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VALUES MATERIALIZED: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ARCHAEOLOGY OF  
SOCIO-HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE CELTO-GERMANIC  
IRON AGE AND ROMAN PERIOD

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Values in the Greco-Roman World

Around the turn of the first and second century AD, the Greek philosopher Dio Chrysostom traveled through parts of the Roman Empire, making keen observations about socio-economic inequality and cultural particularities. In his writings, Dio contrasted town and country life and explicitly voiced his disapproval of the attitudes and behaviors of urban elites while at the same time praising the rural poor (Dio Chrysostom *Orationes* VII). While traveling through Euboea (Greece), Dio clearly admired the simple lifeways of the inhabitants of ‘the wild’ and seems to have reached the conclusion that poverty encourages humility and kindness. The way this philosopher extols in moral terms about poverty and the poor reveals what we might term ‘the outlook’ of a critical intellectual whose post-materialist disposition encourages foregrounding socio-economic inequality as the cause of human suffering. But, more than this, Dio’s observations also shine a light on the attitudes and outlooks of the Euboean landless poor. Ostensibly, these people viewed their existence as better than any other, despite the deplorable circumstances under which they labored (combining farming with herding and hunting). These marginalized commoners did not participate in a money economy or pay taxes, yet they considered themselves members of a civic community and recognized their civic responsibilities. Showing great pride in their own labor, these landless inhabitants of the wild were compelled by a strong desire for self-reliance. Notably, in this particular context, there will have been little exposure to an ideological discourse imposed by elite classes that could have mystified understandings or naturalized hardships (in Marxian terms). Instead, what we find is a closely nurtured constellation of values that includes a desire for autonomy and self-sufficiency, justice and honor, close inter-family connections, and communal loyalty.

Around the same time, Petronius wrote his famous *Satyricon*, a work of entertainment that pokes fun at the vulgarity and extravagance of the Roman *nouveau-riche*. The book contains a fictional narrative of an ambitious freedman by the name of Trimalchio whose desires for lavish spending and sumptuous living are out of control. As a member of the Roman senatorial class, Petronius was well-known among his social peers for his interest in luxurious indulgence, and knowledge of fashion and good taste (Tacitus *Annals* 16.18). Because of this, it is clear that this Roman nobleman did not criticize the inappropriateness of extravagance in ways a moralizing philosopher like Dio Chrysostom would; rather, Trimalchio and his social peers are characterized as flawed reproductions of 'genuine' elites. As a guardian of Roman 'high culture', Petronius was critiquing the behavioral transgressions of ambitious Romans who were unable to distinguish between fashion and *faux-pas*.

Fortunately, in crafting his caricature of an absurd social transgressor, Petronius unwittingly shines a light on the attitudes and outlooks of the typical well-to-do freedman. It may well be that his protagonists fail to accurately understand and imitate the behavioral intricacies that make a true member of the Roman upper class, but this failure is rooted in the attitudes and outlooks of the social circles in which they move. Moreover, the text also clearly indicates that people like Trimalchio and his peers are fully aware of their social position. They know they do not belong, and they are glad for it! These freedmen value such things as self-sufficiency, hard work, the practical use of education for business ventures, and the importance of maintaining an honorable reputation. The successful freedman is above all independent, self-made, and socially recognized.

Apart from literary sources like Dio and Petronius shining a light on the values maintained by individuals as members of particular social groups, communally shared ideals are also apparent in epigraphic sources. Joshel's (1992) study of occupational inscriptions on Roman funerary epitaphs, for example, shows how notable differences existed between the dedications of free citizens,

freedmen, and slaves. This work provides strong empirical evidence for the existence of unique outlooks maintained by members of different social groups. Joshel argues how the depreciation of Roman citizenship encouraged freeborn citizens to centralize the importance of family life while increasing a desire to control others (epitaphs focus on family life, occupation, management positions, and membership in associations). Freedmen, by contrast, stressed the importance of independence and financial success due to the ghost of a servile past and a strong desire to ensure their children's integration into Roman society (epitaphs focus on independence, financial success, identity, and dignity derived from professionalism). Slaves, lastly, also prioritized family relations and professional expertise but this is understood as a response to depersonalization and desocialization (epitaphs focus on family relations, personal skill, and economic activity). Slaves seemed to have valued family relations (especially spouses) very highly precisely because these were illegitimate.

Whether epitaphs were formulated by the deceased themselves or their next of kin is less important than their function: tombstones were public media used for broadcasting communally shared values. They show that social distinctions were maintained and communicated within particular social spheres. Yet, at the same time, it is undeniable that certain values (e.g. family relations and occupation) were prioritized by most people regardless of social background. The fact that standard funerary practices were adopted in Rome by many who could afford to do so also speaks to this reality of certain social phenomena manifesting across the social strata. Large-scale comparative analyses like Joshel's demonstrate, then, how values and ideals are constituted within and across social boundaries. However, such approaches do risk glossing over individual agency and non-normative interests, attitudes, and behaviors; Joshel's study does not show, for instance, how these are also greatly shaped by personal interests and the human life course.

The influence of life course dynamics may be gleaned from mortuary evidence as well. The famous funerary inscription of the ‘Mactar harvester’ is unique for the way it so poignantly illustrates a rags-to-riches story of a commoner in Roman Africa achieving a position of wealth and social status.<sup>1</sup> Yet, the text does more than this. While it consciously broadcasts a particular constellation of values that will have been quite familiar to those who held membership in the harvester’s social circles (including high appreciation for hard work, frugality, social recognition, independence, leisure, and family life), this particular epitaph also illustrates how human motivation, apart from being influenced by shared ideals, is also greatly shaped by the human life course. The text is particularly valuable for the way it illustrates how this individual’s early adulthood was characterized by greater activity, a desire for (relative) autonomy, and concern for reputation, while as an older adult the harvester came to prioritize leisure, family life, and respectability more. The universal influence of the life course over human motivation is undeniable, yet it is not readily encountered in the archaeological literature.

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<sup>1</sup> “I was born into a poor dwelling and of a poor father, who had no property or household. From the time of my birth, I lived in the country looking after my business; there was no time off in the countryside and none for me at any time. And when the time of year had brought forth the grain ready for harvest, then I was the first reaper of the stalks. When the sickle-bearing gangs of men had made their way to the fields, whether heading for The Nomads of Cirta or The Fields of Jupiter, as harvester I preceded all, first into the fields, leaving the packed bands behind my back. I reaped twelve harvests under the raging sun, and afterwards became a work gang leader instead of a laborer. We led the gangs of harvesters for eleven years and our band cut down the Numidian fields. This effort and my frugal lifestyle brought success and made me master of a household and gained me a house, and my home itself lacks nothing. And my life gained the rewards of office: I was myself enrolled among the conscript councilors. Elected by the order of the decurions, I had a seat in the order's temple and, starting out as a humble country boy, I too became censor. I produced children and saw them grow into young men and saw their children too. In accord with our services in life, we have enjoyed years of fame, which no bitter tongue has hurt with any reproach. People, learn to pass your lives without giving reason for reproach. The man who has lived deceitfully has earned meeting his death in such a manner” (Parkin and Pomeroy 2007, 39).

While Joshel's study of commemorative practices identifies class-based differences in values and priorities, it also shows how, in the context of the Roman metropole, distinct social groups did not always maintain radically different outlooks. To discover if differences existed on a regional scale requires the kind of quantitative analysis performed by Laurence and Trifilò (2015) who compare age commemoration practices throughout the Western Mediterranean. By examining a large number of epitaphs they are able to recognize important regional differences in the way people referenced age in mortuary contexts. In the Italian and French sample, for instance, there is a "strong emphasis on the commemoration of the younger age groups over the elderly" (*ibid.*, 105). This contrasts with the situation in North Africa, where early life stages are rarely commemorated. There, references to age predominantly concern those of mid-life and senior adults. It is a pattern found across the whole of North Africa, as well as in Spain.

Laurence and Trifilò discuss this in terms of global convergence and regional divergence. As to the former, they note the common adoption of the epigraphic habit, and the use of specific Latin formulae inscribed on mortuary stones that commemorated the deceased. Such convergence, they argue, was facilitated by the presence of the Roman military; "the military, as an institution, was the means of dissemination of the practice of representing age at death on both male and female epitaphs" (*ibid.*, 107). Regional divergence, by contrast, is explained in terms of a 'cultural outlook'. In Italy, family interest for commemorating deceased children reflects a 'forward looking' outlook, while in North Africa 'backward looking' outlooks placed a strong focus on parents and the past. Roman cultural imperialism facilitated a 'global' convergence of commemoration practices, while at the same time allowing for cultural divergence in the way this widely adopted practice manifested at a regional level.

Laurence and Trifilò's study illustrates well current interests in Roman archaeology. There is one of a number of recent attempts to apply ideas drawn from globalization studies to the Roman context (Witcher 2000; Hingley 2005; Mata 2012; Pitts and Versluys 2015). Engagement with this literature has encouraged Romanists to recognize that social and cultural phenomena manifest at different scales (local, extra-local, and 'global'), and that globalization processes strengthen at once cultural homogeneity at a global level and heterogeneity at a local level. This concern for relating the local to the global, for understanding particular local trajectories in terms of meta-historical developments, is shared by those archaeologists who have looked at similar co-constitutive dynamics through the lens of hybridity and colonialism in recent decades (Rowlands 1998; Terrenato 1998; van Dommelen 1998; Webster 2001).

Following in the footsteps of others, Laurence and Trifilò grant substantial significance to the role of the military in the development of certain cultural standards manifesting at a global level (i.e. convergence), like the adoption of the Latin language, the epigraphic habit, mortuary commemoration, and even particular ways of dining and bathing (Roymans 2004; James 2011). In many ways, this results from a praiseworthy desire for moving beyond elite-centric acculturation models. However, this has not generally produced more sophisticated interpretations of past social dynamics. Roman archaeologists seem to simply have replaced one dominant historical agent with another; instead of granting exaggerated agency to Roman colonizers or native elites, now soldiers and veterans are treated as the primary movers of socio-cultural transformation.

While it can be granted that military lifestyles were characterized by great uniformity - no doubt considered a necessity from a pragmatic military point of view - no individual can be said to belong to a single community. Indeed, Dio's landless poor may have been easily distinguished from urban elites but they still identified themselves as citizens, and all will likely have been able to relate

to an Euboean, Greek, or Hellenic identity in certain situations. Petronius, in turn, may have sought to ridicule the motivations and behaviors of Rome's *nouveau-riche*, but all will have been able to relate to some or other conceptualization of *Romanitas*.<sup>2</sup> Nor do people maintain coherent and stable identities for the duration of their lifetime, as illustrated by the epitaph of the Mactar Harvester. People universally maintain pluriform identities and they uphold complex behavioral and discursive practices as they participate in a wide variety of social networks over the course of their lifetime.

Yet, Laurence and Trifilò's comparative study of age commemoration also illustrates an important drawback that continues to diminish interpretation in (Roman) archaeology. While being successful in identifying regional divergence in funerary commemoration, Laurence and Trifilò offer no further explanation why such divergence might form in the way that it did. And, even if they and other archaeologists become more innovative in dealing with the complexities of human identitarian behavior, in the end 'Identity' by itself explains little. Military identities may have formed through military service, and military service may have encouraged the global spread of certain cultural ideals and social norms, but these military identities clearly did not cancel out regional differences that a study of funerary commemoration can expose. Instead, the questions that need to be asked by (Roman) archaeologists have to focus on 'motivation' rather than identity. We may ask, then, why the inhabitants of *Numidia* predominantly broadcasted the age of elderly adults, while their contemporaries in Italy and Mediterranean Gaul were far more concerned with their children. Treating such discrepancies in terms of cultural difference by referencing a 'Numidian identity' or a 'Roman identity' has little explanatory merit. If commemoration of the elderly was an important cultural aspect of what it meant to be Numidian, then what does it mean when we recognize similar

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<sup>2</sup> Idealized notions regarding 'Romaness', initially formulated in antiquity and subsequently adopted by modern historians.

outlooks in *Baetica* (Spain)? Why did Numidians and Baeticans maintain (or choose to broadcast) backward-looking outlooks in contrast to the forward-looking outlooks found elsewhere? The fact that different social and cultural groups prioritized similar values across time and space urges a consideration of human motivation at a cross-cultural level. In other words, the cultural relativist perspective that has limited the archaeological endeavor to merely describing regional variation - mainly in reference to a particular social or cultural identity - requires reassessment.

To be sure, studies like Joshel's have already made important contributions to such an effort. The interest for explanation over description clearly comes to the fore in her comparison of the commemorative tendencies of those identified as freeborn, freedmen, and slave. Joshel highlights linkages between the values of particular social agents and the reality of their lived experience (i.e. human ecology) - freeborn citizens were concerned about the depreciation of Roman citizenship, freedmen were motivated by the legacy of a servile past, and slaves sought to overcome the constraints posed by a subordinate legal status. Yet, these are variables not easily recognized in other cultural contexts, or from other sources of evidence. While the materialist interests and preoccupations of archaeologists will lead many to focus on such concerns like economic strategy or wealth, or the discrepant structuring influences of urban and rural lifeways and environments, Joshel explains human motivation by reference to variables most easily accessed through literary sources (e.g. social norms, moral prescriptions, legal institutions). The scope of Joshel's research, furthermore, makes it impossible to know whether similar outlooks and preoccupations can be found among communities of freeborn citizens, freedmen, and slaves (or other groups) outside the context of the Roman metropole. Can the values broadcast through literary sources and funerary epitaphs only inform us about human motivation in the socio-cultural contexts from which they are

derived, as radical relativists would have it, or can they also inform the interpretation of other situations?

Critically, for countless inhabitants of the Roman world, the autonomous and self-reliant family formed the foundation of civilized society. As shown by Joshel, notions of family life, self-reliance, prosperity, and perpetuity had long been idealized throughout the social strata in Rome, even if these were realized differentially. Yet, such ideals were not uniquely Roman (i.e. cultural) because they also arose among pre-Roman communities in parts of France (Haselgrove 2007; McCartney 2012) and Spain (González-Ruibal 2006). A comparable value system developed in the Lower Rhineland region during the Late Iron Age and Early Roman period. Archaeologically, this is shown by the historical trend whereby unenclosed and single-generation shifting farmsteads situated near communally held agricultural fields were gradually replaced by enclosed settlements of fixed multi-generational farmsteads situated on private property (Gerritsen 2003; also see De Clercq 2009). The ideological centrality of the family also became broadcast through tombstone imagery in the Roman northwest provinces (Chmielewski 2002), and through the numerous dedications to deities like the popular *matronae* whose localized worship consistently focused on health, fertility, and prosperity (Derks 1998; Garman 2008). Moreover, the formation of villa landscapes across this region (Roymans and Derks 2011) not only speaks to post-conquest socio-economic integration, it is a material manifestation of an ideological outlook that centralized the cultural importance of the autonomous and perpetual family lineage.

While prehistorians have looked at such transformational patterns through the lens of ‘complexification’ (Brun 1995; Joffe 1998; Hayden 2001; Fernández-Götz *et al.* 2014), Roman archaeologists have mainly talked about this in terms of ‘acculturation’, as the cultural change experienced by native peoples due to their incorporation into the Roman imperial state. This they

have generally done by reference to the (variably understood) ‘Romanization’ concept (Hingley 2008; Rothe 2013; Versluys 2014). Yet, as this dissertation will show, a wide range of value expressions is easily identified in a variety of sources, across time and space, regardless of social or cultural context. This fact alone urges for an approach to human motivation in universal terms. In doing so, questions not normally considered present themselves. For example, why are certain values consistently prioritized over others under particular circumstances, and how does this manifest at the level of lived experience for groups and individuals? How do people prioritize what values they seek to implement, and how are individual priorities that are shaped by personality and lived experience reconciled with social norms and cultural ideals? If some values can be shown to have universal efficacy, can the same be said about the particular ways in which people choose to realize them? Considering questions of this kind can greatly inform our understanding of the motivations that shape human action and interaction, and, in the aggregate, socio-cultural formations. Socio-historical transitions that manifest at various levels of lived experience always reconfigure value systems, but how exactly this reshapes individual priorities, social norms, and cultural ideals often remains unclear, not least because studies have not explicitly looked at such issues from a value-oriented perspective.

This introductory consideration of the cross-cultural occurrence of various values in literary, epigraphic, iconographic, and archaeological sources from classical antiquity has also introduced the study area that will be the focus of this dissertation. It is an area where archaeological research has adequately shown how important socio-historical transformations occurred during the Iron Age and Roman period. I will next provide background information on this region situated in Northwest Europe where Iron Age ‘complexification’ and Roman period ‘acculturation’ processes changed how

people prioritized and realized a limited range of basic human values, thereby reshaping social norms and cultural ideals.

## **1.2 Values in the Celto-Germanic World**

The geographic area that is the focus of this dissertation is situated in Northwest Europe (figure 1). It includes the low-lying areas of Northwest France, the Belgian and Dutch lowlands, and Northwest Germany. This region is partly situated in a distinct geomorphological zone known as the Northwest European Plain where the natural environment is greatly influenced by the presence of several large river-drainage basins, most prominently that of the Scheldt, Meuse, and Rhine. Within the Northwest European Plain, a notable distinction can be made between flat Holocene landscapes where coastal peat and riverine clay soils predominate (North Sea coastal regions), and higher-lying Pleistocene landscapes where soils primarily consist of aeolian sand and loess (Belgian Flanders and the southern Netherlands). The southeastern parts of the study area consist of high-lying landscapes situated between Middle Rhine and Meuse (Ardennes and Eifel), between Moselle and Rhine (Hunsrück and Saar), and beyond (Taunus). This region is referred to as the West-Central Uplands, a series of hilly landscapes and low mountain ranges that separates the North European Plain from Alpine lands in the South. These upland landscapes predominantly consist of forested hills with rocky outcrops and steep river valleys where the potential for agriculture is quite limited. The southwestern region of the study area includes the undulating hilly landscapes of the French Picardy region (Somme, Oise, Aisne, and Marne rivers) where loess and chalk soils predominate.



*Figure 1: Study area situated in Northwest Europe (figure by author)*

During the latter part of the Iron Age, this geographically varied region was inhabited by groups which the Romans referred to as Belgic Gauls (Drinkwater 1983; Wightman 1985; King 1990; Roymans 1990 and 1996). These northern Gauls were supposedly distinguishable from more ‘barbaric’ Germanic groups believed to inhabit all lands east of the Rhine River. Historical sources also stress a trans-Rhenian Germanic origin for many of these Belgic groups because this allowed

differentiating them from their ostensibly less barbaric Gallic brethren in the South. Archaeological research has dispelled these ancient colonialist characterizations by showing how the region is best understood as one where long-term contact between Gallic and Germanic cultural spheres was the norm. Archaeologists now typically label the prehistoric peoples inhabiting an area extending from northern France (Somme River) to northern Germany (Weser River) as Celto-Germanic. This perspective is shared by linguists who refer to this in-between zone as the Northwest Block, a region where a unique language developed during the long Iron Age that was neither distinctly Celtic nor Germanic (Gysseling 1981; Lendering and Bosman 2012, 62).

The study area was situated on the Northwest periphery of the West-Central European Hallstatt world of the Late Bronze Age (HA A-B) and Early Iron Age (HA C-D).<sup>3</sup> It is especially for the southern half of the study area where archaeological evidence suggests that inter-regional relations with Hallstatt communities were maintained. This is also the area where archaeologists have situated the earliest manifestations of the La Tène ‘cultural phenomenon’ which arose during the Middle Iron Age (LT A-B). Ongoing complexification processes (i.e. economic expansion, industrial specialization, ‘proto-urbanization’, organized religion, and political centralization) encouraged the formation of hierarchical ‘proto-state’ societies during the Late Iron Age (LT C-D) in Central and Southern Gaul. These are believed to have been starkly differentiated into social classes of ‘kings’, aristocratic families, priests, warriors, craftsmen, rural serfs, and slaves (Drinkwater 1983; Creighton 2000; Arnold 2011).

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<sup>3</sup> See appendix II for the periodization used in this dissertation. This includes references to important historical events and developments manifesting in the Mediterranean World, West-Central Europe, and the study area.

Different was the situation among northern Celto-Germanic groups that remained highly segmented into the Late Iron Age, with 'tribal' organization predominantly shaped by the central role of clans and their nuclear families (Roymans 1983; Todd 1992). Larger collectives that arose in the North are viewed as weakly developed autonomous chiefdoms, with several petty chiefs to each clan, and a political organization largely determined by kinship and descent. Clan heads likely held membership in 'pan-tribal' political bodies, especially at times of conflict when war leaders could temporarily arise to represent the council and tribal community. However, overall there is little archaeological or literary evidence for social stratification such as known for Central and Southern Gaul. The difference in socio-cultural complexity between northern egalitarian groups and southern stratified groups has long been interpreted, from a center-periphery perspective, as the result of diverging interaction patterns with the Mediterranean World. Though long-distance socio-economic networks (i.e. elite reciprocity and exchange of base goods) certainly extended northwards during the Iron Age, the evidence for trade with the Mediterranean world overall is relatively scarce for the northern half of the study area.

This peripheral status of the Celto-Germanic North is also suggested by the fact that the European *oppidum* zone of large defended settlements that formed over the course of the third and second century BC throughout West-Central Europe does not extend into the northwestern lowlands where there is little evidence for large-scale settlements for this period (Gerritsen and Roymans 2006). This contrasts sharply with the southern half of the study area where numerous Iron Age hillforts have been identified, especially throughout the West-Central Uplands (see figures 11-15). These are believed to have served primarily as temporary refuges, although differentiating between these refuges and ideal-type *oppida* is anything but clear-cut. Throughout the low-lying regions of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, the dominant form of habitation since the

Bronze Age was the small unenclosed farmstead that rarely clustered into larger settlements. These farming settlements show great uniformity in the way they adhered to a house-building tradition typified by the post-built rectangular farmhouse (or longhouse) with living-section and animal stable under one roof (Roymans 1996; Wesselingh 2000; Gerritsen 2003; Lange *et al.* 2014). For the Bronze and Iron Age, these are known as ‘wandering farms’ (Schinkel 1998) because farmhouses moved around communal farming fields as each new generation built a farmhouse in proximity to a previous one.

The economic strategies pursued by Celto-Germanic groups seems to have been strongly geared towards self-sufficiency during the pre-Roman Iron Age. Yet, at the same time, intra-regional distinctions are recognized as well. For example, in the northern part of the study area a contrast is commonly made between the economic potential of high-lying Pleistocene and low-lying Holocene landscapes (Louwe Kooijmans *et al.* 2005). This also comes to the fore in material culture, with archaeologists recognizing regional traditions (e.g. in house-building tradition and native pottery production) that broadly coincide with these landscapes. Yet, despite such regional diversity, and despite the position of the Lower Rhineland in a wider zone of long-term cultural interactions, prehistoric groups on both sides of the Rhine, indeed, throughout the entire study area, were remarkably uniform in terms of socio-economic complexity for a significant part of the long Iron Age. Notable changes seem to have occurred during the Late Iron Age, though predominantly in the southern half of the study area where settlements became increasingly enclosed and movement through intra-settlement space became more controlled. The development is interpreted as a move away from a kinship-ordered mode of production based in communal ownership of agricultural land, towards a peasant economy where land was held privately (Slofstra 1983). In other words,

these changes are interpreted in terms of increased socio-economic differentiation, yet how this relates to motivational values, or broader socio-historical processes, remains uncertain.

As this study will make clear, there is little archaeological literature available that is explicitly concerned with values, and this is no different for archaeologies of European prehistory and the Roman world. The closest that prehistorians and Romanists have come to this is in studies of ritual and religion, or when values feature implicitly in developmental narratives that describe how societies become more complex (e.g. Iron Age complexification) or culturally different (e.g. Roman period acculturation). This is typically done by making reference to variables like social stratification or political centralization, processes implicitly understood to have involved important shifts in value systems. In terms of disciplinary development, it wasn't until the post-processual analytical shift unto the ideational sphere that interest for symbolic meaning, political ideologies, and cultural ideals increased (Hodder 1982a, 1982b, and 1991). Among prehistorians, this inspired studies of the value systems of Bronze and Iron Age 'warrior societies'. This has primarily involved engagement with the 'martiality' concept, which is understood as a "system of ideas and values linked to the use of force" (Roymans 1996, 13) and presumed to have been a dominant cultural focus throughout the Celto-Germanic world (Bazelmans 1999; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001; Fontijn 2005). Comparisons to the early medieval phenomenon of the Germanic 'warband' (*gefolgschaft*) are commonly made in this literature.<sup>4</sup>

The martial value systems maintained by these warrior societies manifested through ritual practices that involved the deposition of weapons in rivers, graves, or cult-places where ancestors or deities were worshipped. Such ritual practices have also been linked to an age-class system wherein

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<sup>4</sup> The *gefolgschaft* can be understood as a patron-client arrangement between male warriors who swore loyalty and provided military service to aristocratic elites in return for social prestige and material resources.

warriors moved through life-stages with inter-stage movement communally celebrated through rite-of-passage ceremonies. Seemingly, cross-cultural participation in ideological discourse through which these shared values and ideals were communicated encouraged the expansion of long-distance exchange systems. Indeed, many prestigious Mediterranean imports are believed to have been exchanged as gifts between elites, or distributed by elites among their clientele. Cosmology and ritual life were closely entwined, then, with a socio-economic reality actively manipulated by local aggrandizers and willingly reproduced by subordinate followers who presumably maintained similar outlooks and aspirations.

The motivations of those partaking in *gefolgschaft*-type relations are thought to have been strongly linked to certain ideals about masculinity (strength and courage), mastery (fighting skills), and outward appearance (status and identity), a range of values subscribed to by elites as well as their social subordinates. This constellation of high-priority values informed social norms regarding hospitality, reciprocity, and feasting, which together functioned to increase communal cohesion and ease the formation of political alliances. While it certainly is true that widely shared social norms and cultural ideals like these could function preventatively to avoid conflict and violence, such violence-detering aspects of martial value systems undoubtedly coexisted with those directly tied to actual violence and risk-taking that served male bonding (i.e. *männerbund* solidarity), and which also allowed individuals to gain social prestige (Enright 1996; Bazelmans 1999). The martial lifestyles of young men characteristically involved the pursuit of hazardous situations, where daring deeds could be performed and threats to life and limb overcome. Within close-knit warrior bands, social prestige was intimately linked to warrior prowess and the accretion of reputation gained through fighting skills, performance in battle, and careful manipulation of outward appearance. The long Iron Age is

commonly characterized in terms of the rise and fall of local warrior leaders who competed for wealth and prestige, with martiality dominating Celto-Germanic value systems.

This presumably was the situation at the time of Roman expansions into trans-Alpine Europe during the first century BC. As Roman political and economic imposition advanced north, attitudes towards Gallic value systems were shaped by ideologically informed biases as well as practical considerations. Once the Roman frontier became permanently established on the Rhine River during the first century AD, the pragmatics of military recruitment and the staffing of military installations encouraged investment in martial ideologies that were imagined to have been dominant throughout the pre-conquest Celto-Germanic world (Roymans 1996 and 2004). In other words, an essentializing imaginary of the barbarian's warrior ethos was embraced by Roman leadership to serve the colonial project. On the frontier especially, military service provided the main context in which a new colonial value system manifested, yet during the first century AD this contrasted substantially with the interior of northern Gaul. Urban life and villa-based economies developed earlier and faster, along with non-martial value systems that matched the socio-economic conditions there. Traditionally, this has been expressed in terms of southern regions becoming 'Romanized' earlier and faster than the militarized frontier zone in the North. Yet, even on the frontier, the same socio-economic developments that encouraged the establishment and expansion of civic life elsewhere unavoidably resulted in a decline there of martiality as a central ideology (Roymans 1996, 41). The situation across the Rhine presumably remained largely unaltered due to the absence of 'Romanization' processes that shaped provincial societies (Lendering and Bosman 2012, 78). This seems substantiated by literary sources that tell of the supposed pervasiveness of martiality, warfare, and raiding among trans-frontier groups, which, over the course of centuries, elicited numerous Roman punitive responses; on these ancient historians eagerly reported. It would seem, then, that

the warrior lifestyles and martial value systems of old survived across the Rhine frontier, even strengthening and spreading again after the collapse of the Roman Empire.

### **1.3 Challenges and Questions**

These archaeological perspectives on Iron Age and Roman-period value systems in Northwest Europe are not without significant interpretive deficiencies. To begin, there is the ever-present task faced by all archaeologists of determining the past significance of material culture. As Dobres puts it succinctly, “material remains of ancient lifeways do not necessarily preserve in direct proportion to their evolutionary or socio-cultural significance” (Dobres 2010, 105), such that scholarly bias always influences perceptions of past lifeways. In this light, we can consider the earliest archaeological endeavors in Northwest Europe, namely the antiquarian salvage of impressive objects (mostly weapons and armor) from mortuary contexts. These were housed in prestigious private and public collections (Miller 2007 and 2013). This singular focus on collectible objects resulted in much archaeological evidence (e.g. mundane objects, settlement structures, cultural landscapes) being ignored because it was granted low historical and cultural significance. Excavators entirely ignored contextual information, and dating was mostly based on stylistic seriation techniques. Such decontextualized and ahistorical treatment of a limited range of object categories did not allow for the interpretation of complex socio-historical dynamics, let alone value systems. This situation was exacerbated by the use of unsophisticated characterizations of Celtic and Germanic warriors that dominated scholarship, and which held great symbolic significance for European nationalist agendas (Dietler 1994; Díaz-Andreu 1995). Indeed, even though the widespread occurrence of weapons and armor was taken as evidence for the deplorable pervasiveness of warfare among prehistoric societies, this simultaneously allowed culture-historical links to be established with brave, virile, and free-

spirited ancestors. It was in the context of these earliest antiquarian and nationalist endeavors that martiality among Celtic and Germanic Iron Age societies was attributed with the highest cultural significance.

These 19th century European nationalist and colonialist perspectives shaped scholarly perspectives that persist to this day. This is readily shown by the common tendency among early anthropologists of colonial Africa and archaeologists of prehistoric Europe alike to make essentializing statements about tribal warfare and cattle raiding. Tribal warfare has long been accepted as a deplorable reality of brutal pre-state conditions, and cattle raiding as a characteristic economic strategy of pastoral groups. In highly comparable ways, prehistorians have generalized about the belligerence of hunter-forager groups who seem eternally burdened with the charge that violence prevention is not possible when social hierarchies or centralized power are lacking (Morris 2015, 33). Why non-state groups enter into conflict with each other (*pax* competition over resources), at what scale or frequency, or what social mechanisms might be in place to prevent this, are questions rarely asked.

Arguably, the main problem seems to be that non-state peoples are essentialized and placed outside of history. In the British colonial context, for example, this is exemplified by a particular incarnation of barbarian discourse known as ‘martial race theory’ (Marjomaa 2003; Rand 2006), and other instances of barbarian discourse are easily found in the literature. Even with archaeologists having become more conscious of the presence of such discourse in 19th century scholarship, a tenacious ‘primitivization’ of the Celto-Germanic world still endures among modern state-bound archaeologists in ways not very dissimilar from ancient ethnographic observers. This can be seen, for example, in the way any kind of non-utilitarian (i.e. poorly understood) behavior is at risk of being relegated to the ritual sphere. It is likewise still possible to note the persistence of a rather nefarious

colonial notion that pastoral people are somehow inherently more belligerent or violent than settled agrarian populations (van Driel-Murray 2008). Why non-sedentary groups might come to rely on raiding as an economic strategy despite the high risk to life and limb, or that socio-historical and environmental factors can actually encourage a rise or decline in the prevalence of (cattle-) raiding, is rarely considered (Kaimba *et al.* 2011).

Just as it was ludicrous for Roman expansionists to maintain that the ‘non-civilized’ peoples they conquered were inherently more barbaric or violent, so European colonizers had to be quite innovative in deploying their imaginaries to legitimize the violence done unto non-state populations. Somehow, state violence, in both the past and the present, never makes states barbaric. If the presence of crime in civic states does not produce criminal nations, why does the presence of weapons or the occurrence of cattle-raiding among tribal groups produce warrior societies? Why is martiality not perceived as the dominant value system in ancient Rome, or in modern states with bloated military budgets or high rates of civilian firearm ownership? Why are imperial states of famed cultural achievement not ‘warrior states’ despite their demonstrable engagements in incessant warfare (*pace* Hopkins 1983, 1)? If these observations strike one as unsophisticated, it need only be pointed out that archaeologists to this day continue to characterize the Celto-Germanic world as predominantly consisting of ‘warrior societies’ for no other reason than precisely such indicators, namely the occurrence of violence and presence of weapons.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> For some, the problem may also simply remain one of *faux* causality, which relates to the way description and explanation are confused (D’Andrade 2008, 49): on the one hand archaeologists might claim that people who predominantly maintain martial values form a warrior society (description), while on the other hand arguing how martial values are subscribed to by those who hold membership in a warrior society (explanation).

Another problem is the way social-scientists commonly view collective boundary-making (e.g. tribalism, ethno-centrism, nationalism) as somehow more normative, and boundary-crossing (e.g. cosmopolitanism) as more irregular, or rejectable even as unrealizable utopianism. This ignores how humans have an innate capacity for relating to other individuals and their cultures, for maintaining multiple identities and loyalties, and navigating different systems of meaning (Gille and Ó Riain 2002, 277). They merely diverge in the ways this is contextually valued and realized, in both conflictual and harmonious ways. While social mechanisms for preventing intra- and inter-group violence have long been attested cross-culturally, this has had little effect on the characterization of European Iron Age societies. Thus, the common phenomenon of ritual weapon deposition in aquatic and mortuary contexts is treated as evidence for the cultural centrality of martial values and the historical prevalence of conflict and warfare. The fact that many such weapons and other metal objects were broken or deformed before their deposition has long been recognized, with various interpretations having been proposed over the years. However, that such practices might instead be understood as a symbolic rejection of violence and conflict has yet to be seriously considered.<sup>6</sup>

The main drawback of this singular focus on martiality as a characteristic value system of prehistoric warrior or Roman military communities is the way other values, maintained by groups or individuals other than warriors or soldiers, are simply not considered. For many ancient

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<sup>6</sup> This is striking because even a cursory glance at the available evidence suggests the likelihood of this. The most important Roman source on Germanic groups, for example, provides ample evidence for the role of women as arbitrators of conflict (Tacitus *Germany* 40). This same source also describes religious ceremonies that called for a temporary removal of metal objects (i.e. weapons) and a cessation of all inter-communal hostilities. This alone urges considering whether the ritualized deposition of weapons in Northwest Europe is not better understood in terms of conflict prevention and resolution rather than the ideological centralization of conflict and warfare. Moreover, it also reminds how women should be granted far greater historical agency than is done by andro-centric archaeologies of ‘warrior societies’ and military communities (van Driel-Murray 1997 and 2008).

ethnographers, the main social principle among barbarians appears to have been that of individual aggrandizement within tribal contexts. Germanic society was perceived as a meritocracy where honors, rights, and privileges were mostly recognized within particular communities rather than across society. Accumulated during the life course of a single individual, such gains were lost if not maintained by direct descendants. The lives and prospects of the multitude were shaped by the whims of the rise and fall of individual leaders (i.e. 'big men' or chiefs) and their nearest relations. Ostensibly, Julius Caesar was saving the Gauls from the deplorable socio-economic circumstances this 'cultural characteristic' engendered. Yet, notably, the main contrast highlighted by ancient historians does not oppose barbarian martiality to Roman pacifism; rather, among barbarians, individualist values were widely prioritized, and this seemingly stood in stark contrast to the Roman prioritization of the family and the civic community. Of course, as I have briefly shown already, the situation was far more complex than Roman observers themselves seemed to have realized. But, this observation does illustrate the need to approach values differently.

The singular focus on martiality is not simply the result of archaeologists neglecting other aspects of past lifeways. Certainly, processual archaeologists characteristically ignored the ideational sphere, and at best perceived it as deriving from adaptive socio-economic arrangements. However, since the 1980s, post-processualists have forcefully argued for a shift of focus on issues pertaining to symbolic meaning and valuation (Hodder 1986). Yet, this has mainly resulted in archaeologists granting greater interpretive significance to 'political ideology'. Following Marxist theory, early post-processualists have primarily treated values in terms of elite discourse that serves to mystify power differentials and naturalize economic inequality. Another important aspect of this post-processual shift is the use of structuralist theory which posits the operation of culturally determined cognitive structures of transhistorical endurance that are shaped by enviro-economic factors (Roymans 1993;

Derks 1998). Roymans, for example, draws inspiration from Dumont's (1986) holistic approach to cultural values and defines ideology as "a system of ideas, values and norms that structures human behavior and thought, and that is basic to the reproduction of the entire socio-cosmic order, including the social, the economic, the political as well as the religious domain" (Roymans 1996, 12). Yet, as I have already argued and will expand upon in this dissertation, it is rather problematic to characterize prehistoric societies in over-generalized terms as 'warrior societies', or to argue for a transhistorical endurance of essential 'barbarian dispositions' into Roman times. Indeed, the brief survey of ancient value expressions at the opening of this introduction has also already shown how it would be unwise to stress the uniformity, endurance, or distinctiveness of Greek, Roman, or North African value systems.

Does the Marxist-structuralist perspective favored by post-processual and later archaeologists, which grants cross-societal primacy and long-lasting endurance to a particular set of cultural values, offer the greatest potential for studying and understanding value systems? I will argue otherwise. In the social sciences, holistic perspectives have increasingly been challenged in recent years by those that stress socio-cultural pluralism. Anthropologists, in particular, have moved away from treating culture as bounded, uniform, and coherent, and instead have treated cultural formations as dynamically constituted through situated negotiation. In other words, 'Culture' as a noun, has increasingly been replaced with 'cultural' in its adjective form. Perceived in this way, cultural constructs are always in the process of becoming. In line with this, one of my aims is to move beyond the holistic characterization of entire human collectives by a single all-encompassing ideological focus, like martiality.

Yet, is it at all feasible to unpack any particular 'constellation of values', one that is presumed to have been uniform, coherent, and culturally dominant, and identify certain constituent elements

that are anything but culturally specific? Can archaeologists identify certain basic human values that shape and reshape social norms and cultural ideals? What can be said about the ways people develop and negotiate diverging value priorities under changing socio-historical conditions? How might we replace frameworks that contrast simple-complex, egalitarian-stratified, native-Roman, military-civic, rural-urban, or rich-poor with one that recognizes that people are variably motivated to engage in complex and dynamic relations through participation in different kinds of social networks? How can we move beyond interpretations that remain too strongly focused on 'Identity' - for example, in terms of a surviving 'native identity' (cultural continuity), an adopted 'Roman identity' (acculturation), or a newly developed 'provincial Roman identity' (hybridization) - and instead examine how new and existing constraints and affordances were negotiated by local agents with diverging interests, outlooks, and levels of empowerment?

What would an 'Archaeology of Values' look like? Can it be realized, and is such an endeavor worth the effort? Partly, this can be answered by pointing out that archaeologists have already implicitly engaged in this. Assumptions about human behavioral tendencies have long influenced interpretations, with archaeologists habitually making highly comparable statements about past valuations of objects, structures, or materials. They base their arguments on a range of assumptions about such things as scarcity, uniqueness, intrinsic value, technical skill, scale, or visual prominence. Indeed, archaeological interpretations are commonly shaped by largely unspoken assumptions that all people, at all times, regardless of cultural background or personal dispositions, will positively value rare or unique objects, technical skills, creativity and innovation, certain minerals over others, large and elaborate structures, or prominent topographical locations. Yet, they do so without explaining why this would be so. Why do some people choose unenclosed wind-swept mountaintops for their rituals, while other groups construct massive enclosed structures in the

middle of large settlements to conduct their ceremonies? Are these merely cultural particularities that require no more than ethnographic description, or does this speak to the prioritization and realization of a limited and knowable range of motivational values that humans share cross-culturally? An archaeology that recognizes the importance of basic human values in the formation and transformation of socio-cultural formations can make important contributions to such questions.

This, then, is one of the central aims of an ‘Archaeology of Values’. Its aspirations are based on the notion that all human action and interaction is shaped by motivational values that have a cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimension, such that people think, feel, and actualize values. They are contextually realized through conscious as well as habitual behavior. In other words, while individuals can consciously realize certain values in their daily lives, much value-motivated behavior manifests entirely unreflexively, being the result of socialization and habit. While the situated realization of values often occurs only partially, and commonly in conflict with other values, this does not take away from the fact that all human engagements are wholly value-driven. Values regulate individual behavior and social relations, such that social life would not be possible without reference to them. Values also inform ideal (‘good life’) constructs that people aspire to realize, including preferred ways for achieving this. In short, values motivate all human actions and interactions and this is the main reason why social scientists, including archaeologists, need to pay more attention to them.

It is somewhat surprising, then, that no ‘Archaeology of Values’ has so far been formulated. To be sure, archaeologists do deal with values, but mostly indirectly and implicitly. Whenever archaeologists note socio-cultural variability, whenever they talk about socio-cultural change in terms of complexification, differentiation, or individualization, they are in fact talking about shifts in value

emphases, or they are describing how past peoples chose to realize similar values in different ways. Yet, such efforts rarely involve close engagement with values themselves, their motivational content (e.g. bravery or generosity), structural relation (compatible or conflictual), or socio-historical significance (in terms of adaptive efficacy and developmental impact).

In taking a value-centric approach to archaeological inquiry, I want to understand the motivation behind human action and interaction, in particular by examining how people sought to realize certain basic values in particular human ecologies. This requires a subtle shift in focus from describing how people might have perceived and given meaning to the world and all things in it (Hodder 1986 and 1987), to trying to understand how they imagined the world should be like, and how this manifests behaviorally and materially. Rather than narrating culture-historical trajectories, or describing how different socio-cultural groups engaged and understood material realities in discrepant ways, I want to understand how past peoples were motivated to action by notions of 'worthwhileness'. The aim of an 'Archaeology of Values', then, is to gain an understanding of what was perceived as worthwhile, and how this motivated action and interaction within particular socio-historical contexts.

Such an archaeology asks why certain values are consistently prioritized over others under certain socio-historical conditions, and how this manifests at the level of lived experience for groups and individuals. It involves asking how people prioritize what values they seek to implement, and how individual priorities shaped by personality and lived experience are reconciled with social norms and cultural ideals. If some values can be shown to have universal valence, can the same be said about the particular ways in which people choose to realize them? Furthermore, how does the pursuit of value realization relate to social life, and how can a value-centric approach contribute to our understanding of socio-cultural transformation? If societies are formed through the numerous

actions and interactions of individuals, and if culture is constituted in the context of social life, how do society and culture link to individually experienced and conceptualized motivational values? An ‘Archaeology of Values’ encourages engagement with the largely unexplored basic motivations that determine how humans perceive and negotiate life’s challenges and opportunities (e.g. socio-historical transformations shaped by colonialism and globalization).

#### **1.4 Dissertation Outline**

This introduction has introduced the central focus of this dissertation: an archaeological investigation of socio-historical transformations in pre-Roman and Roman Northwest Europe, and concomitant changes in value prioritization and realization. I will next briefly outline the content of the various chapters and sections.

**Chapter two** starts by showing how archaeologists have generally dealt with values implicitly, in terms of complexification, stratification, or individualization. I briefly discuss how such processes are commonly understood to manifest and suggest ways of nuancing perspectives. Specifically, I identify common assumptions and argue how processes of complexification must be examined by considering a wider variety of factors, material as well as ideational. I furthermore argue that it is important to recognize that oft-referenced dynamics (e.g. equality-inequality or individualism-collectivism) have always been present among human collectives, regardless of socio-cultural complexity.

The next section in chapter one (section 2.2) engages a small body of archaeological literature that demonstrates some of the ways archaeologists have explicitly examined the material manifestation of values. This shows how some have focused on stylistic or technological difference across time or between cultural groups, while others have instead preferred contextualized multi-

thread approaches. Also noteworthy are the different ways in which interpretation operates inconsistently for archaeologists. I foreground those works in which archaeological evidence is used to speak to the idealized conceptions that people actively sought to implement in their daily lives. It is this latter approach to interpretation that urges a closer consideration of personal values, social norms, and cultural ideals. Taken together, this literature review demonstrates how a critical ‘Archaeology of Values’ requires formulating a sophisticated theoretically substantiated methodological framework that allows for analyzing implicit and explicit manifestations of basic human values contextually and comparatively.

In the third and final section of chapter two, I review value research in anthropology and note the stark divergence between universalist and particularist perspectives. I discuss how cultural relativist attitudes have reduced interest for the universal operationalization of basic human values. I argue that anthropological approaches to values are largely shaped by disciplinary interests and methodologies. Most notably, it is the rise of interpretive and practice-oriented approaches that has diminished interest in studying universal patterns in human motivation. To be sure, cultural differences shape, and are shaped by, differences in value prioritization and realization, yet the underlying motivational values potentially at play are the same for all, regardless of the cultural or lexiconic particularities that influence how values are named or conceptualized, or the ways in which they are realized. I argue, then, that social scientists can gain a better understanding of the motivations that drive human action and interaction by taking an anti-relativist stance. I propose that the place of motivational values in social systems and cultural formations can be studied more effectively if these can be identified and compared substantively and relationally. Only then can we speak to motivational aspects, adaptive efficacy, and transformational significance.

The first section of **chapter three** offers a conceptual discussion on values, how these are best defined and how they may be understood to motivate people as individuals and members of social groups. Section 3.2 reviews and expands upon the ‘Theory of Basic Human Values’ as formulated by the social psychologist Shalom Schwartz, which stands at the core of this dissertation’s methodological framework. I further consider the analytical purposes of such a universal framework, which ranges from deconstructing common assumptions, to reassessing interpretations, to identifying value prioritization and realization in particular socio-historical contexts.

Like all organizational frameworks that unify fixed categories into stable groupings, the classification of universal values by substantial and relational aspects, such as I present it in section 3.2, cannot be used to show how value orientations form and transform within individuals and collectives, how motivational preferences are emphasized or ignored as people act in the world. This informs the arguments made in section 3.3, which are guided by the following question: if the same set of value orientations are found among individuals, institutions, and cultures the world over (past and present), is it not also possible to talk about the formation and transformation of value orientations as driven by widely attested socio-historical dynamics in equally universal terms? I argue, in the affirmative, that it is possible to enhance archaeological narratives with causal interpretations of value-motivated behavior, if archaeologists recognize the influence of human ecologies over human cognitive development.

Research in Developmental Psychology demonstrates how the linkages between human ecologies, cognitive development, and value adherence leads to predictable shifts in societal transformation. I describe one particular framework which uses the well-known *gemeinschaft-gesellschaft* opposition to contrast ideal-type ecologies at either end of a continuum along which socio-

demographic development moves in either direction. I expand on this model and reformulate it in terms of an expansive-contractive dimension that allows for identifying human ecological variables and gauge their transformational impact and directionality in particular socio-historical contexts. Local contexts are shaped by a wide variety of internal and external influences that provide the conditions for socialization through which value orientations form in individuals as members of social groups. People who strive to overcome challenges and exploit opportunities in particular socio-historical contexts do so adaptively as motivated by universal value orientations. Human action and interaction results in behavioral patterns, then, that are both consistent and comprehensible. Moreover, countless such adaptive actions have a cumulative effect, such that it becomes possible to characterize a society by the adaptive behaviors of its members in the aggregate. The expansion-contraction model allows for more sophisticated explanations of behavioral differences in contrasting human ecologies.

The next part of chapter three (section 3.4) expands on the proposition that people universally negotiate local transformational processes at four particular levels of lived experience (i.e. individual, family, community, and society) and this universally produces highly similar patterns of value realization. Approaching value prioritization and realization at these four levels of lived experience helpfully reduces what are seemingly endless permutations of value realization to a manageable and broadly predictable set of motivational orientations (i.e. individualism, familism, communalism, and universalism). Cultural particularities ultimately result from people instantiating values that provide the greatest adaptive advantages at these four universal levels of lived experience.

Section 3.5, lastly, sums up the methodological issues that were raised in the previous chapters and sections. I expand on this to provide the rationale for the ways in which I approach a

wide range of sources and archaeological contexts in the study area, as presented in chapter four and five.

**Chapter four** offers an exploration of Iron Age value systems. After a brief consideration of shifting food procurement strategies in the study area I offer a detailed comparative analysis of mortuary practices in three geographic zones (Aisne-Marne, Rhine-Moselle, and Scheldt-Meuse), and during three periods (Early, Middle, and Late Iron Age). I discuss the relevance of socio-historical variables that can be foregrounded for having been instrumental in shaping the behavioral and material patterns that, ultimately, are the worldly manifestation of value priorities. Specifically, I suggest that connectivity, interaction, and security were crucial variables to consider when assessing the (trans-)formation of intra-regional value systems. Central significance is given to an ‘international’ slave trade that functioned to bring Celto-Germanic slaves to Mediterranean markets. It is a distinct historical phenomenon that had a fundamental impact on socio-cultural trajectories in the study area.

In **chapter five**, lastly, I discuss how the incorporation of indigenous populations into the Roman state went hand in hand with a range of expansive socio-historical processes (e.g. urbanization, connectivity, interaction, and communication). I argue that the creative negotiation of local restraints and affordances encouraged farming families (the largest social segment in any Roman province) to reprioritize their values adaptively in highly patterned ways. This mainly involved a growing interest for ‘domesticity’ (i.e. the behavioral and material manifestation of familist values). I take a multi-thread approach and show how familist orientations shaped the everyday experience, actions, and interactions of people of various walks of life (i.e. across socio-economic boundaries), and this, in the aggregate, shaped dominant social norms and cultural ideals throughout the Roman northwest provinces.

## CHAPTER 2: VALUES IN ARCHAEOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND BEYOND

How can archaeologists gain a better understanding of the motivation behind past behaviors? How can they assess objects, materials, or built environments and identify the values that people explicitly sought to express? Alternately, how can they interpret the material record for implicit manifestations of value preferences? Such questions, as well as the theoretical and methodological frameworks that might be used to answer them, are almost entirely absent in the archaeological literature. Only quite recently, a tentative interest for values has started to emerge, notably, by a Roman historian (MacMullen 2014) and a classical archaeologist (Morris 2015). Both studies explicitly consider human values, though unavoidably from different perspectives and favoring different approaches; the culture-historical and evolutionary approaches of MacMullen and Morris respectively show this divergence succinctly. Markedly, neither of these works deploys a universal values framework such as presented in this dissertation.

This isn't to say that archaeologists do not deal with values. Indirectly they generally do, and not merely because basic human values underlie all human action and interaction. Whenever archaeologists talk about social developments in terms of complexification, stratification, or individualization, they are in fact considering the effects of value reprioritization. When they analyze local manifestations of such processes, they are considering the social and cultural contexts where value reprioritization and implementation take place. It serves, then, to take a closer look at the ways such transformational processes have been approached by archaeologists. This I will follow by reviewing a representative range of archaeological works in which values have explicitly been studied through direct engagement with material culture. This allows identifying a number of challenges and shortcomings which this dissertation seeks to address.

## 2.1 Archaeologies of Complexification

Early archaeologists approached complexification as the inevitable consequence of cultural evolution. From such a point of view, human collectives would unavoidably become more complex due to such factors as population growth, technological innovation, or economic expansion.

Influential in this body of scholarship were 19th century evolutionists like Tylor, Morgan, and Spencer who held that complexification as cultural progress could best be understood by reference to evolutionary stages (e.g. savagery, barbarity, civilization). For early archaeologists who followed suit, differences in cultural complexity resulted from temporal discrepancies in progression, and this was often explained in terms of environmental happenstance (some groups simply were more fortunate in terms of climate and resources), or, more nefariously, in terms of essential racial differences (certain biological qualities allow some groups to progress more quickly).

After a period of decline, cultural evolution garnered interest again around the middle of the 20th century through the work of such prominent individuals like Leslie White, Julian Steward, and Elman Service. These scholars abandoned some of its original premises, but the deployment of developmental stages (minus teleological directionality) was still deemed useful, and this continued to influence archaeological theories on complexification (table 1). While the use of cultural classification systems has been much critiqued since then (mainly for the way these reify socio-historical dynamics), degrees of socio-cultural complexity are still measured and labeled in various ways not altogether different from these early frameworks. The use of such concepts as ‘trans-egalitarian’ - used to describe socio-cultural situations where no clear distinction between egalitarianism and stratification can be made - is an illustrative example of this (Hayden 1995).

Partly, this continued preoccupation with distinct stages results from the conflation of complexity with development. It is commonly supposed that ‘highly complex’ is the same as ‘highly

evolved'. Chick aptly points out that this idea of groups of divergent complexity representing different evolutionary stages of cultural development "disregards the fact that the environmental and social contexts in which contemporary cultures find themselves may be quite unlike those of past cultures. Cultural features that appear to be adaptive today may have come about for quite different reasons in the past" (Chick 1997, 287; *contra* Morris 2015). Chick also poignantly notes how 'cultural traits' may appear, disappear, and reappear over the long term, regardless of the level of 'cultural development'. While Chick is not explicitly talking about values here, it is clear that his comment may be understood to mean that people have long been motivated by the same basic values, but that they have continuously changed the ways in which these are realized, and this has resulted in countless historical and cultural differences in value realization.

Values are sporadically foregrounded in archaeological studies. Brun, for example, places complexification processes during the 'Celtic' Iron Age in the following terms: "the process by which the number of different interdependent elements constituting the social system increases; it occurs through specialization and the establishment of a hierarchy of functions" (Brun 1995, 121). In other words, a totalized social system with intermixed functions dominated by kinship relations is gradually replaced by one with distinct but interdependent (socio-kinship, economic, political, and ideological) subsystems. At least since Weber wrote about complexification in such terms, this has been the predominant understanding in the social sciences. Likewise, Brun argues how processes of specialization and division were motivated by a desire for improving functional efficiency in response to demographic changes. For Celtic Iron Age communities, the preferred solutions to expansive developments presumably were fission and migration, or, when this was not possible, social stratification (i.e. control over production and redistribution) and systemic division. Such processes are generally linked to the rise of pre-state forms of social organization (e.g. chiefdoms)

and commonly believed to have manifested gradually, directionally, and enduringly. Interest for bi-directional processes of centralization and decentralization, and the reality of heterarchical social dynamics has only recently developed (Crumley 1995; Fernández-Götz and Krausse 2013, 485).

Notably, as this relates to values, Brun suggests that developments took place in the following order: “first, parts of the ideological domain were modified in order to adapt the value system, then the economy underwent intensified production, and finally there was a political trend towards strengthening the means of government” (1995, 125). Interesting here is the proposition that value adaptation took place before economic and political developments. In other words, changes in the value system facilitated changes in other social domains because this ensured communal support for new political-economic projects. Value adjustment will also have curbed conflict and violence because value reprioritization aided the naturalization of new social realities and the legitimization of new power relations. Notably, then, values are largely treated in terms of legitimizing ideology. Indeed, the social transformations experienced by trans-Alpine communities where complexification occurred are thought to have benefitted elites - presumably the principal manipulators and beneficiaries of ideological discourse - primarily.

This transformational trajectory described by Brun, which centralizes the role of political ideology, is commonly encountered in the archaeological literature (e.g. Fernández-Götz 2014a, 117), though many other variables of complexification processes have been explored as well. Ames usefully lists a number of environmental and social factors (table 2), as well as various social mechanisms, which may be linked to such developments (Ames 2007; also see Hayden 1995). These show how an important distinction needs to be made between the preconditions of complexification (e.g. environmental potential, population density), and those factors that drive it, such as warfare or feasting. They also show that demographic growth and surplus production, though commonly

foregrounded in the archaeological literature (e.g. Fernández-Götz and Krausse 2013, 479), are only two of numerous such factors at play in complexification processes.

Denton (2004) takes a slightly different approach to studying complexification processes. He formulates a scalar framework that includes a number of variables commonly considered in the literature (e.g. technology, urbanization, and literacy) that are used to characterize societies as more or less complex. The production of food and energy is foregrounded as a basic determinative factor that shapes all subsequent variables (*ibid.*, 6). In similar terms, Morris centralizes the determinative importance of dominant forms of energy capture (i.e. foraging, farming, and fossil fuels) (Morris 2015).<sup>7</sup> Notably, approaches that involve the identification of ultimate causes tend to be materialist in kind, while also being overly reliant on quantification (Chick 1997, 288).<sup>8</sup> This, of course, explains their appeal to archaeologists. Yet, despite being friendly to quantitative analyses, they ultimately cannot show why people are motivated to, for example, increase food production. No group or individual is ever motivated to ‘advance the human species’; rather, people aim to realize more

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<sup>7</sup> Energy capture certainly is an important factor, but it is hardly determinative considering varying levels of material and psychological empowerment (see section 2.4) and differences in individual, institutional, and cultural value priorities. Indeed, a dominant method of energy capture has little influence over the complexities of lived experience, but such variety is wholly ignored when the focus remains on a single determinant.

<sup>8</sup> Certainly, quantification has long been one of the primary analytical tools used by archaeologists. Arguably, this has been so because of the (often implicit) assumption that human valuation is measurable. We may consider here Belshaw’s statement: “value implies worthwhileness, which implies degree, which implies scale, which is compounded of quantity and measurement” (Belshaw 1959, 561). Archaeologists find objects because they were once used by people. They were used by people because they were appreciated in accordance with certain motivational values. Such appreciation is measurable in terms of overall quantity, proportionality, and diversity. An archaeological study of values is possible, then, because patterns identified in the material record are linked (however strongly or weakly) to shifts in the valuation of things, and value-driven behaviors. Yet, ultimately, quantitative data by themselves cannot demonstrate anything because they still require interpretation with qualitative arguments.

modest reproductive goals. While some archaeologists commonly presume that a desire for producing surplus or improving productive efficiency is motivated by pragmatic considerations (surplus allows surviving times of scarcity), others will stress the importance of human interest in social prestige (surplus allows controlled resource allocation which grants the distributor social capital). Yet, even this last proposition perpetuates the (materialist) utilitarian argument when the main purpose of accumulating social capital is to safeguard against times of scarcity (because social capital can be transferred into food and labor). The main problem, then, with scalar approaches that measure degrees of complexity is the fact that they ignore non-materialist (cognitive and expressive) factors.

That social scientists have long desired to adopt analytical methods from the natural sciences certainly is no new observation, and the archaeologist's unique focus on material culture has also encouraged an enduring preoccupation with 'hard facts' over 'soft variables'.<sup>9</sup> Generally, cognitive and expressive traits of culture are largely ignored by scalar approaches to complexity; as Chick aptly points out, the "skew of the sample of scales toward utilitarian, rather than expressive, variables means that complex cultures are limited to those that are technologically complex (as opposed to societies that are not particularly technological but are rich in art, myth, or other expressive forms)"

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<sup>9</sup> Clearly, the exigencies of post-depositional activities and processes predominantly ensure the survival of 'hard things' over 'soft things' in the archaeological record, which, no doubt, has shaped modern valuations of ancient manufacturing activity and its products, and encouraged a thinking that such materials must have had substantial social significance in the past as well. Dobres reminds us, however, how "the material remains of ancient lifeways do not necessarily preserve in direct proportion to their evolutionary or socio-cultural significance" (Dobres 2010, 105). Of course, gauging significance is a central concern of archaeologists, and a challenge faced by processual, post-processual, as well as symmetrical archaeologists (Olsen 2003; Shanks 2007; Webmoor 2007; Witmore 2007).

(Chick 1997, 292). While qualitative or expressive variables (table 3) may be harder to quantify by archaeologists, they are very much worth considering in analyses of complexification.

For Chick, culture is to be understood as a complex adaptive system that shapes, and is shaped by, the cognitive conceptualizations of its members; “Complex adaptive systems acquire information about their environments, plus their own interactions with their environments, identify regularities in that information, and then construct plans or models of those regularities that permit functioning in the real world” (*ibid.*, 290). These adaptive plans and models that shape how the world is perceived and engaged are invariably referred to as ‘worldview’, ‘cultural schema’, or ‘mentality’. While none of such analyses of complexification explicitly foregrounds the role of universal human values, implicitly values certainly are at the center of attention, especially when the focus is on social differentiation or stratification.

### ***2.1.1 Egalitarianism***

When archaeologists discuss complexification they commonly associate this with social differentiation, and, when they discuss stratification they invariably contrast it with egalitarianism. In terms of ‘economies of power’, it is the ‘moral economy’ that is associated with egalitarian societies, while stratified societies are believed to give rise to ‘political economies’ (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 203). Both represent a range of values that are thought to be antagonistic. In other words, it is generally assumed that if communities become more stratified, they become less egalitarian. In societies broadly characterized as egalitarian, differentiation certainly exists, but it primarily manifests as interpersonal difference based on sex, age, or individual ability. Among such communities, positions of status and prestige are “fluid from generation to generation, informal, and reflective of qualities of individuals” (Ames 2007, 489). Reciprocity, generosity, and hospitality are generally

highly valued, and there may be strong social mechanisms in operation that are meant to prevent excessive resource accumulation by any individual member or sub-group. In other words, the means of economic and social reproduction are meant to be equally accessible to all members of the group.

If complexification involves increased stratification, does that mean that non-complex social systems are always egalitarian? For pre-state societies, the general perception has long been that this is indeed the case. The idea that small-scale ‘primitive’ societies were more egalitarian, and its members more altruistic (less wasteful even), can be found in the earliest anthropological and sociological writings in which a lost primitive world was pitted against the consumerist societies of capitalist modernity. The notion that the ‘simplest’ human groups were egalitarian is derived from older evolutionary models that perceive a teleological development towards increased complexity, a process deemed irreversible. However, those early modern moralists who deplored increased social stratification and inequality in human societies were also unable to overcome the conundrum that dominance and imposition exist in both egalitarian and stratified societies. The difference being that, in the former case, this involves the dominance of the community over individuals or subgroups, while in the latter case it is the reverse. In other words, the perception that egalitarianism allows for dominance-free social formations is simply not correct. Rather, it is a socially shared ideology that motivates individual behavior as well as social engagements in equally prescribed ways.

The Western self-image of early sociologists and anthropologists equally skewed their ideas about past ‘primitive’ societies, but, in the latter half of the 20th century, ethnographic work increasingly managed to adjust these earlier misconceptions (Wilk 2006). Armstrong’s discussion of the Badeng longhouse people of Central Borneo, for example, shows how ‘primitive’ life is equally driven by concerns for replenishment, self-centered pursuits, and desire for ‘a good life’ (Armstrong 1998). It highlights the constant disparity between the aspirations of individuals and households, and

the availability of goods and resources to meet their goals. Armstrong argues how “the notion that the good things in life are in short supply is not just a feature of capitalist thought”, and “risk-taking, self-interestedness, disinclination to give without return and ambition for their children” are all familiar behaviors and sentiments in this ‘primitive’ context of Central Borneo (*ibid.*, 427).<sup>10</sup> It would be a mistake, then, to assume that ancient foragers will have predominantly prioritized values relating to social equality or environmental harmony. Indeed, the potential for the formation of such cultural ideals exists equally among Morris’ fossil fuel users, his farmers, as well as his foragers (Morris 2015). Countless variables at play in human ecologies shape multifarious and dynamic socio-historical situations, in Badeng communities, within the societies of Western ethnographers, and elsewhere.

Egalitarianism is in fact a difficult to realize ideal, requiring repression of individual interests, participation in obligatory reciprocity, and subjection to social monitoring (Ames 2007, 491). There is no reason to assume that this was any different in the distant past. Yet, if egalitarianism cannot be linked to some primordial human condition, when, and under what circumstances, did it initially arise? Ames speculates that it arose during the Upper Paleolithic, among increasingly mobile hunter-gatherers who came to value the adaptive importance of maintaining close social relations in high-risk environments. Communities with egalitarian value systems formed out of adaptive necessity, then, such that the primary context of human socialization, the family or extended kin group, allowed for more differentiation than the larger communities they occasionally formed. In different

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<sup>10</sup> Sutton highlights a contrasting phenomenon: “the specter of communism might lurk not only within families and friendships but within the very organization of corporate capitalism itself, or pretty much any situation in which people are united in a common task, and inputs and outputs therefore organized only by the actor’s capacities and requirements rather than by any balancing of accounts ... Even if this is a kind of communism, it remains lodged within larger structures that are anything but egalitarian” (Sutton 2004, 377).

environments, with different challenges and opportunities, such dynamics between primary groups and larger collectives will have played out in different ways, but, being social beyond the family-group will have been challenging for all who pursued it. It is not hard to imagine, then, how egalitarian values come to be deprioritized when the benefits of cooperation decrease, when certain opportunities for self-enhancement make adherence to communal demands less attractive. Because the efficient and strife-free maintenance of larger collectives generally is very challenging, egalitarian attitudes and behaviors are easily abandoned when challenges or opportunities arise for individuals and their closest relations to become more inward-focused or to differentiate themselves.

### ***2.1.2 Differentiation***

When thinking about ‘differentiation’, it is important to stress that interpersonal difference is not the same as inequality; “inequality exists when a society invests these differences with cultural and social meanings, prizing and rewarding some over others” (*ibid.*, 487). This is an important distinction, but there are numerous other ‘dissimilarity’ concepts to be found in the literature (table 4). Arguably, humans seem primed for emphasizing difference, either physiologically or socially. This relates to two of Wolf’s well-known ‘modalities of power’ (Wolf 1999). The first is ‘individual power’ which shapes interpersonal dominance (e.g. physical strength or intelligence), the second is ‘social power’ which relates to the ways an individual is able to impose their will through social relations. Because complexification does not arise unless populations are of a certain size and density, it has historically been common for egalitarian value systems to arise within supra-family collectives before these were challenged by social differentiation processes. When complexification eventually occurs, however, two new sources of power can manifest themselves: ‘organizational (or tactical) power’, which

individuals derive from occupying social positions where power resides, and ‘structural power’ which relates to an ability to deploy resources and labor in particular contexts.

While egalitarian values and behaviors are learned through socialization in the primary kin group, egalitarian ideals as cultural constructs are reproduced through participation in a larger collective. The same could be said for non-egalitarian values, behaviors, and ideals. Both egalitarian and non-egalitarian formations result from countless individual-level actions and interactions shaped by socio-historical conditions; both can provide ways for successful (though not necessarily optimal) socio-economic reproduction. Archaeologists typically view the rise and communal tolerance of ‘aggrandizers’ (Hayden 1995) as inevitable. Functionalist perspectives, in particular, presume that ‘managerial elites’ come to the fore when demographic growth and higher levels of socio-economic complexity necessitates their organizational contributions to ensure the survival of the collective. Yet, the rise of ‘big men’ (Hayden and Gargett 1990) is never a sure thing, even when preconditions are favorable and circumstances force populations to explore innovative solutions to new problems, such as those relating to colonialism or globalization. This notion has only in recent years received more attention among European prehistorians who have been more open to ‘non-triangular’ or ‘non-hierarchized’ interpretations of social complexity (Hill 2006; Sastre 2011). In terms of the adaptive negotiation of local realities, the universal consideration is between the benefits to be had from either the proliferation of strong individuals and groups (e.g. chiefs, warrior elites, landowning aristocrats), or from the close cooperation of people of equal status living in undifferentiated communities. In terms of human cognition and adaptive capacity, the interests for differentiation and social hierarchy have been with us as long as those for equality and social cooperation.

Oppositions between supposedly coherent value systems are commonly made in archaeological and anthropological scholarship. In Crawford’s (2008, 12) Moroccan context, for

example, a distinction has long been made by ethnographers between the value systems of egalitarian mountain dwellers on the one hand, and stratified communities of low-lying plains on the other. Yet, Crawford shows how both value emphases are part of the same cultural system, with egalitarian relations between, and authoritarian relations within, households. Social change does not involve the absolute replacement of a coherent egalitarian system by an equally coherent stratified system; rather, value systems that prioritize equality and distinction are dialectically constituted, and situationally prioritized, with one or the other gaining the upper hand under particular socio-historical circumstances or in certain social contexts (Chang 2012).

McGuire and Saitta (1996) likewise note how both egalitarian and hierarchical relations were present in Native American pueblo societies. Guided by a dialectical epistemology, these archaeologists reflect an “interest in the lived experience of past peoples, i.e., their actions within fields of social relations and cultural meanings, and their roles as conscious creators and negotiators of culture” (*ibid.*, 198). From a dialectical perspective that foregrounds tensions between egalitarian and differentiating forces it is the resolution of social struggles that is seen as the motor of social change. To capture socio-historical conditions of the Prehispanic pueblos, these scholars use concepts like ‘complex communal societies’ in which “the extractors of surplus labor are simultaneously the producers” (*ibid.*, 201); ‘subsumed elites’, in turn, are understood as privileged groups of individuals that are considerably constrained by obligations and “responsive to, rather than exploitative of, the commune” (*ibid.*, 202).

A familiar but notable distinction brought forward by their study of Pueblo society is that between equity (people get what they need) and equality (people get an equal share); “the defining condition of pueblo communalism was not equivalent access, but rather guaranteed access to resources” (*ibid.*, 202). In terms of complexification, this particular context shows how, during a pre-

colonial contact phase, an equity-centric need-based support system provided opportunities for individuals and families and ensured survival for all. This was followed by a post-contact phase, when new opportunities were exploited by some individuals and families which encouraged the formation of an equality-centric or exclusionary social system in which some gained a privileged position over others. McGuire and Saitta's case study reminds us how many pre-contact societies known from the early ethnographic literature were not simply more collectivist or egalitarian compared to subsequent individualist or hierarchical systems of post-contact periods; rather, pre-contact situations were generally more dynamic. Characteristically, then, post-contact societies generally became more rigid, such that established differences were harder to undo despite socio-historical transformations. The social dynamism of preexisting social formations decreased due to the formation of reified social hierarchies under colonial rule.

### ***2.1.3 Individualization***

Complexification is also commonly understood to involve the formation of cultural ideals that centralize individualist over collectivist values. Individualization (see section 3.4.1) may be understood as a process whereby the actualization of 'idiocentric' rather than 'allocentric' attitudes and interests becomes increasingly dominant (and permissible) throughout a growing number of social spheres. If complexification involves such things as differentiation of social life into distinct social domains, the formation of specialized institutions, and diversification of social roles and categories (Thomas 2008, 63), then it might be supposed that value systems are also far less complex in 'simple' societies. Indeed, this seems to be what MacMullen suggests when he writes how "forager or hunter-gatherer groups" maintain "far simpler value systems" (2014, 28). However, if we are to assume that small-scale hunting and gathering groups are less complex than large-scale chiefdoms or

states, then the claim that complexity encourages individualization becomes problematic. After all, individualism can be shown to have prevailed in societies of various sizes and degrees of complexity (DeMarrais *et al.* 1996, 21). It is more accurate, then, to treat complex societies as more heterogeneous, and that this allows for greater variance in ‘looseness’ and ‘tightness’; societies are loose when there is a higher social tolerance for normative deviancy, which provides individuals with more autonomy (Triandis and Suh 2002). Social complexity does not directly encourage individualization, then, but complex societies do provide more social contexts where different value systems (e.g. more-or-less collectivist) prevail and where deviance from rules, norms, and traditions is tolerated to varying degrees.

In order to better understand the interplay between complexification and individualization, it is worth considering the rise of capitalist economies. The progressively disembedded lives of individuals, and the tolerance for individualist pursuits in increasingly distinct social spheres, has long been noted in social scientific scholarship on socio-historical transformation. Anthropologists have long argued how “the capitalist mode of production and exchange leads to an atomization of social relations” (Counihan 1984, 56). Yet, at the same time, it can be shown how in even the most capitalist societies of the modern world individualist values continue to be maintained alongside collectivist values in many spheres of life (Valsiner 2012, 15). Comparable to what was said about stratification and egalitarianism, it is reasonable to argue that collectivism and individualism are not coherent and exclusionary value systems. There are no radical individualist or collectivist societies; rather, both kinds of value-driven attitudes, behaviors, and ideals are present in all human collectives where they are situationally prioritized. Which values are emphasized greatly depends on who is interacting, in what social context, and to what end. Such values may then also rise to prominence as cultural ideals under certain historical conditions, but their importance is still prioritized situationally.

