

MAMLŪK STUDIES REVIEW

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Symbiotic Relations: Ulama and the Mamluk Sultans

INTRODUCTION: ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY

The ulama played a vital role in the political and social life of the Mamluk state. Ira Marvin Lapidus, for example, makes the following observation about the urban society of the Mamluk period:

In Mamlūk cities no central agency for coordination or administration of the affairs of the whole existed. There were no municipalities, nor communes, nor state bureaucracies for urban affairs. Rather the cohesion of the city depended not on any particular institutions but on patterns of social activity and organization which served to create a more broadly based community, and this community was built around the religious elites.

The “religious elites” referred to above are identified by Lapidus as ulama who, in his words, “were that part of the Muslim community learned in the literature, laws, and doctrines of Islam. They were judges, jurists, prayer-leaders, scholars, teachers, readers of Koran, reciters of traditions, Sufis, functionaries of mosques, and so on.” The whole aim of the somewhat awkward phrase “that part of the Muslim community learned in” is to avoid the term “class” when referring to the ulama. Lapidus is very explicit about his perception of the ulama: “the ‘*ulamā*’ were not a distinct class, but a category of persons overlapping other classes and social divisions, permeating the whole of society.”¹ I would argue that the ulama must be perceived as a class and not as a category. What distinguished ulama from other classes was their religious learning but, like other classes, they were divided according to wealth, status, and occupation. If we speak about merchants, administrators or the military in term of classes the same must be applied to the ulama.

Another approach has been adopted by Carl F. Petry, who perceives the social structure of Cairo, and by extension that of the Mamluk state, as based on a threefold division: the ruling military caste, “a civilian administrative elite, the majority of whom were designated ‘*ulamā*,’” and the masses. The term “civilian elite” is broader than ulama and also contains notables who were not necessarily ulama.² Petry’s administrative elite, or “le milieu des administrateurs civils,” is at

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¹ Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 107.

² Carl F. Petry, *The Civilian Elite of Cairo in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1981), 3–4.



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the heart of Bernadette Martel-Thoumian's study of the Mamluk administration of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The professional administrators as typified by the *kātib* are extensively discussed by Martel-Thoumian, who makes the following observation: "Nous avons parlé de milieu civil par opposition aux milieux militaires et religieux. Ce sont donc essentiellement les personnages ayant fait carrière dans l'administration qui sont l'objet de cette étude, même s'il est arrivé à certains d'entre eux d'exercer des fonctions classées, par les recueils de chancellerie, comme militaires ou religieuses."³ However, a neat distinction between ulama and people employed in the administration (*kuttāb*) is rather difficult to make.

With respect to the Mamluk political system, Petry poses three pertinent questions: were civilians able to exert influence on the rulers, and secondly, "did the 'ulamā' serve primarily as mediators between the Mamlūks and the general population . . . ?" Petry goes on by asking "does the concept of mediation fail to do justice to the complexities of civilian elite status during this period?"⁴ The notion that the ulama acted as mediators between the Mamluk rulers and the population has gained wide acceptance among scholars.⁵ However, in her study of Zangid-Ayyubid Syria, Daniella Talmon-Heller takes a step beyond the notion of ulama as mediators. She writes: "Rulers cooperated closely with 'ulamā', bolstering their role as guardians of the religious law, and as propagators of Islamic norms in wider social circles."⁶ I would like to go even farther by arguing that the relations between rulers and ulama were symbiotic.

ULAMA AND RULERS: A SHORT HISTORICAL SURVEY

During the two first centuries of Islam, as has been convincingly shown by Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, the tendency for religious legitimization of political power was strong and persistent, and the Umayyad and early Abbasid caliphs adopted the evocative title *khalifat Allāh* (deputy of God).⁷ The full ramifications

³ Bernadette Martel-Thoumian, *Les civils et l'administration dans l'état militaire mamlūk (IXe/XVe siècle)* (Damascus, 1992), 11–12.

⁴ Petry, *Civilian Elite*, 201.

⁵ Linda S. Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan: The Career of al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn and the Consolidation of Mamlūk Rule in Egypt and Syria (678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.)* (Stuttgart, 1998), 230; Stefan Leder, "Damaskus: Entwicklung einer islamischen Metropole (12.–14. Jh.) und ihre Grundlagen," in *Alltagsleben und materielle Kultur in der arabischen Sprache und Literatur*, ed. Thomas Bauer and others (Wiesbaden, 2005), 241 (I owe the reference to Leder's article to the kindness of Stefan Heidemann of the University of Jena).

⁶ Daniella Talmon-Heller, "Religion in the Public Sphere: Rulers, Scholars, and Commoners in Syria Under the Zangid and Ayyubid Rule (1150–1260)" in *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies*, ed. Miriam Hoexter and others (Jerusalem, 2002), 59.

⁷ Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, *God's Caliph* (Cambridge, 1986), 4, 6, 27, 80–83.



of the doctrine that the caliphs are God's deputies are discussed by Wadād al-Qāḍī.⁸ On the practical level, it endowed the caliphs with a paramount role in the religious life of the state and implied that obedience to caliphal rule is God's command. The first three centuries of Islam also saw the emergence of the so-called "Arabic sciences," including jurisprudence, and the formation of the ulama class.⁹ The jurists (*fuqahā'*) were an integral part of the ulama class, but they developed a professional distinction as experts in the intricacies of the law.¹⁰ The relations between rulers and ulama were complex, and the issue of whether the ulama divested the caliphs of religious authority and left them with only political power is beyond the scope of the present article. Lapidus, for example, has argued that since the *miḥnah* of the ninth century religious and political life in medieval Islam developed separately.¹¹ In my discussion, I follow Muhammad Qasim Zaman's view that there was no separation between politics and religion in the early Abbasid period and that: "A difference of function between the caliphs and the '*ulamā'* in and by itself does not necessarily signify a separation of state and religion." He, however, leaves open the question whether there was ever "a divorce of religion and the state."¹²

The basic meaning of the term '*ilm*' is knowledge. The ulama, therefore, were the possessors of '*ilm*'. The broad meaning of the term must not obscure the fact that when we speak about ulama of the Mamluk period we mean people versed in the Arabic religious sciences. When the political relations between the ulama and rulers are examined, not all groups of the ulama class are equally important.

⁸Wadād al-Qāḍī, "The Religious Foundation of Late Umayyad Ideology and Practice," in *Saber Religioso y Poder Político en el Islam* (Madrid, 1994), 231–73, esp. 241–56.

⁹ By "Arabic sciences" I mean Arabic language-oriented sciences such as grammar, *tafsīr*, and jurisprudence, in contrast to medicine, which is referred to as the "science of the ancients" (i.e., the Greeks) and is written in both Arabic and Persian.

¹⁰ The literature on these topics is vast, and my references go only to some of the most recent publications. Although the following references focus on *mawālī*, they also offer valuable insights into the development of the Arabic sciences. See John Nawas, "The Emergence of Fiqh as a Distinct Discipline and the Ethnic Identity of the Fuqahā' in Early and Classical Islam," in *Studies in Arabic and Islam*, ed. Stefan Leder and others (Leuven, 2002), 491–501; Monique Bernards, "The Contribution of Mawālī to the Arabic Linguistic Tradition," in *Patronate and Patronage in Early and Classical Islam*, ed. Monique Bernards and John Nawas (Leiden, 2005), 426–53; John Nawas, "A Profile of the Mawālī 'Ulamā'," in *ibid.*, 454–85.

¹¹ Ira Lapidus "The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (1975): 364, 383. For a more complex approach, see Crone and Hinds, *God's Caliph*, 97.

¹² Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "The Caliphs, the 'Ulamā', and the Law: Defining the Role and Function of the Caliph in the Early Abbasid Period," *Islamic Law and Society* 4 (1997): 36; *idem*, *Religion and Politics Under the Early Abbasids* (Leiden, 1997), 213.



Quite obviously, grammarians, for example, were a more marginal group than jurists, while qadis, in contrast to what might be called academic jurists, stood at the very focal point of these relations. The relations between qadis and rulers were unique from the beginning, due to the centrality of law in all aspects of the private and communal life of medieval Muslims. The appointment of judges preceded the development of Muslim schools of law; early qadis implemented caliphal law and relied on their own judgment (*ra'y*).¹³ From the early days of the Muslim state, it was clear that qadis were appointed, paid, and dismissed by the state. The development of Muslim sacred law (*shari'ah*) only enhanced the communal role of the qadis. Judging from the judicial history of eighth- and ninth-century Egypt, some of the qadis displayed great zeal in executing their task and greatly expanded the sphere of their responsibilities. For instance, the qadi 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Mu'āwiyah, appointed as qadi in 86/705 in Fustāt, was the first to take over the control of orphans' money. He supplanted the tribal *'arīfs* as the managers of this sort of funds. Orphans' money also attracted the attention of the authorities, and the qadi Khayr ibn Nu'aym yielded to the demand of the caliph al-Manṣūr (754–75) to transfer orphans' money to the Treasury. This intervention, however, set no precedent and failed. Qadis continue to play a key role in the management of orphans' money. In 118/736, another Egyptian qadi, Tawbah ibn Nimr, was the first to assume supervision of the revenues of pious endowments. He created a powerful and lasting precedent and, in many cases, qadis were responsible for the supervision of *waqfs*.¹⁴ The definition of the qadi's sphere of judicial and managerial responsibilities was a two-way process. It came from below as a result of actions by some assertive qadis and from above in the form of letters of appointment issued by the rulers. The most powerful precedents were created during the Fatimid period when Isma'īli qadis of the Nu'mān family received wide judicial powers combined with administrative responsibilities and supervision over religious rites. The Fatimids envisaged the qadi as an official with executive authority, and this was symbolized by the sword a qadi carried during the investiture ceremony. During the Fatimid period another precedent was also created: the melding of judicial and vizierial authority. The Fatimids also paid the ulama. In 406/1015–16, jurists, Quran reciters, muezzins, and probably others as well received a total of 71,733 dinars. The Fatimid payroll included both Cairo and Fustāt, meaning Isma'īli and Sunni ulama. The Fatimid imam al-Ḥākim abolished these payments, but his policies were idiosyncratic and it must have been only a temporary nullification.¹⁵

¹³ For *ra'y*, see Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Kindī, *The Governors and Judges of Egypt*, ed. Rhuvon Guest (Leiden, 1912), 312–13. For caliphal law, see Crone and Hinds, *God's Caliph*, 44–45.

¹⁴ Al-Kindī, *Governors and Judges*, 325, 346, 350, 383, 394–95.

¹⁵ Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz al-Ḥunafā' bi-Akḥbār al-A'imma al-Fāṭimiyīn al-Khulafā'*, ed.



The impact of the Fatimid precedents on the Zangid, Ayyubid, and Mamluk periods is visible, though in an unsystematic way. Under Nūr al-Dīn members of the Shahrūzūrī family occupied the key judicial posts in the state. Kamāl al-Dīn served as qadi of Damascus while his son served in Aleppo and other relatives served as qadis in Ḥamāh and Homs.¹⁶ In a quite similar fashion, relations of trust and cooperation evolved between Saladin and the Kurdish qadi ʿĪsā ibn Dirbās (d. 605/1209). His first appointment as qadi took place in 566/1170–71 in Egypt. After 1174, as Saladin extended his rule over Syria and beyond, he was nominated as qadi of the Syrian towns and was responsible for the management of pious endowments; he executed his responsibilities by appointing many deputies. ʿĪsā ibn Dirbās' career under al-Malik al-ʿAzīz, Saladin's son, was marked by many ups and downs. However, when appointed, he was entrusted with supervisory responsibilities over the markets and the mint, as well as preaching at the mosques.¹⁷ These appointments typified Fatimid policies. Whether all these cumulative precedents guided Baybars when he appointed Ibn Khallikān as the qadi of Syria in 659/1260–61 remains an open question. Ibn Khallikān (1211–82), the author of a famous biographical dictionary, was appointed as the qadi of Syria with responsibility stretching from the town of al-ʿArīsh in southern Palestine to Salamiyah in the north. He was authorized to nominate deputies as he pleased, and he controlled the pious endowments of many mosques, charitable institutions, and law colleges. In addition, he was charged with teaching law in seven law colleges.¹⁸ It remains unclear whether he was expected to teach in them or simply authorized to appoint teachers on his behalf. Whether guided by precedents or not, Baybars' nomination was in line with the traditional view of the qadi and his role in society. Long before the Mamluk period, the qadi came to be perceived as more than just a judge. He became responsible for the administration of various trust funds unconnected with state administration and, occasionally, was entrusted with additional supervisory powers.

Inevitably, there was also a political dimension to the relations between qadis and rulers, and critique of a regime by a qadi was taken seriously. Ibrāhīm ibn

Muḥammad Aḥmad (Cairo, 1971), 2:112; Yaacov Lev, "The Qadi and the Urban Society: The Case Study of Medieval Egypt, 9th–12th Centuries," in *Towns and Material Culture in the Medieval Middle East*, ed. Yaacov Lev (Leiden, 2002), 98–99, 100–1.

¹⁶ ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Ismāʿīl Abū Shāmah, *Kitāb al-Rawḍatayn fī Akhbār al-Dawlatayn*, ed. Ibrāhīm Zaybaq (Beirut, 1997), 2:157–58.

¹⁷ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Rafʿ al-Iṣr ʿan Quḍāt Miṣr*, ed. Ḥamid ʿAbd al-Majīd and others (Cairo, 1957–61), 2:368–70.

¹⁸ Abū Shāmah, *Tarājīm Rijāl al-Qarnayn al-Sādis wa-al-Sābiʿ* (Beirut, n.d.). He was dismissed from his post in 609/1212–13. See ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Shaddād, *Tārīkh al-Malik al-Ẓāhir*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥuṭayṭ (Beirut, 1983), 236.



Ishāq was an outspoken critic of the authorities. In 204/819, he was appointed as qadi with the responsibility for preaching by Sarī ibn al-Ḥakam, the governor of Egypt. Ibrāhīm ibn Ishāq used to reprove the authorities by saying: “You punish for illicit sex while you yourself indulge in it, you execute a thief while you yourself steal, you put (people) to death because of wine while you yourself consume it.” He was a severe judge who relinquished his post because of Sarī ibn al-Ḥakam’s attempt to influence his judicial decisions. The governor asked him to resume his duties, but he refused by saying: “no intercession (is allowed) in the judicial process.”¹⁹ Any criticism of the authorities had political implications, but that of Ibrāhīm ibn Ishāq was unfocused and couched in moral terms. The defiance of other qadis was overtly and unmistakably political. In 217/832, the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mūn came to Egypt to suppress rural rebellions and to launch an investigation into their causes. The hearings took place in Fuṣṭāṭ at the Ancient Mosque where the qadi Ḥārith ibn Miskīn referred to the two tax collectors in Egypt as oppressors, using the strong term *ẓulm*. The hearing broke into an uproar and al-Ma’mūn, who was told that the qadi enjoyed popular support and that his view reflected that of the people, invited Ḥārith ibn Miskīn to a private session. The qadi was asked whether he had been in any way wronged by these two tax collectors and he said no. Then he was asked how he could accuse them of oppression. His answer touched at the very core of the debate about legitimization of political power. Ḥārith ibn Miskīn said that he had never met al-Ma’mūn but nevertheless testifies that he is the caliph; he had not participated in his raids (meaning apparently the summer raids on Byzantium), but he bears witness that they took place. He was immediately imprisoned and later exiled to Baghdad. The case of Ḥārith ibn Miskīn implies that when a regime presents itself as legitimate and pretends to rule properly it bears the burden of evidence. Legitimacy is not accorded but won, and a regime must earn it for itself in order to be beyond reproach. Rather surprisingly, in 237/851, the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil re-appointed Ḥārith ibn Miskīn as judge in Fuṣṭāṭ. He proved to be as strict and unyielding as ever, even when the personal economic interests of the Abbasid family in Egypt were at stake. Eventually, he was dismissed for the second time.²⁰ Al-Mutawakkil’s nomination of Ḥārith ibn Miskīn reflected a permanent dilemma of rulers as to whom to appoint to judgeships. On the one hand, the regime was interested in people of integrity who would be respected both personally and as

¹⁹ Al-Kindī, *Governors and Judges*, 427; Ibn Ḥajar, *Rafʿ al-Iṣr*, 1:22.

²⁰ Ḥārith ibn Miskīn was also known for his extensive non-judicial activities. He was involved in the building of a congregational mosque, digging a water canal, and supervision of religious rites. Al-Kindī, *Governors and Judges*, 469–70, 472–73; Ibn Ḥajar, *Rafʿ al-Iṣr*, 1:168–69, 171–72. For the wider context of the ninth century rebellions and the Abbasid response, see Kosei Morimoto, *The Fiscal Administration of Egypt in the Early Islamic Period* (Kyoto, 1981), 158–63.



representatives of the regime. An honest judge meant an honest government, since such people were not easily manipulated.

Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn (868–84), the semi-independent ruler of Egypt, was faced with open defiance of his policies and political ambitions by the qadi Bakkār ibn Kutaybah. In 882, Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn suggested to the caliph al-Mu‘tamid that he relocate the caliphate to Egypt in order to be free of the tutelage of his brother al-Muwaffaq. Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn ordered that al-Muwaffaq be cursed publicly and sought the approval of the qadis of Damascus and Fustāṭ who, with the exception of Bakkār ibn Kutaybah, yielded to his demand. Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn dismissed and imprisoned Bakkār ibn Kutaybah, but the conditions of his imprisonment were rather soft. By demanding that the qadi return the salary he had been paid, Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn revealed his complete lack of understanding of the complex relations between qadis and rulers. He received back 16,000 dinars, since the qadi had not used the 1,000 dinars paid to him annually as salary.²¹ Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn should have known better. Among the ulama an ethos of independence from the corruptive powers of the government had evolved, and qadis of Ḥārith ibn Miskīn’s or Bakkār ibn Kutaybah’s stature could not be bought with money. This overview has direct relevance for the relations between the ulama and the rulers. I will argue that patterns typifying these relations had evolved long before the Mamluk period. For example, Mamluk sultans of the fourteenth century had many difficulties with the chief Shafi‘i qadi Burhān al-Dīn ibn Jamā‘ah (d. 1388) and, in 1382, Barqūq dismissed him. No one, however, attempted to buy him off.²² The evidence suggests that the Mamluk sultans had to come to terms with the ulama more than the ulama had to come to terms with the sultans.

The fusion between politics and religion brought about two parallel developments within the ulama class, one that advocated estrangement from the state and another that sought cooperation with it.²³ Although state intervention in

²¹ Al-Kindī, *Governors and Judges*, 477–78; Ibn Ḥajar, *Raf‘ al-Iṣr*, 1:151–52, 154.

²² Joseph Drory, “Jerusalemites in Egyptian Society During the Mamlūk Period,” in *Governing the Holy City*, ed. Johannes Pahlitzsch and Lorenz Korn (Wiesbaden, 2004), 110–13. For other aspects of jurists’ relations with the rulers, see B. Jokisch, “Socio-Political Factor of Qaḍā’ in Eight/Fourteenth Century Syria,” *Al-Qanṭara* 20 (1999): 503–30, esp. 512–13.

²³ The literature dealing with the *miḥnah* is extensive. Nimrud Hurvitz, for example, perceives the *miḥnah* as a culmination of the struggle between the *mutakallimūn* and *muḥaddithūn*. See his “Who is the Accused? The Interrogation of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal,” *Al-Qanṭara* 22 (2001): 359–73. For other views, see Michael Cooperson, “Two Abbasid Trials: Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Ḥunayn Ibn Ishāq,” *Al-Qanṭara* 22 (2001): 375–93; Tayeb el-Hibri, “The Image of the Caliph al-Wāthiq: A Riddle of Religious and Historical Significance,” *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* 19 (2001): 41–60; John N. Nawas, “The Moral Imperative in Contemporary Islamic Movements: An Early Expression in the Structure of al-Ma‘mūn’s Inquisition (Miḥna), 833 C.E.,” in *Strategies of Medieval Communal Identity: Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, ed. Wout J. van Bekkum and Paul M. Cobb (Leuven,



doctrinal disputes as it took place during the *miḥnah* was rare,²⁴ various Sunni and Shi'i regimes declared certain doctrines as official creeds and conferred patronage on a chosen school of law. Furthermore, the ulama involved the state in their doctrinal disputes and expected the rulers to take firm action against those whom they labeled as deviating from orthodoxy or as heretics. People considered to be heretics were executed, but rulers, at the behest of the ulama, also intervened in disputes concerning religious rites and practices.

The emergence of the law college (madrasah) as a major educational institution also played a role in the creation of close relations between the state and the ulama. The role of the Seljuk vizier Nizām al-Mulk (1040–92) in the spread of the madrasah as the educational institution that enjoyed the highest patronage was crucial and manifold. Nizām al-Mulk established the Nizāmiyah network of endowed law colleges, which were dedicated to the teaching of the Shafi'i school of law. Nizām al-Mulk's deeds were emulated by Nūr al-Dīn, who established many law colleges (if not an actual network thereof) in the Syrian towns under his rule.²⁵

The spread of the madrasah in the Muslim Middle East from the eleventh century onwards was phenomenal. It opened many employment opportunities, especially for the jurists and transmitters of Prophetic traditions. Law colleges also offered teaching positions in the field of Arabic language, as well as other posts for religious functionaries such as prayer leaders, preachers, and Quran reciters. Students received stipends and food rations, and some law colleges became large institutions with hundreds of affiliated people, including manual workers, administrative staff, religious functionaries, teachers, and students. Joan E. Gilbert, who has studied medieval Damascus, points out that 121 religious-educational institutions, offering 400 positions, were set up in the town between 1076 and 1260. She perceives the years of Zangid-Ayyubid rule as the period when the integration of the ulama into the fabric of the state took place.²⁶ Michael

2004), 75–87. For the persecution of heretics in the Abbasid period, see Zaman, *Religion and Politics*, 63–69. For the involvement of the Zangid and Ayyubid rulers in religious disputes, see Talmon-Heller, "Religion in the Public Sphere," 49–63; Roxanne D. Marcotte, "Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl, the Martyr of Aleppo," *Al-Qanṭara* 22 (2001): 395–419. For the persecution of heretics in the Mamluk period, see Yossef Rapoport, "Legal Diversity in the Age of Taqlid: The Four Chief Qadis Under the Mamlūks," *Islamic Law and Society* 10 (2003): 223–26.

²⁴ Christopher Melchert, for example, has pointed out that most of the ninth-century Abbasid caliphs "... were content to follow religious trends, not to set them." See his "Religious Policies of the Caliphs from al-Mutawakkil to al-Muqtadir (A.H. 232–295/A.D. 847–908)," *Islamic Law and Society* 3 (1996): 342.

²⁵ Yaacov Lev, "Politics, Education, and Medicine in Eleventh Century Samarkand: A Waqf Study," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 93 (2003): 130–34.

²⁶ See Joan E. Gilbert, "Institutionalization of Muslim Scholarship and Professionalization of the



Chamberlain makes the following observation: “By founding *madrasas*, powerful households could insert themselves into the cultural, political, and social life of the city and turn existing practices and relationships to their own benefit. This was how charitable foundations became instruments of politics.”²⁷

Early madrasahs were built for one particular *madhhab*, but later on, madrasahs were built for two and eventually all four Sunni schools of law. The spread of the madrasah did not undermine the fact that the medieval Muslim world of learning, in and outside the madrasah system, was independent both in terms of its subject matter and in the fact that the ulama acted as a self-governing body. The topics that were at the heart of Muslim learning, such as the Quran and its exegeses, the transmission of Prophetic traditions, law, and Arabic language and poetry, embodied the development of a culture that was shared by the ulama and the rulers who acted as their patrons and of the literati. Even non-Arab rulers such as Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin adapted themselves to the culture of the ulama.²⁸

Recently, Devin Stewart, elaborating upon earlier works by George Makdisi, has shown that the ulama of the Mamluk period regulated their academic affairs entirely independently of the regime. Academic certificates issued by them, especially the *ijāzat al-futyā wa-al-tadrīs* served “as a credential that established qualification for employment in judicial and teaching posts.”²⁹ Stewart’s findings tally with those of Leonor Fernandes and must be seen in the wider context of the ulama as a body that regulated its own affairs.³⁰ This phenomenon has a long history in medieval Islam. The debate about the qualifications of the mufti and who can serve as a mufti, for instance, began prior to the Mamluks and continued into the Mamluk period. To take another example, jurists of the Mamluk period discussed and defined their internal hierarchy, which was based on the scope

‘Ulamā’ in Medieval Damascus,” *Studia Islamica* 52 (1980): 118, 127.

²⁷ See Michael Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350* (Cambridge, 1994), 52.

²⁸ For the ‘*ālim*’-like image of some of the Abbasid caliphs, see Zaman, *Religion and Politics*, 120–21, 123, 128–30, 135–36. For Nūr al-Dīn’s titles referring to ‘*ilm*’, see Nikita Elisséeff, “La titulature de Nūr al-Dīn d’après ses inscriptions,” *Bulletin des Études Orientales* 14 (1952–54): 157–58. For Saladin’s participation in hadith sessions, see Yaacov Lev, *Saladin in Egypt* (Leiden, 1999), 36. The evidence for the participation of mamluks in the world of learning is more complex. See Jonathan Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo* (Princeton, 1992), 146–60; idem, “Silver Threads Among the Coal’: A Well Educated Mamlūk of the Ninth/Fifteenth Century,” *Studia Islamica* 73 (1991): 109–35.

²⁹ See Devin Stewart, “The Doctorate of Islamic Law in Mamlūk Egypt and Syria,” in *Law and Education in Medieval Islam: Studies in Memory of Professor George Makdisi*, ed. Joseph E. Lowry and others (London, 2004), 63.

³⁰ Leonor Fernandes, “Between Qadis and Muftis: To Whom Does the Mamluk Sultan Listen?” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 6 (2002): 96–99.



of the jurist's legal education.³¹ Furthermore, in some cases during the Mamluk period, the ulama were those who defined the parameters of orthodoxy. Quite independently of the regime, they initiated hearings against heretics and sentenced them to death.³²

The issue of whether madrasahs served as the institution for training administrative staff or, rather, madrasah graduates sought employment in state administration, is much debated. Although during the Zangid-Ayyubid period the career patterns of the ulama and bureaucrats remained largely separate, both classes, as has been pointed out by R. Stephen Humphreys, shared a common set of values.³³ The readiness of the ulama of the Zangid-Ayyubid period to unhesitatingly serve sultans such as Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin was a result of the convergence of attitudes between rulers and ulama. Both sultans are depicted as the embodiment of the Sunni orthodoxy of the age and defenders of Islam against external enemies and, therefore, rulers whom one could serve without demur. The realities of the Zangid-Ayyubid period have a direct relevance for our discussion, since they set the parameters of the relations between the ulama and rulers during the Mamluk period. Twelfth- and thirteenth-century ulama expected the rulers to defend Islam as a territorial and political entity (*dār al-Islām*) and as a social organism (*ummah*) and to adhere to the principles of Sunni Islam.

SULTAN BAYBARS AND THE ULAMA

THE ULAMA AND THE ISLAMIC CONTENT OF THE MAMLUK STATE

The relations between the ulama and the early Mamluk sultans evolved in a period dominated by the Mamluk-Mongol war, when a vigorous defense of Islam was much needed. Following the Mamluk victory at the Battle of 'Ayn Jālūt, the ulama, typified by the qadis and chief qadi, played a crucial role in both providing legitimacy for Baybars' rule and shaping the Islamic identity of the Mamluk regime. Ibn Wāṣil (1208–98) was at that time on a diplomatic mission to Sicily, and his account is of limited value. More important is Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir (1223–92) who, from 1259, served in the chancery and gained the confidence of Baybars. During 1263–64, he wrote several official letters on behalf of Baybars, and his history of Baybars' reign is considered to be an official biography. Some

³¹ For the issue of mufti, see Wael B. Hallaq, "Iftā' and Ijtihād in Sunnī Legal Theory: A Developmental Account," in *Islamic Legal Interpretation*, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud and others (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 33–45; Norman Calder, "Al-Nawawī's Typology of Muftis and its Significance for a General Theory of Islamic Law," *Islamic Law and Society* 3 (1996): 137–64.

³² For a notable case, see Stefan S. Winter, "Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Makkī 'al-Shahīd al-Awwal' (d. 1384) and the Shi'ah of Syria," *MSR* 3 (1999): 149–83.

³³ See R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols* (Albany, 1977), 377–81.



of the documents quoted by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir are also reproduced by Baybars al-Manṣūrī (1247–1325).

The first report to be discussed deals with the arrival of Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad, the future caliph al-Mustanṣir billāh, on 9 Rajab 659/8 June 1261, from Iraq to Cairo. The reasons behind Sultan Baybars’ re-establishment of the Abbasid caliphate in Cairo are well known and need no elaboration. I would like to focus on the caliph’s investiture ceremony and its meanings. After the arrival of Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad in Cairo, the leading military commanders, the vizier, the chief qadi and other judges, the jurists and ulama, the righteous, the leading mystics, the merchants, and civilians (*al-nās*) were assembled at the citadel for the verification of Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad’s pedigree. This verification was necessary, as Baybars was eager to re-establish the caliphate, believing that prophetic qualities were perpetually passed on among the Abbasid offspring. Baybars’ beliefs tallied well with the popular esteem for the caliphate. The question of whether Baybars was driven only by political considerations or whether his attitude reflected the mood of his time or was even directly inspired by it, remains unsolvable.³⁴

The investiture ceremony took place after the identity of Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad was satisfactorily established and approved by the chief qadi. He was invested as caliph and designated Imām Aḥmad al-Mustanṣir billāh, and Baybars pledged his allegiance to him, stating his commitment to the Quran, the Prophetic tradition (*sunnah*), *al-amr bi-al-ma’rūf*, holy war, and the lawful collection of God’s money and its expenditure among those entitled to it. Following Baybars’ pledge of allegiance to the caliph, the latter appointed Baybars to rule the Muslim lands held by him and those he would conquer in the future from the unbelievers, with God’s help. The ceremony was concluded with the people swearing allegiance to the caliph.³⁵

The accounts dealing with Baybars’ oath to the caliph reveal the Islamic content of the regime established by him. Although these accounts deal with the declarative level only, the oath was entirely in line with the political norms and ethical values of the Middle Eastern Muslim world of the high Middle Ages. The

³⁴ The popular admiration for the caliphate is epitomized by the account of Abū Shāmah (1203–68). Abū Shāmah lived in Damascus when the news about the re-establishment of the caliphate by Baybars was proclaimed in the city. He writes that the people rejoiced, and thank God for that (*Tarājim*, 213–14). There are a number of studies dealing with the establishment of the Abbasid caliphate in Mamluk Egypt. See, for example, Stefan Heidemann, *Das Aleppiner Kalifat (A.D. 1261)* (Leiden, 1994), esp. 91–104.

³⁵ Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-Fikrah fi Tārīkh al-Hijrah*, ed. Donald S. Richard (Beirut, 1998), 60–61; Ibn Muḥyi al-Dīn Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, *Sirat al-Malik al-Zāhir*, ed. and translated into English by Fatima Sadeque, *Baybars I of Egypt* (Dacca, 1956), 35–36; Muḥammad ibn Sālim Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-Kurūb fi Akhbār Bani Ayyūb*, vol. 6, ed. ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Salām al-Tadmūrī (Beirut, 2004), 312–13.



references to the Quran and *sunnah* are self-explanatory and have a long tradition as political slogans in medieval Islam. Equally obvious is the reference to holy war, which must be seen against a twofold background. During the twelfth century the issue of holy war against the Franks came to dominate the political life of the Zangid and Ayyubid states, and the destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols added a new dimension to it. Baybars' achievements in fighting the Mongols were well known, and all were aware that the ceremony at the citadel was possible only thanks to the victory at 'Ayn Jālūt.

As the work of Michael Cook has shown, the maxim *al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf wa-al-nahy 'an al-munkar*, commanding right and forbidding wrong, evolved into a doctrine that became deeply ingrained into Islamic thought and ethics. It was the great sage al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) who equated the doctrine of *al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf* and its implementation with the institution of *ḥisbah*. Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130), the founder of the Almohad state, personally practiced *al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf*, and it became part of the ideological make-up of the state.³⁶ In the words of Mercedes García-Arenal, the adoption of the doctrine by the state meant that "the precept is no longer the engine of social reform, but acts as a mere reminder of prohibitions on wine, gambling, or musical instruments, suggesting that the *ḥisba* loses its radical character when it is exercised, or rather appropriated by the powerful. . . ." ³⁷ The same can be argued for the Mamluk state and its adoption of *al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf* as a political manifesto.

The somewhat awkward phrase: "The lawful collection of God's money and its expenditure among those entitled to it" must be understood as referring to the issue of legal taxation. Abbasid caliphs and Zangid and Ayyubid sultans frequently abolished illegal taxes, and Baybars, so it seems, committed himself to the collection solely of taxes allowed by the law. The reference to the expenditure of the money "among those entitled to it" remains enigmatic. This aspect of the financial policy of medieval Muslim states was never fully clarified.

Whatever the Islamic education acquired by the young Mamluk cadets during their military training was, the shaping of their Muslim identity took place later in their lives when they lived within Muslim society and were exposed to its values and ethos.³⁸ Baybars' career before becoming a sultan was in the service of the Ayyubid rulers of Syria, where the notion of caliphal suzerainty was at the center of the political system. Ayyubid sultans, like their Zangid predecessors,

³⁶ Michael Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge, 2000), 427–50, esp. 447–50.

³⁷ Mercedes García-Arenal, *Messianism and Puritanical Reform*, translated into English by Martin Beagles (Leiden, 2006), 176.

³⁸ For a different view, see Donald P. Little, "Religion Under the Mamlūks," *The Muslim World* 73 (1983): 168, 174.



acknowledged Abbasid caliphs as their overall lords and sought letters of appointment from them. These letters were an essential element in a broader system of political legitimization that the Zangid and Ayyubid sultans created for themselves. Baybars' allegiance to the caliph is well attested by his title and the epigraphic evidence studied by Reuven Amitai.³⁹

The events that followed the ceremony at the citadel were a conscious attempt to re-enact the Zangid-Ayyubid system of political legitimization. The name of the caliph was publicly proclaimed and inscribed on coins. On Friday 17 Rajab 659/16 June 1261, the caliph delivered a sermon at the congregational mosque in the citadel and, on 24 Shaʿbān/23 July, another ceremony took place at the Bustān al-Kabīr outside the citadel. Baybars, clad in the black Abbasid insignia, held a public audience and bestowed robes of honor on the amirs, the vizier, the chief qadi, and the chief of the chancery, and the caliphal letter of appointment (*taqlīd*) was publicly read. The ceremony at the Bustān al-Kabīr was concluded by a procession through the town with the *taqlīd* being publicly displayed. The *taqlīd* is a fascinating document but outside the scope of this article. It adds two significant points to Baybars' public pledge of allegiance to the caliph. The document states Baybars' commitment to *ʿadl*, justice, and *iḥsān*, good moral deeds or, in the narrower sense, charity. The *taqlīd* was written by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Tāhir, a professional *kātib* entitled as *rāʾis* and the author of a number of official letters. He was not an *ʿālim* in the strict sense of the term, and his religious education is dismissed in a disparaging remark about his insufficient study of Prophetic tradition. Although he exemplifies the administrators studied by Martel-Thoumian, he also epitomizes Humphreys' observation that administrators and ulama shared a common set of values.⁴⁰ The significance of *ʿadl* and *iḥsān* as components of what constitutes good government was as clear to him as to any other *ʿālim*.⁴¹

On 2 Muḥarram 661/16 November 1262, following the killing of the caliph al-Mustanṣir during an expedition to Iraq, a new caliph, al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh, was installed. In this case, Ibn Wāṣil's account of these events proves to be detailed and valuable. Baybars swore to the caliph, expressing his commitment to the Quran, the *sunnah*, *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf*, holy war, the lawful collection of God's money and its expenditure among those entitled to it, the execution of the penalties laid

³⁹ See Reuven Amitai, "Some Remarks on the Inscription of Baybars at Maqām Nabi Musa," in *Mamlūks and Ottomans: Studies in Honour of Michael Winter*, ed. David J. Wasserstein and Ami Ayalon (London, 2006), 47–48, 50–51.

⁴⁰ See nn. 3 and 31 for these references.

⁴¹ Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-Fikrah*, 61–63; Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, *Sīrat al-Malik al-Zāhir*, 36–41, esp. 38; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah fī Aʿyān al-Mīṭah al-Thāminah*, ed. ʿAbd al-Wārith ʿAlī (Beirut, 1997), 3:64–65.



down by God (*ḥudūd*), the implementation of religious policy to which the imam is obliged, and the protection of Muslims.⁴² This document shows a conscious evolution in defining the Islamic content of Baybars' state. 'Alā' al-Dīn inserted the commitment to 'adl and *iḥsān* into the *taqlīd* document of 659/1261, while somebody else added the commitment to the holy law (shari'ah), meaning the implementation of the *ḥudūd*, and the protection of Muslims to Baybars' oath of allegiance to the caliph al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh. The accounts dealing with the investiture of the caliphs al-Mustanṣir and al-Ḥākim are invaluable for the topic under discussion, as they show that ulama were integrated into the fabric of the state and endowed it with its Islamic content, and having done so, they could serve the state without hesitation.

THE REFORM OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

In 663/1264–65, Baybars introduced a major change in the administration of justice by appointing four chief qadis. This change is extensively discussed by both medieval chroniclers and modern scholars. Joseph H. Escovitz, for example, perceives Baybars' deed as the culmination of a process of change toward the recognition of the four Sunni schools of law as equal.⁴³ In Jorgen S. Nielsen's view, Baybars' action aimed at creating a better balance in the way the different legal schools were represented in the judicial system.⁴⁴ Sherman A. Jackson explains Baybars' deed as a response "to the exclusivist policies (i.e. Shāfi'ī preferences) of chief justice Ibn Bint al-A'azz." He also points out that Baybars secured the support of jurists of the other legal schools and that his policy tallied with their interests. Baybars, in his words, "showed himself to be the consummate Mamlūk politician."⁴⁵ Recently a significant contribution to the ongoing discussion of Baybars' judicial reforms has been made by Yossef Rapoport. He points out that, beginning with the twelfth century, the doctrine of *taqlīd* insisted that qadis belonging to a certain *madhhab* should adhere to the precedents of their school rather than exercise their own independent judgment (*ijtihād*). Therefore, from the point of view of the public, the appointment of four chief qadis added flexibility to the judicial system and was welcomed by both the jurists and the people. Rapoport's conclusion is

⁴² Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-Kurūb*, ed. Tadmuri, 350–51; Baybars al-Manṣūri, *Zubdat al-Fikrah*, 78–79.

⁴³ Joseph H. Escovitz, "The Establishment of the Four Chief Judgeships in the Mamlūke Empire," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 102 (1982): 53.

⁴⁴ Jorgen S. Nielsen, "Sultan Baybars and the Appointment of the Four Chief Qadis," *Studia Islamica* 60 (1984): 167–76.

⁴⁵ Sherman A. Jackson, "The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Ibn Bint al-A'azz and the Establishment of the Four Chief Judgeships in Mamlūk Egypt," *JAOS* 115 (1995): 57, 65.



powerfully stated: “The state and its jurists shared a common vision of the social good.”⁴⁶

One can agree with Jackson that the confrontation between Baybars and Ibn Bint al-A‘azz was also a clash of personalities between a powerful sultan who was no stranger to violence and a stern self-made jurist. Ibn Bint al-A‘azz came from a highly respected provincial ulama family. He lost his father at a young age and devoted his boyhood to study. Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī (1372–1449) characterizes him as a loner who had missed his childhood. He studied with the luminaries of his age and was certified to teach law and to issue legal opinions. Rather surprisingly for a scholar trained in the traditional sciences, Ibn Bint al-A‘azz also studied the art of administrative writing (*kitābah*) and accounting (*ḥisāb*). Ibn Bint al-A‘azz was very much the product of the Ayyubid age and the cooperation between the ulama and the rulers. He owed his first appointment as a witness in the Treasury to his reputation as a person of integrity and, probably, to his study of accounting. Ibn Ḥajar claims that he tried to avoid this appointment, but this sounds like an unconvincing cliché. The sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb (1240–49) appointed him supervisor (*nāẓir*) of governmental offices (*dawāwīn*) and, in 654/1256, during the sultanate of Aybak, he received his first nomination as qadi. A year later, he was appointed vizier while the former vizier took over his judicial position. In 657/1259, Sultan Qutūz dismissed him from his post, but Baybars re-appointed him (659/1261).

There was nothing exceptional in Ibn Bint al-A‘azz’s career. He was a local man who earned a name for himself and moved between judicial and administrative appointments, epitomizing the interdependence between the ulama and rulers. Ibn Bint al-A‘azz is described as a just qadi who extended the authority of the shari‘ah, firmly controlled the court witnesses, and successfully managed the pious endowments under his authority. A just and efficient qadi was an asset for the ruler who appointed him. As the glory of the qadi was projected onto the ruler, Baybars might have been very satisfied with the way Ibn Bint al-A‘azz executed his office. However, the latter was an unyielding person who adhered strictly to the letter of the law and refused to give preferential treatment to either local notables (*akābir*) or Mamluk amirs. He also appeared to be a kind of protector of the local population against financial extortion by the rulers. As vizier he abolished the practice of taking the revenues of two months from property owners, which was done under the pretext that this money was needed to face the Mongol menace. But, from the point of view of the sultan, perhaps the greatest trouble with Ibn Bint al-A‘azz was that he was a Shafi‘i zealot. Although the terms *muta‘aṣṣib* (bigot) and *ta‘aṣṣub* (fanatical adherence to one’s legal school) are not mentioned

⁴⁶ Yossef Rapoport, “Legal Diversity in the Age of Taqlid: The Four Chief Qadis Under the Mamlūks,” *Islamic Law and Society* 10 (2003): 210–28, esp. 227.



when referring to Ibn Bint al-Aʿazz, he was in fact a Shafiʿi zealot who displayed disregard for other legal schools. *Taʿaṣṣub* and adherence to *taqlīd* of one's legal school were different manifestations of the same phenomenon which had a long history.⁴⁷

In the Iranian world and the Middle East of the high and late Middle Ages, regimes favored the legal school of their choice. The Ghaznavids, for example, preferred the Shafiʿi school, while the Seljuk rulers adhered to the Hanafi *madhhab* and Ashʿari theology. In line with Seljuk policies, the Hanafis enjoyed preponderance under Nūr al-Dīn. This policy was reversed by Saladin, who backed the Shafiʿi school but continued to adhere to the Ashʿari doctrine. Saladin's policies, however, were far more balanced than those of the Seljuk rulers, including Nūr al-Dīn. Some Hanafi scholars maintained their positions, and Saladin also established law colleges for the Malikis and Hanafis. The Ayyubid rulers, with the exception of al-Malik al-Muʿaẓẓam (1218–27), adhered to the Shafiʿi legal school. Al-Malik al-Muʿaẓẓam was a Hanafi zealot who systematically favored the Hanafis. However, as the only Hanafi of the Ayyubid ruling family, he had to compromise to some extent. In Damascus he built two law colleges: one for the Hanafi *madhhab*, which also served as his family burial shrine, and one for the Shafiʿis, where his paternal grandmother was buried.⁴⁸

In Egypt, al-Šāliḥ Ayyūb adopted a different approach: the law college he established in 641/1243–44 in Cairo was dedicated to the teaching of the four Sunni schools of law. To what extent he was influenced by the establishment of al-Mustanṣiriyyah law college in 1233 in Baghdad remains unknown—in al-Mustanṣiriyyah all four schools of law were taught. On the other hand, one can regard al-Šāliḥ Ayyūb's act as a culmination of a local tradition that began with Saladin, who built law colleges not only for the Shafiʿis but also for the Hanafis and Malikis, and continued with al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, who built a law college for both the Shafiʿis and Malikis in 580/1184–85. Al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, a former Fatimid administrator and a member of Saladin's inner circle, was an Egyptian in the full sense of the term who acknowledged the Maliki presence in Egypt and their role in the religious life of the country. During Ayyub's reign, al-Šāliḥ Ayyūb's law college served as the seat for the court of complaints (*al-nāẓir fī maẓālim*). More significantly, in 677/1278–79, during his short reign (1277–79), Baybars' son Berke Khān provided the madrasah with a rich endowment that supported

⁴⁷ Al-Subkī writing about the muftis is critical of both *taʿaṣṣub* and lack of commitment to any legal school. See Daniella Talmon-Heller, "Fidelity, Cohesion, and Conformity Within Madhhabs in Zangid and Ayyubid Syria," in *The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress*, ed. Peri Bearman and others (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 107.

⁴⁸ Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-Kurūb fī Akhbār Banī Ayyūb*, vol. 5, ed. Ḥasanayn Muḥammad Rabīʿ (Cairo, 1977), 211–12, 219–20; Lev, *Saladin*, 4, 131–32.



the four teachers of law and their assistants and students. Other beneficiaries of the endowment were the muezzins and imams of the law college. The overall supervision over Berke Khān's *waqf* was entrusted to the Shafi'i chief qadi, but he appointed the Maliki chief qadi to be the actual manager of the endowment.⁴⁹ On the symbolic level, Berke Khān's deed meant to convey his commitment to continuing his father's ecumenical policies which, in the world of learning, had Ayyubid precedents.

Ibn Ḥajar writes that it was Baybars' prerogative to appoint a Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali qadi to serve as Ibn Bint al-A'azz's deputies. Eventually, Baybars nominated four chief qadis but maintained the privileged position of the Shafi'i chief qadi, who supervised pious endowments and various funds and ratified legacies and pious endowment deeds. Ibn Ḥajar's remark highlights a completely different context against which Baybars' policy must be examined. Jonathan P. Berkey has dealt extensively with the question of the Muslim identity of the Mamluks and made the following observation: "There was nothing to prevent the Mamlūks, as well as any other social group, from participating in the dynamic process of constructing and reconstructing Islam."⁵⁰ When one argues that the ulama endowed Baybars' regime with Islamic content, one must not forget the power of the sultan—a foreign military slave—to define Islam and the way it was practiced. The appointment of four chief qadis was more than just a procedural innovation. It shaped intra-*fuqahā'* relations and the relations of the jurists and ulama with the state. In conclusion, Rapoport's statement that "the state and its jurists shared a common vision of the social good" reflects the fact that, as much as the ulama shaped the Islamic identity of the Mamluk state, it was also shaped by the deeds of the rulers.

ULAMA AS SPIRITUAL GUIDES

IN THE SHADOW OF THE PLAGUE

The outbreak of the plague cast its grim shadow over the people's lives in the year 833/1429–30. On 4 Jumādā I/28 January 1430, the daily death toll in Cairo was as high as 1,200 people. In the second half of Jumādā II/March, as the plague intensified, Barsbāy convened a meeting with the ulama and asked for their opinions on how to ward off the plague. Earlier attempts had failed. These had

⁴⁹ Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Mawā'iz wa-al-I'tibār fī Dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa-al-Āthār*, ed. Ayman Fu'ād Sayyid (London, 2003), 4:2:490. For law colleges in Ayyubid Egypt, see Gary La Viere Leiser, "The Restoration of Sunnism in Egypt: Madrasas and Mudarrisūn 495–647/1101–1249 (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1976), 187–405, esp. 334–61.

⁵⁰ See "The Mamlūks as Muslims: The Military Elite and the Construction of Islam in Medieval Egypt," in *The Mamlūks in Egyptian Politics and Society*, ed. Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann (Cambridge, 1998), 173.



involved a three-day fast followed by public prayers in the desert on the fourth day. At the meeting, the sultan asked what kind of supplication prayers, *qunūt* or *du‘ā*, should be performed to end the plague, and what had been prescribed by the ulama of the earlier generations. They all agreed that *du‘ā* prayers, imploring of God, and repentance are legally suitable means for putting an end to the plague. However, repentance, the cessation of oppression (*mazālim*), and the implementation of the dictum *al-amr bi-al-ma‘rūf* take precedence over supplication prayers. They were divided, according to *madhhab* lines, about the *qunūt* prayers. The sultan, to whom the fatwa issued by the ulama was read, inquired about the reference to *mazālim* and its meaning. Several grievances against government policy were mentioned, and the sultan declared that he would abolish innovations introduced after Barqūq’s reign. At this point the meeting took an unexpected turn when the chief Shafi‘i qadi specifically referred to policies introduced by Barsbāy in 833/1429–30. He mentioned the compulsion of the Kārimī merchants to sell spices only to the sultan, the forced purchase (*ṭarḥ*) of natron, and the edict permitting the growing of sugar cane only on the lands of the sultan. Barsbāy, who was notorious for his monopolies, chose to ignore this remark but instructed the qadis and amirs to command people to repent and refrain from sinning. The meeting ended with one practical decision: to forbid women from appearing on the streets, on pain of death.

In 841/1437, a new outbreak of the plague took place, and Barsbāy again consulted the ulama, some of whom suggested that it was due to the spread of *zinā’*. Usually, the term refers to illicit sex, but in this context, it means the presence of women in the public space. The ulama explained that women adorn themselves and frequent the streets and markets day and night. In the ensuing discussion, it was hotly debated whether all women should be banned or just those who offend public morals by adorning themselves, and the sultan became obsessed with the idea that a total ban should be issued. Some exceptions were allowed: elderly women and maids and slave girls on urgent errands were allowed to use the streets. Ibn Shāhīn (1440–1514) writes that the ban was taken seriously by the women and obeyed.⁵¹

There is no church structure in Islam, and the ulama were not clergy able to grant absolution to sinners, but clearly their advice was sought on religious matters. In the cases discussed above, the ulama appear as interpreters of the spiritual dimension behind a cataclysm that had befallen humanity. In contrast to this approach stands Barsbāy’s spurning of their advice concerning *mazālim*. The evidence is too flimsy to discuss Barsbāy’s inner religious world, but he was not irreligious. Quite the contrary, his religiosity reflected the mood of the time.

⁵¹ See Abd al-Bāsiṭ ibn Khalil Ibn Shāhīn, *Nayl al-Amal fi Dhayl al-Duwal*, ed. ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Salām Tadmūrī (Beirut, 2002), 5:28.



In 833/1429–30, prior to his meeting with the ulama, Barsbāy distributed pure silver coins as charity for the recovery of his son. The notion that charity delivers one from death was deeply embedded in the minds of medieval people, and distribution of charity during sickness was widely practiced. In 841/1437–38, the sultan himself was sick (he suffered from colic), and he tried to cure himself by distributing charity and visiting holy sites in the Qarāfah cemetery. The sultan's sickness coincided with the outbreak of the plague, and it is possible that in his perception, the public calamity merged with his personal affliction. Probably his obsession with the need to ban women from the streets reflected his understanding that a moral reorientation was required both for his personal salvation and the well-being of the public. Barsbāy's conduct was not irreligious but pietistic. He, in contrast to the ulama, perceived no link between his economic policies and the plague. His world view differed only in details from that of the ulama. His thinking was dominated by the need to restore public morals and pietism or, to put it differently, by *al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf*. This was the proper response to afflictions at both the communal and personal level.⁵²

HARMONIZING THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL PRACTICE

When faced with calamities, rulers and ulama acted in unison. In 822/1419, two events took place: a solar eclipse and an outbreak of the plague. The solar eclipse occurred on 29 Šafar/27 March, and special prayers for its termination were performed at Azhar. The ulama knew exactly what should be done, and the prayers were conducted by the mosque's preacher, who admonished the people and mentioned the name of God. The *muḥtasib* (market supervisor, a post held in the Mamluk period by jurists) was responsible for bringing the people to the mosque to attend prayers. Al-Maqrizī (1364–1442), who narrates these events, is quick to offer his own observation, commenting that when people came to the mosque in a state of humility and implored God for forgiveness, their prayers were answered. This was an affair handled solely by the ulama, though; in the fight against the plague, the involvement of the regime was necessary.

The efforts to stave off the plague took the form of a great public spectacle in which the *muḥtasib* was most instrumental. He proclaimed that the people should fast for three days and go with the sultan to perform supplication prayers in the desert on the fourth day. The call was obeyed, and on the fourth day a great crowd, led by the ulama, the jurists, the heads of the Sufi *khānqāhs*, and mystics, went to the mausoleum of Barqūq. The vizier and the *ustādār* made the preparations for the arrival of the sultan, who came dressed in woolen garments riding a horse with simple riding gear with no gold or silk adornments. The sultan

⁵² Ibid., 5:19–20, 24–25.



was accompanied by the chief qadi, notables, ulama, and the caliph. He performed the supplication prayers and implored God for forgiveness. The high point of the event was the offering of sacrifices to God by the sultan, who slaughtered the animals himself. The sacrificial meat and bread were divided among mosques, Sufi *khānqāhs*, mausoleums, and the poor. Supplication prayers led by leading ulama were also performed in these places.

The three-day fast and the offering of sacrifices were preceded by the attempts of the *muḥtasib* to impose moral behavior in Cairo. Although al-Maqrīzī makes no connection between these two events, his account is highly suggestive. The *muḥtasib* was personally engaged in these actions: he destroyed jars of wine and forbade women to weep over the dead. Public consumption of hashish was prohibited, and prostitutes were banned from soliciting customers in the markets. Other steps were taken against non-Muslims, who were obliged to wear distinctive signs as prescribed by law. One cannot escape the impression that these deeds aimed at bringing society in line with a moralistic outlook of how society should conduct itself. Moral reorientation was a prerequisite for meaningful repentance and solicitation of God for the termination of the plague. Since the Mamluk state officially adopted the doctrine of *al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf*, the responsibility for imposing morals in the public domain fell on the regime. The sources are always evasive about the motives behind the attempts to impose morals in the public domain. In 664/1265–66, Baybars ordered a ban on alcohol and prostitution, but whether it was somehow related to his campaign against the Franks in Syria and Palestine remains unknown.⁵³

Al-Maqrīzī refers to the supplication prayers and the sacrifices performed by the sultan as a memorable event, but he adds that it was in contrast to the conduct of the righteous ancestors. They perceived the plague as mercy from God and those who died in it as martyrs. Al-Maqrīzī refers to the famous tradition about the 'Amawās plague which asserts that the plague was God's mercy, and he ends his account with a mild criticism of his contemporaries whose conduct was unlike that of the ancestors. Although he refrains from describing the events that took place as a *bid'ah*, a reprehensible innovation, his allusion to what appears to be a dissonance between theology and social practice is fascinating.⁵⁴

⁵³ Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-Fikrah*, 102; Li Guo, "Paradise Lost: Ibn Dāniyāl's Response to Baybars' Campaign Against Vice in Cairo," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 121 (2001): 219–36, esp. 225. For Ibn Dāniyāl's influence on how these events were depicted by fifteenth-century Mamluk historiography, see Amila Buturović, "'Truly, This Land is Triumphant and its Accomplishment Evident!' Baybars's Cairo in Ibn Dāniyāl's Shadow Play," in *Writers and Rulers*, ed. Beatrice Gruendler and Louise Marlow (Wiesbaden, 2004), 149–69, esp. 157.

⁵⁴ For the tradition concerning the 'Amawās plague, see Josef van Ess, "Text and Contexts: Heroes of the Plague," in *Text and Context in Islamic Societies*, ed. Irene A. Bierman (Reading, 2004),



The gap between theology and social practice was bridged by the ulama. As has been pointed out by Michael W. Dols, the notion that plague is a punishment from God was prevalent in Muslim thinking, but the social response at the personal and communal level was channeled toward pietistic behavior. The ulama shaped social conduct and co-opted the rulers to fall in with their vision of what should be done under such circumstances. The cooperation between the ulama and the rulers turned into a truly symbiotic relationship in which the ulama served as guides to both the rulers and people by interpreting the meaning of events and guiding the social response.⁵⁵

CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN SULTANS AND ULAMA

IN THE FACE OF THE MONGOL MENACE

Although relations between the ulama and the state were symbiotic, friction did occur, and such incidents are reported by the sources, especially in the context of consultations between the sultans and ulama. The first recorded consultation between a sultan and the ulama took place early in the history of the Mamluk state. In 657/1259, an emissary of the Ayyubid sultan of Damascus, al-Malik al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, arrived in Cairo, asking for help against the Mongols. Quṭuz consulted the jurists, qadis, and *a'yān* (civilian notables) about the Mongol menace and the permissibility of taking money from the population for the “holy war against God’s enemies.” The two leading ulama present at the consultation were ‘Izz al-Dīn ibn ‘Abd al-Salām and the chief qadi of Egypt, Badr al-Dīn Yūsuf. ‘Izz al-Dīn presented a legal opinion that was supported by the ulama which permitted the taking of people’s money, provided that the Treasury was exhausted and the rulers had sold their gold and luxury items. The same was demanded of the troops; they needed to sell their luxury items and to keep only their gear and arms. The troops and people had to share the financial burden of the holy war equally, and only then was the taking of people’s money allowed.

‘Izz al-Dīn’s legal opinion is what one might have expected: cooperation with the regime in the face of grave external danger. What is more surprising is that it was a conditional cooperation. The language of the legal opinion holds the key to understanding the approach of the ulama. The text begins by saying: “When the enemy attacks Muslim territory, then it is the duty of every *‘ālim* to fight the enemy, and you are allowed to take the money of the people for your holy war. . . .”⁵⁶ ‘Izz al-Dīn’s departure point is the legal injunction that when Muslim

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⁵⁵ Michael W. Dols, “The Comparative Communal Response to the Black Death in Muslim and Christian Societies,” *Viator* 5 (1974): 275, 277, 279; idem, *The Black Death in the Middle East* (Princeton, 1977), 244–54.

⁵⁶ Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-Kurūb*, ed. Tadmurī, 262.



territory is attacked, the participation in the holy war becomes a personal duty and the ulama are not exempt. The most striking aspect of the text is, however, the dichotomy between “you,” meaning “you the rulers,” and the “people” (referred to in the text as *al-‘āmmah* and *al-ra‘īyah*), meaning “we the subjects.” The ulama were part of “we the subjects,” and their conditional cooperation was an outcome of their self-image as to which segment of society they belonged. Even if one might argue that the text is not a direct quotation but a paraphrase, it eloquently captures the deeply rooted distinction between rulers and subjects. Although this distinction evolved prior to the Mamluk period, it remained relevant and powerful throughout the whole span of the late Middle Ages. The division between rulers and subjects, and the ulama’s perception of themselves as belonging to the subjects, did not preclude symbiotic relations between ulama and rulers, but it put much strain on them.⁵⁷

THE STRUGGLE OVER PIOUS ENDOWMENTS

In 780/1379, the amir Barqūq, before becoming sultan, convened a meeting attended by qadis, ulama, and civilian notables and asked them about the possibility of nullifying the pious endowments of mosques, law colleges, and Sufi institutions and those dedicated to the sons of sultans and amirs. He also mentioned *al-rīzaq al-aḥbāsīyah* and asked why it was legal to buy the tax-yielding agricultural lands of Egypt and Syria from the Treasury. In the course of the meeting, the deeds of *waqf*-supported institutions in Egypt and Syria were presented, and it became clear that vast revenues were tied up in these foundations. According to Ibn Ḥajar, Barqūq said: “The weakness of the Muslim army is only because of these pious endowments, and it is right to reclaim them.” Akmal al-Dīn spoke with Barqūq and the amir Barakah in Turkish, and they got angry with him; Sirāj al-Dīn was asked for his opinion. His view was uncompromising: under no circumstances could the pious endowments for mosques, law colleges, and the Sufi institutions that benefit the ulama, the jurists, the muezzins, and the leaders of prayer be dissolved. Furthermore he claimed that: “If the rights (*ḥaqq*, meaning financial rights) of Muslims are not paid them, you should establish an office that will pay our rights until it will become clear to you that what we deserve exceeds what is endowed for us.” Concerning the pious endowments of Fāṭimah and ‘Ā’ishah, Sirāj al-Dīn claimed that it must be established whether the endowed properties were bought legally from the Treasury and that nullification would be permitted only in case of illegal acquisition of properties from the Treasury.

Three sayings are attributed to the chief qadi Badr al-Dīn al-Biqā‘ī, and they

⁵⁷ For another perception of the relations between the ulama and rulers, based on a different type of sources, see Louis Marlow, “Kings, Prophets and the ‘Ulamā’ in the Mediaeval Islamic Advice Literature,” *Studia Islamica* 81 (1995): 101–21.



reflect a completely different mood. He is quoted as saying: “O amirs, you have the power and authority,” and: “The land belongs to the sultan and he can do with it whatever he wishes.” Although he was sharply rebuked by Sirāj al-Dīn, he had his reasons and drew from experience to make the following observation: “O amirs, you appoint the qadis, and if they do not do what you instruct them, you dismiss them. So it was with Sharf al-Dīn ibn Maṣṣūr and al-Malik al-Ashraf (1363–77), who removed him when he did not do what he wanted.” The meeting ended with no dramatic results, and only a few pious endowments were dissolved and the vacant land distributed as *iqṭāʿ* among the soldiers.⁵⁸

IN THE FACE OF THE OTTOMAN MENACE

Following a humiliating defeat of the Mamluk army in 872/1468 by Shāh Suwār, the sultan convened an assembly that was attended by the caliph, the four chief qadis, Shaykh al-Islām Amīn al-Dīn al-Afṣārī, leading ulama, and the amirs. The sultan was represented by his *kātib al-sirr* (confidential secretary), who explained at length that the Treasury was empty. He referred to Shāh Suwār as an oppressor who conquered lands and killed the worshippers, emphasizing that an army must be sent to protect “the lands of the sultan,” and that money was needed for this purpose. He pointed out that many people (*al-nās*) had surplus incomes and that pious endowments for mosques had multiplied. The *kātib al-sirr* said that the sultan was determined to leave enough funds for the proper running of the mosques but to transfer any surplus income to the Treasury. The qadis and the caliph, who earlier had been divested of some of his *iqṭāʿ* lands by the sultan, were inclined to approve this proposal, but Amīn al-Dīn strongly objected. He said that the sultan was allowed to take money from the people (*al-nās*) only by legal means and, in a case like this, money should be collected from the amirs, the troops, and women, who should give their jewelry (he meant apparently women of the Mamluk class i.e., daughters and wives of the Mamluks). Only if this collection were insufficient would the people (*al-muslimūn*) be assessed according to what the law allowed. Amīn al-Dīn went on by saying that this was God’s religion (*dīn Allāh*) and, if the sultan obeyed, he would be rewarded by God. If not, the sultan could do whatever pleased him. In a somewhat defensive tone, Amīn al-Dīn declared that he was afraid of God asking him on the Day of Judgment why he neither forbade this nor explained to the sultan what was right. This semi-apologetic utterance was followed by the much more assertive question of why the sultan bothered

⁵⁸ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Anbāʾ al-ʿUmr*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥabashī (Cairo, 1969), 1:178–79; al-Maqrizī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿAshūr (Cairo, n.d.) 3:1:345–46. For other attempts to seize pious endowments, see Kosei Morimoto, “What Ibn Khaldūn Saw: The Judiciary of Mamluk Egypt,” *MSR* 6 (2002): 114–19; Joseph H. Escovitz, *The Office of Qāḍī al-Quḍāt in Cairo Under the Bahri Mamlūks* (Berlin, 1984), 149–53.



to assemble them at all if he intended to act against the law. Amīn al-Dīn went on by declaring that God would protect them from this calamity through the supplication prayers of a humble, righteous man (Amīn al-Dīn was apparently referring to himself). The assembly dispersed, accomplishing nothing, but the people, including the amirs, were very grateful to Amīn al-Dīn.

In a meeting between the sultan and the qadis that took place in 873/1468, Qāyṭbāy informed them about his intention to stop paying salaries to old soldiers and women. The sultan complained sorely about the lack of funds, the destruction of the provinces, and his personal distress because of the situation. The possible causes for the deteriorating situation were discussed at length, but no practical conclusions were reached. In any case, the sultan carried out his intentions and arbitrarily stopped paying salaries to old soldiers, orphans, and women. It is quite clear that the sultan aimed his policy at the weaker segments of the Mamluk military society and, therefore, met no opposition from the qadis. They, it appears, regarded themselves as the protectors of the indigenous Muslim population and, of course, their own class interests.⁵⁹

In a meeting that took place in 896/1491 between Qāyṭbāy and the qadis, he bitterly complained about hostile Ottoman intentions, the destruction of the Aleppo region, merchants abstaining from trading with Egypt, and the need to pay the *julbān* to avoid their violence in the capital. He emphasized that the army, which was to be dispatched to Aleppo, needed to be paid while the Treasury stood empty. Qāyṭbāy declared that he would take the yearly income generated by pious endowments and the income from properties such as bathhouses and mills, including ships in the capital. Following a discussion with the qadis, it was decided that income of only five months would be collected, since two months' income had already been taken by the state. In any case, during 896/1491, pious endowments and property owners lost seven months' income.⁶⁰

CONCLUSIONS

The description of the ulama as mediators between the Mamluk regime and the local population is too narrow and diminishes their role. The relations between the state and the ulama were symbiotic. This symbiosis enabled the Mamluks to rule and endowed their regime with its Islamic content. To put it differently, the Mamluk rulers acculturated themselves to the religious-cultural world of the ulama, and having done so, they won the acceptance and cooperation of the ulama. The gains of the ulama were enormous. They preserved their position as the class that embodied Islam and defined and protected its values. The qadis

⁵⁹ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr fī Waqāʾiʿ al-Duhūr*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā (Cairo, 1960–75), 3:12–14, 24.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 3:278–79.



applied Islamic law and maintained their position as judges and administrators of funds and pious endowments. The narrow class gains of the ulama preserved and perpetuated the Islamic identity of the society. On the other hand, the ulama were those who empowered the Mamluks to rule, and the ulama-Mamluk symbiosis made Mamluk rule religiously and culturally meaningful to the subjects.

The ulama-Mamluk symbiosis did not mean the obliteration of the separate identity of the ulama or of the frictions between ulama and rulers. These frictions concerned economic issues: taxation and control of pious endowments. The events of 657/1259 and 872/1468 indicate that, in issues pertaining to taxation, the ulama played the role of advocates/protectors of the subjects. The cases discussed in this article are too few to allow any sweeping conclusions as to what extent the ulama were successful in their endeavors. This issue needs further study, but it is clear that the ulama were unable to influence broad economic policies of the Mamluk rulers such as the monopoly system.

The issue of pious endowments was quite different. Here the narrow class interests of the ulama were involved, and their professional integrity was at stake too. Due to the phenomenal spread and success of the pious endowment system, many ulama and many religious and charitable institutions came to be dependent on the system. The Mamluk ruling establishment, sultans and amirs, created *waqfs* on a massive scale and, in order to procure land for new endowments, old *waqfs* had to be nullified. To do so, the laws of the *waqf* were bent, and the qadis and jurists found themselves in an impossible situation. Many qadis and jurists, but by no means all of them, cooperated with the rulers in the nullification and expropriation of old pious endowments and the creation of new ones. Undoubtedly, the jurists who cooperated were somehow rewarded for their efforts. These were simple cases in which the self-interests of both the Mamluk ruling establishment and the jurists tallied, and what was demanded from the jurists was some legal flexibility.

