

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A Ukrainian Nationalist's Italian  
Job: Diplomacy on Behalf of a  
Stateless People

By

Matthew Huller

July 2024

A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the  
Master of Arts Program in the Social Sciences

Faculty Advisor: Faith Hillis

Preceptor: Deirdre Lyons

## **Abstract**

This thesis examines the career of Ievhen Onats'kyi, a representative of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, who lived in Italy from 1922-1947. While there he worked to expand knowledge about Ukraine and the Ukrainian language as well as lobby for the Organization. His position in Fascist Italy and within the Organization is a prime node to allow a thorough examination of how Ukrainian Nationalists adapted ideologically theory to their practices, how the power imbalance between them and foreign powers pushed certain considerations. Onats'kyi's work illustrates also the diplomatic appeals which Ukrainian Nationalists used to try and align Fascist Italy with their cause.

## Note on Transliteration and Translation

This piece uses a simplified version of the Library of Congress romanization system for Ukrainian, that is to say, without ligature marks or special vowels. The letter «Ь» will be denoted by an apostrophe. If a different transliteration was used in publication, that transliteration will be reproduced in citation. For non-English names in other languages the most recognizable English transliteration will be used. Acronyms will be written in their original languages or in transliterations in the Latin alphabet in their original language. In terms of the names of regions, the traditional and more well-known English versions will be used, for example: Galicia instead of *Halych*, or Transcarpathia instead of *Zakarpattia*. In terms of cities, the names used will correspond to contemporary status, so L'viv instead of Lemberg or Lwow, and Kyiv instead of Kiev.

## Introduction

After World War One, the defeat of the nascent Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) resulted in a wave of émigrés and refugees who settled in disparate venues as far apart as Harbin, Manchuria and Cleveland, Ohio.<sup>1</sup> At first the main groups were continuations of ones from the short period of Ukrainian statehood. The traumatic failures of the Struggle for Independence immediately engendered a fierce debate on the reasons behind Ukraine's defeat and what needed to be done the next time the country might

---

<sup>1</sup> For information on the Ukrainian colony in Manchuria, and Ukrainians in the Far East generally see: Ivan Svit. *Ukraiins'ko-Iapons'ki Vzaiemyny 1903-1945*. New York, New York: Ukraiins'ke Istorychne Tovarystvo (1972): 78-344.

have a chance to achieve independence. Out of these debates a new group would come to overshadow much of Ukrainian political life until the country finally achieved independence in 1991, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).

The Treaty of Riga in 1922 between the Poles and Soviets had cemented the partition of Ukrainian lands between four disparate states: the USSR received the vast majority of the former Russian Empire's Ukrainian territory; while Poland received Galicia and Volhynia, of which the former was considered the most nationally conscious region in Ukraine; Romania annexed the small but somewhat urbanized province of Bukovyna, in addition to the highly rural Bessarabia; and Czechoslovakia acquired the mountainous and poorly developed region of Transcarpathia.<sup>2</sup> Despite numerous international agreements and promises, Ukrainian autonomy was not granted in any state. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania a variety of legal Ukrainian opposition parties soon arose, animated by demands for cultural or regional autonomy, but eschewing violence. The OUN and its predecessor, the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), were the only significant Ukrainian groups consistently committed to achieving independence through violent struggle and therefore operated as clandestine organizations. The focus of the OUN was to defeat Poland in Galicia and Volhynia in order to create an independent Ukrainian state in the west, which could serve as base to liberate the rest of the country. Their experience as an underground force would position the OUN well to affect events in Ukraine during the Second World War, when legal parliamentary politics was an impossibility.

---

<sup>2</sup> There was a large Polish minority in the Western Ukrainian provinces that country seized. Likewise, Romanian annexed regions were fairly mixed, Northern Bukovyna and Southern Bessarabia were Ukrainian majority, but the other parts of those areas were generally populated by a Romanian majority. Transcarpathia had a Hungarian minority but very little Czech or Slovak presence, rather it had joined Czechoslovakia because of American pressure and the defeat of the ZUNR.

This work seeks to expand understanding of the complex relationships between the OUN and foreign states, their international activities related to education, activism, diplomacy, espionage, and violent acts of resistance. This is to be accomplished through an analysis of how the OUN in emigration adapted to the transnational context in which it found itself, how it sought to influence foreign governments and publics. In other words, to what extent did the Organization's members and affiliates modify their approach respective to the circumstances of their host country? Likewise, how was the OUN changed through their interaction with transnational spaces? Without ignoring the ideological debates of historians or OUN members themselves, no discussion of the OUN is really complete without reconciling the ideological with the practical, both acts of violence and diplomatic activism. The OUN and its fellow travelers likewise designed doctrines and theories of international relations and geopolitics, which placed Ukrainian affairs at the center of an imagined shake-up of the European order. In this sphere as well, action and theory should be analyzed in concert with each other.

### **Ievhen Onats'kyi—The OUN's Man in Italy**

The primary case study is Ievhen Dometiiiovych Onats'kyi (1894-1979). He was a diplomat for the UNR sent abroad in 1919, working briefly in Geneva before being transferred to Italy. During his time in the mission, he made significant journalistic, academic, and political contacts. The mission disbanded in 1922, coincidentally the same year as Mussolini's March on Rome. Over the course of the two decades during which Onats'kyi lived in Italy, he attempted to cultivate relationships with influential figures in the Fascist government, worked to spread knowledge of Ukrainian language and culture in Italy, and became the OUN's leading

representative and advocate in that country. His archive, currently held at the University of Minnesota Special Collections, comprises thousands of invaluable documents, which give necessary behind the scenes insight into a variety of OUN activities relating to not only Italy, but also powers as far afield as the United States, Germany, and Japan. This broad context is invaluable in shaping a transnational comprehension of the OUN's multifaceted international activities over the first decade of its existence. Internal correspondence reveals that, like any large organization, there was very significant disagreement on practical and theoretical questions, analysis of which aids in illuminating the reasoning behind the OUN's activities and beliefs. Material from the Collection comprising some 3,500 pages (a fraction of the total inventory) written in at least eight languages has been examined in the research process for this work.<sup>3</sup>

The content of Onats'kyi's archive demonstrated a concerted one-man campaign to influence Italian policy in favor of the OUN through private lobbying, letter-writing, and organizing student protests. The latter was possible thanks to scholarships for Ukrainian students Onats'kyi himself had successfully lobbied for. The OUN was even able to secure clandestine training for a handful of its operatives in Italy. His correspondence with other members reveals frequent ideological controversies, the OUN was highly divided until 1940, when it officially split in two. Onats'kyi was often involved in polemics against both flanks of the Nationalist ideological spectrum. This material shows how Nationalist thought and action was colored by their need to work with foreign governments in a subordinate position.

---

<sup>3</sup> The majority of the works analyzed from the Collection pertain to Ukrainian diplomatic efforts from 1918-1922, from multiple diplomatic missions; internal OUN correspondence; correspondence to Italians in government, academia, journalism, and publishing; and Onats'kyi's personal correspondence to friends, ideological rivals, and others. The languages in question are: Ukrainian, Italian, Spanish, French, Russian, German, Japanese, and Chinese.

The March on Rome inspired a wave of fierce debate and copy-cat movements across Europe, including among Ukrainians. The Italian example proved to be a more contentious topic among Nationalists, due to the issue of Ukraine's statelessness. Onats'kyi took on the primary role of informing the Ukrainian public at large and the OUN's leadership of events in Italy and the ins and outs of life under Mussolini in his role as a prolific journalist. As a result, he serves as an early, but pivotal node in the transnational exchange between Ukraine and Italy, the culmination of which was Italian participation in the German invasion of Soviet-occupied Ukraine. One of Onats'kyi's Italian students, by then a professor in his own right, would be killed in battle while serving in the "Italian Army in Russia" (ARMIR) as a Ukrainian translator.

In the academic debate about the OUN's connections to fascism, Onats'kyi is often cited. He was the main Ukrainian witness to the rise of Fascism and spent years publicly praising Mussolini, likewise he also stressed differences between the Ukrainian and Italian contexts, advocating for ideological independence. So, while Onats'kyi has not been the focus on any English language work, he has not been forgotten. His correspondences or publications have been referenced by historians writing about the OUN in recent monographs, such as those by Myroslav Shkandrij and Trevor Erlacher, whose work has dealt with the ideology debate.<sup>4</sup> In Ukrainian, a short biography of Onats'kyi, by historian Tamara Demchenko, was published in 2016. That work covers the totality of his life, from his youth, diplomatic work, membership in the OUN, arrest by the Gestapo, and subsequent post-war second emigration, this time to Argentina where he continued his political and academic work until his death in 1979.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> See: Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015: 9, 29-43, 63, 101-122, 155-189, 270. And Trevor Erlacher. *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Age of Extremes*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (2021): 267, 505-532.

<sup>5</sup> Tamara Demchenko. *Zdobuttia Bat'kivshchyny: Zhyttia ta Tvorchist' Ievhena Onats'koho*. Chernihiv, Ukraine: T.H. Shevchenko National University Chernihiv (2016).

The OUN's leadership was reliant on foreign support for a base of organization, publishing, funding, and asylum to continue their activities. In the event of a potential conflict with Poland or the USSR, victory would only be possible with significant external aid, this much was obvious. Diplomacy should then be seen as one of the most critical aspects of their work. International commitments and ideological considerations often clashed, much of the OUN's decision making was geared towards an attempt to balance the two. The failure of the tripartite balancing act foreign interests, the leadership, and the base (back in Ukraine) would significantly contribute to the OUN's splitting. This had serious ramifications and weakened the Nationalist effort in the Second World War, causing the deaths of several high-ranking members, allowing Germany to play the two factions off of each other, and crippling the Nationalist attempt to infiltrate Soviet Ukraine after Operation Barbarossa.

As a primary node in the Italo-Ukrainian Nationalist political connection, and as someone who had a significant deal of influence in presenting Italy and Italian affairs to a Ukrainian audience, Onats'kyi is a necessary cog in the OUN's diplomatic efforts in the 1930s. Geopolitically, Fascist ambitions in the Carpathian Basin and Eastern Mediterranean actually placed Ukrainian affairs at the periphery of Italy's sphere of interest. Italy most importantly served in 1938 as the mediator over the issue of Czechoslovakia, which resulted in a brief resumption of Ukrainian statehood and further in 1939 hosted a Second OUN Congress in Rome. Despite the OUN's ability to adapt its messaging to differing political contexts as a core component of its pragmatic revisionist foreign policy, it was unable to succeed in attracting any consistent or committed allies. Italy, after 1936—increasingly isolated as a result of the diplomatic fallout surrounding its invasion of Ethiopia—left Eastern European affairs to Germany.



A detailed study of Onats'kyi's career not only reveals the methodology of the OUN's work in Italy, but how the Organization grappled with maintaining its political and ideological independence while simultaneously trying to draw itself closer to much more powerful actors. Many Nationalists, Onats'kyi included, praised Fascism while being careful to consistently affirm that Ukrainian Nationalists forge a philosophically autochthonous ideology and political mythology. Dealing with potential allies with whom there would be a major power imbalance risked diminishing the Organization's independence, a scenario which many desperately wanted to avoid. Were the OUN to merely copy Italy, Germany, or someone else, that risked damaging not only their appeal but also their agency, whereas drawing on similarities allowed the OUN to present themselves as ideologically compatible to potential allies, even including non-authoritarian countries. In the end the OUN failed in this balancing act, internally it was unable to keep moderates and radicals together. Externally it faced essentially impossible circumstances during the Second World War and failed to acquire a single significant long-term alliance.

