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INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS: STRATEGIC ALLIANCES VS. COLLECTIVE SECURITY COMMUNITIES

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ABSTRACT:

This research paper aims to explore the question: What would implementing a network analytical methodology tell us about collective security in the context of NATO? In the evolving landscape of international relations, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains a cornerstone of global security, yet its nature and underlying dynamics are subject to differing interpretations. Constructivist perspectives propose that NATO functions as a 'security community' sustained by shared norms and mutual trust. While constructivist scholars have discussed the role of norms in shaping international organizations, empirical studies that quantify these aspects are limited. Network analysis may be the methodological mechanism that constructivists can utilize to produce insights into understanding NATOs structure and functionality as a collective security community. The nuances of norm diffusion—the construction and spread of shared norms—are found in the complex narratives of communicative processes. Using degree centrality, a network analysis measurement tool for determining how much access an actor has to other nodes in a network, this project demonstrates how the operationalization of norms in discourse exemplify NATO as a collective security community.

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Introduction

  In the evolving landscape of International Relations (IR), The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains a cornerstone of global security, yet its nature and underlying dynamics are subject to differing interpretations. Traditionally, NATO has been viewed through a realist lens, which emphasizes material capabilities and strategic interests. However, constructivist perspectives propose that NATO functions as a 'security community' sustained by shared norms, collective identity, and mutual trust. While constructivist scholars have extensively discussed the role of norms and collective identity in shaping international organizations, empirical studies that quantify these aspects are limited. Network analysis may be the methodological bridge constructivists can utilize to produce powerful insights into understanding NATOs structure and functionality as a collective security community.

  Network analysis and theory examines the relationships and interactions between agents to understand how these connections influence behavior, decision-making, and overall system stability (Wellman 1983). By examining NATO through a network approach, we can identify key nodes (influential actors) and ties (relationships) that reveal the structure and dynamics of NATO's interactions. Therefore, this research paper aims to explore the question: what would implementing a network analytical methodology tell us about collective security in the context of NATO? By contrasting a purely materialist account with a norms-based approach, this study

seeks to elucidate the extent to which network analysis could reveal NATO's function as a collective security community.

Realism, a dominant theory in IR, posits that the international system is anarchic, with states acting primarily out of self-interest to ensure their survival and security (Mearsheimer 2001). From this perspective, NATO is seen as a strategic material alliance created to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War (Asmus 2002). Further, under realism NATO's primary objective is to provide collective defense, with member states motivated by the strategic benefits of mutual protection and deterrence against common adversaries (Hyde-Price 2015). In a realist network model of NATO, we would expect to see these strategic aims reflected as a hierarchical network structure dominated by material power.

A realist model, however, would overlook the importance of shared values, beliefs, and cooperative norms that bind the alliance together. Constructivist theories in IR emphasize these ideational and normative aspects of international cooperation. Barnett and Adler's (1998) concept of security communities posits that states can form deep, enduring bonds based on shared values and mutual trust, leading to a stable peace that transcends mere strategic alliances. According to this view, NATO is more than a military coalition; it is a community where member states are united by common norms, fostering cooperation and mutual security. A constructivist network model of NATO would highlight a more integrated and cohesive structure as the nuances found in intangible ties are lost in a realist model. The nuances of norm diffusion—the construction and spread of shared norms—are found in the complex narratives of communicative processes between actors, or discursive interactions (Anderson 1983; Florini 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Hansen 2006). I argue, an analysis of discourse in combination with the

methodological tools of network analysis, would enable norms to be operationalized to exemplify NATOs collective security.

To support this project's argument, I develop a three-fold theoretical framework that integrates network analysis, norms, and discourse. First, network theory provides the structural lens through which I examine NATO. In this framework, member states are nodes, and the connections between them (ties) are defined by the exchange and acceptance of norms. By examining these relationships, you can identify central actors, clusters, and the overall density of the network, which in turn can reveal the patterns and strength of normative ties within NATO. Second, a norms theory emphasizes the role of shared values, beliefs, and expectations in shaping state behavior (Florini 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Within NATO, norms such as democratic governance, human rights, and rule of law reinforce its physical requirement of collective defense, which in turn plays a crucial role in maintaining cohesion. This paper's framework posits that these norms are not static but are continuously diffused and reinforced through discursive interactions among member states. Third, discourse theory focuses on the ways in which language, communication, and rhetoric shape social reality. In the context of NATO, a discourse analysis involves examining speeches, agreements, and other communications to understand how NATOs norms are articulated and propagated. This helps in identifying the narratives that underpin NATO's identity community and norms of collective security. It is in this process of discursive norm diffusion that network analysis can operationalize NATO as a security community.

To be clear, this paper does not provide a comprehensive literature review of network, norms, and discourse. The goal of this paper is theory development, as I use elements of network analysis, constructivism, and discourse theory to demonstrate NATO as a collective

security network structure. By utilizing degree centrality—a methodological analytical tool in network analysis for determining how many connections an actor is or how much access it has in the network—I aim to determine how integrated or fragmented NATOs network is through both a realist and constructivist account. By integrating this discourse data on norms with network analysis, I demonstrate how a network methodological approach may provide IR scholars with a comprehensive view of NATOs structure and functionality and its relevance as a collective security community.

Moreover, the significance of this project lies in its potential to advance theoretical understanding, address empirical gaps, and inform practical policy and strategy. By integrating network analysis with discourse theory and norm diffusion, this research offers a comprehensive and innovative approach to studying NATO's structure and functionality. It challenges traditional realist views, supports constructivist theories, and provides valuable insights for both scholars and practitioners in IR. Ultimately, this project aims to enhance our understanding of NATO as a collective security community, recognizing the critical interplay of material capabilities and normative dimensions in shaping its operations and purpose.

The paper proceeds as follows. After distinguishing the difference between strategic alliances and collective security communities in a literature review, I provide an overview of this paper's theory of network, norms, and discourse to examine under this logic how these two perceptions of NATO are conceptualized. I then apply this framework to model what a realist and constructivist account of NATOs network would entail through measuring member states degree centrality. For the realist model, I analyze how material capabilities as the ties that facilitate connections form NATOs network. For the constructivist account, I utilize the discursive

interactions on norms amongst member states as the ties that create connections in NATOs network structure.

