



Portuguese Liberal Imperialism: A Study in its Rise, Character, and Practice (1820-1910)

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June 2025

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A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the
Master of Arts Program in the Committee on International Relations.

Additionally presented to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors.

*Proud o'er the rest, with splendid wealth array'd,
As crown to this wide empire, Europe's head,
Fair Lusitania smiles, the western bound,
Whose verdant breast the rolling waves surround,
Where gentle evening pours her lambent ray,
The last pale gleaming of departing day;
This, this, O mighty king, the sacred earth,
This the loved parent-soil that gave me birth.*

Luís Vaz de Camões (trans. Mickle, 1877), *Os Lusíadas*, Book III, Verse 20.¹

¹ All translations, except for the above, are my own.

Contents

Acknowledgements	4
Abstract.....	5
Introduction	6
Literature	9
Portuguese Historical Dependency on its Colonies.....	13
The Rise of Portuguese Liberalism	16
The Character of Portuguese Liberalism	21
The Character of Portuguese Liberal Imperialism	27
The Practice of Portuguese Liberal Imperialism	35
Implications of Portuguese Liberal Imperialism	44
Conclusion.....	48
Future Research	49
Bibliography	51

Acknowledgements

Thank you to my parents who have always infected me with a love for those who walked so I might run.

Thank you to Professor Jennifer Pitts and Professor Linnea Turco for their boundless support.

Abstract

This thesis argues that the economic dependency of the Second Portuguese empire on its colonies through the 18th century was a fundamental factor in the construction of a unique Portuguese variety of liberal imperialism which consolidated illiberal colonial expansion and domestic liberal practices as coexisting national ideas. Portuguese liberals following the Civil War failed to extend their vision of extending equal political and judicial representation to their colonial subjects, choosing instead to impose vehemently illiberal practices that served to maintain a decadent colonial empire through force and might as opposed to equality. The thesis traces the *dual necessity* of Portuguese statesmen to simultaneously reform an illiberal ultramarine empire and to sustain a weak, underdeveloped Portuguese economy dependent on colonial exploitation. This thesis ultimately seeks to deliver an argument that forces scholars of liberalism and empire to reconsider their focus on the British, Dutch, and French, and compel them to widen their case study window to include Portugal and its unique liberal imperial processes.

Abstrato

Esta tese defende que a dependência económica do Segundo Império Português em relação às suas colónias durante o século XVIII foi um fator fundamental na construção de uma variedade portuguesa única de imperialismo liberal que consolidou a expansão colonial iliberal e as práticas liberais domésticas como ideias nacionais coexistentes. Após a Guerra Civil, os liberais portugueses não conseguiram alargar a sua visão de igualdade de representação política e judicial aos seus súbditos coloniais, optando, em vez disso, por impor práticas veementemente iliberais que serviram para manter um império colonial decadente através da força e do poder, em oposição à igualdade. A tese traça a *dupla necessidade* dos estadistas portugueses de reformar simultaneamente um império ultramarino iliberal e de sustentar uma economia portuguesa fraca e subdesenvolvida, dependente da exploração colonial. Esta tese procura, em última análise, apresentar um argumento que obrigue os académicos do liberalismo e do império a reconsiderar o seu foco nos impérios britânicos, holandeses e franceses, e os obrigue a alargar a sua janela de estudo para incluir Portugal e os seus processos imperiais liberais únicos.

Introduction

During the time of the Second Portuguese Empire (1663-1822), the essence of Portugal was Brazil; without the economic benefits it provided, Portugal would not have had the diplomatic power that it was able to wield in the 17th and 18th centuries.² Having isolated itself from European affairs after the dissolution of the Iberian Union, Portugal, unlike other modern European states, had not industrialized. As it entered the 19th century, Portugal was inarguably a backward state compared to its European neighbors. Backward indeed, but not poor; instead of industrializing, the previous century had been spent building up an economy from tariffs on gold, sugar, and tobacco from the Atlantic Islands and especially Brazil.³ Portugal, or to be accurate, its nobility, had become one of the richest in Europe; they rode in lavish carriages, their churches were bathed in gold ornaments, and beautiful palaces were built⁴, but this was not parallel to reversing the trend of decline in relation to Europe's "advanced core" that began in the 17th century.⁵ Portugal was a rural state without industry or any dependable domestic exports⁶; yes, it had regained its prominence but had, in the process, become mortally dependent on its colonial jewel.

It is this paper's argument that the economic dependency of the Portuguese empire on its colonies through the 18th century⁷ was a fundamental factor in the construction of a unique Portuguese variety of *liberal imperialism* which consolidated anti-liberal colonial expansion

² De Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* v.1, 431.

³ Ibid, 380.

⁴ Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal* (Second Edition), 67.

⁵ Costa, Palma, and Reis. *The Great Escape? The Contribution of the Empire to Portugal's Economic Growth, 1500-1800*.

⁶ Apart from perhaps wine, which had become the root of profitable trade deals with England, but even it had been abused to the point that wheat, maize and other core plants weren't being grown to make room for grapes, further showing the obsession with developing an economy based on satisfying external buyers as opposed to developing the Portuguese domestic economy.

⁷ And, certainly, throughout its history.

and domestic liberal practices as coexisting national ideas. Accepted by liberal political leaders as a national necessity, the maintenance of a colonial empire through despotic, illiberal means was justified as an economic need alongside the expanding liberal state. Through the analysis of individual Portuguese liberals,⁸ this paper proposes that the constitutional monarchy constructed a state which embraced its colonial project as a requirement to maintain economic prosperity and international prestige; it is this *dual necessity* of liberal political growth and colonial economic dependency which led to liberal imperialism and is the main focus of this paper.

The overarching literature this piece fits into revolves around explaining how the 19th century became, simultaneously, the century of liberalism *and* the century of colonial empires. In recent decades, theorists like Jennifer Pitts, Uday Singh Mehta, Duncan Bell, and others have taken on this challenge wholeheartedly, and have discovered fascinating answers for the question why the wholly distinct projects of imperialism and liberalism came together time and again so seamlessly. These scholars have found that in many ways those two ideas not only failed to clash but also formally built and aided each other to create liberal empires that dominated global politics for much of the nineteenth century. Liberal empires became so ubiquitous that theorists did not question their character until only very recently. Ultimately, while this exercise has been done by the scholars mentioned above, there is a distinct lack of literature on the Portuguese empire, that, while not as large as the French or British, was the first and last empire in Africa. In its purest sense, the unique articulation of Portuguese liberal imperialism is the subject of my thesis. Portugal was exceptionally dependent from an economic standpoint, possessed a unique historical tradition of liberalism, unique approach

⁸ Also, a reference must be left to de Ferreira Borges, Garrett, and Herculano, although these aren't discussed.

to empire-making, and endured a unique liberal civil war just as the African continent became colonized. To explore this mélange of issues is also to shed light on an unavoidably understudied section of liberalism and empire. This thesis seeks to halt the underrepresentation of Portugal in this area by demonstrating that the Third Portuguese Empire is a vital case for understanding modern liberal imperial thought.

This paper is organized as follows. First, I will provide an overview of the literature on liberalism and empire. Many of the theoretical frameworks and conclusions this literature has provided are invaluable structures and basis of reasoning for my argument. Then, I will provide a historical analysis of the second Portuguese Empire (1663-1822) I will do this with the specific goal of demonstrating the economic dependency Portugal suffered from in relation to its colonies. This is vital because I will observe that this economic dependency far surpassed any relationship that existed in other 18th century ultramarine empires, and precipitated the unindustrialized and largely rural character of the Portuguese economy heading into the 19th century. In the following sections I will outline my theory of Portuguese liberalism and provide my own political reasoning for its rise. The seemingly ancient history of liberal ideas in Portugal, stretching back to the founding of the state, I suggest, also proved to be a decisive factor in the unique brand of the ideology practiced in Portugal. Coupled with this ideology, I will detail the liberal imperialist theory that this economic dependency convinced revolutionaries to erect. The conflict between political state-making and economic dependency is what I will term the *dual necessity*. In the same section I will also examine the reality of Portuguese liberal imperialism, and the radical differences between *de jure* and *de facto* applications of the concept. In exploring the *de facto* aspects of the Portuguese colonial project in Africa, I will conclude that any ambition of expanding liberal rights to the colonies

was quixotic at best. In short, I find that, while early revolutionaries may have been genuinely concerned for instituting liberal rights to the colonies, practical Portuguese liberals in positions of power understood this would be virtual impossible if the state still endeavored to extract substantial wealth from the colonies.⁹ The extractive economic element having remained the top priority, the forces arrayed against such a project were too strong and political leaders accepted illiberal extractive tactics like pacification campaigns and absolute colonial governorship as a result. Their dissatisfaction, while noted in this piece, did not stop them from being complicit in the further exploration of the African colonies through liberal imperialism. Having outlined my argument, the last section explores the theoretical implications of my argument for the idea of liberalism in the 19th century. In this section I will defend the utility of the Portuguese Empire as a valid case study to be added to the literature of liberalism and empire, as well as demonstrate that its singularity must not be taken as idiosyncrasy but a worthwhile impetus for further research. I will also demonstrate that the addition of Portugal to the literature of liberalism and empire is not only a worthwhile but necessary step if scholars of the topic wish to strengthen its analytical value beyond its current state.

