

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

**White Halo Piercing the Sun:
Juntong's Anti-*Hanjian* Campaigns and GMD's Legitimacy during and after the War
Resisting Japan**

By

Yuxiang Hao

June 2025

A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Master of Arts degree in the

Master of Arts Program in the Social Sciences

Faculty Advisor: Johanna S. Ransmeier

Preceptor: Deirdre T. Lyons

The Secret War: Introduction and Literature Review

Revolutionary youth, quickly prepare,
 革命青年快准备
 Be wise, humane, and brave!
 智仁勇都健全
 Grasp the pulse of this stage,
 掌握着现阶段的动脉
 Stand before the great age!
 站在大时代的前面
 —Song of Juntong's Linli Training Class¹

Japan's quest for a Great Japanese Empire in the Chinese mainland began with the annexation of Manchuria in 1931 and ended with the eventual defeat in 1945. During this time, the Nationalist Party (GMD) relied on one of its most significant secret service organizations, the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, to carry out its espionage activities against both Japanese aggressors and collaborators working for the Japanese (in Chinese, referred to as, *hanjian* 汉奸). The Military Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (known as Juntong 军统 in Chinese) was probably the largest secret service organization of GMD and the main executive branch of the government's anti-*hanjian* campaigns during the war. Dai Li, Chiang's right-hand man, controlled the secret service agency.

Dai Li's mission to eliminate *hanjian* began in 1932. He first established a secret society the Blue Shirts based in Shanghai, recruiting patriots and idle civilians to carry out espionage against officials of the Japanese puppet regime in Shanghai. Japan's aggression of Beiping in 1937 marked the break out of the total war with China; in response to the Japanese invasion, the GMD reorganized the Blue Shirts into a larger, party-controlled secret service agency, Juntong. In 1938, Dai Li was officially appointed as the acting director of Juntong.

¹ Shen Zui, *Juntong neimu* [Inside Juntong] (Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 1984), 15.

Under his leadership, Juntong conducted at least 930 assassinations of *hanjian* from 1938 to 1945.² Juntong and its subordinate organizations indeed made positive contributions to China's pursuit of national salvation from Japanese imperialism by violently punishing traitors. Nevertheless, as a further investigation of the role of Juntong during and after the war will demonstrate, there are some negative sides of Juntong that we must acknowledge. The term "*hanjian*" during wartime allowed the authority to arrest anyone suspected to be harmful to the regime, granting Juntong the unlimited power to supervise wartime society and arrest suspicious targets. Juntong's attitude towards *hanjian* during wartime could be said to be harsh; however, postwar *hanjian* trials illustrated a change in that firm stance. Juntong began to collaborate with former *hanjian* for its own political influence, and took advantage of its power to manage *hanjian* trials to commit corruption, which eventually became a reason for the failure of the GMD regime in mainland China. While the anti-*hanjian* campaign operated by Juntong was meant to consolidate GMD's military dictatorship, it ended up in a Faustian bargain dilemma: short-term regime consolidation eventually caused a long-term negative effect that contributed to the downfall of the GMD.

Statistics suggest that to a large extent GMD relied on Juntong to execute the party's will to punish traitors during the War Resisting Japan. However, not many systematic studies about Juntong had been conducted. One prevailing way to study Juntong is to put Dai Li at the center of the narration. One of the most influential works on Juntong written in English is *Spymaster: Dai Li and Chinese Secret Service* by distinguished historian Fredric Wakeman. As extensive research of the life of Dai Li, the book mainly discusses the development of

² *Junweihui diaocha tongji ju linian xingdong chengguo tongjibiao* [Table of statistics on Juntong's operations and results by year], 1938–45, 148-020100-0005, Academia Historica, Taipei.

Juntong under Dai Li's leadership in almost every aspect. Wakeman gives a very clear summary of this trinity among Juntong, Dai Li, and Chiang Kai-shek "[T]hey also paradoxically counseled passive acquiescence to the Leader's will: "Intelligence agents may not have their own political views. They must accept the will of the Leader as their own will."³ In Wakeman's account, Dai Li, Juntong, and the GMD regime were a trinity to be studied together.

Wen-hsin Yeh is another leading historian in Juntong studies in the U.S. Her book chapter "Urban Warfare and Underground Resistance: Heroism in the Chinese Secret Service during the War of Resistance" skillfully shows Dai Li's intentions in building Juntong and how several incidents demonstrate the employment of Dai Li's values in Juntong. Yeh examines the ideological construction of Juntong and reveals how Dai Li's obsession with heroic figures in Chinese historical epics impacted Juntong's language and practice centered around "loyalty" and "heroism."⁴ At the same time, she also noted the nuance in Juntong's ideological construction: while Dai Li attempted to appeal to patriotism to inspire his agents, he also required his subordinates to be mindless tools of the GMD leadership. As Yeh writes, "In so far as Dai Li demanded that individuals surrender their discretion and hence their moral autonomy, the notion of the anonymous hero suited the organizational requirements of a secret service meant only to serve as an instrument of the Leader's ends."⁵ Yeh's observation aligns with the mainstream of Juntong studies worldwide: Juntong is usually considered a mark of GMD's corrupt politics.

³ Fredric Wakeman Jr., *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 213.

⁴ Wen-hsin Yeh, "Urban Warfare and Underground Resistance: Heroism in the Chinese Secret Service during the War of Resistance," in *Wartime Shanghai*, ed. Yeh Wen-hsin (New York: Routledge, 2005), 119-122.

⁵ Yeh, "Urban Warfare," 134-135.

While Wakeman and Yeh did not expand their discussions on Juntong's anti-*hanjian* campaign, several other monographs had established research on that subject. Jiang Shaozhen, one of the first Chinese historians with expertise on Juntong, wrote a comprehensive book *Dai Li and Juntong*, which also considers Juntong as merely the nefarious wing of GMD. The standpoint of this book is highly critical. The general attitude of Jiang is, that Juntong as an instrument of GMD dominance, faithfully operated as the GMD and Dai Li instructed to maintain the regime's military dictatorship.⁶ As one of the most full-scale sources for scholars to look at Juntong activities from the beginning to the end, Jiang's book briefly discusses the interaction between Juntong and *hanjian* with his criticism of anti-*hanjian* campaigns under Juntong leadership.

However, the book leaves two questions unanswered. First, while the book did criticize Juntong's problematic operations against *hanjian*, it only took it as a representation of GMD's larger problem; in other words, Jiang's critical account of Juntong in anti-*hanjian* campaigns only treats Juntong as a mark of GMD's structural problem, rather than a deeper investigation of Juntong as a major problem that caused the destabilization of GMD's legitimacy. As we will see later, Chiang Kai-shek and Dai Li had a series of power struggles regarding postwar anti-*hanjian* campaigns. This is proof that we cannot simply view Juntong as a part of the problem, but should consider it a problem itself. Instead of narrating a unified GMD story like previous scholars, this project will apply greater nuance to understand Juntong and its actions. This is not to say that the GMD is not important; rather, the method will be to put Juntong at the same level of salience as we will see from investigating primary

⁶ Jiang Shaozhen, *Dai Li he Juntong* [Dai Li and Juntong] (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Publishing House, 1994), 1-2.

sources that had never been used in these monographs. Second, they did not illustrate how civilians reacted to the problems that emerged during the postwar anti-*hanjian* campaigns. Although the book indeed incorporated some criticisms from the Communist Party, the lack of voices from civilians still made Jiang's account incomplete. A more direct response from Chinese society is needed.

Xia Yun, Professor of History at Shanghai University, investigates GMD's anti-*hanjian* campaigns in detail in her book *Down with Traitors: Justice and Nationalism in Wartime China*. Using extensive archival sources, Xia depicts a complete scenario of the development of GMD's anti-*hanjian* campaign. The politicization of the term *hanjian* was utilized to construct wartime nationalism.⁷ While this book is one of, if not the most, full-scale monography of GMD's anti-*hanjian* campaigns so far, it also encountered the problem that Jiang's book had. Though Xia's book had an extensive discussion about Juntong, it still considers Juntong as merely a part of the GMD government, instead of an organization with active agency to reshape the wartime and postwar legal system. At the same time, the book is mainly concerned with GMD's ideological construction through anti-*hanjian* campaigns instead of providing throughout reflections on Juntong's operations themselves, which should be a topic to be considered to complete the historiography of Juntong and *hanjian*. A more detailed account of Juntong's operations is needed to further investigate anti-*hanjian* campaigns.

Another book of Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime*, provides an urban history of Shanghai from 1937 to 1941—the period when the

⁷ Xia Yun, *Down with Traitors: Justice and Nationalism in Wartime China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2017), 13.

Japanese armed forces took the most aggressive posture. Wakeman did a good job outlaying abundant historical details about political assassination in this book. He conducts his research on assassinations operated by both Chinese agents and the collaborationist government, and concludes that such wartime terrorism had turned wartime Shanghai into a “badland” filled with violence and disturbance: “The Japanese ruled Shanghai securely not because they were politically nimble, but because the Chinese in the city were psychologically devastated.”⁸ While this book stresses the significance of anti-*hanjian* campaign in affecting wartime society, it does not mention postwar *hanjian* trials.

In conclusion, three trends can be found in these studies: first, scholarships on Juntong often use the biography of Dai Li as a representation of the development of Juntong. While this way of narration is effective (and reasonable, since Dai Li and Juntong are two associated names), still, studies tend not to consider Juntong as an organization with political agency. Second, Juntong is usually considered a part of the larger problem of GMD’s incompetence. While this statement is undoubtedly true, tensions between Juntong and GMD still exist. Hence, Juntong needs to be studied not only as a representation of GMD’s failed governance. Third, the causal relationship between GMD’s downfall and Juntong’s operation is yet to be studied. As Professor Pan Min from Tongji University notices, the studies on Juntong “mostly focus on the analyzing of historical materials and narrating historical phenomena. In other words, scholars are trying to figure out the question of “what happened” in history, instead of explaining the question of “why it happened,” that is, they did not

⁸ Fredric Wakeman Jr., *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 135.

explain the reason for the emergence of such historical phenomena.”⁹

Hence, understanding Juntong's postwar anti-*hanjian* activities worth investigating independent from GMD's larger problem of right-wing dictatorship and corruption requires more focused research. Before that, however, we need to answer a question first: as we have mentioned the term "*hanjian*" multiple times, what, then, is *hanjian* exactly in a Chinese context?

Assassin's Creed: GMD and Juntong's Attitudes Towards *Hanjian*

With heroic abandon I sing in the market of Yan,
慷慨歌燕市
At utmost ease I become a prisoner from Chu.
从容作楚囚
The blade drawn turns into a sharp thrill,
引刀成一快
That truly deserves this fine young head!
不负少年头
—Wang Jingwei, *Orally Composed Upon Being Arrested* 被逮口占¹⁰

How do we define “collaborators” in a Chinese context? The word often used in Chinese is “*hanjian* 汉奸,” which is challenging to render in English. To understand the construction of *hanjian* we need to first interpret the meaning of the two characters. “*Han*” is the name of the ethnic majority of China, and “*jian*” contains multiple meanings. The character primarily means “selfish” and “vicious.” In some contexts, it also refers to “foul things,” “scoundrel,” “fake,” “chaos,” “cunning,” “illicit intercourse,” “rape,” and

⁹ Pan Min, “20 shiji 80 niandai yilai chengzhi *hanjian* yanjiu zongshu [An Overview of Studies on *Hanjian* Punishment since the 1980s],” *Kangri zhanzheng yanjiu* no.3 (2010): 150.

¹⁰ Yang Zhiyi, *Poetry, History, Memory: Wang Jingwei and China in Dark Times* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2023), 42. This poem was composed after Wang Jingwei's failed operation of assassinating Zaifeng, the Prince Chun of the Qing Dynasty. Ironically, the young revolutionary assassin became one of, if not the most, infamous collaborators with the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s.

