IGARASHI DAISUKE

University of Tokyo

The Evolution of the Sultanic Fisc and al-Dhakhīrah during the Circassian Mamluk Period

I have shown in a previous article that al-Ṭāhir Barqūq, the first sultan of the Circassian Mamluks (r. 784–91, 792–801/1382–89, 1390–99), possessed several private properties, especially landed estates, in such forms as *milk* (pl. *amlāk*; privately-owned land) or *waqf* (pl. *awqāf*; Islamic endowment) land, and that he organized their management through the establishment of a new bureau, the *Dīwān al-Amlāk wa-al-Awqāf wa-al-Dhakhīrah*. Although it is unsurprising that the Mamluk sultans possessed private assets that were independent of the state purse, their inclination to hold private property—especially in the shape of agricultural lands—only became popular in the late fourteenth century. From Barqūq's reign onwards, successive sultans developed a variety of ways to increase the financial resources of the sultanic fisc. Eventually, the scale of the sultanic fisc would reach its apogee under the reigns of al-Ashraf Qāytbāy (r. 872–901/1468–96) and al-Ashraf Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r. 906–22/1501–16), two prominent sultans from the late Mamluk period.

Al-Dhakhīrah, a term that is frequently found in the sources from the Circassian Mamluk period, is key for understanding the sultanic fisc. Al-Dhakhīrah, which originally meant "treasure" in Arabic, was a technical term that related to the sultan's finances during the Circassian Mamluk period, and which accrued new meanings over time. However, because little attention has been given to the term, the meaning of the term and its transformation are not clear. I believe that a more detailed investigation of al-Dhakhīrah is essential if we are to arrive at a proper understanding of the fiscal system of the Circassian Mamluk sultanate.

To this end, this article considers the state, role, and development of the sultanic fisc under the Circassian sultans, as well as the background that necessitated its establishment and development. Throughout the course of the article, I will

³ Ibn Manzūr, *Lisān al-ʿArab* (Beirut, n.d.), 4:302–3; al-Fīrūzābādī, *Al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ* (Cairo, 1306 A. H.), 2:34; E. W. Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon* (London and Edinburgh, 1863–93), 3:956.



[©] The Middle East Documentation Center. The University of Chicago.

¹ Igarashi Daisuke, "The Private Property and *Awqāf* of the Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barqūq," *Orient* 43 (2008).

² Igarashi Daisuke, "The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāytbāy," *Mamlūk Studies Review (MSR)* 13, no. 1 (2009): 27–51; Carl F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?: The Last Mamlūk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power* (Albany, 1994), chaps. 6, 7; Miura Toru, "Urban Society in Damascus as the Mamluk Era was Ending," *MSR* 10, no. 1 (2006): 158, 168–76.

demonstrate that significant changes occurred in the financial system during the Circassian Mamluk period. I will make clear that the difficulties, restructuring, and eventual bankruptcy of the state's finances arose against the same background as the expansion and increasing role of the sultanic fisc—both phenomena were organically united and mutually influential. In addition, I will also outline the overall historical development that occurred in the structure of the Mamluk sultanate.

WHAT IS AL-DHAKHĪRAH?

To begin, I will investigate how the term al-Dhakhīrah has been interpreted by contemporary scholars, and how it is explained in the chancery manual sources of the Mamluk period. As I indicated above, little attention has been given to the term; what is agreed upon is that some members of the sultan's financial staff bore al-Dhakhīrah in their titles (such as nāzir al-dhakhīrah), and they have been regarded, somewhat obscurely, as managers of the sultan's own treasures.⁴ However, beyond this rather vague common ground, scholars have presented differing interpretations of the meaning and role of al-Dhakhīrah. For instance, A. N. Poliak says, "The vacant fief (i.e., $iqt\bar{a}^c$) was managed and exploited by the department designated as dīwān al-dhakhīrah until its grant by the sultan to another feudatory."⁵ 'Āmir Nāsir has a different interpretation of this dīwān and suggests that it was a department responsible for managing the sultan's $iqt\bar{q}^{c}$ lands—all the revenues from which were designated to the sultan himself. 6 In addition, several studies that have been conducted on the spice trade between Mamluk Egypt and Venice have identified the "dacchieri"—the Mamluk governmental office that was in charge of the trade and that appears several times in the Venetian documentary sources—as cognate with the Arabic term al-Dhakhīrah.

Disparate descriptions of *al-Dhakhīrah* also occur in the chancery manual sources from the Mamluk era. Judging from the fact that al-'Umarī's *Masālik* (written in

⁷ John Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Letter of 877/1473," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (BSOAS)* 24 (1961): 206, 211, note 7; idem, "A Mamluk Ambassador to Venice in 913/1507," *BSOAS* 26 (1963): 528, note 3.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

⁴ William Popper, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans 1382–1468: Systematic Notes to Ibn Taghrī Birdī's Chronicles of Egypt (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955–57), 1:93, 98; Bernadette Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l'administration dans l'État militaire mamlūk (IXe/XVe siècle) (Damascus, 1992), 54; Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, Al-Awqāf wa-al-Ḥayāh al-Ijtimā'īyah fī Miṣr 648–923 A.H./1250–1517 A.D. (Cairo, 1980), 119–21; Adam Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 1250–1517 (Cambridge, 2000), 72.

⁵ A. N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, 1250–1900* (London, 1939; repr. Philadelphia, 1977), 22.

⁶ 'Āmir Najīb Mūsá Nāṣir, *Al-Ḥayāh al-Iqtiṣādīyah fī Miṣr fī al-ʿAṣr al-Mamlūkī* (Amman, 2003), 116–17.

the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century)⁸ and al-Qalqashandī's Ṣubḥ (written in 814/1412)⁹—two of the most important chancery manual sources—do not mention any offices or works that related to al-Dhakhīrah, it seems that, in the period of the late Bahri Mamluks and the beginning of the Circassian Mamluks, when these two sources were composed, al-Dhakhīrah had not yet been established as an organization or an office. Thereafter, there is an abridged description of the Dīwān al-Dhakhīrah which is found in al-Ṭāhirī's Zubdah (written in 846/1422),¹⁰ as follows: "The Dīwān al-Dhakhīrah. This is one of the most important bureaus (dawāwīn). The money (māl) of al-Dhakhīrah was collected from various resources (jihāt) to it. It has a nāẓir (manager) and members of staff (mubāshirūn)."¹¹ We are given no specific information about the institution in this simple explanation. However, another source—known as al-Khālidī's "Al-Maqṣad al-Rafī'" (hereafter cited as Dīwān al-Inshā')—provides a more detailed description, as follows:

The naẓar al-amlāk wa-al-dhakhīrah. These two (i.e., amlāk and dhakhīrah) are income sources bound together (humā jihatāni mutaqāranatāni). Al-amlāk means [the assets] that are purchased for the sultan or his relatives (aqāribhu), such as arable lands (diyā), houses (ribā), and others relating to them. Al-Dhakhīrah means [the assets] that are rented (mā yusta)jar) for the sultan such as tax districts (nawāḥī), agricultural lands (mazāri), water wheels (dawālīb), and others. A person appointed to this office takes charge of incomes such as [those from the assets that were] purchased for the sultan and [were] sold from [his hand], and those rented for him and leased out from him. He is an administrator (mutaṣarrif) who disburses [the money for] that which should be disbursed, and conveys [the money for] that which should be conveyed to the treasury (khazā)in). A military man sometimes holds the office. 12

According to this description, al-amlāk referred to "the sultan's private real

 $^{^{12}}$ An anonymous chancery manual known as al-Khālidī's "al-Maqṣad al-Rafī^c," Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale MS Arabe 4439 (hereafter cited as $D\bar{t}w\bar{d}n$ al-Inshā^c), fol. 137v. As for the source, see Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l'administration, 16.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

⁸ Al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-Abṣār fī Mamālik al-Amṣār*, ed. Ayman Fu'ād Sayyid (Cairo, 1985).

⁹ Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-A'shá fī Ṣinā'at al-Inshā' (Cairo, 1913–22). As for its date of composition, see *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., "Al-Ḥalḥashandī."

¹⁰ As for its date of composition, see 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ al-Ḥanafī, "Al-Rawḍ al-Bāsim fī Ḥawādith al-'Umr wa-al-Tarājim," Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MSS Vaticano Arabo 728, 729, 1: fol. 64r.

¹¹ Al-Zāhirī, Kitāb Zubdat Kashf al-Mamālik, ed. Paul Ravaisse (Paris, 1894), 110.

estates" and al-Dhakhīrah referred to "the sultan's leasehold lands."

To sum up, there are discrepancies in the interpretation of *al-Dhakhīrah* among scholars and among sources. However, if we accept that *al-Dhakhīrah* underwent a transformation, then most of the interpretations presented above may be regarded as true. I will show in this article that, as the sultanic fisc evolved throughout the Circassian Mamluk period, so too did the term *al-Dhakhīrah*, taking on new meanings with time. I will start by examining instances where the word appears in the sources from the period between the late eighth/fourteenth century and the beginning of the ninth/fifteenth century.

