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People's Will and Political Fragmentation:
Contradictions in Chile's Ongoing
Constituent Process

By

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Abstract

In October 2020, Chileans were asked to vote in a referendum on whether the country should write a new constitution; eighty percent voted in favor. Nevertheless, when parties on the Yes side formed candidate lists for the constituent assembly, they displayed extreme fragmentation. This study is meant to explain how this apparent unity dissolved into disunity. It hypothesizes that the party fragmentation process is not recent but rather ongoing since the last decade. I analyzed this fragmentation process using data from Chile's electoral agency. I calculated Laakso & Taagepera's index of effective number of political parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies as a marker of fragmentation over a longer period. Next, I compared the evolution of Chile's party system between 1989 and 2017 to the 2021 election of representatives for the constitutional convention analyzing possible significant differences in fragmentation distinct to the 2021 election. Two main results were obtained. First, political fragmentation was a process already ongoing by 2013. Second, even more fragmentation took place after the 2015 voting reform. This phenomenon was even more marked for the 2021 Constitutional Conventional elections than for the 2017 Chamber of Deputies, even under highly similar voting systems. I offer an explanation of these results following Cox's (1997) work on strategic voting and entry from non-partisan groups into political parties and lists. The lack of electoral history for this type of election and district sizes made strategic voting difficult, impeding to reduce the number of candidates and lists. At the same time, the erosion of traditional party brands, and the lower entry costs, made the entry of new actors easier without needing to participate in existing parties.

Introduction

On October 18th, 2019, a social eruption process started, with students protesting the rise in subway tickets cost in Chile's capital, Santiago. In a matter of hours, multiple riots and political manifestations were raised throughout the country. In the following days, during the peak of these demonstrations, around 1.2 million people (20% of Santiago's population) gathered in Plaza Italia (now popularly known as *Plaza Dignidad*), located in Santiago's downtown. As protests grew in strength, one of the people's demands became fundamental: the necessity of changing the 1980's Constitution enacted during Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship (1973-1990). On the night of

November 15th political parties¹ signed an agreement to conduct a plebiscite that would allow citizens to vote on whether a constituent process should take place (Ansaldi & Pardo-Vergara, 2020). On October 25th, 2020, Chile's people decided to initiate the process by a victory of the Yes (*Apruebo*) side with 78 percent of the votes.

Chile is facing a contradictory situation. How is it that after the *Apruebo* side's victory by nearly eighty percent of the votes, the lists and candidates representing that position seem to show an abnormal level of fragmentation? Even though the *Apruebo* side obtained more than two-thirds of the seats in the Conventional Convention, the striking display of fragmentation and vote share for independent lists and candidates was unexpected. This study tries to elucidate this contradiction. To do so I will measure differential fragmentation of parties and lists in Chile's constituent assembly elections compared to previous periods and analyze these results, to determine how political fragmentation has evolved, and what was the impact of 2017's electoral reform. Then, using Cox's (1997) arguments on strategic voting and party entry, the results of 2021 Constitutional Convention's election will be analyzed, especially among those organizations that represented the *Apruebo*'s side.

First, this paper will describe the history of Chile's party and electoral system. I begin with a description of these systems, primarily the lower Chamber of Deputies-between 1925 and 1973. This historical context is important, because Cox (1997, p. 114) classifies Chile's electoral system during that period as a pooling vote system (Cox, 1997, p. 42) among divisor-based proportional representation (DBPR) systems.

In September 1925, Chile adopted a proportional system, allocating seats through the D'Hondt method including specific modifications (such as intra-list competition). With minor

¹ Among the parties with representatives in the lower Congress chamber, the only important parties that did not sign the agreement were the Communist Party of Chile (PC) and Social Convergence (CS) on the left and the Republican Party (REP) on the right. All of the remaining (11) parties signed it.

changes, this system was used until the military coup and democratic breakdown in 1973. By explaining this electoral system and the resulting party scheme, a clearer picture emerges of the historical roots of the proportional system in Chile and its resemblances to some European party systems (which also had three identifiable poles: the left, the center, and the right) (Valenzuela, 1978, p. 3). Several parties from this period continued to exist 17 years after Pinochet's dictatorship, in the midst of the return to democracy, which shows long-standing trends in political representation and party brands that were formed during this era.

Next, the post-authoritarian period (known as *La Transición*, 1990-) will be assessed. By early 2000, Chile was evaluated as one of the most stable countries in Latin America. Nevertheless, several political legitimacy issues were raised in the last years of *La Transición*. Political parties are among the most degraded institutions in terms of legitimacy. Also, the features of the 1980's Constitution and the problem it faced during *La Transición* are explained. This Constitution, enacted during Pinochet's dictatorship, included institutional arrangements that limited democracy. At the same time, it has legitimacy problems due to its non-democratic origin. Those features will explain why a new constitution was the partial answer to the claims made by protesters during 2019 mobilizations.

The party and electoral system during *La Transición* (1990-) is also described. I present in detail the Binominal Electoral System, the 2017 changes to the system leading to a proportional electoral system, and the modifications of the latter for the 2021 Constitutional Convention election. I describe the evolution of party systems and parties' vote shares during this period. Initial trends towards fragmentation are shown with this exposition: the diminished turnout for the centrists' political parties and the sustained decrease in participation.

After this review of Chile's electoral systems and political landscape, I analyze political fragmentation through time, using electoral data. First, I compare the 2017 and 2021 elections in terms of candidates running per district. I conducted a paired t-test across districts, testing whether

there was a significant increment in the number of candidates between these two elections with highly comparable electoral systems. This would test whether the level of fragmentation in the 2021 election- operationalized as the number of total candidates running for the same number of seats- was greater than that of the past election under electoral systems that are extremely similar. Then, I conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA to analyze if the district size affected the number of candidates that ran for each electoral district. This would highlight whether this effect transcended district size or if it was being mainly driven by districts with more seats- which are also more urban and populated than smaller districts- or by smaller- more rural, remote, and less populated, districts.

To contextualize this fragmentation analysis in Chile's broader political history, I consider a more extended period of time (1989-2021) for further analyses. I calculated Laakso and Taagepera's effective number of parties index for each electoral cycle within this period. I present this index data, and I interpret qualitative trends. Next, to quantify the fragmentation process over this extended period of time, I applied a linear regression model to assess the effect of the electoral period (i.e., time) on the effective number of parties and votes per seat ratios. Then, I compare the 2021 election's fragmentation index to the Laakso and Taagepera index data across time to test whether this year constituted an anomaly within the historical values for this index. I also calculated Taagepera's balance index to analyze how the relation between the biggest party and the number of parties with representation in the Chamber of Deputies has evolved since the end of the Pinochet regime until the 2021 election. Finally, I calculated the Gallagher index for the same period to analyze how the ratio between votes and seats has changed over time.

I attempt to explain the observed fragmentation trends during the last decade and especially during 2021 election. I use Cox (1997) arguments to examine the conditions for entry and strategic voting as a feasible explanation of fragmentation. I suggest that due to the lack of historical electoral information, there was little room for strategic voting. As strategic voting reduces the number of viable candidates and lists, it could be expected to have a high number of candidates and

lists. Also, social pressure to make the political system more representative, the decay of traditional party brands in this period, and the lowered entry costs for new political actors contributed to the abnormal level of fragmentation that the 2021 election displayed.

1. Chile's party and electoral system (1925-1973)

In the following section I will describe the history of Chile's electoral and party systems as to historically contextualize institutions (such as the divisor-based proportional electoral system, the pooling vote system, or the development of certain political parties) in the twentieth century, as they have an impact in current institutions and political behavior.

Until 1973, Chile was one of the longest-standing democracies in the world, boasting a democratic rule from 1830 to 1973. For 143 years, Chile only had thirteen months of unconstitutional rule (Valenzuela, 1989, p. 160).

Chile's electoral system for most of the 20th century, was adopted in September 1925, shaped by Decree Laws 542, 543 and 710. These laws established a proportional representation system, using the D'Hondt system with modifications (Gil, 1966; Parrish et al., 1970). This system, was revisited in 2017 as the electoral system for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies elections- incorporating some present-day alterations. The incentives posed by this system provide a framework for the configuration of political pacts and lists, and remains in the political culture of several political parties.

During this time the Chamber of Deputies had 24 districts electing varying number of seats, ranging from 18 to 2. In every district, each list could register as many candidates as there were seats open for election. For example, in a district with three seats ($M=3$) each list could register a maximum of three candidates. Individual independent candidates were allowed to run for a seat and parties could compete jointly as lists, forming a pact at a district level. People could vote for an individual candidate or a list using a system known as *cédula particular*. Each candidate, party or list prepared their own ballots. If a voter wanted to vote for a specific candidate, that preference was

marked next to the candidate's name. If the person did not mark a preference, the vote counted for the list as a whole. The allocation of seats was determined as follows. First, the votes issued for each candidate were added to that of all other candidates in their list, resulting in each list's votes. Each of the list votes was then divided by 1, 2, 3... until every list reached as many quotients as seats in that district. Quotients were ranked in decreasing order until reaching the district magnitude. The last of these quotients is known as the electoral quotient (or *cifra repartidora*). Each list's number of votes was divided by the electoral quotient determining how many seats each list would have. Finally, to decide which candidates were elected, Decree-Law 542 indicated several rules. Initially, if the number of seats that correspond to a list equals the number of candidates on that list, all of them will be proclaimed winners. If it is not the case and a list has fewer candidates than the number of seats allocated to it, all the other seats will be distributed among the remaining lists, as if there was a new election, using the same system, and remainder of votes. Third, if there were more candidates than seats allocated to that list, seats would be assigned to those candidates whose personal votes were equivalent or more to the electoral quotient. Finally, if seats remained to be filled (in other words, if none of the candidates met the electoral quotient), the candidate's votes in the first place on the list were considered equal to the number of seats allocated to that list. The votes of the second name on the list were considered equal to the same number of seats minus one, and so on, until the last candidate. The multiplied votes of each candidate were listed in decreasing order, and the candidates obtaining the highest values were proclaimed winners (Gamboa & Morales, 2015, pp. 53–55).

