THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE CITIES THAT IMMIGRANTS BUILT: THE CREATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN

WEST COAST CITIES, 1849-1911

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

BY

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

AUGUST 2024

DEDICATION

To my grandparents.

You helped inspire this work and it was a privilege to share the research with all of you, even if you did not get to see it completed.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I set out to undertake historical research, I imagined myself as a solitary researcher in a large library. I would have never expected the number of advisors, collaborators, supporters, cheerleaders, and people willing to let me trespass on their time and kindness to ensure that I could produce meaningful work.

First, the people who I knew would help me guide this project: Lis, Nicole, and Robert. You have all encouraged me to be creative, push boundaries, and find my voice. Lis, you are the most incredible advisor I could have hoped for. Your patience, kindness, high expectations, and constant detailed feedback have taught me so much and made me fall in love with sociology and historical research. Nicole, I can always trust you to be honest and supportive. I never imagined I would be studying cities until you showed me all the interesting questions they hold for organizations, politics, and the nonprofit world. Robert, you have brought me into your research and utterly changed the course of this dissertation when you pushed me to take a race-based perspective. You have shown me how to combine empirical rigor with a sense of purpose.

I would have easily lost my way if it was not for my many kind-hearted colleagues who could not only be relied on for valuable scholarly feedback, but for also keeping me sane and grounded while in the existential throes of the dissertation process. Most of all my sock friends: Ariel, Anna, and Stephanie. You inspire me with your ability to do amazing research while being such dear friends, always available for a chat, donut, or animal emoji. You are always much more concerned about how my life is going, the recent gossip, and where the closest delicious food is, than the current state of my research. To my greatest mentor, Carrie. You are the person I want to be. I am in this program because of you and made it to the finish line because of all your wisdom and encouragement. To my other collaborators, Samina and Donghyun, who have leaned into the

idea that our "research meetings" are opportunities to hangout and catch up, and maybe we talk about research in the last few minutes. To many of the other people that made this program great: Wan-Zi, Ilana, my whole cohort, and my many friends in the program. We made UChicago a fun and collaborative place to study. I owe a huge thank you to the department staff: Meredith, Linnea, Pat, Esther, and Crystal. You all make this program possible and this department function. None of this would be possible without you.

After the pandemic, when I finally got into the research field, so many people made the research process fun and helped me find what I was looking for. To all my hosts, some of my most avid supporters: Thomas, Sam and Jeff, Mr. and Mrs. Hwang, Mari and Kipp, Erica, Avery and Alex, and all your pets. You made it so easy to go off to the archives and come back to a welcoming home. These acknowledgements would go on for several pages if I listed all the archivists that were essential in this project. I have to deeply thank the staff at the Sacramento Public Library's Sacramento Room, Bancroft Library, Graduate Theological Union Special Collections, UC Berkeley Ethnic Studies Library, Chinese Historical Society of Southern California, Huntington Library, Los Angeles Public Library Special Collections, Loyal Marymount University Special Collections, Seaver Center for Western History Research, City of Portland Archives and Records Center, First Immanuel Lutheran Church, Grieg Lodge Library, Lewis & Clark College Special Collections, Multnomah County Archives, Multnomah County Library, Oregon Historical Society, Oregon State University Special Collections and Archives, Pacific Lutheran University Archives and Special Collections, Portland Chinatown Museum, Portland Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, State Archives of Oregon, State Library of Oregon, University of Oregon Special Collections, Japanese Cultural and Community Center, Museum of History and Industry Collections, National Nordic Museum, Seattle Public Library's

pushed me to describe my research in new ways and articulate why it was important. My parents who have always been excited, optimistic, and overly confident about what I can do. Naomi, you have no idea how much influence you have had as a role model for me. I would not have taken on this research journey, or even considered it as an option, if it was not for you. Chris, I love you so much! You saw this project when it was just an idea, you traveled with me to all these new places, and you gave me love and support in the good times and when I was struggling. The last few years have been so difficult, least of all because of the dissertation. I have made it through because of you.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a longitudinal, comparative, and mixed methods study of the early development of community organizations in the first four metropolitan areas of the West Coast, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle. As the places grew from small towns into large cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the cities developed distinct political, economic, social, and cultural institutions all undergirded by their unique civil societies. The cities were also unique in the U.S. for their populations' diversity across race, religion, and country of origin. As I show, immigrant, racial, and ethnic organizations were prominent among West Coast cities' civil societies and played central roles in the cities' early developments. Further, the number of organizations a community built, which community organizations had power, and what kinds of power they wielded varied across cities and racial and ethnic groups. Race and place played formative roles in the development of civil society and, as a result, in the young cities' developing institutions. I document racism and the development of settler colonial racial scripts in each place as the cities and their communities sought to make sense of their newfound location in the U.S. and global orders. These racial scripts played a central role in not just determining who was White or non-White, but also in creating new and locally contingent understandings of what it meant to be "White," "American," "Chinese," "Catholic," etc. The resulting racism, or lack thereof, further structured community organization growth and development among both Whites and non-Whites. I obtain these results through quantitative and network analyses of novel datasets that I built from city directories and county incorporation documents, and qualitative analysis of archives from government, private, and community collections. In this dissertation I argue that race and place are critical and underappreciated elements in the history of urban civil society, the history of these four cities, and in the political and organizational development of the U.S.

INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation, I show that race and place are foundational structures in the development of civil society in the U.S. This thesis is not just a call for more geographic or racial diversity in research on civil society, nor a call for more nuance. Rather, I aim to show that race and place were two of the strongest forces structuring civil society growth and development on the West Coast in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The peripheral status of race and place in prior histories of civil society is partially due to a focus on New England as the center and birthplace of civil society. I ground this dissertation on the West Coast, specifically on the region's cities. While the West Coast got a late start—most of the territory was not even part of the U.S. when Tocqueville wrote *Democracy in America*—it eventually became home to the densest nonprofit sectors in the country. To explain the outsized abundance of the West Coast's modern-day nonprofit sector, historical narratives must explain either how New England-originated organizational forms became so successful in the West or show that the West had its own history of civil society. I take the latter approach. The relative lack of population density on the West Coast and its diverse, immigrant demography make race and place clear starting points to understand civil society development. This is not to say that these structures did not matter elsewhere. However, the West Coast highlights the blind spots of privileging New England—the birthplace of non-indigenous civil society models in the U.S. That focus has often taken U.S.-born, white, Protestant organizational members and leaders as the implicit focus of civil society history. By developing theories about how race and place mattered to civil society development, I also seek to inform theories of race and urban studies. As a third sector relation between government and the for-profit sector, this study of civil society is also a story of how politics, economics, and collective action interacted to build these immigrant cities.

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In this introduction I write a brief review of the classic narrative of civil society history, expose race as an understudied factor in civil society theory, and describe the known and revealed history of civil society on the West Coast. I end the introduction with a chapter overview.

THE CLASSIC HISTORICAL CIVIL SOCIETY NARRATIVE IN THE U.S.

In Chapter 1, I note that the first civil society organization incorporated in the U.S. was Harvard University. Historians like Peter Dobkin Hall (1984; 1992) have taken Harvard, and later Yale, as the starting point for the history of U.S. civil society. These Protestant, primarily theological schools were modeled on the elite universities of England. The schools educated the elites that would become many of the top lawyers, politicians, and preachers in the growing U.S. They built alumni networks that stretched across the territory of the U.S., which helped formed an organizational basis for the development of a new U.S. culture and consciousness. This was a culture derived from the collective experiences and relationships forged in New Haven and Cambridge. With Boston as the primary economic hub in the pre-Revolutionary U.S., culture, politics, money, and civil society all seemed to flow to and from the Northeast.

The Northeast was also of crucial importance to Tocqueville (2004) for the development of civil society. To him, it was not the elite universities that were critical, but the role of democratic equality. He identified this spirit of equality as being institutionally rooted in the New England, Puritan Town Hall. The Town Hall was a place for public decision making where mostly white men were given an equal voice and expected to participate cooperatively for the betterment of their community. This way of building the U.S. polity, Tocqueville argued, had infused a culture of associationalism and democratic participation in the country. Puritanism and

its organizational forms were institutionally rooted in the Northeast, yet Tocqueville saw its effects in many of the places he visited throughout the young country.

Tocqueville saw the U.S.'s associationalism as exceptional because of its positive effects on democracy. However, formal organizations did not develop in any exceptional numbers in the U.S. until the latter half of the 19th century. This rapid and expansive building of formal organizations was centered on the fraternal society. These societies had vestiges of the equality of the town hall (Skocpol 2003), but rather than serving broad public needs, they were mutual insurance organizations. They promoted democracy with the spirit of their organization—cross-class brotherhoods—but less in the collective action of the organization. These fraternal organizations spread through networks created by the Civil War and from Protestant revivals (Crowley and Skocpol 2001; Schlesinger 1944). They were based on the East Coast, and many, like the Masons and Odd Fellows, had traveled from the United Kingdom to the U.S., and built their national bases in the Northeast.

An implication of this three-stage history is that native-born, white, male Protestants were the prominent actors in developing the foundation for civil society in the U.S. Historians have been careful to often call out the role that other groups, such as women, Catholic parishioners, and Black communities, among others, did develop fraternal societies and branches and were occasionally included in associational efforts. However, prior to the late 19th century their role is often described as supplemental and less foundational to the main narrative. These groups, especially those racialized as non-white throughout the U.S.'s history, have been given less credit for the organizational building they have done through their own community resources and acumen. Particularly, as opposed to applying organizational repertoires developed by the mostly white, male, Protestant communities before them (ex. Prince Hall Masons) (Skocpol and Oser

2004). Communities distant from the ideal white, Protestant mold have rarely been depicted as central agents in creating the foundational building blocks of civil society in the U.S.

The specifics of place have also been absent. Besides Boston being a special town, the historiography emphasizes nation-wide networks, branches, and federations that span the country. The Universities had their alumni networks, Tocqueville sought to describe patterns he was seeing across the U.S., fraternal organizations sought to give a traveler a familiar welcome in any city he found himself in. In this story, a uniform civil society stands for an American exceptionalism lacking in variation across place. If anything, civil society helped flatten place. In almost any town in the U.S. one can still find the handful of familiar looking fraternal halls, with a recognizable insignia, where a member could enter and feel at home.

RACE AND CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY

The assumed prominence of the white, male Protestant in the written history of U.S. civil society contrasts with the ideas of pluralism and liberal theories of civil society. In Dahl's (1981) theory of pluralism, civil society is a crucial part of U.S. democracy. Civil society is a site where people can give voice to their needs, goals, and desires, find common bonds, organize, and bring issues up for policy change. In his over-idealized conception, urban democracy works because civil society is a truly open field of contention, organization, and voice. Some groups should not have greater say over others because of birthplace, religion, race, and gender. Some organizations may have a greater say because they form a larger number of the population, but even minority voices should be expected to form their own organizations and lobby for their own purposes. Dahl is not alone in this conception of civil society. Many theorists admire civil society particularly for its ability to give voice to different perspectives (ex. Habermas 1962; Mill 2015).

In an ideal, pluralist civil society one might not expect minority voices to be heard in eventual public policy. However, one should expect that minorities will organize and create robust debate within civil society. A diverse demography should be a key predictor of civil society size and development. The greater the number of people with different experiences and perspectives should offer a greater variety of opinions about the direction of policy. This then should lead to a denser and more active civil society sector. However, this is not what the common narrative of U.S. civil society suggests. A civil society founded by a uniform, non-diverse community that is not representative of the country should not produce the well-functioning democracy it is purported to have created.

In Chapters 3 and 4 I argue that the experience of racism has led communities to build abundant and diverse community organizations and institutions. Through racism, marginalized groups have been highly organized forces in civil society. Scholars of race and ethnicity such as Du Bois (1889; 1903), have documented prolific and creative organizing efforts by marginalized groups. This literature on histories of specific racial and ethnic communities has rarely been brought into conversation with the scholarship on the importance of civil society in American Political Development. Connecting these research streams can give scholars a greater opportunity to identify the historical and developmental role racism and organizations play in shaping individual community institutions and the institutions of the U.S. state. Chapters 3 and 4 provide examples that I hope can motivate greater intersections across these literatures. For example, in Chapter 3 I show that the Chinese community's experience of racism pushed them to build of strong and varied community organizations that wielded great influence over immigration law in the United States and led to a political revolution in China. In another example, in Chapter 4, I show that German Jews' and Irish Catholics' past experiences of racism

combined with being considered white on the West Coast allowed their organizations to become

central nodes in the governance of Seattle and Portland. Both chapters show that racism, and its

changing forms, stimulated organization building, growth, and power. As a result, these

communities played formative roles in the creation of political institutions in the U.S. and

abroad. In this dissertation I argue for a deeper and richer inclusion of the history of organizing

in marginalized communities in understanding U.S. civil society and political history. I also hope

to urge scholars of racial and ethnic communities to see the community organizational

development they study as having important impacts outside of the community itself. These

communities have been part of a larger narrative of organizational and political development in

the U.S. as a whole.

RACE AND THE BIRTH OF WEST COAST CITIES

One reason region and place are important is due to the unique combinations of people,

geography, cultural, and social structures that feature in a single area. These structures are highly

interdependent and in every place these structures combine and interact in potentially unique and

novel ways. This was especially true in the mid-19th century. At that time, before massive

railroad, canal building, and popular stagecoach roads, places could be highly isolated.

Compared to today, places were relatively independent entities with their own configuration of

social structures. Due to path dependency, a place that became large enough to institutionalize its

social structures at this time could ensure its unique character well into the future. With civil

society's makeup and texture dependent on these components and interconnections in local social

structure, a place's relatively independent configuration should lead to qualitatively and

quantitatively different civil societies. Once institutionalized, civil society's character becomes

locked-in within a place. While the classic civil society narrative flattens place differences, more recent research has shown that civil society is different across place and perpetuates those differences across time (Brandtner and Dunning 2020; Brandtner and Powell 2022; Greve and Rao 2012; Nelson 2021).

Chapter 2 reveals the importance of place and capturing this moment in time. With their unique demographics, West Coast cities' leaders constructed unique racial scripts based on the identity they were building for their cities as influenced by their economic and political structures and needs. Thus, race and place were tied together in a unique configuration in each city. Place, race, and civil society were all constructed together. Racism does extend across place and is a universal of modern social life. However, the particular racial scripts and the way racism is deployed is not as universal. Today, there are more dominant racial formations that surpass any given place's efforts to alter. When place was more independent, racial scripts could vary across cities. With the West Coast cities institutionalizing their economic and political structures, their individual conceptions of race locked-in through the material structures, institutions, and memory of the city.

In sum, race structured civil society by pushing marginalized groups to organize prolifically and in specific ways (see Chapters 3 and 4). Place structured civil society by offering unique, institutionalized configurations of demography, economics, and politics. This formed a specific character of civil society that was hard to change, even as those other social structures changed in the future. Race and place were interrelated through the urban cultures and racial scripts city leaders developed simultaneously. In this way race and place became foundational structures of civil society on the West Coast.

THE HISTORICAL ARC OF RACE, PLACE, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND POLITICS ON THE WEST COAST

This dissertation is part of larger project that seeks to understand how racial and ethnic civil society development shaped the governance structures of West Coast cities. I focus on the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when a handful of small or practically nonexistent towns on the West Coast developed into major metropolises. I focus on two interrelated particularities of the West Coast at that time. First, the West Coast was a place where civil society had high levels of economic and political power. Second, the West Coast's people were unprecedentedly diverse across race and religion. I will these particularities separately below, but it is in their simultaneous combination that they have the strongest explanatory power. Together, they describe how civil society mediated the role racial and ethnic communities played in the development of urban power on the West Coast. The project describes how these cities were built by immigrants.

Prominent Civil Society

In the 1850s, the local and state government of San Francisco and California lacked a monopoly on violence. Across multiple years, armed groups of "respectable" residents took over what they saw as an ineffective and corrupt government. They never could agree on what should replace the government. The result was that a weak government with a strong civil society came to be seen as a strong form of democracy. Preventing corrupt national parties from wielding too much power and allowing civil society to overtake government if necessary was seen as democracy in action. This was continually reinforced as the national parties took little interest in the policy goals of the West Coast. Creating a political system that allowed civil society to interfere with government policy worked for everyone except the parties. The respectable

element sought a wide tent so that they could legitimately undertake their political efforts but did not want to participate and/or could not agree on a strong form of government free from corrupt parties. This meant providing access to power to any other civil society element that could seek to claim legitimacy. This ended up providing for a wide range of political groups. Legitimacy did not stem from vote-getting, but from organizational capacity. Over the next two decades, the Chinese, Jews, and Irish, to name a few, all showed that they could use civil society organizations to effectively influence local and state government. Bestowing so much political power on civil society meant that people who may have been formally disenfranchised, or needed to rely on political machines elsewhere, could turn to their own community-built organizations.

Fatefully, in the late 1860s, the railroads also successfully exploited San Francisco's purposefully porous governmental system. The development of the railroad had allowed for the creation of new concentrations of people and capital in Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle. But these places had learned from San Francisco's example and sought to check the power of the railroads. Again, none of these places chose to end this corruption with a stronger government. A stronger government could be captured by parties or railroads, and that would leave city residents firmly in the grasp of special interests. In Portland and Seattle, the cities and their rural hinterlands firmly agreed to give their state government the power to break up and regulate monopolies but kept government weak. In Portland and Seattle, resistance to the railroad came from all but the highest end of the upper classes who had relied on the railroad money for their economic success. Farmer, labor, and middle-class progressive reformers hoped that civil society organizations, working through the state government, could be a check on runaway capitalism and monopolistic power. In Los Angeles, on the other hand, the upper classes were the staunchest

anti-railroad forces and consolidated relatively early and successfully. Since the 1860s, multiple railroads had refused to make Los Angeles a terminus and in the late 19th century the railroads sought to build a port and transportation lines that would circumvent the city. The local elite interests directly opposed the railroads' goals. Rather than appealing to the state government, the Los Angeles elite fought locally to keep the railroad out of its politics and engaged at the federal level to ensure key appropriations went to the local elite and not the railroad barons.

In this way, Seattle and Portland saw civil society from below as the best check on economic excess and corruption, while in Los Angeles it was civil society from the local elite. Finally, as the railroad boom subsided, San Francisco was also able to defeat the railroad monopoly. This was a predominantly working-class movement that intersected with the anti-Chinese politics of the time. In cities outside the West Coast, different segments of society built or folded themselves into existing parties to gain control over government. Both national parties had long been allied with the railroad so on the West Coast the parties were not to be trusted. The party system also reminded residents of the monopolies they loathed. In political campaigns, municipal candidates would often be criticized for being closely aligned with party organizations.

In all four West Coast cities, different groups, especially working-class communities sought to create new independent parties. These parties were often briefly successful in dominating city and even state elections, but they never become institutionalized pieces of the governing machinery. Instead, independent parties often collapsed just as quickly as they formed. The boom-and-bust parties left even more politically-inclined civil society organizations in their wake. This is an overly brief political and economic explanation for the unusual power of civil society in West Coast cities. It is not complete without understanding the role race played.

Diverse Peoples and Racial Ideologies of the West Coast

Before 1850, the West Coast was split between Spanish-settled, Mexican-governed California and the mostly indigenous lands of the Pacific Northwest. Long-term European settlement was present in the harsh Catholic mission system by the Spanish in California, in coastal fur-trapping settlements from the U.S. and a variety of European powers in the Northwest, and in scattered U.S. Protestant missions. Several events brought mass immigration to the West Coast. The pursuit of Manifest Destiny included the colonization, seizure, and destruction of Native lands. This gave the promise of landownership to settlers regardless of their economic background. The West was also a place of religious freedom. Mormons found greater freedoms in the West as did Catholics. It was the discovery of gold that brought many more people to the West on a global scale. In its early years, San Francisco had a Chinese Quarter and a Chilean ("Chili") Quarter. Immigrants from Australia and Europe also came to strike it rich, from Oregon down to Southern California.

Before the Civil War, California and Oregon made it clear that they did not want Black slavery in their states while also resisting free Black migration. They did condone and encourage the enslavement of the indigenous communities, but this was through a logic of elimination rather than developing a long-term labor source. During the Civil War, California supported the North. The California economy did not see itself benefiting from slavery in the South; it was not nearly as reliant as the Northeast for cotton and other raw materials produced in the South. The corporate titans of the West Coast had found an efficient labor source among Chinese immigrants, who often came as single men hoping to return to China after a few years. The large mining and railroad interests encouraged Chinese immigration, and many saw it as one potential solution to the end of slavery.

With the railroad, the seizure and settlement of Native lands increased as did immigration from the Midwest and East Coast. This was often two- or three-hop immigrants, who came from Europe, and settled on the East Coast or Midwest before making their way out West. The railroads helped determine which small towns would be a railroad terminus and receive the jobs and trade associated with it. With the region more economically connected internally and to the rest of the world, it was now a question of how Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, and eventually Seattle would grow. The railroad and global advancements in transportation made the West Coast more easily accessible from Asia and the East Coast, which was entering a new wave of mass migration. These diverse peoples who made their way to the sparse and politically undeveloped West Coast sought to make their home there and build a city through their community organizations.

Religious pluralism and freedom were established early on the West Coast. Before major waves of immigration much of the economic elite were not Protestant nor English speakers. The first California Constitution required all public materials to be translated into Spanish. The gold rush prompted mass Chinese immigration and encouraged many members of the 1840s mass immigration from Ireland and Germany to cross the continent. The Irish Catholics and German Jews were not taken to be inferior purely because of their religion. German Jews could now access the top tier of the elite that had often been denied them on the East Coast. Irish Catholics could also make it into the elite as well, but more importantly they were no longer on the bottom of the labor hierarchy. When economic downturns hit, the Chinese were the scapegoats, leading to violence and unprecedented exclusion measures. Mexicans in Los Angeles formed an odd and unique case. They were wealthy, elite, politically powerfully, and legally white, but culturally not quite fully assimilable. A handful were able to successfully assimilate into the elite, and hundreds

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assimilated within a generation. However, many more lost everything through the illegal settlement and colonization of new migrants. The social structure and hierarchies among the Californios did not map easily in theory or practice onto the racial ideologies of the U.S.

At the turn of the 20th century, Scandinavians began arriving in large numbers, particularly in the Pacific Northwest. Japanese immigrants took advantage of their country's rising power and the economic opening left by Chinese exclusion to economically advance on the West Coast. In Southern California, Mexicans began immigrating in larger numbers as laborers, with strongly diminished claims to assimilability. In all, this history shows the large diversity of race, religion, and ethnicity that made the West Coast highly unique in the U.S and the world. Religious pluralism, shifting boundaries of whiteness, and radical and violent exclusion of racial groups created a fascinating admixture of understandings of identity.

Racial and Ethnic Organization

What is most interesting is not either of these arcs but how they intersect. A political structure with large opportunities for civil society organizations gave advantages to communities with pre-existing forms of organizing. This notably included the Chinese, Irish Catholics, and German Jews. Each of these three communities had an organizational playbook that they executed on the West Coast. They were now doing so for the first time in a new political context where their organizations could have great influence on the politics, and economics of the West Coast and its cities. For the Irish Catholics and German Jews who were largely accepted as white and assimilable into the elite, this was a major boon that allowed them to engage in new strategies of influence (ex. privatizing non-particularistic social services). For the Chinese who were experiencing novel racism, they had to adapt their organizing to meet the needs of their community and their limited access to governing.

For other identity-based communities (ex. German Protestants, Scandinavians, English, French, Japanese, etc.) early organizing was based almost entirely in a church, sending country government, or on non-political organizing.[1] Few of these identity-based organizations were involved in early political advocacy and policy change on the West Coast. However, they did come together to form large and distributed networks that tied many prominent actors in these organizations together. For the civil society leaders that happened to be from these communities, their identity was not something they highlighted (they did not often organize on particularistic identity terms) nor hid (ex. name changes pre-WWI were few).

As the four cities grew, these identities started to become stronger bases for political organizing. This was quite evident in the Scandinavian and Japanese communities. Both communities had strong women's movements, and both gained direct investment in their organizations from their sending country governments. It is notable that these communities were predominantly working class. For the assimilable Scandinavians, their political organizing split along class lines while they maintained a central cross-class connection within the church. Elite Scandinavian clubs were connected into the elite circles of the city, while the lower-class Scandinavians became heavily active in labor movements. The Japanese were far less assimilable. The elites of the community were uniquely positioned within the cities' elite as an economic bridge to investment. The working classes, like the Chinese before them, were a source of cheap labor. The Japanese community thus connected deeply into economic networks and could wield political power through economics but struggled to gain any cultural recognition as members of the city.

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[1] German 1848ers is perhaps an additional story here as sophisticated political organizers that were on the West Coast in significant numbers. However, this dissertation does not focus specifically on this community and so I make no additional comment of it here.

Mexican community organizing in Los Angeles was somewhat like the Scandinavians, split along class, but with no central church or organization to hold the classes together. In the 1880s the Catholic church built additional cathedrals in the city that separated Mexicans that had successfully entered the elite from the rest. Thus, the community cleaved. Unlike the other cities and communities, being seen as overtly Mexican or indigenous did get in the way of the political fortunes of the Mexican elite. As a result, they did seek to assert their European ancestry. The Mexican families that did assimilate into the elite did have some small, non-political organizations among themselves, but their organizations were notably not cross-class.

The Resulting Political Consequences

The different organizations, communities, and racial structures of the different cities on the West Coast resulted in political consequences in the long run of the cities. With open political access, the fact that each place had different community organizations with different political goals led to governmental regimes with different institutions and legitimate roles for civil society.

Los Angeles is the most unique case. Los Angeles was the most religiously pluralistic of these cities. Religion formed no barrier to elite consolidation when the elite sought to battle the railroads. Los Angeles was proud of this pluralism. The elite consolidation also relied on the old Mexican elite that had successfully assimilated. This assimilation required these elites to break ties with the lower-class Mexican community. Elite consolidation required a rearticulation of racial lines. A strong elite civil society cut itself off from, and became antagonistic to, lower-class forms of civil society. Elite organizations created a political regime that could be highly influenced by the local land-owning elite, but not by other forms of civil society, least of all laborers and those who are not assimilable.

San Francisco had a rockier development. In the 1870s and later, working-class, non-Chinese communities found political efficacy in identifying the perceived cooperation between the upper class and the Chinese as the corrupt influence of the city. Like the "respectable" elements a few years prior, they (predominantly Irish Catholic, but not exclusively) successfully overthrew the railroad monopoly and sought a form of identity-based interest group politics. The Irish Catholics saw the hated Chinese organizations as politically successful groups to emulate. The Irish wanted particularistic cutouts from the government budget and to be seen as a legitimate group within the city <u>because</u> of their identity. While San Franciscans feared monopolies, minority groups were to be protected—so long as they could prove they were not as foreign as the Chinese or Japanese.

Portland's identity-based communities, unlike Los Angeles and San Francisco, were not aligned well with class. There were elite Scandinavians, German Protestants, German Jews, Irish Catholics, and even Chinese that were essential to the city's future. These elite were members and leaders in cross-class organizations working alongside the working-class members of their racial and ethnic communities. There was no elite that was willing to consolidate, and no consolidated working class that could overthrow it. The elites of the city were invested in organizations deferential to working-class and majority opinion. The result was that when the same elites made it into government, they maintained a highly deferential political system. If a civil society group was able to appear in large enough numbers, it could usually get its policy through. Political candidates generally appealed to working class populism to get elected but, once in office, rarely put forward any strong agenda.

Seattle was like Portland in that its identity-based communities were cross-class. There was more of a consolidated elite, but the elite cared more for keeping their (mostly Scandinavian

and German) ethnic communities together than in Los Angeles or San Francisco. Instead of

being deferential, they often took a more paternalistic attitude. They could do so because the

success of Seattle's most prominent economic elites was not dependent on its own resident

workers. Seattle's economy was based on its location as a trading port for exploiting the

resources of other places, notably Alaska and Asia. Thus, the economic elite could exist, support

their poorer co-ethnics, but not have to be deferential to them. The cross-class civil society

organizations made claims on government based on technocratic economic outcomes.

Government was run more like a business. It was highly professionalized and city functioning

was well documented. Claims on the city clearly specified the actions government should take

and what the results would be. This situation allowed an economic elite to maintain its position

while not abusing it. It gave openings to other groups who could also bring data and specificity

to their claims.

We continue to see many of these similar patterns within these cities' governments and

civil societies today. This was the result of the interaction between a politically powerful role for

civil society and a uniquely diverse population.

HOW PLACE AND RACE MATTER: CHAPTER OVERVIEW

I have spoken in very broad terms of how race and place matter and about the broad

history of the West Coast over 60 years. The following chapters describe in rich detail, and with

primary data, how race and place mattered in West Coast history and how researchers can

improve their own understandings of race, place, and other social structures.

Chapter 1 presents novel data to establish place and race as predictors of civil society

organization founding. I digitize data on county-level incorporation from Seattle, Portland, and

Los Angeles to show what civil society organizations were being organized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. While there were many churches and benevolent societies, most surprisingly, there were also many ethnic organizations. The data also reveals some limits of the great expansion of civil society in the late 19th century. I show that these cities did not have a clear increase, on a per capita basis, through the late 19th century. The lack of growth was even more apparent when looking at fraternal societies, whose cumulative incorporations declined on a per capita basis at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Instead, I show that civil society incorporation was a function of place. Different place-based structures that conditioned the creation of organizations led to different absolute numbers of founding in each place but affected for-profit and civil society organizations similarly. Disaggregating civil society organizations further showed that each place had unique mixes of organizational types that led to different roles and meanings of civil society. These mixes offer an early glimpse at the place-based political differences described above. I also show that ethnic organizations were common. They were far more common than women's organizations and even more common than fraternal organizations. I argue further that ethnic organizations were likely undercounted relative to fraternal organizations, further emphasizing this finding. Finally, the racial and ethnic communities that had the greatest incorporation per capita were the Black and Chinese communities, two of the communities that experienced the fiercest racism on the West Coast. This chapter reveals some of the individuality and divergent trajectories of each city, while highlighting the frequency of civil society organizing based on ethnic and racial identity. The racial and ethnic communities of these cities created abundant organizations to bring their communities together and express their interests. This data shows that these communities were consequential members of these cities early civil societies.

In Chapter 2, I use the case of three World's Fairs held 15 years apart in Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle to reveal the capitalist and racial projects city boosters used to announce their cities to the world. Within a settler colonial framework, city growth machines sought common cause to create an urban myth that would build the city's reputation, interest external capital, and create a shared identity for residents. These urban myths refracted the available racial scripts from settler colonialism to develop and apply modified, specific racial scripts to their diverse population. This reveals both the importance of the contingent and constrained myths while showing the variety of racial scripts available within the U.S., and the dominant scripts within each city. The chapter's data reveal additions to the settler colonial framework. I demonstrate the importance of a strong, white labor movement and the potential of wooing non-white capital as crucial factors in the racialization of a city's communities. While not featuring civil society organizations directly, the chapter reveals the power and structuring nature of race, economic prerogatives, and place in structuring cities' futures. The Fairs were a formative moment in the cities' histories that reveal elite racial dynamics, how the elite related to the city's politics, and how racial and ethnic communities organized for and prioritized participation in the city-wide event. The chapter gives valuable context and character about race and place that can be applied to civil society. Future research and data out of this project will show how these racial scripts did manifest themselves in the civil society sector of each city.

Chapter 1 established the vitality of racial and ethnic organizations, while Chapter 2 described the racial environment of the West Coast cities. Chapters 3 and 4 describe how racism, or the lack of racism, influenced the role of racial and ethnic civil society organizations in these cities. Chapter 3 focuses on the non-white Chinese civil society, while Chapter 4 focuses primarily on what I call Previously Non-White organizations—ethnicities racialized as non-white

elsewhere, such as Irish Catholics and German Jews, that were racialized as white on the West Coast. Both chapters connect the racial conditions of these communities to their role as political players.

Chapter 3 dives deeply into the Chinese case to understand how the organizational field of Chinese civil society organizations evolved alongside increasingly burdensome and institutionalized racism. I tell the story of Chinese organizations and the unprecedented organization-building that the Chinese community did. With less than half a percent of the U.S. population, they built some of the largest civil society organizations in the U.S. that were some of the most structurally complex and (transnationally) politically successful organizations. Furthermore, they built most of these organizational structures prior to the Civil War. While these organizations were based on models from China and other overseas Chinese communities, they evolved in step with increasing anti-Chinese racism in the U.S. I theorize how and why they changed with insights from Black community studies and studies of Black social movements. I develop a novel theory and model of how the organizational life of a community changes under the pressures of racism. The Chinese organizations and the racism they responded to were a central part of racial formation on the West Coast and the development of immigration policy within cities, states, and the country. The organizations' leaders wielded political influence and used it strategically. These organizations were responsible for the way each city developed, and other racial and ethnic community organizations saw the Chinese organizations as a model for engaging in city politics.

I use Chapter 4 to document a unique racial phenomenon of the West Coast—communities that had been racialized as non-white elsewhere but were white on the West Coast. I focus on these Previously Non-White organizations, German Jewish and Irish Catholic

organizations that faced concrete racial barriers in Europe and the East Coast but were white on the West Coast. Taking race and place as foundational structures of civil society, how did the new racial categorization in a new place change the civil society development of these communities? I theorize, first, that communities that experience racism will be organizationally prolific, even if that racism was in the past. Second, that whiteness removes barriers to political power, but does not immediately remove past discrimination the community experienced. Using a novel dataset collected from annual city directories across a 21-year period in Portland and Seattle, I recreate the civil society governance structure by building board interlock networks of civil society organizations. The mixed effect regression analyses reveal two different racial hierarchies. When I use organizations as the unit of analysis, Previously Non-White organizations are the most central organizations. Alternatively, when I use individuals as the unit of analysis, Previously Non-White individuals are one of the least central categories. These results show that on an individual basis, Previously Non-White individuals were discriminated against and not elected to the same prominent board positions that other ethnic and "non-ethnic" individuals were voted into. However, their organizations were able to make powerful and valuable connections in the network to establish power in the civil society governance structure. These networks reveal a governing structure of the city that was open to ethnic organizations. It shows the types and prominence of these organizations as well as their leaders and links to the prominent politicians of the day. It shows how some immigrant communities were tightly linked to the political structures that the elites were actively building.

Chapters 3 and 4 do not explicitly discuss place as a central analytic, however for both it is an important background. Both studies gain their analytical heft by noting that in one place the community experienced racism and in another place they did not. The claim that racism varies

across place is necessary for the arguments in both chapters. For parsimony, Chapter 3 does not discuss all the ways that place matters for the organizational life of the Chinese community, but rural-urban patterns and San Francisco v. other city patterns are evident throughout the chapter. The other way Chapter 4 makes a statement about place is through the omission of Los Angeles. Los Angeles's civil society and racial structures were different enough to make it impossible to include it in the same analysis. The civil society governance network of Los Angeles was simple, a small, tightly interconnected elite. The contested and malleable whiteness of Mexicans does not fit neatly into the categories of ethnicity or whiteness.

In all, these four chapters use novel data collection and analysis to establish that race and place are both central in structuring the civil society sectors of West Coast cities. The results enable me to build novel theories to suggest how racism, or its lack, structure community organizational life and political power.

CONCLUSION

By putting race and place into the early development and functioning of civil society in the U.S. I hope to change the narrative of which communities and organizations were critical to the development of the third sector in the U.S. My analyses show the surprising prominence of Chinese, Catholic, and Jewish organizations in the civil society history of the West Coast. With race and place as key factors in hand, how might civil society historians approach other regions in the U.S.? How might the civil society histories of the South, Southwest, Midwest, and even the Northeast change if we look for variations across place, as opposed to uniformity, and for robust organizing of currently and previously racialized groups? Understanding this history across the U.S. can help bring understanding to the uniqueness, or lack thereof, of the West

Coast. Even if it is wholly unique, I have established that there are multiple civil society histories within the U.S. With this new history, how do we understand the modern-day nonprofit sector differently?

Beyond just impacts in the nonprofit sector, civil society is deeply interrelated with both the economic and political history of the U.S. A West Coast history of civil society changes how we understand the political and economic development of the U.S. For example, follow-on research to Chapter 1 could analyze the relationship between civil society incorporation and for-profit incorporation, looking beyond simple percentage rates and into the people, identities, and interrelationships that likely influence their mutual development. For politics, further research in Chapter 4 could assess what these previously non-White communities did with their privileged positions. How did they influence urban and state governance? Another research stream could understand how immigration status, voting, and civil society organization participation interact. For example, what does it mean for democracy that the West Coast's largest civil society organization represented a community that was largely barred from voting? Civil society's relationship with democracy likely took on a different form. Future research can address how these civil society organizations structured the culture of democracy on the West Coast that may extend to other regions of the U.S. as well.