It is entirely possible, therefore, for collectivist attitudes and behaviors to flourish contextually within societies where individualism is a dominant cultural ideal, and *vice versa*. Research among the Sami, a migratory people living in tight-knit groups throughout the circumpolar regions of Scandinavia, Finland, and Russia, shows exactly this. The Sami have collectivist tendencies due to their size, relative isolation, and harsh living conditions, but their migratory lifestyles also require strongly individualist attitudes and values. As argued by Javo *et al.*, “for societies struggling to survive in very harsh environments, individualism and collectivism would be two essential cultural survival strategies” (2004, 76). Moreover, through socialization, people are conditioned to understand when, and in what ways, it is culturally acceptable to emphasize one over the other.

The notion that ‘traditional’ communities increasingly fail to regulate the self-interested behaviors of individuals due to social complexification is commonly encountered in early social scientific scholarship. Yet, at the same time, some also recognized how re-integrative movements can bring individuals back into the communal fold on new terms. Under certain conditions, this dynamic between communal disintegration and reintegration can become more pronounced, with the shifting interests, agendas, and ideals of individuals and their families colliding with those of others. Arnold’s understanding of social dynamics among Late Hallstatt and Early La Tène trans-Alpine communities illustrates this. In that particular context, mortuary evidence reflects “a decentralized, highly stratified society with complex status divisions and social roles based on age and gender as well as personally achieved prestige, in which self-aggrandizing behavior is framed in mortuary contexts in terms of the common good” (Arnold 2011, 169). This vying for relative autonomy between individuals, and between families and the community, is a normal aspect of human sociality (see section 3.4). While such social struggles can be both stabilizing and destabilizing to the overall social order, much human social action and interaction leads to unintended

consequences. Under certain circumstances, such consequences can become viewed as pathological, and it seems that the moral dispositions of early social scientists certainly shaped their attitudes towards individualization and disembeddedness in such terms.

#### ***2.1.4 Why does Differentiation Occur?***

Simple causative explanations for complexification and differentiation processes (like those that foreground demographic growth, natural abundance, or technological innovation) ignore the fact that such developments have occurred among populations of different sizes, in environments of different kinds, and under a wide variety of historical conditions. So, rather than treating early instances of complexification as wholly driven by ultimate materialist causes, we may ask from a value-centric perspective, why competitive differentiation becomes a motivational ideal for particular groups and individuals under particular socio-historical circumstances? Why are aggrandizers, who successfully set themselves and their descendants apart from the rest of the community allowed to do this? Why are they not successfully resisted in their efforts?

Archaeologists who habitually place elites at the apex of hierarchically ordered social systems above subordinate dependents of various sorts may really be misinterpreting past social dynamics. Among communities of self-sufficient rural households, being forced into unequal relations of dependence probably is not a very attractive prospect. Indeed, it would be wrong to assume that people become entangled in relations of subordination and dependence supposedly due to a universal ability of social entrepreneurs to bamboozle members of their community ('mystification' in Marxian terms). Instead, it needs to also be recognized that unequal relationships are often willingly engaged in because this can fulfil needs and satisfy desires. While modern sensibilities shaped by emancipatory ideals may lead us to lament such a conclusion, it strikes me as more

accurate than granting the universal operation of Marxian mystification. This isn't to say that power and ideology are not crucial factors to be considered by archaeologists; rather, a value-oriented archaeology that considers the motivation for human action and interaction will recognize that people historically have been willing to accept subordination, even tolerate abuse, as long as they are able to continue realizing certain high priority ideals. Beyond merely reconstructing the material conditions that presumably led to social inequality, then, archaeologists need to ask how this may have been perceived (Hodder and Cessford 2004, 18). The ethnographic literature provides examples how differentiating processes rarely result from individuals or families gaining dominance over a larger collective of people simply through accumulation of surplus wealth. That some families are able to farm more land, harvest more crops, or store more foodstuffs (conveniently all archaeologically verifiable factors) does not mean that they can claim high social status, or, that members of such families are at all interested in becoming social leaders. Rather, preeminence and leadership are often granted, imposed even, by the collective (Arthur 2003, 521; Arnold 2011, 162).

In noting how feasting events provide aggrandizing individuals with opportunities for gaining power and prestige in “socially acceptable contexts for competition”, Chicoine (2011, 432) touches on an aspect that is generally ignored in narratives that argue how social struggles unavoidably lead to stratification; the notion of 'social acceptability' is key here. This is recognized by Arnold (2011, 164) as well, who discusses socially acceptable forms of conspicuous consumption (dressing and dining) in mortuary contexts among Iron Age communities in West Central Europe. Indeed, we might contemplate here the rather abrupt rise and fall of Late Hallstatt (HA D) 'princes' who occupied large hillforts and were buried in lavishly outfitted burials. While this phenomenon is commonly linked to the waxing and waning of exchange networks with the Mediterranean world, we may consider how this decline resulted from these princely entrepreneurs being perceived locally as

insupportable because their atypical behavior did not fit local value systems. It is unlikely that control over a trade in prestige goods alone ensured the communal acceptance of elite-run social systems that diminished the autonomy and self-realizing abilities of subordinate groups and individuals. If entrepreneurial individuals operated in opposition to local value systems this will have been viewed as socially disruptive or morally reprehensible by most members of the community. If local value systems did not accommodate such challenges, if people were unwilling or unable to align their interests and ideals with those of aspiring individuals and families, this will have led to conflicts. The rise, dominance, or survival of differentiating groups and individuals is never inevitable or left unchallenged.

Social differentiation processes that lead to institutionalized stratification are commonly treated as somehow unavoidable. From such a standpoint, any given community will inevitably produce a number of 'entrepreneurs' who seek to extend their control over, and claim a larger share of a community's productive output. All that is required to encourage their disproportionate accumulation of wealth and status is the availability and successful deployment of surplus or high-value resources. Of course, a regretful consequence of such a perspective is that this turns most other people into gullible, incompetent, or unmotivated victims of manipulative, creative, and aspiring innovators, and the socio-historical transformations they engender. To be sure, all people aim to secure the material resources, safe living conditions, and relative autonomy needed for self-realization and social reproduction. This commonly encourages the formation of interpersonal and intergroup dependencies, along with the attitudes and ideals that help sustain these (see section 3.4). Just as commonly, however, individuals and groups will experience social embeddedness as too constraining. This predictably occurs when individuals or families become materially and psychologically empowered, and when social embeddedness becomes experienced as too

constraining for self-realization as motivated by shifting ‘ideal life’ constructs. Opportunities for improving one’s living conditions (i.e. gaining more autonomy on preferred terms) are then commonly sought out. Especially under colonial or globalizing conditions, the extra-local may present attractive disembedded opportunities for aspiring individuals and their families. This both necessitates and encourages value reprioritization, leading to a proliferation of new attitudes, ideals, and behaviors. There is no recognition of an inherent superiority of external forms, then, but a creative use of local and extra-local resources for the enhanced reproduction of situated lifeways.

While there have always been entrepreneurs and accumulators who unquestionably aim to set themselves apart from the community, just as commonly there have been those who are unable, or unwilling, to do the same. The certainty of this does not make it less significant. When the former manage to differentiate themselves within a community, the latter may soon find themselves in a relationship of dependence, or, alternately, at risk of being ostracized because their ideals are no longer normative. While it may seem that such trends would find widespread resistance, relinquishment of autonomy (see section 3.4.1) in exchange for security and stability is commonly considered by people who hope to gain certain benefits. More important, however, is the fact that differentiating behavior is often not resisted because aggrandizers, and those poised to follow them, pursue their goals primarily by deploying existing social mechanisms rather than engaging in transgressive behavior (Graeber 2001, 19). Successful aspiring entrepreneurs are innovative in the sense that they find new ways of negotiating, and manipulating, existing socio-cultural resources, and typically ‘gain the upper hand’ only gradually and cumulatively through their ongoing social engagements (Hodder and Cessford 2004). This is exactly how social transformation engendered by diacritical attitudes and behaviors becomes morally substantiated. Socio-economic differentiation is accepted precisely because it results from socially embedded actions and interactions shaped by

affective ties of loyalty and shared notions of morality. Over time, countless of such small-scale engagements shape the formation of new social norms and cultural ideals.

This is an important point to emphasize: the availability of surplus or disembedded opportunities are always merely preconditions for aggrandizing behavior. The main reason why diacritical aspirations are tacitly allowed, or even actively supported, is because these are pursued through established social structures and relational pathways, with reference made to shared ideals and deployment of existing social mechanisms that together provide the moral justification required for communal acceptance.<sup>11</sup> Social inequality does not universally result, then, from the mystifying discourses deployed by elite manipulators. Moreover, when we remember that power differentials also exist in communities where these are not institutionalized into permanent systems of hierarchically ordered domains and positions, it is not hard to see why increased social distinction is not resisted more. After all, it's not as if aggrandizers are very innovative in that respect.

People negotiate, accommodate, and prioritize their values situationally and relationally. They continuously consider the expressions and behaviors of other people in relation to motivational values that they may, or may not, prioritize in similar ways. Because of this, conflicts of interest are a normal part of social engagements. As long as this takes place in accordance with an established order of rules and norms, there is room for the self-interested maneuvering of individuals and their families. Only extreme divergence will be perceived as too disruptive to the social order. When this happens, community members may become stigmatized as social deviants, and their actions and values consciously resisted. These communal responses to social disruptions

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<sup>11</sup> This is, of course, what Gramsci was talking about when arguing how people participate in their own subordination (Urbinati 1998). They willingly participate in the systems, and subscribe to the ideals, that allow for their subordination.

may take any form, but all are aimed at regaining some semblance of social equilibrium. Not in the sense of Durkheimian functionalism, but in terms of a desire for restoring a social order perceived as functioning optimally in accordance with long-established and communally recognized norms and ideals, a reconstitution that provides both comfort and familiarity (Nsamenang 2012, 772).

From the above discussion, it has become clear how values have predominantly been treated in archaeological scholarship in restricted ways: as mystifying ideology deployed by manipulating elites, or in broad characterizations of socio-economic complexity in reference to individualism-collectivism and differentiation-egalitarianism oppositions. I also highlighted the common assumption that complexification is caused by ‘hard’ variables like demographic growth or technological innovation. Such factors, in turn, are believed to embolden aspiring individuals (‘aggrandizers’ or ‘big men’) whose agendas challenge prevailing conditions. The social struggles they engender are commonly assumed to promote further socio-economic and cultural transformations. I have attempted to nuance some of these perspectives and assumptions by noting how processes of complexification may be examined by considering a wider variety of variables, particularly ideational ones. It is also important to critically reflect on the way differentiation and individualization tend to feature in discussions of complexification, and forego making simplistic distinctions between social formations that are more-or-less complex; equality-inequality and individualism-collectivism dynamics have always been present among human collectives, regardless of cultural complexity. Interpersonal conflict, family strife, struggles between kin-groups and larger communities, these can all encourage social integration or disintegration, and all have been present in even the most small-scale and least complex of human groups. At the same time, people who hold different interests, or seek to implement their values differentially, do so through participation in existing social networks

and institutions where each value-driven point-of-view derives its moral legitimacy. The degree of social embeddedness of such pursuits may, or may not, involve the deployment of mystifying discourse by manipulating elites.

In these ways, then, archaeological treatment of values can be nuanced. However, deconstructing dominant perspectives and implicit assumptions that prevail in the archaeological literature can only serve as a prelude to the formulation of a value-centric archaeology of socio-historical transformation. How some archaeologists have explicitly looked at the material manifestation of values is a question I shall turn to next.

## **2.2 Value Research in Archaeology**

In order to more directly investigate the material dimensions of socio-historical transformation and concomitant changes to value systems, I will now engage a small body of archaeological literature that has explicitly looked for both in the material record. To begin, we can consider a number of studies that have sought to relate changes in 'style' to socio-historical dynamics (Fisher 1961; Robbins 1966; Dressler and Robbins 1975). In particular, these have ventured to explain differences in art style in terms of 'cognitive maps' that form under particular socio-political conditions. To achieve this, a range of stylistic variables (e.g. repetition, space, symmetry, enclosure) are examined for the way they can be linked to egalitarian or stratified systems (table 5 and 6). One of the main difficulties with these archaeological approaches to style is the uncritical (i.e. subjective) manner in which stylistic variables are chosen and interpreted. Furthermore, the linkages between artistic style on the one hand and human 'cognitive maps' shaped (in unknown ways) by human ecological conditions on the other remain difficult to assess without extensive cross-cultural comparative work. The singular focus on style also places clear constraints on interpretations, such that these can only

be corroborated by looking at other manifestations of similar outlooks and worldviews, like in the built environment or in everyday behaviors (Glassie 1975; Deetz 1977).

Assessing technological change has been another means through which archaeologists have evaluated transforming value systems. While much archaeological work on prehistoric socio-historical transformation has focused on complexification in terms of such things like social stratification or economic specialization, Keightly offers an inspiring approach that attempts to illuminate cognitive and behavioral aspects of culture change (Keightly 1987). This work aligns with a number of post-processual studies that sought to foreground mentalist (or ideational) aspects of culture change (e.g. Lechtmann 1977 and 1984). These are representative of a short-lived program in archaeology that became inspired by ideas and approaches emanating from the French Annales School (Knapp 1992), in particular ideas about temporal scales (long, medium, and short) and cultural *mentalité* (Hodder and Hutson 2003, 136).

Keightly contrasts technological developments in two cultural complexes (an egalitarian Neolithic formation and a hierarchical Bronze Age formation) in order to “reveal prehistoric habits of thought and behavior” (*ibid.*, 92). While technology is the clear focus of this study, style receives ample attention as well. Keightly’s goal is not to discover symbolic meaning in objects, materials, or behaviors, but to link particular technological practices to structuring mentalities. This approach is based on the proposition that there exists “a relationship between the technology of a culture and its conception of the world and of man himself” (*ibid.*, 93). Moreover, because systematic ways of doing things suggests the existence of collectively shared ‘mentalities’, Keightly proposes that it is possible to distinguish a Chinese Bronze Age mentality by the way it reflects a greater willingness to differentiate and manipulate objects, behaviors, spaces, and people in complex ways (table 7).

Keightly's comparison between two culture complexes illustrates well the importance of the cognitive factor in socio-historical transformation. He argues how shifts in Bronze Age mentalities led to increased exploration and experimentation in finding solutions to existing problems, but also stresses that it certainly was not the case that members of this cultural complex became faced with new environmental challenges (as functional-processualists would argue). What changed were attitudes towards preexisting conditions, such that traditional solutions increasingly were no longer considered adequate. Instead, we witness a stronger focus on aesthetic and behavioral elaboration that encouraged stronger attention for detail and a 'right way of doing things'. Aspects of pottery manufacture suggest increased desire for delegation and compartmentalization. Productive tasks were performed in increasingly structured ways by specialists who had acquired special skills and knowledge. The tools and objects they used were also designed for specific tasks that were executed in planned operations and required a range of preferred materials. Such specialized work also took place in dedicated spaces. All of this required a different kind of mentality from what prevailed among the undifferentiated kin-based communities of the Neolithic cultural complex where production took place at the household level. The noted transformations in pottery manufacture and use "suggest a world view that was more fundamentally controlled, precise, measured, standardized, mathematical, componential, articulated, and differentiated" (*ibid.*, 112). While informative, one of the main drawbacks of Keightly's work, as well as most archaeological studies of *mentalité*, concerns the way ethnographic description and contextual interpretation are favored over explanation; thus, we learn that material culture became more complex, or technologies more sophisticated, and that such changes relate to differences in cultural mindsets (for which genealogies may also be reconstructed), yet, it is never really explained why such transformations occur.

Different from Keightly's treatment of material culture is Wells' study of 'visuality', a concept used to discuss "the visual properties of things as they are perceived by a viewer" (2012, 11). Wells argues that visuality is a telling indicator of the way ancient peoples perceived and understood their world. Thus, the use and display of pottery and other objects can be assumed to have facilitated the conscious communication of ideals, but it can also inform archaeologists about past (non-expressed) mindsets. Wells' goal is to elucidate the forces that encouraged a transformation of visual style in the material culture of West-Central European communities between the Bronze Age and the Roman Period. Various developments in the visuality of objects and materials are recognized, which strongly suggest changes in the ways people perceived and experienced their world.

In this association between the visual appearance of material culture and worldviews, Wells aligns himself with the studies discussed so far, yet, curiously, he does not reference any of this literature. A clear improvement of Wells' efforts over the archaeological studies of style and technology discussed above, however, is his interest in interdisciplinarity (e.g. ecological psychology, extended-mind theory). On the other hand, this is mostly done superficially, while his emphasis on universal aspects of human neurophysiology (*ibid.*, 58) may dissuade archaeologists from following his lead, especially since it is not precisely clear how this can aid archaeological interpretation. What is missing from Wells' otherwise innovative study are issues pertaining to subjectivity, relationality, and mediation, or, in other words, how exactly individuals mediated being embedded in human collectives and broader human ecologies. People did not merely observe worldly phenomena near and far, they engaged their natural and cultural environments in meaningful ways, and then primarily through participation in social networks of various kinds. Notwithstanding the reality of human physiological universals, an adaptive approach (see section 3.3) would recognize that embeddedness

in human ecologies shapes how groups and individuals prioritize and realize a limited range of basic values.

The study of complexification processes through intensive analysis of material culture and socio-economic transformations (e.g. in burial practices or economic strategies), such as can be found in Wells, has been a mainstay of prehistoric archaeology. Archaeologists like DeMarrais (DeMarrais *et al.* 1996) and Earle (1997 and 2004) have written on prehistoric developments in the Danish peninsula (table 8). They discuss transformations between the Later Neolithic and Early Bronze Age, and some of their conclusions are based on a number of familiar assumptions. They argue, for example, how the local scarcity of certain materials (tin and copper) or techno-economic innovations (metallurgy) encouraged the rise of elite-run distribution systems. The underlying assumption is that abundant local resources and simple technologies are far less suitable for creating systems of social control. Once such systems are created, however, they may increasingly encompass local resources for socio-economic reproduction, and associated values may penetrate other spheres of life, thereby gradually legitimizing new socio-political realities. As discussed already, this materialist perspective on complexification processes is widely shared among prehistorians.

It is worth pausing here and note how a value-oriented perspective encourages reflection on a range of questions that are generally left unconsidered. For example, why does a demand for non-local resources develop in the first place? Why would bronze axes become valued more highly than stone axes? This seems rather pertinent since the former are not qualitatively better, from a utilitarian perspective. If bronze items had a higher potential for becoming prestige objects, it still needs to be explained why this mattered to people living in egalitarian communities. We might also ask why access to non-local resources could not remain equivalent among the members of an egalitarian community. Is it because outside traders prefer dealing with community representatives,

or does each local group only produce a limited numbers of ‘entrepreneurs’ who are willing to travel to distant regions to acquire resources? If elite control over specialist skills and knowledge (e.g. bronze metallurgy) was an important variable, why did this not happen for local materials? Did every farmer know how to make a stone axe? While materialists would argue that the scarcity of certain resources or the exotic allure of certain objects increases their demand, thereby allowing certain aspiring individuals to manipulate desire by restricting access, idealists would stress that control over rare resources would not matter without preexisting ideas, ideals, and imaginaries. In other words, people have to first care about ‘things’, because this provides those ‘things’ with a potential for reshaping social systems. Do people subject themselves to systems of control because they are universally in awe of (or outplayed by) the organizational skills of elites, or because the former already subscribe to a shared worldview that facilitates the latter’s efforts? As I pointed out, studies of prehistoric complexification rarely explicitly theorize about values (with the exception of those values believed to motivate elite differentiation or male martiality), yet, they nonetheless feature importantly in archaeological interpretations. For example, certain well-known oppositional dimensions can be identified in DeMarrais and Earle’s study of Neolithic-Bronze Age transformations, like individualism-collectivism, stratification-egalitarianism, male-female, and simplicity-complexity. They are recognized by these archaeologists, but not further discussed.

Compared to these approaches in Danish prehistoric archaeology, Pydyn (1998) offers a rare study of complexification processes in which ‘valuation’ is explicitly considered. In describing transformations between the Late Bronze and Early Iron Age in Central Europe, Pydyn is particularly interested in the way different cultural groups valued differently. For this archaeologist, cultural value differentials give rise to exchange networks in unique objects and materials - for instance, Mediterranean glass beads and cowry shells for Baltic Amber - that are valued differently

within the communities between which trade takes place. These differences manifest synchronically among various geographically dispersed contemporary groups, but also diachronically in terms of socio-historical transformations experienced by particular communities. Pydyn distinguishes between two periods (table 9) in which a “characteristic system of values” prevailed (*ibid.*, 102). The transformations that occurred between these two periods is summarized by reference to individualization and centralization.

For Pydyn, the valuation of imported materials and objects “can only be understood in relation to the aims of exchange. These aims were to provide enjoyment, excitement, economic benefits, but most of all, to win social games of preserving and exercising the power of individuals and of communities” (*ibid.*, 100). The circulation of objects of communally recognized worth allowed for the maintenance of inter-community relations and social competitive behavior, while easing the exchange of other goods as well. Important here is the recognition that exchanged goods served multiple purposes, satisfying the needs and interests of different groups and individuals, and in various domains of life. Archaeological interpretation of exchange has to include close analysis of particular socio-historical contexts then.

Pydyn stands out for his willingness to consider how valuations were made, why some materials and objects were deemed valuable and others were not, and why this led to value differentials between communities. He notes how social scientists have consistently distinguished between two familiar meanings of the term value: “In the first, value is connected with morality, ethics, welfare and social relations. The second meaning of the term value is related to economics and to the material world” (*ibid.*, 97). The distinction made here is the familiar values-value opposition which I discuss below (section 2.3.3). Pydyn also recognizes the existence of absolute (or universal) values on the one hand, and subjective (or relative) values on the other. The former have

an integrating capacity such that they facilitate “social communications and social relations” (*ibid.*, 97), while the latter are understood to function motivationally at an individual level. The value systems shared by the members of a community enable the formulation of categories with which people understand the (meta-)physical world. Pydyn stands out, then, for his willingness to directly engage values, yet the effort remains critically undertheorized.

Notably, Pydyn does recognize the importance of dialectic dynamics; “The introduction of large-scale iron production and the changes in social structures and value systems were both reasons and result. On the one hand, iron was introduced as the result of internal changes in Bronze Age societies and of shifts in patterns of long-distance exchange. On the other hand, iron and iron production to a large extent stimulated these changes” (*ibid.*, 103). In other words, changing Bronze Age social dynamics (including values and ideals) encouraged a growing interest for iron manufacture and its products, and this, in turn, stimulated more substantial socio-historical transformations during the Early Iron Age.

This notion of culture-historical formations resulting from recursive processes is also emphasized by Dobres (2010) who argues how mainstream materialist approaches to technology need to be balanced with a greater attention for social values and cognitive structures. Such variables were equally important in the constitution of past technological traditions. Drawing inspiration from ‘chaîne opératoire’, ‘behavioral chain’, and ‘life history’ approaches, her methods aim to blur the lines between practical and cultural interpretations. Noting Sahlins’ (1976) distinction between ‘practical reason’ (associated with ahistoricism, positivism, pragmatism, and functionalism) and ‘cultural reason’ (associated with contextualism, interpretivism, constructivism, and agency), Dobres describes the instrumentalist approach to technology as one that stresses its fundamental role in shaping “most other aspects of culture, including economics and social organisation, politics and

identity formation, social values and symbolic constructs” (Dobres 2010, 104). From this point of view, it is the technological that turns the natural into the cultural. A desire for rational efficiency and management of complexity, as well as the affordances and limitations imposed by artifact physics, are assumed to have been paramount considerations.

Yet, as Dobres notes, the longevity of technologies often directly results from a desire for ‘doing things properly’, and this, more often than not, has more to do with social norms and cultural ideals than practical efficiency. In drawing attention to the work of Keightley (1987) and others, Dobres emphasizes how ‘life history’ analysis of material remains can reveal how “deep-seated cultural constructs, symbolic categories, metaphors, and even social attitudes about the proper way to act in the world, directly influenced both techniques of manufacture and artifact morphology” (2010, 107). Such a human-centric approach borrows concepts and ideas from structuralism and symbolic studies, phenomenology, gender studies, and practice theory. In other words, it encourages a consideration of the role of habituation and embodiment in everyday practice, as well as the importance of conscious reflection, both of which are shaped by human ecologies. The analysis of operational sequence, choice of materials, techniques and designs, notions of bodily comportment, the social distribution of labor, as well as the spatio-temporal situatedness of activity can all suggest “something of the communal values, symbolic worldviews, and social attitudes people held about the ‘proper’ way to make and use the material world” (*ibid.*, 107).

With this distinction between practical and cultural reason in mind, we can next consider the work of those scholars who have studied local articulations of socio-historical transformation in colonial North America. Most prominently, Glassie’s (1975) folkloristic study of housing traditions in colonial Virginia has been influential. This work is representative of a cognitive approach that draws on the anthropological structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, and “mediates between the quantitative

but overgeneralized approach of the scientific historical archaeologists and the richly descriptive but theoretically timid work of those of a more particularistic bent” (Deetz 1988, 221). Glassie’s structuralist perspective, and in particular his ‘multi-thread’ approach (i.e. the analysis of various categories of evidence derived from different social contexts), allows for more ‘holistic’ interpretations of shifting value orientations than can be found in the studies mentioned so far that predominantly focus on style or technology, or those that aim to reconstruct the life histories of objects.

Glassie recognized a historical trend whereby 18th century nature-oriented folkways were increasingly replaced by “opposing choices in the early 1800s, which represented the desire to dominate nature and exemplified a new, controlling, private, individual, and segmented mindset” (Beck 1998, 109). In terms of material culture, Glassie identified a growing preference for white dishes, white-washed houses, and polished gravestones. While this could be interpreted (from a materialist perspective) in terms of technological innovation, commercial interest, elite differentiation, or subelite emulation, Glassie’s structuralist perspective foregrounds the importance of a cognitive transition from a ‘natural’ to an ‘artificial’ mindset. Moreover, his multi-thread approach is able to show that mediation took place in a number of social domains, both public and private. Why exactly this ‘cultural focus’ developed is also answered by Glassie: 19th century domestic architecture stood as an index of widespread ‘social anguish’ that drove individuals and their families to adopt inward-looking orientations and withdraw from communal engagements. This social anguish also encouraged household investment in identical and idealized house forms, and in the adherence to radical ideals relating to racism, nationalism, and cultural order (Vlach 1978, 137).

The historical archaeologist Deetz famously built on Glassie’s structuralist work and adopted the same multi-thread approach. Especially his ‘In Small Things Forgotten’ has long stood as a

model example of the cognitive approach in historical archaeology (Deetz 1977). Deetz professed a commitment to discovering general covering laws with which to study historical processes comparatively (Deetz 1988, 219). Such an approach relied heavily on quantification methods to discover patterns in human behavior, thus contrasting with particularistic studies that are analytically more qualitative and hold interpretive value in particular contexts only. At the same time, Deetz argued how archaeologists were not paying enough attention to the underlying causes of material changes; claiming that tastes, values, and preferences “changed and produced a new [cultural] form merely points to a cause and an effect, but does not explain what activated the causes” (*ibid.*, 221), how people perceived their world and their place in it, and how they sought to reshape it. For this archaeologist, the study of material culture grants access to the minds of past social agents, and this can break the reliance on literary and representational sources that are generally heavily biased towards certain (mostly male elite) social groups. In other words, it allows studying cognitive aspects of people who behaved in everyday situations throughout the social strata.

Deetz talks about the ‘mental templates’, ‘mind-sets’, and ‘cognitive structures’ that prevail within certain cultural groups under certain socio-historical conditions, while elaborating on a general historical development in colonial (Anglo-American) North America whereby a ‘Medieval’ (traditional) mindset slowly transformed into a ‘Georgian’ (modern) mindset (table 10). In trying to determine what brought about this change, Deetz navigates materialist and idealist arguments (Deetz 1977, 182). While materialist interpretations would readily link consumption rates to wealth and household size, Deetz is compelled to nuance this by including cognitive factors. For 18th century Virginian households, he argues, the size and quality of household assemblages “need not be and probably are not a function of either wealth or household size. Numbers of containers for food and drink are surprisingly low until one realizes the corporate nature of food consumption, reflecting a

public and corporate mode of eating” (Deetz 1982, 721). In other words, while a family could in certain ways be shown to have been well-off, consumption rates may actually have been low due to a particular value orientation. The link between higher consumption rates and individualization has everything to do with people no longer sharing things and wanting to possess and use things and spaces at an individual level. In other words, low rates of consumption have less to do with economic marginality than with corporate mentalities that are (most likely) an adaptation to insecurity and anxiety.

Following Glassie, Deetz argued that heightened anxiety encouraged people to want to increase their autonomy and control of their social and natural environments, and this manifested itself at the level of individuals, families, and communities. The forces that cause anxiety are varied, of course, and can include economic stress, social conflict, inter-group warfare, exposure to extreme cultural difference, *etcetera*. Deetz considered non-material factors to attempt to explain the reasons for social anxiety which clearly had become a force of socio-historical transformation in colonial North America. Yet, this preference seems to have developed at a time for which there are no signs of resource scarcity or economic decline. Furthermore, while high birth rates and large-scale immigration did cause a rise in population, this did not increase economic stress. On the contrary, the clustering of heterogeneous populations in an expanding urban world afforded high interconnectivity and substantial social mobility across the social strata (MacMullen 2014, 108). For Deetz, levels of anxiety increased due to an ‘expansion of the world’ which people increasingly perceived as complex, chaotic, and unpredictable. Moreover, those benefitting from new economic opportunities (in trade, industry, and land settlement ventures) unavoidably came to challenge existing moral systems, social structures, and power relations, and this seems to have caused much anxiety within conservative rural communities where patriarchal relations and social conformity

received stronger emphasis (also see Wilk 1983). These are of course the kind of modernization processes which social scientists have long described, and which continue to manifest in many parts of the contemporary ‘globalizing’ world. In the historical context of colonial Virginia specifically, the attitudes and outlooks of slave owners will also have contributed strongly to social anxieties (e.g. fear for slave uprisings or the ‘savage instincts’ of individual slaves).

In Deetz’ work we see how colonial Virginians were increasingly compelled to negotiate everyday situations in new ways, and then mainly in reference to a number of identifiable conceptual oppositions (table 11). These are understood to be structurally related, such that “changes taking place in the same direction and at the same time in otherwise unrelated sectors of culture are attributable to changes in the nature of the mediation of underlying oppositional structures” (Deetz 1988, 222). The mediation of these binaries had a clear directionality towards the individual and the private. Yet, even with individualism on the rise, it is possible to show the continued interplay of individualist, familist, and communalist interests despite this general directionality of socio-historical transformation (see section 3.4). For example, scattered epitaphs carrying highly individualized first-person messages were increasingly replaced by formulaic epitaphs written in the third-person that cluster in family plots. While individuals gained more autonomy in life, relations with the surviving community were increasingly managed by the family in mortuary context. Yet, as families withdrew from their communities (privatization and delineation of household property and space), and gained greater relative autonomy, they continued to behave in socially acceptable and normative ways. Similarly, as family members withdrew from each other (privatization and delineation of personal property and space), and individuals gained greater relative autonomy within the contexts of family life, they continued to identify with, affectively relate to, claim rights from, and fulfill obligations towards their families. Unidirectional processes (e.g. individualization or complexification) always

were negotiated by individuals at various levels of lived experience (section 3.4), then, with dynamic outcomes that matched or conflicted with prevailing norms and ideals.

Deetz' work on colonial North America has of course not remained unchallenged. Schuyler (1980, 644) in particular points out three problems in Deetz' approach: presentism, reductionism, and cultural delineation. These may briefly be considered here because they are regularly pointed out in the literature, such that Deetz is certainly not unique in this regard. Presentism concerns the way past events are interpreted in terms of modern concepts and values. While important, the risk of presentism does not affect Deetz' work in particular, or structuralism in general, but all interpretation of the human past. In this dissertation, the risk of presentism is mitigated against by the deployment of a universal framework of basic human values (section 3.2), as well as a universal theory of human cognitive development (section 3.3). Reductionism (e.g. in Deetz the reduction of lived experience to binary structures of mind), more broadly than presentism, is a challenge faced by all social scientists. Whenever we generalize about human action in terms of patterned behavior we risk reducing complexity (section 2.3.1). This is why it is important for archaeologists to aim for theoretical versatility, to explore multiple lines of inquiry at different scales, and to consider various categories of evidence derived from different domains of social life (see section 3.5). It strikes me that such aims are indeed pursued by Deetz, and Glassie before him. Where this concerns the problem of cultural delineation, lastly, it should readily be recognized that all acts of boundary-making are artificial but assist interpretation. In other words, delineation is always an analytical move. Yet, this etic (scholarly) need for drawing boundaries to achieve coherence and facilitate understanding and communication may be compared with the ever-present emic need of past human subjects to do the same. Archaeologists should account for both kinds of artificial boundary-making.

Schuyler also expresses doubts about the place of determinism in structuralist approaches. Did new socio-economic conditions and material worlds reshape cultural mindsets or did transforming worldviews encourage such changes? For Schuyler, “the symbolic level cannot be isolated during research from that of technology or social structure in the manner that culture as a whole can be separated from the natural environment or biology” (*ibid.*, 645). The argument is familiar, and Schuyler, like countless materialists before him, stresses the importance of the ‘technomic’ and the ‘sociotechnic’ over the ‘ideotechnic’ (Binford 1962). Yet, Deetz’ approach could hardly be characterized as radically idealist; rather, his goal is to navigate a middle-road and reconcile the material with the cognitive, the particular with the universal. In other words, there is a recognition of the role of dialectic dynamics, much as we find it in Pydyn and Dobres.

A similar focus on dialectics can be found in the last example of value-oriented archaeology reviewed here. González-Ruibal (2012) emphasizes how human cognition is intimately related to material culture, such that the two cannot be separated in social scientific analysis. More specifically, he argues that Cultural Psychologists have to account for ‘the material’ as they seek to understand the effect that culture has on the human mind. This is necessary because “artifacts, due to their simultaneous material and ideational nature, are the fundamental constituents of culture, which in turn is fundamental in shaping cognitive processes” (*ibid.*, 133). González-Ruibal further proposes that archaeological inquiry needs to be informed by a recognition that the ideational and the material exist in a co-constitutive relationship. Human cognition is not simply projected onto the material world, then, it is “embodied, situated, extended, enacted, distributed and mediated” (*ibid.*, 135).

González-Ruibal also considers the individuality-relationality (i.e. individualism-collectivism) distinction and notes how societies that may be characterized as predominantly individualist or relational can be shown to engage the material world differently, and some of his observations are

listed in table 12.<sup>12</sup> Regarding the supposed stability or coherence of value orientations, González-Ruibal (*ibid.*, 141) poignantly notes how the drastic transformation of what is supposed to be habitual everyday behavior (e.g. foodways or refuse disposal) signals that it has become discursive, that the realization of old and new ideals has become a potential point of conflict. Especially when practices can be seen to have changed in one type of context (e.g. domestic) but not another (e.g. mortuary), it will have become more discursive if not conflictual because it was consciously realized in one context and consciously ignored or suppressed in another. Only a multi-thread approach such as can be found in the works of Glassie and Deetz would be able to expose such dynamics.

Uncommon for an archaeologist, González-Ruibal also briefly considers aspects of cognitive development, in particular the formative importance of place attachment. Childhood experiences in particular physical settings create long-lasting ties of emotional attachment to a family dwelling, town, or natural landscape. To illustrate this, two kinds of domestic context are compared, one in a broadly egalitarian (Bertha) society, another in a broadly stratified (Swahili) society (table 13). Yet, it could be argued that archaeologists have a special interest in foregrounding this influence of physical environments on human development (Gerritsen 2004, 147). Indeed, it remains important to also consider the formative impact of non-physical belongingness or connectedness because people are situated in social worlds as well as material worlds (Nsamenang 2012, 773). Especially for mobile groups of various kinds, it is the connectedness to the social group, not predominantly the places they inhabit or move through, that are important elements in the formation of personal biographies.

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<sup>12</sup> Yet, he also admits that even in broadly collectivist cultures individualism has its place; “Ritual specialists in segmentary societies, for instance, tend to use a very peculiar material culture and wear extravagant clothes and adornments ... as an index of the more individualized self” (González-Ruibal 2012, 140). I have already argued for this necessity for not perceiving value orientations within human collectives as uniform, stable, or coherent.

This connectedness often has more to do with concepts and ideals of togetherness than shared occupation of, or engagement with, physical environments.

From this cursory review of value-oriented archaeological scholarship, the following observations can be made. Some of these exclusively examine stylistic or technological differences diachronically across time or synchronically between cultural groups, while others prefer taking a multi-thread approach to examine culture-historical trajectories. Also noteworthy is the way differences exist in the approach to interpretation. Those looking at style, for example, treat stylistic elements as (in)direct expressions of social phenomena. For Fischer, the boundedness of figures on pots relates to differentiation in society, while for Wells the coarseness and natural color tones of Bronze Age pots are linked to the visual aesthetic of egalitarian farming communities. For these archaeologists, material culture encapsulates the world such as it was lived and viewed by people. Interpretation for archaeologists like Deetz and Keightley works differently. For them, material culture can do more than inform archaeologists about the material aspects of lived experience; rather, archaeological evidence can speak to the idealized conceptions that people actively sought to implement in their daily lives. These archaeologists have argued how people consciously sought ways to master the natural world, to impose their conceptualizations on the physical environment, by shaping pots, building houses, or preparing food in specific and often increasingly elaborate ways.

Reviewing this small body of archaeological literature also demonstrates that value research among archaeologists remains undertheorized. While it is true that those who have been inspired by structuralism have come closest to formulating a generalizable methodological framework that archaeologists can deploy in different culture-historical contexts, that particular program is not

without its shortcomings, as I noted in the introduction. This will also become apparent in the next section where I explore anthropological scholarship for theoretical and methodological inspiration.

### **2.3 Value Research in Anthropology**

The strong and enduring preoccupation with ‘Identity’ across the social sciences is partly (if implicitly) based on the assumption that there is some configuration of traits that uniquely characterizes groups and individuals alike, one that can be discovered and described, and, for some, even causally explained. While disciplinary interests largely shape what variables are focused on, most social scientists work from the assumption that value preferences are crucial if not foundational factors of personal and collective identity. Even a cursory consideration of the literature shows how values have long preoccupied scholars across the social sciences. Moreover, a prominent distinction can be made between the efforts of those who engage in ‘universalist’ projects and those who prefer ‘particularist’ approaches.

The earliest social scientific scholarship of the modern era includes numerous efforts at formulating universal schemes that allow studying values across social and cultural boundaries. Tönnies (1988[1887]) famously opposed two ideal-type ecologies (*gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*) where characteristic value systems prevail, while Durkheim (1984[1893]) drew the well-known contrast between mechanical and organic solidarity. Rickert (1986[1913]) proposed that a universal framework of ‘value orientations’ could be formulated to assist the exploration of historically situated instances of value realization. Scheler (1973[1913]), in turn, devised a hierarchical scheme of ‘value modalities’ through which people perceive and engage worldly phenomena. Inspired by this diverse scholarship, Weber (2010[1921]) talked about economic ‘classes’, honor-based ‘*stände*’, and goal-driven ‘parties’ as contexts of social engagement where distinct value orientations are

maintained. Comparable ideas were held by Dilthey (1988[1922]), who suggested that much socio-political strife in the modern world was caused by conflictual ‘worldviews’ (*weltanschauung*) (Naugle 2002; Koltko-Rivera 2004). Rickert’s scheme directly influenced Spranger (1928) who is best known for his formulation of a six-part classification of ideal-type personalities (‘types of men’), each with a characteristic motivational orientation (i.e. religious, aesthetic, theoretical, political, social, and economic). Such universalist scholarship also influenced French *Annales* historians like Bloch and Febvre who inspired research on ‘mentality’ (Burke 1986), as well as scholars like Lukács, Elias, and Bourdieu who became strong proponents of the ‘habitus’ concept (Pickel 2005). The influence of the Marxist ‘class consciousness’ concept in these works on collective psychologies, dispositions, and values is substantial, if not always explicitly recognized. After these early efforts, universal schemes were also formulated in anthropology. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), for example, presented a framework of motivational ‘value orientations’ that shape how universal problems are perceived and negotiated by cultural groups. Psychologists, in turn, continued to articulate universal ‘personality types’ that could assist their psychoanalytic efforts (Allport *et al.* 1970). Equally universalist in approach are those value-oriented studies in social psychology (Hofstede 1980; Schwartz 1994) and social anthropology (Douglas 1970) that continue to inspire those who aim to associate characteristic motivational orientations with distinct forms of social organization. One common aspect shared by all these works is that they are based on the proposition that it is justifiable, possible, and useful to study basic human values from a universalist point of view.

These varied efforts may be compared to a contrasting body of literature in which theories and methods are shaped by a particularist perspective. While Durkheim was well-known for his universalist approach to intra-societal dynamics, this early sociologist also argued that it was justifiable to talk about distinct ‘national characters’ (*volkscharakter*); it was Durkheim after all who

elaborated on a unique ‘German mentality’ (1915). The father of Historical Particularism, Franz Boas, likewise believed that it was possible to identify certain unique ‘cultural themes’ (*leitmotif*) among Native American groups of the Pacific Northwest region, and some of his better-known students entertained similar ideas (Hatch 1973, 206). The linguistic anthropologist Sapir (1924), for example, found that it was useful to talk about a country’s ‘national genius’ (*volksgeist*) and possible to identify a distinct French ‘national character’. Ideas about ‘cultural configurations’ were central to the scholarship produced by what became known as the Personality and Culture school, of which Boasians like Cora DuBois, Margaret Mead, and Ruth Benedict were prominent advocates. These psychology-oriented anthropologists formulated concepts like ‘modal personality’ in order to describe human collectives in terms of psycho-cultural types. This kind of anthropological research continues to influence cultural relativists today. MacMullen (2014), for example, recently proposed that it is possible to explain culture-historical trajectories by foregrounding the developmental influence of a ‘cultural character’. For this Roman historian, characterizing certain groups with psychological labels like ‘aggressiveness’ or ‘neuroticism’ allows understanding, predicting even, their developmental trajectories. Anthropologists who have explicitly engaged values in recent decades have likewise looked at the varied ways in which ‘Culture’ shapes value systems. Indeed, the determinative influence of cultural constructs over all acts of valuation is largely taken for granted by interpretive and practice-oriented anthropologists (Graeber 2001), and in this they are not very different from cultural psychologists (Valsiner 2012). Universals in human motivation are largely ignored, then, by cultural relativists who primarily study values from a historical particularist point of view.

It is worth considering, then, why universalist approaches have drawn scholarly interest in fields like political science, sociology, and social psychology, while these are largely avoided by

anthropologists and other culture-oriented scholars (Schwartz 2006, 138; Robbins 2012, 130). Why have interpretive and practice-oriented anthropologists excelled in describing local valuation practices, while they have neglected to study any kind of universal principles that can inform them about the substance of, relational linkages between, or contextual operationalization of basic human values? Since persuasive arguments (in terms of logic and coherence) can be found in both universalist and particularist scholarship, several reasons relating to disciplinary methods, interpretive perspectives, and philosophical worldviews might be considered to better understand this stark divergence.

### ***2.3.1 Understanding Disciplinary Apprehensions***

“For the last three generations or so, social scientists have exaggerated the cultural diversity in the world and often failed to see what was universal. Today, we know that cultural universals do exist ... that cultural and ethical relativism, however beneficial they may have been in combating ethnocentric bias, have been discredited ... that post-modernism, despite its beneficial corrections of the arrogant certitudes of positivism, ultimately leads to the dead-end of nihilism ... We know that in human societies that have flourished, people have developed basically similar core values. And we know, finally, that where people have not developed the right moral values, they have created more or less sick societies that failed in important ways to satisfy the biological and social needs of their members” (Bell 2002, 130).

To start, deemphasizing cultural particularism in the pursuit of formulating universal ‘laws’ nowadays prompts serious reservations among those anthropologists who experience discomfort when faced with assessments of socio-cultural formations in terms of adaptive efficacy or reproductive success, as suggested by Bell quoted above. Yet, this will most readily be the case for radical relativists, reifying multiculturalists, and those scholars whose lived experience is dominated by, in terms of Marx, idealist superstructure rather than materialist substructure concerns.<sup>13</sup> Granted,

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<sup>13</sup> Anthropologists tend to have quite different interests and attitudes than the people they write about. Not to discount the financial challenges faced by graduate students and adjunct professors, the lived experience of most scholars tends to be shaped far more by their interest for personal

Bell's project specifically involves formulating a universal morality, which demands deemphasizing cultural difference in order to establish a Global Ethic of universal rights and responsibilities. Yet, it is precisely such cross-cultural projects that best demonstrate that it certainly is possible to approach human values in universal terms.

For many anthropologists, the necessary de-emphasis of social complexity and cultural diversity that follows from treating values in universal terms will seem unpalatable (Bunge 1998, 55; D'Andrade 2008, 4; Thomas 2008, 68). This should not surprise when disciplinary developments are taken into account. Since the formative years of their field, anthropologists have mainly conducted their work in non-industrial and non-Western societies, while the object of study for sociologists and social psychologists was primarily located in the 'developed' world. Research in these different contexts necessitated the use of different methodologies. While anthropologists commonly embed themselves in local communities where participant observation is a key method, sociologists tend to gather large amounts of quantifiable data within populations of various sizes. Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that it is disciplinary interests and methodologies that encourage anthropological suspicion about the positivist attitudes and methods of sociologists, political scientists, and social psychologists who commonly seek to reduce complexity and diversity to something analytically manageable to serve their efforts in policy development, organizational management, and psychoanalysis.<sup>14</sup>

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development, intellectual curiosity, and aesthetic expressivity than materialist concerns. Indeed, as countless intellectuals from Plato to Kant have sought to experience life unimpeded by materialist anxiety and power differentials, so they have also tried to convince others of the virtues of the idealist worldview.

<sup>14</sup> Of course, anthropologists are not the only scholars with methodological suspicions. Psychologists and economists have also long been equally hesitant to afford 'Culture' a place in their 'scientific' endeavors (Cole 1998; Valsiner 2012).

A hesitance for exploring the theories and methods common to other disciplines is also likely associated with a tendency among anthropologists to position themselves as champions of subaltern groups and ‘underdeveloped’ societies (D’Andrade 2000). From the point-of-view of those engaged in applied anthropology especially, the same outlooks and attitudes that promote Western cultural dominance, global power disparities, and erosion of local lifeways presumably also shape the scholarship of economists, sociologists, and social psychologists that legitimizes the problematic ‘development’ and ‘assistance’ agendas of Western governments, NGO’s, and policy advisors. Many anthropologists also harbor negative stances towards excessive consumerism and essentializing discourse, and they commonly struggle with the fact that advertising companies and polling agencies have long been quite adept at measuring consumer interests and (sub)cultural values alike. Indeed, they will likely be the first to suggest that consumer demand is produced, and political consent manufactured, rather than simply measured. Notwithstanding the power of branding and essentializing discourse, it paradoxically is also quite commonly anthropologically trained specialists who work in marketing, and they reliably show how values (plural) are commonly reduced to value (singular) by the consumer groups they study, allowing for measurement and prediction. Indeed, while academic anthropologists may deplore the ways some of their colleagues in marketing devise new ways of reducing (cultural) values to a single quantifiable (economic) value, this is in fact a universal activity that people regularly engage in, and a reality against which some scholars take clear moral stances (Miller 1987 and 2012).

Considering the pervasiveness and intensity of identity clashes in the world today, this anthropological unease for reducing social complexity and ignoring cultural diversity is understandable. Yet, the anthropological discipline has in fact long harbored proponents of the universalist perspective. After all, generalization from comparison (e.g. the search for functional or

structural principals) is precisely what social anthropologists and ethnologists have long engaged in. This has little to do with some recognized potential that makes the universalist perspective intrinsically better-suited for studying the human condition. Rather, ethnologists have simply been more interested in understanding the functional operation of social systems, and *explaining* differences between them. Ethnographers, by contrast, have mainly concerned themselves with the *description* of cultural peculiarities. The British social anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown, for instance, was highly interested in comparative work because this could reveal universal principles of social organization,<sup>15</sup> and this may be compared to those anthropologists working within the Historical Particularist tradition who rarely engaged in comparative research. For them, any cultural group was inherently worthy of having its distinctive characteristics recorded. Yet, notably, Boas and his students were not primarily motivated by certain paradigmatic convictions; rather, their anthropological efforts were explicitly linked to an anti-discrimination agenda which targeted European ethno-centrism, Anglo-American exceptionalism, and white racism.

Illustrative of this divergence in methodological preferences is the way culture-oriented scholars tend to reject the quantitative sampling methods of social psychologists because these presumably all suffer from the same problem: they only target distinct populations, like corporate employees or university students, such that general conclusions about human tendencies are informed by highly constrained sample data (Valsiner 2012, viii; MacMullen 2014, 26). Yet, it apparently is not generalization from extrapolation itself which is problematic, because, even if

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<sup>15</sup> Radcliffe-Brown's position is clarified with the following quote: "the comparative method used as an instrument for inductive inference will enable us to discover the universal, essential, characters which belong to all human societies, past, present, and future. The progressive achievement of knowledge of this kind must be the aim of all who believe that a veritable science of human society is possible and desirable" (quoted in MacMullen 2014, 37).

students or corporate employees seemingly cannot represent humanity, it curiously is still possible for modern-day ‘tribal’ groups to inform about the motivations of past culture groups (e.g. MacMullen 2014, 34). By contrast, social psychologists (e.g. Schwartz 2013) work from the assumption that sample groups like university students can speak to universal human values because they possess cognitive faculties comparable to any other human. A sample consisting of students from various countries is not homogeneous just because they share a variable or two (e.g. being young adults whose lived experience includes academic pursuits and social engagements in a university setting), nor do all students from across the world share in a uniform and recognizable ‘student culture’. For students worldwide, culture shapes, and is shaped by, countless acts of value realization. Yet, the underlying motivational values potentially at play are the same for all, regardless of the cultural or lexiconic particularities that influence how values are named and conceptualized, or the specific ways in which they are situationally realized. University students and corporate employees can cognize, prioritize, and realize the same range of basic values as any other individual. When thinking about formulating a universal framework, then, the goal has to be to identify values that anyone can recognize, and this does not require interviewing all humans, or recording and comparing all cultural ideals, nor are members of ‘traditional’ societies better candidates for studying some essential humanity which ‘modern’ humans can no longer speak to.

Universal statements have long been produced across the social sciences. Indeed, much social scientific scholarship is produced based on the notion that analytical reduction of complexity and diversity can produce useful generalizations (Triandis and Suh 2002; Thomas 2008). Despite identifiable idiosyncrasies, exceptions, and particularities, efforts aimed at ‘discovering’ patterns, rules, or principles are valid and helpful for social scientific analysis, and whether the focus is on human cognition, social systems, or cultural constructs, reducing personal, social, or cultural

complexity in order to identify patterns worth theorizing about is a necessary part of this.

Approaching values from a universalist perspective is especially valuable because this allows moving beyond the intuitive explanations and impressionistic descriptions that characterize much of the culture-oriented literature.

Apart from these disciplinary interests and outlooks, anthropologists likely have also shied away from studying universal values because of the difficulties in conceptualizing theoretically, and tracking empirically, something that is considered all-pervasive and elusive (Robbins 2007, 293; Helgesson and Muniesa 2013, 4). Indeed, there appears to be no clear limit to the number of basic human values that might be identified, such that the challenge of organizing them in a comprehensive way seems daunting. Yet, this is exactly what structuralist anthropologists focused on during the 1960s and 1970s when they theorized about universal structures of human cognition. Lévi-Strauss (1963) famously made the suggestion that all humans think in oppositional terms (e.g. day-night, inside-outside, raw-cooked, nature-culture) and that this shapes how values and ideals are realized in culturally specific ways. If social anthropologists like Mary Douglas (1970 and 1999) sought to associate forms of social organization with characteristic values and outlooks, it was structuralist anthropologists like Lévi-Strauss who attempted to identify linkages between forms of social organization and structures of the mind. This program, more than any other, inspired those archaeologists interested in studying ideational aspects of culture (Deetz 1977; Hodder 1982a, 1982b, and 1990). Since structuralism was prominently concerned with formulating a universal theory of human cognition, its decline likely contributed to the limited interest in values among anthropologists (Graeber 2001, 2; D'Andrade 2008, 3).

One of the problems with structuralism is that it never adequately addressed how universal structures of mind actually motivate the behavior of individuals in particular socio-cultural contexts,

while it could not demonstrate how cognitive structures make and remake socio-cultural formations. Further, the structuralist preoccupation with timeless structures of the human mind exposed it to the charge of ahistoricism. What good could come, then, of identifying universal structures of mind if this supposed universality of human cognition could not explain socio-cultural diversity and historical change (Deetz 1988, 221)? Partly because of such shortcomings, structuralism declined in anthropology. Yet, its ideas have not been altogether abandoned by those few anthropologists who have concerned themselves with the study of values in recent years (e.g. Robbins 2007 and 2013).

### ***2.3.2 Monism vs. Pluralism***

The way structuralism emphasizes the universality of human cognitive structures owes much to the theoretical foundations laid out by linguists like de Saussure (1986[1916]). For de Saussure, the value of a word is determined by its meaning. Yet, meaning is not intrinsic to the word but is derived from comparison with other words. Words, then, embody meaning relationally vis-à-vis other meaning-laden words in an organizational system (i.e. language). Analyzing the systems from which words (or other things like values) derive their meaning is what structuralists occupy themselves with. The structuralist perspective of Louis Dumont likewise became influential in value-research (1970 and 1980). His ‘monist’ approach to the study of the Indian caste system centralized the importance of value hierarchies. This anthropologist argued that the social totality represented by that particular cultural system was organized around a supreme value of ‘cleanliness’, with the highest caste of Brahmin priests (those with religious power) associated with the highest level of cleanliness, which even supersedes that of royalty (those with political and economic power). All other values in Hindu society are related to this supreme all-encompassing value. Here we see the central importance of structural relationality. Notably, Dumont also emphasized that value concepts, as well as the social

contexts in which they are deployed, were not merely distinguishable from each other, they were also ranked. Moreover, rank inversion was a possibility as well, such that a higher value could be deprioritized in lower-ranked contexts where lower-ranked values received the highest priority.

Characteristically, Dumont's focus was not on the value-driven behavior of individual problem-solving actors, but on values as social facts, as shared ideas about a cosmic order; "In Dumont's view, the transformation from non-modern to modern ideology can be seen as a transformation from society as a community (*gemeinschaft*) governed by the principles of the cosmos, to society seen as a collection of contractually related individuals (*gesellschaft*)" (Berger *et al.* 2010, xvii, *original emphasis*). Yet, arguably, Dumont probably overestimated the historical endurance and internal coherence of the Indian value system. Indeed, people may have believed in the universality of their values but still not act in accordance with certain norms or ideals. Furthermore, they also rarely act consciously in accordance with certain values; rather, behavior is motivated by a common-sense knowledge system that rarely requires discursive acknowledgement in everyday situations (Dumont 1977, 20). Moreover, while some value priorities remain relevant to this day, there clearly has also been a movement away from preexisting hierarchies (Berger 2012, 348), and there is no reason to think that such shifts in value prioritization are a uniquely modern phenomenon. Even in pre-modern times, expressions of adherence to a universal purity-centered hierarchy will always only have been made situationally, with trends towards increased or decreased value coherence manifesting in particular times and places. Even a social order like the Hindu caste system is constituted relationally by countless individual subjects in wide variety of social situations (*ibid.*, 333). While Dumont's structuralist work on value systems in India (and Europe) provided anthropologists with important insights on hierarchy-equality and holism-individualism dynamics (Barnes 1985; Macfarlane 1993), the 'monist' perspective it represents was increasingly rejected during the 1980s

when scholars objected to the notion that a culture could be organized around a single all-encompassing value.

Yet, while anthropologists have increasingly been drawn to agency-centric theories (Ortner 2005), the monist perspective such as made famous by Dumont has not been entirely replaced. For example, ethnographic work among the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea led Robbins to identify ‘relationality’ as the supreme value that dominates all social relations within that community; among the Urapmin, “actions that create or enhance relationships are reckoned as moral, while those that prevent relationships from forming or injure those that already exist are immoral” (2007, 308). In similar fashion, Robbins (2013) also identifies a supreme value for Hasidic Jews living in modern-day New York. Within this community, values are prioritized in such a way as to provide men time to conduct religious studies, with as ultimate objective the ‘redemption’ of the Jewish people. Other anthropologists have also perpetuated the monist perspective by continuing the search for supreme values.<sup>16</sup> Here as well it could be argued that individual members of particular collectives are not consciously motivated by an ultimate value in all their actions and interactions. For Robbins’ Jewish community, for example, it is not this highest value of ‘redemption’ that consciously guides everyday actions and interactions. Rather, references to the supreme value are made when people are asked (or challenged) to do so, when they are forced to show how their actions and interactions have meaning, that their lives are meaningful. Be that as it may, these more recent monist works maintain the notion that cultural values are principally located in a hierarchy that all members of the

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<sup>16</sup> For example, among the Berbers of the Moroccan Rif region it is ‘divine grace’ (*baraka*), among the ‘Aru’Aru in the Solomon Islands it is again ‘relationality’, while in a Moluccan village it is ‘law’ (*lor*) that feature as supreme value (Graeber 2001, 19).

community are familiar with. Each value is ordered in such a way as to assist the realization of the supreme value, and, consequently, few morality conflicts (presumably) arise.

In contrast to this, 'pluralism' refers to the way values are not organized hierarchically but may be prioritized differentially depending on personal and collective preferences and contextual relevance. From a pluralist perspective, the pursuit of any value may become the end-goal for certain individuals or sub groups, while any value may become supreme. As a consequence, conflicts in value prioritization are a common part of social life (D'Andrade 2008, 25). This monist-pluralist opposition seems to inform Robbins' division between a 'morality of reproduction' and a 'morality of freedom' (Robbins 2007 and 2012). The former refers to those contexts where people unquestionably adhere to social norms that are based in value hierarchies. Monist cultures presumably offer few situations where members are free to realize their values as they see fit. By contrast, pluralist situations are those where cultural norms are questioned and social actors more strongly consider personal values while navigating social expectations. In those situations, autonomy in conscious value prioritization is central. In drawing this distinction between a morality of reproduction and morality of freedom, Robbins stresses that monist situations provide group members with moral comfort as they go about reproducing their everyday routines in accordance with a well-established value hierarchy. In pluralist situations, on the other hand, people may experience "a heightened sense of moral concern, a drift toward scrupulosity or to fixating on moral debate in everyday life" as a consequence of their autonomy from value systems (Robbins 2007, 311). Yet, such anxiety does not seem to be an inherent feature of pluralist contexts. Acting with autonomy can certainly become part of a society's perception of 'the good life', such that adherence to such a value would then be viewed as morally praiseworthy instead of causing psychological stress or social disruption.

Instead, moral uncertainty and personal anxiety may arise among those people who move between contexts where either kind of morality prevails. For example, the ethnographic literature provides countless examples where the movement from *gemeinschaft*-type communities (e.g. a small rural village) to *gesellschaft*-type contexts (e.g. a large city) can cause anxiety. Yet, in well-established *gesellschaft*-type contexts this struggle has largely been played-out for those who reside there. Furthermore, morality of freedom does not unavoidably result from distressed reproduction moralities because new ones may take their place. One need only think of urban enclaves where strongly bounded ethnic groups maintain strong communal value systems. On the other hand, moralities of freedom are not characteristic of an intermediate phase of communal chaos and uncertainty between periods of harmonious reproduction that are some sort of existential default. It is rather problematic, then, to characterize entire societies or cultures as entirely monist or pluralist. The monist-pluralist distinction does remain analytically useful, but only at lower levels of human engagement. For each context of social engagement it can then be ascertained whether monist or pluralist moralities prevail.

Robbins (2013) seems to reach this conclusion himself in a later publication, when he argues how people always have to face choices in the realization of values. The problem with monism is the way all values are considered vis-à-vis a supreme value at all times. The members of a society may agree on the supreme value, but how the other values are prioritized and realized in relation to this supreme value still involves negotiation or even struggle. People will always have to face situations where they need to be willing to sacrifice realization of one value in order that they might assure realization of another, supreme or not. Value negotiation is always highly situational then. For example, individuals are commonly willing to sacrifice a degree of personal autonomy to ensure membership in a group, yet social engagements can also assist in the realization of autonomy values.

Submission to hierarchical work relations may in fact lead to gains in autonomy when this can be realized by accumulating and spending wage-labor income. Value prioritization may or may not be perceived as tragic or conflictual, but this is entirely determined by individual interests and agendas, as well as context.

### ***2.3.3 Value vs. Values***

While debates shaped by the monist-pluralist contrast have hampered universalist approaches to values among anthropologists, disciplinary trajectories and theoretical perspectives have been shaped by a more encompassing opposition, namely the value-values dichotomy. In noting the apparent anthropological disinterest for the study of ‘values’, Robbins (2013, 100) argues how ‘value’ has remained a topic of interest in the field, if only to critique economic theories and perspectives that ignore cultural influences altogether. Graeber (2013, 224) objects to this observation, not because he is able to identify much anthropological literature specifically concerned with values, but because he takes issue with the value-values distinction altogether. For Graeber, it is in the field of anthropology that the clearest attempts at crossing this divide between ‘value as worth’ and ‘value as worthwhileness’ have taken place. He argues how anthropologists deal with values whenever they engage cultural negotiations of the value-values opposition. How value is created and negotiated in particular cultural contexts - how the inalienable, the priceless, or the incommensurable is made alienable, priced, and commensurable, or not - is exactly what anthropologists have long focused on.

In doing this, anthropologists have created somewhat of a niche for themselves in the social sciences; they dutifully engage the classical philosophical and sociological literature in order to formulate their theories on ‘valuation’ with which to examine culturally-specific instances of value prioritization and realization. This involves moving beyond classifying something as, for example,

commodity or non-commodity, and determining how such constructs are contextually constituted and negotiated. The focus is on action and processes rather than static forms and realities. This is what Otto and Willerslev claim involves a “third line of reasoning”, whereby anthropologists “attempt to establish a kind of synthesis between worth-based theories and values-as-worldviews by looking at the ways action is informed by values and simultaneously creates value” (2013, 3). The recent inaugural publication of the new interdisciplinary Valuation Studies journal also acknowledges the importance of transcending the value-values opposition and examining social processes, structures, mechanisms, and imaginaries that shape all acts of valuation (Helgesson and Muniesa 2013).

The conceptual distinction between ‘value as worth’ on the one hand and ‘value as worthwhileness’ on the other exudes from the literature. Table 14 shows how the value-values opposition manifests in a wide variety of binary concepts in social scientific scholarship. Yet, it must be emphasized that dualistic thinking like this does not require a scholarly mind. Rather, such oppositional constructs are created by all ‘dealers in value’ who contrast the alienable with the inalienable precisely because they seek to exploit the opposition. This is what Stark highlights when noting how entrepreneurs profit from the uncertainty that results from potential (in)commensurability; “entrepreneurship is the ability to keep multiple orders of worth in play and to exploit the resulting ambiguity” (2000, 3). After all, ‘priceless’ and ‘inalienable’ objects are able to collect the highest price precisely because they are deemed to belong to a separate order of worth and are supposedly beyond monetary value (Miller 2008, 1127).

There always exist various ‘logics of value’, ‘orders of worth’, or ‘principles of evaluation’ in any society. Yet, such pluralism should not be equated with chaos or incoherence because the negotiation of different logics of value is still principled and justified. It is also still possible to adhere

to the classical sociological view that a society is functionally divided into spheres, fields, or domains where certain orders or logics predominate. But no group or individual operates exclusively in a single sphere, field, or domain, such that negotiation is a constant feature of human sociality, and this need not necessarily cause social anxiety or inter-group conflict but can just as well lead to cooperation and adaptation. Notably, the value-values division (and the many binary concepts it has engendered) has shaped the trajectory of entire disciplines (Stark 2000). It particularly encouraged the formation of a stark division between ‘economic value’ studied by economists and ‘social values’ studied by sociologists, and it is only in recent decades that scholars on both sides of the divide have increasingly accepted that economic relations are simultaneously social relations. While it is still analytically useful to isolate an economic sphere from other social spheres, the reality remains that all economic activity is embedded in systems and institutions where personal preferences, social norms, and cultural ideals are operationalized. The constitution of ‘value’ always occurs through the situational prioritization and realization of ‘values’. It is the prioritizing of certain values over others (and never their absence as some early social scientists would have it) that allows for the reduction of the priceless into something with monetary value.

In these particular ways anthropologists have approached valuation. Yet, it is notable that this has not involved any recent attempts at formulating a universal values framework that can inform about the substance of basic human values (e.g. freedom or generosity), or the structural linkages between values (e.g. commensurate or conflictual). Indeed, it is surprising for a structuralist like Robbins to suggest that anthropologists should not try and determine “how many different kinds of values there are in the world” (2013, 102). Yet, in response, one could ask whether it is possible to understand the meaning of a single word without comparison to other words, or without knowledge of the

structural makeup of a language. Similarly, is it possible to understand the meaning of a particular value without comparison to other values? When can values be considered compatible or conflictual, and does this vary or remain constant across social and cultural boundaries? It could furthermore be asked whether anthropologists always have to rely on their ethnographic informants to determine precisely what values are socially operationalized, how they are prioritized, in what social contexts, and why cross-cultural patterns in value realization have also long been recognized by social scientists. As this section has shown, anthropologists have excelled in using ethnographic studies to study culturally situated acts of valuation. Yet, particularist descriptions of local valuation practices cannot show why some modes of behavior, social institutions, or ideational constructs manifest cross-culturally while others rarely do. Indeed, anthropologists and other culturalists tend to ignore the fact that a range of highly comparable behaviors, norms, and ideals have a broad cross-cultural occurrence in human history, and, that all can be linked to a limited and knowable range of motivational values. It is this realization that motivates my aim to formulate a methodology to study values in universal terms. The next chapter concerns this particular effort.

## CHAPTER 3: APPROACHING UNIVERSAL VALUES

### 3.1 Definitions and Concepts

Around the middle of the twentieth century, Kluckhohn defined values as conceptions, “explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action” (1951, 395). This early definition encapsulates certain long-held assumptions about values: that people do, or do not, realize values consciously, that value orientations exist at the level of individuals and groups, that values relate to desire, and that they motivate action. The notion that values also function aspirationally is captured by Voich *et al.* who note that values are “deeply held assumptions about how things should be and about how these ends should be achieved” (1994, 1). In other words, they are ideals that people aspire to realize, including ideas on how best to achieve this. In a similar way, Schwartz and Sagie define personal values as “desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” (2000, 467). They emphasize how values as aspirational concepts are maintained by individuals irrespective of context (which isn’t to say that people will not situationally reprioritize their values or adjust associated behaviors in ways that may not cohere with personal priorities).

At the level of individuals, values have an intellectual (cognitive), emotional (affective), and conative (behavioral) dimension, such that people think, feel, and actualize values. Values are what they are because of their situatedness in cognizant, emotional, and embodied beings who act and interact within particular human ecologies. The formation of individually maintained value orientations is greatly shaped by early formative upbringing (see section 3.3.2), but individuals remain open to outside influence throughout their lives, responding adaptively to ever-changing

circumstances during their life course. As members of social groups, individuals orient their lives towards the value-driven norms and ideals that are shared within the community. Values regulate social functioning, then, such that social life would not be possible without them. However, people are never enslaved to the social collective, such that there always remains a degree of agency in the prioritization and realization of values.

Moreover, the hierarchical position of any value in a larger value complex shapes its motivational significance. This is valid for collective value systems characterized as monist or pluralist, where values shape normative as well as idiosyncratic behavior. Even in monist systems where strict value hierarchies are maintained, variation is not the same as deviation; “Every culture permits, and must permit, a sizeable range of alternatives” (Kluckhohn 1951, 415). Distinctions can be made, then, between ‘central values’ that influence most social behavior by inspiring social norms and cultural ideals, and ‘peripheral values’ that have less social impact or influence over normative behavior. These peripheral values are what Kluckhohn refers to as ‘hypothetical values’ that have little real influence on action. These include ‘traditionalistic values’ for which people make some culture-historic association but which have lost most of their operational relevance, and ‘utopian values’ for which people realize it is unlikely they will ever become realized. It is possible and useful, then, to characterize values as ‘dominant’ (prescriptive), ‘variant’ (permissive), ‘deviant’ (prohibitive), and ‘hypothetical’ (non-operationalized).

Much human action consists of habitual behavior, such that individuals are typically only able to rationalize their motivations in terms of values when they are asked (or forced) to do so. Indeed, the motivational content and contextual efficacy of values arises through acts of comparison and recognition. In other words, values are only cognized and expressed by individuals in relation to other values, or the value-driven projects of other people. This difference between habitual and

conscious value realization was already recognized by Kluckhohn who distinguished between ‘asserted values’ for which people are able to give explicit testimony, and ‘operating values’ that are merely implicit in behavior (1951, 408). This idea of consciousness arising from value incongruence is firmly present in the anthropological literature (Nicholson *et al.* 1994, 30; Voich *et al.* 1994, 12; Graeber 2001, 19; D’Andrade 2008, 25).

### **3.2 Towards a Universal Framework of Basic Human Values**

#### ***3.2.1 The Schwartz Theory of Basic Human Values***

With this basic conceptual understanding of values in place, I next turn to the task of formulating a methodological framework of basic human values that can assist archaeological inquiry of value driven actions and interactions in particular socio-historical contexts. The framework presented in this section has at its core a model first formulated by the social psychologist Shalom Schwartz (1994 and 2012), which allows approaching values in a systematic way (Schwartz 2006, 142). An increasing number of social scientists who engage in value-research (e.g. Steenkamp 2001; Imm Ng *et al.* 2006; Hsue *et al.* 2013) have stated their preference for the Schwartz framework because it is theoretically sophisticated, while being able to capture various aspects of a collective value system. The value dimensions that are part of Schwartz’ comprehensive scheme encompass others that have been formulated elsewhere (table 15), while it also uses sample data obtained from more diverse regions. Indeed, it is grounded in the most extensive cross-national study of values performed to date (D’Andrade 2008, 41). Schwartz’ framework covers all those value dimensions used by other researchers, while it is the conceptualization of values as relational constructs that makes this model very useful. This is why Schwartz’ ‘Theory of Basic Human Values’ was chosen to feature as a central component of this archaeological study of values.

In order for social scientists to organize what is potentially a substantial number of basic human values requires the formation of a theoretically informed and methodologically effective framework. For Schwartz, a universal framework of human values allows considering motivational aspects of human behavior in various spheres of life, where personal, institutional (social), and normative (cultural) value prioritizations are negotiated and realized (Schwartz 2006: 139). Extensive international surveying have led to the identification of a substantial number of universally occurring values that hold comparable meaning across cultures (table 16).<sup>17</sup> These cluster in similar ways for all sample groups, allowing for classification into ‘value orientations’. This is shown in Schwartz’ circumplex model (figure 2), which lists nine altogether: *universalism*, *benevolence*, *conformity-tradition*, *security*, *power*, *achievement*, *hedonism*, *stimulation*, and *self-direction*.<sup>18</sup> These orientations are situated in four characteristic ‘value domains’ – *self-transcendence*, *conservation*, *self-enhancement*, and *openness to change* – with the hedonism orientation sharing elements with the latter two (indicated with dotted lines). In addition to these orientations and domains, Schwartz also identifies three antagonistic ‘value dimensions’ (figure 3): *hierarchy-egalitarianism*, *autonomy-embeddedness*, and *mastery-harmony*. These can be used to characterize how particular cultural groups principally engage life’s challenges. In other words, prioritization of values associated with either side of these oppositional dimensions suggests

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<sup>17</sup> For Schwartz and others who conduct value research by using national surveys, the validity of equating cultures with countries is not always made explicit. This is generally found acceptable because countries make for clearly delineated units of analysis. Further, the citizens of countries typically maintain ideas about a shared ‘national culture’, and such notions are generally encouraged by governments (e.g. in education). Lastly, the national identity of survey participants is also more easily ascertained than their membership in sub- or trans-national communities.

<sup>18</sup> The value continuum shows how *conformity* and *tradition* are located in a single wedge because both are broadly motivated by self-subordination. However, the way *tradition* values are located closer to the periphery signals the idea that these are more abstractly absolute and generally conflict more strongly with opposing values (*stimulation* and *self-direction*).

a preferred mode of dealing with worldly phenomena (Schwartz 2013, 3). In contrast to the first two organizational levels (i.e. orientations and domains) that are most suitable for analyzing value prioritization and realization at the level of individuals and institutions, value dimensions can be used for studying values at the cultural level.