“communication with enemies.”¹¹ Combining the two characters, the term *hanjian* conveys a complicated message: becoming a *hanjian* does not only mean treason to the Chinese ethnicity, but also the lack of political morality. The first time the term *hanjian* appeared in Chinese history was during the Song Dynasty, as a condemnation of people who worked for the Jin Dynasty, the empire in northeastern China established by Jurchens.¹² During the Qing Dynasty, the term encountered a nuanced change of meaning, since the Qing rulers were also ethnic minorities from the northeast. Nationalism was appealed as intellectuals witnessed the imperial forces invaded and colonized China in a series of wars. For example, prominent patriotic bureaucrat Lin Zexu arrested those who worked for the British during the First Opium War. He was celebrated as a national hero ever since. A Manchu official Qi Ying saw a British writing Chinese characters, his immediate response was suspecting a *hanjian* taught the British to write in Chinese.¹³ The definition of *hanjian* had surpassed the ethnic conflict between Manchu and Han Chinese, becoming a collection of anyone who violates the interest of the greater nation of China. In that sense, collaborators who worked with foreigners to sabotage China’s sovereignty became “internal others” in the context of modern China.¹⁴ As Wakeman says, “To be read out of the corporate group was to become “other,” to lose one’s ability to be genuinely human, to leave behind or “transgress” (*jian*) being Chinese (Han) or even being just a man (*han*).”¹⁵ Xia Yun also explains the overlap of illegality and immorality

¹¹ Zhang Qiyun, ed., *Zhongwen da cidian* [The encyclopedic dictionary of the Chinese language] (Taipei: Hwa Kang Publishing Center, 1967), 9:143, 9:145; Luo Zhufeng, ed., *Hanyu da cidian* [The comprehensive Chinese dictionary], vol. 6 (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1990), 4:349.

¹² Frederic Wakeman Jr., “*Hanjian* (Traitor)! Collaboration and Retribution in Wartime Shanghai,” in *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond*, ed. Wen-hsin Yeh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 301.

¹³ *Da Qing Xuanzong cheng (Daoguang) huangdi shilu* [An honest record of the Daoguang Emperor of the Great Qing] (Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964), vol. 338, 118.

¹⁴ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 17-19.

¹⁵ Wakeman, “*Hanjian* (Traitor)!,” 300.

the term *hanjian* implies, not as a crime against individuals, but against the collective well-being and of the political morality of an imagined Chinese community that transcended national borders,” illustrating the “un-Chinese characters” of the collaborators. Xia deemed “*hanjian*” possessed a much stronger emotional accusation compared to other terms like *pantu* (traitor) or *maiguozei* (sellout).¹⁶

The term *hanjian*, naturally, became a part of China’s rising nationalist language in the face of Japanese aggression in the 1930s and 1940s. The term not only circulated among people but also became a political concept of the GMD government’s ideological construction. Facing criticisms of passive resistance and challenges from political rivals utilizing anti-*hanjian* languages, Chiang Kai-shek, the head of the GMD government, utilized the term to consolidate his authority.¹⁷ In 1936—the prelude of the total war between China and Japan—the Military Affairs Commission issued an adapted volume of *Biographies of Twice-Serving Ministers* 贰臣传, a historical document compiled during the Qing Dynasty, redacting former Ming officials who embraced Manchu dominance after the Ming Dynasty had fallen. Chiang wrote the introduction of the new edition himself and suggested renaming it as *Biographies of Hanjian in the Fall of Ming* 明末汉奸列传.¹⁸ As the total war between China and Japan was approaching, the term *hanjian* was then confirmed as a politicized language. The GMD government began to use it officially as a part of its wartime nationalist ideology. In 1937, the GMD’s Publicity Department presented a report called “Propaganda Outline for the Elimination of *Hanjian* 消灭汉奸宣传大纲,” defining *hanjian* as: those who

¹⁶ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 7-8.

¹⁷ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 19.

¹⁸ Military Affairs Commission, National Government, ed., *Mingmo hanjian liezhuan* [Biographies of *Hanjian* in the Fall of Ming] (Nanjing: Military Affairs Commission, 1936), 1-3.

colluded with the Japanese aggressor to endanger the Republic; those who sell out national interests; those who collude with enemy states; those who engage in all kinds of works that benefit the enemy (including political, military, economic, and social activities, etc.).¹⁹

Following the official anti-*hanjian* narrative, GMD's legislative branch responded by legalizing this nationalist language, granting illegality to the term *hanjian*. "*Hanjian*" officially became a crime with the issue of Regulations on Punishing *Hanjian* 惩治汉奸条例 in 1937. In the next few years, the GMD continued to complete its *hanjian*-related laws. It revised the Regulations on Punishing *Hanjian* on August 15th as the final version to be carried out during the war. In 1939, GMD issued another legal code Resolutions on Preventing *Hanjian* Activities and Espionage 防治汉奸间谍活动办法. Even after the war had ended, GMD's anti-*hanjian* laws were still being made and executed. The GMD government abolished the wartime Regulations on Punishing *Hanjian* to make a new version on December 6th, 1945, redefining the scope of *hanjian*. Regulations on Handling *Hanjian* Cases 处理汉奸案件条例 was also issued on November 23rd, 1945, as guidance for the legal system to perform postwar *hanjian* trials.

Both wartime and postwar anti-*hanjian* campaigns served one political agenda for the GMD and Chiang, that is, appealing to nationalism to cement their political legitimacy. In the 1930s, Chiang politicized the term *hanjian* to face challenges from political rivals: "Chiang Kai-shek's adoption of the word in propaganda and in law, therefore, was a defensive move and a key step in establishing his leadership in the national war against Japan once it proved inevitable."²⁰ A 1940 slogan put out by GMD's Publicity Department said: "Whoever

¹⁹ Shu Peiquan, ed., *Hanjian* (Guilin: Qiandao shuju, 1937), 85.

²⁰ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 22.

opposed the order of the supreme Generalissimo is a *hanjian*.”²¹ The issuing of a series of *hanjian*-related laws was more than a response to the Japanese aggression; it was also a means for Chiang Kai-shek to maintain his leadership, enabling the GMD government to have extended power to supervise the function of GMD’s authority in the name of *hanjian* elimination. Juntong, as the executive branch of GMD’s anti-*hanjian* campaign, naturally controlled the power to use the crime of “*hanjian*” as a “pocket crime,” as we will see in the later sections.²²

Similar to how Chiang utilized the term *hanjian* to construct his wartime legitimacy, the GMD again manipulated nationalism in postwar *hanjian* trials, like the 1946 Suzhou Trials charging eminent *hanjian* Chen Gongbo and Zhou Fohai, to win Chiang and the GMD government a positive political prestige and appeased the nationwide fever for liquidating *hanjian*. Margherita Zanasi from Louisiana State University notes: “At the popular level, the spectacle of the trials, regardless of the propriety of their legal procedure, fulfilled a deeply felt need for retribution.”²³ Harsh punishments on *hanjian* during and after the war were unquestionably a mark of righteousness after being ravished by Japanese aggressors for more than a decade. Heated public debates also helped the legitimacy of Chiang’s nationalist posture. For example, a leftist magazine *Minzhu*, as a frequent critic of the GMD government,

²¹ *Chen Bulei zhi Chen Cheng Enshi diliu zhanqu zhangguanbu jiu yidang wenti zhenggong huiyi han* [Letter from Chen Bulei to Chen Cheng’s ministerial headquarters of the 6th war zone in Enshi about the issue of other political parties], November 27, 1940, 002-080204-00002-002, Jiang Zhongzheng dang, Guojia cuoshi (2) [Chiang Kai-shek collections, National Measures (2)], Academia Historica, Taipei.

²² “Pocket crime 口袋罪” is a term in Chinese jurisprudence, originated from the metaphor that a pocket that is capable of holding every crime, referring to the names of crime that have ambiguous definitions, so that a suspect could be found guilty in accordance. See Sun Daocui, “‘Koudai zui’ de xingfa dingwei chongshu [Restatement of the Role of “Pocket Crimes” in Criminal Law],” *Journal of National Prosecutors College* no. 1 (2022): 105-122.

²³ Margherita Zanasi, “Globalizing *Hanjian*: the Suzhou Trials and the Post-World War II Discourse on Collaboration,” *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 3 (Jun 2008): 750-751.

appealed for quick and harsh sentences on Zhou Fohai and Chen Gongbo, which echoed the final judgment and confirmed the GMD government's ideological construction.²⁴

Nevertheless, as we will see in the following sections, while Chiang successfully appealed to nationalist and patriotic agendas to solidify his legitimacy, the whole process of putting *hanjian* on trial also went amiss—especially with the execution of Juntong.

As the GMD government posited itself as the defender of the Chinese nation, Juntong aligned with that narrative and attempted to convert the long-lasting negative image in the minds of the public. The GMD government considered the war an opportunity to reshape the popular imagination of Juntong: it was once one of, if not the most, notorious agency of GMD, committed numerous political assassinations of Chiang's political rivals, leftist activists, and communist sympathizers in and outside of GMD, including Deng Yanda, Yang Xiongfo and Shi Liangcai. However, as the war approached, Dai Li wished to utilize the war to redefine Juntong into his ideal heroic figure of martyrs. The righteousness of the War Resisting Japan gave Juntong a pretext to rewrite the public impression of it as only an agency for suppressing political rivals.²⁵ As Yeh notes, "Dai Li's men later glorified that world by depicting a domain of romantic heroes; they projected themselves into it as the knights errant of the modern age, fighting to protect China from the Japanese."²⁶

If attacking *hanjian* during wartime can be said to serve the dual goal of resistance and power consolidation, then postwar *hanjian* cases illustrate a trend of the GMD government's growing effort for the latter purpose. As Xia notes, "[I]n the postwar phase of

²⁴ Zanas, "Globalizing *Hanjian*," 751.

²⁵ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 53.

²⁶ Yeh, "Urban Warfare," 135.

the anti-*hanjian* movement, Chiang's administration was mainly after those who had founded, supported, or followed the regime that had opposed his government."²⁷ However, as identifying those who took part in the puppet regime government might be an easy task, it can be hard to track people who interacted with the Japanese side, since it was almost impossible for civilians to survive without connections with the Japanese. Nevertheless, the postwar legal codes still determined that a person did not need to conspire with the Japanese to be a *hanjian*; affiliation to some extent was enough for the GMD government to recognize their treason. With that ambiguous definition, the potential range of *hanjian* covered almost every social aspect of occupied areas.

Juntong agents and *hanjian* were on the two polar ends of the spectrum in the context of the war—at least in the first several years of the war. The anti-*hanjian* narrative had always been a significant instruction of Dai Li and a core creed of his subordinates. In a 1938 agent training textbook *Political Detective* 政治偵探 compiled by Dai Li himself, he clearly noted the responsibility of agents, which includes the elimination of *hanjian* as one of the most frequently mentioned missions: “The foundation of the security of our nation and ethnicity lies in the presumption that political detectives can accomplish their missions...Political detectives need to accomplish the mission as the sentries of national defense. The spies of the enemy and *hanjian* are the biggest targets to be attacked.” Dai Li listed the “investigation and reports of *hanjian*'s activities and organizations” as one of eighteen entries of “important works to be done on the supervision of domestic politics.” According to Dai Li, *Hanjian* shall be one of the prior enemies of agents, and it is the agents' natural duty to eliminate them,

²⁷ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 31.

even with violent measures: “Every schemer during the national revolution, and everyone standing in the way of the national revolution, shall be eliminated with discipline...In general, political detectives bear every mission that benefits the war during wartime.”²⁸ Dai Li approved the use of violent measures that would help the War Resisting Japan, justifying means like assassination, blackmail, and extortion. Conniving, even suggesting the importance of unconventional measures for the sake of national salvation Dai Li’s instruction made it possible for Juntong to apply violence and purge *hanjian* suspects.

Other than the official approval of unconventionality, the scale of supervision Dai Li could impose on Chinese society also marks the expanding power of agents during wartime. Another section in *Political Detective* suggests thirteen types of components that best categorize *hanjian*. In Dai Li’s mind, *hanjian* can be found everywhere in China in 1938, thus a nationwide network of identifying, spying, and eliminating them is necessary. “These components are distributed in every corner of society; hence we need to send political detectives all over the nation and try our best to eliminate them,” wrote Dai Li.²⁹ Echoing Dai Li’s suggestion, another official handbook issued by the GMD, *Notices on Preventing Espionage and Eliminating Hanjian* 防谍肃奸须知, also illustrated a wide range of suspicious populations that are potentially *hanjian* with 61 categories in total.³⁰ The 1939 Resolutions on Preventing *Hanjian* Activities and Espionage officially regulated the classification of suspicious populations, including those who constantly misbehave, have

²⁸ Dai Li, *Zhengzhi zhentan* [Political Detective] (Nanjing: Political Department, Military Affairs Commission, National Government, 1938), 61-62, 66-67, 63.

²⁹ Dai, *Zhengzhi zhentan*, 73-76.