IR Theoretical Debate

The NATO alliance was originally formulated as a strategic military alliance to safeguard security against the Soviet Union (William and Neuman 2000). In the aftermath of the Cold War, Eastern European countries also sought to ensure their security against potential aggression from Russia. As a result, NATO underwent significant enlargement following the fall of the Soviet Union, most evidently between 1999 and 2009 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2024A). For the member states, integrating Eastern European countries was a way to stabilize the region, prevent conflict and ensure stability. However, some scholars saw it as a critical period in which NATOs strategic purpose was underscored and even facilitated by normative elements (Asmus 2002). Both NATO and prospective members often framed enlargement as mutually beneficial, emphasizing the enhancement of regional and international security (Geremek 1999). Yet, interactions between these states involved narratives that highlight NATO's transformation from a strictly military alliance to one committed to upholding collective norms and values in the region as a network. In this section, I offer a concise overview of the theoretical debate amongst IR scholars regarding NATO as a strategic material alliance or as a collective security community. This is to highlight the gaps in both literatures that this paper's theoretical framework and empirical analysis aims to address.

Strategic Alliances

Material strategic alliances in IR are primarily based on shared security interests through the aggregation of military and/or economic capabilities to counter external threats (Waltz 1985). Further, understanding state cooperation motivated by physical/material factors can be best

understood when viewed as a state's calculation of its security in an anarchic international network or structure (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1990). Waltz and Mearsheimer, in addition to other realists, assert that these security seeking efforts are strategic aims of balancing power to ensure their survival, ultimately leading to collaboration when it enhances states' security or counterbalances a common threat (Baylis 2008; Flammengi 2011; Hyde-Price 2015). However, examinations of strategic alliances rooted in material interests are generally more limited in scope, as state cooperation and action are calculated as strictly in response to specific external threats, or physical security seeking efforts. Simply, strategic material alliances under neorealism fit within a framework of rational actions and decisions. Rational choice theory posits that states behave strategically, weighing potential outcomes and choosing actions that are most likely to achieve their goals. Under this framework, states form alliances as a strategic decision to enhance their security, offset power imbalances, or achieve shared material/physical objectives (military, safeguarding territoriality etc.) (Park 2014). This suggests that states carefully evaluate the costs and benefits of alliance formation by considering factors such as potential threats, shared interests, and, most importantly, the distribution of power in the international system (Quackenbush 2010).

Arguably, the most prominent example of a strategic alliance in international politics is NATO. At its fundamental level, NATO was established as a military alliance that allows member counties to share military resources and strategic capabilities (William and Neuman 2000). This alliance enhances the collective defense capabilities of its members through the sharing of military assets, joint trainings excises, and coordinated defense strategies (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2024B). One of the primary arguments for NATOs enlargement according to neorealists, as well as member states of NATOs own justification on the initiative, is

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asserted on their desire to maximize security (Zemen 1999; Mearsheimer 2001). States perceive that by joining forces with other nations, they can more effectively deter potential aggressors, protect their interests, and fortify the region. The expansion of NATO into the former Warsaw Pact countries served multiple rational strategic objectives, primarily it aimed to enhance stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe by incorporating these states into the network, in turn preventing the re-emergence of regional conflicts and promoting democratic reform (Asmus 2002).

However, the second half of the 20th century gave rise to the occurrence of asymmetrical military-political alliances and institutions. In these networks, a hegemon or groups of Great Powers possess a majority the material capabilities that are then provided to the rest of the alliance. Further, these Great Power states maintain cooperations with other actors who are weaker in comparison to their exhaustive capabilities (Istomin and Baykov 2019). As of 2020, There is still a distinct gap in defense spending and overall military capabilities between North American and European states, particularly Eastern European states and the continuity of this gap between these groups of states reflects the broader a difference in value attributed to security and defense between them (Husera and Balte 2021). As Husera and Balte's note (2021, 27), whereas North American states invest more in their physical capabilities, therefore contributing more to NATO, European states invest into the notion of "state's well-being and self-understanding." Husera and Balte's discussion on these distinctions illustrates the possible normative underpinnings in the behavior of European NATO states. Their work suggests that European nations might consider their contributions to NATO in a broader context, incorporating elements like political stability, social cohesion, and the promotion of a liberal international order

as part of their security strategy. This contrasts with a more traditional, materialist perspective focused solely on military capability and expenditure.

Collective Security Communities

Constructivist scholars have long argued that identities, beliefs, and norms in the international system play a crucial role in shaping their behavior, emphasizing that shared identities and social norms facilitate cooperation through mutual trust and understanding (Peterson 1993; Barnett and Adler; 1998; Wendt 1999; Mattern 2001). At the turn of century, identity emerged as a crucial aspect of contemporary security debates. This was predominantly due to the increase in nationalist and ethnic conflict following the Cold War (Snyder and Jervis 1995; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996). However, when the concept of security communities was initially introduced by Karl Deutsch in 1950, it remained relatively unexamined for several decades (Barnett and Adler 1998). Barnett and Adler revitalized this concept following the end of the Cold War and the radical change in international dynamics with state behavior that negated conventional theories on rational choice.

Barnette and Adler define a security community as a region where conflict has become highly unlikely or even unthinkable. This is dependent upon the shared norms, values, and institutions that foster mutual trust and cooperation among member states. The most common example of a security community is the European Union (EU). Similar to NATO, the EU's origins can be traced back to the aftermath of World War II, with its initial purpose of integrating European states economically to withstand future conflicts (Delanty1993). Further, whereas NATOs complex institutional framework lies its integrated command and military structure (i.e. North Atlantic Council (joint political decision-making body), STAGNAGS (ensure interoperability), Military Committee (consensus decision-making/consultation mechanisms),

etc.), the EU similarly possesses an intricate institutional framework that includes integrated decision-making bodies that facilitate cooperation and adherence to shared norms and rules. Further, despite its material monetary conception, throughout the years the EU has introduced norms and values to the network structure that are now deeply engrained as the network's collective identity (Mitzen 2016).