There are two major limitations to the overall argument of this dissertation. San Francisco is central to Chapter 3 but does not play an explicit role in the other three chapters. This was mostly a data availability issue—San Francisco's city directories and incorporation records are missing or incomplete due to the 1906 earthquake and ensuing fire, and the city did not hold a comparable World's Fair. In this dissertation I do not theorize or discuss the prominent role that San Francisco, as the first major city on the West Coast, played in influencing the development

of the other three cities. It was certainly important. However, I have no reason to believe that its importance or influence would change the results or conclusions of any of the chapters in this dissertation. An adequately complete story of West Coast civil society needs to include more about San Francisco. Second, was the West Coast story possible only because it happened at this specific point in time? In multiple chapters I argue that the period covered by this study was crucial, either because of the character of incorporation laws; the repertoire, freedom, and capital potential of urban myths and racial scripts in this period; or the role that civil society played in urban governance at this time. If nothing else, the timing is convenient. As I indicated above, I do believe that place mattered before and up through this period of study in a way that it does not after World War I. This is not to say that place no longer mattered, but place became less independent and more interdependent with other cities, its region, and the national government. Race, on the other hand, I believe is harder to study in this period. The meaning and boundaries of race was experiencing rapid change at this time. The meaning of race was much clearer before the first mass immigration and after 1924 (Jacobson 2000). In a different period, a similar analysis to what I do in Chapter 2 may be unnecessary and self-evident. In sum, this period is unique, and I have tried to show how and why it is unique. This should not take away from my thesis that race and place are foundational structures in the development of civil society in the U.S.

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CHAPTER 1

INCORPORATING A COMMUNITY:

CIVIL SOCIETY, LEGAL INCORPORATION, AND PLACE IN THE WEST, 1863-1909

CHAPTER ABSTRACT

Few changes have been as dramatic for U.S. economic, political, and social life than the policies governing corporations in the mid-19th century. Prior, charitable organizations were a plurality of incorporated organizations. But after mid-century, the scholarship on civil society organization incorporation is scarce. This is the case even though lowering barriers to civil society incorporation was an impetus for the policy development. In this paper I ask, what happened to civil society organization incorporations after the Civil War? In doing so, I theorize that civil society incorporation took on an intertwined meaning with place. I digitized data on county-level incorporation from Portland, Los Angeles, and Seattle on the 2,459 civil society and the 15,108 for-profit corporations founded after the Civil War. From this view, the oft-heralded growth of civil society in the late 19th century appears anemic. Place proves to be the best predictor of incorporation. Differences in civil society incorporation emerge between counties revealing important differences across place. One commonality is the robustness of ethnic organization incorporation, particularly of Black and Asian communities. New incorporation laws gave these communities an opportunity to establish themselves in the growing cities.

INTRODUCTION

> Charitable or public-spirited individuals, desirous of making
> permanent appropriations for charitable or other useful purposes,

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find it impossible to effect their design securely and certainly without an incorporating act.
Chief Justice John Marshall, for the majority, *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 17 U.S. 518, 637 (1819).

In 1819, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court underlined the importance of formal, legal incorporation for charitable organizations. In the early Republic, cash-strapped state governments leaned heavily on charitable organizations to do the work of the state. This was possible through a legal tool: the corporate charter (Kaufman 2008). Although today it is associated with large companies and global capitalism, the U.S. corporation started out as a legal technique to improve the public good. Economic and legal historians of the corporation highlight this quasi-public role of the corporation before the mid-19th century. After the Civil War, however, the history of the corporation turns its focus to the major interstate and commercial interests of the time (Lamoreaux 2004)—the railroads, manufactories, and conglomerates of the Gilded Age. So, what happened to the charitable organizations that had been the early and numerous beneficiaries of the corporate form?

The late 19th century was a time of rapid growth in fraternal societies, women's groups, and labor organizations (Soskis 2020). However, none of the research mapping this growth of civil society[1] analyzes incorporation data—the tool that, according to Marshall, was required to effect social change. This is surprising given that the mid-19th century policy change, the General Incorporation laws, were passed specifically to build a more pluralistic, republican civil society. General incorporation was a policy innovation that North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) argue was

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[1] In this paper, I use the term "civil society" to refer to organizations that do not seek a profit to return to shareholders. This is called the nonprofit sector today. In terms of corporate law these are non-shareholder, or non-pecuniary, organizations. When I refer to "owners" of a civil society organization, I am referring to the people who would be held legally liable for the organization's property and activity if the organization was not incorporated. I use the term "for-profit corporations" to refer to organizations that are organized to return profit to shareholders.

crucial to letting civil society not only persist but thrive. To fill this gap in the literature, I first ask, what happened to civil society organization incorporations after the Civil War?

In Portland, Seattle, and Los Angeles, civil society incorporations did grow after the Civil War, but this growth was slow. Compared to for-profit incorporation, the growth of civil society was an order of magnitude less. Civil society incorporations rose more slowly than population leading to a decrease in per capita rates of incorporation in all three cities at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. This finding is at odds with the consistent finding that civil society rapidly expanded in the U.S. at this time. To make sense of this contradiction, I theorize and empirically test what incorporation now meant for civil society in the late 19th century. I argue that civil society organization incorporation represents the ability and desire to establish a community's mission in a place. Both incorporation law and its practical purpose highlighted the importance of incorporation for the communal ownership of property, particularly land (Ciepley 2021; Hansmann and Kraakman 2000; Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire 2006; Lipton 2010). Local civil society became intertwined with place physically, culturally, politically, and financially. The way property, politics, and economic organizations intersected, and built cultural meanings tied to the history and idiosyncrasies of each county, gave place its own independent character (Molotch, Freudenberg, and Paulsen 2000) Differences. This in turn had effects on civil society incorporation. Differences in civil society ecologies emerged quickly across Portland, Seattle, and Los Angeles revealing far more about a place than incorporation had prior to the mid-century policy shifts. Comparatively, Los Angeles developed a conservative and elite civil society oriented around churches and cooperation among commercial firms. Incorporation for Portland's civil society was typified by large proportions of women, labor groups, and other marginalized communities. King county formed a middle ground between the other two, but with

a strong labor movement. A commonality across the places was the relatively high level of incorporation among ethnic groups. This was surprising given that county administrators systematically discriminated against ethnic communities' incorporation (Bloch and Lamoreaux 2017a). Notably, more marginalized ethnicities, such as the Asian and Black community, incorporated more organizations per capita than others.

To arrive at these findings, I utilize county-level data on all general incorporations from each county until ten years after the given county reached a population of 100,000. These counties are in three of the first states to adopt general incorporation law into their constitution when they were admitted to the Union (Evans 1948). Given the similar dates, economic theories that disregard the importance of place would expect each county to have similar levels of incorporation across different types of organizations. The resulting differences I observe thus highlight the strong relationship between place and civil society incorporation.

I proceed by recounting the history of incorporation, putting civil society groups at the center. I then discuss the meaning of incorporation for civil society and highlight the role of land and the meaning of place. I introduce the data and reveal the common patterns across all counties that show a relatively slow growth of civil society incorporation. I then show the consistent differences across the three counties. Finally, I discuss the high concentration of ethnic incorporation across counties particularly among the Black and Asian communities.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE HISTORY OF INCORPORATION

Justice Marshall's decision in *Dartmouth* exemplifies the importance of charitable, particularly eleemosynary institutions, to early corporate law. Harvard University was the first

charitable corporation in the U.S. and underlines the public nature of these early civil society institutions. The University was tax-supported, had government officials on its board, and its purpose and operations were regularly discussed by the state legislature (Hall 1992). Its incorporation did not make it private, rather it was an extension of the state (Novak 1996). To become an incorporated organization required the state legislature to pass a bill requiring the association to further the public good and remain deferential to the state. This extended beyond the large, traditional educational or religious institutions. Even the Masons were obligated to justify the incorporation of their secret societies by arguing that they were public bodies as well (Hall 1992: 20).

Civil society organizations dominated the early U.S. landscape of incorporations and were the main actors in testing and pushing the boundaries of the corporate form. In Kaufman's (2008) analysis of Massachusetts incorporations, excluding the chartering of townships, 65% of the legislature's incorporations from 1781-1790 were civil society organizations. Civil society was the foundation of organizational incorporation in the U.S. Starting with the *Dartmouth* decision, civil society in the early Republic opened additional legal protections for the modern business corporation. Slowly, state legislatures started increasing the mission and purposes that civil society groups could claim to receive incorporation (Levy 2017). Utopian societies experimented with new corporate powers and managerial forms that would lay the groundwork for later managerial capitalism (Lipartito 2004). Associations limited the freedom of their members with strong regulatory powers that would later appear in late-century fights between shareholders, managers, and labor (Novak 2001).

States' expansion and increasing flexibility with the corporate form had its consequences. Some larger corporations used their wider latitude to line their pockets with money from the

state, creating a public outcry. Politicians responded by seeking to undercut the power of large

corporations. Popular fear at the public power of charities prompted states to place caps on

donations and organization size (Hall 1992). States prevented incorporation for organizations

that political elites thought might threaten the social order (Lamoreaux and Wallis 2017).

Democratic concerns with civil society extended to the process of incorporation itself. Prior to

the mid-19th century, receiving a corporate charter was not a simple matter. Given that charters

came directly from the state legislature, becoming incorporated require elite social and political

networks (Hilt 2017a). Which organizations received incorporation documents was more a

measure of elite society than of associationalism (Lu and Wallis 2017). This inherently

undemocratic situation would end with the populist wave of the Jacksonian Democrats. Their

solution was to democratize and standardize incorporation, making it a small, cheap

administrative affair handled by local officials (Gershenson 2018). This made incorporation

widely available, ended abuse through special privilege, and took decision making away from

politicians. Starting in the late 1840s, nearly every state eventually adopted these general

incorporation laws to use the power of the people, as opposed to legislature privilege, to decide

what organizations receive the benefits of incorporation (Hilt 2017b).

Growth without Incorporation

As legislatures passed these laws in state after state, civil society was reaching its era of

massive growth. The relationship between incorporation law and civil society growth is

unknown. It is not clear if incorporations of civil society grew with increases in the number of

members and organizational foundings recorded in other data. Hockey stick-like curves mark the

growth in membership of civil society from the 1860s through the beginning of the 20th century

(Gamm and Putnam 1999; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000). This was the age of the fraternal

society (Beito 2000; Kaufman 2002), the formation of the interest group (Clemens 1997), the rise

of the labor organization (Voss 1993), massive women's and veterans' movements (Skocpol

1992), and when elites developed the community chest to handle the unrelenting wave of

charitable activity (Barman 2006). According to Arthur Schlesinger (1944), this was the crucial

moment when the U.S. became the "nation of joiners." Many civil society historians argue that

state action was the impetus for this growth by pointing to developments during the Civil War

and in the rapidly changing nature of the state (Clemens 2020; Crowley and Skocpol 2001). Yet

none of these historians analyze data or theorize about the change in incorporation law—a law

with the purpose to massively democratize and expand civil society.

General incorporation laws do play a significant role in the development of the large

corporation. Since Chandler's *The Visible Hand* (1977), sociologists have focused their attention

on incorporation in researching the development of large corporations. Sociological texts that

highlight the importance of incorporation seek to explain the development of the large

corporation (e.g., Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Roy 1997) or to explain economic history by

selecting on only the largest organizations (e.g., Fligstein 1990; Perrow 2005). Some even

remove civil society organizations altogether as unrelated to their analysis (e.g., Evans 1948;

Perrow 2005). This, Lamoreaux (2004) argues, has been a detriment to our understanding of the

corporation because these large organizations were outliers. They were unrepresentative of

corporations as a whole and their data did not include the many smaller organizational concerns

that made up the vast bulk of incorporations in the U.S. The lack of analysis of civil society

incorporation by both civil society historians and corporate historians has left a gulf in

knowledge: what happened to civil society organization incorporations after the Civil War?

Figure 1-1 offers preliminary data and leaves much to explain. Civil society and for-profit incorporation are approximately equal in the number of incorporations per year across the early decades in all three counties. However, in the last decades of the 19th century, right when we expect rapid civil society growth, civil society incorporation numbers stay relatively flat. For-profit organizations, on the other hand, see exponential growth. Figure 1-1 shows that the late-19th century was not a time of great growth in civil society, at least in relative incorporation terms. So how did general incorporation laws change civil society, and how do we make sense of this relatively anemic growth when associationalism was at its peak?

A Boost to Civil Society? The Development of General Incorporation Law

Recent historians of the corporation have turned to North, Wallis, and Weingast's *Violence and Social Orders* (2009) to understand the changes wrought by the general incorporation laws. According to the authors, general incorporation laws turned the U.S. from a limited access order to an open access order. Previously, the bestowal of rights to political and social organizations was limited to elites who were already in favor with the state legislature. These incorporation rights certainly benefitted the elites who acquired them, but they were also precarious. States still held the ultimate power, and should any change occur in the political and social context, states could revoke the prior charters. To North, Wallis, and Weingast, this violent and undemocratic system could not produce a liberal and just civil society. General incorporation laws for civil society meant far greater access to the corporate form with protection from the whims of state legislators. There should be vastly more civil society incorporation as a result because incorporation was both easier to get and easier to keep.

Theoretically this was the purpose, and politically this was also the goal of the reformers and state constitution writers at the time. General laws created a basic format for incorporation

(a) Multnomah County

(b) King County

Incorporation Type
- - - Forprofit
—— Civil Society

(c) Los Angeles County

Figure 1-1. General Incorporations Filed Each Year by Civil Society and For-Profit Organizations. Panels are (a) Multnomah County (to 1909), (b) King County (to 1908), and (c) Los Angeles County (to 1900).

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and devolved decision making down to county-level judges and administrators. Instead of enumerating the specific purposes civil society organizations had, legislators made incorporation rules general and non-specific. For example, New York's 1895 incorporation statute simply referred to civil society as organizations "not organized for pecuniary profit" (Levy 2017: 219). Incorporation was no longer a matter of political jockeying and bribes but became a matter of filling out a form correctly and paying a small fee (Hilt 2017a). Historians of incorporation associate general laws with the rising importance of democratization and suffrage expansion (Gershenson 2018; Hall 1992; Hennessy and Wallis 2017), concerns with competition and monopoly powers of companies and civil society organizations (Hilt 2017a; Wright 2018), checks on elites (Lu and Wallis 2017), and distrust in state legislatures (Lamoreaux and Wallis 2020). General laws did come with some restrictions, but these had minor, if any, effects on the non-shareholding civil society organizations (Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire 2006). Lamoreaux and Wallis (2020) claim that general laws created far greater access to civil society organizations to allow them to operate and fundraise more effectively.

The enthusiasm for general incorporation was perhaps the strongest on the West Coast, although it is frequently left out of the history. California, Oregon, and Washington were three of the first states to put a right to general incorporation in their founding constitutions and forbade special charters to non-governmental bodies (Evans 1948). As railroads increasingly sought political prominence across the West Coast, general incorporation increased in political importance to check the rising monopolistic power.

In sum, between the Revolution and Civil War, civil society organizations inspired the model for corporate law in the United States. The evolution of corporate law to general incorporation in the mid-19th century was not meant to alter the central role of civil society. To

the contrary, general incorporation was meant to be a boost towards a more pluralistic, democratic, and fully chartered civil society. Nowhere else would we expect this to be the case but on the West Coast. The vast expansion of civil society in the late 19th century seems, at first, to be related to these changes in incorporation law. However, as Figure 1-1 showed, this was not the case in the incorporation data. To fully assess this puzzle, it is necessary to go deeper into incorporation law to understand what this newly democratized incorporation now meant for civil society organizations.

THE NEW MEANING OF INCORPORATION FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

The *Dartmouth* case provides an important starting point for the value of incorporation. The case was about an attempt by the state of New Hampshire to expropriate land from the incorporated Dartmouth College. Ciepley (2021) argues that, prior to *Dartmouth*, incorporation gave limited governance and property rights to organizations. *Dartmouth* made corporations centrally about property rather than governance. It specifically gave corporations stronger property rights that the state could not infringe on. Other legal historians come to the same conclusion: incorporation became about property (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000; Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire 2006; Lipton 2010). Incorporation not only allows organizations to shield their property from seizure by the state, but it also protects an organization's property from its managers and board. "Entity shielding," one of the main benefits of incorporation, means that an organization's property is protected from the creditors of its members and owners (Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire 2006). Without incorporation a creditor may pursue all the debtor's property, including the organizations they are a part of. Incorporation prevents this and protects

the organization's property from potential abuse by members and their creditors. Additionally, incorporation also means "perpetual succession" (Kaufman 2008; Wright 2018). This allows an organization's property to not be dependent on the life or competence of members. Without incorporation, an organization's assets would typically go through inheritance proceedings after the death of an owner. With incorporation, property is not tied to the owner but is connected to the organization, which can continue its normal functioning.

While legalistic, these two rules about incorporation have profound consequences for one critical type of civil society organization: the fraternal society. Fraternal organizations have a lot of ritual and status concerns, but they are fundamentally a form of death and sickness insurance (Kaufman 2002). First, proper functioning of this insurance required anyone who joined to trust that the collective pot of insurance money would still be around for them when they needed it. Every member needed to know that their money would not be taken away by an opportunistic member or the member's creditors. The money needed to be shielded from its individual owners and ensured that it would be used as intended (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000). Second, the purpose of the fraternal society was tied to the knowledge that any member may be rendered incompetent through sickness or death at an unknown time in the future. Thus, the organization could not be dependent on a single owner's competence. And, when competence ceased, the organization had to be able to quickly fulfill its purpose of paying out the member's insurance policy—it could not waste valuable time with legal proceedings. Without incorporation, civil society organizations like fraternal societies could not be confident that they could adequately address their mission. The critical piece was the protection and efficient use of property.

Protecting the Land

For many civil society organizations, particularly on the West Coast, property meant land. For-profit corporations at this time were overwhelmingly transportation routes, mining interest, and the banks that invested in them. For-profit ventures often incorporated to secure land rights. Similarly for civil society organizations, early schools, cemeteries, and churches (most early civil society organizations) were concerned with the ownership of land and buildings to carry out their missions. After *Dartmouth*, the next major Supreme Court case concerning corporations was *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad*. The ruling further strengthened corporate property rights. *Santa Clara* was about whether the recent 14th amendment's right to due process covered corporations. *Santa Clara* and its associated *Railroad Tax Cases* concerned land in the West and were stewarded through the court system and the Supreme Court by California jurist Stephen Field (Lipton 2010). The case's ruling is often misread as defining a corporation as a constitutional person deserving rights. The actual ruling was far more restrictive. The Court decided that, depending on the context, a corporation's property, not the entity itself, can be protected by the 14th amendment as a natural person would (Bloch and Lamoreaux 2017b). However, Field went further throughout his career extending this ruling far past its explicitly restricted meaning (Ciepley 2013).

Incorporation law is nearly always paired with land. This provides a basis for the meaning of incorporation. While many for-profit corporations sought exploitation of the land, civil society organizations saw the land as central to delivering their missions. On the West Coast, land for civil society organizations meant physical investment, colonialism, and permanence. Civil society organizations, as landowners, became literally invested in a place's economic future. A plot of land could be rented out, be borrowed against, and be held for wealth

accumulation, but all these possibilities depend on land values. Incorporated civil society organizations should be more likely to join growth machines (Logan and Molotch 2007[1987]) as they are directly invested in a place's wealth accumulation. Land could also mean protection. Minorities, women, and religious groups could find themselves relatively free from harassment by the state and others if they could claim legal ownership of the land (Madokoro 2021). On the West Coast specifically, land meant something far more meaningful than other places in the country. Just a generation prior, settlers and the government stole the land from indigenous communities. Many of the people who had fought in those battles and were complicit in the theft were the same people that filed the incorporation documents of civil society organizations in the late 19th century.[2] Land meant the success of Manifest Destiny and the claiming and colonizing of the West. Finally, owning land was a sign of permanence. A common indictment of settlers in the West were that they were temporary sojourners, present briefly for the mining boom but with plans to return to their home state or country afterwards (Chan 2000). Incorporation was an indication that a civil society organization's members felt it was important to establish a permanent presence in a place.

Place and Incorporation

With the general laws, the meaning of incorporation for civil society organizations became the ability and desire to establish their mission in a place. Land and property ownership linked civil society organizations to places physically. The resources and terrain of an area determined the value of land and thus the value and concentration of incorporation for for-profit and civil society organizations. On a physical level, any given place on the West Coast should be

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[2] This relationship involved more than just the same people. For example, in Oregon, tax-supported, public relief for Indian War veterans where channeled through the incorporated Grand Armies of the Republic (Multnomah County Archives, Assessment and Taxation Records (multco024), Licenses and Filings, 1895-1974, Reel #2).

associated with a particular configuration of incorporation for the transportation and trade routes, mining and manufacturing locales, and civil society groups to support the accumulation of people and capital. Place had its own effects on early incorporation patterns. Organizations are one way that places perpetuate their own character and identity and maintain their unique effects. As people enter and participate within incorporated organizations that last beyond the life of any one individual they replicate and reproduce the meaning of a place (Molotch, Freudenberg, and Paulsen 2000; Ternullo 2024). On the West Coast, organizations also became invested politically in the location that they incorporated in. With the devolution of incorporation to counties, local governments now also held regulatory authority over civil society groups. Thus, governments tied civil society to place through politics as well.

The importance of place to incorporation is another blind spot in the history of incorporation law. While multiple scholars have used variation in state laws to understand why and when certain incorporation laws passed (e.g., Creighton 1990; Hilt 2017b), they do not theorize that this then might change the nature, meaning, and ecologies of organizations in different places. While scholars have remarked at the great authority that county-level administrators and state judges had over incorporation decisions (Bloch and Lamoreaux 2017a; Levy 2017), I have not been able to find county-level comparisons or state-level comparisons in the resulting organizational ecologies of places. Part of this is due to the "race to the bottom" in incorporation law that occurred in the late 19th century, where companies were no longer required to incorporate in every place they did business. This makes it hard to make any claims about the meaning of place for large interstate corporations, but not so for small businesses and civil society (Bloch and Lamoreaux 2017a).

Culturally, incorporation was taking on new meanings regarding place as well. At the end of the 19th century, corporations started to be understood as natural organizational bodies with independent interests (Knight 2023; Lamoreaux 2004). This change was also slow and not uniform across place. Culturally, place had always been important for civil society. For example, southern states following a Jeffersonian republicanism, particularly Virginia, were highly distrustful of corporations and the interests they might represent (Hall 1992). Each state had its own approach and meaning tied to corporation law (Hall 1992). The context of place was also necessary to understand what civil society organizations emerged and persisted. Johnson and Powell (2017) use the concept of "poisedness" in their history of the New York Botanical Garden to understand why in one point in time New York City could not support a research-intensive botanical garden, but a century later, it provided the ideal context for just such an institution. They theorize place as a key ingredient for civil society, a finding echoed by other scholars since (Brandtner and Dunning 2020; Nelson 2021).

While culture may have made it more or less likely for certain associations to form and apply for incorporation, county administrators used their discretion to shape who could incorporate. General laws made incorporation available widely, but not completely. Counties were not supposed to grant incorporation to organizations that may prioritize political interests over public interests. For example, political parties were overwhelmingly not granted incorporation across the U.S. and in the counties I study here (Bloch and Lamoreaux 2017a). Counties were also not supposed to grant incorporation to organizations that may pose issues to the social and political order. This had strong effects on labor groups, particularly the International Workers of the World (IWW) and groups that local administrators thought were similarly linked to revolutionary intentions (Bloch and Lamoreaux 2017a). In some areas of the

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country the threat to social order also referred to groups organized on racial identity (Brooks and Guinnane 2017). In the South, states encouraged counties to reject Black civil society organization incorporation applications (Hilt 2017b). In general, states gave deference to the subjective discretion of county officials. Officials especially targeted immigrants (Bloch and Lamoreaux 2017a). In 1890's Pennsylvania, Chinese, Russian, and Italian civil society groups were rejected for fear that they may not keep to their declared purpose, and, as foreigners may hold allegiance to another country ("Judicial Approval" 1955). Silber (2001) reports that cases like these occurred in California and Washington although the records and details have been lost.

With the passage of general laws, place became a key constructor for the field of civil society in a place financially, politically, culturally, and racially. Incorporation became about whether a given civil society organization had the ability and desire to hold property in a given place and legally tie that property to its personal mission and goals. One should expect that the typical native, White fraternal organization would have full ability and desire to incorporate given the protections, property, and the lack of limitations in receiving the charter. Other groups, political, labor, and ethnic groups especially, should be underrepresented in incorporation counts due to their reduced incorporation rights. Thus, a comparative analysis of incorporations of civil society organizations should reveal a lot about a place—what organizations were able and interested to incorporate.

DATA AND METHODS

In this paper, I retrieved county-level incorporation records from Multnomah (Portland), King (Seattle), and Los Angeles counties. Outside of San Francisco, whose records were lost in the 1906 earthquake, these were the three major metropolitan counties on the West Coast in the

19th century. General incorporation laws were enshrined in the state constitution at the founding of all three states. And all general incorporations were recorded by county administrators in records books. These records include the name of the incorporation, the date of incorporation, and where to find the incorporation documents (although these do not always still exist). In Los Angeles, these records have been transcribed by the Seaver Center for Western History at the Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County. In Multnomah and King Counties, I transcribed the handwritten records from the Multnomah County Archives and the Puget Sound Regional Branch of the Washington State Archives. After transcription I removed duplicates of organizations, mergers, and re-incorporations to focus on the date of the first incorporation for any given organization. As the counties underwent rapid expansion at different times, I had to limit my transcription before the counties became too large to transcribe. I transcribed all incorporations from the earliest date recorded to ten years after the county reached a population of 100,000 people (1900 in Los Angeles, 1908 in King, and 1909 in Multnomah). This covers a comparative window of time in years and in city growth. This was a time of rapid growth in all three counties, with a county population of over 150,000 by the time my data collection in each county ended. In total, I identified 17,567 organization incorporations.

None of these records identify which organizations are civil society organizations. I first used the corporation's name to categorize all organizations that were obviously for-profit or civil society (ex. "Glacial Deposit Hydraulic Mining Company" v. "Public Welfare League"). For the in-between cases I validated all civil society organizations across four different sources. First, I identified an organization as a civil society organization if it appeared in any of the city directories of the period either as an educational institution, a church, a benevolent society, labor organization, or club. Second, my archival fieldwork provided long lists, ephemera, and

organizational documents for additional civil society organizations within the incorporation records.[3] This provided context, mission, and purpose in addition to identifying an organization as civil society or not. Third, I searched local newspapers for mentions of the organization. Many organizations sought to make their meetings public and published reports of meetings in newspapers. Other times, organization incorporations were reported directly in the paper alongside additional information about the organizations. Fourth, biannual state attorney general records, although not all available, reported incorporations often with more detail than the county-level registers. Of the 17,567 incorporations I identified 2,459 (14.0%) as civil society incorporations.

Using these supplemental records, I categorized all organizations in multiple ways. I created binary codes if the organization was a religious organization, a women's organization, an ethnic organization (and if so, what ethnicity), and whether the mission of the organization sought to imminently own land (ex. churches, masonic hall building associations, sanitariums, etc.). I additionally coded all organizations with a mutually exclusive organizational type variable that included types such as church, charitable,[4] fraternal, political, for-profit association[5] (ex. chamber of commerce), and labor. Table 1-1 shows the general statistics over the full period of the civil society organizations across all cities.

Table 1-1 replicates some of the expected findings, such as very low counts of political and labor organizations. Of the political organizations, most are temperance organizations, a unique group that Bloch and Lamoreaux (2017a) also identify as the most common political

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[3] Of notable use here were the Seaver Center (Associations and Clubs Collection, GC 1233), Oregon Historical Society (Associations and Institutions Collection, MSS 1511), and Washington State Archives (Secretary of State and Territory Collection, Charities Division, Eleemosynary Register AR3-3-40, Volumes 1 and 2).

[4] I identify an organization as charitable if it sought to directly improve the welfare of people who were not members of the organization.

[5] I identify an organization as a for-profit association if it does not have shareholders for itself, but still seeks to coordinate action among shareholding organizations, and acts in the interest of those shareholding members.

All Incorporated Organizations (n = 17,567)

	N	%
Civil Society	2,549	14.0
Forprofit	15,018	86.0

All Incorporated Civil Society Organizations (n = 2,549)

	N	%
Multnomah County	877	35.7
Los Angeles County	851	34.6
King County	731	29.7
	N	%
Land-Related Organizations	1,439	58.5
Religious Organizations	869	35.3
Women's Organizations	102	4.1
Ethnic Organizations	366	14.8
	N	%
Churches	649	26.4
Charities	564	22.9
Fraternal Societies	303	12.3
Forprofit Associations	254	10.3
Social Clubs	143	5.8
Labor Organizations	80	3.3
Political Organizations	75	3.1
Other	391	15.9

Table 1-1. Descriptive Statistics of Incorporation Data. NOTE: The "Other" category includes organizations centered on activities (e.g. hiking clubs), and discussion groups on specific interests, among others.

organization that was not seen as disrupting the political or social order. However, the data does come with limitations. Most notably, incorporation is not a measure of persistence, strength, or membership size. I still argue that this data tells us a group of people's ability and desire to establish their mission in a place. They may not have been successful or large, but I interpret incorporation as a sign of aspiration.

Throughout this paper I often use a count, percentage, or per capita number of cumulative incorporations. This does not account for organizational deaths. The data should not be understood as the number of active organizations but the number of potentially active organizations. This measure is highly imperfect but would not change many of the conclusions for the findings below. Unless explicitly mentioned, I assume no organizational deaths. In most cases, assuming some or any rate of organizational death would reinforce the findings further, and I explicitly make note of that when it is particular significance. Organization death does become an issue for the conclusions about place if the rate of death differs unpredictably across place and organizational type unpredictably. This is possible, but the results end up being quite stable across place in a way that suggests this is unlikely. The methods in this paper are also meant to be descriptive. I report counts across time and city population. I aim to make no causal claims, but only point out the patterns the data reveal, how they compare to pass theory, and how the data in each place compares to each other. This description is still powerful in showing patterns that go against common knowledge and in showing differences across place.

RESULTS

I will present the results in two parts. First, I will look at what happened to civil society organization incorporation after the Civil War. I will then show that place is a better way to understand incorporation than time. In the second part, I will show a set of graphs that reveal differences about each county to paint a more nuanced picture of each county's civil society.

Civil Society Incorporation after the Civil War

Figure 1-1 established that civil society lagged far behind for-profit organizations in terms of incorporation. The difference in magnitude that opens in the 1880s and 1890s is not one

that could be easily explained by differences in organization age or another unmeasured factor. This is clearly a time when for-profit corporations, large and small, took over the use of the corporate form. Figure 1-2 provides further evidence that adds greater context to the heralded expansion of civil society in the late 19th century. Figure 1-2 presents cumulative civil society incorporations per capita in the growing counties, that is, the total number of incorporations of civil society organizations prior to and including a given year. To prevent noise, the lines start when each county has at least 50 civil society organizations.

Figure 1-2. Cumulative Civil Society Incorporations. Data is presented on a per capita basis of one for every 1,000 people in Multnomah, King, and Los Angeles Counties. NOTE: lines begin when the given county has at least 50 cumulative civil society incorporations.

Figure 1-2 shows there are multiple stories in each county, and that the late 19th and early 20th centuries were not simply moments of great civil society expansion, particularly where incorporation is concerned. In the late 1880s all three counties have cumulatively incorporated 3.5 civil society organizations for every thousand residents, but the time before and after that

point tell divergent stories. Multnomah had a relatively high number of civil society organizations cumulatively incorporated per capita prior to 1880 but witnessed a steep decline over the 1880s. Los Angeles and King Counties see comparably rapid expansions in cumulatively incorporated organizations per capita in the late 1880s. After 1890, Multnomah and King Counties see rapid expansion, while Los Angeles's is more middling. After 1900, Multnomah and King Counties see a rapid decline. Every decade and every county tell a different story. This is not a simple matter of expansion, but a history that involves additional complexities.

What of fraternal societies? These organizations were the iconic civil society organizations of the period behind the great expansion of civil society (Beito 2000; Kaufman 2002; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000). Furthermore, as I argued above, general incorporation laws likely impacted fraternal organizations more than any other, making it easier and more imperative for these specific organizations incorporate. Figure 1-3 shows cumulative fraternal organization incorporation per capita—the total number of fraternal organizations that had been incorporated prior to and including a given year. The graph is like Figure 1-2, except with an even slower increase and even a decrease over time. Both Los Angeles and Multnomah counties have their highest number of cumulative incorporations per capita in the late 1870s into 1880. King County also nears a peak in terms of cumulative fraternal organization incorporations in 1880 before that statistic declines rapidly. The differences across places are also stark. Prior to 1880, Los Angeles County has had just over three fraternal organizations cumulatively incorporated for every 10,000 residents, while Multnomah has had over 12.5 and King County has had nearly 7.5. These are drastically different numbers revealing different types of civil society. Just like in Figure 1-2, Figure 1-3 shows that there was no great expansion in fraternal

society incorporations through the late 19th and early 20th century. If fraternal societies did grow in this period, it was more likely through expansion in membership and not the incorporation of additional organizations.

Figure 1-3. Cumulative Fraternal Society Incorporations. Data is presented on a per capita basis of one for every 10,000 people in Multnomah, King, and Los Angeles Counties.

Instead of searching for a consistent longitudinal trend, what if I take place more seriously than year? Figure 1-4 does this in two ways. First, instead of counting total incorporations or incorporations per capita, it looks at the percent of cumulative incorporations coming from civil society organizations compared to all incorporated organizations. This understands incorporation as a place-based phenomenon where it may be relatively harder or easier across states and counties. Second, instead of graphing over time, I graph the patterns as the <u>population</u> of each county grows. Civil society incorporation in a given location may be less

about what is happening external to the county at a given time and more about where a given county is in its own development.

Figure 1-4. Cumulative Civil Society Incorporations as a Percentage of All Incorporations. Graphed with county population levels in Multnomah, King, and Los Angeles Counties.

Figure 1-4 is starkly different from the past graphs in that the counties are similar in their relative rates. There is a quick rise in the percent of incorporations that are for civil society organizations to 35% of cumulative incorporations when cities have populations around 25,000. While the three counties have divergent paths between populations of 25,000 and 50,000, in all of them the percent of cumulative civil society organization incorporations declines after the county reaches 50,000 people. This decline is uniform. Los Angeles is the highest percentage county at populations of 100,000, but it is still lower than all counties when they had populations of 50,000. While Los Angeles sees a slower decline than the other two counties, its final years start seeing a more rapid decline that is on trend to converge with the other two counties.

The conclusion from Figure 1-4 is that incorporation must be understood in relative terms with other factors of place. Figures 1-2 and 1-3 that are based on incorporation counts, the measure commonly used, see great variance across place. The graphs are a sign of a lack of uniformity over time and place. Figure 1-4 shows stability and commonality when civil society incorporation is understood in context with other local corporate phenomena. If place is then the best way to understand incorporation, what do the relative differences in civil society tell us about these three counties?

Making Sense of Place through Incorporation

First, I will provide evidence for my claim that land was crucial to civil society incorporation. By the end of each county's period, 65.0% of Los Angeles, 59.0% of King, and 52.7% of Multnomah Counties' civil society organizations were incorporated with land as a key part of their mission (ex. "to build a public meeting hall" is the purpose for incorporation for more than a dozen civil society groups). This is the percent of civil society organizations that required land to deliver their mission. It likely underestimates the number of organizations that owned land. As Table 1-1 shows, this was the most common pattern evident among all civil society organizations in the data. By the time King County and Los Angeles County were above 10,000 people, more than half of the civil society incorporations had been directly related to land ownership, and this share never drops below half again. While land is clearly connected to incorporation in all three counties, it also reveals differences between places. Most notably, Multnomah County nearly always has fewer land-related, cumulatively incorporated civil society organizations than the other two; consistently about 10 percentage points fewer. Land seems to be of less relative significance in Multnomah than the other two counties.

All three counties were similar in the types of organizations that were the most common across the period—churches, charities, fraternal societies, and for-profit associations. Figure 1-5 graphs the relative rates of these four types as a percentage of all cumulative civil society organization incorporations. The differences in the three graphs are stark. In Multnomah County, churches, charities, and fraternities are close to each other for most of the graph, with for-profit associations (e.g. Chambers of Commerce, Produce Growers Associations, etc.) at a rate about ten percentage points less. Fraternities start declining as a percent of all previously incorporated civil society groups after the county reaches 150,000 people. King County sees greater separation with more churches than charities than fraternal societies than for-profit associations. Relative to Multnomah County it has more churches, fewer fraternal groups and slightly fewer for-profit associations. Los Angeles has even greater differences. When the city reaches a population of 90,000, churches are nearly half of all previously incorporated civil society organizations. Fraternities, on the other hand, see a steady decline, with for-profit associations nearly always a higher percentage. Los Angeles appears more religious, less fraternal, and more oriented to the for-profit sector. Multnomah County is less religious and more fraternal. King County forms a middle point between the two. Figure 1-5 does not include political, social, or labor organizations which never form nearly as large a share of incorporations in any of the three counties.

As mentioned before, and shown in Table 1-1, these counties generally reflect the expected patterns of fewer labor and political groups. Political organizations are 3.4% of Multnomah, 3.3% of Los Angeles, and 2.4% of King County cumulative civil society incorporations over the full period. These generally reflect the relative strength of the temperance movement in each place, but these differences are minor. The role of labor has more variance—

Figure 1-5. Cumulative Incorporations of Churches, Charities, Fraternal Societies, and For-profit Associations. Graphed as a percentage of cumulative civil society incorporations.

