Comparing Russian and American Military Studies on the Lessons of Mongol Military Art

Utilizing Network Analysis and Close Readings

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Table of Contents

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In the 13th century, the Mongol Empire under Genghis Khan and his generals created the biggest contiguous land empire and the second biggest state in the history of the world.[1] Every piece of land from the borders of Korea to the plains of Hungary; from the tundra of Russia to the Indus fell under the purview of the Great Khan and his descendants.[2] They achieved this expansion and unparalleled rate of conquering using a sophisticated army and the innovation of its leaders. But due to their nomadic nature most of the sources that exist today, with few exceptions, were written by their enemies. Many of these accounts attributed their successes to mystical abilities, outrageous numerical superiority, and/or a devilish ferocity in battle. Due to these myths, it took centuries for military historiography, especially in the Westernized world, to consider the Mongol campaigns as examples for military learning.[3]

Within the historiography that developed, two military institutions undertook the mission of explicitly incorporating Mongol lessons into their doctrines and tactics. These were the Imperial/early Soviet Russian armies and the 20th century/early 21st century American armies. [4]Therefore, this thesis will examine written works by members of both of these institutions with three aims in mind. Firstly, we will try to see what were the conclusions in both of these time periods for the inclusion of the Mongols within the established canon. The second purpose will be to examine if and how these two periods were connected and how they related to the original

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[1] Benfield, D.C. (2012) The Mongols: Early Practitioners of Maneuver Warfare A Monograph. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

[2] Benfield (2012) p. 1-2

[3] Liddell Hart, B. H. (1927). *Great captains unveiled.* W. Blackwood & Sons.

[4] Benfield, D.C. (2012) *The Mongols: Early Practitioners of Maneuver Warfare A Monograph.*

sources of the Mongol campaigns. Lastly we will examine how the sources of the authors shaped their conclusions. This will allow us to conclude if and how the analysis of Mongol military theory impacted the development of Russian and American theories. It would also provide evidence for the consideration of the Mongols within modern military learning. And finally it will argue for the effect of sources selection on the conclusion of military theoretical works.

To study the late Imperial Russian and early Soviet Russian military period, we will be analyzing five texts, four written by Soviet or Imperial commanders of the time and one of them written by a civil military historian. All of these texts examined military strategy and contained references to applicable lessons from the Mongols' military art.

To study the 20th and 21st century United States Army, we will be studying five texts all of which are Master level theses from the School of Advanced Military Studies by field- grade officers (Capt, LtCol, Col) that analyzed the Mongols' campaigns or their generals in some shape or form.[5]

To perform this analysis and arrive at our conclusions the thesis shall have two components. The first one will be a close reading of all the conclusions of the selected texts and how they addressed the Mongol art of war. For some, like the military histories, only the sections on the Mongols contained within the text will be consulted. For others such as the Mongol military analysis manuals this will mean reading almost their entire work, with particular emphasis on their conclusions.

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[5] United States Army. "School of Advanced Military Studies." United States Army Combined Arms Center, United States Army, usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/cgsc/sams. Accessed 25 Apr. 2022.

The second component of the analysis shall be a digital network for the citations of these ten works. The author hopes to get two pieces of information from utilizing this digital approach. The first is, if and how these periods are connected; this means if the American works utilized the precious work done by the Russians on the Mongols. The second is to see how both of them relate to the original sources of the Mongol campaigns. Did the military analysts embark on their own study of the Mongol primary sources or did they trust the already performed historiographical works? How did their selection of sources biased or guided their particular analysis?

After having done both of these comparisons (the close readings and the network analysis) the thesis shall unite these two to try to answer how the theoretical legacy of Mongol military art was felt in both of these armies at their time of study. In addition, we will also make an argument on how these were included, what sources were used and how did these influence the conclusions of their respective authors.

Having concluded with the historiographical analysis and conclusions, the second section of the thesis shall discuss the digital methodology used within the context of the field of the digital humanities. In addition, this section shall explore if and how the network contributed to the traditional historiographical arguments.

The Russian studies of Mongol Military Art

During the end of 19th century Russia embarked on its last great imperial expansion; this time into the Central Asian region. At the beginning of their invasion, in their campaign against the Khiva Khanate in 1839 they are utterly defeated which leads to a reconsideration by Russian leaders of what is necessary to win a prolonged war in Central Asia.[6]

In this period of reconsideration, General Mikhail Ivanin was the first military leader to recommend a study of the Central Asian art of war to solve the astounding defeats. In a manuscript in 1875 titled *"On the Military Art and Conquests of the Tartar-Mongols and Central Asian Peoples under Genghis-Khan and Tamerlane"* he detailed how the Mongols and other conquerors of Central Asia conducted their campaigns.[7] The purpose of the manuscript was to transform the Russian military knowledge being taught at the time in their military academy. Therefore, he states that the future of Russian military success in Central Asia hinges on their understanding of these ancient battle tactics and how they could be applied to their modern battlefields with greatly improved armament, armor and communication systems. For these purposes, Ivanin makes four recommendations to Russian military leaders after his comprehensive detailing of Tamerlane's and Genghis Khan's campaigns. [8]

The first recommendation was that the Russians had to dispel the myth that the Mongols achieved their victories by large numbers or ferocity alone.[9] Ivanin hoped that his thorough analysis of their campaigns would be proof enough that this was not the case; but instead that the

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[6] Ivanin, M. I. (1875). *о военном искусстве и завоеваниях монголо-тартар и среднеазиатских народов при чингисхане и тамерлане.* Saint Petersburg.
[7] Ivanin, M. I. (1875). p.10-20

[8] Ivanin (1875) p. 260
[9] Ivanin (1875) p.262

Mongol campaigns were prepared extensively, intellectually and physically, by their leaders. By performing this analysis he is making his case against conventional wisdom and creating the space for further studies into the Central Asian way of war.

The second change that he suggests is how to supply their armies when invading the Central Asian zone.[10] He established that if one was familiar with only European tactics, they were not going to be able to triumph against the people of the steppe. The first reason for this was the difficulty in acquiring water and food when traveling for long campaigns in arid central Asian regions; which was not a problem in Europe, because of pillaging and the increased population density. This is clearly seen in the First Battle of Geok-Tepe in which the Russians retreat, losing almost half of their cargo animals in the process, due to lack of water and proper food supplies.[11] To solve this General Ivanin suggested that the Russians had to 'take a page out of the Mongol's book' and treat campaigns as a "migration".[12]

This meant that to beat the nomads of the steppe, the Russian armies had to become nomads themselves. They had to guarantee that supplies were not only close at hand but readily available. Again, using the example of the Battle of Geok-tepe, the second incursion entailed a multi-tiered supply system to deal with the extreme aridness of the zone and the previous failure. The Russians decided to create a supply base much closer to the battle; bringing more cargo animals and food with them. These modifications changed the pace of conquering while at the same time creating a more stable initial stronghold in the region.

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[10] Ivanin (1875) p. 262

[11] Morrison. "The 'Turkestan Generals' and Russian Military History."