Literature

Before delving into the substantive sections of my thesis I must introduce the decently sized, but still limited, literature on liberalism and empire. Unlike other papers mine does not stray away from the existing literature in any theoretical way. That is, I have no outstanding conflicts with the abstract framework many of these scholars have created. In fact, as this section will demonstrate, I utilize many of their overarching conclusions and concepts as

⁹ Sometimes these early revolutionaries and later practical liberals were the same people.

fundamental building blocks of my work. Where this paper certainly does stray from common approaches is in its choice of case study. The inherent economic differences between the Portuguese Empire and the empires extensively studied in the literature will, I hope, bring a new piece of furniture into the room of liberalism and empire. To analyze Portugal through this lens, I believe, will provide the literature a new type of case study as well as increased theoretical depth.

It is fair to say that the first piece which truly catapulted Liberalism and Empire as a section of political theory was Uday Singh Mehta's book of the same name *Liberalism and Empire*. In it, Mehta outlines the various theoretical contradictions of liberalism as it has been practiced throughout history with empire, particularly within the British Empire. The conflicting ideas of political rights and self-determination, as Mehta concluded, were also used to justify the construction of an empire. He traces not only how empire fit with liberalism, but in fact how it stemmed from liberal theoretical beliefs regarding reason and history. It was Mehta who first described the "liberal justification of empire",¹⁰ and it is his definition of liberalism as an idea "committed to securing individual liberty and human dignity through a political cast that typically involves democratic and representative institutions, the guaranty of individual rights of property, and freedom of expression, association, and conscience, all of which are taken to limit the legitimate use of the authority of the state" which most informs my understanding of the paradigm. Fundamentally, Mehta's intentions in his book can be summarized in the following statement he makes,

"The British, Dutch, and French rightly conceived of themselves as having elaborated and integrated into their societies an understanding of political freedom, and yet during this very period they pursued

¹⁰ Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, 2.

and held vast empires where such freedoms were either absent or severely attenuated for the majority of the native inhabitants.”¹¹

Crucially, he explains, we cannot clarify the concurrent existence of empire and liberal thought through simple contradiction. In fact, he explains, that claim is “neither obvious, nor ultimately true.”¹² I wholly agree with this, and it is from this perception of symbiosis that I build my argument. His exercise, broadly, entails an analysis of the approaches foundational British political theorists took to the British rule in India. The exercise he undertakes, and his understanding of 19th century liberalism as a paternalistic, reformist, and activist agenda has greatly motivated my work and certainly the work of a dozen others who write on liberalism and empire. It is from his theoretical foundations that I take my theoretical assumptions for the most part.

In further works of this literature, authors deciphered the political theory frameworks that upheld and challenged the relationship between liberalism and empire. One such work is Jennifer Pitts’ *A Turn to Empire*,¹³ which explores, from the British and French angles, the understandings that many of the prominent theorists of the 18th and 19th century had toward their empires’ colonial policies. Her book not only discusses empire’s liberal detractors like Smith, Bentham, Burke and Kant, but focuses predominantly on some of its greatest liberal supporters, namely John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. Professor Pitts’ analyses of Mill and Tocqueville’s ideologies, for instance, were a paramount factor in shaping my conception of the *dual necessity*. Whilst Mill was a distinct advocate for individual freedom as well as democratic self-government in essays such as *On Liberty* and *Considerations on*

¹¹ Mehta, 7.

¹² Mehta, 7.

¹³ Pitts, *A Turn to Empire*.

Representative Government, he was also an outspoken advocate of British colonial rule in India and Ireland and understood those as backward societies that required civilization. Possessing similar social views, the analysis of Tocqueville's economic reasoning in Professor Pitts' work showed me a distinct awareness by European scholars of the economic welfare that the colonies provided for the metropole. Tocqueville's rationale is novel, though, because it indicated a need for colonialism. In his *First and Second Report on Algeria*, Tocqueville clearly understands Algeria as a necessary economic asset for the French state. He lists the fertile land and location as a necessary way to relieve the burden on the French state, and that by holding on to Algeria, France would also be able to open its markets throughout the world. It is mostly from these two analyses that I thought to investigate Portugal, a notably underdeveloped empire that underwent a liberal revolution. The spark for this thesis was most emphatically lit when I began to consider how different 18th century Portugal truly was from the "backward societies" Mill diagnosed and Professor Pitts underlined. When I began to see more similarities than differences, this raised questions about the way economic dependency can create liberal imperialism; that process conclusively incited this project.

It is from this authoritative understanding of 19th century liberalism and empire as interdependent ideas that this project is built. Of course, other pieces such as Duncan Bell's *What is Liberalism* and *Reordering the World* have been influential in my thinking, but I feel the pair I outlined here do an acceptable job of outlining how my own theoretical foundations map onto the existing literature.

Portuguese Historical Dependency on its Colonies

The century preceding the Portuguese Liberal Wars (1822-1826) was one marked by the resurgence of the Portuguese Empire as a global economic power. Even if plagued by an inevitable international subjugation on political and military levels, the Portuguese monarchy enjoyed, for the most part, an 18th century with abundant economic growth. The monarch became an “austere and isolated figure”¹⁴ who created an absolutist political regime rivaling the ones of the French Bourbon kings, facing not Europe, but his colonies, content with ignoring the economic backwardness of his state while the gold, of which his family taxed a fifth, continued allowing for a minimal deficit. His court, one of the most illustrious in Europe,¹⁵ and nobility would rather enjoy court festivals and bullfights than participate in government affairs.¹⁶ This section argues that the 18th-century economic practices of the Portuguese state created an empire whose metropole became so severely dependent on its colony that it substantially neglected its own economic development, relegating the metropole to an eminence equal to, if not lower than, that of its colony.

First, it must be noted that Portugal was one of many states that possessed and extracted substantial wealth from transoceanic empires in the 18th century. The distinction the paper purports and will shortly explain is that the Portuguese were outliers in the extent to which they depended on those colonies; most concisely Portugal not only extracted substantially more wealth per capita with its colonies than any other power, but also failed entirely at translating that wealth into a domestic industry leading into the 19th century. To start, Portugal led all colonial nations in per capita transoceanic trade in 1750, was barely behind

¹⁴ Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal*, 68.

¹⁵ Monteiro, *17th and 18th century Portuguese nobilities in the European Context*.

¹⁶ de Bragança Cunha, *Eight Centuries of Portuguese Monarchy*, 85.

the Dutch at the turn of the century and fell only behind the aforementioned and the British heading into the 19th century.¹⁷ It traded nearly as much across oceans with a few colonies in South America and Africa, as the British and Dutch empires traded with colonies in North America, South America, Africa, and Asia. For a state with a substantially smaller empire to trade with, a higher per capita trade is astounding. In 1750, the percentage of real wage¹⁸ attributable to transoceanic trade within the Portuguese Empire was 17% whilst the number for the British was only 2.9% and the Dutch 6.5%. By 1800, the Portuguese share had risen to 22.8%, outnumbering the British Empire at 16%¹⁹ and the Dutch at 5.4%.

In the long term, the Dutch and British imperial wealth extraction had completely different domestic social effects to Portugal's, even though the three had similar numbers in their relative gain from empire. Between 1630 and 1755, Portuguese average per-capita economic growth was 0.44%, compared to the Dutch 0.41% (1500-1650) and the English 0.30% (1600-1750). Regardless, while Dutch and British society urbanized and developed robust domestic industry, Portuguese society remained starkly agricultural and rural. In Portugal, the percentage of the population living in urban designations in 1800 was only 16.2%, compared to Britain and the Netherlands at around 35-40%.^{20,21} Even if the Portuguese state extracted wealth to a similar or even greater degree than other competing modern European empires during the 18th century, it failed to use this wealth to economically converge in a manner that would indicate that it did. This was because the spice and jewel (gold and silver)-based trade, combined with imports from Britain failed to entice any industrial development domestically.

¹⁷ Freiré Costa et. Al., *The contribution of the empire to Portugal's economic growth, 1500–1800*, 9.

¹⁸ See Freiré Costa et. Al., for a better explanation and outline of the methodology of all the conclusions made and the units prescribed.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁰ Davenport, *Urbanization and mortality in Britain, c. 1800–50*, 457.

²¹ Paping, Richard. *General Dutch Population development 1400-1850: cities and countryside*, 11.

Palma and Reis propose that early modern economic stagnation is a result of an economy's structural incapacity to produce meaningful organizational and technological change. Three requirements have to be met for some growth to occur at the intensive level. 1) innovation would take place and have a significant impact on various economic sectors, 2) this impact would need to result in observable increases in productivity, and 3) this momentum would need to be maintained for a sufficient amount of time. Recent studies show that preindustrial Britain and Holland clearly possessed these characteristics, while Portugal categorically did not.²²

Fundamentally, I support the standard view that the Portuguese Empire's dependency on profits from spice and jewels insulated Portugal from competitive pressure, thereby limiting industrialization. This view, propagated since Adam Smith, but also supported in newer pieces like Anderson (1962) and Nuno (1999), finds that the empire became a millstone for Portuguese development of domestic industries.²³ Continually focused on sending more men to the sea on disease-ridden ships, the Portuguese failed to leverage any growth at home. The Methuen Treaty, for instance, remains a perfect example of the way the Portuguese economy was content remaining dependent on foreign goods as opposed to encouraging domestic production of industrial materials like fabric.²⁴ While Smith was against it because he thought it benefitted Portugal, Friedrich List found that the treaty led to the "sudden and complete ruin of the Portuguese manufactures".²⁵ This distinct lack of industry in the Portuguese

²² Palma and Reis, *From Convergence to Divergence: Portuguese Economic Growth, 1527–1850*, 498.