Far more serious were the cases when the jurists were asked to nullify pious endowments for the distribution of these lands as *iqṭāʿ* among the troops. Here state interests, and not just the narrow interests of the ruling establishment, were at stake. Ostensibly, the jurists had every reason to be sympathetic to these requests, since state interests tallied with those of society as a whole. However, matters were never that simple. The jurists had every reason to be suspicious of the rulers and their motives. Furthermore, the political interests of the Mamluk rulers did not always correspond to those of the subject population. I doubt if we can speak about a typical ulama response in such cases. It seems that it was a matter of circumstances and, to some extent at least, the personalities of the people involved.

The qadis, because of the social network within which they operated, were



able, if they so chose, to resist the rulers. The dismissal of a qadi did not mean the end of his career. Qadis also occupied other posts, and cases of reappointment of qadis took place frequently. Within the overall symbiotic scheme, the balance of power between Mamluks and ulama heavily tilted in favor of the rulers, but the ulama were not entirely powerless.



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The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāyrbāy

The expansion of the Ottoman Empire from the middle of the ninth/fifteenth century redrew the power map in northern Syria and eastern Anatolia, threatening the hegemony of the Mamluk sultanate over the region. It also threatened the security of the sultanate, which had traditionally employed a defensive strategy of subordinating local rulers under its authority to protect its border areas. Because of frequent military conflicts with the Dulkadir (Dhū al-Qādir), Aqqyunlu, and the Ottomans which arose after 870/1455–56, the Mamluk sultanate suffered from a massive manpower and fiscal burden. Accordingly, combined with the dysfunction of the superannuated governmental machinery, the Mamluk sultanate entered a period of profound crisis wherein constant structural, political, and economic instability ensued for half a century until the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 922/1517.¹

Under these circumstances, al-Ashraf Qāyrbāy (r. 872–901/1468–96) and al-Ashraf Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r. 906–22/1501–16), two prominent sultans in the late Mamluk era, made persistent efforts to bolster the regime throughout their long reigns. They took two courses of action—reconstruction of the existing state machinery and adoption of new military and financial measures to overcome the crisis. Carl F. Petry's works have revealed the military innovation of introducing firearms and establishing *waqfs* (religious endowments) as financial resources sustaining the policy.² Miura Toru, who has studied Damascus in this period, suggests that the adoption of a new financial policy imposing taxes on private

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¹On the external affairs of the Mamluk sultanate at that time, see: Shai Har-El, *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War 1485–1491* (Leiden/New York/Cologne, 1995); Aḥmad Fu'ād Mutawallī, *Al-Faṭḥ al-ʿUthmānī lil-Shām wa-Miṣr wa-Muqaddimātuḥu min Wāqīʿ al-Wathāʾiq wa-al-Maṣādir al-Turkiyah wa-al-ʿArabiyyah al-Muʿāṣirah Lahu* (Cairo, 1995); Ghaythāʾ Aḥmad Nāfiʿ, *Al-ʿAlāqāt al-ʿUthmāniyyah–al-Mamlūkiyyah 868–923/1464–1517* (Sidon and Beirut, 2005); Carl F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?: The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power* (Albany, 1994), Chap. 3; Muḥammad Aḥmad Dahmān, *Al-ʿIrāk bayna al-Mamālik wa-al-ʿUthmāniyyin al-Atrāk maʿa Riḥlat al-Amīr Yashbak min Mahdī al-Dawādār* (Damascus, 1986); ʿAbd al-Rāziq al-Ṭanṭāwī al-Qarmūṭ, *Al-ʿAlāqāt al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿUthmāniyyah* (Cairo, 1995).

²Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?*, Chap. 7; idem, “Fractionalized Estates in a Centralized Regime: The Holdings of al-Ashraf Qāyrbāy and Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī According to Their Waqf Deeds,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (JESHO)* 41, no. 1 (1998); idem, “The Military Institution and Innovation in the Late Mamluk Period,” in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. 1, *Islamic Egypt, 640–1517*, ed. Carl F. Petry (Cambridge, 1998).



and *waqf* properties in urban areas and the formation of a new army comprising non-Mamluk infantry equipped with firearms were characteristic features of the late Mamluks.³

Incidentally, as I have made clear in my previous articles, the financial history of the Circassian Mamluks before the enthronement of Qāyṭbāy can best be understood from the perspective of the constant financial difficulties caused mainly by the alienation of state lands (*amlāk bayt al-māl*) and the sultans' responses to this problem, which showed two major trends. The first resulted from the reorganization of government finances which followed upon the establishment of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad (the independent bureau) by al-Zāhir Barqūq, the first sultan of the Circassian Mamluks (r. 784–91, 792–801/1382–89, 1390–99), and the second resulted from the development of the sultanic fisc following Barqūq's establishment of the Dīwān al-Amlāk (the bureau of the sultan's private real estate).⁴ I believe that the financial history of the late Mamluk era after Qāyṭbāy's enthronement should be reconsidered from the perspective of these two trends affecting the financial structure of the sultanate.

From this perspective, I approach the financial policies of Qāyṭbāy from two angles: first, the reconstruction of the state's finances initiated just after his enthronement in 872/1468; and second, his efforts, especially from around 880/1475, to accumulate money and property under his control, and the consequent expansion of the role of the sultanic fisc in the sphere of administration. Through this analysis, I will show that the financial system of the period followed the two aforementioned trends throughout the Circassian Mamluk period, and that the regime of the Mamluk sultanate itself was maintained based on the sultanic fisc, the relative importance of which was increasing in the period under consideration. I believe that this investigation can provide a new perspective on the overall picture of "decline" in this period, as well as illuminate the process by which the Mamluk regime was brought to an end.

THE FINANCIAL SITUATION AT THE TIME OF QĀYTBĀY'S ENTHRONEMENT

In 788/1386, Sultan Barqūq established al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, a special bureau responsible for providing monthly wages (*jāmakīyah*), fodder (*ʿalīq*), clothing allowances (*kiswah*), and other essentials to the Royal Mamluks (*al-mamālik al-sultānīyah*) from income derived from the *iqṭāʿ* land he had gained as an amir.

³Miura Toru, "Urban Society in Damascus as the Mamluk Era was Ending," *Mamlūk Studies Review* (MSR) 10, no. 1 (2006): 158–59.

⁴Igarashi Daisuke, "The Establishment and Development of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad: Its Background and Implications," MSR 10, no. 1 (2006); idem, "The Private Property and *Awqāf* of the Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barqūq" [in Japanese], *Oriente* (Bulletin of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan) 47, no. 2 (2004); [in English], *Orient* 43 (2008).



Because of the increased importance of the Royal Mamluks, the payment of their stipends had been one of the most important ways for the rulers to maintain their regimes since the late Bahri Mamluk period (648–784/1250–1382). At the same time, the traditional state machinery based on state landholdings and the *iqṭāʿ* system was becoming dysfunctional because of the alienation of state lands through their sale as *milk* (private property) and the conversion of these lands into *waqfs*. Under such circumstances—giving priority to providing stipends to the Royal Mamluks—al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, a special bureau with an income separate from the state treasury, was established. Later, this *dīwān* grew in importance following the acquisition of large agricultural lands which provided its revenue. The state structure as a whole was reorganized around the newly established *dīwān*. Consequently, the financial affairs of the state that had hitherto been under the control of the vizier were divided among three independent *dīwāns*—Dīwān al-Wizārah (headed by the vizier), Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ (headed by the *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ*), and al-Dīwān al-Mufrad (headed by the *ustādār al-sultān*/*ʿāliyah*). Each of them performed their functions with their own source of revenue, and al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, which became the most important financial bureau among them, acquired the greater portion of Egyptian *khāṣṣ* land (land in the government’s domain) as its revenue source.⁵

On the one hand, a reorganization of the state’s financial machinery was progressing in this way; on the other hand, the scale of financial resources put under the direct control of the sultan—independent of the state treasury—was gradually growing. In order to accumulate funds for a large purchase of slaves to replenish the sultan’s power base and for rewards or gifts for acquiring and securing his political supporters, Barqūq made efforts to acquire private property and accumulated a huge amount of real estate as *milk* and *waqf* properties. Further, through the establishment of the Dīwān al-Amlāk in 797/1395 and its subsequent transformation into the Dīwān al-Amlāk wa-al-Awqāf wa-al-Dhakhīrah (the bureau of the sultan’s *milk* and *waqf* properties and treasures), the sultan’s private and *waqf* properties were managed more systematically as his personal revenue source. To secure resources and increase money entering directly into their own hands, the sultans after Barqūq also strove to accumulate agricultural lands in such forms as *milk*, *waqf*, and leased property (*mustaʿjarāt*). Further, they applied more energy to the intervention and direct participation in the spice trade and other commercial activities in order to raise even more money.⁶

Incidentally, after the death of Sultan al-Zāhir Jaqmaq in 857/1453, the financial situation took a sharp turn for the worse. The financial bureaus were

⁵Igarashi, “Al-Dīwān al-Mufrad,” 118–30.

⁶Igarashi, “Private Property and *Awqāf*.”



confronted with enormous difficulties, and the delay of *jāmakīyah* payments and daily meat supplies caused frequent riots among the Royal Mamluks demanding them. The political instability of the times also accelerated this financial crisis. Especially following the death of Sultan al-Ẓāhir Khushqadam in 872/1467, three sultans (al-Ẓāhir Yalbāy, al-Ẓāhir Timurbughā, Qāytbāy) came and went in rapid succession in one year. Without sufficient countermeasures, the financial situation was deteriorating significantly.

Let us now look closely at the causes of the financial difficulties at the time of Qāytbāy's accession to the sultanate. The first factor was the abnormal increase of regular and informal recipients of *jāmakīyah* and other remuneration distributed from al-Dīwān al-Mufrad and of meat distributed from Dīwān al-Wizārah beyond the *dīwāns*' capacity. Because the continuous process of the alienation, privatization, and "waqfization" of state lands reduced the amount of land that could be assigned as *iqṭāʿ*s, the *ḥalqah* troopers, especially the *awlād al-nās* (the sons of mamluks) who were affected most directly by the problem, came to be allotted *jāmakīyahs* instead of *iqṭāʿ*s. In addition, the number of mamluks who received *jāmakīyahs* instead of *iqṭāʿ*s was steadily increasing. Moreover, various groups became recipients of funds from the *dīwāns* because powerful amirs added their mamluks and other well-connected individuals to the *dīwān* register. In addition, the purchase and sale of status became widespread.⁷

The second problem was in the sphere of revenue. Various problems had arisen in rural areas, the main source of revenue for the state. The alienation of state lands, which decreased the government's taxable lands as well as the number of *iqṭāʿ*s, caused chronic financial difficulty for the government. Therefore, the *ustādār* (the chief of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad) who also held the viceroyalties of Lower and Upper Egypt and was invested with the authority to appoint and dismiss local governors (*wālī*, *kāshif*), started demanding large amounts of money from newly appointed local governors to cover the loss of income. Further, he obliged them to pay monthly tributes to the *dīwān*. These policies forced local governors to impose heavy taxes in their jurisdictions and thus impoverished the villages. As a result, Bedouin tribes hostile to the government grew in power in these areas, weakening the local administration represented by local governors and amirs of the Arabs (*amīr al-ʿarab*).⁸ Especially in 872/1467–68, along with the political instability

⁷Igarashi, "Al-Dīwān al-Mufrad," 132–37. On the alienation of state lands, see: ʿImād Badr al-Dīn Abū Ghāzī, *Ṭaṭawwur al-Ḥiyāzah al-Zirāʿīyah Zaman al-Mamālīk al-Jarākisah: Dirāsah fī Bayʿ Amlāk Bayt al-Māl* (Cairo, 2000). Cf. Adam Sabra, "The Rise of a New Class? Land Tenure in Fifteenth-Century Egypt: A Review Essay," *MSR* 8, no. 2 (2004).

⁸Ibn Taghribirdī, *Ḥawādith al-Duhūr fī Madā al-Ayyām wa-al-Shuhūr*, ed. William Popper (Berkeley, 1930–42), 691–92 (hereafter cited as *Ḥawādith*). On the *ustādār*'s holding of the viceroyalties of Upper and Lower Egypt, see: Igarashi, "Al-Dīwān al-Mufrad," 128–29.



of the central government, disorder in rural areas grew more serious, caused by successive rebellions by Bedouin tribes and a subsequent decline in agricultural production and tax revenues.⁹ In Dhū al-Qa‘dah 872/May–June 1468, all Bedouin shaykhs in the province of Buḥayrah in Lower Egypt rebelled against Mamluk rule. In an effort to suppress these rebellions, seven amirs of one hundred (*amīr mi‘ah muqaddam alf*) were dispatched to these regions.¹⁰

The issue directly relating to such an unstable situation in rural areas was that of *ḥimāyah* (private protection). To resist the oppression of local governors and disorder in local areas, *muqta‘*s (*iqṭā‘* holders) and peasants demanded protection from representatives of the central government in return for their payment of tribute. The expansion of *ḥimāyah* over rural areas further weakened the local administration and prevented tax collection from these areas.¹¹ These problems in the two spheres of income and expenditure contributed to the failure of the state’s financial system. Consequently, after around 860/1442–43, the financial *dīwāns* of the state could not function properly without financial support from the sultanic resources (*dhakhīrah*: this is a question to be considered later).¹²

In addition to these domestic problems, a very tense international situation confronted Qāytbāy. In 870/1465, Shāh Budāgh, a monarch of Dulkadir whose enthronement was supported by the Mamluk government, was deposed by his brother Shāh Suwār with the help of the Ottomans. The new monarch extended his power over northern Syria, threatening the hegemony of the Mamluk sultanate in the area. At that time, a military conflict between Dulkadir and the Mamluk sultanate was unavoidable. However, because the dispatch of Egyptian troops was postponed due to the deteriorating health of the reigning sultan Khushqadam, in Rabī‘ I 872/October 1467, the Mamluk army, comprising the armies of the Syrian provinces and led by the viceroys of these provinces, was shamefully defeated by Dulkadir. Therefore, Qāytbāy began preparations for war as soon as he acceded to the sultanate in Rajab 872/February 1468. The next month, Sha‘bān/March, he dispatched the first expeditionary force against Dulkadir under the command of the *atābak al-‘asākīr* (commander-in-chief) Jānībak Qulqsiz.¹³ However, in Dhū

⁹*Hawādith*, 651–56.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 631–32; ‘Abd al-Bāsiṭ al-Ḥanafī, “Al-Rawḍ al-Bāsim fi Ḥawādith al-‘Umr wa-al-Tarājim,” Vaticano Arabo MS 729, fol. 181v (hereafter cited as *Rawḍ*); idem, *Nayl al-Amal fi Dhayl al-Duwal* (Sidon and Beirut, 2002), 6:326–27 (hereafter cited as *Nayl*).

¹¹On the *ḥimāyah*, see: al-Asadī, *Al-Taysīr wa-al-‘Itibār wa-al-Taḥrīr wa-al-Ikhtibār fīmā Yajib min Ḥusn al-Tadbīr wa-al-Taṣarruf wa-al-Ikhtiyār* (Cairo, 1968), 95–96, 135–36 (hereafter cited as *Taysīr*); John L. Meloy, “The Privatization of Protection: Extortion and the State in the Circassian Mamluk Period,” *JESHO* 47, no. 2 (2004).

¹²Cf. Igarashi, “Al-Dīwān al-Mufrad,” 137.

¹³This expeditionary force was composed of four amirs of one hundred, one amir of forty (*amīr*



al-Qa‘dah/June, the army was crushed in battle near Aintab. Many amirs and soldiers were killed, and the commander Jānībak Qulqsīz was taken prisoner.¹⁴ This military defeat shook the Mamluk government severely. To recover its hegemony over the border area, the reconstruction of the army and raising of funds for expeditions became a matter of the greatest urgency.

Incidentally, a military expedition at that time was more costly than it had been previously because, in addition to bonuses (*nafaqah*) for going on expeditions, regular stipends such as *jāmakīyah*, *kiswah*, and ‘*aliq* were to be paid in advance to the mamluks joining the expedition.¹⁵ The first prepayment of these regular stipends, to my knowledge, was made during the preparation of Qāytbāy’s first expedition;¹⁶ thereafter the prepayment of four-month *jāmakīyah* and ‘*aliq* and one-year *kiswah* was followed as a matter of regular practice for military expeditions. The establishment of the practice of prepayment shows that the soldiers’ dependence on the stipends was growing. As a rule, although *nafaqahs* were distributed when a military expedition was undertaken, the soldiers were required to pay their own expenses with income from their *iqṭā‘*s because military service (*khidmah*) was the primary duty of military men and the *iqṭā‘*s were given as compensation for this duty. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, soldiers of relatively low rank, such as *ḥalqah* troopers and rank-and-file mamluks, relied increasingly on the stipends paid from the government *dīwāns* because of the reduction of *iqṭā‘* lands, their original source of income. For that reason, if the soldiers joining an expedition could not receive these stipends when they were absent from Cairo during the campaign, their lives would be difficult. Therefore, the prepayment of the stipends became indispensable for dispatching an expeditionary force.¹⁷

To sum up, Qāytbāy was confronted with two urgent tasks: first, reorganization

al-ṭablkḥānāh), nineteen amirs of ten (*amīr ‘asharah*), and a thousand mamluk soldiers (anon., “*Tārīkh al-Malik al-Ashraf Qāytbāy*,” British Library MS Or 3028, fol. 6r–v [hereafter cited as *Tārīkh Qāytbāy*]). This source has detailed information about the military expeditions in the early years of Qāytbāy’s reign. Cf. David Ayalon, “The System of Payment in Mamluk Military Society,” *JESHO* 1, nos. 1, 3 (1958): 292–94.

¹⁴ *Hawādith*, 633–34; *Nayl*, 6:323–26; *Rawḍ*, fol. 182r–v; Ibn Iyās, *Badā‘i‘ al-Zuhūr fī Waqā‘i‘ al-Duhūr* (Wiesbaden, 1960–75), 3:12 (hereafter cited as *Badā‘i‘*); idem, *Jawāhir al-Sulūk fī Amr al-Khulafā‘ wa-al-Mulūk* (Cairo, 2006), 354 (hereafter cited as *Jawāhir al-Sulūk*).

¹⁵ Ayalon, “The System of Payment,” 54, 58.

¹⁶ *Hawādith*, 623, 625; *Rawḍ*, fol. 178v. The total amount of *nafaqah* paid on the expedition was 141,700 dinars, except the expenditures for prepaid *jāmakīyahs*, *kiswahs*, ‘*aliqs*, and costs for horses and camels (*Tārīkh Qāytbāy*, fol. 7r).

¹⁷ In some cases, these stipends were distributed to expeditionary armies in towns where they were stationed [Ibn Ajā, *Tārīkh al-Amīr Yashbak al-Zāhiri* (Cairo, 1973), 72, 152]. On the growing dependence of military men on the stipends, see: Igarashi, “Al-Diwan al-Mufrad,” 134–35, 137–38.



of the regular payment system that had collapsed because of structural problems in the financial and military systems; and second, raising funds for military expeditions in the midst of a tense international situation. We shall now examine how Qāyṭbāy tackled these problems.

THE FINANCIAL REORGANIZATION OF 873/1468–69

In Dhū al-Qa‘dah 872/June 1468, as soon as he received a report on the defeat of the first expeditionary army, Qāyṭbāy convened a conference (*majlis*) to discuss countermeasures. In this *majlis*, he argued the need for dispatching another military expedition and simultaneously brought up the obvious lack of funds for it. However, his plan for confiscating *milk* and *waqf* properties was blocked by strong opposition from the ulama;¹⁸ thus, he explored other measures for raising money. In Ṣafar 873/August–September 1468, Qāyṭbāy suspended payment of *jāmakīyahs* to non-mamluks such as the *awlād al-nās*, *fuqahā’* (legal scholars), *muta‘ammimūn* (ulama, civilians), and “the people connected with influential men in the state (*muḍāfi kibār al-dawlah*).” At this point in time, he calmed their protests with a promise to provide them with the suspended wages until the following month, after the fulfillment of payments to the Royal Mamluks.¹⁹ However, this was the starting point for further drastic reforms of the payment system. The next month, on 11 Rabī‘ I/28 September 1468, Qāyṭbāy tested the *awlād al-nās* on their military ability in the courtyard (*ḥawsh*) of the Citadel of Cairo (*qal‘at al-jabal*). Although the *awlād al-nās*, who were originally military men belonging to the *ḥalqah* troops, had been enrolled in al-Dīwān al-Mufrad and had received, like the mamluks, *jāmakīyahs* and other remuneration since the reign of Jaqmaq, a large number of people with little military ability, such as women and children, were included among them. On this occasion, Qāyṭbāy prepared three bows, each with different string tensions, called out the names from the list of recipients one after another, and made them draw the bows. The names of the people who could draw the bows were entered in the list of soldiers joining the new expedition. The people who could not draw them were excused from the expedition in exchange for payment to the sultan’s treasury (*khizānah*) according to the amount of *jāmakīyahs* they received—100 dinars for the recipients of 2,000 dirhams, 75 dinars for those who received 1,500 dirhams, and 50 dinars for those who received 1,000 dirhams. Judging from the fact that the disqualified people did not lose their rights to receive *jāmakīyah* but were only obliged to pay money as compensation, it is clear that Qāyṭbāy’s primary intention with this test was to collect funds for the military expedition rather than to reorganize al-Dīwān al-Mufrad itself. Given

¹⁸ *Hawādith*, 635–37; *Rawḍ*, fols. 182v–183v; *Nayl*, 6:328; *Badā‘i*, 3:13–14.

¹⁹ *Hawādith*, 678; al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbā’ al-Ḥaṣr bi-Abnā’ al-‘Aṣr* (Cairo, 1970), 16 (hereafter cited as *Inbā’ al-Ḥaṣr*); *Nayl*, 6:345; *Rawḍ*, fols. 203v–204r. Cf. *Badā‘i*, 3:20–21.



that many people waived their rights to receive *jāmakīyah* to avoid the obligation to pay the money, Qāyṭbāy may have had another intention—to lead those who received the *jāmakīyahs* as a kind of “public assistance payment” into abandoning these rights by themselves. Through the test, Qāyṭbāy reminded those present that the original purpose of the *jāmakīyahs* was to reward military service.²⁰ In any case, this made it possible for Qāyṭbāy to distribute *nafaqahs* of 100 dinars per capita and four-month *jāmakīyahs* to the mamluks taking part in the campaign. In the next month, Rabīʿ II, he dispatched the second expeditionary force with 500 mamluks under the command of Amir Uzdāmūr al-Ibrāhīmī al-Ṭawīl.²¹

As its size shows, this expeditionary force was an advance party to defend Aleppo, which was exposed to imminent danger due to the previous defeat. In order to organize and dispatch a larger main force, a radical reform of the payment system was essential. Under the circumstances, a reconstruction of the system of meat supply was initiated prior to the *jāmakīyah* reforms. Similar to the payment of *jāmakīyah* from al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, the provision of daily meat supplies to mamluks and others—the responsibility of the Dīwān al-Wizārah—was in arrears. On 15 Rabīʿ I/2 October 1468, just after the military fitness test was implemented, Qāyṭbāy granted Yashbak min Mahdī, the *dawādār kabīr* (the executive secretary), a *khilʿah* (robe of honor) “that was equivalent to that of the *atābak al-ʿasākīr*,” and appointed him to additional posts as vizier and viceroy of all the Egyptian provinces (*kāshif al-kushshāf*). Qāyṭbāy’s intention was to entrust the reform of the Dīwān al-Wizārah to Yashbak, whose position was strengthened by the fact that he held the rank just below the sultan, equivalent to the *atābak al-ʿasākīr*, while Qāyṭbāy himself initiated a reform in the payment of *jāmakīyah* from al-Dīwān al-Mufrad. In other words, a total reconstruction of the overall payment system was intended through cooperation between the two. In consequence, Yashbak succeeded in cutting the supply of meat for everyone except the mamluks, such as the *awlād al-nās*, *mutaʿammimūn*, and women.²² With this as the starting point, they embarked on a sweeping reform of the payment system for mamluks.

On 16 Rabīʿ II/2 November, just after the departure of the second expedition on the 6th of that month/23 October, Qāyṭbāy again summoned high government officials and the ulama to a second *majlis*. He complained in the *majlis* that the government was on the brink of total bankruptcy because of the enormous number of stipends. Nevertheless, the strong opposition of the ulama forced him to abandon

²⁰ *Hawādith*, 681–82; *Inbāʿ al-Ḥaṣr*, 20–21; *Rawḍ*, fol. 205r, v; *Nayl*, 6:348; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:22. Cf. Igarashi, “Al-Dīwān al-Mufrad,” 135.

²¹ *Hawādith*, 679, 685, 687; *Inbāʿ al-Ḥaṣr*, 30–31; *Nayl*, 6:347, 352; *Rawḍ*, fols. 204r, 208v; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:21, 24. The total cost of expenditures for this expedition was 87,000 dinars (*Tārīkh Qāyṭbāy*, fol. 7r–v).

²² *Hawādith*, 682–83; *Inbāʿ al-Ḥaṣr*, 23–24; *Rawḍ*, fol. 205v; *Nayl*, 6:349; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:22–23.



his attempt to levy extraordinary taxes on *milk* and *waqf* properties yet again. He finally initiated reform of the payment system. Qāyrbāy, together with Yashbak, mobilized the entire financial staff, such as *kātib al-mamālīk*, *muqaddam al-mamālīk*, and the scribes in charge of fodder or warehouses. Then, at the courtyard of the Citadel, Qāyrbāy and Yashbak called out the recipients one by one according to the roster in order to review the provision of *jāmakīyah*, *‘aliq*, and meat. Two reforms were undertaken as a result of the review. The first was the cutting of payments to those unqualified for military service, which was determined by another test on military ability. The test was carried out using bows, as in the previous month. The previous test had been mainly to select soldiers to join the expedition and to collect money from the people exempted from it; however, the second test was to cut the stipends of the people who were judged unfit for military service. Accordingly, a great number of the *muta‘ammimūn*, women, and children, for example, became subject to the stipend cut. Under the second reform, limiting payments to the specified amount was strictly observed. Because stipend-receiving status could be bought and sold, some powerful mamluks had received more than the specified stipend amount through purchase of additional stipend-receiving status. Through an inspection, if a mamluk had received more than the specified amount, i.e., a *jāmakīyah* of 2,000 dirhams, *‘aliq* of three bowls, and daily meat of three *ratls* for each rank-and-file mamluk (as for the *khāṣṣakīyah* [sing. *khāṣṣakī*; bodyguard],²³ the regular amount of *‘aliq* was five bowls), the excess was eliminated. If a mamluk had received more than the specified amount through the purchase of others’ stipend-receiving status, he was obliged to return it to the sellers.²⁴ Although preceding sultans who tried to reform the payment system had been forced to abandon their attempts because of strong opposition from amirs and mamluks, Qāyrbāy succeeded by taking advantage of the terrible shock of the military defeat immediately after his enthronement. As a matter of course, some protests against his policy and interventions were made by powerful figures, but these did not develop into a movement to overthrow Qāyrbāy.

As a result of the reform, al-Diḡān al-Mufrad and Diḡān al-Wizārah were revitalized to some extent. Because the sultans had hitherto met the deficit of the two *diḡāns* from the *Khizānah*, the revitalization of the *diḡāns* probably enabled Qāyrbāy to use the money to support military expeditions. In addition, through the reduction of the amount paid as *jāmakīyahs* and the strict observance of its correct allotment, the total expenditure for a four-month prepaid salary was reduced. Furthermore, when the troops were reviewed for the third expedition in Jumādā

²³On the *khāṣṣakīyah*, see: David Ayalon, “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army 1,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (BSOAS)* 15, no. 2 (1953): 213–16.

²⁴*Hawādith*, 689–95; *Inbā’ al-Haṣr*, 33–43; *Nayl*, 6:353–54; *Rawḍ*, fols. 209r–211v; *Badā’i*, 3:24. Cf. Igarashi, “Al-Diḡān al-Mufrad,” 136–37.



II/January 1469, all the men exempted from the expedition, including the Royal Mamluks, were obliged to pay a fixed amount to the *Khizānah*—100 dinars in the case of *iqṭāʿ* holders or 20 dinars in the case of *jāmakīyah* recipients.²⁵ As a result of these policies, the problem of the shortfall in the military budget was resolved for the moment. On 24 Rajab/7 February, the four-month *jāmakīyahs* and one-year *kiswahs* were prepaid to the soldiers joining the third expedition, in addition to supplying draft camels.²⁶ Then the third expedition, comprising 1,500 mamluk cavalry, commanded by the *atābak al-ʿasākīr* Uzbek min Ṭuṭukh, was dispatched on 9 Shaʿbān/22 February.

Incidentally, on 4 Shaʿbān/17 February, just after the completion of *nafaqah* payments to the third expeditionary army, Qāyṭbāy again appointed Yashbak to an additional post as *ustādār*. Yashbak was now serving concurrently as *dawādār*, vizier, *ustādār*, and viceroy of all the Egyptian provinces.²⁷ Accordingly, Yashbak assumed sole responsibility for a series of financial tasks, from collecting taxes on lands in the Egyptian provinces to providing all kinds of stipends for mamluks and other recipients, as a major part of the governmental domain in Egypt was assigned to al-Dīwān al-Mufrad and lands of some provinces were assigned to the Dīwān al-Wizārah. It seems reasonable to suppose that after succeeding in reducing *jāmakīyahs* for military men, which had been the hardest task, Qāyṭbāy transferred the management of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad to his confidant Yashbak and let him exercise direct and strict control over the system of payments. However, there is no doubt that the sultan exercised close supervision over the qualifications of recipients and the payment of correct amounts in view of the fact that he regularly attended the payment inspections of troops.²⁸ Rather than addressing the problems of disbursements, the appointment of Yashbak as *ustādār* was to address the following two problems having to do with the collection of revenue.

First, because the *dawādār*, one of the high-ranking military men who could mobilize their own mamluk soldiers, assumed the responsibility for the two *dīwāns* and the post of viceroy of all the Egyptian provinces, it became possible for him to collect taxes by force from rural areas, which had previously been subject to delay due to the aforementioned chaotic situation in these areas. He was also expected to suppress rebellious Bedouins by force and to restore order in the rural areas. From 873/1468–69 until 874/1469–70, Yashbak made repeated expeditions to various regions of Egypt. With the expedition to Upper Egypt in Jumādā I 873/November

²⁵ *Hawādith*, 697–98; *Rawḍ*, fol. 213v. Cf. *Nayl*, 6:359; *Inbāʿ al-Ḥaṣr*, 48; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:26.

²⁶ *Hawādith*, 701; *Inbāʿ al-Ḥaṣr*, 54; *Rawḍ*, fol. 215v; *Nayl*, 6:361–62. The total expenditures on *nafaqahs*, *jāmakīyahs*, *ʿaliqs*, and rations for the third expedition amounted to 300,000 dinars, not including expenditure on horses, camels, and weapons [*Tārīkh Qāyṭbāy*, fol. 8r–v].

²⁷ *Hawādith*, 702; *Inbāʿ al-Ḥaṣr*, 56, 58; *Nayl*, 6:363; *Rawḍ*, fol. 217v; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:28–29.

²⁸ *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:331–32.



1468 as the start, he mounted expeditions against Buḥayrah from Shawwāl of that year until Muḥarram of the following year, and again against Upper Egypt as soon as he returned from Buḥayrah.²⁹ As is evident from the fact that Yashbak requisitioned crops and livestock from villages in addition to the suppression of Bedouin revolts, these expeditions were made not only for the restoration of order in the rural areas but also for the collection of overdue taxes in order to fund al-Dīwān al-Mufrad and Dīwān al-Wizārah.

Second, we should regard Yashbak's holding of such additional posts as a measure against *ḥimāyah*, which was another factor obstructing the government's tax collection in rural areas. The impact of *ḥimāyah* over a region was dependent on the patron's position in the central government, through which he could influence the *ustādār* or the vizier, i.e., the regional governor's superior officer.³⁰ Because al-Dīwān al-Mufrad and Dīwān al-Wizārah were put under the authority of Yashbak who was the *de facto* second-in-command in the government at that time, it became possible for these *dīwāns* to collect taxes from villages, even if they were under the *ḥimāyah* of powerful amirs, irrespective of their interventions. Accordingly, the collection of revenue and the overall financial situation were revitalized to some extent by virtue of these reforms; they enabled Qāyṭbāy to focus on the war against the Dulkadir. After a series of military campaigns, Shāh Suwār was finally captured and executed in 877/1472, and the Mamluk sultanate regained its hegemony over the area.³¹

Nevertheless, although these policies achieved a measure of success in resolving the current financial and military difficulties, it is hard to say that they brought about an ultimate solution to the problems. While Qāyṭbāy certainly reduced the total amount of payments more than the preceding sultans, interference from powerful figures and the enrollment of irregular recipients in the *dīwān* ledgers was not completely eliminated.³² The external menace also continued; the military campaign against the Aqqyunlu was launched in 877/1472, just a few months after the victory over Shāh Suwār.³³ Furthermore, 'Alā' al-Dawlah ('Alī Dawlāt), a

²⁹The expedition to Upper Egypt in 873/1468–69: *Ḥawādith*, 695–96; *Rawḍ*, fol. 212r; *Nayl*, 6:357; *Inbā' al-Ḥaṣr*, 44–45. The expedition to Buḥayrah: *Ḥawādith*, 707, 735; *Inbā' al-Ḥaṣr*, 64, 119; *Rawḍ*, fol. 220r. The second expedition to Upper Egypt in 874/1469: *Inbā' al-Ḥaṣr*, 123, 126, 131; *Rawḍ*, fol. 247r; *Nayl*, 6:392, 409; *Badā'i*, 3:37, 43. Cf. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?*, 110.

³⁰*Taysir*, 136.

³¹Dahmān, *Al-ʿIrāk bayna al-Mamālīk wa-al-ʿUthmāniyyīn*, 31–61.

³²In 903/1498, two years after the death of Qāyṭbāy, the enrollment of a large number of amirs' mamluks as recipients of payments was regarded as a problem again (Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, *Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Wafayāt al-Shuyūkh wa-al-Aqrān* [Sidon and Beirut, 1999], 2:47 [hereafter cited as *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*]).

³³*Nayl*, 7:49–50, 54; *Badā'i*, 3:80–82; *Inbā' al-Ḥaṣr*, 483. Cf. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?*, 44–



prince of Dulkadir, revolted against the Mamluks with the support of the Ottomans. The war between the Mamluks and Dulkadir, which raged from 889/1484 until 896/1491, escalated into a direct conflict between the Mamluks and Ottomans.³⁴ Thus, sixteen military campaigns were undertaken during Qāyṭbāy's reign, and the total expenditures for *nafaqah* ran as high as 7,065,000 dinars.³⁵ Furthermore, the financial *dīwāns* of the government again fell into arrears with the *jāmakiyah* payments and meat supply after about 877/1472.³⁶ Although Yashbak resigned from the offices of *ustādār* and vizier³⁷ because he was often obliged to stay away from Egypt as commander on campaign, which interfered with his supervision over the two *dīwāns*, he ultimately continued to exercise general supervision over them.³⁸ Moreover, he was appointed to an additional post as *amīr silāḥ* (master of arms), one of the high-level military posts occupied by amirs of one hundred, enhancing his position even more and adding the *iqṭāʿ* belonging to its position as an additional income source to fund programs according to his own discretion.³⁹ The *dawādār's* holding of offices such as *amīr silāḥ*, *ustādār*, vizier, and viceroy of all the Egyptian provinces, as well as his taking charge of the state's financial affairs and local administration in Egypt, continued under governments until the end of the Mamluk sultanate.⁴⁰

49; Dahmān, *Al-ʿIrāk bayna al-Mamālik wa-al-ʿUthmāniyyin*, 161–77; John E. Woods, *The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire* (Salt Lake City, 1999), 116–17.

³⁴Har-El, *Struggle for Domination*, 124–30; Nāfiʿ, *Al-ʿAlāqāt al-ʿUthmāniyah–al-Mamlūkiyah*, Chap. 2; Dahmān, *Al-ʿIrāk bayna al-Mamālik wa-al-ʿUthmāniyyin*, 179–200; al-Qarmūṭ, *Al-ʿAlāqāt al-Miṣriyah al-ʿUthmāniyah*, Chap. 2; Carl F. Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamluk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy and Qānṣūḥ al-Ghawri in Egypt* (Seattle and London, 1993), 88–103.

³⁵*Badāʾiʿ*, 3:325. According to *Nayl*, the total amount of *nafaqahs* paid for the expeditionary armies during the period from Qāyṭbāy's enthronement until Rabīʿ II 894/February–March 1489 reached 7,165,000 dinars (*Nayl*, 8:149). According to *Tārīkh Qāyṭbāy*, the total expenditures for seven expeditions made during the period from Qāyṭbāy's enthronement to Shaʿbān 877/January 1473 amounted to 1,753,700 dinars (*Tārīkh Qāyṭbāy*, fols. 7r–v, 8v, 9v, 10v, 12v; Ayalon, “The System of Payment,” 293–94).

³⁶For examples of riots of the mamluks against Yashbak or his agents performing the works of *ustādār* and vizier, see the case in 877/1473: *Nayl*, 7:54; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:82. In 878/1474: *Nayl*, 7:90, 91. In 879/1474: *Nayl*, 7:100; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:96.

³⁷*Nayl*, 7:82, 86, 106, 190; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:92, 93–94, 130.

³⁸*Nayl*, 7:216; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:148. Although Khushqadam al-Aḥmadī officially assumed the vizierate in 879/1474, it seems that Yashbak kept the primary responsibility for the management of *Diwān al-Wizārah*, in view of the fact that Khushqadam probably confronted Yashbak about the management policy of the *dīwān* (*Nayl*, 7:113; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:101) and that Yashbak kept the additional post of vizier (*Badāʾiʿ*, 3:149).

³⁹*Nayl*, 7:219; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:149; *Jawāhir al-Sulūk*, 361.

⁴⁰*Badāʾiʿ*, 3:357, 445; 4:4, 284; *Jawāhir al-Sulūk*, 365, 386.



THE SULTANIC FISC: MEASURES TO INCREASE INCOME FOR THE SULTAN'S EXCLUSIVE USE

While Qāyṭbāy made efforts to rationalize the financial affairs of the government as we have seen, he also strove to increase his personal income, leading to an expansion of the role of the sultanic fisc in state affairs. As for his *waqf* properties, which formed part of his own revenue sources, his madrasah and primary *waqf* were established on 24 Jumādā II 879/5 November 1474.⁴¹ This date corresponds with the time when the state's finances were worsening again. Additionally, especially during his reign, the sale of official offices and the confiscation of dismissed or deceased officials' property became widespread, and the money collected in this way seems to have been considered a kind of fine imposed upon all candidates for the posts.⁴² Qāyṭbāy also enforced new tax policies in rural and urban areas, especially in the 890s/1485–94. On the principle that all tax revenues from an *iqṭāʿ* land were assigned to a mamluk or an amir holding the *iqṭāʿ*, in 893/1488 and 895/1490, he collected a fifth of the annual *kharāj* (land tax) from *iqṭāʿ* lands in al-Sharqīyah province through the governor of the province (*kāshif al-Sharqīyah*).⁴³ In 894/1489, the cash equivalent of two months' rent was collected from the owners of *milk* and *waqf* properties in Fustat and Cairo, including amirs.⁴⁴ Similarly, five months' rent was collected in 896/1491.⁴⁵ He also charged Cairene merchants 40,000 dinars in 892/1487,⁴⁶ and confiscated the *dhimmīs*' properties twice during his reign.⁴⁷ Such circumstances were described by Ibn Ṭawq (in 894/1489) as follows: "All [the subjects of] the sultan's kingdom were under severe tyranny and the [yoke of] confiscation of the people's property."⁴⁸

Qāyṭbāy's extra taxation policies, some of which he was forced to abandon in

⁴¹ *Waqf* deed, Sultan al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy, Wizārat al-Awqāf (WA), q886; L. A. Mayer, ed., *The Buildings of Qāyṭbāy as Described in His Endowment Deed* (London, 1938), 87.

⁴² Miura Toru, "Administrative Networks in the Mamluk Period: Taxation, Legal Execution, and Bribery," in *Islamic Urbanism in Human History: Political Power and Social Networks*, ed. Sato Tsugitaka (London and New York, 1997), 44–55; Bernadette Martel-Thoumian, *Les civils et l'administration dans l'état militaire mamlūk (IXe/XVe siècle)* (Damascus, 1992), 88–92; idem, "The Sale of Office and Its Economic Consequences during the Rule of the Last Circassians (872–922/1468–1516)," *MSR* 9, no. 2 (2005); Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?*, 166–73.

⁴³ *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:253, 269. For another example of tax collection from *iqṭāʿ* lands: *ibid.*, 331.

⁴⁴ *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:260–61; *Jawāhir al-Sulūk*, 367; *Nayl*, 8:141, 154; al-Sakhāwī, *Wajīz al-Kalām fī al-Dhayl ʿalā Duwal al-Islām* (Beirut, 1995), 1081–82 (hereafter cited as *Wajīz*).

⁴⁵ *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:278–79; *Jawāhir al-Sulūk*, 368; *Nayl*, 8:217, 219; *Wajīz*, 1178. According to *Jawāhir al-Sulūk*, money was also collected on this occasion from the *waqf* properties of Maṣūri hospital (*al-Bimāristān al-Manṣūri*), merchants, the Christians, and the Jews.

⁴⁶ *Nayl*, 8:73.

⁴⁷ *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:331.

⁴⁸ Ibn Ṭawq, *Al-Taʿlīq: Yawmiyāt Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Ṭawq* (Damascus, 2000–4), 845 (hereafter cited as *Taʿlīq*).



the early days of his reign, show that his efforts to revitalize the state's finances eventually proved abortive. Although these taxes were imposed on the pretext of being temporary emergency measures, the sultans succeeding Qāyṭbāy also imposed them and frequently imposed them especially as bonuses for amirs and mamluks for joining military campaigns or for pronouncing the *bayʿah* (oath of allegiance) to a newly enthroned sultan.

A key to understanding the sultan's finances of the times is the function of the *dhakhīrah*. *Al-dhakhīrah*, which originally meant "treasure" in Arabic, changed its meaning with the development of the sultan's fisc throughout the Circassian Mamluk period, and finally during Qāyṭbāy's reign, this term came to include various kinds of financial resources placed under the direct control of the sultan.⁴⁹ For instance, according to the sources, *al-Dhakhīrah* was considered the place where confiscated properties or the money paid for offices were to be delivered (in the same meaning as *khizānah*),⁵⁰ or as an agency taking charge of the spice trade.⁵¹ In addition, "the lands of *al-Dhakhīrah* (*bilād al-dhakhīrah*)" meant the sultan's domains, i.e., lands designated as the sultan's exclusive financial resources.

The table below lists the tax districts (*nāhiyah*) in Egypt belonging to *al-Dhakhīrah* around 885/1480 during the reign of Qāyṭbāy (according to *Tuhfah*).⁵² This table shows that the agricultural land of *al-Dhakhīrah* in Egypt was composed of forty-eight districts with annual revenues (*ʿibrah*) estimated at 208,193.2 *jayshī* dinars. These districts were, on the whole, spread across various parts of Egypt, although ten of them were concentrated in al-Sharqīyah province. Successive sultans tried to add various kinds of land (such as *milk*, *waqf*, and leased land) throughout Egypt and Syria to *al-Dhakhīrah* for the purpose of increasing their own property.⁵³ In addition, *iqṭāʿ* lands were also targeted for this purpose.⁵⁴ Finally,

⁴⁹On *al-dhakhīrah*, see: Igarashi Daisuke, "A Study on *al-Dhakhīrah*: The Sultan's Finance during the Circassian Mamluk Period" [in Japanese], *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 73 (2007).

⁵⁰Al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs wa-al-Abnān fī Tawārīkh al-Zamān* (Cairo, 1970–94), 1:322, 372, 440; 3:177, 381, 398–99, 436; al-Biqāʿī, *Izhār al-ʿAsr li-Asrār Ahl al-ʿAsr* (Riyadh, 1992–93), 2:15 (hereafter cited as *Izhār*); *Ḥawāḍith al-Zamān*, 2:245–46.

⁵¹John Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Letter of 877/1473," *BSOAS* 24 (1961): 206, 211, n. 7; idem, "A Mamluk Ambassador to Venice in 913/1507," *BSOAS* 26 (1963): 528, n. 3; Horii Yutaka, "The Mamluk Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (1501–16) and the Venetians in Alexandria," *Orient* 38 (2003): 180–81; Nayl, 7:429.

⁵²Ibn al-Jīʿān, *Kitāb al-Tuhfah al-Saniyah bi-Asmāʾ al-Bilād al-Miṣriyah* (Cairo, 1898) (hereafter cited as *Tuhfah*).

⁵³*Izhār*, 1:211–12, 218; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawāḍith al-Duhūr fī Madā al-Ayyām wa-al-Shuhūr*, ed. Fahīm Muḥammad Shaltūt (Cairo, 1990), 1:300–1; al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Tibr al-Masbūk fī Dhayl al-Sulūk* (Cairo, n.d.), 386; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:13–14.

⁵⁴In 863/1459: *Izhār*, 3:94. In 865/1461: *Izhār*, 3:258. In 867/1463: *Ḥawāḍith*, 770. In 882/1477: Ibn al-Jīʿān, *Al-Qawl al-Mustazraf fī Safr Mawlānā al-Malik al-Ashraf* (Tripoli, 1984), 74–75.



Table: Distribution of Lands of *al-Dhakhīrah* (around 885/1480)

	Province (<i>iqḷīm/a‘māl</i>)	Number of <i>Nāḥiyahs</i>	<i>‘Ibrah</i> (<i>jayshī dinar</i>)
Lower Egypt	The Suburbs of Cairo	2	10,500
	Al-Qalyūbiyah	3	16,375
	Al-Sharqīyah	10	47,066.7 +
	Al-Daqahliyah	0	0
	Ḍawāḥī Thaghr Dimyāt	0	0
	Al-Gharbīyah	7	35,462
	Al-Manūfiyah	4	19,625
	Abyār wa-Jazīrat Banī Naṣr	0	0
	Al-Buḥayrah	4	6,880 +
	Fūwah	1	3,500
	Nastarāwah	0	0
	Ḍawāḥī al-Iskandariyah	0	0
	Total for Lower Egypt	31	139,408.7 +
Upper Egypt	Al-Jīziyah	0	0
	Al-Itfīḥīyah	4	13,566
	Al-Fayyūmiyah	0	0
	Al-Bahnasāwīyah	7	35,875
	Al-Ushmūnayn	2	3,812.5
	Al-Manfalūṭīyah	2	7,500
	Al-Asyūṭīyah	0	0
	Al-Ikhmīmīyah	1	2,031
	Al-Qūṣīyah	1	6,000
	Total for Upper Egypt	17	68,784.5
	Total for Egypt	48	208,193.2 +
	Average ‘Ibrah		4,525.9

* All figures were rounded off to one decimal place.

**If *al-Dhakhīrah* shared a *nāḥiyah* with other uses, the *‘ibrah* of *al-Dhakhīrah* was calculated by dividing the *‘ibrah* of the *nāḥiyah* under consideration equally, except in a case wherein the *‘ibrah* of each was specified.



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by the time of Qāyṭbāy's death in 901/1496, the number of *iqṭāʿ*s included in *al-Dhakhīrah* had reached approximately one thousand.⁵⁵

Qāyṭbāy tried to manage administrative and financial affairs by using his own money acquired through such financial policies.⁵⁶ In order to make this policy work, he systematized the sultan's financial management and organized a special staff for the service. The executive responsibility for the sultan's fisc usually rested with the chief (*ustādār*) of *Dīwān al-Amlāk wa-al-Awqāf wa-al-Dhakhīrah* in the period from the reign of Barqūq until that of al-Muʿayyad Shaykh (815–24/1412–21), and then with the *zimām-khāzindār* (the chief-eunuch who acted as the sultan's treasurer) in the period from the reign of al-Ashraf Barsbāy (825–42/1422–38) until that of al-Ashraf Īnāl (857–65/1453–60).⁵⁷ Responsibility for the sultan's fisc seems to have been divided among people who were of relatively low rank in the government hierarchy but who had personal connections with the sultan, as we shall see in what follows. Such a manner of management suggests that Qāyṭbāy tightened his direct supervision and control over the sultan's fisc because of its growing size and importance.

One of the changes in the governmental bureaucracy caused by the development of the sultan's fisc was the functional metamorphosis of *wakīl bayt al-māl* (the agent of the public treasury) into an independent financial agent for the sultan. This was originally a religious post occupied by one of the *ulama*. Its function was to conduct sales of the state's property, which was unrelated to the financial administration itself.⁵⁸ However, during Qāyṭbāy's reign, the post assumed a new role as an official agent for the sultan's financial affairs, independent of the financial *dīwāns* of the government, and was regarded in the same light as *wakīl al-sultān*, the sultan's personal agent.⁵⁹ The case of Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm al-

However, when the government was unsettled, the sultan was often obliged to distribute *iqṭāʿ*s from *al-Dhakhīrah* to attract support from mamluks and amirs. In 865/1461: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Nujūm al-Zāhīrah fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-al-Qāhīrah* (Cairo, 1963–72), 16:258 (hereafter cited as *Nujūm*); *Nayl*, 6:118–19; *Badāʾiʿ*, 2:383. In 872/1467: *Nujūm*, 16:381. In 874/1470: *Inbāʾ al-Ḥaṣr*, 159–60. In 897/1492: *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:292. In 901/1496: *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:335; Ibn al-Shiḥnah, *Al-Badr al-Zāhīr fī Nuṣrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy* (Beirut, 1983), 51 (hereafter cited as *al-Badr al-Zāhīr*). Cf. ʿAmir Najīb Mūsā Nāṣir, *Al-Ḥayāh al-Iqtisādīyah fī Miṣr fī al-ʿAṣr al-Mamlūkī* (Amman, 2003), 116.

⁵⁵*Badāʾiʿ*, 3:335; *al-Badr al-Zāhīr*, 51.

⁵⁶The total amount of expenditures disbursed from his *khizānah* for military expeditions, the purchase of mamluk slaves, weapons, and horses, buildings and repairs, charities and donations reached 3,770,000 dinars during the period from his enthronement to Shaʿbān 877/January 1473 (*Tārīkh Qāyṭbāy*, fol. 15r–v).

⁵⁷Igarashi, "A Study on *al-Dhakhīrah*," 140–42.

⁵⁸Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī Ṣināʿat al-Inshāʾ* (Cairo, 1913–22), 4:36–37 (hereafter cited as *Ṣubḥ*).

⁵⁹In the sources of the period, the appointees to the post of *wakīl bayt al-māl* were often referred



Nābulusī⁶⁰ and his son Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad is a good example of the role of the *wakīl* at the time. Burhān al-Dīn was appointed as *wakīl* of Damascus in 874/1469 and was engaged in collecting money, especially relating to the sale of offices and confiscation of officials' property.⁶¹ Later, he was transferred to the post of *wakīl* of Egypt and took a more active political role.⁶² He was often dispatched to the Syrian provinces, being assigned tasks relating to financial affairs such as the confiscation of estates. In 880/1475, he was sent to Tripoli and seized properties estimated at over 120,000 dinars from the viceroy of Tripoli, his *dawādār*, and the *nāẓir al-jaysh* (the chief of the Dīwān al-Jaysh; i.e., the bureau of military affairs).⁶³ Then he arrived in Damascus and collected 8,000 dinars from the *ḥājib* (chamberlain), Dawlātbāy al-Najmī, confiscated the *ḥājib*'s house, arrested the *nāẓir al-jaysh* and the Maliki judge (perhaps in order to seize their properties), and confiscated the Shafi'i judge's property.⁶⁴ Burhān al-Dīn's son, Shihāb al-Dīn, arrived at Damascus in Shawwāl 880/February 1476, taking over his father's post as *wakīl* of Damascus with the additional posts of *nāẓir al-jaysh* and *nāẓir al-qal'ah* (the superintendent of the citadel; this will be discussed in detail later).⁶⁵ He collected a huge amount of money during his tenure.⁶⁶ Ibn al-Ḥimṣī describes him as follows:

He ordered the seizure of the people's properties through [various] pretexts (*bi-al-ḥiyal*). . . . He does not respect the viceroy, judges, ulama, or anyone. If it was said to a person "al-Nābulusī demanded you [to pay money]," he would die of fear.⁶⁷

Qāyṭbāy also entrusted vassals and attendants close to him, especially low-ranking military men (such as the rank-and-file mamluks and amirs of ten), with the tasks of his financial affairs. The case of al-Ḥājj Ramaḍān, who was a courtier

to as *wakīl al-sultān*.

⁶⁰ Al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Daw' al-Lāmi' li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsi'* (Cairo, 1934–37), 1:10–11 (hereafter cited as *Daw'*); 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ al-Ḥanafī, "Majma' al-Mufannan bi-al-Mu'jam al-Mu'anwan," Maktabat Baladīyat al-Iskandariyah MS 4448/800b musalsalah 5 Tārīkh, fol. 3r–v (hereafter cited as *Majma' al-Mufannan*).

⁶¹ Al-Buṣrawī, *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī* (Damascus, 1988), 39, 50 (hereafter cited as *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*).

⁶² *Nayl*, 7:87.

⁶³ *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 71.

⁶⁴ *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 72–73; *Badā'i*, 3:110–11; *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 1:214; *Nayl*, 7:139.

⁶⁵ *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 74; *Majma' al-Mufannan*, fols. 60v–61v.

⁶⁶ *Daw'*, 1:191–92.

⁶⁷ *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 1:212. A popular uprising against Shihāb al-Dīn surfaced in 881/776 because of his ruthless methods of money collection (*Majma' al-Mufannan*, fol. 61r).



serving as *mihtār al-tashtkhānāh* (the keeper of the sultan's wardrobe,⁶⁸ a minor office of the royal court), is a notable example. He had served Qāyrbāy since he was still a member of the *khāṣṣakīyah*, and then acquired power with his master's enthronement and assumed charge of "the sultan's resources (*jihāt al-sultān*)" in addition to the posts of *mihtār* and *nāẓir al-kiswah* (the controller of the Kiswah). He acted as an intermediary between applicants for offices and the sultan, taking advantage of his closeness to the sultan, and it was said that most appointments were made through his mediation.⁶⁹ As for Qāyrbāy's *waqfs*, which formed a large part of his financial resources, the following military men close to Qāyrbāy served as proxy for the official *waqf* administrator (*nāẓir*), i.e., Qāyrbāy himself: Jānībak al-Ashqar, amir of ten, a member of the *dawādāriyah* (pen-box holders), and the *shādd* (rent-collector) of Qāyrbāy's *waqf*. He was one of the sultan's favorites (*khawāṣṣ*) and was often dispatched by him to various regions on important missions.⁷⁰ He was followed by Barsbāy al-Maḥmūdī al-Ashrafī, amir of ten and *khāzindār thālith* (the third treasurer). He succeeded Jānībak (who died in Shaʿbān 880/December 1475) as the proxy of the *nāẓir* of Qāyrbāy's *waqf* "because of his [Qāyrbāy's] favor [to him]." He was also appointed as *ustādār al-amlāk* (the manager of the sultan's private land) and the keeper of Qāyrbāy's warehouse (*ustādh al-shūnah al-Ashrafī*), taking charge of Qāyrbāy's various resources in addition to his *milk* and *waqf* properties.⁷¹ Finally there was Barsbāy al-Khāṣṣakī, a member of the *khāzindāriyah* (treasurers) and one of the favorites of Qāyrbāy. He took over the management of a large part of the resources that had been the responsibility of Barsbāy al-Maḥmūdī after his death on 1 Ramaḍān 890/11 September 1485 in addition to the management of *waqf* properties dedicated to Medina.⁷²

These measures were also applied to the financial administration of the government. Khushqadam al-Aḥmadī, a eunuch serving in the royal court as *raʾs nawbat al-suqāh* (the head of cup-bearers) and in other roles, was appointed to the vizierate in 879/1468 when Yashbak resigned from it. He increased his power when he was appointed to the posts of *zimām* and *khāzindār* in addition to the

⁶⁸ *Ṣubḥ*, 4:10–11; William Popper, *Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans 1382–1468: Systematic Notes to Ibn Taghri Birdī's Chronicles of Egypt* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955–57), 1:95.

⁶⁹ *Badāʾiʿ*, 4:342–43. The successors to the post of *mihtār al-tashtkhānāh* continued to be close with the sultan under al-Ghawri's reign and continued to take part in the financial affairs of the sultan (*Badāʾiʿ*, 4:182, 263, 442–43).

⁷⁰ *Waqf* deed, Sultan Qāyrbāy, WA, q886: 142; Mayer, *The Buildings of Qāyrbāy*, 75–76, 86; *Ḍawʿ*, 3:55; *Nayl*, 7:146–47. Cf. *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:113.

⁷¹ *Majmaʿ al-Mufannan*, fols. 215v–216r; *Ḍawʿ*, 3:10. *Waqf* deed, Sultan Qāyrbāy, WA, q886: 193–94 (219–20).

⁷² *Majmaʿ al-Mufannan*, fol. 215v; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:287; *Ḍawʿ*, 3:8, 10; *Wajīz*, 1290.



vizierate in 882/1477.⁷³ Given that the *zimām-khāzindār* was the top officer of the royal court in charge of the *khizānah*, although this office had lost its former function as chief supervisor of the sultanic fisc, it seems reasonable to suppose that Dīwān al-Wizārah was put under the auspices of the sultanic fisc and was managed with its support. These measures of Qāyrbāy also affected the power structure within the government, and as a result, some of these low-ranking individuals, as typified by al-Ḥājī Ramaḍān, acquired political importance.

THE FINANCIAL POLICY IN THE SYRIAN PROVINCES: THE CASE OF DAMASCUS

Such a financial policy was also applied to the Syrian provinces, and the consequence was the establishment of a new system for effectively concentrating wealth in Syria in the hands of the sultan in Egypt. Here I limit the discussion to the case of Damascus, the most important province in Syria. Similar to the *wakīl* of Egypt, the *wakīl* of Damascus developed into an independent financial officer directly involved with the sultanic fisc. We have already seen that the al-Nābulusī family, occupying the posts of *wakīl* in both Egypt and Damascus, played an important role in financial affairs during Qāyrbāy's reign. The successive *wakīls* of Damascus after the downfall of the al-Nābulusī family (in Ṣafar 882/May 1477) also participated in sultanic financial affairs, such as assisting in the confiscation of senior officials' estates,⁷⁴ and bearing witness to the audits of the Damascene citadel's coffers⁷⁵ (this will be discussed later). In view of the further fact that the *wakīls* of Damascus had jurisdiction over the affairs concerning *al-Dhakhīrah* in the province,⁷⁶ we can say with fair certainty that most of the sultanic financial resources in the province were under the *wakīl*'s control.

In addition, the extra taxes that were frequently imposed in Egypt after 890/1485, as we have already seen, were also introduced in the Syrian provinces. As an example, when a tax was levied on merchants in Damascus in Jumādā I 896/March 1491 for the purpose of raising money for a military expedition, the same tax was also levied in Cairo, Alexandria, and Damietta.⁷⁷ Although Egyptian chronicles mention only a few remarkable cases of the extra taxations in Syria,⁷⁸ we can gather from Damascene sources that the sultan's decrees (*marsūm*) concerning the extra taxation frequently came from Cairo during the 880s/1475–84, and especially after 890/1485. These taxations were usually carried out by

⁷³ *Ḍawʿ*, 3:176–77; *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:99, 130, 207, 267; *Nayl*, 7:107, 189, 374–75; 8:160–61.

⁷⁴ *Taʿlīq*, 109, 217, 285–86; *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 153; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-Khillān fī Ḥawādith al-Zamān* (Cairo, 1962–64), 1:26 (hereafter cited as *Mufākahah*).

⁷⁵ *Taʿlīq*, 174, 678.

⁷⁶ *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 39, 116; *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 1:213.

⁷⁷ *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:281. For other examples: *ibid.*, 3:280; 4:15.

⁷⁸ For example: *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:110–11.



the *khāṣṣakīs* on assignment from the sultan, acting under the authority of decrees authorizing the collection of the taxes. Taxes on *waqfs*, which were collected through the official audit (*kashf*) of *waqf*-financed institutions, were more frequently imposed in Damascus than in Cairo.⁷⁹ For instance, when a *khāṣṣakī* arrived in Damascus with the sultan's decree authorizing an audit of *waqfs* for *jāmi'is*, *masjids*, madrasahs, and other institutions in Ramaḍān 892/August 1487, three chief judges and the ulama conferred and came to an agreement to pay 4,000 dinars from the *waqfs* to him.⁸⁰ However, it seems that this was not the only money he collected. Ibn Ṭulūn relates that:

He engaged in corruption (*ẓulm*) that cannot be expressed. He grabbed money from each *masjid* even though it was poor, and similarly from each mausoleum (*turbah*) and madrasah. He did not take the condition or welfare (*maṣāliḥ*) of these institutions into consideration, but [was only concerned about] his interests and those of the sultan.⁸¹

The *khāṣṣakīs* were also dispatched from Cairo to collect money from Damascene citizens, merchants, and *dhimmīs*.⁸² Such taxations were sometimes carried out by the provincial viceroys according to the sultan's decrees, but were usually carried out by the *khāṣṣakīs* themselves.

It seems that the collection of money from the sale of offices and the confiscation of dismissed officials' estates was generally performed by the *wakīl* (mentioned earlier) or the governor of the citadel (*nā'ib al-qal'ah*; this will be discussed later); however, in some special cases, such as confiscations targeting several officials simultaneously, the *khāṣṣakīs* were assigned to Damascus for the task. On 6 Ṣafar 891/11 February 1486, Māmāy, a *khāṣṣakī*, arrived in Damascus for "collecting the money [being confiscated] from officials and others for the sultan" after confiscating the officials' estates in Jerusalem. He accosted Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Muḥammad al-ʿAdawī, the *wakīl* of Damascus who had been obliged to pay 2,000 dinars to the

⁷⁹In 881/1477: *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 80. In 891/1486: *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 1:305. In 892/1487: *Ta'liq*, 715; *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 120. In 894/1489: *Ta'liq*, 881. In 898/1493: *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 1:342–44; *Ta'liq*, 1163. As for cases in Jerusalem, see: al-ʿUlaymī, *Al-Uns al-Jalīl bi-Tārīkh al-Quds wa-al-Khalīl* (Amman, 1973), 2:338, 364–65 (hereafter cited as *Uns*).

⁸⁰*Ta'liq*, 715–16.

⁸¹*Mufākahah*, 1:78. He was being assigned to Syrian provinces such as Gaza, Jerusalem, Safad, Hamah, Tripoli, and Aleppo to collect taxes from these cities.

⁸²In 891/1486: *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 1:305–6. In 892/1487: *Mufākahah*, 1:78. In 893/1488: *Mufākahah*, 1:91. In 894/1489: *Mufākahah*, 1:111; *Ta'liq*, 903, 911. In Jumādā II 895/May 1490: *Mufākahah*, 1:124–25. In Ramaḍān 895/August 1490: *Mufākahah*, 1:128, 130; *Ta'liq*, 972. In 897/1491: *Mufākahah*, 1:146.



sultan every year. Because he had been remiss in fulfilling this obligation, Māmāy confined him to the citadel (*qalʿah*) and confiscated 10,000 dinars from him to repay the sultan.⁸³ In Rabīʿ II/April, Māmāy confined ʿImād al-Dīn al-Nāṣirī, the Hanafi chief judge of Damascus, to the citadel and forced him to choose between paying 6,000 dinars or being sent to Cairo.⁸⁴ The *khāṣṣakīs* (or low-ranking amirs) were also appointed as estate collectors, referred to as *ḥawwāt*, in the event of the death of high officials. For example, when Qijmās al-Ishāqī, the viceroy of Damascus, died in Shawwāl 892/September 1487, Qāyṭbāy dispatched Qānṣūh al-Alfi, *dawādār thānī* (the second executive secretary) of Egypt, to Damascus to collect his estate. On arrival in Damascus, he confined Qijmās's private staff to the citadel for the audit and confiscation of his estate.⁸⁵ Because the appointment and dismissal of most officials in the Syrian provinces were within the sultan's authority (especially in the case of high-ranking officers), the sale of offices and confiscations targeting them were the most lucrative sources of his income. In other words, through the appointment and dismissal of Syrian officials, the wealth accumulated by them in Syria would be funneled to the sultan in Cairo.⁸⁶

The citadel of Damascus played an important role in such financial policies of the sultan. In each of the provincial capitals in Syria, a governor (*nāʾib*) was assigned directly by the sultan to the citadel, which was located in a corner of the provincial capital city as a stronghold for the city's defense, separate from the provincial viceroy (*nāʾib al-saltānah*) who was head of the provincial administration.⁸⁷ Backed by his independence, military power, and direct connection with the sultan, the governor of the citadel kept an eye on the viceroy's activity to prevent him from revolting against the sultan; in fact, there were some instances when a governor of the citadel arrested the provincial viceroy in accordance with the sultan's

⁸³ *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 110; *Taʿlīq*, 591–92, 594; *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 1:305–6. On the confiscation he performed in Jerusalem, see: *Uns*, 2:335.

⁸⁴ *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 111; *Taʿlīq*, 597. For other examples: *Nayl*, 6:352; *Inbāʾ al-Ḥaṣr*, 32–33; *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 127; *Mufākahah*, 1:108, 138; *Taʿlīq*, 1417.

⁸⁵ *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 121–22; *Mufākahah*, 1:81–82; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Iʿlām al-Warāʾ bi-Man Wulliya Nāʾiban min al-Atrāk bi-Dimashq al-Shām al-Kubrā* (Damascus, 1964), 99 (hereafter cited as *Iʿlām*). For another example: *Mufākahah*, 1:104.

⁸⁶ According to Martel-Thoumian, among the sales of office concluded in the late Mamluk period, the most numerous were the cases in Damascus (Martel-Thoumian, “The Sale of Office,” 54). On the sales of office and confiscations in Damascus, see: Taha Thalji Tarawneh, “The Province of Damascus during the Second Mamluk Period (784/1382–922/1516)” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1987), 190–204.