[12] Chris Bellamy (1983) Heirs of Genghis Khan: The influence of the Tartar-Mongols on the imperial Russian and Soviet Armies, The RUSI Journal, 128:1, 52-60

The third recommendation that General Ivanin provided was that a journal of military topics of Asia had to be established by the Russian government.[13] This would allow further studies into the military tradition of Asia to be conducted by Russian military intellectuals for the knowledge of the whole force. The fourth and last recommendation proposed by Ivanin was that the campaigns of Central Asian conquerors had to be taught at the military academy for the reference of future officers. In this list of conquerors, he included Genghis Khan, Tamerlane and Nadir Shah.[14]

It is hard to say how much his ideas were heeded by the Russian military leaders because, only four years after the publication of the book, they fail at the first battle of Geok Tepe which has already been discussed. But in the second battle of Geok-Tepe in 1881 his practical ideas for supply management are clearly implemented by the Russian invasion force. In terms of education, one would need to gain access to the curriculums during that time at the Russian Imperial Academy to analyze if his recommendations were incorporated into the classroom material.

Twenty years after the observations of General Ivanin we find the first Russian military leader in a high position of power and influence to consider the Mongols worthy of observation. General N. P. Mikhnevich served as the Chair for Russian Military History and taught at the Imperial Military School.[15] Therefore, his knowledge and what he includes in his books is particularly fascinating because we know that this would have filtered into his curriculum design at the academy. His seminal book was titled the "History of Military Art" and was written to be a traditional military history to accompany the training of young commanders. [16]

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[13] Ivanin (1875) p.263
[14] Ivanin (1875) p.264
[15] Bellamy (1983) p.56
[16] Mikhnevich, N. P. (1896). история военнаго искусства. St.Petersburg

In the book "History of Military Art" he dedicates a section, albeit a very brief one, to the Mongols.[17] In this section Mikhnevich states that the Mongol system was superior to their period-specific European equivalents and that their plans and tactics were essential to understanding Central Asian warfare thereafter. In addition, he mentions that Central Asian military knowledge did influence the future development of Russian military art, even though he doesn't specify what these changes might be.[18] Therefore, the existence of his text hints at the first evidence for widespread knowledge of Central Asian campaigns in Russian military instruction which would have to be verified with further studies into the military curriculum.

In addition to just the text that included in this treatise we can see that he deemed fit to include a collection of maps demonstrating the complexity of Mongol warfare. The first of these maps describe the Battle of Mohi sometimes referred as to the battle of Saho River. In addition to the specific campaign, we can see that Mikhnevich also adds a separate map detailing the overall organization and division in tumans of the Mongol army, to showcase their maneuverability.[19]

Having discussed the works at the end of the 19th century we can now move to the three works that were written during the transition years of the 1920s. During this time, there was a movement called Eurasianism within the academic and intellectual circles of Russia and its émigré community.[20] Its proponents argued that Russian culture was unique and different to both their Asian and their European counterparts. In many of these cases this also entailed a further study of the Asian influence within Russian history to separate from the already established currents of the

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[17]Mikhnevich (1896). p. 302

[18] Mikhnevich (1896) p. 303

[19] Mikhnevich (1896) p. 303

[20] Shlapentokh, D. V. (1997). Eurasianism: Past and Present. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30(2), 129–151. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45302025

predominant influence of Europe in Russia. This movement affected all areas of Russian culture and knowledge including their conceptions of their military knowledge.

One of the academics that identified to the Eurasianist's theories was a civil historian called Ereghen Khara- Divan. He wrote a book titled " Genghis Khan: A military Commander and His Legacy" which studied the Mongols and particularly the figure of Genghis Khan from a military leadership standpoint.[21] His text was written in 1929 and as we can see from its introduction had the main purpose of attacking what the author called " the prejudice of Europeanism" that had affected the analysis of not only Genghis Khan and his military legacy but the entire legacy of the Mongol yoke in Russia.

He organizes his text in a very particular manner in accordance with his Eurasianist ideal. Khara- Divan does not compare the Mongols to anybody, in a different manner than the preceding works that we have seen. He reserves the comparisons with the Europeans for the closing sections of the book. Instead, he decides to dedicate his whole work to just analyzing the Mongol way of war. As we can see form the book title, the most important emphasis of the book is to observe how Genghis Khan himself behaved as a military commander, which is reflected by the beginning sections. But the latter half on the book studies particular military campaigns, such as the Khawrezmian campaign, and what they demonstrate about the entire Mongol system of warfare, not only their leaders.[22]

Having completed this in-depth analysis, Khara-Davan's conclusions states multiple ideas that seem to be revolutionary at this point in time. He is the only one out of the Russian texts that

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[21] Khara-Davan, E. (1929). Chingis-Khan kak polkovodet͡s i ego nasledie: Kul'turno-istoricheskiĭ ocherk Mongol'skoĭ imperii XII-XIV veka. Izd. avtora.
[22] Davan (1929) p. 167-200

we will examine in this thesis that states outright that Genghis and his two best generals Jebe and Subotai were even better than Julius Caesar, Napoleon, or Alexander the Great. [23]He comes to this determination by analyzing their army organization but also by noting that the Mongols had no great defeats in the time these three commanders were serving. This is in stark contrast to the first two of the classic Western figures above whose victories were as grandiose as their defeats in the annals of history.

Having described the conclusions of Mikhnevich, Ivanin, and Khara Divan we will now move to the work of Commander Alexander Svechin. Svechin participated in World War I and the Russo-Japanese War. After years of service in both the Imperial and Soviet armies he died as a result of Great Purge conducted by Joseph Stalin to solidify his power.[24] During his career Svechin was a successful commander and a prolific military historian who taught at the Imperial and Soviet academies. During this time Svechin wrote the military classic "Strategy" which was used as a seminal textbook within the Soviet Russian academy. This book was meant to be a military handbook and to teach future commanders the tenets of command and military decision making.

Reading the military manual "Strategy" we see that Svechin places a lot of emphasis on the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz and on the European styles of war. This is not uncommon at the time and it is to be expected even when faced with the Eurasianist ideas that were present. But this is why it is even more shocking to observe how Svechin treats the ideas of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane . [25]

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[23] Davan (1929) p. 204-206

[24] Hill, Alexander (2017). The Red Army and the Second World War. Cambridge, United Kingdom.

[25] Svechin, A., & Lee, K. D. (1992). Strategy. East View Publications.

In his treatise Svechin tries to cover all the aspects of war that he considers essential including the political processes that arise with the classical notions of war. It is here where he approached the ideas of the Mongols in detail. Svechin states that the Mongols upend the traditional idea of Clausewitz that the more terrain an army covers the weaker it becomes. Instead he dictates that if an army still practiced the nomadic ways then it would be easier for resources and men to change hands and to actually make an army stronger when they conquered more territory.[26] He emphasized the concept that this may have also been factor in halting the Mongol expansion in Hungary because, for him, the Clausewitzian doctrine is true in all European warfare.

Now although he describes the Mongols and how they upend one of the Clausewitzian doctrine tenets, we can observe that it is in a very reductive way. Svechin is just trying to observe and destroy any loopholes that are left within his European -based strategy and doesn't really laud the Mongols as Khara Divan does. Instead, he is just stating a point that may be useful for future commanders if they ever found themselves in a similar situation, not really for the purpose of changing a theory. Therefore we can saw that he treats the military lessons of the Mongols as an addendum to existing theory instead of a revision.

Svechin' second text is titled the Evolution of Military art, and as we can see from the title it is written to be a treatise about military history more than a text for instruction such as his version of the Strategy. He studies the Mongols in a section titled " The Military art of the east".[27] Here he grouped not only Genghis Khan and his generals but also the actions of his grandchildren and other Chingissid and Timurid leaders.