### **The Historical Debate on Nationalism and Fascism**

Few topics in the study of Ukrainian history have generated more political and academic controversy than that of the OUN and its offshoots. The longest and most enduring debate is the one over ideology, which began as an internal debate as soon as the group came into existence, but has continued long after Ukraine gained independence and the OUN ceased to be a significant political force. Among contemporary academics, the most volatile sticking point has been labeling the OUN's ideology, the most charged term being without question: "Fascism."<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> This work is not concerned with the question of if the OUN should be designated as "Fascist," because that is a complex discussion reliant on defining what Fascism is, which would distract from the topic at hand.

The loudest voice in favor of applying the Fascist label to the OUN's ideology and practices is certainly Polish-German historian Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, who focuses on the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and ethnic cleansing committed by Ukrainian Nationalists in 1943.<sup>7</sup> Opposing views are presented by historians like Alexander J. Motyl, who argues that Ukrainian Nationalism should be considered a more autochthonous political phenomena, distinct from Fascism and therefore scholars should eschew such labels. Likewise, historian Oleksandr Zaitsev prefers instead the term "Ustashism," seeing it as a more analytically accurate label within the context of the OUN attempting to represent a stateless nation in contrast to the fundamentally different context of established nation-states. This follows the OUN's own logic, which will be discussed in more depth below.<sup>8</sup> This label appears to be the most mechanically useful vehicle for comparison with more well-known and historically significant "Fascist" movements. An overarching label, "Integral Nationalism," is particularly useful as an umbrella term taken to include a variety of authoritarian forms of right-wing nationalism, which focus on national and social unity through class cooperation. Zaitsev sees Ustashism and Fascism as two distinct streams of Integral Nationalism, a categorization of the OUN which dates back to one of the first American scholars of Ukrainian nationalism in the 20th century, John A. Armstrong.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Some of his most notable works on the subject include: Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe. "The Fascist Kernel of Ukrainian Genocidal Nationalism." *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, No. 2402. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The Center for Russian and East European Studies, (2015). And Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult*. Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem Press (2014). Worth noting is also Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe and Arnd Bauerkämper: *Fascism without Borders. Transnational Connections and Cooperation between Movements and Regimes in Europe 1918 to 1945*. Oxford: Berghahn (2017): 1-38, 168-191.

<sup>8</sup> See: Alexander J. Motyl. *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism 1919-1929*. New York, New York: Columbia University Press (1980). And Oleksandr Zaitsev. "Fascism or Ustashism? Ukrainian Integral Nationalism of the 1920s–1930s in Comparative Perspective." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 48, no. 2/3 (2015): 183–93. While there certainly exists academic works which engage in apologia for the OUN and its affiliates, the contemporary debate and the pieces cited above are far more heuristic than partisan. The alternative label provided by Zaitsev, "Ustashism," is not a complement.

<sup>9</sup> John A. Armstrong. "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe." *The Journal of Modern History* 40, no. 3 (1968): 396–410.

Since one of the main focuses of this piece is the relationship between the OUN and Fascist Italy, using the term Fascism to refer to both the OUN's and the Italian National Fascist Party's (PNF) ideologies would be needlessly confusing. Therefore, it is prudent to avoid applying the label to the OUN simply for clarity's sake. Ukrainian (Integral) Nationalism will be how the ideology promoted by the majority of OUN members and organs is referred to. Whereas, to borrow a device from Myroslav Shkandrij's *Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature*, small "n" nationalism will generally refer to the broader belief in an independent nation-state, which was mainstream among the majority of non-Communist Ukrainian political organizations.<sup>10</sup> The OUN and related thinkers tended to define their ideology as simply "Nationalism," so maintaining this distinction through capitalization is consistent with primary sources. For example, as in Italy letters were sometimes signed off with "Fascist Greetings," so too did OUN members end their correspondence with "Nationalist Greetings." The word Fascism should be taken in this work to be exclusively in reference to Italy and the PNF unless otherwise stated.

### **Studying Propaganda, Logistics, and the Inner Workings of the OUN**

The most recent monograph on the OUN is Polish historian Magdalena Gibiec's *Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*, which was published in the Spring of 2024. The evidentiary base of

---

<sup>10</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 3.

this work is the archive of OUN activist and former UVO commander Omelian Senyk.<sup>11</sup> The monograph's three principal topics are examining the OUN's internal hierarchy, tactics, and decision making, as well as the effectiveness of their operations; mapping the lines of interpersonal contact, and how they formed a broader web of relationships beyond the organization; and discussing the dynamics between the two parts of the OUN, its younger base, located in Western Ukraine, and the older generation of émigrés and exiles who made up the official leadership of the OUN.<sup>12</sup> Gibiec's work is of great utility to this one, because Senyk was more centrally connected to the OUN hierarchy than Onats'kyi, who dealt with primarily with external affairs and was rarely consulted on decisions by the leadership. Put together, the two archives complement each other greatly. Gibiec utilizes a significant amount of Onats'kyi's published correspondence (released in four volumes covering 1930-1934) and his memoirs, which likewise cover a period up until 1935.

In methodological terms, Gibiec focuses on “critical analysis of archival sources, elements of network analysis and the biographical method.”<sup>13</sup> For the OUN members, these letters represented their main manner of communication with each other in regular circumstances, as they were scattered throughout Europe. Comparing their private correspondence, published material, and known actions has the capacity to give the historian detailed insight into the thought process of individuals and the process by which the OUN, as an organization, functioned. These letters may contain requests for money, familial well-wishes, and grievances against other members along with any political or academic discussion, in that

---

<sup>11</sup> The archive was seized by Czechoslovak police and later found its way to Polish authorities. The Polish files, including transcriptions and translations of original documents are now held in L'viv, Ukraine, but were thought lost until Gibiec discovered them in 2017.

<sup>12</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 1-3.

<sup>13</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 5.

way they reveal the context of what it meant to live and work abroad and through those turbulent decades.

Shkandrij's *Ukrainian Nationalism* is one of the most recent and best works on the subject, with a definitive internal split with the first half discussing the OUN's ideology and history and the second half describing the main literary figures associated with the Nationalist movement, not all of whom were members. A significant personage in that work is Mykola Stsibors'kyi, who represented a more moderate wing of the Organization, ideologically emphasizing mass politics. They contrasted with Dmytro Dontsov's more extremist faction concentrated among Galician youth who emphasized voluntarism, will-to-power, an elite vanguard, and more explicitly admired Nazi Germany—Dontsov even translated Hitler's *Mein Kampf* for a Ukrainian audience (going as far as to delete passages which could offend Ukrainians). Shkandrij's work deals especially with the literary dimension of this intra-Nationalist ideological division.<sup>14</sup>

Shkandrij utilizes a similar method to Gibiec in dealing with OUN correspondence, mostly through the OUN archives located in Ukraine as well some of Onats'kyi's published correspondence (up to 1935); a great deal of his work is, however, focused on literary analysis and poetic explication. Drawing on ideological polemics and Nationalist letters to illustrate the political context behind the literary theory espoused by the figures in question. Shkandrij's thesis

---

<sup>14</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 79-100, 191-225. For information on Dontsov see: Trevor Erlacher. *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Age of Extremes*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (2021). Little has been written focusing on the life of Mykola Stsibors'kyi, one of the more interesting characters in the PUN and one of its main ideologists—although he is often mentioned in discussions of the OUN's relationship to Jews due to his philosemitic publications, and the fact that his wife, Inna Stsibors'ka (nee Salman) was Jewish. As the OUN drifted closer to Nazi Germany, Stsibors'kyi emphasized this much less. Surprisingly uncommon for Nationalist leaders, General Mykola Kapustians'kyi and Riko Iaryi likewise had Jewish wives. For Stsibors'kyi's main contribution to Nationalist political theory see: Mykola Stsibors'kyi. *Natsiokratia*. Paris, France: (1935). Vinnytsia: Derzhavna Kartohrafichna Fabrika, (2007).

is that the Nationalist movement encompassed a wide variety of political views, in contrast to a perception that Dontsovism was monolithically dominant. Shkandrij is eager to point out these internal disputes over matters such as antisemitism, *fuhrerprinzip*, and the role of hierarchy (i.e. elitism vs. populism).

## **The OUN's Consolidation**

The Ukrainian Nationalist movement had its genesis in three distinct groups, the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), the League of Ukrainian Nationalists and other smaller Nationalist political organizations, and Nationalist student organizations in Western Ukraine. Aside from the students, the UVO and LUN were made up of émigrés, especially veterans. The 1920s were a decade of consolidation, the UVO shed a pro-Soviet splinter and the LUN absorbed many small factions.<sup>15</sup> They came together in 1929 formally to form the OUN. Almost from the very beginning of the Organization there was a division between the younger base primarily still residing in Western Ukraine and the older émigré leadership. This expressed itself in ideological and methodological terms. The leader of the OUN, Ievhen Konovalets' found himself playing a careful balancing act, oftentimes lamenting the lack of control he exercised over the youth. As a result, the Homeland Executive, the OUN's command in Poland, often acted independently,

---

<sup>15</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 60-65. Pro-Soviet UVO members loyal to Petrushevych formed a short-lived militant splinter group, the West Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Organization (ZUNRO) in 1926, but it had ceased activities by 1929. There has been next to no research on this group, but it was small and unpopular, it probably committed far fewer acts of violence or sabotage than the UVO and faded away rather quickly as the pro-Soviet position gradually lost popularity in the latter part of the 1920s.

sometimes carrying out unauthorized assassinations of both Poles and Ukrainian opponents of the Nationalists.<sup>16</sup>

The OUN was organized as follows, in Ukraine itself the Homeland Executive exercised control and gradually absorbed the UVO's functions, whereas outside of Ukraine the Provisional Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN) formed a nine-person leadership council, with Konovalets' as *Providnyk* or leader. There were numerous sub-committees often led by PUN members on matters such as propaganda or military affairs.<sup>17</sup> The OUN had a number of international affiliates or allied organizations, the most significant was the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODVU) based in the United States.<sup>18</sup> In Canada the OUN affiliate was called the Ukrainian National Alliance (UNO). North American donations kept the OUN financially afloat throughout the interwar period.<sup>19</sup>

The young base's increasing extremism pushed them towards more violent acts of resistance, while the older generation in leadership grew increasingly concerned about conflicts with the Church and the rest of mainstream West Ukrainian society. Konovalets' was a popular leader but was only able to hold the two disparate and unofficial factions together by effectively allowing the Homeland Executive to do whatever it wanted. This also meant making ideological compromises with the radical youth, much to the chagrin of Onats'kyi and Stsibors'kyi, among others.<sup>20</sup> Konovalets' even admitted in one letter to Onats'kyi that they had never really had

---

<sup>16</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 17-19, 110-120.

<sup>17</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 70-75.

<sup>18</sup> "Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 3, (1993).

<sup>19</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 220–225.

<sup>20</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 99. Stsibors'kyi was much more willing to accept violence and terror as a legitimate tactic, but was more ready to criticize Italian Fascism than Onats'kyi. Both critiqued German Nazism. This contrasts with Dmytro Dontsov who unapologetically admired Hitler (and

much control over them to begin with.<sup>21</sup> This eventually led to an outright split in the Organization in 1940 after the death of Konovalets' in 1938. The split was formalized when the radical youth elected Stepan Bandera, in contrast to the émigrés who elected Andrii Melnyk, who had been Konovalets' second-in-command in the Ukrainian Army and UVO. Melnyk was a compromise candidate and had a good relationship with the Church, being considered particularly moderate. Onats'kyi remained loyal to the PUN and Melnyk.<sup>22</sup> These new factions became the OUN-B (Bandera) and OUN-M (Melnyk).<sup>23</sup>

It must be stated that the OUN was never the most popular Ukrainian political organization during the interwar, considering it was illegal this is hardly surprising.<sup>24</sup> Its primary rival was the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO) which was a big tent centrist party with ties to the Greek Catholic Church that almost monopolized the Ukrainian vote in the Polish Sejm. At first relations between the OUN and UNDO were actually fairly positive. In Transcarpathia the Christian People's Party (KhNP) was the biggest Ukrainian party, it was a conservative autonomist party led by a Greek Catholic Priest, Avhustyn Voloshyn. It would

---

Mussolini) and actively collaborated during the Second World War. This became a significant wedge issue within the OUN between the émigré leadership and young base.