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5.1% of King, 2.7% of Multnomah, and 1.8% of Los Angeles County cumulative civil society incorporations. Labor was quite strong in King County; this was the period right before the Seattle General Strike (Schwantes 1979). Labor was also strong in Multnomah but it was dominated by the IWW and more radical groups that were unlikely to receive incorporation (Kimeldorf 1988). Los Angeles, on the other hand, was a city proud of the open shop with organized corporate resistance to unions (the correlate to having a relatively high number of for-profit associations) (Erie 1992).

Another marginalized group were women's organizations. These were organizations that were quite politically capable and well organized at the time (Clemens 1997; Skocpol 1992). However, they faced barriers to incorporation. Property law for women was still unsettled. Women's competence, especially in financial matters, was still culturally in question. Thus, the all-male county administrators and judges were skeptical to assign state-protected property rights to women's organizations (Bloch and Lamoreaux 2017a). Figure 1-6 shows the results of this ambiguous situation. Women's organizations form a small percentage of all previously incorporated civil society organizations, no more than 6.0% in any county and often closer to 3%. Again, there are clear differences across the counties. Multnomah consistently has more women's organization incorporations and King County has consistently fewer.

Figure 1-6. Cumulative Incorporations of Women's Organizations of All Civil Society Incorporations.

The prior literature also expects ethnic organizations to have higher barriers to incorporation. Figure 1-7 tests whether this is the case. Interestingly, ethnic organization incorporations are quite common in all three counties, especially when compared to the other underrepresented groups like women's, political, and labor organizations. At most points, and as seen in Table 1-1, ethnic organization incorporations are more cumulatively numerous in these three counties than fraternal organization incorporations. These ethnic organizations likely faced barriers to incorporate because of racism and xenophobia, language differences, and knowledge of the legal system. That is, these numbers are likely undercounts of the aspiration of the community organizations to receive incorporation. Often described as sojourners, these communities have also been traditionally thought of as not interested in establishing themselves within the U.S. However, Figure 1-7 shows that ethnic organizations overwhelmingly overcame

these barriers to establish themselves in these three counties. The comparison with fraternal groups, who lacked the same barriers and had great incentive to incorporate, is particularly striking; all three counties have more cumulative ethnic incorporations than fraternal incorporations. As with the above graphs, there are still important and consistent differences across counties. Note that this is not likely a difference from demography. All three cities have a slight majority of their population as first or second-generation immigrants, and similar numbers of non-White individuals. Multnomah County, at every population level has a higher share of ethnic incorporations than the other two counties. While Los Angeles has many ethnic incorporations early on, this declines to slightly above 10% of civil. King County forms a middle ground, slower to build up a high percentage, but leveling off at about 15% of civil society. Like with women's organizations, Multnomah County appears to be a more welcoming place for the incorporation of marginalized groups.

Figure 1-7. Cumulative Incorporations of Ethnic Organizations of All Civil Society Incorporations.

To understand this surprising finding I looked at what ethnic groups were leading these numbers. The very first civil society organization incorporated across all three counties was the First Hebrew Benevolent Association in Multnomah County in 1863 when the Multnomah County had only a few thousand residents. This was three years earlier than the second organization. Ethnic civil society thus established itself quite early in Multnomah and along the West Coast. At the end of the period the most frequent ethnic incorporations in each place were German incorporations in Multnomah (6.8% of all civil society organizations) and Los Angeles (3.0%) and Scandinavian incorporations in Seattle (5.8%). However, these percentages are well below the presence of those ethnicities in the full county population. Compared to their population, Black and the Asian[6] communities were the most frequent civil society incorporators in all three counties. In each county, these two communities' percentage of cumulative civil society incorporations was more than half of their percentage within the population of the county (ex. Asians are 3% of the population in King County and their communities incorporated 2.2% of the civil society organizations). As a comparison, German and Scandinavian civil society incorporation rates were about one-third their frequency in the population. The only other ethnicity that had an incorporation rate similar to the Black and Asian communities were Jews in Multnomah County, but this was not the case for Jews in the other two counties. One caveat about the Asian community is that their percentage of cumulative incorporations did not rise until relatively late in the period under study. Asian immigrants were mostly barred from owning property either as individuals or through corporations (Takaki 1998). It was only once the U.S.-born second-generation could become incorporators that the percentage rose.

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[6] I group Chinese and Japanese together because Census numbers do not separate them across the period of study.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this paper I started with the research question: What happened to civil society incorporations after the Civil War? Newly digitized data showed that civil society incorporation lagged far behind for-profit incorporation. To understand this surprising result, I theorized that mid-19th century general incorporation laws made civil society incorporation less tied to the elite politics and more tied to place. My results revealed this pattern. When looking at simple counts of incorporation on a time scale, nearly each county in each decade showed different trends. There was no evidence of a fraternal society revolution or even much evidence of expansion in the number of new civil society organizations. A common story did emerge when focusing on place—understanding civil society incorporation as relative to other incorporations within the county and relative to the county's size. For these counties, cumulative civil society incorporation as a percentage of all county incorporations spiked when the county population reached 50,000, but then declined as a percentage of cumulative incorporations as the counties grew larger.

While this major commonality was evident in all counties, I also identified clear differences across counties in the traits and types of civil society organizations that incorporated. Relative to the other counties, Los Angeles's civil society was more oriented to land ownership, church development, and for-profit associations, and less to ethnic organizations. Multnomah's civil society was more oriented to fraternal, women's, and ethnic organizations, and had fewer churches. Finally, King County had more labor organizations but fewer women's organizations. A surprising result was that ethnic organizations were quite numerous in each county—with higher rates of incorporation than fraternal societies. The ethnic groups most likely to incorporate relative to their population were the Black and Asian communities. Two groups that had to

surmount some of the greatest barriers to incorporate their organizations in the West and elsewhere in the U.S.

These results call for two turns of attention in understanding civil society incorporation. First, civil society incorporation seems to be about the effect of place rather than a period in U.S. history. The expansion of civil society in the 19th century may have been about membership growth or political power, but there is no clear expansion of civil society organization incorporation. The story that emerges with the incorporation data here was that civil society does grow as a county begins to expand, but it then declines as a portion of the economy as the counties urbanized. The implication is that the rapid growth of civil society incorporations may have been due to the settling and growth of the West and the suburbs in the late 19th century rather than other uniform social, cultural, and political influences across the country. In terms of incorporation in Multnomah, Los Angeles and King Counties, the growth of civil society was primarily a function of county population. This is theoretically consistent with the understanding that incorporation is related to the politics of place, and how much place means to civil society associations seeking to incorporate their organizations. If land ownership plays as central a role as I hypothesized, past a certain threshold, a growing county offers fewer opportunities to own land.

Second, ethnic organizations need to be taken seriously in the history of civil society. The expectation from other historical work was that ethnic organizations were a relative footnote on civil society growth in the 19th century. In all three counties ethnic organizations were more frequent incorporators than either fraternal societies or women's organizations. This was true despite ethnic communities confronting racial and legal barriers to incorporation. Without these legal barriers, ethnic communities may have incorporated in even greater numbers. Ethnic

incorporations had their highest rate among two of the most marginalized groups on the West Coast: Black and Asian communities. Despite facing formal and informal barriers to incorporation, these communities sought to establish their organizations in these counties and invest in these growing places. This data cannot show whether this may have been because these communities simply had more organizations, whether organizations frequently failed and were subsequently replaced, and/or whether marginality gave these groups additional motivation to publicly and politically establish themselves as members of the growing counties. Either way, the groups continued to seek incorporations, a tool for collective groups to establish a permanent place in the growing counties. Future research should seek to understand the relationship between marginality and incorporation (Dellheim 2004).

This analysis makes clear that incorporation is not simply a legal form. Incorporation has always been about politics, state power, and property. With the passage of the general incorporation laws in the mid-19th century, I argue that civil society incorporation also became about place. The above results communicate valuable information about the kinds of places that were developing on the West Coast. I will take Los Angeles as an example. Los Angeles County appears conservative and elite. Churches were common as were for-profit associations. Fragmentation (a pattern noted by Fogelson (1993)) is also apparent. Unlike King and Multnomah where there were only a few major churches for each domination, every denomination in each small town and neighborhood of Los Angeles seemed to incorporate its own church. Similarly, for-profit associations were fragmented across the county. For example, there were seven separate incorporated associations for lemon growers. Of the women's organizations that incorporated, they were more likely to take the form of social clubs for upper class women compared to the women's organizations in the Northwest. For white ethnic

communities, there was a tendency to assimilate as shown by relatively few incorporations. Germans, the most populous ethnic minority, outnumbered Asians five to one in the population, yet both ethnicities incorporated a similar number of organizations. The large Mexican community also trended toward assimilation, as their organization incorporation was tempered by elites who politically and socially sought to identify as white (Griswold del Castillo 1979).[7] They had the lowest number of organizations per capita of all ethnic communities in all three counties. The Catholic Church may have provided for more social capital and organizational support for the community, but the Mexican community incorporation rates were lower other ethnic communities that also had a central, top-down religious organization (ex. Irish, Italian, French, Swedish). The description of a place from incorporation data must consider the different abilities of groups to incorporate, but the organizations that did incorporate tells a story about the groups that sought to establish themselves in Los Angeles.

Limitations

These results are based on the limited selection of three counties, all on the West Coast, all of which experienced rapid growth at the end of the 19th century. I cannot make causal claims about the effects of the general incorporation law because its exogenous shock happened several years prior to the data here. While I suggest that these findings have external validity outside the West Coast, that proposition can be empirically tested. The importance of place that I underline here also means that other counties, states, and regions of the U.S. might have had different patterns that might contradict the arguments here. I also look at a very specific kind of county,

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[7] Griswold del Castillo (1979) argues that elites did temper the organization of the community yet comes to a different conclusion that organizing within the community was still robust. He counts 17 organizations founded (incorporated and non-incorporated) in the same time frame of the study here. But his conclusion is noncomparative. Compared to other communities, like the Black and Asian community, this level of organizing is not robust. I estimate a similar number of total (incorporated and non-incorporated) Black organizations organized in the period despite the Black community being ten times smaller than the Mexican community in Los Angeles.

one that moves from rural to urban over a short period of time. Counties like these are not common, but the rapid change allowed me to study tens of thousands of organizations across similar external contexts in a small window of time.

The lack of organizational deaths is also a major limitation of this study. While the lack of deaths cannot explain the early peaks in per capita civil society organizations and fraternal organizations close to 1880, they do limit the interpretation of the place differences. Larger numbers of cumulative incorporations could be due to large numbers of organizational deaths, not necessarily more active organizations. Different rates of organizational deaths would be a helpful data point to further understand differences across place and the ecology of each counties' civil societies.

Incorporations also do not account for membership. Both membership and incorporations are useful for understanding civil society ecologies, but each come with their own limitations. A rich civil society sector would feature high membership levels and organization incorporations. High membership rates or high incorporation rates alone cannot capture the complete texture and meaning of civil society in a place.

Future Research

These findings prompt future research on county-level incorporations of civil society organizations. What were the incorporation patterns of other counties in the U.S. at this time? What other similarities and differences exist across counties in the same state, or in entirely different regions of the country? This would provide greater context and nuance to understanding the full impact of the general incorporation laws as well as the growth of civil society in the late 19th century. This research could also focus on the role of ethnic community organizations, taking them seriously as significant civil society actors after the Civil War. Finally, as a

predecessor to today's incorporated 501(c)(3) nonprofit sector, this research could connect 19th century history to today. What does early incorporation data reveal about the civil societies of the modern day?

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CHAPTER 2

"A GRAND MINGLING OF BARBARIC SPLENDOUR":

THE LOCAL FORMATION OF RACE AND CAPITAL IN WEST COAST CITIES,

1894-1909

CHAPTER ABSTRACT

At the turn of the 20th century Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle each held enormous fairs to announce themselves as new investment destinations for a worldwide audience. These cities were unique in the U.S. partly because of their large share of foreign-born white and racialized residents. In this paper I ask, how did city boosters craft racial scripts alongside the urban myths they were creating to attract capital investment? Settler colonial theories and economic theories of "place branding" identify race-making and placemaking as contingent processes constrained by historical repertoires. I argue that urban myth and racial script only appear authentic if they reinforce each other. By using the World's Fairs as a site, I demonstrate how, at the urban scale, logics of race and capital found mutual fits, at a time when the understandings of neither were determined nor guaranteed to hold. I show how each fair offered a different image of how to combine factors of product with racial meanings in the newly developing settler colonial communities, revealing different possible paths for the future of the cities and racial meanings within the U.S. today. In doing so, I extend ideas of economic placemaking to attend more to racial scripts as a fundamental constraint, while revealing the results of organized, white labor and non-white capital investors to the structure of settler colonialism in the U.S.

INTRODUCTION

West Coast cities were built on the successful colonization of the West. As a result of imperial projects by the U.S. and Europe, the U.S. sought laborers and settlers to conquer and exploit its Western half (Glenn 2015). As a result, the new Western towns of the 19th century were made up of significant populations of Asians, Latin Americans, American Indians, and European immigrants, in addition to native-born whites (Almaguer 1994; White 1991). In the late 1800s, the pastoral image of the Western frontier was giving way to the creation of cities, agglomerations of capital, ports, and railroad terminals (Deutsch 2022). By 1910 there were five cities with populations over 100,000, joining a list that had only included San Francisco less than 20 years prior. All the West Coast cities, at some point, were majority first- or second-generation immigrant, and all were distinct in the U.S. in their significant numbers of non-white, foreign-born residents. Capitalists and boosters who wanted to see their towns grow faced the problem of presenting their city for investment while seeking to derive meaning from the city's novel combination of races.

The 1876 Philadelphia Centennial Exposition and the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago added the World's Fair and Exposition to the repertoire of city politicians and business leaders (Rydell 1984). While local and regional expositions were frequent, Chicago showed that a worldwide exposition could bring huge amounts of tourism, investment, migration, notoriety, and hope to a city. Over the next 15 years, large expositions were held in New Orleans, St. Louis, Omaha, and Jamestown, all receiving generous appropriations from city, state, and federal governments. These were large enterprises with even smaller expositions costing $200 million in 2024 dollars. The goal of these expensive fairs was to bring capital to the city. Whether it was rising real estate values from migration, investment in industry, development of hinterlands to

increase trade, or just advertising to boost a city's profile, these cities sought money and connections into the global capitalist system (Rydell 1984). Doing so was more than just a matter of showcasing the value of local goods and industry, it was also about building authentic cultural identity, symbols, reputations, and narratives—what I refer to as "urban myths"—that would attract capital and make local residents proud enough to join the growth machine coalition (Bandelj and Wherry 2011; Vanolo 2018).

A World's Fair was an inherently diverse undertaking. Fair committees invited countries across the world to present their resources and advantages. The Fair was a way for nearby residents, and for the U.S. more broadly, to glimpse of the world's people, arts, culture, industry, and technology (Rydell 1984). In doing so, the Fair also served as a scene for the host city to reckon with the meaning of their own demography and local diversity. This was the situation that confronted the city leaders on the West Coast—namely, Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle. Their populations were racially diverse, and the racial scripts—the repertoire of cultural meanings ascribed to different races (Molina 2014)—behind most of the diverse communities were still in flux in the nation, and particularly in the West (Almaguer 1994; Jacobson 2000). In this paper I ask the research question, how did city boosters craft racial scripts alongside the urban myths they were creating to attract capital investment? The boosters faced the question of whether their racial diversity, and which races in what ways, was an asset to their capital projects. In this way, the Fairs were not just a reflection of boosters' capitalist goals but also was the manifestation of racial projects, connecting the meanings and identities of race to the cultural and capitalist structures of the city (Omi and Winant 1986).

In answering these questions, boosters constructed urban myths and racial scripts that could be viewed as mutually consistent and intelligible by Fair visitors. In doing so they were

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constrained by the history, prevailing existing myths, and geography of their location and by the existing racial logics of settler colonialism (Molina 2014). While this still left many options, the urban myth and racial scripts had to fit into an intelligible whole. In this way, economic placemaking and race-making structured each other. In the interurban contest for economic superiority on the West Coast, each city had to differentiate itself (Molotch 1967). This led to contrasting urban myths and different racial meanings in each city.

In describing the urban and racial representations within the Fairs, I combine and contribute to sociological theories of economic placemaking and to settler colonialism. Additionally, the Fairs reveals the scripts that were available at a pivotal point in time for these cities', and the U.S.'s, economic, racial, and imperial orders. Sociologists have long held that culture plays a role in urban economies in a way classical economics fails to describe (Firey 1945). This has helped to inform the sociology of growth machines (Logan and Molotch 1987) and, more recently, place branding (Ermann and Hermanik 2018). These authors have paid less attention to the mutually constitutive relationship of racial scripts for the myths that places create for the purposes of economic growth.

Sociologists have recently turned to settler colonialism as a way of approaching the intersections between race and capitalism (Glenn 2015). In U.S. history, the theory can often be used deterministically, always producing the same outcome. In this paper, I show that, when refracted through each city's unique cultural and economic posturing, the logic of settler colonialism led to different racial scripts in the three cities. I highlight two major differences from the classic settler colonial model based on land and labor (Wolfe 2001). First, where organized, white labor was strong and part of the growth machine coalition, other non-white races could not be depicted as ideal, productive laborers within the urban myth—unions were not

willing entice would-be investors with a racial script of cheap, non-white labor. Second, the growing geopolitical strength and wealth of Asian countries led to a reassessment of some non-white races as now being potential sources of capital. The potential of capital investment from Japan and China to forward the settler colonial project changed the racial calculus of city boosters. I show that cities' racial scripts changed in ways not predicted by current settler colonial theory that often simplifies colonialism as an exclusively white and Western process.

In the following section I review the literature on the intersections between culture, economy, and place, and the theories of race and settler colonialism. For each of the three cities, I describe how the Fair started and why and how the different urban myths came to be, along with the significance of race in the planning process. Finally, I show how different racial groups were depicted at each fair in line with the urban myths each city was seeking.

GROWING A CITY WITH URBAN MYTHS

Place branding is becoming increasingly popular today as a government strategy to boost the economic value of a city, region, or country. This branding seeks to increase the symbolic value of culture, identity, and authenticity as a post-industrial goal to imbue middle-class values onto commodities to increase profit without changing the cost of production (Bandelj and Wherry 2011). In the last few decades, countries and regions have been putting money in their tourism boards and creating culture offices to increase tourism and the value of their exports (Rivera 2011; Wherry 2006). This phenomenon has developed to the point that there is even an annual conference for national brand managers.[1] These brand managers understand that they are changing nothing material about the commodity but are increasing its price by changing the

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[1] See the International Conference on Advances in National Brand and Private Label Marketing: http://www.nb-plmarketing.org/.

symbols, values, and cachet that come with a commodity's purchase. While developing countries have recently seized on this notion within the current globalized economy, the idea itself is not new. For example, the 19th century Thai government went to great lengths to promote itself and its goods in World's Fairs to show that it had an exotic history with symbolic value. It sought to highlight that it was a never-colonized, civilized country that should be considered an equal by the world's powers (Wherry 2008). The Thai government sought to develop a unique brand different from other Southeast Asian countries to compete on the global stage in terms of cultural value instead of tangible quality.

Researchers have found similar goals underlining the importance of branding for cities within the U.S., from Atlantic City to New Orleans to San Antonio (Bremer 2004; Simon 2004; Souther 2006). Walter Firey (1945) highlighted a cultural approach to understanding the economic value of symbolism and sentiment to urban development. He emphasized that these symbols are not just for outside consumers but create attachments and meanings for residents. Harvey Molotch (1967) took these ideas further showing that residents with these sentiments organize to protect the places they hold emotionally and culturally special while looking to further enrich them. The cultural value of a place is meaningful to create economic value for exports and for the psychological benefit of residents living there.

Organizationally, the creation of culture value takes the form of the growth machine (Logan and Molotch 1987). City growth and its increasing valuation are the goals that most of the powerful people within a city can agree on (Peterson 1981). A growth machine is rarely a formal organization, but is a coalition of elites, business owners, media, politicians, real estate developers, and even labor unions, that see growth as improving their wealth, clout, and power within the city (Logan and Molotch 1987). Growth machines are a constant of city life and are

the main actors in interurban competitions for capital investment. Many parts of the growth machine may not agree on any other urban issue, but they can agree on growth. This provides a large constraint when it comes to building an identity for a place. The growth machine's urban myth needs to be agreed upon by enough of the coalition to provide a semblance of authenticity (Regnault 2011).

This is because authenticity itself is socially constructed and contested (Grazian 2003). To be legible as a brand, a city needs to invent a myth of its history and value for its own residents and to potential investors. To be legible to outside audiences it needs to be performed well by all the insiders (Grazian 2004). It is a performative strategy of impression management (Goffman 1959). The myth must appear internally consistent, be reasonable to local residents, make sense to outsiders who may know little, and be agreed upon by enough members of the growth coalition to make the performance appear comprehensive and ubiquitous (Grazian 2003; Regnault 2011; Wherry 2008). The successful creation of an urban myth is quite the social achievement. Myths cannot be chosen at random. They cannot be chosen to only fit the instrumental, profit-seeking goals of the growth machine. Myths must have some believed basis in a place's history or nature. That basis could be fictional, but it must be believed (DeLyser 2005). Neither can a myth be chosen for its broad feeling of truth and objective basis if it does not promote enough, the right kind, or the diversity of growth that the wide variety of boosters may desire (Regnault 2011). For existing cities and cities with long histories, past successes and history offer a broad repertoire of prior successful and appropriate myths to choose from. Mythmaking for a town on the rise is a much more difficult achievement. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the cities of Portland, Seattle, and Los Angeles were barely known in the U.S.'s psyche, let alone the world's. The meaning of the city to both insiders and outsiders was

not clear. Boosters needed to settle on a myth with enough truth to residents, tourists, and capitalists that could feel authentic but that would also induce investment, not just after the Fair, but simply for the purposes of putting on the Fair itself.

History and Race in Placemaking

Often discussed in post-industrial or neoliberal terms, the literature on place branding often assumes that it is a recent phenomenon. However, there was a brief window when branding became a well-understood industry and had major consequences for cities' futures. Advertising was professionalizing in the late 19th century. This was also a time of economic liberalism and globalization, where goods flowed relatively unimpeded. Just like the post-industrial values of the 21st century, this was a time when creating symbolic value was a way for cities and nations to increase the value of their goods (Kühschelm 2018). From World War I to the end of the Cold War, however, protectionism, Keynesianism, and war industries put national governments in a dominant position in picking the winners and losers of interurban economic competition (ex. O'Mara 2005). The turn of the 20th century was a golden age of place branding. Place branding was carried out to its fullest extent at World's Fairs. These Fairs became a tool for places to attract tourism and business (Kühschelm 2018). To hold a successful World's Fair, a place required a myth. For example, Philadelphia's Centennial Exposition in 1876 kicked off this era by celebrating the birthplace and founding of U.S. democracy on the Declaration of Independence's centennial.

Part of the purpose of the World's Fair was to highlight diversity of the world's cultures and people, but also of a cities' access to those trade markets. In doing so, it could be advantageous for a city's Fair to also highlight the diversity of the city's own residents. The diverse World's Fair, as a placemaking strategy, required Western cities to grapple with and

present their racial diversity and urban myth together. I will show how race and myth structured each other in the interurban contest for economic growth.

The decisions city boosters made at this time would have strong ripple effects for cities' futures. A successful myth did more than help put on a one-time festival or bring in short-term investment. For current residents and business owners, how they view and make sense of their home changes how they act, the kind of products they sell, and the communities and social actions they seek out (Small 2004; Wherry 2011). These views further perpetuate and build upon the myth, not just in the amorphous world of culture, but in the organizational spaces, built environment, iconography, language, and repertoires present in the everyday interactions people have with place (Molotch, Freudenberg, and Paulsen 2000; Saxenian 1994; Wherry 2011). Through these structural and cultural processes, urban myths are sticky, perpetuating the success or failure of a chosen myth. Tourists, outside investors, and potential future residents also use these myths to guide their action. Tourists help transform places by pushing destinations to meet their expectations (DeLyser 2005; Kyle 2000). When moving to a new city, future residents aware of the myth then seek to continue to enact it once they arrive (Molotch, Freudenberg, and Paulsen 2000). Investors may put money in a place expecting the workforce to act a certain way or to receive benefits from a mythically, business-friendly government (Saxenian 1994; Logan and Molotch 1987).

The residents of a place, either as a central audience and/or creators of the myth are necessary for its success. When this population is racially and ethnically diverse, scholars of place see growth machines as focused on city development, with race as one of many problems to tackle along the way. Instead, I argue that racial understandings are constitutive of urban mythmaking. For example, Logan and Molotch's (1987) analysis of growth machines

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essentialized ethnic diversity as class-based, seeking to ensure future investors that the class and racial structure is stable enough for a quiescent workforce. Alternatively, Regnault (2011) and Wherry (2007) provide a more central place for race, describing how nations might highlight one indigenous culture or practice as being a central part of a national myth, but this decision ends up erasing a country's other indigenous cultures. While they show the negative racial results of branding, these authors' studies often begin after the critical decision of myth has been mind. Race, I argue, plays a central role in determining the authentic myths available to place boosters.

RACIAL SCRIPTS OF SETTLER COLONIALISM

A settler colonial perspective sees racism in the U.S. as relational, specific, and tied to capital. The racial scripts applied to one group are not independent from the racial scripts of another (Molina, HoSang, and Gutiérrez 2019). In settler colonialism, racism is not an undifferentiated, all-encompassing institution of oppression but is particular to the surrounding economic and historical context. Settler colonialism seeks to understand how the demands of capital, expansion, and empire interrelate with racial difference to racialize some groups differently than others (Wolfe 2001). In the West, the myths of the frontier and Manifest Destiny, the wars against indigenous communities that continued into the 1890s, and the growth of cities and capital on the West Coast were part of a settler colonial project (Glenn 2015). World's Fairs were an accomplishment of a settler colonial state, formally and explicitly combining modernity's rhetoric of progress, property and individualism, on top of a recently colonized and settled space (Mignolo 2007).

Patrick Wolfe (2001) identifies two central goals of the settler colonist: land and labor. The economic logic of settler colonialism was to control the land and make it economically

productive through privatization and the coercion of labor. For the American Indians that were on the land white settlers wanted, this meant elimination (Wolfe 2006). Either from death, removal from territory, or assimilation, the technique of elimination required a racial script that justified it (Glenn 2015). Labor was a different issue. Labor required control over bodies, the categorization of the dominated as lesser peoples, and hence segregation and slavery. After the Civil War in the U.S., American Indians were seen as assimilable, dying out, and part of history, while Black people were seen as a lesser race meant to labor (Wolfe 2001).

Wolfe's (2001) analysis is careful to show that this is contingent on place. He analyzes multiple settler colonial states and highlights both the similarities and differences between them. Settler colonialism is built on shared primary organizing logics, but the resulting racial scripts can vary. Settler colonialism is a "structure" that continues through time (Glenn 2015; Wolfe 2006), but not one that dictates specific racial scripts. In recent works, "settler colonialism" has taken on a faddish quality that is used uncritically to explain of why a group is racialized the way it is today. Settler colonialism does not dictate specific categorizations, meanings, nor racial scripts. Rather, the resulting racialization within the settler colonial structure is highly contingent on place, the needs for land and labor, and its geopolitical setting (Wolfe 2001; Glenn 2015).

At this moment of Western history, racial categorization was still rapidly evolving, and settlement was not yet fully accomplished. This period offers an opportunity to witness the racial options available to settlers. Different cities chose different racial scripts to suit their own economic goals that were still aligned with the land and labor needs of empire and settlement. The resulting racial scripts were also conditioned on the urban myths the city boosters created. While racialization from settler colonialism today may be seen as nationally uniform, the World's Fairs reveal that there are also differences across specific cities within the nation. While

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a dominant national racial script eventually appeared, the 19th and early 20th centuries show the many scripts that were possible within the settler colonial structure. In this paper I analyze these three World's Fairs to show the possibilities of urban myths and racial scripts and show how the growth machines came upon a believable fit between them.

Two main features of the West Coast created intercity variation of racial scripts within the settler colonial framework. First, settler colonialism's theme of racializing a labor source conflicts with the goals of well-organized, white labor unions. While many scholars have written about the lack of power of organized labor in the U.S. (Eidlin 2018; Voss 1993), the West Coast is an exception. San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle all had strong white labor movements capable of winning elections and controlling production well into the 20th century (Haydu 2008; Kimeldorf 1988; Schwantes 1982). In these cities, unions formed critical pieces of growth machines and had a voice in determining cultural definitions and meanings of the cities' people. While most unions engaged in racist exclusion, they should be expected to resist the "Negroization"—racialization of a group as subclass of laborers, akin to Black slaves and sharecroppers (Aarim-Heriot 2003)—of non-white communities. This was the case in San Francisco, for example, where the rise of the Workingmen's Party was built on the phrase, "The Chinese Must Go!" The white laborers did not depict the Chinese as productive workers, but as enslaved foreigners who did not belong in the settler colonial dream and could be deported back to where they came from. White labor built a new racial script of foreignness under settler colonial constraints (Glenn 2002). The Chinese were not seen as assimilable into Whiteness, and while they were initially welcomed by urban elites, they were not accepted by the growing white labor movement. The solution for "The Chinese Problem" was foreign exclusion (Kim 1999). Importantly, as I will show, foreignness was a new and effective racial script in San Francisco,

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but it did not fully determine the eventual racial scripts Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle boosters would use to describe their Asian communities.

Second, the West Coast was also home to another new, rarely discussed phenomenon— the allure of the non-white capital investor. Wolfe (2001) and others often leave out the need for capital as critical factor of settler colonialism. The West required immense amounts of capital to settle, control, and modernize (Cronon 1991). Scholars typically assume that the capital for settler colonialism comes from Europe or the dominant whites of previously colonized states. This was not necessarily the case on the West Coast. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries both China and Japan formed large potential sources of capital that city boosters and the national government were eager to attract (Jacobson 2000; Azuma 2019). What happens to racial scripts when the settler colonial project becomes reliant on non-white capital? As I will show, Portland and Seattle, both of which sought to court Asian investors, used different racial scripts in line with their urban myths that often praised these communities. In perhaps a foreshadowing of the model minority script, these communities could not be fully brought into Whiteness, but were still courted and placated for their potential value.

A settler colonial framework reveals how racial scripts are tied to the factors of production and the colonial project in West Coast cities. The cities did not just directly apply dominant racial scripts but created modifications of prior racial repertoires to suit their local needs. This created constraints and possibilities as boosters set about to plan their fairs.

WEST COAST FAIRS: CONTEXT AND COMMUNITIES

The end of the 19th century was a time of rapid expansion of West Coast cities as settler colonialism gave birth to urban agglomerations of capital. In the early 1850s, the California gold

rush had brought the first wave of settlers to the West Coast and quickly built up its first major city, San Francisco. For the next 40 years, San Francisco stood alone as the only metropolis on the West Coast. The transcontinental railroad reached the navigable waterways of San Francisco Bay in the 1860s, but it was not until the late 1880s and 1890s that railroads began connecting to other terminuses along the West Coast. Whenever any city on the West Coast became a railroad terminus, it experienced a population and real estate boom. The second wave of immigration to the U.S. could now more easily traverse the country and arrive on the West Coast. This timing coincided with the U.S.'s military plans and their pivot to the Pacific Ocean. The Spanish-American War in 1898 resulted in the colonization of the Philippines and a new trade relevance of the West Coast spurred on by Theodore Roosevelt's imperial projects. Japan's quick rise as a military force and potential trade partner gave the U.S. a unique economic advantage over Europe that it sought to exploit. The Alaskan Gold Rush at the end of the 19th century brought further settlers and industry to the Pacific Northwest. These series of events had finally brought relevance and capacity to West Coast cities who turned to the repertoire of the Fair to capitalize on this development and attention.

Within the humanities, World's Fairs have been a historical site for the study of gender, race, performativity, and exclusion. These authors have found that while fairs are performances of forward-looking myths, the ideologies the myths espouse have real consequences on inequality and the direction of the country (Bank 2002; Graff 2012; Palm 2010). Mostly studying Chicago's 1983 Columbian Exposition, these scholars have seen the holding of the Fair as a critical turning point in the increased political power for women (Gautier 2006; Olsen 2008; Palm 2010), the regression of equality for Blacks (Cook 2007; Gautier 2006; Hochman 2006; Rudwick and Meier 1965; Rydell 1978), and the full entrance of the U.S. into an age of empire

(Domosh 2002; Rydell 1984). All these scholars see World's Fairs as a crucial research site to study changing and institutionalizing meanings of gender, race, and political power.[2]

The Fairs on the West Coast were an order of magnitude smaller than the Columbian Exposition. This was partly practical but was also a political decision. Los Angeles's Fair, La Fiesta de Los Angeles ("La Fiesta"), was a weeklong event that occurred annually from 1894-1897. While it is not best described as a "World's Fair" it had the same goals and similar design compacted into a single week. At the same time La Fiesta was born, economic elites in Portland began discussing the possibility of holding a fair in their city. In the summer of 1905 Portland held the Lewis & Clark Centennial and American Pacific Exposition and Oriental Fair ("Lewis & Clark Exposition"). Lastly, inspired by Portland's success, Seattle followed with the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition ("A-Y-P Exposition") in the summer of 1909. From just their names, there is a clear point of internationalism to each fair. Each occurred as the city eclipsed 100,000 residents and sought to continue their growth. The Fairs sought to put their new cities on the map of the United States and in the minds of investors.[3]

Given the diversity of these cities' residents demographically I focus this paper on only a few communities in each city. In each city I focus on at least one white immigrant and ethnic identity (German Jews and/or Scandinavians), at least one Asian identity that could potentially offer capital (Chinese and/or Japanese), and a non-white identity that could not (Mexicans or Filipinos) to compare and identify the dimensions of foreignness, race, and indigeneity. All except the Filipinos made up at least five percent of the city's population and were in the top five

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[2] Due to space constraints, this paper does not discuss issues of the portrayals of gender and intersectionality in the Fairs.

[3] Although San Francisco held a Midwinter International Exposition in 1894 and a Panama-Pacific International Exposition in 1915, I do not include the city in this comparison. As a much larger, older, wealthier, and notable city at the time of its expositions, its goals, possibilities, and meaning of the Fairs were quite different from those of Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle. Its urban myths and racial scripts had largely been established (Ethington 1994).

most populous identity groups in the city where I discuss them. I include Filipinos because they were a frequent topic of newspaper coverage, highlighting their prominent place in the Fair and city's psyche.

DATA AND METHODS

These comparative cases are based on an extensive review of archival records in California, Oregon, and Washington. For each case, I visited the government archives of the city, county, and state, the local library, any major private collections, and the local flagship university. In each place I also contacted the focal ethnic communities to learn from their community historians and explore their archives if they had any. All three fairs had a major history written about it that provided a valuable starting point, but each history had blindspots that the comparative nature of the project helped to expose. Luckily, these fairs and the political processes behind them have been well-documented and preserved. Unfortunately, many of the experiences of the communities most severely impacted by the Fairs have been erased. I have made many efforts to try to find these sources, and do not make any assumptions about how communities and individuals felt about what was happening unless I had primary evidence. I aim to interpret the process and portrayals that are well-documented and not explore the motives and feelings of the marginalized communities involved.

I proceed with two findings section. The first analyzes the founding and funding of the Fairs. These histories reveal the urban myths that the Fairs created and what racial scripts appeared in the organization, operation, and initial planning of the Fairs. The second section looks at the actual production of the Fair and how racial scripts appeared in the Fairs' portrayals. This organization is not meant to suggest that the urban myth then influenced the racial script nor

vice-versa. As a point-in-time, I cannot suggest strong causal directions between the urban myth and racial script. Racial scripts often <u>appear</u> most prominently only after the urban myth has been created. This is not to suggest that the racial scripts came later. The resulting configurations show a fit between myth and script, settler colonial logic and city histories, that strongly suggest a mutual structuration process.

CREATING AN URBAN MYTH: FOUNDING AND FUNDING THE FAIR

The Tightly Controlled Fiesta

Max Meyberg was born in Germany in 1850. He arrived in Los Angeles with his brother in 1875, quickly became integrated in the Jewish clubs and communities of the city, and married into one of the wealthiest families of the city, also of German-Jewish descent.[4] In 1885, Los Angeles was made the terminus of the Santa Fe Railroad and the following rate war between railroads led to a boom in real estate values and population. In 1888 the bubble collapsed, and Los Angeles lost population and economic value. After a few cautious years, Meyberg and other city merchants created the Merchants' Association to bring back the city's economy. They sought to do so in a more careful and cautious way. The Merchants' Association, the recently recreated Chamber of Commerce, and the new Manufacturers' Association wanted to build back the city on their terms, not on the terms of railroads and outside speculators (Issel 1988). Meyberg's idea was a fair that could bring desirable migrants to Los Angeles and highlight the city's unique history and culture.

