THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

HASHEMITE HOUSEHOLD ANXIETIES:

THE AMIRATE OF MECCA, ARABISM, AND THE ARAB REVOLT (1880-1919)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF NEAR EASTERN LANGUAGES AND CIVILIZATIONS

BY

SAMI JIRYIS SWEIS

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

JUNE 2020

In loving memory of

Jiryis Saliba Suleiman Sweis

"Work is love made visible."

العمل حبّ تجسّم للعيون

- From Khalil Gibran,"On Work" in *The Prophet* (1923)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF APPENDICES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Behind the pages of a dissertation is a long journey, and I have been blessed to have been guided by a community of people who wanted to see me succeed. This dissertation could not have been possible without the patience and endurance of my adviser, mentor, and committee chair, Prof. Orit Bashkin. She always saw the potential of my ideas, even when I doubted them, and she never hestitated to be a source of encouragement and inspiration. Alongside her brilliance was an understanding humanity who likewise reminded me to prioritize my own humanity and that of others. Professors Fred Donner and Holly Shissler also guided me in the completion of this dissertation with their own expertise. They also modeled for me the caring mentors whose love for their students was always evident and known. For this committee, I am eternally grateful.

During this journey, I also benefited from other travellers who offered their assistance and support from outside the University of Chicago. For two summers, I received the generous funding from The Nicholson Center for British Studies at the University of Chicago (Summers 2016 and 2017) to travel to the United Kingdom and work in The National Archives, the British Library, and the Middle East Centre Archive at St. Antony's College at Oxford University. At Oxford, I benefitted from the assistance of archivist Ms. Debbie Usher. Her advice made these short trips to Oxford productive for both this project and future projects. I also received funding from the Humanities Division Dissertation Research Travel Grant from the University of Chicago (2017) to travel to Amman, Jordan, where I worked at The Center for Documents and Manuscripts at the University of Jordan and the National Library. In Jordan, Dr. Mohammad Adnan Al-Bakheet graciously met with me, offered his encouragement on my project, and generously gifted me several volumes that aided in my research. Muhammad Al-Sharqawi of Ward Books also met with me several times and aided in my collection of published sources from his fantastic collection, which included published copies of *al-Qibla*. His generosity greatly helped and will continue to help my future research. I also enjoyed meeting Issam Suleiman Mousa, the son of the great Jordanian historian, Suleiman Mousa. His vast knowledge of the period and his kindness strenghtened and encouraged my ideas.

In addition to those that aided my research trips, I also continuously benefit from a collaborative relationship with Prof. Yoav Alon, who had initially sparked my journey to study the Middle East, in particular Jordan, when I was an undergraduate in 2009. Our initial and subsequent interactions have always been a source of encouragement and inspiration, and I am grateful for his friendship. More recently, I have also been fortunate for the expertise and mentoring of Prof. Tariq al-Tell, whose knowledge of the Hashemites and of this period is unparalleled. His wealth of knowledge of this topic and its sources strengthened—and will further strengthen—my project. I look forward to our future collaborations and meetings.

In addition to these professional contacts and supports, I could not have completed this dissertation without the moral support, constant love, and endless endurance of my friends and family. In Chicago, I would like to thank my spiritual family at St. Makarios Orthodox Church, whose constant support and sense of community grounded me. Likewise, I am grateful for Ustadh Osama Abu-Eledam's training in Arabic and his patience in listening to my speculations and musings about Jordanian and Hashemite history. Many breakthroughs were made in his office. Among my peers in Chicago, I offer endless thanks to Christopher Caldwell Lee, Matthew Barber, Annie

Greene, Carl Shook, Marshall Watson, and Michael Peddycoart for putting up with my ramblings and for bouncing around ideas with me. I will always look forward to catching up and sharing a panel at conferences with them. Most recently, I am appreciative for my colleagues at Centre College (Steven Beaudoin, Jim Morrison, Amos Tubb, John Kinkade, Sara Egge, Jon Earle, John Harney, and Tara Strauch) who all have molded me as a teacher and encouraged me to see—and look forward to — life after a dissertation.

Among my family, I am especially grateful for my Uncle Suleiman Saliba Sweiss who always encouraged my research and generously hosted me in Amman, Jordan, where he introduced me to his contacts who offered their assistance in formulating my ideas, finding sources, and locating books. I am thankful for all the times he collected and saved books for me and even brought them from abroad so that I could benefit from them. His own curiosity and love of history (and Jordan) inspired my own pursuit to study the region. My in-laws, John and Gwenda McQuilkin, have also contributed to my dissertation through books, prayers, and encouragement. My mother, Donetta Sweis, and my brother, Laith Sweis, have ceaselessly encouraged and comforted me, patiently listened to my ideas and stories, and have offered an ear for any gripes. My mother, despite her worries, has always encouraged me to pursue my passions and to explore the world. It is her kindness and love for others that I have always attempted to model. My brother in the usual fraternal ways always reminded me not to take myself too seriously. A recent addition to the family's team, Hyde, offered his frequent criticisms and life experiences as an instructive tool.

Finally, the epicenter of my support, encouragement, and boundless love that made this journey possible and enjoyable is my wife, Lindsey Anne Sweis, whom I met and married in the midst of my graduate career. I look forward now to whatever journeys are ahead of us. You are the best companion.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the evolution of the Hashemite dynasty into two competing households during the late Ottoman period (1880-1919). Further, it explores how this rivalry between the ‘Awn and Zayd households led a member of the ‘Awn household to launch the Arab Revolt in 1916 and subsequently crown himself “King of the Arabs.” This project traces how these Hashemite households adopted two distinct political ideologies in order to legitimate their claims to the Amirate of Mecca. The ‘Awn cultivated and leveraged a cultural Arab identity wedded to Islamic unity through loyalty to the Ottoman caliph. This strategy proved most compatible with the political program of then Sultan-Caliph ‘Abd al-Hamid (1876-1909). In order to leverage their claim to the Amirate, the more senior Zayd household sided with movements calling for political reform to limit the power of the Sultan through a constitutional government.

I argue that this divergent political evolution, coupled with changing political circumstances in the Ottoman Empire after the 1908 Revolution, eventually led one prominent Hashemite, Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali of the ‘Awn household, to embrace political Arabism. Having embraced an ideology that called for Arab political independence, he launched the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916 with British and Arab nationalist support. With the outbreak of the Revolt and the subsequent nominal appointment of his Zayd rival to the Amirate of Mecca, Husayn then articulated a new Arabist and Islamic title for himself as the “King of the Arabs.” His formulation of this novel title and subsequent political program not only embraced essential elements of emerging Arabist discourses but also was ultimately shaped by his continued competition with a Hashemite rival throughout the Arab Revolt.

Previous narratives of this period emphasize the post-1908 Ottoman government’s alienation of Husayn ibn ‘Ali and his subsequent attraction to British promises of support. In contrast, this dissertation highlights the significance of the rivalry between the two Hashemite households as a catalyst for Husayn ibn ‘Ali’s launch of the Arab Revolt and creation of the title, “King of the Arabs.” Whereas other scholars focus their analyses of this period only on formal negotiations, this project examines the writings produced by members of both the ‘Awn and Zayd Hashemite households to chart how the rhetorical and political rivalry of these households interacted with Ottoman, British imperialist, and Arabist trends. By locating the impetus for Husayn’s political development within an intra-Hashemite rivalry, this project offers a new insight into the dynamism behind the making of the Hashemite dynasty and the extent to which external powers (whether Ottoman, British, or Arabist) influenced these local politics during a critical moment in modern Middle East history.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

With foreign words, I have opted to avoid as much as possible unnecessary diacritical marks for a simplified transliteration using spelling conventions that are widely recognizable. Whenever I translated a phrase, passage, or title from an original Arabic course, however, I used the transliteration guidelines provided by the *International Journal for Middle East Studies* with appropriate diacritical markers to distinguish ‘ayn and hamza consonant sounds and the sounds of long vowels. Since my project primarily deals with an Arab Ottoman dynasty centered in the Arabic-speaking province (the Hijaz) of the Ottoman Empire, I have decided for the sake of recognizability to spell names and titles using a convention consistent with Arabic sounds. For instance, instead of using the Turkish spelling convention of “Cemal,” I instead use the more Arabic-sounding “Jamal.” Likewise, I use “‘Abd al-Hamid” instead of “Abdülhamid.”

Introduction

The German pilot Richard Euringer recounted in his 1938 memoirs how he and several officers were sitting around a "makeshift desert bar" in Palestine in 1916 and began to discuss a recent situation in the Arabian Peninsula. Rumors had spread that the Amir of Mecca, Husayn ibn 'Ali (1854-1931), had plans to declare a revolt against the Ottoman Empire, which had claimed the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina since the 16th century. The officers wondered why the Ottoman military governor for the region, Jamal [sic] Pasha in Damascus, had allowed Husayn's son, Faysal, to return to Medina when he ought to have held him captive to ensure the Amir's continued fealty. Present among the German officers was Curt Prüfer--a German diplomat and intelligence officer--charged in part with the task of advising the Ottomans in attacking British positions in Egypt. He likewise served secretly in Arabia, gaining intelligence about the tribes and attempted to spread propaganda to ensure their loyalty to the Ottomans.[1] Among the German officers and their barrage of questions about Husayn and his plans in Arabia, Prüfer reportedly made the following observation:

> Husayn is a blusterer. He apparently considers himself a genie, because the British are flirting with him. He is getting pushed and believes he can push too…. Husayn already knows what he wants. Because he possesses the *imaret* [the Amirate of Mecca], he towers above all others. Any nonsense that he engages in can hardly be redressed. Still, he will not conquer Arabia for the Arabs. At best, he is helping the gentlemen in London punch a hole in Turkey.[2]

Recorded twenty-two years after the event, Prüfer's prescience was undoubtedly informed by the colonial realities of an Arab Middle East in 1938, when the British and French had indeed divided

[1] Described and quoted from Curt Prüfer, *Germany's Covert War in the Middle East: Espionage, Propaganda and Diplomacy in World War I*, trans. Kevin Morrow, (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2018), 201–3; For a description of the German propaganda campaign, see Tilman Lüdke, "(Not) Using Political Islam: The German Empire and Its Failed Propaganda Campaign in the Near and Middle East, 1914–1918 and Beyond," in *Jihad and Islam in World War I*, ed. E.J. Zürcher, Debates on Islam and Society (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016), 71–94.

[2] Prüfer, *Germany's Covert War in the Middle East: Espionage, Propaganda and Diplomacy in World War I*, 203.

the Arab Middle East into colonial Mandates. Regardless, the fact Euringer remembered Prüfer's focus on Husayn's appointment as the Amir of Mecca as central in how he perceived himself vis-a-vis his regional rivals was an interesting counterpoint to the wealth of scholarship that focused on Husayn's future ambitions (as an Arab national "king" or eventual Caliph) as the rationale for his decision to launch the Arab Revolt in 1916 against the Ottoman Empire. From Prüfer's perspective, Husayn's already-obtained identity as the Amir of Mecca informed and guided his decision to revolt.

The Amir of Mecca, a 9th century Islamic institution that had was held by a Hashemite, that is, a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, and possessed the prerogative of administering, regulating, and overseeing the two Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina and the whole Hijaz, the province that contained them. The yearly *hajj* (pilgrimage), which he accordingly oversaw that brought Muslims from around the world also traditionally provided the Amir with both tribute and a lucrative source of wealth with which to bolster his standing among the tribesmen in the region. The Amir of Mecca, however, was not wholly independent or self-selecting, but depended on the formal recognition of the Caliph. Since the 16th century, the Amir depended on the recognition and patronage of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph in Istanbul. By the 19th century, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph in Istanbul enjoyed the prerogative of appointing--and dismissing--the Amir of Mecca from among the Hashemite family in Mecca. Because of the Amirate's growing international importance as the center of the *hajj*, most narratives of Husayn's political trajectory rightly began with his appointment to the Amirate in 1908. As the Amir of Mecca, he could boast to be the highest Arab official in the Ottoman Empire, thus an ideal figure to lead an Arab nationalist movement; as the overseer of the Holy Cities, he was also potentially a global Muslim leader to counter the religious authority of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph that threatened European standing

among their colonial Muslim-subjects. For these reasons, once Great Britain found itself at war against the Ottoman Empire during World War I (1914-1918), British officials ought to stymie the Sultan-Caliph's appeal to global *jihad* (holy war) against them by supporting the separatist aspirations of Husayn. In June 1916, Husayn raised the banners of the Revolt in Mecca and thereby provided the British with an influential Islamic ally to legitimate their war against the Ottomans. This romantic image celebrated of the Arab Revolt emphasized the image of British officials supporting desert tribesmen rallying for national independence against an oppressive Turkish state but distorts the Ottoman context of its leaders, the Hashemites, and flattens its actors into nationalist molds. Instead of seeing the Arab Revolt as European—or externally—inspired, the thesis of this project, however, seeks to recover the Ottoman context and motivations for the Arab Revolt by focusing on its architect, Husayn.

The Amirate of Mecca allowed Husayn to claim to represent the aspirations of the Arab national independence and to challenge the authority of Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. The centrality of the Amirate of Mecca to Husayn's political project raises an interesting dilemma that has not been adequately explored. Shortly after Husayn launched his revolt against the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan-Caliph summarily dismissed Husayn as the Amir of Mecca and appointed his relative, an important notable by the name of 'Ali Haydar (1866-1935), as the new Amir. Much attention will be given in this project to 'Ali Haydar, as representing an alteranative model for Arab-Ottoman leadership. More specifically, this appointment proved symbolic, considering that the new Amir never took up his post in Mecca; instead, he could only reach the second holy city of Islam, Medina, where the Prophet Muhammad was entombed. For several months in Medina, the nominal Amir issued proclamations against Husayn and called for Arab Muslim loyalty to the Caliphate. Among previous historians, the appointment of Husayn's relative--who possessed an older claim

to the Amirate through his rival Hashemite family branch--has received little if any attention. Besides brief mentions of ‘Ali Haydar’s appointment in 1916, any role in his inspiring or prompting the evolution of Husayn’s political project have been overshadowed by the narrative of the Arab Revolt that Husayn and his sons launched and led against the Ottoman Empire; the competing, incompatible promises made among the ally powers; and the reality of the colonial division of the post-Ottoman Middle East.

The historiographic oversight of ‘Ali Haydar’s Amirate “of Mecca” rested presumably on the fact that Husayn and his sons became the exclusive “face” of the Hashemite family. For one, following the Ottoman defeat and the empire dismantled, ‘Ali Haydar’s political career as Amir, which had been hobbled from the start on account of the Arab Revolt, effectively ended as he left the country altogether. Second, the post-Ottoman colonial realities of the Middle East, to which Husayn and his sons played leading roles in countries like Syria, Iraq, and Transjordan (whose “Husaynid” Hashemite legacy still persists), meant that this side of the Hashemite family became entwined with the colonial and later nationalists histories of the region, which has overshadowed (and distorted) the Ottoman legacy in this region. These twin realities have caused the Hashemite family’s history to flatten and to become monolithic in its exclusive focus on Husayn’s family, and thus eclipsing the multi-faceted and contentious rivalry that had emerged between the two dominant branches of Hashemites represented by Husayn ibn ‘Ali and ‘Ali Haydar in the 19th century.

This project seeks to bring the Amirate of Mecca--and the Hashemite rivalry--back to the center of Husayn’s ambitions, thoughts, and, most importantly, anxieties. Rather than ascribing to national narratives that emerged in the post-War era, this project emphasizes the Ottoman and Arab contexts in order to explore Hashemite identity and politics by studying how the internal

Hashemite competition for the Amirate of Mecca influenced Husayn's political trajectory. This omission in historical studies of Husayn's political evolution overlook one of--if not the--defining elements of Husayn's identity upon which his political, religious, and even later national claims to legitimacy rested: his Hashemite identity made politically and religiously salient through the Amirate of Mecca. Considering that Husayn's political coming-of-age occurred in the midst of an internal Hashemite rivalry for the Amirate, and that his assumption of this coveted post resulted because his branch had effectively usurped another, the evolution of the Hashemites into rival households in the 19th century was foundational to Husayn's identity.

Thus, this project argues that Husayn's political evolution that led to his break from the Ottoman Empire had been a response to an internal Hashemite rivalry for the Amirate of Mecca. Shifting the focus of the cause of the Arab Revolt away from tribal histories, colonial politics, or even Husayn's post-Ottoman ambitions, I analyze how reformist discourses in the late Ottoman period interacted with Husayn's anxieties over his control of the Amirate of Mecca (rooted as they were in the Hashemite rivalry). While European colonialism, manifested in his alliance with Great Britain, was operative to Husyan's revolt, the Hashemite rivalry was in fact affected by competing political ideologies of Arabism and Ottomanism, both of which influenced Husayn and his rival, 'Ali Haydar, respectively. Ottomanism was a political ideology of reform that emerged in the 19th century that sought to preserve the Ottoman state through the articulation, application, and enforcement of a common Ottoman identity, the contours of wich were heavily debated and contested (as will be explored below), to rejuvenate the Ottoman and Islamic worlds. Arabism was another reformist ideology articulated Arabic-speakers primarily in Egypt and Syria that called for the elevation of the Arabs (politically and/or religiously) in order to preserve Arab national identity and, among some, to likewise rejuvenate the Islamic world against European

intrusions. For Husayn, against the reactivation of the Hashemite household rivalry following ‘Ali Haydar’s appointment in 1916 to the Amirate, it was Arabism that provided him an ideology with which to legitimate his bid for independence that pitted him against the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph during the so-called “Arab Revolt.” Husayn’s adoption of Arabism, another matter of debate among historians (examined below) was clearly distinguished by his Hashemite rival’s continued insistence of Ottomanism, a political program that called for Ottoman unity through a program of political reform in Istanbul. Thus, the dynastic rivalry among the Hashemites became infused with a reformist political rivalry as each Hashemite sought to legitimate his claim to the Amirate by attaching himself to a different ideology: either Arabism or Ottomanism.

The Hashemites as Households

The “Hashemites” refers to those claiming descent from the family or clan of the Prophet Muhammad (“Banu Hashim” in reference to the Prophet’s great-grandfather, Hashim ibn Abd Manaf). These individuals also enjoyed the title “Sharif” (pl. *ashraf*) to signify their noble lineage, which in Islamic history also accorded them a distinguished rank. Since the 9th century, during the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad (750-1258), a member of the Hashemites, in particular those that claim direct descent to Muhammad’s son-in-law ‘Ali, occupied the post of Amir of Mecca (“Prince of Mecca”) to oversee the Hijaz region that contained the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. As such, they also managed the yearly Hajj (pilgrimage) that brought Muslims from around the world to the region. As explored in more depth in the first chapter, during the Ottoman period, the Amirs of Mecca (or Sharifs of Mecca), enjoyed relative autonomy in governing the region and selected their successors from among themselves that was then recognized by the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph in Istanbul through his representatives in Damascus. By the second half of the 19th century,

however, as the Ottoman Empire sought to centralize its control over its remaining provinces, the Sultan-Caliph began to appoint the Amir of Mecca directly, thereby treating the post as a personal agent alongside his other appointed provincial representatives.[3]

The dynastic landscape of the Hashemite dynasty that originated in Mecca was much more dynamic and multifaceted than the later "Hashimid" dynasty created by Husayn ibn 'Ali and his sons following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1919 and the emergence of the colonial mandates in Syria, Iraq, and Transjordan (where a descendent of Husayn still governs). As discussed in more detail below, by the 19th century two dominant households emerged from the various branches of the Hashemite family tree. The Zayd household, from which Husayn's rival 'Ali Haydar descended, had a more senior lineage to the Amirate of Mecca, but lost its claim following the temporary Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz in the first half of the 19th century. Eventually, because of Egyptian governance, the Zayd household was replaced by another, the 'Awn, from which Husayn ibn 'Ali descended. After the Ottoman restored their control over the Amirate of Mecca, they manipulated the appearance of two rival households and leveraged that competition in order to regulate the Amirate of Mecca as part of its centralizing reforms.

When employing the term "households," I apply the framework articulated by Jane Hathaway in her study of the Mamluk families in Ottoman Egypt as "a social, economic, political and often military structure which served as an arena for patronage."[4] Hathaway's model for re-

---

[3] Arendonk, C. van and Graham, W.A., "Sharif", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 21 November 2018.

[4] Jane Hathaway and Karl K. Barbir, *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800*, 1st ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2008), 13; Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Also useful for thinking about the Hashimites is Ehud Toledano's category of the "Ottoman-Local elite." See his "The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research," in *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from within*, ed. Ilan Pappé and Moshe Ma'oz, vol. 6, Library of Modern Middle East Studies (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 145–62.

characterizing the relationship between regional political elites and the Ottoman state offers a more fluid--and arguably richer--interpretation that accounted for the social and political networks these households operated and depended. Although the Egyptian Mamluk households were much more developed and operated with greater military and political sophistication than any household that emerged in the Hijaz, the characterization of "households" to the rival branches of the Hashemites were nonetheless apt. The Hashemite households, through the position of the Amirate of Mecca, cultivated political and economic networks among the settled and nomadic inhabitants of the region that resembled in the perspective of one historian "a state within a state."[5]

According to Hathaway "the concept of the household, allowing for a wide range of variation, from relatively informal barracks coalitions to highly articulated residence-based conglomerates, provides a more flexible and representative" framework to understand the elite-formation process in Ottoman Egypt, " by allowing us to accommodate the decidedly disparate elements who participated in household-building."[6] Although Hathaway focused on those disparate elements that factored in the specific rise of the Qazadağlı household in the second half of the seventeenth century (like soldiers, slaves, Anatolians, artisans, and even ashraf), Hashemite households likewise consisted of different elements that extended beyond the key family members: local tribesmen, slaves, merchants, and ulama. Together, these elements augmented the household's influence in the region in order for its head to claim the Amirate of Mecca. To be the Amir of Mecca by the late 19th century, as succession became more competative between two

[5] Joshua Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2001), 11–12.

[6] Jane. Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 24.

branches, was thus a byproduct of household-building dynamism through strategic marriages and patronage that made a household "a bastion of political power."[7]

By using the household framework, I avoid prefiguring later nationalist interpretations that considered the Hashemites as Arabs and the Ottoman administrators as Turkish outsiders. Althought the term is often identified with either military slaves in the Ottoman Empire or early modern power struggles in the provinces of the Ottoman Middle East, I find it a useful category for unpacking local politics in Arabia in which members of the same family struggle to achieve the approval of the imperial center to their local politics, on the one hand, and, concurrently, carve out autonomous spaces of powers for themselves, on the other. The framework in which to interpret the Ottoman reincorporation of the Hijaz has indeed mirrored the paradigm set forth by historian Albert Hourani, who employed the term "politics of notables." In this framework, the Hashemite Amirs of Mecca were considered "local notables" (or *ayʿan*) within the Hijaz.[8] As local leaders, the Amirs claimed authority against the agents of the Ottoman government who were appointed to overlook them, most visibly the *wali* or "governor." Often, the extent of Hashemite power was inversely related to the extent to which the Ottoman government could exercise its authority over the region. And yet Jane Hathaway has convincingly argued that "politics of local notables," or "'*ayʿan*-Amir" system, created an ahistorical bifurcation between local leaders, whether merchant, religious, tribal, etc. and the "formal" agents of the Ottoman government like governors or military figures. In the context of the Arabic-speaking region, this characterization

[7] Hathaway, 26.

[8] Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, by William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 41–68; Ehud Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research," in *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within*, ed. Ilan Pappé and Moshe Maʿoz, vol. 6, Library of Modern Middle East Studies ; (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 145–62.

has also served to identify erroneously later nationalist divisions: the local leaders, Arabs, who struggled against the increasingly centralized--and violent--state authorities, who were often Turkish speaking. As such, scholarship has bolstered the impression that as local leaders, the Hashemites were naturally antithetical to the centralization project of the 19th century Ottoman state, and thus their relationship with the Ottoman officials were often inherently hostile or submissive. This proto-nationalist Arab-Turkish conflict thus predicted nationalist violence.[9]

Instead of suggesting a clear division between the local *'ayan*, in this case the Hashemite Amir of Mecca, and the state authority, "household" suggests a more fluid and dynamic field of action and allows for consideration of rivalries within the same class of notables. Often the patron of the household enjoyed close ties with the general population and with a member of the government simultaneously so that power depended on how rival households interacted within a political, economic, and even global matrix. For the Hashemite Amirs of Mecca, as both local authorities who had their own patron-client networks in the Hijaz and as the appointed agents of the Ottoman Sultan because of the patron-client networks they had established in the imperial capital, they encapsulated the liminal space the "household" framework provides.[10] Moreover, that dynamic field was not necessarily uniform or static but involved the competition of several different households striving for Ottoman recognition--and funding--that bolstered standing and influence. The temptation to limit the Hashemite-Ottoman interaction to the relationship between state representatives and the Amir of Mecca placed too much emphasis on the current Amir without considering his Hashemite competitors. By emphasizing household politics among the

[9] Hathaway and Barbir, *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800*, 81.

[10] See William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), 132-147; Joshua Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*,12-18.

Hashemites, it becomes possible to consider the Amirate more holistically as a process of intra-Hashemites households competing for the honor of appointment.

Husayn ibn 'Ali: Household Identities and Ideological Considerations

The historical studies of Husayn ibn 'Ali's political evolution have tended to focus on his complex interactions with Arabism and Ottomanism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Arabism is often considered by historians to be the ideology that eventually birthed Arab nationalism by articulating a distinct and unique Arab identity in religious, cultural, and political ideas rooted in political, religious, and literary revivals in the 19th century. It coincided with Ottomanism, a political project that emphasized the development of an Ottoman collective identity that superseded ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences to become "imperial citizens."[11] As the preeminent Arab official, Husayn's emergence as an Ottoman-appointed Amir of Mecca and then the leader of a Revolt necessarily meant navigating these ideologies.

With the analytical flexibility afforded by re-conceptualizing the Hashemites into rival households, it is also possible to apply the same flexibility to Hashemite--and more specifically, Husayn's--ideological evolution. Whereas the politics of notables and the 'ayan-Amir system privileged nationalist interpretations for conflict between the Arab local power broker and the Ottoman Turkish administrator, household politics allows for more strategic ambiguity and evolution. Such ambiguity is appropriate, considering how the historiography of Husayn's political ideology has evolved since the publication of the first English history of the Arab nationalist movement by historian George Antonius in 1938 in his pioneering work *The Arab*

[11] For an insightful examination of this process among different religious groups, see Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford University Press, 2011), 3.

Awakening. He located the appearance of Arab nationalism among the literary cultural elite in Lebanon and Syria, beginning with Arab Christians in the mid-19th century, who attended the Syrian Protestant College, though having a "false start" with the Egyptian reform movement initiated by Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman-appointed governor of Egypt, a few decades before.[12] The Arabs eventually sought their independence because of the Turkish nationalizing policies of the Ottomans. Thus, for an initial generation of historians, both Arab and British, the fact that the Amir of Mecca Husayn faced similar pressures from the Ottomans and had contacts with the Arab nationalist parties in Damascus, he could claim to represent the Arabs against the Ottoman "Turks," thus confirming his nationalist bonafides and thus the nationalist nature of the Revolt.

A later generation of scholars with access to disclosed British records have instead challenged the lionizing accounts of Antonius that appeared to feed post-Ottoman Hashemite political ambitions by too closely associating them to Arab nationalism. They emphasized the heavy role the British played in instigating and directing Husayn's revolt. Pioneered by Elie Kedourie and popularized later by Efraim and Inari Karsh, these historians have depicted Husayn as a European pawn and tied his ambitions to British colonial ambitions. These histories, however, have tended to overemphasize the weight of European colonial designs and completely elided any lasting Ottoman-era influence on the region. As such, these historians have considered the colonial period in the Middle East as a complete break from the Ottoman period.[13]

---

[12] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement* (London: H. Hamilton, 1938), 21–34.

[13] Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East.* ([London]: Bowes & Bowes, 1956); Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914-1939*, Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). Karsh and Karsh have also dismissed any ideological basis for Husayn's actions, but instead suggested that Husayn harbored imperial ambitions that he believed could be realized with the aid of the Britishh--but was sorely mistaken. As such, they considered Husayn's Arab Revolt to be a "myth in the desert." See Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, "Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt," *Middle Eastern Studies* 33, no. 2 (1997): 267–312; Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, *Empires of the Sand : The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 185–221.

From Antonius' portrayal of Husayn as the paradigmatic Arab nationalist to a generation of scholarship that considered Husayn a colonial creature, more recent historians have instead analyzed and reflected on the slower eclipse of Ottoman ideas and institutions in the Middle East. Instead of a sharp break with the Ottoman system, these historians instead see continuity and evolution. From the perspective of Husayn's political project, they noted his slow rejection of the Ottoman state as he adopted Arab nationalism. In Ernest Dawn's work, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, he challenged Kedourie's arguments of Husayn's European-derived ambitions. Adopting Hourani's framework of the politics of notables, he suggested that Arabism had been a function of elite formation. He argued that amid the changing political landscape of the shift from the pan-Islamic politics promoted by Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II (1976-1909) to a more centralizing Ottoman-Turkish regime, Arab nationalism appeared among Arab elites in Syria and Egypt as a function of elite formation and resistance against centralization and its Arab partners. He likewise critiqued Antonius by suggesting that Arab nationalism resulted from an intra-Arab competition for local power and not the result of Turkish oppression. He concluded that Arab nationalism became a tool for excluded Arab elites to challenge the status quo that privileged Arab more aligned with the Ottoman order and protective of their status.[14]

Concerning Husayn's adoption of Arabism or Arab nationalism, Hourani's model did not fit since Husayn was among the privileged Arab elites that were different from those in Syria and Lebanon. Instead, Dawn and others located Husayn within traditional Sunni Islamic discourse with his sons, particularly 'Abdullah ibn Husayn (1882-1951), adopting a form of Islamic Arabism

[14] C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 122–47.

while still being loyal to the Ottoman system. Dawn distinguishes the two different ideologies as such:

> The ideological influences which affected the two principal leaders of the Arab Revolt, or which were used by them to gain popular support, originated in the general Moslem reaction to European domination which began in the nineteenth century. Husayn and ‘Abdullah agreed in desiring above all to preserve the independence and integrity of Islam and of its fundamental institutions, the shari‘a and the caliphate. Beyond this point, however, their views were divergent. Husayn held fast to traditional Sunnite Islam, while ‘Abdullah joined ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida, and in a general way the Arab nationalists in advocating an Arab revival as the necessary precursor of the restoration of Islam.[15]

In Dawn’s detailed analysis, both Sharifs Husayn and ‘Abdullah placed prime importance on the Caliphate as the central Islamic institution out of Islamic duty. So long as this Islamic order prevailed, the current Caliph was legitimate. However, once the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) dominated the Ottoman government after the 1908 constitutional revolution, its critics charged it abandoning Islamic principles, first for Western institutions and then by abusing Arabs in wartime. As a result, Dawn explained, “the Arabs then naturally were compelled to oppose Ottoman policy, first to restore Islam and second to regain the position which God had allotted to them.”[16] While not overtly nationalistic in the sense of demanding Arab independence before the Arab Revolt, ‘Abdullah had clearly articulated an Islamic-rooted Arabism by joining with Arabist, Islamic reformer, and theologian Rashid Rida (1865-1935) in Cairo. His father Husayn held similar views to his son ‘Abdullah, but was anti-nationalistic. Rejecting nationalist-divisions in the Islamic *umma*, Husayn considered, “the lawful state [was] not a national state but a Moslem state, a caliphate, embracing as much of the community of the faithful as possible.”[17] Thus,

[15] Dawn, 86.

[16] Dawn, 7.

[17] Dawn, 81.

‘Abdullah’s Arabist ideology rested within a specific form of Islamic Modernism compared to his father’s traditional conservatism. He deviated from his father’s traditional Sunni ideology by pursuing an Arab-dependent Islamic revival.

Building on Dawn’s work, Mary Wilson concluded that Husayn’s Arabian politics and the Arab Revolt was the transition for Husayn and ‘Abdullah to Arabism and nationalism as the Arab Revolt left the Hijaz. She further developed William Ochsenwald’s observations that the Hijaz, as a region, was not a particularly likely location for Arabism or Arab nationalism. Lacking a substantial urban centers with literate intellectuals, largely tribally based, the least developed of the Ottoman Arab provinces in terms of administrative and infrastructural integrations, the Hijaz did not display the necessary ingredients for Arabism let alone nationalism. Furthermore, because the global Muslim importance of Mecca and Medina, religion was the prevailing ideological concern for the region.[18] For that reason, Mary Wilson saw a connection between Husayn’s and ‘Abdullah’s Arabist ideology and their proximity to Syria and other traditional centers of Arabist discourse. Comparing him to his brother Faysal (1883-1933), Wilson concluded that ‘Abdullah became an Arab nationalist only when he arrived to Transjordan in 1920--and not before. According to Wilson, “the ideology of Arabism was not espoused by the Hashemites until it became of particular use to them with particular audiences.”[19] In Wilson’s appraisal, when Faysal’s “military activities took him outside traditional Hashemite spheres of influence [the Hijaz] and into Syria,” where early historians claimed had been the heart of Arab nationalism and Arabism, only then “Arabism provided the necessary ideological justification both for his

[18] William Ochsenwald, “Ironic Origins: Arab Nationalism in the Hijaz, 1882-1914,” in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 189–203.

[19] Mary Christina Wilson, “The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism,” in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 214.

particular leadership and for his actions against the empire."[20] For Faysal, he began to work more closely with the traditional epicenter of Arab nationalism and the British accordingly celebrated his Arabist bona fides, since they worked most intimately with him. In contrast, Husayn's and 'Abdullah's theater of the conflict remained in the Arabian Peninsula, "distant from the nationalist movement of the Fertile Crescent."[21] Their rivals included Bedouin tribesmen and a religious fundamentalist movement, Wahhabism. Any secular or political formulations of identity, like Arabism or nationalist, would have proved useless. Instead, Wilson claimed Husayn and 'Abdullah "relied on the old language of religion and of tribal and familial loyalties."[22] Once 'Abdullah's dreams of his own kingdom in Arabia proved impossible, he traveled north towards Syria and adopted a new vocabulary: Arabism and then Arab nationalism, while his father nevertheless preserved his religious ideological outlook.

William Cleveland also suggested the idea that one converts to Arabism or Arab nationalism by one's proximity to Syria when he analyzed Husayn's propaganda and proclamations over the course of the 1916-1918 Arab Revolt. In his reading of Husayn's revolutionary newspaper, *al-Qibla*, which he published beginning in August 1916, Cleveland concluded that "in the early stages of the revolt the emphasis," of the newspaper, "was on protecting and preserving Islam, not on extolling, or even identifying, Arab and Turkish national differences."[23] Even so, any references to an Arab nation were merely transitory and valueless:

---

[20] Wilson, 215.

[21] Wilson, 215.

[22] Wilson, "The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism," 215.

[23] William L. Cleveland, "The Role of Islam as Political Ideology in the First World War," in *National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie*, ed. Edward Ingram (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 1986), 91.

> The political vocabulary of the contributors of al-Qibla reflected a terminology in transition, a blurring of national and religious concepts and a reliance, in the end, on an Islamic ideology. There were no definitions of Arabism because neither the amir of Mecca nor his editor, Muhib al-Din al-Khatib, were comfortable with them; nor were they certain that they constituted the most effective form of propaganda.[24]

Nevertheless, he noted that in later issues more Arabist vocabulary did appear--but only following the development of a more Syria-focused Hashemite agenda. Similar to Wilson's claims, Husayn's religious rhetoric necessarily evolved to a more nationalist one as the Hashemite project left the conservative, more religiously inclined Hijaz.[25]

The treatment of Husayn's--and his sons'-- relationship with Arabism by Kedourie, Dawn, Wilson, and others emphasize the literary and urban cultural origins of Arabism and Arab nationalism to Syria or Cairo as first explored by George Antonius. Recently, however, scholars have challenged the fixation of this narrative and instead thought more broadly about the origins of Arabism (and Arab nationalism).[26] Rashid Khalidi's contribution to the debate, for instance, noted that whereas Ottomanism (loyalty to the Ottoman state) and Arabism (Arab cultural and political preeminence or independence) have often been treated as mutually incompatible, but that

> It has since been pointed out that there were several diverse way stations between Ottomanism and Arabism, and that the two ideologies were by no means mutually exclusive. Thus, Arabists could also be believers in the Ottomanist ideal, and before World War I most were. In this, there was a clear difference before 1914 between the majority of Arabists, whose emphasis on Arab identity was linked to continued loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, and the tiny minority of extreme Arab nationalists who called for secession from the empire.[27]

---

[24] Cleveland, 91–92.

[25] Cleveland, 92–93.

[26] Sylvia Haim's anthology of Arab nationalism, which included writings of Islamic Modernist voices liked Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi and Rashid Rida must be considered pioneering in this regard--despite her suggestion that their ideas were European contrived (see Chapter 1). Likewise, Albert Hourani's study of "liberal thought" among Arab Muslim writers, in particular those in Egypt, further explored the emergence of "modern" ideas among Islamic intellectuals. See Sylvia Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962); Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[27] Rashid Khalidi, ed., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), ix.

By recognizing fluidity and overlap between Ottomanism and Arabism, it became possible to detect the expression of these ideologies away from the educated Arab Christian elites in Syria and Lebanon and to decipher its appearance elsewhere. For instance, Arabism likewise emerged among Muslim Arab intellectuals in Cairo, concerned with reforming the Islamic world in order to resist European domination. They had articulated Islamic modernist ideologies that had emphasized the special role Arab religious and cultural preeminence had to Islamic rejuvenation.[28] For Arabist movements, both nationalist and Islamist, the post-1908 restored constitutional period had offered a fertile landscape for various other Arabist parties to emerge. The return of parliamentary elections, and the general mood for reforms, provided a platform for young Arab intellectuals and officials to re-imagine the state. This perspective directly challenged narratives of outright CUP oppression of Arabs as the catalyst for Arabism by tracing a more positive connection between the spirit of reform, liberalism, and constitutionalism as providing a space for Arab elites to challenge the status quo.[29] Other Arabist parties, concerned with the broader Arab world emerged during this period to include some regionalized varieties like "Syrianism," "Lebanonism," and perhaps even an "Iraqism."[30]

Relevant to Husayn and the Hashemites was Hasan Kayalı's more recent revisionist work on the relationship between the Arabs and the Turks following the 1908 Revolution (which led to

---

[28] Rashid Khalidi and C. Ernest Dawn, eds., "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 3–30.

[29] For example, in the theories of Philip Khoury, Arabism offered Arab notables, excluded from patronage politics, an avenue in which to challenge the prevailing political system. See Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Since the publication of his work, however, he and others have modified his theory. See this work's introduction for a more detailed discussion.

[30] For an in depth description of these Arab movement, see Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: F. Cass, 1993). Quote from Tauber, 1.

Husayn's appointment as the Amir of Mecca).[31] Utilizing Ottoman state records, he noted that collaboration between Arabs and Arabists and the post-revolutionary government (dominated by the Committee of Union and Progress or the "Young Turks" characterized this period and not antagonisms as previous historians have emphasized. For example, between Sharif Husayn's appointment and his declaration of the Arab Revolt, Kayalı described a continuation of the centralization and Ottomanist policies that had predated the 1908 Revolution. He has expertly explored the relationship between the CUP and Amir Husayn and shown how Husayn performed Ottomanism because of its continued benefits alongside the CUP government officials. In his appraisal, "the Young Turk governments successfully steered Sharif Husayn to conduct those policies that advanced the interests of the imperial center."[32] In pursuit of Ottoman interests, Kayalı also located structural changes in the ways the CUP sought to govern the Hijaz that undoubtedly threatened Husayn's privileges and prompted him to seek a new patron. Namely, the severance of Medina from the Hijaz *vilayet* and the CUP's agreements with Husayn's rivals in the Arabian Peninsula prompted Husayn's outreach to the British. As a result of centralization (and not Turkification), Kayalı concluded that the Arab Revolt was "not so much the culmination of Arab nationalist activity or a rejection of the refashioned Ottomanist ideology, but a convergence of dynastic ambition and strategic exigency that contributed to the eventual political separation of Arabs and Turks."[33] In an effort to preserve his authority in the region, Husayn revolted but only did so once World War I created the conditions that provided him a new benefactor, Great Britain.

---

[31] The first historian to systematically challenge Antonius' thesis of Turkish oppression as contributing to Arab nationalism was Zeine N. Zeine. See Zeine N. Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism; with a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East*, [3d ed.] (Delmar, N.Y.,: Caravan Books, 1973).

[32] Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (University of California Press, 1997), 173.

[33] Kayalı, 15–16.

In deciphering a greater overlap between Husayn and the Ottoman government (interpreted as a continued reliance on Ottomanism or at least Islamism) laid the foundation of M. Talha Çiçek's groundbreaking study Ottoman-Arab relations at the provincial level, namely Syria, during the governorship of Jamal Pasha during World War I.[34] Again, using Ottoman state records, Çiçek provided an alternative narrative of this period that challenged older narratives of outright Ottoman (or Turkish) oppression against the Syrian Arab population and the Arabist parties that had culminated into the Arab Revolt and support for Husayn's project. Çiçek instead described how Jamal Pasha's policies, rooted in military exigencies, while at first hostile towards the Arabist parties, eventually strategically adjusted his policies in such away were more moderate. Remarkably, he even noted a brief rapprochement, that is, an attempt at negotiating a settlement that took place between Husayn's son Faysal and the Ottoman authorities in Syria in the midst of the Arab Revolt in early 1918.[35] According to Çiçek, the Ottoman policy towards the Arabs had proved much more accommodating, which accounted for the actual lack of active support for Husayn's revolt by Arabs outside the Hijaz, a topic that will be explored in greater detail in chapter four.

The recent tendency to treat Arabism and Ottomanism as overlapping spectrums and to consider them more locally mirrored another development in the historiography of Arabism: Arabism as not exclusively a political project but also a cultural project.[36] To this end, Youssef

---

[34] M. Talha Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria : Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917* (London: Routledge, 2016).

[35] Çiçek, 63–65. Much of Çiçek's work has shown that Ottoman policies directed towards its Arab subjects, whether urban, rural, or tribal had been much more pragmatic and accommodating than hostile. See M. Talha Çiçek, "Negotiating Power and Authority in the Desert: The Arab Bedouin and the Limits of the Ottoman State in Hijaz, 1840–1908," *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no. 2 (March 3, 2016): 260–79; M. Talha Çiçek, "The Tribal Partners of Empire in Arabia: The Ottomans and the Rashidis of Najd, 1880–1918," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 56 (2017): 105–30.

[36] Pioneers in this regard were the works of Gershoni and Jankowski whose look at how Arab nationalism is locally performed in Egypt. See Israel Gershoni and James P Jankowski, *Commemorating the Nation: Collective Memory,*

Choueiri has been instrumental in articulating different phases to Arab nationalism in order to better interpret ideological statements within their ideological contexts. Relevant to Husayn, from Choueiri's perspective, was that he was a liminal figure between "cultural" Arabism and "political Arabism." According to his definitions, cultural Arabism was "a result of the convergence of socio-economic and political factors in the nineteenth century," such as responses to Ottoman reforming projects, European encroachment, and the legacy of Arab civilization.[37] Arabism, however, was "confined at this stage to a broad awareness of a cultural identity that had to be cherished and reformed."[38] Cultural Arabism sought primarily to study and obtain recognition of Arab contributions to world history, and as such, study circles formed that then became the basis for political parties that appeared at the turn of the 20th century. World War I became the watershed moment for cultural Arabism as its members began to articulate Arab identity "in more rigorous terms," by associating increasingly with ideas of Arab "self-determination, independence and the active participation of indigenous elites in deciding its general well-being."[39] Because of the prospects of the Ottoman Empire being defeated and the wartime pressure afflicted on the Arabists, Arabism thus entered its next phase, political Arabism.

As an ideology possessing both political and cultural origins, pioneering work has been done to examine the emergence of Arab nationalism on the individual and local level. Whether through biographies that charts its emergence in the lives of political figures and intellectuals[40] to

---

Public Commemoration, and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2004).

[37] Youssef M. Choueiri, *Arab Nationalism, a History : Nation and State in the Arab World* (Oxford ; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000), 56, 65.

[38] Choueiri, 56.

[39] Choueiri, 82–83.

[40] See for instance, William L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' al-Husri* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). More recently, the biography of

even literary icons like poets who arrive at Arabism through cultural--not necessarily philosophical--exposure. As a result, Arabism became not only a political doctrine or but also a localized performance. James Gelvin expertly charted the performative aspects of Arabism in his work on post-Ottoman Arab Damascus, where Husayn's son Faysal had established the short-lived Arab government with him as King. By studying the slogans (both official but also in the form of graffito), public celebrations, and symbols, Gelvin revealed that Arabism could also be iconographic and performative. In this similar vein, Peter Wien's study of Arab nationalism reminded scholars to not fixate on Arab nationalism's political agenda, but to "focus on the roots, establishment, and evolution of imaginative, symbolic, or 'lived' ties between people(s) who claimed to belong to an Arab national community…."[41] As such, he concluded elsewhere that

> It would be a misunderstanding therefore to speak of only one Arab nationalism. Rather, there is a sometimes contradictory Arab nationalisms that take different forms in the different Arab lands and are deeply rooted in local contexts. They do, however, share a common reference to a vaguely defined and delineated Arabness.[42]

Wien aptly accomplished noting the transregional and localized nature of Arab nationalism by tracing the nationalist biographies and histories of individuals, monuments, celebrations, and even corpses in his recent work.

By adopting Choueiri's phases of Arab nationalism, namely his categories of cultural Arabism and political Arabism, my project makes it possible to recognize Husayn's Arabism

---

Fawzi al-Qawuqji by Laila Parsons shows the many paths, phases, and fissures of Arab nationalism in the life of an Ottoman Arab soldier and anti-colonial fighter. See Laila Parsons, *Commander: Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the Fight for Arab Independence 1914-1948* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016).

[41] Peter Wien, "Preface: Relocating Arab Nationalism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 2 (2011): 203.

[42] Peter Wien, *Arab Nationalism: The Politics of History and Culture in the Modern Middle East* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 3.

without prematurely suggesting that he harbored political ambitions outside the Ottoman state. I do not mean to reduce Husayn's ideological choices to petty political considerations, but I do want to show the ways in which Arabism and household politics interact and influence one another, as other ideologies also take root in Arabia, and as another imperial power, the British, become bolder in their political undertakings. As chapters one and two (and most of three) examines, Husayn's political identity was primarily rooted in his local Hashemite context: a member of the 'Awn household who rivaled against the older Zayd household for honor to become the Amir of Mecca. The 'Awn, exemplified by Husayn, emerged as a cultural Arabists in that they leveraged their identity as Arabs from the Hijaz singularly loyal to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph to legitimate their dominance over the Amirate of Mecca after 1882. In this way, the debate as to whether Husayn was an Ottomanist, Islamist, or Arabist becomes mute, as it was possible to label Husayn a "cultural Arabist" that valued, celebrated, and promoted an Arab identity without separatist political ambitions. To accommodate Husayn and his household's cultural Arabism with their loyalty not necessarily to the Ottoman state *in toto* but to the Ottoman caliphate specifically, I describe them as "Hamidian Arabs" because of their political affinity to the Ottoman Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid (r. 1876-1909). His and his household's cultural Arabism thus came to distinguish them from their Zayd rivals, whose identity rested on liberalizing schemes of Ottoman reform and thus are best characterized as "Ottomanist."