²³ Anderson, *Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism- Part I.*; Nuno, *Economic Consequences Of Empire- The Portuguese Case*.

²⁴ Benzecry, *Friedrich List and the Methuen Treaty*.

²⁵ List, *National system of political economy*, 132.

metropole heading into the 19th century forced Portugal to cling onto its colonies in order to remain economically afloat.

Even possessing similar numbers throughout the 18th century, Portugal could not find an equal economic level to its competitors and would only begin to converge with the rest of Western Europe in the 1950s.²⁶ An even more striking revelation is that Portugal's GDP per capita in 1850 was exactly the same as what it had been in the early 1530s; in the long-term, over 300 years, Portugal had experienced two golden ages and improved its net GDP/capita by *nothing*.²⁷ It is substantively clear that the dependence of the Portuguese state on its colonies, especially Brazil, existed, and the ability to adequately invest it into a self-sufficient industrial model was sorely lacking²⁸. As other states utilized their colonial wealth to create successful, financially independent *domestic* states, the Portuguese state maintained an agrarian and undeveloped metropole severely dependent on colonial exploitation. It was in this weak and colony-dependent economic climate that liberalism as a political ideology would arise.

The Rise of Portuguese Liberalism

Whilst the main causes for the rise of liberalism and the Liberal Revolution of 1820 that put an end to the absolute monarch can be partly laid at the feet of British and French subjugation of domestic affairs and the complicated Brazilian situation, the paramount cause of the

²⁶ Palma and Reis, 477.

²⁷ Ibid, 478. Of course, the Portuguese state created tremendous amounts of wealth during those three centuries, and, yes, perhaps the author picking the year 1850 is in bad faith seeing as it was the end of thirty years of civil struggle. Regardless, it is a fact that the Portuguese Empire came into the 19th century as the most backward economy in Western Europe. The growth of the population coupled with a stagnation in growth post-1750 brought Portugal directly back to where it stood 300 years prior.

²⁸ This idea is not only reflected in contemporary thinking but evident in Portuguese political thinking of the time. See de Sá Nogueira de Figueiredo (1836) "we return today to the state we were in when we discovered the Brazil jewel."

revolution was the dramatic rise of liberalism as a result of the reforms of Portugal's most renowned prime minister, the Marquis of Pombal. In short, this section will demonstrate how a set of particular circumstances and historical events led to the creation of liberal forces in the Portuguese metropole. The section is most important because it introduces the unique character of Portuguese liberalism as a decisive political ideology which was lit in response to Portugal's political subjugation. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, 1st Marquis of Pombal, is perhaps the most important figure to discuss to understand the origins of Portuguese liberalism. Historian Oliveira Marques concludes, "Pombal's rule had the great merit of (unwillingly) preparing the country for the liberal revolution of the nineteenth century."²⁹ His sweeping reforms of the Portuguese state, while autocratic in their application, created the conditions by which liberal ideas entered Portuguese society.

Pombal enacted sweeping reforms in political and economic sectors by creating specific guilds for each industry, expanding the manufacturing sector in the production of wine in the Douro region, halting the Portuguese inquisition against Jews, and granting political rights to *conversos*^{30,31,32,33}. Effectively, Pombal dealt a deadly blow to the aristocracy and clergy which they would never recover from³⁴. This hit was crucial as it allowed the growth of an increasingly enlightened lower bourgeoisie balanced between the upper bourgeoisie and the lesser nobility,³⁵ which Pombal himself was a part of, that had been severely silenced during

²⁹ Ibid, 421.

³⁰ Previously Jewish citizens of Portugal and Spain that had converted to Catholicism.

³¹ Ramos, *Pombal e o esclavagismo*.

³² Skidmore, *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change*.

³³ De Freitas, *O Marquez de Pombal e o Santo Oficio da Inquisição*.

³⁴ De Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal*, 421.

³⁵ Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal*, 84

the years of João V's rule. As discussed later, these would be the individuals who led the revolution 40 years later.

The Marquis' most consequential liberal impact, though, were his educational reforms. Beginning in 1759, he expelled all forms of the Jesuit Order of Portugal from the Portuguese empire.³⁶ The pretext he used for this act was that the Jesuit order had previous knowledge of the attempted assassination of the King in the Távora Affair. Their control over crucial educational institutions such as the Coimbra, Lisbon, and Évora universities continued to promote an ideology supporting church influence in the state, the increased power of ecclesiastical forces in the political sphere, and absolutist thought.³⁷ These ideas went against the Marquis' intended secularism, but more importantly, regalism, or that the state should hold ultimate authority over the church.³⁸ The vacuum left by the Jesuit expulsion from Portuguese dominions in 1759 would be filled by the Marquis' own educational organ, headed by the *Diretor de Estudos*. Their prerogative would be to analyze the “fastidious and pernicious” Jesuit methods and oversee “the change of the Portuguese system into a closer practice of the more civilized nations of Europe”³⁹. New classes taught, for example, included Moral and Rational Philosophy, Political Economy, Drawing and Figure, English Language, and French Language. He would also establish a College for Nobles, expanding this liberal influence over the aristocratic power structures.⁴⁰ Although his rule was autocratic, the Marquis used his power to enact inarguably liberal policy to modernize an educationally and

³⁶ PORTUGAL. *Lei de 3 de setembro de 1759: Exterminando os jesuítas e proibindo a comunicação com os mesmos*, 713-716.

³⁷ Unlike the other reasons, this is not one that Pombal used; he was more than content they were espousing absolutist thought, finding his power in that system. Additionally, their growth in Brazil was causing problems for the taxation of minerals leaving Minas Gerais.

³⁸ Camargo, *Aulas Régia, Projeto Memória da Administração Pública Brasileira*.

³⁹ PORTUGAL, *Alvará de regulamento dos estudos menores*, de 28 de junho de 1859, 673-678.

⁴⁰ Falcon, *A época pombalina: política econômica e monarquia ilustrada*, 83.

politically classical Portuguese state. This liberal educational reform he enacted would be a crucial driving force for the revolution and the subsequent consolidation of liberal power in Portugal.

The elected constituent assembly (*Cortes*) that would eventually rise from the Revolution of 1820 and meet in Coimbra to write the constitution was primarily composed of members of the professional middle class, as opposed to the commercial.⁴¹ In this assembly were twenty university lecturers, forty lawyers, and fourteen priests, but only three merchants, two proprietors, and no abbots: a markedly professional, middle-class make-up.⁴² Most outstandingly, a large majority of these individuals were graduates of the very institutions that the Marquis of Pombal had reformed, stemming from the liberal universities of Lisbon and Coimbra. In the wake of the Napoleonic wars, then, with the Portuguese royal family in Brazil and the British Marshal Beresford exercising martial domination of the state, this group of liberally educated nobles became the revolutionary force that ousted Beresford and forced John VI to return to Portugal.

Their ambitions were immediately liberal, laying out that the king would be distanced from legislative power being unable to “convene or suspend the legislative branch,” that Catholicism would not be the sole religion of the state, and that civic rights would be broadened.⁴³ While in these early writings, be it the charter or the manifestos, the authors did not utilize the exact moniker of ‘liberal’, their political project can only be described as such, taking on the objective to create a new political system which limited the power of the

⁴¹ Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal*, 108.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Lario, *Monarchy and Republic in Contemporary Portugal: From Revolution to the Rise of Executive Power*, 163.

monarch and guaranteed individual rights. Further, the document was modeled on the liberal Spanish constitution of 1812 and the French constitutions of 1791 and 1795. They created a parliament, abolished feudal controls over the countryside, and removed the legal privileges of the clergy.⁴⁴ Approved by the elected constituent assembly as the Portuguese Constitution of 1822, this document would be a crucial piece of Portuguese liberal political theory. John VI swore an oath to the Constitution in October 1822. Even if it was replaced by the compromising Constitutional Charter of 1826, it became a foundational document for many radical liberals in Portugal, after 1836 known as *Setembrists*.

Portuguese liberalism rose in favorable and seemingly accidental, but decisive circumstances. It was lit by a devastating national disaster that provided an unexpected, ambitious autocrat from the lower bourgeoisie with immeasurable power over the Portuguese monarchic state. While keeping this power to himself, faced with a blank canvas upon which to rebuild, and a catatonic king, he enacted sweeping political, social, and, most consequentially, educational reforms that set the stage for a liberal revolution. These reforms would build a class of liberally-minded individuals that would sign into law a liberal constitution precisely a half-century after his death. This group was motivated by a miserable domestic situation which saw the Portuguese state dominated by foreign forces, chiefly of those the influence of Beresford. Their liberal character is best demonstrated by their allegiance to the liberal side of the civil war that followed after the death of John VI.

⁴⁴ Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal*, 109.

The Character of Portuguese Liberalism

The civil war that followed the Liberal Revolution of 1820 cemented the constitutional monarchy as the monarchical system that Portugal would conclusively exercise. The ‘liberals’ led by Pedro IV, fought a 2-year-long war against the ‘absolutists’ led by his brother Miguel. A liberal victory saw the Constitutional Charter of 1826 be taken into law, and Pedro IV’s daughter, Maria da Glória, become Maria II. Stability in the kingdom was severely lacking for several decades of Maria’s reign due to the remnants of the civil war’s factions until in 1852 significant changes known as the Additional Act of 1852 would be introduced to Pedro IV’s Charter of 1826 to appease the tensions. This charter, thereafter a constitution, stood as a legitimate document accepted by a Chamber of Deputies elected through direct suffrage the 1852 Act conferred. The Portuguese state now stood on a foundation of popular sovereignty. The king, now Pedro V, ruled through a constitution that guaranteed *all* its citizens “personal safety, and safety of property,” “religious freedom,”⁴⁵ “freedom of imprisonment without just cause,” and “right to property in all its plenitude.” It also inaugurated second-generation rights, introducing “colleges and universities,” “public health services,” and “primary education” as tasks of the government to provide for its citizens⁴⁶.