Figure 2: Structural continuum of basic human values (adapted from Schwartz, 1994 and 2012)

While Schwartz presents them as discrete, value orientations form a continuum of overlapping motivations, such that each shares motivational goals with two neighboring ones (table 17). The further the distance between values in the continuum, the more motivationally antagonistic they are. An individual or group may situationally prioritize certain values over others in a way that is very different from other individuals or groups, but the way these are structurally related to each other is consistent for all (Schwartz and Sagie 2000, 469). While Schwartz allows for cultural difference

where this concerns the relative importance of values (i.e. how these are placed in value hierarchies), and the preferred ways of realizing these (e.g. in accordance with ‘ideal life’ imaginaries), it is the content and structural relationship of the nine value orientations, as well as their situatedness in four characteristic value domains, that is considered cross-culturally applicable.




Figure 3: Hierarchy-egalitarianism, autonomy-embeddedness, and mastery-harmony dimensions (adapted from Schwartz, 2013)

The fact that it is possible to place these value orientations in a structural continuum has important implications for the way values relate to each other. Value priorities may characterize individuals and their collectives, but an assessment of relative importance can be approached in universal terms due to the continuum’s stable relational arrangement. For example, an individual or group may prioritize contextually certain values over others in a way that is very different from other individuals or groups, but the way these are structurally related to each other is consistent for all (Schwartz and Sagie 2000, 469). Schwartz allows for cultural particularism where this concerns the relative importance of basic values (e.g. helpfulness, ambition, or creativity), how these are placed in value hierarchies, as well as the preferred ways in which these are realized. However, it is the content and stable structural association (proximate or distant) of the nine value orientations, as well as the way they are able to characterize value domains and dimensions, that is considered cross-culturally applicable.

While the worldly instantiation of values can be culturally specific, the work of Schwartz and others does show that a broad cross-cultural consensus exists where this concerns the prioritization of values (Schwartz and Bardi 2001: 280; Bell 2002: 131; Triandis and Suh 2002: 147; D'Andrade 2008: 56; Schwartz 2012: 14). Values clustered within *benevolence*, *universalism*, and *self-direction* are almost unanimously considered primary. This is most likely so because the first two orientations motivate the smooth functioning of social relations, *benevolence* for proximate non-kin (e.g. rural community or neighborhood) and *universalism* for non-proximate others (e.g. city, ethnic group, or country). *Self-direction*, in turn, relates to the high valuation of (relative) autonomy in thought and action. Within the boundaries of the socially acceptable, the autonomous pursuit of personal interests is considered legitimate by most social groups. *Security* and *conformity* relate to communal living, and they are generally ranked lower because of the restriction and control of the individual's autonomy through demands and sanctions. *Hedonism* is strongly linked to the satisfaction of individual desire, and the experience of pleasure and arousal. Because *hedonism* and *stimulation* are not always perceived as socially disruptive (especially when pursued in isolated contexts like the domestic sphere) they are often ranked above *power* which is generally considered more disruptive to communal life. *Achievement* is broadly considered of moderate importance because it reflects an unpredictable compromise between group-centered and self-centered investment of effort. While *tradition* is closely associated with group cohesion, it is typically ranked lower than *security* and *conformity* because it involves commitment to abstract forms (e.g. beliefs, symbols, rituals) rather than the mitigation of behavioral transgressions. The lowest priority is typically given to *power* because of the risks it brings to disrupting social cohesion and stifling individual autonomy. Appreciation may increase when the realization of *power* values (and loss of relative autonomy) is perceived as providing advantages to in-groups without destabilizing social harmony.

The notion of a broad cross-cultural (or ‘global’) consensus in value priorities may raise skepticism (MacMullen 2014, 27), but it must be remembered that this proposition concerns the *prioritization* of universal values, not how people seek to *instantiate* these situationally in particular ways. Furthermore, the proposition seems reasonable precisely because the survey data on which Schwartz’ framework is based was derived from citizens of modern nation states whose lives are thoroughly urbanized and interconnected in highly comparable ways. That such people are primarily interested in cooperating with other individuals and maintaining positive relations with non-kin groups, while at the same time enjoying a strong degree of autonomy, is not surprising in terms of adaptive efficacy (see section 3.3).<sup>19</sup>

Yet, this ‘global consensus’ is not a uniquely post-modern phenomenon since countless ethnographies derived from a wide range of cultural and socio-historical contexts likewise suggest the importance of the *benevolence*, *universalism*, and *self-direction* triad in other times and places. Small geographically bounded communities (i.e. *gemeinschaft*-type arrangements) that stifle the autonomy of individuals and family households by demanding conformity to communal interests, norms, and traditions are well-attested in the literature. However, people have also long formed small nuclear families (less kin with legitimate demands), or moved into larger heterogeneous population centers where there are more opportunities for self-realization and where interpersonal ties are more ephemeral and participation in social networks less permanent. However, it would be a mistake to view the historical expansion of *gesellschaft*-type ecologies wholly in terms of an undesirable consequence of impersonal meta-historical processes (e.g. urbanization, economic integration, or

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<sup>19</sup> This prioritization of *self-transcendence* values (*universalism* and *benevolence*) is even perceived as a human cross-cultural constant, or “natural tendency”, which becomes suppressed due to economic stress and social anxiety (Schwartz and Sagie 2000, 488).

globalization) rather than the empowered realization of value-driven ideals. It is the human ability to act emphatically towards cultural others, and a need for relieving tensions between the local and the global, that have long urged prioritization of *benevolence* and *universalism* values. Such orientations allow people to maintain relations and cohabitate with strangers, to participate in a foreigner's psychological survey or ethnographic interview, and to support universalist projects like the Declaration of Human Rights (Bell 2002: 131).

It certainly seems, then, that some value orientations have wider relevance than others for people around the globe, past and present. Indeed, it is difficult to see how an orientation like *hedonism*, whether of the amoral or the ethical variety, could ever become a normative orientation beyond the level of individuals or sub-culture groups. Certain orientations have the greatest functional efficacy for most people in the majority of social situations. In other words, some value orientations simply are better-suited for contributing to "the survival and flourishing of human societies" (Bell 1997, 171). Consider, for example, how in many parts of Europe it will have been rare for individuals or family groups to have lived their lives in complete isolation since at least the Bronze Age. Suitable value orientations allowed for effective participation in ever-expanding networks of social interaction (despite periods of contraction) and which facilitated the effective negotiation of cultural differences that have never lastingly stood in the way of people reaching agreement over the importance of certain values over others. The human capacity for establishing value-consensus across boundaries of kin, class, and culture has enduringly enabled practical cooperation and conflict prevention (Schwartz and Sagie 2000, 466).

This exposition of a cross-cultural value consensus will serve as a useful point of departure from where to start thinking about past instances of value prioritization and realization. The main point to make, as will be elaborated on below, is that relational aspects determine the potential for

value congruence or incongruence in consistent ways across cultures. So, *hedonism* values will always contrast sharply with those values that serve group maintenance (*benevolence* and *conformity-tradition*), but how exactly individuals and their collectives realize these values is not predetermined. At the same time, however, it is important to subdue radical relativist tendencies and recognize how patterns in implementational preferences (e.g. interest for exotic goods, the expression of identity through dress, or power through the built environment) have also long been recognized by archaeologists.

It is furthermore both possible and useful to reformulate the Schwartz continuum in ways that enhance its analytical efficacy for interdisciplinary research, including archaeological. What may be termed an *individualism-collectivism* dimension has long been recognized by social scientists as one of the main dynamics at-play in all human societies (Kearney 1984, 107; Macfarlane 1993, 1; Voich *et al.* 1994, 6; Thomas 2008, 62).<sup>20</sup> Figure 4 reflects this fundamental dimension along a horizontal axis, together with Schwartz' nine value orientations. Individualist values (*power*, *achievement*, *hedonism*, *stimulation*, and *self-direction*) relate strongly to personal interests, actions, and experiences, while collectivist values (*universalism*, *benevolence*, *conformity-tradition*, and *security*) are all associated with communal interests, actions, and experiences. *Universalism* and *self-direction* on the one hand, and *security* and *power* on the other, are boundary values. Each pertains to both individualist and collectivist motivations. While *universalism* is structurally situated in the collectivist realm, it is proximate to the individualist *self-direction* orientation due to their motivational compatibility; people commonly perceive autonomous self-realization and personal responsibility in universal terms (i.e.

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<sup>20</sup> Schwartz himself describes this opposition as one between a “personal focus” that predominates throughout the *self-enhancement* and *openness to change* domains, and a “social focus” that pervades the *conservation* and *self-transcendence* domains (Schwartz 2012, 13).

all humans are equal in autonomous individuality). Likewise, *power* is an individualist orientation, but it is readily deemed compatible with the collectivist *security* orientation because it can benefit the safety of the in-group; people generally seek to increase their control over people and resources to promote secure living conditions for themselves and their kin.




Figure 4: Four value domains vis-à-vis the individualism-collectivism dimension (figure by author)

While the four value domains identified by Schwartz helpfully characterize the value orientations they subsume, it is useful to relabel these in order to foreground the centrality of the *individualism-collectivism* dimension. In terms of the two individualism domains, the main distinction to be made relates to ‘embeddedness’. Schwartz characterizes *openness to change* values as most strongly opposed to *conservation* values; the former are adaptively the least effective in achieving communal cooperation and cohesion. However, values situated in the *self-enhancement* domain are less antagonistic to *conservation* values because the recognition and subjection sought by individuals who prioritize *power* and *achievement* values are granted by other people. It is useful, then, to relabel the *openness to change*

and *self-enhancement* domains to *disembedded* and *embedded individualism* respectively.<sup>21</sup> It certainly is not the case that disembedded individuals are not interested in maintaining social relations; rather, the motivations that encourage social engagement are different. An important distinction needs to be made between a general desire for being social experienced by all, and for special recognition desired by some; the former covers the entire value continuum, while the latter only relates to the *embedded individualism* domain. As for the collectivist orientations, all are subsumed under the *conservation* and *self-transcendence* domains. The main distinction to be made here is between a collectivism that is more or less inclusive. *Exclusive collectivism* is concerned with the safety and internal cohesion of the in-group (*security* and *conformity-tradition*), while *inclusive collectivism* centralizes the importance of harmonious relations with those beyond the in-group on equal terms (*benevolence* and *universalism*).<sup>22</sup>

The literature provides countless examples of values that can be categorized as either collectivist or individualist (Manago and Greenfield 2011, 2). But, as I argued (section 2.1), individuals and social groups are never entirely collectivist or individualist. More-or-less individualist values are emphasized contextually, depending on institutional and personal priorities, and they are never located in coherent or radically bounded value systems that manifest at a societal level (Javo *et al.* 2004; *contra* Kearney 1984, 75). On the other hand, differences in the prioritization of individualist and collectivist values are certainly noticeable at the level of normative culture (e.g. Gouveia and Ross 2000, 27; Triandis and Suh 2002, 139).

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<sup>21</sup> This distinction between two kinds of individualism resembles a contrast that others have drawn between vertical and horizontal individualism (Triandis and Suh 2002, 140). Vertical individualism aligns with hierarchical values (*power* and *achievement*), while horizontal individualism is characterized by egalitarian values (*self-direction* and *universalism*).

<sup>22</sup> As with individualism, this distinction between *exclusive* and *inclusive collectivism* aligns with one made between vertical and horizontal collectivism (Triandis and Gelfland 1998); the former allows for hierarchical social relations while the latter favors relations based on equality.

### ***3.2.2 Using a Universal Values Framework***

There are a number of clear benefits to be had from adopting the proposed framework of universal values for archaeological inquiry. It not only presents a significant number of basic values of cross-cultural validity, these are also organized in such a way that it becomes possible to talk about relational dynamics. While the values themselves, and their placement in value orientations and value domains, allows for approaching and interpreting personal values, it is the way these can be related to value dimensions that allows for studying values at the level of social groups and (non-)normative culture.

The critical scrutiny of value-oriented arguments is also an important purpose of a universal framework of basic human motivations. For example, we can consider the conflicts that ostensibly arise when people attempt to pursue ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ with equal dedication (Robbins 2013, 101). Equality is a value that is located under the *universalism* orientation within the Schwartz continuum. If liberty, in turn, is equated with the freedom value that is situated within the *self-direction* orientation, we can note that these values are not conflictual at all. On the contrary, as proximate values they are quite compatible. Referencing the values continuum makes it possible, then, to suggest that a supposedly antagonistic liberty value is better understood more broadly as individualist autonomy. This, in turn, prompts considering a range of value orientations that fall within the two individualism domains. Doing so shows that the *universalism* orientation is most conflictual with *power* and *achievement*, where values like wealth and status accumulation contrast sharply with equality.

Another example concerns a critique of the Schwartz framework itself. MacMullen (2014, 26) argues how the continuum does not include certain values that historians may readily come

across in their sources; examples given are ‘God-fearing’ (living in accordance with sacred directives), ‘reproduction’ (producing a large progeny), and ‘approval’ (accumulating renown within a collective). When we consider the continuum, however, it actually is possible to situate such values in particular value domains. God-fearing (or other manifestations of religious zeal or spirituality), can manifest itself at an individual or collective level. When it manifests as a personal pursuit of a spiritual life aimed at gaining inner harmony, God-fearing may be situated in the disembodied individualism quadrant and linked to *stimulation* or *self-direction*. When this form of spirituality is more directly informed by aspects of uncertainty and anxiety, it is best associated with the *security* and *conformity* orientations of the exclusive collectivism quadrant. Of course, for an individual to publically assert that they are God-fearing has a clear communalist motivation. MacMullen’s other values can also readily be placed in the continuum, in that ‘reproduction’ seems to encompass *power* and *security* values, while ‘approval’ lines up best with *achievement* values.

One other clear use of the proposed framework concerns the identification of universal values in particular socio-cultural contexts. To illustrate this, we may briefly return to the sources described in the introduction. Dio Chrysostom, for example, seems to prioritize *universalism* and *benevolence* values, those he also recognizes as shaping the motivations of impoverished people. Those wealthy elites who serve as a moral contrast to the poor (and Dio himself) are critiqued for prioritizing *power* and *achievement* values. In the world described by Petronius, on the other hand, we see how *hedonism* and *achievement* values reign supreme among those whose economic security was never in doubt, and whose social engagements primarily emphasize competence in comportment (appearance, speech, behavior) in the context of luxurious living. The values maintained by transgressive well-to-do freedmen differs somewhat from those adhered to by wealthy elites of noble birth. The self-made freedmen primarily values autonomy, mastery, and self-respect, all values

belonging to the *self-direction* orientation. The difference lies primarily in the way freedmen seem to prioritize values situated in the *disembedded individualism* domain, while noble elites prioritize those that are more readily linked to *embedded individualism*. Noble elites were likely more interested in maintaining the *status quo*, which demands greater subordination to moral and legal constraints, while aspiring freedmen would be more interested in challenging these. It is important to note, however, that all of Petronius' actors seek to realize these values behaviorally in quite comparable ways (e.g. luxurious feasting), while motivational differences can still be proposed.

Turning to the epitaph of the Mactar Harvester, the motivational values that can be recognized are those belonging to both the *embedded individualism* and *exclusive collectivism* domains, mainly covering *security*, *power*, and *achievement* values. This prioritization of *exclusive collectivist* values (*conformity-tradition* and *security*) can also be recognized in Laurence and Trifilò's study of funerary epitaphs, which shows how backward-looking outlooks and parental commemoration were a central focus in *Numidia* (North Africa) and *Baetica* (Spain). By contrast, the funerary texts from France and Italy predominantly broadcast forward-looking outlooks and a preoccupation with the commemoration of children. Referencing the framework allows suggesting that Gallic and Roman orientations align best with *disembedded individualism* (*stimulation* and *self-direction*) compared to the *exclusive collectivism* of Numidians and Baeticans. While Joshels' study adds nuance to these distinctions - because it shows contrasts between the funerary expressions of freeborn citizens, freedmen, and slaves - her comparative work also shows how all three 'classes' were highly concerned with family relations. Distinctions certainly existed, because the children of freeborn citizens and freedmen were free citizens, while the children of slaves would never be; the most that slave parents could hope for is that they or their children would one day be manumitted and gain freedman status. Yet, all three groups show a strong preoccupation with values situated in the

*embedded individualism* and *exclusive collectivism* domains. Much like Numidians and Baeticans, then, Romans were also quite motivated by *self-enhancement* and *conservation* values.

Referencing the value continuum makes it possible, then, to place Laurence and Trifilò's conclusions in a new light. The differences they note are not in value prioritization, but value realization. Where a person came from, the family to which they belonged, what an individual had achieved during a lifetime, this was as important to a Numidian as to a Roman. Equally, the death of a child could affect the stability, prosperity, and perpetuity of a Numidian family as much as a Roman family. However, what these families chose to communicate about the loss of family members in their particular socio-historical environments differed. While in Gaul and Italy an expressive focus was placed on children, in *Numidia* and *Baetica* it was adults. One possible explanation for this difference in value realization may be that the local community held greater significance for Numidian and Baetican families. After all, adult family members were also members of larger communities, while infants and young children were first and foremost members of families. The distinction between family-centric and community-centric values is an important consideration, and one which I will expand upon below (section 2.4). More significantly for this part of the discussion, however, is that this example clearly shows how choices in value realization was still guided by recognizable value priorities.

The prioritization and realization of personal values in local contexts is shaped by socio-historical processes, and this shapes social norms and cultural ideals in the aggregate. Such norms and ideals then have a recursive effect on prioritization and realization, and so on. Where this concerns cultural ideals about the family, for example, communal norms influence intra-family dynamics in non-determinative but potentially influential ways (e.g. regarding such things as household size, internal organization, or child-rearing ideals). The ethnographic literature amply

shows how societies that idealize extended family arrangements also tend to centralize social control values (obedience, authority, hierarchy, obligations), while deemphasizing autonomy and emancipatory values (independence, openness, tolerance), mainly because this ensures internal cooperation and smooth functioning of family life. In other words, it is an adaptive strategy that provides functional advantages. However, due to socio-historical developments such family adaptations may or may not be congruent with prevailing norms and ideals. Personal and institutional values can also enduringly stand in stark contrast to normative cultural values. In reality, individuals are always adapting their behavior to social norms and cultural ideals for certain expected outcomes, in accordance or conflict with personal priorities. Similarly, when non-local norms and behaviors are adopted as a consequence of cross-cultural engagement (e.g. due to colonialism or globalization) this involves similar functional adaptive processes.

Lastly, to demonstrate the analytical efficacy of the proposed framework, I once again consider those value-oriented works produced by archaeologists, from Fischer to González-Ruibal (section 2.2). For some of these it is possible to relate certain observations to the values, value domains, and value dimensions of the continuum (table 18). The individualism-collectivism and hierarchy-egalitarianism dimensions are referenced by most, while others are less frequently recognized. For example, the mastery-harmony dimension appears in various forms in Deetz, Keightley, Wells, and Dobres. The consequences of conflictual openness to change and conservation values are implicitly engaged by Robbins, Glassie, Deetz, and Keightley. Overall, values and value domains are less frequently discussed, while value orientations are almost never considered. This is, of course, a direct result of archaeologists commonly working with non-expressive (e.g. literary, epigraphic, or iconographic) kinds of material evidence which problematizes interpretation of meaning (or motivation). Further, archaeologists have yet to recognize the

analytical worth of universal value frameworks that have long been used by social scientists in other disciplines, such that they remain unfamiliar with their methodological constructs.

Here we have reached a point where we come up against a clear limitation posed by all organizational frameworks that classify fixed categories like values into stable groupings like value orientations, domains, and dimensions. While I have highlighted the deconstructive and (re)interpretive uses of the proposed framework, it cannot be used to talk about the forces and dynamics that help form and transform value orientations in individuals and collectives. For this, it is necessary to consider the role of socio-historical variables (e.g. urbanization, connectivity, education) in shaping human socialization and cognitive development, and, consequently, the (trans)formation of personal and collective value systems. This I will address next.

### **3.3 Formation and Transformation of Value Priorities**

The methodological framework presented in the previous section classifies a wide range of basic human values according to motivational and relational aspects that are valid across cultural boundaries (Schwartz 1994 and 2012; Schwartz *et al.* 2012). Such universal values are maintained subjectively and collectively, and are prioritized and realized through structured improvisation in various contexts of social engagement. Its use foregrounds the interpretive importance of human motivation, a crucial determinant of human action and interaction, without reducing socio-cultural complexity. What it cannot speak to, however, is how individual and collective value priorities form and transform. This section expands on the following question: if the same range of basic value orientations are found among individuals, institutions, and cultures the world over (past and present), is it not also possible to talk about the formation and transformation of value orientations as driven by widely attested socio-historical dynamics in equally universal terms? To be able to assess

this requires going beyond formulating a stable framework of structurally related values. An ‘Archaeology of Values’ cannot remain limited to the description of characteristic traits (of individuals or their collectives), such that we also need to consider the (trans)formational role of human ecologies, along with the adaptive efficacy of basic human values. Only then will it be possible to expand our archaeological narratives with useful causal interpretations of shifts in value priorities, and associated changes in behaviors, norms, and ideals.

### ***3.3.1 Socio-Historical Transformation***

In order to understand how value orientations form and function adaptively, we can consider cognitive development research in the field of Developmental Psychology. Patricia Greenfield (2009 and 2014; Manago and Greenfield 2011), in particular, has elaborated on an ecological framework that centralizes the role of socio-demographic factors in human socialization, learning, and cognitive development, and, consequently, the (trans)formation of value orientations in individuals and their collectives. She suggests that this linkage between human ecologies, cognitive development, and value priorities leads to predictable shifts in developmental pathways. In order to show this, Tönnies’ well-known *gemeinschaft-gesellschaft* opposition is used to contrast ideal-type ecologies at either end of a continuum along which socio-demographic development moves in either direction. Importantly, Greenfield (2009, 402) does not perceive a teleological movement from an original *gemeinschaft*-type situation to a final *gesellschaft*-type situation, she merely considers the many variables linked to contrasting socio-historical conditions in order to elucidate transformational movement along a continuum anchored by contrasting ideal-type ecologies that have never existed, and will never be realized. As analytical concepts, *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* are ecological generalizations that

can be used to indicate transformational directionality, and gauge the substance and transformational impact of a wide range of ecological variables.

While Greenfield refers to a “direction of historical change” towards ideal-type ecologies (*ibid.*, 409), archaeologists generally discuss such movement broadly in terms of complexification, or, more specifically, with terms like specialization or stratification. Such concepts emphasize certain variables over others, like the complexity of social systems, the level of economic diversification, or degree of social differentiation. In this way, archaeological interpretations generally aim to show how certain societies are more or less complex, economically diversified, or socially differentiated. Furthermore, because factors like community-size, population density, or connectivity are widely recognized as important variables in complexification processes, transformational directionality is perhaps best understood as either ‘expansion’ towards *gesellschaft*-type ecologies or ‘contraction’ towards *gemeinschaft*-type ecologies. This seems valid because the movement towards either ecology-type occurs when populations are living together in larger or smaller collectives (aggregation variable), where everyday interactions with non-kin occurs more or less commonly (socialization variable), where people are exposed to a higher or lower diversity of norms, values, and identities (culture variable), and where more or fewer technologies are used (technology variable), complex institutions form (complexity variable), and material wealth is accumulated (resource variable), and more or fewer modalities of power require negotiation (stratification variable). The descriptives ‘expansion’ and ‘contraction’ seem to accurately capture such directional developments.

In table 19 the *gemeinschaft-gesellschaft* division is shown, along with a number of other well-known concepts commonly used by social scientists to talk about transformational directionality and associated variables. While these socio-demographic variables are associated with either contractive or expansive directionality, all do not need to be in play for a collective to be characterized as more

*gemeinschaft* or more *gesellschaft*. The list is also not exhaustive. Over the years, many of these concepts have received their fair share of criticism, primarily for the way they tend to harbor moral judgments (e.g. individualism as amoral, traditionalism as backward, or modernization as improvement), or how they reify what are in reality dynamic social systems. Greenfield (*ibid.*, 415) circumvents some of this criticism because her approach makes no value judgements regarding the losses or gains experienced by people due to expansive or contractive transformations. Furthermore, while global historical developments have over the course of centuries clearly lead to a sustained growth of *gesellschaft*-type ecologies, Greenfield perceives this transformational directionality as dominant rather than persistent or unavoidable. While her framework recognizes that expansion is the dominant historical dynamic, it also allows for instances of contraction.

Historical directionality has been a topic of interest across the social sciences. Post-structurationist scholars, for example, have sought to counter the ahistorical tendencies of structurationists and provide a larger role for historicity in processes of social reproduction and transformation. They argue that socio-cultural structures limit the agency of individuals to such a degree that some developmental outcomes are more likely than others. This results in limited, non-random, historical directionality (e.g. the global spread of literacy or communication technologies), which gives some validity to grand narratives (Bell 2002). Increased social complexity, in turn, results from the accumulation of material and symbolic resources, as well as knowledge and skills, which together can provide competitive advantages to particular human collectives, even if the mutation and recombination of such things remains largely unpredictable. With historical directionality the incidental by-product of unending negotiations of local constraints and affordances, what is perceived, then, is an evolutionism without teleology.

Much like Greenfield, other scholars have also allowed for reversal and contraction. Ames (2007, 491), for example, argues how reversal towards less-complex social forms can occur, while Bell (1997, 184) in similar terms notes that there is always a possibility that the predominantly expansive trajectory of global developments will reverse. Archaeologists have also concerned themselves with the notion of historical directionality, but there are different stances towards the reversal of socio-cultural complexity. McGuire and Saitta (1996, 211), for example, talk about “aggregation and dispersal” as well as expansion and contraction. Hodder (2012), by contrast, is less certain about the possibility of such a reversal. He argues how over the long course of human history people have become increasingly ‘entangled’ (in a material sense) and that this is a trend not easily reversed. Olsen has argued likewise for a long-term increase of materiality, such that “more and more tasks are delegated to non-human actors; more and more actions mediated by things” (2003, 88). This understanding of directionality resembles the idea of a development towards increased cumulative complexification that may be disrupted or temporarily halted at the local level, but never entirely at the meta-level of human historical development (*pace* some global catastrophic event). The cumulative effect of human-thing entanglements encourages directionality, such that it “becomes very difficult, costly in economic, social and cultural terms, to disentangle things and go back to the beginning” (Pollock *et al.* 2014, 163). In other words, a radical reversal (e.g. a ‘return to the Stone Age’) becomes increasingly unlikely. Perhaps it can be agreed that there always will be various levels of expansion and contraction (or entanglement and disentanglement) at any point in human history, relative to a meta-historical trend of increased expansion (or entanglement). In what ways local developments follow or contribute to ‘global’ trends remains an empirical question to be answered.

Greenfield's framework does allow for the manifold ways in which situated agents deal with shifting constraints and affordances in accordance with cultural logics, as well as individual interests, understandings, and abilities (Manago and Greenfield 2011, 22). This is also recognized by Schwartz who underlines the influence of structuring forces over agentic action, but, at the same time, also allows for a reciprocal link between values and socio-economic development. In terms of functional adaptation, "societies continually adapt to political, economic, military, climatic, technological, and other changes in their environment. In this process, their preferred value emphases change", yet, at the same time, "individuals, institutions, and cultures can reciprocally influence exogenous forces" as well (Schwartz 2014, 45). As long as room is made for the contributions of local communities and cultures to macro-scale processes, and for the creative agency of people in shaping their own adaptive behavior, the determinism charge is adequately mitigated against. One clear insight to take away from Greenfield's ecological approach, then, concerns the way socio-demographic variables and transformational trajectories are held to be highly comparable cross-culturally. If the Schwartz continuum provides us with a stable structural scheme of basic human values, Greenfield's work shows how the prioritization and realization of values is influenced by socio-historical variables in highly patterned and predictable ways.

Greenfield's work in Developmental Psychology provides a way for understanding value prioritization in relation to ecological conditions, human adaptive strategies, and cognitive development. But, how exactly does ecological transformation affect value-systems? It certainly is not common for Roman archaeologists to consider how the prioritization and implementation of values, at any level, may be examined in terms of adaptive response to social complexification rather than such things as imperial ideologies or colonial policies. This is not a challenge strictly faced by Romanists of course. For the Roman past as well as the contemporary world, scholars have long

limited their interpretations by prioritizing external influences when pondering local transitions. Schwartz and Sagie note how those who emphasize external influences like colonial domination, military relationships, or international trade are in fact arguing “that the prevalence of modern values across societies may largely be a consequence of the diffusion of Western values and behavior patterns, rather than an adaptive response to structural change” (2000, 473; also see Valsiner 2012, 10).<sup>23</sup> For those who have followed the fervent ‘Romanization’ debates in recent decades (Hingley 2008; Rothe 2013; Versluys 2014), these words, written by two social psychologists, will seem quite familiar. More often than not, the nativist approaches that have prioritized local attitudes and interests in cross-cultural entanglements have been less of a corrective when these are predominantly treated as a response to external pressures (e.g. in terms of native elites willingly negotiating Roman cultural influence).

Local contexts are shaped by a wide variety of internal and external influences that provide the conditions for socialization through which value orientations form in individuals as members of social groups. Such orientations, in turn, shape how people behave adaptively in particular socio-historical contexts that pose challenges and provide opportunities. The countless adaptive actions of individuals have a cumulative effect, such that it becomes possible to characterize a collective by the adaptive behaviors of its members. It is this which makes it possible for anthropologists to make sweeping generalizations about cultural behavior, for laymen to stereotype about national characteristics, and for advertising bureaus to effectively target a particular consumer group with their marketing efforts.

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<sup>23</sup>This might seem like a false dichotomy, but for the social scientist who seeks to understand the motivations that drive human action and interaction, it isn’t primarily material realities or political-economic structures that deserve attention but how people perceive and engage these.

### ***3.3.2 Adaptive Cognitive Development***

Here it is useful to contrast two ideal-type contexts of human socialization and learning (table 20): the ‘traditional’ village-based extended family that centralizes collectivist (i.e. *gemeinschaft*) values and the ‘modern’ city-based nuclear family that prioritizes individualist (i.e. *gesellschaft*) values. Under the *gemeinschaft*-type conditions of the extended family, collectivist values that promote cohesion and interdependence are central. The tasks of child-rearing are distributed among family members, such that child-socialization occurs within a large kin-based collective with much social stimulation. Consequently, parent-child interactions are more limited, with less face-to-face contact, maternal schooling, and object stimulation, while power dynamics are mostly authoritarian in nature. Such collectivist forms of care and socialization result in later self-recognition and less self-regulation. Abstract thinking, independent learning, and negotiating decontextualized phenomena are also less developed. Learning and cognitive performance are primarily valued for the benefits they can bestow to the group.

Under the *gesellschaft*-type conditions of the city-based nuclear family, individualist values that promote self-realization and independence are central. Child-rearing falls to parents and professional educators, such that there is a strong focus on child-development. Socialization primarily takes place within the nuclear family and among non-kin community members. Parent-child interactions occur more frequently, with more face-to-face contact, maternal schooling, and object stimulation, with power dynamics more likely authoritative in nature. Professional schooling not only exposes children to the values of educators and the educational system, but the school setting foregrounds the individuality of the child. Such individualist forms of care and socialization result in earlier self-recognition and more self-regulation. Abstract thinking, independent learning, and negotiating

decontextualized phenomena are more developed. Learning and cognitive performance are primarily valued for the way they encourage self-realization and increase self-esteem.

Comparable observations have been made by other scholars. Triandis and Suh (2002, 141), for example, describe in similar terms this divergence in cognitive development, emotional dispositions, and social skills between groups that harbor contrasting value systems. Among a number of contrasts, they mention how collectivist dispositions are characterized by holistic thinking, a higher tolerance for inconsistencies and contradictions, as well as strong emotional development. Individualist dispositions, on the other hand, are characterized by pluralist thinking, little tolerance for inconsistencies and contradictions, while abstract thought is well-developed (table 21). It compares well with a theoretical framework of psycho-cultural adaptation elaborated on by Erchak (1992, 3), who likewise contrasts the behavioral traits of personalities adapted to particular human ecologies. According to Erchak, “different personalities behave differently in social roles and are therefore rewarded differently by the culture” (*ibid.*, 19), and this influences success in ecological adaptation. In comparing cognitive development in contrasting ecologies, where different value systems are maintained, these studies bring attention to a number of variables. To be sure, not all of these will be equally relevant in any comparable context, while other factors may yet be considered. However, such comparisons do adequately demonstrate the linkage between human ecology and cognitive development, which greatly informs how transformation in value systems may be understood to work.

Greenfield’s ecological approach to human development demonstrates how socio-historical transformation relates to human adaptive behavior and value prioritization. Her insights allow for a clearer understanding of universal human developmental patterns. Further, enhancing the values framework with insights from developmental psychology more generally makes it possible to

provide more sophisticated explanations for behavioral differences in contrasting human ecologies. More important still, it makes it possible to forego characterizing certain instances of cross-cultural entanglement (rather unproductively) as more or less ‘Romanized’, ‘hybridized’, or ‘globalized’. Instead, we can now say that *gesellschaft*-type ecologies expanded in Late La Tène West-Central Europe, or we can describe any Roman provincial context as having experienced certain expansive or contractive processes (e.g. economic growth/decline, increased/decreased connectivity, *etcetera*). A consideration of socialization and cognitive development also allows thinking about the role of emotional development and social skills, and how this prepares and empowers people for extra-local and cross-cultural engagements. Greenfield’s model also suggests that socio-historical adaptation produces recurring patterns in the ways people realize their values, despite cultural particularities. Indeed, people universally negotiate local transformations (i.e. expansive or contractive processes) at particular levels of lived experience, and this produces highly similar patterns of value realization. This is an important realization which I will expand on in the next section.

### **3.4 Value Prioritization at Four Adaptive Levels**

Wilk’s (1990) ethnographic study of social transformation among Q’eqchi Maya groups (Belize) shows how a turn away from subsistence strategies towards market involvement is negotiated (and has consequences) at multiple levels of human experience. At the community level, ‘traditional’ strategies center on the shared exploitation of land and resources. Membership in the community is considered a matter of survival, such that community relations are usually deemed more important than kinship ties. Independent nuclear households predominate, but there exists a high level of exchange and mobility between households and between settlements (e.g. reciprocity and marriage). Houses tend to be dispersed and evenly placed near communally-held land. While all household

members may become involved in productive labor (which has no market-value), male and female spheres are only poorly differentiated, and disposable income is divided among all members.

Measures are regularly taken to prevent social disruption caused by competition between households. These may be aimed at promoting egalitarian ideologies and communal homogeneity (e.g. in the built environment), imposing social constraints on conspicuous consumption, and participating in practices that benefit the community-at-large (e.g. obligatory generosity).

Through the exploitation of economic opportunities beyond the local community (e.g. market-oriented production, immigrant labor) individuals may become empowered in ways that can have significant consequences for themselves, their families, and their communities. Empowered individuals and their families tend to demand greater autonomy from social responsibilities, and this commonly results in a loss of community support. This further increases reliance on extra-local sources for goods and income. Wealth allocation problems between family members arise because labor increasingly has a market-value and commodities a cash-value. Gender-based divisions of labor become more defined, while younger household members who tend to be more successful in exploiting new economic opportunities are demanding more behavioral liberties. The younger generation not only tends to be less interested in contributing to communal expenditures, they actively challenge social norms by new forms (and increased rates) of consumption. Some allocation problems are solved by investment in household property (e.g. buildings and furnishings), while resources are also pooled to provide economic security. Such investment in the household serves to keep the family together, yet this also tends to encourage competition between households that are interested in increasing their autonomy from the community. Inter-household differentiation manifests through such things as house expansions or the clustering of family property. Inter-family

competition for land, labor, and resources also make family ties and inheritance more important, leading to long-term continuity between family and house site.

The transformational dynamics such as described here for the Q'eqchi of Belize are certainly not unique. Comparable cases are readily found in the ethnographic literature (Counihan 1984; Collier *et al.* 2000; Rosenswig 2006; Crawford 2008; Manago and Greenfield 2011). They demonstrate that relations between individuals, families, and their communities are never static but involve endless negotiations. The rights and responsibilities of individuals vis-à-vis the family, or those of the family vis-à-vis the local community, can shift during their life course due to fortunes and set-backs experienced by all. In other words, the negotiation of individual, family, and community priorities is unending. Increased individualism, understood as the prioritization of individual interests and agendas in an increasing number of social contexts, or the dissipation of communal support systems due to the diacritical maneuvering of families, these are developments commonly described in the literature. Yet, at the same time, there are no guaranteed outcomes of economic integration, wealth accumulation, or social complexification for the Q'eqchi or countless other groups that experience expansive transformations. All spheres of life may experience invigoration or depression, and this directly (if not immediately) shapes value prioritization.

From countless such examples found in the ethnographic literature it is possible, and analytically useful, to propose that value prioritization and realization takes place at 'four levels of human adaptive experience': individual, family, community (familiar non-kin), and society (unfamiliar non-kin).<sup>24</sup> People prioritize and implement values at a subjective level, as individuals,

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<sup>24</sup> Others have also recognized similar 'levels of lived experience'. For example, Mathiot (2011) describes dynamics in Late Iron Age settlement patterns at the level of the individual, the family, and the community, while Sastre (2011) talks about 'social scales' (domestic, local, and supra-local) in the context of Iron Age *castro* society in NW Spain. Crowley likewise recognizes scales like "the familia,

but there are clear patterns in the ways this manifests due to regularities in human cognitive formation. For the vast majority of people, past and present, socialization and learning primarily take place in the context of family life, followed by social engagements in various supra-family networks of interaction. For human social life to be possible requires the perpetual negotiation of value priorities between individuals, between individuals and their families, and between people and social groups of various forms and sizes. Recognizing four levels of adaptive value realization allows approaching the prioritization and instantiation of values in a systematic way, and purposefully, with greater specificity than Greenfield's bi-directional framework. Moreover, this also makes it possible to deploy the stable framework of motivational values. I shall begin with a discussion of values at the level of individuals, followed by a treatment of value prioritization and realization at three levels of collective life (family, community, and society). I will also consider the importance of factors like autonomy, anomie, fatalism, and empowerment. This, in turn, allows returning to the values continuum to assess the adaptive valence of values, as well as transformational directionality, at these four levels of lived experience. Moreover, I shall provide a method for archaeologists to operationalize this framework in ways that allow for examining the material record.

### ***3.4.1 Individualism***

When thinking about value prioritization and realization at the individual level, it is imperative to consider the twin concepts individualization and individualism. The former may be understood as a historical process whereby personal autonomy is increasingly emphasized in a growing number of

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the regional politically active classes, the inter-regional cultural koiné” (2011, 205), while Lynch (2003) recognizes individuals, families and communities in her study of Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe.

social domains, and this also becomes accepted as a cultural ideal. As a common historical phenomenon, it has long captured the attention of social scientists. Since the musings of Marx, Tönnies, Durkheim, and Weber, it has been closely tied to modernization, industrialization, and complexification, phenomena believed to encourage the transformation of household-based subsistence economies into specialized wage labor economies where market dependence, high consumption rates, wealth discrepancies, and elective social engagements become the norm. Highly complex and affluent societies are typically individualist because their populations are distributed across large and heterogeneous population centers, while their economies tend to be highly diversified with labor tasks performed by professional specialists. Under such conditions, the lived experience of groups and individuals is shaped by individualism as a motivational ideology (e.g. political liberty, freedom of expression, the pursuit of self-fulfillment, autonomous action, *etcetera*). What prevails in many parts of the contemporary world today are values and ideals that allow and encourage the prioritization and realization of individualism within many realms of social life.

With individualism a cultural ideal, societies allow and encourage (through laws, norms, and discourse) individualist thinking, behaving, and relating. The dominant moral system encourages self-direction, such that personal guilt is deemed more important than conformity to norms and the shaming of deviant behavior. Indeed, in societies where strong individualization processes are at work, decision-making and result-evaluation are increasingly pushed to the private sphere. Each individual is evaluated for their uniqueness as this relates to ideas, understandings, and abilities. Individuals are expected to be self-reliant, creative, assertive, and in pursuit of self-improvement. When social and economic reproduction becomes less defined by kinship ties or communal institutions, personal merit and ‘entrepreneurship’ become increasingly important elements, as do social mobility, wealth accumulation, and conspicuous consumption. The successful accumulation of

socio-economic power also increasingly depends on a willingness for adopting short-term, high-risk, innovative, and norm-challenging strategies. Individualization, then, commonly leads to the social preeminence of innovators and entrepreneurs such as revered in modern globalist discourse.

Some scholars have also elaborated on the linkages between individualism and materialism (Bauman 2001; Wilk 2006). Dumont, for example, argued how traditional community-centric societies centralize relations between people, while relations between people and things are more important in modern individualist societies (1977, 5 and 1986, 62; Macfarlane 1993, 4; Pollock *et al.* 2014, 154). Such a distinction seems problematic since all social relations are always materially constituted. It is perhaps more accurate to say that groups and individuals develop new ways of constituting social relations materially, or that rates of consumption change. While this manifests itself variably, one pattern has emerged across cultures: in increasingly individualist and heterogeneous societies (e.g. those experiencing urbanization processes), the successful realization of a 'good life' typically becomes dependent on the formation and expression of unique identities. This, in turn, centralizes the importance of outward presentation, commonly leading to a preoccupation with health and hygiene, and the management of a social corporal image. Such interests generally result in higher consumption rates (e.g. clothing, dress ornaments, beauty products, hair styles, *etcetera*).

Furthermore, group membership for individualists is often highly varied and fluid because this is mostly driven by self-centered interests. Individualization goes hand in hand with stronger interests in self-indulgence, self-enhancement, and self-direction (Counihan 1984, 47; Fischler 2011, 531). It is a value orientation that prioritizes individual autonomy, experience, and achievement rather than social responsibilities. An awareness of self-construal is strong, such that autonomy and internal attributes rather than interdependence and external attributes are emphasized. For

individualists, other social actors are seen as independent entities rather than community representatives. Individuals are eager to join multiple groups and shift between them in pursuit of self-gratification and personal improvement. However, the ephemeral nature of social relationships need not diminish feelings of loyalty because these can still be experienced as quite strong. Individuals might also develop a sense of separation, not merely *apropos* an abstract society, but from ancestors and descendants. This is what Garzon refers to as ‘ahistorical individualism’ (2000, 50), which results from individuals being increasingly concerned with the present.

For social scientists, modernity provides abundant examples of individualization processes. González-Ruibal, for instance, has suggested that ‘relational identities’ were dominant before the 16th century AD, with ‘individualist identities’ increasing in global dominance since then (2012, 140). Yet, it has become increasingly evident that comparable processes have occurred at other times and in other places, such that these values and ideals are not limited to modernity or ‘Westernized’ countries. We only need to think here of some of the Greco-Roman literati who seemed to have maintained, and disseminated, decidedly individualist ideals that included notions of individual autonomy and personal improvement. Yet, such ideals never over-determined socio-cultural conditions, such that relationality remained a central part of lived experience for these Ancient Greeks and Romans. This also remains the case in our modern world. The place of individuality or relationality as cultural ideals have shifted through time and space, and across cultures, with the former having become increasingly dominant in the modern globalized world, yet, this certainly has not erased the importance of relationality in the lived experience of people the world over.

These ideas on individualization and individualism leave open a range of questions. For instance, how can we best understand this presumably universal interest for autonomy? What happens when individuals are not able to realize their individualist value priorities, or the ideal

constructs these inspire, and how does this shape societies in the aggregate? When considering the autonomy concept, it is important to dispel early modern notions of the essential self-centeredness of ‘natural man’, or later ideas regarding ‘rational’ economic agency, which contrast strongly the needs and interests of individuals and social collectives. Care must be taken to not get bogged down in absolute utilitarian arguments that present individualism (self-interest) and collectivism (conformity) as mutually exclusive (King 2009, 274). The conscious use of ‘autonomy’ instead of ‘independence’ here, accommodates the recognition that the pursuit of individual needs and desires also involves being social.<sup>25</sup> What people desire is the security of being part of a social group, of being intricately and unambiguously connected to the experiences and expectations of others (Sahlins 2013, 168; MacMullen 2014, 30), whilst at the same time feeling that they can largely determine how personal lives are lived.<sup>26</sup> When individuals increase their autonomy, they gain more control over the means for satisfying their needs and desires in emotionally or intellectually satisfying, and morally acceptable, ways. At a basic level this can mean actively pursuing opportunities that increase empowerment through self-directed engagements in particular social

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<sup>25</sup> It is useful here to distinguish between ‘independence’ on the one hand and ‘autonomy’ on the other. The word autonomy originates from the Greek words *auto*, meaning self, and *nomos*, meaning law. In this literal sense, it means that an individual or group has the power to determine, and adhere to, its own set of rules. Independence, on the other hand, signifies the notion that a distinct and bounded entity can exist without being subjected to external influences.

<sup>26</sup> Chirkov *et al.* note the following: “People’s happiness and well-being are inseparable from their experience of personal and motivational autonomy in pursuing freely chosen life-goals, actions, and behaviors. We consider this axiom to be universal and applicable to people from all cultural communities ... the feeling of autonomy and self-determination is what makes us most fully human and so most able to lead deeply satisfying lives - lives that are meaningful and constructive - perhaps the only lives that are worth living” (2011, 1).

contexts, or, alternately, consciously seeking to diminish the psychological impact of disempowerment and dependence.<sup>27</sup>

It's worth recalling how citizens of modern countries almost universally prioritize *self-direction* over *power* values (see section 3.2.1). This suggests that self-determination has more significance to the average person than the control over resources (material, human, or symbolic). Important here is the fact that resources are rarely accumulated for the sake of accumulation alone; if so, it would not be unreasonable to interpret this as a pathological abnormality.<sup>28</sup> Instead, the accumulation of wealth beyond basic necessities becomes instrumental for the way it can satisfy the universal desire for increasing 'relative autonomy'. Yet, this also is not autonomy for autonomy's sake; rather, the ultimate goal is autonomy in realizing values. In other words, the accumulation of wealth is a means to an end. For the same reason, wealth is sometimes given away or autonomy willingly surrendered. Indeed, people commonly participate in their own subordination to the collective by relinquishing individual autonomy. Both generosity and obedience can assist in realizing values. The desire for increased autonomy in individuals rarely entails a complete severing of social ties, or 'liberation' from relations of affect, dependence, and responsibility. Rather, people are interested in decreasing social obligations and communal scrutiny while gaining more control over the conditions for self-realization through continued participation in social life.

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<sup>27</sup> Consider, for instance, the 'celebration of poverty' to be found among various religions of the world, or expressions of 'pride in ignorance' present in North American identity discourse.

<sup>28</sup> A difference can be made between collecting and hoarding. Collecting is widely recognized as a benign leisure activity that is psychologically rewarding to individuals. The amassing of wealth in extreme excess, on the other hand, may be put in terms of hoarding, which is recognized as an affliction that, while psychologically as rewarding as any addiction, impairs personal development and social functioning because it is linked to extreme self-centered behavior.

Counihan's (1984) ethnography of social transformation in Sardinia provides an illustrative example for this. Her study shows how communal bread production gradually gave way to a market-driven system where bread became almost exclusively produced by specialists supplying local supermarkets. Yet, the end of communal bread-production, and other home-processing activities that had long brought women regularly together, did not lead to a significant decline in interpersonal contact or social cohesion. Face-to-face interactions continued to take place, in neutral public spaces, as well as in more private settings where events were organized for select guests. In other words, the women of this community had increased their relative autonomy by reconfiguring how certain social relations were maintained. Professionalization and market integration (i.e. the arrival of bakers and supermarkets) facilitated the sought-after realization of certain value priorities.

In comparable ethnographic contexts, such developments often can be seen to result in starker divisions of labor and gender roles. Gender relations may be greatly disturbed, for example, when traditional roles are tied to special knowledge and skills that diminish in importance when professional specialists (e.g. bakers, potters, weavers) arise who distribute their products through market mechanisms. Quite commonly, the contributions of husbands and brothers increase in importance due to their participation in wage labor arrangements that the family becomes increasingly dependent on. When household production disappears in particular local contexts due to market access, the socio-economic roles of women commonly shift to one of dependence on male household members who are often the first or only ones to exploit cash economies. Furthermore, the equally common reorientation towards commodity consumption that results from participation in cash economies may also increase the dependency of women on male family members. This loss of autonomy experienced by women is a direct consequence of men increasing theirs. But, as shown by Counihan's Sardinian case, the women may actually experience this as a

positive development, likely because dependence on members of the nuclear family is generally preferred over reliance on extended family or familiar non-kin.

It needs to be stressed, however, that when family members gain relative autonomy by accepting wage employment in a market-driven system, they are merely trading one configuration of obligation and scrutiny for another. While the autonomous self-realization aspired to by individualists is achieved by a loosening of social ties and responsibilities, they enter a world of new power relations, distinctions, and dependencies, a world of laborers, specialists, and managers. Yet, this commonly does not dissuade individuals from engaging in such endeavors. While social scientists might argue how poverty and insecurity have long forced people to accept economic inequality, power disparities, and grim labor conditions (Morris 2015, 100), when considering the universal human interest in (relative) autonomy it is possible to make a different argument.

This can be done with a familiar example. Borrowing money from a bank is a rational economic transaction that creates a relationship of legal and clearly stipulated obligation that ensures pay-back of the borrowed sum (plus interest) within a certain timeframe. Once this responsibility has been met, the relationship ends. By contrast, borrowing money from family or friends is a social transaction that creates expectations shaped by ties of affection and moral obligation. Such expectations are far more enduring, unpredictable, and potentially conflictual than those set by banks. In short, what people are aspiring to realize when pursuing rational transactions rather than moral relations is increased relative autonomy.<sup>29</sup> Ethnographic work on social mechanisms like

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<sup>29</sup> It is an argument long made by social scientists, at least since Simmel (1990[1900]) argued how monetary systems arose because these allowed for personal (moral) obligations to be substituted by impersonal ('rational') obligations. It isn't primarily that coinage allows for less cumbersome exchange compared to barter systems where goods and services are exchanged directly for other goods and services; rather, coinage (and other standardized systems of value tokens) greatly increased autonomy in accumulating, storing, moving, and distributing wealth because people can

'hospitality' further substantiates this importance of a human autonomy-seeking motivation (March 1998, 46). For people the world over (past and present), disembedded relations and rational transactions are preferred over embedded relations and moral transactions, unless such embeddeness is sure to provide certain predictable advantages. While it is tempting to explain such dynamics in terms of cultural tradition (as ethnographic informers themselves might claim), this can often best be interpreted in terms of adaptive value prioritization at the level of individuals and families under changing socio-economic conditions.

Another ethnographic example can show how the shifting priorities of individuals and their families shape the communal manifestation of particular norms and ideals. The Baktaman of western New Guinea display different attitudes towards generosity compared to the Balinese of Indonesia (D'Andrade 2008, 135). For the Baktaman, the generosity value is consciously deployed, not because it is morally right to do so or because they experience it as enjoyable, but because it effectively prevents conflict. The Balinese are equally generous and sociable, yet their society differs markedly from Baktaman society. The Baktaman own land communally while other resources (tools, materials, structures) are commonly shared among all members of the community. By contrast, private land-ownership, social distinction, competitive behavior, and wealth accumulation are normal within Balinese society. It is also among the Balinese that generosity is a strongly developed, formally institutionalized, and elaborately expressed value. If "values are always a compromise in a tension between opposing tendencies" (D'Andrade 2008, 136), then the Baktaman do not seem to elaborate on generosity because in their egalitarian society selfishness is rarely an issue. In other words, it is increased social differentiation among the Balinese that encourages the cultural

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forego establishing, maintaining, and keeping track of social relations that had previously been absolutely necessary.

elaboration of the generosity value. Put differently, the cultural normativity of disembedded individualism among the Baktaman encourages them to focus on people in more universal terms (the pursuit of harmony and equality), while the cultural normativity of embedded individualism among the Balinese encourages them to be far more specific about who they share with (the pursuit of dominance and influence).

Examples for this important dynamic are not difficult to find in other culture-historical contexts. In the Roman world, for example, generosity has been studied in terms of ‘euergetism’, a social mechanism that functioned to redistribute the wealth of socio-economic elites to their communities, commonly through the financing of mass events and public works (Lomas and Cornell 2003). This allowed for the realization of both *self-enhancement* and *conservation* values because elites could gain social prestige through their acts of generosity, while their donations served the flourishing of local community life in serviceable and opulent built environments (e.g. infrastructure and urban amenities). In the contemporary world, in turn, we can distinguish between disembedded individuals who donate to good causes due to a universal sense of responsibility, and embedded individuals who manipulate reciprocity and hospitality norms to gain social and economic benefits for themselves and their closest relatives.

This human concern for self-determination involves more than a desire for gaining relative autonomy within families (e.g. children vis-à-vis their parents) and communities (e.g. inter-household dynamics). This very common interest can also be understood more broadly, in terms of a basic desire for lessening the impact of constraining conditions or controlling forces. Human cognitive capacities allow individuals to reflect on the conditions of life, on the worldly influences that influence or control their lives, and to imagine ways of moderating their impact. Again, examples abound. We can think here of the way foragers and farmers alike sought to overcome

environmental constraints by developing various technologies (whereby higher efficiency or productivity is not always the explicit goal or guaranteed outcome), or how artists seek to resist those forces that stifle their creativity, or scholars those that threaten bias-free scholarship.

A consideration of human interest in relative autonomy has to also consider the effects of its diminishment on individuals and their collectives. Expansive processes encourage transformational shifts that can have serious destabilizing repercussions for individuals and their collectives. Quite commonly, expansive developments offer individuals who are motivated by the prospect of increased personal autonomy and self-realization with opportunities to shirk communal responsibilities, resist hierarchical relations, and ignore moral restrictions. In other words, a rise in individualism in close-knit communities generally coincides with a reconfiguration of power relations, a loosening of social ties, and disintegration of communal support systems. Relations deteriorate between those who successfully pursue individualist lifestyles and those who do not, while those between aspiring individualists become more competitive. A contrast commonly made is that between progressive modernizers and conservative traditionalists. When the individualism of modernizers comes to dominate a society, traditionalists may form enclaves of conservatism where they emphasize communal cohesion and ideological coherence in order to cope with stress and anxiety, even if this produces adaptive disadvantages. Because traditionalists may become viewed as a threat to the 'modern' order, this may motivate people to abandon the old ways and adopt individualist lifestyles. Of course, this can be quite detrimental to those individualists who unsuccessfully face increased social competition and economic insecurity, especially when the securities offered by family networks and communal institutions can no longer be relied on.

Under expansive conditions, competition between households, or between household members, may increase when some individuals are granted more liberties and opportunities than

others, distinctions commonly shaped by gender and age. Again, the universal interest for gaining relative autonomy commonly causes conflicts because people maintain different priorities, or they seek to realize their interests in dissonant ways. This is universally shaped by life course dynamics that manifest in comprehensible patterns. The world over, senior members of families and communities are generally more concerned with issues of tradition, stability, health, and comfort, while healthy and energetic youths are typically eager to explore and experiment with change, diversity, and risk-taking. Value conflicts also commonly arise in subsistence-level households when only some of its members are able to exploit new economic opportunities (e.g. wage-labor, cash-based exchanges), with the younger generation generally holding an advantage over senior family members (Wilk 2006, 19).

The stress and anxiety experienced by individuals and their families who experience expansive processes can become a widespread social condition (Erchak 1992, 106). For early scholars, value pluralism and the formation of irreconcilable value spheres (Harrington 2000, 87) were seen as the root cause of the degradation of social institutions (e.g. reciprocity, hospitality, collective labor projects), and subsequent rise in social inequality and economic malaise (Rasmussen 2012, 98). In the social sciences, social pathological behavior is commonly understood as a consequence of such processes; the society that fails some of its members can no longer rely on their goodwill or cooperation, and this invariably invites deviant behavior.

In order to talk about disharmony in value prioritization at a societal level, social scientists have long discussed the merits of the ‘anomie’ concept (Durkheim 1951; Merton 1968; Thio 1975). But it is important to differentiate between disharmony in value ‘prioritization’ and (perceived) disruption of value ‘realization’. The latter is more accurately conceptualized as ‘fatalism’ rather than anomie. Fatalism communicates the idea that individuals perceive a diminished control over their

lives, that there are external forces that cause undesirable changes within a society (Garzon 2000, 52). Fatalism is to be understood as a mindset that forms due to a loss of self-determination, in terms of socio-economic marginalization and imposed regulation. From a value-centric perspective, the cause (or cure) for fatalism relates to the diminished (or increased) ability for people to realize certain values in preferred ways. The contrast to remember, then, is between a lack of value congruence (i.e. anomie) and a lack of control over those forces that (are perceived to) cause value incongruence (i.e. fatalism). A failure to realize a life in congruence with personal, institutional, or cultural values leads to anomie, while a diminished influence over undesirable constraints leads to fatalism. Anomie relates to conditions and consequences, while fatalism speaks to attitudes and outlooks.

When people actually develop a sense of disempowerment, and to what degree, is not universally consistent, but fatalist attitudes commonly become more widespread under globalizing and colonial conditions because local contexts (e.g. social norms, economic systems, or structures of power) are transformed by outside forces that people sense they cannot control or influence. Moreover, fatalism manifests in a wide variety of ways. It may be expressed religiously, for example, in ways that allow people to regain a sense of control over their lives through negotiation with the divine, or to become more accepting of living conditions by reference to a divine will. It can also become experienced somatically, whereby political disempowerment is perceived in terms of emasculation (e.g. sexual malperformance or loss of manhood), or socio-economic malaise becomes expressed in terms of mental or physical illness (Yarris 2011). Such outlooks often encourage a heightened interest in strengthening and healing of the body, with all its material repercussions.

A decline of autonomy in realizing local lifeways in accordance with certain values also commonly results in increased ideological discourse, such that phenomena that are more accurately

characterized as economic or political are commonly put in terms of essential cultural difference. It is not difficult to find examples of this in the ancient literature. While the Greek historian Herodotus (c. 484-425 BC) might be forgiven for his entertaining yet ignorant descriptions of distant lands and peoples, later ethnographic commentary shows an increase in uninformed stereotyping and willful misrepresentation because it was produced under circumstances of increased antagonism (Webster 1996 and 2007). The supposed fertility and bellicosity of Celts and Germans, their natural lust for wealth and wandering, these became common topoi in Greco-Roman literature (Livy *History* 5.34; Strabo *Geography* 4.1.13). Such observations were made by individuals who were couching political and economic conflict in terms of radical cultural difference. The deployment of essentializing characterizations of the Other by economic and political competitors was as common in the past as it is today.

In similar ways, entire communities or cultures can become characterized as essentially fatalistic, such that the circumstances (e.g. political strife, economic inequality, social anxiety) that actually encourage such outlooks and attitudes are entirely ignored. Thus, whether of the ancient Germanic, post-columbian Mesoamerican, or modern Islamic variety, fatalism is treated as a cultural particularity rather than the outcome of socio-historical processes (e.g. the result of Roman, Spanish, and Western imposition respectively). For this very reason Grambo (1988, 16) observes that early scholarship on fatalism has suffered from what may be termed a formalist approach that attempts to describe universal aspects of fatalism without allowing for such factors as historical calamities, socio-economic malaise, or personal suffering. In actuality, anomie and fatalism increase or decrease in occurrence and intensity as shaped by socio-historical factors. When it can be shown that deplorable socio-economic conditions caused stress and anxiety within a society, or if fatalist outlooks can be recognized in the expressions of groups and individuals, then we can assume high levels of value

incongruence and disempowerment. Put differently, when increasing numbers of people are no longer able to effectively adapt to human ecological transformations caused by expansive processes, anomie and fatalism spread. This foregrounding of adaptation does not constitute taking an evolutionary approach that sees maladapted individuals and families 'go extinct'; rather, maladaptation coincides with higher rates of anxiety and disempowerment.

That particular socio-economic conditions can cause tensions and conflicts among human populations has of course long been recognized. Yet, the historical significance of insecurity and anxiety is not commonly recognized, and archaeologists certainly need to reconsider their reliance on cultural identity as a determinative shaper of conflict in their interpretations. Materialist interpretations, moreover, have long centralized competition over resources within and between groups as a universal cause for conflict, such that archaeologists tend to consider factors like environmental marginality, overpopulation, and social differentiation as causes for scarcity and conflict. If they are considered at all, values play second fiddle, or they are understood mainly in terms of manipulating ideology. Yet, if it can be accepted that the survival of a socio-cultural order relies on value coherence, then value incoherence should be granted greater causative force than it has so far received.

Notably, the Greek poet Hesiod clearly identifies value incongruence as one of the major causes of conflict and anxiety. Hesiod witnessed deplorable socio-historical transformations around the turn of the 8th and 7th century BC, developments that for him characterized humanity's Age of Iron (Hesiod *Works and Days* 174).<sup>30</sup> His descriptions include such factors as the degradation of family relationships and loyalties, the decline of hospitality norms, and growth in inter-community

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<sup>30</sup> Similar descriptions were given by Ovid centuries later (Ovid *Metamorphoses* 1).

conflicts. The poet despaired how values like respect, honor, and justice were no longer relevant in a time when wealth and influence meant everything. What this Greek poet describes are of course the consequences of expansive processes (i.e. colonialism, economic growth, social inequality, individualization, and ethno-centrism) taking place in the Archaic Greek world.

Furthermore, it is for these and later times that we also have clear evidence for the rise of various ‘counter-globalization’ or ‘counter-colonialism’ efforts in the form of intellectual schools and spiritual movements that critiqued and worked to rectify the deplorable socio-economic consequences of globalization and colonialism. Morris (2015, 80), following others, notes the historical significance of what has been termed the ‘Axial Age’ (c. 500 BC), a period when numerous secular and spiritual thinkers influenced political leaders and shaped the lives of entire societies throughout Eurasia (including China, India, the Middle-East, and the Mediterranean). While the writings of Greco-Roman historians betray a preoccupation with war and conflict, and philosophers primarily intellectualized about fatalist outlooks, there is also evidence for groups and individuals who were involved in more practical programs (e.g. healing sickness, feeding the poor). Indeed, some have argued for a long-lasting tradition of wandering ‘healers’ (*iatromanti*) who traveled widely to disseminate knowledge, offer political council, improve social conditions, or otherwise alleviate human suffering in the Age of Iron (Ogden 2002, 9; Graf 2009, 48; Tolley 2009, 94; Eidonow 2014, 80).

In Greece, the philosopher Socrates (470-399 BC) elaborated on the notion of happiness, and, from a post-materialist perspective, argued how any individual, regardless of background or personal experience, could and needed to overcome the urge to satisfy basic desires and instead aim to attain a higher form of happiness (*eudaimonia*). This could be achieved through self-reflection, increased awareness, and personal development. Countless other socially engaged intellectuals railed

against the unrestrained acquisition of material wealth, social status, and political power that were widely understood to cause human misery. The literary works of later Stoic philosophers, in particular, reflects an interest for overcoming anomie and fatalism in ancient societies. They too argued how “it is people’s capability for rational thinking and reflective reasoning that makes both autonomy and happiness possible” (Chirkov *et al.* 2011, 3).<sup>31</sup> This ancient philosophical focus on personal empowerment through rational reflection and self-growth as a proposed remedy for fatalism deserves further attention.

Archaeologists will be familiar with the distinction between ‘power-to’ and ‘power-over’ (Miller and Tilley 1984; McGuire and Saitta 1996, 208). Every individual can be said to have a capacity for acting in the world (power-to), but the degree to which people have the ability to control material, human, and cultural resources (power-over) varies significantly.<sup>32</sup> Materialist archaeologists have long been fascinated by issues relating to power-over (material and ideological imposition), while idealist archaeologists (or those maintaining bridging perspectives) are more prone to think in terms of power-to (agency). Notably, neither perspective treats these two notions of power in terms of value-driven motivation. When we consider the Schwartz continuum, the *power* orientation aligns best with the way power-over has been conceptualized. Most archaeologists and anthropologists understand power in this latter materialist sense, whereby it signifies the supposedly universal desire of individuals to gain control over reproductive resources, and to accumulate

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<sup>31</sup> In terms of the values continuum, Stoics seem to have prioritized those values situated in the *disembedded individualism* domain (*self-direction*) and *inclusive collectivism* domain (*universalism* and *benevolence*), and rejected individual autonomy understood in terms of *hedonism*, *achievement*, and *power*, or the kind of ethno-centrism that encouraged violent conflict (*security* and *conformity-tradition*).

<sup>32</sup> Or, put differently, people are interested in gaining ‘freedom from’ or ‘freedom to’ (Bunge 1998, 26).

material wealth (which is conveniently also most easily identified by archaeologists), regardless of social or environmental consequences. To be sure, the material conditions of lived experience have a strong influence over levels of empowerment, which, in turn, influence greatly to what degree, and in what ways, people aim to realize idealist values.

When we approach this issue in terms of value realization, it is possible to conceptualize these two senses of power more broadly, as ‘empowerment’. Using empowerment instead of power underscores a recognition that human motivation is shaped by more than a desire for control and accumulation (Douglas 1999, 413). It may also be derived from other sources, such as the successful implementation of values like self-direction, harmony, or conformity (Erchak 1992, 27). Where people derive a sense of empowerment from is certainly not random, such that it is possible to identify likely sources under particular circumstances. In complex and heterogeneous societies where individualist orientations predominate, self-expression and self-realization are generally highly valued (Triandis and Suh 2002, 142). When individuals are free to choose a course of action, express their unique identities, and exploit opportunities for personal growth, this increases their sense of empowerment. This may be contrasted to conditions in collectivist groups where individuals gain a sense of empowerment from successful adaptation to social expectations (norms and regulations).

Ancient philosophers rightly emphasized how reflexivity and empowerment have a universal presence. Indeed, while no single individual is all-powerful in terms of being able to secure complete control over the forces that shape their lives, anyone can experience an actionable level of empowerment. As socio-historical conditions change, people seek out new sources of empowerment. While this can vary greatly among groups and individuals, clear trends can also be recognized. Bell notes how “religions of love and mercy ... arose at a time of brutal and costly wars, of food shortages, of the rise of cities, of rigid inequalities of social rank, and of widespread poverty.

These religious doctrines, thus, incorporated both existing values of a people coping with the maladaptations of one social order, often old and dying, and the visionary hopes of another social order, struggling to be born” (1997, 204). In Greek religion, erratic cosmic forces and the unpredictable interferences of countless petty deities had to be assuaged with regular offerings. Roman religion, in turn, was shaped by greater individualism because it allowed individuals to engage in *quid pro quo* contracts with deities, providing wealthy dedicants with a clear advantage. Socio-economic inequality became less an issue when Christian individualism allowed for maintaining personal relations with a single prime deity, one that required no material offerings but instead mental and behavioral suppliance. By centralizing individual piety, Christian doctrine also granted autonomy to individuals in terms of ‘free will’. Of course, individuals were still members of faith communities where the collective gaze had a strong regulating effect on behavior, but the ideological focus on personal responsibility is notable. When in later centuries the Catholic Church increasingly sought to constrain individual access to the divine, this undoubtedly coincided with higher rates of fatalism. While anomie and fatalism predictably arise when people experience value incongruence and disempowerment, people will engage in counteracting efforts with an equal measure of certainty (though responses to social anxiety or economic malaise are never equally impactful or enduring).

The main insight to take away from this discussion on autonomy, anomie, fatalism, and empowerment is the following: throughout their lives, individuals continuously negotiate a wide range of opportunities and constraints that shape their lives, and, what is perceived as a hindrance by some may be perceived as an opportunity by others. Crucially, how this is perceived is directly linked to the dominant value orientations that individuals maintain. And, again, it is those countless

individual-level actions and interactions that shape the (trans)formation of social norms and cultural ideals.

### ***3.4.2 Familism***

The primary context of socialization for the vast majority of humans past and present is the family, irrespective of reproductive strategy, or interpersonal dynamics. A wide variety of domestic and residential arrangements have existed over time and across cultures, but the family as a foundational form of human solidarity is near-universal (Greenfield 2009, 403; Nsamenang 2012, 771). At a basic level, the family-group provides a place to dwell in relative comfort, for children to be nurtured and socialized, and for family members to receive and provide support. Personalities initially take shape under the influence of family dynamics. It is in family contexts that children initially learn to adjust their behavior to gain praise and recognition, and where they learn to distinguish themselves.

Relations with the immediate community are also commonly filtered through the family. As Robertson writes it, the family is “a front-line institution for dealing with the complexities and hazards of reproducing whole populations” (1991, 9). Moreover, the family, in whatever form, “whether corporate or extensive, or individualized and nuclear ... functions as the context wherein individuals are brought to an awareness of their culture’s rules” (Deetz 1982, 718). For most people the world over, past and present, the family is the initial and most enduring locus where psychological tendencies initially take form, and where social norms and cultural ideals are instilled.

The construction of ideal-types and analytical categories is a common practice in the social sciences (because this can help tease out particularities and regularities in human behavior), and much effort has long been spent to try and define family households in universal terms (e.g. nuclear, extended, *etcetera*). One problematic consequence of this is that households have too readily been

treated as mere units of analysis, such that their internal dynamism or transformational trajectories are deemphasized or ignored; “households appear like social bricks, static and durable, each brick pretty much like any other in the social edifice” (Robertson 1991, 9). Recent work in economic anthropology (Granovetter 2005; Wilk and Cliggett 2007; Smelser and Swedberg 2005; Jackson 2009), in particular, has dispelled many of the assumptions to be found in centre-periphery models that foreground the conservatism and backwardness of peasant families, as well as their subordination to macro-scale forces and processes. In actuality, rural households can be quite heterogeneous, morphologically and behaviorally, showing great variability in composition, internal relations, organization, and economic activity (Ellis 1993; Roseberry 1995; Djurfeldt 1999; Harris 2005). They are always structured by a complex web of internal and external factors, such that no *a priori* assumptions about such things as gender roles, land-ownership, or commitment to agriculture or market involvement can be made. The continuous balancing of individual and social needs with cultural norms and value systems shapes the ever-shifting objectives of rural households, and this always involves rational assessment that is contingent rather than universal. Furthermore, rural households operate at different levels of socio-economic integration such that they are not universally peripheral to larger historical trends. On the one hand, the social, cultural, and historical are ever-present factors in the constitution of the local and the intimate, but they are never determined by such forces. Such realizations have increasingly shifted the analytical focus towards identifying and understanding family dynamics contextually (Creed 2000, 330).

At the same time, however, the emphasis on uniformity, stability, and durability is commonly projected by families themselves, such that it is necessary to maintain a clear distinction between this subjectively constructed image of the ‘ideal family’, which relates directly to value priorities, and the objective existence of family groups as dynamic congregations of people that are continuously

reconstituted over the life course of one or more generations. While families universally experiment with such things as internal arrangements and labor divisions as they negotiate shifting socio-economic circumstances, the ideal notions they maintain regarding family life are often resilient enough to survive such dynamics. Despite life course dynamics, families commonly seek to realize notions of ‘the good family’, and this includes ideas about family arrangements and the organization of domestic environments. Again, this does not directly determine how family households are actually arranged (and dwellings organized), since many changes are typically made in adaptive response to internal or external factors during a family’s life course. All households experience cycles of expansion and contraction, and this manifests itself differentially depending on value priorities and empowerment levels. Yet, at the same time, some or other motivational ideal of family life is still generally maintained within a community or wider society. Moreover, a failure to achieve such strived-for norms can encourage anomie, especially when this is judged by the community in pathological terms, when the underlying socio-economic factors that shape family arrangements are ignored or denied (Bunge 1998, 45; Creed 2000, 335; Edgell and Docka 2007, 28).

Just like it is possible to talk about individualism as a complex of ideals that centralizes the individual, it is equally useful to talk about the family in terms of ‘familism’. While encapsulating various family-centric phenomena, this concept mainly signifies how individuals put the well-being of the family ahead of their own needs and desires, or the demands of the community (Garzon 2003; Schwartz *et al.* 2010; Li 2013). At the level of individual affect, familism involves a strong sense of attachment to one’s family, and this is variably expressed through cooperative attitudes and feelings of loyalty, respect, obligation, and sacrifice. Familism may also centralize the importance of honoring the family and avoiding shame through disrespectful behavior. Such feelings and attitudes form through years of cohabitation and the sharing in family biographies that strengthen bonds of

affiliation and loyalty. These are commonly experienced as far stronger for the family than any other social group, and tend to extend well into adulthood after children have left the parental household. The notion of ‘filial piety’ captures this desire for honoring and caring for parents during their lifetime, and even long after (e.g. through ritualized behavior like ancestor worship). It could be said that familism can result in heightened retrospective and prospective emphases; what develops is an increased concern with continuity from ancestors, as well as the perpetuation of the lineage through the safeguarding of future generations.