<sup>21</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 24, 29, 31, 34, 184-189.

<sup>22</sup> See: Oleksandr Kucheruk. *Ryko Iaryi – Zahadka OUN*. L'viv, Ukraine: Literaturna Ahentsiia Piramida (2005). Rikhard "Riko" Iaryi is undoubtedly one of the more mysterious figures in Ukraine's 20th century history. Scholars cannot agree as to his ethnic background, whether his family were originally German, Jewish, Hungarian, or—as he claimed—actually partially Ukrainian. Iaryi was alleged to be both a Soviet and German agent, and despite being of the older generation and a non-Ukrainian, he was one of the only senior leaders to side with Stepan Bandera after Konovalets' death.

<sup>23</sup> The OUN-B is sometimes also called the OUN-R (Revolutionary). After the Second World War there would be another split of the OUN-B, which would be known as the OUN-Z. The lineage of the various OUN splinter groups continues into independent Ukraine, but no faction or political party representing a Nationalist ideology has ever attained electoral success barring a handful of parliamentary seats.

<sup>24</sup> One of the primary reasons the OUN is so important was that, during the Second World War, it was the only major Ukrainian political actor able to continue activity under the circumstances of the War. It already had an underground structure used to conducting illegal activities and was ready to use violence. The other Parliamentary parties ceased functioning when they could no longer participate in a democratic or even semi-democratic process under Soviet and German occupation—whereas the OUN-B's armed wing, the UPA, maintained an underground struggle from 1943 until the mid-1950s against first German and later Soviet and Polish forces.



cooperate somewhat with OUN affiliates during the formation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian state in 1938 out of necessity, but ideologically was conservative and Catholic, thereby placing it closer to the UNDO than the traditionally anti-clerical OUN.

### **Nationalist Grappling with Fascism—Philosophy, Aesthetics, or Stages in Development?**

When the LUN first formed out of several small Nationalist groups, one of the constituent factions of the LUN was the Union of Ukrainian Fascists (SUF) founded by Petro Kozhevnykiv and Leonid Kostariv who went on to be members of the PUN. They favored a less original importation of Mussolini's own ideas and practices, explicitly modeling themselves on his new regime. The appeal made sense, the socialist and democratic parties which ran the UNR had failed to defeat Poland and the Bolsheviks or establish an internally stable state structure, so an ideology which prioritized the strength of the state above all else had a reasonable rhetorical edge. Dontsov was the first significant Ukrainian thinker to openly embrace Fascism and soon came to represent the most iconoclastic, esoteric, and extremist trends in Ukrainian Nationalist thought—he compared Fascist and Bolshevik tactics and advocated that they be adopted by Nationalists, although he maintained that Ukrainians should form their own ideological foundations.<sup>25</sup> From a contemporary perspective it might be difficult to discern what differences, above aesthetics, this actually implied. Fascism as a distinct model for Ukrainian Nationalism had been embodied by the SUF, but the fact that both Kostariv and Kozhevnykiv would be kicked out of the Organization for espionage a few years later tarnished their reputations. This high-profile betrayal has made both Nationalists then, and historians now, such as Zaitsev,

---

<sup>25</sup> Oleksandr Zaitsev. "Ukraiins'kyi Natsionalizm ta Italiis'kyi Fashyizm (1922-1939)." *Ukraiina Moderna* (2012).

question whether their actions or promulgations emerged from a place of genuine conviction. Neither left many sources behind and both ceased political activity after being caught. In either case, the decision not to mimic the Fascist model was made before allegations of espionage had been made.

Within the LUN, before Kostariv and Kozhevnykiv were removed, there was an open debate about the extent to which foreign models should be used as an inspiration. Italian Fascism appeared to be a dynamic and successful new political philosophy which fit the emerging zeitgeist of interwar Europe, but Stsibors'kyi successfully argued for using exclusively Ukrainian traditions of “statehood” and “spirituality” as the foundation for their Nationalism.<sup>26</sup> In his 1935 book, *Natsiokratia*, Stsibors'kyi praises Fascism in opposition to liberal democracy, socialism, and communism, while reserving some limited critique of specific Italian policies—he also lambasted the *fuhrerprinzip*. His own ideal system likewise made provisions for a strong executive, but he underscored that he believed in temporary dictatorship.<sup>27</sup> To what extent this was a meaningful distinction is up for debate, Zaitsev does not think it is.<sup>28</sup> As the foreign situation and internal dynamics of the OUN shifted, so to did the views of the leadership and Stsibors'kyi. It is difficult to ascertain what shifts were genuine and which ones were politically motivated.

Onats'kyi joined the OUN in 1930 and became an active participant in the debate on how Ukrainian Nationalism should receive Italian Fascism. His views generally sound the same as Dontsov's and Stsibors'kyi's, when he wrote that Italian Fascism was the nationalism of a

---

<sup>26</sup> Oleksandr Zaitsev. “Ukraiins'kyi Natsionalizm ta Italiis'kyi Fashyizm (1922-1939).” *Ukraiina Moderna* (2012).

<sup>27</sup> Mykola Stsibors'kyi. *Natsiokratia*. Paris, France: (1935). Vinnytsia: Derzhavna Kartohrafichna Fabrika, (2007). And Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015). 110-122.

<sup>28</sup> Oleksandr Zaitsev. “Ukraiins'kyi Natsionalizm ta Italiis'kyi Fashyizm (1922-1939).” *Ukraiina Moderna* (2012).

“nation-state” and centered on the “cult of its established state,” whereas Ukrainian Nationalism, being a nationalism of a stateless people, must be “irredentist” and ready to destroy the “cults” of occupying states. Onats’kyi drew a distinct line between the two “nationalisms” based more on context and circumstances than principle, contrasting with Stsibors’kyi’s more policy-based critiques—although he shared a view on the nationalism of nation-states and stateless nations as being distinct. Onats’kyi wrote positively about the similarities between the two, stating that “Young Ukrainian Nationalism adopted from Fascism, first and foremost the recognition of a need for an iron-clad hierarchical organization and the subordination of individual, party, and class interests to the interests of the homeland.”<sup>29</sup>

These ideological debates were not entirely internal matters. Over the 1930s when criticisms of Fascism and Nazism emerged from the OUN, those governments made their displeasures known. The obvious and massive imbalance of power between the Nationalists and those powers incentivized Konovalets’ and the PUN to temper such critique. One of the most significant incidents, which particularly frustrated Onats’kyi involved a lecture Stsibors’kyi gave in Paris criticizing Fascism, which was reported in the Russian émigré press and from there made its way to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>30</sup> This was made all the more problematic as Stsibors’kyi’s lecture coincided with the visit of Milena Rudnyts’ka, an important Ukrainian parliamentarian, to Italy. Onats’kyi wrote to Stsibors’kyi telling him: “Now it is possible that someone could point out that prominent members of the Provid are organizing a ‘Critique of Fascism’ in Paris at the same time as our event in Rome.”<sup>31</sup> Rudnyts’ka’s visit will be discussed

---

<sup>29</sup> Ievhen Onats’kyi. “Lysty z Itali. I. Deshcho pro fashyzm.” *Rozbudova Natsii* no.3 (1928) 94-96. In Oleksandr Zaitsev. “Ukraiins’kyi Natsionalizm ta Italiis’kyi Fashyzm (1922-1939).” *Ukraina Moderna* (2012).

<sup>30</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 237-242.

<sup>31</sup> Ievhen Onats’kyi. *U Vichnomu Misti: Zapysky Ukraiins’koho Zhurnalista 1933 rik*. Vol 3. Toronto, Canada: Novyi Shliakh (1985): 72-74.

later, but suffice to say it was a significant accomplishment for the Ukrainians and an embarrassment for Poland.

The rise of Hitler also changed the calculus of the Nationalist leadership, by and large they remained willing to cooperate with German intelligence, but as relations between the Third Reich and Poland improved, culminating in a 1934 non-aggression pact, criticism of Nazism became more common in the Nationalist émigré press. In some respects, an alignment with Italy—over Germany—seemed like it had potential. Nazism’s hostility to Slavs and specific territorial ambitions in Ukraine were known to the OUN. Onats’kyi wrote and published tracts which criticized German Nazism, especially on the lines of its adoption of eugenicist and racist policies, before 1938—the year Italy adopted Nazi style racial laws—he compared Italy to Germany favorably on this matter specifically. The émigré leaders in the PUN ensured that a full translation of *Mein Kampf* be made available in Ukraine—the Germans even complained that Konovalets’ was running an anti-Nazi publicity campaign. Onats’kyi would even be arrested by the Gestapo in 1943, after that city fell under German occupation.<sup>32</sup> German intelligence had even reported that Konovalets’ attempted to meet with Mussolini in the early 1930s to generate competition between Germany, the UK, and Italy for support of Ukraine so that the OUN would not be reliant on any one power, or bloc of powers, as Ukraine had been during the First World War.<sup>33</sup> Nonetheless, independently of each other, both Italy and the OUN had gravitated into a

---

<sup>32</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 111-114.

<sup>33</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 242. Italy and Germany were not yet allies, indeed up until the Invasion of Ethiopia and the start of the Spanish Civil War, the two countries remained generally hostile as Italy supported the Fatherland Front regime in Austria, which the Nazis tried repeatedly to overthrow. The OUN had weak representation in the UK, but at that time there were hopes that the Nationalists could cooperate with prominent Ukrainian leaders there, but they fell through. Only after the Second World War would the OUN become a significant force in the Ukrainian diaspora in Britain.

distinct German sphere of influence by the late 1930s. Nationalist critique of Germany and Nazism accordingly slowed significantly.

While in the early 1930s Fascist Italy was seen, by the more conservative leadership, as a positive example which could be contrasted with Nazi Germany, by 1938 Germany was the unquestioned leader of the revisionist camp in Europe.<sup>34</sup> The long links with German intelligence going back to the pre-Nazi days never went away even when the PUN did critique Nazism. To avoid ideological conflicts with the base, Konovalets' encouraged a more conciliatory position towards their radicalism, asking Onats'kyi not to publish certain articles critical of Germany and Dontsov. Stsibors'kyi's own theoretical work took on a more radical tone, tempering his philosemitism and emphasizing "totalitarianism." In Shkandrij's words, Stsibors'kyi and the OUN engaged in a "a dance of acquiesce and resistance."<sup>35</sup> At this point, many Nationalists felt that war would be inevitable, and that as Germany's likely enemies would be some combination of Czechoslovakia, Poland, or the USSR, that alignment with Hitler was inevitable to restore Ukrainian statehood. When relations with the Germans got worse, these tendencies shifted, and when they improved or the OUN got desperate, they improved.

One of the most hopeless hours of the OUN was between the joint German-Soviet invasion of Poland and Operation Barbarossa. Germany was in an effective alliance with the USSR and all of Western Ukraine was under Soviet occupation. The sole exception was Transcarpathia, a Ukrainian majority region which the Germans had allowed Hungary to invade, partially as a way to assuage Stalin's fear that Germany was sponsoring Ukrainian Nationalists to

---

<sup>34</sup> Oleksandr Zaitsev. "Ukraiins'kyi Natsionalizm ta Italiis'kyi Fashyizm (1922-1939)." *Ukraiina Moderna* (2012).

