000001337 001__ 1337
000001337 005__ 20251007025120.0
000001337 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.6082/uchicago.1337
000001337 037__ $$aTHESIS$$bDissertation
000001337 041__ $$aeng
000001337 245__ $$aIdentification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Collusion
000001337 260__ $$bUniversity of Chicago
000001337 269__ $$a2017-06
000001337 300__ $$a111
000001337 336__ $$aDissertation
000001337 502__ $$bPh.D.
000001337 520__ $$aThis dissertation develops a method to detect collusion and estimate its effect on the seller's revenue in first-price auctions with independent, private valuations. The challenge is that collusion may be difficult to detect because colluders can use a simple and costless strategy to make their bids appear competitive. If the econometrician observes an exogenous shifter of the level of competition in the auction in addition to the winning bids, a statistical test for collusion by a given bidder can be formulated as a test of independence between the exogenous shifter and the valuations that rationalize its bids under the null hypothesis that it is not colluding. Simulations confirm this test performs well even when colluders attempt to disguise their behavior. I then adopt a multiple hypothesis testing framework to simultaneously test for collusion bidder by bidder. By controlling the probability of making one or more type I errors, the set of rejected hypotheses serves as a lower confidence bound on the set of colluders. To produce a lower confidence bound on the cost of collusion, I use consistent estimates of the bidders' valuation distributions to numerically solve for the seller's expected revenues in auctions with and without collusion. To provide an example of this identification strategy, I use exogenous variation in the reserve prices at British Columbia's timber auctions to estimate the extent of collusion in the years preceding a lumber trade dispute between the United States and Canada.
000001337 540__ $$a© 2017 Karl Schurter
000001337 542__ $$fCC BY-NC-SA
000001337 650__ $$aEconomics
000001337 650__ $$aStatistics
000001337 653__ $$aAuction
000001337 653__ $$aCollusion
000001337 653__ $$aFirst-Price
000001337 690__ $$aSocial Sciences Division
000001337 691__ $$aKenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics
000001337 7001_ $$aSchurter, Karl$$uUniversity of Chicago
000001337 72012 $$aAli Hortacsu
000001337 72014 $$aAzeem Shaikh
000001337 72014 $$aBrent Hickman
000001337 8564_ $$97786cb1f-8a8c-4e66-ab06-28db1a0f87f9$$s1576698$$uhttps://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/1337/files/Schurter_uchicago_0330D_13738.pdf$$eEmbargo (2019-06-20)
000001337 909CO $$ooai:uchicago.tind.io:1337$$pDissertations$$pGLOBAL_SET
000001337 983__ $$aDissertation