Barnett and Adler assert that NATO's formation in the aftermath of World War II was for the purpose of a collective defense organization against the Soviet Union, but the organization has moved away from a purely military alliance and transformed into a security community. Their argument is built upon the observations that NATO has shifted their focus from defense against external threats to promoting internal stability and averting conflicts amongst member states. Overall, NATO adapted to the post-Cold War environment by re-articulating its purpose to include crisis management, peacekeeping, and partnerships with non-member states (Barnett and Adler 1998; Asmus 2002). Still, critics argue that despite the transformative narrative, security dilemmas persist among NATO members (Walt 2009; Rynning 2014)arguing that Eastern enlargement has been viewed by Russia as a threat, leading to the resurgence of security competition in Europe, indicating that conventional security concerns still play a significant role in NATOs network structure and dynamic (Walt 2009). Also, the internal disagreements within NATO on strategic priorities challenge the notion of a cohesive security community due to varying levels of commitment to collective defense obligations among member states, thus undermining the mutual trust and collective identity that Barnette and Adler emphasize (Rynning 2014).

Collective security operates on the principle that an aggression against one member state is considered an aggression against all, warranting a mutual and collective response (Kupchan

1994: Kupchan and Kupchan 1995). Kupchan (1994, 43) asserts that the foundational logic of collective security is 'two-fold', in which he states,

> "First, the balancing mechanisms that operate under collective security should prevent war and stop aggression far more effectively than the balancing mechanisms that operate in an anarchic setting: At least in theory, collective security makes for a more robust deterrence by ensuring that aggressors will be met with an opposing coalition that has preponderant rather than merely equivalent power. Second, a collective security organization, by institutionalizing the notion of all against one, contributes to the creation of an international setting in which stability emerges through cooperation rather than through competition.

Kupchan's first claims fits within a realist framework for the formation of strategic alliances by demonstrating how collective security theoretically strengthens deterrence because it unites a large number of states against a potential aggressor. However, his second assertion provokes a deeper analysis into *how* the concept of 'all against one' is institutionalized in an organization beyond the notion of rationality, balance, and deterrence. Collective security as a defense framework is built on *mutual trust* amongst states, despite any possibly internal disagreements within the alliance as Rynning asserts. This mutual trust is institutionalized through the agreements, treaties, and discussions conducted in the rhetoric and narratives propagating this norm of collective action.

International organizations often serve as platforms for states to articulate, discuss, and agree upon common norms and values. These norms, such as the prohibition of aggression, respect for sovereignty, and the protection of human rights, form the foundation of collective security (Barnett and Adler 1998). Through discourse, states reaffirm their commitment to these principles, which helps to align their expectations and helps legitimize collective actions taken in response to security threats. For instance, when a state violates agreed-upon norms, such as committing aggression, the collective discourse within organizations like NATO can lead to

resolutions that authorize collective measures, including sanctions or military interventions. This discourse provides a normative justification for collective action, enhancing its legitimacy and the willingness of member states to participate in accordance with this collective identity.

Therefore, collective security is inherently dynamic as the discourse on norms surrounding collectiveness and its functions is not static. International organizations provide the structural space for states to re-articulate or reinforce these norms. The concept of structure under realism is primarily based on the distribution of material capabilities (Goddard 2009). In contrast, a network approach understands structures the consistent patterns of connections among actors (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009). As a result, the meanings, understandings, and actions of actors in international relations are interconnected and influenced by their interactions with one another. Unlike static theories, such as the neorealist perspective, which view the international system's structure as unchanging and determined primarily by physical capabilities, network relations emphasize the fluid and dynamic nature of these interactions. In a networked approach, the structure is not fixed; it evolves as actors interact, share norms, and influence each other's behavior, leading to changes in their identities and interests over time. This dynamic understanding highlights the importance of communication, relationships, and the context in shaping international politics (Wellman 1997; Hafner Burton et al. 2006; Goddard 2009; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009).

Similarly to network theorists, constructivists see the international system as inherently dynamic, where continuous interaction and socialization among states and other actors lead to the diffusion of norms, ideas, and practices. This ongoing process influences state behavior and the nature of international relations (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Therefore, network theory and analysis provide a nuanced methodological approach for constructivist scholars to

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demonstrate the evolving and interactive nature of conventionally understood strategic alliances, such as NATO. This approach goes beyond the traditional view of mutual deterrence through strategic material alliances by illustrating how the spread of norms serves as the connecting ties between states that not only institutionalize a collective defense framework but operationalizes the concept of collective security.

Theoretical Framework: Networks, Norms, and Discourse

In this paper, I seek to use a network analytical approach to understanding NATO's collective security. To do so, I argue that discourse is the best medium to undergo this research endeavor by examining its role in norm diffusion---the spread and construction of norms in the international system (Florini 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). However, it must be first understood how network analysis examines the structure and dynamics of relationships between various actors.

Network Analysis: An Overview

Network analysis focuses on the patterns of connections that form structure and the flow of information, resources, and influence within a network. In the case of NATO, network analysis can reveal the intricate web of relationships that underpin the international organization's functioning. For this paper, international organizations are conceived as network structures made up of "ties" and "nodes" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009). In network analysis, these nodes can be individual actors in an international organization and the ties between them are representative of the relationships or interactions between the actors (Kahler 2009). These ties have both "form" and "content" in that they can be tangible, material relationships like military alliances and trade transactions, as well as intangible relations, such as narratives that define appropriate behavior or give meaning to physical action (Goddard 2018, 767). It is the persistent patterns of relations among nodes through the transmission of both these intangible and tangible ties that "create

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[network] structures, that in turn define, enable, or restrict the behavior of nodes" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009, 562)

This is a rearticulation of the international system beyond the realist notion of anarchy, but as a pattern of relations. This may be an oversimplification for IR theorists, but as Maoz (2008) argues, network analysis can uncover hidden structures and power dynamics that traditional methods might overlook. By mapping relationships and connections, it reveals patterns of influence that are not immediately apparent by extending the point of inquiry beyond what an organization/network is theorized or claims itself to be, but what it exemplifies through its interactions. One of the primary tools for measuring these interactions in network analysis is degree centrality, which is the "importance" of nodes in the network determined by the "sum of the value of the ties between that node and every other node in the network" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009, 564). This measure tells us how much *access* a node has to every other node. In the context of NATO, this can tell us how member states have access to one another through the various kinds of mediums their interactions in their relationships are propagated. In other words, do member states have access to each other when their ties are defined through material or through normative means?