The newspaper owners, some of the wealthiest and most powerful city residents, shared this goal. Harrison Gray Otis, the founder and owner of the *Los Angeles Times* had recently won

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[4] Max Meyberg, n.d., GC 1383, box 41, Historical Society of Southern California Collection (2018 Donation), Seaver Center for Western History, Los Angeles County Natural History Museum, Los Angeles, CA,

a years-long battle against the Typographical Union and had publicly claimed his goal of making the city an open shop unfriendly to unions. This was a propitious time for the elite who could take firm control of the cities' politics and economic life (Erie 1992; Issel 1988). This is what a fair could help achieve. An editorialist for the *Times* came up with the name "La Fiesta de Los Angeles" to honor the city's Spanish, but not Mexican, past. Less than a decade prior, Helen Hunt Jackson had published her novel *Ramona*. Partially written while staying with one of Los Angeles's boosters, Jackson intended the novel to have the effect of an *Uncle Tom's Cabin* for the plight of the American Indians. Instead of doing so, the popular novel's idyllic and bucolic scenery became entrenched in readers' minds. By 1890, tourists visiting Southern California, and Los Angeles were in search of a fantasy Spanish past that they had read in the novel (DeLyser 2005). This developing reputation was a myth the boosters of the city could easily build on.

The first goal of La Fiesta was short-term: to uplift the economic ills that the city had faced since 1888 (Spalding 1931). The hope was that La Fiesta could also bring upper and middle-upper class visitors to the city who would be enticed to become permanent residents and whose economic pursuits would not require hiring much labor (Brook 1904). Outside investment in the city was a secondary and cautious goal of La Fiesta. Having been harmed by the outside interests in the previous decade, the city's wealthy wanted to ensure control over city growth. For example, when discussing the need for more hotels in the city the Chamber of Commerce endorsed the resolution to "induce, if possible, Eastern capital, <u>assisted by a considerable amount raised locally</u>, to venture into this enterprise" (Chamber of Commerce Minutes, March 2, 1894, pg. 356, emphasis added). Portland and Seattle, by contrast, were happy to welcome capital in any form.

Meyberg was put in charge of the festival planning with support from the Merchants'
Association and the Chamber of Commerce. Control of the Fair by local business interests was
one of the main considerations in the Fair's operation and funding. Support from the California
or federal Governments was out of the question, as was giving control to a broader swath of the
city residents. The organizers concluded the Fair had to be small because the funding came
mostly from the city's own business interests. They raised $30,000 from companies in town
including a significant, but limited amount from the railroads who hoped to profit off the event
(Wielus 1946; Workman 1935).

The 10-member executive committee had three German Jews, an additional two
immigrants, and was made up of Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant members. In elite
remembrances of Los Angeles history, this committee was the paragon of patriotism and
citizenship. It is notable that a German-immigrant Jew led a committee on building the myth of a
fantasy Spanish Catholic past that was inspired by Mexican and American Indian life. Yet, this
was to be a symbol of the patriotic spirit of the festival (Wielus 1946). The Spanish background
was a historical strategy to differentiate Los Angeles from other cities in the U.S.; Los Angeles
was now the largest city in the U.S. that had also been a major town under the Mexican
government. In the planning for La Fiesta, white immigrant and ethnic differences were
flattened. The important identity for the capitalism Los Angeles sought to build was whether
someone was invested in long-term local land values. For example, what differentiated Mexicans
from Spaniards at this time was that Spaniards were Mexicans who owned land (Almaguer
1994). Celebrating a Spanish past meant that the Catholic, non-English speaking Spanish were
assimilable in the history of the city. This necessitated that other non-Protestant, non-English
speaking Europeans were also assimilable, and could be part of the land-owning elite. The urban

myth of a fantasy Spanish past helped consolidate a diverse elite of variegated Whiteness (Jacobson 1998).

Portland Residents to Host America's Fair

The direction of the Lewis & Clark Exposition was not to be tightly controlled by an elite but was to be firstly, for all residents of Portland, and secondly, for all residents of the United States. Individual boosters developed the idea for an international exposition in Portland as early as 1895. While leaders wanted an exposition to boost the economic prospects of the city, they felt that they needed a broader mission to get funding beyond the elite business interests. The variety of myths that early boosters conceived of were never broad enough to bring together a large enough growth machine coalition that a World's Fair demanded. The actual idea and support for the Lewis & Clark Exposition did not come from a business group (many of whom had given up on finding unifying theme by 1900), but from the Oregon Historical Society. Like in Los Angeles, these myths do not necessarily derive from a business elite focused on shorter term profits, but often come from other groups that might better capture the city's ethos. In December 1900, the Historical Society passed a resolution to send letters to Oregon's Congressional delegation and to the Governor to pass appropriations to fund an exposition in Portland in 1905 to honor the centennial of the Lewis and Clark expedition. This gave the exposition idea a sudden burst of approval. In a clear call to settler colonialism, Portland boosters sought to tie their urban myth to the success of Manifest Destiny and Western expansion. This idea would connect Portland with the rest of the U.S., which was a distant location for visitors, business, and tourists. Celebrating Lewis and Clark also meant celebrating the entire state, not just the city of Portland, a clear need if the Fair was to receive state appropriations. Early in 1901 the Oregon Legislature pledged state aid, created a commission to study the prospects, invited

states, the federal government, and other foreign countries to participate, and permitted the city of Portland to start raising tax revenue. Curiously, the state resolutions did not use "Lewis and Clark" or "Northwest" (the words the Historical Society used) to refer to the Fair but called it instead the "Oriental Fair." It turns out that what was more convincing to the state legislature was less the history and more the state's economic connection to Asia—enticing Chinese and Japanese capital and the ability to enter the Asian market was a big selling point.[5]

Later that year, city boosters incorporated a private corporation to run the fair called, "Lewis and Clark Centennial and American Pacific Exposition and Oriental Fair," although none of its members could ever recite the full mouthful of the name. This name highlighted U.S. history and the promise of Pacific trade. Many of the corporation's officers were German, and its long-term 1st Vice President and eventual President was a second-generation German Jew. The Oregon government's official support altered the opinions of the local businessmen who had been cautiously and skeptically waiting for appropriations. The Manufacturers' Association, Board of Trade, and Chamber of Commerce all began contributing to the effort. Their next two priorities were getting money from the people of Portland and the U.S. government.[6]

In November 1901, the Lewis & Clark Corporation prepared to canvass Portland to find subscribers to the capital stock. The Corporation set out to raise $300,000, ten times what Los Angeles had set less than a decade before. The Corporation board created a large organizational apparatus and a long list of people to fundraise from. The board arranged 17 committees of three people each to fundraise from different types of businesses and neighborhoods in the city. On November 18th they added an 18th committee, an "Oriental Committee," to raise money from the

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[5] History of the Lewis and Clark Centennial Exposition by Henry E. Reed, MSS 383, box 9, Henry E. Reed Papers, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, OR.
[6] Ibid.

Chinese, and small number of Japanese, in the city. At this stage, the resources the Corporation was dedicating to raising money from the city's Asian residents was identical to the resources it put towards banks or manufacturers. In a few weeks' time, the corporation would add a few dozen more committees, but the early date of the Oriental committee emphasizes its importance to the organizers. The Corporation also invited Chinese residents join the committee to help with the canvas, although none ended up conducting the fundraising. After two days, the Oriental Committee raised $1,520 and were annoyed that "another committee saw fit to invade our Territory" and had raised an additional $1,150. The eventual rate of delinquency among Asian subscribers was below average in the city.[7] This was a very small percentage of the $417,000 the Corporation raised in those two days. The considerable effort to raise the negligible amount of funds in a non-exploitative way from the Asian community demonstrated an early and earnest desire for the Chinese to be part of Portland's economic future.[8]

Turning to Washington, D.C., fair organizers targeted their pitch on patriotism and the goal of the Exposition to celebrate the United States as a whole. This was not just meaningless rhetoric to convince Congressmen, but a strong belief the organizers carried with them. In speeches before Congress, representatives from the Corporation and the Oregon congressional delegation repeated the history of the Lewis and Clark expedition relentlessly. This was the myth that had caught on in Portland. As articulated by Senator Mitchell of Oregon:

> It is respectfully and confidently suggested that no other historical event in our national existence of an individual nature has done so much toward the development of American occupation and settlement, American commerce, domestic and foreign, and American civilization as has the geographic, scientific, and military

[7] List of Stockholders of Lewis and Clark Centennial and American Pacific Exposition and Oriental Fair who Have Paid One or More Assessments, but Who Have Not paid in Full, December 5, 1905, MSS 1609, box 1, folder 4, Records (Lewis & Clark Exposition), Oregon Historical Society, Portland, OR.
[8] Board Minutes, 1901, MSS 1609, box 1, folder 2, Records (Lewis & Clark Exposition), Oregon Historical Society, Portland, OR.

expedition across the then track-less American continent by
Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark one hundred years
ago.[9]

The U.S. government appropriated about $450,000 in addition to the State of Oregon's

appropriation of $500,000.[10]

The fundraising actions and rhetoric all served to Americanize the diverse residents of

Portland. A common refrain in the speeches about Lewis and Clark portrayed Portland as the

embodiment of the goals of Thomas Jefferson; Oregon could be the home of the republican

farmer. In calls to Jefferson and Frederick Jackson Turner,[11] Portland was claiming the West

settled and wanted to show off its occupation, modernization, and democratic republic that its

settlers had created (Turner 1893). Doing so in a city that was one of the nation's most diverse

was controversial at best. Americanization of the entire community, whether they be Asian,

Jewish, or Catholic became a key part of the urban myth if the idealized Jeffersonian America

was to be realized. Figure 2-1 shows the logo created for the Fair, emphasizing the dream of the

U.S. manifesting itself through Lewis and Clark when they reached the West Coast. They are led

by Columbia, a symbol of Manifest Destiny, from John Gast's 1872 painting, *American

Progress*.[12] As Figure 2-1 and Senator Mitchell's quote suggests, Portland saw its capitalistic

interests as being aligned with the identity of America and direct connections to U.S. commerce,

settlement, and civilization. Everyone in Portland was seen as being able to serve that interest

and be vested in it. For instance, when deciding the contentious question of whether to keep the

Fair open on Sundays, the private committee meeting's records said, "the people feel a strong

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[9] Speech of Hon. John H. Mitchell, of Oregon, in the Senate of the United States, Thursday December 17, 1903. Washington, D.C. Accessed as E660 .M5 v.2, Oregon Collection, University of Oregon Special Collections and University Archives, Eugene, OR.
[10] History of Lewis and Clark Exposition, Henry E. Reed Papers.
[11] Turner presented his famous frontier thesis at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893.
[12] Columbia is understood as a personification of the United States. Portland is on the Columbia River, the river that Lewis and Clark eventually followed to reach the Pacific Ocean.

proprietary interest in the Fair and its outcome…If it be the will of the masses that this Exposition shall entertain people on Sunday, then we should have open gates."[13] This was far different from the approach Los Angeles boosters had taken.

Figure 2-1. Logo for the Lewis & Clark Exposition.

One difficulty in arriving at the Lewis and Clark myth was racial constraints. Oregon's strong labor movement required labor to be part of the growth machine coalition (Kimeldorf

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[13] Executive Committee Reports 1904, MSS 1609, box 5, folder 18, Records (Lewis & Clark Exposition), Oregon Historical Society, Portland, OR.

1988; Schwantes 1982). This prevented the, mostly laborer, Chinese as being racially scripted as a labor source. But could the Chinese, mostly non-citizens with restricted immigration, be Americans? The state took a different tack. By calling it the Oriental Fair, they enabled the Chinese to be foreigners who could enable trade across the Pacific. By investing in the fair, the Chinese residents of Portland showed their value as a bridge to the China market. This was a possible racial script that was available in the early 1900s, especially as it connected with prior foreignness and expansionist scripts that were already available. However, as the preparation for the Fair continued, everyone forgot that this was to be a "Pacific Exposition and Oriental Fair" and became centrally about the Lewis and Clark myth. The racial script of the Chinese followed suit and, as I will show, city boosters tried to highlight the far less prominent myth that the Chinese could be full-fledge Jeffersonian Americans. The partial Chinese ownership of the Fair became a sign of the patriotism of the Chinese in Portland, and not their ability as foreigners to invest in the city.

Seattle as the Entrance to the Pacific

The mission of the A-Y-P Exposition was set early. The exposition idea came from an Alaskan merchant who was returning from the Lewis & Clark Exposition. On his way back he stopped by the Alaska Club, an organization of businessmen with economic interests in Alaska. He convinced them of the idea of holding an international exposition in Seattle to highlight trade and the conquest of Alaska. The Chamber of Commerce had similar enthusiasm and they set to work with the creating the A-Y-P Exposition Corporation and borrowing its executives almost directly from the Alaska Club. This included its President, J. E. Chilberg, a second-generation Swedish American and president of the Scandinavian-American Bank. The initial goal was to have the Fair in 1907 to commemorate the decennial discovery of gold in Alaska, but that year

had just been claimed by Jamestown, Virginia for its exposition. While the Alaska trade had

stimulated enough initial interest, the lack of a decennial celebration prompted the A-Y-P

Exposition to broaden its goals. City boosters expanded the mission of the Exposition to also be

about the U.S.'s growing Pacific empire. Organizers realized that trade and cooperation with

Canada was essential to Alaskan business and so they incorporated the Yukon. Shortly after that,

organizers also wanted to ensure the participation of Japan, a rapidly growing trade interest.

Then, they sought to attract U.S. government appropriations by highlighting the Hawaiian and

Philippine colonies. The Fair organizers specifically noted that the Portland's myth in the Lewis

& Clark Exposition had failed to follow through on its "Oriental trade" ambitions. This gave

Seattle boosters an opening to promote Pacific trade as their unique economic value in seeking to

outcompete Portland (Stein et al. 2009).[14] The myth of a staging ground for empire and Pacific

trade was partially due to an accident in timing and was partially reactive to Portland's myth.

After the Lewis & Clark Exposition, Portland had seen a rapid rise in migration, land

values, and economic activity (Lansing 2003). Seattle wanted the same, but particularly wanted

to highlight potential government development of its port, industrial, and imperial capabilities.

The fundraising for the A-Y-P Exposition was far easier once organizers could use the example

of the successful Lewis & Clark Exposition. They did a broad canvas like Portland but did not

have to put in as much effort. The Seattle-based corporations that stood to directly profit from

the Fair were eager to sign up for the recently proven model. Seattle's economy was also larger

and wealthier when it sold its stock than Portland had been, so it managed to sell $650,000 in one

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[14] The Organization and Management of the Business of the Alaska Yukon Pacific Exposition of 1909 by J. E. Chilberg, 0296-003, box 1, folder 9, Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition Collection, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.

day. Portland's biggest subscribers had been individuals or their small firms, while Seattle's

were predominantly large corporations (Stein et al. 2009).[15]

Compared to Los Angeles's focus on local businessmen and Portland's focus on all its

residents, Seattle was focused on corporations and international trade. Seattle's trade industries

stood to gain the most from the growing imperial ambitions of the U.S. Seattle also succeeded in

its government appropriations. They secured $1 million from the Washington State government

partly by holding the A-Y-P Exposition on the grounds of the University of Washington where

improvements of the land and permanent buildings would directly benefit state property (Stein et

al. 2009). The federal government appropriation was more complicated than for Portland. The

Jamestown Exposition in 1907 had just defaulted on $860,000 of a federal government loan and

Jamestown left many states with worthless leaseholds on the Exposition grounds. A-Y-P

Exposition's tactic was to not ask for money directly, but only request that the government pay

for presenting its own lands and properties, most importantly Hawaii, Alaska, and the

Philippines.[16] President Roosevelt understood the goal in his December 1907 annual message to

Congress:

> The courage and enterprise of the citizens of the farnorth-west in
> their projected Alaskan-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, to be held in
> 1909, should receive liberal encouragement. This exposition is not
> sentimental in its conception, but seeks to exploit the natural
> resources of Alaska and to promote the commerce, trade, and
> industry of the Pacific States with their neighboring States and with
> our insular possessions and the neighboring countries of the Pacific.
> The exposition asks no loan from the Congress but seeks
> appropriations for National exhibits and exhibits of the western
> dependencies of the General Government.[17]

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[15] History of the Lewis and Clark Exposition, Henry E. Reed Papers.
[16] General Correspondence, Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, 0106-003, box 103, folders 6-9, Edmond S. Meany Papers, University of Washington, Seattle Washington.
[17] Roosevelt, Theodore, Seventh Annual Message, December 3, 1907. Accessed: https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-3-1907-seventh-annual-message.

The hero and symbol of the A-Y-P Exposition was former Secretary of State William Seward. The organizers placed a large statue of Seward at the center of the Exposition grounds. Although Seward never visited Seattle, he is credited with the purchase of Alaska for the U.S., which was materially relevant to the Exposition. Seward was also famous for being one of the earliest, most prominent, and ardent expansionists and supporters of imperialism. By honoring him, the Exposition's goals were clear: overseas trade and conquest.

While Portland sought to showcase the colonization of the West, Seattle sought to showcase the new imperial ambitions of the U.S. A-Y-P Exposition organizers also prioritized appropriations from the Japanese government. Osaka had held its World's Fair in 1903. Seattle industry had eagerly participated in it, and a Northwest resident, Henry Dosch was a commissioner of that Fair. A-Y-P Exposition organizers appointed Dosch to be the head of all exhibits at the A-Y-P Exposition and his first task was to go on a tour of Japan with former State Supreme Court Justice Thomas Burke to convince the Japanese government to participate.[18] It was not the thousands of Japanese residents of Seattle who were seen as capable of helping gain the participation of Japan, nor did they play a role like the Chinese in Portland of co-ownership. As I will show further in the next section, this was part of the foreignization of the Japanese residents of Seattle. Like in Portland, union backing was critical to throwing a successful Fair. With its imperial ambitions, Seattle boosters sought to highlight Japanese commerce but were constrained in not giving attention to Japanese laborers. In doing so, they iterated on the foreignness rhetoric of the Chinese. Like the Chinese, the Japanese were foreign, not local laborers dedicated to the long-term mission of Seattle's economic future. However, the Japanese

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[18] Address of Hon. Thomas Burke At the Opening of the Japanese Exhibit at the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, July 21, 1909, 1483-002, box 32, folder 5, Thomas Burke Papers, University of Washington, Seattle, WA. Dosch was also the head of exhibits at the Lewis & Clark Exposition. History of Lewis and Clark Exposition, Henry E. Reed Papers.

were not to be excluded, they were a complementary foreign <u>partner</u> who could help Seattle and the U.S. reach their goal of Pacific domination. As Figure 2-2, the logo of the A-Y-P Exposition shows, the U.S., the woman in the red dress, Alaska, the woman in the white, and Japan, the woman in the blue, all have valuable commodities to trade and are portrayed as equals.

Figure 2-2. Logo for the A-Y-P Exposition.

Lastly, I noted that in Los Angeles and Portland I saw no signs of the identities of the Fair organizers being relevant to their work. In Seattle this was not the case. Chilberg was a public and staunch advocate for Swedish and, to a lesser extent, Norwegian participation in the A-Y-P Exposition. It was important to him that the Scandinavians of Seattle were celebrated fully and on their own terms (Nordeen 1944; Stein et al. 2009). This may have not worked in with the urban myths of Portland and Los Angeles whose myths were aligned with full assimilation of white ethnics. Seattle's myth of empire, the seat of international expansionism and trade, put it in a unique position to highlight the international quality of its residents.

DISPLAYING DIVERSITY IN THE FAIR

The Discriminatory Fiesta

Max Meyberg claimed that he wanted to use the fair to show off Los Angeles's broad diversity. It was particularly important to him that Chinese and American Indians appear at the Fair (Wielus 1946). *The Los Angeles Times* highlighted the enthusiastic feeling of this diversity, "Not many cities could produce representatives of four out of the five human races, Caucasians, Mongolians, African and Red Men, from the residents of its immediate locality."[19] This quote exhibits many identity processes at once. First, it reifies a eugenics-based racial classification system to the Los Angeles population. Second, it collapses all the white ethnic, religious, and immigrant communities into Caucasians, highlighting their sameness and Americanizing them. Third, where are the Mexicans? They do not fit easily into the racial schema and so are left out, even though they are one of the largest racial backgrounds of people in the city.

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[19] "Fiesta Features: New Attractions Being Added Daily." *Los Angeles Times*, March 28, 1894, pg. 4.

The Fiesta parade provides some answers. The highlight of La Fiesta was the sequence of floats that parade down the main street. The organizing committee prepared the floats to tell the history of the region. The floats show caricatured versions of the Incas, Aztecs, and various indigenous political communities in the U.S. played by white actors. This was a common scene at World's Fairs: the side-by-side display of past civilizations highlighting the backwardness of other races and moving towards modernity (Jacobson 1998). As the parade continues, heroic Spanish conquistadors and missionaries come to tame the "savage," "wild," and "treacherous" Natives.[20] The Fair admits that there are still American Indians, but they are brought in from a reservation to showcase their pre-industrial tools and skills. They are a dying race, not built for modernity.

Yet, Americanization was possible. There were two racial scripts depicting Mexicans in Los Angeles. They are either described as "savage Indians" or "proud Spaniards." This has its basis in a combination of skin color and land ownership (Almaguer 1994; Molina 2004; White 1991). As long as one owned land, they were a Spaniard and eventually an American. The daughters of Mexican landowners, especially if they were light-skinned, were highly sought after by the white elite and these Mexican families became part of an American elite. But if landowners had darker skin and their daughters did too, the Mexican landowners would be steadily dispossessed of their land (Griswold del Castillo 1979). In this way, Mexicans were either Americanized or Indigenized depending on their perceived race and their relation to capital. This constrained city boosters who could not depict Mexicans as a lesser race—many boosters were either married to Mexicans or were the children of Mexicans. Although they did not identify as such, they could not argue that Mexicans were unassimilable or genetically

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[20] La Fiesta de Los Angeles Program, 1895, mssLAT, box 638, folder 1, Los Angeles Times Records, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.

disposed to labor. La Fiesta used the two racial scripts at once, referring to Mexicans selectively as both Spaniards and Indians. Crucially, even if they were Indians, they were still assimilable (Molina 2006), unlike the Black or Chinese communities.

What role did the "Mongolians" and "Africans" play? In the days before the first Fair, members of the Black community and Chinese community raised funds and agreed to participate in La Fiesta.[21] The Black community was offended enough by the experience they did not participate again, while the Chinese community negotiated additional incentives to participate in later years (Wielus 1946). The Chinese community put significant money and effort into their participation, but the press described the Chinese performances with racist awe. Even though the Chinese described clearly in the *Los Angeles Times* "in almost perfect English: 'We will represent an event in our history of 2800 years ago. It was when China was divided into six warring nations…'"[22] *The Los Angeles Herald* described the ensuing display with confusion and racist tropes:

> It was like bedlam on a rampage…The scene presented might have been mistaken for a war between six nations of Chinamen. It was an overdone imitation of a boiler factory in full operation. And all the inhabitants of Chinatown with la fiesta colors entwined in their pigtails, curiosity sticking out of their oblong eyes and a grin relaxing their features were there. They jostled and jammed each other at a furious rate, all anxious to do something, and no one doing it.[23]

This is an unequivocal presentation of the racist script applied to the Chinese. They are described as physically different, as laborers, as a disorganized group not knowing what they are doing. There is an implicit acknowledgement in these quotations that Chinese are local residents

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[21] "La Fiesta. Getting the Musical Programme in Shape." *Los Angeles Times*, March 27, 1894, pg. 7; "Fiesta Features. Normal School Girls Will Take Part." *Los Angeles Times*, March 30, 1894, pg. 4.
[22] "Getting the Musical Programme in Shape," *Los Angeles Times*.
[23] "Viva La Fiesta!" *The Los Angeles Herald*, April 11, 1894, pg. 1.

invested in the Fair, but they are of a lesser race. There is a curiosity and excitement within the Chinese community to participate, loaning La Fiesta a $2,000 banner of red silk and putting together floats worth $5,000 (Wielus 1946; Workman 1935). As described in the 1895 program: "This will be one of the grandest features of the entire week. An allegorical display of Celestial splendor will be presented by a corps of Chinese artists, robed and decorated in the most magnificent array."[24] But the next year this is described as "a grand mingling of the barbaric splendour of three thousand years ago with the softer polish of the later world" (Wielus 1946: 32). Without a strong labor movement and with elites interested in forwarding and open-shop ideology, the Chinese are depicted as a lesser race of resident laborers.

This becomes further apparent later in the week during the tournament of sports. There are five bicycle races of White competitors featuring prizes of jewels, high-quality clothing, and watches, and then one "special race" featuring "Chinaman vs. colored man. Prize, fine pair of shoes."[25] Explicitly Negroized, the Chinese and Black person are compared directly against each other for the entertainment of the White audience. The one who wins gets shoes, a prize worthier for a laborer. The fantasy Spanish past myth did not give explicit room for the Chinese. However, using the settler colonial scripts of segregated, physically distinct laboring race served the purposes of the consolidation of the city's elite and their goals to limit labor migration and push for upper-middle class, white migration. The Chinese were an athletic labor force that could compete with any labor that might be tempted to come into the city. They formed a permanent second-class citizen to be servants and farmworkers to Los Angeles's desired migrants.

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[24] La Fiesta Program, 1895, Los Angeles Times Records.
[25] La Fiesta Program, 1895, Los Angeles Times Records.

The Americans in Portland

The portrayal of the Chinese community was different in Portland. Los Angeles did not have a port at the time of La Fiesta, so trade with Asia was not a reasonable selling point of the city. Portland did have access to Pacific trade. This difference, and the city's urban myths, helped the Portland Chinese community become wealthier and more organized than the Los Angeles Chinese. They were able to make connections to the elite of Portland and become elite themselves. Harvey Winfield Scott, the editor of the *Oregonian* and the second president of the Lewis & Clark Exposition was an outspoken advocate for Chinese rights although he relied on racist tropes to do (Wong 2004). The Chinese participated in the Fair explicitly as U.S. citizens. Although first-generation Chinese immigrants were legally barred from becoming citizens, the Chinese of Portland highlighted their American credentials. The Chinese government did not formally participate in the Fair, but in its stead, the local American-Born Chinese Association, made up of U.S. citizens, prepared the only exhibit representing China.[26] When trade with China was a major economic goal of the U.S. and the Fair, it was Chinese-American citizens of the U.S. that presented what it meant to be Chinese to the world audience.

The Lewis & Clark Exposition featured special days where they highlighted different communities within the city. They reached out to multiple members of the local Chinese community and were disappointed when the Chinese chose not to sponsor a special day.[27] However, the Chinese community did their fair share of participation. In addition to the exhibit, they also built an enormous $10,000 dragon to display for the event, to be manipulated by 200

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[26] Official Catalogue of the Lewis & Clark Centennial, 1905, MSS 1609, box 98, folder 12, Records (Lewis & Clark Exposition), Oregon Historical Society, Portland, OR.
[27] China Day, 1905, MSS 1609, box 26, folder 12, Records (Lewis & Clark Exposition), Oregon Historical Society, Portland, OR.

dancers.[28] Finally, the Exposition empowered the Chinese community to give guided tours of

Chinatown and paid them to print community-authored informational booklets about their home.

The booklet reveals a community amid Americanization. On the first page the authors write, "In

no other place outside the Celestial Empire do we find the Chinese so varied in condition, so

truly heathen and so thoroughly Americanized, as in the Rose City of the West." The next page

displays a picture of the American-Born Chinese Brigade, a military unit of Chinese-American

U.S. citizens dedicated to protecting the country. However, the later pages do describe the

"peculiar" traditions and traits of Chinese people. Seid Back, Jr., a second-generation Chinese-

American, authored the booklet and clearly wrote it for racist outsiders. While disabusing the

reader of some stereotypes, "one never sees a drunken Chinaman," it reifies others, "the

Chinaman clings to his primitive condition."[29] Portland's capitalist goals of the Fair were ones

that claimed universal Americanism. The Exposition gave the decently well-off Chinese

community an opportunity to highlight their American and citizenship credentials.

The Exposition also used a script of Americanization for the local German Jews. On

Independence Day, one of the most popular days of the Fair, the organizers selected a prominent

Rabbi, Stephen S. Wise, to be the keynote speaker for the day. Wise, a German Jew, was the

chosen representative of U.S. patriotism. He himself remarked on this unusual situation, but

makes the argument that his identity makes him even more proud to be an American:

> Such pride as I, a teacher in Israel, may be moved to share at this
> recollection [of the signing of the Declaration of Independence] is
> transformed into the proudest gratitude at the thought of the refuge
> and sanctuary which these United States are become to the Children
> of Israel…Speaking on behalf of my fellow-Jews here and
> throughout the land, I am impelled to declare that no part or class of

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[28] George Lem Newspaper Accounts, Chinese Historical Society of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.
[29] A Trip Through Chinatown, Portland, OR: Lewis & Clark Exposition. Accessed as 917.95 P832H, Oregon State Library.

the citizenship of America surpasses those of the Jewish church in devoted loyalty and in fervent patriotism.[30]

Wise ties Jefferson's signing of the Declaration of Independence to the pride of Jews in Portland—the most patriotic element in the city. The goals and actions of the Fair allow an oft-racialized community to claim patriotism and full whiteness. Both Wise and Back are clearly aware that the racialization of their community is contested, but the Fair's leaders and myths allow both to claim Americanness and belonging.

The Scandinavians in Portland are less explicit in their Americanization, their race was far less contested (Jacobson 1998). In comparison to Seattle, the racial script does become more apparent. Scandinavians do take up the Lewis & Clark Exposition's offer of a special day, unlike the Chinese and the Jews who were both offered and declined.[31] There is a single Scandinavian Day but Baisinger (1981) claims that "Scandinavia Day was little more than name…only a concert in the evening celebrated the day" (53). Another Scandinavian historian referred to the day as "badly broken up" because many Norwegian organizations refused to participate, yet "the event was an eye-opener to everybody. It was not known before that there were so many Scandinavians in these regions."[32] The lack of "Scandinavian" as an identifiable race and community is also evident in the Scandinavian Day Committee led by Rev. Carl Renhard of the 1st Emmanuel Lutheran Church, the largest Scandinavian religious organization in Portland. The same year as the Exposition, Renhard fought to move the church to be next to the wealthy churches of the city despite this being quite a distance for most of the parishioners. That year, he

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[30] History of the Lewis and Clark Exposition, Henry Reed Papers, pgs. 302-303.
[31] China Day, Records (Lewis & Clark Exposition). B'nai B'rith Day, MSS 1609, Box 26, folder 6, Records (Lewis & Clark Exposition), Oregon Historical Society, Portland, OR.
[32] FILC Anniversary Celebrations – 60th Anniversary, 1939, Box 3, Folder 4, First Immanuel Lutheran Church, Portland, OR.

also proposed that English start being used in the congregation.[33] Renhard was the leading Scandinavian of the city, and he was leading his Swedish congregants on a program of assimilation.

The showcasing of Portland's credentials as the embodiment of the Jeffersonian ideal led to an Americanization rhetoric for the Chinese, German Jewish, and Scandinavian communities. Fair organizers faced a more difficult quandary when it came to their plans to host an Igorot (a Native Filipino tribe) exhibit that, in the St. Louis Exposition right before, had been described as grotesque and obscenely racist (Rydell 1984). How would this fit under the Americanization theme? However, due to a logistical mistake, the Filipino performers arrived late in the summer, after most of the Fair was over. Due to the exhibit being empty for most of the Fair, organizers placed the exhibit in a less-trafficked area, so the Igorot exhibit did not garner much attention.[34] As a nation, the U.S. was still trying to understand what role Filipinos played in the country's future. Former President McKinley, right after the seizure of the territory, sought a "benevolent assimilation," with the potential continuing of settler colonialism across the Pacific. President Roosevelt and others now felt it was to be an imperial colony, one to be exploited for its natural resources, and used to gain a larger military and economic foothold in Asia (Jacobson 2000). Portland's urban myth of U.S. expansion through settler colonialism led to the city relying on McKinley's increasingly out-of-favor script of assimilation. The official guidebook referred to the Igorot as "Indians."[35] A curious analogy that Filipinos were not foreigners but were part of the U.S.'s settler colonial destiny. At the Fair, Filipinos were more visible in the form of a 100-strong contingent of Philippine scouts, the islands' constabulary force, that encamped at the

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[33] Ibid.
[34] History of the Lewis and Clark Exposition, Henry E. Reed Papers.
[35] Official Guide to the Lewis and Clark Centennial Exposition, 1905, 505Po B 728, Oregon Collection, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR.

Exposition. An article in the Lewis and Clark Journal of the Fair described their movement from native savage to the potential of a Western, "civilized" character: "The Filipinos represented in the battalion are trim, orderly and soldier-like in appearance, though noticeably small in stature…The commands to both these military organizations are given in English. The bands play American airs…It has the significance of the real work accomplished in the Philippines— the bringing of law and order and discipline out of insurrection and ignorance, of real organization and of teaching the lesson of good government."[36] While making a physiological note, the Fair highlighted Filipinos as assimilable Americans. Like the Chinese, there was also a show of their military willingness, that they were patriotic too. For both Chinese and Filipinos, the Fair organizers encouraged unpopular racial scripts that aligned well with the city's urban myth.

Seattle's Global Frontier

The native Filipinos were a prominent, perhaps the most popular, part of the A-Y-P Exposition. Fair organizers diverged sharply from Portland in the racial scripts they used to describe them. Compared to Portland's settler spirit, Seattle saw the Philippines as a location for empire. The press and Fair organizers exhibited and sensationalized the Igorot people. Chilberg ridiculed their clothing, that the Exposition required them to wear, in private letters and by donning it himself.[37] An ethnology class held at the University of Washington that summer used the exhibit as part of their studies, and school children were given discounted tickets for the education the exhibit could provide. The performers were constantly described as savages and something to be ogled at. The more progressive imperialists looked on them with hope—that

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[36] Lewis and Clark Journal, February 1905, A2010-015, box 1, folder 2, Auditor's Historical Records, City of Portland Archives, Portland, OR, pg, 11.
[37] J. E. Chilbert to Governor M. E. Hay, July 19, 1909, 2G-2, box 5, folder Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, Hay Administration, Washington State Archives, Olympia, WA.

with education and more time among U.S. ideals they might become full U.S. citizens. This was evident in the final day's festivities when the Filipino performers sang, "My Country 'Tis of Thee" to the audience of tens of thousands (Stein et al. 2009). However, the overwhelming spirit of the Fair was that these were foreigners and Asia was a place for exploitation not settlement. Seattle sought to emphasize its economic advantages in accessing the Pacific Islands. Seattle's Fair held multiple racial scripts about what it meant to be Filipino. Unlike in Portland, where only a clear Americanization script fit with their urban myth, Seattle could rely on the popular scripts of the day, both of which aligned with an urban myth of Pacific expansion.

Two of the most visited days at the A-Y-P Exposition were Swedish Day on July 31st and Norway Day on August 30th. Both Swedish and Norwegian communities also claimed additional days for a Norwegian Day and two days for the Swedish Singers convention.[38] There were more Scandinavians in Seattle than Portland but not a five-fold difference to explain the number of celebratory days. Both Swedish and Norwegian communities made the most of their Days, bringing in popular amusements from outside the state, inviting in famous Scandinavian politicians, and creating large performance acts, including dressing as Vikings and rowing a Viking boat across the lake to the Exposition grounds (Stein et al. 2009). The Scandinavians found pride and no contradictions in being Scandinavian and American. As Gunnar Lund, the editor of the Norwegian *Washington Posten* wrote, "At Norway Day the Norwegian banner was borne higher than it has ever been borne in America. The American press has given us similar praise" (Lund 2000: 75). In Portland's urban myth of Americanism, the differences among Europeans were de-emphasized, in Seattle's myth of internationalism and expansionism, the global identities of Europeans could be showcased.

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[38] Comparative Chart of Receipts, 0296-003, box 1, folder 8, Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition Collection, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.

Could the non-European Japanese residents be honored similarly? They differed from Europeans in two major ways. On one hand, they were assumed to be non-white and first-generation immigrants were excluded from citizenship. On the other hand, Japan as a country had become a world military power and offered the promise of major capital and trade. Japan's government was the only foreign country to officially appropriate money and support the A-Y-P Exposition. The Japanese exhibit hall was the only one to be designed and paid for by people outside of the U.S. and Europe. Yet, the exhibit hall featured no representation from the thousands of Japanese living in Seattle and Washington State. Unlike the Chinese in Portland and Los Angeles, the local Japanese community was not represented in visitors' experience of the Fair. The A-Y-P Exposition also gave two days of the summer to honor Japan, but these were about honoring the foreign nation and mostly ignored the local community. The fourth day of the A-Y-P Exposition was Japanese Navy Day. The Japanese Navy brought two ships into Seattle harbor and left one in the harbor for the summer to be present throughout the Fair.[39] In the other two cities Chinatown was a site for visitors to learn more about the Chinese community, the Japantown of Seattle was hidden and subordinated to the symbol of the Japanese Navy. The day after Japanese Navy Day was Children's Day. On that day a chorus of 1,700 local children sang an English version of the Japanese national anthem in front of thousands of families (Stein et al. 2009). This further reinforced the view of Japanese people as foreigners to the residents of Seattle and visitors of the Fair.

