.”
- “The Christopher party was met on arrival in Taipei Wednesday night by 6,000 to 10,000 angry demonstrators who hurled eggs, tomatoes, mud and rocks at the U.S. officials and smashed their automobile windshields with bamboo sticks. During their stay, a Taiwanese set himself on fire to protest the U.S. action and the newspaper China News said another chopped off his left index finger and wrote ‘I love my country’ in blood on a piece of white linen.”
- “According to the official account, Chiang told Christopher that the government and people of Taiwan were ‘outraged’ by Carter’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with ‘a staunch ally.’”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/carter-says-u-s-could-go-war-help-taiwan/docview/147106872/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Carter says maybe defend Taiwan) (Feb 1979) (TAIWAN_1979_WP_6)
 - “President Carter, in remarks released by the White House yesterday, said the United States retains the option of using the Seventh Fleet or even of going to war to protect Taiwan against a future challenge from the People’s Republic of China.”
 - “The comment, volunteered in response to a more general question about China, appeared to be directed at the congressional drive to enact a resolution of U.S. support for Taiwan’s future security.”
 - “Carter has opposed the enactment of legislation on the defense of Taiwan as unnecessary. In recent days, however, the administration has indicated that it will not object to congressionally sponsored resolutions that do not contradict the recent understandings between Washington and Peking.:
 - “In his latest comment, Carter said U.S. policy “does nothing to prohibit a future president or a future Congress, if we feel that Taiwan is unnecessarily endangered, from interposing the American Pacific Fleet between the island and the mainland.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “In the Shanghai communiqué issued at the close of that visit, the United States said its ‘ultimate objective’ was the withdrawal of all American

forces and the closing of all military installations on Taiwan.”
(TAIWAN_1979_NYT_1)

- “We are going to continue the process of reducing troop level on Taiwan consistent with the principles adopted in the Shanghai Communique, but I do not want to get into a timetable of reductions,” Trattner said.
(TAIWAN_1979_WP_2)
- “In the Shanghai communique negotiated by President Nixon and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, the United States said "it reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.” (TAIWAN_1979_WP_3)
- “Chinese Communist party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping was also reported Thursday as predicted only gradual progress toward full diplomatic relations with the United States. Japan's Kyodo news agency said Teng told Japanese journalists in Peking that the ‘Taiwan lobby’ in Washington was a problem and that Peking would not hurry in negotiating normalization.” (TAIWAN_1979_WP_4)
- “Earlier in the day, Shen said goodbye at his embassy to Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who denounced the switch in U.S. diplomatic relations and charged President Carter with ‘lying, thumbing his nose at the Constitution and the U.S. Congress, and selling out Taiwan,’ Shen said, ‘All I want to say is that I'm very sad.’” (TAIWAN_1979_WP_5)
- Financial concerns
- Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “In the Shanghai communiqué issued at the close of that visit, the United States said its “ultimate objective” was the withdrawal of all American forces and the closing of all military installations on Taiwan.”
(TAIWAN_1979_NYT_1)
 - “A government spokesman said yesterday the United States would continue to withdraw troops from Taiwan in accordance with the 1972 Shanghai agreement signed by Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai and President Nixon.” (TAIWAN_1979_WP_2)
 - “In the Shanghai communique negotiated by President Nixon and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, the United States said "it reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the

meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.” (TAIWAN_1979_WP_3)

- “In a sign of its continued interest in normalization of relations with Peking, the Carter administration had reduced the number of American military personnel on Taiwan to 750, about half the size of the U.S. force one year ago.” (TAIWAN_1979_WP_4)
- Popular movement
- Regime type

Turkey 1976-1978

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-gets-turkish-deadline/docview/146396046/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 1975) (TURKEY_1976_WP_1)
 - “Turkey gave the United States 30 days’ notice yesterday to negotiate terms for the use of two dozen American bases in an attempt to end the U.S. embargo on arms shipments to Turkey”
 - “Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil said in Ankara that on July 17 American military and intelligence gathering bases in Turkey will be placed on ‘provisional status.’ At that time, Caglayangil said, Turkey will notify the United States which of the bases ‘will continue operating and which of them will not continue operating.’”
 - “Caglayangil said Turkey ‘has waited in vain for reversal of the American decision’ under which Congress imposed the arms embargo on Feb. 5 [1975] over the opposition of the Ford Administration... Congress voted the embargo on the ground that Turkey violated American law by using American-supplied weapons in landing Turkish troops in Cyprus last summer... and congressional sponsors of the embargo refuse to lift it until Turkey shows greater flexibility in producing a Cyprus compromise.”
 - “Caglayangil told a news conference in Ankara ‘The 30-year-long good relations between Turkey and America have been impaired as a result of the embargo decision.’”
 - “In a formal note delivered to the United States yesterday, he [Caglayangil] said: ‘The Turkish government has decided to negotiate the new rules and conditions governing the maintenance of joint defense facilities and activities with the United States.’”
 - “Opponents of the present Turkish government criticized the Turkish action as too soft.”
 - “Turkey insists that the arms embargo and the Cyprus question are unrelated.”

- “Greece last summer announced it was pulling out of the NATO integrated military command, for lack of support from NATO in preventing the Turkish landing in Cyprus.”
- “Anderson made no direct comment on the new Turkish note except to say that it will be studied and that the Ford administration ‘will continue working actively to try to get the House to vote to end the Turkish embargo.’”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/turkey-is-halting-most-operations-at-bases-u-s/docview/120341730/sem-2?accountid=14657> (July 1975) (TURKEY_1976_NYT_2)
 - “The Turkish Government announced tonight that it would halt virtually all activities at American military installations in Turkey starting tomorrow.”
 - “The Government statement, which said existing joint defense agreements had ‘lost their legal validity,’ came in retaliation for the refusal yesterday by the United States ‘House of Representatives to vote in favor of resuming arms shipments to Turkey.’”
 - “The announcement said that operations could continue only at the air base at Incirlik, which houses a squadron of F-4 fighter bombers, the only American combat unit in the country. But the Turkish Government specified that it would allow only defense activities there on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”
 - “It appeared, however, that the Turkish Government was suspending operations at the bases, not closing them entirely, in response to the demands of Turkish public opinion for retaliation against the American arms embargo.”
 - “As for putting the installations under the control of Turkish forces, all bases here already have Turkish commanders, at least in theory. In many cases, however, they do not exercise much authority, and that is likely to change.”
 - “Premier Demirel has been reluctant to take any drastic action against the American bases, on the ground that they serve Turkish interests. On June 17 Ankara gave Washington one more month to resume arms shipments. Last week it postponed the deadline again.”
 - “‘We would prefer,’ said Foreign Minister Ihsan S. Carlayangil, ‘to be open to criticism rather than endanger Turkey’s national interests.’”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/turkey-u-s-reopen-talks/docview/146325183/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Oct 1975) (TURKEY_1976_WP_3)
 - “Turkey agreed Tuesday to reopen talks on the use of American military and intelligence bases on its territory, and to encourage negotiations on ‘all aspects’ of the Cyprus dispute.”

- “Cagalyangil said President Ford sent a message to Turkish Premier Suleiman Demirel on Oct. 15, expressing hope for revitalized defence cooperation, and for negotiated settlement of Turkish-Greek disputes, including the Cyprus problem.”
- “The Turkish foreign minister said in Ankara that the decision of Congress on Oct. 3 for a partial lifting of the embargo it imposed on arms shipments to Turkey on Feb. 5 ‘has been interpreted as a positive step toward improvement of our relations.’”
- “Turkey has told the United States, Caglayangil said, that reopening the American bases depends on ‘new principles to create a reciprocal balance of responsibilities and duties between the two countries,’ plus an agreement ‘to assure sufficient support for defense needs of the Turkish armed forces.’”
- “In lifting the embargo, Congress permitted the delivery to Turkey of about \$185 million in military equipment already paid for by Ankara. But U.S. grant aid to Turkey is still suspended, while about 7,00 American servicemen are marking time at U.S. installations there.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historic-al-newspapers/u-s-turkey-reach-accord-on-bases-aid/docview/122993479/sem-2?accountid=14657> (March 1976) (TURKEY_1976_NYT_4)
 - “The United States and Turkey reached agreement today on a new four-year accord that will allow American military installations to reopen in Turkey in return for a pledge of about a billion dollars in American grants and loans.”
 - “But the accord depends on approval by both houses of Congress — something that is far from certain because of continuing concern on Capitol Hill about the pace of Turkey's efforts to end the Cyprus crisis.”
 - “From what is known, the accord includes the following... ‘The American servicemen, now numbering about 7,000 and their families will be subject to special status-of-forces arrangements. Earlier the Turk had threatened to make them subject to Turkish law.’”
 - “Basically, the United States took the position—apparently accepted by the Turks in the end—that it would help Turkey modernize its forces as it had been doing in recent years at the level of about \$200 million yearly. But it would not pay what amounted to “rent” to help defend its ally.”
 - “Several members of Congress who have been involved in the Cyprus issue predicted that unless there was major progress in the negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the accord might have difficulty on Capitol Hill.”
 - “Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Democrat of Queens, who was a leader in the efforts to cut off aid to Turkey, said today that ‘unless there is significant improvement in the refugee situation on Cyprus, no Turkish aid package can pass the Congress.’”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-turkey-agree-on-bases/docview/146558361/sem-2?accountid=14657> (March 1976) (TURKEY_1976_WP_5)
 - “The United States and Turkey signed yesterday a four year agreement restoring U.S. privileges at defense facilities in Turkey that were closed down last summer.”
 - “The agreement means the United States will regain access to several intelligence gathering facilities used for monitoring military activities inside the Soviet Union... Those facilities are among about two dozen installations in Turkey that are affected by the agreement. U.S. privileges at the Turkish sites were suspended last July, five months after the U.S. arms embargo went into effect.”
 - “Kissinger said there is no mention of Cyprus in the accord.”
 - “Although there has been little progress towards a negotiated settlement, congressional hostility toward Turkey has eased somewhat, prompting American officials to believe that Congress will approve the base agreement.”
 - “The softening of congressional attitudes is attributed to the fact that the embargo has not produced a settlement on Cyprus, as some members of Congress expected, but instead has cost the United States the friendship and cooperation of Turkey, a long time ally.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/greeks-turks-threaten-future-u-s-bases/docview/146559248/sem-2?accountid=14657> (March 1976) (TURKEY_1976_WP_6)
 - “Turkey and Greece both made threatening moves toward the future of U.S. bases toward the future of U.S. bases in their countries yesterday, virtually forcing Washington to choose between alienating one ally or the other.”
 - “Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, who signed the new U.S.-Turkish defense pact Friday, said the agreement that permits American bases in Turkey ‘will end... if Congress refuses to ratify the agreement.’ Any amendment, he added, will amount to rejection of the accord.”
 - “The Athens government... issued a statement calling it ‘obvious’ that the Turkish-American agreement ‘created serious problems.’”
 - “If the agreement fails to make it through Congress, U.S. officials in Turkey told Washington Post special correspondent John Lawton, it would mean a loss of 30 percent of American intelligence on the Soviet Union gathered from electronic surveillance installations in Turkey. NATO bases staffed by Americans would not be affected.”
 - “One of the principal congressional objections to the new pact is the fact that there is no linkage with the Cyprus dispute.”
 - “The Turkish government has presented the agreement as a significant victory, and Cglayangril hailed it on his return...”

- “But the pact has aroused some controversy in Turkey. Yesterday an opposition spokesman said that the bases represented a threat to Turkish security because they are directed against the Soviet Union, and denounced ‘renting our territory to a foreign power.’”
- “Press reaction was predictably along political lines, with a pro-government paper bannering ‘America has given in’ and an opposition paper carrying a front-page cartoon of Caglayangil in his socks and underwear while Kissinger held his coat and pants.”
- “Public opinion appeared to favor the agreement and to presume that Congress would approve it.”
- “Still, diplomats said, Turkey’s confidence in the United States has not recovered from the blow of the arms embargo and its drive for better relations with Communist and Third World neighbors remains unchecked.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/turkey-threatens-expel-u-s-troops/docview/123376302/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Nov 1977) (TURKEY_1976_NYT_7)
 - “Turkish Government officials have privately warned the State Department that unless progress is made in obtaining Congressional approval for a \$1 billion joint defense agreement by early spring American military forces in Turkey are likely to be expelled.”
 - “The United States has some 7,000 military personnel in Turkey at 25 installations. Officials view the Turkish threat to expel them as an effort to put pressure on the Administration to seek Congressional approval for the defense accord, which would provide \$1 billion in arms aid and credits over four years.”
 - “At the same time, several officials say the warning accurately reflects the political mood in Turkey, which has grown increasingly bitter over the Administration's reluctance to move on the defense agreement. As a result, the threat of American military expulsion is not taken as a bluff.”
 - “Some officials view the warning as a possible prelude to a more fundamental shift in the Turkish political and military alignment. According to one senior official, Turkey could decide to leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and choose neutrality. He pointed to Turkey's growing contacts with Arab countries, such as Libya, and the Soviet Union, to back up this contention.”
 - “The Carter Administration in May was able to raise this amount to \$175 million, but the continuing opposition of a small group of Congressmen sympathetic to Greece again ruled out any effort to gain Congressional approval for the largescale arms agreement.”
 - “In view of this opposition, officials indicated that the White House is now unwilling to send the agreement to Congress until a similar accord with Greece

has been completed and some progress made toward a settlement of the Cyprus problem. Officials agree that there is little chance that either will occur soon.”

- “These factors have led some Administration officials to suggest that the White House should immediately move to secure Congressional approval of the Turkish agreement. They argue that if the White House stresses the urgency of the Turkish case, it could override the concerns of the so-called Greek lobby... The support of members of Congress sympathetic to Greece, such as Representative John Brademas, Democrat of Indiana, and Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, is thought to be important on these issues. As a result, the White House officials say, President Carter cannot afford a Congressional battle over Turkey.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “Cagalyangil said Turkey ‘has waited in vain for reversal of the American decision’ under which Congress imposed the arms embargo on Feb. 5 [1975] over the opposition of the Ford Administration... Congress voted the embargo on the ground that Turkey violated American law by using American-supplied weapons in landing Turkish troops in Cyprus last summer... and congressional sponsors of the embargo refuse to lift it until Turkey shows greater flexibility in producing a Cyprus compromise.” (TURKEY_1976_WP_1)
 - “Several members of Congress who have been involved in the Cyprus issue predicted that unless there was major progress in the negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the accord might have difficulty on Capitol Hill.” (TURKEY_1976_NYT_4)
 - “Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Democrat of Queens, who was a leader in the efforts to cut off aid to Turkey, said today that ‘unless there is significant improvement in the refugee situation on Cyprus, no Turkish aid package can pass the Congress.’” (TURKEY_1976_NYT_4)
 - “The Carter Administration in May was able to raise this amount to \$175 million, but the continuing opposition of a small group of Congressmen sympathetic to Greece again ruled out any effort to gain Congressional approval for the largescale arms agreement.” (TURKEY_1976_NYT_6)
 - “The support of members of Congress sympathetic to Greece, such as Representative John Brademas, Democrat of Indiana, and Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, is thought to be important on these issues. As a result, the White House officials say, President Carter cannot afford a Congressional battle over Turkey.” (TURKEY_1976_NYT_6)
 - Financial concerns
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - Popular movement

- “It appeared, however, that the Turkish Government was suspending operations at the bases, not closing them entirely, in response to the demands of Turkish public opinion for retaliation against the American arms embargo.” (TURKEY_1976_NYT_2)
- “At the same time, the Demirel Government is under enormous political pressure to retaliate against the American embargo, and has already been criticized for being too lenient.” (TURKEY_1976_NYT_2)
- “But the pact has aroused some controversy in Turkey. Yesterday an opposition spokesman said that the bases represented a threat to Turkish security because they are directed against the Soviet Union, and denounced ‘renting our territory to a foreign power.’” (TURKEY_1976_WP_6)
- “Still, diplomats said, Turkey’s confidence in the United States has not recovered from the blow of the arms embargo and its drive for better relations with Communist and Third World neighbors remains unchecked.” (TURKEY_1976_WP_6)
- Regime type
 - “Turkey agreed Tuesday to reopen talks on the use of American military and intelligence bases on its territory, and to encourage negotiations on “all aspects” of the Cyprus dispute.” (TURKEY_1976_WP_3)
 - “Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, who signed the new U.S.-Turkish defense pact Friday, said the agreement that permits American bases in Turkey ‘will end... if Congress refuses to ratify the agreement.’ Any amendment, he added, will amount to rejection of the accord.” (TURKEY_1976_WP_6)
 - “The United States has some 7,000 military personnel in Turkey at 25 installations. Officials view the Turkish threat to expel them as an effort to put pressure on the Administration to seek Congressional approval for the defense accord, which would provide \$1 billion in arms aid and credits over four years.” (TURKEY_1976_NYT_7)
 - “At the same time, several officials say the warning accurately reflects the political mood in Turkey, which has grown increasingly bitter over the Administration's reluctance to move on the defense agreement. As a result, the threat of American military expulsion is not taken as a bluff.” (TURKEY_1976_NYT_7)
 - “Some officials view the warning as a possible prelude to a more fundamental shift in the Turkish political and military alignment. According to one senior official, Turkey could decide to leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and choose neutrality. He pointed to Turkey's

growing contacts with Arab countries, such as Libya, and the Soviet Union, to back up this contention.” (TURKEY_1976_NYT_7)

South Korea 1978-1981

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pressure-on-carter-over-korea-is-seen/docview/123009213/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Dec 1976) (SK_1978_NYT_1)
 - “High Ranking State Department officials said today that the continuing revelations about South Korea's questionable lobbying practices made it more likely that the Carter Administration would be under early pressure to withdraw the 42,000 American troops in that country.”
 - “Jimmy Carter has advocated a cautious policy of troop withdrawal under close consultation with South Korea and Japan. But now, the department officials said, they fear that Congressional pressures for an early pullback will mount.”
 - “In a telephone interview, Representative Donald M. Fraser, Democrat of Minnesota, said that he preferred to give the Carter administration time to press the Koreans to ease up on their repressive internal policies.”
 - “He acknowledged that the troop issue was a sensitive one since it was a source of major concern not only to this country and South Korea but to the Japanese as well.”
 - “The Japanese Government, which has historically been worried about any threat to stability in Korea, has in recent weeks urged the United States not to take any precipitous action regarding the troops.”
 - “When reports began to appear in the press that the Justice Department was investigating charges of South Korean bribes and other favors to members of Congress, some State Department officials believed the issue would eventually fade away. But now, particularly with the decision of a senior official of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency to Cooperate with the Justice Department in the investigation. State Department officials say that there is a greater likelihood of additional reports of wrongdoing and impropriety.”
 - “Mr. Carter in his campaign statements had first called for a phased withdrawal of American forces from South Korea over five years. Then, he altered his position by calling for withdrawal in consultation with South Korea and Japan in an unspecified period.”
 - “The State Department, afraid of alarming the South Koreans and concerned about not upsetting the Justice Department investigation, has said very little about the situation.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/carter-sees-pullout-korea-1982/docview/123212330/sem-2?accountid=14657> (March 1977) (SK_1978_NYT_2)

- “President Carter said today that he intended to withdraw American ground forces from South Korea in four to five years, enunciating a critical point in a new policy on Korea that is taking shape in the Administration and the Congress.”
- “In addition, Administration officials said that Mr. Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance expressed the Administration's concern over continued violations of human rights in Korea to the visiting South Korean Foreign Minister, Park Tong Jin.”
- “At a news conference this morning, Mr. Carter said: ‘My commitment to withdraw American ground troops from Korea has not changed.’”
- “He made the commitment during the campaign last fall. Today Administration officials said his remarks applied to all ground troops.”
- “A White House spokesman said that Mr. Carter ‘emphasized to the Foreign Minister our deep concern over human rights problems in Korea and elsewhere throughout the world.’ The spokesman also said the President assured the Foreign Minister that the troop withdrawal would be carried out carefully so that it would not upset the military balance on the Korean peninsula or contribute to instability there.”
- “But if the Administration falters, Congressional critics of the Korean Government assert that they have the leverage, because of the mood generated by the Korean bribery scandal, to push ahead with the policy changes they deem necessary.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-general-korea-pullout-risks-war/docview/146678958/sem-2?accountid=14657> (May 1977) (SK_1978_WP_3)
 - “The third-ranking U.S. Army general in South Korea says that President Carter's plan to withdraw U.S. troops here in the next four to five years is a mistake that will end in war with North Korea... ‘If we withdraw our ground forces on the schedule suggested it will lead to war,’ said Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, chief of staff in the U.S. Forces Korea headquarters.”
 - “Some military officers, saying the planned withdrawal may jeopardize gains made here over the past 24 years and pose serious military and credibility problems, are trying to influence Washington policy decisions.”
 - “‘I don't know anybody who is not staggered by it,’ a headquarters Army officer said of the planned withdrawal ‘There's no military or strategic logic for withdrawal. In fact, there's a very good case for reinforcing’ American strength in South Korea.”
 - “The apprehensions voiced by Singlaub are echoed to some degree by many, if not all U.S. military leaders in South Korea. ‘No one understands why they are being pulled out,’ said a well-informed American source. ‘Carter says that

withdrawal won't endanger South Korean security or upset the military balance. Our military people say that would be a miracle. They think it can't be done.”

- “Some officers stress the fear that - despite all assurances to the contrary, the drawdown will be interpreted in South and North Korea as a disengagement.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-withdrawal-korea-said-start-78/docview/146800895/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 1977) (SK_1978_WP_4)
 - “The network said the number of combat troops to be withdrawn next year would be 6,00. At the end of the withdrawal program sometime within the next four or five years, 6,00 U.S. ground troops of the 32,000 now in South Korea would remain, NHK added.”
 - “Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced in Seoul May 27 that not all U.S. ground troops would be withdrawn. He said the remaining troops would be those whose duties will be to support the air force units that stay here (in South Korea) and provide certain types of communications and general support in logistics that will continue to be required.”
 - “NHK also reported that... the United States consulted both China and the Soviet Union to confirm that neither of the major allies of Communist North Korea had any intention of heightening tensions in the Korean Peninsula... only after... did President Carter make his final decision to withdraw U.S. ground combat troops, NHK reported.”
 - “Both China and the Soviet Union have been told that Wahsington is determined to defend South Korea and that any military action on their part would lead to direct confrontation with the United States.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/joint-chiefs-korea-plan-was-denied/docview/146768822/sem-2?accountid=14657> (July 1977) (SK_1978_WP_5)
 - “Army Chief of Staff Bernard W. Rogers testified yesterday that the Joint CHiefs of Staff recommended a much smaller withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea than that eventually ordered by President Carter. The testimony opened a gap for the first time in public between the unformed service Chiefs and Carter’s plan.”
 - “The JCS memo reportedly said it would be military imprudent to withdraw all U.S. ground forces before South Korean materiel, military capability and confidence are sufficient to withstand an attack from the North.”
 - “Rep Samuel S. Stratton (D-NY), who chaired yesterday’s hearing, said Rogers’ testimony ‘confirmed some of the fears of those opposing the withdrawal.’”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/carter-cuts-total-u-s-troops-leave-south-korea/docview/123731995/sem-2?accountid=14657> (April 1978) (SK_1978_NYT_6)

- “President Carter announced tonight that he would reduce by two-thirds the number of American combat troops scheduled to be withdrawn this year from South Korea. He cited as the reason Congressional inaction on a compensatory aid package for the Seoul Government.”
- “One American combat battalion of about 800 men and 2,600 support personnel will be withdrawn this year, but the two other combat battalions that were scheduled to be pulled out will remain until next year.”
- “The \$800 million package was also opposed by members of Congress objecting in general to the Administration's Korean pullout strategy.”
- “The \$800 million arms transfer package is a crucial ingredient in the withdrawal strategy because the Joint Chiefs of Staff based their approval of the withdrawal plan on the explicit understanding that compensatory aid would be provided to bolster South Korean armed forces. When it became clear in recent weeks that Congress might not approve the package this year, the Administration was faced with the prospect of losing the Joint Chiefs’ endorsement if it proceeded with the scheduled pullout.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “High Ranking State Department officials said today that the continuing revelations about South Korea's questionable lobbying practices made it more likely that the Carter Administration would be under early pressure to withdraw the 42,000 American troops in that country.” (SK_1978_NYT_1)
 - “Mr. Carter in his campaign statements had first called for a phased withdrawal of American forces from South Korea over five years. Then, he altered his position by calling for withdrawal in consultation with South Korea and Japan in an unspecified period.” (SK_1978_NYT_1)
 - “At a news conference this morning, Mr. Carter said: ‘My commitment to withdraw American ground troops from Korea has not changed.’ He made the commitment during the campaign last fall. Today Administration officials said his remarks applied to all ground troops. (SK_1978_NYT_2)
 - Financial concerns
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - Popular movement
 - Regime type
 - “When reports began to appear in the press that the Justice Department was investigating charges of South Korean bribes and other favors to members of Congress, some State Department officials believed the issue would eventually fade away. But now, particularly with the decision of a senior official of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency to Cooperate

with the Justice Department in the investigation. State Department officials say that there is a greater likelihood of additional reports of wrongdoing and impropriety.” (SK_1978_NYT_1)

- “In addition, Administration officials said that Mr. Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance expressed the Administration's concern over continued violations of human rights in Korea to the visiting South Korean Foreign Minister, Park Tong Jin... A White House spokesman said that Mr. Carter “emphasized to the Foreign Minister our deep concern over human rights problems in Korea and elsewhere throughout the world...” (SK_1978_NYT_2)

Greece 1985-1988

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pentagon-making-contingency-plans-remove-bases/docview/138733937/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Feb 1985) (GREECE_1985_WP_1)
 - “The Pentagon, concerned by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou’s criticism of the United States, is making contingency plans to remove U.S. military bases from Greece in 1988, but administration sources said yesterday that the Defense and State departments disagree about how far to push U.S. disputes with Papandreou.”
 - “...if Papandreou wins a new four-year term in this year’s Greek elections and adheres to his public stance that the four bases are to be closed in 1988.”
 - “However, the sources added, the State Department believes it would be tactically wiser to keep the planning on what one source called “a low-level, long-range and quiet contingency basis.” By contrast, the sources continued, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and Pentagon planners appear to favor a high-level public statement of U.S. determination to assess the relationship if the Papandreou government continues to be hostile.”
 - “The sources were unable to say how specific Weinberger might be in spelling out relocation plans. But they noted that one obvious option would be to seek a base agreement with Turkey, which the Papandreou government’s official defense policy has identified as Greece’s most likely potential enemy.”
 - “More recently, however, the administration has become dismayed by such Papandreou actions as his pursuit of agreements with his communist neighbors.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/18-hurt-greek-bus-bomb/docview/139209122/sem-2?accountid=14657> (April 1987) (GREECE_1987_WP_2)

- “A bomb concealed near a railroad track ripped through a Greek Air Force bus carrying 25 U.S. military personnel to an American air base Friday, injuring at least 16 Americans and two Greeks, police said.”
- “A far left-wing guerrilla group known as November 17 said it was responsible for the bombing, the Reuter news agency quoted police sources as saying. They said the group made the claim in a letter sent to the daily newspaper Eleftherotypia.”
- “November 17 claimed responsibility for the assassination in 1975 of Athens CIA Station Chief Richard Welch. The group also claimed that it assassinated a U.S. Navy captain, George Tasntes, in November 1983 and tried to kill U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Robert Judd.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/greece-threatens-oust/docview/139616727/sem-2?accountid=14657> (May 1988) (GREECE_1985_WP_3)
 - “Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou... is threatening to oust U.S. forces from the Hellenikon base 10 miles south of Athens, according to Reagan administration officials.”
 - “Papandreou has made generalized threats about ousting the U.S. military from its four bases in Greece, but this time, officials said, he is being specific about Hellenikon, perhaps emboldened by the Spanish government’s success in forcing a wing of U.S. F16 fighter planes to leave a base in Torrejon. That wing is expected to relocate in Italy.”
 - “Spain has not been satisfied with removal of F16s from Torrejon and is making new demands about being consulted before U.S. forces launch operations from Spanish bases, officials said. The demands are particularly difficult in regard to nuclear weapons, they added, without being specific.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-halts-talks-on-bases-greece/docview/110457479/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Sept 1988) (GREECE_1988_NYT_4)
 - “In July, Mr. Kostopoulos said Greece would close Hellenikon Air Base, near Athens, regardless of the outcome of the talks on a new accord. Today's announcement was the formal notification of that decision.”
 - “Mr. Kostopoulos repeated that Greece would not sign a new accord unless Washington satisfied ‘Greece's supreme national interests.’”
 - “The current base accord expires on Dec. 21, and the United States would have 17 months to remove its bases if a new accord is not reached. There are 4 major American bases and 12 lesser United States installations in Greece.”
 - “Mr. Papandreou's absence for heart surgery in England also makes it difficult for Greece to negotiate.”