Perhaps the most distinctive modification between 1925 and the start of the military dictatorship in 1973 to the traditional proportional system using the D'Hondt method for allocating seats was the introduction of the *lista conjunta* (joint list). When Chile was discussing its electoral system, the assumption was that the D'Hondt system would allow larger parties to maintain their dominant position. The problem that emerged from applying the D'Hondt in its unmodified form

was that some parties would win seats in some districts with far more votes than needed.

Meanwhile, in other districts, parties and candidates would be pushed aside by stronger parties in those districts. This problem was particularly relevant for the Conservatives because while they had strong support in the countryside, they could be seized by left-wing parties in urban areas. It was also a problem for the parties occupying the political center: *liberales, demócratas, nacionales y liberales democráticos*. Oppositely to the extremes (*conservadores* and *radicales*) they were fragmented and lacked the discipline (Heise González, 1982, p. 292) required to excel in the new electoral system that privileged larger parties. By joining efforts in a *lista conjunta*, parties could maximize their outcome and gain more seats. In other words, even with the same number of votes for all the parties within a *lista conjunta*, running as a *list conjunta* would provide more seats overall for that coalition (Parrish et al., 1970, p. 257).

By 1930, Chile's party system was comprised of five main political parties. The traditional liberals and conservatives inherited nineteenth-century cleavages on the separation between the State and the Church. The Radical Party emerged, pivoting around the same issue: to create a secular state. Finally, the socialist and communist parties were created during the 1920s, reflecting a growing class divide. The only major party that would become an important actor during this time period was founded after 1950. This was the Christian Democratic Party, which tried to promote social reforms from the perspective of Reform Catholicism (Valenzuela, 1995, p. 169).

In the mid-twentieth century, Chile had distinctive features in its party system. Chile was the only Latin American country where political forces resembled those of many European countries with three clear blocks: the Right, the Center, and the Left (Gil, 1966, p. 244). Specifically, Valenzuela suggests that Chile's electorate—especially between 1925 and 1975—was substantially loyal to political *tendencias*, being more flexible in loyalty to specific political parties (Valenzuela, 1995, p. 59). Chile's party system was deeply rooted in the country's social fabric interacting with it to a considerable degree. This interconnectedness between parties and society mainly took place in

two political arenas. On one hand the National Congress level and the executive branch's elite took center stage. On the other hand, the mundane side of politics usually occurred far from the first arena and Chile's capital, Santiago. Here, a complex system of transactions resulted from the exchange of small benefits for political support. In this context, ideological and programmatic cleavages were superposed in the interaction between political parties and broader Chilean society in these two political arenas (Ibid., p. 8- 9).

Chile's party system was also very competitive during this period. In 1930, there were more than thirty parties; by 1970, the system had stabilized at around ten parties. None of them obtained more than thirty percent of the electorate in national elections, except the Christian Democrats (DC), which reached 42.3% of the electorate in 1965, and 35.6% in 1967. During this period an initial trend towards polarization can be observed. Political forces were easily identifiable: the Left (composed mainly by Socialists and Communists), the Center (Radicals and PDC), and the Right (National Party, NP). As the system was polarized, its centrifugal forces led the center to instability, one of the causes of the subsequent collapse of the political system (Ibid., pp. 6-7).

The late 1960s brought along a political crisis. A significant change during this period is the appearance of the Christian Democrats (DC). They tried to offer a third, central, alternative to the increasingly polarized Chilean society. After their foundation Christian Democrats gained a rising number of votes for each electoral cycle and had the momentum to face the 1964 election. Both Liberals and Conservatives showed their support for the Christian Democrat presidential candidate, Eduardo Frei Montalva, who won by a landslide victory. For the 1965 parliamentary election DC won 42.3% of seats. These successes made it so, in practice, they started to rule as a *partido único* (single party). They tried to obtain majority support without the support of Liberals and Conservatives, as a centrist party. This strategy provoked an intense reaction both from the right and the left. Contrary to Christian Democrats' purpose of offering a third alternative to the increasingly polarized political system, they contributed to pushing both extremes far from the political center.

They were an unstable center mostly because their voters did not particularly align with their ideology but rather voted for them out of rejection or lack of identification with more polarized parties. Adding to this political turmoil was that achievements from Frei Montalva's governmental program (agrarian reform and copper nationalization, central issues in Christian Democrats' agenda) clashed with political opponents (Valenzuela, 1978, p. 37-38).

The Left further contributed to political instability. The influences from the Cold War and several revolutionary leftist groups in Latin America, inspired the Left to radicalize its discourse and actions. In this group, the most relevant party was the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), organized by students in Universidad de Concepcion.

In 1970 Salvador Allende, the candidate for *Unidad Popular* comprised of the Left and Left-leaning parties at the time, was elected with only 36.61% of votes. Allende's government was faced the problems that came from being a presidency obtained with a minority of votes. On top of this, the extent of reforms that he wanted to establish was tremendous, making the government very fragile. As an additional challenge, his presidency faced two groups that were willing to abandon democracy and civil liberties in favor of establishing their regimes. MIR intended to build a socialist society by the violent uprising of peasants and workers. They were skeptical of Allende's strategy to conduct radical reforms respecting democratic institutions. From the right, a sector uncommitted to democratic rule was comprised of wealthy economic groups, military sectors, and a portion of the middle class. Both extremes overrode those who wanted a peaceful resolution. The breakdown of democracy in Chile and the collapse of Allende's government was multicausal, with the political and economic crisis and international intervention playing an important role. On September 11th, 1973, the military conducted a coup against Allende's government. The military proclaimed a *Junta* composed of the highest officers in the navy, the air force, and the marine. Civil liberties were constrained, and leftist parties were forbidden. Over 3.000 people were dead or missing, more than 10.000 people were tortured, and approximately 200.000 were exiled.

Many facets of Chile's party system before Pinochet's dictatorship showed great stability, surviving the breakdown of democracy. Several political actors resisted during the dictatorship and were able to resurge and available to participate in the democratic elections that came. Additionally, specific features in Chile's electoral system, such as intra-pact or intra-list competition, and the proportional electoral system with specific dynamics to build a coalition for presidential elections, are a heritage from this era.

2. *La Transición*, social movements and 2019's political crisis

During the last decades, Chile has been appraised by the consolidation and stability of its party system (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Siavelis, 2016). However, this desirable feature (political stability) also represented a problem: Chile became a rigid political system (Valenzuela & Dammert, 2006). This scenario partially contrasted with the Latin American tendency of decline in party brands: dramatic and sudden breakdowns of political parties (Lupu, 2016). Although Chile faced a generalized crisis of representation (Luna, 2016), the country still managed to have a stable party system. According to Altman and Luna (2011), Chile's party system is not homogeneously institutionalized (i.e. defined by specific age-groups and socioeconomic segments, there are significant disparities in identification or participation in political parties). At the same time, by 2011, these authors showed how the system was increasingly disconnected from civil society and stagnated at the elite level.

Throughout the *Transición*, several anti-democratic elements persisted from the 1980's Constitution, provoking a stagnant political system. Atria (2013, p. 45) has described the effect of those elements as neutralizing the people's will. One consequence of a neutralized political system is a generalized aversion towards institutions, especially political ones such as political parties (Castiglioni & Rovira, 2016). Informal institutions that developed within Chile's political system during *La Transición*, enhanced the formal anti-democratic elements in the constitution (Siavelis, 2016) that helped bring consensus and stability during this period. However, years later, some of

those informal institutions (such as *cuoteos* -to divide designations in state organs among parties of the leading political alliances, *Concertacion*² and *Chile Vamos*,³, by informal agreements) are at the center of critiques, contributing to uprising the crisis Chile was facing.

At the beginning of the *Transición*, the rights to associate (hold public meetings) and political demonstration were restored. The repression and persecution of social activists and political leaders conducted during the dictatorship were formally eradicated, opening new horizons and possibilities for social actors (Donoso, 2016, p. 175; Valenzuela, 1989, p. 169). During the 2000s, several social movements became noticeable in the streets and the public sphere. Social movements' central moments of activity can be traced back to 2006 and 2011 for student movements, a 2009 rise in environmental activism, and the rising influence of the feminist movement, especially during 2018 protests and mobilizations. These movements made important critiques of Chile's development model and the provision of public goods (von Bülow & Donoso, 2017), and constructed several demands that were enacted during the 2019 protests, creating ideological stances and programmatic claims that raised important cleavages in the 2021 Constitutional Convention election. All these previous factors contributed to the political fragmentation in this period.

2.1 The Role of Social Movements during Chile's Transición

In Latin America, social movements historically held an ongoing dialogue with state officials and political parties (von Bülow & Donoso, 2017, p. 5). Social movements that were allied to political parties during the 60s and 70s had virtually no scope of action during Pinochet's dictatorship. Savage selective repression, economic bonanza, and propaganda spread by the controlled press helped Pinochet win the 1980 constitutional plebiscite (Silva, 2009, p. 251). Nevertheless, by 1983 the political scenario was completely different and more confrontational

² The center-left coalition that governed Chile from 1990 to 2010. Details of its composition are in the annex.

³ The center-right coalition that governed Chile from 2010 to 2014. Details of its composition are in the annex.

towards Pinochet. The severe economic crisis from 1982 to 1983 and limited political liberalization galvanized citizens and social movements towards activism. and an ongoing protest cycle against Pinochet's regime.

