THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

REAL UNITY AND REPRESENTATION IN HOBBES'S *LEVIATHAN*

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 2018

To James Yeager, for all your love and support

This is more than consent, or concord;

it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person.

Thomas Hobbes

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates the influence of theology on Hobbes's concept of political representation. Although his model of formal authorization between individuals and their chosen sovereign has long been regarded by scholars as a legal rationalist phenomenon, based purely upon consent, the resulting "real unity" of the commonwealth that Hobbes describes is not easily reduced to such rationalist measures. This dissertation argues that Hobbes appropriated specific theological tropes referring to Christ as the divine Representative of his church "body" in order to envision a political community with greater social cohesion than was possible through legal-rationalist mechanisms. Adopting this theological motif as the inspiration for an absolutist political vision involved Hobbes in contemporary debates over the appropriate application of Christology within the political sphere, a religious controversy that may have had a determinative influence on shifting attitudes toward political representation in England during the Civil War.

The first chapter ("What is Real Unity?") examines the historical usage of the expression "real unity" in England during the 17^{th} century and finds that it referred, not to transubstantiation, as several scholars have recently suggested, but to Jesus Christ's divine representation of his church "body." This meaning fully comports with Hobbes's discourse on political representation and amplifies his broader commitment to the image and analogy of the "body politic." Hobbes's usage of the body metaphor is more in keeping with the theological iteration rather than the ancient and classical version, in that it envisions a corporate body that is non-natural in its origin and dependent upon a central, representative figure for its existence and sustenance. Clarifying the referent of Hobbes's "real unity" forces us to reconsider the philosophic and theological significance of the body motif for his concept of political representation.

The second chapter ("Real Unity and the Law") examines the relationship between embodiment and authorization in Hobbes's concept of representation. The twin mechanisms of consent and authorization ground Hobbes's representation and give the concept its dis-

tinctly legal and rational qualities. Consequently many scholars have ignored the extra-legal aspects of his theory of representation or judged that they categorically contradict the first foundations of his concept, based largely on the assumption that legal rationales are logically incompatible with those that are extra-legal. This chapter argues that Hobbes assumed precisely the opposite about the compatibility of legal and extra-legal justifications and he was relying upon a theological prototype for his concept of representation that explicitly conjoined them. English pastors of Hobbes's era insisted that Christ's representation of his church-body, along with the unity he shared with it, was both a legal and an extra-legal phenomenon. Hobbes's concept of political representation follows this pattern and should be understood in terms of an expansion, rather than a contradiction, of legality as the foundation of his theory.

The third chapter ("Real Unity and Rhetoric") addresses questions raised about the conceptual proximity of the expression "real unity" to the metaphor of Christ's "body," and the larger role that rhetoric plays for Hobbes's theory of representation. Many scholars believe that his statement "real unity" is purely rhetorical, and that his larger analogy of the "body politic" is a similar, rhetorical conceit that has an ironic, if not antithetical, relationship with the scientific and philosophical arguments that make up his rational discourse. But this chapter argues that Hobbes explicitly committed to deliver rhetorical metaphors that illuminated rather than obscured his rational discourse, and that the trope of "body politic," conspicuous throughout all his scientific works, deserves to be interpreted according to this stated principle. Moreover, the expression "real unity" is not a metaphorical but a technical term, used by 17^{th}- century pastors and theologians to depict and define a social reality. Hobbes would have known that his phrase would be understood in that way, and he gave no indication that it should be read differently.

The fourth chapter epilogue ("Hobbes's Christology and the Politics of Real Unity") examines Hobbes's understanding of Christ's religious role and suggests that he deliberately politicized the Christological doctrine of "real unity" by translocating it from its spiritual

purview to the realm of human institutions. In doing so, he involved himself in an important theological controversy of his day that had erupted over Christ's ecclesiastical representation and the precise manner in which that divine representation could or should be applied in an institutional setting. Many Christian pastors and theologians held that Christ's "real unity" was an invisible, spiritual reality. They emphatically denied that it could be realized politically and tended to favor decentralized, democratic church/state government structures in order to emphasize this distinction. But some others believed, like Hobbes, that Christ's "real unity" should be manifested politically in church and state structures typified by hierarchical mediation. The doctrinal difference between the two groups may have had a determinative influence on shifting attitudes toward political representation in England during the Civil War.

CHAPTER 1

WHAT IS REAL UNITY?

The Christology behind Hobbes's concept of Representation

One of the most memorable passages in *Leviathan* contains an expression that has befuddled scholars for decades: in Chapter XVII, Hobbes describes the relationship between individuals and their chosen political representative as one which is "more than Consent, or Concord; it is a *real Unity* of them all, in one and the same Person."[1] The phrase "real unity" is not defined by Hobbes, but its inclusion in this text seems to directly challenge the standard assumption that his commonwealth is held together exclusively by bare consent, bolstered by fear. If the civil union in *Leviathan* entails nothing more than a legal relationship of formal obligation between author and agent, then it can be called only a *legal* unity (or as Hobbes might have said, a unity of "words only"[2]). But the expression "*real* unity" that he uses in this passage connotes something entirely different, and his previous statement about this union being "more than consent" only emphasizes the potentially extra-legal nature of the association in question.

The line is problematic, and while earlier Hobbes scholars preferred to pass over it without commentary, many recent theorists have tried to confront and reconcile the tension by suggesting that "real unity" is paradoxical, ironic, contradictory, or even a mistake, and

1. *Leviathan, or The Matter, Form, and Power of A Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil* (London, 1651), XVII.13 (p.260). In order to facilitate reference between the various editions of Leviathan, chapters will be given in Roman numerals followed by the Molesworth paragraph numbers, and the respective page numbers in Noel Malcolm's Clarendon edition will be offered in parenthesis.

2. Ibid., XIV.7,18,31 (pp.200-2,210,216).

is certainly not to be understood as genuine unity, in sense either technical or colloquial.[3] The most important insight so far along these lines is the connection recently drawn by Philip Pettit between Hobbes's "real unity" and the Roman Catholic "real presence" of transubstantiation, in which the sacramental bread and wine is ontologically transformed into Christ's body and blood. Pettit notes the evocative similarities between this Catholic event and the *Leviathan* commonwealth narrative, by which the multitude is transformed into a corporate person, however he suggests that Hobbes's appropriation of transubstantiation in this manner (if deliberate) was ironic and even "wicked,"[4] given his well-documented disdain for the doctrine.[5] Many other theorists have repeated this assessment and interpreted Hobbes's "real unity" as a shrewd joke directed toward Roman Catholicism.[6]

This chapter questions such interpretations by showing that the proper referent of "real unity" in *Leviathan* is almost certainly not transubstantiation, as has been assumed, but another Christian doctrine having to do with spiritual embodiment and representation. Using archival evidence from over 400 texts published in England during the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century, I

3. See Patricia Springborg, "The Paradoxical Hobbes: A Critical Response to the Hobbes Symposium, *Political Theory*, Vol. 36, 2008," *Political Theory* 37, no. 5 (2009): 676-88; Deborah Baumgold, "UnParadoxical Hobbes: In Reply to Springborg," *Political Theory* 37, no. 5 (2009): 689-93, at 691-2; Monica Brito Vieira, *The Elements of Representation in Hobbes: Aesthetics, Theatre, Law, and Theology in the Construction of Hobbes's Theory of the State, Studies in the History of Political Thought, v. 2* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009). 165-6; Bryan Garsten, "Religion and Representation in Hobbes," in *Leviathan, or, The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. Ian. Shapiro, Rethinking the Western Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 519-46. Victoria Kahn, *The Future of Illusion: Political Theology and Early Modern Texts* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), 35-7.

4. Philip Pettit, *Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 74-5.

5. See *Leviathan*, XXXVII.13 (pp.694-6), XLIV.11 (pp.966-970), XLVI.18 (p.1082).

6. See Brito Vieira, *The Elements of Representation in Hobbes*; Garsten, "Religion and Representation in Hobbes"; Kahn, *The Future of Illusion*, 35-7

will show that the expression "real unity" was a technical theological term used during that period to describe the unique relationship between Jesus Christ and the members of his church "body." According to this doctrine, Christ's divine representation of each individual sinner before God the Father instantaneously created a "real union" of them all in Christ's person, such that the resulting community was regarded metaphorically as a human body, with Christ as head (and soul). By mid-century, this professional theological understanding of "real unity" had been so well absorbed into the popular consciousness of the nation that Oliver Cromwell could casually (and correctly) refer to the "real unity" of all believers "in the Body and to the Head" of Christ in a famous 1645 letter to Parliament.[7] Hobbes might have learned of the expression "real unity" from this published letter, or he may have discovered it through his familiarity with Puritan[8] sermons and treatises from the period. It would be odd, however, if Hobbes was unaware of the expression, given its prevalence and currency in the culture, and it would be even less likely for him to have invoked "real unity" by sheer coincidence: inadvertently alluding to a theological dogma about divine representation and embodiment in precisely the same passage that he was describing a quasi-divine form of representation and embodiment, without having any knowledge of his pertinence in doing so.

The first part of this chapter sets forth historical evidence concerning the usage

7. Oliver Cromwell, Letter to William Lenthall, Speaker of the House of Commons, from Bristol, September 14th, 1645

8. In the intellectual scholarship of England during the 17th century, the terms "Puritan" and "Anglican" have not yet been standardized, and perhaps they never will be. Throughout this dissertation I use the term "Puritan" in a general sense, to describe the combined groups of Calvinist Presbyterians and Independents during the 17th century who were dedicated to doctrinal and ecclesiastical reform of the Church of England. Many Anglicans, especially early in the century, sympathized with these Puritans, they were Calvinist (an association that became more significant as Anglicanism swung Arminian with Laud), and they questioned at least the absolutism of hierarchical Episcopalianism, making them what we might call "closet" Puritans.

and meaning of the expression "real unity" in England during the 17th century. Given the philosophic complexity of the religious dogma in question, I have tried to quote as many authors and works as space allows in order to let the pastors and theologians of the period describe their own understanding of "real unity." Wherever possible, I compare their explanations and formulations to those of Hobbes, emphasizing a probable connection between the unity of Christ's church as a spiritual body and the unity of Leviathan's commonwealth political body. The second half of the chapter continues to defend this connection by exploring Hobbes's use of the body metaphor throughout all his political works and by showing that this recurring trope more strongly resembles the Christological iteration of social incorporation rather than the secular Hellenic version. By tracking the theme of "body politic" through the thought of Aristotle, Cicero, Salisbury, and Marsilius of Padua (among others), I argue that the Christological metaphor of the body differs from the ancient and classical metaphor of "body politic" in at least two key ways: by envisioning a deliberate and non-natural union of members to their chosen "head," and by insisting that the "head" actively creates the body, in addition to sustaining it. These two features, which do not appear in the Aristotelian version, resonate powerfully in Hobbes's account of embodied sovereignty and suggest that he derived the rhetorical inspiration for his great Person of the Commonwealth as much from Christian theology as from classical political philosophy.

In short, clarifying the proper referent of Hobbes's expression "real unity" — as an allusion to Christ's representation and embodiment of believers rather than to transubstantiation — has several consequences for Hobbes scholarship and interpretation,

beginning with certain common assumptions that have recently been made about Hobbes's intentions. Unlike the doctrine of transubstantiation, Hobbes nowhere questions or ridicules either Christ's representation of believers or his mystical body, making it more difficult for us to read his statement about "real unity" as an ironic joke. The two Christological doctrines alluded to in the expression "real unity" simply reiterate and amplify the image portrayed in the frontispiece of *Leviathan* and described in organic detail throughout the book: the community as a great human body, animated and sustained by its sovereign representative. Hobbes's alternative analogy of the mechanical automaton, from the introduction to *Leviathan*, has always attracted more scholarly attention than that of the "body politic," even though the automaton analogy occurs only once in Hobbes's political works while the body metaphor appears in every single one of them, usually quite prominently. The rediscovery of the source of Hobbes's "real unity" in such an important passage from *Leviathan* may encourage us to reconsider the significance of the body analogy for his political philosophy. It may also renew scholarly interest in the theological underpinnings of his thought, especially with regard to his pivotal theory of representation. Hobbes's appropriation of Christ's representation as a prototype for political representation reveals a great deal about the interconnection of religion and politics in his philosophic outlook and methodology, and it may also reflect a noteworthy cultural tendency of the Civil War era in which he wrote: allowing (or expecting) theological convictions to bleed freely into political ideals. By the principles of this tendency, it is possible if not likely that contested beliefs in 17$^{\text{th}}$-century England about Christ's divine representation were correlated with contested opinions about *political* representation during the same time. Investigating this dynamic in Hobbes's work may

help us to understand how and why it could have occurred on a larger scale.

1.1 The "real unity" of Christ's body in 17th-century England

Oliver Cromwell, the leading lieutenant general of Parliament's cavalry during the early 1640s, was tasked with providing regular updates to the House of Commons on the progress of the war between parliamentary and royalist forces in northern England. His meticulous missives were dry and to the point, focused almost exclusively on the minute details of the military initiative, but one letter, written from Bristol on September 14th, 1645, contained an addendum that gained instant notoriety in both England and Scotland because of certain controversial theological claims. In the letter Cromwell had related that the Presbyterians and Independents in his army were getting along well, commenting, "Pity it is it should be otherwise anywhere! All that believe have the *real unity*, which is most glorious because inward and spiritual, in the Body and to the Head [of Christ]."[9] Cromwell contrasted this "real" inward unity with formal, institutional unity, which he depicted as a less important matter that should be settled privately and individually, "as far as conscience will permit," rather than a national concern to be decided and imposed by Parliament.[10] With these statements Cromwell was probably protesting the proceedings of the Westminster Assembly, a council of theologians commissioned by Parliament in 1643 to investigate and propose a new ecclesiastical order for England and Scotland. At the

9. Cromwell, *Letter*. Emphasis added here and in many similar quotes throughout this paper. See Appendix A for a reprint of Cromwell's entire letter.

10. Ibid.: "In other things, God hath put the sword in the Parliament's hands... "

writing of Cromwell's letter in 1645, the Westminster Assembly seemed most sympathetic to Presbyterian forms of worship, and Independents such as Cromwell were alarmed, not only at the prospect of another governmentally sanctioned church, but also by the likelihood of that church being Presbyterian in structure rather than Congregationalist.

Cromwell's unsolicited admonishments were probably not received favorably, but given his indispensable service to the cause, Parliament chose to quietly bury the confrontation by omitting his addendum to the letter when it was made available to the public. This decision backfired badly when an anonymous individual discovered the original and republished it,[11] quickly fueling open, outspoken debate in both countries over Cromwell's remarks.[12] The controversy had to do with Cromwell's political application of the concept of "real unity," not with the concept itself nor with Christological belief to which it referred. The Westminster Assembly formally endorsed Christ's "real unity" in its

11. Anonymous, *The Conclusion of Lieutenant General Cromwell's Letter to the House of Commons, Concerning the Taking of Bristol Which Was Contained in the Original, (Signed by Himself) but Omitted in the Printed Copy, Which Is Authorized by the House of Commons, (Though There Was a Whole Page Left Blank in That Sheet): Whereby the World May Know, How Both Truth Itself, and That Worthy Gentleman Are Wronged (as Well as Other Men) Either by the Printer or Some Others*, 1645. The author is possibly David Buchanan, a Scottish Presbyterian who had earlier in the year expressed his frustration with the Independents in the Assembly (Buchanan, *An Explanation of Some Truths*, 1645, 42-58: "The Independents in their wisdom, are not only busy to stop the settling of the Church in a true and thorough reformation, as by the Covenant we are all sworn to; but they continue and maintain divers kind of errors and heresies."). He had also threatened to reveal Parliamentary documents (David Buchanan, *A Short and True Relation of Some Main Passages of Things Wherein the Scots Are Particularly Concerned*, 1645, 9-11). He published a treatise shortly after the revelation of Cromwell's letter entitled *Truth, It's Manifest* (lost?) that extensively analyzed Cromwell's letter. Abraham Babington called Buchanan a "hot-headed Presbyterian" and a "zealot for his Kirk government" (Babington, *An Answer to a Discourse Entitled, Truth It's Manifest, & c*, 1648, 152,154).

12. The letter was published again two years later in a less incendiary manner by a chaplain in the army (Joshua Sprigg, *Anglia Rediviva*, 1647, 112-8). Shortly thereafter, Scottish Presbyterian Samuel Rutherford professed that he felt obliged to analyze Cromwell's statements, "because this letter was publicly printed, and contains doctrine unsound and scandalous to me" (Samuel Rutherford, *A Survey of the Spiritual Antichrist*, 1648, 250-1). Rutherford rebuked Edward Bowles for defending Cromwell's letter, despite having been well positioned to "witness more against the sense of it." Bowles was a chaplain in Cromwell's cavalry. See Bowles, *Manifest Truth*, 1646. For two other reviews of Cromwell's statements, see Babington, *Answer to a Discourse*, 145-56, and Nicholas Lockyer, *A Little Stone* (Leith, 1652).

1647 *Larger Catechism*,[13] but by then the doctrine was already a commonplace in the culture. "That a Christian is by faith *really* knit to Christ," wrote Puritan Humphrey Chambers (1652), "and engrafted into him, and made one with him, is old scripture doctrine, acknowledged by all Protestant divines."[14] Theologian Giles Firmin (1656) wrote, "It is the common received truth among divines that *the union* [between Christ and believers] *is real*, that is, it is not *ens rationis*, tis not an imaginary thing, and that Christ is the head mystic. Who denies it?"[15]

The hyperbole in these statements seems somewhat justified given the staggering number of references to Christ's "real unity" that were cited in 17th-century religious literature, not only by prominent scholars of theology but also by country pastors and laypersons, all in general consensus about the meaning of the expression and how it was to be used. There are over 400 texts published between 1600 and 1700 that cite "real unity" or "real union," and fully three-quarters of those texts refer to the spiritual relationship between Christ and believers, described in terms of a physical body.[16] A number of the remaining passages refer to other similar theological concepts, such as the relationship between Christ's divine and human natures or the relationship between members of the triune Godhead (neither of which employ the metaphor of a human body).[17] However, the

13. See Question 66: "What is that union which the elect have with Christ? Answer: The union with the elect have with Christ is the work of God's grace, whereby they are spiritually and mystically, yet really and inseparably, joined to Christ as their head and husband."

14. Humphrey Chambers, *Animadversions on Mr. William Dell's Book*, 1652, 45.

15. Giles Firmin, *lishing against Shaking*, 1656, 36.

16. See Appendix B for a detailed list of the 427 texts collected.

17. Thirty-seven texts refer to Christ's natures, and twenty-five texts refer to the Godhead. See Appendix B for more details.

"real presence" of transubstantiation was not a common referent for "real unity," and in fact, the few passages in which "real unity" was used to refer to transubstantiation often occur in Protestant reconstructions of what was thought to be an erroneous Roman Catholic understanding, along with vociferous rejections of it. "Christ now bodily in heaven hath true and *real union* with his members on earth," wrote Henry Ainsworth (1657), "so as there needs no popish transubstantiation."[18] John Denison (1631) stated, "There is only a symbolical and rational union betwixt Christ and the elements [of the Eucharist], but the spiritual and *real union* is betwixt Christ and his members."[19] Thomas Morton (1631) argued that believers could "*really* and truly" be united with Christ "without this Sacrament,"[20] and John Preston (1633) explained that it was "not necessary that there should be a corporal presence [of Christ] in the Sacrament" given that Christ's "true *real unity*" with believers was spiritual not concrete and "done by faith" rather than physical elements.[21]

Anxious to show that the union of Christ and believers was a spiritual encounter coordinated by God rather than a liturgical event performed by the church,[22] the early 17th-century English Protestants (or Puritans) worked to dissociate the term "real unity"

18. Henry Ainsworth, *The Art of Logic, or, The Entire Body of Logic in English* (London, 1657), 46.

19. John Denison, *The Heavenly Banquet*, 1631, 85. See also Gilbert Primrose, *The Table of the Lord*, 1626, 158: "We have no real union with Christ in the sacraments but by the Spirit."

20. Thomas Morton, *Of the Institution of the Sacrament*, 1631, 213. See also Pierre Du Moulin, *The Buckler of the Faith*, 1620, 464: "This union is as well without the Eucharist as in the Eucharist."

21. John Preston, *The Cup of Blessing*, 1633, 5. See also Henry Lukin, *The Life of Faith*, 1660, 15: "It is not a corporeal Union, as the Papists would prove from John 6:56; that place is interpreted literally, only to serve their hypothesis of transubstantiation."

22. For a sampling of texts in this genre, see Thomas Hooker, *The Soul's Exaltation*, 1638, 6-7; James Wilcock, *Six Sermons*, 1641, 43,46; John Eaton, *The Honeycomb of Free Justification*, 1642, 434; Henry Ferne, *Of the Division between the English and Romish Church*, 1655, 170-2.

from the sacramental context by depicting an imaginary political courtroom and describing the phenomenon as a legal exchange. William Perkins (1603) wrote that "Christ upon the cross stood not as a private person but as a public person, in the room, place, and stead of all the elect... as in the Parliament, when the Burgess gives his voice, the whole corporation is said to consent by him and in him." Then, "in the conversion of a sinner, there is a real donation of Christ and all his benefits unto us, and there is a *real union* whereby every believer is made one with Christ."[23] Thomas Draxe (1608) called this union a "spiritual contract" and also described it as a "mystical and spiritual, yet *real and substantial union* and conjunction between Christ and the Church, whereby they are made one flesh, and by special compact and consent have right and interest in another, yea and abide and dwell one in another."[24] Samuel Cradock (1659) tried to clarify this alleged connection between "*real* and legal unity"[25] by explaining that "when we are willing to be in subjection to [Christ] and to be ruled by him, as the members of the body are by the head, then is there a *real and spiritual union* wrought between Christ and our souls."[26] By 1678 William Strong could give the proposition even greater precision: "It is a natural, and not merely voluntary union, and therefore... some express it by a voluntary, and some by a

23. William Perkins, A *Commentary upon Galatians*, 1603, 141. See also Pierre Du Moulin, *The Anatomy of Arminianism*, 1620, 58 ("Christ satisfying for us on the cross hath not suffered as a private person, but as sustaining and representing the whole church in the head."), and Thomas Goodwin, *Christ Set Forth*, 1642, 193 ("We are representatively in Christ as our head.").

24. Thomas Draxe, *The Lamb's Spouse or the Heavenly Bride*, 1608, Unnumbered manuscript.

25. John Brown, *Christ in Believers* (Edinburgh, 1694), 58: "... All which palpably hold forth a real and legal union betwixt Christ and believers to their joy, comfort, and satisfaction. Christ their cautioner stands obliged for them and answers in judgment for them, as a head and public person appearing for them."

26. Samuel Cradock, *Knowledge and Practice*, 1659, 147. See also John Flavel, *The Method of Grace*, 1681, 43-4: "The members are subject to the head. Dominion in the head must needs infer subjection in the members. In vain do we claim union with Christ as our head whilst we are governed by our own wills and our lusts give us law."

natural, union: Christ and the soul are not only one by consent, but they are naturally one."[27]

The Puritans' heuristic conceit of a courtroom contract between Christ and believers gave the spiritual relationship a rarefied formality that contrasted nicely with the sacramental corporality of Roman Catholic dogma, but it also ran the risk of reducing the relationship to a voluntarist, legal-rationalist phenomenon. Anxious to guard against this other extreme, the Puritans were careful to qualify their theological legalese and show how the unity between Christ and believers could be initiated by consent without being reduced to it. William Perkins, who was one of the first to give the courtroom analogy, cautioned that the "near and *real union*" between Christ and believers should not be thought of as a "soldering of one soul with another, [nor] a bare agreement of the souls among themselves, but by a communion and operation of the same spirit, which being by nature infinite, is of sufficient ability to conjoin those things together which are of themselves far distant from each other: the like we see in the soul of man, which conjoineth the head with the foot."[28] Edward Reynolds (1638) wrote that "the faithful are not only by a consociation of affections and confederacy of wills, but by a *real* though mystical union, engrafted, knit, and as it were jointed unto Christ by the sinew of faith."[29] Thomas Manton (c.1650) related, "Some are in Christ by external profession, *de jure*; they are bound to be new creatures that they may not dishonour their head. Others, by *real* internal union; they not only ought to be, but *de facto* are, new creatures, because they are made partakers of his

27. William Strong, *A Discourse of the Two Covenants*, 1678, 75.

28. William Perkins, *A Golden Chain* (Cambridge, 1600), 115.

29. Edward Reynolds, *Meditations on the Holy Sacrament*, 1638, 61.

spirit, and by that spirit are renewed and sanctified."[30] Simon Birckbek (1635) assured his readers that they had with Christ "a greater and more *real union* than barely by consent and concord of will"[31] — a statement that strikingly anticipates Hobbes's own formulation in *Leviathan* (1651): "This is more than consent or concord, it is a *real unity* of them all in one and the same person."[32]

Distinguishing Christ's unity with believers from a merely legal, consensual unity (or from transubstantiation) put 17th-century pastors and theologians no closer to actually defining it, however. Despite their frank admissions that the dynamic was "unexpressible"[33] and "difficult to understand the manner of it,"[34] they persistently emphasized how "real" it was. "Do not conceive of this union as some imaginary thing that hath no other being but in the brain," warned Joseph Hall (1647). "Do not think it an union merely virtual... nor yet a metaphorical union by way of figurative resemblance; but know that this is a true, *real*, essential, substantial union, whereby the person of the believer is indissolubly united to the glorious person of the Son of God." Hall proceeded to define the unity as "spiritual," carefully adding, "Neither is it the less real because spiritual."[35] Pierre Du Moulin (1620) wrote, "This wonderful union is not a thing in mere imagination, no, nor consisting in mere charity, love, and affection only; but it is a true,

30. Thomas Manton, *Christ's Eternal Existence*, 1685 [posthumous], 142. See also Peter Williams, *Philanthropia*, 1665, 236: "... So doth the body of Christ, and every member thereof that is truly of the body, not tied thereto by an outward profession only, but closely knit by a real union."

31. Simon Birckbek, *The Protestants' Evidence*, 1635, 77: "And in respect of our mystical union with him and his body, we become members of Christ's body, and quickened by his spirit."

32. *Leviathan*, XVII.13 (p.260).

33. Henry Vertue, *Christ and the Church*, 1659, 222: "A true and real union it is, not imaginary."

34. John Shower, *Sacramental Discourses*, 1693, 5.

35. Joseph Hall, *Christ Mystical*, 1647, 9-12.

real, and substantial union."[36] Thomas Watson (1666) admitted, "This union with Christ may well be called mystical; it is hard to describe the manner of it. As it is hard to show the manner how the soul is united to the body, so how Christ is united to the soul. But though this union be spiritual, it is real."[37]

The confidence with which Christ's union was pronounced "real" seems to have been derived, not only from the faith that these English Christians had in God and revelation, but also from the "real effects"[38] of the union that they experienced and shared as a community — beginning with the very creation of the community itself. According to pastors and theologians, Christ and each individual believer were united in faith, and this relationship automatically generated a completely new entity of the combined parties — a church — independent of them both and at the same time constituted of them both.[39] "[This] union," wrote John Norton (1653) "is the conjunction of the person of Christ and the person of the believer into one third being, whence ariseth an everlasting relation and answerable communion of head and members between Christ and the believer forever."[40] John Fisher (1626) explained this process through a physiological analogy: "When soul and body come to be united, by this union is produced a third substance, to wit, a man

36. Du Moulin, *Buckler of the Faith*, 429. See also Eaton, *Honeycomb of Justification*, 430: "Certainly nothing can be more real and substantial than such a union."

37. Thomas Watson, *The Godly Man's Picture Drawn*, 1666, 344.

38. William Lyford, *The Plain Man's Senses Exercised*, 1655, 115: "That union produceth real effects and operations in us, therefore the union is real." See also James Durham, *Clavis Cantici* (Edinburgh, 1668), 149: "It's a real and not an imaginary union (though it be spiritual and by faith). It makes and transfers a mutual right of the one to the other, and hath real effects."

39. For Hobbes's similar allegation that the relationship between a master and his servant automatically generates a "little body politic, which consisteth of two persons," see *De Corpore Politico, or, The Elements of Law, Moral and Politic*, 1650, XXII.2.

40. John Norton, *The Orthodox Evangelist*, 1654, 285.

composed of soul and body," and in general, when any "two individual things are truly and *really united*, by this union is made a third individual thing distinct from each of them apart and from all other individual things."[41] According to this principle, the church "is a true and real body," wrote Thomas Jackson (1627), "consisting of many parts, all really (though mystically and spiritually) united unto one head. And by their *real union* with one head, all are truly and really united amongst themselves." Stephen Marshall (1653) said that believers are by faith "compacted into one body" such that "the whole church, or the collection or aggregation of all the saints, are one body in Christ, of which body Christ is the head and all the saints are members."[42] And John Owen (1672) argued that "the *real union* of all true believers" was created "by their relation unto the Head [of Christ], and thence to one another, unto the constitution of the whole."[43]

Within this newly constituted community, believers could enter into genuine fellowship with one another in a manner that was impossible under in any other arrangement. "A soul having *real union* with Jesus Christ finds the communion of saints its proper and natural element," wrote Humphrey Saunders (1655), "out of which he languisheth, and in which he liveth with much pleasure."[44] The life and vigor of the community was generated and sustained exclusively through the individual relationships of believers with Christ, without which the symbiotic experience would be destroyed.[45]

41. John Fisher, *The Answer unto the Nine Points of Controversy*, 1626, 71.

42. Stephen Marshall, *A Sermon Preached to the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor on April 1652*, 1653, 2-3.

43. John Owen, *A Discourse Concerning Evangelical Love*, 1672, 97-8.

44. Humphrey Saunders, *An Anti-Diatribe*, 1655, 163.

45. Richard Baxter, *Pneumatou Diakonia*, 1682, 19: "The union betwixt Head and Body is a real, near union [which] cannot be separated but by destruction of the whole."

Edward Reynolds (1635) declared, "All that we are in regard of spirit and life is from [Christ]. We are nothing of ourselves and we can do nothing of ourselves. All that we are is from the grace of Christ… [and] a man may belong unto Christ by implantation into his body, which is done by faith."[46] John Flavel (1681) insisted, "This union with Christ is as necessary to the maintaining [of life] as before it was to the producing of it."[47] This emphasis on spiritual life and health made the organic body metaphor an easy choice for most pastors and theologians, not least because the apostle Paul (1st century) frequently used it himself. Richard Hooker, arguably the most influential English theologian of the 16th century, foregrounded the analogy in his *Ecclesiastical Polity* (1594), writing "For in [Christ] we actually are [saved] by our actual incorporation into that Society which hath him for their Head and doth make together with him one Body (he and they in that respect having one name), for which cause by virtue of this mystical conjunction, we are of him, and in him, even as though our very flesh and bones should be made continuate with his."[48]

The strong resemblance between these theological depictions of Christ's representative unity and the details of Hobbes's political account of sovereignty is unlikely

46. Edward Reynolds, *An Explication of the Hundreth and Tenth Psalm*, 1635, 299-300. See also Vincent Alsop, *Anti-Sozzo, Sive, Sherlocismus*, 1676, 421: "We conceive first a real union between the Head and the Members before we can conceive the Head should communicate spirits to all the parts, to quicken them to motion."

47. Flavel, *Method of Grace*, 43-4.

48. Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity Eight Books*, 1604 [posthumous edition], 219. See also Girolamo Zanchi, *A Confession of Christian Religion* (Cambridge, 1599), 82: "This true and real union (though spiritual) of our bodies and souls with the body and soul of Christ can be letted by no distance of place, though never so great, because that spirit is so mighty in operation, as it reacheth from earth to heaven and beyond, and joineth in one no less strictly the members of Christ being on earth with their head in heaven sitting at the right hand of the Father, then the soul of a man joineth together the heands and legs and other members into one body with the head."

to be coincidental. Like the Puritan pastors, Hobbes insisted that sovereign representation should be understood first and foremost as a formal, legal authorization between an author and their chosen actor: each contracting individual voluntarily consents and submits their will to the representative.[49] This decision does not remain a purely fiduciary matter, however, because at the moment of consent, there is a "real unity" formed between each respective author and their common representative that is "more than consent and concord." It incorporates each contracting individual with the sovereign representative in such a way that a "third thing"[50] is generated in the process, and this new entity enables and ensures a peace, unity, and fellowship among them all that is hopelessly impossible under any other arrangement. In *Leviathan* Hobbes referred to this community as a "person," by which term he seems to have been signaling the purely abstract quality of the entity in question.[51] But his chosen metaphor of an embodied human being, captured in the iconic frontispiece of his book, belies this suggestion and evokes, not a coolly intellectual category of personhood, but a warm, fleshy organism, teeming with life. Overt descriptions of the physical and biological status of the commonwealth in Chapters XXIII-XXIV, and XXIX[52] reinforce this trope and offer yet more evidence that Hobbes's vision of political sovereignty may have been inspired by the theological prototype of Christ

49. *Leviathan*, XVI.1-8 (pp.244-6).

50. Ibid., XVII.13 (pp.260-2): "The multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth, in Latin Civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God to which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defense."

51. Ibid., XVI.1-3 (p.244): "A person is he whose words or actions are considered either as his own or as representing the words or actions of another man... A person is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation."

52. See Ibid., XXII.1 (p.348): "Having spoken of the generation, form, and power of a commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of systems, which resemble the similar parts or muscles of a body natural... "

the Representative and his church "body."

Before we can provisionally determine that this is so, however, there are a couple of objections that need to be considered first. Hobbes's statements about the "body" of the commonwealth, for instance, might not be a theological allusion so much as a classical allusion. The ancient analogy of a "body politic" predates Christianity and appears prominently in a myriad of political theory texts, from Greek and Roman times through the Middle Ages up to the early-modern era. Perhaps Hobbes's political body references reveal the debt he owes, not to Christian theology, but to this ubiquitous Hellenic tradition. A second objection, however, focuses on Hobbes's hostility to Hellenistic political philosophy and questions whether he really intended to recommend, let alone appeal to, such an Aristotelian concept. The "artificial" automaton depicted in the introduction to *Leviathan* seems to compete and contradict the "real unity" of a metaphysical human body that Hobbes describes elsewhere. Many theorists have expressed skepticism about his commitment to the metaphor of body politic and found it much easier to reconcile the image of the automaton to Hobbes's political philosophy. Is the "real unity" of Hobbes's commonwealth important at all, regardless of its proper referent? The next section of the chapter addresses these concerns.

1.2 Hobbes and the classical tradition of "body politic"

The scholarly tendency to question or evade Hobbes's theme of metaphysical embodiment is not new. David Hale wrote a book in 1971 on *The Body Politic* in which he alleged that

Hobbes had "little use for the metaphor of the body politic" and decisively "put an end to sustained or serious use of organic imagery in political discussion" by replacing the old-world body trope with a legalist social contract.[53] This claim relies upon an assumption that the mechanism of formal consent is intrinsically incompatible with organic, metaphysical unity — which whether valid or not, does not seem to be an assumption held by the pastors and theologians reviewed above nor by Hobbes himself. There is no political analogy for the commonwealth that occurs more often in his works than the physiological: in addition to frequent organic allusions to the "head," "members," "nerves," etc., Hobbes explicitly calls the commonwealth a "body" several times in *Human Nature* (1640)[54] and in *De Corpore Politico* (1640, literally entitled "The Body Politic"),[55] once in *De Cive* (1642),[56] at least five times in *Leviathan* (1651),[57] twice in Behemoth (1668),[58] and in his late scientific works, once in *De Homine* (1658)[59] and once in *De Corpore* (1565), where he unequivocally states that "there are two chief kinds of Bodies, and very different from one another: one whereof being the work of nature, is called a Natural Body; the other is called

53. David Hale, *The Body Politic: A Political Metaphor in Renaissance English Literature* (Mouton, 1971), 127,130.

54. *Human Nature [1640;1650], ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford World's Classics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), I.1; XIX.8-11.

55. *De Corpore Politico*, XX.1-4,14,18; XXI.4-5,7,11; XXII.1-2; XXIV.1; XXVII.7; XXVIII.8; XXIX.1.

56. *Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, or De Cive [1642 in Latin]*, 1651, V.10: "the body itself of the sodality" (ipsum corpus sodalitatis), an ecclesiastical and religious formulation, no less. Also VI.19 obviously refers to the body, leading the 1651 English translator to add the clause "to the body."

57. *Leviathan*, Introduction (p.16), XVIII.18 (p.280), XXI.21 (p.344); XXIX.15 (p.512), Review and Conclusion (p.1141), and for other suggestive passages, see XXII.1 (p.348), XXIV.13 (p.396), and XLII.125 (p.916).

58. *Behemoth, or, An Epitome of the Civil Wars of England, from 1640 to 1660 [Written in 1668]*, 1679, Dialogue 1 (p.2) and Dialogue 2 (p.76).

59. *De Homine [1658], ed. Bernard Ge*rt (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1991), Preface: "For man is not just a natural body, but also a part of the state, or (as I put it) of the body politic."

a Commonwealth, and is made by the wills and agreement of men."[60]

This distinction between the "natural" body and "political" body is accentuated with rhetorical force in the Introduction to *Leviathan*, where the commonwealth is compared to a mechanical automaton, and ultimately described as a human body with an "artificial" soul, joints, and nerves.[61] The "artificiality" of the commonwealth in this passage may not be as remarkable or scandalous an innovation as theorists have often assumed. Hobbes says that through art the automaton and political body "imitate nature,"[62] and this is a premise that nearly verbatim echoes that of John of Salisbury, a medieval theorist, who related that "both Cicero and Plato have written about the commonwealth, the one discussing it as it ought to be, the other as it was instituted and handed down by the men of earlier times. But both laid down the same formula for the existing or projected body politic, namely that its life should *imitate nature*, which we have so often called the best guide of life."[63] Salisbury followed this assertion with an elaboration on the alleged political constitution of honey bees (drawn from Vergil), which is an analogy that Hobbes emphatically rejected because it was used to imply that humans had, like bees, a "natural inclination" to social harmony.[64] At first glance, Salisbury et al.

60. *Elements of Philosophy the First Section, Concerning Body [De Corpore]*, 1656, I.9.

61. *Leviathan*, Introduction (p.16).

62. Ibid.: "Nature... is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated."

63. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus: The Statesman's Book, trans. John Dickinson* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), V.21 (emphasis added).

64. See *Human Nature*, XIX.5, *De Cive*, V.5, and *Leviathan*, XVII.6-12 (pp.258-60). See also Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship, to the King of Cyprus, trans. Gerald B. Phelan, First Edition edition* (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), I.2: "In the multitude of bodily members there is one which is the principal mover... Wherefore, if artificial things are an imitation of natural things and a work of art is better according as it attains a closer likeness to what is in nature, it follows that it is best for a human multitude to be ruled by one person," (emphasis added).

seem to hold the more compelling position on this point, as it is not intuitively obvious how or why humans would go about *un*naturally imitating nature, as Hobbes alternatively maintained.[65] But leaving that question aside for the moment, Salisbury's words make clear that there is nothing in Hobbes's introduction to *Leviathan* about artificiality, mimesis, or even mechanical artistry that necessarily obviates, undermines, or contradicts the metaphor of "body politic."

There is also nothing in Hobbes's notorious skepticism about the "soul" that would lead us to question his portrayal of sovereignty in terms of body and soul.[66] Hobbes carefully denied the reality of a certain kind of soul, popular in ancient philosophy and superstitious religion: namely, a soul that existed as a "separate" or "independent essence," like a disembodied ghost.[67] But he just as carefully affirmed (what he considered to be) the biblical understanding of soul[68] as the source and extent of "life" in the body,[69] and even accepted that the soul was immortal along with the body — not naturally but supernaturally, by the direct intervention and sustenance of God.[70] The passages in which

65. Hobbes even states in one passage that "nature itself compels" humans to seek peace and society (*De Cive*, Preface).

66. For a Straussian interpretation, by which Hobbes's scientific appraisal of "soul" is used to argue that his "body politic" metaphor was rhetorically intended for an "unfit audience," see Stephen B. Hequembourg, "Hobbes's Leviathan: A Tale of Two Bodies," *The Seventeenth Century* 28, no. 1 (2013): 21-36. For a similar judgment, see Robin Douglass, "The Body Politic Is a Fictitious Body,'" *Hobbes Studies* 27, no. 2 (2014): 126-47 at 139.

67. See *Leviathan*, XII.7 and XLIV.15 (pp.166-7, 974-6).

68. See Ibid., Latin Appendix, I.45-6, 55-6 (pp.1160, 1164-8): "I shall indeed say nothing to on this matter except what I find said clearly and without any ambiguity in the Scriptures, openly contradicted by no other text. Together with almost everyone else, you have indeed acquired this idea... from the philosophers — whom I do not wish to have as my masters, when I already have the Holy Scriptures."