⁸⁷ *Ṣubḥ*, 4:184–85. ʿAbd al-Qādir Rayḥāwī, *Qalʿat Dimashq: Tārīkh al-Qalʿah wa-Āthārḥā wa-Funūnhā al-Miʾmāriyah* (Damascus, 1979), 103–4; Muḥammad Aḥmad Dahmān, *Wulāt Dimashq fī ʿAṣr al-Mamālik* (Damascus, 1984), 24. The provincial government house, referred to as *Dār al-Saʿādah* or *Dār al-Niyābah*, was located outside the citadel.



secret order.⁸⁸ In other words, the citadels served as extensions of the sultan's authority in Syria. The citadel of Damascus assumed a new role in the sultan's finances during the period under consideration. As for the collection of money through confiscations and the sale of offices, the appointments to Damascene government posts—especially in the case of civilians and judicial officers—were frequently made in Cairo, and at that time, the appointees paid money for the posts to the sultan.⁸⁹ On the other hand, most confiscations of dismissed officials' estates were performed while they were confined in the citadel of Damascus.⁹⁰ The citadel was also involved in the seizure of deceased officials' estates. During the seizure of Qijmās's estate in 892/1487 (mentioned earlier), the clerk of his private treasury (*kātib khizānat al-nā'ib*) and his *diwān*'s official were confined to the citadel.⁹¹ Another example that can be cited is the confiscation of property left by a deceased official of the *Diwān al-Jaysh* by the governor of the citadel in Muḥarram 897/September 1491.⁹² Although the citadel had played such a role since the days before the enthronement of Qāyrbāy, it grew in importance as its role in the collection of money for the sultan's fisc increased. The money that had been collected was removed from the jurisdiction of the provincial government as the sultan's money (*māl al-sultān*) and was kept in the citadel's coffers, referred to as *ṣundūq*.⁹³ This money was disbursed for the sultan's official or private use (such as the cost of repairs of mosques and financial assistance for the hajj caravans),⁹⁴ or was conveyed from the citadel to Cairo by the garrison troops.⁹⁵ As an illustration, in Muḥarram 902/September 1496, just after the death of Qāyrbāy, 100,000 dinars in cash were conveyed from the citadel of Damascus to Cairo by one hundred cavalymen and the governor of the citadel.⁹⁶

⁸⁸Dahmān, *Wulāt Dimashq*, 36; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah* (Damascus, 1977–97), 1:27, 330; *I'lām*, 80–83. For examples of the intervention of the governors of the citadel in the viceroys' activities: *Ta'liq*, 1351; *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 161; *Mufākahah*, 1:164, 298–99. Accordingly, the provincial viceroy's unlawful occupation of the citadel by force was regarded as high treason (cf. Rayḥāwī, *Qal'at Dimashq*, 114–19).

⁸⁹For example: *Mufākahah*, 1:36–37, 39; *Badā'ī*, 3:119, 308–9.

⁹⁰*Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 36, 51, 77, 81, 132–33, 139; *Ta'liq*, 286, 304, 507, 608–9, 756, 767, 798, 911, 1409; *Ḥawāḍith al-Zamān*, 1:213, 220, 304; *Mufākahah*, 1:138.

⁹¹*Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 120–21.

⁹²*Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 153. For other examples of the citadel's participation in assessment or confiscation of estates: *Ta'liq*, 143, 217, 285–86, 1258, 1355.

⁹³*Mufākahah*, 1:121, 170; *Ḥawāḍith al-Zamān*, 1:237, 355, 363–64; *Ta'liq*, 174, 197, 678, 812, 1008, 1279, 1293.

⁹⁴*Ḥawāḍith al-Zamān*, 1:237, 355; *Ta'liq*, 197; *Mufākahah*, 1:121.

⁹⁵*Ta'liq*, 656, 1435. For an example of the provincial viceroy's misappropriation of money preserved in the *ṣundūq*, see: *Ta'liq*, 1008.

⁹⁶*Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 187, 191; *Mufākahah*, 1:170; *Ta'liq*, 1444.



As a matter of course, the citadel was required to have its own bureaucracy executing such financial tasks in addition to the military functionaries originally stationed there, such as the governor and his adjutant, *naqīb al-qalʿah*.⁹⁷ We can say with fair certainty that among the various civilian officials who are frequently mentioned in the sources in connection with the citadel, the *nāẓir al-qalʿah* was the chief financial administrator.⁹⁸ The first reference to the post, to my knowledge, was in 847/1443–44.⁹⁹ It seems reasonable to suppose that as a result of the citadel's growing importance in financial affairs from the mid-ninth/fifteenth century resulting from a systematization of the sultanic fisc and frequent sales of offices and confiscations, the post of *nāẓir al-qalʿah* was newly established or began to attract the chroniclers' attention for the first time. In view of the fact that many *wakils* served concurrently as *nāẓir al-qalʿah* in Qāyṭbāy's reign, these two posts were closely related to each other as offices involved in sultanic financial affairs in Damascus.¹⁰⁰ In addition to the *nāẓir*, various civilian officials attached to the citadel are mentioned in the Damascene sources of the late Mamluk period, such as *dīwān al-qalʿah*, *ṣayrafī al-qalʿah*, and *ustādār al-qalʿah*.¹⁰¹ It is not far from the truth to say that these officials composed a *dīwān* in the citadel and administered the sultanic fisc independently of the provincial government. Moreover, the fact that Qāyṭbāy often appointed "his own mamluk" or "his relative (*qarīb*)" as the governor of the citadel instead of Damascene amirs clearly indicates his intention of maintaining control over the citadel through the appointment of people close to him.¹⁰²

CONCLUSION

To surmount the financial failure of the government and the urgency for military funds, Qāyṭbāy made various efforts to construct an effective mechanism for concentrating cash from all over Egypt and Syria in his own hands, as well as to

⁹⁷ *Ṣubḥ*, 4:186.

⁹⁸ *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 25, 49, 57, 58, 74, 126, 141, 188; *Mufaḥahah*, 1:36, 37, 39, 91, 125, 156; *Taʿlīq*, 49, 51, 54, 66, 770, 940, 952, 991; *Ḥawādīth al-Zamān*, 1:309.

⁹⁹ Al-ʿAynī, *Iqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān* (Cairo, 1989), 598, 601.

¹⁰⁰ During the period from Qāyṭbāy's enthronement until the end of Mamluk rule, 10 men assumed the post of *nāẓir al-qalʿah* of Damascus on sixteen different occasions, and in 8 of the 16 cases, the *nāẓir al-qalʿah* concurrently held the post of *wakīl*.

¹⁰¹ The *dīwān al-qalʿah*: *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī*, 126, 136, 171, 191; *Mufaḥahah*, 1:9, 212; 2:19; *Taʿlīq*, 636, 990; *Ḥawādīth al-Zamān*, 2:279. The *ṣayrafī al-qalʿah*: *Ḥawādīth al-Zamān*, 2:261. The *ustādār al-qalʿah*: *Ḥawādīth al-Zamān*, 2:205. The *shāhid al-qalʿah* and the *mubāshir al-qalʿah*: *Mufaḥahah*, 2:19.

¹⁰² *Mufaḥahah*, 1:99, 114, 134, 146, 153. Such a tendency was also seen in Aleppo (*Badāʾiʿ*, 3:125; *Dawʿ*, 3:65). Cf. *Mufaḥahah*, 1:261.



reorganize the state's finances. Although his policies generally stood on a common foundation with those of his predecessors, the situation that prevailed during his reign required him to pursue these policies more radically. Consequently, the importance of the sultan's finances and the state's finances was reversed during his reign, with the former coming to play a pivotal role in the spheres of administration, finance, and military affairs in the late Mamluk period. Throughout the reign of al-Ghawrī, Qāyrbāy's actual successor enthroned in 906/1501, the sultan's fisc saw substantial growth and increased importance amidst a deteriorating general financial situation. Al-Ghawrī employed various means for raising revenue—such as extra taxation, the sale of offices, and confiscation—more frequently.¹⁰³ However, as we shall see in what follows, his financial policies basically constituted an extension of those introduced by Qāyrbāy.

In general, the *dawādār*'s control over the *Dīwān al-Wizārah* and *al-Dīwān al-Mufrad* continued throughout al-Ghawrī's reign. Al-Ghawrī's nephew, Ṭūmānbāy, who was the last Mamluk sultan, took the post and worked as al-Ghawrī's right-hand man. The Royal Mamluk corps often demonstrated and rioted, but until the very end of the Mamluk period their rioting seems rarely to have been caused by delays in the regular payment of *jāmakīyah* and daily meat supplies. Rather, they usually demonstrated to gain extra bonuses for participating in military expeditions or for pronouncing a *bay'ah* to a new sultan. This suggests that the regular disbursement of the two *dīwāns* was, on the whole, conducted smoothly under the supervision of the *dawādār*. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this was achieved with the help of the sultan's fisc, as well as by the maintenance of the payment system through the regularly held inspections of recipients following that of 873/1468.¹⁰⁴ Judging from the fact that *al-Dīwān al-Mufrad*, as described in 897/1492, continued to complete the payments with the financial support of *al-Dhakhīrah*,¹⁰⁵ which often covered the two *dīwāns*' deficits after 860/1455–56, Qāyrbāy's financial restructuring made no radical change to the overall financial situation, wherein the paralysis of the state's finances was advancing and their operation was being sustained by the sultan's fisc. In addition to covering deficits, *al-Dhakhīrah* came to be used as a source of payment for the amirs. Many amirs, including some amirs of one hundred, came to receive *jāmakīyahs* and wheat supplies from *al-Dhakhīrah* instead of holding *iqṭā's*.¹⁰⁶ *Al-Dhakhīrah* also started to

¹⁰³For example: *Badā'i*, 4:149–50, 190, 442–43.

¹⁰⁴In 896/1490: *Nayl*, 8:216; *Badā'i*, 3:277. In 907/1502: *Badā'i*, 4:25; *Ḥawāḍith al-Zamān*, 2:141.

¹⁰⁵*Wajīz*, 1232.

¹⁰⁶*Badā'i*, 4:100, 181, 338, 436. Some amirs received their stipends from the revenues of the weekly tax (*mujāma'ah*) and the monthly tax (*mushāharah*) collected by a *muḥtasib* (market inspector) from markets (*Badā'i*, 5:19). The first reference to the amir receiving stipends from



take charge of granting pensions to retired military men¹⁰⁷ and sheep to mamluks and amirs for sacrifice on the occasion of *ʿĪd al-Aḏḥā*.¹⁰⁸ The financial crisis of the government and dysfunction of the *iqṭāʿ* system remained unresolved in a situation wherein the alienation of state lands was accelerating. It was inevitable that the sultanic finances, which were originally managed for the sultan himself without any specific administrative function, assumed such functions as the financial *diwāns* of the government came to a standstill.

The financial staff for the sultanic fisc increasingly grew in importance during al-Ghawrī's reign, and thus some of them extended their authority and acquired broader powers.¹⁰⁹ The emergence of the sultan's *bardadār* in 907/1502 is a good example to illustrate the change in power structure within the government. The post of *bardadār*, which had been that of a minor official, was established during Qāyṭbāy's reign as a new office directly relating to the sultan, probably intended to collect money for the sultan more effectively.¹¹⁰ Thereafter, the sultan's *bardadār* gained political influence by taking advantage of his strong connection to the sultan, and eventually assumed jurisdiction over the three major bureaus of the government, i.e., *Dīwān al-Wizārah*, *Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ*, and *al-Dīwān al-Mufrad* in 908/1502, although he had no official authority over them.¹¹¹ After 920/1514, the sultan's *bardadār* assumed executive responsibilities for the management of *al-Dīwān al-Mufrad*.¹¹² Finally, the dependence of the administration of the Mamluk regime on the sultanic fisc, which increased in Qāyṭbāy's reign, reached the *terminus ad quem* under al-Ghawrī as a necessary consequence of the reorganization of the state's finances and the development of the sultanic fisc that had advanced throughout the Circassian Mamluk period.

al-Dhakhīrah was in 886/1481 under Qāyṭbāy's reign (*Badāʿī*, 3:190).

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 4:139.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 4:170, 429.

¹⁰⁹For example, Ibn Abī al-Jūd, who served concurrently as *wakīl*, the sultan's *bardadār* (bailiff), *nāẓir al-awqāf* (the controller of religious endowments), etc., took charge of confiscations from foreign merchants (*Badāʿī*, 4:29, 44–45; *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 2:170–71); Shams al-Dīn Ibn ʿAwad, who held the posts of *wakīl* and *ustādār al-dhakhīrah*, served as “the person in charge of a lot of financial resources of lands (*mutakallim ʿalā ʿiddat jihāt min al-bilād*)” for al-Ghawrī (*Badāʿī*, 4:377, 387–388); al-Zaynī Barakāt, who succeeded these two people's jobs, took the responsibility for the management of al-Ghawrī's various income sources including land (*Badāʿī*, 4:50, 75, 157–58, 197–98, 381, 397–98; 5:19, 46. Cf. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?*, 144–47).

¹¹⁰*Badāʿī*, 4:29. Cf. Popper, *Systematic Notes*, 1:95, 100.

¹¹¹*Badāʿī*, 4:44.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, 4:380–81, 390–91; 5:5, 67.



The Sons of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and the Politics of Puppets: Where Did It All Start?

بيت قلاوون سعادته في عاجل كانت بلا أجل
حل على أملاكه للردى دين قد استوفاه بالكامل¹

The period from al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's death (741/1341) until the emergence of the Circassian dynasty under al-Zāhir Barqūq (784/1382) witnessed the unbridled succession to the throne of Egypt and Syria of the scions of that sultan, who ruled for 31 years during his third reign. These eight sons, two grandsons, and two great-grandsons are generally characterized as puppets whom the amirs enthroned as they wished. Their youth is usually identified as the reason why these sultans could be deposed as easily as they were put on the throne; their lack of experience, or perhaps more exactly of proper training, may have led them to behave in inappropriate ways or to make decisions not in accordance with those expected from a ruler. The rationales which the modern historian can invoke to try to understand how and why this situation continued for such a long period of time, particularly after the very long and successful reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, are numerous and can involve politics, sociology, and economics. As in many cases in history, it is probably a combination of several factors that played an undeniable role. From a historical point of view, it remains very tempting to try to generalize the whole period in that way, but the result necessarily offers a simplistic view of the events.

In the eyes of a later Mamluk historian such as al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/1418), this succession of reigns looked like a mere coincidence, albeit strange in its regularity; this is what Muslim historians called *gharā'ib al-ittifāq*.² On the basis of a comment made by al-Ṣūlī, who noticed that, from the beginning of Islam down to his time, every sixth holder of authority was dismissed, al-Qalqashandī completed the list provided by a predecessor (al-Ṣafadī) for the later periods, considering the

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¹Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān al-ʿAṣr wa-A'wān al-Naṣr*, ed. ʿAlī Abū Zayd et al. (Beirut and Damascus, 1997), 2:524 (read *ḥalla* and not *ḥakka*, as in idem, *Al-Wāfi bi-al-Wafayāt* [Istanbul and Beirut, 1931–] 9:155).

²See Barbara Langner, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Volkskunde Ägyptens nach mamlukischen Quellen* (Berlin, 1983), 111–12.



Fatimids, the Ayyubids, and the Mamluks.³ While al-Ṣafadī stopped his assessment with al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn, the first ruler of a new series of six, al-Qalqashandī went further up to the reign of Baybars al-Jāshankīr, then started a new series with al-Manṣūr Abū Bakr (al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's first successor) up to al-Muẓaffar Ḥājji, then from al-Nāṣir Ḥasan up to al-Ṣāliḥ Ḥājji, and finally ending with the last series for which the first ruler was, rather opportunely, the founder of the Circassian regime, al-Zāhir Barqūq. Al-Qalqashandī compiled this list during the reign of Barqūq's successor, al-Nāṣir Faraj, the second ruler of this new series, and he concluded by saying: "God knows best who will be the sixth!"⁴ In this rather schematic presentation, the involved historians did not bother to twist the truth (several depositions intervened in between the pattern of every sixth ruler), but it shows that they felt a need to explain the phenomenon.⁵

Modern scholarship, after having shown more interest in the reigns of great rulers, has finally felt it necessary to study the factors that could explain why and how al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's succession led to such a shift in power. Amalia Levanoni's studies have analyzed the role that the innovations and modifications introduced in the Mamluk system by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad may have played in this respect.⁶ Recently, Jo Van Steenberghe focused his attention on the period that followed al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's death up to Barqūq's accession to the sultanate.⁷ The work of both scholars has helped to further our understanding of the processes that were taking place during the entire period. The aim of this article is not to provide another analysis of the political role played by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's successors; it is rather to explore al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's influence on his succession. In other words: did he prepare for his succession, and if so, in what manner? It is hoped that through the attempt to answer this question, some insight will be gained into the events that took place in the roughly forty years that followed his death before the rise of Barqūq.

³Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā bi-Ṣināʿat al-Inshāʾ* (Cairo, 1913–19), 1:443–45.

⁴In his earlier work on the caliphate, *Maʾāthir al-Ināfah fī Maʾālim al-Khilāfah*, ed. ʿAbd al-Sattār Aḥmad Farrāj (Kuwait, 1985), 3:352–54, al-Qalqashandī made the same statement regarding the caliph ruling at that time, but given the subject of this book, he limited his remarks to the caliphate and made no comment on the sultanate.

⁵In one particular case, an attempt to circumvent this law of the series is documented by Ibn Nubātah. The Abbasid caliph al-Mustanshir (r. 623–40/1226–42) received the oath of allegiance, but being the sixth of a series, he was deposed and then enthroned again for fear of this fate. See al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā*, 1:444.

⁶Amalia Levanoni, *A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad Ibn Qalāwūn (1310–1341)* (Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1995). See also idem, "The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26 (1994): 373–92.

⁷Jo Van Steenberghe, *Order Out of Chaos: Patronage, Conflict and Mamluk Socio-Political Culture, 1341–1382* (Leiden and Boston, 2006).



“AL-MULK ‘AQĪM”: PAVING THE WAY FOR SUCCESSION

With the words “Kingship is childless (*al-mulk ‘aqīm*),” the Abbasid caliph al-Mustakfī I indicated that the authority conferred by him upon the sultan was by no means transferable to the offspring of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (who had just abdicated in 708/1309),⁸ thus arguing that it could be bestowed on Baybars al-Jāshankīr, who had no genealogical link to the Qalāwūnids.⁹ For lexicographers, this idiom represents the fact that no genealogical link is of use when it comes to political power, given that a ruler can kill his own son, brother, uncle, or the like in order to maintain his rule. In this way, authority is by no means inheritable.¹⁰ This should have been all the more true in the case of the Mamluks, given that one’s ability to rule was determined by several personal qualities.¹¹ Despite this factor, it remains that the hereditary, dynastic principle was strong throughout the Turkish period. Some historians have considered that dynasticism in this case was only the result of a “specious and misleading” impression: if the Qalāwūnids succeeded in monopolizing the throne, it was only for the sake of convenience, with the different sultans playing the role of under-aged puppets in the service of

⁸By that date, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad had at least two male children, presumably both by his wife Ardūkin: al-Malik al-Manṣūr ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī, who was born in 703/1303–4 and died in 710/1310 (al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk li-Ma‘rifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyādah and Sa‘id ‘Abd al-Fattāh ‘Ashūr [Cairo, 1934–73], 2:91; Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah fī A‘yān al-Mīṣr al-Thāminah*, ed. Muḥammad Sayyid Jād al-Ḥaqq [Cairo, 1966–68], 3:190 [no. 2892]), and al-Malik al-Muẓaffar, who was born in 704/1304 (Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar wa-Jāmi‘ al-Ghurur* [Cairo, 1960–92], 9:126). The date of his death is unknown, but we are told that when his brother ‘Alī died, he was al-Nāṣir’s only son at that time, from which we may infer that al-Malik al-Muẓaffar died before that date. It is to be noted that this al-Malik al-Muẓaffar, whose name (*ism*) is never quoted in the sources, cannot be identified with Ḥājji, as put forward by P. M. Holt, “The Position and Power of the Mamlūk Sultan,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 38 (1975): 241, given that the latter was born in 732/1331–32 (al-Ṣafadi, *Al-Wāfi bi-al-Wafāyāt*, 11:237; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Muqaffā*, ed. Muḥammad al-Ya‘lāwī [Beirut, 2006], 3:73).

⁹“I dismissed his predecessor [al-Nāṣir Muḥammad] after I came to know that he had abdicated. I regarded that as my duty, and the four judges delivered their judgment in favor of that. Know—may God have mercy upon you—that kingship is childless: it is not transmitted by inheritance to anyone, be it from a predecessor to a successor, or from an illustrious elder to a peer.” These words are part of the deed of nomination drawn up on al-Mustakfī’s behalf and meant for Baybars al-Jāshankīr. See al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:65.

¹⁰On this issue, see P. M. Holt, “Some Observations on the ‘Abbāsīd Caliphate of Cairo,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 47 (1984): 505–6; Ulrich Haarmann, “Regicide and the ‘Law of the Turks,” in *Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays Written in Honor of Martin B. Dickson*, ed. Michel M. Mazzaoui and Vera B. Moreen (Salt Lake City, 1990), 130; Konrad Hirschler, “‘He is a child and this land is a borderland of Islam’: Under-age Rule and the Quest for Political Stability in the Ayyūbīd Period,” *Al-Masāq* 19 (2007): 39.

¹¹See Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyādah’s comment on this in al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:65 (n. 4).



an oligarchy of amirs.¹² More recent research has demonstrated that, at least in the case of the Qalāwūnids, “a dynastic reflex was at work”;¹³ when the necessity to enthrone a new sultan was felt, it was always a scion of Qalāwūn, through his son Muḥammad, who was chosen. Moreover, in the great majority of the cases, it was the eldest surviving son who was chosen, suggesting that he was expected to play a greater role than that of a puppet. In some way, primogeniture forced itself upon the amirs once a choice had to be made.¹⁴ By that time, the above-mentioned principle of the non-hereditary character of authority had been superseded, and it took decades before it could be invoked again, with the accession of Barqūq. Even in this case, it was only by pretending that none of the surviving descendants of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad could hold legitimate power that this genealogical link could be broken and power could pass to an amir who was not considered a usurper.¹⁵

Given that a dynastic principle was at work, together with some sort of primogeniture—if not in favor of the eldest son, then at least one of the eldest—during the Qalāwūnid period, it is legitimate to question whether the ruling sultan was likely to prepare for his succession, and if so, how this was done. Before considering the practical aspect of this preparation in the case of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, it is necessary to examine what was expected from a theoretical point of view. It is probably no coincidence that one of the latest treatises of the *Fürstenspiegel* genre is dated to that very period. Written by a scion of the Abbasid family, who started to compose it on Saturday 23 Shawwāl 708/5 April 1309, *The*

¹²Holt, “The Position and Power of the Mamlūk Sultan,” 240. See also Levanoni, “The Mamluk Conception,” 379.

¹³Jo Van Steenberghe, “‘Is anyone my guardian . . .?’ Mamlūk Under-age Rule and the Later Qalāwūnids,” *Al-Masāq* 19 (2007): 55. Cf. the words pronounced by Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Aḥmadī while al-Nāṣir Muḥammad expressed the wish, on his deathbed, to designate his successor: “Amirs! We are the mamluks of this family, and even if there only remained from our master’s offspring a blind daughter, we should obey her until her death.” Al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn al-Ṣāliḥi wa-Awlādihi*, ed. Barbara Schäfer (Wiesbaden, 1977), 105.

¹⁴However, it must be kept in mind that the Mamluks always adopted a contradictory stance towards hereditary rule. Even though they selected an heir of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, their aim was mainly to ensure stability among the different factions. See Levanoni, “The Mamluk Conception,” 382–83.

¹⁵Importantly, in this context, the last Qalāwūnid sultan, al-Ṣāliḥ Ḥājji, who had been deposed by Barqūq in 784/1382, was restored to the throne in 791/1389 on the basis that “he had been overthrown by Barqūq.” See Amalia Levanoni, “Al-Ṣāliḥ Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Ḥādjdī,” *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., 9:987. Anne Broadbridge has recently established that the Qalāwūnids were fully aware that they were members of a royal ruling family, as is confirmed by some passages found in documents issued by these rulers and the frequent mention of their lineage up to their ancestor Qalāwūn on their coins. The chancellery may have played a decisive role in fostering the continuity of this ideology. See Anne Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds* (Cambridge, 2008), 147–48.



*Remains of the Past Regarding the Organization of the States*¹⁶ aims at providing the usurper of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's throne, Baybars al-Jāshankīr, with a manual of rules and advice to administer the state. The third chapter of the third section of this book deals with the manners of children and relatives.¹⁷ In the body of this chapter, the author touches upon the question of preparing the ruler's child to succeed him on the throne. Among its advice is that the ruler is encouraged to appoint to an office the son in whom he sees nobility and efficiency, so that he can be drilled and given practice and so that if authority should be bestowed upon him, he would thus be experienced. But the author acknowledges that, when the ruler feels that he can designate one of his sons or relatives as his heir to the throne, the decision must be taken after mature consideration and selection without neglecting the advice of others. If he is resolved in his choice, the deed of appointment should be written down and attested by those he usually consults on matters of state. Then, two options are available: either he keeps his decision secret, commanding those he consulted to act in the same way and leaving the deed of nomination in a secure place, or he reveals it and consequently enables his heir to administer freely, authorizing him to grant land tenure and money. In any case, the ruler is cautioned not to waver between these two options, for example by revealing his intention but prohibiting his heir from acting as such. This behavior could only lead to his son's resentment against him and his willingness to overthrow his father if the latter's life continues long thereafter.¹⁸

Despite the non-hereditary character of authority, the idea of preparing a ruler's son to succeed his father on the throne was nonetheless accepted, as is attested in this *Fürstenspiegel* which is contemporary with the events dealt with in this article. The advice provided, though theoretical, tallies with the factual elements which we will now consider.

¹⁶Al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-ʿAbbāsī, *Āthār al-Uwal fī Tartīb al-Duwal* (Bulāq, 1878), 199. The starting date of composition (13 Shawwāl 708) is provided on the title page, on the basis of the manuscript used for preparing the edition. It appears to be erroneous, as the given date did not fall on a Saturday, but on a Wednesday. Moreover, it is established that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad left Cairo, presumably to fulfil the pilgrimage, on Sunday, 10 Shawwāl, and that Baybars al-Jāshankīr was put on the throne on Saturday, 23 Shawwāl. It is thus impossible that the author started his work for al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, who was away and already considered as having abdicated, but rather he did so in order to attract the new sultan's benevolence. In the light of this, it may be established that the author started his book on the 23rd of Shawwāl, a Saturday and the day of Baybars' enthronement (see al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:45). In the colophon (p. 198), the author mentioned the name of the ruling sultan, Baybars al-Jāshankīr, which means that he completed his work in a very short period of time. Be that as it may, the manual was not meant for al-Nāṣir Muḥammad.

¹⁷Al-ʿAbbāsī, *Āthār al-Uwal*, 109–11 (*fī ādāb al-awlād wa-al-aqārib wa-ḥusn al-sirah maʿahum*).

¹⁸Ibid., 110–11.



LAYING OUT THE FAMILY'S GENEALOGICAL TREE

In order for the matter to become clear, it is crucial to understand who al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's offspring were and how many they were. Although much work has been done on this aspect of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's life,¹⁹ it is hard to have a clear picture of his offspring and of the marital links arranged by him, and after his death, by his sons. In this respect, a genealogical tree is clearly needed.²⁰ Ideally, this tree should not be limited to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's offspring: it would rather take as its starting point the ancestor, Qalāwūn himself, and also consider the marriage policy that he developed, a policy that was continued over several decades by his scions. I have thus decided to meet this need in producing a genealogical tree of the Qalāwūnid family.²¹ It must be kept in mind that this is a preliminary result of a few months of research into the sources. Indeed, to get a clearer picture of all the links, it is necessary to go through numerous contemporaneous and later sources for which indexes are not always available, meaning that some data is found either by chance, or through reading a considerable amount of material. While some of the persons considered performed an important role in the state, and were thus subjects of biographical entries in dictionaries or chronicles, it remains that the majority of them were rather unknown to historians, thus not deserving any particular mention. Data regarding these persons are found in rather unexpected places, as is the case with most women, whose names are seldom mentioned and whose existence is confirmed in the entries of their husbands. Another problem in establishing this genealogy lies in the identification of the mothers of these near-phantoms. In a genealogical tree, each person must be connected to both a father and a mother, hence the necessity to attribute all those for whom a mother is not mentioned in the sources to a unique unnamed mother. This is the case for a great number of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's daughters, but also for some of his sons. Hence, there is an unrealistically large number of daughters who could be identified

¹⁹See P. M. Holt, "An-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (684–741/1285–1341): His Ancestry, Kindred and Affinity," in *Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras: Proceedings of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd International Colloquium Organized at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in May 1992, 1993 and 1994*, ed. Urbain Vermeulen and Daniel De Smet (Leuven, 1995), 313–24; Levanoni, *A Turning Point in Mamluk History*, 48–49; Van Steenbergen, *Order Out of Chaos*, 82–85; idem, "Mamluk Elite on the Eve of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's Death (1341): A Look behind the Scenes of Mamluk Politics," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 9, no. 2 (2005): 192–94; Doris Behrens-Abouseif, "Waqf as Remuneration and the Family Affairs of al-Nasir Muhammad and Baktimur al-Saqi," in *The Cairo Heritage: Essays in Honor of Laila Ali Ibrahim*, ed. Doris Behrens-Abouseif (Cairo and New York, 2000), 58–60.

²⁰A first attempt was provided by Eduard de Zambaur, *Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam* (Hanover, 1927), 106.

²¹A preliminary version of the genealogical file on the basis of which the above-mentioned chart (see <http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/su/mideast/qalawunids/qalawunid-pedigree.pdf>) was created is available at the following address: <http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/su/mideast/qalawunids> (The Qalāwunids: a pedigree).



only occasionally with persons mentioned as wives. It is hoped that, in pursuing this project and the analysis of the sources, greater precision will be gained. On the other hand, the continuity of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's lineage was ensured for more than a century: the last descendant known thus far from the sources died in 852/1448–49, but it is expected that later descendants will be discovered in the future.²² A quite complete genealogy could thus be produced, despite the above-mentioned drawbacks, taking into account the various collateral links and the relative offspring.

LIKE FATHER, LIKE SON

Being himself the heir of a sultan, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad knew that advance planning for matters of succession was crucial. His father, Qalāwūn, had prepared for his own successor well in advance: he designated his favorite son, 'Alī, as his heir to the throne and simultaneously appointed him joint sultan. 'Alī eventually died before his father, in 687/1288, and Qalāwūn chose, rather reluctantly, his second-oldest son, Khalīl.²³ Although this designation was made public, the official deed of appointment was never signed by Qalāwūn, which demonstrates his reluctance regarding Khalīl, but the latter's accession to the throne, on his father's death, was not questioned.²⁴ In any case, the only other son available at that time, Muḥammad, was not of age (he was 5 when Qalāwūn died) and was still living in the harem. When, at the age of 9, he succeeded his elder brother, he was an inexperienced boy, and it was not long before a usurper removed him from the throne. His own experience with power had taught him that no ruler is able to maintain his authority unless he is prepared to do so. Setting up a dynastic principle had unexpected consequences, such as the tendency to "demilitarize" the ruler, who was unable to take part in battle or to lead an expedition. Although al-Nāṣir Muḥammad managed to impose himself in the end as an autocratic sultan, he was aware of the drawbacks of failing to prepare. The solutions he crafted were multifarious, as we will see, and regarded several of his sons.

Considering that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad could not determine with certainty which sons would survive him, such preparation had to involve several sons, but of course this did not preclude favoritism. The timeline chart below shows which sons were

²²Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Sha'bān ibn al-Nāṣir Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn (d. 852/1448–49). When he died, his parents were still living, and he left numerous children. He was one of Jaqmaq's courtiers. See Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi wa-al-Mustawfā ba'd al-Wāfi*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn (Cairo, 1984–), 2:663–64 (no. 2280); al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍaw' al-Lāmi' li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsi'* (Cairo, 1934–36), 8:184–85 (no. 470).


²³Holt, "The Position and Power of the Mamlūk Sultan," 241.

²⁴Holt, "An-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (684–741/1285–1341): His Ancestry, Kindred and Affinity," 314–15.



likely to succeed him on the throne and thus to receive an appropriate designation (disregarding whether they were favored for the succession in actuality).

On his deathbed, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad is reported to have gathered all his sons



Estimated dates of birth or death are indicated with shading. Full brothers are joined by braces.



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(except Aḥmad, who was in al-Karak), in order to designate his heir to the throne; they were, in all, twelve at that time,²⁵ which tallies with the data provided by most of the sources.²⁶ Five sons had already died: three at an early stage of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's third reign, and two shortly before his own death. The first three were apparently the sons he had with his first wife Ardūkīn, the widow of his brother Khalīl.²⁷ Little is known about them except that the two named sons received a *malik* title together with a *laqab*: al-Malik al-Manṣūr 'Alī²⁸ and al-Malik al-Muẓaffar.²⁹ In naming his sons in such a way, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad respected a tradition going back to the Ayyubid period and adopted by Qalāwūn himself. Instead of being reserved for the ruling sultan, as was the custom in Mamluk rule, the *malik* title was given to some of his sons who were, perhaps, considered as future successors. That such a title could be given simultaneously to more than one son is evidenced by the mention of his two sons, 'Alī and Khalīl, with their royal titles in an official document dated to 684/1285. On the other hand, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad himself is said to have received his royal title upon his birth.³⁰ Be that as it may, if al-Nāṣir Muḥammad followed this practice with the desire to see the two sons succeed him, his hopes were soon dashed with the premature deaths of both of these sons. He apparently no longer followed this practice for his younger sons. In subsequent years, no other son is reported to have been born, hence his divorce from Ardūkīn in 717/1317.³¹ It was not before 716/1316–17 that his lineage was finally guaranteed: from that date to the end of his life, no less than fourteen sons were born, their mothers being either legal wives or concubines.

²⁵ Al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārikh*, 110. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah provides only eleven names (*Al-Tārikh*, ed. 'Adnān Darwish [Damascus, 1977–97], 2:133), while al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:546, leads us to believe that when al-Nāṣir died, he left (*taraka*) fourteen boys, including Muḥammad and 'Alī. The latter had died by that date. See below.

²⁶ According to a pronouncement by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad on his deathbed, he had fifteen sons. See Ibn Abī al-Faḍā'il, *Al-Nahj al-Sadīd wa-al-Durr al-Farīd fīmā ba'd Tārikh Ibn al-'Amīd*, ed. Samira Kortantamer (Freiburg, 1973), 264 = 105 (Ar. text). It might be that this figure is the result of a later reconstruction made by the author on the basis of the total number of sons al-Nāṣir had during his lifetime (seventeen in the chart).

²⁷ Al-Malik al-Muẓaffar is never said in the sources to have been the son of Ardūkīn, but it is highly probable that she was his mother, as at that time al-Nāṣir Muḥammad had no other official wife.

²⁸ He died at the age of six in 710/1310. In 709/1309, he was said to be al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's only child. Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān al-'Aṣr*, 3:512; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:91; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 3:190 (no. 2892).

²⁹ His *ism* is unknown. He was already dead when his brother 'Alī died. He thus lived less than six years. See Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar*, 9:126.

³⁰ See Holt, "The Position and Power of the Mamlūk Sultan," 241.

³¹ Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:177. In Rajab 719/August–September 1319, she was expelled from the citadel. *Ibid.*, 195.



Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad had six legal wives, of course not simultaneously. Aside from Ardūkīn, he also married, in 720/1320, Ṭulunbāy/Dulanbiya, the niece of Üzbek Khān;³² in 721/1321, Ṭughāy,³³ a Turkish slave-girl he bought from Tankiz al-Ḥusāmī, his governor in Syria;³⁴ then in 734/1334, Quṭlūmalik,³⁵ Tankiz al-Ḥusāmī's daughter and Aḥmad ibn Baktamur al-Sāqī's widow.³⁶ At an unknown date, but before 740/1339, he married Zādū, the sister of Ṭūlū Qurṭaqā who was married to Yalbughā al-Yahyāwī,³⁷ and, also at an unknown date, he married the sister of Qawṣūn.³⁸ As for concubines, his love of them was proverbial,³⁹ but only six are known for sure to have borne him children, and among these only four are

³²Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:203–5; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar*, 9:302; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 2:329–30 (no. 2052, Ṭūlū). On the question of her genealogical link to Üzbek Khān, see Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 132. She did not bear any children and was repudiated in 728/1328. She was successively married off, by al-Nāṣir himself, to three of his amirs. See Holt, “An-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (684–741/1285–1341): His Ancestry, Kindred and Affinity,” 316–17. See al-Yūsufī, *Nuḥḥat al-Nāṣir fī Sirat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥuṭayṭ (Beirut, 1986), 235, for the attestation of a forgery written by a judge in regard to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's declaration to Üzbek's envoy that she was dead, though she was still alive.

³³Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfī*, 16:447–48 (no. 381); Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 2:322 (no. 2025). She bore him Ānūk.

³⁴Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:232.

³⁵Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar*, 9:380. She bore him Ṣālīḥ and a daughter.

³⁶Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:289.

³⁷Ibid., 473. Yalbughā's wife gave birth on that date and Zādū is referred to as al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's wife. Zādū is not reported to have given birth to any children.

³⁸Al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 160. No child reported.

³⁹Levanoni, *A Turning Point in Mamluk History*, 184.



named by the sources:⁴⁰ Narjis,⁴¹ Bayād,⁴² Ardū,⁴³ and Kudā.⁴⁴

In the end, it can be said that the sons who were the most liable to succeed him, given their dates of birth, were: Aḥmad, Abū Bakr, Ibrāhīm, Ramaḍān, Yūsuf, and Ānūk.⁴⁵ The remaining sons were born too late to be considered realistic successors by their father and, indeed, the former sons often appear in the sources regarding events that took place during their youth and linked to what could be considered education and training, while the latter sons are mainly mentioned after their father's death because it was only then that they finally played politically significant roles. The forthcoming comments will thus deal with four of the aforementioned six eldest sons, as Ramaḍān and Yūsuf are seldom mentioned in the sources with respect to events that took place during their father's lifetime.⁴⁶

⁴⁰The first of the two unnamed concubines was the mother of Ismā'īl, Sha'bān, and a daughter (married to Bahādur al-Damurdāshī). She was later married by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad to Arghūn al-'Alā'ī. See al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:756. The second unnamed concubine gave birth to Ḥājji. She was later married to Lājīn al-'Alā'ī. The latter was compelled by al-Kāmil Sha'bān, during his reign (746–47/1345–46), to divorce her. See al-Maqrizī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 3:73; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 2:83. Other unnamed concubines probably bore him children. These are all classified under the same mother in the pedigree for the aforementioned reasons, but it does not reflect reality.

⁴¹Mother of Abū Bakr, Ramaḍān, and Yūsuf. Later, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad married her to Ṭuquzdamur al-Ḥamawī (who died in 746/1345; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:551). After the latter's death, she was married to Arghūn al-Ismā'īlī (still living with him in 756/1356; al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārikh*, 139).

⁴²Mother of Aḥmad. A slave-girl and singer, she was set free by Bahādur Āṣ, the *ra's nawbah*, and later married to Malikṭamur al-Sarjuwānī (at least before 731/1331; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 3:384).

⁴³She was a Tartar and the mother of Kujuk. After al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's death, she was married to Āqsunqur al-Nāṣirī, in 743/1343, at the latter's request (al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:635), and finally to al-Kāmil Sha'bān (before 746/1345; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:683).

⁴⁴Mother of Qumārī/Ḥasan and Tatar. She died in Qumārī's infancy (al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:745).

⁴⁵The youngest, Ānūk, was 17 years old when he died almost a year before his father.

⁴⁶Their dates of birth are unknown, but they were born after Abū Bakr. Yūsuf was married in 738/1337 by his father to a daughter of his amir Badr al-Dīn Jankalī ibn al-Bābā, which means that he was probably born between 722–25/1323–26. He died in Rabī' II 747/July–August 1346, perhaps murdered on order of his brother Sha'bān. See al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān al-'Aṣr*, 5:99; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:436, 707; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 5:248 (no. 5160) and 2:83 (suspicion against his brother for his killing). Ramaḍān and Yūsuf were full-brothers of Abū Bakr, who had just been put to death (Jumādā II 742/November 1341); their mother was Narjis. No marriage is reported for Ramaḍān in the sources, and this might imply that he was younger than Yūsuf. In 743/1342, after the accession of Ismā'īl, Ramaḍān attempted to rise against him, though he had no real support among the senior amirs. He had to flee to al-Karak, where he tried to join his brother Aḥmad, but he was killed before he could reach him. See al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān al-'Aṣr*, 5:99; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 2:42; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 2:203 (no. 1726); Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Al-Tārikh*, 2:326–27.



The order followed will be chronological, except that the youngest son, presented by the sources as the preferred son, will be treated first here.

THE PARAMOUNT SON: ĀNŪK

Although the youngest of the brothers listed as the most likely to succeed their father, Ānūk⁴⁷ quite quickly began to hold an important place in his father's heart: his mother, Ṭughāy, had become his beloved and preferred wife because of her beauty, probably around 721/1321, after the dispassionate marriage to Ṭulunbāy.⁴⁸ Ānūk is also said to have been the dearest son to his father by reason of his handsomeness, in addition to his father's deep affection for his mother.⁴⁹ Once he left the harem, his father took charge of his fate. As early as 731/1331, when Ānūk was aged 8, he married him to the daughter of one of his senior amirs, Baktamur al-Sāqī:⁵⁰ the contract was concluded on 2 Ṣafar 732/4 November 1331⁵¹ and by the end of the same month (23 Ṣafar/25 November), his father expressed the wish, in the presence of his amirs, to designate him as his heir to the throne (*walī 'ahd*), a wish to which they all adhered.⁵² He consequently granted him an *imrah mī'ah taqdimah alf*,⁵³ and it was issued by decree that a ceremony would take place to celebrate this designation; it was decreed that Ānūk would ride through the city, wearing the emblem of the sultanate (*shī'ār al-saltānah*), surrounded by the other amirs. An unknown event made al-Nāṣir Muḥammad change his mind: he ordered that all the preparations for the ceremony of official designation be stopped and, in the end, decided that Ānūk would ride through the city just to celebrate his new function of amir of one hundred. Instead of wearing the emblem of the sultanate,

⁴⁷Sources are not unanimous in giving his date of birth: either 15 Jumādā 721/12 July 1321 (al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:242; idem, *Al-Muqaffā*, 2:175-76; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 2:322), or 30 Rabī' I 723/8 April 1323 (al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:231-32, who did not notice that he reported two different dates) or Rajab 723/July 1323 (Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 1:446). One of the two later dates is more probable as a contemporaneous chronicler (Ibn al-Dāwadārī, *Kanz al-Durar*, 9:309) mentioned his birth during that year.

⁴⁸Ṭulunbāy did not please the sultan, who went out hunting the day after the consummation, which took place on the same day as the wedding (2 Rabī' II 720/12 May 1320). See al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:205.

⁴⁹Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 9:431; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 2:176; idem, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:176. He bore the same *laqab* as his father: Nāṣir al-Dīn, another sign of this preeminence (al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 2:175; idem, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:343).

⁵⁰On 15 Ramaḍān/22 June. See Ibn al-Dāwadārī, *Kanz al-Durar*, 9:358.

⁵¹A copy of the marriage contract (*ṣadāq*) is to be found in al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A'ṣhā*, 14:303.

⁵²Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:343. One can see in this decision al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's intent, at an early date, to perpetuate the dynastic system established by his father.

⁵³Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 9:431; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 2:176.



he decided to let his son wear the one of his grandfather, Qalāwūn.⁵⁴ The effect was obviously less impressive, and although it indicated Ānūk's preeminence over his elder brothers (who were only amirs of forty),⁵⁵ al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's final intent was nevertheless clear, but not definitive. His change of mind was perhaps induced by the fact that the official designation could have led to his own premature end.⁵⁶ Despite this step backward, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad went on showing favoritism to Ānūk. In the course of the same month, he gathered the various clerks working in the ministries to select the person who would be put in charge (*khāzindār*) of Ānūk's personal purse (*dīwān*). His new title and function (*amīr mi'ah-taqdimah alf*) brought him a large amount of money:⁵⁷ his purse is said to have reached a total of six thousand dinars—not *jayshī*, but cash—without taking into account business transactions (*matjar*). Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's choice fell on al-Nashw. A steward (*ustādhār*), Alṭunqush al-Jamālī, was also appointed on the same occasion.⁵⁸ A few months later, on 11 Sha'bān 732/8 May 1332, on the occasion of Ānūk's marriage (*ʿurs*), a stupendous feast was organized.⁵⁹ The

⁵⁴Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:343. Qalāwūn's mausoleum was repeatedly associated with such ceremonials dealing with the appointment of the sultan's sons to titles in the military hierarchy. See Jo Van Steenbergen's remark on its social implications, which were perhaps more symbolic than he suspects, in "Is anyone my guardian . . . ?" Mamlūk Under-age Rule and the Later Qalāwūnids," 62 (note 23). See particularly Mounira Chapoutot-Remadi, "Symbolisme et formalisme de l'élite mamluke: la cérémonie de l'accession à l'émirat," in *Genèse de l'État moderne en Méditerranée: approches anthropologiques des pratiques et des représentations*, ed. Henri Bresc (Rome, 1993), 61–79; idem, "Liens propres et identités séparées chez les Mamelouks bahrides," in *Valeur et distance: Identités et sociétés en Égypte*, ed. Christian Décobert (Paris, 2000), 181. This is confirmed by the following event: in 767/1366, amirs who received the honors of the sultan went down from the citadel to Qalāwūn's mausoleum (al-madrasah al-manṣūriyah) where they fulfilled their oath as it was customary (*kamā hiya al-ʿādah*). See al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 3:118.

⁵⁵This fact rather impressed the historians who reported it as they all insisted on the lower status of the elder brothers, who were consequently considered inferior to him and had to dismount before him and to be at his service. See al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 2:432; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 2:177.

⁵⁶See al-Shujāʿī's comment (*Al-Tārīkh*, 113) regarding al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's management of the state: "*wa-law takhayyala min wuldihi ahlakahu ḥifẓan li-mulkihi*" ("If he had been suspicious about one of his children[']s bad intentions], he would have put him to death to preserve his rule").

⁵⁷He was granted, on that occasion, the *iqṭāʿ* held by the late Mughulṭāy al-Jamālī. See al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:343.

⁵⁸Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 9:431; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:343–44. Alṭunqush was also the steward of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:674). Another person, Arghūn al-ʿAlāʾī, was Ānūk's *lālā*. See al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:492 (Arghūn was replaced by Ṭaybughā al-Majdī in 740/1339–40). As for his purse, al-Nashw was replaced by his own brother, al-Mukhlīṣ, in 739/1339–40. See al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:469.

⁵⁹The ceremony started at sunset on the given day, i.e., at the end of Thursday in our calendar. See al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 9:431; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:345–46; idem, *Al-Muqaffā*, 2:176.



apex was reached when his father stood at the door of the palace with his son standing in front of him with the same bearing, while the amirs approached one-by-one according to their rank and accompanied by their mamluks, bringing the lighted candles they had presented five days earlier during a similar ceremony. Each one kissed the ground before al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, then Ānūk, until they were relieved from respecting the ceremonial towards the son.⁶⁰ Such a ceremony reinforced Ānūk's preeminence over his elder brothers and confirmed the father's good intentions towards him.

A few months later, in Shawwāl 732/July 1332, Ānūk was still closely associated with his father's activities. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad decided to go to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage, and he took with him his beloved wife Ṭughāy and his son Ānūk. Two other sons were likely to join the convoy at al-ʿAqabah: Aḥmad and Abū Bakr were brought to the meeting point by Maliktamur al-Sarjuwānī, the governor of al-Karak, where they were both residing together with their brother Ibrāhīm. In the meantime, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad had learned of the bad intentions that Baktamur al-Sāqī, who was Ānūk's stepfather, harbored towards him, and once al-Nāṣir had reached al-ʿAqabah, he pretended Ānūk had fallen ill and sent him back with his mother and the two brothers to al-Karak under the protection of Maliktamur al-Sarjuwānī. The sultan eventually succeeded in unmasking Baktamur's conspiracy and in getting rid of him, and Ānūk was later transferred safely with his mother to Cairo.⁶¹ The event is interesting in that it shows al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's anxiety to protect the son who was most likely his heir, putting him in the protective hands of an amir who was closely related to him.⁶²

With regard to Ānūk's later years, which must have been important for his development and education, the sources are silent, at least until 740/1339. The event which took place in that year might have been insignificant if its effects had not been so dramatic. Now a young man (17 years old) and married for eight years, Ānūk did not seem to be fond of his wife.⁶³ He would rather spend time with a young female singer named Zuhrah, with whom he fell deeply in love, and he spent his time in a house he had built near Birkat al-Ḥabash; since he was particularly keen on animals, there was also an enclosure for birds at this

⁶⁰Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 2:176. More than three thousand candles were presented on that occasion, which means the etiquette should have been respected by more than that same number of persons!

⁶¹Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-Nāṣir*, 135–36; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:355.

⁶²Maliktamur al-Sarjuwānī had married the sultan's concubine, Bayād, who was the mother of the latter's son, Aḥmad, at an early date sometime before 731/1330–31, the date of Bayād's death. See al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 3:384.

⁶³When he died a few months later, she was still a virgin. See al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:683.



place.⁶⁴ When his father heard of his fondness for this girl and, more importantly, that he neglected his wife, he took measures against the entire class of female singers. Separated from Zuhrah, Ānūk felt resentment against his father, though the latter had made every arrangement to ensure that his son would not know that these measures had been decreed by him. Ānūk's reaction demonstrated the level of his anger: with the help of one of his personal mamluks, he plotted against his father, giving him the impression that two of his senior amirs were conspiring against him. The plot was soon unmasked, and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad would have beheaded his son were it not for the intercession of his mother and his female slaves.⁶⁵ Frightened, Ānūk is said to have stayed in bed until he died on 7 Rabīʿ I 741/31 August 1340, less than a year before his father. Despite al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's reaction, his sorrow was deep⁶⁶ because his preferred son, in whom he had laid his trust, had perished and with him the plans for his succession, which had to be modified *in extremis*. We will see that, rather opportunely, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad had prepared other sons for the succession as well.

“AS FOR AḤMAD, WHO IS IN AL-KARAK, DO NOT LET HIM CROSS [THE SOIL OF] EGYPT!”

As of 719/1319–20, Aḥmad, who was born the previous year, was the only son of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad. His mother, Bayāḍ, was a singer who had been set free by Bahādur Aṣ and perhaps offered to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad. She does not seem to have borne him any other children, and this might explain why (although she had not been al-Nāṣir's legal wife) she was later married to an amir, who became Aḥmad's stepfather. This kind of marriage link appears to have been a common feature of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's Machiavellian management of the state.⁶⁷ It is unknown when the marriage took place, but Bayāḍ died in 731/1330–31. Aḥmad, in the meanwhile, had been sent to the fortress of al-Karak on 7 Jumādā I 726/11 April 1326; he was not yet 10 years old.⁶⁸ A contemporary historian considered this to be a young age,⁶⁹ but al-Nāṣir Muḥammad intended to provide the boy with a good education and a sound training both in hunting and horsemanship (*furūsiyah*) under the supervision of the new governor of al-Karak

⁶⁴According to Ibn Abī al-Faḍā'il, *Al-Nahj al-Sadīd*, 80–81, it was his father who had built a birdcage (*ḥawsh*) and a house (*dār*) for his son.

⁶⁵See al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:492; idem, *Al-Muqaffā*, 2:177.

⁶⁶Al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 120.

⁶⁷Providing in this way a tutor and substitute father-figure for the future. On this practice in the Mamluk political system, which led to a crossover of blood and biological ties, see Mounira Chapoutot-Remadi, “Liens propres et identités séparées,” 178.

⁶⁸Eight years old, according to al-Maqrīzī (*Al-Sulūk*, 2:272; *Al-Muqaffā*, 1:384).

⁶⁹Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 8:86: *akhrajahu wālīduhu ilā al-Karak wa-huwa ṣaghīr la'allahu yakūn 'umruhu lam yablugh 'ashr sinin*.



designated on that occasion, Bahādur al-Badrī.⁷⁰ To ensure that this plan went aright, a treasury, which had to be deposited in the fortress, accompanied the child. For the next five years, nothing is known of Aḥmad. However, in Shaʿbān 731/May 1331, he was called back to Cairo by his father who expressed the wish to see how he had grown up. On 16 Shaʿbān/25 May, he arrived at the capital brought by the governor of al-Karak, Bahādur al-Badrī, who had to be replaced by Maliktamur al-Sarjuwānī, Aḥmad's stepfather.⁷¹ Maliktamur must have been widowed by that date, and the decision to give him the governorate of al-Karak, where al-Nāṣir Muḥammad regularly sent his sons Aḥmad, Abū Bakr, and Ibrāhīm to reside, may be seen as a consolation, or more probably, as an attempt to tie the stepfather more closely to his son Aḥmad. Two days later, at the age of 12, Aḥmad was circumcised.⁷² This event, which took place rather late in the life of the boy, was to be followed by a joyful announcement: his father had decided to promote him and to grant him an amirate, a title he received on 26 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 731/30 September 1331, two months before his much younger brother Ānūk.⁷³ Festivities were organized to celebrate this promotion, and a retinue made up of the amirs and all the *khāṣṣakīyah* rode to Qalāwūn's mausoleum in the service of Aḥmad, who was wearing a *sharbūsh* and carrying a standard. The next day, he was sent back to al-Karak, where his stepfather welcomed him. Orders had been given to Maliktamur al-Sarjuwānī to see to his upbringing and education (*tarbiyah wa-taʿdīb*).⁷⁴ Nothing is heard of Aḥmad until 738/1337, aside from the fact that he and his brother Abū Bakr went to al-ʿAqabah in 732/1332 to join their father, who was on his way to Mecca; al-Nāṣir Muḥammad then changed his mind and sent both of them, along with their brother Ānūk, back to al-Karak under the protection of the governor. However, in 738/1337 al-Nāṣir Muḥammad learned that Aḥmad was on intimate terms with the "riffraff" (*awbāsh*) of al-Karak and requested that he come to Cairo. His anger towards his son was tempered when he saw how handsome the boy had

⁷⁰ Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:272 (*li-yaqūm bi-amrihi . . . bal yumarrinahu ʿalā al-ṣayd wa-al-furūsiyah*); idem, *Al-Muqaffā*, 1:384 (*li-yurabbīyahu wa-yumarrinahu ʿalā al-furūsiyah*).

⁷¹ Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:332; idem, *Al-Muqaffā*, 1:384. Maliktamur officially received his new title and charge on 10 Ramaḍān/17 June and left for al-Karak on the same day, without Aḥmad. See idem, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:333. His deed of nomination is found in al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā*, 12:223–25 (read Maliktamur al-Nāṣirī instead of Tuluktamur al-Nāṣirī).

⁷² Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:333; idem, *Al-Muqaffā*, 1:384.

⁷³ Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar*, 9:357; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:334–35. Aḥmad's title at that date is not known, and from the quoted source, it might be inferred that he was made amir of ten, as al-Maqrizī specifies that three amirs were promoted to this rank on the same day as Aḥmad. On the other hand, he was made amir of forty (*ṭablkhānah*) in 739/1339. See al-Shujāʿī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 1:49.

⁷⁴ Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:335.



become, a fact from which it can be inferred that he had probably not seen him for a long time.⁷⁵ In an attempt to redress Aḥmad's leaning towards men, he married him to the daughter of one of his senior amirs, Ṭāyirbughā, whose health was declining. The contract was concluded on the same day as one for his brother Ibrāhīm.⁷⁶ The consummation took place a few weeks later, unusually without any special ceremony.⁷⁷ Aḥmad was sent back to al-Karak, burdened with a wife and gifts received from his father. Eventually, Aḥmad succeeded in regaining al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's favor: he protested against his stepfather, the governor of al-Karak, which demonstrates that their relations were far from cordial, or rather, that Aḥmad was able to manipulate his entourage. Malikṭamur al-Sarjuwānī was discharged from his office and al-Karak was given to Aḥmad.⁷⁸ The unique source which reports this fact is not explicit and goes on to report that an amir was appointed as the mentor of Aḥmad in al-Karak.⁷⁹ From this, it might be inferred that this amir was the new governor, but it actually seems that Aḥmad was appointed as governor of al-Karak—a fact generally ignored—with an amir who received instructions to supervise Aḥmad. This is supported by the evidence provided in the copy of the “deed of appointment to the governorate of al-Karak written down on behalf of the Sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn for his son al-Malik al-Nāṣir Aḥmad.”⁸⁰ Once stripped of its rhetorical metaphors, the text is very informative about al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's feelings towards his son. The document stresses God's blessings that favored the family

⁷⁵ Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:432; idem, *Al-Muqaffā*, 1:384.

⁷⁶ See al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 8:86. On 20 Rabī' I 738/16 October 1337, according to al-Maqrizī (*Al-Muqaffā*, 1:384), or in Rabī' II 738/November 1337, according to al-Shujā'ī (*Al-Tārikh*, 18) and al-Maqrizī (*Al-Sulūk*, 2:432, who fixes it on the same day as in *Al-Muqaffā* (20 Rabī' II 738/15 November 1337). Ṭāyirbughā died a short time later (28 Jumādā I 738/22 December 1337). See al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārikh*, 28. Ibrāhīm was married to the daughter of Jankalī ibn al-Bābā. See al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārikh*, 18.

⁷⁷ On 4 Jumādā I 738/28 November 1337. See al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārikh*, 18.

⁷⁸ It is not easy to understand whether this event took place on the same occasion of the marriage or during another visit to Cairo. Al-Shujā'ī (*Al-Tārikh*, 18) doesn't say a word about the ruffraff episode, but places his nomination on the occasion of his marriage. On the contrary, al-Ṣafadī (*A'yān al-ʿAṣr*, 1:370–71) speaks of two visits for each event. He reports that things started to go wrong between Aḥmad and his stepfather and that they were both conveyed to Cairo. The sultan got annoyed with his son, and he let him reside in Cairo for a while until he sent him back alone to al-Karak, without any governor (*waḥdahu bi-lā nāʿib*). This last element is in contradiction with the evidence provided in what follows.

⁷⁹ Al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārikh*, 18: *wa-aʿṭā al-Karak li-Aḥmad wa-aʿṭā ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Ṭaybars al-Zumurrudī arbaʿin fāris wa-jaʿalahu nāʿib Aḥmad bi-al-Karak*. Al-Zumurrudī was in fact his steward (*ustādhḍār*). See *ibid.*, 47.

⁸⁰ Found in al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā*, 12:226–32. The text adds: “before he was made sultan.” This is a later addition referring to his rule as sultan after the death of his father.



with rule,⁸¹ securing it in the genealogical tree of Qalāwūn through his son Muḥammad.⁸² Allusion is then made to Aḥmad through a pun on his *laqab* (Shihāb al-Dīn), where he is compared to a star (*shihāb*) equal in perfection and beauty to the moon. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's treatment of his son resulted from a divine order to behave kindly to the reverent son. Consequently, he decided to offer Aḥmad what God had granted al-Nāṣir himself: a place in which to rule.⁸³ By this act, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad was following the righteous example of Abraham, who had worked together with his son Ismā'īl to build the Temple. God had shown the sultan how lovely and commendable this design was, and this was why he settled Aḥmad in al-Karak during that period.⁸⁴ Now, the decision was taken to make him the ruler of this place with which he was familiar and whose population showed him their affection.⁸⁵ Thus, the order was decreed that he be appointed governor of al-Karak and al-Shawbak.⁸⁶ The sultan's intuition (*firāsah*) would have to be confirmed by the results, but how could it go wrong, given that Aḥmad was the son and the grandson of noble rulers, the one on whom hopes had been pinned to perfect the rulership before he would completely take charge of it?⁸⁷ The deed then goes on with recommendations and advice addressed to Aḥmad for good ruling practices as well as for good manners (undoubtedly an allusion to his preference for boys). The document is revealing in that, at that date, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad still had trust in Aḥmad: this appointment appears to have been a test which could have been decisive in case the succession had to be modified, i.e., if the preferred son, Ānūk, were to die in al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's lifetime. It seems that Aḥmad did not seize the opportunity, either because he failed to realize the importance of this test, or because he did not want to do it. Aḥmad behaved badly, at least in the eyes of his steward, al-Zumurrudī, and consequently in the eyes of his father. Al-Zumurrudī sent a letter to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad informing him that Aḥmad had

⁸¹Ibid., 227: “*wa-wahabanā fi al-mulk al-nasab al-‘alī al-‘arīq wa-al-ḥasab alladhi huwa bi-al-taqdīm wa-al-taḥkīm ḥaqīq.*”

⁸²Ibid.: “*fa-fayya’anā min shajarah hādihā al-bayt al-sharīf al-nāṣirī al-manṣūrī kull ghuṣn wariq.*”

⁸³Ibid.: “*wa-awda’nā ladayhi mā awda’ahu Allāh ta’ālā ladaynā: mamlakah murtafi’ah muttasī’ah li-yartafi’ maḥalluhu wa-yattasi’ amaluhu wa-lā yaḍīq.*”

⁸⁴Ibid., 228.

⁸⁵Ibid., 229: “*ḥakkamnāhu fi hādhihi al-niyābah allatī alifahā wa-darrabahā wa-‘arafa umūrahā wa-jarrabahā wa-istamāla khawāṭir ahlihā wa-istajlabahā.*”

⁸⁶Both fortresses were part of this *mamlakah*. For its geographical limits, see Maurice Gaudiefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie à l’époque des Mamelouks d’après les auteurs arabes* (Paris, 1923), 125–34.

⁸⁷Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A‘shā*, 12:230: “*wa-firāsatinā talmaḥ natā’ij al-khayr min hādihā al-taqdīm wa-siyāsatinā tuṣliḥ mā qaruba minnā wa-mā ba’uda bi-ta’rif aḥkām al-taḥkīm wa-kayfa lā wa-huwa al-karīm ibn al-karīm ibn al-karīm al-mu’ammal li-tamām al-su’dud qabla an yu’qad ‘alayhi al-tamīm.*”



fallen in love with a young Bedouin boy named Shuhayb and that he spent most of his time with him, drinking and dressing like an Arab. Aḥmad was summoned to Cairo where he arrived, together with Shuhayb, in Shaʿbān 739/March 1339. He was coldly received by his father and then sent to the palace. Orders were given to imprison Shuhayb and to recover the amount of money that he and his father had received from Aḥmad. Aḥmad's reaction was to sequester himself in his room and refuse to eat. In the meanwhile, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad had tried to dissuade his son from continuing his relationship with Shuhayb, his envoys in this delicate case being his two senior amirs Bashtāk and Qawṣūn. Both of them tried to convince the rebellious son, threatening him with warnings of his father's determination, but to no effect. Aḥmad preferred to stay with his boyfriend, even rejecting his father's proposal that he take one hundred of his own mamluks. In the end, conscious of Aḥmad's stubbornness, al-Nāṣir bowed to the arguments of his two senior amirs. Firm in his judgment that nothing good would come of this son, he decided to resign himself: Aḥmad was made an amir of forty, but he had to remain in Egypt, his brother Abū Bakr being sent to al-Karak in his place.⁸⁸

For the next two years, Aḥmad seems to have kept a low profile, with Shuhayb still in his close entourage, until 741/1341, when the latter was involved in a conflict with a eunuch over a frivolous case of bird competition. Aḥmad championed his cause and the case reached the ears of the sultan, who confronted his son once again by means of Bashtāk and Qawṣūn. The mediation ended in the same way as in 739/1339: Aḥmad refused to abandon Shuhayb. He was thus exiled by his father to the fortress of Ṣarkhad,⁸⁹ but before he reached it, amirs, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's wives, and the harem spoke in his favor. Aḥmad was called back to Cairo, but in the meanwhile his father had ordered that his horses be sold, and in the end he decided to send him back to al-Karak with al-Sarjuwānī as governor.⁹⁰ Clearly, in al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's mind, Aḥmad was not to play any

⁸⁸Al-Shujāʿī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 47–48; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 1:384–85. Although the sources remain silent about the appointment of Abū Bakr as governor of al-Karak on that occasion, it is highly probable that he took the place of Aḥmad not only as resident but also as governor. Both he and his brother Ibrāhīm had been amirs of forty since 738/1337–38, a year before Aḥmad. See below under Ibrāhīm and Abū Bakr.

⁸⁹He was accompanied by Maliktamur al-Sarjuwānī, his stepfather, and al-Dāwūdī, his *lālā*. See al-Shujāʿī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 97; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 1:385. In another source, it is established that his father reached this decision because of indisputable evidence (*bayyināt*) he found; one must understand this to mean documents. Unfortunately, their nature is not explicated, but the prospect of a coup should not be rejected. See al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:515. By that time, Abū Bakr had already been nominated as heir to the throne (see below).

⁹⁰At the beginning of 1 Ramaḍān 741/18 February 1341, according to al-Shujāʿī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 97, or in Ṣafar 741/August 1340, according to al-Maqrizī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 1:385. Meanwhile, Abū Bakr had been called back to Cairo, hence the appointment of al-Sarjuwānī as new governor. Al-Maqrizī,



future role, at least not in his own lifetime; the order was given not to let him make any decisions.⁹¹ Aḥmad did not leave his place of exile, enjoying life with Shuhayb, not even when his father was at death's door.

On his deathbed, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad was urged—according to the sources—by his amirs to designate his heir to the throne, as though he had not prepared his successor. On that occasion, he is said to have rejected any solution in favor of Aḥmad, though he was his eldest surviving son:⁹² “As for Aḥmad, who is in al-Karak, do not let him cross [the soil of] Egypt; do not put him in charge of anything, because he would cause the ruin of the state!”⁹³ Whether by intuition or paternal feeling, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad was convinced that Aḥmad would not be fit for the sultanate; on several occasions, he gave him opportunities to show his mettle and in each case he was found lacking.

IBRĀHĪM THE PRODIGAL⁹⁴

Younger than Aḥmad and older than Abū Bakr,⁹⁵ Ibrāhīm was born between 719/1319 and 721/1320.⁹⁶ The sources remain silent on him until he reached his teens: in 731/1331, on 11 Rajab/11 July, he was sent by his father to al-Karak accompanied by some amirs, among them the newly appointed governor, Malikṭamur al-Sarjuwānī.⁹⁷ Chroniclers are more laconic in his respect than with Aḥmad, as they do not explain why his father decided to send him there,⁹⁸ but it can be understood that his purpose was to provide Ibrāhīm with the same military training as Aḥmad. Ibrāhīm's younger brother, Abū Bakr, joined him some time later, and al-Ṣafadī indicates that the residence of the three brothers in al-Karak continued until they grew up (*taraʿraʿū*).⁹⁹ In 735/1335, Ibrāhīm was

Al-Sulūk, 2:515.

⁹¹ Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:515: “*wa-awṣāhu al-sulṭān allā yadaʿ li-Aḥmad ḥadīth wa-lā ḥukm bayna ithnayn*.”

⁹² Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Al-Tārīkh*, 2:133. It was Bashtāk who pronounced Aḥmad's name. In some way, the competition between Bashtāk and Qawṣūn was already visible, each one having a favorite candidate.

⁹³ Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Muqaffā*, 1:389: “*wa-ammā Aḥmad alladhi bi-al-Karak fa-lā tadaʿūhu yaʿbur Miṣr wa-lā tuwallūhu shayʿan fa-yakūn sabab li-kharāb al-mamlakah*.” See also Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 1:315. Al-Maqrīzī (*ibid.*) adds that the father's intuition (*firāsah*) was right and imputes to Aḥmad, when he was made sultan, the deterioration and the ruin of both the lands of Egypt and Syria.

⁹⁴ His prodigality, for which his father used to blame him, is reported by al-Shujāʿī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 34.

⁹⁵ Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 6:138.