³⁰ *Fangdie sujian xuzhi* [Notices on Preventing Espionage and Eliminating *Hanjian*], in *Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shiliao congkan* [Series of Historical materials of China’s War Resisting Japan], vol. 357, ed. Yu Heping (Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe, 2016), 120-124.

unknown family relationships, wear clothes with uniform styles, look anxious or panicked, in all, anyone who looked abnormal. The legalization of the supervision of these people marked Juntong's ultimate power to spy on the entire wartime society. The legal code itself was ambiguous in defining people suspected to be *hanjian*; with this standard, we can imagine how wartime anti-*hanjian* laws often led to unjust cases and eventually caused the expansion of *hanjian* cleansing.

Juntong's power continued into the postwar era in the fields of arresting and convicting *hanjian*. After the quick expansion of Juntong's power during wartime, the secret service agency had 14,941 secret service agents and 9,784 agents stationed at other public organizations by early 1946, excluding affiliated groups under the command of Juntong.³¹ Dai Li set up Committees of Handling *Hanjian* in major cities in China, nominated himself as the chair of the Shanghai Committee, and appointed prominent Juntong officials including Ma Hansan, Wen Qiang, and Deng Kuangyuan to control committees in other metropolitan areas.³² While the GMD and Chiang meant to utilize Juntong as a tool to consolidate their political authority and stability, the extended power GMD granted Juntong in dealing with *hanjian* cases also negatively impacted the GMD regime. Juntong's arbitrariness together with the ambiguous legal codes resulted in the expansion of *hanjian* trials and sabotaged the GMD's legal system.

While the government had specific legal codes regarding *hanjian* cases as harsh as

³¹ *Dai Li zhi Jiang Zhongzheng sanshisi nian ju gongzuo baogao* [Dai Li's work report of the Bureau to Chiang Kai-shek at the 34th year of the Republic], January 28, 1946, 148-010400-0001, Dai Li dang, Guofang bu junshi qingbaoju [Dai Li collections, Bureau of Military Intelligence, Department of National Defense], Academia Historica, Taipei.

³² Huang Kangyong, *Wo suo zhidao de Juntong xingshuai: Yuan Guomindang Juntong shaojiang de huiyi* [The Rise and Fall of Juntong that I know: Memories of a Former Major General of GMD's Juntong], ed. Zhu Wenchu (Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 2005), 164.

they could be, Juntong ignored those openly published laws, instead handling *hanjian* cases in accordance with their internal documents which granted the power of detainment, judgment, and even execution of *hanjian*. Juntong agents neglected the written laws to a great extent in practice. A Juntong's internal report states their ultimate power overriding the law was "the authority granted by the leader (Chiang Kai-shek)."³³ In a telegram Chiang sent to the GMD's party committee in Henan Province, he admits that secret service agents "often detain civilians in the name of arresting *hanjian* and blackmail them, thus most people felt uneasy."³⁴ It is important to acknowledge Juntong's contribution to finding and prosecuting *hanjian*; but at the same time, Juntong's almost unlimited power of handling *hanjian* cases in the immediate postwar period caused a broadening of *hanjian* trials: the legal procedure was suspended, causing disorder in society. Juntong did not become the heroic figure Dai Li imagined but brought terror to the land—not only to the Japanese aggressors and the Chinese collaborators, but also to the innocent population that was also under suspicion.

Which Side Are You On?: Broadening the Scope of *Hanjian*

Keep your cheers for today—tomorrow your crimes will be listed one by one!
 别看今天闹得欢, 就怕将来拉清单!
 —Zhang Ga the Soldier Boy 小兵张嘎³⁵

Ni Youliang received another letter on February 21st, 1945. As the shipping manager of Songtai Hotel in the Japan-occupied area in Shanghai, he had already received three letters

³³ *Sanshiwu nian benwu gongzuo jihua* [Bureau's work plan at the 35th year of the Republic], January 1946-July 1946, 148-0101400-0001, Dai Li dang, Guofang bu junshi qingbaoju, Academia Historica, Taipei.

³⁴ *Zhongguo Guomindang Henan shengwei zhixing weiyuanhui daidian* [Telegram from Executive Committee of Henan Province, GMD], October 25, 1945, M0002-015-00418-001, Minguo dang, Guanyu zhanlingqu de youji budui ji tegong renyuan bude jie bu *hanjian* jubu jumin deng de daidian [Republic of China collections, Telegrams on forbidding guerilla units and secret service agents in occupied areas to arrest civilians in the name of arresting *hanjian*], Henan Provincial Archive, Zhengzhou.

³⁵ *Xiaobing Zhang Ga* [Zhang Ga the Soldier Boy], directed by Cui Wei and Ouyang Hongying (Beijing Film Studio, 1963), 40:15-40:20, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=Qpm2l017qDE>.

in the past few months, all from the same sender: Wang Zhendong, the chief of the second detachment, Pudong Political Commissioner, Loyal and Patriotic Army. Wang Zhendong had sent three previous letters to Ni Youliang, asking for logistic replenishments for their urban warfare against Japanese occupation. Ni Youliang, however, for some reason—possibly his fear of the Japanese finding out his connection with resistance groups, or simply fulfilling his duty as a shipping manager—ignored Wang Zhendong’s requests. But the letter Wang Zhendong sent this time was different. He used more serious and coercive expressions to threaten Ni Youliang:

As investigated, because of the need for military supplies, our detachment had sent three letters on December 6th and 21st last year, and February 8th to you, asking you to donate two-thirds of shipping income as donations to resistance every ten days to our detachment as military supplies, and our detachment will dispatch a commissar to supervise. However, you went to rely on the protection of the Japanese and ignored our request. This stubborn resistance not only deviates from the natural duty of a Chinese citizen but also scorns our detachment’s order. I, the Commissar, could not tolerate any hindrance to the enforcement of my order; thus you should have been sanctioned as a warning to others. However, punishment without teaching a lesson is really not a good way to promote policies. Here, I order you to compensate for all our requests within three days after the letter arrives, and your donations still shall be sent to our detachment every 10 days afterward. And to alleviate people’s hardship, you should follow our previous order to not arbitrarily add fees on shipping. If the order is delayed ever again, I, the Commissar, have no choice but to execute effective measures as a warning to anyone willing to commit treason. My words are effective orders; do not say words were not foretold. [You are] hereby warned!³⁶

This is not the only move Wang Zhendong made in early 1945. On March 18th, he put out an announcement, claiming to be responsible for the death of Qiao Wangyun, the head of collaborating policing force in Zhuqiao, Nanhui County:

³⁶ *Riwei Shanghai tebieshi Pudongnanqu gongshu guanyu songtai kezhan matou jingli Ni Youliang jiehuo wei junshiweiyuanhui bieongjun zhongyijiuguojun Pudong zhengzhi tepaiyuan banshichu dierzhidui bu konghehan de cheng* [Memorial from Pudongnan District Office about Ni Youliang, shipping manager of Songtai Hotel, receiving a threatening letter from second detachment, Pudong Political Commissioner, Loyal and Patriotic Army, Special Movement Corps, Military Affairs Commission]. March 14 1945, R4-1-150-1, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

As investigated, the former district governor of the Japanese puppet regime Qiao Wangyun has the same heart as a bat and the same conduct as a jackal. As an official, he framed the people, collaborated with wicked people, and ran roughshod. Backed by the enemy, he was greedy and corrupt, taking bribes, brutally treating the people, embezzling property, colluding with other corrupt officials, acting recklessly in the jurisdiction, speculating, gambling, and usurping national interests. As his unwise and unmerciful violation of the right path was warned by us multiple times, he turned a deaf ear to our warning. Tracing back his crimes, he cannot be forgiven. Do not blame the law for having no intolerance. Military law is all about getting rid of evil people, and politics is nothing more than transparent punishment and justice. If this wicked man is not punished, how can the patriotic and virtuous people in our country be encouraged? If we do not deal with this evil person, how can we appease the surging public opinion? I, the Commissar, in awe of the principle of "admonishing the people with the capital punishment," sent men of great strength to seek an opportunity, spying on his whereabouts, and finally identified and executed this wicked traitor in the open. I am deeply concerned that society does not know the truth, thus hereby declare his guilt as this announcement lists. Capital punishment shall be applied in times of turbulence; we made an example of completely eliminating an evil person. Don't waste your (the audience's) promising life being the heir to this great evil. Please let it be known!³⁷

Wang Zhendong exhibited different but extreme measures towards Ni Youliang and Qiao

Wangyun: he forcefully threatened and blackmailed the shipping manager Ni Youliang; to

Qiao Wangyun, assassination was his response to the traitor. Seemingly Wang Zhendong

would apply harsher punishments on confirmed *hanjian* like Qiao Wangyun, while giving

another chance to *hanjian* suspects like Ni Youliang. However, it is still noticeable that Wang

Zhendong warned Ni Youliang of his potential action of "willingly to commit treason,"

suggesting Ni Youliang, as a Chinese, not bearing the responsibility of resisting Japanese

aggression was deemed a potential *hanjian* to Wang Zhendong. How did Wang Zhendong

³⁷ *Riwei Shanghai tebieshi Nanhui xianzhengfu wei huibao qianren Zhuqiao jingchasuozhang Qiao Wangyun Beihai qingkuang bing qing tonglingxieji de cheng* (fu junshiwei yuanhui biedongjun, zhongyiji guojun Pudong zhengzhi tepaiyuan dier zhidui bu gonggao) [Memorial from Nanhui County, Shanghai Special City, Japanese puppet regime to report the murder case of Qiao Wangyun former director of Zhuqiao Police Station and request an order to assist investigation (Affiliating the announcement of second detachment, Pudong Political Commissioner, Loyal and Patriotic Army, Special Movement Corps, Military Affairs Commission)], April 2 1945 and April 9 1945, R4-1-148-21, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

define and classify collaborators? Is there any difference in principle regarding the treatment of potential collaborators like Ni Youliang and confirmed collaborators like Qiao Wangyun?

The blurred definition of *hanjian* suspect touches the construction of potential *hanjian*/zhunhanjian 准汉奸, that is, the population that the GMD government recognized may be a threat to social order. From the Regulations on Preventing *Hanjian* Activities and Espionage, the GMD government categorized *hanjian* suspects based on their occupations, appearances, interpersonal connections, social mobility, and places they frequented. Among all categories, the Resolution determines, one entry suggests “those who frequently interact with foreigners” shall be on suspicion of being *hanjian*. In a 1939 telegram sent from Chiang to general Guo Chan, Chiang stated whoever was in Japanese occupied area trading Japanese products “has to be killed regardless of military personnels or civilians, who should be sentenced in accordance with *hanjian* crimes adding one degree.”³⁸ Chiang’s words illustrate the almost unlimited power of GMD to classify *hanjian*: not only those who directly worked with the Japanese but also people who “indirectly” helped aggression and passive onlookers.³⁹ Nevertheless, it was almost impossible for civilians to dodge buying and selling Japanese products in occupied areas; even people who served in the Silk Improvement Association in occupied areas were classified as *hanjian*.⁴⁰ Timothy Brook summarized the trend of wartime collaboration as not necessarily willing to commit treason, but a pragmatical

³⁸ Jiang Zhongzheng zhi Guo Chan dian [Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Guo Chan], December 5, 1939, 002 -010300-00030-015, Jiang Zhongzheng dang, Choubi—Kangzhan shiqi (30) [Chiang Kai-shek collections, Plans: Era of the War of Resistance (30)], Academia Historica, Taipei.

³⁹ Wakeman, “*Hanjian* (Traitor)!” 302.

⁴⁰ Sifayuan yijue [Resolution passed by Judicial Yuan], August 1, 1940, 015-010311-0005, Sifayuan dang, Junweihui hanqing jieshi zai weizuzhi nei fuwu ying ruhe lunzui [Judicial Yuan Collections, Letter from the Military Affairs Commission inquiring about how to prosecute those who served in puppet organizations], Academia Historica, Taipei.

way to ensure one's survival under Japanese forces: "[M]any simply saw no alternative to going along with what the Japanese wanted, either because they regarded compliance as a more realistic survival strategy."⁴¹ The emergence of a great amount of unjust *hanjian* cases during the war is a natural outcome of the ambiguous, sometimes even unreasonable boundaries between lawful, loyal Chinese and collaborators.