The more access *every* node has to every other node in the network, the more decentralized and integrated the network will appear as ties occur through the structure and are continuous. Socially, integrated structures exhibit a high volume of interactions among actors as these transactions occur significantly and are institutionalized. Further, these kinds of networks are correlative, meaning interactions are comprised of shared rules and understandings. Finally, the more integrated a network structure is, the less structural holes will be present in the network (Burt 1992; Mische and White 1998; Goddard 2009; Burt 2005).

Figure 1. Integrated and Fragmented Networks (Goddard 2009, 259)

Structural holes are gaps in a network where there are a few or no ties connecting a node or groups of nodes to the rest of the network. On the left, **Figure 1** demonstrates an integrated network with no structural holes. In contrast, on the right of **Figure 1** a fragmented structure is illustrated. A fragmented network will have groups of nodes that are more centralized, where they hold numerous connections amongst each other, whereas other nodes in the network possess little to no ties to these central nodes. Typically, these central nodes define the rules of interaction in a network, creating a hierarchical structure (Podolny and Page 1998). Continuing, fragmented networks contain these structural holes due to these central nodes only possessing consistent ties amongst each other and lacking ties to the rest of the network. Usually, fragmented networks carry little to no shared understandings as the network is composed of ties that are "discordant symbolic resources" (Goddard 2009, 259). In the context of NATO, degree centrality can determine how much *access* member states have to one another, in turn, what kinds of relationships facilitate integration of fragmentation of its network where nodes are either

decentralized or centralized. In other words, do member states have more access to each other when their ties are defined through normative or material means?

Discourse and Norms

To examine if NATO is an integrated network as a collective security community through shared norms and values, we must first understand discourse as a capability and recognize that the discursive power has the potentiality to construct political and social identities and interactions. Originally developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Discourse theory and analysis in the context of IR is a framework that examines how language, communication, and narrative shape political and social realities. Similarly to Hansen (2006) and Anderson (1983), I argue that identities—and the norms and values we associate with them—are not things we are born within an absolute sense. Instead, these identities are shaped and defined by the way we communicate about them and the narratives employed to illustrate communication. In international politics, policies and decisions are also influenced by these identities constructed through communication, as the narratives found in discourse are ever-changing and transforming according to the context in which they are formed. Therefore, identities and norms aren't fixed or objective realities, but are shaped by the prevailing narratives. With this assertion, there are no norms that can exist independently of discourse and narratives. In other words, there isn't a 'true' identity or norms that can be used as a standard of measure against which we can examine behavior and action as a result of identity and norms through any other non-discursive analyses (i.e. economic conditions, geography, democracy scores etc.) (Hansen 2006; Anderson 1983).

Overall, discourse is not merely a reflection of reality but an active agent in shaping perceptions, identities, and social practices. These social practices, or norms, as defined in constructivism, are shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of

actors. They guide the actions of states and other actors by providing standards of 'right' or 'acceptable' conduct (Florini 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the context of NATO, norms are not limited to military capabilities, but encompass broader values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These norms are communicated, reinforced, and sometimes contested through discourse. Overall, discourse shapes the content and meaning of norms, while norms provide a framework within which discourses are understood and interpreted. Hence, the discourse analysis in this paper aligns with constructivist discourse theory in the same broad sense that these approaches examine the "co-constitutive" relationship between discourse, structure, and context (Holzscheiter 2014). Simply, this paper's analysis examines how the structure (NATOs network) influences the discourse (narratives, speeches, and media) produced and how these texts, in turn, shape actors understanding of the context in which they exist and the structure itself. In general, discourse provides a medium through which norms can be operationalized in network analysis.

Integrating norms into network analysis involves examining how shared norms influence the formation and maintenance of network ties. In the context of NATO, this involves how normative commitments to the adherence of democratic principles, human rights, and rule of law shape the interactions and alignments among actors. This discursive norms-based approach allows us to see how shared values and norms, rather than mere material capabilities, underpin the alliance's cohesion and resilience as a network structure. For instance, states that strongly adhere to NATO's core norms may form closer ties and play more central roles within the alliance. Conversely, states that diverge from these norms may find themselves on the periphery or in conflict with the core group. This approach helps to reveal the normative underpinnings of

NATO's cohesion under Barnett and Adler's conceptualization of a collective security community.

NATOs Network Through Degree Centrality: A Fragmented Strategic Alliance, An Integrated Collective Security Community

As discussed in the literature review on strategic alliances, the distinct gap in defense spending and overall military capabilities between North American and European states in NATO reflect the broader a difference in value attributed to security and defense between them. When NATO is examined as a network through a realist framework where ties are based on material capabilities, the actors in the network assign different significance to this tangible connection with many states consistently not meeting NATOs standard of defense criteria. In other words, NATO is composed of discordant symbolic ties, therefore a realist account of NATOs network is a fragmented system with gaps in the network.

NATO requires its members to spend a minimum of 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense, the rationale behind this guideline being to maintain and enhance the collective defense capabilities of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2024C). If military contributions are used to represent realist notions of material capabilities, there would be groups of member states in NATO that contribute significantly more to NATOs collective defense capacities than other member states. These states with increased capabilities would be central nodes in a network where ties are determined by meeting NATOs defense criteria. These groups of central nodes would demonstrate high degree centrality amongst each other within the network or would have *more access* to other central nodes that consistently meet NATOs defense criteria. In other words, they would have consistent connections amongst each other, but member states that don't meet the criteria (diminished material capabilities) would have less access to

network. These low degree centrality nodes would have very few connections, making it so they are not fully integrated into the predominant network structure.