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[26] Svechin(1992) p. 147-149

[27] Svechin, A. (1927). Evoli͡ut͡sii͡a voennogo iskusstva s drevnei͡shikh vremen do nashikh dnei͡. Gos. izd-vo.

Here he speaks about the same topics as Mikhnevich did earlier. Therefore, he addresses how advanced the Mongols were in comparison to their European counterparts. But in difference to Mikhnevich, he does delve a bit deeper into the details of their battles. Therefore, he studies their tactics within battle and their foreign political associations with leaders at the time. This is not surprising due that his Strategy treatise did include a more complex understanding of the political policy of the Mongols than that of Mikhnevich.

Close reading conclusions of the Russian Corpus

We can divide the analyzed Russian texts into 3 key types. The first ones are those meant to be historical references, which include Mikhnevich's History and Svechin's Evolution of Military Art. From these two texts we can draw the clear conclusion that the Russian army, at least within their theoretical and academic consideration of military art, considered the Mongols worthy of admission to their canon**.** But we must note that for both of these books the Mongols occupy a very minimal space of their military canon taking second place to the strategies of Napoleon, von Moltke and Ceaser. Therefore, we can conclude that although the Mongols are included, their place is never exalted in the eyes of the Westernized observer.

In addition if we observe the footnotes on Svechin's work he states that even though Ivanins text is " especially valuable", " it is not always critical enough" of the elements he is presenting [28] Here he again devalues the Mongols in the face of European militaries and differentiates these two in the eyes of the military student. Therefore, he only utilizes the Mongol art of war to teach where European strategy does not apply; what he defines as the central Asian steppes and other regions of the Asian continent. For the rest of the Russian strategy, he utilizes the examples of European and Russian leaders as primary teachings.

On the other hand the second type of works are those that considered the Mongols as part of the lessons to be emulated by future commanders, such as the work of the Strategiya by Svechin. In this work it becomes clear that for Svechin and other of his contemporaries the Mongols are not only just a historical chapter in the development of war but an important part of their future leader development.

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[28] Svechin (1927)p. 151

In addition to the Strategiya, we can group Ivanin's work underneath the same category of instructional writings. The main difference between these two is that Ivanin's work only analyzes the Mongols to arrive at conclusions that will be helpful to Russia's planned invasion of the Central Asian region. Therefore, this work guides the future commander to success within a very specific context instead of a more broader application like Svechin's.

The last type of works were those done by Eurasianist scholars which held the Mongols in the highest praise following their ideological inclinations to the rest of the Russian knowledge spectrum. In Khara-Divan's text we can observe that the Mongols are referred to as one of the greatest forces that world has ever produced. They are obviously painted as a force in history to be emulated and applied in present conflict. But Khara-Divan's work is very different from all the other ones because it shows not only appreciation out of the ordinary but also the diminishing of western standards of warfare to the detriment of the "classics" of Napoleon and others.

By combining all three types of works and how their different conclusions affect the conception of the Mongols within the Russian military psyche we can arrive at a unified conclusion of how the Russian works considered Mongol strategy within their system. Asides from Khara Divan, all of these works approach the Mongols from a European centric version of war. Even in Ivanin's work it is clear that the Mongols are being studied with the primary goal to invade the Central Asian region successfully, not transform the entirety of Russian doctrine. Therefore, the majority of the texts here include in some way or another the lessons of the Mongols for the benefit of future leaders but never to the exclusion or to the same level of consideration as their treatment of European military classics such as Clausewitz or Napoleon.

American Studies of Mongol Military Art

When retiring from his years of service General Douglas MacArthur stated in his letter that the future of the US army depended in studying the lessons of the past. He wrote:

"*Were the accounts of all battles, save only those of Genghis Khan, effaced from the pages of history, and were the facts of his campaigns preserved in descriptive detail, the soldier would still possess a mine of untold wealth from which to extract nuggets of knowledge useful in molding an army for future war. The success of that amazing leader, besides which the triumphs of most other commanders pale into insignificance, are proof sufficient of his unnering instinct for the funadamental qualifications of an army"* [29]

During the 20th and 21st centuries some of the officers within the US Army did indeed heed the call that MacArthur had issued and started embarking on highly academic and descriptive papers about the Mongol's campaigns, their leadership's structure and what could be their implementation in today's battlefields. Therefore this section of the essay shall analyze the conclusions of five of these works, all master's level theses taken from the United States Military's Colleges, published between 1983 and 2012.

The first of these was written for the US Army Command and General Staff College by Major Richard D McCreight titled "The Mongol Warrior Epic: Masters of Thirteenth Century Maneuver Warfare.".[30] As encapsulated by the abstract and introduction of this work, Major

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[29] MacArthur, D., Whan, V. E., & United States Military Academy. Department of Military Art and Engineering. (1965). A soldier speaks: Public papers and speeches of General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur. Praeger.
[30] McCreight, Richard D. (1983) The Mongol Warrior Epic: Masters of Thirteenth Century Maneuver Warfare. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.p. 1-28

McCreight sets out to disprove some of the historical myths of the Mongol "hordes" and to highlight the sophistication of their strategic, operational and tactical doctrines.

Major McCreight achieves this by doing a comprehensive two avenue study. Firstly, he focuses on the literature available to him and making an accurate portrayal of not only the Mongol warrior but also their leadership structure and their training. Here is where he sets out to disprove the narrative of the barbarian wild hordes that conquered based on their ferocity instead of their planning or sophistication. We can observe this when he starts addressing some of the quasi-mythological texts describing Mongol invasions and detailing how they obscured the military strategies in play. [31]

After having dealt with the preconceived notions of the reader, he proceeds to analyze a series of case studies. McCreight selects 5 key battles of the Mongols to analyze not only their tactics but their leadership in action. In McCreight's conclusion we can see that he notes multiple elements on why the current army must learn from the Mongols and their leaders.[32] The first of these is the ability to adapt. As noted by McCreight the Mongol army changed from a solely cavalry force to a joint artillery branch and even infantry reserves when needed. In addition, he remarks that the Mongol army had the ability to note talented leadership and to move them into the appropriate levels of command. For example Subutai, Genghis Khan's greatest general was not of royal blood or related to the Khanate's most important families in any way, he was a traditional nomad who rose to command the mightiest army on Earth at the time by sheer will, creativity and strict adherence to an excellent way of command. [33]

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[31] McCreight (1983) p.140-149
[32] McCreight (1983) p.
[33] McCreight (1983) p.16-28

In conclusion McCreight baptizes the Mongols and their leaders as one of the finest armies in the history of mankind and opens the door for others within the US Armed Forces to analyze the specifics of their lessons with more vigor. [34]

After McCreight we see that the next chronological work is that of Major William S. Taylor called "Genghis Khan: Leadership for the Airland Battle".[35] In this reading, the Mongols are being studied for a specific concept lesson within the US military already established doctrine of Airland battle. The framework of Airland Battle guided the US military's fighting doctrines during the 80's and 90's, and an application of its tenets is being suggested here by studying the Mongol lessons.

Before the comparison elements of his work he performs a brief biography of Genghis Khan. Here he notes his early life and then analyzes his qualities as a leader independently from the qualities of the army. From this we can see that Major Taylor is interested in both the command and tactical lessons that can be drawn from the Mongol military machine.