Among all *hanjian* categories, one needs particular attention: economic *hanjian*. As the name implies, the category referred to those who did business with the Japanese that damaged China's sovereignty. Nevertheless, popular opinion made it hard to tell righteous businesspersons from those who colluded with the Japanese, especially with the long-existing distrust of merchants in Chinese culture. As a Chinese idiom suggests, "there is no merchant who is not treacherous 无商不奸." In the context of the War of Resistance, this distrust was magnified, especially in occupied areas: as we previously discussed, it was almost impossible for merchants in occupied areas not to interact with the Japanese. The interaction reinforces merchants' untrusted status and people's resentment. As Xia noted, "People assumed that those whose wealth increased during the war must have done something treacherous."⁴² The entire financial market was on suspicion of being a potential *hanjian*. The overall distrust of the merchants explains Wang Zhendong's incentive to send the blackmail and threat letter to the shipping manager.

Juntong's action of sending letters was also inspired by the early periods of the war. Patriots began to take action to deal with potential *hanjian*. Sending warning letters to

⁴¹ Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 3.

⁴² Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 57. 93.

potential *hanjian* had been a tradition of anti-Japanese organizations. Early in 1932, a local organization in Shanghai called Iron and Blood *Hanjian*-Elimination Team 铁血锄奸团 adopted this measure. They sent a warning letter to the Shanghai Coal Association, accusing one of its members of buying coal from Japanese firms. The resistance organization threatened the Shanghai Coal Association that they would take action by force if the Shanghai Coal Association did not deal with such unpatriotic behaviors. As a response, the Shanghai Coal Association announced “A Pledge of Voluntary Promotion of National Products,” sent people to join the Iron and Blood *Hanjian*-Elimination Team, and promised to put pressure on members trading with the Japanese.⁴³ As noted by Xia, the measure of sending threatening letters made it clear that violent consequences would apply against collaborative actions, and effectively forced individuals to cut any existing or potential ties with the Japanese side.⁴⁴

No wonder Wang Zhendong viewed Ni Youliang as a potential *hanjian*. Even though we cannot find further documents proving Ni Youliang indeed colluded with the Japanese, the fact that the hotel managed to remain in business in an occupied area itself constituted evidence for Juntong and GMD to confirm his connection with the Japanese, and thus recognize his identity as a potential economic *hanjian*. The comparison between the letters to Ni Youliang and the Shanghai Coal Association also indicates a shift in recognizing collaborative actions: while the Iron and Blood *Hanjian*-Elimination Team considered having direct trade with the Japanese as potential treason, the Loyal Patriotic Army, under the leadership of Juntong, took the more recognized anyone not directly helping their resistance

⁴³ *Shanghaishi meishangye tongye gonghui jie Tiexue chujiangtuan jinggao benye jianshang fanmai rimei youguan wenshu* [Documents on the Shanghai Coal Association and their responses to the Iron and Blood *Hanjian*-Elimination Team], August 1932–August 1937, (S304)-1-158, 1-10, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

⁴⁴ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 58.

was tantamount to treason. This suggests a change in *hanjian* definition and the practice of lawful vengeance, since the system operated by Juntong was a simplified binary friend-or-foe recognition system that allowed suspicion to be evidence to classify potential *hanjian*.

Wartime anti-*hanjian* law enforcement eventually deviated from the ideal model of the law that granted punishment aligned with crime and transformed people, becoming instead a public terror that left almost no gray space for people, especially those who survived in occupied areas, to defend themselves. The state of being in a war granted the GMD regime to perform quick trials, and the suspects sometimes were found guilty without hard evidence, but simply based on suspicion of collaboration. As Klaus Mühlhahn says, “criminal justice was reduced to the question of penal treatment.”⁴⁵

The occasion of ambiguous, broadened *hanjian* recognition based on the friend-or-foe recognition system continued to the postwar era; anyone who did not explicitly rebel against the Japanese aggressors was facing the danger of being considered a *hanjian*. Li Zhengzhong, for example, was secretly an anti-Japanese intellectual living in Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet regime in Northeastern China. However, his work experience in Manchukuo as a judge got him in trouble: he was arrested and put in prison for an entire year after the war.⁴⁶ Patriotism had been tightly linked to open forms of resistance against Japanese aggression. Though historians like Keith Schoppa have pointed out that “collaboration was not necessarily summed up by the word betrayal; resistance did not necessarily connote nationalism,” explicit resistance was the only way for people to prove their loyalty to the

⁴⁵ Klaus Mühlhahn, *Criminal Justice in China: A History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 173.

⁴⁶ Norman Smith, *Resisting Manchukuo: Chinese Women Writers and the Japanese Occupation* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), 130.

Chinese nation; the complicated wartime experience was simplified as a friend-or-foe polarization. Anyone who did not take sides with patriotism openly would be subject to suspicion of collaboration.⁴⁷

However, the problem so far seemed to be not serious enough for the GMD to lose its political legitimacy at once, especially in the context of war and postwar China. Wang Zhendong classifying Ni Youliang as a potential *hanjian* is explainable, since patriotic organizations, whether under the Juntong command or not, did not have faith in the merchants; even the action of sending the letter was inspired by local resistance groups. Not to mention the assassination of Qiao Wangyun, who served a prominent role in the Japanese puppet regime: harsh punishments on *hanjian*, though largely problematic, still conformed to the public's desire to cleanse the shameful traitors of the nation.⁴⁸ Some even thought the process of punishing *hanjian* was too lenient. Suzanne Pepper analyzed the radical trend among newspapers and summarized: "The press was unanimous in demanding punishment for the collaborators. At stake, it was argued, was the integrity of the nation. If these people were not punished in some way, queried the critics, why should people remain loyal in the event of another national crisis?"⁴⁹ Though media could not be said to be the representative of the entire Chinese population, it can at least reflect the social trend to a certain extent, that during wartime, being too harsh to *hanjian* was not deemed as the paramount concern. Then, what was the alternative explanation for the collapse of GMD's legitimacy?

⁴⁷ Keith Schoppa, "Patterns and Dynamics of Elite Collaboration in Occupied Shaoxing County," in *Collaboration with Japan, 1937-45: The Limits of Accommodation*, ed. David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 178.

⁴⁸ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 36.

⁴⁹ Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 12.

Make Fortunes out of Disasters: Juntong and Postwar *Hanjian* Trials

-“Concentrate our will to defend the leader”—I’ve studied this slogan for 15 years.
凝聚意志，保卫领袖，这句话我研究了十五年哪。

-What was the result of your study then?
您研究出什么结果了？

-The result is, anyone not serving themselves shall be doomed.
结果就是，人不为己天诛地灭。

—*Lurk* 潜伏, Wu Jingzhong’s conversation with Yu Zecheng⁵⁰

While Juntong presented a nationalist posture during the war, using harsh, sometimes violent measures against *hanjian*, its approach soon changed to the other side of the spectrum as the war was about to end. Juntong became reluctant to prosecute *hanjian* after the war, causing dissatisfaction among people. While one of the main responsibilities of Juntong was to resist Japanese aggression, it did not exclude the possibility of working with *hanjian*. As the war was approaching its conclusion, Juntong recruited former *hanjian* to “supervise the actions of the enemy, maintain local order, and prevent attacks and riots of bandits.”⁵¹ Dai Li himself was also one of the biggest advocates in the GMD government that supported recruiting the Collaborationist Army after the war: “As long as the Collaborationist unit obeys the order from (our) headquarters and firmly resist against bandits, our bureau could...report to the headquarters and give them status...to supervise the actions of the enemy and prevent actions of bandits.”⁵² Juntong justified its collaboration with *hanjian* with

⁵⁰ Qianfu [Lurk], Episode 15, YouTube, 10:04-10:20, April 27, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bCdvwol-vEk&list=PL7Hz9GT50Q3wIMV8TazXtBPILFzwDnjx&index=12>. *Lurk* 潜伏 is a popular TV series in China. Yu Zecheng was once a Juntong agent, but converted to the Communist Party after witnessing Juntong’s collusion with the Japanese officials. Wu Jingzhong was the chief of Juntong’s Tianjin Station, Yu Zecheng’s superior. He sent Yu Zecheng to blackmail Mu Liancheng, a former *hanjian*, promising to erase Mu Liancheng’s crime as a *hanjian*.

⁵¹ *Dai Li dian Guo Lüzhou suobu yu Zhang Huifang bu kaijin Shanghai weichi zhian bili Zhongyang jieshou* [Dai Li’s telegram to the units of Guo Lüzhou and Zhang Huifang to enter Shanghai to maintain order and assist the central government’s takeover of properties], in *Dai Li xiansheng yu kangzhan shiliao huibian: Zhongmei hezuosuo de yewu* [Historical materials of Mr. Dai Li and the War of Resistance: Responsibilities of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization], ed. Wu Shufeng (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2011), 118-119.

⁵² Liu Ximing, *Weijun: Qiangquan jingzhu xia de qizi (1937-1949)* [The Collaborationist Army: The Pawn in the

a righteous pretext for the greater good of order maintenance.

Political concern was also a main reason for Juntong to work with former *hanjian*. As the war was about to end, Juntong began to reach out to influential businessmen and politicians serving the Japanese puppet regime, and recruited them to work for Juntong. Hence, the identity of these *hanjian* with competing loyalties was hard to define: on the one hand, there was clear evidence of their collaboration with the Japanese; on the other hand, Juntong also received help from them. Classifying the loyalty of these *hanjian* was a particularly tough task for the tribunals, and it opened space for Juntong to manipulate the judicial system. For example, Juntong would submit documents to prove that *hanjian* on trial, usually influential ones including political figures and business tycoons, were actually Juntong undercover agents, to strengthen their own political network.⁵³ In many cases, Juntong was able to maneuver legal procedures to shield *hanjian* suspects, even verified *hanjian*. An example is the case of Luo Hongyi, an infamous drug dealer in Shanghai, accused of collaborating with the Japanese in the opium business. Luo Hongyi used his nepotism with Du Yusheng, the local mafia boss who worked closely with Dai Li during wartime, to forge an identity as a Juntong undercover agent, and eventually got his crime lightened. Even Chen Gongbo and Zhou Fohai worked with Juntong as the war was about to end, seeking protection from Dai Li; Zhou Fohai was even appointed as the chief of an action team in Shanghai by Dai Li. They were only sentenced after Dai Li died in a plane crash in March 1946.⁵⁴

Struggle of Powers, 1937-1949] (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2002), 381.

⁵³ Sun Yaodong, *Fushi Wanxiang* [Phenomena in the World of Turbulence], ed. Song Luxia (Shanghai: Shanghai Education Publishing House, 2005), 256-263.

⁵⁴ Wang Anzhi, “Shunshi ‘yingbian,’ juntong ju ‘cefan’ [‘Changing’ in accordance with time, instigated by Juntong];” Xu Zhaoming, “Rikou touxiang, yaoshen yibian chengwei ‘gongchen’ [Suddenly became a

The expansion of Juntong's judicial power caused a growth in Dai Li's ambition to increase his political influence. In January 1941, Dai Li suggested Chiang Kai-shek establish a special tribunal to deal with *hanjian* cases, so as to control the judicial power of interpreting and adjudicating treason. Moreover, Dai Li also drafted a proposal for police directors in all metropolitans and submitted it to Chiang. However, alarmed by Dai Li's ambitious proposal and the quick growth of Juntong's power in the past few years, Chiang turned down his appeal and appointed the sheriff for major cities including Beiping, Nanjing, and Shanghai, including Xuan Tiewu, Dai Li's long-term political rival as a response to Chiang's concern of Juntong's expanding political influence. The appointment of Xuan Tiewu was a deliberate move to counter Dai Li's power.⁵⁵ Controlling Juntong Shanghai Station and secret service agents in the city, Dai Li hoped to be in charge of *hanjian* cleansing in Shanghai as a step to expand his power over policing forces. However, Chiang picked Xuan Tiewu, Dai Li's long-term political rival, as the director of Shanghai Municipal Police. Xuan Tiewu, together with other of Chiang Kai-shek's trusted subordinates, raised Dai Li's concerns about losing political power. Dai Li's concern was soon verified.

To combat political rivals, Dai Li sought to work with personnel in Shanghai's business sectors to enhance Juntong's influence, including those suspected to be working with the Japanese before. Li Ze was one of them. As the manager of Xinxin Company, one of

'meritorious man' after the Japanese aggressor surrendered],” in *Wo suozhidao de hanjian Zhou Fohai* [The *Hanjian* Zhou Fohai that I Know], ed. Wen Fei (Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 2005), 75-83, 121-123.