While family members harbor feelings of obligation, they also maintain expectations of support; indeed, familist attitudes and ideals practically provide assurance for this. Yet, the familism concept encompasses more than a simple focus on the welfare of the family group, or the mere provision of basic care and security. People who are guided by familist orientations reference the family for identification and self-formation. They define themselves in relation to the family because they understand their lives and identities to be deeply rooted in the family. As a motivational value complex of close familial interdependency, familism may centralize ideals of marriage, parenthood, and parent-child obligations, often in combination with strong ideas regarding ideal family forms and trajectories (Garzon 2000, 46). Such aspirational constructs guide the life goals of individuals, such that marriage and parenthood, for example, become viewed as essential to personal self-fulfillment. Familism also refers to behavioral ideals that are commonly highly gendered. Indeed, gender polarization and biological essentialism have a common occurrence in ethnographic studies (Edgell and Docka 2007, 27). Such ideals can also shape ideas about ‘spheres of family life’, whereby male activity is commonly more public and women are more closely associated with the private sphere (Håland 2012). Such ideals can furthermore also influence attitudes towards child-rearing

(e.g. more or less strictness), or regarding the equality and autonomy of individual family members (e.g. more or less attention for personal development and self-realization).

While antecedents of the familism concept can be found in 19th century social scientific literature,<sup>33</sup> it is around the middle of the 20th century that sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists elaborated on a number of useful conceptualizations. Adorno *et al.* (1950), for example, critiqued the adverse influence of the conservative (traditionalist) family over the social and political dispositions of individuals as members of civic societies. The influence of familist values on the formation of a civic society was also considered by Banfield (1958). Both influential and infamous, Banfield's work put forward the concept of 'amoral familism' (strong family commitment, weak community engagement, and distrust of social institutions) which he used to argue how the familist orientations nurtured by the inhabitants of a small community in southern Italy formed an obstacle to their participation in civil society. Notably, Banfield interpreted the backwardness and poverty of such communities as a consequence of their cultural (i.e. family-centric) orientation, rather than realizing how families shifted their value priorities as an adaptive response to economic malaise, political impotence, and other manifestations of disempowerment (Muraskin 1974; Erchak 1992, 105; Burawoy *et al.* 2000, 46).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> The French philosopher Rousseau, for example, wrote about the importance of child development, and of nurturing the innate kindness to be found in all humans, in order to counter the negative influences of society (Branco 2012, 751). Garzon mentions the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville and Herbert Spencer, works in which the competitive character of the public domain is commonly contrasted with the spirit of cooperation and care to be found in the domestic domain (Garzon 2003, 547).

<sup>34</sup> Similar descriptions have been made for other historical contexts as well, like the North American western frontier where pioneer lifeways were shaped by harsh living conditions and low levels of communal engagement, encouraging both individualism and amoral familism (MacMullen 2014, 116)

In subsequent decades, superstructure ideals (in terms of Marx) became increasingly culturally normative in the economically and politically stable societies of Northwest Europe and North America. This encouraged the rise of new familist ideals that made families far more open and morally relaxed, and built around principles of individual autonomy and equality. The idea that the family serves primarily to provide its individual members with opportunities for self-realization and achievement is a central notion of the psychologized ‘new familism’ concept. It is ‘psychologized’ because familist values in this vein are placed in the duty of the psychological needs of individual family members, rather than the family itself, or the civic society to which it belongs (Garzon 2003, 548).<sup>35</sup>

Different from this is the conceptualization of ‘political familism’, which “refers to the deployment of family institutions, ideologies, idioms (idiomatic kinship), practices, and relationships” in the pursuit of political goals (Joseph 2011, 150). It is discussed by Joseph in the context of Lebanese political life where political parties are intricately shaped by family relations, and political discourse commonly deploys notions of the ideal family. Another example of such mixing of politics with familist values is offered by Durante *et al.* who have looked at governmental decentralization initiatives in Italy, and the ways these encourage the role of familism in academic hiring (2011). Both examples illustrate how familist values in less stable political-economic systems (economic insecurity, political mistrust) shape the attitudes and behaviors of individuals who are

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<sup>35</sup> What is termed ‘new familism’ refers to a rather instrumental understanding of family life as a means towards personal fulfillment and realization, a resource for addressing psychological needs. It seems somewhat problematic to view this as familism rather than individualism, yet it is what Garzon calls “an individualist reinterpretation of the family” divorced from preexisting community values regarding family life (Garzon 2000, 45).

engaged in self-realizing political projects. This understanding of familism is less individualized (or psychologized) because such diacritical maneuvering requires stronger communal embeddedness.

As with all ideal-type concepts, in using these formulations of familism there is a risk of downplaying dynamics in value prioritization, and, here as well, this can usefully be approached in terms of autonomy and empowerment. Now, it may well be that family interests prevent individuals from contributing to communal efforts or engaging in civic institutions as suggested by Banfield and other proponents of the amoral familism perspective (Bailey 1971). Exclusive attitudes shape engagements with the outside world, and this can certainly be detrimental to communal engagements. This may also be compared to modernization narratives that blame familist attitudes for discouraging individual self-realization and hampering socio-economic success (Hutton 1981, 246; Valenzuela and Dornbusch 1994, 34; MacMullen 2014, 101). Yet, a contrasting view of familism centralizes the ability of families to respond to stress and provide security for its members. From this point-of-view, familism can promote the well-being of family members under challenging socio-economic conditions.<sup>36</sup> It seems, then, that such discrepant valuations of family-centric value orientations are the direct result of families being studied in highly contrastive socio-historical circumstances.

A family continually adapts in dynamic ways to the complexities that arise during its life course. It does this in ways both structured and improvisational, often leading to unforeseen and complex outcomes. And, just like families are able to change household arrangements in response to various forces and influences, so they are able to reprioritize their family-centric values. Informative

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<sup>36</sup> As noted by Voich *et al.* (1994, 13), it is quite common for groups living under stressful conditions to develop inward-looking attitudes and pursue common goals of need-satisfaction through close collaboration with family members, while maintaining exclusionary relations with outsiders.

examples of value reprioritization in family contexts can be found in the ethnographic literature. Migrant communities especially have received much attention because of the crucial role familism plays for people who are forced to negotiate the uncertainties posed by transcultural engagements (Sabogal *et al.* 1987; Bacallao and Smokowski 2007; D'Andrade 2008; Nsamenang 2012; Li 2013). A common topic of interest concerns the internal conflicts that are expected to arise in immigrant families, primarily due to inter-generational differences caused by discrepant acculturation rates of parents and their children; the former tend to emphasize the 'traditional' values of the home community, while the latter more readily adopt the 'modern' values of the host society. Such value discrepancies are commonly expected to erode family cohesion. The way such developments are interpreted in terms of culture, whereby a failure to preserve harmony and ensure reproductive success is directly linked to a strict adherence to familist values (in terms of Banfield), negates the possibility of people reprioritizing their values.

A common notion is that familist values are deprioritized as family members improve their personal circumstances by exploiting opportunities such as education and wage employment, thereby becoming less dependent on family support. Family cohesion is affected when some family members 'get ahead' of those who continue to adhere to cultural traditions (Bacallao and Smokowski 2007). Yet, such foregrounding of cultural tradition should also be understood as a basic coping mechanism favored by people faced with difficult circumstances. While the first generation of immigrant families commonly aims to preserve the cultural norms of the home community, subsequent generations tend to subscribe to different norms as an adaptive response to life in the host society.<sup>37</sup> Conflicts may arise in migrant families because people disagree about value

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<sup>37</sup> Such intergenerational conflicts between children who demand more behavioral tolerance and personal autonomy from the family, and their parents who demand cultural conformity and

prioritization and realization, but this does not necessarily erode feelings of loyalty and obligation.

Despite value discrepancies, expectations of care and support may still continue. In the end, even for migrant families who come to prioritize the ‘modern’ (i.e. new familist) values of individual autonomy and self-realization, the family remains a central point of reference (Lynch 2003, 10).

The level of empowerment experienced by individuals and their families greatly shapes how such dynamics play out. While the family provides care and security, and satisfies the individual’s psychological need for belonging, family life may also empower individuals to reconsider their relative autonomy (e.g. self-direction, satisfaction of personal desires) vis-à-vis the family. The family as a whole may likewise experience increased or diminished levels of empowerment, and this greatly influences internal perspectives and behaviors, as well as patterns of communal engagement. Creed describes the early modern obsession with the family (e.g. celebration of birthdays and holidays, or the veneration of portraits, heirlooms, and family trees) that occurred when early modern “industrial production moved from the household to the factory [and] opened up vast new possibilities and obligations for individuals to construct family worlds according to their own specifications” (2000, 334). Different are the patterns described by Garzon who notes how post-materialist values tend to arise under conditions of economic prosperity and political security, resulting in a shift of focus from security and well-being towards meaning-of-life issues, personal fulfillment, self-expression, equality, and openness to change and variety (Garzon 2000, 49; also see Abramson and Inglehart 1992; Joas 2000, 2; Bell 2002, 133). Families whose members prioritize such post-materialist values are typically externally oriented, such that they harbor reduced levels of mistrust towards others, and

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recognition of authority are readily found in the literature. This can be extended beyond the context of migrant families to any situation where people are introduced to radically different lifeways for a sustained period of time.

are more concerned with broader social issues. The breakup of families and disintegration of family lineages has a higher likelihood when family members pursue such post-materialist or psychologized life goals.

Such attitudes and interests tend to spread under conditions of economic security and political stability, conditions that encourage individual empowerment. Empowered individuals, in turn, are better able to withstand life challenges, and their acquired post-materialist dispositions may still prevail during subsequent periods of economic or political instability. However, for the vast majority of people past and present, securing the basic necessities of life has been a dominant factor, shaping everyday experience and encouraging materialist attitudes. Such considerations also directly inform the shape, frequency, and intensity of family engagements with the community. This is clearly shown by those ethnographic contexts where amoral familism has been deployed as a central concept to explain communal dynamics. In Banfield's (1958) South Italian context, amoral families exhibit a strong distrust for social and political institutions, with a particular dislike for what is perceived as external meddling in family affairs. The emphasis on family autonomy, and mistrust of communal endeavors, is linked to poor economic development and political impotence in the face of unwelcome imposition by distant authorities. However, the blame is placed with familist values and attitudes rather than with the circumstances under which they exist. Instead, what is perceived here is an unwillingness of families to rally behind communal projects, to act together for the common good, unless this grants clear advantages. It is in such studies that familism is treated as antithetical to the development of strong communal life. Yet, it is quite reasonable to interpret the growth of amoral familism as a response to economic malaise and the absence of social institutions that could ameliorate such conditions. Disempowered families are blamed for their preoccupation with family interests and familist values, even though they have little control over the circumstances

that led to their marginalization. Others have referred to this in terms of a ‘culture of poverty’ which supposedly consists of a range of dysfunctional values that poor families transmit to their children (Harvey and Reed 1996). Erchak, on the other hand, puts this clearly in terms of ecological adaptation, by stressing how each new generation born in conditions of poverty has to adapt “anew to the same or similar stultifying and deadening life conditions. It is this continual repeated ‘situational adaptation,’ not the intergenerational transmission of bad values ... that accounts for such problems as educational and economic failure” (1992, 26).

A central issue here is the absence of communal cohesion and institutionalized support systems, the breakdown of which is a common result of expansive processes. This might actually become part of local discourse, whereby people may have a collective memory of such things and they seek to reinstate what was lost (i.e. breakdown of ‘traditional society’ narratives), or there is no collective memory of such things but they seek to realize an imagined future that addresses this absence (i.e. aspirational ‘good society’ projects). It would be a mistake, however, to view communal life and communalist values beyond the immediate family group as foundational to the human condition. The human ability and inclination to live in groups should not be understood to mean that it is a primordial condition from which people have increasingly turned away in recent millennia. Living in collectives larger than the family group is hard work, and this has always been so (McGuire and Saitta 1996, 209). The formation of supra-family associations between people requires openness and trust; “Interpersonal trust refers to a favorable and general attitude towards other people, a tendency to perform and choose social activities which implicate other people, and a high valuation of generosity and trust as personality traits” (Garzon 2000, 48). This is commonly contrasted with the bonds of loyalty and cooperation subsumed under familism, and, in terms of amoral familism, one is even believed to cancel out the other.

Yet, associative collectives beyond the family also commonly use kinship terminology to refer to community roles and relations, and express collective solidarity (Lynch 2003, 1). This reflects directly on the social centrality of the family in community-forming endeavors. Indeed, people often try and establish family-like ties with non-kin individuals. Moreover, familism may actually encourage adherence to communalist rather than differentiating values because it encourages collective life. So, while strong familist orientations can indeed undercut communal relations, the family also offers inspiration for establishing these. Families and their values help form communities, while they in turn may adopt values from the public sphere into the private sphere. Clearly, then, we should understand such dynamics in terms of dialectic exchanges between social spheres where different values are continuously considered for prioritization.

It is not difficult to identify historical instances of families relinquishing their autonomy to communal interests and institutions. For example, one can think of early Christian communities that deemphasized ties of blood and descent, or the urban poor in the Roman Empire who joined professional or religious associations (*collegia*) for the family-like securities they provided. In all such cases, high levels of poverty and insecurity, and concomitant low levels of family empowerment, greatly determined the prioritization of communalist values. It is not the supposed familist orientations of the disempowered, then, that cause the breakdown of community relations and social support systems. After all, impoverished families have a vested interest in maintaining these. Rather, the primary cause of diminished communalism is the diacritical attitudes, interests, and behaviors of empowered and aspiring individuals (and their families) who seek to differentiate themselves within the community, and, in doing so, adversely affect communal endeavors and social support systems.

The rise of the bourgeois family in early modern Europe offers a clear example of such developments. Creed writes how aspirational empowerment shaped by economic improvements

encouraged uniformity in middle-class family arrangements which became powerfully iconic within the broader society. Once established, this idealized model also served to blame the lower classes for their inability to realize it (Creed 2000, 344). In this early modern context we do not see the (irrational) abandonment of communalist values by disempowered families, but their designation as pathologically non-conformist by empowered families who adhere to a particular ideal that encourages diacritical positioning. Furthermore, it is precisely this differentiating form of familism that encourages social inequality in a material sense as well because it is directly linked to such things as wealth accumulation, landownership, tenant systems, labor control, and other such factors, all of which encourage socio-economic inequality. It is a type of familism that commonly encourages stricter intra-household divisions (typically based on gender), separation between private and public spheres, while favoring patriarchic control, all of which are detrimental to individual autonomy. They are the characteristic features of family arrangements in stratified societies, which have a long historical recurrence, and, of which countless aspects are assessable through archaeological inquiry.

### ***3.4.3 Communalism***

Much that has been said about family groups also relates to supra-family collectives. People choose to live within communities beyond the immediate kin group for various reasons. The successful reproduction of the individual and the family can be safeguarded and improved by the establishment of close bonds with non-kin individuals and families. Rural family households may form a close-knit social network through which labor and resources are shared, and relations of mutual support are maintained. Historically, security has been an important factor in motivating the formation of supra-family collectives at various scales. Interest for economic activities like trading and manufacturing has had similar results. More or less distinct communities also formed in the ever-expanding urban

spaces of the ancient world. Elective membership in social groups beyond the kin group offered comparable relations of mutual assistance and responsibility for those poor urbanites faced with high mortality rates and weak or broken family bonds (Lynch 2003, 2). In addition to such instrumental reasons of providing and receiving support and security, there are psychological reasons as well. The human desire to belong and be recognized is strong, and, just like the family, the supra-family community can feature importantly in the psychological formation and self-realization of its individual members.

Yet, communities are also rife with conflict, such that the formation and maintenance of solidarity can be a challenging project, regardless of the motivation for collaboration. Most aspirational projects that envision a society of high social responsibility and engagement tend to ignore that communal life is hard work; “only imaginary communities can appeal to the wish for an egalitarian world in which everyone is validated and in which all contribute as one, and that is only because concrete people do not interact face-to-face in such communities” (Brint 2001, 20). Following Brint’s assessment, we can think how over the course of human history egalitarianism has been much more common among dispersed foraging and pastoral communities due to lower rates of interpersonal contact. By contrast, processes of differentiation commonly occur in dense populations due to cohabitation and high interaction rates. Ultimately, for supra-family collectives to form and function, there has to be a workable level of interpersonal trust that allows for adherence to shared norms and ideals, participation in communal life, and subordination to systems of cooperation and reciprocity, sanctions and punishments.

Just like it is possible to talk about individualist and familist value orientations, so it is possible to talk about this at the community level, in terms of communalism. Membership in a collective beyond the family is based on communally shared beliefs about a shared identity, history,

and future. Ideas of harmony, cooperation, interdependence, and moral duty are widely employed in the everyday experience of strongly communalist groups. Interdependent self-construal is also strong, such that a personal identity defined by group membership may last a lifetime. When communalist values are dominant, individuals are seen as community representatives rather than independent entities. In other words, interdependence and external attributes rather than independence and internal attributes are emphasized. Living life as a shared experience, through everyday social interactions and close relationships, is a central aim for individuals with strong communalist outlooks (Schwartz *et al.* 2010, 549).

Where communalist values prevail, individual and family interests are subordinated to the needs and demands of the community. This manifests itself most commonly as obligatory generosity (sharing of resources and services) and obedience to social norms. Because people directly link responsibility and accountability to morality, they experience a strong need to comply with communal norms; “People commit themselves to the shared goals of their group and are held to those goals because approbation from their fellows is a tangible good in itself, inspiring contentment and pleasure, while the disdain of colleagues is viewed with dread” (King 2009, 282). People want to be admired for their adherence to a shared moral system, such that conformity is achieved simply because people fear the shaming and sanctioning that results from deviant behavior (Thijssen 2012, 455). Behavioral deviance may be forgiven if it also serves the collective good in addition to benefiting individuals and their families. When communalism reigns supreme, notions of honor and shame shape community-level interactions, and, notably, there is little difference in this between egalitarian and stratified societies (*contra* Triandis and Suh 2002, 139). Honor and shame are associated with egalitarian 'fitting in' as much as with differentiating 'rising above'. The social esteem

that is gained through correct behavior and communalist attitudes translates into gains that are aligned with normative values, whether they are egalitarian or differentiating.

Any strong show of communalism should not, however, distract from paying attention to the dynamics of value prioritization that enduringly manifest at the level of individuals, their families, and the community. It is always necessary to critically appraise value prioritization at any of these levels of lived experience. Díaz (2002), for example, argues how, in the context of gang life in southern California, adolescence is a time when the importance of the family may become deemphasized. This is particularly the case for male youths who form surrogate families by maintaining pseudo-familial relations among associations of friends. Such associations increasingly compete with the family, such that identity formation, self-affirmation, and support are increasingly sought and found outside the family. Elective communities such as gangs can even function as surrogate families because individuals can form very strong emotional ties with non-relatives, even when they are not expected to endure. People can turn to friends for practical, moral, or emotional support even when friendships are fleeting (e.g. at work, or at school). Further, in the context of adolescent gang life in California, adulthood often means a reversal of the noted trend, whereby the centrality of the nuclear family is reestablished, with or without relinquishment of close non-kin relations with community members. Again, we see the importance of the human life course on value prioritization. This particular ethnographic case amply demonstrates the complexities that arise when people negotiate value orientations in different social situations, and in different life phases. Furthermore, it shows that communities should not be treated as coherent collective actors, but as situated networks of interaction through which individuals maintain inter-personal relations as they purposefully pursue a wide variety of interests and goals during their lifetime, and this involves constant reprioritization of values.

This particular ethnographic context also demonstrates how *gemeinschaft*-type (non-elective family membership) and *gesellschaft*-type (elective gang membership) aspects can be quite compatible, both shaping the relations of family members active in gang life. This compatibility and merging of *gemeinschaft*-type and *gesellschaft*-type aspects has been noted elsewhere as well. Brint, for example, writes how “the virtues of urbanism - mental freedom, variety of opportunities, diversity of contacts, and constant change - were found to be perfectly compatible with the virtues of community - close personal relations, safety, support, and belonging” (2001, 6). Thus, elective association can provide people with assistance and emotional support unavailable in non-elective communities. Alternately, inequality and conflict, and variable levels of commitment and involvement, can be encountered within geographic communities where mechanical solidarity is thought to prevail. While Durkheim long ago argued for a mechanical or essentialist understanding of the preindustrial community, it has now increasingly become clear that essentialist and other imagined discourse is produced among all kinds of social collectives, while associative bonds of partnership or friendship can also involve strong feelings of attachment and loyalty that are usually associated with familial bonds. Harmony and strife can be found in families as well as religious or professional associations. It is quite possible to find forms of mechanical solidarity in a modern *gesellschaft*-type society, to find examples of selfish individualism within *gemeinschaft*-type communities, or for people to identify ‘subjectively’ with one type of community while ‘objectively’ belonging to another.

On the one hand it can be argued that one kind of solidarity can prevail under certain human ecological conditions, while on the other hand it is also true that these need not be mutually exclusive; aspects belonging to either ideal-type of solidarity can merge situationally (e.g. familial bonds can be established with friends). Moreover, the oscillation between increased and decreased engagements in interest-based associations beyond the mechanical community can be treated as a

universal phenomenon (Thijssen 2012, 468). The primordial mechanical community is the family or kin-group, beyond which intersubjective bonds are established that may be characterized as either mechanical or organic depending on motivational factors. A sense of otherness, mild or extreme, has to be overcome for communal solidarity of any form to take shape, and the human capacity to relate empathically is key here. The formation of community under expansive conditions (e.g. population growth, urbanization, mobility, *etcetera*) can only occur relatively smoothly because of this universal human capacity.

#### ***3.4.4 Universalism***

‘Imagined’ communities (Anderson 1983; Cohen 1985) are non-interactive collectives because population size and spatial dispersal make it impossible for all members to interact or know each other. Within such geographically extensive collectives, any sense of community that exists is wholly discursive. Any relatedness perceived by people is primarily established through imaginaries that foreground relationality. The clearest examples are the ethnic group, territorial nation-state, or ‘global’ *ecumene*. While the territorial boundaries of large political entities or cosmopolitan cities can generally be identified by archaeologists, the boundaries of non-delineated ‘imagined’ communities (e.g. ‘the West’ or ‘the Islamic World’) are difficult to identify.

For Anderson, language and literature in particular allow citizens of modern nation-states to reproduce social imaginaries that stress shared origins and destinies. Of course, such notions are generally also expressed in countless other ways, such as folk dress, art, and music. Through socialization and education, people come to identify with ‘the nation’ as an abstract concept, and share the interests, attitudes, and outlooks of fellow citizens. It was no different for the city-states and empires of the ancient world. Now, it certainly is true that declarations of national identification

and loyalty are expressed by people who participate in interactive networks, but, characteristically for imagined communities, face-to-face interaction between community members is not required.

A straightforward example can illustrate how such imagined discourses are commonly perpetuated at the everyday level, and why people might be motivated to participate in them. I recognize my Dutch nationality from the fact that I was born and raised in the Netherlands, and this grants me the right to carry a Dutch passport. I remain affectively tied to family and friends who still reside in the Netherlands, as well as the Dutch cultural and natural landscape. I have furthermore internalized some of that society's norms and ideals through personal experience, socialization, and education. Yet, at the time of writing this dissertation, I am not participating in the reproduction of a Dutch community, real or imagined, in any interactive way while being a permanent resident of the United States. Moreover, my Dutchness may or may not be recognized by those around me, but it has little consequence to their lives. On the other hand, my non-Dutch neighbors can certainly contribute to the reproduction of notions of Dutchness, for example, by propagating stereotypes regarding cheese consumption, shoe fashion, or flower veneration, or less fanciful ideas concerning social liberalism and political pragmatism. Yet, in doing so, they are not consciously reproducing an 'imagined' Dutch community through participation in nation-bound networks; rather, they are merely consuming and giving expression to discursive constructs that have no relevance to their lives.

The ways in which my American neighbors contribute to imagined notions of 'Americanness' are hardly different. It strikes me that the patriot is a ready participant in nationalist discourse precisely because this requires low levels of dedication and investment. Compared to other forms of communal life, reproduction of the imagined community is least dependent on direct social engagements. Raising flags on national holidays, or keeping these permanently affixed to family

homes, has little direct impact on people's lives, on family autonomy, and it certainly does not demand social engagement. Most likely, therein lies its attraction. The close connection between the rise of the nation-state and individualism (i.e. the increased prioritization of relative autonomy) has long been noted by social scientists.

Notably, small localized (geographically bounded) communities can also be conceptualized as 'imagined' because people can be situated in communities where interpersonal interaction primarily occurs due to geographic proximity. Yet, interaction rates may be extremely low due to predominant value orientations, namely individualism and new familism. Under such conditions, low frequency interaction characterizes social engagements as largely inconsequential (Miller 2015).<sup>38</sup> Any sense of community under such circumstances is primarily imagined, despite its geographic situatedness in a specific locale. Examples of localized non-interactive communities are the modern residential suburb or the gentrified rural village. Especially under present-day conditions in the United States and Europe, many people are situated within such collectives; there is co-presence, but people do not necessarily participate in social networks through which a sense of community, the one in which they are geographically located, is reproduced. In other words, when there is interaction people are networked, when there is no interaction there is no network, but a community may still exist. This may be a contentious position to adopt, but it stems in the reasonable proposition that co-presence and acknowledgement of another's existence (e.g. greeting a stranger

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<sup>38</sup> Beyond instrumentally-driven interaction, people can influence the behavior of community members without interacting. How they decorate their house during festive times, how they landscape their gardens, what lifestyles they maintain, this may all influence the behavior of those who maintain geographic proximity but do not interact. The vast majority of communal engagements may occur at this level. Such a situation is accurately characterized in terms of social disembeddedness.

on the street) is not the same as actively collaborating in the maintenance of meaningful social relations in networks of interaction.

The non-interactive belief-based community can be both dispersed and localized then. This is why the oft-referenced rural-urban opposition is often difficult to maintain in the contemporary world. In the literature, the small rural community characterized by stability, homogeneity, social embeddedness, and mechanical solidarity has long represented the primordial *gemeinschaft*. The city, by contrast, has stood for instability, heterogeneity, social disembeddedness, and organic solidarity in terms of *gesellschaft*. Yet, the supposed coherence of particular social contexts with either of these ideal-typical arrangements is often hard to demonstrate. This was already the case in Tönnies' own time when the primordial *gemeinschaft* was difficult to locate.<sup>39</sup> Again, it is quite possible for people to pursue *gemeinschaft*-type relations within *gesellschaft*-type contexts, or maintain *gesellschaft*-type relations in *gemeinschaft*-type contexts. It is important, then, to determine contextually whether we should understand local collectives in terms of 'community' or 'society'.

As I argued earlier, communalism refers to the ways the interests and values of a supra-family collective converge into a shared complex of norms and ideals that are reproduced through participation in networks of high or low frequency interactions. Universalism, by contrast, is the predominant value orientation that manifests itself at the level of the non-interactive society. Social life in heterogeneous contexts like cities is more complex because people are forced to negotiate a larger variety of identities, outlooks, norms, and ideals. For social life to unfold efficiently and

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<sup>39</sup> There is a commonly made dichotomy whereby urban dynamism is opposed to rural backwardness. The sped-up lifeways of modern urbanites are contrasted with the dreary (and oft-romanticizes) timelessness of traditional rurality. The rural then represents the Other in the formation of understandings of the modern or urban self. When this happens, rurality comes to represent a hinterland or periphery. Notably, these are not simply modern constructs as they were made in the past as well.

peacefully under such circumstances requires the formation of tolerant dispositions; “The recognition of the *value of otherness* is essential to successfully integrating individuals into an organic whole. Recognition claims tend to promote group differentiation but also organic solidarity because they also proclaim unity in diversity” (Thijssen 2012, 456; *my emphasis*). Tolerance for difference has to increase for people to successfully navigate larger collectives and their complex internal dynamics. For Triandis and Suh, cultural tightness relates to conformity and leniency, or, in other words, how lenient people are in accepting transgression of norms and rules (2002, 139). ‘Tight’ cultures show less leniency, while ‘loose’ cultures show more tolerance. In society-level contexts, the policing of social norms is greatly diminished. To be sure, systems of norm regulation certainly can increase under particular historical conditions (e.g. wartime) or within certain political systems (e.g. totalitarian regimes), but this does not change the characteristic ecological conditions of such heterogeneous contexts. In other words, in terms of functional efficacy, tolerance and trust are central aspects of the universalist value orientation that offer the best adaptive advantages in society level contexts.

#### ***3.4.5 Directional Dynamics at Four Adaptive Levels***

In order to reduce what are seemingly endless permutations of value realization (the bread and butter of cultural ethnographers) to a manageable set of value-based motivations, I will next relate these observations about value prioritization and realization at four levels of lived experience more directly to the universal values framework. This allows talking about both adaptive efficacy and transformational directionality. Four ideal-type value spheres are positioned at four cardinal points around the values continuum (figure 5) - *hedonism* for the individual, *power* and *security* for the family, *conformity* and *benevolence* for the community, and *self-direction* and *universalism* for the society. This is

done based on the assumption that cultural particularities (e.g. ideal family arrangements, or communal reciprocal systems) ultimately result from people prioritizing values that provide the greatest adaptive advantages at these four universal levels of lived experience. It is necessary to emphasize the role of adaptive efficacy, because, despite cultural particularities, the realization of certain basic values over others provides clear adaptive benefits at the level of personal value realization (and, in the aggregate, the formation of social norms and cultural ideals). Moreover, because personal value realization occurs in highly comparable socio-historical situations, patterns manifest that are both recognizable and comprehensible.




Figure 5: Four ideal adaptive levels vis-à-vis the values continuum (figure by author)

In order to talk about transformational directionality, three-fold divisions are conceptualized for each of the four ideal-type orientations (table 22). From any of these (e.g. familism), it is highly likely for value adjustments to move in one of two directions towards proximate value domains (e.g. starting from familism and moving towards either diacritical familism or conformist familism). This is based on the following proposition: as people reorder their value preferences in adaptive ways to

changing socio-historical conditions (i.e. contraction or expansion), this rarely results in the prioritization of radically different values; rather, adjustments are slight, enough to allow for adaptive benefits to be gained, but not enough to cause psychological stress or social conflict.

‘Individualism’ - People are not born with morals, nor are they able to act in accordance with communal norms and interests until they are socialized through education and social experiences to care for such things. The value orientation of the radically autonomous and affectively self-gratifying individual centers on *hedonism*. This individual is entirely focused on satisfying personal desires for comfort and pleasure. This conflicts most strongly with those values that are central to forming and maintaining social groups beyond the immediate kin-group (*benevolence* and *conformity-tradition*). The formation of personal value orientations during early childhood generally involves a movement away from the *hedonism* orientation that serves as the human infant’s fundamental baseline, into either the *embedded individualism* or the *disembedded individualism* domain. If, on the other hand, *hedonism* remains a central value orientation for individuals beyond the formative years of childhood, this is commonly perceived as amoral because associated behaviors are deemed incompatible with social life.

‘Disembedded Individualism’ - As children grow up and personalities form, the hedonistic infant may develop a dominant individualist orientation with directionality moving towards *stimulation* (pursuit of new experiences) and *self-direction* (creativity, assertiveness, and personal development). While such orientations still conflict strongly with those values that are central to maintaining social cohesion at the community level, such orientations provide the greatest adaptive benefits at the level of the populous heterogeneous society (compare ‘Disembedded Universalism’).

‘Diacritical Individualism’ - Alternately, children grow into adults whose dominant value priorities align best with *achievement* (recognized success, ambition, and competence) and *power* (control, wealth, and prestige) orientations. Compared to disembedded individuals, the aspirations of

diacritical individuals requires greater embeddedness because their aspirations for gaining social distinction can only be realized through higher levels of social engagement (compare 'Diacritical Familism').

'Familism' - The universal desire for individuals to belong to tight-knit groups of mutual care and responsibility manifests almost universally through membership in family groups. The central priority of the family is to provide a safe and stable reproductive environment for its members, regardless of personal preferences, social norms, or cultural ideals that shape in what ways this is realized (e.g. nuclear or extended, autarkic or symbiotic, differentiating or egalitarian). The *security* and *power* orientations provide families who are predominantly concerned about safety, stability, and resource availability with the greatest adaptive benefits. This is especially so for families with low levels of empowerment, those that cannot rely on communal support systems or perceive communal engagements as disadvantageous or intrusive. More elementary, however, are parental concerns for child growth and safety, which likewise foreground the adaptive efficacy of these orientations. From the point of view of the broader society (e.g. the civic state), such family-centered orientations may come to be considered amoral (in terms of Banfield) because it is entirely inward-looking or enclave-like.

'Diacritical Familism' - Growing empowerment may lead a family to deemphasize the importance of *security* and reorient their priorities towards *power* and *achievement* values. Families that engage in such differentiating activities are interested in amassing greater wealth and social standing, and may even strive for leadership roles. Because of the potential benefits this can bring to the community, this form of familism (and the social stratification it encourages) is less readily touted as amoral; yet, such benefits are a potential only because, quite commonly, diacritical familism

encourages an ever stronger desire for gaining autonomy from communal responsibilities like public expenditures or reciprocity systems (compare ‘Diacritical Individualism’).

‘Conformist Familism’ - By contrast, families may prioritize the needs of the community (*conformity-tradition*) more highly under particular socio-historical circumstances. Families are most likely to value communal engagements when stable and fair reciprocal systems are in place, such that family security is not put at risk. *Conformity* values may become prioritized when the survival of social structures requires more than the sharing of abstract traditions. In other words, community membership requires active participation in communal projects and institutions, and dedicated conformity to rules and norms. Consequently, an initial step for conformist families who try to differentiate themselves within the community is foregrounding the importance of less demanding abstract tradition values over more demanding conformity values (compare ‘Conformist Communalism’).

‘Communalism’ - For people to form stable and enduring supra-family communities requires prioritization of *benevolence* and *conformity-tradition* values (responsibility, care, obedience, and respect). Such orientations are functionally most effective for forming stable bonds with groups and individuals that are not a member of the immediate kin-group.

‘Conformist Communalism’ - A movement away from *benevolence* and *conformity-tradition* towards *security* (stability and safety) occurs in exclusive communities that prioritize the safety and integrity of the self-contained community. Due to a heightened preoccupation with preservation, such inward-looking communities are less accepting of outsiders and outside influence. *Gemeinschaft*-type variables are best used to characterize this kind of communalism (compare ‘Conformist Familism’).

‘Benevolent Communalism’ - When communities prioritize universal responsibility and care (*benevolence* and *universalism*) more they can be said to become more inclusive. Such outward-looking communities are more accepting of outsiders and concerned with supra-community interests. Communalism of this kind is best characterized by referencing *gesellschaft*-type variables (compare ‘Benevolent Universalism’).

‘Universalism’ - The formation and survival of large heterogeneous collectives depends on the successful realization of *universalism* and *self-direction* values. The plurality of outlooks, interests, and identities to be found in such contexts necessitates openness towards otherness, and prioritization of values like equality, harmony, creativity, and self-guidance.

‘Disembedded Universalism’ - Society-level contexts offer affordances (e.g. anonymity and autonomy) that allow for resisting the regulating influence of families and communities. For many individuals who act and interact in such contexts autonomous action (*self-direction*), personal experience, and self-growth (*stimulation*) are primary motivations (compare ‘Disembedded Individualism’). The progressive liberal society foregrounds the importance of Disembedded Universalism.

‘Benevolent Universalism’ - Alternately, *benevolence* values are prioritized when there is less emphasis on self-centered pursuits and greater concern for social issues. There may also be movement towards (abstract) *tradition* values in loose societies and (regulating) *conformity* values in tight societies (compare ‘Benevolent Communalism’). Social liberalism and democratic socialism are descriptives used to describe progressive collectivist societies of this kind.

This scheme presents four ideal-type orientations that encompass values that provide the greatest adaptive benefits at four levels of lived experience. One of its purposes is to encourage

archaeologists to try and determine whether people actually prioritized and sought to realize these best-fit values at four levels of lived experience, and in what ways. But, how might such a scheme assist archaeological interpretation in practical terms? To start, archaeologists can at least continue doing what they are already doing, which is determining for each context under investigation how the material evidence for human activity links to behavioral regularities and social dynamics. Does the material evidence reflect the value-motivated behavior of human agents as unique individuals, or, in more patterned ways as members of families or larger social groups? Once it is determined at what level of lived experience these phenomena manifest, how may this be further characterized vis-à-vis particular value orientations? Does the material record speak to *embedded* or *disembedded individualism*, *inclusive* or *exclusive collectivism*, and in what domains of human practice does this manifest (e.g. domestic life, communal ceremonies, *etcetera*)? What can archaeological evidence tell us about factors that can speak to levels of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, like connectivity or the local impact of regional and global trends?

Countless ethnographic cases are available to archaeologists that can inform how people have long negotiated expansive and contractive processes in patterned and idiosyncratic ways, at these four levels of lived experience. It is useful to look more closely at one of these, namely Adams' (1988) study of the 'modernization' of third-world farming families. Doing so can demonstrate how the proposed scheme can be operationalized by archaeologists. Adams recognizes three 'tiers of agricultural industrialization'. Her first tier consists of highly capitalized industrial agriculturalists who largely produce for export. Their rise is often accompanied by the displacement of small farming households and the accumulation of land and resources in the hands of elite landowners. This also involves the formation of rural landscapes shaped by increased boundary maintenance and the use of specialized farming facilities. The reliance on wage labor is paramount. Ties with the local

community are predominantly shaped by diacritical relations, such as those manifested through patron-client systems. A middle-tier is occupied by small peasant producers who are able to tap into local markets by expanding and capitalizing their production. They mainly accomplish this by utilizing family labor, such that the role of wage labor is negligible. Due to the successful exploitation of commercial opportunities, ties with the broader agricultural community become circumscribed, leading to a reduction in inter-household reciprocity and dependency. A third tier, lastly, is occupied by semi-self-sufficient peasants who tend to work marginal lands. For these households, the continued maintenance of communal ties remains central to their well-being. There is also a complete reliance on the productivity of all household members. Participation in local commercial exchanges is only possible when surpluses are available, while households may become increasingly reliant on providing wage labor to other households and enterprises. Private land ownership, which is of central concern under capitalist agricultural conditions, may not be possible at the third tier, even for marginal lands, such that tenancy may become a necessity for many.

With this three-tiered system in mind, several familiar patterns can be identified when considering interest for autonomy in relation to family demographics. While the size and internal age distribution of families in the third tier is all-important for their productivity, this is of little significance for families operating in the first tier. As this relates to gender, the economic contributions of women, which in the pre-capitalist agricultural system was centrally organized around household production (e.g. food, pottery, cloth), has decreases significantly in the first tier. With the men of the household increasingly in control of commercial management, women's domestic tasks are increasingly defined in terms of superfluous 'expressive tasks' (e.g. aesthetic craftwork, personal conduct and appearance, leisure and hosting), while the household is

increasingly viewed as a consumption unit (Kampen 1981, 130; Adams 1988, 473).<sup>40</sup> It is for households in the third tier that the productivity of women remains central, while some women become active in new roles (e.g. as managers) required for the commercial endeavours of second tier households that produce for markets.

Adams' three-tiered approach allows for considering her ethnographic observations vis-à-vis the values continuum. Specifically, her three types of rural families - industrial agriculturalists, small peasant producers, and semi-self-sufficient peasants - seem to suitably align with the three forms of familism - diacritical familism, familism, and conformist familism respectively. Further, and for archaeologists especially, it is ethnographic cases like Adams' that make it possible to see how people realize these adaptive values in highly patterned ways, in particular materially through productive strategies, built environments, consumptive behaviors, *etcetera*.

### **3.5 Methods, Materials, and Beyond**

It is important to emphasize here that this dissertation does not seek to 'prove' a particular thesis. Rather, the main goal is to engage in a kind of exploratory archaeology whereby I approach various contexts and categories of evidence from a unique theoretical perspective and by deploying a distinct methodological toolset in order to address the kind of value-centric questions posed in the introduction (section 1.3). The motivation for doing so stems in a desire to not engage in either a

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<sup>40</sup> As stressed by Poe and Ralston (2011, 376), it certainly is necessary for modern scholars to become more aware of their own gender-based assumptions that encourage them to foreground factors like 'fashion' and 'cosmetics' instead of 'power' when talking about the social place of women in past societies. On the other hand, idealization of feminine beauty is not simply Western or modern. It can readily be shown how such preoccupations have a cross-cultural occurrence, especially when certain socio-historical conditions encourage prioritization of particular values (e.g. *diacritical familism*, see section 2.4.2).

crude scientific archaeology of ‘hard facts’ or an overly speculative heuristic archaeology of ‘soft facts’, but an interdisciplinary archaeology that values theoretical and methodological multifocality and allows for the exploration of a wide variety of data sources in order to increase our understanding of the forces and motivations that shape human action and interaction in both predictable and unexpected ways (Deetz 1983). As such, the theoretical and methodological framework which I formulated in the previous chapters has three main purposes: to allow critical assessment of archaeological interpretations, to guide the formulation of value-oriented questions, and to assist the analysis of different forms of evidence derived from various social domains.

One of the main methodological arguments I made in chapter two (section 2.1) is that there is a need for diminishing our reliance on utilitarian variables and ultimate materialist causes (e.g. surplus production or technological innovation) and pay equal attention to cognition and expressivity. In chapter three (section 3.2), I reviewed and elaborated on a universal values framework that orders a range of universal values in a stable relational continuum. While featuring as a core methodological component, I also argued (section 3.3) that such a static scheme cannot be used to understand the dynamics that help form and transform value orientations in individuals and collectives. This is why it is necessary to also consider the influence of socio-historical processes (e.g. economic expansion, demographic growth, urbanization, commercialization) over human socialization and cognitive development, and, consequently, the (trans)formation of personal and collective value preferences. Several well-known processes are listed in table 19. Archaeologists can use this information to relate socio-historical variables to broad shifts in value systems (e.g. individualization, stratification).

The chosen approach can also address another prominent problematic which I identified in chapter two. This concerns the common assumption that past socio-cultural transformations were

primarily driven by the machinations of differentiating aspirers who managed to gain disproportionate control over symbolic and material resources in their communities. Considering a broader range of socio-historical phenomena and relating these to basic human motivations can assist in meeting this challenge. To be sure, it remains valid and useful to talk in terms of egalitarianism or stratification because the values framework allows understanding the motivational values that drove such oft-mentioned processes (e.g. socio-economic differentiation typically result from the successful realization of *self-enhancement* values). However, it should be understood that a broader range of motivations needs to be considered for understanding human action and interaction.

In section 3.2.2, I talked about some of the ways in which the framework can be used to expose implicit assumptions, deconstruct common arguments, and (re)interpret different kinds of evidence. This showed that archaeologists can consider a variety of sources for explicit expressions of values, or implicit manifestations of value-motivated behavior. In section 3.4, in turn, I argued that still greater specificity can be achieved by using a four-fold scheme of adaptive value realization, which I operationalized by using a three-tiered approach borrowed from Adams' (1988) ethnographic work on rural industrialization. Taken together, this allows approaching past expressions and behaviors in terms of orientations (e.g. conformity), domains (e.g. embedded individualism), dimensions (e.g. mastery vs. harmony), or adaptive value realization (e.g. diacritical familism). In other words, it is possible to assess the motivation behind certain kinds of behavior in reference to different conceptual classes of human motivation.

Another goal is to better understand the material manifestation of basic human values comparatively. Furthermore, comparisons with ancient and modern ethnographies can assist the analysis of socio-historical trends and behavioral patterns because phenomena that have a cross-cultural occurrence can inspire the interpretation of contextual particularities. For archaeologists

especially, it is ethnographic comparison that allows understanding how people have historically realized certain adaptive values in highly patterned ways, and with comprehensible material repercussions (e.g. productive strategies, built environments, consumptive behaviors). A comparative approach also necessitates that equal interpretive importance is granted to patterns and idiosyncrasies. The value-centric discussion in the introduction in particular has already shown that it is necessary to pay attention to normative trends that result from people repeatedly behaving in similar ways, as well as non-normative phenomena shaped by life course dynamics and deviant interests. Any discussion about general socio-historical trends need to be qualified by evidence for divergence (Bunge 1998, 24),<sup>41</sup> and an archaeology that strives to address both needs to engage in quantitative as well as qualitative forms of analysis.

In chapter two (section 2.2), I also talked about the shortcomings of a particular kind of value research that aims to relate art styles to socio-historical conditions, and this was followed by a brief consideration of cognitive approaches that aim to interpret material culture in terms of dispositions, mentalities, and worldviews. The first approach may primarily be critiqued for the problematic meanings given to stylistic elements. While ‘behavioral chain’ and ‘life history’ approaches to material culture have a greater chance of exposing the influence of social norms and cultural ideals over behaviors, and the basic motivations that influence all, such approaches remain limited when description is favored over explanation. Certainly, the object of study may not always allow more than descriptive analyses, but, where possible, interpretation of underlying causes and influences should be attempted, even if tentatively. Such initial approximations of past complexities

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<sup>41</sup> As argued by Bunge, “the nomothetic/idiographic dichotomy is untenable because *all* sciences are nomothetic *as well* as idiographic. In fact, all of them seek patterns underneath data, and all of them account for individuals in terms of universals, and employ particulars to guess at and check generalities” (Bunge 1998, 23; *original emphasis*).

can then invite future exploration (Thomas 2008, 69). Moreover, if these cognitive approaches to material culture are representative of the single-thread analytical method, the alternative is to engage in multi-thread inquiries. The choice whether to engage in one or the other approach is shaped by scholarly interest and expertise, as well as the type, quality, and availability of evidence. Multi-thread analysis is possible when a broad range of material categories is available. Such approaches are also advisable because norms and ideals, and the values that inspired them, will have manifested in different domains of life and through different modes of behavior. This can only be assessed through the critical analysis of a broad range of evidence derived from various social contexts; in the introduction (section 1.1) it already became clear how values can be revealed by considering literary, epigraphic, iconographic, and archaeological sources of evidence of variable origins.

Problems in interpretation can also be minimized by engaging in multi-scalar analysis that is able to reconcile the particular with the universal. Importantly, an exploration of the linkages between local, extra-local, and 'global' processes has to recognize the significance of historicity and co-constitutive dynamics. Historicizing regional phenomena, like connectivity and insecurity, can show whether, and in what ways, broader processes and developments impacted local trajectories. The use of multi-scalar approaches is also motivated by the realization that the constitution of socio-cultural formations always involves the entanglement of local and non-local people, goods, and ideas that enduringly flow through ever-shifting networks of interaction and exchange.<sup>42</sup> A desire for effective participation in such networks required that people carefully consider non-local forms and

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<sup>42</sup>The foregrounding of co-constitutive processes stems in the recognition that much culture-historical work exaggerates the impact of Mediterranean civilization on Celto-Germanic barbarity, while post-processual nativism and contextualism have led archaeologists to ignore the manifestation of transcultural phenomena (Mata 2017). It is precisely the persistent use of self-other dualities (e.g. civilized-barbarian, Roman-native, colonizer-colonized) that has discouraged looking for nondualistic forms of cross-cultural linkages and formations (Cooper 2005, 47).

phenomena in ways that allow for the reproduction of the local. Likewise, the transformational processes taking place in the Celto-Germanic Iron Age and Roman period can only be fully understood by considering socio-cultural formations as historically situated co-constituted phenomena.

With these methodological aspects in mind, it is clear that value research is greatly served if culture-historical trajectories and material culture are well-known. In the study area, a strong history of archaeological research grants access to a wide variety of written and representational sources, while material culture studies are numerous and accessible. Moreover, regional developments have also long been assessed in relation to phenomena manifesting further afield in West-Central Europe and the Mediterranean world. This greatly facilitates comparative analysis.

In chapter four, I will consider a range of socio-historical transformations that manifested in the study area during the Iron Age. A brief consideration of changing food procurement strategies – with concomitant shifts in ‘(agri)cultural mentalities’ (de Hingh 2000, 195) - provides a useful entry point for assessing the transformation of Iron Age value systems in the study area. This not only shows how diverse value emphases manifested in various social domains, and through different modes of behavior, it also demonstrates how archaeologists may not be able to spot such shifts when they focus on a single social domain or behavioral mode. I will examine in greater detail shifting patterns in material culture derived from mortuary contexts in three distinct zones - an Aisne-Marne zone situated in the Southwest, a Rhine-Moselle zone situated in the Southeast, and a Scheldt-Meuse zone situated in the North (figure 6). In contrast to the material residues of everyday life derived from settlement contexts (like food procurement activities), the deposition of objects in mortuary contexts involved meaningful acts that communicate, implicitly or explicitly, personal values, social norms, and cultural ideals (Chapman *et al.* 1981; Parker Pearson 1999; González-Ruibal

2012, 142; Tarlow and Nilsson Stutz 2013). For Diepeveen-Jansen, “funerary practices are a medium in the creation and consolidation of all interrelations, of personal identities as well as the social collectivity” (2001, 21). For this archaeologist, the deposition of bronze wares, weapons, horse gear, and vehicles in ‘elite burials’ throughout the study area constitutes a regional expression of an ideological system with a long temporal persistence and wide geographical occurrence. Notably, the prehistory of Northwest Europe was initially revealed through the efforts of antiquarians and culture-historians who predominantly worked with precisely such burial assemblages; indeed, knowledge of the material culture of Iron Age groups primarily derives from mortuary contexts. Archaeologists who have studied burial rituals have long occupied themselves with the identification and description of social stratification and cultural diffusion processes. My aim is to demonstrate that archaeological evidence derived from mortuary contexts has a greater interpretive potential. Whether we consider structural, ritual, depositional, or symbolic aspects, mortuary contexts can inform about changing norms and ideals that, ultimately, resulted from the adaptive realization of a limited range of individualist and collectivist values under particular socio-historical conditions. I will consider this information for the three zones in the study area, noting patterns within cemeteries as well as comparing these intra-regionally. Specifically, I will compare burial content (body remains and grave goods) together with structural and spatial aspects. This can demonstrate how mortuary evidence reflects the interplay of a range of (individualist, familist, and communalist) value priorities that people expressed behaviorally, by burying their relatives in certain meaningful ways and using significant objects and materials.

Following this, I will attempt to relate the observed patterns and discrepancies to broader socio-historical processes that can be considered for having influenced intra-regional shifts in value prioritization. Now, in the previous chapters I have at various points noted the impact of insecurity

and anxiety on socio-historical developments. Throughout human history, physical insecurity and psychological stress have encouraged the proliferation of disproportionately empowered individuals, families, and communities. The impact of these factors on Iron Age developments in the study area will be assessed by looking at the evidence for refuge construction. I will primarily consider spatio-temporal evidence, such that I intentionally ignore structural factors like construction methods or site layout, or ideational aspects like communal identity, territoriality, or status display. Attending to such aspects would require an entire study dedicated to the topic. What I will focus on instead is the spatio-temporal distribution of refuges throughout the study area in order to talk about long-term trends in insecurity. This is guided by an underlying assumption: communities of self-sufficient farming families collaborated in the construction of refuges out of a shared interest for addressing insecurity. These communities cooperated in the construction of such sites for what has to be recognized as their primary function, namely the collective defense of people, animals, and goods. In foregrounding this functional use of refuges I am not denying the symbolic goals and effects of communal endeavors like the construction and occupation of collective settlements (Gerritsen and Roymans 2006; Fernández-Götz and Krausse 2013; Fernández-Götz 2014a and 2014b). Considerations of communal identity and cohesion are certainly important, but such objectives could be achieved in other ways as well. In other words, refuges functioned primarily for defensive purposes, even if their construction and occupation also had symbolic aims and consequences.

Next, in order to understand trends in refuge construction, I consider the significance of intra- and inter-regional connectivity and interaction. Both can be understood in terms of geographic allowance (how landscapes encourage or constrain movement), and in terms of socio-historical dynamics (who interacted, when, and why). In order to come to a fuller understanding of the motivations that shaped interaction and exchange, it is important to grant that local and regional

developments did not manifest in isolation from broader ('global') phenomena. This is why I dedicate the remainder of chapter four to gauging the impact of Mediterranean developments on trans-Alpine Europe. Special emphasis will be placed on the historical manifestation of an 'international' slave trading system that for centuries functioned to bring northern captives to Mediterranean markets. I consider it crucial to assess the socio-historical impact of such a distinct phenomenon if we are to accurately understand Iron Age developments in West-Central Europe. Doing so can speak to certain processes (e.g. stratification, militarization, specialization), value priorities (e.g. familism), as well as outlooks and attitudes (e.g. mastery, fatalism) that gradually became more dominant throughout the Celto-Germanic world, and which manifested through distinct behaviors and symbolic expressions. Here, again, I take a multi-thread approach and consider a variety of sources (historical, material, and comparative ethnographic) and object categories.

Chapter five presents a consideration of Roman-period transitions. The availability of new sources of evidence (material, historical, epigraphic, and iconographic) for the first two centuries of the Roman period allows considering a range of expansive processes (e.g. commercialization, urbanization, militarization, connectivity, communication) that can be shown to have caused notable shifts in value-motivated behaviors, and, in the aggregate, social norms and cultural ideals. For most inhabitants of the Roman northwest provinces, farming remained the primary means of socio-economic reproduction. While evidence from settlement contexts is relatively scarce for the Iron Age, particularly for the southern half of the study area, knowledge of rural lifeways is far better understood for the Roman period. The available data on settlements and farmsteads grants an opportunity to look more closely at aspects of domestic life in a rural setting. I operationalize Adams' tri-partite classification approach to organize the available information on rural households.

This shows how expansive processes reshaped how people sought new ways to realize familist values, with clear socio-cultural consequences.

Beyond the information garnered from settlement research, it is again mortuary data that provides the clearest information on shifting value systems. Comprehensible expressions of interests and ideals can be found in mortuary iconography, and this can be substantiated by other kinds of evidence (i.e. historical sources, bronze military diplomas, site assemblages, ritual depositions). In doing so, I again take a tri-partite classification approach to organize mortuary data and relate this to three familist orientations. This offers clear indications about the priorities, interests, and ideals maintained by Roman provincials.

## CHAPTER 4: THE CELTO-GERMANIC IRON AGE

As an entry point into Iron Age value systems, I begin by briefly considering de Hingh's study of prehistoric food procurement strategies (de Hingh 2000). It uses data drawn from excavations in the Meuse-Demer-Scheldt (N Belgium and S Netherlands) and Moselle regions (NE France and Luxemburg). These two zones are situated in a larger *Hauslandschaft* - a region of relatively uniform socio-economic organization, settlement pattern, and house building tradition - extending from southern Denmark to northern France (*ibid.*, 20). The widely dispersed Bronze and Iron Age populations that occupied the varied landscapes of this region maintained mixed farming strategies, combining cereal-based agriculture and animal husbandry with limited foraging. De Hingh uses botanical data in order to speak to agricultural 'intensification' (increase in productive output, innovation in farming practices), 'specialization' (diversity of specialized agricultural activity, division of labor), and 'diversification' (variation in farming practices, variety of cultigens, culinary diversity), which together argue for socio-cultural changes occurring from the Middle Bronze Age (MBA) to Late Iron Age (LIA) (table 23). It is especially the interest for outlooks and worldviews that make de Hingh's study pertinent for an archaeological study of Iron Age values.

Where this concerns the range of cultigens, the Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age (EIA) stand out for the way the crop assortment expands threefold to a range that remains stable well into the Late Iron Age. The greater diversity of crops, along with new cultivation and processing techniques, points to substantial diversification of the agrarian regime. From a motivational point of view, this suggests that important shifts took place in prevalent value systems; "As the various crops all have their specific demands with regard to soils, soil working and manuring ... their introduction must be associated with an increase of different agricultural practices (preparing and working of the

soil, sowing, weeding, harvest methods), crop processing and food preparation activities” (*ibid.*, 195). All this required greater attention for planning and scheduling, for organization (labor division and coordination), and accumulating and communicating horticultural knowledge. In other words, what formed over time was a “totally different (agri-)cultural mentality” (*ibid.*).

De Hingh nuances radical materialist interpretations of agricultural diversification by emphasizing how the potential of the natural environment had remained constant. What changed were social conditions and cultural attitudes towards consumption and cultivation; “The spread of new crops is a social process ... A model of food choice imposes itself, where certain new foodstuffs as well as the accompanying preparation and habits of consumption were adopted for social reasons ... The reason for a shift towards crop and food diversity might have been necessary for social and prestige display. It could also have been symbolic, in terms of the establishment of a (new) cultural identity” (*ibid.*). While this attention for socio-cultural aspects in the interpretation of food procurement strategies is commendable (because it complicates environmental and technological determinism), the restricted and unexamined focus on social differentiation and cultural identity limits de Hingh’s interpretations.

Another problematic concerns the notion that subsistence farmers were solely driven by survival needs (*ibid.*, 202), such that intensification, diversification, and specialization all worked to increase productivity and reduce risk. Yet, how exactly diversification can lead to risk-reduction is not straightforward, especially since it might necessitate extra labor input which could just as well be dedicated to the production of larger quantities of less varied staple foods. Indeed, some of de Hingh’s observations clearly suggest the formation of new attitudes and ideals that cannot simply be reduced to issues of security. While anxiety may have encouraged stronger notions of ownership and control, and stronger distinctions between natural and cultural worlds (e.g. Deetz 1977), the

evidence for changing food procurement practices also suggests greater interest for experimentation and novelty, and the formation of future-oriented outlooks. Notably, the greatest expansion of the crop assortment occurs in the Middle to Late Bronze Age, such that cultural ideals, which undoubtedly continued to change throughout the Iron Age, are no longer clearly traceable in food procurement practices. This validates taking a multi-thread approach, while inviting further inquiry in different domains of life.

Prehistorians tend to characterize ancient value systems uniformly in terms of collectivism (the local community or a broader society) or individualism (individuals or family households). What de Hingh's study contributes to such perspectives is attention for complexity, such that there is a recognition for the operation of diverse value emphases in various social contexts that also manifest materially in different behavioral ways. Communalism, for example, is indicated by large LBA urnfields and LIA settlement nucleation, while familism comes to the fore in the isolated and dispersed farmsteads occupied by families that own and work fields intensively during the LBA and EIA. It is worth noting how private ownership of land is only possible through membership in a community where such entitlement is collectively recognized. In other words, only membership in a supra-family community can give rise to private property arrangements (Mathiot 2011, 370). De Hingh's study not only serves to show how food procurement patterns in the study area changed throughout prehistory, her recognition of the role of values and outlooks makes it possible to demonstrate the co-occurrence and interplay of different value emphases that shift through time. It suggests that people are never motivated by uniformly individualist or collectivist orientations; rather, individuals situationally negotiate individualist, familist, and communalist values, and generally strive to realize them in ways that follow social norms and cultural ideals.

Notably, evidence for experimentation in food procurement strategies is strongest for the Bronze Age, while during the long Iron Age we see a continuation of strategies established in earlier times. If we combine the various indications for differentiation processes (i.e. the decline of undifferentiated communal cemeteries, the growing prominence of family-centric burials, the smaller house sizes of nuclear families, the locational stability and delineation of farmsteads) with this apparent disinterest for experimentation in food procurement strategies, can it be suggested that openness to experimentation declined as people turned increasingly inwards? To consider this proposition it is helpful to look more closely at temporal and geographic patterns and discrepancies in mortuary practices, and subsequently relate these to broader socio-historical processes.

#### **4.1 Regional Patterns in Mortuary Practice**

In an effort to relate developments in food procurement to broader regional processes, de Hingh also considers long-term developments in mortuary practices. One notable transformation concerns a process whereby Middle Bronze Age individuals are increasingly buried in mounds used by single family units rather than undifferentiated collective burials. This growing social centrality of the family expressed symbolically in mortuary contexts likely also manifested in other domains of life. This situation subsequently changed during the Late Bronze Age (LBA), when a shift to collective ‘urnfield’ cemeteries (typically used by three to six families) shows how communalist values again became prioritized, at least in mortuary context. However, because individual burials tend to cluster in these communal cemeteries, the family-centric emphasis continued to be expressed as well. Moreover, because these collective cemeteries with their family clusters ultimately consisted of individual burials, individuality also remained emphasized (*ibid.*, 38). During the LBA, then, values associated with a number of value spheres - individualism, familism, and communalism - were being

expressed in new ways. This situation changed again quite drastically during the Middle Iron Age (MIA) when collective cemeteries largely fell out of use, suggesting a deprioritization of communalist values. Not only does de Hingh's brief treatment of mortuary practices demonstrate that this particular social context allowed for more than one ideal to be broadcast, it also points to notable transformations during the Iron Age. It serves, then, to consider in greater detail changing mortuary practices. This I will do comparatively for three distinct zones within the study area (Aisne-Marne, Rhine-Moselle, and Scheldt- Meuse) during three time periods (Early, Middle, and Late Iron Age).

#### ***4.1.1 Early Iron Age (HA D)***

##### *Aisne-Marne Zone*

In the Aisne-Marne zone of the Early Iron Age (HA D), farming settlements were situated near and along waterways, in stream valleys, and on river terraces (Diepeveen-Jansen 2001, 126; Haselgrove 1996). While rectangular post-built farmhouses deviated in layout (one, two, or three-isled) and construction, most were not occupied longer than a single generation. Many of such farmhouses were surrounded by secondary structures such as workshops, stables, granaries, ovens, pits, and underground cellars. Delineation features like ditches and palisades built around houses and farmyards seem to occur at their earliest during the La Tène A period. While such enclosures are subsequently built throughout the long Iron Age, the small isolated open farmstead seems to be the most common type of settlement until enclosed farmsteads (sometimes clustering in hamlets) become dominant in the Late Iron Age throughout the southern half of the study area. Notably, house construction was quite varied (Mathiot 2011, 364), such that conformity to social norms or cultural ideals does not seem to have been a significant factor. If it can be accepted that uniformity in house construction results from communal building efforts, then a high degree of divergence

suggests that people were not commonly collaborating in the construction of farmsteads. Put differently, communalism as a value priority did not manifest strongly in settlement context.



Figure 6: Vehicle burials of the HA D period (adapted from Pare 1991; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001; Fontijn and Fokkens 2007)

For the centuries between the Late Hallstatt and Late La Tène periods, burials are commonly found associated with unenclosed homesteads. Inhumation is the dominant disposal practice in this area, though cremation burials sometimes occur as well (table 24). Burials are mostly single interments, with double burials being quite infrequent (usually mother-and-child inhumations). Even three to four individuals have been found buried together, including man-woman, man-man, and woman-woman combinations, and it can safely be assumed that some (likely familial) relation existed which warranted joint interment. While men and women appear in relatively equal numbers, children are very much underrepresented. Some clustering in the cemeteries suggest family-based groupings, with child burials being extremely rare. Despite such a focus on the nuclear family, it is unlikely that

diacritical familism (e.g. concern for perpetuity, ancestor worship, purity of family lineage, inheritable material assets) received ideological attention at this time.

Most Early Iron Age (HA D) burials of the Aisne-Marne zone lack grave goods. When dress ornaments are found, they are associated with the graves of women. Swords and razors, in turn, only occur in the burials of men. Iron knives are found associated with both men and women, and likely served as a multi-purpose tool for all. This suggests that people were buried with their personal belongings; in other words, grave goods express the individuality of the interred. The display of status or wealth through the manipulation of personal appearance does not seem to have been an important focus at this time (the use of rare materials is also not common, though beads made of non-local amber and coral do occur). The expression of identity, on the other hand, seems mainly to have centered on gender, suggesting the importance of conformism to social norms. It can furthermore be noted that weapons do not appear in the burials of men until the Late Hallstatt period (HA D); during the Bronze Age, weapons were predominantly deposited in aquatic contexts like rivers and marshlands (Fontijn 2005). Further suggestive of normative patterns in this regard is the fact that refuges were not built in the Aisne-Marne zone until the Late Iron Age (section 4.2.2). In times when insecurity and anxiety were not important socio-historical factors, the martial focus may largely have been symbolic. Furthermore, no bronze wares were interred in this area during the HA D period, while not all graves contain pottery. Those that do often hold no more than a single piece, and much of it is also undecorated. When multiple pieces are present, drinking forms are dominant. This suggests that commensality (drinking together) was a focus, with relationality (communal cohesion) rather than differentiation being emphasized. A disinterest for (or taboo on) displaying social distinction is not only suggested by the absence of wealth display through grave good deposition, it is also indicated by the lack of monumentality in mortuary context.

### *Rhine-Moselle Zone*

In the Rhine-Moselle zone, unenclosed homesteads were distributed throughout hills and valley landscapes during the Early Iron Age (Diepeveen-Jansen 2001, 60). Apart from small upland refuges, such settlements were the most common form of habitation. Post-built houses were typically two-aisled and averaged 3-4 meters in length, and these do not seem to have survived longer than a generation. Unlike the long byre-houses of the northern lowlands (including the Scheldt-Meuse zone), farmhouses of the Rhine-Moselle zone were not typically used for stabling animals. Livestock seems to have been kept in separate structures and in fields. Farmyards usually included sheds, huts, wells, pits, and granaries. It is a type of habitation that existed throughout much of the Iron Age in this region.

In notable contrast to the inhumation tradition of the Aisne-Marne zone, the cremation rite was dominant in the Rhine-Moselle zone. Cemeteries were likely used by a single family over the course of multiple generations; when more than a single family made use of a cemetery, spatio-structural aspects like clustering and delineation reflect a family-centric focus (Diepeveen-Jansen 2001, 76). Despite the occasional deposition of a high quantity of grave goods in a single burial, material wealth in the Rhine-Moselle zone was low compared to the well-known ‘princely burials’ (*fürstengraber*) of West-Central Hallstatt groups that seem altogether extravagant (Arnold 2011, 159). The wealthier burials of Rhine-Moselle cemeteries occasionally stand out due to a greater degree of monumentality (e.g. underground stone chambers or above-ground structures built of stone or wood). However, it is difficult to interpret this in terms of opulence and wealth display because not all such investments would have been visible once covered by the burial mound. Furthermore, larger mounds always cover vehicles, such that their scale resulted from the wagons and chariots buried

there and likely was not intended to communicate status (figure 6). This is also shown by those ‘elite mounds’ that lack a vehicle but in which bronze wares are deposited. These are no larger than other ‘non-elite graves’. The focus mainly remains on individual and family differentiation, then, not (institutionalized) social stratification.

Jewelry and clothing accessories are primarily encountered in a small number of inhumation graves. Metal finger rings and bracelets are worn by men and women, while beaded necklaces are made of non-local glass and amber. Only male graves contain weapons, but iron knives are found within the inhumation burials of both men and women; these are usually placed near pottery vessels, which points to their utilitarian function. Compared to the burials of women and children, male burials are clearly distinguishable due to the types of deposited goods and their quantity. Much like the Aisne-Marne zone, then, differentiation is mostly focused on gender during the HA D period, with the burials of men seemingly receiving special attention and investment.

The practice of interring four-wheeled wagons such as known from West-Central Hallstatt burials also seems to have existed in the Rhine-Moselle zone during the HA D period. The deposition of two-wheeled chariots, however, was a new phenomenon. These vehicles are relatively simple constructions with little ornamental work. While they are quite rare in the Aisne-Marne and Scheldt-Meuse zones during this time (a few wagons, no chariots), Rhine-Moselle groups seemed to have maintained a greater interest for the use of vehicles and what these may have represented ideologically. It remains unclear whether they were imported by locals, or if West-Central Hallstatt groups settled in the Rhine-Moselle region. While these kinds of vehicles are commonly interpreted in terms of status display, it seems likely that the ideological message expressed by their deposition

can be linked to their usage in life.<sup>43</sup> Wagons are suitable for transport of people and goods, while chariots are uniquely designed for mounted combat, and both types of vehicle could have symbolized ‘mobility’.

The deposition of Etruscan bronze wares in the Rhine-Moselle zone, in particular the highly ornamental beaked flagons (*schnebelkannen*) and bucket-shaped *situlae*, starts during the HA D period as well; like chariots, these bronze wares are absent in the Aisne-Marne zone at this time. Bronze *situlae* were used for holding large quantities of consumable fluids, and they were a prominent part of prestigious drinking sets used by Etruscan elites and their trans-Alpine trading partners of the West-Central Hallstatt world. The presence of these objects in the Rhine-Moselle zone shows that contacts were maintained with the Mediterranean world directly, or, perhaps more likely, with intermediaries who controlled Alpine trade routes. In such a trade-centric scenario, bronze *situlae* found in the Rhine-Moselle region might have been the property of indigenous individuals who maintained relations with non-local traders, at home or abroad.<sup>44</sup>

It is furthermore probable that the specialized drinking sets originally designed for wine consumption were used differently in communities where beer was the more likely beverage of choice. This is indicated by the absence during the HA D period of wine drinking accessories like bronze ladles, sieves, and drinking cups; interred cups and beakers were made of wood and ceramic

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<sup>43</sup> Pertinent here is the fact that wagon scenes are the most common of all daily life activities depicted on Roman-period tombstones in this region (Chmielewski 2002, 38). This contrasts markedly with Pannonian wagon reliefs of similar date that predominantly depict funerary rites. It is interesting to think how this divergence in the symbolism of wagons may already have existed in the pre-Roman Iron Age, such that the chariots found in Iron Age cemeteries of the Aisne-Marne and Rhine-Moselle zones likely symbolize everyday activity instead of expressing a ‘last journey’ theme.

<sup>44</sup> Linkages were likely maintained with people belonging to Golasecca culture groups inhabiting the Ticino region of present-day Switzerland (Brun 1994, 59).

instead.<sup>45</sup> Beer consumption would have made the large ‘buckets’ functionally and symbolically interesting, but not the various paraphernalia designed specifically for the serving and consumption of wine. Much like the Aisne-Marne zone, then, in the Rhine-Moselle zone we see an ideological emphasis placed on commensality (drinking together). Despite the presence of luxury imports in burials of the Rhine-Moselle region, burial evidence actually seems to point in the direction of a disinterest for (or taboo on) the display of social differentiation. This is suggested by both the absence of wealth display through grave good deposition and the lack of monumentality. Though it is commonly suggested that the interment of vehicles and imported Bronze wares point to the manifestation of social stratification, there are no other convincing signs for this in mortuary or settlement contexts. It is likely, then, that these objects speak to the social ‘role’ of the deceased, not their ‘position’; something also emphasized through the deposition of smaller goods like swords and jewelry. Gender was a pronounced category, warrior and trader may have been others. Overall, however, relationality (communal cohesion and cooperation) rather than differentiation received symbolic emphasis in the mortuary sphere. While it is true that mortuary contexts provide the bulk of archaeological evidence for this period, what data there is on settlements also does not suggest a strong degree of socio-economic differentiation at this time.

#### *Scheldt-Meuse Zone*

Much like the previous two zones, agrarian self-sufficiency also was the norm in the Scheldt-Meuse region. There, rectangular post-built dwellings generally housed people and livestock under a single roof. These ‘shifted’ around agricultural field systems and communal cemeteries when each new

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<sup>45</sup> Trace analysis also suggests this preference for beer and mead. For example, a cauldron deposited in a HA D burial at Hochdorf (Germany) apparently contained mead not wine (Arnold 1999, 75).

generation relocated to a newly built farmhouse (Schinkel 1998; Arnoldussen and Jansen 2010). Such single-generation farmhouses were part of larger homesteads that included structures like sheds, granaries, and wells, with ditches and fences used for spatial delineation. For some farmsteads there are signs of metalworking, though it is rarely encountered at this time (Mathiot 2011, 366). While there seems to have been a strong focus on livestock rearing, there are no clear signs for economic specialization. Without strong evidence for surplus production, nuclear families predominantly seem to have aspired for self-sufficiency while maintaining relations with nearby farming families.<sup>46</sup>

In this period, the cremation rite was dominant in the Scheldt-Meuse zone, though inhumations have also been found (Hessing and Kooi 2005; van den Broeke and Hessing 2005). The members of non-nucleated farming communities of three-to-five households placed graves in communal cemeteries that sometimes remained in use for centuries (Gerritsen 1999, 92). In inhumation burials, women are typically positioned on their back with arms placed along the body. When the position of the body deviates from this pattern this usually concerns men and youths. Perhaps this suggests that women were treated with greater reverence by the family and the broader community. Women also outnumber men slightly among the inhumations. We are mostly dealing with adults, while children are underrepresented in both cremation and inhumation burials. Despite this low presence, from their treatment it seems as if children were considered full members of the community and eligible for respectful burial treatment. Two or more individuals were sometimes also buried together; for these, a woman-child inhumation would perhaps be the least challenging to interpret, but, as far as I know, these have actually not been found. Adult men and women have

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<sup>46</sup> Such communal ties also manifest in the form of regional house building traditions. Building traditions did not form because autonomous family groups were copying their neighbors, but because they participated in communal construction projects.

been found buried together, as well as pairs of adult men. Some family relationship likely motivated such combined interments.

