

**Blessed be the Negative Peacemakers: Israel,
Palestine, and Perpetual Occupation**

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Introduction

Around 6:29 in the morning on October 7, 2023, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip fired the largest barrage of rockets ever upon the southern Israeli communities bordering the Strip. Under the cover of rockets, Palestinian terrorists swiftly infiltrated Israel by paraglider, by boat, and by cutting open the border fence and crossing on foot and by motor vehicle to raid Israeli communities, military bases, and even music festivals throughout the next few days. By the end of this invasion, roughly 1,200 Israelis were killed, including over 800 civilians, and 253 people had been taken back to Gaza as hostages (Haaretz 2024). It was the single greatest loss of Jewish life in a day since the Holocaust, but it was also the culmination of 56 years of occupation, to varying degrees, of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by the State of Israel. Israel captured these territories during 1967's Six-Day War, and since then it has governed over millions of Palestinians with security measures that repress Palestinians in varying modes and intensity. To date, it is one of the longest military occupations in history, and the longest ongoing occupation by far.

However, in the roughly seventeen years between the Second Intifada, during which Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, and October 7th, Israel and its security forces in the West Bank experienced an era of reduced violence. Between January 1, 2007, and October 7, 2023, Israelis killed 1,049 Palestinians in the West Bank (B'Tselem). In contrast, Israelis killed 1,755 West Bank Palestinians during the Second Intifada from September 29, 2000, through 2006, a much higher death toll during a much shorter period (B'Tselem). October 7th was the end of roughly seventeen years of relative peace within Israel and the West Bank, a “negative peace” under Johan Galtung's framework, where there was a relative absence of lethal violence but also

a failure to achieve social justice for the Palestinian civilians living under occupation (Galtung 1969, 183). Israel maintained this negative while continuing to perpetuate lethal and nonlethal violence against West Bank Palestinians, without many hearts-and-minds initiatives to win over civilians.

Israel's success in this era is at odds with several academic theories about military occupations and terrorism. It contradicts Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson's argument (2009) concerning the importance of hearts-and-minds and modern militaries' inability to win them. It also contradicts many of the logics about terrorist organization (TO) strategies, such as Robert Pape's argument (2003) that groups engage in suicide terrorism against democratic occupying states until the occupiers' constituents demand troop withdrawal. Suicide bombings continued in the 1990s after Israel withdrew from most of the towns in the occupied territories; conversely, it declined after 2002, when Israel reoccupied those areas during Operation Defensive Shield. Even as Israel continued to occupy the West Bank after the Second Intifada, levels of suicide terrorism remained very low, despite no solution to the political grievances of West Bank Palestinians. If modern militaries are inept at winning over civilian populations, and if modern democracies are susceptible to political fallout from suicide terrorism, how did Israel, a democracy with a highly technological military, manage to control the West Bank and suppress political violence through a widely hated occupation? And why did the peace fall apart on October 7? Why have other counterterror occupations, such as Northern Ireland, resulted in political settlements that created lasting peace and improved social justice, albeit imperfectly?

This paper will argue that occupations cannot create a "positive peace" (Galtung, 183) that includes social justice because of their inherent structure, which prioritizes the security concerns of the occupier over the social, economic, and political wellbeing of the occupied. The

occupation cannot erase the social grievances that violent organizations can exploit to fill the ranks of a terrorist campaign or an insurgency. Inevitably, bouts of social unrest will erupt that have the potential to become full blown uprisings, which TOs can exploit to wage their own violent campaigns against the occupier. This is especially true if the occupier attempts to suppress social unrest with large levels of lethal violence. Without addressing social grievances permanently, the occupier can suppress outbreaks of political violence by prioritizing generally nonlethal security measures that work in tandem with a comprehensive human intelligence network, such as local collaborators, to neutralize TOs within the occupied area. But this requires a careful and indefinite deployment of tactics, as well as constant vigilance that few states can maintain over a long period, and if this strategy is pursued imperfectly, the occupier runs the risk of experiencing an unending cycle of terrorist campaigns and subsequent state repression with high costs to both sides.

To evaluate this argument, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip provides an ideal case study. Israel and the occupied territories had been plagued by almost two decades of Palestinian terrorism and political violence in the First Intifada, the Islamist suicide bombing campaign of the 1990s, and the Second Intifada of 2000-2006. Even before this, Palestinian terrorists had attacked Israel from foreign bases such as Lebanon. These uprisings and terrorist campaigns were clearly in defiance of the Israeli occupation, but it is up to debate as to which aspects of the occupation provoked many Palestinians to engage in violent dissidence. There is, of course, the very presence of the occupation itself. The occupation exists in place of a sovereign Palestinian state. In Area C of the West Bank, which contains the Israeli settlements and over sixty percent of the West Bank's total area, the occupation supplants Palestinian civil authority completely.

Restrictions on Palestinian movement throughout the West Bank are frequently tied to the presence of Israeli settlements. In Israel, the settlements are often framed in public discourse as a security measure. Within Israel proper, Jews, especially religious Jews, tend to view the settlements as improving national security (Silver and Smerkovich 2024). Getmansky and Sinmazdemir (2018) argue that illegal outposts have immediate security benefits when they expand into the home districts of suicide bombers immediately after said bombers commit attacks (241). Meanwhile, Israeli Arabs and secular Jews tend to view the settlements as hurting national security (Silver and Smerkovich 2024). There are clearly strong reasons to believe that the settlements have an impact on security measures, one way or another. However, not everyone believes that the settlements have a significant impact on Palestinian political violence. Twenty-one percent of Israeli adults believe that settlements neither hurt nor help (Silver and Smerkovich 2024). This neutral view is not entirely without merit. Alimi (2007) points out that there is no clear relation between levels of Palestinian dissidence and settlement construction between 1967 and 1987 (84). In any event, the settlements are more of a political component of the occupation rather than a security measure, and thus they are not the primary focus of this paper.

Instead, this paper will examine the role of several ostensibly nonlethal security modes present in the Israeli occupation. Here, the preexisting literature focuses on the effects that state repression has on the individual participants rather than the militant organizations that recruit them. These are measures which impact a far greater number of Palestinians in the West Bank, as they also did in the Gaza Strip before unilateral disengagement in 2005. The oldest and most ubiquitous of these is incarceration. Arrests are relatively common under the Israeli occupation, and while the system of incarceration and interrogation is complicated, it has two main components. First is imprisonment of convicted terrorists, who unlike Israeli citizens go before

an Israeli military court. Second is administrative detention, a holdover from the British Mandate period. Administrative detention allows Israeli security forces to detain a suspected terrorist indefinitely as a preventative measure against the detainee committing an act of terror in the future. Administrative detention, in theory, has no time limit, although very few detainees at any given time have been under Israeli custody for more than two years ([B'Tselem](#)). Arrests and incarceration are also occasionally tied in with deportations, the targets of which have been militants, close associates and relatives, and/or general civilians.

The Israeli occupation, especially during times of heightened violence like the two Intifadas, has also utilized house demolitions. Like administrative detention, this policy originated under the British Mandate, and it was first deployed en masse by Israel in the late 1960s, after the Six-Day War (Benmelech et al. 2015, 30). They became common again during the First Intifada and yet again during the Second Intifada. Benmelech et al. divide the forceful demolition of Palestinian houses into two general categories. The first is *precautionary house demolitions*, or “clearing operations,” as the IDF often refers to them (29). Precautionary demolitions are intended to deny enemy snipers a position from which to ambush security forces. They can involve demolishing a single home, or they can target a whole area to be cleared of unapproved structures, such as the “no-go areas” that the IDF carved out of the Gaza Strip during the Second Intifada (29). The second category is *punitive house demolitions*, which are employed as a tactic to punish known terrorists and to deter other Palestinians from committing violence against Israel. These generally make up a minority of the demolitions. From Israel’s perspective, punitive demolitions are a necessary deterrent against terrorism, and precautionary demolitions address legitimate security concerns. But from a Palestinian perspective, the loss of one’s home can be devastating and humiliating.

Another measure is the deployment of IDF checkpoints on Palestinians roads.

Checkpoints are intended to track the movements of Palestinian militants and intercept terrorists en route to committing a terror attack, but they also have impeded the movement of Palestinians throughout the West Bank, often making commutes that would take twenty minutes last several hours. In some cases, soldiers manning the checkpoints have also assaulted or humiliated Palestinians without cause (Longo et al. 2014, 1008). In addition, sixty-one women were forced to give birth while stuck behind an Israeli checkpoint between 2001 and 2004, with thirty-six infants dying as a result (United Nations 2005). It is consequences like these that led one Palestinian journalist to claim, “The legal father of the suicide bomber is the Israeli checkpoint, whilst his mother is the house demolition” (Byman 2012, 837). However, other empirics suggest that, as oppressive as these ostensibly nonlethal measures can be to ordinary civilians, who question why they must tolerate this decade after decade, these measures do not directly contribute to overall levels of Palestinian terrorism and political violence. However, when applied excessively, they can create a powder keg of grievances that can easily explode into violent conflict with just the right provocation, typically in the form of lethal state violence.

This paper’s findings have many broader implications for the body of preexisting literature. Throughout many military occupations, it has been assumed that the occupier had to win local hearts and minds to defeat native-borne insurgents and terrorists. In this vein, it has also been assumed that security measures which severely restrict the civil liberties of occupied people will encourage more individuals to commit violence against the occupier. There are not many academic works that examine how everyday oppression might directly provoke individuals and organizations to commit violence against the occupier. Several articles address how oppression can cause individuals under occupation to support *others* committing violence, but

they stop short of explaining how popular support relates to individual or organizational action, which is what most occupiers are more concerned with.