Several months later, September 4th marked Japan Day, a day organized by the local Japanese Association of Washington. This was also one of the most attended days of the Exposition, but the locals were overshadowed again by the Japanese foreign dignitaries there to

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[39] Organization and Management of A-Y-P Exposition, Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition Collection.

celebrate the day.[40] The local Japanese were mostly shut out of the banquets and closed-door

sessions with the political and economic elites that marked the day. The press covered the

foreign visitors closely and only referred to the local Japanese as being from "the Japanese

colony."[41] Figure 2-3 shows a group of foreign Japanese business and political leaders that

visited the exposition on Japan Day. While the men are dressed up in almost a caricature of the

Western capitalist, the women are dressed in formal, traditional Japanese attire.[42] The picture

shows how the Japanese balanced the economic demands of trade with the social demands of

foreignness.

The lack of welcome to local Japanese was also explicit. Earlier in 1909, the Washington

State legislature considered two bills that would restrict Japanese immigration and remove rights

from those living in the state. Although the bills were likely direct violations of the prior year's

Gentlemen's Agreement made between the Japanese and U.S. government, the Washington

legislature still pushed forward. It was not until they were convinced that it would negatively

impact Japan's presence at the A-Y-P Exposition that they tabled the bills (Stein et al. 1909). The

Executive Committee of the A-Y-P Exposition was also not favorable to the local Japanese. In

1906, Vice President J. H. McGraw said that "While we all admire the Japanese, we cannot for a

moment approve of their becoming citizens of the republic" (Lee 2007: 290). This opinion was

reinforced by Baron Shibusawa of the Japanese Commercial Commission, "Japanese business

men regard the restriction of the Japanese emigration to America, which, as I understand is now

being enforced at our initiative, as a good thing…As a business man, therefore, I regard the

sending out of cheap labor to this or any foreign country, will prove a great disadvantage to our

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[40] Chart of Receipts, Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition Collection.
[41] Pacific Northwest Commerce, October 1909, 2006.3, box 2, folder 27, Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition Collection, Museum of History and Industry, Seattle, WA.
[42] Ibid, pg. 15.

Figure 2-3. Foreign Japanese Guests at the A-Y-P Exposition. SOURCE: Seattle Chamber of Commerce. 1909. "Seattle Opens Doors of Country to Japanese Commissioners." *Pacific Northwest Commerce* 1(4): 11-19. Pp. 15. In 2006.3, box 2, folder 27, Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition Collection, Museum of History and Industry, Seattle, WA.

home industry."[43] Shibusawa shows deft knowledge of the local situation, highlighting cheap

labor as a main source of contention. The Fair sought to hide the Japanese laborer and did not

use available racial scripts to speak of the Japanese as cheap labor. Foreignness was a racial

script the organizers used, but they altered its valence and meaning. For San Francisco's

Workingmen's Party,[44] Asian foreignness was a way to highlight a lack of belonging and

deportability. For the Exposition organizers, Japanese foreignness emphasized the promise of

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[43] Ibid, pg. 22.
[44] The leader of the Workingmen's Party, Denis Kearney eventually extended his line "The Chinese Must Go!" to "The Japs Must Go!" (Jacobson 2000).

trade, Japan's civilizational attainment, and the goal of peace between the two countries'

imperial ambitions. Japanese leaders reinforced this foreignness, telling the local Japanese

residents that they should be loyal to Japan first and foremost (Azuma 2019).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

> "It is conceded by all who have seen Los Angeles grow, that this first *Fiesta* and the resulting strengthening of the [Merchants'] Association have been among the earliest and, in some respects, the most important elements contributing to the wonderful growth and development of our city." – Harris Newmark (1916: 606)

> "The purpose of the exposition in bringing Portland into the consciousness of the nation was attained beyond expectations…The city tried its wings and found that they were strong." – Henry E. Reed (1930)[45]

> "Aside from the Klondike gold discovery, no single event in Seattle's life returned so many civic dividends." – Henry Broderick (1969: 110)

As the above quotes demonstrate, these expositions left a lasting mark on the cities, at the

very least in mind of the boosters who helped put them on. The boosters' urban myths were

successful. They created a mythical history that the cities have continuously returned to. The

boosters ran the Fairs successfully, building strong memories that are still commemorated in the

cities' histories. The success of these myths has helped hide the fact that these histories were

indeed myths. Each of the cities had other rich histories to draw upon and other geographic or

economic advantages that boosters could have highlighted. Placemaking in this way was not a

search for authenticity, but the attempt to manufacture it by creating an attractive story that all

growth machine participants could agree on. Reaching this agreement was not an easy feat. One

of the greatest constraints was the settler colonial logic. For example, each city had rich

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[45] Reed, Henry E. 1930. "After a Quarter-Century." *Oregonian*, June 1, 1930.

American Indian history that some of the city boosters were aware of and had researched. No city chose to honor that history, even in a way that might demean the American Indians. Unlike Australia, where colonists did highlight indigenous history, the form of settler colonialism in the U.S. West sought elimination and the revision of memory. Within the bounds of settler colonialism and growth machine consensus, city myths did appear to succeed in bringing investment, tourists, and notoriety to a city. In a liberal world order, myths were a strategy for places to differentiate themselves and increase their value. The study of modern place branding should do more to connect and compare today's efforts to those of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. How has the meaning and importance of place in economic value changed from that liberal era to the current neoliberal one?

These myths did far more than bring economic advantage to a city, they informed the racial scripts city boosters used to define their population. Table 2-1 lists the findings of this paper, the urban myths and racial scripts that boosters used in their fairs. These scripts were not random, they all existed as previous ways of understanding race within the U.S. However, they were refracted through the cities' urban myths leading to the selection of certain scripts over others and revised other scripts to best suit the myth. The result is that the Fairs depicted the same community differently in the different cities. This was perhaps most evident for the Chinese and the Japanese. Two prominent scripts previously existed for Asian communities, one of laborers and one of foreigners. In Los Angeles, a town with little trade with China and a proud open shop, the Chinese were depicted as laborers. In Portland, a town with strong, white labor unions and several elite Chinese residents, a laborer script was not tenable among the growth machine. A foreigner script was possible and seemed likely at first, but as the myth crystallized on Lewis and Clark and a Jeffersonian vision, the Fair adopted a lesser-used racial script that the

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second-generation Chinese had been developing—the Chinese-American citizen of the U.S. In Seattle, another town with strong, white labor unions and economic interests in Japan, a laborer script was also not possible. Seattle's leaders turned to foreignness instead, but with a positive salience, showing the importance and value of foreign connections to Japan to boost the city. In this way, racial scripts and urban myths sought matches between each other to keep the growth machine together while telling a cohesive story about the place they were growing.

City	Urban Myth	Community	Summarized Racial Script
Los Angeles	Fantasy Spanish Past	Non-Protestant Europeans	Assimilable Whites, akin to the Spanish
		Mexicans	1) Spanish (see above) 2) "Indians," potentially assimilable
		Chinese	Segregated, physically different, underclass of labor
Portland	Jeffersonian-American Republic	Non-Anglo Saxon Europeans	Assimilable Americans
		Chinese	Assimilable, citizens, halfway on the path of Americanization
		Filipinos	Assimilable, starting on the path of Americanization
Seattle	Internationalist, Imperial Trade Center	Scandinavians	White, Scandinavian-Americans
		Japanese	Foreigners with high potential of trade and investment
		Filipinos	Currently foreign, but: 1) maybe future Americans 2) exploitable colony

Table 2-1. Summary of Urban Myths and Racialized Scripts Used in the Fairs

These different scripts at this time in history show that the racial scripts used today were far from inevitable and offered a variety of futures. All the above scripts were in line with a racist, settler colonial view of the U.S. and the communities in it. The object of future analyses should be to explain why certain scripts "won out" and what happened to the others. Even when one script has seemingly become dominant others were still in use. Scholars assume that after the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese had become perpetual foreigners. More than a decade

afterwards, in their fairs, Los Angeles and Portland are using other racial scripts to depict the community. These scripts clearly have resonance, even if they are not the dominant one.

In this analysis I have also given attention to two factors that lead to different racial scripts among these three towns in settler colonialism. First, strong, white labor movements in Portland and Seattle prevented any group from being racialized as a laboring class. The one city, Los Angeles, that lacked strong, white labor did develop a labor-race rhetoric for the Chinese. Second, the potential investment for the settler colonial project from non-white races also inflected race-making. The Chinese residents of Portland, as investors in the Fair, were given large amounts of control of their own depiction. The Japanese in Seattle were ignored, but as a race, the Fair organizers altered the foreignness racial script to appeal to the potential investors from Japan. White labor, and non-white investment also altered the racial scripts available under settler colonial logic beyond the goals of labor and land domination.

As with the Chinese in Portland, I have also sought to show that the communities themselves were implicated in and/or resistant to the changes they were facing. These racial scripts were not simply imposed upon subjects, but these communities did their best to make decisions about whether they were to participate and how. For example, the Black community in Los Angeles backed out of La Fiesta after a year. In Seattle, one of the Filipino performers pointed out that it was degrading work, but he was getting paid $5 per day compared to the 2 cents per day he was making back in the Philippines (Stein et al. 2009). Whether incentivized or not, the symbols were not solely top-down impositions but also reflected community decisions to participate and how.

While future research should go beyond World's Fairs, this paper shows the study of the major capitalist endeavors of nascent cities as a valuable research site to uncover local capital

goals, changing and ambiguous racial scripts, and their interconnections. This is a period when the future of the city has broad potential options available to it, and where urban history, political and economic goals, and race had multiple possibilities and could be contested. The myths and racial scripts of the Fairs have long-running consequences on these cities, how they developed, and the institutions they built. Research on this crucial period of growth, applies to not just historical research in the age of liberalism, but also to current growing cities in the U.S., and particularly to cities in the Global South, where communities are still defining the meanings and relevance of race and capitalism.

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CHAPTER 3

THE DOUBLE-CONSCIOUS FORMATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE:

CHINESE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S., 1849-1911

CHAPTER ABSTRACT

How does racism influence the formation and development of organizational life in a racialized community? In this paper, I extend Du Bois's concept of double consciousness to explain community organizations' roles and development. Combined with the concepts of oppositional consciousness from social movements and decoupling from organization theory, I build a processual model of organizational life for racialized communities. I show how the model explains the development of 19th and early 20th century Chinese organizations in the U.S., and describes how the community formed an incomparably large, sophisticated, interconnected, and politically-active organizational field at such an early point in U.S. history. The organizations that developed—based in historical Chinese migrant organizations that responded to anti-Chinese racism—looked different from past and contemporary Chinese or U.S.-based organizational fields. This case and theoretical model show the types of organizations and stages of development for the organizational life of communities that face racism.

INTRODUCTION

How does racism influence the formation and development of organizational life in a racialized community? In sociology, many theoretical perspectives have sought to understand the organizational life of racialized communities (Bloemraad, Chaudhary, and Gleeson 2022; Du

Bois 1996[1889]; Dunning 2022; McAdam 1982; Pattillo 1999), but none capture both the breadth of the organizations within the community and its change over decades. There is a good reason why—this is a demanding undertaking. Yet, theories that can answer this question aid researchers in understanding the constraints, opportunities, and roles that any given organization may face in serving its marginalized community. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Chinese community in the U.S. was relatively small (less than 0.5% of the national population) and geographically bounded. For most early Chinese immigrants to the U.S. this was the first time they faced racism directly. They had a rich and abundant organizational life, consisting of multiple organizations with membership counts that rivaled the largest organizations in the U.S. The development of Chinese organizations in the U.S. allows for a historical study over a relatively short period of a small community with a dense organizational life that was experiencing racism directly for the first time. In this paper, I will tell the story of Chinese organizational development in the U.S., while theorizing the lessons that this history has for our understanding of organizational life in racialized communities.

Elsewhere in the U.S. in the late 19th century, W. E. B. Du Bois was studying the impact racism was having on the Black community. *The Souls of Black Folk* takes a deeply phenomenological and data-rich approach to understanding racialization in the U.S. (Du Bois 1903). At its core, the book is a theory of the self, particularly the idea of double consciousness (Itzigsohn and Brown 2015). Although it is not his primary goal in the book, Du Bois also discusses the range of organizations that originate from the experience of double consciousness. In complement to his community study in *The Philadelphia Negro*, Du Bois (1996[1889]) consistently connected racism to Black organizational life. In describing churches, mutual aid groups, universities, and other Black societies, Du Bois described how the experiences of racism

and double consciousness have led group members and founders to participating in the organizational life of their community.

In this paper, I will draw out his theories of organizations supplementing them with two additional perspectives that have made organizational dynamics a central part of their theorizing, either implicitly or explicitly aware of Du Bois's theory double consciousness. In social movements scholarship focusing on racialized groups, researchers have theorized the role of oppositional consciousness and how it forms a necessary component to community organizations, particularly in their political goals (Morris and Braine 2001). Often fostered through organizations' use of traditional and indigenous rituals and symbols, oppositional consciousness holds a power for organizing that motivates novel, "second sight" action and participation by community members (Morris 1992). In organization theory, scholars have paid far less attention to the impacts of racism on community organizational fields, yet they have understood how organizations manage external perceptions that may be antithetical to authentic organizational goals. In the pursuit of external legitimacy and voice, organizations seek to manage their environment by decoupling internally to produce an acceptable face to outsiders while still achieving their core goal (Meyer and Rowan 1977).

In this paper, I will show how Chinese organizational development responded to racism by developing a wholly novel organizational system built out of traditional organizations, ritual, oppositional consciousness, and decoupling. In striking ways, the Chinese system mirrored what Du Bois was witnessing in Black organizational life at a similar point in time. I also seek to highlight the Chinese case for future research. Despite being a small percentage of the country, they created some of the largest organizations in the nation with impressive track records of political activism and mutual aid, both in the U.S. and in China. Furthermore, they were

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successfully organizing in the antebellum period, well before most histories of immigrant-based organizing. Through the case of Chinese organizations and Du Bois's theory of double consciousness I build a processual model of the organizational life of racialized communities.

THE ORGANIZATION OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

Itzigsohn and Brown (2015) separate Du Bois's theory of double consciousness into three separate concepts: the veil, two-ness, and second sight. The veil separates the racialized from the racializing. The veil splits the experiences of the racialized as they exist simultaneously in two contradictory communities—two-ness. These simultaneous positions give racialized subjects a "second sight" that allows them to more fully understand and reinterpret the experience of race, and, in an optimistic reading, remake their worlds in ways the racializing will always struggle to understand. For organization-building, the veil creates a shared consciousness among the racialized that can lay the groundwork for a nuanced and unique understanding of race and identity—a commonality that can bring groups together. Second sight then allows for the potential for imaginative and new missions, practices, and activities through reinterpretations of race and racism.

In *Souls of Black Folk*, Du Bois (1903) describes how these three components of double consciousness led to the creation of diverse organizations and their organizational vitality. In particular, he highlights three different Black organizations that highlight the effects of the veil. The Black Church is his quintessential example of the vitality, beauty, and creative potential of life behind the veil. Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute, which Du Bois vilifies, can be understood as another response to double consciousness. It is only through two-ness that Washington can communicate with and provide a racial solution palatable to Whites. However,

Du Bois argues that this is a solution that deepens the racial structures of society and does not draw upon the richness of Black life behind it. Finally, Du Bois turns to his solution: elite, Black educational institutions. He sees the ideal institution as improving the second sight of its students; celebrating, identifying, and building upon the richness of the world behind the veil; and striving for something far better than the limited world that whites have created.

Alternatively, Du Bois (1996[1889]) in *The Philadelphia Negro* is much less hopeful about the potential for Black organization, saying "The art of organization is the hardest for the freedman to learn, and the Negro shows his greatest deficiency here" (221). This was not the Black community's fault, Du Bois argues, but the legacy of slavery and the prior illegality of organization that prevented the Philadelphia Black community from developing a more productive associational life. He covers mostly two organizations. An early Free African Society created in 1787 that sought to help "people of their own complexion whom they beheld with sorrow, because of their irreligious and uncivilized state." The Society was founded under the idea that "a society should be formed without regard to religious tenets, provided the persons lived an orderly and sober life, in order to support one another in sickness, and for the benefit of their widows and fatherless children" (Constitution of Free African Society quoted in Du Bois 1996[1889]: 19-20). The organization subordinates itself, accepting some racist discourse and looking down on the Black community, but still finding hope in the community's future. This perspective was quite similar, in many ways to Washington's Tuskegee Institute. The organization however, only existed for a short period before breaking into separate churches. The later evolution of those churches is where Du Bois spends most of his organizational focus. They are not just religious centers but are complete institutions, "a government of men" (210). Like the churches in *Souls* these institutions dealt mostly behind the veil combining African tribal life

with the past organized efforts of slaves. Despite having "accomplished much" Du Bois is disappointed that they "are far from ideal associations for fostering the higher life" (233-234). He could not find the promising organizations that he felt could reinvent the Black experience with their second sight.

These examples reveal tensions and similarities between organizations. Du Bois notes that the experience of the veil and two-ness can lead in multiple contradictory directions: those that "avoid every appearance of segregation" and those where a member "prides himself on living with 'his people.'" These are not the only two nor deterministic paths. Du Bois also understands and describes in the two books that the veiled experiences of Blacks in the North will differ from those in the South and will lead to different outcomes. The experiences of the veil are contingent, based on the institutions imposed by the racializing and the attempts at resisting the racial order. In both Philadelphia and the South, Du Bois finds several commonalities: 1) a rich organizational life (ex. he counts 100 mutual aid organizations in Philadelphia in 1838 for under 5,500 Black residents), and 2) complete organizations (churches) based on tradition and ritual.

OPPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In his historical study of Black Philadelphia, J. T. Roane (2023) identifies where Du Bois's missing higher life organizations were. While Du Bois was looking for his second sight organizations among the well-educated population, as he successfully found in the South, Roane instead points to the working-classes of the urban North. Worldmaking, political insurgency, and new racial consciousness of Black collectivity was emerging through the underground gatherings of the Black working-class. Second sight occurred amid the drudgery of economic and social

marginality. It was there that the Black community reinvented their African traditions and generated the possibility of belonging outside of servitude, in organizations like the Divine Peace Mission and MOVE.

This "oppositional consciousness" was coined by Aldon Morris (1992). Pre-existing organizations, either from past community-grown models or from a hegemonic ideal, limit the innovation and potential success of movements (Morris 1984). Oppositional consciousness is a way for racialized groups to find political success. Morris (1992: 363) defines the concept as the "set of insurgent ideas and beliefs constructed and developed by an oppressed group for the purpose of guiding its struggle to undermine, reform, or overthrow a system of domination." This consciousness is not purely race- or class-based but is founded in reaction to the interlocking structures of hegemony. The consciousness is always derived from community-based traditional ritual and culture and may use resources from the hegemonic culture as well. In the Black community, oppositional consciousness almost always comes from the Black Church, whose rituals have consistently been the basis for reimagined tools in local and national organizing (Butler 2007; Pattillo-McCoy 1998; Morris 1984; Weisenfeld 1997). Oppositional consciousness does not develop on its own nor as an independent counterweight to the hegemonic consciousness: "Rather than running along parallel tracks, cultures of subordination and cultures of opposition travel crisscrossing routes with frequent collisions and cross-fertilization" (Morris and Braine 2001). Subordination to hegemonic consciousness can provide opportunities to develop survival strategies and a common language and identity. These opportunities can create the foundation for oppositional consciousness's rhetoric of injustice, while providing a legitimating façade to the dominating outsiders. This segregated underground life gives counterhegemonic communities "free space" in the backstage, behind the veil, to

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continue developing a second sight that can build a cohesive, successful, and innovative movement (Morris and Braine 2001).

Two-ness—the interaction between oppositional and hegemonic consciousness—goes beyond the intangibility of consciousness and into organizational participation. For example, Karen Lacy (2004) studied middle-class Blacks who seek out spaces and community on both sides of the veil. A racialized person's two-ness enabled them to inhabit multiple, contradictory institutions simultaneously. Lacy's interviewees did not have to choose between the White world and the Black world; the veil forces them to simultaneously inhabit both allowing them to participate in both. This choice by organizational members is strategic and multifaceted (Meghji 2017). Roane's (2023) underclass also found their organizational success in fitting in between the more well-to-do life and the "dark agoras" of marginalized Black, working-class life. Rather than inhibiting collective action under repression, participating in front of the veil can give greater cultural material for second sight. If there is an oppositional culture that 1) articulates the injustice of racial oppression, 2) emphasizes familiar, traditional ritual, and 3) can be communicated in "free spaces" among the oppressed, we should expect strong, consciousness-building interactions between the world of subordination and the world of revolutionary action (Eddins 2022; Covin 1997; Evans and Boyte 1986; Morris and Braine 2001). Just as Du Bois uses his discussion of Tuskegee Institute as a rhetorical and teaching tool about understanding racism, seeing cultures of subordination can aid in giving birth to oppositional consciousness.

The development of oppositional consciousness provides a clear processual development of organizational life. There are the indigenous organizations, models, traditions, and rituals from a community's past. With oppression comes initial organizations of subordination in front of the veil. Through two-ness, oppositional consciousness can develop allowing for new and inventive

organizational forms. However, this last step seems unlikely, if not impossible, without the initial

attempts to ascribe to the subordinating, hegemonic consciousness in front of the veil. As I will

show with the Chinese community, they quickly adopted their prior forms of organization upon

arrival in the U.S. In response to racism, they initially built organizations to appease and

subordinate themselves to the white oppressors. Over time, as that strategy proved fundamentally

flawed, and an underclass developed with organizational tools of resistance, new organizations

arose with novel rhetoric and visions of what it meant to be an oppressed Chinese person living

in the U.S.

DECOUPLING AND SEPARATION

How does oppositional consciousness survive when it poses a direct threat to the

hegemonic ideals of White supremacy? What many social movement authors do not address is

how, organizationally, these multiple consciousnesses manifest. What happens when community

organizations undertake oppositional goals when appearing legitimate to the hegemonic ideal is

necessary for survival? This is one of the main questions that has driven the sociological field of

neoinstitutionalism. From its outset, neoinstitutional scholars have argued that what is

cognitively appropriate or legitimate for an organization or individual to do is often at odds with

more rational, productive goals (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Institutional pressures on

organizations frequently conflict, forcing organizations to choose (Zuckerman 1999), develop

intensive administrative structures (Meyer, Scott, and Strang 1987), use the contradictions to

build institutional change (Clemens and Cook 1999), or succumb to crisis and chaos (Vaughan

1997).

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Like the theory of double consciousness, neoinstitutional theory is also based on phenomenological reasoning (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). While neoinstitutionalism has been frequently applied to market, political, and nonprofit organizations and fields, it seldom appears in research on racial or ethnic organizations (Bloemraad, Chaudhary, and Gleeson 2022). How do the conflicts created by the veil impact the field of organizations? The veil creates two institutional worlds with conflicting sets of norms, rules, and schemas (Itzigsohn and Brown 2015). How would neoinstitutionalism see these manifesting at the level of the organizational field? The first answer might be that these two sides of the veil would decouple within an organization (Nelson, Graham, and Rubin 2021). Institutional conflicts can exist within a singular organization as long as the two institutional pieces are kept distant. Chinese organizations do initially attempt decoupling and, throughout the period under study, are able to maintain some decoupling. But as white, racist leaders remain unconvinced of the separation, internal decoupling becomes untenable. When racism continues to impose too many barriers to existing as one whole, organizational separation is possible. This strategy lets the hegemonically legitimate form in front of veil claim formal independence from its less legitimate pieces. This formal separation does not prevent continuing informal fertilization of ideas and strategies. New organizational forms can still be created by combining and iterating on available organizational repertoires (Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005). This is like how Christian rituals have constantly provided a valuable text for novel Black organizing tactics (Morris 1996; Pattillo-McCoy 1998).

While organizations can decouple and separate, individuals cannot and need not. As Lacy (2004) and others have described, individuals live with these seeming contradictions. Further, these contradictions can enable them to better exist as their full selves. If two-ness is an inherent part of the life of a racialized person, living in only one space may not be an authentic expression

of self. Thus, while organizations decouple, we should not expect the same of the members of organizations. Just as the leaders of Civil Rights-era groups consistently worked across organizations (Morris 1996), their members did not have to choose one or the other, but likely were involved in many. This manifold identity stresses the importance of capturing the breadth of organizational life within a community. From the relatively disengaged member to the top leadership, a single organization, mission, or goal is not the only one they are participating in to make their life and their community's life better.

To add decoupling to the processual model articulated above, pre-existing organizations must decouple or separate many of their activities, functions, and goals, to develop models that can successfully challenge hegemonic consciousness. Figure 3-1 displays this ideal-type processual model of organizations that I expect to be developed in a racialized community. Communities start with their pre-existing organizations. They respond to initial racialization through organizations of appeasement. As the nuances of the hegemonic consciousness become more apparent, the community will decouple and separate the parts of pre-existing models that may prevent the organization from legitimately pursuing its political goals for equality. Finally, through racialization and the failure of appeasement, communities develop new organizational forms that respond to racialization, and use second-sight to envision new futures and ways of existing within, and challenging, the racialized society. The result is an organizational field with a rich set of interlocked organizations in front of, behind, and combining the race-based institutions that make up a racialized person's lifeworld.

Figure 3-1. Processual Model of the Creation of Organizations within a Racialized Community.

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DATA AND METHODS

      This paper takes a processual approach to understanding racialization and organizational fields. This approach accounts for the dynamism and changing nature of institutions, organizations, and culture. The nature of this approach when undertaking a history of 60 years in one paper means that I have been parsimonious in identifying the important variables and details in this paper. I have taken aims to present the most accurate data aligned with key organizational developments and racialization in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

      Most of the data for this paper comes from secondary sources. This is because most of the Chinese organizations were based in San Francisco and their records were lost in the 1906 earthquake. However, it is also an opportunity to resurface the extensive work done by community historians and academics that has largely been forgotten, were difficult to publish before race and ethnicity were appreciated academic topics, and were rarely published in peer-reviewed journals.[1] I have gone through extensive effort to track the claims of secondary sources back to their primary source and triangulate data among multiple sources. In this process I visited dozens of archives throughout California, Oregon, Washington State, and Washington, D.C. I also conducted off-the-record interviews with professional and lay historians and the current leaders of many of the groups I discuss in the paper. I do not quote from or use the interviews as data here but have used them to corroborate and provide context to what I was finding in the archives and various secondary sources. A team of research assistants and I uncovered Chinese-language secondary and primary sources that, to our knowledge, had never been translated into English. These provided an additional perspective and a more data to help verify the findings.

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[1] This is not necessarily because the standards were low but because many of the historians felt the recipient of their research should be their community and not other academics.

My qualitative coding scheme involved two tracks. The first track followed racist laws, violence, and rhetoric against the Chinese. The second track looked at the evolution of the Chinese organizational field, the actions and relative sizes of the organizations. Crucial to the paper's question was identifying the relations between events and processes on the two tracks. How did racialization events and trends influence, or were influenced, by Chinese organizations? We can likely never fully tease apart these causal processes. For these relations I rely on multiple historian and primary sources to back up any claims and follow the clear major trends.

There are two significant problems uncovering this history—missingness and bias. There is a lack of voice from the organizations' community members. Most Chinese laborers, the majority of Chinese immigrants, were illiterate and few efforts to record their experience during this period have survived. This is a huge omission in history. As a result, I can only make informed guesses about why these immigrants joined the organizations they did when and what their experiences were in them. There are several studies from the early 20th century that do capture some of these experiences, and so I try to use these to provide face validity to others' claims about the immigrant experience. Second, the two major groups that documented this history were biased. Chinese organizations tended to inflate their importance and significance while white observers tended to use their information for racist and/or political purposes. This made triangulation of the data doubly important. I coded primary and secondary sources for their motivations and audiences. I specifically valued data points where an author's claim appeared to be counter to the author's goals.

FINDINGS

On November 19, 1849, the Chinese community of California was organizing. Already one of the largest ethnic communities in the soon-to-be state, the Chinese likely understood the importance of building an organizational presence in their new home. On that day, about 300 Chinese immigrants attended a meeting at the Canton Restaurant in Jackson Street. They voted unanimously on a formal resolution to hire a white, U.S.-born counselor and advisor to work with the U.S. population. The celebration of the event involved Mayor Geary and other prominent city officials.[2] Simultaneously, small handfuls of Chinese immigrants were already laying the groundwork for building branches of formal organizations connected back to China or other overseas colonies. Yet, the full unity they showed at the November meeting and following meetings the next summer and fall foreshadowed the unified organizational spirit of the community. As the *California Courier* wrote in 1850, "We have never seen a finer looking body of men collected together in San Francisco," calling the Chinese a model of order for immigrants and native-born citizens (Williams 1879: 218).

The following sections take the next stages of organizational history in three parts, each approximately twenty years, from the period of rapid growth of traditional organizations,1851-1870; the peak of racist fervor, 1870-1892; and the finding of a new organizational order and balance, 1892-1911.

Building the Backbone of Overseas Chinese Civil Society, 1851-1870

The Huiguan System. In 1851 Chinese residents built two of the foundational organizational pieces of the Chinese community: the Sam Yup and See Yup huiguan (Lai 1987). In the U.S., huiguan became the most important community organizations to overseas Chinese.

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[2] *Daily Alta California*. December 10, 1849. "A Chinese Public Meeting in San Francisco." Pg. 1, Col. 4.

Literally translated as "meeting hall," huiguan were community-based district associations. These associations were primarily based on subregions of the Chinese province of Guangdong, where most Chinese immigrants were from. These subregions also mapped onto pre-existing linguistic differences among the immigrants (Lai 1987).

Huiguan provided much of the social services in the community—they were a bank, job agency, travel agency, social service provider, and community space. They often arranged work and travel before the immigrant left China, met them at the San Francisco docks, provided housing and food on their immediate arrival, and helped take them to the mining or railroad regions where they could find a job (Lai 1987). All the early huiguan had branches throughout the state where their community members worked (Lai 2004). The huiguan's extensive networks and logistics operations enabled communication and remittances between China and the U.S. (Liu and Li 2011). Huiguan had temples for prayer, hosted festivals and community events, and perhaps most importantly, provided death and old age assistance ensuring that their community members' spirits would be taken care of back in their ancestral Chinese villages (Lai 1987). The operations, membership, and size of these organizations were vast. Each huiguan had an internal federated structure and a division of labor. Each huiguan held a variety of family associations whose leaders formed the governance body of the huiguan. Family, or clan, associations were their own community organizations performing many of the functions of the huiguan. In addition to being from similar districts, these associations were based on last name and a loose, ancestral notion of family (Lai 1987). Within the family association, members were able to reconstruct the meaning and purpose of family regardless of the existence of blood ties (Lee 1960). Like many immigrant groups, the Chinese grouped into certain economic industries. Even more specifically certain families were concentrated in certain industries and built separate guilds and trade

organizations based on shared economic interests (Lai 2004). In the 1850s, huiguan members also built shantang as another organization within the huiguan. These organizations handled death rituals and other charitable activities. The shantang were more regionally specific than the huiguan with one created for every county within the huiguan's district (ex. Sam Yup huiguan was made up of three main counties and the See Yup was made of four, and both also included other districts that were not large enough to form their own huiguan) (Sam Yup Benevolent Association 1998). The shantang were responsible for the finding, recovery, burial, and shipping of deceased and elderly members back to China (Lai 1987). They would be met in Hong Kong by another organization, called a Gold Mountain Firm, that handled the cemetery plots and travel to the specific village of the member (Lai 2004). Similarly, xinju were organizations that handled remittances and letters between China and the U.S. (Lai 2004; Liu and Li 2011). As I will discuss later, temples and tongs were two additional prominent organizations within the huiguan and family association structures.

By the mid- to late-1850s, several huiguan had fully developed this complex operational and governing structure, visible in Figure 3-3. This was possible because these organizations were not new. Huiguan and their concomitant pieces date back to the 15th century, existing for internal migrants within China and for overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia (Armentrout Ma 1984; Lai 1987).

At the top of the huiguan's governance structure were wealthier merchants. After becoming established in the U.S. the huiguan started bringing in government officials from the Qing Dynasty in China who would serve a few years as president (Lai 1987). The merchants still functionally ran the organization, but these Qing officials could provide greater legitimacy to the organization for its members, to the U.S. government, and closer connections to the Qing

leadership in China. As learned scholars they also served as teachers to the community and

preservers of Chinese culture (Lai 2004). This organizational structure and leadership meant that

the huiguan structure was built on a strict, elite, patriarchal, capitalistic, and state-related

hierarchy (Lai 1987). However, due to the strong familial and regional ties that were at their

core, they did hold strong obligations to anyone who was a part of the community, even those

who might be short on their dues (Crissman 1967).[3]

The financing for the huiguan was based on regular assessments and a large tax for those

who wanted to return to China. The huiguan had relationships with the Pacific Mail Steamship

Company which monopolized the travel between the U.S. and China. Only those who had

permission from a huiguan could travel back, and huiguan charged a steep price for the many

Chinese looking to do so (Loomis 1868). For this reason, huiguan have often been referred to as

involuntary associations. However, there were other options. The YMCA and other churches

offered an alternative transportation route, community, and social services outside the huiguan.

However, this was seldom used. Reverend Otis Gibson reported that in 1877 only about 10% of

the Chinese in the U.S. chose to not be part of a huiguan.[4]

Figure 3-2 shows the estimated size of the huiguan, both individually and their total

compared to the population of Chinese in the U.S. The graph should be read as a rough estimate

as it uses a variety of sources which vary in their reliability. However, there are two points where

multiple sources agree in their estimates. First, in 1855, the huiguan counted approximately

40,000 members collectively, only five years after mass Chinese immigration had begun.

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[3] For example, an 1878 list of regulations from the Pan Yu Chang Hou Tang, a shantang for the Panyu county, writes that although they are formally assessing every member $10, "because life is hard so it cannot help to be more lenient" a $2 payment would be plenty for a member to not be considered in debt to the organization. Translation by Sonia Ng Chan. In Him Mark Lai Papers, AAS ARC 2000/80, Box 109, Folder 7, UC Berkeley Ethnic Studies Library.
[4] In Yuk Ow Collection, AAS ARC 2000/80, Box 34, Folder 21, UC Berkeley Ethnic Studies Library.

Table 3-2a. Estimated Membership Size of the Seven Major Huiguan. SOURCE: Data was compiled by Him Mark Lai from the following sources: From 1852: "Report of the Committee on Mines and Mining Interests," 1853; 1854: San Francisco Herald, 1854; 1856: San Francisco Herald, 1856; 1858: Daily Alta California, 1858; 1866: Daily Alta California, 1866; 1868: "The Chinese Six Companies," 1868; 1869: Sacramento Daily Union, 1869; 1876: Lloyd, 1879: 277; Gibson 1877: 21; Gui, 1983; "John Chinaman in San Francisco," 1876; 1878: Lanbin, n.d.; 1888: Yunlong, n.d. Him Mark Lai's notes and the copies of the original data can be found in the Him Mark Lai Research Files (AAS ARC 2010/1 and AAS ARC 2000/80) at the UC Berkeley Ethnic Studies Library, Berkeley, CA.

Table 3-2b. Estimated size of huiguan over time. Total size of the seven major huiguan relative to the Chinese population in the U.S. SOURCE: Ibid; US Census Bureau.

Second, in 1876, there were collectively over 150,000 members. For reference, at this time,

California had a population of about 800,000 people. No other organization could claim a similar

size in the Western U.S., and few rivalled it nationally. At its peak the collective membership

was greater than the Knights of Pythias and likely more than national organizations like the

YMCA, Grand Army of the Republic, and the Elks (Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000). As is

also clear from Figure 3-2, huiguan members outnumbered the Census count of Chinese in the

U.S. This is for several potential reasons. First, the Census likely undercounted the Chinese

population, many of whom were transitory, and many feared and mistrusted the U.S.

government. Second, many huiguan members frequently went back to China, either temporarily

or permanently, but continued their relationship with the organization. While the organizations

were mostly primarily based in San Francisco, these were transnational organizations.[5]

As Figure 3-2 shows, as the Chinese population grew, so did the number of huiguan. As

the membership grew within each huiguan and people from even more localized regions and

districts came to reach a critical mass, they often separated and formed their own associations.