Quite possibly, the burial treatment for some individuals diverged because they were considered outsiders based on identity (immigrants) or status (social transgressors). Indeed, for some bodies it appears as if they were placed in burial pits rather carelessly. When arms are positioned awkwardly this suggests binding of the wrists. Also 'aberrant' are those bodies who are placed face-down (van den Broeke 2014, 161). Their deaths may have resulted from punitive action, yet one would not expect such individuals to be buried with grave goods such as personal ornaments. Other scenarios, like 'cultural otherness', are more likely in those cases. Indeed, it is commonly suggested that influences from the Aisne-Marne and Rhine-Moselle zones are noticeable in the mortuary practices in the Scheldt-Meuse zone (Bloemers 1986; de Wit 1997/1998). Notably, the bronze spears that are common in Rhine-Moselle burials do not occur in inhumations of the Scheldt-Meuse zone in this period, but they are occasionally found with cremation burials. It might be significant that the cremation rite was the dominant method of body disposal among Rhine-Moselle groups throughout the long Iron Age. It is quite possible, then, that visitors or immigrants from the South were buried in this region.

Overall, EIA urnfields are rather poor where this concerns the deposition of grave goods (Gerritsen 1999, 92). These are predominantly found deposited in the inhumation burials of women, for whom it was common to be interred with dress ornaments, though rare and valuable materials seldom occur (some non-local amber and tin beads are present). Inhumations with grave goods are generally those where the individual was positioned face-up. However, compared to cremation burials, inhumation burials do not contain much pottery. The opposite is true for metal ornaments which are more frequently found in inhumation burials (perhaps because these did not survive the

burning pyre). In the Scheldt-Meuse zone individual identity was primarily expressed in terms of gender, and, comparable to the other zones, wealth display seems not to have been a focus in the Scheldt-Meuse zone at this time. If it did, we would expect more goods to have survived, something that certainly happened in later periods.

Where this concerns the occurrence of wealth display in mortuary context, it is necessary to note the discovery of a small number of exceptionally wealthy ‘chieftain’s graves’ in the northern half of the study area (Netherlands and Belgium) that primarily date to HA D and LT A (Bloemers 1986; de Wit 1997/1998; Fontijn and Fokkens 2007; Roymans 2009; Fokkens *et al.* 2012). They are noteworthy because they appear quite out of place within a broadly egalitarian and segmentary society of self-sufficient farming families in which expressions of social differentiation were highly constrained in all spheres of life (de Mulder and Bourgeois 2011, 310). In socio-cultural contexts where archaeological evidence primarily points at conformist familism and conformist communalism, the symbolic expression of individualism and materialism (i.e. diacritical forms of individualism and familism) may be considered anomalous. While this aberrant character of a small number of HA D to LT A burials has prompted archaeologists to suggest the rise of ‘chiefs’ as a result of local stratification processes, such interpretations are difficult to maintain when evidence from other social domains are considered (e.g. settlement system, economic strategy, technological complexity).<sup>47</sup> Indeed, beyond these atypical graves there are no convincing indications for socio-economic differentiation. What they show, at most, is that the burial treatment of a small number of individuals during the Early Iron Age and first half of the Middle Iron Age diverged significantly

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<sup>47</sup> In the absence of social norms or cultural ideals that could encourage hierarchization, material wealth cannot be linked to social rank. Material wealth may also simply point to economic activity or the materialist dispositions of the interred. In this light, it is interesting to note how the skeletal remains of wealthy Hallstatt salt miners show clear signs of hard labor (Pope and Ralston 2011, 376).

from normative mortuary patterns that aligned with the socio-economic realities and associated cultural ideals that prevailed in this region. Furthermore, the provenance of deposited grave goods clearly demonstrates linkages with southern regions (i.e. Rhine-Moselle, Aisne-Marne, and beyond).

With mobility (vehicles and horse gear), martiality (weapons), and materialism (high quantity and quality of grave goods) receiving strong symbolic emphasis, it is tempting to interpret these elaborate burials not as the final resting place of internationally linked rulers of local farming communities, but of members of mobile groups that (intermittently) entered the region to exploit local resources or trade routes between sedentary communities. That this was not an isolated occurrence can easily be shown by reference to the ancient sources that regularly report on the movement and resettlement of prehistoric groups (e.g. Fernández-Götz 2014c, 205). Indeed, it is necessary for archaeologists to take mobility more seriously and grant that groups had always moved through Bronze and Iron Age Europe (Kelly 1992; Fernández-Götz 2016). This is also increasingly substantiated by isotope analyses of skeletal material that show that individuals could move great distances across the European continent (Oelze 2012; Oelze *et al.* 2012; Scheeres *et al.* 2013; Scheeres 2014; van den Broeke 2014, 174). Another way this can be shown is by considering the evidence for textiles, with samples from a HA D ‘chieftains’ grave’ at Oss (Netherlands) again suggesting their aberrant character (Jørgensen 1992, 124).<sup>48</sup> Arguably, culture-historical parochialism, postcolonial nativism, and post-processual contextualism together have precluded serious consideration of

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<sup>48</sup>Jørgensen identifies several regions where certain cloth types were dominant during the HA D - LT A periods: the *Huldremose* type is mainly found in Scandinavian regions north of Jutland; the *Haraldskejaer* type is predominantly found distributed throughout the North European Lowlands (broadly corresponding with the Jasdorf culture); the *La Joya* type which is found in the Iberian Peninsula; the Central European region, lastly, is most heterogenous as it includes four cloth types (*Döbren*, *Dürrnberg*, *Oss*, and *Vače*). Interestingly, it is the Oss type that has been found in widely dispersed locations: Oss (South Netherlands), Dürrnberg (Northwest Austria), Sonnenberg (Northeast Germany), and Burton Fleming (Northeast England).

mobility and its effects on socio-historical developments in the study area during the Iron Age. For anomalous burials in the Scheldt-Meuse zone, for this and later periods, we are most likely dealing with outsiders, like members of permanently mobile groups that tended to combine pastoralism with specialist craftsmanship and trading, or, as I will argue below (section 4.2.4), of semi-mobile groups who recurrently entered northern regions in pursuit of a specific kind of resource. The deceased of such mobile groups were buried wherever they were temporarily located. The mortuary ceremonies of such groups could be impressive (judging from the interred grave goods), yet it also cannot be denied that the largest known chieftain's burial mound in the area (at Oss) was only three meters high. This level of monumentality will have been rather low for these burial hills to have functioned as significant loci of communal memory and commemoration (Gerritsen 2003, 194).

#### ***4.1.2 Middle Iron Age (LT A-B)***

##### *Aisne-Marne Zone*

In the Aisne-Marne zone, settlement patterns did not change significantly between HA D and LT A (Mathiot 2011). In fact, until the LT C period, settlements remained predominantly unenclosed and shifted around shared agricultural fields. Autonomous households maintained self-sufficient strategies, engaging in pottery production, food processing, and textile manufacture at the household level. Signs for iron production are also found at a small number of sites.

During the Middle Iron Age (LT A-B), both inhumation and cremation were still commonly practiced, with the first continuing to be more dominant (table 25). Yet, despite such differences in body disposal practices, graves are practically indistinguishable when assemblages are compared (Diepeveen-Jansen 2001, 134). Not only does the number of graves increase during the LT A period, the proportion of wealthy burials increases substantially. Generally, one to three vessels are

deposited, with wealthy graves containing around five pieces of pottery, occasionally more than ten. The presence of drinking forms is again noteworthy. Changes in burial assemblages are not merely quantitative but qualitative as well. Compared to the HA D period, there is greater variation in pottery form and vessel size, while decoration on pots and other objects becomes more complex and lavish, pointing to shifts in interests and outlooks.

Jewelry and dress accessories are more common, and, while they are mostly found on the body of inhumation burials, there is no reason to think that cremated individuals were not dressed in similar ways. The use of brooches increases during the LT A period, but these (together with belt-hooks) are usually found in wealthier graves, and may therefore not have become standard dress items until later times. Gold jewelry is only found in chariot graves of which a minority is also associated with women. Ear and finger rings seem altogether rare. There are again some notable patterns linked to gender. While grooming sets are found with both men and women, razors are only part of male assemblages (though these are rare). Bracelets are worn by women and girls on each arm, and by men on the left arm. While gold bracelets were only given to men, glass bracelets, which first appear during the LT A period, were deposited in both male and female graves. Gold ear and finger rings, as well as glass and amber beaded necklaces, are found in female burials only. Notably, non-local materials, like amber and coral, are mostly used for the jewelry of women. The overall evidence suggests a strengthened focus on grooming and outward appearance, most likely due to higher rates of interaction with familiar and unfamiliar non-kin through expanding social networks. A focus on female beauty may also have developed, possibly linked to the importance of women as representatives of family lineages who were instrumental for establishing and maintaining inter-family alliances. Interestingly, bronze neck rings - which become heavier and more varied in

form and decoration during the LT A period - are only worn by women and this may express complex symbolic ideals regarding female beauty and family perpetuity.

Weapons seem characteristically linked to ideals of manhood. Most are found in even the commonest graves, while swords specifically are only present in 'elite' graves. There is a sharp increase in the deposition of swords and daggers in mortuary contexts during the LT A period. This period also shows the largest variety in form, size, and decoration of swords. This suggests that swords were valued for more than merely their function as tools of violence. In other words, the noted interest for managing outward appearance also manifested through the display of ornate weapons. Since weapons are also occasionally deposited in the graves of women and children, it is quite possible for these objects to have been used to express notions of family or community guardianship, rather than simply having symbolized male prowess. Some swords may also have been heirlooms passed on to spouses and children. All in all, there seems to have been a higher degree of complexity in the way material culture was used in mortuary contexts.

With only two wagons and no chariots known from the previous Hallstatt D period, the number of vehicles interred in the Aisne-Marne zone increases significantly during the LT A period (figure 7). In contrast to mobile goods and horse harnesses, chariots are generally of a simple design with few signs of decorative elaboration. In other words, they seem to have been valued primarily for practical purposes, not their appearance. While swords or daggers were commonly deposited in vehicle graves, they also hold the larger quantities of fine pottery, and the larger vessel forms. For those in possession of chariots, then, material wealth seems to have been an important consideration.





Figure 7: Vehicle burials of the LT A period (adapted from Diepeveen-Jansen 2001)

That graves cluster in certain areas of a cemetery likely resulted from families claiming a distinct burial space for deceased relatives. In mortuary context at least, spatial delineation was used to express familist values. Within such bounded areas, men and women of all ages are found interred. Burials also sometimes contain more than a single individual, while child burials can also contain grave goods. For plural inhumations, the adult-child combination is most common, but other combinations (woman-man, woman-woman, and man-man) occur as well. Interestingly, the practice of deliberately reopening inhumation burials to remove or add body parts (typically skulls, or arm and leg bones) also arose during the LT A period. Jewelry also seems to have been taken, though not consistently since some graves where bones had been removed still had jewelry and clothing accessories present. Vehicle graves were more commonly disturbed, while for men only the skulls seem to have been targeted for removal. Moreover, “the remains of fires in grave pits and between

the graves and the presence of bone material in ditches around the graves point to ritual activities inside cemeteries, even after burial” (Diepeveen-Jansen 2001, 191). Taken together, these kinds of practices suggest rituals relating to some form of ancestor worship, which further supports the idea that (diacritical) familism gained in importance. Particularly in the LT B and C periods, this emphasis on the family group seems to also find expression through the use of delineation features.



*Figure 8: Vehicle burials of the LT B period (adapted from Diepeveen-Jansen 2001)*

However, this preoccupation with the family does not develop equally throughout the Aisne-Marne zone. In the North, burial hills typically contain a single grave, and these are invariably surrounded by rectangular ditches. Burial assemblages can be quite ostentatious, containing much jewelry and painted pottery. In mortuary context, at least, individualism and materialism are descriptors that suitably characterize the expressive focus of northern groups. In the South, by contrast, enclosures surround family graves, and assemblages are quantitatively less extravagant. This suggests that the

individual was predominantly viewed as a member of kin-groups and this required deemphasizing their individuality, including an individual identity expressed through personal possessions. This North-South division develops during the LT A period and continues into the LT C period.

In addition to these intra-regional differences, intra-cemetery distinctions also point at wealth differentials at the family-level. Diepeveen-Jansen notes how “the increased complexity and variability in the grave assemblage, both in elite graves as well as in those belonging to the rest of society” point at horizontal (role) and vertical (position) differentiation (*ibid.*, 177). Yet, notably, wealthy graves are commonly situated throughout cemeteries, such that they were not spatially positioned in ways that could draw special attention. In other words, despite notable differences in family wealth, the spatial ordering of the mortuary landscape does not suggest (institutionalized) stratification. This is further substantiated by a lack of monumentality, which at most involved the construction of concealed timber linings and cover stones, while burial hills hardly stood out in terms of scale.

Arguably, the most significant change between the Hallstatt D and La Tène A periods is the way hospitality and martiality became far more pronounced in mortuary context, and strongly so in the wealthy graves. If the wealthier graves were indeed mostly situated in the northern zone, where individualism rather than familism received greater symbolic emphasis, this highlights the role of martiality and commensality in this part of the region. Martiality expresses a strong concern for security and power (the Schwartz continuum shows how both overlap motivationally). Commensality among northern groups may then mainly have been linked to conformist relationality (ideological coherence and practical cooperation) and not social differentiation. It could even be suggested that northern groups were more martial and mobile and that commensal practices predominantly took place in the context of male gang (*männerbund*) feasting.

The latter half of the Middle Iron Age (LT B) can be characterized in terms of decline and contraction. While many cemeteries were abandoned, the number of newly formed cemeteries, as well as the number of graves they contained, decreased. The wealthy graves are still not distinguishable in a spatial sense as they commonly lay scattered throughout cemeteries. Inhumation remains the dominant burial rite, with double (or more) interments and secondary burials still occurring. Pottery is still deposited but in smaller quantities (2-3 objects). Drinking forms remain dominant. Interestingly, while material wealth and pottery variety decline overall, wheel-thrown pottery first appears during the LT B period, with some forms seemingly modeled after preexisting bronze wares. These wheel-thrown forms may well have replaced bronze wares since none are imported at this time. The LT A trend whereby swords show increased variety in form, size, and decoration reverses again in the LT B period. Helmets and armor plates no longer occur but shields are still present. Gold ornaments are also absent during the LT B period, though non-local amber and coral still occur. Precious materials are not found in graves that contain swords, while decorated brooches, belt-hooks, and neck rings are entirely absent. This increased austerity in material wealth also includes grooming implements of which none derive from LT B contexts. The micro-regional diversity noted for the LT A period decreases towards the end of the LT B period when grave assemblages overall become more uniform. Despite these signs for contraction, there does not seem to have been a radical reemphasis of communalism; indeed, the urnfield tradition is discontinued at this time (Gerritsen 2003, 192). These patterns may also be considered in light of the evidence for refuge construction (section 4.2.2), which suggests that security conditions continued to improve.

### *Rhine-Moselle Zone*

In the Rhine-Moselle zone, a prominent change occurred during the Middle Iron Age. In the LT A period, more graves contain grave goods, while the average quantity of objects deposited in individual graves increases as well. Grave goods also reflect how new and more elaborate styles came into fashion. Wheel-thrown pottery also makes its first appearance (earlier than in the Aisne-Marne zone). Bronze wares also remain popular, with drinking forms (jugs, horns, basins, and cauldrons) dominating assemblages.

Jewelry and clothing accessories are predominantly found on the body of inhumation burials, but again, there is no reason to think dress habits were any different for cremated individuals. Neck rings become more heavily decorated during the LT A period. Bracelets are worn by women and men, and so are finger rings. Ear rings and anklets, on the other hand, seem to be lacking. Iron knives are found within the inhumation burials of both men and women, and these are usually placed near pottery vessels. Toiletry implements (iron razors, tweezers, and 'ear-scoops') are commonly placed among the grave goods of men. Sword scabbards are also quite ornamental. Taken together, these are indications for a growing interest for managing outward appearance in ways not dissimilar from that of Aisne-Marne communities. Likely, this period of growth and expansion increased connectivity and interaction between all zones situated in the study area. The occurrence of chariots in the Rhine-Moselle zone also increases considerably during the LT A period, while these were also more ornamental and not solely associated with wealthy burials. Lance and spearheads (for mounted and on-foot fighting respectively) are the most frequently interred weapons. Swords rarely occur, and then only for the wealthier graves. Notably, these swords first appear in the burials of the Rhine-Moselle zone during the LT A period where they were previously

absent (in contrast with their presence in the Aisne-Marne zone), and they are commonly joined by other weapons as well (though arrows, helmets and shields remain rare).

The overall impression for the LT A period is that the proportion of ‘elite graves’ in cemeteries increases, while differences in wealth become more pronounced (luxurious jewelry, weapons, and bronze wares are commonly found together in the same burials). In some parts of the region, such goods seem to have signaled social status. This is also suggested by the way some burial hills seem to have been placed more prominently in mortuary landscapes. However, the apparent disinterest in monumentality in mortuary context remains notable. Burial hills commonly include a central chamber made of stone or wood, while stone and wooden coffins are used more often too, but such ‘opulence’ would not have been visible in the mortuary landscape. Possibly, burial placement patterns reflect a concern for family differentiation, while the use of chambers, coverings and containers (e.g. slabs, trunks, and coffins) point to a concern for body conservation. This latter focus was likely linked to revisitation rituals and secondary interments, practices that foreground the central importance of the family. Taken together, the notion that families in the Rhine-Moselle zone operated in a highly competitive social environment is not very convincing, such that differentiation did not encourage the formation of a permanently stratified society (*contra* Fernández-Götz 2014c, 85).

While the burials of women and children are more easily recognized in the cemeteries of the Rhine-Moselle zone during the LT A period, they still remain underrepresented. Furthermore, despite this relatively higher visibility of women and children, their graves are often secondarily added to the burial mounds of men, which are still the most conspicuous. Gender-based differentiation is prominent, then, with the burials of men typically having received greater attention and investment. Moreover, despite children remaining underrepresented in total numbers, their

treatment could certainly closely resemble that of adults in terms of grave goods deposition (Diepeveen-Jansen 2001, 108). When a young boy was buried with an adult weapon like a sword, it is tempting to suggest the prevalence of ideological notions of masculinity or manhood, but there are indications that the focus was actually elsewhere. Consider, for example, the symbolic multivocality of the chariot. Diepeveen-Jansen argues that these vehicles were valued for more than their functional use in warfare (*ibid.*, 118). Chariots appear in burials during HA D while swords only started being deposited in mortuary contexts in the subsequent LT A period. Furthermore, because chariots are also found in the burials of women, and swords are deposited in the graves of children, their symbolic value likely extended beyond that of male martial prowess. Family welfare and representation seems a more likely focus, then, such that men, women, and children could become designated as guardians or representatives of family lineages, a role expressed in mortuary context through the symbolic deposition of weapons and other objects. The ideological focus on hospitality will have served a similar goal; through commensal practices, intra- and inter-family relations were maintained with the ultimate goal of safeguarding the well-being and perpetuity of the family lineage. It is noteworthy, however, that the social centrality of values like martiality and hospitality only comes to the fore through mortuary practices. As far as this can be gathered from archaeological evidence, these ideals were not expressed in settlement or religious contexts. In other words, it was precisely through mortuary ritual, a context where families negotiated the loss of their kin, that familist ideals were expressed most strongly.

I noted a North-South division that arose in the Aisne-Marne zone during LT A, and a comparable divide can be identified in the southeast region of the study area. There, Hunsrück-Eifel chariot burials commonly contain weapons and Mediterranean imports, while such imports were not deposited in the chariot burials found further north in the Belgian Ardennes (Fernández-Götz

2014c, 96). In this latter region, the proportion of chariot burials within the total mortuary population is also higher.

To a degree, demographic trends in the Rhine-Moselle zone are comparable to those of the Aisne-Marne zone. Most notably, it is the LT B period that can be characterized as having experienced contraction, especially in the Belgian Ardennes which seems to have become depopulated almost entirely (*ibid.*, 129). While Diepeveen-Jansen (Diepeveen-Jansen 2001, 78) attributes the scarcity of burial evidence during the LT B and C periods to the increased popularity of the cremation rite (which leaves fewer physical traces) and decreased interest for erecting burial hills, pollen studies now also indicate a reduction in farming activity (and expansion of forests) for the Middle La Tène period (LT C) (Fernández-Götz 2016, 5). The great hilltop centers (i.e. *not* the small refuges, or *burgen*, discussed in section 4.2.2) were also largely abandoned during LT C (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 121). The number of graves within cemeteries already started declining during the LT B period, when new cemeteries were rarely started. On the other hand, bronze wares, weapons, and personal adornment objects continue to be deposited, beaded necklaces occur in greater numbers, and wheel-thrown pottery continued to gain in popularity during the LT B period. While chariots occur in lower numbers, they are still being interred. Notably, neck-rings disappear entirely from burial assemblages at this time (as is the case in the Aisne-Marne zone).

#### *Scheldt-Meuse Zone*

At the start of the Middle Iron Age (LT A-B), rural life in the Scheldt-Meuse zone largely remained unaltered, despite some demographic growth and perhaps a greater interest for ‘locational stability’ of farmsteads (Schinkel 1998, 177; Arnoldussen and Jansen 2010, 387). For the LIA, Gerritsen has put this in terms of a shift from ‘transience’ to ‘durability’ (2003 and 2007). If communal urnfields

symbolized the durability of the wider community, it was the wandering farmsteads that represented transience (or generational cyclicity). Yet, this notion of demographic growth and farmstead stability contrasts with the scarcity of archaeological evidence from mortuary contexts for the Middle Iron Age (de Mulder and Bourgeois 2011, 311; van den Broeke 2014, 161).

Most mortuary evidence derives from communal cemeteries that are associated with small unenclosed self-sufficient farming settlements. Compared to the Early Iron Age (HA D), and in contrast to the southern zones of the study area, mortuary evidence for the LT A period points at contraction. In the North, the total number of known graves declines, while cemeteries are generally quite small in size (Hiddink 2014, 189). They also rarely produce substantial assemblages of grave goods. Prominent structural features are absent, and burial mounds tend to be small; when such mounds are entirely lacking, burials are referred to as ‘surface graves’ (*vlakgraven*). Most of these simple burials do not contain cremation urns. Indeed, during the transition from HA D to LT A, the proportion of surface graves without urn increases compared to the proportion of cremations with urn (Roymans 1990, 233). Among the inhumation graves women are prominently present. Children, by contrast, are not well represented. Some double interments occur, while burials also sometimes cluster within cemeteries. In such cases it is perhaps possible to argue for family-centric differentiation. On the other hand, isolated burials also commonly occur. Overall, there seems to have been a notable decline in mortuary investment in the Scheldt-Meuse zone (Gerritsen 2003, 192).

In terms of grave goods, the familiar range of objects and materials remains present, though quantities are low. Jewelry and clothing accessories are perhaps most common, and especially so for the inhumation graves of women. Neck rings made of gold, bronze, and iron have been recovered in low numbers, while bronze bracelets and earrings are more common. Non-local amber beads do

occur, but glass ornaments (beads or bracelets) are largely absent. Only a few metal brooches have been found, all of which are imports from southern regions. Weapons occur in the form of spears and lances, and these were likely imported from the Rhine-Moselle zone (as were the neck rings). Despite such regional connections, bronze wares, horse gear, and vehicles are quite rare, a situation that stands in stark contrast with the two southern zones (Hiddink 2014, 189). All of the pottery, furthermore, consists of local handshaped forms. While the occurrence of ‘Marne pottery’ (including imitations) shows that connections existed with the Aisne-Marne zone, knowledge of (or interest for) wheel-thrown pottery production seems not to have developed in the Scheldt-Meuse zone at this time.

Communist ideals did not receive great emphasis in the Scheldt-Meuse zone. The small scale of cemeteries suggests that these were used by generations of people belonging to the same family lineage rather than a larger community. Grave goods also suggest a strong focus on individual identity because the assemblages mainly contain objects that can be interpreted as the personal belongings of the deceased. There are some indications that socio-economic roles are emphasized, for example, when a whorl is deposited (e.g. spinning and weaving by daughters) or cattle teeth are placed in the hands of an adolescent (e.g. herding by sons) (Lanting and van der Plicht 2006, 319).

Furthermore, it is also clear that populations occupying the lowland areas of the Scheldt-Meuse zone were quite heterogeneous, with different burial rites occurring side-by-side, and a handful of ‘aberrant’ wealthy graves contrasting sharply with the far more common simple burial. Overall, material assemblages suggest conservatism at a time when connections of a sort were maintained with both the Aisne-Marne and Rhine-Moselle zones; indeed, isotope analysis has demonstrated the non-local origin of a number of excavated individuals (Roymans 2009; van den Broeke 2014). However, such interconnectivity apparently did little to diminish the stark contrast, in

terms of material wealth, monumentality, and ideological emphasis, between the two southern zones on the one hand and the Scheldt-Meuse zone on the other.

#### ***4.1.3 Late Iron Age (LT C-D)***

##### *Aisne-Marne Zone*

Starting in LT C, farmsteads in the Aisne-Marne zone became increasingly enclosed (ditch and fence works) during the Late Iron Age. New landscapes also came under cultivation and this was likely associated with demographic growth (Habermehl 2013, 56). Over the course of the second century BC, these enclosed farmsteads (*fermes indigenes*) were situated in densely settled landscapes, and this coincides with a LT D interest for increased spatial organization (rectangular ground plans and rigid internal divisions). The general LIA trend in terms of settlement, then, was towards increased stability, nucleation, and differentiation.

At this time, burials in the Aisne-Marne zone were placed in cemeteries that contain at most thirty to forty graves. In contrast to previous periods, it is the cremation rite that was dominant at this time, with inhumations rarely found (table 26). The overall decline in the number of cemeteries and wealthy burials noted for the preceding period (LT B) seems to continue into the first half of the Late Iron Age (LT C). In some parts of the Aisne-Marne zone, pottery is practically absent from graves. When present, it is only in low quantities (five to ten pieces). Occasionally, larger quantities of pottery (30+) were deposited, suggesting increased wealth disparities. While neck rings that are simple in style occur again in LT C, these eventually disappear from burial contexts altogether during LT D. Beaded necklaces are also no longer common. For dress items as well, differences in wealth are noticeable; for example, the poorest burials did not have any brooches while the wealthier graves

could have up to six. While these patterns might be indicative of growing inequality, the quantity and quality of grave goods overall is not very impressive.



*Figure 9: Vehicle burials of the LT C period (adapted from Diepeveen-Jansen 2001)*

Substantial quantities of pottery were occasionally included in the burials of children, and sometimes exclusively so. Furthermore, men, women, and children are also buried alongside each other. Taken together, this shows how children may have been considered full family members. The stronger focus on younger family members, compared to earlier periods, suggests changing value emphases, specifically the formation of forward-looking outlooks that stress the importance of family perpetuity. Together with the limited evidence for wealth differentials, we may have signs here for socio-economic differentiation that could have involved certain families gaining social prominence at the expense of others (i.e. diacritical familism).



Figure 10: *Vehicle burials of the LT D period (adapted from Diepeveen-Jansen 2001)*

There are again some differences between the northern and southern areas of the Aisne-Marne zone. For example, chariots and bronze wares are only deposited together in the northern part of the Aisne-Marne region. By contrast, wine amphorae (from Mediterranean Gaul) and Campanian pottery (from southern Italy) are found in the South only. Furthermore, swords are absent in the North during the LT C period when they only occur in the South, a pattern that reverses during LT D. Chariots only occur in very small numbers during the Late Iron Age. Interestingly, it is during the LT D period that bronze wares reappear after having been absent during the LT B and C periods. Likewise, wine amphorae do not arrive until LT D. Notably, and comparable to chariots and weapons, bronze wares and wine amphorae are also found outside mortuary contexts, in refuges and settlements. The prominence of commensal practices (drinking together) again suggests interest for relationality (communal cohesion and cooperation). It is in this very period that far more refuges are

built in the western half of the study area (section 4.2.2). For this same region, archaeologists have noted the abandonment of farmsteads starting early in the LT D period, a development that may be linked to the rise of a small number of large defended settlements (*oppida*) in the area (Haselgrove 1996, 151; Habermehl 2013, 56).

### *Rhine-Moselle Zone*

During the Late Iron Age (LT C-D), preexisting burial practices persisted in the Rhine-Moselle zone. The cremation rite continues to dominate, while graves still cluster in small cemeteries (mostly around twenty, sometimes more) used by self-sufficient farming families. Men, women, and children tend to be buried alongside each other, with rare double interments considered to be those of mother and child. Graves also commonly cluster inside the communal cemeteries, such that a family-centric focus in mortuary context remained.

Continuity is also demonstrated by the fact that the range of grave goods does not change significantly. All the familiar categories are still found - pottery, bronze wares, vehicles, horse gear, and personal adornment items. Dress ornaments are usually limited to brooches, but pendants, bracelets, and rings occur as well. Notable for this period is the more common deposition of special craft tools in male burials. The interment of such objects might suggest that a new symbolic emphasis centralized the role of male individuals as craft specialists. With craft skill (or economic activity) an acceptable focus of symbolic expression in mortuary contexts, expressions of differentiation no longer are limited to gender role and family affiliation.

When pottery is present in graves this typically ranges between one to five pieces. Even for those wealthiest graves that contain more than twenty, wealth display probably was not linked to social status at this time due to the continued absence of monumentality. Only a small proportion of

burials contained (concealed) wooden or stone pit linings. In fact, communalism may actually have received a stronger focus during this period, as suggested by the particularities of the cremation rite. Such rites manifested as communal events that involved the presence of people from beyond the immediate kin-group. Furthermore, such proceedings took place at pyre sites that were used repeatedly for the disposal of the dead. Indeed, the fact that burned fragments of the same pot, ornament, or weapon are found distributed across multiple graves indicates that multiple individuals were cremated at a single location but at different times, resulting in incomplete and mixed collection of cremated remains. Important here is the fact that this was deemed acceptable; in other words, the sanctity of the individual body (which would have demanded its isolation from other bodies) was not an issue for people who had come to prioritize communal ideals in mortuary contexts.

Such a communal focus may have been the outgrowth of social anxiety. During times of stress and insecurity, individuals and their families can choose to either withdraw from a larger community when they feel this is more advantageous, or, alternately, they will recognize the importance of communal cooperation. It seems that, at least in mortuary context, Rhine-Moselle communities came to express communalist ideals more strongly during the Late Iron Age (LT C-D). Apart from the particularities of the cremation rite, this is also suggested by sword deposition patterns. The deposition of swords peaks during the LT D period, and resembles the peak noted for the LT A period. These peaks in sword deposition also align with increased refuge construction (section 4.2.2), further suggesting that security was an important factor. Under such circumstances, swords are more than mere symbolic tokens of male martial prowess or family representation.

Above, I mentioned the discrepancy in mortuary practice between the northern and southern parts of the Aisne-Marne zone. In the Rhine-Moselle zone, such differences can also be

recognized for the Late Iron Age, but here it manifests as an East-West divide. The deposition of chariots and swords was far more common in the eastern half of this zone, and Fernández-Götz (2014c, 185) has related this to the prevalence of a warrior ethos in this area. While chariots and swords are rarely interred in burials situated in the western half of the Rhine-Moselle zone, it is here where we find most of the Italic imports. This suggests greater connectivity and interaction with southern trading groups from where these objects were undoubtedly derived. As for Aisne-Marne groups, it is perhaps possible to glean the prevalence of different value priorities, whereby eastern groups prioritized (at least in mortuary contexts) individual ability and communal belonging, values befitting the martial lifestyle of male-gang groups (*männerbund*). Among western groups, familist values may have been more dominant, and this encouraged the use of prestigious imports for diacritical positioning. This compares well with the North-South divide noted for the Aisne-Marne zone.

#### *Scheldt-Meuse Zone*

In the northern regions of the study area there is evidence for increased settlement nucleation (up to five farmsteads) and farmstead durability (houses are sturdier and multiphased), together with demographic expansion and agricultural intensification (Gerritsen 2003; Habermehl 2013). In contrast to developments in the Aisne-Marne zone, however, settlements remained loosely structured and unenclosed until the early Roman period (mid first century AD).

Evidence for Late Iron Age mortuary practices is not extensive for the Scheldt-Meuse zone. While large centuries-old cemeteries consisting of fifty to one hundred graves do occur, most cemeteries are of a small size (c. twenty graves). Within these communal cemeteries, adult men and women were buried alongside children. That graves sometimes cluster within cemeteries suggests a

desire for families to claim a section of a communal cemetery. The fact that graves are situated in small cemeteries adjacent to farmsteads points to the ideological centrality of the autonomous family as well (Gerritsen 1999, 94). The foregrounding of familist values appears to have endured, then, during this time. However, again it can be mentioned that different value emphases coexisted, such that the very fact that people choose to inter their deceased family members in shared cemeteries suggests the importance of communalist ideals as well. This is also shown by the use of centralized pyre sites where different bodies were recurrently cremated, resulting in the collection and deposition of mixed remains (a practice also recognized in the Rhine-Moselle zone).

Substantially different from both the Aisne-Marne and Rhine-Moselle zones is the poverty of grave goods in the North. Grave goods were typically cremated along with the body on a pyre, with few objects surviving to be deposited with cremated remains. Burials that could be considered 'elite' are extremely rare. Those that have been found contain horse gear, vehicles, and bronze vessels and implements. When pottery is present, they are simple hand-shaped forms. Simple brooches are the most common dress item. Evidence for weapons exists but these objects are extremely rare. There are also no signs of monumentality. Overall, then, there is little evidence for differentiation (by social role) or stratification (by social position) in the North.

#### **4.2 Socio-Historical Transformations**

In order to understand better these dynamics in mortuary practices, I will next consider several important socio-historical processes that can increase our understanding of the observed patterns and discrepancies. The review of burial assemblages has already shown that a wide range of tradable goods circulated throughout the study area, while certain kinds of objects were also imported into the region from further afield. Items made of non-local materials were imported into the region

throughout the long Iron Age (e.g. Baltic amber, Atlantic tin, Atlantic or Mediterranean coral, and Mediterranean glass and bronze), such that their enduring presence shows how the Celto-Germanic peoples of Northwest Europe were enduringly linked into intra- and inter-regional exchange networks.

This is significant because the degree to which local groups participated in extra-local networks of interaction can speak to local attitudes and outlooks. In other words, the willingness of groups and individuals to acquire and use materials and objects of non-local provenance, and interact with those who could provide them, can show how open they were to the outside world, how willing they were to engage ‘otherness’. From the enduring presence of non-local materials in mortuary assemblages it might be suggested, therefore, that openness and cultural tolerance were enduringly at an appreciable level throughout the Iron Age. On the other hand, the analysis of mortuary evidence has already raised the issue of security, a factor that greatly influences how people perceive the larger world, and their readiness to engage it. Indeed, it could certainly have been the case that a growing presence and influence of the ‘Other’ in the lived experience of local groups amplified a preoccupation with security, both practically and ideologically. While mortuary evidence can show how families and communities expressed certain values and ideals, socio-historical variables like security, connectivity, and interaction can inform about changing priorities. I will start by briefly comparing intra-regional patterns in value expression in mortuary context, followed by discussions on refuge construction, connectivity, and trade.

#### ***4.2.1 Intra-Regional Comparison of Values***

During the HA D period, communities in the Aisne-Marne zone expressed individualism predominantly in terms of normative gender roles, such that the members of largely self-sufficient

farming families prioritized a concern for conformism (i.e. conformist familism and communalism) in mortuary context. Yet, this is best understood in terms of differentiation rather than stratification. During this time, conflict and insecurity do not seem to have been important socio-historical factors; only a single defensive refuge is known for this period (figure 11). Martiality, as suggested by the (increased) deposition of daggers and short swords, mainly seems to relate to symbolic expression instead of actual violence. The absence of chariots in the Aisne-Marne zone during this period is also indicative of this.

This situation changed during the LT A period, when a segment of the local population displayed a greater interest for non-local goods (bronze wares are a new category), more stylistic variation among local goods, as well as the accumulation and display of material wealth. At this time, some people participated in wider networks of interaction, and this seems to have stimulated a focus on outward appearance, through the use of dress ornaments and weaponry. Higher mobility will undoubtedly have been an important factor, such that it is fitting that chariots are deposited for the first time during this period. These also immediately occur in substantial numbers, with numbers only declining in subsequent periods.

Communal cemeteries also reflect increased interest for what appears to be family-centric differentiation (grave clustering, attention for child burials, ancestor worship), which suggests a directional move towards diacritical familism. Yet, this kind of differentiation did not lead to institutionalized stratification. A distinction is noticeable, however, between the ideological emphases of northern and southern groups in the Aisne-Marne zone. While familism seems to have been a strong focus in the South, individualism was seemingly of greater importance in the North where there also was a greater interest for materialism, martiality, and commensality.

The subsequent LT B period may be characterized as a time of contraction and decline. Wheel-thrown pottery imitates and replaces imported bronze wares that are now absent. There is also less interest in stylistic variation, with numerous categories of objects no longer being deposited in graves. The proportion of graves that contains pottery or dress ornaments declines, while the number of interred chariots is also significantly lower. Long swords (suitable for mounted combat) are of greater uniformity and have largely replaced daggers and short swords.

Despite the reappearance of bronze wares during the Late Iron Age (LT C-D), it seems as if the LT B trend of contraction and decline continued. The sample reflects a continued drop in the deposition of weapons, bronze wares, vehicles, and dress items. Interestingly, the proportion of pottery increases during the latter half of the Late Iron Age (LT D), when we also see the arrival of new imports (Campanian ware and wine amphorae) in the southern part of the Aisne-Marne zone. During this period, more graves contain small quantities, with only a small subsection of graves containing substantially more pottery. While this signals the continued importance of commensality, mortuary evidence more generally suggests greater socio-economic disparity; some graves contain substantially more pottery and fibulae, while grave clustering, monumentality, and delineation is more common. Yet, while the importance of commensality and differentiation of family groups within the community increased, material wealth and interest for managing personal appearance declined. These contrasts manifested at a time when refuges were built in substantial numbers in the Aisne-Marne zone (figure 15). Notably, there seems to have been a far stronger focus on diacritical familism among southern communities of the LT D period, where there were fewer communal refuges. There, Mediterranean imports and feasting equipment were also more common, and the deposition of grave goods and erection of grave structures and boundary features signal greater interest for differentiation (Haselgrove 2007, 497). Both individualism and communalism likely

continued to receive greater emphasis among northern communities where martial ideology was more pronounced and many refuges were built.

During the latter half of the Early Iron Age (HA D), the self-sufficient farming families of the Rhine-Moselle zone were motivated to differentiate themselves in mortuary context (clustering of graves, delineation of clusters, and investment in structures). Individualism was primarily expressed in terms of social roles, whereby greater emphasis was seemingly placed on the burials of men (which generally contain more grave goods). The presence of four-wheeled wagons not only suggests connections with West-Central Hallstatt communities, this also signals the importance of mobility. The same could be said for the chariots that initially arrive at this time (earlier than the Aisne-Marne zone). As these lack any degree of ornamentation, vehicles likely were mainly valued for their functional use. Furthermore, the martial focus of Rhine-Moselle communities seems to be of a different kind compared to the Aisne-Marne zone. In the Aisne-Marne zone, short swords and daggers largely make up the assemblage of weapons at this time, while chariots are altogether lacking. In the Rhine-Moselle zone, by contrast, we encounter a wider variety of combat equipment (arrows, spears, lances, shields), while chariots are present in substantial numbers. Martiality seems to have been less about symbolic expression, then, and more directly linked to conflict. That a relatively high number of refuges are located in this part of the study area (figure 11) during this period also suggests that Rhine-Moselle communities had a greater interest for security. Greater communal cooperation is a common response to insecurity, and refuge construction certainly required a substantial degree of cooperation. That a communal focus was also expressed in mortuary context is suggested by the preference for drinking forms (including bronze wares), which centralizes the importance of commensality (drinking together), and hence relationality and conformism. This is also suggested by the way wealth display played no significant role in mortuary

context. We have a society, then, where differentiation existed, but not in the form of a pronounced stratification that could subvert communal interests.

Significant changes are noticeable for the first half of the Middle Iron Age (LT A), when the mortuary record reflects a greater interest for material wealth, stylistic diversity, and opulence. Interest for wheel-thrown pottery suggests that producers and consumers alike were more interested in innovation and experimentation. Bronze wares continue to be interred, with drinking forms remaining dominant. As was the case for Aisne-Marne communities, Rhine-Moselle groups likewise showed greater interest for managing outward appearance (dress ornaments and toiletry equipment) at this time, a period when expansive processes increased rates of interaction with familiar and unfamiliar non-kin. That insecurity and anxiety lessened during the LT A period is suggested by the decline in refuge construction (figure 17). Equally suggestive for this trend is the fact that male martiality seemed to have become more symbolic, with chariots and swords signaling a stronger interest for ornamentation over function. It can again be emphasized, however, that wealth differentials primarily manifest through grave good deposition, not monumentality. Indeed, conservation of the family lineage (prosperity and perpetuity) seems to have received a stronger focus (i.e. diacritical familism). While the latter half of the Middle Iron Age (LT B) is marked by demographic decline, the material consequences are far less pronounced for the Rhine-Moselle zone compared to the Aisne-Marne zone.

This contraction seems to have continued during the Late Iron Age (LT C-D), when no significant changes occurred in mortuary practice, with the exception of one innovation in the way social identity was communicated; in addition to the expression of gender and kinship, economic activity or craft skill became an acceptable form of social identification in mortuary context. Wealth display as an expression of diacritical distinction was not very pronounced, except, perhaps, among

western groups where familist values may have become more dominant. This contrasts with the interests and priorities of eastern groups where martial lifestyles were more prevalent, and individual differentiation (not institutionalized stratification) and communal belonging seem to have been prioritized.

Mortuary practices were rather varied in the Scheldt-Meuse zone during the latter half of the Early Iron Age (HA D), such that it is difficult to discern normative patterns. Comparable to the two southern zones, rural communities in the North also interred their deceased relatives in communal cemeteries, which were shared by several families. There are indications that the burials of women received greater investment (heightened care for the female body and more grave goods), and this contrasts with the Rhine-Moselle focus on male martiality. Individuality was primarily expressed in terms of socially recognized gender roles then. Display of wealth was not common at all. Those 'chieftain's graves' of variable date that occur in low numbers in the northern half of the study area should be considered anomalous; they likely were the burials of outsiders who sporadically moved through the region. For local communities, conformist familism and communalism seem to have been dominant ideals at this time.

This situation does not change significantly during the Middle Iron Age (LT A-B). In fact, while there are indications for demographic growth, the scarcity of archaeological data for mortuary practices in the Scheldt-Meuse zone (a region where there has not been a lack of research) points to contraction and decline. This contrasts starkly with the expansive processes attested for the two southern zones. While insecurity and social anxiety commonly trigger prioritization of communalist values, clear signs for such an emphasis are largely absent in the North; collective refuges were never built in this region (figures 11-15), while communal cemeteries are smaller and scarcer than before. Though objects derived from both southern zones are found throughout the Scheldt-Meuse zone,

the situation in the North can accurately be characterized in terms of conservatism and low socio-political complexity. These trends seem to persist into the Late Iron Age (LT C-D), when cemeteries do not show any changes in burial construction or deposition, and Mediterranean imports are mostly absent. The highly segmented communities of the Scheldt-Meuse zone show signs for continued differentiation in terms of social role and family membership, but certainly not socio-economic stratification.

How are we to understand these diverging patterns in the three zones of the study area? How can we best understand this evidence derived from mortuary contexts vis-à-vis broader socio-historical developments? Archaeologists have linked the effervescence of La Tène culture during the Middle Iron Age (LT A-B) to the development of a more complex socio-cultural system in a core area that includes the Rhine-Moselle zone. It is commonly supposed that the main impetus for this was the ability of local aspirers to control the trade in prestige goods, enabling these social innovators and their supporters to rise to temporary prominence. Early generations of archaeologists, in particular, foregrounded the significance of Mediterranean cultural influence. Indeed, many of the earliest narratives of culture-historical development reflect a basic assumption: that primitive barbarians simply would not have been able to resist the allure of the Mediterranean world and its products (e.g. wine, fine wares, metal objects). This triggered competition and warfare as local elites strove to control the import and distribution of these highly desirable goods, and convince subordinate masses to contribute to their self-aggrandizing and society-changing projects.

Presumably resulting from complexification processes of this kind, Celto-Germanic communities throughout West-Central Europe experienced profound transformations during the latter half of the Late Iron Age (LT D): the founding of large-scale defended settlements (*oppida*), the

formation of larger socio-political entities (the countless 'tribal' groups named by historical sources), the rise of communal sanctuaries of regional importance, the use of coinage for economic and political purposes, as well as the pronounced displays of socio-economic inequality in various social contexts. In the absence of a permanent centralized authority, these peripheral pre-state societies seemingly engaged in incessant feuding and inter-tribal warfare, such that it took pacification by Rome to end a state of affairs deemed typical for groups operating at the chiefdom level. For observers past and present, what were perceived as essential shortcomings of people living at a pre-state level of socio-political organization were briefly 'aggravated' through contact with a highly complex state (i.e. 'tribalization'), and subsequently 'enhanced' through post-conquest acculturative processes (with stratification and emulation perceived as dominant social dynamics).

More nuanced have been the interpretations of post-processual archaeologists and their theoretical inheritors. They have emphasized the importance of local political economies and cultural cosmologies that shaped the contextual negotiation of external goods, ideas, and behaviors. However, while it might be thought that the foregrounding of native agency and local meaning-making significantly changed perspectives on Iron Age societies, post-processual interest in Marxist theory (i.e. the determinative role of class conflict as the motor of historical transformation, and of ideology for mystifying and legitimizing inequality) has instead only validated the place of competition and conflict in archaeological interpretation.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, the enduring primitivizing tendencies of modern state-based archaeologists - who habitually ascribe ritual significance to

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<sup>49</sup> A recent discussion of Marxist ideas can be found in Sastre, who considers the theoretical pertinence of the Germanic Mode of Production for interpreting Iron Age developments. Notably, she argues how the internal stress that resulted from differentiation dynamics (i.e. individuals and families vying for social preeminence) was "resolved by the intensification of inter-community conflict" (Sastre 2011, 271).

difficult to interpret non-utilitarian behavior - also clearly comes to the fore in structuralist perspectives that grant religious significance to the violent excesses of European prehistory. While ancient ethnographers blamed conflict among barbarians on essential dispositions and cultural shortcomings rather than political and economic competition, modern archaeologists have essentialized Celto-Germanic belligerence and violence by embedding it in trans-historical moral systems and cultural cosmologies (Derks 1998; Bazelmans 1999; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001).

By foregrounding indigenous interests and cosmologies in her study of mortuary practices, Diepeveen-Jansen is led to conclude that it must mainly have been aspiring men that distinguished themselves socially and who manifested as community leaders through successful realization of certain ideals linked predominantly to martiality (Diepeveen-Jansen 2001, 56). In similar terms, Roymans links all LIA patterns to “social hierarchisation” and the institutionalization of relations of inequality (2004, 20). By creatively manipulating widely shared value systems, aspiring innovators managed to change existing social arrangements, and centralize the cultural importance of patron-client relations. Presumably, the reproduction of these systems became a cultural ideal that all members of the community strove to realize. The main socio-historical transition recognized, then, is that from a broadly egalitarian to an increasingly stratified society. For each local context under consideration, this is perceived as the main developmental trajectory. It is a model of socio-cultural transformation that dominates the literature (Haselgrove 1987; Dietler 1990; Roymans 1990; Sastre 2011; Fernández-Götz *et al.* 2014).

Archaeologists who have sought to deemphasize earlier core-periphery models that centralize the importance of a trade in prestige goods tend not to move beyond discussing quantifiable economic and demographic variables. From this perspective, social stratification is assumed to follow directly from demographic growth, with increased agricultural production as

ultimate cause. A recent discussion on the rise of HA D proto-urban settlements is illustrative in this respect (Fernández-Götz and Krause 2013, 479). The unique (i.e. aberrant) character of one ‘princely’ hillfort (Heuneburg), in particular, is clearly communicated in this work, and largely approached within a Marxist and nativist framework. It is argued that demographic growth directly encouraged socio-economic inequality attested at this prominent site. Managerial elites presumably achieved their superior status by successfully mobilizing communal loyalties and aspirations through the manipulation of ideological discourse, in particular through the organization of public ceremonial performances at sacred places (Fernández-Götz 2014a, 117). Yet, in the context of the West-Central Hallstatt world, it remains difficult to see how differentiating aspirers were able to convince members of broadly egalitarian communities to participate in aggrandizing projects in such a chronologically and geographically erratic manner. Indeed, it cannot be ignored that most societies throughout Iron Age Europe remained broadly egalitarian and rural. Furthermore, if population growth encouraged centralization and stratification, was it population decline that triggered contrasting developments? Did the persistence of egalitarian ideals among communities that were contemporary with ‘princely hillforts’ result from a lack of demographic growth? Was the decline of the Heuneburg settlement after less than two centuries the result of a regional population decline?

Alternately, those archaeologists who interpret social differentiation across Iron Age Europe from a comparative ethnographic point-of-view might emphasize the transformational potential of certain social mechanisms, like ‘feasting’ (Dietler and Herbich 2001; Spielmann 2002; Hayden 2003; Michael 2003), through which some individuals and family groups were able to mobilize local labor forces and differentiate themselves within the local community. Yet, it is difficult to see how rural farming families collaborated in building the monumental walls, gates, and towers of ‘princely’ hillforts through participation in presumably voluntary ‘work feasts’. Such projects undoubtedly

required labor investments of a scale and duration that are incomparable to the creation of even the largest burial mounds.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, without clear evidence for the prevalence of extended households or polygamous family arrangements in Iron Age Europe (Nash-Briggs 2003, 254), it is not at all certain whether the work feast could carry the same kind of labor potential it demonstrably has in African contexts. Taken together, then, the nativist perspective remains problematic when it relies too heavily on environmental and demographic variables, and ignores the role of extra-local influences (as demonstrated by the Mediterranean architectural influence at the Heuneburg or the presence of large quantities of non-local objects and materials in surrounding cemeteries), while the interpretive potential of ethnographic comparative studies that foreground the transformational significance of social mechanisms like work feasts also remains limited.

#### ***4.2.2 Insecurity and Refuge Construction***

As I discussed earlier, socio-historical models that presume the inevitability of social stratification processes ignore how the goals and interests of ‘big men’ might be opposed by their communities.<sup>51</sup> Caesar’s retelling of the political machinations of Orgetorix of the Helvetii (Switzerland), whose efforts were resisted within his own community, may serve as a clear historical example of this

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<sup>50</sup> For example, for the Iron Age *oppidum* at Manching it has been calculated that a single phase of construction required approximately 500,000 person-days of labor (Wells 2005, 57).

<sup>51</sup> Hill (2006) argues that we should not assume hierarchical social structure to have been a norm, and instead imagine a non-triangular Iron Age. Collis complains about the homogenization of information from Iron Age societies, leading to reconstructions of “generally all male and childless” societies (2011, 223). Pope and Ralston (2011, 375), in turn, argue that archaeologists must clearly demonstrate rather than assume social hierarchization, and also note that material wealth alone does not prove ranking. Sastre (2011, 269) likewise notes how egalitarian ideology co-occurs with differences in wealth.

(Caesar *Gallic Wars* 1.2).<sup>52</sup> Indeed, differentiating entrepreneurs are always at risk of eroding or severing bonds with their families and communities. Reversely, for groups and individuals to render services or surrender resources in order to secure a share in the redistributive systems controlled by wealthy elites is not inherently attractive. Indeed, this only makes adaptive sense under certain socio-historical conditions. Physical insecurity and psychological stress are factors that can easily be shown to have promoted the proliferation of disproportionately empowered individuals, families, and communities throughout human history. Such conditions commonly encourage communal cooperation and prioritization of communalist values. Yet, the successful realization of equality-based collaborative projects is never easy to achieve. A threshold can be reached, then, with or without the assistance of differentiating manipulators, at which point people are willing to surrender a degree of autonomy as a way of addressing insecurity and anxiety. The stratified systems that often initially form due to these factors then shape subsequent socio-historical developments that commonly encourage inequality and imposition (and anomie and fatalism, if not adequately mitigated). There seems little doubt that insecurity and anxiety have historically been crucial factors in the spread of stratified socio-political systems.

While describing intra-regional patterns in mortuary practice, I have referred to the presence of defended refuges in the study area, and have mainly done so in order to point to changing levels of insecurity. In order to further explore the role of conflict and insecurity in shaping socio-historical developments in the region, I will next consider more closely spatio-temporal patterns in refuge

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<sup>52</sup> Another example concerns Caesar's arbitration of an internal conflict among the Aeduans (Central France). Within this community, laws seemed to have been in place that were intended to prevent the centralization of power. Apparently, Aeduan families could only have one of their members serve as an "officer of the state", such as to prevent certain families gaining too much influence (Caesar *Gallic Wars* VII, 33).

construction. The vast majority of small-scale refuges found across the Rhine-Moselle zone tend to provide archaeologists with little material to work with; prominent objects like vehicles, bronze wares, and other imports are largely absent. The majority of these sites were also not favorably situated along transport routes, such that isolation seems to have been an important consideration for many. This is further suggested by the fact that even the highest concentration of LT A elite graves in the Rhine-Moselle zone is not associated with refuges. Their distribution also speaks against their function as central places of communities that commanded a surrounding territory. Resource control also does not seem to have been a factor, while only a handful of refuges provide evidence for craft or industrial activity. Their small size (1-3 ha) and the general absence of dwellings and internal structural divisions suggests that the majority of hilltop refuges were built to be used temporarily and intermittently (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 107). While these small refuges are almost contemporary with the earliest wealthy burials of the Rhine-Moselle zone, no clear linkages can be demonstrated. Contrary to the burials, the vast majority of small refuges do not provide any evidence for the presence of Mediterranean imports. Tellingly, signs of destruction and rebuilding have been found, along with sling projectiles and the remains of metal weapons.

Due to a lack of research and problems in dating, any conclusions regarding the spatio-temporal distribution of refuges remain tentative. I will nonetheless make some preliminary observations here which future research will no doubt be able to nuance. Figures 16-18 below visualize the data on Iron Age refuge construction in the study area. Refuges have been allocated to the period when they were initially built in order to counter the problem that many will have been occupied, abandoned, and reoccupied over the course of the long Iron Age. If it can be accepted that refuge construction was closely linked to insecurity and anxiety, then it can be concluded that the latter part of the Early Iron Age (HA D=32) witnessed increased insecurity compared to the

previous (HA C) period, with conditions having improved somewhat during the Middle Iron Age (LT A =20 and LT B= 19). The earlier part of the Late Iron Age (LT C=4), in turn, witnessed the lowest level of insecurity in centuries. This was followed by the extreme conditions of the second half of the Late Iron Age when we witness a historical peak in the construction of defended sites (LT D=65).



*Figure 11: Newly constructed refuges of the HA D period (adapted from Collis 1975; Roymans 1990; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001; Sicherl 2007; Verhoeven 2008)*




Figure 12: Newly constructed refuges of the LT A period (adapted from Collis 1975; Roymans 1990; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001; Sichel 2007; Verhoeven 2008)




Figure 13: Newly constructed refuges of the LT B period (adapted from Collis 1975; Roymans 1990; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001; Sichel 2007; Verhoeven 2008)




Figure 14: Newly constructed refuges of the LT C period (adapted from Collis 1975; Roymans 1990; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001; Slicherl 2007; Verhoeven 2008)




Figure 15: Newly constructed refuges of the LT D period (adapted from Collis 1975; Roymans 1990; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001; Slicherl 2007; Verhoeven 2008)




Figure 17: Number of newly occupied defended refuges per period (figure by author)




Figure 16: Scale variety by period (figure by author)




Figure 18: Proportional distribution (%) of defended refuges by scale (ha) per period (figure by author)

The trends described here differ slightly from those identified by Diepeveen-Jansen (2001, 64) who worked with a smaller sample of twenty-five refuge sites. She also noticed a decline in the building of fortifications after the HA D period, and further mentions how there are more smaller-sized hillforts during the HA D and LT A periods compared to the LT B and C periods. The larger sample (n=141) used here can add further nuance to her conclusions. It shows how a comparable number of refuges was built during the LT A and LT B periods, although numbers are significantly

lower than the preceding HA D period. Again, the lowest number of defended sites are built during the LT C period, subsequently rising to a record number during the LT D period.

Differences can also be seen in the proportional distribution of refuges by size. The scale at which refuges were built is an important variable because this can speak to the circumstances of use. During periods with higher levels of insecurity, when people felt repeatedly or enduringly under threat, more people will have occupied refuges repeatedly or enduringly. Consequently, we would expect higher numbers of larger-scale refuges to occur in periods with higher levels of insecurity, to provide refuge to more people for longer periods of time. The sample seems to reflect this. It shows that the greatest scale diversity occurs in those periods (HA D and LT D) when the most refuges are newly built. Though the lack of dating precision prevents conclusions being drawn at a comfortable level of certainty, for now the data suggest that the high level of scale diversity for the HA D period declines for the LT A period. This decline persists throughout LT B and LT C, only to rise again during the troubled LT D period. In other words, during those times when people felt most insecure they built the largest refuges, while also constructing them at the greatest range of scales. It seems, then, that local communities were compelled to collaborate in the construction and defense of communal refuges at a wide range of scales when living conditions became increasingly and enduringly insecure.

Despite these patterns in refuge construction, and the identification of most as places where local people could shelter temporarily from threats, there are some fortified sites that warrant a different interpretation. The small temporary refuges considered here are not to be compared with the ‘princely’ hillforts (*fürstensitze*) of the West-Central Hallstatt world that were often larger in scale and permanently occupied during the Early Iron Age (Dietler 1995). Nor are they to be equated with the *oppida* of the Late Iron Age that were comparable in scale and function to the earlier ‘princely’

hillforts (Moore *et al.* 2013). Diepeveen-Jansen (2001, 65) also clearly distinguishes between small-scale refuges that were occupied intermittently, and the much larger defended settlements that were permanently occupied during a period of use.

This latter category of HA D-LT A defended sites is described by Fernández-Götz as “large collective centres” (2014c, 116).<sup>53</sup> Which could be quite extensive in scale (in the Rhine-Moselle zone the Titelberg and Wallendorf hillforts are the largest at *c.* 40 ha) and some have provided evidence for metal and textile production (*ibid.*, 109). While their formation is primarily seen as the result of hierarchization and centralization processes encouraged by demographic growth, if both of these regional centers and the much smaller *burgen* formed an integrated settlement system (whereby leading families or clans controlled large regional centers and ruled over subordinate families or clans that controlled the smaller hillforts) we would expect clearer linkages between both kinds of defended sites. Strikingly, none of these local and regional elites ever seemed to have permanently occupied either the small or large hillforts during the HA D-LT A periods.

In addition to these large collective centers of the Rhine-Moselle zone, a small number of high-lying fortified sites of HA D-LT A date are known within the Belgian region of the Scheldt River system (de Mulder and Bourgeois 2011). These hold the remains of ditches, ramparts, and palisades and seem to have been built in locations where they could command valleys and river confluences. In contrast to many of the smaller refuges of the Rhine-Moselle zone, then, for these fortified sites of the Scheldt River system isolation appears not to have been an important factor. This is also suggested by material evidence (e.g. Attic Black glaze ware, imitations of Greek and Etruscan ceramic forms), which demonstrates how these sites were linked to exchange networks

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<sup>53</sup> Fernández-Götz lists Bleidenberg, Donnersberg, Kastel-Stadt, Martberg, Otzenhausen, Titelberg, and Wallendorf (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 109-111).

extending as far as Central Europe and the Mediterranean World. The occurrence of a locally manufactured red painted pottery (i.e. Kemmelberg pottery) at several of these fortified sites also shows participation in regional networks. Together with evidence for chariots and horse gear, these findings have led archaeologists to interpret these defended sites as the regional seats of local elites, and in this they are comparable to the Early Iron Age ‘princely’ hillforts of the West-Central Hallstatt world, as well as the large collective centers of the Rhine-Moselle zone.

However, in light of what I argued above for the aberrant HA D and LT A ‘chieftain’s graves’ of the Scheldt-Meuse zone, it is possible to venture a different interpretation for these fortified sites. Without other convincing evidence for socio-economic differentiation within these segmented societies of predominantly self-sufficient farming families, it remains difficult to argue for the rise of elites who somehow managed to gain social prominence by controlling local productive output or the import and distribution of exotic goods of (presumably) universal appeal. The building of these sites also occurred during a time when there was a peak in refuge construction in the study area, though the vast majority of HA D refuges were built in the Rhine-Moselle zone. The LT A timing of the decline of these ‘elite’ fortified sites is also curious; in this period, there are stronger signs for expansive processes in the Aisne-Marne and Rhine-Moselle zones, but contraction in the Scheldt-Meuse zone. Much like the aberrant ‘chieftain’s graves’, then, these fortified sites deviate from normative patterns, such that they can be considered anomalous occurrences (perhaps even ‘insertions’) in a preexisting and normative socio-cultural context.

#### ***4.2.3 Connectivity and Interaction***

In order to understand socio-cultural convergence and divergence in the study area it can be emphasized again that the historical trajectories of local Celto-Germanic groups have to be

interpreted without making reference to some essential warrior identity, or the evolutionary inevitability of social complexification. What should instead be asked is what socio-historical factors encouraged martiality to gain such ideological prominence throughout the study area in particular times and places, and what forces influenced the clear spatio-temporal patterns in refuge construction. To understand the noted patterns in refuge construction better, it is necessary to consider the significance of intra- and inter-regional connectivity, and then specifically how engagement in long-distance interaction networks shaped local dynamics. While a greater geographic potential for connectivity also brought higher risk of insecurity, this potential remained of course quite consistent throughout the long Iron Age. Moreover, a high potential for connectivity does not automatically lead to higher degrees of complexification.

It is useful to start by considering the spatial distribution of refuges. The figures 11-15 not only reflect the number of newly built refuges per period, they show where they were built. During the latter half of the Early Iron Age (HA D), the majority are found in the eastern half of the study area that includes the Rhine-Moselle zone. The situation is reversed during the latter half of the Late Iron Age (LT D) when most are found in the western half of the study area that includes the Aisne-Marne zone. If it can be accepted that security and connectivity were closely linked, then disparities in these variables could explain differences in refuge construction. Yet, connectivity can be understood in terms of the geographic allowances for mobility (how landscapes facilitate or constrain movement), and in terms of socio-historical dynamics (who traded, when, and why). I will briefly consider both.

In order to gain access to Mediterranean consumers and producers, Celto-Germanic agents engaged in trading activities could travel in two general directions. West of the Alps, the Saône-Rhône river system functioned as a prominent trade corridor that allowed access to the West

Mediterranean region. All the major river systems of Northwest Europe (Loire, Seine, Meuse, and Rhine) could be used to access (via overland routes) the Saône-Rhône system. North of the Alps, the Danube river system linked northern rivers (Rhine, Weser, Elbe, Oder, and Vistula) with Adriatic and Pontic trade systems. It is clear, then, that the communities of the Rhine-Moselle zone were ideally positioned to link into western (Seine and Meuse), northern (Rhine and Weser), southern (Saône-Rhône), and eastern (Danube) exchange systems (*contra* Fernández-Götz 2014c, 113). Compared to Rhine-Moselle communities, Aisne-Marne groups were less ideally situated, with the greatest potential for extra-regional connectivity provided by Seine and Meuse routes. The fact that refuges do not occur here in any significant numbers until the LT D period, perhaps speaks to this lower level of extra-regional connectivity, and the same could be said for communities situated in the Scheldt-Meuse zone. Indeed, the distribution of Mediterranean imports into the study area suggests this as well; the earliest arrival (HA D) of Etruscan bronze wares are found in the Rhine-Moselle zone, when these remained absent in the other two zones. This changed during the LT A and B periods when such imports were also deposited in the Aisne-Marne zone, though in small quantities; it is not until the Late Iron Age that imports (e.g. Italic Campanian ware and South Gallic amphorae) were deposited in substantial quantities there. This contrasts with the Rhine-Moselle zone on the one hand where Mediterranean imports were enduringly present during the long Iron Age, and the Scheldt-Meuse zone on the other where imports never occurred in appreciable numbers.

A distinction needs to be made, however, between a potential for connectivity, and actual interaction. One need only consider how the expansive waterways of the low-lying coastal and riverine landscapes of the Netherlands and Belgium (i.e. the Scheldt-Meuse zone) offered a high potential for connectivity. Indeed, this degree of connectivity (which presents both opportunities

and challenges) would become a crucial factor in the maintenance of the later Roman frontier. Yet, this apparently did not encourage substantial socio-economic complexification among the segmentary communities of farming families that inhabited these areas during the Iron Age. Moreover, despite the socio-historical transformations experienced by communities situated in the Aisne-Marne and Rhine-Moselle zones, this clearly did not result from any changes in the geographic conditions that facilitated and constrained connectivity. In other words, it is necessary to consider the socio-historical dynamics of exchange systems.

We can start by considering the trading potential of the study area. What were people exchanging for Mediterranean imports during the Iron Age? Roman literary sources of Late Republican and later date not infrequently provide lists of trade items that suggest how a wide variety of goods moved through West European exchange systems. Here I proceed from the assumption that it was not primarily agricultural products that lured Mediterranean traders into West-Central Europe (e.g. Kindstedt 2012, 105). Indeed, there were few goods that could be imported from the Late Hallstatt and Early La Tène North that were not also available from nearer sources (Dietler 1989, 129). Rather, the greatest interest was for metals and commodities (e.g. amber, furs, and slaves) for which there existed fluctuating but enduring demand in the Mediterranean world because sources there were intermittently scarce or altogether absent (King 1990, 120). Notably, sources of metal ore are quite rare in the Celto-Germanic Northwest, though gold deposits may have been exploited by Rhine-Moselle groups inhabiting the German Hunsrück area (Morteani and Northover 1995, 124), where iron may also have been produced during the LT A period

(Shefton 1995, 11).<sup>54</sup> The distribution of sources for tin ore on the Atlantic Rim (mainly Brittany and Cornwall) attracted Mediterranean traders from a very early date, with the Garonne and Loire, and possibly the Seine, functioning as important trade corridors (Giunlia-Mair and Lo Schiavo 2003). The study area lacks tin deposits, however, such that there was no reason for merchants to venture further north than necessary for that particular resource.

Amber, by contrast, has a far greater potential for having been exchanged by Celto-Germanic communities in exchange for Mediterranean goods. In prehistoric West-Central Europe, amber derived from North Sea and Baltic sources was long transported south via Rhine, Weser, Elbe, Oder, and Vistula river routes. Reaching Alpine regions, it was then moved along a western route using the Saône-Rhône corridor, or along an eastern route to the Adriatic and beyond (Angelini and Bellintani 2005; Czebreszuk 2003 and 2007). Amber-trading groups like the Vindelici (or Veneti) seemed to have monopolized East Alpine trade routes during the Late Iron Age (Pliny *Natural History* 37, 43). Indeed, the Romans founded the fort and settlement of Aquileia (situated at the head of the Adriatic) around 180 B.C., in part, to control this Venetic trade in amber. Despite the formation of the Danubian frontier, the role of Aquileia as importer of raw and exporter of carved amber continued until *c.* A.D. 180 when frequent wars with trans-Danubian groups finally cut-off Central European supply routes. By this time, however, another important center for the amber trade had already arisen on the Rhine, where workshops in Cologne operated from the second to the fourth century A.D. (Veldman 2003, 34). Furs brought from boreal regions will have been moved along these same ‘Amber Roads’. Notably, the Rhine most likely was the most western

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<sup>54</sup> Fernández-Götz argues that the exploitation and commercialization of iron cannot be treated as the reason for Early La Tène complexification processes manifesting in the Hunsrück-Eifel region (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 112).

route along which these northern commodities were transported to southern markets. Thus, where this concerns access to inter-regional exchange networks, Rhine-Moselle communities were better positioned compared to their neighbors of the Aisne-Marne and Scheldt-Meuse zones.

In considering the commercial potential of the study area, then, amber and furs seemingly had the greatest potential for reaching southern markets and enticing southern traders to venture north. Yet, it remains difficult to see how a trade in these particular goods could have shaped the discrepant socio-historical developments in the study area, or how exactly engagement in a trade in amber and furs can explain the evidence for insecurity (as suggested by patterns in refuge construction) or the strong ideological focus on martiality (as shown by the deposition of weaponry, armor, horse gear, and vehicles in sacred and mortuary contexts). A clear way forward starts with the recognition that local and regional developments did not manifest in isolation from global phenomena. This urges recognition of the importance of Mediterranean connections. Not because of some misguided admiration of Greek, Etruscan, or Roman cultural achievements (and hence a neglect of Celto-Germanic agency), but because of a pragmatic consideration of socio-historical realities (Mata 2017).

We can start by considering the two hard to ignore peaks in refuge construction, the first towards the end of the Early Iron Age (HA D), the other during the latter half of the Late Iron Age (LT D).<sup>55</sup> What was transpiring in the Mediterranean world during these periods, and how did this shape interactions with the Celto-Germanic World? The HA D period lasted a little over a century, from *c.* 600 BC to 475 BC. Significant for this period is the founding of Greek trading colonies in

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<sup>55</sup> Depending on the scholar's perspective, these peaks are considered high or low points in socio-cultural complexity. If linked to insecurity and conflict, it is difficult to argue in positive terms (e.g. Pope and Ralston 2011, 387) that HA D and LT D represent periods of Celto-Germanic cultural achievement.

southern France, most notably Massalia (Marseille) *c.* 600 BC. Somewhat later, this period also witnessed the formation of a confederacy of Etruscan city-states, likely in response to the growth of Greek and Punic influence in the Western Mediterranean. These Etruscan communities colonized the Po valley in northern Italy and established emporia in the North Adriatic region where they came to control cross-Alpine passes and dominate East Alpine trade routes.<sup>56</sup> In this same period, the West-Central Hallstatt world witnessed the rise of ‘princely’ hillforts that are associated with elaborate wagon burials containing Greek and Etruscan imports (Walsh 2014).

Here it is useful to reflect on an illuminating study by Sacchetti (2016) who has tracked the temporal and geographic distribution of Mediterranean wine amphorae in the latter part of the Early Iron Age (HA D-LT A). She is able to show how the earliest of these arrived in trans-Alpine Europe during the second half of the sixth century BC (HA D1-D2) and are found at ‘princely’ residences in eastern France (Burgundy and Franche-Comté) and southwestern Germany (Baden-Württemberg). In a subsequent phase dated to the late sixth and early fifth century BC (HA D2-D3), amphorae are found in many more locations in eastern France and southwestern Germany. Both phases belong in a period when we see a first peak in refuge construction in the study area, notably in the Rhine-Moselle zone, where the earliest Mediterranean imports (bronze wares) are found. Subsequently, during the first half of the fifth century BC (HA D3-LT A), these amphorae are solely found in France, concentrating around the Saône-Rhône corridor. This probably does not reflect a waning of Etruscan participation in the trans-Alpine trade, merely that wine amphorae were primarily moved through southern France at this time. Etruscan merchants may have focused more on the bronze wares that came to inspire La Tène stylistic innovations. Lastly, Sacchetti identifies a fourth phase

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<sup>56</sup> Brun refers to this as an “Etruria-Middle Rhine axis” (Brun 1994, 59).

during the second half of the fifth century (LT A), when the circulation of Mediterranean amphorae in France was again more widespread. In the study area, this first half of the Early La Tène period is characterized by a stronger focus on familism and differentiation in both southern zones of the study area, developments that were likely encouraged by higher levels of connectivity and increased participation in supra-regional exchange networks.