<sup>35</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 114-124. And Oleksandr Zaitsev. "Ukraiins'kyi Natsionalizm ta Italiis'kyi Fashyizm (1922-1939)." *Ukraiina Moderna* (2012).

advantage itself in an invasion of the USSR.<sup>36</sup> At this point in the War the OUN began to slowly pivot towards the United States and United Kingdom—this was a chaotic moment, the Organization was in the process of officially splitting and some members continued to work with Germany preparing Nationalist military units that would help Germany in its invasion of Poland.

Stephen Davidowycz was a Ukrainian-American ODVU member. He corresponded with Onats'kyi proposing cooperation with influential non-Nationalist Ukrainians in Britain, a suggestion Onats'kyi shot down.<sup>37</sup> In 1940 he translated to English a short booklet written by Stsibors'kyi and published in New York. The work described recent Ukrainian history, including the Hungarian occupation of Transcarpathia, assassination of Konovalets' by a Soviet agent, and reaction to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. In the preface, written by Davidowycz and not Stsibors'kyi, the former emphasized democracy as an aspect of the Nationalist political program: “Ukrainians everywhere realize that only in the victory of democracy over the forces of aggression can Ukraine hope to achieve independence... this book should serve to lend weight to Ukraine’s claim to freedom by showing that its struggle is in keeping with the highest democratic principles of every free nation.”<sup>38</sup> By this point Stsibors'kyi had referred to the OUN as a “totalitarian” organization. Even the political system envisaged in his *Natsiokratiiia* (likely more representative of his actual beliefs) five years earlier, despite stating that it would be less

---

<sup>36</sup> Vincent Shandor. *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Legal History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (1997): 40-57.

<sup>37</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Stepan, Davidovich, 20 December 1939, IHRCA, Box 11, Davidovich, Stepan, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. And Stepan, Davidovich to Ievhen Onats'kyi, 22 November 1939, IHRCA, Box 11, Davidovich, Stepan, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>38</sup> Mykola Sciborsky [sic]. *Ukraine and Russia*. Translated by Stephen Dawidowycz. New York, New York: Ukrainian Printing and Publishing Co., (1940): vi., 178-186.

authoritarian and dictatorial than Mussolini's Italy, could not be called a democratic system within an American frame of reference. Indeed, he was explicitly critical of liberal democracy.<sup>39</sup>

The OUN as an organization had limited agency. It was reliant on foreign powers to sustain itself, let alone achieve its objectives. As a result, its ideological expression necessarily had to be carefully monitored and controlled. Foreign considerations indeed dominated not only what members publicly expressed, but shifted the balance of the Organization's beliefs. There were limits, however, the OUN did not become a democratic organization because Davidowycz said it was, but when circumstances drove both the OUN and Italy closer to Germany, its ideology became far more radical. Onats'kyi's own critiques of Nazism, the radicals, and Dontsov in particular could not be printed, despite his protestations to Konovalets'. He was too worried about the base and relations with Berlin to approve.<sup>40</sup> In this respect, unsurprisingly, the ideological agency of the OUN's members was even more restricted than of the Organization itself.

## **Mercenary Espionage**

It was necessary for the UVO to secure foreign alliances if it wanted to have any chance at sustaining itself in the long-term, let alone defeating Poland. The UVO quickly turned to Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Germany, who all had noteworthy border disputes with Warsaw and generally feared the Soviet Union. To help fund their activities the UVO spied for the

---

<sup>39</sup> Mykola Stsibors'kyi. *Natsiokratiiia*. Paris, France: (1935). Vinnytsia: Derzhavna Kartohrafichna Fabrika, (2007): 17-32.

<sup>40</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 110-116.

aforementioned governments.<sup>41</sup> In return OUN operatives received asylum, false passports, and subsidies, most especially from Lithuania.<sup>42</sup> Over the course of the next few decades the OUN would attempt to replicate those relationships, first with Japan and then after the Second World War with Britain and the United States. This was not without risk, as any host country could easily turn on the OUN when Poland successfully applied diplomatic pressure. In some ways this contradicted the core Nationalist mission, as it necessarily subordinated the OUN to the aims of foreign governments. Ideologically this made it awkward for Nationalists to critique certain foreign governments. Czechoslovakia is the most notable example. Despite controlling Transcarpathia, Czechoslovakia's position as the OUN's primary base of operations and organization made hostilities decidedly unwise. This was justified on political grounds, Czechoslovakia did not grant Ukrainians autonomy, but the region had willingly joined Prague and as the last East European democracy, its Ukrainian citizens had more political rights than Ukrainians anywhere else on the continent.<sup>43</sup>

This espionage went both ways, OUN and UVO members feared infiltration from foreign agents. This fear was well-founded, Ievhen Konovalets' would be assassinated in 1938 and Stepan Bandera in 1959, both by Soviet agents. Germany also spied on the nascent OUN. Stsibors'kyi himself would be accused of espionage on multiple occasions, allegedly on behalf of the USSR or Poland—these allegations are almost certainly false. Later the two co-leaders of the

---

<sup>41</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 65-71. And Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 45.

<sup>42</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 156-162. And Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 275.

<sup>43</sup> Marek Wojnar. "A Minor Ally or a Minor Enemy? The Hungarian Issue in the Political Thought and Activity of Ukrainian Integral Nationalists (until 1941)." *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 53, no.3 (2018): 170-172.



SUF, who had become PUN members, would be expelled from the Organization for espionage.<sup>44</sup> One, Leonid Kostariv, for spying for the USSR and the other for Germany. Gibiec believes that it was Kostariv who had been providing Polish intelligence with the information that other OUN members believed had come from Stsibors'kyi. Whether he had been spying for both the USSR and Poland is unclear, as is the possibility of German involvement. This massive failure led directly to Konovalets' establishing an OUN counter-intelligence group.<sup>45</sup> The OUN was itself spying for Germany against Poland at the same time as was said above.

Another high-ranking OUN member, Riko Iaryi, an ethnic German and the representative in Berlin, was accused frequently of spying for either Germany or the USSR. Espionage, much like bank or postal robberies committed by the UVO and later OUN, was intended to support the Organization materially. Spying against Poland was not particularly hypocritical for the OUN and UVO which considered Poland to be their most immediate enemy. The practice did encapsulate a core contradiction inherent in the OUN's status as a Nationalist organization led primarily in-exile, and therefore necessarily subordinate to foreign powers and susceptible to their influence.

### **Onats'kyi's Early Career in Italy**

Despite the importance which Italy was to play in Central European events in the late 1930s, the OUN never had more than one long term representative in Italy. In the words of

---

<sup>44</sup> The existence of the SUF has not played a major role in the debate on Fascism as a label applying to the OUN because of the issue of its leaders' both being foreign agents, and that it came into existence and was absorbed into the LUN in the mid-1920s—before the rise of Nazi Germany.

<sup>45</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 98-102, 136-137.

Gibiec, the OUN activities in Italy could be summarized as a “one man show,” with Ievhen Onats’kyi as the singular performer. Onats’kyi had made some valuable contacts while serving in the UNR’s diplomatic mission in Italy. He worked as both a journalist and academic publishing numerous works. Being in Italy afforded Onats’kyi the freedom to publish anti-Polish and anti-Soviet material, both for a Ukrainian and Italian audience. In few other countries did OUN members have the same access to state officials. For the first few years of the OUN’s relationship with Italy there seemed to be much promise, Italy saw an anti-Communist group hoping to revise the Versailles Order which had the potential to be an ally in the Black Sea or Carpathian Basin, which generated some interest and a handful of concrete acts of cooperation. The rise of Nazi Germany, however, refocused Italian priorities to the South and West.<sup>46</sup>

Italy was a young country when Onats’kyi arrived, having only fully unified in 1871. The March on Rome occurred only 50 years after Rome had been seized from the Papacy and made Italy’s capital. Mussolini’s new regime took a few years to consolidate its hold on power, these years formed the final nails in the coffin of the UNR’s vague hopes. Ukraine had experienced a multiyear long period of chaos, warlordism, and foreign invasions starting in 1917.<sup>47</sup> This disorder and disunity, often characterized as a multisided civil war, was unsurprisingly blamed for Ukraine’s occupation and lack of independence. This contrast must have influenced Onats’kyi’s positive appraisal of Fascism, he specifically praised Fascist Corporatism and the manner in which the nation had been broadly unified under the regime. Onats’kyi avoided publicly praising certain Fascist policies in Galician publications, such as state censorship, because the “tools” of Fascism remained in the hands of Polish occupation authorities and

---

<sup>46</sup> Volodymyr Kovalchuk. “Ukraiins’ke Pytannia u Lystuvanni Chleniv OUN z Italiis’kymy Derzhavnymy Diiachamy u 1930-kh Rokakh.” Kyiv, Ukraine: *Ukraiins’kyi Arkheohrafichnyi Shchorichnyk* no.13/14 (2009): 352-364.

<sup>47</sup> On the entirety of modern Ukraine’s borders, more than a dozen distinct armies operated from 1917-1922.

providing justification for state authorities censoring nationalist publications was obviously counter-intuitive.<sup>48</sup>

Onats'kyi served—in his function both as a journalist and a member of the OUN—as the person most influential in shaping the reception of Italian affairs within the Ukrainian cultural sphere and most especially within the OUN. The issue of ideological influence or similarity was a contentious one not just for contemporary academics but also for the OUN at the time. In communications with Italian officials, or Mussolini himself, the incentive was obviously to highlight a theoretical closeness and when other Nationalists critiqued the Fascist regime Onats'kyi was placed in an awkward position. He frequently wrote to Konovalts' and other Nationalists explaining Italian affairs, including updating them on their relationship with the Catholic Church or on the Racial Laws of 1938.<sup>49</sup>

Onats'kyi supported himself primarily through a mix of teaching and publishing, which served one of the OUN's most important foreign policy objectives: furthering political and historical knowledge about Ukraine abroad.<sup>50</sup> For the OUN, if its arguments about Soviet or Polish oppression were to be heeded, foreign audiences must first have some understanding of the existence of a distinct Ukrainian nation as well as its recent history. As an academic Onats'kyi taught Ukrainian at La Sapienza University in Rome. He also taught at the Oriental University of Naples and in 1936 helped establish a department of Ukrainian language and culture there, which would remain influential in Ukrainian Studies even decades after he left Italy. To augment his income, he ran a boarding house for tourists and tutored Russian. His

---

<sup>48</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 110-114.

<sup>49</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 110-114.

<sup>50</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 237-240.

connections in academia and within the Italian government also allowed him to secure scholarships for five Ukrainian students to study in Italy. The students would be members of OUN affiliated student groups. Two notable beneficiaries were Mykhailo Turchmanovych and Stepan Bandera's younger brother Oleksandr.<sup>51</sup> For Ukrainian students in Italy, Onats'kyi was often a point of contact between their student *Hromada* and the Italian government. Letters from student leaders to Italian officials, which often contain petitions or information about anti-Soviet or anti-Polish demonstrations, passed through Onats'kyi's hands as many are preserved or copied in his personal papers.

Aside from contributing to Ukrainian journalism through his reporting on Italian and European affairs more generally, Onats'kyi often wrote for Italian publications including those associated with the Fascist regime, such as *Antieuropa*.<sup>52</sup> He also wrote numerous books in Italian which vastly expanded the corpus of available knowledge about Ukraine and the Ukrainian language. Onats'kyi was sure to send copies of works on Ukraine to important figures in both the Italian government and among the foreign diplomatic community. In 1937 Onats'kyi presented his Italian language Ukrainian grammar to the *Duce* himself. Likewise, to Dino Alfieri, Italian ambassador to Germany, he presented a work "The Ukrainian Minority in Poland," in response to a Polish "propaganda" piece of the same title which, in Onats'kyi's words: "presents the situation in a completely false light." Another work, *Studies of Ukrainian History and*

---

<sup>51</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 237. The Oriental Institute would be one of the founding institutions of the International Association of Ukrainian Studies (IAUS) which was even founded in Naples. See: Iaroslav Isaievych. "The International Association of Ukrainian Studies and Its Congresses." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 18, no. 3/4 (1994): 415-417.