After an in-depth analysis of the Mongols and their similarities with the Airland battle system, Major Taylor proceeds to state a few lessons from the Mongol system that can be incorporated into the Airland Battle's existing framework. The first of these is that the training of units before battle and wartime is of extreme importance.[36] Here he says that commanders, even those that are not battle tested, can maintain their readiness by extreme training in conditions similar to war and experiencing near exhaustion while taking decisions. In addition, he concludes

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[34] McCreight (1983) p. 140-148

[35] Taylor, W.S. (1988) Genghis Khan: Leadership for the Airland Battle. Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

[36] Taylor (1988) . p.6-18

that by understanding how Genghis Khan anticipated enemy actions during his campaign the United States leaders can achieve better control and success in future battlefields.[37]

After McCreight's and Taylor's text the next analysis was performed in 1992 by Major Glenn Takemoto titled "Back Azimuth Check: A Look At Mongol Operational Warfare.".[38] This work takes a similar but slightly different emphasis than Taylor's work. As we see from his introduction Major Takemoto is again comparing the Mongol's art of war to the AirLand Operations concept. But it is also important to note that he places emphasis on the DTOML theoretical concept which was an abbreviation of "doctrine, training, organization, materiel, and leader development".[39] He utilizes the DTOML framework to analyze the Mongol army and then compare it to the current state of the AirLand Operations Concept.

The purpose of his thesis is to provide the Mongols' campaign as the historical example for the transformation of the Land concept within AirLand concept of the US Armed forces. For this reason, we can say that his work advances the work of Major Taylor before him. The Mongols in Major Takemoto's work are not only a model case of military knowledge instead they are being proposed as primary inspiration for a transformation within the US Army.

To argue for this transformation Major Takemoto analyzes their leader development, staff organization and tactical maneuvers under the framework of DTOML.[40] But we can clearly note that Takemoto's main concern is to study the overall composition and doctrine of the army instead of just individual battles or moments like his predecessors.

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[37] Taylor (1988) . p.20-36

[38] Takemoto, Glenn H. (1992) *Back Azimuth Check: A Look At Mongol Operational Warfare.* School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

[39] Takemoto (1992). P.1-2, 22-35

[40] Takemoto (1992). P.22-35

At the end Major Takemoto makes some definitive conclusions on the manner in which the Mongols must be viewed for their continued study within American military theory. Here we see that Major Takemoto states that the current army is moving towards the Mongol operational concept instead of away from it. He attributes this to the fact that armies have only gotten smaller and more maneuverable from WW1 to the present and therefore the concepts necessary for their success are found in the Mongol successes. He also states that the Mongol style of operations may very well be the ideological ancestor of the Airland concept that the Army has been practicing for the last decade. Here we see the first clear reading of one of the American leaders determining that the Mongols are not only learning cases but a way of war that should be emulated in its totality by American commanders.

The next study on the Mongols by a United States officer is performed by Major Dana Pittard in 1994, titled "Thirteenth century Mongol warfare: Classical Military Strategy or Operational Art?". This thesis analyzed the Mongols possible consideration as practitioners of operational art, 700 years before the supposedly invention of the operational art concept. [41]To be able to understand the conclusions of his paper we must first explore what is operational art and why its employment by the Mongols would be a point of contention enough to be the title of this essay. Operational art is the level of command between the grand national-level strategy and the miniscule unit-level tactics, and its name and definition was given to it by the Soviet Russians. Its core five precepts are:

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[41] Pittard, Dana. (1994) Thirteenth Century Mongol Warfare: Classical Military Strategy or Operational Art. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

"(1) the identification of military strategic goals, (2) establishing military conditions, (3)sequential and simultaneous operations, (4) resource allocation, and(5) commanders with broad operational vision."[42]

Even with this clear definition, its origin and those that contributed to its development is still a very highly contested issue within the realm of military history.

Within the US military academic world there are two prevailing views exist on when the origins of operational art must be attributed. The first of these is led by Dr. Robert Epstein and argues that the origin of operational art lies in the tactics of Napoleon during his wars on Europe and his invention of the corps structure.[43] The second field argues that the origin of operational art, in its modern form, lies with the tactics and technological advancements of the American Civil War. The academics in this side of the argument propose that without the necessary technology the precepts of operational art cannot be practiced.

Therefore, the purpose of Major Pittard's paper is to propose the Mongols as earlier practitioners and possibly originators of operational art. In terms of methodology, this paper is most similar to Taylor's because it is trying to match the Mongols to a clear definition of an existing military doctrine by analyzing particular campaigns.[44]. In addition, part of the paper is still dispelling the myths of the ferocious ad brutal Mongol hordes to the exclusion of their organizational brilliance like McCreight's piece.

But his conclusion is much straightforward than all the ones preceding his work. He states that the US army's School of Military Studies must either include the Mongols within its teaching

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[42] Pittard (1994) p. 5
[43] Pittard (1994) p.3-5

[44] Pittard (1994) p.7-37

corpus or call itself the School of Advanced Euro-American Military Studies.[45] This makes evident

that the previous three works have not had a strong enough impact to generate a curriculum or

thought change in the entire military.

The last of the American works was written in 2012 by Lt. Col. Darrel Benfield, titled "The

Mongols : Early Practitioners of Maneuver Warfare".[46] In this work the Lt. Colonel focuses only

on the Khawaremian campaign of the Mongols, coincidentally one of the two used by Colonel

Pittard. By studying only this campaign the monograph tries to provide justification for including

the Mongols within the corpus of battles that had maneuver warfare present. He utilizes the

description of maneuver warfare found in the MCDP-1 which is the Manual utilized by the United

States Marine Corps for determining its concepts within the context of the operational level of war

which we already discussed. [47]

He divides the analysis of the campaign into two parts, initially exploring the strategic

setting of the campaign which means the planning phase before any actual movements are

performed by the fighting force. He clearly states that the planning of the Mongols was as detailed

as that of the Europeans and should not be discounted just because the record of their battles by

their enemies only emphasized their brutality in battle. [48]

The second part of this study focuses on the campaign itself which he divides into three

steps: the topography, the opening moves, and the next steps. This is of importance to this study

because it shows a traditional structure of military analysis, usually only done with groups

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[45] Pittard (1994) p.40
[46] Benfield, D.C. (2012) The Mongols: Early Practitioners of Maneuver Warfare A Monograph. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
[47] Benfield (2012) p. 3-6
[48] Benfield (2012) p.7-20

engaging in highly complicated multi-step campaigns, being applied perfectly to the Mongols for

their study. At the same time, it opens the door for his conclusions that the Mongols should clearly

be added to the corpus, which he describes in the following quote:

"… the United States Military would be well served to expand beyond its current comfort

level of the American Civil War, World War Two, and the Napoleonic campaigns and add a study

of the 13th century Mongol warfare into the curriculum".[49]

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[49] Benfield (2012) p.38-39

Close reading conclusions of the American Corpus

Observing the five American studies, we can clearly see that there are three objectives to their theses, two of which were not achieved to their entirety. The first, as exemplified perfectly by Richard McCreight's text, is to disprove the myths around the Mongol conquest. This theme resurfaces in every subsequent work that we analyze. The idea that the Mongols conquered due to ferocity instead of planning seems to be a trope that exists within mind of the imagined audience to these texts. Therefore, if the audience has remained uninformed during the four decades in which these writings take place we must state that they have failed at their goal to persuade their audience to think differently.