Early Racialization and Resistance: The Development of the Six Companies. Laws

targeting Chinese immigrants came the same year mass Chinese immigration began. The Foreign

Miners' Taxes of 1850, 1852, and 1854 all sought to make it difficult and expensive for non-U.S.

citizens to mine in California's gold fields. These laws were often contentious, as each new state

administration would pass and/or repeal different bills. Although lawmakers and the media saw

the Chinese as those who were supposed to be most impacted by the law, the laws themselves

did not call out Asians specifically. The 1850 law affected all non-citizens, while later laws

specifically targeted both Chinese and immigrants from Central and South America (McClain

1994). The racism was still tempered. Elites fought explicitly against racist legislation, as they

hoped to benefit from the massive workforce and potential market they could exploit. Chinese

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[5] An inscription board on the major federation (CCBA, discussed later) was a gift from the Qing government and said, "Thy prestige spreads abroad" (Lian Lianfang 1902, quoted in Bronson and Ho 2022: 158).

immigrants were mostly an unknown quantity and even those who most disapproved of their immigration used language that did not fault the Chinese as a race. For example, the *Sacramento Daily Union* in an article arguing that the Miners' Taxes did not go far enough wrote, "We shall be slow to believe that the people of California are disposed to drive the Chinese or any other foreigners out of the country like so many cattle…Our citizens do not ask that the poor Chinamen who have come peaceably among us should be expelled. They would rather endure whatever inconvenience they may have to endure by the presence of the Chinamen already among them, than to commit an act of cruelty and oppression."[6]

The huiguan were well-aware of the political situation and were not complacent. In response to Governor Bigler's campaign's hostility to the Chinese in 1852, leaders of the Sam Yup and Yeong Wo huiguan wrote multiple letters to the Governor and met with him. When the Committee on Mines and Mining sought to recommend further legislation regulating mining in 1853, the heads of four huiguan met with them to ensure that the Chinese community would have a voice in the legislation (Sam Yup Benevolent Association 1998). Two themes were evident from these early political interactions. First, while the huiguan had plenty of disagreements among themselves, they quickly came together and cooperated when it came to dealing with matters outside the community. In 1853, the four major huiguan called themselves the "Four Great Houses." Nine years later they more formally created the "Chinese Six Companies" consisting of the six, and eventually seven, major huiguan (Armentrout Ma 1983; Lai 1987). It was very common for huiguan to give money to other huiguan during fundraising campaigns or as loans (Bronson and Ho 2015; Griffith 2007). Second, the huiguan took an accommodationist stance. In their letter to Bigler they wrote "we have determined to write you as

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[6] "The New Foreign Miners Tax Law." *Sacramento Daily Union*, May 10, 1852. Pg. 2, col. 1.

decent and respectful a letter as we could, pointing out to your Excellency some of the errors you have fallen into about us."[7] In front of the mining committee they declared that they were okay with the racist mining tax, they just wanted the money from it to be allocated differently and wanted the state to take action against the anti-Chinese violence occurring in the mining regions (Assembly Committee on Mines and Mining Interests 1853). They were even willing to help the state collect the tax. They hoped that their approval of the miners' tax would be a way to counter racism by appealing to the economic goals of the state (Ngai 2021: 98).

The pressing need for the unified front against racism was short-lived. Mining turned from competitive individual mining claims to exploitative large corporations engaged in mass hydraulic mining. Mining was no longer a way for an individual entrepreneur to strike it rich, but a business that sought to employ large amounts of cheap labor in rustic labor camps. This meant that much of the Chinese population were kept far away from cities and towns and performed underpaid and unenviable work that was boosting up the booming economies of California and Oregon. As mining subsided in the 1860s, the Chinese workforce maintained similar conditions building railroads while the country was gripped by the Civil War and racial questions far removed from the Chinese (Ngai 2021). As a sign of this relative racial peace, in 1868 the U.S. government signed the Burlingame Treaty with China that gave China "most favored nation" status for trade and granted new and generous privileges and liberties to Chinese subjects living in the U.S. (McClain 1994).

Racism and Response, 1870-1892

Anti-Racist Strategies Emerge. The relative calm of the 1860s changed quickly as railroad building slowed in the early 1870s. The Chinese railroad workers steadily moved into

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[7] Wa, Hab, and Long Achik. "The Chinese in California." *San Francisco Herald*. May 16, 1852

cities and towns and contributed to the development of large and permanent communities. The end of railroad building in California also caused an economic slump. For the first time since 1850, economic growth slowed and unemployment rose. Now the Chinese community was both more visible and in direct competition with whites for the same jobs. The economic and political conditions led quickly to racist attacks, initially through legal means. San Francisco's city council started passing laws to regulate and criminalize Chinese life. In the summer of 1870, the city passed the Cubic Air Ordinance, requiring that a boarding house have 500 cubic feet of air in a room for each occupant—clearly targeted towards Chinese boardinghouses. That same year the city also passed a laundry license law charging extra to Chinese-owned laundries (McClain 1994). In 1873, the mayor vetoed a "queue ordinance" meant to cut off the traditional hair of most Chinese immigrants. In his veto statement, Mayor Alvord still recognized the government as a bulwark against racism, "this order…is a special and degrading punishment inflicted upon the Chinese residents for slight offenses and solely by reason of their alienage and race" (Gibson 1877: 283). Racism against Chinese was brewing but it had not yet developed into a legitimate form of politics.

In the 1870s the Chinese Six Companies developed a clear legal strategy against the onslaught of these laws. They and their subsidiary organizations hired some of the best, most famous lawyers of the day to take these laws to court (ex. lawyers included ex-California governor Henry H. Haight, and Chinese lawyers in Oregon read like a Who's Who of the Oregon Bar) (Wong 2004; Zou 2019). Showing a remarkable knowledge of politics and the legal system, the Six Companies manufactured test cases immediately upon passage of laws and with clear and effective legal arguments that also showed respectability and deference to the U.S. legal system (McClain 1994). For example, the San Francisco City Council carefully constructed the Cubic

Air Ordinance to not mention "Chinese" and to read like a public health measure. Even so, the Six Companies encouraged the Chinese in violation to be arrested and fill the jails so that the jails themselves became illegal under the ordinance (McClain 1994). Behind the visible court proceedings, the Six Companies were also engaging in a messier side of politics. They consistently built mutual relationships with the leading politicians and judges of the day, preventing many laws from even coming to a vote (Wong 2004).

The Chinese Six Companies strategy was well-suited to manage the disorganized racist efforts of the early 1870s (Lammers 1988), but this changed in 1875. Denis Kearney founded and led the Workingmen's Party of California in early 1875 with the infamous rallying cry, "The Chinese Must Go!" Made famous by his popular and racist diatribes against the Chinese in San Francisco, he led a rapid and highly successful political movement. Within the year, the Workingmen's Party was winning elections. California and San Francisco lawmakers passed the Queue Ordinance quickly at the state level and in San Francisco, and the Workingmen successfully achieved a revision of the California Constitution in 1879. The approved constitution had an article directly devoted to the Chinese that made it illegal for any corporation or government in the state to employ them. At the federal level the 1875 Page Law severely limited female Chinese immigration to the U.S., depicting all Chinese women as prostitutes (Paddison 2012). Explicit and unabashed racism had fully entrenched itself in the federal, state, and city governments, and was widely supported by the voting population.

The Chinese Six Companies was not prepared for this. Their form of resistance had limits that they had not predicted. The Six Companies' strategy was based on complete acceptance and reliance on the legal system, and faith that judges would adhere to the Six Companies' reading of the constitution (McClain 1994). They relied on a racist constitution and racist judges to protect

them from racism. They also became a tool of social control by the white supremacist regime when they agreed to be the police force and garbage collection agency for San Francisco's Chinatown (Armentrout Ma 1983). The court cases were costly and the judges, lawyers, and politicians they relied on were under constant pressure to end their relationships with their Chinese clients. This often put the Six Companies in a position of appeasement. They publicly discouraged Chinese immigration to the U.S. They pushed to make the Chinese appear as orderly and law-abiding as possible, and not provide confirmation of the stereotypes being pushed out in the anti-Chinese newspapers and from the Workingmen's Party.

Decoupling. Some of the initial forms that this appeasement took were new organizational strategies. The parts of the huiguan that seemed the most offensive to the white community were formally and rhetorically spun out of the huiguan structure or were tempered and hidden. These consisted primarily of religious rituals and violent groups. For example, funereal and exhumation ceremonies and parades were widely popular, multiracial events in towns across the West during the 1850s and 1860s (Wong 2004). After 1870, these became quiet affairs, hidden from view. When they did invite outside observers, the observers often commented that they were surprised how *not* unusual the services had become (Culin 1890). When there was a funeral for a prominent individual, the huiguan or shantang would usually hire an American band to lead the procession and even contract with Christian priests to conduct some of the ceremonies (Chung 2002; Farkas 1998). Thus, the "heathen" rituals could appear as signs of assimilation. The huiguan architecture also changed. Whenever a huiguan built a new building it always put its shrines on the top floors and made their entrances simple, boring affairs that blended in with the U.S. architecture of the era. The largest huiguan, Ning Yung, rebuilt its association in 1891 with hundreds of thousands of dollars and a well-known architect. Like other

temples, while its insides were staggering, the outside was boring (Ho and Bronson 2022; Hoy 1939). As Ho and Bronson (2022: 33) describe about the U.S.-based temples in general, "Their outsides may have been plain enough, but their insides were luxurious and beautiful." Whereas the opening of a temple in the 1850s would be a cause for a party with the local press and politicians, these now became internal community affairs.[8] Perhaps most compellingly as a sign of decoupling, temples no longer appeared on huiguan's account books. Most huiguan spun their temple off as its own organization independent from the association (Zou 2019). Even, many times, selling the opportunity to run the temple to a private individual (Ho and Bronson 2022). While it remained within the building and honored the specific deities, ancestors, and practices of the huiguan and family association, it had officially become a separate entity.

The other major decoupling occurred with the fighting tong. In other overseas Chinese communities fighting among huiguan was not uncommon. As early as 1854 in Weaverville, California there was a well-known battle between the Sam Yup and Yan Wo huiguan for mining rights in the area (Lai 1987). It was not the merchants that did this fighting but a "self-defense" or "youth organization" better known as a fighting tong (Lei 2022). As tensions, population, and racism rose across the West, huiguan members increased their demands for the associations to physically protect them. While the Six Companies sought to protect the Chinese from the outside white population, tong were the protective strategy for internal affairs that could not be worked out through peaceful mediation (Lai 1987). With the need for young people to undertake this dangerous job, the tong usually expanded the recruitment criteria and were willing to take in members across regional or family lines, including non-Chinese individuals (Bronson and Ho 2015; Chin 1990; Reynolds 1935; Tom 1944). Thus, it was not always clear to outsiders that

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[8] It was quite common to find early public announcements of temple openings in the local newspapers. For example, see *Alta California* August 23, 1864, or September 20, 1864.

tong were related to a given association (Zesch 2012). However, the history clearly shows tong

slowly being spun out of different huiguan or family associations with most fighting tong having

a membership clearly related to a specific district or surname (Lai 1987; Lei 2022). People could

also become a member of multiple fighting tong leading to confusion and making it unclear who

could provide protection in any given instance (Zesch 2012). However, the huiguan and Chinese

Six Companies denied any relationship between themselves and the tong. They were successful

enough at this separation that even local policemen and journalists were convinced that the tong

were an underbelly of the community, out of the control of the respectable elite leaders (Zesch

2012). The tong may have reached this state at some point, but they were clearly birthed from the

merchant-led organizations. The separation of the fighting tong also enabled them to engage in

the profitable trades of gambling, prostitution, and drugs that the huiguan also sought to gain

distance from (Zesch 2012). This likely helped develop an underclass with different demands,

goals, and interests than their huiguan leadership (Ngai 2021).

The decoupling went all the way to the top of the organizational hierarchy. The Chinese

Six Companies tried to appear as a respectable "American" civil society organization while

maintaining their traditional structures. As Crissman writes (1967: 194), "Their names and stated

purposes, which are sometimes chosen more with an eye toward official governmental

regulations than anything else, are often irrelevant to their primary role of community

organizations and camouflage their true structural and functional importance." A Chinese critic

of the Qing government wrote in 1903, "I looked at the *huiguan*'s bylaws and found that by and

large they were patterned after organizations in the West—very civilized and very detailed. But

when I observe the implementation, then there was not a single instance where the actions were not contrary to the provisions" (Qichao 1936: 122).[9]

New Rhetoric and a New Organization. Through these organizational and performative machinations, the Chinese Six Companies sought to appease the racist movements. Since the early 1870s they sent circulars and placards back to cities in China advising potential immigrants not to come.[10] In 1876, as racism was mounting and legislators were putting forward Chinese exclusion as a potential solution to "the Chinese Problem," the Chinese Six Companies did not disagree. In a public letter published in the newspaper they agreed with a potential repeal of the Burlingame Treaty and said, "Now this honorable country is discussing the importance of prohibiting the further emigration of the Chinese. This is very good indeed."[11] Throughout its existence, the Chinese Six Companies had sought appeasement as the strategy for the racist attacks on Chinese residents in the U.S. This had seemed to work, but that strategy was now fraying.

Three years later a Chinese organization much less familiar to white outsiders penned a public letter in the *San Francisco Post*:

> This increase of suffering, destitution and crime among the lower class of Chinese, is not the result of any abnormal turpitude in the Chinese as a race, but a sad sequel to the terrible and brutal persecutions of these people by the low and ignorant of the naturalized element of the population, a subservient truckling press and the local government, administered as it is by miserable demagogues who, in hope to preserve their official existence, pander to this selfish and disorderly element. These persecutions have for their object to take from the patient, docile and faithful Chinese laborer all employment, and thus reduce him to want, starvation, crime or death.[12]

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[9] Translation by Him Mark Lai.
[10] *Sacramento Reporter*. May 26, 1890. Pg. 2, Col. 1.
[11] Six Chinese Companies, "Chinese Manifesto." *Daily Alta California*. April 5, 1876. Pg. 1, Col. 7.
[12] Quong Jun Yuen & Co. *San Francisco Post*. July 18, 1879.

This is a contrasting tone, identifying racism and calling out U.S. citizens, the press, and the government as those persecuting the Chinese. It highlights and honors the Chinese laborer as opposed to the Six Companies framing of the respectable, Westernized merchant. This was written by a representative of the Zhigongtang. The Zhigongtang has a long and complex history. It was founded in the 17ᵗʰ century and was strongest in the southern provinces of China where most immigrants to the U.S. were from. It started as a political movement seeking to overthrow the Qing Dynasty and became a highly secretive society when the Qing government banned it. The organization survived, notably in overseas Chinese colonies where its participants often fled to avoid the Qing government (Ownby and Heidhues 1993). The Zhigongtang is both its own organization, or "lodge," as well as a federation of other smaller "tong"[13] that carried the same purpose and rituals (Lee 1979). It was a highly ritualistic organization having a complex initiation process involving 36 oaths and 21 regulations (Chung 2002). At the core were the values of righteousness, brotherhood, secrecy, and nationalism (Chin 1990). While still led by well-educated community elites, it was a far more egalitarian organizational system than the huiguan, and promoted history and practices that sought to support people experiencing persecution (Chin 1990; Ownby 1996). In this way it tied the Qing government's persecution of Southern Chinese to the racism Chinese were experiencing in the U.S. Since the early 1850s, the Zhigongtang claimed that the huiguan system had given the merchants unfair advantage and power (Eng and Grant 1930). The Zhigongtang was also a mutual aid organization performing many of the practices of the huiguan, including the funerary rituals (Chung 2002). The Zhigongtang, as an egalitarian, nationalist organization, did not draw boundaries based on place

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[13] The organizational field reveals its overlapping boundaries here. The tong within the Zhigongtang federation are not the same as the huiguan-related tong. However, the tong of both often were involved in similar illicit trades, competed, and engaged in physical fights. Given the secrecy of both, it is hard to differentiate between these and it may not be meaningful to do so in a given period or location—a tong could easily be closely associated with both.

of birth or family name but cut across the traditional boundaries to serve any potential member. Unlike the other associations it was a voluntary organization that did not monopolize any services to force anyone to join, although leaving the association may have been difficult given their focus on secrecy (Lyman, Willmott and Ho 1964).

The Zhigongtang started small in the U.S. with only a few hundred members in San Francisco and a few thousand in California during the mid-1850s. This was equivalent to less than 10% the size of the huiguan membership at the time (Armentrout Ma 1983; Chung 2002: 219-220). In the late 1870's its popularity started to increase as racist violence rose. Unlike the Six Companies, the Zhigongtang did not have a clear initial strategy to confront the racism but was developing a novel rhetoric as seen above. The lack of strategy created some early problems for the organization. Between 1876 and 1880 it had a major rift as dissenting members created the Binggongtang (Chung 2002). The Binggongtang maintained many of the features of the Zhigongtang, including all the initiation rituals, but sought a strategy that led it to be more active in the illicit trades and build up their own fighting tong (Armentrout Ma 1983).

Institutionalized Racism. In 1882, President Arthur signed the Chinese Exclusion Act. It was the first sweeping, national immigration law focused on a single population, and the first barring immigration. This law was what the Six Companies feared and part of the reason they sought appeasement—to defuse the racialization that had been building for decades. For the Six Companies, the law was not a total loss. They had been able to put in place a few exceptions and loopholes, specifically for merchants. The law was also only temporary, to lapse after 10 years. The Six Companies also saw the law as a clear violation of the Constitution and of the Burlingame Treaty in ways that their previous court cases had confirmed time and again. This law could be declared unconstitutional like many of the previous ones (McClain 1994).

The courts in the post-Reconstruction era were inconsistent and were changing with public opinion. The Six Companies' initial challenges to the law failed and the Supreme Court enshrined the law as constitutional. This was only a temporary setback. Utilizing the loopholes in the law and their deep knowledge of the court system, the Six Companies created a "habeas corpus mill," filing 4,000 claims between 1882 and 1884 (Fritz 1988; McClain 1994). This prevented Chinese arrivals from being immediately deported and gave aspiring immigrants the time they needed to assemble a court case and convince a judge that they qualified for the many exceptions under the Exclusion Law. Judges who might have felt too much public pressure to overturn the Exclusion Act could be far more amenable to approving individual cases for entrance. In the meantime, the Six Companies publicly discouraged immigration, hoped that racism would pass, and the bill would lapse.

The Exclusion Act also prompted another change in the Six Companies organizational structure. As a result of the Act, the Qing government took a greater interest in the Chinese population in the U.S. They created a consulate to work closely with the Six Companies, and formally gave the Six Companies in San Francisco more powers and organization, officially becoming the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) in 1882 (Lai 1987). This gave the new CCBA more authority and resources both within the Chinese community and in its dealings with the U.S. government (Lee 1979). This came at an important time. The Exclusion Act had served as a legitimation to the budding anti-Chinese efforts. In 1885 and 1886, across the West, white settlers undertook violent attacks on Chinese residents, emptying entire communities from small mining towns to larger cities like Tacoma and Seattle (Daniels 1978). The CCBA's new footing allowed it to respond to these catastrophes. They successfully called on the U.S. President to send out federal troops to protect Chinese communities and won federal

government remuneration for many of the victims of the settlers' violent evictions (McClain 1994).[14]

While these events strengthened the new CCBA in many ways, the same events also weakened the organization. The attacks in rural areas brought an influx of poorer Chinese to the cities where the merchants had ruled. The failure of the Exclusion Act had weakened the Six Companies/CCBA in the minds of many (Armentrout Ma 1983). That merchants were granted exceptions in the law created an even larger gulf between merchants and the working classes (McClain 1988). The smaller towns that had lost much of their population were not important enough to have a CCBA branch and many were too small and diverse to support a district or family association. Lastly, greater Qing government involvement was not an encouragement to many of the Chinese residents who had fled that same government. As the CCBA grew closer to the Qing, anti-Qing organizations became increasingly attractive. The Zhigongtang started growing rapidly in this period from the disenchanted laborers, anti-Qing sympathizers, and to those in smaller towns where it provided the only source of broad community (Armentrout Ma 1983; Chung 2002).

The Qing consulate was quite aware of what was happening and sought to undermine the Zhigongtang. This proved difficult as many leaders of the CCBA were also involved with the Zhigongtang. In Portland in 1888 and in San Francisco in 1890, at the CCBA's (and likely the consulate's) urging, the local police department raided the cities' Zhigongtang lodges and destroyed their shrines (Pricco 1978). The CCBA and Chinese Consulate had told the newspapers and police that the Zhigongtang were one of the main fighting tong and responsible for much of the vice in the city (Ho and Bronson 2022; Masters 1892). While many of the

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[14] *Sacramento Record-Union*. March 8, 1886. Pg. 4, Col. 2.

Zhigongtang's member lodges benefited from the vice trades, the organization itself was more ambivalent towards it. However, the one illegal trade clearly tied to the organization was in using its infrastructure to aid passage of illegal Chinese immigrants into the U.S. (Armentrout Ma 1983; Hansen 2006). To most of the Chinese however, this was the righteous thing to do. The CCBA in San Francisco did not let up its campaign. It next created a vigilante organization to suppress the tong in 1893.[15] Outside of San Francisco, however, they were already losing the battle for Chinese loyalty with prominent merchants publicly aligning with both the Zhigongtong and huiguan (Bronson and Ho 2015).

The Failure of Appeasement. The CCBA's attempt to wait out racism for 10 years was a grave misjudgment. In 1892, the Exclusion Act's renewal came up in the form of the Geary Act. Congressional lawmakers and U.S. judges had become far more illiberal and racist in this period, undoing many of the wins of Reconstruction. The Geary Act sought to end many of the loopholes in the Exclusion Act, make individual habeas corpus cases outside of the purview of courts, and require all Chinese residents to carry a residency card. While the CCBA did not like any of these conditions, they felt that the residency card requirement was a gross violation of the Constitution and an easily winnable court case. When the law went into effect in 1893 the CCBA told its members to not register for a card (McClain 1994). In an impressive show of strength, and one of the largest acts of organized civil disobedience the U.S. had witnessed up to this point, only about 3,000 of the 110,000 Chinese residents in the U.S. registered for a residency card by the legally-imposed deadline (Pfaelzer 2008). The Six Companies raised nearly $100,000 from its membership (about $1 from ever member), hired additional top lawyers, and immediately took the case to court (McClain 1994). In *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, the

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[15] *San Francisco Call*. April 5, 1893. Pg. 8, Col. 1-2.

Supreme Court rejected the Six Companies' suit voting 5-3 to uphold the residency card requirement.

This was a hard and personal loss for Chinese immigrants. Most had personally given part of their working-class earnings to the court case and had complied with not registering. Now every single resident had to personally apply for a residency card and be reminded of their racial and foreign status. It was also a reminder that the CCBA had failed. Up to this point the Zhigongtang had not directly contested the CCBA's leadership. It now began to do so. In smaller towns, like Watsonville, California, the Zhigongtang supplanted the local version of the CCBA as the major organization representing the Chinese (Armentrout Ma 1983; Lydon 1985). In the 1890s, the Zhigongtang developed similar organizations in Boston and New York City where it competed with the top huiguan and family associations for dominance (Chin 1990). By 1898, they claimed a membership of 70% of the Chinese community in the U.S. (Armentrout Ma 1983).

Multiple Organizational Representatives

In San Francisco, the center of Chinese life in the U.S., the CCBA remained the uncontested representative of the Chinese up until 1900. That year, other organizations started challenging its leadership. Challengers met the CCBA, not in nearby towns or in back alleys of Chinatown, but in the center of Chinatown and in front of the city government. In the spring, health authorities discovered several cases of bubonic plague in Chinatown. The San Francisco City Council, courts, and public health officials took action alongside the CCBA, imposing and lifting quarantines, and seeking to test new therapies on the Chinese population (McClain 1988). Eventually, the CCBA came to an agreement with the San Francisco Board of Health to vaccinate everyone in Chinatown with a dubious new vaccine. The CCBA was confident in its

ability to have the population fall in line (McClain 1988). On May 17th and 18th unprecedented

numbers of Chinese residents marched on the headquarters of the CCBA and businesses closed

in protest at the forced inoculation.[16] In its reporting, the new Chinese newspaper, *Chung Sai Yat*

Po wondered why their leaders were "so lazy as not to lodge a protest."[17] This organized

resistance was likely led by the tong.[18] The CCBA gave up the vaccination campaign and were

able to get a court injunction for the inoculation. When the CCBA lawyers arrived at the hearing

on May 25th another organization was also there to represent the Chinese, the Baohuanghui

(McClain 1988).

The Baohuanghui was founded just the year prior in 1899 by two political asylum seekers

from China: Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. Their mission was to create dramatic reforms in

the existing Qing government and do so by building up an egalitarian movement of Chinese

across family, class, and home district (Larson 2002). It sought to "introduce among the people

of the Chinese Empire, that feeling of brotherhood and love which will cement them together as

a mighty power" (Baohuanghui charter, quoted in Wong 1992). The egalitarian and inclusive

values of the Baohuanghui and the Zhigongtang were highly similar, so much so that many

subsidiary organizations were members of both federations (Feng 1954). Both sought to ask their

members to reimagine what it meant to be Chinese (Ngai 2021). The Baohuanghui was not a

mutual aid organization, nor did it employ secretive fraternal rituals, but it extended

egalitarianism further, even including women's chapters (Choy 2018). The Baohuanghui were

quite transparent in contrast to the opaque huiguan. Its charismatic leaders proved quite adept at

raising money and building membership. So that by May 1900, they felt comfortable going up

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[16] "What Should We Do About Inoculation." *Chung Sai Yat Po*. May 18, 1900; "The Background of Vaccination."
Chung Sai Yat Po. May 19, 1900.
[17] "What Should We Do About Inoculation." *Chung Sai Yat Po*. May 18, 1900.
[18] *Sacramento Record-Union*. May 20, 1900. Pg. 1, Col. 4.

against the CCBA with their own prestigious lawyer, future U.S. Senator Samuel Shortridge. The Baohuanghui did not trust the CCBA and sought their own doctors, lawyers, and suits in dealing with the crisis (McClain 1988). Just eight years prior, the CCBA had led a massive campaign with near universal national consensus in their attempt to contest and overthrow the Geary Act. By 1900 their control was now directly contested.

Beyond Accommodation. The Baohuanghui and Zhigongtang saw the culmination of their work in the early 1900s. By 1903 the Baohuanghui had 50 local chapters across the U.S. and Canada (Larson 2002). The leader, Kang, wielded enough influence to meet with President Roosevelt (McKee 1977). They were instrumental in the massive, but eventually unsuccessful, boycott of U.S.-made goods in China. Where they did succeed was in spreading the consciousness of discontent with the Qing government and how the Chinese, as a whole, were treated in the U.S. (Ngai 2021).

Near the same time, Sun Yat-Sen was touring the U.S. going town to town to raise money for his attempt to overthrow the Qing government. He was a member of the Zhigongtang, and the organization took him around the West, touring and staying in their different lodges. The Zhigongtang was a different order of magnitude in size than the Baohuanghui. They had at least 373 branches in North America at this time (Lei 2022), and by 1911 a reporter for the *Nevada State Journal* estimated that 90% of Chinese in the U.S. were members.[19] Sun raised immense amounts of money from the society's members—the same *Nevada State Journal* article claimed that $200,000 were sent to Sun through San Francisco in August and September of 1911 alone. When Sun successfully overthrew the Qing government in 1911 he declared that the overseas Chinese were the "mother" of the Chinese Revolution (Armentrout Ma 1990).

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[19] "Young China Association is Preparing to Petition U.S. to Instruct Missionaries." *Nevada State Journal*. October 14, 1911. Pg. 7, Col. 6-7.

Not all these non-district- and non-family-related organizations were oriented towards China. U.S.-born Chinese formed a new organization in the mid-1890s called the Native Sons of the Golden State. It was founded by U.S. citizens organizing for patriotic, educational, and moral purposes. Instead of looking back towards China, they began to consider what their future would be like in the U.S. (Lee 1979). Reverend Ira Condit estimated that 50% of Chinese citizens above the age of 18 were members, including 17 that had fought in the Spanish-American War.[20] Like the Zhigongtang and many of the huiguan and family associations, this organization still exists today as the Chinese American Citizens Alliance.

These three organizations created new ways for the Chinese in the U.S. to engage in politics transnationally and at home without going through the CCBA. Each honored the past and tradition in their own way and none were exclusive to a family or district. Most of the people involved in each organization were likely also involved with their district association, family association, and multiple of these three. Given the Zhigongtang's size and reach and the practical necessity of being under the CCBA, most Chinese in the U.S. were members of multiple organizations with different goals and approaches to trying to improve the life for Chinese residents and citizens in the U.S. and in China. The scope and hierarchy of the Chinese organizational system is visible in Figure 3-3.

Organizational Development and Comparison Outside the U.S.

The initial huiguan system was adopted wholesale from the organizational structures the Chinese community had refined over centuries. But that did not prevent adaptation. As Bronson and Ho (2015: 122) have written "Flexibility of purpose and fluidity of structure were hallmarks of Chinese social organization." In the U.S., huiguan were relatively unique from their

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[20] In Yuk Ow Collection, AAS ARC 2000/70, Box 34, Folder 16, UC Berkeley Ethnic Studies Library.

Figure 3-3. Organizational Hierarchy among Chinese Organizations. For readability, this figure is simplified and only discusses the prominent organizations described here. A line and organization box shows the existence of an organization and relationship, respectively. The lack of a line should not be taken as a sign of no organization or relationship. Dashed lines show decoupling.

Figure 3-3 (cont.). Organizational Hierarchy among Chinese Organizations. For readability, this figure is simplified and only discusses the prominent organizations described here. A line and organization box shows the existence of an organization and relationship, respectively. The lack of a line should not be taken as a sign of no organization or relationship. Dashed lines show decoupling.

predecessors in Asia by being cross-class organizations containing both upper-class merchants and working-class laborers. They also took on more charitable purposes and mutual aid than huiguan had in the past (Armentrout Ma 1983).

Perhaps most importantly, in the U.S., the Chinese community developed the community-wide federation for the first time, the Chinese Six Companies. Some other overseas Chinese immigrant communities had created some overarching institutions such as hospitals and

schools, but none that claimed to be such a wide representation of the activities and membership as the Chinese Six Companies did (Crissman 1967; Lee 1979). I hypothesize that the creation of the federation was a response to racism in the U.S. A strong federation appeared only in the U.S. context because it was the only major Chinese immigrant community where the receiving country racialized the Chinese as inferior. Outside of the U.S., Chinese immigrants struggled to build federations. This was often because conflicts between districts or families were significant, and these conflicts were about political supremacy and control of industries and geographic areas, not about the life, death, and liberty of their members. In the U.S., a federation was necessary to protect all their members from a hostile and racist external population.

The huiguan realized the strategic importance of banding together to present a unified "respectable" front for the racist public. They also engaged in the organizational strategies of breaking apart, or decoupling. Temples and shrines have always been prominent parts of district and family associations. Yet it seems that only in the U.S. did these become separate organizational entities (Zou 2019). Similarly, fighting groups were frequently an integral part of the huiguan system, but in the U.S., these also became their own independent organizations. This was so unique that scholars are still piecing together the differences between the variety of tong that existed in the U.S. That "heathen," "barbarian," "violent," and "uncivilized" were the prominent racist descriptors whites used to subordinate the Chinese population, it is reasonable to assume that the decoupling and separation of these religious- and security-oriented organizations was a response to racism. The prominence of fighting tong, their role outside of the huiguan system (often defying the CCBA), and their open membership outside of the given family or district, also appears unique in the U.S. context (Lai 1987). These tong appealed to a young, marginalized population. Their membership grew just as the CCBA's formal,

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institutional, and elite way of dealing with life in the U.S. was falling short (Chin 1990; Zesch 2012). As the Zhigongtang described above, it was racism that pushed laborers into the underclass of criminal organizations that provided the immigrants with mutual support.

The fighting tong were not the only organizational option available to those who were marginalized. The Zhigongtang was a clear response. It, its subsidiaries, and the fighting tong were highly ritualistic organizations that honored the traditions, mutualism, and brotherhood that the Chinese community was so familiar with. But for the first time, in the U.S., these organizations did not restrict membership within geographic and familial boundaries (Culin 1890; Ho and Bronson 2022; Ownby 1996). In other overseas Chinese communities, the Zhigongtang was beset by clan and district conflicts, which prevented the organization from creating the cohesive Chinese consciousness that they sought (Armentrout Ma 1983; Chin 1990). In the U.S., these organizations started to build a sense of unity across traditional ruptures within the Chinese community while preserving a sense of home and purpose clearly aligned with traditional Chinese values. Ownby (1996) found that people who joined the Zhigongtang were often victims of state violence. By honoring its founding and continued existence that highlighted violent persecution, it likely had clear appeal to the Chinese actively experiencing state violence in the U.S. (Reynolds 1935). The Boahuanghui served as an additional option as well. Boahuanghui's organizers found the most committed members among the Chinese who received the worst treatment from white Americans (Larson 2002). Being racialized and treated as an other helped create a new consciousness among the Chinese in the U.S. that led to high memberships, participation, and involvement in a wide variety of community organizations that sought to bring the Chinese community together to realize their power. The Chinese Six

Companies/CCBA had begun this work. However, its failures called for a different consciousness that did not so easily accept subservience.

Throughout my discussion of the varying dominance of different organizations, it is important to note that despite the varying fortunes of the huiguan and Chinese Six Companies/CCBA, there is little evidence that their membership was affected. The options that allowed a Chinese resident to loosen their dependence on the organization—churches and assimilation—saw no significant rise in membership that could not be easily explained by demographics. The median Chinese individual in the U.S. paid their dues to the Zhigongtang and to the CCBA. In San Diego there was so much cross over that the two organizations merged (Chung 2002). Just like the tong that were part of the Baohuanghui and Zhigongtang, these organizations were not opposing options but rather formed complementary major pillars of organizational life for the average Chinese resident who sought a better life for themselves and their community.

DISCUSSION

I have presented two organizational stories thus far, a theoretical story derived primarily out of the study of Black communities in the U.S. and a history of the Chinese community in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. White, state-sanctioned racism played a strong role in both in different ways at different times but led to some surprising similarities in the development of the communities' organizational life. The Chinese huiguan and the Black church both formed complete institutions—community "governments"—based on rituals and traditions where community members could exist outside of the gaze of the external racist state and public. Both communities have created highly visible and active organizations that sought appeasement

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through subordination to gain favor with the white community. Black and Chinese organizations also learned how to highlight a more legitimate, respectable face that would accommodate the hegemonic ideal through decoupling, organizational separations, and public relations strategies. Finally, as racism became clear in its strength and power, both Chinese and Black communities created novel organizational forms based on oppositional consciousness to reinvent what it meant to be a racialized subject in the U.S. They created new goals and dreams that could subvert power in society.

These developments and the racial theories behind them suggest that there is a common story about the organizational life of racialized communities in the U.S. The Chinese and Black histories are unique in their own ways and hold many crucial and important differences, but where the two come together offer lessons for the study of other racialized communities. The pre-existing organizations, the illegitimate organizations, the organizations of appeasement, and the organizations utilizing second sight, are all ideal types that scholars can look for in various communities, and that interact with each other to push each on their own path of development. In the Chinese case, each organization type has had an invaluable role to play in the community that, without it, the other organizations would not have existed as they did. While I have been critical of the Six Companies/CCBA and praiseworthy of the Zhigongtang, both are far more complicated. The Six Companies deserves admiration for many of its achievements and the Zhigongtang deserves to be critiqued for many of its activities. In this paper, I have only focused, in general terms, on the different ways each responded to the racism in the U.S.

The Chinese case also allowed me to be relatively geographically bounded in my analysis. I was able to generalize in many ways because the community was centered in San Francisco with limited numbers outside the West Coast. Du Bois was clear that Philadelphia and

Georgia did not have the same form of racism and did not feature the same types of organizational responses as a result. The Chinese community, although often surprisingly similar across place, also had important geographic differences. The Zhigongtang varied significantly in its strength and the form it took, looking very different in rural towns and on the East Coast than in major cities of the West. Chinese-American citizens created an impressive organizational nexus tied to White organizations in Portland that was not matched anywhere else. Understanding the different shapes, forms, and dynamics of racism and a community's history in any given place, and their differential effects on organizational life is an avenue of future study.

The ideal types I presented here can allow for more nuanced investigation into each and to the organizations that may not appear to fit the model well or continue past the process I have written about here (ex. Getachew's (2019) writings on global, post-colonial efforts to redefine race). The organization types and process model also broaden the researcher's scope to see organization members as multifaceted, seemingly contradictory, and invested in multiple forms of resistance and existence. Following their members, the Chinese organizations were acting in response and in concert with the other community organizations whether they shared similar goals or not. Together they form a double conscious organizational field that maps on to the double conscious experience of their members.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have taken on two tasks. First, I have derived a theoretical model that can be used by other researchers of racialized communities and their organizations. Second, I have told a truly miraculous and little-known story of organizing in the Chinese community. I cannot understate the sheer size, breadth of activities, interlocking components, and success of these

organizations. That they did so relying entirely on community-based resources at a time when political organizing (not to mention race- and immigrant-based organizing) was in its infancy, further underlines the unprecedented nature of this community. It has been disappointing to me that this history appears only in ethnic histories and not in the organizational, political, or social movement histories of the U.S. Racism has been central to the U.S.'s founding and political development. In recent decades, scholars of race have shown how anti-Black racism has been a necessary part of every decade of U.S. history. In this paper, I have described how racism impacted the Chinese community in ways that led it to redefine and play a significant role in the history of both the U.S. and China. Beyond the simple retelling of the 1882 Exclusion Act, scholars should seek to further understand how anti-Chinese racism has played in formative role in the history and development of the U.S.