The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is hardly the only occupation to earn the hatred of those living under it. The British Army's deployment in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, coalition forces in post-invasion Iraq, and the Russian deployments in both Chechen Wars are all examples of occupiers that both earned the occupied peoples' resentment and found themselves the target of terror campaigns against both soldiers and civilians. However, these are all cases where a political settlement was reached before the occupier withdrew. If no settlement can be reached, academics should understand how occupiers would manage an indefinite presence, and whether they would prioritize tactics that build up popular resentment in the long term while suppressing violence in the immediate future.

The remainder of the paper will begin with a literature review examining previous arguments made about the criticality of hearts-and-minds, as well as the differing strategies that TOs fighting an occupation have utilized. Second, a theory based on these arguments' merits and weaknesses will be proposed that explains the relationship between ostensibly nonlethal measures and the behavior of dissidents in an occupied populace. Third, a case study with two main sections will help explain the theory. The first section will examine analyses of the motivations of suicide bombers and the organizations that recruit them. The second section of the case study will utilize a historical overview of the conflict to explain how various security measures have influenced violent reprisals over time. This section contains four subsections: a) the first two decades of occupation between the Six-Day War in June 1967 and the start of the First Intifada in December 1987; b) the First Intifada; c) the Second Intifada; and d) the period between the Second Intifada and the October 7th attack, with an emphasis on the West Bank. The

final section will be a discussion, in which the greater implications of the Israeli occupation will be examined in detail.

Literature Review

Before examining the Israeli occupation in depth, it is necessary to address the preexisting academic literature on terrorism logics and military occupation, highlighting gaps that this case study will address. First, one must examine works on terrorist strategies, namely why and how TOs wage campaigns against occupiers. These strategies have frequently involved suicide bombings, both as a tactic and as a strategy in themselves. Because of the Intifada's concurrency with 9/11, the Iraq War, the War in Afghanistan, the Second Chechen War, and various other Islamic suicide bombing campaigns, many terrorism scholars have used the Second Intifada as a case study for develop suicide bombing logics. Pape, writing in 2003, uses Israel-Palestine and other conflicts to develop a widely cited suicide bombing logic. He argues that, at the organizational level, suicide bombing, even when religious militant groups employ it, is usually employed with the secular and nationalistic objectives of inducing democratic occupier states into reducing their forces and making political concessions (Pape 2003, 344). According to Pape, suicide terror campaigns are conducted less in retaliation to specific acts of repression committed by the occupier. Rather, these campaigns are designed to convince the occupying power's voter base that continuing the occupation is not worth the cost, at which point voters will pressure their government to end the occupation.

In addition to Pape's widely cited work, there are other theories concerning suicide terror campaigns, especially in response to the Israeli occupation. Mia Bloom focuses on Palestine, using its peculiarities to help question Pape's logic. She argues that a TO can use suicide bombing to spoil an occupier's withdrawal and keep the occupation ongoing if the terms of

withdrawal are not in the group's interest. In a related logic, she also contends that suicide terrorism can be used to outbid rival TOs by demonstrating that the more violent group can successfully fight for the peoples' interests (Bloom 2004, 66). Bader Araj argues against both Bloom and Pape, claiming that both the timing and effects of suicide bombings do not match up with either theory. Instead, he argues that suicide terror is primarily reactive to harsh state repression, rather than a grand strategy planned far in advance (Araj 2008, 299). Unlike Bloom and Pape, he believes that consistent harsh state repression can have a major impact on TO behavior, which is in line with this paper's argument. However, Araj's work does not make a clear distinction about what *forms* of state repression are the most likely to cause individuals living under occupation to retaliate with lethality. One of this paper's goals is to make this distinction clearer.

The second piece of the puzzle is to determine the motivations of individuals to become terrorists, suicide terrorists especially. The natural temptation is to assume that terrorist motivations are not only a product of the self, but also general societal conditions. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) explore whether economic conditions are related to participation in terrorism. After examining survey data of Palestinians in the early 2000s, they find that the more educated Palestinians are more likely to support terrorism than those who were illiterate or had little formal education (126). They conclude that political liberties matter more than socio-economic status when determining support for terrorism (119). Their findings may seem obvious, but basic civil and political liberties have always been restricted within the occupied territories. This, however, has not resulted in a constant 57-year stream of Palestinians volunteering to become shahids.

Edward Newman is not as quick to ignore the role of economic conditions entirely. He suggests that a humiliation, both of oneself and one's community plays a significant role in driving Palestinian youth towards terrorism (Newman 2006, 769). Newman argues that political repression can add to humiliation, as can terrible economic conditions that leave civilians living in squalor and cramped conditions (769). His humiliation theory is supported by Longo et al., who coordinated their own surveys in villages nearby two West Bank checkpoints, one that had many of its travel restrictions lifted and one that did not. They concluded that the villagers near the second checkpoint supported political violence against Israelis more than villagers near the less restrictive checkpoint, with humiliation being their primary gripe with IDF checkpoints (Longo et al., 1018). The issue here, however, is that these studies sometimes conflate support for terrorism with a willingness to engage in it oneself. It is therefore critical to make a distinction between forms of oppression that cause resentment, which is not always visible to the occupier, and those that immediately incite violence, which an occupier can observe before adjusting its tactics or strategy.

Finally, once terrorism and widespread political violence have taken root within an occupied area, one should consider how an occupier can resolve this state of unrest. An obvious answer is to withdraw and restore the occupied peoples' own sovereignty, which would theoretically lead to positive peace. But if the occupier's own strategic goals have not yet been achieved, namely protecting its own national security, then the occupier is more likely to focus on defeating the terrorists *and then* withdrawing, which is where Lyall and Wilson's theory (2009) comes in. Although they primarily focus on counterinsurgency, they analyze conflicts such as the Algerian War of Independence that involved terrorism against the occupier's own soldiers and civilians, which resembles Israel-Palestine. They argue that modern militaries are

overly mechanized, in contrast with 19th-century militaries, which did not have modern vehicles or logistics, forcing soldiers then to forage and regularly interact with the public (68). This forced occupiers to build rapport with locals, which had the benefits of maintaining good relationships with the people they occupied, endowing soldiers with cultural sensitivity, and gathering intelligence on their enemies. Modern militaries, in contrast, keep their soldiers isolated from the occupied populace (76). They therefore lack information-collection abilities, which makes it difficult to identify insurgents and selectively apply punishment (68). In short, they make an argument supporting the importance of hearts-and-minds.

But how ironclad is their claim? The modern IDF is famously technology-heavy, with the ready deployment of modern tanks, fighter jets and helicopters, and attack drones. It is true that they have coordinated with the Palestinian Authority at times to combat Islamic TOs, but the bulk of their success in quelling the two Intifadas came when Israel acted unilaterally. Cultural sensitivity and positive rapport had very little to do with Israel's success. It seems clear that, in both the short and long terms, Israel managed to collect intelligence on Palestinian militants well enough by relying on individual collaborators, which did not involve improving Israel's public image among Palestinians at large. This implies that, if alternatives to hearts-and-minds can be used for intelligence gathering, there is no tactical need to make peace with the occupied populace. But the collaborator model may not make for a sufficient long-term strategy, as an occupier such as Israel can neutralize TOs without resolving the root causes of the conflict. The ebbs and flows of 75 years of conflict with Palestinians clearly demonstrates this.

Theory

Occupations create a political grievance based on a failure to maintain or to achieve social justice. This grievance is spread to varying degrees across all classes. Partially, the

occupied populace resents that a foreign country has violated its sovereignty without their consent. But it also resents the inevitable particulars of the occupation. The occupation's central authority prioritizes its continued existence over the personal liberty of the occupied. It restricts freedom of movement within the occupied zone to protect its own security forces. It also restricts freedom of expression and assembly to avoid mass demonstrations and civil unrest. It rules without properly consulting local politicians. As a foreign entity that is not accountable to the people it governs, the occupier also prioritizes its own security interests over the economic wellbeing of the occupied, which inevitably leads to regulatory mismanagement.

Over time, mismanagement and oppression creates mass resentment against the occupation. Minor spouts of unrest occur, and they can be civil, violent, or both. The occupier suppresses the low-intensity unrest without either fully addressing the root grievances that led to the unrest or completely eradicating the opposition. Thus, a period of relative negative peace occurs, which frequently convinces the occupation authority that dissent has been suppressed indefinitely. This period is marked by few or no instances of low-intensity unrest. However, social tension continues to build among the occupied populace until a flashpoint moment catches the occupation authority by surprise. The flashpoint can take many forms, including the occupier killing a civilian, or a riot that is suppressed brutally. But this instance of state violence causes popular resentment to explode into massive continuous riots and protests, which the occupier is unprepared for and reacts to with excessive force, including the increased deployment of lethal violence. The increase in fatalities leads to an increase in public support for lethal retaliation against the occupier- both its security forces and, if reachable, its own civilians in its homeland. It also leads to an increase in those occupied persons willing to commit this violence, although most supporters of political violence against the occupier do not commit violence themselves.