- “The diplomats said Washington was expecting a Conservative Party victory at the June elections and a more favorable stand on the bases, including an extension of the present deal pending the negotiation of a new accord.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - Popular movement
 - “...if Papandreou wins a new four-year term in this year’s Greek elections and adheres to his public stance that the four bases are to be closed in 1988.” (GREECE_1985_WP_1)
 - “A bomb concealed near a railroad track ripped through a Greek Air Force bus carrying 25 U.S. military personnel to an American air base Friday, injuring at least 16 Americans and two Greeks, police said.” (GREECE_1985_WP_2)
 - “A far left-wing guerrilla group known as November 17 said it was responsible for the bombing, the Reuter news agency quoted police sources as saying. They said the group made the claim in a letter sent to the daily newspaper Eleftherotypia.” (GREECE_1985_WP_2)
 - “November 17 claimed responsibility for the assassination in 1975 of Athens CIA Station Chief Richard Welch. The group also claimed that it assassinated a U.S. Navy captain, George Tasntes, in November 1983 and tried to kill U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Robert Judd.” (GREECE_1985_WP_2)
 - Regime type
 - “The Pentagon, concerned by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Pandreou’s criticism of the United States, is making contingency plans to remove U.S. military bases from Greece in 1988, but administration sources said yesterday that the Defense and State departments disagree about how far to push U.S. disputes with Papandreou.” (GREECE_1985_WP_1)
 - “...if Papandreou wins a new four-year term in this year’s Greek elections and adheres to his public stance that the four bases are to be closed in 1988.” (GREECE_1985_WP_1)
 - “More recently, however, the administration has become dismayed by such Papandreou actions as his pursuit of agreements with his communist neighbors.” (GREECE_1985_WP_1)
 - “Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou... is threatening to oust U.S. forces from the Hellenikon base 10 miles south of Athens, according to Reagan administration officials.” (GREECE_1985_WP_3)

- “In July, Mr. Kostopoulos said Greece would close Hellenikon Air Base, near Athens, regardless of the outcome of the talks on a new accord. Today's announcement was the formal notification of that decision.” (GREECE_1985_NYT_4)
- “Mr. Kostopoulos repeated that Greece would not sign a new accord unless Washington satisfied ‘Greece's supreme national interests.’” (GREECE_1985_NYT_4)

Belgium 1988-1990, 1992-1994

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/inf-pact-leaves-costly-bases-with-no-mission/docview/140029682/sem-2?accountid=14657> (April 1989) (BELGIUM_1988_WP_1)
 - “Coiso, one of the Air Force’s newest bases... it was designated to support a weapon that has been rendered obsolete by the U.S. Soviet treaty eliminating intermediate and shorter-range nuclear forces in Europe. Comiso, and 10 other U.S.-operated nuclear missile facilities throughout Europe have become the targets of a bitter international battle over the spoils of the missile withdrawals: hundreds of millions of dollars of American-financed buildings, roads and other structures catered across the European countryside.”
 - “The debate over the future of the sites-six ground-launched cruise missile bases and three Pershing II missile facilities and two Pershing support units- has become even more heated as U.S. officials continue diplomatic duels with NATO allies reluctant to renew other basing-rights agreements”
 - “At the same time, some members of Congress who are trying to curtail military spending argue that the United States and NATO will waste millions of dollars if they build facilities while the almost-new nuclear missile facilities go unused”
 - “I am very troubled by pouring concrete in places where we don’t know we’ll be five years from now” said [D-CO Rep] Schroder “The ground launched cruise missiles are a great example.”
 - “The U.S. military has already shut down its cruise missile operations at bases in Belgium and the Netherlands. The U.S.-funded buildings, some of them barely used...”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/nunn-says-u-s-should-negotiate-deeper-cuts-on/docview/108640382/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (BELGIUM_1988_NYT_2)
 - “Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000... Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000. The

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- “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-military-cuts-europe-hastened-crisis-over/docview/140091280/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Dec 1990) (BELGIUM_1988_WP_3)
 - “To move forces of this size, the U.S. Army has had to displace shipments of German goods on more than 600 German trains and clear entire docks in the Dutch port of Rotterdam and in Antwerp, Belgium, to load ships and barges. A nearly around-the-clock air, land and sea convoy has been established from central military bases in German cities such as Frankfurt, Mannheim, Ramstein and Aschaffenburg to northern and eastern Saudi provinces.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.” (BELGIUM_1988_NYT_2)
 - Financial concerns
 - “At the same time, some members of Congress who are trying to curtail military spending argue that the United States and NATO will waste millions of dollars if they build facilities while the almost-new nuclear missile facilities go unused” (BELGIUM_1988_WP_1)

- “I am very troubled by pouring concrete in places where we don’t know we’ll be five years from now” said [D-CO Rep] Schroder “The ground launched cruise missiles are a great example.” (BELGIUM_1988_WP_1)
- Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “Coiso, one of the Air Force’s newest bases... it was designated to support a weapon that has been rendered obsolete by the U.S. Soviet treaty eliminating intermediate and shorter-range nuclear forces in Europe. Comiso, and 10 other U.S.-operated nuclear missile facilities throughout Europe have become the targets of a bitter international battle over the spoils of the missile withdrawals: hundreds of millions of dollars of American-financed buildings, roads and other structures catered across the European countryside.” (BELGIUM_1988_WP_1)
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- Popular movement
- Regime type

Netherlands 1988, 1990-1995

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/lawmakers-urge-reducing-u-s-troops-europe-25-000/docview/14006777/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Feb 1989) (NED_1990_WP_1)
 - “A liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican on the House Armed Services Committee have joined forces on legislation that they predict will break the line against congressionally mandated U.S. troop reductions in Europe that has held since World War II.”
 - “Reps. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) and Andy Ireland (R-Fla.) said Thursday that they will launch a campaign next week to require the Defense Department to reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe by the 25,000 men and women assigned to U.S. missile sites to be scrapped under the ratified Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.”
 - ““Our amendment will provide lots of political cover,” Ireland said. ‘I’m considered a conservative hawk. But supporting this limited withdrawal demonstrates I haven’t got blinders on. I can explain that we’re just taking out the extra troops who were supposed to go with missiles that won’t be in Europe.’”
 - “Under the INF Treaty, the 120 Pershing II missiles already deployed in West Germany and the 319 ground launched cruise missiles in Britain, Italy, The Netherlands and West Germany will be removed by mid-1991. Ireland said that in Europe, the Army had about 6,000 men and women assigned to the Pershing IIs and the Air Force about 19,000 attached to ground launched cruise missile bases at the time of INF ratification.”
 - “Schroeder said the deficit, a growing conviction in Congress that the United States is doing more than its share in defending Europe and the sense that the Bush administration must respond to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s steps to end the Cold War are building support for significant U.S. troop reductions in Europe in the near future.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/nunn-says-u-s-should-negotiate-deeper-cuts-on/docview/108640382/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (NED_1990_NYT_2)
 - “Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000... Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000. The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Georgia Democrat’s comments on troop cuts are part of a broader recommendation that the

United States redefine the overseas role of its forces by concentrating on air power while cutting costly Army troops stationed around the world.”

- “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.”
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 - “Coiso, one of the Air Force’s newest bases... it was designated to support a weapon that has been rendered obsolete by the U.S. Soviet treaty eliminating intermediate and shorter-range nuclear forces in Europe. Comiso, and 10 other U.S.-operated nuclear missile facilities throughout Europe have become the targets of a bitter international battle over the spoils of the missile withdrawals: hundreds of millions of dollars of American-financed buildings, roads and other structures catered across the European countryside.”
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 - “The U.S. military has already shut down its cruise missile operations at bases in Belgium and the Netherlands. The U.S.-funded buildings, some of them barely used...”
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 - “To move forces of this size, the U.S. Army has had to displace shipments of German goods on more than 600 German trains and clear entire docks in the

Dutch port of Rotterdam and in Antwerp, Belgium, to load ships and barges. A nearly around-the-clock air, land and sea convoy has been established from central military bases in German cities such as Frankfurt, Mannheim, Ramstein and Aschaffenburg to northern and eastern Saudi provinces.”

- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “A liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican on the House Armed Services Committee have joined forces on legislation that they predict will break the line against congressionally mandated U.S. troop reductions in Europe that has held since World War II.” (NED_1990_WP_1)
 - “Reps. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) and Andy Ireland (R-Fla.) said Thursday that they will launch a campaign next week to require the Defense Department to reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe by the 25,000 men and women assigned to U.S. missile sites to be scrapped under the ratified Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.” (NED_1990_WP_1)
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 - “Schroeder said the deficit, a growing conviction in Congress that the United States is doing more than its share in defending Europe and the sense that the Bush administration must respond to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s steps to end the Cold War are building support for significant U.S. troop reductions in Europe in the near future.” (NED_1990_WP_1)
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 - Financial concerns
 - “At the same time, some members of Congress who are trying to curtail military spending argue that the United States and NATO will waste millions of dollars if they build facilities while the almost-new nuclear missile facilities go unused” (NED_1990_WP_3)

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Mannheim, Ramstein and Aschaffenburg to northern and eastern Saudi provinces.” (NED_1990_WP_4)

- Popular movement
- Regime type

Turkey 1985-1990

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/nunn-says-u-s-should-negotiate-deeper-cuts-on/docview/108640382/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (TURKEY_1985_NYT_1)
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- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pentagon-lists-u-s-bases-that-are-candidates/docview/108618103/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (TURKEY_1985_NYT_2)
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... Erhac Air Base, Turkey; Eskisehir Munitions Storage Site, Turkey.”
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- Popular movement
- Regime type

Germany 1987-1996

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/lawmakers-urge-reducing-u-s-troops-europe-25-000/docview/14006777/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Feb 1989) (GERMANY_1992_WP_1)

- “A liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican on the House Armed Services Committee have joined forces on legislation that they predict will break the line against congressionally mandated U.S. troop reductions in Europe that has held since World War II.”
- “Reps. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) and Andy Ireland (R-Fla.) said Thursday that they will launch a campaign next week to require the Defense Department to reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe by the 25,000 men and women assigned to U.S. missile sites to be scrapped under the ratified Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.”
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- “At the same time, some members of Congress who are trying to curtail military spending argue that the United States and NATO will waste millions of dollars if they build facilities while the almost-new nuclear missile facilities go unused.”
- ““I am very troubled by pouring concrete in places where we don’t know we’ll be five years from now’ said [D-CO Rep] Schroder ‘The ground launched cruise missiles are a great example.””
- “Army officials said that 27 of the 234 Pershing II missiles at the West German bases have been eliminated so far under the treaty.”
- “Some of the bases may have less difficult transitions to new uses than remote Comiso, according to U.S. and NATO officials. Army officials say they can easily convert the three Pershing missile facilities and two support bases in West Germany to operations centers for a number of other overcrowded facilities in that country, although proposals have not been solidified.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/nunn-says-u-s-should-negotiate-deeper-cuts-on/docview/108640382/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (GERMANY_1992_NYT_3)
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- “A much smaller U.S. military presence in Europe, initially projected for the late 1990s, will become a reality by mid-January courtesy of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.”
- “Tens of thousands of the best U.S. troops and hundreds of top-line tanks, artillery and aircraft are being withdrawn from Europe for use in a potential war with Iraq, leaving behind a U.S. force of roughly the size planned for a safer and more stable period years from now, according to U.S. and allied military officials.”
- “Other troops and weaponry may be left behind in Saudi Arabia as a deterrent to further Iraqi aggression. And some may fall prey to shifting U.S. budget priorities and be shipped straight home, many European defense officials have predicted.”
- “Although Washington has not yet provided an answer, Woerner said he does not expect all of the forces to return. He suggested that the transfers have pushed U.S. military forces into a downward slide toward a residual force of about 100,000 personnel in Europe, roughly a third of the level earlier this year.”
- “The most recent U.S. military unit to head for the Persian Gulf region was the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing of top-line F-15s based at Bitburg, Germany, which left Thursday, more than a week ahead of schedule. In all, squadrons from eight of the 11 U.S. tactical fighter, reconnaissance and airlift wings in Europe are expected to be in the Middle East by mid-January, according to Air Force officials.”
- “This unprecedented shift of air power from the region is matched by a massive transfer of ground forces out of central Germany, roughly equivalent to one U.S. corps of about 75,000 to 80,000 personnel, accompanied by more than 750 tanks, 450 armored personnel carriers, 150 howitzers and 75 attack helicopters. With supporting equipment, the total transfer as of late November - the most recent public figures - included more than 20,000 wheeled military vehicles and 4,500 tracked vehicles, according to Army officials.”
- “But NATO ambassadors, who met Friday in emergency session in Brussels to discuss the resignation, said in a statement that they expect important elements of Soviet foreign policy, including the phased - and, in some ways, complementary - withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, to be maintained under Shevardnadze's successor.”
- “Pulling out, Germany: 2nd Armored Division-Forward Brigado, Garlstedt (4,000 troops) | 435th Tactical Airlift Wing, Rhein Main, C-130 transports | 3rd Armored Division, Frankfurt (about 17,000 troops) | 50th Tactical Fighter Wing, Hahn, F-16 fighters | 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, Wiesbaden, Apache helicopters (about 1,500 troops) | 36th Tactical Fighter Wing, Bitburg, F-15 fighters 52nd Tactical, Spangdahlem, Fighter Wing F-4G Wild Weasels (fighters adapted to detect and destroy hostile radar systems) | VII Corps Headquarters and Support

Command, Stuttgart (8,700 troops) | 1st Armored Division, Ansbach (about 17,000 troops) | 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Nurnberg (about 4,500 troops)”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/substantial-cut-urged-u-s-nato-troops/docview/140388945/sem-2?accountid=14657> (March 1991) (GERMANY_1992_WP_5)
 - “The United States should reduce troops in Europe to fewer than 100,000 during the next five years as the Soviet Union withdraws forces from Eastern Europe, a group of lawmakers, retired military officers and scholars said Friday... Former defense secretary Harold Brown and former treasury secretary William E. Simon directed the study, which was supported by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Maine), a member of the panel.”
 - “The collapse of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance, unification of Germany and overthrow of communist governments in Eastern Europe warrant a reorganization of NATO's military arm to include the lower troop levels, according to the Johns Hopkins University study group...”
 - “Volker Ruehe, a member of the German Bundestag and general secretary of the governing Christian Democratic Union, said separately in Washington last week that the United States should maintain no more than 60,000 to 80,000 troops in Germany.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-vii-corps-bids-goodbye-germany-after-four/docview/140612727/sem-2?accountid=14657> (March 1992) (GERMANY_1992_WP_6)
 - “The departure of the 73,000-strong force from Germany represents a major portion of the U.S. withdrawal from Europe. The American troop level of 314,000 in 1990 has been reduced to around 225,000, and Bush administration plans call for it to reach 150,000 by 1995.”
 - “Hundreds of German citizens pressed against barricades outside the castle courtyard today to see ceremonial cannons fired and hear marching bands play John Philip Sousa tunes. Reflecting divisions of opinion in the German population, some waved antiwar banners and cheered the American withdrawal, but many others carried VII Corps balloons and American flags and spoke sadly of the GIs' departure.”
 - “Among those bidding farewell today was Stuttgart Mayor Manfred Rommel, son of famed German field marshal Erwin Rommel, known as the Desert Fox, who commanded German armies defending against the Normandy invasion. ‘I did not want you to leave us,’ Rommel told his audience. ‘But it cannot be denied that the Iron Curtain which had cut Europe in two has been lifted.’”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups

- “A liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican on the House Armed Services Committee have joined forces on legislation that they predict will break the line against congressionally mandated U.S. troop reductions in Europe that has held since World War II.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_1)
- “Reps. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) and Andy Ireland (R-Fla.) said Thursday that they will launch a campaign next week to require the Defense Department to reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe by the 25,000 men and women assigned to U.S. missile sites to be scrapped under the ratified Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_1)
- ““Our amendment will provide lots of political cover,” Ireland said. ‘I’m considered a conservative hawk. But supporting this limited withdrawal demonstrates I haven’t got blinders on. I can explain that we’re just taking out the extra troops who were supposed to go with missiles that won’t be in Europe.’” (GERMANY_1992_WP_1)
- “Schroeder said the deficit, a growing conviction in Congress that the United States is doing more than its share in defending Europe and the sense that the Bush administration must respond to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s steps to end the Cold War are building support for significant U.S. troop reductions in Europe in the near future.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_1)
- “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.” (GERMANY_1992_NYT_3)
- “The United States should reduce troops in Europe to fewer than 100,000 during the next five years as the Soviet Union withdraws forces from Eastern Europe, a group of lawmakers, retired military officers and scholars said Friday... Former defense secretary Harold Brown and former treasury secretary William E. Simon directed the study, which was supported by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Maine), a member of the panel.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_5)
- “But many questions remain unresolved about the future U.S. presence here. VII Corps’ withdrawal leaves the United States with one corps in

Europe, the Frankfurt-headquartered V Corps, but its presence could be threatened by calls in Congress to reduce the troop level to 80,000 or less.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_6)

○ Financial concerns

- “At the same time, some members of Congress who are trying to curtail military spending argue that the United States and NATO will waste millions of dollars if they build facilities while the almost-new nuclear missile facilities go unused.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_2)
- ““I am very troubled by pouring concrete in places where we don’t know we’ll be five years from now’ said [D-CO Rep] Schroder ‘The ground launched cruise missiles are a great example.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_2)
- “Other troops and weaponry may be left behind in Saudi Arabia as a deterrent to further Iraqi aggression. And some may fall prey to shifting U.S. budget priorities and be shipped straight home, many European defense officials have predicted.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_4)

○ Changing geopolitical concerns

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- “Army officials said that 27 of the 234 Pershing II missiles at the West German bases have been eliminated so far under the treaty.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_2)
- “Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000... Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000. The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Georgia Democrat's comments on troop cuts are part of a broader recommendation that the United States redefine the overseas role of its forces by concentrating on air power while cutting costly Army troops stationed around the world.” (GERMANY_1992_NYT_3)
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U.S. budget priorities and be shipped straight home, many European defense officials have predicted.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_4)

- “But NATO ambassadors, who met Friday in emergency session in Brussels to discuss the resignation, said in a statement that they expect important elements of Soviet foreign policy, including the phased - and, in some ways, complementary - withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, to be maintained under Shevardnadze's successor.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_4)
- “The collapse of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance, unification of Germany and overthrow of communist governments in Eastern Europe warrant a reorganization of NATO's military arm to include the lower troop levels, according to the Johns Hopkins University study group.” (GERMANY_1992_WP_5)
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- Regime type

South Korea 1989-1993

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/nunn-says-u-s-should-negotiate-deeper-cuts-on/docview/108640382/semi-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (SK_1991_NYT_1)
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 - “The Georgia Democrat's comments on troop cuts are part of a broader recommendation that the United States redefine the overseas role of its forces by concentrating on air power while cutting costly Army troops stationed around the world... Mr. Nunn elaborated his views, which are likely to be influential in Congress's budget deliberations, in a recent interview on a broad range of security issues.”
 - “In the Dec. 22 interview, Mr. Nunn insisted that he wanted to reserve judgment on many of the specifics, pending hearings by his committee on the new Pentagon budget, the changing threat to the United States' national security and the development of a new military strategy. The hearings are to begin in the third week of January.”
 - “Senator Nunn also said Western European nations and Japan must assume a greater burden for defending the sea lanes from the oil fields in the Persian Gulf to their countries. He urged the United States to buy more of its oil from South America, which would enable Washington to concentrate more of its military resources on the Western Hemisphere. But while Senator Nunn is urging a rethinking of American military deployments around the world, he is not reconsidering some crucial and contentious programs that he has long supported.”
 - “In the Pacific, Mr. Nunn advocated a ‘partial, gradual draw down’ of American troops in South Korea, adding that the United States should maintain the capability to use air power there. Senator Nunn also said the Bush Administration should consider withdrawing some American forces from Japan.”

- “But an effort by Senators Dale Bumpers of Arkansas Democrat and J. Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, both Democrats, to cut 10,000 of the 43,000 American military personnel in South Korea was unsuccessful.”
- “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pentagon-lists-u-s-bases-that-are-candidates/docview/108618103/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (SK_1991_NYT_2)
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... Overseas Closures, Air Force, Kwang Ju Air Base, Suwon Air Base and Taegu Air Base, all in South Korea.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/south-korea-reportedly-set-agree-larger-u-s-troop/docview/140222026/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Feb 1990) (SK_1991_WP_3)
 - “South Korea will agree this year to U.S. troop withdrawals that go beyond a minor reduction announced earlier this week, a senior South Korean official said today.”
 - “The official, expressing South Korea's reluctant reversal of its longstanding opposition to reductions in the U.S. military presence here, said the cuts should hit only noncombatants and not touch what he described as the ‘fighting element’ among the 45,000 U.S. troops stationed on this divided peninsula.”
 - “He [Senior South Korean official] denied suggestions that South Korea is willing to make trade concessions in a swap for continued U.S. military backing, saying the two issues are unrelated. He indicated, however, that Seoul is willing to pay a larger share of the multi-billion-dollar cost of keeping U.S. forces here.”
 - “South Korea, led for nearly 30 years by generals who fought in the Korean War, has firmly opposed any reduction in U.S. troops because of fears that such a move would weaken its security and give North Korea the impression that the United States would not step in if its longtime ally were attacked.”
 - “Faced with the political reality of budget-cutting in Washington, South Korea's government apparently feels it cannot stop a partial pullout, particularly when Congress is upset over Seoul's trade practices and anti-American protests by radicals.”

