This thesis investigates how the structure and distribution of international aid influence the likelihood of external conflict in post-revolutionary governments. Challenging the assumption that foreign aid uniformly stabilizes fragile states, I argue that aid from a single dominant donor often exacerbates internal fragmentation and encourages aggressive foreign policy behavior, particularly under conditions of great power rivalry. In contrast, a diversified donor base tends to reduce conflict potential by promoting internal balance and accountability. Drawing on a mixed-methods approach, the research combines cross-national quantitative analysis of 77 post-revolutionary states from 1945 to 2004 with four in-depth historical case studies—China, Iran, South Sudan, and Tunisia. The findings reveal a consistent pattern: post-revolutionary regimes supported primarily by a single donor are more likely to initiate external conflict, while those backed by balanced coalitions of donors tend to adopt more restrained foreign policies. These insights underscore the need to rethink international aid strategies for transitional states, highlighting the geopolitical risks associated with donor concentration and the stabilizing potential of inclusive, multilateral support structures.