69. Ibid., XXXIV.10 (pp.616-8), XXXVIII.4 (pp.706-8), XLVII.15 (p.974): "The soul in Scripture signifieth always, either the life or the living creature; and the body and soul jointly, the body alive."

70. *De Corpore Politico*, XXV.6; *De Cive*, XVII.13; *Leviathan*, XXIX.23 (p.518), XXXVIII.4 (pp.706-8), XLIV.14-5, 23-6 (pp.972-4, 986-90), Latin Appendix, I.45-6, 55-6 (pp.1160, 1164-8).

Hobbes casually refers to "body and soul"[71] or carefully states that the political sovereign of a commonwealth is the "soul" of the community[72] ought to be read and interpreted in light of his own understanding of "soul," not rejected or questioned on the basis of the understanding he denied. As to the precise role that the soul plays in relation to the body, Hobbes criticized Aristotle for arguing that the soul was "the *first giver of motion* to the body, and consequently to itself,"[73] while Hobbes himself continued to insist that the political sovereign is the soul that "gives life and motion to the whole body."[74] These two statements seem to contradict each other, but there is some confusion about what in particular about Aristotle's claim Hobbes was rejecting. He seemed more displeased by the use to which the claim was put by republican advocates of "free will" than by the claim itself, and was also more anxious to correct the implication that the soul had some kind of independent existence from the body than to correct the implication that the soul is the source or initiator of life and movement. Moreover, he makes a crucial scientific distinction in *Leviathan* between "vital movement" and "animal movement," along with their different origins, and he clarifies in the introduction of the book that "life is but a motion of limbs, *the beginning whereof is in some principal part within.*"[75]

Most importantly of all, questioning whether Hobbes really wanted his readers to believe that the soul gives motion to the body effectively undermines his rhetorical argument about the indispensability of sovereignty within the community, and it is not

71. See *De Corpore Politco*, XXI.4; *Leviathan*, XXXI.6 (p.560) and XLV.20 (p.1032).

72. *Leviathan*, XXI.21 (p.344), XXIX.15,23 (pp.512,518), XLII.125 (p.916).

73. *Behemoth*, Dialogue 1 (p.42).

74. *Leviathan*, Introduction (p.3), XXIX.23 (p.518).

75. Ibid., VI.1 (p.78) and Introduction (p.3), emphasis added.

clear why he would want to do so, especially given his considerable effort reassigning the role of the "soul" to the political sovereign rather than the "head," as was more common in ancient and medieval usage.[76] Hobbes deliberately made this choice in order to emphasize the ability of the sovereign to "animate" the body, to "command," and to "will" : all functions that he attributed to the soul rather than head, which was not an unprecedented decision. Assigning sovereignty, life, and movement to the soul rather than the head was an increasingly common practice during the early-modern era — among theologians describing *Christ's* role, not the monarch's. "As the body liveth by the soul," wrote Thomas Hooker (1638), "the soul closing, and communicating, and quickening of the same, so Christ is in a Christian, and enableth a Christian to the performance of that he doth. Hence the body of the faithful is called Christ."[77] John Preston (1632) declared to his readers, "The Son will quicken you as the soul doth the body... The Son of God infuseth life into him to whom he is conjoined."[78]

Most pastors and theologians continued to refer to Christ as the "head," but they also tended to either attribute to the head all the life-giving faculties of the soul or inextricably join them. Richard Hooker (1597) related, "The head being of all other parts of man's body the most divine, hath dominion over all the rest: it is the fountain of sense, of motion, the throne where the guide of the soul doth reign... So Christ is the highest in his Church, inseparably knit with it."[79] John Ball (1645) wrote, "For the head is to give

76. See *De Cive*, VI.19.

77. Hooker, *Soul's Exaltation*, 4.

78. John Preston, *Spiritual Life and Death*, 1632, 87-8: "The Son will quicken you as the soul doth the body... The Son of God infuseth life into him to whom he is conjoined."

79. Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, vol. V [1597], 5 vols., Everyman's Library 202*

influence of sense and motion unto the body, and Christ gives supernatural sense and motion unto his mystical body."[80] Thomas Higgensen (1653) argued, "Even as the natural spirit or soul of man is in the head, and not there only, but diffused in and through all the members, and is the life of all, in which the members being many, become and conspire into one body; so is the spirit of God in Christ the Head, and thence and therewith shed abroad, not by infusions only, as some distant effects, but by himself into all the members, and is the life of all, in and for which they being many become one spiritual body."[81] Edward Forset (1606) helpfully explained, "There is a question amongst philosophers, where and in what part of the body the soul should be seated. Some place it in the head... and others allotting it no chief seat at all, extendeth it equally unto all [and] is nowhere circumscribed, bounded with no including limits, or more certainly in one place than in another." Forset thought that there were merits to both analogies, but he preferred the soul metaphor because it better evoked God's "immeasurable infiniteness of being everywhere."[82] Theologians often circumvented the dilemma by simply referring to Christ as both head and soul,[83] and Hobbes seems to handle the description of political sovereignty in much the same way: he strongly preferred the analogy of the soul to that of

(New York: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1954), 202. See also Richard Fowns, *Trisagion*, 1618, 116 ("For as the head is the principal seat of the soul, so is Christ of the Spirit of God, from whom it is dispersed into the whole Church."), and William Nicholson, *Ekthesis Pisteos*, 1661, 538 ("The faculties of the soul take up their residence in the head, and their whole scope and labour is, that the little Commonwealth of man receive no detriment... And this is the labour of our Head [Christ]: he sustains, quickens, and wisely moderates all things.").

80. John Ball, *The Covenant of Grace*, 1645, 268

81. Thomas Higgenson, *Glory Afar Off*, 1653, 31.

82. Edward Forset, *A Comparative Discourse of the Bodies Natural and Politic*, 1606, 23-5.

83. See Guillaume Bucanus, *Institutions of Christian Religion*, 1606, 523: "... the mystical body of Christ, the head and soul whereof is Christ: because it is quickened, cherished, and conserved by the spirit of Christ, and is perfected by his fullness, and is coupled with Christ the head by the same spirit, as by a most close and strong chain, and the members thereof do by virtue of the same spirit grow together."

the head, but he sometimes used the term "head" anyway, especially when discussing the sovereign's role in the church.[84]

Hobbes may have favored the soul over the head, not only because of its association with life in the body, but also because of a general tendency amongst parliamentarians to demote the "head" in relation to the whole body politic and treat it as if it were an appendage like any other. According to this (biologically inaccurate) metaphor, a diseased head could be removed from the body, just like a hand or foot, especially if it was actively threatening the health of the whole organism. King James I frequently challenged this inference in his addresses to Parliament, and discoursed at length on the subject in his 1598 treatise on the *Reciprocal and Mutual Duty betwixt a Free King and His Natural Subjects*: "For the similitude of the head and the body," he wrote, "it may very well fall out that the head will be forced to cut off some rotten members (as I have already said) to keep the rest of the body in integrity. But what state the body can be in if the head, for any infirmity that can fall to it, be cut off, I leave to the reader's judgment." He peevishly conceded, "If the children may upon any pretext that can be imagined, lawfully rise up against their father, cut him off, and choose any other whom they please in his room, and if the body for the weal of it, may for any infirmity that can be in the head, strike it off, then I cannot deny that the people may rebel, control, and displace, or cut off their king at their own pleasure, and upon respects moving them."[85] In

84. See *De Corpore Politco*, XXIV.2; *De Cive*, XVII.28; *Behemoth*, Dialogue 1 (p.58); *Leviathan*, XXXVII.13 (pp.694-6), XLII.79 (p.864). Hobbes might have intended the term "head" in its non-physiological sense (to mean "leader" or "chief"), but he seems to have drawn the title, at least in part, from the precedent of the Roman pope and Jesus Christ, both of whom held the title in its physiological sense. See *De Corpore Politco*, XXVI.10, *De Cive*, XVII.19,22, and *Leviathan*, XXXIX.3 (p.730).

85. James I, King of England, "The True Law of Free Monarchies: Or the Reciprocal and Mutual Duty

a 1603 speech to Parliament, James rhetorically asked, "Could ever the Body be counted without the Head, which was inseparably joined thereunto?"[86] Apparently many people in England thought that this was indeed a real, if regrele, possibility, and Hobbes's decision to depict sovereignty as the soul rather than the head of the body signaled to his readers that dispensing with the representative of the commonwealth would result, not merely in an inconvenient "headless multitude,"[87] but in an unambiguously *dead* multitude.

The popular early-modern notion of regicide by amputation may have been derived from the ancient Greco-Roman imagination. Cicero once advocated that Phalaris, the notorious tyrant of Sicily, be "exterminated from human society" by "proper measures" sule for grave physiological dysfunctions: "For, as certain members are amputated, if they show signs themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity."[88] Cicero frequently invoked the metaphor of the body politic ("*corpus rei publicae*"[89]), and he used it in order to emphasize the intrinsic and intuitive nature of the social bond within a community — formed, fostered, and sustained by every single citizen, lowly as well as elite.

Betwixt a Free King, and His Natural Subjects [1598]," in *The Political Works of James I* (Russell & Russell, 1965), 65-6. James was so disturbed by this manipulation of the body politic metaphor that he questioned whether it was appropriate to use any organic or physiological analogies when describing monarchy.

86. James I, King of England, "A Speech, as It Was Delivered in the Upper House of the Parliament to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal [March 1603]," in *The Political Works of James I* (Russell & Russell, 1965), 269-80 at 272

87. James I, "True Law," 68.

88. Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Officiis [On Duties], trans. Walter Miller, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 30* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), III.32. This passage occurs at the end of a longer section describing the "body" of society (III.21-32).

89. Ibid., I.85.

"A commonwealth is the property of a people," he wrote, "[And] a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The first cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man."[90] Plato and Aristotle propounded similar statements about the organic origins of human society,[91] and generally shared Cicero's belief that human beings could — and should — instinctively and spontaneously cohere together without requiring remedial education (far less threats of centralized coercion) in order to do so.[92] This while elites certainly played an important role within the ancient community, many ancient philosophers did not consider them to be completely indispensable for ensuring its existential unity, and in physiological analogies about the "body politic," the locus or source of vitality in the organism was always dispersed symbiotically throughout the whole, rather than concentrated within one part, member, person, or class.

Christianity introduced a new "body" of members to society, whose life and soul was Christ as God, the prime mover and sustainer of the whole, and during the Middle Ages, the two bodies — ecclesiastical and political — were combined, in metaphor as well as fact: John of Salisbury (1159) could speak of one hybrid social organism, with king as

90. Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Re Publica [The Republic], trans. Clinton Walker Keyes, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 213* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Havard University Press, 2006), XXV.39. See also *De Officiis*, III.v-vi.

91. See Plato, *The Republic*, II.368d-369a, IV.434d-e; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1254a, 1281b, 1290b.

92. See Plato, *Republic*, III.400d-403c; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1252b, 1253a, 1256b; Cicero, *De Officiis*, I.xvi-xvii, I.xliv.

head and God as soul (represented by the priests).[93] But by the late medieval era, the confederation was considerably strained and new advocates of a "two swords" separation between church and state tended to envision society in terms of two bodies rather than one, each with its own mythology, purview, and modus operandi. Thomas Aquinas (1267) turned back to Aristotle in his exposition on the body politic, although he retained features of the Christian iteration — like God as soul — and bestowed them on the king: "Let the king recognize... that he is to be in the kingdom what the soul is in the body, and what God is in the world."[94] Aquinas admitted that this soul analogy for the king was a little misleading because the soul was responsible, not merely for governing and "moving" the body but also for animating the body, which was not an intrinsic power of kingship.[95] Marsilius of Padua (1324) had a similar problem after attributing to the king the "heart" of the body: an organ, he said, that "regulates and measures, through its influence, the other parts of the animal in such a way that it is not itself regulated by them in any and receives no influence from them either." Marsilius quickly clarified that these particular faculties of the heart were not applicable to a prince, because he, "being human, has an intellect and a desire which can take on different forms — such as a false conception or a perverted desire or both — [and] it is possible for him, if he follows them, to do things contrary to what is laid down by law. For this reason the prince is, in these actions, rendered subject to measurement by something else that has the authority to measure or

93. Salisbury, *Policraticus*, V.

94. Aquinas, *On Kingship*, I.12.

95. Ibid., I.13. Aquinas states that some kings, such as Ninus and Romulus, originally elished their kingdoms, but even these kings could not create *ex nihilo*.

regulate him according to the law."[96]

The "law" became the soul of the body politic for theorists of the Renaissance and Early-modern eras, much as it had been for Cicero,[97] and this impersonal, transcendent life-force was believed to permeate and suffuse the entire polis through the unprompted and unforced social commitment of each individual. Nicholas of Cusa (1434) said of the first political communities elished by humans, "It was clear that by a marvelous and beneficent divine law infused in all men, they knew that associating together would be most beneficial to them and that social life would be maintained by laws adopted with common consent of all... For we see that man is a political and civic animal naturally inclined to civilized life."[98] Nicholas later argued that the "nerves" of the body politic "are like the imperial laws which strike a balance between severity and laxity and bring all the members together in harmony. And the head which represents the emperor is not exempted, since all those nerves flow from the operation of reason and nature to which law no one is superior."[99] Richard Hooker (1604) wrote, "Two foundations there are which bear up public societies: the one, a natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other, an order expressly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner

96. Marsilius of Padua, *The Defender of the Peace [Defensor Pacis], trans. Annabel S. Brett* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), I.15.7, 1.18.2-3, and see also II.30.4: "'The eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee.' In the same way or an analogous way, therefore, the principate too depends on and receives something from the actions of certain parts of the city which are inferior to it... This is so even though these very parts themselves depend on the principate in respect of something more excellent and more perfect, i.e. coercive jurisdiction."

97. See Otto Friedrich von Gierke, *Associations and Law: The Classical and Early Christian Stages, trans. George Heiman* (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 87,58n: "It is noteworthy that in Cicero the impersonal lex occupies the place of a living personality of the state."

98. Nicholas of Cusa, *The Catholic Concordance [1434], trans. Paul E. Sigmund* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), III.169-70.

99. Ibid., III.587-8.

of their union living together. The latter is that which we call the law of a commonweal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth."[100] Cardinal Robert Bellarmine (1610) assured his readers that "in a political body, it is not necessary that all members, that is, citizens, be subject, strictly speaking, to the authority of the head, that is, of the ruler,"[101] because "in all bodies, the members are connected and there is a dependency of one upon the other."[102]

This last allegation of Bellarmine's deeply frustrated Hobbes, and it prompted what is arguably his most important — and precise — statement about what he considered to be the essence of the body politic, contra the conventional, ancient understanding: "[Bellarmine] says the members of every commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend one of another: it is true, they cohere together; but they depend only on the sovereign which is the soul of the commonwealth; which failing, the commonwealth is dissolved into a civil war, no one man so much as cohering to another, for want of a common dependence on a known sovereign; just as the members of the natural body dissolve into earth, for want of a soul to hold them together."[103] What is so impressive in this passage (and to some theorists, surprising) is Hobbes's emphatic affirmation of the body politic as an appropriate and illuminating metaphor for the relation of individuals within his commonwealth: "It is

100. Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, 68.

101. Robert Bellarmine, "On the Temporal Power of the Pope [1610]," in *On Temporal and Spiritual Authority, trans. Stefania Tutino* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012), 121-405 at Ch. 35, p.374

102. Robert Bellarmine, *De Romano Pontifice [On the Roman Pontiff, 1586], trans. Ryan Grant*, 2016, V.7.

103. *Leviathan*, XLII.125 (p.916).

true, they cohere together." He could have rejected the entire analogy as false and counterclaimed that the relationship between individuals was purely formal and legal, but instead he unswervingly reiterated his longstanding commitment to the image of the body politic, and with it, to an organic, metaphysical union of society. Hobbes's complaint with Bellarmine had to do with two assumptions commonly associated with the ancient metaphor: one, that the organic union of individuals was natural or self-generated, and two, that their union could exist prior to, or independent of, their sovereign representative. In *Behemoth* (1668), Hobbes wrote a fictional dialogue in which one interlocutor wondered aloud if "the people [of England] had then no Representative," given Parliament's 1642 military campaign against Charles I. The second interlocutor grimly replied, "Then there was no commonwealth."[104]

Hobbes's body politic radically diverges from the ancient version in that it is animated non-naturally and *ex nihilo*,[105] in and through its representative, and cannot live or breathe, let alone act, independently of him.[106] This variation to the conventional body politic narrative was not a Hobbesian idiosyncrasy: it was a distinctly Christological gloss on the metaphor that was ubiquitous in the theological literature of his time. The puritan parliamentarians were eager to assert the *classical* version of the body politic over and against the absolutist claims of the king (much to Hobbes's chagrin[107]), but the essence

104. *Behemoth*, Dialogue 3 (p.121).

105. *De Corpore Politco*, XX.1: "... like a creation out of nothing... "

106. See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XVI.13-4 (pp.248-50), XVII.13 (p.260) ("And in him consisteth the essence of the Commonwealth," emphasis added), XVIII.4,18 (pp.266,280), XXIX.9,23 (pp.504,518), XXX.3 (p.520).

107. Hobbes frequently chastised his "democratical" opponents for being so impressed by what he called "the Greek and Roman anarchies." See *De Cive*, VII.3, XII.3, XIII.7; *Leviathan*, XXI.8-9 (pp.332-4), XXIX.14 (pp.506-8), XXXI.41 (p.574), XLVI.23,35-6 (pp.1094-7); *Behemoth*, Dialogue I (p.3,23,43,56), Dialogue III (p.158). For a brief history and analysis of this philosophic collision between the parliamentarians and the

and operation of the body of *Christ* was an entirely different matter. Paul Baynes (1621) gravely warned his readers not to be deceived by the "proportion of a politic body and natural" as to indiscriminately "apply all that is in these to Christ's mystical body, not remembering that analogon is not in *omni simili*, for then should it be the same with the analogatum." Baynes continued, "In a politic body, power is first in the community, [and then] in the King from them; but all ecclesiastical power is first in our King before [it can be] in the Church from him."[108] Puritan pastors and theologians were generally satisfied with comparisons between the Aristotelian concord of the body politic and the harmony of believers in Christ[109] — much like Hobbes, who easily acknowledged that the individuals of his commonwealth cohered together in the classical sense — but the uniquely divine origin and essence of Christ's body in contradistinction to the classical body politic often made theologians suspicious about these comparisons and skeptical about the quality of "coherence" that was possible in the political sphere. "For whether you consider the outward and true visible members, or the catholic and invisible church of Christ," opined Henry Finch (1621), "how honourable and glorious things must needs be spoken of thee, thou excellent City of God. In thee is seen a body politic, whereunto all other corporations in the world are but counterfeits... Thou hast a soul as it were, which other corporations want, that glueth and knitteth the parts together, one unto another and all unto the head.

king, see Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 251-2.

108. Paul Baynes, *The Diocesan's Trial*, 1621, 83. John Milton wrote that it was "a kind of treason against the dignity of mankind to affirm [that] the people must be thought created all for [the king], he not for them, and they all in one body inferior to him single," ("Tenure of Kings," in *The Student's Milton, ed. Frank Allen Patterson* [New York: F.S. Crofts & Co., 1936], 757-8).

109. For two examples of this, see Thomas Fitzherbert, *Second Treatise Concerning Policy and Religion*, 1610, 205, and Matthew Mead, *Two Sticks Made One*, 1691, 1-2.

And what is that soul? The quickening spirit of Christ, which is God himself that doth unite and make thee one him."[110]

The simplest distinction that pastors and theologians could draw between the body politic and the body of Christ was that the former was natural and the latter was decidedly not natural. The union of individuals in a commonwealth was therefore considered to be an Aristotelian bond of social agreeability (what Hobbes called "consent and concord"[111]) that could be regarded as a "political," or "civil" unity. The union of believers in Christ, however, was considered to be an ontologically deep connection and identity shared among them and their divine representative, such that their association could be called a "real" unity, in contradistinction to all other unities. "The union whereby Christ and his church are united [is] a true and *real union*," wrote Edward Elton (1615). "It is not natural, as when two things are joined in one nature... nor political or civil, as the prince and people are conjoined; but it is mystical and spiritual by the bond of the same spirit, and by faith."[112] Henry Burton (1629) clarified, "Christ and the believer are one, not essentially or naturally, but are made so by grace... not so much by the coherency of essences as by the correspondency and nearness of wills... So that in our unity with God in Christ, there is not *confusion naturam*, *sed voluntatum consensio*: not a confusion of natures, but a consent of wills."[113] Thomas Jackson (1627) asserted, "This union betwixt

110. Henry Finch, *The Calling of the Jews*, 1621, 103.

111. Hobbes usually uses the term "consent" in its formal and legal sense, and the term "concord" in an Aristotelian sense. For the latter, see *Human Nature*, XIX.4-7; *De Cive*, V (section synopses 3-4); *Leviathan*, XIII.11 (p.194).

112. Edward Elton, *An Exposition of Colossians*, 1615, 225,715.

113. Henry Burton, *Truth's Triumph*, 1629, 107.

the members of the true church... is wrought by a power supernatural, by a skill super-artificial, by a wisdom infinitely surmounting the highest reach of human policy. It exceeds all other union of bodies civil, artificial, or natural."[114] Thomas Jacombe (1672) concurred, "Now this union is purely supernatural. What can Nature be imagined to do for the bringing about of such a thing as this? O surely tis all of the mere grace of God! As tis not natural for the matter of it, so neither is it so for the production and application of it. Tis supernatural as to the Thing, and also as to the Person to whom it belongs."[115]

Hobbes's commonwealth has much more in common with the body of Christ described above than with Aristotle and Cicero's body politic, in that his social organism is non-natural in its origin and wholly dependent upon one quasi-divine figure[116] for its very existence, life, and health. Hobbes's pointed allusions to the "mortal God" of his commonwealth and the "real unity" shared by all of them "in one and the same Person" merely confirm what his readers would already have inferred: that the essence and operation of Leviathan was greater than that of any other "merely political" body diminished by puritan pastors, that it was similar to the body of believers united in their one divine Lord, and Hobbes's political Sovereign was (like) that true King. At the same time, Hobbes affirmed Christ's *corpus mysticum* and even cited the apostle Paul as the source of that doctrine,[117] but wary of puritan efforts to mobilize the concept of Christ's

114. Thomas Jackson, *A Treatise of the Holy Catholic Faith and Church*, 1627, 18,20.

115. Thomas Jacombe, *Several Sermons on the Eighth Chapter of Romans* (London, 1672), 55.

116. Hobbes pointedly maintained that the sovereign of a commonwealth could be one person (monarchy), several persons (aristocracy), or the entire community (democracy), see *De Corpore Politco*, XX.3, XXI; *De Cive*, VII; *Leviathan*, XIX (pp.284-305). But he openly preferred monarchy (see *De Corpore Politco*, XXIV; *De Cive*, Preface, VII.14, X), and in his general political writing, referred to the sovereign as if he was one man. For simplicity's sake I have followed Hobbes's general usage throughout this dissertation.

117. *De Cive*, XVII.19.

mystical body against political and institutional approximations, he carefully explained that Christ's church body could be said to exist only "*in potentia*, [and] shall not actually be so before [believers] be separated from the reprobate and gathered together among themselves in the day of judgment."[118] In the interim, Hobbes obviously had no compunction about fashioning a similar body on earth, and his efforts to do so fully comport with his broader intention to make all spiritual and invisible entities tangible and visible, to bring God down into the civil sphere, and to create the kingdom of heaven on earth.[119]

1.3 Hobbes and the "real unity" of Christ: concluding thoughts

When in Chapter XVII of *Leviathan* Hobbes referred to the "real unity" of individuals embodied in their sovereign, this was probably not the first time that he utilized theological terminology about Christ's representation in order to explain political representation. Throughout his works, Hobbes describes the representative relationship as one in which individuals' wills are "involved" in their representative's will, or "reduced," or "virtually included" in that one will: all verbs that were consistently and conspicuously used in the theological literature of his time to describe the relationship between Christ and believers. For example, Hobbes wrote in *De Corpore Politico* (1640) that individuals are "*virtually* contained in the body of the commonwealth," and that their wills are

118. Ibid., XVII.22.

119. Hobbes treats the "kingdom of heaven" similarly to Christ's corpus mysticum: he insists that it is an eschatological reality and refers to the earthly commonwealth as the "kingdom of heaven" until then. See *Leviathan*, XXXV.13-14 (p.644) and XXXVIII.5,17 (pp.708,722), in which the Latin edition baldly states, "The kingdom of heaven is a commonwealth, instituted by men for the sake of security against the enemy."

"*virtually* in the sovereign."[120] The concept of so-called "virtual" representation would become popular in the political literature of the 18th century, but in the 17th century, "virtual" representation (especially with the suggestion of physiology) was the purview of Christology. Henoch Clapham (1606) said that Christ "dwelleth in his members *virtually*," such that his believers, "by reason of their union with Christ, are said to partake of the divine nature."[121] Thomas Taylor (1633) told his readers that they were "*virtual* members. . . .in respect of our head [Christ],"[122] and Henry Roborough (1643), quoting Cardinal Bellarmine on mankind's relationship to Adam, the prototype of Christ,[123] wrote, "Adam bare the person of all mankind. . . His will was ours, and therefore our transgression is ours: because he is not considered as one man, but as the root of mankind, in which we all were *virtually* included, and as Augustine saith, we all were that one man."[124]

As to the other terms, Hobbes used the word "reduced" in a somewhat peculiar manner twice in his works: once in *De Cive*, where he refers to a multitude being "*reduced* into one person,"[125] and then again in *Leviathan* Chapter XVII, in which he says that the sovereign representative is able to "*reduce* all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one

120. *De Corpore Politco*, XXI.1,11. See also XX.18 and XXI.5, emphasis added here and in the passages following.

121. Henoch Clapham, *A Manual of the Bible's Doctrine*, 1606, 46

122. Thomas Taylor, *Christ's Victory over the Dragon*, 1633, 462.

123. See Goodwin, *Christ Set Forth*, 58: "Observe that because Adam was in this his being a common person unto his, the shadow and the lively type of Christ, who was to come after him, that therefore he is called the 'first man' (of these two) and Christ, the 'second man,' as typified out by him."

124. Henry Roborough, *The Doctrine of Justification Cleared*, 1643, 83. See also Edward Kellett, *Miscellanies of Divinity Divided into Three Books* (Cambridge, 1634), 89: ". . . that sin of Adam, to which our will involvedly concurred. . . "

125. *De Cive*, VI.1.

will."[126] The context does not seem to comfoly support the conventional meaning of "reduce" (by which something is made smaller or condensed), and Robert Filmer (1680) flatly rejected Hobbes's formulation, declaring that, "" To reduce all the wills of an assembly by plurality of voices to one will' is not proper speech."[127] In Christian theology, however, that kind of speech was common. John Ball (1645) referred to Christ as "the Head and chief, to whom as an Head the unity of all the rest is *reduced*,"[128] and Richard Baxter (1671) wrote that, "if our wills were cured and *reduced* to God's will, we should find no fault with him."[129]

Hobbes's use of the last term — "involved" — is even more suggestive than his use of "reduced," not only because of the term's overt significance in 17$^{\text{th}}$-century literature on theological representation, but also because he so carefully defined it against other alternatives. In *Human Nature* (1640), he explained that "when the wills of many concur to some one and the same action or effect, this concourse of their wills is called consent'... [But] when many wills are *involved or included* in the will of one or more consenting, then is that involving of many wills in one or more called union.'"[130] This distinction between "consent" and "union" occurred frequently in theological discourses on Adam and original sin: James Wadsworth (1615) asked, "How can it be sin in infants who never had use of

126. *Leviathan*, XVII.13 (p.260).

127. Robert Filmer, "Observations upon Mr. Hobbes's Leviathan," in *Political Discourses of Sir Robert Filmer*, 1680, 170.

128. Ball, *The Covenant of Grace*, 39-40.

129. Richard Baxter, *God's Goodness Vindicated*, 1671, 54.

130. *Human Nature*, XII.7-8, repeated in XIX.6, emphasis added. For other passages in which Hobbes uses the term "involved" in this sense, see *De Corpore Politco*, XX.3, XXI.1, and *Leviathan*, XXII.10 (p.352), XL.2 (p.736).

will to give consent? It is answered: that original sin is on our behalf in some sort voluntary in Adam, in whose will and person all our persons and wills were *included*. For he was our Head, a public person representing all mankind."[131] Thomas Goodwin (1642) asserted that Adam and Christ "were both Common persons, that had the rest in like considerations *included and involved* in them. Adam had all the sons of men born into this world *included* in himself... and Christ the second man had all his elect *included* in him."[132] Goodwin related, "Hence [Christ's] will in offering up himself was *volunt* as *totius*, the act and will of the whole body, whose persons he sustained. Our wills were thereby *involved* in his will, [and] his act was our act."[133] Robert Tichbourne (1649) wrote that "it is the duty of saints in conformity to Christ their Head to have no will but the will of God... Doubtless it will be worthy of our pains to consider the benefits that do accrue to the souls of God's people in having their wills *involved* into the will of the holy God."[134]

Hobbes's "real unity" allusion to Christ's body in his *Leviathan* narrative on representation was obviously not an isolated or random occurrence; he consistently described political representation with terminology drawn from the theological discourses of his time on Christ's representation. This doctrinal influence deserves to be taken just as seriously as the metaphor of the body politic when analyzing and interpreting Hobbes's

131. James Wadsworth, *The Contrition of a Protestant Preacher*, 1615, 33. For other similar passages, see John Stalham, *Vindicae Redemptionis*, 1647, 43, Jean-Franois Senault, *The Christian Man*, 1650, 110, and John Collinges, *Five Lessons*, 1650, 17,77,137.

132. Goodwin, *Christ Set Forth*, 57-8: "Now if you ask wherein Christ was a Common person, representing us and standing in our stead, I answer [that] he had no other end to come down into this world, but to sustain our persons, and to act our parts, and to have what was to have been done to us, acted upon him."

133. Thomas Goodwin, *Christ the Universal Peace-Maker*, 1651, 36.

134. Robert Tichborne, *A Cluster of Canaan's Grapes, Being Several Experimented Truths Received through Private Communion with God by His Spirit*, 1649, 155.

philosophy, even if these features force us to rethink conventional assumptions about his alleged materialism and rationalism. The old-world image of the body politic, which evokes the notion of an organic and metaphysically rich group-identity, might be difficult to reconcile with Hobbes's primary interest in legal authorization and voluntarist consent, but it is not impossible to reconcile, especially if his political vision is understood in terms of an epic origin myth that has "before" and "after" scenarios: one typified by detached individualism, and the other by existential collectivism, with an ontological metamorphosis in between. My next chapter will explore this possibility in Hobbes's work by testing the limits of legal rationalism in his exposition on political representation and by investigating the clues indicating that Hobbes was aware of these limits and sought to transcend them. I will argue that he discovered in the theological resources prevalent in 17$^{\text{th}}$-century England a uniquely Christological variety of representation that allowed him to build upon his juridical foundation a powerfully metaphysical edifice that neither compromised nor negated the thoroughgoing legality of the whole.

Hobbes's larger philosophic structure seems to support the Christological framework without at the same time revealing anything about the sincerity of Hobbes's own personal convictions concerning Christ's representative role or Christianity in general, and therefore, careful not to make any presumptions about the state of Hobbes's inner heart or mind, I have chosen to rely exclusively upon his explicit affirmations and denials. Since Hobbes affirms rather than denies the concepts of both Christ's mystical body and of Christ as representative (unlike the Catholic concept of transubstantiation), he has given us little reason to *prima facie* ignore or dismiss possible allusions to either Christological

doctrine in his work. But given the metaphorical quality of Christ's church body, questions could be raised about the role of rhetoric in Hobbes's thought and the interpretive weight that should or should not be given to such a figurative (not to mention theological) analogy. But given the metaphorical quality of Christ's church body, questions could be raised about the role of rhetoric in Hobbes's thought and the interpretive weight that should or should not be given to such a figurative (not to mention theological) analogy. Chapter Three will review Hobbes's stance on rhetoric and metaphor, situate the "real unity" of Christ's body within that stance, and measure the psychological and political payoff of the doctrine, not only in Hobbes's work, but also in the theological literature of his time.

Using the doctrine of Christ's representation in the way that he did, Hobbes was very unlikely to persuade the puritans of his political ideas. As Cromwell's letter to Parliament demonstrates, there was a marked tendency among many pastors and theologians of the 17th century to aggressively block attempts to institutionalize the mystical body of Christ or personify Christ's uniquely representative role. A strong minority of Laudian Anglicans continued to maintain that the government structures of church and state ought to imitate the body of Christ, both in hierarchical offices and in one final representative "head," but they faced extreme popular pressure from advocates of Presbyterianism and Independency in both England and Scotland. Both sides of the debate fervently believed in the doctrines of Christ the Representative and his mystical body, but they marshalled those doctrines toward completely opposite political ends. Chapter Four investigates the range of 17th-century theological positions on the "real unity" of Christ's body and shows how two rival interpretations about the social applicability of "real unity"

rose to prominence and coincided with two rival political perspectives about the structure and extent of governmental authority. Hobbes's *Leviathan* reference to the "real unity" of his commonwealth is only one example of a general tendency among English Christians during the Civil War era to shape theological belief about Christ's representation into political ideals. Getting the referent of Hobbes's expression right — as an allusion to Christ's body rather than transubstantiation — opens an important window on England's 17^{th}-century crisis and shows how a fine doctrinal distinction about Christ's representative role may have had enormous political implications for both church and state.

CHAPTER 2

REAL UNITY AND THE LAW

Hobbes on Authorized Embodiment

The last chapter demonstrated that Hobbes's expression "real unity" was a 17$^{\text{th}}$-century theological term for the spiritual relationship between Christ and believers, closely associated with the metaphorical image of a living body. This referent seems consistent with the immediate context of Hobbes's passage in *Leviathan*, in which he describes the emergence of an embodied commonwealth constituted though the relationship of individuals with their god-like, sovereign representative. What seems slightly inconsistent with this image, however, is Hobbes's own theory of representation presented earlier in Chapter XVI of *Leviathan*, in which Hobbes describes the relationship between an author and representative agent as one that is purely formal and legal, rather than vital or immediate, as is suggested by the analogy of embodiment. His emphasis throughout *Leviathan* on the legal obligation between citizens and sovereign, ratified through voluntary consent, is at tension with his statement in Chapter XVII that the relationship between citizens and sovereign is "more than consent," and at odds with his persistent portrayals of the commonwealth as a substantive, organic community, rather than a mere individualist aggregation held together through formal contracts alone. There are, in short, two concepts of unity described in Hobbes's work — one purely legal, the other embodied — and the question is how (or if) Hobbes wanted them to be reconciled.

Many recent Hobbes scholars have determined that these two concepts are inherently incompatible and therefore irreconcilable. Noting the individualist premises that Hobbes introduces in his state of nature narrative, these scholars — from Gierke, MacPherson, and Oakeshott to Runciman and Skinner — have emphasized the legal rationalist underpinnings of Hobbes's theory of representation and regarded his commonwealth as a sophisticated network of isolated legal contracts between individuals and their sovereign. The machine analogy, which Hobbes briefly mentions in the introduction to *Leviathan*, has often been marshalled in support of this legalist interpretation, but the living body metaphor, used throughout *Leviathan* and all of his works, has generally been viewed with suspicion because it connotes a much greater (and some have said unsubstantiated) social unity than can be accounted for through formal authorization alone. Confident about Hobbes's firm commitment to the legality of the relationship between sovereign and citizens, scholars have concluded that his theory of representation consists of a purely legal exchange, and have rejected allusions to collective embodiment in Hobbes's text that seem to challenge this interpretation.

This chapter argues, however, that Hobbes's theory of representation is no less about embodiment than it is about legality, that these two aspects of his theory are distinct rather than contradictory, and that the 17$^{\text{th}}$-century theological context from which Hobbes's expression "real unity" was drawn provides a clue as to how he might have logically reconciled them. Pastors and theologians of his time-period spoke of Christ as representative of his people in two senses: the first, as a legal "surety" authorized through voluntary consent, and secondly, as the head and soul of the larger, embodied community,

through whom the community was generated and in whom the community was sustained. These dual aspects of Christ's representation led pastors to describe the relationship between him and believers as distant and contractual in one sense and immediate in another sense, as an arrangement of legal imputation on one hand and a synergy of interconnected existence on the other. The two facets were often distinguished from one another, and sometimes contrasted, but they were never considered to be contradictory. By mid- to late-century, theologians were able to provide fairly sophisticated analyses on the logical compatibility of what one Puritan pastor called "the real *and* legal union betwixt Christ and believers."[1]

Hobbes also elished a "real" and legal union between his sovereign and citizens, and he gave little indication that he regarded legality and embodiment to be incompatible. At the very least, his religious readers probably would not have balked at his juxtaposition of these concepts or found them to be contradictory, and at the most, it seems plausible to suggest that he was aware of the Christological precedent and found it useful for his political vision. Hobbes used an explicitly theological expression — "real unity" — to describe the representative relationship and depicted the commonwealth as a living body animated by the sovereign, a ubiquitous analogy in Christian theology for the essence of the church in Christ. If he was alluding to Christ's representation and had even a rudimentary sense of the contemporary theological literature on that subject, he probably would have presented political representation as simultaneously legal and embodied. Moreover, it would have made sense for him borrow these concepts for his political

1. John Brown, *Christ in Believers, the Hope of Glory* (Edinburgh, 1694), 58, emphasis added.

philosophy: Christ's representation was praised by pastors and theologians for its rational, legal validity, and prized for the immediate dynamism it brought to the community through each individual believer. The representation of embodiment was also considered to be additive to legal representation, not subtractive. Thus in adopting this understanding of representation, Hobbes would have been able to present to his readers a robust and substantive political community that did not at the same time threaten the power of the sovereign over citizens or undermine their legal obligation to him.

Many scholars have observed that Hobbes's legal arguments, while thorough and reasonable, are inadequate as a guarantee of security in the commonwealth and even less effective at fostering social unity or corporate solidarity in the commonwealth. The first part of this chapter reviews these scholarly assessments and measures Hobbes's concept of legal unity within the political community. His concept of "real" unity within the community has been rejected by many scholars because it does not seem to be derived from the concept of "legal" unity, nor does it easily or obviously harmonize with it. The second part of this chapter presents a 17^{th}-century theological context in which legal unity and real unity were considered to be complementary concepts, and in which legal representation was seen to initiate or command another type of transformative representation, in addition to the legal version. We have good reason to suspect that Hobbes was aware of this precedent and that he would have found it useful as a way to fortify his theory of political representation without subverting the legal formalism of his design. The third part of this chapter elaborates on the specific aspects of Christological representation that Hobbes might have found most attractive for his political thought, and draws out the theological

distinction between Christ's "legal" unity, which elishes a mere legal identification between Christ and believers, and his "real" unity, which creates a personal and moral identification between participants. Hobbes had good reason to claim this latter type of identification between sovereign and citizens, in addition to the legal identification, so that citizens would only feel more responsible for their sovereign's actions and more engaged in the community created through his person.

2.1 Hobbes's Legal Unity

From the very beginning, Hobbes's depiction of original individualism raised eyebrows. Bishop Bramhall (1657) loudly condemned his "pernicious principles and other mushroom errors,"[2] which was a reference to a memorable passage in *De Cive* in which Hobbes proposed, "Let us return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other."[3] Although this heuristic thought experiment would become a popular early-modern leitmotif and feature prominently in the work of Locke and Rousseau, Hobbes's early adoption of this methodology invited instant criticism from Aristotelian and Christian proponents of a *natural*, rather than *deliberate*, process of civil association. Hobbes only deepened the critique by explicitly rejecting Aristotle's principle of natural sociability and insisting instead that human beings have a congenital disposition

2. John Bramhall, *Castigations of Mr. Hobbes and Catching of Leviathan*, 1657, Preface.

3. *De Cive [1641], ed. Bernard Gert* (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1991), VIII.1.

against each other,[4] that they behave like wolves rather than bees,[5] and that they are virtually incapable of working and living together voluntarily without being forced to do so through fear of punishment.[6]

These allegations about human nature, along with Hobbes's evocative descriptions of the state of nature, have led many mid- to late 20$^{\text{th}}$-century political theorists to regard him as the forerunner of modern individualism (if not liberalism). Leo Strauss (1958) claimed that Hobbes's "extreme" individualism was "more uncompromising than that of Locke himself."[7] C.B. MacPherson (1962) thought that "individualism, as a basic theoretical position, start[ed] at least as far back as Hobbes... His postulates were highly individualistic."[8] David Gauthier (1969) asserted that "Hobbes may with reason be regarded as the bourgeois, or individualist political philosopher, par excellence."[9] Michael Oakeshott (1975) claimed that "Hobbes's individualism [was] far too strong to allow even the briefest appearance of anything like a general will."[10] Jean Hampton (1986) spoke of Hobbes's "radical individualism,"[11] and Alan Ryan (1988) stated, "That Hobbes was one

4. *Human Nature [1640;1650], ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford World's Classics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), XIV.3-4,12; *De Corpore Politico [1640;1650], ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford World's Classics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), XX.2; *De Cive*, I.2-3,6.