At this point, TOs can choose one of two options. The first option is to exploit the public's support for violence to wage a terror campaign. This requires the organization to have a robust infrastructure within the occupied territory, and it cannot be chosen by a TO that has already been internally crippled by the occupier. If the TO chooses this option, it can wage a robust terror campaign, taking advantage of the steady supply of eager, angry potential recruits within the occupied populace. The second option, which is the only option for crippled or underdeveloped TOs, is to avoid exploiting the popular support for violence. In this case, various individuals or small groups within the occupied populace engage in small-scale disorganized terrorism.

If a TO chooses to wage a terror campaign, the occupier reacts by engaging in counterterrorism. The success of the counterterror campaign depends on the strength of human intelligence. This can be gathered by individual collaborators within the occupied populace, as well as by winning over a former enemy faction within the occupied populace. With strong intelligence, the occupier can identify targets for neutralization, preferably in the form of arrests, since assassinations typically provoke retaliatory terrorist violence. The more targets that are neutralized, the less potent the TO's infrastructure becomes, and arrested terrorists can be convinced or compelled to supply more intelligence that leads to more neutralization. The occupier can also restrict freedom of movement pragmatically to prevent terrorists from carrying out attacks. In addition, the occupier can engage in other predominantly nonlethal security measures that prevent and disincentivize most potential terrorists from engaging in political violence without provoking further backlashes from individuals who cannot be deterred.

If this general strategy is deployed competently, the occupier cripples the TO's (or organizations') ability to conduct a terror campaign within the occupied territory. Upon

suppressing large-scale terror, the occupier achieves an imperfect negative peace. If it makes no political concessions towards social justice, this whole cycle eventually repeats- barring extreme, widespread, totalitarian repression. The cycle also repeats if *some* political concessions are made, such as delineating partial political and security powers to a local faction, without creating a consensus among the occupied populace that social justice has been achieved. In this case, however, the next flashpoint will be delayed in comparison to the case of no improvements to social justice. If the occupier has a strong enough security apparatus and a sufficiently strong robust intelligence network, it can theoretically suppress a flashpoint indefinitely, but this would require perfect vigilance and a swift response to outbreaks of unrest that precede flashpoints.

Case Study: Analysis of Individual Terrorists

The Second Intifada was the peak of the Israel-Palestine conflict, in terms of casualties on both sides. It also was the first conflict in which all ostensibly nonlethal security measures were in place, and in some cases, scholars tried to study their effects quantitatively. Before delving into the history of the conflict, it is important to examine studies on the motivations of Palestinian terrorists, particularly suicide terrorists. Some bombers were interviewed after their attacks failed and they were arrested. Others succeeded in their attacks and therefore had information regarding their motivations investigated and compiled after the died. Ironically, there have been quite a few studies on the motivations of suicide bombers, despite their general inability to grant interviews to researchers after the fact. This may be because suicide bombing victims have made up a large percentage of Israeli casualties since 1993. Suicide attacks caused 44 percent of Israeli casualties from terrorism between September 2000 and August 2002, the Second Intifada's two most violent years (Moghadam 2003, 65). Understanding the motivations

behind suicide attacks provides immediate insight into a major component of violent resistance to the occupation.

An analysis of the motivations behind suicide attacks also has wider implications for terrorism in general. There is good reason to believe that, for Palestinians in particular, the motivations of suicide bombers and other militants are very similar. Palestinian suicide bombings stem from the concept of *Istishhadia*, or “self sacrifice in the path of God” (Schweitzer 2007, 670). The terrorists themselves, or *instishhadis*, do not make a distinction between suicide bombings and suicide missions, where the attacker does not commit suicide as part of the attack but expects to be killed in the process (670). Before suicide bombings became more frequent in the 1990s, many of the attacks carried out by Fatah, Black September, and others were effectively suicide missions. Most or all Palestinian terrorists died during the Munich Massacre of 1972 and the Coastal Road Massacre in 1978, to provide two examples (Byman 2010; 64). Since suicide bombings fell off dramatically during the Second Intifada, many attacks have also been suicide missions in effect, namely the lone-actor vehicle-borne attacks that will be discussed later and the series of stabbing attacks in 2015-2016 known as the Stabbing Intifada. In these attacks, the terrorists could not reasonably expect to survive. One can presume that the motivations of most Palestinian terrorists, regardless of terror method, are similar.

The motivations of suicide bombers and TOs vary. Moghadam breaks down individual motivations behind various categories, including personal motives (such as revenge), nationalistic struggle, and religious motivates. Organizations, he adds, can share many of these motivations, but are also concerned with tactics and politics (68). Moghadam is skeptical of religion’s role. He points out that there is a selection bias towards devout Muslims if a suicide bomber is recruited by Hamas or PIJ. In addition, most suicide attacks after 2002 were organized

by Fatah or Fatah affiliates (namely the Tanzim and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades), which were secular-nationalist organizations that did not select recruits based on religion or advocate any explicitly religious motivations (69). But motivations can be complicated, and both individuals and groups can be motivated for multiple different reasons. This overlap makes it difficult to devise a counterterrorism strategy that targets one set of motivations without neglecting or further inciting other motivations.

However, even cases where religion, nationalism, or personal honor are drivers to become a suicide terrorist, revenge for Palestinian fatalities is often a driving factor. Moghadam points out that suicide martyrdom can simultaneously achieve several goals: a) fulfill of religious command, b) escape from humiliation felt by most Palestinians, c) provides family with benefits, d) gain societal prestige, and e) exact revenge against the Israelis (87). This is supported by anecdotes about individual suicide bombers. Hanadi Jaridat exploded herself in Haifa in retaliation for Israel killing Palestinians and confiscating their land. But she was primarily motivated by Israel killing her brother and cousin (Kimhi and Even 2004, 827). Teoria Hamoria attempted a suicide attack in Jerusalem but failed. During interrogation, she revealed that she had both hoped to help end the occupation, a nationalistic goal, while also hoping to avenge the growing number of Palestinian children killed by Israeli soldiers (828). Jamal Nasser, aged 22 from Nablus, exploded himself in April 2001 for several reasons. In part, he wanted to retaliate against Israel destroying homes and stores in the occupied territories. But he also wanted to avenge the violent deaths of other Palestinians, many of whose funerals he had attended (Araj, 297). Every case involved some motive besides avenging someone killed by Israel, sometimes including elements of humiliation that Newman discusses, but vengeance for lethal violence was the common element.

One need not only rely on individual stories, however. Brym and Araj (2006) conducted an in-depth study that attempted to deal with overlapping incentives of both organizations and individual attackers to engage in suicide terror. For their study, they compiled data on 138 suicide bombings, including unsuccessful attacks, that targeted Israelis both within Israel and the occupied territories. Brym and Araj compiled data on suicide bomber motives from a combination of Israeli sources, the *New York Times*, and two Arabic newspapers. They relied most heavily on the Arabic newspapers because those sources provided more consistent and detailed evidence drawn from interviews with the organizations' leaders and the suicide bombers' families (Brym and Araj, 1974). The authors examined the data for information on the primary, secondary, and tertiary motivations of both organizations and individual bombers for participating in suicide attacks. These motivations were not necessarily tied to specific events, and they could include a general desire to avenge Palestine, avenge family or friends, or a sense of religious duty. The authors also examined the primary, secondary, and tertiary "precipitants"-specific events that organizations decide to respond to with a suicide attack (1974). Thus, they recognized the criticality of both individual and organizational motivations in sustaining a suicide terror campaign, while acknowledging that organizations ultimately determine the timing of these attacks and the specific state actions that they retaliate against.

Ideally, for each of the 138 suicide attacks, Brym and Araj would have discovered nine total data points: three for individual motivations, three for organizational motivations, and three for precipitants. However, they did not have a complete data set, and not every attack had multiple motivations or precipitants. Nevertheless, the compiled data showed several clear trends. The authors found that 67 percent of known individual motivations were for personal revenge or national revenge (1979). Personal revenge could potentially include retribution for

nonlethal acts committed by Israeli security forces, such as house demolitions or assault and torture. But the authors state that most instances of personal revenge were for the killing of a close relative. Likewise, national revenge was usually for notable attacks against Palestinians by Israeli security forces, which frequently included lethal violence (1979). Religion was behind only 27 percent of known individual motivations (1979).

A similar result was found for known organizational motivations. Organizational revenge, such as for the killing of group members, and national revenge accounted for 59 percent of known motivations, while religion accounted for 7 percent (1980). Tactical and strategic advantages notably made up only 34 percent of organizational motives, suggesting that reaction to Israeli violence, especially lethal violence, is a greater driver for terrorism than political agendas (1980). This conclusion is bolstered when one examines the data on organizational precipitants. Thirty-four percent of known precipitants were assassinations of organizational leaders; an additional 30 percent were killings of other Palestinians (1978). Only 18 percent of precipitants were for nonlethal actions by the Israelis, and another 18 percent were political and ideological events such as negotiations or elections (1978). Although their data is imperfect, Brym and Araj demonstrate that organizations, much like the attackers they recruit, primarily plan and execute their attacks in reaction to lethal violence. Issues such as religious duty, nonlethal action, or the social injustice of the occupation itself are not primary causes of suicide terrorism, and most likely not of terrorism in general.

The study of motivation is important because it helps terrorism scholars understand whether a particular security measure or a combination of measures incites more violence than it suppresses, in both the short and long term. Studies of terrorist motivations reveal that lethal security measures leads to more terrorist recruitment than ostensibly nonlethal security measures.