The second goal which was not achieved by the American texts was the inclusion of the Mongols on the American instructional corpus on military theory, particularly within the concept of maneuver warfare and operational art. We can observe in both Benfield's and Pittard's case that they try to propose the Mongols as originators of these theories instead of just exampled for current implementation. But if we observe the book: " Historical Perspectives of Operational Art" we can conclude that their inclusion into the current corpus never occurred.[50]

The previous book is the current US military standard for the teaching of the history of operational art. We have seen an intention from the all the thesis to try to include the Mongols within the military teaching corpus from 1983 onwards. But this book, published in 2005, still doesn't include the Mongols contributions to the development of operational art. They are left yet again outside of the main doctrinal theories within the United States military.[51]

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[50] Krause, M. D., & Phillips, R. C. (2005). *Historical perspectives of the operational art*. Washington, D.C: Center of Military History.

[51] Krause, Phillips (2005). P. 257

Even though the works failed in adding their arguments to the instructional corpus, the works still accomplish serious scholarly work which considers the Mongols more than just lessons of military art. By inserting them as originators of operational art, it gives credit where credit is due and as seen by the number of works after McCreight's thesis creates the tradition for in-depth study of the impact of Mongol military thinking on future generations.

The third objective of the works was to fit the Mongols within their already established doctrine as lessons for future commanders. We can see this as the primary theme to all the other thesis particular Pittard's, Taylor's and Benfield's **,** who compare the Mongols to either the FM-100 (Operational War manual) , The AirLand Concept, or the MDCP (Marine concept for Maneuver warfare) respectively . [52] This was indeed accomplished as can be seen by the in-depth conclusions of all the officers.

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[52] U.S. Department of the Army. (1993) *Field Manual 100-5* . Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Global Close Reading Conclusions

Having analyzed all ten of these texts, we can make a series of conclusions about the effect of these studies on the image of the Mongol art of war within each of these armies. The Russian texts, particularly Ivanin's text was successful in making the Mongols an included part of the military canon as can be observed in their presence in both state-produced histories (Mikhnevich and Svechin). In addition, the Mongols became a lesson for future commanders as exemplified by their presence in the Strategiya manual by Svechin. But the Russian texts did fail in making the Mongols campaigns receive the same considerations as their European counterparts. As we could see in Ivanin's and Svechin's writing the Mongols seemed to be added on to stretch the conception of strategy beyond what was considered traditional European warfare.

Therefore, as mentioned in the analysis, the manner in which the Mongols were incorporated into Russian military doctrine was as an addendum to the existing theories, not as a transformation to its core lessons even if it did involve them in the curriculum. By treating the Mongols and warfare in the steppe as a special case it allowed them to keep most of their strategies intact.

By these same standards, the Americans achieve something very different. As can be observed by all five theses the main impact of the American theses is to consider the Mongols worthy of study by their colleagues. These authors had to provide some motivation for those atround them to consider the Mongols with more vigor. This was not necessary for the Russians due that the invasion of the Central Asian region served as a catalyst for their consideration and the Mongols are already part of their culture's history. But even though the American works achieve in generating reasons for study they fail, as far as we know, on a similar impact on the curriculum or instruction of the US military as a whole. They argued and partially succeded for

the Mongols inclusion into doctrine standards but we see no changes in incorporating them into the actual classroom instruction of future officers.

In conclusion of the close- reading section for both of these corpuses, we must state that the Russians succeed in incorporating the Mongols into their instruction practices but they aimed to incorporate the Mongols as a specialty case. In this way they avoided any real rewriting of their main conceptions of war and just moved the Mongols to "plug the gaps" within their existing theories (be that Central Asian supply management or drafting practices). On the opposite vein the Americans aimed to incorporate Mongol lessons to their core doctrines such as operational art, AirLand operations, and maneuver warfare. But they spent just as much time, if not more, in disproving the Mongol's original myths every single time because of a lack of education at the officer level in their introductory military histories. This lack of education could be because of the temporal and geographical distance of the Mongols to the American military of today.

Network of citations

The close reading section of this thesis revealed how the military thinkers of both respective times analyzed the Mongols and the conclusions they came to for the future of their armies. But this close reading and its conclusions does not reveal the whole story behind the making of these documents as they relate to the sources that went into their production.

For these reasons the second part of this thesis will investigate all the sources that composed the corpus of knowledge from which the American and Soviet military analysts drew their historiographical and military information. The purpose of this is threefold. The first goal is to identify the nationality and time period of sources that went into the making of the documents analyzed. The second reason is to note the incidence of primary sources and how did their presence affect the conclusions, if it did. For this reason we will also be exploring how we can denote the effect of a source on a text, if at all. The third reason is to identify what works provided the most information for both corpuses and interconnected them.

To perform this analysis of sources and the interconnectedness of the movements, a network analysis was made using the platform Gephi.[53] The Gephi platform was selected because it was designed as a humanities tool that was able to contain information in data tables and in a visual network. This allowed the author to record all the traditional metadata for the initial books and their sources. This data includes author, publisher, year, translator, language, original language, and place of origin and the selection of fields was done utilizing the Dublin Core

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[53] *Gephi*. (n.d.). Gephi Open Viz Platform. Retrieved February 17, 2022, from https://gephi.org/

standards.[54] The last field of Place of Origin was the only one generated by the creator of the data table. This field recorded the initial country of the author that published the original text. We will see this will become an issue of particular importance when dealing with primary historiography that was translated many times over the centuries. In the case of these specific works, the place of origin of the original work was added to the network instead of the place of origin of the translator. This begs to be noted because it changed the result of the conclusions.

The Gephi network allowed for the connection of nodes in a directed and undirected manner. The creator choose to mark the connection by having a directed edge (network term for connection between two " nodes"- in this case independent works) from the source to the work that cited it.[55] In terms of the graphs this means that the arrow in the diagram is pointing towards the work that cited the node from where it originates. The weight or the "importance" of each edge was maintained at the same weight (1.0) for all connections. In the improvements section to the network, we will revisit the concept of weights and how these could change the way the network was done.[56]

The last important element of the network were the transformations performed on the nodes. The first of these was the colors to be assigned. The color palette was assigned by Gephi utilizing the Place of Origin field in the data table. This allows the viewer to get an easy visual gauge on how much a specific works relies on works from a particular place of origin. A separate

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[54]*Dublin Core Metadata Standards*. (n.d.). Dublin Core Metadata Innovation. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from

https://www.dublincore.org/specifications/dublin-core/dcmi-terms/#section-6

[55] *Tutorial visualization*. (n.d.). Gephi Open Viz Platform. Retrieved February 19, 2022, from

https://gephi.org/users/tutorial-visualization/

[56] Tutorial Visualization (n.d.)

network was also made were the Original Language field was utilized for the coloring of the nodes. The overlap between these was almost perfect which is why only the Place of Origin network is showed in the Appendix.

In addition to the coloring, the size of the nodes was also selected but this time not by the creator but by the computer software. After having completed the network, the average path length was calculated. Then a statistical analysis was performed using the Betweenness Centrality Distribution.[57] This statistical analysis measures how often a node appears on the shortest paths between nodes on the network. Therefore the biggest nodes are the ones that connect the most nodes on the graph.