During the period under consideration, the term *dhakhīrah* (pl. *dhakhā*'ir) usually connoted "movable property," in the ordinary sense of the word—cash, gold, silver, jewels, luxurious textiles, and other luxury items—and especially referred to the movable property held by sultans and amirs. On the other hand, private real estate such as lands and houses were distinguished from these goods and were referred to as amlāk. As for the sultan's dhakhīrah, the descriptions of the nazir al-dhakhirah, i.e., the controller of the sultan's dhakhirah, emerged during Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'bān's reign (764–78/1363–77). After this, al-Zāhir Barqūq, who was enthroned in 784/1382, strived to increase his private wealth through the acquisition of private lands and the transformation of these into waqf, and then set up an organization for the management of the properties. Following the establishment of *Dīwān al-Amlāk*—a bureau responsible for administering his private lands—in 797/1395, he established the office of ustādār al-amlāk wa-alawqāf wa-al-dhakhīrah in 799/1397. Consequently, his movable, unmovable, and waqf properties were regarded as "the sultan's private property" and thus came to be managed exclusively within this office. 13

Judging from these examples, we may say that, during this period, the term *dhakhīrah* was used to refer to the private movable goods of powerful figures, especially the sultans. However, according to the description of *Dīwān al-Inshā*' mentioned above, after this time, the term came to be applied to "the sultan's leasehold lands." We shall now examine the circumstances under which the meaning of the word changed, by considering the problem of the land system in this period.

Starting in the late Bahri Mamluk period, the governmental domains—lands from which the Mamluk government collected land tax (*kharāj*)—came to be leased by powerful amirs for negligible amounts. This issue was seen as one of the main causes of the financial difficulties that the government of the time was experiencing. These leased lands (*musta*'jarāt) are often identified in the sources as one of the financial resources of powerful figures. For example, Shaykhū al-

¹³ Igarashi, "The Private Property and Awqāf," 171–75.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

Nāṣirī (d. 758/1357), the *atābak al-ʿasākir* (commander-in-chief) of the late Bahri Mamluks, earned an income of over 200,000 dirhams per day from his *iqṭāʿ*, *amlāk*, and *mustaʾjarāt*. ¹⁴ The leasing of governmental domains seems to have become popular during the unstable political and economic circumstances that occurred during the reign of the late Bahri Mamluks, in the wake of changes such as the weakening of the sultan's power and the decrease of agricultural production caused by the Black Death and its adverse effect on the *iqṭāʿ* system. ¹⁵ If we consider that the lease of the governmental domain was popularly adapted by amirs as a way of supplementing their personal income, it is no wonder that the sultan—who himself was originally a Mamluk amir—held lands by lease just as other amirs did. Actually, Barqūq seems to have acquired leasehold land both before and after his enthronement as sultan. ¹⁶ His son Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj (r. 801–8, 808–15/1399–1405, 1405–12) also had a special *dīwān* administering his *mustaʾjarāt* and *ḥimāyah* (protection fee; this will be discussed latter) "in the same way as other amirs do."

How then did the term *al-Dhakhīrah* come to mean "the sultan's leasehold land"? The first instance where it clearly relates to agricultural land can be seen in the following description, which concerns the land survey that was carried out in 799/1397, late in Barqūq's reign: "On 2 Jumādá I 799 (1 February 1397), the sultan (Barqūq) ordered Amir Ḥusām al-Dīn Ḥusayn al-Gharsī, the *shādd aldawāwīn* (superintendent of bureaus), to go to Upper Egypt and to survey (*miṣāḥah*) the state lands (*bilād al-dawlah al-sharīfah*), privately-owned lands (*amlāk*), and [lands of] *al-Dhakhīrah* [of the area]." ¹⁸

It is clear that the term *al-Dhakhīrah* in this description does not refer to "the sultan's movables," the general meaning of this term in this period; however, it is unclear what the term actually does refer to here. While it is possible that it referred to "the sultan's leasehold land," this must be regarded as unlikely as the evidence suggests that it had not acquired such a meaning around this time. Table 1 lists those people who held the post of *ustādār* (director) or *nāzir* (vice-director) in the *dīwān*, who were responsible for administering the sultan's private financial resources, such as *amlāk*, *awqāf*, and *dhakhīrah* during the period between Ibn al-Ṭablāwī's first appointment as *ustādār al-amlāk wa-al-awqāf wa-al-dhakhīrah* in

¹⁸ Ibn al-Furāt, *Duwal*, 9:461.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

¹⁴ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal al-Sāfī wa-al-Mustawfá ba^cda al-Wāfī* (Cairo, 1985–2006), 6:260.

¹⁵ Igarashi Daisuke, "The Establishment and Development of *al-Dīwān al-Mufrad:* Its Background and Implications," *MSR* 10, no. 1 (2006): 123.

¹⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Ma^crifat Duwal al-Mulūk (Cairo, 1939–72), 3:402, 858–59; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, Tārīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah (Damascus, 1977–97), 1:580, 621; Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh al-Duwal wa-al-Mulūk, vols. 7–9 (Beirut, 1936–42), 9:438.

¹⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Mawā*ʿiz wa-al-I'tibār fī Dhikr al-Khitat wa-al-Āthār (London, 2002–4), 1: 299.

799/1397 (mentioned above) and 844/1441, the beginning of the reign of Sultan al-Zāhir Jagmag. However, as the table indicates, the historical sources written by roughly contemporary authors, such as Ibn al-Furāt, Ibn Hijjī, al-Magrīzī, Ibn Qādī Shuhbah, Ibn Hajar, and al-'Aynī, as well as those written by historians of a later generation, such as Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Sayrafī, and al-Sakhāwī, disagree with each other over the title of their posts. Moreover, inconsistencies are found within different sources written by the same author, and sometimes even within a single source. In addition to dhakhīrah, this post was also associated with one or more of the types of agricultural property, such as amlāk, awgāf, musta³ jarāt, and himāyah. In a few cases, the post is simply referred to as "ustādār al-khāss alsultānī," i.e., the director of the sultan's private property. By way of example, Ibn al-Tablāwī, the first appointee of the post, is described as "ustādār al-amlāk wa-alawqāf wa-al-dhakhīrah" by Ibn al-Furāt and Ibn Qādī Shuhbah; in contrast, he is described as "ustādār al-amlāk wa-al-awgāf" by al-Magrīzī, as "ustādār al-dhakhīrah wa-al-amlāk" by Ibn Hajar and al-Sakhāwī, and simply as "ustādār al-dhakhīrah" by al-'Aynī and al-Sayrafī. He is also described as "ustādār al-khāss" by Ibn Qādī Shuhbah, as "ustādār al-khāss al-sultānī" by Ibn Hajar, and as "ustādār khāss lilsultān" by al-Sakhāwī. To prevent confusion of the titles of the post, hereafter I will designate this office as "the sultan's private financier." Judging from the fact that this office was sometimes designated "ustādār al-amlāk wa-al-dhakhīrah waal-musta'jarāt wa-al-awqāf al-sulṭānīyah," writing both dhakhīrah and musta'jarāt (Nos. 4, 7, 8) together, we cannot say that the term dhakhirah was always used according to the particular sense of "leasehold land."

Among the 57 instances in which the sultan's private financiers are mentioned in the sources, most frequent are the cases in which only the two terms amlāk and dhakhīrah are attached to the title of office, such as ustādār or nāzir al-amlāk wa-al-dhakhīrah (27 cases); the next most frequent are the cases in which only the term—dhakhīrah—is attached (8 cases). Among the 9 cases in which only one type of term is attached to the title of office, 8 cases include dhakhīrah. In contrast, there are rare cases in which the dhakhīrah is not mentioned in reference to the office (9 of 57). Such trends seem to be clearer in the sources that were written in the later period. From these examples, it seems reasonable to suppose that during the process through which various types of properties and resources were being administered under the sole control of the sultan's private financier, the term dhakhīrah lost its original sense of treasure (movables) and came to be used as a term that represented the sultan's properties, especially agricultural lands that were held in various ways and forms. We shall see each type of the sultan's financial resources in the following section.