- “The official also acknowledged that Seoul's armed forces are much stronger now than a decade ago, when the government here lobbied furiously in Washington [in 1978] to block then-president Jimmy Carter's plan for a pullout of some ground forces. He said South Korea now is at two-thirds parity with North Korea's armed forces.”
- “Still, the South Koreans insist that unlike Europe, where tensions are easing, the standoff with Communist North Korea remains volatile. Officials thus are putting on a brave public face although they clearly are unhappy with the U.S. reductions and privately oppose them.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/seoul-officials-see-agreement-on-u-s-troop-cut/docview/108595019/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Feb 1990) (SK_1991_WP_4)
 - “Senior Government officials said today that they ‘fully expect’ to reach an agreement with the United States this year for the largest withdrawal of American military personnel from South Korea since the end of the Vietnam War.”
 - “The officials said that they expected that the reductions would involve 4,000 to 5,000 of the 43,000 Americans serving in the armed forces in South Korea. The move would bring United States forces to the level of the early 1980's, before the Reagan Administration began a broad buildup that swelled the American military presence in Asia and around the globe.”
 - “Despite their surprising willingness to reach an agreement, South Korean military officials have in recent days stepped up their warnings that the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe have yet to reduce tensions in Asia, or to have any detectable influence on North Korea.”
 - “A senior South Korean official deeply involved in military affairs said today that the Government of President Roh Tae Woo had no objection to cutbacks ‘as long as the basic element of deterrent defense remains in Korea...’ That appears to mark a subtle but important change in South Korea's stated position. Previously, the Government had regularly sought assurances that there would be no reductions of any kind.”
 - “‘Any plan to reduce the size of U.S. ground forces in Korea in haste is unrealistic,’ the English-language Korea Herald asserted this morning, saying North Korea's ground forces outnumber South Korea's by about 10 to 7. Dong A Ilbo, a leading newspaper here, insisted today that ‘the military threat from the North has not decreased,’ but said that ‘the question of American troop withdrawal has left our hands.’”
 - “Government officials disputed that view, saying that the United States was acting only after full consultations with South Korea. During the Carter Administration, they argued, North Korea was more threatening and the South had yet to surge ahead economically or build up its own military forces. Most officials here say

that they now view the North's economy as unsustainable, and that North Korea will soon have to reduce its own army.”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-decides-withdraw-weapons-korea/docview/140423469/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Oct 1991) (SK_1991_WP_5)
 - “The Bush administration has decided to remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, paving the way for a renewed demand that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program to ensure the strategic peninsula remains nuclear-free.”
 - “Administration officials said the decision was made last week after renewed consultations with South Korean authorities. President Bush was reported to have been reluctant to order removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons until he was confident that civilian and military leaders in Seoul would not interpret this as undercutting South Korea's security or the U.S. commitment to it.”
 - “An administration official said changes in military technology, including the increased effectiveness of high-tech conventional weapons used by U.S. forces this year in the Persian Gulf War, makes the presence of nuclear weapons on Korean soil much less important.”
 - “He said consideration is being given to supplying more such conventional weapons to U.S. and South Korean forces, and also to supplying Patriot anti-missile defense systems or other means of countering the longer-range ballistic missiles being deployed by North Korea.”
 - “The elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea will permit the United States, Japan and other nations to increase pressure on North Korea to stop its nuclear weapons program, which is generally considered the most dangerous security problem in East Asia and which is capable of producing sufficient plutonium for an atomic weapon within ‘a year or two,’ according to latest U.S. estimates.”
 - “Removal of the U.S. weapons also will permit Seoul to call for denuclearization of the peninsula, a goal that has considerable popular appeal on both sides of the North-South dividing line.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-pact-with-south-korea-delays-further-troop/docview/108872852/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Oct 1992) (SK_1992_NYT_6)
 - “The United States and South Korea announced today that there would be no further reduction in the 37,400 United States troops in South Korea until concerns over North Korea's nuclear weapons program were settled.”
 - ““Both sides reconfirmed that any further drawdown of United States forces in Korea would be made only after the uncertainties surrounding the North Korean nuclear program have been thoroughly addressed,’ the statement said.”

- “The communique accused North Korea of stalling on its promise to South Korea to permit mutual inspections of nuclear installations, and using a promise to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and its inspectors as an excuse.”
- “South Korea also agreed to increase its financial support for the United States troops to \$220 million next year, from \$180 million in the current year, \$150 million last year and \$70 million in 1990.”
- “Almost 7,000 United States troops have left South Korea over the last two years, but Washington and Seoul agreed last year to postpone a second phase because of concern that Pyongyang was developing nuclear weapons. The United States began troop reductions in Korea in 1990 because the threat from the Soviet Union was shrinking.”
- The five factors
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 - “But an effort by Senators Dale Bumpers of Arkansas Democrat and J. Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, both Democrats, to cut 10,000 of the 43,000 American military personnel in South Korea was unsuccessful.” (SK_1992_NYT_1)
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 - “Faced with the political reality of budget-cutting in Washington, South Korea's government apparently feels it cannot stop a partial pullout, particularly when Congress is upset over Seoul's trade practices and anti-American protests by radicals.” (SK_1992_WP_3)
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 - “In the Pacific, Mr. Nunn advocated a ‘partial, gradual draw down’ of American troops in South Korea, adding that the United States should maintain the capability to use air power there. Senator Nunn also said the Bush Administration should consider withdrawing some American forces from Japan.” (SK_1992_NYT_1)

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- “Government officials disputed that view, saying that the United States was acting only after full consultations with South Korea. During the Carter Administration, they argued, North Korea was more threatening and the South had yet to surge ahead economically or build up its own military forces. Most officials here say that they now view the North's economy as unsustainable, and that North Korea will soon have to reduce its own army.” (SK_1992_WP_4)
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Philippines 1989-1993

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pentagon-lists-u-s-bases-that-are-candidates/docview/108618103/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_1)
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... Overseas Reductions, Navy, Reassignments at San Miguel Naval Communications Station in the Philippines”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/philippine-senate-votes-reject-u-s-base-renewal/docview/108678449/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Senate vote) (Sept 1991) (PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_2)
 - “The Philippine Senate voted today to reject a new treaty for the Subic Bay Naval Station and to end an American military presence in the country that has lasted nearly a century. But President Corazon C. Aquino effectively extended the American lease by calling for a national referendum on the base's future.”
 - “‘The treaty is defeated,’ the Senate President, Jovito R. Salonga, announced in a solemn tone after the vote was taken this morning in a show of hands. The decision was greeted with applause and tears in the chamber.”
 - “The vote reflected a view among many senators that the compensation package offered by the United States was too small and, more broadly, that it was time to end an American military presence that began when the United States acquired the Philippines by winning the Spanish-American war.”
 - “Invoking the rallying cry of ‘people power’ that she used with such success in ousting President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986, Mrs. Aquino proposed in a televised address Sunday night that ‘we take the issue directly to the people.’”
 - “While the Bush Administration indicated last week that it would start an immediate and irrevocable withdrawal from Subic if the Philippine Senate vetoed the 10-year treaty, Western diplomats said in recent days that the American position was actually far more flexible, and that American troops would probably remain at the base until after a referendum. Interim arrangements for compensation to the Philippines were unclear.”
 - “While its strategic value has declined with the end of the cold war, Bush Administration officials say that replicating the functions of Subic Bay at installations elsewhere in the Pacific would cost several billion dollars.”
 - “Clark Air Base, a sister American installation on the central Philippine island of Luzon, was abandoned this year after it was smothered by volcanic ash released by nearby Mount Pinatubo.”
 - “Washington offered \$203 million a year in compensation, far less than was originally sought by Manila. Some of the Philippine lawmakers had demanded that the treaty be renegotiated.”

- “Mrs. Aquino, aware of opinion polls showing that an overwhelming majority of Filipinos support the treaty, is refusing to acquiesce in the Senate's rejection of it. The Philippine military also strongly favors the treaty.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/given-one-years-notice-u-s-begins-pull-out-subic/docview/140565859/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Told to get out) (Dec 1991) (PHILIPPINES_1992_WP_3)
 - “The U.S. Navy, rejecting a Philippine suggestion that it negotiate a longer stay with the next government here, pursued withdrawal plans following notice earlier today of eviction from Subic Bay Naval Base by the end of 1992.”
 - “In a statement read at the Malacanang presidential palace, Franklin Drilon, the executive secretary of President Corazon Aquino, left open the possibility of renewed talks between Washington and a new Philippine government following elections in May. But a U.S. official said that by the time the next administration takes office here at the end of June, ‘more than half of Subic will be gone.’”
 - “Although the United States vows to remain a Pacific and Indian Ocean power, the pullout from Subic, 50 miles northwest of Manila, appears to mark the end of an era of high-visibility U.S. military engagement in the security of Southeast Asia. U.S. officials said the Navy will carry out its missions in the region with fewer ships and a reduced ‘forward’ presence.”
 - “For the Philippines, the withdrawal removes the most controversial vestige of an often tumultuous relationship with the United States marked by both bitter enmity and close, sentimental attachment. While officials on each side today underscored continuing trade and other relations, the pullout appears likely to diminish U.S. interest in the country that American forces seized from Spain in 1898, ruled as a colony after crushing a rebel movement, lost to and later liberated from the Japanese during World War II and granted independence in 1946.”
 - “...Four smaller bases were turned over to the Philippines during the course of the talks, and the huge Clark Air Base was handed to the Philippine air force late last month after it was heavily damaged and rendered inoperable by ashfall from the June eruption of the nearby Mount Pinatubo volcano.”
 - “Negotiators from the two sides announced agreement last summer on a treaty under which the Philippines would let the U.S. Navy use Subic for 10 more years in return for at least \$2.18 billion in direct U.S. base-related aid. But in September the Philippine Senate refused to ratify the accord on grounds that it violated national sovereignty and provided insufficient compensation. Aquino and a majority of the senators later agreed, however, to let the United States withdraw from Subic over three years with no obligation to pay compensation.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/philippines-orders-u-s-leave-strategic-navy-base/docview/108755763/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Dec 1991) (PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_4)

- “Although it is theoretically possible that a new agreement could be hammered out, Administration officials in Washington said that they considered this unlikely, and that they would accelerate the pullout and the search for alternative sites in the Pacific.”
- “American and Philippine officials reached tentative agreement last summer on a treaty that would have extended the lease on the naval base for at least another decade in exchange for \$203 million in annual aid. But the Philippine Senate rejected the treaty in September after an impassioned debate in which the American military presence was assailed as a vestige of colonialism and an affront to Philippine sovereignty.”
- “The United States never increased its offer, but opened negotiations on a three-year phased withdrawal in the hope that the lease could be extended after a new government is elected in the Philippines in May.”
- “The negotiations stumbled, officials said, over the United States' reluctance to commit itself to a firm schedule for removing troops and equipment and to guarantee that no nuclear weapons would pass through the base.”
- “President Corazon C. Aquino had vowed to find a way to keep the United States in place, even proposing a referendum on the issue after the Senate rejected the bases treaty. But Mrs. Aquino, who has indicated that she does not plan to seek re-election next year, eventually backed down in the face of adamant political opposition.”
- “Money was not an issue in the impasse. In recent years, Washington has pledged a certain amount in economic, military and housing assistance instead of paying yearly rent for American bases. In the fiscal year that ended in September, the Philippines received \$408 million in connection with the bases, and the Subic Bay base has pumped more than \$344 million a year into the country's economy.”
- “Both American and Philippine officials said today that the United States' willingness to retain the Subic base had waned in recent months, especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. ‘Global events overtook Subic and undermined its value,’ said Alan Ortiz, assistant director of the Philippine Government's National Security Council.”
- “The withdrawal may also raise questions about the Bush Administration's assertion that the United States remains fully committed to Asia, a theme the President is expected to voice throughout his trip.”
- “But the vast American military presence has long been an irritant in the Philippines' uneasy relations with the United States. Resentment flared this year when Mrs. Aquino's Government finally negotiated the 10-year extension of the Subic Bay lease. Opposition was fierce in the Senate, where lawmakers asserted that the deal would perpetuate the country's image as an American lackey, though polls suggested that the Philippine people largely supported the treaty.”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-military-ends-role-philippines/docview/140805885/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Troops leave) (Nov 1992) (PHILIPPINES_1992_WP_5)
 - “President Fidel Ramos, after witnessing the raising of a huge Philippine flag at the site, called for a review of the two countries' Mutual Defense Treaty ‘in the context of the post-Cold War era.’ He said U.S. ship visits and joint military exercises would continue under a 1951 treaty.”
 - “And they departed amid controversies over alleged toxic wastes that critics say remain on the base and over plans for future access to Philippine ports and airfields.”
 - “The U.S. government insists that, despite relinquishing its last military base in Southeast Asia, the United States will remain a Pacific power and continue to project its forces across the region. But there is a widespread perception that the departure from Subic Bay reflects a growing U.S. military disengagement that could unsettle confidence in the stability of the economically booming area and lead other countries, notably China and Japan, to take more active roles.”
 - “In fact, while Philippine nationalists often have decried the U.S. bases as violations of sovereignty and sources of social ills such as prostitution, AIDS and illegitimate children, the townspeople closest to them have been the facilities' staunchest defenders...”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... Overseas Reductions, Navy, Reassignments at San Miguel Naval Communications Station in the Philippines.” (PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_1)
 - “The United States never increased its offer, but opened negotiations on a three-year phased withdrawal in the hope that the lease could be extended after a new government is elected in the Philippines in May. The negotiations stumbled, officials said, over the United States' reluctance to commit itself to a firm schedule for removing troops and equipment and to guarantee that no nuclear weapons would pass through the base.” (PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_4)
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “Both American and Philippine officials said today that the United States' willingness to retain the Subic base had waned in recent months, especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. ‘Global events overtook Subic and undermined its value,’ said Alan Ortiz, assistant

director of the Philippine Government's National Security Council.”
(PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_4)

- “The withdrawal may also raise questions about the Bush Administration's assertion that the United States remains fully committed to Asia, a theme the President is expected to voice throughout his trip.”

(PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_4)

- “The U.S. government insists that, despite relinquishing its last military base in Southeast Asia, the United States will remain a Pacific power and continue to project its forces across the region. But there is a widespread perception that the departure from Subic Bay reflects a growing U.S. military disengagement that could unsettle confidence in the stability of the economically booming area and lead other countries, notably China and Japan, to take more active roles.” (PHILIPPINES_1992_WP_5)

○ Popular movement

- “In fact, while Philippine nationalists often have decried the U.S. bases as violations of sovereignty and sources of social ills such as prostitution, AIDS and illegitimate children, the townspeople closest to them have been the facilities' staunchest defenders.” (PHILIPPINES_1992_WP_4)

○ Regime type

- “‘The treaty is defeated,’ the Senate President, Jovito R. Salonga, announced in a solemn tone after the vote was taken this morning in a show of hands. The decision was greeted with applause and tears in the chamber.” (PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_2)
- “The vote reflected a view among many senators that the compensation package offered by the United States was too small and, more broadly, that it was time to end an American military presence that began when the United States acquired the Philippines by winning the Spanish-American war.” (PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_2)
- “American and Philippine officials reached tentative agreement last summer on a treaty that would have extended the lease on the naval base for at least another decade in exchange for \$203 million in annual aid. But the Philippine Senate rejected the treaty in September after an impassioned debate in which the American military presence was assailed as a vestige of colonialism and an affront to Philippine sovereignty.”
(PHILIPPINES_1992_NYT_4)

United Kingdom 1989-1998

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-military-cuts-europe-hastened-crisis-over/docview/140091280/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Feb 1989) (UK_1990_WP_1)
 - “A much smaller U.S. military presence in Europe, initially projected for the late 1990s, will become a reality by mid-January courtesy of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.”
 - “Tens of thousands of the best U.S. troops and hundreds of top-line tanks, artillery and aircraft are being withdrawn from Europe for use in a potential war with Iraq, leaving behind a U.S. force of roughly the size planned for a safer and more stable period years from now, according to U.S. and allied military officials.”
 - “Other troops and weaponry may be left behind in Saudi Arabia as a deterrent to further Iraqi aggression. And some may fall prey to shifting U.S. budget priorities and be shipped straight home, many European defense officials have predicted.”
 - “Although Washington has not yet provided an answer, Woerner said he does not expect all of the forces to return. He suggested that the transfers have pushed U.S. military forces into a downward slide toward a residual force of about 100,000 personnel in Europe, roughly a third of the level earlier this year.”
 - “But NATO ambassadors, who met Friday in emergency session in Brussels to discuss the resignation, said in a statement that they expect important elements of Soviet foreign policy, including the phased - and, in some ways, complementary - withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, to be maintained under Shevardnadze's successor.”
 - “Also pulling out Britain: 48th tactical Fighter Wing, Lakenheath, F-11 multipurpose fighter/bombers; 10th Tactical Fighter Wing, Alconbury, A-10 ground-attack aircraft; 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, Upper Heyford, EF-111 Raven electronic countermeasure aircraft.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/nunn-says-u-s-should-negotiate-deeper-cuts-on/docview/108640382/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (UK_1990_NYT_2)
 - “Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000... Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000. The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Georgia

Democrat's comments on troop cuts are part of a broader recommendation that the United States redefine the overseas role of its forces by concentrating on air power while cutting costly Army troops stationed around the world.”

- “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pentagon-lists-u-s-bases-that-are-candidates/docview/108618103/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (UK_1990_NYT_3)
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... R.A.F. Fairford, R.A.F. Greenham Common and R.A.F. Wethersfield, all in Britain.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/lawmakers-urge-reducing-u-s-troops-europe-25-000/docview/14006777/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Dec 1990) (UK_1990_WP_4)
 - “A liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican on the House Armed Services Committee have joined forces on legislation that they predict will break the line against congressionally mandated U.S. troop reductions in Europe that has held since World War II.”
 - “Reps. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) and Andy Ireland (R-Fla.) said Thursday that they will launch a campaign next week to require the Defense Department to reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe by the 25,000 men and women assigned to U.S. missile sites to be scrapped under the ratified Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.”
 - ““Our amendment will provide lots of political cover,” Ireland said. ‘I’m considered a conservative hawk. But supporting this limited withdrawal demonstrates I haven’t got blinders on. I can explain that we’re just taking out the extra troops who were supposed to go with missiles that won’t be in Europe.’”
 - “Under the INF Treaty, the 120 Pershing II missiles already deployed in West Germany and the 319 ground launched cruise missiles in Britain, Italy, The Netherlands and West Germany will be removed by mid-1991. Ireland said that in Europe, the Army had about 6,000 men and women assigned to the Pershing IIs and the Air Force about 19,000 attached to ground launched cruise missile bases at the time of INF ratification.”

- “Some of the intermediate missiles have been removed, and their supporting personnel have been reassigned. U.S. cruise missiles at Britain's Molesworth Royal Air Force base, for example, have been destroyed and almost all the 900 American support personnel reassigned, Washington Post correspondent Jonathan Randal reported from London. Only about 30 U.S. Air Force maintenance workers from the 303rd tactical missile wing at Molesworth remain.”
- “Schroeder said the deficit, a growing conviction in Congress that the United States is doing more than its share in defending Europe and the sense that the Bush administration must respond to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's steps to end the Cold War are building support for significant U.S. troop reductions in Europe in the near future.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.” (UK_1990_NYT_2)
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Gorbachev's steps to end the Cold War are building support for significant U.S. troop reductions in Europe in the near future.” (UK_1990_WP_4)

- Popular movement
- Regime type

Italy 1990-1993

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/lawmakers-urge-reducing-u-s-troops-europe-25-000/docview/14006777/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Feb 1989) (ITALY_1990_WP_1)
 - “A liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican on the House Armed Services Committee have joined forces on legislation that they predict will break the line against congressionally mandated U.S. troop reductions in Europe that has held since World War II.”
 - “Reps. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) and Andy Ireland (R-Fla.) said Thursday that they will launch a campaign next week to require the Defense Department to reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe by the 25,000 men and women assigned to U.S. missile sites to be scrapped under the ratified Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.”
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- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/inf-pact-leaves-costly-bases-with-no-mission/docview/140029682/sem-2?accountid=14657> (April 1989) (ITALY_1990_WP_2)
 - “Coiso, one of the Air Force’s newest bases... it was designated to support a weapon that has been rendered obsolete by the U.S. Soviet treaty eliminating intermediate and shorter-range nuclear forces in Europe. Comiso, and 10 other U.S.-operated nuclear missile facilities throughout Europe...”

- “The debate over the future of the sites-six ground-launched cruise missile bases and three Pershing II missile facilities and two Pershing support units- has become even more heated as U.S. officials continue diplomatic duels with NATO allies reluctant to renew other basing-rights agreements.”
- “At the same time, some members of Congress who are trying to curtail military spending argue that the United States and NATO will waste millions of dollars if they build facilities while the almost-new nuclear missile facilities go unused”
- “‘I am very troubled by pouring concrete in places where we don’t know we’ll be five years from now’ said [D-CO Rep] Schroder ‘The ground launched cruise missiles are a great example.’”
- “Nowhere, said military officials, is that more obvious than at Comiso Air Station, an isolated base where water wells run dry in summer and the only access is by rural farm roads and a small helicopter landing pad. Comiso (pronounced Co-ME-so) was the most expensive of the ground launched cruise missile bases, according to congressional budget records.”
- “Groundbreaking had barely begun when the treaty was signed mandating all missile be removed from the [Comiso] base by 1991.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pentagon-lists-u-s-bases-that-are-candidates/docview/108618103/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (ITALY_1990_NYT_3)
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... Overseas closures... Comiso Air Base, Italy”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/nunn-says-u-s-should-negotiate-deeper-cuts-on/docview/108640382/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (ITALY_1990_NYT_4)
 - “Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000... Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000. The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Georgia Democrat's comments on troop cuts are part of a broader recommendation that the United States redefine the overseas role of its forces by concentrating on air power while cutting costly Army troops stationed around the world.”
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to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.”

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(ITALY_1990_NYT_4)

- Popular movement
- Regime type

Spain 1990-1994

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/spain-tells-u-s-remove-f16s/docview/139232385/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Dec 1987) (SPAIN_1991_WP_1)
 - “Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez has broken off negotiations with the United States over the stationing of American F16 fighter-bombers in Spain and has told Washington it must withdraw the warplanes within 3 1/2 years, diplomatic sources disclosed today.”
 - “The sudden decision by Gonzalez to declare the departure of all 72 F16s -- three squadrons stationed at Torrejon air base -- a ‘nonnegotiable’ issue and unilaterally to set a withdrawal deadline for them was conveyed to the American Embassy here on Dec. 10 and has been a closely held secret in both countries since then, according to these sources.”
 - “Spain's action -- the first important unilateral reduction of American forces ordered by a European ally since France closed American installations in 1966 and withdrew militarily from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- creates the potential for a bitter and divisive dispute that officials in both countries say they have been successful in avoiding until now.”
 - “Loss of the three F16 squadrons, which make up the 401st Tactical Air Wing, is likely to mean the withdrawal of all of the approximately 4,500 American airmen stationed at Torrejon and closure of the base, which is just west of Madrid, American officials have indicated in the past.”
 - “Gonzalez, who is carrying out a pledge made to his electorate in 1986 by ordering the departure of the 401st wing, has repeatedly said that he does not want to disturb the functioning of the other American installations and will sign a new long-term agreement covering them after the current accord expires next May.”
 - “The stationing of U.S. troops here is seen by many Spaniards as a symbol of the help the United States provided Franco in breaking out of the diplomatic isolation that he faced at the time.”
 - “Gonzalez's decision to set a three-year limit for the withdrawal is likely to be interpreted in Washington as having been politically motivated. He is expected to

seek a third term in elections that would normally be held in 1990, and by setting the deadline for withdrawal a year from then, he will be able to enter the campaign asserting he has carried out his 1986 pledge.”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/spaniards-around-u-s-base-divided-over-closing/docview/426715958/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1988) (SPAIN_1985_NYT_2)
 - “But a few blocks away, in this town that grew from some 4,000 residents in 1950 to more than 80,000 today, Vicente Saenz de Jubera was jubilant.”
 - ““We're just happy they're leaving,” said Mr. Saenz, secretary general of the Torrejon local of the General Workers Union. ‘People here saw the planes and weapons as the potential enemy, and no matter who owned them -whether Americans, the Soviets, the Italians - we are against them being here.’”
 - “Last week, after 18 months of often heated discussions, American negotiators finally acceded to Spanish demands that the squadron of 72 F-16's based at Torrejon be removed within three years [by 1991] and the troop level be reduced by 40 percent, making the base useless for American purposes as part of the defense of Europe's southern flank.”
 - “Nevertheless, a majority in the town are in favor of shutting it [Torrejon Air Base] down. Public opinion polls indicate that this sentiment reflects the mood in the rest of the country.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/greece-threatens-oust/docview/139616727/sem-2?accountid=14657> (May 1988) (SPAIN_1985_WP_3)
 - “Papandreou has made generalized threats about ousting the U.S. military from its four bases in Greece, but this time, officials said, he is being specific about Hellenikon, perhaps emboldened by the Spanish government’s success in forcing a wing of U.S. F16 fighter planes to leave a base in Torrejon. That wing is expected to relocate in Italy.”
 - “Spain has not been satisfied with removal of F16s from Torrejon and is making new demands about being consulted before U.S. forces launch operations from Spanish bases, officials said. The demands are particularly difficult in regard to nuclear weapons, they added, without being specific.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/spains-chief-criticized-on-u-s-defense-pact/docview/110453299/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Oct 1988) (SPAIN_1991_NYT_4)
 - ““The condition of non-nuclearization of Spanish territory will remain the same as under the previous agreement,’ he [Spanish PM Gonzalez] said on Spanish television. Announced at U.N. The agreement was announced at the United Nations by Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Spain's Foreign Minister,

Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez, and ended 26 months of tense and tough negotiations.”