If realists were model NATO's network using degree centrality, we should see the characteristics of a fragmented network with numerous structural gaps. We would expect to see a hierarchical structure dominated by material power. Actors who are the largest military and economic contributors would occupy the central nodes, exerting considerable influence over other members. The network would reflect a power hierarchy where the strategic importance and military capabilities of states determine their positions and interactions. Relationships within this network are viewed as transactional, driven by pragmatic considerations of power and security.

However, a realist model overlooks the importance of the ties formed through discursive interactions of shared values, beliefs, and cooperative norms that bind the alliance together. Holzscheiter (2014, 3) asks, "where is the boundary between discourse and the material world?" Discourse scholars answer this question by asserting that discourse is the environment in which individuals articulate the material, formulate meanings, and where narratives of our environment become real (Anderson 1983; Laclau and Mouffe 1983; Hansen 2006). The discourse surrounding collective security in NATO is propagated by the norm of mutual aid of democratic nations, which in turn is a principle enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty (NATO 2024A). Ultimately, the realist model undervalues the contributions of all members who play crucial role in maintaining the alliance's ideological cohesion. The realist network model diminishes the normative power in intangible ties that form the network structure. This is why there are actors with varying degrees of material capabilities, but no member states in the network that are not democratic nations that aim to uphold values of human rights and the rule of law.

A constructivist network model of NATO would highlight a more egalitarian and cohesive structure---central nodes in this network would not necessarily be the most powerful states in material terms but those most committed to NATO's shared norms and values. Ideally, if all states demonstrate discourse that constructs and spreads the collective norms of NATO, therefore forming ties, all nodes within the network would possess high degree centrality with no actors possessing few connections to the greater network. Degree centrality is the network analytical measure that operationalizes this paper's theory of norms and discourse. By counting the number of connections an actor has to the other nodes in the network, or how much access a node has to the network and other nodes based on what kind of tie the connection is, we can demonstrate whether NATO is fortified by material means or reinforced by norms in the discourse found amongst member states that facilitates cohesion and integration of the network. Therefore, I argue that implementing a network analytical methodology can explain why NATO remains cohesive despite varying levels of material contribution, thus exemplifying role of norms in NATOs collective security.

Network Analytical Methodology

To support my theoretical arguments, I developed two models of NATOs network structure based on degree centrality. First, network analysis theorists set boundaries on their studies or define the network through several methodological and conceptual approaches, specifically through 1) boundary specification and 2) node and tie selection (Wellman 1983). For this study, the boundary specification is set for 1999 to 2009. The node selection is the following NATO member states, United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Czech Republic. However, the tie selection differs to contrast a purely materialist account and a norms-based approach.

The neorealist concept of [network] structure is based on the material capabilities across units. Therefore, in the realist model, the ties are relationships where member states meet the defense expenditure criteria. Comparatively, the ties in the constructivist model are discursive interactions characterized by norm diffusion of NATO as a collective community. As articulated in the theory of this paper, norm diffusion refers to process through which norms are spread, and one of the primary ways this is done is through communication, or discourse. Hence, I sought out discursive interactions that encompass shared democratic norms and values NATO member states employ to reinforce the networks collective security framework. The aim of this model is demonstrate how a discourse-norms approach operationalizes collective security.

Coding discursive interactions and material ties involves a five-step step process. First, determining the source node, the state initiating the discourse or discussion. In the case of material capabilities, this involves determining what states consistently meet NATOs defense expenditure criteria. Second, determining the target node, the state or states receiving discourse being addressed. With the realist model, this involves determining what states do not consistently meet defense guidelines. As discussed for the constructivist model, the third step is determining interaction details, or information on the content and context of the interaction, specifically focusing on norm diffusion. For the realist model, as the data is numerical there is no need to determine the context and nature of this kind of tie. Continuing, the fourth step involves creating an adjacency matrix to represent the network in both models. For example, **Figure 2**. is the adjacency matrix calculated and constructed for **TABLE 2.** *Constructivist Theoretical Model of NATO Using Degree Centrality*

Adjacency Matrix	US	UK	FR	GR	IT	ES	PL	EE	HU	LT	LV	CZ
US	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UK	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FR	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GR	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
IT	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ES	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
PL	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
EE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
HU	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
LT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
LV	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1

Figure 2. Adjacency Matrix for Discursive Interactions of Shared Norms

Rows and Columns represent NATO member states. Each cell (x, y) represents the presences of an edge (tie) from state (x) to state (y). If state (x) has discursive interactions characterized by norm diffusion with state (y), the cell contains a 1; otherwise, it contains a 0. The final step is then calculating and interpreting degree centrality. This measure is determined by the number of direct connections a node has and can be calculated in two forms, in-degree centrality and out-degree centrality. To match the nature of the discourse data analyzed, this study measures out-degree centrality, or the number of outgoing edges from a node. This reflects how many times a state initiates discursive interactions wither other states (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009). In other words, if member states uphold the collective shared norms and values of NATO discursively. For the realist model, the adjacency matrix is determined by whether a state shares a tie based on consistently meeting (or not meeting) defense expenditure criteria, or its out-going tie. The

adjacency matrix constructed for **TABLE 1**. *Theoretical Realist Model Using Degree Centrality* can be found in Appendix A (pg. 46). Finally, interpreting degree centrality involves determining whether a node has high or low degree centrality. If a state has high degree centrality this means it has numerous connections to other states in the NATO network based on the type of tie it has. For the constructivist model, this indicates that a state is actively engaging in norm diffusion. For the realist model, this demonstrates NATO is formed based on member states defense capabilities.

I provide two analyses. The first entails comparing the network properties of each model. The second entails closely examining two discursive interactions to further examine how the interplay between discourse and norms operationalizes NATO as a collective security community. Finally, I conclude the following section with a discussion on the implications of this study.