THE SULTAN'S PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ITS ADMINISTRATION

As my previous article made clear, Barqūq held a large amount of real estate in the shape of amlāk and awqāf. This way of holding private assets became popular for those sultans who succeeded him, too. Table 2 lists the milk and wagf assets that were held by Barquq, al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh (r. 815–24/1412–21), and al-Ashraf Barsbāy (r. 825–42/1422–38), three sultans of the early Circassian period, on the basis of the archival sources. As the table shows, the number of each sultan's assets steadily increased (Barq $\bar{u}q: 33 \rightarrow Shaykh: 43 \rightarrow Barsb\bar{a}y: 81$). The list shows that all of these early Circassian Mamluk sultans held farm lands, urban estates, and other assets such as water-use facilities in villages throughout Egypt and Syria. The proportion of farm lands that each successive sultan held increased particularly sharply (Barq $\bar{u}q: 30.3\% \rightarrow Shaykh: 46.5\% \rightarrow Barsb\bar{a}y: 50.6\%$). This is especially the case for farm land in Egypt; Barqūq held only three tracts (9.1%); however, Barsbāy's farm land accounted for about half the number of his total assets (39; 48.1%). It is possible that these assets included some that had been acquired personally in the period when they were amirs, before their enthronements, or that were acquired through fair transactions; however, I believe that their status as sultan facilitated their acquisition of assets on such a large scale, especially in the case of farm lands. As I described in my previous article, Barquq acquired state lands (amlāk bayt al-māl), including governmental domains and igtā^c lands, as his private property, or he converted them into his waqf properties. 19 The fact that the proportion of assets that were farm land continuously rose under the reigns of Shaykh and Barsbay indicates that the conversion of state land into amlak and awqāf steadily continued. In Rabī' II 835/December 1431 under Barsbāy's reign, some ulama (Islamic intellectuals) objected to the legality of Barsbay's purchase of state lands through the wakil bayt al-māl (the agent of the state treasury), who was appointed by Barsbay himself, and the successive conversion of these lands to his waqf property. As the waqf deeds indicate, this episode also shows that the scale of state land privatization and transformation into wagf undertaken by Barsbāy was on a larger scale than any of his predecessors had engaged in. Indeed, it seems that it was on such an unprecedented scale that the ulama could not overlook it, despite the fact that they were dependent on the income generated from awqāf and usually tended to protect the waqf system. However, the objection was rejected and the legality of the sultan's establishment of awqāf through such means was confirmed. 20 The sultans' holding of property through wagf endowment would continue after him until the end of the Mamluk sultanate.

In common with other powerful figures of the government, such as amirs and

²⁰ Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalānī, *Inbā*' al-Ghumr bi-Abnā' al-'Umr (Cairo, 1969–98), 3:477–79.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

¹⁹ Igarashi, "The Private Property and Awqāf," 172–79.

civilians, the sultans leased the governmental domains for themselves. A large proportion of the sultan's *musta* jarāt had existed in al-Ghawr, a fertile agricultural region in Syria, since the beginning of the Circassian period, although it seems likely that there were probably many leasehold lands in various regions across Egypt and Syria. ²¹ In addition, the *nāzir al-musta* jarāt al-sultānīyah bi-al-Shām—the controller of the sultan's leasehold lands in Syria—was appointed in 824/1421.²² Dīwān al-Inshā', which identified the dhakhīrah as the sultan's leasehold land, is likely to have been written around the reign of Barsbāy, 23 at the same time as the controversy about the legitimacy of the sultan's purchase of state lands and transformation of them into waqf arose. It is likely that, under such circumstances, the land that was accumulated through the lease of the state lands—the legality of which was unchallenged on the whole—constituted an increasingly large proportion of the sultan's private property. This seems to be an underlying cause of the transformation of these personally-held lands into "the sultanic domain," as will be discussed later. However, it is unlikely that the sultan actually paid the relevant rental fees or the cost of purchase to the financial bureaus of the Egyptian or Syrian government, even for land that was ostensibly "musta'jarāt" or "amlāk."

The <code>himāyah</code> was another important source of revenue connected with agricultural land. The sultan's private financier was also in charge of the sultan's <code>himāyah</code>. The <code>himāyah</code> represented powerful figures' private protection over local areas, and it involved their collecting protection fees in exchange for protecting the village against the "exploitation" of local governors (<code>wālī</code>, <code>kāshif</code>), ²⁴ resulting in the exclusion of the governmental supervision by the local governors from the protected areas. ²⁵ This was one of the private income sources of powerful figures

²⁵ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Hawādith al-Duhūr fī Madá al-Ayyām wa-al-Shuhūr*, ed. William Popper (Berkeley,



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

²¹ Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ, 4:190. It is reasonable to suppose that special financial agents and civilians appointed to al-Ghawr were in charge of the sultan's *musta'jarāt* in the region. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 1:268, 462, 603, 608; 4:150, 266; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:1008; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs wa-al-Abdān fī Tawārīkh al-Zamān* (Cairo, 1970–94), 3:390; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith al-Duhūr fī Madá al-Ayyām wa-al-Shuhūr, ed. Fahīm Muḥammad Shaltūt, vol. 1 (Cairo, 1990) (hereafter cited as *Hawādith¹*), 1:224.

²² Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā*⁷ *al-Ghumr*, 3:249–50. Barqūq also assigned a person to take charge of his own *musta*⁷ *jarāt* and *matjar* (mentioned later) to Damascus (Ibn al-Furāt, *Duwal*, 9:438; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 3:858–59; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 1:580).

²³ Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l'administration, 16.

²⁴ The himāyah also represented powerful figures' personal protection over commercial activities. As for the himāyah, see al-Asadī, *Al-Taysīr wa-al-I'tibār wa-al-Taḥrīr wa-al-Ikhtibār fīmā Yajib min Ḥusn al-Tadbīr wa-al-Taṣarruf wa-al-Ikhtiyār* (Cairo, 1968), 95–96, 135–36; John L. Meloy, "The Privatization of Protection: Extortion and the State in the Circassian Mamluk Period," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 47, no. 2 (2004).

such as amirs and high-ranking civilians that increased after Shaykh's reign. ²⁶ This indicates the sultan's conflicting positions; while he dominated the Mamluk state through the governmental machinery in his official capacity, he himself gave private protection to the specific areas in his private capacity, interrupting the governmental supervision over the area.

We are now able to see that the Circassian sultans strove to accumulate agricultural land in various ways for their private income sources, and the scale of this accumulation grew steadily. The circumstances that led to their acquisition of private income sources were the chronic financial difficulties of the times, which were mainly caused by the alienation of the state lands since the late Bahri Mamluk period.²⁷ Despite this, the sultans took countermeasures against this alienation of state lands in their capacity as the head of the government, while simultaneously trying to acquire state land personally and transform it to amlāk, awgāf, musta jarāt, and himāyah, just as other amirs were doing, thereby contributing to the alienation of state land. How can we explain this baffling and contradictory behavior? It is hardly surprising that the sultans, who were originally amirs, continued to pursue the holding of private property, as the other amirs did. More noteworthy is the reorganization of the financial system of the government that occurred in the beginning of the Circassian Mamluk period. With the establishment of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, the state's finances began to be administered by three independent dīwāns, namely, the Dīwān al-Wizārah, the Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ, and al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, each of which was responsible for providing certain allowances from its own resources.²⁸ Although in theory, after paying expenses, the remainder of each dīwān's income should have been delivered to the sultan, in practice this was actually impossible, due to the chronic financial difficulties of the times. Inevitably, in order to raise money that they needed for themselves for things such as purchasing slaves to increase the Royal Mamluk corps (al-mamālīk al-sultānīyah), paying bonuses, and granting rewards to political supporters, the sultans needed to generate their own revenue sources independently of the state's finances.

Next, we will examine the office that held control over the sultan's private properties. The *Dīwān al-Amlāk wa-al-Awqāf wa-al-Dhakhīrah* was the special financial bureau that was established under Barqūq's reign for this purpose. However, as Table 1 indicates, the *ustādārs* or *nāẓirs* of this *dīwān* were not mentioned in the sources until over twenty years after the death of Taqī al-Dīn

²⁸ Ibid., 127-28.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

^{1930–42) (}hereafter cited as Ḥawādith²), 458.

²⁶ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-al-Qāhirah* (Cairo, 1963–72), 16:160.

²⁷ Igarashi, "Establishment and Development," 120–24.

'Abd al-Wahhāb ibn Abī Shākir in 819/1417; in fact, they do not occur until late in Barsbāy's reign. I suggest that this was due to the fact that the sultanic treasury (al-khizānah al-sharīfah/khizānat al-sultān; pl. khazā'in), which kept the incomes in custody, only gradually became organized into its final form as its role expanded into the sphere of financial affairs and it came to supervise the sultan's private property directly. Although the term khizānah—meaning "treasury" in Arabic—occurs frequently in the sources throughout the Mamluk period, that to which the term actually referred transformed over time. In the Bahri Mamluk period, the state's income was delivered to the public coffers (Bayt al-Māl/al-Khizānah [al-Kubrá]) in the Citadel (Qal^cat al-Jabal) in Cairo. Then, with the establishment of Dīwān al-Khāss in the third reign of Sultan al-Nāsir Muhammad ibn Qalāwūn (709–41/1310–41), a large amount of tax revenue flowed into the private coffers (Khizānat al-Khāss), which were under the jurisdiction of nāzir al*khāss*, the director of the *dīwān*. As the result, the public coffers became redundant and were finally converted into a warehouse for the robes of honor (khil'ah) that the *nāzir al-khāss* was responsible for procuring and providing.²⁹ However, when the majlis al-mashūrah (the Supreme Council), consisting of seven high-ranking amirs, assumed the reins of government in 748/1347 in the wake of the sultan's loss of real political power, the private coffers were put under the jurisdiction of the $ra^{3}s$ nawbat al-umar \bar{a}^{3} (the head of guards of amirs). 30 Consequently, the Diwan al-Khāss lost its original role as the special organization that was responsible for administrating the sultan's "private property," as the name indicated; hereafter, it became one of the official financial bureaus of the government.