While these social movements were crucial to end authoritarian rule, social mobilization decreased once democracy was reestablished. Trauma from the 70s and its deadlock and polarization trends impacted the assessment of the democratic breakdown made by *Concertacion's* elite. During the 70s, it was excessive pressure from popular mobilization that contributed to the coup. Accordingly, political parties in the left and the center started to abandon political mobilization as a base for their constituencies (von Bülow & Donoso, 2017, p. 15) . This is the 1990s context that the student movement, environmental activism, and feminist mobilization inherited before their uprising extensively in the 2010s decade.

These three social movements (students, feminists, and environmental activism) directly contributed to the scenario that led to a plebiscite for a new constitution with an overwhelming victory and influenced the shape it took. The three movements also define some of the more significant issues claimed by voters as motivations to change the constitution. Moreover, some of their leaders contributed to creating new political parties in the period between 2013 and 2021. Other actors, especially from environmental and feminist movements, were also elected as independent candidates in the Constitutional Convention.

2.2 Students Movement

By 2006 the first generation of high school students had lived their entire life in a democracy. During the first year of President Michelle Bachelet's government (2006-2010) and the fourth consecutive administration of the *Concertación*, a wave of secondary school student protests surprised the country. Even though the movement was initially motivated by economic concerns (such as lowering the cost of public transport for students), after multitudinous protests and school occupations, it forced a profound discussion on Chile's educational system. In response to this

movement and the support it garnered the government created a Presidential Advisory Commission on the Quality of Education and the process ended with promulgating a new General Law of Education in 2009 (Bellei et al., 2010, pp. 12–18; Donoso, 2013, p. 2).

However, this Educational Reform proved insufficient. During March 2011, the board of a private university that had been established as a non-profit institution with a public role attempted to sell the institution to a for profit organization. Students repeatedly occupied the university and triggered public demonstrations from students in other universities. Initially these protests were in solidarity with their fellow students and echoed the demands of the 2006 protests on education. On June 16th, more than eighty thousand students marched through Santiago's main avenue. The primary demand was “*no más lucro*” (end of profit-making) in educational institutions. The movement persisted from 2011 to 2013. The claim that some spheres of life should not be arranged by the market outcomes rapidly expanded from education to other areas. The legitimacy of the student movement in that period was high among Chilean society.

The magnitude of the rallies and citizenship support for the students' demands pressured President Sebastian Piñera's administration to change the Minister of Education three times. Perhaps, the most significant achievement of this movement was a package of measures trying to soften student loans. However, structural demands made by students were not addressed. For that reason, the movement remained very active during the following years (Donoso, 2017, pp. 81–83).

During the last decade, the student movement impacted the political sphere in two significant ways. First, especially during the first half of the 2010s, this movement had great influence in setting Chile's educational policy agenda. Second, the student movement impacted the relationship between political forces, which will be explained by analyzing Chile's current party system (Donoso, 2017) in [sections 3.2](#) and [8.3](#).

2.3 The Feminist Movement

On November 20th, during 2019 Chile's protests, the Valparaiso feminist collective *Las Tesis* performed an artistic public intervention titled “*Un violador en tu camino*” (A Rapist in Your Path, a play on words on Chile's Police's motto: a friend in your path) in Plaza Anibal Pinto, in Valparaiso's downtown.⁴ The performance went viral and was repeated by independent groups in several cities around the world. *Las Tesis*' lyrics and choreography harshly critiqued Chilean polices gendered sexual violence and the institutional systems that support it. This performance is a good summary of issues addressed by the feminist movement in the massive protests during 2019. The movement was not limited to a public policy discussion on reproductive rights (which was also an essential part of their goals) or any other specific policy decision. Instead, it was a comprehensive critique of patriarchy in Chilean society, expressed through violence against women, sexual harassment, sexist education, political underrepresentation, the gender pay-gap, unpaid domestic work, and a wide array of sexist practices and institutions (Zeran, 2018, p. 114).

In addition to the feminist movement triggered by police gendered sexual violence several cases of gendered sexual and workplace harassment in universities came out during 2017 and led the following year to be filled with protests and the occupation of several universities. During 2018 several demonstrations were made in different cities across the country, reaching their peak on May 16th, 2018, when around 200.000 women marched through Chile's capital main streets.

The current third wave of feminist movements in Chile had significant effects on the electoral system. First, it contributed to adopting several affirmative actions in electoral regulation. Second, feminists also contributed to creating a mechanism to achieve gender parity in the Constitutional

⁴ The performance can be watched with English subtitles in the following link:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5AAscy7qbl>

The Chilean version of the performance includes references to the police's anthem where they reference a young innocent girl being watched by her lover, a policeman. It also includes choreography mimicking the degrading squatting position women are forced to adopt while naked during detentions. The blindfolds used by the performers is a reference to the eye injuries that were caused by police violence during the 2019 protests.

Convention. Both sets of rules will be explained in detail when describing the electoral system for the 2017 and 2021 elections in [sections 3.3](#) and [3.4](#).

2.4 Environmental Activism and Protests

One major environmental movement in Chile's history led the first massive protest since the last mobilization against Pinochet's dictatorship. They were *Patagonia sin Represas* (Patagonia Without Dams), a movement against a mega-dam complex to be built in the Chilean Patagonia (Schaeffer, 2017, p. 131). Several other environmental mobilizations also occurred against existing or planned contaminating industrial complexes.

Environmental activism in Chile has certain singularities. It exists across the country in zones where there is no other social movement active. The diversity and fragmentation of environmental activism made of organizational and political learning fundamental, leading smaller groups to learn how to work together and act politically in the public sphere. In most cases, this type of activism is rooted in the territory. Another singularity is that during the *Patagonia sin Represas* protests, Chile's development model was questioned, which encompassed one of the more profound and transversal critique during the *Transición*.

The historical context for Chile's political party landscape, electoral structures, and the influence of social movement, is central to understand the trajectory of fragmentation in Chile's political system. The questions this paper tries to answer are: Is Chile's political system more fragmented in the run-up to the Constitutional Convention than in past elections? If there is more fragmentation than in the past, how can we explain this fragmentation? Is the level of fragmentation similar across the political spectrum? How is this fragmentation connected with Chile's party system evolution? And, how the entry of new actors in 2013, 2017 and 2021 is related with this trend?

3. Evolution of Chile's electoral and party system (1990-2021)

3.1 Binominal Electoral System (1989-2013)

An electoral system can be defined as:

The set of rules that specify how voters can express their preferences (ballot structure) and how the votes are translated into seats. The system must specify at least the number of areas where this translation takes place (*electoral districts*), the number of seats allocated in each of these areas (*district magnitude*), and the seat allocation formula (Taagepera, 2007, p. 2).

Chile's Binominal System consisted of a proportional system with a district magnitude equal to 2 ($M=2$) across 60 districts (120 seats) in the Chamber of Deputies and 19 districts (38 seats) in the Senate.⁵ As Cox (1997, p. 114) classifies it, it is a proportional system with a divisor-based proportional representation using an open list. The voter is given one categorical vote to cast for a candidate within a list (ballot structure). Seats are allocated among lists using the D'Hondt method. First, all vote shares are divided by 1, which does not alter them. Then, the first seat is allocated to the largest share. Then, the previous vote share divided by one is divided by 2. New shares are compared, and the second seat is allocated to the largest share. Competition among allied parties is possible. Nonexclusive candidates votes are transferred to the list vote totals, which Cox denominates "pooling vote" (Cox, 1997, p. 42). Within a list, the votes for all candidates are added and counted as the basis for allocation of the seats by D'Hondt. The seat(s) go to the candidate(s) with the most personal votes.⁶

The main effect of the Binominal system was that political forces tended to form two large blocks. After 1989, it gave birth to the *Unión para el Progreso*⁷ (grouping center-right and right-wing parties) and the *Concertación* (center-left and left-wing parties). A list needs at least 33.4% of

⁵ The 38 directly elected senators were accompanied by nine non directly elected senators and two former heads of state (Augusto Pinochet and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle) as senators for life. In 2005 a Constitutional Reform eliminated non-directly elected senators and senators for life.

⁶ The Binominal System was enacted on May 5th, 1988, by law 18.700 on the Constitutional Organization of Popular Voting and Counting.

⁷ *Unión para el Progreso* will be known in the subsequent electoral periods as Alliance for Chile (*Alianza por Chile*).

votes to obtain a seat under the binominal system. In practice, there is barely any chance to get elected for a political actor that is not running with the two major blocks. The only candidate running as independent outside the two major blocks that have been elected under the binominal system was, a current presidential candidate, Gabriel Boric in the Magallanes district in the 2013 parliamentary election. If a list wanted to get the two seats in a district, they needed 67% of the votes, making it extremely difficult. The uniqueness of the binominal system was that it favored the first minority. A list that only obtained 33.4% of votes could obtain half of the district seats.

Supporters of the binominal electoral system claimed that it has several advantages:

1. It would produce a convergence towards moderate positions. Parties would need to move towards the center (or median) within their potential electorate.
2. It would promote negotiation among parties rather than confrontation, based on the necessity of constructing big blocks. This incentive would also make governments more stable, in opposition to proportional electoral systems.
3. It would discourage the splitting of parties.

The system would pose an incentive to merge political positions instead of splitting them, contributing to the political system stability (Guzman, 1993) .

The law that instituted the electoral system was enacted after Pinochet's defeat in the plebiscite that started the path to restoring democracy in Chile. The binominal system held a strategic advantage for the parties that supported Pinochet, assuring that ring-wing parties would not hold a diminished position after the 1989 parliamentary election. Since in every district, they needed just 33.4% of votes to win a seat this would assure their representation in congress.