5. *Human Nature*, XIX.5; *De Cive*, Letter Dedicatory, V.5; *Leviathan, or The Matter, Form, and Power of A Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*, 1651, XVII.6-12 (pp.258-60). Chapters will be given in Roman numerals, followed by the Molesworth paragraph numbers. Page numbers for the Clarendon edition are given in parenthesis.

6. *Human Nature*, XIX.4,6; *De Cive*, V.4,6; *Leviathan*, XVII.2-5 (pp.254-8).

7. Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952). 156-7.

8. C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 1.

9. David P. Gauthier, *The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 90.

10. Michael Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 62.

11. Jean Hampton, *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge Univer-

of the begetters of modern individualism is widely asserted... Hobbes espoused a consistent (though not in all respects persuasive) form of individualism in intellectual, moral, and political matters."[12]

Quentin Skinner (1990-2000) reinforced this assessment in his analysis of Hobbes's concept of political representation by emphasizing the "systematically rationalist" underpinnings of the arrangement between authors and actors described in Chapters XVI and XVII of *Leviathan*.[13] Hobbes asserts in these passages that a sovereign representative of the commonwealth can be appointed through a process of separate authorizations from each and every individual within the state of nature. These authorizations are formal and contractual, giving the sovereign unqualified power to speak and act on behalf of each isolated individual. He or she cannot speak on behalf of them all together as one unified group, because they do not — and cannot — exist as a unified association unless and until they are all singly represented by one common agent.[14] That condition being satisfied, "a multitude of men are made one person," with a unity that originates and resides in the sovereign representative rather than the dissociated multitude. "For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one," wrote Hobbes.

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sity Press, 1986), 27.

12. Alan Ryan, "Hobbes and Individualism," in *Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1988), 81-105, 81.

13. Quentin Skinner, "History and Ideology in the English Revolution," in *Hobbes and Civil Science, 5th ed., vol. 3, Visions of Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 238-63. See also Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes on Representation," *European Journal of Philosophy* 13, no. 2 (August 2005): 155-84; Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes on Persons, Authors and Representatives," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 157-80; Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," in *Hobbes and Civil Science, 5th ed., vol. 3, Visions of Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 177-208.

14. *Leviathan*, XVIII.4 (p.266).

"And unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude."[15]

> Despite the care and precision in this last statement of Hobbes, the essence and status of civil unity in his commonwealth is still a perplexing matter for many scholars. The process of legal authorization does not require — and certainly does not create — a deep bond of social cohesion among individuals who contract together, nor is it clear how this authorization might elish even a merely *legal* union of them all. Hobbes's citizens certainly share one common representative, and in the performative moment in which the representative simultaneously speaks and acts on behalf of each one of them, the *effect* is one of unity. But the only real bond that exists between citizens is a precarious, pre-political agreement among them all to choose the same representative.[16] Neither this agreement nor the performative effect of simultaneous action quite rises to the level of even "legal unity. If there is any unity at all to be had through legal authorization, Hobbes could perhaps have called it "fictitious" or "artificial" unity, or even "false" unity, given the manner in which it effectively lies about objective reality, but on the basis of legal authorization alone, Hobbes probably had no business referring to his commonwealth as a "real" unity, and many theorists have explicitly questioned his decision to do so.[17]

15. Ibid., XVI.13 (p.250).

16. *De Homine [1658], ed. Bernard Gert* (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1991), XV.3; *De Cive*, V.7, VI.2,20, VII.7,18; *Leviathan*, XVII.13 (p.260), XVIII.1,3-4 (p.264-6), XXI.11 (p.336).

17. See Patricia Springborg, "The Paradoxical Hobbes: A Critical Response to the Hobbes Symposium, *Political Theory* , Vol. 36, 2008," *Political Theory* 37, no. 5 (2009): 684; Deborah Baumgold, "UnParadoxical Hobbes: In Reply to Springborg," *Political Theory* 37, no. 5 (2009): 692.

It would be easier to dismiss "real unity" as a mistake if Hobbes had not provided a wealth of rhetorical and philosophic support for the concept, not only in his recurring image of a living human body, but also in his definition of a "people" as opposed to a mere "multitude." Hobbes uses the term "multitude" in a fairly intuitive manner to depict a group of dissociated individuals, either in the pre-political state of nature or in the post-political breakdown of society.[18] He uses the term "people" to depict a group that is "one person" rather than many individuals: this concept is much less intuitive and it seems to rely upon an odd ontological transformation in which individuals become one, new, indivisible entity *while simultaneously remaining* separate individuals in another sense. Hobbes wrote in *De Cive* that "a multitude is no natural person. But if the same multitude do contract one with another... then it becomes one person... and is oftener called the people." Thus, "when we say the people wills, commands, or doth anything, it is understood that the city commands, wills and acts... but as oft as anything is said to be done by a multitude... that is understood to be done by many single citizens together."[19] Hobbes added, "Even in monarchies the people commands, for the people wills by the will of one man; but the multitude are citizens, that is to say, subjects." There are at least three conceptual categories described here — a multitude, a people, and a representative — and Hobbes often treats them as interchangeable entities or as identifications that can be held simultaneously: the individuals of the multitude, for instance, are simultaneously the people, and the representative is simultaneously the people as well, which seems to create a filtered identity between the multitude and the representative, etc.

18. *De Cive*, VII.16; *Leviathan*, XVIII.3 (p.264); XIX.18 (p.300). Hobbes also refers to the multitude as an "aggregate." See *De Corpore Politico*, XXI.2,11.

19. *De Cive*, V.1 (note), XII.8.

This is important because Hobbes thought that names, categories, and identities ought to accurately describe concrete and objective realities, rather than inventive fantasies of the mind.[20] He indefatigably worked toward clearer definitions, and he frequently cautioned against the cavalier creation of new words and names that in his estimation were often "senseless" and merely "invented by teachers to hide their own ignorance."[21] In one of his scientific works, Hobbes insisted that the name of a given entity should remain the same unless the entity itself were somehow to change in its ontological essence: "A human being, who, once eighteen inches tall, becomes three foot tall," would retain the name "human being," Hobbes explained, because the new measurements would only indicate that he was a different kind of human being. "If he be changed into a tree," however, "we say that the tree is generated and that the man perishes. The death of a body is that change which will render inapplicable the name the body bore previously."[22] The term Hobbes uses here — "generate" — is especially significant because it appears prominently in his "real unity" passage from Chapter XVII in *Leviathan*, along with a conspicuous name-change: "The multitude so united in one person is called a *commonwealth*, in Latin *civitas*. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God to which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defense." If Hobbes was adhering to his own principles regarding essences and names, then this line suggests that he intended for his "commonwealth" to be regarded as some kind of new

20. See *Human Nature*, V.14; *De Corpore Politico*, XXVII.13; *De Cive*, XIII.9; *Leviathan*, IV.13,24 (p.56,62), XVLI.2-3,16ff (pp.1052,1078ff); *De Corpore [1656], ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford World's Classics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), VI.15,19.

21. *De Homine*, X.3.

22. *Thomas White's De Mundo Examined [1642], ed. Harold Whitmore Jones* (London: Bradford University Press in association with Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1976), V.3. For a statement about "generation" vis-a-vis presuppositions about properties and essences, see *De Corpore*, I.4-5.

entity in its own right, generated from what was formerly known as the "multitude."

Quentin Skinner has expressed great interest in the precise nature of this newly generated entity,[23] which he calls a "purely artificial person," wrought from a "transformation" of the multitude.[24] Skinner defines this commonwealth as "an *apparent* abstraction" with a "shadowy existence" and "mysterious force,"[25] but he also repeatedly cautions that it is "but a word" without sovereign power behind it,[26] effectively leaving open the question of its objective substance. David Runciman has picked up this thread, admitting that "though [the commonwealth] seems to lack any *substantial* presence in the world of Hobbes's political philosophy, still it is unquestionably there, haunting the pages of *Leviathan* like a ghost."[27] Runciman is impressed by Hobbes's determination to depict a political entity that transcends "the random congruence of the multitude" even though — and perhaps because — Hobbes's "essentially juristic account of persons and things personated given in Chapter XVI is insufficient" to create such an entity.[28]

But many other theorists have been far less impressed by Hobbes's insinuations about a "real" state personality and have labored to correct this impression by exposing

23. Skinner speaks of procreation and christening. See "Hobbes on Representation," 178, "Hobbes on Persons, Authors and Representatives," 175, and "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," 198-9.

24. For this alleged "transformation" or "conversion," see "Hobbes on Representation," 170-1,175,177; "Hobbes on Persons, Authors and Representatives," 163-4,171,173; "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," 190,197-9,206,197.

25. "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," 177,202,204.

26. "Hobbes on Representation," 178; "Hobbes on Persons, Authors and Representatives," 174; "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," 177,201-4.

27. David Runciman, "Hobbes and the Person of the Commonwealth," in *Pluralism and the Personality of the State, Ideas in Context 47* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 6-33 at 18, emphasis added.

28. David Runciman, "What Kind of Person Is Hobbes's State? A Reply to Skinner," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2000): 268-78 at 272; Runciman, "Hobbes and the Person of the Commonwealth," 32.

what Gierke called the "purely external and formal" character of his commonwealth.[29] Oakeshott has argued, for instance, that "neither before nor after the elishment of civil association [in *Leviathan*] is there any such thing as the *people*," despite Hobbes's words to the contrary: "There is in this association no concord of wills, no common will, no common good; its unity lies solely in the singleness of the Representative, in the *substitution* of his one will for the many conflicting wills." According to Oakeshott, Hobbes's notion of juristic representation creates an illusion of political unity without actually bringing it to pass. "The common view," wrote Oakeshott, "is that though Hobbes may be an individualist at the beginning, his theory of civil association is designed precisely to destroy individualism. So far as the generation of civil association is concerned, this is certainly not true."[30] The fact that Hobbes expresses his association in terms of a legal contract is powerful evidence, for Oakeshott, that he only intended to "erect and maintain a sovereign' civil authority, not to unite covenanters in pursuit of a common substantive enterprise."[31]

Oakeshott categorized Hobbes's purely legal association as a *societas* rather than a *universitas* — which are terms originally used by Gierke to describe "two irreconcilable dispositions" concerning social and political unity.[32] *Universitas* is allegedly the older concept, dating back to the Middle Ages, and it envisions society as if it were a single (human) organism. "Analogically, *universitas* is not difficult to understand," states

29. Otto Friedrich von Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to 1800, trans. Ernest Barker* (Cambridge: University Press, 1934), 61.

30. Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, 61-2.

31. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford University Press, 1975), 232. See Baumgold, "UnParadoxical Hobbes," 692: "There is no sense that Hobbes saw unity as a desideratum."

32. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, 200-1. For another similar commentary on Gierke's terms, see Roger Scruton, "Gierke and the Corporate Person," in *The Philosopher on Dover Beach* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 56-73.

Oakeshott. "It is persons associated in a manner such as to constitute them a natural person; a partnership of persons which is itself a Person, or in some important respects like a person."[33] Although this formulation sounds fairly Hobbesian, Oakeshott follows Gierke in arguing that Hobbes's commonwealth is "in no sense a *universitas*," because apart from Hobbes's Sovereign, "the community is a loose heap of individuals, a disunited multitude."[34] According to Gierke and Oakeshott, Hobbes's commonwealth is more properly categorized as a *societas*: which is a more modern concept depicting "a formal relationship in terms of rules, not a substantive relationship in terms of common actions."[35] Ernest Barker attributed this concept to a "doctrinaire and individualistic liberalism" that leaves society "without either body or animating soul, [that] dissolves it into a nexus of contractual relations between the associate members... and forgets the pulsation of a common purpose which surges, as it were from above, into the mind and behavior of the members of any true group."[36]

Sensitive to Hobbes's persistent portrayals of the commonwealth as a human person, which seem hard to reconcile with this legal-rationalist assessment, many of the theorists above have noted the potential irony.[37] Gierke addressed the paradox head on, and tried to argue that Hobbes "built a bridge... from the conception of social organism to

33. Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, 203.

34. Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to 1800*, 61.

35. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, 201, 232.

36. Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to 1800*, lxi, from the Introduction by Barker.

37. Runciman, "Hobbes and the Person of the Commonwealth," 24: "At first sight, Hobbes's organic imagery, like his attribution to the state of its own personality, is hard to reconcile with Oakeshott's claim that the Leviathan is an unequivocal societas, for it was the corporate universitas, not the impersonal partnership, that was commonly described in corporeal terms."

that of mechanism," by ultimately "transforming his supposed organism into a mechanism, moved by a number of wheels and springs, and his man-devouring monster turned into an artfully devised and cunningly constructed automaton."[38] There are two problems with this interpretation, and the first one is that this alleged transformation from organism to machine never occurs explicitly in Hobbes's work, nor does it concur implicitly with his broader portrayal of the commonwealth. Hobbes only mentions the automaton once, within the introduction to *Leviathan*,[39] in order to emphasize the non-natural origin of his body politic, but he continued to refer to his commonwealth as a human organism in the introduction, throughout *Leviathan*, and in his later scientific works.[40] He also insisted that his commonwealth should be regarded as similar to an Aristotelian "body politic" in every sense except its creation and the locus of its "soul."[41] Hobbes was simply not as invested in the mechanical metaphor as he was in the body metaphor; thus interpretations that have Hobbes abandoning or rescinding the organic ontology of his commonwealth for something mechanical seem unsubstantiated.

Even if it were the case that Hobbes transformed the commonwealth from a body to a machine, Gierke does not explain why Hobbes would have needed to use the organic imagery in the first place. Runciman has acknowledged this difficulty in Gierke's interpretation and drawn attention to Gierke's bemusement at what he considered to be Hobbes's "conceptual and terminological confusion" concerning the commonwealth:

38. Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to 1800*, 53, 136.

39. *Leviathan*, Introduction (p.16).

40. For those later references, see *De Homine*, Preface, and *De Corpore*, I.9.

41. *Leviathan*, XLII.125 (p.916).

according to Gierke, Hobbes "did not need to fall back on organicism because his argument makes sense in purely mechanistic terms." Runciman comments, "Of course, this raises the interesting historical question of why Hobbes nevertheless chose to employ the imagery of the living body. But Gierke is not really interested in this point."[42] Hobbes's living body does indeed raise interesting questions, and they are probably not merely historical questions but fundamental, conceptual questions about the hard tension — if not contradiction — between individualism and collectivism, between law and spirit, and between legal realities and metaphysical realities. Hobbes's casual mix of these concepts should and has made interpretation of his thought more complicated, especially for modern scholars who are less familiar with the deeply theological context from which Hobbes almost certainly borrowed for his exposition on legal and "real" representation. In this sense then, the historical question raised by Runciman is of enormous importance for this conversation, as it may provide the key to understanding the intriguing relationship between legality and physiology in Hobbes's thought. For this particular issue, the 17$^{\text{th}}$-century theological context, in which Puritan pastors and theologians routinely discoursed on the legal and "real" representation of Christ, is the site of our historical investigation.

2.2 Christ's Legal versus Real Unity

The Puritans of Hobbes's era were Calvinists who believed in the absolute sovereignty of God to save sinners unilaterally, which ultimately earned them the epithet "deniers of free

42. David Runciman, "Gierke and the Genossenschaf,'" in *Pluralism and the Personality of the State, Ideas in Context 47* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 34-63 at 40.

will" — a damning assignation leveled at Thomas Hobbes as well. Despite the severity of their views on this subject, however, the Puritans shared with Hobbes a strong interest in individualist freedom, and they frequently balanced their unyielding vindications of God's sovereignty with equally forceful declarations about free consent. Rudolf Gwalther (1572), a Genevan pastor who had a lasting influence on Puritan exiles during the 16th century, called Jesus Christ "the author of true unity and consent,"[43] an assertion that anticipated what would become a recurring theme in Puritan literature on the redemptive relationship between Christ and each individual believer. Sometimes this theme of freedom could inhabit the same space as that of absolutism within the Puritan mentality, creating what might seem like a confusing clash of concepts: John Ball (1645) declared, for instance, that "the way whereby Christ enters upon his kingdom, is ever by conquest... and his people [are] themselves by nature rebellious, unwise, disobedient, until they be subdued and brought into subjection." Two lines later he asks, "But what then, doth Christ compel men to subject themselves unto him? In no sort... The people of Christ are free and voluntary, who offer themselves willingly unto the Lord, and yield themselves unto his service. Therefore they are said to come unto Christ, to run unto him, to serve him with a perfect heart, and a willing mind."[44] This easy compatibility between freedom and subjection in Christ, which was considered self-evident in Calvinist theology, closely resembles Hobbes's formulation of political freedom, in which he argues that voluntary consent is entirely consistent with necessity, coercion, and fear.

And like Hobbes, the Calvinists tended to explain and describe voluntary consent

43. Rudolf Gwalther, *One-hundred and seventy-five Sermons*, 1572, 689.

44. John Ball, *A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace*, 1645, 323-4.

in terms of a formal and legal exchange. "Without a doubt," wrote Anglican Thomas Tuke (1617), "the Lord Jesus Christ hath contracted and united himself unto his people, and is their head... So in this holy, happy, and spiritual contract and conjunction between Christ and all true believers, there is a mutual giving and taking of one another."[45] Returne Hebdon (1646) urged, "Consider the estate of the church of Christ in unity, universality, and free consent, that Jesus Christ is the head thereof."[46] James Durham (1685), a Scottish Presbyterian, insisted, "This union [between Christ and believers] is made up by mutual consent of parties, and the consent must be willing."[47] Sometimes this consent was compared to a formal and public exchange of wedding vows. "As the marriage union is made by the consent of both parties," wrote Henry Lukin (1660), "so is this union betwixt Christ and the soul. Christ hath given his consent by the offer and promise of the Gospel, and the soul consents when by faith it accepts this offer and lays hold on this promise."[48] Obadiah Sedgwick (1661), a prominent member of parliament's Westminster Assembly (1643-1653), stated that, "Two acts make up our union [with Christ]: I take you, saith Christ, and I take you, saith the Believer. I consent, saith Christ, and I consent, saith the Believer. This mutual consent makes the match or union."[49]

More often, though, this union was described as the result of a formal authorization of Christ as a substitutionary representative of individual believers, initiated and facilitated by God the Father. "Christ is the Public Person elected by God," declared

45. Thomas Tuke, *A Theological Discourse of the Conjunction of Christ and a Sincere Christian*, 1617, 30-1.

46. Returne Hebdon, *A Guide to the Godly*, 1646, 82.

47. James Durham, *The Unsearchable Riches of Christ* (Glasglow, 1685), 44.

48. Henry Lukin, *The Life of Faith*, 1660, 16-7.

49. Obadiah Sedgwick, *The Bowels of Tender Mercy Sealed in the Everlasting Covenant*, 1661, 194.

Paul Hobson (1647), one of Oliver Cromwell's army chaplains.[50] Another of his chaplains, Thomas Goodwin (1642), wrote, "Now if you ask wherein Christ was a Common Person, representing us, and standing in our stead, I answer [that] he had no other end to come down into this world, but to sustain our persons, and to act our parts, and to have what was to have been done to us, acted upon him."[51] "Christ is an Ambassador, sent by the Father into the world," stated pastor George Hutcheson (1657)[52] and Robert Bacon (1646)[53] explained this mission and role in catechistic detail:

> Q. Were we involved in Christ's death? A. Yes.
>
> Q. Had we a share too in his resurrection or release? A. Yes.
>
> Q. How? A. All that he is, he is to us.
>
> Q. How mean you? A. He is the head of the body.
>
> Q. What then? A. He was our representative.
>
> Q. How was Christ our representative? A. He transacted our affairs.
>
> Q. With whom? A. With God.

An anonymous treatise of 1697 asserted, "We doubt not, there is a commutation of Persons in a legal sense, Christ by consent between the Father and Him, putting on the Person, and coming into the room and stead of sinners."[54]

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50. Paul Hobson, *A Garden Enclosed, and Wisdom Justified Only of Her Children*, 1647, 82.

51. Thomas Goodwin, *Christ Set Forth in His Death, Resurrection, Ascension*, 1642, 57-8.

52. George Hutcheson, *An Exposition of the Gospel according to John*, 1657, 349.

53. Robert Bacon, *Christ Mighty in Himself and Members Revealed in Some Short Expressions by Way of Catechism*, 1646, 140.

54. Anonymous, *Remarks on a Paper*, 1697, 5. For a similar description of Christ as "the public person in the room of mankind," see Thomas Moore, *A Discourse about the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ*, 1646, 40.

The Puritans argued that this juristic exchange between Christ and the Father elished a *legal* identity and union between Christ and the individuals he was authorized to represent. Presbyterian Thomas Jacomb (1672) wrote that Christ "struck hands with God, put himself into [believers'] stead, took their debt upon himself, and bound himself to make satisfaction to God: now from this act of Christ there results a Legal or Law-Union betwixt Christ and believers." Jacomb proceeded to explain, "You know in Law the debtor and the surety are but one Person; the Law looks upon them as One and makes no difference betwixt them... So tis with Christ and us; he is our surety, for he took our debt upon himself... Upon this, Christ and we are but One Person before God, and accordingly he deals with us. For he makes over our sins to Christ, and also Christ's righteousness and satisfaction to us, he now (in a legal notion) looking upon both but as One person." Jacomb added, "This doth so exactly fall in with the common notion and case of suretyship amongst men that I need not further insist upon the illustration of it."[55] A similar argument had been made earlier by English Puritan Rowland Stedman (1684), who wrote, "There is a legal conjunction and oneness arising from a believer's reception of Christ: such an union as there is between the principal debtor and the surety, who hath paid the debt for him, and made over that payment unto him. The Law reckoneth them as one... Such an union there is between Christ and his people, and therefore we call it a legal union, because of the analogy it beareth unto the proceedings of Law in Courts of Judicature amongst men."[56]

So far, this concept of Christological representation seems to correspond fairly well

55. Thomas Jacomb, *Several Sermons Preached on Romans Chapter Eight*, 1672, 49-50.

56. Rowland Stedman, *The Mystical Union of Believers with Christ*, 1668, 134-5,159.

to Hobbes's concept of formal authorization insofar as it elishes a purely *legal* connection between Christ and believers. The "law-union" described above is an abstract, notional relationship created by the law, for the law, in order to regard two (or more) people as one person, and it neither requires, necessitates, or results in any other degree of unity between the parties involved. Thus if the bond between Christ and believers were no more than this law-union, it could be graphically portrayed in much the same way as Hobbes's concept of representation: one common agent who has a "particular"[57] relationship with each, single individual he represents, like spokes radiating out from a central hub. Even in the passages detailing Christ's law-union, however, there are indications that legality is not the only component of unity between Christ and believers. Just like Hobbes's account, the juridical descriptions quoted above are sprinkled with references to a "body" and to a physiological relationship between "head" and "members" that belie the legalistic context in which they appear and evoke a completely different type of union altogether. One Presbyterian pastor, Stephen Marshall, preached a sermon before the mayor of London in 1652 that pointedly distinguished between these two depictions: "As in the natural body," he declared, "all the members [of Christ's body] do not only meet in the head, as all the lines do meet in a center, and are One there, though they do not touch one another anywhere else; but they are all by the wonderful power and wisdom of God so contrived, and compacted, and joined together, that they have a *real union* one with another. So in this mystical and spiritual body, all the Saints have not only each for his own part a union and conjunction with Jesus Christ, but also a *real union* and conjunction one with another."[58]

57. *Leviathan*, XVI.13 (p.250).

58. Stephen Marshall, *A Sermon Preached to the Lord Mayor, April 1652: Wherein the Unity of the Saints with Christ, the Head, and Especially with the Church, the Body*, 1653, 2-3, emphasis added here and

This so-called "real union" — that also appeared prominently in Hobbes's commonwealth narrative from *Leviathan* (1651)[59] — was used to connote a physiology and an ontological identity with Christ and among believers that was impossible within a strictly "law-union." This special relation did not obviate or supplant the original, legal exchange, however, and in many theological discourses, such as those above, the two aspects were conflated. In other texts, more care was taken to distinguish the two modes of union with Christ. The influential early Puritan William Perkins (1603) wrote, "It may be demanded upon what ground [a believer] should say, I am crucified with Christ'? Ans. There be two reasons for this speech. One is, that Christ upon the cross stood not as a private person, but as a public person, in the room, place, and stead of the Elect; and therefore when he was crucified, all believers were crucified in him, as in the Parliament, when the Burgess gives his voice, the whole corporation is said to consent by him, and in him. The second reason is this: in the conversion of a sinner, there is a real donation of Christ, and all his benefits unto us, and there is a *real union*, whereby every believer is made one with Christ."[60] Presbyterian Henry Scudder (1631), a member of the Westminster Assembly, described "two bonds" by which "every true member of Christ is knit unto Christ" : one formed through the official decree of justification, which Scudder called a "relative union," and another bond called "the *real union* of the Spirit," by which believers received life and grace.[61] William Strong, a Puritan who frequently preached before Parliament during the 1650s, declared, "We must become one with Christ:

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throughout the chapter wherever "real unity" is cited.

59. *Leviathan*, XVII.13 (p.260).

60. William Perkins, *A Commentary on Galatians*, 1603, 141.

61. Henry Scudder, *The Christian's Daily Walk in Holy Security and Peace*, 1631, 698.

naturally, by receiving his spirit, and *voluntarily*, by consenting unto his covenant. And these two are the branches of our Union, without which it cannot be complete."[62]

This distinction between the two branches, or two bonds, of union with Christ was given greater intellectual scrutiny and increasing doctrinal sophistication during the second half of the 17th century. Comparisons and contrasts between the two unions were often amplified with explanations about the nature of the *relationship* between them. Puritan Thomas Warren (1654) wrote, "Although it be willingly acknowledged that Christ was a common person in his death, and a surety for all the Elect, and what he did was for them; yet this constitutes not the mystical union between Christ and us. This only rendered him capable of having our sins imputed to him and served to lay a foundation for our partaking in his righteousness, when we should be implanted into him by mystical union through faith... Christ as a public person, is a surety; but Christ as united to us, is a Head, which are different considerations: in the one he is a meritorious, moral cause of salvation, in the other a physical cause, or efficient natural cause."[63] Descriptions like this one implied that Christ's legal representation of believers might temporally precede their *real*, physiological relationship, but it was to be regarded as a necessary rather than sufficient component of corporate union.

Subsequent statements by other pastors and theologians made this clear, and also emphasized the relative superiority of Christ's *real* rather than *legal* relationship with believers: "It is not a legal union only," warned Presbyterian Thomas Case (1670), who had also been a prominent member of the Westminster Assembly. "Christ and the Believer

62. William Strong, *A Discourse of the Two Covenants*, 1678 [posthumous], 75, emphasis added.

63. Thomas Warren, *Unbelievers No Subjects of Justification, nor of Mystical Union to Christ*, 1654, 94,179.

are not One only as the debtor and surety are one in Law, in a forensic sense, i.e. in the interpretation and judgment of the Court. In this sense they are one indeed, viz. in the judgment of God, as a Judge, but not only so... Nor yet is it merely an Union of consent. The Believer is not one with Christ only by consent of wills... We acknowledge indeed Believers to be so far one with Christ, and that is a very sweet and precious union: to will and nill the same things, is an high degree of love and oneness. But to say no more of the Union betwixt Christ and his Saints is to say too little."[64] This statement echoes a sentiment delivered much earlier in 1635 by pastor Simon Birckbek, in which he defines the relationship between Christ and believers as "a greater and more *real union* than barely by consent and concord of will."[65] Moreover, it should be noted that Thomas Hobbes used this language almost verbatim in his description of political unity (1651): "[It] is more than consent, or concord; it is a *real unity* of them all, in one and the same person."[66]

The clearest and most extensive analysis on the relationship between Christ's legal and real representation was eventually given by a Scottish Presbyterian minister, Robert Ferguson, in a treatise entitled *The interest of reason in religion with the import and use of scripture-metaphors, and the nature of the union betwixt Christ and believers* (1675). "Though there be a Legal Union betwixt Christ and Believers," Ferguson wrote, "a Legal Union alone will not sustain the weight of all the Scripture-expressions which declare the mystery of our coherence with our Blessed Redeemer. A Legal Union I not only grant,

64. Thomas Case, *Mount Pisgah, or, A Prospect of Heaven*, 1670, 25-6. See also John Flavel, *The Method of Grace*, 1681, 32: "The Saints Union... is not a federal Union, or an Union by Covenant only. Such a Union indeed there is betwixt Christ and believers, but that is consequential to and wholly dependent upon this [real Union]."

65. Simon Birckbek, *The Protestants' Evidence*, 1635, 77: "... in respect of our mystical union with [Christ] and his body, whereby we become members of Christ's body, and quickened by his spirit."

66. *Leviathan*, XVII.13 (p.260).

but assert; only I say that the whole of a Believer's Union with Christ is not comprehended in it. Two things then I am to prove: 1) that there is such an Union between the Lord Jesus Christ and the Elect of God, as may be styled a Legal Union, and 2) that this is not all the Union which intercedes between Him and Believers."[67] Ferguson went on to describe the legal logistics of Christ's relationship with believers, stating, "The Law Union between the Redeemer and us is the emergency and result of a Federal Pact between the Father and the Son... Christ's suffering in our stead, and being punished for our sins, as well as the whole efficacy of his death and merit of his passion, bear upon an antecedent contract between the Father and him. And this Agreement which Divines call the Covenant of Redemption, is the foundation of that Legal Union between Christ and us."[68] Ferguson concluded that this was "all that we intend by a Legal Union with Christ, [and] he must not only disclaim Christ's being Mediator in any proper sense, but renounce the whole Gospel that denies it."[69]

Ferguson again denied, however, that the union between Christ and believers was merely, or even *primarily*, legal, and he gave two major reasons for this stance: "First, there are many Scripture texts manifestive of an Oneness that the Saints have with Christ which a Legal Union doth not come up to the heighth and grandeur of... Who can think that a Legal Union is all that the Holy Ghost intends by our being one Spirit with the Lord, and being engrafted into Him as branches are into a stock or root; cemented to Him as the building is to the foundation; incorporated with him as our ailment and food is with

67. Robert Ferguson, *The Interest of Reason in Religion*, 1675, 534.

68. Ibid., 535,537.

69. Ibid., 559.

our fleshly substance; ligued and connected to him as the Bodily Members are to their Natural and Vital Head? I know all these expressions are metaphorical, yet I also know that they must be declarative of something that is not only *real*, but whose greatness it is not easy to conceive. As the variety of metaphors which the Spirit makes use of to decipher it by declare its importance, so the quality of them serves to intimate that it is not merely a Legal Union." With especial respect to the metaphor of the body, Ferguson added that if there were really no other kind of unity between Christ and believers than legal, "there could not be a symbol worse chosen to express it."[70]

The second reason given by Ferguson on behalf of *real* union had to do with the self-evident conceptual demarcation between the "hugely different" notions of "legal union" and "spiritual union" in Christ, necessitating a categorical acknowledgement of the latter in addition to the former: "That the idea which we have of the one is distinct from that which we have of the other, appears in that our Legal Union implies a relation to Christ as our High Priest and Sponsor, interposing and acting on our behalf towards God; whereas our Mystical Union respecteth Him as acting to us in the quality of a Vital Head... Those things are different," claimed Ferguson, "whereof the one is the meritorious fruit as well as consequent to the other... Our spiritual Union is a purchased fruit of what Christ as substituted in our room, and so one with us *in conspectu curiae*, did and suffered. Yea, the honor of being Heir of all things, and Head of Influence to the Redeemed, is a reward of what Christ underwent and performed as our Surety, in the relation of which he stood Legally United to us."[71] This is a complex passage and a complex set of concepts, but

70. Ibid., 560-1.

71. Ibid., 561-3.

Ferguson seems to be suggesting, first, that the thematic divide between "legality" and "physiology" is a manifestation of a deeper, substantive divide between the reality of a formal, official union versus a spiritual, or "mystical" union. Ferguson is arguing, secondly, that both of these bonds are necessary and essential components to the representative relationship between Christ and believers, and thirdly, Ferguson is attempting to logically juxtapose and reconcile the two unions such that one type (the legal) is seen to initiate or *command* a genuine metaphysical unity, while the other (the mystical) actually brings it to fulfillment.

While these concepts may still seem opaque, especially to those who are unfamiliar with doctrinal terminology used during the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century, there is an obvious philosophic depth and sophistication in Ferguson's analysis of the relationship between legal and mystical representation that is sometimes missing — or rather, *assumed* — in the earlier theological work from English pastors and theologians. The Scots of the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century tended to frame their religious and political institutions around the concept of "covenant," and were considered experts on all matters related to compacts and contracts, which quickly earned them the description "Covenanters."[72] Their discourses on Christ's representation often had a greater clarity and efficiency than those of their English counterparts, especially later in the century, but in substance, the pastors and theologians of both countries were in complete agreement about the dual aspect of Christ's representative role, as well as the respective types of unity that were derived from them. For instance, Samuel Rutherford, a prominent Scottish Presbyterian invited by Parliament

72. See James King Hewison, *Covenanters: A History of the Church in Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution* (Glasglow: John Smith and Son, 1908).

to the Westminster Assembly, gave a taut statement explaining this relationship in a treatise of 1655, declaring "There is a twofold imputation: one legal, [and] another which for doctrine's cause we call application or *real* (though the legal imputation be also real; but not to us as the former)."[73] In the same year, Thomas Lyford, an English vicar who was also nominated to the Westminster Assembly, delivered a similar statement: "Christ and a Christian are linked together in covenant," he wrote, "and have given themselves each to other, first freely, secondly fully... We take him with full consent to be our Lord and King, [and] this bond by mutual covenant and consent, makes us very nigh each to other. But though this be much, yet this is not all: there is a further degree of Union between Christ and a Christian... It is a spiritual and *real Union*, whereby Christ and a Believer are knit together. Our very Persons, Soul and Body, are coupled to the Person of Christ by the same Holy Ghost, which dwelleth in him and in us."[74]

The Puritans of both countries believed that there was an enormous difference between Christ's *legal* union and his *real* union with believers, reflected in the contrasted heuristics of the courtroom and the living, human body. Hobbes emphasized both of these themes in his own work, and scholars have been right to acknowledge and emphasize the inherent conceptual dissonance between them. The interpretive assumption, however, that this dissonance indicates a contradiction, such that one of the two themes should or must be regarded an irony or a mistake, is not accurate, and an investigation of the theological context in which Hobbes's work was situated makes this clear. His description of a real unity which was "more than consent" would have been understood, not as a repudiation of

73. Samuel Rutherford, *The Covenant of Life Opened*, (Edinburgh, 1655), 206.

74. William Lyford, *The Plain Man's Senses Exercised to Discern Both Good and Evil*, 1655, 116.

consent or legality, but as an affirmation and amplification of consent and legality; his thoroughgoing juridical formulations would have been read, not as preclusions, but as prerequisites, of metaphysical realities. The theological tradition of his time-period openly portrayed Christ's representation in precisely these terms, often without any explanation given. Explanation was not considered necessary: the legal and real union of Christ was a commonplace in England during the early 17$^{\text{th}}$ century, even if it is not now. Recovering this understanding may be the key to reconciling the legal and real unity of Hobbes's commonwealth.

2.3 Two concepts of unity and representation

The 17$^{\text{th}}$-century theological distinction between legal and real unity is part of a larger dichotomy between legal and embodied representation — or to put it another way, between what we might call "substitutionary" versus "participatory" representation. Substitutionary representation entails a simple replacement of one person or entity for another, such that only one of the two figures is present at any given time. It is a formal and sometimes legal authorization, frequently referred to as "deputyship." Participatory representation, conversely, could be seen to entail a certain kind of metaphysical relationship between the two figures such that both are (virtually) present as one. In this latter version of representation, which was often described in the medieval and early-modern periods in terms of "embodiment," actions are not just imputed by law from the agent to the author, but are actually performed by both agent and author in one combined movement. In this scenario, the author's ownership of the given action is more

immediate and deeply felt, insofar as it is in fact truly their own action performed by them personally, rather than someone else's distant action imputed by law.

Given the intensified sense of ownership evoked by participatory representation, and Hobbes's interest in strengthening the obligation of citizens to their sovereign, it seems likely that he would have considered adopting this variety of representation into his political philosophy. At the very least, he would have been wary of participatory representation as a potential foil to legal, substitutionary representation, in a similar way that he regarded God's invisible power to be stronger than man's visible power and thus potentially prejudicial to it. If the two types of representation were inherently incompatible, and if Hobbes had to choose between them for his political vision, he would probably have favored legal, substitutionary representation over embodied, participatory representation; he simply was more comfole with political rather than spiritual realities. If, however, he did not regard the two varieties of representation to be incompatible, he would have had good reason to utilize them both, if only to neutralize the potential threat of embodiment to legality.

Combining these two varieties would have been entirely in keeping with 17^{th}-century theological precedent, in which legality and embodiment were considered necessary and compatible components of Christ's divine representation. Pastors and theologians attributed Christ's actions to believers in both senses — as actions imputed to them legally, as well as actions they performed by themselves through Christ — sometimes without making clear which relationship was being described at any one moment. "By virtue of [Christ's] union," declared William Perkins (1603), "the cross and passion of

Christ is as verily made ours as if we had been crucified in our own persons."[75] Despite the evocative effect of crucifixion attributed physically in this passage, the ambiguous conjunction "as if" leaves open the possibility that Perkins was simply describing a strictly substitutionary action imputed to believers rather than a participatory action of them all, and a legal union between Christ and believers rather than a "real" union. As shown in the last section, theologians often spoke of the pure formality of Christ's substitutionary atonement, not to deny the immediacy of Christ's relationship with believers, but to emphasize the objective and official validity of Christ's work on their behalf. As Thomas Goodwin (1642) explained, "Christ took all other relations for us — as of an Husband, Head, Father, Brother, King, Priest, Captain, &c. — that so the fullness of his love might be set forth to us, in that what is defective in any one of these relations, is supplied and expressed by the other," and in this sense, "God ordained Christ to take and sustain [the] relations of a Surety and a Common Person, in all he did for us, thereby to make our justification by him the more full and legal; and justify (as I may so speak) our Justification itself or his justifying of us, by all sorts of legal considerations whatever that hold commonly among men in like case."[76]

This legal, courtroom-style representation, in which Christ's actions were attributed to believers in a formal, distant, and substitutionary manner, was often amplified with participatory, embodied representation, in which Christ's actions were shared with believers rather than merely imputed to them. Anglican bishop Joseph Hall (1628) delivered a sermon before Parliament in which he asserted:

75. William Perkins, *A Commentary or Exposition, upon the Five First Chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians*, 1603, 141.

76. Thomas Goodwin, *Christ Set Forth in His Death, Resurrection, Ascension*, 1642, 49.

> The arms and legs take the same lot with the head. Every believer is a limb of [Christ's] body: how can he therefore but die with Christ, and in him? That real union, then, which is betwixt Christ and us, makes the cross and passion of Christ ours... by virtue whereof, we receive justification from our sins and true mortification of our *corruptios*. Every believer therefore is dead already for his sins, in his Savior. He needs not fear that he shall die again. God is too just to punish twice for one fault, to recover the sum both of the surety and the principal.[77]

Hall's mixed metaphors here, of the courtroom and the living body, indicate where and how he shifts between legal representation — with its formal substitution of surety on behalf of the principal debtor — and embodied representation, in which Christ's fate is existentially shared with believers, just like death experienced by the head must also be experienced by the limbs. Thomas Goodwin (1651) wrote that "Christ's will in offering up himself was voluntary and total: the act and will of the whole body, whose persons he sustained. Our wills were thereby involved in his will, his act was our act, and it may truly be said that a covenant of peace was then made before God, BY US, and for us."[78] This language of profound "involvement," which Hobbes utilizes in several passages from *Human Nature* (1640) and *De Corpore Politico* (1640),[79] was unique to 17th-century theological discourses on Christ's representation and also Adam's representation in the fall of mankind: English priest James Wadsworth (1615) asserted, "Original sin is on our behalf in some sort voluntary in Adam, in whose will and person all our persons and wills were included: for he was our Head, a public person representing all mankind, our first root whereof all the branches must savor, and our general father in whom we are all so

77. Joseph Hall, Sermon Preached at Westminster, on the Day of the Public Fast (April 5, 1628) to the Lords of the High Court of Parliament and by Their Appointment Published, 1628, 113-4.