At the same time, they eliminate members of the TO that plan these attacks. Overall, the reduction in organizational capability appears to be evenly offset by the replacement of dead terrorists with new recruits. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) measure the effect of targeted killings of Palestinian militants on overall levels of terrorism during the Second Intifada. They demonstrate that targeted killings do not lead to a statistically significant increase or decrease in terrorist violence (378). The authors also point out that the main factor in the decrease in terrorist attacks against Israelis starting in 2002 was most likely “defensive” measures such as constructing the West Bank border barrier, more security checkpoints, closures of Palestinian towns, and better collection of human intelligence on terrorist cells (378). The next section of this paper, the Historical Overview, will show that this finding applies consistently throughout the history of the Israeli occupation. Security measures that focus on crippling organizations rather than killing individuals are more effective at reducing political violence, especially when combined with steady intelligence.

Case Study: Historical Overview

Before the First Intifada (1967-1987)

Palestinian terrorism has been indelibly tied to resisting the Israeli occupation, but the violence predates the occupation itself. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which saw the establishment of the State of Israel, over 700,000 Arabs fled their homes to neighboring Arab countries, as well as to the Jordanian-held West Bank and the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip. Some of these refugees became Palestinian fedayeen, who began launching raids into Israel during the 1950s from the West Bank and Gaza. Israel would frequently retaliate by executing reprisal operations against both the Palestinian fighters and the foreign states that had assumed responsibility for them (Roy 1988, 64). Thus, Israeli counterterrorism in the West Bank and the

Gaza Strip predated the occupation of those two areas, and Palestinian political violence began as retaliation to Israel's very existence in historic Palestine.

In 1959, Yasser Arafat and Khaled al-Wazir (nom de guerre "Abu Jihad") founded Fatah, which executed its first raid into Israeli territory in 1964 (Byman 2010, 30-32). Fatah was devoted to reclaiming all of Palestine for the refugees of 1948, as made clear by multiple public statements and the oath of loyalty each member had to swear (31). Fatah included former fedayeen fighters such as Abu Jihad, and its members executed raids, primarily against civilian targets, in the hope that they would provoke further reprisal operations against Palestinian civilians that would galvanize Arab public opinion into pressuring the Arab states to actively support the Palestinian cause. This strategy was called "consecutive detonation," a recurring theme in the Israel-Palestine conflict (Byman, 32). From 1965 until June 1967, Fatah executed 113 attacks on Israeli territory, which left eleven Israelis and seven Palestinians dead. Israel, in turn, raided the West Bank village of Samu on November 13, 1966, killing fifteen Jordanian soldiers and five civilians (Byman, 32). The Samu raid triggered riots in Jordan over Amman's underwhelming response to Israeli incursions, an early sign that consecutive detonation might work. At the same time, Israel was employing collective punishment, in part because its security forces lacked the intelligence sources to identify and target the actual militants. Even before June 1967, both sides were devising modes of terror and counterterror that would be employed for decades to come.

Paradoxically, the nature of Palestinian violence did not radically change when Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem during the Six Day War. Fatah immediately launched a militant campaign against Israel in the West Bank. Arafat attempted to establish Fatah cells in every village and urban neighborhood, but he simply lacked the resources and

organizational infrastructure to do so (Byman, 35). Fatah and other Palestinian groups only had a grand total of 10,000 fighters in 1968, not enough to wage a strong campaign against the occupying forces (Sayigh 1997, 20). The PLO was founded with the intention of providing the Palestinian masses with political representation, but it lacked any institutions to promote mass political participation. It was also heavily repressed by both Israel and the Arab states where Palestinian refugees resided, so the PLO had little opportunity to provide social services that could galvanize public support behind it (19). Therefore, Palestinians in the West Bank could not be mobilized either in militancy or civil resistance against the Israeli occupation during this time. The situation was different in the Gaza Strip, where militant groups such as the Palestine Liberation Army carried out guerilla attacks against the IDF and Israeli establishments (Roy, 67). The Gaza refugees were highly sympathetic to the militant cause, and the PLA used the refugee camps for cover and supplies (67). But this base of support only extended to the refugee camps; the native Gazans did not back the PLA's campaign, which made militancy difficult to maintain in the long term.

The militant campaigns in both territories convinced Israel to begin implementing modes of control that would become standard throughout the occupation. Beginning in 1971, Israel started enforcing 24-hour curfews on the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, with stringent restrictions of movement for their inhabitants (67). Israeli forces engaged many PLA militants in combat and killed them. But they also arrested large numbers of Palestinian fighters, activists, and political figures. These arrests were accompanied by mass deportations in 1970. The Israelis did not only deport suspected militants, but also 12,000 relatives of suspected militants (67). This combination of lethal and ostensibly nonlethal tactics succeeded in eliminating violent Palestinian militancy in the Gaza Strip by the end of 1971.

In the West Bank, Israeli security forces also deployed ostensibly nonlethal measures successfully against Fatah (Byman, 35). Israelis began deporting suspected West Bank militants in 1967, deporting five that year. In 1968, that number grew to sixty-nine, and grew to 223 in 1969, and peaked with 406 deportations in 1970 (35). At first, this may have been selective, but the rapid increase in the yearly deportation figures suggests that the Israelis may not have been entirely precise in deporting only terrorists. Ultimately, these deportations may have served as de facto collective punishment. Israel also employed curfews to punish villages and towns suspected of harboring militants (35). The IDF also carried out house demolitions against those who housed attackers. From 1967 until 1970, Israeli security forces committed roughly 1,400 punitive house demolitions in the occupied territories, leveling the homes of those accused of either being militants or aiding them (Benmelech et al. 2014, 30). House demolitions had mixed results; the destruction of Dr. Tokan's house in Nablus led to strikes and demonstrations (Byman, 35).

Nevertheless, Israel's first campaign against Palestinian militants in the occupied territories appeared to be a resounding success. Between 1967 and 1973, 269 Israelis died from terrorism and guerrilla attacks, as did 327 Palestinians, most of whom died at the hands of other Arab militant groups, not the IDF (Byman, 38). The casualty figures, especially when one considers the number of Palestinians killed by other Palestinians, was in stark contrast with future conflicts. However, ostensibly nonlethal modes of counterterrorism were in full play, demonstrating that, when deployed competently, they could suppress much more political violence than they incite. There was no flashpoint moment during this era that triggered massive riots. And even if there had been, Palestinian militants lacked the organization infrastructure to transform these riots into a sustainable uprising against the Israeli occupation.

From then on, terrorist attacks against Israel and its citizens generally fell under the realm of international terrorism. After Israel expelled Fatah from the West Bank, Fatah was also violently purged from Jordan during the 1970-71 “Black September” conflict (Sayigh, 22). Many attacks against Israeli were then launched from Lebanon. After Fatah took over the PLO in 1969 (19-20), the Fatah-led PLO constructed a state-in-exile based in South Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps in an area known as “Fatahland” (Byman, 59). The move to Lebanon dictated the kind of operations terrorists based there could execute. The PLO started committing cross-border “suicide” raids into Israel to demonstrate its presence and force the United States and Israel to include it in peace negotiations (27). The PLO hoped that these attacks would spoil peace initiatives that excluded Palestinians, namely the American-led negotiations that led to the 1978 Camp David Accords. At the same time, the PLO had to build up militia forces in Lebanon to protect its fledgling state-in-exile from attack by the IDF (27). By devoting so many men and resources to defending its infrastructure in Lebanon, the PLO limited the scope and complexity of the attacks that it could carry out. This meant that Fatah was limited to occasional attacks on Israeli civilians, and Fatah’s strategy did not differentiate much from smaller groups that did not appreciably change the occupation’s nature.

The PLO’s terror campaign, as well as the attacks carried out by smaller groups like the PFLP, killed far fewer Israelis than Palestinian political violence in later years. Had these Palestinian groups been able to devote more resources to their terror campaigns, the death toll would have been much higher. It is hard to measure the relationship between refugee animosity against Israel and involvement in Palestinian militancy. Membership in a militant group may have been for survival, or exacting revenge against other militias in Lebanon’s Civil War, especially Christian forces. Even without these factors, the nature of personal grievances of

refugees in Lebanon undoubtedly differ from those of Palestinians living under direct Israeli occupation. Fewer Palestinians died from Israeli counterterrorism in Lebanon before 1982 than in the occupied territories from the First Intifada onward, which implies that desire for revenge against Israel would be lower. However, the humiliation of being expelled from one's homeland may have replaced the killing of others as an incentive to attack Israelis. In addition, these attacks occurred no more than 35 years after the Nakba, and refugees may have wanted to avenge friends and relatives whom Jewish militant groups and the IDF killed in that conflict.

The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon effectively ended the PLO armed struggle and its state building efforts (Sayigh, 28). After being ejected from their bases in Beirut and South Lebanon, Fatah and the PLO were forced to relocate to Tunisia, and they never restored their previous capabilities to carry out terrorism and militancy (Byman, 67). From Tunis, there was little the PLO could do but wait (67). Fatah committed some acts of international terrorism, but nothing at the scale of the Coastal Road massacre and their other attacks in the 1970s. Also, with Fatah's operational capacity destroyed, there was no organization that could recruit terrorists within Israel, meaning that domestic terrorist strategy was not viable either. After 1982 and the collapse of their out-of-Lebanon strategy, Fatah was forced to adapt, eventually focusing more on directly appealing to the political concerns of Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories, as opposed to appealing to Palestinian refugees abroad as they had up until this point.