Limitations

This study, while thorough in its methodological approach, encounters several limitations that merit consideration. First, the node selection for this study excludes other NATO members, potentially omitting significant interactions and contributions from those states. Nonetheless, this selection results in an incomplete representation of NATO's overall network as including a broader range of member states could provide a more comprehensive understanding of NATO's collective security dynamics. Second, regarding the tie selection, the realist and constructivist models reflect different theoretical perspectives. As ties in the realist model are based on defense expenditure criteria, highlighting material capabilities, this approach may oversimplify the complex interdependencies and strategic considerations beyond mere defense spending. In the constructivist model, while the normative discourse approach enriches the analysis, it is largely

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still interpretivist. Interpretivism emphasizes understanding the subjective meanings and interpretations that individuals attach to their experiences and social interactions. Discourse analysis aligns with this by examining how narratives construct and convey the meanings of norms.

Finally, the reliance on degree centrality as the primary measure for network analysis introduces limitations inherent to this metric. Degree centrality focuses on the number of direct connections a node has, which might not fully capture the multi-dimensional nature of NATO's network. Other centrality measures, such as betweenness or closeness centrality, could provide additional insights into the strategic positions. However, using the full methodological 'tool-box' of network analysis to supplement the field of IR is a noted challenge amongst scholars (Hafner Burton et al 2009; Goddard 2009). The inherent complexity of the network analysis tools mentioned still requires research to accurately measure both normative and physical ties in the international system.

Empirical Analysis

Network Properties and Characteristics

TABLE 1. *Theoretical Realist Model Using Degree Centrality*

Nodes	Ties	# of Connections	Degree Centrality
Member States	*Average Defense Expenditure as a Share of GDP 1999-2009*		
United States	5.29 %	2	High
United Kingdom	2.46 %	2	High
France	2.02 %	2	High
Germany			
Spain			
Italy			
Poland		**0 Connections**	

Estonia	< 2%		Low Degree Centrality
Hungary			
Lithuania			
Latvia			
Czech Republic			

Note. See Appendix B for cited NATO defense expenditure data

Ties are formed in this model when a node consistently meets defense expenditure criteria. When averaged over the course of 10 years, only 3 states consistently meet this network requirement for forming connections. This network is *centralized* when only material ties are utilized to represent the relationships amongst NATO member states. Connections are not evenly distributed amongst the nodes and only a small group of nodes have a significantly higher number of connections compared to others. The highly connected nodes, or central nodes, in this mode are the United States, United Kingdom, and France with ties connecting them consistently to one another. In theory, the countries who consistently meet defense expenditure criteria will have disproportionate influence within NATO. They may drive strategic decisions, prioritize threats, and shape the networks' defense policies. Further, a few highly central nodes (member states) will have the majority of military resources. This may lead to faster mobilization and effective coordination in times of crisis, as seen in the 2011 Libya intervention, where the United States, France, and the United Kingdom led the NATO mission, contributing the most in terms of resources and operational control (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2015). Overall, a realist account of NATOs network is a hierarchical structure dominated by material power determining the connectivity of NATO. Despite the strengths of NATO as a centralized network in application, this structural dynamic's exclusion of member states with lower material capabilities highlights a potential vulnerability.

As discussed in this paper's theoretical framework, the more integrated a network structure is, the less structural holes will be present in the network. The realist model of NATOs structure is one where little to no ties connect the central nodes beyond each other to the rest of the network. As a result, a materialist account is fragmented with structural holes. Overall, this indicates that when ties and the relationships that form NATO are understood as strictly material, multiple actors in the network do not have access to each other. What this implies is that NATO is a non-cohesive organization with multiple non-integrated member states that don't adhere to the to the alliance's foundational mechanism, mutual defense. However, this is not currently observed as multiple states have *discursively* agreed to the principles that enshroud collective security, indicating that there are different forms of connection linking all NATO member states, facilitating a cohesive and integrated network.

TABLE 2. *Theoretical Constructivist Model Using Degree Centrality*

Nodes	Ties	# of Connections	Degree Centrality
Member States	*Norm-based discursive interactions*		
United States	NATO Washington Summit 1999; Speech by President Clinton; "community of freedom."		
United Kingdom	NATO Washington Summit 1999; Opening Remarks by Prime Minister of United Kingdom and Ireland; "…the basis of our collective security…upholding our values of peace, liberty, and justice."		
France	United Nations Security Council 2003; Remarks by Foreign French Minister.		
Germany	45th Munich Security Conference 2009; Speech by Federal Chancellor Merkel; "we are united by our common values, freedom, and democracy."		
Spain	NATO Washington Summit 1999; Remarks by President Maria Aznar; "principles that make us strong call us: cohesion, determination and commitment in the defense of human rights."	**12 Connections**	**High Degree Centrality**
Italy	Informal Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers 2006; Minister of Defense of Italy; "NATO's new responsibilities… to defend the values of freedom, democracy and peace."		
Poland	NATO Ceremony of Deposition and Protocols of Accession 1999; Address by Minister of Foreign		

	Affairs of the Republic of Poland; "alliance is a community of values."		
Estonia	NATO Accession Ceremony 2004; Response by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia.		
Hungary	NATO Washington Summit 1999; Speech by Prime Minister of Hungary Orban; "A solid pillar of our joining the Alliance is that we succeeded in building such [democratic, with rule of law] countries."		
Lithuania	NAC Meeting Brussels 2004; Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania; "A community of common nations that protects…common values"		
Latvia	NAC Meeting 2004; Speech by President of Latvia; "We stand ready to contribute our part to collective security."		
Czech Republic	NAC Meeting Brussels 1999; Speech by Prime Minister of Czech Republic Zeman; "interoperability of minds."		

Note. See Appendix C cited list of discourse data

Under this model, all member states engaged in some form of discursive interaction in which NATO's norms were spread or exemplified. As a result, every node in the network is connected to each other, indicating high degree centrality throughout the network. Accordingly, NATOs network is decentralized in this model, with connections more evenly distributed among nodes and no single node or small group of nodes dominating the network. As there are no central nodes under this model, control and decision-making, theoretically, are spread across the network, reducing dependence on any single node or hubs of nodes. Although communication and coordination may be less efficient compared to the realist model due to the absence of centralized authority, the robustness of the network as a result of its integrated structure compensates for this.