78. Thomas Goodwin, *Christ the Universal Peace-Maker: Or, The Reconciliation of All the People of God, notwithstanding All Their Differences, Enmities*, 1651, 36 (emphasis in the original).

79. See *Human Nature*, XII.8, XIX.6; *De Corpore Politico*, XX.3, XXI.11.

comprised that what he did, it was also our deed."[80] When describing the imputation of "original sin" to humankind, theologians such as Wadsworth were careful to emphasize the participatory nature of Adam's action in part to prevent anyone from thinking that they themselves were not technically guilty of his crime, and that it had merely been imputed to them — perhaps unfairly. Participatory, embodied representation ensured that Adam's sin was not only attributed to his future progeny as in a legal sense, but also personally experienced and willed by them as well.

Jesus Christ was regarded as the "second Adam" in that his representation operated by exactly the same principle and (happily) involved believers in a much different performance. Humphrey Chambers (1652), a Puritan who occasionally preached before Parliament, related:

> Christ is made so one with a Christian, and a Christian with Christ, that there is no more distinction between them in this unity, then there is between the head and a member... So that if the law, sin, death, or the devil come to a believer, to accuse, terrify, or condemn him, he (because of this most real and near union with Christ) may reply in truth, and say, It is not I. I am not I, I am through faith become a member of Christ, and I am he, and he is I; and if you have anything to say, say it to the Person himself, for I am but a Member, and *do live in his Person.*[81]

This last phrase, to "live in his Person," calls to mind Hobbes's frontispiece from *Leviathan*, as well as various passages from that work in which Hobbes forecloses the possibility of political resistance, not only because each individual citizen had legally authorized the sovereign, but also because in some sense, each individual had become part of the sovereign: they had a shared identity, a shared will, and a shared fate. The physiological analogy illustrated this relationship well, both for Hobbes and for

80. James Wadsworth, *The Contrition of a Protestant Preacher*, 1615, 33.

81. Humphrey Chambers, *Animadversions*, 1652, 48 (emphasis added).

17th-century theologians, providing a rhetorical counterpoint to the analogy of legal surety. John Sadler (1664), a Puritan lawyer who was at various times a friend of Oliver Cromwell, a Member of Parliament, and the Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, declared, "[Christ] is become the Head of the Body. And till this be wrought in us, we do not act, but are acted by some other: not by an inward principle of Life and Motion."[82] Christ's purely legal representation created a scenario in which believers were "acted upon" by a formal and distant imputation, but with the addition of Christ's embodied representation, believers were given an agency that they otherwise lacked and made authors of Christ's actions in a deeper, more profound sense.

There is a conspicuous resemblance between Sadler's statement about Christ's embodiment and Hobbes's memorable depiction of the Sovereign as the "public soul, giving life and motion to the commonwealth,"[83] in whom the citizens seem to personally act rather than be acted upon. Hobbes said that when the sovereign dies, he leaves the multitude of individuals "without any representative in whom they should be united and be capable of doing any one action at all,"[84] a statement that indicates Hobbes located the unity of citizens in the very person of the sovereign and suggested that within the sovereign, they themselves were capable of acting. These points are worth noting and emphasizing, because they challenge the scholarly assumption, made by Oakeshott and many others, that Hobbes presented political representation as a purely legal imputation of action between sovereign and citizens, rather than a symbiotic amalgamation of identity

82. John Sadler, *Christ under the Law: With the Times of the Gospel, and Fullness Thereof*, 1664, 3-4.

83. *Leviathan*, XXIX.23 (p.518). See also XXI.21 (p.344), XXIX.15 (p.512), XLII.125 (p.916).

84. Ibid., XXIII.4 (p.378), XXVII.37 (p.478), XXIX.6 (p.502).

and will. Skinner and Runciman have widened this alleged distance between sovereign and citizens still further by suggesting that political union occurs, not in the person of the sovereign, but in the person of the *commonwealth*, which they portray as a shadowy entity completely separate from either the citizens or the sovereign. According to this interpretation, the sovereign is the "mere representative"[85] of the commonwealth, and this relationship is in no sense indicative of a "real group personality" or an "organic unity" in which the will of the commonwealth becomes identical with the will of the sovereign: according to Skinner, the only identification possible between the commonwealth and the sovereign is one which is formal and legal.[86] The evidence for this interpretation is derived from Hobbes's repeated descriptions of the sovereign as one who "beareth the person"[87] of the commonwealth and is therefore the "representative of the commonwealth."[88]

This language, isolated from other statements Hobbes makes about representation and the commonwealth, does indeed suggest that the relationship between the sovereign and the commonwealth could be considered a formal, distant, and predominantly legal affair, but Chapter XXVI of *Leviathan* suggests that this is only a possible inference and only one of many representative scenarios. Hobbes says in that chapter, "To personate, is to act, or *represent himself*, or another; and he that acteth another, is said to bear his person, or act in his name; in which sense Cicero useth it where he says... I bear three

85. See Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes on Representation," *European Journal of Philosophy* 13, no. 2 (August 2005): 155-84 at 177-8; Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes on Persons, Authors and Representatives," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's* Leviathan*, ed. Patricia Springborg* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 157-80 at 173-4; Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," in *Hobbes and Civil Science, 5th ed., vol. 3, Visions of Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 177-208 at 200-1.

86. Skinner, "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," 201.

87. *Leviathan*, XVII.14 (p.262), XXIV.17 (390).

88. Ibid., XXIII.4 (p.378), XXVII.37 (p.478), XXIX.6 (p.502).

persons; *my own*, my adversary's, and the judge's."[89] If by Hobbes's logic it is possible to "bear" and represent your own person, then the passages defining the sovereign as the "representative" of the commonwealth do not necessarily indicate that the sovereign and the commonwealth are to be regarded as separate, independent entities, although that is certainly a possible inference; rather, they are ambiguous statements that require elucidation from other passages. One such text is in Chapter XXVI, where Hobbes asserts, "The commonwealth is no person, nor has the capacity to do anything, but by the representative (that is, the sovereign)."[90] Since Hobbes previously explained that the commonwealth was generated as a person,[91] this text seems to imply that the commonwealth does not exist at all apart from the sovereign. As if to underline this identification, Hobbes often uses the terms "sovereign" and "commonwealth" interchangeably: he writes, "To those laws which the sovereign himself, *that is, which the commonwealth* maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be subject to the commonwealth, *that is to the sovereign representative, that is to himself*, which is not subjection but freedom from the laws."[92] In Chapter XXVI Hobbes states, "In all courts of justice, the sovereign *(which is the person of the commonwealth)* is he that judgeth,"[93] and in the climactic Chapter XVII passage depicting the generation of the commonwealth, Hobbes unequivocally declares, "In him [the sovereign] consisteth the essence of the commonwealth" — a statement that describes so close an identification between the

89. Ibid., XVI.3 (p.244), emphasis added.

90. Ibid., XXVI.5 (p.416).

91. Ibid., XVII.13 (p.260).

92. Ibid., XXIX.9 (p.504), emphasis added. See also XXIV.7 (p.390): "For seeing the sovereign, that is to say, the commonwealth (whose person he representeth)... "

93. Ibid., XXVI.7 (p.422), emphasis added.

sovereign and the commonwealth, it almost sounds like equivalency.

Numerous statements of Hobbes directly identify the will of the sovereign with the will of the commonwealth. "In a monarchy," he wrote in *De Cive*, "the civil will and natural will are all one."[94] Hobbes reiterates this point in *Leviathan*: "Where the public and private interest are must closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public."[95] Later in the work, he implies that the wills of the sovereign and the commonwealth are effectively identical: "All laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and force from the will of the commonwealth; *that is to say, from the will of the representative.*"[96] And in one of his most clear statements on this matter, drawn from *De Cive*, Hobbes defines the one will of the commonwealth (or "the people") and equates its essence with that of the king:

> The people is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action can be attributed. None of these can properly be said of a multitude. The people rules in all governments, for even in monarchies, the people commands, for the people wills by the will of one man; but the multitude are citizens, that is to say subjects... In a monarchy, the subjects are the multitude, and (however it may seem a paradox) *the king is the people.*[97]

It is possible that Hobbes was merely describing in this passage a legal substitutionary relationship between the king and the people, such that the king could be said to be the people in the sense that he stood for them legally. But with the word "paradoxical," Hobbes seems to signal that he is asserting something far more cryptic. His parallel implies that the king is related to the people in the same sense that the subjects are related to the

94. *De Cive*, VII.14. It is a little unclear why this would not also be the case for an aristocracy or democracy; Hobbes's reasoning on this point seems opaque.

95. *Leviathan*, XIX.4 (p.288).

96. Ibid., XXVI.10 (p.420).

97. *De Cive*, XII.8 (emphasis added).

multitude. This latter relationship appears to be a tautology in that it essentially renames the same entity (multitude for subjects), and if this is so, Hobbes would then have been claiming that the king ought to be identified with the people in the same sense. Using the terms introduced at the beginning of this section, Hobbes's statement could then be interpreted as suggesting that the king represents the people — not merely in a legal, substitutionary sense, as suggested by Skinner — but in a participatory sense, according to which we might say that the king embodies the people, that they make up one combined entity, and that the actions of one are fully and personally performed by the other.

This possible relationship of participatory identification between sovereign and commonwealth is extended by Hobbes to the isolated individuals of the multitude as well. He says of them, "They have every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person, and therefore if they depose him, they take from that which is his own."[98] What is remarkable in this passage is the double-ownership of the commonwealth as a "person" that simultaneously belongs to each isolated individual and to the sovereign representative as well. The shared participatory, performative ownership of this one person seems to be automatically reproduced and extended to the relationship between the sovereign and each individual as well. Hobbes frequently reminded his readers that the Sovereign directly represented, not just the person of the commonwealth, but each and every individual as well: "The sovereign, in every commonwealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects."[99] Because of these many personal connections, each separate individual could in some sense claim that they were part of the sovereign, in word, deed and psychology, such

98. *Leviathan*, XVIII.3 (p.264).

99. Ibid., XXII.5 (p.350). See also XVIII.1 (p.264) and XIX.1 (p.284): "... the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude."

that, "He that complaineth of injury from his sovereign complaineth of that whereof he himself is author, and therefore ought not to accuse any but himself; no nor himself of injury, because to do injury *to one's self* is impossible."[100] Again, it is possible to understand this passage to be positing a merely legal authorship by the citizen of their sovereign's action, but the reference to "one's self," and the sense of existential self-preservation evoked by it, suggests that Hobbes might have been assuming an embodied, participatory authorship. He insisted that every single act made by the sovereign "is the act both of himself *and of all the rest*, because done *in the Person*, and by the right of every one of them in particular." He writes, "For of the act of the sovereign every one is author, because he is their representative unlimited... Every member of the body is author of it."[101] Passages such as these strongly suggest that Hobbes was encouraging citizens to consider themselves authors of their sovereign representative, not merely by legal authorization and consent, but also by an existential interrelation through which they inhabited the same space, constituted the same being, and willed and acted as one.

Hobbes's expression "real unity" corroborates this possibility, because in 17th-cenutury Christology, this term evoked precisely the dynamic described above: a coalescence of persons and wills, and thus a directly shared accouility for all actions performed. The term actually fell under suspicion by certain theologians because the metaphysical relationship connoted by it elished so deep an identity between participants that it often seemed to imply an ontological fusion of essences and natures — which not only eradicated individuality, but even more problematic for Christianity, erased the

100. Ibid., XVIII.6-7 (p.270), emphasis added.

101. Ibid., XVIII.4 (p.266), XXII.9 (p.352), emphasis added.

important distinction between Christ's divine nature and believers' human natures. Over-zealous statements about "real unity" sometimes insinuated that believers could be deified with Christ because of their existential relationship with him: one devotional tract (1632), for instance, heavily inflected by an Eastern Orthodox (mystical) style of theologizing, stated that "God, who is called the *Deus noster ignis consumens est*, is united to our Soul *per se*, really, and receiving the same into himself, reduceth it to a being supernatural, and deified, in so much as it seems to be nor more a Soul but God himself: a verity which St. John publisheth when he saith, we shall be like unto him."[102] Suggestive statements such as these led many theologians to initiate a counter-literature effectively distancing the concept of "real unity" from any accusation of ontological equivalency. "True it is," wrote Henry Nicols (1653), "there is a *real*, relative union betwixt Christ and a believer... but to dream of such an union as shall render us Goded and Christed (where it is said that the Elect are partakers of the divine nature) is high blasphemy."[103] John Goodwin (1642) took on the very metaphor of the body and reasoned, "There is a *real union* and communion between the head and the feet in the same natural body, yet is not the head made the brain or feet by imputation."[104] Thomas Jacombe (1672) explained, "Believers are united to Christ, but yet not so that they are changed or transformed into the very essence of being of Christ (so as to be Christed with Christ, as some too boldly speak), or that he is changed or transformed into the essence and being of Believers... Christ is Christ still, and Believers are but creatures still (notwithstanding this Union);

102. M. de (Jean-Puget) La Serre, *The Sweet Thoughts of Death, and Eternity*, 1632, 88.

103. Henry Nicols, *The Shield Single against the Sword Doubled*, 1653, 47-8. See also Ministers of Oxford, *An Account given to the Parliament*, 1647, 43.

104. John Goodwin, *Imputatio Fidei*, 1642, 196. See also Paul Baynes, *A Commentary on Ephesians*, 1618, 397.

though they be *really* and nearly united, yet both keep their natures distinct, and are the same after the Union that they were before it." Jacombe added, "You may take a lower resemblance of it (if you please): in man there is a near Union between soul and body, and these two united make up the man. Yet upon the union the Soul is not turned into the nature of the Body, nor the Body into the nature of the Soul. They are not confounded though united, they yet retain their essence and properties distinct: the Soul is the Soul still, and the Body is the Body still. So it is in the Union between Christ and Believers."[105]

Richard Baxter, one of the most prominent English Puritans of the 17th century, was so wary of the insinuation of ontological equivalence with Christ that he consciously avoided the expression "real unity" and preferred the alternate term "relative unity." In 1650 he wrote of Christ's relationship with believers, "A Real Conjunction we may expect, and a true Union of Affections, a Moral Union, and a true Relative Union, such as between the members of the same political body and the Head, yea such as between the husband the wife, who are called one flesh, and a real communion and Communication of Real Flavors, flowing from that Relative Union. If there be any more, it is acknowledged unconceivable and consequently unexpressable, and so not to be spoken of." He cautiously conceded, "If any can conceive of a proper *Real Union* and Identity, which shall neither be a unity of Essence nor of person with Christ (as I yet cannot), I shall not oppose it: but to think of such an Union were High Blasphemy."[106] Five years later, he confessed, "I know that Caspar Streso [a Dutch Reformed theologian] and divers others do place [Christ's

105. Jacomb, *Several Sermons on Romans*, 45-6. See also Benjamin King, *The Marriage of the Lamb*, 1640. 7-9: "Believers are distinct persons and distinct from the person of Christ, yet by one and the same Spirit, abiding in Christ and believers, they become one."

106. Richard Baxter, *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*, 1650, 27-8.

union] in an unconceivable, unexpressable medium between Relative Union and Physical Union, which yet must be called a *Real Union*: I will not now stand on this... but I am very fearful of coming so near, as to make Christ and sinners one real Person, lest blasphemously I should deify man and debase Christ."[107] By 1682, Baxter was sufficiently reconciled to the expression and concept to briefly state, "Of [believers'] Union with relation to the Lord Jesus: the Union betwixt Head and Body is a *real*, near Union [and] cannot be separated, but by the Destruction of the whole."[108]

Baxter's reluctance to adopt the expression "real unity" for fear of its connotation reveals, not only the metaphysical power of the expression, but also the common disagreements and misunderstandings that, even then, threatened it. The precautions that 17th-century pastors and theologians took to preserve the distinctions between individual believers and Christ suggests that most of them had a more nuanced understanding of the collectivism of Christ's body than an indiscriminate fusion of natures and beings. Reinstating this theological mindset as a likely influence for Hobbes's formulation of the commonwealth might help inform common scholarly assumptions about individualism in his thought. For example, Michael Oakeshott rejected the possibility that Hobbes could in any sense be regarded a collectivist, simply because Hobbes's commonwealth was not "destructive of individuality" : Hobbes still spoke of individual citizens and the freedoms that they enjoyed, outside the bounds of the commonwealth (or the laws).[109] The above theological discourses from his time-period demonstrate, however, that it was entirely

107. Richard Baxter, *Aphorisms of Justification* (Hague, 1655), 133-4.

108. Richard Baxter, *Pneumatou Diakonia*, 1682, 19.

109. Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, 62.

possible to imagine a certain kind of collectivism in which individual members were still considered distinct and differentiated from each other, within the bounds of that special community as well as outside of them. Along these lines, Hobbes's description of various limited forms of individuality within and without the commonwealth should not necessarily invalidate or preclude the possibility of collectivism in his thought.

Moreover, emphasizing the extent of individualism in Hobbes's commonwealth (post-contract) and undermining or denying the collectivism, foregrounds a sense of alienation and formal distance in his society that effectively weakens the authorship between citizens and sovereign — and it is not clear why Hobbes would have wanted this result. There are, however, passages in his work that do imply that individuals "alienate" their own actions and will to their chosen representative.[110] These are passages that describe legal, substitutionary representation, and with regard to this specific strand in Hobbes's thought, Oakeshott's synopsis is at least partially correct, that "to authorize a representative to make a choice for me does not destroy or compromise my individuality; there is no confusion of wills, so long as it is understood that my will is in the authorization of the representative and that the choice he makes is not mine, but his on my behalf."[111] But even in Hobbes's description of formal authorization, the psychology he wants citizens to have is one of identification rather than alienation: he enjoins, "Every one... shall authorize all the actions and judgments of that man or assembly of men, *in the same manner as if they were his own*."[112] His other statements, many cited above — describing

110. See *Human Nature*, XIX.10 and *De Cive*, V.6-7, VI.12.

111. Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, 62.

112. *Leviathan*, XVIII.1 (p.264), emphasis added. See also XVIII.6-7 (p.270): "Because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted... "

a relationship of embodiment in which citizens dwell in the very person of the sovereign and thus both identify and positively participate in his actions — give an even stronger impression that Hobbes did not want his readers to imagine the political relationship between citizens and sovereign as a distant, legal arrangement between isolated individuals.

Recently scholarship has emphasized the concept of legal "personhood" in Hobbes's work, and discussed the allegedly "shadowy existence" of his commonwealth. The abstract, legal category of "personhood" was certainly very important to Hobbes as a way in which to demonstrate and justify the formal and rational basis of his commonwealth, but whenever he described its very essence and nature, he used overtly physiological terminology, as if encouraging his readers to regard the commonwealth as something tangible and corporeal rather than "delicate" or "shadowy." His intention in doing so may have been to suggest, not that the commonwealth literally had an independent, ontological existence, but that the political relationship created between sovereign and citizens transcended the legal arrangement that brought it forth and elished a deep, engaged union between them all that was to be regarded more than the sum of its parts. One Puritan pastor (1654) said that "real unity" was "a conjunction of the person of Christ and the person of the believer into one third being: whence ariseth an everlasting relation, and answerable communion of Head and Members, between Christ and the believer forever."[113] Although he refered to the church as a "third being," and perhaps in some sense it could be considered as an entity of its own, the elaboration made clear that the church should more properly be regarded as an "everlasting relation and communion," signaled in so many theological treatises with the motif of the body. Hobbes's description of a body

113. John Norton, *The Orthodox Evangelist*, 1654, 291.

politic that spontaneously emerges through a legal exchange, so closely mimics this Christological precedent that it seems likely he also intended his "person of the commonwealth" to be viewed in the same way.

One recent Hobbes scholar has suggested the commonwealth in *Leviathan* was not generated "by individuals contracting together and thereby bringing something new into existence, but by their ceasing to think of themselves as individuals at all, and acting accordingly."[114] The rhetorical psychology of Hobbes's theological descriptions will be discussed with greater depth in the next chapter, but for this one, it is important to note the practical consequences of an embodied mentality with regard to both political and theological representation. The pastors and theologians of Hobbes's era used the image of the human body to describe the "real" union of Christ and to distinguish it from the equally valid legal union of Christ, with all of its forensic trappings. Hobbes's philosophic and methodological exposition on political representation conforms to this theological precedent in enough ways that it seems reasonable to suggest that his thought should be understood — and interpreted — in light of it.

2.4 Final Thoughts

The significance and prevalence of the doctrine of Christ's legal and *real* representation in 17th-century religious thought cannot be overstated. Oxford theologian John Owen wrote a treatise in 1677 that summarized the doctrine and repeatedly emphasized its ubiquity and indispensability in Christian thought: "The Lord Christ became one mystical Person with

114. Timothy Stanton, "Hobbes and Schmitt," *History of European Ideas, Pact with the Devil: the Ethics, Politics and Economics of Anti-Machiavellian Machiavellism*, 37, no. 2 (June 2011): 165-6.

the church, and bare the Person of the church what he did as Mediator," declared Owen. "This having been the faith and language of the church in all ages, and that derived from and founded in express testimonies of scripture... cannot now with any modestly be expressly denied."[115] Hobbes was almost certainly familiar with this doctrinal tradition, and given his desire to describe a type of political representation that was at once formal, legal, voluntary, non-natural, deliberate, transformative, and powerful enough to support centralized, absolutist sovereignty, there was no other analogy at hand that could better serve his purpose. Moreover, we have more than enough evidence from his works that Christ's mystical representation was indeed *a* prototype (if not *the* prototype) for his theory of political representation, not only in the evocative and involved descriptions of a body politic, animated in and through one quasi-divine representative, but also in Hobbes's deliberate choice of phrasings such as "involved" or "included in one will" and the "real unity of them all in one person" — which were overtly theological expressions in England during the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century, associated with the doctrine of Christ's divine representation.

Given this theological parallel, it seems appropriate to allow 17$^{\text{th}}$-century exegesis on Christ's representation to assist us, if it can, in interpreting Hobbes's theory of political representation, especially when thorny questions arise. One such puzzle, concerning the precise relationship between legality and embodiment in Hobbes, benefits directly from this kind of contextual investigation, because the parallel theological puzzle of legality and embodiment in *Christ* was of great interest to English theologians of the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century, it was the subject of countless sermons, tracts, and treatises, and it thus provides modern

115. John Owen, *The Doctrine of Justification by Faith through the Imputation of Christ*, 1677, 276. See also 294-5,302.

scholars invaluable insights into the early-modern mentality on this matter. From the excavation conducted in this chapter alone, at least two major applications can be drawn from the doctrine of Christ's legal and embodied representation that are of direct relevance to Hobbes scholarship: the first one is that there is indeed a deep, conceptual contrast between legal authorization and ontological embodiment, therefore scholars have not been wrong to emphasize this tension in Hobbes's work. The pastors and theologians of the 17th century frequently drew attention to the clashing characteristics of these phenomena in their discourses on Christ's representation, and recruited the analogies of the courtroom and the living, human body as rhetorical expressions of this philosophic divide. Hobbes's work exhibits all these features and should be read in a similar fashion.

The English theologians did not, however, consider legality and embodiment to be incompatible, either conceptually or rhetorically — and this is the second application that can be drawn from 17th-century theology for the interpretation of Hobbes. Notwithstanding the obvious tension between legality and embodiment, theologians insisted on the indispensability of both aspects when discoursing on Christ's representation of believers. Their voluminous philosophic contributions on this subject make clear, not only *that* these two concepts were expected to compliment rather than contradict each other, but also *how* they were logically understood to do so: as separate but conformable phenomena, with a legal exchange that initiates, commands, and effects the embodiment which follows. Many scholars have rejected the features of Hobbes's thought having to do with metaphysical union and embodiment solely because of an assumption that the concepts of embodiment and legal authorization are inherently incompatible and contradictory notions. It is hoped that the research in this chapter explains how and why this assumption is incorrect, at

least according to the 17th-century theological mentality from which Hobbes almost certainly drew the inspiration for his concept of political representation.

Scholars have dismissed the metaphysical allusions in Hobbes's work for other reasons, however, and chief among them is the allegation that Hobbes's thoroughgoing materialism does not allow for spiritual realities.[116] The extent of Hobbes's materialism is a complicated matter and it merits more space and attention than I can give here. For the purposes of this chapter, perhaps it is sufficient to note that Hobbes's alleged materialism is probably more textured and equivocal than is often assumed. For instance, human passions and imagination are neither visible nor sensible except through their physical effects, but they are not less real for Hobbes. And although they are deeply influenced by material objects, Hobbes never states that they are wholly determined by those objects.[117] More to the point of this chapter, Hobbes believed in the reality of the soul, as the source of life (as movement) to the body,[118] although he categorically rejected any understanding of the soul as a "separate" or "independent" existence apart from a physical body, such as a disembodied spirit or ghost.[119] His position, if we can extrapolate one from these two cases, seems to be closer to a metaphysical physicalism than to a rigorous materialism, insofar as it appears to affirm and assert the existence of spiritual and/or invisible realities within and through physical forms. If this is an accurate assessment, then the body politic

116. See Patricia Springborg, "Hobbes's Biblical Beasts Leviathan and Behemoth," *Political Theory* 23, no. 2 (May 1, 1995): 353-75 at 523; Stephen B. Hequembourg, "Hobbes's Leviathan: A Tale of Two Bodies," *The Seventeenth Century* 28, no. 1 (2013): 21-36; Robin Douglass, "The Body Politic Is a Fictitious Body,'" *Hobbes Studies* 27, no. 2 (2014): 126-47.

117. For a fairly complicated description of the relationship between objects and imagination, see *Leviathan*, VI.1ff (pp.78ff).

118. See Ibid., XXXIV.10 (pp.616-8), XXXVIII.4 (pp.706-8), XLVII.15 (p.974), Latin Appendix, I.45-6, 55-6 (pp.1160, 1164-8).

119. Ibid., XII.7 and XLIV.15 (pp.166-7, 974-6).

analogy that he uses to describe the substance of the commonwealth is completely consistent with this ontology in a way that Skinner and Runciman's "shadowy" phantom is not: the body politic — or more literally, the body of the sovereign — is the physical vehicle for the metaphysical group-personality of the commonwealth that is created through representation. Hobbes could not have allowed the invisible spirit of the commonwealth to exist separately or independently from a physical form, if he was being true to his metaphysical ontology. In this sense, Hobbes's peculiar brand of materialism might not obviate, so much as require, the notion of a body politic.

In the end and if at all possible, it seems preferable to read Hobbes's work on the assumption that there is a consonance to it, rather than a dissonance or a contradiction — which then must be evaluated as a mistake, an irony, or a joke. In this chapter I have tried to show the inherent consonance between Hobbes's concept of legal authorization and his depiction of an embodied personality of the commonwealth. Hobbes called this latter phenomenon a "real unity which is more than consent," and in doing so, he did not mean to disparage or negate legal "consent," so much as orient it toward another reality. The expressions he used and the rhetorical devices he chose in order to explain this reality are virtually identical to those used in the theological literature of his time-period to describe Christ's representation of believers, and according to this literature, Christ's representation was simultaneously a legal exchange and an embodied union. Hobbes almost certainly assimilated this understanding to his theory of political representation, and gave no indication that concepts of legality and embodiment in his thought should be perceived by any other logic.

Ernest Barker wrote, "Although Hobbes may argue that his Leviathan is a

creative essence of unity, transcending the sphere of contract, Leviathan is himself, after all, included in a contractual bracket, and it is this including bracket of contract which really creates such unity as Leviathan himself appears, but only appears, to provide."[120] What is interesting in this statement — and in many similar assessments by scholars about Hobbes's concept of representative unity — is the confidence with which Hobbes's body politic, along with its corporate personality and "real unity," is rejected, despite Hobbes's persistent claims otherwise. Later in Barker's analysis, he protests against the very concept of a "real" group personality, and gravely warns, "If we make groups real persons, we shall make the national State a real person. If we make the State a real person, with a real will, we make it indeed a Leviathan: a Leviathan which is not automaton, like the Leviathan of Hobbes, but a living reality... The experience of our own day goes to corroborate such hypothetical fears."[121] The assumption here — that Hobbes did not care to create a true living political reality, that he did not imbue his commonwealth with a soul, and that he did not seek to present his Leviathan as an absolutist organism, in whom all citizens would thrive and outside of whom they would die — is odd, given the rhetorical tone and tenor of Hobbes's work. The next chapter will explore these themes in greater detail.

120. Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to 1800*, lxiv-lxvi, from the Introduction by Barker.

121. Ibid., lxxiv-lxxv.

CHAPTER 3

REAL UNITY AND RHETORIC

Hobbes on the Theater of Embodiment

Hobbes said that the "real unity" between citizens in his commonwealth was "more than concord,"[1] by which he meant that it was more than the natural concurrence of individual wills together.[2] But in other passages, Hobbes suggested that "concord" was in fact his ultimate political goal and an important expression of "health" in the commonwealth.[3] This chapter explores the relationship between concord and real unity and shows how Hobbes juxtaposed them as distinct but compatible concepts, much as he did with legality: in Hobbes's political formula, formal authorization of the sovereign served as a precursor to real unity, while social concord became its practical and political effect. Hobbes unequivocally rejected the Aristotelian claim that social concord was the cause of political union, but by re-elishing it as the effect, he was able to retain the ancient metaphor of the "body politic" on his own terms. He could affirm the organic cohesion of society — not as a given human predisposition — but as the extraordinary outcome of a deliberate event to *reverse* human predisposition. Moreover, by embellishing the misery of the original crisis, by glorifying the alternate condition of peace and unity, while also emphasizing its fragility, and by making the sovereign representative indispensable to this possibility, Hobbes

1. *Leviathan, or The Matter, Form, and Power of A Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*, 1651, XVII.13 (p.260). In order to facilitate reference between the various editions of Leviathan, chapters will be given in Roman numerals followed by the Molesworth paragraph numbers. Page numbers for the Clarendon edition are given in parenthesis.

2. See *Human Nature [1640;1650], ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford World's Classics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), XII.7, XIX.4-6.

3. *Leviathan*, Introduction (p.16). See also XVIII.9 (p.272) and XXX.7 (pp.524-6).

fostered in his readers a psychology of indebtedness and dependence that was designed to intensify their sense of moral obligation, both to the sovereign and to the organic community of which they were part.

In his execution of this strategy, Hobbes introduced an explanatory narrative and implemented a set of rhetorical techniques that were virtually identical to those used by pastors and theologians of his time-period in their descriptions of the church community. Like Hobbes, pastors of the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century routinely exhorted their readers to seek peace and concord, and they were careful to clarify that this kind of social agreement was properly to be sought as the effect of "real union" in Christ. The metaphor of the human body, which always featured prominently in these discourses, served as an analogue for the Christian community, simultaneously illustrating the deep, organic bond between believers, and rhetorically heightening the consequences of dysfunction within the group or division from it. The person of Christ was so integral to this embodied community, it was regarded simply as *his* body, outside of which there could be no peace or life, and in pursuit of these goods, pastors of Hobbes's era urged their readers to submit to Christ and obey him as the author of peace, the source of life, and the essence of their unity. Hobbes's state of nature narrative employs all of these Christological tropes, and this parallel is of interest, not merely as a historical discovery about Hobbes's possible literary influences, but also as an explanation of why he would have used this specific literature to express his political vision: Hobbes and the pastors of his era shared the same practical and political goal in that they were concerned about communal concord, and they believed that submission to a sovereign representative was the key to creating and maintaining this social state. Therefore Hobbes probably used the expressions and tropes of Christology to explain his

political philosophy because they had a certain consonance with his general ends and would be easily understood by his audience.

Uncovering the parallel between Hobbes's narrative and 17th-century Christology also directly informs — and challenges — recent scholarship that has emphasized the artificiality of certain rhetorical conceits utilized by Hobbes. His elaborate analogy of the body, for instance, has been interpreted by numerous theorists as a stylistic and theatrical gloss, employed by Hobbes to amuse and inspire his perceptive readers, while perhaps also deliberately deceiving those who were less perceptive. His expression "real unity," which is mistaken for a reference to transubstantiation, often anchors this interpretation by allegedly demonstrating that Hobbes was accustomed to describing the unity of his commonwealth in rhetorical terms that he rationally disavowed elsewhere, effectively encouraging his readers to regard it as a subjective illusion rather than an objective reality. This interpretation miscalculates Hobbes's intent on multiple levels, beginning with the correct theological referent of his expression "real unity," as an allusion, not to transubstantiation, but to Christ's mystical body (which he nowhere denies). Furthermore, Hobbes discoursed transparently on the proper and improper application of metaphors and analogies, permitting their use as a way to "open up" rational understanding, and rejecting their use in order to obscure or deceive.[4] He explicitly asserted in *Leviathan* that his own use of rhetoric was to be taken in the former sense rather than the latter,[5] making all the more curious the determination of recent scholars to interpret his work in the opposite manner.

What is more, their interpretation, if true, would critically undermine the larger

4. Ibid., VIII.8 (p.108).

5. Ibid., Review and Conclusion.1,4 (pp.1132-3).

practical and political purpose of Hobbes's work — to strengthen citizens' obligation to their sovereign. The rhetorical exposition of his state of nature, the peace and concord of his embodied commonwealth, the god-like stature of his sovereign, and the perpetual threat of social dissolution had the ability to foster in his readers a certain psychology that would encourage them to obey and submit, but only if they actually believed that his rhetorical portrayals were objectively true in some important sense. They would have little reason to worry about threats to the organic harmony of society, for instance, if they regarded that social harmony to be wholly imaginative and illusory to begin with. Hobbes declared that "men cannot be afraid of the power they believe not,"[6] which is a statement that represents, if not his own perspective, then certainly the broader 17th-century mentality on this subject, reflected in the theological literature from which he drew the inspiration for many of his rhetorical analogies and expressions: the pastors and theologians of his era knew that the "body" of their church community was metaphorical, but they were able to exhort their congregants to peace and concord, confident that there was an objectively true and "real" union depicted by that body metaphor, which had to be protected and maintained at all cost. There may not be any reason to interpret Hobbes's body metaphor differently.

6. *Human Nature*, XVI.16.

3.1 Concord and Hobbes's Commonwealth Narrative

Concord and unity are often regarded as synonyms, but Hobbes rejected this colloquial usage and insisted that they be conceptually distinguished.[7] "When the wills of many concur to some one and the same action, or effect," he wrote, "this concourse of their wills is called *consent* (or *concord*); by which we must not understand one will of many men, for every man hath his several will, but many wills to the producing of one effect." However "when many wills are involved or included in the will of one or more consenting, then is that involving of wills in one or more called *union*."[8] The distinction made here is numerical, in that "concord" consists of many wills agreeing together, while "unity" consists of only one will (though it includes many constitutive wills). Hobbes seems to have been aware of the enigmatic quality of this latter concept and formulation, because he immediately drew another set of distinctions between concord and unity to make clear that concord was a familiar, natural phenomenon, while unity was not. The intuitive association of bees and ants, for instance, Hobbes called "concord," in pointed disagreement with Aristotle, who had claimed that their colonies and hives were "political" in their configuration and thus analogous to human patterns of governance.[9] "Those animals," Hobbes admonished, "[are] not to be termed political, because their government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as is necessary in civil government)

7. *De Corpore Politico [1640;1650], ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford World's Classics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), XXVII.7: "... want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifieth not the concord, but the union of many men."

8. *Human Nature*, XII.7-8. Hobbes mentions only "consent" in this passage, but he adds "concord" in the second iteration: see XIX.4.

9. See Aristotle, *Historia Animalium*, 1.1.488a8; c.f. *Politics*, 1.1.1253a8-9

one will."[10] Moreover, "*natural* concord, such as amongst those creatures, is the work of God by the way of nature; but concord amongst men is *artificial*, and by way of covenant."[11] Hobbes's first statement reiterates the numeric distinction between concord and unity, and his second statement argues that concord should be understood as something spontaneous, unprompted, and therefore natural, in contrast to unity, which should be understood to be intentionally designed, and therefore non-natural or artificial.

Hobbes's momentary shift in terminology — from concord versus unity to "natural concord" versus "artificial concord" — suggests, not so much his dissatisfaction with his original terms, which he quickly reelished, nor a relaxing of the conceptual tension between them, but a reengagement of the ideal of "concord" in a different context, with a new role. Hobbes declared that the newly-ordained sovereign was to actively "conform the wills of particular men into unity *and concord*,"[12] and described the "well-governing of men's actions" as a broader political initiative on behalf of "peace *and concord*."[13] In his famous introduction to *Leviathan*, Hobbes depicted concord as the "health" of the body politic,[14] with remarkable ease given the overt Aristotelian overtones in the motif, and reaffirmed later in the work that his commonwealth did indeed cohere in an organic, Aristotelian manner: because of the work and person of the sovereign.[15] "The prosperity of the people," he wrote, "cometh from the obedience *and concord* of the subjects," adding,

10. *De Cive [1641], ed. Bernard Gert* (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1991), V.5.

11. *Human Nature*, XIX.5, emphasis added.

12. *De Cive*, V.8. For a parallel passage, see *Human Nature*, XIX.7.

13. *Leviathan*, XVIII.9 (p.272).

14. Ibid., Introduction (p.16).

15. Ibid., XLII.125 (p.916).

"Take away in any kind of state, the obedience, and consequently *the concord* of the people, and they shall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved."[16] Social concord seems to have been understood by Hobbes as the effect of representative unity rather than its cause. In his sequential narrative tracking mankind's transition from war to peace, "real unity" occurs first, *ex nihilo*, and then concord manifests (by way of obedience).

Hobbes's qualified endorsement of concord lent to his political vision a moral and psychological appeal that was somewhat lacking in his exposition on legal authorization. The mechanism of formal consent might have been enough to satisfy the rational objections of his readers, but it could not adequately alleviate the emotional aversion elicited by his absolutist scheme. Many scholars[17] have expressed incredulity that anyone would voluntarily consent to the openly autocratic terms he draws up under chapter headings such as "Dominion Paternal and Despotical," and "The Power of Fathers,"[18] with statements such as "The subjection of them who institute a commonwealth amongst themselves, is no less absolute, than the subjection of servants."[19] Aware of the unpalility of this notion, Hobbes frequently acknowledged that "a man may here object that the condition of subjects is very miserable, as being obnoxious to the lusts and other irregular passions of him or them that have so unlimited power in their hands."[20] Hobbes's repeated

16. Ibid, XXX.7 (pp.524-6).

17. See Jean Hampton, *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 203-4, 218-9, 264; Katrin Flikschuh, "Elusive Unity: The General Will in Hobbes and Kant," *Hobbes Studies* 25, no. 1 (2012): 22; Arash Abizadeh, "The Representation of Hobbesian Sovereignty: Leviathan as Mythology," *Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century*, 2013, 116; cf. C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 97-8: "Market men are good enough calculators... "

18. See *Human Nature*, XIX.11; *De Corpore Politico*, XXII-XXIII; *De Cive*, VIII-IX; *Leviathan*, XX (pp.306-22).

19. *De Corpore Politico*, XXIII.9.

20. *Leviathan*, XVIII.20 (p.282). For parallel passages, see *De Corpore Politico*, XX.13; *De Cive*, VI.13

rejoinder always entailed a brief sketch of the "nasty and brutish" alternative and a reminder about all the benefits gained by escaping it. "Whoever holds," he chided, "that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawful for all men, he contradicts himself. For every man by natural necessity desires that which is good for him, nor is there any that esteems a war of all against all, which necessarily adheres to such a state, to be good for him. And so it happens, that through fear of each other we think it fit to rid ourselves of this condition, and to get some fellows." Using this rationale, in contrast with the normatively anemic, voluntarist legality presented elsewhere, Hobbes was able to portray political subjection as the morally responsible choice, and a desirable one at that: by which individuals could exchange the certainties of war and death for "pleasure and beauty of life, which peace and society are wont to bring with them."[21]

Without necessarily abandoning reason, Hobbes gave his political proposals a rhetorical force that appealed directly to the human passions of his readers by inciting and exploiting their fears. Of all the fears that he invoked, fear of the sword has received the most attention, and rightly so, considering that it is the one Hobbes cites most explicitly throughout his work. There are, however, several less explicit fears that he stoked as well, such as the fear of social dysfunction through rebellion or dissent, the fear of untimely death by way of anarchy, and the fear of God himself, in his future retribution of injustice and (most important of all) in the immediate power of his lieutenant, the civil sovereign. These three fears — represented in Hobbes's metaphor of the body politic, in his state of nature myth, and in the "mortal god" of his civil sovereign —significantly amplified the

[footnote on "absolute"], IX.9.