- “...But Spanish media have reported that under the accord, the Government agrees not to inspect American ships to determine whether they are carrying nuclear weapons on port calls to Spain. In a referendum two years ago, voters approved keeping the country in NATO with the proviso that nuclear weapons are banned from Spanish territory.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/u-s-withdraw-72-jet-fighters-spanish-base/docview/110634991/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1988) (SPAIN_1991_NYT_5)
 - “The United States, after months of negotiations with Spain, has decided to accede to Spanish demands and withdraw 72 F-16 jet fighters based there, Defense and State Department officials said today.”
 - “Despite the insistence of the Socialist Government of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez that the F-16's be taken out of Spain, the Government in Madrid is willing to negotiate a new defense treaty that would allow continued access by the United States to the port at Rota, near the Strait of Gibraltar; to two smaller air bases, at Moron in the south and Zaragoza in the north, and to nine communications installations, the officials said.”
 - “Defense Department officials ruled out the possibility that a new base would be built for the planes, in part because the cost would be prohibitive. An offer by Morocco to have the planes based there has been ‘met with a lack of enthusiasm,’ an official said.”
 - “In addition, a provision contained in the continuing resolution on the budget last month prohibits any military construction funds from being used in the transfer of the Torrejon base.”
 - “State Department officials have portrayed the withdrawal of the F-16's in a positive light to avoid giving the impression that the removal will weaken the alliance.”
 - “A senior State Department official acknowledged that ‘there will be changes’ in the Spanish bases, but added that the impact of any change “should not be regarded as damaging to the NATO alliance.”
 - “The removal of the F-16 squadrons will probably mean the withdrawal of the 4,500 American airmen stationed at the base. Administration officials said they expected a three-year withdrawal (by 1991) after the other negotiations are completed.”
 - “There is also concern in the Administration that the decision could have an adverse affect on NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations on reducing conventional arms.”

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/italy-base-evicted-u-s-f16-wing-calabria/docview/139619184/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 1988) (SPAIN_1991_WP_6)
 - “Italian military authorities have chosen a military airport at Crotone in far southern Italy as the base for 72 F16 fighter-bombers that Spain is evicting from the Torrejon air base outside Madrid, visiting Italian Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita said here yesterday.”
 - “Speaking to Washington Post editors and reporters, the Italian leader said the decision on a site for the U.S. Air Force’s 401st Tactical Fighter Wing was made yesterday and predicted that there will be little opposition from local officials or the Italian Parliament, which has yet to approve it formally.”
 - “‘Its willingness to do its part, to share the risks and responsibilities as well as the benefits of NATO membership is exemplary,’ Reagan said.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/nunn-says-u-s-should-negotiate-deeper-cuts-on/docview/108640382/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (SPAIN_1991_NYT_7)
 - “Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000... Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000. The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Georgia Democrat's comments on troop cuts are part of a broader recommendation that the United States redefine the overseas role of its forces by concentrating on air power while cutting costly Army troops stationed around the world.”
 - “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-military-cuts-europe-hastened-crisis-over/docview/140091280/sem-2?accountid=1465> (Dec 1990) (SPAIN_1991_WP_8)

- “A much smaller U.S. military presence in Europe, initially projected for the late 1990s, will become a reality by mid-January courtesy of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.”
- “Tens of thousands of the best U.S. troops and hundreds of top-line tanks, artillery and aircraft are being withdrawn from Europe for use in a potential war with Iraq, leaving behind a U.S. force of roughly the size planned for a safer and more stable period years from now, according to U.S. and allied military officials.”
- “Other troops and weaponry may be left behind in Saudi Arabia as a deterrent to further Iraqi aggression. And some may fall prey to shifting U.S. budget priorities and be shipped straight home, many European defense officials have predicted.”
- “Although Washington has not yet provided an answer, Woerner said he does not expect all of the forces to return. He suggested that the transfers have pushed U.S. military forces into a downward slide toward a residual force of about 100,000 personnel in Europe, roughly a third of the level earlier this year.”
- “But NATO ambassadors, who met Friday in emergency session in Brussels to discuss the resignation, said in a statement that they expect important elements of Soviet foreign policy, including the phased - and, in some ways, complementary - withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, to be maintained under Shevardnadze's successor.”
- “Also pulling out SPAIN: 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, Torrejon, F-16 fighters.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “In addition, a provision contained in the continuing resolution on the budget last month prohibits any military construction funds from being used in the transfer of the Torrejon base.” (SPAIN_1991_NYT_5)
 - “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.” (SPAIN_1991_NYT_7)
 - Financial concerns
 - “In addition, a provision contained in the continuing resolution on the budget last month prohibits any military construction funds from being used in the transfer of the Torrejon base.” (SPAIN_1991_NYT_5)
 - “Other troops and weaponry may be left behind in Saudi Arabia as a deterrent to further Iraqi aggression. And some may fall prey to shifting

U.S. budget priorities and be shipped straight home, many European defense officials have predicted.” (SPAIN_1991_WP_8)

○ Changing geopolitical concerns

- “State Department officials have portrayed the withdrawal of the F-16's in a positive light to avoid giving the impression that the removal will weaken the alliance.” (SPAIN_1991_NYT_5)
- “A senior State Department official acknowledged that ‘there will be changes’ in the Spanish bases, but added that the impact of any change “should not be regarded as damaging to the NATO alliance.” (SPAIN_1991_NYT_5)
- “Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000... Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000. The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Georgia Democrat's comments on troop cuts are part of a broader recommendation that the United States redefine the overseas role of its forces by concentrating on air power while cutting costly Army troops stationed around the world.” (SPAIN_1991_NYT_7)
- “Other troops and weaponry may be left behind in Saudi Arabia as a deterrent to further Iraqi aggression. And some may fall prey to shifting U.S. budget priorities and be shipped straight home, many European defense officials have predicted.” (SPAIN_1991_WP_7)
- “But NATO ambassadors, who met Friday in emergency session in Brussels to discuss the resignation, said in a statement that they expect important elements of Soviet foreign policy, including the phased - and, in some ways, complementary - withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, to be maintained under Shevardnadze's successor.” (SPAIN_1991_WP_8)

○ Popular Movement

- “Gonzalez, who is carrying out a pledge made to his electorate in 1986 by ordering the departure of the 401st wing, has repeatedly said that he does not want to disturb the functioning of the other American installations and will sign a new long-term agreement covering them after the current accord expires next May.” (SPAIN_1991_WP_1)

- “The stationing of U.S. troops here is seen by many Spaniards as a symbol of the help the United States provided Franco in breaking out of the diplomatic isolation that he faced at the time.” (SPAIN_1991_WP_1)
- “Nevertheless, a majority in the town are in favor of shutting it [Torrejon Air Base] down. Public opinion polls indicate that this sentiment reflects the mood in the rest of the country.” (SPAIN_1991_NYT_2)
- “...But Spanish media have reported that under the accord, the Government agrees not to inspect American ships to determine whether they are carrying nuclear weapons on port calls to Spain. In a referendum two years ago, voters approved keeping the country in NATO with the proviso that nuclear weapons are banned from Spanish territory.” (SPAIN_1991_NYT_4)
- Regime Type
 - “The sudden decision by Gonzalez to declare the departure of all 72 F16s -- three squadrons stationed at Torrejon air base -- a ‘nonnegotiable’ issue and unilaterally to set a withdrawal deadline for them was conveyed to the American Embassy here on Dec. 10 and has been a closely held secret in both countries since then, according to these sources.” (SPAIN_1991_WP_1)
 - “Gonzalez, who is carrying out a pledge made to his electorate in 1986 by ordering the departure of the 401st wing, has repeatedly said that he does not want to disturb the functioning of the other American installations and will sign a new long-term agreement covering them after the current accord expires next May.” (SPAIN_1991_WP_1)
 - “Gonzalez's decision to set a three-year limit for the withdrawal is likely to be interpreted in Washington as having been politically motivated. He is expected to seek a third term in elections that would normally be held in 1990, and by setting the deadline for withdrawal a year from then, he will be able to enter the campaign asserting he has carried out his 1986 pledge.” (SPAIN_1991_WP_1)
 - “Last week, after 18 months of often heated discussions, American negotiators finally acceded to Spanish demands that the squadron of 72 F-16's based at Torrejon be removed within three years [by 1991] and the troop level be reduced by 40 percent, making the base useless for American purposes as part of the defense of Europe's southern flank.” (SPAIN_1991_NYT_2)
 - “Papandreou has made generalized threats about ousting the U.S. military from its four bases in Greece, but this time, officials said, he is being specific about Hellenikon, perhaps emboldened by the Spanish government's success in forcing a wing of U.S. F16 fighter planes to leave

a base in Torrejon. That wing is expected to relocate in Italy.”
(SPAIN_1991_WP_3)

- “Spain has not been satisfied with removal of F16s from Torrejon and is making new demands about being consulted before U.S. forces launch operations from Spanish bases, officials said. The demands are particularly difficult in regard to nuclear weapons, they added, without being specific.” (SPAIN_1991_WP_3)

Greece 1990-1995

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/nunn-says-u-s-should-negotiate-deeper-cuts-on/docview/108640382/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (GREECE_1990_NYT_1)
 - “Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000... Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000. The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Georgia Democrat's comments on troop cuts are part of a broader recommendation that the United States redefine the overseas role of its forces by concentrating on air power while cutting costly Army troops stationed around the world.”
 - “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/greeks-say-u-s-plans-close-2-4-bases/docview/140115764/sem-2?accountid=14657> (GREECE_1990_WP_2) (Jan 1990)
 - “The United States will close two of its four major military installations in Greece, political party leaders said today. The disclosure came after leaders of the three parties that support the coalition government met with Premier Xenophon Zolotas.”
 - “The letter said Hellenikon Air Base, adjacent to Athens International Airport, and the Navy communications station at Nea Makri, 20 miles southeast of here,

would be removed. This would leave an Air Force monitoring post and a Navy refueling base on Crete.”

- “A five-year agreement covering the bases expired in December 1988. It allowed 17 months to dismantle the bases if no new accord were reached. Parliament is to debate a proposal next month calling for a six-month extension of the May 21 deadline to remove personnel and materiel in order to give Greek-U.S. negotiators more time.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pentagon-lists-u-s-bases-that-are-candidates/docview/108618103/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (GREECE_1990_NYT_3)
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... Overseas Reductions, Navy, Nea Makri Naval Communications Station, Greece... Navy, Hellenikon Air Base, Greece.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/greeks-feel-pinch-as-two-u-s-bases-close/docview/108606095/sem-2?accountid=14657> (GREECE_1990_NYT_4) (Feb 1990)
 - “For years the presence of American bases in Greece has led to huge rallies, riots and terrorist acts. American soldiers were advised to limit off-base activity for fear of public incidents. Now, in a paradoxical reversal of the public mood, that anti-American campaign has given way to last-minute efforts to hang onto the millions of dollars that will leave an already feeble economy when the United States shuts down two bases this year.”
 - “Washington has also indicated it will reduce military and economic aid to countries where it is cutting its military presence. But Greece has announced it will take “every necessary measure” to maintain the \$350 million in military sales credits it receives annually from the United States.”
 - “Huge U.S. Debt Reported - Mr. Alexandrou asserts that the Americans owe \$3.5 million in pay claims, severance pay and social security benefits. The American military contests those figures and says the responsibility for the employees lies with the Greek Defense Ministry.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-greece-conclude-new-8-year-bases-pact/docview/89109397/sem-2?accountid=14657> (GREECE_1990_WP_5) (May 1990)
 - “After a year of contentious negotiations, the United States and Greece agreed yesterday on a new defense pact that will allow U.S. air and naval bases to remain in Greece for the next eight years.”

- “The clash has been between Greece’s commitments to North Atlantic Treaty Organization defenses and its internal nationalist pressures to oust the four U.S. bases and 20 smaller units from Greek soil.”
- “With the Cold War rapidly drawing to an end and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact posing a greatly diminished military threat to the West, the U.S. need for a strong air and naval presence along NATO’s southern flank in Greece is considered likely to disappear by the time the new pact expires in eight years.”
- “In fact, U.S. officials said yesterday, the latest agreement will mean a substantial reduction in the American presence in any case, because it incorporates plans, announced by Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney in January, to close two of the bases as part of a worldwide cost-cutting drive.”
- “The installations to be closed are the Hellenikon Air Force Base outside Athens and a naval communications station at Nea Makri, northeast of the capital. Both have aroused considerable anti-American sentiment over the years, including occasional terrorist attacks on their personnel, because of their high visibility in the densely populated Athens area.”
- “Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis who will visit here next week has pledged to reach a bases agreement following the election victory in April of his conservative New Democracy Party. The government of former Socialist prime minister Andreas Papandreou, ousted in national elections a year ago, was hampered in previous elections by its desire for nationalist support, and the talks had languished until their revival under Mitsotakis.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “The pressure in Congress to cut deployments is likely to be stronger in the coming year because many members of Congress view it as a more attractive way to save money than closing bases at home. In addition, the Army has drawn up plans to refashion itself into a fast-reaction force that would be largely based in the United States, adding to the emerging consensus for cuts in overseas deployments... For his part, Senator Nunn urged that the United States redefine its overseas role for defending Western Europe to make the most efficient use of its military resources.” (GREECE_1990_NYT_1)
 - Financial concerns
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... Overseas Reductions, Navy, Nea Makri Naval Communications Station, Greece... Navy, Hellenikon Air Base, Greece.” (NYT_3)

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- Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000... Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested a reduction from the current American strength of 305,000 Army and Air Force troops to about 200,000 to 250,000. The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Administration has proposed a troop limit of 275,000 as part of a treaty cutting conventional forces in Europe... The Georgia Democrat's comments on troop cuts are part of a broader recommendation that the United States redefine the overseas role of its forces by concentrating on air power while cutting costly Army troops stationed around the world.” (GREECE_1990_NYT_1)
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- Popular movement
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years, including occasional terrorist attacks on their personnel, because of their high visibility in the densely populated Athens area.”

(GREECE_1990_WP_5)

- Regime type

Bermuda 1991-1995

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/historical-newspapers/pentagon-lists-u-s-bases-that-are-candidates/docview/108618103/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 1990) (BERMUDA_1991_NYT_1)
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... Reduction in personnel at Bermuda Naval Air Station.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/anti-submarine-effort-may-be-cut-navy/docview/140252381/sem-2?accountid=14657> (BERMUDA_1991_WP_3)
 - “A dramatic decrease in Soviet submarine patrols and other naval operations worldwide has prompted the Pentagon to propose significant cuts in some U.S. anti-submarine warfare programs long considered critical in countering the Soviet threat, according to top Navy officials and intelligence reports.”
 - “Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in the Atlantic, told the Senate panel that the Soviets are sending ‘very few submarine patrols into the Atlantic’ where the United States has centered much of its anti-submarine effort in recent years. That is only part of a global decrease of Soviet naval operations in recent years, said Kelso, whom Bush yesterday nominated to the Navy's highest-ranking post, chief of naval operations.”
 - “‘The Soviets have espoused a defensive doctrine,’ Kelso said. ‘They've pulled back to support that defensive doctrine.’”
 - “The decline in Soviet submarine patrols in the Atlantic Ocean has prompted the Defense Department, facing severe budget pressures, to propose cuts in several anti-submarine warfare programs in the fiscal year 1991 budget: The Navy has recommended buying less than half its usual number of sonar buoys which are used to eavesdrop on submarine movements. Instead of the 440,000 buoys it purchased last year, the Navy has recommended buying 185,000 at a cost of \$73 million in 1991.”
 - “Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney has proposed significant reductions at the Navy's Bermuda Naval Air Station, which is used primarily as a center for tracking submarines in the Atlantic Ocean.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups

- Financial concerns
 - “Here are the domestic and overseas military bases that are candidates for possible closure or reductions as announced by the Defense Department today. The bases are listed by service or defense agency... Reduction in personnel at Bermuda Naval Air Station” (BERMUDA_1991_NYT_1)
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- Changing geopolitical concerns
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 - “‘The Soviets have espoused a defensive doctrine,’ Kelso said. ‘They've pulled back to support that defensive doctrine.’” (BERMUDA_1991_WP_3)
- Popular movement
- Regime type

Panama 1994-1999

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-panama-review-troop-pullout/docview/903356070/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Sept 1995) (PANAMA_1999_WP_1)

- “The United States and Panama agreed yesterday to explore whether a U.S. military presence should be kept in the Central American nation after it takes control of the Panama Canal in 2000.”
- “U.S. troops now number about 8,000 in Panama and are to be removed when the United States hands over the 50-mile canal to Panama by Dec. 31, 1999, under two 1977 treaties.”
- “But there are mountain concerns in Panama about the economic impact of the withdrawal. Experts say Panaminans could lose 16,00 jobs and \$330 million a year in wages and sales- equal to 8 percent of Panama’s economy.”
- “...He [Panamanian president Perez Balladares] said many Panamanians would prefer to retain a U.S. presence because of its economic impact.”
- “Clinton and Perez Balladares both reaffirmed their commitment to the canal treaties, including the promise to maintain the canal’s neutrality beyond 2000.”
- “The United States already has decided to move headquarters of the U.S. Southern Command, which is in charge of all U.S. troops in Latin America, from Panama to the Miami region in 1998.”
- “Opinions have reversed since 1977 when Panamanians wanted the United States to leave while Americans preferred to stay, according to an article by Pastor in Tuesday’s Washington Post.”
- “In December 1989 President George Bush sent U.S. troops to Panama to capture strongman Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega and bring him to trial in the United States on drug trafficking charges. Convicted in April 1992, Noriega is serving a 40-year sentence at a prison outside Miami.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/wading-into-murky-waters/docview/1707868172/sem-2?accountid=14657> (May 1999) (PANAMA_1999_WP_2)
 - “Judging from numerous interviews, many Panaminans share his concern about the departure of the Americans... In particular, they fear that entrenched political corruption and incompetence in the government will affect the administration and financial stability of the canal... They also worry about the economic costs of the U.S. troop pullout as well as potential harm to the investment climate.”
 - “Such reservations are not without irony. The treaties that set the stage for the canal handover and troop withdrawal were negotiated by Panama’s then-leader, Gen. Omar Torrijos, and President Jimmy Carter and approved overwhelmingly by Panamanian voters in 1977.”
 - “In recent years, however, newspaper polls have indicated that between 50 and 70 percent of Panamanians queried support a continued U.S. military presence beyond 2000 particularly when the issue is framed in economic terms.”

- “Some said growing distrust in political leaders changed their minds. Others expressed concern that Panama, which doesn’t have an army, will be vulnerable without the protection of U.S. troops.”
- “But Panamanian officials, including the newly elected president, Mireya Mocosó, have vowed to shield the canal from politics and corruption.”
- “At the same time, some contend that the departure of the United States could provide an opportunity for Panama to mature politically- forcing its leaders to take responsibility for their country rather than blaming its problems on Washington.”
- “Similarly, some Panamanians said they hoped the canal handover would lead to a stronger national identity in perhaps the most Americanized country in Latin America.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/handover-panama-base-hinders-anti-drug-efforts/docview/1707880362/sim-2?accountid=14657> (May 1999) (PANAMA_1999_WP_3)
 - “The turnover of a U.S. military base to Panama earlier this month has left a gaping hole in American counter-drug efforts in Central America and the Caribbean, forcing the Clinton administration to scramble for new facilities that can be used to track drug shipments from South America.”
 - “All U.S. forces are scheduled to leave Panama, formerly headquarters for the U.S. Southern Command, by the end of the year under terms of the Panama Canal treaties. On May 1, Howard Air Force Base was turned over to Panama, depriving the United States of a base for 22 surveillance aircraft and causing a sharp drop in anti-drug coverage of the region.”
 - “To maintain a presence in the area, the Clinton administration has hastily negotiated a short-term agreement with the Netherlands to station aircraft at the airports in the Dutch Caribbean protectorates of Aruba and Curacao. It negotiated a similar agreement with Ecuador to station airplanes in the Pacific coast city of Manta... Washington is seeking a third such agreement in Central America and, to that end, is currently negotiating with Costa Rica.”
 - “In a May 20 letter to Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, four Republican congressmen warned that the loss of Howard [base in Panama] has presented the United States with ‘one of the worst disasters in our U.S. counterdrug history.’... ‘These counterdrug flights are essential for information sharing with other countries in the region, for eradication and narcotics interdiction,’ said the letter from representatives John L. Mica (Fla.); Benjamin A. Gilman (N.Y.); Mark Edward Souder (Ind.); and Robert L. Barr Jr. (Ga.). ‘Without these essential flights the department is creating a wide open door to drug traffickers and destroying the first line of defense against illegal narcotics traffickers.’”

- “Barry R. McCaffrey, the administration's national drug policy director, said he was ‘worried’ by the loss of Howard but blamed the delay in getting the new bases operational on then-Panamanian President Ernesto Perez Balladares, who, he said, had agreed privately to extend the U.S. presence in Panama, then backed out last September.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-out-panama/docview/1707920941/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Oct 1999) (PANAMA_1999_WP_4)
 - “...The Department of Defence has meet all requirements of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and cares for installations overseas using the same management tools, diligence and seriousness used for installations at home.”
 - “As part of an assessment of all the ranges in Panama that was initiated in 1996, the United States put together a transfer plan provided equipment and training to Panama to help it manage the ranges. As a result, more than 6,600 items of unexploded ordinance and 2 million pounds of scrap material were removed.”
 - “By the end of this year, we will have completed the transfer of the remaining Defense Department areas in the former Canal Zone. Close to 98 percent of the land then will be available for unrestricted use. Also, 14 installations and 4,827 buildings will have been turned over to Panama before the treaty’s expiration.”
 - “The United States leaves Panama with a proud legacy of environmental stewardship and fulfillment of our treaty commitments.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “Clinton and Perez Balladares both reaffirmed their commitment to the canal treaties, including the promise to maintain the canal’s neutrality beyond 2000.” (PANAMA_1999_WP_1)
 - “Opinions have reversed since 1977 when Panamanians wanted the United States to leave while Americans preferred to stay, according to an article by Pastor in Tuesday’s Washington Post.” (PANAMA_1999_WP_1)
 - “...The Department of Defence has meet all requirements of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and cares for installations overseas using the same management tools, diligence and seriousness used for installations at home.” (PANAMA_1999_WP_4)
 - Financial concerns
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - Popular movement
 - “Opinions have reversed since 1977 when Panamanians wanted the United States to leave while Americans preferred to stay, according to an

article by Pastor in Tuesday's Washington Post.”

(PANAMA_1999_WP_1)

- “Such reservations are not without irony. The treaties that set the stage for the canal handover and troop withdrawal were negotiated by Panama's then-leader, Gen. Omar Torrijos, and President Jimmy Carter and approved overwhelmingly by Panamanian voters in 1977.”
(PANAMA_1999_WP_2)
- “In recent years, however, newspaper polls have indicated that between 50 and 70 percent of Panamanians queried support a continued U.S. military presence beyond 2000 particularly when the issue is framed in economic terms.” (PANAMA_1999_WP_2)
- Regime type
 - “Clinton and Perez Balladares both reaffirmed their commitment to the canal treaties, including the promise to maintain the canal's neutrality beyond 2000.” (PANAMA_1999_WP_1)
 - “Barry R. McCaffrey, the administration's national drug policy director, said he was "worried" by the loss of Howard but blamed the delay in getting the new bases operational on then-Panamanian President Ernesto Perez Balladares, who, he said, had agreed privately to extend the U.S. presence in Panama, then backed out last September.”
(PANAMA_1999_WP_3)

Uzbekistan 2003-2006

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-opposed-calls-at-nato-probe-uzbek-killings/docview/2605119831/seam-2?accountid=14657> (Probe on massacre and backlash) (June 2005)
(UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_1)
 - “Defense officials from Russia and the United States last week helped block a new demand for an international probe into the Uzbekistan government's shooting of hundreds of protestors last month, according to U.S. and diplomatic officials.”
 - “The communique's wording was worked out after what several knowledgeable sources called a vigorous debate in Brussels between U.S. defense officials, who emphasized the importance of the base, and others, including State Department representatives at NATO headquarters, who favored language calling for a transparent, independent and international probe into the killings of Uzbekistan civilians by police and soldiers.”
 - “Other officials said the disagreements between Defense and State officials reflect a continuing rift in the administration over how to handle a breach of human rights that has come under sharp criticism by the State Department, the European Union and some U.S. lawmakers.”

- “Rice has said publicly that international involvement in an inquiry into the killings in Andijan is essential, and she has declined an Uzbek invitation for Washington to send observers to a commission of inquiry controlled by the parliament. Three U.S. officials said Uzbek President Islam Karimov has retaliated against her criticism by recently curtailing certain U.S. military flights into the air base at Karshi-Khanabad, in the country's southeast. The U.S. military considers the base a vital logistics hub in its anti-terrorism efforts.”
- “...If there was tension, a senior defense official said, it was between supporting ‘democracy in Uzbekistan’ and ‘democracy in Afghanistan.’”
- “Rumsfeld said the ministers needed to know that the Uzbekistan situation had direct implications on NATO operations in the region. He mentioned the tons of humanitarian aid that pass through the Karshi-Khanabad air base and warned that alternatives to the base would be more difficult and expensive.”
- “The senators — Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), John McCain (R-Ariz.), John E. Sununu (R-N.H.), Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) — added that ‘we believe that the United States must be careful about being too closely associated with a government that has killed hundreds of demonstrators and refused international calls for a transparent investigation.’ They suggested that the administration explore alternative basing arrangements ‘in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and elsewhere in the region’ to give Washington more flexibility.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/uzbeks-threaten-evict-u-s-air-base-near/docview/92923046/sem-2?accountid=14657>
(Eviction first threatened after crackdown) (July 2005) (UZBEKISTAN_2005_NYT_2)
 - “The statement on Thursday from Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry said it had allowed the base, where 800 American troops are stationed, to be established for the sole purpose of ousting Taliban rulers from Afghanistan.”
 - “‘Any other prospects for a U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan were not considered by the Uzbek side,’ The Associated Press quoted the statement as saying.”
 - “The statement was released two days after a meeting of the Russia-and China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which called for the United States to set a timeline for withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan and Central Asia.”
 - “American relations with Uzbekistan have grown increasingly strained recently, after a government crackdown in the wake of a prison break and protest in Andijan, in northeastern Uzbekistan, on May 13 in which hundreds of unarmed demonstrators died. Uzbek authorities restricted American military operations at the air base, in June after Washington officials called for an international inquiry into events in Andijan.”

