@article{TEXTUAL,
      recid = {13021},
      author = {Kashyap, Anil K. and Tsomocos, Dimitrios P. and  Vardoulakis, Alexandros P.},
      title = {Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run  Risk},
      journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
      address = {2024-02-09},
      number = {TEXTUAL},
      abstract = {We modify the 1983 Diamond and Dybvig model so that banks  offer liquidity services to depositors, raise equity  funding, make risky loans, and invest in safe, liquid  assets. Banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay  loans and they are susceptible to depositor runs. We model  the run decision by solving a novel global game. Relative  to a social planner, banks opt for a more deposit-intensive  capital structure, their assets may be more or less lending  intensive, and the level of lending may be higher or lower.  Correcting these three distortions requires a package of  three regulations.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/13021},
}