As Cox (1997, pp. 117–120) points out, the binominal system has room for strategic voting. Suppose that two lists (one conservative, one leftist) are running for a district, each one with two candidates. If neither list doubles the other's votes, and conservative candidates are expected to have the same number of votes than the leftist list, leftists' voters may have an impact in

determining which of those conservative candidates would win. If the expected number of votes for the leftist list exceeds the conservative list, this could transfer votes from the stronger list to the weaker, altering the distribution of votes across lists. Nevertheless, this happened just few times, mainly in the district dominated by the ring-wing parties.

3.2 Parties' shares (1989-2021)

From 1993 to 2005, every political sector (Left, Center and Right) was able to obtain roughly one-third of the votes in the Chamber of Deputies. This split between three political sectors resembled Chile's party system between 1925 and 1973. The right was composed by the *Union Demócrata Independiente* (UDI) and the *Renovación Nacional* (RN) parties. Then, the center comprised the *Democracia Cristiana* (DC) and the *Partido Radical Social Demócrata* (PRSD). Finally, the left was traditionally comprised the *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD) and the *Partido Socialista* (PS).


Table 1

Parties	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009	2013	2017	2021
Right	28.1	28.4	31.2	38.9	36.4	40.8	33.88	38.01	19.52
<i>UDI</i>	9.82	12.1	14.4	25.1	22.3	23.0	18.96	15.96	7.83
<i>RN</i>	18.2	16.3	16.7	13.7	14.1	17.8	14.92	17.79	7.23
<i>EVOPOLI</i>	n/a	n/a						4.26	4.46
Center	29.9	30.1	26.1	22.9	24.3	18.0	19.48	13.42	13.67
<i>DC</i>	25.9	27.1	22.9	18.9	20.7	14.2	15.55	9.03	3.65
<i>PRSD</i>	3.94	2.98	3.13	4.05	3.54	3.8	3.63	3.61	1.18
<i>Non-Neutral Independents (Independientes No Neutrales)</i>									8.84
<i>PL</i>							0.3	0.78	1.25

Left	11.4 5	23.7 7	23.6	22.7 3	25.4 7	22.5 7	26.26	30.88	37.9
<i>PPD</i>	11.4 5	11.8 4	12.5 5	12.7 3	15.4 2	12.6 9	11.03	6.1	2.58
<i>PS</i>		11.9 3	11.0 5	10.0 0	10.0 5	9.88	11.12	9.75	4.84
<i>RD</i>								5.72	5.99
<i>CS</i>									3.23
<i>PH</i>								4.23	
<i>PC</i>							4.11	4.58	4.99
<i>People's List (Lista del Pueblo)</i>									16.27
<i>Turnout</i>	94.7 2	91.3 4	87.2 3	87.1 1	87.6 7	87.7 0	49.35	46.05	41.51

Table 1. Percentage of votes for each major political party represented in the Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2017. Results of those parties in the 2021 Constitutional Convention election, are in the last column.

Figure 1



The 1989 election had some particularities. Most importantly, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party did not run with their labels since both had been banned during the dictatorship. Besides these singularities, the 1989 and 2013 elections period are comparable because they were conducted under the binominal electoral system. The 2017 election incorporated a proportional system that was used with some modifications in the 2021 constitutional convention election.

Table 1 and Figure 1 show three important tendencies. First, there is a dramatic decrease in the percentage of votes that the political center obtains over time. In 1989 the center represented almost one third of the votes. By 2017 it represented only 13.42% of the votes. Then, a second element to consider is how major left political parties swift from just two major parties in 1993, to five in 2017, each winning a similar portion of votes. In contrast, the right political parties only increased from two to three parties during the same period.

Voter turnout remained stable from 1993 to 2009. In that period, Chile had a compulsory system of voting. People could decide not to be in the electoral registry, but once a person was registered as a voter, they had an obligation to vote, facing considerable fines if they did not vote. In 2012 Congress approved a law that automatically registered people over 18 in the electoral registry and allowed them to vote. However, in each election, voting was non-compulsory. Table 1 also shows the decrease in turnout from 2013 to 2021 after this change in the voting system. Although the 2020 plebiscite and the election of representatives for the Constitutional Convention in 2021 faced a pandemic, which may have affected voter turnout for health and safety concerns, Chile has experienced a sustained decrease in turnout. The same trends can be seen in congressional and local elections and are not limited to presidential elections.

Finally, there is a clear trend in fragmentation between 2013-2017. In 2017 new parties entered to the Congress: EVOPOLI in the right, Liberal Party (PL) in the center, and Democratic Revolution (RD) and Social Convergence (CS) in the left. Then, for the 2021 Constitutional

Convention election, two new lists also obtained significant results: People's List and Non-Independent Neutrals.

3.3 2017 Proportional Electoral System

The center-left obtained favorable electoral results in 2013. Since the transition to democracy, it had the majority in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies for the first time. In April 2015, an overhaul was conducted to Chile's electoral system. The binominal system was changed into a more proportional one. In the Chamber of Deputies, the number of districts was reduced from 60 to 28. The district magnitude was increased from 2 to a range between 3 to 8, depending on the district. The result is a lower chamber integrated by 155 deputies. In the case of the Senate, 19 districts were reduced to 15. The district magnitude was increased from 2 to a range between 2 to 5. In the first period, the Senate was going to be composed of 43 Senators. Then, in the next election, the Senate would be completed reaching 50 senators. Every ten years, the districts would be reevaluated according to changes in population. In any case, no district for the lower chamber election would have less than three or more than eight. Lists running for Senate or Chamber of Deputies seats can present as many candidates as there the district magnitude for each district plus one (M+1). Along with the modification of the electoral system, the reform contained affirmative actions to increase women's representation in Congress. Each party is mandated to have at least 40% female candidates. Additionally, for each woman who is elected, there will be a bonus of approximately USD 20.000 for the party (Fuentes, 2017, pp. 6–7).

Under these new regulations, entry barriers are diminished for independents. They only need 0.5% of the last election's voters endorsing their candidacy in order to run. That change should introduce more proportionality in the system, allowing smaller parties or a third coalition to be competitive.

3.4 2021 Constitutional Convention Electoral System

The electoral system used for the Constitutional Convention is based on the 2017 electoral system for Deputies with modifications.

First, there is a gender clause that allocates the seats achieving gender parity in each district. The Constitutional Convention Electoral system was the first in the world to include a mechanism to achieve gender parity within elected candidates.

The thirty first transitory provision of the Constitution describes the allocation of seats:

1) In the districts that allocate an even number of seats, half of them should be assigned to men and the other half to women. In the other districts, that allocate an odd number of seats, the difference between genders cannot be more than one.

2) Following the Law 18.700, the seats will be preliminarily allocated. If there is gender parity, according to the first rules, those candidates will be proclaimed.

3) If there is no gender parity following the previous rules, the number of seats corresponding to each list will be maintained. But the allocation of the seats will be done according to the following rules:

- The number of men and women that should be augmented or diminished will be established
- The candidates of the overrepresented gender will be ordered from the lower number of votes to the highest
- The candidate of the sub represented gender with most votes, who has not been proclaimed as winner and is a member of the same political party or list, will be proclaimed as a winner.

Additionally, in December 2020, the law that allowed candidates running for indigenous people's groups rather than normal districts was approved by Chile's Senate. With this clause, the number of the Constitutional Conventions members to be elected with the previously described

system dropped from 155 to 138. The other seats will be assigned following a different electoral system for indigenous people's reserved seats.

Table 2.

Region	District	Seats	% Indigenous People 18+ YO	Decrease in Seats	Seats After Reform
ARICA Y P.	1	3	32.9		3
TARAPACA	2	3	22.6		3
ANTOFAGASTA	3	5	13.2	1	4
ATACAMA	4	5	18.0	1	4
COQUIMBO	5	7	8.3	1	6
VALPARAISO	6	8	5.9		8
VALPARAISO	7	8	7.3	1	7
METROPOLITANA	8	8	10.5	1	7
METROPOLITANA	9	7	11.3	1	6
METROPOLITANA	10	8	8.3	1	7
METROPOLITANA	11	6	6.6		6
METROPOLITANA	12	7	11.2	1	6
METROPOLITANA	13	5	10.4	1	4
METROPOLITANA	14	6	8.8	1	5
O'HIGGINS	15	5	7.1		5
O'HIGGINS	16	4	4.9		4
MAULE	17	7	5.1		7
MAULE	18	4	3.6		4
ÑUBLE	19	5	4.6		5
BIO BIO	20	8	9	1	7
BIO BIO	21	5	12.5	1	4
ARAUCANIA	22	4	28.7	1	3
ARAUCANIA	23	7	33.1	1	6
LOS RIOS	24	5	23.5	1	4
LOS LAGOS	25	4	26.8	1	3
LOS LAGOS	26	5	24.7		4
AYSEN	27	3	25.8		3
MAGALLANES	28	3	20.6		3
TOTAL		155		17	138

Table 2. Electoral districts for the 2021 Constitutional Convention election

4. Political Fragmentation

4.1 Number of Candidates: Pre electoral comparison of candidates between 2017 and 2021

There are overall similarities between the 2017 and 2021 electoral systems making them highly comparable in formal terms. Differences in the number of lists and candidates that ran for each election could only be marginally explained by changes in the electoral system. This would allow to isolate the effects from political fragmentation that surpass what is expected under different electoral systems. Usually, studies neglect to analyze the registration of lists and candidates at a pre-electoral stage as a measure of fragmentation. Nevertheless, Cox (1997, p. 29) delineates the importance of pre-entry politics. In this stage, the main question is which factors deter entry? (Such as major parties' nomination procedures, anticipation of failure by minor parties and independent candidates, among others). The abnormal number of candidates running for the 2021 election could constitute a first approach to see major changes even in a pre-entry scenario.

