@article{TEXTUAL,
      recid = {14450},
      author = {Ghezae, Isaias and Yang, Fan and Yu, Hongbo},
      title = {On the Perception of Moral Standing to Blame},
      journal = {Open Mind},
      address = {2025-01-20},
      number = {TEXTUAL},
      abstract = {Is everyone equally justified in blaming another’s moral  transgression? Across five studies (four pre-registered;  total N = 1,316 American participants), we investigated the  perception of moral standing to blame—the appropriateness  and legitimacy for someone to blame a moral wrongdoing. We  propose and provide evidence for a moral commitment  hypothesis—a blamer is perceived to have low moral standing  to blame a moral transgressor if the blamer demonstrates  weak commitment to that moral rule. As hypothesized, we  found that when blamers did not have the chance or relevant  experience to demonstrate good commitment to a moral rule,  participants generally believed that they had high moral  standing to blame. However, when a blamer demonstrated bad  commitment to a moral rule in their past behaviors,  participants consistently granted the blamer low moral  standing to blame. Low moral standing to blame was  generally associated with perceiving the blame to be less  effective and less likely to be accepted. Moreover,  indirectly demonstrating moral commitment, such as  acknowledging one’s past wrongdoing and feeling/expressing  guilt, modestly restored moral standing to blame. Our  studies demonstrate moral commitment as a key mechanism for  determining moral standing to blame and emphasize the  importance of considering a blamer’s moral standing as a  crucial factor in fully understanding the psychology of  blame.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/14450},
}