⁹⁶ The name of his mother is ignored in the sources.

⁹⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:332–33.

⁹⁸ Al-Maqrīzī, *ibid.*, uses the verb “*aqarra*” (to establish).

⁹⁹ Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 6:138; Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, 2:159. In 732/1332, when al-Nāṣir



conveyed to Cairo at his father's request.¹⁰⁰ It seems that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad had decided that Ibrāhīm was to remain with him at the citadel, together with his brother Abū Bakr, who had also arrived in Cairo in the meanwhile, while Aḥmad had to remain alone in al-Karak.¹⁰¹ A year later, on 9 Ramaḍān 736/21 April 1336, Ibrāhīm received the title of amir, and the two preferred amirs of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, Qawṣūn and Bashtāk, organized the cortège and ceremony associated with such an appointment for a sultan's son.¹⁰² In 737/1336, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad proceeded further with his policy of creating a web of relationships between his amirs and his children, both male and female. On 17 Muḥarram/26 August, a marriage contract was concluded between his son Ibrāhīm and Ṭuquzdamur al-Ḥamawī's daughter.¹⁰³ A year later, two similar contracts were made on the same day, one for his brother Aḥmad, and another for himself; this time, he was to get married to Jankalī ibn al-Bābā's daughter.¹⁰⁴ A few weeks after the consummation, his father decided that a third tie could be useful, and another marriage was arranged with another of Ṭāyirbughā's daughters.¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile, Ibrāhīm had just been promoted to the rank of amir of forty together with his brother Abū Bakr.¹⁰⁶ This promising career was suddenly interrupted by smallpox; isolated from his brothers for fear of contagion, and without a last visit from his father, he died on 25 Dhū al-Qaʿdah 738/14 June 1338.¹⁰⁷ With his death, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad lost a possible candidate to succeed him.¹⁰⁸

stopped in al-ʿAqabah on his way to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage, Ibrāhīm is not mentioned among the sons who were brought there by al-Sarjuwānī; only Aḥmad and Abū Bakr were meant to take part in the trip. See al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:355.

¹⁰⁰Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-Nāẓir*, 272; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:387. According to al-Maqrīzī, Ibrāhīm arrived in Cairo on Monday 3 Dhū al-Ḥijjah/25 July 1335, but this day fell on Tuesday, not Monday.

¹⁰¹Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 6:138; al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-Nāẓir*, 272; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:387.

¹⁰²Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-Nāẓir*, 290; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:392. He was probably made amir of ten at that time, because he received the higher rank (amir of forty) later.

¹⁰³The marriage was consummated on 1 Rabīʿ I/8 October of the same year. See al-Shujāʿī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 3.

¹⁰⁴In Rabīʿ II 738/October–November 1337 (consummated on 20 Shaʿbān 738/13 March 1338). See al-Shujāʿī, *Tārīkh*, 18 and 29. For Aḥmad, see above (the dates do not really tally). It is interesting to note that another of Ibrāhīm's brothers, Yūsuf, was married during the same year to another daughter of the same amir. See al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:436.

¹⁰⁵The marriage, probably never consummated, took place just before Ibrāhīm died. See al-Shujāʿī, *Tārīkh*, 34 and 33.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁰⁷He was buried in his uncle al-Ashraf Khalil's mausoleum. *Ibid.*; al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 6:138; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 1:68.

¹⁰⁸If the following words are to be trusted, Ibrāhīm was aware that he could have ruled at some



THE LAST RESORT: ABŪ BAKR

When Abū Bakr was put on the throne, on 21 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 741/7 June 1341, it is said that he was about 20, from which it may be inferred that he was born around 721/1320. His mother, Narjis, gave her husband two other sons (Yūsuf and Ramaḍān) who were Abū Bakr's younger brothers. Nothing is known of his childhood, either in the harem or after he left it. However, in 732/1332, he was already in al-Karak with his brothers Aḥmad and Ibrāhīm, whom he probably joined in 731/1331 (the same year in which the latter arrived there). He thus left Cairo at the age of about 10 to receive the same military training as his brothers. These years are shrouded in mist; unless events that occurred there had an echo in the capital, as with Aḥmad's debacle for instance, chroniclers ignored what happened in this peripheral place. It seems that Abū Bakr's teenage years were different from those of his elder brother, as nothing is reported regarding him before 735/1334. On 4 Rabī' I/4 March, Abū Bakr, who like his brother Ibrāhīm had been brought back to Cairo, was granted the title of amir a year before the latter was to receive this title.¹⁰⁹ On that occasion, Qawṣūn led a procession from his stables up to the citadel, during which all the royal mamluks rode in attendance of Abū Bakr, who was wearing the *sharbūsh*. Apparently, Abū Bakr remained in Cairo with Ibrāhīm, at which point his father made another decision that would have an enormous impact on his career: he decided to marry him to Ṭuquzdamur al-Ḥamawī's daughter. This was indeed a profitable day for this amir, as the contract was concluded on the same day as Ibrāhīm's with Ṭuquzdamur's other daughter.¹¹⁰ Incidentally, by that time, Ṭuquzdamur was probably already married to Abū Bakr's mother and one of his other wives was one of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's daughters.¹¹¹ The place where the contract was concluded (Qawṣūn's house) demonstrates once more that these marriages between the sultan's children and his amirs and their children had implications beyond what is generally believed. A few months later (12 Ramaḍān 737/14 April 1337), Abū Bakr was poised to play a significant part in an attack against al-Nashw which could have cost the latter his life. Abū Bakr's name is mentioned as one of the potential enemies engaged in the affair, but in the end, al-Nashw was not harassed.¹¹²

It has been noticed that Ibrāhīm and Abū Bakr had almost parallel careers in their appointments and relationships. This was again true when Ibrāhīm was

time after his father: "*anā amūt qablak aw atamallak ba'dak*." See al-Shujā'ī, *al-Tārīkh* 34.

¹⁰⁹ Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-Nāẓir*, 236; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:379.

¹¹⁰ Al-Ṣafādī, *Al-Wāfī*, 10:252; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:407. For Ibrāhīm, see above.

¹¹¹ For the latter marriage, see al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:698.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 422. The name provided is Abū Bakr ibn al-Nāṣirī Muḥammad. See also Levanoni, *A Turning Point in Mamluk History*, 75.



made amir of forty: Abū Bakr was promoted to the same rank in the same year (738/1337–38). During the following year (739/1339) al-Nāṣir Muḥammad lost any hope for Aḥmad; he had been called back to Cairo and admonished to abandon his boyfriend, but had refused and was ready to commit suicide if he was not left in peace. In view of this, his father made the decision not to waste any more time with this son and to send Abū Bakr in his place.¹¹³ As had been the case with Aḥmad, this settlement in al-Karak, at a time when their father was already an old man, can be considered a test. Ānūk was still the first choice for succession, but he needed a backup. The experiment does not seem to have been concluded: in 740/1339, after his brother Ānūk had disappointed his father with his infatuation for a singing slave-girl, Abū Bakr was invited to visit al-Nāṣir Muḥammad. He brought along a gift of more than two hundred thousand dirhams, but it soon was discovered that this amount had been taken from the people of al-Karak in the form of an unrefusable loan—those who opposed it had been killed.¹¹⁴ Later, Bashtāk was asked to bring Ānūk and Abū Bakr to al-ʿAbbāsah, where they all stayed a few days before coming back to the citadel: no reason is given for this retreat,¹¹⁵ but in the end, Abū Bakr turned back to al-Karak, now his residence. He remained there until 20 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 740/17 July 1340, when he returned to Cairo at his father's request, and the latter gathered his amirs and asked them to take an oath in the form of a sworn covenant to support him (*ḥilf*) personally and his son Abū Bakr, after his death.¹¹⁶ The oath was augmented by generous gifts of money to each amir according to his rank. The news of this official designation put the city in a state of agitation.¹¹⁷ Interestingly, Ānūk was still alive at that time (he died a month and a half later), but it is reasonable to think that he was not in good health. Backed up by an official appointment, Abū Bakr rode back to his stronghold at al-Karak, expecting news of his brother's impending death. The order to present himself at the citadel of Cairo arrived in Rajab 741/January 1341; Abū Bakr's arrival, on the 24th/13th of the same month, was accompanied by another gift of one hundred thousand dirhams for his father. On that occasion, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad gave orders to bring Abū Bakr's units (his *ṭulb* and mamluks) from al-Karak to Cairo, as well as all the revenues held in al-Karak.¹¹⁸ Aḥmad, on his

¹¹³Al-Shujāʿī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 49.

¹¹⁴Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:492.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 2:493.

¹¹⁶On the oath as a form of designation in the Mamluk period, see Holt, "The Position and Power of the Mamlūk Sultan," 241. The case is quite different here, as it took place before the sultan's death and in presence of the army (the amirs first, then the soldiers). Moreover, as shown by the sources, they were paid for taking that oath.

¹¹⁷Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:499.

¹¹⁸He also received the *iqṭāʿ* of a Mamluk whose charge had been modified (Bahāʾ al-Dīn Aṣḥam



way to his exile in Şarkhad, was finally directed to al-Karak, where he was likely to remain quiescent under the supervision of Maliktamur al-Sarjuwānī, the newly appointed governor.¹¹⁹ Clearly, Abū Bakr had to remain in residence in Cairo out of necessity, as his elder brother was not to play any role in the succession. The following months were marked by new signs of Abū Bakr's preparation to succeed his father: he was granted the fief of an amir, Bashtāk was asked to look after his interests and, consequently, the *wāfidiyah* of Aleppo were put in his service, along with other troops. The reason for all of this was clear: the old sultan wanted his son to be prepared to rule.¹²⁰ The effective nomination took place when al-Nāṣir became convinced that he would not survive his illness. On 18 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 741/4 June 1341, on his deathbed, al-Nāṣir convened his senior amirs and his royal mamluks and asked them to swear the covenant in favor of Abū Bakr. He gave him his grandfather's sword and conferred upon him the latter's *laqab* (al-Malik al-Manṣūr).¹²¹ His last will was fulfilled three days later: the transfer of power went smoothly, to the greatest surprise of the populace.¹²²

“I AM AWARE THAT NOT ONE OF MY CHILDREN IS FIT [FOR THE SULTANATE]”

The starting point of my investigation was to consider whether al-Nāṣir MuḤammad, who had a greater progeny than any other Mamluk sultan, consistently planned to prepare his sons to succeed him on the throne. Given that Qalāwūn himself was succeeded by two of his sons (without taking into account a nominated son who died well before he could rule), it is legitimate to ask whether al-Nāṣir MuḤammad ever thought of being succeeded by one of his sons, and if so, whether he did anything in order to facilitate his accession to the throne and to compel his own mamluks to accept an heir on the basis of genealogy.

Conscious of being the son of a mamluk himself, and thus a member of the *awlād al-nās* (sons of the elite), al-Nāṣir MuḤammad was fully aware that, in a self-defining non-hereditary system such as the Mamluk sultanate, where legitimacy lay more in merit than in genealogy, his desire to see one of his sons succeed him on the throne would remain a vain wish if he failed to plan carefully. Preparation, i.e., education and training (from a military point of view), but also the creation of a network of faithful supporters, could constitute a decisive element in this respect. Considering the biographical elements gleaned from what historians and

received the governorship of Şafad instead) on 18 Ramaḍān 741/7 March 1341. See al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārikh*, 97.

¹¹⁹Ibid.; al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk* 2:515.

¹²⁰Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:517. Interestingly, it must be noted that Abū Bakr also married Ānūk's widow during this period.

¹²¹Ibid., 2:523; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Al-Tārikh*, 2:133; al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārikh*, 104–5.

¹²²Al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārikh*, 107.



chroniclers have deemed worthy of mention, we notice that several concordant elements concern the sons who received such training (Aḥmad, Ibrāhīm, and Abū Bakr): residence in al-Karak, promotion, and marriages.

Ever since it was seized by the Ayyubids, the fortress of al-Karak had been linked to the ruling sultan in Egypt. In the Mamluk sultanate, during the Turkish period, this link was not weakened; on the contrary, several members of the Qalāwūnid family resided in the fortress on several occasions and under various circumstances. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad himself was well acquainted with it—he resided there on two occasions when his power was usurped by a rival. When he regained power the first time, he had spent most of his teens in that place, consolidating his ties with the inhabitants and the neighboring Bedouins, among others. It is thus no surprise that he decided to send the sons who were the most likely to succeed him to al-Karak, once they came out of the harem; their age was between 8 and 10 and their stay there, far from the court, the harem, and the intrigues, was meant as a formative exile during which each son must be trained in horsemanship and hunting, according to the sources, and also educated in the Mamluk way.¹²³ As *awlād al-nās*, they would always lack *khushdāshīyah*, the fraternal ties that characterized the mamluks raised in the barracks, but at least they could develop relationships with the mamluks put in their service. Among the three sons, the one who best succeeded in creating a network of relationships was Aḥmad. However, his network relied not on the mamluks, but on the Bedouins of the surrounding area: he dressed like them, he hunted with them, and he even loved one of them. His link with al-Karak was so strong that he even refused to leave it once he was chosen as sultan, and in the end, when he did leave it, it was for a short period of two months, before he went back to the place where he had grown up.¹²⁴ Instead of *khushdāshīyah*, Aḥmad had developed *‘aṣabīyah*!¹²⁵ This tribal network worked for several years, even after his deposition, but in this context, it was the wrong type of network.

During his long reign, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad is reputed to have introduced an innovation generally regarded as detrimental to the Mamluk system: promotion of

¹²³This formative role played by al-Karak had already been noted in 1976 by Muḥammad ‘Adnān al-Bakhīt. The original work in Arabic was not available to me. The quote is from the German translation: Alexander Scheidt, *Das Königreich von al-Karak in der mamlūkischen Zeit* (Frankfurt, 1992), 84–85. On al-Karak, see now Marcus Milwright, *The Fortress of the Raven: Karak in the Middle Islamic Period (1100–1650)* (Leiden, 2008).

¹²⁴Once deposed, he proposed to remain in al-Karak as governor, considering the fortress as a heritage received from his grandfather and father, where his brothers, sent in exile to Qūṣ by Qawṣūn, had to be sent in order to live with him. See al-Shujā‘ī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 147 (“inna hādhihi qal‘at al-Karak hiya wirāthah la-nā min abī wa-jaddī”).

¹²⁵Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Muqaffá*, 1:385 (“fa-kathurat qālat al-Karakiyīn wa-tajamma‘ū khawfan ‘alá Aḥmad wa-‘aṣabiyatan ‘alayhi”).



the *awlād al-nās*, a rather new category in Mamluk society, in the army. Promotion regarding his own sons must thus not be considered an unusual practice. In each case, with the exception of his preferred son, Ānūk, who was presented as the designated heir and immediately made amir of one hundred, they started their career in the hierarchy at the lowest rank, i.e., amir of ten. They were then promoted to the intermediary rank of amir of forty, but never to the highest rank. These promotions must be seen in the light of the training mentioned earlier, but also as answering to the necessity to link the eldest sons to the army, the senior amirs, and the royal mamluks. The ceremonies that took place on each occasion were orchestrated by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's closest amirs (Qawṣūn and Bashtāk). In every instance, the sons wore a symbol of power, albeit one associated with a previous ruler: the emblem of the grandfather, Qalāwūn, whose mausoleum was always the meeting point for the procession through the city. On the other hand, it is reported that none of these four sons received a *malik* title. As a young father, at the beginning of his reign, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad had followed his own father's practice in attributing such a title to more than one son; his first two sons were thus known to have received such titles. However, they died in infancy, and it seems that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad never applied this practice again. When a contemporary chronicler, al-Ṣafadī, mentioned that Abū Bakr and Ibrāhīm were made amirs of forty, he stressed that they received neither a *malik* title nor a *laqab*—they were just called “Sayyidi Ibrāhīm or Sayyidi Abū Bakr, the amirs.”¹²⁶ From this, it may be inferred that, in the eyes of a contemporary witness who was fully acquainted with the Mamluk system by origin, a logical link existed between such a promotion and the attribution of such a title to a sultan's sons. The reason why al-Nāṣir Muḥammad no longer conferred the *malik* title is unknown, but it might be for fear of losing his own power, or out of superstition (as already stressed, two sons who received it died in infancy).

Marriages undoubtedly played another important part in preparing the way for his sons to succeed him. “Al-Malik al-Nāṣir's ingenious marriage policy, reminiscent of the dynastic manoeuvrings of the house of Habsburg in fifteenth century *Felix Austria*, created a network of dependencies and loyalties between the sultan and his sons and daughters, on the one hand, and the senior amirs and their offspring, on the other.”¹²⁷ The effects of this marriage policy have been considered questionable because the fathers-in-law of his sons were “outsiders,” and as such they were devoid of *khushdāshīyah* and thus unable to lead a faction

¹²⁶ Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 6:138: “*wa-lam yusamma aḥad minhumā bi-Malik wa-lā luqqiba bal kāna al-nās kulluhum yaqūlūna Sayyidi Ibrāhīm aw Sayyidi Abā Bakr al-umarāʾ.*”

¹²⁷ Ulrich Haarmann, “Joseph's Law—The Careers and Activities of Mamluk Descendants before the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt,” in *The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society*, ed. Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann (Cambridge, 1998), 66.



powerful enough to impose itself on Mamluk politics.¹²⁸ Whatever these effects might have been if they were ever weighed, it remains that they created strong ties in most cases which proved beneficial after al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's death.¹²⁹ One can take the case of Ṭuquzdamur al-Ḥamawī, who crafted numerous links with the sultan; he was not only the husband of Narjis, the former concubine of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and mother of Abū Bakr,¹³⁰ but he later married a daughter of his master,¹³¹ and two of his own daughters were married to the sultan's sons Abū Bakr (now his stepson),¹³² and Ibrāhīm.¹³³ It is no wonder that he became Abū Bakr's *nā'ib al-salṭanah* when the latter was enthroned, as well as his strongest supporter. One may wonder, once again, if these ties were not created to strengthen the position of the sultan's sons and to substitute for the lack of links between these sons and the mamluks.¹³⁴

What went wrong? On his deathbed, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad is said to have advised his mamluks to obey his designated heir Abū Bakr on the condition that he acted as a good ruler. If this proved not to be the case, they were urged to depose him and replace him with any of the surviving sons (referred to as minors, which they were), but under no circumstances should Aḥmad be brought to Egypt and put on the throne.¹³⁵ Though the historian must remain cautious with the sources, especially with alleged oral reports, it appears that in this particular case, the substance of this advice was more than likely part of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's last will. The fact that this advice was repeatedly followed by mamluks who were present on that occasion, when one of his sons had to be deposed, even twenty years later, corroborates its historicity.¹³⁶ In pronouncing these words, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad put in the mamluks' hands a double-edged sword. They were indeed authorized to depose those sons who disrespected the mores of proper rulership, but on the other hand, they were exhorted subsequently to enthrone

¹²⁸Holt, "An-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (684–741/1285–1341): His Ancestry, Kindred and Affinity," 320–23.

¹²⁹See Van Steenbergen, *Order Out of Chaos*, 82–85.

¹³⁰Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:551.

¹³¹Ibid., 2:698. At al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's death, eight of his daughters were already married. See al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 111.

¹³²Al-Ṣafadī, *Al-Wāfi*, 10:252; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:407.

¹³³Al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 1:3.

¹³⁴Later on, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's scions by his daughters could even be considered as eligible for rule. See Amalia Levanoni, "Awlad al-nas in the Mamluk Army during the Bahri Period," in *Mamluks and Ottomans: Studies in Honour of Michael Winter*, ed. David J. Wasserstein and Ami Ayalon (London and New York, 2006), 100.

¹³⁵Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Al-Tārīkh*, 2:133.

¹³⁶Al-Shujā'ī, *Al-Tārīkh*, 163; al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:709; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah*, 2:289.



another son. It would take forty years for this cycle to be broken. Aside from the various reasons that could be invoked to try to explain why one faction could not prevail over another and consequently seize power to the detriment of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's scions, it must be acknowledged that his last decision was his most successful, the apex of a long and perhaps Machiavellian reign: he managed to keep power within his family. In most cases, when one of his descendants was deposed, whatever the reasons put forward, the mamluks routinely chose the elder rather than the younger candidate, thus demonstrating that they were hoping for a promising sultan rather than a puppet.¹³⁷ Moreover, for several decades, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's progeny supplied an almost endless reservoir of suitable candidates to the sultanate; among the *awlād al-nās*, they constituted a separate, privileged category, the *asyād*, the descendants of a sultan, the family of a ruler, the members of a *bayt*, who not only formed a special unit inside the *ḥalqah*,¹³⁸ but also had the right to reside at the citadel.¹³⁹ It was not until almost a century later, during Barsbāy's reign (in 836/1433), that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's scions were finally ousted from the citadel, together with the idle mamluks.¹⁴⁰ Even in

¹³⁷See Van Steenberghe, "Is anyone my guardian . . . ?" Mamlūk Under-age Rule and the Later Qalāwūnids." See also, for instance, al-Shujā'i, *Al-Tārīkh*, 140 (Baybars al-Aḥmadi's reaction at the nomination of Kujuk, still a child: "*lā yaṣluḥ illā man yakūn rajul kabīr ya'rīf tadbīr al-mulk*").

¹³⁸Ulrich Haarmann, "Arabic in Speech, Turkish in Lineage: Mamluks and Their Sons in the Intellectual Life of Fourteenth-Century Egypt and Syria," *Journal of Semitic Studies* 33 (1988): 103; idem, "Joseph's Law—The Careers and Activities of Mamluk Descendants before the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt," 64.

¹³⁹See al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Daw' al-Lāmi'*, 3:87, regarding Ḥājji ibn al-Ashraf Shaḥbān: "*wa-amarahu bi-iqāmatihī fī dārihi bi-qa'at al-jabal jaryan 'alā 'ādāt banī al-asyād*." According to al-Maqrīzī, there were more than 600 of them living in the citadel in the twenties of the ninth/fifteenth century. They got revenues from various sources (salaries from the sultan and fiefs). See al-Maqrīzī, *Durar al-Uqūd al-Faridah*, ed. Maḥmūd Jalīlī (Beirut, 2002) 1:572–73 ("*wa-aqāma fīman aqāma min Banī Qalāwūn bi-qa'at al-jabal wa-la-hum fuḍūl amwāl wa-murattabāt sulṭānīyah wa-iqtā'āt wa-kāna yuqāl la-hum al-asyād wa-balaghat ziyādatuhum 'alā sitt mi'ah fa-lam yazal 'adaduhum yaqillu wa-māluhum yanquṣu wa-sa'duhum yadburu wa-jāhuhum yaḍmaḥillu ḥattā ṣārū ilā ḍiq ba'd jāh 'arīḍ wa-dawālīb kathīrah li-i'tisār qaṣab al-sukkar bi-bilād al-ṣa'id wa-maṭābikh lil-sukkar bi-madīnat Miṣr wa-khuddām ṭawāshīyah la-hum 'adad kathīr wa-amwāl jammah wa-takhdimuhum 'iddat mubāshirīn yu'rafūn bi-mubāshirī al-asyād li-kull kabīr min al-asyād dīwān mufrad*."). Besides this, the *asyād* were awarded amirate ranks with suitable *iqṭā'āt*. See Levanoni, "Awlad al-nas," 100–1. The lands they held were reintroduced in the *iqṭā'* system when Barqūq instituted the *dīwān al-mufrad*. See Ulrich Haarmann, "The Sons of the Mamluks as Fief-Holders in Late Medieval Egypt," in *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, ed. Tarif Khalidi (Beirut, 1984), 142–44.

¹⁴⁰See al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 4:889–90 : "*wa-muni'a man baqiya min al-asyād awlād al-mulūk min dhurriyat al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn min suknā al-Qāhirah wa-ṭulū'ihā wa-ukhrijū min dūrihim bi-hā wa-kānū lammā muni'ū min sinīn sakana aktharuhum bi-al-Qāhirah wa-ṣawāḥirihā fa-dhallū ba'd 'izzihim wa-tabadhdhalū ba'd taḥajjubihim wa-baqiya min a'yānihim ṭā'ifah muqīmah bi-al-Qal'ah wa-tanzil bi-al-Qāhirah li-ḥājātihā thumma ta'ūd ilā dūrihā fa-ukhrijū bi-ajma'ihim fī ḥādhihi al-ayyām*



801/1398–99, some of them had been granted a stipend by Barqūq on the sole basis that they were part of the late sultan's progeny.¹⁴¹

In conclusion, we have seen that the issue of succession inside the Qalāwūnid house had been considered by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad at a very early date. In order to prepare his most promising successors for the throne, he chose to adopt a series of measures that concerned most of these sons, measures mostly echoed by a “mirror for princes” written contemporarily with these events. The main motive for such preparation was the notion that, being sons of the ruler and thus *awlād al-nās*, they would lack relationships, ties, and links with the most powerful mamluks, a network of supporters, and qualities needed for rulership. If preparation was not a guarantee of success, it should have helped these sons in any case. What al-Nāṣir Muḥammad probably failed to realize was that experience was also required to be an effective ruler.

wa-muni'ū min al-qal'ah fa-tafarraqu shadhar madhar kamā fa'ala abūhum al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn bi-awlād al-mulūk Banī Ayyūb wa-kadhālik fa'ala Allāh bi-Banī Ayyūb kamā fa'ala abūhum al-Kāmil Muḥammad ibn al-ʿĀdil Abū Bakr ibn Ayyūb bi-awlād al-Khulafā' al-Fāṭimīyīn 'wa-la yazlim rabbuka aḥadan' [al-Kahf, 49]. The reference to a previous partial expulsion must be dated to the end of 825/1422, at the beginning of Barsbāy's rule. See al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍaw' al-Lāmi'*, 8:184.

¹⁴¹ See al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍaw' al-Lāmi'*, 7:216, regarding Muḥammad ibn Ḥājji: “*ṣallā 'alayhi al-Zāhir Barqūq bi-al-ḥawsh al-sulṭānī min al-qal'ah wa-qarrara li-awlādihi wa-hum 'asharah rātiban.*”



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The Tribal Dimension in Mamluk-Jordanian Relations

A growing interest in provincial history is producing alternative understandings of Mamluk political culture, ones that recognize the contributions and influence of local actors.¹ Given the uniquely local perspective of Syrian sources, the frequency with which one encounters references to local families and their larger tribal networks is not surprising. Jordanian *nisbahs* are a staple of Syrian biographical dictionaries, *waqfiyāt*, and chronicles of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, indicating the degree to which the peoples of Transjordan participated in the cultural, intellectual, economic, and indeed political life of the time in southern Syria. Malkawis, Ḥisbānīs, and Ḥubraṣis made academic careers in Damascus, Jerusalem, and Cairo and were active in Sufi organizations outside their home towns; Shobakis acquired land at an early stage in the development of private estates, endowing much of it as family and charitable *awqāf* at the turn of the ninth/fifteenth century; ‘Ajlūnīs controlled markets and were successful in business; Kerakis were a constant challenge to the state in the fifteenth century, playing an active role in rebellions of myriad forms.² These teachers, businessmen, and rebels, regardless of where they were actually born and raised, traced their

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¹Yūsuf Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥaḍarī li-Sharq al-Urdunn fī al-‘Aṣr al-Mamlūkī* (Amman, 1982); idem, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī li-Sharq al-Urdunn fī ‘Aṣr al-Mamlūkī al-Awwal (al-Mamālīk al-Baḥrīyah)* (Amman, 1982); and idem, *Dimashq fī ‘Aṣr Dawlat al-Mamālīk al-Thānīyah* (Amman, 2005); Taha Tarawneh [Tarāwinah], *The Province of Damascus during the Second Mamluk Period (784/1382–922/1516)* (Irbid, 1987); Alexandrine Guérin, “Terroirs, Territoire et Peuplement en Syrie Méridionale à la Période Islamique (VIIe siècle–XVIe siècle): Étude de Cas: le Village de Msayké et la Région du Laḡa” (Ph.D. diss., University of Paris–Lyon II, 1997); Aḥmad al-Jawārinah, *Tārīkh al-Urdunn fī al-‘Aṣr al-Mamlūkī* (Amman, 1999); Yehoshua Frenkel, “Agriculture, Land-Tenure and Peasants in Palestine During the Mamluk Period,” in *Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras*, ed. Urbain Vermeulen and Jo van Steenbergen (Leuven, 2001), 193–208; Shawkat Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī li-Minṭaqat Sharq al-Urdunn (min Junūb al-Shām) fī ‘Aṣr Dawlat al-Mamālīk al-Thānīyah* (Irbid, 2002); Zayde Antrim, “Place and Belonging in Medieval Syria, 6th/12th to 8th/14th Centuries” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2005) and idem, “Making Syria Mamluk: Ibn Shaddad’s *Al-A‘laq al-Khaṭīrah*,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 11, no. 1 (2007): 1–18; Bethany Walker, “The Role of Agriculture in Mamluk-Jordanian Power Relations,” in *Proceedings of Roundtable on the Age of the Sultanates*, ed. Bethany Walker and Jean-François Salles (Damascus, 2007), 77–96; and idem, *Jordan in the Late Middle Ages: Transformation of the Mamluk Frontier*, forthcoming.

²For examples of entries of ulama with Jordanian *nisbahs* found in contemporary biographical dictionaries, see Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥaḍarī*, 169–200.



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roots to Jordan, the majority maintaining close ties with kin there.³

There was, of course, no “Jordan” in the Mamluk period—a province (Mamlakat Karak) and the southernmost district of another (Mamlakat Dimashq) comprised the territory of what is today’s Hashemite Kingdom. The region was, in short, not an administrative unit. This is not the place to postulate whether, in spite of this, a “Jordanian” identity existed then—that belongs to another study. Nonetheless, there was, as there is today, a strong tribal dimension to Transjordanian society, a social cohesion created and reinforced by tribal ties and self-reference. Contemporary sources support this anthropological understanding of tribal society, as they describe the extent to which the Mamluk state tried at times to engage, at others break through, the complex tribal networks that permeated Jordanian societies. Economic life was, in part, structured by these networks, as were the relations that bound scholars in Damascus to ‘Ajlūn and Kerak and Jerusalem. Moreover, political power here was channeled through such networks, on both the local and imperial levels. The Mamluk state could not avoid encounters and confrontations with Jordanian tribes and their wide-flung and complex web of political, social, and economic ties.

While Transjordan represented the eastern frontier of the Mamluk empire, it was not peripheral to the political and strategic interests of the state. Transjordan was a linchpin in the Mamluk state’s defense against foreign invasion, as well as control over the peoples of Syria. At the beginning of the Mamluk period Transjordan represented a security concern; Ayyubid princes still maintained castles there, and the principle hajj route from Damascus to Mecca ran through the middle of the region. Sultan Baybars initiated an ambitious defensive project that involved reinforcing the citadel walls and towers at former Ayyubid castles, such as Kerak and Shobak, and building new fortifications at what would become rural capitals, such as Ḥisbān and Salt.⁴ He also built and leveled roads and reorganized the *barīd* system that would, by the eighth/fourteenth century, blossom into a comprehensive communications network of postal centers (*marākiz*), pigeon and fire towers, and caravan and pilgrim stops. Local tribesmen, who maintained tight social networks and were well armed and mobile, represented an immediate threat to this infrastructure. To secure the eastern frontier required controlling a complex tribal society that was not fully understood, culturally marginal, and never wholly incorporated into the state structure.

Recent scholarship in political anthropology and post-colonial theory have demonstrated that peoples and places normally on the geographical and cultural

³The complex meanings of *nisbahs* in the Mamluk period is considered in David Ayalon, “Names, Titles, and ‘Nisbas’ of the Mamluks,” *Israel Oriental Society* 4 (1975): 189–232.

⁴Bethany Walker, “Mamluk Investment in Southern *Bilād al-Shām* in the Fourteenth Century: The Case of Ḥisbān,” *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 62, no. 3 (2003): 243.



margins of the state emerge in times of political flux as critical to its maintenance or reform.⁵ The “imperial margins” described in such work are places of partial belonging that have always demonstrated some degree of autonomy or are beyond complete state control; are often subjected to irregular administrative practices, administrative or economic experimentation, and sporadic political violence; and are frequently the locus of resistance. They provide an ideal vantage point from which to observe the instability of state power and the mechanisms of its transformation. Tribal societies, which are flexible in structure and tend to move in and out of imperial systems as sociopolitical conditions change, are natural “margins” through which to evaluate political change.⁶ Rather than merely impassive subjects of imperial action, they can be political agents in their own right, impacting the state in important ways.

The following offers a few thoughts on ways to evaluate the exercise of political power by the Mamluk state in Transjordan at the turn of the fifteenth century. The central point of reference is the multiple relationships between the state and local tribes, considering not only the imposition of the imperial authority on local peoples, but also the ways in which the tribes helped to shape political culture in the region. It is a provincial perspective on Mamluk politics that pulls on textual and anthropological analysis and archaeological data to evaluate the ability of local actors to transform the imperial system during periods of political instability and turmoil.

DEFINING JORDANIAN TRIBALISM

Before we address the question of whether the Jordanian tribes were a political force at the turn of the fifteenth century, we must define what we mean by a “tribe.” The anthropological definition is a group of people that claim descent from a common ancestor. The term usually reserved for this in contemporary sources is “*‘ashīr*” (pl. *‘ushrān*). Local clans and tribal confederations are collectively referred to as *‘ushrān*.⁷ The term refers to a form of social organization and is not

⁵Veena Das and Deborah Poole, eds., *Anthropology in the Margins of the State* (Oxford, 2004); Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat, *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World* (Princeton, 2005).

⁶Øystein LaBianca, “Indigenous Hardiness Structures and State Formation in Jordan: Towards a History of Jordan’s Resident Arab Population,” in *Ethnic Encounters and Change*, ed. Muhammad Sabour and Knut Vikør (London, 1997), 143–57.

⁷A comprehensive presentation on the individual tribes of Jordan is well beyond the scope of this article. The reader should consult one of several works available on the topic. Al-Zāhiri describes individual Transjordanian tribes in some detail (Ghars al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Shāhīn al-Zāhiri, *Zoubdat kachf el-mamālīk: Tableau politique et administrative de l’Égypte, de la Syrie et du Hidjâz sous la domination des sultans mamloûks du XIII au XV siècle*, ed. Paul Ravaisse [Paris, 1894], 105ff). In the third chapter of his chancellery manual, *Kitāb Tathqīf*, Ibn Nāẓir al-Jaysh, an official of Sultan



specific to any economic strategy or settlement pattern: it can refer to peasants, herdsmen, villagers, nomads, or any combination of these.⁸ The term is generally used in collective reference to the Muslims of Transjordan.⁹ More often individual tribes or clans are named, in the context of specific events, such as targeted strikes on specific tribes by Mamluk amirs¹⁰ or the hospitality shown by others towards a sultan.¹¹

Among the *‘ushrān* of Jordan, Syrian sources differentiate between the *‘urbān* and *ahl al-balad*.¹² The *‘urbān* (s. *‘arab*) appear with the most frequency on account of their attacks on state officials and villages and raids on trade and pilgrimage caravans.¹³ The violence of this group is often cited by contemporaries as a

Barqūq, describes the proper address for Arab amirs and tribal leaders in formal correspondence (Taqī al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Taymī al-Ḥalabī al-Miṣrī ibn Nāẓir al-Jaysh, *Kitāb Tathqīf al-Ta’rif bi-al-Muṣṭalah al-Sharīf*, ed. Rudolf Veselý (Cairo, 1987). Brief references to individual tribes and events, however, are found in most Arabic sources of the period. See also A. S. Tritton, “The Tribes of Syria in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 12 (1947): 567–73; Frederick Peake, *A History of Jordan and its Tribes* (Coral Gables, 1958); Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥadārī*, 135–40; and Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 211–17, for information regarding their political relationships to one another, territory under their control, and their impact on the local economy.

⁸For a discussion of the wide-ranging use of this term in a Jordanian context, see Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 211–22. For an alternative understanding of the term, as semi-nomadic or sedentarized tribes, see Robert Irwin, “Tribal Feuding and Mamluk Factions in Medieval Syria,” in *Texts, Documents, and Artefacts: Islamic Studies in Honour of D. S. Richards*, ed. Chase Robinson (Leiden, 2003), 256.

⁹Jordan has a significant Christian minority, historically concentrated in the larger towns of Kerak, Shobak, and ‘Ajlūn. They are generally referred to as among *ahl al-Karak*, *ahl al-Shawbak*, and so on (Walker, *Jordan in the Late Middle Ages*, Ch. 2).

¹⁰The Banū al-Maghrawī were singled out among the *‘urbān* of ‘Ajlūn District for their insolence and independence. In 807/1404 the governor of Syria seized their homes, money, crops, and other property and demanded from every clan (*kull ṭā’if min al-‘arab*) a number of camels to carry the grains to ‘Adhrī‘at (Taqī al-Dīn Abī Bakr ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah*, ed. ‘Adnān Darwish [Damascus, 1997], 4:397).

¹¹For the hosting of Sultan Barqūq by the Beni Mahdi at Ḥisbān, see below.

¹²Ibn Ḥijjī occasionally differentiates villagers and farmers (*al-nās min arbāb al-qūrah wa-al-baṣāṭin*) from the *‘arab*; both, however are *‘ashīr* (see, for example, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū al-‘Abbās al-Sa‘īdī al-Ḥasbānī ibn Ḥijjī al-Dimashqī, *Tārīkh Ibn Ḥijjī*, ed. Abū Yaḥyā ‘Abd Allāh al-Kundarī [Beirut, 2003], 2:769, 777).

¹³The most powerful and established tribes of the *‘urbān* were the Banū Sakhr (and their clans), the Banū ‘Uqbah (and their clans), and the Banū Lām (Muḥammad al-Bakhīt, “Mamlakat al-Karak fi al-‘Ahd al-Mamlūkī,” as *Das Königreich von al-Karak in der mamlukischen Zeit*, ed. Alexander Scheidt [Frankfurt am Main, 1993], 31–32; Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 211–30; Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥadārī*, 135–40). The Banū Lām were arguably the greatest of the Transjordanian tribes, as well as the most ruthless. They are best known in Mamluk sources as the tribesmen who made



factor in the economic decline of Syria and the political collapse of the Mamluk provinces.¹⁴ They also appear as part of the state apparatus as caravan guides and guards and are appeased, temporarily, through assignments of amirships and *iqṭāʿāt*. In addition, the Jordanian *ʿurbān* provided the Mamluk state with horses for the *barīd*, camels for transport of grain, and sheep, a staple of the Mamluk diet and a specialty of local herdsman, then as today.¹⁵ Although the term is used to denote a local Arab elite, it is not entirely clear what specific social, political, or economic groups belonged to it.¹⁶ It is easier, however, to define what the *ʿurbān* were not: they were not Christians, local merchants, or town dwellers.¹⁷ They do include armed groups of Muslims that lived on the desert periphery. According to al-ʿUmārī, the *ʿurbān* included Arabs who claimed descent from the nomads of the Arabian Peninsula, regardless of whether they continued the nomadic existence or had settled in villages.¹⁸ While largely herdsman, it is likely that many lived at least seasonally in small villages and did some farming.¹⁹

The term *ahl al-balad* refers to everyone else. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, one of our most important sources on Jordanian society in this period, uses the term in the broad sense of the people of a region,²⁰ but more frequently townsmen, villagers, and residents of dispersed hamlets, in other words people of an identifiable residence. They comprised both Muslims and Christians and included local officials and the intelligentsia, merchants, and tribal leaders who lived inside the town proper.²¹

a living from attacking pilgrim caravans and killing those present.

¹⁴According to Ḥajjah, the local *ʿurbān* were a critical factor in the financial collapse of Transjordan in the fifteenth century. Their attacks on hajj caravans did considerable damage to the businesses that supported them, and their raids on Jordanian towns and villages destroyed local trade and agriculture, leading to demographic decline (Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥadārī*, 229–30).

¹⁵Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 4:397; Sato Tsugitaka, *State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam: Sultans, Muqtaʿs and Fallahun* (Leiden, 1997), 98.

¹⁶Rapoport comes to a similar conclusion regarding the *ʿurbān* of contemporary Egypt (Yossef Rapoport, “Invisible Peasants, Marauding Nomads: Taxation, Tribalism, and Rebellion in Mamluk Egypt,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 8, no. 2 [2004]: 1–22.).

¹⁷For a fuller discussion of this argument, see Walker, *Jordan in the Late Middle Ages*, Ch. 3.

¹⁸See discussion in Rapoport, “Invisible Peasants,” 16–17.

¹⁹See note 23.

²⁰In this sense, note, for example, an incident reported by Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah: in a struggle over the governorship of Kerak in 802/1399, all the local people (*ahl al-balad*) supported the incumbent (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 4:81).

²¹Occasionally the medieval historian will emphasize the presence of Christians among the “people” (*ahl*) of the town, particularly in cases of conflict with the local Muslim community, when their loyalty is in doubt. To cite one example, after executing his two top amirs, Alṭunbughā and Ṭashtamur, in 742/1342, Sultan al-Nāṣir Aḥmad ordered the people of Kerak (*ahl al-Karak*), “Christians and others,” to take the widows and children of these amirs by force, an action strongly



Culturally, they were virtually indistinguishable from the *‘urbān*, many of whom belonged to the same *‘ushrān*. Both groups were armed and shared the same customs, value system, and local identity: both the *‘urbān* and *ahl al-balad* of Kerak were “Kerakis.” Socially, however, *ahl al-balad* were distinguished from other tribesmen, as the Christians among them did not belong to the extensive tribal networks that comprised the *‘ushrān* proper. This is suggested, in part, by the formula “*al-‘ushrān wa-ahl al-balad*,” used by Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah to indicate the participation of all local people in an event—Muslim and Christian.²²

The ambiguity of these terms reflects in part an incomplete knowledge about Jordanian tribal society by the Mamluk state as well as its fluid structure and economic strategies. Traditional Jordanian society was always based on a mixed agricultural and pastoral economy. As a result, many individuals spent part of the year in permanently built stone houses in villages, while seasonally living in the fields to guard crops or tend to herds.²³ In addition, residents of large towns often owned land in the countryside, which family members tended and on which they resided seasonally.²⁴ We will examine this fluidity of residence, which is a survival strategy special to southern Syria, later in this article. Nonetheless, the scholars’ demographic categories based on residence and subsistence may not accurately reflect the complexity and overlapping points of self-reference of Jordanians in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; neither did the terms used by contemporaries based in Damascus and Cairo. The terms *‘urbān* and *ahl al-balad* reflect at best the ways state officials understood their engagement with local peoples: one of potential conflict with people in places not easily administered and one of mixed

condemned by contemporaries (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 4:81).

²²Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 3:107.

²³A contemporary description of these village houses is reproduced from a fourteenth-century *waqfiyah* in Yūsuf Ghawānimah, “Al-Qaryah fi Junūb al-Shām (al-Urdunn wa-Filistīn) fi al-‘Asr al-Mamlūkī fi Ḍaw’ Waqfiyat Ādar,” *Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan* 1 (1982): 363–71. For archaeological reports and architectural analyses of Mamluk-period domestic ruins, see Bāsim al-Maḥāmīd, “Ḥufriyāt Tall Dhibān al-Āthārī Mawsim 2002,” *Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan* 47 (2003): 71–76 (Dhibān); Alison McQuitty, “The Rural Landscape of Jordan in the Seventh-Nineteenth Centuries AD: the Kerak Plateau,” *Antiquity* 79 (2005): 327–38, and idem, “Khirbat Fāris: Vernacular Architecture on the Kerak Plateau, Jordan,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 11, no. 1 (2007): 157–71 (Khirbat Fāris—Kerak Plateau); Bethany Walker and Øystein LaBianca, “Tall Ḥisbān, 2004 Season,” *American Journal of Archaeology* 109, no. 3 (2005): 536–39 (Ḥisbān); Bethany Walker, “Northern Jordan Project, 2006 Season: Preliminary Report on Fieldwork in Sahm and Ḥubrās,” in “Archaeology in Jordan,” ed. C. Tuttle and B. Porter, *American Journal of Archaeology* 111, no. 3 (2007): in print (Sahm and Ḥubrās).

²⁴Poliak’s observation about the half-sedentary lifestyle of the *‘urbān* reflects this phenomenon (A. N. Poliak, “Les révoltes populaires en Égypte à l’époque des Mamelouks,” *Révue des études islamiques* 8 [1934]: 258).



benefit with places under direct control of the state. In short, such terms stand for two categories of place the state authorities could easily recognize and that fell into two different administrative categories: the walled town (with its village satellites and agricultural hinterland) versus the open countryside.²⁵

PERCEPTIONS OF “THE OTHER”

How did the state engage local tribes and upon what assumptions? Did the cultural distance between urban Cairo and rural Transjordan contribute to misunderstandings or exacerbate political tensions? Kerak emerges from contemporary sources as the ultimate symbol of Jordanian tribalism. The language used to describe the place and its people alternates from disregard to respect and fear, reflecting the political challenges this semi-autonomous provincial capital presented to the state. While certainly unique among administrative and defensive centers in Jordan for its size and political importance, official images of the place are suggestive of the ways local society was at times tamed, at others considered a political threat.

The physical and perceived political and cultural distance of Kerak from Cairo is behind many of the derogatory literary devices used to describe life in Kerak Castle.²⁶ Written sources present a rather unflattering image of life in the castle, which probably reinforced the belief that the lifestyle adopted by royal exiles here was frivolous and the place politically non-threatening. Here is where a sultan’s son would go to drink, meet women (and men), and waste his time; it was a land beyond the legal and cultural norms of Egyptian society; here was freedom from official duties and responsibilities. This is exactly where the perceptions of the capital failed to grasp the political realities of the province. Desert lands are not

²⁵The imprecision of nomenclature in reference to local tribes is echoed in the sliding tax scale used by the Ottomans in the sixteenth century to reflect degree of control over the local population (Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, “Ottoman Administration of the Desert Frontier in the Sixteenth Century,” *Asian and African Studies* 19 (1985): 145–55). For example, the tax categories of the *mezrā‘ah* were ambiguous and could refer to a hamlet, an isolated (grain) field, or a tribe (ibid., 151–52; see also use of term in the Arabic commentaries on the tax registers of Liwā’ ‘Ajlūn in Muḥammad al-Bakhīt and Noufan Hmoud, *The Detailed Defter of Liwā’ ‘Ajlūn (The District of Ajlun) Tapu Defteri No. 970* (Amman, 1989), and idem, *The Detailed Defter of Liwā’ ‘Ajlūn (The District of Ajlun) Tapu Defteri No. 185, Ankara 1005 A.H./1596 A.D.* (Amman, 1991).

²⁶Under normal circumstances, the journey from Cairo to Kerak should have taken a couple of weeks. However, Sultan Baybars in 675/1276 made that trip in only eleven days (Fawzi Zayadine, “Caravan Routes Between Egypt and Nabataea and the Voyage of Sultan Baibars to Petra in 1276,” *Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan* 2 [1985]: 171). This was an unexpectedly fast trip, as the sultan was on campaign. Sultan Aḥmad in 742/1342, anxious to return to a city to which he had a special attachment, accomplished the same in a mere six days (Joseph Drory, “The Prince Who Favored the Desert: Fragmentary Biography of al-Nāṣir Aḥmad [d. 745/1344],” in *Mamluks and Ottomans: Studies in Honour of Michael Winter*, ed. David Wasserstein and Ami Ayalon [New York, 2006], 27).



necessarily isolated or apolitical, nor are tribal societies without structure and cultural norms. Criticisms of local society and the “laxity” residence here produced in privileged exiles, such as sultans’ sons, illustrate a cultural condescension that underestimated its political potential. That is not to say that local tribesmen were not paid off when needed—they certainly were—but there was never a coherent policy to fully incorporate them into the state through marriage alliances, long-term residence, or some degree of assimilation, strategies with cultural currency then and today.²⁷ Three notable exceptions are found in the practices of Sultans al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, his son Aḥmad, and Barqūq, who made frequent trips to, and occasionally resided in, local towns and “Bedouin” encampments and were familiar with the local culture and its norms.

Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad felt a particular obligation to the people of Kerak, who had played a critical role militarily in returning him to the throne for his third reign and in whose company the sultan often travelled when in Syria. He was exiled twice to Kerak: the first time in 697–99/1297–99 as a child (deposed by his amirs) and then again in 709–10/1309–10, a self-imposed exile, which bought him time and opportunity to build an army and regain the throne. He had developed an attachment to Kerak and had developed political and social ties with its people. This sultan had a special respect for the tribal society of Kerak and its culture. He considered Kerak a kind of wet nurse, a healthy place for future sultans to grow up and grow tough. He sent his own sons there to be trained in martial techniques, utilizing the new *maydān* there for this purpose, and to acquire *furūsiyah*.²⁸ His sons Aḥmad, Ibrāhīm, Abū Bakr, and Ramaḍān were, essentially, raised there, with the hope that they would acquire the best qualities of tribal culture and would gain the love and respect of the local people.

The language used in two *taqlīds* sent to the amir Maliktamur describes Kerak in terms of “homeland” and its people as the sultan’s “flock.” In this first document, Maliktamur is assigned the governorship of Kerak and made responsible for the well-being of the sultan’s son. The text, preserved by al-Qalqashandī, expresses the sultan’s sentiments towards “a land that has become for us a home, whose virtues are in our hearts from love for its people (*min ḥubb al-waṭn*), and where our sons continue to live.” Not long afterwards, and shortly before his death, the sultan issued a second *taqlīd*, in which he promotes his son Aḥmad to the governorship but retains Maliktamur’s services there to assist him. Here the sultan expresses a patron’s care in tribal terms, as he reminds his amir that “these are

²⁷While one does read of the occasional marriage between Mamluk and tribal families, they are exceptional. Note, for example, the marriage of Amir Miṭāsh to a daughter of Nu‘ayr ibn Ḥayyār ibn Muhanna’, the great Arab amir of Barqūq’s reign. The alliance meant to be solidified by this union, however, failed (Irwin, “Tribal Feuding and Mamluk Factions,” 260).

²⁸Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 195–96; Drory, “The Prince Who Favored the Desert,” 19.



our dependants, in your care, and our flock, belonging to us and you. Shield them with your wings, and indulge them.”²⁹ In these documents the sultan adopted culturally appropriate terms to describe his relationship with this province, which was pastoral and tribal.

Thus, the Jordanian *‘ushrān* were imagined simultaneously as a people of particular martial qualities and skills, a flock in need of a shepherd, and a society without structure or discipline. What were Jordanian perceptions of the Mamluk state? It is difficult to identify the particular perspective of the *‘ushrān* in Syrian sources. Such abstractions as cultural perceptions and preferences are not easily retrieved from the archaeological record, either, which is otherwise quite informative about local society—its subsistence, consumption, and standards of living. Nevertheless, formal complaints against local officials by Jordanian villages, which are recorded with greater frequency from the mid-fourteenth century, do articulate the kinds of expectations people had about the state and what practices they found the most exploitative, culturally insensitive, and short-sighted.

In his recent book on Damascus in the Circassian period, the Jordanian historian Yūsuf Ghawānimah spares no words of criticism in his evaluation of the impact of Mamluk policies on rural society. On the basis of polemics by Damascus-based historians, Ghawānimah essentially describes *iqṭāʿ* holders and local officials as exploitative colonists, who were violent and uninterested in the well-being of local people: they “were particularly tyrannical to the peasants, harsh and arbitrary in their dealings, assaulting their honor and property.”³⁰ The critiques of villagers echo these sentiments. The people of the Jordan River Valley (the Ghūr) filed numerous complaints against officials posted there at the turn of the fifteenth century, largely in response to illegal diversion of shared water, forced labor on sugar plantations, physical violence, inability to react to local crises, and inappropriate use of the land.³¹ It is in the language used to describe the reception of popular officials, however, that popular images of the state are clarified: Amir Zayn al-Dīn Zubālah (d. 784/1382), *Bāshir al-Aghwār*, “loved the people;”³² Amir Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn (d. 784/1382), another *Bāshir al-Aghwār*, was “meritorious” (*min mashkūrīn*);³³ and Amir Sayf al-Dīn Baydamar (d. 789/1388), *Bāshir al-Aghwār*, “was known for his good [administrative] practice

²⁹Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A‘shā fī Ṣinā‘at al-Inshā’* (Cairo, 1963), 12:226–32; Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 196.

³⁰Ghawānimah, *Dimashq*, 31 (translation mine).

³¹For a fuller discussion of these themes, see Walker, “The Role of Agriculture,” and idem, *Jordan in the Late Middle Ages*, Ch. 2.

³²Ibn Ḥijjī, in Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 1:97.

³³Ibn Ḥijjī, in *ibid.*, 102.



(*ishtahara bi-ḥusn al-mubāshirah*) and good reputation.”³⁴ Expectations ran low among the people of the Ghūr, however, after surviving a series of corrupt and violent administrators, so that they cautiously awaited the arrival of each new official. This cynicism is reflected in Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah’s assessment of Amir Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Tālik (d. 799/1396), *Mutakallim al-Ghūr*, of whom he claims “there is no doubt about it, he was better than most!”³⁵ Apathy, greed, and ineptitude were to some degree expected from local officials, who were often the only point of contact between rural communities and the state.

The ambiguities of such cultural perceptions exacerbated tensions and created irregularities in practice and in responses it elicited. In the period of intense clientage that followed the death of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, state officials tried to manipulate local tribal networks as they did the urban networks of Cairo, but with less facility.³⁶ Likewise, local societies saw the state as both a necessary evil in moderating tribal conflicts, as well as a foreign, and usually unwelcome and exploitative, presence, whose ignorance about local resources and peoples caused damage in the long term. Disdain and distrust characterize the images of “the other” that occasionally emerge from the texts, modelling the ways in which both parties engaged the other. The state tried three strategies to control local tribes, each informed by assumptions about Jordanian society held by the Mamluk elite: selective cultural assimilation, clientage, and confrontation through military force. The response of Jordanian tribes to these efforts was effective at times in preventing further imperial penetration of the area but, more importantly, also transformed, in subtle ways, the Mamluks’ administrative and political culture.

ASSIMILATION

As a show of military force was financially and politically costly, and risky, the Mamluk state generally attempted first to neutralize the potential of political opposition from local tribes through co-option. The “softest” strategies involved a kind of selective assimilation, through the partial adoption of local customs for political purposes, and cultivating ties with local tribal networks, through occasional residence or repeated visitation. The irregular reign of Sultan Aḥmad best illustrates the former trend. Although the story of his residence in Kerak is well known to Mamluk historians, a review of some salient points about his cultural transformation there is relevant here.³⁷

³⁴Ibid., 226.

³⁵Ibid., 639.

³⁶For the social and political maneuvering of the Mamluk elite during this period, see Jo Van Steenberghe, *Order out of Chaos: Patronage, Conflict and Mamluk Socio-Political Culture, 1341–1382* (Leiden, 2006), Ch. 2.

³⁷The following summarizes the account presented by Shams al-Dīn al-Shujāʿī, who was a



Al-Nāṣir Aḥmad spent more time at Kerak than he did in Cairo: through a complex series of events, he essentially became “Jordanian” and no longer felt comfortable in Cairene Mamluk society. Aḥmad’s first trip to Kerak was in 726/1325, when his father, the reigning sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, sent him there, to be joined later by his brothers, to be raised, educated, and disciplined.³⁸ Aḥmad was eight years old at the time. The boys were eventually called home to Cairo by their father; Aḥmad did not stay long, though, as his father sent him back to Kerak soon afterwards. In 731/1330 al-Nāṣir Muḥammad once again called his son to Cairo, this time for his circumcision; Aḥmad had the surgery and returned to Kerak. Seven years later, he was summoned home for a third time, on this occasion to marry. At this point the reason for Aḥmad’s reluctance to marry and remain in Cairo for any length of time was revealed to the sultan, either as a rumor or an official report: he had fallen in love with a Keraki boy, whom he showered with gifts. Moreover, the sultan learned, his son spent his time in Kerak drinking and occasionally left the citadel wearing Keraki shoes.³⁹ The implication that he had “gone native” was enough to infuriate his father and insist that he stay in Cairo: the ties he was developing with Kerak smacked of rebellion and shame.

His father died later that year, and Aḥmad used the opportunity to free himself of Cairo, he believed, once and for all. He withdrew to Kerak, which he now claimed as his territory through his father’s *taqlīd*, and his brother Abū Bakr, the *wālī ‘ahd*, was put on the throne. After Abū Bakr’s arrest and exile to (and later execution in) Qūṣ in Upper Egypt, Aḥmad was declared sultan and eventually forced to return to Cairo to take the throne, which he did in 741/1342, in the company of a small group of Keraki intimates and clad in Bedouin dress (*zayy al-‘urbān*).⁴⁰ His return to Cairo was, however, brief, as he went back to Kerak only 51 days later, serving a mere two days in the Dār al-‘Adl. He meant for this move to be permanent: Sultan Aḥmad took the imperial Treasury with him, along with stocks of food and various supplies; it appears he meant to move the capital to Kerak. His amirs could not comprehend such an act and sincerely feared what

contemporary of these events (as *Tārīkh al-Mālik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn al-Ṣāliḥi wa-Awlādihi*, ed. and tr. Barbara Schäfer [Wiesbaden, 1985], 35, 69–71, 250–53, 278–80), and Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, who borrows largely from al-Shujā‘ī and Ibn Kathir (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:125–421).

³⁸ See al-Maqrīzī’s account of the same, where young Aḥmad is disciplined in *furūsiyah* (Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Ma‘rifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, ed. Muṣṭafā Ziyādah and Sa‘īd ‘Ashūr [Cairo, 1956], 2:272).

³⁹ Al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 69; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:421.

⁴⁰ Drory, “The Prince Who Favored the Desert,” 24, citing Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, and al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*.



such a move would do to the stability of the state.⁴¹ Al-Shujā'ī describes this pivotal event in terms of a physical transformation of the sultan, as Aḥmad left the Cairo citadel and headed towards Kerak:

The sultan got down [off his horse], took off his garments [of state], and put on luxurious Arab dress and was draped in two veils (*wa-daraba lahu li-thamayn*). The Kerakis came to his side, and he mounted a camel and rode this way on the open road to Kerak.⁴²

The amirs begged the sultan to return to Cairo. Once again, Sultan Aḥmad's response is indicative of his attitude towards his office, and his image of Kerak's position in the empire:

Syria is mine, and Egypt is mine, and Kerak is mine, and any place important to me where I have resided. You don't bother to visit me, so I am under no restrictions of yours.⁴³

The amirs were furious and, after repeated pleas for his return to Cairo and the return of the Treasury, put his brother on the throne. The winter of that year (743/1344), two years after Sultan Aḥmad left Cairo for good, and after seven or eight campaigns, the armies of Egypt and Syria met at Kerak, took the citadel, with the help of a *muqaddam* of local 'urbān foot soldiers, Bāligh ibn Yūsuf ibn Tayyī',⁴⁴ captured Aḥmad and assassinated him, decapitating him, cutting off his arms, and burying the body (minus the head) where it belonged, in the soil of Kerak.

Sultan Aḥmad's assimilation to Jordanian culture was sharply criticized by contemporaries, who cited it as an example of personal folly, suggesting that it threatened the stability of the state.⁴⁵ While I know of no comparable instances of

⁴¹One of the sultan's closest advisors tried to talk him out of this move: "O lord, what is so important that you must go [to Kerak]? Once you leave we will devour each other (*na'kulu ba'dunā ba'dan*), and the crops will be destroyed, [at this time], during the harvest" (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:246; in a slightly different form in al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 250).

⁴²Al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 253; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:247.

⁴³Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:296.

⁴⁴He is described as the "ornament of the tribes and the support of the kings and the sultans" (*zayn al-qabā'il . . . 'umdat al-mulūk wa-al-salāṭīn*) in a *manshūr* granting him an *iqṭā'* for his services to the state in this event (preserved by al-Maqrīzī and published by Frédéric Bauden, "The Recovery of Mamluk Chancery Documents in an Unsuspected Place," in *The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, ed. Michael Winter and Amalia Levanoni [Leiden, 2004], 59–76).

⁴⁵Ibn Iyās called him a "crazy teacher" (*mu'allim majnūn*); al-'Asqalānī accused him of mismanagement and preoccupation with his own personal pleasures; for al-Ṣafadī he caused social and spiritual harm to the people; to Ibn Taghrībirdī he was frivolous and thoughtless; and to al-Maqrīzī "the ruin of the monarchy (*sabab li-kharab al-mamlakah*)" (Drory, "The Prince Who



cultural assimilation among the Mamluk elite, there are hints in Syrian sources of attempts by sultans and their representatives to present themselves in culturally acceptable forms. Visiting local communities, for example, was a more subtle form of cultural engagement that required from the representative of the state some knowledge of local cultural norms and tribal structure. The visits of two sultans to the town of Ḥisbān and their temporary, and fully voluntary, residence there are suggestive of the ways targeted visitation was put to political use.

On a strategic hilltop location some 25 kilometers south of Amman, overlooking the grain fields of the Madaba Plains and the northeast corner of the Dead Sea, the town of Ḥisbān was a very old settlement of Byzantine, Roman, and Moabite foundations. Its importance in the Islamic period was tied to its location, which made it a convenient stop on the pilgrimage caravans to Mecca and Jerusalem.⁴⁶ Ḥisbān was already a substantial settlement with its own qadi, madrasah, market, citadel,⁴⁷ and extensive fields and orchards⁴⁸ and was made the capital (*wilāyah*) of the Balqā (the southernmost district of Damascus Province) for a while, likely replacing the town of Salt, on the eve of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's third reign.⁴⁹ A relatively minor town from the imperial perspective, and a rural administrative center of less than fifty years, Ḥisbān was privileged with sultan's visits on three occasions: twice by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and at least once by Barqūq. It is worth examining in some detail these visits for the light they shed on imperial-tribal relations in the fourteenth century.

The documented visits of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad took place in 709/1309, during a tour of Syria to garner support for his return to the throne, and again in 717/1317, when he visited only Ḥisbān. On the first occasion he sat in audience in the local citadel, presumably meeting with tribal leaders from the region and his amirs, bringing an "iron, Chinese throne" from Kerak for the purpose.⁵⁰ On the second

Favored the Desert," 29).

⁴⁶Ḥisbān was a node in the interior pigeon route through Syria, was a stop on the *barīd* route, and was not far from the hajj road from Damascus.

⁴⁷The entrance to the citadel, the upper courses of the fortification walls, and the southwestern tower (which was rebuilt at twice the scale of the other three) appear to be early Mamluk constructions. This work may be attributed to Sultan Baybars, who did similar work at Kerak and Salt, strengthening damaged towers by rebuilding them bigger and with higher walls (Walker, "Mamluk Investment in Southern *Bilād al-Shām*," 243; Robin Brown, "Excavation in the 14th Century AD Mamluk Palace at Kerak," *Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan* 33 [1989]: 290; Peake, *A History of Jordan and its Tribes*, 80; Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 74, 77).

⁴⁸It was said to have controlled an agricultural area of over 300 villages (al-Zāhirī, *Zoubdat Kachf el-Mamluk*, 46).

⁴⁹According to al-ʿAynī, there was already a *walī* serving at Ḥisbān at the beginning of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's third reign, when he visited the site (Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥaḍarī*, 48–49).

⁵⁰Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥaḍarī*, 116, citing al-ʿAynī. The excavators believe the large, vaulted



visit, the sultan left Cairo specifically to visit Ḥisbān and check on its affairs.⁵¹ There he met with his Syrian amirs, including the governor of Syria, thereafter returning to Cairo without traveling on to Damascus.⁵² The latter trip took the sultan 12 days from Cairo, a not insignificant period to visit a single town.⁵³

During Barqūq's sojourn at Ḥisbān, which in many respects resembled that of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad in 709/1309, the town was no longer the capital of the Balqā and retained no official importance.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, as part of his attempt to return to power in 791/1389, after a year's exile (and house arrest) in Kerak Castle, Barqūq stopped at Ḥisbān en route to Damascus. He stayed for a while with his mamluks and a group of Kerakis who had accompanied him there. From his temporary camp at Ḥisbān, Barqūq corresponded with the governors, qadis, and amirs in Syria, in an effort to confirm the alliances in Syria and to form a new army to march on Cairo.⁵⁵

Where did Barqūq reside during the roughly two weeks he was in Ḥisbān?⁵⁶ Most of the citadel was in ruins, with only sporadic or seasonal occupation of individual rooms after an earthquake destroyed the citadel a generation earlier.⁵⁷ Although he left Kerak in the company of 500 mamluks and 1000

room to the west of the central courtyard of the governor's residence, the "*dīwān*," was the location of formal meetings with tribal leaders and amirs (Bethany Walker, "Mamluk Administration of Transjordan: Recent Findings from Tall Ḥisbān," *al-ʿUṣūr al-Wuṣṭā* 13, no. 2 [2001]: 29–33; idem, "Mamluk Investment in Southern *Bilād al-Shām*," 251; Bethany Walker and Øystein LaBianca, "The Islamic *Qusūr* of Tall Ḥisbān: Preliminary Report on the 1998 and 2001 Seasons," *Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan* 47 [2003]: 447, 449, Fig. 5).

⁵¹Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārikh al-Siyāsī*, 194; full account is provided by al-Nuwayrī.

⁵²As governor of Ḥamāh, Abū al-Fidā' should have attended this meeting and offered to do so, but the sultan excused him from the long journey, accepting a gift of horses in return (al-Mālik al-Mu'ayyad 'Imād al-Dīn Abū al-Fidā', *Al-Mukhtaṣar fī Akhbār al-Bashar*, as *Tārikh Abī al-Fidā'*, ed. Muḥammad Dayyub [Beirut, 1997], 4:97–98).

⁵³*Ibid.*, 428.

⁵⁴Ḥisbān remained the district capital until 757/1356, when the governor (*wālī*) was transferred to Amman. The sources are silent about the rationale for the promotion of Ḥisbān to *wilāyat Balqā*, but as for its demotion in 757/1356, there are indications that the move to Amman served the financial interests of Amir Ṣarghatmish. It is also possible that the Ḥisbān citadel was not usable at this point, as there is archaeological evidence for a mid-century earthquake at the site (Walker, "Mamluk Investment in Southern *Bilād al-Shām*, 254; Walker and LaBianca, "Tall Ḥisbān, 2004 Season," 451).

⁵⁵Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārikh*, 1:294.

⁵⁶According to Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, Barqūq arrived in Ḥisbān on Thursday, 20 Shawwāl, then left and reached Adhra'āt and then Zarqah on 3 Dhū al-Qa'dah (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārikh*, 1:293–95).

⁵⁷See note 54.



Kerakis,⁵⁸ he came to Ḥisbān with a small retainer.⁵⁹ Upon his arrival in Ḥisbān, he enjoyed the hospitality of the Beni Mahdi.⁶⁰ Given the relatively small number of his forces, the circumstances of his residence there, and the physical state of the citadel, he likely stayed in the plains around the citadel, in the camps of the Beni Mahdi.⁶¹ Using modern Jordanian tribal practice as a gauge, it is likely that Barqūq was given quarter with them and shared a large and elaborate *mansef*⁶² (eaten communally with the tribal elite). He would have been in the constant company of the Beni Mahdi, who would have had ample opportunity to scrutinize his behavior. There was some political risk involved in accepting hospitality of this sort. Barqūq, who had spent a lengthy exile in Kerak, had become familiar enough with Jordanian tribal customs to successfully fulfill his role as guest among them.