⁵⁵ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 62-63; Shen Zui and Wen Qiang, *Dai Li qiren* [The Person Dai Li] (Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 1980), 155-156, 253; Tang Zong, *Zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian de banian: shicongshi gaoji muliao tangzong riji* [Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek: Journal of Tang Zong, Superior Advisor of Attendant's Office], eds. Pan Jiazhao, Zhong Min, Hou Junhua, and Li Muzhen (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1991), 542; Wakeman, *Spymaster*, 354.

Shanghai's top retailing companies, he worked for both Japanese officials and Juntong agents. After the war, he was not classified as a *hanjian* by Juntong. However, Shu Yueqiao, a former employee of Xinxin Company, reported Li Ze's collaborating actions to the Department of Justice, causing an outraged public reaction for a *hanjian* pretending to be resistant to escape trial. Realizing this could be an opportunity to combat Juntong and Dai Li, Xuan Tiewu quickly acted to arrest Li Ze. Chiang Kai-shek was also suspected to be a supporter of Xuan Tiewu's action: he replied to Shu Yueqiao's report in person, promising a quick legal procedure, and dismissed the Juntong official Bi Gaokui who declared Li Ze's innocence.⁵⁶

In response to Xuan Tiewu's action, Dai Li also attempted to alleviate Li Ze's crime. Several Juntong submitted documents to the tribunal, suggesting Li Ze's collaboration with Juntong during wartime and his contribution to resistance.⁵⁷ As a result, the tribunal had to consider the reactions of both sides regarding Li Ze's case; Li Ze was eventually sentenced to three years in jail, and all his properties were confiscated. However, while Juntong eventually helped Li Ze escape severe punishment, the final conviction still led to public dissatisfaction, believing it was too light for Li Ze's crime.⁵⁸

No matter what Li Ze really was—a hateful collaborator or a hidden hero of

⁵⁶ “Bi Gaokui yajie Nanjing, Li Ze jiang gongkai shenxun [Bi Gaokui was sent to Nanjing, and Li Ze will be interrogated publicly],” *Wenhui Bao*, January 24, 1946; “Bi Gaokui chezhi, Shu Yueqiao huo Jiang zhuxi fuhan [Bi Gaokui was dismissed, and Shu Yueqiao received a reply from Generalissimo Chiang],” *Dagong bao*, January 15, 1946; “Jushuo shi juan, Bi Gaokui chezhi [It is said that Bi Gaokui was dismissed because of his failure of old cases],” *Wenhui Bao*, January 16, 1946.

⁵⁷ *Juntong de zhengmingxin* [A letter of identification from Juntong], April 4, 1946, (Q118) 12-31-27, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai; *Huang Ruitang de Zhengming xin* [A letter of identification from Huang Ruitang], April 1946, (Q118) 12-31-24, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

⁵⁸ “Li Ze an zuo xuanpan: jinchu tuxing sannian [Li Ze's case convicted yesterday: only a three-year sentence],” *Shidai ribao*, June 9, 1946; “Li Ze zuo panxing sannian: Yuan jianju ren renwei pande taiqing [Li Ze convicted for a three-year sentence yesterday: plaintiffs consider the sentence too light],” *Wenhui Bao*, June 9, 1946.

resistance, the bigger problem reflected in the case is that the media had been reporting the suspicious progression of the trial, which had negatively impacted GMD's legitimacy. As the initial plan was to consolidate GMD's political authority by constructing nationalism through *hanjian* trials, the collusion between Juntong and former *hanjian* eventually led to mass dissatisfaction. For instance, the appointment of Zhou Fohai caused a great distrust of GMD's willingness to execute nationalist agendas and bring justice. A journalist commented: "[T]he common people can only raise infuriated cries as they see how those people who used to bully and oppress them are still assuming and enjoying power."⁵⁹ The collusion between Juntong and *hanjian* not only led to people's disappointment in GMD's inability to perform just *hanjian* trials but also suspicions of the economic ties between GMD and *hanjian*. People's concerns were justified: severe corruption did take place when handling *hanjian* cases. Juntong attempted to protect some influential former *hanjian* own incentive of expanding political influence, but eventually ruined its wartime effort to post a patriotic posture.

Another aspect of Li Ze's case that drew public attention was the suspicion of a secret deal between GMD and Li Ze. A newspaper report openly questioned the transparency of Li Ze's sentence: "Li Ze tried to buy his innocence by stuffing gold bars into officials' pockets...since the beginning of this case, there probably have been more than a hundred officials who would be found guilty of corruption."⁶⁰ In another case, Liu Hongsheng, one of the most influential businessmen in Shanghai, bribed Dai Li to let his two sons accused of

⁵⁹ Pepper, *Civil War in China*, 12.

⁶⁰ *Xinxin gongsi jingli Li Ze hanjian de choushi* [The hideous history of *hanjian* Li Ze, the manager of Xinxin Company], Y15 (1–134), Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

collaboration escape conviction. At a party thrown by Dai Li, the two sons of Liu Hongsheng were treated as guests instead of suspects. The second son of Liu Hongsheng even considered Dai Li as his “personal bodyguard.”⁶¹ Yuan Lüden, Wen Lanting, and Lin Kanghou, the “three elders (sanlao 三老)” influential in Shanghai’s business circles, who were arrested by Juntong after the revindication of Shanghai, also received light sentences. While the GMD government claimed it was because of their contribution to resistance, public opinion still tended to believe they bought their way out.⁶² Together with the case of Luo Hongyi, we can deduce that bribing and secret deals between Juntong and *hanjian* suspects were quite common.

This public skepticism did not come out of nowhere; the corruption of Juntong was already an open secret. Immediately after the end of the war, Dai Li rushed to Shanghai and directed Juntong to not only arrest *hanjian* but also launch confiscation of *hanjian*’s properties. The process of confiscation was full of corruption. For example, among 52 confiscated mansions, 17 were privately taken by GMD organizations including Juntong.⁶³ Ye Yansun, a major general of Juntong, threatened Longhua Renyu Textile Factory involved in collaboration and blackmailed 70 *liang* of gold, and Renyu Grain Store for two million of

⁶¹ Sherman Cochran and Andrew Hsieh, *The Lius of Shanghai* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 260-263.

⁶² Zhu Jinyuan and Chen Zuen, *Wangwei shoushen jishi* [Documentaries of Wang Jingwei’s puppet regime on trial] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 1988), 109-110; Yuan Yuquan, “Wang weizhengquan kuatai qianhou [Before and after the fall of Wang Jingwei’s puppet regime],” in *Weiting youying lu: Dui Wang weizhengquan de huiyi jishi* [Records of the Shade of the Puppet Regime: Memories of Wang Jingwei’s Puppet Regime] (Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 1991), 364-366; Dongyoun Hwang, “Wartime Collaboration in Question: An Examination of the Postwar Trials of the Chinese Collaborators,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 6, no.1 (2005): 90.

⁶³ *Shanghai gaodeng fayuan jianchachu kouya hanjian fangwu weituo Zhongyang xintuoju diwei chanye qinglichu baoguan qingdan* [A list of *hanjian*’s houses confiscated by the Shanghai High Court Supervision Division entrusted the Central Trust Bureau, Division of Clearing Properties of the Enemy to keep], (Q187)-1-2, 30-32, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

National Currency.⁶⁴ Not only high Juntong officials, but also lower-level agents participated in the corrupt takeover. Wang Lei, a member of the Loyal Patriotic Army, received cars from former *hanjian* offices and sold them; the huge amount of money Wang Lei obtained even drew attention from Dai Li: “Wang took over assets from the former puppet regime without permission...[He] received a lot of assets from former puppet regime in the name of Loyal Patriotic Army.”⁶⁵ What was confiscated were not only assets of former *hanjian*, but also innocent civilians, even foreigners. For instance, an Italian civilian living in Shanghai found out his car was “borrowed” by Juntong agent Deng Baoxian to give to his superior Wu Boming.⁶⁶

People nicknamed GMD’s takeover of properties (*jieshou*/接收) as “disastrous takeover (*jieshou*/劫收).”⁶⁷ The disorder and corruption GMD brought led to great dissatisfaction among people. A leftist newspaper in Xi’an made doggerel to criticize the GMD government’s chaotic governance:

Look, the green cash is shining
Only fools would not make fortunes
Quickly to Shanghai to rake in
Our nation and ethnicity can fuck off!⁶⁸

⁶⁴ “Bi yu dikou *hanjian* tongdiao zhe [Punishing those who assemble enemies and *hanjian*],” *Xinhua ribao*, September 30, 1945.

⁶⁵ *Zhongmei hezuosuo daidian Shanghai shi jingchaju chaji Wang Lei, Ceng wu zhongyi jiuguo jun, size jieshou dichan (qiche dengwu) bianmai ji Shanghai shi jingchaju diaocha niming gaofa fanan Yang Deqing deng she ziyouhang zhuan jiejia feichedang touqie zhi cheliang gaizhuang chushou* [Telegram from the Sino-American Cooperative Organization about Shanghai Police Department investigated the case of Wang Lei, once a member of the Loyal Patriotic Army, who took over enemy’s assets (cars and so on) and sold off, and Shanghai Police Department investigated an anonymous report on Yang Deqing and others establishing business particularly to refit and sell cars stolen by street racers], February 1946, Q131-5-2297, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

⁶⁶ *Shanghai shi jingchaju guanyu yiqiao Kangboli zhi qiche bei juntong tewu zhanyong shi laiwan wenshu ji youguan cailiao* [Paperwork and related materials from Shanghai Police Department about of Italian citizen Canbury (transliteration)’s car being occupied by Juntong agents], October 31, 1945, Q131-5-647, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

⁶⁷ Frederic Wakeman Jr., *Hongxing zhaoyao Shanghai cheng, 1942-1952: Gongchandang dui shizheng jingcha de gaizao* [Red Star Over Shanghai: The Communist Transformation of the Municipal Police, 1942-1952] (Beijing: People’s Press, 2011), 23-24.

⁶⁸ Cui Guangling, “‘Jieshou’ yu Guomindang zhengquan zai dalu de xunsu fuwang [The “Disastrous Takeover” and the Quick Perish of GMD’s Dominance in Mainland China],” *Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue* 116, no.2 (1994): 55.

Newspapers and magazines in Shanghai collected even more doggerels: “expecting the government to come, things only got worse after the government came,” “business stopped to celebrate the victory, stomachs starved to welcome the GMD army,” “people came from the sky, people came from the earth, people in Shanghai cannot survive.”⁶⁹ A newspaper correspondent in Shanghai openly expressed his devastated feelings about the chaos that Juntong and GMD caused: “To whom can we complain? We do not have an organ to represent the opinion of the people.”⁷⁰ Another newspaper based in Chongqing also pointed out:

It is deplorable that the prestige of the National Government has been perceptibly lowered among the people. Why is this so? This question may be answered by answering the following: Why are the government officials who have disturbed the lives of the people ... not punished?... Why are the civil liberties of the people repeatedly violated? Let us be frank and direct. It is the government officials themselves who have undermined the credit of the Government with the people.⁷¹

The chaotic process of Juntong’s stationing in previously occupied areas illustrates the extent of its corruption. Their corruption led not only to economic disturbances, but also to a huge distrust among civilians. Shao Yulin, a GMD official, reported the corruption to Chiang with deep worry. From Shao Yulin’s perspective, “if (the situation) continues, though our territory had already been recaptured, we will lose people’s heart.”⁷² People started to realize the inequality in the confiscation and distribution of former *hanjian* properties. The take-over process overseen by Juntong became a process of corruption and appropriation for personal interests. Xia notices such a trend and writes: “Despite media and public scrutiny, many

⁶⁹ Cui, “Jieshou,” 55.

⁷⁰ Pepper, *Civil War in China*, 41.

⁷¹ Pepper, *Civil War in China*, 41.

⁷² Shao Yulin, *Shengli qianhou* [Before and After the Victory] (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1967), 76.