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[57] *Tutorial layouts*. (n.d.). Gephi Open Viz Platform. Retrieved February 20, 2022, from

https://gephi.org/users/tutorial-layouts/

Historiographical Network Analysis

Having discussed the digital elements and thought process that went into the elaboration of the network, I will now analyze its findings. The first section shall analyze the two corpuses (American and Russian) independently. Here we will be able to see commonalities between all the works and maybe understand where they were drawing their information at that time. The next section shall utilize the same images of the Appendix but shall study the interconnectedness between the American and Russian corpuses.

Now before delving into this analysis, we must state the purpose for integrating this digital tool to the traditional historiographical arguments that have already been presented in the first sections of the thesis. As we know the main purpose of this thesis is to show two intellectual movements that analyzed the Mongols in a military light, and to see how their conclusions were similar or different. The second purpose is to observe how the intrinsic nature of sources could influence the conclusions of each work. Now this last point deserves a more in depth description.

As we all know history itself is a subjective manner due prejudices and lived experiences of those recording it. Even the most objective of historians has an upbringing and a specific outlook on life that will impact their conclusions of the historical event they describe or retell for generations to come.[58] For this reason, the researcher believed that it was appropriate to investigate where the information is coming from to elaborate the conclusions already explored above. It is the hope of the researcher that the citation network and its conclusions may reveal some indication as to how the authors were informed and how their previous information may have influenced their conclusions.

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[58] Blake, C. (1955). Can History Be Objective? Mind, 64(253), 61–78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251044

But we must be careful when making statements that allude to a direct correlation of source and citation particularly when dealing with sources that analyze readings opposed to their intended message. This is very evident in the American selections particularly the work of Dana Pittard. In Pittard's text we see that he cites the works of Epstein who stated that operational art has its grounding in Napoleon's corps structure and doctrine, while he is arguing that it has its origin in the Mongols way of war. Therefore, the citation of Epstein is not done in favor of the argument instead it is done to be disproven by the author citing the text.

For this reason we will explore the citation network utilizing the context provided by our close readings to be able to make correct inferences as to their effect, particularly primary versus secondary sources on the conclusions of these military writers.

Network Analysis of American Corpus

As mentioned above we will analyze each of the corpuses separately and try to observe any commonalities between the texts themselves. The first element to note of the American corpus is that between all 5 texts we only find a very small number of sources that are not American and even among these almost half are British sources. Therefore, while analyzing the American sources the first thing to note is that it has a substantial bias towards English written works. This is particularly evident in the second work analyzed: "Genghis Khan and the Leadership for Airland Battle".

In this work we can clearly observe that only 7 sources were utilized out of which all but one was American, and that outlier is British.[59] It must be said that this is the least expansive out of all the works. This author just combines sources to push an argument of the transformation of American doctrine without significant attention to the historiographical underpinnings. But even though this is the goal for the other writers as well they are more careful to their historiographical elaboration. It must also be clarified that this is the only work that wasn't written under the auspices of the US training command Master's program and therefore was not written as a research investigation project.[60] Therefore it is no surprise its sources are less extensive and there is more emphasis on the application rather than the historiographical framing.

The other four works were written to be master's theses and research works at their core, therefore they have a very exhaustive list of sources: between 30-60 for all of them. But we can also notice that the majority of their citations were also from English works and even these

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[59] Appendix, Diagram 1
[60] Taylor(1988) p. i-v

secondary texts sometimes did not cite primary sources. The most prominent case of these works with no citations is that of the book Captains Unveiled by Lidell B. Hart.

The book Captains Unveiled is one of the only two books (the other one being On War by Von Clausewitz) that may be considered a military classic on its own right outside of the field of Mongol military historiography. In this book Captain Liddell B. hart, who served in Her Majesty's Armoured force, makes a historical analysis of five, of what he considers to be the world's greatest captains.[61] Among these he included Genghis Khan and his greatest general Subutai. This book has no references and was not written as a historiographical work but as a call to action to change the maneuverability of the armies of Europe of the time. The reason for this is because it was written in the InterWar period when many armies were trying to escape, doctrinally and literally, the atrocities of trench warfare. [62]

This book, Captains Unveiled, was quoted by four out of the five American works, and its influence is clearly seen in their arguments for greater maneuverability and greater division of forces which echoes the thoughts of Captain Liddell Hart and his contemporaries. Although this book is critical because of the manner in which it treats the Mongols and the suggestions it makes, it is not an academic work. Therefore, the arguments being made are made with a specific agenda in mind that is then replicated by its citers that support its theories.

The other important observation of the American corpus is that only a few of the primary source books are quoted and even those are not quoted by all five of the works. Some of the primary

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[61] Liddell Hart, B. H. (1927). *Great captains unveiled*. W. Blackwood & Sons.

[62] Lidell hart (1927) p. 1-24

sources are "The Secret History of of the Mongols", "The History of the World conqueror" by Juvaini Ala- Al Din and "The Succesors of Genghis Khan" by Rashid Al-Din. [63]

The Secret History of the Mongols is a very pivotal text in the study of the Mongol empire as a whole. In this work we find a translated history of the Mongols (because the only surviving version was written in classical Chinese) as recounted by the Mongols themselves. This book at the same time serves as a primary source for the other two books mentioned above. This work is filled with details that border on almost mythological but its first hand knowledge of events, however much exaggerated is very useful for the dedicated Mongolist.[64] It is interesting then that being the only primary source available by the Mongol themselves it is only cited by two out of the five American works.

If most of their works are trying to disprove the myth of barbarism what better way that analyzing the writing of those that did not believe themselves to be barbarians? This is clearly exemplified by Pittard and McCreight, both of which use this text, to help in their argument against the wild Mongol characterization.

The other two texts were written by Persian historians, the most important of which is the work by Rashid Al-Din. This historian and statesman had a very clear advantage to latter chroniclers because he had direct unfiltered access to the official Secret History of the Mongols before it was translated into the Chinese form.[65] In addition, Rashid Al-Din lived through the Chinggisid reign, and served under the Il-khans in Persia, having access to the inner relations of

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[63] Appendix, Diagram 1 and 2

[64] Rachewiltz, I. d. (2004). *The secret history of the Mongols: A Mongolian epic chronicle of the thirteenth century*. Brill.

[65] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2022, January 1). Rashīd al-Dīn. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rashid-al-Din

the descendants of the Great Khan. His history was commissioned by the state and was able to incorporate the accounts of family members for many of the events covered in our studies. Therefore, it is a surprise that only two of the texts cite him as a source or utilize his descriptions to formulate their arguments.

Having discussed the primary sources found within the citations of the Americans works we can now observe how they are connected from one to another. Most of the later works cite almost all the works that came before them, particularly those that were produced under the same department. For this reason, we sometimes see the work by Taylor excluded just because it was made under a different department of the military academic community. This would imply that the thesis marker was simply not aware of Taylor's contribution to the field or didn't believe the work provided any particular information to their independent analysis.

In conclusion of the American network analyses, we can come away with two particular conclusions. Firstly, the Americans tended to cite their own texts or the conclusions by the British. The reason for this may just be convenience due to language skills or not accessible translations, but we would have to further investigate the resources available to each author. But those that did include the primary sources and placed emphasis on reanalyzing the campaigns such as Pittard, McCreight and Benfield produced a better and more complete recommendation of the Mongols inclusion into American canon. This addition of better historiographical sources allowed their actual analysis to be more critical without falling into a false praise or exaggerations of the Mongol's ability.