Where this constitution is interesting, and where this paper tries to understand its external intentions, lies with the rights and privileges it affords to the large ultramarine empire that Portugal possessed. It was apparent to the significant Portuguese liberal thinkers of the time that the ultramarine empire was as Portuguese as was Lisbon, that its inhabitants, regardless of skin color or race, were Portuguese and deserved the same rights afforded to residents of

⁴⁵ This was conferred only to foreigners; the state religion was Catholic after 1826. Not that it mattered, virtually all the population was Catholic anyway.

⁴⁶ PORTUGAL, *Carta Constitucional de 1826*.

the metropole. Problematically these thinkers also came to understand that the state was mortally dependent on its empire and would be forced to consolidate and expand the same after the loss of Brazil if it wished to retain any semblance of its ancient global prestige.

It must be first recognized, though, what Portuguese liberalism truly meant. Crucially, most Portuguese liberal thinkers, as other liberals in Europe, did not see themselves as revolutionaries. The word itself, “revolution”, is scarcely found in the literature of the period. Instead, key thinkers of the time styled themselves “revanchists” of the traditional Portuguese government, where the *cortes* “worked wonders of valor while obeying the laws which they wisely constituted, laws which profited all, because they obliged all”⁴⁷. In their “*Manifesto da Nação Portuguesa aos Soberanos e Povos da Europa*”⁴⁸ the liberals remind their cause isn’t “an innovation”, but “the restitution of the ancient and healthy institutions corrected and applied according to the lights of the century and the political circumstances of the civilized world; it is the restitution of the inalienable rights that nature has granted them, as it grants to all peoples”. Likely written by prominent liberals Manuel Fernandes de Tomás and José da Silva Carvalho, the manifesto presents their project not as a rebellion, because a rebellion is the “resistance to legitimate power, and it is not legitimate the power which is not regulated by the law”, but more so a *de rigueur* event because of their piteous condition. They additionally remind that “the Cortes and Constitution are not anything new in our kingdoms: they are our rights, and the rights of our parents”. Historically speaking, this is partly correct; the cortes had been crucially present at every important event of the Portuguese people: they had invested Afonso Henriques first King of Portugal,⁴⁹ elected João I, deposed Sancho II,

⁴⁷ Authors not confirmed but believed to be Manuel de Tomás and José Carvalho, *Manifesto da Nação Portuguesa aos Soberanos e Povos da Europa*, Lisboa. 1820.

⁴⁸ Manifesto of the Portuguese Nation to the Sovereigns and Peoples of Europe.

⁴⁹ As I'll discuss below this has been proven to be myth.

raised John of Bragança as João IV, and deposed Afonso VI. It is these events that the manifesto recollects in its argument. It is thus convincing to see this institution not as a temporary radical body born of revolution, but yes, as de Bragança describes, “an institution grown out of the healthy action of a people and developed along with the state of society”⁵⁰.

Other prominent liberals, especially the ones in exile like João da Rocha Loureiro, equally outline the wish for “a constitution and the restoration of the *Cortes* and former forms of our government, which are closest to those of the British Government, and so far-removed from the absolute and intemperate manner in which we are now governed”⁵¹.

The long-standing popular conception of the *Cortes* certainly deserves further exploration because it distinguishes the Portuguese case from others, and because, remarkably, what the revolutionaries are describing here is essentially imagined history. This mainly merits discussion because while the *Cortes* certainly existed throughout Portuguese history, they were never anything more than a strictly deliberative manifestation of the three estates. Even at that they were rarely called to action. They existed only when the King was forced to rely on the nobility for his power through economic support, as was the case under João I for example; the 14th and 15th centuries were probably the time at which they were most important, but with the growth of the ultramarine empire the King no longer depended on the economic support of his nobility and the *Cortes* quickly descended into irrelevance. After the 15th century, they became important again only during the Iberian Union (1580-1640) and for a decade directly after. The ‘last Cortes’ were held in 1698, but as had been the case since 1640—and for much of their history—these were nominal confirmations of the King’s

⁵⁰ de Bragança Cunha, *Eight Centuries of Portuguese Monarchy: A Political Study*, 116.

⁵¹ da Rocha Loureiro, *O Portuguez*,

wishes. In 1820, when the revolution occurred, the courts had not been called for 122 years and four successive monarchs.

Still, the revolutionaries forced the king's hand, and called the "General and Extraordinary Cortes of the Portuguese Nation". The existence of a shared myth, such was the importance of the *Cortes*, certainly also speaks to the character of liberalism as it was practiced in Portugal. The Portuguese revolutionaries desired a return to "ancient and healthy institutions"; institutions those that were almost completely imagined. Many of the characteristics of the *Cortes* described by the revolutionaries in their manifestos, particularly their judicial aspects are manifestly false, and speak to an idealization of the old Portuguese state of the 14th and 15th centuries as some sort of proto-constitutional monarchy. Such a political organization was far from the reality of the time or anything similar.⁵² If one assumes that the well-educated architects of these manifestos, graduates of prestigious universities understood this conception of history was a fallacy, then it certainly compels current scholars to understand those pieces as carefully deliberated revisionist works of political action.

Regardless, the veracity or not of these historical conceptions is unimportant to my objectives. In this case, it is clear that to understand Portuguese liberalism, we must understand it not as a revolution, but as a pragmatic use of circumstances to reform a decadent absolutist regime through an appeal to shared values. As I will now show, appeal to shared values was not limited to the Portuguese people's understanding of history, but also to their avowed love of their monarch.

⁵² O'Callaghan, *Cortes, Leon, Castile and Portugal*.

The manifesto is extremely amicable to its ‘exiled’ king, nationalist in its speech, and it fervently distances itself from the “absurd philosophism” of “unlimited liberty”. In its declaration, it never insults the king or disparages his abilities, pinning the blame on his absence and the people’s lack of guidance instead; they understand that “in such an acute crisis, this heroic People has lost neither its honor, nor its value, nor its loyalty to its King”.

They further add that “if the Portuguese did not love and respect their Prince and their August Dynasty with a kind of religious love and adoration; if they did not want to receive reforms and public improvements from only his justice and beneficence; which such a state of affairs imperiously demanded; it would have been very easy for them, at that time, to put limits to their power”. The leaders of the movement accepted that the people had been pressured by the wave of European revolution to accept a revolution of their own, to oust their king when he was abroad, but they waited dutifully for his return, and this is the representation that their revolution was out of an absolute necessity. They purposefully distance themselves from the republican revolutions of Europe by saying they support not “the false principles of an absurd philosophy that disorganizes societies. – it is not the love of an unlimited freedom, and irreconcilable with the true happiness of man, which has led him [the Portuguese] in his patriotic movements. - It is the deep feeling of public disgrace, and the desire to remedy it.”

They speak to the peoples and sovereigns of Europe and their king in this address, declaring that their suffering has not been heard, and their sovereignty has been stifled for too long. Possessing this system of supposed popular sovereignty, they advocate instead a vigorous reengagement with that ideology which had apparently been characteristic throughout Portuguese history but now had been forgotten or, at the least, poorly practiced.

Thus, it is imperative that one understands that the Liberal Revolution of 1820 is *not radical*, it is *not French*, and it is *not really a revolution*. While it may be remembered as such by the historiography, the early thinkers of this movement did not designate themselves as revolutionaries and did not see themselves as radicals. Most interestingly, while its proposals are clearly liberal, it does not use that word once. At its very core the manifesto concludes that its existence is “the votes of all the Portuguese, proclaiming the need for a Constitution, a fundamental Law, which would regulate the limits of Power and Obedience; that would guarantee the rights and happiness of the People for the future; to **restore** to the Nation its honor, its independence, and its glory” as it did from the Portuguese inception until 1698. Still, after the revolution many took on the mantle of “liberal” and the civil war that ensued would also be remembered as the “Liberal Wars”. The core unit of individuals that organized the revolution understood itself as a grieving last straw to prevent the total collapse of the Portuguese people at a time when their king was an ocean away, a British general ruled the nation with an iron fist, and their isolated economic situation became increasingly dire. They don’t wish to do more than is necessary, and, given the circumstances involved with any attempt to engage in a successful political change, this is an understandable endeavor. If one looks at these revolutionaries with a more questionable eye, he might ask whether they did so simply to avoid the moniker that had, in those years in Europe, become synonymous with death. This is a hypothesis for which I do not provide a conclusion, mainly because it is of no concrete interest to my piece. Whether the characteristics are owed to a natural or pragmatic inkling from the ‘revolutionaries’ does not change the fact that they organized their revolution as such.

The Portuguese had lost so much in so short a time, and when they couldn't look to a King, it is a viable political conclusion that they looked to each other.⁵³ This would become the overarching liberal ambition and the most critical characteristic of Portuguese liberalism: not creating but *returning* an ancient power to the people, an ancient power which, in its practice, coincided with a period of extraordinary Portuguese prosperity. While this ancient power was largely a myth, its historical validity as such is relatively null given the massive political organizing principle it provided for the formation of a new political identity.