On the other end of the secularist-Islamist continuum, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members would later found Hamas in 1988, quietly engaged itself in apolitical, nonviolent civic programs that promoted Islamism within the occupied territories. The Brotherhood created Hamas so its members could engage in political violence in the Intifada while maintaining the Brotherhood's plausible deniability (Abu Amr 1993, 5). This made sense, because the Muslim

Brotherhood had built up its reputation over decades as a peaceful, civic-minded organization, and Hamas's actions would threaten this reputation. The Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928, and it became established within Palestine in 1945. The Brotherhood aimed to transform Palestinian society into one that closely resembled the society established by Muhammad and his companions (5). After the Six-Day War, the Brotherhood in the territories focused on building schools, charities, social clubs, and other civic infrastructure that would help in "the upbringing of an Islamic generation" (7), all of which worked toward their goal of restructuring Palestine into an Islamic society.

The Brotherhood's development and gradual foray into politics was marked by pragmatism and long-term planning. It generally avoided political advocacy until the Late 1970s (7). Until then, the secular nationalist resistance movement led by the PLO and Fatah was incredibly popular among Palestinians, and attempting to challenge the secularists in the fields of politics and militancy would have been futile. However, Palestinians within the territories started to become disillusioned with the PLO (7). The Brotherhood capitalized on this opportunity to increase its political activism, especially within Palestinian universities. The Brotherhood also started building its political influence by utilizing the various social networks, such as sports clubs, libraries, and social clubs, that it had spent decades developing (8). The Brotherhood's initial political advocacy worked to counter the influence of the PLO and other secularists within Palestinian politics, with little attention given to the Israeli occupation itself (7). All the while, it continued building mosques throughout the occupied territories, with the number of mosques growing from 400 to 750 from 1967 through 1987 in the West Bank and from 200 to 600 in the Gaza Strip during the same period (8). The long-term strategy of spreading political influence through building civic institutions and social networks did not appeal to all Islamists, and several

of the Brotherhood's militant members decided to split off and form Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the early 1980s.

All the while, the Israelis built up an increasingly repressive occupation. In 1967, Moshe Dayan envisioned an invisible occupation wherein Israeli security forces had such a light presence that the Palestinians barely noticed they were there. (Byman, 34) However, this never came to be, and the Israeli management of the territories soon became repressive. In the Gaza Strip, Rashad al-Shawwa, a leading citrus merchant, became the mayor of Gaza City in September 1971, at Israel's request (Roy, 67-68). He then formed a municipal council made up of upper-class Gazans like himself. His government drew the ire of nationalists for both cooperating with the Israeli occupation and excluding the lower and middle classes, as well as refugees, from representation. Still, this less-than-ideal civic arrangement did not engender the Palestinians in the Strip to resist militantly, since the PLA's infrastructure had already been crippled. Over the next ten years, the Gaza Strip experienced several shifts between Israel-appointed municipal control and direct military rule. Mayor Shawwa resigned in October 1972, and he was replaced by direct military rule until October 1975, when he agreed to be reappointed as mayor despite popular demands for elections (68).

Around this time, many Gazans turned towards civil resistance. The 1978 Camp David Accords included an autonomy plan for Gaza, which the people of Gaza largely detested (69). The plan included continued Israeli control over land, water, settlements, and security in Gaza Strip and West Bank. It also included a continued ban on establishing a Palestinian government that could enact laws and adopt regulations (69). Naturally, the occupier prioritized Israeli concerns over Palestinian rights, since the occupied populace had been denied the ability to express its own perspective. The result was predictably a buildup in social grievances that led to

low-level civil unrest. A September 1978 rally was held protesting the autonomy plan. The rally included both Gaza natives and refugees. After the September rally, Israeli authorities put in place severe restrictions on political activity in Gaza, but civil disobedience continued (69). As would frequently occur throughout the occupation, Israel nonlethally repressed civil unrest without addressing its root causes, which only delayed and intensified future outbreaks.

A similar situation arose in the West Bank around the same time, where continuous repression by the occupier had only intensified grievances. After pro-PLO candidates won the April 1976 West Bank municipal elections, Israeli indefinitely suspended future elections (Roy, 68). Instead, Israel began removing local Palestinian leaders and administering towns and cities directly. By 1985, the Israeli civil administration had replaced most Palestinian elected municipal officials with IDF officers (Khawalja 1993, 53). Inevitably, West Bank Palestinians responded with civil protests, which only became more common over time. Israeli security forces responded by deploying mostly nonlethal measures, but not in full force compared to later periods. Nevertheless, the West Bank resistance movement provided ample data on what was to come. Marwan Khawalja (1993) studied modes of repression used by the Israelis in the West Bank between 1976-85, measuring the relationship between 14 modes of repression and rates of civil unrest against the occupation. These modes range included restrictions on movement such as curfews and checkpoints, arrests, home searches, and blatant violence such as shootings and beatings. Unsurprisingly, home searches, which offered the greatest chance to collect intelligence on dissidents, was the only mode with a strong negative correlation with instances of civil unrest (63). All other modes appeared to have either little effect on Palestinian dissidence or a counterproductive effect (63). Nevertheless, the occupier continued to employ them, and Israel

managed to add personal grievances against its security forces to the long list of political grievances Palestinians held against the occupation.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Fatah despised the occupation, but before the First Intifada they had little reason to recruit locals to fight for it. Fatah was foreign-based, and their mission was as much devoted to bringing about the return of Palestinian refugees abroad as it was about ending the occupation. This incentivized recruiting from refugees in countries like Lebanon, where the central authority was weak, over creating networks within the territories that the Israeli security state could discover and dismantle. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood was reluctant to be associated with violence. This allowed them to operate with relatively little suppression by Israeli authorities while still laying the groundwork for an eventual uprising based on Islamic principles. The most important factor was the reactions of the Palestinians themselves. The occupied territories experienced relatively low levels of political violence during this period. Between June 1967 and December 1987, 650 Palestinians in the territories were killed in relation to conflict with Israel, or roughly 32 per year (Gordon, xvii). Compared to later eras, these relatively few fatalities at the hands of Israeli security forces meant that far fewer Palestinians were provoked into joining a militant or TO because of the death of a relative, friend, or fellow countryman. However, this did not mean that resentment from other nonlethal modes of the occupation did not quietly build up, waiting for a flashpoint moment to explode.

First Intifada (1987-1993)

The First Intifada exploded after a decades-long increase in tension when an IDF truck near the Erez Crossing in the Gaza Strip ran into and killed four Palestinians returning from their jobs in Israel, in addition to severely wounding seven others (Byman 2010, 71-72). Given the methods that Israel had used to crush dissent within the occupied territories over the previous

twenty years, those who believe that ostensibly nonlethal security measures incite terrorism would have expected the First Intifada to immediately erupt into a massive terrorism campaign against Israelis. But it did not. Despite heavy Palestinian fatalities almost immediately, the popular committees were able to direct rank-and-file towards civil disobedience. Instead of seeing a marked increase in Palestinian terrorism, the Intifada was defined by a significant uptick of what Eitan Alimi calls “contention” such as stone throwing, roadblocks, tire burning, mass gatherings, and riots. According to him, contention does not include the use of firearms, bombs, grenades, or arson (Alimi, 122). Although there were instances of lethal violence directed at Israelis, they were limited at first; of the 160 Israelis killed by Palestinians during the First Intifada, only 65 were killed in its first three years (B’Tselem), when the contention strategy was in full force.

The Intifada provides a good example of how organizations determine the tactics used. Palestinians turned to popular protests for a myriad of reasons. As mentioned earlier, Israeli security forces killed roughly 35 Palestinians per year during the occupation’s first two decades. This relatively low death toll meant that there was less desire to seek lethal retribution against Israelis compared to later years. At the same time, resistance leaders pursued the grassroots contention strategy to convince both Israelis and international observers that the Palestinians were capable of resisting occupation in a manner becoming of a people who deserved their own state. This occurred at both the organizational level, with Fatah’s second-in-command Khalil al-Wazir building and coordinating a network of Palestine-based popular committees that carried out contention, and on the individual level, with thousands of Palestinians eagerly participating (Sayigh, 30). But this commitment to contention over terrorism was partially artificial. Many Palestinian dissidents wanted to militantly engage Israeli forces, but PLO leaders urged groups

operating under the Intifada's unified leadership to eschew lethal action, though only for a while. Leaders assured subordinates that the Intifada's contention phase was only intended to be a first step in an all-out uprising against Israel (Alimi, 126). Therefore, there was always an underlying desire to resort to political violence from the leadership down, and it would not take much to release the reins.

Unsurprisingly, Israeli security forces played a major role in escalating the conflict. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin called for a strategy of mass military presence, arrests, threats of mass deportation, and administrative detention. Rabin wanted to use "might, power, and beatings" to disperse mass contention. His strategy was to use nonlethal force to disperse contention events and deter future participation in them, while avoiding killing Palestinians and provoking violent retaliation (Alimi, 130). The First Intifada was also the first time since the 1960s that the Israeli security forces resorted to punitive house demolitions en masse, demolishing 500 houses between 1988 and 1992 (Benmelech et al., 30). The hope was to prioritize generally nonlethal measures to dissuade Palestinians from engaging in further resistance. Rabin's plan resembled an intensified version of Israel's West Bank strategy of the decade prior, which failed to prevent a build-up in grievances and civil unrest, instead accelerating it. In turn, the intensification of the old strategy only increased resentment and the latent desire to engage in violence against the occupier.