21. *De Cive*, I.13. See also *Human Nature*, XIV; *De Corpore Politico*, XX.2-3; *Leviathan*, XIII, XVII (pp.188-96, 254-62).

original fear of punishment that he continued to invoke, while also compensating for its limitations. Hobbes frequently admitted that physical force, however powerful, was often an ineffective threat in certain situations,[22] necessitating remedial education in order to inculcate social allegiance and a disposition to obey. "The grounds of [the rights of sovereignty] have the rather need to be diligently and truly taught," he advised, "because *they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment.*"[23] Hobbes knew that legal obligation and physical force had only so much power in the long term, but he had hope that a large-scale education program would give citizens both the knowledge and the emotional temperament to support and uphold the political order, long past the point that direct force might have lost its terror.

Hobbes divided the content of his proposed curriculum into roughly three components: first, the origin and essence of society, secondly the sole alternative to society, and thirdly the role of the sovereign with regard to both of these possibilities. These three facets correspond to the three fears described above, and while the second fear — the fear of the state of nature as an alternative to society — has made the most lasting impression on readers, his first fear — the fear of society breaking down from within — receives a more sustained treatment throughout his work in the pervasive parable of the "body politic." Hobbes's commonwealth is originally generated, or rather, it is *born*, as a living, breathing organism that presents itself as a creature that is simultaneously awesome and

22. See *Leviathan*, Review/Conclusion.2,16 (pp.1132, 1140-1). For Hobbes on rebellion despite the power of the sword, see XXVIII.23 (p.494), XXIX.14 (pp.506-8), and XXX.29 (p.550). For his anxiety about the way religion makes people impervious to fear of the sword, see XLIII.2 (pp.928-30), as well as XXIX.15 (pp.510-12) and XLII.11-2, 102 (pp.784-8, 892). See also Michael P. Krom, *The Limits of Reason in Hobbes's Commonwealth* (London; New York: Continuum, 2011). And for Hobbes's failure to guarantee police control in his commonwealth, see Hampton, *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*, 2, 203-6.

23. *Leviathan*, XXX.4 (p.522), emphasis added.

intimidating as well as vulnerable and of delicate constitution, its "health," according to Hobbes, depending upon the social concord of its people, and its "sickness" consisting in "sedition" and dissent.[24] Hobbes chose to graphically depict these rebellious threats to the commonwealth as a series of grotesque, terminal diseases attacking the body politic,[25] thereby subtly evoking and exciting the one fundamental and inalienable instinct of human existence: that "every man use all his endeavors to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows."[26]

One recent scholar has called Hobbes's body politic allegory "the one metaphor he cannot do without,"[27] and this is probably true, not only as a rhetorical impetus for stronger social identification and loyalty, but also as a technique to emphasize the indispensability of the civil sovereign. Hobbes declared, "The Sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the commonwealth, which expiring, the members are governed by it no more than the carcass of a man, by his departed soul."[28] Hobbes was always careful to define the human soul as the source and force of life and motion in the human body,[29] and therefore his deliberate assignation of the civil sovereign as the soul of the body politic had the effect of inextricably fusing the fates of citizens and sovereign together, while also making those fates wholly and existentially dependent upon the wellbeing of the sovereign. In this way, Hobbes could present the commonwealth as a body owned in part by all

24. Ibid., Introduction.1 (p.16).

25. See *De Corpore Politico*, XXVII.1; *Leviathan*, XXIX (pp.498-518).

26. *De Cive*, I.7.

27. Katherine Bootle Attie, "Re-Membering the Body Politic: Hobbes and the Construction of Civic Immortality," *ELH* 75, no. 3 (2008): 501.

28. *Leviathan*, XXIX.23 (p.518).

29. Ibid., XXXIV.10 (pp.616-8), XXXVIII.4 (pp.706-8), XLVII.15 (p.974), Latin Appendix, I.45-6, 55-6 (pp.1160, 1164-8).

citizens, as members, and in full by the sovereign, who enlivened them. Playing on the physiological analogue of the association, Hobbes stated, "Every Sovereign hath the same right in procuring the safety of his people that any particular man can have in procuring the safety of his own body."[30] Given this radical identification, and the sovereign's instinctive interest in the wellbeing of his commonwealth, Hobbes could reasonably enjoin citizens to actively support, preserve, and promote the "soul" of their social existence — or at the very least, not to resist or obstruct his authority: "For otherwise, the power of a body politic (the essence whereof is the not-resistance of the members) is none, nor a body politic of any benefit."[31]

The fear of the sovereign as if he were God might seem initially to be at odds with this body metaphor. The relationship between members, organs, and capacities of the body is immediate and immanent, while the relationship of humans to God is generally understood to be one of distance and difference. One could be grateful for the indispensable organs or functions of one's own body, for instance, but it would be considered strange to fear or worship them as if they were *other* in some sense. Throughout his work, Hobbes's rapid shifts in metaphor, from the body to God, seem to be impelled by the common motif in them both of "power" (which was Hobbes's preferred characterization of God[32]), and it is on the basis of this theme that the mix of metaphors makes some sense. In *De Homine*, Hobbes wrote that, "Power, if it be extraordinary, is good, because it is useful for protection; and protection provides security. If it be not extraordinary, it is useless; for

30. Ibid., XXX.30 (p.552).

31. *De Corpore Politico*, XX.18.

32. Among many such passages, see *De Cive*, XV.7; *Leviathan*, XXXI.5 (p.558).

what all have equally is nothing."[33] The depiction of the civil sovereign as the soul of the body and a mortal God of the realm could be seen as Hobbes's way of encouraging citizens to believe that their monarch had an extraordinary power over them — in all likelihood for their good, but hypothetically for their harm as well. Reverence, obedience, submission were the only accele and reasonable responses to this state of affairs, "for every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him."[34]

The idea in this last quote of being "saved" is another theme that ties Hobbes's tripartite fears together and explains their relation to each other. His rhetorical progression — from death and destruction in his state of nature, to life and health in the commonwealth — is mediated and achieved through the person and work of the sovereign, without whom this transition would not be possible, and from whom the entire narrative takes on a redemptive tone. The various elements and allusions of Hobbes's political vision that otherwise seem only loosely related, comfoly coalesce together when understood as integral components of a salvation saga, which is corroborated by Hobbes's tell-tale reference to the "real unity" of the commonwealth. As we have seen, this 17$^{\text{th}}$-century theological expression described the role of Jesus Christ as the sovereign and divine representative, in whom believers constituted one body and through whom they were saved. Hobbes's identical tropes are almost certainly not idiosyncratic or original innovations, but deliberate adoptions of familiar Christological conceits, transposed into a political key. Examining this religious referent for his rhetorical structure may help to explain how he would have expected to be understood by his readers, and thereby may

33. *De Homine [1658], ed. Bernard Gert* (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1991), XI.6.

34. *Leviathan*, XX.5 (p.310).

help to explain why he used it.

3.2 Concord and Christ's Redemption Narrative

During the post-Reformation era, ecclesiastical peace and unity was of urgent concern to pastors and theologians all over Europe, and England was no exception. From Henry VIII's break from Rome, through the early 17th-century Puritan awakening, to a threatened Presbyterian and Independent coup represented in the Westminster Assembly, and beyond into the Restoration — England was nearly destroyed by religious controversy and strife. During this time-period, the fragility of union in Christ formed the subject of countless tracts, treatises, and sermons, often accompanied with anxious admonitions about maintaining and preserving it. In 1582, a work on the theme of Christian unity and dispute by Pierre Boquin, a popular Huguenot theologian embroiled in controversy with Erastus on the Continent, was translated into English and published in London. "How tender a thing the unity and consent of the church in Christ is," Boquin observed in one passage, "and how easily it is shaken and dissolved... Those therefore, which wish well unto the church, and the safeguard thereof, ought chiefly to take care that they keep the band of unity, and to maintain it unbroken: which ought to be the common endeavor of all men."[35] English Christians took this commission seriously, despite or perhaps because of their increasingly intrale divisions. From time to time, a treatise would be published that engaged the subject of Christ's unity on purely theoretic, doctrinal grounds, such as Robert Ferguson's

35. Pierre Boquin, *A Defense of the Profession of Christianity*, 1582, 25.

Interest of Reason (1675),[36] but more often than not, the 17th-century religious literature on this subject had a pastoral tone and a practical objective, in response to contemporary concerns.

Many of the rhetorical strategies employed in these works resemble those used by Hobbes in *Leviathan*, not least the description of a miserable pre-social war zone to be avoided and escaped. Theologians of that period did not explicitly refer to a "state of nature," as Hobbes did, but they often portrayed existence apart from Christ in similar terms, as a violent collision of wills and desires. "Remaining and abiding in Christ we find all comfort, refreshment, and peace; and being out of him we run headlong into all evil," wrote Anglican priest Thomas Draxe (1608). "Wherefore we must labor and endeavor always to continue in this union and communion with Christ, and not depart an hair's breadth from him."[37] Catholic priest Louis Richeome (1619) asserted, "We are united even one with another, and made one spirit and one body under our chief Sovereign Jesus Christ... Behold you the opposite effects? By the flesh of Adam we are made sinners, separated from God, both in spirit and body: men are divided among themselves by enmities, arising from the love of the flesh, and every man is divided in himself, his flesh rebelling to the spirit."[38] "Indeed if we were persons by ourselves," reasoned Puritan Humphrey Chambers (1652), "that is, persons not united unto Christ as head and mediator, we should be very miserable... When we consider ourselves in ourselves, then we do truly both fear and feel sin, and death, and hell within us. [Wherefore] we must wholly

36. Robert Ferguson, *The Interest of Reason in Religion with the Import and Use of Scripture-Metaphors, and the Nature of the Union Betwixt Christ and Believers*, 1675.

37. Thomas Draxe, *The Lamb's Spouse or the Heavenly Bride, A Theological Discourse, Wherein the Contract Betwixt Christ and the Church Is Plainly and Profly Set Forth*, 1608, unnumbered manuscript.

38. Louis Richeome, *Holy Pictures of the Mystical Figures*, 1619, 224-5.

cast away our own person, and be united into one person with Christ, yea, and lose our person in his... for the escaping these eternal evil things, and for the obtaining these eternal good things."[39] Presbyterian Humphrey Saunders (1655) declared, "A soul having real union with Jesus Christ finds the communion of saints its proper and natural element, out of which he languisheth, and in which he liveth with much pleasure."[40]

As this last quote reveals, sustainable social concord was an important desideratum sought after and ultimately made available: through Jesus Christ alone. The human condition apart from Christ was always described in 17th-century discourses as a dark, grim, individualistic crisis, necessitating a divine intervention. Concord and communion among believers was absolutely possible, and in fact guaranteed, but only as an effect of Christ's "real unity" with each, separate believer through faith. This understanding was suggested and obliquely implied in much of the literature published in the first half of the century, as indicated in the statements quoted above, but it was often explicitly stated and explained in the discourses that appeared later in the century. Puritan Henry Lukin (1660) argued, "There is an union of affections [among believers], yet this is *but the effect* of a nearer union, which (though we fully understand not its nature) is set forth to us by several similitudes, as of a vine and its branches, of an head and members, of an husband and wife: all which show the effects of this union, denoting the influence of divine power and virtue which believers have from Jesus Christ."[41] Robert Ferguson elaborated on this point in his 1675 treatise *Interest of Religion*, in which he

39. Humphrey Chambers, *Animadversions*, 1652, 48,52.

40. Humphrey Saunders, *An Anti-Diatribe*, 1655, 163.

41. Henry Lukin, *The Life of Faith*, 1660, 15, emphasis added.

distinguished between the "real unity" of Christ and the "moral unity" of all believers which resulted from it: "By moral union we understand a harmony of wills," he wrote, "an agreement in designs, a confederation in affections, [and] in a word, an union by way of mutual and reciprocal love." Ferguson "readily acknowledged" that this moral union could and should be shared among believers, "but how high, noble, and necessary soever this union is which intervenes betwixt one Christian and another," he warned, "yet it is not equipollent to the union which occurs between Christ and believers." The "real union," according to Ferguson, is that "whereby all the members of Christ being first copulated to him as a vital living head, and being harmonious in the belief of all the essential fundamental doctrines of the Gospel, come to be principally knit together among themselves." The moral union of believers, therefore, "as it terminates upon Christ from us, or, as it implies our affections being set upon him, is so far from being the formal reason of our mystical union, that *it doth suppose us already cemented to him.*"[42]

The metaphor of the body, which seems to have encapsulated both real unity and "moral" concord, was the preferred 17th-century doctrinal analogy, and it was also the basis for graphic depictions of social dysfunction among believers, along with emphatic exhortations to peace. "Alas! We have made a division in the body of Christ," lamented Oxford Anglican Thomas Jackson (1579-1640). "While we wrangle unmannerly about idle questions, or terms of art, our jars make all the world besides, and ourselves oft-times (we may fear) doubt of the true and real unity betwixt Christ and his members, now eclipsed by our carnal divisions."[43] Puritan Henry Vertue (1659) soberly admonished, "We all make

42. Ferguson, *Interest of Reason in Religion*, 563, 565, 571-2, 581.

43. Thomas Jackson, *A Collection of the Works of That Holy Man, Thomas Jackson*, 1653 [posthumous], 19.

one Body, under one Head, Christ; therefore let us take heed of schism and disunion, and endeavor to keep Unity."[44] Leading Independent pastor Matthew Mead (1691) wrote, "Christ hath many members, but he hath one body, and all that believe in Christ are that one body. Now how monstrous is it for the members of the same body to fight one against another, to rend and tear one another, for the hand to pluck out the eye, the mouth to tear the hand, &c."[45] This social conflict in the embodied community was condemned, not merely as social injustice, but also as a crime against the author and sustainer of the community, Christ. "A monstrous, imperfect, or a crazy body joined with the most excellent soul, can never make an healthy man," observed George Hughes (1644), a Puritan pastor who frequently preached before Parliament. "Heart to heart, spirit to spirit must be suited, that the placing of these parts be orderly, Christ in Supremacy, the soul in subordination. That body is not well whose members are out of place: it must be deficient in beauty, if not in health."[46]

The sovereignty of the soul over the body became a metaphor for Christ's preeminence over his church community, and an analogy by which to argue that it was a matter of vital self-interest to acquire and maintain union with Christ. "Let us get a real union with Christ [and] walk with the more caution," enjoined Thomas Manton (1658), a chaplain to Oliver Cromwell and a participant of the Westminster Assembly. "Be not high-minded but fear: 'tis dreadful to be cast out of the true church. The finger that is cut off from the hand is also cut off from the head. That censure, if rightly administrated

44. Henry Vertue, *Christ and the Church*, 1659, 374.

45. Matthew Mead, *Two Sticks Made One*, 1691, 24-5.

46. George Hughes, *A Dry Rod Blooming and Fruit-Bearing*, 1644, 116-7.

against us, should be matter of great sorrow and humiliation to us."[47] Robert Ferguson (1675) reminded his readers, "Life is said to be in Christ, not only formally as in its subject, but causally as in its fountain. Nor is he only called the Word of Life, and the Prince of Life, but he is expressly said to be our Life (Colossians 3:4)."[48] Ferguson explained, "The highest and closest Union is between those things that are actuated by one Spirit dwelling and moving in them... 'When the animal spirits forsake any member in the organic body, it is immediately as if it were not knit to the head."[49] Thus, in the same way that "natural life proceeds from, and must be ascribed to the soul as its spring and principle, so all spiritual life is owing to Christ as immediately acting us by his quickening spirit." The logical and psychological implication of this relationship, according to Ferguson, is a radical and existential dependence of believers on Christ:

> Of our selves, we are without strength, without love, no power, no liking, no possibility to do good, nor any principle of holiness or obedience in us. 'Tis Christ that strengthens us, that wins, that quickens us by his Spirit to his service. Christ is the principle and fountain of holiness, as the head is of sense or motion... forasmuch as no vital principle doth or can operate, but as it is united to the subject that is to be quickened by it. Christ being then the Principle of our spiritual life, there must be a Union of Christ with us as the spring and foundation of his influence upon us. No one thing can be supposed the principle and source of life to another, without admitting a previous Union between them.[50]

The wording of this passage has an uncanny consonance with Hobbes's formulations in *De Cive* and *Leviathan* depicting the civil sovereign as the "soul" of the commonwealth, without whom life and motion would be impossible, and the psychology on display in

47. Thomas Manton, *A Practical Commentary, or, An Exposition with Notes on the Epistle of Jude*, 1658, 422.

48. Ferguson, *Interest of Reason in Religion*, 638.

49. Ibid., 656.

50. Ibid., 639-40.

Ferguson's analysis fully comports with Hobbes's broader intent to glorify the person of the sovereign in the eyes of his citizens.

This congruity of Christological sovereignty in Ferguson and civil sovereignty in Hobbes raises the issue of human and divine agency in Hobbes's thought, and suggests that Puritanism — or Calvinism — may have strongly influenced aspects of his political argument. Many of the religious and theological positions that Hobbes embraced or permitted, were productive toward his broader political aim to magnify the civil sovereign and obtain the submission of citizens to the sovereign's power. Insisting upon the sovereign's formal headship of the national church, for instance, was a comfoly Anglican position, while emphasizing the sovereign's priestly rights ("which is a great bond of civil obedience"[51]), apostolic succession, and doctrinal absolutism were uncomfoly Roman Catholic notions. Hobbes's determinism — on full display in his scientific discourses on human deliberation, in his analysis on political freedom, and in his protracted debate on the subject with Bishop Bramhall — was a Calvinist stance, used by him to diminish human agency vis-a-vis external forces and internal passions beyond human control. The Calvinists believed that humans were completely ruled by sin after the fall of Adam, with a possibility to be ruled by Christ in redemption (if chosen), premises that ascribed very little to human agency in any positive sense. "As the old sinful nature is communicated from the first Adam to us, without any [rational] argumentation," wrote Puritan pastor Thomas Shepard (1650), "so the new nature, which is the seed, foundation, and plot of all grace, is diffused into us by the second Adam [Christ] when we are united to him, without

51. *De Cive*, XVIII.14.

argumentation. It is only by divine operation. The Lord leave not me, nor any friend I have, to a naked Arminian illumination and persuasion... Consider it is not your reason and argumentation, but Christ's blood that doth all, by an admirable, and yet secret operation."[52]

Calvinism exalted the work and person of Christ as the effective cause of any believer's salvation, thereby minimizing any contribution of that believer to the process — even faith — as a response wholly conditioned and determined by divine will. "Laying hold upon Christ [is] the principal object of faith," said Puritan Matthew Lawrence (1657), "not as if faith had this life, or this power to give life, in itself... but as by it we are united to Christ our Head, and Fountain of Life." Lawrence added:

> Faith comes from Christ and turns round to him again, to draw still more virtue from him. As our communion with Christ in grace flows from our union with him, so also all spiritual operations, or living acts of spiritual life. Look as in the natural body, the life of all the members is from the head, and that life conveyed by certain nerves and sinews to every part. So the life of sanctification in all the members is derived from Christ the Head: and that by the sinews and nerves of faith, conveyed to all the elect in due time, by which they live, and more and more increase from day to day.[53]

Lawrence's use of the body analogy to diminish the import and role of human volition was a common rhetorical strategy among Calvinist theologians, who frequently marshalled this metaphor or some other — such as a vine and its branches, or a building — into the service of a larger argument about human subordination and dependence on Christ for salvation. "It is an union wrought by God, not by us," declared English Presbyterian

52. Thomas Shepard, *Certain Select Cases Resolved Tending to the Right Ordering of the Heart*, 1650, 42-3.

53. Matthew Lawrence, *The Use and Practice of Faith*, 1657, 123.

Ralph Robinson (1656). "What doth the branch contribute to its union with the root? What do we contribute to our union with Christ? We neither cut off ourselves, nor graft in ourselves. Man is passive in his conversion."[54]

At the same time, Calvinists were careful not to give the impression that believers were *merely* passive. New England pastor John Norton (1654) stated, "When the body mystical is looked at as that third being [made by Christ and believers], then Christ in the gift of the grace of faith, giving himself as our God actually, is the band on his part; and either the Soul's receiving of Christ actually, in its passive receipt of faith, or actively, by the act of faith, is respectively the band on our part."[55] By the end of the century, this understanding of faith as both an active and passive orientation was asserted with greater clarity. "The union between betwixt Christ and the Christian is first passive and then active," declared Matthew Mead (1691). "There is the operation of the spirit uniting and then the act of faith in closing. We are apprehended of Christ before we can apprehend Christ... God is first in it. Uniting graces must precede uniting acts, and if God thus make us one, then we shall be one."[56] Walter Marshall (1692), an Independent Puritan, concurred with this sentiment: "Faith doth not unite us to Christ by its own virtue, but by the power of the Spirit working by it and with it. Thus we are first passive and then active in this great work of mystical union. We are first apprehended of Christ, and then we apprehend Christ. Christ entereth first into the soul to join himself to it, by giving it the spirit of faith, and so the soul receiveth Christ and his Spirit by their own power, as the sun

54. Ralph Robinson, *Christ All and in All*, 1656, 315.

55. John Norton, *The Orthodox Evangelist*, 1654, 88.

56. Mead, *Two Sticks*, 6.

first enlighteneth our eyes, and then we can see it by its own light."[57] Puritan Calvinists of the 17th century were willing to affirm human agency and volition, but not without demonstrating also how human freedom was entirely compatible with divine compulsion.

The political use that Hobbes made of this premise was more oblique and less straightforward than the use he made of certain Anglican and Catholic tenets. The Calvinist image of Christ calling and claiming believers before they were willing or had expressed free consent worked well as a prototype for Hobbes's exposition on the "Commonwealth by Acquisition." A Puritan member of the Westminster Assembly wrote in 1635, "Christ hath propriety unto us... by right of conquest and deliverance. He hath dispossessed and spoiled those that ruled over us before... and translated us into his own kingdom. We are become his servants, and owe obedience unto him as our patron."[58] Hobbes's pointed portrayal (in all of his works) of sovereignty by conquest and force[59] perfectly conforms to this Calvinist characterization of redemption, but his analysis on the "Commonwealth by Institution," which is obviously his greatest interest, seems to collide with Calvinism, rhetorically if not philosophically. In his depiction of social contract, there is no sovereign before institution to either call, compel, or conquer individuals; they all voluntarily consent to submit themselves to a person of their own choosing, perhaps before that person was even chosen, and therefore in some sense they could be regarded as the progenitors of sovereignty. Some scholars have intimated that since Hobbes's citizens create sovereignty, perhaps they also *own* sovereignty and have dominion over it, in the same way

57. Walter Marshall, *The Gospel-Mystery of Sanctification*, 1692, 77.

58. Edward Reynolds, *An Explication of the Hundreth and Tenth Psalm*, 1635, 297.

59. See *Human Nature*, XIX.11; *De Corpore Politico*, XXII-XXIII; *De Cive*, VIII-IX; *Leviathan*, XX (pp.306-22).

that a mother owns her child;[60] one scholar has even argued that Hobbes's citizens positively control and constrain the sovereign, as a unified people no less.[61] These interpretations give individuals in Hobbes's worldview a great deal of agency and power — certainly pre-contract, and possibly post-contract as well — which inevly makes his "despotical" institution look like an odd antithetical aberration by comparison. Murray Forsyth has dismissed Hobbes's commonwealth by conquest as "merely authorization under duress," in contrast to institution, as "a positive act of representation and authorization by a people free to choose how their peace and security is to be elished."[62]

Hobbes maintained the opposite, however: that commonwealths by either conquest or institution operated by the same principle, that individuals in both scenarios had roughly identical powers of agency, and that the "Calvinist coercion" explicit and overt in his tale of conquest and patrimonial domination was fully replicated in his tale of contractual institution, albeit in a more nuanced manner. In fact, the alleged voluntarism in his state of nature is subject, arguably, to even greater and more numerous coercions than those represented in his "despotical" arrangement. From God's sovereign control of human thoughts and actions,[63] to the intrusion of the material world,[64] to the tyranny of

60. See David Runciman, "Hobbes's Theory of Representation: Anti-Democratic or Proto-Democratic?," in *Political Representation, ed. Ian Shapiro* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 23; Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State," in *Hobbes and Civil Science, 5th ed., vol. 3, Visions of Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 203.

61. See Murray Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," *POST Political Studies* 29, no. 2 (1981): 191-203.

62. Ibid., 202-3.: "There can be little doubt that a commonwealth elished in this way is separated by a wide gulf from the commonwealth by institution. . . "

63. *De Cive*, XV.5-7; *Leviathan*, XXI.4 (p.326), XXXI.2 (p.554), XL.2 (p.738), XLIII.7 (p.934), XLVI.31 (p.1090), XLVII.20 (p.1116).

64. *Human Nature*, X.1; *De Homine*, XI.2, XIII.2,4; *Leviathan*, I.4 (pp.22-4), VI.1 (p.78).

conflicting passions,[65] to the "uncontrollable dictates of necessity" that by nature compel humans to seek their own perceived good at all cost,[66] to the encroachments of one person on another in either word or deed,[67] to the threat of inevle, violent death in the state of nature[68] — an entire bevy of controlling influences beset Hobbes's individual, and make his so-called "voluntary subjection"[69] far less voluntary than might be assumed by that description. Hobbes entitled one chapter in *Human Nature* "Of the *Necessity* and Definition of a Body Politic,"[70] and he maintained in many other passages throughout his works that nature inexorably "compels" mankind to pursue peaceful association,[71] effectively arguing that all political contracts of institution are authorized under no less duress (and perhaps more) than that of the battlefield.

Like the Calvinists, Hobbes persistently upheld the freedom — and therefore responsibility — of human *actions*; no one, in Hobbes's estimation, should have cause to complain that his actions were involuntary and inadmissible because extorted by fear or "the hardness of the choice."[72] But Hobbes also insisted that the human *will* was subject to any number of influences and coercions, and thus was not and never would be free. On this understanding, common to both Hobbes and the Calvinists, human existence is a tale

65. *Human Nature*, X.2; *De Homine*, XI.2; *Leviathan*, VI.54,57 (pp.92, 94), VIII.14-5 (p.110).

66. *Human Nature*, XIV.12, XVI.6; *De Cive*, Letter Dedicatory, Preface, II.18, III.9, VIII.3; *Leviathan*, XV.17 (p.232), XXVII.8 (p.456).

67. *Human Nature*, XIII.1; *De Homine*, X.3, XIII.1,3,7; *De Cive*, I.3-7, VI.11; *Leviathan*, VIII.27 (p.122), XIII.4 (p.190).

68. *Human Nature*, XIX.2; *De Cive*, I.6,13; *Leviathan*, XIII.3,9 (pp.190, 192).

69. *De Corpore Politico*, XXI.14, XXII.6; *De Cive*, VIII.8.

70. *Human Nature*, XIX, emphasis added. See also *De Cive*, Letter Dedicatory.: ". . . the absolute necessity of leagues and contracts. . . "

71. *De Cive*, Preface, I.2 (note on"born fit"). See also VI.3 and *Leviathan*, XIII.4 (p.190).

72. *Human Nature*, XII.3, XV.13. See also *De Cive*, II.16; *Leviathan*, XIV.27 (p.212), XXI.3 (p.326).

of profound subjection — the only possible choice being between various types of subjection.[73] In 1754, American theologian Jonathan Edwards wrote, "When Calvinists oppose the Arminian notion of the freedom of the will, and contingence of volition, and insist that there are no acts of the will, nor any other events whatsoever, but what are attended with some kind of necessity; their opposers cry out of them, as agreeing with the ancient Stoics in their doctrine of fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his opinion of necessity." Edwards confessed that he had not read Hobbes, and reasoned, "If Mr. Hobbes has made a bad use of this truth, that is to be lamented: but the truth is not to be thought worthy of rejection on that account. 'Tis common for the corruptions of the hearts of evil men, to abuse the best things to vile purposes."[74] Hobbes and the Calvinists might have agreed about the natural subjection of mankind, but they utilized that doctrine toward two very different ends: Calvinists used it to justify and recommend subjection to Christ, as an infinitely lighter, liberating subjection than the alternatives, while Hobbes used it to justify and recommend the relative benefits of subjection to his civil sovereign.

In an important sense, therefore, Hobbes's commonwealth by institution parallels Puritan Christology just as closely as his commonwealth by conquest did. The civil sovereign may not technically precede the commonwealth or call and compel individuals to come to him, but the inescapable forces of nature, internal and external, apply this pressure as if on his behalf. Pushed to their limit, individuals in Hobbes's state of nature seem to conjure up the sovereign in their hearts and minds before he even exists, they pin

73. See *Leviathan*, XX.18 (p.320).

74. Jonathan Edwards, *The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Volume I: Freedom of the Will [1754], ed. Paul Ramsey* (Yale University Press, 1957), 372.

on him their hopes and trust, and then they collectively plot and plan to surrender to him, as their savior and deliverer. Jurist Carl Schmitt's gloss on Hobbes's narrative draws out these very themes:

> The terror of the state of nature drives anguished individuals to come together; their fear rises to an extreme; a spark of reason flashes, and suddenly there stands in front of them a new god. Who is this god who brings peace and security to people tormented by anguish, who transforms wolves into citizens and through this miracle proves himself to be a god... The sovereign-representative person is much more than the sum total of all the participating wills. To be sure, the accumulated anguish of individuals who fear for their lives brings a new power into the picture: the leviathan. But that affirms rather than creates this new god. To that extent the new god is transcendent vis--vis all contractual partners of the covenant.[75]

The leviathan entity that Schmitt defines in this passage as constituting "more than the sum total" of aggregated individuals is what Hobbes and 17th-century theologians (with the ancients and medievals) portrayed as a living body: a third thing created through the relationship of individuals, but not reducible to them. And the transformation that Schmitt describes, from wolves to citizens (which are Hobbes's terms[76]), refers to what seems like a comprehensive conversion in each individual of their psychological orientation and behavior, if not their ontology, from hostility to geniality, from discord to concord, and from bitter war to Aristotelian harmony.

Schmitt ascribes this transformation to the sovereign, directly and personally, which is a suggestion he may have drawn from Hobbes. The embodied commonwealth is generated in and through the person of the sovereign, according to the narrative in

75. Carl Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans. George Schwab* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008 [1938]), 31, 34.

76. *De Cive*, Letter Dedicatory.

Chapter XVII from *Leviathan*, so in this sense, the sovereign certainly plays an integral role in the alleged transformation of wolves to citizens. But what is more, Hobbes frequently describes the real-life transition from war to peace, not as one undertaken or carried out by the citizens on their own, as they gradually realize that the world they inhabit is secure enough for sociability, but a herculean task unilaterally performed both for them and on them by the sovereign: Hobbes says that "he to whom they have submitted" actively "conforms,"[77] "reduces,"[78] "compels,"[79] "directs their actions to the common benefit,"[80] and "frames the will of them all to unity and concord amongst themselves."[81] Many of these passages assert that "fear" and "terror" are the tools by which the sovereign achieves social unity and concord, and these methods fully correspond to Hobbes's estimation of God's role and the relationship he has with believers.[82] Moreover, pastors and theologians of the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century typically ascribed the harmony and concord of believers in the church community (where it existed), not to the efforts of believers themselves — although they were exhorted to do their part and were blamed for the lapses — but to God's sovereign power, and this was standard practice among all Christians, not just Calvinists. Roman Catholic priest Etienne Molinier (1635) declared:

> It is not a work of human wisdom, but a masterpiece of the Divine providence, that so infinite a multitude of men so different in humors, opinions, affections,

77. Ibid., V.8; *Leviathan*, XVII.13 (p.260).

78. *De Cive*, V.1; *Leviathan*, XVII.13 (p.260).

79. *De Corpore Politico*, XXI.10.

80. *Leviathan*, XVII.12 (p.260).

81. *Human Nature*, XIX.7.

82. See *De Homine*, XIV.2,5; *De Cive*, XV.5-7,15; *Leviathan*, XIV.31 (p.216), XXVIII.27 (p.496), Latin Appendix III.9-10 (p.1232). For the work of Christ and his successors to "reduce" individuals to unity and obedience, see *Leviathan*, XVI.12 (p.248), XXXVIII.23 (p.726), and XLII.80 (p.866).

> and interests, should unite, and assemble themselves to become subject to one man [Christ], to obey his laws, follow his motions, depend on his pleasure, commit to his justice their means, their honors, and their lives: that so great a submission could be maintained amidst the natural pride of men, such respect among so froward and refractory humors, so excellent order in the throng of so many contrary passions, so firm an unity in so manifest and antipathy.[83]

The unprecedented power praised in this text not only to create a community but also to cause its members to cohere and coalesce seems comparable to the strength and capabilities Hobbes rhetorically ascribes to his civil sovereign.

And the attitudes of awe, humility, and obedience elicited in believers because of Christ's power and their perceived dependence on him, go a long way toward explaining why Hobbes would have adopted the expressions and tropes of this theological tradition into his exposition on political sovereignty, without concealing or disguising his allusions to God. Grateful obedience and submission, which were precisely the features Hobbes most wanted to foster in citizens, were seen by pastors and theologians of his time-period as inevle consequences of Christ's creative embodiment of believers. "Those very principles by which we are regenerated," wrote Robert Ferguson (1675), "are both the ligaments which knit and unite us to [Christ], and the *springs and sources of all our Gospel obedience*."[84] Puritan William Lyford (1655), who was elected to the Westminster Assembly, warned that "apparent unconformity and unlikeness unto Christ plainly shows that thou has no *real Union* or communion with him. If Christ be not fashioned in you, you are none of his: everything acts as it lives, according to the principle of life that is in it. If Christ were in

83. Etienne Molinier, *A Mirror for Christian States, or, A Table of Politic Virtues Considerable amongst Christians*, 1635, 29-30.

84. Ferguson, *Interest of Reason in Religion*, 440, emphasis added.

you, you would live like a Christian."[85] Ralph Robinson (1656) asserted, "He that will not acknowledge his dependence on Christ doth stop up the current of the grace of Christ to himself. If we withhold our acknowledgments, Christ will withhold his outflowings. Let this persuade all Christians to own their dependence on Christ."[86] And Henry Vertue (1659) enjoined, "Let us be obedient unto Christ, and subject to his government, and guided by him in all things. So are all inferior members of the natural body subject unto the head, and guided and ordered by it. So ought we therefore to be to Christ, who is our head, and the church his body, and we all members in particular." Vertue reiterated, "Let us acknowledge the relation between Christ and us, as between head and members, and accordingly render him due obedience, and be subject to him in all things... Let us carry ourselves, that by the conformity of our behavior to his, we may show to what head we belong."[87]

All of the passages above (with the exception of Ferguson's) were published about the same time as *Leviathan*, and they demonstrate that Hobbes's theme of exaltation through embodiment was an elished, common, and current theological motif. There are differences in detail and emphasis between the theological version and Hobbes's version. The idea of increasing conformity to Christ in his righteousness, virtue, and purity is not replicated in Hobbes's formulation, for instance, and much of this has to do with the difference of ends between the Christian church and Hobbes's political commonwealth: the

85. William Lyford, *The Plain Man's Senses Exercised*, 1655, 133, emphasis added.

86. Robinson, *Christ All in All*, 319-20.

87. Vertue, *Christ and the Church*, 230-1, 233. See also John Flavel, *The Method of Grace*, 1681, 40.: "They wound their head of government: Christ is a guiding as well as a quickening head... What do you do when you sin against him, but rebel against his government, refusing to follow his counsels... "

ultimate interest of the church seems to be moral holiness, while Hobbes's interest was social peace and prosperity.[88] But whether individuals were urged to conform to their sovereign in his personal virtue and righteousness (as in the Christian version), or in his will, law, judgment, and "direction" for the common good[89] (as in Hobbes's), both iterations made the sovereign indispensable to corporate unity, conceived of that unity through the metaphor of the body, and rhetorically exhorted on behalf of it by appealing to three fears: fear of death, fear of losing life, and fear of God. While Hobbes's work may bear the imprint of many different rhetorical traditions and schools,[90] his rhetorical debt to Christian theology is far greater than has yet been recognized. And given the possible centrality of these Christian tropes, metaphors, and analogies to Hobbes's political thought, it is important to remember what he thought of them and of rhetoric in general, especially because both aspects have been a source of recent controversy among scholars.

3.3 Hobbes on Rhetoric and Metaphor

While the Christological structure of Hobbes's political argument has not yet been systematically surveyed by scholars, his imitation of general rhetorical strategies employed by 17$^{\text{th}}$-century pastors has been mentioned in a few recent studies,[91] and his liberal use of

88. Although his conflation of the church and state, rigorously defended in Books III and IV of *Leviathan*, blurs this distinction a little.

89. *Leviathan*, XVII.12 (p.260).

90. See David Johnston, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation, Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1986); Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

91. See Monica Brito Vieira, *The Elements of Representation in Hobbes: Aesthetics, Theatre, Law, and Theology in the Construction of Hobbes's Theory of the State, Studies in the History of Political Thought, v.*

common persuasive techniques such as hyperbole, metaphor, and analogy (especially in *Leviathan*), has been widely investigated and discussed.[92] The general consensus is that Hobbes used these techniques in order to promote or perhaps ameliorate many of his otherwise unconvincing and unpalle political propositions, and along these lines, many scholars have noted Hobbes's tendency to rhetorically embellish and elevate the power of the sovereign over citizens as a way to foster in them a religiously-tinged, extra-rational psychology of fervor, reverence, and obligation.[93] Having observed and attested to this strategy of Hobbes, however, certain scholars have proceeded to undermine it by exposing his poetic tropes as empty or ironic rhetorical devices that he himself did not believe and may not have wanted his (discerning) readers to believe either.

For advocates of this argument, the expression "real unity" has figured prominently as evidence that Hobbes meant for his rhetorical conceits to be read against themselves. Following Pettit's suggestion about Hobbes's "real unity" being an allusion to the "real presence" of Catholic transubstantiation, theorists Victoria Kahn, Bryan Garsten, and Monica Vieira have concluded that Hobbes offered the expression ironically (given his

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2 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009); Paul D. Cooke, *Hobbes and Christianity: Reassessing the Bible in Leviathan* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Arash Abizadeh, "Publicity, Privacy, and Religious Toleration in Hobbes's Leviathan," *Modern Intellectual History* 10, no. 2 (August 2013): 261-91.

92. See Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*; Johnston, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan*; Raia Prokhovnik, *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Hobbes'* Leviathan*, Political Theory and Political Philosophy* (New York: Garland, 1991); Bryan Garsten, "The Rhetoric against Rhetoric: Hobbes," in *Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2009), 25-54; Victoria Kahn, *Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640-1674* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2004), 134-70; Victoria Kahn, *The Future of Illusion: Political Theology and Early Modern Texts* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014).

93. See Patricia Springborg, "Leviathan, the Christian Commonwealth Incorporated," *Political Studies* 24, no. 2 (June 1, 1976): 171-83; Bryan Garsten, "Religion and Representation in Hobbes," in *Leviathan, or, The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. Ian. Shapiro, Rethinking the Western Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 519-46; Abizadeh, "The Representation of Hobbesian Sovereignty."

explicit antipathy toward transubstantiation) and wanted his readers to surmise that the unity they shared with each other and the sovereign was categorically *not* real — the precise opposite meaning of his chosen terminology: "Priests who misunderstood transubstantiation took too literally the metaphor between the bread and body of Christ," reasoned Garsten. "[Thus Hobbes's] metaphor between sovereign and people was one that openly admitted to being nothing more than a metaphor; it was an artifice that wore its artificiality on its sleeve for all to see." Garsten adds, "In drawing attention to the artificial quality of sovereign representation, Hobbes indicated that subjects should keep a certain psychological distance from the sovereign."[94] Kahn has similarly drawn attention to Hobbes's derision of transubstantiation, and concluded, "Hobbesian representation has nothing to do with [religious] tradition, incarnation, or real presence. Instead, Hobbesian representation is essentially theatrical... The political subject is someone who has consented to be a member of the audience and to watch — as if on a stage — the sovereign play or counterfeit his actions... The political subject has consented to this *divorce* between the author and agent, between himself and his representative."[95]

Hobbes's metaphor of the body politic has been interpreted similarly, as a fantastic illusion, an ironic joke, or a clever ruse.[96] After comparing Hobbes's descriptions of natural and political bodes, and investigating his stance on the "soul," Stephen Hequembourg has concluded that "Hobbes does not take his own metaphor seriously... [It]

94. Garsten, "Religion and Representation in Hobbes," 538-9.

95. Kahn, *The Future of Illusion*, 37 (emphasis added). See also Vieira's argument that "whereas bread and wine remain effectively the same after the act of consecration," so does Hobbes's alleged union between citizens: Brito Vieira, *The Elements of Representation in Hobbes*, 165-6.