Conversely, in the Circassian Mamluk period, the sultanic treasury was put under the direct control of the sultan, holding its own revenue sources independently of the financial bureaus of the government. This sultanic *khizānah* was located inside the sultan's private area in the Citadel and was superintended by a *khāzindār* (treasurer), a eunuch who had been appointed to the role, which acquired further importance as the treasury came increasingly under the sultan's direct control. This office of *khāzindār* originated from the office of *khāzindār al-dhakhīrah*, which had been occupied by a eunuch, Sandal al-Manjakī, under

³¹ Ibid., 3:1067–68; *Dīwān al-Inshā*³, fol. 127r.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

²⁹ Al-ʿUmarī, *Masālik*, 61; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:734; Hassanein Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt A.H. 564–741/A.D. 1169–1341* (London, 1972), 144. After its conversion to the warehouse for *khilʿah*s, the public coffers came to be called "the supreme coffers (*al-Khizānah al-Kubrá*)," then "the coffers of the *Khāṣṣ* (*Khizānat al-Khāṣṣ*)" because it was under the jurisdiction of the *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ* (al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 3:472). The coffers disappeared, being converted into a prison by Amīr Minṭāsh in 791/1389 (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 3:674; idem, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:734–35).

³⁰ Al-Magrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:750–51.

Barqūq;³² we must discriminate between this office and that of the *amīr khāzindār* (it is also usually referred to in the sources simply as *khāzindār*), a position which was filled by an amir of ten (*amīr ʿasharah*) or amir of forty (*amīr al-ṭablkhānah*) and was included among the military functionaries.³³ Thus, the sultanic treasury of the Circassian sultans was a new treasury in which the sultan's personal money and property, which had increased through Barqūq's establishment of the *Dīwān al-Amlāk*, were deposited, independent of the financial bureaus of the state.

Incidentally, with the enlargement of the sultan's private property in the period during and after Barqūq, the eunuch *khāzindār* in charge of the sultanic treasury gained importance and became influential over the government; this was especially the case when Zayn al-Dīn Marjān al-Hindī assumed the office of the *khāzindār* under Sultan Shaykh. ³⁴ During his term of office, the sultanic treasury gained exclusive income sources and assumed new roles. ³⁵ Around this time, the sources frequently mention the office of *nāzir al-khizānah*, the accountant of the sultanic treasury. ³⁶ In particular, members of the Jīʿān family (Banū al-Jīʿān) were employed in this area until the very end of the Mamluk sultanate. ³⁷ The fact that the post of *nāzir al-musta jarāt al-sulṭānīyah bi-al-Shām* was concurrently held by

³⁷ As for the Jī^cān family, see Martel-Thoumian, *Les civils et l'administration*, 295–319.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

³² Ibn al-Furāt, *Duwal*, 9:128, 429; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhah*, 2:28; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 4:48; Igarashi, "The Private Property and *Awqāf*," 173.

³³ Whereas a eunuch held the post of *khāzindār*, at the same time another person was at the post as *amīr khāzindār*. For example, see Ibn Taghrībirdī, μ awādith¹, 1:29–30, 106, 195, 333–34, 409–10.

³⁴ Al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Daw* al-Lāmi li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsi (Cairo, 1934–37), 10:153–54.

³⁵ In 816/1413, the Dīwān al-Mawārīth (the bureau of inheritances) was separated from the jurisdiction of the Dīwān al-Wizārah and the Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ; henceforth heirless estates came to be delivered directly to the sultanic treasury (al-ʿAynī, 'Iqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān, ed. 'Abd al-Rāziq al-Ṭanṭāwī al-Qarmūṭ [Cairo, 1985], 164; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4:257; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, 3:8; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhah, 2:325). In 818/1415–16, the nāẓir of the sultanic treasury assumed the role of providing the kiswah for the Kaʿbah (al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4:382). In 823/1419, the Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ was put under the jurisdiction of Marjān (Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, 3:224, 238; al-Sakhāwī, pawʾ, 10:153–54). The first obvious instance wherein the sultanic treasury held its own revenue source was seen in 803/1401 under Sultan Faraj. At this time, a vacant iqṭāʿ piece of land was converted into an income source of the sultanic treasury. Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:1067–68.

³⁶ With the assumption of the post of *nāẓir al-khizānah* under Sultan Shaykh as a beginning, Zayn al-Dīn 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ henceforth held many offices such as *nāẓir al-jaysh* and became the most influential civilian under the reign of Sultan Barsbāy (Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Manhal*, 7:137–39). We must discriminate between this office and the different office with the same name mentioned in the sources such as *Khiṭaṭ* and *Masālik al-Abṣār*, which had taken charge of the public coffers (mentioned earlier) but lost its role after the establishment of the office of *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ* (al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:734; al-'Umarī, *Masālik*, 61; cf. Rabie, *Financial System*, 143–44).

the khāzindār under Sultan Shaykh indicates that this sultanic treasury became actively involved in the administration of its sources of revenue, in addition to the work of keeping the sultan's money in custody. 38 Under Sultan Barsbāy, who strove to accumulate private assets in various ways, the sultanic treasury acquired additional income sources, and the khāzindār exerted increasing influence over the government. A eunuch, Jawhar al-Qunuqbā⁷ī (d. 844/1440), ³⁹ who served as khāzindār throughout Barsbāy's long reign, advised the sultan to establish a monopoly over the spice trade, in order to increase the flow of money into the sultanic treasury. 40 During Jawhar al-Qunuqbā'ī's term of office, the sultanic treasury assumed responsibility for the Mint Bureau (*Dār al-Darb*), which originally belonged to the Dīwān al-Khāss. 41 Finally, he also assumed responsibility for al-Dhakhīrah and collected the money that was generated from it. 42 He acquired an additional post, known as zimām (the chief-eunuch), under Sultan Jagmag (r. 842–57/1438–53), and he held these two posts until his death in 844/1440. Apart from the short time after his death when the sultan's private financier was appointed once again (Table 1, No. 9), the khāzindār serving concurrently as zimām continued to be in charge of al-Dhakhīrah and to assume the responsibility over the sultanic fisc throughout the greater part of Jaqmaq's reign. 43

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SULTANIC FINANCES

As we have seen above, the meaning of the term *al-Dhakhīrah* changed over time, from "treasure," to the sultan's sources of income—especially those relating to agricultural land during the reign of Sultan Barsbāy. However, the sultan's categorization of these properties as his "private property" gradually became obscured, as a large proportion of these properties were originally the state's property. After 844/1441 when Zayn al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Kuwayz was appointed as the sultan's private financier (Table 1, No. 9), the sources came to refer to *al-Dhakhīrah* independently, without referring to it together with *awqāf*,

⁴³ Fayrūz al-Nūrūzī, who was the *zimām-khāzindār* during the period between the reigns of Jaqmaq and al-Ṣāhir Khushqadam (r. 865–72/1461–67), entrusted the work of *al-Dhakhīrah*, which was within his jurisdiction, to Yūnus ibn 'Umar ibn Jarabughā, his private *dawādār*, as its *mutakallim* (the staff in charge of the work) (al-Sayrafī, *Inbā*² *al-Hasr bi-Abnā*² *al-'Asr* [Cairo, 1970], 467).



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

³⁸ Ibn Ḥajar, $Inb\bar{a}$ al-Ghumr, 3:249–50.

 $^{^{39}}$ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Manhal*, 5:38–42; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā* $^{\circ}$ *al-Ghumr*, 4:167–69; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw* $^{\circ}$, 3:82–84.

⁴⁰ Ibn Hajar, *Inbā*⁷ *al-Ghumr*, 3:423.

⁴¹ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 15:345. 'Abd al-Bāsiţ, "Rawḍ," 1: fol. 14v.