In order to compare the potential increase in fragmentation as measured by a higher number of lists and candidates being registered to run for elections I conducted two paired T-tests across each of Chile's electoral district. I compared the number of lists and candidates for the 2017 and 2021 elections. This is a pre-electoral comparison. This paired T-test would determine if there is a statistically significant increase in the number of lists and candidates across the country between the two elections. In this case, the independent variable is time, operationalized in these two electoral cycles (2017 and 2021). The dependent variable is the number of lists and candidates per district.

The 2017 Chamber of Deputies election had, on average, 6.430 (SD=0.997) lists running per district. In the 2021 election of representatives for the Constitutional Convention, there was a statistically significant increase in the average number of lists running per district (\bar{x} =8.290; SD=1.802, $t(27)=-5.173$; $p<0.001$).

The same pattern can be observed at the level of candidates running per district. In the election held for the Chamber of Deputies in 2017, there were on average 33.960 (SD=10.686) candidates running per district. In the 2021 election of representatives for the Constitutional Convention, there was a statistically significant increase in the average number of candidates running per district (\bar{x} =45.640; SD=15.377, $t(27)=6.184$; $p<0.001$).

These trends can be observed in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2




Figure 2. Number of lists and candidates running for the 2017 Congressional Deputies election and the 2021 Constitutional Convention representatives.

At this point, it is necessary to consider certain limitations of the previous approach related to the pre-electoral comparison. The 2021 electoral system has minor changes in relation to the system used in 2017. First, the new gender parity rule increased the number of candidates that each list could present. Although there is an increase of candidates in most cases across different districts

and lists due to this specific rule -the lists added candidates beyond the M+1 criterion, in the cases where the gender parity rule operated- the most significant increase in candidates comes from a rise in the number of lists. Second, there are reserved seats for indigenous people. The 17 seats for indigenous people were discounted from several electoral districts. However, the law that included reserved seats was approved on December 15th, 2020, and the deadline for the registration of lists and candidates ended on January 11th, 2021. In practice, the coordination of parties, lists, and candidates for the non-indigenous election started months before. Several parties had already defined their candidates by that date, so the reserved seats for indigenous people should not have a significant effect on this measurement.

How does a list (or an independent candidate) decide to run for a seat? The most common approach is that parties' elites can anticipate strategic voting. If a list or a candidate will not be competitive, is reasonable to withdraw from that election (Cox, 1997, p. 171). Nevertheless, that argument has some limitations. In first place, is it not clear at the moment in which withdrawals decisions need to be made, that parties' elites will be capable of foresee which candidates or list will be viable on the election's day. One possible answer, is that electoral history is relevant in determining which candidates are viable (Cox, 1997, pp. 157–158). At the same time, this argument presupposes that parties' elites have as only motivation the victory of its candidates (Cox, 1997, p. 171). But, if there are long-term perspectives, the coordination game is more complex than the basic model: it is a multistage coordination game (Cox, 1997, p. 158). It is common to have a high number of candidates and lists in emerging democracies where there are no clear track or electoral history: it is not easy no determine who is viable and who is not (Cox, 1997, p. 159). A third element is related to how important are party labels at the moment of determining who should run for a seat. According to Cox, the party should have the monopoly of a given segment of opinion, to be able to effectively coordinate candidates within that segment (Cox, 1997, p. 160). In the case of Chile's 2021 election, these three conditions are present. Even tough Chile has a defined

party system, due to new social cleavages and a new electoral system, it was not easy to foresee possible people's support for this election. At the same time, in the *Apruebo* side, there were traditional parties competing with those new political parties created by students' movements leaders alongside with ad-hoc lists created for the 2021 election. Accordingly, there is no monopoly of certain segments of the opinion. Finally, party brands are in a severe decline. Established political parties were illegitimate for the general public. This motivated that several social leaders and possible candidates preferred to create new lists (such as People's List and Non-neutral Independents) rather than competing with the label of preexisting parties.

4.2 District size effects

Additionally, the effect of district size was also tested. In other words, does the district's size affect the tendency to have more candidates or lists? I ran two repeated-measures ANOVAs using a 2x3 design (2: time, 2017 or 2021, and 3: grouped districts by size; small (3-4 seats), medium (5-6 seats), or large districts (7-8seats). Size effects were separately compared for lists and candidates between the 2017 and 2021 elections. One possible problem is that even though districts were grouped by size, the number of data points could still be too small to have adequate power to show an existing effect. The effect of electoral period (T1=2017, T2=2021), time, was incorporated as a within-subjects effect and district size as a between-subjects effect. Given that some district sizes changed between 2017 and 2021, separate ANOVAs were run using 2017 or 2021 district sizes to check these results for robustness. These two tests would explore whether there was a differential effect by district size on the number of candidates presented for both electoral periods. As expected, there was a significant between-subjects effect of district size on the number of candidates using 2017 ($F(2,25)= 41.392$; $p<0.001$) and 2021 district sizes ($F(2,25)=37.010$; $p<0.001$). Large districts had the largest number of candidates, followed by medium districts and finally small districts. Results are visualized in the Figure 3. The significant increase in the number of candidates observed using a paired t-test was replicated using this analytical approach. Electoral cycle showed

a significant effect in the number of candidates using either 2017 ($F(1,25)=42.728$; $p<0.001$) or 2021 district sizes ($F(1,25)= 45.126$; $p<0.001$). The interaction between district sizes and electoral period was of special interest since it might indicate a greater driving force from districts of a specific size in the augmentation of electoral candidates. No significant interactions were found between size and electoral time period using 2017 ($F(2,25)=2.980$; $p=0.069$) or 2021 district sizes ($F(2,25)= 2.071$; $p=0.147$). However, in 2017 a trend-level interaction effect can be observed, as well a qualitative pattern could indicate a steeper increase in the number of candidates for larger districts. This trends as well as the district size and time effects can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3




Figure 3. Estimated Marginal Means increase in the number of candidates between 2017-2021 elections, by district size (1:3-4, 2:5-6, 3:7-8).

4.3 Fragmentation: Number of Effective Parties

This study's core analysis is focused on the electoral results and analyzes political fragmentation in the 2021 election. I compare election results between 2017 and 2021 in terms of political fragmentation at the aggregated level of the entire political system. I used the Laakso and

Taagepera's (1979) index to measure the effective number of parties to operationalize post-electoral fragmentation. This index is the most straightforward test on the political system's fragmentation. I discarded other options, such as Wildgen's index of hyperfractionalization (Wildgen, 1971) which is more suited to party systems characterized by small parties, or the Molinar's index (Molinar, 1991) which is more appropriate to party systems with a salient feature of the predominance of big parties. Chile is different: there is no predominance of big or small parties, making the Laakso and Taagepera index the best index of fragmentation for this case.

Laakso and Taagepera's index's formula is:

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$$

Where n is the number of parties with at least one seat (in 2017, operationalized as seats in the lower chamber and 2021, operationalized as seats in the Constituent Assembly) and p^2 each party's proportion of all votes or seats. N depicts the number of effective parties. Using this index electoral fragmentation outcome can be assessed at the level of lists and candidates.

However, reducing this comparison to the last two elections can be insufficient when analyzing the 2021 election results in a broader timeframe. For this reason, I calculated the number of effective parties and the Gallagher Index from 1989 to 2021. Then, a linear regression was run to assess the effect of the electoral period (i.e., time) on the effective number of parties. I used the electoral year as a regressor, and each index is used as an outcome measure. This approach would show whether there is a statistically significant increase in fragmentation in 2021 using these measures. Additionally, I will look into whether fragmentation could be explained as a progressive result of a dealignment or realignment process.

After exploring the changes in fragmentation between the 2017 and 2021 elections, I analyze a broader period of time to check whether this was an ongoing trend that started before the change in

the electoral system. To achieve this, linear regressions were conducted, including either the percentage of votes or seats, for all parties with parliamentary representation between 1989 and 2021. In both cases, time is included as a regressor, and both models included an intercept. When the percentages of votes are analyzed, the electoral period is a significant predictor in the increase of the number of effective parties ($t=3.136$; $p=0.016$). This single regressor model was also found to be significantly predictive ($F(1,7)=9.836$; $p=0.016$). Using this model, I found a 0.851 increase in the number of effective parties for each additional electoral period since 1989. I found a similar effect when analyzing the percentage of seats, with the electoral period being a significant regressor ($t=3.983$; $p=0.005$). This single regressor model is also found to be significantly predictive ($F(1,7)=15.86$; $p=0.005$). Employing this model, I found a 0.547 increase in the number of effective parties for each additional electoral period since 1989. These changes can be visualized in Figure 4.

It is important to note that the number of effective parties differs for each electoral period when considering percentages of votes and seats for each party represented in the Chamber of Deputies. The electoral system can explain such a difference. The number of effective parties considering the percent of votes does not consider the electoral system in how those votes are translated into seats. When analyzing the percentages of seats, values of the effective number of parties tend to be smaller as an outcome of the electoral system.

Figure 4




Figure 4. Number of Effective Parties, by percentage of votes (Green) and percentage of seats (Orange).

In addition, I conducted a single sample T-test with the data from each of these indexes, analyzing the results obtained in 2021 could be considered as part of the array of values between 1989 to 2017. The mean number of effective parties in 2021 using the Laakso and Taagepera index with the percentage of votes for each party with at least a seat in the congress is statistically different to the sample of previous elections periods ($t(7)= 17.169$; $p<0.001$), this was significantly greater in 2021.. When using the percentage of those parties' seats represented in the Laakso and Taagepera index, the same results are obtained ($t(7)= 15.053$; $p=0.017$).

Finally, in order to analyze whether this effect is due to the change in the electoral system, I conducted a single sample T-test with the data from each of these indexes, comparing their values between 1989 to 2013 with the values obtained for 2017.