Mamluk culture did not, apparently, hold the same attraction for Jordanians as their tribal culture did for some sultans. I have not identified any evidence in either written or archaeological sources for an attempt to assimilate the Jordanian tribes or any process of acculturation on the part of the *‘ushrān*. There is, on the other hand, some evidence for the cultural assimilation, whether deliberate or not, of the non-Mamluk population of Cairo—a militarization of civilians that is expressed in some consumer goods, such as housewares, textiles, and dress.⁶³

⁵⁸Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Ibn al-Furāt, *Tārīkh Ibn al-Furāt*, ed. Cushtanin Zurayq (Beirut, 1936), 9:1:125. While the numbers are likely exaggerations on the part of Ibn al-Furāt, it is clear that a large force was traveling with Barqūq, whose lodging could only be provided outside villages and towns.

⁵⁹Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 1:294.

⁶⁰The Benu Mahdī were one of the most important tribes of the central plateaus, together controlling, with the Beni ‘Uqbah, the important hajj route to ‘Aqabah and authorized, through assignment of *iqṭā‘āt*, to command a thousand horsemen (Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥaḍari*, 137; Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 221). Their traditional grazing lands were the Balqā region, including the erstwhile administrative centers of Salt, Ḥisbān, and Amman.

⁶¹Citing once again Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, we learn that the Beni Mahdi put him up in their camp: *wa-dayyafahu ‘Arab Banū Mahdī wa-anzalūhu* (*Tārīkh*, 1:294).

⁶²The *mansef* is the national dish of Jordan: rice and boiled lamb (or sheep and goat) served in a heavy yoghurt sauce on a large tray. It is often mentioned in Mamluk-period sources in the context of entertaining by and for tribal shaykhs and amirs.

⁶³For evidence of the “militarization” of Cairo’s civilian population in matters of dress, see Bethany Walker, “The Social Implications of Textile Development in Fourteenth-Century Egypt,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 4 (2000): 167–217, and in housewares, idem, “Ceramic Evidence for Political Transformations in Early Mamluk Egypt,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 8, no. 1 (2004): 1–114. There is, as well, growing evidence for the popularization of military titles, inscriptions, and blazons in a Syrian ware, called “Glazed Relief Ware” in archaeological circles. Produced in Jerusalem, and likely elsewhere in Syria, bowls in this style are found throughout Palestine and Transjordan in fourteenth-century village sites associated with administrative centers and large



While this phenomenon may be the result of the opening up of the amiral class in the second half of the fourteenth century,⁶⁴ the granting of numerous amirships and *iqṭāʿāt* to local tribal leaders in Jordan for the purposes of pacification and road security did not produce a market for “militarized” goods there. The aping of Mamluk culture that appears in Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus, and other large administrative centers is quite limited in Kerak, Shobak, ʿAjlūn, or any of the other district capitals. If anything, the material culture of Mamluk-period sites in Jordan suggests just the opposite: that Mamluk amirs and soldiers stationed in Transjordan adjusted to local conditions of housing, diet, and consumerism.⁶⁵

CLIENTAGE

The immediate effect of sultanik visits was to build on and benefit from ties of clientage that had developed with local tribes. There were defensive and overtly political objectives in these personalized visits, which frequently coincided with changes in local administration. The state’s overarching concern for defense (against both foreign and domestic enemies) impacted the structure of administration in the region, which in southern Bilād al-Shām was particularly fluid, with periodic shifts in administrative borders and district (*safaqah*) capitals (*niyābahs* or *wilāyahs*) and the combination or division of districts.⁶⁶ The promotion of a previously undistinguished village to a district capital, for example, served to solidify relations between the sultan and the powerful local tribes of Transjordan in the power struggles among the Mamluk elite throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

iqṭāʿāt. (Idem, “Militarization to Nomadization: The Middle and Late Islamic Periods,” *Near Eastern Archaeology* 64, no. 4 [1999]: 220–21; idem, “Mamluk Administration of Transjordan”; idem, “Mamluk Investment in Southern Bilād al-Shām”; and idem, “The Northern Jordan Survey 2003—Agriculture in Late Islamic Malka and Ḥubrāṣ Villages: A Preliminary Report of the First Season,” *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 339 [2005]: 67–111; Walker and LaBianca, “The Islamic *Qusūr* of Tall Ḥisbān,” 466; Marcus Milwright, “Modest Luxuries: Decorated Lead-Glazed Pottery in the South of Bilād al-Shām [Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries],” *Muqarnas* 20 [2003]: 85–111).

⁶⁴In his recent book, Van Steenberghe suggests the awarding of amirships to non-mamluks in the post-Nasirid period accounts for the spread of special privileges, such as dress (Van Steenberghe, *Order out of Chaos*, 20).

⁶⁵For cultural analyses of ceramic assemblages in Mamluk citadels in Jordan, see Brown, “Excavation in the 14th Century AD Mamluk Palace at Kerak,” and idem, “Karak Castle/Qalʿat Karak” (www.lib.uchicago.edu/su/mideast/encyclopedia/index2.html, forthcoming) for Kerak; Marcus Milwright, *Fortress of the Raven: Karak in the Middle Islamic Period (1100–1650)* (Leiden, 2008) for Kerak; and Walker and LaBianca, “The Islamic *Qusūr* of Tall Ḥisbān,” 464–66, and idem, “Tall Ḥisbān, 2004 Season,” for Ḥisbān.

⁶⁶Walker, “Mamluk Investment in Southern Bilād al-Shām,” 241–46.



While contemporary sources reveal little about the rationale behind the irregular administrative structure, they do intimate that rivalries among officers, uprisings and revolts, and tribal relations may have influenced a sultan's or amir's decision to promote one administrative center over another.⁶⁷ In his account of the revolt of Khadar al-Mālik al-Mas'ūd, the son of Sultan Baybars, in Kerak in 678/1279, Baybars al-Dawādārī, the Mamluk officer then serving at the Kerak citadel, related that Sultan Qalāwūn temporarily promoted the capital of the Balqā at the time, Salt, which was formerly a *wilāyah*, to the status of a *niyābah*, appointing an *amīr jandār* to its governorship.⁶⁸ Ghawānimah suggests that the sultan may have done so for strategic reasons, to block the movement north of al-Mālik al-Mas'ūd's troops;⁶⁹ the administrative promotion of Salt meant the assignment of a higher-ranking garrison commander and, thus, a stronger and larger garrison. Administrative restructuring could occur on the provincial level: the previously independent Province of Kerak was merged, first with the districts of 'Ajlūn and Salt in the third quarter of the fifteenth century, and then absorbed in its entirety by the Province of Damascus in the early sixteenth. Contemporary sources attribute this change to an attempt by the state to eliminate the independence of the Kerak governors and quell the amiral rebellions there that rocked Jordan in the late Mamluk period.⁷⁰

While administrative restructuring was used to control local rebellions, so too was the manipulation of tribal networks. For example, through choice and coercion and as the result of inter-tribal rivalries, Kerakis (of all walks of life) were pulled into conflicts between officials throughout the Mamluk period and directly into the amiral rebellions that raged on the Kerak Plateau at the turn of the fifteenth century. Historical rivalries, such as those that existed between the Qaysis and Yemenis, could be easily exploited and turned to political advantage, although with unexpected results. This was the case during the rebellion of the governor of Kerak, Amir Sudūn, against Sultan al-Faraj in 802/1399. During this conflict, the sultan sent his official, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, to Kerak to kill the governor. The arrival of the sultan's agent divided the tribes of Kerak, who willingly participated by

⁶⁷On a variation of this theme, Tarawneh suggests that the complexities and vacillations of Syrian administration were due to the intramilitary patronage practices of the sultans (Tarawneh, *The Province of Damascus*, 26).

⁶⁸Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥaḍarī*, 48. A brief survey of the uprising, from a military perspective, can be found in Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Manṣūrī al-Dawādārī, *Zubdat al-Fikrah fī Tārīkh al-Hijrah*, ed. D. S. Richards (Beirut, 1998), 180. Eventually becoming governor (*nā'ib*) of Kerak, for a while, and later imprisoned there, Baybars al-Dawādārī was an eyewitness to, and participant in, the vagaries of Mamluk rule in Jordan.

⁶⁹Ghawānimah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Ḥaḍarī*, 48.

⁷⁰Hajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 185–87.



supporting, with arms, one amir or the other: the Keraki Yemenis, led by the local *ḥājib*, defended the governor, as the Qaysis, following the *qāḍī al-quḍāh* in Kerak, threw their support behind Amir al-Muḥtār. The result was civil war, with the violence spreading even to the Ghūr.⁷¹

More often than not, tribal rivalries were an immediate liability to the state, as they could prevent the smooth running of official business. When Amir Batkhāṣ was named governor of Kerak later that year, he tried to enter the city in the company of members of the local Qaysi confederation. Members of the rival Yemeni clans were offended, rebelled against him, and locked the gates of the city, preventing his entry. The people of Kerak wrote a letter of complaint to the sultan, asking for Batkhāṣ's dismissal and his replacement with Amir Jarkās. Unwilling to witness further turmoil in the region, the sultan agreed, sending Batkhāṣ to Aleppo and Jarkās on to Kerak.⁷² Al-Maqrizī credits inter-tribal conflicts for the Kerakis' decision to support Barqūq in 791/1388. Tribal politics could have even greater consequences for the state. Amir Miṭṭāsh, then in power in Cairo, made the decision to execute Barqūq, who was imprisoned in Kerak Castle. He sent his amir, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Barīdī, to Kerak to fulfil this mission. Al-Barīdī was originally from Kerak, but he had become a *persona non grata* there following his dishonorable divorce from the daughter of a popular judge. The people of Kerak never forgave him for slighting this family. When he arrived in Kerak, and news got out of his plan to murder Barqūq, the previously neutral population decided to help rescue Barqūq and pledge him their allegiance, because of their hatred for al-Barīdī. A group of Kerakis made their way into the citadel one night and murdered al-Barīdī before he could finish his task. The following day, the governor opened the gates of the citadel, and Barqūq walked free.⁷³

In all of these cases, inadequate knowledge of tribal disputes exacerbated existing tensions between the executors of Mamluk policy and local peoples. Effectively building clientage networks is time-consuming, however, requires knowledge of current tribal alliances, and does not offer immediate results. An alternative way of garnering tribal support, and neutralizing opposition, was through awards—both cash and employment. The state knew just how restless and variable the region could be politically and was prepared to bribe local tribes for their support, or minimally, for their non-interference. This was the case in 802/1399, during a rebellion against the sultan by the governor of Kerak, described above. The sultan's agent wisely arrived with money and letters of appointment to

⁷¹Ibid., 115.

⁷²Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 3:107.

⁷³Summarized from *Kitāb al-Sulūk* in Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 72–73.



distribute among the *‘urbān*, winning the support of some.⁷⁴ In a similar fashion, after Sultan al-Nāṣir Aḥmad’s return to Kerak in 741/1342, local tribesmen were paid to ravage the countryside and the leader of the Āl al-Faḍl⁷⁵ paid to block the roads in order to create disorder and force the sultan to leave his hilltop fortress.⁷⁶ The capture of Kerak Castle and arrest of Aḥmad two years later would not have been possible without the financial incentives offered to Keraki tribesmen, which included both cash and *iqṭā‘āt*.⁷⁷

The distribution of cash awards was, however, a risky and short-term solution to local conflict; moreover, it could never guarantee tribal compliance. On the other hand, the employment of tribal leadership through state service had the benefit of merging official and local interests on the long-term, as well as co-opting tribal networks. The *‘urbān* penetrated Mamluk administration as amirs. In this capacity, they received titles⁷⁸ and *iqṭā‘āt* and collaborated with the state in matters of road maintenance and security, guiding and granting safe passage to the hajj caravan, providing state officials with information about rebellions, and serving militarily as auxiliary forces. The judgment of contemporaries about these tribes is mixed. On the one hand, the *‘urbān* of Kerak were politically loyal to the point of sacrificing their own lives; they were among the Kerakis who gave their wives their *ṣadaqah* and paid in full their debts before leaving with Barqūq for Damascus, knowing they may never see Kerak again.⁷⁹ On the other hand, they could be rapacious and cruel: in the fifteenth century, in a medieval form of “highway robbery,” the *‘urbān* of Kerak and Shobak attacked countless hajj caravans, leaving pilgrims—without transport, money, food, or water—to die in the wilderness.⁸⁰ Collectively, they represented the greatest support locally to the state, when the state was strong, as well as one of the greatest political threats, in times of imperial weakness.⁸¹

⁷⁴Ibn Qāḍi Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 4:81.

⁷⁵This tribe was among the largest (according to al-Zāhiri, 24,000 strong) and most influential in Syria (Tritton, “The Tribes of Syria,” 572).

⁷⁶Al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 278; Ibn Qāḍi Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:207ff.

⁷⁷Al-Maqrizī, the partially published *manshūr* cited earlier; Bauden, “The Recovery of Mamluk Chancery Documents;” al-Ṣafadī, *A‘yan al-‘Aṣr*; Drory, “The Prince Who Favored the Desert,” 28.

⁷⁸A formal system of title and address for tribal amirs was developed in the fourteenth century and described in detail by Ibn Nāẓir al-Jaysh (d. 786/1384), in his *Tathqīf al-Ta‘rīf bi-al-Muṣṭalaḥ al-Sharīf*. For an analysis of this document, see Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 218; for the introduction of the tribal amirates, see M. A. Hiyari, “The Origins and Development of the Amirate of the Arabs During the Seventh/Thirteenth and Eighth/Fourteenth Centuries,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 36 (1975): 509–24.

⁷⁹Ibn Qāḍi Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 1:292.

⁸⁰Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī*, 226.

⁸¹This is the point of view, as well, of the Jordanian historian Ḥajjah, who contrasts Mamluk rule



CONFRONTATION

The “soft” approaches of selective assimilation and clientage, however, frequently failed, particularly during times of environmental stress and political turmoil, which destroyed crops and led to the abandonment of villages. Poor administration by local officials, who put an extra strain on limited local resources (especially water),⁸² made life particularly difficult for peasants and herders alike under these circumstances and was one of the most common flashpoints of conflict between Jordanians and the state.⁸³ Armed confrontation was usually the result. The effective, however temporary, resistance of the *‘ushrān* during these crises was due to several factors: their socioeconomic and residential flexibility, physical mobility, the unique topography of the Jordanian interior, and their martial skills and access to arms.

Flexible subsistence was one strategy for survival during droughts, wars, and times of political insecurity.⁸⁴ The opposition between the “desert and the sown” is an artificial one, as mixed farming has always been the subsistence foundation of the country: nearly everyone, regardless of where they lived, had family members engaged in both farming and herding. Ottoman tax authorities, who built on Mamluk practice in the region, recognized this sliding scale between the fully sedentary and the nomadic by assigning special categories for “Bedouin” who maintained small plots, taxing them on both harvest and flocks.⁸⁵ There has, thus, always been a range of subsistence and residential choices available, from village-based farming to nomadic pastoralism, options that allowed local communities to survive as sociopolitical conditions changed. The demographic decline and disappearance of villages in fifteenth-century Jordan so hotly debated by archaeologists today suggests that many farmers adopted a semi-sedentary or semi-nomadic lifestyle when attacks on villages made residence there untenable.

The traditional mobility of Jordanian tribes, documented archaeologically and ethnographically, functioned much the same way. For much of the Ottoman period Jordanians used the natural, and ubiquitous, caves in the limestone escarpments

in Jordan in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Ḥajjah, *Al-Tārikh al-Siyāsī*, 217).

⁸²Modern Jordan is notoriously limited in natural water sources and today suffers from extreme water shortages during the summer months. Rainfall today in Jordan ranges from 600 mm a year in the northern hill country to 200 mm in the southern and eastern steppes; 300 mm annual rainfall is needed for dry farming. Because so much of the country received barely enough rain for dry farming, and because grains (the staple of Jordanian agriculture) are generally not irrigated, the wheat crop today fails on the average of once out of every five years (Carol Palmer, “Following the Plough”: The Agricultural Environment of Northern Jordan,” *Levant* 30 [1998]: 132).

⁸³Walker, “The Role of Agriculture.”

⁸⁴This is a central theme of LaBianca, “Indigenous Hardiness Structures.”

⁸⁵See note 25.



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domestically, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries adding stone structures to the entrance.⁸⁶ “Cave villages,” the ruins of which dot the Jordanian countryside, often escaped the attention of Ottoman tax collectors.⁸⁷ The ability of villagers to move to the desert, of “Bedouin” to live in a village, and the use of caves by both to escape notice, would have been very effective strategies for outmaneuvering Mamluk officials, one not articulated in Mamluk-period sources but amply attested archaeologically, ethnographically, and in Ottoman-period travelers accounts.

In short, the mobility of the local *‘ushrān*, both *‘urbān* and full-time villagers, owes much to the unique topography of Jordan. Most of Transjordan is occupied by a rough plateau dissected by deep valleys bordered by hills and mountains, with elevations ranging from 400 meters below sea level (the Dead Sea) to 1700 meters above sea level (Jebel Rūm, near Petra). In periods of political insecurity, the plains and plateaus have been abandoned for the hill country, where villages were secure from “marauding Bedouin” and, generally, the political violence of the state.⁸⁸ This is the general demographic pattern emerging from archaeological surveys and one that seems to be connected to the repeated rebellions by local people and amirs alike. The desert, as well, offered the opportunity for escape for the economically and politically persecuted. The romantic vision of the political independence of the hills and mountains⁸⁹ so lovingly painted by French social historians such as Braudel and Le Roy Ladurie for the late medieval Mediterranean resonates for fifteenth-century Jordan.⁹⁰ Here, too, hill villages suffered less from direct state violence and “feudal” control than those in the valleys and plains. The great grain fields of the Madaba Plains and the Kerak Plateau fell under the jurisdiction of *muqtāʿ*s, while the smaller orchards of the northern hills gradually

⁸⁶This kind of architecture has come under archaeological scrutiny in recent years. The domestic use of caves in the Mamluk period is also suggested by recent excavations at Tall Ḥisbān.

⁸⁷The village of Shammākh near Shobak is one of these villages (L. Noca, *Smakieh: Un village de Jordanie* [Lyon, 1985]; Walker, “Militarization to Nomadization,” 215). Extensive ruins can also be seen at Ḥisbān, across the Wādī Ḥisbān from the tell. Ethnographic interviews with residents at Ḥisbān document the use of caves under the oldest houses for hiding goods from tax collectors a century ago (MPP–Tall Ḥisbān Excavation project archives, 2001 and 2004).

⁸⁸Walker, “Mamluk Investment in Southern *Bilād al-Shām*,” 248.

⁸⁹Braudel differentiates between “hills” (which lay at an altitude of 400 meters above sea level or less) and “mountains” (which are higher than that) (Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* [New York, 1972], 1:55). The only true mountains, by this definition, in Jordan are the seats of Crusader, Ayyubid, and Mamluk castles: Kerak, Shobak, Habis, ‘Ajlūn. I am referring here to Jordan’s numerous “hills” that rim the central plateaus and border Irbid in the north.

⁹⁰Ibid., 25–60; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error* (New York, 1978), 3–23, 69–88.



became, over the course of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, *waqf*, communally-held land (today we would use the term *musha'*), or private estates.⁹¹ While the hill country was not entirely inaccessible physically to state officials, invading armies, and the *'urbān*, the longevity of these communities through the troubled fifteenth century—with their populations increasing while much of the rest of the country's declined—bears witness to the security and hope for escape that these regions offered.

Most importantly, Jordanian tribesmen were armed—on this point the sources are clear. As early as Qalāwūn's reign, there was an attempt to disarm the *'urbān* in the provinces.⁹² Villagers and townsmen were armed, as well, and could be used as local militias or auxiliary forces when needed. This was the case, when at the conclusion of his exile and imprisonment in Kerak in 791/1388, Barqūq raised troops among both the *'urbān* (specifically the Beni 'Uqba, Āl Faḍl, and 'Arab Jarm) and the “troops of Kerak and Shobak” (*ahl al-Karak wa-al-Shawbak wa-ajṇādiḥā*).⁹³ Armed resistance by peasants is described in both the Syrian and Egyptian countrysides as either a collaboration with the *'urbān* or as occurring at the same time as “Bedouin” attacks against villages.⁹⁴ Either way, the victims were other villages and officials in transit or on patrol. Inter-village violence is also recorded: the political turmoil surrounding the rebellions against Barqūq in 801/1389 encouraged peasants to plunder crops, apparently their neighbors'.⁹⁵ The sources do not fully explain the background of rebellions or raids, but one can surmise in many cases that many were perpetrated by displaced peasants, forced to leave their villages and homes because of armed conflict or drought. Incidences of this sort increased in northern Jordan immediately after Timūr's

⁹¹This is addressed in Walker, *Jordan in the Late Middle Ages*, Ch. 5.

⁹²Both Ibn Furāt and al-Qalqashandī reproduce a memorandum (*tadhkirah*) that was supposed to have been written by Sultan Qalāwūn for his vice-sultan Kitbughā in 679/1281. In it, the provincial and district governors are to “notify the *'urbān* not to carry swords, spears and weapons of any other kind. They are to be prohibited from purchasing them in Cairo. Those who flout this order and travel with weapons from village to village will have them confiscated and will be punished.” (Sato, *State and Rural Society*, 113–14).

⁹³Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ṣaṣrā, *Al-Durrah al-Mudī'ah fī al-Dawlah al-Zāhiriyyah*, as *A Chronicle of Damascus 1389–1397*, ed. William Brinner (Los Angeles, 1963), 25. According to a European merchant living at the time in Damascus, Bertrando de Mignanelli, Barqūq relied on armed peasants from Kerak during his march to Damascus (“*Ascensus Barcoch: A Latin Biography of the Mamluk Sultan Barqūq of Egypt* [d. 1399], Written by B. de Mignanelli,” *Arabica* 6 [1959]: 155ff).

⁹⁴For a clear example of collaboration, see Ibn Ṣaṣrā, *A Chronicle of Damascus*, 42.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 24. For parallels from Egypt, see Stuart Borsch, *The Black Death in Egypt and England: A Comparative Study* (Austin, 2005), 49.



invasion and are attested even five to six years afterwards.⁹⁶ Much of the violence of the fifteenth century in Jordan can be attributed to the arming of a wide cross-section of the population.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion we return to two questions introduced at the beginning of this essay: were the tribes of Jordan a political force, and if so, in what ways did they mold Mamluk political culture in the troubled period at the turn of the fifteenth century? I would suggest that the *‘ushrān* acted politically and asserted themselves through institutional, military, and diplomatic means throughout the Mamluk period. The Mamluk state was forced to take account of tribal networks and local power structures and to recognize the potential military threat the *‘urbān*, in particular, presented to regional security. Mamluk-tribal relations in Jordan resembled in many respects the relations between post-colonial states and their “margins”—the fluid and inconsistent administration of these regions, the level of political violence, and the ability of local communities to force accommodation in policy and practice. In these terms, Mamluk political culture was molded locally by tribal structures and politics. Whether this was a uniquely Jordanian situation or characterized provincial administration as a whole is an important issue that belongs to another study.

⁹⁶ Ibn Ḥijjī, *Tārīkh*, 2:769. It is not clear whether these were actions of desperation or concerted attacks on the state, however.



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An Unpublished Anthology of the Mamluk Period on Generosity and Generous Men

Scholars are aware that the amount of unpublished—and sometimes unknown—works of Arabic literature is sizeable indeed. As Thomas Bauer recently emphasized, the Mamluk period in particular, with its flourishing cultural life, is still awaiting a complete evaluation of its literary production.¹ With this article I hope to make a small contribution to the catalogue of this literature.

Among the manuscripts preserved in the library of the University of Liège, which houses still more undiscovered treasures for Arabists, a work entitled “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā’ wa-Bahjat al-Nudamā’” (The ornament of generous people and the joy of the boon-companions)² attracted my attention. The title announced that kind of monothematic *adab* anthology dedicated to a specific theme or to a specific category of persons: in this particular case, the theme of generosity, certainly one of the most valued in the ethics of classical Arabic culture, and the category of generous people.

The sabbatical year I spent at the University of Liège allowed me to see the manuscript and to make a quick study of the text. It turned out that not only is the work still unpublished,³ but more interestingly, that the identity of its author seemed dubious and the text itself was problematic as far as the contents of the chapters and order of the narratives contained therein are concerned. If this title is to be added to the list of the Mamluk anthologies recently compiled by Thomas Bauer,⁴ the issues raised by its authorship and the form of the text preserved in

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¹Thomas Bauer, “Mamluk Literature: Misunderstandings and New Approaches,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 9, no. 2 (2005): 105–32.

²The catalogue of the Arabic and Oriental manuscripts of this library is still in progress. I thank Frédéric Bauden, who is preparing it, for having pointed out this title to me.

³It does not appear among the titles mentioned by Reinhard Weipert, *Classical Arabic Philology and Poetry: A Bibliographical Handbook of Important Editions from 1960 to 2000*, Handbook of Oriental Studies 63 (Leiden, 2002), nor in the catalogues of the most important libraries of Middle East studies.

⁴Thomas Bauer, “Literarische Anthologien des Mamlūkenzeit,” in *Die Mamlūken: Studien zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur: Zum Gedenken an Ulrich Haarmann (1942–1999)*, ed. Stephan Conermann and Anja Pistor-Hatam (Hamburg, 2003), 71–122. In this connection Bauer states: “This list can



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the manuscript tradition call for a further inquiry.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE AUTHOR

The Liège manuscript of “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā’ wa-Bahjat al-Nudamā’,” which I took as my point of departure, made no mention of the author’s name. To learn more, I looked at *Kashf al-Zunūn* of Ḥajjī Khalīfah: the title “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā’” was in fact mentioned. The work was attributed to Ibn Abī al-‘Īd al-Mālikī.⁵ He is certainly not a well-known author in the history of Arabic literature. I checked in Brockelmann’s *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, and the book was mentioned twice, but—to my surprise—with two different attributions. In fact, Brockelmann mentions ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ ibn Muḥammad al-Shubrāwī al-Mālikī ibn Abī Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Shaykh Ishāq,⁷ a person about whom no biographical details are known. Only a manuscript of the work, preserved in Algiers, is mentioned in relation to this quite unknown author. Up to this point I had entertained the following hypothesis: (a) two different works having the same title, but not the same author; or (b) one single work with a double attribution. But the question turned out to be still more confusing when I discovered a third possible attribution for this same title. George Vajda, in a note dated 1952 correcting some errors in the magnum opus of Brockelmann, points to the existence of another manuscript of the “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā’” unaccounted for in *GAL*. This “new” manuscript was preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris, but the name of the author given by Vajda was not ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ ibn Muḥammad al-Shubrāwī al-Mālikī ibn Abī Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Shaykh Ishāq but instead Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Khālidi. In any case, George Vajda noticed that “quoi qu’il en soit de la question de l’auteur, les deux notices de Brockelmann doivent être fondues en une seule.”⁸ The matter then seemed a little less nebulous, even if the issue of the authorship remained to be cleared up: apparently there was only one work entitled “Ḥilyat

easily be augmented, but it may provide a first orientation for future efforts. What we need most urgently given the present state of our knowledge are preliminary studies of as many of these anthologies as possible.” (“Mamluk Literature,” 124). This article is then intended as a small contribution to answer the call.

⁵Ḥajjī Khalīfah, *Kashf al-Zunūn fī Asāmī al-Kutub wa-al-Funūn*, ed. Sharaf al-Dīn Yāltaqāyā and Rif‘at Bīlkah al-Kalīsī (Beirut, 1982, reprint of Istanbul, 1941), vol. 1, col. 690.

⁶Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur* (Leiden, 1943–49), S2:905, ch. 2, n. 3.

⁷*GAL*, S2:909, n. 44.

⁸George Vajda, “Notes sur la Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur,” *Journal Asiatique* 240 (1952): 19.



al-Kuramāʾ,” but once the additional information given by Vajda was taken into account, the possibilities for the name of the author rose to three.

The only way to clarify the issue was to consult all the manuscripts mentioned in the bibliographies and the catalogues of manuscripts in connection with this title. The number of known manuscripts that I could trace amounted to seven, three dated and four undated. Apart from the Liège manuscript, I found two preserved in Princeton, one in Paris, one in Algiers, one in Gotha, and one at al-Azhar library in Cairo.⁹ The perusal of six of these seven (the Algiers copy being inaccessible to me) confirmed that the matter of authorship was rather muddled. Some manuscripts mentioned the name of the writer, but in inconsistent forms, while others left it out.

Four manuscripts mention the author's name. The first one is Princeton, Yahuda Collection 847, undated (but probably copied in the eleventh/seventeenth century): at fol. 1 a certain al-Sakhāwī is mentioned, but as this was a widespread *nisbah* in Egypt in the Mamluk period, no further light is shed on the matter. The manuscript of Gotha, undated but in any case earlier than 1807 (which is the date of acquisition), at fol. 1a cites ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ ibn Muḥammad al-Shubrāwī al-Mālikī as the author. A further reference in the form “Ibn Abī al-‘Īd al-Mālikī” has been added in a different handwriting, no doubt on the basis of the attribution given by Ḥajjī Khalīfah, who is also mentioned on the same page. An analogous case is that of the manuscript of al-Azhar, recent and defective: at fol. 1b this one also mentions the attribution to Ibn Abī al-‘Īd al-Mālikī, but in this case too we are dealing with a later addition made in a different handwriting, on the basis of the information given by Ḥajjī Khalīfah. Therefore, the al-Azhar manuscript is of no use in solving the problem of authorship.

The last manuscript which mentions the author's name is the Algiers one. Unfortunately, since it remained inaccessible to me, I had to content myself with the accurate description made by E. Fagnan in his catalogue. Following the details given by the French scholar, the name that is cited in this manuscript (undated, but copied probably in the tenth/sixteenth century) is that of al-Shaykh Ishāq, the one related by Carl Brockelmann.

The second manuscript of Princeton (Garrett 157H) and the one preserved in Liège do not mention the name of the writer and therefore they are of no help in shedding light on the authorship of the book.

A case apart is that of the Paris manuscript, copied in Cairo in 1169/1755. In his note Vajda suggested the authorship of an unknown writer, Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Khālidi, which was rather puzzling. A closer examination of the manuscript revealed that this hypothesis was based both on a mistaken reading

⁹Princeton MS Garrett 157H 1112/1700; Paris MS ar 3476(2); Liège MS 5300/1; Algiers MS 1880 (fols. 157–338r); Princeton MS Yahuda 847; Gotha MS Pertsch 1232; Azhar MS Abāza 7034.



and a misinterpretation. In fact the name on the colophon is that of Muḥammad Zayn al-Dīn, but this name identifies the copyist, not the author of the book as Vajda surmised.¹⁰ So, the Paris copy must also be discarded in connection with the issue of authorship.

Obviously, in order to clear up the matter, the manuscripts bearing the author's name as a later addition based on the reference of Ḥajjī Khalīfah were to be disregarded; I could then only base my investigation on three manuscripts, namely those bearing the name of the author in the very same handwriting as the copyist. I obtained the following forms for the identity of the writer: 'Abd al-Fattāḥ ibn Muḥammad al-Shubrāwī al-Mālikī (Gotha), al-Sakhāwī (Princeton Yahuda 847) and al-Shaykh Ishāq (Algiers). Excepting the last eccentric form, inconsistent with the others and with the data of Ḥajjī Khalīfah, I had then to deal with the following: 'Abd al-Fattāḥ ibn Muḥammad al-Shubrāwī al-Mālikī and al-Sakhāwī, for both of whom the *nisbahs* clearly reveal an Egyptian origin.

The name mentioned by Brockelmann, namely 'Abd al-Fattāḥ ibn Muḥammad al-Shubrāwī al-Mālikī ibn Abī Muḥammad ibn 'Abd, rests in fact on the combination of the forms given by the manuscript of Gotha ('Abd al-Fattāḥ ibn Muḥammad al-Shubrāwī) and that given by Ḥajjī Khalīfah (Ibn Abī al-'Abd al-Mālikī),¹¹ but contains a further onomastic element (ibn Abī Muḥammad) of unknown origin. It needs nevertheless a minor correction: Ibn al-'Abd is the form based on a misreading of the Flügel edition of *Kashf al-Zunūn*,¹² which gives 'Abd instead of the correct 'Id. With such a nebulous description of the identity of the writer, in order to establish the authorship it was necessary to look in the biographies for more information about writers whose name could match, at least in part, the aforementioned one and whose life and intellectual activity could provide useful clues about the authorship of the "Ḥilyat al-Kuramā'." The works of a much better known al-Sakhāwī, the historian Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān Shams al-Dīn, are the sources that could shed some light on the matter. Two entries seemed particularly interesting in this connection, the first one contained in his *Al-Daw' al-Lāmi' li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsi'*¹³ and the second one, a little more detailed, in his *Al-Tuhfah al-Laṭifah fī Tārīkh al-Madīnah al-Sharifah*.¹⁴

¹⁰The name of both the owner and the copyist that figures on the title page is instead Muḥammad ibn al-marḥūm al-ḥājj Ḥusayn Zayn al-Dīn.

¹¹Vajda, "Notes," 18.

¹²Repr. New York and London 1964, 3:112, n. 4633.

¹³Cairo, n.d., vol. 7, notice n. 243, 110–11.

¹⁴Cairo n.d., vol. 3, notice n. 3647, 508–11. The author's life and the role he and his family played in Medina are also discussed in 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mudayris, *Al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah fī al-'Aṣr al-Mamlūkī (648–923 h./1250–1517 m.): Dirāsah Tārīkhīyah* (Riyadh, 2001), 173 and passim, but only on the basis of the information given by al-Sakhāwī.



BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

The author of “*Ḥilyat al-Kuramā*” must be identified as Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Mūsā ibn Abī Bakr ibn Abī al-ʿĪd, al-Shams Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Sakhāwī, *thumma* al-Qāhirī al-Mālikī,¹⁵ also known as Ibn al-Qaṣabī, al-Sakhāwī, and earlier as Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd, qadi and *nazīl* of Ṭaybah, “the perfumed one,” i.e., Medina. His renown is certainly not universal, and therefore it could be useful to give some details about his life, his intellectual activities, and his (scarce) bibliography.

He was born in Sakhā, in the Nile Delta, in 819/1416–17. After having studied in his native town, in 831/1427 he went to Cairo, where he stayed for more than seven years, attending the lectures of famous teachers. In 840/1436 he went on the pilgrimage and afterwards he came back to his native town, where he stayed until 859/1454. In that year, he returned to Cairo for the second time, where he dedicated himself to the study of law under the guidance of the representatives of the four legal schools, first alone and then with his son. Prior to his appointment in Medina, in order to earn his living he held the offices of witness and deputy judge. The biographies say that he was also a panegyrist and he gained his living from this activity, which also brought him wide renown. Thanks to some influential acquaintances, he was eventually appointed qadi of Medina in 860/1455, a fact to which he owes his *nisbah* of al-Madanī. There he carried out his duties with the utmost dignity and showed every virtue, much to his subjects’ satisfaction. He also attained a remarkable degree of power. After more than three decades he suffered a stroke leading to partial paralysis and, due to the progressive decline in his health, in 892/1486 he was succeeded by one of his two sons, Khayr al-Dīn Muḥammad.¹⁶ This succession was a happy one, since—as the sources tell us—his son Muḥammad was even wiser and more virtuous than his father. Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd died 5 Muḥarram 895/29 November 1489.

Muḥammad al-Sakhāwī, the author of *Al-Ḍawʿ al-Lāmiʿ*, reports that on several occasions he had been in touch with him. He first met him at Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī’s house, referring to al-ʿAsqalānī as *shaykhunā* (our master). He then met him again in Minā and went to visit him in Medina, where Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd (already afflicted by his infirmity) showed him hospitality. Al-Sakhāwī also informs us that they shared intellectual interests and exchanged poetry: on several occasions al-Sakhāwī transmitted his poems to Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd and received his poems in return, which he copied in a quire (*kurrāsah*). Nevertheless, al-Sakhāwī fails to mention the literary skills of our author in the field of prose, and therefore no hint of the

¹⁵Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍawʿ al-Lāmiʿ li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsiʿ* (Cairo, n.d.), 7:110; idem, *Al-Tuhfah al-Laṭīfah fī Tārīkh al-Madīnah al-Sharīfah* (Cairo, n. d.), 508 has also “*thumma* al-Madanī.”

¹⁶Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Mūsā ibn Abī Bakr ibn Abī al-ʿĪd: al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, 7:47–48, notice n. 124.



writing of literary anthologies or *adab* books is to be found in relation to our qadi. On the contrary, he speaks well of both prose and poetry composed by his son Muḥammad. The little anthology that I present here is unaccounted for in the bibliography of Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd al-Mālikī as it is given in his biography.

As far as the personality of our author is concerned, the portrait sketched by his biographer is overwhelmingly positive. Al-Sakhāwī highly praises his character; in particular he expresses his appreciation for his modesty, his cheerfulness, his integrity and—more pertinent to the argument of this article—his generosity. Concerning this, he specifies that Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd gave a warm welcome to all those who came to see him and that he showed a great liberality towards all the poor people who addressed him: he gave them food and other means of subsistence.¹⁷ These character traits, as well as his manners and behavior, are especially consistent with the choice of the subject treated in “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā” and are well represented in the text of this anthology. In fact, a substantial part of the material presented in the “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā” deals with hospitality and its duties, and the carrying out of charitable deeds is also stressed. As a matter of fact, one passage is especially revealing of the charitable attitude of Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd and speaks of his inclination to Sufism, if not of his open adherence to a Sufi confraternity. At the end of the first chapter, dedicated to the concept of generosity and to the characteristics of generous men, the author mentions two of his masters and recalls their acts of charity, namely the act of offering food to needy people.¹⁸ The two masters are Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Ghamrī (d. 849/1445)¹⁹ and Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Shādhilī al-Taymī (d. 847/1443).²⁰ The close master-disciple relationship revealed by the mention of these two personalities in the “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā” and the pious words which follow their names also receives an external confirmation in the biographical sketches by al-Sakhāwī: according to this source, these two Sufis figure among the saintly men (*sādāt*) that Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd met in his life.²¹ The first one, Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar

¹⁷ Al-Sakhāwī, *Tuhfah*, 510: *wa-rassā kathīran min al-qādimīn bi-simāʾ al-ḍuʿafāʾ bi-al-ṭaʿām wa-naḥwahu*.

¹⁸ On charity see Yaacov Lev, *Charity, Endowments, and Charitable Institutions in the Medieval Islam* (Gainesville, Florida, 2005), 18 passim for food distribution to the poor, and 104ff. for the world of mystics.

¹⁹ GAL S2:150, notice 15a; Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, *Al-Aʿlām* (Beirut, 1989), 6:315; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Abnāʾ al-ʿUmr*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥabashī (Cairo, 1994–98), 4:243; al-Sakhāwī, *Dawʾ*, 7:238–40, n. 641; ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn Aḥmad al-Shaʿrānī, *Al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā, al-Musammā bi-Lawāqih al-Anwār fī Ṭabaqāt al-Akhyār*, wa-bi-hāmishihi *Kitāb al-Anwār al-Qudsiyah fī Bayān Adab al-ʿUbūdiyyah* (Cairo, n.d.), 2:80–81.

²⁰ GAL S2:150, notice 17; al-Ziriklī, *Aʿlām*, 6:88; al-Shaʿrānī, *Ṭabaqāt*, 2:81ff.

²¹ Al-Sakhāwī, *Tuhfah*, 3:510.



al-Ghamrī, lived a life of poverty among the poor (and was reproached for this lifestyle by Ibn Ḥajar, among others²²) and dedicated himself to the building and restoration of mosques. The second one, Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Shādhilī al-Taymī, a Hanafi, was a member of the Shādhiliyah confraternity and was known for some stories concerning him and the sultan Faraj ibn Barqūq. The tone of speech Ibn Abī al-ʿId uses when he mentions both of them removes any doubt about the influence they had on him; it also shows how deeply he had been marked by their teachings and the example they set when he met them during his stay in Cairo in his youth.

THE TEXT

As far as I know, the text of “Ḥilyat al-Kuramāʾ wa-Bahjat al-Nudamāʾ” has been preserved in seven manuscripts, which testifies to the wide circulation of this work. Six of them have been copied in *naskhī* writing, and only one of them in *maghribī*, which suggests that its circulation was relatively minor in the western part of the Muslim world. Out of these six, three are closely connected with Egypt, and more specifically Cairo. They are: (a) the Paris manuscript, which was copied in Cairo in 1169/1755; (b) the Gotha manuscript, which was bought in Cairo in 1807 by Setzen; (c) the al-Azhar manuscript, which is still preserved in al-Azhar library. We can thus deduce that the book was mostly circulating in the region of origin of its author. This would entitle us to put forward a hypothesis about the place where this anthology was composed, which could have been Egypt, and most probably Cairo, before its author’s departure to Medina.

As concerns the chronology, the extant manuscripts are dated between the tenth/sixteenth century and the thirteenth/nineteenth century (the al-Azhar manuscript, dated in the fourteenth/twentieth, is defective). This means that the oldest manuscript (Algiers) was probably copied one century after the death of the author.

Out of the six manuscripts I have been able to consult, two contain an incomplete text. In particular, the Liège manuscript seems to be a summarized version with some interpolations: some passages are missing, and the fifth and final chapter does not correspond at all to its counterpart in the other manuscripts. Furthermore, after this last chapter, the copyist who drew up the Liège manuscript added a completely new section with a pious tone which does not figure in any of the other manuscripts. This copy is therefore of little use for the reconstitution of the text of “Ḥilyat al-Kuramāʾ.” The same goes for the al-Azhar manuscript, which stops abruptly in the middle of the fourth chapter despite the declaration made by the copyist on the title page (probably for commercial reasons) that the

²²See Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ*, 4:243.



manuscript contains the text “in its totality” (*‘alá al-tamām wa-al-kamāl*).

Apart from these two cases, as far as it can be assessed on the basis of the four manuscripts which are seemingly complete, the text is far from being unequivocal. Two areas are rather problematic: the end of the second chapter and the entire fifth chapter. The end of the second chapter poses some difficulty: the three manuscripts that usually agree on the rest (Princeton Garrett, Gotha, Paris) and which constitute the most plausible basis for the edition of the text that I am preparing, present some important fluctuations in the type and order of the materials between chapter two and chapter three, while in the fourth manuscript (Princeton Yahuda) many anecdotes are simply missing. Chapter five in principle should contain some pieces of advice (*waṣāyā*), as it is announced in its title: “On the recommendations which are useful to the intelligent man and are a warning to the careless man.” As a matter of fact, the chapter’s content is consistent with its title only in one manuscript out of four, the Princeton Yahuda, where chapter five consists of a series of aphorisms arranged in alphabetical order. On the contrary, in the others (Princeton Garrett, Gotha, Paris) the number of aphorisms is much smaller and a short section of a zoological character is appended to the paremiological section.

Obviously the copyists tinkered with the text in more than one way and at more than one point. This is a rather common phenomenon considering the composite character of these anthologies; as they are made up of independent textual units (anecdotes, aphorisms, short narratives, poems) arranged in intermediate units (the chapters), it is easy to shift, remove, add, or replace each textual unit, and so change the text. This is also more likely when the copyist has before him a corrupted or defective copy, as could have been the case with our text: the temptation to complete the corrupted passages, to offer a better version of an anecdote, or to adapt the contents of a chapter to its title must have been very difficult, if not impossible, to overcome.

DESCRIPTION OF THE WORK

Following the established conventions of the anthologies of the period, “*Ḥilyat al-Kuramā*” is composed of miscellaneous materials, both in prose and poetry: Quranic verses, hadith, poetry, aphorisms, and a good number of anecdotes and stories, organized in five chapters preceded by an introduction. All these materials are arranged in the hierarchical order which is usual in *adab* works: both in the introduction and in the following sections Quranic verses, if present, come first, followed by traditions, pious anecdotes, and worldly anecdotes or aphorisms.

The theme of generosity has a long tradition going back to the beginnings of Arabo-Islamic literature: it was among the preferred subjects that scholars treated in both monothematic works and in specific sections of works of a more



encyclopedic nature. Among the most popular books of Arabic literature dedicated to this subject, I shall limit myself to the mention of *Al-Mustajād min Fa‘ālāt al-Ajwād*, which has long been attributed to al-Muḥassin al-Tanūkhī (d. 384/994). *Adab* encyclopedias also often include generosity in the range of the themes they deal with, as is the case with *Al-‘Iqd al-Farīd* by Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih (d. 328/940). Generosity (and the generous: *karam*, *karīm*, and the synonymous *jūd/jawād*, etc.) as well as its antonym, meanness, were then part and parcel of the range of topics treated in canonical *adab* works, which is also demonstrated by the substantial list of titles which mention a word for generosity.²³ Our anthology, “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā’ wa-Bahjat al-Udabā’,” is thus the heir of a long tradition, from the point of view both of theme and organizational scheme.

The following is the list of contents found in the introductory section.

Introduction: on the intellect and the legal rules that originate in it and are established on its basis

Chapter one: on generosity and its features, and on those who bear its signs

Chapter two: on doing good deeds and the assistance of those who have suffered injustice

Chapter three: on the lives of the sovereigns, the ancients, and the histories of outstanding civil servants

Chapter four: on the state of women and men, and on their habits in all conditions

Chapter five: on the recommendations which are useful to the intelligent man and are a warning to the careless man

The introduction is mostly made up of Quranic verses and hadith, but also of short poems and anecdotal material concerning the creation of the intellect (*‘aql*) and its substance. The division of the faculty of the intellect into that which originates from experience (*al-‘aql al-tajribī*) and that which is an innate faculty is also briefly sketched, along with a list of signs typical of the intelligent man. It is a subject which is often treated in anthologies and in *adab* encyclopedias²⁴ of the Arabic literary tradition, especially in their introductions, and virtually forms a kind of standard opening for this type of text. What is noticeable, on the contrary, is the absence of the lexicographical section which is so common in the literary anthologies and in the monothematic *adab* works of the Abbasid period. In fact, these normally begin with a presentation of the keyword identifying the theme of the literary composition (e.g., *karam*, as in this case) and related terms: the

²³A catalogue for the Abbasid period, with a brief introduction to the topic and a presentation of the lexical issues, in Mohsen Zakeri, ed. and trans., *Persian Wisdom in Arabic Garb: ‘Alī b. ‘Ubayda al-Rayḥānī (d. 219/834) and his “Jawāhir al-kilām wa-farā’id al-ḥikam”* (Leiden, 2006), 1:285–91.

²⁴See, e.g., Antonella Ghersetti, “La conception d’intellect dans le *Kitāb al-aḍkiyā’* par Ibn al-Ḡawzi,” *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* 10 (1992): 63–73, and bibliography.



etymology, meaning, and use of each term is explained and discussed. In the case under consideration, there is no lexicographical treatment of the terms *karam*, *karīm*, or related ones. The substantial presence of hadith and the conceptual treatment of the subject in philosophical terms indicate a normative and dogmatic tone, which points to the ethical concerns and hortatory purposes which must have inspired the author. This can no doubt be taken as a sign of the shift of interest from the aesthetic aspect of the anthologies to their practical function and content, and to the role played by the ulama in the intellectual life of this time.²⁵ This one could be a typical case: the *forma mentis* of the qadi Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd was that of a man of law and a pious Muslim, and his concern was more for legal and ethical issues than for philological ones.

Chapter one, the longest of all, treats generosity and its signs. It opens with some traditions in which the Prophet praises hospitality, urges the believers to share their food, and prescribes the rules concerning meals (*ādāb al-akl*). These, hospitality and food, are two themes so often associated with generosity and so profoundly intermingled that they constitute a kind of canonical thematic network.²⁶ What is clearly hinted at by the choice of the traditions related in the very beginning of the first chapter is thus the concept of generosity: to be generous means first of all to share food. This, by the way, also seems to be the essence of hospitality: hospitality substantially consists of offering food and drink.²⁷ This triplet (generosity, food, and hospitality) can be tracked down elsewhere in the “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā’”; to be more precise, almost all the contents of this anthology pivot around it. After the normative section composed by hadith, the chapter continues with many anecdotes that feature high-ranking figures such as Hārūn al-Rashid or the Barmakids, scholars such as al-Shāfiʿī or Anas ibn Mālik, venerated personalities such as Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, and ʿAlī, but also some unknown people. The common trait is of course their exceeding generosity and their liberal behavior.

Chapter two, dedicated to the support due to needy people, clearly continues the theme of food. Strangely enough, here we find a refined man (*ẓarīf*) presenting a list of the shortcomings of the bad table companion. This would sound rather eccentric in connection with the main subject of the chapter, but can easily be

²⁵The authors of Mamluk anthologies were first of all historians or jurists, and only secondly men of letters; in this sense the ulama replaced the *kuttāb* of the Abbasid period. See Bauer, “Literarische Anthologien,” esp. 79ff.

²⁶The fourth pillar of this thematic network being the antonym of generosity, meanness (*bukhl*), a theme which is in fact treated further in this anthology.

²⁷On this concept and on the thematic network mentioned above see my “À la recherche de nourriture: étude des thèmes liés aux pique-assiettes (*tufayliyyūn*) dans la littérature d’adab,” *Al-Qantara* 25 (2004): 433–62.



explained if we keep in mind the close association linking food and table manners. In a sense, table manners had already been hinted at in the prophetic traditions of the preceding chapter pertaining to *ādāb al-akl*. The list of epithets is followed by a section on meanness (*bukhl*), a feature that is criticized as the worst vice, in accordance once more with the encyclopedia of the ethical values of Arab civilization. This part also contains, obviously in hierarchical order, Quranic verses, traditions, and anecdotes on mean people, all aiming at criticizing this kind of behavior. The purpose of the section devoted to avarice is to emphasize the following exhortation to feed poor people, and in order to support this call, a series of exemplary stories is presented. Here, too, historical and high-ranking figures such as Mu‘āwiyah, ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr, and al-Mahdī feature in the anecdotes, as well as unknown and common people.

Chapter three, on the sovereigns, the ancients, and high-ranking officers, is fairly interesting. Moving from the assumption that men are remembered for their good deeds, the author states that if common people must practice virtue and avoid vice, sovereigns must do this all the more. Thus, intelligent people must take the stories of just and generous kings as paragons of virtue and be guided by their good example. That is why the author gives a series of anecdotes on exemplary kings. In the introductory part of the chapter, he also states that people owe obedience to the sovereign (*al-sulṭān*) because power has been given to him by God, and he reports some prophetic traditions about the proper conduct of the powerful. In this connection, the distinction between the just sovereign (*al-sulṭān al-‘ādil*) and the unjust one (*al-sulṭān al-ẓālim*) is also outlined, and it is specified that the kingdom of the latter is destined to perish. The rest of this chapter is rich in anecdotes, sometimes separated by a gnomic break, on historical personalities: Persian and Indian kings, caliphs of both the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, as well as the orthodox caliphs. ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, Mu‘āwiyah, Hārūn al-Rashīd, al-Manṣūr, and al-Mahdī are among the most important characters. The series is closed by a story about Alexander the Great. Apart from anecdotes with a strong historical flavor coming from “high literature,” some stories of clearly folkloric origin are found, such as the story of the fisher set among the Banū Isrā’īl.

Chapter four, which treats men and women with no additional qualification, contains a fair number of anecdotes and many aphorisms, but no discursive material. The pre-eminent place, in terms of quantity, is given to stories about poetry and music, wherein the main characters are caliphs or noblemen, together with singers or poets. Thus, they feature, e.g., ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Ja‘far, Hārūn al-Rashīd, or al-Ma’mūn, and talented singing-girls who often constitute the object of royal generosity. In accordance with this setting, the quantity of poetic verses mentioned in this chapter is far more substantial than that mentioned in the rest of the anthology. What is remarkable, or eccentric to



be more precise, in this section is a curious catalogue of the defects commonly attributed to women. However, the author must not be accused of misogyny: the sexes are treated equally, since immediately after this list he gives a woman leave to speak. Of course, this wise woman (*imra'ah* 'āqilah) does not hesitate to address a list of the defects of men. Furthermore, to dispel any doubt about the gifts that distinguish cultivated ladies, a series of anecdotes on witty and eloquent women “whose mention cannot be omitted” is included. Curiously enough, in this chapter the stress seems to be laid more on eloquence and musical ability than on generosity, a theme that often remains in the background.

Chapter five is very short (between 1 and 3 folios) in all the manuscripts taken into consideration that contain it (namely Princeton Garrett, Gotha, Paris, and Liège), except in the Princeton Yahuda, where it is longer (7 folios), but where its contents are also completely different. In the three manuscripts which agree on the contents (Princeton Garrett, Gotha, and Paris, as Liège has a completely different text), it opens with some aphorisms on the most varied subjects, including women, but it suddenly continues with a list of the characteristics of certain animals.

At this point, though I am waiting to prepare a more thorough study to be published with the edition of the text, I am nevertheless in a position to make some general remarks on the “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā’.” First of all, it is arranged in narrative units which, as is usual in *adab* anthologies, are grouped together on the basis of affinity of both contents and structure. What is more noteworthy in this case is the frequency of authorial interventions, i.e., notes revealing the author’s voice that serve to clarify the affinity or relevance of the textual units or, in some cases, the differences in style and narrative effect. For instance, there are definitions such as *mā huwa fī al-ma’nā qarīban wa-aqwā himmatan wa-uslūban* or *ḥikāyah tantāzim fī silkihā wa-tandamij fī sabkihā*, obviously aiming at evaluating the significance and construction of the anecdotes. Another typical use of the author’s voice is his habit of stressing the demarcation of the units composing the text: every anecdote is in fact preceded by a heading which identifies the narrative typology or the tone of the story. We thus find phrases such as: *ḥikāyah jāmi’ah wa-ḥaqīqah māni’ah*, *ḥikāyah gharībah ‘ajībah*, *ḥikāyah laṭīfat al-ma’ānī wa-‘adḥbat al-majānī*, *ḥikāyah laṭīfah wa-innahā khafīfah*, *ḥikāyah wajīzah wa-nuktah ‘azīzah*. The terms used to define the narrative units are *ḥikāyah*, *jawharah*, and *nādirah*, apparently without indicating any difference in the structure of the narrative; the word *fā’idah* is preferred for aphorisms or sections devoid of any narrative character.

The stories and anecdotes never contain any indication of their origin, not to speak of *isnāds*, which are almost completely absent even in their most embryonic form. One exception I came across is a story in the fourth chapter, reported on the authority of Abū al-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī; it is in fact preceded by an *isnād* composed



in a proper way, which qualifies it as a “scholarly *isnād*.”²⁸

As to the sources of the materials assembled in this anthology, the author only very vaguely indicates the provenance of the information used in his compilation: in the introduction he confines himself to hinting at the type of sources, rather than identifying them precisely. He claims to draw his materials from the “helpful books of the scholars” (*kutub al-‘ulamā’ al-mu‘tabarah*) as well as from “their clear and well-known speeches that were preserved” (*aqwāluhum al-muḥrazah al-wāḍiḥah al-mashhūrah*). In any case, some anecdotes can be easily traced back to well-known *adab* works of the Abbasid period such as *Murūj al-Dhahab* and *Al-‘Iqd al-Farīd*²⁹ or of the Mamluk period such as *Al-Mustaṭraf fī Kull Fann Mustazraf* of al-Ibshīhī.³⁰

The author’s vague statements qualifying his sources as exemplary confirm the edifying purpose of the book, which obviously had not been conceived only as a literary exercise, but also and first of all as an act of “militant charity”³¹ with the aim of urging the readers to generosity, charity, and assistance of poor people, just as the author was taught by his two masters, Muḥammad al-Ghamrī and Muḥammad al-Shādhilī al-Taymī, and just as he did throughout his long life.

CONCLUSIONS

It is now time to draw some conclusions. First of all, concerning the authorship: all the identities proposed in the secondary literature must be discarded, except that of Ibn Abī al-‘Īd. The author of “*Hilyat al-Kuramā’*” is definitely Muḥammad ibn [Abī] Aḥmad ibn Mūsā ibn Abī Bakr ibn Abī al-‘Īd, al-Shams Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Sakhāwī, *thumma* al-Qāhirī *thumma* al-Madanī al-Mālikī,³² also known as Ibn al-Qaṣabī, al-Sakhāwī, and previously as Ibn Abī al-‘Īd. This is demonstrated both by external elements, namely the quotation of Ḥājji Khalīfah, and by internal

²⁸As Julia Ashtiany Bray would call it (for types of *isnāds*, see her “*Isnāds and Model of Heroes: Abū Zubayd al-Tā’ī, Tanūkhī’s sundered lovers and Abū ‘l-‘Anbas al-Ṣaymarī*,” *Arabic and Middle Eastern Literatures* 1 [1998]: 7–30).

²⁹Among others, the anthology contains (in chapter four) a story on Ibrāhīm ibn al-Mahdī which had a wide circulation in Arabic literature and the most ancient versions of which are found in *Murūj* and *‘Iqd* (see my “*L’anecdote-accordéon ou comment adapter le sens du récit au contexte narratif*,” in *Le répertoire narratif arabe médiéval: transmission et ouverture: Actes du colloque international qui s’est tenu à l’Université de Liège 15–17 septembre 2005*, ed. Frédéric Bauden, Aboubakr Chraïbi, and Antonella Ghersetti (Liège, 2008), 15–17).

³⁰Al-Ibshīhī, *Al-Mustaṭraf fī Kull Fann Mustazraf* (Beirut, 1986), 1:397.

³¹This was a common phenomenon in the Mamluk period since, as Bauer says (“*Literarische Anthologien*,” 109), the structure and contents of literary anthologies so often go arm in arm with paraenesis.

³²The form given is derived from the combination of information from al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍaw’ al-Lāmi’*, and idem, *Al-Tuhfah al-Laṭīfah*.



elements, namely the mention in the “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā” of the two personalities (Muḥammad al-Ghamrī and Muḥammad al-Shādhilī al-Taymī) who were actually the masters of Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd. Among the internal elements, it is also worth noting a more general feature, i.e., the relevance of tone and contents of the anthology to the attitude, beliefs, and lifestyle of the author.

I can also suggest a hypothesis for the place and date of composition of this work, on the basis of the internal elements as well as of codicological ones. As for the place of composition, the area of diffusion of the manuscripts hints at Cairo, or in any case Egypt, most probably the village of Sakhā, the native town of our author where he lived for nearly twenty years after his first stay in Cairo. This assumption is corroborated by other internal elements more relevant to the date of composition, namely the mention of Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd’s masters and the eulogies following their names. The terms *naffaʿanī* (or, according to a different reading, *mattaʿanā*) *Allāhu bi-ḥayātīhi* (or, according to a different reading, *naḥāḥātīhi*) *wa-aʿāda ʿalaynā min barakātīhi* and *adāma Allāhu qaṣḍahu* are in fact used to refer to persons still alive and not to somebody who is deceased. The writing of the “Ḥilyat al-Kuramā” would then have taken place before the death of the two saintly men, who died shortly thereafter (Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Shādhilī al-Taymī died in 847/1443 and Muḥammad al-Ghamrī in 848/1444). As to the date of composition, I would then propose as a *terminus ante quem* the date of 847/1443, well before Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd’s departure to Medina.

This anthology is an interesting example of the thematic anthologies that were such a flourishing genre in the Mamluk period. It also represents a sample, if one is needed, of the intense cultural and literary activity practiced by the scholars (ulama) of that period, even outside the circles of literati and philologists *stricto sensu*, which is a feature very typical of Mamluk cultural life. In this sense, it could even be considered an emblematic case of the shift of the primacy in the cultural debate from the *kātib* to the *ʿālim*.³³ This work also testifies to the continuity of the themes and of the organization schemes of composition of *adab* anthologies since the golden age of this genre, i.e., the Abbasid period. Notwithstanding this formal continuity, the Mamluk authors were able to express in a very effective way their own purposes. In this particular case, the main purpose of Ibn Abī al-ʿĪd no doubt corresponds to what has been defined as ethical *adab*, i.e., instructing the readers and urging them to virtuous behavior by showing them apt examples in the form of narratives. Charity was exactly that virtuous behavior which our author was taught by his masters, which he practiced all his life, and which he persistently urged upon the readers of his anthology.

³³See Bauer, “Literarische Anthologien,” esp. 72, 110.



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***Zulm* by *Maẓālim*? The Political Implications of the Use of *Maẓālim* Jurisdiction by the Mamluk Sultans**

INTRODUCTION

“Maẓlūm, it’s unfair, by the people and by God, it’s unfair,” the man muttered in a weak voice when he was taken away into the holding cell. A stomach pump had just brought to light a considerable piece of hashish out of his intestines. The doctor and the police officer who had brought the drug user into the hospital were clearly convinced that the poor man would be punished for this crime. Both had been annoyed at first by the incident because they had been heavily smoking hashish themselves that evening before being interrupted by the call to duty. But now the officer’s pink eyes filled with joy. The crime was proven and the evidence was secured.¹

Although this episode, taken from a short story by the modern Egyptian author Yūsuf Idrīs (d. 1991), is purely fictional and surely non-Mamluk, it clearly illustrates the ambiguity of the terms justice (*‘adl*) and injustice (*ẓulm* or *maẓālim*). Whether or not you are served and treated well often depends upon which side of the law you are standing on. Muslim societies have recognized from an early stage that there is a high probability of legal abuse by state officials. This was demonstrated by constant appeals for Muslim rulers to be just and wise. In addition to these exhortations, however, the institution of *maẓālim* courts emerged, where ideally those who were usually at the receiving end could complain about official wrongdoers. If one was prepared to take risks or was tired of life, one could even complain about the sultan himself at the *maẓālim* courts. However, the problem in the system lay in the fact that the *maẓālim* court sessions were run by public officials, i.e., the very people whose abuses one wanted to protest. Therefore legal complaints sometimes had to be carefully prepared using the rivalries between different factions at the Mamluk court. Finally, it depended on the willingness of the sultan to pursue the matter, and therefore the outcome was often unpredictable and arbitrary. In many cases, however, justice was served, and this upheld the image of Mamluk sultans as just rulers among their subjects. This was an ideal

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¹Yūsuf Idrīs, *Arkhaṣ Layālī* (Cairo, n.d., first published in 1954), 186.



image that no Mamluk ruler was prepared to give up, and the *mazālim* court sessions became an integral part of the Mamluk approach to governance.

THE JUST RULER AND MAZĀLIM IN THE MAMLUK CONTEXT

Mazālim denotes literally unjust or oppressive actions. From an early stage in the formation of Islamic institutions it became known, as Jørgen Nielsen puts it, as “the structure through which the temporal authorities took direct responsibility for dispensing justice.”² Initially the Prophet and the early caliphs had combined in themselves the roles of judge and ruler. Later on, the growth of the Muslim community led to the need for caliphs to delegate their judicial functions to specially appointed qadis. From the second/eighth century onwards the development of the shari‘ah law system, with the qadi in the center, established the religious scholars (the ulama) as legal authorities and rivals of the Muslim rulers in judicial affairs. There are hints that even the Umayyad caliphs started to hear *mazālim* petitions from their subjects. It is more certain, however, that the Abbasid caliphs al-Mahdī (r. 158–69/775–85) and al-Hādī (r. 169–70/785–86) did arrange for regular *mazālim* sessions under the supervision of the vizier. However, the institution remained controversial—the ulama in particular saw it as a rival to their shari‘ah jurisdiction.³

Nevertheless, holding these appeal sessions thereafter became a hallmark of a just ruler. The Abbasid author al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) therefore included a long chapter on *mazālim* jurisdiction in his book on the ordinances of government (*al-aḥkām al-sultāniyah*). There he states:

the redress of wrongs involves persuading the contending parties by the awesome presence and dignity of the person in office to accept an equitable settlement and end their dispute. The official concerned must, therefore, be majestic, authoritative, and imposing, as well as manifestly honest, free of avarice, and eminently pious. Since his office calls for a combination of the charisma of those in power with the serenity of judges, he must enjoy the qualities proper to both categories, and show by his courtliness the ability to command the obedience due to each.⁴

Subsequent treatises on the duties of *mazālim* follow more or less the outline drawn by al-Māwardī and do not add anything substantially new. It was now

²Jørgen Nielsen, “Mazālim,” *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., 7:933.

³*Ibid.*, 933–34.

⁴‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī, *The Ordinances of Government: A Translation of al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya w’ al-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyya*, trans. Wafaa H. Wahba (Reading, UK, 1996), 87; al-Māwardī, *Al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyah*, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Umayrah (Cairo, 1994), 1:194.



clearly established that hearing *maẓālim* cases was part of the definition of a Muslim ruler. Ibn Shaddād (d. 632/1235), the biographer of the famous Ayyubid sultan Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (r. 567–89/1171–93), praises him with the following words regarding his *maẓālim* practice: “Everyone who had a grievance was admitted—great and small, aged women and feeble men, . . . and he always received with his own hand the petitions that were presented to him, and did his utmost to put an end to every form of oppression that was reported.”⁵

Mamluk rulers continued this long-standing legacy. Their rise to power was not undisputed, as they had been slaves before. Al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442) quotes an Arab Bedouin shaykh who commented in the year 651/1253 about the rise to power of the Mamluks: “We are the lords of the land. We are more worthy to rule than the Mamluks. It was enough to serve the Ayyubids, who were outlaws and took the land by force, and the Mamluks are only the slaves of these outlaws.”⁶

Mamluk sultans therefore had an interest in appearing as just and ideal rulers. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir (d. 692/1292), who wrote a biography of Sultan Baybars I (r. 658–76/1260–77), describes him in several chapters as the ideal ruler who restored the *dār al-‘adl* (Palace of Justice), abolished uncanonical taxes, and helped the oppressed. In one instance Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir reports how Baybars allowed a *maẓālim* case against himself to be heard. The background of the story was that Baybars had started the building of a well when he was still just an amir. He could not finish the work, though, because he went into exile for a time. The well was then completed by an ordinary soldier who demanded as compensation for his work the ownership of the well from Baybars, who meanwhile had risen to the office of sultan. Baybars set up a public legal process before the chief judge. When the soldier appeared, “the *atābak* [commander-in-chief] said to the sultan, ‘Let my lord betake himself to the Holy Law.’ So the sultan rose, ungirt his sword, and placed himself on an equal level with his opponent, standing before the chief judge, who was seated.” Finally, the legal decision stated that Baybars was still the owner of the well but should pay the soldier for his efforts in the construction work.⁷

The hearing of *maẓālim* cases became an integral part of the Mamluk system

⁵Bahā’ al-Dīn ibn Shaddād, *The Life of Saladin*, by Behā ad-Dīn, trans. C. W. Wilson and Lieutenant-Colonel Conder (London, 1897), 15; here cited after Linda T. Darling, “Medieval Egyptian Society and the Concept of the Circle of Justice,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 10, no. 2 (2006): 5.

⁶Al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442), *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Ma‘rifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyādah (Cairo, 1934–73), 1:386; Peter M. Holt, “The Sultan as Ideal Ruler: Ayyubid and Mamluk Prototypes,” in *Sulayman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World*, ed. Metin Kurt and Christine Woodhead (London, 1995), 130.