By analyzing how the Hashemite household rivalry intersected with Arabism and Ottomanism over the course of the 19th century, my project seeks to build on this trajectory for Arab nationalist studies by localizing Husayn ibn 'Ali's adoption of political Arabism to competition for the Amirate of Mecca. In this respect, this project sidesteps the questions of Husayn's future ambitions, like the question of the caliphate that had garnered the most

disagreement among scholars. Instead I argue that Husayn's political transformation from an Arab Hamidian (or cultural Arabist who leveraged his Arab identity within an Ottomanist framework) to a political Arabist who launched a revolt against the Ottomans was rooted in a Hashemite rivalry that had emerged in the 19th century and continued throughout the 1916-1919 Arab Revolt. The contours of which were clearly discernible when his Zayd rival, 'Ali Haydar, became the last Ottoman-appointed Amir of Mecca in response to Husayn's political revolt.[43] To draw this connection, this project focuses on Hashemite interactions, both dynastic and rhetorical, that formed the basis for this rivalry to trace how it evolved politically into Husayn's project for political independence. Ultimately, by focusing on the Hashemite household rivalry, we are able to discern another path to Arabism that considered how two Ottoman elites adopted different political ideologies in order to secure power that culminated into violence--both real and rhetorical.

The trajectory of my analytical intervention likewise builds on recent scholarship that has emphasized the continuity of Ottoman institutions during this period. The traditional historical literatue, by focusing on Husayn's and British narratives of World War I and the Arab Revolt, exaggerated the extent in which this period marked a dramatic break from Ottoman systems and traditions that then allowed for the introduction of colonial forms of government. In many ways, this portrayal served the interests of Arabist or colonial figures seeking to separate themselves from the Ottoman legacy to which they had rebelled. As Michael Provence's recent work has shown, this generation of figures—including Husayn—represented "the last Ottoman generation"

[43] I choose 1919 as the end year of the Arab Revolt because although the October 1918 Mudros Armistice had technically ended all fighting in the Middle East and the November 1918 Armistice had ended World War I, the Ottoman forces that held Medina only surrendered to Husayn's forces on January 13, 1919. Considering the importance of the city to Husayn's project, explored in chapter 4, it is only appropriate to consider that while the Ottomans and the Europeans had stopped fighting, the war had not ended for Husayn until he claimed the Holy City.

united by their "common legacy of the late Ottoman modernization project…."[44] This generation's interface with Ottoman military schools, bureucracy, and life experiences that characterized the late Ottoman period impacted and informed their actions into the colonial period. For Husayn, the persistence of the Hashemite household rivlary to his political actions represented one such area of continuity between the Ottoman era and his declaration of independence.

At the same time, since my project relies in part on those sources preserved or produced by British officials, my project necessarily reconstructs networks. I thus argue that the networks between the British Empire and the Arabian Peninsula did not limit themselves to only the key figures. The British were not just simply looking for an ally in the region with whom they could form an alliance (as modeled by the Shaykh Mubarak in Kuwait; Ibn Sa'ud in the Najd and al-Hasa; and eventually the Amir of Mecca in the Hijaz), but that they were actively trying to create one.[45] In the case of the Amir of Mecca, local British officials involved themselves in the internal dynastic struggles of the two households to actively promote one household over another—not passively accept whomever was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan. In a way, this intervention very much mimicked Ottoman political pratices. Thus, as a function of British colonialism, the British experience with the Amirate of Mecca revealed the localized efforts by its officials to shape proactively their potential allies.

Methodology and Sources

Because of Husayn's leadership in the Arab Revolt and his family's legacy in the colonial period in the Middle East, their history and sources are well-trodden territory for historians, both

[44] Michael Provence, *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 6.
[45] H.L. Stebbins, "British Consuls and 'Local' Imperialism in Iran, 1889-1921" (The University of Chicago, 2009).

Arab and British. This project has focused, as much as possible, on the writings produced by the members of the Hashemite households, many of which are found in the British archives, compiled in published collections, and presented in the form of memoirs disclose the self-image of key Hashemite figures. This self-image, while undoubtedly a later curated political project, when collaborated with outside contemporaneous sources, nonetheless preserved outlooks, values, and very personal histories from which to construct hosuehold-building processes. Documents from the British archives are especially well explored but have been examined from the perspective of European colonial interests or for hints of Husayn's ambitions for either national kingship or the caliphate.[46] The Jordanian historian Suleiman al-Musa's comprehensive oeuvre includes narrative histories of the Hashemites and collections of documents, the most interesting of which come from the collection of papers preserved by Husayn's youngest son, Zayd, who played a minor role in the events examined in this project.[47] A significant source for Husayn's rhetoric that has only received cursory examination by historians was Husayn's propaganda newspaper *al-Qibla* that was first published in Mecca in August 1916 until the Saudi conquest of the city in 1924, which ended Hashemite political presence in the Hijaz. (At the same time, the Hashemite archive in Mecca, which undoubtedly offered an intimate look at the Hashemites and the function of Husayn's Hijazi government, disappeared.[48])

---

[46] From this perspective, the works of Kedourie and Teitelbaum are exemplary. See Kedourie, *England and the Middle East.*; Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*; Joshua Teitelbaum, "Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman Order: From Chieftaincy to Suzerainty," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 1 (1998): 103–22; Joshua Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia* (London: Hurst & Company, 2001); Joshua Teitelbaum, "The Man Who Would Be Caliph," in *Jihad and Islam in World War I*, ed. E.J. Zürcher (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016), 275–304.

[47] Sulayman Musa, *Al-Marasalat al-Tarikhiyya, 1914-1918: Al-Thawra al-'arabiyya al-Kubra* (Amman, Jordan: Sulayman Musa, 1973).

[48] See endnote 5 in Jeffery Rudd, "Abdallah Bin Al-Husayn: The Making of an Arab Political Leader, 1908-1921" (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1993), 21.

Compared to Sharif Husayn and his sons, the source material on Sharif 'Ali Haydar's attitudes and perspectives of the household rivalry is limited to a memoir he produced, but the original text was never published; instead, large blocs were translated and included in an English-language biography. With the help of the Sharif's wife, his British biographer George Stewart Stitt assembled and preserved these pieces in translation. Though admitting that he had "rewritten and edited and, to a certain extent, embellished," he also insisted that he did so "without any way altering the facts." In addition to this English biography, his daughter "Princess" Musbah Haidar likewise penned her own memoir three years before Stitt, in English. She claimed to "have written it as [she] saw it; as [she] remember it," but acknowledges the use of Stitt's manuscript so as to "refresh [her] memory of events and dates." As a result, both works must be viewed as their attempt to "correct" the narrative dominated by Sharif Husayn and his sons in the post-Ottoman period.[49] By the time they published, Sharif Husayn's legacy had been established by George Antonius' 1938 history, *The Arab Awakening*, and by the earliest edition of T.E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, which recounted his role alongside in the Arab Revolt where be depicted Sharif Husayn and his sons as sympathetic Arab leaders, betrayed by the British.[50] Both Antonius and Lawrence portrayed Sharif Husayn as the quintessential Hashemite leader. The fact that Princess Musbah published her memoirs at the same time as Sharif Husayn's second son, 'Abdullah, must also be considered since she only wrote her memoirs in English. Revealingly, although Sharif Husayn and his sons had their advocates, the voices of Sharif 'Ali Haydar and his daughter made their first published appearance only in English. In that sense, both Stitt and Musbah had an

[49] See George Marquis Stewart Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia, the Emir Shereef Ali Haider* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1948), pg. 5 and Musbah Haidar, *Arabesque* (London: Hutchinson, 1945), pg. 6.

[50] See George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement (London: H. Hamilton, 1938) and T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: The Complete 1922 Text, New ed. (Fordingbridge, Hampshire: J. and N. Wilson, 2004).

English-speaking audience in mind and did not write for an Arab audience. Unlike Musbah, ‘Abdullah’s memoirs were initially published only in Arabic, and no doubt had an Arab audience in mind. I do not make this observation merely on the basis of language or date of publications; rather, the decisions of Sharif ‘Ali Haydar and his daughter, the former to write his memoirs in Ottoman Turkish for his wife to translate into English (and only preserving the English text) and the latter to write only in English, offers a clue in the way these two members of the Zayd clan viewed themselves vis-a-vis their relatives among the ‘Awn.

In reading and analyzing these documents, I have attempted to draw out and analyze how rhetoric and discourse evolved alongside, reflected in, and was wielded by the Hashemite household rivalry as Husayn adopted political Arabism. In this task, I revisited and analyzed documents--when possible in the original Arabic—located in British archives in London and Oxford. My critical readings of British officials’ documents from the Peninsula, coupled with Arab sources in their keep, allowed me to analyze to what extent Husayn’s anxieties to protect his and his household’s claim to the Amirate of Mecca against rival household challengers contributed to the ideological evolution. The inter-Hashemite household, frustrations with the Ottoman government, and interpretation of British intimations during wartime all factored into Husayn’s evolution.

Since this project seeks to interpret Husayn’s transformation from a cultural Arabist to a political Arabist, the Arabic sources that include his personal writings, his proclamations, as well as his newspaper *al-Qibla* have been essential in charting his alienation with the Ottoman government and then his adoption of political Arabism. As such, it was through the Arabic sources (his proclamation and his newspaper) that Husayn launched his rhetorical war of legitimation against his Hashemite rival, ‘Ali Haydar, who issued his own counter-proclamations while in

Medina from August 1916-January 1917. Likewise, memoirs (in particular those of ‘Ali Haydar and ‘Abdullah, Husayn’s son) also proved useful in articulating how these different households viewed themselves and experienced the Ottoman state.[51] By analyzing these two Hashemite figures from two competing households through their respective writings, both amidst the rivalry for the Amirate and into the war period, it is possible to discern the ideological contours they developed and inherited: political Arabism for Husayn and his sons and Ottomanism for ‘Ali Haydar. Moreover, the Arabic sources--and arguably the British sources--represent the contested plain for the Hashemites who in the midst of World War I sought to affect Arab opinions, thus resting part of their claims to legitimacy to Arab opinion and thus through Arabic.

[51] Memoirs, especially perhaps those written by political figures, are subject to criticism considering the fact that autobiographies are subject to exaggerations, retrospective justifications, and the effects of selective memory. Elie Kedourie’s analysis of several political memoirs reads them from the perspective of providing the reader a glimpse into “the character of recent Arab politics” and from those he studied after the colonial period, he noted that they “paint a melancholy picture of the disappointments and disasters which its practitioners have had to suffer.” See Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies* (London: Cass, 1974), 178. In the case of these two Hashemite authors, the fact that they were written within a few years of each other (1945 and 1948), near the end of the colonial mandate period in the Middle East, suggest an attempt by both to define the historical narrative on their own terms at the height of the colonial period. Other historians have taken a more critical approach towards autobiographies by treating them as historical fiction. As Joseph Nevo noted in his analysis of ‘Abdullah’s memoir, ‘Abdullah may have deliberated distorted his chronicle of the past in order to suit his contemporary political project, namely the “Greater Syria” project, by exaggerating his family’s role in Arab nationalism while downplaying their critics. See Joseph Nevo, “‘Abdullah’s Memoirs as Historical Source Material,” in *The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World: Essays in Honour of the Late Professor Uriel Dann*, ed. Uriel Dann, Aryeh Shmuelevitz, and Asher Susser (Routledge, 2013). Recent research, not exclusively on the Middle East context, has re-examined the historical usefulness of autobiographies neither as perfect personal records nor complete fabrications. Instead, they ought to be deciphered as much as possible with outside sources. Discrepancies do not always result from fabrications, however, but attempts by the author to place him or herself into their historical context through narrative. As such, autobiographies can provide a glimpse of the subject’s experience (versus recording) of the past. For example, in the American context see Paul E. Lovejoy, “Autobiography and Memory: Gustavus Vassa, Alias Olaudah Equiano, the African,” *Slavery & Abolition* 27, no. 3 (December 1, 2006): 317–47. For my purposes, I have used memoirs--paired as much as possible with other sources--to construct how the Hashemite subjects located themselves within the Ottoman system and remembered their experiences. Husayn’s son ‘Abdullah’s memoirs captured his family’s experience of cultural Arabism to ‘Ali Haydar’s experience of Ottomanism. These memoirs are also essential in retelling the vicarious experience of these figures within their own families--information that may be intimated but not detailed in official documents.

Organization

Chapter one provides a context for the relationships between the Hashemite households. It argues that a rivalry had emerged between the ‘Awn and Zayd households of the Hashemites by mid-century that had evolved alongside the maturation of Ottomanism, Arabism, and European colonialism in the Hijaz. The chapter begins in 1880 with the assassination of the Hashemite Amir of Mecca from among the ‘Awn household--the relative dynastic newcomer to the Amirate of Mecca among the Hashemites. The assassination and its aftermath (the oscillation of the Amirate between the ‘Awn then Zayd and finally ‘Awn households and the discourses that emerged from it) provide a framework in which to articulate and interrogate the emergence of the rival Hashemite households. By considering these dramatic events, which brought together Ottoman, European, and Arabist concerns to the Amirate of Mecca and the Hashemites more specifically, it is possible to discern the stakes of the household rivalry: control over the Amirate, access to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, and schemes for the restoration of the Arab and Islamic worlds. This chapter examines the emergence of the household rivalry during the Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz and traced how the rivalry became a political tool for the Ottoman state to manage the peripheral, yet symbolically important region. At the same time, British imperial interests in the Islamic world, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Red Sea likewise affected the household rivalry (which culminated in the assassination of the ‘Awn Amir). For Arabist entertaining ideas of rejuvenating the Arab and Islamic world through Arab religious and cultural preeminence, the descendants of Muhammad, the Hashemites, emerged as potential agents in Arabist imaginations. By 1883, when the ‘Awn returned to the Amirate of Mecca, their triumph over the Zayd that lasted until 1916, laid the foundation for the separate evolution of the households, which is the subject of chapter two.

Chapter two argues that with the ‘Awn confident in their relationship with the Ottoman Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid a period of internal consolidation took place that revealed the different ideological formulations of the Hashemite households between cultural Arabism and Ottomanism. Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq (r.1883-1905), who enjoyed the longest tenure as the Amir of Mecca than any other member of the ‘Awn, sought to establish a dynasty for him and his sons by circumventing the ‘Awn dynastic succession. In so doing, a conflict erupted within the ‘Awn household that led to his nephew Husayn ibn ‘Ali leaving the region to reside in Istanbul for the remainder of his uncle’s tenure and even through his younger cousin’s administration from 1905-1908. Only after the 1908 constitutional revolution led to his cousin’s deposition, the sudden death of his aged uncle, and the intervention of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid did Husayn reclaim his place dynastically to the Amirate of Mecca among his household. For Husayn, as an ‘Awn who bridged the Ottoman elite politics of Istanbul with the household politics of Mecca, his embrace of cultural Arabism-- that is, an identification with Arab cultural identity without seeking political independence on that basis-- made him emerge as the ideal local Arab leader during the Hamidian period. As a cultural Arabist exclusively loyal to Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid, he could exist within the Hamidian political framework that had emerged vis-a-vis the Amirate of Mecca and Istanbul. His Zayd rival, ‘Ali Haydar, took a different ideological path. For ‘Ali Haydar, having been completely alienated from the Amirate of Mecca and almost entirely acculturated to the politics of the Ottoman capital, he sympathized with the reforming elements of the Ottoman state. His sympathies also reflected his household’s legacy with Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid, who had deposed his grandfather the last Zayd Amir of Mecca, for his support of the Young Ottomans and the 1876 constitution. When deciphering the values and memories of ‘Ali Haydar, it becomes apparent that he felt alienated by the Hamidian schema and instead identified with the more reforming elements of Ottomanism.

With this ideological bifurcation between the ‘Awn and Zayd Hashemite households, it becomes possible in chapter three to trace the ideological evolution of Husayn ibn ‘Ali as he grew increasingly frustrated by and alienated from the emerging Ottoman government in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Chapter three argues that Husayn’s adoption of political Arabism (marked by the Arab Revolt), represented the culmination of his cultural Arabist critiques of the CUP that undermined a Hamidian compromise his household accepted during the reign of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II. As the new CUP government and even Husayn took steps to more directly manage the Hijaz and safeguard it from Arab Peninsular powers like ibn Saud and al-Idris, the CUP abrogated the terms of his loyalty once they reached out to his peninsular rivals (who represented political and religious threats), bifurcated the Hijaz by administratively separating Medina from Mecca, and publically affiliating with members of the Zayd household. With these actions, Husayn began to seek new allies, which culminated in his agreements with Arabist parties in Syria and Egypt and an agreement with the British. In so doing, Husayn’s cultural Arabism began to assume more elements of political Arabism. Feeling threatened, Husayn declared his Revolt in June 1916, his proclamation of which located his decision between cultural Arabism and political Arabism (by adopting some of the Arabist political party’s discourse). He eventually made the leap to political Arabism, as chronicled in the pages of his revolutionary newspaper, when the Ottoman government stripped him of his title and formally appointed his Zayd rival, thereby reactivating the Hashemite household competition for the Amirate of Mecca. His rival, as recorded through his proclamation from the Ottoman stronghold in Medina, represented the loyal Ottoman Hashemite, which posed a dangerous challenge for Husayn, whom he depicted as a colonial pawn. By August 1916, we can discern Husayn as the “Awakened Amir” (having adopted the discourse of the Arab *nahda*) and ‘Ali Haydar as the

"Specter Amir" who represented a very potent Hashemite alternative for Arabs and Muslims fearing British domination of the Holy Cities or further dismemberment of the Islamic world.

Those fears were apparent during the 1916 pilgrimage (October 1916), which begins chapter four. Chapter four argues that contrary to histories that emphasized the Arab Revolt as a Hashemite-led struggle against the Ottomans, the household rivalry (represented by an Arabist Mecca against an Ottomanist Medina) remained a factor for Husayn that ultimately stymied his project for independence. The lackluster support among Arabs in the Ottoman Empire, the displayed anxieties of Husayn's supporters and of pilgrims in Mecca during the pilgrimage, plus Husayn's stated anxiety of 'Ali Haydar in the region issuing proclamations prompted Husayn and his supporters to reformulate his leadership in order to confront these liabilities. His subsequent coronation as the King of the Arabs, which rhetorically declared complete Arab national and religious independence from the Ottoman Empire, was a culmination of Husayn's political Arabism. By adopting this title, which had no antecedent, Husayn fully embraced this ideology to define his place in the Arab and Islamic world in opposition to the Ottoman order. Since the position lacked precedence, the editors of his newspaper, *al-Qibla*, articulated and defined the title. Their definition incorporated Arabist discourse, dubbing the King of the Arab as a culmination of the nationalist and patriotic spirit of the Arabs. They also argued for its applicability to the non-Muslims in the Arab regions, in a nod towards Syria, by hearkening back to the treatment of Jews and Christians during the initial Islamic period. Their mentioning the current plight of the Armenians as instructive for the Arabs for the need of a unifying King to defend against Ottoman Turkish violence. This concern was not just rhetorical, however, but reflected Husayn's real interest in the fate of the Armenians both before and during the War. Husayn's outreach represented one way he performed his Kingship.

Chapter four concludes by considering how the Hashemite household rivalry played out during the Arab Revolt with Medina as a site of contest. With Ottoman forces fortified within the city, they posed a real military threat until at least January 1917, but the city continued to pose a rhetorical challenge as the Specter Amir issued proclamations from there. In these, he decried his ‘Awn relative and called the Arabs to defend the sanctity of the Holy Cities from British imperialism by waging *jihad* and to remain united through loyalty to the Ottoman caliph. Having failed to capture Medina, Husayn could only wage a rhetorical war against his Zayd rival. Using his newspaper to chronicle the deteriorating conditions Medina caused by Ottoman Turkish violence and looting, Husayn sought to use these reports to justify stripping the Ottoman caliph’s name from the weekly *khutbah* (Friday sermons) in the Hijaz and to formulate his own prayer that recognized him as sovereign. Amid this struggle for Medina, the legitimacy of their respective households likewise factored into the competing rhetoric with each Amir seeking to legitimate not only themselves but also their households. Ultimately, it becomes possible to measure the material effect of this competition by the depressed numbers and relative poverty of the pilgrims to Mecca over the course of Husayn’s Revolt. Without possible access to Medina, wealthier and more connected pilgrims skipped the pilgrimage altogether. This translated into a lost opportunity for Husayn to elevate his standing globally and to develop an independent source of wealth. The relatively poorer pilgrims likewise required Husayn’s charity, further draining his resources without concomitant benefits the wealthier pilgrims could offer. As attention and British resources followed the Arab forces northward into Syria, Husayn remained in Mecca struggling to prove his independence.

Chapter 1- The Death of an Amir and the Political Evolution of the Hashemites into Households in the 19th Century

Introduction

The Amir of Mecca was a Muslim institution that governed the Hijaz, which is the western coastal region of the Arabian Peninsula where Mecca and Medina are both located. For centuries, the title of Amir of Mecca ("Prince" of Mecca) was passed down among the Hashemites, a family of notables, who claimed to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (that is, from the House of Hashem from the Quraysh tribe).[1] Because of their prophetic lineage, they held the noble responsibility of managing the Holy Cities and overseeing the yearly pilgrimage (*hajj*) that attracted Muslims from all over the world to complete prescribed rituals in accordance with tradition. Given their noble lineage, reverence for these individuals was reflected by the application of the title of "Sharif" (pl. *ashraf*), meaning "the honorable" given to members of recognized prophetic descent.[2]

That reverence for the Hashemites, however, had limits. On March 14, 1880, Husayn ibn Muhammad (r. 1877–1880), the Amir of Mecca, accompanied by his agents, aides, and personal guards, entered the Red Sea port of Jeddah where he was met with much fanfare. From the crowd, an elderly man approached the Amir as though to venerate him. Unexpectedly, the man instead lunged toward the Amir and stabbed him just under the heart.[3] Within twenty-four hours, the Amir

[1] For a narrative history of the Hashemites as Amirs of Mecca, see Gerald de Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca* (London: Harrap, 1951); Joshua Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia* (Hurst, 2001), 1–10.

[2] For a literary history of the Hijaz, especially Mecca, from pre-Islamic until 1925, see F. E. Peters, *Mecca: A Literary History of the Muslim Holy Land* (Princeton University Press, 2017). For a legal history, see Malik ibn Rabiʿ Dahlan, *The Hijaz: The First Islamic State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[3] TNA: Telegram from Mr. Malet, Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 22 March 1880 [FO 195/1313].

died of internal bleeding, leaving his post vacant.[4] In the aftermath of his death, agents of the Ottoman Empire, which had controlled the Hijaz since the 16th century, quickly appointed an interim-Amir who happened to be the Amir's youngest brother. The Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul, however, quickly appointment a nearly ninety-year-old Hashemite, who had previously served as the Amir twice and been dismissed both times. The Sultan in Istanbul, who as Caliph had the ultimate prerogative to choose the next Amir of Mecca as his personal agent in the region, installed this returning Amir, Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib ibn Ghalib (1790-1886). Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib ibn Ghalib was from a much older branch of Hashemite Amirs, the Zayd branch, than the late Amir was. His reappointment proved short-lived, however, because he was again dismissed in 1882. He was replaced by a different brother of the assassinated Amir, thus solidifying control of the Amirate of Mecca for the next thirty years to the rival Hashemite branch, the 'Awn, from which the deceased Amir hailed.

The circumstances and the details of this assassination and its aftermath (hereafter "the events of 1880-1882") require a brief elaboration in order to appreciate the full confluence of history and the importance of this particular historical moment in the political trajectory of the Hashemites. The assassin was an Afghan, who was angered by the fact that Amir Husayn ibn Muhammad of the 'Awn had sent agents to Afghanistan to bolster Muslim opinion of the British there who were fighting a war against Russia as part of the "Great Game."[5] The Amir was very close to European powers: he died in the British consulate, and his physician was French.[6] Despite

[4] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[5] Edward Ingram, "Great Britain's Great Game: An Introduction," *The International History Review* 2, no. 2 (1980): 160–71. For a brief history of the Second Afghan War, see M. Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics* (HarperCollins, 2002), 86–97.

[6] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

British protests, the Ottomans swiftly--albeit begrudgingly--appointed ‘Abdul Muttalib ibn Ghalib of the Zayd branch. Amir ‘Abdul Muttalib, although residing near the Sultan in Istanbul, had become infamous within Ottoman circles. In particular, his ancestors had in fact, during the French occupation of Egypt in 1798, attempted to rebel against the Ottomans.[7] His first dismissal from the Amirate of Mecca took place during the Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz because of allegations that he was too aligned with the Wahhabis, a strict, puritanical strain of Islam that had emerged in the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century and had occupied the Hijaz since 1803. His most recent dismissal in 1856, took place after attempting a rebellion himself.[8] His third and final removal from office in 1882 to be replaced by a member of the opposing Hashemite branch likewise followed suspicions of his opposition to Ottoman Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II.

This brief history of the Amirate of Mecca in the 19th century has often been understood as reflecting the relationship between its government and local leaders in the provinces; that is, the Ottoman *wali* (*vali* in Turkish or “governor”) and the Hashemite Amir of Mecca.[9] Like other regional leaders in more distant provinces, the Hijaz had traditionally been governed with minimal interaction from a more centralized Islamic state. Mirroring other Ottoman provinces, conflict necessarily emerged as the Amir of Mecca resisted the intrusion of Ottoman bureaucrats and administrative reforms. As a provincial leader, the Hashemite Amir of Mecca had a traditional

---

[7] M. Abir, “The ‘Arab Rebellion’ of Amir Ghalib of Mecca (1788-1813),” *Middle Eastern Studies* 7, no. 2 (1971): 185–200.

[8] de Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca.*, 248–49; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Ashraf Makkat Al-Mukarramah Wa-Umara’iha Fi al-‘ahd al-‘Uthmani*, trans. Khalil ‘Ali Murad (Beirut: al-Dar al-‘Arabiyah lil-Mawsu‘at, 2003), 215–16; Ş. Tufan Buzpinar, “Vying for Power and Influence in the Hijaz: Ottoman Rule, The Last Emirate of Abdulmuttalib and the British (1880–1882),” *The Muslim World* 95, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 1.

[9] For a useful examination of this conflict, the works of al-Amr and Ochsenwald have become essential: Saleh Muhammad Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914: Ottoman Vali, the Sharif of Mecca, and the Growth of British Influence* (Riyad University Publications, 1978); William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984).

local base of support in the form of merchants, tribesmen, and urban notables who profited from his patronage and management of the yearly pilgrimage. The attempts by the liberalizing *tanzimat* reforms and the more conservative Hamidian reforms (still marked by administrative reforms and infrastructural projects) to more closely incorporate the Hijaz, however, threatened the Amir's basis of support by circumventing his authority or redirecting revenue away from his allies. The resulting conflict between the Amir and the Ottoman administrators mirrored many of the circumstances experienced in other peripheral regions, like Syria or Iraq.[10]

While conflicts between the Amir of Mecca and the Ottoman state characterized the historical development of the Hijaz in the 19th century, the Amir of Mecca was more than just a provincial semi-autonomous post who confronted the centralizing powers of the 19th century state. This curious administrative episode in the history of the Amirate of Mecca--an assassination, followed by dynastic restoration, and ending finally with return (or re-usurpation, depending on one's perspective)--was far from a typical moment in the history of the Amirate. For one, the events of 1880-1882 took place simultaneously as the Ottoman state, governed by Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II, underwent a change in identity--away from liberalizing reforms that had culminated into a constitution, which he prorogued--to one seeking to centralize administration of its provinces and subdue regional authorities, like the Amir of Mecca, to his personal authority.[11] Second, the oscillation of appointments took place as European powers, namely the British, sought to incorporate the region into its imperial designs and to find a Muslim ally to counter the pan-Islamist

[10] A useful comparison is the case of the "Transjordan" region that over the course of the 19th century transformed from a peripheral region of Damascus and Jerusalem, to an administered region of the Syrian *vilayet*. See Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[11] For a description of Sultan Abdülhamid's political ideology, see Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford University Press, 2001).

policies of the Ottoman Sultan. Finally, the circumstances behind this brief moment likewise seemed to echo in the imaginations of Muslim Arabists, who by the turn of the 20th century had articulated a vision of Arab national rejuvenation that included the Amirs of Mecca.

Considering this complex web of relationships, I argue that the 1880-1882 events represented a turning point in the political history of the Amirate and the Hashemites. By studying the circumstances behind the assassination of the Hashemite Amir--an uncle of Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali--and the immediate and long-term consequences, the divergent political evolution of the two Hashemite households in their quest to control the Amirate of Mecca became apparent. The inter-Hashemite rivalry between the ‘Awn and Zayd households shaped this evolution and affected the political trajectory of the members of these households by placing them within certain ideologies. As subsequent chapters examine, among the ‘Awn household, an Islamic-centric cultural Arabism formed the basis for their claim to the Amirate, while the Zayd clung to Ottomanism, including the resurrected liberalizing Ottomanism that called for a constitution that reappeared following the 1908 Revolution. In order to trace this path, this initial chapter analyzes three important features of this period. First, it analyzes the political context for the emergence of the Hashemite households and their rivalry that was on display during the 1880-1882 events as a function of Ottoman efforts of political centralization and localized efforts by British officals to shape a potential ally. Second, it analyzes how Hashemite rival households overlapped with the political trends affecting the region at the time, namely Ottomanism, British colonialism, and Arabism. Third, it explores how the Hashemite rivalry was affected as the Hijaz became an Islamic symbol for the British in order to counter Hamidian pan-Islamism and by Arab Islamists to emphasize Arab religious and cultural preeminence in the Islamic world.

The Hashemites as Rival Households

Prior to the 19th century, the Hijaz, as a peripheral region under the Mamluks and then Ottomans in the 16th century had historically enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.[12] The Amir of Mecca, often referred to as the "Grand Sharif" (or Grand Sharifate) by European observers, was a formal institution in the Islamic world since at least 968 AD (357 AH) and which the Hashemites dominated since at least 1200 (598 AH).[13] Because of its early origins, the Amir of Mecca had existed under different Islamic dynasties to oversee and manage the yearly pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. The prerogative of selecting or recognizing the Grand Sharif rested on the authority of the ruling power of the region or the caliph. Traditionally, this appointment was locally decided (by the ruling Amir's descendants) and then recognized *ex post facto* by the ruling authority.[14] Among the claimants, the choice of succession to the Amirate followed roughly the principle of agnatic seniority in which the brothers of any given Amir succeeded the other before the next generation (that is, their sons) did so.

Because of the Amir of Mecca oversaw the Holy Cities, he had been locally selected, often by members of his own family, from among the Hashemites. The Hashemites refer to a specific family hailing from the Arabian Peninsula who claim descent from the Islamic Prophet Muhammad through his grandson, Hasan. An ancient family with fourteen centuries of history, the Hashemites had splintered into various branches and clans. By the 19th and early 20th

[12] Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*, 11–12.

[13] For a useful survey of the history of the Hijaz Vilayet and the Amirate of Mecca, see Ali Ibrahim. Kholaif, "The Hijaz Vilayet : 1869-1908 ; the Sharifate, the Hajj, and the Bedouins of the Hijaz" (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1986), 15–50.

[14] Kholaif, 63–65.

centuries, two Hashemite branches dominated the Amirate: the Zayd and the ‘Awn. Other less notable branches included the ‘Abd ‘Il-lah and Barakat.

Both the Zayd and the ‘Awn shared an ancestry with the historical Amir of Mecca, Sharif Abu Numayy Muhammad II (d. circa 1584). Among his descendants, the Zayd branch had been the most preeminent since its members traced their lineage to Sharif Zayd ibn Muhsin (d.1666). As the Amir of Mecca, Zayd ibn Muhsin passed down his privileged position to his descendants and members of his own clan. The Zayd line thus predated any other claims to the Amirate of Mecca until the 19th century. Their control over the Amirate of Mecca was only challenged in 1827, however, when a member of its rival household, the ‘Awn (from which Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali of the 1916 Arab Revolt claimed descent), took control of the Amirate. For a member of the Hashemite dynasty, the preeminent position of authority and status came if appointed the Amir of Mecca, traditionally by members of his family.[15]

The basis for the relative independence of the Amir of Mecca were rooted in his independent source of authority and income. As such, the Grand Sharifate possessed political power within the Hijaz and held a position that proved economically lucrative to its holder. Because of his geographic distance from the imperial centers of Islamic dynasties, the Grand Sharif managed and governed the internal affairs of the Hijaz: enforcing *shari‘a,* appointing judges, and hearing appeals.[16] Furthermore, he enjoyed the privilege of collecting gifts and payments from regional and distant Muslim powers to ensure the safety of the pilgrimage caravans—a largess that he distributed to loyal family members, urban merchants, and to the region’s tribesmen. At the

[15] Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca.*, 128–64; For genealogical tables, see also De Gaury, 136, 164, 176, 190, 243; Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*, 9–10; Mai Yamani, *Cradle of Islam : The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 40–41.

[16] Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914*, 45–46.

same time, he collected taxes from trade passing through the region and from the pilgrims themselves. The a*wqaf* (s. *waqf),* or religious endowments, in the region likewise were a lucrative source of revenue for the Amir of Mecca and other members of the Hashemite family.[17]

Once the Ottomans conquered the Hijaz following their defeat of the Egyptian Mamluks in 1517, they initially only symbolically incorporated the position of Amir of Mecca into the Ottoman administrative schema to bolster their religious claims to authority. The Hijaz, despite its strategic location along the Red Sea trade circuit, lacked a substantial agrarian base from which to extract tax revenue. In terms of administrative cost, the lack of potential tax revenue did not justify the cost of maintaining troops to establish an effective Ottoman central administration. Instead, the Hijaz, held an essential symbolic and religious place within the Ottoman Empire since it housed Islam's two holiest cities—a significance that previous Islamic empires had also valued. For the Ottomans, the prestige provided from overseeing the *hajj* and the appellation of "Servant of the Two Sacred Cities" bolstered the image of the Ottoman Sultan in the Islamic world, making the Hijaz a region of strategic legitimating importance both to the Sultan domesttically and with the broader Islamic world.[18]

Until the 19th century, the selection of the Amir of Mecca merely mirrored the symbolic importance of the Hijaz to the Ottoman Sultan, who since the 18th century lacked the administrative and infrastructural mechanisms to exert centralized control over the region. The Amir, for instance, continued to be selected by his own clan in Mecca without the Ottoman Sultan

[17] Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*, 14.

[18] See Karl K. Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708-1758* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); Hakan T. Karateke, "Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate: A Framework for Historical Analysis," in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005); William Ochsenwald, "Ottoman Arabia and the Holy Hijaz, 1516-1918," *Journal of Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective* 10, no. 1 (2016): 25–28.

directly involving himself. The Sultan merely recognized the new Amir in time for the annual *hajj*. If there resulted any ambiguity surrounding the Grand Sharif because of challengers or rivalries, the Sultan's highest official in Damascus traditionally settled the manner.[19] In exchange, besides symbolic orders for tranquility and access for pilgrims, the Sultan only requested his name be mentioned during Friday prayers.[20]

It was within the sacred, symbolic, diverse, and relatively isolated space of the Hijaz that a member of the Hashemites enjoyed the exclusive privilege of holding the position of Amir of Mecca, creating what some scholars have called a "dual authority" or a "state within state."[21] Considering the political and economic benefits that came with such an appointment, the position was ripe for the emergence of new rivalries by the 19th century as regional and global developments thrusted the Hijaz into a new set of political relationships that sought to better define and subdue the religiously significant, albeit peripheral, position. Over the course of the 19th century, beginning with the 1812 Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz by the Ottoman governor Muhammad 'Ali (Mehmet Ali Pasha), who was the de facto ruler of Egypt from 1805-1848, and then culminated into the return of Ottoman administrative reforms in 1845, the Amir of Mecca transformed. From a rather autonomous position, where those Hashemite families closest to the Amir appointed each subsequent Amir, now the Amir was chosen by a succession plan dependent on direct appointment from the Ottoman capital. In reaction to this development, Hashemite households--based on eponymous branches--emerged to lobby for the Amirate of Mecca.

---

[19] Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914*, 46.

[20] Al-Amr, 46; Ali Bey, *Travels of Ali Bey : In Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, Between the Years 1803 and 1807*, vol. 2 (Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1816), 123.

[21] Kholaif, "The Hijaz Vilayet : 1869-1908 ; the Sharifate, the Hajj, and the Bedouins of the Hijaz," 68–70; Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*, 11.

The catalyst for the emergence of distinct, political Hashemite households based on lineage took place because of the relatively brief Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz (1812-1845) that followed the Wahhabi conquest of the Hijaz in 1803. The Wahhabi forces consisted of tribesmen who had allied to the family of al-Saud to form a confederacy centered in the Najd region of the Arabian Peninsula. These tribesmen had adopted the teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). ‘Abd al-Wahhab preached a puritanical form of Hanbali Islam that called for a return to the “original” Islam devoid of any innovations (*bid‘a*).[22] Together, the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance in 1744 propelled the creation of the first and second Saudi state. Beginning in 1801, under the leadership of Sa’ud bin ‘Abdul Aziz al-Saud (d.1814), Wahhabi forces ventured from their territories in central Arabia and raided tribes as far afield as Ottoman Syria and Iraq. In 1803, they captured Medina and Mecca, a move that threatened the universal Muslim prestige the Ottoman Sultan garnered overseeing and managing the yearly Hajj there.

During the Wahhabi/Saudi occupation, the Amir of Mecca, Sharif Ghalib of the Zayd Hashemites, successfully navigated the Wahhabi conquest of Mecca, being temporarily replaced by his brother when he fled Mecca for Jeddah.[23] When the bulk of the Wahhabi forces left Mecca, however, Amir Ghalib returned with an armed contingent. He reached agreeable terms with the Wahhabi forces, where he agreed to submit to their authority by not taxing them during the

[22] For an introductory history of the Saudi family during this period, see Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State* (Oxford University Press, 1993); For a history of Wahhabism, both founding, theology, and characterizations, see David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (I.B.Tauris, 2009); David Commins, “From Wahhabi to Salafi,” in *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, ed. Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stéphane Lacroix (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 151–66.

[23] “Affairs in the Najd, 1765-1803” from J.G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, Vol. 1 (Historical), Calcutta, 1915, pg. 1055.

pilgrimage.[24] In exchange, he maintained the autonomy of his office without having to pay any tribute to the Saudis.[25]

With the Ottoman inability to repel the Wahhabi tribesmen from the Hijaz, Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) resorted to requesting the aid of his powerful governor of Egypt, Muhammad ‘Ali. An Albanian Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha (1769-1849) who pushed for more autonomy following his takeover of Egypt after Napoleon’s forces left from Egypt in 1801. Once he became the governor of Egypt, he set out implementing European-inspired military reforms like forming his personal army and instituting elements of European modernity to Egyptian society. His success transformed him into a nominal vassal of the Sultan, who even called for his service first against Greek independence uprising and later against the Wahhabi threat in the Hijaz. In response to the Sultan’s call, Muhammad ‘Ali sent his son Ibrahim to the Hijaz. Between 1811 and 1818, he successfully expelled the Wahhabis and executed the captured Saudi leader, thus silencing the religious challenge posed by the Wahhabis for the time being. In Mecca, Sharif Ghalib quickly sided with Muhammad ‘Ali’s occupying force by providing intelligence on Wahhabi positions in the region and offering his assistance in their conquest of Mecca.[26]

The Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz lasted until 1845. In an attempt to create an independent, submissive dynastic state for himself, Muhammad ‘Ali established the Zayd-‘Awn Hashemite rivalry for the Amirate of Mecca.[27] He did so in order to ensure a compliant Amir of

---

[24] “Affairs in the Najd, 1765-1803” from J.G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, Vol. 1 (Historical), Calcutta, 1915, pg. 1056.

[25] Bey, *Travels of Ali Bey*, 2:140–41.

[26] de Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca.*, 200.

[27] For an analysis of how Muhammad ‘Ali projected his individual authority, particularly in the context of his military, see Khaled. Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Mecca, whose religious authority could be used to legitimate his own independent authority. For this reason, Muhammad ‘Ali deposed Sharif Ghalib of the Zayd household in 1815. Muhammad ‘Ali suspected Sharif Ghalib of sympathizing with the Wahhabis, and he exiled him to Salonica where he died from plague the following year.[28] Muhammad ‘Ali made this exchange without the Ottoman Sultan’s approval.

To further his political project, following the removal of Sharif Ghalib, Muhammad ‘Ali sought the support of various Hashemites from different branches. At first, he bypassed Ghalib’s brothers and sons by appointing one of Ghalib’s nephews, Sharif Yahya ibn Sarur, as Amir of Mecca. In 1820, Amir Yahya also fell out of favor with Muhammad ‘Ali. A Hashemite Sharif from a minor local branch replaced him as Amir, but Yahya succeeded in having the new Sharif assassinated in 1827.[29] At this point, a group of local Meccan notables appointed Sharif Ghalib’s son, ‘Abdul Muttalib, as Amir in order to replace Yahya. In a letter from Muhammad ‘Ali to his agent in Istanbul written in 1830, he described that this short-lived appointment of ‘Abdul Muttalib was a result, not of his approval or the Sultan’s, but of the machinations of Sharif Ghalib and Ahmad Pasha, Muhammad ‘Ali’s representative in Mecca, the Chief Judge of Mecca, and some notables of the city.[30]

Consequently, tribal supporters of the cousin-Sharifs Yahya and ‘Abdul Muttalib broke into war against one another. This conflict prompted Muhammad ‘Ali to appoint Sharif Muhammad ibn Abdul Mu‘in, a member of the ‘Awn Hashemite branch, to the Amirate of Mecca.

---

[28] de Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, 204–7; Uzunçarşılı, *Ashraf Makkat Al-Mukarramah Wa-Umara’iha Fi al-‘ahd al-‘Uthmani*, 198–99.

[29] de Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, 240.

[30] This information comes from a letter written by Muhammad Ali describing the appointment of Sharif Ghalib and the Sharif Muhammad ibn Abdul Muin. See footnote 2 of İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Ashraf Makkat Al-Mukarramah Wa-Umara’iha Fi Al-‘ahd Al-‘Uthmani*, translated by Khalil ‘Ali Murad (Beirut: al-Dar al-‘Arabiyah lil-Mawsu‘at, 2003), 208.

He then exiled Sharif Yahya to Egypt where he died in 1838. As a result, the ‘Awn branch held the Amirate of Mecca from 1827 until 1851. The choice to promote the ‘Awn undoubtedly resulted from Sharif Muhammad ibn Abdul Mu‘in’s own machinations, since at the time of his appointment he had been residing in Cairo and had apparently been a familiar figure to Muhammad ‘Ali.[31]

This promotion of the ‘Awn at the expense of the Zayd thus laid the foundation for the later household rivalries that characterized the 19th and early 20th centuries for the Amirate of Mecca. The significance of this moment cannot be overstated. Sharif Muhammad ibn Abdul Mu‘in, the first ‘Awn Amir, depended on Muhammad ‘Ali--and not the Sultan--for his legitimacy.[32] This reliance became even more pressing since ‘Abdul Muttalib, the Zayd heir to the Amirate, was still a force, first in the Hijaz and then in the Sultan’s court in Istanbul where he moved in 1831 with close members of his family. Testifying to his influence in the Sultan’s court, the Ottoman Sultan attempted to depose the new ‘Awn Sharif in order to restore Sharif ‘Abdul Muttalib, but the Zayd Sharif was blocked on his way back to Mecca by Muhammad ‘Ali’s son, Ibrahim, who had marched into Syria.[33] Consequently, Sharif Muhammad established the ‘Awn as a dynastic force whose leadership depended on his and his descendants’ skill to harness the support of outside forces to underpin and support ‘Awn authority.[34] Through subsidies and backing from Muhammad ‘Ali in Egypt, for example, Amir Muhammad indeed became a force in his own right first within

---

[31] Ibid.

[32] Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. *Ashraf Makkat Al-Mukarramah Wa-Umara’iha Fi Al-‘ahd Al-‘Uthmani*. Translated by Khalil ‘Ali Murad. Beirut: al-Dar al-‘Arabiyah lil-Mawsu‘at, 2003. Pg. 209.

[33] Uzunçarşılı, *Ashraf Makkat Al-Mukarramah Wa-Umara’iha Fi al-‘ahd al-‘Uthmani*, 209. And De Gaury, Gerald. *Rulers of Mecca*. London: Harrap, 1951.

[34] De Gaury, in his history of the Amirs of Mecca, noted that Sharif Muhammad’s excellent relationship with the Harb tribe--and his ability to pivot them against the “Turks”--foreshadowed the Arab Revolt: “And out of this [their relationship] grew the permanent spirit of mistrust [with the “Turks”] which contributed to the ease with which the descendants of Muhammad ibn Aun were able to raise the tribesmen against the Ottomans in the Arab Revolt.” See De Gaury, Gerald. *Rulers of Mecca*. London: Harrap, 1951. Pg. 246.

the Hijaz and then in the Arabian Peninsula. Subduing recalcitrant tribes through force or gifts, the Amir consolidated his authority in the Hijaz, and even began making expansionary moves in the Nejd, Asir, and even the Yemen.[35] Even though it was clear that the Sharif was "aiming at a greater measure of independence and power than had his immediate predecessors," he was nevertheless beholden to Muhammad 'Ali who recalled him to Cairo for a time in the late 1830s while his representative went to the Hijaz to restore Egyptian order.[36] As a consequence of directly appointing and dismissing the Amirs of Mecca, Muhammad 'Ali had laid the foundation for the exploitation of this rivalry in the management of the Hijaz.

Ottoman Modernity: The Tanzimat and Hamidianism

The emergence of Hashemite household rivalries as a result of Egyptian governor Muhammad 'Ali's intervention with regards to the Amirate of Mecca between 1812-1845 laid the foundation for the Ottoman Sultan to use the rivalry as a tool for administering the Hijaz province. The political oscillation between Hashemite households -- from 'Awn to Zayd to 'Awn to Amirate of Mecca during the 1880 - 1882 events -- highlighted the maturation of a rivalry among the Hashemites that the Ottoman Sultan could leverage. According to Tufan Buzpinar in his analysis of the last Amirate of 'Abdul Muttalib, the events of 1880-1882 were emblematic of the way the Ottoman Sultan had effectively used the inter-Hashemite rivalry as "a useful means of limiting the power of both" the 'Awn and the Zayd Hashemites in order to manage the Hijaz province. In other

[35] De Gaury, Gerald. *Rulers of Mecca*. London: Harrap, 1951. Pg. 242.