The mean number of effective parties in 2017 is statistically different to that of previous elections periods ($t(6)= 17.169$; $p<0.001$) using the Laakso and Taagepera index with the percentage of votes for each party with at least a seat in the congress. Just like the 2021 results, the 2017 results were larger than that of years before them. When using the percent that the seats of those parties represented in the Laakso and Taagepera index, the same results were obtained ($t(7)= 8.855$; $p<0.011$).

5. Taagepera's Index of Balance

Laakso and Taagepera's effective number of parties depicts the number of equal-sized parties to which the actual set of parties is in some ways equivalent. However, it does not express information about the balance of shares between different size parties. Taagepera (2005, pp. 290–291) created an index of balance:

$$b = \frac{-\log s_1}{\log p}$$

Where s_1 is the largest share and p is the number of seat-winning parties. It can range from 0 (absolute imbalance) to 1 (equality of all parties). This index, in relation to the effective number of parties, has the same function that the mean has in relation to standard deviation (Taagepera, 2005, p. 290).

Figure 5 and Table 3 show how, in contrast to the fragmentation tendency shown by the number of effective parties across time, the balance index has remained between 0.491 and 0.616 over time. The balance indexes for the 2017 and 2021 Constitutional Convention elections are within the range of previous values between 1989-2013. These values are within the range Taagepera observed in party systems with more than two parties. They have close to normal distribution around 0.5. Nevertheless, there is not political or logical reasons found up to this point, that lead party constellation close to a half-balance (close to $b=0.5$) (2005, pp. 290–291).

There are two peaks in b values in 2001 and 2005 ($b=0.616$ and $b=0.588$, respectively). Those peaks are associated with the outstanding electoral performance from Democratic Independent Union (UDI) in both years. UDI reached 25.18% of votes and 31/120 seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 2001. In 2005, UDI obtained 22.36 and 33/120 seats in the same Chamber. According to Huneeus (2001), since 1989, the UDI increased its electoral base in each election. Among the reasons for UDI's success are the high institutionalization and internal cohesion. During the dictatorship, UDI's members participated in key government areas and the media. Several of them were panelists in TV shows and were regular writers in newspapers, contributing to their visibility as a younger generation contributing to Pinochet's dictatorship. Also, they held key positions in the state, especially in the Ministry General Secretariat of Government who was the cabinet-level administrative office in charge of acting as the government's organ of communication. Finally, several UDI's members were designated as majors, which give them local roots and networks.

At the beginning of the *Transición*, the UDI was the second-largest party on the right, before National Renewal (RN). Surprisingly, they managed to obtain this outstanding electoral performance without abandoning explicit support for Pinochet's dictatorship. Also, external factors contributed, such as RN internal divisions and *Concertación* attrition due to the successive periods building the transition to democracy and the economic crisis Chile faced in 1999 during Eduardo Frei (DC-Concertación) office.

What does the balance index contribute to understanding fragmentation trend in Chile's politics? Fragmentation seems to be occurring while the proportion between representation of the largest political party and the number of political parties remains similar to that between 1989 and 2013. Although it is still too soon to reach any important conclusions on Chile's new DBPR (with district magnitudes between 3 to 8 seats) system implemented since the 2017 elections, up to this point the number of parties that manage to obtain a seat in the Chamber of Deputies had remained within the previous periods b values range. A small tendency is shown in 2017 and 2021

Conventional Election in which b values tend to 0.5. In the future, this could lead to a more equilibrated party system than under the binominal electoral system.⁸ To some extent this fact resembles Chile's party system between 1925 and 1950 decade, in which several parties existed but just five or six of them were relevant in the Congress.

This tendency towards a more equilibrated party system can be partially explained by analyzing the results of three candidates in the 2013 congressional elections, because they would contribute to create new political parties for the 2017 election. Two young candidates on the Left (who emerged from the student movement) won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in that election (Giorgio Jackson in district 22 of Santiago and Gabriel Boric in district 60 in Chile's most south region). They would contribute to create two new political parties between 2013 and 2017 (Democratic Revolution -RD-, and Social Convergence -CS). Changes on the right wing also happened during that electoral period. Felipe Kast, a right-wing independent who participated in President Piñera's first government (As Minister of State and as Presidential Delegate for emergency camps and villages after 2010 Chile's earthquake), won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies representing district 22, in Santiago. Although he was part of the list that gathered UDI and RN, traditional right-wing parties, he ran as an independent candidate. Years later, he would contribute to create a new center-right political party called Political Evolution (Evopoli) which tried to oppose UDI's dictatorial legacy and RN's deep roots in the traditional right-wing politics of Chile's 20th century.

⁸ Even though the 1989 election has a b value close to 0.5, the particularities of that election (prohibition of certain parties, the dictatorship influx, etc.) makes that value somewhat irrelevant.

Figure 5




Figure 5. Taagepera's index of Balance from the end of Chile's military dictatorship to present day elections.

Table 3

YEARS	Index of Balance
1989	0.499
1993	0.535
1997	0.499
2001	0.616
2005	0.588
2009	0.491
2013	0.572
2017	0.515
2021	0.501

Table 3. Taagepera's index of Balance from the end of Chile's military dictatorship to present day elections.

6. Gallagher Index

Finally, I analyze the relationship between percentage of votes for a party or sector and the number of seats that parties and political sectors obtained between elections. In this case, I operationalized the dependent variable (ratio between votes and seats) as the results on the Gallagher index (Gallagher, 1991) and the independent variable is time operationalized as the Chamber of Deputies election cycles between 1989 and 2017 and the election for the Constitutional Convention in 2021.

Gallagher's index is used to measure the disproportionality between votes and seats obtained in a legislature, at a party level, and from all parties in given elections.

Gallagher index's formula is:

$$LSq = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - S_i)^2}$$

The index is calculated by taking the square root of half the sum of the squares from the difference between the percentage of votes (v) and percentages of seats (s) for each political party.

These two alternative methods (comparing the number of effective parties and votes and seat proportion) to measure fragmentation will provide greater robustness to the present fragmentation analysis. In the case of the Gallagher index, more fragmentation -given Chile's modified D'Hont electoral system - means fewer seats for those lists.

I use the data from Gallagher & Mitchell's book *The Politics of Electoral Systems* (2008) and the book's website for elections in the period 1989-2017. For 2021's Constitutional Convention election I obtained the data from Chile's electoral service (Servel).

Figure 6




Figure 6. Gallagher Index values from the end of the military dictatorship to the 2021 Constitutional Convention elections in Chile.

Table 4

Years	Gallagher Index ⁹
1989	7.09
1993	6.18
1997	7.97
2001	5.17
2005	7.08
2009	5.65
2013	8.04
2017	7.22
2021	8.98

⁹ The Gallagher index was calculated using lists instead of parties, given the singularity of Chile's electoral system for Parliamentary elections. As the number of seats is defined first by the list's votes and then are allocated within the list, Gallagher prefers to use this method. This paper will show also the values using the data from individual parties. More information available at:

https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/people/michael_gallagher/EISystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf

Figure 6 shows how there is no obvious trend over time tracking the relationship between number of votes and lists- seats. The index's peaks occurred in 2001, 2009 and 2021. Years such as 2005 or 2013 depict the lower values in the index. The 2021 election has the largest value, probably because in a deeply fragmented elections, an important number of votes were wasted, in the sense that their candidates were not elected. However, in a broader time frame, these results show no apparent relation to the progressive fragmentation of the political system.

7. Strategic Voting?

7.1 Divisor-based Proportional System with Pooling Vote

As stated before, Cox classified Chile's binominal system as a divisor-based proportional system (DBPR) that uses a mechanism of pooling vote (PV) under an open list mechanism. The 2015 electoral reform and the minor changes introduced to the 2021 Constitutional Convention election did not change the nature of the system. This changes just increased the number of seats elected for each district (and, in the case of the 2021 election, introduced a mechanism for gender equality and diminished the requisites to run as an independent candidate).

Originally, Duverger's law stated that the simple majority and simple ballot system (also known as Single Member Simple Plurality system or SMSP) favors the two party system (Cox, 1997, p. 14). Nevertheless, vote concentration- resulting from the strategic diversion of resources from non-competitive candidates or lists- is a feature that can be found in other electoral systems. Cox states that the number of candidates or party lists will reach an equilibrium limiting the maximum possible number of running lists or candidates. If the number of candidates or lists is bigger than this upper bound voters' will show a rational tendency to concentrate their votes on a smaller number of competitors or lists, especially in those who are seen as more viable (Cox, 1997, p. 31).

In other words, under single non-transferable vote systems, at most $M+1$ candidates would have positive votes shares. The strategic voting equilibrium can take a Duvergerian or non-

Duvergerian form. Under Duvergerian equilibrium there will be a well-defined breach between the two candidates with the most votes that did *not* get elected. Voters recognize that the candidate with less votes had practically no chance of competing for the last seat to be allocated. Conversely, a non-Duvergerian equilibrium exists when it is not clear who will be the second and the first loser, so there is no strategic desertion from any of those two (or more) candidates. In this case, the number of viable candidates can exceed $M+1$ (Cox, 1997, p. 101). There is a second argument, from the perspective of those actors that want to enter the system, that suggests why $M+1$ candidates or lists seems to be feasible as an upper limit. If there are just M candidates, all of them will secure a seat. In this case, a potential entrant could have good chances of securing a seat, pushing the potential entrant to run in that election (Cox, 1997, pp. 101–102).

Does the strategic voting work equally in SMSP and in multimember systems such as the SNTV in multimember districts? There seems to be a difference at least in the SNTV system: strategic voting does not have to necessarily benefit stronger candidates by deserting the voters from weaker candidates (Cox, 1997, p. 102). In the SMSP case, there is one seat per district. If it is clear who is the best second candidate, the third candidate will be deserted by the voters. But, in multimember districts and especially under a SNTV system, if there is a candidate that is clearly hegemonic, there can be room for strategic voting through deserting the supermarginal candidate: the votes that exceed the necessary to get the candidate elected are wasted votes.