Almost immediately, internal strife within the Intifada networks led to a breakdown of the unified command, and therefore a breakdown in the resistance's policy of avoiding violent retribution against the occupier. Within Fatah, Wazir had taken charge of funding and coordinating the grassroots organizations within the territories. However, Israeli commandos assassinated him in Tunis in April 1988, and Arafat gained control of the support infrastructure

(Sayigh, 30). Wazir's careful work at building these organizations (institutions, professional associations, or nongovernmental organizations) crumbled under Arafat's tendency to disperse funds in an uncoordinated manner, thereby creating an inefficient system of patronage with Arafat as the patron (30). He created a situation in which Palestinian leaders competed for his patronage, often working against each other instead of working together against the state. Arafat also did not carefully select whom he patronized, so long as they were loyal to him (31). Consequently, he started funding violent militants who had little interest in the contention strategy (Alimi, 141). Personal empowerment, not social justice, became the primary goal of many within the resistance. With the PLO incapable and uninterested in restraining anti-Israeli violence, individuals were given free rein to exact retribution. However, their lack of centralized control also meant that violence had relatively low intensity, since there was little organizational infrastructure coordinating these attacks.

Even without strong organizational backing, Israel's increasingly harsh repression of the Intifada provoked more Palestinians into retaliating in cold blood. Israelis committed heavy amounts of physical violence against Palestinian protesters that were intended to be nonlethal. This not only included the use of rubber bullets and tear gas, but also frequent brutal beatings of Palestinians. These methods not only created scores of physical injuries, but they killed Palestinians on several different occasions (Byman, 73). Live ammunition was also frequently deployed, and by the end of 1989, 628 Palestinians had been killed by Israeli security forces in the occupied territories during the Intifada – close to the 650 Palestinians killed during the first 20 years of occupation (B'Tselem). This buildup in Palestinian dead over such a short period provoked Palestinians to engage in terror attacks. Terrorism became even more attractive upon Israel's successful infiltration of the grassroots contention movement, which left conflict-oriented

Palestinians with few alternatives to violence. Israel's massive use of collaborators also became a national humiliation, which when combined with other humiliating practices such as house demolitions ensured that regular Palestinians would not strongly object to the Intifada's more lethal turn.

At the same time the pre-Intifada rivalry between Fatah and the Islamists intensified over their differing views of social justice, and they disagreed over what an acceptable peace would look like – and the role of terrorism in achieving that peace. The Muslim Brotherhood was skeptical of the Intifada's chances of success, or whether the Brotherhood wanted its success. Nevertheless, the Islamists felt they had to become involved, and their leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin opted to create a resistance front group known as " Hamas " in January 1988 (Abu Amr, 10-11). Hamas would participate in the Intifada on the Muslim Brotherhood's behalf; if the uprising failed, the Brotherhood would distance itself from this separate organization and continue its old strategy. Hamas did not want a negotiated peace with Israel, as the Jewish state's presence in Muslim lands was an affront to Islam, according to the group's August 1988 Charter (12). Throughout most of 1988, Hamas did not openly challenge the Intifada's secular-nationalist leadership. Hamas leaflets during that time avoided calling for attacks on nationalists, instead advocating for preserving unity within the Intifada movement (Alimi, 142). However, Hamas ended this cooperation after December 13, 1988, when Arafat gave a speech at the UN recognizing Israel and renouncing terrorism (143). It became clear to them that Arafat was willing to make compromises unacceptable to their conception of a just Islamic society.

As Arafat continued appealing to Israel, Hamas committed increasingly more violence. After December 13, 1988, Hamas began committing terrorist acts, such as kidnapping and assassinating soldiers. Consequently, Israeli forces conducted a large operation in May 1989 to

arrest Hamas members (143). These arrests continued into 1990, including the imprisonment of Sheikh Yassin, which led Hamas to renounce contention and resort solely to terrorism. However, their terror capabilities were limited. In December 1992, Hamas killed five Israeli soldiers and also kidnapped and murdered a Border Policeman, Nissam Toledano. Israel then temporarily deported 415 Palestinian militants, mostly Hamas members, to Lebanon (Byman, 74). This prevented Hamas from effectively spoiling the secret negotiations between Israel and Fatah that would lead to the September 1993 Oslo Accords that created a plan for Israel's gradual withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

On a tactical level, Israel managed to defeat both secular and Islamist militants through ostensibly nonlethal means, combined with strong intelligence. The effectiveness of collaborators was enough that Palestinians began pursuing suspected collaborators with a vengeance. Some estimates suggest that more Palestinians were murdered as suspected collaborators during the Intifada than were killed by Israelis (Byman, 72). The death toll of suspected collaborators is unprecedented in the Israel-Palestine conflict before or since, which is surprising given that the First Intifada was not as deadly as later phases of the conflict. The extent of these killings not only made suppressing the Intifada easier for Israel, since most terrorism was intra-Palestinian, but the hysteria surrounding collaborators demonstrated the effectiveness of their deployment alongside other security measures. Intelligence gathering assisted Israel in employing mass arrests, with 13,000 Palestinians incarcerated in 1989 alone (Byman, 73). It also assisted in Israel's suppression of contentious events, which began to decline rapidly in 1990 (Alimi, 141). Compared to later phases of the conflict, the occupier succeeded in quelling dissent, albeit after provoking increasing acts of retaliatory violence through its own frequent use of lethal force.

At the same time, the Palestinians demonstrated that the costs of occupation might not be worth it for Israel. Israel did not pursue peace with the PLO out of military necessity. Although more Israelis were dying every year, their death toll was much smaller than in future phases of the conflict, and only a fraction of Israeli casualties in Lebanon and Yom Kippur. Rather, Yitzhak Rabin, who had recently become Prime Minister, faced financial pressure from the United States to make peace (Byman, 75). He also felt, unlike his predecessor Shamir, that a permanent occupation based on repression would gradually degrade Israel's Jewish and democratic values (76). Therefore, the Intifada not only incurred significant losses of Israeli resources and lives, but it demonstrated that in the future, it might threaten Israel's national identity. Both the incurred and potential costs of occupation alarmed the Rabin administration, which pushed it to pursue a permanent positive peace over an indefinite, costly, negative peace that no one could guarantee.

Second Intifada (2000-2006)

The Second Intifada broke out on September 29, 2000 when Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount to emphasize Jewish claims to the site, despite the presence of the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Mount (Byman, 133). Sharon's trip was provocative, but the Temple Mount visit alone was not enough to set off another explosion of mass violence. Many fewer Palestinians were killed by the occupation after Oslo, despite Israeli counterterrorism against Hamas and PIJ. Israelis had killed 389 Palestinians since the Oslo Accords, 239 of whom were killed before 1996 (B'Tselem). This was significantly fewer fatalities than during the First Intifada, and therefore not nearly as many Palestinians were pining for revenge against the Israelis. However, those nearly 400 dead were not insignificant to the people who knew them,

nor to the Palestinian people at large, and they added to the widespread anger and resentment over the Oslo process's failures.

Many Palestinians pre-Oslo political grievances had returned. The peace process had failed to result in Israel withdrawing fully from the occupied territories, and the Israeli settler population had expanded from 113,000 to 200,000, much of that during the previous two years (Byman, 116). Settlements threatened the integrity of the Oslo peace, in part because Israel maintained control of the territory surrounding them and the roads connecting them under the 1995 Taba Agreement (Longo et al, 1009). To accommodate settlement expansion, Israeli authorities had appropriated more Palestinian-owned land and established checkpoints that restricted Palestinian freedom of movement (Byman, 116). These actions not only were oppressive to those Palestinians who were personally affected, but it violated the spirit of the Oslo Accords and threatened Palestinian sovereignty.

Because of these resentments, 60 percent of Palestinians supported resuming attacks against Israelis, according to a July 2000 poll (117). This sentiment was present among those protesting Sharon's visit, and a riot broke out. No one died that day, but on September 30, Israeli Border Police opened fire and killed 7 Palestinians after a mob had surrounded them and one stone-thrower had knocked a policeman unconscious (115). This was a flashpoint moment that broke years of relative peace. Within the first month of the Second Intifada, 109 Palestinians had been killed, as well as 10 Israelis (124). Within the first two months, 247 Palestinians had been killed – more than the previous five years (115). A cycle of lethal violence erupted during this. Riots would erupt, Israeli security forces would kill Palestinians, those Palestinians would have public funerals, which would trigger more violent demonstrations, during which Israeli security forces would kill more Palestinians, and so on (127). This awful outbreak of violence created the

perfect storm for militant groups to exploit public anger to justify a new terror campaign against the occupier – with a fresh pool of recruits.

Both secular nationalists and Islamists took advantage of the societal chaos. Yasser Arafat had led the Palestinian Authority since 1994, and he attempted to use terror to negotiate a better political settlement with more autonomy from the Israelis. However, he wanted to utilize terror indirectly, and he authorized Fatah members, including those belonging to Fatah's militia, the Tanzim, to fight Israeli security forces while he presented the Authority to Israel as trying to preserve order (121). Some of those members then founded the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which would carry out a series of brutal attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians over the next six years. Arafat's PA continued to unofficially fund Al-Aqsa Martyrs even after the group officially disavowed him for arresting PFLP leader Ahmad Sa'adat in October 2001, under heavy Israeli pressure (Bloom, 78). Arafat's Fatah faced pressure from both the Israelis and fellow militants, but it still attempted to exploit the Palestinian public's desire for vengeance to maintain popularity and control.