[36] De Gaury, Gerald. *Rulers of Mecca*. London: Harrap, 1951. Pg. 209. In a latter appraisal of this relationship, the author of Arab Bulletin No. 91 (June 4, 1918), wrote in a history about the Hashemite family that "It was not, however, till Emir Mohammed had received at least on sharp lesson in subservience, that Mohammad Ali allowed him to feel safe on his throne." [FO 882/27].

words, the Ottoman Sultans learned to use the household rivalry to subdue the otherwise rather autonomous Amirate of Mecca by playing one member of the Hashemite family against another.[37]

This innovation in managing the Amir of Mecca corresponded with statewide efforts to centralize administration after centuries of decentralization that threatened the integrity of the state. When Muhammad ‘Ali surrendered the Hijaz to the Ottoman Sultan, the Hijaz was re-incorporated back into the Ottoman administration using a new rubric. Up until the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire had enjoyed centuries of conquest and expansion and had devised an administrative system that satisfied those needs by relying on local intermediaries to represent the Sultan in Istanbul. The Sultan’s direct influence was felt in the core regions of the Empire (Anatolia and the Balkans) through the network of judicial, religious, and legal officials matriculating from its imperial schools. As a result, the Ottoman system had devised a decentralized administrative structure of tax collection and military recruitment that allowed for local, regional autonomy. Initially, after conquering the Arab Middle East in 1516 (including North Africa and the Middle East), Sultan Selim I had installed “professional” Ottomans to govern the region. These professionals consisted of governors (*wali* or *vali*) and chief judges (from the Ottoman-sponsored Sunni Hanafi school) to represent the Sultan. In the more distant provinces or geographically isolated regions, the Ottoman relied on a local chieftain to serve as governor and who ultimately treated the provinces “as a virtual principality of his own.”[38] In areas closer to the capital and more urbanized, like Damascus, the cultivated lands were subdivided into *timars* and assigned to calvalrymen (*sipahis*), who acted as provincial military governors charged with tax and troop collection.

---

[37] Buzpinar, “Vying for Power and Influence in the Hijaz: Ottoman Rule, The Last Emirate of Abdulmuttalib and the British (1880–1882),” 1.

[38] Bruce Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516–1918: A Social and Cultural History* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 59.

By the 18th century, however, amid the erosion of the *timar* system and the legthargy of the *sipahis* (who increasingly failed to campaign when called), the Ottomans relied on what one scholar styled as "self made" governors since their authority did not rest on their relationship with the House of Osman.[39] Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt emblematized this dependency and its underlying weakness vis-a-vis the Ottoman center. Thus, leading up to the 19th century, Ottoman control in the Arab provinces depended on intermediaries with indigenous authorities, like tribesmen and the local notable families, the *a'yan*, who held positions of influence and could administer the region. These actors jockeyed for formal recognition from the Sultan by proving their ability to influence the region or by purchasing the honor.[40] The Hijaz represented another special case, especially Mecca, where the Ottomans entrusted the city and province to local traditions of rule where a Hashemite as a descendent of Muhammad governed the region. The strategy rested on the Ottoman understanding the region, because of its religious signifiance, necessarily required a unique administration. In addition, it was believed that a local Hashemite could best manage the tribal population than an outsider without any connections to the region.[41]

This decentralized system of administering the state had made the Ottomans susceptible to internal challengers by the 19th century.[42] Both the rise of the Wahhabi challenge to Ottoman suzerainty in the Hijaz and the expansionary exploits of Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt exemplified

---

[39] Masters, 37–42. Likewise, as Barbir has shown, however, the growing reliance on these local authorities had been a process—and not an immediate collapse of traditional Ottoman authority. See Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708-1758*.

[40] Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, by William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 41–68. An excellent example of how the 'Ayan system function vis-a-vis the Ottomans were the Azms in Damascus. See Eugene Rogan, *The Arabs, A History* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 39–45.

[41] Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire*, 61-62.

[42] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 6–41.

internal, Muslim challenges by peripheral leaders. Likewise, the diversity of peoples and religions treated as subjects of the Ottoman Empire also threatened the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. Nascent nationalist groups among the Christian populations in the Balkans and Greece revolted against Ottoman administration and even received widespread support from European powers who championed their independence. These challenges ultimately led to increased autonomy if not outright independence for these groups. Thus in 1830, Serbia obtained local autonomy after Russian intervention. The same year, with British aid the Greeks likewise became independent after centuries of Ottoman rule. As the 19th century progressed, Romania and Bulgaria eventually obtained autonomy and eventual independence.[43]

Decentralized administration also left the Ottoman state vulnerable to external pressures, namely European imperialism that increasingly focused on the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Earlier in the 19th century, however, the fate of the Ottoman Empire vis-a-vis European powers (the so-called "Eastern Question") became a pressing concern for Great Britain. Under Russian pressure, the Ottoman state was susceptible to collapse as the Russian navy sought to gain access to the Mediterranean in order to secure a year-round warm water port. In 1774, an Ottoman-Russian war was concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. In this treaty, among other trade-related and political demands, Russia declared itself the protector of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman domains. In 1798, Napoleon's French forces occupied Egypt for three years, only being defeated by British naval intervention in Alexandria. After the Russo-Turkish

[43] Sean McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame : War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923* (New York, New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 9–32.

War of 1828-1829 with the Treaty of Edirne, Russia gained territories in the Caucasus and secured commercial shipping access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles at Istanbul.[44]

Finally, in 1853, the Crimean War broke out between the Ottomans and the Russians, who seemed poised to capture Constantinople (Istanbul); the British and French declared war on the Russians in order to protect the Ottomans from collapse. At the same time, while Great Britain and France sought to prevent the conquest of the Ottoman state that would allow Russia to expand to the Mediterranean, these European powers also occupied and eventually annexed Ottoman territories. The first areas to fall into French hands were the provinces in North Africa--Tunisia and Algeria--whose peripheral governments fell prey to European imperialist designs in 1830 and 1881, respectively. With the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, British politicians deemed its access as essential for the maintenance of British imperialism, especially in India. As a result, the British "Scramble for Africa" resulted in occupying Egypt in 1882 and the Sudan a decade later. Concurrently, the British also made it a policy to recognize the sovereignty of local Arabian powers in Yemen (1839) and Kuwait (1899) as an indirect way to exert its influence in the region, thereby also contributing to the Ottoman loss of territory and peoples under its authority.[45]

Amid these dramatic corrosive pressures and interventions from European powers over the course of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire seemed poised to collapse and was in need of reforms. Once the threat of Muhammad 'Ali had been thwarted, Sultan Abdülmecid I (1839-1861) initiated a series of reforms meant to strengthen the Ottoman State. Beginning with the Gülhane

---

[44] A.L. Macfie, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923: Revised Edition* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2014); Victor Taki, "The Russian Protectorate in the Danubian Principalities: Legacies of the Eastern Question in Contemporary Russian-Romanian Relations," in *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered*, ed. L.J. Frary and M. Kozelsky (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 35–72.

[45] For a history of the Ottoman experience of the Crimean War, see Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War: 1853 - 1856* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

Hatt-ı Şerif in 1839, the Sultan proposed reforms to tax collection, the military, and the treatment of his non-Muslim subjects. Bowing to European pressures following the conflict with Russia in Crimea, in 1856 he also issued the Hatt-ı Hümayun to advance further reforms with promises of equality in civic appointments between Muslims and non-Muslims with equal justice and educational opportunities. More relevant to the present analysis, the *Vilayet* (Provincial) Law of 1864 during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876), reorganized provincial administration. Coupled with the expansion of trained bureaucrats backed by a professional military, railways, and eventually telegraphs, these administrative reforms allowed direct control of peripheral regions, including provinces in the Arabic-speaking lands.[46] The capstone of the *Tanzimat* reforms was the issuance of the 1876 Constitution by Sultan ʻAbd al-Hamid II that was championed by a coterie of reformers called the "Young Ottomans." The constitution called for the creation of an elected parliament, the curtailment of Sultanic absolute authority, and the protection of liberal freedoms.[47]

The regularization and standardization of provincial administration under the *Tanzimat* and the Hamidian regime directly affected the Amirate of Mecca in the Hijaz. As previously examined, the Amir of Mecca had essentially governed his own "limited state within the state," since his position included a variety of judicial policing and even tax-collecting responsibilities. Although recognizing the ultimate suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, these traditional prerogatives had augmented the political standing of the Amir, making the position not only contested among other Hashemites but also the target for Ottoman reformers, who were nervous about strong,

[46] It is important to note that the establishing provincial executive councils that oversaw more localized councils, according to one scholar, "was a policy designed to co-opt different ethno-religious groups into the administration by soliciting advice and intelligence from their loyal and respected leaders without actually allowing them to participate in political decision-making." Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 76. Within the more homogeneous Arab context, it empowered the elite Muslim families, the aʻyan. See Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516–1918*, 177.

[47] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 72–108.

autonomous provincial rulers. Unlike other regions or provinces, however, the Arabian Peninsula proved too poor and underdeveloped to be a significant source of revenue for Ottoman tax officials to support administraive or infrastructural reforms over a population almost entirely tribally organized. In addition, it possessed only a handful of towns and urban centers, and it depended economically on Ottoman subsidies and the yearly influx of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina.[48]

Yet, because of its religious significance to the Sultan's standing in the Islamic world as Caliph, attempts were made to stave off any challenges to Ottoman rule. At the start of the 19th century, the region had proved vulnerable to Wahhabi tribesmen from the Nejd, the forces of Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt, and later European encroachment (the subject of the next section). To counter the influence of possible outside forces within the Hijaz and to constrain the autonomous authority of the Amir of Mecca, the *Tanzimat* introduced reforms, making both administrative and legal changes, designed to increase the hold of the central government over this essential albeit economically inconsequential district. The embodiment of the Ottoman central government's oversight over the Hijaz in the 19th century came in the form of a *wali* (*vali* in Turkish) with whom the Amir of Mecca had to contend. The *wali* existed to ensure the enforcement of orders and tax collection on behalf of the capital.[49] Predictably, the power struggle between the Ottoman *wali* and the Amir of Mecca resulted in conflict between the two, which often resulted in the Sultan's intervention by either replacing the *wali* with a more effective candidate or even removing the Amir of Mecca by selecting a new candidate from a different household.

---

[48] Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia*, 153–86; Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*, 35.

[49] Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914*, 74–75.

Analyses of the *Tanzimat* period often focused on the tension between local authorities and agents for the encroaching centralizing bureaucracy of the Ottoman state. In the case of the Hijaz, the conflict between local Ottoman administrators and the Amirate of Mecca mirrors the challenges and tensions that arose in other provinces.[50] In order to manage this resulting conflict, the Sultans manipulated the Hashemite household rivalry. The events of 1880-1882, namely the re-appointment and dismissal of Amir ‘Abdul Muttalib within these two years, went much deeper than just seeking a loyal ally. These events took place during a liminal period for the Ottoman Empire that affected the political evolution the Hashemites as Ottoman households. Just a few years before, Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II had prorogued the liberal constitution of 1876, which its supporters celebrated as the capstone of the Tanzimat reforms. He suspended the constitution on the pretense of the outbreak of another war with Russia, thereby initiating what historians have labelled the “Hamidian Period” that lasted until the 1908 Constitutional Revolution. The Hamidian period was marked by the dominance of the Sultan’s personal authority and governance that resembled absolutism with an emphasis on the Islamic character of the state (Islamism). When examining the circumstances for the appointment of Sharif ‘Abdul Muttalib to the Amirate of Mecca and then his dismissal and the return of the ‘Awn household in 1882, the analysis must go deeper than the relationship with Ottoman governors. It must also consider how the Hashemite households responded to the changing ideology of the Ottoman state, that is, Hamidianism.

The rule of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid (1876-1909) was essential to the political development of this period. Despite being associated with oppressive despotism and Islamism, Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s political program was intended to preserve the state at all costs--and did not necessarily stem from maniacal religious fanaticism that his critics claimed. He was also associated with (pan-

[50] A useful corollary of Ottoman centralization pressures and regional resisters was perhaps “Transjordan.” See Rogan, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire*.

) Islamism, by which I mean the projection of his religious authority as a political program of legitimating his rule in his domains and among Muslims globally. His policies, in fact, reflected his reading of the dire situation in which the Ottoman Empire found itself after the 1878 Treaty of Berlin and his perceived failure of liberal reforms. Furthermore, his absolutism also reflected traditional Ottoman political thought. For one, like his ancestors, Sultan ʻAbd al-Hamid appeared genuinely to believe his rule was divinely sanctioned. Following the imperial tradition of the Ottoman dynasty, their sovereignty existed outside of religious dictum (i.e. Islamic law) and rested on their success in expanding--and preserving--the Ottoman state. For ʻAbd al-Hamid, preserving "the patrimony (*mulk*) of the dynasty," was his "most sacred duty."[51] His absolutism was thus a function of his duty to safeguard his dynastic legacy.[52]

Not only did other European powers threaten his dynasty with destruction, but the Sultan also believed that the reformers advocating for the Ottoman constitution represented a more insidious, and proven threat. By mobilizing the traditional pillars of state (the bureaucracy, the army, and the religious establishments), the constitutionalists had successfully led a coup against his uncle, ʻAbd al-Aziz, and threatened his sacred rights as Sultan with a constitution designed to curtail his authority. By adopting absolutist policies, first by suspending the constitution and the parliament, ʻAbd al-Hamid co-opted the very institutions that threatened his absolute sovereignty. To do so, he created a sort of cult of personality that emphasized loyalty by granting ranks, appointments, and decorations at his personal discretion. Critical regions of the empire, like the Hijaz and provinces in Africa and the Balkans, fell under his direct authority.[53]

---

[51] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 157.

[52] Karpat, 158.

[53] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 123–29. For a history of the relationship of the between the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid and the Hashemites Amirs of Mecca, see Butrus Abu Mannah, "Sultan Abdülhamid and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)," *Asian and African Studies* 9 (1973): 1–21.

The Tanzimat reforms made Hamidian absolutism possible through an expansive bureaucracy and new technologies, revealing an ironic continuity between the two periods and explaining the pragmatism that underpinned ‘Abd al-Hamid’s policies. It has been pointed out that far from a religious reactionary opposed to all forms of modernity or reform, the Sultan continued the infrastructural and political reforms that had characterized the *Tanzimat*. A wide-reaching, sophisticated bureaucracy and modernized army, for instance, continued to expand during the Hamidian period, as well as the accompanying technological developments. Instead of a civilian-led government directing them, however, ‘Abd al-Hamid had complete oversight. With the opportunities afforded by new technologies like telegraphs and railroads, coupled with greater oversight by the Sultan over his technocratic bureaucracy, ‘Abd al-Hamid consolidated more personal oversight and rule to counter all possible challenges, which some observers and historians characterized as absolutist.[54]

One of the most visible and recurring aspects of ‘Abd al-Hamid’s Islamism was his self-promotion as the universal Caliph of Islam. Labelled as “pan-Islamism” to refer to a multifaceted religio-political ideology that sought to revitalize the Islamic world against European encroachment and colonialism into the Islamic world, it took the form of seeking to promote Muslim unity. At the center of this policy for ‘Abd al-Hamid was the caliphate. His assertion as the caliph was not a novel policy within Ottoman history, however. The caliphate had been an Islamic institution that emerged after the death of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. Largely considered a political institution out of necessity of guiding the Islamic *umma*, it passed from different dynasties with multiple claimants holding the title simultaneously. In the Ottoman context, Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) supposedly claimed to the caliphate following his conquests

[54] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 158.

of Syria and Egypt when he had the last Abbasid Caliph come to Istanbul to appoint him Caliph in a ceremony in Aya Sophia.[55] The Ottoman Sultan's claims to the caliphate took on greater agency following the conquest of the Hijaz by Suleyman the Lawgiver (r. 1520-1566). Now the Sultan-Caliph managed the yearly Hajj that garnered global Muslim attention.[56] With the legitimating traditions of the Hijaz, the Ottoman Sultan could leverage the title as Caliph against other Muslim claimants to the Caliphate.[57] With non-Muslim states, there had been a tradition preceding the Hamidian period of invoking the caliphal responsibility in diplomatic negotiations. For example, after the Ottoman loss of Crimea to the Russians in 1774, the resulting Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca included an article that insisted that Crimean Muslims must continue to recognize and follow the Ottoman Caliph, since the Ottoman Sultan considered himself the universal defender of Muslims.[58]

Although Pan-Islamism, as a modern political program, may have had its origins in the 19th century, historians tend to associate it with 'Abd al-Hamid.[59] Since pan-Islamic politics championed the caliphate over other political institutions, after proroguing the Ottoman constitution, thus ending an era of constitutional reforms, pan-Islamism proved a useful strategy for 'Abd al-Hamid to legitimate his authority within the Ottoman and broader Islamic worlds as

---

[55] Karpat, 241. Against critics that claimed Selim I did not actually claim the caliphate, see Nurullah Ardıç, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism: The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the Early 20th Century*, SOAS/Routledge Studies on the Middle East (London: Routledge, 2012), 81–82.

[56] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 242. For a detailed analysis of the early transformation of the Ottoman caliphate to Suleyman's reign, see Huseyin Yılmaz, *Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2018).

[57] Yılmaz, *Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought*, 82–85.

[58] Ş. Tufan Buzpinar, "The Question of Caliphate under the Last Ottoman Sultan," in *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration*, ed. Itzchak Weismann and Fruma Zachs (I.B.Tauris, 2005), 17–18.

[59] For a discussion of Pan-Islamism in the Ottoman empire before Abdülhamid's reign, see Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 23-40.

the most prestigious, independent Caliph. As such, during his reign, ‘Abd al-Hamid placed greater emphasis on his role as Caliph by leveraging his title through pompous ceremonies and religious rituals with Muslims in the Empire and by continuing to demand foreign recognition as the universal protector of Muslims outside his domains.[60] Rather than reflecting some deep-seated “fanatical” religious convictions, as European observers had claimed, pan-Islamism represented a logical strategy. According to Kemal Karpat, “if one looks at ‘Abd al-Hamid’s internal and external policies in a detached way, one is bound to conclude that these policies did not stem from dogmatic, religious principles but from certain Ottoman historical practices and pragmatic considerations.”[61] In other words, the Sultan policies did not derive wholly from an embedded personal zealotry, whether from religious sentiments of personality defects, but from an Ottoman historical tradition and the specific circumstances facing the Ottoman Empire during ‘Abd al-Hamid’s rule. Both his absolutism, but especially his pan-Islamism responded to the crisis facing the Ottoman state and revealed the pragmatic motives underlying the Sultan’s actions.

The shift in the ideological underpinnings of the Ottoman state, from the liberal-inspired *Tanzimat* to more conservative Hamidianism overlaid itself on the Hashemite household rivalry during the 1880-1882 events. My emphasis on the ideological relationship of the Hashemite household as opposed to the administrative relationship with the Ottoman governor rests on the rather quick alternation of households during this period that was driven by Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid and not his local administrator. The Sultan drove this shift through his appointments, which had in fact contradicted the advice and desires of his governor in the Hijaz. For this reason, it became

---

[60] For an examination of the Hamidian ceremonies and symbols to project authority within the state and also among global powers, see Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, New ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 16–43.

[61] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 156.

clear that although the relationship between the Amirs and the Ottoman governor mattered, the provincial administration did not independently determine which household held the Amirate of Mecca. That decision remained in the hands of the Sultan. As such, by 1882, it became evident that the households had separately grafted themselves onto two different ideologies. The Zayd, embodied by Amir ‘Abdul Muttalib, represented the reforming order that sought to constrain the absolutism of the Ottoman Sultan. The eventual triumph of the ‘Awn household, however, rested ultimately on their acceptance of the terms of Hamidianism: exclusive loyalty to the Ottoman Caliph.

Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s choice to replace the assassinated ‘Awn Amir with a member of the Zayd household contradicted the advice of his Ottoman governor, Naşid Pasha (1879-1880), who favored the ‘Awn candidate. Following the assassination, the Ottoman authorities (the *wali* and the *kaimmakam*) had appointed the ‘Awn *wekil* (agent) and the deceased Amir’s brother, Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah, as the “Acting” Amir of Mecca until his more senior brother, ‘Awn al-Rafiq could be formally appointed by the Sultan and then installed in Mecca.[62] In fact, according to the British consul, he reported that immediately following the news of the Amir’s assassination ‘Awn al-Rafiq had been appointed and was even prepared to board a steamship to Jeddah, but the Sultan suddenly and inexplicably changed his mind and appointed Sharif ‘Abdul Muttalib from among the Zayd. This action took the local Ottoman authorities completely by surprise since the Sultan had not consulted them.[63]

[62] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London, 7 April 1880 [FO195/1313].

[63] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London, 7 April 1880 [FO195/1313]. The British consul even reported the Ottoman wali saying when pressed about his feelings of the appointment, “I feel like one cast helpless in the waters, tossed by every wave. I cannot see my way and I know not what will happen not only here but even at Constantinople, all is in black confusion, the Sultan seems to have lost his mind [and] no one dares to approach him with advice, and a dire catastrophe seems to be hanging over the Empire.” TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London, 7 April 1880 [FO195/1313].

The reason for abandoning the ‘Awn in 1880 had apparently not been a response to the Amir’s mismanagement of the province but his close relationship with British officials. The late Amir had been Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s first appointment to the Amirate in 1877, and during his three-year tenure as Amir, observers characterized his Amirate for its relative “quietness.” The annual pilgrimage took place with minimal disruptions and public work projects were successfully carried out to improve the infrastructure of the region.[64] Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s turn against the ‘Awn was most likely a response to Amir Husayn’s close relationship with the British consul, James Zohrab (1830-1891). An Armenian, James Zohrab was the son of Peter Paul John Zohrab, a merchant and interpretor who became a naturalized British subject in Malta, where he was born. James Zohrab had worked for the British army as an interpreter during the Crimean war (1853-1855), and then became a British consul working in various parts of the Ottoman Empire, Eastern Europe, and even the Caribbean. Before being place in Jeddah (where he served from 1878-1881), Zohrab had in fact earned noteriety for an 1860 report he authored while in Sarajevo detailing the supposed violent Ottoman treatment of Christians there.[65] The rapport that had developed between the British Consul and Husayn resulted in the Amir’s efforts to support the British in the Afghan war against Russia (discussed below), and could be interpreted as the Amir of Mecca aiding a vocal critic of Ottoman policies. Therefore, in considering the political shaping of the Hamidian period, Amir Husayn--and by extension his household--had trespassed against ‘Abd al-Hamid’s political project. By sending agents abroad to Afghanistan, the Amir had demonstrated political

[64] Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia*, 180.

[65] See “Zohrab, James Ernest Napoleon (1830-1860) on JSTOR,” accessed December 18, 2019, https://plants.jstor.org/stable/10.5555/al.ap.person.bm000154758; “James Ernest Napoleon Zohrab,” accessed December 18, 2019, http://www.zorabfamily.co.za/jamesenz.html.

and even religious autonomy by collaborating with a foreign power.[66] Because of these cardinal sins, the Sultan dismissed his entire ‘Awn household from the Amirate by granting the position to ‘Abdul Muttalib, whose claim to the Amirate existed since the region was under Egyptian control.

‘Abd al-Hamid’s choice, however, must have been fraught with uncertainty, because of ‘Abdul Muttalib’s history of real and suspected disloyalty. Similar to the ‘Awn household, the Zayd household also had a compromised legacy of challenging Ottoman authority. ‘Abdul Muttalib’s first removal from the Amirate of Mecca by Muhammad ‘Ali was based on his supposed sympathy with Wahhabism. ‘Abdul Muttalib’s second return to the Amirate in 1851 that lasted until 1856, however, left a permanent mark against him. His second dismissal followed his failed attempt to rebel against the Ottoman Empire, using Bedouin forces, in the midst of the Crimean War between the Ottomans and the Russians.[67] Having failed, the Sultan exiled him to Salonica and then Istanbul, where he spent nearly twenty years in the Sultan’s shadow. Nevertheless, having someone of such a high religious authority--a Hashemite and former Amir of Mecca--in Istanbul also proved to be a liability to the emerging Hamidian order because it apparently captured the imagination of the Young Ottomans who promoted the 1876 constitution. As part of the liberal reforms to constrain the Sultanate, Midhat Pasha (1822-1884), a leading reforming figure, flirted with the idea of granting the caliphate to ‘Abdul Muttalib during debates in the 1870s around the Ottoman constitution to separate religious and civil functions of the Ottoman state.[68] While ‘Abdul Muttalib seemed to have disabused these notions, it was observed that he was present at the War

---

[66] For a description of the British role in the Amirate of Mecca during Husayn’s Amirate, see Buzpinar, “Vying for Power and Influence in the Hijaz: Ottoman Rule, The Last Emirate of Abdulmuttalib and the British (1880–1882).”

[67] Uzunçarşılı, *Ashraf Makkat Al-Mukarramah Wa-Umara’iha Fi al-‘ahd al-‘Uthmani,* 215.

[68] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 195–96. Likewise, this idea of separating the caliphate from the Ottoman Sultan and given to Abdul Muttalib appeared to have been circulating at the time among European and other Ottoman circles. See footnote 7 in Low, 43.

Ministry building in Istanbul when the oath of allegiance was made by Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s predecessor following the deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz, who had opposed the liberal reforms.[69] ‘Abd al-Hamid weighted the present threat the ‘Awn household posed with desire to check it by reminding them of his Zayd option. His decision undoubtedly also reflected pragmatism. European observers suspected that Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid had appointed ‘Abdul Muttalib to remove him from the capital, away from the Young Ottomans.[70]

‘Abdul Muttalib’s final dismissal and house arrest has been credited to his mismanagement of the region, conflict with the Ottoman governor, and his attempts to cultivate a relationship with the British, which may have involved asking for arms.[71] Another possible factor, however, may have been his continued sympathies for the Young Ottoman reforms, specifically Midhat Pasha. Despite his long career as a capable bureaucrat, after the suspension of the constitution, Ottoman officers arrested Midhat Pasha and imprisoned him in Taif, on the outskirts of Mecca in 1881. In the memoirs of his grandson (who eventually became the last Ottoman Amir of Mecca in 1916), ‘Abdul Muttalib had maintained despite his promotion to the Amirate, “a warm personal regard” for Midhat Pasha. Accordingly, ‘Abdul Muttalib reportedly ensured that “during his [Midhat Pasha’s] imprisonment, [he] did everything possible to care for his health and comfort….”[72] Rumors that the Amir supported Midhat reached the ears of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II, which

[69] Ochsenwald, 179. TNA: Acting Consul Lynedoch Moncrieff, Jidda to the Earl of Dufferin, 1 February 1882 [FO 195/1415].

[70] TNA: Acting Consul Lynedoch Moncrieff, Jidda to the Earl of Dufferin, 1 February 1882 [FO 195/1415].

[71] Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia*, 180–83.; TNA: Jeddah, transmitting report of Mr. Wyndham No. 2 January 2, 1882 to Foreign Secretary, 27 February 1883 [FO 78/3532]. There is debate, however, as to whether or not his request for arms had been a hoax perpetrated by the remaining ‘Awn in the region to discredit the Amir.

[72] Quoted in George Marquis Stewart Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia, the Emir Shereef Ali Haider* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1948), 72.

naturally stoked his suspicions.[73] The sultan appointed Osman Pasha (1882-1886) as the new *wali*, and specifically charged him with the task to oversee Midhat's imprisonment.[74] According to 'Abdul Muttalib's grandson, Osman Pasha ordered the Amir to execute Midhat Pasha in order to test his loyalty. The Amir refused, citing his advanced age and need to keep his hands "blameless," but suggested that if the Sultan wanted Midhat Pasha's death, to execute him himself.[75] His refusal only heightened tensions between himself and the Ottoman governor, whose vision for the region was to subdue it finally to Ottoman administration. It also undoubtedly set him apart from 'Abd al-Hamid by indicating his rejection of the Hamidian terms. Therefore, the Ottoman Sultan recalled the Amir back to Istanbul in 1882, and replaced him with 'Awn al-Rafiq from the 'Awn household.[76] Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib was allowed to reside in the Hijaz but was placed under house arrest: first in Taif and then eventually in Mecca until his death in 1884.

'Abdul Muttalib's rejection of Hamidian framework contrasts him with the 'Awn who immediately after Amir Husayn's assassination began their transformation (or perhaps conversion) of the 'Awn household along the Hamidian rubric. With his assassination and the disposition of the 'Awn from the Amirate, the scions and leaders of the 'Awn household necessarily had to re-ingratiate themselves to Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid. The next 'Awn in line, and fourth son of the line's founder, 'Awn al-Rafiq, remained in Istanbul and his youngest brother who had become the Acting

[73] Christopher Michael Low described in his dissertation suspicions circulating among Ottoman circles the fear of the British aiding Midhat to escape from prison in Taif. See Michael Christopher Low, "The Mechanics of Mecca: The Technopolitics of the Late Ottoman Hijaz and the Colonial Hajj" (Ph.D., Columbia University, 2015), 45.

[74] Low, 45.

[75] Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 75.

[76] Low, 49; TNA: Consul J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir G. A. Lowther, Constantinople, 5 December 1908 [FO 195/2286].

Amir left the Hijaz alongside other notable family members (including Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali, who launched the Arab Revolt in 1916) following the impending arrival of ‘Abdul Muttalib.[77]

In a series of revealing letters exchanged between the British Consul Zohrab and ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s youngest brother Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah emphasized his household’s continued loyalty to the Sultan. In one letter addressed to the British Consul, Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah explained that despite Sharif ‘Abdul Muttalib’s appointment “it is a sacred duty to obey the orders of superiors and to protect public interests my sincere desire is to submit to the wishes of His Majesty the Sultan and to act for the benefit of the people and especially for those who come to this Holy Land where everyone suspects to be at peace.”[78] Even in a private letter to his own agent, privy to Zohrab whose office had intercepted it, Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah continued to express the same loyalty to the Sultan, explaining to him that either “far or near we are always the servants of the Sultan whether in favor or out of favor.”[79] For ‘Abd al-Ilah, although the arrival of Sharif ‘Abdul Muttalib represented a change in fortune for the ‘Awn household, yet the highest importance remained obedience to the “Master the Sultan” and to await the orders of the sovereign who he repeated affirmed as the Muslim Caliph.[80]

Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah’s rhetoric, at times bombastic in its reverence for the Sultan and perhaps directed at a British audience to advertise his household’s distance with them, nonetheless

[77] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Marquis of Salisbury, Foreign Office, London, 15 April 1880 [FO 195/1313].

[78] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Captain Rising HMS Eclipse enclosing copy of his letter to Abdul Ilah Pasha and of latter’s reply, together with a copy of Abdul Ilah Pasha’s letter to Omar Nassif Effendi, Jeddah 9 April 1880 [FO 195/1313].

[79] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Captain Rising HMS Eclipse enclosing copy of his letter to Abdul Ilah Pasha and of latter’s reply, together with a copy of Abdul Ilah Pasha’s letter to Omar Nassif Effendi, Jeddah 9 April 1880 [FO 195/1313].

[80] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Captain Rising HMS Eclipse enclosing copy of his letter to Abdul Ilah Pasha and of latter’s reply, together with a copy of Abdul Ilah Pasha’s letter to Omar Nassif Effendi, Jeddah 9 April 1880 [FO 195/1313].

highlighted their ideological shift as they adopted the terms of Hamidianism. Whereas their recently deceased head had sought to ingratiate himself with the British and to act independently of the Caliph, the next generation of leadership in the ‘Awn household sought to re-integrate themselves back into Ottoman administration. The return of the ‘Awn family in 1882 with the appointment of ‘Awn al-Rafiq established ‘Awn preeminence during the remainder of the ‘Abd al-Hamid’s reign. The tenure of ‘Awn al-Rafiq was long, lasting until 1905, and has been characterized by his personal cruelty, his struggle with and eventual accommodation of the Ottoman *wali*, and perhaps most significantly, his relative disregard for European consuls in Jeddah. As explored more in the next chapter, ‘Awn al-Rafiq was the quintessential Hamidian Hashemite, thus revealing his household’s political evolution following the 1880-1882 events. As will be explored, this political evolution ultimately opened the Hashemite household to further state manipulation that laid the foundation for Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali’s political trajectory that led to his launch of the Arab Revolt in 1916.

The Hashemite Households in British Imperialist Designs

The maturation of the household politics between the Zayd and the ‘Awn and their subsequent transmutation into liberal Ottomanism and conservative Hamidianism, respectively, represented one factor of the political evolution of the Hashemites in the 19th century. Another factor, fully displayed during the events of 1880-1882, was the threat and influence of British colonialism on the Hijaz and in Arabia more broadly. As discussed in more detail below, British interest in the region evolved over the course of the 19th century from primary economic interests, to public health, and then eventually to a religious interest so as to stymie Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s promotion of pan-Islamism that threatened British standing among their Muslim subjects in Africa

and South Asia. The British colonial discourse likewise incorporated the Amir of Mecca, and the Hashemites more broadly, as a figure that could circumvent if not fundamentally challenge the Ottoman Sultan as caliph. Besides leading to Amir Husayn's assassination, the reporting of the events of 1880-1882 likewise had a lasting impact on the Hashemite households by elevating their standing in the British imagination. Finally, in a somewhat parallel fashion to the elevation of the 'Awn within the Hamidian political project, the British likewise privileged the 'Awn over the Zayd as the ideal Hashemite household.

British interests in the region were rooted initially in the strategic value of the Hijaz along the Red Sea and the religious value of Mecca to its colonial subjects. Since Russian expansion into the Black Sea in the 18th century and France's occupation of Egypt at the end of the 18th century, Great Britain increasingly intervened into Ottoman affairs in order to secure its political and commercial dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean.[81] Early British intrusion took the form of treaty capitulations and at times military intervention, like the 1808 Anglo-Ottoman War.[82] As John Slight has studied in his work on the British Empire and its interest in the annual *hajj*, British interest in the Hijaz originally focused on securing British maritime traffic in the Red Sea and trade. A year after the British occupied Aden in Yemen in 1837, for example, the British established its first consulate in Jeddah, along the Red Sea in 1838 in order to promote trade between India and the Hijaz.[83] By mid-century, a global cholera epidemic in 1865 also changed British interest in the pilgrimage. According to an international body, the cholera epidemic began

[81] Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), 265–71; Rogan, *The Arabs, A History*, 109–48.

[82] For a military history of the Ottoman Empire and Europe, see Virginia Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged* (London ; New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2014).

[83] Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914*, 169–76; John Slight, *The British Empire and the Hajj: 1865-1956* (Harvard University Press, 2015), 35–43; 65–71.

in Mecca in 1865, led to the deaths of 15,000 Muslim pilgrims, and then spread with the pilgrimage traffic to North Africa and Europe, killing nearly 200,000 people.[84] Because the epidemic originated due to the *hajj*, the British took it upon themselves to oversee the sanitary and quarantine conditions of the yearly pilgrimage, thus inaugurating British involvement in the yearly pilgrimage because of global public health concerns.

The relationship between Great Britain and the Hijaz (and by extension the Amirate of Mecca) changed drastically in the second half of the 19th century with the construction of the Suez Canal that gave British officials reason to control Egypt and the Sudan in order to secure access. After the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, British politicians considered its unhindered access and control of the Red Sea an imperial strategy to secure its most valuable colonial holding, India.[85] In pursuit of this policy, the British occupation of Cyprus following the Berlin Congress in 1878 ensured British naval domination of the Eastern Mediterranean. Later, in 1882 British occupied Egypt when the *khedival* government (descendants of Muhammad ‘Ali that had been granted dynastic rule over Egypt) defaulted on British and French loans, and the subsequent British “Scramble” to the Sudan (and East Africa) represented further British aims to control access to the Red Sea and by extension the Suez Canal.[86]

The Hashemite Amir of Mecca began to factor into British colonial designs with the emergence of pan-Islamism as a political project during the reign of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid during (1876-1908). For European powers, in particular Great Britain, ‘Abd al-Hamid’s promotion of himself as the universal caliph of Islam threatened their control over their Muslim subjects in South

[84] Slight, *The British Empire and the Hajj*, 78–81.

[85] Slight, 67.

[86] Francis Egerton, *Great Britain, Egypt, and the Suez Canal*, ed. C. M. (Charles Morgan) Norwood, William Rathbone, and Francis Egerton (London: Chapman and Hall, 1884).

Asia and Africa. From the British perspective, pan-Islamism represented the ultimate threat against its imperial ambitions by intervening directly among its colonial subjects.[87] To overcome this threat, the British sought to prove its commitment to its Muslim subjects through overseeing and facilitating the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. The centrality of the *hajj* in British imperial machinations resulted from British realization that the pilgrimage posed for them a dilemma. On the one hand, they feared that within that sacred space that prohibited their presence as non-Muslims, their own Muslim populations were vulnerable to fanaticization. On the other hand, any attempt on their part to regulate or intervene in the yearly *hajj* (pilgrimage) threatened to be interpreted as intervention and may spark anti-British sentiments.

To overcome that bind, a British colonial project emerged during the Hamidian period that deemed the Amir of Mecca as a powerful tool to ameliorate the threat of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s pan-Islamist project. Summarized by the British Consul in Jeddah, James Zohrab predicted that if the British could influence the Amir of Mecca than “England will have gained to herself the whole of the Hedjaz and with such a religious element working amongst Mussulmans in her favor, her position with the Mohamedan world will and must become solid.”[88] His ideas regarding British strategies in the Muslim world did not emerge from a philosophical vacuum, however. The events of 1880-1882, in particular the death of Amir Husayn and the diminution of the ‘Awn household through the appointment of ‘Abdul Muttalib, revealed the stakes for Britain’s empire if it lost influence in the Hijaz through the Amir of Mecca.

[87] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924*, 40–50.

[88] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 17 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

Behind Amir Husayn's assassination had been his planned intervention in recent events in Afghanistan on behalf of the British. From 1878 until 1880, the British undertook what has been called the Second Anglo-Afghan War, led by the British Raj in India against the Amirate of Afghanistan to thwart Russian advances into the region. The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) inaugurated what became known as "The Great Game" between Great Britain and Russia. Similar to the First, the Second Anglo-Afghan War involved repelling Russian advances into Central Asia, which threatened British interests in both India and the Persian Gulf. The British deemed a friendly--or at least neutral--Afghan power to buffer the Russian Empire from British India a strategic necessity. When the Russians sent an uninvited mission to the Amir of Afghanistan in Kabul following the 1878 Congress of Berlin, the British responded in kind by sending their own diplomat to Kabul. Under Russian influence, the Afghan Amir refused to receive him, precipitating a British invasion of Afghanistan. During the course of their campaign, the British faced heavy resistance and uprisings from the Afghans, in both Kabul, Herat, and the countryside. Once British forces overwhelmed the Afghans and concluded an agreement in Kabul in September 1880, the war eventually ended with the British exacting steep concessions on the region that included complete oversight of the region's foreign policy that proved unpopular with Afghans and became the basis for British intervention through the 19th century.[89]

Although the events in Afghanistan were a world away from the deserts of the Hijaz and appeared unrelated to the centralization efforts unfolding in the Ottoman Empire, the Amir of Mecca had become one component of British strategy during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. In

[89] Karl E. Meyer, *The Dust Of Empire: The Race For Mastery In The Asian Heartland* (Cambridge: PublicAffairs, 2008), 113–68; Edmund James Yorke, *Playing the Great Game: Britain, War and Politics in Afghanistan Since 1839* (London: Robert Hale, 2012); Evgeny Sergeev, *The Great Game, 1856–1907: Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia* (Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press / Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 23–64.

the final, dramatic months of the Afghan conflict with the British occupying Kabul, the Amir of Mecca had sent a letter by way of the British that called the Afghans to cease fighting the British. In it, he also "condemned [Afghan] conduct," urging them to resist the Russians.[90] To further his intervention, the Amir of Mecca agreed to visit the British consul in Jeddah, to discuss sending his own personal mission to Afghanistan to appeal to the Afghan forces on behalf of Great Britain.[91] Importantly, the Ottoman Sultan had already sent a delegation in support of the British, that represented him as Caliph in 1877, but which had proved unsuccessful in ending hostilities between the Afghan Amir and the British. The British request to the Amir of Mecca may have resulted simultaneously from the Sultan's failed effort and the fear of the Ottoman Sultan's eagerness to send further delegations.[92]

It had in fact been during Amir Husayn's trip to Jeddah on March 14, 1880, to meet with the Consul Zohrab that an Afghan resident of the city stabbed and killed him. Although the exact reasons for the assassination were never definitively settled, Zohrab reasoned that the catalyst had been Sharif Husayn's intervention in the British-Afghan conflict. In one of his earliest reports of the assassination, Zohrab lamented the late Amir's passing, explaining that he "sacrifice[d]...his life...on a self-imposed duty in favor of our own interests," that is, his intervention in Anglo-Afghan affairs.[93] In a later report that providing more details of the Amir's death, Zohrab described

[90] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 22 March 1880. [FO 78/3131].

[91] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[92] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924*, 80–88.

[93] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 17 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

his reasoning for suggesting a connection between the assassination and his role in assisting the British in Afghanistan. He explicitly stated the connection:

> It is a strange coincidence that the murderer should be an Afghan. May the murder not have been the result of vengeance on account of His Highness having openly condemned the conduct of the Afghans? There are many Afghanis in Mecca and the Grand Sharif made no secret of his strong disapproval of the treachery with which the Afghans met our liberal offers.[94]

Although Ottoman authorities had quickly apprehended and imprisoned the assassin, Zohrab visited the accused in prison, since as an Afghan he was a British subject, but he offered no further observations on the extent of the man's guilt.[95] His reticence to declare openly that British interests in Afghanistan had led to the death of the Sharif perhaps reflected his own diplomatic restraint at the time. Nevertheless, in his summary of the assassination--both its origins with the Afghan War and the correlating identity of the assassin--Zohrab left little doubt that the Sharif died because his association with the British, and that his support for their own Afghan policy made him a target for retribution.[96]

Over the next several reports, as news of 'Abdul Muttalib's appointment and arrival to replace the 'Awn household to the Amirate of Mecca reached Jeddah, Zohrab articulated the case that such a shift would negatively affect Great Britain's standing in the Muslim world. In the view of Consul Zohrab, Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib threatened British interests in the Hijaz because of what

---

[94] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 22 March 1880. [FO 78/3131].

[95] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 22 March 1880. [FO 78/3131]. In his historical analysis, using both British and Ottoman Turkish sources, for the aftermath, Buzpinar noted that even during the official interrogation of the assassin, no reason was given for his actions. The subsequent investigation discovered that the Afghan had attempted to meet the Amir several times prior to the assassination. See Ş. Tufan Buzpinar, "The Hijaz, Abdülhamid II and Amir Hussein's Secret Dealings with the British, 1877–80," *Middle Eastern Studies* 31, no. 1 (January 1, 1995): 117–18.

[96] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 22 March 1880. [FO 78/3131].

he perceived to be a religious fanaticism of the new Amir. In his report, Zohrab argued that the Zayd Amir still held Wahhabi sympathies that threatened British and other groups be believed to be religiously moderate:

> If Abdul Mutalib gets the position [as Amir of Mecca], his influence as Grand Sheriff will be exercised to the prejudice of England, for to him as a secret Wahabee all Christians are but dogs that ought to be swept from the face of the earth and to injure them would be meritorious. I have been assured from the best sources that if he comes not only will the Christians have to abandon Jeddah, but all the Indians and most of the Arabs would quit the country for under him life for them would become intolerable.[97]

According to Zohrab, the new Amir's fanaticism had originated from his previous collaboration with the Wahhabis, when they had occupied the Hijaz from 1803-1811 when Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib's household colluded with the Wahhabis in order to preserve their standing. Zohrab described that at the time of the Egyptian occupation of Muhammad 'Ali, which had pushed the Wahhabis from the Hijaz, the Egyptians had nevertheless "found an unscrupulous intriguing antagonist, who was leagued with the Wahabees and bent on ridding the province of Ottoman authority," that is, the Zayd Amir.[98] Although the Egyptian administrators selected Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib to be the next Amir of Mecca, Muhammad 'Ali refused to confirm their nomination when he learned that the Zayd clan "had joined the Wahabees and opposed his authority."[99] In doing so, Muhammad 'Ali hoped to rid the region of any Wahhabi sympathizers.

Zohrab contrasted his prediction of 'Abdul Muttalib's reign and his characterization of the Zayd household against the 'Awn household, which he believed would be best for the region and

[97] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah, to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 17 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[98] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah, to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 17 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[99] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah, to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 17 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

for British interests. Zohrab argued that the ‘Awn family represented the more enlightened and developed branch of the Hashemite family that naturally looked favorably towards Great Britain, since they have proven themselves allies through the sacrifice of Amir Husayn. In building the case for British support of the late Sharif Husayn’s successor, his brother ‘Awn al-Rafiq, and the family’s deputy, Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah, Zohrab remarked how they were both “enlightened men eager to see their country progress in civilization and they are firm friends of England.” He specifically described Sharif ‘Awn al-Rafiq as “a very firm energetic man, but tempered and of quick resolve,” and that “he never hesitates and he resents injustice with a firm will, he is greatly respected in the province.”[100] As for his younger brother and acting-Amir, Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah, Zohrab noted that among the people of the Hijaz he was “beloved for his gentle manners, good nature and open handedness.”[101]

In addition to the ‘Awn sense of justice and enlightened ideas of governance, Zohrab remarked on their friendliness towards Christians, which he associated with a natural proclivity of friendliness towards the British. Although the Christian population in the Hijaz was incredibly small, only centered on important trade cities like Jeddah, their protection deeply concerned the British, including Zohrab. He wrote that “towards the Christians the Awn family have, during the past twenty years shown much friendship and they have not failed in protecting them.”[102] Even though the 1858 massacre in Jeddah of many of its resident Christians occurred during the reign of the ‘Awn household, Zohrab excused the ‘Awn amir, claiming that a serious illness had afflicted

[100] TNA: Consul Zohrab to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 17 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[101] TNA: Consul Zohrab to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 17 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[102] TNA: Consul Zohrab to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 17 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

the Amir at the time had hindered his ability to intervene.[103] Furthermore, in a sweeping statement of the 'Awn family's tolerance towards Christians, he also completely dismissed any notions that the Hijaz region, because of its religious significance or the attitudes of its inhabitants made it inherently hostile towards Christians--or even foreigners. Zohrab assured his addressee that any "fanaticism" in the Hijaz originated not from among the residents or even the nomadic Bedouins of the region.[104] Instead, the British Consul reminded the Foreign Office "that in the massacre of the Christians in 1858, not one Bedouin or native Arab was concerned"; rather that it only involved foreigners who resided there for trade. He alleged that the Hadrenes, natives of Oman, had been solely responsible.[105] In his depiction of this massacre, he not only excused the 'Awn Amir but also the Arab residents of the Hijaz, in particular, the tribes which he believed to be naturally tolerant of Christians.[106] According to Zohrab, only the Zayd represented fanaticism.

Besides considering the 'Awn as the most political optimal of the Hashemites for British colonial policies, the late Amir Husayn and his household captured Zohrab's imagination. In his telling of Amir Husayn's arrival to Jeddah, just before his assassination, Zorab's depiction of Husayn's entrance revealed the beginnings of British realization of the possibilities of the Amirate of Mecca:

> His Highness entered Jeddah on the 14th [of March 1880]. I witnessed his entry from a window, and if anything was required to convince me of his honor as head

[103] For a historical sketch of the massacre see W.L. Ochsenwald, "The Jidda Massacre of 1858," *Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 3 (October 1, 1977): 314–26.

[104] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Marquis of Salisbury, Foreign Office, 26 April 1880 [FO 195/1313].

[105] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Marquis of Salisbury, Foreign Office, 26 April 1880 [FO 195/1313].

[106] The discourse of Bedouin tolerance and moderation in religion has a long history and had consequences to British colonial policies before and after the Ottoman Empire. On the history and personal psychoanalytic origins, see Kathryn Tidrick, *Heart-Beguiling Araby* (London ; New York: Tauris, 1990). To see how such romanticization played out in the post-Ottoman colonial context see Yoav Alon, "'Heart-Beguiling Araby' on the Frontier of Empire: Early Anglo-Arab Relations in Transjordan," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (2009): 55–72.