⁴² Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:1234; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Manhal*, 5:40; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhah*, 4:225–26; 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ, "Rawḍ," 1: fol. 14v. I interpret *al-Dhakhīrah* here to represent the sultan's lands privately held in the various shapes as we have seen above.

amlāk, or others. This is because it became the generic term for various kinds of official financial resources that were under the direct control of the sultan. In the period of Jaqmaq's reign in the middle of the ninth/fifteenth century, the lands of al-Dhakhīrah (bilād al-dhakhīrah) referred to the sultanic domains, i.e., lands officially designated as the sultan's exclusive financial resources, independent of the state's finances. According to Ibn al-Jīʿān's Tuḥfah, the lands of al-Dhakhīrah in Egypt were composed of forty-eight districts (nāḥiyah) around 885/1480, under Sultan Qāytbāy. 44 We have no definite information about how and when this development occurred. However, in view of the fact that the vast private holdings of the sultan consisted of amlāk, mustaʾjarāt, and other lands that had originally been diverted from the state domains, it seems reasonable to suppose that these lands gradually came to be recognized as under the sultan's direct control and for his exclusive use. That is, as the sultan collected ever more state lands for his own use, eventually all pretence was dropped, and these lands were acknowledged as belonging to the sultan himself rather than the state.

The sultans added various kinds of land (such as *milk*, *waqf*, and *musta*²*jarāt*) to *al-Dhakhīrah* at opportune times to increase their income sources. ⁴⁵ The *iqtā*^c land was also targeted for this purpose. ⁴⁶ However, some *iqtā*^cs were occasionally granted to amirs and mamluks from the land of *al-Dhakhīrah*. The first instance of this that appears in the sources involves al-Manṣūr 'Uthmān, who succeeded his father Jaqmaq as the sultan in 857/1453. He granted three of the *iqṭā*^cs of the amirs of ten derived from the lands of *al-Dhakhīrah* to military men. ⁴⁷ Henceforth, especially during the distribution of honors and reshufflings of personnel, or when the new sultan was enthroned, *iqṭā*^cs were often distributed from the lands of *al-Dhakhīrah*. ⁴⁸ When al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāytbāy (r. 901–4/1495–98) was enthroned after the death of his father Qāytbāy in 901/1495, he distributed about one thousand *iqṭā*^cs to amirs and mamluks—these were all the *iqṭā*^cs which had been included in the lands of *al-Dhakhīrah* under his father's reign. He did

⁴⁸ In 865/1461 (al-Ṭāhir Khushqadam's enthronement): Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 16:258; ʿAbd al-Bāsiṭ al-Ḥanafī, *Nayl al-Amal fī Dhayl al-Duwal* (Sidon and Beirut, 2002), 6:118–19; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, 2:383. In 872/1467 (al-Ṭāhir Timurbughā's enthronement): Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 16:381. In 874/1470 (al-Ashraf Qāytbāy's enthronement): al-Sayrafī, *Inbā' al-Hasr*, 159–60.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

⁴⁴ Igarashi, "The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāytbāy," 40–41.

⁴⁵ Al-Biqā^cī, *Izhār al-ʿAṣr li-Aṣrār Ahl al-ʿAṣr* (Riyadh, 1992–93), 1:211–12, 218; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith¹, 1:300–1; al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Tibr al-Masbūk fī Dhayl al-Sulūk* (Cairo, n.d.), 386; Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr fī Waqāʾiʿ al-Duhūr (Wiesbaden, 1960–75), 3:13–14.

 $^{^{46}}$ In 863/1459: al-Biqā'ī, *Izhār*, 3:94. In 865/1461: ibid., 3:258. In 867/1463: Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith², 770. In 882/1477: Badr al-Dīn Ibn al-Jī'ān, *Al-Qawl al-Mustazraf fī Safr Mawlānā al-Malik al-Ashraf* (Ṭarāblus, 1984), 74–75.

⁴⁷ Al-Sakhāwī, *Tibr*, 427–28; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith*¹, 1:339; idem, *Nujūm*, 16:29. Cf. Nāṣir, *Al-Ḥayāh al-Iqtiṣādīyah*, 116.

not keep any of them in reserve. 49 Furthermore, if the sultan's power became unsettled, then he became obliged to distribute some of the land of al-Dhakhīrah as $iqt\bar{a}^c$ s among the troops to placate them. ⁵⁰ These examples, in which $iqt\bar{a}^c$ s were included in al-Dhakhīrah and distributed from it, provide the basis for Poliak's interpretation of the *Dīwān al-Dhakhīrah* as a department that was responsible for managing and exploiting the vacant *iqtā*^cs, as is mentioned above. However, these phenomena arose from circumstances wherein on the one hand, the sultan strove to add iqtācs into al-Dhakhīrah in order to increase his financial resources, yet on the other hand he was forced to use it as a pool from which he could distribute land depending on the political situation. In short, these phenomena resulted from the competition between the sultans and other ruling elites regarding the acquisition of land and the balance of power between them. To put it another way, the strength of the sultan's power base and the relationship between the sultan and other ruling elites, such as amirs and mamluks, decided the scale of al-Dhakhīrah's land and whether the sultan was able to establish a firm source of revenue.

Because of the diversification that was occurring in the land held by Circassian Mamluks, *al-Dhakhīrah*'s land included many types of land. For example, many *rizqahs* (pl. *rizaq*) were added to *al-Dhakhīrah*⁵¹ in addition to water wheels (*dūlāb*, pl. *dawālīb*), which were indispensable to agriculture. ⁵² Furthermore, when powerful figures who held a large amount of land in various forms, such as *iqṭā*', *amlāk*, *awqāf*, *musta*'*jarāt*, and *ḥimāyah*, died or fell from power, these lands were often added to *al-Dhakhīrah*. Without returning these "leased" or "protected" lands to the governmental domain, these lands were continuously administered en bloc by an independent *nāzir* who was newly appointed by the sultan, and the income generated from them was delivered to *al-Dhakhīrah*. ⁵³ Moreover, the posts of the *nāzir*s of various *awqāf* were often added to *al-Dhakhīrah*. For example, when two prominent amirs, Jānībak Nā'ib Juddah, the *dawādār kabīr*, and Tanam Ruṣāṣ, the

⁵³ The case of the *kātib al-sirr* (chief secretary) Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Bārizī (in 854/1450): Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith*¹, 1:297; al-Sakhāwī, *Tibr*, 384. The case of the viceroy (*nā*¹*ib al-salṭanah*) of Damascus Julbān al-Mu¹ayyadī (in 859/1455): al-Biqāʿī, *Izhār*, 2:93–94. The case of the *dawādār kabīr* Jānībak Nāʾib al-Juddah, the amir of a hundred (*amīr mi*¹*ah muqaddam alf*), and the *muḥtasib* Tanam Rusās, the amir of forty (in 867/1463): Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Hawādith*², 770.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

⁴⁹ Ibn Iyās, Badā'i', 3:335; Ibn al-Shiḥnah, Al-Badr al-Zāhir fi Nuṣrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāytbāy (Beirut, 1983), 51.

⁵⁰ Ibn Iyas, Bada'i, 3:292. Cf. Nasir, Al-Ḥayah al-Iqtisadiyah, 116.

⁵¹ See note 49. *Rizqah* was the land assigned from the state land to retired amirs, widows and orphans of mamluks, religious institutions, and so on. See Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt*, 32–34; Ito Takao, "Aufsicht und Verwaltung der Stiftungen im mamlukischen Ägypten," *Der Islam* 80 (2003): 55–61.

⁵² Al-Şayrafī, *Inbā*³ al-Hasr, 442–43; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Hawādith*², 318.

muhtasib, were killed during a political struggle in 867/1463, their awqāf were added to al-Dhakhīrah along with their iqtā's and other properties. 54 The post of the nāzir of Nuri hospital (al-Bīmāristān al-Nūrī) in Damascus, which had been in the hands of the Shafi^ci judge of Damascus, was also included in al-Dhakhīrah before 917/1511.⁵⁵ Al-awqāf al-zimāmīyah, i.e., the awqāf established by the successive zimām-khāzindārs, were administered by the nāzir al-dhakhīrah. 56 In these cases, these wagf properties were not "confiscated" and transferred to al-Dhakhīrah; on the contrary, by keeping their status as waqf, the posts of their nāzirs, having the authority to collect fees from the wagf-endowed properties and to manage their own income, were put under the control of al-Dhakhīrah with regard to their financial interests. These posts were not permanently included in al-Dhakhīrah, but were given to other people according to their specific circumstances. At this stage, we should pay attention to one case when Sultan Muhammad ibn Qāytbāy was enthroned in 901/1495. As we have seen above, as soon as he ascended to the sultanate, he allocated a large amount of $iqt\bar{a}^c$ lands that had been included in al-Dhakhīrah to amirs and mamluks, for the purpose of gathering support from them. At the same time, he also allocated to them the posts of the *nāzir*s of various awqāf that had been included in al-Dhakhīrah, as they were similar to iqtācs. 57 This fact implies that the posts of the *nāzirs* of *awqāf* were treated as a kind of income source, which was freely transferred among people.