<sup>52</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 237.

*Culture*, was presented to Alfieri in 1939.<sup>53</sup> He also facilitated the transfer of petitions and letters from important Ukrainian figures, like Konovalets' or Count Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, the head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, to Mussolini, Ciano, and others.<sup>54</sup> This was significant work because it provided his contacts within the Italian government with favorable information and data which contributed to their public and diplomatic protests against Poland as will be discussed in greater detail below.

### **Black Sea Space in Fascist Imaginations**

Italy's main geopolitical areas of interest in Europe were the Mediterranean and Carpathian Basin, where its two best European allies of the early 1930s, Austria and Hungary were located. Touching on the Black Sea (connected through the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean) and the Carpathian Basin, Ukrainian Nationalists felt they could convince Rome that the "Ukrainian Question," could be one with a highly beneficial solution for Italy. One of Onats'kyi's most important Italian point of contacts was Enrico Insabato, an Italian with a longtime interest in "Oriental" affairs, particularly West Asian, North African, and to a lesser extent Eastern European affairs. A former anarchist, peasant organizer, Italian agent in Libya, and later Fascist MP, Insabato had taken an interest in Ukrainian affairs after the end of the First World War, where he communicated with the UNR's Diplomatic Mission on the issue of

---

<sup>53</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Dino Alfieri, 15 February 1936, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. And Ievhen Onats'kyi to Dino Alfieri, 2 February 1942, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>54</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Benito Mussolini, 9th of August 1937, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. and Ievhen Onats'kyi to Benito Mussolini, 29th of September 1938, IHRCA Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

Ukrainian PoWs being held in Italy.<sup>55</sup> He was an acquaintance of both Konoval's and Onats'kyi. He published a couple works on Ukrainian topics.<sup>56</sup> Likewise he also assisted Onats'kyi in the publication and distribution of some of his Italian-language material.<sup>57</sup>

That Mussolini had encouraged Insabato to work with Eastern European nationalist movements revealed that the state of knowledge about Ukraine was low enough in Italy that an expert on the Middle East was considered close enough. It also demonstrated that Italy's primary interests in the Black Sea region revolved more around Caucasian oil—accessible through imagined conquests of British and French colonies in the region, closer to a Middle Eastern scholar's area of expertise.<sup>58</sup> Nonetheless he seems to have worked diligently in promoting the OUN's case and writing positively about Ukraine, all things considered.

As a member of the Italian Parliament, Insabato's influence was an asset in acquiring state approval to form a Ukrainian Cultural Club, for which approval by the Undersecretariat of the Interior was sought. As a result of the Fascist regime's authoritarian internal security apparatus, the establishment of such a club could well be a matter of police concern. Insabato, as an MP, held the influence to help secure a positive response from the Government.

---

<sup>55</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Enrico Insabato, 20 October 1919, IHRCA, Box 11, Insabato, Enrico, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>56</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 239-241. For a record of meetings between Insabato and Konoval's see: *Ievhen Konoval's ta ioho Doba*. Vydannia Fundatsiï im. Ievhena Konoval'sia. Munich, Germany: Druchgenossenschaft CICERO eGmbH (1974): 727. For biographical details on Insabato's bizarre life see: Giampietro Berti. "Insabato, Enrico." *Dizionario Biografico online degi anarchici Italiani*, San Giuliano Terme, Pisa (2015). And for an account of the type of work Insabato did for the Italian state's colonial projects in North Africa see: Alessandra Marchi. "Italian Pro-Islamic Politics in the Writings of Enrico Insabato: Between Libya and Egypt." in *Images of Colonialism and Decolonisation in the Italian Media*. Edited by Bertella Farnetti, Dau Novelli. Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Press (2017).

<sup>57</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Enrico Insabato, 23 September 1938, IHRCA, Box 11, Insabato, Enrico, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>58</sup> Volodymyr Kovalchuk. "Ukraiins'ke Pytannia u Lystuvanni Chleniv OUN z Italiis'kymy Derzhavnymy Diiachamy u 1930-kh Rokakh." Kyiv, Ukraine: *Ukraiins'kyi Arkheohrafichnyi Shchorichnyk* no.13/14 (2009): 357-359.

In connection with your interest in favor of the Ukrainian Culture Club, I inform you that indeed, through its President, the Ministry has been notified of the establishment of the aforementioned club and the request for permission for its operation.

Said club is not to be considered an association of international character; therefore, ministerial authorization is not necessary in this regard.

However, the local Police Headquarters was informed of the notification received.

Moreover, the Ministry will not fail to keep in mind [your] favorable view and earnest concern for this club.<sup>59</sup>

That Insabato was motivated to wield his influence in favor of the Nationalists is not surprising, that same year Konovalets' approved giving him a 100 lire monthly subsidy—considering the OUN's financial difficulties and the ongoing Depression, this was a significant financial commitment. Onats'kyi believed that Insabato was really only interested in Ukrainian matters for personal profit, and wrote to Konovalets' to tell him as much.<sup>60</sup> In 1937 Insabato penned one of several publications advocating for Italian support for the Ukrainians in which pointed to economic and strategic factors, playing off of Italy's Mediterranean ambitions.

Italy, as a Mediterranean nation, cannot but recognize the enormous economic importance of the Black Sea, through which Italy, like the medieval maritime Italian republics of old, spreads its economic and spiritual influence among the coastal nations,

---

<sup>59</sup> Unknown to Enrico Insabato, 24 September 1933, IHRCA, Box 11, Insabato, Enrico, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>60</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi. *U Vichnomu Misti: Zapysky Ukrainiis'koho Zhurnalista 1933 rik*. Vol 3. Toronto, Canada: Novyi Shliakh (1985): 325. In: Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 240.

that is, in Ukraine, the North Caucasus and Georgia, which are on the routes to the heart of Asia... Therefore, it is in Italy's interest that the Black Sea shores should be inhabited by free and friendly nations - Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, the Kuban, the North Caucasus, Georgia, and Turkey.<sup>61</sup>

Insabato was not the only important Italian with whom Onats'kyi had personal contact. Another contact was Riccoboni Giovanni who was likely an unofficial go-between for the Nationalists in Prague (where he served as the Italian legation's press officer) and Rome. Gibiec uncovered information from the Polish Legation in Prague which suggested that Giovanni had let the editor of the *Ukrainian Bulletin* know that Mussolini was interested in Ukraine, sympathetic with the Nationalist movement, and had asked whether Ukrainian émigrés would be capable or organizing their own armed forces and how they could be deployed to Europe.<sup>62</sup> Presumably this manpower would come from North America's large Ukrainian diaspora. There, the OUN affiliate ODVU competed with the Agrarian-Monarchist United Hetman Organization (SHD). The SHD had formed a Ukrainian "Liberation Army," which had at least one separate Ukrainian company within the Illinois National Guard and formed a Ukrainian "Air Corps," acquiring three aircraft. Not to be outdone the ODVU likewise moved to acquire aircraft for training and fundraising purposes. The smaller ODVU alone had recruited some 10,000 members and as the monarchist movement began to fracture and decline in the 1930s its influence only grew.<sup>63</sup>

---

<sup>61</sup> V.B. Pekhiv. "Italiis'kyi Vektor Zovnishn'oi Polityky OUN." *Derzhava ta Armiia*. L'viv, Ukraine: L'viv National Polytechnic University (2008): 139.

<sup>62</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 240.

<sup>63</sup> See: "Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 3, (1993). And "United Hetman Organization." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 5 (1995). The aircraft were used in fundraising activities by offering rides at local fairs which also served to advertise the Ukrainian cause. The activities of both organizations are noted in the archives of Soviet intelligence services, many documents relating to them are now held by the Ukrainian SBU.



Onats'kyi's contacts in the interconnected world of Fascist government, journalism, and academia included figures like Francesco Coppola, founder of the pre-war predecessor of Mussolini's PNF, the blue-shirted Italian Nationalist Association (ANI); Italian ambassador to Germany, Dino Alfieri; journalist, MP, and veteran of the March on Rome, Giuseppe Bottai; journalist, MP, and Secretary of Fascist youth Asvero Gravelli; and military men like General Alberto Ademollo. It is not necessary to track the relationships between Onats'kyi and each of his Italian acquaintances since they tend to follow the same general trends, including often the gifting of literature on some Ukrainian topic.

### **Ukrainian Activism in the League of Nations**

Two of Onats'kyi's most significant achievements in the realm of international diplomacy are related to Italian activities in the League of Nations. The League was an important avenue for Ukrainian activism because Poland's control of Eastern Galicia and its treatment of the Ukrainian minority should have been, from the Ukrainian point of view, regulated by treaties which Warsaw had signed with the League and in accordance with decisions made near the end of the Peace Conference in 1923 which awarded the regions to Poland on condition of autonomy. Further Poland had been a signatory to the Minorities Treaty (although it would renounce it in 1934) which the Ukrainians alleged the Poles had failed to follow through on.

In 1930 Józef Piłsudski, now dictator of Poland, initiated a "Pacification Campaign," in response to the UVO's violent activities. The Polish army was sent in to Ukrainian areas to search for weapons, anti-Polish propaganda, and arrest nationalist activists or UVO members. Over the course of the operation some 300 firearms would be confiscated and about 1,000 people

arrested from the 21st of September to the 16th of October 1930. Both prominent UNDO and UVO leaders were arrested, including five Ukrainian MPs. Abroad both the UNDO and OUN engaged in a diplomatic and press campaign to draw global attention to the repressive actions of the Polish state. The League of Nations decided not to sanction Poland on the basis that the campaign was justified by OUN violence, which caused further internal divisions among Ukrainian activists over methodology.

While many countries expressed concern with the situation, the Italians were one of the most critical of the Powers. Massimo Pilotti, Italy's representative to the League, was one of Onats'kyi's contacts. In 1931 Mussolini himself gave a speech to the League admonishing Poland for failing to live up to its legal obligations with respect to Ukrainian autonomy.<sup>64</sup> The next year the Grand Council of Fascism also took up the issue and Onats'kyi forwarded a letter of thanks to "[his] Excellency Mussolini" on behalf of the "Ukrainian residents of Rome... applauding and expressing their profound and heartfelt gratitude."<sup>65</sup> This high profile recognition of the Ukrainian position was hard to come by in the 1930s, especially from a Great Power. This high-profile recognition of the Ukrainian position was a noteworthy diplomatic coup and elicited concern within the Polish government and intelligence services, which carefully monitored Ukrainian-Italian ties, including Onats'kyi and his contacts in the Italian diplomatic service.<sup>66</sup>

The League was a very significant avenue for Ukrainian activism, even for rivals of the OUN, whom Onats'kyi remained happy to work with for the first few years of the 1930s. Within the OUN Onats'kyi was somewhat controversial because he continued to write for non-

---

<sup>64</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 241.

<sup>65</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Benito Mussolini, 11 April 1932, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>66</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 237-242.

Nationalist journals and newspapers. It was only after Konovalets' authorized a \$10 monthly subsidy for Onats'kyi, that he able to focus on writing for pro-OUN journals.<sup>67</sup> According to Konovalets' himself, the person who brought the most attention to the plight of the Ukrainians was Galician feminist and nationalist Milena Rudnyts'ka. Known as one of the most exciting orators in the Sejm, she led the Union of [Ukrainian] Women (SU) which had at its peak some 60,000 members. Five of its 13 executives were affiliated with the OUN, and while Rudnyts'ka disapproved of the OUN's violent tactics, she had her admirers in the OUN's old guard in-exile who also disapproved of the Homeland Executive's Actions but had little control over them.