⁷Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, *Al-Rawḍ al-Zāhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Zāhir*, ed. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Khuwayṭir (Riyadh, 1976), 84–86; Holt, “Sultan,” 132.



of government in the following years, and it was clear that it was the sultan's prerogative to decide how a case should be classified and that he had the last word in judicial matters. In a memorandum of Sultan Qalāwūn (r. 678–89/1279–90) for his son al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ on how to govern Egypt during the absence of his father on campaign, it states: “The Prince knows that justice is the profitable capital of the kings and an act that brings them success. . . . If the case be of religious nature, he sends it back to the judges whom We have appointed to separate between the lawful and the forbidden. If the case concerns maliciousness, the Prince himself exacts punishment, for He is a man of pertinent thought and clever mind. . . . If a judgement is delivered on a man of importance and high rank in favour of someone weak or insignificant, let the Prince give the wronged the fullest redress against the wrongs, for the Sultan was created to make a weak one win over his oppressor and to strengthen the hand of the poor and powerless against his litigant.”⁸

THE VENUES OF *MAẒĀLIM* COURTS

In order to hear *maẓālīm* cases, one needed a venue. Often this would be the place where the presiding official already conducted his general duties.⁹ But sometimes special structures were built to serve this purpose. Inside the palace of the Abbasid caliphs in Samarra was situated the Dome of Complaints (*qubbat al-maẓālīm*), where the caliph al-Muhtadī (r. 255–56/869–70) tried to revive older traditions of public access to the ruler in 256/870.¹⁰ Still, it does not seem that this was common practice, and therefore it apparently was considered an innovation when Nūr al-Dīn Zankī (r. 541–69/1146–74) established a special house of justice (*dār al-ʿadl*), sometimes also known as *dār kashf al-maẓālīm* (house of *maẓālīm*'s inquest) around 558/1163 in Damascus in order to provide a specific setting for his bi-weekly *maẓālīm* sessions.¹¹ The Ayyubids took this innovation further and built two additional *dār al-ʿadls*, one in Aleppo in 585/1189 by al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī, the son of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, and one by al-Kāmil Muḥammad at the citadel of Cairo

⁸Paulina Lewicka, “What a King Should Care About: Two Memoranda of the Mamluk Sultan on Running the State's Affairs,” *Studia Arabistyczne i Islamistyczne* 6 (1998): 13, 15 (English text), 12, 14 (Arabic text).

⁹Nielsen, “*Maẓālīm*,” 934.

¹⁰Hugh Kennedy, *The Court of the Caliphs: The Rise and Fall of Islam's Greatest Dynasty* (London, 2004), 146.

¹¹Nasser O. Rabbat, “The Ideological Significance of the *Dār al-ʿAdl* in the Medieval Islamic Orient,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, no. 1 (1995): 3, 6, 7; for the *dār al-ʿadl* in Damascus, see also William M. Brinner, “*Dar al-Saʿada* and *Dar al-ʿAdl* in Mamluk Damascus,” in *Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet*, ed. Myriam Rosen-Ayalon (Jerusalem, 1977), 235–47.



around 603/1207.¹² Rabbat has argued that these Ayyubid *dār al-ʿadls* represented an “original innovation of an extraordinary time.” He sets them in the context of the Islamic ideological revival which accompanied the counter crusade against the Franks and the threat of the Mongols in the thirteenth century. In this period rulers had to appear as just rulers who adhered to proper Islamic codes. Once the immediate threat had dissipated in the fourteenth century, the *dār al-ʿadls* were no longer used in their primary function.¹³ I might agree with the first part of his reasoning, but as we will see the *maẓālim* sessions did not stop in the fourteenth century. Only the venue of the sessions in the citadel changed, but this might have been a matter of the individual taste of the rulers rather than the end of an ideological approach to proper Islamic rule.

However, after the Ayyubids, Sultan Baybars I decided to install his own *dār al-ʿadl* just below the citadel in 662/1264. He used it for holding *maẓālim* sessions and for inspecting the Mamluk army. The structure became known later as the *dār al-ʿadl al-qadimah* (the old *dār al-ʿadl*) and by the time of al-Maqrizī in the fifteenth century it was used as a performance venue for the military band (*ṭablkhānah*).¹⁴ It seems that the successors of Baybars I found this building not representative enough, and therefore its function as *dār al-ʿadl* was apparently moved inside the citadel by Sultan Qalāwūn (r. 678–89/1279–90) to the *iwān*, a large columned room used as the principal audience hall, which he had rebuilt. His son Sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl (r. 689–93/1290–93) renovated this structure, before finally his brother, another son of Qalāwūn, Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (r. 693, 698–708, 709–41/1293, 1299–1309, 1310–41), had the building torn down and built his impressive *iwān/dār al-ʿadl* in the citadel, whose remains were still encountered by European visitors of the early nineteenth century.¹⁵ (See figs. 2 and 3.)

At first, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad held his *maẓālim* sessions in his new *dār al-ʿadl* once a week on Mondays, before he switched to a bi-weekly scheme on Mondays and Thursdays.¹⁶ During the time of his weak Qalāwūnid successors, the *dār al-ʿadl* retained mainly representational functions, as the real powers were with the high-ranking Mamluk amirs. Al-Shujāʿī (d. after 756/1356) reports how the amirs sat before Sultan al-Nāṣir Aḥmad (r. 742/1342) and told him what to do. He said to them: “Do things as you understand them. Whatever you think is right, I

¹²Rabbat, “Ideological Significance,” 3.

¹³Ibid., 4.

¹⁴Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, *Al-Rawḍ*, 182; al-Maqrizī, *Al-Mawāʿiẓ wa-al-Iʿtibār fī Dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa-al-Āthār*, ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London, 2002), 3:655; idem, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:236.

¹⁵Al-Maqrizī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:659; idem, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:107; Rabbat, “Ideological Significance,” 13.

¹⁶Al-Maqrizī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:660, 665; idem, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:103.



consent.”¹⁷ However, this might have been a trick. To great general astonishment, he summoned a surprise *maẓālim* session for the first time in his reign in Dhū al-Qa‘dah 742/May 1342 in the *dār al-‘adl*, where he heard petitions and signed documents. He then ordered the selling of some of his own cattle in order to collect the money awarded to deserving plaintiffs, before he went into exile at al-Karak some days later.¹⁸

By this time, however, holding *maẓālim* sessions in the *dār al-‘adl* seems to have been exceptional; in the second half of the fourteenth century *maẓālim* sessions were usually held at the palace of the powerful viceroys, the *dār al-niyābah*, in the citadel. The viceroys had the power to administer justice among the people at a barred stand (*shubbāk*) at their palace.¹⁹

Once Sultan Barqūq (r. 784–91, 792–801/1382–89, 1390–99) had restored the authority of the Mamluk sultanate, it seems that at first he revived the *maẓālim* sessions in the *dār al-‘adl iwān*, but in order to underline the uniqueness of his sultanate, he then transferred the hearing of the petitions to some place in the royal stables in 789/1387 (see fig. 4). Moreover, the bi-weekly sessions were switched to Sundays and Wednesdays and some time later changed to Tuesday, Saturday, and Friday afternoons.²⁰ According to Linda Darling the new setting was not degrading, as “in Turkish practice stables were often places of political sanctuary.”²¹

It seems that Barqūq occasionally did administer justice on the *maydān* below the citadel, as happened in 792/1390, but the royal stable represented the usual place for the wronged to go even after Barqūq’s reign.²² The *dār al-‘adl/iwān* was still in use, but no longer for *maẓālim* sessions. Crowds would gather there for very formal events, like the reception of foreign guests. However, some occasional judicial sessions still took place there. Sultan Barsbāy (r. 825–41/1422–38) held one there in 831/1428; Ibn Taghribirdī (d. 874/1470) notes that that had not happened for a very long time.²³

The royal stable apparently represented the main *maẓālim* venue before a new location was introduced in the time following Barsbāy, the so-called *dikkah* (platform) in the sultan’s park (*hawsh*). It was a wooden platform with an imperial

¹⁷ Al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn al-Ṣāliḥi wa-Awlādihī*, ed. and trans. Barbara Schäfer (Wiesbaden, 1985), 1:205 (Arabic text), 2:241 (German translation).

¹⁸ Ibid., 1:217 (Arabic text), 2:252 (German translation).

¹⁹ Ibid., 1:255 (Arabic text), 2:288 (German translation); al-Maqrizī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:696.

²⁰ Al-Maqrizī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:662, 666.

²¹ Darling, “Circle of Justice,” 14.

²² Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-al-Qāhirah*, ed. William Popper (Berkeley, 1936), 5:520; William Popper, *History of Egypt 1382–1469 A.D.* (Berkeley, 1954), 1:115.

²³ Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Nujūm*, 6:632; Popper, *History of Egypt*, 4:55.



tent above it. Ibn Taghribirdi reports for the year 871/1466: “[In this year] the sultan [Khushqadam (r. 865–72/1461–67)] began to hold Saturday and Tuesday sessions in the sultan’s stable to adjudicate cases among men as had been the custom of the rulers of the past. This had not occurred since the day he became sultan; for the sultans of our time have sat on the platform of the sultan’s park in the citadel and dispensed justice there among men.”²⁴ Apparently the platform had been in use long before that date. This means that, at least from the middle of the fifteenth century onwards, it had become the usual location to hear petitions. In any case, the former locations were still held in high esteem. Sultan Qāyrbāy (r. 872–901/1468–96) apparently invested a large amount of money in the restoration of the *īwān* in order to use it like in the old days.²⁵ It does not seem, however, that he really used it for *maẓālim* sessions. It is more probable that he continued to sit in the park, where he had a special throne erected beside the *dikkah*.²⁶

Qāyrbāy is also reported to have administered the usual legal hearings in the royal stable in Rajab 876/December 1471.²⁷ Therefore it is likely that the royal stable was used during the winter months and the *dikkah* in the park during the rest of the year in the time of Qāyrbāy.

The arrangements around the *dikkah* in the park seem to have been very impressive for foreign visitors. The German pilgrim Arnold von Harff, who visited Cairo in 1496, tells us that he came through eight doors before he was brought to a large square. He saw 16,000 men standing there, all of whom had to come there three times a week with the full sun on their necks. The sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (r. 901–4/1496–98) himself sat high on a platform on nice carpets and he had his legs crossed like tailors in Germany. In this manner he would sit there three times a week to hear complaints of his subjects and to dispense justice.²⁸ (See fig. 5.)

As one might assume, the wooden *dikkah* was not going to last. Sultan Qānṣawh al-Ghawrī (r. 906–22/1501–16) had it removed in 916/1511. Instead he erected

²⁴Ibn Taghribirdi, *Al-Nujūm*, 7:745; Popper, *History of Egypt*, 7:71.

²⁵Finally the roof and the *qubbah* of the *īwān* were set on fire at the beginning of 923/1517 by the Ottomans shortly after the conquest, under the pretext that Sultan Ṭūmān Bāy had been there during the war. This led to the collapse of the *qubbah* in 928/1522, and it was never restored. Ibn Iyās (d. around 930/1524), *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr fī Waqāʾiʿ al-Duhūr*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā (Wiesbaden, 1963), 5:155, 441.

²⁶Ibid., 3:60 ,61; al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbāʾ al-Ḥaṣr bi-Abnāʾ al-ʿAṣr*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥabashī (Cairo, 1970), 295, 339.

²⁷Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:66; al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbāʾ*, 391.

²⁸Arnold von Harff, *Die Pilgerfahrt des Ritters Arnold von Harff von Cöln durch Italien, Syrien, Aegypten, Arabien, Aethiopien, Nubien, Palästina, die Türkei, Frankreich und Spanien, wie er sie in den Jahren 1496 bis 1499 vollendet, beschrieben und durch Zeichnungen erläutert hat*, ed. Eberhard von Groote (Hildesheim, 2004), 89, 90.



a richly decorated marble platform (*maṣṭabah*) at the same site. According to Ibn Iyās the people were sad that the *dikkah* was gone, as so many kings had sat on it—its removal was perceived as a bad omen.²⁹

It seems that Qānṣawh al-Ghawrī very much liked the *maẓālim* proceedings to be public. Some of his *maẓālim* sessions were held on the racecourse (*maydān*) just underneath the citadel, maybe following the example set by Barqūq, but Qānṣawh even ordered the building of a special throne and a house on the racecourse in 909/1503 in order to administer justice there.³⁰

One reason for this could be that more people could attend to witness the justice of the ruler on the *maydān*. In Shawwāl 921/November 1515 he summoned a Jewish merchant, who originally came from the lands of the Franks but had already stayed for a while in the Mamluk Empire, to the *maydān* and had him tortured right in front of him because the Jew apparently had stolen a considerable amount of money. Asked about the whereabouts of the money, the merchant would not divulge its location, but instead he recited aloud the *shahādah* to show that he had become a Muslim. The crowd started to shout *Allāhu akbar*, but the sultan ordered further torture, saying: “There are many Muslims and Islam does not need this one.”³¹

After Qānṣawh al-Ghawrī had died in battle in Syria, his ill-fated nephew Sultan Ṭūmān Bāy (r. 922–23/1516–17) tried to revive flagging Mamluk spirits and, despising al-Ghawrī’s theatrical opulence, he had the stone *maṣṭabah* in the park destroyed and replaced with the wooden *dikkah* of Qāyṭbāy. Ibn Iyās remarked: “The *dikkah* of justice came back and the *maṣṭabah* of injustice was destroyed.”³² It did not really save Ṭūmān Bāy, who was hanged after the Ottoman conquest in 923/1517.

What can be stated in general about the *maẓālim* venues is that the shifting of the locations all around the citadel throughout the Mamluk period provided an individual Mamluk sultan with the opportunity to reinvent himself in matters of representation and leave his particular stamp on the administration, while still adhering to the general notion of the just ruler who caters to the wronged in *maẓālim* sessions.

LEGAL PROCEDURES IN THE MAẒĀLIM COURT

The procedures of the *maẓālim* sessions were highly formalized. An account of the court ceremonies is given by Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī (d. 749/1349), who served

²⁹Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 4:203.

³⁰Ibid., 4:56.

³¹Ibid., 4:481.

³²Ibid., 5:107.



as an official in the chancery of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad. This source is only slightly modified in the famous chancery manual of al-Qalqashandī. According to these descriptions, the sultan came to the *dār al-ʿadl/īwān* in the citadel on Monday mornings (except in Ramaḍān) to hear petitions. He sat on a seat so high his feet barely touched the ground, to the side of the royal throne which resembled a *minbar* (pulpit). The eschewing of the royal throne during the sessions symbolized that the sultan was almost equal to the rest of the society. The slightly higher seat, though, meant that he still had a slightly higher standing. To his right were seated the four chief judges (*quḍāt al-quḍāt*) of the four law schools, who were accompanied later in the fourteenth century by newly created officials, the special *muftīs* (legal counsellors) of the *dār al-ʿadl* for each law school. Behind the ulama sat the controller of the treasury (*wakīl bayt al-māl*) and then the market inspector (*muḥtasib*) of Cairo. To the sultan's left were seated his privy secretary (*kātib al-sirr*), followed by the army supervisor (*nāẓir al-jaysh*). The circle was completed by the scribes of the bench (*kuttāb al-dast*), who wrote down the proceedings. If a vizier was in office he would stand between the sultan and the *kātib al-sirr*. Behind the seats of the circle on the side of the sultan there were special guards (*silāḥdāriyah*). On the left and the right side of the hall behind the circle were places reserved for the eminent Mamluk amirs. In front of the circle stood the chamberlains (*ḥujjāb*) and the *dawādārs* (the so-called bearers of the inkwell) in order to receive written petitions (*qīṣaṣ*) from the plaintiffs among the people. The petitions then were read to the sultan and he decided who should deal with them. If he thought it should be the qadis, they received it. Matters concerning the army were brought to the attention of the chamberlains and the privy secretary, and so on.³³

Of course, this arrangement must have impressed the ordinary citizen, and even more so as the proceedings were highly formalized and contained theatrical elements. We have already heard of the incident when Sultan Baybars I left his throne during a session in order to go down to the level of a man who complained about him.³⁴ In 879/1475 Sultan Qāyṭbāy was holding a court session in the royal stable where the petitions were being read to him by the *kātib al-sirr*, when a man entered and complained about Yashbak the *dawādār*. The sultan ordered that Yashbak should go down to the man and stand in front of him and stay there as

³³Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmārī, *Masālik al-Aḥsār fī Mamālik al-Amṣār, Dawlat al-Mamālik al-Ulā*, ed. Dorothea Krawulsky (Beirut, 1986), 100–2; al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/1418), *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī Ṣināʿat al-Inshāʿ*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Shams al-Dīn (Beirut, 2000), 4:45–47; al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:666–68; see also Rabbat, “Ideological Significance,” 15–18, and S. M. Stern, “Petitions from the Mamlūk Period: Notes on the Mamlūk Documents from Sinai,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 29, no. 2 (1966): 265–66.

³⁴Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, *Al-Rawḍ*, 84–86; Holt, “Sultan,” 132.



long as it would take to reach a verdict. The same happened when another man complained about another dignitary.³⁵

The *maẓālim* sessions not only provided the sultan with an opportunity to excel as a just ruler, but moreover they helped him to control his entourage and to keep them busy at least twice a week. In the memorandum of Sultan Qalāwūn for his son, it therefore states that the prince should preside over the sessions, provide justice to the wronged, and especially take care that everybody who should be there was indeed there. “Nobody presents a petition directly to the Prince and nobody participates in handling the petitions, if it is not his customary duty. Nobody talks on matters that do not concern him; nobody stands in a place other than his own; and nobody stands by the Sultan’s side, if it is not his customary duty. Everyone who participates in the court session performs his duties in a place and location assigned to him. Let the Prince’s eyes be open for this and His thoughts concerning those important matters [be] pertinent.”³⁶ Absentees certainly should have a good legal excuse.³⁷ Assembling the amirs at a certain time in the week in the *dār al-ʿadl* could come in very handy. In 786/1384 Sultan Barqūq sat in the *dār al-ʿadl* and bestowed robes of honor on some amirs while he had others taken away and imprisoned in the same session.³⁸

The sultan and the amirs went to *dār al-ʿadl* sessions in public procession (*mawḳib*), and after hearing the cases an official banquet (*simāt*) followed, and the whole ceremony became known as *khidmah* (service).³⁹ In a matter of time it seems that the two parts of the ceremony, i.e., the hearing of complaints and the formal audience, were sometimes separated from each other. The *dār al-ʿadl/iwān* continued to be used occasionally for formal events like receiving foreign guests, whereas the location of the *maẓālim* sessions moved to different locations within the citadel.

In contrast to the ideal, we have to observe that during the time of the Mamluk sultanate the bi-weekly aspect of the sessions was not always strictly upheld. First of all, there were of course usually no sessions in Ramaḍān, and in troubled times they were cancelled altogether. However, Mamluk historians clearly note the suspension of *maẓālim* sessions, for instance when they praise Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad for restarting the sessions in 710/1310, after his power was firmly established.⁴⁰ In 871/1466 Sultan Khushqadam (r. 865–72/1461–67) held *maẓālim*

³⁵Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:102.

³⁶Paulina Lewicka, “What a King Should Care About,” (English text) 19, 21, (Arabic text) 16, 18.

³⁷Ibid., (English text) 31, (Arabic text) 30.

³⁸Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 3:768.

³⁹Nielsen, “Maẓālim,” 935.

⁴⁰Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 1:103.



sessions for the first time after six years in office. Criers went through the streets to invite the wronged to come on Saturdays and Tuesdays to the citadel. Apparently people had to be reminded about the *mazālim* session. Ibn Iyās, however, states that this was the last sign of justice displayed by this sultan, as he died a year later.⁴¹

In any case, sessions were held most of the time throughout the Mamluk period, and the written petition (*qiṣṣah*) played a central role.⁴² Al-Qalqashandī describes six ways in which such a petition should be presented to the authorities.⁴³ The first way would be to come on a normal day to the citadel and leave it there. If the sultan decided on it, then the clerks would issue a decree. How successful such a “petition by chance” was, is hard to say, but sultans were given petitions on a regular basis once they descended from the citadel.⁴⁴ In the memorandum of Qalāwūn for his son it states that: “If petitions were presented to Him while riding (on processions outside the citadel), let Him help the one who presents them, treat him justly and give redress against the wrongs. He should investigate the injustice personally and not entrust the case to those who delays things.”⁴⁵

The second possibility was to address the petition to the chancery, where it would be decided if the sultan should hear the case or not. The third way was to present oneself on the *mazālim* days in the *dār al-‘adl* and give the petition to the *kātib al-sirr*, who would then read a selection to the sultan. The fourth way was to present it to a high representative of the sultan, called the plenipotentiary governor (*al-nā‘ib al-kāfil*) by al-Qalqashandī. This might be a representative of the sultan when he was away. The fifth way consisted of the presentation of the petition to the army commander, the *atābak*. This was especially the case if the sultan was a minor. Finally, contacting a chamberlain directly constituted the last of the possibilities.

It seems quite clear that it certainly helped a request if one knew someone within the system, as the petitions seldom reached the sultan directly, and even if they did, Mamluk sultans were not exactly known for their Arabic reading skills. Therefore the assistance of government officials could certainly help even when the petitioner lived in a remote province. When in 713/1313 a new cadastral survey (*rawk*) would have meant considerable financial losses for the local family of the Buḥturids, who lived in the mountains south of Beirut, a leading representative of

⁴¹Ibn Iyās, *Badā‘i*, 2:444, 471.

⁴²For details about the few surviving petitions, see: Stern, “Petitions from the Mamlūk Period,” 233–76; Hans Ernst, *Die mamlukischen Sultansurkunden des Sinai-Klosters* (Wiesbaden, 1960).

⁴³Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 196–200; Jørgen Nielsen, *Secular Justice in an Islamic State: Mazālim under the Bahri Mamlūks 662/1264–789/1387* (Istanbul, 1387), 65–70.

⁴⁴Nielsen, *Secular Justice*, 66.

⁴⁵Lewicka, “What a King Should Care About,” 35, 37 (English text), 36 (Arabic text).



the family went to Tankiz, the governor of Damascus, who intervened on behalf of the Buhturids at the sultan's court in Cairo. There he obtained a decree of the sultan which exempted the Buhturids from the survey because of their role in fighting the Crusaders.⁴⁶

Another key element of the procedures of *maẓālim* jurisdiction was the relationship between the sultan and the judges of the four law schools, who had to be present at every session. As has been shown, the sultan decided whether a case should be looked at by the judges in shari'ah affairs or by other Mamluk officials if worldly matters and civil administration (*sīyāsah*) were concerned. However, the claim of al-Maqrizī that in the latter cases the so-called Mongol *Yāsa* was used as the basis of the law can be discounted.⁴⁷ There is simply no evidence to substantiate such a claim. Maybe this accusation resulted from the frustration of a scholar who knew that the actual independence of the judges in the *maẓālim* court was quite limited even in matters of so-called religious affairs. In any case, the decrees which the sultan and his officials issued regarding worldly matters were certainly not meant to contradict the shari'ah. Moreover, the attendance of the judges at each session demonstrated that the sultan and his institution based their decisions on an underlying religious intent, or at least they wanted it to appear that way.

For the religious scholars, though, it was not highly recommended to disagree with the sultan on legal issues. In 723/1323 the sultan had a judge imprisoned in order to obtain his *waqf* property, but the judges would not give it to him. The sultan therefore bribed witnesses in order to achieve his goal.⁴⁸ Another event concerning *waqf* properties occurred in 780/1378. Before becoming sultan, the already powerful amir Barqūq wanted to confiscate *waqf* properties. The scholars objected and one scholar tried to explain the matter to Barqūq in Turkish until Barqūq became very angry and asked Shaykh al-Bulqīnī why he had remained silent. Al-Bulqīnī said that he had not been asked to speak, but he would rule against Barqūq. Another scholar, Ibn Abī al-Biqā'i, then apologized for al-Bulqīnī and said to the amirs: "You are the masters of complaints; in the end, you decide." Al-Bulqīnī then remarked: "O amirs, you order us to give our legal opinion, but

⁴⁶Ṣāliḥ ibn Yaḥyá, *Tārīkh Bayrūt: Akhbār al-Salaf min Dhurriyat Buhtur ibn 'Alī Amīr al-Gharb bi-Bayrūt*, ed. Francis Hours and Kamal Salibi (Beirut, 1969), 86–87.

⁴⁷Al-Maqrizī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 712–18; Nielsen: "Maẓālim," 935; on the Mongol *Yāsa*, see David O. Morgan, "The 'Great Yasa' of Chingiz Khan' and Mongol Law in the Ilkhanate," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 49, no. 1 (1986): 163–76; Robert Irwin, "What the Partridge Told the Eagle: A Neglected Arabic Source on Chingiz Khan and the Early History of the Mongols," in *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy*, ed. Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David Morgan (Leiden, 1999), 5–11.

⁴⁸Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:243–44.



if we do not carry out matters your way, you dismiss us.”⁴⁹ Even worse was the outcome for the judges in the following story, which concerns a famous case of adultery. An auxiliary Hanafi judge by the name of Khalil had a beautiful wife who betrayed him with his Shafi‘i colleague Nūr al-Dīn. Khalil found them together in his house and went to the grand chamberlain to launch an official legal complaint. The Shafi‘i auxiliary judge Nūr al-Dīn then wrote down a written legal confession of his crime. The chamberlain had the couple taken into custody and severely beaten. Then they were seated facing backwards on donkeys and paraded through the streets. The chamberlain then wanted the wife to pay an indemnity of 100 dinars, which she could not; the chamberlain ordered the betrayed husband Khalil to pay. He refused and was imprisoned himself. By coincidence, the son of Khalil did know someone near to the sultan, and Qāṣawh al-Ghawrī got interested in the case. He summoned the four chief judges and together they decided that the couple should be stoned. After the decision another Shafi‘i auxiliary judge named al-Zankalūnī raised the question of whether the couple could still legally be stoned if the written confession was withdrawn. The sultan became furious and asked the judges how something could be withdrawn if it was already confessed. The judges told him that this was an existing legal concept. But the sultan replied: “Is it not up to me to decide? I have the right in this matter.” He then dismissed the four *quḍāt al-quḍāt*. The Shafi‘i auxiliary judge al-Zankalūnī, who had given the legal opinion about the withdrawal of the confession, was brought to a legal session at the racecourse where the sultan told him: “O al-Zankalūnī, is it really your decision which counts and not mine?” Then the sultan had him beaten to death. The cheating couple was hanged at the door of another judge who had disobeyed the sultan.⁵⁰

Despite this obvious case of injustice, it seems that the legal practice of the Mamluks did impress foreign visitors. The Irish friar Symonis Semeonis who visited Cairo in 1324 remarked that: “In Cairo as in all Egypt and India (Ethiopia) the administration of justice and equity is of so high a standard that nobles and peasants, youths and old men, and foreigners of whatever creed or condition, with no possibility of bribery, are subject to the infliction of the same penalties, and this especially when it is a case of capital punishment, death being inflicted by crucifixion, decapitation, or cutting in two with swords.”⁵¹ The Venetian merchant Emmanuel Piloti, who lived in Egypt at the beginning of the fifteenth century, remarked, apparently astonished, about the regular law sessions of the

⁴⁹Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 3:345–46; Leonor Fernandes, “Between Qadis and Muftis: To Whom Does the Mamluk Sultan Listen?” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 6 (2002): 100.

⁵⁰Ibn Iyās, *Badā‘i‘*, 4:340–47.

⁵¹*Itinerarium symonis Semeonis ab Hybernia ad Terram Sanctam*, ed. Mario Esposito (Dublin, 1960), 81.



Mamluks: “Quant le souldain donne l’audience, tousjours commence au femmes, et à celles donne premiers espacement.”⁵²

DANGER IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: VIOLENCE DURING *MAẒĀLIM* SESSIONS

Even though many armed guards were present at *maẓālīm* sessions, they still constituted a public event with accompanying dangers. In the year 664/1266 the *nāʾib al-salṭanah* amir ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Ḥullī (?) acted for a while as the deputy of Sultan Baybars in the *dār al-ʿadl* and held legal sessions. A man appeared with a written petition in his hand and was brought before the amir. The man suddenly produced a knife which was hidden under his clothes, attacked the amir and stabbed him in the throat. The amir managed to get hold of the hand of the assailant and kicked him down with his feet. In the ensuing struggle the attacker killed an amir before he himself finally succumbed to sword strokes. It was said that this madman belonged to the ones who constantly ate hashish to foster their madness.⁵³ When a messenger informed the absent sultan about the incident, he apparently cried out: “I could cope with the death of my son Berke but not al-Ḥullī.” News finally arrived that al-Ḥullī had recovered, and the sultan was relieved.⁵⁴

More common, though, were apparently fatal disputes among Mamluks themselves at the public sessions, as they could plot their attacks beforehand. An attempt on the life of Amīr Sayf al-Dīn Qawṣūn during the *maẓālīm* sessions is reported by al-Shujāʿī for the year 742/1342. As usual, Qawṣūn led the parade (*rakaba al-mawkib*) towards the citadel, but he did not participate in the session itself because he had been warned of the coup. From a safe place he announced that the eight leading conspirators should be taken into custody. They refused and went out to fight, but finally had to admit their defeat.⁵⁵

Another violent incident occurred in 758/1357, when the Mamluk soldier Quṭlūbughā handed a written petition to Amir Shaykhū asking for his promotion from a monthly-salaried Mamluk to that of a Mamluk holding an *iqṭāʿ*. After his promotion had been refused, Quṭlūbughā murdered Shaykhū on the spot in the *dār al-ʿadl*.⁵⁶ In 801/1398 a strange episode occurred, when a Persian dressed in Sufi garb presented a petition in the royal stables. He went up to Sultan Barqūq, grabbed his beard, and insulted him with great vehemence. By the sultan’s order

⁵²Emmanuel Piloti, *L’Égypte au commencement du quinzième siècle d’après le traité d’Emmanuel Piloti de Crète (Incipit 1420)*, ed. P.-H. Dopp (Cairo, 1950), 109.

⁵³On this, see: Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (New York, 1968).

⁵⁴Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 1:550–51.

⁵⁵Al-Shujāʿī, *Tārīkh al-Malik al-Nāṣir*, 1:149–54 (Arabic text), 2:186–91 (German translation).

⁵⁶Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 3:33–34.



he was then subjected to corporal punishment.⁵⁷ Given these incidents, it is no wonder that Sultan Qalāwūn told his son in his memorandum to watch his back carefully and never leave the prescribed route on public outings.⁵⁸

During the period of the outdoor *maẓālim* sessions on the *dikkah* in the park in the fifteenth century some other unexpected dangers arose, as Ibn Iyās reports: “In this month [Rabī‘ II 893/March 1488] the sultan [Qāytbāy] sat on the *dikkah* in the park as usual to hold a public session. Suddenly a storm began. It was the strongest storm which had ever occurred in the park. It wounded several amirs and the grand chamberlain was hurt in the face. . . . The turbans of the scholars and the *takhfifah* hats of the Mamluks were blown all over the place. The sultan stood up and was blown into the pond. His servants fled and left him alone; even the army fled, as they thought the day of judgement had come. And the weather really created great injustice (*wa-qad aẓlama al-jaww ẓulmatan.*)”⁵⁹

MAẒĀLIM IN THE DAR AL-‘ADL PERIOD (648–789/1250–1387)

The first ninety years of this period were dominated by the more or less stable reigns of the three sultans: Baybars I (r. 658–76/1260–77), Sultan Qalāwūn (r. 678–89/1279–90), and Sultan al-Naṣīr Muḥammad (r. 693, 698–708, 709–41/1293, 1299–1309, 1310–41). Jørgen Nielsen underlines the fact that these sultans had highly formalized the procedures in the *khidmah* and *maẓālim* ceremonies in order to emphasize their role as just rulers. In doing so they had supplanted the jurisdiction of the qadis, and it had become difficult to distinguish their actual jurisdiction from other governmental functions, as everything had been centralized under them.⁶⁰ On the other hand, it might be this centralization which ensured the actual holding of these *maẓālim* sessions and the sultan’s active interest in the affairs of his subjects.

Jørgen Nielsen has collected 63 *maẓālim* cases from various sources for this period. If we discount the 21 surviving decrees which were issued in favor of St. Catherine’s Monastery and deal mainly with the protection of the rights of the monastery and condemn Bedouin raids against it,⁶¹ then there are still 42 *maẓālim* cases. Out of these, 30 were directly dealt with in Cairo’s *dār al-‘adl* or adjacent institutions. Nearly 50% of them deal with matters of land/*waqf* property and inheritance. What is very remarkable for this period is that we can find at least

⁵⁷Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Nujūm*, 13:169.

⁵⁸Lewicka, “What a King Should Care About,” 35, 37 (English text), 34, 36 (Arabic text).

⁵⁹Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i*, 3:249–50.

⁶⁰Nielsen, *Secular Justice*, 135.

⁶¹Stern, “Petitions from the Mamlūk Period,” 233–76; Ernst, *Die mamlukischen Sultansurkunden des Sinai-Klosters*.



nine cases where complaints against abuses of power by Mamluk officials are raised.⁶²

At the beginning of the period, the Mamluks restructured the organization of the legal establishment in Cairo. In the year 663/1265 Sultan Baybars ordered the creation of four chief judgeships because he had become angry with the Shafi‘i chief judge, Tāj al-Dīn Ibn Bint al-A‘azz, who had held this position alone. According to al-Maqrizī, this came after the complaint of the daughters of an Ayyubid prince. The women explained to the sultan that they had bought a house from the former Shafi‘i chief judge Badr al-Dīn al-Sinjārī. But now that the judge had died, the heirs of al-Sinjārī argued that the house was actually a religious endowment (*waqf*) and therefore could not have been sold in the first place. The sultan turned to Tāj al-Dīn Ibn Bint al-A‘azz and asked why judges would act in that manner. Tāj al-Dīn ignored the issue by stating that the women should be financially compensated. “What if the heirs have no money for the compensation?” the sultan asked. The judge replied that if there was no money, there was no compensation, as the *waqf* had to remain inviolate. The sultan was not pleased with the answer, and after some other dubious rulings by Tāj al-Dīn, he decided to install four chief judges representing all four law schools to bring more legal opinions into play.⁶³

During the reign of Sultan al-Naṣīr Muḥammad, complaints against officials had a good chance of success. In 739/1338 the qadi of Ḥamāh arrived in Cairo to complain about the injustice of his overlord, the governor al-Malik al-Afḍal. The sultan had al-Malik al-Afḍal come to Cairo and spoke to him in the *dār al-‘adl*: “I have brought you here to the *dār al-‘adl* so the judges can witness what is discussed. I have heard a lot (of evil things) about you. . . . If you do it again, you will harm your family tremendously.”⁶⁴ On the other hand, the hearing of complaints against officials could also backfire against the sultan. Twice in 735/1334 and 737/1336 he successfully dismissed allegations of abuse of power against his favorite, al-Nashw, the *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ*, i.e., the inspector of the sultan’s treasury, but this could not save al-Nashw in the end. Finally the sultan had to consent to al-Nashw’s arrest and execution by torture because of pressure from the Mamluks and the public. This caused a week-long celebration in Cairo.⁶⁵

For the rest of the *dār al-‘adl* period, the time of the mostly powerless successors of Sultan al-Naṣīr Muḥammad, we notice the total absence of complaints against

⁶²Nielsen, *Secular Justice*, 140–53.

⁶³Al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 1:538–39; Joseph H. Escovitz, *The Office of Qāḍī al-Quḍāt in Cairo under the Bahārī Mamlūks* (Berlin, 1984), 20.

⁶⁴Al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad*, 1:60–61 (Arabic text), 2:39–40 (German translation).

⁶⁵Nielsen, *Secular Justice*, 140–53; for the complete story, see Amalia Levanoni, “The al-Nashw Episode: A Case Study of ‘Moral Economy’,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 9, no. 1 (2005): 207–20.



abuse of power. Nielsen counts only 16 cases throughout the period 741–84/1341–82 that can be clearly linked to the *maẓālim* jurisdiction.

Recently Jo von Steenberg has shown that in order to survive and prosper during these confusing and chaotic times, one needed functioning personal networks.⁶⁶ The legal system was certainly no exception. In 753/1352 a group of Persian merchants was thrown into prison by the Hanafi chief qadi for failing to pay import dues. The chief chamberlain had them released and gave them indemnities.⁶⁷ We might assume that money was involved to build up this network. The following legal decision, though, was certainly based on a purely male network and male complaints. In 750/1350 the vizier Manjaq and the judges met in the *dār al-ʿadl* while the minor sultan al-Nāṣir Ḥasan (748–52, 755–62/1354–61, 1347–51) was present. The legal council then decided to ban certain women's clothing. The popular long-sleeved shirt that reached the ground and fetched a price of 1000 dirhams was forbidden, as were the so-called Baghdadi silk buttons for 1000 dirhams each and expensive shoes. All agreed that this was a matter of honor and action was needed. Soldiers started to go into the brothels to confiscate the illegal apparel. Mamluks searched shops and patrolled the streets looking for this kind of clothing. When they found a woman still wearing it, they tore her clothes to pieces; some women were taken into custody. At the gates of Cairo officials erected dressed wooden puppets to show the women which kind of dress was suitable and legal. The prices of Baghdadi buttons plummeted to 80 dirhams but nobody would dare to buy one.⁶⁸

However, more frequent than complaints against women's clothing in the *dār al-ʿadl* were allegations of misbehavior by Christians. After such complaints increased significantly in 755/1354, the *dār al-ʿadl* council issued a decree reinforcing the discriminatory legal regulations concerning the *ahl al-dhimma*. The Christian patriarch and the leader of the Jewish community were present and had to consent. But instead of cooling down the atmosphere, the decision led to riots against Christians and Jews in Cairo which lasted for several days.⁶⁹

MAẒĀLIM DURING THE ROYAL STABLES AND DIKKAH PERIOD 789–923/1387–1517

During this period *maẓālim* cases were mainly heard at the royal stables, but sometimes at the *maydān*, and especially after the mid-fifteenth century, cases were usually heard on the *dikkaḥ* platform in the royal park in the citadel. This period once again witnessed stable sultanates, and complaints against abuses of

⁶⁶Jo van Steenberg, *Order out of Chaos: Patronage, Conflict and Mamluk Socio-Political Culture, 1341–1382* (Leiden, 2006), 169–70.

⁶⁷Al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:717–18.

⁶⁸Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Sulūk*, 2:810.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 2:921–28



power were heard again at *maẓālim* court sessions after the time of weak rule by the Qalāwūnids. Therefore, *maẓālim* sessions reappear as a sultan's regular duty at the turn of the century. It might have been to show that a traditional institution was renewed that Sultan Barqūq had the sessions transferred to the royal stables. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah (d. 851/1448) remarked about this re-introduction: "Everywhere in Cairo and Egypt was uttered loudly the invitation that the one who has been wronged could come to the sultan's stables. And when somebody came and said: 'Can I present my case to the judge or to the chamberlain?' and the sultan said no, then the man was beaten and thrown outside. But if the sultan said: 'Yes, the case is accepted,' then the sultan ordered the man's opponent in the legal case to present himself, and he rendered justice between the two."⁷⁰

In 821/1418 Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh (r. 816–24/1413–21) had Ibn Ṭablāwī, the *wālī* of Cairo, whipped at the regular *maẓālim* session in the stables. The reason for this had been that a poor man did not have enough money to pay for the burial of his drowned son, for which the *wālī* had imposed five dinars. The father therefore had to dump the cadaver beside the Nile, where dogs started to eat the corpse. A complaint reached the sultan who decided to punish the *wālī*.⁷¹

Staging regular legal sessions was upheld after the death of al-Mu'ayyad. The grand amir Ṭaṭar, who was in charge of state affairs for al-Mu'ayyad's two-year-old son, summoned the amirs and judges ten days after the death of al-Mu'ayyad in Muḥarram 824/January 1421 to the first *maẓālim* session: "Proclamation was made that grand amir Ṭaṭar would sit for judgement among the men. When the Friday prayer was over the grand amir took his seat in the reception hall of the royal stables as al-Malik al-Mu'ayyad used to sit there, except that Ṭaṭar sat at the left of the throne not upon it. He decided cases between people and settled the affairs of men most judiciously, for he was a man of outstanding ability, alert and intelligent, and had a good knowledge of jurisprudence and other subjects; he loved to study especially the teachings of the Hanafite masters, for he held them in high honor."⁷²

Ṭaṭar, who might have made a very just ruler, even reached the sultanate this year but suddenly died in the same year. In times when the sultan was a minor, the *maẓālim* sessions were apparently supervised by the grand amir. Grand amir Barsbāy, who shortly thereafter became Sultan Barsbāy (r. 825–41/1422–38), held *maẓālim* sessions on a regular basis before attaining the sultanate: after some complaints from the public, he had the money changers come to the royal stables in 825/1422. There he ordered that the Mu'ayyadi dirhams should be weighed

⁷⁰Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah*, ed. 'Adnān Darwish (Damascus, 1977), 221.

⁷¹Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī*, 2:40.

⁷²Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Nujūm*, 6:484; Popper, *History of Egypt*, 3:126.



when accepted for payments rather than being counted, as apparently the dirhams had suffered a strong diet regime in the hands of the money changers, who had reduced their weight by almost half.⁷³

Another example of a Mamluk who was actively involved in the *maẓālim* jurisdiction is found in Amir Sūdūn, who served as chamberlain during the reign of Barsbāy. He seemed to be almost obsessed with favoring the weak over the strong during *maẓālim* sessions. Even when a Mamluk had a substantial legal case against a peasant, Sūdūn would favor the peasant. No wonder he fell into disgrace and was exiled to Jerusalem.⁷⁴

It seems that the proper functioning of the *maẓālim* system depended to a large extent on the will of the reigning sultan or other strong men of the sultanate to enforce it. It could certainly not work well when the sultan was openly corrupt. Sultan Jaqmaq (r. 842–57/1438–53) apparently had this reputation, and Petry has recently shown how the daughter of Sultan al-Muʾayyad Shaykh had waited with her legal complaint about a property dispute until after the death of Jaqmaq because the accused in the case was the sultan's favorite. When she filed her suit, presumably through the *maẓālim* jurisdiction, it came at the right time, as Sultan Ināl (r. 857–65/1453–61) was reviewing acts of nepotism by his predecessor and she was granted a financial indemnity.⁷⁵

This brings us near to the end of the Mamluk sultanate as a whole, to the “Twilight of Majesty.”⁷⁶ This period was dominated, if we follow the contemporary sources, by the rule of the good and just sultan Qāyṭbāy (r. 872–901/1468–96) and the bad and unjust sultan Qānṣawh al-Ghawrī (r. 906–22/1501–16).⁷⁷ Qāyṭbāy was especially well known for his interventions against officials. In 876/1471 for example, he had the controller of his privy funds (*nāẓir al-khāṣṣ*) flogged for cheating three plaintiffs during a bi-weekly *maẓālim* session in the royal stables.⁷⁸ There were other similar stories about him, but often they contained a certain “show off” element and staid symbolism.⁷⁹ Carl Petry remarks in this context that “the sultan did frequently uphold the rights of legitimate petitioners. His

⁷³Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Nujūm*, 6:536; Popper, *History of Egypt*, 3:165.

⁷⁴Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Nujūm*, 7:267ff; Popper, *History of Egypt*, 5:176.

⁷⁵Carl F. Petry, “Crime in Mamluk Historiography: A Fraud Case Depicted by Ibn Taghribirdī,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 10, no. 2 (2006): 141–51.

⁷⁶Carl F. Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamlūk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy and Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī in Egypt* (Seattle, 1993).

⁷⁷Carl F. Petry, “Royal Justice in Mamlūk Cairo: Contrasting Motives of Two Sultāns,” in *Saber religioso y poder político en el Islam: Actas del simposio internacional (Granada, 15–18. octubre 1991)* (Madrid, 1994), 197–211.

⁷⁸Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:66; al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbāʾ*, 391.

⁷⁹Petry, “Royal Justice,” 199, 202.



reputation as a defender of orphans, widows and the helpless was not without merit. Yet, adjudicating their grievances usually involved petty sums, restoration of which cost him little. Public acclamation for protection of the lowly's claims was cheaply bought."⁸⁰

In contrast to Qāyṭbāy, Sultan Qānṣawh al-Ghawrī did not even bother with such symbolic gestures, but we have to acknowledge that our main historical source, Ibn Iyās, is not very friendly towards him. However, stories about his unjust behavior abound, and some have been mentioned here already. It is hard to find a positive story about him. Maybe this one will do: in 915/1509 he asked Qurqmās al-Muqrī, an amir of ten, to refund money which he had taken from the people of his quarter. Apparently 1000 dinars had been stolen from the house of al-Muqrī. As al-Muqrī could not find the thief, he forced his neighbors to pay him the sum. Finally, the real thief was caught in Mecca, but al-Muqrī still did not refund the money. His neighbors therefore went with a written petition (*qiṣṣah*) up to the sultan, who decided against al-Muqrī. But Ibn Iyās had to add that Qānṣawh al-Ghawrī did this because he already had mixed feelings towards al-Muqrī.⁸¹

It looks like it had been almost impossible to file a suit against a favorite of al-Ghawrī. When the murder of a young boy was committed by a man in the service of al-Ghawrī's nephew Ṭūmān Bāy, the case could not be tried, as no witnesses dared to present themselves.⁸² Another instance of unjust jurisdiction occurred when Qānṣawh al-Ghawrī had the chief judges examine the family tree of the descendents of the Prophet in order to eliminate them from the state's payroll if they could not prove their ancestry.⁸³

However, the worst injustice of his reign is that apparently many crimes were not examined at all, but simply ignored. This negligence on the part of the head of state frustrated the public. Therefore Qānṣawh's reign certainly constituted the heyday of the phenomenon of privatization of justice in the Mamluk period.⁸⁴ Illegal "legal platforms" (*dikak*) popped up almost all over the city in front of houses of influential persons. In this legal "black market," complaints were accepted and pursued by semi-official doormen (*nuqabāʾ*) in the service of influential people.

⁸⁰Ibid., 203.

⁸¹Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 4:162, 180.

⁸²Ibid., 4:168.

⁸³Ibid., 4:260.

⁸⁴For a discussion of the phenomenon of privatization of law in the Mamluk period, see John Meloy, "The Privatization of Protection: Extortion and the State in the Circassian Mamluk Period," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 47/2 (2004): 195–212; Robert Irwin, "The Privatization of 'Justice' Under the Circassian Mamluks," *Mamluk Studies Review* 6 (2002): 63–70.



Especially towards the end of his reign it seems that Qānṣawh al-Ghawrī strongly disapproved of this practice, as numerous official orders were issued in 919/1513 to forbid officials from erecting these *dikak* in front of their houses and using them to dispense legal rulings.⁸⁵ Finally he re-allowed the *dikak* in Jumādā I 919/July 1513, with the restriction that the *nuqabā'* should not impose excessive financial penalties on the accused parties. Apparently the amirs, who naturally did not want to lose this income, had convinced the sultan by saying: "If the sultan does not provide justice and the amirs do not provide justice, then the rights of the people will be lost."⁸⁶ The people could now choose where to take their legal complaints, either to the public sector and the *dikkah* in the sultan's park or to the private sector and the *dikak* in the streets of Cairo.

CONCLUSION

After the fall of Mamluk Empire, the Mamluk *maẓālim* jurisdiction disappeared. The Ottoman sultan Selīm I (r. 918–26/1512–20) apparently did not wish to pursue such forms of public display. "When Ibn 'Uthmān went up to the Citadel he hid from the people and did not show himself to anyone. He did not sit for public hearings on the *dikkah* in the park in order to help the wronged against the oppressor. On the contrary, the people increasingly told stories about new injustices (*maẓlamah*) committed by him and his officials," remarked Ibn Iyās about the end of a legal institution which had shaped Egypt's and Syria's legal history throughout the Mamluk period.⁸⁷

How can we sum up this institution? It functioned right to the very end of the Mamluk era; it was used by the sultans to enforce their images as just rulers and to fulfil the legal obligations which they had as Muslim rulers. In doing so, they followed the system which had been laid out by the Ayyubids, although the Mamluks had made some adjustments. They certainly formalized the procedure to an extent that it might be asked whether the legal decisions given during these sessions were sometimes merely a by-product of the general public representation of the sultan. Some sultans, though, took their legal obligations more seriously and apparently really tried to help the poor against the powerful. Still, there were limits to this when personal interests of the sultan or the empire were at stake.

To answer the question posed in the heading of my paper: was there *ẓulm* (injustice) done by the *maẓālim* procedure? Well, there was a lot of *ẓulm* perpetrated in and through *maẓālim* sessions, yet there was no injustice automatically built into the system. The aim of it was clearly to provide a forum for appeals against

⁸⁵Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i*, 4:76, 302, 312, 318, 320; Irwin, "Privatization," 69.

⁸⁶Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i*, 4:320.

⁸⁷Ibid., 5:162.



legal decisions of state officials and to put overall control of all matters of the state, including the judiciary, into the hands of the sultan. The *maẓālim* jurisdiction enforced the image of the good ruler who, though he might have bad advisers, would stand up for his subjects if needed. Of course this was not always the case, but in times of stable rule the *maẓālim* jurisdiction could really be an effective tool against legal abuses. It was perceived by all layers of Mamluk society as an indispensable part of the legitimacy of Mamluk sultans—the institution as such was never questioned.






Fig. 1. Cairo in Mamluk times (Carl Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamlūk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy in Egypt* [Seattle, 1993], xii. Courtesy of Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington.)



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


Fig. 2. *Īwān* of the Citadel. (From Robert Hay, *Illustrations of Cairo* [London, 1840] and *Description de l'Égypte*.)



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


Fig. 3. The *dār al-ʿadls* at the Citadel (Redrawn based on Nasser O. Rabbat, “The Ideological Significance of the *Dār al-ʿAdl* in the Medieval Islamic Orient,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, no. 1 [1995]: 11.)



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


Fig. 4. The Citadel of Cairo (Carl Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamlūk Sultans al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy in Egypt* [Seattle, 1993], xi. Courtesy of Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington.)



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Fig. 5. Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (r. 901–4/1496–98) on the *dikkah* (Arnold von Harff, *Die Pilgerfahrt des Ritters Arnold von Harff von Cöln durch Italien, Syrien, Aegypten, Arabien, Aethiopien, Nubien, Palästina, die Türkei, Frankreich und Spanien, wie er sie in den Jahren 1496 bis 1499 vollendet, beschrieben und durch Zeichnungen erläutert hat*, ed. Eberhard von Groote [Hildesheim, 2004], 90. Courtesy of Georg Olms Verlag.)



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Awqāf in Mamluk Bilād al-Shām

The thesis of this article is that the desire for political hegemony was the primary motivation for the *awqāf* policy adopted by the Mamluk elite.

During its first century in Syria and Egypt (1516–97), the Ottoman Empire carried out several cadastral surveys. The data gathered in these surveys were recorded and catalogued. Among the items listed in the Ottoman registers of each of the provinces are religious endowments, their founders, and their property.¹ Looking some centuries backward and comparing the information provided in the Ottoman lists with the data on the Islamic religious endowments (*awqāf*) in Bilād al-Shām at the end of the Latin Kingdom (1099–1291), we can get a clear picture of the remarkable number of endowments established by Muslims in Damascus, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Palestine during the Mamluk period (1250–1517).

Considering the abundant additional information found in inscriptions,² legal compendia, biographical works, and chronicles, we can clearly see that the *waqf* had an unmistakable presence in Mamluk society.³ It was represented in almost

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¹Mehmet İpşirli and Muḥammad Dāwūd Tamīmī, eds., *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimīn fī Filastīn fī al-Qarn al-ʿAshir al-Hijrī ḥasab Daftar 522* (Istanbul, 1402/1982); Muḥammad ʿIsā Ṣāliḥiyah, *Sijill Arāḍi Alawīyah Şafad Nābulus Ghazzah wa-Qadāʾ al-Ramlah ḥasab al-Daftar Raqm 312 Tārīkhuhu* 963/1553 (Amman, 1419/1999); idem, *Sijill Arāḍi Liwāʾ al-Quds ḥasab al-Daftar 342 Tārīkhuhu* 970/1562 (Amman, 1422/2002); Muḥammad ʿAdnān al-Bakhīt, *Daftar Mufaṣṣal Khāṣṣ Liwāʾ al-Shām* 958/1551 [tapu daftari 275] (Amman, 1989), 27 (*waqf ḥaramayn sharīfayn*), 28, 29, 30, (*al-ʿushr ʿan māl al-waqf*), 36 (*al-ʿushr ʿan jumlat mutaḥaṣṣil al-awqāf*), 40, 46, 67 (*awqāf ḥaramayn wa-quds sharīf wa-khalīl al-raḥmān wa-jāmiʿ banī umayyah sharīf*), 69, 76, 82, 89, 126, 128; idem, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century* (Beirut, 1982), 147–48; Karl K. Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758* (Princeton, 1980), 101; Alexandrine Guérin, “Interprétation d’un registre fiscal ottoman: Les territoires de la Syrie méridionale en 1005/1596–97,” *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 61 (2002): 6–8. On the Ottoman method of taxation of endowments, see Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Ḥawāḍith Dimashq al-Yawmīyah: Şafahāt Mafqūdah min Kitāb Mufākahat al-Khillān fī Ḥawāḍith al-Zamān*, ed. Aḥmad ʿIbīsh (Damascus, 2002), 246.

²*Répertoire Chronologique d’Épigraphie Arabe* (hereafter RCEA) 18:6–7 (784009), 27–28 (786003).

³Ulrich Haarmann, “Mamluk Endowment Deeds as a Source for the History of Education in Late Medieval Egypt,” *Al-Abḥāth* 28 (1980): 31–47; Gilles Hennequin, “Waqf et monnaie dans l’Égypte mamluke,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 38 (1995): 305–12; Jean-Claude Garcin and Mustafa Anouar Taher, “Les waqfs d’une madrasa du Caire au XVe siècle: les propriétés urbaines de Ḡawhar al-Lālā,” in *Le waqf dans l’espace islamique: outil de pouvoir socio-politique*, ed. R. Deguilhem (Damascus, 1995), 151–86; Rudolf Veselý, “Procès de la production et rôle du waqf dans les relations ville-campagne,” in *ibid.*, 229–41; Carl F. Petry “A Geniza for Mamluk Studies?”



all aspects of urban and rural society as a means for accumulating wealth and influence. This leads to the crucial question: why did the military class⁴ so eagerly pursue a policy that in effect transferred a considerable portion of agricultural land and urban property from the state treasury into religious endowments,⁵ a development that seriously diminished the sultanate's resources?

It is not an easy task to solve this knotty problem, particularly as we possess no sound information as to the motives of the endowers, who couched their reasoning in general statements and citations from the Quran⁶ and hadith.⁷ In order to advance an answer to the question posited above, the present article aims to scrutinize the information concerning endowments, donors (particularly sultans, viceroys, and officers), beneficiaries, and *waqf* property that is preserved in various sources: endowment deeds (*kitāb al-waqf*; *waqfiyah*), inscriptions, juridical works, biographical works, and chronicles.

These sources clearly reveal Mamluk society as a contractual society, that is to say, a society that used legal documents to articulate personal relationships.⁸ The

Charitable Trust (*Waqf*) Documents as a Source for Economic and Social History," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 2 (1998): 51–60; idem, "Waqf as an Instrument of Investment in the Mamluk Sultanate: Security vs. Profit?" in *Slave Elites in the Middle East and Africa: A Comparative Study*, ed. Miura Toru and John Edward Philips (London, 2000), 99–115; Sylvie Denoix, "A Mamluk Institution for Urbanization: the Waqf," in *The Cairo Heritage: Essays in Honour of Laila Ali Ibrahim*, ed. Doris Behrens-Abouseif (Cairo, 2000), 191–202.

⁴On the so-called "royal *awqāf*" see Adam Sabra, "Public Policy or Private Charity—The Ambivalent Character of Islamic Charitable Endowments," in *Stiftungen in Christentum, Judentum und Islam vor der Moderne: auf der Suche nach ihren Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschieden in religiösen Grundlagen, praktischen Zwecken und historischen Transformationen*, ed. Michael Borgolte (Berlin, 2005), 96.

⁵Imād Badr al-Dīn Abū Ghāzī, *Fī Tārīkh Miṣr al-Ijtimā'i: Taṭawwur al-Ḥiyāzah al-Zirā'iyyah Zaman al-Mamālik al-Jarākisah* (Cairo, 2000), 105; Adam Sabra, "The Rise of a New Class? Land Tenure in Fifteenth-Century Egypt: A Review Article," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 8, no. 2 (2004): 205, 207. The Ottoman policy of reincorporating decayed *awqāf* in the *kharāj* lands is another illustration of this development; see Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Ḥawādith Dimashq al-Yawmiyah*, 169.

⁶Frequently quoting Sūrat al-Tawbah (9), verse 18: "He only shall tend Allāh's sanctuaries who believes in Allāh and the Last Day and observeth proper worship and payeth the poor-due," and verse 60: "the alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allāh, and for the wayfarers; a duty imposed by Allāh." (trans. M. Pickthall).

⁷Commonly alluding to the tradition: "Only three things remain after death: a lasting charity, religious knowledge that teaches the next generations, and a righteous son that will pray for the deceased." *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* (Cairo, 1955), 3:1255 (no. 1631 *bāb mā yulḥaq al-insān min al-thawāb ba'd wafātihi*); 'Abd Allāh al-Dārimī, *Sunan* (Cairo, 1398/1978), 1:139 (also printed as *Musnad al-Dārimī* [Mecca, 1421/2000], 1:462 [no. 578]); Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, *Biḥār al-Anwār* (Beirut, 1412/1992), 1:349 (no. 65) (in the 1983 edition 2:22).

⁸Norbert Rouland, *Legal Anthropology* (London, 1994).



ties between husband and wife, patron and client, or testator and inheritor were framed in legal contracts that were made public and verified by the qadi's court. In this context, a religious endowment should be seen as a contract between a benefactor and beneficiaries. In the *waqf* charter, the benefactor stipulates his intentions and the aims of the endowment. Moreover, he regulates the activities within the institution's walls, including instructions relating to accommodation, food, study, and prayer.

This aspect of the *waqf* as a legal tool in arranging financial relations among family members is well documented in the records I have studied.⁹ These report on the role of *awqāf* in providing economic benefits to kin and others that the founder wished to support with cash payments,¹⁰ salary (*jāmakīyah*),¹¹ food,¹² housing, etc. Administrators of *awqāf* were also beneficiaries of the endowment,¹³ although it should be said that most Mamluk families varied from the ordinary civilian Muslim family in the fact that they were first generation families with no elders.¹⁴ They thus found it difficult to claim nobility by birth.¹⁵ Hence, by

⁹Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Jazarī, *Tārīkh Ibn al-Jazarī al-Musammā Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Anbā'ihī wa-Wafayāt al-Akābir wa-al-A'yān min Abnā'ihī al-Ma'rūf bi-Tārīkh Ibn al-Jazarī*, ed. 'Umar 'Abd al-Salām al-Tadmūrī (Beirut, 1419/1998), 2:157, 200–1 (the story of Ibn al-Dajajīyah), 282; Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Fatāwā al-Subkī* (Beirut, n.d.), 1:508. This is not the place to launch a general inquiry into the link between endowment and family bonds. It is sufficient to indicate that this line of explanation reflects early source data on *ḥabs*; Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futuḥ Miṣr*, ed. Charles Torrey (New Haven, 1921), 135–36.

¹⁰Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Ṭawq, *Al-Ta'liq: Yawmiyāt Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Ṭawq Mudhakkirāt Kutibat bi-Dimashq fī Awākhir al-'Ahd al-Mamlūkī 885–908/1480–1502*, ed. Ja'far al-Muhājir (Damascus, 2000), 1:245 (A.H. 888); RCEA 13:71 (no. 4902).

¹¹Aḥmad Darrāj, ed., *Hujjat Waqf al-Ashraf Barsbāy* (Cairo, 1963), clause 22.

¹²Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Al-Qalā'id al-Jawhariyah fī Tārīkh al-Ṣālihiyah*, ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad Duhmān (Damascus, 1401/1980), 1:266–68.

¹³'Abd al-Ra'ūf ibn Tāj al-'Arifīn al-Munāwī, *Kitāb Taysīr al-Wuqūf 'alā Ghawāmiḍ Aḥkām al-Wuqūf* (Riyadh, 1418/1998), 1:213; al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 1:468, 2:526; Ibn al-Jazarī, *Tārīkh*, 2:405.

¹⁴I am not arguing that sons of mamluks (*awlād al-nās*) did not join the ruling military elite. See Stephan Conermann and Suad Saghbini, "Awlād al-Nās as Founders of Pious Endowments: The *Waqfiyah* of Yahyā ibn Tūghān al-Ḥasanī of the Year 870/1465," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 6 (2002): 24–25. Later Mamluk sources report on sultans that sent emissaries to bring members of their families to the sultanate. See Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Maqrizī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk fī Ma'rifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyādah (Cairo, 1934–), 4:646 (A.H. 826); Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī' al-Zuhūr fī Waqā'ī' al-Duhūr*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā (Cairo and Wiesbaden, 1982–84), 4:88 (ll. 11–12, A.H. 911); Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-Khillān fī Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā (Cairo, 1962), 1:82.

¹⁵One of the stories on the emergence of Quṭuz relates that he claimed to be the offspring of a royal family. See Abū al-Maḥāsīn Yūsuf Ibn Taghrībīrdī, *Al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-al-Qāhirah* (Cairo, 1937), 7:85.



establishing *awqāf*, these manumitted slaves could preserve their wealth and reputation, for example in buildings that bore their names.¹⁶

The meticulous and extremely detailed clauses of the *waqfiyah* indicate that the endowment was not a random act of charity but a carefully calculated initiative, delineated in a meticulously formulated legal document. Thus, for example, the *kitāb* of *waqf al-maghāribah* in Jerusalem says: “This charity was established in support of the Maghribis who dwell in Jerusalem and those that will arrive.” During the three sacred months (Rajab, Sha‘bān and Ramaḍān), “the *waqf*’s supervisor will prepare bread and distribute it among the inhabitants of the Maghribi lodge and all North Africans living in Jerusalem.”¹⁷ Another example that supports this line of reasoning is the *waqf* deed by al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy that spells out the payments to the administrator and staff at the college he had built in Jerusalem. The thirty Sufis who resided in it would receive cash payments and food.¹⁸

Assuming that the Mamluk governing elite considered gifts to be a kind of personal transaction also leads us to view religious endowments as contracts.¹⁹ The philanthropist presumably had faith that by providing material assistance he would be rewarded in the afterlife. In several records we come across formulas asking for reprieve (‘*afw*) or pardon (*ghafar*).²⁰ Benefactors asked God to accept their donation (*taqabbala Allāh minhu*) and requested his closeness (*qurbah*).²¹ Frequently, a paraphrase of verses from Sūrat Yūsuf (usually 12:88 or 90) or other Quranic verses was engraved on the walls of the *waqf*.²²

There is no reason to discount the statements of men and women who believed that donations would contribute to keeping their memories alive.²³ Donors established endowments that paid for people who would come and pray for their

¹⁶ Al-Munāwī, *Kitāb Taysīr al-Wuqūf*, 1:222; Ibn al-Jazarī, *Tārīkh*, 1:77.

¹⁷ Muḥammad As‘ad al-Imām al-Ḥusaynī, *Al-Manhal al-Ṣafī fī al-Waqf wa-Aḥkāmihī wa-al-Wathā‘iq al-Tārīkhīyah lil-Arāḍi wa-al-Ḥuqūq al-Waqfiyah al-Islāmiyah fī Filasṭīn* (Jerusalem, 1982), 73, 74; İpşirli and Tamīmī, *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn*, 28 (item 20).

¹⁸ Al-Ḥusaynī, *Al-Manhal*, 76–77; İpşirli and Tamīmī, *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn*, 39–41 (item 52); cf. Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahaṭ*, 2:6 (22)–7 (1).

¹⁹ Kenneth Joseph Arrow, “Gifts and Exchanges,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (1972): 343–62.

²⁰ Heinz Gaube, *Arabische Inscripten aus Syrien* (Beirut and Wiesbaden, 1978), 78 (#146 l. 1), 84 (#159 l. 4), 86 (#163 l. 2), 92 (#176 l. 2); RCEA 18:185 (no. 796006).

²¹ Gaube, *Arabische Inscripten*, 110 (#197).

²² Ibid., 40 (#65 l. 3); 65 (#119 ll. 2–3), 89 (#170), 111 (#198); Solange Ory, *Cimetieres et inscriptions du Ḥawrān et du Ḡabal al-Durūz* (Paris, 1989), 48.

²³ Ibn al-Jazarī, *Tārīkh*, 2:287; Gaube, *Arabische Inscripten*, 115 (#208).



souls.²⁴ This partially explains the existence of donations to maintain tombs,²⁵ as these endowments generated among donors a sense that their well-being was guaranteed not only on earth but in the hereafter as well.²⁶

Religious or philanthropic motives need not be completely ruled out, and in many cases an altruistic impulse can be found. However, the pietistic formulas reflect only one element among many in this complex phenomenon.²⁷ In addition to philanthropic motives, the Mamluk elite certainly also had materialistic motives for establishing religious endowments. My chief argument is that we should search in the political arena for motives that drove sultans, viceroys, governors, and other officials to endow property and resources to establish *awqāf*.

This thesis, at least as a partial explanation for the vast scope of the *waqf* phenomenon, is generally agreed upon. Yet I would take this thesis a step further, advocating that the *awqāf* served the Mamluk ruling elite not merely as a tool to uphold its prestige, but as a device to establish its hegemony. Hegemony in this case was not only power over the civilian masses but total dominance of society. The rulers aspired to hold the governing power that controlled culture and shaped the organization of society.

To achieve this aim, rulers could not restrict their activity merely to policing the public sphere or monitoring society. They had to invest in buildings that embodied their position. The religious endowments functioned in the urban landscape as signs representing the lofty position of the donors. They were employed to institutionalize social hierarchy and to demonstrate the relationship between donor and recipient. As such, the *awqāf* represented the ideology of the rulers.²⁸ This could not be accomplished by army officers alone. Sultans and governors needed the support of a religious establishment that benefited from the *awqāf*.²⁹ Without securing support from other sectors of society, Mamluk rulers could not fully establish their hegemony.

²⁴Gaube, *Arabische Inscriften*, 21 (#20) and cf. 91 (#174 ll. 4–5), 116 (#210).

²⁵Th. Emil Homerin, *From Arab Poet to Muslim Saint: Ibn al-Fāriḍ, His Verse, and His Shrine* (Cairo, 2001), 60–62.

²⁶Ṣālihiyah, *Sijill Arāḍi Alawīyah Ṣafad Nābulus Ghazzah wa-Qaḍā' al-Ramlah*, 107, 119. This assumption is supported by comparison to other cultures. See Jerome Blum, *Lord and Peasant in Russia* (Princeton, 1961), 190–91.

²⁷For an opposite evaluation, see Moshe Gil, *Documents of the Jewish Pious Foundations from the Cairo Geniza* (Leiden, 1976), 11.