Notably, the numbers of imported amphorae are consistently low, and this, according to Sacchetti, has led archaeologists to deemphasize economic factors and foreground socio-political aspects (*ibid.*, 258). The limited availability of a high-status commodity is commonly believed to have enabled elites to restrict access and manipulate social systems (i.e. the Marxist perspective), or for some individuals and their families to get ahead in their communities through display and redistribution (i.e. the comparative ethnographic perspective). Importantly, Sacchetti writes how the “non-synchronic activity of the Hallstatt sites that were receiving Mediterranean imports indicates that the princely event of the West Hallstatt area is not culturally homogeneous and chronologically uniform in terms of imports” (*ibid.*, 262). In other words, the highly insular distribution of Mediterranean imports in West-Central Europe shows that HA D - LT A trade was quite intermittent.<sup>57</sup> Many of the sites can solely be allocated to one of four phases identified by Sacchetti. These are not signs, then, of enduring socio-cultural complexification; rather, what we are seeing is the incidental and temporary ascendance of differentiating individuals and their kin to leadership positions within local communities, their occupation of defended settlements, and their interment in extravagant burials. In other words, the spatio-temporal distributions of wine amphorae across the

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<sup>57</sup> That trade was both intermittent and directional (i.e. potential trade partners were consciously targeted) is also suggested by the distribution of Italic bronze wares in the Rhine-Moselle zone in the Early La Tène period. Bronze *situlae* from northern Italy predominate in the eastern part, while beaked flagons are somewhat later more dominant in the western part (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 87).

West-Central Hallstatt world demonstrates the periodic and highly localized centralization of power. Indeed, only a handful of regional concentrations of (Early and Late La Tène) sumptuous burials have been identified between the Alps and the Atlantic (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 184). Whatever it was that motivated Mediterranean traders to establish relations with such trans-Alpine groups, these Late Hallstatt and Early La Tène ‘princes’ became linked into exchange systems that spanned vast distances along well-trodden trade routes, but also through social networks that had to be established, reinforced, and regularly renewed through hospitality, commensality, and reciprocity. Notably, the high-status character of wine (resulting from a combination of rarity and exoticism) made it ideal for limited gift exchange and treaty trade (Sacchetti 2016, 261).

#### ***4.2.4 The ‘International’ Slave Trade***

While the contemporaneity of Mediterranean and trans-Alpine developments has long been thought significant (Rowlands *et al.* 1987), and the importance of native perspectives that shaped demand for foreign products certainly cannot be ignored (Dietler 1989 and 1990), what archaeologists and historians have neglected to ask is why Greek merchants in particular elected to venture across the Mediterranean to establish trading colonies in southern France in this particular period. While oft-considered variables like demographic growth and resource demand may certainly have been important, substantial historical significance can be given to events taking place in Athens around this time. Specifically, this concerns the radical political reforms promoted by the Athenian statesman Solon *c.* 594 BC. This resulted in the emancipation of Athenian debt slaves and the legislative protection of that city’s poorer citizens from future enslavement. Solon’s efforts also led to a significant expansion of commercial enterprise, the goal of which seems to have been to transform an agrarian city-state into a commercial powerhouse. Important here is that the

emancipation of debt-slaves and criminalization of citizen enslavement together resulted in serious labor shortages. These social, political, and economic developments directly encouraged a significant expansion of the slave trade. Moreover, these processes did not solely take place in Athens. Other Greek city-states went through similar experiences around the same time (Robinson 2008). It is not unreasonable to argue, then, that increased labor demands and state investment in commerce together resulted in the expansion of the Greek slave system, and that this motivated colonial activity in the Black Sea region as well as the Western Mediterranean.<sup>58</sup> Late Hallstatt slave trading activities across West-Central Europe were directly linked, then, to democratizing processes taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean!

If Greek colonies in southern France came to dominate the slave trade west of the Alps, it seems likely that Etruscan traders were the primary Mediterranean agents in a slave trade that brought captives to the Adriatic via East Alpine routes. Like elsewhere in the Mediterranean world, forced servitude had also become a common phenomenon within the highly stratified Etruscan world. Slaves in Early Etruscan society (HA C-D) could mainly be found in household settings

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<sup>58</sup> Finley (1962) is often referenced for his pioneering work on the slave trade in the Black Sea region. It was one of the first attempts to move away from the notion that slavery was sporadic rather than systemic, informal and opportunistic instead of formal and organized. Tchernia (1983, 99) mentions how Romans in Gaul or Greeks in Thrace were not working to expand the wine and salt trade respectively, they were actively looking to expand the slave trade. Braund and Tsetschlazde (1989) have looked at the slave trade in the Black Sea region as well, and then in particular where this concerns the export of slaves from Colchis to the Achaean. Rosivach (1999) has written about the ideological aspects of the Greek slave system, while Gavriljuk (2003) more recently examined the Greco-Scythian slave trade during the 6th and 5th centuries BC. Lewis (2011 and 2015) has looked at the slave trade between Classical Greece and the Persian territories of the Eastern Mediterranean and emphasizes its considerable proportions. While scholars commonly consider issues of scale when talking about the Greek slave system, many are still highly skeptical of the extreme numbers communicated by the ancient sources, like Atheneus who communicates census figures that suggest that a mere seven per cent of the population of Attica in the later fourth century BC was *not* enslaved (Taylor 2001, 29).

where they engaged in tedious everyday tasks (Nash-Briggs 2002 and 2003). Moreover, slaves with particular aesthetic qualities (e.g. light skin and hair) seemed to have been highly valued by Etruscan elites who could gain social prestige from being able to flaunt ownership of physically attractive women and youths. The inevitable replacement of young boys and girls ensured a constant demand for them, and there is little doubt that these slaves originated from trans-Alpine regions. While Etruscan and Celto-Germanic parties may initially have maintained social, political, and economic relations by exchanging goods (resources and specialized craft objects), people (marriage partners and domestic slaves), and knowledge (specialists of various sorts), this situation likely changed during the Early Iron Age (HA C) when Etruscan society became increasingly stratified, as suggested by the growth in family-centric mortuary opulence, no doubt leading to an increased demand for household slaves. This demand likely expanded further during HA D when Etruscan cities founded new colonies in the Po Valley and the North Adriatic region, resulting in a growth of commercial activity and social competition, with both further stimulating the ‘consumption’ of slaves.

For the Iron Age communities in the study area it was not contact with foreign traders who maintained general mercantile interests, then, that triggered a supposedly dormant potential for complexification. Rather, it was the very specific Greek and Etruscan interest for slaves that shaped regional dynamics (including mortuary practice and refuge construction). While forced servitude has been a common historical phenomenon (likely since Neolithic times), a large-scale commercial system with dedicated professional operators and infrastructure that functions to supply slave-based agricultural and industrial economies (as well as specialty markets for domestic and ‘leisure’ slaves) only develops under certain socio-historical circumstances (Taylor 2001 and 2005). An important distinction has to be made, then, between irregular exploitation and informal systems of servitude on the one hand, and a formal slave trade in human commodities with specialized operators (raiders,

transporters, merchants), facilities (holding structures, markets), and objects (shackles, chains, weapons, vehicles) on the other.

Archaeologists have yet to consider seriously the impact of slave trading in later prehistoric Europe.<sup>59</sup> When mentioned, the slave, at most, tops the lists of trade goods believed to have moved between Mediterranean and trans-Alpine communities. This perception of a slave trade featuring as only one element in a broader mercantile system is as far as most scholars are willing to go. But, just like it would be rather negligent to write a historical account of early modern East or West African groups (Klein 2001; Kusimba 2004), or of Viking or Slavic Europe in early medieval times (Henning 1992; Jankowiak 2013), without considering the impact of slave trading, so I consider it crucial to assess the socio-historical impact of such a specific phenomenon if we are to accurately understand Iron Age developments in West-Central Europe. While a detailed study of the ideological and practical aspects of slavery and the slave trade falls outside the scope of this discussion on the effects of socio-historical transformation on Celto-Germanic value systems, I will continue to relate patterns observed in the study area to ‘global’ developments, whereby I will foreground the impact of a formal trade in slaves. This is relevant for our discussion because it can speak to certain interests, outlooks, and attitudes (e.g. in terms of individualism, familism, and communalism, power and security, as well as anomie and fatalism) that gradually became more dominant throughout the Celto-Germanic world, and which manifested through distinct behaviors and symbolic expressions.

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<sup>59</sup> Taylor (2005, 225) argues how archaeologists should start from the premise that slavery was an important structural part of any particular socio-historical formation before the modern era, especially when the economic system was based on agriculture. So, it is no longer necessary to try and prove the presence of slavery, but to try and understand its mechanisms and components. Forced servitude needs to be foregrounded as a common phenomenon before the rise of ‘modern’ moralities that led to its (presumed) removal from the contemporary world.

I have identified two peaks in refuge construction in the study area, and a consideration of certain pertinent global developments (i.e. the expansion of Greek and Etruscan slave trading activity) has allowed understanding the first increase in refuge construction in Late Hallstatt Western Europe. Subsequent periods (LT A-C) witnessed a gradual decline in refuge construction, with a lowest number built during the LT C period. After the first (HA D) peak of refuge construction, we enter a period which archaeologists and art historians have long associated with a pronounced degree of stylistic effervescence manifesting in the material culture of groups situated on the northwestern periphery of the Hallstatt world.<sup>60</sup> Over the course of the Middle Iron Age, this La Tène ‘cultural phenomenon’ gradually extended across trans-Alpine Europe, from the Atlantic to the Pontic (Brun 1994; Cunliffe 1997). Rhine-Moselle groups seemed to have been closely associated with the earliest stylistic innovations in La Tène material culture, which is believed to have been inspired by Etruscan models. These developments coincided with the abandonment of most Late Hallstatt ‘princely’ hillforts, sites formerly occupied by those with the highest likelihood of having contributed to an inter-regional slave trade.

Subsequently, throughout West-Central Europe, people predominantly came to occupy unenclosed settlements, with little evidence for larger village-like agglomerations. Social differentiation also became more widespread, a process which Pope and Ralston express in terms of more people gaining “access to status display” (2011, 388). Local groups also seem to have become better organized militarily, with warrior burials becoming a widespread phenomenon and weaponry

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<sup>60</sup> That this opulent new style included many exotic elements (notably Etruscan motifs) reflects the rise of distinct cosmopolitan attitudes. The fact that the earliest objects of this new La Tène style are found in sumptuous graves of social elites who sought to “set themselves apart from other members of their communities” (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 91) suggests that we are dealing with a cosmopolitan orientation that was strongly diacritical in kind (Mata 2017).

increasingly found outside ritual and mortuary contexts. It is from written sources, furthermore, that archaeologists have learned about trans-Alpine ‘tribal confederacies’ settling in northern Italy and partaking in Romano-Etruscan conflicts, and of Gallic mercenaries serving Hellenistic rulers and ‘migrating’ considerable distances to settle in East Mediterranean territories. For Celto-Germanic groups across West-Central Europe, the Early La Tène period can be characterized, in broad terms, as one of cultural confidence, political-economic initiative, and military assertiveness (Lejars 2012). In the study area, we see a contemporary decline in refuge construction in the South, and increased locational stability (i.e. farmsteads survive multiple generations) and greater settlement nucleation in the North (de Hingh 2000, 37). The first half of the Early La Tène period (LT A), in particular, provides signs for increased material wealth, higher levels of security, interest for technological innovation and stylistic experimentation, and a greater willingness to engage a wider world. It is especially for the Rhine-Moselle and Aisne-Marne zones where archaeological evidence suggests that communities adapted to expansive processes in predictable ways during this time.

If it can be accepted that slave trading activity in trans-Alpine Europe peaked in the Late Hallstatt period, then the expansive developments of the Early La Tène period might be related to a drop in the scale and frequency of slave raiding. As the construction of refuges declined in the study area, the occurrence of Greek ceramics in trans-Alpine Europe diminished as well (Walsh 2014). This can perhaps best be understood in reference to the geo-political situation in the East Mediterranean region. Between *c.* 500-450 BC, conflicts between the Persian Empire and various Greek city-states greatly affected the closely interconnected exchange systems that spanned the Mediterranean. This situation hardly improved in subsequent decades, when numerous city-states competed with each other politically and economically. Between *c.* 430-400 BC, protracted warfare resulted in the death of countless men of fighting age, the enslavement of captive women and

children, widespread devastation of land and settlements, together leading to considerable levels of socio-economic malaise (Kagan 2003). This apparently was so extreme that historians have characterized this period in terms of the demise of a ‘Golden Age’ (i.e. the Greek Classical Period). While it is difficult to gauge the impact of East Mediterranean events and developments on commercial activity across West-Central Europe, Greek colonial outposts will undoubtedly have had great difficulty continuing business as usual with indigenous communities when goods like wine and fine wares had to be imported from East Mediterranean producers. It is furthermore likely that the commencement of Massalian colonial enterprise (the foundation or annexation of trade colonies by colonizers originating from Massalia) is closely linked to an enduring disruption of industrial and commercial activity. Etruscan communities, in turn, seem to have responded to this new Massalian assertiveness by strengthening their control over Alpine trade routes, and this allowed for the continued export of Etruscan goods into trans-Alpine Europe (as shown, for example, by the enduring presence of bronze wares in Rhine-Moselle burials).

The social, political, and economic engagements between Etruscan and trans-Alpine actors was likely far more substantial than can be deduced from the material record alone. The primitivizing tendencies of archaeologists have encouraged deemphasizing socio-economic linkages and cross-cultural sharing (Mata 2017). Archaeological attitudes vis-à-vis a supposed Celto-Germanic disposition to ‘migrate’ is illustrative in this regard. Ancient observers who sought to explain barbarian mobility did not merely seek to rationalize this by engaging in essentializing discourse (the characterization of the cultural Other as essentially lacking in various ways), this also involved making rather dubious pseudo-scientific assertions (e.g. in terms of barbarian fertility rates or environmental deterioration). This problem is exacerbated when modern archaeologists attempt to substantiate such rationalizations with modern scientific data. Fernández-Götz (2016, 9), for

example, attempts to explain Celtic population movements occurring *c.* 400 BC by highlighting a contemporary period of climatic deterioration. It is difficult to see how a reported early fourth century BC movement of Gallic groups into northern Italy can be explained by reference to paleoclimatic data, since these ‘migrations’ were not massive or enduring but relatively small-scale and incidental. Indeed, countless more people throughout temperate Europe clearly chose to stay put during this time of cooler annual temperatures. More likely, and in line with details found in literary sources, Etruscan agents readily formed alliances with trans-Alpine trading partners to deal with socio-political competitors in Italy, most prominently Roman (e.g. Nash-Briggs 2003, 257). The privileged position of Etruscan cities in trans-Alpine commercial networks had long been threatened by the gradual expansion of Roman influence, and this was a developing political-economic reality that Celto-Germanic groups were forced to negotiate as well. As Rome gradually gained influence over the lucrative trade networks that connected trans-Alpine Europe to Mediterranean markets, it became faced with assertive and confident ‘barbarians’ who were logistically competent enough to come to the aid of political allies and settle in distant but familiar territories.

Notably, the signs of contraction described for the late LT B and early LT C period broadly coincides with a Roman consolidation of politico-military hegemony in the Italic peninsula (*c.* 280 BC), which not only affected the networks of Etruscans and their trans-Alpine partners, it gradually reconfigured a political-economic system in which Celto-Germanic groups had a vested interest. Surely, the fact that it was precisely in this period that a zone of large defended settlements (*oppida*) formed across West-Central Europe (Collis 1984; Woolf 1993) was no historical happenstance but instead points to a transformation of West-Central European political-economic systems in general,

and to Roman assertiveness in particular (Wells 2005, 56).<sup>61</sup> A combination of archaeological and historical evidence provides clear evidence for such inter-regional dynamics. It has been shown, for example, how Roman mercantile activity across northern Gaul increased significantly due to the decline of Arvernian political power in Central Gaul and the formation of the Roman province of *Gallia Narbonensis* (121 BC) (Loughton 2009, 99). Momentous events and short-term political developments also had their impact on long-term transformational processes. For instance, Rome gained political and military supremacy in the West Mediterranean after permanently defeating Carthage in 146 BC, and this achievement inevitably increased Roman political and economic assertiveness towards trans-Alpine Europe.

In the study area, the highest peak in refuge construction also bears witness to changing socio-historical realities. In contrast to the HA D period, in LT D most refuges were built in the Aisne-Marne zone. There we also witness the contemporary abandonment of farmsteads and occupation of a number of large defended settlements. Such *oppida* were also established in the Rhine-Moselle zone, where we see a LT D reoccupation of hilltop sites where large collective centers arose during the LT A period (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 144). Mortuary contexts, furthermore, show clear signs of greater wealth disparity, and a desire for family groups to differentiate themselves within the community (e.g. import of luxury goods, substantial grave good deposition, and monumentality). In this same period, martiality expands from mortuary to

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<sup>61</sup> Fernández-Götz (2014c, 162) argues for a combination of proximate and ultimate causes. Thus, the developmental trajectory of any individual *oppidum* is to be related to endogenous factors that shape functional aspects (i.e. sacred, political, economic, *etcetera*), while the *oppidum* phenomenon as a whole is understood to have been driven by climatic improvement, increased economic output, demographic growth, and social stratification. As I argued (section 2.1), for this to happen, certain value orientations need to gain social preeminence, also leading to the formation of closely related cultural ideals.

settlement and religious contexts, pointing to a ‘militarization’ of society. From this, it seems reasonable to argue how the establishment of Roman hegemony and subsequent engagements with trans-Alpine Europe reinvigorated inter-regional connectivity and interaction, with important consequences for communities in the study area as well.

Here we can again look more closely to the impact of slave trading activity across Northwest Europe. While the structural aspects of a trade in human commodities in the Late Iron Age remain understudied, closer consideration of known historical processes and events can move our understanding of socio-historical transformations in the study area forward. One dominant process manifesting in the Italic peninsula seems particularly pertinent: the concentration of agricultural land and political power in the hands of wealthy elites, which drove large numbers of landless peasants into poverty (Harris 2011). This situation was compounded by a growing use of slaves in agriculture, a trend that reduced paid labor opportunities. These processes caused a substantial demographic shift to towns and cities where the impoverished masses became a source of civic unrest and political instability. Attempts to push through land reforms - most famously by Tiberius Gracchus (133 BC) and his brother Gaius Gracchus (123 BC) - failed due to an unwillingness among political leaders and the propertied class to redistribute wealth. Moreover, they combined this reluctance with a readiness to externalize their social and economic problems by encouraging colonialist endeavors. This had important consequences for Rome’s engagements with trans-Alpine Europe.

In addition to such gradual developments, there also are particular events to consider. In the last decade of the second century BC, Rome engaged in prolonged military activity against various Germanic and Gallic groups in a series of conflicts known as the Cimbrian Wars (113-101 BC). These proved so challenging to Roman military leadership that they triggered significant organizational innovations (i.e. the ‘Marian reforms’). One important change was the formation of a

standing army of professional soldiers. Notably, this was made possible by allowing landless poor to enlist for military service; prior to this change in recruitment policy, a property qualification prevented most poor from joining the ranks. With high numbers of soldiers having to be outfitted, and veterans retiring with payments and land grants, Roman military expenditure rose exponentially. It is not difficult to see how costly decisions like this also encouraged further imperialist endeavors.

Mass enlistment of the rural and urban poor undoubtedly resulted in labor shortages in cities and rural areas across the Italic peninsula, and this encouraged an expansion of Late Republican slave trading.<sup>62</sup> This was compounded by another factor. While it is true that the sources for Mediterranean slaves were varied (Scheidel 1997; Harris 1999), two significant sources were largely erased when Roman ascendancy reduced the frequency and scale of warfare and piracy around the Mediterranean world. Thus, the availability of human labor will have declined substantially over the course of the first century BC. Roman engagements with trans-Alpine Europe was greatly shaped by these political-economic realities, with predictable consequences for Celto-Germanic groups who became faced with a choice to resist or participate in an expanding and lucrative trade in human commodities.

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<sup>62</sup> Crawford's (1977, 123) study of numismatic evidence leads him to suggest that some 30,000 slaves were removed annually from the lower Danube basin between 60-30 BC. This is adjusted by Taylor (2001, 29) to the almost incredible number of 300,000. Objections based on demographic considerations are easily dispelled by the realization that these enslaved masses were not entirely or primarily derived from the regions closest to Mediterranean markets, but were transported over great distances. Tchernia (1983, 98) in turn, suggests that we can expect 15,000 slaves to have been removed from Gaul annually during the last century of the Roman Republic. Harris (1999) and Scheidel (1997 and 2011), moreover, have examined the demographics (scale, ratios, and sources) of the Roman slave system, and despite disagreements about numbers, it seems beyond doubt that the Mediterranean demand for slaves, while highly mutable, was enduring and in certain times and places extremely high. While Koester (2008) has looked at the eastern sources of the Roman slave trade (from where many skilled, multi-lingual, and literate slaves were imported), Schörle (2012) and Wilson (2012) have examined the Saharan slave trade, concluding that it was at least as substantial as the medieval trade in slaves (*i.* 3-5,000 slaves annually).

One way in which it is possible to get a sense of the scale and geographic extent of slave trading is by considering evidence for the trade in wine and wine drinking paraphernalia. The importance of wine consumption for the Late Republican/Late La Tène slave trade seems beyond doubt. Literary sources point at its importance (Polybius *Histories* 4.38; Strabo *Geography* V 1.8 and XI 2.3), and historians and archaeologists have increasingly realized its significance (Tchernia 1983; Braund and Tsetschladze 1989).<sup>63</sup> Ever since Tchernia argued for the significance of wine in the slave trade in pre-Roman Gaul, archaeologists have adequately demonstrated the high level of pre-Roman wine consumption there (Dietler 1990; Vencl 1994; Arnold 1999; Loughton 2009). Ancient literary commentary about a Gallic desire for wine may have been less barbarian discourse than presumed, then, such that the ancient notion that Gauls were selling their own kin into slavery for a jug of wine (Diodorus *Library of History* V.26) likely is indicative of socio-economic realities.

In discussing the slave trade in Gaul, Fentress directly links the import of wine into Gaul with the export of slaves to Mediterranean markets during the last two centuries BC (Fentress 2011). Huge numbers of amphorae are commonly found in enclosed ritual sites used for potlatch-type feasting between the middle of the second and the middle of the first century BC. At these sites, large amounts of drink and food were consumed recurrently over the course of decades in highly ritualized ways. It is not difficult to imagine, with Fentress, that such ‘sacred’ sites were in fact associated with the slave trade (Fentress 2011, 65). If such a linkage can be accepted, then the earliest manifestation of these Late Iron Age ‘feasting sanctuaries’ suggests an intensification of the slave trade around the end of the third century BC (mid LT C), around the time when Rome gained

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<sup>63</sup> Telling iconographic evidence also points in this direction. Koester (2008), for example, discusses a tombstone which clearly depicts the exchange of wine for slaves. Notably, the tombstone belongs to a former slave turned slave trader.

hegemony in the Italic peninsula, and when we also again have evidence for expansive processes (including social stratification, militarization, refuges and defended settlements, communal sanctuaries, *etcetera*) throughout West-Central Europe (Arnold 2011; Lejars 2012). In Gaul, it is likely that from this time onwards (and after a possible LT B-C ‘respite’) Italic traders regularly traveled to riverside trade centers such as Chalon (Saône River), Lyon (Rhône River), or Toulouse (Garonne River), to exchange wine for slaves.

Late La Tène commercial activity in trans-Alpine Europe cannot be fully understood in highly generalized terms then. Indeed, for many who participated in long-distance exchange systems, commercial interests will have been quite specific. Moreover, Mediterranean merchants also clearly operated under conditions assisted by Roman political and military imposition. Tchernia (1983, 99) aptly notes how the slave trade was assisted by what can accurately be described as ‘commercial imperialism’, whereby economic aims were aggressively pursued with assurances provided by Roman political and military power. On the other hand, the contributions of indigenous groups to a slave trade also cannot be denied. Political alliances were formed with Gallic groups who were well-positioned and willing to assist in the export of slaves to Italy and beyond.

While archaeologists have preferred treating enslavement among Celto-Germanic groups as a side-effect of endemic warfare (e.g. Nash-Briggs 2003, 256; Roymans 2004, 22 and 2007, 489), motivations for participation were undoubtedly varied. Avram points at the role played by ‘barbarian’ slavers and pirates in a pre-Roman slave trading around the Black Sea (Avram 2007). For these indigenous suppliers of human labor, enslavement was not a result of supposedly inevitable tribal warfare, it had become the goal. Wilson (2012, 435) likewise suggests that preyed-upon communities could choose to protect themselves from trans-Saharan slave raiders by becoming slave suppliers themselves. Creighton also aptly comments that in “modern colonial circumstances the

demand [for slaves] was not met directly by imperialist entrepreneurs, but rather indirectly through new political structures which developed amongst the native population to procure these goods” (2000, 20).

Yet, the local transformations that resulted from exposure to, or participation in, slave trading undeniably extended beyond the political sphere. Klein’s (2001) work on the West African slave trade is illustrative in this respect. She distinguishes between simple egalitarian groups that are preyed upon by more complex stratified groups. The former are forced through a particular process of complexification in response to a slave trade that threatens their existence: this generally starts with communal cooperation in the construction of defenses (Kusimba 2004) and interest for inter-group alliances. Other responses include innovations in the built environment (e.g. increased control of movement), changes in everyday behaviors (e.g. regimented workdays), centralization of decision-making (e.g. management of labor and defense), social differentiation (e.g. individuals and families gaining social prominence), economic specialization (e.g. smithing and weapon manufacture), and the formation of religious and ideological constructs that assist in dealing with violence and insecurity, practically and psychologically.

As affected societies become more complex, the enduring presence of the slave trade continues to exert influence over the way such processes unfold, commonly leading to increased intra- and inter-group conflict. Consider, for example, how it is far more likely for peaceful relations between competing parties to be reestablished (e.g. for war captives to be exchanged conditionally) when a formal slave trading system is lacking. However, when a slave trade is present, antagonists have a tempting means for dealing with competitors through an extra-societal mechanism. Consequently, the sale of captives into slavery results in continued antagonism because captives are not returned to their home communities (that are also not compensated for their loss in other ways).

Beyond this example there are numerous other ways in which groups or individuals might exploit the presence of the slave trade to achieve certain personal or collective goals (Afigbo 2006). Klein offers further illustrative details in this regard:

“The ways of the market worked themselves out in a remorseless manner, penetrating different kinds of societies. These forces were effective not simply because of human greed, but because they either provided older men the resources to maintain their hegemony or they offered young men an escape from dependent relationships. Generational conflict was probably the most important force opening societies to the action of the market. The demand for slaves also led to the creation of institutions that provided for the elimination of unwanted persons; the forces of the slave trade both exploited inequalities and increased them dramatically” (Klein 2001, 65).

A particular process of complexification seems to have played out in early modern East and West African societies whereby initial communal responses to slave trading triggered local complexification processes, including the formation of local systems of servitude and participation in an extra-local slave trade (Kusimba 2004; Nwokeji 2010). Crucially, stratification is an essential precondition for groups to become slave owners, or to become active in a slave trade. With these observations about the socio-historical effects of slave trading in mind, it becomes possible to conceive how the presence of a slave trading system in West-Central Europe during the Late Iron Age shaped developments there. Fentress speaks to this as well:

“... slave raiding as an economic activity gives a particular dynamic structure to a society, transforming over time its relationships with its neighbors and those within the society itself. Among the effects is the emergence of a warrior elite, and of goods, such as wine, that form part of their rites and display, redistributed by a chief to his men and eventually by a king to his citizens. Control over the elements of warfare, such as the horse, extension of control over the trade routes and the creation of fortifications to protect them, and the creation of an administrative system, are all components of raiding states” (Fentress 2011, 70).

The popularity of chariots, the prevalence of martial ideologies, and the occupation of refuges by Late Hallstatt and Early La Tène groups perhaps are phenomena that are better understood by foregrounding the transformational role of a slave trade. For the Late Iron Age, the initial circulation of gold coins and rise of the “warrior bands of picked horsemen” (Roymans 2007, 487; also see Fernández-Götz 2014c, 215) likely were closely related to an expansion of an inter-regional trade in

human commodities as well. The rise of warrior sub-cultures among West African groups is illuminating in this regard (Klein 2001, 60); these did not merely form reactively out of considerations of defense, but in order for parentless boys and young men to survive outside disintegrating social systems. The phenomenon succinctly captures the concurrent processes of stratification and marginalization (and associated fatalist outlooks). Interestingly, the Roman historian Tacitus reports on a curious ‘tradition’ maintained among the trans-Rhenian Chatti (Tacitus *Germany* 31). Within this community, young men were forced to wear iron neck rings. This was considered a mark of disgrace, likely because such objects signalled a person’s enslavement. Notably, it was possible for young men to shed this degrading status by killing a foe.<sup>64</sup>

It is not difficult to see how increasing numbers of people became socially and economically marginalized in the last decades of the pre-Roman Iron Age. The prime importance of alcohol in the slave trade, in particular, may be considered for the way it will have had distinct social consequences. The drinking of alcoholic beverages has of course been quite common throughout human history, and social scientists have long pointed at the psychological, social, and cultural significance of alcohol consumption. However, it also certainly is true that this can reach “problematic levels when people lose their sense of self-efficacy, when they feel hopeless and powerless against their environment and the future ... Is it just a coincidence, for example, that simple small-scale societies, many of whom have used indigenous alcoholic beverages for centuries, only begin to experience significant levels of problem drinking after loss of political sovereignty and economic self-sufficiency?” (Erchak 1992, 152). The impact of an enduring exchange of slaves for alcohol has been

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<sup>64</sup> While the radical relativist would be content to report on this as an interesting cultural particularity, when considering the deplorable effects of slaving it is possible to recognize how such a ‘tradition’ might manifest among groups that seek to exploit the bodies and minds of the young in ways not very different from those who control the minds and bodies of modern-day child soldiers.

demonstrated in a number of historical contexts (Arnold 1999; Curto 2004; Dietler 2006). In all such cases, a very specific and lasting exchange of alcohol for slaves had predictable social consequences. Increased trade in, and consumption of, alcohol across pre-Roman Gaul may have increased socio-economic malaise, thereby spreading fatalist outlooks that manifested in practice and discourse. The fact that a northern distributional limit of amphorae (figure 19) coincides with a historically reported resistance to wine and other Mediterranean imports among some North Gallic and trans-Rhenian groups (Caesar *Gallic Wars* II.15 and IV.2) is perhaps a telling sign of the disruptive effects of slavery and alcohol consumption in the Celto-Germanic world of the Late Iron Age.<sup>65</sup>

Marginality also has a role to play where this concerns the motivations of groups that participate in a slave trade. Braund and Tsetskhldze (1989) note how banditry and piracy could become a main strategy for survival for groups living under certain environmental and socio-historical circumstances. In similar terms, Gavriljuk (2003, 77) argues how the ‘barbarian’ steppe societies north of the Black Sea could only offer slaves in return for the Mediterranean luxury goods (wine, ceramics, and metal objects) they were importing. If a Mediterranean demand for slaves was enduring, at times even increasing substantially, this will have had predictable consequences for peripheral groups that had little else to offer in exchange.

Moreover, marginality also encouraged the enduring exploitation of particular populations by slave raiders (Wrenhaven 2013). If communal self-defense (e.g. construction of refuges, military organization) depended on surplus production and socio-political organization, then environmental

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<sup>65</sup> While wine may certainly have been transported north in wineskins rather than amphorae (Taylor 2001, 28), in the absence of any clear geographic obstacles that may have necessitated this it is difficult to understand what may have limited distribution of amphora further north (as shown in figure 19) other than a cultural resistance as reported by ancient observers. The few finds in the northern half of the study area date to the Augustan era, and likely arrived there with Roman legions.

marginality could make this much more challenging. In other words, where archaeologists are able to argue for a marginal productive potential or low levels of socio-political organization, it is reasonable to assume that local groups will have been vulnerable to the excesses of a slave trade. Moreover, as long as local groups remained unable to organize in their own defense, the risk for marginalization from exploitation remained, turning entire regions enduringly into slave catchment areas. Only if long-term exposure to slave raiding eventually triggered successful resistance (or participation) would slave traders seek out more vulnerable populations elsewhere.




Figure 19: Distribution of Roman Republican (LT C-D) amphoras (adapted from Loughton 2009; Morris 2010)

It has also been argued that slave trading groups enduringly target certain populations because slave-owning societies tend to form ideas about the essential qualities of certain cultures or ethnic groups (Gavriljuk 2003; Joshel 2010). The insecurity and anxiety experienced by marginalized populations not only increased their vulnerability because this hampered organized resistance, then, it was their

marginalized existence that legitimized enslavement in the eyes of slave traders and their customers. References to barbarians selling their own into slavery (Herodotus *Histories* 5.6; Diodorus *Library of History* V.26) reflect two important aspects in this regard: that the othering of the barbarian served to legitimize enslavement, and that commercial imperialism both encouraged and exploited those very forces of marginalization that it blamed on its victims.

Those involved in the enslavement of marginalized people have always sought to legitimize this by all sorts of rationalizations in the form of laymen stereotyping all the way to complex intellectual discourse (e.g. Aristotle *Politics* I). Irrespective of its sophistication, the result is the radical othering of exploited populations. This also universally leads to extreme dehumanizing treatment of captives. Quite commonly, groups or individuals (along with their possessions) experience violent punitive retribution because of their resistance to what their exploiters perceive as a legitimate ('natural') order of things. In West-Central Europe, archaeological evidence for the discriminatory treatment of 'human cattle' (Bradley 1992, 129) no doubt have long been hidden in plain sight. Deviating mortuary practices especially are a strong indicator for this. Undoubtedly, the bodies of maltreated and murdered captives were disposed of in aberrant ways (e.g. without ceremony or grave goods, but commonly with bodily damage or disarticulation, and placed in odd positions), deviating from normative mortuary practices (Roymans 1990, 242; Taylor 2008; Perego 2014; Ailincăi 2016). For example, in an area where the most common burial rite was cremation and placement in communal cemeteries, the isolated inhumation of human body parts in disused storage pits, or settlement and road-side ditches, are clear enough signs. Evidence for deviant mortuary treatment of marginalized individuals is also encountered in other historical contexts, and commonly in association with a slave trade (Taylor 2005, 230).

This isn't to say that marginalized individuals were always treated in *ad hoc* ways. Indeed, the violence committed by slavers against their captives could be performed in highly ritualized ways (Graham 1965; Baum 1999; Ojo 2005). At sanctuary sites like Verbe Incarné at Lugdunum (Lyon, France) ritual sacrifice is suggested by the co-presence of 'decapitated' wine amphorae and the decapitated skull of a woman (Fentress 2011). It is not difficult to imagine how such an individual may have been abused and killed in ritualized ways not unlike those observed in the context of the Viking-Arab slave trade (Taylor 2005, 230). Aldhouse-Green (2004 and 2005) in particular has provided evidence for such practices in later European prehistory.

The occurrence of human bones (commonly with signs of damage or disarticulation) in the many 'sacred' places of the Celto-Germanic world strongly point to non-sporadic ritualized violence. In Late Hallstatt and Early La Tène (HA D-LT A) southwest Germany, large numbers of human bones have been found at the Heuneburg and Alte Burg hillforts (Fernández-Götz and Krause 2013, 478). Human bones (including many skulls) have also been found in ditches and pits and among surface finds of the Late Iron Age (LT C-D) *oppidum* at Manching, where restraining chains have been found as well (Sievers 1999; Wells 2005, 57).<sup>66</sup> Skull fragments were found near a ritual altar and within a surrounding ditch at the open assembly area of the contemporary Titelberg *oppidum* (in the Rhine-Moselle zone). While it has been suggested that such finds might be interpreted as evidence for ancestor worship (Fernández-Götz 2014a, 118; Fernández-Götz and Roymans 2015, 20), the fact that these human remains were left in open ditches might instead point

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<sup>66</sup> Collis (1977, 8) also lists Altenburg-Rheinau, Breisach-Hochstetten, Marthalen, and Basel-Gasfabrik in addition to Manching, where human remains have been found scattered among settlement refuse. Wells (1999, 81) mentions the remains of a human skull found near the inner wall of the Kellheim *oppidum*, while human limb bones have also been recovered near the inner wall of the Engelhalbinsen *oppidum* (Wiedmer 1963).

to human sacrificial rituals.<sup>67</sup> Other Late Iron Age sites, like Gournay-sur-Aronde, Acy-Romance, and Ribemont-sur-Ancre (in the Aisne-Marne zone) have become altogether famous for the evidence they have provided for ritualized violence.

Notwithstanding the clear ritualized ways in which violence was committed, archaeologists have also certainly ‘primitivized’ past practices, especially when these are difficult to interpret from a utilitarian perspective, or when archaeological assemblages are not easily categorized (Arnold 2011, 162). With symbolic meaning-making foregrounded but eternally challenging to interpret, human behavior is commonly moved into the realm of the sacred, with practices explained as being ritualistic in rather generalized terms. Aldhouse-Green’s study of ritualized violence is illustrative in this respect: sacrificial victims like adult women or deformed youths are believed to have been killed because such individuals threatened a precariously balanced socio-cosmic order. However, it is not altogether certain whether physically deformed people would actually have been perceived in this way. Indeed, evidence for medical knowledge and healing practices in later prehistory (Moghaddam *et al.* 2015) suggest that a tolerance for physical deformity may have been greater than supposed. Notably, the famous Vix ‘princess’, who was interred in one of the most opulent (HA D or LT A) burials in the West Hallstatt world, suffered from physical deformities (Arnold 2011, 163), yet this apparently did not adversely affect her status in life. Nor is it certain that female sexual promiscuity (another proposed scenario) would have been seen as transgressive in segmentary and undifferentiated societies, contexts where we can expect greater gender equality.

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<sup>67</sup> This idea of rituals being linked to ancestor worship has also been entertained for several Late Iron Age burials discovered in the Southern Netherlands (Panningen-Stokx, Someren-Waterdael, and Weert-Molenakkerdreef) where the cremated remains of several men apparently did not include any skull fragments (Hiddink 2014, 193). Without evidence for other rituals, like body exposure, revisitation, or reburial rites, it is equally likely that these men met a gruesome death at the hands of a raiding party.

Moreover, for some individuals ‘sacrificed’ in the swampy places of northern Europe (i.e. bog-bodies), there are indications that those committing the violence had not prepared for this at all; rather, captives were bound and throttled with their own clothes and belts, suggesting that improvisation may have played a bigger part than recognized. This seems to go unrecognized precisely because of the preference for interpreting brutal acts of violence as sacred ritual guided by certain socio-cosmic beliefs. Alternative explanations that foreground motivations like male-gang violence or economic profit remain unconsidered (Taylor 2005, 230). When considering the more profane interests of slavers, it might be suggested that inaccessible marshlands served as places of refuge for those not mobile enough to evade raiding parties, a regional tactic actually reported on by Roman observers (Caesar *Gallic Wars* III.28). Foregrounding the slave trade, then, urges new questions to be asked. Had a woman been brutally staked to the ground in a bog because she resisted being removed from her homeland by a raiding party? Was the blond hair of some female captives removed because this was a prized commodity on Mediterranean markets (Bartman 2001, 14)?<sup>68</sup> Violence may certainly have been performed in ritualized ways, but this should not uncritically be understood (in ‘primitivizing’ ways) to have focused on the restoration of some socio-cosmic order.

This call for considering more profane motivations for ‘ritual violence’ seems especially pertinent for the study area. When trying to understand the evidence for violence at infamous cult sites like Gournay, Acy-Romance, or Ribemont-sur-Ancre (Aldhouse-Green 2004, 333 and 2005, 156), it is necessary to distinguish between religious systems that emphasize the importance of a regenerative lifecycle, and those where there is a disproportionate focus on violence and death. For

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<sup>68</sup> Aldhouse-Green (2004, 335) mentions the punitive practice of shaving the heads of runaway slaves by slave traders.

the former we can expect a distributed focus on life and birth, fertility and procreation, or death and rebirth. However, if the only detectable cultic focus is violence and death (explicitly enacted through brutal acts of torture, dismemberment, and exposure) then other motivations have to be considered; in particular, those shaped by socio-historical realities in which slave raiding featured centrally.

Notably, if ritualized violence among Aisne-Marne groups was motivated by security concerns, such that they relate to the sacrifice of life in order to ensure it (i.e. death ensures fertility and rebirth), why did such practices not continue during the crisis decades of increased Roman imposition? Furthermore, the fact that it was predominantly adult men who were ‘sacrificed’ at these infamous sites is readily explained when we consider the commercial interests of slave traders. For those who captured and transported slaves, adult males were potentially more troublesome and certainly less profitable than women and children, resulting in disproportionate levels of violence directed towards adult men. Moreover, terrorizing captives by exposing them to the abuse and murder of their kin was an effective way of forcing cooperation and easing transport to Mediterranean markets.<sup>69</sup>

Highly ritualistic practices such as those highlighted here suggest how complex ideologies developed in pronounced ways among those groups participating in a slave trade, with violence being a characteristic aspect. Yet, ideological systems manifest beyond ceremonial contexts, also touching other aspects of life and becoming expressed in various social contexts. It is perhaps not surprising that it is among slave-owning societies that we find some of the strongest ideas about personal and collective autonomy. It has already been noted, for example, how Greek slave systems

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<sup>69</sup> Similarly, causing terror was an important tactic of slave raiders who planned to enduringly ‘harvest’ catchment areas. Not only was it necessary to overcome local resistance during any particular incursion, punishment needed to be severe enough as to terrorize target groups into believing that any future attempt at organized resistance was highly unwise. The mutilation and decapitation of adult males could achieve this.

expanded significantly at a time when strong democratizing processes were manifesting there. As socio-historical realities changed across the Celto-Germanic world during the Late Iron Age (in large part due to the impact of the slave trade), new ideas will have formed there as well, and these could have centered on such oppositional constructs as self-other, difference-equality, freedom-servitude, and mastery-harmony. Taylor notes how the valorization of freedom, such as it was expressed and maintained by entrepreneurial and aggressive slave traders, may have become more pronounced precisely because of a strong conceptual distinction from enslavement. Thus, the interest for torc symbolism can be understood as “a reflex of the existence of slave chains” (2010, 39). Indeed, it seems reasonable to think that torcs signaled servitude to a deity, ethnic group, or lineage, bonds that no real-world enslavement could undo (Aldhouse-Green 2004, 328; Taylor 2005, 231; Arnold 2011, 157).<sup>70</sup>

While the cultural valuation of women is not altogether predictable despite cross-cultural regularities, it nevertheless is not difficult to show how particular gender-based ideologies have long manifested within strongly stratified societies (de Beauvoir 1968), especially those with institutionalized systems of servitude like ancient Greece and Rome (Pomeroy 1975; Bauman 1992; Blundell 1995). Within such stratified societies, women are commonly venerated as keepers of house and hearth, as well as the family lineage. Ideological constructs with a clear gender focus also commonly arise among slave trading groups, or those who are enduringly exploited by a slave trade. Among these, gender differences can become quite pronounced, with women becoming highly

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<sup>70</sup> Illustrative are the observations of the 10th century AD Arabic traveler Ibn Fadlan who wrote “I saw the Rus, who had come for trade and camped by the river Itil ... Round their necks, [their women] wear torques of gold and silver, for every man, as soon as he accumulates 10,000 dirhams, has a torque made for his wife. When he has 20,000, he has two torques made [and so on] ... With them, there are beautiful slave girls, for sale to the merchants” (Fadlān 2012, 45).

valued as tokens of wealth or prestige, or sacred representatives of communities. Torcs and other dress items may then become significant gender-centric signifiers of collective belonging; that neckrings, amber, and glass are only worn by women during LT A in the Aisne-Marne zone may point to such ideas. Furthermore, the contemporaneous initial arrival of chariots and (Mediterranean) glass objects in this region of the study area during LT A is perhaps equally suggestive of prevailing ideologies there.

By contrast, among those groups that were enduringly targeted by slave raiders, certain socio-cosmic beliefs will have allowed people to negotiate such realities psychologically. The abduction of women and children, and killing of men, not only resulted in immeasurable personal suffering, it will also have had tragic consequences at a societal level. Consider, for example, how the removal of women and girls signified the end of entire family lineages in a matrilineal society (Arnold 1999, 83; Pope and Ralston 2011, 382; Fernández-Götz 2014c, 101). It is not difficult to imagine, then, how familist ideals concerning descent, conservation, and perpetuity became increasingly prioritized. This is, of course, exactly what archaeological research has adequately shown, as discussed in the introduction and section 4.1. Changes in both mortuary and settlement contexts strongly suggest how an ideological outlook that centralized the importance of the autonomous family (and its lineage) first arose in the Aisne-Marne and Rhine-Moselle zones of the study area, and then quite later in the Scheldt-Meuse zone. This ideological centrality of the family then continued to be expressed materially through mortuary and cultic expressions (e.g. tombstone iconography and dedications to local ‘mother’ deities) throughout the slave societies of the Roman northwest provinces (see chapter 5).

The central point to make here is that any examination of socio-historical processes that can inform about changing value systems in the study area has to take account of the significance of a

trade in slaves, which, despite spatio-temporal variability in scale, intensity, and execution, endured for centuries and expanded significantly in the last decades of the pre-Roman Iron Age. It can be emphasized again here that those groups inhabiting the study area had little to exchange for Mediterranean luxuries apart from slaves. With some exceptions (Dietler 1989, 133; Nash-Briggs 2002, 166 and 2003, 248; Roymans 2004, 22 and 2007, 489) this is a point not widely recognized. Arnold has made a useful contribution in this regard, arguing for greater recognition of the importance of the slave trade among Aisne-Marne communities.<sup>71</sup> She poignantly notes how a “trade in slaves requires specific social conditions which are not the same as those necessary for the export of forest products or other raw materials” (1988, 180). Indeed, the fact that the infamous sanctuaries of Gournay-sur-Aronde, Acy-Romance, and Ribemont-sur-Ancre are situated in the territories of groups who most likely controlled a cross-channel slave trade that brought British captives to the continent may not be a coincidence.<sup>72</sup> It is also among the Aisne-Marne and Rhine-Moselle groups (the ‘birthplace’ of La Tène artistic effervescence) where archaeologists have found clear evidence for Iron Age complexification, and where hilltop refuges were predominantly built; initially, perhaps, by communities keen on defending themselves from foreign slavers, but eventually by those who

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<sup>71</sup> Similarly, Nash-Briggs contemplates whether “Aisne-Marne warlords” may have brought northern slaves (women and children) to places like Mont Lassois (Burgundy, France) during the HA D period. The presence of wealthy burials there shows how local elites were able to import prestigious Mediterranean goods during the late sixth century BC (Nash-Briggs 2003, 255). Places like Mont Lassois may so have served as transshipment points where northern slaves were transported along the Seine or Aube Rivers in a southeasterly direction towards the Saône-Rhône river system.

<sup>72</sup> Literary references that directly identify Britain as a source for slaves support this notion (Cicero *Letters to Atticus* 4.17; Strabo *Geography* IV 5.2). Modern archaeologists have also wondered whether large parts of Britain, likely those where hillforts were a common feature of Iron Age landscapes, may have served as hunting grounds for slave traders (Creighton 2000, 20). Caesar (*Caesar Gallic Wars* V-XIV) believed some groups in Britain to have practiced polyandry, and this ‘cultural tradition’ may have arisen due to the demographic consequences of an enduring slave trade.

came to participate in an inter-regional slave trade. It is also amongst these communities that we find the strongest signs for centralization and socio-economic differentiation during the century before the Roman conquest, and where a number of large permanently occupied defended settlements (*oppida*) were situated. It is also in the southern parts of the study area where rural settlements (figure 20 and 21) show the tell-tale signs of private land ownership (settlement enclosures, movement control, spatial planning), while the regional production and distribution of coins and craft objects (e.g. fibulae and pottery), and the widespread occurrence of Mediterranean imports (e.g. wine and bronze wares), suggest that a market-based commercial system was developing rapidly.




Figure 20: Enclosed and open LT D settlements (adapted from Roymans and Habermebl 2011)




Figure 21: Axial LT D settlements (adapted from Roymans and Habermehl 2011)

These developments in the southern half of the study area stand in stark contrasts with patterns recognized for the Scheldt-Meuse zone. In the North, there is little evidence for social stratification or the formation of larger political groupings until the arrival of Caesar's legions (51-58 BC). Throughout the long Iron Age, communities there were weakly integrated, being highly geared towards self-sufficiency. There is no evidence for communal refuges or defended settlements. Throughout the La Tène period, the open farmstead or small farming settlement remained the dominant forms of habitation in the North (Roymans 1996; Gerritsen 2003). Throughout this undifferentiated segmentary society where equality and self-sufficiency were idealized, there are no signs for economic specialization, surplus production, or centralized storage and distribution. There was no market exchange in base goods, and indigenous coins were only minted in the last decades before the Roman conquest, and then only non-commercial high-value pieces (Roymans and Aarts

2009). While material culture from other regions consistently reached these northern parts throughout the Iron Age (Roymans 2009), this never occurred in substantial quantities. It is also only in the decades before the Roman conquest that a very limited interest developed for settlement enclosures and intra-site delineation. These are the first real signs of socio-economic differentiation (Slofstra 1983), a development greatly disrupted by Roman military incursions, but which subsequently intensified when all territories south of the Rhine became incorporated into the Roman state (see chapter 5).

With these North-South differences in socio-historical developments in mind, it becomes possible to suggest that the northern half of the study area was far more vulnerable to the excesses of a slave trade. Indeed, throughout the long Iron Age, northern regions may variably (in terms of intensity and scale) but enduringly have served as the catchment area of slavers belonging to Rhine-Moselle and Aisne-Marne groups (initially West-Central Hallstatt groups). This probably changed over the course of the first century BC when northern groups finally managed to thwart repeated exploitation, likely by becoming contributors to the slave trade. Groups situated in the Lower Rhineland region, like the Eburones and the Batavi after them, may have started supplying slaves to groups that maintained friendly relations with Rome, like the Remi in the Aisne-Marne zone and the Treveri in the Rhine-Moselle zone (Roymans 2009, 221). Such a scenario seems substantiated by historical commentary that claims that northern groups like the Eburones were clients of the Treveri (Caesar *Gallic Wars* IV.6 and V.27). These dominant groups and their subordinate clients may be contrasted with those decentralized and segmentary groups situated in the western and northern

coastal regions (e.g. Menapii and Frisii) that remained far more vulnerable to exploitation.<sup>73</sup> Yet, among the Eburones and the Batavi transformational processes moved slowly despite intensified relations with southern groups. The available evidence for complexification (i.e. coins, weapons, horsemanship, and ‘cult sites’) suggests that this remained highly constrained. In the end, it was mostly small numbers of young men who partook in the raiding expeditions of entrepreneurial individuals. However, this was not enough to radically transform what remained a broadly egalitarian society, until the Roman conquest.

In foregrounding the historical significance of a slave trade it becomes possible to nuance dominant interpretations of various forms of archaeological evidence in the region. Beginning with numismatic data, it can be observed that high-value gold coins first arrived in the northern half of the study area from a SW (Aisne-Marne) and a SE (Rhine-Moselle) direction during the second century BC (Roymans and Aarts 2009). When we consider the historical circumstances of their introduction in the Celto-Germanic world - namely, payment of mercenaries by Hellenistic rulers (Haselgrove 1984 and 1999) - it is not difficult to see how high-value coins could have been minted and distributed specifically to fund raiding campaigns. The way this may have worked is hinted at by Fernández-Götz (2014a, 120) who compares the public ceremonies at *oppida*-based assemblies to the Viking assembly known as the ‘Thing’. Significantly, it was at these annual springtime meetings that Viking communities planned raiding expeditions. It stands to reason, then, that such events could have been commemorated by the minting of coins that were also used to pay participants of slave

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<sup>73</sup>There also may have been groups that actively resisted slave trading, like the Nervii, of whom Caesar reported that they did not allow southern merchants or their corrupting goods to enter their territory (Caesar *Gallic Wars* II, 15).

raids organized by southern groups in the study area.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, when coins were minted under the patronage of deities this could serve as an effective means of securing loyalties. These coins used for commemoration and recruitment were also ideal for communicating ideological discourse with relevance to the interests and ideals of their issuers (Mata 2017, 21). That the use of high-value-coins can be linked to the slave trade is perhaps also suggested by the fact that the earliest imported coins (mid-second century BC) in the Scheldt-Meuse zone are immediately associated with gold torcs (Roymans 2007, 479; Fernández-Götz 2014c, 214). Coin emissions were not locally minted in the northern half of the study area until the mid-first century BC (60-30 BC), when the Eburones and the Batavi likely became active participants in the slave trade. It is in relation to these socio-historical realities that we can perhaps also understand the expansion of horsemanship in the Lower Rhine region during the Late Iron Age (Gerritsen and Roymans 2006, 256).

It can be proposed, then, that a boundary zone between predatory and exploited groups steadily moved north during the last decades before the Roman conquest, with trans-Rhenian territories becoming a catchment zone for southern raiders, now also including Scheldt-Meuse groups. Apart from patterns in coin circulation, the geographic distribution of La Tène glass bracelets likewise suggests the formation of such a boundary zone in the Lower Rhineland region. The earliest arrival of glass bracelets (figure 22) there has been dated to the second half of the third century BC (LT C), and this is quite close to their initial mid-third century BC occurrence in Central Europe (Roymans and Verniers 2010, 204), which suggests rather focused exchange efforts.<sup>75</sup> If the

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<sup>74</sup> Coins were minted at four Treveran *oppida*: Donnersberg, Martberg, Titelberg, and Wallendorf (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 155).

<sup>75</sup> Circulation halted rather abruptly in the Augustan period (44 BC-AD 14), when La Tène glass bracelets largely disappear from the archaeological record.

notion of a trans-Rhenian slave catchment zone can be accepted, then the fact that the highest concentration of the earliest La Tène bracelets in trans-Alpine Europe can be found precisely in this area is suggestive of a possible role in this distinct trade.

Importantly, the raw glass used to craft bracelets was imported from the East Mediterranean region (Roymans *et al.* 2014). For the beginning of the Late Iron Age (LT C), it is either the case that glass bracelets were manufactured at *oppida*-based manufacturing sites in southern Germany and from there brought to the northern half of the study area, or, alternatively, that raw glass was imported into the Lower Rhineland region where local craftsmen manufactured their own designs. In any case, it becomes possible to envision a trade whereby merchants from southern Germany and the East Alpine regions endeavoured to exchange Mediterranean glass for trans-Rhenian slaves in the Lower Rhineland area where Roman sources would later situate the Eburones. Furthermore, this was a trade that Rhine-Moselle groups in particular could have sought to control during the subsequent LT D period; again, that the Eburones reportedly became clients of the Treveri aligns with this idea.<sup>76</sup> Comparative ethnographic data shows how a trade of such a kind could develop, and, intriguingly, it was precisely glass (beads) which became a favored trade good among European merchants for acquiring slaves from African suppliers who valued this particular commodity highly (Guerrero 2010).

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<sup>76</sup> The intrusion of Roman military power undoubtedly upset existing socio-economic systems, and in particular the trade in human commodities. Whether because slave traders attached themselves to Roman legions or because Roman leadership actively sought to repress local participation in such a trade, both scenarios will have disrupted the participation of local groups in this inter-regional trade. This, then, might suggest the abrupt halt to the circulation of glass bracelets in the study area.




Figure 22: Glass bracelets of the LT C period (adapted from Roymans and Verniers 2010, 204)

If trans-Rhenian slaves were indeed exchanged for a commodity like glass bracelets, such objects likely became imbued with strong ideological meaning, not unlike torcs; notably, glass bracelets were almost exclusively worn by women. While it could be thought that the exotic origin and fragility of glass bracelets will have increased their value (making them ideal objects for marking special life-stage events), glass bracelets actually seem to have been omnipresent. Found in substantial numbers in settlement contexts, these dress items may actually have been worn rather regularly (if not daily) despite their exotic and fragile nature. Intriguingly, however, the fragility of glass dress items (and other delicate objects) may point to certain ideals about female bodily comportment. Does this indicate, then, that the women who wore fragile ornaments so regularly were not very active? If so, can it be proposed that manual labor was mainly performed by those who did not (or were not allowed to) wear glass bracelets?

Apart from the information to be gathered from coins and glass bracelets, communal ‘cult places’ (or ‘regional sanctuaries’) constitute one particular category of archaeological contexts that may be considered for its relevance to slave trading activity in the North. While this type of site is predominantly found in the southern half of the study area (Roymans 1990, 64), several are now also known in the Dutch central river area (e.g. Elst, Empel, and Kessel-Lith). It is commonly argued that these Late Iron Age (LT D) cult places functioned as regional sites where communal ceremonies were staged that served the reproduction of (sub-)ethnic communities. Countless of these cult places continued to function into the Roman period when many experienced monumentalization and became the focus of Gallo-Roman religious activity. For Late Iron Age communities, cultic activity seemed to have centered on feasting (ceramics and bones) and the ritual deposition of weapons (swords and armor), coins, and dress items (metal brooches), all presumably to commemorate a common (sub-)ethnic descent.

I already suggested an alternative interpretation for some cult sites, in particular those where we see signs for human sacrifice. Of the thirty-three cult sites discovered in the study area and enumerated by Roymans in his 1990 study, there are six that have provided evidence for human remains, and these commonly show signs of mutilation and disarticulation.<sup>77</sup> These human remains were also commonly encountered in ditches or found scattered among surface finds. Most cult places with human remains are situated in the southwestern part of the study area, but it is quite possible that human remains are also present outside this area at sites where unidentified bone

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<sup>77</sup> Roymans (1990, 63) lists six ritual sites where human remains have been found: Epiais-Rhus (skulls), Estrées-Saint-Denis (loose bones and complete skeletons, Digeon (various bones), Moeuvres (disarticulated skeletons of c. 200 individuals), Ribemont-sur-Ancre (various articulated and disarticulated bones of c. 200 individuals), and Gournay-sur-Aronde (disarticulated and damaged bones of c. 12 adults).

remains have been found. One cult place where people seemed to have engaged in ritual violence was discovered near present-day Kessel-Lith in the Dutch central river area, at the confluence of the rivers Maas (Meuse) and Waal (Roymans 2007, 482). Among the many objects (coins, weapons, metal dress items) dredged from the river bed are the bones of adult males that show clear signs of violence.

In light of what has been said about the participation of northern groups in a slave trade that brought trans-Rhenian captives to southern merchants, it is possible to nuance the presumed religious character of this LT D site. Much like the HA C-D ‘chieftains’ graves’ of the Meuse-Scheldt zone, or the HA D-LT A fortified sites in the Scheldt river system, these sanctuaries where communal rites are believed to have taken place are rather aberrant in this socio-cultural context of an undifferentiated segmentary society of self-sufficient farming households. Especially for the beginning of the LT D period, there is no evidence for social stratification, not from settlement nor from mortuary contexts. Despite the circulation of non-local objects like high-value coins, glass bracelets, and metal brooches, Lower Rhine groups do not appear to have imported Mediterranean goods like wine or bronze wares (*ibid.*, 489). In the Scheldt-Meuse zone, *oppida* and refuges were absent in the Late Iron Age, while farming settlements were small-scale and unenclosed. It is problematic, then, to link the rise of these ‘communal sanctuaries’ to the formation of an elite class whose members vied for social prominence by staging communal rituals at cult places of regional importance.

If we instead consider the practical aspects of a slave trade, it becomes possible to interpret ‘cult places’ like the one at Kessel-Lith as transshipment facilities, originally established and controlled by non-local groups but eventually taken over by local groups like the Eburones and the

Batavi after them. In this regard, observations made by the 10th century Arab traveler Ibn Fadlan who described the arrival of Viking slave traders at river-side ports-of-trade is revealing:

*“As soon as their boats arrive at this port, each of them disembarks ... and prostrates himself before a great idol, saying to it: ‘Oh my lord, I have come from a far country and I have with me such and such a number of young slave girls, and such and such a number of sable skins ... I would like you to do the favor of sending me a merchant who has large quantities of dinars and dirhams and who will buy everything that I want and not argue with me over my price’”* (Fadlān 2012, 45)

The economic and the religious are clearly entwined here, and this particular aspect of the Arab-Viking slave trade certainly was not unique. In the Greco-Roman world both spheres were also strongly entangled (Silver 1992; Rauh 1993). In the absence of international law and enforceable mercantile norms, tying commercial activity to religious ideas and practices had obvious benefits. More than this, the ideational, behavioral, and structural elements of religio-mercantile systems assisted commercial activity by allowing for relations of trust to coagulate around shared beliefs, for people to follow behavioral norms, and for facilities situated at nodal points in transport networks to be used by merchants of diverse origins (Grout 2016). Many Late Iron Age ‘cult places’ in West-Central Europe might perhaps best be interpreted as places where commercial exchanges could safely take place in highly ritualized ways because this helped regulate the behavior of a various participants in commerce.

This notion of the commercial and the religious being intertwined is also entertained by Fernández-Götz, who observes how “the proximity between sanctuary and market place is repeatedly observed throughout history” (2014a, 112). Yet, the interpretive benefits of such a realization is diminished when it foregrounds a particular assumption maintained by many archaeologists working within a Marxist-structuralist framework, namely that religious activity primarily serves the political interests of social elites. Furthermore, and from a social constructivist perspective, the staging of communal performances at sacred sites is treated as a core aspect of ethnogenetic processes (Fernández-Götz and Roymans 2015, 18). Such treatment of ideational

aspects centralizes the importance of elite differentiation and community formation. Yet, as I argued above, there is little evidence for socio-political complexification in the northern half of the study area, especially during the early part of the LT D period. It remains problematic, then, to interpret rural ‘cult places’ as communal sanctuaries of regional importance where elites vied for social prominence and communal identities were constructed.

If, on the other hand, we grant greater importance to the economic role of these ‘sacred’ places, then it becomes possible to consider the significance of the slave trade. Specifically, it becomes possible to entertain the proposition that captives derived from trans-Rhenian catchment areas were transported south from transshipment sites like Kessel-Lith. In this role, it may be compared to the HA D-LT A fortified sites of the Scheldt region. For the occupants of these latter sites, the Scheldt River system allowed access into northwestern coastal regions. Being situated in the Dutch central river area enabled those groups using the LT D site at Kessel-Lith to organize raiding expeditions beyond the Rhine.

The likelihood of LT D raiding activity north of the Rhine can perhaps be substantiated by evidence for certain ‘walled enclosures’ (at present-day Vries, Zeijen and Rhee) that were contemporary (late second and early first century BC) with the transshipment site at Kessel-Lith (Waterbolk 1977). Archaeologists have rejected interpreting these sites as fortified farmsteads because they are unlike any that have been excavated in the region. These enclosed sites also do not seem to have been places of refuge because their position near a known prehistoric roadway shows how connectivity was more important than isolation. It could be proposed that they functioned as holding facilities where captives were temporarily detained for short periods of time before being transported to transshipment sites like Kessel-Lith.

That these propositions might approximate historical realities is further suggested by a contemporaneous population decline in the trans-Rhenian area where these walled enclosures are situated. It is conceivable that intermittent but enduring raiding activity in catchment areas resulted in demographic decline there.<sup>78</sup> This is a pattern perhaps also observable in the Aisne-Marne and Rhine-Moselle (Hunsrück-Eifel) zones when a period in which the largest number of chariots was interred over the course of two to three generations (LT A) was followed by a period of demographic decline (Fernández-Götz 2016, 3), most strongly in the Belgian Ardennes.<sup>79</sup> Archaeologists have also noted a population vacuum in southern Germany where a number of great *oppida* were abandoned around the middle of the first century BC (Wells 2005, 60; Fernández-Götz 2014c, 230). Further illustrative in this regard is the mid-first century BC demographic decline observed for the Cologne and Meuse-Demer-Scheldt regions that likely resulted from large-scale Roman military activity (Roymans and Fernández-Götz 2015, 77). Compared to these Roman campaigns, slave raiding activity was small-scale and intermittent, but it nonetheless could have profound demographic consequences when it was a persistent phenomenon.

In any case, from these transshipment sites, caravans of slavers and their captives likely followed river routes to the nearest *oppida* in the southern half of the study area (e.g. the Titelberg, Donnersberg, and Martberg). What are commonly described as central open spaces found at some of these Treveran *oppida* are mainly interpreted as sacred places of assembly (*area sacra*) where the

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<sup>78</sup> It could then also be suggested that a socio-historical phenomenon like slave trading, rather than environmental degradation or population growth, encouraged abandonment of slave catchment areas and occupation of marginal environments like the coastal areas of the northern Netherlands during the Middle Iron Age (LT B) (van Gijn and Waterbolk 1984).

<sup>79</sup> It is during the subsequent LT B period of contraction that chariots are initially deposited for an even shorter period (one to two generations) across the English Channel in Yorkshire (UK) (Jay *et al.* 2012).

members of (sub-)ethnic communities gathered for religious rituals, political decision-making, and commercial activity.<sup>80</sup> From this perspective, the defensive function of what clearly were difficult to reach fortified places is deemphasized in such a way as to become problematic. Further, it is possible to reinterpret certain structural features discovered in these ‘sacred spaces’. At the Titelberg *oppidum*, for example, what are described as “parallel movable palisades” are currently understood to have functioned as voting installations (Fernández-Götz 2014a, 113), and similar structures have also been found at the *oppidum* of Gournay-sur-Aronde. Such features could equally have been used to corral captives. Moreover, the large building subsequently built in the location of these installations is described as resembling a Roman market place (*basilica*) more than a temple, while there are also indications that Mediterranean merchants may actually have maintained a trading post at the pre-Roman Titelberg *oppidum* (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 148 and 240). As noted already, the evidence for ritual violence in ‘cult places’ might equally be interpreted as an aspect linked to the slave trade, and signs for human sacrifice have also been found here. The attested butchering and consumption of large numbers of cattle may likewise be reinterpreted by centralizing the interests and needs of slave trading groups. For those communities that were involved in an inter-regional trade of human cattle, rural cult sites or *oppida*-based sanctuaries will have been the places where captives were ritually killed (mostly adult men) and women and children were gathered, guarded, and cared for, before being transported to southern markets. Their appropriated livestock, in turn, was redistributed by leaders, or collectively consumed during celebratory events that marked the completion of successful campaigns. Of course, these open spaces most likely were multi-functional, allowing for a range of

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<sup>80</sup> If these open spaces at Treveran *oppida* mainly functioned as places of communal assembly, where important religio-political and social constructive events took place, the absence of such public spaces in the *oppida* of other (sub-)ethnic communities, like the neighboring Mediomatrici, is rather puzzling (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 206).

events and activities. Therefore, what archaeologists need to consider contextually is the likelihood of these places of ritual and assembly being used for activities linked to a commercial trade in human commodities.

One final line of inquiry can further validate the historical accuracy of these propositions about the transformational impact of slavery on socio-cultural developments in the study area. This concerns the realization that those groups who traded in slaves will likely also have come to exploit slave labor. It is especially the central *oppidum* of the Treveri at the Titelberg for which it is possible to propose the presence of enslaved laborers. To start, excavations at a cemetery situated outside this large defended settlement have attested a child interment rate of thirty percent (Fernández-Götz 2014c, 196). This deviates radically from a very common underrepresentation of children in mortuary context in the study area. It is worth asking, then, why such an abnormally high number of children was buried outside the most prominent of the Treveran hillforts, or, more specifically, whether it is possible to show that children were systematically exploited for their labor on the Titelberg. The concept of ‘child labor’ is, of course, very much a modern one, in that the vast majority of children before the modern era worked rather than played or went to school.<sup>81</sup> This was no different in the Roman Empire, where only the children of the wealthy enjoyed a childhood free of physical labor (Laes 2011). It should not surprise, then, to find that children were exploited for their labor in purposeful and highly organized ways in stratified communities. If it can be accepted that the Titelberg *oppidum* had an important commercial function for slave traders, this allows considering the likelihood of human labor being exploited there as well.

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<sup>81</sup> Indeed, one Millennium Development Goal set by the United Nations - achieving universal primary education around the globe by 2015 - remains to be realized at the writing of this dissertation.

For particular labor tasks, children can actually be more proficient and productive than adults. For example, ethnographic evidence shows how children historically have been active in mining (small bodies in small spaces); notably, iron ore was mined at the Titelberg during the Iron Age. Furthermore, small metal craft is another area of production in which children have historically been active (small nimble fingers and good eye-sight);<sup>82</sup> the Titelberg *oppidum* is known to have been a prolific producer of metal objects, especially the mint foundries that were discovered there seem to have been particularly productive (Rowlett 1988).<sup>83</sup> However, it is textile manufacture which may have had the greatest potential for having relied on child labor. While the production of woolen fabrics was an important industry in the Treveran area during the Roman period, this particular economic focus was established during the Late Iron Age (Drinkwater 1982).

One critical aspect to consider here is that urbanization and social stratification historically have coincided with increased cloth consumption, because increased interaction and differentiation encourage a greater interest for manipulating outward appearance (Gleba 2014; Dimova 2016).<sup>84</sup> The commencement of (proto-)urban habitation in the southern part of the study area, where communities were increasingly participating in commercial enterprise (including town-based manufacture and trade) is one reason to suspect that slaves were increasingly exploited by local

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<sup>82</sup> It has recently been suggested that the manufacture of Bronze Age daggers may have involved child labor because the application of fine decorative details would have required excellent eye-sight (personal communication with David Dawson, director at Wiltshire Museum, UK).

<sup>83</sup> While the discovery of an infant burial near a bronze casting furnace has (predictably) led archaeologists to suggest that sacred rituals may have taken place there (Shaw 2007, 15), if we allow for the possibility that young boys and girls were exploited for their labor this suggests a more depressing scenario.

<sup>84</sup> Congruent with this growing interest for managing outward appearance across trans-Alpine Europe is the LT D growth in brooch diversity and ornamentality, especially in *oppida* assemblages (Edgar 2012).

groups. As this concerns stratification processes, households who sought to become more autonomous or differentiated can be expected to have readily abandoned the various labor-intensive activities associated with cloth production. They realized this by outsourcing this work to slaves, servants, or commercial professionals. As noted, in the Mediterranean region, the increased cultural centrality of ideals regarding family autonomy and differentiation coincided with a substantial rise in the use of slave labor, and cloth manufacture will generally have been delegated to household slaves. Similarly, the advancement of diacritical familism in the southern half of the study area during the Late Iron Age is one strong sign for an expansion of slave labor there.

It is not difficult to show how textile production has long been allocated to enslaved laborers, both in domestic contexts and in industrial settings. Greek literary sources provide evidence for the use of slave labor in textile industry (Aeschines *Against Timarchus* I.97; Wild 1976, 53), while anthropology provides comparative data on the complex linkages between textile production and slave labor (Schneider 1987). Importantly, most textile production steps can be performed by children. While Nosch has shown that children were commonly active in textile production in the Minoan and Mycenaean palaces of the Bronze Age (Nosch 2001 and 2014), Nash-Briggs (2003, 253) has argued that Etruscan households likely used enslaved children to produce fabrics as well. It is not difficult to see, then, how those Celto-Germanic agents of the slave trade, those who participated in satisfying an enduring Mediterranean demand for household labor, would eventually also recognize its potential for local production efforts. It seems likely that the same hierarchization, commercialization, and urbanization processes that manifested across the Mediterranean and West-Central Europe during the Late Iron Age would shape similar transformations in the southern parts of the study area. Thus, it is especially among southern groups where we can expect a shift from trading in slaves to trading in the productive fruits of slave labor.

Moreover, among those groups where ideals regarding family autonomy and differentiation gained cultural centrality, we can expect certain ideological expressions to manifest. Notions of family freedom, fertility, and fortune will have encouraged greater attention for the welfare of children. Similarly, those groups and individuals who exploited child labor might also engage in ritual activity aimed at securing good fortune in their economic pursuits. In other words, among those stratified groups who traded in children as commodities, we paradoxically also find a heightened concern for child welfare. This may actually have happened among the Lingones (Seine-Marne region) and Aedui (Loire-Saône region) where Derks (2014, 53) has attested concentrations of infant votives in his Roman-period sample. In these regions, the ideological centrality of children likely was an outgrowth of their role in the pre-Roman slave trade. Another ritual expression of such interests can perhaps be found among the Treveri and Batavi, where votive dedications to *Mars/Mercurius Iovantucarus* (guardian of the young) and *Hercules Magusanus* (old youth) were made to secure the welfare of children (Roymans 1990, 57).