Onats'kyi was able to bring Rudnyts'ka to Italy to meet with Mussolini personally in February of 1933, this was followed up by passing on a letter from a group of Ukrainian representatives in the Polish Sejm to Mussolini reemphasizing their arguments on Poland's failure to meet its legal obligations. The meeting was a prestigious accomplishment, but did not yield further results. The "Ukrainian Representation" in the Sejm was a caucus dominated by the UNDO.

[T]he sovereignty of the Polish state over ... Eastern Galicia, was recognized under the explicit condition that [Poland] organize an autonomous regime in that territory. The concerning clause ... is as follows: "Considering that it is recognized of Poland that, as far as concerns the Eastern part of Galicia, the ethnographic conditions necessitate an autonomous regime."

---

<sup>67</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 241.

We must assert that the aforementioned decision was made against the will, and without the participation of, the representatives of the Ukrainian people ... [and] absolutely contradicts the right of peoples to self-determination ...

[W]e believe it is our duty to state before Your Excellency that Poland has not fulfilled its international obligations regarding Eastern Galicia ... this is the same Poland which fiercely defends the inviolability of the peace treaties and today's political order based on the Versailles system. ...

Since under that aforementioned international act ... there is also the signature of the Representative of the Italian State ... we take the liberty of addressing Your Excellency with a kind request to declare before the Forum and in whatever form you deem appropriate that:

I) Poland has violated its international commitments to international institutions regarding Eastern Galicia.

II) The sovereignty of Poland over Eastern Galicia, from the point of view of international law, becomes dubious, because the implementation of an autonomous status in the aforementioned territory conditioned the granting of the same country to Poland.<sup>68</sup>

This 1933 letter placed the Ukrainian movement's democratic elements within the revisionist camp, opposed to the post-1919 European order. At this point, a few months before Hitler came to power, Italy was unambiguously the most openly revisionist anti-communist Power and therefore the natural place for the Ukrainians to appeal to. Germany was not a

---

<sup>68</sup> Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation to Benito Mussolini, 15 March 1933, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

member of the League of Nations in any case, and its diplomatic protestations were unlikely to arouse anything but anger in Warsaw and suspicion in Paris and London. However, as the situation for Ukrainians in Poland continued to worsen and dissident right-wing members of the UNDO split to form the FNİe, the party's leadership decided on a policy of "normalization" with the Polish government.<sup>69</sup> The results were politically disastrous for the democratic camp, which splintered, driving away firebrands like Rudnyts'ka with a great deal of name recognition. After "normalization," Onats'kyi had far fewer contacts with anyone associated with the UNDO.

Even before "normalization," the OUN did not allow the UNDO to monopolize the voice of Ukrainian national grievances, the next year Onats'kyi would forward another letter from Konovalts' to Mussolini following similar lines of argumentation. This was preceded by Poland and Germany signing a non-aggression pact in January 1934, to the OUN's great consternation. Weimar Germany had been sympathetic to the OUN as a counter-weight to both the USSR and Poland, having paid the UVO for intelligence work. The new Nazi regime's positive relations with Poland made things increasingly difficult for the OUN, although they remained in contact with German intelligence services.

In the era of 1919-1920 ... few people in Europe recognized [Ukraine] ... One of these rare clairvoyants was the editor-in-chief of "Il Popolo d'Italia" [Mussolini] who, on September 6th 1919, wrote in his journal: "Ukraine is fighting not only for itself, but also for Europe."

---

<sup>69</sup> Andrzej Zięba. "Normalization." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. An agreement was signed by the UNDO and members of the Sanacja government which was widely viewed as an unpopular capitulation and enhanced the popularity of the OUN. This distanced the UNDO from nationalism and towards autonomism.

Subsequent events confirmed this observation. However, these events have not been favorable to Ukraine ... Europe is transforming itself and taking the direction inspired by the Fascist revolution. A new order is being established little by little.

Political Europe is starting to see more clearly and more justly. Thus, in the Eastern question, it is beginning to discern reality and to come to terms with the idea that you expressed about Ukraine fifteen years ago. The builders of the new Europe have to reckon with the new reality in this country which is reforming under the sign of Nationalism. It is as a representative of this moral and political force that we, the Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists, believe it is our duty to raise the problem of Ukraine in all its scope before Europe. And it is to you, the architect of the new order in Europe, that we address this appeal.

... we are very certain that Fascist Italy cannot have a surer and more useful ally in the East than Ukrainian Nationalism. Under these conditions, collaboration between Italian Fascists and Ukrainian Nationalists seems inevitable to us. We take the respectful liberty of submitting to you herewith concrete proposals regarding this collaboration.<sup>70</sup>

Unfortunately, the “concrete proposals” are not preserved in the Papers. The most significant example of OUN-Italian cooperation is unfortunately poorly documented, but according to a variety of contemporary historians, OUN/UVO operatives trained in Italy at secret camps alongside Croatian Ustasha members.<sup>71</sup> Some of those trainees would go on to help bring

---

<sup>70</sup> Ievhen Konoval's' to Benito Mussolini, 8<sup>th</sup> October 1934, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>71</sup> Magdalena Gibiec. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024): 253. And Volodymyr Kovalchuk. Orhanizatsiia “Ukraiins'kykh Natsionalistiv ta Ustashev'ka Khorvats'ka Revoliutsiina Orhanizatsiia: Sproba Porivnial'noho Analizu.” Kyiv, Ukraine: Zhurnal Voienna Istorii, no. 6, vol. 54 (2010).

the OUN to China, settling in the Ukrainian community in Harbin.<sup>72</sup> Consistent with the writings of Insabato and Onats'kyi, Konovalets' letter firmly draws a line in the land between the pro-Versailles order and anti-Versailles order, throwing himself on Mussolini's side, flatteringly calling him "the architect of the new order in Europe."

Ukrainian Nationalism was necessarily revisionist, as was Italian Fascism. Both countries felt they had been promised something by the post-war European order's chief architects, Italy had been denied territories and influence in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Turkey, while promises of self-determination had seen nearly all other European nations acquire independent states, except for Ukraine. Their appeal was predicated on a promise to revise those grievances. While the international revisionism shared by the Nationalists and Fascists should, then, be categorized as a case of organic convergent evolution, that leaves open the question of domestic aspects of Fascism which could have or did influence the OUN and how those internal issues were connected with international ones.

The Italian state would also benefit from Onats'kyi's work, in 1941 one of Onats'kyi's former students at the Oriental Institute in Naples, Dr. Nicolino Farina, "volunteered for the anti-Bolshevik front, trying to contribute to our cause." He served in the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (CSIR) and was killed "with weapon in hand on the field of glory during a fierce winter storm," on January 21, 1943. He was 27 years old and engaged to be married at the time of his death. His Ukrainian obituary noted that he "spoke Ukrainian almost without any foreign accent" and "completely understood Ukrainian national ideals and sincerely embraced them." He died before the planned publication of two of his translations, one of "Intermezzo" by Mykhailo

---

<sup>72</sup> Ivan Svit. *Ukraiins'ko-Iapons'ki Vzaiemyny 1903-1945*. New York, New York: Ukraiins'ke Istorychne Tovyarystvo (1972): 78-344.

Kots'iubins'kyi and "Partyzany" by Antin Krezub (nome de plume of Osyp Dumin). If those works were eventually published, this author has found no evidence of it.

### **The Czechoslovakian Crisis and the OUN's relationship with Hungary**

Between the extinguishing of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1921 and the restoration of Ukrainian statehood in 1991, an independent Ukrainian state existed for a single day in 1939. At that moment when the map of Europe was being changed it would seem that Ukraine and Ukrainian matters occupied the attention of the whole world. This would-be Ukrainian state existed in the small province of Carpatho-Ukraine, now Ukraine's Transcarpathia Oblast, a part of Czechoslovakia from 1918 until that state's dissolution. Italy would serve as the international mediator over the Munich Conference and First Vienna Award which revised Czechoslovakia's border and internal structures. At first this was in favor of the Ukrainians and allowed for the creation of a Ukrainian autonomy, albeit at the cost of territorial concessions to Hungary. Onats'kyi was a critical link in the OUN's activism and diplomacy in favor of Carpatho-Ukraine, as the point through which the PUN communicated with Mussolini and Ciano, the two mediators who they believed would decide the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine. This crisis would pull the OUN and even other Ukrainian political factions to throw themselves towards Germany and Italy—to an unsatisfactory result.

As stated before, Ukrainian Nationalists had tried to align themselves with Italy by marketing themselves as the main revisionist force in Eastern Europe, but by 1938 the most significant revisionist power was Nazi Germany. Having already annexed Austria, only possible thanks to Mussolini's acquiescence, Hitler's ambitions turned to the Czechoslovakia's



Sudetenland region, which contained a German majority. Hungary, Europe's third revisionist entity, had long been hostile to Czechoslovakia since all of Slovakia and Transcarpathia had been part of the Kingdom of Hungary until 1918. Poland too had territorial claims against Czechoslovakia.<sup>73</sup> By 1938 Czechoslovakia was Continental Europe's only democracy outside of Scandinavia, France, Switzerland, and the Low Countries and it faced not only three external threats, but two internal ones as well in the forms of Ukrainian and Slovak nationalism.

Transcarpathia's population was mostly Ukrainian, with significant Hungarian minorities in the south west of the province, some small Jewish, German, Slovak, and Czech minorities were also present. The Ukrainian population there was divided more so than other parts of the country between competing national alignments, Ukrainophile, Russophile, and Magaryophile—the latter two were financially supported by Budapest. Like in neighboring Galicia, the initial promises of autonomy were not followed through and the territory was directly governed from Prague. The OUN's activities in the territory were initially violent, but an attempt to import UVO style terror ended in 1930 almost as quickly as it began after a botched attempt on a local Russophile ended in several arrests. After that the OUN focused on propaganda and educational work, not wanting to sour relations with Czechoslovakia.<sup>74</sup>

When it seemed like Germany might invade and skirmishing broke out on the border, Mussolini offered himself as a mediator to peacefully resolve the situation.<sup>75</sup> Daladier and

---

<sup>73</sup> Poland had fought a war against Czechoslovakia in 1919 over the Silesian border region of the Trans-Olza that had ended in a Czechoslovak victory and their control of the small but important border region. The territory contained a significant population of ethnic Poles, as well as crucial rail junctions and natural resources, especially coal. Poland also desired certain strategic mountain passes in northern Slovakia. See: Felix Button. "The Polish-Czechoslovak Conflict over Teschen Silesia (1918—1920): A Case Study." *Perspectives*, no. 25 (2005): 63–78. And Anna M. Cienciala. "The Foreign Policy of Józef Piłsudski and Józef Beck, 1926-1939: Misconceptions and Interpretations." *The Polish Review* 56, no. 1/2 (2011): 139.

<sup>74</sup> Oleksandr Pahiriia, Mykola Posivnych. "Voienno-Politychna Diial'nist' OUN u Zakarpatti (1929-1939)." *Ukraiins'kyi Vyzvol'nyi Rukh, Istoriia UVO ta OUN 1920-1939 Rokakh*, L'viv, Ukraine (2009): 45-56.

<sup>75</sup> Czechoslovakia was a member of an alliance with Romania and Yugoslavia, underwritten by France, known as the Little Entente. Open war, especially if Hungary intervened, could well have started a general European conflagration, which France and United Kingdom were not ready for, and therefore they were eager to compromise.

Neville Chamberlain, French and British Prime Ministers respectively, would attend the conference, hoping to avoid war with Germany. No Czechoslovak representative would be present, let alone a Ukrainian one. The OUN wanted to affect a solution which would strike a balance between weakening centralized Czechoslovakia to allow for Ukrainian autonomy, but not so weak as to allow Hungary and Poland to partition Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. To do this, the OUN and local Ukrainian leaders both engaged in public relations and private lobbying campaigns to influence both global opinion and world leaders. Onats'kyi would necessarily play a central role in this effort thanks to his Italian diplomatic contacts.