The financial interests concerning commercial activities were also included in *al-Dhakhīrah*. We will begin by considering the spice trade, one of the most important income sources for the Circassian Mamluk sultans. As soon as Sultan Shaykh was enthroned in 815/1412, he started forcing Venetian merchants, who were visiting Alexandria to trade in spices, to purchase a fixed amount of spice from the sultan's private stock at a higher price than the market price.⁵⁸ Then, Sultan Barsbāy advanced this policy and set up a spice monopoly, excluding ordinary merchants from the spice trade. Although this monopoly did not continue to work long term, this way of forcing Venetian merchants to purchase the sultan's spices continued until the very end of the Mamluk sultanate, and the spice trade became one of the most important income sources for subsequent sultans.⁵⁹ In

⁵⁹ As for the commercial policy of Sultan Barsbāy, see Aḥmad Darrāj, *L'Égypte sous le règne de Barsbāy* (Damascus, 1961), chap. 6; John L. Meloy, "Imperial Strategy and Political Exigency: The



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

⁵⁴ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Hawādith*², 770.

⁵⁵ Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Wafayāt al-Shuyūkh wa-al-Aqrān (Beirut, 1999), 2:218.

⁵⁶ Ibn Iyās, $Bad\bar{a}$ 'i', 4:35, 82, 197. As for the eunuchs' $awq\bar{a}f$ of the times, see C. F. Petry, "From Slaves to Benefactors: The Ḥabashīs of Mamlūk Cairo," *Sudanic Africa* 5 (1994): 63–66.

⁵⁷ Ibn al-Shihnah, *Al-Badr al-Zāhir*, 52.

 $^{^{58}}$ Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā* $^{\circ}$ *al-Ghumr*, 2:521; Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), 276–77.

the late Mamluk period, after the enthronement of Sultan Qāytbāy, the sultan's merchants (tājir al-sultān), who were involved in spice dealing on behalf of the sultan, were also called "the Dhakhīrah's merchants" (tājir al-dhakhīrah alsharīfah). 60 Moreover, as is noted above, the term "dacchieri" (i.e., al-Dhakhīrah) was often used in the documents when describing the commercial agreements that were concluded between Venice and the Mamluk government. According to studies using the documentary sources, Venetian merchants who were permitted to stay in Alexandria during a fixed period of time every autumn were obliged to purchase 210 sporte⁶¹ of pepper from al-Dhakhīrah and to pay the price that had been allotted to it.⁶² The price of al-Dhakhīrah's pepper was decided after a consultation undertaken between four merchants, who were appointed by the Venetian consul in Alexandria, and the staff of al-Dhakhīrah. This committee then discussed the matter with the *tājir al-dhakhīrah*. 63 In exchange, precious metals that had been brought by the Venetians were exclusively bought by al-Dhakhīrah. 64 In addition to these agreements, al-Dhakhīrah also laid claim to a part of the customs that had been levied on imported and exported goods, the additional fees that had been levied for the extension of Venetians' permitted stay in Alexandria, and the confiscated property of offenders who overstayed the period of their resident permit. 65 The nāẓir al-dhakhīrah stayed in Alexandria to supervise the trade during the period, 66 and the keys of the coffers in which quality-checked

Red Sea Spice Trade and the Mamluk Sultanate in the Fifteenth Century," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 123, no. 1 (2003); Eliyahu Ashtor, "Le monopole de Barsbay d'après des sources vénitiennes," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 9 (1974–79); idem, *Levant Trade*, 277–83. As for the spice trade between the Mamluk sultanate and Italian city-states, see Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, chap. 5; Nājlā Muḥammad 'Abd al-Nabī, *Miṣr wa-al-Bunduqīyah: al-ʿAlāqāt al-Siyāsīyah wa-al-Iqtiṣādīyah fī ʿAṣr al-Mamālīk* (Cairo, 2001), 131–34; Horii Yutaka, "The Mamlūk Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (1501–16) and the Venetians in Alexandria," *Orient: The Reports of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan* 38 (2003).

- ⁶⁰ See Horii, "Mamlūk Sultan," 180–81. For example, the case of Muḥyī al-Dīn (or Zayn al-Dīn) 'Abd al-Qādir ibn 'Ulaybah (d. 890/1485), the *tājir al-dhakhīrah* in Alexandria under Qāytbāy's reign: 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ, *Nayl*, 7:429; al-Sakhāwī, *paw'*, 4:259–60; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, 3:221.
- ⁶¹ Sporta (pl. sporte) is a unit of mass, equivalent to 536 or 480 pounds (Wansbrough "A Mamluk Ambassador," 525, note 4). The unit "coufe" was also used (M. Reinaud, "Traités de commerce entre la république de Venise et les derniers sultans mameloucs d'Égypte, traduits de l'italien, et accompagnés d'éclaircissemens," *Journal Asiatique* 4, no. 19 [1829]: 25, 27, 35, 39).
- ⁶² Reinaud, "Traités de commerce," 27, 33 (art. 4, 12); Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Ambassador," 525–26 (art. 2).
- 63 Reinaud, "Traités de commerce," 24-25 (art. 1).
- 64 Ibid., 35–36 (art. 14).
- 65 Ibid., 26-27, 41, 42.
- ⁶⁶ Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Ambassador," 528 (art. 12). There was a secretary for *al-Dhakhīrah* (*kātib al-dhakhīrah*) in Alexandria regularly (Cairo, Wizārat al-Awqāf [WA], j483, v. [document



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

peppercorns were stored were kept by him and the Venetian consul.⁶⁷ These facts indicate that it was not only the revenues from the sultan's transactions in spice that came to be included in al-Dhakhīrah, but also some of taxes on commercial activities, 68 despite the fact that tax revenues collected from foreign merchants in Alexandria were originally a part of the income sources of the Dīwān al-Khāss. 69 In addition to spice, the sultans earned a high income from commercial activities such as speculation in grain, and by participating in trade in sugar, timber, etc. The sultan's warehouses (al-ḥawāṣil al-sultānīyah) and the granaries (shuwan, ahrā') in which these goods were stored⁷⁰ came to be called "Hawāsil al-Dhakhīrah" and "Shuwan al-Dhakhīrah" in the late Mamluk period, and special staff members were appointed for their administration. 71 The monthly tax (mushāharah) and the weekly tax (mujāma'ah) that were collected from the markets (sūq) in Cairo also contributed to the revenue of *al-Dhakhīrah*. 72 Although the first obvious instance of a payment of these taxes to al-Dhakhīrah occurred in a case in 907/1502,73 it is clear that merchants had been obliged to pay some taxes to al-Dhakhīrah regularly prior to that.⁷⁴

Incidentally, although successive sultans intervened actively in commercial activities throughout the Circassian Mamluk period, 75 the term $al\text{-}Dhakh\bar{\iota}rah$

⁷⁵ The latest study on Barsbāy's intervention in transactions in wheat and sugar is John L. Meloy's "Economic Intervention and the Political Economy of the Mamluk State under al-Ashraf Barsbāy,"



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

on 15 Ramadan 899]).

⁶⁷ Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Ambassador," 528–29 (art. 15).

⁶⁸ In addition, "al-Dhakhīrah's pepper (filfil dhakhīratnā al-sharīfah)" was mentioned in Qāytbāy's letter sent to Venice in 877/1473 (Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Letter," 206, 211). These spices were procured from merchants visiting Jiddah, a Red Sea port, through various ways such as the compulsory purchase of a third of their load of spice at their buying cost in Calcutta in India (Gabriel Ferrand, "Les Poids, Mesures et Monnaies des du Sud aux XVe et XVIIe siècle," Journal Asiatique, série 11, tome 16 [1920]: 19). Three decrees dated in 891/1486 and 892/1487, included in the documents of the monastery of St. Catherine, mention Sultan Qāytbāy's orders to his staff in al-Ṭūr, a coastal port at the Red Sea, to store "al-Dhakhīrah's spice (bahār al-dhakhīrah al-sharīfah)" in warehouses (ḥawāṣil) (Hans Ernst, Die mamlukischen Sultansurkunden des Sinai-Klosters [Wiesbaden, 1960], 182, 184, 188).

⁶⁹ Al-Zāhirī, Zubdah, 108.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 122–23.

⁷¹ WA, j714, r. (document on 28 Jumādá II 906); al-Sakhāwī, *Wajīz al-Kalām fī al-Dhayl ʿalá Duwal al-Islām* (Beirut, 1995), 971; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 4:413. As for the monopoly and the speculative buying, see al-Asadī, *Taysīr*, 138–46.

⁷² As for the taxes, see Jonathan Berkey, "The Muḥtasibs of Cairo under the Mamluks: Toward an Understanding of an Islamic Institution," *The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, ed. M. Winter and A. Levanoni (Leiden and Boston, 2004), 269–70.

⁷³ Ibn al-Himsī, *Hawādith al-Zamān*, 2:145. Cf. Ibn Iyās, *Badā*'i', 4:25.