²⁸R. Stephen Humphreys, “The Expressive Intent of the Mamluk Architecture of Cairo: A Preliminary Essay,” *Studia Islamica* 35 (1972): 79–80.

²⁹Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, *Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Wafayāt al-Shuyūkh wa-al-Aqrān*, ed. ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Salām al-Tadmuri (Beirut, 1419/1999), 1:80 (*kathīr al-maḥabbah li-ahl al-‘ilm wa-al-qur’ān wa-al-ṣulḥā’ wa-al-fuqarā’*); and see the description of a sultanīc procession in Damascus by Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, 2:15.



Waqf was probably the most prominent social and economic institution operating within the boundaries of the Mamluk sultanate. Considerable sums were invested in constructing impressive institutions and in financing their ongoing activity. The *waqf* acquired an image of an institution open to all. Theoretically, all social classes used the *awqāf*, utilizing one kind of *waqf* or another.³⁰ For this reason the *awqāf* conveyed the impression of being a social institution that supported the entire Islamic community without distinction, though practically speaking, most of the beneficiaries of the endowments belonged to the Mamluk elite.

Indeed, the *awqāf* may be classified in two categories. The great majority of the endowments supported a well-defined beneficiary. They were founded in order to provide family, associates, and the religious establishment with funds, assets, housing, and positions.³¹ Considerably smaller was the number of *awqāf* that provided food, shelter, or money to the general public, let alone the poor and the needy. Moreover, in the *awqāf* documents, the meaning of the Quranic tags “*maskīn*” (needy; deprived) and “*faqīr*” (fakir = poor) lost its literal connotation and actually depicted a well-defined social group. The *fuqarāʾ* in Mamluk *awqāf* texts were Sufis, scholars, and other beneficiaries, not those suffering from hunger and misfortune.³²

Looking at the religious endowments from this perspective, it seems proper to highlight two additional features of *awqāf*. First, the accommodation of Muslims at the *waqf* was supplemented by sustenance that was served ritually during the public gathering. Food was provided on a regular basis, together with lodging, to the chosen group of teachers and students that resided in the madrasahs and *zāwiyahs*. Communal consumption of food is an apparent vehicle for the diffusion of propaganda and for generating a sense of amity and community. In addition, scholars engaged in the study of law (*fiqh*) and Sufis busy with mystical rituals were supported by these *awqāf* that provided the means for payments and grants.

The economic advantage of being entitled to receive payments from the *awqāf* coffers is demonstrated by reports on people who paid to be named in endowment registers.³³ Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad bought his position in the Saʿīd al-Suʿadāʾ.³⁴ The

³⁰ Al-Munāwī, *Kitāb Taysīr al-Wuqūf*, 2:411.

³¹ L. A. Mayer, ed., *The Buildings of Qaytbay as Described in His Endowment Deed* (London, 1938), 84; RCEA 16: 83 (6116); Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufaḥḥat*, 1:236, 244.

³² For a late Ayyubid image of the poor, see ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jawbarī, *Al-Mukhtār fī Kashf al-Asrār wa-Hatḥ al-Astār* (Beirut, 1992), 57ff. (*La Voile arrache*, trans. René Khawam [Paris, 1980], 1:121ff., is based on a different manuscript).

³³ Al-Munāwī, *Kitāb Taysīr al-Wuqūf*, 1:173–76, 198; al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 1:509 (*dafaʿa ilā al-dawlah mālan*).

³⁴ ʿAlī ibn Dāwūd al-Jawharī al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs wa-al-Abdān fī Tawārīkh al-Zamān*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥabashī (Cairo, 1971–94), 1:142–43.



economic benefit of being attached to a *waqf* can also be inferred from accounts about conflicts among beneficiaries.³⁵ To facilitate the examination of *waqf* data on these issues, additional cases will be presented below.

Yet, before elaborating on *waqf* institutions let us make a short detour to look at how economic support for these religious endowments was provided. Substantial data on the urban and rural property endowed by the Mamluk military elite is furnished by *waqf* documents and wall inscriptions.³⁶ One example is the *waqf* founded by Baybars to support Ibrāhīm al-Armawī.³⁷ Other examples can be found above gates and windows.³⁸ But if early generations of Mamluk army officers could endow Latin property to support their *waqfs*, later generations of viceroys and governors seized farm lands to finance the army.

Instances of rural properties in Syria and Egypt being alienated to support *awqāf* are recorded during the pre-Mamluk period,³⁹ yet the use of *iqṭāʿ* property to support urban institutions acquired new characteristics during the age of the Mamluk sultanate. Although some Mamluk *fuqahāʾ* considered the endowment of the sultanate's lands (*waqf irṣād*),⁴⁰ particularly in those regions that were reconquered from the Franks and the Mongols, as illegal,⁴¹ this ostensibly legal barrier did not prevent donors from endowing fields and gardens that were not

³⁵ Albert Arazi, "Al-Risāla al-Baybarsiyya d'al-Suyuti: Un document sur les problèmes d'un waqf sultanien sous les derniers Mamluks," *Israel Oriental Studies* 9 (1979): 329–54.

³⁶ Cf. ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad al-Nuʿaymī, *Al-Dāris fī Tārīkh al-Madāris*, ed. Jaʿfar al-Ḥasanī (Damascus, 1367/1948), 1:326 (*wa-raʿaytu marsūman bi-ʿatabatihā*).

³⁷ Al-Subkī, *Fatāwāʾ*, 1:496–99. On Ibrāhīm al-Armawī, see al-Nuʿaymī, *Al-Dāris fī Tārīkh al-Madāris*, 2:196; Ibn Ṭulūn, *Al-Qalāʾid*, 1:284.

³⁸ RCEA 13:98–99 (4946 Damascus: Khān Iyāsh), 14:91 (5343), 18:6 (784008 Damascus: Masjid Ḥaydar al-ʿAskarī), 40 (787009 Mardin).

³⁹ Aḥmad ibn Mughith al-Ṭulayṭulī, *Al-Muqniʿ fī ʿIlm al-Shurūṭ*, ed. Francisco Javier Aguirre Sadaba (Madrid, 1994), 208–9.

⁴⁰ Taqī al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Balāṭunūsī, *Tahrīr al-Maqāl fīmā Yaḥillu wa-Yuḥarramu min Bayt al-Māl*, ed. Faṭḥ Allāh Muḥammad Ghāzī al-Ṣabbāgh (al-Manṣūrah, 1989), 105–9, 137–38; Baber Johansen, *The Islamic Law of Land Tax and Rent: the Peasants' Loss of Property Rights as Interpreted in Hanafite Legal Literature during the Mamluk and Ottoman Periods* (London, 1988), 81, 92; Sabra, "Public Policy or Private Charity," 100–1, 105–6; Murat Çizakça, *A History of Philanthropic Foundations: The Islamic World from the Seventh Century to the Present* (Istanbul, 2000), 74–75, 110–12.

⁴¹ It seems that some Muslim scholars questioned the legal status of the territories taken by the Mamluks from the Latins and the Mongols, arguing that these lands were the collective property of the Muslim community (*fayʾ*). By designating lands as *fayʾ* these jurists opposed its endowment by private donors. See Abū al-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī, *Al-Istikhrāj li-Aḥkām al-Kharaj* (Beirut, 1985), 15, 43–45, 111. On the early history of this concept, see Werner Schmucker, *Untersuchungen zu einigen wichtigen Bodenrechtlichen Konsequenzen der islamischen Eroberungsbewegung* (Bonn, 1972), 38–39, 127–32.



their private property (*jārin fī milkihi*)⁴² but rather belonged to the *iqṭāʿ* farms.⁴³ The growth of these endowments put pressure on the sultanate's sources of income.⁴⁴

The economic and political importance of *waqf* impelled the Mamluk administration to establish an exclusive state bureau (*diwān al-awqāf*)⁴⁵ staffed by inspectors and controllers (*shadd al-awqāf*; *mushadd al-awqāf*).⁴⁶ Among their duties was the inspection of the *awqāf*'s receipts and expenditures.⁴⁷ Examples of this are the numerous records from Jerusalem mentioning the post of *nāẓir al-ḥaramayn al-sharīfayn*.⁴⁸ A second example is an account of a thorough inspection (*kashf*) of the schools, which took place in Damascus in spring 725/1325.⁴⁹ The religious establishment of the city, along with the administrative staff, saw to the reimbursement of jurists and students.⁵⁰ Such measures were taken because some

⁴²Kāmil Jamīl al-ʿAsālī, ed., *Wathāʾiq Maqdisiyah Tārīkhiyah* (Amman, 1983), 1:109 (l. 5); a related matter is when a property is owned jointly (*waqf al-mushāʿ*). Cf. Najm al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Munʿim ibn ʿAbd al-Ṣamad al-Ṭarsūsī, *Anfaʿ al-Waṣāʾil ilā Taḥrīr al-Masāʾil*, ed. Muṣṭafā Muḥammad Khafājī (Cairo, 1344/1926), 77, 80–92.

⁴³Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm al-Ḥanafī al-Ṭarābulusī, *Kitāb al-Isʿāf fī Aḥkām al-Awqāf* (Mecca, 1406/1985), 20 (l. 20: “It is appropriate to endow private land that the sultan has allocated or barren land that a person has developed, but it is improper to endow property that is possessed by the treasury.”)

⁴⁴Al-Munāwī, *Kitāb Taysīr al-Wuqūf*, 1:195–96 (780/1378), 217 (835/1432). Carl F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?: The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power* (Albany, 1994), 196–200.

⁴⁵A narration from southeastern Anatolia elucidates the political dimension of *awqāf* management. A Christian called Ibn Shalīṭah was nominated by the Marwanids (983–1085) from Mayyafariqin (Silvan) to administrate a *waqf* (ca. 425/1033). Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf ibn ʿAlī Ibn al-Azraq al-Fāriqī, *Tārīkh al-Fāriqī*, ed. Badawī ʿAbd al-Laṭīf ʿAwaḍ (Cairo, 1959), 164.

⁴⁶Étienne Marc Quatremère, *Histoire des sultans mamlouks de l'Égypte* (Paris, 1845), 1:110–12 (n. 141); Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar Ibn Kathīr, *Al-Bidāyah wa-al-Nihāyah*, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwad and others (Beirut, 2001), 14:206 (744). Ahmet Halil Güneş, *Das kitab ar-raud al-ʿāṭir des Ibn Aiyūb: Damaszener Biographien des 10/16 Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1981), 19; Moshe Sharon, *Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum Palaestinae* (Leiden, 1997–), 3:46–47.

⁴⁷Ibn al-Jazarī, *Tārīkh*, 2:73–74, 197–98, 316–17, 320–21; Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn Jamāʿah al-Ḥamawī, *Taḥrīr al-Aḥkām fī Tadbīr Ahl al-Islām*, ed. Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Munʿim Aḥmad (Qatar, 1988), 93; al-Nuʿaymī, *Al-Dāris fī Tārīkh al-Madāris*, 1:333 (*wa-raʾaytu fī qāʾimah bi-kashf al-awqāf sanata ʿishrin wa-thamānimīʾah*).

⁴⁸Donald P. Little, *A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Haram aš-Šarīf in Jerusalem* (Beirut and Wiesbaden, 1984), index; RCEA 18: 91 (788054), 95–96 (789002).

⁴⁹Ibn al-Jazarī, *Tārīkh*, 2:73–74 (Damascus 725), 196, 197–98 (Damascus 727); Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, 87, 88–89 (Damascus 893).

⁵⁰For a later event, see Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, *Hawādiṭh al-Zamān*, 1:305 (891/1486).



people attempted to use the *awqāf* for their personal benefit.⁵¹

The Mamluk military elite founded a range of institutions, both for the benefit of the religious establishment and the general public. The religious endowments financed their construction and everyday operations. In order to demonstrate the salient presence of the *waqf* and its significant imprint on the landscape, what follows is a list of structures that made the religious endowment a visible phenomenon that cannot be ignored even by historians writing centuries after the fall of the Mamluk sultanate.

Monumental mosques had dotted Syria's map since early Umayyad times. The Frankish and Mongol invasions did not manage to erase the Islamic presence. Thus, when Baybars conquered Damascus and Aleppo, he entered territories that were replete with places where believers could congregate. Yet the victorious sultan and his successors did not refrain from constructing new houses of prayer.

In the closing days of the Mamluk sultanate, a considerable number of mosques adorned the streets of towns and cities of Bilād al-Shām from Gaza in the south⁵² to Aleppo in the north.⁵³ A *waqf* in the coastal town of Tripoli included two villages in central Syria and two orchards near the city, as well as shops and houses. The incomes from these properties paid the personnel that maintained the mosque and readers who prayed. Money was allocated to buy oil, water, bread, candles, and clothes.⁵⁴ Similar examples from Baalbek⁵⁵ and Damascus illustrate the situation.⁵⁶

Mentions of Muslims' visits to sacred tombs in Syria are found in geographical and historical writings going back to the Abbasid period. Following the expulsion of the Crusaders, many new shrines emerged in the territory governed by the Mamluk sultans.⁵⁷ Near the village of Ashdod (Azdoud; Isdud), at the mausoleum of Salmān al-Fārisī, the manumitted Balaban ordered the construction of a mosque (667/1269) and endowed a garden and a water fountain. The memorial inscription concludes with the ominous warning: "cursed be the person who changes or exchanges it."⁵⁸ In Homs, at a mausoleum dedicated to Khālīd ibn al-Walīd, a

⁵¹Ibn al-Jazarī, *Tārīkh*, 2:320–21 (Damascus 729).

⁵²RCEA 13: 68 (4898).

⁵³Gaube, *Arabische Inscripten*, 38 (#60 Qara-Sunqur's mosque built in 757/1356), 55 (#99 Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad's mosque built in 806/1404).

⁵⁴RCEA 16:215–16 (6324=760/1359); al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 1:509–12.

⁵⁵RCEA 12:232 (4748=676/1277).

⁵⁶Ibid., 12:157 (4637), 158 (4638); 13:57–58 (4885), 164 (5034); 14: 190 (5486); Gaube, *Arabische Inscripten*, 93–96 (#178), 100 (#179); Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, 20, 143.

⁵⁷Nimrod Luz, "Aspects of Islamization of Space and Society in Mamluk Jerusalem and its Hinterland," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 6 (2002): 135, 147–48.

⁵⁸RCEA 12:134 (4600). Next to it is the shrine of Sīdī Ibrāhīm al-Matbulī (d. 877/1472). See



long inscription narrates the deeds of Baybars, who is eulogized as the sultan of the Arabs, the Persians, and the Turks.⁵⁹ Baybars undertook a similar initiative in the Jordan valley, where he ordered the foundation of a cupola over the tomb of Abū ‘Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrāḥ. To maintain the mausoleum, the “lord of the Arab and Persian kings” endowed half of the revenues of Dayr Tubin, a settlement in the province of Homs that was in a territory controlled jointly (*munāṣafat*) by the Mamluks and the Franks.⁶⁰ Additional examples are unnecessary.⁶¹

Tombs (*turbah*) constructed by Mamluk army officers in preparation for their own deaths were entirely new types of buildings that emerged in the streets of Syrian towns.⁶² In Ṣafad, Najm al-Dīn Fayrūz (741/1340–41) built a mosque and a tomb, and he endowed half a garden and a bath to maintain the foundation and to pay ten men, among them an imam, a muezzin, a custodian, and readers of Quran and hadith.⁶³ The chamberlain Ak-Turak constructed a mosque and a tomb in Tripoli (760/1359). He endowed two hamlets (*mazrā‘ah*) in the district of Ḥiṣn al-Akrād (Krak des Chevaliers), orchards, shops, a public oven, and a house, together with other buildings. The income from this property provided the salaries of an imam and a muezzin and compensated readers of the Quran and hadith. Sums were also allocated to provide oil, food, water, and clothing.⁶⁴ The story of the Zāhirīyah (Baybars’ tomb in Damascus) is well known: its inscription describes the foundation that the sultan had endowed.⁶⁵

Religious endowments financed a considerable number of educational institutions (madrasah; *maktab*; *dār al-qur’ān*; *dār al-ḥadīth*)⁶⁶ that proliferated throughout Bilād al-Shām. *Awqāf* deeds stipulated the curricula for these schools and colleges. Occasionally, the endowment document arranged for the provision of food and distribution of clothing. In the al-‘Umariyah madrasah, the endowment provided bread and gateaux (*tulmah*). Two clerks were in charge of feeding the five hundred pupils enrolled in this institute. In winter, cooked wheat (*jashishah*) was served in addition to a daily ration of about one thousand loaves of bread. On

Sharon, *Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum Palaestinae*, 1:124–28.

⁵⁹RCEA 12:104–5 (4556, 4557 Homs, Mausoleum of Khālīd ibn al-Walīd 664/1266; two inscriptions), and cf. 13:149 (5011 waqf al-Turbah al-Ṣāliḥīyah).

⁶⁰Ibid., 12:208–9 (4714).

⁶¹Ibid., 13:127 (Tiberias = 4981) and cf. no. 4980.

⁶²Al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 1:478.

⁶³RCEA 15:201–2 (5926).

⁶⁴Ibid., 16:215–16 (6324).

⁶⁵Ibid., 12:229–30 (4743).

⁶⁶Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, “Wathīqat Waqf al-Sultān Qāyṭbāy ‘alā al-Madrasah al-Ashrafiyah wa-Qā‘at al-Ṣilāḥ bi-Dimyāt,” *Al-Majallah al-Tārīkhīyah al-Miṣriyah* 22 (1975): 343–90; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Al-Qalā‘id*, 1:139, 142.



Friday nights, oil and roasted chickpeas (*quḍāmah*) were supplied. During Rajab and Sha‘bān, sweets were provided,⁶⁷ and during the month of Ramaḍān, a dinner was served that included dishes of meat and wheat (*harisah*), sweet rice, and pickled vegetables. In order to facilitate the provision of food, the sultan Qāyṭbāy (1468–96) ordered that Dārayyā, a village close to Damascus, provide sixty sacks of wheat flour. A ten-percent tax levied on farmers in the Lebanon Valley would pay for the sheep. On the 15th of Ramaḍān pastries were distributed, and the same was done on the 27th night (al-Qadar). During the great festival, meat was allocated to the inhabitants. Long underwear was given twice a year and a wool cloak once a year. Each house received a small rug. The *waqf* also paid for a collective circumcision banquet that was celebrated once a year. As a result of al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy’s initiative, a place was set up for readers to recite verses from the Quran and praise the sultan.⁶⁸

Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-Dīn al-Khawājī (d. 847/1443–44) built the al-Dalāmiyah madrasah in the al-Ṣālihiyah quarter of Damascus. The institution was designated as a school for the instruction of the Quran. According to a synopsis of the endowment document, the founder installed an imam to read verses from the Quran and prophetic traditions from *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* and to invoke God in favor of the donor, as well as an administrator who would serve as doorman and muezzin.⁶⁹ The institution accommodated six Sufis who arrived in Damascus from non-Arab lands, and six orphans. The Sufis’ duties included ritual reading from the Quran, and their monthly stipend was 30 dirhams. The orphans received 10 dirhams. They were supervised by a shaykh who was paid 60 dirhams per month. Each Tuesday an instructor came to the school to read select books with them. Each year, money was allocated for the purchase of oil and candles, sweets, and two goats. Once a year each of the orphans was given a cotton gown, a long undershirt, and a kerchief. During the three sacred months of Rajab, Sha‘bān, and Ramaḍān, a reader was paid to read from al-Bukhārī’s hadith collection. After the dawn and evening prayers, the residents of the madrasah could meditate and voice invocations on behalf of the donor.⁷⁰

Some officers endowed schools specifically for orphans (*maktab lil-aytām*). Thus, for example, an inkstand-holder (*dawādār*) who also served as the superintendent

⁶⁷Cf. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, ed. ‘Adnān Darwish (Damascus, 1977–97), 4:263.

⁶⁸Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Al-Qalā‘id*, 1:226–28 (based upon a narrative by Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Maḥāsīn Ibn Mibrad [1436–1503]).

⁶⁹The salary of the first was 120 silver dirhams per month, and that of the second was 100. The endowment inspector earned 60 dirhams per month. The annual salary of a laborer who was in charge of maintenance was 600 dirhams.

⁷⁰Its *kitāb al-waqf* was summarized by al-Nu‘aymī, *Al-Dāris fī Tārīkh al-Madāris*, 1:9–10; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Al-Qalā‘id*, 1:125.



of the al-Yālbughā mosque (in Damascus) ordered the construction of such an institution, declaring that he was following the instructions of his late mother.⁷¹ The list of institutions that housed students, teachers, and Sufis (occasionally under the same roof) is long, and it is not necessary to cite additional cases in order to demonstrate our argument.⁷² We may now turn to look at the various institutions that housed Sufis.⁷³ The occupants of these lodges depended on endowments. Their donors took great pains to specify the distribution of food, clothing, and expenses that the Sufis and their shaykhs were to receive.⁷⁴

The beneficiaries of *awqāf* were not confined to a narrow stratum. The ruling elite profited from the very fact that not all the religious endowments were conferred on professionals such as the jurists and Sufis. Sultans used *awqāf* to strengthen their reputation as impartial rulers. Those *awqāf* designated as institutions open to the general public surely contributed to achieving the goal of fortifying the image of the just sultan (*al-malik al-ʿādil*).⁷⁵ Particularly instrumental were those religious endowments that provided relief services and other care for the needy, such as hospitals. Several sultans and viceroys financed the building and maintenance of hospitals (*bī-māristān*; *māristān*), institutions that were known in Syria prior to the victory at ʿAyn Jālūt (1260).⁷⁶ Yet the development of hospital facilities⁷⁷ in peripheral sites seems to be a new development that occurred after this turning point in the history of Syria. Examples of this development can be seen in remote places such as Gaza,⁷⁸ Ḥiṣn al-Akrād,⁷⁹ and Ḥamāh.⁸⁰

⁷¹Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, 1:137.

⁷²RCEA 11:233 (4350), 249 (4380), 257 (4391); 13:55–56 (4883); 14:102 (5359); 15:115 (*Dār al-Qurʾān* = 5780); Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Al-Qalāʾid*, 1:140, 164, 245–46 (*Dār al-Ḥadīth*).

⁷³Donald P. Little, “The Nature of Khanqahs, Ribats, and Zawiyas under the Mamluks,” in *Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams*, ed. Wael B. Hallaq (Leiden, 1991), 91–106.

⁷⁴RCEA 13:6 (4810), 146–47 (Jerusalem = 5009); İpşirli and Tamimi, *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn*, 44 (Ribāt Qalāwūn al-Manṣūri). Cf. RCEA 11:235 (Ayyubid Aleppo = 4353), 262 (Ayyubid Damascus = 4400).

⁷⁵Şārim al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad ibn Aydamir Ibn Duqmāq al-ʿAlāʾi, *Al-Nafḥah al-Muskiyah fī al-Dawlah al-Turkiyah: min Kitāb al-Thamīn fī Siyar al-Khulafāʾ wa-al-Salāṭīn*, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmuri (Beirut, 1420/1999), 57, 134, 214.

⁷⁶Cf. İpşirli and Tamimi, *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn*, 45–46 (*waqf al-Şālihiyah* in Jerusalem).

⁷⁷“Wathāʾiq Waqf al-Sulṭān Qalāwūn ʿalā al-Bimāristān al-Manṣūri,” in Ḥasan Ibn Ḥabīb, *Tadhkirat al-Nabih fī Ayyām al-Manṣūr wa-Banihi*, ed. Muḥammad Amin (Cairo, 1976): 295–396 (Appendix).

⁷⁸İpşirli and Tamimi, *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn*, 6 (item 13 = the al-Nāşiri *bimāristān*).

⁷⁹RCEA 13:13–14 (4820); 14:139 (5414 = Ḥiṣn al-Akrād 719/1319). Cf. 14:141 (5417).

⁸⁰Ibid., 16:131–32 (6197 = Ḥamāh).



Even wider in scope were those endowments that provided drinking water to passersby. In Cairo, several water fountains (*sabīl*) were built by sultans and commanders. The *waqfiyah* of the endowment founded by the amir Sayf al-Dīn Qarāqujā al-Ḥasanī (d. 853/1449) contains clauses concerning a *sabīl* and payment to a water bearer (*sāqī*).⁸¹ Additional water fountains were constructed in Cairo by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, Barsbāy (in Sūq al-Naḥḥāsīn), Jaqmaq, and Qāyṭbāy (in al-Azhar). In Jerusalem a *sabīl* was incorporated into the Ṭashtamuriyah. Qāyṭbāy restored a *sabīl* in the courtyard of the Dome of the Rock in 887/1482.⁸² This *sabīl* would be used by every Muslim that entered the Ḥaram. The endowment of caravanserais for the benefit of travelers fulfilled a similar social function.⁸³ *Awqāf* also contributed to the general welfare of the Muslim community by financing the construction of bridges, renovation of fortifications and walls, and the ransoming of Muslims held in captivity by pirates (*fakk al-asīr*).⁸⁴

Following this partial list of *awqāf*, we can return to the primary question, i.e., what motivated the Mamluk rulers to donate sizeable properties to finance the construction and maintenance of religious endowments. Although in the following paragraphs the political dimensions of endowment will be emphasized, it should nonetheless be noted that the *waqf* was a complex phenomenon and hence there is no single answer to this question.

Sultans and governors invested considerable resources in buildings, streets, and squares (*maydān*), which helped support their claims to authority over the physical urban landscape. Absentee officers collected duties in goods and cash from villagers and city dwellers, and they funneled this income to support urban facilities.⁸⁵ *Awqāf* incomes were pooled, creating a network that bound farming communities together with the cities.⁸⁶

Moreover, the alienated property did not finance nearby institutions exclusively. The *awqāf* supply lines stretched over thousands of miles. The Mamluks even constructed networks that linked cities and villages in Syria with *awqāf* in Cairo.⁸⁷

⁸¹ Abd al-Laṭīf Ibrāhīm ‘Alī, “Silsilat al-Wathā’iq al-Tārikhiyah al-Qawmiyah,” *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Cairo University* 18 (1956): 203–4 (II. 56–59).

⁸² Michael Hamilton Burgoyne, *Mamluk Jerusalem: An Architectural Study* (London 1987), 470, 606–12.

⁸³ Sharon, *Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum Palaestinae*, 2:232–34.

⁸⁴ Ibn Ṭawq, *Al-Ta’līq*, 1:127, 128 (A.H. 887); Ibn al-Jazarī, *Tārikh*, 2:155 (*waqf*), 192 (a synopsis of a legal decision); al-Balāṭunusī, *Taḥrīr al-Maqāl*, 102–5; al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 2:105.

⁸⁵ Darrāj, *Ḥujjat Waqf al-Ashraf Barsbāy*, 7–8, itemized shops in Damascus that contributed to the support of the founder’s mosque in Cairo.

⁸⁶ Al-Nu‘aymī, *Al-Dāris fī Tārikh al-Madāris*, 1:398–99, 427; al-‘Asalī, *Wathā’iq*, 1:176–80.

⁸⁷ Mayer, *The Buildings of Qayṭbay as Described in His Endowment Deed*, 51 (Khān al-‘Anbari in Damascus); İpşirli and Tamimī, *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn*, 16 (item 54 waqf Qānṣūh),



This apparatus helped create the impression that the sultanate was a unifying force that brought together a vast territory and connected ports, farmland, towns, and cities with the governing centers and the heartland of Islam. The *awqāf* that supported the Islamic sacred territory (the lesser Ḥaramayn) of Jerusalem and Hebron are examples of this.⁸⁸ Numerous endowments supported the al-Aqṣá Mosque and the Patriarchs' tombs. They were run by the *nāẓir al-awqāf*, who was responsible for collecting the incomes and allocating the resources to the personnel who operated these holy shrines, which attracted visitors from afar.

Moreover, Mamluk sultans alienated villages and urban property in Bilād al-Shām and Egypt to support the two holy sites in Arabia (al-Ḥaramayn al-Sharifayn).⁸⁹ A single example should suffice. A long *waqf* deed illustrates the policy of al-Ashraf Shaʿbān towards the Ḥaramayn and his efforts to bolster his image.⁹⁰ To this end the sultan alienated (in 777/1375) villages in Transjordan, Syria, and Palestine, as well as a bath in the vicinity of al-Karak.⁹¹ Shaʿbān's *waqf* was intended to support several foundations: the Kaʿbah in Mecca, the Prophet's tomb in Medina, and the rulers of these cities. In return, the rulers would not tax visitors. The sultan's deed also enumerates the personnel of the endowment and their assignments: six readers would assemble every morning and evening at the Kaʿbah, read chapters from the Quran, and invoke prayers during Shaʿbān. The *waqf* also supported a hadith teacher and ten students in Mecca, four law professors and forty law students, a teacher and ten orphans, an orator who would recite verses extolling the Prophet three times a week, eight individuals who would be in charge of cleaning the shrine, and two water carriers. All the people on the payroll of the *waqf* were to pray to God and appeal to Him to have

41 (53 Īnāl), 52 (90 Barqūq), 90 (10 al-Malik al-Muʿayyad Shaykh), 94 (1 Barqūq); al-Maqrizī, *Al-Sulūk*, 1:796.

⁸⁸ Al-ʿAsalī, *Wathāʿiq*, 2:177–91; Šāliḥiyah, *Sijill Arāḍi Alawiyah Šafad Nābulus Ghazzah wa-Qaḍāʾ al-Ramlah*, 163; and the plentiful references in the Ḥaram documents found in Little, *A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Haram aš-Šarif in Jerusalem*.

⁸⁹ İpşirli and Tamīmī, *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimin fi Filastīn*, 20–21; Šāliḥiyah, *Sijill Arāḍi Alawiyah Šafad Nābulus Ghazzah wa-Qaḍāʾ al-Ramlah*, 115 (*waqf ʿalā zayt al-madinah*).

⁹⁰ Rāshid Saʿd Rāshid Qaḥṭānī, *Awqāf al-Sulṭān al-Ashraf Shaʿbān ʿalā al-Ḥaramayn* (Riyadh, 1414/1994).

⁹¹ The village of Adar in the district of al-Shawbak [Crac de Montréal] (ll. 52–53) and an orchard near Karak (ll. 793–94); the village of Sāskūn in the district of al-Ḥamāh (l. 170); the village of ʿAyn Jārā (alt: ʿAyn Jārah) in Jabal Simʿān (ll. 263–64); the villages of Armanā (ll. 341–43) and Maʿar Hiṭāt (ll. 622–23) in Syria; the villages of Shaykh al-Ḥadid (l. 562), Kūrīn (ll. 701–2) and Ḥilān (ll. 763–64) near Aleppo; the village of Farʿatā (alt: Farʿatah) near Nablus (ll. 357–59); and a ḥammām near Karak (l. 705). Yūsuf Darwīsh Ghawānimah, *Dirāsāt fi Tārīkh al-Urdun wa-Filastīn fi al-ʿAṣr al-Islāmī* (Amman, 1983), 87, 94–100.



mercy on the donor.⁹²

Sultans and viceroys drew on *awqāf* as a tool to influence the territory under their control. The endeavor to transform Crusader settlements into Islamic towns and villages is another aspect of this policy⁹³ and the alienation of property to support covering Bilād al-Shām with Islamic shrines is yet another.⁹⁴ It seems sufficient to name several well-known locations: Waqf Abū Ḥurayrah in Jabneh⁹⁵ and Waqf Nabī Mūsá⁹⁶ in Palestine are two such cases.

A third example is the mausoleum (*mashhad*) of Khālīd ibn al-Walīd in the Syrian city of Homs. The endowment inscription praises Baybars: “the exterminator of the Franks, Armenians and Mongols, the king of the two seas (the Mediterranean and the Red Sea), the holder of Mecca and Jerusalem (*qiblatayn*) and servant of the two sanctuaries,” and notes that the sultan alienated the village of Far‘am in northern Palestine/Israel in perpetuity (664/1266).⁹⁷ By securing sizeable funds in Syria and Egypt for the principal Islamic shrines, the sultans appeared not only as devoted Muslims but also as a unifying force.

In order to demonstrate their power and authority, rulers are inclined to invest considerable resources. The Mamluk ruling elite was no exception. Mamluk governors used *awqāf* to finance the construction of spaces that would embody the regime’s ideology and spread the image of the sultanate as an everlasting, generous, and just power.⁹⁸

⁹²Qaḥṭānī, *Awqāf al-Sultān al-Ashraf Sha‘bān*, ll. 844ff., 880, 891, 899, 915, 927, 943, 953.

⁹³An example of this is an unpublished document (no. 306) in the Jerusalem Ḥaram collection. It is a copy of an endowment document bequeathed by al-Ma‘ālī Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn. The property of this endowment included the al-Burj (castle) district of Beirut. See Huwaydā al-Ḥārithī, ed., *Kitāb Waqf al-Sultān al-Nāṣir Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn* (Beirut, 2001), 3; Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad al-‘Aynī, *‘Iqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn (Cairo, 1987–92), 2:340–41. See in addition to it the inscriptions republished in RCEA 14:136 (5412 719/1319), 137 (5413 719/1319), 139 (5414 719/1319), 141 (5417). Yehoshua Frenkel, “The Impact of the Crusades on the Rural Society and Religious Endowments: The Case of Medieval Syria,” in *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th centuries*, ed. Yaacov Lev (Leiden, 1997), 237–48.

⁹⁴Hana Taragan, “The Tomb of Sayyidna-‘Alī in Arsuf: the Story of a Holy Place,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 14 (2004): 83–102.

⁹⁵İpşirli and Tamīmī, *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimīn fī Filastīn*, 12 (item 35); L. A. Mayer et al., *Some Principal Muslim Religious Buildings in Israel* (Jerusalem, 1950), 20–24; Hana Taragan, “Politics and Aesthetics: Sultan Baybars and the Abū Ḥurayrah/Rabbi Gamliel Building in Yavne,” in *Milestones in the Art and Culture of Egypt*, ed. Asher Ovadia (Tel Aviv, 2000), 117–45; Andrew Petersen, *A Gazetteer of Buildings in Muslim Palestine* (Oxford, 2001), 313–16.

⁹⁶Al-‘Asalī, *Wathā‘iq*, 3:119–21; idem, *Mawsim al-Nabī Mūsá fī Filastīn* (Amman, 1410/1990); İpşirli and Tamīmī, *Awqāf wa-Amlāk al-Muslimīn fī Filastīn*, 32 (item 29).

⁹⁷RCEA 12:128–29 (4593).

⁹⁸Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Al-Qalā‘id*, 1:96.



One example is the inscriptions that the donors had engraved on the walls of their buildings. Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad, who served as director of the chancellery of Bilād al-Shām, instructed the builders of a minaret (in Aleppo 830/1427) to engrave the Quranic verse: “And Say: Praise be to Allāh, Who has not taken unto Himself a son, and Who has no partner in Sovereignty, nor has He any protecting friend through dependence. And magnify Him with all magnificence.” From the early years of Islam, Muslim rulers maintained that this verse contained a sharp criticism of the orthodox interpretation of Jesus’ personality, and they used it to send an anti-Christian message.⁹⁹

Moreover, these structures were not static. *Awqāf* often provided for activities which would contribute to the ongoing religious life in Mamluk towns.¹⁰⁰ Such, for example, is the long account of an event in Damascus in 897/1492. Accompanied by an entourage of jurists, an architect (*mi‘mār*), and other officials, the amir Ibn Manjak went to inspect the tomb of his grandfather. At the site he examined the endowment’s deed and checked the inscription on the wall above the door. The text specified the payments to the imam and to the readers, and it stipulated which reading from the Quran they should recite. In addition, the endowment paid a teacher and ten orphan children who were to meet early in the morning. A reciter would read hadith intermittently during the three sacred months, one year from *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* and the next year from *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. He would conclude the reading on the 27th night (*laylat al-qadar*). During the two Islamic feasts (*‘īd al-fiṭr*; *‘īd al-adḥā*) money would be allocated to buy sweets.¹⁰¹

The governing elite nominated the religious personnel, who belonged to different law schools, to serve together under the same roof. This act sustained their claim that they constituted the cornerstone of the society under their charge.¹⁰² In the madrasah al-Ṣābūniyah, the donor stipulated that his offspring hold the position of the endowment’s supervisor. This official would run the *waqf*’s budget and administration jointly with the chamberlain of Damascus and with the madrasah’s imam. The imam was to be an adherent of the Hanafi school, while the preacher should adhere to the Shafi‘i *madhhab*.¹⁰³

Many of the *waqf* institutions accommodated students of orthodox Islam as well as Sufis. They benefited from the hospitality of lodges that provided them with food and a stipend, in addition to living accommodations. The Tankiziyah in Jerusalem housed a madrasah and a Sufi lodge (*ribāt*). On the ground floor

⁹⁹Gaube, *Arabische Inscriften*, 80 (#151 ll. 1–3, Quran 17:111).

¹⁰⁰Al-Subkī, *Fatāwā*, 2:61–66.

¹⁰¹Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat*, 1:148–50.

¹⁰²Mayer, *The Buildings of Qaytbay as Described in His Endowment Deed*, 60, 64–83.

¹⁰³Al-Nu‘aymī, *Al-Dāris fī Tārīkh al-Madāris*, 1:14, 543, 604.



eleven rooms housed law students (*fuqahā' ḥanaḥīyah*), while an additional eleven rooms on the second floor housed the Sufis. Next to this institution stood a *ribāt* for women.¹⁰⁴

Supplying food for visitors flocking to festivals or other social gatherings helped to establish close relationships between the donor and the crowd. This idea was not foreign to Mamluk sultans, who were keen to strengthen their image as devoted Muslims and their role as lavish hosts. Army commanders used the *awqāf* funds to benefit the religious establishment, as can be inferred from several inscriptions.¹⁰⁵ Many *awqāf* deeds supplemented cash payments with a ration of bread (*khubz*) and occasionally with sweets and even meat. Some endowments provided a salary to a water carrier. Religious endowments seldom paid for the accommodation of visitors who gathered at a mosque, tomb, or other location.¹⁰⁶ In Hebron a local tradition had developed, connecting the practice of hospitality and visitation to Abraham (Khalīl Allāh).¹⁰⁷ Sayf al-Dīn Bulghaq supervised the building of a mill that was alienated to support a hospital, a lodge (*ribāt*), and an ablution room (*ṭahārah*) in the town of Hebron in 706/1307.¹⁰⁸ The amir Ṭaybars provided food for the visitors at the shrine (*simāt*).¹⁰⁹ Sultan Barqūq founded a *waqf* (796/1394) for the same purpose.¹¹⁰

The religious establishment almost unanimously backed the sultanate's *awqāf* policy. One reason for this attitude might have been the very fact that Sufis and jurists were among the greatest beneficiaries of the *awqāf*. Gaining their support was a considerable advantage to the Mamluk officers who attempted to radiate power and attain supremacy. The benefits from *awqāf*, combined with government policies designed to suppress Jews and Christians, enabled the Mamluk ruling elite to win the support of the Muslim religious establishment.

It would seem that the widespread suggestion that *awqāf* were instruments ("tax shelters")¹¹¹ employed by the Mamluk elite in order to protect property from confiscation cannot withstand the numerous reports concerning the seizure and abolition of religious endowments.¹¹² In addition, the argument that the *awqāf*

¹⁰⁴ Al-ʿAsalī, *Wathāʾiq*, 1:109–12.

¹⁰⁵ RCEA 16:84 (6117).

¹⁰⁶ Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufaḥḥat*, 1:148–50 (quoting al-Nuʿaymī on Turbat Manjak).

¹⁰⁷ RCEA 12:257 (4787); 13:95–96 (4943); 14:4 (5205), 22–23 (5236).

¹⁰⁸ Sharon, *Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum Palaestinae*, 1:118–19.

¹⁰⁹ Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ḥawādith*, 1:236.

¹¹⁰ RCEA 18:179 (796001); Sharon, *Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum Palaestinae*, 3:63.

¹¹¹ Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, 32.

¹¹² Al-Munāwī, *Kitāb Taysīr al-Wuqūf*, 1:194, 196; Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 2:163 (908); Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Ḥawādith Dimashq al-Yawmīyah*, 106. Al-Nuʿaymī composed his collection to commemorate those *awqāf* in Damascus that were in danger of being destroyed or confiscated; see *Al-Dāris fi*



were used to circumvent the Islamic inheritance law cannot be accepted as an adequate rationalization for the foundation of numerous institutions by rulers and army commanders.

The political reasoning presented above can provide better answers to the primary question of the motives that drove the governing Mamluk elite to endow such considerable resources. The religious endowments provided them with property through which to express their ideology. These *awqāf* were useful tools that a sultan could utilize in his efforts to present himself as the embodiment of the ideal Muslim ruler.

The alienation of urban and rural property to finance the *awqāf*, and the networks used to collect their proceeds, functioned alongside government tax collectors as a parallel system of revenue extraction. Using income from farmland, the Mamluks boosted their image as devoted Muslims and protectors of social harmony. Thus the sultanate surrounded the harsh reality of levies and corvée with the image of religious propriety. They were able to utilize *awqāf* assets as a tool in their efforts to overcome conflicts.

Endowing institutions, supplying food, and distributing gifts were among the most powerful tools at the Mamluks' disposal in their difficult quest to gain support and recognition. Obtaining the political support of the religious establishment was a crucial component in the sultans' endeavor to gain social acknowledgment and approval. By becoming generous donors, they were able to maintain control over social and religious practices and thus preserve their dominant position in society.

In a political system that distanced the second Mamluk generation (*awlād al-nās*) from the dominating central positions of the sultanate, the establishment of religious endowments gave the Mamluk elite a powerful mechanism to help them preserve their fame and memory. Within the buildings financed by the *awqāf*, worshippers, most of them men of religion, raised their voices in the invocation of God (*du'ā'*) to protect the donors. Their prayers signaled that they shared with the rulers a vision of *awqāf* as the physical representation of sultanic ideology.

Tārīkh al-Madāris, 1:3, 5; Abū Ghāzī, *Fī Tārīkh Miṣr al-Ijtimā'ī*, 79.



Book Reviews

LI GUO, *Commerce, Culture, and Community in a Red Sea Port in the Thirteenth Century: The Arabic Documents from Quseir* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004). Pp. xx + 334.

REVIEWED BY FRÉDÉRIC BAUDEN, Université de Liège

Our knowledge of the Red Sea trade, and consequently of the Indian Ocean trade, in the pre-modern period is hardly satisfactory. The main reason does not lie so much in the paucity of the data, provided either by historical sources or primary documents, as in the neglect of these sources. Until very recently, the documents of the Cairo Genizah had barely been studied from the point of view of maritime trade, though some scholars realized the importance of this source for this purpose.¹ The situation has changed since the appearance of Roxani Eleni Margariti's revised doctoral dissertation submitted at Princeton in 2002 (*Aden and the Indian Ocean Trade: 150 Years in the Life of a Medieval Port* [University of North Carolina Press, 2007]). As for historical sources, there is no doubt that the forthcoming publication of É. Vallet's doctoral dissertation on power, commerce, and merchants in Yemen during the Rasulid period (thirteenth–fifteenth centuries) will improve our understanding of trade in the region, too.²

The book under review expands our knowledge of this history, as it unveils a significant, though anecdotal, part of the history of Red Sea trade in the early thirteenth century on the basis of previously unpublished documents. These documents, mostly scraps of paper, were brought to light by the excavations carried out by the University of Chicago in 1982 in the Islamic residential complex of the site of Quseir (Qūṣayr al-qadīm), a port later abandoned when ʿAydḥāb

¹ Apart from Goitein's masterpiece, one can cite his articles entitled "From the Mediterranean to India: Documents on the Trade to India, South Arabia, and East Africa from the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries," *Saeculum* 29 (1954): 181–97; "Arabic Documents on the Trade Between India and the Mediterranean Countries (11th and 12th centuries)," in *Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth International Congress of Orientalists* (New Delhi, 1970), 251–56; "From Aden to India: Specimens of the Correspondence of India Traders of the Twelfth Century," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 23 (1980): 43–66. Also worth a mention is the following study: H. M. Rabie, "Al-Baḥr al-Aḥmar fī al-ʿAṣr al-Ayyūbī," in *Al-Baḥr al-Aḥmar fī al-Tārīkh wa-al-Siyāsah al-Duwalīyah al-Muʿāṣirah* (Cairo, 1979), 105–23.

² A major source for the study of trade in this period started to appear in 2003: *Nūr al-Maʿārif fī Nuṣūṣ wa-Qawānīn wa-Aʿrāf al-Yaman fī al-ʿAhd al-Muṣaffar al-Wārif*, crit. ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Jāzīm (Sanaa, 2003–5), 2 vols.



superseded it. The documents were discovered in what appeared to be a merchant's house, whose name, Abū Mufarrij, is found in several of them. The dates provided by a small number of documents confirm that his business was active during the first half of the thirteenth century (earliest document dated 612/1215, latest dated 633/1235), a fact substantiated by the numismatic findings. The excavated house proved to be a warehouse (*shūnah*) which also served as a residence for the family. Should we recognize in this discovery a genizah, as Mark Cohen recently suggested?³ In his view, the archive, together with other material not necessarily connected with the family (official documents, religious texts, charms), was probably saved from oblivion for the same reason that led to the preservation of tens of thousands of fragments in the Cairo Genizah and other genizah-like findings in the Islamic tradition (the documents of the Ḥaram in Jerusalem, the fragments of Quranic manuscripts in the Great Mosque in Sanaa, the documents of the Great Mosque in Damascus): to preserve honorably fragments of the Quran, in the first place, and secondarily documents. These would have been placed in the attic of the shaykh's house and were scattered everywhere in the room when the building collapsed. Though this is a tempting explanation, it fails to address other problems. Guo does not consider the possibility that this cache was a genizah, as he speaks of clearly discarded trash which had not been deliberately kept and was in a state of disorder, and he even notices that a letter seemed to have been "kneaded into a ball and then tossed in [a] trash bin" (p. 158). In another case, an account was found torn into several pieces (p. 41). The main characteristic of the Cairo Genizah is that manuscripts and documents, sometimes even personal archives, were placed in a specific room over quite a long period. If the shaykh's house was used in this way, how can we explain that other documents were found thanks to later excavations in another place not connected with this building and identified as a *sibākh* (organic refuse)?⁴ As the archeologists put it, "no significant difference in date or character of the deposits was noted between the material from within and outside the structure, or between different levels within the deposit. This suggests that the *sebakh* is not representative of *in situ* activity but rather accumulated through the deliberate dumping or redepositing of refuse from other parts of the Islamic town."⁵ If genizah-like practices were current in Quṣayr al-qadīm, there is no reason that they would not have been applied to

³ Mark Cohen, "Geniza for Islamicists, Islamic Geniza, and the 'New Cairo Geniza,'" *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 7 (2006): 129–45, 138.

⁴ The University of Southampton carried out excavations from 1999 to 2003 (see <http://www.arch.soton.ac.uk/Projects/default.asp?ProjectID=20>). Anne Regourd is in charge of the study of the Arabic documents that surfaced during this new campaign of digging (see <http://www.rqad.leeds.ac.uk/>).

⁵ See the interim report for 2003, trench 13 at the website indicated above.



other documents such as those uncovered in trench 13, for instance. At other sites in Egypt, too, documents have been found in layers that looked like refuse. On the other hand, it is known that the recycling of paper documents was a common occurrence.⁶

The book is divided in two sections. The first one is devoted to the study of the material deciphered in the second section. Guo succeeds in making the most of scraps of paper hardly decipherable not so much because of the nature of the handwriting, but rather because of the poor state of preservation. The author manages to reconstruct the social milieu revolving around the shaykh, Abū Mufarrij (chapter I), including his family (as it seems that Abū Mufarrij's business later became a family business, with one of his sons deeply involved), the company and its employees as well as its associates, and all the other categories of persons dealing with the house (clients, suppliers, buyers, but also officials, given that documents issued by this category surfaced together with the collection of business papers). Guo asks why official documents are found among the private business documents: he suggests that Abū Mufarrij's warehouse probably served as a postal address for the official documents or that he acted as a government agent. If so, why were these official documents unearthed in his house if he was supposed to transmit them to the authorities or other recipients? Guo does not answer this question. It might be that some of these official papers were intended for reuse of the blank verso, but in the end they were not.⁷

Chapter II is devoted to the economic problems raised by the business letters, accounts, and the like. The documents provide important data about the metrology in use in this remote part of the Muslim world which barely attracted the attention of medieval historians. As such, it is an incomparable source for the study of weights and measures in the Red Sea: similar data available for the holy cities provide an interesting comparison.⁸ Importantly, the author also succeeds in demonstrating that the Quseir economy was first and foremost a credit one based on paper. This is not a surprise, rather it confirms a situation prevailing in the Near East at this time.

⁶ Either reused for the blank parts or recycled to produce new paper. See on this Jonathan M. Bloom, *Paper before Print* (New Haven, 2001), 76.

⁷ For the reuse of some of the documents, see p. 110. Anne Regourd found, among the papers excavated at Quseir by the University of Southampton, a death certificate which was reused on the back to write a letter. See her article to appear in the proceedings of the Third Conference of the International Society for Arabic Papyrology held in Alexandria in 2006. This practice is also confirmed in other cases (documents of the Cairo Genizah or those excavated in Fustat).

⁸ Since Guo's study was published, a book devoted to economic life in the Hejaz during the Mamluk period has appeared: Muḥammad Maḥmūd Anāqirah, *Al-Ḥayāh al-Iqtisādiyyah fī al-Ḥijāz fī 'Aṣr Dawlat al-Mamālīk, 648–923 h., 1250–1517 m.* (Riyadh, 2006).



Among the documents excavated, some were obviously not connected to business: sermons, prayers, block-printed amulets, magical texts, and astrological dials (chapter III). These improve our knowledge of popular culture in such a remote place. A major question is: are these documents related to the business ones and, consequently, with Abū Mufarrij? If we consider that they were unearthed in the shaykh's house and that the business section belonged to Abū Mufarrij, we should, as the author did, regard them as part of the family business. As Guo noticed (p. 84), Abū Mufarrij's son, Ibrāhīm, is described as a *khaṭīb* in a document, and it is probable that the sermons and the like are to be seen as connected to this activity. The block-printed amulets constitute another group (12 fragments) of highly attractive materials. Considered as a link between Chinese and European printing activities, the block-printed texts raise more questions than they answer. A thorough study of all the specimens preserved in various collections around the world could provide a good starting point. Those found in American and European institutions have recently been published.⁹ Thanks to those studied by Guo in his book, there only remain those held in Middle Eastern collections (mainly Egypt) to be analyzed. The Quseir items corroborate that block-printed texts were spread throughout the Near East.

The second part of the book contains the decipherment and philological commentary on the documents. In this part, a selection of business letters, accounts, shipping notes, funeral texts, and amulets are published. These 84 fragments were selected from among several thousand (the exact number is not provided, see p. 104) for their interest and their state of preservation. This does not mean, however, that Guo neglects to analyze in the first part of the book those documents he decided not to publish in this second part. This part is introduced by chapter IV, which deals with the material analysis. Guo provides detailed remarks on the handwriting, including a paleographical study, a survey of the abbreviations and logograms (a particular case remains unsolved, see pp. 111–12), and of the numerals. As for language, most of the items published were written in a type of language that is now referred to as Middle Arabic (in this case, Muslim Middle Arabic), though this designation is not universally accepted.¹⁰ Truly, most of these texts feature several traits generally noticed in modern dialects and found in many documents dated to the medieval period. Guo gives an exhaustive list of the linguistic characteristics of the documents studied and usually compares them to similar features noted in the scientific literature.

The edited texts (chapter V) are organized according to the typology established by the author (pp. 101–5). Guo was not content with only studying photographs

⁹ See Karl R. Schaefer, *Enigmatic Charms: Medieval Arabic Block Printed Amulets in American and European Libraries and Museums* (Leiden and Boston, 2006).

¹⁰ See, for instance, P. Larcher, "Moyen arabe et arabe moyen," *Arabica* 48 (2001): 578–609.



of the documents: he paid a visit to the Islamic Museum, where they are now kept. Scrutiny of the actual documents made it possible for him to describe precisely the writing material (color of the paper, dimensions, actual state, and color of the ink). Each document is introduced by a summary of its contents, then the text and the translation are provided together with a commentary on the words that require clarification or those with dubious meaning. Given the state of these fragments and the cursive script with which they were written, the author is to be praised for the result he managed to achieve. The reader must realize that a fragmentary text is in itself difficult to decipher because some parts, decisive for its understanding, may be missing. In this particular case, the difficulty is magnified by the nature of the texts, the language used, and the type of script. If a criticism has to be made, it should regard the fact that the documents edited are not reproduced. Of course, this may well be due to a decision by the publisher rather than the editor. Although four plates display some examples, the reproduced documents are so small that one can hardly compare the edited text with these photographs. Under these circumstances, the reader will have to take the edited text for granted. Fortunately, in the meantime, the documents have been introduced in the Arabic Papyrology Database, and some readings have been improved because the editors had access to scans of the documents. Consequently, the edition must now be read in conjunction with the website.¹¹

To conclude, answers to the many questions these documents pose obviously remain conjectural due to the fragmentary state of this “archive,” but the result is a convincing reconstruction of the activities of a family business at the dawn of the thirteenth century. Given the challenge presented by the Quseir fragments, Guo must be commended for the tremendous work he has accomplished on these scraps of paper. His book is indispensable for all those interested in economic and social history, Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade, numismatics, diplomatics, and documents.

¹¹ <http://orientw.uzh.ch/apd/project.jsp>. Select “papyri” and on the page that appears, scroll down (“choose an edition”) to “P.QuseirArab.”



‘ABD AL-RAḤMĀN MUDAYRIS AL-MUDAYRIS, *Al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah fī al-‘Aṣr al-Mamlūkī (648–923 H./1250–1517 M.): Dirāsah Tārīkhīyah* (Riyadh: Markaz al-Malik Fayṣal lil-Buḥūth wa-al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah, 2001/1422). Pp. 438.

REVIEWED BY JOHN L. MELOY, American University of Beirut

This book is not so much a historical study of Medina during the Mamluk period as it is a compendium of information on five aspects of the city gathered from primary sources. Readers interested in a new take on Medina or the Hijaz in the Mamluk period will not find it here. Al-Mudayris’s overall approach is based on the received view that Mamluk power was the only effective force in the region, operating through direct control of Mecca.

Al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah seems to have been assembled according to a prescribed notion of what is necessary for a book to contain. Al-Mudayris divides his material into five chapters covering the fields of politics, economics, society, religion, and scholarship. These are systematically subdivided into descriptive subcategories. He rarely refers to secondary literature of any kind; the bibliography includes secondary works, mostly in Arabic along with two articles in English by Richard Mortel. The work includes a number of appendices, including three documents transcribed from al-Qalqashandī’s *Ṣubḥ al-A‘shā*; these are only briefly cited in the text, and they are not annotated. The author’s including them seems to be simply because they are there. An unfortunate consequence of al-Mudayris’s method is that connections between these various fields are overlooked or neglected. He does, briefly, acknowledge the importance of the connection between politics and economics (p. 106), but readers who are interested in the relationships of any of these areas will have to undertake their own analysis.

Given the author’s approach and method, some of his conclusions are predictable. His view is that the political history of indigenous rulers of Medina is one of contention and weakness which allowed the Mamluks to dominate the region. The economy of the city was overshadowed by the florescence of Jedda, which is attributable to the Mamluks. Religious practice in the city shifted from Shi‘ism to Sunnism as a result of Mamluk control, a topic discussed by Mortel. Some conclusions lack support. The author claims that the city’s “social structure” underwent transformation as a result of the influx of scholars who settled in Medina. It is not clear that this trend started only in the second half of the thirteenth century, and the transformative impact of foreign *mujāwirūn* on local society is not altogether clear. Scholarly production increased and had an impact on the wider Islamic world; neither assertion is adequately proven.

Nevertheless, readers may find value in some of the book’s descriptive information. While the chapters on politics and economics do not offer much new,



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there are sections on somewhat unusual topics, such as marriage ties, customs and traditions, and even food, which may be useful to some researchers. The author's unwillingness to tackle the significance of any of the data may irritate the reader, along with the occasional judgmental comment about "bad" cultural practices, like the use of talismans (p. 158). Overall, *Al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah* is not particularly illuminating, but the selective reader may derive some value from parts of it.

JON HOOVER, *Ibn Taymiyya's Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism*. Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Science, vol. 73 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007). Pp. xii + 276.

REVIEWED BY CATERINA BORI

This book is devoted to a specific theological topic, that of theodicy. Theodicy is that branch of theology that elaborates on divine justice and seeks to explain the existence of evil in relation to it. The opening question is: where does Ibn Taymiyah stand between the two main trends of Islamic theology concerning the relationship between evil and divine justice? These two trends are the so-called free will tradition, as represented by Mu'tazilī *kalām*, and the optimistic tradition, exemplified mainly by Ibn Sīnā. Jon Hoover's detailed and competent analysis of Ibn Taymiyah's writings leads to the conclusion that, while on the specific problem of evil Ibn Taymiyah is to be set along the optimistic trend of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā, his very original image of a dynamic and perpetually active God sets him apart both from the *mutakallimūn* and the philosophers' idea of God's perfection in its unchanging and timeless essence. This analysis emerges from Chapter 2, which focuses on Ibn Taymiyah's elaboration of God's wise purpose (*ḥikmah*) while preserving his self-sufficiency. Hoover examines Ibn Taymiyah's argument for the rationality of God's acts, demonstrating how he distanced himself from the Ash'arī denial of God's wise purpose in creation, from the Mu'tazilī disassociation of any wise purpose from God (*al-ḥikmah al-maṭlūbah munfaṣilah 'anhu*), and from Ibn Sīnā's stress on God's strong self-referentiality that finds its utmost expression in creation by emanation and in the eternity of the world. The unique idea of God's perpetual dynamism in acting and willing (already discussed by Hoover in two important articles) shapes a personal and "close" image of God that can be seen to set aside Ibn Taymiyah from the previous traditions.¹

¹ It may be noted that at p. 79 (a quote from Ibn Taymiyah's *Majmū'āt al-Fatāwā*, ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim and Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad [Cairo, n.d.], 8:84), it would be more appropriate to translate *maḥdhūrān* as "two things to be afraid of or to be



If things are so, Ibn Taymiyah then needs to explain how it is possible to maintain human accountability. This is the subject of Chapters 3 and 4. Hoover opens here with a commentary on a passage of the *Tadmuriyah* that presents a three-fold typology of human error in relation to the issue of compatibility between God's creation (of all human acts: *khalq*) and his command (*amr*), the former corresponding to God's decree (*al-qadā' wa-al-qadar*) and the latter to the revealed law (*al-shar'*). He examines the "polemical" labels (p. 106) Ibn Taymiyah exploits to outline the error of these groups and notes the "oddity" (p. 112) of grouping together as *mushrikūn* Jahmīs, Jabrīs, Ash'arīs, and antinomian mystics.

More could have been said in this regard. The topic is intriguing and the linguistic choices of Ibn Taymiyah reveal much of his originality and deserve further investigation. *Mushrik* is primarily the person who associates other beings with God as objects of worship or prayer. Next, *mushrik* is commonly taken to be an idolater (one who worships an *eidos*, literally an image [of God]), although the Arabic root (*sh.r.k*) is not semantically equivalent to that of idolatry. Yet, as Gerald Hawting has recently shown, both Muslim tradition (outside the Quran) and the secondary literature generally identify *mushrikūn* as idolaters/polytheists, whereas in the Quran the *mushrikūn* are presented as "imperfect monotheists."² Ibn Taymiyah proposes a strikingly similar view to this Quranic conception of *shirk*. In fact, here and elsewhere he takes the *mushrikūn* to represent those whose monotheistic faith is incomplete.³ One has the impression that Ibn Taymiyah deploys a targeted communicational strategy here. On the one hand, he draws upon Quranic terminology for the labels of the three erring groups (*Majūs*, *Mushrik*, *Iblīs*). On the other, he bends the original meaning of these words to serve his own needs and understanding of their error. Thus, his personal interpretation shapes three collective categories which are closely connected to scriptural language. Seen in this way, the "oddity" (p. 112) Hoover perceives in Ibn Taymiyah's

avoided," rather than "two prohibited things."

² Gerald Hawting, *The Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam: From Polemic to History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). The expression "imperfect monotheists" is taken from Gerald Hawting, "Idolatry and Idolater," *The Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān* 2:478.

³ See for instance, *Majmū'āt al-Fatāwā*, 10:264-65: the *mushrikūn* among the Arabs were those who professed the *tawḥīd al-rubūbiyah* (the uniqueness of God's lordship), but not the *tawḥīd al-ulūhiyah* (the uniqueness of God's divinity). They did not fully accept Muhammad's message and the priority of joining both the confessional and practical dimension of the proclamation of God's uniqueness (*wa-lā yajma'ūna bayna al-tawḥīd al-qawli wa-al-tawḥīd al-'amali*). In fact, they did not deny that God was the Creator, but "together with their recognition that Allah is the only Creator, they used to consider other Gods together with Him." Also translated by Yahya Michot, "La Foi et l'Amour: du *tawḥīd* théorique à sa mise en œuvre effective," *Textes Spirituels* VI, in *Le Musulman* 19 (Paris, 1992): 11-12.



grouping of *mushrikūn* is perhaps not so odd. Each of the three rubrics is both broad enough and clearly enough defined to embrace different theological stances with regard to the issue of compatibility between *khalq* and *amr*. Ibn Taymīyah's criterion is not that of the classical theological approaches to the problem of evil, but is strictly related to the strong ethical concern of neglecting God's command. Thus, the *mushrikūn* equally comprise Jahmīs, Jabrīs, Ash'arīs (i.e., al-Rāzī) and antinomian Sufis. Their common denominator is their disregard towards the commanded aspect of divine creation (i.e., the law) by stressing the compulsion of God's will. They are incomplete in their *īmān*. While Hoover identifies their determinism as the common element characterizing their imperfect faith (pp. 12 and 114), he fails to highlight properly the ethical outlook that drives Ibn Taymīyah's categorization and his understanding of Islamic history and tradition that underpins the choice of his labels. This is all the more relevant considering that in the first chapter the author outlines Ibn Taymīyah primarily as a jurist even in his theological discourse. Thus, these people's dismissal of God's *amr* and their consequent nullification of the value of *sharʿ* are for Ibn Taymīyah a major concern and explain why the *mutaṣawwifāh*, in their claim of attaining Reality (*al-ḥaqīqah*) are classified under this label. For the same reason, elsewhere Ibn Taymīyah violently attacks the epistemological validity of Aristotelian logic as a means of attaining metaphysical knowledge. As Wael B. Hallaq has rightly remarked, Ibn Taymīyah's final preoccupation is that of destroying the metaphysical foundation of speculative mysticism that nullifies the distinction between Commander and commanded, hence the value of the law. Hoover could usefully have used Hallaq's analysis in order to clarify Ibn Taymīyah's thinking on this point.

The second part of Chapter 3 tackles the causes of error and shows Ibn Taymīyah's concern with balancing out "creation" and "command." Hoover usefully familiarizes the reader with the key terminological accord between *khalq* and *amr* by which Ibn Taymīyah often describes these two branches of God's activity. He also illustrates Ibn Taymīyah's failure in elaborating a full argument for the compatibility between the two.

Chapter 4 examines the problem of human acts. Here Hoover exploits Western philosophical categories, moving away from previous interpretations of Ibn Taymīyah's thought on this issue by Laoust, Makari, and Gimaret. He classifies the Hanbali theologian as a "soft determinist" or a "compatibilist," that is, as admitting human choice within the framework of a strong determinism. Given the importance of al-Rāzī for the understanding of Ibn Taymīyah's doctrine, one would have expected the author to have made direct use of Rāzīyan texts rather than relying upon those quoted by Gimaret. A slip occurs at p. 170, where the



Sunnah of Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 311/923) is quoted as no longer extant, whereas it has recently been published.⁴

The final two chapters get to the heart of the theodicean problem, and they deal respectively with evil and divine justice. What does Ibn Taymīyah make of evil? Hoover's attention to this issue is substantially new in the field of Taymīyan scholarship. In trying to make sense of the existence of evil, Ibn Taymīyah is shown to have echoed a series of Avicennan optimistic solutions, while embarking upon an edifying and spiritual understanding of evil's wise purpose that draws him close to Sufi and Mu'tazilī ideas. The other side of the coin is divine justice. Ibn Taymīyah confronts the two extremes (Mu'tazilī free-will theodicy and Ash'arī voluntarism), setting himself apart by connecting divine justice to God's wise purpose and accepting Ibn Sīnā's optimism through al-Ghazālī's "best of all possible worlds." This analysis is especially interesting because it shows the connection of Ibn Taymīyah to the "optimism" of al-Ghazālī (and Ibn 'Arabī). It is a shame, however, that Hoover did not take this further and attempt a more detailed explanation of the reasons for the *shaykh al-islām*'s ambivalent attitude towards al-Ghazālī's dictum. This may have thrown further light on the development of the shaykh's thought on the issue and on his relationship with his own sources. Another important issue—beyond the scope of the book but interesting for future research—is that of Ibn Taymīyah's (or Ibn 'Arabī's?) contribution to the acceptance of al-Ghazālī's dictum from the fourteenth century onwards. This will give an idea of the impact of some Taymīyan ideas on the surrounding intellectual *milieux*.

From this book, Ibn Taymīyah emerges as a literalist theologian drawing upon elements of Islamic philosophy in order to provide a further rationale for revealed knowledge. By doing so, he produced a highly original synthesis of Islamic tradition that in terms of methodology aimed at keeping together reason and revelation, and in terms of ethics sought to guide the believer towards the right path to God. Hoover has done a good job in highlighting two key elements in Ibn Taymīyah's theory of God's acts and the Taymīyan way of talking about God: God's wise purpose and "the highest similitude." Both recur throughout the book and will hopefully be useful interpretative tools for further research. The purpose of the book is to shed new light on Ibn Taymīyah's theodicy through an analysis of the shaykh's own arguments and by contextualizing his thought in the main trends of Islamic philosophy and theology. While the first is fully accomplished, the second is less thoroughly achieved (the author is aware of this: see pp. 4 and 237). That said, Hoover has offered the reader a solid intellectual framework in which to set the topic of theodicy and has provided a stimulus for further research. A more

⁴ Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Khallāl, *Al-Sunnah*, 5 vols., ed. 'Aṭīyah ibn 'Atīq al-Zahrānī (Riyadh: Dār al-Rāyah, 1995).



complete appreciation of Ibn Taymīyah's originality as a theologian will emerge not only by exploring his appropriation of the doctrines of previous thinkers, but also by considering what the Hanbalis of his time were writing, studying, and discussing, as well as their position on the theological issues that animated late thirteenth- and fourteenth-century traditionalist circles.