The Ukrainians had tried to find some accommodation with the Hungarians in the preceding decades. The issue had been discussed at the foundational Congress of the OUN. Hungary was the most revisionist state on the continent and did not control any territory the OUN desired, however the overlapping claims and Hungary's subsidies to Magyarophilic and Russophilic factions in Transcarpathia—fierce rivals to the Ukrainophilic parties—remained a barrier. Onats'kyi met with various Hungarian figures in the 1920s and early 1930s to discuss cooperation against Czechoslovakia or setting up an OUN office in Budapest. The Hungarians had longstanding lobbying allies in Rome, as well as the resources one would expect of an actual independent state, funding sympathetic newspapers and complex lobbying operations all over Europe. They felt themselves the most aggrieved revisionist entity and tried to build up support for border alternations in Italy and the United Kingdom. The OUN hoped that cooperation would prevent them from becoming reliant on Prague and potentially frighten the Czechoslovak government into giving the OUN more support.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>76</sup> Marek Wojnar. "A Minor Ally or a Minor Enemy? The Hungarian Issue in the Political Thought and Activity of Ukrainian Integral Nationalists (until 1941)." *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 53, no.3 (2018): 171-176.

At first the Hungarians seemed happy to advocate for increased autonomy in the province, however, they subsidized Magyarophiles and Russophiles hostile to even admitting there was such a thing as a Ukrainian nation.<sup>77</sup> Poland was another major barrier, as it enjoyed an unofficial alliance with Hungary. In 1938 both countries would cooperate in waging a covert campaign of infiltration, terrorism, and sabotage in Transcarpathia designed to allow Hungary to annex the province. Poland's own interest in the region was specifically centered on preventing increased Ukrainian activism which might influence Ukrainians in Poland.<sup>78</sup> By 1938 the OUN had given up on ambitions to cooperate with Hungary and viewed them correctly as a threat. Onats'kyi's negative reports to the PUN convinced it that this effort was without potential.<sup>79</sup>

### **Onats'kyi and Ciano**

The negotiations over Czechoslovakia took two stages, the first were presided over by Mussolini, and the second by his Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano. Despite being formed ostensibly to resolve the territorial dispute between Germany and Czechoslovakia, the resulting Diktat would also sharply affect the internal structure of the country. Onats'kyi took to writing Ciano, Mussolini, and others in the Italian government as well as furiously publishing articles and

---

<sup>77</sup> Marek Wojnar. "A Minor Ally or a Minor Enemy? The Hungarian Issue in the Political Thought and Activity of Ukrainian Integral Nationalists (until 1941)." *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 53, no.3 (2018): 175-182.

<sup>78</sup> Vincent Shandor. *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Legal History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (1997): 71-75. And Józef Kasperek. "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia." *East European Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 3 (1989). Hungary's relations with Poland were so good that, despite being an ally of Germany, it would not participate in the War against Poland nor allow German troops to attack Poland from its territory.

<sup>79</sup> Marek Wojnar. "A Minor Ally or a Minor Enemy? The Hungarian Issue in the Political Thought and Activity of Ukrainian Integral Nationalists (until 1941)." *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 53, no.3 (2018): 186-192.

rebuttals to negative pieces about the OUN in the Italian press. He outlined the Nationalist position in a letter to Ciano quoted below:

On behalf of the “Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists” (OUN) and particularly also the “Ukrainian National Defense” (UNO) of Subcarpathian Ukraine, I have the honor to extend to you the profound and heartfelt gratitude of all the Ukrainian people for your brave and profoundly humanitarian work on the nationality problem in Czechoslovakia.

... [Transcarpathia] was ceded to Czechoslovakia in the treaty of St. Germain on the explicit condition that it be granted complete national autonomy.

But, despite the passing of 20 years, the Czechoslovak government has not only failed to permit a semblance of autonomy... [it also creates] enmity between two peoples who are natural friends [Slovaks and Ukrainians].

Thanks to your powerful clarifying stance, the injustice perpetrated should be repaired and every nationality should have its right to self-determination.

For us Ukrainian Nationalists, who fight with all of our strength for the creation of a united independent Great Ukraine, which can and should have a very important role in the equilibrium of forces in Eastern Europe and in the Black Sea Basin, the problem of Subcarpathian Ukraine gains capital importance since it would bring about a Ukrainian Piedmont.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>80</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Benito Mussolini, 9 September 1938, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

In Transcarpathia the sole significant pro-Ukrainian party was Avhustyn Voloshyn's Catholic-Conservative KhNP. There was significant ideological distance between them and the Nationalists, but circumstances necessarily drove them together. While the KhNP controlled the government, OUN members and sympathizers quickly dominated the UNO eventually renamed to the Carpathian Sich—intended to be the foundation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Army.

In this moment, Onats'kyi took up an essentially impossible task, putting on a “one man show” to influence Italian mediation towards the Ukrainians and away from Budapest. Onats'kyi also forwarded a book in German, “Karpatenukraine,” to the Italian Foreign Ministry.<sup>81</sup> When Italian newspapers, *Piccolo di Roma* and *Corriere dell Sera*, criticized the OUN, Onats'kyi mailed them his “corrections,” and forwarded his letters of complaint again to Mussolini, asking that some “authoritative intervention” be made to ensure their publication.<sup>82</sup> Another short note, posted the following month, notified Mussolini of a protest organized by the Ukrainian student Hromada in Rome, which “invok[ed] the [name of] the Duce, [for] the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people of [Carpatho-Ukraine].”<sup>83</sup>

In the aftermath of the Munich Conference, which granted the Sudetenland to Germany, the new Czechoslovak Prime Minister, General Jan Syrový, granted Slovakia and “Subcarpathian Ruthenia,” autonomous self-government. Hungary had hoped to use Russophilic sentiment to undermine Ukrainian nationalism in the territory, but when evidence of Hungarian bribes to anti-Ukrainian politicians was revealed, the Prague government ordered the arrests of both leaders, leaving the Ukrainophiles that last faction standing. Monsignor Avhustyn Voloshyn

---

<sup>81</sup> Unknown to Ievhen Onats'kyi, undated, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>82</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Benito Mussolini, 1 September 1938, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>83</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Benito Mussolini, 8 October 1938, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

became Prime Minister of the autonomous province, immediately changing the name to Carpatho-Ukraine.<sup>84</sup>

Following the Munich Diktat, Hungary now demanded territorial satisfaction comparable to what Germany had received in the Sudetenland. The Vienna Arbitration, overseen by Galeazzo Ciano, would grant to Hungary the towns of Mukachevo, Uzhhorod, Chop, and Berehove to Hungary—four of Carpatho-Ukraine’s five most populous towns. The small city of Khust was the only one that remained outside of Hungary, it became Carpatho-Ukraine’s new capital. Likewise, Slovakia was forced to make painful concessions as well, losing that country’s second most populous city of Košice. Hungary continued making military incursions into both countries. The loss of the only rail connection to the west, most of the province’s industry, and the more defensible original southern border were painful losses for Carpatho-Ukraine. Even if that state would only consist of one of the least developed portions of Ukrainian ethnographic territory, it was better than anything the nationalist movements had achieved in the past two decades.

The OUN and Voloshyn government now relied on Germany, it was only their influence which kept Hungary from attacking. In the case of a German-Polish conflict, Carpatho-Ukraine and the Nationalists would be well positioned to aid and in-return receive Galicia and Volhynia, which would produce a far more viable Ukrainian state. Kolodzins’kyi would author a short brochure entitled “The Military Significance and Strategic Position of Transcarpathia,” which was soon translated into German with the aim of influencing Nazi leadership. It claimed that the only force capable of organizing the region was “Ukrainian Nationalism,” that it would be only force capable of resisting Prague, Budapest, Moscow, and Warsaw, and further that the area held

---

<sup>84</sup> Vincent Shandor. *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Legal History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (1997): 68-84.

important strategic military value.<sup>85</sup> After the Vienna Arbitration which had taken so much from Carpatho-Ukraine, Onats'kyi sent a telegram of thanks to Ciano in Vienna, which gave him credit for having “saved the Ukrainian State” and thanked him for his “impartial work,” despite the territorial sacrifices.<sup>86</sup> The reality was quite different, it was Ciano who had pushed the Hungarian position, convincing German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, to accede to the harsh losses for Carpatho-Ukraine.<sup>87</sup>

The Carpatho-Ukrainian state, as an autonomous province would exist from the 30th of December 1938 to the 15th of March 1939. In Khust a number of countries began to set up consulates, there was a plan to install Insabato as Italian consul according to historians Oleksandr Pahiriia and Mykola Posivnych, a Japanese delegation also visited the territory from Berlin to gather information. Onats'kyi had spent several months writing to the Japanese Army's attaché in Rome, Lt. Col Seizo Arisue, while Iaryi established a contact with Japan's Berlin attaché, Colonel Hiroshi Oshima.<sup>88</sup> While the OUN had higher hopes of cooperation with Japan, as an anti-Soviet power, this work was not entirely wasted in Europe, since Oshima would intervene with Ribbentrop to request the Hungarians release Sich PoWs, although none of the sources mention if the Hungarians followed through with the request.<sup>89</sup> A secretary from Japan's

---

<sup>85</sup> Marek Wojnar. “A Minor Ally or a Minor Enemy? The Hungarian Issue in the Political Thought and Activity of Ukrainian Integral Nationalists (until 1941).” *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 53, no.3 (2018): 179-182. This point is true, when the USSR attempted to send troops to garrison Czechoslovakia against Germany, it asked Romania to allow the Red Army through its territory which would have necessitated going through Transcarpathia to reach Bohemia and the German border.

<sup>86</sup> Ievhen Onats'kyi to Benito Mussolini, undated, IHRCA, Box 6, Ciano, Count Galeazzo, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

<sup>87</sup> Vincent Shandor. *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Legal History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (1997): 50.

<sup>88</sup> Oleksandr Pahiriia, Mykola Posivnych. “Voienno-Politychna Diial'nist' OUN u Zakarpatti (1929-1939).” *Ukraiins'kyi Vyzvol'nyi Rukh, Istoriiia UVO ta OUN 1920-1939 Rokakh*, L'viv, Ukraine (2009): 60-81.

<sup>89</sup> Oleksandr Pahiriia, Mykola Posivnych. “Voienno-Politychna Diial'nist' OUN u Zakarpatti (1929-1939).” *Ukraiins'kyi Vyzvol'nyi Rukh, Istoriiia UVO ta OUN 1920-1939 Rokakh*, L'viv, Ukraine (2009): 72-80.

embassy in Moscow also visited later, with the intention of negotiating the installation of a Japanese Consulate in Khust.<sup>90</sup>

The end for Carpatho-Ukraine came following the German invasion of the rump Czechia, both Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine would be invaded by Hungary. Slovakia lost a slice of its eastern territory along the border with Transcarpathia (which not incidentally included a significant Ukrainian-Rusyn minority). However, the day Carpatho-Ukraine declared independence on March 15th 1939, the Hungarians crossed the border, engaging in combat with the paramilitary Carpathian Sich and remnants of the Czechoslovakian army, conquering the territory in a day. The government remained in Khust only long enough to declare independence and sign into a law a constitution delineating its national flag, anthem, and language, before Msgr. Voloshyn fled across the border to Romania. Nationalists and Sich members decided—contrary to the advice of Iaryi—to suicidally fight against the numerically and technically superior Hungarian forces. A brief insurgency followed but was quickly stamped out.<sup>91</sup>

This, along with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact would, as discussed above, temporarily tarnish OUN-German relations. At this point, Italy was clearly in an alliance with Germany and had little interest in Eastern European affairs. The OUN, now in the chaos of an internal split, had little they could do to affect the situation. Onats'kyi continued his journalistic and academic work. When Germany invaded the USSR and Italian forces joined their Nazi allies, Onats'kyi would help forward numerous complaints and petitions to Mussolini, Ciano, Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg, and others.<sup>92</sup> Unsurprisingly these petitions had no effect on the German occupation,

---

<sup>90</sup> Vincent Shandor. *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Legal History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (1997): 87.