⁷⁴ Abd al-Bāsit, *Nayl*, 8:73–74.

rarely appears in the contemporary sources in relation to the sultans' commercial activities before Qāytbāy's reign. 76 The first instance where the term al-Dhakhīrah was used in this way is, to my knowledge, Ibn 'Uraybah's assumption of the office of tājir al-sultān and nāzir al-dhakhīrah in 877/1472 under Qāytbāy.⁷⁷ On the contrary, al-Matjar al-Sultānī, 78 an office that had been in charge of the sultan's private commercial activities beforehand, is rarely mentioned in the sources after Qāytbāy's enthronement. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that the function and role of al-Matjar was included in al-Dhakhīrah, and that, as a result, al-Dhakhīrah became the generic term for all the sultanic financial resources. Moreover, the payment for the sale of governmental offices, and the confiscation of the property of officials who had died or lost their office, are usually expressed in the sources as money or property that had been "paid to the sultanic treasury." However, sometimes, especially in the sources written after the middle of the ninth/fifteenth century, they are referred to as being "paid to al-Dhakhīrah," 79 where the term al-Dhakhīrah is used in the same way as khizānah. It seems that the sultanic treasury was regarded as a part of al-Dhakhīrah. Sometimes, other financial interests belonging to the government or officials, such as the rights and interests of the Mint Bureau, were added to al-Dhakhīrah. 80 Moreover, al-Dhakhīrah had many sources of income from various regions in Syria. For instance, in Safar 857/February 1453, 95,000 dinars that had been collected from al-Dhakhīrah's income sources in Syria were delivered to Cairo.81 Al-Dhakhīrah had many financial interests, especially in the Nabulus region. 82 Yūnus ibn 'Umar ibn Jarabughā, who was responsible for al-Dhakhīrah as mutakallim under the supervision of the zimām-khāzindār Fayrūz al-Nūrūzī during Jagmag's reign, and then officially assumed the office of nazir al-dhakhīrah at a certain time during al-Ashraf Īnāl's reign, took a tour of the Syrian regions and appointed a financial

MSR 9, no. 2 (2005).

⁸² Ibid., 3:241.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

⁷⁶ The sources written after the late ninth/fifteenth century mention the term "al-Dhakhīrah" with relation to the sultans' commercial activities in the earlier times (cf. 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ, "Rawḍ," 2: fol. 230r; idem, *Nayl*, 5:80) probably because this term was used in the new meaning given in the authors' days.

⁷⁷ Al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbā*² *al-Haṣr*, 489–90. He was also referred to as *tājir al-dhakhīrah* ('Abd al-Bāsiṭ, *Nayl*, 7:429). At the time of his death, a part of his estate was confiscated by *al-Dhakhīrah* as its share (al-Sakhāwī, *Wajīz*, 959–60, 965–66). As for him, see note 60.

⁷⁸ Ashtor, Levant Trade, 283.

⁷⁹ Al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhah*, 1:322, 372, 440; 3:177, 381, 398–99, 436; al-Biqāʿī, *Izhār*, 2:15; Ibn al-Himsī, *Hawādith al-Zamān*, 2:245–46.

⁸⁰ Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, Ḥawādith al-Zamān, 2:145.

⁸¹ Al-Biqā^cī, *Izhār*, 1:317.

agent (ustādār) for al-Dhakhīrah in every region.83

Al-Dhakhīrah was usually administered by the *zimām-khāzindār*, ⁸⁴ but the sultans sometimes entrusted it to an independent official ⁸⁵ or a powerful figure in the government. ⁸⁶ This was probably to consolidate its operation. After Qāytbāy's enthronement and the introduction of his policies on the expansion of the sultanic fisc, the responsibility for the sultanic finances was divided among people who were of a relatively low rank in the government but who had personal connections with the sultan. ⁸⁷

Ever since the sultans began accumulating land as their own private property, the main purpose in establishing the sultanic fisc had been to secure and increase independent revenue sources for the sultanate. Therefore, the income was basically distributed at the sultan's own discretion. Although the specific details of its distribution are rarely mentioned in the sources, it seems reasonable to suppose that the income was used to award bonuses (*nafaqah*) for personnel involved in the ongoing military expeditions (which used to be distributed directly from the sultanic treasury), for the purchase of slaves in order to organize the *mushtarawāt* (mamluks who were trained by the present ruling sultan), and for political funds to help secure and exercise his political power, etc. However, under the deteriorating financial circumstances that occurred after the middle of the ninth/fifteenth century, the sultanic fisc extended its role in the administration and finance of the state; I believe that it was this that prompted the development

⁹⁰ According to *Sulūk*, *nafaqah*s for the Royal Mamluk corps, presents (*silāt*) for amirs and Turkmen, and the expenses of the purchase of mamluk slaves and of military expeditions were referred to as "the sultan's expenditures (*nafaqāt al-sulṭān*)" paid by Sultan Jaqmaq (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:1228–29). According to another source, the expenses of military expeditions, the purchase of mamluk slaves, arms, horses, arrows, and lancers, constructions and repairs of buildings, rewards (*in*'ām), presents, charities (*birr*), and ṣadaqah were derived directly from the sultanic treasury (anon. "Tārīkh al-Malik al-Ashraf Qāytbāy," British Library MS Or 3028, fol. 15r–v).



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

⁸³ Al-Ṣayrafi, *Inbā*⁷ *al-Haṣr*, 431–32, 467–68. See note 43.

⁸⁴ For example, Fayrūz al-Nūrūzī, who took the two posts of *zimām* and *khāzindār* in 846/1442 and kept them under the five sultans until his death in 865/1461 (Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 16:29; idem, *Hawādith*¹, 1:340; al-Sakhāwī, *Tibr*, 428; al-Biqā^cī, *Izhār*, 1:300).

⁸⁵ For example, Abū al-Khayr al-Naḥḥās (d. 864/1459): al-Biqāʿī, Izhār, 3:65; Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith², 326, 392; idem, Nujūm, 16:132, 210–11; Richard T. Mortel, "The Decline of Mamlūk Civil Bureaucracy in the Fifteenth Century: The Career of Abū l-Khayr al-Naḥḥās," Journal of Islamic Studies 6, no. 2 (1995).

⁸⁶ For example, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Kātib Jakam (d. 862/1458), the *nāẓir al-jaysh wa-al-khāṣṣ* under Jaqmaq and Īnāl: al-Biqā^cī, *Iẓhār*, 1:297, 300, 350; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith*¹, 1:370.

⁸⁷ Igarashi, "The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qaytbay," 42–45.

⁸⁸ Al-Qalqashandi, Subh, 3:453. Cf. Nāṣir, Al-Ḥayāh al-Iqtiṣādīyah, 116-17.

⁸⁹ Cf. al-Şayrafi, Nuzhah, 3:266.

of the sultanic fisc—the change in its character from the sultan's private property to the official revenue sources that were directly assigned to the sultanate. Compensation for the deficits of the financial bureaus of the government, such as the Dīwān al-Wizārah and al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, came from al-Dhakhīrah. The first instance of this can be seen in a case in Safar 860/January 1456, under Īnāl. At this time, the vizier (wazīr; the chief of the Dīwān al-Wizārah) Faraj ibn al-Nahhāl had disappeared because of his failure, due to insufficient funds, to pay for the daily meat supplies that were required by the Royal Mamluk corps, for which the Dīwān al-Wizārah had responsibility. After returning, Īnāl requested that he stay in office on the condition that 40,000 dirhams per day were supplied to the Dīwān al-Wizārah from *al-Dhakhīrah*'s fund. 91 As the result of further cash injections from al-Dhakhīrah's fund, the amount per day reached 70,000 dirhams. 92 The injection of al-Dhakhīrah's money into al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, which was responsible for the monthly stipends and other essentials required by the Royal Mamluk corps, had been carried out since before 863/1459.93 In addition to this, in 867/1463, Sultan al-Zāhir Khushqadam agreed that 10,000 dinars per month would be injected from al-Dhakhīrah's fund into al-Dīwān al-Mufrad. 94 Although this agreement was not fulfilled in the end, the injection of 8,000 dinars per month was maintained, as it had been before. 95 In 888/1484, Sultan Qāytbāy covered the deficit of the Dīwān al-Khāss that had been accrued by distributing sheep for sacrifice on the occasion of 'Īd al-Adḥá. 96 While previous sultans had sometimes made temporary compensation for the deficits of these financial bureaus of the government, 97 it became far more commonplace during and after the reign of Īnāl. 98 This shows that al-Dhakhīrah had become indispensable for the management of the financial bureaus, especially as financial difficulties had reached their limit by this time.

Furthermore, *al-Dhakhīrah* undertook the responsibility of paying regular salaries and stipends. For instance, around 850/1446–47, a qadi regularly

⁹⁸ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Hawādith*², 292.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

⁹¹ Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith¹, 1:492–93; ʿAbd al-Bāsiṭ, Nayl, 5:455. The next month, from the earnings from ex-iqṭāʿs of amirs, 35,000 dirhams per day were added to the amount of money being injected into the Dīwān al-Wizārah. See Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ḥawādith¹, 1:494–95. Cf. ʿAbd al-Bāsiṭ, Nayl, 5:456–57.