Nationalist officials turned the takeover process into a scandalous misappropriation of resources to which the common people had no access.”⁷³

Shao Yulin’s insights on the GMD government losing support from the civilians were soon proven. The Communist Party, as the biggest political rival of the GMD government, benefitted the most from the chaos Juntong and GMD produced after the war. For example, the GMD government ruled that every college student who was enrolled in schools in occupied areas must take mandatory exams to prove their loyalty to the nation to continue their student careers. The almost humiliating measure caused a great sentiment among students. John Leighton Stuart, the principal of Yenching University, openly stated that the GMD government was pushing these students to the Communist Party’s side.⁷⁴ Realizing the GMD government was losing popular support, the Communist Party moved to criticize the chaotic situations the government created and illustrated sympathies to the victims of such chaos.⁷⁵ Several of the press issues revealing the collusion between Juntong and Li Ze were published by Communist Party-controlled or pro-Communist Party newspapers and magazines. GMD’s loss of popular support directly caused the Communist Party to win it, which later became a trump card for the Communist Party in the Civil War.⁷⁶

Despite the Communist Party’s criticisms of GMD’s anti-*hanjian* measures, we still need to acknowledge that the Communist Party also executed violent operations and passed anti-*hanjian* regulations that were no less lenient than the GMD government; and, similar to how the GMD government turned *hanjian* trials into public spectacles to appeal to

⁷³ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 111.

⁷⁴ Pepper, *Civil War in China*, 38.

⁷⁵ Pepper, *Civil War in China*, 41.

⁷⁶ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 117.

nationalism, the Communist Party also performed public *hanjian* trials. For instance, in a public trial held in Xingtai, Hebei Province, around forty-five thousand people showed up to witness the final sentence of several collaborating county magistrates; similar public trials could also be found in other cities and provinces under the control of the Communist Party, with attendees ranging from hundreds to tens of thousands.⁷⁷ Rumor even said in some cases the Communist Party even sentenced some extremely notorious *hanjian* to death by *lingchi*.⁷⁸ The Communist Party shared similar measures in *hanjian* elimination with Juntong: appeal to popular sentiments and apply harsh punishments. Whereas, as the GMD government and Juntong enlarged *hanjian* recognition to cover everyone trying to survive under Japanese occupation, the Communist Party left a way out for the neutral commoners: as long as their *hanjian* crimes were not severe enough to do great harm to local communities, and they were willing to join the anti-Japanese force, their lives may be spared; they could even keep their own lands to restart their careers.⁷⁹

While this method is also seemingly similar to Juntong's collusion with *hanjian*, the Communist Party's anti-*hanjian* campaigns were much less criticized, not only because its honesty in handling *hanjian* cases won it a good reputation, but also because it took direct measures to win popular support. Properties and assets confiscated by the Communist Party were processed in a comparatively transparent way. For those who committed severe *hanjian*

⁷⁷ Editorial team of *The Script of the Chronicle of Tao Xingzhi*, research office of education theories, China National Institute of Education Sciences, ed., *Tao Xingzhi nianpu gao* [The Script of the Chronicle of Tao Xingzhi] (Beijing: Education Science Publishing House, 1982), 22; Meng Guoxiang and Cheng Tangfa, "Chengzhi *hanjian* gongzuo gaishu" [A brief account of the punishment of *hanjian*], *Minguo dang'an* 2 (1994): 108.

⁷⁸ *Lingchi* is a corporal punishment in imperial China, meaning to cut the criminal's flesh alive by slices. Wang Xiaohua, *Hanjian Dashenpan* [Great Trials of *hanjian*] (Nanjing: Nanjing Publishing House, 2005), 134-147.

⁷⁹ "Guanyu ruogan teshu tudi de chuli wenti [On the handling of several special types of land], *Jiefang ribao*, February 6, 1942.

crimes, their land would be reallocated to peasants; their assets would also be redistributed as public expenditures.⁸⁰ For example, in Xiangfan, Hubei Province, confiscated assets were invested to establish primary schools; in Rehe Province, the Communist Party distributed two million of Border Area Currency and a great deal of farm products to send to civilians along their march.⁸¹ This is not to say that the Communist Party did not keep anything to themselves; the distinction between the Communist Party and the GMD government was that the Communist Party could actually give out a large portion, if not all, of confiscated properties to civilians. At the same time, Juntong's measures seemed more like revenge with severe economic and political corruption.⁸² In an ordinance issued by the Party Committee of Huaibei Revolutionary Base on September 5th, 1945, "the level of popular resentment" was a guiding principle in handling *hanjian* cases. The ordinance also regulated: "those flagrant *hanjian* detained who deserve the death penalty, if there are people advocating to release them, shall not be released arbitrarily; if the popular appeals are authentic, those *hanjian* shall not be executed arbitrarily either."⁸³ The Communist Party paid more attention to its public image in handling *hanjian* cases, taking popular opinion into prior consideration, while Juntong, even though appealing to nationalism, collaborated with *hanjian* despite popular dissatisfaction. Naturally, the Communist Party, rather than the GMD government, gained more popular support. The handling of *hanjian* cases not only implies the incompetence of

⁸⁰ "Guanyu ruogan teshu tudi de chuli wenti."

⁸¹ Border Area Currency is the currency issued by the Communist Party. Hu Jiuming, Wen Liang, Xu Shijie, and Xu Guobao eds., *Xiangfan laoqu jiaoyu jianshi* [A Brief History of Education in Xiangfan Revolution Base] (Xiangfan: Xiangfan Revolution Base Education Research Committee, 1998), 69; Masui Koichi, *Kankan saiban shi* [History of *Hanjian* Trials] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1977), 291.

⁸² Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 177.

⁸³ Wang Xiaohua, Meng Guoxiang and Zhang Qingjun eds., *Guo gong kangzhan da sujian: Shangpian* [Great Anti-*hanjian* Campaigns of GMD and CCP: Volume 1] (Beijing: Zhongguo dangan chubanshe, 1996), 200-201.

the GMD government, but also sheds light on the victory of the Communist Party in the coming civil war. While Juntong's campaign failed to win popular support through *hanjian* punishment was not the only reason for the downfall of the GMD regime, the contrast between Juntong and the Communist Party's practices definitely contributed to a more communist-leaning public opinion.

Harsh Law for a Time of Turbulence: Consequences of the State of Exception

When Nieh Cheng killed Han K'uei a white halo pierced the sun.

聂政之刺韩傀也，白虹贯日。

—Zhan Guo Ce, *Strategies of Wei Book 4* 战国策·魏策四⁸⁴

Carl Schmitt, Nazi Germany's top political scientist brought up the idea of the “state of exception.” The state of exception, as Schmitt defines it, is a political state in which the sovereignty's order overrides legal procedure in times of emergency and turbulence. American political scientist George Schwab says: “Legally it usually means the temporary, partial or total suspension of ordinary and constitutional laws by the president to restore order.”⁸⁵ In the case of wartime, the concept was utilized to fit in the extreme conditions of the friend-or-foe binary created by war. As Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben's study on the state of exception suggests, the state of exception would lead to a “legal civil war,” allowing the regime to eliminate not only its political opponents, but also “entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system.”⁸⁶

Comparing the concept of the state of exception with GMD and Juntong's

⁸⁴ James Irving Crump, *Legends of the Warring States: Persuasions, Romances, and Stories from Chan-kuo Ts' e* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 1998), 129.

⁸⁵ George Schwab, *The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1966* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 7.

⁸⁶ Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, Trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 2.

enforcement of the anti-*hanjian* campaign, we can see a resemblance in both cases: the suspension of normal legal procedures as the law was executed by the will of the sovereign. As early as 1928, the Republic of China had already issued the Criminal Code marking a major departure of Republican laws from the traditions of imperial laws. The 1928 Criminal Code defined external aggression as a threat to the entire nation-state of China, rather than the Great Qing Code's definition as a danger to the imperial family.⁸⁷ However, as the war approached, the 1928 Criminal Code was replaced by more powerful, yet forceful codes. The issuing of the 1931 Emergency Law on Crimes Endangering the Republic 危害民国紧急治罪法 illustrated a trend to suspend its normal legal system facing the early stage of Japanese aggression. As the Regulations on Punishing *Hanjian* was issued in 1937, the state of "legal civil war" between patriotic Chinese people and *hanjian* was officially confirmed; the appointment of Juntong was a symbol of the beginning of the legal civil war, in which measures including assassination, blackmail, extortion, and kidnapping became a normalized terror. With the belief in "harsh law for a time of turbulence 刑乱国用重典," the GMD established military tribunals, putting suspected *hanjian* on trial under military law.⁸⁸ *Notices on Preventing Espionage and Eliminating Hanjian* listed three types of *hanjian* trials, all requiring the involvement of military tribunals.⁸⁹

Through the legalization of *hanjian* crimes, we can trace how "external aggression" during the war had changed. As the 1928 criminal code fractures from the Qing definition of the security of the royal family of Aisin Gioro, the involvement of Juntong made the

⁸⁷ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 22-23; Mühlhahn, *Criminal Justice in China*, 60-61.

⁸⁸ Sun Kekuan, "Lun dui fei junren de junfa shenpan [On Military Tribunals for Civilian Cases]," *Falü pinglun* 15, no.8 (October 1947): 1-2.

⁸⁹ *Fangdie sujian xuzhi*, 140-141.

separation of Chiang's authority and China's national security a complicated topic. As the *hanjian*-related laws indeed stressed their role in protecting China from Japanese aggression—as they had accomplished, and people would acknowledge—it also served Chiang's agenda to consolidate his power through nationalist postures, as Dai Li and Juntong recognized their responsibility as the executor of Chiang's will. Hence a paradox arises: Juntong's anti-*hanjian* campaigns maintained the GMD's legal authority, but at the same time sabotaged it by Juntong's ambiguous division between national security and Chiang's political agendas. The heavy reliance on Juntong's unconventional measures to enforce anti-*hanjian* laws consolidated GMD and Chiang Kai-shek's authority, but at the same time sabotaged and caused the dysfunction of GMD's legal system. Lü Xun summarized the extremely harsh punishments and lynching carried out by Juntong as the “retroaction of rule of man against the rule of law,” which “brought a certain amount of panic to society.”⁹⁰

While most scholars consider Dai Li and Juntong as the faithful executor of Chiang's will, they did not get along all the time (which is confirmed by Chiang's plan to constrain Juntong's power by appointing Xuan Tiewu). Moreover, Chiang and the GMD also considered revising the wartime legal system under the state of exception. The 1945 Regulations on Handling *Hanjian* Cases clearly stated that “political and military offices shall send materials about *hanjian*'s activities, properties, and other aspects to prosecutors to investigate after high courts and their branches in recaptured areas once started to operate.”⁹¹

Ju Zheng, a senior member of GMD and the head of the Judicial Yuan, also expressed his

⁹⁰ Lü Xun, “Kangri zhanzheng yu Guomindang chengsu *hanjian* yundong [War Resisting Japan and GMD's Anti-*Hanjian* Campaign],” *Shehui kexue yanjiu* no. 6 (2019): 147, 152.

⁹¹ “Chuli *hanjian* anjian tiaoli [Regulations on Handling *Hanjian* Cases],” in *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu xia* [Records of Interrogating *Hanjian* of Wang Jingwei's Puppet Regime, Volume 2], ed. Nanjing Municipal Archive (Nanjing: Phoenix Publishing House, 2004), 1442.

wish to abandon the wartime legal system and reestablish China's legal normalcy. He openly stated: "During the War of Resistance, we had made several special laws and regulations to meet the need of reality. At the beginning of the 34th year of the Republic, we knew that victory was about to come; hence, we must prepare for demobilization and making postwar laws." He also announced that the GMD government was already taking action: the Judicial Yuan had drafted several regulations and submitted them to the legislative branch to be reviewed.⁹² The vision of normalizing China's legal system never came to fruition, in spite of Ju Zheng's appeal. The War of Resistance that lasted for a decade and the following Civil War with the Communist Party made it extremely hard for the GMD regime to abandon the wartime legal system. On top of that, the skyrocketing numbers of *hanjian* cases after the war with Japan put tremendous pressure on the courts, giving the GMD government no choice but to continue to rely on Juntong to carry out trials.⁹³ The state of exception did not end after the state of exception; the wartime legal system still operated as it had been during wartime. The legal civil war against *hanjian* remained a continuity China inherited from its war with Japan.

As Juntong largely interfered with China's judicial system in the name of wartime national security, they argued that the survival of China in the face of Japanese aggression was the priority instead of maintaining legal normalcy. This statement was unquestionably true; even during the wartime, the Communist Party confirmed Juntong's achievement in resisting Japanese aggression. For example, *Wenxian* magazine held by Communist Party

⁹² Ju Zheng, "Weishenme yao chongjian Zhongguo faxi [Why Reestablishing China's Legal System is Needed]," in *Weishenme yao chongjian Zhongguo faxi: Ju Zheng fazheng wenxuan* [Why Reestablishing China's Legal System is Needed: Selective Works of Ju Zheng on Political Science and Law], eds. Fan Zhongxin, You Chenjun, and Gong Xianzhai (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2009), 71.