Network analysis of Russian Corpus

Before starting on the complete analysis of the Russian citation network it must be clarified why two of the Russian works are not represented in the network. The works by Mikhnevich and Svechin's Strategiya are not in the network for two reasons. The first of these works did not have citations at all, to very much the detriment of this project. The second work did not have any citations on its section of the Mongols which is worthy of commentary because many citations could be found in the text for the contributions of Von Moltke (a foundational German commander) or Napoleon. [66] Even though these works cannot be included in the digital component of this thesis, the arguments they presented for the historiographical part of the thesis were invaluable and therefore worth their earlier discussion.

Therefore, we only find the works of Khara-Divan and Ivanin with their full array of sources. Even for Svechin's military history "Evolution of Military art " we only get one source. Int this case this connection is important because we see an interconnectedness of the Russian corpus itself. Svechin cites Ivanin's book as the main source of the Mongols for a military learning experience. [67]In this way he is not trying to cite how he gained the historiographical knowledge but in some way trying to direct the reader to further reading if they wish to engage in it from a military doctrine perspective.

If we analyze the independent sources of Khara-Divan and Ivanin, we see a very diverse group of readings but with an obvious prevalence of knowledge produced in the Russian language. This is particularly evident in Divan who cites many of his fellow academics who are also engaging in the Eurasianist movement. In both of these cases the citations are multi-lingual and include

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[66] Svechin (1992) p. 147-149
[67] Svechin (1927)p. 151

books from Germany, France, Russia and even Serbia.[68] In this manner we also a see a bias towards western historiography except for one of the cited works which came from Chinese (Pekin) sources, but this was also from European missionaries who were there and their observations, not necessarily from the common populace or academics of the region.

Therefore, we can find a distinct difference between the citations from the American works and the Russian works. Firstly, it must be noted that these works have a century between them and that the standardization of citations by professional academic journals had still not occurred when the Russian texts were written.

But even though their citations are scarce or have an amalgam of information, they still present a very compelling argument. The Russians only cited that which would augment the argument of the idea being proposed particularly in Ivanin and Svechin. If it weren't for Svechin's citation then the reader would not be able to find further study material into the actions of the Mongols outside of a purely historical context. It must also be said that the Russian scholar may be assuming a greater familiarity by the reader of the actions of the Mongols just because they were a large chapter of pre-modern Russian history. This may have also influenced Mikhnevich and Svechin to add less citations which they found redundant to a knowledge producing and thought-provoking treatise.

But the citations of Khara- Divan, Ivanin, and Svechin still reveal some critical aspects of the Russian corpus. Firstly, there was an evident bias towards Russian sources, but there was a great amount of language diversity in what was being included . This may just be reflective of the time, in which the Russian émigré community was flourishing, and the scholars who were

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[68] Appendix, Diagram 1

producing the work. The second observation is that the Russians did indeed have some of the primary sources in their analysis such as the works of Rashid Al-Din and the Secret history of the Mongols which was discussed in the previous section

Interconnected Network Analysis

Due that we have discussed both corpuses separately we can now proceed to examine what works interconnect them. Firstly, we must note that there are no direct citations from the Americans to the Russian who came before. The only possible direct avenue for transmission here comes from a work by Tukhachevsky which was cited in Benfield's work. The only reason this could be counted is because Tukhachevsky was a contemporary of Mikhnevich and would have at least known of most of the work when writing this treatise. But even if he knew it, there is no guarantee that he incorporated the Mongol lessons into his writing. This could be further verified by studying his work separately.

But the diagram does reveal one text that connects the seemingly disparate groups in a chronological fashion; the work of Chris Bellamy titled " Heirs of Genghis Khan: The influence of the Tartar-Mongols on the imperial Russian and Soviet Armies".[69] This work was made with the purpose to illustrate the Mongols' legacy of military thought into the military works of the Russian elite and mentions many of the same works explored in this thesis included Ivanin and Mikhnevich even providing quotations and arguments of their contributions to Russian military art. This work connects to the work by Takemoto which was then cited by two of his compatriots. So we know that for at least three of the five thesis performed they were aware of the presence of a study that signaled the ideas of the Mongols in Russian military art.

The other thing we can note from comparing both of the corpuses is that they only truly share two of the same sources for their elaboration which is the book "Genghis Khan: the Emperor of All Men" and "The Secret history of the Mongols". The book "Genghis Khan: the Emperor of

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[69] Bellamy(1983) p. 52-60

all Men" has long been considered a classic in western academia for any study of the Mongols as it was written by Harold Lamb, a prolific Mongolist and historian that dedicated his life to make sure the Mongols had their correct appreciation in history.[70] The citation by both corpuses of this classic is due to the early publication date (1927) of the book and the fact that the Eurasianist movement also had proponents across the English-speaking world such as Lamb so its presence on Divan's bibliography matches up with the ideological inclinations of the author and the source.

The other shared citation is the Secret History of the Mongols, which we discussed previously is the main primary source for everything related to the Mongols and their studies, therefore it is no surprise it is shared by both corpuses even when they were written centuries apart. In addition to these two works, Rashid Al -Din works are quoted by both Russians and the Americans even if they are not connected in our diagram due that they were different works. This implies that they both utilized the primary Persian sources for their historiographical selections.

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[70] Lamb, H. (1927). *Genghis Khan, the emperor of all men*. R.M. McBride.

Network Conclusions

Having discussed the observations of the network both in each corpus and as a whole, we can start to make some arguments as to what these connections may indicate and how they could relate to the conclusions presented. This section will be divided into Eurasianist, American and Russian sections. The reason for dividing the Eurasianist reading (Khara -Divan) is not only because its conclusions are so different from the other Russian texts but also because their sources reveal an additional ideological connection.

Starting with the Russian works, their citation indicates an inclination towards military theory instead of historiography. We see for Svechin that most of the works he cites are not those referring to the actual historical events but instead those that had already discussed the Mongols in a military light, such as Ivanin. Therefore we can see by the citations that his arguments are not of a historiographical nature but of a military analytical one. This very different emphasis is also evident in the close reading itself due to the applicability of his conclusions.

Ivanin's work and citations on the other hand are of a historiographical nature but this is just because it was the first of its kind within Russian military historiography. The same observation can also be made of McCreight's text within the American corpus. Both of these works have the distinction of being the first in their field and therefore must indulge in a more throughout historiographical analysis to " set the stage' for future military theorists.

Following with the Eurasianist reading we can see that Khara Divan not only cites historical sources to help him build his analysis but also cites sources that directly guide his work towards exalting the place of the Mongols in history like Lamb's work. In his writing we can see a clear example of a source not only informing but forming the thought of the author and their

opinions. This is very similar to the Russian ones but with the additional complication that the ideological train of thought starts not at the beginning of the book but its sources.

In the American's texts we find not only supporting and informing sources but also contrarian sources to the intended conclusion, particularly in the work of Dana Pittard. As we stated in the " Historiographical Network Analysis" section the citation of Epstein is not done in support of the argument like Lamb's presence in Divan's book, it is included only to be refuted by the author.