I will close this chapter on Iron Age developments by stressing again how certain socio-historical processes manifested across countless Mediterranean city-states that directly encouraged the use of slave labor. Behind these processes we can recognize a central motivation: the desire for individuals and their families to gain greater autonomy and recognition in their local communities. The main way Mediterranean city dwellers sought to realize this was by exploiting the labor of the social and cultural Other; initially the local poor, but increasingly enslaved foreigners. The realization of Greek, Etruscan, and Roman familist ideals shaped attitudes and behaviors towards outsiders at a societal level. In other words, it was the enduring demand for human labor among those families who strove for self-reliance (familism), or to distinguish themselves vis-à-vis other families (diacritical familism), that shaped engagements with the inhabitants of temperate Europe in distinct

ways. The culture-historical trajectories of trans-Alpine groups were greatly shaped by the broad socio-historical dynamics this engendered, and similar processes eventually manifested there as well. Inevitably, Mediterranean slave-owning societies would seek to control their barbarian sources of human labor, and this will have been a major contributing factor to Roman imperialist endeavours.

## CHAPTER 5: ROMAN GAUL AND GERMANY

The incorporation of indigenous populations into the Roman imperial state has long been associated with expansive processes by archaeologists and historians. The dominance of materialist perspectives, in particular, has directed much attention to economic issues. Narratives of economic integration, for instance, generally talk about the local impact of new phenomena like market-oriented production, everyday commercial use of money, and subjection to a taxation system. These relate to one notable development that involved the replacement of self-sufficient agricultural production and household-level manufacture with market-oriented cash-crop agriculture and specialized manufacture. This was also driven by the arrival of new agricultural and manufacturing technologies, and the development of industry-scale production that demanded stricter labor organization (including slavery). The availability of low-cost commodities, furthermore, gave rise to increased levels of consumption across the social strata, with people of various walks of life engaging in new and diverse consumptive behaviors. State integration also intensified socio-economic differentiation. While it is true that this manifested well before the arrival of Roman legions in trans-Alpine Europe, the introduction of Roman laws and spread of new social norms further amplified differences in social status and material wealth. These diverse developments can usefully be put in terms of monetization, commodification, commercialization, specialization, intensification, and stratification. Other expansive processes commonly considered are urbanization, and, in those regions where state frontiers were situated, militarization. Connectivity can also be listed as an important transformational force, and this has long been a topic of interest by those who have tracked the movement of people and goods across the Empire. In this chapter I will consider a range of expansive processes that manifested in the study area as its populations became

incorporated into the Roman imperial state. I will examine how some of these processes can be associated with shifts in value priorities, specifically familism, as can be gathered from a diverse range of historical, material, representational, and epigraphic sources.

## **5.1 Socio-Historical Transformations**

### ***5.1.1 State Formation and Provincial Development***

The more-or-less differentiated agro-pastoral communities of Belgic Gaul and the Rhineland were first directly affected by Roman state expansion at the time of Caesar's Gallic Wars (58-51 BC). Going by the written sources, Caesar's multi-year campaign had disastrous consequences for local groups. While *ad hoc* alliances were formed with some, those who resisted Roman imposition were treated in typical Roman fashion, with efficient brutality. This especially seems to have been the case for groups situated within the Scheldt-Meuse zone. A cursory comparison of communal identities known for the period of Caesar's Gallic Wars and the subsequent Early Roman period is strongly suggestive of the impact of Roman campaigns (figures 23 and 24). While most previously known groups continue to be mentioned (along with several new identities), a number are no longer mentioned at all. Clearly, then, entire communities had been forcibly removed or annihilated by the Romans and their regional allies. An infamous case concerns the military defeat and enslavement of the Eburones and the Aduatuci (Caesar *Gallic Wars* VI.34 and II.33; Roymans and Fernández-Götz 2015).



Figure 23: Late Iron Age (LT D) indigenous groups (figure by author)

During the decades following Caesar's campaigns, there was no significant Roman military presence in the region. The internal struggles for power during the second Roman triumvirate (43-33 BC) likely drew attention elsewhere. However, in order to protect Caesar's achievements in the region *in lieu* of occupation, Roman leadership combined diplomacy with military intervention. This involved the settling of new groups along the Rhine (e.g. the Cananefates in the Dutch coastal area, the Batavi in the Dutch river area, and the Ubii in the German Rhineland). Such measures seemed to have provoked resistance by those who believed themselves disadvantaged, and, between 31 and 28 BC, violent conflict erupted with several rebellious groups. A few years after having become the sole ruler of the Roman Empire, Augustus organized a census and administrative reorganization of the Gallic provinces (27 BC). About a decade later, at the conclusion of the Cantabrian Wars in *Hispania* (19 BC), Roman attention was fully directed towards Belgic Gaul and the Rhineland. The number of

legionary troops stationed in the region increased in order to permanently establish Roman control. These developments likely triggered the conflicts that resulted in the defeat of a Roman legion by trans-Rhenian groups in AD 16 (*clades Lolliana*). Yet, the calamity only further encouraged Roman leadership to prioritize *Germania*, and, that same year, emperor Augustus oversaw the construction of roads and military installations throughout Belgic Gaul and the Rhineland (figure 25).



Figure 24: Early Roman (1<sup>st</sup> century AD) indigenous groups (figure by author)

Roman rulers seem to have realized that establishing tributary arrangements with indigenous groups could benefit their imperialist agenda. This not only ensured submission to Roman hegemony, it allowed for the recruitment of ‘ethnic units’ for military service. Local elites were rewarded for their loyalty and military service with Roman citizenship, command over auxiliary units, and substantial autonomy in managing local affairs. The members of this privileged martial class likely also held leadership positions in their home communities where they were placed in charge of recruitment,

taxation, administration, and other communal functions like priesthoods. While such arrangements allowed for a large measure of autonomy and empowerment among indigenous elites, the Rhineland zone in particular did remain under strict control by Roman military authorities.

Imposed political alliances, large-scale militarization, and infrastructural development together enabled Roman leadership to launch plans for conquering greater *Germania*. Starting around 13-12 BC, the Germanic Campaigns lasted a number of years, and, for a time, it seemed as if Rome had succeeded in pacifying *Germania* up to the Elbe River. However, this situation changed drastically in AD 9 when an uprising of various Germanic groups resulted in the catastrophic defeat (*clades Variana*) of a number of Roman legions (Wells 2003). The calamity led to a phased withdrawal from *Germania*, and, during the reign of Augustus' successor Tiberius (AD 14-37), further annexation of trans-Rhenian territory was altogether abandoned. From then on, the Rhineland gradually transformed into a permanent frontier occupied by legionary units consisting primarily of soldiers of Mediterranean origin, in addition to numerous native auxiliary units for which recruits were drawn from local communities (see appendix III). For many young men stationed along the frontier, adult life was spent within military communities that were situated in or near their own 'tribal' areas, and under command of native officers.



Figure 25: Augustan (c. 30 BC - AD 40) roads and military sites (figure by author)

This situation lasted barely a generation. Upon the death of Emperor Nero (AD 54-68), the Roman Empire became embroiled in a struggle for the imperial throne. This provided an opportunity for Batavian leaders to challenge Roman rule. Their rebellion involved the participation of all Batavian units and various other auxiliary regiments, with groups from both sides of the Rhine lending their support. Our primary historical source, Tacitus, mainly interprets these events in terms of a clash of

personalities, while also noting a native desire for rectifying Roman abuses (Tacitus *Histories* IV.14). However, it is more likely that socio-economic transformations had encouraged increased dissatisfaction among local groups. While the region had initially remained under strict military control, from the second half of the first century AD onwards a Roman-style municipal order had gradually formed. This involved processes of economic integration (taxation, monetization, market-oriented agricultural and industrial production) that commenced well before the reorganization of *Gallia Belgica* and formation of two new additions to the Roman provincial system *c.* AD 84, *Germania Inferior* (Lower Germany) and *Germania Superior* (Upper Germany).

In addition to the economic benefits to be had from military service, the expansion of agriculture, industry, and commerce also increasingly offered economic opportunities outside the military sphere (Aarts 2003; Groot *et al.* 2009). For many young men and their families, military service no longer was the only or most attractive option for earning a livelihood. Over time, landowners, merchants, and industrial entrepreneurs gained influence in their local communities, such that elite competition increasingly took place in an expanding civic sphere. In other words, landowning and mercantile elites were gradually replacing a privileged class that had long derived its social preeminence from activities in the military sphere (Roymans 1996, 40). It was ongoing socio-economic developments, then, that led to important shifts in social structures and relations of power. This was further encouraged by the pragmatics of frontier maintenance; sustaining recruitment levels and ensuring professional efficiency among soldiers and officers will have been of greater interest to Roman authorities than safeguarding the social status of martial elites in their home communities. Because the privileged position of aristocratic families depended on their role in recruitment and command, any changes to existing arrangements would undoubtedly be perceived as a challenge to their position. This is just what seemed to have happened following the death of

Emperor Nero when various contenders sought to exploit the military potential of Rhineland communities, in ignorance of traditional arrangements. After Vespasianus (AD 69-79) managed to overcome his political adversaries and claim the imperial throne, he was able to end the Batavian Revolt and reestablish order along the Rhine frontier. To prevent future uprisings, Roman legions continued to be stationed along the Rhine, but native auxiliary units would from then on mainly serve abroad. For decades after the revolt, the Rhineland frontier would primarily be occupied by foreign military personnel.

It is worth emphasizing this last point: from the last quarter of the first century AD onwards, and throughout the second century AD, numerous legions of international composition were enduringly stationed along the frontier. Acculturation perspectives that have elaborated on the different ways in which ‘natives’ became more ‘Roman’ have too commonly treated Roman culture as coherent and uniform, while post-colonial nativist perspectives (and the heritage interests of modern nation states) have encouraged archaeologists to stress the unique characteristics and trajectories of local groups. In doing so, they have generally ignored the international make-up of the societies that developed along the imperial frontiers. In the pre-Flavian period, the legions that were stationed along the Rhine predominantly consisted of Mediterranean recruits levied in Italy, southern France, and Spain. Of these, a substantial (though difficult to measure) proportion settled in the study area, and then primarily throughout the frontier zone in the vicinity of military forts and settlements, as well as urban centers.

When considering the international composition of legions, it isn't the original cultural identity of recruits that is significant. Despite the possibility of national or cultural uniformity at the time of a legion's formation, and despite the pragmatic interest among military leadership to encourage regimental coherence (which required suppressing cultural identities), the continued

addition of new recruits to units would unavoidably result in legions becoming increasingly heterogeneous (i.e. cosmopolitan). By contrast, the formation of regimental identities and traditions was quite important for auxiliary units of indigenous recruits, mainly because Roman martial discourse foregrounded the essential military qualities of certain 'tribal' groups. The earliest auxiliary units seems to have been formed by Augustus in Gaul, while the recruits of subsequently raised units were mainly levied in Spain and the Danubian provinces, with further units derived from various Mediterranean provinces. While these smaller 'ethnic' units (c. 500-1000 soldiers) were initially partnered with the much larger legions (c. 5000 soldiers), the former increasingly came to operate autonomously. In the Germanic provinces, in particular, the majority of fortifications were manned by auxiliary units, with the total number of actively serving auxiliary soldiers eventually surpassing the number of legionary soldiers during the second century AD. Yet, ultimately, even for these auxiliary units, cultural 'hybridization' was unavoidable, if only due to the pragmatics of frontier maintenance.

In light of these observations concerning the international composition of military communities, it can be concluded that strong cosmopolitanizing processes were at work in military contexts. While similar processes undoubtedly manifested in urban contexts, it is easiest to show this for the military frontier zone because, there, recruits from all over the empire were long stationed. We need only consider the highly diverse origins of both legionary and ethnic soldiers populating the Rhineland to get a sense of this (table 27). Military contexts were heterogeneous places where the interaction between cultural others was the norm. It was in the military communities along the frontier where disembedded individualist and inclusive collectivist values would have provided the greatest adaptive benefits.

Beyond the influence of the military sphere over the formation of a cosmopolitan frontier zone, provincial society was at its most complex (or culturally hybrid) where urbanization processes had been at play the longest. In the southern half of the study area, many Late Iron Age *oppida* and ‘tribal’ centers developed into urban spaces during the Roman period. Although urbanization processes certainly did not unfold uniformly, most capitals of provincial districts (*civitates*) seemed to have followed this trajectory.<sup>85</sup> Various other kinds of settlement also developed near sites of religious (sanctuaries), industrial (mining and manufacture), or mercantile (markets, crossroads, and river confluences) activity. Roman authorities also founded a small number of official colonies, most significantly those at Trier (*Colonia Augusta Treverorum*), Cologne (*Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium*), and Xanten (*Colonia Ulpia Traiana*). Other colonies could be found in the districts of the Morini and Mediomatrici, but it is unclear whether this involved the settlement of military veterans or merely the conferral of honorific titles to existing towns. Overall there is little evidence for the expropriation and redistribution of land to veteran soldiers or other colonists in the study area (Wightman 1985, 58; Roymans and Derks 2011, 12).<sup>86</sup> On the other hand, while the colonial status of a town may largely have been honorific, it certainly will have been the case that this increased the

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<sup>85</sup> For example, Bagacum of the Nervii, Samarobriua of the Ambiani, Viromanduorum of the Viromandui, and Divodurum of the Mediomatrici.

<sup>86</sup> It should also be remembered that parts of the study area experienced demographic decline in the pre-Roman decades (Wells 2005, 60; Fernández-Götz 2014c, 230; Roymans and Fernández-Götz 2015, 77), such that land will almost certainly have been available for veteran settlement, in particular the Rhineland. Moreover, and in the absence of clear evidence for official land redistribution efforts, it remains important not to uncritically impose liberal economic perspectives and exaggerate the agency of economic actors in buying and selling private property. Especially in the military frontier zone and around large urban centers, military-administrative interests (along with the self-interest of politically connected landowners and merchants) will have placed substantial constraints on the agency of groups and individuals, such that many economic decisions (e.g. land division, industrial activity, *etcetera*) were restricted by oversight and regulation, as well as unofficial interferences by competitors.

likelihood of veterans and citizens from other parts of the empire settling there for the benefits that Roman laws and administrative norms could provide. Most urban centers were primarily inhabited by civic leaders, foreign traders, and craftsmen, and, even without official veteran settlement programs, the territories surrounding these centers typically housed large numbers of foreign soldiers (Haalebos 2000, 467).

In the North, where large defended settlements like *oppida* did not exist during the Late Iron Age, 'tribal centers' arose in the early decades of Roman occupation. The presence of military units proved an important motivational force since numerous small settlements formed around auxiliary forts (*vici*) and legionary fortresses (*canabae*), and these could expand substantially, even surviving the removal of garrisons. In the Lower Rhineland, the *oppidum Batavorum* (Nijmegen) became the administrative center for the Batavian district. Situated along the Waal River, it was the site where legionary camps were initially built by Drusus at the time of Augustus' Germanic Campaigns, and where Roman legions were permanently stationed. Under Trajan (AD 98-117) municipal rights were extended and, soon after, the town was renamed *Ulpia Noviomagus Batavorum*. The main center of the district of the Cananefates was situated along the *fossa Corbulonis*, a waterway built around AD 47 by the Roman general Corbulo (c. AD 7-67) to connect the rivers Rhine and Meuse. The town likely received its official name *Municipium Aelium Cananefatium* (Voorburg) during a visit in AD 121 by Emperor Hadrian (AD 117 - 138).



Lower Rhineland (Nicolay 2007; Roymans 2009), and it is not unreasonable to think that this phenomenon was common in other areas as well. In addition to rural settlements (hamlets), military veterans, craftsmen, and merchants of various origins will also have inhabited the countless river- and road-side ‘rural centers’ (villages) where agricultural products were gathered and goods were manufactured to supply military and civilian markets (Hiddink 1991; Jansen and Fokkens 2010).

When thinking about the movement and settlement of people with diverse socio-cultural identities and backgrounds throughout the study area, ‘connectivity’ is a crucial factor to consider. Roman interest for infrastructural development (driven by administrative, military, and economic needs) encouraged enduring investment in the construction of an expansive road network consisting of primary and secondary roads (figure 26).<sup>87</sup> Indeed, the development of a permanent frontier in the Rhineland necessitated tending to the long-term pragmatics of maintenance and supply. Roman investment in infrastructure, in particular, was necessary for developing a regional economy that was geared towards supplying growing urban and military demands. Roads and waterways allowed military units to be deployed more rapidly, while supplies could be transported more efficiently. Agricultural producers and merchants will also have found it much easier to move their goods to market, while industrial sites could be supplied regularly with raw materials. Without adequate connectivity, neither the military nor the economy could function. It was this system of official (and unofficial) roads and waterways which greatly increased the interaction between people with different socio-cultural backgrounds who inhabited a wide variety of settlements and lived increasingly complex lives in heterogeneous communities. Moreover, if connectivity encouraged

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<sup>87</sup> Of course, infrastructural projects encompassed more than roadworks, since Roman authorities also organized the maintenance of navigable waterways, and associated amenities like ditchworks, bridges, and harbor facilities.

interaction, interaction necessitated communication. With so many of the region's inhabitants active in commerce, military service, and state administration, Latin and literacy spread fast and wide. The evidence for epigraphy and literacy are the clearest material manifestation of this particular expansive process (figures 27 and 28).




Figure 27: Roman seal boxes (adapted from Derks and Roymans 2002)

Because of these kinds of developments, no simple binary constructs that oppose natives and Romans, soldiers and civilians, or peasants and urbanites can adequately capture the complexity of social life in Belgic Gaul and the Germanic provinces. The wide range of socio-historical transformations that followed state integration allowed for a range of new identifications to manifest, such that people were forming and expressing identities linked to affiliation (kin or tribe), provenance (town or province), or in terms of socio-economic categories like age, gender, or

profession. This was done in familiar ways, like the manipulation of outward appearance, but also in new ways like epigraphic and iconographic statements (Derks 2009).




Figure 28: Epigraphic finds (adapted from Epigraphic Database Heidelberg)

### **5.1.2 Rural Lifeways in Transition**

While militarization, urbanization, and connectivity certainly were significant aspects of Roman-period socio-historical transitions, the lifeways pursued by the vast majority of provincials remained characteristically rural. For most inhabitants of Belgic Gaul and the Germanic provinces, farming remained the primary means of socio-economic reproduction, even if this was accomplished in diverging ways (e.g. De Clercq 2009).<sup>88</sup> This reality will certainly have found encouragement from

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<sup>88</sup> This presumably involved the establishment of a market economy in which autonomous economic agents could operate in accordance with principles of supply and demand. Integration in the formal imperial economy seemingly followed a familiar process whereby participation in market

Roman authorities, since agricultural producers became a vital component of a formal economic system that operated to supply urban and military markets. Indeed, the mobilization of rural productive forces to service a military frontier system and an expanding civic world is generally understood to have been the main impetus behind the radical transformations taking place during the Roman period (e.g. Vossen and Groot 2009).

The various provincial developments described above forced farming families to negotiate a range of constraints and affordances, and this generally seems to have encouraged experimentation.<sup>89</sup> Important in this regard is the availability of low-cost commodities produced by specialists that could release households from such time-consuming labor tasks like food, cloth, and pottery production. While this resulted in a variety of new behaviors in production and consumption, this was ultimately linked to how each individual family reprioritized a limited range of relevant values. Indeed, this is why the lifeways of many Roman provincials converged around a limited range of ideals. Despite great differences in wealth, people of various social and cultural backgrounds displayed great interest for what we might term ‘domesticity’; a constellation of discursive and behavioral ideals linked to domestic life. While this concept has already been used in analyses of familist ideals in epigraphic and iconographic sources (e.g. von Hesberg 2008), materially this found a clear expression through the built environment, by the adoption of new house forms like villas, or through innovations in traditional house building techniques.

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exchanges offered access to specialized goods; this freed-up local labor, which, in turn, led to increased specialization and further expansion of agrarian production.

<sup>89</sup> Motivated by a desire to grant women greater historical agency, van Driel-Murray (2008, 83), for example, argues that high recruitment rates in the Lower Rhineland region will have made it necessary for women to step up and perform much of the labor that absent husbands and sons would normally have taken a share in. This, subsequently, encouraged innovative adjustments to economic strategies (e.g. horticulture, craft work, and market-oriented food preparation).

A strong interest developed among Roman provincial families for what some archaeologists have labeled ‘monumentality’. This could involve the use of stone-built foundations or walls, ceramic or slate roofs, elaborate entrances and porticos, painted wall plaster, and tiled and mosaic floors. Not noticeably monumental but shaped by similar motivations were less visible innovations in construction, like the use of thicker roof posts, squared beams, and iron nails. Notably, for the vast majority of these innovations it is ‘durability’ rather than the outward display of wealth or *Romanitas* that seemed to have mattered most. This material manifestation of domesticity is one of the clearest signs that expansive processes reshaped family-level value orientations. Indeed, it has increasingly become apparent that provincial life already became strongly family-centric during the early Roman period, and this informed a wide range of behavioral and discursive practices.

As noted already, it was particularly in the southern half of the study area where an interest for enclosing farmsteads and settlements developed during the Iron Age, and it is there where extensive villa landscapes (figure 29) formed in Roman times (Roymans and Derks 2011; Habermehl 2013). Further north, villa landscapes are mostly found throughout the Meuse valley (Belgic and Dutch Limburg). This predominantly southern interest for villa-style living contrasts markedly with the situation in the northern low-lying sandy regions where villas were rarely built. They seem altogether absent in the sandy Flanders region (Northwest Belgium), while only a small number have been discovered in the Dutch Lower Rhineland region where they appear relatively late, around the beginning of the second century AD (De Clercq 2011). Although the adoption of the villa mode of production has long been taken as evidence for the replacement of pre-Roman subsistence regimes by a market economy based in agricultural and industrial production, this new economic regime apparently did not depend on the adoption of the villa form. The numerous non-villa farming

settlements of the Dutch central river area, for example, generally appear to have produced for markets as well (Groot *et al.* 2009).




Figure 29: Distribution of stone-built villas (adapted from Roymans and Habermehl 2011; Ählfeldt 2015)


For Roman archaeologists, villas are distinguishable from other forms of rural habitat because walls were (partly) stone-built, while floors and roofs were covered with various durable materials like stone, ceramic, and concrete. Such construction techniques were absent in the study area during pre-Roman times. It is the use of these durable materials that contrasts strikingly with the traditional use of organic materials like wooden posts and planks, wattle and daub, stamped earth and thatch. Yet, despite innovations in construction techniques and the use of new materials, villas do not completely denote a radical change in rural living because they also embody a continuation of values and interests that already existed during the Late Iron Age; “rooted in long-term developments towards discrete, enclosed, stable and well-organised settlement units ... villa development involved

new ways of organising settlement space, including spatial structuration, segregation and hierarchisation” (Habermehl 2013, 95).

Even in areas where villas did not become a dominant form of rural living, and where a preexisting tradition of constructing post-built longhouses largely survived (figure 30), noteworthy changes still occurred. For example, farmhouses excavated near the Cananefatian and Batavian capitals show how new architectural elements, construction techniques, and materials were used (Bloemers 1979; Willems *et al.* 2009). Together with the construction of larger and sturdier farmhouses, these innovations have generally been treated as evidence for increased economic wealth and subscription to Roman cultural values, while at the same time demonstrating the continued importance of local house building traditions. While the incorporation of new elements in farmhouses has long been attributed to native elite efforts (Roymans 1993; Carroll-Spillecke 2001), more recently it is the interests of well-to-do military veterans that are believed to have encouraged innovative investments in traditional farmhouses (Heeren 2009, 155).

As has long been argued, interest for expressing socio-economic differentiation through the built environment was far greater among Roman provincial populations than among Iron Age groups. It was the desire of elites and the well-to-do to distinguish themselves, and of subelites to emulate them, which presumably encouraged the adoption of new house forms, construction techniques, and building materials (Roymans and Derks 2011, 8). However, it is necessary to move beyond interpretations that treat elite competition and subelite emulation as the two main forces that drive socio-cultural transformation, and instead follow the example set by comparative ethnographic studies that explore a wider range of factors and motivations that influence the formation of built environments in rural contexts. Wilk, for example, describes the actual human decisions that shape the formation of house and household - “the choices, negotiations, disagreements and compromises

that are involved in the construction, purchase, and use of a house” (1990, 35) - a range of considerations in which cultural tradition or social competition are merely two factors among many.



*Figure 30: Distribution of post-built longhouses (adapted from Brabandt 1993; Roymans 1996; Rotting 1985; Kodde 2007; Meyer 2010)*

Compared to the limited internal partitioning of Iron Age farmhouses, villa floorplans notably show far greater complexity in the division of interior space. This reflects a greater interest for maintaining dedicated spaces, to be used for certain activities, or by certain individuals (i.e. individualism).

Rooms with distinct functions, like sleeping, cooking, dining, or bathing, are good examples for this, and the new ways of enhancing domestic space with decorative features like wallpainting, molding, and mosaics assisted with this (figure 31). Moreover, new means of scheduling and management (requiring literacy and numeracy skills) facilitated the effective use of multi-purpose spaces, and for farming operations to increase in scale. These structural and organizational aspects suggest a greater interest for order (axiality and symmetry) and control (planning, measurement, and communication).




Figure 31: Occurrence of mural painting (adapted from van Dierendonck *et al.* 1991; de Mol and de Kind 1992; Barbet 2008)

Yet, even for non-villa farmsteads, it is possible to observe changes that point to comparable interests and values. Noteworthy for some traditional farmhouses in the Batavian countryside, for example, is the creation of larger open indoor space that could accommodate different family dynamics and facilitate new forms of social interaction (Heeren 2009; Lange *et al.* 2014). This undoubtedly involved the reorganisation of domestic life, for example, by raising the roof and adding lofts that could be used for extra storage or as dormitory space for a growing household, new features that new construction techniques would have made possible. As noted, the innovations in construction and use of durable materials for villas and ‘enhanced’ non-villa farmsteads clearly expresses a greater concern for durability, and it is one of the clearest expressions of a family-centric concern for trans-generational continuance and perpetuity, an interest that also manifested in mortuary context, as I show below (section 5.2).

However, before I turn to other kinds of evidence that can further demonstrate the manifestation of these widely shared ideals, it is useful to take stock of the knowledge of villa and non-villa farmsteads, and assess this in reference to the values framework. As described in section 3.5, this can usefully be accomplished by operationalizing Adams' (1988) tri-partite classification of rural industrialization in relation to three familist orientations. This involves conceptualizing three ideal-type farming families - *enterprising*, *self-sufficient*, and *cooperative* - that can be associated with *diacritical familism*, *familism*, and *conformist familism* respectively. These ideal-type families with their characteristic value orientations can then be aligned with three categories of rural habitat that are encountered throughout the study area - *medium to large villa estates* with a monumental multi-room stone-built house, *small to medium 'enhanced' farmsteads* with a post-built house containing non-traditional structural enhancements and durable materials, and *small 'traditional' farmsteads* with a post-built longhouse (Roymans and Derks 2011, 2).<sup>90</sup> It is then also possible to relate these three categories of rural habitat to various characterizing features like structural aspects, labor arrangements, productive focus, social engagements, and family dynamics (table 28). In this way, it is possible to associate ideal-type farming families to characteristic motivational orientations, and, consequently, to interests and attitudes that shaped a range of behaviors. Moreover, it also becomes possible to understand the formation of certain widespread ideals that manifested at the level of normative culture, and which were expressed in a variety of media.

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<sup>90</sup> Habermehl (2013, 73) distinguishes between four "basic types of houses" (traditional, Romanised traditional, timber framework, and multi-roomed stone-built houses). It seems that his second and third type are subsumed under Roymans and Derks' (2011, 2) second type.

## 5.2 Familism Materialized

As far as this can be shown archaeologically, familism during the Iron Age manifested most clearly in mortuary context. What evidence there is suggests that this did not find strong expression through the built environment in settlement contexts. At most, it was the growing use of settlement and farmstead enclosures that suggest greater concern for delineation of household properties, likely because families sought to differentiate themselves within their communities. It is noteworthy, then, that immediately in the decades following the Roman conquest, provincials opted to express familist values more forcefully through the construction of houses and farmsteads that were larger and sturdier, and organized in increasingly complex ways. It is the ideological centrality of the family, as expressed through mortuary practices in pre-Roman times, and, afterwards, in new ways through the built environment in rural settlements, that demands further attention.

While identity-centric research has long focused on the transformation of ‘indigenous identities’, and much literary and epigraphic evidence does indeed demonstrate the rise of new kinds of identification (e.g. ethnic, civic, professional), a substantial body of evidence strongly suggests that it was specifically family identity, and hence familist values, that manifested most strongly during the first two centuries AD. In light of the socio-historical developments that drove the formation of a complex, multi-cultural, and hierarchical society in Belgic Gaul and the Germanies, it is notable that people with widely different socio-cultural backgrounds came to prioritize a comparable range of basic values centered on familism, a value orientation that manifested through a range of discursive and behavioral forms. Notably, it is especially recent archaeological research in military contexts that has provided strong evidence for the ideological centrality of the family in the study area.

### ***5.2.1 The Manifestation of Familist Ideals***

To show this, it is useful to first consider observations made by Saller and Shaw (1984), who studied family relations in the Early Roman West by examining funerary epitaphs. Their influential work is pertinent because it seems to demonstrate a low interest for broadcasting family relations among military communities of the Germanic provinces, a notion which archaeologists have long taken for granted. Saller and Shaw argued that nuclear family arrangements were relatively common in the Roman West; “grandparents, uncles and other extended family members appear too infrequently as commemorators for us to believe that they were regarded as part of the core family unit” (*ibid.*, 124). Most frequent of all were commemorations by spouses, parents, and children, with dedications by siblings and extended family members quite rare. Indeed, given the choice, people more often erected tombstones for friends and dependants than for distant relatives. Furthermore, within the military sphere in particular, nuclear family arrangements seem to have prevailed among members of the wealthier officer classes. Common soldiers, by contrast, are not only less often commemorated on tombstones, this seems to have been done most often by friends and non-kin heirs. These patterns in mortuary commemoration, then, seemingly deemphasized the importance of family relations for common soldiers, and, by extension, for most non-elites.<sup>91</sup>

A number of scenarios can explain why the common soldier was rarely commemorated by relatives in Saller and Shaw’s Germanic sample. The patterns they describe were no doubt shaped by regional fashions in tombstone use, the availability of suitable stone, the cost of their creation, the

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<sup>91</sup> Saller and Shaw (1984, 142) note that *c.* sixty per cent of commemorations were dedicated by non-kin in the German provinces.

spread of the epigraphic habit, and other such factors (Greene 2011, 197).<sup>92</sup> It is certainly possible that commemorations arranged by non-kin meant that the deceased had no family, or, less likely, that they did not wish to recognize them. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that soldiers appointed friends as legal representative to deal with inheritance affairs after death, and this may have included taking care of a non-recognized *de facto* family. Of course, extra-legal arrangements like this worked best in tight-knit (exclusive) communities, where someone's reputation could be damaged if they defaulted on a known (i.e. publically broadcast) agreement. Mortuary commemorations were public statements without legal power, but, in tight-knit communities, such expressions will have been quite effective in forcing observance of communally recognized responsibilities. Be that as it may, Saller and Shaw's findings have not remained unchallenged. Indeed, it has now become possible to demonstrate the central importance of the family within military communities on the Germanic frontier.

It is especially the study of military diplomas that has led to new insights in recent years (Cuff 2010; Greene 2011). From the time of Claudius (AD 41-54) until the early third century AD, retiring auxiliary soldiers received bronze military diplomas that recorded certain rights and privileges. Specifically, this concerned the legal recognition of existing or future spouses and children. These official statements are particularly strong indicators that auxiliary soldiers were quite concerned with the welfare of their families. Most recruits entered military service in their late teens or early twenties, and, because bronze diplomas (like tombstones) frequently mention spouses and children, auxiliary soldiers must generally have formed their families while actively serving in the

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<sup>92</sup> Saller and Shaw themselves already noted several patterns; for example, the use of commemorative tombstones was most popular amongst the wealthy and well-to-do, while it also was far more common among urban than military or rural populations.

military. That Roman authorities were willing to officially recognize the families of retiring soldiers is only one of a number of indications that they were allowing military personnel to form and maintain families during their years of active service. Indeed, while Augustus' interest for increasing military discipline led him to remove marriage rights from soldiers, this apparently never really prevented military personnel from starting families before their retirement (Phang 2001). Despite strict laws prohibiting active soldiers from being married, then, *de facto* relationships were commonly allowed. Whether high- or low-ranked, legionair or auxiliary, most military personnel formed families while being stationed in military forts.

Quite different from political attitudes and official legislation, then, on-the-ground realities encouraged the adoption of pragmatic attitudes by military leadership. No doubt it will have been recognized that allowing soldiers to form and support families in or near forts will have increased morale and strengthened ties to communities; this will have motivated soldiers in ways no monetary reward could. The Claudian reforms that introduced the practice of awarding honorary diplomas to veterans were not the result of military authorities begrudgingly reaching the conclusion that they needed to align their policies with this reality of active servicemen desiring to form families; rather, its primary aim was to provide further enticements for recruitment and honorable completion of service. Emperor Hadrian acted in an equally pragmatic way when amending Roman law regarding the inheritance rights of the illegitimate offspring of deceased soldiers. This allowed soldiers to explicitly acknowledge the inheritance rights of their non-citizen children. In light of enduringly high mortality rates among auxiliary soldiers<sup>93</sup>, post-mortem arrangements that could ensure the well-

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<sup>93</sup> Cuff (2010, 81) argues for a fifty per cent rate of soldiers not completing their twenty-five years of service.

being of *de facto* families will have been of significant concern to soldiers, and it was this which Hadrian's policy changes addressed.

From AD 140 onwards, Roman authorities no longer granted citizenship to children born from illegitimate conjugal partnerships formed during military service. While auxiliary diplomas continued to legalize *de facto* marriages (i.e. these continued to be allowed), citizenship was denied to any children born before a soldier's retirement. Even in those cases where the father and his conjugal partner both held citizenship prior to enlistment, the marriage they formed while serving was not officially recognized, such that any children born during the time of service would not be granted citizenship post-AD 140. This important change in policy no doubt resulted from another pragmatic consideration, namely maintaining enlistment rates. This is suggested by several points. The change occurred after a substantial early second century AD rise in the inclusion of children on diplomas (*c.* 70 per cent mention children), and these could each list as many as six (Greene 2011, 215). This suggests that people were not merely able to raise larger families but that they had a desire to do so during a period of political stability, military security, and economic growth; in other words, forming larger nuclear families had become a widely shared ideal. Notably, for a frontier society where the military sphere was all-pervasive, having larger families increased the likelihood that more children did not enter military service, but instead pursued different kinds of livelihoods. Moreover, a century after the Claudian reforms, many young provincials who enlisted will already have held citizenship because they would have inherited this from their parents. For these recruits, the prospect of being granted citizenship upon retirement will have meant little. The legal change helped ensure, then, that military families continued to enlist their children, who could only gain citizenship if they themselves served.

From these considerations it is again clear that a discrepancy existed between legal policy and official directives on the one hand, and pragmatic accommodation of on-the-ground realities on the other. Tellingly, it is mainly Rome's literary and political elites who seemed to have condemned the soldier's preoccupation with his family, mainly because it was believed to encourage the deterioration of military discipline and efficiency (van Driel-Murray 2008, 84; Speidel 2012, 184).<sup>94</sup> While political elites and intellectuals may have believed that bad soldiers were motivated by money and other reprehensible passions, and good soldiers by duty and honor, it is clear that, for auxiliary soldiers at least, one of the main motivations for completing twenty-five years of service was improved legal status (citizenship and conjugal rights) for themselves, their spouses, and their children. No doubt, military service provided a crucial way for poverty-stricken masses to survive the socio-economic challenges of the Roman imperial order, but for peregrine soldiers in particular, honorable retirement granted the soldier and his descendants real-world benefits. On the other hand, while auxiliary soldiers and their (future) spouses will undoubtedly have considered the implications of Roman law on their prospects and those of their descendants, it is also clear that people who are motivated to establish conjugal relations and form families will pursue this irrespective of constraints posed by laws or social norms.<sup>95</sup>

Archaeologists have now adequately shown how family-centric interests and ideals were realized throughout the social strata in the study area, including the military sphere. For example,

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<sup>94</sup>The fourth century AD rhetorician Libanius of Antioch, for example, deplored the soldier's widespread preoccupation with his family. He wistfully talks about "the good old days" when unmarried soldiers "hankered after glory, not cash" to feed his wife and children (cited in Phang 2001, 375).

<sup>95</sup> Indeed, it is difficult to see how the granting of citizenship to all inhabitants of the Roman Empire in AD 212 could have had any serious effects on family planning in a frontier society, other than that it will have declined interest in military service for that particular benefit.

through critical reconsideration of various categories of material evidence (e.g. dress items, handmade pottery) the presence of women and children in and around forts has adequately been demonstrated (Bowman and Thomas 1994 and 2003; van Driel-Murray 1997, 2008, and 2009; Allison 2006 and 2015). In doing so, archaeologists have helped dispel the common assumption that soldiers did not form families because military interests in general, and barrack life in particular, could not accommodate this. The situation seems to have been quite the reverse. There is now convincing evidence available that suggests that many forts and fortresses in the Rhineland had a significant non-combatant component already during the earliest phases of occupation. This realization makes it possible to overcome one of the strongest hurdles for reassessing the value priorities of those in the military sphere, and granting the socio-cultural significance of familism throughout the Belgic and Germanic provinces during the first two centuries AD.

There are other material categories and social contexts that equally demonstrate this ideological centrality of the family in the study area. To start, it is clear that, compared to the situation during the Iron Age, attitudes towards children and childhood changed noticeably from the start of the Early Roman period. In contrast to the generally low presence of children in Iron Age cemeteries, the proportion of children in Roman-period cemeteries is more substantial, though likely still underrepresented due to taphonomic processes (Derks 2014, 49). In Roman times, infants of perinatal age tended to be inhumed rather than cremated, and they are commonly found at settlements of various kinds, including farmsteads and military forts. The inhumation of newborns and infants in domestic rather than cemetery contexts suggests that their burial was generally considered a private affair. It is likely that infants were first and foremost seen as members of families, not a broader community, such that deceased children who had not yet attained a social persona were treated differently in mortuary context.

Noteworthy is Derks' discussion of votive dedications for children (*ibid.*), a particular cultic practice for which evidence is mainly found in the southern half of the study area.<sup>96</sup> Derks proposes that the absence of infant votives in areas where there was a strong votive tradition (e.g. in the frontier region around Cologne) might be explained by the male-military factor that could have suppressed the habit from being adopted there (*ibid.*, 52). However, this suggestion can be countered by the main proposition discussed here, that family life was as important in the military sphere as elsewhere. Indeed, inhumed infants certainly have been found in cemeteries situated on the frontier where infant votives do not generally occur. What likely shaped the pattern is that votive dedications were performed in communal sanctuaries, while the burial of children likely was considered a private affair that involved parents and close relatives. The increased concern for children during the Roman period is also suggested by the prevalence of certain representational motifs expressed in various media, like 'the swaddled infant', 'the mother-and-infant', and 'the resting infant'. While Derks' study is mainly concerned with sanctuary-based votives that constitute declarations of gratitude to a deity for protecting or healing an infant, the distribution of this kind of child-centric symbolism is certainly more widespread - for example, figurines with mother-and-infant motive are found in cemeteries as far north as the Lower Rhineland. The oldest of these already date to the earliest phase of Roman occupation (*ibid.*, 58), but the range of motifs and the media in which they materialize expand from the late first century AD onwards.

Another way familist ideals were expressed in public ways were through the iconographic illustration of couples (i.e. husband and wife partnerships) on tombstones, and then in particular through the rather emblematic portrayal of wives and mothers. On 'couple reliefs', women are very

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<sup>96</sup> Of Derks' sample of c. 90 votives, the majority are found south of the study area, in Burgundy (East-Central France).

commonly depicted in highly emblematic fashion as *mater familias* - formally seated upright in high-backed chairs, these mothers are commonly shown in luxurious clothes, bejeweled and with a small lock-box, while accessories linked to wool spinning (spindle, distaff, and wool) are often shown as well (Pearce 2011b, 235). The symbolic focus is generally placed on the beauty, piety, and domesticity of spouses, but various other virtues are also commonly expressed through associated inscriptions, like faithfulness (*pudicitia*), obedience (*obsequium*), friendliness (*comitas*), and frugality (*frugi*). That such notions concerning ideal wives and mothers received such extensive elaboration in mortuary iconography and epigraphy again strongly suggests the centrality of family life within provincial society.

Moreover, the ideological centrality of motherhood (and the family by extension) also comes to the fore through religious practice. In particular, this is shown by the prevalence of the so-called ‘mother cults’ in the study area (Roymans 1990; Burns 1994; Garman 2002; Woolf 2003; Roymans and Derks 2011). Families, rural communities, even entire ‘tribal’ groups seem to have participated in the worship of mother goddesses (*Matres* and *Matronae*).<sup>97</sup> Thematically, mother cults focused on protection, motherhood, fertility, and fortune, and in this they align with beliefs and rituals associated with the Roman worship of household deities (*lares* and *penates*). Furthermore, while Italic colonists who settled in the northwest provinces can be expected to have continued the family-centric worship of guardian deities, a widespread practice in Italy (Orr 1978), this did not radically

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<sup>97</sup> Some seem to have been family names - for example, the *Matronae Etrahenae* (Etrates), *Matronae Austriahenae* (Austriates), and *Matronae Gesahenae* (Gesationes) - while others seem to have alluded to real or mythical founding individuals - for example, the *Matronae Arvagastae* (Arvagast) and *Matronae Albiahenae* (Albius). It also seems to have been the case that cultic mothers were linked to ‘tribal’ groups - for example, *Matres Treverae* (Treveri), *Matres Remae* (Remi), *Matres Nervinae* (Nervii), and *Matres Cantrussteihiae* (Condrusi), as well as geographic areas - for example, *Matronae Ambiamarcae* (those living on either side of the Amber river) and *Matronae Ambireneses* (those living on either side of the Rhine river).

differ from comparable beliefs and rituals maintained by indigenous groups. Quite analogous is the regional practice of placing foundational offerings in domestic contexts, which likely was motivated by similar concerns for the protection, fertility, and fortune of the household (Beilke-Voigt 2007; Trebsche 2007; van Hoof 2007). The symbolic focus of such rituals again substantiates this idea of familism having become a dominant cultural ideal in the study area during the Roman period.

### ***5.2.2 Familism in Mortuary Context***

Having considered several lines of evidence that allow demonstrating the ideological centrality of familist values in N Gaul and the Germanies, I will next consider certain burial practices more closely because it is in mortuary contexts where we find some of the strongest explicit expressions of familist values. Compared to the apparent uniformity of the North Gallic Burial Tradition (Collis 1977; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001), Roman-period mortuary practices seemingly became increasingly heterogenous. While it is true that there were notable differences in the placement, scale, and elaboration of burials, as well as in the quality and quantity of burial assemblages, it is undeniable that large numbers of people from across the social strata were willing to invest more resources in the ritualized disposal and commemoration of their relatives. Certain kinds of burial practices also became quite normative in the study area. For example, communal cemeteries large and small became consigned to the peripheries of towns, forts, villas, and farmsteads, thereby strictly separating the living from the dead. Moreover, the commemoration of deceased relatives by the erection of conspicuous stone monuments also became very common. Ofcourse, such structures were variably used to broadcast socio-economic status, signal subscription to Roman imperialist values, or express communal ('tribal', provincial, urban, or professional) affiliations. But, more than anything, it was the preservation of memory that was one of the main functions of mortuary

monuments (Carroll 2007 and 2011; Pearce 2011a and 2011b). Indeed, epigraphic and historical evidence amply demonstrates how provincials became quite preoccupied with ‘being remembered’. Moreover, these “stones that guard memory” (Propertius *Elegies* 2.13.40) functioned to manage relations with a community in which the descendents of the deceased still held membership.

Roman archaeologists have long interpreted such changing norms in mortuary practice in terms of acculturation (e.g. the adoption of distinctly Roman ways of acting and interacting), but a value-centric archaeology recognizes that this can best be understood in terms of the adaptive prioritization and realization of a limited range of basic values in highly regular ways. More specifically for the study area, Roman state integration triggered expansive socio-historical processes, and this encouraged the adaptive prioritization and realization of certain value priorities over others. As has already been demonstrated, the ethnographic literature provides countless examples for the varied ways in which expansive and contractive processes encourage adaptive responses within human collectives. While this study does not allow for detailed analyses of specific mortuary contexts, a brief description of local developments at a well-researched cemetery can serve to demonstrate how such processes could manifest at the local level.

The excavation of a rural settlement and associated cemetery at Tiel-Passewaaij (Netherlands) has shown how local farming families came to share a communal cemetery around the middle of the first century A.D. (Aarts and Heeren 2007; Heeren 2009). In doing so, they turned away from a preexisting tradition of placing family burials near farmsteads. While this development by itself suggests a reorientation towards communalism, the uniformity of graves in the cemetery also points to an interest in egalitarian conformity (i.e. differences in burial form, placement, or grave good deposition are negligible). The broadcasting of a profession or skillset (e.g. horse and cattle breeding, textile manufacture) seems to have been one acceptable way in which people were

allowed to differentiate themselves within the context of the cemetery. While this shift in mortuary practice may be interpreted as a local response to broader socio-historical processes, in this regional context greater specificity is possible; the noted changes occurred at a time when Batavian auxiliary units were removed from the region to serve abroad, and this likely encouraged local households to rely more on inter-household support systems and to prioritize communal values in the sudden absence of men (van Driel-Murray 2008).

It is for the beginning of the second century AD that it is possible to recognize a shift of focus from communalist to familist values at Tiel-Passewaay. Notably, it was during this period of stable political and economic conditions that child mortality rates declined and the average household size increased (Aarts and Heeren 2011, 73). Most single child burials date to this period, and these are also given substantial grave goods. This growing investment in child burials undoubtedly points to a shift in family priorities. Contemporary changes in the cremation rite also suggest how mortuary rituals became restricted to household members (Mata 2012, 41), while burial assemblages also reflect the greatest differentiation (in terms of the quantity and quality of grave goods) at this time. At Tiel-Passewaay, then, we see how socio-historical dynamics encouraged changes in mortuary behavior, and this can ultimately be linked to adaptive shifts in value priorities.

Here it is helpful to repeat the approach adopted above for studying the material dimensions of familist value realization among rural households, and to see whether it is possible to use a similar tri-partite scheme for ordering mortuary data and see whether we can distinguish between family priorities. This can be done by considering iconographic aspects of tombstones. More specifically, it is the study of so-called 'daily life scenes' on funerary reliefs that can inform us about the ideological

preoccupations of those active not in agriculture or the military but in industry and commerce.<sup>98</sup> The majority of such monuments were erected outside towns and along roads and waterways, while a relatively small number of prominent examples is associated with large villa estates. Most of these tombstones with daily life scenes are found in an area between the rivers Marne and Rhine, from Cologne in the North to Strasbourg in the South (Chmielewski 2002, 12). Occupational activity like industry, transport, and commerce is depicted most often, with leisure and family banquet scenes less commonly shown.<sup>99</sup> Notably, daily life scenes are not biographical but emblematic; in other words, they do not retell events in the life of the deceased, but communicate ideals and interests in a recognizable visual language. The choice of representing everyday activities on tombstones, instead of portraits or mythological scenes for example, signals that many provincials (the deceased themselves or their commemorating next of kin) wished to communicate their qualities and achievements, and, consequently, their value priorities, to posterity. This was done in ways recognizable and comprehensible by other members of their community.

It is not unreasonable to presume, then, that these tombstones with daily life scenes were mainly used to broadcast the deceased person's occupation and their socio-economic status (Chmielewski's 2002, 173). Yet, where this concerns claims to status, this was not commonly done through expressions of Roman *savoir faire* (Pearce 2014).<sup>100</sup> Indeed, those with potentially the greatest

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<sup>98</sup> These funerary monuments were predominantly used by those *not* active in agriculture, with manufacturing (e.g. jewelry and shoes) and commercial (e.g. textile and wine merchants) occupations most commonly depicted.

<sup>99</sup> Chmielewski's (2002) study classifies the available iconographic data (*c.* ninety monuments) by thematic categories: wagon, ship, rent-paying, merchant and craftsmen, textile, agricultural, family banquet, and leisure scenes.

<sup>100</sup> Pearce argues that provincials developed a desire to broadcast Roman cultivation in mortuary context. While it is true that people during the Iron Age maintained comparable interests (e.g. managing outward appearance), during the Roman period this came to signify Roman *savoir faire*;

interest for this, like office-holding magistrates, are not known to have erected this type of commemorative tombstone. On the contrary, they were predominantly erected by indigenous provincials who lacked Roman citizenship (e.g. the Roman *tria nomina* naming convention that would indicate this is rarely present) and who did not desire to represent themselves in an explicitly Roman way (e.g. people are rarely represented wearing a *toga*). One prominent way in which people did seek to distinguish themselves was through visual splendor (scale and artistic opulence), yet, here also differences are notable because the range of burial monuments includes large pillars (*pfeilergabmäler*), smaller rectangular blocks that are sculpted on three sides (*cippi*), and thinner rectangular monuments (*stelae*). It seems, then, that those in a position to invest greater wealth in commemorative monuments were also more concerned with demonstrating socio-economic status, yet, not all mortuary monuments reflect this preoccupation with status display because less opulent tombstones tend to show a greater concern for emphasizing personal skill and occupational achievement instead.

Another notable point of difference concerns the portrayal of gendered ideals. Chmielewski notes how “literal depictions of women at work are more frequent on smaller monuments favored by the lower classes, while the more elaborate monuments of wealthier individuals tend to portray women in passive roles” (*ibid.*, 108). This seems to relate to motivational ideals that are commonly encountered in the ethnographic literature; once families reach a certain level of wealth, women commonly take on the role of managers and overseers rather than remaining laborers. Those wealthy elites who are more concerned with social status and political influence, in turn, increasingly

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according to Pearce, “conduct in public and private settings marks possession of the virtues and cultural expertise necessary to assert membership of a Roman elite” (2014, 237). So, knowing how to act like Roman elites (i.e. sophistication and cultivation encapsulated by the concept *humanitas*) became a goal for many provincial elites who sought to differentiate themselves from social and cultural others, like provincial subordinates and non-state barbarians.

prioritize ideals relating to outward appearance and comportment (i.e. feminine beauty and modesty). Such ideals generally necessitate the withdrawal of ‘respectable’ women from economic activity, even everyday public engagements. There is a clear distinction to be made, then, between the larger monuments of wealthy elites who chose to depict idealized lifestyles (management, wealth, luxury, and leisure), and the humbler monuments of the well-to-do lower classes that focused more on the depiction of real-life situations relating to occupation (personal skills, social engagement, hard work).

It is useful to place Chmielewski’s thematic evidence in terms of ‘semantic fields’ that can be associated with a range of behavioral and material aspects, and which can also be proposed to have held a certain meaning content (table 29). While behavioral and material aspects show what daily life activities people chose to depict on tombstones, an extra interpretative step is required to assess the potential meaning of particular scenes or scenic elements. However, from a value-oriented perspective that stresses the universality of human cognitive functioning, interpretation of symbolic meaning (or analogical reasoning more broadly) is less problematic than commonly supposed by those who maintain radical relativist perspectives. Furthermore, reference to the values continuum allows relating any particular meaning focus to motivational values. This is shown in table 30, where it becomes clear that commemorative tombstones were predominantly used to broadcast values that belong in the *embedded individualism* domain. Much of the meaning content broadcast through the various semantic fields predominantly relates to *power* and *achievement* values. This is followed by values situated in the *exclusive collectivism* domain, most often *security* followed by *conformity-tradition* values. Taken together, this information on tombstones that depict daily life scenes informs the tripartite scheme presented in table 31. As before, the conceptualization of three tiers allows associating various characteristic aspects (e.g. burial placement, grave good deposition) with three

familist orientations. In such a way it becomes possible to see in what ways directional reprioritization of values, shaped by socio-historical processes, could be realized by those groups and individuals active in commerce and manufacture.

In this chapter, I have sought to examine a wide range of archaeological data and contexts in order to talk about various socio-historical developments, while stressing how individuals situationally prioritized and realized a limited range of basic human values. As Roman provincials negotiated everyday circumstances at four ideal-type levels of lived experience (individual, family, community, and society), the adaptive qualities of instantiated values ensured that countless actions and interactions, in the aggregate, shaped social norms and cultural ideals. As I have shown, archaeologists can examine these through various lines of inquiry and using different categories of evidence. Whether we consider the diplomas of veteran soldiers that demonstrate a strong concern for the rights and privileges of spouses and children, or those cultic rituals through which countless provincials aimed to gain some matter of control over the well-being and continuation of their family line, or the commemorative monuments through which family-centric ideals were expressed in mortuary context, the value emphases expressed by countless Roman provincial families is often remarkably clear.

## CONCLUSION

**Chapter one** introduced the central goal of this dissertation: to engage in an exploratory investigation of socio-historical transformations, and associated shifts in value prioritization and realization, in pre-Roman and Roman Northwest Europe. The motivation for this is manifold but mainly stems in a desire to overcome certain enduring difficulties in archaeological interpretation. This ranges from the persistence of primitivism, elite-centrism, andro-centrism, and ahistoricism in archaeological narratives of Celto-Germanic ‘barbarity’, to the predominance of Marxist and structuralist theory in post-processual and later scholarship. Archaeologists inspired by these latter schools of thought commonly attribute prime historical causality to the aggrandizing projects of social aspirers. The efforts of ‘big men’ are universally believed to cause social conflicts within and between communities, while the ideologies they produce are mainly supposed to serve the mystification of power differentials and naturalization of various inequities. While structural-Marxism has long been challenged for the way it ignores other social dynamics and human capacities (e.g. negotiation, cooperation, boundary-crossing, empathy, *etcetera*) it remains dominant in both the complexification narratives of prehistorians and the ‘Romanization’ narratives of Roman archaeologists.

The goal I set myself is to engage in an archaeology that is better equipped to deal with socio-cultural complexity and a greater diversity of human attitudes and interests. One aim involved replacing simple binary concepts, like simple-complex, egalitarian-stratified, native-Roman, and elite-subordinate, with a methodological framework that is able to accommodate the notion that people are variably motivated to engage in dynamic relations through participation in different kinds of social networks. But how can archaeologists move beyond interpretations that remain too strongly

focused on ‘Culture’ or ‘Identity’, and instead examine how new and existing constraints and affordances were negotiated by local agents with diverging interests, outlooks, and levels of empowerment? Furthermore, is it possible for archaeologists to identify certain basic human motivations that shape and reshape social norms and cultural ideals in more or less regular and comprehensible ways?

I proposed that archaeological inquiry of this kind needs to ask why certain values are consistently prioritized over others under certain socio-historical conditions, and how this manifests at the level of lived experience for groups and individuals. If some motivational values can be shown to have universal valence, can the same be said about the particular ways in which people choose to realize them? If societies are formed through the countless actions and interactions of individuals, and if social norms and cultural ideals are constituted in the context of social life, how do society and culture link to individually experienced and conceptualized motivational values? I hold that an ‘Archaeology of Values’ encourages engagement with the largely unexplored basic motivations that determine how humans perceive and negotiate life’s challenges and opportunities.

In the first section of **chapter two**, I showed how archaeologists have generally dealt with values implicitly. That is, whenever they talk about social developments in terms of complexification, stratification, or individualization, archaeologists are in fact discussing the effects of value reprioritization. When they analyze local manifestations of such processes, they are considering the social and cultural contexts where value reprioritization and realization have taken place. I looked at the ways in which this has been studied through direct engagement with material culture, and concluded that archaeologists tend to emphasize the relevance of a limited range of preconditions or determinant forces that are commonly believed to trigger and encourage complexification processes (e.g. overpopulation, natural abundance, or technological innovation). I argued that socio-historical

processes must be examined by considering a wider range of factors, material as well as ideational, and that it is important to forego making distinctions between social formations that are simple or complex, egalitarian or stratified, *etcetera*. Instead, it has to be recognized that equality-inequality and individualism-collectivism dynamics have always been present among human collectives, regardless of socio-cultural complexity.

However, deconstructing the common arguments and implicit assumptions maintained by archaeologists can only serve as a prelude to developing a value-centric archaeology of socio-cultural transformation. In the next section of chapter two (section 2.2), I engaged a small body of archaeological literature that shines a light on some of the ways in which archaeologists have explicitly examined the material manifestation of values. This showed how some have focused on stylistic or technological difference across time or between cultural groups, while others have instead preferred contextualized ‘multi-thread’ approaches. Also noteworthy are the different ways in which interpretation works for archaeologists. For some, material culture encapsulates the world such as it was viewed and experienced by people. Others, in turn, hold that material culture can do more than inform about the material conditions of lived experience; for the latter, archaeological evidence can speak to the idealized conceptions that people actively sought to implement in their daily lives. It is this latter approach to interpretation that urges a closer consideration of personal values, social norms, and cultural ideals. This brief review of pertinent archaeological literature demonstrated how a critical ‘Archaeology of Values’ is best served by the careful analysis of various forms of evidence, derived from a variety of social spheres, and analyzed at a number of spatio-temporal scales. But this has to happen in reference to a sophisticated theoretical and methodological framework that allows for analyzing implicit and explicit manifestations of basic human values contextually and comparatively.

To achieve this, I considered value research in other disciplines in the final section of chapter two. Specifically, I identified a stark divergence between universalist and particularist perspectives in anthropology. Ethnographic research has long been shaped by relativist attitudes, as well as certain methodological preferences, because it has primarily been concerned with the *description* of endless configurations of cultural values. Indeed, interpretive and practice-oriented approaches have dominated anthropological scholarship for decades now because these are felt to offer the highest potential for contextual interpretation. Notably, particularist anthropological scholarship tends to ignore the universality of human cognitive functioning that is the main reason why a broad range of basic motivations (and the behaviors, norms, and ideals they engender) manifests cross-culturally.

To be sure, cultural differences shape, and are shaped by, countless acts of value realization, yet the underlying motivational values potentially at play are the same for all, regardless of the cultural or lexiconic particularities that influence how values are named or conceptualized, or the ways in which they are realized. The use of a universal framework of basic values is especially valuable because this allows moving beyond intuitive explanation and impressionistic description, methods that characterize much of the earlier ‘culturalist’ literature on values. I argued, then, that social scientists can gain a better understanding of the motivations that drive human action and interaction, but this requires taking an anti-relativist stance. If it can be accepted that humans are motivated to act and express themselves in comparable ways, it becomes necessary to focus on the ways underlying motivational values operate cross-culturally. Further, the place of motivational values in social systems and cultural formations can only be studied effectively if these can be identified and compared substantively and relationally. Only then can we speak to motivational aspects, adaptive efficacy, and transformational significance. This requires the use of certain

structural and relational principles that can assist such an endeavor. Even if we cannot hope to ever identify all values that humans are able to conceive, it remains necessary to identify a broad range of universal values so that it at least becomes possible to consider their potential role in particular socio-historical situations, especially since our subjects do not always give clear voice to them.

In the first section of **chapter three**, I discussed values conceptually, how these are best defined and how they may be understood to motivate people as individuals and members of social collectives. The next section (3.2) reviewed and expanded upon the ‘Theory of Basic Human Values’ as formulated by the social psychologist Shalom Schwartz, which features as the methodological core of this archaeological study of values. I also considered the analytical purposes of such a universal framework, which ranges from deconstructing common assumptions, to reassessing interpretations, to identifying value prioritization and realization in particular socio-historical contexts. However, like all organizational frameworks that unify fixed categories into stable groupings, the classification of universal values by substantial and relational aspects, has its limitations. Most notably, it cannot be used to show how value orientations form and transform within individuals and collectives, how motivational preferences are emphasized or ignored as people act in the world. This informed the arguments of section 3.3. These were guided by the following question: if the same set of value orientations are found among individuals, institutions, and cultures the world over (past and present), is it not also possible to talk about the formation and transformation of value orientations as driven by comparable and widely attested socio-historical dynamics in equally universal terms? I argued, in the affirmative, that it is possible to enhance archaeological narratives with causal arguments of value-motivated behavior if archaeologists recognize the influence of human ecologies over cognitive development.

Research in Developmental Psychology demonstrates how the linkages between human ecologies, cognitive development, and value adherence leads to predictable shifts in societal transformation. I described one particular framework which uses the well-known *gemeinschaft-gesellschaft* opposition to contrast ideal-type ecologies at either end of a continuum along which socio-demographic development moves in either direction. I expanded on this model and reformulated it in terms of an expansive-contractive dimension that allows for identifying ecological variables and gauge their transformational impact and directionality in particular socio-historical contexts. Practically, archaeologists can determine whether processes can be understood in terms of expansion or contraction, after which it becomes possible to interpret human action and interaction in terms of the adaptive prioritization and realization of universal values.

Local contexts are shaped by a wide variety of internal and external influences that provide the conditions for socialization through which value orientations form in individuals as members of social groups. People who strive to overcome challenges and exploit opportunities in particular socio-historical contexts do so adaptively as motivated by universal value orientations. Human action and interaction results in behavioral patterns, then, that are both consistent and comprehensible. Moreover, countless such adaptive actions have a cumulative effect, such that it becomes possible to characterize a society by the adaptive behaviors of its members in the aggregate. The expansion-contraction model allows for more sophisticated explanations of behavioral differences in contrasting human ecologies, making it possible to forego characterizing certain instances of cross-cultural entanglement as more or less acculturated or hybridized.

The next part of chapter three (section 3.4) discussed the proposition that people universally negotiate local transformational processes at four particular levels of lived experience (i.e. individual, family, community, and society) and this universally produces highly similar patterns of value

realization. That this generally goes unrecognized is due to a strong anthropological and archaeological interest for identifying and describing cultural particularities, and because, from a Marxist perspective, all historical change ostensibly results from the societal struggles between socio-economic elites and subordinate masses. An interdisciplinary appraisal of value prioritization and realization at these four levels of lived experience showed how social scientists can helpfully reduce what are seemingly endless permutations of value realization (the bread and butter of ethnographers) to a manageable set of adaptive motivational orientations (i.e. individualism, familism, communalism, and universalism). Cultural particularities ultimately result from people instantiating values that provide the greatest adaptive advantages at these four universal levels of lived experience.

Section 3.5, lastly, provided the rationale for the proposed framework and its deployment for research in the study area. An archaeology that seeks to profitably negotiate human universals and particulars must strive for interdisciplinarity, theoretical pluralism, and methodological multifocality. I also argued that the exploration of a wide variety of data sources allows for a better understanding of the forces and motivations that shape human action and interaction in both predictable and unexpected ways. This, then, prompts adoption of multi-thread, comparative, and multi-scale analyses.

In **chapter four**, I presented a comparative exploration of shifting value systems in Northwest Europe during the Iron Age. I started by noting a study of changing food procurement practices that draws attention to the concurrence of different and transforming value emphases. Such complexity invited a comparative analysis of depositional, spatial, and structural data derived from mortuary contexts from three periods (Early, Middle, and Late Iron Age) and in three geographic zones within the study area. In order to understand geographic and temporal dynamics in mortuary practice (section 4.1) I discussed the relevance of certain socio-historical variables that

can be foregrounded for having been instrumental in shaping these (section 4.2). However, rather than simply offering an interpretation in terms of complexification understood as an unavoidable evolutionary process, I explored a range of socio-historical variables. Specifically, I suggested that connectivity, interaction, and security were crucial factors to consider when trying to comprehend the (trans-)formation of intra-regional value systems in the study area. Physical insecurity and psychological stress, in particular, are factors that can easily be shown to have promoted the proliferation of stratified socio-political systems throughout human history. To gauge the impact of insecurity in the study area I considered temporal and geographic patterns in refuge construction, and this showed how levels of insecurity shifted throughout the long Iron Age. Notably, interpreting such dynamics demands that socio-cultural formations and historical developments are approached as co-constituted phenomena. Taking a 'global' perspective, then, I argued that Greco-Etruscan commercial activity across West-Central Europe during the Early Iron Age was directly encouraged by Greek democratization and Etruscan stratification processes. Crucially, this did not simply expand mercantile activity among Celto-Germanic groups in general terms, it stimulated a focused trade in slaves. The transformative significance of an 'international' slave trade was revealed by a consideration of various forms of evidence derived from different contexts.

In foregrounding the socio-cultural impact of an intensive and long-lasting trade in human captives, I have not sought to replace one historical determinant (e.g. population growth) with another (i.e. slave trading). Rather, what I have tried to do is improve interpretations shaped by evolutionist and structural-Marxist perspectives that view complexification as an unavoidable and predictable historical process. I aimed to demonstrate that the impact of an enduring trade in human commodities was far greater than generally recognized for the study area. However, it remains to be seen for other Iron Age places and periods whether such a disruptive phenomenon shaped similar

socio-cultural trajectories. Even if archaeologists remain hesitant to foreground the transformative significance of an international slave trade at the local or regional level, but they can accept that the andro- and elite-centric perspectives that have long shaped ideas about Celto-Germanic ‘warrior societies’ are too problematic, then this presents an avenue for future research. If the ‘big men’ models of social complexification in prehistoric Europe should be nuanced, or replaced altogether, how can this be achieved? However prehistorians decide to tackle this challenge, it remains important to recognize that no group or community in trans-Alpine Europe was ever completely isolated from external influence or meta-historical developments. Foregrounding historical co-constitution serves as an important corrective to the particularist archaeologies (shaped by heritage interests, post-colonialism, and contextualism) that have dominated the field since the 1980s (Mata 2017).

In **chapter five** I shifted my focus on Roman period developments. I already noted that Roman assertiveness towards trans-Alpine communities during the Late Iron Age was fed by internal processes that increased socio-economic inequality, and encouraged militarism and imperialism. The eventual incorporation of Celto-Germanic populations into the Roman state went hand in hand with a range of comparable developments. I described how conquest and pacification were followed by certain expansive processes (e.g. urbanization, connectivity, literacy), which significantly intensified interaction and communication throughout the study area (section 5.1). Such socio-historical developments resulted in the formation of a dynamic multi-cultural and hierarchical society, with distinct ways of behaving and relating that became endowed with diverse cultural meanings. I further argued that the creative negotiation of local restraints and affordances encouraged countless farming families - the largest social segment in any Roman province - to reprioritize their values adaptively. This manifested in distinct ways, but mainly by a growing interest

for ‘domesticity’, understood as the behavioral and material manifestation of familist values. It proved possible to show how people of various walks of life strove to realize familist values, behaviorally through both mundane practices and highly expressive acts, materially through built environments and consumption practices, and relationally through various kinds of social engagements. Countless such actions and interactions, in the aggregate, shaped the social norms and cultural ideals that manifested throughout the Roman northwest provinces during the first two centuries AD (section 5.2). It is noteworthy that people with different socio-cultural backgrounds came to prioritize a comparable range of basic values centered on familism, a value orientation that manifested through a range of behaviors and expressions that archaeological inquiry has access to.

This dissertation aligns with an emerging body of ‘human nature’ scholarship that is willing to recognize certain human universals (like human cognitive capacities), while also allowing for the multifarious ways in which experiences and lifeways unfold (Brown 1991; Grunwald *et al.* 2002; Pinker 2002). It is commonly pointed out that archaeology, as a distinct field of inquiry, contributes to social-scientific scholarship in two unique ways: first, by the recovery and analysis of material culture in order to reconstruct past lifeways and interpret socio-cultural phenomena; second, by explaining the transformation of these over long periods of time. If archaeologists are to become proficient negotiators of the complexities posed by universals and particulars, openness to interdisciplinary exploration in theory and method becomes a necessity. In this dissertation, interest for universal human motivations and historical transformation led to the merging of two methodological frameworks: a static organizational scheme developed for social psychological analysis, and a dynamic ecological model formulated to study cognitive development. Theoretically, this approach was further substantiated by ideas and concepts found in anthropology and sociology,

while it also drew strongly on comparative information found in modernization and globalization ethnographies.

Taken together, this provides archaeologists with a sophisticated toolset to relate patterns in the material record to a range of basic motivations. And, as basic motivations are universal, so the behaviors, norms, and ideals (e.g. labor divisions, family arrangements, hospitality, *etcetera*) they engender across social and cultural boundaries become comprehensible. Furthermore, due to socio-historical regularities in adaptive responses it is possible to understand the motivations, behaviors, and aspirations of groups and individuals who are variably (dis-)empowered by expansive processes. Thus, prehistorians and Romanists can examine intra- and inter-regional dynamics and determine the local effects of such processes, how expansion or contraction influenced individual and collective levels of empowerment, and how this shaped value prioritization and realization (and norms and ideals) in both predictable and unexpected ways.

It is furthermore possible to contribute to the efforts of other disciplines where congruent methodologies are used. Social scientists have long conceptualized contrasting dimensions, like agency-structure, subject-object, and internal-external oppositions, and these align suitably with the individualism-collectivism axis of the values framework used in this dissertation. Other such dichotomous constructs, like stability-change, conservatism-progressivism, materialism-idealism, high regulation-low regulation, and high anxiety-low anxiety coincide with the vertical axis of the framework. Social scientists regularly devise such bidimensional schemes to inform their questions and guide their analyses. Political scientists like Inglehart and Welzel (2005), for example, have sought to relate economic security to attitudes and outlooks. Their main approach involves mapping national value scores unto a grid formed by two axes: a traditional to secular-rational axis (which informs thoughts on conservative-progressive, inward-outward, intolerant-tolerant, hierarchical-

egalitarian dynamics), and a survival to self-expression axis (which aligns with Marx' superstructure-substructure division). Archaeologists have only recently started to reference this particular kind of social scientific research to supplement their own endeavors (MacMullen 2014, 101; Morris 2015, 22). Yet, prehistorians and Roman archaeologists who deploy similar biaxial schemes are in a unique position to contribute ancient comparative data to such broader social scientific efforts. Moreover, studies that deploy such biaxial schemes in both ancient and contemporary contexts can benefit from a two-part framework that combines a stable classification of related values with an ecological scheme of adaptive development.

The social anthropologist Mary Douglas (1970 and 1999) long studied the linkages between values and social organization. Her initial efforts inspired a body of anthropological scholarship variously referred to as Grid-Group Analysis and Cultural Theory. Douglas deployed a simple model that positions four stable forms of social organization along an incorporation (group) axis and a regulation (grid) axis. The four quadrants thus created correspond to distinct forms of social organization that are more-or-less incorporated, and more-or-less regulated. In each quadrant of the model, distinct value biases are believed to prevail (*individualist, fatalist, hierarchist, and enclavist*). The prehistorian Niall Sharples (2011) recently attempted to characterize archaeological sub-disciplines in reference to Douglas' grid-group scheme in order to talk about the distinct interests and attitudes of those who engage in Iron Age studies. Thus, we learn about the preferences and interests of 'paradigm shifters' whose marginalized position puts them at odds with 'Grand Old Men' that are the gatekeepers of knowledge and funding. For Sharples, use of the grid-group scheme allows for the classification of archaeological biases in relation to institutional roles and positions.

While Sharples can be commended for his willingness to explore the potential of such methodologies, this particular effort is hindered by certain fundamental deficiencies of the grid-

group scheme. While I plan to contribute to Cultural Theory in a forthcoming paper – wherein I aim to re-characterize the four cultural biases of the grid-group scheme - I will here briefly follow Sharples' example and consider more closely certain stable value biases in archaeology. This can be done by drawing on another biaxial scheme, this one formulated by Kavous Ardalan (2009 and 2012). This economist has published a series of papers in recent years in which he repeatedly shows how it is possible to classify certain theoretical perspectives into four broad paradigmatic worldviews: *interpretive*, *humanist*, *structuralist*, and *functionalist*. These worldviews are shaped by certain fundamental assumptions about the nature of society and the scientific endeavor. This concerns matters of ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology, and can be understood by reference to a subjective-objective dimension (for science) and a change-regulation dimension (for society). Because these dimensions can be aligned with the axes of the values framework, it becomes possible to relate *disembedded* and *embedded individualism* with *humanist* and *interpretive idealism* respectively, while *inclusive* and *exclusive collectivism* can be linked to *structuralist* and *functionalist materialism*. What the values framework allows, then, is identifying the motivations behind particular worldviews, and, consequently, of scholarly predispositions towards certain 'best-fit' theories and methods.