⁹³ Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 78.

member Qian Xingcun issued an article praising agents in the Loyal Patriotic Army: “They—whether they are workers and peasants, young intellectuals, even bandits and hooligans—all united under the banner of loyalism and patriotism, seeking national salvation through resisting Japan.”⁹⁴ Modern scholars in China also tend to acknowledge Juntong’s achievements in fighting against aggressors.⁹⁵ Going even further, Wakeman proposed a potential direct causal relationship between Juntong’s operations and China’s eventual victory over Japanese aggression: Juntong’s assassination of eminent *hanjian* Chen Lu and Xi Shitai led to Japan’s overreaction, threatening to use fierce measures to secure the safety of Japanese forces in Shanghai’s foreign concessions, which caused the breakdown of the relationship between the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. decided to end commercial interactions with Japan and activate embargos, leading to the breakout of the Pacific War and the grand finale of the War in Asia. As Wakeman investigates the butterfly effect of China’s victory in the war, “wartime terrorists were the first to cast the die.”⁹⁶

However, this state of exception was not without cost. As Mühlhahn suggests, “Ideas of justice and fairness receded into the background, as the notion of being caught in a struggle for survival began to hold sway. Expedient systems of justice evolved that were crooked,

⁹⁴ Song Tao, “Zhongyi jiuguo jun: Huoyue yu dongzhanchang zhi minzhong wuzhuang [Loyal Patriotic Army: mass armed force in the eastern battlefield], *Wenxian*, December 1938, D2-0-71-140, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

⁹⁵ Yang Yun, “Juntong Shanghai kangri chujian huodong yanjiu: Yi 1939 nian wei zhongxin [Juntong’s Activities of Resisting Japan and Eliminating *Hanjian* in Shanghai: Centering Around 1939]” (MA Thesis, Shanghai Normal University, 2014), 1-2, 41-44, 47-48; Sun Yongqi, “Juntong Shanghai kangri chujian huodong yanjiu: Yi 1940, 1941 nian wei zhongxin [Juntong’s Activities of Resisting Japan and Eliminating *Hanjian* in Shanghai: Centering Around 1940 and 1941]” (MA Thesis, Shanghai Normal University, 2016), 2-3, 43-45, 47-48; Wang Shaolong, “1942-1945 nian Juntong Shanghai kangri huodong yanjiu: Yi chujian he cefan wei zhongxin [Juntong’s Activities of Resisting Japan in Shanghai, 1942-1945: Centering Around *Hanjian* Elimination and Defection Incitement]” (MA Thesis, Shanghai Normal University, 2017), 2, 42-48, 52-53; Sun Xiaoxiao, *Juntong dui ri zhan jiemi* [Uncovering Juntong’s War Against Japan] (Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 2016), v-vi.

⁹⁶ Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*, 5.

unreliable, and open to political intervention.”⁹⁷ Relying on Juntong was a double-edged sword for GMD and Chiang. On the one hand, Dai Li and Juntong could be said to indeed be meritorious during wartime: they successfully confirmed the legitimacy of Chiang’s nationalist posture and assisted the national effort against Japanese imperialism through their harsh actions against *hanjian*. At the same time, Juntong should also be considered responsible for the numerous unjust trials based on their ambiguous recognition of *hanjian* and the almost unlimited power to exercise means like assassination and extortion. Juntong’s arbitrary abuse of power not only brought long-term terror to the Chinese people, but also undermined GMD’s legal system. In addition, Juntong also engaged in secret deals with former *hanjian* to expand its political influence and caused instability in recaptured areas. As the representative of the GMD government, Juntong’s arbitrariness caused great dissent among civilians. People not only questioned the fairness of *hanjian* trials, worrying that Juntong may cover up traitors, but also criticized and satirized Juntong’s corruption in the process of liquidating *hanjian*’s properties. The Communist Party took advantage of Juntong and GMD’s corrupt anti-*hanjian* campaigns to promote their agendas and gained popular support through the comparison between their relatively trustworthy anti-*hanjian* operations and that of GMD’s. While GMD did consider constraining Juntong’s interference in *hanjian* trials, social realities eventually hindered the government from taking steps further before people were completely disappointed. The employment of Juntong presented an unsolved puzzle for Chiang: his legitimacy was being consolidated and sabotaged at the same time. Juntong was utilized by the GMD government and Chiang to resolve wartime problems, but

⁹⁷ Mühlhahn, *Criminal Justice in China*, 128.

eventually became a part of the problem itself. Juntong forced the GMD government into a Faustian bargain: to operate anti-*hanjian* campaigns and consolidate nationalism and the ideological foundation of the party, the government must give up a great extent of legal authority and trust among civilians in exchange.

The ancient Chinese text *Strategies of the Warring States* 战国策 recorded the story of a legendary assassin Nie Zheng. The story begins with a political coup in the state of Han: the scholarly official Yan Sui was purged by his political opponent Han Kui and fled from the state of Han to the city where Nie Zheng lived. Yan Sui held a grudge and decided to seek a way to take revenge on Han Kui. Having heard Nie Zheng, a local man of valor, Yan Sui purposefully approached him and made friends. After knowing Yan Sui was absconding from a political purge, Nie Zheng decided to seek revenge for his friend; he went to the capital of the state of Han all alone. At the time the state of Han was holding a feast. Nie Zheng seized the opportunity, jumped onto Han Kui, and violently pierced him with a sword. After assassinating Han Kui, Nie Zheng killed tens of bodyguards present at the feast, disfigured his own face so that no one could recognize him, and then committed suicide. Rumor shrouded Nie Zheng's assassination in mystery, saying there was a "white halo piercing the Sun" as Nie Zheng pierced Han Kui.⁹⁸

Two thousand years later, as if an echo of destiny, the GMD government drew its sword called Juntong to pierce the rising Sun of the Great Japanese Empire. Chiang and Dai Li absorbed the spirit of heroism from Chinese classics, hoping Juntong agents could align with that heroism, become Nie Zheng of their time, and achieve national salvation from

⁹⁸ Crump, *Legends of the Warring States*, 125-129.

Japanese aggression. What the GMD government did not expect was that Juntong was a double-edged sword; what it pierced was not only the ambition of the Japanese Empire to establish a new order in East Asia but also the legitimacy of the GMD government itself.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

“Bi Gaokui chezhi, Shu Yueqiao huo Jiang zhuxi fuhan [Bi Gaokui was dismissed, and Shu Yueqiao received a reply from Generalissimo Chiang].” *Dagong bao*, January 15, 1946.

“Bi Gaokui yajie Nanjing, Li Ze jiang gongkai shenxun [Bi Gaokui was sent to Nanjing, and Li Ze will be interrogated publicly].” *Wenhui Bao*, January 24, 1946.

“Bi yu dikou *hanjian* tongdiao zhe [Punishing those who resemble enemies and *hanjian*].” *Xinhua ribao*, September 30, 1945.

Chen Bulei. Jiang Zhongzheng dang, Guojia cuoshi (2) [Chiang Kai-shek collections, National Measures (2)]. *Chen Bulei zhi Chen Cheng Enshi diliu zhanqu zhangguanbu jiu yidang wenti zhenggong huiyi han* [Letter from Chen Bulei to Chen Cheng’s ministerial headquarters of the 6th war zone in Enshi about the issue of other political parties]. November 27, 1940. 002-080204-00002-002, Academia Historica, Taipei.

Chiang Kai-shek. Jiang Zhongzheng dang, Choubi—Kangzhan shiqi (30) [Chiang Kai-shek collections, Plans: Era of the War of Resistance (30)]. *Jiang Zhongzheng zhi Guo Chan dian* [Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Guo Chan], December 5, 1939. 002 - 010300-00030-015, Academia Historica, Taipei.

“Chuli *hanjian* anjian tiaolin [Regulations on Handling *Hanjian* Cases].” In *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu xia* [Records of Interrogating *Hanjian* of Wang Jingwei’s Puppet Regime, Volume 2], edited by Nanjing Municipal Archive. Nanjing: Pheonix Publishing House, 2004.

Cui, Wei and Ouyang Hongying, directors. *Xiaobing Zhang Ga* [Zhang Ga the Soldier Boy]. Beijing Film Studio, 1963. 1:40:13.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=Qpm2l017qDE>.

Dai Li dian Guo Lüzhou suobu yu Zhang Huifang bu kaijin Shanghai weichi zhian bili Zhongyang jieshou [Dai Li’s telegram to the units of Guo Lüzhou and Zhang Huifang to enter Shanghai to maintain order and assist the central government’s reception of properties]. In *Dai Li xiansheng yu kangzhan shiliao huibian: Zhongmei hezuosuo de yewu* [Historical materials of Mr. Dai Li and the War of Resistance: Responsibilities of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization], edited by Wu Shufeng. Taipei: Academia Historica, 2011.

Dai Li. Dai Li dang, Guofang bu junshi qingbaoju [Dai Li collections, Bureau of Military Intelligence, Department of National Defense]. *Dai Li zhi Jiang Zhongzheng sanshisi*

nian ju gongzuo baogao [Dai Li's work report of the Bureau to Chiang Kai-shek at the 34th year of the Republic], January 28, 1946. 148-010400-0001, Academia Historica, Taipei.

Dai Li. *Zhengzhi zhentan* [Political Detective]. Nanjing: Political Department, Military Affairs Commission, National Government, 1938.

Da Qing Xuanzong cheng (Daoguang) huangdi shilu [An honest record of the Daoguang Emperor of the Great Qing], vol. 338. Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964.

Fangdie sujian xuzhi [Notices on Preventing Espionage and Eliminating *Hanjian*]. In *Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shiliao congkan* [Series of Historical materials of China's War Resisting Japan], vol. 357, edited by Yu Heping. Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe, 2016.

“Guanyu ruogan teshu tudi de chuli wenti [On the handling of several special types of land].” *Jiefang ribao*, February 6, 1942.

Huang Kangyong. *Wo suozhidao de Juntong xingshuai: Yuan Guomindang Juntong shaojiang de huiyi* [The Rise and Fall of Juntong that I know: Memories of a Former Major General of GMD's Juntong],” edited by Zhu Wenchu. Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 2005.

Huang Ruitang. *Huang Ruitang de Zhengming xin* [A letter of identification from Huang Ruitang], April 1946. (Q118) 12-31-24, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

“Jushuo shi jiu, Bi Gaokui chezhi [It is said that Bi Gaokui was dismissed because of his failure of old cases].” *Wenhui Bao*, January 16, 1946.

Ju Zheng, “Weishenme yao chongjian Zhongguo faxi [Why Reestablishing China's Legal System is Needed].” In *Weishenme yao chongjian Zhongguo faxi: Ju Zheng fazheng wenxuan* [Why Reestablishing China's Legal System is Needed: Selective Works of Ju Zheng on Political Science and Law], edited by Fan Zhongxin, You Chenjun, and Gong Xianzhai. Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2009.

Judicial Yuan. *Sifayuan dang, Junweihui hanqing jieshi zai weizuzhi nei fuwu ying ruhe lunzui* [Judicial Yuan Collections, Letter from the Military Affairs Commission inquiring about how to prosecute those who served in puppet organizations]. *Sifayuan yijue* [Resolution passed by Judicial Yuan]. August 1, 1940, 015-010311-0005, Academia Historica, Taipei.

Juntong de zhengmingxin [A letter of identification from Juntong], April 4, 1946. (Q118) 12-31-27, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

Junweihui diaocha tongji ju linian xingdong chengguo tongjibiao [Table of statistics on Juntong's operations and results by year], 1938–45. 148-020100-0005, Academia Historica, Taipei.

“Li Ze an zuo xuanpan: jinchu tuxing sannian [Li Ze's case convicted yesterday: only a three-year sentence].” *Shidai ribao*, June 9, 1946

“Li Ze zuo panxing sannian: Yuan jianju ren renwei pande taiqing [Li Ze convicted for a three-year sentence yesterday: plaintiffs consider the sentence too light].” *Wenhui Bao*, June 9, 1946.

Luo Zhufeng, ed. *Hanyu da cidian* [The comprehensive Chinese dictionary], vol. 6. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1990.

Qianfu [Lurk]. Episode 15. YouTube, 45:12. April 27, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bCdvwol-vEk&list=PL7Hz9GT50Q3wIMV8TaaZxtBPILFzwDnjx&index=12>.