At the same time, Hamas and PIJ resumed suicide bombings, hoping that a campaign of high-casualty attacks on Israelis would make them, not Fatah, the standard-bearer of the Palestinian cause and eventually provide them the popular mandate to achieve their goal of a Palestine united under Islamist principles. This strategy initially worked. The suicide campaign began in earnest with the June 2001 Tel Aviv Dolphinarium disco attack, which killed 21 Israelis and wounded 120 (Byman, 132). By July 2002, Hamas had killed 161 Israelis through suicide bombings, and PIJ had killed 28 (Moghadam, 78-79). These attacks continued with regularity, and Hamas's popularity began to rise among everyday Palestinians. In 2003, opinion polls showed that Hamas had finally tied with Arafat's Fatah as the most popular militant group

among Palestinians (Bloom, 69). Suicide bombing's potency soon became impossible for the secular-nationalists to pass up either. In the first half of 2002, Fatah and its affiliates had executed more suicide attacks than everyone else combined (Moghadam, 82). Suicide bombing seemed like an unstoppable strategy for fighting the occupation, although because these groups were utilizing it in competition with each other, it made no clear progress towards achieving a positive peace.

Instead, it provoked an Israeli crackdown. Up until March 2002, Israel had pursued a counterterrorism strategy that prioritized targeted killings, which predictably did not decrease instances of deadly terrorism. Targeted killings of militants, much like killings of civilians, only added to Palestinians' desire for revenge, but eliminating individual terrorists did reduce their organizational capabilities. Kaplan et al. (2005) use a stock model to demonstrate that the stock of suicide terrorists increased from January 2001 through March 2002 (232). During this period, Israel primarily pursued a policy of targeted killings against terrorist operatives from both nationalist and Islamist groups, killing 119 terrorists and 80 civilians from 2001-2003 (227). However, the deadly Netanya suicide bombing on March 27, 2002, which killed 30 Israelis, convinced Israel to reoccupy Areas A and B of the West Bank, where most suicide bombings were launched from. Under Operation Defensive Shield, Israeli security forces also began executing many more arrest missions, in addition to targeted killings. These arrest missions primarily targeted mid-level terrorist operatives, who were involved in the planning of terrorist operations (Kaplan et al., 230). During Defensive Shield, the stock of terrorists started to deplete (230). This implies a direct correlation between an emphasis on nonlethal arrests and a decrease in terrorism, especially suicide terrorism. In addition, arrests and killings of so many experienced militant leaders and planners meant that their replacements were much greener. The effects of

this are clear: Shin Bet was able to intercept 95 percent of attempted attacks on Israel by 2004 (Byman 2012, 837).

Ultimately, a reduction in Palestinian violence caused by a combination of more selective lethal violence and arrests, both aided by collaborator intelligence. Here, lethal and nonlethal modes were used in combination, much like the early 1970s and the First Intifada. The construction of a new barrier separating Israel and the West Bank also protected Israelis from suicide attacks. Israel focused on completing the northern portion of the West Bank barrier first. As a result, terrorist cells in northern cities such as Jenin had to plan attacks that crossed into Israel along the southern portion of the Green Line. This in turn required coordinating with terror cells in the southern part of the West Bank, as well as sending attackers through many more checkpoints before they could reach their intended target. Bombings were made even more difficult by a gradual increase in IDF checkpoints throughout the West Bank until 2005, as each one a terrorist passed through was a chance to be arrested (Longo et al., 2014). As former Shin Bet director Avi Dichter mused, “One plus one is eleven [chances to interdict terrorists before they enter Israel]” (Byman, 832). The other side also had to concede to the Barrier’s effectiveness at, as one PIJ leader admitted years later (832).

In addition to arrests, barriers, and checkpoints, the IDF also utilized punitive house demolitions throughout the Second Intifada. The IDF had suspended punitive house demolitions in 1998, but they renewed the policy on October 23, 2001, when they leveled the house of Sa’id al-Hutri, who had recently killed himself and 20 Israelis in a Tel Aviv suicide attack (Benmelech et al., 30). After this, the IDF would punitively demolish 5 more houses in the remainder of 2001, 235 in 2002, 218 in 2003, and 167 in 2004 (Benmelech et al., 32). House demolitions peaked in 2002, the same year as Operation Defensive Edge, and this was also the same year

suicide attacks began falling. House demolitions were certainly humiliating and traumatizing, especially for the other occupants of the demolished houses, many of whom had no known ties to anti-Israeli violence. However, the punitive demolitions had the effect of punishing terrorists without killing them, therefore avoiding the lethal violence that would provoke other Palestinians to seek vengeance against Israel by joining TOs. It also established a direct consequence for engaging in terrorism that could affect not only the individual terrorist, but also his or her immediate family, which undoubtedly was dissuasive for many fighting-age Palestinians.

The exact rational mechanism for explaining how terrorists reacted to the shift in Israel's counterterrorism is up to debate, but there have been a few insights. Kaplan et al. noticed that civilian deaths did not correlate with subsequent terror attacks. It was only when the IDF killed terrorists that TOs responded with additional attacks (232). Terrorist operatives are most affected, both personally and operationally, when their comrades are killed. Therefore, it is logical that they prioritize retaliating against deaths of fellow terrorists over unaffiliated civilians. Civilian deaths may encourage bereaved Palestinians to join TOs, but it is the TOs that ultimately decide to recruit, train, and deploy them. The IDF's shift in focus on arrests, checkpoints, and punitive house demolitions allowed them to simultaneously reduce the supply and demand for suicide bombers.

Arresting terrorists instead of killing them reduced their compatriots' desire to retaliate against Israel violently, and the arrested terrorists could be interrogated for intelligence that Israel could use to cripple their organizations further. This reduced the demand of TOs to plan and execute attacks. But the post-Defensive Shield model also reduced civilian casualties and the supply of Palestinians willing to be recruited to avenge their friends and relatives. The consequences of security measures such as travel restrictions, checkpoint searches and wait

times, and mass arrests affected civilians as well as terrorists, but compared to lethal violence, these consequences were less severe. It makes sense that if killing civilians does not lead to immediate increase in terror attacks, stopping them at checkpoints, arresting them, building a barrier, or demolishing their homes will not either. It also means that arresting terrorists will compromise their networks without the fallout from killing them.

From an Israeli perspective, the new strategy was a resounding success; it saved countless Israeli lives. In 2002, the year that this new strategy came into full effect, Palestinian fighters killed 419 Israelis, but in 2003, they only managed to kill 185, followed by only 108 in 2004 and 23 in 2006 (B'Tselem). However, despite attacking terrorist infrastructures and removing much of the incentive to attempt terror attacks, Israel's emphasis on ostensibly nonlethal tactics did not have the same drastic reduction on Palestinian fatalities. Palestinian deaths also peaked in 2002, at 1034 fatalities, but they did not decline nearly as dramatically Israeli fatalities; security forces killed 829 Palestinians in 2004 and 665 in 2006 (B'Tselem). Israel figured out how to strongly reduce Palestinians' ability to resist and retaliate with lethal violence, but they did not determine how to end the cycle of state-perpetrated violence that created this unending hatred in the first place. By prioritizing its own security needs in the immediate future, Israel did not create a situation where a permanent withdrawal from both territories was viable, as it was clear that independent or not, the Palestinian territories had unresolved grievances and internal instability that would bring the occupation back, were it to leave.

Indeed, the sheer number of Palestinian dead during the Second Intifada can help explain the situation in Israel-Palestine today. The Palestinian publics' grievances against the occupation remained strong, and so no one was able to unify the secular-nationalist and Islamist factions within the territories to make a lasting peace with Israel. Making concessions to Israel was just

not popular, especially if the settlements were largely to continue expanding. Fatah and the PA declared a ceasefire with Israel in February 2005, followed by Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs agreeing to a temporary ceasefire in Spring (Byman, 833). Israel then decided, partially under American pressure, to withdraw its troops and settlements from the Gaza Strip unilaterally, leaving it to the Palestinians to determine how to run it (836). Much like the First Intifada, this was not done out of immediate security necessity, and it would have political ramifications in due time.

The intra-Palestinian disagreements over visions of social justice once again took front stage. Hamas and Fatah, which still ran the PA, agreed to elections in January 2006, which Hamas won in a plurality. Fatah was not strong enough to repress Hamas entirely, since Israel had decimated its fighting forces throughout the Intifada, and a brutal violent struggle broke out between the two in which Hamas won full control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 and Fatah retained incomplete control of the West Bank, most of which Israeli forces still occupied (837). This situation created the relative negative peace that Israelis largely benefited from until October 7, but its maintenance would require a continuous cost in manpower and materiel – and occasionally lives. By leaving the Gaza Strip, Israel also made it much harder to surveil Hamas and find collaborators to spy on it, which meant unraveling part of the counterterrorism strategy that up until this point had protected Israelis from Islamic terror. At the same time, it gave Hamas the opportunity to rebuild its militant and terrorist infrastructure, which were the tools it needed to pursue its idea of social justice relatively unabatedly – and violently.