- “The relationship between the Bush administration and Uzbekistan, an autocratic and corrupt state with a poor human rights record, has become even more uncomfortable, though, since the May 13 events in Andijon, which human rights observers say left 750 people dead.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-evicted-air-base-uzbekistan/docview/2600674898/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Evicted- focus on Kyrgyzstan flights and the official note) (July 2005) (UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_3)
 - “Uzbekistan formally evicted the United States yesterday from a military base that has served as a hub for combat and humanitarian mission to Afghanistan since shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Pentagon and State Department officials said yesterday.”
 - “If Uzbekistan follows through, as Washington expects, the United States will face several logistical problems for its operations in Afghanistan. Scores of flights have used K2 monthly. It has been a landing base to transfer humanitarian goods that then are taken by road into northern Afghanistan, particularly to Mazar-e Sharif -- with no alternative for a region difficult to reach in the winter. K2 is also a refueling base with a runway long enough for large military aircraft. The alternative is much costlier midair refueling.”
 - “The eviction notice came four days before a senior State Department official was to arrive in Tashkent for talks with the government of President Islam Karimov. The relationship has been increasingly tense since bloody protests in the province of Andijan in May, the worst unrest since Uzbekistan gained independence from the Soviet Union.”
 - “Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns was going to pressure Tashkent to allow an international investigation into the Andijan protests, which human rights groups and three U.S. senators who met with eyewitnesses said killed about 500 people. Burns was also going to warn the government, one of the most authoritarian in the Islamic world, to open up politically -- or risk the kind of upheavals witnessed recently in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, U.S. officials said.”
 - “The United States was given the notice just hours after 439 Uzbek political refugees were flown out of neighboring Kyrgyzstan -- over Uzbek objections -- by the United Nations. The refugees fled after the May unrest, which Uzbek officials charged was the work of terrorists. The Bush administration had been pressuring Kyrgyzstan not to force the refugees to return to Uzbekistan.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/uzbeks-order-us-base-refugee-rift/docview/93015615/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Evicted- focused on context of crimes) (July 2005) (UZBEKISTAN_2005_NYT_4)

- “‘When we got notice of the Uzbek action Friday morning, we decided it would be inappropriate for me to go at this time,’ he [Diplomat R. Nicholas Burns, under secretary of state for political affairs] said in an interview. ‘We were going to have a conversation about human rights, Andijon and the fact that the Uzbek government's failure to reform has put it in international isolation.’”
- “Mr. Burns said the United States had been ‘profoundly concerned’ about the status of the Uzbek refugees in Kyrgyzstan who fled after the Andijon incident. ‘We have energetically supported the efforts to bring them to safety in Romania,’ he said, “because we feared they would be persecuted if they were sent back to Uzbekistan.’ ‘We are not willing to overlook these very important human rights concerns,’ he added.”
- “Another State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of department ground rules, said, ‘Obviously we don't want to lose K-2.’ But he added that loss of the base was preferable to backing away from demanding that Uzbekistan start political and economic reforms and agree to an international investigation of the Andijon killings.”
- “The Kyrgyz government has picked up 29 refugees for detention because some were charged with crimes. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has been working to get them to safety, the official said, and early Friday most were taken to an airport to be airlifted to Romania.”
- “Mr. Rumsfeld received assurances from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that the American military could continue to use bases in those Central Asian nations to support relief and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/uzbekistan-senate-says-u-s-troops-must-leave/docview/2605784355/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Uzbek senate votes to kick out) (August 2005)
(UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_5)
 - “Uzbekistan’s senate voted unanimously yesterday to expel the U.S. military from a base that it has used to support missions in Afghanistan, a strong public statement that backs a recent government decision to oust U.S. troops.
 - “...But concerns about the government’s response to protests in the province of Andijan in May - human rights groups estimated that hundreds of people were killed - prompted U.S. officials to encourage Tashkent to allow an international investigation of the incident.”
 - “‘Wherever American bases crop up, so does a fundamentalist mood and so do enemies of America, and we don’t want to be caught between the two,’ Nuriddin Zayniyev, governor of Kashkadarya Region where the base is located, told parliament, according to the Associated Press.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/russia-uzbek-military-pact-allows-mutual-use/docview/2604922621/sem>

[-2?accountid=14657](#) (Uzbek-Russian alliance fills the void) (Nov 2005)

(UZBEKISTAN_2005_NYT_6)

- “The presidents of Russia and Uzbekistan signed a military treaty at the Kremlin on Monday, forging an alliance that reasserts Moscow’s influence in the former Soviet republic, which until recently was a U.S. ally.”
- “Monday’s treaty [between Russia and Uzbekistan] was signed shortly after the Uzbek Supreme Court sentenced 15 people to 14 to 20 years in prison on charges of attempting to overthrow the government in the Andijan violence. Human Rights groups condemn the seven-week proceeding as a show trial.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “The senators — Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), John McCain (R-Ariz.), John E. Sununu (R-N.H.), Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) — added that ‘we believe that the United States must be careful about being too closely associated with a government that has killed hundreds of demonstrators and refused international calls for a transparent investigation.’ They suggested that the administration explore alternative basing arrangements ‘in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and elsewhere in the region’ to give Washington more flexibility.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_1)
 - “Mr. Burns said the United States had been ‘profoundly concerned’ about the status of the Uzbek refugees in Kyrgyzstan who fled after the Andijon incident. ‘We have energetically supported the efforts to bring them to safety in Romania,’ he said, ‘because we feared they would be persecuted if they were sent back to Uzbekistan.’ ‘We are not willing to overlook these very important human rights concerns,’ he added.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_NYT_4)
 - “The Kyrgyz government has picked up 29 refugees for detention because some were charged with crimes. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has been working to get them to safety, the official said, and early Friday most were taken to an airport to be airlifted to Romania.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_NYT_4)
 - “...But concerns about the government’s response to protests in the province of Andijan in May - human rights groups estimated that hundreds of people were killed - prompted U.S. officials to encourage Tashkent to allow an international investigation of the incident.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_5)
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Andijan violence. Human Rights groups condemn the seven-week proceeding as a show trial.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_NYT_6)

- Financial concerns
- Changing geopolitical concerns
- Popular movement
- Regime type
 - “Rice has said publicly that international involvement in an inquiry into the killings in Andijan is essential, and she has declined an Uzbek invitation for Washington to send observers to a commission of inquiry controlled by the parliament. Three U.S. officials said Uzbek President Islam Karimov has retaliated against her criticism by recently curtailing certain U.S. military flights into the air base at Karshi-Khanabad, in the country's southeast. The U.S. military considers the base a vital logistics hub in its anti-terrorism efforts.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_1)
 - “The eviction notice came four days before a senior State Department official was to arrive in Tashkent for talks with the government of President Islam Karimov. The relationship has been increasingly tense since bloody protests in the province of Andijan in May, the worst unrest since Uzbekistan gained independence from the Soviet Union.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_3)
 - “Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns was going to pressure Tashkent to allow an international investigation into the Andijan protests, which human rights groups and three U.S. senators who met with eyewitnesses said killed about 500 people. Burns was also going to warn the government, one of the most authoritarian in the Islamic world, to open up politically -- or risk the kind of upheavals witnessed recently in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, U.S. officials said.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_3)
 - “The United States was given the notice just hours after 439 Uzbek political refugees were flown out of neighboring Kyrgyzstan -- over Uzbek objections -- by the United Nations. The refugees fled after the May unrest, which Uzbek officials charged was the work of terrorists. The Bush administration had been pressuring Kyrgyzstan not to force the refugees to return to Uzbekistan.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_3)
 - “Uzbekistan’s senate voted unanimously yesterday to expel the U.S. military from a base that it has used to support missions in Afghanistan, a strong public statement that backs a recent government decision to oust U.S. troops.” (UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_5)
 - ““Wherever American bases crop up, so does a fundamentalist mood and so do enemies of America, and we don’t want to be caught between the

two,' Nuriddin Zayniyev, governor of Kashkadarya Region where the base is located, told parliament, according to the Associated Press.”
(UZBEKISTAN_2005_WP_5)

Iceland 2006-2009

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/u-s-remove-military-forces-aircraft-iceland-base/docview/2695215043/sem-2?accountid=14657> (ICELAND_2006_WP_1)
 - “...a move that will leave the island nation with virtually no military defenses and that has caused diplomatic tension between the two NATO allies.”
 - “‘After careful consideration of the global strategic environment, including the new threats and demands on resources, the continued permanent presence of U.S. fighter aircraft at Keflavik is no longer an appropriate use of those assets, nor is it in the best interest of the alliance’ said Lt. Cmdr. Joe Carpenter, a Pentagon spokesman.”
 - “‘We are deeply disappointed over this decision,’ said Helgi Agustsson, Iceland’s ambassador to the United States... ‘We have a defense agreement with the U.S., and with the withdrawal of the fighter aircraft, it raises the question of credible authority. Iceland has no military forces.’”
 - “‘Officials in the United States and Iceland said they are unsure what the continued defense of Iceland would look like though they hinted that NATO could have a presence.’”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/historical-newspapers/iceland-presses-u-s-not-remove-jets/docview/2267513537/sem-2?accountid=14657> (ICELAND_2006_WP_2)
 - “Pentagon officials contend the planes, remnants of an operation started four decades ago to guard the North Atlantic against a Soviet threat, no longer need to be based in Iceland and can be used better elsewhere. But Iceland, which has no military, regards the aircraft as essential to its air defense and, even more important, as a symbol of a U.S. commitment to defend the nation.”
 - “In numbers of personnel and equipment, the Iceland case constitutes only a small fraction of the large-scale repositioning of U.S. forces around the world, which the Pentagon has undertaken in an attempt to shift from Cold War-era missions and focus more on combating terrorism and interdicting weapons of mass destruction. But this case also highlights how these U.S. military shifts can run afoul of host country sensitivities and interests.”
 - “Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force has been pressing to pull its jets out of Iceland. In 1994, the Clinton administration withdrew eight fighters but agreed to keep four permanently at the Keflavik Naval Air Station, near Reykjavik. The two sides were to renegotiate the deal in 2001, but talks were postponed in the

wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and a U.S. strategic review. Now the Bush administration wants to withdraw the remaining four F-15 fighter jets, along with five rescue helicopters and two refueling planes.”

- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - ““After careful consideration of the global strategic environment, including the new threats and demands on resources, the continued permanent presence of U.S. fighter aircraft at Keflavik is no longer an appropriate use of those assets, nor is it in the best interest of the alliance” said Lt. Cmdr. Joe Carpenter, a Pentagon spokesman.” (ICELAND_2006_WP_1)
 - “Pentagon officials contend the planes, remnants of an operation started four decades ago to guard the North Atlantic against a Soviet threat, no longer need to be based in Iceland and can be used better elsewhere. But Iceland, which has no military, regards the aircraft as essential to its air defense and, even more important, as a symbol of a U.S. commitment to defend the nation.” (ICELAND_2006_WP_2)
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 - Popular movement
 - Regime type

Germany 2010-2013

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/hnpn-nyorktimes/newspapers/u-s-faces-new-challenge-fewer-troops-europe/docview/1705876673/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Jan 2012) (GERMANY_2012_NYT_1)
 - “With word that the Pentagon will bring two combat brigades home from Germany, the Obama administration faces a challenge to convince Atlantic allies that the military's new orders to refocus on the Asia-Pacific region, while sustaining its role in the Middle East, will not mean abandoning Europe to fit shrinking budgets.”

- "...withdrawal of two heavy armor brigades will reduce the Army presence by 10,000 to just 30,000 troops, with a cavalry brigade still based in Germany and an airborne brigade in Italy."
- "American officials acknowledge that the global economic crisis, pushing down defense budgets across the alliance, presents a test."
- "The Bush administration had also once planned to withdraw the two brigades, but the Obama administration delayed the move as forces based in Europe were needed for the NATO mission in Afghanistan and in Iraq."
- "Even senior European officials acknowledge that it is in the best interests of both the United States and the European allies for Washington to reshape its approach to their territory and adapt NATO to the new realities of the 21st century."
- "The Obama decision on reducing ground forces in Europe 'was not a surprise,' said one senior French official. 'If some American troops leave Europe, it won't create any political problems,' he added. 'We don't need a massive presence of U.S. troops. After all, we don't see Russia anymore as an enemy or an adversary, but even as a partner, if a difficult one.'"
- "Members of Congress already are doing their own lobbying, hoping that the brigades returning from Germany will be garrisoned at bases in their home districts in the United States. But it is most likely that as shrinking budgets force the Army to drop from 570,000 to 490,000 personnel over the next decade, that the brigades from Germany will vanish off the roster."
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/storied-u-s-barracks-closes-with-little-fanfare/docview/1815024362/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Sept 2013) (GERMANY_2012_NYT_2)
 - "The ceremony on Friday afternoon, before about 300 onlookers, marked the closing of Campbell Barracks, which, as the headquarters of the United States Army in Europe, issued the orders for the millions of American soldiers -- 15 million in Germany alone -- who have served on the Continent since 1945. It was a day that most present, mostly an older crowd, had never imagined could come."
 - "After the end of the cold war with the collapse of the Soviet Union, then the absorption of new NATO members and alliance commands at the base, followed by almost 10 years of preparation and a dwindling military presence, power was passing forever from Heidelberg."
 - "As General Campbell noted, it is more effective to concentrate Army might in five key locations in Germany as well as in Vicenza, Italy, and in a cluster supporting NATO in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium, where NATO is headquartered."
 - "Micha Hörnle, 42, a reporter for a local newspaper, The Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung, said the [Post-9/11] security measures had created a "gated community" and local

resentment in a city long grateful that it had been spared American bombing in World War II.”

- “Closing Heidelberg will save the Pentagon \$112 million a year, mostly in costly security expenses for several scattered facilities, Mr. Garvey said. Still, Lt. Gen. Mark P. Hertling, commander here until his retirement in November, agreed with Mr. Hörnle.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - “American officials acknowledge that the global economic crisis, pushing down defense budgets across the alliance, presents a test. (GERMANY_2012_NYT_1)
 - “Closing Heidelberg will save the Pentagon \$112 million a year, mostly in costly security expenses for several scattered facilities, Mr. Garvey said. Still, Lt. Gen. Mark P. Hertling, commander here until his retirement in November, agreed with Mr. Hörnle.” (GERMANY_2012_NYT_2)
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “Even senior European officials acknowledge that it is in the best interests of both the United States and the European allies for Washington to reshape its approach to their territory and adapt NATO to the new realities of the 21st century.” (NYT_1)
 - “The Obama decision on reducing ground forces in Europe ‘was not a surprise,’ said one senior French official. ‘If some American troops leave Europe, it won’t create any political problems,’ he added. ‘We don’t need a massive presence of U.S. troops. After all, we don’t see Russia anymore as an enemy or an adversary, but even as a partner, if a difficult one.’” (GERMANY_2012_NYT_1)
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 - Popular movement
 - Regime type

Kyrgyzstan 2012-2019

- Maybe:
 - <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/news/papers/reversal-kyrgyzstan-wont-close-u-s-base/docview/1030643300/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 2009) (KYRGYZTAN_2014_NYT_1)
 - “The turnabout is a victory for the Obama administration as it seeks to step up operations to quell the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz government had ordered the base closed in February, apparently under pressure from the Kremlin, which has resented the deep American military presence in an area of the world that it has long considered its zone of influence.”
 - “It has also been a focal point in the struggle between the United States and Russia for influence in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Russia pledged a \$2 billion loan to Kyrgyzstan on the day in February that the Kyrgyz president announced that the United States would be evicted from the base.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/news/papers/new-leader-says-u-s-base-kyrgyzstan-will-be-shut/docview/1634248761/sem-2?accountid=14657> (Nov 2011) (KYRGYZTAN_2014_NYT_2)
 - “In one of his first statements as Kyrgyzstan's new president, Almazbek Atambayev said Tuesday that he would seek to close an important American military base when its lease runs out in 2014, reviving a threat dropped by past leaders after the United States agreed to increased payments.”
 - “Mr. Atambayev, a former prime minister who won the presidency in an election on Sunday, had indicated earlier that he would seek to close the base. On Tuesday, after his victory was all but confirmed, he told journalists that he feared that the base would become a security risk for his country.”
 - “In 2009, Washington persuaded Kyrgyzstan's president at the time, Kurmanbek S. Bakiyev, to keep the base open by agreeing to pay over \$40 million a year extra in rent and provide an expensive renovation of the Manas airport.”
 - “Indeed, relations with Moscow may have been a significant factor in Tuesday's announcement. Russia, which maintains its own military base in Kyrgyzstan, has long been uncomfortable with the idea of an American military installation in a region it deems its sphere of exclusive influence. Pressure from Moscow is widely believed to be the reason Mr. Bakiyev initially ordered the base closed in 2009.”
 - “Many of Kyrgyzstan's newest leaders now view Russia as their country's most reliable ally. A Russian propaganda campaign against Mr. Bakiyev is credited with helping to pave the way for the mass protests that ousted him from power in April 2010.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/news/papers/staging-base-afghan-war-handed-over-kyrgyzstan/docview/1942793857/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 2014) (KYRGYZTAN_2014_NYT_3)

- “Now, the American pullout from Kyrgyzstan stands as a sign not only of the dwindling war effort in Afghanistan, but also of worsening relations with Russia and its closer allies among the former Soviet republics.”
- “The Kyrgyz government first moved to evict the United States from Manas in 2009, acting under a mix of pressure and incentives from Russian allies who were increasingly hostile to the United States' presence in the region. American officials headed off that attempt by agreeing to pay more rent, raising it to \$60 million a year, and also spending a substantial amount on facilities improvement, from the original \$17.4 million, according to American and Kyrgyz officials.
- “More recently, when it became clear that the Kyrgyz government was adamant that the American lease ending next month would be the last, NATO officials began planning ways to route around Manas as they began the extensive troop and cargo withdrawal effort in Afghanistan. The American military started using a base in Romania as its main transit center for the Afghan war this year.”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - Financial concerns
 - Changing geopolitical concerns
 - “Now, the American pullout from Kyrgyzstan stands as a sign not only of the dwindling war effort in Afghanistan, but also of worsening relations with Russia and its closer allies among the former Soviet republics.” (KYRGYZTAN_2014_NYT_3)
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initially ordered the base closed in 2009 .Many of Kyrgyzstan's newest leaders now view Russia as their country's most reliable ally. A Russian propaganda campaign against Mr. Bakiyev is credited with helping to pave the way for the mass protests that ousted him from power in April 2010.” (KYRGYZTAN_2014_NYT_2)

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Saudi Arabia 2014-2016 (N/A)

Germany 2020

- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/trump-plans-curtail-u-s-troops-germany/docview/2902714587/sem-2?accountid=14657> (June 2020) (GERMANY_2020_NYT_1)
 - “The United States will cut its troop presence in Germany by more than 25 percent, former American officials said on Friday, as the Trump administration sends a frosty message to a major NATO ally and shrinks a military footprint long resented by the Kremlin.”
 - “The move - which blindsided German officials and many American military leaders in Europe - is in keeping with Mr Trump’s ‘America First’ vision of limited U.S. deployments overseas, and with his insistence that allies must shoulder more of the burden for their own defence.”
 - “While Mr. Trump has complained about the expense of protecting the United States’ allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and has long singled out Germany as a wealthy nation that spends proportionately little on its defense, former officials and analysts argued he was damaging American interests.”
 - “The withdrawal of troops will be welcomed in Moscow as another sign of division in the Atlantic alliance and of fading American interest in global leadership. While the drawdown should not immediately affect NATO’s deterrence forces in Poland and the Baltic States, the drawdown is bound to complicate American military logistics and readiness.”
 - “Many analysts said the move had a whiff of politics and even personal resentment.”

- “‘What Trump will never understand is that this move won’t hurt Merkel at all,’ said Julianne Smith, a former Obama administration official now with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. ‘If he’s hoping to hurt her politically, this does nothing. It actually hurts us more. We are cutting off our nose to spite our face.’”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/u-s-will-pull-12-000-troops-germany-defense-chief/docview/2903035546/sem-2?accountid=14657> (July 2020) (GERMANY_2020_NYT_2)
 - “The United States is cutting back its deployments in Germany by nearly 12,000 troops and shifting some of those forces around the continent, including the relocation of some units to Belgium and Italy, Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper announced on Wednesday.”
 - “The move is certain to rankle European leaders and anger both Democratic and Republican lawmakers who see the United States’ troop presence on the continent, especially in Germany, as a cornerstone of the post-World War II order.”
 - “The Pentagon’s decision to cut... is in keeping with President Trump’s “America First” approach and his deep-seated drive to bring U.S. forces home from wars started after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.”
 - “‘This is clearly a punitive move against Germany that it’s hard to see any benefit from this’ said Rachel Rizzo, the director of programs at the Truman Center for National Policy... ‘It really puts future administrations in a bind; it gives them no room to maneuver and will stick in Europeans’ mind well into the future.’”
 - “Mr. Trump addressed the issue when he spoke to reporters on Wednesday, stressing that Germany had not paid its full share for defense under NATO commitments. ‘Germany is delinquent,’ Mr. Trump said.”
 - “Mr. Esper said the change was part of an ongoing review of U.S. troop presence around the world that was ‘accelerated’ by Mr. Trump’s announcement of cuts to forces in Germany.”
 - “The governors from the four German states that host American troops sent a letter this month to more than a dozen U.S. lawmakers, pushing them to urge Mr. Trump not to scale back the troop presence in Germany.”
 - “Tobias Lindner, a lawmaker from Rhineland-Palatinate... echoed the hope of the four governors that Congress would possibly prevent all of the movements from going through.”
 - “In 2012, the Obama administration withdrew two combat brigades from Germany to a mostly muted response, though the move was opposed by many officials in Europe.”

- “But that was two years before Russia invaded Crimea and field an insurgency in eastern Ukraine... prompting European and American officials to call for a reinvigorated NATO and a harsher stance against Russia.”
- “In a statement Wednesday, Senator Mitt Romney, Republican of Utah... called Mr. Trump’s plan to cut troops in Germany a ‘grave error.’”
- “The Kremlin has long seen American troops in Europe as a threat to Russian borders.”
- “Mr. Esper did say that some American forces could increase rotational deployments to the Black Sea region near Russia, as well as to Poland and the Baltic States.”
- <http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/newspapers/more-troops-germany-as-u-s-bolsters-ukraine/docview/3128168396/sem-2?accountid=14657> (April 2021) (GERMANY_2020_NYT_3)
 - “The United States and NATO, anxious about a major Russian troop buildup on Ukraine's border, signaled strong support for the Kyiv government on Tuesday.”
 - “The increase in U.S. troops in Germany is a strong indication of the Biden administration's commitment to NATO and to collective European defense. Coupled with President Biden's harsh words about President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, the expansion of United States troops and the reversal of Mr. Trump's plans to withdraw up to 12,000 of the roughly 36,000 stationed in Germany will not go unnoticed in the Kremlin.”
 - ““These forces will strengthen deterrence and defense in Europe,”” Mr. Austin said after meeting in Berlin with his German counterpart, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. ‘They will augment our existing abilities to prevent conflict and, if necessary, fight and win.’”
- The five factors
 - Interest groups
 - “The move - which blindsided German officials and many American military leaders in Europe - is in keeping with Mr Trump’s ‘America First’ vision of limited U.S. deployments overseas, and with his insistence that allies must shoulder more of the burden for their own defence.” (GERMANY_2020_NYT_1)
 - “While Mr. Trump has complained about the expense of protecting the United States’ allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and has long singled out Germany as a wealthy nation that spends proportionately little on its defense, former officials and analysts argued he was damaging American interests.” (GERMANY_2020_NYT_1)
 - Financial concerns
 - “The move - which blindsided German officials and many American military leaders in Europe - is in keeping with Mr Trump’s ‘America First’

vision of limited U.S. deployments overseas, and with his insistence that allies must shoulder more of the burden for their own defence.”

(GERMANY_2020_NYT_1)

- “While Mr. Trump has complained about the expense of protecting the United States’ allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and has long singled out Germany as a wealthy nation that spends proportionately little on its defense, former officials and analysts argued he was damaging American interests.” (GERMANY_2020_NYT_1)

- “Mr. Trump addressed the issue when he spoke to reporters on Wednesday, stressing that Germany had not paid its full share for defense under NATO commitments. ‘Germany is delinquent,’ Mr. Trump said.” (GERMANY_2020_NYT_2)

- Changing geopolitical concerns

- “The Pentagon’s decision to cut... is in keeping with President Trump’s ‘America First’ approach and his deep-seated drive to bring U.S. forces home from wars started after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.” (GERMANY_2020_NYT_2)

- “Mr. Esper said the change was part of an ongoing review of U.S. troop presence around the world that was ‘accelerated’ by Mr. Trump’s announcement of cuts to forces in Germany.” (GERMANY_2020_NYT_2)

- Popular movement

- Regime type

Appendix 3 - Process tracing sources, South Korea 1971

This appendix has two sections: documents from the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972* archive (FRUS Docs) and documents from *The United States and the Two Koreas* archive (Two Koreas Docs)

In both sections, each article has the name of the document, its direct link, its date of internal publication, its subject title and a subsequent summary of its contents. Both the publication date and the subject title are present based on case-by-case availability on those pieces of information.