In contrast to the realist account, the constructivist network is integrated. These normative ties occur throughout the structure and are continuous, resulting in little to no structural gaps in the network. In theory, this denotes a sense of resilience against external actors aiming to form new connections that are not characterized as pre-existing normative ties in

NATO's network. Simply, in order to be an integrated node (member of NATO), an actor must demonstrate a commitment to the collective security identity that sustains and forms NATO as a network. It is the norms of collective security amongst democratic nations that facilitate every actor having access to every other node in the network, despite varying degrees of material capabilities. Ultimately, this resilience can be attributed to member state's commitment to shared foundational norms and values fortifying the network structure in times of conflict.

This is the nuance that the realist model fails to capture. Under realism, NATOs network is an asymmetrical material alliance where (under network analysis) fragmentation ensues due non-integrated nodes with little connections to the most capable nodes in the network in times of conflict. However, despite asymmetrical capabilities, the adherence to collective security to sustain and defend a democratic Eastern Europe is upheld *discursively* through interactions, commitments, and meetings, hence reinforcing physical action.

A Closer Look at Norms-Based Discursive Interactions

A purely materialist model fails to capture the complexity of member state's relationships that an analysis of discourse provides. As I articulate in the theoretical framework, discourse analysis is an examination of the meanings in communicative processes through which social reality is constructed. While narratives found in discourse have always been instrumental in constructing our social understanding of the world, it is particularly significant to the examination of how collective security is facilitated. We lose the complexity of NATO's network dynamic when it is only examined in material data in that only a small number of the nodes in NATO are essentially a part of the alliance network. However, this simply is not the case. NATO is a collective security community where members construct shared meanings and understandings about their security, threats, cooperation, and position in the network through

discourse. Overall, discourse captures the construction and spread of norms that form connections, as a result, networks cannot only be deducible to their material properties. The following cases provide a closer look at how norms are articulated, constructed, and reinforce collective security in NATO.

NATO Washington Summit 1999, Speech by President Clinton: In his speech, President Bill Clinton (1999) underscored the collective norms and values of democracy that form the bedrock of NATO by highlighting the historical significance of NATO, established in 1949 to prevent the devastation of future wars. He referenced key figures—such as the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson---who envisioned NATO as a means to safeguard peace and provide a sense of security to its member nations. Clinton states,

> "…the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, said that NATO's fundamental aim was not to win a war that would after all leave Europe ravaged, but to avoid such a war and I quote "by becoming together strong enough to safeguard the peace". He was right. No member of NATO has ever been called upon to fire a shot in anger to defend an Ally from attack. The American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, said that NATO would free the minds of men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity and enable them to work and plan with confidence in the future, and he was right."

By emphasizing the fact that no member state has employed Article 5 of the Treaty at this time, he instills a narrative that it asserts that simply the *norm* of collective security sustains NATO as it promotes stability and mutual support among member states. By recalling NATO's role in supporting the Marshall Plan and fostering cooperation among allies, Clinton illustrated how NATO's existence has encouraged democratic governance and economic interdependence. Overall, the alliance's success in maintaining peace and preventing conflict among its members showcases the practical benefits of collective security rooted in democratic values.

Further, Clinton's speech celebrated the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO, framing their membership as a return to the "community of freedom." This narrative emphasizes the alliance's role in supporting the democratic transitions of former Eastern Bloc countries, but also reinforces the norm that NATO must be a network of democratic, free nations. This expansion of NATO can be seen as a diffusion of democratic norms, as the new member states would ultimately adopt democratic principles and practices in alignment with NATO's values in order to be members of the network.

Finally, Clinton addressed the ongoing conflict in Kosovo at this time, describing NATO's intervention as a mission to replace ethnic cleansing with tolerance and decency in which he states,

> "As we look to the future we know that for the first time in history we have a chance to build a Europe truly undivided, peaceful and free. But we know there are challenges to that vision, in the fragility of new democracies and the proliferation of deadly weapons and terrorism, and surely in the awful spectre of ethnic cleansing in southeastern Europe, where Mr. Milosevic, first in Croatia and Slovenia, then in Bosnia, now in Kosovo, has enflamed ancient hatreds to gain and maintain his power. He is bent on dehumanising, indeed destroying, a whole people and their culture, and in the process driving his own people to deep levels of distress. We are in Kosovo because we want to replace ethnic cleansing with tolerance and decency, violence with security, disintegration with restoration, isolation with integration into the rest of the region and the continent."

In this line of rhetoric, he positions NATO's actions in Kosovo as a defense of the values that underpin the alliance—human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. By framing the intervention in moral and ethical terms, Clinton reinforced the idea that NATO's military actions are guided by democratic principles and a commitment to protecting human dignity. This perspective highlights how NATO's collective norms influence its responses to international crises, but also exemplifies that a requirement of the discourse among and towards NATO members must have the narrative of their norms and values. The alliance's commitment to

democracy and human rights drives its involvement in conflicts where these values are under threat. Clinton's rhetoric here serves to justify NATO's actions as aligned with its foundational principles, thereby reinforcing the diffusion of these norms within the network and on a global scale.

NATO Ceremony of Deposition and Protocols of Accession 1999, Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland: In a Speech Delivered by Bronisław Geremek (1999), the discourse displayed underscores the significant role of narratives in shaping Poland's entry into NATO and the broader collective security framework. The speech goes beyond a mere recounting of events; it constructs a narrative that emphasizes shared values, historical contexts, and the symbolic end of the Cold War shifting NATOs network characteristics.

Geremek's specifically refers to NATO as a "community of values," asserting that the success of the organization since its creation has been built upon "the principles of democracy, civil rights and liberties, shared by all of its members." This narrative constructs a collective identity that transcends material alliances, rooting the member states' relationships in shared ideologies rather than just strategic interests. Additionally, by invoking historical struggles, such as the uprisings in Budapest, Prague, and Gdańsk, the speech aligns Poland's journey with broader democratic aspirations, thus reinforcing a collective narrative of unity. His speech employs symbolism and historical references to construct a deeper meaning of NATO's role. For instance, referencing Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, Geremek contrasts the past division with the present unity, symbolizing NATO as a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe. This rhetoric frames NATO not merely as a strategic alliance but as a moral and

ideological beacon so that the promotion of democracy and human rights justifies the organization's actions.