Post-Second Intifada (2006-2023)

After the withdrawal from Gaza, the occupation's unpopularity remained consistently high. Between then and October 7th, Israel engaged Hamas in four major conflicts: Operations Cast

Lead (2008-9), Pillar of Defense (2012), Protective Edge (2014), and Guardian of the Walls (2021). Over time, Hamas's violent confrontation with Israel gathered it support from Palestinians in both territories, while solely pursuing peace negotiations remained unpopular. Polling data collected over 14 years supports this claim. In 2009, 40 percent of Palestinians supported a return to armed Intifada instead of continued peace negotiations with Israel (PCPSR). In 2012, 41 percent preferred armed attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers, with 24 percent preferring negotiations (PCPSR). In August 2014, an overwhelming 86 percent supported rocket attacks into Israel to end the Gaza siege and blockade, with 72 percent of Palestinians supporting importing Hamas's approach to fighting the occupation into the West Bank (PCPSR). This majority-hatred for the occupation continued through 2023, with a July poll that year showing that 53 percent of Palestinians supported a return to armed intifada (PCPSR). Every time Hamas and Israel engaged in open conflict, the staggering levels of Palestinian fatalities in those conflicts devastated and angered Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza.

This is despite a large reduction in both Palestinian fatalities between the Second Intifada and October 7th, with far fewer people dying in the West Bank in those seventeen years than the previous six. Israeli security forces took several measures after the Second Intifada to reduce the West Bank occupation's everyday oppressive nature, albeit without eliminating it. First, they introduced more nonlethal methods of riot control. Both Intifadas had begun as riots and spiraled out of control once those riots were suppressed lethally. Starting in 2008, Israeli security forces started spraying Palestinian protestors with "skunk water," a foul-smelling liquid that is designed to make rioting physically unbearable, while stopping short of endangering the victim's health. However, this did not entirely replace tear gas, rubber bullets, or even live ammunition (BBC, 2015). Israel also modified their checkpoint system. Although the overall number of checkpoints

had not decreased by 2016, many checkpoints were less frequently manned or blocked off after 2005 (OCHA, 2017). In addition, the IDF added water fountains, bathrooms, and rest areas to major checkpoints, and it addressed allegations of physical abuse by creating a code of conduct for checkpoint personnel, though some Palestinian's debate how well that code is enforced (Byman, 835). These efforts may have reduced instances of brutality and movement restrictions, but they did not eradicate them.

Likewise, Israeli security forces could only limit their use of lethal violence in the West Bank, which meant that some Palestinians were inclined to commit revenge acts of terrorism. After Hamas had relocated most of its surviving members to the Gaza Strip in 2007, lone-actor vehicle-borne attacks became more common in lieu of suicide bombings. These attackers largely fit the suicide-bomber profile; they were overwhelmingly young males with an above-average socio-economic status (Perry, Hasisi, and Perry 2018, 906). However, they did not have a terrorist organization's resources behind them, reducing their lethality to 27 fatalities between 2000 and 2016 (904). Still, they were a response to Israeli lethal violence; with the attacks peaking in 2014-16, after Operation Protective Edge, and with most known motivations being nationalist revenge, mainly for conflict-related deaths in Gaza (904, 907). The uptick in these attacks demonstrates that Palestinian fatalities continued to provoke violent retaliation against the occupier, even if the organizational capability to exploit this desire had largely been eradicated by counterterrorism. However, with vehicle-borne attacks killing fewer Israelis in 16 years than a single suicide bombing could in one day, it was easy for Israel to consider the sequestering of the Islamists to the Gaza Strip a counterterrorism success. The imperfect negative peace was working for them, and there was no need to reach a positive resolution to the conflict

that would somehow have to placate the Israeli, secular-nationalist, and Islamic concepts of social justice.

After Protective Edge, Hamas's behavior bolstered Israeli confidence in the negative peace. Hamas amended its charter in 2017 to remove direct references to the destruction of Israel and the Jewish people, although it kept other references to revolutionary violence against the Jewish State (Margolin and Levitt 2023, 7). Many Israeli officials interpreted this as Hamas accepting that Israel could not be defeated, thereby choosing to moderate its stance towards Israel's destruction. After Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, Hamas ceased firing rockets at Israel, and Israeli operations in Gaza instead targeted PIJ, who replaced Hamas as the primary culprit of rocket attacks against Israel (Svetlova 2023). This new counterterrorism approach appeared to work for Israel by kowtowing Hamas, but it did so without the benefit of a network of collaborators that could inform Israel on Hamas's true intentions, such as its preparations for an invasion of southern Israel in 2023. Nevertheless, unilateral withdrawal had delivered Israel some success. When Hamas moved most of its infrastructure to Gaza, it became more difficult to trigger a Third Intifada, and Israelis enjoyed their longest relative peace since the 1980s.

All the while, Israeli security forces also maintained the apparatus in the West Bank that allowed them to quickly target and eliminate terrorists involved in complex operations against Israel. This added to Israel's appearance of omnipotence and invulnerability, in large part because of the ostensibly nonlethal modes of occupation. The border barriers prevent attackers from getting in. The checkpoints allowed the IDF to arrest terrorists en route to an attack and to collect intelligence on the movements of suspected militants and terrorists. Incarceration, including administrative detention, served as both a deterrent from participating in political violence and terrorism and a means of sequestering violent actors from their compatriots, thereby

making complex terror operations much more difficult to plan and execute. Similarly, house demolitions served as a deterrent towards participation in militancy and terrorism, and in some cases, it allowed Israeli settlements to expand into neighborhoods and villages with a militant organization's presence and infringe upon that presence. However, it had a potential drawback of overextension. The more the settlements expanded, the more security forces were required to protect them, and the IDF had to divert precious resources to maintaining security Area C in the West Bank, as well as East Jerusalem. This left Israeli vulnerable to attacks in Gaza even though the West Bank was more secure, which Hamas and its allies tragically exploited when they crossed the border, massacred civilians, and took hundreds of hostages on October 7, 2023, before Israeli security forces could comprehend what had happened, let alone react.

Discussion

October 7th constitutes a major intelligence failure on the part of Israel, and this begs the question: was the attack unavoidable on Israel's part? Israeli intelligence services knew that Hamas was planning some operation, as the country's National Security Council issued a travel advisory on August 31, stating that Hamas was planning to kidnap Israelis to use as a bargaining chip (Wyss 2024, 4). At one point, Israel supposedly possessed an intricate network of thousands of collaborators within the Gaza Strip, even after withdrawing in 2005, but this is hard to confirm (4). Regardless, it appears that Israeli security forces had a more difficult time surveilling Hamas activities once the IDF left the Strip and Hamas forces consolidated there. Israel's primacy in surveillance and manpower has played a major role in securing the West Bank; the one lesson that Jerusalem has most likely learned is that surrendering its primacy over the West Bank by reducing its presence could lead to similar results. There is no plausible permanent solution in

the West Bank that would permit an Israeli withdrawal short of evicting the half-million settlers there now. Thus, Israel will likely choose to reinforce the security apparatus that has upheld the negative peace, with special care to suppress outbreaks of civil unrest that can spiral into another Intifada and repeat the cycle that occupier and occupied have lived through for almost sixty years.

It is unclear if the negative peace would have ever fallen in the West Bank. For seventeen years, the conflict there maintained a relatively low intensity. Barring any intelligence failures like on October 7th, Israeli forces could have suppressed (and have suppressed) any uprising in the West Bank. But security requires more than simply collecting intelligence from human sources. It requires analyzing it and determining which threats are credible and which are not. And it requires following each step correctly *every single* time. All the technology and power asymmetry in the world cannot negate human error, and this is the greatest paradox a perpetual occupation faces.

Nevertheless, in theory, the collaborator model is a legitimate alternative method to hearts-and-minds for collecting intelligence. In this century, the most prominent example of heart-and-minds succeeding is the Iraqi Surge of 2007. Biddle et al. credit the Sunni Awakening with helping the Surge succeed. When former Sunni insurgents realigned with coalition forces against Al-Qaeda in Iraq, they immediately provided the coalition with intelligence on Al-Qaeda members and insurgents still aligned with the intelligence group. This included intelligence on membership, cell structure, safe houses and bomb-making workshops, and the locations of roadside IEDs and booby traps (Biddle et al. 2012, 24). However, the US-led coalition was forced to win over these Sunni tribes, largely through significant bribes, because they made up a foreign occupation, with most occupation personnel coming from thousands of miles away.

Israel, on the other hand, borders both Gaza and the West Bank; one can drive from Jerusalem to Jericho in under 30 minutes. This means that Israel has three advantages over typical occupations. First, its proximity means that its logistics are not spread thin, so Israel has an easier time enforcing the occupation without airlifts or sealifts. Second, its proximity makes it easier to find and recruit more collaborators, thereby bypassing the need to win Palestinian hearts-and-minds, which was most likely impossible anyway given decades of grievances and the expanding settler population. Third, its proximity to two hostile areas means Israel has higher stakes in occupying its neighbors to prevent military incursions. October 7th was exactly what Israel had spent 56 years trying to avoid, and the price its citizens have paid for its mistakes will be the justification for continuing the occupation, with a reevaluation of its surveillance apparatus to ensure the same flaws are not exploited again.

In conclusion, there are two lessons scholars should take from the world's longest ongoing occupation. First, occupations are only as permanent as the resources behind them. Eventually, revenue and public support can expire, as they did with America's presence in Iraq. Therefore, in the long run, political settlements in which a positive peace is achieved are the best option. This is not always possible, often due to the instability of an occupied peoples' internal politics; the Fatah-Hamas rivalry is a good example of this. Second, occupations inherently breed resistance, since they inherently violate popular sovereignty and therefore the occupied peoples' concept of social justice. There is no humanitarian way to completely eradicate dissent, so the only other option is to carefully repress it with careful tactics. But this requires a constant, perfect vigilance that most states, including Israel, are not always capable of. Therefore, a permanent occupation can only be successful if the occupier accepts the potential costs years and decades in the future- in money, manpower, and lives.

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