FRUS Docs

- 45. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d45>
 - Date: Nov 24, 1969
 - Nixon wanted to move out troops but the EC-121 shootdown incident denied it.
 - Goal is to cut down the number of soldiers in half, and air/sea power to the minimum required for a retaliatory strike. Nixon wants Kissinger's plan by the end of 1969
 - Consultation with SK needed
- 46. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d46>
 - Date: Nov 25, 1969
 - Subject: General Wheeler on his Conversation with President Park of Korea
 - General Wheeler met with President Park on October 2. Park is calm right now, but would rather not see troops be withdrawn.
 - Park's key points
 - Wants to build up his Home Reserve Forces to prevent North Korean sabotage
 - Wants to avoid attacking NK.
 - He thinks NK won't attack if SK's economy grows and there is a US presence. He thinks war is inevitable if the US withdraws

- To prevent such war scenario, SK's armed forces must match NK's and SK must have an "independent defense capability" (A tad contradictory with the US presence condition)
 - Memorandum "Tab A" sent by Secretary Laird that describes the aforementioned conversation. Attached but not printed to doc
- 47. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d47>
 - Date: Dec 12, 1969
 - Subject: Reduction in U.S. Presence in Korea
 - Kissinger will have withdrawal options ready for January 21 NSC meeting
 - Comprehensive study on US-SK policy being written. Preliminary results shared during a NSC meeting in August of 1969 (during the EC-121 shootdown crisis- See Document 34)
 - Report will focus on
 - US presence
 - US military aid
 - US/SK burden sharing
 - Report being reviewed by relevant agencies so the plan is ready for Nixon's consideration by late December. January 21 meeting will discuss implementation.
 - The January 21 meeting was delayed for March 4. See meeting minutes at Document 55
 - Nixon approved this timeline suggested by Kissinger on December 16.
 - Regardless of Nixon's decision, consultation with SK will be needed to avoid a confrontation with Park or an abrupt withdrawal of SK forces in Vietnam.
- 48. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d48>
 - Date: December 15, 1969
 - Subject: Korean DMZ Incidents
 - After an October 18 Ambush incident by NK forces in the DMZ, DoD asked for a report of suitability of US actions in the peninsula.
 - See Document 43, Footnote 3 for said report.
 - Mel Laird's response to DoD request: Focus on air and land procedures in the DMZ. His analysis on the incident concludes that
 - Disorientation by the helicopter pilot was inexplicable
 - Machine gun jeep escort was not provided to the work team that was ambushed- against protocol
 - Personnel error, not inadequate procedure, was at fault

- Frequent reminders of the importance of following procedures in the DMZ needed. A check in 6 months is recommended (Approved by Nixon- Kissinger sent a follow up to Holdrge and Haig on July 7, 1970).
- 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d49>
 - Date: Jan 29, 1970
 - Subject: MAP (Military Assistance Program) and U.S. Force Levels.
 - Meeting between ambassador Kim and SecDef on January 20 led to these statements by SecDef:
 - Pressure for USA to withdraw forces from SK increasing
 - SK forces should be modernized before that happens. Increased military aid for SK is a priority for Laird
 - Nixon doctrine includes increasing military aid to reduce troop presence in allied countries.
 - Laird supports a minimum of \$164 million in MAP aid to SK out of \$425 million global aid. Proposed congressional cut is \$140 million to SK, \$350 million globally. Laird would like to see it go up by \$50 million above his \$164 million proposal.
 - January 21: Ambassador Kim calls Assistant Secretary Green and Deputy Assistant Secretary Brown. They clarify that...
 - No decisions made on withdrawals yet. Focus should be on modernizing and giving more aid to SK's forces
 - No proposals on troop withdrawals yet- There would be consultation with SK if that were the case
 - Kim confirms that he did not think previous discussions had been on immediate troop withdrawals. He opposes associating increased aid with troop withdrawals
 - Kim says he won't bring this conversation up with Seoul, but later discussions suggest otherwise.
- 50. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d50>
 - Date: D.C., undated
 - Subject: Economic Assistance Program to Korea for FY 1970
 - Kissinger recommends the president to approve both a \$128 million economic packet and a \$39 million agricultural credit packet to South Korea.
 - Economic packet is mostly loans, and a section of it is assistance. Passed to try to stabilize the inflation that has come with SK's explosive economic growth.
 - Agricultural credit is mainly for Korean purchase of US grain- strongly supported by Californian farmers. Presidential approval needed to get past some legal middle ground (including a local/Korean currency downpayment)

- These packets are unrelated and untied to the military aid/presence changes that could come from next week's NSC meeting.
- 51. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d51>
 - Date: February 6, 1970, 2:45–3:35 p.m.
 - Subject: Korea (NSSM 27)
 - Key decisions
 - New analysis (by February 13) on how many SK divisions are needed to defend from a potential NK or NK/Chinese attack, and how American aid/modernization can play into this. (See Section 2, Document 52)
 - Updating the definition of how many minimum American troops are needed in the Korean peninsula (Posture 4 -> Posture 2) (This and point above favored by General Unger)
 - Posture 4 called for withdrawal of all US land forces in Korea. Posture 2 calls for a partial withdrawal alongside modernization of ROK's forces.
 - Military Aid Program schedule should be updated (1970-74 -> 1971-75). Withdrawal should be moved to by June 1971 rather than June 1972
 - This was done to lower cost impacts
 - Hold further meetings: Review Group on February 19, NSC on February 25 (March 4, see Document 55)
 - Why Amb. Brown wanted consideration on the "Korean item" to be fast tracked
 - Maximize time between US decision and the 1971 Korean election- So Park has time to react
 - So the US decision can be reviewed well, and not done in a hasty manner due to DoD budget cuts.
 - Why Kissinger postponed the NSC meeting from February to March: So President Nixon has more time to familiarize himself with the topic before NSC meeting
 - As said in document 49, Mr. Schlesinger confirms only \$350 million in MAP has been approved for the next Fiscal Year
 - Mr Court said to Kissinger that SK needs 12-14 forces to repel a NK attack of 25 divisions (based on manpower needed, not division numbers).
 - Between the discussion on the 1974 vs 1975 budget cycles and the discussion of Kim Il Sung's possible reactions, there are some classified lines relating to European parallelism.
 - General Unger recommends leaving enough forces in Korea to withstand a joint NK/Chinese attack, not just a NK one. Ambassador Brown recommends not making any final decisions until Park is consulted. This is so to ensure there are no spats with Park or an abrupt removal of Korean forces from Vietnam

- General Unger admits the Japanese would be concerned if we withdraw troops from Korea
- 52. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative to the National Security Council Review Group (Unger) to the Chairman of the Review Group (Kissinger)¹
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d52>
 - Date: February 17, 1970
 - Subject: NSSM-27, US Policy for Korea (U)
 - Feedback on NSSM-27 by the JCS...
 - The Joint Chief of Staff disagrees with NSSM-27 that 12-14 Korean divisions are enough to hold off a North Korean attack. While 20 may be enough to hold them back (18 SK, 2 US), JCS recommends 21 (19 SK, 2 US)
 - While the modernization and mechanization of Korean forces may help increase Koreana capabilities, that alone cannot make up for the lesser number of defenders, especially during the renovation process. JCS is against having less than 18 divisions total in SK, and believes NSSM-27 undersells the funds needed for SK's naval and air upgrades.
 - JCS believes withdrawal should not be considered until after Korean forces return from Vietnam. Then, the minimum deterrent (to compel for NK to not attack, not to defend) is 18 modernized SK divisions and 1.333 US divisions. Before Korean forces return from Vietnam, minimum deterrent should be 19/1.333
 - Political, psychological and economic repercussions of withdrawal must also be considered. A hasty withdrawal may scare SK, and to allies and enemies alike it may indicate the US's commitment to defend the region is wavering (Especially if we don't meet SK's modernization needs).
 - Suggested JCS corrections are attached but not included in the online doc. Is there anywhere we can find these corrections? FOI request?
- 53. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d53>
 - Date: February 26, 1970
 - Subject: ROK force capabilities
 - Joint Chief of Staff's Posture 3 in Korea "issues" paper says that SK does not have the forces to fight back a NK or NK/Chinese attack.
 - This memo concludes that
 - Withdrawing one US division while retaining 18 or 19 Korean one poses no dangers
 - For SK to have a credible military deterrent after our withdrawal, we do not need to modernize all of their 18/19 divisions.
 - Posture 3 in detail
 - 1 US infantry division (15K soldiers + 15K in support)

- 16 SK infantry divisions (13.2K soldiers per division, 13.2K support per division) -> 429,000 soldiers total. 5 ready reserve divisions, 7 rear reserve division, and 500,000 militia men (number going up to 2 million)
 - Against 25 North Korean divisions (9,200 soldiers each, for a total of 281,000 men) OR 45 NK/Chinese divisions for a total of 660,000 soldiers. North Korea would do its initial attack with at least 12 divisions.
 - At the beginning of the Korean War, NK had the numerical and qualitative advantage over SK. However, the UN's eventual quality advantage managed to hold back and counterattack a larger NK/Chinese force (550K vs 700K)
 - Superior UN logistics also meant that half of the UN forces could be engaged at any given moment, while China/NK could only do so for 1/3rd
 - If SK has kept this logistics/quality comparative advantage, then in a hypothetical war 215K Korean soldiers out of 430K could be engaged, while NK could only engage 115K-180K
- War game simulation
 - Conservative Army war game: 20.667 ROK divisions and 1.334 American divisions could hold back 21 of the 25 NK divisions (Assuming NK attack is a complete surprise) for at least 3 days
 - NSC assessment: Army's assessment is too conservative- NK doesn't have the force structure of logistics to attack with such power. They believe 9 to 12 SK/USa divisions could hold back such attack
 - 16 modernized SK divisions under Posture 3 would more than do that
- SK has a general quality and logistics advantage over NK, although the former has to improve their infrastructure. SK will retain this advantage or increase it so long as NK's army isn't modernized by the Soviets or China
- Overall verdict
 - 12-14 unimproved SK divisions could hold back NK. Larger numbers could push the NK back
 - 16-18 modernized SK divisions could hold back a NK/Chinese attack on Seoul for at least 30 days. This is the goal of Posture 3.
 - Little US involvement.
- 54. Memorandum of Conversation
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d54>
 - Date: March 3, 1970
 - Subject: Ambassador Porter's Comments on US Troop Withdrawals from Korea
 - State's position: Support 16, not 18, modernized SK divisions. They also originally wanted 2 withdraw 2 US divisions immediately and 2 after Vietnam is

over, but they settled with withdrawing 2/3rds of a division (10K soldiers, 10K support)

- Kissinger instead wanted 18 modernized SK divisions plus 1 American division.
 - An American division: 12K soldiers, 12K support
- The military wanted a brigade to watch the Panmunjom region of the DMZ, while Kissinger/Porter thought a battalion would suffice. SK would watch the rest of the DMZ line.
- Porter wanted the withdrawal issue to be addressed ASAP so it doesn't interfere with SK's 1971 election. Kissinger couldn't give promises on that so long as General Michaelis didn't have the list of materials needed for the two stages of modernization (before and after SK leaves Vietnam) ready.
- For the March 4 NSC meeting Kissinger recommended Porter to bring back radio accounts from Korea that might be useful or interesting.
 - Porter also deduced that North Vietnam would attack again after the U.S. withdrew its troops as they needed to win this war for their survival.
 - Some inconclusive talk with Senator Fulbright regarding nuclear weapons policy.
- Both Amb. Porter and Kissinger believe Porter's renomination to his post shouldn't have any issues in the Senate.
- Porter believes SK will want modernization to happen first and then withdrawal, although he believes both can happen at the same time without major risks.
- 55. Draft Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d55>
 - Date: March 4, 1970
 - Director Helm's update on the Korean security situation
 - North Korea started an unconventional warfare campaign against SK in 1964, but it is scaling it down as of 1969 due to failure to dissuade US support to SK or creating tensions within SK.
 - No sign of any of the Soviets, Chinese, or North Koreans wanting NK to engage in conventional warfare in the peninsula.
 - SK has placed strong coastal, counterintelligence, and anti-subversion laws mechanisms to be able to counter NK's unconventional warfare/terrorism more effectively.
 - North Korea has a modern air and naval apparatus due to Soviet aid, but its land and transportation elements are lagging behind.
 - 14 of their 25 divisions are in the DMZ border, which is less manpower than SK has there (350K vs 500K). Another challenge they face is excessive military investment (15-20% of their GDP goes to the army, and 20% of their males are conscripted).

- Current forces: 18 SK divisions (+ 2 ⅓ in Vietnam), 2 American divisions. Better supported than NK's, but weaker in air and naval presence. Enough to hold back a NK attack north of Seoul, or to delay a NK/Chinese attack until reinforcements can arrive. JCS believes one more SK division is needed for the latter scenario.
- Kissinger's five postures for future US presence in the peninsula
 - 1) 2 U.S. divisions plus 18 ROK divisions;
 - 2) 2 U.S. brigades plus 18 improved ROK divisions;
 - 3) One U.S. division plus 18 improved ROK divisions;
 - 4) One U.S. division plus 16 improved ROK divisions;
 - JCS disagrees with this one
 - 5) A residual U.S. force plus 18 improved ROK divisions
 - JCS disagrees with this one
- To consider in withdrawal:
 - How much troops needed for a mental deterrent to remain (hence why a plan of 19 SK divisions and 1/3rd of an American one is not viable)
 - How much savings the US is aiming for (\$20 million in savings to relocate 20K american troops, but \$450 million if those 20K troops are fully deactivated)
 - Admiral Moore: Withdrawal must happen early into the fiscal year for savings to happen
 - Where are the troops being withdrawn from- only the DMZ frontline, or both front and back (State recommends leaving a battalion behind in the DMZ, while JCS recommends a brigade) and what counterinsurgency plans will be put in place.
- Key things Kissinger thinks we should consider in the withdrawal
 - Size of our force
 - How much we are modernizing SK troops
 - Timing of the withdrawals
 - Timing of when to consult SK- before or after their presidential elections
- JCS's preference: 18 improved SK divisions, 1 ⅓ American divisions. Modernization of SK's air and naval strength, with retention of American air/naval presence in Korea.
- Dept of State's priorities in withdrawal
 - Decide in principle the reduction
 - Start consultations, make final decision
 - Sec Rogers: Park's support is key to legitimize the Guam doctrine as a whole
 - Sec Rogers and Amb Porter want and will start consultations immediately
 - Initiate congressional authorizations

- Secretary Packard thinks it will be difficult to get the congressional support to modernize 18-19 SK divisions without it being backed with immediate withdrawal (putting a dent to JCS's plan of modernizing first and then withdrawing)
 - Sec Rogers believes a withdrawal of 20K soldiers will get congressional support
 - Kissinger: Some modernization can come from US equipment used in Vietnam
- Agnew's takes from Manila meeting: SK doesn't want any troop reductions, they'd be willing to send more forces to Vietnam so that doesn't happen, and they are willing to make the use of any new facilities in the country free of charge
- Key factors for Nixon
 - Some level of withdrawal must happen
 - It must be related to the April withdrawal from Vietnam (alongside consultations with Park)
 - Debate on withdrawal must be controlled by the WH
 - Avoid looking like we are withdrawing from our responsibilities by ensuring withdrawal is accompanied by modernization and we don't reduce our forces "precipitously". Per Agnew, credibility of commitment must be guarded.
- Under Secretary of State Richardson: Best way to get withdrawal is to get Park to ask for it. Could happen by giving him assurances on modernization
- Sec Rogers: Park "applauded" Guam doctrine, but said "don't do it to me". Also avoid confrontations with Park or Congress
- Kissinger: NSC must begin working on level of reduction, so the Under Secretaries Committee can prepare a game plan with instructions for Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis.
- President's final thoughts: Partial withdrawal must be done to ensure a long term sustainable presence as spending considerations change. Increments of 10K more or less troops must also be considered.
- 56. National Security Decision Memorandum 48
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d56>
 - Date: March 20, 1970
 - Subject: U.S. Programs in Korea
 - Confirmation of withdrawal of 20K soldiers by the end of FY 1971.
 - Priorities
 - Consultation with Park. Goal is to make it look like withdrawals come from Park's initiative due to SK's strength and agreement for modernizing SK's forces.
 - Conditions for consultation/withdrawal

- \$160 million to \$200 million in Grant MAP aid to SK in FYs 1971-75
 - Economic assistance to SK by PL-480 increased by \$50 million
 - No further withdrawals considered for now, although it may be reconsidered when SK leaves Vietnam
- Other preparations for consultation
 - DoS plan to consult with Congress
 - DoD plan on how withdrawal will be done, and what will be left in the peninsula
- Creating a five year plan to both modernize SK forces and to make the US troops/resources that remain in the peninsula better structured.
 - This will be guided by guidelines in NSSM 4 and 27
- Plan will be organized by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, and then submitted to the President
- 57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d57>
 - Date: April 23, 1970
 - Subject: For Ambassador from Alexis Johnson. Subject: U.S. Troop Reductions.
 - Park delivered a professional letter and a handwritten letter to Nixon.
 - The former can be found at Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea, Park, 1970.
 - The latter has not been found
 - Key points in hour and a half conversation between Ambassador Kim and Ambassador Johnson
 - Park did not think troop reductions were going to happen based on previous conversations, so recent consultations have been a shock to him
 - Park understands there is no immediate and intense pressure to withdraw troops from Korea in the same way there is towards Vietnam
 - Park accepts the principle of the Nixon doctrine, but warns that removing troops before helping modernize SK's forces will have "profound domestic political consequences" in Korea
 - Johnson confirms that further MAP aid is tied down to troop withdrawals, but the US will still honor its defense commitments in the peninsula (withdrawals are to make US troops more "flexible").
 - Johnson implies the withdrawal decision is final and its best to cooperate with it (IE, making the withdrawals be viewed as a mutually agreed action so the psychological effects are lower). However, he promises to bring up Kim's concerns to President Nixon.
- 58. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d58>

- Date: May 26, 1970
- Response to Park's letter delivered through ambassador Kim (Doc 57)
- Withdrawing troops as part of the Nixon doctrine, but commitment towards South Korea's defense remains. 20K troops withdrawn is less than 1/3rd of the current American force there
- The US is only asking for more SK defense contributions after they've established a strong economic base, which they have.
- Nixon will ask Congress for increased aid from 1971 to 1975, so modernization happens effectively.
- Nixon explicitly asks Park to take initiative in announcing these changes to his country and the world to "show Korean progress" (This is what the Nixon admin wants the most out of Park with this letter)
- 59. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d59>
 - Date: May 29, 1970
 - For Ambassador Brown
 - Park won't agree to any withdrawals until he knows the extent of the modernization program
 - If he takes initiative in announcing it, he must be ready to answer questions he can't answer yet. It would make his position difficult and worry the general public
 - A year ago SK submitted a policy proposal (footnote 2, Document 21) which if applied would make the withdrawal more digestible for SK.
 - Had that plan been enacted, SK would have been in a position where it could afford to see the withdrawal happen now rather than in 1975.
 - However, since that wasn't enacted, SK asks for withdrawals to be pushed back as far as 1975, while strengthening US/SK forces in the area before that year.
 - Both sides agree to make the modernization be spoken mainly in terms of equipment rather than costs. Ambassador affirms that Park saying that some American troops could leave would increase his prestige to Congress and the American people
 - Park is clarified that he is being consulted, not asked for permission. The withdrawal in 1971 will happen.
 - Ambassador Porter suggested that Park make a public or private statement (his choosing) reaffirming that he will ensure modernization aid is given before withdrawals happen, and then the duo can negotiate the programming of the modernization after congressional approval arrives.
 - Modernization is to reaffirm commitment to SK. It will happen while withdrawal happens, but not at the same pace.

- Park asks for patience, he believes that by 1975 they will be able to take on all the burden of the \$150 million MAP contribution the US provides. Brown says they are not considering anything that would undermine the trust of the Korean public towards the US.
- Park's request to start talks ASAP is agreed too. As a gesture of good will, the US would also separately start talks to open a M-16 factory in Korea, however, Park's continued opposition to the withdrawal would make both negotiations harder, especially in Congress.
 - M-16 factory negotiations could begin as soon as possible, but withdrawal negotiations can only begin after Congress is briefed.
- Porter addresses American military leaders saying we will withdraw troops from South Korea as reacting to Congressional/media/Assembly press- something similarly seen with SK military officials.
- 60. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d60>
 - Date: June 1, 1970
 - For Ambassador Brown
 - Park continues resisting American proposals. This is partially because if we withdraw unilaterally, his administration's message of "The US cannot withdraw any troops without my consent" will break, hurting his image and threatening his chances for the 1971 election. Yet, Park cannot be allowed to set precedent on who has veto power on US troop movements.
 - Porter believes Park will eventually send the PM and/or the Defence Minister to DC to negotiate- and so they could also be scapegoats should negotiations fail. Porter wants to avoid this from happening.
- 61. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State (Park's letter)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d61>
 - Date: June 15, 1970
 - Content of Park's letter to Nixon
 - Park wants to explain his reasoning
 - To prevent USA's commitment to defend SK from being marred, any withdrawals should happen at the same time as measures to strengthen SK's forces.
 - In addition to the modernization of equipment, Park is already implementing anti-guerilla and tactical development plans the US had recommended in 1969 to SK into a unified 5 year plan
 - Consultation should be made on requirements, means of implementation, if aid levels should increase, and if/how to create a domestic Korean defense industry.

- Park also believes that air/naval US presence should increase, while reaffirming defense commitments to SK with or without conflict, and measures to reduce negative psychological effects.
 - Park wants consultation in the implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty (KEY)
 - It must be reaffirmed to the UN that the partial withdrawal will not hamper the UN/SK/US goal of a “unified, independent, and democratic” Korea.
 - Meeting these conditions will be key to get through domestic opposition in SK against withdrawals. If the Mutual Defense Treaty is reaffirmed, Park is willing to meet to discuss with flexibility his opposition to withdrawing American troops before 1975 (when his anti-guerilla/tactical renovation plan is completed).
- 62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d62>
 - Date: July 2, 1970
 - For Ambassador Brown (previous telegram recommended notified the Korean gov of the first withdrawal date before the Honolulu summit in July 21):
 - Johnson considers it fair game to tell SK the American withdrawal plan any time after Park’s June 15 letter is answered. DoD’s withdrawal plan is now with the Under Secretaries Commitment- nearing completion.
 - Ideal to notify of withdrawals in the early part of July before the conference.
 - Without concrete information on modernization plan, SK will be annoyed. However, it needs to happen to meet the June 1971 deadline and to get support in congress for extra MAP for SK.
- 63. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d63>
 - Date: July 6, 1970
 - Subject: U.S. Troop Reductions in Korea: Possible Bureaucratic Dispute over Who Instructed Porter to Inform Park of “Deadline” in Effectuating Reductions
 - A broken telephone game regarding who instructed Porter to tell Park there is a “deadline” to effectuate the troop withdrawals. Kissinger’s theory is that this confusion originated from Secretary Rogers telling different things to different people (Porter / Choi) at similar times, without Rogers realizing
- 64. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park (Nixon’s response to Park’s letter)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d64>
 - Date: July 7, 1970

- Nixon reaffirms the US's commitment to honor the Mutual Defense Treaty should SK ever be attacked. Remaining forces in Korea will also act as a deterrent.
- Nixon committed to get congressional approval for further MAP to SK.
- Nixon believes it is time for representatives from both countries to meet and discuss his program and the modernization plan.
 - The US has used the "Republic of Korea Forces Development Objectives Plan" to plan modernization aid, while Nixon affirms he is willing to integrate that to SK's 5 year modernization plan.
- Nixon insists on having Park be the one to initially announce the withdrawal to the general public.
- 65. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d65>
 - Date: July 9, 1970
 - Subject: "Re-aligned Configuration" of Two U.S. Divisions in Korea
 - Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis's suggestion to reduce political pressures on Parks: Adding two SK brigades to be under a US division to directly make up for withdrawn American brigades. This would appease the need for withdrawal without either leaving SK or American forces undermanned nor having to withdraw part of the American leadership apparatus from SK.
 - Schemes like this have been done since the Korean War with success
 - The Korean brigades would guard the American section of the DMZ, thus making it so no Americans guard the DMZ, further reducing the chances of incidents.
- 66. Memorandum of Conversation
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d66>
 - Date: July 13, 1970
 - Subject: Korean Troop Reduction Plans
 - Key person in this memorandum: Congressman Gallagher, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
 - Gallagher believes that NK/China are scheming to attack SK before 1975, when Japan is expected to have sufficiently armed to deter them.
 - SK can live with the withdrawal of the 20K men so long as the US keeps the division organization of the 2nd and 27th division in the peninsula.
 - SK is willing to send 25K more men to Vietnam if the US agrees to fully keep those two divisions in the peninsula.
 - Even if Kissinger hasn't taken formal decisions yet, they are willing to consider this because it shows SK is slowly becoming more open to troop withdrawals.