Duverger analyzes the lower house election in Japan, between 1958 and 1990 using the SF ratio (the ratio of the second to the first loser's vote total in a district). Duverger finds that in 3 and 4 seats districts there is a bimodal distribution: the system tends to produce competitive second losers or absolutely non-competitive second losers (Cox, 1997, pp. 104–105). Nevertheless, starting at a district size of 5, it is not clear that there is a bimodal distribution of non-winning candidates. In other words, it is not that easy to identify competitive candidates and subsequently strategic voting declines as district size increases (Cox, 1997, p. 105). In district with 5 or more seats, candidates

with low percentage of votes can win a seat: it is much more complex to differentiate those candidates that are just below the threshold of votes needed to be elected.

Up to this point I analyzed the SMSP and the SNTV with multimember districts. Nevertheless, Cox classifies Chile's electoral system as a Divisor-based proportional system (DBPR).

Cox (1997, p. 114) states that proportional systems (PR) allocating seats by a divisor-based formula, should also follow the M+1 limit. PR systems would be similar to largest remainders formula (LRPR) electoral systems- the similarities between these two systems would be analogous to the parallels between LRPR and SNTV systems. I will now explain LRPR seat allocation and the influence of this system on strategic voting- this will provide some framework for the understanding of the divisor-based PR. LRPR closed-list electoral systems allocate seats in the following process: first, the electoral quota (Q) is multiplied by the total number of valid votes in the district (V). The result is the price or quota. Then, lists buy the number of seats that their vote totals allow, given the price (QV) per seat. After this process, each list has a certain number of seats and a certain number of non-utilized votes or remainder. The available seats at this point are allocated to the lists with largest remainders. Finally, the number of seats allocated for each list through the previous process, are distributed to the candidates in their order of appearance in the list (Cox, 1997, pp. 108–109). Cox affirms that in LRPR systems, strategic voting works in two different forms: Voters abandon submarginal lists (those that are not expected to win a seat or to be competitive for the last allocated remainder seat), and voters also leave strong or supermarginal lists (1997, p. 109).

Proportional systems using a divisor-based allocation formula (DBPR) are like LRPR systems, in terms of strategic voting. This is the case of the D'Hondt method used in Chile to allocate seats. DBPR systems follow M+1 rule, in terms of viable lists (Cox, 1997, p. 114).

Cox (1997, p. 114) utilizes evidence from the Spanish case. Spanish DBPR districts with a low magnitude voted strategically abandoning smaller or non-viable parties. Cox generalizes the results from this case: strategic voting under an open-list DBPR system entails strategic voting to the disadvantage of smaller parties, following the M+1 rule.

Chile has a specific DBPR system. As we saw in the [section 3.1](#), Chile adopted a Single Pooling Vote (SPV) system (Cox, 1997, p. 143). Would DBPR system with SPV, follow the M+1 rule? The same logic applied in the other voting systems should be applied here: short-term rational voters have no reasons to support a list with no possibility of win a seat. The only difference, is as DBPR with SPV allow parties to join effort in a list; the upper bound M+1 applies to lists and not to parties (Cox, 1997, p. 144). As I will show, this fact presents a challenge to measure fragmentation: Laakso & Taagepera's index of effective number of parties works with parties and not with lists. If strategic voting can occur in DBPR systems with SPV, what happened in the 2021 election for representatives in the Constitutional Convention?

7.2 The role of information for strategic voting

Electoral information is a prerequisite for strategic voting: “If voters have little information about the electoral prospects of the various candidates, then one should expect little strategic voting because it will never be clear who is trailing” (Cox, 1997, p. 107). A main source of electoral information for voters, is electoral history. If there are minor changes at the candidate-level between elections, voters can infer possible results extrapolating them from the past similar election. But, if the candidates landscape changes, the informational requirements for strategic voting could not be met.

In [section 4.1](#) I analyzed three different issues. First, the number of candidates and lists. There is a significant increase in the number of candidates and lists across districts. When comparing the 2021 constitutional convention with the 2017 chamber of deputies' election the 2021 elections show a significant increase in candidates. [Section 4.2](#) shows that district size had an effect

on the number of candidates. Large districts (M=7 and M=8) had the largest number of candidates, followed by medium districts (M=5 and M=6) and finally small districts. (M=3 and M=4). Then, the electoral cycle showed a significant effect in the number of candidates: the 2021 election had more candidates per district than the 2017 election. Finally, there was a trend-level interaction and a qualitative pattern, indicating a steeper increase in the number of candidates for larger districts (M=7 or M=8).

As I stated before, the 2017 election for the Chamber of Deputies was the first election after considerable modifications were made to the Binominal System. District magnitudes were increased from M=2 to a range between M=3 and M=8. Voters in that election did not have substantial electoral history, and strategic voting was unlikely to happen. This effect was even more marked for the 2021 election. The lack of a stabilized electoral history, the changes in the electoral rules that allowed independents to be pooled in independent lists and diminished the requisites to be an independent candidate all diminished the information available about candidates and their potential results for voters. Additionally, the specific dynamic of an election for a Constitutional Convention (different from a normal Chamber of Deputies election) made it even more difficult for voters to have information that would allow them to forecast the possible results of each list. Also, large district sizes made strategic voting and forecasting possible winners, viable candidates or lists, even more difficult (Cox, 1997, p. 100;122).

Cox asserts that new democracies or polities with unstructured party systems are the type of situations that lead voters to lack information that would make them able to forecast possible winners or viable candidates (1997, pp. 151–152). Although in the case of Chile, the 2021 election shared features with the previous 2017 Chamber of Deputies election, the incorporation of new rules, a scenario of social uprising, and the new nature of the election (representatives for a Constitutional Convention) made this election one that posed less information from the perspective of voters, being closer to elections that occur in contexts without previous electoral information.

Strategic desertion of weak lists or candidates due to electorate's coordinated expectations was unlikely to happen in 2021 Chile's election. The number of candidates and lists, and the political fragmentation in that election confirm that hypothesis.

7.3 Effective number of political parties versus viable lists in PV (pooling vote)

Cox indicates that in the case of DBPR with PV systems, the upper bound of $M+1$ is applicable to lists. Nevertheless, Laakso and Taagapera is used to measure the effective number of political parties and not lists. For example, the book *The Politics of Electoral Systems* (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2008) has in the authors website a comprehensive list of the effective number of political parties. In the case of Chile, they measure the effective number of parties and the effective number of lists, since the seats are allocated per list and then per party. There is still no agreement on how the upper limit of $M+1$ should be measured in relation to the effective number of political parties in PV systems.

8. Entry Conditions

8.1 Entry

In the past section, I stated that there was no room for strategic voting reducing the number of lists or candidates because there was not much information available to voters in Chile's 2021 election, to coordinate their expectations on which candidates were not viable or competitive.

Nevertheless, another phenomenon took place. New political actors tried to defy incumbents in the Left and the Center: Lista del Pueblo finally obtained 26/155 seats and Independientes no Neutrales 11/155, being both the main outsiders lists winning seats. Which were the conditions that allow or impulse these actors to entry the system?

The entry to a political system is always costly. A new candidate or list will try to compete only if the probabilities of victory surpass the cost (Cox, 1997, p. 157). The 2021 election for the Constitutional Convention lowered the requisites to register an independent candidate and allow independent candidates to pool votes among them.

To register a new political party in a Chilean election, article 5 of the Law 18.603 mandates that at least 100 citizens able to vote and not registered in another political party, need to initiate the process. Then, the article 6 of the beforementioned law, states that in the following two hundred days, they need to recruit at least the 0.25 percent of the people that voted in that region, during the last Chamber of Deputies election, with a minimum of 500 citizens. Finally, the article 7 indicates that after recruiting the number of people stated in the previous article in at least 8/15 regions of the country or in 3 contiguous regions, and meeting the other legal requirements, the party will be registered as a national political party.

For the 2021 election for the Constitutional Convention, the requisites were diminished. The transitory provision 29 of Chile's Constitution stated that to register an independent candidate for this election, that candidate needs the support of 0.2 percent of the people that voted in the last election for the Chamber of Deputies, with a minimum of 300 citizens. Additionally, it allowed to constitute a list joining two or more independent candidates. To register a list, at least 0.5 percent of the voters in the last Chamber of Deputies election had to support the independents' list, with a minimum of 500 people. This requisite had to be met, by the sum of every candidate supporters.

In practice, this modification in the electoral system allowed that in every district lists of independents challenged established parties. It was easier to register an independent list in a region, than constituting a party for a normal election or running as an independent candidate alone. This is the first form in which the entry costs were lowered.

8.2 Party Brands

If it is clear who is viable and not, nonviable candidates will be deterred from entry. Cox suggests two main sources to identify who is viable. First, the electoral history. As I stated before, in the case of Chile's 2021 election, electoral history was not a resourceful source of information. A second form to identify viable candidates and lists is endorsements from major parties that confer viability advantages (Cox, 1997, p. 158).

An M+1 limit resulting from strategic voting occurs at the entry-level when party elites anticipate who will be affected by strategic voting. Parties can have more information on their viability and handle party endorsements accordingly (Cox, 1997, p. 159). Party endorsements are valuable to voters because they carry information about policy positions and the viability of candidates (Cox, 1997, p. 160).

From the perspective of a group that wants to compete through an established political party, the group needs to secure an endorsement in a competitive position among the party's candidates (Cox, 1997, pp. 164–166). Several parties approached the 2021 election being permeable to social movements, academics, or other public persons. *Revolución Democrática* (RD), *Convergencia Social* (CS), *Partido Comunista* (PC) and *Partido Socialista* (PS) created joint lists with people that were not necessarily party members. These groups, in general, obtained good results and in some cases, people not coming from the party structures pulled in the joint lists the party members to be elected.