The Character of Portuguese Liberal Imperialism

After the implementation of the constitutional monarchy, Portugal remained severely economically dependent on its colonies as had been the case through the previous centuries. Now, though, it also possessed a huge political force with intentions to liberalize the empire and include all citizens in the liberal ideas, rights, and laws of the new monarchy. The conflict that arose as a result of these antithetical goals is what I've termed the *dual necessity*; that is, the wish of liberal political leaders to reform an illiberal ultramarine empire whilst also needing to sustain a weak, underdeveloped Portuguese economy dependent on colonial exploitation. This section will explore how the *dual necessity* pushed the Portuguese state to liberal imperialism.

The subsequent piece to the *Manifesto of the Portuguese Nation*, the *Manifesto of the Provincial Junta of the Supreme Government of the Kingdom to the Portuguese People*.⁵⁴, authored by the same actors of the 'revolution', addresses the people. The people are a vague

⁵³ It is also, certainly, a viable political conclusion that, like many before them, the 'revolutionaries' took advantage of the situation, adapted a 'people-friendly' script and moved forward. As I mentioned, this is largely unimportant for my study.

⁵⁴ *Manifesto da Junta Provincial do Governo Supremo do Reino aos Portuguezes.*

term at the time, and the ‘revolutionaries’ resolve to define the empire, in all its breadth, as the nation, and all its inhabitants as its citizens. This declaration addresses the people in the second person, announcing “law and will, will be in you the same thing; rights and justice, synonyms; dignity and equality, reciprocal definitions; and the honor of the citizen the highest nobility your ambition can aspire to.” They expressed to their citizens, “You will have a *constitution*...whose characters tyranny is not given to pay, nor the prescription of abuses to undo; and the 19th century, precursor in its acclamations to the ones that follow it, personalized in its glory and immortality, will accompany the crown, and say ‘This document is mine, all my genius created it, it was born from mature meditations of the old, and modern times.’” It takes a very different, more poetic, tone from the one written in addressing the governments of Europe, that means to rouse sympathetic feeling, and it recounts the past to invoke the time when the *cortes*, and the constitution, existed at the same time as Portugal was ‘great’. It starts each paragraph with “Portuguezes!”, which truly puts into question whom the men are referring to. On the fourth page of the manifesto, the revolutionaries address this question, and here lies the answer to Portuguese liberal colonial policy as it would remain throughout the constitutional period until the end of the *Estado Novo*.

“We limit ourselves to praying for our ultramarine brothers, in name of the fatherland, of so intimate and sacred relations, that link us in the same family. **Forever extinct the vituperative distinction of “colony”, we all wish a different name, the title of co-citizens of the same fatherland.** Be you European, African, Asian or American, there will rest no distinction apart from the one who strives most for ingrained fatherland, heroic patriotism, and daring sacrifices.”

Thus, with a king ruling from Brazil and relegated to equal imperial status as its old colony, the Portuguese had been forced to accept that to hold on to their empire whilst evolving to

liberalism, they would be forced to become a liberal empire. The nation would thereafter transcend the bounds of the mainland, through the seas stretching to Macau and Timor; all the empire's peoples now became citizens of Portugal. They granted rights to all citizens of the empire and began the long process of Portuguese liberal imperialism. This process is most effectively summarized as the legitimization of imperial and colonial expansion by granting artificial liberal rights to the ultramarine provinces, which are promptly evaded to allow for the consolidation and growth of the Portuguese colonial project.

Firstly, the *de jure* imperialism. According to the Constitutional Charter of 1826--with the crucial Additional Act of 1852--which can very well be considered to be the most concrete practice of Portuguese liberal thought until 1974, all are Portuguese citizens that are “born in Portugal or her dominions, and that are not today Brazilian citizens.”⁵⁵ As we will see, it was not remotely the case they all actually enjoyed the same privileges. The new “monarchic, hereditary, and representative government”⁵⁶, ruled through a constitution that guaranteed all its citizens “personal safety, and safety of property,” “religious freedom,” “freedom of imprisonment without just cause,” and “right to property in all its plenitude.” The Charter also ended all unfair and cruel punishment, instituted meritocratic assignment of public offices, abolished noble privileges, and outlawed the prohibition of any “work, culture, industry, or commerce”. It also incurred second-generation rights, introducing “colleges and universities,” “public health services,” and “primary education” as primary obligations of the

⁵⁵ These dominions are clearly outlined in the previous Article I,2 as, “in West Africa, Bissau and Cacheu; in Costa da Mina, the Fort of S. João Baptista de Ajudá, Angola, Benguela, and its dependencies, Cabinda and Molembo, the Cape Verde Islands, and those of S. Tomé and Príncipe, and its dependencies; on the East Coast, Mozambique, Rio Sena, Sofala, Inhambane, Quelimane, and the Cabo Delgado Islands. In Asia, Salsete, Bardez, Goa, Daman, Diu and the Establishments in Macau and the Solor Islands and Timor.”

⁵⁶ Important to note the order of adjectives Pedro IV decided upon, marking the order of importance of its primary characteristics: the government was monarchic and hereditary before it was representative.

government to provide for its citizens. It wasn't nearly as liberal as the Constitution of 1822, for instance creating a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, and census suffrage with property and income qualifications as opposed to broader suffrage but, to the interest of this paper, kept an identical position towards its ultramarine empire. The true compromise of the radical liberal wing came in 1852 when the Additional Act instituted direct suffrage of the deputies in the Chamber of Peers, limited the power of the monarch in matters of treaties, and enlarged the limits of suffrage. From 1852 the Constitutional Charter became a constitution, seeing as it was finally voted on and accepted by a *Cortes* which derived its power from the people. More pertinently, the final article of the 1852 Additional Act, which, from a naïve eye, may be seen as a positive addition in line with its other articles to compromise a more liberal constitutional monarchy, is in fact the most important piece of colonial legislation in the Constitution. This article inserted by the 1852 Additional Act declares that,

“The Overseas Provinces may be governed by special Laws, as required by the convenience of each one of them. 1. - When the Cortes are not in session, the Government, having heard and consulted the competent stations, may enact the legislative measures deemed urgent by the Council. 2. - Likewise, the Governor-General of an Overseas Province may, after hearing his Governing Council, take the necessary measures to respond to any need so urgent that it cannot wait for the decision of the Cortes, or of the Government.”⁵⁷

Most basically, the colonies and ultramarine citizens which inhabit them now became subject not to a legislative body containing their representatives, but in case of an “urgent need”—which lacks any definition in the amendment—to a sole colonial governor with the power to

⁵⁷ Article 15, Additional Act to the Portuguese Constitutional Charter, 1852.

act with absolute discretion on his subjects. Additionally, the Act allows the creation and abolition of laws that don't exist in the metropole. It doesn't limit the number of laws that may be changed, how they may be changed or any aspect of those laws, leaving full discretionary power to the colonial governing council. Yes, the inhabitants of the colonies are nominally citizens of Portugal, but in this Act, they lose the same political representation. The *dual necessity* of the Portuguese liberal state is here unfolded; the act possesses a necessity for following liberal ideology, but an equally demanding necessity for economically prosperous colonies. To achieve the latter, they must amend the former. This dichotomy pushes it to liberal imperialism. This raises a question this paper has not yet been able to answer conclusively: what was the idea behind extending equal citizenship in the first place if the Additional Act would remove any chance it would be carried out in practice? I propose liberal theorists of the era realized economic exploitation at the levels necessary to uphold the Portuguese economy was at odds with their plans for equal legal and political standing of the colonial subjects. The Additional Act of 1852, which came 25 years after the original constitution served to remedy that fact and institute different, unique, policies for the respective colonial holdings so that the might maximize economic output.

Through Article 15 of the Additional Act, the Portuguese liberal regime signed a *carte blanche* for the exertion of anti-liberal practices in its colonies. Even though Portuguese political history during the period of the constitutional monarchy is sorely lacking in detailed primary accounts of the colonial situation, these despotic and anti-liberal practices are documented sufficiently to paint a clear picture of Portuguese Liberal Imperialism. In

writing, *de jure*, all individuals born in Portuguese land were Portuguese.⁵⁸ This included all natives and non-natives, metropole-born or otherwise, and meant they were all citizens of the Portuguese Empire, enjoying all the rights afforded to them by the Constitution. *De facto*, the situation was very different.

Despite the apparent affirmation of the formal equality of imperial citizens at the outset of the Portuguese constitutional monarchy, what was left of the Portuguese Empire in Africa was severely underdeveloped, and this meant that a severe development project to bring them to a similar economic prosperity as Brazil would be necessary. This project cannot be characterized as liberal. In 1836, the Minister of Navy and Overseas (MNO), then Viscount Sá da Bandeira⁵⁹, charged with a report of the empire, reported a “critical state of utter decadence and anarchy.”⁶⁰ The report speaks of devastating famines in Cape Verde, the reduction of Portuguese Guinea to a handful of forts, juntas raised in Angola and Mozambique, the destruction of the “old empire in India”, and the imprisonment of Portuguese governors-general in Timor-Leste.⁶¹ After more than a decade of domestic civil war, the empire was distinctly fractured. This text first proposes to the cortes “a particular consideration for the social state of the peoples of the diverse territories... and that for the Ultramarine Provinces, legislation should be special, and not universal.” This policy recommendation would be critically influential in the article which formed part of the

⁵⁸ Of course, this doesn’t include Brazilian citizens, as stated before, or Portuguese citizens that have naturalized in a foreign state. This is Title II, Article 7, of the Constitutional Charter of 1826.