> of the Moslem faith, that entry would have been sufficient. Mohamedans of every nationality were crowded around him, dancing, singing, shouting with delight, it was not the arrival of a Prince, it was the triumphant entry of a hero. Since many of the chants of the people struck me as indicative of their feelings and his position.
>
> ‘Hail Prince of Mecca
> Lord of all Mussulmans’
> ‘The earth and all that therein is is [sic]
> The Lord’s[’]
> ‘And after Him to Hussein (alluding to His Highness as the direct descendent of the Prophet through Hussein the son of ‘Ali[)][’]
>
> These chants were taken up by the crowd with loud voice and no possibility of doubt, that the people expressed but their belief was left to me.[107]

From this terse description of Amir Husayn’s arrival, Consul Zohrab claimed to have evidence that all Muslims, no matter their backgrounds, revered the Amir of Mecca as a global, Muslim authority. They held him in higher regard than perhaps even the Ottoman Sultan when they chanted him as the “Lord” of all Muslims and possessor of the entire world. From this display, it was clear why the British should be interested in the Amirate of Mecca, its potential, and perhaps its latent, yet unrealized, power in the Muslim world.

More locally, one power held by the ‘Awn impressed Zohrab was the loyalty they attracted from the Bedouin tribesmen in the region. In the context of the ‘Awn-Zayd rivalry, the opinion of British officials fell squarely on the members of the ‘Awn family as being key to controlling the Bedouin in the region. For example, immediately following the assassination of Sharif Husayn, Zohrab described a region on the brink of chaos. As a result of a combination of “grief and rage at such an unheard of crime,” that is, the assassination of an Amir of Mecca, “the Arabs”--the Bedouin-- “seem to be seeking an object in which to satiate their vengeance.” In his prediction, any incident, no matter how trivial, would have served as an excuse for “blood to flow like

[107] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131]. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Hashemites claimed to have descended from Ali’s son Hasan, not Hussein. It is curious, then, that Zohrab heard Hussein being invoked, which may simply be an error on his part.

water."[108] As a result, instead of jailing the accused in Jeddah, Zohrab noted that the authorities transferred him outside the city because his presence would have stirred up the Bedouin against its inhabitants. For the Bedouin, he explained, "would have brought yet greater peril on the town, for suspicions that he [the assassin] might escape punishment."[109] He reported that thousands of Bedouin stood ready "to wreak[] their vengeance stained with the Grand Sheriff's blood."[110] The only assurance of order came not from the Ottoman authorities--the *Vali* or the *Kaimmakam*--but from the Acting-Amir Sharif 'Abd al-Ilah. He alone "succeeded with great difficulty," to subdue the impending violence first by calling all the Ottoman officials to remain indoors and off the streets until the initial "grief of the Arabs passed."[111]

Zohrab also related his own personal experience of the power of the 'Awn household to manage the tribes. He reported that once the assassin was apprehended, an initial rush of Bedouins surrounded the prison "to get him out and kill him."[112] Since he considered the Afghan a British subject, the Consul felt obligated to the jail to make sure justice was being applied appropriately.[113]

---

[108] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[109] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[110] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[111] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[112] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[113] Zohrab wrote that the Ottoman Vali "Nashi Pasah lost no time in letting me know of the arrest and he expressed a hope that I would not feel annoyed at the irregular manner in which the arrest had been made." By irregular manner, he probably meant the quickness of the arrest and the fact that accused was jailed away from the city. Zohrab, perhaps pre-empting the concern of British officials, he also wrote that the accused had not been tortured but treated well. See TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 22 March 1880. [FO 78/3131].

As he passed through the crowd of angry Bedouin, it amazed him how "the people stepped aside to let me by." He credited the safe access afforded him by the fact that "the Grand Sheriff had me in great esteem and in Mecca my name was much respected," so that "everyone, therefore, who came here and recognized me as the British Consul would certainly respect [him].[114] Thus, in addition to the latent religious power of the Amirate of Mecca headed by an 'Awn for British imperial interests, Zohrab also hinted at a political power that in his experience had been extended to him: the ability to harness the power of the Bedouin tribes for British interests. [115]

From Zohrab's administrative and political reports, his colonial reports on the Amir of Mecca in fact ultimately reached a wider public audience through Wilfred Scawen Blunt's book, *The Future of Islam*. Blunt, an English poet and writer, was interested in Arabian horse lines, and this interest brought him and his wife to the region in 1880. Blunt's book was a classic orientalist production that reproduced British imperialist knowledge of the Islamic world and called for British intervention in the development of the caliphate ostensibly to rejuvenate Muslim spirituality, but also admittedly as a tool to counter any possible Islamic threat to the British empire. In his observation, he concluded the

> The Caliphate is a weapon forged for any hand--for Russia's at Bagdad, for France's at Damascus, or for Holland's (call it one day Germany's) in our stead at Mecca. Protected by any of these nations the Caliphate might make our position intolerable in India, filling up for us the measure of Mussulman bitterness, of which we already are having a foretaste in the pan-Islamic intrigues at Constantinople.[116]

---

[114] TNA: Consul Zohrab, Jeddah to Foreign Office, London and British Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, 16 March 1880 [FO 78/3131].

[115] As the 19th century progressed, with the British experiencing the military power of the tribes, particularly during the Mahdi uprising in the Sudan and the Sanusi against the Italians in Libya, the need for an ally who could shield them from the passion and violence of tribes only grew more urgent. See Albert Edwards, "The Menace of Pan-Islamism," *The North American Review* 197, no. 690 (1913): 645–57; David Motadel, "Islam and the European Empires," *The Historical Journal* 55, no. 3 (2012): 831–56; Lionel Gossman, "The Spectre of Pan-Islamism and Jihad," in *The Passion of Max von Oppenheim*, 1st ed., Archaeology and Intrigue in the Middle East from Wilhelm II to Hitler (Open Book Publishers, 2013), 47–80.

[116] Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *The Future of Islam* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882), 213.

Published in 1882, Blunt appeared to have been influenced the events of 1880-1882 Blunt had in fact experienced the anti-British sentiments of the ‘Abdul Muttalib when he arrived in Jeddah in December 1880--months after the death of Amir Husayn. After his arrival, Zohrab requested permission from Amir ‘Abdul Muttalib for Blunt to explore the Hijaz, but it was denied.[117] In his history of the Amirate of Mecca, his judgment of the Zayd, which he deemed “the reactionary party” constrasted with his elevation of the ‘Awn household as a member of the “Liberals” reflected the same categorization presented by Zohrab.[118] The significance of Blunt’s book rests on his its influence, having become part of the British orientalist canon of knowledge production and influencing Arabist authors like al-Kawakibi (analyzed below), and in his formulation of an Arab caliphate to replace the Ottoman caliphate.[119] Although the idea of an Arab caliphate, even one emanating from the Hashemite family was not new in British circles, his *The Future of Islam*

[117] Buzpinar, “Vying for Power and Influence in the Hijaz: Ottoman Rule, The Last Emirate of Abdulmuttalib and the British (1880–1882),” 6.

[118] Blunt, *The Future of Islam*, 120–28.

[119] There is debate as to the origins of al-Kawakibi’s ideas and to what extent his ideas reflected other, most notably European authors’ ideas of the caliphate. See Sylvia Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962), 27–29; for his confirmation and expansion of her analysis to other Arabist authors see Elie Kedourie, “The Politics of Political Literature: Kawakabi, Azouri and Jung,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 8, no. 2 (1972): 227–40. However, I have adopted the view of Rashid Khalidi and Itzchak Weismann. For Khalidi, the main weakness in what he called the “Haim-Kedourie thesis” is that it “fails to take into account the full scope and complexity of the pre-World War I interaction between early Islamic reformers and the young generation of nationalists they influenced, both in Egypt and Syria.” See Rashid Khalidi, “Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature,” *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 5 (1991): 1369–70. In his very informed and useful study of al-Kawakibi, Weismann noted that al-Kawakibi had in fact acknowledged his European influences but that “there is no doubt that the two books are essentially the fruit of his own spirit. Both demonstrate Kawakibi’s profound acquaintance with the Islamic religious sources and methods, along with proficiency in Western political science and a keen observation of Muslim history and its current situation. The claim about his lack of originality ultimately derives from the Orientalist inclination to see all innovative ideas as coming from the modern West.” Itzchak Weismann, *Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi : Islamic Reform and Arab Revival*, Makers of the Muslim World (London: Oneworld Publications, 2015), 4-5.

perhaps synthesized previous British ideas with his own emphasis on a spiritual caliphate to be occupied by a member of the Hashemite family.[120]

A spiritual caliphate was essential to the reformation of the caliphate, according to Blunt, because the current crisis in the Islamic world--threatened by civilizational decay and external powers--was political despotism. He located this political despotism to the Ottomans because they merged political authority with religious authority in the form of the Sultan-Caliph. In his history of the caliphate, as an institution it must be held by a descendent of Muhammad, and since the Ottoman dynasty had Turkic origins, he portrayed the Ottomans as a "usurper" of the caliphate because "before him no man not of the house of Koreysh, and so a kinsman of their Prophet, had never claimed to be his spiritual heir."[121] Therefore, Blunt argued that only because of his political authority, evidenced by the state they had created and its subsequent tyranny, did the Ottomans claim and maintain the caliphate. Because his religious authority, as caliph, rested on the political might, the Ottomans necessarily distorted the institution as a political tool and in doing so, weakened Islamic spirituality.

In Blunt's reading of Islamic history and his prescription for Muslim spiritual rejuvenation, he believed that the caliphate should be restored as a solely spiritual institution. In his opinion, the Sharifs of Mecca held the key to restoring the spiritual caliphate and thus Islamic civilization. Considering what he perceived to be universal Muslim disapproval of 'Abd al-Hamid, Blunt predicted that the current Ottoman Sultan was the last Ottoman caliph. After the Ottoman Sultan's death, he speculated that various powers in the Arabian Peninsula would claim the Caliphate.

---

[120] Joshua Teitelbaum, "Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman Order: From Chieftaincy to Suzerainty," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 1 (1998): 104.

[121] Blunt, *The Future of Islam*, 50.

Ultimately only the "the Sherifal family" as an Arab dynasty and the undisputed descendants of Muhammad, was "surrounded with a halo of religious prestige which would make their acquisition of the supreme temporal title appear natural to all but the races who have been in subjection to the Ottomans."[122] He further observed that if "a man of real ability to appear amongst them he would, in the crisis we have foreseen, be sure to find an almost universal following."[123] For Blunt, the future of caliphate as the spiritual leader of the Islamic world, rested ultimately with the Sharifs of Mecca, not because of their political authority per se, but because the Hijaz could act as the center of the spiritual life of Muslims, as the location of the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca. As a religious center, the region could never serve be the basis of a political empire like Istanbul. In this way, the threat of political power contaminating the caliphate would be negated.[124] These suggestions of the power of a Hashemite caliphate contained echoes of Zohrab's observations concerning the appeal of the 'Awn household.

For Blunt, Great Britain had an important role to play in the promotion of a spiritual caliphate in Mecca. One reason rested on the role Britain played in facilitating the pilgrimages. Besides producing the great amount of pilgrims from British territories, the British also facilitated pilgrimage traffic that relied increasingly on its merchants and naval fleet.[125] Unlike other European powers, which he dubbed "the Crusading States of Europe" because of their ill-intent designs on the Islamic world, "the place of adviser and protector" pointed towards Great Britain who by its reputation among the Muslims in Egypt and India had shown its benevolence towards

[122] Blunt, 118-119.

[123] Blunt, 119.

[124] Blunt, 189–90.

[125] Blunt, 208.

Islam.[126] As such, Great Britain was the ideal guard for the Caliphate from European threats, and thus "The Caliphate--no longer an empire, but still an independent sovereignty--must be taken under British protection, and publicly guaranteed its political existence….."[127] Although having made the case earlier for Mecca to be the seat, Blunt believed that the caliphate could be located in a number of places, a decision he believed must be left to the Muslims of India as the largest Muslim community under British dominion. Nevertheless, since the position of the Caliphate must be devoid of political dominion and yet safe from hostile European interference, the Hijaz was geographically the ideal choice, and without a Christian population that needed European protection, the Hijaz could serve as a sort of "Stati Pontificali" akin to Vatican City for the Roman Catholic Pope.[128] Having a political territory guarded from European intrusion but also unable to forge a political empire, Mecca would ideally suit the restoration of a spiritual Caliph.

The Hashemites, as both a recognized descendent of Muhammad and the Amirs of Mecca, had a special role in the creation of Arab Caliphate. Although never explicitly saying that the Caliphate must be a member of the Hashemites, leaving the question for Indian Muslims to decide, he had indeed argued on behalf of their merits to the caliphate.[129] No matter whom the Muslim world selected as Caliph, Blunt saw that the Amir of Mecca (or as he referred to it, "Sharif of Mecca"), possessed a certain gravity entwined with the Caliphate nevertheless. For instance, while exploring the possibility of an Arab caliphate in Cairo, Blunt concluded that wherever the Caliphate initially emerged following the fall of the Ottomans, "it would be in fact but the prelude

[126] Blunt, 202 and 194.

[127] Blunt, 204.

[128] Blunt, 207. It should also be noted that according to Blunt, in an earlier chapter, he argued that the only reason that the Caliphate did not reside

[129] Blunt, 118.

to that final return to Arabia which Arabian thought, if no other, destines for the Caliphate." The Sharif of Mecca was the reason for this inevitable pull to Arabia, because "the Sherif of Mecca would hardly tolerate any further subjection to an Emir el Mumenin [Caliph] shorn of his chief attributes of power [being Arab and a descendent of Muhammad], and unable...any longer to enforce his authority."[130] It was this observation that Blunt reflected an argument echoed by the Hashemites themselves (specifically Husayn ibn 'Ali to justify his break with the Ottomans in 1916), that the Amir of Mecca, as the guardian and overseer of the divinely mandated pilgrimage, also possesses the prerogative of recognizing the Caliph.[131] In fact, some of Blunt's earlier historical analysis on the Amirate reveal his opinion that had the Grand Sharif possessed the necessary power to defend himself from tribal threats in the Arabian Peninsula, he could have blocked the Ottomans from claiming the caliphate for themselves.[132] In recognizing the special role of the Amir of Mecca to the Islamic world, Blunt argued that ultimately "whether or not the Caliph reside at Mecca, the Grand Sherifate must always there exist and the pilgrimage continued…" undoubtedly as a potential, if not ultimate, check on the legitimacy of the Caliph if the position is not held by a Sharif.[133]

Ultimately, the creation of an Arab caliphate, specifically held by the Hashemites (ideally, from the 'Awn household), according to Blunt would weaken 'Abd al-Hamid's pan-Islamist policies that threatened British standing among its Muslim subjects. More than revealing British imperial anxieties, however, Blunt's writing on the caliphate provided a glimpse into the ways

[130] Blunt, 206.

[131] Discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.

[132] Blunt, 105.

[133] Blunt, *The Future of Islam*, 207.

British officials understood the Caliphate as a Muslim institution and the role the Hashemites ought to play in the future of the Islamic world. The fact that his ideas had derived from the events of 1880-1882 also demonstrated the global effects the ‘Awn-Zayd households rivalry had on British colonial discourse. As households continued to evolve, the ‘Awn also appeared primed to integrate themselves into the British colonial discourse, as the ideal Hashemite capable of harnessing the power of Muslims globally and more locally as tools to manage the largely tribally-organized region--both ends to British benefit. Ultimately, while the British had a legacy in the Hijaz that obviously extended to before the 1916 Arab Revolt, their interactions were not limited to the semi-colonial schemes in the Gulf (like political alliances with tribesmen) but also was based interventions in the household politics of the Hashemites.

Arabist Imaginations of the Hashemites

The events of 1880-1882, although most visibly influenced by Ottomanism and the effects of British colonialism, also featured another factor, Arabism. Arabism refers to an ideology of national distinctiveness that emerged among Arabic-speaking intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire that distinguished the Arabs from the Turks of the empire in both cultural and social terms. Rashid Khalidi described Arabism as an ideology of cultural separateness that included cultural, social, or even some political autonomy. Arabism, he suggested, is distinguished from Arab nationalism, which strove for national political independence.[134] In the traditional narrative, articulated by George Antonius in his classic history of the movement, *The Arab Awakening* (1938), he located the beginnings of the “Arab Movement” among a literary society in 1847 in Beirut.[135] According

[134] Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), ix.

[135] See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement* (London: H. Hamilton, 1938), 35–39.

to Antonius, Arabism appeared among Arab Christians in the Levant--specifically Beirut and Syria--began articulating an Arab nationalist vision that corresponded to their Arabic literature studies. As Western missionaries and merchants became increasingly part of the social and economic landscape of the Levant, their activities incorporated the region into the global marketplace and exposed its inhabitants to Western ideas and education through missionary schools. The most famed among these mission schools was the American Protestant College (American University of Beirut).[136] Their interest in resurrecting Arabic literature marked the *al-nahda,* the "awakening" or "renaissance" that led to the mass publication of Arabic language newspapers, periodicals, and literature. In time, secret societies, formed by the new generation of Arab literati that then emerged as political movements that called for Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire--the first such claim came from Arab Christian Najib Azouri (1837-1916).[137] Their call for Arab independence, according to Antonius, rested on their collective desire to preserve their Arab heritage, language, and identity that they believed Ottomanism threatened to eradicate through oppressive centralization and the privileging of Turkism as a function of statecraft.[138]

---

[136] This interaction did not begin in the 19th century however, but began in 15th century with the exchange of Maronite Catholics from Lebanon to study in Italian institutions. See Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Cornell University Press, 2009), 38–39. However, credit for Arab nationalism often focused on the missionary active in the 19th century, since these European missionaries, largely Protestants--though Catholic missionaries were also present--resided in the Levant and created European-inspired institutions of higher learning where they exposed these young Arabic-speakers to non-theological topics. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*, 35–60; Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 95–102.

[137] Negib. Azoury, *Le réveil de la nation arabe dans l'Asie turque: Partie asiatique de la question d'Orient et programme de la Ligue de la patrie arabe* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie, 1905); Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*, 98–99; Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939*, 277–79.

[138] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*, 282–91; C. Ernest Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 3–30.

Arabism did not only have a Christian Arab genealogy, however, but also included Arabic-speaking Islamic thinkers who articulated an alternative Arabist vision in their efforts to revitalize Islam and the Ottoman State. Critiquing Antonius' narrative of Arabism in the Syrian countries, scholars like Albert Hourani, C. Ernest Dawn, and Rashid Khalidi have described the emergence of an Islamic Arabism that included, according to Khalidi, "several diverse way stations" between Ottomanism—that is, the exclusive identification and loyalty to the Ottoman State—and Arab nationalism that called for Arab independence.[139] In appreciating the spectrum of Arabist associations, Arabs who claimed a distinct Arab identity while also remaining loyal to the Ottoman state were no less Arabist than their counterparts calling for secession. Scholars debate the timing of the emergence of Arabism, or at what point it became a critical force in Arab-Ottoman relations, but at its core rests the same concerns of Ottoman modernity discussed above. Meaning, it represented an "Arab" response to the issue of reform and modernity against the discourse of decline.

According to this revise narrative, Islamic Arabism had a much earlier genealogy than the Arab Christian counterparts and had began as early as the French occupation of Egypt by Napoleon's forces in 1798 as Muslim thinkers began to consider the current state of the Islamic world vis-a-vis Christian Europe.[140] Many of the pioneers of this civilizational self-reflection were Egyptian students whom Muhammad 'Ali had sent to Europe to study and bring their new knowledge back to Egypt for the service of his administration. These Arab writers reflected on the conditions of the Islamic world that appeared to be in decline. The cumulative effect of increased literacy and Arab Muslim self-reflection of the state of Islamic world compared to the

[139] Rashid Khalidi, ed., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), ix.

[140] Ibrahim A. Abu-Lughod, *Arab Rediscovery of Europe : A Study in Cultural Encounters*, Princeton Oriental Studies, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

Christian West, led to the eventual formation of a "nationalist self-view" nested within an Islamic modernism.[141] Islamic modernism, broadly defined, thus reacted against the apparent progress of Christian Europe by emphasizing the role of Islamic civilization to European advancements through contributions in scientific thought and philosophy. They hearkened back to its own Islamic intellectuals, like philosophers al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, whose writings and ideas affected the canons of scholarship in Europe. Later Islamic modernist figures in the 19th century, like Muhammad ʻAbduh (1849-1905) of Egypt and pan-Islamic activist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) claimed that Islamic civilization was inherently superior to the Christian West, but it had become corrupted and thus overtaken because of un-Islamic innovations. To restore the superiority of Islamic civilization, Islam must shed those elements that had corrupted it. Nested with this Islamist program, were key Muslim Arab thinkers who articulated a vision of history that interpreted Islamic history as a progressive departure from the values and ideas of the original Muslim community. In advocating such a view, they proposed a *salafi*-vision of Islamic renewal that advocated for a return to an Arab-centric Islamic world. As such, these Arabist thinkers called for the restoration of Arab culture, languages, and even leadership to solve the problems facing the broader Islamic world. For these thinkers, they found justification in the Quran and even European-orientalist temporal categories like the "golden age" of Islam, which was characterized by Arab civilization.[142]

---

[141] Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," 4.

[142] The verse from the Quran that was often quoted was from Surat al ʿIm'ran (3:110): "You are the best nation produced [as an example] for mankind." (Sahih Translation) For a brief description of their doctrines, see Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*, 19–21; Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," 8–10. For a detailed examination of the history and commentary of the *Salafiyya* movement as a response to the modern state, see Itzchak. Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2001), 261–72.

Some of the key figures for this movement were the Syrian thinkers ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1855-1902) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), a student of Muhammad ‘Abduh in Egypt. Unlike Arab nationalists who called for the political severance of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire, these Islamic Arabist authors originally wanted to maintain Muslim political unity currently represented by the Ottoman state. They nevertheless sought to carve a greater cultural and religious role for the Arabs to revitalize the Ottoman state and to restore proper Islamic norms. Al-Kawakibi, for instance, decried the political despotism that characterized the current Ottoman government as the primary source of the Islamic degeneration. In his most notable book, *Umm al-Qura (Mother of Cities*, i.e. Mecca), al-Kawakibi urged for “the creation of a modern and unified system of law” through *ijtihad* (inquiry) to reform Islam from its innovations and imitations that allowed for superstitions and political oppression.[143] For al-Kawakibi, the solution to Islamic degeneration was to return to Islam as practiced by the original pious early generations (*al-salaf al-salih*) and importantly the return of the caliphate to the Arabs, as the original community.[144]

In calling for an Arab caliphate, al-Kawakibi sought to reclaim religious and cultural superiority to the Arab world, which he expounded upon in his second book *Umm al-Qura* where he recorded the minutes of a secret--apocryphal--meeting held in Mecca with twenty-two scholars from all around the Muslim world.[145] He described how the delegates located the causes for the

---

[143] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939*, 272. “*Ijtihad*” refers to the use of reasoning to interpret and arbitrate matters of Islamic law. See Schacht, J., and MacDonald, D.B. ‘Idjtihad’. In *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, P.J. Bearman (Volumes X, XI, XII), Th. Bianquis (Volumes X, XI, XII), et al. Accessed December 18, 2019.

[144] For an extended commentary of Al-Kawakibi’s ideas of the caliphate, see Weismann, *Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi : Islamic Reform and Arab Revival*, 83–100.

[145] For the “record” of these meetings, see ‘Abd al-Rahman Kawakibi, *Umm al-Qura: wa-huwa dabt mufawadat wa-muqarrarat Mu’tamar al-Nahdah al-Islamiyah al-mun‘aqid fi Makkah al-Mukarramah sanat 1316* (Misr: al-Matba‘ah al-Misriyah, 1931).

Muslim world's predicate to the adoption of various innovations, including some forms of Sufism, the abandonment of Caliphal democracy for corrupt, absolutist government.[146] The solutions reached by the conference included, among other items, a *salafi* reformation of Islam whereby a strict interpretation of the Qur'an would guide the Muslim world and would divide political and religious authority in the Islamic world under the assumption that reform required returning to the original generation of Muslim leaders (i.e., "al-salaf al-salih" or the "the pious predecessors). Al-Kawakabi concluded that although religious and political power had been joined during the Rashidun caliphate ('Abu Bakr 'Umar, 'Uthman, and 'Ali, 632-661), the caliphate had been separated from political power in the later Arab caliphates, like the Abbasids, and should follow that formula. He suggested an Arab caliphate in Mecca whose political authority was limited to the Hijaz province from where he would only comment on religious matters affecting the broader Islamic world.

Rashid Rida had concurred with Kawakibi, using his own periodical, *al-Manar*, to publish *Umm al-Qura* in 1902.[147] In the midst of World War I, as described in more depth in later chapters, Rida also published a petition in 1915 that called for the founding of an independent Arab State and a universal Arab caliphate to revitalize the Islamic world. According to him, the Arab caliph must be located in Mecca and must oversee all Islamic religious matters. He believed in a sort of division between the religious and political realms whereby a president of the Arab empire would be located in Damascus, but unlike al-Kawakibi who envisioned a complete separation of the Caliph from political life through the creation of a political entity for the caliph, the Hijaz, Rashid

[146] Weismann, *Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi : Islamic Reform and Arab Revival*, 174.

[147] *al-Manar* no. 5 (1902); For a summative description of *al-Manar*'s role in the Islamic revivalist movement see Stephane A. Dudoignon, Komatsu Hisao, and Kosugi Yasushi, eds., *Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation and Communication* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006).

Rida did not advocate for such a division. He believed that the caliph must have some political role in the administration of the Arab empire, both practically by requiring his approval for all matters from the council of deputies and symbolically with his name mentioned in all prayers, stamped on coins, and presented on all treaties and official documents.[148]

For both Islamic Arabist thinkers, the need for the restoration of an Arab caliphate was essential for the restoration of the Islamic world, but not just any Arab should become caliph. Significantly, for the members of the Hashemite family, these authors had proposed the caliphate to be chosen from among the descendants of Muhammad, that is, from among descendants of Quraysh. This prerequisite necessarily referred to the Hashemites, whose prestige and political status rested on their recognized lineage to Muhammad. While a noble lineage, perhaps none considered nobler than the Prophet, projected a certain form of dynastic authority that these Arabist authors found compelling--particularly because the Prophet's line provided a revered Arab lineage that all Muslims could admire--these authors did not limit their claims to ancestry alone.

The theories of Ibn Khaldun (1336-1406) from the fourteenth century had provided a theoretical underpinning that provided an Arab Islamic discourse on authority and political legitimacy that did not rely on European modalities or vocabularies. Ibn Khaldun's ideas, presented in his magnum opus, *al-Muqaddimah*, have been recognized as immensely influential in both the Arab and Ottoman worlds, and his writings were studied by both Ottoman officials and Arab thinkers.[149] In particular, most useful for the Arabist authors was ibn Khaldun's theory of

[148] Eliezer Tauber, "Rashid Rida as Pan-Arabist before World War I," *The Muslim World* 79, no. 2 (April 1989): 102–12. Summarized from Tauber but crossed checked from General Organic Law of the Arab Empire by Rashid Rida enclosed in TNA: Reginald Storrs, Cairo, to Lt. Colonel Clayton enclosing "General Organic Law of the Arab Empire," 5 December 1915 [FO 882/15/1].

[149] See Nurullah Ardiç, "Genealogy or Asabiyya? Ibn Khaldun between Arab Nationalism and the Ottoman Caliphate," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 71, no. 2 (2012): 315–24. Significantly, ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah* was printed for the first time in Cairo in 1858, indicating a renewed interest in the philosopher's ideas.

the foundational role of *'asabiyya* (often translated as "group solidarity," particularly tribal solidarity) to the emergence and rejuvenation of states. In Ibn Khaldun's theory, dynastic states underwent a cycle of growth and decay based on the society's relative *'asabiyya*, made functional based on the degree the leader and his dynastic line could attract group solidarity overtime. Simply, the greater the *'asabiyya* garnered by a leader, the stronger the hold on legitimacy and power.[150]

For Arabist thinkers in the 19th and 20th centuries, the ideas of Ibn Khaldun underpinned their analyses for the future of the Arab and Islamic worlds as a defense for the importance of an Arab Caliphate potentially led by a descendent of Muhammad. Rashid Rida's application of *'asabiyya* to his own Arabist theories allowed him to criticize Ottoman modernity (as expressed by Ottoman orientalism) while defending his Arabist theories. Rida critiqued *'asabiyya* in the sense of ethnic bonds should not be the core of one's belonging to a nation or society. And yet, he attempted to balance the need for *'asabiyya* in creating solidarity while recognizing that it can also be divisive has created confusion among later scholars to his real judgment of the utility of *'asabiyya*.[151] He asserted that the only way for the Muslim world to unify under states could only derive from a common religion, i.e. Islam, and thus he did not believe that *'asabiyya* can--or should--be the basis for the creation of a state. In his view, *'asabiyya* ultimately led to the fragmentation and destruction of the state. Thus, he criticized the efforts by Ottoman reformers

[150] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal, Abridged ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969).

[151] Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2001), 65–66. In fact, his attempt to balance the two realities of group solidarity has created confusion as to his real judgement of *'asabiyya*. See Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939*, 299

who promoted "Turkism" in the final years of the Ottoman Empire, because he dubbed it a tribalistic *'asabiyya* a kin to pre-Islamic times.[152]

His analysis appeared to refute the importance and necessity Ibn Khaldun placed on *'asabiyya*, and seemed to place Rida in an opposing camp. Rida made an exception, however, with the *'asabiyya* of the Arabs, particularly as it related to the creation of an Arab caliph. In the analysis Albert Hourani provided, he observed that Rida distinguished between the *'asabiyya* of other Muslims with the *'asabiyya* of the Arabs: "while the 'asabiyya of other Muslim peoples was in conflict with the interests of the *umma*, that of the Arabs was in harmony with them."[153] Rida reached this conclusion namely because of his requirement that the caliph be from the family of Quraysh. In ibn Khaldun's model, the Quraysh, as a tribe, had possessed the necessary *'asabiyya* to create the first Muslim state and thus claim the caliphate, but that "caliphal" *'asabiyya* could be possessed by other groups besides the Quraysh.[154] Rida now argued that the Quraysh had the standing and prestige to unify both the Arab and the Islamic worlds by inspiring the same group solidarity. Because Quraysh prestige, as descendants of Muhammad, was a function of the prestige of Islam, they must always be in harmony with Islamic interests. In Hourani's summation "in them, as in no other family, religious zeal and the pride of the race reinforce each other."[155]

---

[152] Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Le Califat dans la doctrine de Rašid Rida : traduction annotée d'al-Hilafa au al-Imama al-'uzma (Le Califat, ou l'Imama suprême)*, trans. Henri Laoust, Mémoires de l'Institut français de Damas (Paris: Librairie d'Amerique et d'orient, 1986), 209; Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Al-Khilafah* (Madinat Nasr, al-Qahirah: al-Zahra' lil-I'lam al-'Arabi, 1988), 123. This idea of Turkish comprising a tribalistic *'asabiyya* was likewise expounded by the editors of *al-Qiblah*, the revolutionary newspaper of Husayn ibn 'Ali in 1916. See chapter 4 below.

[153] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939*, 301.

[154] M.H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1966), 167.

[155] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939*, 301; Rida, *Le Califat dans la doctrine de Rašid Rida : traduction annotée d'al-Hilafa au al-Imama al-'uzma (Le Califat, ou l'Imama suprême)*, 209; Rida, *Al-Khilafah*, 123.

Although Rashid Rida challenged Ibn Khaldun's understanding of the *'asabiyya'*s place in the formation of states, he nonetheless tied Arab *'asabiyya* to the interests of the Muslim *umma*, for the regeneration of the Islamic world. Arab *'asabiyya*, however, was deeply connected with an Arab caliphate by a member of Muhammad's family, possibly a Hashemite.[156]

Components of al-Kawakibi's and Rashid Rida's ideas, as Islamic Arabists reflected a shift in Arab intellectual discourse that allowed for the adoption of ideas pertaining to the Hashemites (such as the Arab caliphate by a descendent of Muhammad and the ideas of 'asabiyya, which often had tribal connotations) to be later adopted by non-Muslim and more nationalist Arabist authors. Namely, al-Kawakibi and Rashid Rida's analysis and prescriptions for the Islamic world rested on an important shift in the Arab *imaginare* that embraced the desert tribes. "Imaginaire" meant the "complex way that society (and the nation) create imaginary visions of themselves."[157] Among the settled populations, whether Arabic-speaking or otherwise, the *'Arab*, had specified the desert roaming nomads of the Syrian and Arabian steppes whose brutal lives, disregard for the restraining hand of government, and even claims of irreligion made them the dread of village or settled peoples. Their trampling herds and marauding members coerced farmers and even pilgrims to pay tribute. Those vulnerable to their predations feared them, and they became the epitome of the savage, barbaric oriental in both the European and the Ottoman imagination. As previously noted, much of the 19th century *Tanzimat*, whether through administrative and military reforms or the

---

[156] Mahmoud Haddad offered a different analysis of Rashid Rida's ideas regarding the connection among the Quraysh, *'asabiyya*, and the caliphate. He argued, in contrast to Hourani and Kerr, that Rida had a more Khaldunian perspective whereby the Quraysh claim to a universal *'asabiyya* and thus to the caliphate was not exclusive; other dynasties could--and did--possess the necessary *'asabiyya*. Haddad has shown that Rida did not challenge the legitimacy of the Ottoman Sultan to the universal caliphate--at least before 1916. He did so on the basis of ibn Khaldun's application of *'asabiyya* to caliphs not from Quraysh. See Mahmoud Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Rida's Ideas on the Caliphate," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 117, no. 2 (1997): 256.

[157] Birgit Schaebler, "From Urban Notables to 'Noble Arabs': Shifting Discourses in the Emergence of Nationalism in the Arab East, 1910-1916," in *From the Syrian Land to the State of Syria and Lebanon*, ed. Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann (Beirut: Orient-Institut, Ergon-Verlag, 2004), 176.

establishment of schools to indoctrinate the tribesmen with the ideas and traits of civilization. The consolidation of Ottoman authority in the margin of the empire required that they be subdued into law-abiding *Ottoman* citizens. By the end of the 19th century, however, Arabist writers re-imagined the figure of the tribal Arab who had been feared by urban or village Arabs alike. Essentially, the discourse of the desert Arabs changed. No longer considered villains, they "were reinterpreted and transformed in a radically new way, and imbued with a potential to salvage the future of the Arab Muslim east," specifically from Turkish oppression.[158] Now, the desert Arab, seen as a pure, indomitable Arab, represented salvation and regeneration against national and cultural degradation. Behind this re-imagining of the Bedouin Arab was the adoption of Ibn Khaldun's cyclical theory of civilizational rise and fall. For ibn Khaldun, he considered desert tribesmen, united purely by *'asabiyya*, the reservoir of social change when urban civilization became too decadent and languished.

In the Ottoman context of the 19th century, the regenerative powers of the desert Arabs was once again introduced through the writings of al-Kawakibi. In his most notable work, *Umm al-Qura* he was the first Arabist author to celebrate "the Arab tribes and the Arabian peninsula," which was "unheard of in Arab political literature."[159] Among the Salafi-inspired ideas of al-Kawakibi, the role of the desert Arab to the revitalization of the Islamic world order was clearly articulated. The frame of his book, published in 1900, claims to report a conference held by twenty-three dignitaries in the holy city of Mecca in 1898. At this purported meeting, these Muslim leaders from around the Islamic world gathered to discuss the state of the Islamic world and the actions to ensure its survival. Far from depicting the desert Arabs of the Peninsula who

[158]Schaebler, 178.

[159] Schaebler, 181.

were present in this fictional conference in fearful terms, al-Kawakibi's record of this secret conference concludes that the hopes of the Islamic world depended on the people of the Arabian Peninsula.[160] Among the reasons given included the religiosity and religious way of life preserved by the people of the Peninsula having been outside the influence of foreigners, including the Ottoman Turks.[161] They deemed the peninsular Arabs the most moral on earth, lacking vices like greed because the region lacked wealth in natural resources.[162] They were also judged to be most in solidarity, or possessing *'asabiyya*—a clear allusion to the regenerative role of the Bedouin in the ideas of Ibn Khaldun. Al-Kawakibi's celebration of the desert tribal Arab's virtues deeply impacted the ideas of other contemporary Islamic Arabists in both Cairo and Damascus by inaugurating a shift in the Arab *imaginaire,* which was indicated by increased romanticization within Arabist and nationalist circles of the Arab tribesmen. This change in attitudes was on full display in the Arab press treatment of "Arab" tribal challenges to Ottoman authority in the state's frontiers.[163] As a result, a "discursive shift" had taken place at the start of the 20th century whereby the Arabs of the desert transformed from "outlaws of Ottoman order into victims of Ottoman injustice and from there into Arab heroes, embodying all the true virtues of the Arab race and nation…."[164] In one scholar's opinion, this process was quick, taking only a few years.[165]

---

[160] Kawakibi, *Umm al-Qura*, 193.

[161] Kawakibi, 191.

[162] Kawakibi, 194.

[163] For instance, before 1910, there had been campaigns against "Arab" tribesmen from Iraq, Jabal Druz, Karak, the Hijaz, Yemen, and eventually Asir. See Shaebler, pg. 192.

[164] Schaebler, "From Urban Notables to 'Noble Arabs': Shifting Discourses in the Emergence of Nationalism in the Arab East, 1910-1916," 187.

[165] Schaebler, 187.

This shift in the Arab imaginaire undoubtedly informed Rashid Rida's fascination with the Arabian tribesmen and ultimately with the Wahhabism of the Arabian Peninsula. As a *salafi* thinker, Rashid Rida was attracted Wahhabism, which preached a very strict interpretation of Islam, because it represented what he believed to be true, orthodox doctrines and pure Islamic practices. In particular, Rida had tacitly supported the leadership of 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud of the Najd over the tribes in Arabia because his support of Wahhabism both represented true, orthodox doctrines and pure Islamic practices, especially in their absolute rejection of Sufism and its associated practices.[166] Rida's interpretation of Wahhabism contrasted sharply with the Amirs of Mecca, in particular the 'Awn, who considered Wahhabism a heresy for its rejection of the Ottoman caliphate (discussed more below). In Rida's opinion, through Wahhabism, 'Abd al-'Aziz was spreading religion and "culture amongst the tribes."[167] In fact, indicative of his affinity for the tribes and religion of the Arabian Peninsula and belief that they could simultaneously revitalize the Muslim and Arab world, he purportedly travelled in 1913 to Kuwait from India to enlist Shaykh Mubarak's help to lead an Arab revolution. In 1899, Shaykh Mubarak had entered into a treaty with Great Britain, which granted him European recognition and support. Rebuffed by the British aligned shaykh, he then reportedly visited Abd al-Aziz, who had also opened up relations with the British (that led to the Darin Treaty in 1915).[168]

The new-found admiration and celebration of the Arab tribesmen as a rejuvenating force for the Arab world, ideally led by a descendent of Muhammad as the universal Caliph, did not only

---

[166]Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 231. Albert Habib Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 90-102.

[167]Orit Bashkin, "Journeys between Civility and Wilderness: Debates on Civilization and Emotions in the Arab Middle East, 1861-1939," in *Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth Century Asia and Europe*, ed. Helge Jordheim Margrit Pernau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 137.

[168] *La Verité Sur La Question Syrienne*. (Stamboul : Commandement de la IVme Armée, 1916), pgs. 102-103.

appeal to Islamist Arabists, however. These ideas also belongd to the Arab revival movement, the *Nahda*, in that they also constructed a place an Arab descendent of Muhammad to hold the caliphate. Thus, even Christian Arabists, like Najib ‘Azuri (1873-1916), were affected by these ideas. ‘Azuri, a Maronite Christian Arab from Lebanon, has the distinction of first calling for the independence of the Arab nation in his 1905 book he published in French titled, *Le réveil de la nation arabe dans l’Asie turque*. Besides advocating for the political separation of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire and the creation of an Arab Sultan in Damascus, he argued for a separate Hijazi Arab province guided by an Arab caliph in Mecca. In particular, the universal caliph would be from among the “sherif (descendent of the Prophet)” who will “embrace openly his party [Arab nationalism] and will devote himself to this work.”[169] As a descendent of Muhammad, the Caliph will also “enjoy the sovereign honors and will possess a real moral authority on all the Muslims of the Earth.”[170] He explained that the reason the caliphate had fallen away from the Arab and now has “become so ridiculous and contemptible in the hands of the Turks,” was that the current Ottoman caliph had centralized religious and political power.[171] By advocating an independent Arab Sultan in Damascus and an Arab caliph in Mecca to govern the Hijaz, he hoped to prevent a similar fate by allowing the Arab Hashemite Caliph to “morally govern all the Muslims of the universe” while separating it from the political responsibilities of the Arab Sultan in Damascus.[172]

[169] Azoury, *Le réveil de la nation arabe dans l’Asie turque*, 246.

[170] Azoury, 246.

[171] Azoury, 246–47.

[172] Azoury, 247.

Arabism in the Hijaz through Hashemite Household Politics

Although these Arabist theories had included the Hijaz, the Hashemites, and even the Arab tribesmen for Arab and Muslim regeneration, as an ideology, Arabism had essentially been limited to more urbanized areas of the Ottoman Arab worlds. The Hijaz, according to Ochsenwald, while an ironic location for Arab nationalism (in the form of the Arab Revolt in 1916) to emerge, lacked many elements like literary culture to prime its widespread acceptance.[173] In his analysis, "the strength of the religious identity" suppressed any nationalist ideas.[174] While not suggesting any popularly accepted notions, the backdrop of the events of the 1880-1882 nevertheless suggest some proto-Arabist ideas were factors in the drama of Amir Husayn's assassination. In particular, behind Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's choice to promote the Zayd and demote the 'Awn household had been renewed fears of the creation of an Arab caliphate, a keystone to later Arabist writers' designs for religious rejuvenation.

In communiques dated to 1879, James Zohrab began reporting the apocryphal existence of a secret society operating from Medina that called for the creation of an Arab caliphate. Zohrab had credited his knowledge of this society to Amir Husayn, who had informed him that his brother, the previous Amir, had in fact established it. In 1882, a Muslim Javanese mentioned the secret society again to Zohrab, which he described as "a widely extended society...embracing Musulmans of all nationalities, its object being to restore the Khalifate to the Arabs of the Hedjaz." The society's headquarters was allegedly in Medina, and its members were expected to take a secret oath over Muhammad's tomb.[175] According to the British official's description of the secret

[173] See his chapter in Khalidi, *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, 189–203.

[174] Khalidi, 199.

[175] TNA: British Consul, Jeddah to Earl of Granville, Foreign Office, London, 8 February 1882 [FO 78/3415].

society, the rationale for this society's aims to reclaim the Caliphate for a Hijazi Arab--presumably a Hashemite--was global Muslim dissatisfaction with the Ottoman Sultan's response to the Russian threat to the Islamic world. Such a rationale contained echoes of the last Arab rebellion launched by 'Abdul Muttalib in 1855-56, the last time the Ottomans found themselves in a full-fledged war with Russia. The rumor of the plan for an Arab caliphate even reached Ottoman authorities in Syria. In a message written to the Ottoman Grand Wazir dated February 19, 1880, the Chief Scribe reported allegations made by the reformer Midhat Pasha, while serving as governor of Syria, of meetings between the British representatives with Amir Husayn ibn Muhammad to establish an Arab government in the Hijaz in order to claim the caliphate. The report recommended to Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid to send Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib to replace the disloyal Amir, who was assassinated the following month.[176]

The idea of a secret society of Muslim notables that included the Amir of Mecca planning to restore the caliphate for the Arabs, as told by Zohrab, undoubtedly affected Blunt when he visited the region in 1880 to gather information about Islam as the British consul's guest. By extension, his reporting may have even perhaps inspired al-Kawakibi, who framed his book *Umm al-Qura*, as the minutes of a secret society that met in Mecca during the pilgrimage season in 1899.[177] While the existence of such a society was apocryphal, the fact that Zohrab mentioned hearing of it from a Javanese Muslim suggested that the ideas of an Arab Caliphate being organized by a secret society may have been a widespread rumor and not limited to British imaginations. Despite his influence on al-Kawakibi, Blunt never mentioned the existence of a secret society in

[176] See footnote 1 of Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. *Ashraf Makkat Al-Mukarramah Wa-Umara'iha Fi Al-'ahd Al-'Uthmani*. Translated by Khalil 'Ali Murad. Beirut: al-Dar al-'Arabiyah lil-Mawsu'at, 2003. Pg. 225.

[177] Martin S. Kramer, *Islam Assembled : The Advent of the Muslim Congresses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 13–15. Teitelbaum, "Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman Order: From Chieftaincy to Suzerainty," 105.

his book, *The Future of Islam*, so his influence on al-Kawakibi on this point is uncertain. Moreover, considering that Zohrab sourced his knowledge of the society to Amir Husayn who may have had contacts with Arab intellectuals in Beirut, the notion of a secret society of Muslims planning the creation of an Arab caliphate seemed to have Arab origins--either from Arab intellectuals or from the Hashemite Amir, himself.[178] If so, Amir Husayn may have fabricated the idea of a secret society of Muslims in order to elevate his own standing with the British, perhaps in an attempt to rebel, just like his Zayd rival had done nearly three decades ago.

Regardless of its origins, whether British or Arab, Amir Husayn had nonetheless acted as an independent religious official before his death that would be reminiscent of later Muslim Arabist authors' views of the potential of the Hashemite family. By sending a formal letter to the Amir of Afghanistan and making plans to send a personal delegation to Kabul, he declared his intentions to be a source of religious authority on his own standing as the Amir of Mecca and on his reputation as a descendent of Muhammad. The fact that the Ottoman Sultan, as Caliph, had already sent his own mission to support the British against the Russians, but had proved unsuccessful, reasonably provided an opening for the Amir to assert his own independence to the wider Islamic world that included non-Ottomans and non-Arabs. In doing so, he likewise poised himself as an alternative religious figure to the Ottoman Sultan. Although later Arabist authors did not mention the events of 1880-1882 in their writings, the fact that the suggestion of a secret society of Muslims planning the creation of an Arab caliphate to challenge the Ottoman Sultan's claim was indeed present during these events and did make their appearance in their writings, suggests a connection. Although writing decades after the event, Arabist thinkers appeared to take

[178] According to Ochsenwald regarding Amir Husayn : "He was personally in touch with, and favorable toward, the ideas of the new Arabic-speaking intelligentsia being formed in Beirut." Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia*, 179.

inspiration from the dramatic assassination of the Amir of Mecca and the mysterious presence of some sort of secret society as they formulated their ideas on the Arab caliphate.[179]

These later Arabist authors like al-Kawakibi may have taken inspiration for the rumor of a secret society of Muslims working towards the creation of an Arab caliphate from European sources, but these Arabist authors differed in one important aspects vis-a-vis their treatment of the Hashemites when compared to the Ottomans and the British. Unlike the formulation of a Hamidianism and British colonial discourse that favored the ‘Awn household over the Zayd household, later Arabist authors did not entertain such preferences. They did not adopt either the British or Ottoman rubric of treating one household, the ‘Awn, as “ideal” because of its compatibility with their respective political projects. For them, it seemed, any Arab member of Quraysh could legitimately hold the caliphate regardless of household rivalries. The fact that these Arabist authors did not articulate a preference either Hashemite household suggests that the household rivalry was indeed a tool that emerged as a way of managing the Amirate of Mecca and therefore only applied to those forces seeking to harness the position.[180]

Conclusion

The events of 1880-1882 were a watershed movement in the history of the Amirate of Mecca and the Hashemite family more broadly. The circumstances behind the assassination of the

[179] In his biography of al-Kawakibi, Weismann noted that in the diaries of the French consulate in Aleppo, there was a note in 1892 that reported the arrest of al-Kawakibi, the “head of a secret society” for conspiring to call tribesmen in Syria to rebel against the Turks and create an Arab Caliph. Weismann calls this the earliest formulation of al-Kawakibi’s scheme that appeared in 1900 with the publication of *Umm al Qura*. See Weismann, *Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi : Islamic Reform and Arab Revival*, 55-56.