96. Although for one piece that does not draw these conclusions, see Sophie Smith, "Democracy and the Body Politic from Aristotle to Hobbes," *Political Theory* 46, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 167-96.

is a concession to the defects of his hearers... directed to the vulgar heads" that would inevly see in the illustration certain political "truths" that would appeal to them.[97] Robin Douglass has argued that Hobbes's body politic obviously "exists *only* in the imaginations of men," although Hobbes tried to conceal this fact from his readers by coyly describing the political body as "artificial" rather than "purely fictitious,"[98] and Patricia Springborg has pointed to the metaphorical nature of the image, to Hobbes's materialist sensibility, and to the philosophic tension between embodiment and formal legality as proof that his "term 'body politic' was really no more than a literary conceit... an automaton... a spoof on all organic theories of state."[99] The above assumptions are based upon (or agree with) a broader tendency among many of these same scholars to regard Hobbes's rhetorical gestures — and especially his images and metaphors — as ornaments that either ignore, obscure, or attack rationality: whether his intention in employing them was to distract the contentious reader,[100] placate the benighted,[101] warn off the knowing,[102] or amuse, entertain, and entrance them all,[103] Hobbes was playing at duplicity and fantasy rather

97. Hequembourg, "Tale of Two Bodies," 25-6, 29.

98. Douglass, "The Body Politic 'Is a Fictitious Body,'" 142.

99. Springborg, "Leviathan, Incorporated," 175; Patricia Springborg, "Thomas Hobbes and Cardinal Bellarmine: Leviathan and 'The Ghost of the Roman Empire,'" *History of Political Thought* 16, no. 4 (1995): 523.

100. Garsten, "Rhetoric against Rhetoric," 27.: "Hobbes did not use metaphors and other rhetorical tropes as a way to articulate an argument for deliberating citizens. Rather, he used such devices to close off deliberation."

101. Hequembourg, "Tale of Two Bodies," 29.: "... noble lies... " See also Johnston, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan*, 76.

102. Garsten, "Religion and Representation in Hobbes," 539.: "... artifice that wore its artificiality on its sleeve for all to see... The ideal citizen... would not identify too closely... " See also Abizadeh, "The Representation of Hobbesian Sovereignty," 149.: "... to 'see' the illusion represented by the sovereign but also to see it as an illusion." And Kahn, *Wayward Contract*s, 280: "... the critical judgment that is facilitated by the distancing effect of artifice."

103. Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 140-5; Kahn, *The Future of Illusion*, 23-53; Brito Vieira, *The Elements of Representation in Hobbes*, 131-3.: "... to make people 'see' things his way, quite independently... of their

than truth or rational objectivity.

Before these large-scale assumptions about Hobbes's use of rhetoric can be weighed or considered, it should be noted that the inferences about "real unity" are based upon simple misunderstandings that are easily corrected. As was demonstrated in the first chapter of this dissertation, the proper referent of "real unity" is Christ's embodied relationship with believers rather than the "real presence" of transubstantiation, which significantly undercuts the allegation that Hobbes intended the expression to be read ironically. There is also no reason to categorize it as a metaphor of any kind: Hobbes always uses the word "real" in its literal sense throughout *Leviathan*,[104] and the line it appears in has a straightforward, conceptual precision that discourages a metaphorical gloss.[105] The body politic, on the other hand, is indeed a metaphor, therefore Hobbes's general stance on the use of rhetoric is highly relevant. And a cursory assessment of that stance seems to justify the skepticism of the interpretations detailed above: in each one of his books, Hobbes showed unveiled disdain toward the "hot air of rhetoric"[106] he often observed in his opponents. Declaring "metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical speech" duplicitous by their very nature,[107] Hobbes "utterly excluded" their use for any activity

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reality."

104. For "real" versus imagined, dreamed, or fictitious, see *Leviathan*, XXVII.1 (p.452). For "real" versus "seeming," see XXXIV.25 (p.630); versus "metaphorical," see XXXV.11 (642)' versus "the act of a tongue or pen," see XXXVII.13 (p.696); versus "phantasms of the brain" and "human fancy," see XLIV.3 (p.958); versus "figment of the mind," see XLVI.16 (OL, p.1079); versus "specter," see Latin Appendix.I.4 (OL, p.1144); versus "name," see Latin Appendix.I.65 (OL, P.1172); versus "supernatural phantasm," see Latin Appendix.III.15 (OL, p.1234).

105. Ibid., XVII.13 (p.260): "This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person."

106. Ibid., XXV.15 (Latin edition, p.409-11: "... ubi se nonnunquam flatu Rhetorico ad incendium Civitatis muotuo inflammant").

107. Ibid., IV.24 (p.62, "[they] profess their inconstancy"), VIII.8 (p.108 "... they openly profess deceit").

that involved "seeking of truth."[108] He also expressed grave suspicion toward "eloquence," "exhortation," and "counsel vehemently pressed" : all tactics of persuasion "which seek not truth, but belief" and are thus "directed to the good of him that giveth counsel, not of him that asketh it."[109]

Hobbes's antipathy toward rhetoric was contrasted with — and provoked by — his passionate regard for truth and reason.[110] He asserted that the laws of nature were "eternal and immle,"[111] and that "solid reasoning" was "grounded upon principles of truth."[112] While he frequently enumerated and lamented the difficulties involved in either ascertaining or demonstrating it, Hobbes was unshakably convinced that "evident truth" existed,[113] that it was objective and knowable,[114] and that it could set humanity free from the horrors of their own making.[115] He remained optimistic that "men of great ability" (or at least of studious and discerning disposition) could deliver not only themselves but also others from the morass of emotional, sensorial, and linguistic equivocation[116]: "Teachers

108. Ibid., V.14 (p.70, VIII.8 (p.108).

109. *De Corpore Politico*, V.14; *Leviathan*, XXV.6-7 (pp.400-2).

110. Hobbes tended to use these terms interchangeably. See *Human Nature*, V.12-3; *De Cive*, Letter Dedicatory, II.1; *Leviathan*, XXXIII.3 (p.588).

111. *De Corpore Politico*, XXVIII.2; *De Cive*, III.29; *Leviathan*, XV.38 (p.240), XXVI.24,41 (pp.432, 448). See also *Human Nature*, XV.1: "The law of nature consisteth not in consent of men, but reason. . . ."

112. *Leviathan*, Review and Conclusion.1 (p.1132) See also XLVI.2: "Nothing is produced by reasoning aright, but general and immle truth."

113. Ibid., XXVI.22 (p.430). For the relationship between "truth" and "evidence," see *Human Nature*, V.12, VI.2-3.

114. *De Corpore Politico*, XXVII.13.

115. *De Cive*, Preface: ". . . when derived from true principles by evident connection, we shall then best discern, when we shall but well have considered the mischiefs that have befallen mankind from its counterfeit and babbling form."

116. *Human Nature*, V.7-8,14; *Leviathan*, III.11 (pp.44-6), XI.20 (p.158), XXV.13 (p.406), XXVII.12 (p.460), XXXII.9 (p.584).

and tutors of youths," he enjoined, "must imbue the minds of youths with precepts which are good and true."[117] This instruction would gain sway, according to Hobbes, not only because it would enjoy the support and protection of the law, but also because it would be "so consonant to reason that an unprejudicated man needs no more to learn it than to hear it."[118]

Truth and reason were thus objective realities for Hobbes, persuasive in their own right, but persuasion alone, devoid of truth or reason, was a different matter entirely: rather than engage in the grueling activity of "demonstrating and teaching the truth," mere persuasion entailed no more than "putting together passionate words and applying them to the present passions of the hearer."[119] The intention of such persuasion, according to Hobbes, "is not to inform, but to allure," and its goal is typically "not truth (except by chance), but victory."[120] People who use rhetoric in this way are sometimes innocent of its absurdity and are simply repeating what they've heard; others are more cunning, and they knowingly use it "to deceive by obscurity."[121] But either way, "when they use words metaphorically, that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for," they "thereby deceive others."[122] The ferocity and sharpness of these statements easily overwhelm the subtle distinction Hobbes was quietly positing between different types of persuasion, only certain traits of which he condemned. The rhetorical techniques he loathed were the ones

117. *De Homine*, XIII.7. See also *De Cive*, XIII.9. For a condemnation of those who attempt to teach anything other than truth, see *Human Nature*, XIII.4.

118. *Leviathan*, XXX.6 (p.524).

119. *De Corpore Politico*, XXVII.14.

120. *De Cive*, X.11.

121. *Leviathan*, VIII.27 (p.122).

122. Ibid., IV.4 (p.50).

accompanied with some other blameworthy quality or directed toward an inappropriate end: he found that eloquence fosters rebellion, for instance, but only in a "man of little wisdom" who "lacks discretion" or is otherwise foolish.[123] Fancy "ends in stupidity," but only "if it exceeds moderation,"[124] and it is "madness," but only if it be applied "without steadiness and direction to some end."[125] Persuasion "begetteth no more in the hearer than bare opinion," but only if applied without any "evidence."[126]

Conversely, persuasion pressed into the service of practical wisdom or truth was an entirely different matter for Hobbes. Although he generally preferred the austerity of "deliberation" and "solid reasoning" to rhetoric, he readily admitted that "sometimes the understanding [has] need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of fancy."[127] Moreover, "if there be not powerful eloquence, which procurreth attention and consent, the effect of reason will be little."[128] At the conclusion of *Leviathan*, Hobbes elaborated and defended his final stance on rhetoric, first, by examining the common objection against it — an objection that he himself had leveled before: reason and eloquence are allegedly "contrary faculties... Both these, they say, cannot stand together in the same person."[129] Hobbes then declared that despite difficulties, these two can and

123. *De Corpore Politico*, XXVII.14-5. See also *De Cive*, XII.13; *De Corpore [1656], ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford World's Classics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), XIII.2: "Nevertheless, I deny not but the reading of some such books is very delightful; for they are most eloquently written, and contain many clear, wholesome and choice sentences, which yet are not universally true... " (emphasis added).

124. *De Homine*, XIII.2.

125. *Leviathan*, VIII.3.

126. *Human Nature*, XIII.2.

127. *Leviathan*, VIII.8 (p.108). For a description of the benefits of fancy when combined with "discretion," see VIII.3,8-9 (pp.105-6, 108).

128. Ibid., Review and Conclusion.1 (p.1132).

129. Ibid.: "These are contrary faculties: the former being grounded upon principles of truth; the other

should be reconciled: "Reason and eloquence... may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of error, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn." Hobbes cautioned that this powerful fusion required great skill, "education and discipline," but he specifically cited his friend Sidney Godolphin, to whom he dedicated *Leviathan*, as an example of someone who had successfully combined both "clearness of judgment and largeness of fancy, strength of reason and graceful elocution."[130]

Quentin Skinner has argued that Hobbes learned this approach from the ancient practitioners of rhetoric, such as Cicero, who also tended to distinguish between two forms of persuasion: the first which was vacuous, cynical, and interested in winning over an audience at all costs and regardless of the position, in contrast to the second type, which was substantive, sincere, and interested in appealing to the rationality and moral conscience of the audience.[131] Hobbes explicitly insisted that his own usage of rhetoric fell into the latter category. In his earlier works he was careful to exhort his readers only when he thought *their own good* (rather than his) was threatened,[132] and he openly alerted them to passages in which he had attempted to persuade without the requisite evidence.[133] In *Leviathan*, which is his most deliberately rhetorical work, he elaborated on the legitimate

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upon opinions already received (true or false) and upon the passions and interests of men (which are different and mle)."

130. Ibid., Review and Conclusion.4 (p.1133).

131. See Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, 4, 344-5, 352-3, 373-6.

132. *De Cive*, Preface.

133. Ibid.: "For though I have endeavored, by arguments in my tenth chapter, to gain a belief in men, that monarchy is the most commodious government, which one things alone I confess in this whole book not to be demonstrated, but only probably stated... "

use of exhortation[134] and removed the persuasive leanings in those earlier unsubstantiated passages.[135] He frequently discoursed on correct and incorrect metaphors, offering example after example (often from scripture) and tirelessly exposing potential pitfalls and errors in interpretation. The expression "hell fire," for instance, "is spoken metaphorically" in that we should not expect a literal fire in hell; but it is an appropriate metaphor in that "there is a proper sense to be enquired after, both of the place of hell, and the nature of hellish torments and tormenters."[136] Likewise, the word "spirit" is understood metaphorically to mean "some extraordinary ability," in addition to its plain meaning, "real substance."[137] However, the "kingdom of God" should *not* be understood metaphorically, because scripture forbids it, except in rare situations.[138] Similarly, the term "baptism" must be taken literally to denote a washing of water; when Cardinal Bellarmine tried to offer a metaphorical interpretation of the word ("a baptism of penance"), Hobbes rejected it because "this is a metaphor of which there is no example, neither in the Scripture nor in any other use of language, and which is also discordant to the harmony and scope of the Scripture."[139]

Consequently when interpreting Hobbes's own metaphors and tropes, it seems safest to assume, first, that they agree with the harmony and scope of his work, since that was one of the criteria by which he judged their soundness and suility. When the

134. *Leviathan*, XXV.9-10 (pp.402-4).

135. Ibid., XIX (pp.284-304).

136. Ibid., XXXVIII.11 (p.714).

137. Ibid., XXXIV.14 (p.618).

138. Ibid., XXXV.2,11,13 (pp.634, 642, 644).

139. Ibid., XLIV.34 (p.1002).

agreement of his work is in question — as in, for example, the scholarly allegation that Hobbes rejected the concept of the "soul" yet described the sovereign as a soul, or affirmed formal legality yet spoke of embodiment, which is a contradiction — care must be taken to ascertain whether or not there actually is anything discordant in Hobbes's usage, or more importantly, whether he himself would have thought so. His understanding of "soul" was discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, and the logic of legality and embodiment was discussed in the second chapter, neither case suggesting that Hobbes's metaphor of the body politic was noticeably inconsistent or at odds with his broader philosophic commitments and goals. This chapter showed how his other rhetorical allegories and analogies, such as the state of nature, the mortal god, and the representative as creator, seamlessly coalesce with the original body politic motif, all of them together reinforcing and promoting his ultimate political end: civil obedience. If, as so many current scholars maintain, Hobbes's readers were to understand by his tropes that sovereignty was wholly imaginary, that his state of nature narrative was merely a fictitious romance, and that his alleged "real union" between sovereign and citizens was so artificial, it should more properly be called a "divorce" — it is hard to know how his goal of civil obedience would be furthered, and easy to see how it might be subverted. This conundrum is avoided, however, if Hobbes's second criterion for appropriate rhetorical usage is observed and his metaphors are presumed to illuminate rather than deceive, and persuade by reason rather than manipulate by emotion.

The scholarly suggestion that Hobbes had two audiences in mind — one whom Hobbes could safely deceive with various religious and rhetorical tropes, and the other who

would ignore these tropes or merely be amused by them — is convenient but highly disple.[140] Hobbes never recommended that anyone be deceived, regardless of their acumen; he was confident that the truth was on his side and that everyone should be able to appreciate that according to their capacity. In his Letter Dedicatory to the 1658 edition of *De Homine* and *De Cive*, Hobbes explained that the two works were dissimilar in that:

> One is very difficult, the other very easy; one consists of demonstrations, the other of experience; one can be understood by few, the other by all. They are therefore somewhat abruptly conjoined; but this was necessary, granted the method of my work as a whole. For man is not just a *natural body*, but also a part of the state, or (as I put it) of the *body politic*; for that reason he had to be considered as both man and citizen, that is, the first principles of physics had to be conjoined with those of politics, the most difficult with the easiest.[141]

Hobbes may posit two audiences here, but it is clear that the second audience is inclusive of the first; at no point does Hobbes suggest that the unlearned should be deceived or misled (and he frequently urges the opposite), nor does he intimate that the "hard" aspects of his philosophy are somehow incompatible or inconsistent with the "easier" aspects (and again, the opposite). Hobbes presented the methodological differences between physics and experience as alternative, but not contradictory, approaches in the gleaning of evidence and the pursuit of truth. He often presented the differences between scientific discourse and scriptural revelation in a similar manner,[142] promising at the end of *Leviathan* "to offer such doctrine as I think true (and that manifestly tend to peace and loyalty), in this time that men call not only for peace, but also for truth," adding "All truth of doctrine

140. Skinner casts doubt on this hypothesis: see *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, 426-7.

141. *De Homine*, Letter Dedicatory. For other examples of Hobbes's interest in "undeceiving" the simple, see *De Cive*, III.26, XIII.9; *Leviathan*, II.8 (p.34), XVIII.16 (p.278).

142. See *De Cive*, IV.1, XI (title heading), XV.1; *Leviathan*, XX.16,18 (pp.316, 320), XXXI.1 (p.554), XXXII.1 (p.576), Review and Conclusion.16 (p.1140).

dependeth either upon reason or upon Scripture."[143]

And for all of the assumptions that have been made about the alleged ignorance and naivety of Hobbes's religious audience, there has been little scholarly interest in investigating their actual mindset, and the mentality by which they would have understood and interpreted Hobbes's rhetorical gestures. His expression "real unity" is a theological term, and his metaphor of the body politic — ensconced as it is within a larger rhetorical narrative about escape from death and celebration of life, in and through a quasi-divine representative — is a religious, Christological trope. Knowing more about the 17th-century Christian perspective on these tropes would help to explain the mentality of Hobbes's target audience, and may also reveal that they had a surprisingly sophisticated understanding of biblical metaphors, of the proper use of these metaphors in rational discourse, and of their inherent usefulness for fostering social peace and concord.

3.4 17th-century Attitudes toward Christological Rhetoric

The metaphor of Christ's church body first appeared in an epistle written by the apostle Paul to the Christian community at Corinth,[144] a group that was notorious for its internal conflict and dysfunction. Paul encouraged them to mend their divisions and work together as one unit: "For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is Christ." As for the natural organism, "God

143. *Leviathan*, Review and Conclusion.14-15 (pp.1138-40) "All truth of doctrine dependeth either upon reason or upon Scripture."

144. See I Corinthians 12:12-31 (written c. AD 53-4)

hath tempered the body together... that there should be no schism in the body... Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular."[145] This metaphor, which became the leading analogy in Christian theology for the church and for the unity between believers and Christ, proved to be intuitive enough when used in a pastoral setting, casually and rhetorically, but in each subsequent generation since Paul, it has presented significant interpretive difficulties when subjected to rigorous, rational scrutiny. Under pressure to elucidate the reality behind the metaphor (or as Hobbes put it, to inquire after the "proper sense" of the metaphor[146]), theologians throughout the centuries have tended to describe Christ's church body as both a "mystical" and a "real" phenomenon, a formulation that has proven less than satisfactory, especially in the modern era. One prominent theologian has recently observed that "the terms 'mystical' and 'spiritual' take back what the term 'real' offers; but they fail to cover up the difficulty in carrying through the 'real' with consistent literalness to the end. We might as well have the courage to say 'metaphorical.'"[147]

The pastors and theologians of Hobbes's time-period would probably not be impressed with this statement. They were completely cognizant of the metaphorical nature of Christ's mystical body and thus its non-literal function. They did not locate "realness" in the physicality of that image, but beyond it: "By union I am a member of the body, whereof Christ is the head," declared Henry Roborough (1643), the year he began to serve as scribe for the Westminster Assembly. "We are partakers of the same spirit: then is our

145. Ibid., 12:12,24-5,27

146. See *Leviathan*, XXXVIII.11 (p.714).

147. Robert Horton Gundry, Soma *In Biblical Theology* (Cambridge University Press, 1976), 228.

union real, *revera* [in reality], and *not metaphorical only.*"[148] Welsh Independent Walter Cradock (1646) preached a sermon to the House of Commons in which he asserted, "As there is a greater nearness, so there is a greater reality in our union with Christ than is between any natural things whatsoever; they are but shadows of spiritual things."[149] The understanding of metaphors as "shadows" of something else was yet one more indication to pastors and theologians that Christ's union with believers was more or greater than the analogies offered in scripture, and certainly not less. "If [Christ's real union] be not so," Puritan Thomas Higgenson (1653) protested incredulously, "then all those figures, allegories, and parabolical similitudes of vine and branches, husband and wife, head and members, chosen and expressed by the Spirit in the scriptures to shadow out the union of Christ and saints, have much more in them than is in the mystery or truth typed and shadowed by them!"[150] For 17$^{\text{th}}$-century believers, Christ's union was emphatically more real than the various metaphors and analogies they put forward for it, despite or perhaps because of the fact that Christ's union was invisible and spiritual in contrast to the corporeal and tangible nature of the analogies themselves. "Because it is not a corporeal, but a spiritual Union," argued Puritan Thomas Case (1670), "therefore it is so true and real, that in comparison of it, all unions and conjunctions in nature are nothing else but so many figures and shadows."[151]

148. Henry Roborough, *The Doctrine of Justification Cleared*, 1643, 91 (emphasis added).

149. Walter Cradock, *The Saints' Fullness of Joy in Their Fellowship with God Presented in a Sermon Preached July 21, 1646, before the Honorable House of Commons in Margarets Westminster*, 1646, 21.

150. Thomas Higgenson, *Glory Sometimes Afar off*, 1653, 31-2.

151. Thomas Case, *Mount Pisgah, or, A Prospect of Heaven*, 1670, 29. For a similar statement, see Thomas Jacombee, *Several Sermons on Romans*, 1672, 52.

Because pastors and theologians had less of a commitment to the metaphors themselves than to the spiritual union to which they referred, it was easy for pastors to acknowledge that the metaphors inevly broke down and either failed to capture, or actively misrepresented, the reality in question. Presbyterian Stephen Marshall (1652) delivered a sermon before the mayor of London in which he admitted:

> Though the church be not Christ's natural body, it is yet *as* his natural body: the great question is, Wherein doth this comparison or resemblance stand? To that I answer first: it is easy for a man to name many particulars wherein the comparison will not hold betwixt the church and natural body, and it is easy for a man to name many things wherein they are very like one to another. But we must not be wise beyond the scripture, nor stretch it any further than the Lord intends it.

Marshall said he believed that the comparison should be properly made in that,

> As in the natural body the members and every member hath a real union with the head... having the same spirit animating it that is in the head, and thereby hath a communion with, and dependence upon the head in all the offices that the head can do for it; so every particular Christian, or member of the church, hath a real, indissoluble, spiritual union and conjunction with the Lord Christ, having his spirit communicated unto them, which is the foundation of all their communion, the very root and principle of their spiritual life, and which enables them every one for their part to live unto Christ.[152]

Irish clergyman Claudius Gilbert (1658) similarly signaled that caution was to be taken when using the common metaphors for Christ's union, although he was equally careful to insist upon the incontrovertible reality behind them: "There is indeed a spiritual relative union between Christ and the regenerate, set forth in scripture by divers emblems: the natural union between the head and members, the civil union between husband and wife, the artificial union between foundation and building set it forth. But we must not strain

152. Stephen Marshall, *A Sermon Preached to the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor,* 1653, 5.

figurative speeches beyond their scope. This union is real, yet mystical, full of mysteries."[153]

Often the metaphors themselves would prove problematic or confusing, which would lead many pastors to abandon the metaphors and remind their congregants that the analogies were to be used only as long as they continued to elucidate and no longer. After Presbyterian Thomas Jacombe (1672) preached that Christ and believers were made "one mystical person," he warned, "But hereon sundry discourses to ensue and various enquiries are made — what a person is, in what sense, and how many senses that word may be used, what is the true notion of it, what is a natural person, what a legal, civil, or political person — in the explication whereof some have fallen into mistakes." Jacombe dismissed these disputes as mostly irrelevant because,

> Although there may be some imperfect resemblances found in natural or political unions, the union from whence that denomination is taken between [Christ] and us, is of that nature, and arises from such reasons and causes, as no personal union among men (or the union of many persons) hath any concernment in. And therefore as to the representation of it unto our weak understandings unable to comprehend the depth of heavenly mysteries, it is compared unto unions of divers kinds and natures.[154]

In an anonymous catechism published 1688, the familiar caution about shadows was reiterated, along with a somewhat defensive apology for the term "mystical" : "Nothing could be more real than [Christ's] union," the author declared. "We call this a mystical union in opposition to a natural and visible union. It is supernatural, illustrated by natural, artificial, and civil unions, in metaphorical shadows and illustrations. We do not

153. Claudius Gilbert, *A Sovereign Antidote against Sinful Errors*, 1658, 112-3

154. Jacombe, *Several Sermons on Romans*, 246, 250.

darken or deceive the minds of men by calling this union mystical or secret: the whole of our religion, and in particular this union, is a mystery... therefore to expose this term, mystical, to derision calls for repentance."[155]

Once again, Robert Ferguson offers us the most developed treatment on this subject from his 1675 treatise *The interest of reason in religion with the import and use of scripture-metaphors, and the nature of the union betwixt Christ and believers.* He held a similar position to Hobbes with regard to the use of metaphors and often expressed himself in phrases nearly identical to those written by Hobbes — indicating either that Ferguson was influenced by Hobbes (highly unlikely, given Ferguson's religious and political convictions[156]) or that (more likely) Hobbes's opinions on this matter, while sharp and forceful, were not atypical for his time-period. Ferguson was quite skeptical about rhetoric, and especially metaphors, used in rational, philosophic discourse, complaining, "There are no schemes of speech that are more liable to be mistaken and wrested to a perverse sense than metaphors are. The instances in which one things may resemble another are so many, and the power of imagination so great, that in nothing may a man sooner prevaricate than in expounding metaphorical terms and phrases."[157] Ferguson openly defined metaphor as "a bare and single similitude, where one thing is misnamed by another, because of their

155. Anonymous, *Catechism Made Practical, the Christian Instructed*, 1688, 59.

156. Ferguson was a Scottish Presbyterian who was known as the "the Plotter" because of his persistent involvement in political plots to overthrow the government. One biographer said that he was "always in opposition to the elished government" (see James Ferguson, *Robert Ferguson the Plotter: Or, The Secret of the Rye-House Conspiracy and the Story of a Strange Career* [Edinburgh: D. Douglas, 1887], 2.) What is more, Ferguson briefly mentions Hobbes in *Interest of Religion*, only to relate that Hobbes "grossly prevaricates" about there being no independent spirits without a body, denies God's being, and "combats God's grace" (see Ferguson, *Interest of Reason in Religion*, 230, 433).

157. Ferguson, *Interest of Reason in Religion*, 341.

agreement in some one adjunct, affection, or property."[158] He reported:

> Augustine defines metaphor to be the traduction of a word from its proper signification to a sense that doth not originally belong to it." He asserted, "A metaphor then, is the styling of one thing by the name of another, which as they have no necessary connection absolutely considered, so they stand in no such relation, but that the one may be apprehended without the other. Only because of some similitude or proportion, the one is denominated by the term which expresseth the other, the better to manifest and illustrate some property, affection &c. in that other.[159]

Whatever grave doubts Ferguson had about the use of metaphors for philosophy, he reversed that attitude for theology:

> I can very well allow that in philosophy, where the quality and nature of things do not transcend and over-match words, the less rhetorical ornaments, especially the fewer metaphors, providing that the phrase be pure and easy, the better. But in divinity, where no expressions come fully up to mysteries of faith, and where the things themselves are not capable of being declared in logical and metaphysical terms, metaphors may not only be allowed, but are most accommodated to the assisting us in our conceptions of Gospel-mysteries.[160]

He agreed with the "shadow" analogy for metaphors in that "everything spoken metaphorically is spoken obscurely with respect to expressing the nature of things," but he observed that "on the other hand, a metaphor carries along in it something of perspicuity... It renders things clear, it accommodates them to our senses, and gives some umbrage and shadow of them, though as to the full manifesting their nature to our reason it falls short." In this sense, "rhetorical tropes and figures have been usually accounted for lights and colors to illustrate things, and not for shades and clouds to darken and obscure

158. Ibid., 315.

159. Ibid., 298, 301.

160. Ibid., 279-80.

them."[161] Ferguson concluded, "I suppose it beyond all subject and debate (at least among persons that are not wild and frantic) that where the terms in Scripture are metaphorical, yet the truths expressed by them are real. 'Tis a high blasphemy against the Spirit of God to imagine the Scripture a mere dress of words employed about nothing." He sternly added, "Metaphors are not used to impregnate our minds with gaudy phantasms, but to adjust the mysteries of religion to the weakness of our capacities."[162]

Ferguson declared that there was "not one thing in the Gospel which the Holy Ghost hath judged meet to express in greater variety of phrase than the mystery of our cohesion with Jesus Christ." He listed the many scripture analogies for union with Christ, such as branches, body, and building foundation, observing, "I know all these expressions are metaphorical, yet I also know that they must be declarative of something that is not only real, but whose greatness is not easy to conceive."[163] Sensitive to the incredulity that might be expressed at this alleged mystery, he argued, "I see no reason why the incomprehensibleness of the manner of our union with Christ should any ways obstruct or weaken our belief of it." Ferguson pointed out that many unions occurring in nature, such as the union of body and soul, were equally incomprehensible: "That a tremor begot in the nerves by the jogging of matter upon the sensory organs should excite cogitations in the soul; or that the soul by a mere thought should beget a motion in the animal spirits... is a phenomenon in the theory of which we are perfectly nonplussed."[164] (In a passage that

161. Ibid., 294, 320-1.

162. Ibid., 342.

163. Ibid., 559-60.

164. Ibid., 487, 495-7.

Hobbes would probably approve, Ferguson specifically accused the Aristotelians of taking up these questions and "resolv[ing] themselves either into idle tattle and insignificant words, or obtrud[ing] upon us contradictions and nonsense."[165]) This observation about the incomprehensibility of many physical unions was common among 17th-century pastors and theologians, from which it was suggested that Christ's union ought to be given as least as much respect as any other union whose substance or workings were invisible to the human eye. Anglican bishop Joseph Hall protested, "Spiritual agents neither have, nor put forth, any whit less virtue because sense cannot discern their manner of working. Even the loadstone, though an earthen, yet, when it is out of sight, whether under thele or behind a solid partition, stirreth the needle as effectively as if it were in view. Shall not he contradict his senses that will say, It cannot work because I see it not?"[166]

This statement raises the question of epistemology, and it suggests that invisible entities can be known by their visible effects: a principle frequently maintained by Hobbes, especially with regard to God's being.[167] Ferguson tended to emphasize the authority of scriptural revelation when attempting to ascertain the reality of spiritual realities. "The highest assurance of the reality of anything is God's affirming it," he wrote. "And what God asserts we are with reverence to assent to its truth, though we can frame no adequate idea of it, nor fathom it in our conceptions."[168] This was a standard Christian reflex, but

165. Ibid., 491.

166. Joseph Hall, *Christ Mystical, or, The Blessed Union of Christ and His Members*, 1647, 12.

167. For the effects of God's being and will, see *Leviathan*, XI.25 (p.160), XII.6 (p.166), XXXI.26 (p.558), XXXVII.8 (p.688). For other (primarily religious) effects of invisible entities, see XXIX.8 (pp.502-4), XXXIV.3 (p.612), and XXXIV.26 (p.630).

168. Ferguson, *Interest of Reason in Religion*, 654. See also Thomas Staynoe, *Salvation by Jesus Christ Alone*, 1700, 75: "It is a presumption to measure all possibilities by the standard of our own reason... There are actually several real unions which must be confessed to be so which yet we should never have known if

many pastors and theologians pressed beyond this proof to insist that Christ's union could (and should) be known to be real and true through its visible effects in believers. "That union produceth real effects and operations in us," contended Puritan William Lyford (1655). "Therefore the union is real."[169] Presbyterian James Durham (1668) reported, "It makes and transfers a mutual right of one to the other [Christ and believers], and hath real effects."[170] Puritan pastor John Flavel (1681) cautioned, "God only discerns it, who is the author of it; but we may discern it mediately and secondarily by the effects and operations of it." He explained the difference: "Could we see the simple essence of grace, or intuitively discern our union with Christ, our knowledge would be demonstrative, *a priori ad posterius*, by seeing the effects as they are lodged in their cause. But we come to know the being of grace, and the reality of our union with Christ *a posteriori*, by ascending in our knowledge from the effects and operations to their true cause and being."[171]

Regardless of how it was accessed or ascertained, however, 17th-century pastors and theologians were unshakably convinced that Christ's union with believers was *real*. The select expression they designated for it — "real unity" — was itself a deliberate and unequivocal announcement of that fact: Christ's union might be mystical, spiritual, invisible, and insensible, but in no sense was it to be regarded as illusory, imaginary, metaphorical, rhetorical, notional, fanciful, fictitious, figurative, or fake. No other opinion on Christ's representative unity was asserted with such clarity and unanimity than this

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we had not been made acquainted with them by revelation."

169. Lyford, *The Plain Man's Senses*, 115.

170. James Durham, *Clavis Cantici, or, An Exposition of the Song of Solomon* (Edinburgh, 1668), 149.

171. Flavel, *Method of Grace*, 405.

one, and it began to be expressed with exceptional force and increased frequency around the time that Oliver Cromwell's letter (which cited Christ's "real unity") and Hobbes's *Leviathan* was published. Here is a sampling, in chronological order:

- "The Scripture saith that we are one body with Jesus Christ... which union I think [even] our adversaries [the Roman Catholics] *will not call imaginary and figurative.* They rather acknowledge it to be real and true." Pierre Du Moulin (1620)

- "A true, real union of our persons (bodies and souls) with the person of Christ... is to be noted against their conceit who imagine this union to be only *in imagination and conceit*, or else only in consent of spirit, heart, and will." William Gouge (1622)

- "Now this union is *not a mere notional and intellectual union*, that consists only in the understanding, and without the understanding is nothing... but this union is a real, mystical, and spiritual union." Benjamin King (1640)

- "The disposition of these [members] each to other is real. *Imaginary unions* are as useless here as imaginary parts... Health is not in imagination." George Hughes (1644)

[Oliver Cromwell's letter to Parliament published, 1645]

- "It is *not a notional union*, as some conceive that Christ and we are united... I would not have you think that the union between Christ and the saints is nothing but a poor, *empty notion or imagination*, but I will marry thee in truth... in reality, as much, or rather more really than man and wife are united by marriage." Walter Cradock (1646)

- "Do not then conceive of this union as *some imaginary thing*, that hath no other being but in the brain... Do not think it *an union merely virtual*... Do not think it *an accidental union*... nor yet *a metaphorical union* by way of figurative resemblance. But know that this a true, real, essential, substantial union, whereby the person of the believer is indissolubly united to the glorious person of the Son of God. Know that this union is not more mystical than certain... Away yet with all gross carnality of conceit. This union is true, and really existent, but yet spiritual... Neither is it the less real, because spiritual." Joseph Hall (1647)

[**Hobbes's *Leviathan* published, 1651**]

- "Christ and we are one, *not only in speculation or imagination*, but really, whether you think it or not... It is *not only mental, or in conceit, or speculative by imagination*, but real, and a thing existing extra mentem, whether we conceit or not." William Lyford (1655)

- "It is a real union... Christ and a believer are united, *not imaginarily*, but really. Though it be an invisible union to the eye of sense, yet it is visible to the eye of faith. Though it be a spiritual union, yet it is a true union." Henry Vertue (1659)

- "The union which is made with us and Christ... is real and *not imaginary*... The union which faith makes is a real union, even such a union wherein we are indeed rooted or joined unto Christ... Our union is so real that are bodies are called the members of Christ." Obadiah Sedgwick (1661)

- "Neither is the saints' sleeping at their dissolution a *bare piece of rhetoric*, but a most real notion... Saints' bodies are, whilst in the grave, really united to Christ, which real union of their dust to Christ is a glorious security of their bodies' blessed life, which the former bare union of their souls and bodies together before death could never give them." Robert Tatnall (1665)

- "It's a real and *not an imaginary union* (though it be spiritual and by faith)." James Durham (1668)

- "'Tis a real union: *not a notional, fantastic, or opinionative thing*, something that is *merely matter of fancy and imagination*, or something that dull and melancholy persons please themselves with the thoughts of. O 'tis not so, but 'tis a real things and as great a reality as any whatsoever it be. You have very many scriptures which speak to it, under great variety of expressions, all of which with the greatest evidence and clearness do point to it, and cannot be otherwise understood, and yet will you doubt of it and look upon it as a mere fancy?...Nothing in religion is real if this be not. Take away this mystical oneness between Christ and the soul, and take away all." Thomas Jacomb (1672)

- "Now is Jesus Christ a sacrifice for our redemption, sanctification, and salvation: *not by an imaginary, notional, arbitrary imputation*, but a real immediate union between Christ and the world." Peter Sterry (1675)

- "We see this union is real and *not imaginary*. Though Christ be in heaven and we upon earth, yet the bond is real, the same spirit in both, as many members of one body acted by the same soul." William Strong (1678)

- "It is a most real union. It is *not a mere notional and intellectual union* that consists only in the understanding and without the understanding is nothing. It is *not an imaginary thing* that hath no other being but only in the brain. No, no, it is a true, real, essential, substantial union." Isaac Ambrose (1680)

- "The saints' union with Christ is *not a mere mental union*, only in conceit and notion, but really exists extra mentem, whether we conceit it or not. I know the atheistical world censures all these things as fancies and idle imaginations; but believers know the reality of them... This doctrine is not fantastical but scientifical." John Flavel (1681)

This last quote, along with the above quote by Lyford (1655), emphasizes that Christ's union exists *extra mentem*: independent of the mental or emotional acknowledgement, not only of "atheistical" skeptics, but also of the very believers who make up Christ's union and formally assent to the doctrine. "Christ and we are one," pronounced Lyford, "not only in speculation or imagination, but really, whether you think it or not."[172]

The efforts made here to persuade and assure an audience that should need no persuasion or assurance reveals that the motivation behind the strenuous defense of the union's objective existence was as much about insulating it from the vicissitudes of believers' emotions and psychology, as about defending the doctrine against unbelievers. Given the post-reformation crisis in Britain, and the ecclesiastical war that raged between Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Independents for decades, believers of the 17th century were

172. Lyford, *The Plain Man's Senses*, 115.

just as subject to doubts about the reality of Christ's union as anyone else. Thomas Jackson's lament (1653) quoted earlier in this chapter epitomizes the pastoral consternation routinely expressed during this era about the religious conflict that constantly threatened to "make all the World besides, *and ourselves oft-times (we may fear*) doubt of the true and real unity betwixt Christ and his members, now eclipsed by our carnal divisions."[173] Moreover, this 17th-century ecclesiastical strife only aggravated the internal, intellectual and emotional turmoil which was considered typical in the faith life of believers of any era. "There may be a true and real union between Christ and the soul," cautioned Puritan John Lougher (1680), "and yet the soul may discern many disorders and sad miscarriages in itself."[174] Ezekiel Hopkins (1692), a prominent Puritan clergyman in Ireland, acknowledged that, "Those who have a real and vital union to Christ, and maintain a spiritual communion with him, yet even they have a sad mixture" of sin and doubt within them, such that "[along] with our profession of faith, we had need also to prefer that humble petition, Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief."[175]

Insisting upon the unambiguous objectivity of Christ's union was a subtly powerful way to minimize doubts, and the Puritan preoccupation with the doctrine's formal and legal dimension effectively worked toward foregrounding rationality when emotional confidence was burning low. Leading Scottish Presbyterian Samuel Rutherford (1655) firmly demanded that Christian unity "not [be] understood subjective, as if it were in us, but legally and objectively in Christ." Rutherford was quick to admit, however, that

173. Jackson, *Collection of Works*, 19 (emphasis added).

174. John Lougher, *A Treatise of the Soul's Union with Christ*, 1680, 31.

175. Ezekiel Hopkins, *An Exposition on the Lord's Prayer*, 1692, 41.

this legal relationship, "as it is terminated to single persons, to me or to you," remains somewhat unbelievable "until by faith we apprehend it,"[176] thereby highlighting the danger of any approach that permanently ignores psychological realities in favor of those that are formal and objective. While 17th-century theologians were careful not to reduce Christ's union to an emotional experience, they refused to minimize the psychological assurance that Christ's union could provide to believers in their everyday lives: "We desire to feel this union and experimentize it in our own souls," wrote Puritan pastor Christopher Fowler (1655), "knowing that in these cobwebby times of vain speculations, one beam of God's love, one drop of the blood of Christ upon our hearts, one witness of the spirit in ordinances, will do us more good than all the meteors and notions in the world."[177]

The internal experience of Christ's unity brought comfort to early-modern believers, but even more importantly, it created, not so much the ontological reality of that union (which was understood to exist independently of internal experience), but the *productive* reality of it. The spiritual union of Christ could be made manifest — it could be made visible — in each individual believer and in the community at large, but sincere, unqualified obedience to Christ was crucial to this possibility and process: "Abide in your obedience to God in the just performance of your duties," exhorted one anonymous treatise (1668). "Do it that you may preserve your union... that you may evidence yourselves, to yourselves and to others also, to have had and have a true and real union."[178] Puritan pastor Henry Dorney (1613-1683) went still further: "Be very serious in exercising faith, to

176. Samuel Rutherford, T*he Covenant of Life Opened* (Edinburgh, 1655), 208, 211.

177. Christopher Fowler, *Daemonium Meridianum*, 1655, 36.

178. Anonymous, *A Word in Season, Or, Three Great Duties of Christians in the Worst of Times*, 1668, 79.

represent the truth and reality of this Union-state, that there is such a thing," he gravely enjoined. "And in that exercise dilate your thoughts in an awful, serious, comfole reverence and reverent love of God manifested in the flesh, to be Emmanuel, God with us. Pursue this meditation till you even make this Union as visible as may be to the eye of your faith."[179] There is a performative effect sought after in these exhortations that both confirms and manifests the union in question. And there is a kind of rhythm and rationale in the theological exposition on Christ's unity — grounded as it is both in objective rationality and in personal experience, while also productive toward a specific existential and social reality — that coincides with Hobbes's own rhetorical means and his ultimate political ends.