- Kissinger doesn't see the need for more foreign troops in Vietnam, so he doesn't want Gallagher to bring this up while he visits SK. However, Kissinger wants Gallagher to reaffirm that the US withdrawal is to ensure long term stability of US presence, which Gallagher agrees to do so.
 - "Mr. Gallagher thought that the Koreans want the cadre division but are not particularly interested in fleshing it out with Korean troops." Sounds important but not 100% sure what it means- especially "cadre"
 - Again, emphasis that Park's initial shock of possible withdrawals came from the symbolism, not that US commitment would disappear.
- 67. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Department of State
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d67>
 - Date: July 23, 1970, Honolulu
 - Summary of the Honolulu conference - For Assistant Secretary Green from Ambassador Brown.
 - Honolulu conference summary.
 - Korean requests if withdrawals happen Bold is US response
 - \$200 million per year for 5 years to assist with modernization
 - No response to Secretary Packard's counteroffer to "leave behind the equipment of the departing 20 thousand plus adding some substantial items from excess stock, such as 286 M-48 tanks, plus a regular MAP appropriation of 140 million dollars, plus a request for a supplemental appropriation in substantial but unspecified amount"
 - Jung (Korean Minister of Defense) said existing equipment wouldn't help modernize as it's already there
 - US will commit itself to more MAP aid but not tho such number of \$200 million
 - Help in establishing defense factories (US open to it)
 - Specifications of what SK's modernization aid will be, and a commitment that 60% of such aid will be given in the first 2 years of the 5 year span.
No
 - Separating SK's MAP from potential congressional gridlock. Nixon admin will work for more congressional MAP aid but no comment on "separating" it
 - American clarification on what defensive measures would American naval/air units undertake in if NK attacked
 - Americans reassured that new air squadrons will replace the ones being withdrawn in September

- The US reaffirms it is committed to Mutual Defence Treaty- no need to emphasize it again
 - Reassurances on American commitment to the Mutual Defence Treaty and warnings to NK to not attack now or in the future
 - The US reaffirms it is committed to Mutual Defence Treaty- no need to emphasize it again
- SK wants assurances on those demands before withdrawals happen, and that they disapprove of unilateral action. American delegates were incredulous at this as we had already told them long before that decision to withdraw 20k men was final. SK delegates had a body language of being aggravated.
- Secretary Packard's response: The US is already meeting its defense and treaty commitments so we don't need to reaffirm that. The US has helped SK get on its feet and be free from communism, so we have shown good faith and it is warranted to say we have reached a stage where SK can take on a bigger share of its defense burden.
 - The US is committed to get more MAP aid for SK, and work for SK to establish its military factories. However, to consider the offer to leave equipment from troops leaving the peninsula as bad is disingenuous as it would ensure SK has material similar to the current US army.
 - Finally, the US is not obliged by treaty to list the modernization aid it will give to SK- so doing that is out of the question.
 - The US feels it has worked on good faith, therefore, it won't tie itself down to more commitments than the offers it has already given to SK- let alone meeting all those SK demands on a whim.
- In short, there are many points that neither side committed itself to a yes or no answer. McCain suggests that further discussions should happen in DC between US and SK delegates.
- Jung feels very strongly about this topic because of both possible backlash from Park if he fails and worries that the withdrawal would jeopardize SK's security. However, he felt a lot better when the post-conference communique emphasized agreement points and did not mention withdrawals.
- 68. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d68>
 - Date: August 4, 1970. Seoul
 - Park-US commander in the UN Michelis meeting
 - Park does not want to negotiate withdrawals before "assurances" on modernization are made, despite the clarifications given in Honolulu
 - Withdrawal plan: 5K soldiers out by December 1970, 8.5K more by March 1971, 4.9K by June 30, 1971

- Park says “he will not object but he will not cooperate” should withdrawals happen as they are at the moment. However, both sides know they would each take a huge PR hit if this withdrawal led to an open spat.
- Park later begins conceding: If conditions in the US Gov make it impossible for the withdrawal to wait, then he will not object so long as the modernization plan goes forward. Despite Park’s hesitation to believe it, the US is committed to modernization.
- The US shuts down any ideas regarding changing security commitments as it would require re-negotiating the Mutual Defense Treaty, which would not be an efficient use of time at the moment.
- Now Park explains why he is stressed about this withdrawal, despite the strength of US-SK relations: He feels that a year ago Nixon in a meeting had promised that SK would be exempt from the Guam Doctrine’s implications, and that this was expressed too in a joint communique (*See Document 35, Footnote 7*). He also referred to a promise by General Beacher that so long as SK troops were in Vietnam, there wouldn’t be American troop withdrawals in SK.
 - Communique found in- *Public Papers: Nixon: 1969*, pp. 682–683.
 - In short, he is looking for so many assurances because he wants to tie down the US not being able to go back on their word again- or at least what he sees as that.
 - However, this is also the point where Park begins fully conceding: He says it’s time for SK to take leadership of its own economy and self-defense, but he asks the US to understand that this is a process that “won’t be done in a day or two.”
- To address Park’s uncertainty on America’s stance, Ambassador Brown suggested that he speak to General Michelin’s staff to iron out the details of withdrawal and modernization. However Park says he won’t do that until modernization talks have made satisfactory progress.
 - And also Americans want SK in now on that planning because that planning is both long and the South Koreans refused to participate in the timing of the different stages of withdrawal, which the Americans regretted. Park feared that the Americans only wanted SK to listen, not speak, in those planning stages- which the US delegates denied (The Americans had to remind Park of his nonparticipation on planning many times).
- Park eventually agrees to not object to withdrawal and be willing to talk about it so long as the modernization plan is satisfactory “to a degree.” Michelin’s staff begins sharing withdrawal data then.

- Overall, Park is slightly more willing to meet the Americans halfway (reluctantly), but he insists that withdrawal has a unilateral nature, and is driven by domestic concerns, not military reality.
- Brown's final statement
 - It is on their best interest (Especially when facing the communists) to show the world both countries are working together
 - The US has given as much assurances and offered generous modernization aid, so Brown doesn't understand why Park won't share these assurances to the public (Reminder, the US still wants Park to share these assurances to the world. The US is giving him the political ammunition so it is a safe move to do)
 - Modernization and withdrawals have to go together as if the latter doesn't happen, the former will face troubles in the American congress.
 - Brown left a document behind for Park to read: Telegram 121444 to Seoul, July 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec. 70)
- Park responds that he will await to comment until when he gets his modernization report
 - Brown noticed Park was smiling as he was reading the forces reduction report General Michelins left behind for him. Porter believes that it is important to let things settle down before the US initiates talks again so SK doesn't think that their hard balling is working
- 69. Telegram From the Commander, United States Forces in Korea (Michaelis) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d69>
 - Date: Aug 19, 1970 - Seoul
 - Subject: KRA 3085
 - Minister of Defense Jung reaffirms SK will only entertain negotiating troop withdrawals after a modernization plan is offered that is in a condition to be shared with the general population
 - Jung specifies his position on troop withdrawal style: Reduction of 20K soldiers, but no divisions/crops HQ/crops artillery to be removed- two US divisions and crops structure must remain
 - "Man for man and unit for unit substitution"
- 70. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d70>
 - Date: August 22, 1970 - Washington DC
 - Subject: Military Assistance for Korea

- The Under Secretaries' Committee estimates that the 5 year modernization plan will cost \$1 billion for SK's army, and an extra \$500 million for their navy/air force. Much higher than what NSDM-48 envisioned, but Kissinger still thinks it's worth it
- \$1.5 billion in aid for FY 71-75 would come through grants, MAPs, and excess equipment/supplies
 - Kissinger also recommends a supplementary \$150 million MAP for Korea (after November only, so it doesn't interfere with some aid going to Cambodia)
- Both Kissinger and Amb. Porter recommends that VP Agnew does not announce the supplementary MAP when he visits Seoul- he ought to only speak in general terms about modernization during that visit.
 - General Michelines will announce the supplementary MAP later on
- 71. Backchannel Telegram From the Ambassador to Korea (Porter) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d71>
 - Date: Aug 25, 1970 - Seoul
 - Subject: 692. Following message also sent to President from Vice President via State channels. Please forward if necessary.
 - Agnew-Park meeting came up with two proposed texts
 - One saying how the US will lead modernization, and that there will be a level of troops in Korea so long as modernization is happening. Designed to help diffuse domestic tensions in SK
 - This is another statement which indicates that Park doesn't object to the withdrawal so long as modernization & defense aid comes, and no further troop reductions until the former two types of aid are implemented. This one is in case the US decides to tie down modernization to withdrawal, which the US isn't so sure of.
 - The suggestions here became the basis of the final joint communique. It's important to review this and how it evolved before and after the "Agreed Minutes" document
- 72. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d72>
 - Date: September 22, 1970 - Washington
 - Due to the magnitude of 20k soldiers withdrawal, Sec Rogers believes the US would not be able to do another major withdrawal from Korea in a year or two.
 - He is also worried about the Japanese reaction to the withdrawal: They are volatile, and the withdrawal could potentially send a wrong signal that would make them think we are withdrawing our deterrent in the region and their country.
- 73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

- <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d73>
- Date: October 26, 1970 - Washington D.C.
- “Agreed minutes” note from Ambassador Kim to Secretary Rogers. He wants an 8 point secret agreement between SK and the US.
 - The first 5 points weren’t meant to cause much controversy.
 - 6 says that the US has “no intention” to act against the wishes of the SK government in respect to consultation regarding military withdrawals.
 - Instantly shot down by Rogers because the US will not give veto power to SK over American military decisions.
 - 7 calls for the creation of an annual formal meeting of both countries’ defense and foreign ministers, and a joint military consulting committee.
 - Rogers was against the formal meetings point (although he would be ok with some DoS members being involved in the existing defense meetings), and he thought the committee was redundant
 - He also points out that it would be impossible for the executive branch to agree to a secret agreement while saying that it didn’t change anything to US commitments- congress would shut that down
- Rogers says he does not envision this paper to become a signed agreement, but that he would be okay for the Foreign Ministry of both countries to release identical statements at the same time to give it teeth (regarding point 8).
- 74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d74>
 - Date: October 26, 1970
 - “Agreed Minutes” text - SK proposals based on consultations
 - 1. The US will continue honor the Mutual Defense Treaty’s commitment
 - 2. The US will protect SK from nuclear threats
 - 3. The US will continue supporting SK within the UN umbrella
 - 4. SK will continue working to modernize its economic and defense capabilities, with US help
 - 5. SK doesn’t object to US partial withdrawal, and X amount of troops will still remain in the peninsula. Partial withdrawal comes only after consultation with SK, and it will not hamper US commitments in SK.
 - 6. The US commits to not withdraw further troops beyond aforementioned numbers unless there is previous SK consultation. US won’t act against the wishes of SK government (shot down by Rogers because of veto power conflict)
 - 7. Creation of an annual formal meeting of both countries’ defense and foreign ministers, and a joint military consulting committee. Rogers lukewarm for the former, and believes the latter is redundant (what the two countries already do)

- 8. The two countries will make a joint declaration to deter possible aggressors and show commitment to each other.
- 75. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d75>
 - Date: November 3, 1970 - Seoul
 - Subject: Korean Presidential Campaign
 - President Park's Democratic-Republican Party is being given a run for its money by Kim Dae Jung's New Democratic Party. Kim is outspoken and has huge crowds in cities.
 - Kim wants to abolish the Homeland Defense (biased in favor of government officials and city dwellers), and to ensure the promised local elections happen (ending the rural patronage system that exists).
 - Kim doesn't deny Park's achievements, but he believes the country can do better to combat existing inequalities.
 - Awkward decision making the the DRP-controlled Central Elections Committee has not had the desired effect to dilute the strength of Kim's campaign
 - American bureaucrats refuse to comment about the election generally speaking.
 - FoPo wise, Kim prefers building a mutual atmosphere of peace with NK (with Kim Il Sung having to renounce aggression too) rather than using stress and uncertainty to cointune propping up both authoritarian regimes. This hit a nerve with the Park.
 - DRP's strategy of campaigning on Park's successes isn't very effective- voters prefer to hear of what will be done tomorrow over what was done in the past. Park hasn't campaigned yet either.
- 76. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d76>
 - Date: November 7, 1970 - Seoul
 - 5853. Dept pass interested addressees as appropriate. Subj: Interview with President Park Nov 6: Politico-Military Subjects.
 - Ambassador Porter let Park know the selection of items for the modernization program is going smoothly in DC.
 - No comment on either side on whether the I Corps would be retained
 - On the Agreed Minutes document: It would have an adverse effect in congress, as congress is icky of new commitments when we are trying to withdraw troops. Porter suggests that the best path is to leave this document aside so the modernization agenda can be sold in congress. Meanwhile, the fate of the I Corps can be decided separately, and Porter can send a draft to DoS that satisfactory progress has been made with Korea's modernization and our commitment remains, so as to reassure the public.

- To Porter's surprise, Park was very accepting of these proposals. He might have seen this as a satisfactory replacement for the 8 points (perhaps Park got what he really wanted, a public reassurance from the US?) Porter will make sure Korea's Foreign and Defense minister are both notified of this verbal agreement so there isn't any confusion.
- 77. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d77>
 - Date: November 7, 1970 - Washington
 - Subject: The Korean Presidential Campaign
 - A competitive election between NDP's Chung and DRP's Park (Who recently had the constitution amended so he could run for a third term) is approaching.
 - Park can tout SK's economic and political stability, while enjoying control of the military and the media apparatus. However, corruption and inequality will hold his campaign back a bit.
 - Chung comes as a reformist candidate, with a tune of "We can do better." Wants to reform biased tax codes, abolish the Homeland Reserve (that's full of favoritism), re-establishing local governments, lower the voting age, and raise rural investment. FoPo wise, he is pro-unification talks but only after NK renounces aggression (and have the unified state's security be guaranteed by USA, Japan, China and the Soviets). He accused Park of using the specter of NK to extend his regime (similar to his third term amendment campaign- "himself or chaos")
 - DPR has urged Park to take action against Chung on basis of the nation's Anti-Communist laws (Possibly regarding his NK stances), and PM Il-Kwon has urged Park "to do something" about Chung. However, Chung is too popular to be eliminated- he would become a martyr.
 - Executive Secretary Eliot's take: A competitive and divisive election is coming.
- 78. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d78>
 - Date: November 10, 1970 - Washington
 - Subject: Koreans Abandon Efforts to Obtain Diplomatic Assurances Regarding U.S. Troop Reductions
 - Nixon is informed of how the "Agreed Minutes" document was unacceptable because of the Point that de facto gave Korea veto power over future reductions of US presence in the peninsula. However, both Porter and Park agreed that a joint statement like that would have been useful to announce to the world that the two countries have reached a satisfactory agreement on withdrawal, modernization, and reaffirming their alliance.

- Rogers believes that there are domestic and diplomatic reasons behind Park's capitulation.
 - Diplomatically: It's important for him to give off the sense that he has negotiated to a satisfactory end; and he might have realized that the more stubborn he was, the weaker his position became in the Korean electorate and in the American congress (to get support for modernization)
 - Domestically: Chung is a strong rival, and he is giving Park a run of his money by accusing Park of butchering the negotiations, and stoking fears of NK aggression and American abandonment to "extend" his regime.
- The ideal outcome for the US
- 79. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d79>
 - Date: Nov. 16, 1970
 - Subject: U.S./ROK Joint Statement
 - Porter climbed down Korea's statement from a sweeping statement that the US would not act against Korea's wishes ever to a reaffirmation of the Mutual Defense treaty and the consensual nature of the modernization and withdrawal.
 - In the proposed statement, the US wants to avoid using the word "Commitment" for a statement that doesn't change anything. They also want to clarify that troop withdrawals do not affect the US "determination" to defend SK from attacks.
- 80. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 42-70)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d80>
 - Date: December 2, 1970
 - Subject: The Changing Scene in South Korea
 - Key conclusions
 - SK's economic and military position is strong, therefore the American withdrawals won't compromise its security. SK has come a long way from its 1950s chaos.
 - North Korea has shifted away from terrorism and paramilitary tactics towards political subversion in SK and creating a stronger diplomatic force that both undermines support for NK and makes the public in SK look for closer SK-NK relations
 - SK may respond to new NK policy by looking for warmer relations with the Eastern Bloc, but less tensions with NK are unlikely due to distrust. SK will also look to improve military relations with the US and local allies
 - For NK to do political subversion in SK, they may look for either signs of domestic economic/political dysfunction or dysfunction in the US-SK alliance. Should this tactic work, NK may consider paramilitary tactics in SK again

- Park has brought some newfound economic, political and diplomatic stability to SK. Normalizing relations with Japan has been key to this. SK challenges on dependence on loans and foreign credits for growth remain. Also lack of rural investment and dependence on Park are also a problem (even if Koreans value stability over freedom).
 - Democracy in SK will be tricky so long as Park remains with this level of centralized power and doesn't allow a peaceful transition of power. 1971 election with NDP's Chung will be interesting because of this.
 - With SK's improved anti-guerilla tactics and the modernization aid, SK will not suffer militarily or diplomatically from the withdrawal.
- After the failure of previous terrorist tactics by NK (IE the Blue House Raid), NK has shifted towards a diplomatic focus for recognition, with some success in Africa and the Middle East. NK also is pivoting towards more peaceful diplomatic acts on SK, while calling for American troops to leave the peninsula. We don't know exactly why they shifted, but the Sino-Soviet split may have led NK to have to take a more peaceful approach.
 - Kim is unpredictable, so we don't know how long he will retain this more peaceful approach.
- SK is worried that NK will perceive withdrawal as sign of SK weakness. Hence, SK is focusing on pinning the US down more to the peninsula's defense and only then improving cooperation with her Asian neighbors, and using tensions with NK to justify it.
 - SK may commence a détente of sorts with some communist countries so SK isn't completely isolated from half of the world
 - Many of the gestures both sides make have some bad faith caveat attached in order to make the other side look unreasonable. Therefore, tensions won't go down until both sides make honest attempts to negotiate
- Possible sources of tensions between US and SK:
 - SK thinking the US is wavering its anti-communist commitment in East Asia
 - SK going publicly against the US withdrawal
 - Domestic political instability
- The challenges that SK faces have shifted from military confrontation to competition at home and abroad. SK can prevail here, but tensions between the US and SK or within SK could give North Korea the grounds for successful political or paramilitary action against SK.
- 81. Memorandum of Conversation
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d81>
 - Date: December 2, 1970, Washington
 - Subject: Kim Chong Pil's Remarks on US-Korea Relations

- Kissinger thinks SK can withdraw troops from Vietnam when either some form of peace settlement is placed there or Vietnam reaches a level where they can truly defend themselves.
- Kissinger explains again that considerations of troop withdrawals had changed between 1969 San Francisco meeting and today
- Kim Chong Pil said that they expect regional changes soon (China in the UN, a settlement in Vietnam) and while SK could learn to become flexible, new harsh conditions might close the door on SK's policy, and possible even lead to SK "being compelled to act against its own will"
 - Kissinger responded that while geopolitics may change, the Nixon admin won't ultimately let their allies down. And even if the Koreans at first did not like the withdrawal, they ultimately went along with it because they didn't want to be isolated from their key ally.
 - Ultimately, SK is worried about being isolated by China's flexible foreign policy with the US.
 - US won't abandon Korea because they are a legitimate friend, while China is only an enemy turned into ally of convenience because of a greater shared competitor
 - Again, emphasis on how modernization will be integral to secure SK's defense position within the next 5 years.
- 82. Memorandum of Conversation
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d82>
 - Date: December 4, 1970 - Washington
 - Subject: The Vice President's Meeting with Korean Foreign Minister Choe Kyu-ha
 - Some talk about successful US-SK cooperation in the UN.
 - Agnew reaffirms that the joint communique is simply reaffirming existing US-SK commitments without changing anything, and informs about the bonus \$150 million in military aid Nixon earmarked for SK.
 - Foreign Minister Choe happy the aid went through the House and is next in line in the Senate, but he would like for Agnew to push further (as he did during his Seoul visit).
 - Agnew's only problem in US-SK relations: SK fishers keep on fishing Pacific Salmon, which SK had previously agreed to respect as an exclusive resource for the US and Canada. Ambassador Kim stated that legal fishing had been stopped, but illegal fishing persists. This came out of nowhere hahaha
 - However the US willing to help SK build up its legal fishing facilities
 - SK has detected that NK incursions through the DMZ are no longer happening mostly through the (now well defended) DMZ, but rather through the coastline-particularly with speedboats.

- Overall, this meeting reflects a positive state of US-SK relations and that the withdrawal ordeal has come to a satisfactory end
- 83. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d83>
 - Date: December 23, 1970 – Washington
 - Subject: CIA Memorandum on the South Korean Elections
 - Memorandum on Kim Chae-Thung's campaign to unseat President Park
 - Chung is young, charismatic, Catholic- mirrors JFK in some ways
 - Chung's NDP has little cash and organization compared to Park's DRP. Even with Chung's mass rallies taken into consideration, this makes his chance to unseat Park low.
 - US partial withdrawal is projected to have little impact on election. Originally, Park could have been accused of putting unnecessary strain on US-SK relations by hard balling the withdrawal by attempting to frame it as something that would directly cause NK to be aggressive. Now that is settled because the modernization talks have helped bring back a cooperative atmosphere.
 - Chung can't comment much about the withdrawal. CIA deduces that if Chung says that the withdrawal puts SK in danger, the military establishment might have take it as Chung saying that they are ineffective at their job, and maybe even cause "Anti-Communist" laws to be used against him for "aiding and comforting the enemy"
 - Also, NDP and DRP have fairly similar foreign policy views, so given the parties are in agreement it is unlikely this would become a hotly debated issue anyways (Footnote 4).
- 84. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d84>
 - Date: December 28, 1970 - Washington
 - Subject: Republic of Korea: Park Girds for Election Battle
 - Yi Hu-rak returns from the Ambassadorship to Japan to become the Korean Central Intelligence Agency director. KCIA projected to be a key factor in the 1971 election. Park expects Yi to make the KCIA more effective, and also Yi is not a yes-man to Park- valuable on that too.
 - Park's DRP offered Kim Chong-pil the VP slot to try to bring him back to the party, but he is not expected to take the offer.
 - Paek Tu-chin replaces Chong Il-Kwon as Vice President.
 - Park has also appointed 8 new assistants for different topic areas to "modernize" and strengthen the Blue House's manpower.

- Based on these technocratic, hard fighter style appointments (Rather than appointments that improve his public image), Park expects a long and dirty presidential race.
- 85. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d85>
 - Date: January 27, 1971 - Seoul
 - Subject: ROKG Concern about Opposition Nominee's Trip to U.S.
 - Candidate Chung is visiting the US, with rumors that some Americans are funding that trip. SK's Prime Minister Paek (Pro-Park) asked Ambassador Porter to release a statement saying that the US is neutral in this election. Porter thinks that's impractical as then other people could create new rumors that would need further clarifying statements.
 - Porter says the US will treat Chung in the same way they would if other high profile Korean assemblymen visited SK.
 - See Document 75 for example of US impartiality
 - PM Paek's behavior during this meeting (and other contacts) seem to indicate that SK is trying to put the US "in a defensive state of mind" when it comes to Chung and the Presidential Election.
- 86. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d86>
 - Date: February 2, 1971 – Seoul
 - General Michelins is to begin withdrawing troops from the US 2nd Division in the DMZ on February 8, and the Korean First Division will fill the gap.
 - SK is trying to pressure the US to release joint communiques and sign military documents before February 8 so SK has a claim that they made US troops stay until there was a modernization deal.
 - COMUSK has been in direct contact with the Korean Defense Ministry to try to sway them away from that, but the latter won't budge.
 - SK says that if the US cooperates, Michelins will get an audience with Park where Park will send operational relief to the US 2nd Division's position.
 - Once again, the US doesn't want its troop movements to be constrained by such documents, so they won't sign anything/make joint statements before February 8. Porter also warned that SK refusing to cooperate with the redeployments until they got the kind of modernization deal they wanted (at this stage!) would be terrible PR for SK within the American congress and public.
 - If the Koreans don't make any announcement on Feb 8 regarding the withdrawals, the US will probably make its own ones, as these are important news for Americans too.

- The US recommends that if SK makes a statement, SK also says that the withdrawal is done partially to reduce tensions in the peninsula. That being said, the US would consider obscuring the withdrawals within Korea media if the government doesn't cooperate, so it doesn't interfere with their elections.
- A last ditch effort by SK to get the public assurances that tie modernization and withdrawal together?
- 87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d87>
 - Date: February 3, 1971 - Washington
 - Subject: Kim Tae-chung in Washington. Ref: State 17347.
 - Candidate Kim Tae-Chung came to DC for a second meeting partially due to his fears that the Korean election would be rigged. First, he asks how SK security would be guaranteed in the future (a possible four power security pact?). There's skepticism of China being involved on it, as part of its implementation would depend on how NK responds to this idea.
 - Mr. Green said that at the moment the US supported stronger links with Beijing but did not want to unseat Taiwan from the UN- but no formalized stance yet. Ching also commented how he and the NDP would *probably* oppose a policy of universalization, as it would perpetuate the Korean division.
 - Chung really wanted to get an answer on what would the US do if there was a military coup in Korea. He was not given the answer, but American officials implied they are interested in a SK government that represents the will of the people.
- 88. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d88>
 - Date: February 5, 1971 – Washington
 - Subject: Agreement with the ROKG on U.S. Troop Withdrawal and Korean Military Modernization
 - A joint statement on February 5 between President Park and Ambassador Porter will signify the successful end of the withdrawal and modernization talks started on March 22, 1970
 - Park will also make a unilateral statement on February 8. The US will be given a copy of the statement a day before he says it
 - Contents of the joint statement (very similar to what Agnew suggested before- See Document 71).
 - Modernization and withdrawal talks have finished with success
 - The US will help with modernization of SK army

- There was consultation for the withdrawal of 20K troops. This withdrawal won't affect the US's commitment towards the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954
- There will be annual consultation meetings between officials from both countries to analyze the current Korea defensive apparatus against foreign threats
- This document is also meant to explicitly show that SK did not get veto power over any future US withdrawals- no "act against the interests of SK" clause
- Footnote 8: In Telegram 727 on Feb 8, Ambassador Porter pointed that Park accidentally weakened his position in negotiations by being so stubborn on not cooperating with withdrawal unless there were written "guarantees." This is because he delegated this task to his ministers with a hard deadline of Feb 8, meaning that the closer they got to the deadline without the US relenting, the more desperate they got and thus they accepted clauses that sounded good but were exactly what the US wanted.
 - Finding this telegram is key!! It reveals an important flaw of SK's negotiations tactics that gave the upper hand to the US to get their way- as best revealed in the "Agreed Minutes" negotiations
 - Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971

Two Koreas Docs

- [U.S. Troops in South Korea; Includes Follow-up Memorandum]
 - http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/government-official-publications/u-s-troops-south-korea-includes-follow-up/docview/1679061221/sem-2?accountid=14657
 - Date: November 24, 1969
 - Part 1 is Document 45 in FRUS (Nixon orders Kissinger to begin planning a withdrawal from Korea)
 - Part 2 is *Document 46* in FRUS (Park opposes the withdrawal on the basis that it would lead NK to attack SK)
- Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces from the Republic of Korea [Includes Follow-up Note]
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679061998/E49FB0B61DFC4D8FPQ/5?accountid=12874
 - Date: December 10, 1969
 - Subject: Withdrawal of US Ground Forces from South Korea

- Acting Assistant Secretary of International Security Ware disapproves of withdrawing one or more divisions from Korea by the end of FY70 by the following reasons
 - Not enough time to pull it off
 - Nixon Doctrine must be deployed carefully, not in a rash manner
 - Major division withdrawals would need compensation, probably in the form of MAP
 - An abrupt withdrawal would have a negative effect on SK domestic politics- Park might respond by abruptly withdrawing his forces from Vietnam
 - Would also have a negative impact on the 1971 Korean presidential elections
 - SK misgivings with the US would be compounded, especially after the “ill-received” Okinawa reversion agreement
 - Unilateral moves without negotiations may also concern the Japanese.
- Recommends any withdrawals to be delayed until FY71. Ware’s recommendations will be Forwarded to DoD in late December or early February
- Reduc. in U.S. Presence in K.
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679061561/4C5E1281ACB14BEE PQ/1?accountid=12874
 - Date: December 1969
 - Document 47 in FRUS (Report before NSC meeting back in August of 1969 on Korea will focus on US presence, US military aid and US/SK burden sharing. From this they hope to have a withdrawal plan by late December. Also stresses need of consulting Park on this to prevent a breakdown of relations or an abrupt SK withdrawal from Vietnam)
- U.S. Withdrawals from K. [Includes Follow-up Memorandum] (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger - January 21, 1970)
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679061668/E49FB0B61DFC4D8F PQ/6?accountid=12874
 - Date: January 21, 1970
 - Part 1: During a call between Secretary Laird and SK’s ambassador, Laird let the ambassador know that they are considering withdrawals, but they would also look for extra MAP aid to SK in exchange. State’s reaction was to speak only in general terms, and that no final decision has been made. Richardson may bring this up at the January 22 luncheon. Holdridge thinks that Ambassador might not notify Park of this yet out of fear of a “violent” reaction.
 - Part 2: Korean ambassador is not reporting this to Park because he has been convinced by Secretary Roger’s stance that both no withdrawal decisions have

been made and that the US would consult with SK if a withdrawal was seriously happening.