⁵⁹ Bernardo de Sá Nogueira de Figueiredo (1795-1876), eventually Marquis of Sá da Bandeira and five-time Portuguese Prime Minister, was a deeply liberal individual, and key figure of the abolition of slavery in the colonies. A war hero, having had his arm amputated in conflict during the Liberal Siege of Porto, he was a radical liberal, a *Setembrist*, adamant supporter of the Constitution of 1822, and head of the anti-Cartist movement until his death.

⁶⁰ de Sá Nogueira de Figueiredo, *Relatório Memorial Ultramarino e Marítimo*.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

previously mentioned Additional Act fifteen years later. Furthermore, this document would become a foundational representation of the uninhibited objective of the Portuguese state in the African colonies: to “create new Brazils in Africa” that would make up for the lost colony’s economic contributions.⁶² With the explicitness of this quote, there doesn’t seem to exist at all an idea of equal flourishing of the supposed ‘citizens’ of the empire as a whole, but indeed the economic exploitation of those new ‘citizens’. Even Sá da Bandeira, an ardent liberal, recognizes the African empire will exist to be exploitative. In this case we are presented with the example of a practical liberal or “economic imperialist”; one who simultaneously identifies himself with the flourishing of the African subjects but also preoccupies himself with the economic realities of the Empire. He is a useful representation of the *dual necessity*. He writes, “we must promote the establishment of Europeans, the development of its industry, the employment of its captains, the foundation of new colonies, and within a short number of years we will extract as great results as we have from our old colonies [Brazil & India].” Further, in his unofficial section, he declares “we have many colonies to make us respected, and which are capable of compensating for the loss of Brazil.” It is more than evident in this language that the purposes of the colonial endeavors were linked to the Portuguese economic project to extract large amounts of resources from a productive colonial empire, even in the minds of the most liberal thinkers. To achieve these ends would require an additional need for non-liberal means, thus leading to the rise of liberal imperialism.

On the other hand, Sá da Bandeira counterbalances this ambitiously colonial declaration with striking liberal recommendations for the colonies, including, most prominently, the abolition

⁶² Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*.

of slavery beyond the metropole. For instance, he advocates the “abolition of the institution of slavery: foundation of civilization and prosperity of African peoples”, in addition to the “restriction of the power of the governor-general”, and the “creation of permanent judicial seats”, and “judicial conduct syndicates”. Sá da Bandeira blatantly acknowledges that the Portuguese Empire “must practice a policy in its Ultramarine Colonies founded with relation to the character, nature, and locality of these peoples, and whenever possible by the [Constitutional] Charter.” In the eyes of even the most liberal Portuguese thinker, colonization and liberal ideals are simultaneous ideals, ones that may exist concurrently with no ideological conflict. It became increasingly evident that the liberal policies of the metropole would not be *de facto* practicable with the expansionist ideals intending on recuperating a lost Brazilian jewel to revive a backward European state. In practice, this is exactly what occurred. To expand real liberal rights to colonial subjects, while also extracting sufficient wealth from the colonial possessions was virtually impossible, because the level of investment necessary to make the colonies operate profitably while also liberally was beyond reach. Early Portuguese political leaders, even those staunchly liberal like Sa da Bandeira, from the sources presented in this section, seemed to understand this was the case.

It is crucial, then, to consider the possibility that Portuguese liberals who accepted illiberal policy were imperialists, not by choice, but by necessity. As R.J. Hammond makes clear, “In nothing was the conservatism of the Republic evinced more clearly than in the absence of anti-imperialist feeling, such as was to be found among contemporary British radicals, or of any recrudescence of proposals to reduce the size of the empire.”⁶³ In his book Hammond calls Portuguese politicians of the time “economic imperialists”, which may not be too far

⁶³ Hammond, *Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910; a study in uneconomic imperialism*, 338.

from the truth. In 1891 a member of parliament even proposed the sale of Guinea and São Tomé so that Angola and Mozambique might see more railway investment.⁶⁴ Portuguese liberals, then, who occupied the constitutional monarchy, and eventually the republic, seemed to be pragmatic statesmen who understood the crucial economic value of the colonies. Their aim of enacting a liberal project in Africa proposed by the revolution likely fell behind a pragmatic realization that the colonies upheld the last semblance of Portuguese international prestige and economic production. As we will see in the next section, the catatonic inability of these statesmen to deliver themselves from this self-destructive arrangement would continue in practice throughout the constitutional period.

The Practice of Portuguese Liberal Imperialism

Article I.15 within the Additional Act of 1852, allowing for despotic rule of governors-general and indiscriminate creation and abolition of laws throughout the ultramarine empire conclusively created a brand of Portuguese liberal imperialism which attempted to consolidate liberal political policy in the metropole with a brutal expansionist colonial policy abroad. This ultimately failed, and what devolved in African colonial policy was a vicious cycle of violent *pacification campaigns* that failed to create a real presence or development of the colonies in any way resembling Brazil in the 18th century. During the period of the constitutional monarchy, it became evident that the liberal vision of an equal empire would not be economically viable. Portuguese politicians, liberals included, repeatedly enacted illiberal colonial policies in the hopes of maintaining the Portuguese economic output from complete collapse. In line with the conflict I have traced throughout the piece, of economic extraction against the realization of a liberal political project, I also note in this section the

⁶⁴ Ibid, 339.

additional variable of race. From primary sources of the time, race seems to play a crucial role in convincing those who believe in the liberal project in Africa of the necessity of illiberal methods for economic exploitation. This race component is in further tension with the view I traced in the previous section of the “economic imperialist” because it puts into question the rational argument of colonialism.

The most important moment for the true consolidation of Portuguese Liberal Imperialism was, without a doubt, the Berlin Conference of 1884 and the introduction of the concept of *effective occupation*. Effective occupation established “the international downplaying of the rights of discovery and the necessary replacement of the traditional rhetoric of *historical rights*. ”⁶⁵ In the Portuguese case, effective occupation meant that the minor coastal holdings Portugal had held for centuries were no longer viable international currency in the colonial theatre, and that “Portuguese elites” would have to “enhance their imperial expansionist maneuvers...including political, economic, religious and ecclesiastical drives and strategies.”⁶⁶ In the build-up to the Berlin Conference, the empire that Sá da Bandeira had envisioned fifty years prior was not nearly realized and the colonial possessions were still in utter decadence. For example, in 1877, the colonial governor of Angola stated “the few colonial outposts in the interior, either officially sponsored or privately driven are lost isles in a boundless indigenous ocean”⁶⁷. Portugal had not been able to consolidate a renewed empire in Africa as it had in Brazil, but now that the rules of imperialism had changed, Portugal knew it would be forced to change as well. This conference reignited the Portuguese colonial effort that had been reduced to a few sporadically controlled fortresses on the coast,

⁶⁵ Bandeira Jerónimo, ‘States and Empire’ in *The Making of Modern Portugal*, 71.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ de Almeida e Albuquerque, *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Secretaria de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar, Direcção-Geral do Ultramar, Correspondência dos Governadores, Angola*.

but it would be a “quick and impossible effort to send troops and civil officials to all the areas they claimed as theirs”.⁶⁸ To the Portuguese, as Bandeira Jerónimo elucidates, the internationalization of Africa after the Berlin conference was the perfect opportunity to undergo two important processes, *nationalization of empire* and *imperialization of the nation*. This consisted of 1) reclaiming the colonies that survived the dissolution of the previous imperial configuration, and the tentative redefinition of its political, administrative, economic and even social facets, and 2) numerous official initiatives to mobilize Portuguese society to embrace those novel imperial and colonial designs.⁶⁹ Portuguese colonization had always taken the mission of converting the African into a Portuguese⁷⁰, and with the advent of the Berlin Conference, the Portuguese government was forced to send expeditions, military forces, and colonists to the large empire in Southern Africa that it had been claiming for centuries. This effort would not come to great results; in fact, the “Pink Map”, a stretch of land connecting Luanda to Lourenço Marques, which the Portuguese were forced to give up became a great source of antipathy towards the constitutional regime and a decisive factor in the later collapse of the monarchy.

Regardless, the Portuguese effort showed the true colors of liberal imperialism. Several institutions created after the conference expanded the supposed ability of the state to *civilize*, so that the goals of an economically productive colonial empire might match the liberal ideals of the metropole. Realistically, what occurred is what Jeronimo defines as a merely “self-proclaimed *civilizing state*” which was related to maps and information that “did not represent

⁶⁸ de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* v.2, 111.

⁶⁹ Bandeira Jerónimo, *Portuguese Colonialism in Africa*.

⁷⁰ de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* v.2, 113.

or understand local realities or contexts.”⁷¹ Even if Portuguese colonial ambitions attempted to become increasingly liberal in their applications—for instance, in the creation of geographical societies, the abolition of slavery, etc.—their fundamental objectives were overshadowed by an inability to comprehend and adapt to the real situations of the peoples and cultures they claimed as Portugal.

Thus, whilst liberal protocols were sent from the increasingly ‘enlightened’ Portuguese society, the practical colonial rule was constantly reduced to the use of modern warfare techniques. With a striking lack of resources, the liberal ambitions of ‘civilization’, i.e., “rationalization of economic circuits, control of political and economic agents, and the establishment of an infra-structural power of the colonial state”⁷² were often ignored in preference to a sporadic and more cost-efficient demonstration of military might. As late as 1915, Governor-General of Angola, Norton de Matos wrote,

“We have been unable to occupy and control Angola: our campaigns have been limited to the organization of military columns...; **once they have won a few battles, made some prisoners, killed or shot a few natives, they retire and dismantle, leaving just a small fort here and there...** which will soon be considered harmless by the local populations.”⁷³

Norton de Matos, himself a liberal who would stand firmly against the authoritarian Salazar regime, is referring to the constant practices known as *pacification campaigns* which began in the 1880s and characterized the 1890s. These involved the conscription of African natives into military ranks and their utilization to stamp out the widespread unrest that had become

⁷¹ Bandeira Jerónimo, Miguel. ‘The Civilization Guild’: race and labour in the third Portuguese Empire c.1870-1930’ in *Racism and Ethnic Relations in the Portuguese-speaking world*.