Overall, Geremek's speech focus on historical struggles, or the context that gives meaning to Poland's and other Eastern European state's accession, serving to legitimize Poland's inclusion in NATO by portraying it as a return to its rightful place in the "free world." Geremek ultimately claims that the alliance's strength lies not just in military capabilities but in the shared norms and values that bind its members. This discourse reflects the idea that NATO operates as a collective community, where the construction and spread of norms are crucial for collective security.

This discourse analysis of NATO member rhetoric provides a way to operationalize norms-based collective security by illustrating how NATO's historical actions, expansions, and interventions are all guided by a commitment to democratic principles. By embedding these values in its operations and strategic decisions, NATO ensures that collective security is achieved through a shared commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. This approach not only enhances the alliance's internal cohesion but also promotes a more stable and democratic international order, NATO's ultimate objective as an international organization.

Implications

Under the constructivist model, it is the persistent ties of association through norms among nodes, or high degree centrality, which create the network's integrated structure. Therefore, not only are shared norms and values the foundational basis that creates NATOs cohesive structure, but it also implies that normative elements are what reinforce material aspects and physical action of NATO. By giving these tangible aspects meaning, it demonstrates the influence of normative capabilities on network structure and in the international system. Further,

network scholars have recognized the significance of normative capabilities in networks by adopting this notion that degree centrality is another form of social power (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009). However, with all power comes the possibility of leveraging through coercive means.

Knoke (1990, 9) defines network power as "prominence in networks where values information and resources are transferred from one actor to another." Therefore, a network node with high degree centrality can possess social power by easily accessing resources from other nodes in relations to their positions. In this study's constructivist network model, there was a common amount of high degree centrality amongst all nodes, however actors can leverage these positions of high degree centrality socially to produce 'structural inequality' (Beckfield 2008). Hafner Burton and Montogomery (2006, 11) propose that actors with high degree centrality can "withhold social benefits such as membership and recognition or enact social sanctions such as marginalization as a method of coercion…in a conflict." Hence, as this study demonstrated the influence that normative capabilities do have, an implication of this influential power lies in their ability to be leveraged similar to the coercive capabilities of material power.

Despite this implication, this study exemplified NATO as a network with many high centrality members when examined from a norms-based perspective. Continuing with this concept of degree centrality as a form of social power, Beckfield proposes that an actor that has numerous ties to regional neighbors still possess less social power than an actor that is a member of a network with many other high degree centrality actors. Regarding NATO, this means despite any potential adversaries possessing regional ties where norms can be leveraged for coercive measures, its crucial NATO continues efforts to uphold norms that facilitate all their members possessing high degree centrality, or numerous connections facilitated by shared norms and values. In other words, NATO member states are less likely to succumb to any structural

dismantling efforts by outside actors if they continuing operating under,---as what Barnett and Adler consider them to be--- a collective security community where enduring bonds based on shared values and mutual trust lead to a stable peace that transcends mere strategic alliance.

Conclusion

I have demonstrated that a network analytical methodology produces powerful insights into the comparative differences between NATO as strategic alliance formation versus as a collective security community. This project contributes to the ongoing theoretical debate between realism and constructivism by challenging the traditional realist view, which predominantly focuses on material capabilities and strategic interests, and instead arguing that a network analytical methodology demonstrates the significance in normative dimensions of NATOs collective security. By developing a theoretical framework that integrates network analysis with constructivist insights on norms and discourse, the study offers a more nuanced understanding of NATO's structure and functionality. While constructivist scholars have extensively discussed the role of norms and collective identity in shaping international organizations, empirical studies that quantify these aspects are limited. By focusing on discourse data and norm diffusion efforts, this project provides empirical support for constructivist theories and demonstrates how network analysis can be effectively used to study normative interactions. This was done Through operationalization of discourse on collective norms by determining the degree centrality of a node, therefore providing a comprehensive analysis of how norms are propagated and institutionalized within NATO, in turn giving meaning to the networks physical and material aims.

Despite these methodological strengths, the goal of this paper is largely theory development, and the evidence used here is illustrative and interpretivist. Stacie Goddard (2009)

questions how network theory may be too complex to empirically test, in doing so the oversimplification of actor's choices, interactions, and relationships ensues for models to be conceptualized and tested. While these limitations are necessary given the constraints of this project, it also raises methodological questions regarding network theory's applicability to the real world. For instance, can network theory truly articulate *how* actors leverage their resources relationally beyond the fact they simply do? More importantly, could network theory sufficiently explain this project's theory of norm diffusion leveraging if the purpose of that leveraging wasn't for an *observable* strategic material aim of mutual aid and collective security?

There is much to discuss on the methodological implications of network theory, especially regarding its applicability and usefulness externally. However, ontologically, network theory still challenges the traditional understanding of NATO as merely a collection of sovereign states cooperating based on shared interests. Instead, it re-conceptualizes NATO as a complex, adaptive system characterized by interdependence and emergent properties. This perspective underscores the importance of relational processes in shaping the organization's identity and strategic direction. The perspective of NATO as a collective security community may be better understood through the lens of network theory, which highlights how shared values, norms, and practices are constructed and reinforced through continuous discursive interactions. It posits that the strength and stability of NATO derive not solely from formal treaties and agreements but from the dense and dynamic network of relationships that embed member states and partners in a web of mutual obligations and shared understandings.

Whether or not network theory is the best framework through which IR scholars should examine the international system, its relevance to the field is hard to refute. The global political landscape is constantly evolving, with shifts in power dynamics, the emergence of new norms,

and changing identities. A ridged adherence to one explanatory model can limit the adaptability of IR theories to new developments. As NATO and other international networks continue to evolve in response to these new challenges, network theory may eventually be proven as an invaluable framework to supplement IR theories in understanding the ever-changing web of relationships that underscore cooperation and collaboration.

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APPENDICES

A, B, C

Appendix A

Adjacency Matrix of Member States, Consistently Meet Defense Expenditure Criteria

Adjacency Matrix (x)	US	UK	FR	GR	IT	ES	PL	EE	HU	LT	LV	CZ
(y)												
US	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FR	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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