[180] Although any household preference or absence thereof at this point seems merely discursive to support some political project, the fact that Arabism did not assign any preference may also help account for the lackluster support Amir Husayn ibn ‘Ali received among Arabists during his Arab Revolt in 1916. Despite his efforts to associate himself to Muslim Arabism, the fact that any member of the Quraysh family could claim the Arab caliphate, not just a member of the ‘Awn family, may have stymied his efforts to claim any exclusive legitimacy on the basis of his lineage.

Amir, his household's dismissal with the appointment of a rival Hashemite household, and then that new Amir's disposition reveal how the Amirate of Mecca--a historically peripheral position in the politics of the Muslim world tasked with overseeing the annual pilgrimage--intersected with regional, global, and ideological trends. More importantly for the trajectory of this project, the events of 1880-1882 became a point of departure for the two rival households of the Hashemites. They evolved politically over the remainder of the 19th century and even--as future chapters chart--through World War I when the rivalry reactivated itself between Sharif Husayn ibn 'Ali of the 'Awn household launched a rebellion against the Ottoman state in 1916 while his primary Hashemite rival, Sharif 'Ali Haydar of the Zayd household, remained loyal to the Ottomans.

Their divergent trajectories began with the 19th century emergence of rival Hashemite households because of the Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz from 1812-1845. A family that carried the prestige of serving as the Amirs of Mecca, the Hashemites historically selected from among themselves the successor to the Amirate. When the administration of Muhammad 'Ali deposed the Amir of Mecca who had colluded with the Wahhabi conquerors to replace him with a member of the 'Awn family, he thus began the competition for the Amirate of Mecca that continued when the Ottomans restored control over the Hijaz. No longer adjudicated among the Hashemites, the Amir of Mecca became appointed directly by an outside imperial power (first Muhammad 'Ali and then the Ottomans) as the Hashemites formed into two households: the 'Awn and the Zayd whose control over the Amirate predated the 'Awn. Claimants from these two households descended to Istanbul where they lobbied and cultivated connections with the Sultan, who as caliph now claimed ultimate authority to appoint and dismiss the Amir of Mecca. The quick succession of the Hashemite households from 'Awn to Zayd to 'Awn again during the events of 1880-1882 revealed the success the Ottomans had in using the rivalry to manage the Amir of Mecca.

Managing the Amirate of Mecca became a strategic necessity for the Ottomans who over the course of the 19th century faced European interventions, occupations, and the perpetual threat of regional leaders splintering from Ottoman rule in pursuit of independence or dynastic autonomy. Over the course of the 19th century, the *Tanzimat*, the first phase of liberal Ottoman political reforms designed to reshape and centralize the state administration, introduced the Hijaz to new rubrics of Ottoman administration and new ideologies that culminated into the 1876 constitution. The liberalism represented by the constitution did not last, however, because Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid suspended it in 187. His reign resulted in a multi-decade period of Sultanic absolutism to which the ‘Awn household readily aligned themselves in order to secure the Amirate of Mecca against the Zayd. By accepting the Hamidian compromise--absolute loyalty to the Sultan as Caliph--the ‘Awn positioned themselves to undergo internal transformation (the subject of the next chapter).

The events of 1880-1882 were precipitated by the injection of British colonial politics into the Hijaz and the Hashemite Amirs of Mecca. In seeking an ally to suppress the pan-Islamist project of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid, British officials turned the Amir of Mecca into a potential ally that could act as a religious intermediary with their Muslim colonial subjects. In fact, it was the Amir’s intervention on behalf of Britain with the Afghans that led to his assassination and then precipitated into the oscillation of the Hashemite households to the Amirate until 1882. Because of the Zayd household claiming the Amirate from 1880-1882, a British discourse emerged that privileged the ‘Awn as the ideal Hashemite household for British imperial interests. The ‘Awn were perceived as the more enlightened, Christian-friendly, and ultimate the best suited--because of their ability to manage the tribes--to govern the Hijaz and oversee the pilgrimage. This discourse emerged simultaneously to the larger colonial articulation for the desire to create and subsequently assist the creation of an Arab caliphate to stymie the Ottoman Sultan’s projection of

religious authority in the broader Islamic world that the British characterized as despotic and a threat to their imperial interests. The events of 1880-1882, which highlighted the Ottoman control over the Amirate through leveraging the household rivalry, justified increased British intervention in the Islamic world. This intervention necessitated an intermediary: the Amir of Mecca, as a decedent of Muhammad, overseer of the Hajj, and as an Arab ethnically distinguished by the Ottoman Turkish Sultan, became the ideal figure.

Finally, the events of 1880-1882 prefigured some of the arguments made by later Muslim Arabist thinkers who articulated a vision of Arab religious and cultural rejuvenation as the necessary precursor for revitalizing Islamic civilization. While Amir Husayn's death by an Afghani resident was rooted to his interference in Afghanistan, Ottoman authorities had already considered his dismissal based on information from their officials in Syria that the Amir of Mecca had plans to declare an Arab caliphate with the help of the British. The fear of the Amir of Mecca breaking away from the Ottoman system had been a perennial one, justified by two previous attempts. Whether Amir Husayn had entertained such designs is not known, but the fact that the Amir of Mecca, as an appointed servant of the caliphate, took it upon himself to appeal to the Afghans on behalf of a European power suggested that he considered himself an alternative religious authority--and that a "Great Power" like Britain did as well. Moreover, another rumor reached British officials through the Amir and even through Javan Muslims that also prefigured the Arabist arguments. Rumors circulated that there existed in Medina a secret society, represented by Muslims worldwide, that planned to create an Arab caliphate in the Hijaz. This dubious society became the frame of al-Kawakibi's treatise, *Umm al-Qura*, which purported to be the minutes of that society meeting in 1899 to discuss the future of the Arab world, which included the creation of an Arab caliphate. Considering that rumors of an Arab caliphate and the existence of just such

a secret society factored into the events of 1880-1882, Arabist authors were likewise affected by the potential role of the Amir of Mecca to restore Arab preeminence in the Muslim world as an independent religious official.

Already during the short, but dramatic events of 1880-1882, we can detect the trajectory of how the Hashemite households were politically evolving. For the ‘Awn, whose claim to the Amirate of Mecca depended on their allegiance with Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s political program, they strategically evolved to match his administrative needs. An important aspect of that evolution included acculturating their household to elite Ottoman politics in Istanbul, which were predominantly Turkish. Yet, to be useful provincial intermediaries within the Hamidian rubric, the ‘Awn had to maintain an Arabness, which the Hamidian compromise allowed. For the Zayd, however, their household had been shut out from the Amirate of Mecca for the remainder of the 19th century. Their exclusion translated into a political evolution that positioned them to critique the Hamidian order, resulting in their adoption of liberal Ottomanism that saw the future of the state as being based on the rule of law (and thus curtailing the Sultan’s power). In addition, considering that the Zayd now became alienated from the Arab context of the Hijaz, they increasingly adopted a more Ottomanist identity that privileged Turkish elements of Ottoman society as the direction of modern civilization. Consequently, both households evolved along two different paths: the ‘Awn as Hamidian Arabs and the Zayd as Ottoman Orientalists.

It was in the midst of this political evolution of the ‘Awn and the Zayd households following the events of 1880-1882 that Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali of the ‘Awn and Sharif ‘Ali Haydar of the Zayd emerged. Sharif Husayn’s trajectory to become the Amir of Mecca in 1908 followed a lengthy dynastic struggle with his uncle, ‘Awn al-Rafiq, and his younger cousin, ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah. When considering Husayn’s later dynastic ambitions, they were rooted in his own

personal experience of being alienated by his relatives. Moreover, the divergent political evolution of the ‘Awn and Zayd households likewise affected these two Sharifians, as it informed the discursive household rivalry during World War I as these two Hashemites rhetorically dueled the future of the Arabs in the Ottoman state.

Chapter 2- The ‘Awn Triumph: Internal Dynastic Rivalries and Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali, 1883-1908

Introduction

The promotion of ‘Awn al-Rafiq to the Amirate of Mecca in 1883 ushered in a lengthy period of ‘Awn dominance over the Amirate of Mecca until the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1916. This period could be characterized as the “‘Awn triumph,” because the ‘Awn household’s preeminence was never challenged during this three-decade long period by the Zayd. This chapter argues that the rise of the ‘Awn household related to Hamidian politics and processes of internal consolidation. ‘Awn triumph must be credited to their acceptance of (or submission to) the Hamidian compromise (that consisted of absolute loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph ‘Abd al-Hamid). In these decades, Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid continued centralizing administration that took the form major infrastructural projects, like rail, and through a policy of integrating the state’s Muslim population through his pan-Islamist policies. With this relative security, the ‘Awn could feel assured of their place as the Amirs of Mecca, so long as they abided by the Hamidian framework. The ‘Awn triumph meant that the ‘Awn household could mature as Amirs of Mecca. This maturation could be seen in the style of governance but also in dynastic consolidation. With the aging of ‘Awn al-Rafiq and ‘Abd al-Ilah, the last remaining sons of the household founder, there emerged the dilemma of succession necessarily having to reach into the next generation the ‘Awn household.

The ‘Awn triumph laid the foundation for the emergence of Sharifs Husayn ibn ‘Ali and ‘Ali Haydar, whose rivalry formed the basis of the outbreak of the 1916 Arab Revolt and the subject of the remaining chapters. Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali was one of the grandsons of Amir

Muhammad ibn Abdul Mu‘in who founded the ‘Awn household, and significant because he became the Amir of Mecca in 1908 and then launched and led the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916. His contemporary, Sharif ‘Ali Haydar, was the grandson of Amir ‘Abdul Muttalib, and emerged as the leading figure for the Zayd household. He struggled to reclaim the Amirate for his family, and was finally successful in 1916 when Husayn ibn ‘Ali launched his rebellion. His appointment reactivated the household rivalry as both figures reoriented their political ideologies against the backdrop of World War I, that signaled the end of the Ottoman system, and the Arab Revolt that effectively severed Mecca and much of the Hijaz from Ottoman authority. This rivalry and political evolution will be explored in the next two chapters.

This chapter locates the origins of this renewed and reframed Hashemite household rivalry to the period under review (1883 - 1908). As the ‘Awn household under ‘Awn al-Rafiq consolidated its authority over the Amirate of Mecca, ‘Awn al-Rafiq attempted to create a dynasty for his sons. In doing so, he alienated members of his household, specifically his nephew Sharif Husayn whom he exiled from Mecca as early as 1891. When the Ottoman governor intervened in 1905 and appointed ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah to the Amirate unilaterally, that is, without Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s approval, Sharif Husayn had seemingly been excluded from succession to the Amirate in favor of his younger cousin. Only after a constitutional revolution in 1908 deposed his cousin and through the intervention of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid did the exiled Sharif Husayn claim the Amirate. Likewise, following the death of his grandfather and his own sort of exile to Istanbul, Sharif ‘Ali Haydar of the Zayd was also excluded from the Amirate. Both Sharifs resided in Istanbul, where they curried favor with the Sultan and his government, in the hopes of reclaiming the Amirate that seemed closed to them.

The steps these two Sharifians took in their attempts to reclaim the Amirate will be examined, but equally important was the fact that their disparate upbringing and circumstances led them to adopt different political ideologies. Both men were Arab Ottomans. Both identified as Arabs, and both recognized--at this time, at least--the legitimacy of the Ottoman state, marked by their residences and political activities in Istanbul within the Sultan's inner circle of supporters. A growing body of literature, however, has emerged that explored the hybridity of identities held by Arabic-speaking subjects of the Ottoman Empire that simultaneously included an Arab cultural or linguistic identity and an Ottoman one defined by historical commitments, ideological sympathies, religious devotion, and anti-colonial stances. The complex transition from Arab Ottoman to Arabist and then to nationalists over the course of the first half of the 20th century has challenged the received notions of the appeal of Arab nationalism or the weight of post-Ottoman European colonialism.[1]

In the case of the Hashemite household politicians, as evidenced through their personal lives and views, they simultaneously diverged in their respective political ideology that then became the marker of their future political rivalry. Sharif Husayn ibn 'Ali, fully embedded in and indebted to the Hamidian political rubric of pan-Islamism and authoritarianism, nonetheless maintained an essential Arabness (or cultural Arabism), whereby he considered the Arabs an equal partner to Hamidian pan-Islamism. Because 'Abd al-Hamid underpinned his loyalty to the Ottoman state, it is perhaps more accurate to describe Husayn as an "Arab Hamidian." By "Arab Hamidian" I mean someone who simultaneously identified as an Arab (culturally, linguistically,

[1] For examples, see Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist*; Salim. Tamari, *Year of the Locust: A Soldier's Diary and the Erasure of Palestine's Ottoman Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Parsons, *Commander: Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the Fight for Arab Independence 1914-1948*; Michael Provence, *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

socially, and even religiously), but whose loyalty to the Ottoman state rested specifically on ‘Abd al-Hamid II’s governance as expressed through his pan-Islamist program. For the Hashemites in Mecca, ‘Abd al-Hamid’s policies towards the Arabs (as the second largest Muslim bloc) gave them certain latitude in their administration of the Amirate of Mecca so long as their loyalty went unquestioned. For the ‘Awn household, in particular Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali (further analysis in the next chapter), his loyalty to the Ottoman state extended only so far as to the Hamidian order--and not necessarily to the entire political system.

Meanwhile, because his household had been effectively blocked from the Amirate yet remained loyal to the Ottoman caliph, Sharif ‘Ali Haydar of the Zayd political identity evolved differently. ‘Ali Haydar’s loyalty was to the Ottoman state and its capacity for modernizing reforms that had exemplified Ottoman progressivism. A term coined by Ussama Makdisi as Ottoman orientalism, ‘Ali Haydar’s political identity could best be described through the civilizational schema that accompanied many Ottoman reforms that privileged the Turkish element of Ottoman society as “modern” against regions and peoples that needed modernization, like the Arabs or other tribal regions.

While these divergent ideologies between Sharifs Husayn ibn ‘Ali and ‘Ali Haydar resulted from their respective household’s lofty political strategies, it also resulted from a specific pragmatism. Because the Zayd household had been alienated from the Amirate of Mecca, and thus the Hijaz, it followed that their education and political training focused on the elite politics of Istanbul. As the biography of ‘Ali Haydar demonstrates, his education and political training was entirely centered in Istanbul, where his household resided, and was only temporarily interrupted by his grandfather’s return to Mecca in 1880. In contrast, Husayn ibn ‘Ali’s upbringing, being from the ‘Awn household, was almost entirely in Mecca and only occassionally interrupted by

internal ‘Awn household conflicts. Nevertheless, as a leading figure among the ‘Awn, Husayn likwise ingratiated himself among Ottoman elites through his political activities in the Sultan’s court and through strategic marriages (more below). Combined with his Meccan Arab education and alliance to the Sultan, Husayn was the ideal candidate for the Amirate of Mecca following the 1908 revolution.

Ultimately, this chapter argues that the future ideological divergence between the ‘Awn and Zayd households--on full display during the Arab Revolt--had its origins during the period of ‘Awn triumph that excluded both Sharifs Husayn and ‘Ali Haydar from the Amirate of Mecca. The internal ‘Awn succession crisis and his adoption of Arab Hamidianism led to Sharif Husayn’s quick appointment to the Amirate of Mecca following the 1908 Constitutional Revolution. With the political evolution that followed the consolidation over the Amirate of Mecca during the Hamidian period, it becomes apparent that Ottoman-Arab relations were not unidirectional in the sense of Ottoman bureaucrats acting upon local Arab officials, but that these regional Arab politicians likewise participated in the political discourses in order to preserve and obtain legitimacy.

Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s Reign and an Impending Succession Crisis

Historians have approached the tenure of ‘Awn al-Rafiq (r. 1882-1905) that have focused on his very dramatic relationship with the series of Ottoman governors appointed to oversee the region. In his narrative history of the Hashemites, De Gaury, described how the Ottoman *Wali* Osman Nuri Pasha (1882-1886) and his immediate successors had reduced the Amirate of Mecca in both influence and prestige. They took over all the former prerogatives of the Amirate and “yielding up the Sherif’s share in such a fashion that it seemed not so much his of right but a salary

in their giving."[2] That is, according to De Gaury, the *wali* successfully circumscribed the authority of 'Awn al-Rafiq. William Ochsenwald's more recent, nuanced analysis noted that since the Hamidian policies of pan-Islamism and centralization "were incompatible with the power-sharing compromise between amir and vali that for so long had been the basis of the Hijazi-Ottoman political order," conflict between the two was inevitable.[3] In his view, the frequent turnover of *walis* proved untenable, until ultimately the Grand Sharif "return[ed] to the old compromise of the amir and vali governing the Hijaz together" after relying on a *wali* who was willing to share this powerful and lucrative post.[4] That *wali* was Ahmad "Ratib Pasha" (1893-1908). Until 'Awn al-Rafiq's death, the two men enjoyed a "close cooperation" that translated into the consolidation of power to the benefit of the Amir and mutual enrichment that even extended beyond 'Awn al-Rafiq to his successor, his nephew 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah (r. 1905-1908).[5]

This narrative that focuses on the interactions between the Amir and numerous *walis*, i.e. a *wali*'s inability to safeguard against the Amir's predations and mismanagement of the *wilayet* (province), has often been used to explain their frequent replacements against the relative strength of the Amir.[6] The extent to which a *wali* lasted has acted as a barometer of authority in the district vis-a-vis the centralizing Ottoman government. A long serving *wali* meant the Sultan's authority was ascendant in relation to the Amir of Mecca; frequent changes suggested that the Amir

---

[2] Gerald de Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca* (London: Harrap, 1951), 258.

[3] William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), 186.

[4] Ochsenwald, 190.

[5] Saleh Muhammad Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914: Ottoman Vali, the Sharif of Mecca, and the Growth of British Influence* (Riyad University Publications, 1978), 130; Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia*, 199.

[6] Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914*, 125–33; Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia*, 186–219.

exercised more influence in the region. Indeed, considering the strategic importance of the Hijaz and its management's symbolism to the Hamidian order, 'Awn al-Rafiq's relationship with the *walis* were undoubtedly important ideologically. As a gauge of the extent of central control over the Grand Sharifate, however, it was less clear. Even though the conflict between the Amir of Mecca and the Ottoman officials was constant throughout the end of the 19th century, it should not be interpolated to reflect the relationship between the Grand Sharif and the Sultan.[7] In the case of 'Awn al-Rafiq, despite the frequent expulsions, appointments, and even reappointments of *walis* to the Hijaz, their high turnover characterized the perennial problems of governing the *wilayet* of the Hijaz as a peripheral region--and not a commentary on the Amir's relationship with the Ottoman order. For instance, the fact that 'Awn al-Rafiq and the *wali* Ratib Pasha eventually developed a stable working relationship did not necessarily result into a more tranquil Hijaz. British consular reports continued to provide an unrelenting litany of instances of local mismanagement, abuse, and extortion of pilgrims during this period with only periodic news of tranquility and uneventful pilgrimages.[8] Nevertheless, against both praise and criticism, 'Awn al-Rafiq enjoyed the longest, uninterrupted term as Amir from among the 'Awn clan until his death in 1905.

To account for this contradiction, we have to reflect once again on the terms of Hamidian compromise. Despite continuous machinations against Ottoman governors who threatened his autonomy, the Amir of Mecca 'Awn al-Rafiq was nonetheless a loyal subject of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. Unlike his 'Awn predecessors, his brother and predecessor Husayn, he never overtly challenged the political or religious authority of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. Just as

[7] F. E. Peters, *Mecca: A Literary History of the Muslim Holy Land* (Princeton University Press, 2017), 335–45.

[8] See Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914*, 209–12.

important, if not more essential, he maintained a distance from British officials, despite the fact that the ‘Awn clan had been praised previously for their friendliness towards the British and Christians in general. According to British accounts, while never openly hostile to European officials, he made his indifference known by taking little interest in pursuing the assassins of a British official in 1895 or intervening in Britain’s frequent disagreements with the *wali*.[9] Thus, instead of treating the Amir-*wali* interactions as a litmus test of the Amir’s feelings toward the Sultan, it would be more accurate to conclude that the Amir’s loyalty to the Ottoman system had never really been questioned. He was satisfied with the conditions of the Hamidian order.[10] The consolidation of the ‘Awn household during the tenure of ‘Awn al-Rafiq, despite frequent power struggles with the Sultan’s chief agent indicated the household’s acceptance of the Hamidian compromise: absolute loyalty to the Sultan as Caliph.

With the ‘Awn household consensus and acceptance of the Hamidian compromise, it is possible to analyze the maturation of the household under the terms of the Hamidian order. Feeling assured of his household’s triumph and secure in his and his family’s claim to the Amirate of Mecca, ‘Awn al-Rafiq adapted his rule to the circumstances. Besides his open conflicts with the Ottoman *wali*, his style of dress changed to become more ostentatious; ceremonies became more lavish; he conducted his affairs in private (as opposed to during public ceremonies); and he became

[9] Among others, there was a case during the 1904 pilgrimage that the British disagree with the wali’s orders that all pilgrims leaving Medina, including the dignitary of Bhopal and a British colonial subject, must take the Syrian caravan to Mecca. According to the wali, the land route south was much safer than the for her to proceed back to Yanbu‘ and take a ship to Jeddah and then go to Mecca. The British sought the advice of the Grand Sharif, who despite his agents assuring their ability to transport the dignitary to Yanbu‘, deferred to the wali’s wishes. Other examples from the British Consul’s reports indicated that despite any “dishonor” directed towards the Grand Sharif by the Wali, the Grand Sharif nevertheless deferred to his wishes. See TNA: Mecca to Consul Devey, Jeddah, 8 January 1904 [FO 195/2174].

[10] This is according to the memoirs of Ali Haydar in George Marquis Stewart Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia, the Emir Shereef Ali Haider* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1948), 69–73.

more abusive to any potential threat to his power.[11] In a word, ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s administration became more “Hamidian” by relying on projecting power through symbols and personal prestige. So long as there was no doubt of his loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, and the pilgrimage devoid of any European interference, ‘Awn al-Rafiq seemed to enjoy relatively free reign to solidify his control of the region.

An important component of ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s rule and a sign of household maturation was dynastic consolidation. When charting the succession plan of the ‘Awn household, it is clear that it faced an impending dynastic crisis that ‘Awn al-Rafiq attempted to leverage to solidify his control over the Amirate by creating a dynasty for his sons, which threatened to succession claims of his relatives. In that way, the situation facing the ‘Awn household during this period mirrored the dilemma that had faced all Islamic dynasties: the propensity to dissolve and fracture with each generation as the number of claimants increased. Within the Islamic world, different patterns of succession and institutions evolved to try to mitigate this corrosive tendency. Consequently, the Amirate of Mecca within the ‘Awn household followed succession by agnatic seniority, which was characterized by the sons of Muhammad ibn ‘Abdul Mu‘in, the first ‘Awn Amir who had been appointed by Muhammad ‘Ali during the Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz, succeeding one another. Therefore, after Amir Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul Mu‘in’s death in 1858, his eldest son, ‘Abdullah, succeeded him. After him, his second son Husayn (1877-1880) ruled, and then finally another son, ‘Awn al-Rafiq (1882-1905) took power.[12] This same pattern of privileging the next oldest sibling mirrored the Ottoman Sultan’s dynastic pattern that had been instituted in the seventeenth century. By ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s term to the Amirate of Mecca, however, the line of sons

[11] Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia*, 190–91.

[12] For a list of the Amirs of Mecca during the 19th and 20th centuries, see Appendix 1.

of the household's founder had nearly reached its end: deaths and aging increasingly limited the pool of potential heirs from the initial generation of sons. With that inevitability, 'Awn succession would require a new generation of siblings to be selected as Amirs. For this reason, 'Awn al-Rafiq began to pursue abusive measures that targeted fellow Hashemites, including his closest relatives. Considering the impending dynastic crisis, his actions are best interpreted as attempts to bolster his authority and to weaken his relatives, perhaps to ensure that his own son succeed him, thus creating a dynastic line within the 'Awn household.

In his study of Arabian dynasties, Michael Herb offered a complimentary understanding to the succession dilemma that had arrived within the 'Awn household during the Amirate of 'Awn al-Rafiq. In anthropological terms, Arabian dynasties tended to be segmentary, rather than unitary, in that the rulers relied on allied powers (like relatives) for administering territories outside the center. As such, a ruler's authority depended as much as on his dynastic claims as the acceptance of his relatives who enjoyed a great deal of bargaining power through regional ties, custom revenues, or independent sources of wealth. In other words, "dynastic monarchies emerged because the rulers' relatives...had powerful bargaining resources which they could use to help rulers stay in power, to aid aspiring rulers in achieving power, or to attack and depose sitting rulers."[13] In this way, a ruler's relatives always posed a threat. In order for a unitary dynastic state to emerge, whereby the ruler directly administers a territory through an "independent administrative machinery," that circumvents and neutralizes the influence of relatives.[14] In the case of the Arabian Peninsula (like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States), a unitary state emerged from

[13] Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies* (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), 22.

[14] Herb, 23.

the creation of a central bureaucratic apparatus afforded by oil revenue or through British colonial intervention. Applying this dynastic lens to the ‘Awn household during this period, I argue that ‘Awn al-Rafiq attempted to create a unitary dynasty by weakening his relatives (since the Hamidian framework had neutralized the Zayd household threat for the time being). To do so, he had to attack his relative’s sources of authority, like their prestige, wealth, and even endowments (*awqaf*).

A contextual support for considering the ‘Awn household’s dynastic crisis and ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s efforts to create a unitary dynasty is provided by the Ottoman dynastic debates that took place in the 19th century. Hakan Karateke has insightfully demonstrated that during the reign of Sultan Abdulmecid (r. 1808-1829), similar efforts were made to bypass the pattern of agnatic succession that had characterized the Ottoman Sultanate for two centuries in favor of promoting his son, Murad, to succeed him.[15] Although unsuccessful, he began a nearly century long debate over Ottoman succession. Karateke traced the succession debates to the modernizing and centralizing project of the 19th century, since both Sultan and liberal reformers, like the Young Ottomans who advocated for liberal reforms and the 1876 constitution, supported implementing primogeniture. (For the Young Ottomans, agnatic succession favored older, presumably more conservative, heirs whereas primogeniture allowed the succession of a young Sultan who would expectedly be more open to change.) In the same way that this issue of dynastic succession was debated in Istanbul, (after the 1876 Constitution enshrined agnatic seniority in its third article) the question also affected Egypt and the line of hereditary governors from Muhammad ‘Ali’s line. In fact, Sultan Abdulaziz (r. 1861-1876) had recognized the right of primogeniture in Egypt in 1866,

[15] Hakan T. Karateke, “Who Is the Next Ottoman Sultan? Attempts to Change the Rule of Succession during the Nineteenth Century,” in *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration*, ed. Butrus Abu Mannah, Itzchak Weismann, and Fruma Zachs (London: I.B.Tauris, 2005), 37–53.

perhaps to "create a positive climate of opinion" for his own efforts to see his son succeed him.[16] As a result, Muhammad 'Ali's grandson, the viceory of Egypt (Khedive) Ismail (r. 1863-1879), had finally implemented succession by primogeniture that lasted only two generations. As Karateke concludes, "the fact that Istanbul's close rival in the modernization contest struggled to achieve the same changes in the succession arrangement may be regarded as part of the same *grand picture*" one that he ultimately located to attempts to imitate European monarchs.[17] In the efforts of 'Awn al-Rafiq to weaken members of his household a similarity presents itself. Although the circumstances of the 'Awn household in Mecca differed on the basis that the Amir was directly appointed by the Sultan and was financially dependent on the Sultan's subsidies, the Amirate of Mecca had its own basis of authority, even when constrained, that made it resemble a dynasty in local terms. I suggest we can locate the contest for intra-'Awn authority during the Amirate of 'Awn al-Rafiq in the same "grand picture." Mirroring the other Muslim dynasties around him, the Amir of Mecca sought to affect a change in 'Awn succession to establish his heir by weakening other 'Awn rivals. This intra-clan conflict came to a head in 1892-1893 when members of the 'Awn authored a petition condemning the abusive policies of 'Awn al-Rafiq that they alleged targeted them. This action ultimately led to the exile of some members of his family to Istanbul, including Sharif Husayn ibn 'Ali.

An 'Awn Petition, 1893

The most important written articulation of the intra-'Awn feud that would engulf Sharif Husayn was an 1893 petition that several members of the 'Awn Sharifians signed and forwarded

[16] Karateke, 43.

[17] Karateke, 49–50. Italics mine for emphasis.

to the *wali* of the Hijaz and to different European consulates. The petition under examination was not unknown to historians, who have used it as evidence of the abusive rule of Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq that led to the appointment of Ratib Pasha as the new *vali* in 1893.[18] It has likewise often been alluded to in the context of Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali’s exile to Istanbul, which separated him from his ancestral home and allowed him to lay the foundation for his dramatic return as its Amir in 1908, thus validating his son’s claim that they left the Hijaz because of “differences” with ‘Awn al-Rafiq.[19] It claims to list the many abuses, some specific and some general, of the Amir, most of which the consular record has confirmed.[20] In particular, this petition listed random imprisonment, confiscation of poverty, and even physical abuse.[21] Significantly, the petition was not an anti-‘Awn al-Rafiq propaganda or vilification of all his crimes. The petitioners did not appeal for redress for all those affected by the Amir’s actions. Rather, they protested against those actions undertaken by the Amir that affected them specifically--their wealth, livelihood, and ultimately prestige. In this way, the 1893 petition captured not another litany of grievances about the Amir, of which there were many in the consular record, but a conflict within the ‘Awn household. Judging by the nature of the complaints, members of the ‘Awn household were lamenting the loss of their benefits and privileges at the hands of ‘Awn al-Rafiq. For his part, by weakening the standing of other members of his household, ‘Awn al-Rafiq was carving for himself

---

[18] See Saleh Muhammad Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914: Ottoman Vali, the Sharif of Mecca, and the Growth of British Influence* (Riyad University Publications, 1978), 129, where he focuses on the “hostilities” that emerged between the Amir and Ali ibn ‘Abdullah and Husayn ibn Ali. Also, William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), 194, where he only mentions a petition of “notables of Jidda and Mecca, including many sharifs” as evidence of his corruption and the role of Ratib Pasha in investigating those charges.

[19] ‘Abdullah Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti* (Amman: Maktabah al-Ahliyya, 1998), pg. 16.

[20] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

[21] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

an exclusive control over the Amirate, which I maintain was intended to forge a dynastic line within the ‘Awn household that the Hamidian compromise and the impending dynastic dilemma allowed.

Curiously, the aggrieved Sharifians only appealed to redress after a decade of ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s rule which suggests a sudden change in the relationship between the Amir and the rest of his household. The petition and the consular record provided various clues for the catalyst. The signatories finally published their petition following direct threats on their lives and their personal properties. Concerning the former threat, the petitioned specifically mentioned the torture of Sharif ‘Abdullah, a Sharifian from among the powerful and influential tribes near Mecca and a relative of the ‘Awn household. The petition described how the Sharif was arrested and then “bastinadoed,” that is, he “was stretched on the ground and three hundred lashes were given.”[22] It even alleged that ‘Awn al Rafiq himself also struck his face multiple times.[23] After the torture, the petitioners remarked that the Amir sent his personal guards, the “bishas,” to the homes of his other relatives, which they interpreted as a form of intimidation. In response, some Sharifians left Mecca and headed to the countryside where “bands of ‘Beeshas’” nonetheless tracked some of them and killed them.[24] In response to ‘Awn al-Rafiq actions, the Sharifians were forced “to fly from his (Grand Shereef’s) tyrannies to a place where he could not reach [them].”[25]

[22] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

[23] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

[24] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

[25] TNA: W.H. Richards, Jeddah to Sir Francis Clareford, Istanbul, 16 December 1892 [FO 195/1767].

In the case of Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali that place of sanctuary was Istanbul. Despite some suggestions from historians to date Sharif Husayn’s departure to 1893, when the petition was issued, his own son dated his family’s exile to 1891. Considering that Sharif Husayn did not sign the petition, it must mean that he was among those who had fled before.[26] The personal cost for Sharif Husayn’s exile provides a second catalyst for the petition in that he was not shielded from the Amir’s crimes even while absent from the region. According to consular reports that explored the context for the 1893 petition, they described how after leaving Mecca Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali had stored his possessions in the ‘Awn ancestral home there.[27] However, a dispute had emerged between ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah (the son of the previous Amir who still resided in Mecca) and ‘Awn al-Rafiq over Sharif Husayn's property. Since the petition listed among other crimes that the Amir “despoiled” his relatives, it is safe to conclude that ‘Awn al-Rafiq had desired to confiscate Husayn’s belongs, and that ‘Ali attempted to intervene. This conflict originally provoked ‘Ali to telegraph Istanbul directly “to complain of the gross injustice and tyranny of which he had been the victim and to beg for redress.”[28] The signed petition resulted from the Sultan’s failure to respond to this telegraph. In that way, Husayn’s exile from fear of torture or death and the subsequent confiscation of his property appeared to have finally prompted this latest petition.

The grievances put forth by the 1893 petition, however, were not limited to the violent abuse of a sharifian or to Sharif Husayn’s complaints. The signatories of the petition also listed

---

[26] The British consular document that mentioned Husayn’s departure at this time, mentioned that he was summoned by the Sultan. See TNA: W.H. Richards, Jeddah to Sir Francis Clareford, Istanbul, 16 December 1892 [FO 195/1767]. According to Husayn’s son, ‘Abdullah, they were exiled by ‘Awn al-Rafiq. ‘Abdullah Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti* (Amman: Maktabah al-Ahliyya, 1998), pg.16. Likewise, this is the conclusion reached by other historians. See al-Amr and Baker. Considering the action taken by ‘Awn al-Rafiq to confiscate Husayn’s property, I interpret Husayn’s departure not as an innocuous summon. Besides, Husayn brought his sons with him, suggesting exile.

[27] TNA: W.H. Richards, Jeddah to Sir Francis Clareford, Istanbul, 16 December 1892 [FO 195/1767].

[28] TNA: W.H. Richards, Jeddah to Sir Francis Clareford, Istanbul, 16 December 1892 [FO 195/1767].

other crimes Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq had directed on them that suggested a more widespread effort to weaken members of their household. They alleged that the Amir’s actions towards them consisted of “his oppression, his trespasses on our rights, the dishonour which we have been subjected to being bastinadoed[,] imprisoned and despoiled, threatened and dispersed and other endless sufferings till we have reached the point of death[,] our families dispersed and our peace changed into dire anxiety.”[29] More than just threatening their lives or confiscating their property, however, the Amir’s action threatened to undermine long-term foundations of their privileges within the region. Those privileges allowed the Sharifians to cultivate their own influences and prestige. They described how ‘Awn al-Rafiq “has stopped our allowances and taken away from us those privileges, which we, our fathers, and grandfathers, have enjoyed for more than 200 years in order to benefit himself.”[30] Most significantly, they claimed he confiscated their *waqfs* (religious endowments), which were a strategy for preserving wealth across generations and were sources of patronage. Importantly, and revealingly, the confiscation and dissolution by state authorities of waqf properties had likewise been a characteristic of the centralizing bureaucracy that began during the Tanzimat and continued into the Hamidian period in an effor to increase state revenue.[31]

The petition observed that ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s actions were not merely for his own personal gain, however; it alleged that he did so to bolster his own standing among residents of the region. As examined before, the prerogatives of the Amir of Mecca had traditionally been the access to subsidies from the Ottoman Sultan and the revenues from certain local and regional privileges that

[29] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

[30] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

[31] John Robert Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), 111–27.

together augmented his regional authority. The petition accused Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq of overstepping those political and economic rights at the expense of members of his own household. Thus, not only did he deprive his relatives of their allowances and ancestral rights to the wealth of *waqf* property, he gave their wealth and source of influence “away to his creatures who are from the dregs of the people.”[32] “His creatures” were undoubtedly his supporters and were non-Hashemites, non-’Awn since the petition described them as the “dregs of the people.” Exact numbers or statistics to limn the extent in which the Amir used patronage taken at the expense of his own relatives to augment his authority with those in the Hijaz are not provided. Nevertheless, the principle of the complaints hurled at the Amir by his relatives and the fact that many of the most influential ‘Awn Hashemites--in particular, those with succession ambitions--had to flee the region suggested that ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s abuses were widespread and had a real impact on their standing and chance to succeed their relative.

Indicative of its effects, the petitioners did not limit the recipients of their petition to “the officer of the Sublime Porte,” that is the *wali* Ratib Pasha who was sent by the Sultan in 1893 (and remained until 1908) to investigate these abuses.[33] They also forwarded a copy of their petition to other powers, both tribal and foreign, like the British consul in Jeddah. By taking their grievances to non-Ottoman powers, the petitioners explained that they did so, in order that “no responsibility may be attached to [them] in case anything should happen after [their] exile.”[34] In the case of their message the British consul, the aggrieved Hashemites also clarified in their contact with the British

[32] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

[33] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

[34] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

representative that they had "written this to Your Honor [the consul] in testimony of [their] obedience to the Commander of the Faithful." They perhaps feared that their loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan may be questioned or that they be accused of inviting foreign intervention, thus violating the Hamidian compromise. They went on to explain that they did not want to be accused of any public disturbance after their self-exiles, and thus they desired to inform the foreign consul of their condition and objectives.[35] By including foreign powers as recipients to their petition, the aggrieved Hashemites revealed their dire state. To take such a drastic move by potentially involving a foreign power within strategic Ottoman interests had cost the 'Awn household the Amirate less than fifteen years prior. This move on the part of Sharif 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah, and indirectly Sharif Husayn, revealed the extent to which members of the 'Awn feared 'Awn al-Rafiq's efforts to lessen their prestige.

While the petitioners were desperate enough to appeal implicitly to non-Ottoman actors in their request for relief against their relative's depredations, they nonetheless made their appeals within the prevailing Ottoman framework. In that way, the petition is a remarkable testament of the usefulness of the Hamidian order to the abused Hashemites. Indeed, the petition itself was a response to the Sultan sending Ratib Pasha to investigate the complaints--perhaps at the request of Sharif Husayn who was in Istanbul at the time of the petition. Although not addressing the Sultan directly, since it was written for Ratib Pasha, it nonetheless couched itself along the Hamidian discourse by appealing to the goodwill of the Sultan for relief of their abuses in his capacity as the protector of Muslims. That is, they appealed to Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's pan-Islamic agenda as the sole protector of Muslims and as caliph. Referring to the Sultan as the "Commander of the

[35] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

Faithful" (a term that often referred to the caliph and was used to describe the earliest Muslim caliphs), the signatories trusted that he would be "favourably inclined towards the children of the Great Prophet," suggesting his duty as Caliph to protect the Hashemites.[36] In fact, they reminded Ratib Pasha that he was sent to the region in order to fulfill the Sultan's responsibility of preserving "blessing and peace" in the Hijaz, an illusion to the Sultan's title as the Servitor of the Two Holy Cities.[37]

Petition's Aftermath

Ultimately, the appeals made to both Ottoman and foreign actors appeared ineffective to restrain Amir 'Awn al-Rafiq. Overall, his tenure as Amir was marked by the continued aggrandizements of his authority vis-a-vis other members of the 'Awn household while simultaneously never upending the Hamidian order. Even though Ratib Pasha, the addressed recipient of the petition, arrived to investigate the 'Awn complaints--perhaps even on the insistence of Sharif Husayn in Istanbul--he quickly formed a mutually beneficial relationship with the Amir. From 1893 until 'Awn al-Rafiq's death, Ratib Pasha served as the appointed *wali*. As a testament to his efficacy and ability, he even continued to serve as the *wali* even after 'Awn al-Rafiq's death through the short tenure of 'Awn al-Rafiq's successor, his nephew 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah. (The conditions of his appointment will be discussed in detail below.) Ratib Pasha lost his post during the 1908 constitutional revolution that swept the empire into a frenzy of reforms that even cost 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah his seat as Amir in November 1908.

[36] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].
[37] TNA: Jeddah to Constantinople, 27 January 1893, enclosing copy of petition, and further letter to British consul [FO 78/4493].

A few observations allow us to suspect that ‘Awn al-Rafiq continued the expansion of his authority and prestige as much as possible, at the expense of his relatives. First, throughout the length of his tenure, Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali never returned to the Hijaz, residing instead in Istanbul where he cultivated relations through both marriage and political appointments among exiled ‘Awn and the Ottoman elite. Moreover, ‘Awn al-Rafiq also continued to take steps to diminish his relatives. In 1899, for instance, the British consul reported that Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq had issued a proclamation in which he forbade “the title of Seyid in all the district comprising Mecca and Jeddah.”[38] The consul rightly reported that the title, bestowed upon those who claim to be descendants of Muhammad, was largely symbolic in the Islamic world, where he estimated at least a quarter of a million who probably hold “this designation, which confers no special right nor distinction but merely involves a claim upon other Moslem’s regard.”[39] Even then, the title was not universally used. He wrote that even the *wali* and his aide claimed such an honorific, but did not actively employ it.

Despite what he felt was an impractical order, one that at most will only attract criticism from Muslims worldwide and perhaps confusion, the consul alluded to the fact that such a regulation mollified ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s specific interests. He surmised that

> Perhaps the Grand Sherif thinks that the too wide distribution of descent from the Prophet weakens his authority or rather his particular distinction; one need not necessarily believe that His Highness has sometimes taken such violent measures as to inflict punishment upon some ill advised Seyid who has avowed himself as such in presence of the ‘Emaret [Amirate].’[40]

[38] TNA: Consul Dewey, Jeddah to Amb N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, No. 10, 1 February 1899 [FO 195/2061].

[39] TNA: Consul Dewey, Jeddah to Amb N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, No. 10, 1 February 1899 [FO 195/2061].

[40] TNA: Consul Dewey, Jeddah to Amb N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, No. 10, 1 February 1899 [FO 195/2061].

This analysis is entirely accurate. Although a different consul in 1899, he alluded to the 1893 petition by remarking that ‘Awn al-Rafiq had a history of physically abusing those he deemed as a threat to his authority rooted as it was on claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad by limiting titles that indicated such lineage. Such an observation mirrored the interests and attitudes that had led to the exile of his relatives years before. Still seeking to lay claim to an exclusive claim to authority, ‘Awn al-Rafiq continued to take measures to augment his standing at the expense of his relatives.

For that reason, it is unsurprising to find that among the many charges levelled against ‘Awn al-Rafiq by a British report describing his unpopularity in the region, that it listed his policy of granting “various small monopolies or levy of duties...from time to time to certain of his favourites….”[41] These sources of wealth and influence were given at the detriment of those who possessed “hereditary rights to receive presents & have the charge of shrines or places of pilgrimage,” that is other Hashemite members of the ‘Awn household whose members’ standing were a function of those sources of influence.[42] Similar to the charges in the 1893 petition, these “valuable benefices” were “assigned to men of no special merit or qualifications solely by the arbitration of His Highness.”[43] Among all the traits associated with ‘Awn al-Rafiq--his oppression, his authoritarianism, and his conflicts with tribes in the region--we must add the abuses aimed at his own relatives, committed in an effort to weaken them and to affect a change to the succession patterns in the ‘Awn household.

---

[41] TNA: Dewey, Jeddah transmitting Report on the Administrative and Economic state of the Hejaz, for the months March to June 1905 [FO 195/2198].

[42] TNA: Dewey, Jeddah transmitting Report on the Administrative and Economic state of the Hejaz, for the months March to June 1905 [FO 195/2198].

[43] TNA: Dewey, Jeddah transmitting Report on the Administrative and Economic state of the Hejaz, for the months March to June 1905 [FO 195/2198].

1905 Succession Crisis and the Triumph of Ottoman Interests

Husayn's Place Among the 'Awn

Sharif Husayn was the eldest son of 'Ali ibn Muhammad and his mother was from a Yemeni tribe. He was born in Istanbul in 1853 when his household was temporarily deposed for the first time from the Amirate of Mecca by the re-appointment of Sharif 'Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib (r. 1851-1856; 1880-1882) of the Zayd household.[44] His household's exile was short-lived, however, once his grandfather returned to Mecca in 1856 as Amir. At this point, Husayn's father moved his family to Mecca. When his uncle, 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad, became the new Amir of Mecca in 1858, Husayn's father left for Istanbul, which became the custom of all the Amirs-in-waiting. Husayn remained Mecca, under the care of his uncle and aunts, visiting Istanbul in 1870 when his father fell ill and then died.[45] With his father's death, Sharif Husayn returned to Mecca to ingratiate himself with his uncle, 'Abdullah, who was then the Amir of Mecca. Sharif Husayn was fully incorporated into his uncle's household. Historians have noted that he often acted as his uncle's agent to the neighboring tribes of Mecca, among whom he had lived as a child.[46] In addition, his first wife, whom he married sometime around 1879, was Sharifa 'Abadiyya (d.1886), the elder daughter of 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad who was the second 'Awn Amir of Mecca from 1858-1876. By her, he had his first three sons ('Ali, 'Abdullah, and Faysal) in Mecca. Before her

---

[44] Randall Baker, *King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz* (Cambridge: Oleander Press, 1989), 6; Khalid. Subul, *al-Hashimiyun: min hukm al-imarah al-'Uthmaniyah ilá ta'sis al-mamalik al-'Arabiyah*, al-Tab'ah al-'Arabiyah 1., Tarikh ('Amman: al-Ahliyah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi', 2011), 68.

[45] "King Husayn" in Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli, *al- 'Alam*, vol. 2 (Beirut, Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malayyin, 2002), 249-250; For an extensive Arabic biography see Nidal Dawud al-Mumini, *al-Sharif al-Husayn ibn 'Ali wa al-khilafah* ('Amman: al-Matba'ah as-Safadi, 1996).

[46] Subul, *al-Hashimiyun*, 68.

death, he also took on another wife in 1882, Sharifa Khadija Khanum (d. 1921), who was his uncle's granddaughter.[47] Based on these contours of Sharif Husayn's life, he lived a "Meccan" life fully involved with his household's interests in the region until 1891 when his other, younger uncle, 'Awn al-Rafiq, forced him and other 'Awn Hashemites to leave for exile to Istanbul, where he then cultivate the necessary Ottoman elite networks to ensure his eventual succession as the Amir of Mecca.[48]

Given the fact that Sharif Husayn's father died before ever being appointed as the Amir of Mecca and the fact that he was integrated within his uncle's family, it is not clear where Sharif Husayn would have fallen in the 'Awn succession pattern. Because of his association with his uncle's family, he would have presumably have been grafted into the line of succession with his cousins, one of whom, 'Ali, became his protector against their uncle 'Awn al-Rafiq and eventually became his rival for the Amirate of Mecca in 1905. Because of his precarious, indeterminate place within the line of 'Awn Amirs, any steps by 'Awn al-Rafiq to weaken his relatives standing within the Hamidian-'Awn matrix in favor for his own sons would have meant total exclusion for Sharif Husayn. The threat was not limited to Sharif Husayn, however, but affected the entire 'Awn household, including 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah and the last 'Awn scion, 'Abd al-Ilah. The contours of this intra-clan dynamics erupted in 1893 when Amir 'Awn al-Rafiq's actions led to the expulsion of members of his own family to Istanbul and to a unique petition outlining his crimes and calling for Sultanic assistance.