Beyond disciplinary self-reflection, there is another direction for future research worth mentioning. This concerns using the scheme to inform archaeological theorizing about certain domains of discourse and practice. Here I will briefly demonstrate how the values framework can be deployed for the study of 'identity' and 'consumption'. It is possible and useful to consider the formation and expression of identity in terms of the individualism-collectivism opposition, by reconceptualizing it as an internal-external dynamic. Yet, this goes beyond the recognition that people (internally) claim an identity for themselves, while these are also (externally) imposed. Just

like it is necessary to consider internal and external variables when trying to understand the formation and manifestation of human motivational orientations (i.e. bodily experience and cognitive reflection on the one hand, and the influence of experiences, social norms, and cultural ideals on cognitive development on the other), so it is possible to understand the ideas and ideals that people maintain about identity as closely related to this same dynamic. People prioritize the importance of identity differently, and this is closely linked to a predominant value orientation. In circumstances where collectivist values are dominant, communal identities are prioritized over individual identities, while the understanding and expression of individual identity is highly regulated by social norms. In circumstances where individualist values are dominant, the autonomous formation and expression of unique individual identities is of greater importance in more social situations.

In addition to this internal-external dynamic, it is also possible to pose an opposition in terms of the amount of flexibility (i.e. a high flexibility-low flexibility dynamic) that people perceive in identity formation, and allow in identity expression. Conceptually, at least, it can be suggested that there is less flexibility in identity formation and expression for *embedded individuals* compared to *disembedded individuals*. While the formation and expression of unique identities can serve the aspirations of the recognition-seeking embedded individual, this very embeddedness places more restrictions on such pursuits. *Disembedded individualism*, by contrast, relates to greater freedom in the formation and expression of personal identities. Overall, individualism centralizes the importance of internal factors in the formation and expression of identity, but *embedded individualism* represents less flexibility while *disembedded individualism* signifies more flexibility. This same dynamic also manifests at the collectivist side of the continuum, with *exclusive collectivism* being less flexible and *inclusive collectivism* being more flexible when it comes to the formation and expression of collectivist values.

Moreover, where this concerns the influence of external factors over identity formation, *exclusive collectivists* perceive less flexibility than *inclusive collectivists*. For those archaeologists who remain enthralled by ‘identity’, these observations present a new way forward because not only are such dynamics measurable through quantitative and qualitative analysis (e.g. assessment of uniformity-variety or simplicity-complexity trends), it is possible to relate identitarian behavior to basic motivations.

If we consider ‘consumption’, it is possible to re-characterize the individualism-collectivism dimension as an indulgence-temperance opposition whereby *power, achievement, hedonism, and stimulation* are readily associated with indulgence and high consumption rates, while *security, conformity-tradition, and benevolence* are suitably linked to temperance and low consumption rates. Only an extensive cross-cultural comparison could show the actual pervasiveness of such a dynamic, but the ethnographic literature provides clear examples. For example, Wilk (1990) shows how high consumption rates subvert, in actuality or perception, social cohesion. In similar terms, González-Ruíbal notes how the dominance of individuality in the West since the 15th century went “hand in hand with an extraordinary increase in the number and variety of artifacts through which new, diverse and often conflictual selves were channeled and constituted” (González-Ruíbal 2012, 142). What developed was a strong focus on the cultivation and projection of the individual self, through dress (fashion), body care (hygiene), and personal development (education). There is no need to see such an expansion of the variety and quantity of consumed goods as a uniquely modern (or Western) phenomenon. Goods and technologies that assist the formation and projection of individual identities have been around for millennia, and have also been present in even the most collectivist of communities.

Other studies (Abramson and Inglehart 1992; Bell 2002, 133; Vauclair *et al.* 2011, 197) note how post-materialist orientations may develop in contexts where autonomy and harmony values (*self-direction* and *universalism*) are emphasized, while materialist ambitions often become dominant when personal and group welfare are tenuous and social reproductive anxiety is high (*power* and *security*). However, an important distinction needs to be made between the quantity and quality of consumed goods, and between increased consumption rates that endure or those that are momentary. For example, anxiety-driven consumption rarely encourages enduringly high rates, nor will there be a strong focus on high quality foodstuffs. Instead, the ethnographic literature on feasting (Hayden and Gargett 1990; Dietler 2001; Spielmann 2002; Hayden 2003; Michael 2003) shows how social cohesion is often achieved by the staging of temporary events of increased consumption, and such events do not typically involve consumption of rare, exotic, or high quality foodstuffs. Rather, basic foodstuffs are consumed in larger quantities than usual, whereby social aspects (the cost and effort spent on preparation, or who shares how much) are far more important. The quality factor, furthermore, relates to variety and innovation as shaped by the newness, strangeness, or uniqueness of resources, objects, technologies, or knowledge. Variety will be highly valued by those *disembedded individualists* who prioritize openness-to-change values, while it will be least valued by those *exclusive collectivists* who prioritize conservation values. For the former, new things will commonly be highly valued for the pleasure they will bring to the individual or for the ways this enhances self-development projects. For the latter, by contrast, new things will more readily be considered disruptive to group cohesion (Garzon 2000, 50). While this dimension harbors the strongest antagonism, the continuum also allows for more transitory orientations to be recognized. For *embedded individualists* who prioritize self-enhancement values, new things are potentially useful for their diacritical pursuits. For *inclusive collectivists*, on the other hand, new consumables may become

attractive for their potential to benefit the larger society (e.g. feeding a large population efficiently and enduringly with new and highly productive crops) or the environment (e.g. promotion of sustainability). There are clear ways forward, then, for prehistorians, Romanists, and other archaeologists who are interested in clarifying the motivations behind identitarian and consumptive behaviors, and countless other phenomena that are accessible to archaeological inquiry.

Appendix I: Tables

<i>Morgan 1877</i>	<i>Service 1971</i>	<i>Murdock and Provost 1973</i>	<i>Clark and Parry 1990</i>	<i>Ames 2007</i>	<i>description</i>
savagery	band	low complexity	simple	band	interpersonal and social differentiation, stable membership based on kinship, hunter-gatherers
				clan*	egalitarian, fluid membership, based on kinship, partnership, and friendship, hunter-gatherers
barbarism	tribe	lower middle complexity	middle-range	tribe	egalitarian, membership fixed, based on cultural ties (e.g. language and religion), hunter-gatherers and farmers
	chiefdom			transegalitarian	neither egalitarian nor ranked, achieved leadership positions based on generosity and ability to attract followers, possibly unequal access to prestige, numbers of prestige positions fluid, leadership has social power
				chiefdom	ranked, ascribed leadership positions, decision-making centralized with a two-tier decision-making hierarchy, leadership lacks coercive power, chiefs have social power
civilization	state	high complexity	complex	state	stratified, with minimally a three-tier decision-making hierarchy, states usually have a territorial base, leadership has both tactical and strategic power - (1) civilization (2) social hierarchies with professional specialization (3) permanent ranking

\* The definition provided here for clans is used for bands by Ames, who does not list clans (Ames 2007, 490). The presumption I am going by is that, for most anthropologists, bands, not clans, are considered the smallest social unit.

Table 1: Levels of socio-cultural complexity (adapted from Ames 2007)

<i>High population</i>	Staged thresholds, interpersonal contact, centralized coordination and decision-making, conflict resolution, cause or consequence of socioeconomic change, collapse survival
<i>Specialization and interaction</i>	Exchange coordination, labor and resource control, regional competition and ranking
<i>Feasting</i>	Aggrandizers, competition for resources and followers
<i>Surplus</i>	Necessary precondition, environmental potential, debt, labor and resource control, political economy
<i>Scalar stress</i>	Human cognitive limits to information processing, efficiency limits of decision-making groups
<i>Sedentism</i>	Necessary precondition, population growth, land ownership, food storage, territorial control and defense, permanent leadership
<i>Storage</i>	Surplus for aggrandizers, land ownership, population growth
<i>Mobility and settlement pattern</i>	Logistical complexity, obligatory winter storage, and varies ways of accumulating resources long-term
<i>Environmental heterogeneity</i>	Defense of high quality environments, social cooperation due to resource fluctuation, specialization and interaction, labor and resource control
<i>Aquatic/maritime economies</i>	High productivity, large population, sedentary, exploitation and transportation technology, mobility, permanent inequality
<i>Subsistence intensification</i>	Population growth, scalar stress, surplus, permanent inequality,
<i>Corporate households</i>	Variable size and complexity
<i>Competition and warfare</i>	Competition, inter- and intra-societal strive, innate violence, resource control, stratification through conquest
<i>Property</i>	Conflict and disputes, permanent inequality,

Table 2: Variables commonly foregrounded for explaining inequality and complexity (adapted from Ames 2007, 493)

<i>Simple Societies</i>	<i>Complex Societies</i>
Local post-marital residence	Neolocal post-marital residence
Higher importance of kinship	Lesser importance of kinship
Less basic color terms	More basic color terms
Less external warfare	More external warfare
Lower suicide and theft rates	Higher suicide and theft rates
Less strict parenting behavior	Stricter parenting behavior
Less puritanical about sexual behavior	More puritanical about sexual behavior
Belief in spirits or gods	Belief in a High God
Less formal religious practices	More formal religious practices
Games of physical skill	Games of chance and strategy
Smaller lexicons	Larger lexicons
Knowledge, skills and practices found throughout society	Knowledge, skills and practices found in distinct social domains

*Table 3: Common distinctions made for more and less complex societies (adapted from Chick 1997)*

<i>Inequality</i>	socially perceived dissimilarity
<i>Differentiation</i>	growth in the number of social categories and increased reification of socially perceived dissimilarity between them
<i>Specialization</i>	differentiation relating to proficiency in knowledge and practice
<i>Dominance</i>	the manifestation of social inequality through imposing behavior; influence over behaviors and perceptions is imposed through manipulation and agonistic behavior; high or low moral worth
<i>Prestige</i>	influence over perceptions and behaviors manifests itself organically or is consciously granted out of reverence; high moral worth
<i>Authority</i>	ability to influence perceptions and behaviors, mainly due to prestige, especially when coercive power is lacking
<i>Status</i>	influence based on dominance or prestige; like prestige, moral worth
<i>Role</i>	if status is a vertical category, role is a horizontal one; in other words, different but equal

*Table 4: Common 'dissimilarity' concepts from the literature (table by author)*

	<i>egalitarian society</i>	<i>authoritarian society</i>
	differentiation is negatively valued	stratification is positively valued
	cooperation is between equal partners	cooperation is between unequal partners
	leadership is potentially threatening and questioned	leadership provides comfort and is accepted
<i>repetition</i>	repetition of (simple) like elements	integration of (complex) unlike elements
<i>space</i>	much irrelevant (empty) space	little irrelevant (empty) space
<i>symmetry</i>	symmetrical design	asymmetrical design
<i>enclosure</i>	unenclosed figures	enclosed figures

*Table 5: Hypothetical universal linkages between social complexity and 'style' (adapted from Fischer 1961, 81)*

	<i>period I (1000-750 BC)</i>	<i>period II (750- 600 BC)</i>	<i>period III (600-450 BC)</i>
<i>social divisions</i>	village-based clans, clan groups, tribes	labor class, landowning classes	labor class, landowning classes, restructured tribal divisions
<i>political power</i>	tribal gathering, council of clan elders, king	(closed) aristocratic council, magistrates, 'king'	(open) tribal councils, magistrates, popular courts
<i>socioeconomic aspects</i>	little alienation from means of production	extensive alienation from means of production (poverty, debt, concentration of landed wealth)	cancelation of debts, redistribution of land, democratization of political system
<i>degree of stratification</i>	X	XXX	XX
<i>complexity</i>	X	XXX	XX
<i>unused space</i>	XXX	X	XX
<i>enclosed figures</i>	XX	XXX	X

Table 6: Linkages between social complexity and 'style' in ancient Greece (adapted from Dressler and Robbins 1975)

		<i>Neolithic Northwest</i>	<i>Bronze Age East Coast</i>
<i>pottery</i>	<i>form</i>	jars, amphorae, bowls and basins	pots, bowls, jugs, cups, special shapes; elevated forms with ring feet or legs
	<i>profile</i>	rounded	angular, segmented, carinated profiles, perky, bird-like
	<i>paint</i>	some forms are painted	mostly unpainted
	<i>construction</i>	'holistic' shaping and coiling	'prescriptive' componential construction
	<i>function</i>	general purpose	specialized
<i>other</i>	<i>symbolic emphasis</i>	grounded, earthbound, 'seated-ness'	lightness, upward-reaching, 'elevated-ness'
	<i>house construction</i>	semi-subterranean dwellings	pile dwellings
	<i>'ideal society' focus</i>	sameness and equality	difference and distinction
	<i>proficiency ideal</i>	competence in wide range of skills*	mastery of limited range of skills
	<i>tolerance</i>	higher tolerance for production 'mistakes'	stricter right/wrong distinctions
	<i>human-world relation</i>	depict and imitate the world	control and change the world
	<i>burial customs</i>	grave goods around legs and feet; lower male-to-female ratio; more care for children before adulthood	grave goods around the body, or near hands and waist; higher male-to-female ratio; less care for children before adulthood (i.e. greater attention for 'social engineering')

\* This seems to resemble an idea popularized by Lévi-Strauss who characterized 'primitive thought' in terms of an ever-experimenting non-specialist bricoleur (Lévi-Strauss 1966).

Table 7: Linkages between social complexity, technology, and mentality in ancient China (adapted from Keightly 1987)

	<i>Early Farmer</i>	<i>Pastoral Warrior</i>	<i>EBA Chiefdom</i>
<i>period</i>	4000-2600 BC	2600-1800 BC	1800-1000 BC
<i>culture</i>	Funnel Beaker	Single Grave and Dagger Period	Nordic Bronze Age
<i>monumentality</i>	large communal megalithic burial mounds and ceremonial causewayed enclosures	small and low burial mounds covering single graves	small and low burial mounds covering single graves
<i>objects</i>	polished flint axes, amber necklaces, elaborately decorated Funnel Beaker ceramics	stone battle axes, flint daggers and arrow heads (men), amber necklaces (women), elaborately decorated Bell Beaker ceramics	bronze swords and daggers (men), bronze brooches (women), raw amber, minimally decorated ceramics, flint scrapers and sickles
<i>themes</i>	agriculture and fertility	male martiality and female beauty	male martiality and female beauty
<i>burial ritual</i>	mixed human skeletal remains	individually interred men and women; secondary interment and grave clustering	individually interred men and women; subsequent grave restoration and elaboration
<i>economy</i>	low density farmers and herders	low-density herding and cereal-grain farming in open field systems	low-density herding and cereal-grain farming
<i>settlement</i>		small hamlets or single farms on hilltops	
<i>dwelling</i>		small single generation post-built pithouses	larger post-built three-aisled houses; greater diversity in house size
<i>environment</i>	forested landscape	open grasslands	open grasslands
<i>social ideals</i>	de-emphasis of individuality and importance of agricultural collective; communal land use; collective cohesion through shared community-centered ritual ceremony	emphasis on individuality and family line; male pastoral warrior; family ownership of land; status rivalry through family-centered feasting	emphasis on individuality and family line; regional warrior chiefs; political centralization through claims to ancestry and control of extra-local resources

Table 8: Prehistoric developments in Denmark (adapted from DeMarrais et al. 1996; Earle 2004)

<i>Late Bronze Age</i>	<i>Early Iron Age</i>
Trading in non-local copper, tin, and bronze encouraged the formation of hierarchical structures in Bronze Age communities	Manufacture and trading in local iron encouraged the rise of local leaders in Iron Age communities
Elites have a socially integrative power derived from communal consent	Aspiring individuals compete for relative status and power rather than broad communal acceptance
Few elites control distribution of raw resources and prestigious objects; Few elites control consumption during public ceremonial and mortuary events	More elites accumulate resources and wealth
Objects having important roles in the reproduction of local leaders as representatives of the community	Accumulation and ownership of special objects important in the reproduction of individuals
Social roles of individuals is more important than the individuals themselves	Local leaders are autonomous individuals
Centrality of long-distance exchange of bronze extended the cultural focus outward	Collapse of the bronze trade redirected the cultural focus inwards
Importance of scarcity, exoticism, and symbolism	Importance of utilitarian function, aesthetics, and social prestige

Table 9: Contrasting values systems in prehistoric Central Europe (adapted from Pydyn 1998)

	<i>'Old English' Period I (1620-1660)</i>	<i>'Anglo-American' Period II (1660-1760)</i>	<i>'Georgian' Period III (1760-1835)</i>
<i>historical conditions</i>	colonial settlement by English immigrants	development of colonial culture; post-Puritan Revolution, reduction of immigration, depressed economic conditions, shortage, isolation	reorientation towards England ('re-Anglicization') and Europe; influence of Renaissance; revolutionary period; secularization
<i>identities</i>	Simple self-sufficient husbandmen and yeomen of English (mediaeval) descent	socio-economically diversified Anglo-American population; peasant society in which farmers produce for themselves and town markets; minority of cosmopolitan city-dwellers with high interest in style, fashion and consumption	
<i>mentality</i>	medieval world view, organic, spatially varied and enduring, corporate	strongly conservative, resistance to change, locally oriented political units, persistence of medieval cognitive map	Renaissance-derived worldview, mechanical, "a progressive and innovative structure, homogeneity in material culture, the individual, and an insistence on order and balance", individualized
<i>architecture</i>	non-uniformity in house-building, asymmetrical floorplans, corporate use of space	regional diversification in house-building; no spatial specialization	"rigidly symmetrical and bilateral house plans"; "spatial specialization and the isolation of family members within the house"; privacy and individuality
<i>ceramics</i>	minor role for ceramics, primarily in dairying	radical increase in use of ceramics; diversification in form; imported fine wares mostly for decorative display (storing symbolic and material wealth) purposes, not new foodways; use differences between England and the colonies; multicolored ceramics not radically artificial	increased individualization shown in predominance of plates, matched individual sets, and chamber pots; white-and-blue ceramics more artificial
<i>commensality</i>	"communally used wooden trenchers"	predominantly communal containers	"individual place-settings"
<i>burial</i>	Single undecorated grave stones marking families; medieval death-head; natural skulls with wings; rough finish reminds of natural stone source	regional diversity, wide range of unusual forms	"individualized graves with their own marker"; stylistic homogeneity; renaissance cherub; cultural angels; smooth finish denies association with natural origin
<i>butchering</i>	meat processing involved chopping of uneven cuts for communally consumed stews		meat processing involved sawing which allowed for greater portion control (i.e. individual equality); denial of natural origin of the food
<i>refuse disposal</i>	sheet refuse around the house; minimal attempts at concentrating deposits		refuse is placed in deep square pits, both in rural and urban contexts; imposition of order and structure

Table 10: Transforming worldviews in colonial America (adapted from Deetz 1974, 1977, and 1982)

<i>oppositional domain</i>	<i>foodways</i>	<i>burial</i>	<i>housing</i>
natural-artificial	multi-colored > white-and-blue dishes	rough multi-source > smooth single-source grave stones	brick > stone fireplace; natural > whitewashed walls; logs > squared timber; dispersed surface > concentrated pit refuse disposal
simple-complex	low > high quantity of ceramics per family		open > divided domestic space
extensive-intensive	random > matched tableware sets		one-storied > two-storied houses; hall-less > hallway houses
emotion-intellect		death's head > ethereal cherub symbolism	
non-symmetry-symmetry			haphazard > structured floorplan; efficient > symmetrical placement of fireplace
public-private	communal > individual forms; hacked > sawed meat portions		shared > personal spaces, furniture and goods
scattered-clustered		communal cemetery > family plots	

Table 11: Structural oppositions in various cultural expressions (adapted from Deetz 1977)

<i>relational identity</i>	<i>individual identity</i>
Small-scale egalitarian community	Highly individualistic society
Personal creativity is curtailed	Few limits to creative innovation
Homogeneous material culture	Heterogeneous material culture
Low quantities of material goods, few personal objects, emphasis on sameness	High quantities of material goods, many personal objects, emphasis on differences between individuals and groups
Engagement with the immediate material world will encourage emphasis on relationality	Engagement with the immediate material world will encourage emphasis on individuality
Representations are of humans but not recognizable individuals	Representations are of recognizable individuals
Bodies are perceived as part of a cosmic totality that is shaped by cyclical time	Bodies are perceived as unique with a post-mortem persistence in linear time

Table 12: Relational and individual identity (adapted from González-Ruibal 2012, 140-142)

<i>egalitarian Bertha house</i>	<i>stratified Swahili house</i>
Homogeneous community	Heterogeneous community
Simple structure	Sturdy substantial construction, built to last generations, richly adorned
Uniformity in house building emphasizes egalitarian ideal and community identity	Anxiety lead to strong focus on boundaries, internal order, and private-public and pollution-purity dualisms
Internal activity, movement and occupation structured by front-back, inside-outside, clean-dirty dualisms	Internal activity, movement and occupation structured by same dualisms
House representational of cosmos	House representational of socio-economic class
Contamination can result from disturbance of cosmological order	Contamination can result from violation of sociopolitical order
Socialization does not mainly occur through scripted performance, but more commonly through daily experience of the immediate material world	Daily life in a highly structured setting encouraged the internalization of the social order

Table 13: Houses in egalitarian (Bertha) and stratified (Swahili) societies (adapted from González-Ruibal 2012, 149-150)

<i>in terms of</i>	<i>value</i>	<i>values</i>
exchange	commercial	non-commercial
consumption	object-centered	context-dependent
selection	choice	judgment
appraisal	worth/price/form	worthiness/priceless/meaning
motivation	rational/utilitarian	moral/ethical
equivalence	commensurable	incommensurable
activity	production/making	action/doing
outcome	objective product	performative consequence
attitude	live to work	work to live
worldview	materialist	idealist
method	quantitative measurement	qualitative assessment
focus	individual	socio-cultural totality
economic theory	formalism	substantivism
policy focus	economic wealth	social welfare
organization	efficiency	legitimacy
social relations	utilitarian calculation	interpersonal trust
human rights	utilitarianism	culturalism
Kantian ethics	inclination (good)	duty (right)
Marx' labor	wage labor	reproductive labor
Main's social bond	contract	status
Weber's rationality	wert (worth)	zweck (purpose)
Tönnies' collective	gesellschaft (association)	gemeinschaft (community)
Durkheim's solidarity	organic	mechanical
Polanyi's economic activity	disembedded	embedded
Bourdieu's capital	economic capital	symbolic capital
Gregory's object	alienable	inalienable
Appadurai's things	commodity	non-commodity

Table 14: Value-Values oppositions in social scientific scholarship (table by author)

<i>Schwartz</i>	<i>Hofstede</i>	<i>Inglehart</i>	<i>Steenkamp</i>
Hierarchy vs Egalitarianism	Power Distance	Traditional vs Secular-Rational	Hierarchy vs Egalitarianism
Autonomy vs Embeddedness	Individualism vs Collectivism	Self-expression vs Survival	Autonomy vs Collectivism
Mastery vs Harmony	Masculinity vs Femininity	-	Mastery vs Nurture

Table 15: Congruence in value dimension schemes (adapted from Hofstede 1980; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Schwartz 1994 and 2006; Steenkamp 2001)

<i>domain</i>	<i>orientation</i>	<i>conflicts with</i>	<i>description</i>	<i>values</i>
Self-Transcendence	Universalism	Power Achievement Hedonism	Understanding, tolerance, appreciation, and protection of people <i>beyond</i> the in-group	Broad-minded, social justice, equality, tolerance, openness, concern, inner harmony, wisdom, world of beauty, natural balance, peace
	Benevolence		Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of the in-group	Humility, reliable, trustworthy, forgiving, responsible, honest, care for in-group members, spirituality, meaning in life, loyal, friendship, helpful
Conservation	Conformity	Hedonism Stimulation Self-direction	Self-subordination to close relations; restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses that lead to negative outcomes for self and the in-group	Politeness, obedience, self-discipline, inconspicuous, modesty, respect for elders
	Tradition		Self-subordination to abstract forms; acceptance of, respect for, and commitment to traditional customs and ideas	Respect for tradition, humble, moderate, devout, acceptance
	Security		Safety, harmony and stability of society, social relations and self	Personal and family safety, social order, reciprocity, health and cleanliness, peace, belonging
Self-Enhancement	Power	Universalism Benevolence	Control over people and resources	Dominance, control, wealth, prestige, status, authority, recognition
	Achievement		Personal success through demonstration of socially valued competence	Success, capable, ambitious, influence, intelligence, competence
	Hedonism	Benevolence Conformity Tradition	Personal pleasure through sensuous gratification	Pleasure, enjoyment
Openness to Change	Stimulation	Security Conformity Tradition	Personal pursuit of excitement, novelty, and challenge	Excitement, novelty, challenge, risk, variety, daring
	Self-direction		Personal autonomy in thought and action	Creativity, curiosity, autonomy, self-respect, mastery, assertiveness, freedom

*Table 16: Classification of basic human values (adapted from Schwartz 1994 and 2012; Schwartz et al. 2012)*

<i>orientation</i>	<i>orientation</i>	<i>shared motivational goals</i>
power	achievement	social superiority and social esteem
achievement	hedonism	self-centered satisfaction
hedonism	stimulation	desire for pleasant affective arousal
stimulation	self-direction	desire for novelty and mastery
self-direction	Universalism	self-regulation and comfort with diversity
Universalism	benevolence	self-transcendence and care for others
benevolence	conformity	normative behavior to promote social relations
benevolence	tradition	devotion to in-group
conformity	tradition	subordination of self to social expectations
tradition	security	preservation of existing social order to ensure certainty of life
conformity	security	protection of order and harmony in social relations
security	power	control over resources and people to avoid or overcome threats

Table 17: Motivational congruence of proximate value orientations (adapted from Schwartz 1994)

source study	data class					analytical focus						value	value orientation	value domain	value dimension	
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	6					
Joshel 1992	X	X										X	X	X		
Laurence and Trifilò 2015	X											X	X	X		X
Fischer 1961				X				X					X			X
Robbins 1966			X					X					X			X
Dressler and Robbins 1975				X				X					X			X
Keightley 1987				X				X	X				X			X
Wells 2012				X			X	X	X				X			X
DeMarrais et al. 1996 Earle 1997 and 2004			X	X				X					X	X		X
De Hingh 2000			X	X				X	X				X		X	X
Pydyn 1998		X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Glassie 1975	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Deetz 1977	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
González-Ruibal 2012			X				X									X


Table 18: Values in archaeological literature vis-à-vis the values continuum (table by author)

#### Data Class

- 1) Literary: terms, concepts, themes, and formulations expressed through literature, epigraphy, inscriptions, *etcetera*
- 2) Representational: concepts, themes, and formulations expressed through iconographic imagery, symbolic signs, *etcetera*
- 3) Structural: non-moveable remains of physical features like buildings, tombs, boundary markers (walls, ditches, and palisades), pits and mounds (ritual or mundane depositions), *etcetera*
- 4) Practical: moveable objects such as pottery, dress items (clothing and ornaments), tools, weapons, and other mobilia, as well as consumable goods like food and raw materials (plant, animal, and mineral), *etcetera*
- 5) Contextual: contextual information like spatio-temporal location, orientation, association, environmental data, *etcetera*

*Analytical Focus*

- 1) Formal: shape and dimensions
- 2) Stylistic: coarseness, color, embellishment (carving, painting), patterning (symmetry, repetition), stylistic complexity, *etcetera*
- 3) Technological: material attributes (roughness, hardness, or elasticity), manufacturing techniques, operational complexity, specialization, *etcetera*
- 4) Practice: practical usage of materials, objects, structures, and spaces
- 5) Expressive: explicit or implicit expressions of literal or symbolic meaning
- 6) Quantitative: spatio-temporal and proportional distributions, diversification, intensification, *etcetera*



<i>concepts</i>	<i>Gemeinschaft, mechanical, community, folk/rural, simple, traditional, underdeveloped, local, parochial, closed, tight</i>	<i>Gesellschaft, organic, society, urban, complex, modern, developed, global, universal, open, loose</i>
<i>socio-demographics</i>	Small-scale social collective	Large-scale social collective
	Large extended family households	Small nuclear family households
	Early marriage, elder-care	Delayed marriage, child-investment
	Low division of labor	High division of labor
	Low technological development	High technological development
	Informal authoritarian education and skill development	Formal authoritative education and skill development
	Homogenous embeddedness with familiar people	Heterogeneous connectedness with unfamiliar people
	Obligatory, strong, and enduring social relations	Voluntary, weak, and fleeting social relations
	Localized and inwardly self-contained	Globalized and outwardly connected
	Subsistence strategies	Commercial strategies
	Lower levels of material wealth	Higher levels of material wealth
	Embedded barter exchange systems	Disembedded market exchange systems
	Accumulation of non-inheritable agricultural surplus	Accumulation of inheritable material wealth
	Decentralized, egalitarian, collectivist	Centralized, stratified, individualist
Transcendence, emphasis on endurance	Transience, emphasis on rapid change	
<i>values</i>	Responsibilities towards and continuation of the collective	Rights and self-realization of the individual
	Social capital gains tied to ideals of social conformity	Social capital gains tied to ideals of social distinction
	Interdependence, responsibility, and obedience	Independence, achievement, and self-regulation
	Socially ascribed status	Individually achieved status
	Differentiation by role	Stratification by rank
	Homogeneity in outlooks, values, behaviors, and identities	Heterogeneity in outlooks, values, behaviors, and identities
	Uniformity in consumption despite wealth differentials	Variety in consumption expressing wealth differentials
Satisfaction of material needs	Satisfaction of psychological needs	

*Table 19: Ecological adaptation and the formation of value orientations (adapted from Greenfield 2009)*

<i>village-based extended family (gemeinschaft)</i>	<i>city-based nuclear family (gesellschaft)</i>
collectivist values	individualist values
extended family arrangement	nuclear family arrangement
cohesion and interdependence	self-realization and independence
child-rearing distributed among family members	child-rearing distributed between parents and educators
socialization primarily with kin	socialization primarily with nuclear family and non-kin community members
less parent-child interactions	more parent-child interactions
less maternal schooling	more maternal schooling
less object stimulation	more object stimulation
authoritarian power dynamics	authoritative power dynamics
later self-recognition	earlier self-recognition
less self-regulation	more self-regulation
abstract thinking less developed	abstract thinking more developed
independent learning less developed	independent learning more developed
handling decontextualized phenomena less developed	handling decontextualized phenomena more developed
individual development valued for group benefits	individual development valued for self-realization and self-esteem

*Table 20: Adaptive formation of value orientations in two ideal-type families (adapted from Greenfield 2009)*

<i>collectivist orientation</i>	<i>individualist orientation</i>
more negative	more positive
respect for others	feeling superior
lower self-esteem	higher self-esteem
other-focused	self-focused
approval of others	self-approval
desire for continuity	openness to change
unskilled at entering new groups	skilled at entering new groups
intimate long-term relationships	non-intimate short-term relationships
silence is golden	silence is embarrassing
moral codes are contextual	moral codes are absolute
behavior hurts or benefits the group	behavior hurts or benefits the individual
sincerity and authenticity is situational	valuation of sincerity and authenticity is person-bound

*Table 21: Aspects of collectivist and individualist orientations (adapted from Triandis and Sub 2002)*

domain	ideal	Power, Achievement and Hedonism		Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction		Universalism and Benevolence		Benevolence, Conformity and Tradition		Security, Conformity and Tradition		conflicts with
		Universalism	Benevolence	Conformity-Tradition	Security	Power	Achievement	Hedonism	Stimulation	Self-Direction	primary orientation	
disembedded individualism	<b>Disembedded Individualism:</b> The autonomous individual pursues novelty, variety, assertiveness and self-growth											
	<b>Individualism:</b> The autonomous individual pursues gratification of affective wants and needs											
embedded individualism	<b>Diacritical Individualism:</b> The autonomous individual strives for personal success and social recognition											
embedded individualism	<b>Diacritical Familism:</b> The family strives to differentiate itself within the community, and acts to gain social preeminence											
	<b>Familism:</b> The family values self-reliance, long-term stability, and safety											
exclusive collectivism	<b>Conformist Familism:</b> The family strives to subordinate its interests to the community by conforming to social norms, rules and traditions											
exclusive collectivism	<b>Conformist Communalism:</b> The community values security, self-reliance, long-term stability, and integrity. Suspicious of outsiders and outside influence, membership is exclusive											
	<b>Communalism:</b> Individual and family interest are subordinated to those of the community											
inclusive collectivism	<b>Benevolent Communalism:</b> Universal responsibility and care are emphasized. The community is open to outsiders and outside influence, membership is inclusive											
inclusive collectivism	<b>Benevolent Universalism:</b> engagement in heterogeneous society-level contexts is motivated by self-denial, responsibility and care for non-kin people											
	<b>Universalism:</b> recognition of individual equality, unity and harmony with non-kin people											
disembedded individualism	<b>Disembedded Universalism:</b> engagement in heterogeneous society-level contexts is motivated by a desire for self-direction, self-growth and unique experiences											

Table 22: Adaptive shifts from four ideal value orientations (table by author)

	<i>Middle Bronze Age 1800-1100 BC</i>	<i>Late Bronze Age 1100-800 BC</i>	<i>Early Iron Age 800-500 BC</i>	<i>Middle Iron Age 500-250 BC</i>	<i>Late Iron Age 250-0 BC</i>
<i>agriculture</i>	Intensification (permanent instead of shifting fields, manuring, plowing, no or short fallow, move to "garden" agriculture)	Intensification (well-defined 'Celtic fields', variable land use through infield-outfield approach, no fallow), diversification (greater variety of cultigens), specialization (labor division)	Continuation of intensified, diversified and specialized agricultural regimes	Continuation of intensified, diversified and specialized agricultural regimes	Continuation of intensified, diversified and specialized agricultural regimes
<i>cultigens</i>	Expansion of cereal-based crop range (six-row barley, millet, emmer wheat and spelt wheat) to include new cereal and non-cereal cultigens (bread wheat, einkorn wheat, pea, horse bean, lentil, rye, and barley).	Further expansion of range of cultigens (flax and gold-of-pleasure)	Sustained range of cultigens	Sustained range of cultigens	Sustained range of cultigens
<i>burial</i>	Large single burial mounds (isolated or in clusters) near contemporaneous settlements used by individual family units	Collective long-term 'urnfield' cemeteries with clusters of low individual burial mounds	Collective long-term 'urnfield' cemeteries with clusters of low individual burial mounds. More signs for monumentality	Decline of collective long-term 'urnfield' cemeteries; small cemeteries frequently nearby settlements	Family graves in settlement (even domestic) space increasingly common
<i>dwelling</i>	Three-isled and two-isled byre-houses; long avg. house length (extended families?)	Three-isled and single-isled byre-houses; shorter avg. house length (nuclear families?)	Three-isled byre-houses; shorter avg. house length (nuclear families?)	Two-isled byre-houses; stable avg. house length (nuclear families?)	Two-isled byre-houses; shorter avg. house length (nuclear families?)
<i>permanence</i>	Shifting single-generation farmsteads	Shifting single-generation farmsteads	Shifting single-generation farmsteads	Fixed multi-generational farmsteads; renovations more common	Fixed multi-generational farmsteads; renovations still common, sturdier construction
<i>nucleation</i>	Isolated and dispersed farmsteads	Isolated and dispersed farmsteads	Isolated and dispersed farmsteads	Isolated and dispersed farmsteads are more often enclosed (in the south)	Isolated and dispersed farmsteads; occasionally nucleation of several contemporary farmsteads, with enclosures

*Table 23: Summarized overview of prehistoric developments (adapted from de Hingh 2000; Geritsen 2003; Mathios 2011)*

	<i>Scheldt-Meuse</i>	<i>Aisne-Marne</i>	<i>Rhine-Moselle</i>
Location	Urnfield cemeteries containing cremation burials and some inhumation burials. Inhumation burials are usually located in the periphery.	Cemeteries with inhumations are the norm, with some cremation burials.	Cremation is the dominant disposal practice placed in cemeteries.
Burial rite	Bodies are cremated on pyres. Cremated remains are separated from pyre debris, collected in urns and placed in shallow pits. Sometimes no urns are used. Some inhumation burials occur as well. Some secondary interments.	Cremation is largely abandoned during HA D.	Cremation remains are usually collected in an urn which is placed in a pit among the pyre debris. Secondary interments are not common and; never more than three per mound.
Structure	Low mound surrounded by open or closed circular ditch. Long-bed mound surrounded by open or closed ditch. Flat graves are rare. Inhumations are never surrounded by ditches. Ditch openings may or may not show post markings.	Most are found as flat graves, though use of mounds is still likely. Some 'elite' burials occur that have large mounds overtop of the burials. Mounds have circular or rectilinear ditches.	Monumental mounds surrounded by a circular ditch are common. Long-bed mounds surrounded by open or closed ditches. Stone chambers positioned centrally within the mound. Stone or post-built structures around or on top of mounds.
Vessels	Hand shaped pottery.	Hand shaped pottery. Thin-walled (angular profile) pots, bowls, beakers and jars.	For inhumations, predominantly large vessels are placed at the foot of bodies. Bronze wares (mostly <i>situlae</i> ).
Animals		Pig, boar and cattle.	Likely but not preserved.
Adornment	Bronze neck and earrings, bronze hair ring, bronze or iron ring, bronze pin, iron, amber and tin beads, iron belt hook.	Brooches, pins, belt hooks. Amber and coral beads.	Hair, ear, neck, belt and finger rings. Metal bracelets. Beaded necklaces with glass or amber beads.
Body care		Iron razors	Iron razors
Fighting and Hunting	Only a few burials contain swords/daggers. Iron arrows.	Only a few burials contain short swords and daggers.	Arrows, spears, lances, shields.
Riding	Only a few burials contain horse gear and wagons.	Two burials contain a wagon.	Elite burials contain wagons and chariots.
Other	Iron knife, ceramic whorl.	Iron knife.	Iron knife.


Table 24: Summarized overview of mortuary trends during the Early Iron Age (600-500 BC, HA D) (adapted from Roymans 1990; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001; Arnoldussen and Jansen 2010)

	<i>Scheldt-Meuse</i>	<i>Aisne-Marne</i>	<i>Rhine-Moselle</i>
Location	Urnfield cemeteries containing cremation burials are smaller. Inhumation burials occur and these are usually located in the periphery. Isolated burials occur as well.	Decline of urnfields; use of small cemeteries	Smaller cemeteries are often elongated and positioned along communication routes.
Burial rite	Bodies are cremated on pyres. Cremated remains are gathered in urns and placed in shallow pits. Occasionally, cremation remains are not separated from pyre debris. Urns are less commonly used.	Inhumation is the dominant burial rite, though cremation burials are still found among inhumations. Entire cemeteries may even contain only cremation burials. Secondary interments (2-4) are common.	Cremation and inhumation occur together. Inhumation is more common during LT A. From LT B cremation is dominant again. Cremation remains are usually collected in an urn which is placed in a pit among the pyre debris. Secondary burials increase in frequency.
Structure	Flat graves are dominant. When mounds are built, they are small. Burials are surrounded by ditches of various shape and size, but never inhumations. Rectilinear ditches occur for the first time. Similar shaped ditches tend to cluster.	Circular ditches are dominant, but key-shaped forms occur also. Square and rectangular structures are more common. Timber linings or cover stones are rarely found.	Mounds become smaller. Post-built and stone structures are lacking. Inhumations are placed in tree trunks, or wooden or stone coffins. Wealthy burials include wooden burial chambers.
Vessels	Hand shaped pottery: bowls, beakers and jars. Affinities with Marne pottery from N France.	Thin-walled Marne style (angular profile) pots, jars, bowls, dishes and beakers. Bronze ware is present but scarce (jug, <i>situlae</i> , sieve, basin). Wheel-thrown forms appear.	Narrow-necked pots/bottles, accompanied by dishes and bowls, dominate the pottery assemblage. Cups and Aisne-Marne beakers are present as well. Usually no more than three vessels are deposited. Wealthy graves contain drinking cups. Many forms of Bronze ware.
Animals	Pig, sheep/goat, cow teeth, deer antler.	Pig, swine, sheep/goat, cattle, hare, poultry, frog.	Likely but not preserved.
Adornment	Bronze or Iron neck rings typical of Hunsrück-Eifel culture, bronze bracelets, bronze ear/nose ring, bronze hair ring, bronze pin, amber beads.	Brooches, belt hooks, bead necklaces (glass, coral, amber and bone), bracelets, neck, ear and finger rings.	Brooches, belt hooks, bracelets, finger and neck rings.
Body Care		Tweezers, double-toothed implement (?), razor, scissors.	Iron razors, tweezer, ear-scoop, or double-toothed implement (?), mirror.
Fighting and Hunting	Spear and lance from Hunsrück-Eifel culture, iron arrows.	Sword, dagger, lance, spear, arrow (with quiver), helmets, shields, breastplates.	Lance, spear, sword, dagger, arrows, helmets, shields.
Riding		Elite burials contain chariots and horse gear.	Elite burials contain wagons/chariots and horse gear.
Other	Whorl, iron knife.	Knife, hammer, chisel, roasting spit.	Iron knife.

Table 25: Summarized overview of mortuary trends during the Middle Iron Age (500-250 BC, LT A-B) (adapted from Roymans 1990; Diepeveen-Jansen 2001; Arnoldussen and Jansen 2010)

	<i>Scheldt-Meuse</i>	<i>Aisne-Marne</i>	<i>Rhine-Moselle</i>
Location	Small cemeteries or single burials next to (or within) farmsteads	Small communal cemeteries.	Small communal cemeteries.
Burial rite	Cremation is the dominant burial rite. Bodies are cremated on pyres. Cremated remains are commonly gathered and placed as piles in pits. Urns are rare.	Cremation is now the dominant burial rite. Inhumation occurs but is rare. Bodies are cremated on pyres. Cremated remains are commonly gathered in urns or placed in pits in pits. Double/multiple burials rarely occur.	Cremation is the dominant burial rite. Bodies are cremated on pyres. Cremated remains are commonly gathered in urns or sack and placed in pits. Double/multiple burials rarely occur.
Structure	Mounds are no longer built. Cremations are placed in flat graves. Apart from a few rectangular and circular ditches, bordering structures are absent. Pits lined with stone or wood are absent.	Mounds are no longer built. Cremations are placed in flat graves or under low mounds. Graves are surrounded by rectangular ditches and bordering structures. Circular ditches are rare. Four-post structures with ditch enclosures are rare.	Large and elaborated mounds are absent. Cremations are placed in flat graves or under low mounds. Some pits are lined with stone or wood. Some burials are placed in linear earthen banks. Apart from a few rectangular ditches, bordering structures are absent.
Vessels	Hand shaped and wheel-thrown pottery, bronze ware (cauldron, fender, hook), iron ladle.	Amphorae, Campanian pottery, bronze jugs, pans, and sieves, Gallo-Roman wares, Roman coins.	Hand shaped and wheel-thrown pottery, amphorae, bronze pans, jugs, sieves.
Animals		Pig, sheep/goat, bird, pigeon, goose, hen, hare, dog, horse.	Pig, sheep/goat, birds, bear skin, grouse wings.
Adornment	Brooches, bronze and glass bracelets, iron belt hook, bronze chain belt.	Neck rings, bronze and iron brooches, metal bracelets, pendants, and belt rings. Glass beads.	Bronze or iron brooches, belt hooks, pendants, metal and glass finger rings and bracelets, glass beads.
Body care		Scissors, razors, tweezers.	
Fighting and Hunting	Swords, shields, lances spears.	Swords, helmet.	Swords and scabbards, shields, lance, spear.
Riding	Chariots, horse gear	Chariots, horse gear	Chariots, horse gear
Other	Axes.	Iron axes, keys, and knives.	Iron axes, knives, hammers, chisels, gouges, saws, tongs, and files. Whetstone. Bronze balance. Whorl.

Table 26: Summarized overview of mortuary trends during the Late Iron Age (250-12 BC, LT C-D) (adapted from Roymans 1990; Arnoldussen and Jansen 2010)



*Table 27: Origin of auxiliary units stationed in Germania Inferior and Superior (see Appendix II; table by author)*

<i>ideal-type</i>	<b>Enterprising Farmer</b>	<b>Self-sufficient Farmer</b>	<b>Cooperative Farmer</b>
<i>orientation</i>	<b>Diacritical Familism</b> (achievement and power)	<b>Familism</b> (power and security)	<b>Conformist Familism</b> (security and conformity)
<i>habitat</i>	Large and medium-sized villa estates	Small to medium-sized 'enhanced' farmsteads	Small 'traditional' farmsteads
<i>structural aspects</i>	One large multi-room stone-built main house; substantial monumentality and luxurious amenities (e.g. painted and sculptured décor, monumental façade, heating and bathing facilities); secondary houses (for hired laborers or slaves) and structures (e.g. stables, sheds, and granaries); spatial organization is highly structured (symmetrical and hierarchical partitioning)	One small post-built main house (often enclosed); partial use of durable materials (e.g. stone foundation or cellar, ceramic or slate roof tiles); some elaboration (e.g. pronounced entrances, painted wall plaster); stronger interest for segregation of domestic life (e.g. removal of stabling section from houses); secondary structures (e.g. sheds and granaries); moderate interest for spatial organization (e.g. buildings align with boundaries)	One small post-built main house (often unenclosed); preference for traditional organic materials (e.g. wooden posts, thatch roof covering, stamped earth floors); variable interest for increased interior openness (e.g. removal of central supports) and sturdier construction (e.g. thicker central posts, post supports, squared timbers); houses with or without byre section; secondary structures (e.g. sheds and granaries); farmsteads are isolated or cluster with others; loose structural arrangements, with or without internal settlement divisions (e.g. ditches and fences)
<i>labor arrangements</i>	Heavy reliance on paid and slave labor	Combined reliance on family and paid labor; limited use of slave labor possible	Strong reliance on family labor and communal cooperation; use of slave labor unlikely
<i>productive focus</i>	Highly organized intensive cash-crop cultivation (e.g. wine or cereals). Large-scale industrial manufacture likely (e.g. pottery, textiles, foodstuffs)	Diversified agriculture, partially specialized and market-oriented (e.g. produce and poultry). Supplemental small-scale manufacture (e.g. wool, foodstuffs)	Diversified agriculture meets immediate household needs. Opportunistic <i>ad hoc</i> productive activity (e.g. fishing and hunting, produce and poultry, foodstuffs, 'piece-work' manufacture)
<i>social engagements</i>	Main emphasis on family differentiation and autonomy. Patrons of clients and masters of servant and slaves. Politically active in urban centers	Main emphasis on family autonomy and security, while engaging in social networks based on equality. Rarely politically active	Main emphasis on family security and communal cooperation. Subservient as clients and tenants and conformist to communal interests. Never politically active
<i>family dynamics</i>	The size and age distribution of enterprising families is of little significance to productivity. With adult men recognized as official heads of families who manage most public relations, and the use of slave and paid laborers, the economic role of women is negligible. Female activity is increasingly limited to expressive tasks of high symbolic significance. Leisure activity is very common and education is pursued for self-improvement and social prestige	The size and age distribution of self-sufficient families is less important for productivity when labor is increasingly outsourced. The women of these families contribute to commercial success by being active in new roles (e.g. labor and financial management). Leisure activity occurs regularly and education is mostly pursued for its economic benefits	The size and age distribution of the family household is all-important for their productivity. The economic contribution of women and children is also central to its survival, increasing interpersonal equality. Leisure activity is uncommon and irregular. Education relates to learning practical skills

Table 28: Tri-partite classification of rural households (table by author)

<i>semantic field</i>	<i>behavioral aspects</i>	<i>material aspects</i>	<i>potential meaning</i>
Transport	Wagon or ship with transport of raw materials, goods, or people	Wagon, donkey or horse, horse gear, furniture, barrels, bundles, sacks, baskets, amphorae, heaps or blocks	Wealth, occupation, mobility, activity, competence
Commerce	Commercial activity, shop or outdoor market, weighing and selling of goods	Structure, furniture, weighing and measuring tools, vessels, various goods	Occupation, activity, competence
Craft and Industry	Craft and industrial activity, managing raw materials and finished goods, working with tools and equipment	Structure, furniture, raw materials, craft tools, equipment, manufactured goods	Occupation, activity, competence
Agriculture and Pastoralism	Agricultural activity, managing soil, vines, trees and animals, working with tools and equipment	Tilling, pruning or harvesting tools, equipment, vessels, harvested goods	Occupation, activity, competence
Management	Overseeing, directing, recording, payment or collection	Scroll, tablet, writing implements, furniture, money, various goods	Status, wealth, occupation, competence, success, activity, passivity
Dining	Individual meal, family dinner, dinner party, or funerary meal	Structure, furniture, preparation, serving, eating and drinking vessels, various foods	Status, wealth, domesticity, family life, leisure, success, relationality
Gaming	Board gaming	Furniture, game board, game pieces	Leisure, masculinity, relationality
Hunting and Riding	Hunting, horse riding and chariot racing	Horse, horse gear, chariot, weapons, dog, game	Status, wealth, leisure, masculinity, competence, activity
Education	Male child schooled by adult, single person reading, writing, or counting	Structure, furniture, scroll, tablet, board, writing implements, staff	Status, wealth, leisure, competence
Grooming	Seated women tended to by hairdressing servants	Furniture, grooming implements, (jewelry?) box, small vessels	Status, wealth, leisure, femininity, domesticity, beauty, passivity

*Table 29: Semantic fields from 'daily life' scenes on tombstones (adapted from Chmielewski 2002)*

	<i>Embedded Individualism</i>		<i>Exclusive Collectivism</i>	
	<i>Achievement</i>	<i>Power</i>	<i>Security</i>	<i>Conformity-Tradition</i>
<i>Competence</i>	x	x	x	
<i>Education</i>	x	x	x	
<i>Activity</i>	x	x	x	
<i>Occupation</i>	x	x	x	
<i>Beauty</i>	x	x		
<i>Female Passivity</i>	x	x		
<i>Leisure</i>	x	x		
<i>Status</i>	x	x		
<i>Success</i>	x	x		
<i>Wealth</i>	x	x		
<i>Familism</i>		x	x	x
<i>Relationality</i>		x	x	x
<i>Masculinity</i>		x	x	
<i>Mobility</i>		x	x	
<i>Perpetuity</i>			x	
<i>Domesticity</i>				x
<i>Femininity</i>				x

*Table 30: Non-exhaustive list of meaning foci in relation to value orientations (table by author)*

	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>
orientation	<b>Diacritical Familism</b> (achievement and power)	<b>Familism</b> (power and security)	<b>Conformist Familism</b> (security and conformity)
preoccupation	Status and wealth, leisure and passivity	Autonomy and security, management and ownership	Hard work and competence
structural	Opulent large to medium-sized monuments (tower tombs and pillars)	Small to medium-sized monuments (tombstones and large mounds)	Small and simple monuments (low mounds)
placement	Wealthy property-transmitting families use highly conspicuous funerary monuments on or near the family's villa estate	Use of public cemeteries with interest for burial differentiation (e.g. monumentality or spatial segregation); property-based burials becomes enticing for autonomy-oriented families	Low or non-existent inheritance prospects and stronger communalist priorities encourage use of communal cemeteries where differentiation is minimal
deposition	High quantity and quality of grave goods (high appreciation for rare or exotic materials and unique craft objects); emblematic objects communicate wealth and status	Substantial quantity and quality of grave goods; emblematic objects communicate economic activity, personal skills, and social role	Low quantity and quality of grave goods; emblematic objects communicate economic activity, personal skills, and social role
education	Education is pursued for self-improvement and social prestige (i.e. oratory and poetic skills signify cultivation)	Education is mostly pursued for self-improvement and economic benefits (i.e. literacy and numeracy increase personal freedom and commercial success)	Education relates to learning basic practical skills

*Table 31: Tri-partite classification of mortuary data (table by author)*

# Appendix II: Chronology

## Iron Age Events and Developments

Lowlands	France/Germany	Mediterranean	West-Central Europe	Study Area	Period
0 bc					
100	Late La Tene	Roman civil wars during the Triumvirate decades 58-50 Gallic Wars	Augustan pacification of circum-Alpine region 58-50 Gallic Wars	Roman fortifications built in South 58-50 Gallic Wars	Roman Period
100	La Tene D	113-101 Cimbrian Wars 121 Roman annexation of Gallia Transalpina 146 Destruction of Carthage; Rome dominates the Western Mediterranean	Institutionalized social differentiation Trans-Alpine 'Viereckschanzen' (rectangular enclosures) and sanctuaries occur from Lower Seine to Bohemia	Construction of hilltop refuges peaks Abandonment of farmsteads in SW zone Southern cemeteries contain primarily cremation burials with pottery, ornaments and weapons; wealthy graves contain bronze or silver vessels and amphorae	
200	Middle La Tene	Roman conquest N Italy Proliferation of martial ideology, formation of tribal confederations and social differentiation in S Gaul	Defended village-like high-land settlements (oppida) occur across Europe Dispersed unenclosed nucleated low-land settlements in West-Central Europe	In SE zone, aggregation of farmhouses peaks; noticeable differentiation between settlements; use of demarcations/fortifications	Hellenistic Period
200	La Tene C	Rome achieves hegemony over Etruscan cities 279 Gallic groups sack Delphi sanctuary 281 Roman conflict with Taranto and subsequent Pyrrhic War	Interment in single burials or corporate monuments with far fewer grave goods	Earliest N Gallic coins modeled after Macedonian (Philip II) and Greek (Massalia and Taranto) emissions First enclosed farmsteads in the South	
300	La Tene B	Roman expansion in Italy Gallic mercenaries serve Hellenistic rulers Gallic groups settle in Gallia Cisalpina			
400	Early La Tene	387 Gallic Senones sack Rome Massalia established colonies Etruscan trade shifts towards East Alpine routes	'Warrior burials' (inhumations with ornaments and weaponry) widespread across Trans-Alpine	Cemeteries are small-scale, lack monumentality, placed near farmsteads In SE zone, farmhouses are more often multi-phased, suggesting increased locational stability Southern influences (inhumation, weapons and other objects) in northern burials Etruscan bronze wares and chariots in southern warrior graves Lowest level of aquatic deposition of metalwork	Classical Period
400	La Tene A		Social differentiation increases; child burials are rare but wealthy; informal burials increase Rise of La Tene art influenced by Etruscan motifs Drop in Greek imports; decline of W Hallstatt hillforts, four-wheeled wagons disappear Decline of urnfields		
500	Hallstatt D	Etruscan colonisation of the Po valley; foundation of N Adriatic emporia Decline of Etruscan control over western trade routes and Tyrrhenian ports Etruscan League: confederacy of Etruscan cities 600 Phocaean colony of Massalia founded in southern France, followed by others Etruscan trade with Gallic communities in France	Rise of 'princely' hillforts associated with prominent wagon burials and Greco-Etruscan imports Greek riverine trade with W Hallstatt centers Etruscan cross-Alpine trade with W Hallstatt centers	Prominent wagon burials in southern graves	Archaic Period
600	Early Iron Age				
700	Early Hallstatt	Rise of the Etruscan cities; elaborate funerary tradition with family tombs and sometimes chariots Greek colonies in Italy Spread of iron technology into Italic peninsula in association with Villanovan culture	Spread of iron technology in central then western Europe	Aquatic deposition of metalwork greatly declined In SE zone, increased differentiation and individualization in burials, now including weapons Rise of 'Celtic' field agriculture in SE zone, with new collective associations and increased territoriality In SE zone, single-phase farmhouses are much smaller than those of the Bronze Age, a shift from extended to nuclear families	
800	Hallstatt C				


## Roman Period Events and Developments

	Period	Dynasty	Belgic Gaul	Rhineland
BC 0 AD	Pre-Roman		<p>57-50 Caesar Campaigns in Belgica, Germania, and Britain. After this departure, N Gaul and the Rhineland remain</p> <p>39-38 Agrippa serves as governor (legatus pro praetore) of Gaul</p> <p>30-28 Morini rebel but are defeated by governor Caius Carinus Treveri rebel but are defeated by general Nonius Gallus</p> <p>27 Augustus reorganizes Gaul and conducts a first census. Gallia Belgica includes the Lower Rhineland, Moselle valley, the Vosges and parts of Switzerland</p> <p>20-19 Agrippa serves as governor again</p> <p>16-13 Augustus returns to Gaul with Tiberius and Drusus.</p> <p>12 BC Another census takes place. The imperial cult is initiated at Lyon</p>	<p>52 Caesar employs a Germanic cavalry guard (corporis custodes)</p> <p>50-40 The Batavi, part of the trans-Rhenian Chatti, occupies the Lower Rhineland</p> <p>42 Octavian and Antonius both employ a Germanic cavalry guard at Philippi</p> <p>37 Agrippa settles the Ubii on the Middle Rhine and initiates auxiliary recruitment</p> <p>36 Batavi and Ubii are probably serving as Octavian's bodyguard on Sicily</p> <p>25 Vinicius takes punitive action against Germanic groups for abuse of Roman merchants</p> <p>17-16 Marcus Lollius is defeated by Sugambri, Usipetes and 13-6 Germanic Campaigns conducted by Drusus, Tiberius and Germanicus up to the Elbe river. Cugerni are settled near Xanten. The Chauki are engaged with Frisian assistance, as well as the Usipetes, Sugambri, Chatti, Suebi, Marcomanni and Cherusci.</p> <p>2 BC Domitius Ahenobarbus campaigns in Germania and crosses the Elbe. He settles the Hermunduri in Marcomanni territory and</p>
		Early Roman	<p>4-5 AD Tiberius is governor of Gaul</p> <p>10-12 Tiberius is governor of Gaul again</p> <p>13-17 Germanicus is governor of Gaul and conducts a census</p> <p>21 A revolt amongst the Treveri, Aedui and Turones is put down</p> <p>Augustus 27 BC-14 AD</p> <p>Tiberius 14-37</p> <p>Caligula 37-41</p> <p>Claudius 41-54</p> <p>Nero 54-68</p>	<p>1 AD Vinicius campaigns in Germania</p> <p>4-5 Tiberius campaigns against the Cannanefates, Attuarii, Bructeri, Cherusci, Chauki and Langobards. The Cherusci supply</p> <p>9 Three legions commanded by Varus are defeated by the Cherusci under Arminius. Augustus disbands his Germanic guard</p> <p>10-17 Germanicus campaigns repeatedly in Germania against the allies of Arminius (Bructeri, Marsi, Angivarii, Langobardi, Chatti and Semnones). Frisii and Chauki are loyal to Rome. At least eight legions are stationed along the Rhine. Batavians may have served in the campaigns against the Cherusci as regular auxiliary units.</p> <p>28 Frisii revolt and destroy castellum Flevum, their independence secure with the cessation of hostilities across the Rhine.</p> <p>40 Caligula visits the Rhineland, campaigns against the Cananefates and the Chauki, and recruits a new horse guard</p> <p>41 Galba campaigns against the Chauki</p> <p>41-54 Claudian reforms guarantee citizenship to auxiliary veterans</p> <p>47 Frisii are subdued by Corbulo who is ordered back to the Rhine</p> <p>50 Cologne receives colony status which grants citizenship to all inhabitants</p>
			<p>69 Galba is defeated. Otho proclaims himself emperor with backing from gallic communities. Otho is defeated by Vitellius.</p> <p>82-84 Gallia Belgica and the two Germanic provinces are governed by the senatorial legatus Augusti propraetore, governor and military commander, from Reims. Financial matters are managed by the equestrian procurator Augusti</p>	<p>69 Upon Nero's death, the Germanic horse guard is disbanded by Galba. Commander of the Lower Rhineland legions, Vitellius, challenges Galba for the throne.</p> <p>69-70 Batavi revolt under Civilis, they are joined by Cananefates, Frisii, Bructeri, Tencteri, Ubii, and Treveri. Most fortifications along</p> <p>77 Punitive expeditions are undertaken against the Bructeri</p> <p>82-84 Domitian transforms the former military district of the Rhineland into the provinces Germania Inferior and Germania Superior. Domitian defeats the Chatti in Germania and annexes</p> <p>89 Antonius Saturninus, governor of Germania Superior, revolts against Domitian but is defeated</p>
Middle Roman	<p>Nerva-Antonine</p> <p>Nerva 96-98</p> <p>Trajan 98-117</p> <p>Hadrian 117-138</p> <p>Antoninus Pius 138-161</p> <p>Marcus Aurelius 161-180</p>	<p>98-100 Trajan manages infrastructural improvements in Germania Inferior. The oppidum Batavorum becomes Ulpia Noviomagus Batavorum (Nijmegen), and given market rights. The town at castra Vetera (Xanten) is renamed Colonia Ulpia Trajana, and given colonial rights. The Germanic horse guard is reinstated as equites singulares Augusti.</p> <p>104 The Lower Rhine is guarded by auxiliary forces again, as was</p> <p>121-125 Germanic raiding necessitates the return of a legion to Nijmegen. Hadrian manages infrastructural improvements in Germania Inferior. The oppidum Cananefatum becomes Municipium Aelium Cananefatum (aka Forum Hadriani).</p> <p>148-161 Forum Hadriani receives municipal rights</p> <p>150 Ulpia Noviomagus Batavorum receives municipal rights</p> <p>161-180 Under Marcus Aurelius, Trier receives a town wall.</p> <p>165-167 Chatti invade and raid Gallia Belgica.</p> <p>172-174 The Chauki commence the first of numerous subsequent raids along North Sea coast, provoking extensive infrastructural improvements in the western part of Belgica</p>	<p>98-100 Trajan manages infrastructural improvements in Germania Inferior. The oppidum Batavorum becomes Ulpia Noviomagus Batavorum (Nijmegen), and given market rights. The town at castra Vetera (Xanten) is renamed Colonia Ulpia Trajana, and given colonial rights. The Germanic horse guard is reinstated as equites singulares Augusti.</p> <p>104 The Lower Rhine is guarded by auxiliary forces again, as was</p> <p>121-125 Germanic raiding necessitates the return of a legion to Nijmegen. Hadrian manages infrastructural improvements in Germania Inferior. The oppidum Cananefatum becomes Municipium Aelium Cananefatum (aka Forum Hadriani).</p> <p>148-161 Forum Hadriani receives municipal rights</p> <p>150 Ulpia Noviomagus Batavorum receives municipal rights</p> <p>161-180 Under Marcus Aurelius, Nijmegen receives a town wall</p> <p>165-167 Eastern army units bring a plague (epidemic of Galenus) to the Rhineland. Chatti cross the frontier.</p>	

### Appendix III: Military Installations, Legions, and Auxilia



Figure 32: Fortifications built between c. AD 40 - 69 (figure by author)



*Figure 33: Fortifications built between c. AD 70 - 138 (figure by author)*



Figure 34: Fortifications built between c. AD 138 - 235 (figure by author)

<i>Roman</i>	<i>Modern</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Legion</i>	<i>Period</i>
Bonna	Bonn	GI	I Germanica	AD 35-69
			XXI Rapax	AD 70-86
			I Minervia	AD 86-359
CCAA	Cologne	GI	XIX	AD 8-9
			I Germanica	AD 9-35
			XX Valeria Victrix	AD 9-35
Fectio	Vechten	GI	XVII	17 BC-AD 7
Novaesium	Neuss	GI	V Alaudae	17 BC-AD 9
			XXI Rapax	17 BC-AD 11
			XVI Gallica	AD 43-69
			XX Valeria Victrix	AD 35-43
			VI Victrix	AD 70-102
Noviomagus	Nijmegen	GI	II Adiutrix	AD 70-71
			X Gemina	AD 70-101
			XVII	AD 7-9
			IX Hispana	AD 121
Vetera	Xanten	GI	XVI Gallica	17-11 BC
			XVIII	17 BC-AD 9
			XXI Rapax	AD 10-46
			V Alaudae	AD 9-69
			XV Primigenia	AD 46-69
			XXII Primigenia	AD 70-102
			VI Victrix	AD 102-122
			XXX Ulpia	AD 122-355
Argentoratum	Strasbourg	GS	II Augusta	AD 15-43
			VIII Augusta	AD 90-406
Mogontiacum	Mainz	GS	I Germanica	16 BC-AD 9
			II Augusta	AD 10-15
			XIV Gemina	AD 10-43
			XVI Gallica	AD 15-43
			XXII Primigenia	AD 39-43
			XV Primigenia	AD 39-46
			IV Macedonica	AD 43-69
			XXII Primigenia	AD 43-69
			I Adiutrix	AD 70-86
			XIV Gemina	AD 70-102
			XXI Rapax	AD 86-89
XXII Primigenia	AD 102-355			
Vindonissa	Windisch	GS	XIII Gemina	AD 16-45
			XXI Rapax	AD 46-69
			XI Claudia	AD 70-101

Table 32: Legionary Units stationed in Germania Inferior and Superior (adapted from Cuff 2010, 145)

<i>alae and cohortes</i>	<i>period</i>	<i>station</i>	<i>origin</i>
Ala Afrorum veterana	AD 78-158	GI	Africa
Ala Agrippiana Miniata	Augustan	G	Gaul
Ala Augusta Vocontiorum	Augustan	G, GI	Narbonensis
Ala Flavia Singularium	AD 78-90	GI	<i>Belgica</i>
Ala Gallorum et Thracum Classiana	Augustan	GI	Lugdunensis
Ala Gallorum Indiana	Tiberian	G, GS	Gaul
Ala Gallorum Picentiana	Augustan	G	Gaul
Ala Gallorum Sebosiana	Tiberian	G	Gaul
Ala Gallorum Tauriana	Tiberian	GI	Gaul
Ala I Asturum	Augustan	G	Tarraconensis
Ala I Batavorum	Claudian	G	<i>Belgica</i>
Ala I Cannanefatium	Augustan	G, GS	<i>Belgica</i>
Ala I Claudia Gallorum Capitoniana	Augustan	G	Lugdunensis
Ala I Claudia Nova miscellanea	Claudian	G	Gaul
Ala I Flavia	Flavian	G, GS	<i>Belgica</i>
Ala I Flavia Augusta Britannica	Augustan/Claudian	G	Britannia
Ala I Flavia Gemina	Flavian	G, GS	misc.
Ala I Hispanorum	Augustan	G	<i>Hispania</i>
Ala I Noricorum	Augustan	G, GI	Noricum
Ala I Parthorum et Araborum	Augustan	G	Parthica
Ala I Thracum	Tiberian	G, GI	Thracia
Ala I Tungrorum Frontoniana	Augustan	G	<i>Belgica</i>
Ala II Flavia Gemina pia fidelis	Flavian	G	misc.
Ala Longiniana	Neronian	G	unknown
Ala Moesica	pre-Neronian	G, GI, GS	Moesia
Ala Pomponiani / Gallorum Petriana	Augustan	G	Gaul
Ala Rusonis	Augustan	G	Gaul
Ala Scubulorum	Claudian	G, GS	Pannonia
Ala Siliana	Augustan	G	Gaul
Ala Sulpicia	AD 78-153	GI	Thracia
Ala Thracum Classiana	*	GI	Thracia
Ala Treverorum	Julio-Claudian	G	<i>Belgica</i>
Ala Vallensium	Julio-Claudian	G	Alpes
Cohors I Aelia Classica	Augustan	G	
Cohors I Aelia Saggitariorum	Julio-Claudian	G	
Cohors I Aquitanorum Biturigum	Augustan	G, GS	Aquitania
Cohors I Aquitanorum Veterana	Augustan	G, GS	Aquitania
Cohors I Asturum equitata	Augustan	G	Tarraconensis

Cohors I Belgarum equitata	Claudian	G	<i>Belgica</i>
Cohors I Civium Romanorum Inguenorum equitata	AD 90-101	G, GS	
Cohors I classica	AD 80-158	GI	
Cohors I Cyrenaica	pre-Flavian	GS	Cyrenaica
Cohors I Flavia Damascenorum equitata sagittaria	pre-Flavian	G, GS	Syria
Cohors I Flavia Hispanorum equitata	AD 78-158	G, GI	<i>Hispania</i>
Cohors I Germanorum	Julio-Claudian	G, GS	<i>Belgica</i>
Cohors I Helvetiorum et Brittonum	Flavian	G, GS	<i>Belgica</i>
Cohors I Hispanorum	AD 90-101	GI	<i>Hispania</i>
Cohors I Ituraeorum	Flavian	G	Judaea
Cohors I Latobicorum et Varcianorum equitata	AD 80-158	GI	Pannonia
Cohors I Lucensium	AD 81-152	GI	Tarraconensis
Cohors I Pannoniorum	AD 95-101	G, GS	Pannonia
Cohors I Pannoniorum et Dalmatarum equitata	AD 95-158	GI	Pannonia
Cohors I Raetorum equitata	AD 90-153	GI	Raetia
Cohors I Sequanorum et Rauracorum equitata	Flavian	G, GS	<i>Belgica</i>
Cohors I Thracum Germanica equitata	AD 80-101	G, GS	Thracia
Cohors I Vindelicorum mil.	AD 90-98	GI	Raetia
Cohors II Aquitanorum equitata	Augustan	G, GS	Aquitania
Cohors II Asturum equitata	Augustan	G	Tarraconensis
Cohors II Augusta	Augustan	G, GS	
Cohors II Augusta Cyrenaica	pre-Flavian	GS	Cyrenaica
Cohors II Brittonum mil.	AD 81-98	GI	Britannia
Cohors II Civium Romanorum equitata	AD 80-153	G, GI	
Cohors II Hispanorum equitata	AD 90-101	GI, GS	<i>Hispania</i>
Cohors II Hispanorum peditata	AD 90-152	GI	<i>Hispania</i>
Cohors II Thracum veteran equitata	AD 81-101	G	Thracia
Cohors II Treverorum	Severan	GS	<i>Belgica</i>
Cohors II Varcianorum equitata	AD 90-153	G, GI	Pannonia
Cohors III Aquitanorum equitata	Augustan/Tiberian	G, GS	Aquitania
Cohors III Breucorum	AD 81-127	G, GI	Pannonia
Cohors III Dalmatarum	AD 80-90	G, GS	Dalmatia
Cohors III Gallorum equitata	Augustan	G	Lugdunensis
Cohors III Hispanorum	Flavian?	G, GS	<i>Hispania</i>
Cohors III Lucensium	Julio-Claudian	G, GI	Tarraconensis
Cohors III Lusitanorum	AD 90-101	GI	Lusitania
Cohors III Sagittariorum	Julio-Claudian	G	
Cohors III Thracum	AD 80-101	GI	Thracia
Cohors IIII Aquitanorum equitata	Augustan/Tiberian	G, GS	Aquitania
Cohors IIII Dalmatarum	pre-Claudian	G	Dalmatia

Cohors III Thracum equitata	Augustan	G, GI	Thracia
Cohors IV Vindelicorum	Flavian-Trajanic?	GS	Raetia
Cohors Ligurum et Hispanorum	Julio-Claudian	GS	Liguria
Cohors Lusitanorum	Julio-Claudian	G	Lusitania
Cohors Raetorum et Vindelicorum	Julio-Claudian	G, GS	Raetia
Cohors Silaensium	Julio-Claudian	G	Syria
Cohors V Dalmatarum	pre-Claudian	G, GS	Dalmatia
Cohors V Hispanorum equitata	Julio-Claudian/Flavian	G	<i>Hispania</i>
Cohors VI Breucorum	AD 98-127	GI	Pannonia
Cohors VI Brittonum	AD 90-152	GI	Britannia
Cohors VI Inguenorum Voluntariorum	Augustan	G	
Cohors VI Raetorum	AD 101-152	G, GS	Raetia
Cohors VI Thracum equitata	Augustan	G	Thracia
Cohors VII Breucorum	pre-Flavian	G	Pannonia
Cohors VII Raetorum equitata	Julio-Claudian	G, GS	Raetia
Cohors VIII Breucorum	pre-Flavian	G	Pannonia
Cohors XV Voluntariorum	AD 90-153	GS	
Cohors XXIV Voluntariorum	Julio-Claudian	G, GI	
Cohors XXVI Voluntariorum	Julio-Claudian	G, GI	
Cohors XXXII Voluntariorum	Julio-Claudian	G, GS	

Table 33: Auxiliary units stationed in Germania (pre-AD 89), Germania Inferior, and Germania Superior (adapted from Cheesman 1914, 149; Polak 2009, 950; Cuff 2010, 246)

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