<sup>91</sup> Oleksandr Pahiriia, Mykola Posivnych. “Voienno-Politychna Diial'nist' OUN u Zakarpatti (1929-1939).” *Ukraiins'kyi Vyzvol'nyi Rukh, Istoriia UVO ta OUN 1920-1939 Rokakh*, L'viv, Ukraine (2009): 81-88.

<sup>92</sup> Andrii Melnyk to Adolf Hitler, no date, IHRCA, Box 37, Melnyk, Andrii, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. And Andrii Melnyk to Benito Mussolini, 12 August 1941, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. Ievhen Onats'kyi to Benito



but they helped get Onats'kyi arrested by the Gestapo in 1943 as he had known anti-German positions. He was eventually released, although at the time believed he would be shot.<sup>93</sup>

## Conclusion

In conclusion, the career of Onats'kyi illuminates the intricate dynamics through which the OUN navigated its transnational existence, grappling with the complexities of ideological commitment and pragmatic needs for alliance and support. Onats'kyi and his fellow Nationalists adapted their strategies to work in their host countries, but ultimately failed to outcompete the conflicting interests of rival powers who had a state of their own. Their weak position meant that Germany and Italy could repeatedly deny the Ukrainians what they wanted, but leave them no other alternative between them and the USSR. The OUN was unable to pivot away due not only to circumstance, but the fact that its ideological adaptability had its limits and as an Integral Nationalist organization, it could not work with Communists and rarely had the same interests as the democratic powers (until the start of the Cold War).

This adaptive approach was necessary to strike a balance to preserve the OUN's ideological independence, however, this effort too failed. It became impossible to balance the considerations of foreign powers, the radical base, the moderate émigrés, and appeal to broader Ukrainian society. Despite their efforts to present a uniquely autochthonous Ukrainian Nationalist ideology, philosophical disagreements inspired most especially by the rise of Nazi Germany pulled the Organization apart. The organization's engagement in both violent

---

Mussolini, 18 May 1942, IHRCA, Box 39, Mussolini, Benito, Yevhen Onatsky Papers, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN

<sup>93</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015): 113.

resistance and diplomatic activism reflected a dual strategy aimed at asserting Ukrainian interests on the international stage, yet ultimately, internal divisions and external pressures limited its effectiveness in shaping the European order as envisioned in its geopolitical theories. Onats'kyi's career and correspondence reflect a significant node in the OUN's diplomatic efforts, but despite his hard work, he had a front row seat to the Nationalist movement's great failure in Carpatho-Ukraine, driven by Italy's ally, Hungary. He likewise pushed against the growing radicalization of the Organization, and remained in the moderate faction after the split—which was far less popular and influential than its radical rival. Ultimately the OUN had limited agency, was too reliant on foreign powers and beset by internal division. Onats'kyi continued to work for the OUN-M until his death in 1979.

## Bibliography

Armstrong, John A. "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe." *The Journal of Modern History* 40, no. 3 (1968): 396–410.

Avramenko, Vasile, director. *The Tragedy of Carpatho-Ukraine*. Avramenko Film Company. Kobzar Film Company. Kalyna Film Company. (1940)

Berti, Giampietro. "Insabato, Enrico." *Dizionario Biografico online degli anarchici Italiani*, San Giuliano Terme, Pisa (2015).

Bran, Ionuț. "The Ukrainian Movement in Bukovina: The Ukrainian National Party." *Codrul Cosminului* 18, no.2 (2012): 249–260.

Button, Felix. "The Polish-Czechoslovak Conflict over Teschen Silesia (1918—1920): A Case Study." *Perspectives*, no. 25 (2005): 63–78.

Chojnowski, Andrzej. "Pacification." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 3 (1993).

Ciano, Galeazzo Count. *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*. Edited by Malcolm Muggeridge. Translated by Stuart Hood. London, United Kingdom: Odhams Press (1948).

Cienciala, Anna. "The Foreign Policy of Józef Piłsudski and Józef Beck, 1926-1939: Misconceptions and Interpretations." *The Polish Review* 56, no. 1/2 (2011): 111–51.

Demchenko, Tamara. *Zdobuttia Bat'kivshchyny: Zhyttia ta Tvorchist' Ievhena Onats'koho*. Chernihiv, Ukraine: T.H. Shevchenko National University Chernihiv (2016).

Erlacher, Trevor. *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Age of Extremes*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (2021).

Gibiec, Magdalena. *Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on Emigration: Its Formation and Transnational Connections in 1929–1934*. New York, New York: Routledge Press (2024).

Ievhen Konoval'skyi ta ioho Doba. *Vydannia Fundatsii im. Ievhena Konoval'sia*. Munich, Germany: Druchgenossenschaft CICERO eGmbH (1974).

Isaievych, Iaroslav. "The International Association of Ukrainian Studies and Its Congresses." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 18, no. 3/4 (1994): 415–17.

Kasperek, Józef. "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia." *East European Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 3 (1989).

Klochurak, Stepan. *Do Voli*. New York, New York: Carpathian Alliance (1978).

Kovalchuk, Volodymyr. "Orhanizatsiia Ukrainiis'kykh Natsionalistiv ta Ustasys'ka Khorvats'ka Revoliutsiina Orhanizatsiia: Sproba Porivnial'noho Analizu." Kyiv, Ukraine: Zhurnal Voienna Istorii, no. 6, vol. 54 (2010).

Kovalchuk, Volodymyr. "Ukraiins'ke Pytannia u Lystuvanni Chleniv OUN z Italiis'kymy Derzhavnymy Diiachamy u 1930-kh Rokakh." Kyiv, Ukraine: Ukrainiis'kyi Arkheohrafichnyi Shchorichnyk no.13/14 (2009): 352-364.

Kucheruk, Oleksandr. Ryko Iaryi – Zahadka OUN. L'viv, Ukraine: Literaturna Ahentsiia Piramida (2005).

Kushnir, Ostap. "Interwar Views on Managing Eastern European Space: Exploring Lypa's Conceptualisation of the Black Sea States Union." *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 4, (2013): 118-136.

Kushnir, Ostap. "Interwar Views on Managing Eastern European Space: Exploring Lypa's Conceptualisation of the Black Sea Union." *The Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 7, no. 4 (2013): 118-136

Lodyn, Pavlo. "Yurii Lypa's Black Sea Doctrine and Intermarium According to Bohdan Osadczuk: Main Ideas and Modern Interpretations." *Trimarium. The History and Literature of Central and Eastern European Countries* 3, no. 3 (2023): 65–82.

Marchi, Alessandra. "Italian Pro-Islamic Politics in the Writings of Enrico Insabato: Between Libya and Egypt." in *Images of Colonialism and Decolonisation in the Italian Media*. Edited by Bertella Farnetti, Dau Novelli. Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Press (2017).

Motyl, Alexander J. *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism 1919-1929*. New York, New York: Columbia University Press (1980).

Onats'kyi, Ievhen. *Italiia i Fashyzm: (1920-1935) Storinky z Ryms'koho Schodenynka*. Zahal'na Biblioteka ch.8. Prague: Ukrainiis'ke Vydavnytstvo "Probiem," (1942).

Onats'kyi, Ievhen. *U Vichnomu Misti: Zapysky Ukrainiis'koho Zhurnalista 1933 rik*. Vol 3. Toronto, Canada: Novyi Shliakh (1985).

Onats'kyi, Ievhen. *Ukraiins'ka Diplomatychna Misiiia v Italiiii*. Zahal'na Biblioteka ch.1. Prague: Ukrainiis'ke Vydavnytstvo "Probiem," (1941).

Onats'kyi, Ievhen. "Lysty z Italiiii. I. Deshcho pro fashyzm." *Rozbudova Natsiii* no.3 (1928).

"Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 3, (1993).

Pahiriia, Oleksandr, Posivnych, Mykola. "Voienno-Politychna Diial'nist' OUN u Zakarpatti (1929-1939)." *Ukraiins'kyi Vyzvol'nyi Rukh, Istoriiia UVO ta OUN 1920-1939 Rokakh*, L'viv, Ukraine (2009): 45-88.

Pekhiv, V.B. "Italiis'kyi Vektor Zovnishn'oi Polityky OUN." *Derzhava ta Armiia*. L'viv, Ukraine: L'viv National Polytechnic University (2008): 136-140.

Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz and Bauerkämper Arnd: *Fascism without Borders. Transnational Connections and Cooperation between Movements and Regimes in Europe 1918 to 1945*. Oxford: Berghahn (2017).

Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz. *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult*. Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem Press (2014).

Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz. "The Fascist Kernel of Ukrainian Genocidal Nationalism," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, No. 2402. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The Center for Russian and East European Studies, (2015).

Sciborsky [sic], Mykola. *Ukraine and Russia*. Translated by Stephen Dawidowycz. New York, New York: Ukrainian Printing and Publishing Co., (1940).

Senkus, Roman. "Mykola Stsiborsky." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 5 (1993).

Shandor, Vincent. *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Legal History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (1997).

Shankovsky, Lev. "Sich Riflemen." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 4 (1993).

Shkandrij, Myroslav. *In the Maelstrom: The Waffen SS "Galicia" Division and its Legacy*. Chicago, Illinois: McGill-Queen's University Press (2023).

Shkandrij, Myroslav. *Ukrainian Nationalism Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2015).

Sodol, Petro. "Mykola Kapustiansky." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2 (1988).

Stasiuk, Oleksandra. *Vydavnychno-Propahandyvna Diial'nist' OUN: 1941-1953*. L'viv, Ukraine: Tsentri Doslidzhen' Vyzvol'noho Rukhu, Instytut Ukrainoznovstvom I. Kryp'iakevycha (2006).

"Stepan Klochurak." *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2 (1988).

Stsibors'kyi, Mykola. *Natsiokratiiia*. Paris, France: (1935). Vinnytsia: Derzhavna Kartohrafichna Fabrika, (2007).

Svit, Ivan. *Ukraiins'ko-Iapons'ki Vzaiemyny 1903-1945*. New York, New York: Ukraiins'ke Istorychne Tovarystvo (1972).

“United Hetman Organization.” *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 5 (1995).

Volynets, Stepan. “Front of National Unity.” *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 (1984).

Wojnar, Marek. “A Minor Ally or a Minor Enemy? The Hungarian Issue in the Political Thought and Activity of Ukrainian Integral Nationalists (until 1941).” *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 53, no.3 (2018): 170-198.

Wynar, Lubomyr. *Ievhan Onats'kyi - Chesnist' z Natsiieiu*. New York, New York: Ukrainian Historical Association (1981).

Yaniv, Volodymyr. “Yevhen Konovalets.” *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2, (1989).

“Yevhen Onatsky.” *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 3, (1993).

Zaitsev, Oleksandr. “Fascism or Ustashism? Ukrainian Integral Nationalism of the 1920s–1930s in Comparative Perspective.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 48, no. 2/3 (2015): 183–93.

Zaitsev, Oleksandr. “Ukraiins'kyi Natsionalizm ta Italiis'kyi Fashyzm (1922-1939).” *Ukraiina Moderna* (2012).

Zięba, Andrzej. “Normalization.” *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*.

Zlepko, Dmytro. “Riko Jary.” *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2 (1988).