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CHAPTER 4

CITY FORMATIONS UNDER NEW RACIAL FORMATIONS:
ETHNIC CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS IN THE CREATION OF PORTLAND AND
SEATTLE, 1888-1909

CHAPTER ABSTRACT

What role does ethnic diversity play in the creation of cities? Urban theories assume that a city's population is homogeneous from the start. Ethnic diversity is thought to come later and become incorporated through assimilation and social movements. This ignores the existence of small towns that were multi-ethnic before they developed into cities. As these multi-ethnic places became cities, were marginalized ethnic groups able to gain a central role in city governance? If so, which groups were able to achieve this central role? I focus on Portland and Seattle at the turn of the 20th century as both places turned from small towns to major cities. Using a novel dataset of over 63,000 organization member-years based on 42 years of annual city directories, alongside an ethnicity identifier based on 1850-1910 Censuses, I construct civil society board interlock networks to determine the role of ethnic organizations in the cities' founding eras. In these two cities, I find that marginalized ethnic organizations can be central agents in the creation of urban political institutions in the U.S., and this power is contingent on groups' historically dynamic relations to whiteness. That is, ethnic communities historically racialized as non-white but were racialized as white in these cities (ex. Jews and Irish Catholics) were able to obtain even greater centrality than "non-ethnic" organizations and ethnic groups that were always considered

white. This updates our understanding of who and how ethnic communities were and were not able to achieve positions of power in building cities and their major institutions.

INTRODUCTION

How does a place become a city? Getting the investment capital to develop a city requires collective action among a city's population. As government is often too small and businesses are undercapitalized in a town's early years, cooperation to build a city must come from civil society (Bridges 1997; Einhorn 1991). Theoretically, a homogeneous civil society should ease this collective action process. This is the assumption of most urban and political concepts of institutional creation—U.S. urban institutions were created by a homogeneous group of elites, implicitly white and Protestant. In this paper, I challenge this assumption in a study of Portland and Seattle. These cities had a heterogeneous, multi-ethnic population when they were small, frontier towns. As these multi-ethnic places became cities, were marginalized ethnic groups able to gain a central role in city governance? If so, which groups were able to achieve this central role?

I find that marginalized ethnic groups can be central founders of urban politics in the U.S., and this power is contingent on groups' historically dynamic relations to whiteness. German Jewish and Irish Catholic communities experienced discrimination, yet their community organizations were the most likely—even more so than non-ethnic organizations[1] and white, Protestant ethnic organizations—to be central in early urban civil society networks. The commonality between these two groups was that they had a shared history in their dynamic relationship to whiteness. Historically, these communities had been racialized as non-white in

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[1] In this paper I use the term "non-ethnic organization" to refer to organizations that are not <u>explicitly</u> associated with a specific non-white race or non-American ethnicity. This does not mean that these organizations were non-ethnic in practice. Neither do I imply that the group was open to members from all races and ethnicities.

Europe and elsewhere in the United States. I argue that this racism pushed German Jewish and Irish Catholic communities to develop abundant and sophisticated community organizations and institutions (compared to groups that did not face the same levels of racism) (Du Bois 2007; Park 1925). Then, when members of these two communities arrived in the 19th century West Coast they were mostly racialized as white. This removed many of the political and economic racial barriers they had frequently experienced elsewhere. High organizational development coupled with the removal of institutional barriers of power gave these newly white communities access to governance power in Seattle and Portland as the small towns grew into major cities.

Scholars of U.S. urban history have long focused on cities of the Northeast and Midwest, researching cases that developed far earlier with a population that was predominantly white and Protestant. This was not the demography of the Southern and Western U.S. In this paper, I study two cities on the U.S.'s West Coast, Portland and Seattle. Both had significant populations of residents that did not share the same religion or ethnicity. This diversity was present when the two places were small towns through their rapid growth as they became large urban centers. Both cities featured large communities racialized as non-white (ex. Asians), communities that had been historically racialized as non-white but were white on the West Coast (ex. German Jews and Irish Catholics), and white, Protestant ethnic communities whose whiteness had rarely been questioned (ex. British and Scandinavians). For each city, I construct 21 years of networks among the cities' civil society organizations. With novel data on local politicians, and an ethnicity estimator derived from 1850-1910 U.S. Censuses, I reconstruct the demography and structure of the cities' civil society organizations and the individuals that were a part of it. I use ordinal and linear mixed effects models to estimate multiple measures of network centrality with a battery of controls. I show that German Jews and Irish Catholics, despite still experiencing

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marginalization as individuals, created civil society organizations that played a central in urban governance.

These empirical cases demonstrate that marginalized, ethnic civil society organizations can be part of city formation, but that power and agency depends on an ethnic community's historical relationship to whiteness. This updates our knowledge of how cities are built and the ramifications of whiteness. First, past literature suggests that for an urban elite to be non-homogeneous, ethnic groups must achieve power through assimilation or movement building (Alba and Nee 2003; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1990). Portland and Seattle's civil society networks were multi-ethnic from the beginning and played a fundamental role in building the initial political and civil society institutions that the cities still hold today. Second, while many scholars have identified and explained communities' dynamic relations with whiteness (Brodkin 1998; Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 2005; Waters 1990), the organizational and political consequences of this racial flexibility have not been given the same theoretical and empirical treatment. In this paper I suggest that dynamic relations to whiteness lead to unique organizational configurations that communities can leverage into central positions in governance.

ETHNIC CIVIL SOCIETY AS A LOCAL STATE FORMATION ACTOR

This paper fills a gap between two rich sociological literatures by asking if marginalized ethnic groups were able to gain a central role in city governance. On one hand, urban sociologists in the U.S. have always been deeply engaged in research on the role and inner workings of racial and ethnic community organizations (ex. Du Bois 1995, Thomas and Znaniecki 1918; Marwell 2007; Vargas 2016). On the other hand, political sociologists since Tocqueville (2004) have documented the prominent role of civil society in state formation of local and urban governance

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in the U.S. in the 19th century to today (Clemens 2020; Putnam 2001; Levine 2021). Between these there has been little work understanding the historical role of racial and ethnic organizations in local state formation.

Civil Society in Local State Formation

Sociologists and political scientists credit civil society groups with the development and bureaucratic formation of the U.S. local, state, and national governments in the late-1800s to the mid-1900s. Much American Political Development is due to the lobbying, efforts, and governance networks of fraternal groups (Skocpol 2003; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000), Women's organizations (Clemens 1997), non-state bureaucratic groups (Carpenter 2001), veteran's groups (Skocpol 1992), and aid societies (Clemens 2020). Everywhere in the 19th and early 20th century U.S. one could see private, voluntary associations engaging in governance themselves while debating what the U.S. local, state, and federal governments should look like (Skowronek 1982). To study local governance in this period is to study civil society networks. Civil society was particularly active at the local scale (Tocqueville 2004). Barman (2006), for example, followed how the meaning and development of local philanthropic giving took root in the late 1800s development of Charity Organization Societies. These societies sought to centralize and coordinate welfare and aid relief among charitable groups, often to preempt the need for public welfare (Clemens 2010).

These historical studies of civil society as a central governing institution rarely focus on racial and ethnic diversity. Other forms of diversity, particularly class and gender, have been a more common focus for researchers. For example, Haydu (2008) notes the development of civil society ties between corporate leaders as a key variable of urban political development that has set U.S. cities on different paths. In a different class-focused framework, Skocpol (2003) argues

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that it was the cross-class nature of fraternal organizations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that laid a robust groundwork for democratic governance for most of the 20th century. These scholars rarely touch on the importance of racial and ethnic organizational diversity and its implications for governance, with one critical exception. Ethnic diversity is discussed in studies of political machines. Machines sought to placate just enough ethnic minorities to win reelection while seeking to disenfranchise the ethnic communities it did not need for a voting majority (Wong 2006). Thus, earlier immigrants, particularly the Irish, were wooed by machines, while later arrivals were not. Machines created community organizations for the ethnic groups they sought to gain votes from (Erie 1988). Yet, urban machines usually developed after a local state had formed (thus being large enough to be a valuable source for spoils) and appeared in only a small number of cities. In her study of political monopolies, Trounstine (2008) finds only six cities had party machines before 1909, the end point of the present study.[2] The study of machines cannot answer whether ethnic communities were centrally involved in local state formation.

Ethnic Civil Society in the City

Early researchers of ethnic civil society organizations did not tend to see the organizations they studied as part of urban governance systems. These scholars described how ethnic organizations provided valuable services and community institutions to their ethnic group, but they did not play a role in broader urban affairs. Researchers of the early Chicago School of Urban Sociology often concluded that ethnic organizations were a deterrent to community members' engagement with the rest of the city. These organizations prevented assimilation and were a sign of a community's difficulty in incorporating into the broader society (Bloemraad, Chaudhary, and Gleeson 2022; Thomas and Znaniecki 1918). When the organizations did enter

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[2] All of these, except for New Orleans were in the East Coast and Midwest. Other machine cities include Baltimore, Cincinnati, Pawtucket, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh.

the mainstream, it was often through political machines. Researchers remarked that this political incorporation was often a passive participation primarily to receive patronage, without broader thought or ambition to political control (Whyte 1993[1943]). The early scholars saw robust ethnic organization as a sign of a lack of assimilation—to put one's own community ahead of non-particularistic and city-wide ties. This finding implicitly puts city governance and assimilation as a binary. Either an individual is assimilated and engages in city-wide politics, or one is unassimilated and at best, caters only to their community interests (LaGumina 1970). There is no room for robust ethnic organizing at the city-wide level.

As early as the civil rights era, ethnic historians identified and challenged the idea that urban governance required assimilation. These scholars most emphatically responded to claims that ethnic communities had and were unorganized or crime-ridden (ex. Hesse-Biber 1979). They also sought to recover the role that racial and ethnic organizations played in city-wide politics. When they did so, they usually described organized political action as a social movement. They depicted ethnic communities as outsider groups of contention; the ethnic organizations were able to alter central government structures through their outsider grassroots organizing, not as central actors (Bada 2014; Baily 1970). Partial incorporation was another alternative. For example, Göbel (1988) describes a path to political power through unions and the incorporation of second-generation immigrants into cross-ethnic working-class solidarities. Today, immigrant movements and their presence in central governing institutions is well-documented (ex. de Graauw 2016; Marwell 2007). However, historians credit these central roles to long periods of struggle within the city. This literature does not entertain the idea that ethnic groups could arrive in a place and immediately enter prominent governing networks. This blind spot of the literature is reinforced by the abundance of stage models in describing how communities gain urban political power. For

instance, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's (1990) popular model describes a community as going through 1) weak mobilization before 2) protest and exclusion which lead to 3) partial incorporation, and finally 4) electoral alliance and strong incorporation.

This paper aims to close this gap in the literature. Scholars of ethnic civil society assume that full multi-ethnic incorporation is a long-term process of mobilization and/or assimilation. These histories do not account for the potential that ethnic community organizations could be central governance actors at the time of early city formation. Scholars of local American Political Development highlight the importance of civil society to local state formation, but do not highlight a role for independent ethnic organizations. Beyond arguing that ethnic civil society could be part of the formation of the local state in some cities, the next section argues which ethnic groups were able to become important actors in governance and why.

DYNAMIC RELATIONS TO WHITENESS

I argue that the ethnic groups that were be able to become important governance actors during early state formation are groups that had previously been racialized as non-white but contemporaneously were racialized as white. In the Pacific Northwest, historians identify Irish Catholics and German Jews as following this dynamic pattern of whiteness. I base this argument on two prior theories. First, that being racialized as non-white leads to high levels of community organization development. Second, that the knowledge and aptitude to develop community organizations is sticky; that is, it does not go away even if a group crosses racial boundaries and becomes racialized as white.

Whiteness in Space and Time

Racism and whiteness are flexible categories that change over time and space (Saperstein and Penner 2012; Robinson 1983; Du Bois 2007; Omi and Winant 1986). Whiteness has often been ambiguous, and its boundaries often suit a given time and place (Fox and Bloemraad 2015; Fox and Guglielmo 2012; Roediger 2005). As Cedric Robinson (1983) noted, racism and non-white categories existed in Europe even before slavery. Jews, Slavs, Roma, and Irish Catholics were all considered inferior races. European countries often channeled these groups into laboring class positions. The dominant Europeans power created formal and informal institutional barriers to prevent access and opportunity for those they deemed to be a separate race. For instance, during the Penal Law regime in Ireland, Irish Catholics could not vote, practice law, be in the civil service, and teach (MacManus 2018). Similarly, Jews throughout Europe faced harsh and violent restrictions and regulations on their livelihoods, access to institutions, and whether they could even live in a country (Barkey and Katznelson 2011). In coming to the U.S. and arriving on the East Coast, both groups often found a more welcoming environment than they had experienced in Europe (Benkin 1978; Ignatiev 1995). However, the jump over the Atlantic did not end their non-white status. While they did not experience the same racism as Blacks in the U.S., newspapers, popular press, and government officials continued to describe Irish Catholics and Jews them as non-white races (Jacobson 1998). The Irish Catholics and Jews continued to experience violence and restrictive laws that denoted their lesser-than racial status (Brodkin 1998; Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 2005).

When Irish Catholics and Jews came to the West Coast, they found themselves racialized as white. David Broderick, an Irish Catholic, was the second Lieutenant Governor of California and was the fourth Senator to be elected from the state in 1856. He was a kingmaker of

California and San Francisco politics and was popular well outside of the local Irish vote (Erie 1988; Williams 1969). In 1875, the Irish-led Workingmen's party swept local and state elections in California by building coalitions across religion. The Irish were consistently winning popular elections on the West Coast without the support of a party apparatus in the same period they were considered non-white on the East Coast (Ethington 1994). Irish Catholics and Jews played prominent roles in the economy and culture of California. The explicitly Irish Hibernian Savings & Loan Bank was the largest bank in California at this time. Prominent Jews were not far behind. The Jewish brothers Michael and Charles de Young founded the *San Francisco Chronicle* in 1865 and quickly turned it into the city's most popular newspaper, controlling the media and cultural landscape of the city (Brechin 2006). Adolph Sutro, San Francisco's largest landowner, became the city's first Jewish mayor when he was popularly elected in 1894, a decade before East Coast immigration agents ended the practice of listing Jews as the "Hebrew Race" on customs forms (Ethington 1994; Roediger 2005).

The Jews and Irish Catholics were able to achieve a level of popular political, economic, and cultural success from the transfer of the West to U.S. hands in the 1850's. Why were they white on the West Coast? First, religious pluralism was central to residents' lived experiences and the state's key institutions. California was predominantly Catholic at the end of the Mexican-American War in 1850. The state's first major English newspaper and booster organization was run by a Mormon. Second and perhaps more importantly, was the presence of a large group of racial scapegoats—the Chinese. As Pease and Pease (1985) describe in their comparison of Boston and Charlotte in the early 19th century, Catholics and Jews faced much more racial animus in Boston than Charlotte because, in Charlotte, cross-religious coalitions were required to subjugate Blacks and maintain the system of slavery. On the West Coast, Jews and Irish were not

seen as a lower racial class when they could be favorably compared with the Chinese. This was explicit in the Workingmen's Party's popular appeals and in the newspaper pages. As long as they did not need to be subjugated for labor, they could be white (Brodkin 1998; Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 2005).

I focus the above history on California and San Francisco to describe the racial hierarchy on the West Coast prior to the development of Portland and Seattle at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. These cities (and Los Angeles and Sacramento) adopted the same racial hierarchy that San Francisco had established—the Jews and Irish Catholics were racialized as white and Asians were racialized as non-white.

Becoming white did not mean that the Jews and Irish Catholics no longer faced discrimination or marginalization. While their candidates were able to win popular elections and gain economic privilege, they were still frequently attacked for their religion and nativity (Paddison 2012). Communities who had never had their whiteness questioned were willing to expand the definition of whiteness. However, there was still a clear hierarchy of which communities most belonged and which were the most deserving of rights and privileges.

The Organizational Legacy of Racialization

Early sociologists noticed the uniqueness of racialization on the West Coast. Robert Park (1925) said as much specifically about the study of ethnic organizations, "While I was on the Pacific Coast a few months ago, studying what we have called 'race relations,' I was impressed by the marked differences, as between immigrant groups, with respect to their ability to accommodate themselves to the American environment and, within the limitations imposed upon them by our customs and our laws, to provide for all the interests of life" (676). In particularly he pointed out, "[some communities'] conflict with America has been grave enough to create in

each a new sense of racial identity, and to give them the sort of solidarity that grows out of a common cause. It is the existence in a people of the sense of a cause which finally determines their group efficiency" (1925: 677). In this prosaic language, Park identifies that the experience of discrimination and racialization has led some communities to build more community institutions, mutual aid societies, and self-help groups than others. Similarly, W. E. B. Du Bois (1995; 2007) studying the Black experience in Philadelphia and in the South saw that the richness and depth of Black organizational life often surpassed that of the outer white society. He credits this organizational development to oppressiveness of racism. These two early sociologists of race noted that racialization and the development of organizational life are intertwined.

Park and Du Bois's theory suggest that the racism the Jews and Irish Catholics faced on the East Coast and in Europe likely led to a rapid and full development of community organizational life in those places. Comparative studies that measure relative organizational life across ethnicities are rare (Park does so non-systematically but names the Jewish community in particular). However, there are extensive histories of Jewish (ex. Benkin 1978; Marinari 2020; Soyer 1997; Tenenbaum 1986) and Irish Catholic (ex. Burchell 1980; Erie 1988; Ignatiev 1995; Lune 2020) associations and their development as responses to racism. The question is, could this institutional and organizational development travel with the ethnic communities to the West Coast? Research on the legacies of mutualism suggest that knowledge and patterns of association building are key predictors for later organizational development (Greve and Rao 2012). Studies of immigrant communities also demonstrate that organizational types are frequently brought directly from sending societies (Armentrout-Ma 1983; Benkin 1978). Thus, we would expect communities that experienced racism elsewhere to have a comparatively rich organizational life on the West Coast even if they were now racialized as white. Moreover, the recent experience of

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racism might provide added motivation for these communities to build political connections to insulate them from potential future changes in the racial hierarchy. I do not suggest that these communities built power without going through years of concerted struggle. Rather, this prior struggle was geographically separate from the eventual city building on the West Coast.

Organizational Political Power and Dynamic Whiteness

Through the changing boundaries of whiteness with their effects on organizational development I operationalize a categorization of racial and ethnic communities to answer the research question and support the theories introduced above. If 1) the historical racialization of a community as non-white leads to high community organizational development, 2) contemporaneous racialization of a community as white creates lower barriers to governance, and 3) racial boundaries shift over space and time, then I expect that the ethnic political power of civil society organizations will not follow linearly from levels of discrimination. Figure 4-1 displays the specifics of the theory.

The top row of Figure 4-1 shows ethnic communities that have rarely, if ever, had their whiteness questioned—Always White Ethnics. In Portland and Seattle, these are predominantly British, Scandinavian, and non-Jewish Germans. Historically, they have not had to develop as complex and politically-active community institutions and organizations as they could generally count on their own voices being heard and represented in formal political institutions. Although they do not face significant barriers to becoming part of the civil society governance network, their communities lack the organizational development to fully exploit the opportunity. The middle row shows the case of the Previously Non-White Irish Catholics and German Jews. As argued above, their prior racial status prompted heightened organizational development while their later inclusion into whiteness removed significant institutional barriers to participate in

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Always White Ethnics	Historically and Contemporaneously White	→	Low Organizational Development + Low Barriers to Governance	→	Low Organizational Political Power + Low Discrimination
Previously Non-White	Historically Non-White Contemporaneously White	→	High Organizational Development + Low Barriers to Governance	→	High Organizational Political Power + Moderate Discrimination
Non-White	Contemporaneously Non-White	→	High Organizational Development + High Barriers to Governance	→	No Organizational Political Power + High Discrimination

Propositions:

Historical or Contemporary Whiteness and Organizational Development

Non-White → High Development

White → Low Development

Organizational legacies persist over time

Contemporary Whiteness and Barriers to Governance

Non-White → High Barriers

White → Low Barriers

Whiteness and Discrimination

Non-White → High Discrimination

White → Low Discrimination

Discrimination persists over time

Figure 4-1. Process of Racialized Whiteness and its Relationship to Organizational Political Power.

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governance. The result is that their organizations could become highly engaged in the civil society governance networks of the growing cities. Finally, the bottom row shows Non-White communities.[3] In Portland and Seattle, these are predominantly the Chinese and Japanese communities, with the small Black community also present in the data. These communities have high organizational development, but because they still face such high barriers to governance, they are blocked from political power access to the cities' governance networks.

DATA & METHODS

The research questions for this paper are: As Seattle and Portland became cities, were marginalized ethnic groups able to gain a central role in city governance? If so, which groups were able to achieve this central role? I answer this question through a novel dataset I collected on the officers of the cities' civil society organizations from annual city directories during each city's rapid period of initial growth. Through this dataset I build civil society board interlock networks that to identify the structure of civil society governance and which organizations were more central. This data reveals that community organizations of ethnic groups that Previously Non-White organizations were the most central on average, even more so than Non-Ethnic groups. Additionally, to show that this was not a result of privilege and that these groups were, in fact marginalized, I run the same analyses but at the level of the individual instead of the organization. I build and apply an ethnicity estimator based on Census Data to identify the likely ethnicities of all individuals in the dataset. This analysis reveals a strict racial hierarchy with

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[3] Note that this group also includes those previously racialized as white and then later racialized as non-white. The Chinese, for instance, were often the dominant ethnic group in many overseas colonies and in their home country. Only in the U.S. were they now racialized as inferior.

third-generation whites at the top, followed by Always White Ethnic individuals, Previously

Non-White individuals, and finally Non-White individuals.

City Directory Data

For the interlock networks, I use 21 years of directories for each city; the ten years before

and after the county reached a population of 100,000.[4] This information can be found in Table 4-

1. I use the county level because the city boundaries were constantly in flux and the county best

represented the boundaries residents constructed their community in. City directories, while they

focus on the city in question, also include all the relevant information at the county-level. City

directories were created by several different publishers throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

They list all the government officials, as well as the prominent organizations and their board

members. They were published annually for Seattle and Portland, providing valuable

longitudinal data. They have been used in several longitudinal and comparative studies of civil

society in the U.S. (ex. Crowley and Skocpol 2001; Gamm and Putnam 1999; Skocpol, Ganz,

and Munson 2000). However, the data comes with limitations. These city directories were mostly

used by city boosters to promote middle-class, white migration to the city. Thus, labor,

immigrant, and non-white organizations are potentially undercounted.

While this absence has made it difficult for past scholars to note and compare the relative

presence of immigrant organizations of this period, it does not pose an immediate issue for this

paper's research question. This limitation increases the likelihood of my models' findings. The

kinds of organizations that are omitted are the least likely to be central. This should reduce the

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[4] There is nothing special about 100,000. As Table 4-1 shows, however, this offers a useful comparison point when
these cities grew rapidly. Both counties at least tripled their population over 20 years; a speed that neither county has
ever achieved since. As the population numbers imply, neither of these places were metropolitan areas at the
beginning of the period, but both were by the end of the period. In addition, neither place was particularly large
relative to other locations in the state at the beginning of the period, but both became the most populous areas by an
order of magnitude by the end of the period.

power of my models and bias coefficients toward zero. Thus, coefficients of variables that are

correlated with greater centrality are likely to be underestimates, further reinforcing any results

that I do find. I support this assumption by finding consistent centrality patterns across multiple

subsamples, including a subsample (the largest connected component) that would not include

these absent organizations even if they were known.

	Seattle	Portland
Years	1888-1908	1889-1909
County	King	Multnomah
Population of County in First Year	52,600	69,900
Population of County in Last Year	250,000	214,000
Percent 1st or 2nd Generation Immigrant	55%	58%

Table 4-1. Years and Populations of the Cities used for Data Collection

City directories list clubs, libraries, hospitals, private schools, and benevolent societies

and their board members. I digitized all organization names and officer members for each year.

This totaled 63,026 member-years comprising of 2,819 organizations and 13,507 people. To

connect and ensure that these civil society networks match with political power I also collect a

related dataset on politicians. Each city directory lists the current prominent city, county, and

state politicians and government officials. I let the city directory define what roles are prominent

based on the organization and design of the directory pages. The same publisher, Polk, published

95% of the directories I use, so the design and organization is highly uniform across all cities and

times. Some prominent roles, such as State Representatives, are not consistently provided each

year. I use additional sources, such as state blue books to fill in the missing years. For each city-

year I transcribed the full name, position, and years served in that position. This totaled 1,860

officials in 6,972 politician-office-years. Prior theory predicts centrality in the network is highly

correlated with political power. As the results show, being a politician is consistently and highly associated with centrality. For example, every mayor is found in the largest connected component. So too are approximately 90% of city council members.

The city directories are not typo free, so I matched individuals in the organization member and politician dataset with a variable edit distance algorithm that relaxed the threshold distance for rarer last names and for potential matches within the same organization but consecutive years. All matches were manually checked and corrected for accuracy. I classify organizations into one of nine types: Activity/Interest-Based, Charitable, City Improvement, Corporate, Fraternal, Labor, Military, Political Advocacy, Social, and Volunteer Fire Department. I also code each organization as to whether it is a women's, ethnic, and/or religious organization.

Board Interlock Networks

Board interlock networks—the connections between organizations and individuals through shared membership on organization boards—is one of the most common ways to identify power structures among organizations (Mizruchi 1992). Board membership has multiple meanings, but all signal social and political capital. Legally, board membership is a fiduciary responsibility. Members are liable for the financial and legal propriety of the organization. The better off an individual is economically, politically, and socially, the better they can serve this board role. Board membership is also a status symbol. Holding a board seat is a signal of one's eminence within a community and offers opportunities to spend time with and connect to other eminent figures (Abzug and Galaskiewicz 2001). Board membership also means organizational control. Board members hire and fire employees, make organizational policies, and control the functioning of the organizations. The more organizations one serves on and the more prominent those organizations are, the more power a board member can wield in a society. Lastly, in the late

19th century and early 20th century, it was organization members that typically voted on who would serve as a board member. Being a board member was a sign that one is deemed competent and eminent among people who actively participated and benefited from the organization.

For this analysis I build two one-mode board interlock networks (Breiger 1974). First, I construct networks where the organizations are nodes and edges exist when two organizations share the same member in the same year. Second, I construct networks where nodes are individuals and edges are when two people are both members of the same organization in the same year. I construct networks with a 3-year rolling window meaning that I capture, for instance, all nodes and edges from 1890-1892 to construct a graph, then 1891-1893, then 1892-1894 and so on. With 21 years of data, I construct 76 network graphs, 19 graphs of each kind (nodes as organizations and nodes as people) for each city.

When two organizations are connected it means that two different organizations' donors consider the same person competent and worthy enough to lead their organization. The elected board member then brings knowledge explicitly and implicitly between the two organizations enabling coordination, communication, and influence between them.

Ethnicity Estimation

I also gather data on the ethnicity of the organization officers. To estimate ethnicity, I obtain 1% Census samples from the IPUMS dataset from 1850-1910. These samples code an individual's last name, race, Hispanic-identity, birthplace, and father's birthplace. From this data I construct an ethnicity classifier that assigns probabilities that a given last name is associated with a given ethnicity. This technique is like Torvik and Agarwal's (2016) *Ethnea* identifier, commonly used in studies of scientific diversity (ex. Kim, Kim, and Owen-Smith 2021), but is likely more robust given my more specific use case, fewer last names, and the rare occurrence of

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exogamy (Lockhart, King, and Munsch 2023). Additionally, to heighten the specificity of the classifier I weight last name frequency by period (heightened during the period of study, 1880-1910) and by location (highest for county, then state, then the West Coast, then U.S.). I group all possible birthplaces, races, and identities into 18 possible ethnicities. However, to simplify the data, I remove five ethnicities that are predicted to be less than 1% of the population and are unlikely to be associated with any one individual, and then renormalize the percentages. For each last name, the estimator provides a discrete probability distribution across all ethnicities. The estimator accurately predicted several hundred individuals whose ethnicities I was able to obtain through local biographic information. I match 96% of the last names in my dataset and drop the missing cases with no change in my results.[5]

A crucial category in this assignment is "Non-Ethnic/3rd Generation+." This is the percent of people with a given last name who was born in the U.S. to a father who was also born in the U.S. Empirically, this is the expected likelihood that someone with a given last name comes from a family that has been in the U.S. for at least three generations. This is correlated with no longer being bilingual, speaking unaccented English, and having fewer connections to one's ancestral sending country. People with last names with a high likelihood in this category were likely disengaged from ethnic community, culture, and organizations (for most of the ethnic community organizations, their official business was not conducted in English). It is also likely that, even if these "Non-Ethnic/3rd Generation+" individuals were highly connected to their ethnicity, they could perform "Americanness" through their talk, gestures, and knowledge of U.S. culture. For

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[5] This method assumes no interethnic marriages of individuals' parents. Martin, Hacker, and Francesco (2018) find that intermarriage rates were less than 10% in 1910. They captured marriages across national-origin boundaries (far more restrictive than ethnicities) and analyze 1910 when the best window for my data is earlier. Thus, we can assume intermarriage was negligible. For further evidence of this, in the full data for this paper I find only one person that is ever a member of organizations identified with different ethnicities.

this analysis, this variable is also a measure of how much a given last name might be read by a voter as ethnic. For voters in political elections and for organizational board seats, they might not know much about a candidate, so this measure shows how likely a candidate might be seen as an "American."

One limitation of this ethnicity assignment technique is that it cannot distinguish religion based on last name.[6] While I assume Irish are Catholic and Scandinavians are Protestant, the German populations in these cities had significant numbers of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, and the Japanese and Chinese populations also followed multiple, different religions. The Census does not have good accuracy when it comes to religious affiliation until later in the 20th century. German Jews, however, were a different ethnicity from other Germans. For the analysis of individuals, I group all Germans together, except if they are a member of a Jewish organization, I label them as German Jews. I also assume that all Jews are German.[7] There are no official statistics on this assumption, but the percentage of Germans in the Jewish population is believed to be above 90%, and all the known Jewish names in the dataset are coded by the ethnicity estimator as being most likely German or Non-Ethnic/3rd Generation+. Japanese and Chinese names are not consistently distinguished from each other in the Census from this period and so I consider them all to be "Asian." These qualifiers only apply to the ethnicity identifier and the models analyzing individual centrality. For the main models of the paper that focus on organizational centrality, it is clear which organizations are German Jewish v. German Christian or Japanese vs. Chinese.

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[6] We also cannot measure Black-White racial differences. However, Blacks make up a small part of the data sample and the population (<0.5%). While there are Black organizations listed in both directories they are small in number and are never connected to any organization outside other Black organizations. I do not include them in the data analysis. However, their inclusion would only accentuate results.
[7] While the East Coast at this time had a large number of Eastern European Jews, Eastern Europeans made up less than 1% of the population of Portland and Seattle.

Dependent Variable: Measuring Centrality

The key outcome of my analysis is the centrality of an organization or individual in the board interlock networks. I measure this in discrete and continuous ways. First, a node in a given year can 1) be an isolate, 2) be part of a small connected component, or 3) be part of the largest connected component (LCC). For the organizational analysis only, occasionally an organization does not list any members and I categorize it in a fourth category: no members listed. In all years, the LCC is significantly larger than any other connected component and so I assume that this is where the governing power lies within the civil society network. To reinforce this assumption, the LCC also always has a higher percentage of politicians than any other component. For the continuous measures of centrality, I only focus on the LCC and measure the eigenvector centrality to measure power, and degree centrality to measure robustness of connection (Bonacich 1987). Due to the skew in distribution of eigenvector and degree centrality, I take the log and normalize the variables to have a standard deviation of one.

Models

My individual observations of the outcome are the centrality of an organization or person for each city-year. However, my independent variable of interest is at the level of the organization or individual. Thus, I use mixed-effects panel data models with random effects at the organization or individual level, where organization-year and person-year are nested within the organization or individual, respectively. For categorical centrality outcomes I use ordinal mixed effects models with a logit link, and for linear centrality I used linear mixed effects models. The equations are similar for both:

$$Y_{ti} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1i}T_{ti} + \beta_{2i}X_{ti} + \epsilon_{ti}$$

$$\beta_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}X_i + \gamma_{02}CITY_i + \mu_{0i}$$

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$$\beta_{1i} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}CITY_i$$

Only for ordinal regression with category j: $logit(P(Y'_{ti} \leq j)) = Y_{ti}$

Where Y_{ti} is the centrality for organization i in year t, and β_{0i} holds the intercept (γ_{00})

and organization/individual-level controls and fixed effects (coefficients γ_{01} and γ_{02} for

variables X_i and $CITY_i$) and random (μ_{0i}) effects. T_{ti} is the year which is additionally interacted

with the city to allow for different longitudinal effects for Portland and Seattle. β_{2i} is the

coefficient of organization- or individual-year variables, X_{ti}. And ϵ_{ti} is the organization- or

individual-year random effect. I run the same models on both cities individually and get identical

results. Combining the two cities into one model improved the model's power, while maintaining

similar magnitude of coefficients. In this paper, I only display the combined models.

Independent Variables: Ethnic Identity

The main variable of interest for the organizational models is a binary of whether an

organization is ethnic (1) or not (0). I run an additional set of regressions with mutually exclusive

factor coding for Non-White (Asian, and some Black, organizations), Previously Non-White

(Irish and German Jewish organizations), and Always White Ethnic (Scandinavian, British, and

other German organizations) organizations. For the linear model containing observations only

within the LCC, I remove the Non-White variable as there are never any Asian or Black

organizations in the LCC. For modeling individual ethnicity, the first models display the

likelihood that an individual is <u>not</u> Non-Ethnic/3rd Generation+. I then break out this variable

into the likelihood the individual is Non-White (Asian), Previously Non-White (Irish and

German Jewish), and Always White Ethnic (Scandinavian, British, other Germans, and all other

predominantly white ethnicities[8]). These likelihoods are from 0 to 1 so the coefficient can be

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[8] This other category includes primarily French, Canadian, other Western European ethnicities. Note that this category does include some other predominantly Catholic communities.

interpreted as the difference from someone being definitively not of a given ethnicity to being definitively of that ethnicity. As with the organizational models, I remove Non-White individuals in the linear LCC model because there are not enough individuals in the LCC likely to be Asian to estimate the coefficient.

Control Variables

Organization Models. Additional variables include the binary variables of whether the organization is a <u>Religious organization</u> and <u>Women's organization</u>, as well as the categorical variable of <u>Organization type</u>. I include the rough measure of <u>Age</u>, the length of time since the organization first appeared in the city directory, the <u>Number of unique members</u> listed by the organization in the three year window, the <u>Average tenure in years of current members</u> up until the year in question, a binary of whether the organization <u>Contained a male member</u> in the three-year window, and a binary of whether the organization contained a <u>Current or past politician</u>[9] in the three-year window. I take the square root[10] of the number of members and average tenure to account for skew and normalize them to have a standard deviation of one.

Individual Models. The variables at the individual level are similar, but I have less information at the individual level than I have of the organizations. I measure the binary variables of whether an individual is a <u>Woman</u> and whether they were a <u>Current or past politician</u>. I include the <u>Number of years</u> the individual was involved in organizations, the <u>Average tenure</u> they have spent in organizations up until the current year, and the <u>Number of organizations</u> they were affiliated with within the three-year window. As with the above, I take the square root of the average tenure and number of organizations to account for skew and

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[9] I initially separated this variable as two different binary variables (current politician and past politician) but they were highly correlated, so I joined them to improve model fit and accurate interpretation of variables.
[10] I take the square root instead of the log because these are small number, primarily count variables, and square root fits the normal distribution assumption better than the log.

	Mean	Median	Max	Min	St. Dev.
Level: Organization-Year (n=19,987)					
Age	5.12	4.00	19.00	0.00	4.83
Number of Members	6.62	4.00	383.00	0.00	9.81
Average Member Tenure	1.74	1.55	12.20	1.00	1.05
Contains a Male Member	0.79	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.41
Politician	0.20	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.40
Year	1900.6	1902.0	1908.0	1889.0	5.34
Outcomes					
No Members	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.27
Isolate	0.53	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.50
Small Component	0.17	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.38
Largest Component	0.22	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.41
Level: Organization (n=2,819)					
Religious Organization (binary)	0.11	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.31
Woman's Organization (binary)	0.13	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.33
Seattle (binary)	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.50
Type: Corporate	0.04	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.19
Type: Fire	0.04	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.19
Type: Fraternal	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.50
Type: Improvement	0.02	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.13
Type: Interest	0.10	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.29
Type: Labor	0.11	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.31
Type: Military	0.02	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.15
Type: Political	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.24
Type: Professional	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.18
Type: Social	0.05	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.22
Independent Variables					
Ethnic Organization	0.09	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.29
Non-White Organization	0.01	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.07
Previously Non-White Organization	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.17
Always White Ethnic Organization	0.05	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.22

Table 4-2a. Descriptive Statistics for Organizational Models—Ordinal Models.