Nevertheless, Chile's 2021 election results point towards a different direction. Traditional party brands had a poor performance in terms of votes and seats. The erosion of traditional party brands in Chile started at the beginning of 2000 decade (Castiglioni & Rovira, 2016, p. 10). Relying on data from the Manifesto Project, Madariaga and Rovira (2020) highlight that there was a convergence in electoral competition strategies between center-left and center-right coalitions. While the center-left coalition was characterized by inertia, the center-right coalition adopted a more moderate position. This transformation in the center-left produced cartelized parties: "characterized by their reliance on state funds that allow the party to professionalize and separate from its social basis." (Madariaga & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2020, p. 348). Accordingly, the problem with Chile's traditional party brands would be the programmatic and ideological convergence between coalitions producing parties detached from society rather than polarization.

Luna (2016) portrays how rare a stable party system is with such a low level of popular identification with political parties. He states that the legitimacy crisis lies in Chile's inequality and ineffective channels of vertical accountability in relation to the polity. This scheme would be a particular case of delegative democracy: while in the traditional version of the concept, there is vertical accountability (the bond between the president and the voters is strong) but no horizontal accountability, in the Chilean case, there is horizontal accountability, but no vertical accountability instead.

As I stated before, traditional party brands had a poor performance in the 2021 election. As an example, the Christian Democrats (DC) obtained just 2/155 seats in the Constitutional Convention, which usually obtained two-digits percentages between 1989 and 2017 in the Chamber of Deputies. The only traditional political party that obtained good results was the Socialist Party (PS) who obtained 15/155 seats in the Constitutional Convention.

For the 2021 election, party endorsements did not confer advantages to candidates. Accordingly, party endorsements were not a complementary form of identifying viable candidates, making more difficult strategic voting, and lowering the cost for potential entrants.

8.3 Social cleavages

Political parties are the result of the interaction between the electoral and social structure (Cox, 1997, p. 9). Political scientists with a sociological approach have criticized Duverger's law because it would entail some level of institutional determinism (Cox, 1997, pp. 15–16). Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) found that the number of parties in a country increases with more diversity in the social structure and a more proportional electoral system. Both factors interact to determine the number of political parties.

There are three steps when evaluating the political concentration in a system. First, social cleavages turn into partisan preferences. Then, partisan preferences are translated into votes. Finally, seats are allocated (Cox, 1997, p. 26).

The social movements described in section 2, had an impact in the 2021 election. Feminist movement and environmental activism fixed some of the major policy positions that were represented by *Lista del Pueblo* and *Independientes no Neutrales*, the two independents group that obtained impressive results in the election. In parallel, the *Frente Amplio* (FA) coalition also obtained good results in the 2021 election. The major parties in the *Frente Amplio* (*Convergencia Social* -CS- and *Revolución Democrática* -RD-) have their foundations in the 2011 student movement.

Conclusion

The 2021 election of representatives for the Constitutional Convention was abnormal: the fragmentation on the *Apruebo* (Yes) side of the plebiscite had several idiosyncrasies. On the one hand, the traditional political parties on the center and left during the *Transición* experienced a considerable decrease in their vote share, with the exception of the Socialist Party (PS). A portion of those votes was captured by new political parties, mainly gathered in the *Frente Amplio* coalition (in *Revolución Democrática* and *Convergencia Social* parties) and by the Communist Party.

On the other flip side, the lists and pacts running as independents, and representing the *Apruebo* (Yes) side of the plebiscite, had outstanding electoral results and vote shares. Among those independent lists, the two major pacts were *Lista del Pueblo* (positioned towards the extreme left) and *Independientes no Neutrales* (positioned close to the center). *Lista del Pueblo* is trying to ease the requirements to run in the next parliamentary elections. Given that an election of representatives for a Constituent Assembly has many unique features, current electoral patterns should be watched closely to determine whether this was a one-time change or if it constitutes a permanent change in political forces.

The suspicion that the fragmentation on the *Apruebo* (Yes) side was due to coordination problems between political parties and independents may be almost completely discarded. The level of coordination that independents showed to run for this election was as high (throughout several

districts) as unexpected. Perhaps the only coordination problem happened between the *Frente Amplio* coalition and the Socialist Party. Shortly before the lists were registered, they could run together in the same list with the *Partido Comunista*. That process failed, and *Frente Amplio* ran together with the *Partido Comunista*, while the *Partido Socialista* was part of the coalition that also incorporated the *Democracia Cristiana*, PRO, and the *Partido por la Democracia*.

In any case, the modification of the proportional system used in 2017, which lowered the requirements to register a list or pact to run for the 2021 constitutional convention election, had an important impact on the fragmentation of the political system. Costs to entry the system were lowered. Nevertheless, the process of fragmentation, started to occur in 2013, mainly driven by left wing political actors. A mixture of social and political cleavages allowed fragmentation in that election, a trend that was reinforced with the changes in electoral rules in 2017.

Electoral results for the right side of the political spectrum were poor. Chilean society's broad rejection of President Piñera's handling of social unrest, and the country's pandemic, plunged electoral possibilities for the right. However, the right's position concerning the social unrest and manifestations made them very distant from the voters on the *Apruebo* (Yes) side. It is an open question how.

The two issues that seem to explain the high fragmentation on the Yes (*Apruebo*) side, are the lack of strategic voting, that could have reduced the number of candidates and lists, and the reduced costs to entry the system.

If Chile's tendencies in the 2021 elections persist through time, there will be interesting new trends in the country's political landscape that could be subject to further academic research. For starters, the narrative that firm social cleavages persisted even after Pinochet's dictatorship should be reevaluated. Another promising topic for future research is the future electoral turnout for independent candidates. If such a trend continues, further research could reconsider the role of party brands in Chile and its connection with citizens' distrust in political parties. Finally, an alternative

explanation of the 2021 election results may come from understanding the independents using a novel axial classification: newer actors versus older actors. In that case, the traditional left-right axis should be complemented by the novelty of the political actors. Considering the 2021 election results, it is unlikely that Chile will remain unchanged after its political crisis and its subsequent constituent process.

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Annex 1. Political parties and coalition names and acronyms

The acronyms correspond to the names in Spanish. The names of coalitions and pacts will appear throughout the text in Spanish.

Parties

CM. Commons Party (*Partido Comunes*)

CS. Social Convergence (*Convergencia Social*)

RD. Democratic Revolution (*Revolución Democrática*)

PH. Humanist Party (*Partido Humanista*)

MIR. Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario)

PC. Communist Party of Chile (*Partido Comunista de Chile*).

PS. Socialist Party of Chile (*Partido Socialista de Chile*)

PPD. Party for Democracy (*Partido por la Democracia*)

PRSD. Radical Party of Chile (*Partido Radical Socialdemócrata*). This party is the result of the fusion between Radical Party of Chile and Social Democracy Party in 1994. The acronym is used for the Radical Party of Chile before and after the merger.

DC. Christian Democratic Party (*Partido de la Democracia Cristiana*).

EVOP. Political Evolution (*Evolución Política*)

RN. National Renewal (*Renovación Nacional*)

PRI. Democratic Independent Regionalist Party (Partido Regionalista Independiente Democrata).

UDI. Independent Democratic Union (*Unión Demócrata Independiente*)

REP. Republican Party (*Partido Republicano*)

Coalitions and Electoral Pacts

LISTA DEL PUEBLO. People's list. Independent electoral pact that run in several districts for 2021 Constitutional Convention election.

FRENTE AMPLIO. Broad Front. Coalition founded in early 2017 and currently composed by the parties: Democratic Revolution (RD), Social Convergence (CS), and Commons (CM). Also includes the political movements called Common Force (*Fuerza Común*), and UNIR.

APRUEBO DIGNIDAD. Approve Dignity. Electoral pact composed by the Communist Party of Chile (PC) and the Frente Amplio coalition.

INDEPENDIENTES NO NEUTRALES. Not Neutral Independents.

CONCERTACION. Coalition of Parties for Democracy. Coalition of center-left political parties in Chile, founded in 1988, at the end of Pinochet's dictatorship. It was mainly composed by the Socialist Party of Chile (PS), the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Radical Party of Chile (PRSD), and the Christian Democratic Party (DC).

NUEVA MAYORÍA. New Majority. Chilean centre-left electoral coalition from 2013 to 2018, supporting the presidential candidacy of Michelle Bachelet in the 2013 election. It was composed mainly by the Communist Party of Chile (PC), the

Socialist Party of Chile (PS), the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Radical Party of Chile (PRSD), and the Christian Democratic Party (DC).

ALIANZA POR CHILE. Alliance for Chile. Coalition of right-wing Chilean political parties. The Alliance was replaced between 2009 and 2012 by the Coalition for Change. After the 2012 municipal elections, the coalition returned to its original name. In 2015 was replaced with Chile Vamos. It mainly included the National Renewal (RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI). In previous periods, it also included the National Party, the Regional Party of the South (Partido del Sur) and the Union of the Centrist Center (Unión de Centro Centro, UCC).

CHILE VAMOS. Let's go, Chile. Centre-right political coalition of four political parties in Chile. The coalition was created on 29 January 2015 by the Independent Democrat Union (UDI), National Renewal (RN), Democratic Independent Regionalist Party (PRI) and Political Evolution (Evop).

VAMOS POR CHILE. Let's go for Chile. Right political coalition formed to compete in 2021 Constitutional Convention elections. It is composed by the Independent Democrat Union (UDI), National Renewal (RN), Democratic Independent Regionalist Party (PRI), Political Evolution (Evop), and the Republican Party (RP).