From these diagrams and observations, we can deduce a list of facts. Firstly, we can tell that there is very high correlation from the work and the citation being from the same place and language. This is evident by the color groupings that are present in the graph and the citations of the Americans and the Russians independently. This is even reinforced by the statistical analysis of the network itself. The Gephi platform ran a grouping system called "Force Atlas" which arranged the visualization. This system united the Russian works on one side of the network because they were the most similar in terms of citations and nationality.

The other conclusion from the analysis of citations is that the ideological doctrines tend to follow from one to the other unless explicitly stated by the author like in the case of Pittard with Epstein's citation. The third and last conclusion from the network is that the use of primary sources tends to indicate how much of the text is dedicated to a historiographical analysis instead of implementation concerns.

This point does deserve additional commentary because it may be the most important conclusion of the citation network. The works with an abundance of primary sources (Mongol, Chinese, Persian) spend the majority of their writing doing a very in-depth analysis of the Mongol

perception in western historiography such as McCreight and Ivanin. But in the contrary we see that those that do not have any primary sources or a small amount such as Taylor's and Svechin's works tend towards a more practical and applicable approach to Mongol strategies. The balance between the two extremes is achieved in some way in Pittard's text. He uses both types of sources to construct two separate but connected sections with a singular purpose: Implementing Mongol tactics responsibly to their originator's ideals but according to the modern age of war.

Analysis of software tool

The above explained concept of having to be careful of not using citations as definitive proof for ideological connections is why it is important for the digital humanities to not forget the traditional methods of the humanities in its analysis. This section of this paper shall critique the digital method used, what could be improved in future iterations, and it's contribution to this historiographical analysis.

As we said before this network is at its core a citation tree that just tracks eight texts and its sources, all together which totaled 183 works with 252 connections. [71]This method has been done before and there are even online tools today that produce citation trees for the interested researcher. The only difference is that most of these tools specialize in one time period, language, or area of study and therefore cannot produce a citation tree like the one used here that connects two independent movement in traditional time conceptions.

Therefore, the generated citation tree does a good job of demonstrating the origin of the sources and how they connected to each other but there are several elements that could be improved upon for future studies. The first change that could be made for a future use of this network would be to add a complete second degree of citations. This mean that for every source of the initial eight works we would add the sources of their sources.

For example if we had never added the sources of Chris Bellamy's text, even if we had everything else, we would have not noted that this British work was the key transmission between the Russian and the American corpus. Adding more of this secondary citations is bound to provide even more overlap or interesting observations.

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[71] Appendix, Table 1

The other improvement is to change the weights of the edges connecting the nodes of the network. A way to do this would be to weight the edge based on the percentages of footnotes or endnotes that mentions the particular source being cited. In this way we could see which sources are the most important for each author. This is particularly relevant for the more modern works that had more than 40 sources, many of them noted only once or twice in a fifty-page monograph. By contrast some sources were cited 20 of more times, with a high level of importance assigned to by the author critiquing them.[72]

The other correction that could be made is to make separate networks of those sources that contradict the source material (like Epstein in Pittard). These could also be noted by using a different type of edge throughout the works. This would let us know where breaks or innovations in thought are happening in a network no matter the field being explored. But this would require manhyy years of close readings and network preparation for bigger networks. A possible solution could be to integrate text analysis and network analysis into a single tool to determining contradiction of citation and work.

Now this digital method allowed us to see the connections and add additional context to the conclusions being presented by the authors. But the interpretations of this network would have been almost useless without the in-depth readings and interpretations presented in the first section of this paper. For that reason this section argues that the digital method used here cannot be used as a standalone contribution to a historiographical analysis. Instead the additional digital work provides context information and a useful visual for supporting the main arguments of the already

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[72] This can be particularly observed in the endnotes of Pittard (1994)

established historiographical analysis, which are the theoretical connection of these periods and

the possible influence of sources on the end conclusions.

Conclusions of Thesis

The analysis and conclusions proposed in the above sections can be summarized into a series of statements. The first is that both the Russians and the Americans have studied the Mongol military tactics with the purpose of integrating them into their own corpus of knowledge. The degree to which these lessons where applied and how they were used differ due to two factors. The first of these are the initial purpose and motivation of each author. The second is the quality and origin of the sources being utilized.

Uniting both the close reading and network observations we were able to ascertain the differences between the Russian and the American analysis of the Mongol way of war. As we explained the Russians succeed in incorporating the Mongols into their curriculum but maintain the transformations of doctrine at the edges of their conception of military theory. In contrast the Americans argue for Mongol influences on core tenets of the military's doctrines but their transformation does not impact the curriculum and, as far as we know, has no practical implication unlike the Central Asian campaign of the Imperial Russians.

The sources utilized by the works also impacted the direction of their argument This effect could also be attributed to a selection bias, due that most authors are prone to select that which they need and not all sources that are available to them for their citations. Therefore, our citation network indicates what each author felt was necessary for their particular argument. But at the same time, it does give some indication to their thoughts and their purpose.

For example, we saw in the "Network Conclusions" section that those work that have a a very long-winded proposal for the transformation of the current military doctrine without an in-

depth historiographical analysis such as Taylor's work and Svechin's "Strategiya" tended to have less primary sources.

In contrast those works that incorporated more primary sources, tended to have a longer analysis of the Mongol's actions while at the same time presenting more comprehensive recommendations such as those by Benfield, Pittard, and Ivanin. But there were also those like McCreight that were caught up on the historiographical elements of the analysis more than their application.

Now these observations cannot prove causation due that by scientific standards we don't have a control case to compare it too. But using the ideals of digital humanities it is worth noting these two observations as a possible pattern for the impact of primary source influence on military analytical texts.

In addition to these observations that united the theoretical and digital elements, the thesis was able to identify the sources that informed both movements, Rashid Al- Din's works and "The Secret History of the Mongols". It was also able to identify the chronological link of corpuses in the work of Chris Bellamy. Therefore, future researchers of either corpus or even just the impact of Mongol military knowledge in present day militaries would be well served to include these three in their consideration.

Finally, the network itself provided the opportunity for further exploration of what citation networks can accomplish for the humanities. It also provided the opportunity to deal with works that had discrepancies in language and format and how they could be united in a very compelling fashion.

Appendix- Diagram 1

All Diagrams can be found at the following link:

https://hernandezj1.github.io/DPwo/contact.html

The PDF of the network to the left can be found at the following link:

fullfullfinal.pdf
(hernandezj1.github.io)

Diagram 2

The PDF of the network below can be found at the following link:

https://hernandezj1.github.io/DPwo/pdf/morethan1final.pdf

Diagram3

Legend-

🟩	United States	(48.21%)
🟪	Russia	(18.45%)
🟧	United Kingdom	(14.88%)
🟦	Canada	(4.17%)
⬛	Persia	(2.38%)
🟨	France	(1.79%)
🟧	Italy	(1.79%)
🟩	Germany	(1.79%)
🟪	Netherlands	(1.19%)
🟩	Croatia	(0.6%)
🟪	Iran	(0.6%)
🟥	China	(0.6%)
🟦	Mongol Empire	(0.6%)
🟩	German	(0.6%)
🟩	Timur Empire (Central Asia)	(0.6%)
🟦	Mongolia	(0.6%)
🟥	Khiva (modern Central Asia)	(0.6%)
🟫	Serbia	(0.6%)

Table 1

Summary information of network

Category	Data
Number of nodes	183
Number of edges	252

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