There are thus several conclusions to be drawn about 17th-century Christian rhetoric that have direct relevance for the interpretation of Hobbes, beginning with the importance of rhetoric — and especially metaphors — for rational, theological discourse about "mysterious" phenomena: firstly, the pastors and theologians of the 17th century, no less than Hobbes, openly relied upon similitudes and metaphors to explain moral and spiritual realities that otherwise defied ordinary human language, and like Hobbes, they gave marked preference for the metaphors presented in and endorsed by scripture.[180] Therefore secondly, theologians took it for granted that there was, as Hobbes put it, a "proper sense to be inquired after" in each metaphor they used, and for that reason they were generally careful to eschew gratuitous or misleading analogies. Thirdly and

179. Henry Dorney, *Divine Contemplations, and Spiritual Breathings of Mr. Henry Dorney*, 1684 [posthumous], 180.

180. See *Leviathan*, XLIV.34 (p.1002), Review and Conclusion.4 (p.1133): "So also reason and eloquence (though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet in the moral) may stand very well together."

significantly, Christians of the 17th century did not regard "real unity" to be a figurative or metaphorical expression: it was a non-rhetorical theological term that both named and described what was regarded to be an invisible moral reality, and Hobbes gave no indication that his own use of the expression should be understood in any other way. Fourthly, the metaphors employed by 17th-century theologians to describe Christ's "real unity" — such as vine branches, building materials, and especially the living body — were certainly intended as aids for comprehension, but they were also used to encourage and foster an existential experience. Christians were urged to "read themselves" (as Hobbes put it), and to discover within themselves psychological evidence that they were indeed connected to Christ and to other believers in a deeply emotional, embedded, and embodied sense. They were also enjoined to actively strengthen this bond and publically manifest it by intentionally submitting their wills to Christ and showing him unqualified obedience.

This rhetorical progression in pastoral literature of the 17th century — from appeals to the evidence of personal experience, and remedial education about the rational and existential evidence for Christ's unity, to insistent exhortations about obedience and social concord — parallels the rhetorical progression employed by Hobbes in his political works, which is perhaps unsurprising given that 17th-century Christians made up Hobbes's primary audience. Since it is not clear that he had any other (enlightened) audience in mind, understanding the attitudes and assumptions of 17th-century Christians about many of the metaphors and analogies used by Hobbes in his work should be considered an important first step toward correcting modern presuppositions, where they exist, about the way he would have been read or wanted to be read. Many interesting observations made in

recent scholarship about the role of rhetorical theatrics and symbolic belief in Hobbes's thought are both affirmed and corroborated in the Christian literature of the 17th century. Reorienting this scholarship toward, rather than against, this context puts it on a more sure footing and opens up possibilities for future growth in the field.

3.5 Reframing the Conversation on Rhetoric in Hobbes

In recent scholarship there has been a marked tendency to assume that Hobbes must have wanted his commonwealth to be regarded as a wholly imaginative construct, or perhaps even as a lie, simply because he chose to depict it with a metaphor. Patricia Springborg has noted, for instance, that since Hobbes's body politic was "clearly metaphorical... it would be unthinkable to take the elaboration literally."[181] Bryan Garsten has also cautioned against "taking this metaphor too literally," concluding that Hobbes's "metaphor between sovereign and people was one that openly admitted to being nothing more than a metaphor; it was an artifice that wore its artificiality on its sleeve for all to see."[182] Robin Douglass has observed that since "a fiction is a composition of different images or conceptions that takes place in the mind," that Hobbes's fiction of the body politic must have been his way of saying that the unity of commonwealth "exists *only* in the imaginations of men." Stephen Hequembourg has tracked what he thinks it the "controlled duplicity" of Hobbes rhetoric, and has bluntly called the body metaphor "a

181. Springborg, "Leviathan, Incorporated," 175. She also called the image "no more than a literary conceit... a spoof on all organic theories of the state." See Springborg, "Hobbes and Bellarmine," 523.

182. Garsten, "Religion and Representation in Hobbes," 539.

noble lie."[183] It should be clear by this point that neither Hobbes nor his audience would have taken his metaphor "too literally," but it should be equally clear that they also would not have regarded it as *purely* fictitious or metaphorical, let alone a lie.

This becomes even more obvious when considering the practical and political consequence of any of these interpretations: Garsten and Kahn have transparently spoken about "the critical judgment that is facilitated by the distancing effect of artifice," the "artificiality of the identity" proposed by Hobbes, and the "psychological distance" or "divorce" between sovereign and subjects, such that citizens "would not identify the sovereign too closely with either God or themselves. . . .The sovereign's commands were not God's. . . The sovereign's will was also not the will of the citizens."[184] These attitudes and beliefs are the very opposite of what Hobbes was trying to foster, as they inherently undermine reverence for the sovereign, "simple" ingenuous obedience in citizens,[185] and their immediate ownership of "all [the] sovereign shall do."[186] These attitudes are, in a word, destructive of absolute authority, and a few scholars who have suggested an interpretation like Garsten and Kahn's have quietly conceded this: Robin Douglass, who insists that Hobbes's commonwealth was "purely fictitious," also admits that Hobbes probably didn't explicitly call it that because to do so would be to "draw attention to its fragility. . . Indeed the very idea that the body politic is only a fictitious body might prove insidious if appropriated by those who would rather use it to excite sedition than to move

183. Hequembourg, "Tale of Two Bodies," 29,32.

184. Kahn, *Wayward Contracts*, 280; Kahn, *The Future of Illusion*, 37; Garsten, "Religion and Representation in Hobbes," 523. 538-9, 539-40.

185. *Leviathan*, XX.16 (p.316-8), XXXI.1 (p.554).

186. Ibid., XVIII.3 (p.266).

men towards peace."[187] Arash Abizadeh, who argues that Hobbes made an imaginary idol of his commonwealth and urged us to "bind ourselves in devotion and fear to the awesomeness of our own projection," also acknowledges that the commonwealth "cannot simply be willed into being... [And] for 'God' to serve as such a device for binding the subject's will, God must have an existence beyond the momentary vicissitudes of the subject's imaginations and desires."[188]

There is, in short, something regarded as objective that must stand behind rhetoric and metaphor in order to give them the degree of power necessary to substantially affect behavior. *In the minds of them whose behavior is in question*, there must be a "proper sense to be inquired after" that is not just as fictitious as the rhetorical devices employed to describe it. From outside this mentality looking in, however, it will invariably appear as if nothing is objective at all and the entire endeavor is a flight of fantasy. Douglass says, for instance, that Hobbes's commonwealth is "no more than men imagine [it] to be,"[189] and David Runciman says that this type of fiction is common to many human associations: "[Group] personality must be a fiction that the group's members create for themselves... They invent and give definition to a person distinct from their own persons... It must be a fiction which the members already understand. The members must believe in the group."[190] Hanna Pitkin calls this "symbolic belief," noting that "you need

187. Douglass, "The Body Politic 'Is a Fictitious Body,'" 142.

188. Abizadeh, "The Representation of Hobbesian Sovereignty," 128, 136: The commonwealth "must be experienced by the subject as the necessary acknowledgement of an external reality that simultaneously resonates with what the subject reads deep in his own soul" (emphasis added).

189. Douglass, "The Body Politic 'Is a Fictitious Body,'" 146.

190. David Runciman, "Hobbes and the Person of the Commonwealth," in *Pluralism and the Personality of the State, Ideas in Context 47* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 31.

not yourself believe in everything that you call a symbol: it is possible to discuss Christian symbolism without being a believer. But for such a thing as Christian symbolism to exist, somebody must believe (or have believed) in the symbolic significance." For these individuals, the symbol has real power because it "is considered to have a meaning beyond itself." In secular settings, this same principle applies: "The crucial test of political representation will be the existential one: Is the representative believed in?... It is all in the mind of the governed"[191] These statements are not necessarily incorrect, but they are perceptions from *outside* the mentality rather than *inside*; they are observations grounded in *unbelief* rather than *belief.* With regard to Hobbes interpretation, they are explanations that stand outside his work and look in to observe his vision, without existentially experiencing it like his audience.

The motif of theatricality is significant here, but again, the recent scholarly tendency has been to emphasize specific aspects of theatricality that Hobbes would probably not want emphasized. Victoria Kahn, for instance, highlights the "counterfeit" nature of Hobbes's concept of political representation, by which subjects allegedly observe the performance of their sovereign as if they were audience goers.[192] To be fair, Kahn draws this theater analogy directly from Hobbes, who began his discourse on representation with an etymological history lesson on the Latin meaning of *persona*, signfiying:

> The disguise or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage... And from the stage hath been translated to any representer of speech and action... So that a *person* is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in

191. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 100, 104.

192. Kahn, *The Future of Illusion*, 37.

> common conversation; and to personate is to act, or represent, himself or another; and he that acteth another is said to bear his person, or act in his name (in which sense Cicero useth it when he says 'I bear three persons: my own, my adversary's, and the judge's').[193]

Hobbes doesn't refer to the theater again after this reference, and his intention in drawing the connection between the ancient art form and the modern legal phenomenon seems to be more about emphasizing the simultaneity of roles and identities, rather than their artificiality. Hobbes says that each individual naturally represents *himself*, for instance, just as Cicero says that he bears *his own person*, which is a relationship that does not invoke artificiality or connote distance and "divorce." The theatricality of representation unobtrusively extended by Hobbes throughout the rest of his work seems to entail, not artificiality and separation, but the profound identification of multiple roles simultaneously claimed and authentically performed by all those involved in the commonwealth, sovereign and subjects alike. The intuition of Kahn and many others to draw attention to the theatricality of Hobbes's representation and rhetoric certainly opens up interpretive possibilities that could build upon his stated aims and illuminate them in a fresh, new way.

The scholarly emphasis on artificiality and illusion fights against these aims, however, and promotes a culture of unbelief that transgresses against the tenor of Hobbes's work, as well as the psychology of his (religious) audience. If there is any kind of intentional disenchantment at work in Hobbes's political philosophy, it is targeted at his opponents' opinions, not his own. Kahn has observed that his most elaborate strategies of demystification were directed towards Roman Catholic beliefs that were "politically

193. *Leviathan*, XVI.3 (p.244).

dangerous when their fictive quality [was] masked and when claims [were] made for their validity or efficacy that pose[d] a threat to the absolute authority of the sovereign."[194] Hobbes's systematic dismantling of these beliefs as fictive fantasies, and his humorous depiction of Rome's "universal church" as an imaginary fairy kingdom were large-scale efforts to promote *unbelief* in his readers so that they would abandon the pope and cease to obey or fear him. Hobbes would have had nothing to gain by turning this same strategy against himself. The "fiction," the "theatrical narrative," that Hobbes told his readers, about the state of nature, about the quasi-divine sovereign, and about social embodiment, was a tale inspired and inflected by Christian theology, and his highly-churched audience would have recognized that: "Hobbes's king is the person in whom all his subjects unite and incorporate as one," acknowledged a recent scholar, "not unlike the composite Christ of the radical theologians."[195] Hobbes obviously wanted belief rather than unbelief for his own ideas, and the Christology of representative atonement seems to have been the prototype he was betting on to achieve it.

3.6 Final Thoughts

Hobbes said that the unity of his commonwealth was "more than concord," but in an important sense, it was not less than concord. He denied Aristotle's premise of social harmony as a precursor to political institution, but he reintroduced social harmony as the *consequence* of political institution, openly using the familiar classical metaphor of the

194. Kahn, *Wayward Contracts*, 146.

195. Brito Vieira, *The Elements of Representation in Hobbes*, 187.

body politic to reiterate his commitment to the idea of a tight-knit, organic social community. This metaphor seems to have served for Hobbes as an intermediary representation of the social reality desired, by which to envision, if not effect, the psychological transformation necessary to manifest it visibly. This specific collectivist mindset has been advanced frequently and strikingly in political theory since Hobbes, often with attendant allusions to a "body," and almost always with an invitation to forsake isolationist individualism and be received — or incorporated — into a radically holistic, social dimension of human existence. Rousseau repeatedly described his political community as a "body politic,"[196] for instance, but he also defined that body as an abstract "general will" in which "each gives himself entirely" and "receive[s] each member as an indivisible part of the whole."[197] Karl Marx appealed to Rousseau's formulation in his own theory, and although he did not refer to a body, he depicted the political community as a "species being" into which each individual is absorbed.[198]

Otto von Gierke carried this concept into the 20th century, reunited it with the rhetorical motif of the body, and drew attention to the complex interplay of subjectivity and objectivity implicit in it:

> Our internal experience corroborates the truth which we learn from external experience. We discover the reality of the community in our own inner consciousness, as well as in the world of external fact. The incorporation of our Ego in a social Being of a higher order is a matter of our own inner life. We are

196. For a sampling, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract, ed. Victor Gourevitch* (Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1997), I 6 [6-10], I 7 [7-8], I 8 [2-4], II 4 [8], II 6 [1], III 1 [2,15], III 2 [entire], III 10 [1].

197. Ibid., I 6 [6-10].

198. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in *The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2d ed* (New York: Norton, 1978), 46.

> conscious of our self as a being enclosed in itself; but we are also conscious of our self as a part of a living whole which is operative in us.[199]

This passage engages the psychology of belief and it emphasizes the fundamental principle, expressed by Rousseau and Marx as well as Pitkin above, that many (if not all) objects of belief must be regarded as objectively and empirically real if they are to have any effective power over human emotions and behavior. In the very moment that the given entity is considered to be illusory or imaginary, its effect is destroyed — and the community is dissolved.[200] Hobbes understood this dynamic well, as testified in his rigorous efforts to invalidate and demystify the beliefs of his opponents, so it seems safe to assume that he did not intend for his own rhetorical analogies and devices to be regarded as equally illusory. He also demanded that metaphors and analogies refer to something objective and empirically true, so to read his body metaphor as a spoof or a pure fiction with no basis in reality would be to regard Hobbes as either wildly inconsistent or inexplicably duplicitous: there would have been no reason for him to undermine the image by which his social enterprise was represented and (possibly) achieved. The psychology of belief, clearly evidenced in the attitudes and assumptions of his religious audience, along with his own stringent standards for persuasion, dictated that Hobbes offer his commonwealth as an objective, empirically real phenomenon, to be accessed *and* visibly manifested through private experience and public effects.

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199. From a 1902 address entitled "The Nature of Human Groups," quoted in Otto Friedrich von Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to 1800, trans. Ernest Barker* (Cambridge: University Press, 1934), 19-22: "Social Wholes are of a corporeal-spiritual nature... This is the reason why we speak, not only of social 'bodies' and their 'members,' but also of the folk-soul... "

200. See Rousseau, *Social Contract*, IV 1 [1,4-6]; Marx, "On the Jewish Question," 43-6. See also Flikschuh, "Elusive Unity," 21: "For Hobbes and Rousseau political unity must be empirically real... "

The Christological rhetoric through which he expressed and explained his political vision is significant, not only because it serves as a cultural artifact of his unique historical context, just like Rousseau's "general will"[201] and Marx's "species-being" (*Gattungswesen*), but also because it reveals a dimension of his organicist collectivism that conspicuously sets it apart from most other theoretical iterations, ancient or modern: Hobbes made one, sovereign, human figure central to his political narrative, and oriented the rest of his literary tropes around that figure, effectively simulating a redemption saga. The structure and impact of his collectivism and his state-of-nature/social-contract formula is personally absolutist in a way that cuts against the more egalitarian and democratic versions typical of these genres. Rousseau comes close, with his "fall" of mankind and tale of social redemption through transformative embodiment, but he also vehemently condemned the notion of representative sovereignty and argued that slavish political obedience was the quickest way to dissolve the body, not strengthen it.[202] Hobbes's political philosophy envisioned a servant-master relationship between sovereign and subjects, and made that relationship essential and indispensable to social transformation. This feature might seem idiosyncratic and odd if regarded in isolation, but tracking the scope and relation of Hobbes's rhetorical allusions and devices, interpreting them according to his stated principles for doing so, matching them up with his self-evident political aims, and most importantly, checking them against his cultural context, reveals that he had a very specific theological referent and prototype in mind. The 17$^{\text{th}}$-century

201. For the philosophic and linguistic origins of 'general will,' see Patrick Riley, *The General Will Before Rousseau: The Transformation of the Divine Into the Civic* (Princeton University Press, 1986).

202. See Rousseau, *Social Contract*, II 1 [3]: "As soon as there is a master, there is no more [popular] sovereign, and the body politic is destroyed forthwith."

doctrinal tropes and concepts associated with Christ's representation and embodiment helped Hobbes compellingly portray a social community typified as much by organic, Aristotelian harmony as by hierarchical servitude: a unity which was "more than concord," because it was Christologically "real."

CHAPTER 4

HOBBES'S CHRISTOLOGY

AND THE POLITICS OF REAL UNITY

The Christological parallels in Hobbes's political narrative suggests answers to many questions about the interpretation of his work, but provokes many more. Of the questions answered, some are pointed and specific — such as the correct allusion invoked by his puzzling expression "real unity" — and others engage his theory of representation more broadly. For instance, there has been a marked tendency in recent Hobbes scholarship to reduce his theory of representation to one isolated characteristic, on the basis of which all other characteristics are either minimized or rejected, and his theory is declared to be merely legalist, rhetorical, metaphorical, or theatrical, etc. The possible influence of 17^{th}-century Christology on Hobbes's theory of representation encourages us to interpret it in an expansive, rather than a reductive, manner, by affirming all the various facets of his theory and by reconciling them: Hobbes's concept of representation (no less than the 17^{th}-century doctrine of Christ's representation) is simultaneously legalist, rhetorical, metaphorical, and theatrical, however it also transcends these characteristics. If, as this dissertation has argued, Hobbes's insistence upon the "real unity" of his representation was an allusion to Christ's mystical embodiment of his people, this concept effectively amplified his own long-standing description of the commonwealth as a living body, and introduced between his citizens a relationship of tight-knit, organic interdependence, in contrast to the atomistic individualism they had recently escaped. With the exception of certain rare

individualist moments — triggered by immediate threats to a citizen's life — Hobbes's commonwealth is therefore no less collectivist than the community envisioned by Rousseau's "general will." An expansive, Christologically-informed interpretation of Hobbes's concept of representation makes this clear, and suggests that his alleged individualism has probably been overstated, as I have argued.

Hobbes's collectivism is peculiar, though, in that it seems to lean heavily on the Christological prototype, not just for its model of social embodiment, but also for its glorification of one representative figure, to whom all the rest are subordinated and in whom they are sustained. The closeness of this correspondence between Hobbes's sovereign and the 17th-century perception of Christ the Representative raises questions about his possible motivation and intent, some aspects of which are more easily ascertained or surmised than others. It seems reasonable to assume, for instance, that Hobbes used popular religious concepts and expressions that he knew would be easily understood, in order to help explain and describe features of his political thought that might otherwise be regarded as confusing or complex. The metaphor of the body was used extensively in the theological literature of his era precisely for this purpose, and if Hobbes thought that the political dynamic he wanted to describe was analogous to this theological phenomenon in any sense (as it seems likely he did), it is understandable that he would have adopted and adapted the relevant metaphor for his own use.

Another possible motivation for the Christological overtones in Hobbes's work might have been his interest in rendering his theories more accele, if not compelling, to his religious readers, but this conjecture seems dubious. Roger Coke (1660), a grandson of

Elizabethan jurist Edward Coke, gave a review of Hobbes's work in which he declared, "It is not worth the examining, what [Hobbes] would have under the title of Religion; for men say the man is of none himself, and complains (they say) he cannot walk the streets, but the boys point at him, saying, There goes Hobbes the Atheist."[1] If Hobbes had been more solicitous of his religious audience, he might not have acquired the reputation of atheist in the first place, and after he acquired it, he probably knew he had little hope of being taken more seriously merely because he had used a few Christian tropes in his work. The quick dismissal of Hobbes's religious thought, common among many of his 17$^{\text{th}}$-century Christian readers, has become equally common among modern scholars, and the recent tendency to write off his Christological tropes as ironic is only the latest manifestation of a general, long-standing assumption about Hobbes's irreverence and impiety. It must be objected against this line of interpretation, however, that even if it were true that Hobbes deliberately described political sovereignty in terms of Christology in order to lampoon Christianity, the associated images, tropes, and concepts do too much work for his larger philosophic and rhetorical narrative for them to be dismissed or laughed off as a mere joke. At the very least, they would have to be regarded as performing several different roles simultaneously, some ironic and some substantive.

It could also be objected that the 17$^{\text{th}}$-century judgement of Hobbes as an atheist deserves more scholarly scrutiny than is usually given. The pejorative "atheist" was applied widely and rather indiscriminately during the early-modern period to any perspective that contained, not necessarily a flat denial of God's existence, so much as an unorthodox

1. Roger Coke, *Justice Vindicated from the False Focus Put upon It, by Thomas White Gent., Mr. Thomas Hobbes, and Hugo Grotius*, 1660, 25.

opinion regarding God's existence or role in the world: and the more heterodox the opinion, the more atheist it would be regarded.[2] The label was an inexact, generally subjective slur put to polemical use in the religious controversies of the 17th-century, and it was often a lazy way to discredit and dismiss ideas without giving them thoughtful consideration. Hobbes's many unorthodox religious opinions doomed his work to this reception during his own era, but he deserves more critical appraisals by modern scholars, who have greater emotional distance and therefore the possibility of greater intellectual objectivity. A cursory examination of Hobbes's work reveals that he was almost certainly not an atheist in any technical sense, a plea he repeatedly maintained,[3] but that he did hold highly nonstandard opinions about God's essence, which he described as "corporeal," because "every spirit, however fine, is still a body" and because Christ, who was physical, embodied the divinity of God.[4] These beliefs may have seemed self-evidently false to 17th-century Christians, but Hobbes painstakingly defended his perspective (as he did for all his religious positions) by appealing directly to scripture and to several patristic theologians. He may have held beliefs about God that were deemed inappropriate during his time-period, but it does not necessarily follow that his beliefs were atheistic or that he held them insincerely.

Unless the religious tropes he used to describe political sovereignty are shown to

2. For a more involved treatment of this phenomenon, see A.P. Martinich, *The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 19-39.

3. *Leviathan, or The Matter, Form, and Power of A Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*, 1651, Latin Appendix III.1-10. For Hobbes's treatment of atheism, see XXXI.2 (pp.554-6), Latin Appendix II.35-8 (pp.1204-6), and for several statements about God's existence, see *De Cive [1641], ed. Bernard Gert* (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1991), VII.21, XIV.19, XV.14; *Leviathan*, XI.25-26 [pp.160-2], XII.6 (p.166). For recent scholarly defenses of Hobbes's theism, see A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," *Philosophy* 13, no. 52 (October 1938): 406-24; Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); Martinich, *The Two Gods of Leviathan.*

4. See *Leviathan*, Latin Appendix.I.12,62 (pp.1148,1170), and III.6-8 (pp.1128-232) Malcolm's translation of Hobbes's quote reads, "Every spirit, however tenuous, is nevertheless a body."

obviously contradict his stated beliefs, the question is not *whether* Hobbes allowed religion to inform his political vision but *how* he did so, as either an analogy or a manifestation, etc. And any examination of these possibilities must begin with Hobbes himself and his stated beliefs, along with his directions, if they exist, about how he expected them to be expressed politically. Fortunately for scholars, Hobbes offered extensive treatments on religion in all of his works, and especially in *Leviathan*, where systematic theology monopolizes well over half of the book. Much more research needs to be done excavating his theological thought, not as mere historical artifact or an entertaining example of religious eccentricity, but as a record of specific convictions that had a direct political payoff for Hobbes in the first half of his work. This work is beyond the scope of this epilogue, but a few words need to be said here about Hobbes's admittedly peculiar stance on Christology, especially given that the religious tropes tracked in this dissertation are probably Christological.

Hobbes struggled with the figure of Christ and with the relevance that Christ could and should have for politics. He was deeply troubled by the political implications about Christ's role and work that were drawn by Roman Catholics, as well as the anti-political implications drawn by Protestants: the former group promoting the Pope to Christ's sovereign "lieutenant" over all believers,[5] and the latter group insisting that Christ was his own lieutenant, needing no human proxy at all. Hobbes combatted both of these implications by first dismissing Christ's contributions as purely spiritual and therefore politically irrelevant (*contra*-Roman Catholicism), and secondly by humanizing and

5. Hobbes accuses the Protestants of covertly claiming this political sovereignty as well, despite their specious disavowals: see *Leviathan*, XLIV.17 (p.978), XLVII.4 (p.1106) and *Behemoth; or, The Long Parliament [1668], ed. Stephen Holmes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), Dialogue I (pp.2-3).

relativizing them to recognizable socio-political roles (*contra*-Protestantism). His notorious iteration of the Trinity, for instance, demoted Christ to the same level as Moses and every other human mediator in scripture,[6] while also elevating all modern civil sovereigns to the same rank. While this dual refutation might have been effective, it also seemed somewhat contradictory in that it made Christ's representative role eminently political, as the model for all other civil representatives of God, and also simultaneously anti-political, as a spiritual kingship relegated to some future eschatological period.[7] The Earl of Clarendon expressed bafflement at this conflicted strategy, which seemed to make civil sovereigns analogous to Christ on one hand, only to "degrade our Savior to... low and insignificant offices" on the other hand. Clarendon observed, "[Hobbes] may forgive those who too reasonably suspect that his design is rather to perplex and disturb and seduce men, than to enlighten and inform them; and that he assigns the errors in every chapter to do as much mischief as they can, and retracts none of them, least the confessing himself to be once deceived, may lessen his power to deceive anymore."[8]

Hobbes's rejoinder to Clarendon, if he had given one, would most certainly have been that there was no inconsistency between his clarification of Christ's role and his

6. Ibid., XVI.12 (p.248), XL.14 (p.758), XLI.9 (p.772), XLII.3 (pp.776-8). See also *De Cive*, XVII.4; *De Corpore Politico [1640;1650], ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford World's Classics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), XXVI.7; *Leviathan*, XLI.3,7 (pp.764,768): "For he was Messiah, that is, the Christ, that is, the Anointed Priest and the Sovereign Prophet of God; that is to say, he was to have all the power that was in Moses the Prophet, in the High Priests that succeeded Moses, and in the Kings that succeeded the Priests."

7. Hobbes distinguishes Christ's "kingdom of heaven" from the earthly kingdoms of other human prophets, priests and kings. See *De Corpore Politico*, XXV.7, XXVI.9; *De Cive*, XVII.5; *Leviathan*, XXXV.11-15 (pp.642-4), XLVII.2 (OL, p.1107). See also J. G. A. Pocock, "Time, History and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes," in *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 148-201.

8. Edward Hyde Clarendon, *A Brief View and Survey of the Dangerous and Pernicious Errors to Church and State, in Mr. Hobbes's Book, Entitled Leviathan*, 1676, 244-5.

assignation of civil sovereigns to the same rank. Hobbes never called civil sovereigns the representatives *of Christ*, but of God, *like* Christ[9] — a fine distinction but an important one, since in redefining and deferring Christ's temporal jurisdiction, he made it inapplicable for succession of any kind (contra Rome). *Leviathan* is laced throughout with claims about the civil sovereign being the "vicegerent" and "lieutenant" of God, as successors of the prophets, priests, and kings recorded in Old Testament scripture, and especially as successor to Moses, whose compound office of military general, civil governor, and divine prophet was much admired by Hobbes (as it had been previously by Machiavelli). In one passage he declared, "Whosoever in a Christian commonwealth holdeth the place of Moses is the sole messenger of God, and interpreter of his commandments," leaving no doubt that this figure was the civil sovereign[10] and that the personage he was to emulate most closely was Moses, not Christ. This quiet minimizing of Christ and his significance for politics may seem to call into question the principal argument of this dissertation, that the religious and metaphysical allusions Hobbes made with regard to his civil sovereign were conspicuously Christological, but the first answer to this objection is the observation that all the Israelite prophets, priests, kings, and judges that Hobbes prefers over Christ are and were generally considered to be messianic prefigurations anyway.[11] Therefore in shaping his civil sovereign as an exalted prophet, priest, and king in the tradition of Israel's ecclesiastical tradition, he was inadvertently envisioning a messianic — or in Christianity's terms, a Christological — office. That he pointedly questioned Christ's own Christological credentials in this matter

9. With perhaps one nle exception: see *Leviathan*, XLII.106 (894).

10. Ibid., XL.7 (p.744): "And according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further than the bounds which are set by their several sovereigns."

11. See *De Cive*, XVII.11: "... by Christ is understood that same king, who was promised from God by Moses and the prophets for to be the king and Savior of the world."

is ironic,[12] but it does not necessarily nullify the paradigmatically Christological cast of political sovereignty in his thought.

The second answer to this objection is that the language of embodiment through representation is a uniquely Christological (rather than Mosaic) theme, and Hobbes explicitly acknowledged this: he affirmed the dogma of Christ's "mystical body,"[13] although he was careful to explain that this embodied church, as one person in Christ, could be said to exist only *in potentia* until the judgment day.[14] Until that point, Hobbes extended Christ's appellation to all human sovereigns, declaring that "there are as many catholic churches as there are heads of churches. And there are as many heads as there are Christian kingdoms and republics."[15] Hobbes's transfer of Christ's ecclesiastical headship to each civil sovereign is fully in keeping with his general tendency to convert rarefied, spiritual realities into concrete, political form. "The kingdom of God is a civil commonwealth," he asserted, and "the points of doctrine concerning the kingdom of God have so great influence on the kingdom of man, as not to be determined but by them that under God have the sovereign power."[16] It is true that these images and roles apply only to Christian sovereigns in ecclesiastical scenarios, and that the secular narrative of "real unity," which is the focus of this dissertation, applies to all sovereigns irrespective of religion. But Hobbes's portrayal of secular sovereignty so closely replicates the language

12. Hobbes tries to emphasize the kingly aspects of Christ's character, but cannot avoid or deny Christ's abdication of earthly rule: see Ibid., XVII.1-3,6; *Leviathan*, XLII.6 (p.780).

13. See *Leviathan*, Latin Appendix II.22 (p.1196).

14. *De Cive*, XVII.22.

15. *Leviathan*, Latin Appendix II.22 (p.1196). See also XXXIII.24 (p.606).

16. Ibid., XXXVII.5 (p.708). See also XXXV.13 (p.644).

and images of Christological sovereignty that, as I have argued, it seems probable that his political vision was shaped by it. At the very least, Hobbes seems to have found Christ's "real unity" to be a helpful analogy for a secular, political dynamic; at most, he may have thought that some aspect of the powerful relationship between Christ and his people was actually instantiated in the civil realm — as a secular approximation, shorn of its usual theological trappings.

He would have had reason for this transmogrification, because Christ's person and work were not politically indifferent matters: not to Hobbes, and certainly not to Christians in England during the 17th century. From Hobbes's embodied "real unity" of the commonwealth, to Oliver Cromwell's pointed letter obliquely warning Parliament off in the name of "real unity," there was a wide range of social and political controversy over Christ's role and whether it should or should not be instantiated in the public square. Much of the controversy was initiated by Henry VIII's self-assignation of ecclesiastical "head," a title that many Christians thought belonged exclusively to Christ, and was perpetuated by the monarchs and Anglican clergy after him who continued to emphasize the indispensability of the king to the national church, often in physiological terminology. Opponents of this perspective, who were primarily Puritan like Oliver Cromwell, contested this claim by arguing that the reality of Christ's union was properly invisible and spiritual, rather than visible and embodied in human persons or institutions. Poles were staked out and lines drawn in this theological debate, in which Hobbes and his iconoclastic thought took part. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to comprehensively examine the range of 17th-century opinions on this subject or to confidently situate Hobbes in relation to it,

but a brief synopsis of two main foci of Christological controversy during this period — the headship of Christ and the invisible society of his church — reiterates the argument of this dissertation — that Hobbes's political thought is suffused in Christology — while also distinguishing the ways in which his Christological politics was both typical of his era and also an affront to it.

4.1 Two Heads, Two Bodies

Christ's headship could be seen as the leading socio-political controversy among many in England during the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century. Its purview was formally theological and ecclesiastical, but with Henry VIII's intervention of 1534, the dispute took on a political import and implication that only deepened during the following century. John Calvin professed himself to be "grievously vexed" by Henry VIII's assumed title, declaring that the English were "guilty of blasphemy when they called him the chief Head of the Church under Christ. This was certainly too much."[17] Anglican Richard Hooker responded by reassuring his English readers that "Mr. Calvin spake by misinformation, and thought we had meant thereby far otherwise than we do."[18] Hooker joined a long and growing list of Anglican divines who waxed enthusiastic about royal supremacy but were equally eager to contextualize and clarify Henry's religious role. In contradistinction to the Pope, Henry VIII was regarded by them to have taken up merely the *visible* and *particular* headship of

17. John Calvin, *Commentary on Amos*, 1557, Part 16, Lecture 64, on Chapter 7:10-15.

18. Richard Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity, Book VIII [Written 1593], ed. Raymond Aaron Houk* (New York: AMS Press, 1973), 195-6.

the English church, rather than the *invisible* and *universal* headship of the global church,[19] this latter position belonging "only to Christ, and... properly and only fit for him alone."[20] Moreover, the English monarch had not and would never undertake ministerial functions,[21] either "to preach, minister the sacraments, [or] excommunicate."[22] William Fulke, a Cambridge Puritan (1580) strongly condemned any possible "confusion of the office of an Emperor and a Bishop," insisting that "although [the King] have authority over ecclesiastical persons, and in causes ecclesiastical, according to God's word, yet is he no ecclesiastical officer, but a Civil Magistrate."[23] This treatise, as so many others at this time, emphasized duties traditionally assigned through the medieval era to a Godly ruler: punishment of "evil doers" in the civil sphere, extirpation of gross heresies, and other general services to facilitate and assist at the church's behest.[24]

From these early clarifications, a distinction quickly came to be drawn between political headship and spiritual headship, and thus also between the properties of a political union versus those of a spiritual union. One Puritan pastor (1615) explained,

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19. John Whitgift, *The Works of John Whitgift, D.D., The Third Portion* (Cambridge University Press, 1853), 419.

20. John Jewel, *An Apology of the Church of England [written 1562, Translated 1564]* (Ithaca, N.Y: Published for the Folger Shakespeare Library by Cornell University Press, 1963), 25. See also Thomas Starkey, *An Exhortation to the People Instructing Them to Unity and Obedience [1536], ed. James M. Pictor, Garland Publications in American and English Literature* (New York: Garland Pub, 1988), 246:"He [Henry VIII] will never suffer any such thing here to take place, which may have any color of the obscuring of Christ's glory... "

21. Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, 182, 189.

22. Whitgift, *Tractates XI-XXIII*, 434. See also pp. 414-5, 424-5 and *Sermon preached at the Cathedral of St. Paul's, London, Nov. the 17th, 1583, being the anniversary day of Q. Elizabeth's coming to the crown*, 592: "It was never given by us to any prince, nor challenged by them... as to preach, minister the sacraments, or consecrate bishops."

23. William Fulke, *A Discovery of the Dangerous Rock of the Popish Church*, 1580, 188,303. See also 189,191,278-9.

24. See also Whitgift, *Tractates XI - XXIII*, 421, 428, 455; Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, 192.

"The union whereby Christ and his Church are united, though it be a true and real union, yet is it not... political as of Prince and people, but mystical and spiritual, by the bond of the same spirit and faith."[25] Inevly and understandably, the political body of prince and people began to fare badly in the contrast with Christ's spiritual body: "This union betwixt members of the true church exceeds all other unions of bodies civil, artificial, or natural," declared Anglican Thomas Jackson, "because it is more real, more firm and solid, than any union can be betwixt the parts of bodies civil, artificial, or natural."[26] This sentiment became bolder as the century advanced. Thomas Case (1670), who was at one time a member of the Westminster Assembly, asserted, "Although, yea, *because*, [Christ's union] is not a corporeal, but a spiritual union, therefore it is so true and real that in comparison of it, all unions and conjunctions in nature are nothing else but so many figures and shadows."[27] An anonymous catechism (1688) instructed, "Nothing can be more real than this union... A political union is an union of persons in policy or government, and is too narrow and low to express this union."[28] Robert Ferguson (1675) concurred, "A political relation doth not adequately express that oneness which the scripture so augustly celebrates as interceding betwixt Christ and believers."[29]

The increasingly high-pitched denunciations of "mere" political unity during the 17th century were provoked, initially, by popular anxiety about monarchical meddling in the church, combined with suspicions about covert Roman Catholicism among the royalty.

25. Edward Elton, *An Exposition of Colossians Delivered in Sundry Sermons*, 1615, 225, repeated at 715.

26. Thomas Jackson, *A Treatise of the Holy Catholic Faith and Church*, 1627, 18,20.

27. Thomas Case, *Mount Pisgah, or, A Prospect of Heaven*, 1670, 29.

28. Anonymous, *Catechism Made Practical, the Christian Instructed*, 1688, 59-60.

29. Robert Ferguson, *The Interest of Reason in Religion*, 1675, 621.

James I delivered a speech to Parliament in 1603 in which he reminded his subjects, "As for mine own profession, you have me your Head now amongst you of the same Religion that the body is of," only to add, "I acknowledge the Roman Church to be our Mother Church, although defiled with some infirmities and corruptions."[30] Protestant alarm was heightened when James I's son Charles proceeded to marry a French Roman Catholic and give his unconditional support to Archbishop Laud, a High-Church authoritarian with anti-Calvinist tendencies. Together Charles and Laud worked to impose doctrinal and liturgical uniformity across the kingdom, meeting fierce resistance almost everywhere, except among the so-called Erastians, who denied that any particular ecclesiastical arrangement or personages (including the Anglican bishops) enjoyed *jure divino* status, and preferred to give over all ecclesiastical concerns to the state. Jurist John Selden, a self-designated Erastian and a friend of Hobbes, thought that "both the Independent Man and the Presbyterian Man do equally exclude the Civil Power, though after a different manner,"[31]and he preferred episcopacy, shorn of its *jure divino* presumptions.[32] Selden observed, "They are equally mad who say Bishops are so *jure divino* that they must be continued, and they who say they are so antichristian that they must be put away. All is as the State pleases."[33]

The English and Scottish Puritans regarded these claims on behalf of the civil

30. James I, King of England, "A Speech, as It Was Delivered in the Upper House of the Parliament to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal [March 1603]," in *The Political Works of James I* (Russell & Russell, 1965), 274.

31. John Selden, *Table-Talk* (London, 1696), 74.

32. Ibid., 22-3: "Bishops do best stand with Monarchy... to send down the King's pleasure to his subjects; so you have bishops to govern the inferior clergy: these upon occasion may address themselves to the King, otherwise every person of the parish must come and run up to the court."

33. Ibid., 21-2.

authority to be new, political versions of the old Roman Catholic threat posed by the Pope to the spiritual headship of Christ in his church — a threat that continue to haunt Puritan pastors and theologians well into the 17th century. Cardinal Bellarmine (1542-1621), whose works were translated and widely circulated in England during the first half of the century, continued to reiterate the Catholic theme that drove the medieval church headlong into the Reformation: "The Pontiff is the head of the Church in the place of Christ. There is one general Vicar of Christ on earth, who is the visible head of the visible Church."[34] This Catholic assertion, along with the more moderated and perhaps derivative contentions of the English royalty, of the Anglican hierarchy, and of the Erastians, provoked emphatic defenses of Christ's spiritual headship and unity from Puritan Presbyterians and Independents, who were eager to disavow the dominion of their opponents by demonstrating the exclusivity of Christ's title and role. "This name Head of the Church is the Royal Prerogative of Jesus Christ," warned Scottish Presbyterian Samuel Rutherford (1646). "Christ is the head and only head of the Church... Christ is a political Head and King of his Church, not properly a visible Head, except that he is a visible Head in this sense: in that he reigneth and ruleth, even in the external visible policy of his Church... I would gladly be informed of formalists how the King is the head and vicegerent of Christ over the Church if Christ's kingdom be only spiritual, mystical, internal, not political, not external."[35] Leading English Puritan Richard Baxter (1658) wrote:

> That the Church has any political universal head except Christ alone, either a Vice-god, or Vice-christ, either Pope or Council... this we deny... and think it

34. Robert Bellarmine, "On the Temporal Power of the Pope [1610]," in *On Temporal and Spiritual Authority, trans. Stefania Tutino* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012), 277.