⁷² Bandeira Jerónimo, ‘States and Empire’ in *The Making of Modern Portugal*, 72.

⁷³ de Matos, Norton. *Memorias e Trabalhos da Minha Vida* Vol. IV. 1945

customary in much of Portuguese Africa. These are very poorly documented in the constitutional monarchy and the republic alike, but their use was preferred to true liberal state-building, and it was an extremely common practice.

To fail to mention race in this paper would discredit much of the fundamental political role it played in understanding of colonialism in the Portuguese constitutional monarchy. Imperialists who rejected the liberal agenda, like A.F. Nogueira, may represent the latent ideas that realistically existed behind the outward-facing appeals of Portuguese liberal leaders. In a speech to the House of Peers, as late as 1891, he stated,

“The native of our colonies is Portuguese like us, in the sense that he has, as our subject, the same political rights as we possess, thanks to our most liberal legislation in that matter; but he is as far from being Portuguese like us as Portuguese Guinea, or Portuguese Mozambique, is from being Portugal... There is much talk of the integrity of the motherland, but we must neither explicitly nor implicitly, in word or thought, confound the sacrosanct soil of Portugal with that of Mozambique, which is governed by Mutassas and such. They are two completely different things”.⁷⁴

The idea that the native colonial citizen was equal in standing to the white colonial citizen or even the citizens of the metropole was continually violated both in policy and in rhetoric. This rhetoric, though, was not limited to those who openly characterized themselves as imperialists. J.P. de Oliveira Martins, for instance, a self-declared anti-imperialist, confidently believed in the inferiority of the black race,

⁷⁴ Nogueira, *A Ilha de S. Thome, a Questao Bancaria no Ultramar e o Nossa Problema Colonial*, 156-7.

“the philanthropists persist in hoping that the Bible, translated into Bundu or Bantu, will convert the savages, and that the schoolmaster’s rod will turn them into men like ourselves...one might as well teach the bible to the gorilla or orangutan”⁷⁵

Many of these racist tendencies undoubtedly translated to the actual policies adopted in Portuguese Africa. Still staunch liberals did exist who countered these views. A paramount example, perhaps the best of 19th-century critical liberal theory in Portugal was Joao de Andrade Corvo’s *Studies Regarding the Ultramarine Provinces*, which rejected race-based physical inferiority. He stated most clearly that this inferiority was “a false argument, based on mistaken scientific foundations, put forward by parties interested in maintaining the slave trade.”⁷⁶ The need, though, Corvo felt to make this argument should demonstrate quite clearly the established paradigm of the time which most succinctly believed that the African race was inferior to the European one.

So, it was not only that an economic incentive clearly existed to halt any extension of liberal rights to the African Empire, but also, it seems, racist rhetoric and ideology clearly played a role in debates regarding African policy. Often this rhetoric served to undermine African subjects’ abilities to practice liberal politics in the first place. Race relations in Portuguese Africa were a crucial aspect of the ‘liberal’ ideology in the colonies. There existed throughout history, and certainly to this day, a conception that race occupied no place in the Portuguese colonies. In this conception rests an idea, propagated in large part during the Salazar regime, that the Portuguese had created unique multiracial societies wherever they went. This became the cultural concept of “Lusotropicalism” which Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Andrade Corvo, *Estudo sobre as províncias ultramarinas*.

invented and championed. Foreign historians often understood, “it is to the credit of Portugal that...she made no distinction of race and colour and that all her subjects once they had become Catholics, were eligible for official posts”⁷⁷. Crown-sponsored miscegenation in São Tomé, African natives being sent to Portugal for theological education, and edicts granting freedmen permission to found religious brotherhoods,⁷⁸ served as evidence for historians that the Portuguese engaged in those egalitarian practices because they lacked a structural appeal for racist ideology. Even to the current republic, there remains an idea that the Portuguese have “a special ability to relate to, and mingle with, other peoples and cultures.”⁷⁹ As recently as 1987, the Portuguese government outlined the following vision for the 500th anniversary of the start of the Portuguese discoveries,

“All aspects of the discoveries are important, but the ones that can inspire and stimulate our development and mobilize the Portuguese...should be most ennobled; namely...the facility in establishing relations with all peoples, and the extraordinary aptitude exhibited by the Portuguese for mediation between cultures.”⁸⁰

This late revisionism for the colonial Portuguese past represents exactly the attitudes of successive Portuguese states, monarchies and democracies alike, to the issue of historical atrocities. There has continuously been an attempt to revive the empire as a positive force for good. Whether this false vision of its past is intentionally manipulated or genuinely believed by the Portuguese masses should yet be a matter of contention. The fact this is a debate,

⁷⁷ C.R. Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion*.

⁷⁸ A. Brasio, *Monumenta Missionária Africana*.

⁷⁹ Mourão, *Whitewash*, 93.

⁸⁰ Cavaco Silva, *Programa do XI Governo Constitucional*, 78.

though, should demonstrate a structural blindness in Portuguese society for the atrocities of its colonial past.

In reality, Portuguese race relations in Africa were far from a calm multiracial society, and miscegenation languished distant from an innocent practice; evidence shows that liberal values were in fact used to prop up a very small *mestiço* elite that ran the various Portuguese African colonies with an iron first. The argument dismantling race-blind Portuguese history was first blatantly laid out by C. R. Boxer, who, in a lecture to the British academy, argued that while the initial Christianization missions to the continent may have consisted of egalitarian practices in line with Catholic standards, quickly the need for slaves overshadowed these activities leading to “dreary rounds of fighting, slave-raiding, and slave-trading...which continued with few intermissions for over two centuries.”⁸¹ Portuguese policy, he proposes, was ultimately a pragmatic one which adapted to the economic necessities of the region. For instance, while *mulattoes* were permitted to serve on town councils in São Tome, they were banned from such posts in Brazil. In Angola and Mozambique, *mulatto* military officers were on equal footing to white officers during the governor’s receptions; in Rio de Janeiro the same officers bowed only from the doorway.⁸² As Hammond reminds, “In Portuguese Africa [compared to Brazil] things were different. There, the tribal societies were in being, the white men outnumbered, and their slaves relatively few.”⁸³ It is thus crucial to note political differences between Portugal’s American and African colonies. While in Brazil the white Portuguese colonists had no problem finding white women to marry, the African situation was much more complicated; this difficulty led

⁸¹ C.R. Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion*, 119.

⁸² Da Silva Correia, *História de Angola*.

⁸³ Hammond.

to different miscegenation policies and racial attitudes. Again, I note the tension between characterizing liberal political leaders of the constitutional monarchy as pragmatic imperialists or subject to racist ideology.⁸⁴ In my view it seems more likely that some combination of both is the most accurate interpretation, that is, a racist outlook of African affairs backing up a pragmatic view to colonial exploitation.

Of importance to this piece is the degree of compatibility this African policy had with liberalism. For Portuguese liberals who sought racial parity it was convenient that the African colonies they'd been left with had liberal-adjacent standards of heterogeneous leadership. Through that angle they could replicate their liberal ideology of equality. This concept fit perfectly within a liberal framework that ostensibly encouraged freedom of the individual and equal rights to all citizens. At the same time, the miscegenation served to create an elite class with political rights that was limited to the coastal areas and a minuscule fraction of the overall population. This small elite was much better equipped to operate colonial politics and ensure economic domination. This exclusionary political force was backed up by blatant ideas of racial subjugation that seemingly dominated Portuguese popular thought. The political organization of these colonies remained strictly practical and spoke to deep racist divides, similar to the ones of other European empires in Africa. Portugal's difference, though, rests on the fact it has yet to own up to these facts.

Thus, when these new international colonial expectations forced Portugal to renew its imperial ambitions through effective occupation it, while being a liberal regime that supposedly granted equal rights to all its citizens regardless of any ethnic, birth, or geographic

⁸⁴ Or even if, say, they had any interest at all in the colonial affairs beyond what levels of output reached the metropole. I assume in the piece they care at all, but this may not have even been the case for the vast majority of liberal thinkers who felt the metropole was 'enlightened' enough.

characteristics, instituted strikingly anti-liberal and violent techniques to control and subdue a renewed African Empire. These techniques, including the *pacification campaigns* for instance, the autocratic power provided to governors-general, and the racialized governance classes were practiced within the legal framework of a liberal state to ensure maximum economic output.⁸⁵ The liberal ideology of the time, including even the most radical thinkers such as Sá da Bandeira and de Tomás or da Silva Carvalho, understood the colonies as necessary to the economic survival of the liberal state in Portugal, and in that necessity the further need for different political practices. Yes, their objectives were different, but it was clearly unavoidable that a state with limited resources such as Portugal would devolve to military despotic rule if it allowed different laws and powers in its colonies. This is exactly what happened, and this section has demonstrated the practical application of liberal imperialism.

