@article{THESIS,
      recid = {12431},
      author = {Coban, Izzet},
      title = {The Islamic Meontological Tradition: Language, Ontology,  and Apophasis in the Classical Period},
      publisher = {University of Chicago},
      school = {Ph.D.},
      address = {2024-06},
      number = {THESIS},
      pages = {279},
      abstract = {This dissertation examines complex  theological-philosophical speculations concerning the  concept of nonbeing, or meontology, in the classical period  of Islam. The concept has been discussed in various  settings such as (1) the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, (2)  the view of evil as privation of good, (3) the  disontological account of God, and (4) a notion of a  dialectical, epistemological, and semantic nature. Modern  scholars have studied the reception of John Philoponus’  understanding of creatio ex nihilo in Islamic thought  closely enough. On the other hand, the Neoplatonic view of  evil as privation of good did not attract close attention  of classical Muslim intellectuals. Therefore, this project  particularly treats the last two dimensions of the concept.  It accordingly consists of two parts of equal length. 

In  Part I, I discuss the emergence of nonbeing as a notion of  a dialectical, epistemological, and semantic character in  the classical period. Chapter 1 explores the origin of this  notion. We encounter preliminary considerations of the  notion in the Imamite discussions of the second half of the  8th century on the doctrine of badā’ (God’s change of his  decision), which in turn led to the formation of  late-8th-first half 9th century Imamī-Mu‘tazilite  controversy over the question whether God ab aeterno knows  nonexistents. In Chapter 2, I reconsider the origin of the  Avicennian essence-existence distinction by tracing it back  to discussions of the nonexistent and the theory of aḥwāl  (states). Chapter 3 is a continuation of the argument  proposed in the previous chapter. I explore the  philological and logical basis for Basran Mu‘tazilī-Ash‘arī  theologians’ opposing approaches to the doctrine of ṣifat  al-dhāt expressed in the form of self-identical sentences  (S is S), e.g., “The substance is a substance in the state  of non-existence.” I suggested that their approaches could  be read against the backdrop of the two distinct  interpretations of the Arabic copula verb kawn (to be)  either as expressing identity/essence or existence. 

In  Part II of the dissertation, I specifically deal with the  meontological ideas of the 10th century Ismaili theologians  of the Fatimid period, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Nasafī (d,  943), Abū Ya‘qūb al-Sijistānī (d. 971) and Ḥamīd al-Dīn  al-Kirmānī (d. 1021). This part has three fundamental  goals. First, I explore that Ismaili authors reconstruct  their account of apophasis through frequent negation of  me/ontological concepts. Therefore, I discuss in some  detail the complexities of these concepts in their  understanding. Second, it will be shown that these authors  are not uniform in their perspectives. Finally, I  investigate how their use of negation (nafy) as an  expression of God’s transcendence builds a strong link  connecting their point of view to the Neoplatonic  tradition. In Chapters 4-6, I discuss, respectively, the  failure of al-Nasafī’s attempt to form the negative path of  speaking of God in line with double negation,  al-Sijistānī’s role in the development of the Ismaili  double negation in comply with the hierarchical cosmology  of Neoplatonism, and al-Kirmānī’s deviation from double  negation in his later work Kitāb al-Riyāḍ, though he  remains loyal to it in Rāḥat al-‘Aql. 
 
},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/12431},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.12431},
}