35. Samuel Rutherford, *The Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication*, 1646, 13-4,17-8,24-5.

> absurd (and much more sinful) as to affirm that all the world must needs have one visible monarch under God to represent him, and that he is no subject to the God of heaven who acknowledges not this visible universal monarch. We deny that the Church is such a society: we deny that it has such an Head: we deny that it has any such universal human laws: we deny that the parts of it are to be conjoined by the subordinate officers (Cardinals, Patriarchs, Archbishops, or whatever) of such an usurping Sovereign. We affirm that no Christian should fancy or assert that any such Head and order for unity is appointed by Christ, or that it is desirable.[36]

Baxter added, "To set up a Vice-god and a Vice-Christ on earth over all the Church... is to set up an idol, and a name of blasphemy against Jesus Christ, whose prerogative it is to the be sole Universal Head, and therefore he must needs be *an* Antichrist, whether he be *the* Antichrist or not."[37] Puritan Henry Vertue (1659) gave a similar but more tempered response: "Such a monarchy of the Pope of Rome, or any other Bishop over all the Churches and Bishops is to no purpose, nor of any use. For what need is there of a substitute where the chief [Christ] is present?"[38]

Situating Hobbes in this (admittedly simplified) continuum between the poles of Catholicism and Puritan Protestantism is tricky, but it seems plausible that Hobbes fell much closer to Rome with regard to many of the positions raised above. He maintained, for instance, that God could only be made "present" in and through human representatives (of which Christ was only one), and that Christ could only be present himself as head of the church, at the end of the world, in bodily form.[39] Hobbes claimed that, until that point, civil sovereigns were "immediate rulers of the church under Christ," and it should be

36. Richard Baxter, *A Key for Catholics, to Open the Juggling of the Jesuits*, 1659, 467-8.

37. Ibid., 470.

38. Henry Vertue, *Christ and the Church, or Parallels, in Three Books*, 1659, 226.

39. See *De Cive*, XVII.5-6; *Leviathan*, XLI.3-6 (pp.762-4), XLIV.5 (p.960).

believed that God "speaketh by his Vice-Gods, or lieutenants, here on earth, that is to say, by sovereign kings,"[40] a claim maintained by Catholicism on behalf of the Pope, rather than kings. As for the scriptural passage most often cited by Roman Catholics as a proof-text for papal sovereignty — in which Christ told Peter, "I will give thee the keys of heaven"[41] — Hobbes concluded, "There is no doubt but the power here granted belongs to all supreme pastors, such as are all Christian civil sovereigns in their own dominions."[42] While Hobbes leveled all of these claims against the competing allegations of Rome, he made clear that Rome's pretended authority was precisely the authority that properly belonged to kings: a premise heatedly denied by the Puritan Protestants.

Hobbes in fact defended the Pope against the accusation of being the anti-Christ because, "seeing the Pope of Rome neither pretendeth himself, nor denieth Jesus, to be the Christ, I perceive not how he can be called Antichrist, by which word is not meant, one that falsely pretendeth to be His lieutenant or vicar general, but to be He."[43] Like the Pope and every other Laudian bishop of his era,[44] Hobbes insisted on *jure divino* rights: he insisted, "The king and every other sovereign executeth his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority from God (that is to say, in God's right, or *jure divino*... And he hath also the authority, not only to preach (which perhaps no man will deny), but also to baptize and to administer the sacraments,"[45] this latter claim pushing far beyond anything

40. *De Corpore Politico*, XXVI.10-1.

41. Matthew 18:18

42. *Leviathan*, XLII.85 (p.872).

43. Ibid., XLII.88 (p.876).

44. See Ibid., XLII.119 (p.904); *Behemoth*, Dialogue I (p.6).

45. *Leviathan*, XLII.71-2.

granted by the Erastians and Laudians, let alone the Puritan Presbyterians or Independents. Hobbes himself explicitly alleged that, "Every Christian prince, as I have formerly proved, is no less supreme pastor of his own subjects, than the Pope of his,"[46] a statement which would not have made him many friends among 17th-century Protestants of any variety. The similarities between Hobbes's portrayal of civil sovereignty and the familiar figure of the Pope were observed and noted by several of his critics. The Earl of Clarendon remarked, "He knows well there is another Sovereign Prince... almost as great as he would have his Sovereign to be in the extent of his power... and that is the Pope."[47] Anglican William Lucy (1657) complained:

> Can a man think that men would ever consent so fully to forsake themselves and their own reason and wills as to submit themselves either to man or men in such an ample manner as to esteem his Prince's judgment or his will for his own? In that great height of infallibility to which the Pope in many men's judgments is attained, they put the Pope *in cathedra* when they say he is infallible... But out of this *cathedra* he may err in his judgment, and they must not approve of that... But Mr. Hobbes confines his Leviathan to no *chair*, but absolutely pronounceth him free from error both in judgment and will. Nay that is not all, but we must allow, yea authorize his errors in both; and this is the foundation upon which all his politics are built.[48]

This last observation, that Hobbes had built his entire political edifice upon an absolutist foundation shared in part by the Pope, draws attention to the theological-philosophic symmetry and consonance between Hobbes's ecclesiastical arguments in the second half of *Leviathan* and his secular political arguments in the first half. He always insisted that the ecclesiastical and political dimensions of civil sovereignty were mutually reinforcing, and

46. *Leviathan*, XLII.131 (p.922).

47. Clarendon, *Survey of Leviathan*, 64-5.

48. William Lucy, *An Answer to Mr. Hobbes, His Leviathan, with Observations, Censures, and Confutations of Divers Errors*, 1673, 10.

that God's revelation about his designated prophets and priests only confirmed and supported the political principles Hobbes had demonstrated and elished through human reason. It is thus not surprising that Hobbes's definition of a church is virtually identical and in fact folded into his definition of a commonwealth: "A church," he asserted, "such a one as is capable to command, to judge, absolve, condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a civil commonwealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a civil state, for that the subjects of it are men: and a church, for that the subjects thereof are Christians."[49]

Hobbes's body metaphor, which he makes more of in the secular political sections of his work, seems yet another example of his general propensity to amalgamate theological and political roles. If he had made his sovereign the "head" of the body politic, he would have remained more comfoly within political precedent and within the limits set by 17th-century pastors and theologians for civil headship, as a role of formal governance rather than "vivifical" influence. But in making his sovereign the soul of the body politic, Hobbes crossed these boundaries and obliquely suggested that political sovereignty operated analogously to Christ's sovereignty. As detailed in the earlier chapters of this dissertation, Christ was often portrayed as the "soul" of the church by 17th-century theologians, as a way to emphasize his ability to give life to believers, which was an ability not always adequately captured or implied by "headship" of the body. The "soul" of the political/ecclesiastical body was therefore a metaphorical office that was considered to be

49. *Leviathan*, XXXIX.4-5 (pp.732-4). Hobbes insisted that the only plausible candidates for this form of church were national churches under civil sovereigns or the Catholic Church under the Pope: see XXXIII.24 (p.606).

exclusively Christ's. Anglican theologians had enough trouble explaining how the king or the archbishop were "heads" in an entirely different sense than Christ; the claim to be "soul" would have been infinitely more risky and provocative.

It is unclear precisely what Hobbes meant politically by claiming that the sovereign was the soul of the commonwealth, but for that matter, it is not clear what the Catholics — who were virtually the only other parties in the 17th century who continued to speak in these terms — meant by the analogy either. Cardinal Bellarmine declared (in the treatise that Hobbes thoroughly censured in *Leviathan*), "The temporal authority is subject to the spiritual, as the body is subject to the soul, and therefore the temporal authority, even the regal one, can be directed and corrected and judged and changed, if it errs, by the spiritual authority, which resides at its fullest in the Pope."[50] It is possible that Bellarmine meant to suggest that the Pope literally and personally animated all believers through his spirit, but it seems more likely that the reality he was trying to communicate through this metaphor was simply a guarantee of safety and salvation through union and obedience to the Pope: which were still Christological guarantees, but perhaps less literally applied than the metaphor would suggest. This is clearer in a treatise published by a Catholic theologian near the end of the century, in which Christ's exclusive claim to be "soul" of the church is affirmed, in and through human mediators:

> What signifies [Christ's] being as it were the soul of his Church, and the root from whence she derives her juice and fatness, but that he is prepared to do us good, if we will lay hold on him; that he is our All in All, that he supports our weakness, mollifies our hardness, enflames our lukewarmness, removes our blindness, and that without *an Union with him by means of Faith and*

50. Bellarmine, "Temporal Power," 348, see also 380.

> *Obedience to our Pastors*... we are able to do nothing but what is imperfect and impure, and which will not end in death or destruction.[51]

Hobbes seems to use his political metaphor of the soul in a similar manner: as an analogy by which to emphasize the existential indispensability of his civil sovereign for the life and health of the commonwealth. This analogy tended to confuse his critics, who were used to seeing various physiological analogies in political contexts, but not ones that made these sorts of claims. Alexander Ross (1653), who was a Laudian chaplain to Charles I, reported that, "[Hobbes] will not have members of a commonwealth to depend one of another, but to cohere together. They depend only (saith he) on the Sovereign, which is the soul of the commonwealth." Ross expressed confusion at this statement and protested that the political relationship should be seen as one of *mutual* dependence between sovereign and subjects: "In a commonwealth the Sovereign depends on the people for assistance, maintenance and defense; they depend on him for counsel, government, and peace."[52] Even to a Laudian attach to the king, Hobbes's physiological metaphor seemed odd and excessive, which is an understandable response to what was probably a theological metaphor, translocated to a political context.

In short, the 17$^{\text{th}}$-century doctrine of Christ's mystical body was a controversial issue, both theologically and politically, and Hobbes knew this. Ever anxious to overthrow the ecclesiastical competitor that threatened his own paradigm most closely, Hobbes declared that Rome was the greatest beneficiary of the idea that Christ's mystical body

51. B. D., *Controversial Discourses Relating to the Church Being an Answer to Dr. Sherlock's Discourse Concerning the Nature, Unity, and Communion of the Catholic Church*, 1697, 101 (emphasis added).

52. Alexander Ross, *Leviathan Drawn out with a Hook, or, Animadversions upon Mr. Hobbes*, 1653, 62.

was purely spiritual and invisible,[53] which perhaps was true in some superficial sense. But in a more expansive, deeply philosophical sense, the Puritan Protestants were the chief beneficiaries of the doctrine, and this became clearer as the century wound to its close. One Catholic theologian (1697) observed that "the essential unity of the church on earth," by which "all true churches are members of the one mystical body of Christ," was considered by Protestants to be the single dogma most devastating to Roman Catholicism and all other movements to elish a visible ecclesiastical head on earth: "This is [supposed] to be the bane of the infallibility of the Church, of the Pope's supremacy, and of the authority of general councils & c," he wrote. "This is to be the shield of the Reformation and the defense of the Protestant cause, which till the publication of this discourse has been carried on but very unluckily."[54] This last assessment, about the "unluckiness" of Protestant efforts to push back institutional authority and control, may be an allusion to the religious (and political) chaos unleashed in England during the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century that seemed directly related to the popular promotion of the concept of Christ's invisible unity — a unity that was often claimed to be stronger and more effective than any other merely human, political, or institutional proxy. The alleged benefits of this "real unity," along with some of its perceived political weaknesses, to which Hobbes was responding, will be discussed next.

53. See *De Civ*e, XVII.22.

54. D., *Controversial Discourses*, 105.

4.2 The Invisible Society

One of Hobbes's critics, Anglican Edward Lucy (1673), systematically worked through *Leviathan*, expressing objections as he went, and when he got to the commonwealth narrative in Chapter XVII, Lucy reported Hobbes's words verbatim: "This is (saith he) more than consent or concord, it is a real Union of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, &c." Lucy then remarked, "If this be the only way to live in peace, I choose war, which is the hatefulest thing in the world, but sin."[55] In many ways, this statement of Lucy perfectly sums up the assumptions of 17th-century Protestants and Catholics alike about the distinction between visible (human) and invisible (divine) governance: rejecting absolutist human authority meant embracing, or at least tolerating, the possibility of conflict. It allowed the introduction of pluralism and dissent, supposedly under the oversight of God and within the orbit of spiritual unity, but often practically, without any obvious oversight or the vaguest suggestion of concord.

From the earliest stages of English Protestantism divorced from the headship of Rome, the specter of religious conflict loomed large and challenged the confidence of believers in Christ's invisible headship, leading many pastors and theologians to explicitly acknowledge this fear and exhort their congregants to seek security in Christ, not in Rome. Only two years after Henry VIII rejected the Pope, humanist Thomas Starkey (1536) pleaded:

> Fear not dear friends, that the unity of Christ's church without this outward head cannot among us remain... [but be] governed by the true vicar of Christ,

55. Lucy, *Answer to Mr. Hobbes*, 7-9.

> which is his holy spirit, to whose governance he committed his church... This head of Rome and superiority is nothing of such necessity, that without the obedience thereto this spiritual unity must needs run to ruin and destruction.[56]

Archibishop Ussher (1624), the Primate of Ireland, delivered a sermon before James I in which he admonished:

> There is one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism... This unity of the faith must be compassed by such means as God hath ordained for the procuring of it, and not by politic tricks of man's devising... The unity of which our adversaries [the Catholics] boast so much (which is nothing else but a willful suffering of themselves to be led blindfold by one man, who commonly is more blind than many of themselves) is no fruit of the spirit, but of mere carnal policy.[57]

The English Protestants seemed to be keenly aware that the success and sustainability of their independence from Rome depended upon their ability to achieve and maintain some degree of ecclesiastical unity: as one Catholic observed, "It will be a strong prejudice against [the Protestant] notion of church-unity, if the unity of the church on earth cannot be maintained in [their] principles."[58]

By privileging spiritual unity over institutional unity as the stronger and more effective bond of cohesion, the Protestants attempted to combat ecclesiastical dissension and dysfunction without either retreating back toward Rome or substituting a similar institutional apparatus in Rome's place. "The mystical union catholic [i.e. universal] is

56. Starkey, *Exhortation to Unity*, 241, 247.

57. James Ussher, *A Brief Declaration of the Universality of the Church of Christ, and the Unity of the Catholic Faith Professed Therein Delivered in a Sermon before His Majesty the 20th of June 1624*, 1629, 12-3.

58. D., *Controversial Discourses*, unnumbered preface.

real; the visible notional only," warned Cambridge theologian John Ellis (1647).[59] In this sense, concluded Anglican William Sherlock (1647), "the political union betwixt Christ and his church may be either only external and visible — and so hypocritical professors may be said to be united to Christ — or true and real, which imports the truth and sincerity of our obedience and subjection to our Lord and Master."[60] This distinction between visible and invisible unity bothered Hobbes immensely because it was almost always presented in such a way as to diminish or demean political unity. He emphatically declared, "Spiritual commonwealth there is none in this world. For it is the same thing with the kingdom of Christ, which he himself saith is not of this world, but shall be in the next world... In the meantime, seeing there are no men on earth whose bodies are spiritual, there can be no spiritual commonwealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh."[61] One of Hobbes's critics, Philip Scot (1650), remarked, "The truth is, [Hobbes] is so zealous in his structure of a civil commonwealth (wherein he hath some excellent things) that he either neglects or reduceth the spiritual commonwealth or church almost to a Platonical inexistent idea." Scot thoughtfully added, "Reason me-thinks will necessarily carry us to prefer spiritual before temporal, and therefore St. Peter in his first epistle, Chap. 2 calls temporal magistracy a human creature, that is in a peculiar way derived from man."[62]

Hobbes's emphasis on the man-made, thoroughly political nature of his

59. John Ellis, *Vindiciae Catholicae, or, The Rights of Particular Churches Rescued and Asserted against That Mere (but Dangerous) Notion of One Catholic, Visible, Governing Church*, 1647, 72.

60. William Sherlock, *A Discourse Concerning the Knowledge of Jesus Christ and Our Union and Communion with Him*, 1674, 168.

61. *Leviathan*, XLII.128 (p.918).

62. Philip Scot, *A Treatise of the Schism of England: Wherein Particularly Mr. Hales and Mr. Hobbes Are Modestly Accosted* (Amsterdam/London, 1650), 50-1, 55-8.

commonwealth made his vision doubly vulnerable: to Catholic claims about the Pope's spiritual dominion, and to Protestant claims about Christ's spiritual dominion. He frequently reiterated, "Temporal and spiritual government are but two words brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their lawful sovereign. It is true that the bodies of the faithful, after the resurrection, shall be not only spiritual, but eternal; but in this life they are gross and corruptible. There is, therefore, no other government in this life, neither of state nor religion, but temporal."[63] Interestingly, this was a very similar argument to one used by Catholics against Protestants, with the terms "spiritual" and "temporal" exchanged for the terms "visible" and "invisible." One Catholic commentator reasoned:

> The visible church is a visible body, and who can comprehend a visible body when the only power which makes it a body by commanding over it is invisible? A visible power and visible obedience are the things that constitute a visible body... [Can] there be a visible King whose subjects are invisible? It is evidently ridiculous... How then can it be said, that the Church is a visible body and a visible kingdom, when the subjects are only visible and the Commanding Power is invisible?...King and subjects, Head and Members, are relations, and relations require the coexistence of such considerations as found the relation that is between their correlates and them.[64]

Richard Baxter's rhetorical response to this premise was to ask, "Are not all true churches parts of Christ's universal church, as a governed body? And yet are not they visible? Is it necessary then that the universal Head must be visible if the subordinate be so?" He elaborated, "All Christians are agreed that the universal church is visible: in its parts and members on earth and their profession, in that Christ the Head was visible on earth, and

63. *Leviathan*, XXXIX.4-5 (pp.732-4).

64. D., *Controversial Discourses*, 117-8.

hath left visible universal laws, and hath a body visible in heaven... and will shortly visibly judge the world. Thus far and no further is the universal head visible."[65]

This Protestant response, which included a cautious acknowledgment of the church's visibility and often a pointed observation about Christ's (limited) visibility as well, became a fairly standard by mid-century. Presbyterian Samuel Hudson (1650) wrote, "The entitive visible unity of the whole as one society under one head, in one visible covenant, under the same seal, under the same laws from the same authority, is enough to denominate a church-catholic visible, and one visible kingdom of Christ here on earth... We desire no other unity then will necessarily flow from this."[66] Leading (and politically active) Independent John Owen (1657) explained:

> Jesus Christ in his human nature is still visible, as to his person, [but] wherein he is the head of his church, he ever was, and is still invisible. His present absence is not upon account of his Majesty, seeing in his majesty he is still present with us... Now it sufficeth not to constitute a visible political body, that the head of it, in any respect may be seen, unless as that their head He is seen: Christ is visible, as this church is visible. He in his laws, in his word: that in its profession, in its obedience.[67]

Later in the century, Owen (1672) repeated this claim about what he called the "true foundation of all Gospel Unity among believers," and solemnly warned that any other "order, peace, concord, or union in the church" that was based upon any other foundation was "like a stone in a building, laid it may be in a comely order, but not cemented and fixed unto the whole, which render its station useless to the building and unsafe unto its

65. Richard Baxter, *A Second True Defense of the Mere Nonconformists*, 1681, 118.

66. Samuel Hudson, *A Vindication of the Essence and Unity of the Church Catholic Visible*, 1650, 180-1.

67. John Owen, *A Review of the True Nature of Schism, with a Vindication of the Congregational Churches in England*, 1657, 155-6.

self; or like a dead, mortified part of the body, which neither receives any vital influence from the Head, nor administers nourishment unto any other part." Owen noted that, in his estimation, very few of those who were most interested in ecclesiastical unity seemed to care much about ultimate union with Christ:

> It is the Romanists who make the greatest outcries about church union, and who make the greatest advantage by what they pretend so to be. Hereunto they contend expressly on the one side that it is indispensably necessary that all Christians should be subject to the Pope of Rome, and united to him, and on the other, that it is not necessary at all that any of them be spiritually and savingly united unto Christ. Others also place it in various instances of conformity unto, and compliance with the commands of men, which if they are observed, they are wondrous cold in their enquiries after this relation unto the Head.[68]

Hobbes seems to fit well within this latter category, in that he briefly affirmed Christ's headship but generally appeared to be "wondrous cold" about it, especially if there was any possibility of Christ's spiritual governance eclipsing or diminishing the visible, human governance of his civil sovereign.

Owen's condemnation, not only of Catholic pretensions, but of English advocates for institutional dominion of the church on either a national or local scale, reveals the extent to which the headship debate and the doctrinal conflict over visible and invisible ecclesiology broadened and became increasingly complex during the 17th century. The Protestant target, which had initially been Rome, almost exclusively, gradually widened to include various Protestant movements that were regarded as covertly "papist" in mentality. Laudian Anglicanism — disparagingly labeled "prelacy" — became one of the first

68. John Owen, *A Discourse Concerning Evangelical Love, Church-Peace and Unity*, 1672, 99.

Protestant casualties in this fight, and was subjected to the same polemical treatment as Rome: Robert Gillespie (1645), a Scottish Presbyterian commissioner to the Westminster Assembly, groaned, "Let it not be said that there can be no unity in the church without prelacy!"[69] In time even the Westminster Assembly itself drew suspicion from Independents like Oliver Cromwell, who (as discussed in Chapter One) famously appealed to Christ's "real unity" in a 1645 letter to Parliament as a way to obliquely protest that the Assembly had no business imposing any kind of institutional uniformity on English and Scottish churches, whether Episcopalian or Presbyterian.[70] Hobbes's reduction and subjection of each national church to one civil head, and his provocative suggestion in several passages (noted by many of his critics) that the Pope would be welcome to doctrinally govern the British church *under* the civil sovereign,[71] would have been a much greater affront to 17th-century Christians than anything proposed by the Presbyterians or Anglicans, and certainly would not have shielded him from the accusation of popery.

The purpose of this discussion is not to imply in any way that Hobbes was a Roman Catholic, but to suggest that several of the political and ecclesiastical positions he held fell within the general orbit of certain familiar 17th-century doctrinal ideas under fierce attack by Puritan Protestantism. Richard Baxter (1659) maintained that, "As soon as ever any man hath received this opinion of the necessity of an universal visible Head, or common government of the whole church, he is either a Papist, or of an opinion equivalent in folly,

69. George Gillespie, *Wholesome Severity Reconciled with Christian Liberty*, 1645, 38-9.

70. See Appendix A for Cromwell's 1645 letter

71. See *Leviathan*, XLII.70,80,83 (pp.854,866,870), XLV.35 (p.1048). Clarendon darkly noted "the power of the Metropolitan School-master, which Mr. Hobbes seems willing to confer upon [the Pope]." See *Survey of Leviathan*, 277.

tyranny, and impiety, to Popery... It is not who shall be the man, or power, but whether there shall be any such man or power that we dispute."[72] For 17th-century Puritans, the problem seemed to be, not so much formal affiliation with Rome or literal fealty to the Pope, although those were unequivocally condemned, but a certain, dangerously subtle, mentality about ecclesiastical unity and authority that was believed to betray one's ultimate commitment to either Christian freedom or human tyranny. Roman Catholicism was considered the extreme pole representing human tyranny, despite its specious regard for Christ — explicitly in doctrine, and implicitly in the tropes and language used to describe Papal sovereignty. The Puritan Independents, who with Cromwell gained ascendancy in England mid-century, were considered (at least by themselves) to be the opposite pole representing Christian freedom. All the other intermediary Protestant persuasions and perspectives were then dropped at various points along the continuum, and while many of these alternative persuasions heatedly protested the claim of Independency to represent Christian freedom — the Presbyterians thought it more properly represented Christian license and anarchy, for instance — most everyone found it helpful to recognize a continuum between Catholicism and Independency as representing a continuum between two radical concepts of unity, between which one could orient oneself.

Insofar as these respective concepts invoked the antithesis "visible and invisible," or "spiritual and political," it seems likely that Hobbes would have been oriented toward the pole of political visibility closer to Rome, and perhaps that he himself would have drawn this very connection, if pressed.[73] The dichotomy was expressed evocatively by

72. Baxter, *Key for Catholics*, 392.

73. Hobbes essentially ignores the Protestants in *Leviathan* and his other major political works, although

Richard Baxter (1659), who in the passage below describes individuals as grains of sand, but for all intents and purposes, could also be describing Hobbes's mushrooms, springing from the earth:

> Every self is a grain of sand that's hardly made coherent with another. The darkest mind is self-conceited, and the poorest child or beggar is self-affected, and high and low, Princes and people have self-interests, which draw them several ways... What hope then of Unity, while every man hath a numerically different center, principle, and end, and so few forsake it and devote themselves to God the common center, and end of the saints — and those few so imperfectly, permitting self to live and do so much within them. And though the Papists have devised a way to make this sand into a rope, or cement innumerable selves together, by finding out such a Carnal Head and Center where every man may find his own carnal interest involved in the interest of that Head and his body, and so may have a carnal unity of a multitude of carnal ones to glory in: yet Christ is another kind of Head and Center, condemning and destroying carnal self, and commanding all his followers upon pain of damnation to deny it, though to nature it be the dearest thing in the world. No wonder therefore if the number of his adherents be few, and the unity of those that center in him, be less conspicuous and glorious in the world.[74]

It seems more likely that Hobbes would have identified with the "carnal" mode of unity depicted in this passage rather than the spiritual mode, and this orientation alone says a great deal about the possibility of a Christological prototype behind the political structure of sovereignty he presented in *Leviathan*, as well as the reception his work would have been likely to receive from the wide majority of 17$^{\text{th}}$-century Protestants because of his decision to use Christ in that way.

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he excoriates the Presbyterians in his *Behemoth*, a book in which he praised the Pope for having the courage to withhold the scriptures from the laity in order to preclude doctrinal dissent (see *Behemoth*, Dialogue I, pp.21-2). Hobbes expressed cautious acceptance of Independency in *Leviathan* (XLVII.20, p.1116), which was published during the tenure of Independency, so long as political sovereignty was upheld, but his most developed — and confident— proposals about ecclesiastical structure are conspicuously absolutist in the same form as Rome, rather than decentralized, like Independency. It should also be noted that he condemned Independency in his later works, as soon as Cromwell fell from power.

74. Baxter, *Key for Catholics*, 458

This dissertation has investigated Hobbes's theory of political representation: its scope, its characteristics, its resonances, and its end. I have demonstrated that the "real unity" between Hobbes's sovereign representative and the citizens of the commonwealth, which he describes in one of the most famous passages of *Leviathan*, was almost certainly an allusion to the theological doctrine of Christ's representative unity between himself and believers. This epilogue has shown some of the ways in which that doctrine was a source of significant socio-political controversy in England during the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century, and suggested that alternate interpretations of Christ's mystical body were correlated with (if not determinative of) contrasting political perspectives about institutional authority in church and state. Hobbes's work was a contribution in this larger dialogue, and at least in retrospect, a significant contribution to it, but his influence at the time was muted and his ultimate impact on policy arguably slight.

The socio-political ramifications of the rival Puritan position, however, can hardly be overstated. The ultimate global success of Puritan Protestantism in eradicating the language of mystical body from politics, in reshaping political representation as a mere deputyship, in privileging the (gradually economic) notion of an invisible society over visible institutions, in decentralizing authority in church and state, and fostering individualistic pluralism in both spheres, has been the subject of numerous scholarly surveys, containing just as many hypotheses about the possible causes and linkages between Protestantism and these observed socio-political effects.[75] Many of the hypotheses

75. For highlights within this genre, see Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*; Weber, *Protestant Work Ethic*; Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*; Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*; Voegelin, *New Science of Politics* (especially the section "Gnostic Revolution: the Puritan Case"); Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*

offered describe broad features or effects of Protestantism, such as toleration or freedom of conscience. However this dissertation suggests that fine, doctrinal distinctions about the person and work of Christ may have played a much larger role than has been assumed in transforming societal assumptions about ecclesiastical and political authority. Much more research needs to be undertaken on the shifting theological opinions of 17$^{\text{th}}$-century believers concerning Christological representation, and the implications of those shifts for political representation. But for the present, this dissertation serves as an introduction to that subject, and an acknowledgment of Hobbes's intriguing contribution to it.

APPENDIX A

OLIVER CROMWELL'S LETTER TO PARLIAMENT, 1645

For the Honourable William Lenthall, Speaker of the Commons House of Parliament:

Sir,

It has pleased the General to give me in charge to represent unto you a particular account of the taking of Bristol; the which I gladly undertake.

After the finishing of that service at Sherborne, it was disputed at a council of war, whether we should march into the West or to Bristol? Amongst other arguments, the leaving so considerable an enemy at our backs, to march into the heart of the Kingdom, the undoing of the country about Bristol, which was already exceedingly harassed by the Prince his being thereabouts but a fortnight; the correspondency he might hold in Wales; the possibility of uniting the Enemy's forces where they pleased, and specially of drawing to an head the disaffected Club-men of Somerset, Wilts and Dorset, when once our backs were towards them: these considerations, together with the hope of taking so important a place, so advantageous for the opening of trade to London, did sway the balance, and beget that conclusion.

When we came within four miles of the city, we had a new debate, whether we should endeavour to block it up, or make a regular siege? The latter being overruled, Colonel Welden with his brigade marched to Pile Hill, on the South side of the City, being within musket-shot thereof: where in a few days they made a good quarter, overlooking the City. Upon our advance, the enemy fired Bedminster, Clifton, and some other villages lying near to the City: and would have fired more, if our unexpected coming had not hindered. The General caused some Horse and Dragoons under Commissary-General Ireton to advance over Avon, to keep-in the enemy on the North side of the Town, till the foot could come up: and after a day, the General, with Colonel Montague's and Colonel Rainsborough's Brigades, marched over at Kensham to Stapleton, where he quartered that night. The next day, Colonel Montague, having his post assigned with his brigade, To secure all between the Rivers Froom and Avon; he came up to Lawford's Gate, within musket-shot thereof. Colonel Rainsborough's Post was near to Durdam Down, whereof the Dragoons and three regiments of Horse made good a post upon the Down, between him and the River Avon, on his right hand. And from Colonel Rainsborough's quarters to Froom River, on his left, a part of Colonel Birch's, and the whole of General Skippon's regiment were to maintain that post.

These posts thus settled, our Horse were forced to be upon exceeding great duty; to stand by the Foot, lest the Foot, being so weak in all their posts, might receive an affront. And

truly herein we were very happy, that we should receive so little loss by sallies; considering the paucity of our men to make good the posts, and strength of the enemy within. By sallies (which were three or four) I know not that we lost thirty men in all the time of our siege. Of officers of quality, only Colonel Okey was taken by mistake (going of himself to the enemy, thinking they had been friends), and Captain Guilliams slain in a charge. We took Sir Bernard Astley; and killed Sir Richard Crane, one very considerable with the Prince.

We had a council of war concerning the storming of the Town, about eight days before we took it; and in that there appeared great unwillingness to the work, through the unseasonableness of the weather, and other apparent difficulties. Some inducement to bring us thither had been the report of the good affection of the Townsmen to us; but that did not answer expectation. Upon a second consideration, it was overruled for a storm. And all things seemed to favour the design; and truly there hath been seldom the like cheerfulness to any work like to this, after it was once resolved upon. The day and hour of our storm was appointed to be on Wednesday morning, the Tenth of September, about one of the clock. We chose to act it so early because we hoped thereby to surprise the Enemy. With this resolution also, to avoid confusion and falling foul one upon another, that when once we had recovered the Line, and Forts upon it, we should not advance further till day. The General's signal unto a storm was to be, the firing of straw, and discharging four pieces of cannon at Pryor's Hill Fort.

The signal was very well perceived of all; and truly the men went on with great resolution; and very presently recovered the Line, making way for the Horse to enter. Colonel Montague and Colonel Pickering, who stormed at Lawford's Gate, where was a double work, well filled with men and cannon, presently entered; and with great resolution beat the Enemy from their works, and possessed their cannon. Their expedition was such that they forced the Enemy from their advantages, without any considerable loss to themselves. They laid down the bridges for the Horse to enter; Major Desborow commanding the Horse; who very gallantly seconded the Foot. Then our Foot advanced to the City Walls; where they possessed the Gate against the Castle Street: whereinto were put a Hundred men; who made it good. Sir Hardress Waller with his own and the General's regiment, with no less resolution, entered on the other side of Lawford's Gate, towards Avon River; and put themselves into immediate conjunction with the rest of brigade.

During this, Colonel Rainsborough and Colonel Hammond attempted Pryor's Hill Fort, and the Line downwards towards Froom; and the Major-General's regiment being to storm towards, Froom River, Colonel Hammond possessed the Line immediately, and beating the enemy from it, made way for the Horse to enter. Colonel Rainsborough, who had the hardest task of all at Pryor's Hill Fort, attempted it; and fought near three hours for it. And indeed there was great despair of carrying the place; it being exceeding high, a ladder of thirty rounds scarcely reaching the top thereof; but his resolution was such that, notwithstanding the inaccessibleness and difficulty, he would not give it over. The Enemy had four pieces of cannon upon it, which they plied with round and case shot upon our men: his Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen, and others, were two hours at push of pike, standing upon the palisadoes, but could not enter. But now Colonel Hammond being entered the

Line (and here Captain Ireton, with a forlorn of Colonel Rich's regiment, interposing with his Horse between the Enemy's Horse and Colonel Hammond, received a shot with two pistol bullets, which broke his arm), by means of his entrance of Colonel Hammond they did storm the Fort on that part which was inward; and so Colonel Rainsborough's and Colonel Hammond's men entered the Fort, immediately put almost all the men in it to the sword.

And as this was the place of most difficulty, so it was of most loss to us on that side, and of very great honour to the undertaker. The Horse too did second them with great resolution: both these Colonels do acknowledge that their interposition between the Enemy's Horse and their Foot was a great means of obtaining of this strong Fort. Without which all the rest of the Line to Froom River would have done us little good: and indeed neither Horse nor Foot could have stood in all that way, in any manner of security, had not the Fort been taken. Major Bethel's were the first Horse that entered the Line; who did behave himself gallantly; and was shot in the thigh, had one or two shot more, and had his horse shot under him. Colonel Birch with his men, and the Major-General's regiment, entered with very good resolution where their post was; possessing the Enemy's guns, and turning them upon them.

By this, all the Line from Pryor's Hill Fort to Avon (which was a full mile), with all the forts, ordinance and bulwarks, were possessed by us; save one, wherein were about two hundred and twenty men of the Enemy; which the General summoned, and all the men submitted.

The success on Colonel Welden's side did not answer with this. And although the Colonels, and other the officers and soldiers both Horse and Foot, testified as much resolution as could be expected, Colonel Weldon, Colonel Ingoldsby, Colonel Herbert, and the rest of the Colonels and Officers, both of Horse and Foot, doing what could be well looked for from men of honour, yet what by reason of the height of the works, which proved higher than report made them, and the shortness of the ladders, they were repulsed, with the loss of about one hundred men. Colonel Fortescue's Lieutenant Colonel was killed, and Major Cromwell dangerously shot; and two of Colonel Ingoldsby's brothers hurt; with some officers.

Being possessed of thus much as hath been related, the Town was fired in three places by the Enemy; which we could not put out. Which begat a great trouble in the General, and us all; fearing to see so famous a City burnt to ashes before our faces. Whilst we were viewing so sad a spectacle, and consulting which way to make further advantage of our success, the Prince sent a trumpet to the General to desire a treaty for the surrender of the Town. To which the General agreed; and deputed Colonel Montague, Colonel Rainsborough, and Colonel Pickering for that service; authorising them with instructions to treat and conclude the Articles, which accordingly are these enclosed. For performance whereof hostages were mutually given.

On Thursday about two of the clock in the afternoon, the Prince marched out; having a convoy of two regiments of Horse from us; and making election of Oxford for the place he

would go to, which he had liberty to do by his Articles.

The cannon which we have taken are about a hundred-and-forty mounted; about a hundred barrels of powder already come to our hands, with a good quantity of shot, ammunition, and arms. We have found already between two and three thousand muskets. The Royal Fort had victual in it for a hundred and-fifty men, for three-hundred-and-twenty days; the Castle victualled for nearly half as long. The Prince had in Foot of the Garrison, as the Mayor of the City informed me, two-thousand five-hundred, and about a thousand Horse, besides the Trained Bands of the Town, and Auxiliaries a thousand, some say a thousand five-hundred. I hear but of one man that hath died of the plague in all our Army, although we have quartered amongst and in the midst of infected persons and places. We had not killed of ours in the Storm, nor in all this Siege, two-hundred men.

Thus I have given you a true, but not a full account of this great business; wherein he that runs may read, that all this is none other than the work of God. He must be a very Atheist that doth not acknowledge it.

It may be thought that some praises are due to those gallant men, of whose valour so much mention is made: their humble suit to you and all that have an interest in this blessing is, that in the remembrance of God's praises they be forgotten. It's their joy that they are instruments of God's glory, and their country's good. It's their honour that God vouchsafes to use them. Sir, they that have been employed in this service know, that faith and prayer obtained this City for you: I do not say ours only, but of the people of God with you and all England over, who have wrestled with God for a blessing in this very thing. Our desires are, that God may be glorified by the same spirit of faith by which we ask all our sufficiency, and have received it. It is meet that He have all the praise. Presbyterians, Independents, all have here the same spirit of faith and prayer; the same presence and answer; they agree here, have no names of difference pity it is it should be otherwise anywhere! All that believe have the real unity, which is most glorious; because inward, and spiritual, in the Body, and to the Head. For being united in forms, commonly called Uniformity, every Christian will be peace-sake study and do, as far as conscience will permit. And for brethren, in things of the mind, we look for no compulsion, but that of light and reason.

In other things, God hath put the sword in the Parliament's hands, for the terror of evil-doers, and the praise of them that do well. If any plead exemption from that, he knows not the Gospel: if any would wring that out of your hands, or steal it from you, under what pretence soever, I hope they shall do it without effect. That God will maintain it in your hands, and direct you in the use thereof, is the prayer of

Your humble servant, *Oliver Cromwell.*

From Bristol, this 14th September, 1645.

APPENDIX B

CATALOGUE OF "REAL UNITY" USAGES

In England and Scotland during the 17th Century

427 references total (numerous same-category citations in a work were counted as one):
- physiological body (classic sense): 5 references
- real presence' (transubstantiation): 15 references
- members of the godhead (Trinity): 25 references
- human and divine natures of Christ: 37 references
- Christ and his (church) body: 305 references
- miscellaneous non-religious: 22 references
- miscellaneous religious: 18 references

Search terms included all spellings and combinations of real unity' or real union'

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Boyle, Robert. *The Skeptical Chemist, Or, Chemico-Physical Doubts & Paradoxes Touching the Spagyrist's Principles Commonly Called Hypostatical*, (London, 1661), 94.

Conway, Anne. *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy Concerning God, Christ and the Creatures*, (London, 1690), 116.

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James I, King of England. *His Majesty's Speech in the Star Chamber, June 20, 1616*, (London, 1616), unnumbered manuscript (one reference).

Philalethes, Eirenaeus. *Ripley Revived, Or, An Exposition upon Sir George Ripley's Hermetico-Poetical Works Containing the Plainest and Most Excellent Discoveries of the Most Hidden Secrets of the Ancient Philosophers, That Were Ever yet Published*, (London, 1678), 277.

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Dunbar, David. *The Theological Key of the Three First Covenants Made by God with Man, in the Several States of Man, Obliging Man to His Law*, (London, 1646), 160, 163-5.

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Rutherford, Samuel. *The Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication: Or a Peaceable Dispute for the Perfection of the Holy Scripture in Point of Ceremonies and Church Government*, (London, 1646), 166.
Taylor, Jeremy. *The Real Presence and Spiritual of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament Proved against the Doctrine of Transubstantiation*, 1653, 50.
Towerson, Gabriel. *Of the Sacraments in General, in Pursuance of an Explication of the Catechism of the Church of England*, (London, 1686), 239.
Ussher, James. *The Great Necessity of Unity and Peace among All Protestants, and the Bloody Principles of the Papists Made Manifest*, 1688, 4-5,12.
Vane, Thomas. *A Lost Sheep Returned Home, Or, The Motives of the Conversion to the Catholic Faith*, (Paris, 1648), 329-30.

GODHEAD (TRINITY)

Anonymous. *A Discourse Concerning the Nominal and Real Trinitarians*, 1695, 12,22,40.
Braddocke, John. *The Doctrine of the Fathers and Schools Considered*, (London, 1695), 109-10.
Charnock, Stephen. *Several Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God by That Late Eminent Minister in Christ, Mr. Stephen Charnocke*, (London, 1682), 224.
Cheynell, Francis. *The Divine Tri-Unity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, Or, The Blessed Doctrine of the Three Coessentiall Subsistents in the Eternal Godhead without Any Confusion or Division of the Distinct Subsistences or Multiplication of the Most Single and Entire Godhead*, (London, 1650), 153.
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