Implications of Portuguese Liberal Imperialism

Fundamentally, Portuguese liberal imperialism must concern scholars of liberalism and empire—and liberalism in general—because it demonstrates that the malleability of liberalism in practical contexts where it requires adaptation can be much more accentuated than previously considered. The Portuguese case is radically unique from a political and economic perspective. The *dual necessity* outlined in this thesis to explain the rise of liberal imperialism simplifies the causes of this phenomenon via a comprehensive historical analysis composed of vast primary source documents. The manner, though, in which Portuguese

⁸⁵ Whilst not in the scope of the piece, even within the republican movement that grew in the background of the constitutional period there existed a firm agreement that the colonies required different political methods. This idea was realized in Title V of the Republican Constitution of 1911, “The prevailing principle in the administration of colonial provinces shall be that of decentralization, with special laws suited to the state of the civilization of each one of those provinces.”

liberals outlined their ideology, meshing it with ancient political foundations and creating loopholes for economic exploitation is a fascinating political process that should make scholars consider the way liberalism's ideas can be engineered for starkly illiberal practices. In this thesis I have outlined a process of early political theory manipulation by policymakers to appease the economic demands of the state. The ease with which this was done in comparison to the expected clash of ideological values should be quite valuable to political scientists.

The Portuguese case not only provides a new and refreshing perspective to the field of liberalism and empire but also delivers a new type of case. While theorists in this area have studied wealthy industrialized states, Portugal was a backward economy that was largely rural and non-industrial. This difference in the economic necessity of a colonial empire forced Portuguese policymakers and theorists alike to create systems that hid empire under the guise of liberalism. This was the *dual necessity*. It compels those who think about 19th century liberalism in any capacity to also consider how the rise of that idea as a concrete method of political organization actually differed from states that profited, like Britain or France, but in fact did not necessarily *depend* on the economic exploitation inherent in imperialism to the extent of Portugal. As demonstrated in this thesis, Portuguese leaders understood their dependency and purposefully created a system that fit the imperial expansion within a liberal framework. When this system predictably failed and antiliberal practices clearly flared, Portuguese leaders doubled down on the façade of liberalism. To expand the case study pool of liberalism and empire to include Portugal can also provide substantial analytical value to the literature as it expands its applicability.

Furthermore, the actions of the Portuguese revolutionaries to call upon events of questionable historical accuracy to support a liberal founding myth demonstrates another distinct case of liberal state-making in Europe. The revolutionaries felt compelled to link their struggle with a supposed Portuguese tradition of liberal or constitutional values. While it is entirely possible that these individuals truly did believe that the *Cortes* had occupied a role remotely similar to a real legislative body, it is much more likely that they knew they were inflating the real qualities of those bodies. After all, these men were some of the most educated in the country, and it is hard to think they were ignorant of the real circumstances the *Cortes* existed in. Acting on that supposition, we then understand those exaggerations as purposeful political ideology to entice more supporters from among the people. As a political action, these events possess much analytic value for the early period of democracy in Europe, and the turn away from absolutism.⁸⁶ To analyze those historical allusions as revisionist political history-making will provide a deeper understanding of the intricacies of liberal political thought in Europe. The large amount of primary source analysis in this work should hopefully have provided the Portuguese case with some analytical importance. To do so would greatly assist scholars of liberalism and empire in the effort to understand how these seemingly contradictory systems became accepted in a popular manner.

It might compel scholars of liberalism to discount the findings of this thesis as focused on an idiosyncratic outlier that was the Portuguese Empire, but I would say that is a mistake for several reasons. First, to grant the Portuguese case decreased importance would have to owe to a lack of relevance to the overarching theory on the political development of liberalism.

⁸⁶ We mustn't conflate democracy and liberalism. The constitutional monarchy was not a democracy by any means. What I am alluding to here was the trend of republicanism that slowly saw absolutism reduced on the continent.

The historiography of this thesis should clearly prove that liberalism in Portugal did not come about suddenly or accidentally, but due to a growing proportion of a population enticed with the ideals it touted. The detailed attempt this thesis makes to trace the political development of liberalism in Portugal via educational and social reform in the Second Empire should thus provide clear empirical applicability to the question of growth of liberalism in a previously autocratic state. This process, often outlined in the literature of political theory, should certainly grant it a place among the scholarship.

Second, the unique aspects of the Portuguese case might make it difficult to directly compare it to other empires. This difficulty might make scholars hesitant to include it in the mainstream liberalism and empire scholarship. This is, in my view, an incorrect way of approaching new cases within this field. The unique aspects of the Portuguese history are precisely what make the empire such a necessary addition to the scholarship. To discount it because it is different would be to refuse to expand the literature beyond the endless tripartite comparative exercise involving the Dutch, French, and British empires. This narrow focus, while helpful in many cases given their clear similarities, also deeply limits the expansion of the literature. It is not that the Portuguese empire must necessarily be compared directly to the other prominent case studies to provide value, but also that its uniqueness can speak to new venues of research and insights scholars have not considered before. Fundamentally, the economic dependency this thesis outlined must not be seen as a critique of the symbiotic growth theories usually made through the analyses of those other European empires, but indeed as an *appendage* to those arguments. If liberalism came to be squared with empire in wealthy states like France and Britain, then we must also understand how it was also domestically squared in poorer metropoles like the Portuguese. The analysis conducted in

this piece of Portugal's unique domestic and economic situations speaks to that question and is fundamentally an attempt to expand the literature itself.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to create a link between the distinctive economic dependence of the Portuguese state on its colonies, specifically Brazil, in the 18th century, and the practice of a unique brand of Portuguese liberal imperialism during the constitutional monarchy. It has taken from a diverse range of historians, political scientists, and revolutionary actors to create an argument that traces the advent of liberalism in Portugal and its subsequent consolidation with imperial expansion, fruit of the mortal necessity of the Portuguese state for its colonies, otherwise known as the *dual necessity*. Comparing Portugal to other colonial powers of the 19th century, it was a clear point to make that it was dependent to an extent others were not on its colonies. This colonial trade, as well as the dependency on foreign imports held the development of the Portuguese economy back, leaving it largely agrarian and unindustrialized. The paper subsequently described the rise of liberalism in Portugal, and its distinctive historical character as expanded by primary thinkers. The paper utilized the historical colonial dependence of the state to attempt to explain the consolidation of a growing liberal ideology with the expansive, despotic, and violent colonial practices in the overseas empire which can be most succinctly characterized as illiberal. Most pervasive throughout this paper has been the relationship between a desire to realize a liberal political project in the imperial sphere while maximizing economic extraction. I hope to have proven, through the extensive primary source evidence provided, that the economic dependence of Portugal on its ultramarine colonies convinced Portuguese politicians of the 19th century, many of them self-proclaimed liberals, that empire was the only way for the Portuguese state

to advance. The unique popular perceptions of Portuguese imperialism, which seem to endure to this day may have served to propagate an idea that the Portuguese were a benevolent colonial power, even if those impressions were far from the reality. The manners in which the Portuguese Empire adapted liberal ideology to encompass colonial expansion, oftentimes simply ignoring, and other times attempting to square the two together, created a special practice of liberal imperialism that is theoretically stimulating. Understanding this practice, its origins, and evolution was the purpose of the paper.

Portuguese liberal imperialism, fruit of its uniqueness, not only adds a case study to the field of liberalism and empire but also adds a new type of case study. The Portuguese constitutional monarchy, an economically backward state, still enacted very similar liberal reforms as the more developed British, French, and Dutch states. It did so, though, for different reasons. While the wealthier monarchies continued to imperialize in the 19th century to get richer, Portuguese leaders did so because they felt they had no other choice. It was mortally dependent on several generations of colonies, India, Brazil, and then Africa. The idiosyncrasy of this relationship, combined with the obvious liberal movement fought for in an intense civil war, must entice the field to grow as it attempts to understand the paradoxical relationship between liberalism and empire. The unique aspects of the Portuguese Liberal Empire will thus hopefully spark a new curiosity which may light new investigation into those processes.

Future Research

To fully conclude, I will point to the fact that this topic is disappointingly arduous to research. The online access to primary sources such as the Sá da Bandeira Reports, the Liberal Revolution Manifestos, and the Norton de Matos and Albuquerque testimonies was

especially recalcitrant. The English-language access to the primary source material of 19th-century Portuguese liberalism is virtually nonexistent, and one must rely heavily on contemporary accounts that hint to specific writers, dominance of the Portuguese language, and specific internet skills to find primary texts. Luckily, they do exist and it's reassuring to know that they do, even if they take some time to find.

Additionally, I think, and perhaps this lies partly in my Portuguese links, that Portuguese colonial history is unique in many ways. The ability of a socioeconomically backward state with an extremely limited population to utilize all its resources and abilities to not only create but maintain, for hundreds of years, an ultra-marine empire that stretched four continents raises the question of the relationships it maintained with its subjects. It is asking for further research, research itself that has been coming along even in the English language, and it is this question that, tied with recent apprentices of liberalism, made me begin to understand this idea of Portuguese imperialism. The fact that even as a democracy, until 1999, Portugal held land in mainland China that it had continuously owned for 450 years only shows the exceptional nature of the Portuguese colonial project. What military, economic, social, or diplomatic choices granted one of Europe's smallest states independence, much less a global empire? What relationships did it create between its citizens and its subjects? Who were its citizens, and when? These are all part of a distinctive line of questions that have been tentatively answered by Luso-historians, and I believe that there is a perception of popular sovereignty, liberalism perhaps, that is pervasive throughout our history which may come to shed light on it. I do sincerely hope others also attempt to answer these decisive questions in understanding a distinctive modern empire.

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