- NSSM-27, U.S. Policy for Korea
 - http://proxy.uchicago.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/government-official-publications/nssm-27-u-s-policy-korea/docview/1679062069/sem-2?accountid=14657
 - Date: February 17, 1970
 - This is Document 52 in FRUS (JCS believes at least 18 modernized SK divisions and 1 ½ American ones are needed to deter NK/China- not 12-14. Political, psychological and economic repercussions of withdrawal must also be considered so withdrawal doesn't happen in a way that makes allies and opponents alike think that US commitment in the region is wavering).
- NSSM 27--Possible Withdrawal of U.S. Division
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679060499/BE815501503644BEPQ/1?accountid=12874
 - Date: February 25, 1970
 - Subject: NSSM 27 - Possible withdrawal of US division
 - Review of NSSM 27 leaves the proposal of modernizing 16 SK divisions.
 - While the US expects an alarmed reaction from SK, we care of the nature of their reaction- hence why consult and give modernization aid
 - Only way to gain any deals is to negotiate through Park
 - Things that they want Porter to say to Park when he announces the withdrawal to him
 - This is something that Park knows that the US has been pondering about for a while
 - Korea has made great progress for stability in multiple fronts
 - He acknowledged publicly that he can't expect the US to sustain 2 divisions in SK indefinitely
 - The US will retain a strong presence in Korea
 - American behavior is consistent with the Guam Doctrine
 - His gov supporting the withdrawal would be an endorsement of the dynamism of SK and Park's gov.
 - Consultations are done so DC officials don't settle into an specific positions before they know the facts of what SK thinks is the most important regarding this withdrawal
 - Porter is not allowed to make any promises regarding MAP or the modernization plan for 16 divisions- requires congressional approval. For now, he has to speak about those on "this is a priority of the Nixon administration" terms. They understand if Park needs time to think, or that he wants guarantees about the secrecy of these talks.

- Issues related to NSSM-27 that will have to be addressed only after Park gives a response
 - Positioning of US troops behind the DMZ
 - Pursuit of MAP transfer
 - Continuation of aid beyond FY72 in the form of TC and PL 480.
 - Counter-infiltration program options
 - Tactical nuclear weapon options
 - US Air Force deployments
- Other important assurances to consider relate to yearly military exercises and how US reinforcing abilities to SK will be improved as the US withdraws troops from Vietnam.
- Review Group Meeting on Korea
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679061820/E49FB0B61DFC4D8FPQ/17?accountid=12874
 - Date: February, 1970
 - Subject: Review Group Meeting on Korea
 - JCS and Review Groups reviewed NSSM 27. On January 18, JCS introduced their take on the withdrawal: At the moment, 21 US/SK divisions needed to defend against a NK attack or delay a NK/China attack. 20 divisions (18 Korean, 2 American) are barely enough for that.
 - However, 18 modernized SK divisions and 1 ⅓ American divisions would be able to do either of those tasks, even if it doesn't meet all of JCSs requirements. This would satisfy them, but not make them fully happy- especially as it's too far late into the timeline to have a proper discussion with them.
 - Dept of State is mostly fine with the current developments regarding the withdrawal plan, but Ambassador Brown and Bill Cargo implore that a NCS meeting happens soon, and that no binding decisions are made pending consultation with Park. State recommends giving time to the DoD and the JCS to review the findings of NSSM 27
 - Recommended talking points for Kissinger for issues paper during NSC meeting
 - Ensuring there is common understanding of NSSM 27, and ensure that the issues paper itself is ready for NSC consideration during the meeting
- NSC Meeting on Korea [Includes Talking Points and Table]
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679044664/BE815501503644BEPQ/36?accountid=12874
 - Date: March 3, 1970
 - Subject: NSC Meeting on Korea
 - Korea NSC meeting background information
 - Will go over NSSM 27, withdrawal plan, and preparation for Park's visit.

- Koreans are worried of possible withdrawals, even if we haven't guaranteed they are happening or not
 - Korea study takeaways
 - State and OSD favor a withdrawal of 20K-30K troops within a year or so. JCS is against a withdrawal, but if it needs to happen, to limit it to two brigades (10K men total)
 - State and OSD favor modernization aid for 16-18 Korean divisions, while JCS favors aid for 19 1/3rd Korean divisions and also giving them modernization aid for air and naval forces.
 - We must also give them economic aid so their rapid economic growth can be sustained while they modernize their army
 - Page 3 describes materials Nixon will have present in NSC meeting (Korean reports, NSSM 27, JCS views on the withdrawal, etc)
 - Nixon's talking points for NSC meeting
 - Emphasizing successes of US aid to Korea in the past 2 decades
 - Given SK's better present position, it is time to modify the shared status quo to something that works better for both countries (especially the US given its current constraints)
 - These remarks would be followed by a presentation of threats faced by Korea (by Director Helms)
 - Concluding remarks
 - Need to make "country plans" for possible foreign policy situations in the future that would be similar to Korea's.
 - Nixon will decide on a 5 year comprehensive strategy on Korea soon
- Korea Decisions [Includes Action Memorandum and National Security Decision Memorandum for President Nixon]
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679060589/BE815501503644BEP/Q/35?accountid=12874
 - Date: March 11, 1970
 - Subject: Korea Decisions
 - President Nixon reaffirms his order of 20K men withdrawal from SK, to be implemented through the Under Secretaries Committee
 - Key postures for consultation with Park
 - Further withdrawals not planned for at the moment, but may be considered as SK withdraws troops from Vietnam
 - Increase of yearly military aid to SK from \$140 million to \$200 million.
 - Economic aid to SK will not be affected provided that SK increases its defense burden

- President desires to link withdrawals with increased aid (although he doesn't want South Korea to demand that aid must come before withdrawals)
 - Some ideas of desired quid pro quos with Park must be brainstormed before consultation
- Ambassador Brown prefers to wait until consultations before making decisions on Korea. However, Lynn recommends coming in with established ideas to throw at SK when consultations begin
- The Korea Plan
 - Develop self-reliant and balanced SK armed forces that can stand up to NK's conventional and unconventional threats (the goal is 16-18 modernized SK divisions within the next 5 years)
 - A plan to help SK sustain its economic growth will it increases its defense burden
 - A series of agency plans regarding SK on the activities different agencies do there
- Organization for implementation
 - Unclear what agency is in charge of planning the 5 year modernization plan. Kissinger favors DPRK, and he thinks they would work best with the DoD.
- Part 2 below- Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon
- SK security: Types of challenges they will face
 - Continued harassment and terrorism campaign by NK (most likely)
 - Conventional attack from NK alone
 - Conventional attack from both NK and China (least likely)
- SK force capabilities
 - Current SK capabilities are adequate to defeat a land assault, as SK troops have a 1.5:1 advantage to NK, and they have better logistics. However, NK's advantage in air and naval power + US troops next to the DMZ present challenges that may force US involvement in future conflicts
- US forces in Korea
 - While the US could withdraw more than 20K troops, Kissinger doesn't recommend it s allies would think the US is fully disengaging from East Asia.
 - He recommends to withdraw the 20K men by the end of FY71, and maintain the 43K other men at least until the end of FY72
- US force positioning
 - Open question on whether successful US deterrence against a potential NK attack requires American troops to be in locations where their

involvement in the conflict would be immediate (DMZ). Kissinger thinks it adds little deterrence and invites a target for NK to attack.

- Kissinger's suggestion: Reduce American DMZ forces to the minimum level required by UN commitments. Let the Under Secretaries Committee decide what is that minimum.
- SK military forces
 - Kissinger recommends increasing SK's MAP aid from \$140 million per year to \$200 million per year from FY71 to FY75 (\$60 million more per year, \$300 million more over 5 years).
 - \$200 million per year will help modernize 18 SK divisions and parts of SK's air/naval forces.
 - A MAP increase to \$160-\$180 million per year could also happen (for 16 SK divisions), but Kissinger doesn't recommend it.
 - Increases of over \$160 million in MAP would need congressional approval. Contingency if congress doesn't approve increased aid: \$200 million per year combined in grant MAPs and excess equipment.
- SK economic aid
 - Given SK's rapid economic growth, economic aid to them can be scaled down from \$160 million in FY70 to \$20 million in FY75. However, some level of economic aid will have to be retained while they increase their defense burden.
 - Economic aid proposals
 - Rapid phasedown: From \$93 million in FY71 to \$20 million in FY75.
 - Maintain the level: From \$93 million in FY71 to \$55 million in FY75.
 - Maintain the level and increase SK's defense burden: Economic aid would be kept at levels said above so long as SK does commit to increasing its defense burden. (Kissinger's recommendation)
- Implementation
 - NSDM 48 includes instructions for Park and Congressional consultations, and instructions towards 5 year modernization aid and other plans related to SK.
- Part III (to relevant agencies- NSDM 48)
 - See [Document 56](#) in FRUS (Withdrawal order, confirmation of 20K men withdrawal plan, 5 year modernization plan, and consultations. A side goal is to make the withdrawals look like they come from Park's initiative so it looks like its a reflection on SK's new strength and their need to modernize their armed forces)
- Korea Program Analysis Study (NSSM-27)

- https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679044621/E49FB0B61DFC4D8FPQ/15?accountid=12874
- Date: March, 1970
- Subject: Korea Program Analysis Study (NSSM-27)
- On US Forces in Korea: Recommends the withdrawal of one division. The withdrawal of one division's 20K men would save up to \$400 million in FY71-75, rapid transfer of modernization equipment from SK (pass down), and would be in line with NSSM-27.
- On grant MAP aid: The \$350 million in MAP approved by Congress may have too many constraints to make the modernization plan happen. Recommended to get more aid through supplementary grants. They would need to go to congress to get approval for that.
 - However, Bureau believes that most Postures's modernization plans can be achieved with a yearly MAP range of \$140 to \$160 million, especially for FY71-75.
 - During consultations, the US can't commit to give a fixed number of MAP at any moment due to lack of assurances from Congress, however, it is smart to demonstrate intention to get a higher level of MAP.
- On SK views of force goals: If SK takes greater ownership of its defense commitments, expect them to determine better what needs does that entail, and for its leaders to behave in a more independent manner.
 - Example: SK may seek to bridge the air force gap it currently has with NK, even if aid for that isn't detailed in NSSM-27. SK will also have to decide between having a larger, but less modernized army, or a smaller but fully modernized army.
 - We shouldn't create a detailed modernization plan until we consult with SK what they need the most for their force goals, but at the same time, consultations must be realistic of the "resource limitations" that both countries face.
- Consultations on Korean Troop Issue [Attachment Not Included]
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679043971/E49FB0B61DFC4D8FPQ/8?accountid=12874
 - Date: April 15, 1970
 - Subject: Consultations on Korean Troop Issue
 - Enacting NSDM 48's plan
 - Key recommendations for Nixon
 - For Nixon to personally inform congress of the withdrawal and modernization plans- so to ensure the plans get congressional support and the American negotiating position with Park is strengthened. Also

- recommended coordinating with Park on congressional consultations and to keep pushing for Pakr to be the one to first announce the withdrawal.
- Goal of congressional consultation is to gain congressional support for the 5 year modernization plan. To put this to test, it is recommended to pass the supplementary \$150 MAP grant for FY71 or get “congressional approval for a drawdown of Department of Defense stocks to be reimbursed as MAP for next year”
 - Stocks plan B could only give \$20-\$30 million dollars of equipment to SK at best
 - Both congress and the executive retain a positive public posture on SK and Park. It must reflect coordination between the two countries
 - The US commits itself to give at least \$1 billion in aid to SK over the next 5 years
 - SK is expected to increase their defense spending/their chunk of burden sharing, while not endangering its economic growth either.
 - Even after you account for the costs of modernization, the withdrawal plan is expected to save up to \$180 million dollars for the US.
 - Modernization plan is carefully evaluated so it doesn’t increase tensions/cause an arms race between SK and NK.
- NSC recommends the modernization plan (including the supplementary grant) to be well on its way when the last of the 20K troops have left by the end of FY71
- NSDM 48: U.S. Programs in Korea [Attached to Forwarding Memorandum; Includes Attachment]
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679044296/BE815501503644BEP/Q/13?accountid=12874
 - Date: June 20, 1970
 - Subject: U.S. Programs in South Korea (NSDM 48)
 - NSC’s withdrawal plan itself- 20K men withdrawal would remove 18,400 land troops and 1600 air force servicemen.
 - Key basic withdrawal steps
 - Termination of temporary deployment of three squadrons in SK
 - US retains “company-width” responsibility for a sector of the DMZ in Panmunjom.
 - Withdrawal and replacement of the US division guarding DMZ with a Korean division
 - Deactivation and replacement of the artillery units and HQ of the US I Corps with a Korean Corps division
 - Passing down as much American deactivated equipment to SK units as possible

- This project would take 3 months of planning and 9 enacting, and also calls for SK to activate 5,500 new military positions. Modification of “1954 Agreed Minute” doc might be needed to give extra MAP.
- Recommended that DoD endorses this plan. This plan hasn’t been brought up to SK yet, so no guarantee they’ll approve of it during consultations.
- Detailed plan
 - Coordinate with SK to make a withdrawal plan of 1 American division, while also making a 5 year modernization plan for SK through MAP. Also pledging to keep SK troop levels in Vietnam stable.
 - Withdrawal/replacement rate will be kept in control. Remaining US forces in Korea will be reorganized into 8 battalions (4 infantry, 2 tanks, 2 mechanized), 3 brigade HQs, and 1 armored cavalry squadron.
 - Chaparral/Vulcan battalion will continue guarding a narrow sector of Panmunjom (500 meters). US equipment not being withdrawn will be handed over to SK. The 3 temporary air force units in SK will be deactivated.
- Conduct of withdrawal
 - Phase I, 3 months- planning: Development of a plans on Korean defense, equipment transfer, and identifying what areas does SK need the most help with to modernize.
 - Phase II: American units are replaced with SK units
 - Phase III: American units are fully withdrawn from Korea
 - Force adjustments: 18,400 land soldiers withdrawn, 1,600 air force officers withdrawn. 43,000 American troops will be left in SK by the end of the withdrawal
 - 9 month withdrawal phase- It is expected that 5,000 soldiers will be withdrawn in the first 3 months after the planning/consultation phase ends, 8,500 during the next 3 months, and 4,900 in the final 3 months
 - If the withdrawal began on February 5, 1971, it means that the second wave was in May 1971, and the final one in August 1971. It also means that consultations ended on November 1970 (3 months after Agnew’s visit to SK)
 - However, considering the FY ends on September 30, shouldn’t that mean the withdrawal must end by September, not November?
- New equipment to SK will come from both passdowns and MAP aid.
- Recommended that divisions currently in reserve in the SK 8th Army (composed of SK marine units and most of the US division that stays in SK) fill the gap made by the withdrawal.
- Withdrawal of US I Corps HQ means that the US division left in SK will answer directly to the Commanding General of the SK 8th army. Worth to note that this

will make communication more difficult for CINCUNC exercises in Korea, and the American brigade in the DMZ will have a unique command structure.

- The remaining American logistical support in SK will be enough to sustain the reduced force, although it would be very hard for them to handle future force increments.
- Troop reductions in Korea [includes attachment]
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679061022/7490328F98CB4CF2P/Q/1?accountid=12874
 - Date: July 11, 1970
 - Subject: Troops Reductions in Korea
 - Holdridge wants Kissinger to ask Ambassador Porter to make a proposed framework of the withdrawal, to see if Nixon is interested in it.
 - Attached June 12 memorandum (page 2) reemphasizes the nature of withdrawal, while also commenting that an April 20 letter by Park requested the US keep their troop level in Korea the same until 1975. Nixon responded on May 26 standing by his decision, and urging Park to begin supporting the withdrawal of some US forces from Korea.
 - While Park said he couldn't agree to support any withdrawal until he knew the specifics of modernization aid, the US said they weren't seeking his permission to withdraw, so it was in his best interest to follow and try to shape the modernization aid to his benefit.
 - Park refuses to take initiative in announcing the withdrawal, but he does want consultations asap.
 - It's on the best interest for the Nixon admin to get congressional support for the 5 year modernization plan as soon as possible, as it is needed to assuage general public criticism towards the US currently going in Korea, and to secure Park's domestic political position.
 - Proposed plan of action- Congressional debrief followed by public announcement
 - Explain that 20K men withdrawal/modernization aid is a big set up for the Nixon doctrine
 - US allies will carefully examine our conduct in Korea
 - 5 year, \$1 billion modernization plan for SK. Might be more expensive if we also modernize the Korean Air force. Needs congressional backing
 - Budget savings from troop withdrawal will more than pay the modernization plan
 - Program needs a good start, therefore the 5 year modernization plan ought to begin with a supplementary \$150 million grant for FY71. Nixon admin is willing to get creative if this can't be approved by the end of the congressional year.
 - Recommendations

- For Kissinger(?) to initiate Congressional consultations
 - If Kissinger can't do it, for Secretaries of State and/or Defense to do it
 - For Kissinger to approve the plan above, and get State and DoD to approve the memorandum too.
- Troop Reductions in Korea (NSDM 48)
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679044184/C2B37F14301E4B04P/Q/1?accountid=12874
 - Date: July 14, 1970
 - Subject: Troops Reductions in Korea (NSDM 48)
 - Document explains to Kissinger the key components of NSDM 48- Withdrawing 20K soldiers, consulting Park.
 - Withdrawal includes removing two F-104 squadrons from SK, the HQ of the US I Corps, and reducing the force in our sector in the DMZ to 1 brigade. When support and air force/navy manpower withdrawn is also accounted, up to 43K men will be withdrawn.
 - NSDM 48 needs Kissinger's approval (which he gave it) before July 21, when the Americans are scheduled to meet with SK officials in Honolulu regarding the withdrawal.
- Modernization of Republic of Korea Armed Forces [Attached to Forwarding Memorandum; Includes Tables] (Memorandum by the USC Under Secretaries Committee for review by multiple departments - August 19, 1970)
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679060512/BE815501503644BEP/Q/14?accountid=12874
 - Date: August 19, 1970
 - Subject: Modernization of Republic of Korea Armed Forces
 - This document is alluded to, but not included, in FRUS Document 70.
 - Memorandum discusses if the modernization aid mandated in NSDM-48 would mean \$1 billion or \$1.5 billion more in aid to SK in the next 5 years
 - Developments since NSDM 48 (and actions in parallel to 20K withdrawal)
 - Belief that \$1 billion in logistics will be needed to sustain a \$2.5 billion modernization plan for SK over 5 years. Excessive amounts
 - State wants a more balanced modernization plan
 - The Korean Air Force (from 205 aircraft to 385 modernized ones- requires \$607 million) must also be given some modernization aid, not just the land forces. Air defense and air base upgrades were also needed, for \$71.8 million for 5 years. Under NSDM-48's \$1.5 billion plan, \$211 million would be allocated to the air force.
 - The Korean Navy needs better equipment to deal with NK infiltration- \$112 million out of \$1.5 billion are needed. However, NSSM 27 said they have sufficient resources to deal with the NK navy.

- Scope of the final modernization plan will depend on the investment levels approved, size of SK forces supported, and growth of the NK threat. Price tag will go much higher if the goal is SK self-sufficiency, and regardless, we would assist them if they were ever invaded. Therefore, the level of aid in the next few years will depend on whether we aim for moderate (balanced force) upgrades or full on SK self-sufficiency.
- Pros of balanced force modernization
 - The direction the US wants to take
 - Would mean less burden/number of US troops in SK required
 - Less money needed for air and naval upgrades
- Cons
 - May upset the balance of power in the peninsula
 - Unlikely SK will reach full self-sufficiency. Therefore, there is still ground for long term military assistance from the US
- Supplementary \$150 million MAP for Korea needed for FY71 due to surprise developments in Indonesia and Cambodia. Legislative approval will be sought for. In this doc it is claimed that the US is willing to help with modernization before withdrawals begin.
- Committee hopes that in Agnew's visit to Seoul he will announce the supplementary aid to SK, and reaffirm our commitment to them
- Key recommendations
 - Balanced force modernization will have a high price tag
 - Probably around \$1.5 billion for 5 years.
 - Supplemental \$150 million aid for FY71
 - Agnew in Seoul will announce that aid
 - Request for legislative authority to pass down US equipment in SK to SK's forces.
- Pages 9 to 14 give an idea on the costs of the \$150 million FY71 supplemental aid plan
- National Security Council--Decisions Index, Korea, Section A. Decisions and Implementing Actions [Withdrawal Consultations with President Park]
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679044212/BE815501503644BEPQ/5?accountid=12874
 - Date: September 23, 1970
 - On force reductions: Consultation with Park will happen before doing this. The US will look to give SK \$200 million every year from FY71 to FY75 in MAP and other grants, while existing aid of \$50 million per year will persist. Further withdrawals won't be considered at least until either SK forces leave Vietnam, or modernization proves successful, or further consultations are made.

- Implementing actions: DoD will prepare withdrawal plan, DoD and State will prepare way to pitch the extra aid to SK through Congress, while Kissinger will coordinate the agencies (DoD, State and related agencies) in the “supervision of USC a 5 year memorandum” on US policies and programs in Korea.
- March 25, 1970: Kissinger approves order for Ambassador Porter to explain US withdrawal position in NSDM48 to Park. Done on March 27, 1970.
- National Security Council--Decisions Index, Korea, Section A. Decisions and Implementing Actions [U.S. Troop Withdrawal]
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679061543/BE815501503644BEPQ/4?accountid=12874
 - Date: September 23, 1970
 - Per NSDM 48, the NSC has made the decision to withdraw 20K soldiers from SK by the end of FY71.
- U.S. Troop Levels in Europe and Korea
 - https://www.proquest.com/dnsa_ko/docview/1679060674/F45D29F655D44DC6PQ/3?accountid=12874
 - Date: October 14, 1970
 - Subject: U.S. Troops Levels in Europe and Korea
 - US commitment to defend allies (especially in Europe) must be flexible in troop numbers, not fixed. We must also look to balance security burdens between the US and allies- and also ensure they don't tie us down to fixed numbers.
 - Proposed “more efficient and equitable” NATO posture
 - Secure commitment from allies to improve their NATO posture as detailed in NSSM-84. Use congressional funding to help facilitate this
 - Talk and consult with allies to reduce the American troop numbers in Europe by 1976 (but still keep a substantial force)
 - Moderate troop reductions in Europe in FY72 to demonstrate will to do troop reductions
 - It's important to get Public and Congressional support before enacting this plan. Laird also argues against Bill Roger's plan to retain the current troop numbers in Europe. The Soviets would continue the waiting game in the region.
 - On Korea: The army has a tentative plan to withdraw the 7th division by the end of FY73 (14K men), leaving a force in SK of 20K men. Requires further planning. Bill Rogers has concerns of the political repercussions of a second withdrawal in 5 years.
 - A few points why Laird thinks this second withdrawal could happen
 - Showing further commitment to the Nixon doctrine, as SK can by far and large defend itself and Agnew made sure we didn't make any promises on not withdrawing more troops in the future

- Withdrawing the 7th division would give that division (and the US army as a whole) more flexibility in responding to global situations
- \$55-65 millions in savings by withdrawing 14K troops from Korea.
- Laird believes future Japanese concerns can be assuaged so long as they keep confidence in our nuclear deterrent against the Soviets and Chinese, which he thinks they are more worried about than conventional deterrence.