That criticism aside, Hoover's book is the first in a Western language solely devoted to Taymīyan theology. While Chapters 2 to 6 will be of interest mainly to the specialist in theology, Chapter 1 provides an excellent grid of interpretation for the scholar interested in any of Ibn Taymīyah's fields of knowledge. It is an attempt to define the authentic quality of Taymīyan scholarship and activism. The latter is an aspect that deserves more consideration, not as something that dictates the shaykh's ideology, as Hoover rightly points out (p. 24), but as a concrete expression of a system where not only theology and jurisprudence but also action are intimately intertwined. Hoover's definition of Ibn Taymīyah's theology as a theological *fiqh* is penetrating.⁵ It implies that *fiqh* is inclusive of theology and that Ibn Taymīyah's scholarship is to be seen as jurisprudential even when he is deeply preoccupied with specific theological questions. In this regard, it will be important to further investigate the shaykh's legal writings with attention to his views on theology in a non-theological context. By itself, this definition calls for a more vigilant interest in Ibn Taymīyah's engagement in the affairs of the society in which he lived.

As a framework in which to set Ibn Taymīyah's discourse on theodicy, Hoover's book represents an important contribution towards the understanding of the meaning of Ibn Taymīyah's scholarship. In a consistent and informative way, Hoover builds on the work of Yahya Michot in challenging the established idea of Ibn Taymīyah's strict traditionalism. In doing so, he does justice to the complexity of one of the most important thinkers in the Islamic tradition. By making available in a single volume a broad spectrum of hitherto underutilized sources, it paves the way for a new understanding of Taymīyan theodicy and related issues.

⁵ It should be read in conjunction with Yossef Rapoport's contribution on Ibn Taymīyah's legal thought, which also draws attention to the deep correspondence between theology and *fiqh*: Yossef Rapoport, "Ibn Taymiyya's radical legal thought: Rationalism, pluralism and the primacy of intention," in *Ibn Taymiyya and his Times*, ed. Shahab Ahmad and Yossef Rapoport (forthcoming, Karachi: Oxford University Press).



SAMI G. MASSOUD, *The Chronicles and Annalistic Sources of the Early Mamluk Circassian Period* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007). Pp. 477 + xii.

REVIEWED BY PAULINA B. LEWICKA

The corpus of annalistic literature dating back to the Circassian, or Burji, Mamluk period includes over seventeen titles, most of which constitute fundamental source material for all kinds of researchers dealing with the Mamluk epoch. As such, these sources—and particularly their published majority—are constantly read, re-read, reconsidered, and referenced. Oddly enough, until now we have had at our disposal only fragmentary studies discussing this corpus from a historiographical point of view. The research undertaken by Sami Massoud is, to use his own words, a result of his endeavor to “fill this lacuna,” by which he means establishing “the value of the Burji historical works in their own right [and] in relation to one another” (p. 6). Indeed, Massoud’s *Chronicles and Annalistic Sources* is the first comprehensive critical analysis of the works written by the historians and chroniclers of the Burji Mamluk era.

In order to realize his objectives, Massoud applied, “albeit with some modifications,” the methodology pioneered by Donald P. Little in his study of the sources for the reign of al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn. In practical terms, this means that Massoud’s method, which he calls a “micro” approach to historiography, consists of word-by-word comparisons of individual accounts of particular events as recorded in chronicles and annalistic sources of the epoch. Indeed, there is probably no other way to detect the inter-relatedness and interdependence of the sources, identify borrowings, discover the original contribution of each historian, and explore the genesis and scope of reports and their impact on the construction of the narrative. By applying this textual collation in order to analyze his sources, Massoud also intended to provide “a detailed understanding of the events of a given year.” This avowed intention might appear to be a gesture towards the limited circle of readers interested in the details of the developments of 778, 793, and 804 A.H. However, this is not the case: by providing a detailed understanding of particular events, Massoud wants to make it possible for “modern historians to revisit, reevaluate, and reconsider historical data” (p. 7).

Has Massoud achieved what he planned? The essential part of *Chronicles and Annalistic Sources* consists of three chapters, each of them devoted to a discussion of records relating to one historical annal. The choice of each of the three annals subjected to source analysis was not made at random. Chapter one deals with the annal of 778/1376-77, which was a year of mamluk rebellions against, and subsequent murder of, the sultan al-Ashraf Shaḥbān. It seems the annal was chosen by Massoud because the events surrounding the sultan’s murder permeate all the



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narratives about the year 778 produced by authors over the next century and beyond. The year 793/1390–91, to which chapter two is devoted, was the year of the “aftershock” of Barqūq’s overthrow and his return to rule, as well as the year in which he consolidated his power. As Massoud observes, it would have probably been more interesting to study the accounts of the disturbances that accompanied Barqūq’s resumption of power at the turn of 791 and in the early part of 792. Due to their multitude and diversity, however, analyzing the events and records of either of these years would have been too demanding to reach satisfactory conclusions. One of the reasons, therefore, why the annal of the year 793/1390–91 was subjected to analysis was simply that it was less complicated than the previous two. The third annal analyzed by Massoud, that of 804/1401–2, does not relate to any particular political or social event. From a historical point of view, the records making up this annal reflect, on the one hand, the ongoing strife within the Mamluk governing circles in Syria, and on the other, they echo the aftermath of the devastation which Syria suffered as a result of Tamerlane’s incursion of 803/1400. From a historiographical point of view, the year 804/1401–2 represents, as Massoud puts it, “the end of a historiographical cycle” (p. 8), by which he means that the works of three authors who witnessed the emergence of the Circassian sultanate as mature historians conclude just before 804/1401–2. At the same time, the year 804 heralded the beginning of a new generation of self-conscious historians who were old enough to comprehend and record the events of their day. As such, the year 804 is, according to Massoud, pivotal from both historical and historiographical points of view, which apparently was the reason why he subjected it to analysis.

Within each chapter, the analysis of records related to a given annal is preceded by a concise presentation of crucial developments which took place in the year discussed. In each of the three chapters, the examined sources are divided into two main categories: the works of authors whose lives coincided with the events reported in a given annal, and the works of later historians. Each of these two categories is further subdivided into a section devoted to Egyptian historians and a section devoted to Syrian historians. In turn, each of these sections consists of subsections discussing individual historians and their works, many of which are still available only in manuscript form. Generally, the historians are introduced into the text according to their year of birth. The analysis of accounts written by a given historian is preceded by a concise presentation of his biography.

For example, in chapter three, in which the annal of 804/1401–2 is studied, first the appropriate accounts of contemporary Egyptian historians are discussed. The list includes Ibn Duqmāq, al-ʿAynī, al-Maqrīzī, and al-ʿAsqalānī. The analysis of their works is followed by an examination of accounts written by contemporary Syrian authors. In this case, the appropriate section includes the analysis of *Tārīkh*



Ibn Ḥijjī. Analogically, the subchapter dealing with “Later historians” includes a section on “Egyptian historians,” and the list includes Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Ṣayrafī, al-Malaṭī, Ibn Iyās, and an anonymous author of a chronicle entitled *Jawāhir al-Sulūk fī al-Khulafāʾ wa-al-Mulūk*. In the section devoted to later Syrian historians, Massoud examines the accounts written by Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah. As in the case of two previous chapters, chapter three ends with brief comments on “minor historians.”

These three analytical chapters are followed by three appendices, one appendix supplementing each of the chapters. Generally speaking, these appendices include the English rendering of the individual reports which were subjected to analysis in the preceding chapters; each of the three appendices consists of entries referencing reports mentioned in the analysis. Each entry is numbered and organized according to four categories (political/military/administrative affairs, religious life, social history/ miscellany, and foreign affairs) and then identified by the abbreviation of its author’s name. As a result, the reader can easily check the text of the reports referred to in the study, as well as find their location in the sources.

Due to its very particular nature, a study based on a word-by-word analysis of sources by means of textual collation can hardly be summarized. However, the intrinsic value of this kind of work consists not in its storyline, but in the details which fill it and which take the form of dozens of conclusions and hypotheses drawn by the author in the course of the Benedictine effort made in comparing the records. Therefore, to appreciate a study such as Massoud’s *Chronicles and Annalistic Sources*, one has to savor its details (including the collated fragments of transcribed Arabic records inserted into the text) and recognize their value. Taking this into consideration, it seems that the most appropriate way to demonstrate the quality and significance of the discussed work is to indicate some of the most characteristic conclusions and hypotheses formulated by its author.

Generally speaking, the opinions and judgments expressed by Massoud can be divided into those that refer to micro-scale historiography and those that apply to a more universal context. The former are the direct result of Massoud’s efforts to achieve one of the main objectives of his research, that is “to examine inside the confines of a single annal, the disposition of *akhbār* and their interrelation within sources” (p. 10). Meticulous, precise, and insightful, these opinions not only define a given historian’s contribution to our knowledge about the events of a given year, they also constitute essential material without which formulating more universal comments would not be possible. Thus one can learn, for example, that Ibn al-ʿIrāqī’s chronicle “is of little value for anyone interested in investigating the social and political scene in Egypt in 778” (p. 48); that “for the year 778 . . . [al-ʿAynī’s] *ʿIqd al-Jumān* has absolutely nothing original to offer” (p. 40); or that “as regards the annal of the year 778, the primary significance of al-Maqrīzī



[i.e., his *Kitāb al-Sulūk*] is that he replicates the contents of Ibn al-Furāt's *Tārikh al-Duwal*" (p. 49). One can also learn details such as the fact that Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī's *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr* "offers a rather poor account of the events of the year 778," that "it is a condensed summary of other people's work" (p. 59), and that it "does not add anything dramatically original to our knowledge of the year 793" (p. 118). A researcher can also read that "the annal of the year 778 in *Jawāhir al-Sulūk* does not reflect Ashtor's assertion that it contains original data not found in contemporary sources" (p. 77), and that generally "*Jawāhir al-Sulūk* is not a very useful source for the events of the year 778" (p. 81). As for Ibn Iyās, we can learn that "perhaps the most striking characteristic of the annal of the year 793 in *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr* is the extent to which it diverges in many parts of its narrative from the general consensus sketched by the other chronicles" (p. 137).

Naturally enough, a great many of Massoud's micro-scale conclusions result from his investigation of textual borrowings. Al-Sakhāwī, for example, relied mostly on Ibn Ḥajar's *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr*, but also on Ibn al-ʿIrāqī's *Dhayl*, at least for the year 778. As for Ibn Ḥajar's *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr*, "the highly condensed and disorganized nature of the narrative, coupled with his [Ibn Ḥajar's] propensity to rewrite other authors' *akhbār*" (p. 55), made it arduous to identify the sources from which Ibn Ḥajar borrowed. However, as far as his elaboration of the annal of 778 is concerned, it can be established with some degree of certainty that he relied on Ibn al-Furāt, Ibn Duqmāq, and Ibn Ḥijjī. Sometimes, as in the case of Ibn Khaldūn's *Kitāb al-ʿIbar*, the clues are so confusing that it is impossible to give a clear answer regarding borrowings. At other times, as in the case of certain data included in the annal of 793/1390–91 in the anonymous *Jawāhir al-Sulūk*, Massoud leaves it for others to determine "whether the author derived this information from an unknown source . . ." or "had recourse to artistic licence by simply inventing this account" (p. 142).

As for Massoud's more general assumptions, comments, and hypotheses, they refer to many different aspects of the works discussed. Most often, they concern a given historian, his style, his reliability, and the value of his work for modern historians. A typical example of such comments are the remarks referring to Ibn Duqmāq's *Nuzhat al-Anām*: the analysis of this chronicle brings Massoud to the fundamental conclusion that it is "the most original of sources in that it was copied extensively by other authors, such as Ibn al-Furāt and al-ʿAynī, and yet does not appear to contain major borrowings from any other works" (p. 34). From the section on Ibn al-Furāt one can learn that *Al-Muntaqá* (i.e., Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah's selections from *Tārikh Ibn al-Furāt*) is "superior to all other chronicles in terms of wealth of information," and that "it contains a substantial number of in-depth additional data that appear to be original" (p. 36). Moreover, *Al-Muntaqá* "contains more accounts of political events than any other contemporary source,



and it also outdoes these with regard to social and religious affairs” (p. 38). As for the anonymous *Jawāhir al-Sulūk*, Massoud warns researchers that reading this chronicle “leaves one with the impression that its author was more interested in the form that his narrative would take than in the historical content it might provide. Moreover, he took some liberty in rewriting history” (p. 80).

Perhaps the most illustrative of Massoud’s shrewd and expert style are the sections devoted to Ibn Iyās. Thus, all those who use, or intend to use, Ibn Iyās’s *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr* can learn that one of the many narrative techniques used by Ibn Iyās was combining story elements from different sources. However, beyond the data he borrowed from others, the chronicle contains a “substantial amount of information found in no other source” (p. 72). Such a feature would generally be considered a positive quality. However, Massoud leaves no doubt as to the value of at least some of such pieces of information, which he describes as “likely to have been nothing but dramatic embroiderings” (p. 73). Massoud further devalues the quality of Ibn Iyās’s accounts by stressing that the chronicler used to take “considerable liberty in rearranging the story line and plots of certain events” or, in other words, to romanticize certain events whenever these lent themselves to such a treatment, and to alter the storyline for dramatic purposes (p. 75). In practical terms, this means that “the fundamental narrative elements of some series of *akhbār* in *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr* are generally common to Ibn Iyās and to most other historians, but their order of appearance, chronological anchoring, circumstantial dimensions, and, more importantly, the dramatic results of the events they depict,” (p. 138) frequently place “his narrative at odds with the accounts of most other historians” (p. 73). However, one should remember that “despite the profound changes to which Ibn Iyās subjected a number of his reports, the information he used to construct his narrative was made up of historical facts” (p. 75).

In other words, Ibn Iyās’s *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr* is a mixture of history and fiction. The main problem with Ibn Iyās, however, is that he was the foremost chronicler to witness the decline of the Mamluk state and Egypt’s transition from Mamluk to Ottoman rule. Consequently, modern historians dealing with this period are forced to rely on him as far as the source material is concerned; for this reason, Massoud’s remarks should always be kept in mind. In fact, Massoud’s *Chronicles and Annalistic Sources* is an extremely useful and indispensable guide to all Burji historiography. The textual collation applied by Massoud has resulted in the production of what Mamlukologists need most of all (and what D. P. Little sought to establish): “an analytical survey of the sources of the period that aims at classifying them in terms of their value to modern historians” (quoted on p. 7). Sami Massoud did his work perfectly. The few typing errors, such as misspelling Jo Van



Steenbergen's name as "Joe" (p. 42), are probably the only examples of imprecision or oversight in this book. The term "*muswadda*" as used by Massoud on p. 22 and defined as "foundation" (of a book) could be also spelled "*musawwadah*," as it was in Ayman Fu'ād Sayyid's 1995 edition of al-Maqrīzī's *Musawwadat Kitāb al-Mawā'iz wa-al-I'tibār fī Dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa-al-Āthār*. The form "*musawwadah*" is not the only correct form, but it is perhaps less Egyptian—and therefore more classical—in flavor. In general, due to its informativeness and uniqueness, the value of the book cannot be overestimated.

BERNADETTE MARTEL-THOUMIAN, *Catalogue des manuscrits historiques de la Bibliothèque nationale de Damas: Période mamlouke* (Damascus: Institut français du Proche-Orient, 2003). Pp. 336.

REVIEWED BY RENÉ-VINCENT DU GRANDLAUNAY, Institut dominicain d'Études orientales

The manuscript collection in the Damascus National Library has numbered over 40,000 titles ever since collections from various Syrian cities were assembled there in the 1980s. Catalogues previous to this date are perforce obsolete. Such is not the case for the catalogue reviewed here: though published in 2003, the author has personally told me that it was completed ten years earlier, in 1993. In this work, Bernadette Martel-Thoumian has compiled the catalogue of manuscripts concerning the Mamluk period (648–922/1250–1517) found in this sizeable and outstanding collection. She grounds her undertaking on previous works, in which she occasionally shows undue trust. We wish to mention specifically the two-volume *Fihris Makhṭūṭāt Dār al-Kutub al-Zāhiriyyah: al-Tārīkh wa-Mulḥaqātuhu*, published by the Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī bi-Dimashq, the first volume of which was edited by Yusuf Eche in 1947, and the second by Khālīd al-Rayyān in 1973.

Note that manuscripts dating to the Mamluk period, but containing pre-Mamluk texts, have justifiably been omitted from this description. Likewise, from works on general history, only the manuscript sections related to the Mamluk period have been retained. Hence, manuscripts of *Al-Bidāyah wa-al-Nihāyah* by Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) are not comprehensively described [26–27]:¹ only volume 10, covering the period from 617/1220 to 702/1303, has been included in this work. Similarly, from the anonymous manuscript of the *Tārīkh al-Islām* [38], only the specifically Mamluk sections 7, 8, and 9 have been described.

¹ The description number in Martel-Thoumian's catalogue is enclosed in square brackets.



This work begins with an introduction primarily concerned with the codicological content of the catalogue. It provides such information about the manuscripts as the type of ink utilized by the writer, the written symbols and ornaments, the catchwords and vowelings, the paper, the types of annotation, and the quires and binding. Following the introduction, the main body of the work includes 237 manuscript descriptions, arranged by alphabetical order of title. Fifteen illustrations of specimens are then displayed, followed by a selected bibliography and indexes.

The 237 descriptions cover fewer than 160 titles. All in all, this is quite a small sample for a historical period spanning nearly 300 years and for such a large collection as this. Each description follows a uniform pattern:

1. The header: sheet number (we prefer the French term “notice” to Martel-Thoumian’s “fiche”), manuscript number in the new collection (the previous call numbers of manuscript excerpts from the *Ẓāhirīyah* are mentioned), Arabic title of the work transliterated into Roman letters, name of the author transliterated into Roman letters, title of the work in Arabic, name of the author in Arabic.

2. Description: the nature of the work, the *incipit* followed by the *explicit*, a description of the manuscript, a codicological description, the place of origin of the manuscript, marks indicating the ownership or previous reading of the manuscript.

3. Reference to text editions

The indexes provided are numerous, but inconsistent in their presentation: they appear in Arabic script and in Roman transliteration. Thus, seven indexes are rendered in French: (1) Manuscripts (which might have been more accurately termed “Titles”), (2) Authors, (3) Copyists, (4) *Waqf* founders, (5) Owners, (6) Sellers and buyers, (7) Readers. Two indexes appear in Arabic: (1) *al-makḥṭūṭāt* (understand *al-ʿanāwīn*) and (2) *al-mūʾallifūn*.

THE CODICOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION

Martel-Thoumian’s work, while inspired by her predecessors’, is novel in that it takes into account the newly expanded collection of Damascus manuscripts. Most importantly, it undertakes a systematic codicological description, which has been heretofore lacking. In addition to being far superior to the descriptions included even in the best editions, it is above all more comprehensive than those included in similar catalogues. The precision which characterizes this work was made possible by the author’s regular immersion in manuscript texts. Our gratitude must be extended to the directors of the Damascus National Library for authorizing the creation of such a catalogue.



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ADDITIONAL REMARKS

The following remarks are meant both as an encouragement of and a contribution to a much-needed Arabic edition of this exquisite catalogue.

A. ROMANIZATION

It is regrettable that the Roman transliteration of the modern names cited in this catalogue is somewhat imprecise. As a rule, using abbreviations in Arabic is a perilous undertaking. Only specialists will recognize that, for instance, the designations A. M. Hilw [129] and F. M. Ḥilū [135] refer to the same individual, ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥilū. Likewise, A. Bigawi, the Egyptian editor of *Tabṣīr al-Muntabih fī Tahrīr al-Mushtabih* by Ibn Ḥajar, becomes A. M al-Bagawi [189]. Another Egyptian editor, ‘Alī Muḥammad ‘Umar, is called A. M. Umarau [145]. With regard to Arabic spelling, the *alif* in *ibn* is too often accompanied by a *hamzah* [71], [82], [138], [215].

B. THE TEXT EDITIONS

After listing the items which are to receive descriptions, Martel-Thoumian states in her introduction that she “might provide the text edition.” We wish to elaborate on this point, which will hopefully be handled more carefully in future manuscript catalogues. This holds especially true when dealing with the Arabic-Islamic heritage, which is presently experiencing a proliferation of editing, not always of the highest quality.² An effort to mention text editions would have been expected within the framework of this catalogue; however, only forty descriptions provide satisfactory information in this regard. Obviously, to indicate every single edition of a given text is out of the question, for this is not the main purpose of a catalogue of manuscripts. Nonetheless, if a text has only one edition, however mediocre, it must be mentioned and qualified as such. Indeed, familiarity with poor editions provides incentive for the production of more thorough works. As stated at the beginning of this review, the catalogue was completed in 1993. Hence, its list of text editions appears somewhat outdated to readers in 2003. In 2007, the year of the present review, its datedness is more glaring still. Here, we

² Though these texts don’t always deserve to be edited (i.e., descriptions 107, 183), we list hereunder those in the catalogue which have not been edited, at the date of the present review: [3], [4], [5, 6, 7], [12], [25], [30, 31], [32, 33], [34], [38–39], [41], [42], [53, 54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62], [63], [68], [69], [70], [71], [75], [80], [81], [82], [83], [84], [85], [91, 92], [96], [101, 102, 103], [105], [107], [108], [112], [119], [128], [137], [138], [143], [148], [148], [149], [150], [151], [152], [153], [155], [156], [157, 158], [179], [181], [182], [183], [187], [188], [190], [191], [192], [193], [194], [197], [198], [199], [200, 201], [202, 203], [207], [215], [216], [219], [235], [236], [237].



provide a list of editions with which Martel-Thoumian might have acquainted herself, in addition to those published after 1993.

[1] *Āthār al-Bilād wa-Akhhbār al-ʿIbād* by al-Qazwīnī (d. 682/1283). This text was first edited by F. Wüstenfeld in *Zakariya ben Muhammed ben Mahmud el-Cazwini's Kosmographie* (Göttingen: Verlag der Dietrichschen Buchhandlung, 1848–49). It has been reprinted twice: (1) Wiesbaden: M. Sändig, 1967; and (2) Frankfurt: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, 1994.

[2] *Kitāb Ikhhbār al-Kirām bi-Akhhbār al-Masjid al-Ḥarām* by al-Asadī (d. 1066/1656). A mediocre edition of this text has been produced by al-Ḥāfiẓ Ghulām Muṣṭafā (Cairo: Dār al-Ṣaḥwah, 1985.)

[3] *Irshād al-Sālik ilā Manāqib al-Mālik* by Ibn Mibrad (d. 909/1503). To be more precise, the author's *nasab* (the string of ancestors mentioned in a name) is Yūsuf ibn Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad ibn Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥādī. Reference number 6 to Brockelmann is mistaken: instead of II, pp. 130–31, read GII, 107–8, and SII, 130–31.

[8] *Asmāʾ Muʾallafāt al-Imām Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymiyah* by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah (d. 751/1350). Surprisingly, the author failed to connect this text with the manuscript later described in description [213], though they both share the same *incipit*.

[13] [14] [15] *Kitāb al-ʿIlām bi-Aʿlām Bayt Allāh al-Ḥarām* by al-Nahrawālī (d. 990/1582). It is regrettable that ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar fails to annotate the text in his edition (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfah al-Diniyah, 2004).

[16] *Al-ʿIlām fī Wafayāt al-Aʿlām* by al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347). The first edition was published in Beirut in 1991 by ʿAbd al-Jabbār Zakkār and Riyyād ʿAbd al-Majīd Murād.

[26][27] *Al-Bidāyah wa-al-Nihāyah (al-juzʾ al-ʿāshir)* by Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373). One should now depend on ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī's edition (Cairo: Dār Hajar, 1999), which includes annotations and indexes.

[35][36][37] *Tāj al-Tarājīm* by Ibn Quṭlūbughā (d. 879/1474). We can now rely on the edition by Muḥammad Khayr Ramaḍān Yūsuf (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1992), which includes annotations and indexes.

[45][46][47][48][49] *Tuḥfat al-Anām fī Faḍāʾil al-Shām* by Ibn al-Imām (d. 1015/1606). A good edition, including annotations and indexes, has been made by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Fayyād Ḥarfūsh (Damascus: Dār al-Bashāʾir, 1998).

[51][52] *Tuḥfat al-Ẓurafāʾ bi-Asmāʾ al-Khulafāʾ* by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505). Al-Suyūṭī inserted this poem, which he composed in a traditional form, as a conclusion to his *Tārīkh al-Khulafāʾ*. This poem is contained in the two manuscripts described here. It is located at the end of the extremely mediocre editions of the *Tārīkh al-Khulafāʾ*. However, Maḥmūd Naṣṣār's edition of al-Suyūṭī's *Kitāb al-Tabarrī min*



Ma'arrat al-Ma'arri (Beirut: Dār al-Jil, 1989) also contains an edition of the *Tuhfat al-Zurafā'*.

[60] *Tarjamat al-Badawī* by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1448). This proves the existence of a second manuscript of this *Tarjamah* of Aḥmad al-Badawī written by Ibn Ḥajar. In her superb work, *Al-Sayyid Aḥmad al-Badawī, un grand saint de l'islam égyptien* (Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale [IFAO], 1994), Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen presumed that there was only one extant manuscript (p. 16). Apparently, this text has not yet been edited.

[76][77][78] *Tawḍīḥ al-Mushtabih* by Ibn Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Qaysī (d. 842/1438). The manuscript in this collection does not display the title or author's name. On page 196 of his *Fihrist Makhtūṭāt Dār al-Kutub al-Zāhiriyyah: al-Tārīkh wa-Mulḥaqātuḥu*, published in Damascus, Yusuf Eche ascribes this text to Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, thus confusing it with another work by Ibn Ḥajar, *Tabṣīr al-Muntabih fī Tahṛīr al-Mushtabih*. However, in 1964, ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bijāwī edited this *Tabṣīr al-Muntabih* (Cairo: Muʿassasah al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿĀmmah lil-Taʿlīf wa-al-Anbāʾ wa-al-Nashr). A simple comparison between both *incipits* dispels all ambiguity: the *Tabṣīr al-Muntabih* must be distinguished from the *Tawḍīḥ al-Mushtabih*. Moreover, in 1986, Muḥammad Naʿīm al-ʿIrqūsī edited the latter text (Beirut: Muʿassasat al-Risālah), which he attributed to its true author, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Qaysī al-Dimashqī (d. 842), better known by his *shuhrah* Ibn Nāṣir al-Dīn. Hence, Martel-Thoumian's erroneous attribution is surprising inasmuch as she is familiar with the edition of the *Tabṣīr al-Muntabih* and probably with the *Tawḍīḥ al-Mushtabih*, re-edited in 1993.

[79] *Thabt al-Bulqīnī* by Ibn al-Bulqīnī (d. 868/1464). Note that this work is comprised of a list of the shaykhs of Sirāj al-Dīn Abū Ṣāliḥ ʿUmar ibn Raslān al-Bulqīnī (d. 805/1403), compiled by his son Ṣāliḥ (cf. Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī, *Muʿjam al-Maʿājim wa-al-Mashyākhāt* [Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2002], 1:493).

[86][87][88] *Husn al-Muḥāḍarah fī Akhbār Miṣr wa-al-Qāhirah* by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505). Note ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar's very recent edition of *Husn al-Muḥāḍarah* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanjī, 2007), with notes and indexes.

[89] *Tārīkh al-Khamīs fī Aḥwāl Anfas Naḥīs* by al-Diyārbakrī (d. 966/1559). The Beirut edition referred to in this catalogue is most likely the 1984 reprint by the Muʿassasat Shaʿbān lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ.

[101][102][103] *Dhayl Lawāqih al-Anwār fī Ṭabaqāt al-Sādah al-Akhyār* by al-Shaʿrānī (d. 973/1565). This is likely *Al-Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣuḡhrāʾ*, the most recent edition of which, by Saʿīd Hārūn ʿĀshūr (Cairo: Maktabat al-Ādāb), completely ignores the three Damascus manuscripts.

[104] *Sukkardān al-Sulṭān* by Ibn Abī Ḥajalah (d. 776/1375). This has been edited by ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanjī, 2001).



[111] *Al-Sham‘ah al-Muḍī‘ah fī Akhbār al-Qal‘ah al-Dimashqīyah* by Ibn Ṭulūn (d. 953/1546). The information provided about the text edition is somewhat succinct. At the very least, we may add that this text was printed without notes on the basis of the Damascus manuscript by the Maktabat al-Qudsī wa-al-Budayr, Damascus, 1929. Dār Zāhid al-Qudsī, Cairo, recently reprinted this edition without dating it. However, we believe it was produced at the beginning of the 1990s.

[123][124][125][126][127] *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīyah* by al-Ḥinā‘ī (d. 979/1571). Although unable to consult this text, we know of its existence; it has been edited in three volumes by Muḥyī al-Dīn Hilāl al-Sarḥān (Baghdad: Maṭba‘at al-Waqf al-Sunnī, 2004).

[129] *Al-Jawāhir al-Muḍī‘ah fī Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīyah* by Ibn Abī al-Wafā‘ (d. 775/1373). The Cairo edition by ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥilū, with notes and indexes, is preferable (Giza: Mu‘assasat al-Risālah, 1993).

[134] *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi‘īyah* by Abū Bakr al-Muṣannif (d. 1014/1605). This was first edited by Nu‘mān al-A‘zamī al-Kutubī (Baghdad: al-Maktabah al-‘Arabīyah, 1937), and then by ‘Ādil Nuwayhid (Beirut: Dār al-Afāq al-Jadīdah, 1971).

[139][140] *Ṭabaqāt al-Lughawīyīn wa-al-Nuḥāh* by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505). The second Cairo edition by Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (‘Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī) was made in 1964, not in 1973 as Martel-Thoumian claims. A third Cairo edition was published in 2005. The editor, ‘Alī Muḥammad ‘Umar, provides few annotations and, as usual, neglects both of these Damascus manuscripts.

[141] *Ṭabaqāt al-Mufasssīrīn* by al-Dāwūdī (d. 945/1539). ‘Alī Muḥammad ‘Umar has produced an edition (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1972), with few notes, but some indexes.

[159][160] *Al-Kawākib al-Durriyah fī Tarājim al-Sādah al-Ṣūfiyah* by al-Munāwī (d. 1031/1621). The most recent edition is likely that of Muḥammad Adīb al-Jādir (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1999). This edition mainly relies on the manuscript described in [159], and it includes notes and indexes.

[162] *Kawkab al-Rawḍah* by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505). This text was edited by Muḥammad al-Shishtāwī in 2001 (Cairo: Dār al-Afāq al-‘Arabīyah) and is yet another example of an Egyptian editor’s ignoring all manuscripts located outside of Egypt.

[163][164] *Lubb al-Lubāb fī Taḥrīr al-Ansāb* by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505). We may also mention, with the utmost reservation, the edition by Muḥammad and Ashraf Aḥmad ‘Abd al-‘Azīz available at the Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah (Beirut, 1991).

[166]–[175] *Lawāqih al-Anwār fī Ṭabaqāt al-Sādah al-Akhyār* by al-Sha‘rānī (d. 973/1565). ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ḥasan Maḥmūd prepared the latest edition (Cairo: Maktabat al-Ādāb, 1993 [vol. 1], 2001 [vol. 2]). However, a critical edition is still needed.



[176][177] *Al-Majmaʿ al-Muʿassas lil-Muʿjam al-Mufahras* by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1448). Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī has indeed edited this text in 4 volumes (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1992). This edition takes into account the two manuscripts described in this work. The editor mentions another manuscript which should have been included in this catalogue since it belongs to Al-Maktabah al-ʿUthmānīyah of Aleppo, no. 241 (395 fols.), and dates back to the year 895. Neither the editor nor Martel-Thoumian were able to consult the manuscript—it seems to have disappeared.

[184] *Mudhakkirāt Yawmīyah* by Aḥmad ibn Ṭawq (d. 915/1509). Jaʿfar al-Muhājir completed the edition of this text between 2000 and 2004 at the Institut Français du Proche-Orient (IFPO) in Damascus (formerly the Institut Français d’Etudes Arabes de Damas [IFEAD]). The title in French is *Journal d’Aḥmad Ibn Ṭawq, 834–915/1430–1509 : La vie quotidienne à Damas à la fin de l’époque mamelouke*. It includes notes and indexes.

[186] [*Dhayl*] *Mirʾāt al-Zamān* by al-Yunīnī (d. 726/1326). Note that the title of al-Yunīnī’s work is *Dhayl Mirʾāt al-Zamān*, which continues Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī’s (d. 1256/654) *Mirʾāt al-Zamān*.

[195] *Al-Maʿazzah fīmā qīla fī al-Mazzah* by Ibn Ṭūlūn (d. 953/1546). Note the Egyptian re-edition in 2002 (Cairo: Dār Zāhid al-Qudsī) of the 1929 edition.

[196] *Al-Muqtanā fī al-Kunā* by al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347). This manuscript provided the basis for Ayman Ṣāliḥ Shaʿbān’s edition (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1997).

[204][205][206] *Manāqib Ibn Qawwām* (not Qawām), i.e., Abū Bakr ibn Qawwām (d. 659/1261), written by his grandson Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar ibn Abī Bakr Ibn Qawwām (d. 718/1318). We have grouped the descriptions 204, 205, and 206 in the same paragraph, since we believe them to be three manuscripts of a single text, authored by the same person. The manner of their presentation in this catalogue is misleading. A comparison with a similar manuscript belonging to the Dār al-Kutub in Cairo might explain their different *explicit*s. Manuscript DK 2597 *Tārikh*, which Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī “transcribed” in a recent commercial edition, resembles the manuscript portrayed in description 206. This manuscript comprises two distinct texts: (1) *Manāqib Ibn Qawwām*, then (2) *Manāqib Sayyidī Abī al-ʿAbbās al-Sabtī*. One might easily overlook the second text, the title of which adjoins the end of the *Manāqib Ibn Qawwām*. For this reason, the *explicit* of the *Manāqib Sayyidī Abī al-ʿAbbās al-Sabtī* is often taken to belong to the *Manāqib Ibn Qawwām*. We believe this to hold true in the present case, since the *explicit* provided in description 206 is identical to the one at the end of the *Manāqib Sayyidī Abī al-ʿAbbās al-Sabtī*. The *Manāqib Ibn Qawwām* has therefore been “edited,” though very poorly, by Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2005).



[208] *Al-Minhāj al-Sawī fī Tarjamat al-Nawawī* by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505). Note the existence of an edition one year older than the one indicated in this catalogue, by Aḥmad Shafīq Damj (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1998), with notes.

[209][212] *Al-Mawāʿiẓ wa-al-Iʿtibār bi-Dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa-al-Āthār* by al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442). Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid's edition must now be added (London: Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, 2002–4), with notes and indexes.

[213] *Muʾallafāt Ibn Taymīyah* by “Ibrāhīm, the author's student” (!): probably the same text as the one presented in [8]. The late copyist limited his undertaking to Quran-related works, for which he listed approximately twenty titles.

[217][218] *Nuzhat al-Anām fī Maḥāsin al-Shām* by Ibn al-Badrī (d. 894/1489). An edition based on manuscript 9210, portrayed in description [218], has since been made by Ibrāhīm Ṣāliḥ (Damascus: Dār al-Bashāʾir, 2006), with notes and indexes.

This fine research tool provided by Martel-Thoumian compels us to dream of a time when conscientious editors may gain easy access to such sources as these. If, for instance, the number of manuscripts consulted in some Egyptian editions is limited, it is probably simply because the task of collating all known manuscripts often proves discouraging. Yet, this is no justification—intellectual endeavors must be judged by their own standards. Admittedly, research conditions in Arab countries are not yet conducive to progress. The complicated process involved in accessing the Damascus manuscripts is a most significant example of this.

Let us conclude by saying that the usefulness of this work will only be felt when similar endeavors are initiated and related to one another. Indeed, the study of a manuscript in isolation contributes nothing, in and of itself, to its intelligibility. It must rather be understood within the wider context of manuscript production, in which texts can be categorized according to manufacturing techniques or places of production. Other similar works would create a corpus of codicological studies, making a worthwhile investigation of manuscript production possible.

Finally, we express the hope that an Arabic edition of this catalogue might be published, thus offering encouragement to the numerous Arab editors and historians of the Mamluk period. The French text will remain inaccessible to the majority of these scholars, whose thirst for progress we do not question



YOSSEF RAPOPORT, *Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society* (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Pp. 137 + xii.

REVIEWED BY LI GUO, University of Notre Dame

The book under review is, to my knowledge, the first monograph in a western language that “sets out to explain the economic, legal and social causes of Muslim divorce in the Middle Eastern cities of Cairo, Damascus and Jerusalem in the Mamluk period (1250-1517)” (p. 4). In doing so, the author has utilized an impressive array of primary sources and recent scholarship, all woven into a narrative that is graced with clarity, precision, and erudition. The result is a splendid blend of social history and Islamic Studies (Islamic law in particular), of macroscopic breadth and microscopic minutiae, of solid quantitative analysis and fine storytelling.

In his introduction to the subject, scope, and sources, the author is quick to warn us that this is not “a grand narrative about patriarchy and Islam” (p. 7), nor does it touch upon *all* the issues related to marriage and family, among these the choice of spouses, polygamy and concubinage, love and sexuality (p. 11). In other words, this is not just another book on marriage and divorce, or gender and women, in Islam in general. Five chapters—the first three on economic issues and the last two on legal discourse—constitute the main narrative, followed by a short conclusion. In a sense, each chapter can be read separately as an independent essay on the given topic. (As a matter of fact, earlier versions of chapters 4 and 5 have been published elsewhere as independent papers.) But they all relate to one another within a grand framework: while the first three chapters focus on “money,” namely, money brought into marriage, money earned outside of marriage, and money managed within a marriage, the last two “legal” chapters examine divorce in practical procedures and divorce/repudiation in practice and theory, respectively.

Chapter 1, “Marriage, divorce and the gender division of property,” deals with the nuts and bolts of the economics in a Muslim marriage and divorce. Various forms of financial and monetary deals that were brought into a marriage are on display, under the rubrics of “the dowry,” “dowry and inheritance,” and “land, cash and credit.” Here we witness the exquisite method at work, a remarkable feature of the book. The chapter starts off with an intriguing divorce case, which leads to a thorough pondering of the sources and some in-depth discussion, winding down with succinct summation and conclusion. The presentation of the individual cases does not stop at what the sources have to offer, but extends to an interpretation, with a modern sensibility, of legal opinions from various schools of Muslim legal



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tradition (for example, pp. 17, 21, 23–24, etc.). The author posits the interesting argument that the exclusion of Mamluk elite women from receiving landed revenue as trousseaux, a practice that had been common in the Ayyubid time, pushed them towards the credit market to gain economic independence (pp. 22–25). However, the gender (or gendered) division of property was sometimes challenged, not by legal thinking, but rather by natural disaster, such as the Black Death. In such cases, large fortunes were temporarily moved to elite daughters out of anxiety, resulting in elite women, married or single, becoming major patrons of religious buildings (pp. 26–29). The phenomenon of Mamluk elite women becoming major patrons of religious endowments has long been noted by historians—Stephen Humphreys, Carl Petry, Jonathan Berkey, among others—and now, thanks to the present book, we have a better idea as to how and why this happened.

It may initially come as a surprise that the ensuing Chapter 2, “Working women, single women and the rise of the female *ribāt*,” seems to step away from the topic of marriage and divorce, and instead explores some of the unknown, or least investigated, aspects of salaried women in and out of wedlock. The rationale for such a “side tour” is explained by the author, in his Introduction, as follows: for the majority of working women, dowries were of less value, and therefore an investigation of women’s employment and wages is “crucial for an understanding of the balance of power that existed between husbands and wives, as well as for a comprehension of the phenomenon of frequent divorce” (p. 6). This chapter is for me the most unexpected, ground-breaking, and thought provoking segment of the book, not least because the medieval sources are notoriously silent on women living on the margins of society, but also because the subject of “working women” has yet to be adequately addressed in modern scholarship. Once again, the author is in total control of his sources and has done an admirable job in combing through historical narratives as well as literary texts, such as poetry, for fragmentary piecemeal materials. He has also successfully avoided the easy pitfall of sensationalizing the gender-sensitive subject (the phrase “working women” alone would surely bring about a dubious wince from some corners) by focusing on three socio-economic arenas where single women either shone or made their presence keenly felt: the textile industry, the women’s shelter (*ribāt*), and women immigrants in Jerusalem. The three segments deal with these arenas from different angles: professional, institutional, and demographic. While the discussion of women in the textile industry (spinning and embroidery were “the female professions par excellence” in the Islamic Near East, as we are told [p. 34]) dwells heavily on the well-known sources, such as the Cairo Geniza and S. Goitein’s monumental synthesis of it, it has also incorporated recent scholarship, such as Bethany Walker’s discussion of Mamluk textiles (pp. 37–38). With regard to elite single women’s shelter/lodging, Remie Constable’s book on the *funduq*



appeared too late for the author to consult. It would be very interesting to see if some comparison between the two would yield a new understanding of this fascinating issue. The picture of the immigrant women in Jerusalem depicted in this chapter is an intriguing one: some of them were probably, judging from the descriptions in the sources, “part-time spinners, part-time beggars and part-time pilgrims” (p. 49). Again, the survey relies on well-known sources, such as the Ḥaram documents and Huda Lutfi’s examination of them, but Rapoport has also utilized some new and/or little used sources—namely three literary works—that shed light on working women in Mamluk Syria (p. 49). Although he does not treat these sources extensively, one can hope that more investigation and study are to come from the author.

Chapter 3, “The monetization of marriage,” takes us once again back to Muslim marriage per se, or the monetary arrangements within a marriage, to be more precise. Various forms of domestic monetary and financial arrangements are discussed, among them the marriage gift (*ṣadāq*), marital support, and a cash allowance—ranging from food money (*idam*), clothing (*kiswah*), to “bed-fee” (*ḥaqq al-firāsh*; one ought to read the book to find out what is at stake here; pp. 60–61). The thematic discussion is followed, and illustrated, by a case study of the saga of Zumurrud, a slave-girl in Mamluk Jerusalem whose revolving-door marriages drive home the many points elucidated herein (pp. 64–68). This is the most fun chapter to read. What makes it even more enjoyable is the fact that all the colorful anecdotal accounts (from sources no less than Ibn Ṭawq, whose Damascene diary offers an endless supply of such material, among others) are accompanied by the author’s careful number crunching, based on the documents (contracts, legal opinions, etc.).

As the book takes the commonly high divorce rate in the Islamic Near East as its starting point, chapter 4, “Divorce, repudiation and settlement,” and chapter 5, “Repudiation and public power,” dive into the thick of Islamic legal discourse regarding the institutional aspects of divorce and repudiation procedures, as well as their impact on society as a whole. Chapter 4 begins with a general outline of the issues and questions at stake, and proceeds to deal with several carefully chosen topics. The topics in this chapter include the various steps in a divorce case, stemming from the initial repudiation and leading to the final showdown in court, in both the Islamic courts (pp. 74–78) and the military courts (pp. 79–82). The chapter winds up with a synthesis of divorce in fifteenth-century Cairo (pp. 82–88). Chapter 5 tackles the rift between the state and the religious scholars over the use of repudiation, and more specifically the Sunni law regarding the use of divorce oaths. The discussion proceeds in two directions: one historical (pp. 91–96), in a survey and narration of the societal, cultural, and even linguistic, functions of divorce oaths in Mamluk society, and one legal (pp. 96–105), through a retelling



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and contextualization of the failed “reform” championed by Ibn Taymīyah, which eventually got him into serious trouble. On the widely practiced use of divorce oaths in daily life situations, the author weaves a tapestry of individual scenes where divorce oaths were used in such a “baffling variety of social contexts” (p. 92)—such as in connection with financial obligations, in the marketplace, during quarrels, and associated with gift giving in popular literature (by the way, the *Arabian Nights*, which is essentially a Mamluk text, is also full of such expressions uttered by the characters in all the above-mentioned situations)—that they lost their true meaning and judicial function. The discussion of the legal hair-splitting regarding the fine line between real divorce oaths and subterfuges designed to circumvent them is based on a thorough reading of the sources and a careful re-construction of how the jurists and Everymen handled the challenge (pp. 93–96). The discussion of Ibn Taymīyah’s attempted reform of the divorce oath is enhanced by a clear and nuanced analysis of his writings on the subject and their theological background and doctrinal ramifications. In the final analysis, as the author has strongly argued, the Sunni doctrine on divorce oaths “withstood Ibn Taymiyya’s attack” (p. 105), in part due to the efforts of the state authorities to suppress the Hanbali’s extremist dogma, and, more importantly, due to the fact that it never gained currency among jurists, let alone the common people, who continued using non-committal “divorce” oaths in their daily life as they pleased. “Ibn Taymiyya’s attempt to reform the Sunni law on divorce oaths,” as the author puts it, “highlights the inextricable link between the patriarchal order of the domestic sphere and the patriarchal values at the heart of the political and social order. Perhaps more than any individual story of failed marriage, the reaction of the Mamluk state to the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya demonstrates the crucial role of the institution of divorce within medieval Islamic society” (pp. 109–10). Hence the significance of the subject, which has received a superb and well-deserved treatment in this magnificent book.

There are many reasons to admire this book. For a serious scholarly work that tackles such an important topic on such a large scale, it is pleasantly readable: exquisitely compact and clear, free of dreadful jargon, and oftentimes amusing and fun. Not a single page is dull, insofar as theoretical discourse is always illustrated by a slew of case studies full of dicey dilemma, colorful personality, and dramatic punch. And it is typo-free; no small feat for a work with extensive quotes from Arabic material. What a treat!



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CATERINA BORI, *Ibn Taymiyya: una vita esemplare: Analisi delle fonti classiche della sua biografia* (Pisa and Rome: Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 2003) (Supplemento n. 1 alla Rivista degli studi orientali volume LXXVI). Pp. 234.

REVIEWED BY ARAM SHAHIN, University of Chicago

This monograph, originally presented as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Rome, grew out of the author's research into Ibn Taymīyah's *fatāwā* against the Mongols. The aim of the study is to analyze the representation or the image of Ibn Taymīyah as propounded by the various biographers of his life. The author does not offer a study of Ibn Taymīyah's doctrines or his thought, nor does she aim for a historical reconstruction of his biography. The critical analysis of the biographical material focuses on the texts composed during the eighth/fourteenth century (p. 19). The premise is that this biographical material must be read as a reflection of the conflicts that arose around Ibn Taymīyah and his authority. The biography is thus seen as a polemical and political instrument. It becomes a battleground in which the focus is not simply the authority of Ibn Taymīyah himself, but rather that of the individual or group whom he represents and which legitimizes or perpetuates its own social status by taking advantage of the image of Ibn Taymīyah (p. 20).

The author lays out the required steps for the study of Ibn Taymīyah as follows: (1) a comparison of all available versions of a notice or report; (2) the contextualization of each report, taking into account the formation of the writer, his *madhhab*, the group that he represents, and his relation to Ibn Taymīyah or to his adversaries; and (3) the identification of the doctrinal and moral model which Ibn Taymīyah needed to fit in order to recognize the more personal and individual characteristics of his image. The author also points out the importance of identifying the individual(s) for whom the biography was intended (p. 24). Following this approach, the study of the biographical tradition of an individual ought to reveal important information concerning the biographers themselves and of the social, political, and cultural context in which the portrayal of the individual is created (p. 24).

The division of the various chapters of the book does not follow a chronological pattern, but rather proceeds according to themes. The monograph itself is divided into two parts. Part one (pp. 27–59) is a description of the sources utilized in the study. Part two (pp. 61–170), comprising the bulk of the work, is dedicated to the study of various aspects of the biographical tradition concerning Ibn Taymīyah.

The author divides the sources that she utilized for her study into three categories: (1) biographical monographs and biographical notices in biographical dictionaries and chronicles; (2) chronicles; and (3) polemical texts composed



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against Ibn Taymiyah or against the ideas of which he was a proponent. In chapter one, which comprises the entirety of part one, the author gives a brief description of the sources that she deems most important and that she utilized most frequently. This is not simply a description of the contents of each work accompanied by a short biographical notice of its author, but also a description of the sources utilized by the author of the work. The reader is thus introduced to the interconnectedness of all of these sources, as many depend on others and derive from them while sometimes presenting the information from a different perspective and with different aims.

The second chapter (pp. 63–110) is an evaluation of how the biographical tradition developed the material for the biography of Ibn Taymiyah with the focus being placed on four aspects: (1) the intellectual formation of Ibn Taymiyah; (2) the moral ideal attributed to him; (3) his polemical image; and (4) the formation of his myth.

With regard to the intellectual formation of Ibn Taymiyah (pp. 63–77), Bori points out a number of aspects that do not conform to the list of conventional *topoi* that one finds given in biographies of Muslim scholars in Islamic literary sources. One of these is the lack of mobility of Ibn Taymiyah during this formative period. Unlike what is usually described of other scholars, once the family of Ibn Taymiyah moved to Damascus, Ibn Taymiyah himself never traveled in search of teachers and knowledge. He, therefore, did not embark on the *riḥlah fī ṭalab al-ʿilm*, which seems to have been an essential part of the career of a religious scholar (pp. 66–67). Despite this, Ibn Taymiyah wrote a number of treatises on hadith. Thus, he was, as Bori remarks, “a *muḥaddith* without *riḥlah*” (p. 68). As such, Ibn Taymiyah cannot be considered a true *muḥaddith*, but rather an expert in the use and citation of Prophetic hadith as proofs in argumentation (*ibid.*). This would put in doubt the true value of some of the titles that are ascribed to him by some biographers. It is possible that such titulature was given to him to impress rivals and strengthen his credibility (pp. 68–70).

The absence of the *riḥlah* in the formative period of Ibn Taymiyah lends weight to the hypothesis that he obtained his education entirely in Damascus. The majority of his teachers who are mentioned in his biographies were Hanbalis and Damascenes. Those who were not originally from Damascus had moved there or passed by there, imparting their knowledge to Damascene students, thereby creating an inversion of the *riḥlah* model (pp. 69–70).

One aspect of the intellectual creativity of Ibn Taymiyah was his poetical compositions. Apparently, he was a mediocre poet who did not compose much poetry. Some critical biographers, like al-Dhahabī, point this out, whereas more adoring students, like Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī, omit any mention of it. Whether the poetic inadequacy of Ibn Taymiyah was due to his austere nature and the revulsion that he



might have had towards poetry or to some other factor, remains an open question (pp. 70–72). However, if we wanted to suppose that he, following the admonition of some sayings attributed to the Prophet, shunned poetry for religious reasons, we would need to wonder why he bothered to compose any poetry at all.

There are two tendencies in the biographical sources in depicting Ibn Taymīyah: one makes him follow the model of Ibn Ḥanbal, while the other depicts him as an independent scholar who did not follow any particular juristic *madhhab* (p. 73). In the latter case, hagiographers tend to present the independence of Ibn Taymīyah as a positive aspect of his juristic thought. However, others, like al-Dhahabī, saw this in a negative light and condemned his teacher's break with the four legal *madhhabs* (pp. 75–77).

The exemplary model on which the biography of Ibn Taymīyah is based is that of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, while the moral ideal attributed to Ibn Taymīyah is based on two intertwined aspects: (1) the idea of *zuhd*, understood as total dedication to knowledge, extreme religious devotion, and detachment from worldly material attractions; and (2) activism and polemic in the struggle for a rigid and literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah, which is expressed in the participation in public life with the conviction that this action is in the best interests of the community (p. 77). The *zuhd* of Ibn Taymīyah was expressed and described mainly through three aspects of his lifestyle: (1) his parsimony in nourishing himself; (2) his abhorrence of expensive clothing that might make him stand out from common people; and (3) his disinterest in money (pp. 78–82).

One interesting aspect of Ibn Taymīyah's life is his celibacy. As the author points out, despite the existence of a number of precedents for this, it is quite unusual for a Muslim religious scholar not to marry, as marriage is considered a *sunnah* of the Prophet and the foundation block of Islamic society. Bori suggests that Ibn Taymīyah might have been of the opinion, shared by a few other scholars, that marriage and family were an impediment from the proper pursuit of knowledge. However, the biographers of the Damascene celibate inserted the information concerning his celibacy within a discussion of his asceticism, probably in an attempt to disguise an aspect of his life that did not conform well to the Islamic model of a Muslim scholar (pp. 82–86).

Some of the more endearing qualities of Ibn Taymīyah's character were his confrontational and aggressive attitude. Some of his students applauded his relentlessness in standing up for his beliefs, but others lamented his uncouth manners and his attachment to polemics. There might have been an attempt by later Hanbali scholars to distance themselves from this aspect of Ibn Taymīyah's opinions and scholarship (pp. 86–91).

Bori selects two episodes from the biographical narratives of Ibn Taymīyah to show the creation of the mythos surrounding his character. The first episode is his



funeral, whereas the second one is his meeting with the Ilkhanid ruler Ghāzān.

The reports about the funeral of Ibn Taymīyah emphasize the attendance of large numbers of people, both men and women. Ironically, the reports also give details of popular commotion, excessive manifestations of grief, and acts of veneration and mass hysteria that accompanied the funeral—the kinds of behavior that Ibn Taymīyah had fought against during his own lifetime. The model on which the narrative of the funeral is based is that of Ibn Ḥanbal himself. The absence of three individuals who were associated with the governor of Damascus and were responsible in some way or another for the imprisonment and eventual death of Ibn Taymīyah is mentioned in the reports. This seems to be done in order to contrast the overwhelming popular presence at the funeral with the absence of an official representation, establishing a dichotomy between the people and the administration (pp. 92–99).

The second episode which Bori studies in detail is the meeting between Ibn Taymīyah and the Ilkhanid sovereign Ghāzān. Here, the author contrasts the information presented in chronicles with that given in biographies of Ibn Taymīyah. As is to be expected, the latter are more detailed, more dramatic, and accentuate more the role and character of Ibn Taymīyah (pp. 99–108). Bori seems to give more credence to the chronicles than to the biographies and describes how al-ʿUmarī “constructs” an episode and an anecdote (pp. 106–7). That biographies of Ibn Taymīyah would tend to eulogize and aggrandize him and to exaggerate certain points in his favor is to be expected. However, I do not see why chronicles should be considered more impartial and objective or why chroniclers should be considered more trustworthy than biographers. In some instances, the chronicler and the biographer were the same individual.

The third chapter of the book discusses the activism of Ibn Taymīyah. Bori begins by giving us glimpses of the activism, both military and religious, of a number of individuals who lived in the thirteenth century in Damascus. This is done for the purpose of contextualizing the activism of Ibn Taymīyah himself and to show the existence of tensions between religious groups, in particular between Hanbalis and Shafiʿis (pp. 112–17). The activism of Ibn Taymīyah himself is divided into:

(1) military activism, including: exhortation of governors and sultans to defend the Muslims from the Mongols; negotiating with the Mongols to secure the release of prisoners or the sparing of bloodshed; and participation in campaigns against the Mongols and against the Shiʿites in Lebanon (pp. 118–23). Bori notes that the most significant of Ibn Taymīyah’s initiatives in this regard occurred during the years 698–705/1298–1305 (p. 118). She also sees a difference in the perspective of Syrian and Egyptian historiography with regard to Ibn Taymīyah’s role in military events. Syrian historiography, especially that based in Damascus, portrays



Ibn Taymīyah as a local hero. On the other hand, Egyptian historiography often neglects to mention his interventions and participation in these events (p. 123).

(2) civil activism, including: the smashing of wine containers; the destruction of stones and idols that attracted people; and the disruption of chess games (pp. 123–30). Bori points out that none of Ibn Taymīyah's activism was directed against the authorities themselves, rather, contrary to the practice of Ibn Ḥanbal, Ibn Taymīyah cooperated with them and in his writings urged obedience to rulers.

Some sources imply that the reason behind Ibn Taymīyah's activism was his political ambitions, and some accusations were leveled against him of plotting sedition against the governorate of Damascus. Some of Ibn Taymīyah's supporters, like Ibn Kathīr, attributed these accusations to envy (pp. 131–33). Bori argues that the accusations and tribulations that Ibn Taymīyah suffered have to be seen within the larger framework of the conflict and competition between the different *madhhabs* and religious factions (pp. 136–39).

A contradictory image of Ibn Taymīyah thus arises in the biographical sources. There is an oscillation between the image of the wise ascetic who abstains from any contact with the political world following the model of Ibn Ḥanbal, and the image of an activist who willfully cooperates with those in power, especially in cases of military emergencies. However, this contradiction is balanced by the coherence of Ibn Taymīyah's actions and his political thought that envisaged a position of intermediary power for the ulama in Islamic society. Although this is a break with the original Hanbali position, it is echoed in the local Damascene Hanbali activism of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (p. 139).

The fourth and last chapter of the book provides a biographical study of some contemporaneous adversaries of Ibn Taymīyah and authors of polemics against him. The objectives of this study are three: (1) to identify the dynamics of social competition in Damascus at the end of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth century in which to place some of the tensions that were focused around Ibn Taymīyah; (2) to point out the themes over which he was mostly attacked; and (3) to give a portrait of Ibn Taymīyah as depicted by his adversaries (p. 141). It would seem that the role, social position, and doctrinal position of the polemicists are often more revealing than the contents of their writings themselves, which were a vehicle and symbol of the conflict, not its true essence (*ibid.*).

Bori begins by arguing for the correctness of the attribution of *Al-Naṣīḥah al-Dhahabīyah*, a critical letter addressed to Ibn Taymīyah, to his disciple al-Dhahabī (pp. 142–48). The letter strongly criticizes Ibn Taymīyah's excessively polemical attitude. It also shows Ibn Taymīyah's involvement in the struggle among the ulama to acquire prestige and authority through the control of the religious institutions of Damascus (pp. 147–48).

Bori then presents brief biographical sketches of five of the adversaries of Ibn



Taymiyah: four Syrian residents in Damascus and one Egyptian, three of whom were Shafi'is, one Hanafi, and one Maliki (pp. 148–54). The author argues that the intellectual polemic against Ibn Taymiyah and the traditionalist group led by him cannot be separated from the battles for the control of teaching positions at religious institutions (p. 154).

Most of the writings of the five individuals presented in the previous section have not survived. On the other hand, the numerous writings of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355–56) against Ibn Taymiyah have survived, and this allows for a more in-depth study of the polemics aimed at Ibn Taymiyah. The rest of the chapter is dedicated exclusively to the polemics of al-Subkī (pp. 155–69).

The book concludes with four appendices: (1) a description of biographies of Ibn Taymiyah that were deemed of secondary importance by Bori due to their brevity or derivative content (pp. 177–81); (2) a table listing the teachers of Ibn Taymiyah as given in seven sources (pp. 183–86); (3) a table listing the titles given to Ibn Taymiyah in eight sources (pp. 187–90); and (4) a translation of *Al-Naṣīḥah al-Dhahabiyah* (pp. 191–94).

This is a very interesting study that highlights a number of aspects of Ibn Taymiyah's life and the way that they have been portrayed by various writers who were mostly his contemporaries. For those readers who are approaching Ibn Taymiyah for the first time, it is advisable that they start by reading a standard biography of the scholar before immersing themselves in Bori's work so that they may become familiar with the general outline of the events of Ibn Taymiyah's life. However, for all the Ibn Taymiyah enthusiasts out there, this will be required reading and a necessary reference point for all future research on the Damascene scholar's life as well as the religious and social milieu in which he lived.

Having said that, I must point out that this must be the worst edited book that I have read—either that or it is the first one that I have read with any diligence. In the 177 pages of text, from the preface to the last appendix, I have found at least one error in 116 pages, or in about 66% of the pages of the book. This is quite frustrating for the reader, especially since the majority of these errors are obvious slips or typographical errors that should have been easily corrected. In what follows, I will mention a number of the more salient errors.

- The word Ġumādā [Jumādā] that appears in the names of two lunar Islamic months has two long vowels and not just one, Ġumāda, as given on pp. 46, 51, 53, 68, 82 (note 89), 120, 131 (note 80), 134, and 151.

- The Arabic equivalent of the name David is Dā'ūd or Dāwūd, with two long vowels, not Da'ūd or Dawūd as it appears in the name of Abū Dā'ūd on pp. 92 (note 133), 95 (in text and in note 151), 98, 130 (note 74), 195 (the bibliography), and 215 (the index).



- The name of the city on the Mediterranean coast is ‘Akkā, with a long vowel, not ‘Akka as given on pp. 122 (in the text and in note 41), 123, and 215 (the index).

- The name Ibn Ruššayq al-Mağribī is found on pp. 40 (in text and in note 54), 148 (note 30), and 221 (the index), and as Ibn al-Ruššayq al-Mağribī on pp. 148 (in the text) and 163 (in the text and in note 129). The name of the student of Ibn Taymiyah is actually Ibn Rushayyiq al-Maghribī (d. 749/1348 or 9), as is clearly voweled by Shams and al-‘Imrān.¹

- The title of the work by Ibn Taghribirdī is *Al-Manhal al-Šāfi*, not *al-Manhal al-Šāfi* as given on pp. 40 (note 52), 43 (in the text and in note 74), 44 (notes 74, 75, and 76), 149 (note 40), 198 (twice, in the bibliography).

- Marğ al-Rāhiṭ on pp. 100, 104, and 105 (twice) should be corrected to Marğ Rāhiṭ.

- There is some confusion in the name of Ğahm b. Šafwān. The name is given correctly twice on p. 162, note 124, but in the same note and in the text on the same page as well as on p. 164, the name is incorrectly given as Ğahm b. Šufyān.

- Two works that are cited in the book are not listed in the bibliography: Ibn al-Hāğğ, *al-Madhal al-šar‘ al-šarīf* [sic] on p. 80 (note 80),² and M. Sakhy, “al-Wāsiṭ,” on p. 116 (note 21), that should be corrected to M. Sakly, “Wāsiṭ.”

- On p. 41, note 59, the title of a second article by de Somogyi and its page numbers has been completely omitted, although it is listed in the bibliography on p. 212. In the bibliographic entry, in the title of the article, it is “Adh-Dhahabī’s record” not “Adh-Dhahabī record,” and the article appears in the *Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume*, not the *Goldziher Memorial Volume*, as correctly given in note 59 on p. 41.

- On p. 42, note 67, Ğamāl al-Dīn Āqqūš al-Afram is identified as governor, first of Damascus from 698 to 709 AH (1298–1309/1310 AD), and then of Kark. Within the text on the same page, his death date is given as ca. 720 AH/1320–21 AD. This information is repeated in an article by the author, except that the death date of al-Afram is given for certain as 720 AH.³ Throughout the article, Bori

¹ See *Al-Jāmi‘ li-Sīrat Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyah (661–728) (khilāl Sab‘at Qurūn)*, collected by Muḥammad ‘Uzayr Shams and ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-‘Imrān (Mecca: Dār ‘Ālam al-Fawā’id lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī‘, 1420/[1999]), 10–13 and 220. For biographical information on Ibn Rushayyiq, see the references on p. 11, note 3. On pp. 10–13, Shams and al-‘Imrān argue that Ibn Rushayyiq al-Maghribī is the author of a short work entitled “Asmā’ Mu‘allafāt Ibn Taymiyah” that has been attributed to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah by some other scholars.

² The name of Ibn al-Hāğğ in the index on p. 220 is not placed in the correct alphabetical order, and neither is Ibn Hallikān nor Ibn Haldūn.

³ Caterina Bori, “A New Source for the Biography of Ibn Taymiyya,” *Bulletin of the School of*



identifies the second place of his governorate as Kark (on pp. 42, 148, and 222). The correct place name is al-Karak, in central Jordan. Reuven Amitai reads the name of the individual as Aqūsh al-Afram.⁴

There is one major complaint that I have, and that is in the method of citation of modern Arab authors. Bori has taken the approach of citing these authors by using initials for the first and middle names. I cannot recommend this method at all and must insist on seeing the full names of the authors to avoid any possible confusion in their identities. This might work for Western authors (although I would like to see the full name of these fellows as well), but for Arabic authors it can be nightmarish. What exactly is one supposed to do with the author identified simply as M. Y. Mūsā (p. 18, note 30)?⁵ This system also fails to indicate compound names. For example, ‘A. ‘A. al-Marāḡī (ibid.) is supposed to be the abbreviation for ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Marāḡī. But how can the reader know whether the two ‘ayns represent the initials of two separate names or whether they are indeed representing the given compound name? And what exactly happened to the definite article in front of the second ‘ayn?⁶ Bori herself is inconsistent, as she sometimes cites some scholars with their full name, while at other times she only gives the scholar’s last name. As is to be expected, the use of abbreviated names has led her to commit some errors. For example, on p. 18, note 30, Ṣ. ‘A. al-Ḥāmid is supposed to stand for Ṣā’ib ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd. The author of *Tarjamat Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyah* is Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī, not ‘A. al-Kurdī. On p. 24, note 56, the editor’s name is not ‘A. Ġ. al-Faryawā’ī, but ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Faryawā’ī. I think that it is always best to give the full name of all cited scholars, especially those with Arabic names.

Oriental and African Studies 67, pt. 3 (2004): 344, note 35. This article is an edition, translation, and study of a biography of Ibn Taymiyah by his student Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347 or 48) given the title *Nubdhah min Sirat Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn ibn Taymiyah*.

⁴ Reuven Amitai, “The Remaking of the Military Elite of Mamlūk Egypt by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn,” *Studia Islamica* 72 (1990): 159–60.

⁵ The full name of the scholar is Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā.

⁶ The same problem arises with the name of the scholar Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, whose full name is cited a number of times, but at others is abbreviated as Ṣ. D. al-Munajjid.



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
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ء	'	خ	kh	ش	sh	غ	gh	م	m
ب	b	د	d	ص	ṣ	ف	f	ن	n
	t	ذ	dh	ض	ḍ	ق	q	ه	h
ث	th	ر	r	ط	ṭ	ك	k	و	w
ج	j	ز	z	ظ	ẓ	ل	l	ي	y
ح	ḥ	س	s	ع	‘				
		ة	h, t (in construct)			ال	al-		
		ـَ	a	ـُ	u	ـِ	i		
		ـً	an	ـُن	un	ـِـ	in		
		آ	ā	وُ	ū	يِ	ī		
		أ	ā	وُ	ūw	يِـ	īy (medial), ī (final)		
		ى	á	و	aw	يِـ	ay		
						يِـ	ayy		

Avoid using apostrophes or single quotation marks for ‘*ayn* and *hamzah*. Instead use the Unicode characters ‘ (02BF) and ’ (02BE).

Capitalization in romanized Arabic follows the conventions of American English; the definite article is always lower case, except when it is the first word in an English sentence. The *hamzah* is not represented when beginning a word, following a prefixed preposition or conjunction, or following the definite article. Assimilation of the *lām* of the definite article before “sun” letters is disregarded. Final inflections of verbs are retained, except in pausal form; final inflections of nouns and adjectives are not represented, except preceding suffixes and except when verse is romanized. Vocalic endings of pronouns, demonstratives, prepositions, and conjunctions are represented. The hyphen is used with the definite article, conjunctions, inseparable prepositions, and other prefixes. Note the exceptional treatment of the preposition *li-* followed by the article, as in *li-l-sultān*. Note also the following exceptional spellings: Allāh, billāh, lillāh, bismillāh, mi’ah, and ibn (for both initial and medial forms). Words not requiring diacritical marks, though following the conventions outlined above, include all Islamic dynasties, as well as the following terms: Quran, sultan, amir, imam, shaykh, Sunni, Shi’i, and Sufi. Common place-names should take the common spelling in American English. Names of archaeological sites should follow the convention of the excavator.

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