Military Affairs Commission, National Government, ed. *Mingmo hanjian liezhuan* [Biographies of *Hanjians* in the Fall of Ming]. Nanjing: Military Affairs Commission, 1936.

Minguo dang, Guanyu zhanlingqu de youji budui ji tegong renyuan bude jie bu *hanjian* jubu jumin deng de daidian [Republic of China collections, Telegrams on forbidding guerilla units and secret service agents in occupied areas to arrest civilians in the name of arresting *hanjian*]. *Zhongguo Guomindang Henan shengwei zhixing weiyuanhui daidian* [Telegram from Executive Committee of Henan Province, GMD]. October 25, 1945. M0002-015-00418-001, Henan Provincial Archive, Zhengzhou.

Riwei Shanghai tebieshi Nanhui xianzhengfu wei huibao qianren Zhuqiao jingchasuozhang Qiao Wangyun Beihai qingkuang bing qing tonglingxieji de cheng (fu junshiweiyuanhui biedongjun, zhongyijiuguojun Pudong zhengzhi tepaiyuan dier zhidui bu gonggao) [Memorial from Nanhui County, Shanghai Special City, Japanese puppet regime to report the murder case of Qiao Wangyun former director of Zhuqiao Police Station and request an order to assist investigation (Affiliating the announcement of second detachment, Pudong Political Commissioner, Loyal and Patriotic Army, Special Movement Corps, Military Affairs Commission)], April 1945, 19450402 19450409 R4-1-148-21, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

Riwei Shanghai tebieshi Pudongnanqu gongshu guanyu songtai kezhan matou jingli Ni Youliang jiehuo wei junshiweiyuanhui bieongjun zhongyijiuguojun Pudong zhengzhi tepaiyuan banshichu dierzhidui bu konghehan de cheng [Memorial from Pudongnan District Office about Ni Youliang, shipping manager of Songtai Hotel, receiving a threatening letter from second detachment, Pudong Political Commissioner, Loyal and

Patriotic Army, Special Movement Corps, Military Affairs Commission]. March 1945, 19450314 R4-1-150-1, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

Sanshiwu nian benwu gongzuo jihua [Bureau's work plan at the 35th year of the Republic], January 1946-July 1946,.148-0101400-0001, Dai Li dang, Guofang bu junshi qingbaoju, Academia Historica, Taipei.

Shanghai gaodeng fayuan jianchachu kouya hanjian fangwu weituo Zhongyang xintuoju diwei chanye qinglichu baoguan qingdan [A list of *hanjian*'s houses confiscated by the Shanghai High Court Supervision Division entrusted the Central Trust Bureau, Division of Clearing Properties of the Enemy to keep]. (Q187)-1-2, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

Shanghai Police Department. *Shanghai shi jingchaju guanyu yiqiao Kangboli zhi qiche bei juntong tewu zhanyong shi laiwang wenshu ji youguan cailiao* [Paperwork and related materials from Shanghai Police Department about of Italian citizen Canbury (transliteration)'s car being occupied by Juntong agents]. October 31, 1945. Q131-5-647, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

Shanghaishi meishangye tongye gonghui jie Tiexue chujiantuan jinggao benye jianshang fanmai rimei youguan wenshu [Documents on the Shanghai Coal Association and their responses to the Iron and Blood *Hanjian*-Elimination Team], August 1932–August 1937, (S304)-1-158, 1-10, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

Shao Yulin. *Shengli qianhou* [Before and After the Victory]. Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1967.

Shen Zui and Wen Qiang. *Dai Li qiren* [The Person Dai Li]. Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 1980.

Shu Peiquan, ed. *Hanjian*. Guilin: Qiandao shuju, 1937.

Sino-American Cooperative Organization. *Zhongmei hezuosuo daidian Shanghai shi jingchaju chaji Wang Lei, Ceng wu zhongyi jiuguo jun, size jieshou dichan (qiche dengwu) bianmai ji Shanghai shi jingchaju diaocha niming gaofa fanan Yang Deqing deng she ziyouhang zhuan jieqia feichedang touqie zhi cheliang gaizhuang chushou* [Telegram from the Sino-American Cooperative Organization about Shanghai Police Department investigated the case of Wang Lei, once a member of the Loyal Patriotic Army, who took over enemy's assets (cars and so on) and sold off, and Shanghai Police Department investigated an anonymous report on Yang Deqing and others establishing business particularly to refit and sell cars stolen by street racers]. February 1946. Q131-5-2297, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

Song Tao. "Zhongyi jiuguo jun: Huoyue yu dongzhanchang zhi minzhong wuzhuang [Loyal

Patriotic Army: mass armed force in the eastern battlefield]. *Wenxian*, December 1938. D2-0-71-140, Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

Sun Yaodong. *Fushi Wanxiang* [Phenomena in the World of Turbulence], edited by Song Luxia. Shanghai: Shanghai Education Publishing House, 2005.

Tang Zong. *Zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian de banian: shicongshi gaoji muliao tangzong riji* [Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek: Journal of Tang Zong, Superior Advisor of Attendant's Office], edited by. Pan Jiazhao, Zhong Min, Hou Junhua, and Li Muzhen. Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1991.

Xinxin gongsi jingli Li Ze hanjian de choushi [The hideous history of *hanjian* Li Ze, the manager of Xinxin Company]. Y15 (1–134), Shanghai Municipal Archive, Shanghai.

Zhang Qiyun, ed. *Zhongwen da cidian* [The encyclopedic dictionary of the Chinese language]. Taipei: Hwa Kang Publishing Center, 1967.

Secondary Sources

Agamben, Giorgio. *State of Exception*. Translated by Kevin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015.

Brook, Timothy. *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Cochran, Sherman and Andrew Hsieh. *The Lius of Shanghai*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.

Crump, James Irving. *Legends of the Warring States: Persuasions, Romances, and Stories from Chan-kuo Ts'ue*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 1998.

Cui Guangling. “‘Jieshou’ yu Guomingdang zhengquan zai dalu de xunsu baiwang [The “Disastrous Reception” and the Quick Perish of GMD’s Dominance in Mainland China].” *Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue* 116, no. 2 (1994): 54-59.

Editorial team of *The Script of the Chronicle of Tao Xingzhi*, research office of education theories, China National Institute of Education Sciences, ed. *Tao Xingzhi nianpu gao* [The Script of the Chronicle of Tao Xingzhi]. Beijing: Education Science Publishing House, 1982.

Hu Jiuming, Wen Liang, Xu Shijie, and Xu Guobao eds. *Xiangfan laoqu jiaoyu jianshi* [A Brief History of Education in Xiangfan Revolution Base]. Xiangfan: Xiangfan Revolution Base Education Research Committee, 1998.

- Hwang, Dongyoun. "Wartime Collaboration in Question: An Examination of the Postwar Trials of the Chinese Collaborators." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 6, no.1 (2005): 75-97.
- Jiang Shaozhen. *Dai Li he Juntong* [Dai Li and Juntong]. Zhengzhou: Henan People's Publishing House, 1994.
- Liu Ximing. *Weijun: Qiangquan jingzhu xia de qizi (1937-1949)* [The Collaborationist Army: The Pawn in the Struggle of Powers, 1937-1949]. Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2002.
- Lü Xun. "Kangri zhanzheng yu Guomindang chengsu *hanjian* yundong [War Resisting Japan and GMD's Anti-*Hanjian* Campaign]." *Shehui kexue yanjiu* no. 6 (2019): 145-156.
- Masui Koichi. *Kankan saiban shi* [History of *Hanjian* Trials]. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1977.
- Meng Guoxiang and Cheng Tangfa. "Chengzhi *hanjian* gongzuo gaishu" [A brief account of the punishment of *hanjian*]." *Minguo dangan* 2 (1994): 105-112.
- Mühlhahn, Klaus. *Criminal Justice in China: A History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Pan Min. "20 shiji 80 niandai yilai chengzhi *hanjian* yanjiu zongshu [An Overview of Studies on *Hanjian* Punishment since the 1980s]." *Kangri zhanzheng yanjiu* no.3 (2010): 147-152.
- Pepper, Suzanne. *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.
- Schoppa, Keith. "Patterns and Dynamics of Elite Collaboration in Occupied Shaoxing County," In *Collaboration with Japan, 1937-45: The Limits of Accommodation*, edited by David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Schwab, George. *The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1966*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.
- Smith, Norman. *Resisting Manchukuo: Chinese Women Writers and the Japanese Occupation*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007.
- Sun Daocui. "'Koudai zui' de xingfa dingwei chongshu [Restatement of the Role of 'Pocket Crimes' in Criminal Law]." *Journal of National Prosecutors College* no. 1 (2022): 105-122.
- Sun Kekuan. "Lun dui fei junren de junfa shenpan [On Military Tribunals for Civilian

Cases].” *Falü pinglun* 15, no.8 (October 1947): 1–2.

Sun Xiaoxiao, *Juntong duiri zhan jiemi* [Uncovering Juntong’s War Against Japan]. Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 2016.

Sun Yongqi. “Juntong Shanghai kangri chujian huodong yanjiu: Yi 1940, 1941 nian wei zhongxin [Juntong’s Activities of Resisting Japan and Eliminating *Hanjian* in Shanghai: Centering Around 1940 and 1941].” MA Thesis, Shanghai Normal University, 2016.

Wakeman Jr., Frederic. *Hongxing zhaoyao Shanghai cheng, 1942-1952: Gongchandang dui shizheng jingcha de gaizao* [Red Star Over Shanghai: The Communist Transformation of the Municipal Police, 1942-1952]. Beijing: People’s Press, 2011.

Wakeman Jr., Fredric. “*Hanjian* (Traitor)! Collaboration and Retribution in Wartime Shanghai,” in *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond*, edited by Wenhsin Yeh. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

Wakeman Jr., Fredric. *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Wakeman Jr., Fredric. *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Wang Chunying. “Zhanhou ‘jingji hanjian’ shenpan: Yi Shanghai Xinxin gongsi Li Ze an weili [Postwar Trials of ‘Economic *Hanjian*’: A Case Study of Li Ze from Xinxin Company, Shanghai].” *Lishi yanjiu* no.2 (2008):132-145.

Wang Shaolong. “1942-1945 nian Juntong Shanghai kangri huodong yanjiu: Yi chujian he cefan wei zhongxin [Juntong’s Activities of Resisting Japan in Shanghai, 1942-1945: Centering Around *Hanjian* Elimination and Defection Incitement].” MA Thesis, Shanghai Normal University, 2017.

Wang Xiaohua, *Hanjian Dashenpan* [Great Trials of *hanjian*]. Nanjing: Nanjing Publishing House, 2005.

Wang Xiaohua, Meng Guoxiang and Zhang Qingjun eds. *Guo gong kangzhan da sujian: Shangpian* [Great Anti-*hanjian* Campaigns of GMD and CCP: Volume 1]. Beijing: Zhongguo dangan chubanshe, 1996.

Wen Fei, ed. *Wo suozhidao de hanjian Zhou Fohai* [The *Hanjian* Zhou Fohai that I Know]. Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 2005.

Xia Yun. *Down with Traitors: Justice and Nationalism in Wartime China*. Seattle: University

of Washington Press, 2017.

Yang Yun. “Juntong Shanghai kangri chujian huodong yanjiu: Yi 1939 nian wei zhongxin [Juntong’s Activities of Resisting Japan and Eliminating *Hanjian* in Shanghai: Centering Around 1939].” MA Thesis, Shanghai Normal University, 2014.

Yang Zhiyi. *Poetry, History, Memory: Wang Jingwei and China in Dark Times*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2023.

Yeh Wen-hsin. “Urban Warfare and Underground Resistance: Heroism in the Chinese Secret Service during the War of Resistance.” In *Wartime Shanghai*, edited by Yeh Wen-hsin. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Yuan Yuquan. “Wang weizhengquan kuatai qianhou [Before and after the fall of Wang Jingwei’s puppet regime].” In *Weiting youying lu: Dui Wang weizhengquan de huiyi jishi* [Records of the Shade of the Puppet Regime: Memories of Wang Jingwei’s Puppet Regime]. Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 1991.

Zanasi, Margherita. “Globalizing *Hanjian*: the Suzhou Trials and the Post-World War II Discourse on Collaboration.” *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 3 (Jun 2008): 731-751.

Zhu Jinyuan and Chen Zuen. *Wangwei shoushen jishi* [Documentaries of Wang Jingwei’s puppet regime on trial]. Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 1988.