---

[47] Christopher Buyers, "Hijaz Al-Hashimi Dynasty Genealogy," The Royal Ark: Royal and Ruling Houses of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas, accessed January 7, 2018, http://www.royalark.net/Arabia/hijaz1.htm.

[48] The year 1891 comes from the memoirs of comes from Sharif Husayn's son, 'Abdullah. See 'Abdullah Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti* (Amman: Maktabah al-Ahliyya, 1998), 16. Other scholars, basing their dates on the eruption of the intra-'Awn conflict that led to a petition, have selected the date of the petition, 1893, as the year of Husayn's exile. As will be discussed, I believe the discrepancy exists because Husayn left for Istanbul in 1891 before the petition since he was not a signatory.

The impending succession crisis reached its culmination following the death of ‘Awn al-Rafiq on July 17, 1905. Despite his best efforts, however, Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq could not ensure that his son, Muhammad Abd al-Aziz, succeeded him, as I believe was his intention from his many attempts to diminish his relatives that had led many of them to flee the region. In the proper line of succession, after ‘Awn al-Rafiq, the next in line for the Amirate of Mecca was ‘Abd al-Ilah, the last son of the ‘Awn household’s founder. After him, succession would begin to fall on a next generation by necessity. If age were to be taken into consideration, such as the Ottoman sultanate’s agnatic succession plans, it was expected that Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali claimed the right to succeed ‘Abd al-Ilah.[49] In terms of age, Sharif Husayn was considered to be one of the older grandsons in the ‘Awn household, being six years older than his cousin, ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah, who was rightly considered next in line after Husayn. After Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq passed, however, the succession scheme was circumvented with the Amirate passing over the next two claimants and landing on ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah. The appointment of ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah, however, represented more than a usurpation of the expected ‘Awn dynastic plan. Assisted by the Ottoman *vali*, Ratib Pasha, his appointment represented the triumph of local Ottoman state interests against intra-‘Awn dynastic plans and even the sultantic preferences of Abdul Hamid.

Sharif ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah eventually returned to Mecca (when exactly after the 1893 petition, which he signed and perhaps even authored, is not clear).[50] His relationship with Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq, however, appeared tense in consular reports, given that he was frequently called to settle tribal disputes--often instigated by the Amir--and was a vocal critic of his uncle’s policies in

[49] TNA: Dewey, Jeddah to N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, 18 August 1905 [FO 195/2198].

[50] It is perceivable that ‘Ali never left the region, but only absented himself from Mecca, perhaps taking refuge in Jeddah or Ta‘if.

regards to members of the ‘Awn household. Because European consular officials in the region sought to ensure the safety of their Muslim colonial subjects visiting the region, they often judged the efficacy of the local authorities, both the *wali* and the Amir, in terms of the number of tribal disturbances. In that regard, as Amir, ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s tenure was marked by a volatile tribal landscape that he proved unable to manage alone. For that reason, Ratib Pasha, the *wali*, frequently resorted to ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah, “who ha[d] great influence over the Bedouins.”[51] From these consular reports, Sharif ‘Ali was often recognized as the most successful in managing the nomadic tribesmen among both Ottoman and European officials in the region.

Despite being useful to the Ottoman *vali*, the relationship between Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq and Sharif ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah did not appear to be cordial. Rather, just as in 1893, Sharif ‘Ali often intervened against the Amir in matters involving the ‘Awn household. As ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s health rapidly deteriorated in 1905, a dispute arose between Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq and the “sons of Sherif Hear” who lived around Taif in late May-early June.[52] Being from a different family grouping within the ‘Awn household, hundreds of relatives and dependents were caught up in the conflict with Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq. In response, Sharif ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah had protested strongly against the Amir’s order to arrest these members of the ‘Awn household. Amir ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s aide, nevertheless attempted to carry out the order. Consequently, he faced violence and a gunshot

[51] TNA: “Report on the Economic and Administrative State of the Hejaz for the four months January to April, 1904,” 17 June 1904 [FO 195/2174].

[52] TNA: Devey, Jeddah to N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, 26 May 1905 [FO 195/2198].

wound.[53] The conflict among the ‘Awn eventually devolved into a Bedouin insurrection “or attack upon Mecca” that presumably required ‘Ali’s intervention[54]

The antagonistic policies of ‘Awn al-Rafiq towards the tribesmen around Mecca and even among his own relatives made the Amir a source of instability and a liability. Because of his role in mitigating or at least challenging the Amir at the behest of the Ottoman *wali*, Sharif ‘Ali Ibn ‘Abdullah was well placed locally to be a contender for the Amirate of Mecca following ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s death in July 1905. As such, the peculiarity of ‘Ali’s eventual appointment, which disrupted the expected ‘Awn succession, represented the triumph of regional Ottoman interests (marked by the *wali*) in the Amirate of Mecca. For one, as discussed below, ‘Ali’s appointment in 1905 did not receive the Sultan’s formal recognition until 1908, meaning his standing rested on the intervention and authority of the local Ottoman authorities--and not the Sultan. For this reason, Ottoman imperial intersts now went beyond the dueling Hashemite households to affect the intra-‘Awn household politics.

The details of ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah’s appointment highlight the pecularity and exception of his appointment. When ‘Awn al-Rafiq died, *Wali* Ratib Pasha temporarily appointed ‘Ali as acting Amir of Mecca until his uncle, ‘Abd al-Ilah, arrived from Istanbul to take up the post.[55] Meanwhile, in the imperial capital, a competition took place between the ‘Awn claimants and Sharif ‘Ali Haydar of the Zayd clan. The competition, preserved in the memoirs of the leading Zayd figure, ‘Ali Haydar, were fraught with allegations of ‘Ali bribing the Ottoman *wali* and the

[53] TNA: Devey, Jeddah to N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, “Report on the Administrative and Economic State of the Hejaz, for the months March to June 1905,” 19 July 1905 [FO 195/2198].

[54]TNA: Devey, Jeddah to N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, “Report on the Administrative and Economic State of the Hejaz, for the months March to June 1905,” 19 July 1905 [FO 195/2198].

[55] TNA: Devey, Jeddah to N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, 20 July 1905 [FO 195/2198].

Sultan, but also offered an account of the unsettled nature of ‘Ali’s appointment that distressed the other, arguably more rightful ‘Awn claimants.[56] In his telling, as both Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah and Husayn lobbied for the Amirate, ‘Ali Haydar relied on the help of the Sultan’s astrologer with whom he was a friend and to inform him of the internal deliberations. He described how concerning the next appointment, “no decision was forthcoming from the Palace,” but that in a meeting with the court astrologer, he recalled how the appearance of a divide between those in the Sublime Porte who supported ‘Abd al-Ilah, who was the rightful heir to succeed his brother, and a party that supported Ratib Pasha’s advocacy for ‘Ali.[57]

Of course, ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah was appointed to both ‘Ali Haydar’s and Sharif Husayn’s chagrin. In his telling, ‘Ali Haydar described how Husayn had “expressed his regret” that ‘Abd al-Ilah had been unsuccessful against ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah. He then allegedly told ‘Ali Haydar that “I will strive my hardest to overthrow ‘Ali and destroy the power of Ratib Pasha.”[58] His version of Sharif Husayn’s reaction was undoubtedly biased against Husayn, who he suggesting had harbored in 1905, a desire to challenge both his family and an Ottoman authority (suspiciously resembling some of the contours of the 1916 Arab Revolt). Regardless, ‘Ali Haydar alluded to a rift appearing between the two cousins that later culminated when Sharif Husayn arrived to Mecca in 1908 to succeed his deposed cousin.

The eventual appointment of ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah to the Amirate of Mecca in 1905 disclosed more than just a succession dispute. His selection revealed that even though the ‘Awn could feel confident in their monopoly to the Amirate of Mecca, their appointment did not rest on the internal

[56] Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 93–94.

[57] Stitt, 93.

[58] Stitt, 94.

decisions of ‘Awn succession, but still, ultimately, could be circumvented on the wishes and preferences of the Ottoman Sultan and his agents. Sharif ‘Ali Haydar’s description of the role of Ratib Pasha to ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah’s appointment was no exaggeration. Even British observers noted the strong appeal Ratib Pasha had for ‘Ali because of the fact that he had proven dependable in managing the tribes. The prevailing British consular opinion of ‘Ali was exceedingly positive, though not dismissive of any of the other ‘Awn candidates.[59] While temporarily appointed, ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah was according to the British consul in Jeddah “fully qualified,” that in terms of “his practical experience and high influence in” the Hijaz, “the charge of the Sherifate is certainly in good hands: for the present all good things are expected from ‘Ali Pasha’s sense of justice & established consideration....”[60] ‘Ali’s credentials were ultimately judged by his reputation managing the tribesmen, which had predated ‘Awn al-Rafiq’s death, and was an advantage for the Ottoman *wali* who pushed for his appointment.[61] Rumors in fact circulated that when Ratib Pasha heard that ‘Abd al-Ilah would be appointed and was leaving Istanbul for Mecca, he threatened to resign.[62]

Sharif ‘Ali’s appointment was peculiar more than just disrupting succession, but also because he only received formal sultanic approval in April 1908--nearly three years after his “temporary” appointment by Ratib Pasha.[63] In fact, for the remainder of the year, confusion prevailed on the point as to when the Sultan would provide his formal investiture to Sharif ‘Ali.

---

[59] For Devey, however, the prospect of a Zayd appointment in the person of Sharif ‘Ali Hadyar was not imaginable. In his appraisal: “It is unlikely that a reversion to the house of Motallib would be made without much opposition & sedition.” TNA: Devey, Jeddah to N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, 18 August 1905 [FO 195/2198].

[60] TNA: Devey, Jeddah to N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, 20 July 1905 [FO 195/2198]; TNA: Devey, Jeddah to N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, 26 July 1905 [FO 195/2198].

[61] TNA: “Haj Report for 1905-1906” 19 September 1906 [FO 195/2224].

[62] TNA: Devey, Jeddah to N.R. O’Conor, Constantinople, 18 August 1905 [FO 195/2198].

[63] TNA: Monahan, Jeddah to Embassy, 9 April 1908 [FO 195/2286].

In October, it was reported that the *wali* was coming to Mecca to read the two firmans, but it still had not arrived. Then, it was suspected that it would be formalized ceremonially when Sultan Abdul Hamid celebrated his thirtieth anniversary as Sultan. When that date passed, it was reported that the investiture would arrive as part of the Sultan's birthday. Finally, it was suggested that it would arrive by the Syrian *mahmal*--pilgrimage caravan. The fact that "Amir" 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah had to wait three years for the formal investiture, only confirmed the oddity of his appointment. As essentially the vali's appointee, instead of the Sultan's, he was a pragmatic choice over the dynastic policies of the 'Awn household. Furthermore, both 'Abd al-Ilah and Husayn still resided in Istanbul among the Sultan's inner circle of advisors. The fact that 'Ali had usurped their rightful place in 'Awn dynastic succession presumably accounted for the Sultan's deferment of formal investiture.

Revolution and a Deposed Amir

A constitutional revolution initiated by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP or "Unionists") reached the Hijaz in August 1908, precipitating a series of events and decisions that deposed Amir 'Ali from his post. After the unexpected death of the newly appointed Amir, the now aged 'Abd al-Ilah, Sharif Husayn inherited the mantle of Amir of Mecca at the behest of the Sultan. The circumstances that led to 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah's deposition, however, were unprecedented in the history of the Amirate of Mecca. During the course of the 19th century, the Amirs were periodically deposed and replaced by a member of a rival Hashemite household. With the deposition of 'Ali and the appointment of Sharif Husayn, two members of the same household succeeded the other, but not through a death but rather through the removal from office of the former. More than providing a vacancy for Sharif Husayn to fill, the deposition of 'Ali reveals yet

again the changing landscape of the Amirate of Mecca and the circumstances for further political evolution of the ‘Awn household. Further, discussed in the next chapter, the experiences of witnessing a relative, even one who had usurped his own rights to succession, left an indelible mark on Sharif Husayn for whom loyalty to the traditional Sunni governance of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid had been a defining trait of the ‘Awn household. With the effects of the 1908 Revolution, a group of army officers proved capable of undermining an appointment of the Sultan-Caliph to a sacred post reserved to the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad who had pledged themselves solely to the caliph.

In the late summer of 1908, Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II, after thirty-two years of rule, faced a *coup d'etat* led by career army officers who formed the Committee of Union and Progress. Two officers in particular, Enver and Jamal Pasha, became the military leaders of the CUP. These reformers, frustrated by the weakness of the empire, held the Sultan’s absolutism as responsible and thus called for the restoration of the Ottoman constitution.[64] Beginning in Macedonia, the demonstrations incited by the CUP spread throughout the Empire. Protesting the Sultan’s policies, the CUP, led by a cohort of army officers, staged massed demonstrations throughout the country. A credit to the strength of the movement, on July 23rd and 24th, 1908, Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid finally issued an imperial decree calling for the restoration of the 1876 constitution and for parliamentary elections. Elites representing minority populations were among those that celebrated the CUP and its constitutional revolution. Armenian, Jewish, and Arab intellectuals celebrated the revolution, and even joined the CUP, believing that parliamentary governance

[64] For a more historical account of the CUP, see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908* (Oxford University Press, 2001); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2010).

would offered them protection against Hamidian politics, which increasingly became violent.[65] Amid the political reforms, like restoring the parliament that would place a check on the powers of the Sultan, the CUP's call for reforms also affected the Amirate of Mecca. Consequently, the appeal of the CUP affected a region often deemed shielded to such political developments by its peripheral location and the tribal demographics of its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the 1908 Revolution even touched the region's two most significant political actors, the Ottoman *wali* and Amir 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah, just months before the annual Muslim pilgrimage.

Amir 'Ali had been the Grand Sharif for barely three years when the Revolution took place, and the restoration of the constitution immediately provoked the ire of both the Amir and the Ottoman *wali*. A broken British telegraph cable delayed the arrival of the news of the revolution to Jeddah and the rest of the Hijaz, but on August 1, 1908, the post arrived with announcements of the restored constitution that "produced an effect of great surprise on the public."[66] The next day, proclamations were posted, and the people began discussing the upcoming elections.[67] At the time the proclamation reached the region, the Grand Sharif was still in his summer residence in Taif while *Wali* Ratib Pasha had been in Mecca. According to British consular reports, both figures refused to acknowledge the revolution so that by August 18th, the "re-establishment of constitutional Government [sic] in Turkey was not publicly proclaimed by the authorities at Mecca

[65] For an insightful analysis of minority responses to the revolution—and their eventual disappointment—see Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford University Press, 2014).

[66] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 7 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

[67] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 7 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

and Taif."[68] In fact, in the case of the Grand Sharif, he took active measures to stifle the news. Any men "found talking of Constitution and freedom were flogged" at his order.[69]

Amir 'Ali's public and dramatic refusal to acknowledge the constitutional revolution set in motion the events that ultimately led to both his and the Vali's dismissal from their respective posts. The floggings catalyzed a group of military officers to form their own "Committee of Union and Progress" in Mecca on August 19th "after discussing the attitude of the local civil authorities," which meant the *wali* and the Amir.[70] Gathering a large crowd, the local CUP party made a "public declaration of the grant of constitution," and then made a sort of pilgrimage to the cemetery where Midhat Pasha, a champion of the constitution in 1876, was buried. They then proceeded to the prison, where Midhat Pasha had died in 1883, and released all the "political prisoners" in an act of political solidarity. From there, they entered the military barracks in Taif to have all the soldiers make an oath to the constitution.[71]

At the barracks and in the midst of a crowd, the CUP-inclined military officers forced Amir 'Ali to publicly endorse the constitution. In a theatrical showing, the ad hoc Committee of Union and Progress staged an elaborate display for the Amir, to drive the point that the revolution eroded the socio-political privileges that underpinned the Hamidian regime from which he, the Hashemite Amir of Mecca, had benefited. According to the British observer,

> The Grand Sherif first hesitated to comply with the request of the people [that is, to come to the barracks] but finding that resistance on his part would be futile, he came

[68] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 7 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

[69] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 7 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

[70] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 7 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

[71] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 7 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

> down from his house and went to the barracks, where he was made to stand by the side of 3 men picked out from the crowd (a slave a Bedouin and an ordinary soldier [sic]) and was asked whether he considered there was any difference before law between him and the three men, who were standing with him. His reply was no.[72]

The show ended with Amir 'Ali taking an oath on the Quran that he would follow the constitution and that he would abandon "all the illegal practices" of his predecessor, Amir 'Awn al-Rafiq.[73] In effect, 'Ali seemingly abrogated the Hamidian compromise--although under duress.

Amir 'Ali's actions saved him from dismissal for the time being. For Ratib Pasha, however, the Hijazi CUP was less forgiving. Perhaps because of his association with two Amirs ('Awn al-Rafiq and 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah) and the corrupt practices associated with their rule, or because Amir 'Ali had alleged that the *wali* had in fact actually governed the region and was responsible for any oppressive practices against his own protests, Ratib Pasha became the next target.[74] As a result, two days after coercing the Amir of Mecca to take an oath on the Quran, on August 21st, military officers and soldiers went to the Government House in Mecca to approach the *wali*. Led by a disgruntled moneychanger resentful of Ratib Pasha (who he alleged had "disgraced" him), armed soldiers arrested the *wali* and his private secretary. In addition, they also arrested his personal banker after confiscating all personal assets of the Ottoman *wali*.[75] The next morning, the remaining government officials "were given [an] oath to serve faithfully the new

[72] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 25 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

[73] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 25 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

[74] Importantly, in the British report, Amir Ali defended his actions saying that the Vali, Ahmad Ratib Pasha, "obliged him" to continue the illegal actions since his protests to the Sultan went unheeded. See TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 25 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

[75] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 25 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

Government," and the British consul described that a "still great excitement prevailed in the town."[76]

With the arrest and dismissal of the Ottoman *wali*, the Hijaz entered a period of significant changes--both in terms of its legal and its administrative culture. Judging from the sorts of reforms being implemented, it became clear that the local upstart Committee of Union and Progress balanced the ideals of the revolution with the reality that the yearly *hajj* (scheduled for January 1-5, 1909). The initial reforms resolved longstanding complaints pertaining to the treatment of pilgrims. The regional administration limited the taxes levied on pilgrims, lowered the costs of renting camels, and it removed the regulations pertaining to the hiring of pilgrim guides--all activities that had been a significant source of revenue for the Sharifian administration and a source of his independent wealth and influence.[77] Consequently, these reforms took place with a quiet and inactive Amir 'Ali residing in Taif. By the end of September, the new *wali*, Kazim Pasha, arrived to Jeddah.

The new *wali* represented a clear, direct challenge to the now-isolated Amir. Kazim Pasha, according to reports, had been the director of the construction of the Hijaz railway, which by 1908 had connected Damascus to Medina. The railway, while promising to aid in the transportation of pilgrims, also embodied the incremental encroachment of the centralizing Ottoman state.[78] That is, as the railway inched closer to the holy cities, so too did telegraphs, troops, and administrators, culminating in an ever-closer administration by the Sultan and his government in Istanbul. Thus,

[76] TNA: Jeddah to HM Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople, 25 August 1908, as to public response in Jeddah [FO 195/2286].

[77] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 22 September 1908 [FO 195/2286].

[78] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, enclosed "Hajj Report for the year 1908-1909," 21 May 1909 [FO 195/2320].

his selection to succeed the previous *wali* represented more than just a pragmatic choice of an official familiar with a region, but also indicated a sea change from the autonomy hitherto enjoyed by those administering the Hijaz--the so-called "old school" that included the Amirs of Mecca who governed the region based on their loyalty to the caliph.[79] For that reason, the first order of business of the new *wali* was to address the obstinate Amir, who had yet to leave Taif to meet him.[80] Kazim Pasha arrived to Jeddah on September 26th, and went to Mecca in order to summon Amir 'Ali to meet him. 'Ali never met him, however, since "he made repeated excuse[s]...." to justify his inability to come to Mecca.[81] The consequences of his actions were not lost to British observers, who believed that the Amir's "return to Mecca may mean his reconciliation with the Government," and thus an acceptance of the status quo.[82] In response to 'Ali's refusal to leave Taif, Kazim Pasha reportedly contacted Istanbul to depose the Amir.[83] As the new *wali* waited for a decision from Istanbul, he proceeded to enact more revolutionary reforms, including overseeing the election of members of parliament to represent Jeddah and Mecca, as called for by the restored constitution.[84]

It is difficult to discern the sequence of events leading up to the dismissal of Amir 'Ali and the short appointment of Sharif 'Abd al-Ilah, his uncle. It seems clear, however, that the authorities in Istanbul (including the Sultan) did not actively communicate their progress to the Hijazi

---

[79] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, enclosed "Hajj Report for the year 1908-1909," 21 May 1909 [FO 195/2320].

[80] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 5 November 1908 [FO 195/2286]

[81] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, enclosed "Hajj Report for the year 1908-1909," 21 May 1909 [FO 195/2320].

[82] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 5 November 1908 [FO 195/2286]

[83] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, enclosed "Hajj Report for the year 1908-1909," 21 May 1909 [FO 195/2320].

[84] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 148.

authorities, the *wali*, or foreign consuls of their deliberations in replacing the current Amir. For instance, as late as November 5, 1908, British reports in Jeddah continued to refer to Amir ‘Ali as the Amir and reported his apparent dissatisfaction with administrative changes taking place in the Hijaz that threatened his standing.[85] Likewise, these same reports noted that Kazim Pasha continued to make repeated attempts to reconcile with the Grand Sharif.[86]

As a result, we do not know exactly when the Sultan appointed Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah the new Amir of Mecca. It is generally accepted that ‘Abd al-Ilah had been appointed Amir for only a few days before his death. Since the Turkish newspaper, *Tanin*, reported his appointment on October 26, and he died the next day, ‘Abd al-Ilah must have been appointed around October 24th or 25th.[87] The limited evidence of his short appointment, since a formal investiture has yet to be found, suggests that Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah died before he formally took the office.[88] Adding to these rapid events, immediately following his uncle’s unexpected death, Sharif Husayn’s son ‘Abdullah began the process of lobbying for his father to succeed ‘Abd al-Ilah.

---

[85] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 5 November 1908 [FO 195/2286]

[86] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 5 November 1908 [FO 195/2286]

[87] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 148.

[88] See Footnote number 19 in Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (University of California Press, 1997), Chapter 5. Kayalı believes, because of his inability to locate a formal irade of investiture for ‘Abd al-Ilah, that he must have died shortly after his appointment to have been formally invested. The date of his death is also unclear, but the date provided comes from İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Ashraf Makkat Al-Mukarramah Wa-Umara’iha Fi Al-‘ahd Al-‘Uthmani*, trans. Khalil ‘Ali Murad (Beirut: al-Dar al-‘Arabiyah lil-Mawsu‘at, 2003), 227. He gives the Hijri date as 2 Shawwal 1326, but unfortunately provides a contradicting Gregorian date. I use the Hijri date, since it is believed that ‘Abd al-Ilah died very shortly after his death, and the *Tanin* newspaper reported that ‘Abd al-Ilah as the new Amir on October 26, 1908. In this timeline, the Amir died the next day after the announcement but before his formal investiture.

Zayd or ‘Awn?: Deciphering ‘Abd al-Hamid’s Appointment

The brief appointment of ‘Abd al-Ilah, albeit never formalized, provides a glimpse into the strategic considerations of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II as he promoted a pan-Islamic vision for his empire. Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah did not represent a revolutionary choice despite the revolutionary mood permeating the empire. A well-known figure within the ‘Awn household, he was the agent for his brothers, the late-Amirs ‘Abdullah and Husayn, and was appointed by the Ottoman *wali* to be the acting-Amir until his older brother, ‘Awn al-Rafiq, was formally appointed. As discussed in the previous chapter, Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah represented the Hamidian political element of Ottoman society that emphasized loyalty and a style of administration that rested on patronage. By taking these traits together, ‘Abd al-Ilah represented a safe, conservative choice for Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid during a moment of uncertainty--both in terms of his own rule and also the direction of the empire. Moreover, his appointment corrected for the usurpation of his nephew’s appointment by restoring the traditional succession pattern of the ‘Awn household. Considering Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s preference for ‘Abd al-Ilah, it is unsurprising that he replaced him with Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali following the aged ‘Abd al-Ilah’s unexpected death. Sharif Husayn, as the oldest grandson of his household’s founder, represented dynastic stability and, more importantly, an expected continuation of the Hamidian compromise to which the ‘Awn conceded.

Sharif Husayn: The "Arab Hamidian"

More than just a political loyalist, however, Sharif Husayn also represented a class of Arab leaders that we can dub as Arab Hamidians: these are Arab-identifying officials, who were enculturated in the Ottoman system to serve the Caliph and who had comprised Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's pan-Islamic program. For 'Abd al-Hamid, as his political program sought to consolidate his standing with the remaining Muslim subjects, now that the state was becoming increasingly Muslim demographically with the loss of Christian-heavy Balkan regions and Egypt, it was logical to look towards the Arabs as the second largest Muslim ethnic group as partners in the protection of the Ottoman state. Not only could their territories replace the revenue loss from territorial erosion, but also "their inclusion in the bureaucracy must be interpreted as conspicuous elements in 'Abdülhamid's strategy to create a viable basis for the unification of the Ottoman population," based on Islamic unity.[89] Besides the increased Arab participation in the state bureaucracy (even being prominent among the Sultan's closest advisers), the administration, and the army, the state necessarily expanded schools and educational opportunities in the Arab regions of the empire. These schools provided the necessary skills and language training (Turkish) for Arab full-participation in the state's offices. Likewise, as discussed by Eugene Rogan when examining the tribal school (*aşiret mektebi*) that the Sultan founded in 1892 for Arab and Kurd tribesmen, "the tribal-school experiment can thus be seen as an instrument to advance the state-sanctioned supranational identities of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism among the marginal communities inhabiting the frontiers of its Arab and Antaloian provinces."[90] Far from a policy of indoctrination

[89] Engin Deniz Akarli, "Abdülhamid II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social, and Economic Transformation*, by David Kushner (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1986), 80.

[90] Eugene L. Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi: Abdülhamid II's School for Tribes (1892–1907)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 01 (February 1996): 83.

meant to eliminate linguistic or ethnic differences, however, Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid’s policy aimed to locate and incorporate Muslim notables from the provinces--tying them through Islam--to use their influence “to legitimize and strengthen the attachment of the common folk to the state and to keep them from unbecoming behavior.”[91] For these notables to act as a sort of bridge between the state and the “common folk,” they had to be trained and incorporated into the elite circles of Ottoman politics yet maintain the identify-markers of their constituents. For the ‘Awn household, they became the intermediaries for the Hijaz, which necessitated they be simultaneously part of the Ottoman Turkish elite and the Arab Hijaz.

Sharif Husayn was born at the time of ‘Awn ascendancy to the Amirate of Mecca, despite some temporary challenges from the Zayd clan. His life bridged the period before and after the Hamidian period at which time the ‘Awn solidified their control over the Amirate. As a result, Sharif Husayn was firmly entrenched within the Ottoman order that had employed the inter-clan rivalry to its advantage. Since he was from the ‘Awn clan which dominated the Amirate of Mecca for most of the 19th century, he and his Zaydi cousin, Sharif ‘Ali Haydar, differed in terms of upbringing. Whereas the Hashemite rivalry alienated Sharif ‘Ali Haydar, as a member of the Zayd clan, from the Hijaz, for Sharif Husayn, in contrast, he was raised almost entirely in the conservative Hamidian milieu of Mecca. As such, it is not surprising to find that Husayn aligned himself with the values of Ottoman society that characterized the Hamidian period: loyalty to the Sultan being primarily as Caliph and the cultivation of Arab Muslim loyalty. When seeking to analyze the specifics of Sharif Husayn’s political ideology in 1908, the lacuna of his personal writings poses an obstacle for historians. Unlike Sharif ‘Ali Haydar, whose political ideology will be discussed below, Sharif Husayn never wrote a memoir or an autobiography. Our sources for

[91] Akarli, “Abdülhamid II’s Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System,” 81.

his life, upbringing, and attitudes come from histories by contemporaries who knew him, his son's memoirs, and from British sources fascinated by his identity as Amir of Mecca and a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad. His son's memoir in particular provides a glimpse into how Husayn defined himself as an Arab notable under the Hamidian rubric through his life in Istanbul and how he sought to train his sons. Moreover, since his personal loyalty was not to the Ottoman system, per se, but to Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid, his identity was more specifically described as an "Arab Hamidian."

Husayn spent his formative youth in Mecca under the care and direction of his uncle, but once he was exiled to Istanbul in 1891, he began to cultivate ties among the Ottoman Turkish elite. Perhaps realizing his influence among the 'Awn, Sultan Abdul Hamid had welcomed Husayn to the capital by providing him a newly built, furnished home on the Bosphorus.[92] By invitation from the Sultan, he had even served in the Sultan's "privy council" (*Shura al-Dawla*), thereby joining the inner political circle of ministers and advisers to 'Abd al-Hamid.[93] His subsequent marriages likewise reflected his ties to the elite politics of Istanbul. In 1895, Husayn married his fourth wife, who was the granddaughter of Mustafa Reşid Paşha (d. 1858), the famed Grand Vazir (who also, coincidentally was closely associated with the British consular office). By her, he had his fourth and youngest son, Zaid, in 1898 (as well as three daughters.)[94] Through a strategic marriage that aligned him to Ottoman elites and to his participation in the Sultan's Privy Council, Husayn was well connected and comfortable in Istanbul, even among Ottoman Turkish circles, acting as an ideal Arab intermediary.

---

[92] 'Abdullah Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti* (Amman: Maktabah al-Ahliyya, 1998), 19.

[93] Ibn Husayn, 19.

[94] Sulayman Musa, *Al-Harakat al-Arabiyyat: Sirat al-Marhala al-Awal Lil Nahda al-Arabiyyat al-Hadithat 1908-1924* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar lil Nashir, 1986), 76.

Regardless of his association with Ottoman Turkish elites, which reflected his inclusion into Istanbul's elite culture, Sharif Husayn managed to cultivate an Arab identity, evidenced by the fact that he pursued a "pure Arab upbringing" for his sons, three of whom had been born in Mecca and who then moved to Istanbul with their father after their exile. First, in Istanbul Sharif Husayn joined a community of Hashemites that included members of his own clan (most notably Sharif 'Abd al-Ilah) and even rival clans like the Zayd.[95] Life in Istanbul, then, did not separate him or his sons from the intra- Hashemite politics or from their identity rooted in their descent from Muhammad. Second, amid the expanded educational possibilities available in the imperial capital, Sharif Husayn made a point to augment his sons' training to include Arabic, when their formal education in the state schools removed it from the curriculum. When they first arrived to Istanbul, Husayn hired private tutors for his sons in Arabic, Turkish, and the military sciences. Eventually, their education moved to a classroom to include geography, arithmetic, Ottoman and Islamic history, Ottoman banking, and oratory.[96] However, when the school dropped Arabic instruction as their teacher "forbade them [Sharif Husayn's sons] from using any Arabic words," Husayn hired private tutors to ensure his sons received proper Arabic lessons. Apparently, during gaps with tutors, he provided lessons himself.[97] In the context of Husayn's Arabness, however, it is telling of his attitude that he made sure that his family preserved their unique Hashemite heritage and developed their linguistic signifier.[98]

---

[95] In 'Abdullah's memoirs, for instance, he often recalled visiting various prominent Hashemites from his own clan and the ritualistic season visiting of other Hashemites, many of whom included the Zayd. See Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 18–19; 28–29. Sharif Ali Haydar's daughter, Masbah, also mentioned in her own memoirs that her "uncle" Husayn would bring his sons to her family's home for visits. See Musbah Haidar, *Arabesque* (London: Hutchinson, 1945), 80.

[96] Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 20; 27–28.

[97] Ibn Husayn, 27–28.

[98] One cannot but contrast this emphasis on Arabic with Sharif Ali Haydar. Although described by his wife as an "Arab scholar" nonetheless wrote his memoirs in Turkish. See Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 7.

From the record of Sharif Husayn's appointment and his departure from Istanbul, it is possible to decipher how his Islamist Arabness attracted Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid, who benefited from the existence of an Arab Hamidian especially during the renewed constitutional period. For example, in his private conversation with the Sultan before he left Istanbul in 1908, both men insinuated that the Arabs of the Hijaz could play a role in restoring 'Abd al-Hamid's authority following the constitutional revolution. The Sultan described to Husayn his fear of being deposed, that because of the recent revolution he no longer held secure the state (*al-dawla*) and sovereignty (*al-mulk*) against "those dominating elements."[99] To his concerns, Sharif Husayn promised, "there is in the Arab countries an element that, if you are so inclined, you may have what you want in preserving the state and [your] sovereignty….the first country among the Arab countries that will take up your command is the Hijaz."[100] To that assurance, Husayn advised that when the time came, the Sultan should follow the advice of the Prophet Muhammad and come to Medina where he would be safe while the Arabs restore his house.[101] As a sign of gratitude, the Sultan awarded him the medal of *al-Iftikhar* order. This brief exchange, preserved in the memoirs of Husayn's son, was reminiscent of ibn Khaldun's tropes of Arab regenerative powers discussed in the previous chapter, and suggest that 'Abd al-Hamid valued Husayn not only because of his connections with the political elite in Istanbul, himself included, but because of his connections with the Arabs of the Hijaz as an Arab. Thus consistent with 'Abd al-Hamid's policies towards the Arabs, Husayn

---

[99] Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 30.

[100] Ibn Husayn, 30.

[101] Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 30.Interestingly, Sharif Husayn made his advice in part by quoting a line from a hadith attributed to Sufyan b Abd Zuahir: "Syria will be conquered and some people will go out of Medina along with their families driving their camels. and Medina is better for them if they were to know it. Then Yemen will be conquered and some people will go out of Medina along with their families driving their camels, and Medina is better for them if they were to know it. Then Iraq will be conquered and some people will go out of it along with their families driving their camels, and Medina is better for them if they were to know it." See Sahih Muslim 1388, Book 15, Hadith 568.

represented the ideal intermediary with his Arab tribal constituency in the Hijaz whose loyalty Husayn suggested he could direct directly to the Sultan.

The emphasis of Husayn's role as the Amir of Mecca predicated on his personal and religious loyalty to 'Abd al-Hamid as Caliph was emphasized again before leaving for Jeddah. Before boarding the Sultan's personal yacht, Husayn met again with Kamil Pasha. The anti-CUP *Wazir* handed the new Amir an undoubtedly informal message of instruction that succinctly articulated the exclusively Hashemite role in the traditional Hamidian compromise that affirmed the Ottoman Sultan's standing as Caliph:

> The blessed Hijaz is connected directly to the position of the Grand Caliphate, and nothing may transgress [its] sacred rights and the foundation between the Noble Amirate [of Mecca] and the Sultan's throne, including the new constitution. Perform your exalted duties on the basis of traditional cooperation. The fact that the eternal sovereignty and the Sublime Porte depend on your descent from the Hashemites is not doubted.[102]

This injunction from Kamil Pasha, who was instrumental in the appointment of Sharif Husayn against his rival, Sharif 'Ali Haydar, reveals the continued contours of the Hamidian compromise despite the constitution. By reaffirming his sacred rights connected to the Caliphate and based upon his Hashemite descent, he reaffirmed the preeminence of the Sultan as embedded in history and tradition. His rank as Amir of Mecca and a Hashemite gave Husayn a sacred prerogative, but he nonetheless must recognize the rights of the Caliph over the Amirate. Importantly, the Amir of Mecca was not beholden to the Ottoman system more broadly. By adding the caveat that nothing, not even the constitution, may interfere in its connection with the Caliph, Kamil Pasha affirmed that Husayn's loyalty was solely directed towards Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid as Caliph.

[102] Ibn Husayn, 36–37.

After these private conversations, Husayn quickly left Istanbul and headed towards Jeddah by sea. He arrived on December 3, 1908, a month before the always-critical Hajj. Waiting for him in Jeddah was a representative of the Committee of Union and Progress, ‘Abdullah Qasim. Husayn’s exchange with the representative further Husayn’s Arab Hamidianism rooted in his belief that the Amirate of Mecca was only loyal to the Caliph. According to Husayn’s son, when Husayn arrived, the representative addressed him as the “Constitutional Amir” (al-Amir al-Dusturiyya), and charged him with the task of turning away from the administration of his previous relatives, marked by oppression and tyranny sponsored by the Sultan. Now, he is charged to know the age (al-‘asr) and the new orders for the position, “under the constitution, which is the light of peace.”[103] In response, Husayn reminded the officer that the source of authority comes from the history of the region: that his ancestor Abu Numay pledged his allegiance to Sultan Selim I, and that each person in the Hijaz must know his place and his own affairs. As such, according to Husayn, the situation in the region was affected by the constitution, since “the Sultan has commanded the constitution...and commanded the work in this country.” In other words, the two responsibilities, the constitution and the work in the Hijaz, are separate and do not overlap. Indeed, Husayn ended this exchange by confirming his authority, as Amir, rests in accordance with his application of “the Shari‘a of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet”--not according to the constitution. According to Husayn, his authority, confirmed by the Caliph, was absolute in the Hijaz where the “constitution of God’s country” was Islamic law.[104] In this way, Husayn acknowledged the constitution as applicable to other regions of the state, but not to this Hijaz, which because of its historical and religious history did not apply. Likewise, because of his

[103] Ibn Husayn, 36–37.

[104] Ibn Husayn, 36–37.

ancestor's submission direct to the caliph meant that the Amirate of Mecca position was only loyal to the caliph.

Sharif 'Ali Haydar: The Reforming Ottoman Loyalist

Sharif Husayn's Arab Hamidianism, rooted in loyalty to the Ottoman caliph while simultaneously preserving an Arabness, contrasts with his Zayd rival and peer, 'Ali Haydar, who has received very little scholarly attention. Sharif 'Ali Haydar was the grandson of Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib of the Zayd household. His father was Sharif 'Ali Jabir, who unexpectedly died during the short reign of his father between 1880 and 1882. Spending all of his life essentially in Istanbul, 'Ali Haydar eventually became the last Ottoman appointed Amir of Mecca in 1916 after Sharif Husayn ibn 'Ali launched the Arab Revolt. Because of the war, he never formally took up the post in Mecca. (He, nevertheless, as will be discussed in later chapters, was a factor in the Ottoman campaign to discredit Sharif Husayn's revolt.) The role of Sharif 'Ali Haydar to the history of the events of the period under review has unfortunately become a footnote for historians. As a result, his place in the Arab and Ottoman world has always been considered marginal or minor by historians, who instead focused on the other Hashemites, namely Sharif Husayn and his sons. In many ways, Husayn and his sons have eclipsed 'Ali Haydar's legacy, since he never was crowned a king nor did he leave his sons a dynasty.[105]

During the chaotic days between Amir 'Abd al-Ilah's sudden death and the rushed appointment of Sharif Husayn ibn 'Ali to the Amirate, it did not appear that 'Ali Haydar

[105] His eldest son, however, was employed by Sharif, then-Amir, 'Abdullah ibn Husayn within the administration of the newly independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. See photo page of that reads "H.H. Shereef Abdul Mejid, [Eldest son of Ali Haider], First Minister for Transjordan at Court of St. James, 1947." Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 240–41.

represented a real contender to replace the deposed Amir ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah. Historians like Hasan Kayalı have concluded that ‘Ali Haydar was merely a minor actor in Hashemite circles and was not a logical choice for the Amirate of Mecca during the uncertainty of 1908 domestically and internationally with the onset of another Balkan war. However, the memoirs of Sharif Husayn’s son ‘Abdullah, ‘Ali Haydar (translated and extracted by George Stitt) and ‘Ali Haydar’s daughter, all claim that ‘Ali Haydar had the support of the CUP. ‘Abdullah ibn Husayn’s memoirs, which provided the most detailed account of his father’s selection, mentioned that the CUP had attempted to promote Sharif ‘Ali Haydar, a viewpoint echoed by scholars using his memoirs. In his own recollections, ‘Ali Haydar, did not portray himself as actively lobbying for the Amirate of Mecca--in contrast to his description of his efforts in 1905 to succeed ‘Awn al-Rafiq.[106] (Although absent in her father’s memoirs, Princess Masbah recounted that he had nonetheless “protested vigorously” for being denied the Amirate of Mecca in 1908.[107])

The record left behind by both ‘Abdullah ibn Husayn and ‘Ai Haydar share similarities that suggest that ‘Ali Haydar had attempted to advocate for the Amirate following Amir ‘Ali dismissal. In ‘Abdullah’s version of events, the decision to appoint his father to the Amirate began with his meeting the Grand *Wezir*, Mehmed Kamil Pasha (in office 1885-1891; 1895; 1908-1909; 1912-1913), who had developed an early hatred for the CUP when it emerged in 1908.[108] According to ‘Abdullah, following the death of his uncle ‘Abd al-Ilah, he sent a petition to Kamil Pasha that

[106] Stitt, 93–95. In his recollection, he explained that he could not afford to match what ‘Ali in Mecca offered to pay for the honor of being Amir.

[107] Musbah Haidar, *Arabesque.*, 80.

[108] Ismail Kemal Bey, *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey*, ed. Sommerville Story (London: Constable, 1920), 321–25.

emphasized his father's senior status among the Hashemites.[109] Besides claiming the most seniority, he asserted that his father was the only one fit to replace his relatives, thereby insisting the Amirate remain within the 'Awn clan.[110] In exchange, he promised his father's "friendship and loyalty" to the Sultan.[111] He delivered his father's petition personally to the Grand Wazir, who ultimately accepted Sharif Husayn's claims. 'Abdullah then sent a copy with a corresponding telegram again to the Grand *Wazir*, the *Shaykh al-Islam* of the Sultan, and the Chief Scribe.[112] Sharif 'Ali Haydar's version of events confirmed aspects of 'Abdullah's memoirs of his father's appointment by revealing the centrality of Kamil Pasha to the election of Sharif Husayn to the Amirate. In his own memoirs, once 'Ali Haydar discovered that his clan was once again circumvented, he expressed his frustrations to the very same *Wazir* who re-articulated the claims made by 'Abdullah:

> One night, during Ramadan, I visited the *konak* of Kamil Pasha and asked him outright why Hussein had been appointed to the Emirate of Mecca instead of me. "There was no question of preference," he replied. "Hussein is your senior."[113]

The fact that seniority mattered for the selection of Sharif Husayn in Sharif 'Ali Haydar's and Sharif 'Abdullah's accounts, suggested that 'Ali Haydar had indeed petitioned for the Amirate,

---

[109] While 'Abdullah and Kamal Pasha both cited Sharif Husayn's seniority among the Hashemites for his appointment, that claim was not entirely accurate. Even in his own memoirs, Sharif 'Abdullah contradicts himself by labeling Sharif Zayd bin Fawaz, a distant relative within the 'Awn as its most senior member. Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 35.

[110] Ibn Husayn, 20–21.

[111] Ibn Husayn, 20-21.

[112] Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 21.

[113] Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 103. To add to the confusion of dates during this period, Ramadan in 1908 was between 27 September - 26 October 1908, making his conversation one day before the purported death of then-appointed Amir 'Abd al-Ilah's death. He may have had a lapse in memory, or he gives an interesting clue to dating the sequence of events that led to the Sharif Husayn's appointment. In that case, we would have to move up the date of 'Abd al-Ilah's own appointment and of Sharif Husayn's, dating his informal appointment to late October.

and even if the Sultan had not considered him, his interest in succeeding to the Amirate was known among some figures in the Ottoman administration, including the Grand *Wazir*.

Another factor that suggests ‘Ali Haydar may have been considered was because of the hurried, secretive nature of Sharif Husayn’s appointment. After Sharif ‘Abdullah sent the telegraph and petition for his father to the Sultan’s chief agents, he received a response instructing Husayn to present himself to the Sultan at the Palace at three o’clock in the morning, a time ‘Abdullah described as “strange.”[114] Such secrecy suggested that in the midst of the political turmoil of the emerging constitutional government, Abdul Hamid feared the CUP might try to circumvent his right to appoint the next Amir of Mecca. For that reason, even if Sharif ‘Ali Haydar was not considered by the Sultan, his very presence made him a possible threat that needed quick resolution by appointing Sharif Husayn as soon as possible. It followed that if Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid feared that his choice in appointing the Amir could be threatened, then ‘Ali Haydar must have been a known entity to the CUP.[115] In his own recollections, ‘Ali Haydar connected his prospects for appointment to the success of the CUP and the restoration of the constitution. He disappointedly wrote that he “had hoped for justice when the new Constitution was declared, but where was justice and where was right?”[116] He expected that the new revolutionary conditions would restore his rightful place by suggesting some degree of shared outlook and sympathy for

[114] Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 21–22.

[115] When testing these unanimous claims, however, historians have been unable to confirm any CUP preference or even participation in the appointment of the new Amir. For instance, ‘Abdullah ibn Husayn, Sharif Husayn’s son, maintained that Sultan Abdul Hamid II appointed his father against the wishes of the CUP; his claims have been adopted by various historians, including Ernest Dawn and Suleiman Musa. Antonius explained that the CUP chose Sharif Husayn as a check against Abdul Hamid. Al-Amr presents the view that he was backed by the British, who used their influence with the Anglophile Grand Wazir, Kamil Pasha, to promote him. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*, 103; Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973, 5; Al-Amr, *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914*, 134; Musa, *Al-Harakat al-Arabiyyat: Sirat al-Marhala al-Awal Lil Nahda al-Arabiyyat al-Hadithat 1908-1924*, 76–77; Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 22.

[116] Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 103.

the CUP. Princess Masbah, ‘Ali Haydar’s daughter insinuated a connection between her father and the CUP when she claimed that the CUP promised her father “their attention” when the Balkan Wars ended, suggesting that he must have had some support from the CUP.[117]

Notwithstanding the underlying similarities between the two accounts of Husayn’s appointment, the issue of whether or to what extent Sharif ‘Ali Haydar was considered for the Amirate in 1908 will remain a matter of debate without any more conclusive evidence. Nevertheless, unlike previous histories of this moment, which have given Sharif ‘Ali Haydar a cursory mention, this section will analyze the biography and political outlook of the Zayd Sharif. Within the context of the Sharif Husayn’s selection, ‘Ali Haydar provides a useful foil to chart the political evolution of the Zayd household in contrast to the Arab Hamidianism of the ‘Awn. Sharif ‘Ali Haydar embodied the aims of the Ottoman modernizing discourse in that we see between these two men the emergence of a Hashemite duality in their understanding of Ottomanism. On the one hand, Husayn, who represented the traditional, conservative choice that appealed to the Hamidian order with his embodiment of Arabness and the ultimate authority of the Caliph. On the other hand, ‘Ali Haydar represented an Ottoman Hashemite who had adopted the reforming project that challenged the supremacy of the Ottoman Sultan for the sake of a modern state.