⁹² Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith*², 321.

⁹³ Al-Biqā^cī, *Izhār*, 3:65, 93; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith*², 392.

⁹⁴ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith*², 757.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 449, 477, 770.

^{96 &#}x27;Abd al-Bāsit, *Nayl*, 7:363.

⁹⁷ Igarashi, "Establishment and Development," 130–31; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:966; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhah*, 3:370; al-Biqāʿī, *Izhā*r, 1:420–21.

received 3,000 dirhams per month from al-Dhakhīrah. 99 During Qāytbāy's reign, al-Dhakhīrah was responsible for granting pensions to retired amirs (tarkhān) and was partly responsible for providing the meat supplies to the military, civilians, and scholars during 'Īd al-Adhá. Moreover, many amirs, including some amirs of a hundred, regularly came to receive monthly stipends and wheat rations from al-Dhakhīrah instead of holding iqtācs. 100 Such an expansion of the role of al-Dhakhīrah in the spheres of administration, finance, and military affairs shows the limitations of the traditional structure of the Mamluk state, which was based on the $iqt\bar{a}^c$ system and the state's landholding. Although the various endeavors of successive sultans to reconstruct state finances throughout the Circassian Mamluk period were successful to a certain degree, they tended to lack a longterm outlook and clearly never solved the fundamental financial difficulties, i.e., the weakening of the state's control over land management and the alienation of the state land. Under these circumstances, the sultanic fisc, which covered the revenue shortage of the government's purse, gradually came to be indispensable for the smooth management of the administration. Consequently, the financial burden placed on al-Dhakhīrah was growing, 101 and its financial troubles directly affected the state's finances, 102 inducing the expansion of the financial resources of al-Dhakhīrah. Finally, especially after the succession of Qāytbāy, and with the state's finances becoming increasingly subordinate to the sultanic finances, the latter came to play a pivotal role in the administrative, financial, and military affairs of the Mamluk state. 103

However, it must be noted again that these phenomena occurred in parallel with the accumulation of properties by powerful amirs, who were anxious to hold onto their personal revenue sources, in addition to their <code>iqtācs</code>; they did this in various ways including holding <code>amlāk</code>, <code>awqāf</code>, <code>musta¹jarāt</code>, <code>himāyah</code>, and commercial activities, just as the sultans did. There was no essential difference between the form and character of the sultanic fisc and that of the amirs' private resources, aside from their scale. In other words, the expansion of the sultanic fisc that we have investigated in this article did not reflect a unilateral strengthening of the sultan's power, or a radical change of its character. Rather, it may be assumed that these trends were advancing in the wake of a situation wherein the ruling elite of the Mamluk state—the amirs, and the sultan as the principal among them—were personally accumulating various rights and interests and

¹⁰³ Igarashi, "The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qaytbay," 39–45, 49–51.



©2010 by Daisuke Igarashi.

⁹⁹ Al-Biqā'ī, *Izhār*, 2:176.

¹⁰⁰ Igarashi, "The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāytbāy," 50–51.

¹⁰¹ Al-Bigā^cī, *Izhār*, 3:258.

¹⁰² Ibid., 3:67–68.

were forming their power bases outside the framework of the traditional state structure. The evolution of the sultanic finance system and *al-Dhakhīrah* resulted in the weakening of the ruling system of the government machinery; as the process developed, *al-Dhakhīrah* functioned as a means of maintaining the rule of the Mamluk regime.

D/A [T, 45] D [D, 3:82]

D/A/H [4:209]

D[15:345]

D/H ['Iqd(2), 562-3]

al-Khāṣṣ bi-Khāṣṣ al-Sulṭān/M/D

D[4:1220]

Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan

Nāsir al-Dīn al-Fāqūsī

(2/2/841)

Zayn al-Din 'Abd

8/7/844

al-Raḥmān ibn

² U: ustādīr / N: nāzir

n.d.)(T).

[1G, 4:85]

al-Sultān/M/D [D, 7:222]

al-Khāṣṣ bi-Khāṣṣ

A/D/M/W [D, 5:102-3]

D/A [2255]

A/W [13:96]

A/D/M/W [Iqd(1),

278

A/D/M/W [1G, 3:110]

A/D [Dh, 249]

D[Iqd(1), 168]

A/D [JG, 2:432]

D/A [4:416]

n

'Alā' al-Din al-Baghdādi

al-Wahhāb ibn Abī

Taqi al-Din 'Abd

5/?/812

7/?/816

z

Tāj al-Din ibn Samakh

A/W [4:110]

D [JG, 3:10]

A/D [1:490]

A/D [Iqd(3), 487]

Ustādār [D, 7:263]

D/A [1:487; 2:49]

D/A [1299]

D/A ['Iqd(3), 493]

A/W/D [4:15]

A/W/D [3:930]

D/M [892]

b

Muḥammadibn

Nāṣir al-Dīn

D/A [3:1007]

D [2:98]

Khāṣṣ lil-Sultān/ D/A

D[1:448]

5.252]

A/D [D, 4:170]

A/D [1:457, 486]

D/A [12:98; 13:22]

A/D ['Iqd(3), 440, A/D [Iqd(3), 484]

al-Khāṣṣ al-Sulṭānī [*Dh*, 105]

al-Khāss [4:129] A/W/D [1:616]

A/M [1:621]

A/M [244]

z

Zayn al-Din 'Abd

Faraj al-Halabi

al-Raḥmān ibn

D/A [JG, 1:528; 2:172]

485]

A/D [1:646-47; 4:14, 233]

A/D [1:485]

al-Sakhāwī (d.902)

al-Şayrafi (q. 900)

Ibn Taghribird (d. 874)

al-'Aynī (d. 855) D[Iqd(3), 412]

Ibn Hajar (d. 852)

Ibn Qāḍi Shuhbał (d. 851)

al-Maqrizi

Ibn Hijji (d. 816)

Ibn al-Furāt (d. 807) A/W/D [9:468]

 $U/\!\! N^2$

Э

'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī ibn

(d. 845)

A/W [3:878] A/D [3:928]

Table 8. Names of People Who Were Appointed the Sultan's Private Financier and the Title of Their Posts

Abbreviations. A. Antick / D. Dhukhinh / H. Firmigah V. M. Massijanit. / W. Awtiff
The sources were as follows in a 4-trait air and a 4-toward or 4-toward and a 4-t
1-11 m 1/11 m 1/

al-Chinn th Ahail d-Chin, 1969-99 (GG), Dhyl al-Duran d-Kaminin, et. Achain Darwist (Cairo, 1982) (Gh), al-Ayain, 'igla Ahain Darwist (Cairo, 1985), (Bh), al-Ayain Darwist (Cairo, 198 alson 2000 / Inn Deglinical Alson 2000 / Inn Deglinical Alson India Market May were d. 2000 / Inn Deglinical Alson India Market Market

• (cc)

bg Dats suk & Jasshi. | 10.6082/M1MG7MNV. (https://doi.org/ 10.6082/M1MG7MNV. (https://doi.org/ DOI of Vol. XIV: 10. individual articles. This work is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC-BY). See http://mamluk.uchicago.edu/msr.html for more information about copyright and open access.

Table 2: Private and Waqf Assets of the Sultans

	Egypt				Syria				Total			
Name of Sultan	Farm	Urban	Other	Total	Farm	Urban	Other	Total	Farm	Urban	Other	Total
	Land	Property			Land	Property			Land	Property		
Barqūq ¹	3 (9.1)	17 (51.5)	3 (9.1)	23 (69.7)	7 (21.2)	3 (9.1)	0	10 (30.3)	10 (30.3)	20 (60.6)	3 (9.1)	33
Shaykh ²	13 (30.2)	12 (27.9)	4 (9.3)	29 (67.4)	7 (16.3)	6 (14.0)	1 (2.3)	14 (32.6)	20 (46.5)	18 (41.9)	5 (11.6)	43
Barsbāy ³	39 (48.1)	33 (40.7)	0	72 (88.9)	2 (2.5)	7 (8.6)	0	9 (11.1)	41 (50.6)	40 (49.4)	0	81

The figures in parentheses are the percentage of total assets

¹ Waqf Deeds, Dār al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmīyah (DW), 9/51; Wizārat al-Awqāf (WA), j51, j67, j562, j704, j728, j736; Igarashi Daisuke, "The Private Property and *Awqāf* of the Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barqūq," *Orient* 43 (2008): 175-76, 194-95.

² WA q938; partially edited by Fahmī 'Abd al-'Alīm, *Al-'Imārah al-Islāmīyah fī 'Aṣr al-Mamālīk al-Charākisah: 'Aṣr al-Sulṭān al-Mu*'ayyad Shaykh (Cairo, 2003), 113-69.

³ Ḥujjat Waqf al-Ashraf Barsbāy, ed. Aḥmad Darrāj (Cairo, 1963).