	Mean	Median	Max	Min	St. Dev.
Level: Organization-Year (n=4,381)					
Age	5.00	3.00	19.00	0.00	4.64
Number of Members	13.70	10.00	383.00	1.00	17.03
Average Member Tenure	1.88	1.63	12.20	1.00	1.03
Contains a Male Member	0.94	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.24
Politician	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.49
Year	1898.6	1899.0	1908.0	1889.0	5.23
Outcomes					
Eigenvector Centrality	0.04	0.00	0.67	0.00	0.09
Degree Centrality	6.28	3.00	90.00	1.00	8.48
Level: Organization (n=873)					
Religious Organization (binary)	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.26
Woman's Organization (binary)	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.28
Seattle (binary)	0.80	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.40
Type: Corporate	0.05	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.21
Type: Fire	0.02	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.15
Type: Fraternal	0.48	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.50
Type: Improvement	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.16
Type: Interest	0.11	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.32
Type: Labor	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.17
Type: Military	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.18
Type: Political	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.23
Type: Professional	0.05	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.21
Type: Social	0.04	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.20
Independent Variables					
Ethnic Organization	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.24
Previously Non-White Organization	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.17
Always White Ethnic Organization	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.17

Table 4-2b. Descriptive Statistics for Organizational Models—Linear Models.

	Mean	Median	Max	Min	St. Dev.
Level: Person-Year (n=31,271)					
Politician (binary)	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.27
Years in Organizations	3.18	2.00	18.00	0.00	3.66
Number of Organizations	1.35	1.00	18.00	1.00	0.81
Average Tenure in Organizations	1.89	1.50	18.00	1.00	1.31
Year	1898	1899	1908	1889	4.97
Outcomes					
Eigenvector Centrality	0.01	0	0.34	0	0.03
Degree Centrality	21.87	11	433	1	37.74
Level: People (n=8,000)					
Woman (binary)	0.16	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.36
Seattle (binary)	0.85	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.36
Independent Variables					
Ethnic Identity	0.40	0.23	1.00	0.00	0.38
Previously Non-White Identity	0.09	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.22
Always White Ethnic Identity	0.30	0.08	1.00	0.00	0.37

Table 4-3a. Descriptive Statistics for Individual Models—Ordinal Models.

	Mean	Median	Max	Min	St. Dev.
Level: Person-Year (n=63,026)					
Politician (binary)	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.24
Years in Organizations	3.11	2.00	19.00	0.00	3.74
Average Tenure in Organizations	1.93	1.50	19.00	1.00	1.43
Year	1899	1900	1908	1889	5.46
Outcomes					
Isolate	0.13	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.33
Small Component	0.38	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.48
Largest Component	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.50
Level: People (n=13,507)					
Woman (binary)	0.20	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.40
Seattle (binary)	0.66	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.47
Independent Variables					
Ethnic Identity	0.42	0.25	1.00	0.00	0.39
Non-White Identity	0.01	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.08
Previously Non-White Identity	0.10	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.23
Always White Ethnic Identity	0.31	0.08	1.00	0.00	0.38

Table 4-3b. Descriptive Statistics for Individual Models—Linear Models.

normalize them to have a standard deviation of one. I do not include the Number of organizations

in the ordinal model because the empirical definition of the categorical outcome is partially

defined by the number of organizations an individual is a part of.

Descriptive statistics of organizational and individual model variables can be found in

Tables 4-2 and 4-3.

RESULTS

In this results section I first analyze the organizational models, then the individual

models, and finally I analyze the prominent edges connecting ethnic organizations to the center

of the LCC.

Before presenting the model results, I will briefly report on basic demographic statistics

of organizational density. As predicted by the model, the racialization of a community as non-

white should lead to higher organizational density. I calculate how many organizations each

community would have if they had the same number of organizations per capita—if every ethnic

community had the same number of organizations per capita, how many more or fewer

organizations do they have relative to that expectation? I find that German Jews have 2.5 times

more organizations than their population in the cities would predict and Irish Catholics produce

1.3 times more organizations than expected.[11] For the most common Always White Ethnic

groups, the Scandinavians are at par, with the same number of organizations as expected, while

the British have only 40% of the organizations than what would be expected. The Non-White

Asian community organizations are highly undercounted in the city directories compared to past

research (ex. Lai 2004; Wong 2004), but even they beat the British in this measure, producing

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[11] I assume German Jews are one-third of all Germans in these cities. This is an overly conservative estimate
meaning that the real number difference from expectation is likely far higher than 2.5.

50% of the organizations compared to expected. The Black community, which also likely faced omissions, still has several times more the number of organizations appearing in the city directories than their numbers in the population would predict. Higher organizational creation appears to be correlated with the past or contemporary experience of racism.

Organizational Centrality

Table 4-4 shows the results for the ordinal model for the organizational networks. Models (1) and (2) use the binary <u>Ethnic Organization</u> variable, while models (3) and (4) break out the variable into its hypothesized components. Models (1) and (3) show the correlations between the independent and dependent variables of interest and models (2) and (4) add the battery of controls. I remove Non-White organizations in model (4) because they never appear in the largest component. In model (1) ethnic organizations are correlated with slightly less centrality, but insignificantly so. With the introduction of controls in model (2), ethnic organization becomes significantly negative. Ethnic organizations, on average, are less likely to be in larger components than Non-Ethnic organizations.

However, when we split up ethnic organizations by category, in models (3) and (4), the ethnic categories show contrasting effects. The results of the coefficients for the key independent variables in model (4) are visualized in Figure 4-2. Non-White organizations are significantly negative with a large magnitude. Non-White organizations are never in the largest component, this is not surprising, but reveals the strength of the barriers of being Non-White. In models (3) and (4), the effect of Previously Non-White organizations is significant and positive, while Always White Ethnic organizations are negative and increase to significance in model (4). With the introduction of controls both variables improve their precision, while Previously Non-White organizations decrease in magnitude and Always White Ethnic organizations increase in

magnitude. This supports the argument that Previously Non-White organizations are more likely to be central, while Always White Ethnic organizations are less likely to be central. The control variable with the largest magnitude in models (2) and (4) is whether the organization contained a male member or not, but even so, women's organizations also had high, positive magnitude. Additional fixed effects results can be found in Appendix 1.

Table 4-5 displays the results for eigenvector and degree centrality within the LCC. The order of models in Table 4-4 are in the same pattern as Table 4-5, alternating between eigenvector and degree centrality as the outcome. The results for eigenvector and degree centrality are similar regarding the main variables of interest. As in the ordinal models, ethnic organization has a negative relationship with centrality in all models, however, only in the model for degree centrality with controls is it significant. Breaking up the variable into Previously Non-White and Always White Ethnic categories again reveals the differences. The effect of being a Previously Non-White organization on centrality is minor in magnitude, insignificant, and tends to be positive in relation to non-ethnic organizations. The effect of being an Always White Ethnic organization on centrality is greater in magnitude across the four models, is always negative, is marginally significant in models (6) and (7) and quite significant in the model for degree with controls. Only in model (8) are Previously Non-White organizations significantly more likely to be central than Always White Ethnic organizations ($p < 0.001$), but the difference approaches significance in models (6) and (7) ($p < 0.01$).

As for other control variables, women's organizations are consistently negative, number of members and having a politician as a member are consistently positive. Average tenure and containing a male member are significant with high magnitude for one of the centrality outcomes but not the other. Of the organization types (Appendix 1), only labor groups and volunteer fire

Organizational Centrality

Ordinal

No Members - Isolate - Small Component - Largest Component

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ethnicity				
Ethnic Organization	-0.06	-0.73***		
	(0.25)	(0.21)		
Non-White			-2.70**	
			(0.83)	
Previously Non-White			1.56**	1.17***
			(0.48)	(0.30)
Always White Ethnic			-0.25	-0.67**
			(0.34)	(0.22)
Controls				
Religious Organization		-0.13		-0.34*
		(0.16)		(0.16)
Women's Organization		1.50***		1.44***
		(0.16)		(0.16)
Organization Age		-0.04***		-0.04***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Number of Members		1.41***		1.40***
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Average Member Tenure		0.70***		0.70***
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Contains a Male Member		3.22***		3.19***
		(0.12)		(0.12)
Politician is a Member		0.57***		0.57***
		(0.10)		(0.10)
Year		-0.07***		-0.07***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Intercepts				
No Members | Isolate	-4.92	1.32	-4.91	1.27
	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.22)
Isolate | Small Comp.	2.15	8.85	2.16	8.79
	(0.04)	(0.24)	(0.00)	(0.24)
Small Comp. | Largest Comp.	3.71	10.53	3.72	10.46
	(0.04)	(0.25)	(0.00)	(0.24)
N(Organization-Years)	19,987	19,987	19,987	19,987
N(Organizations)	2,819	2,819	2,819	2,819
City x Year	No	Yes	No	Yes
Organization Type FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 4-4. Ordinal Model for Ethnic Organizations

Organization-Level Ordinal Centrality Ethnicity Coefficients

Organization-Level Eigenvector Centrality Ethnicity Coefficients

Figure 4-2. Coefficient Plots of Organizational Ethnicity Variables.
Lines show the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient estimation in the models that include all controls. The first plot shows the ordinal results, the second plot shows the linear results for eigenvector centrality within the LCC. In the ordinal plot the estimates are significantly different ($p < 0.001$), in the linear plot the difference between the two estimates does not quite reach significance ($p = 0.075$).

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departments are consistently significant in both eigenvector and degree models, and both are negative. In sum, the ordinal models show that organizations from Previously Non-White communities are more central than Non-Ethnic and other ethnic organizations. In the linear models of the LCC, these organizations are not significantly more central than Non-Ethnic organizations, but they are more central than Always White Ethnic organizations.

Organizational Centrality within the Largest Connected Component

	(1) Eigenvector	(2) Degree	(3) Eigenvector	(4) Degree	(5) Eigenvector	(6) Degree	(7) Eigenvector	(8) Degree
Ethnicity								
Ethnic Organization	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.18** (0.09)				
Previously Non-White					-0.02 (0.14)	0.06 (0.15)	0.07 (0.14)	0.04 (0.13)
Always White Ethnic					-0.02 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.34*** (0.12)
Controls								
Religious Organization			-0.01 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)			-0.05 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.08)
Women's Organization			-0.24** (0.10)	-0.42*** (0.08)			-0.24** (0.10)	-0.42*** (0.08)
Organization Age			-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)			-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Number of Members			0.19*** (0.02)	0.64*** (0.02)			0.19*** (0.02)	0.64*** (0.03)
Average Member Tenure			0.01 (0.04)	0.22*** (0.03)			0.00 (0.04)	0.22*** (0.03)
Contains a Male Member			0.34*** (0.10)	-0.04 (0.07)			0.35*** (0.10)	-0.03 (0.08)
Politician is a Member			0.18*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.03)			0.18*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.03)
Year			0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)			0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Intercept	-1.53*** (0.03)	1.09*** (0.03)	-2.30*** (0.17)	-0.45*** (0.13)	-1.53*** (0.03)	1.09*** (0.03)	-2.30*** (0.17)	-0.45*** (0.13)
N(Organization-Years)	4,381	4,381	4,381	4,381	4,381	4,381	4,381	4,381
N(Organizations)	873	873	873	873	873	873	873	873
City x Year	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

$* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001$

Table 4-5. Linear Model for Ethnic Organizations in the Largest Connected Component.

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Individual Centrality

Tables 4-4 and 4-5 clearly show the impressive level of centrality of Previously Non-White organizations compared to all other organizations, especially other ethnic organizations. Could this be through a different ethnic hierarchy on the West Coast? Were these communities truly marginalized? To enforce the powerful finding of the prior two tables, I run the same analyses but look at individuals. According to the theory in Figure 4-1, the Previously Non-White category is associated with the highest strength in organizational political power, but only a slight improvement in individually experienced discrimination. Tables 4-4 and 4-5 proved the first part of this theory, the following analysis analyzes the second part.

Table 4-6 shows that the effects for organizations do not simply replicate at the level of the individual. Only the effect of being a politician or having a politician as a member is similar in magnitude and direction compared to Table 4-4. The effect of the likelihood of having an ethnic identity on centrality is negative and highly significant in models (1) and (2).

As I break up ethnic identity into the three categories, all remain negative and significant in models (3) and (4) and now have some of the largest magnitudes of all variables in model (4). As Figure 4-3 shows, the variables are also ordered by their expected intensity of discrimination—the likelihood of being Non-White is related to the lowest centrality (not significantly) while the likelihood of being an Always White Ethnic is related to the highest centrality ($p < 0.001$). However, all ethnic individuals are much less likely to be central than likely Non-Ethnic/3rd Generation+ individuals. Of the control variables, being a prior or current politician is a large, positive determinant of an individual's centrality. Women, on the other hand, are less likely to be central.

Individual Centrality
Ordinal
Isolate - Small Component - Largest Component

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ethnicity				
Ethnic Identity	-0.31***	-0.29***		
	(0.07)	(0.06)		
Non-White			-1.63***	-1.01***
			(0.34)	(0.29)
Previously Non-White			-0.48***	-0.54***
			(0.12)	(0.10)
Always White Ethnic			-0.22**	-0.20**
			(0.08)	(0.07)
Controls				
Politician		0.57***		0.57***
		(0.09)		(0.09)
Woman		-0.24***		-0.24***
		(0.06)		(0.06)
Years in Organizations		0.09***		0.09***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Average Organization Tenure		-0.03		-0.03
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Year		-0.23***		-0.23***
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Intercepts				
Isolate | Small Comp.	-3.69	-3.96	-3.69	-3.96
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Small Comp. | Largest Comp.	0.10	-0.03	0.10	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.08)
N(Person-Years)	63,026	63,026	63,026	63,026
N(People)	13,507	13,507	13,507	13,507
City x Year	No	Yes	No	Yes

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4-6. Ordinal Model for Ethnic Individuals.

Individual-Level Ordinal Centrality Ethnicity Coefficients

Individual-Level Eigenvector Centrality Ethnicity Coefficients

Figure 4-3. Coefficient Plots of Individual Ethnicity Variables.
Lines show the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient estimation in the models that include all controls. The first plot shows the ordinal results, the second plot shows the linear results for eigenvector centrality within the LCC. In all plots the estimates are significantly different (Always Non-White v. Previously Non-White, $p < 0.05$: in both panels. Previously Non-White v. Always White, $p < 0.001$).

Finally, Table 4-7 shows the last set of regression results, estimating eigenvector and degree centrality. The independent variables of ethnic identity are all negative and significant across all eight models. In models (1)-(4), ethnic identity is negative and significant across eigenvector and degree. Models (5)-(8) show that Previously Non-White identity and Always White Ethnic identity are negative and significant across all models compared to Non-Ethnic/3rd Generation+ identity. In the models for eigenvector centrality, (5) and (7) (with the main independent variables from model (7) visible in Figure 4-3), Previously Non-White identity is significantly less likely to be central than the Always White Ethnic identity ($p < 0.001$ for both). In the models, (6) and (8), for degree centrality the same coefficients exhibit identical estimated magnitudes.

Other controls reveal large differences in magnitude between eigenvector and degree centrality. Having been a politician, the number of organizations, and average tenure are always positive and significant. Being a woman is strongly negative for eigenvector centrality but has no significant effect for degree centrality. In sum, these individual models show that ethnic identity, of all kinds, is associated with less centrality, but that there is a strict hierarchy from Always White Ethnic individuals to Previously Non-White individuals down to Non-White individuals.

Individual Centrality within the Largest Connected Component

	(1) Eigenvector	(2) Degree	(3) Eigenvector	(4) Degree	(5) Eigenvector	(6) Degree	(7) Eigenvector	(8) Degree
Ethnicity								
Ethnic Identity	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.18***	-0.11***				
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)				
Previously Non-White					-0.27***	-0.10**	-0.33***	-0.11***
					(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Always White Ethnic					-0.08*	-0.10***	-0.14***	-0.11***
					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Controls								
Politician			0.13***	0.19***			0.13***	0.19***
			(0.03)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.02)
Woman			-0.53***	0.04			-0.53***	0.03
			(0.03)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.02)
Years in Organizations			0.00	-0.02***			0.00	-0.02***
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of Organizations			0.13***	0.31***			0.13***	0.31***
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Average Tenure at Organizations			0.09***	0.36***			0.09***	0.36***
			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Year			-0.02***	-0.10***			-0.02***	-0.10***
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	-1.91***	2.12***	-2.23***	-0.34***	-1.91***	2.12***	-2.20***	-0.33***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N(Person-Years)	31,271	31,271	31,271	31,271	31,271	31,271	31,271	31,271
N(People)	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000
City x Year	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

$* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001$

Table 4-7. Linear Model for Ethnic Individuals in the Largest Connected Component.

Central Connections

The last analysis asks, what connections these ethnic organizations make within the LCC that brings the ethnic organizations into a relatively central position in the civil society structure? For this exploration I pull two sets of data, the one-step connections between ethnic organizations and any other organization in the LCC, and the one-step connections between ethnic organizations and Non-Ethnic organizations in the LCC with <u>higher</u> centrality. The former identifies the organizations and connections that bring ethnic organizations in the LCC and the latter determines which organizations are more central within the LCC.

First, the one-step connections within the LCC are highly intra-ethnic. Of the ties that ethnic organizations have, only 30.3% in Portland and 41.0% in Seattle are with non-ethnic groups or groups with different ethnicity. The ethnic groups that make the connections to Non-Ethnic groups are more likely to be fraternal, charitable, or social. Labor groups are nonexistent and political groups are also far below expectation. The ethnic organizations in the LCC appear less contentious than the ethnic organizational population and the full organization population. The organizations that make these connections to Non-Ethnic organizations are predominantly German, German-Jewish, and Irish with a few British organizations. Scandinavian organizations are particularly underrepresented relative to their presence in the organizational population.

Second, I analyze the Non-Rthnic organizations that ethnic organizations are directly connected to that improve the ethnic organizations' centrality scores. Table 4-8 displays a list of the Non-Rthnic organizations that ethnic organizations connected to at least three times across the data. These organizations are sites of bridging social capital (Paxton 2002; Putnam 2001). Table 4-9 lists the ethnic organizations that connected to them at least twice. These are sites of "linking" and bonding social capital, where members share a similar background, but some

members are connected hierarchically to more central organizations (Rubin 2016). Table 4-8 shows that in both cities, the type of organizations that offer bridging social capital are identical in the two cities. The top two are corporate and charitable organizations, and the bottom three are fraternal organizations. In both cities these are the top corporate and top charitable groups that form the center of the organizational network in most years. The fraternal groups are not particularly elite groups relative to others within their city networks. In Table 4-9, it is stark to note that German-Jewish organizations and Charitable organizations make up more than half of the list in both cities. Charitable organizations make up about 10% of the organization population as a whole and 15% of the ethnic organization population, so their frequency here is seemingly non-random. Similarly, German-Jewish organizations are only 15% of the ethnic organization population but are almost two-thirds of these connecting organizations. There is only one political group listed, the Irish National League, a local chapter of a political party in Ireland.

Organization	Type	Number of Connections
Seattle		
Seattle Chamber of Commerce	Corporate	17
Charity Organization Society of Seattle	Charitable	13
Masons - Ionic Lodge No. 90	Fraternal	7
Knights of Pythias - Queen City Lodge No. 10	Fraternal	5
Young Men's Institute - Central Office	Fraternal	3
Portland		
Board of Trade	Corporate	4
Children's Home	Charitable	4
Ancient Order of United Workmen - Multnomah No. 48	Fraternal	3
Masons - Willamette No. 2	Fraternal	3
Royal Arch Chapter - Portland Chapter No. 3	Fraternal	3

Table 4-8. Highly Central Non-Ethnic Organizations with at least one connection to an Ethnic Organization over at least three years.

Organization	Ethnicity	Type	Number of Connections
Seattle			
Seattle Hebrew Benevolent Association	German-Jewish	Charitable	8
B'nai B'rith - Seattle Lodge No. 342	German-Jewish	Fraternal	8
Jewish Cemetery Association	German-Jewish	Charitable	6
Council of Jewish Women - Seattle Section	German-Jewish	Charitable	3
Ladies' Hebrew Benevolent Association	German-Jewish	Charitable	3
B'nai B'rith - Grand Lodge	German-Jewish	Fraternal	2
German Benevolent Society of Seattle	German	Charitable	10
Irish National League	Irish	Political	2
Swedish Club of Seattle	Scandinavian	Social	2
Portland			
Ladies' Hebrew Benevolent Society	German-Jewish	Charitable	4
B'nai B'rith - North Pacific No. 314	German-Jewish	Fraternal	4
First Hebrew Benevolent Association	German-Jewish	Charitable	3
British Benevolent Society	British	Charitable	2
Swedish Brothers	Scandinavian	Fraternal	2

Table 4-9. Ethnic Organizations directly connected to the organizations in Table 4-8 at least twice.

The lack of Irish organizations in Table 4-9 is due to the way I sliced the data for this qualitative snapshot. One should not take away from this picture that the Irish were not central and not responsible for driving the results in the regression tables. Focusing on just German-Jews in the previous regressions leads to similar, but much less precise estimates, reinforcing the finding that the Irish have similar centrality rates and measures overall. How these two communities connected to and within the LCC however is qualitatively different. Irish organizations, which were primarily fraternal within the LCC, were frequently but briefly connected to a wide variety of other fraternal and social organizations. German-Jewish groups on

the other hand, as shown here, were often charitable, and connected to corporate groups and other charitable groups over relatively longer periods of time. This analysis shows that ethnic organizations built connections into the LCC through broad-based charity, fraternity, and corporatism. They did not build connections nearly as much through labor, political, military, or shared interest organizations.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

I asked the research question, as Seattle and Portland became cities, were marginalized ethnic groups able to gain a central role in city governance? And if so, which groups were able to achieve this central role? The above analyses show that some, but not all, marginalized ethnic organizations did become central in city governance. I theorized a crucial difference in ethnicity based on a community's dynamic relations to whiteness: 1) communities racialized as non-white, 2) communities racialized as non-white elsewhere in the U.S. and Europe but as white on the West Coast, and 3) ethnic communities that have always been racialized as white. I argued and then showed that the organizational life of non-white groups, historically and contemporaneously, should be abundant. While non-white racialization creates institutional barriers to network centrality, I theorize that the Previously Non-White communities will carry their association-building skills with their migration and leverage their organizational knowledge into valuable network connections. My models showed that Previously Non-White communities' organizations are more likely than other ethnic groups and even Non-Ethnic organizations to make valuable connections into civil society networks. Once in the LCC, I showed that these Previously Non-White community organizations were not any less likely to be central than Non-Ethnic organizations and were more central than Always White Ethnic organizations. These

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findings did not extend to the level of the individual. Ethnic individuals were significantly less central than Non-Ethnic/3rd Generation+ individuals. The amount of discrimination ethnic individuals faced was revealed by their relative positions within the civil society network. Finally, I showed the connections that ethnic organizations made were generalist and in the charitable, fraternal, and corporate realm. These central ethnic organizations were not particularistic in their interests beyond their identity and stayed out of contentious arenas of politics and labor.

That some types of ethnic organizations were able to be central players in the city's civil society network is a fundamentally surprising finding. Ethnic organizations are a sign of a lack of assimilation and their involvement in governance is usually only after years of hard-fought struggle. Portland and Seattle were founded with these unassimilated organizations at their core. Part of my argument is not that this came without struggle, but that this struggle occurred elsewhere and the learnings from those prior efforts are identifiable and valuable when these Previously Non-White communities arrived in a new location with fewer institutional barriers to power. Individuals were still disadvantaged when their organizations were not. This is a testament to the relative development of their communities' organizational life and political savvy. Far less surprising but no less stark was the racial disadvantage of Asians in the Pacific Northwest. The Chinese and Japanese communities were systematically unable to link the many organizations they created into connections into politics or other civil society groups. Asian individuals as well were left on the outside of these civil society networks.

In addition to identifying ethnic organizations as central actors within local state formation, I also develop a conceptual model for understanding the impact of past and present racialization of a group and its changing relationship to whiteness. While I showed that

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becoming white did not remove discrimination and barriers to access for many individuals, I argue that prior racialization as non-white combined with later racialization as white offered a political advantage in terms of organizational development. This finding asks several questions for future research. What other advantages did having high organizational development bring for these groups? Did Always White Ethnic groups have additional advantages not captured in their communities' organizational lives? How long do these organizational legacies of racism last and do they diminish over time? Beyond organizational development, what other legacies of racism might be present in ethnic groups that have crossed racial boundaries?

For these cases, did the fact that marginalized ethnic organizations could wield power in governance have any long-lasting effect? For example, were these places more inclusive as a result? Their later histories, particularly Portland's experience with the Ku Klux Klan, suggests not. However, both cities are known for having particularly large and diverse nonprofit sectors today and throughout history. While the KKK made Portland less inclusive, the fact that the organization was able to gain a foothold is revealing of civil society pluralism where there were also simultaneously strong labor, conservationist, and women's movements. Today, both Portland and Seattle are known for their progressive politics and have comparatively more racial and ethnic community groups even though their non-white communities are small. Another way early ethnic centrality may have had an effect was by limiting the interaction between government and private civil society groups. Irish Catholics and German Jews sought freedom from government interference and were worried about the government supporting Protestant schools, hospitals, and other institutions that they perceived as threatening (Ethington 1994). Both Washington and Oregon developed strong laws against government engaging directly with private agencies. This has often been credited to monopolistic railroad behavior in this era, but it could have also been

the goal of non-Protestant organizations. This limited case study cannot exactly answer how this initial openness manifested itself, but it does raise the question for future research.

For cities that are arising today, how might they build an inclusive governance structure? The answer provided here, that communities experience of racism elsewhere assists in building organizational political power, is not a useful for inclusive, practical policy beyond the obvious solution of removing racial barriers. However, my findings show that community building by marginalized ethnic groups is possible. The case of the English-speaking, well-educated, schooled in democracy, and wealthy British ethnics suggests that even if a community has all the supposed advantages, more is needed to bring these groups into governance structures. The Irish Catholics and German Jews' success was also based on creating non-threatening organizations that did not press major political ideas on government. This contrasts, for example, with many Scandinavian organizations that were active in the temperance movement. I do not suggest that ethnic groups build non-threatening organizations, but cities arising today should ensure that their governance structures are open to challenger and political groups, particularly labor groups, and not just to charitable and social ones. A potential hypothesis could be that it was precisely because the German Jews and Irish Catholics were marginalized that they brought their organizations into the center of these governance networks. That is, if they had been accepted and welcomed by major political institutions, they may not have felt the need to maintain community organizations and connect them to other politically powerful organizations. However, this hypothesis only further enforces the need to create welcoming and inclusive governance structures.

This research seeks to put marginalized ethnic communities into the story of the founding of urban politics in the U.S., not just as groups of contention but as central founding power

brokers. In addition, I highlight the importance of dynamic relations to whiteness in understanding ethnic groups' political power. Despite some ethnic groups' organizational centrality in the Pacific Northwest, their power, I propose, is a legacy of racism and the lengths communities had to go to preserve, protect, and empower themselves to build a society they could consider safe.

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CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the 20th century, the West Coast had four major metropolitan areas. Fifty years prior no single town could claim more than a few thousand residents. By the early 1900s, four different cities with their own differentiated claims to economic and cultural advantage sought to capitalize on the U.S.'s increasing focus on the Pacific for trade, expansion, and a new global order. How did the swamps, desserts, and mountains of the rugged West Coast turn into major commercial centers of the industrialized era? I argue that in these cities it was rarely the actions of weak governments and political parties that were able to conduct this transformation. And, after the major railroads laid deep tracks of distrust among residents, the people of the West Coast would not allow any one company or industry to monopolize municipal decision making. Instead, I claim that the half-century transformation and development of cities on the West Coast must be explained by the organization and activity of civil society.

In this dissertation, I have established novel insights about the makeup, power, and development of civil society on the West Coast. These findings combine to show that race and place were foundational to the construction of the West Coast's civil society. The novel demography of West Coast cities featured high levels of immigration, including large populations of Asian and Mexican communities among others, on a recently settled, colonial space. The arriving racial and ethnic communities developed their own organizations just as the meaning of race in the U.S., and particularly on the West Coast, was in rapid flux. As racism and racial boundaries changed, so did the community organizations and the opportunities and constraints available to the organizations and their members. Racial and ethnic organizations became some of the most numerous and politically powerful organizations in West Coast cities. Place also mattered. The creation of meaning and symbols tied to geographic locations was both

an accomplishment of civil society and one with its own independent effects on the third sector. The establishment of place-based cultures altered civil society development as new and existing organizations sought to make sense of their identity and new home. The chapters each tell part of the process and outcomes of how race, place, and civil society affected each other in West Coast cities during the cities' formative periods of development.

CHAPTER REVIEW

In Chapter 1, I showed that civil society organization incorporations over time revealed a distinct ecology of incorporations in each city. One of the surprising and major commonalities across cities was the high percentage of ethnic and racial organization incorporations. Despite racial, legal, and resource barriers to incorporation, ethnic and racial communities incorporated more organizations than the comparison group of relatively well-resourced fraternal organizations. The data revealed that place and civil society organization incorporation found a particular and stable match in each place from a relatively early date, and racial and ethnic community organizations showed a particularly high propensity to incorporate new organizations in each city.

My analysis of Chapter 2 was a more qualitative approach to understanding the differences between the cities and how and why a distinct urban character formed. Between the settler colonial background that created the repertoire of racial scripts available on the West Coast and the individual histories, stories, and structural position of each city, city boosters crafted urban myths to describe their growing city. Through the case of World's Fairs in Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle, I show boosters came upon mutual fits between settler colonial racial scripts, urban myths, and the demands of assembling a stable growth machine. Civil

society organizations formed key parts of these growth machines, and in creating the unifying spaces where the diverse interests of city boosters could find common cause. The Fairs also revealed how different racial and ethnic community organizations were incorporated, or not, into the Fairs. I show that this incorporation was highly determinant on the fit between the myths of place and racial scripts that boosters settled on.

In Chapter 3, I performed a longitudinal analysis of a single community—the Chinese community—as they adapted their centuries-old organizations to the novel and rapidly developing racism they faced in the U.S. I showed that the Chinese community had the largest, and some of the most politically successful, organizations on the West Coast. Their organizational system was diverse, adaptive, and complete, impressively providing for many of the wants and needs of the racialized community. However, the organizations could not solve racism in the U.S. The organizations the Chinese community built did much to adapt to racism and fight it. In doing so they created long-lasting impacts in the immigration, judicial, and geopolitical development of the U.S. and China.

Finally, in Chapter 4, I showed that the racial boundaries on the West Coast enabled German Jewish and Irish Catholic community organizations—groups I refer to as Previously Non-White—to hold highly central positions in the civil society networks of Portland and Seattle. I argue that both communities brought a skill, memory, and infrastructure of organization building that they had developed by necessity in Europe and the U.S.'s East Coast. They had built these organizational systems to defend their communities against racism and provide for basic needs that their prior governance systems had denied to them based on their race. On the West Coast, where neither community was racialized as a lesser race, they faced few barriers to formal governance while still wielding the organizational skills they had developed previously.

In all, the four chapters each take a different empirical approach with different data to reinforce the strong relationships between race, place, and civil society. The location and movement of racial boundaries, the creation of a place-based culture, and organizational founding and adaptation all influenced the shape and role civil society would play in each city. A role that was both influential in government and politics and one that gave racial and ethnic groups an unprecedented role in the creation of cities in the U.S.

RACE, PLACE, AND URBAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

These four chapters provide novel data and insights on the history of civil society on the West Coast. Together they show the formative role of race and place in the development of civil society. What the chapters do not fully show are the actions that these civil society organizations then took to have an enduring influence on the political institutions of West Coast cities. I show that race and place are factors that influence the development and structural position of civil society organizations, but outside of the Chinese case in Chapter 3, I have left the political activity of these organizations to future stages of the project. The individual chapters, as self-contained elements, do not tell the full, interlocking story of, for example, the railroad debates, the unionization drives, the women's suffrage movement, or the highly influential role that San Francisco particularly played in the development of other West Coast cities. The individual chapters highlight distinct phenomena but do not reveal how they fully interconnect, nor do any tell a complete history of the political activity of civil society in any given place.

This project aims to go beyond describing the factors of civil society development on the West Coast to show how civil society created the long-lasting institutions of urban politics. Institutions that these cities still experience the path-dependent influences of today. Telling this

larger story will involve a more government-focused analysis that shows the interrelationships between policy, governance regimes, and civil society organizations. It involves connecting the culture and meaning of place in each city to each city's political culture. It involves showing that racial scripts were not just extant at a point-in-time but influenced policymakers and the impactful decisions they made. Finally, it involves showing that these political decisions and influences had long-running consequences. I created the research design to highlight an important moment in time for each place when it became into a city and, theoretically, locked-in their political institutions on a set path. Telling this story of political development will require empirically showing that these institutions and cultures exist across time, well beyond the end of the historical period of this dissertation, up to the present moment.

The intellectual promise of telling the story of political development of West Coast cities lies in what it can tell researchers about urban political development in general. For example, what has been the role of civil society in the early stages of a city's development? What do high levels of immigration mean for the future of a city as it is forming? Or, more broadly, to the perpetual questions of why our cities are governed the way they are today, and what is the role of civil society in democratic urban governance? The results of the dissertation reveal that race and place are two key explanatory concepts that have the potential to guide further questions and answers to puzzles in urban politics. In turn, I have tried to show that urban political history is a promising sight to reveal phenomena about race and immigration in the U.S. The perspective I take in this project is that a crucial point of analysis that connects race, immigration, and place to urban politics is civil society. It is the study of this crucial set of organizations in-between the individual, the economy, and the state that are the central agents in making politics happen and embedding equality and inequality into political institutions.

CONCLUSION

I traveled up and down the West Coast several times to collect the data for this dissertation. With the limited hours of many archives, I was able to spend a significant time interacting in brief ways with the culture and communities within each city. Engaging with the present while analyzing the past helped draw clear commonalities across time that were starkly different from each of the other cities that I had visited. The archivists and historians that I spent the most time with were often allergic to this conversation, bordering on presentism, that I wanted to discuss with them. I wanted to talk about it because that is where this study holds meaning for me. When I met lay people in the city, I would tell them what I was doing and observing about their city's history. They would usually reply by telling me how they can see exactly what I was finding in their everyday lives. Once, when I was presenting the work of Chapter 2, I showed a picture of the Seattle Norwegian community dressed up as Vikings. A professor in the back of the room started laughing loudly. After the presentation she came up to me to apologize. She also told me that she was from Seattle, and she had laughed because the picture so accurately captured her own experience of growing up there. This dissertation is historical, but it is motivated by my desire to understand why civil society plays the role it does in our current governance systems. I set out on this research to find the answer in history. I believe that the power of history is in its ability to describe and better understand our present and future moments.

From the moment I set out to learn about the West Coast it was clear that it would lead me to a novel story of U.S. history. Until the later 19th century, very few white Europeans on the West Coast could say that they were native-born to their state or city. People built these places amidst diversity, immigration, and an expanding settler state. The prominence of the Chinese and

Catholic communities immediately challenged the notion that the West Coast would be a white, Protestant place. Newly arrived settlers initially built the organizations they were familiar with. Yet, none of the settlers had lived in a city like the one they found themselves in on the West Coast. Through their organizations they built new cities while trying to understand a wholly novel racial geography. The organizations they built were informed by new understandings of racial difference, and so the cities the organizations built were as well. In doing so, the organizations also reconstructed the meaning of race. And as places developed identities, residents further sought to reconfigure both their organizations and their understanding of race within the new places they lived. In this dissertation I showed that race, place, and organization built each other on the West Coast. The result was a different civil society than scholars usually identify within U.S. history. West Coast civil society was not directly built on the importation of models from Protestant Anglo-Saxons. The people of the West Coast built new meanings of race, place, and organization through their interaction with the diverse people within the cities they settled in. I have shown that race and place are foundational structures in the development of civil society in the U.S.

I grew up on the West Coast in a mixed-race household with family members who were involved in a variety of ethnic and non-ethnic local organizations. They felt their work was unique and special because of the specific place they were in and the other communities they interacted with. As active participants in the civil society organizations of the 21st century, my family members felt that their work was informed by the history of race and place. It was that history, not necessarily the daily work, that often gave their lives meaning. I hope this dissertation offers new ways of looking at race, understanding place, and approaching civil society that continues to enrich the meaning and efforts of communities today.

	Table 4 Ordinal		Table 5 Linear			
	(2)	(4)	(3) Eigenvector	(4) Degree	(7) Eigenvector	(8) Degree
Type: Corporate	1.09***	1.03***	0.05	-0.22*	0.04	-0.22*
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Type: Fire	-1.79***	-1.85***	-0.56***	-0.93***	-0.57***	-0.94***
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Type: Fraternal	0.98***	0.91***	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Type: Improvement	1.48***	1.41***	0.15	-0.16	0.14	-0.16
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Type: Interest	0.64**	0.67**	-0.01	-0.15	-0.01	-0.15
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Type: Labor	-0.71**	-0.76***	-0.39***	-0.61***	-0.40***	-0.61***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Type: Military	0.01	-0.03	-0.13	-0.35**	-0.14	-0.36***
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Type: Political	1.13***	1.14***	0.09	-0.17	0.09	-0.17
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Type: Professional	0.90**	0.86**	-0.08	-0.17	-0.08	-0.16
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Type: Social	0.55*	0.54*	-0.06	-0.31***	-0.04	-0.29**
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Ethnicity IV: Binary or Categorical	Binary	Categorical	Binary	Binary	Categorical	Categorical

*$p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table A-1. Organization Type Fixed Effect Results for Organizational Centrality Models (Tables 4-4 and 4-5).