In pursuit of that modernity, ‘Ali Haydar’s sympathy and mutual attraction to the Committee of Union and Progress was rooted in what Usamma Makdisi had described as “Ottoman Orientalism,” which was a discourse of modernity that emerged over the course of the 19th century as the state reformed. This discourse consisted of what Selim Deregil dubbed as “image management” as the Ottoman reformers in Istanbul sought to legitimate its continued

[117] Musbah Haidar, *Arabesque.*, 80.

existence against western powers, which were "constantly trying to relegate it to history."[118] The Ottomans, through reforms and image management—both domestically and internally—sought to prove that its Empire was an Islamic Great Power capable of being ranked as a modern civilization.[119] These modernizing measures translated into the emergence of what Ussama Makdisi identified as "Ottoman Orientalism." According to Makdisi, "Ottoman modernization supplanted an established discourse of religious subordination by a notion of temporal subordination in which an advanced imperial center reformed and disciplined backward peripheries of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. This led to the birth of Ottoman Orientalism."[120] Thus, Ottoman Orientalism, as a concept referred to the underlying discourse of reform that emerged out of notions of modernity and civilization, which had a significant impact on the attitudes and agendas of reformers by Orientalizing the Arabic-speaking populations. As a function of the "western" reforming discourse that included administrative, educational, and political reforms in line with global state-building efforts in the 19th century, the Ottoman reformers instinctively embraced the logic presented by Western Orientalism: that modernity and progress originated in the "west" and that backwardness and underdevelopment characterized the "east."[121]

As it related to the Arabs and other ethnic or cultural groups, Ottoman reforms led to an imperial worldview according to which Ottoman Turkish elites now posed themselves as the

---

[118] Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, New ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 165.

[119] On Ottoman "image management and damage control," see Deringil, 135–49.

[120] Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 1, 2002): 769.

[121] On Orientalism as a product of western imposed schema of civilization and modernity, see Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 49–72.

civilizers to the true "Orientals" among its less-modern subjects that included the Arabs. The process of centralization through administrative reforms, infrastructural improvement, and educational reforms directed towards its Arab populations, meant in the Arab context, the pacification and civilizing of Arabia. In effect, the Arab-speaking populations became more civilized, and thus more Ottoman, because of their proximity to the traits—both cultural and linguistic—associated with the "modern" Turkish populations of the Empire.[122] The Hamidian period (1876-1908), which ended the period of Tanzimat and was marked by the increasing overtures and inclusion of the Arab populations into the administration and other positions of power, had established institutions geared towards civilizing its non-modern (that is, non-Turkish) populations.[123] In Makdisi's interpretation, an example of Ottoman orientalism was the aforementioned Imperial Tribal School that had opened in 1892.[124] It was specifically designed for the sons of Arab and Kurdish tribesmen to learn Turkish, classical Arabic, and French in addition to the other useful sciences, and was geared towards creating a modern, civilized Ottoman. To be Ottoman at this school meant to accept the "new temporal hierarchy of Ottoman Orientalism," where the Turkish Ottoman stood as the exemplar of Islamic civilization.[125]

The Hashemites, as the preeminent Arab dynasty, did not escape the temporal hierarchy and trends of Ottoman Orientalism. In many ways, the 19th century trends that resulted from the *Tanzimat* also affected the Hashemites. As the intra-Hashemite rivalry between the Zayd and the 'Awn househould remerged following the appointment by Muhammad 'Ali of the first amir from

[122] Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 769.

[123] For a brief and insightful overview of Arab inclusion during the Hamidian period, see Akarli, "Abdülhamid II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System."

[124] Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi."

[125] Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 771.

the ‘Awn household, the maneuvering by the different families did not exclusively take place in Mecca, even though becoming its Amir was the ultimate goal. Rather, the rivalry expressed itself in Istanbul, the imperial capital where the Ottoman Sultan had the final say on succession of the Amir of Mecca. Members of the Hashemite family became part of the Ottoman landscape of Istanbul. In doing so, they were meant to mirror the idealized modern, or civilized, Ottoman. The Hashemites sent their sons to prominent schools, even the palace school along the Sultan’s sons and the Ottoman elites, where they garnered a modern education consisting of Turkish and the modern sciences, including military sciences. They associated (often through marriage) with prominent political families, and they cultivated ties with the upper echelon of Ottoman (that is, Turkish) society. Generally, they became increasingly “Ottomanized” while in Istanbul by having adopting the language and cultural traits expected from “modern” Ottoman civilization.

This process of being Ottomanized affected the two households differently. For Sharif Husayn, and the ‘Awn household in general, it was argued he embodied an Arab Hamidianism, where his political loyalties focused on the caliph, which necessitated some Ottomanizing but also required he privilege his Arabness as an intermediary to the Hijaz. His identity was a function of the ‘Awn triumph where their dominance in the Amirate was unchallenged. In contrast, as will be discussed below, Sharif ‘Ali Haydar was more “Ottomanized” where any of his Arab identity had bowed to the schema of civilization expounded by Ottoman orientalism. For him, his loyalty was to the Ottoman state and system, which he believed modernized by becoming more Western--and by extension more Turkish in characteristics and less Arab.

Sharif ‘Ali Haydar’s portrayal of his childhood and upbringing embodied the goals of the reforming modernizing scheme that Ottoman orientalism articulated.[126] He was raised almost

[126] Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 89.

exclusively in Istanbul thus the modernizing transformations affecting the city left a lasting imprint on the Sharif. He was born in his grandfather's (Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib) mansion, or *yalı*, in the neighborhood of Kanlıca on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. It was at his grandfather's waterfront retreat where he and his closest family spent their summers. They passed winters in Istanbul in his grandfather's *konak* closer to the city. His father was 'Ali Jabir, the son of Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib, who had married a Circassian woman who bore 'Ali Haydar. She died when 'Ali Haydar was nine years old forcing him and his stepmother to move into his grandfather's harem, since his own father was living in Jeddah where he advocated for Sharif 'Abdul Muttalib as his agent. As a result, Sharif 'Ali Haydar was raised by his grandfather, who "was everything to [him], and [he] loved him dearly."[127] So close was he to his grandfather that although his "painful life passed in difficult circumstances, surrounded in Mecca by intrigue, troubled in soul by the wanton self-seeking of unworthy sons and sons-in-law," he nonetheless showed 'Ali Haydar "affection and consideration—even more than he appeared to show his own sons."[128]

His grandfather saw to his modern Ottoman education. First, as a young boy, he started his education with Mardinli Mohammed Effendi, who worked at the Ottoman Ministry of Justice and was his grandfather's *Imam* during Ramadan. Mardinli Mohammed Effendi's wife also served as his teacher, where she would teach him reading and writing in the harem. He started primary school in the neighborhood of Kanlıca, but in the winter, to be near his grandfather, he studied in Bayazid in Istanbul.[129] As he grew older, he reached the ultimate imperial center when his grandfather arranged for him to study in Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's palace with the Sultan's sons.

[127] Stitt, 39.

[128] Stitt, 40.

[129] Stitt, 40.

The teachers employed in the palace represented the modernizing attitudes prevalent at the time. Among ‘Ali Haydar’s teachers included a Circassian *lala*, who taught the boys reading and writing, but there was also a Frenchman and a German general who came to administer lessons.[130] His education continued in the palace until he had a personal falling out with the Sultan.[131] Not mentioned or highlighted in his memoirs was any formal Arabic language training while living in the capital, although the editors of his memoirs insisted that he was an Arab scholar.[132]

Although the holy city of Mecca was his family’s aim, it is interesting to note that in his memoirs, Sharif ‘Ali Haydar did not hold the city in such high esteem. The fact that Mecca became a backwards, dreary place in his memory revealed his adoption of the temporal and civilizational schema expounded by the Ottoman modernizers. In his first and only trip to Mecca during the Ottoman period, the holy city left him only with a troublesome impression. He described life there as dull and monotonous; his only teacher, whom he considered “harsh and cruel” frequently punished the young ‘Ali Haydar with beatings. Instead of the varied and modern education he enjoyed in Istanbul with foreign teachers, this abusive “*hodca*” (teacher) only taught the Quran since no other subject was permitted.[133] Furthermore, even his recreation, which in Istanbul had consisted of smoking and playing with boys whose fathers were esteemed politicians, became severely restricted.[134] Any toys of “foreign origin” were destroyed. Instead, he passed his time

---

[130] Stitt, 59.

[131] Stitt, 83-84. According to Sharif Ali Haydar, the school was ended when a conflict erupted between Sultan Abdülhamid and his son, Prince Selim. Since the Sharif was a friend and classmate with the prince, Abdülhamid canceled their classes.

[132] This claim was made to defend the fact that ‘Ali Haydar had in fact wrote his memoirs in Turkish before they were translated by his wife, who was Irish, and George Stitt. See Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 7.7.

[133] Stitt, 49.

[134] Stitt, 41-43.

occasioning the mountains surrounding Mecca on horseback. Ultimately, for ‘Ali Haydar the city became unbearable and associated with tragedy. He witnessed the deaths of his brothers, who died in landslides while they frequented the mountains together, and he repeatedly fell ill from malaria. Because of these tragedies, he naturally longed to return to his grandfather and to Istanbul.[135] Perhaps because of his declining health in Mecca, ‘Ali Haydar returned to Istanbul once his grandfather requested his return. Considering the misery he endured, it is unsurprising to find separate instances in his memoirs of Sharif ‘Abdul Muttalib threatening to punish ‘Ali Haydar, now in his complete care, by sending back to Mecca.[136] Stitt provides very little from Sharif ‘Ali Haydar’s memoir of his time in Mecca, yet, from the tone and discussions, it was clear that Mecca felt foreign to ‘Ali Haydar and that Istanbul had become his true home.

In Sharif ‘Ali’s eyes, Istanbul, as a modern and cosmopolitan city, had the most to offer for him and his family. When ‘Abd al-Hamid appointed Sharif ‘Awn al-Rafiq to the Amirate thereby restoring the ‘Awn clan to the Amirate of Mecca in 1883, however, the young Sharif’s relationship and opinion of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid shifted dramatically. No longer allowed to be educated in the palace school, Sharif ‘Ali Haydar faced the mounting animosity of the Sultan who became increasingly suspicious of those around him—which included ‘Ali Haydar and the rest of the Zayd Hashemites in Istanbul.[137] Istanbul, once it became a nest of political intrigues against him, transformed from the setting of his formative years, the background of his youthful antics and

[135] Ibid. 49-50.

[136] Stitt, 59 and 65. At one point, Sharif ‘Abdul Muttalib followed through with this threat by sending his young son Hashim, who was near Ali Haydar’s age, to Mecca following rumors that the family was going to move to Mecca. In his memory of the event, Sharif Ali Haydar notes that once in Mecca, Sharif Hashim has a clairvoyant dream where the Caliph Omar and the Prophet Muhammad himself beckoned his father to enter the Haram al-Sharif. Three months after this dream, Sharif Ali Haydar alleges that his grandfather was re-appointed for the final time as the Amir of Mecca.

[137] Stitt, 65.

modern education, to an increasingly dismal place. "The condition of the country was going from bad to worst," wrote Sharif 'Ali Haydar of this time, "and every one was oppressed by the system of espionage…."[138] All of this corruption and machinations came from a single source. According Sharif 'Ali Haydar, it all "emanated from 'Abd al-Hamid."[139]

In his memoirs, Sharif 'Ali Haydar described how, under Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's policies, life became unbearable in the Ottoman capital. He depicted Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid as becoming increasingly vengeful and paranoid of those around him, including suspicious of the young Sharif. The fact that Sharif 'Ali associated with 'Abd al-Hamid's son, Prince Selim, proved enough to end the special arrangement where he studied in the palace school when the Sultan fell out with his own son. With the removal of his grandfather from the Amirate of Mecca, the Sultan and the Sharif became more distant from one another. He wrote about how he would attend the Sultan's receptions during Bayram and Ramadan, and special Quran readings in the palace, but otherwise, "he showed [him] no other special attention." At the same time, 'Ali Haydar sought to stay out of sight: "I went to no public assemblies and busied myself in my duties towards my family. From the view of Abdul Hamid I kept clear."[140] Regardless, the Sultan's suspicions increased when 'Abd al-Hamid learned that Sharif 'Ali made frequent visits to the countryside. 'Ali Haydar mentions that once the Sultan directly asked about these rides, and that he explained that these trips were to relatives, all of whom the Sultan knew and that he "consider[ed] this interference to be quite unnecessary."[141] Abdul Hamid's actions became so onerous that he even attempted to

[138] Stitt, 95.

[139] Stitt, 95.

[140] Stitt, 87.

[141] Stitt, 88.

stop Sharif ‘Ali’s courtship with a British woman, who became his second wife.[142] ‘Ali Haydar reflected on this shift in his status, explaining that previously he “had a certain amount of respect for Abdul Hamid, but that respect had for long been shattered and replaced by disgust.”[143] Such crimes did not last forever, however, and foreshadowing ‘Abd al-Hamid’s eventual deposition in 1909, he concluded by saying that “God takes His revenge and I witnessed it….”[144]

Sharif ‘Ali Haydar’s criticism and animus towards the Sultan was not only a result of Hamidian tyranny directed towards him and affected his freedom of movement in the city. ‘Ali Haydar also depicted his own clan, Zayd, as supporters of the Ottoman modernization project that opposed ‘Abd al-Hamid’s autocracy. Their credentials as such derived most directly from Sharif ‘Abdul Muttalib, the household’s patriarch, whom ‘Ali Haydar described as colluding with the reforming elements of Ottoman society. In addition to being friends with Midhat Pasha, Sharif ‘Ali Haydar also described how his grandfather assisted Raşid Pasha (1800-1858), the Ottoman Grand *Wazir* who had pushed for the *Tanizmat* through the Hatti-Şerif of Gülhane in 1838 and then the Hatt-ı Hümayun in 1856. In his account, he helped resolve a disagreement between his grandfather and the British Ambassador Stratford Canning, 1st Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe (1786-1880). According to ‘Ali Haydar, having helped both men settle a dispute, his grandfather ultimately cultivated a friendship that indebted both men to him. As such, ‘Ali Haydar described how Canning periodically visited and brought gifts from England to Sharif ‘Abdul Muttalib.[145]

---

[142] Stitt, 90.

[143] Stitt, 89.

[144] Stitt, 89.

[145] Stitt, 44.

The sympathies between his grandfather and the reforming elements of the Ottoman Empire reflected the extent to which Sharif ‘Ali Haydar had adopted a schema of modernization embedded within the Ottoman system. Amid the corruption that he described as characterizing Hamidian rule, ‘Ali Haydar nonetheless identified with an essentially modernizing program that underpinned Ottoman orientalism. That is, he considered the future of the Empire to be more European in outlook and Turkish-led. Thus, ‘Ali Haydar, although quietly supporting the 1908 Revolution, considered the CUP and their policies as a natural progression of the state’s evolution. When on July 24, 1908 Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II had been forced to restore the constitution following the demands of the CUP, Sharif ‘Ali Haydar empathized with the public joy of the moment. He wrote that “I spent some hours with the crowds and they were the sweetest moments in my life. Only those who have lived through years of oppression and bondage can appreciate this.”[146] It is perhaps because of his disappointment that ‘Ali Haydar departed for Egypt after the appointment of Husayn. He did so without his wife and children who remained behind in Istanbul. He returned to Istanbul only in the spring 1909, just in time to witness the deposition of ‘Abd al-Hamid and to be the first to pledge allegiance to the new Sultan.[147] This narrative, undoubtedly affected by later polemics, supports the insinuation that the CUP had preferred ‘Ali Haydar--especially based on the Zayd Sharif’s background and attitudes towards reform and the fact that the reality of Hamidian politics ultimately had blocked him from the Amirate of Mecca.

According to ‘Ali Haydar, the revolution represented a turning point for the Ottoman Empire to once again look westwards in its development and modernization. Because of the revolution, he confidently summarized the mood of the moment that the Ottoman Empire once

[146] Stitt, 97.

[147] Stitt, 108.

more began to look towards Europe just as "an astonished Europe gazed upon us."[148] Progress for 'Ali Haydar also translated into the adoption of the elements of modernity, which for him meant "westernizing" and looking toward the Turks of the empire as models. Both his biographer and daughter confirmed his attitudes. According to his biographer, he concluded that 'Ali Haydar had been "thoroughly imbued with…Turkish ideas."[149] More revealingly, 'Ali Haydar's daughter characterized her father's political perspective as sympathetic to modernizing Turkism. She wrote that her own father had always "remained loyal to the Turks," and that he believed that the Arabs must remain under the guiding, nominal authority of the Ottoman Empire to learn how to govern. Her father, she described, believed that only "by remaining loyal to Turkey...the Arabs were gaining much valuable experience in the government of an Empire, and that through an evolution, which was well-nigh completed, Arabia as one whole unit would find her independence."[150] In his own memoirs, far from praising the inhabitants or the religious significance of the Hijaz, he described how he openly discussed with agents of the State the need for modernizing improvement to all places of the Empire, but especially to the Hijaz. He envisioned "Schools of Art opened in Mecca and Schools of Commerce in Jeddah." He suggested infrastructure improvements—a bane for tribesmen whose livelihood depended on traditional caravans—such as a "good motor road from Mecca to Taif, and a fleet of automobiles from Mecca to Medina." Furthermore, he envisioned the electrification of the Grand Mosque in Mecca and a modern university in Taif from where Muslim pilgrims all over the world could take examinations.[151] For 'Ali Haydar, the Hijaz did not have to be the religiously-focused, conservative region but could become a modern region.

---

[148] Stitt, 97.

[149] Stitt, 67.

[150] Musbah Haidar, *Arabesque*, 58.

[151] Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 106.

‘Ali Haydar’s thoughts about progress, modernity, reform, and even his attitude towards the Arabs within the Ottoman Empire (vis-a-vis the “Turks”) stood in stark contrast to the conservatism that characterized the Hamidian period and that has been assigned to Husayn. For ‘Ali Haydar, the political future of the Ottoman state depended on political, economic, and social reforms more akin to the liberalizing elements of the Ottoman Empire, namely the Young Ottomans and their successors. In this way, ‘Ali Haydar opposed the policies of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid, despite attempting to ingratiate himself with the Sultan-Caliph. In evaluating ‘Ali Haydar’s Ottomanism, Husayn seemed instead to embody a relative Arabness, which was only natural considering his household’s continued ties while ‘Ali Haydar had essentially been alienated from the region because of his household’s exclusion from the Amirate. Thus, in this way, ‘Ali Haydar represented the successfully Ottomanized Arab elite who even adopted the Ottoman orientalist schema of civilization that sought to modernize the Arab regions. Husayn, because of his household’s control of the Amirate of Mecca, represented a different type of Ottomanized Arab. While he identified and sought to ingratiate himself within Ottoman political culture, he also maintained a certain awareness of his Arabness as making him and his family distinct and the ideal intermediaries between the Ottomans and the Arabs of the Hijaz. For Husayn, as he cultivated his Arabness, he exhibited a form of cultural Arabism that his rival did not seem to express.

Husayn’s Victory among the ‘Awn

Although having the Sultan’s formal appointment, when Sharif Husayn finally arrived to the Hijaz to take up the post of Amir of Mecca, he nevertheless had to contend with the fact that the previous Amir, his cousin and thus a member of the ‘Awn household, was very much still

present in the region. ‘Ali had left Mecca during his conflicts with supporters of the CUP following the news of the restored constitution and headed towards Taif. According to the British consul summarizing the situation, he noted that “the dismissed Grand Sherif ‘Ali Pasha, is still in Taif,” but “he is in very feeble health, and does not appear likely to rais [*sic*] any opposition to the new one [Amir] who is his first cousin and whom he has now welcomed by telegraph.”[152] Although the consul did not see a threat, the fact that ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah had outmaneuvered Sharif Husayn three years prior and undoubtedly still enjoyed tribal contacts, nonetheless made him a possible threat. For that reason, after arriving in Mecca, Sharif Husayn’s son, ‘Abdullah, went immediately to meet with ‘Ali and upon returning to Mecca, discussed his uncle’s fate with his father.[153]

By the time Sharif Husayn arrived in the Hijaz, however, he had secured his place within the ‘Awn household through strategic marriages of his sons. Perhaps most strategically, his oldest son, ‘Ali ibn Husayn, had married Nafissa Khanum (b. 1886 in Istanbul, m. 1906). She was the second daughter of Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah.[154] The significance of Sharif Husayn’s son marrying Sharif ‘Abd al-Ilah’s daughter was revealed following ‘Abd al-Ilah’s untimely death in 1908, since ‘Ali ibn Husayn had to organize his funeral arrangements.[155] Sharif Husayn’s other sons, ‘Abdullah and Faysal, both married within their father’s side. ‘Abdullah was the first of the brothers to marry. He married his first wife, Sharifa Masbah bin Nasir, in 1902. She was the

[152] TNA: Monahan, Jeddah to G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 5 December 1908 [FO 198/2286].

[153] Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 37–41.

[154] Subul, *al-Hashimiyun*, 69; Christopher Buyers, “Hijaz Al-Hashimi Dynasty Genealogy,” The Royal Ark: Royal and Ruling Houses of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas, accessed January 7, 2018, http://www.royalark.net/Arabia/hijaz1.htm.

[155]‘Abdullah explained to the Grand Vezir Kamil Pasha why he was petitioning on behalf of his father, despite not being the eldest son, because his brother ‘Abdullah was occupied organizing their uncle’s funeral. This detail also suggests that Sharif Abd-Ilah’s one son may have already died. Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 21.

eldest daughter of his Uncle Nasir, Sharif Husayn's only living brother.[156] His brother, Faysal, also married a daughter of his Uncle Nasir, Sharifa Hazima. Husayn's brother, Sharif Nasir, was a key figure in both his brother's Amirate in Mecca and in events during and after the Revolt.

Besides these matrimonial connections, Amir Husayn enjoyed broad 'Awn support witnessed upon his arrival to Jeddah. Confirmed by British reports, before disembarking at Jeddah, "a crowd of Mecca notables, sherifs and others, went on board to kiss the hands of the new Grand Sherif and of his two sons ['Abdullah and Zayd], one of them a little boy…."[157] Among those Sharifians were the sons of the deposed Amir 'Ali's brother, Muhammad; and his cousins from his father's brother, Nasir. Likewise, there were Sharifians present among different 'Awn clans, like the Fuwaz, Tahama, and others.[158] Most significantly, the fact that Amir 'Ali's nephews were present to greet Sharif Husayn and 'Abdullah indicated that 'Ali sent them to greet the new Amir as a gesture of goodwill or the extent to which 'Ali was isolated from the rest of the 'Awn. Considering that his own sons were not present to greet the new Amir, it is very likely that they may have abandoned their deposed uncle.

Indicative of the rearrangement in the 'Awn household, 'Abdullah ibn Husayn's cousin Jamil ibn Nasir and the two nephews of Amir 'Ali, Muhsin ibn Muhammad and 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad, joined him as he trekked to Taif to escort the previous Amir to meet his father in Mecca. It was during his initial meeting with his uncle, Sharif 'Abdullah's conversation, despite its amiability, revealed the fears underlying the continued presence of 'Ali in the region. According to 'Abdullah, 'Ali asked him whether he should travel to Istanbul to meet with the new

---

[156] Subul, *al-Hashimiyun : min hukm al-imarah al-'Uthmaniyah ilá ta'sis al-mamalik al-'Arabiyah*, 70; Christopher Buyers, "Mecca Al-Hashimi Dynasty Genealogy," The Royal Ark: Royal and Ruling Houses of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas, accessed February 7, 2018, https://www.royalark.net/Arabia/mecca5.htm.

[157] TNA: Monahan, Jeddah to G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 5 December 1908 [FO 198/2286].

[158] Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 33.

government. ‘Abdullah advised that if he desired to remain in the region, he must reach an agreement with his father, the new Amir. Should ‘Ali desire to go to Istanbul, as all the Amirs-in-waiting before him, go only if he had assurances from the CUP leadership for his safety.[159] From this exchange, it is clear that ‘Ali apparently still had not reached an understanding with his cousin thereby revealing the threat he posed and his own uncertainty of this future in the region.

Back in Mecca, after a closed meeting with the former Amir, Amir Husayn ibn ‘Ali met with his brother, Sharif Nasir, his distant cousin Sharif Zayd Fawaz, and ‘Abdullah to discuss what to do about ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah. Reportedly, Sharif Husayn appeared unconcerned about his cousin’s continued presence in the region, but Sharif Nasir proved more skeptical: “I think he should depart to Istanbul because if he remains here, he cannot be trusted. He is rich and as for the Turks, do not believe vicissitudes. Working in them are threats of bribery that cannot be imagined.” Although ‘Abdullah offered a more trustworthy and lenient viewpoint, suggesting that ‘Ali did not pose a threat, he tempered his remarks explaining that if ‘Ali went anywhere, he should go to Egypt. ‘Abdullah explained that if ‘Ali went to Istanbul, the CUP would threaten him and his wealth and use the threat of abuse to undermine his father. For that reason, ‘Ali would be a constant threat to Amir Husayn. Thus, it was decided that ‘Ali would leave the Hijaz after at the end of the *hajj* season.[160] Essentially exiled, ‘Ali no longer posed a threat to Amir Husayn who could be confident that he now headed the ‘Awn household without any competition from other relatives.

---

[159] Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 40.

[160] Ibn Husayn, 40-41.

Conclusion

Sharif Husayn's eventual appointment to the Amirate of Mecca in 1908 was not a simple perfunctory choice on the part of the Sultan—he became that choice in part through strategic marriages in the 'Awn household and integrating himself within the Hamidian order.[161] Moreover, while he was indeed the correct successor in terms of dynastic patterns, Sharif Husayn's appointment represented a longer, more involved process within the 'Awn household itself as it consolidated into its privileged position in the Ottoman system under Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's pan-Islamic vision. Before he could be appointed, Sharif Husayn had to overcome the policies of his uncle, Amir 'Awn al-Rafiq who attempted, in the midst of an impending succession crisis, to overturn the traditional 'Awn dynastic pattern that had prevailed in the Amirate of Mecca. In doing so, he would have excluded members of his household, like Sharif Husayn, from appointment. This challenge led to Sharif Husayn's long exile to Istanbul starting in 1891, and in so doing, temporarily distanced him from the relevant politics of Mecca.

With the death of 'Awn al-Rafiq in the summer of 1905, however, and the appointment of his nephew 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah to the Amirate of Mecca, the history of the 'Awn household turned a major chapter. Despite the depredations and attempts made by 'Awn al-Rafiq to exclude his relatives from succeeding him, he was unable to create for himself a dynasty to leave for his son because Ottoman exigencies proved too overwhelming. Moreover, by circumventing the de facto dynastic patterns with the appointment of 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah to the Amirate of Mecca in 1905, it further emphasized the priority given to Ottoman state interests over any succession plan within the 'Awn household. 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah's appointment rested not on the normal formal recognition by the Sultan-Caliph, but through the enterprising efforts of the local Ottoman

[161] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 149.

governor. For Sharif Husayn to position himself to succeed his cousin and restore proper dynastic succession, he had to ingratiate himself in the Ottoman imperial capital of Istanbul and position him and his sons through strategic marriages to isolate Amir ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah. When the excitement of constitutional reform that swept the Ottoman Empire in the summer of 1908 had penetrated the Hijaz, ‘Ali became its casualty thereby creating the vacancy for Sharif Husayn to be appointed.

Husayn’s struggle to restore rightful succession within the ‘Awn household came with certain lessons that provide a glimpse into Husayn’s political ideology. From the Hamidian perspective, Husayn was an obvious choice to become the Amir of Mecca in terms of dynastic succession, because he represented a continuity of the conservative Hamidian Ottomanism which emphasized Arab and Turkish (as well as other groups) unity through Islam with the Sultan as the caliph, at its center. His relative Arabness or cultural Arabism made him an ideal Ottoman Arab intermediary. Likewise, the fact that he was at first denied his rightful succession (on behalf of his deceased father) in 1905 by the Ottoman governor and that his place had been restored by the Sultan only confirmed his loyalty to the Hamidian order that had already privileged his household but now restored his personal claims. Thus Husayn’s appointment represented both his successful circumvention of his own household’s internal politics consequent to dynastic consolidation and the local challenge the Ottoman *wali* posed in appointing his cousin, ‘Ali to the Amirate. Husayn successfully ingratiated himself with the Hamidian framework, as a loyal Arab, in order to benefit from the Sultan’s intervention. Husayn, as Hamidian supported and cultural Arabist, embodied what can be described as Arab Hamidianism.

In contrast, ‘Ali Haydar, having been alienated from the Hijaz exhibited what some historians have described as Ottoman orientalism. This juxtaposition between the two leading

Hashemite household heads reflected the very tension that characterized the dueling forces of Ottoman modernity between those who adopted the "general discourse of modernizing imperial reform battling backwardness" which "justified Ottoman Turkish rule over not-yet-Ottomanized Arabs," that is Ottoman Orientalism, and those that seemed to abet the elements of non-civilization, namely autocratic despotism.[162] Sharif 'Ali Haydar was the quintessential Ottomanized Arab elite who participated in "this elaboration of Ottoman modernity." As such, he naturally associated himself with the reforming elements within Istanbul and explained his progressively unfavorable judgment of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid.[163] Whereas Husayn represented the continuation, albeit waning, of the Hamidian model of politics, his Zayd rival embodied the goals of constitutional modernity that saw a liberal, increasingly "Turkish" order as the result of political reforms and social modernization.

[162] Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 771.

[163] Makdisi, 771.

Chapter 3- The Awakened Amir and the Specter Amir

Introduction

The political divergence of the Hashemite households following the events of 1880-1882 with the corresponding intra-'Awn dynastic crisis laid the foundation for Sharif Husayn's decision to launch the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916. Husayn's unique combination of Arabism and Ottomanism (through a Hamidian lens) informed his interactions with the new CUP-led government. In the period under review (1908-1916), the Ottoman Empire underwent stages of reforms before the outbreak of World War I. Beginning with the dismissal of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid following his failed counter-revolution in March 1909, the subsequent renewal of external challenges from the Balkans and Italy that led to territorial losses, the CUP-led coalition passed measures aimed at centralizing and reforming administration of its remaining territory, including the Hijaz. The pressures of survival for Ottoman leadership meant challenging old norms to standardize governance to neutralize the threat local authorities posed to the state. In Amir Husayn's own lifetime, the intrusive state and the actions of enterprising local governors, like the one that denied his appointment in 1905, threatened not only the dominance of the 'Awn household but also his perceived rights to the Amirate. Nonetheless, Husayn's eventual willingness to collaborate with the CUP government when its agenda served his interests had reached it limits. After various policies enacted by the central government by 1913 had undermined the terms of the Hamidian compromise, Husayn began to lay the foundation of his revolt that he eventually launched in June 1916 from Mecca.

This chapter argues that Husayn's decision to launch the revolt has been a well-trodden subject for historians because of its perceived contribution to Arab nationalism and European

colonialism in the Arab Middle East.[1] As such, in locating Husayn's impetus for the Revolt, historians have focused on a variety of possible catalysts: his sympathy for Arab nationalism, especially as the war effort led to increase miseries for the empire's inhabitants, including the Arabs; his ever-hostile relationship with the CUP-led Ottoman government; and even his relationship with the British. Most recently, historians utilizing the Ottoman government records have challenged the categories of these standard narratives and offered an analysis that identifies more continuity than outright breaks. The work of Hasan Kayalı has shown that Islamism had provided a successful ideology that overshadowed Turkism or Arabism. As Kayalı analyzed, Husayn performed Ottomanism well, often at the behest of the CUP government that undercut his own authority in the region. In fact, in Kayalı's appraisal, "the Young Turk governments successfully steered Sharif Husayn to conduct those policies that advanced the interests of the imperial center," essentially at his own expense vis-a-vis Husayn's peninsular rivals.[2] Husayn's Revolt, he concluded, was "not so much the culmination of Arab nationalist activity or a rejection of the refashioned Ottomanist ideology, but a convergence of dynastic ambition and strategic exigency that contributed to the eventual political separation of Arabs and Turks."[3] According to his analysis, reforms in the way that the CUP sought to govern the region that ultimately threatened the Amirate's traditional autonomy that prompted Husayn to seek outside help and then launch the

---

[1] For classic histories, both English and Arabic, see Amin Sa'id, *Al-Thawrah al-'Arabiyah al-Kubra, Tarikh Mufassal Jami' Lil-Qadiyah al-'Arabiyah Fi Rub' Qarn*, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Misr: Matba'at 'Isá al-Babi al-Halabi, 1934); Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*; Kedourie, *England and the Middle East.*; Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*; Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973; Sulayman Musa, *Thawrah Al-'Arabiyah al-Kubra : Al-Harb Fi al-Hijaz, 1916-1918*, Tab'ah 1. ('Amman: S. Musa, 1989); David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (Henry Holt and Company, 2001); Sulayman Musa, *al-Harakah al-'Arabiyah: sirat al-Marhalah al-ula lil-Nahdah al-'Arabiyah al-Hadithah, 1908-1924* ('Amman: Dar al-Ward, 2013).

[2] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 173.

[3] Kayalı, 15–16.

Revolt. Building on these statewide policies, M. Talha Çiçek reached a similar conclusion by focusing on the Jamal Pasha's governorate in Damascus during World War I. He has described Jamal Pasha's continued efforts to maintain Arab loyalty through Islamic propaganda campaigns and the adoption of a moderate policy towards the Arabists after Husayn's revolt as reflective of the continued CUP support of Ottomanism (that focused on shared religious identities) over Turkism.[4] For both authors, any allegations of Turkism in the policies of CUP government had not been because of some exclusive nationalist ideology but a perceived by-produce of state formation.

Any exclusive definitions of Ottomanism, Turkism, or Arabism, however, did not neatly overlay atop the Hashemite households. Considering the dueling Ottomanisms--the conservative, pan-Islamist Hamidianism versus the reform-minding modernizers that colored the household conflicts--Sharif Husayn had clearly followed his household the 'Awn in their embrace of the former "Hamidianism." For this reason, as the CUP government deviated from the Hamidian template in circumventing the Amir of Mecca in peninsular matters while also adopted some of the Hamidian period's more absolutist elements, Sharif Husayn nonetheless criticized the government for its departure from Hamidianism. At the same time, within the Hamidian lattice of Ottomanism, there was clearly a space for "Arabness." For one, Arabness was a useful identity for the 'Awn household to administer the Arab Hijaz as intermediaries for the Ottoman state. Second, Hamidianism could also accept Arabness as a celebration of the shared-religious heritage that Islam provided for the Arabs and the Turks of the Ottoman Empire. That Arabness underpinned Husayn's exclusive claim to represent the Arabs and eventually formed the basis of

[4] M. Talha Çiçek, "Visions of Islamic Unity: A Comparison of Jamal Pasha's al-Sharq and Sharif Husayn's al-Qibla Periodicals," *Die Welt Des Islams* 54, no. 3–4 (2014); Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria : Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917*, 12–24.

his post-revolt Hashemite-centric Arabism. Finally, in addition to the various dimensions of Ottomanism and Arabism, the Hashemite households also had a legacy of British colonialism (as epitomized by the events of 1880-1882). Taking Ottomanisms, Arabisms, and colonialism together, Husayn had many avenues in which to rebuke the CUP that culminated into the Arab Revolt.

Ultimately, by recognizing that Husayn could simultaneously be an Ottomanist while also challenging the Ottoman state--because of its divergence from the Hamidian rubric that the ‘Awn household conceded to--this chapter explores Amir Husayn’s ideological transformation. Underpinning this ideological transformation was his continued insistence on the Hamidian compromise that promised his Hashemite dominance of the Hijaz (and its environs) and his household’s monopoly over the Amirate. As the CUP government, from Husayn’s perspective, abrogated the Hamidian compromise, Husayn not only sought allies but also slowly adopted Arabist discourse to justify his critique of the CUP. Amir Husayn initially launched the Revolt in June 1916 based on his adoption of elements of an Arabist discourse. His “conversion” from a Hamidian cultural Arabism to anti-Ottoman political Arabism by August 1916, I argue, was a consequence of the renewal of the Hashemite household rivalry when the Ottomans appointed ‘Ali Haydar as the “Specter Amir,” to the Amirate of Mecca following the declaration of the Arab Revolt. Very shortly after his appointment, ‘Ali Haydar arrived to Medina and issued a counter-proclamation where he articulated his Ottomanist political ideology to compete against Husayn’s. ‘Ali Haydar’s presence in Medina, a fellow Hashemite who still remained loyal to the Ottoman caliph and compounded by the Revolt’ languid beginning, threatened Husayn’s claim for independent action.

Thus, Husayn's political ideology transmuted into a form of a Hashemite-centric Arabism that embraced the Islamic Arabist arguments while also emphasizing the special role the Hashemites, as descendants of Muhammad, in Arab national rejuvenation. This transformation was evidenced within the pages of his revolutionary newspaper, *al-Qibla*, which was first issued just days after 'Ali Haydar's proclamation. In this way, while the state and global politics were operative to Husayn's political transformation, still functional was the Hashemite household rivalry that emerged in the 19th century. As James Gelvin explored in the post-Ottoman Arab national government in Syria that Husayn's son Faysal led (1918-1920), nationalism required the creation of a discursive field, the articulation of its symbols, and its performance through public celebrations or rituals to compete against other forms of identity.[5] Gelvin charted this process in Syria under Faysal's rule, but the nationalist performance in fact began in Mecca where a coterie of Arabist thinkers gathered. Through a new medium, the semiweekly newspaper *al-Qibla*, which Husayn established in August 1916 after 'Ali Haydar's initial proclamation, he and his Arabist supporters translated the Revolt for Arab and Muslim consumption. His newspaper, *al-Qibla*, allowed him amid the uncertain start of the Arab Revolt, to project his message in a more sophisticated, structured way that demonstrated his embrace of Arabism; this Arabism included elements from the *Nahda* period and yet Husayn's Arabist discourses were tailored to the needs and ambitions of his household. With the founding of *al-Qibla* to act as Husayn's mouthpiece to the Arab and Islamic worlds, an internal, Hashemite rivalry had emerged in August 1916 whereby 'Ali Haydar continued promoting Ottomanism and the need to preserve the empire against dissolution for the sake of Islam, and Husayn now adapted the existing Arabist discourse through

[5] James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

the pages of his innovative newspaper. Arabism's emphasis on the special and unique role of the Hashemite family as descendants of Muhammad to the Arab and Islamic worlds offered Husayn a strategic choice for his developing ideology. Consequently, his Islamic Arabism necessarily highlighted the unique role and history of the Hashemite family to both the Arab and Islamic worlds, as their preeminent leaders.

CUP Governance and Husayn

At the start of the constitutional revolution, the Ottoman Empire faced a renewed set of threats that affected how the CUP governed. Shortly after the revolution began, autonomous powers in the Balkans and European powers used the political instability to annex more Ottoman territory. For example, on October 5, 1908 Bulgaria declared independence, and the next day the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by Crete joining Greece. Through their parliamentary majority, the CUP successfully reach agreements with these threats that effectively ended Ottoman suzerainty in the affected territories before facing other threats like Italy's invasion of Libya (1911-1912) that ended Ottoman control in North Africa, and then finally a renewed Balkan War (1912-1913) that ultimately reduced Ottoman presence in the Balkans to Edirne (Adrianople) and Western Thrace.[6]

As the Ottoman Empire faced these external threats, the CUP also faced internal challenges in the form of political opposition: bureaucrats who wanted to restore the strength of the Sultan's government, ethnic and nationalist groups who grew disillusioned by CUP's Turkism, liberals who

[6] Eugene Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East* (Basic Books, 2015), 1–28; Sean McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame : War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923* (New York, New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 59–81.

wanted to see even greater reforms, Islamists fearing secularism, and even labor and trade unions who resented political centralization. The restored Ottoman parliament provided a platform and arena for all these competing voices and interests to interact. As the champions of the Revolution, it was no surprise that the CUP formed the largest coalition in the parliament following elections, yet the presence of so many potential political challengers amidst the crisis in the Balkans posed a dilemma for the CUP. Although hastily dubbed as liberals, the CUP's main objective had always been one of conservation and restoration, that is, conservation of the Ottoman state and restoring it to its previous strength. For this reason, the liberal euphoria of the 1908 moment that had united diverse political, religious, and ethnic groups of the Ottoman Empire was soon eclipsed by the CUP's desire to preserve the state no matter the political cost by absorbing rivals under Unionist political organization. The CUP organizational framework subsumed worker unions, professional organizations, and even rival political parties.[7] Although various non-Turkish ethnic groups had greeted the constitutional revolution, their animation diminished as they faced hostility and exclusion by CUP policies.[8]

An early illustration of the internal threats facing the CUP and their response came in April 1909 when supporters of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid launched a counter-revolution in reaction to CUP-led purges in the army and administration. Soldiers loyal to the Sultan and religious scholars marched on the parliament to demand a return of Islamic law and the removal of Unionist politicians. Unionist officials fled the capital, but returned with the Ottoman Third Army in Macedonia, which had led the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, and occupied Istanbul. They

[7] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 150–154.

[8] For an excellent analysis Jewish, Arab, and Armenian support for the revolution and then their subsequent disappointment with the political realities that followed as the CUP adopted more authoritarian and Turkifying policies, see Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford University Press, 2014).

suppressed the counter-revolutionaries and then called for the chambers of parliament to meet. On April 27, they voted to depose the Sultan and replace him with his younger brother, Mehmed Rashad V.[9] Formally ending the Hamidian period, the CUP took steps following the counter-revolution to suppress political opponents and adopted measures like the curtailment of constitutional liberties all in order to preserve the revolution, which its leaders believed would ensure the state's survival.[10] Because of both these internal and external threats, over the course of the next six years through the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire resembled one party rule as the Unionists oppressed opponents and enacted authoritarian measures to ensure loyalty to their political projects. Just like the Hamidian period, the government also continued administrative and infrastructural projects aimed at centralization in order to tie the state's remaining provinces to the center.[11]

Although far removed from the politics of Istanbul, the effects of the Unionist government were nonetheless felt in the Hijaz. As one of those peripheral provinces but religiously significant, the CUP government sought to continue the policies of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid and extend the centralizing administration to the region. The physical manifestation of those policies was the Hijaz Railway, an infrastructure project that began in 1900 as a pan-Islamic project designed to

[9] Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 8–9.

[10] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 155.

[11] Hanioğlu, 166–67. Another element of the CUP, decried by its critics, had been its Turkification policies. There is debate among scholars as to what extent Turkism was indeed an active policy of the CUP before the outbreak of World War I. For Hanioglu and Rashid Khalidi, for example, they see direct evidence of the CUP's leadership that they had embraced Turkism; as a result, their policies were rightfully decried as Turkifying. Kayali takes a more reserved, revisionist interpretation. He argues that claims of Turkism were politically rooted more in criticism of centralization by those who advocated for decentralization. These similar sentiments are shared by other historians of the period, including M. Talha Çiçek, who has shown an active policy of the part of "Turkish officials" like Jamal Pasha to assuage and even recruit Arabs to the Ottoman war effort. He has suggested that following the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, Jamal Pasha moderated his policy towards Arabists. See Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria : Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917*, 59–63.

connect Damascus to Mecca in order to facilitate the year pilgrimage and symbolize global Muslim unity, since it was funded by Muslim donations worldwide. It likewise responded to the Ottoman need to compete against Europeans in Arabia.[12] Built with German advice, it reached Medina by September 1908.[13] The railway, however, never reached Mecca. Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliament and even Amir Husayn himself successfully opposed its--and other railway projects in the Hijaz--further extension.[14] The railway did more than transport Muslim pilgrims, however, but it also facilitated the transportation of troops and with the laying of telegraph wire, facilitated Medina's incorporation into the centralized Ottoman administration. Because of this physical connection, Medina became the CUP's government's direct outpost to Arabia. For example, in the summer of 1910, the administrative status of Medina as a *sanjak* of Mecca now became its own independent *sanjak* to be headed by a *muhafazalik* appointed from Istanbul. Therefore, the Ottoman government successfully severed Medina from the rest of the Hijaz and thus from Amir Husayn's control. Medina became what one historian labelled an "Ottoman outpost."[15]

With the construction of the Hijaz railway and its ability to facilitate direct administration over Medina, the CUP could use this new outpost to adapt its administration of the Arabian

[12] For an insightful analysis of this point as well as the Ottoman effort to challenge Europeans in Africa and Arabia, see Mostafa Minawi Minawi, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).

[13] For a look at the history of the Hijaz railway as a function of political statecraft, see William Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz Railroad: A Study in Ottoman Political Capacity and Autonomy.* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1980). For a critical look at the Ottoman rhetoric as a function of oppressive measures against he Bedouin tribesmen who challenged the railway's construction see Mostafa Minawi, "Beyond Rhetoric: Reassessing Bedouin-Ottoman Relations along the Route of the Hijaz Telegraph Line at the End of the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 58, no. 1–2 (2015).

[14] Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution*, 131–32; Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 156–58.

[15]The term comes from Kayalı's work. See Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 159.

Peninsula more broadly.[16] Until this period, the Ottoman administration of this region over the course of the 19th century had relied on two sets of intermediaries: the al-Rashid confederacy in Jabal Shamar centered on Hail and the Amirate of Mecca over the Hijaz.[17] Over the course of the 19th century, whenever the Ottomans desired to repel threat or expand its reach into the Peninsula, it relied on these two allies to do so. One challenge was the Wahhabi movement. Beginning in 1902, Abd al-Aziz al-Saud recaptured his family's capital from al-Rashid and began conquering surrounding territories, including al-Qasim by 1906. In response, Amir Husayn sent an Ottoman-backed expedition led by his son 'Abdullah in 1910 to confront ibn Saud in al-Qasim, where he claimed the right to collect tithes from the tribes residing there. They clashed with Saudi forces, and even captured Abd al-Aziz's brother, forcing Ibn Saud to recognize Ottoman and Husayn's control over al-Qasim. Ibn Saud agreed to pay an annual tax for occupying the region and to collect the tithe from the tribesmen in Husayn's name to be forwarded to the Amirate. This agreement was short lived, however, and never actualized, but this interaction exemplified how the Ottomans traditionally relied on its peninsular allies to represent their interests.

Another Peninsular threat emerged to the Hijaz's south in the 'Asir region, which until this point was governed by a provincial Ottoman ally. Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-Idris, a descendent of leaders of a Sufi *tariqa* in Morocco who had studied in al-Azhar and immigrated to the Arabian

---

[16] For histories of non-Hashemite tribal powers in the Arabian Peninsula, see Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State* (Oxford University Press, 1993); Anne K Bang, *The Idrisi State in 'Asir, 1906-1934: Politics, Religion and Personal Prestige as Statebuilding Factors in Early Twentieth-Century Arabia* (Bergen: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1996); Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in An Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Saudi Arabia* (I.B.Tauris, 1997); Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar* (Columbia University Press, 1997); Madawi Al Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[17] Talha Çiçek has suggested that until 1908, Ottoman policy had not been to "eliminate local particularities" of the Arabian Peninsula's leaders but to collaborate with them--often through allied intermediaries like the Rashidis in Nejd or the Hashemites in Mecca. See Çiçek, "Negotiating Power and Authority in the Desert: The Arab Bedouin and the Limits of the Ottoman State in Hijaz, 1840–1908"; Çiçek, "The Tribal Partners of Empire in Arabia: The Ottomans and the Rashidis of Najd, 1880–1918."

Peninsula and declared himself to be the *Mahdi* and independent of the Ottoman Empire with Abha as his capital in 1906. Because of his actions, a six-year insurrection began between him and the Ottomans with Amir Husayn sending his forces, led by his son Faysal, to ‘Asir to battle al-Idris and his tribal supporters. Perhaps more than al-Saud, al-Idris seemingly posed a more dangerous threat to Husayn and the Hijaz because of his proximity to Mecca meant that he could potentially disrupt the pilgrimage, the economic and symbolic source of the Amirate’s independence and Ottoman legitimacy in the Muslim world. That threat proved unfounded as Amir Husayn and Ottoman forces secured the Hijaz’s frontiers from Idrisid influence by 1912.[18]

In both the cases of al-Saud and al-Idris, Sharif Husayn was an instrumental regional authority with whom the CUP-dominated Ottoman government relied. His proximity to these peninsular powers and his religious standing rooted as in his descent from Muhammad and his leadership over the Holy Cities made him a logical vehicle for Ottoman interests. Thus, in both cases, Husayn led the charge--his sons as agents--to subdue these threats. His interest in subduing these threats, however, was not necessarily for the service of the Ottoman government, but mirrored Husayn’s interests in aggrandizing his own authority in the region against possible challengers who could attract the loyalty of nomadic tribesmen. In the appraisal of one scholar, “the sharif played the role assigned to him willingly, because he in turn could use it to promote his position vis-à-vis perennial rivals in the region and maneuver for enhanced local power and prerogatives.”[19] Initially, in dealing with these two powers, the interests of the CUP government to defend Ottoman territories and Husayn’s desire to project his power regionally intersected to justify coordinated action. For Husayn, his more aggressive posturing to regional rivals may have

[18] Bang, *The Idrisi State in ‘Asir, 1906-1934*, 35–55; 68–106.

[19] Kayalı, pg. 172.

also reflected his efforts to make up for the loss of prestige associated with the administrative shuffling in the Hijaz.

As a result of European intervention in the Arabian Peninsula in the form of negotiated treaties of alliances with tribal chieftains in exchange for formal, extra-Ottoman recognition, the CUP government shifted its strategy for exerting its influence in the region. In the midst of the Ottoman war against Italy in Libya, Italy announced its support for the al-Idris's insurrection in 1912 in order to distract the Ottomans from Libya. Denied dominating al-Qasim, ibn Saud looked eastward and in 1913, he successfully conquered the region of al-Hasa along the Persian Gulf. With his conquest of this territory, the Saudis became a Persian Gulf power, thereby attracting the attention of Great Britain. Because of British interests in India and Iran, where oil had been discovered in 1908, the Persian Gulf was a region of strategic interest. In fact, in 1899, British officials had even signed an agreement with the Shaykh of Kuwait, Shaykh Mubarak al-Sabah recognizing his independence in exchange for his friendship. For similar reasons, now that ibn Saud had reached the Persian Gulf, British officials in India sent an agent from Kuwait to meet with him.[20] In response, the CUP abandoned a policy of setting Amir Husayn or al-Rashid in Hail to subdue these powers. Instead, they sought to establish a direct accommodation with them. Beginning in 'Asir, the CUP attempted to negotiate directly with al-Idris, which ended in failure. With Ibn Saud, however, by 1914 the Ottoman government in Basra signed a treaty recognizing his dynastic claim to the territories under his control in exchange for his recognition of Ottoman sovereignty.[21] The CUP's shift in policing the Arabian Peninsula, bypassing Amir Husayn, never

[20] H. R. P. Dickson, *Kuwait and Her Neighbours.* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956); B. Slot, *Mubarak Al-Sabah: Founder of Modern Kuwait 1896-1915* (Arabian, 2005).

[21] For a description, analysis, and the text of the actual treaty see Jacob Goldberg, "The 1914 Saudi-Ottoman Treaty — Myth or Reality?," *Journal of Contemporary History* 19, no. 2 (April 1, 1984): 289–314.

created direct control; instead, it had the effect "to maintain a position of strength vis-à-vis the different local power holders."[22] For Husayn, this policy diminished the prestige granted to him as an Ottoman official, relegating him to one of several peninsular powers.

In Hasan Kayalı's interpretation, the CUP's policies of centralizing administration of the Hijaz, typified by Medina's changing administrative status and their outreach to al-Idris and ibn Saud in the Arabian Peninsula, ultimately frustrated Husayn's effort to dominate the peninsula, despite his persistent collaboration. As Kayalı chronicled, Husayn likewise conflicted with the various Ottoman governors who antagonized him by meeting with members of the Zayd household or not showing him the traditional deference that previous governors had shown to the Amir of Mecca.[23] Nevertheless, Husayn continued to perform Ottomanism. He continued working with government officials, and in the case of his sons, they even served as members of the Ottoman parliament for the Hijaz.[24]

Beneath Husayn's Ottomanism, however, was a critique that extended beyond his own personal frustration with the CUP government. In a letter written to his brother, Amir Husayn articulated a critique of the government's policies in the Hijaz and the Arabian Peninsula along the lines of his Arab Hamidianism, rooted in the Hamidian compromise, whereby the Amirate was tied to the caliphate, and acted as the center--and representative--of the Arab world. The letter was most likely written in 1913, in the midst of Ottoman outreach to al-Idrisi, Sharif Husayn analyzed the current situation to his brother, Nasir. The letter seemed to have been a response to his brother's commentary--or perhaps interception--of a letter from Istanbul "to Yemen for al-Idris"

---

[22] Kayalı, pg. 165.

[23] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 165–71; TNA Acting Consul Abdurrahman, Jeddah, to Ambassador G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 4 November 1911 [FO 195/2376].

[24] Kayalı, 149–54; Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 59–61.

through the local CUP-appointed governor ‘Ali Pasha that may have contained insinuations or directives about negotiating a settlement with the insurrectionist leader in Asir. The bulk of the letter’s content deals with the CUP’s policies as threatening the unity of the Islamic world:

> My Lord, their [the CUP’s] desire is to sink us into the ground despite the important services we provide. What is the purpose of the amirate? No, no my Lord. It is for the seat of the caliphate which is now Islamic unity and a service for your grandfather to his *Umma* which does not scatter its roots. This is that which we strive. I bring you good news that they [the CUP] are failing after their intention to divide the Scripture of Muslims. But, my brother, it is necessary if you hear something like this, go to His Highness [the Grand Wazir] or his adviser and say to him: We have learned this, and we regret that you all seek to let go the Hijaz from your hands and it is now the first *vilayet* in submission and silence. It is necessary to learn that the state, what it is, is confined to the Turk, but we have the greatest share in the advisory [council], and the right to an opinion regarding its foundation…. What we see is harmful and contrary to [the state’s] benefits, so we must also respond by consultation. What is to gain, fame or self-interest, is but to serve the community of Muslims. They [the CUP] gave the Idrissi who follow the Italians and under their influence and have authority over them. And Ibn Saud is the same.[25]

At first glance, Husayn’s claims seemed to mirror the analyses offered by Ernest Dawn and others who have argued that Husayn had couched his critiques functionally along Sunni arguments of Islamic unity.[26] Husayn was frustrated by the State’s decision to reach out to rogue elements like al-Idris or ibn Saud, who represented both religious and political challenges to the state, instead of subduing them. Such a call for Islamic unity mirrored Ottomanism since he advocated for the unity of the state over any corrosive powers.

Present in Husayn’s analysis and critique of the CUP’s policies, however, was his articulation of the contours of the ‘Awn household’s political evolution as Arab Hamidians. For Husayn, while the question of Islamic unity dominated his concerns, he nonetheless couched his

---

[25] “From Husayn to his brother Nasir, approximately 1913” in Musa, *Al-Marasalat al-Tarikhiyya, 1914-1918: Al-Thawra al-’arabiyya al-Kubra*, 9–10.

[26] Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973, 86.

critique along the Hamidian lines of the centrality of the caliphate to the unification of both Islamic world and thus the unity of the state. To Husayn, the Amirate existed "for the seat of the caliphate which is now Islamic unity and a service for your grandfather to his *umma* that does not scatter its roots. This is to which we strive."[27] Then Amirate, then, oriented ultimately to supporting the caliphate and did so by pledging political fealty and looking towards the caliph as the ultimate Islamic authority with the power to appoint or dismiss the Amirate. As such, the caliphate represented Islamic unity, and the Amirate of Mecca had the responsibility of supporting that unity. In terms of the CUP's policies, by attempting to establish an accommodation with al-Idris and ibn Saud, they encouraged political and religious disintegration. Because al-Idris and ibn Saud were as much religious movements that did not recognize the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate, from Husayn's view the CUP now supported the religious disintegration of the Islamic world by groups who did not recognize the supreme religious and political authority of the Caliph.

Besides Husayn valuing the loyalty to the caliph as a sign of Islamic unity, which he believed the CUP threatened, he also displayed in his letter to his brother the historical connection between the Arabs, the Amirate of Mecca, and the Caliphate. First, while never mentioning the "Arabs," Amir Husayn nonetheless referenced the conquest of the Arab provinces by Sultan Selim in 1517, when he described how the Hijaz had been the first of these *wilayet* to submit itself to the Ottoman caliph, thus suggesting his historical reading of the Hijaz leading the Arabs. Second, he drew a contrast between the Arabs and the "Turk" who have taken over the state even though they do not have the greatest share in the Sultan's *Shura* council. Finally, by emphasizing the preponderance of Arab representation in the Sultan's inner-circle of advisers to justify that the Arabs have a "right to an opinion" on state matters, Husayn suggested the Arabs have a special

[27] Musa, *Al-Murasalat al-Tarikhiyya, 1914-1918: Al-Thawra al-'arabiyya al-Kubra*, 10.

relationship with the caliphate that the Turks did not have. Later in his letter, Husayn brought these three points together when he declared to his brother that "what we have is fervor among the Muslims which we stoke, for our country, for our noble people, and for their sacred places….No one is truer than us nor more senior than us in humble veneration and subordination to the position of caliph…."[28] The Arabs, according to Husayn, particularly those that are closest to the holy places of Mecca and Medina are the only ones that can rouse the support of the Muslims. In this way, Husayn offered a version of Hamidian pan-Islamism as it related to the Arabs: more than just political union, courting the Arabs legitimated the Islamic project of the Ottoman state. The linchpin to this project was the Amir of Mecca because of his authority over the sacred areas and because of his loyalty to the caliphate.

Husayn's condemnation of the Turk reflected the emerging criticism that the CUP government promoted Turkism in their centralizing and administrative policies. An allusion made by Husayn further confirmed his early fears that the "Turks" threatened to divide the Islamic world. He mentioned that the CUP "are failing after their intention to divide the Scripture of Muslims." Followed closely by his assertion that the state was being confined to the "Turk," Husayn alluded to a debate in Istanbul of "rendering" the Quran into Turkish.[29] The Quran in Arabic has always held and continues to hold reverence in the Islamic world since Arabic was the language of its initial transmission. Although the history of producing the Quran in other languages has long been debated, following the 1908 Constitutional revolution, the issue gained renewed relevance as key voices in Istanbul advocated for the production of a Turkish Quran. Because its secular and

[28] Musa, 10.

[29] Wilson, M. Brett. "The First Translations of the Qur'an in Modern Turkey (1924-38)." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 41, no. 3 (2009): 419-35.

religious advocates had allied with the Committee of Union and Progress, the project to produce a Turkish-language Quran became associated with the liberalizing project of the CUP. Husayn's early reference in 1913, later echoed during the Arab Revolt, confirmed his early anxieties of the role of Turkish nationalism in corrupting not only the state but also Islam while simultaneously reducing the political and religious prestige of the Arabs.

The critiques contained in Husayn's letter indeed combined elements of Ottomanism--the need to preserve the state against aggression, albeit on Hamidian terms that had emerged decades before in collusion with the 'Awn household. Husayn criticized the CUP government for reaching out to his peninsular rivals who rejected the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate on both political and religious grounds. The recognition of the primacy of the caliphate had been the linchpin for 'Awn loyalty to the Ottoman system. Since the CUP deposed of the Caliph and now reached out to his enemies, for Husayn, the Ottoman government now threatened the unity of the Islamic world which the caliphate represented. In this way, Husayn's Ottomanism, by emphasizing the centrality of the caliphate which Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's pan-Islamist project had done, Husayn criticized the CUP on Hamidian terms.

Beyond this rhetoric, the previous reauthorization of Husayn as the Amir of Mecca in 1911 had provided a public display of Husayn's political ideology through ceremony. The Persian pilgrim Hossein Kazemzadeh described the rituals taking place on December 1st, following the conclusion of all the pilgrimage rites. Kazemzadeh described a receiving tent that could hold three hundred people with ornate carpets, sofas, rows of chairs, and an elevated couch "to serve as the throne for the Sharif…." Beside Amir Husayn's receiving tent was the tent of Ottoman *wali* and the commander of the Ottoman armed forces in the Hijaz. In this tent, Ottoman officials, foreign dignitaries like consul generals, honored guests, and some other Sharifians gathered. Before the

ceremony started, within Amir's reception tent, those attending sat based on their status: "to the right of the Sharif's throne are the pashas [Ottoman officials] and the military authorities; to the left, the sharifs and Arab dignitaries. Behind both lines of chairs are drawn up, standing, the Arab chieftains with their swords and daggers."[30] Then the Amir arrived and sat on his throne, at which time everyone present formed a line to kiss his hand, offer congratulatory sentiments, and receive coffee. When all have been seated, the *Amin al-Surra*, the Sultan's agent charged with delivering the Amir's stipend (*surra*), enters the tent and presented the Amir with the official firman "wrapped in gold brocade" and a mantle provided by the Sultan.[31] Amir Husayn donned the mantle on himself, and then placed the *firman* (which came from the Sultan) on a small pulpit in the middle of the tent. Husayn's secretary (*khatib*) then read the firman, first in Turkish and then Arabic, while the Amir sat and listened. Among the elements of the firman reported by Kazemzadeh were a chronicle of the ancestral gifts from the Sultan; a recognition of the services, loyalty, and the faith of the Amir's family; and finally an account of Husayn's charge to maintain the security of the country, the happiness of his faithful subjects, and a just administration.[32] After the firman was read, the Amir remained at his throne as everyone approached him again before leaving his ten. Finally, the pilgrims "of all nationalities" were allowed to enter and to greet the Amir who remained at his throne (with the firman on his lap) for several hours as "they kiss his hands, his garment, his shoulders, and his feet."[33]

---

[30] Peters, *Mecca*, 352. Original from Hossein Kazem Zadeh, "Relation d'un Pèlerinage a La Mecque En 1910-1911," *Revue Du Monde Musulman* 19 (1912): 183.

[31] Peters, *Mecca*, 352; Kazem Zadeh, "Relation d'un Pèlerinage a La Mecque En 1910-1911," 184.

[32] Peters did not translate this section which is only found in Kazem Zadeh, "Relation d'un Pèlerinage a La Mecque En 1910-1911," 185.

[33] Peters, *Mecca*, 353; Kazem Zadeh, "Relation d'un Pèlerinage a La Mecque En 1910-1911," 185-186.

This ceremony, which according to Kazemzadeh took place every year, symbolized Husayn's Arab Hamidianism. The ceremony, taking place in a tent accompanied with traditional Arab hospitality, embodied the Arabness of Husayn's identity, considering that he could have hosted the event in his palace. Likewise, the presence of a separate tent for Ottoman officials and foreign dignitaries visually created two different groups: the Amir and the "foreigners," that is Ottoman officials and consuls. Within Husayn's tent, his throne was the focal point of two separate groups. On one side were Sharifians and Arab dignitaries, and on the other were government officials. Husayn and his throne connected the two groups. The fact that the Sultan, through his personal agent and not a bureaucratic official like the wali, delivered the firman and mantle directly to the Amir highlighted Husayn's direct connection--without intermediaries--to the Sultan-Caliph. Finally, the inclusion of Muslim pilgrims from all nationalities to the event asserted the Amirate of Mecca's role in the pilgrimage and in the broader Islamic world. Taken all together, the re-investiture of Husayn as the Amir of Mecca celebrated the contours of his Arab Hamidianism by placing him at the center of Ottoman, Arab, and Muslim worlds.

Seeking New Allies

With the terms of the Hamidian compromise threatened by the activities of the CUP government, Husayn sought new allies to safeguard his political authority as the Amir of Mecca, which he believed functioned to unite the Islamic world under the authority of the universal caliphate. This quest for allies to safeguard his position as the Amirate of Mecca became the basis for his decision to launch the Arab Revolt, namely, his and his son's outreach to British and Arabist figures for support. While Husayn undoubtedly looked to augment his position in the Arab and

Muslim worlds by asserting his independence from the Ottoman Empire, the fear of his Zayd rival, ‘Ali Haydar, underscored his efforts. For this reason, the Hashemite Household rivalry still guiding the activities of Amir Husayn who feared that like his cousin, the new government may decide to replace him.

This fear was not unwarranted. Although quietly lobbying for his household’s return to the Amirate of Mecca, ‘Ali Haydar was nonetheless a persistent presence that in many respects must have haunted Husayn. In October 1911, ‘Ali Haydar travelled to Damascus carrying “a personal message for the people of Syria” from the Sultan, and then travelled to Medina by the Hijaz railway.[34] Once he reached Medina with his sons, he reported that “the whole population of Medina turned out to greet us on arrival,” and that daily after prayers he and his sons “received many visitors” who came to pay their respects.[35] He even visited “the club of the Young Turks [CUP],” with his sons, and that while there, he was met by a “large assembly....including the Mufti and other learned men.” He described how “the military band played, speeches were made both in Arabic and Turkish, and poetry was recited,” in his honor.[36] Around this same time, perhaps reflecting his anxiety and frustration at his Zayd rival being so close and receiving such a reception, Husayn refused to enter the reception tent of the Ottoman *wali* in Jeddah until Sharif Nasir ibn Ghalib, the uncle of ‘Ali Haydar, left it.[37] It is reasonable that Husayn’s reconfirmation of his investiture as the Amir of Mecca in December 1911 may have been a response to ‘Ali Haydar’s visit to the region.

---

[34] Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 117.

[35] Stitt, 119–20.

[36] Stitt, 120.

[37] TNA: Acting British ConsulAbdurrahman, Jeddah, to Ambassador. G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 4 November 1911 [FO 195/2376].

As early as 1913, around the same time that Husayn began expressing his objections about the change in state policies towards al-Saud and al-Idris and when the CUP regained control over the parliament, officials in the Hijaz began discussing replacing Amir Husayn with his Zayd rival. In a memorandum, Wahib Pasha, the then-military commander of the Hijaz, articulated his doubts about Husayn's loyalty to Ghalib Pasha, the incoming governor of the Hijaz. Fearing that Husayn had plans to seek "Arab independence and to separate the Hijaz" from the Ottoman state, he recommended that Ghalib find a way to dismiss him and to appoint Sharif 'Ali Haydar. In doing so, he predicted that the state would better be able to control the post. [38] Thus, in this short memorandum between the leading Ottoman officials of the Hijaz, the government's view of Husayn, as an impending traitor, was disclosed. At the same time, these officials connected Sharif 'Ali Haydar to the government's schemes for managing the Hijaz. From this exchange, an important component for the CUP's attempts to bring the Hijaz closer to the centralized Ottoman administration was to eventually replace Husayn with 'Ali Haydar. This suggestion highlighted that closeness between 'Ali Haydar and the CUP officials that now extended beyond ideological commitments but included political goals as well.

Fear of being replaced by 'Ali Haydar underpinned Husayn's outreach to British officials in Cairo in 1914. The British, because of their consular and public health penetration into the Hijaz, had become an alternative power in the Hijaz from whom Husayn could appeal for help and relief. Despite the hostility that European powers confronted from the policies of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid and continued by the CUP government that sought closer ties to Germany, the British had maintained their presence in the Hijaz on behalf of their Muslim subjects who traded, visited, and

[38] For the text of the memorandum, see Kulayb Sa'ud al-Fawaz, *Al-Marsalat al-Matabadala Bayna al-Sharif al-Husayn Bin 'Ali wa al-'Uthmaniyin: 1908-1918* (Amman: Wizarat al-Thaqafah, 1997), 92.

performed the pilgrimage in the area. In general terms, the British had enjoyed a cooperative relationship with Amir Husayn, initially dubbing him "an enlightened man...and is friendly to Europeans" at his ascension to the Amirate of Mecca.[39] Over the course of his reign as the Amir of Mecca, Husayn maintained a workable relationship with British officials both in Jeddah and in Egypt which supplied a large share of pilgrims, despite some periods of tension as Husayn attempted to exert his authority in the region.[40]

An important note must be made of Husayn's sons, who served as his agents during this period. Husayn, as the Amir of Mecca, appears to have never left the region during this period, electing instead to send his sons 'Abdullah (1882-1951) and Faysal (1885-1933) as his representatives. Husayn's sons had proved politically well-connected both within their household and fully embedded within Ottoman elite circles, since their father's exile in 1891 to Istanbul meant that they studied in Istanbul as youths. As Husayn's eldest and heir apparent, 'Ali remained in Mecca and acted as his father's direct agent in the Hijaz. During the period following the 1908 Revolution, as parliamentary elections were held in every province in the empire, 'Abdullah and Faysal were both elected members of parliament. 'Abdullah represented Mecca as one of its deputies, and Faysal represented Jeddah.[41] Both sons spent their winters and spring in Istanbul to be present for parliamentary meetings, but then returned to the Hijaz to be near their father. While both men's parliamentary record proved miniscule, it appeared that 'Abdullah had been sympathetic to the Liberal Union, which had formed in opposition to the CUP.[42] During crises,

[39] TNA: J.H. Monahan, Jeddah, to Sir G.A. Lowther, Constantinople, 5 December 1908 [FO 195/2286].

[40] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 170.

[41] Mary Christina Wilson, King 'Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18-19.

[42] Wilson, 19.

such as the Idrisi threat in ‘Asir in the spring 1911, ‘Abdullah and Faysal had both joined their father in Qunfudha along the coast. ‘Abdullah even led a cavalry of four hundred Arabs to Abha, which were defeated and led the government to dispatch soldiers from Istanbul and Yemen to retake the city.[43]

Thus considering the political realities of the British presence in the Hijaz and the Muslim world as well as the Amirate of Mecca’s historical interactions with its agents, it was logical that Husayn’s son, ‘Abdullah, covertly met with British officials in Egypt in February and April 1914. This meeting was ostensibly coincidental, taking place as a matter of diplomatic courtesy after Lord Kitchener, then-Consul General in Egypt, paid ‘Abdullah a visit at the residence of the Khedive, with whom ‘Abdullah was staying. Kitchener had praised Amir Husayn for safeguarding the pilgrims, and the Khedive’s secretary advised him to return the visit. During this return visit, Lord Kitchener warned ‘Abdullah that the Turks sought to enact “fundamental changes in the Arab countries” that even included “changing the Amir.” In response, ‘Abdullah affirmed his father’s loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph, but also took the opportunity to ask that if his father “opined that such a defense would benefit the Holy Homeland, then would you [the British] support him in that defense?” To that, Kitchener replied that it would be inappropriate considering that his government had friendly relations with the Ottoman government, to which ‘Abdullah responded by reminding him of the agreement the British had concluded in 1899 with the Shaykh of Kuwait that recognized his sovereignty and offered him protection against the Ottomans.[44]

---

[43] Wilson, 20-21.

[44] Philip P. Graves, *Memoirs of King ‘Abdullah of Transjordan* (Jonathan Cape, 1950), 106–7; Ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkarti*, 77.

In Lord Kitchener's report of this meeting to Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he provided a similar account of his meeting with ‘Abdullah. In his version, however, ‘Abdullah expressed more anxiety of the possibility of his father’s dismissal:

> He wished me to ask you whether in case this friction became acute and an attempt was made by the Turkish Government to dismiss his father from the hereditary office of Sherif of the holy places, you would use your good offices with the Sublime Porte to prevent any such attempt. He pointed out that his father had always done his best to assist Indian Moslem pilgrims amongst whom he had many friends. He stated very decidedly that in case the Turkish Government dismissed his father the Arab tribes of the Hedjaz would fight for the Sherif and a state of war against the Turkish troops would ensue. He hoped in such circumstances that the British Government would not allow reinforcements to be sent by sea for the purpose of preventing the Arabs from exercising the rights which they have enjoyed from time immemorial in their own country round the holy places.[45]

In Kitchener’s report, which was dated closer to the meeting, he recounted ‘Abdullah’s fear that the CUP-government had designs to replace his father and his desire that the British use their political but also military influence to protect his father’s position.

In a subsequent dispatch, the British ambassador to Istanbul, Sir Louis Du Pan Mallet, provided a contextual analysis of ‘Abdullah’s fears. He mentioned Husayn’s anxiety that the CUP reached out to his peninsular rivals, thereby weakening his standing, but that Husayn also feared his Hashemite rivals. Sir Mallet wrote in a “Memorandum on the position of the Grand Sheriff of Mecca,” that “it is also interesting to note that the two best known Sherifs resident in Constantinople, ‘Ali Haidar and Jafer, are close allies of the Committee, the former having been for a time Minister of Evkaf and being now Vice-President of the Senate, while Jafer toured Syria in the Committee interest at the time of the 1912 elections.” He continued that “these brothers are reported to be bitterly hostile to the present Grand Sherif. ‘Ali Haidar is the head of the

[45]From: Volume X, Part II: *The Last Years of Peace* (British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, GP Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds. With the assistance of Lillian M. Penson, PhD, 1938), pps 824-838.

dispossessed Motallib branch of the Sherifian family and is said to cherish the ambition of becoming Grand Sherif himself." Mallet rightly concluded that amid the myriad of pressures Husayn faced from the CUP's policy, the presence of 'Ali Haydar as a CUP ally posed a persistent threat that challenged Husayn in the most personal of ways: as a Hashemite.

The British, because of their presence in the Hijaz and because of the 'Awn household's history of petitioning them, were logical allies. In addition to the British, however, considering Husayn's stated concern for the unity of the Arabs and thus the Islamic world, Arabists likewise provided him another potential ally. Some of these emerging Arabist parties, like *al-Fatat* (*al-Jam'iyya al-'Arabiyya al-Fatat*) in 1909, called for the protection, liberation, and independence of the Arab nation and consisted of young literary intellectuals. Others, like *al-'Ahd* in 1913, comprised of Arab Ottoman officers, petitioned for the creation of a bi-national empire, like Austria-Hungary, to be created so as to guarantee the rights of the Arabs but also preserve the unity of the Ottoman state.[46] Generally speaking, these Arab parties inhabited a spectrum between outright Arab secession from the Ottoman Empire--as advocated for by Najib al-'Azuri and like *al-Fatat*--or a schema of decentralization whereby the Arab regions enjoyed greater autonomy within the Ottoman system. As will be discussed below, the "Turkifying" policies of the CUP and the wartime conditions of the Ottoman Empire, had the effect of "radicalizing" these parties against the state.

The earliest Hashemite interaction with Arabist parties followed the meeting with Husayn's son 'Abdullah in Cairo in 1914 when he formally contacted the Islamic Arabist Muhammad Rashid Rida, the founder and editor of the periodical *al-Manar*. Rashid Rida had a long history of political activism that sought to defend the Islamic world against western colonialism. Protesting the

[46] Tauber, 221–22.

policies and governance of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid, he and other Syrian emigres in Cairo established the Society of the Ottoman Council (*Jam‘iyyat al-Shura al-‘Uthmaniyya)* in 1907, which included other ethnic groups of the Ottoman Empire to protest the Sultan’s rule and to advocate for a constitutional reform. Besides attracting the attention of the CUP who sought to merge the two groups together, Rida’s party also inducted Muhib al-Din al-Khatib who passed through Cairo on his way to Yemen to serve as an interpreter to the British consulate there.[47] (At the start of the Arab Revolt discussed more below, he became the editor of Husayn’s revolutionary newspaper, *al-Qibla*.) By 1913, frustrated by the CUP that had regained power in a coup d’état, Rida founded the Society of the Arab Association (*Jami‘iyyat al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya*) that advocated for the union of the Arab powers of the Arabian peninsula and to create a cooperative network of Arab societies.[48]

As a *salafist*, Rida advocated for restoring Islam to its original teachings and practices, which translated into a strict interpretation of the Quran and *Shari‘a* (Islamic Law), and the desire for the Arabs to regain their religious leadership over the Islamic world by eventually reclaiming the caliphate.[49] In search for such an inspirational figure, Rida had looked towards the Arabian Peninsula and its tribes, whom he believed represented a bastion of pure Islam unaffected by innovations or superstitions introduced by non-Arab Muslim dynasties.[50] In fact, his belief that

---

[47] Tauber, 52–53.

[48] Tauber, 114.

[49] Eliezer Tauber, “Rashid Rida as Pan-Arabist before World War I,” *The Muslim World* 79, no. 2 (April 1989), 109 and *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: F. Cass, 1993); Eyal Zisser, “Rashid Rida: On the Way to Syrian Nationalism in the Shade of Islam and Arabism,” in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers and Identity*, ed. Adel Beshara, vol. 10, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern History; (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 131-132. For a detailed description of Rida’s ideas of the caliphate, both before and after the Arab Revolt, see M.H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1966), 153–86.

[50] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 231. Albert Habib Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 90-102; Orit Bashkin, “Journeys between Civility and

the restoration of the Islamic world depended on the peninsular tribes led Rida to visit the shaykh of Kuwait after a speaking tour in India in 1912. Reportedly rebuffed, he then visited ibn Saud from there.[51]

His interest and meeting with ‘Abdullah two years later in Cairo undoubtedly reflected his persistent interest in the peninsular powers and, like his ideological predecessors, a belief that the caliphate must return to the family of the prophet, the Quraysh.[52] Although ‘Abdullah did not mention this meeting in his memoirs, Rida claimed to have inducted ‘Abdullah into his secret society *Jami‘iyyat al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya*.[53] The initial oath for the society, which ‘Abdullah would have made, however, provides one way of interpreting ‘Abdullah’s understanding of the club he joined. Pledges to preserve the absolute secrecy of the society and statements of the threat of God’s wrath and punishment to those that join the society and betray its mission comprised the bulk of the oath. In one line, however, ‘Abdullah referenced his father’s emerging project: “to bring about the cohesion of the Arabs, the unity of their amirs and the founding of a new kingdom for….”[54] From the Hashemite perspective, the oath-binding goal of uniting all the Arabs and to establish a single kingdom for them mirrored Husayn’s earlier critique that the policies of the CUP

Wilderness: Debates on Civilization and Emotions in the Arab Middle East, 1861-1939,” in *Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth Century Asia and Europe*, ed. Helge Jordheim Margrit Pernau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 137.

[51] *La Verité Sur La Question Syrienne*. (Stamboul : Commandement de la IVme Armée, 1916), 102-103.

[52] Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida*, 166–67.

[53] ‘Abdullah’s decision not to expound on his relationship with Rida in his memoirs undoubtedly reflected the post-Ottoman falling out between the Hashemites and Rida. See Nevo, “‘Abdullah’s Memoirs as Historical Source Material.” For a description of Rida’s club, its ideology, and its other members and to read more about the other groups of Arabist parties, see Eli‘ezer Ta’uber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: F. Cass, 1993).

[54] Amin Sa‘id, *Al-Thawrah al-‘Arabiyah al-Kubra, Tarikh Mufassal Jami‘ Lil-Qadiyah al-‘Arabiyah Fi Rub‘ Qarn*, vol. 1 (Misr: Matba‘at ‘Isá al-Babi al-Halabi, 1934), 49–50; English translation provided by Eliezer Tauber, “Rashid Rida as Pan-Arabist before World War I,” *The Muslim World* 79, no. 2 (April 1989): 107.

in the peninsula had the effect of dividing the Arabs by making individual agreements with their leaders. In Rida's later description of this union, he likewise claimed that this union would be presided by Amir Husayn--a prospect that corresponded with Husayn's vision of his leadership over the Arabs in the peninsula.[55]

Husayn's Movement towards Political Arabism

In November 1914, the Ottomans declared war on the Entente (Great Britain, Russia, and France), thereby formally joining the War on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The empire was effectively governed autocratically by the original CUP military triumvirate, or "Three Pashas," that came to power following the 1913 coup d'état: Ismail Enver Pasha (Minister of War), Mehmed Talaat Pasha (Grand Vizier and Minister of the Interior), and Ahmed Cemal ("Jamal") Pasha (Minister of the Navy and then later Military Governor of Syria). While initially hesitant to join the war, preferring to avoid conflict, they nonetheless did so with the understanding that the fate of the empire was at stake.[56] They had ultimately concluded that the war effort offered a means to unite the state in a way that previous efforts had failed and was an opportunity to reclaim territory that had been lost, particularly in the Balkans and in the Caucasus.[57]

Until Amir Husayn declared his independence by launching the Arab Revolt in June 1916, the Ottomans were able, with the aid of German supplies and advice, to defend its territory. From

[55]Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements*, 115.

[56] For a classic general history of World War I in the Middle East, see Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*. For more recent histories see McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame : War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923*; Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015.

[57] See Mustafa Aksakal, "Not 'by Those Old Books of International Law, but Only by War': Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 507–44; Mustafa Aksakal, "The Limits of Diplomacy: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, no. 2 (2011): 197–203.

the very start of the war, the Ottomans faced a multi-front conflict with Russian and British forces. Expecting the Ottomans to collapse, British and Russian forces sought to position themselves in such a way to make territorial claims when the war ended. British forces thus sought to secure access to the Suez Canal (deemed critical for the transportation of forces from India, Australia, and New Zealand) and the critical sea routes like the Red Sea through Bab al-Mandib in Yemen and the Persian Gulf. In addition, the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia had also become strategic regions because of their proximity to India and because of the recently developed oil fields in Persia deemed necessary to provide fuel for the British fleet. Once formal hostilities began, the British used the Persian Gulf to advance into Mesopotamia from Basra. For the Russians, seeking to secure its domination of the Black Sea with eventual access to the Mediterranean by capturing Istanbul, the Russians quickly marched on the Caucasus to create a base for invading Anatolia.[58]

Despite these challenges, however, the Ottoman Empire proved more resilient in the first years of the war than war planners had expected. In particular, during the campaigns in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli against the British, the Ottomans had resisted successfully British advances. Concerned by Jamal Pasha's attempt to capture the Suez Canal and bring the conflict to British controlled Egypt (January-February 1915), British planners aimed to knock the Ottomans from the war by seizing Istanbul through the Dardanelles, which culminated into the Gallipoli (Çanakkale) campaign. The lengthy campaign included almost half of the Ottoman army and ended with British and French retreat from the peninsula in January 1916. By April of that same year, the Ottomans captured the British forces in Kut al-Amara on April 29, 1916 and forced

[58] For a specific history of this front, see Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918* (Cambridge University Press, 2011). For a detailed history of the Ottoman military during this period, see Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die : A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001). For a straightforward narrative, Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 99–114; McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame : War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923*, 135–62, 271–94.

the British to retreat to Basra thus securing Baghdad for the time being. Only in the Caucasus front, however, did the Ottomans face a slow progression of Russian advances following the Battle of Sarikamiş (January 1915) that eventually led to the loss of Van and Trebizond on the Black Sea--and ultimately sparked the Armenian genocide as the Ottomans strove to defend Anatolia.[59] Despite these losses, however, Ottoman victory in Gallipoli in early 1916 offered the possibility of strengthening the fronts by repositioning forces away from the capital to the other fronts.[60]

Ottoman resilience rested on support its German allies provided, both material and advisory, but also on the extreme measures its war planners adopted. Namely, the initial decision to adopt "total war" allowed the state to mobilize all of society, including the home front, in support of its troops. This decision reflected the reality that upon entering the war, the Ottomans were already war-weary, strapped for resources, and ill-prepared in terms of infrastructure for a modern war since having been at conflict with a European power since 1908. Termed "safarbarlik" in the historical literature, this mass mobilization included universal male conscription, the requisition of all agricultural products and materials deemed necessary for the war effort, and the imposition of martial law.[61] As the War progressed, however, these policies resulted into widespread food and labor shortages, population displacement, and, in the case of the Armenian citizens, genocide. In Syria, a natural famine and the alleged abuses of its CUP governor, Jamal Pasha, compounded

[59] According to Erickson, the ethnic violence had resulted from deportation orders, which were a response to the "military threat" the Armenians posed following the Russian advance in Van in the Spring 1915. See Edward J. Erickson, "The Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy, 1915," *War in History* 15, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 141–67; Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 168–84.

[60] Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 185–216, 217.

[61] Najwa al-Qattan, "Safarbarlik: Ottoman Syria and the Great War," in *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon*, ed. Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann (Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 2004), 163–74.

the destructive effects of mass mobilization and even had a lasting impact on the region into the colonial period.[62]

To account for the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, historical narratives have often focused on the interplay of Amir Husayn's personal ambitions and the intimations of British colonial officials and Arabist figures with the deteriorating social conditions resulting from the wartime measures the CUP-led government adopted. This intersection of interests resulted in the famed Husayn-McMahon correspondence (July 1915-January 1916) where Amir Husayn and the British High Commissioner of Egypt Sir Henry McMahon, famously negotiated the future of the Arab world if they launched a revolt. The latent deceptions guiding these negotiations, however, also led to what scholars have called the "Anglo-Arab Labyrinth". These include Husayn's exaggerated claim to be the accepted leader of the Arabs before and during the Arab Revolt and British perfidy in negotiating incompatible agreements with other powers. For example, with the French, they agreed to divide the Arab Middle East into various zones of influence in the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916). In November 1917, in the midst of the Arab Revolt, the British also issued the Balfour Declaration, which promised the creation of Jewish homeland in Palestine.

The most significant negotiation that directly related to Husayn's decision to launch the Arab Revolt had been his correspondence with the British High Commissioner of Egypt Sir Henry McMahon, who replaced Lord Kitchener in January 1915. These series of letters, which were

[62] Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (Columbia University Press, 2013), 19–38; Salim Tamari, *Year of the Locust: A Soldier's Diary and the Erasure of Palestine's Ottoman Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 3–88; For broader social histories, see Nazan Maksudyan, *Women and the City, Women in the City: A Gendered Perspective on Ottoman Urban History* (New York: Berghahn Book, 2014); Yigit Akin, *When the War Came Home : The Ottomans' Great War and the Devastation of an Empire* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018). For a look at the impacts in colonial Transjordan, see Tariq Tell, "Guns, Gold, and Grain: War and Food Supply in the Making of Transjordan," in *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East*, ed. Steven Heydemann (Berkeley, Calif.: Regents of the University of California, 2003), 33–58. For Palestine, see Abigail Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire : Jerusalem between Ottoman and British Rule* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2011).

dated from July 1915 until January 1916 became the basis of Husayn's claims for formal British recognition and sovereignty over the Arabs, while also revealing British colonial interests in the region. Kitchener had tacitly rejected 'Abdullah ibn Husayn's suggestion for British support against the Ottoman Empire on account that the British and the Ottomans had not entered hostilities against one another. When it became apparent that the Ottomans would join World War I on the side of the Germans, however, Kitchener send his agent Ronald Storrs to meet with 'Abdullah in September 1914 to discuss the possibility of his father waging a war against the Ottomans, but 'Abdullah displayed reticence at the notion.

Once the Ottomans had formally joined the war effort, Lord Kitchener's successor Henry McMahon sought to pursue an agreement more aggressively with Husayn beginning in January 1915. His efforts and outreach culminated in a series of letters between him and Husayn in which Husayn offered economic concessions to the British in exchange for their aid in launching a revolt against the Ottoman Empire and their formal recognition of an independent Arab state, with Husayn as its head. Over the course of these negotiations, the British reserved certain areas of Husayn's proposed independent state for its own colonial interests (like the provinces of Basra and Baghdad in Iraq) and the colonial interests of its ally, France (the Eastern Mediterranean littoral that included Alexandretta and portions of Syria west of Damascus, Hama, and Aleppo).[63]

[63] Scholars, most notably Elie Kedourie and C. Ernest Dawn, have debated whether Palestine was in fact included in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence. Kedourie, repeating later British justifications, has argued that the word district in the Arabic ("wilayet") could have only meant the Ottoman administrative district. When the districts of Homs, Hama, and west of Damascus were excluded from an independent Arab state that would have included Palestine. Dawn, however, insisting on the literal meaning of district as a region, since Homs and Hama, which were also mentioned as districts for exclusion, were not Ottoman administrative districts, concluded that Palestine was indeed promised to Husayn as part of his envisioned Arab state since it laid not west, but south of Damascus. See Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914-1939*, Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 141–43; Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973, 90–96.

A Euro-centric narrative tends to place the utmost emphasis on the Husayn-McMahon correspondence as instrumental in Husayn's decision to launch the Arab Revolt. This narrative, however, overlooks the continued negotiations that took place between Amir Husayn and the Ottoman government as well. Hasan Kayalı has shown that Husayn's decision to launch the Arab Revolt in June 1916 was actually far from certain as Husayn carefully deliberated his future. In as much as Husayn began to court non-Ottoman forces, namely the British and the Arabist parties, he nonetheless still negotiated with Istanbul. According to Kayalı's description of that correspondence, in exchange for certain protections as the Amir of Mecca, a perpetual concern for Husayn during the CUP-period, he promised to take a more active role in the Ottoman war effort.[64] This correspondence in 1915, almost contemporaneous with the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, while revealing deep suspicions from both sides, also prove that neither the CUP government nor Husayn were "merely passive victims of Great Power intrigue."[65] Indeed, Husayn's alliance with the Arabists and the British ultimately reflected his own conclusion that a better arrangement could not be made with the Ottoman government. As such, Husayn's decision to launch the Arab Revolt, cannot simply be reduced to his abandonment of some form of Ottomanism for Arabism.

The apparent dual negotiations Husayn held between the British and the Ottomans could be considered an act of "double-dealing" or evidence of his insincerity to either Ottomanism or Arabism and thus his ideological duplicity. Another rubric in which to interpret Husayn's near simultaneous negotiations with Arabists, British officials, and the CUP government, is to consider the role of the historical legacy of the Amirate of Mecca and the Hashemite households factored

[64] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 191.

[65] Kayalı, 191.

into his political trajectory. From the outset, his willingness to weigh options appeared self-serving, but it also mirrored the situation his predecessors to the Amirate of Mecca, from both Zayd and ‘Awn households, had faced in 1856 and 1876, respectively. In these circumstances, the Ottomans were at war against a “Great Power” (Russia), which provided the Amirs an opportunity to exert their independence. In 1856, as discussed in the first chapter, Amir ‘Abdul Muttalib attempted a rebellion; in 1876, Husayn’s uncle attempted to exert independent religious authority to intervene in Afghanistan. With the Ottoman entrance in World War I, Husayn now had an opportunity in 1914 to assert his authority in much the same way his ancestors had done. The tension that existed and tempered Husayn’s negotiations towards or away from the Ottoman system was naturally informed by his continued identification as an Arab Hamidian. Before the outbreak of World War I, it was evident in a communication with his brother why Amir Husayn grew increasingly frustrated with the CUP-led government. Their interactions with Peninsular powers like ibn Saud and Al-Idrisi and relationship with members of the Zayd household threatened Husayn’s standing and abrogated the Hamidian compromise to which the ‘Awn household and Husayn had committed themselves. Husayn interpreted these actions as a threat to Muslim unity, which he believed that the Amirate of Mecca, as the leading Arab authority, had a role in preserving as a servant to the Caliph. Moreover, in that same letter, Husayn lamented that the CUP had “disposed freely” of the Caliphate for their own selfish advantages. Thus, the underlying tension for Husayn was his continued loyalty to the Caliphate, despite seeing it corrupted, informed by the historical need for the Amir of Mecca to preserve the unity of the Islamic world through Arab unity.

For example, by December 1914, it was possible to see Husayn migrate away from his household's Arab Hamidianism. In a conversation with a British messenger, 'Ali Bey, in December 1914, Husayn described his present dilemma:

> 'Ali, Turkey is weighing down heavily upon us, beyond the power of our endurance. We therefore oppose the execution of its commands and plans. Yesterday they were planning to send printed circulars or posters to the chiefs of the tribes for distribution among the pilgrims. We oppose the project with all our might and diplomacy; we have opposed it almost to the point of breaking up our relation (with them); and if the Vali had not returned upon his decision, relations would have been definitely broken up. And perhaps causes might spring up which would break these relations even before you arrive at your country; and it might come to pass that the thing would be delayed some three or four or six months….
>
> 'Ali, the only thing that prevents me from rising against the Turkish Empire is the Moslem world, which now looks upon me and feels annoyed with me, especially under the present circumstances. Another reason is this, I cannot forget the favours the reigning house bestowed upon me.
>
> But the reins of power have passed from the hands of this family. Among the reasons which strengthen the hands of the Turkish statesmen and give weight to their influence and power is the interception of food materials from our land. This thing has caused great want there. More, they (Turks) have informed the people and the Bedouins that it was Britain which intercepted the alms and thus reduced them to their pitiable state….
>
> I am bound by three ties; the Caliphate, and, as I have already intimated, the favours which the reigning house bestowed upon me.
>
> As to the religious tie, you see them now declare openly that the cause of the degeneration of the Moslem nations is religion, and they set themselves to efface it. Yea, some have come to us to pay a visit to the Holy Places (on pilgrimage); and these have mocked and scoffed at the thing, and have not performed their religious duties as it behooves them to do. From this you will perceive that religious matters have become lax. Therefore we are no longer bound to obey them.
>
> The second tie concerns our obedience to the Caliphate, but there no longer exists a Caliphate, and that for various reasons, among others that their rule projects plans and deeds that are all contrary to religion. The Caliphate- means this, that the rules of the book of God should be enforced, and this they do not do.
>
> As to the third, I have already intimated that the Turkish Government has come to be nothing more than Enver and his clique. We therefore are no longer bound to them by any tie.

> Notwithstanding this I am of opinion [sic] that it will be better now to put off action. This is due to the reasons explained here above, and to the fact that it will be in our interests that this delay be.[66]

Despite earlier in their conversation to admitting his desire to see Great Britain intervene in the region, Husayn nonetheless expressed continued ties to the Ottoman system only because of his personal loyalty to the caliphate and its occupying household. His criticism of the CUP's policies nonetheless repeated his earlier critiques. For instance, by directly sending propaganda to the "chief of the tribes" to distribute to the pilgrims or, as he suspected, confiscating food for purely politically calculated reasons, the CUP threatened his preeminent standing and responsibility in the Hijaz--a clear abrogation of the Hamidian compromise. Furthermore, echoing his claims with his brother, Husayn continued charging the CUP for threatening proper Islamic practice, including the sacredness of the pilgrimage, namely because of its unabashed promotion of a Turkish nationalist government under the control of Enver, the Minister of War and leading figure of the CUP.

An important development took place, however, in Husayn's ideological program when discussing the caliphate in how it related to the application of Islamic law, in particular, the pilgrimage. His persistent loyalty to the caliphate was limited ultimately to nostalgia, considering his serious reservations of the legitimacy of the office. He based its legitimacy on its enforcement of Islamic law which he claimed it had failed to do. For Husayn, the government, by promoting Turkism had corrupted the caliphate with its "plans and deeds" that violate Islamic law. Husayn even made the most drastic of claims when considering the effect of Turkism: "there no longer

[66] BL: "Correspondence with the Grand Sherif of Mecca," Undated, [IOR/L/PS/18/B222]. According to both Kedourie and Tietelbaum, this conversation took place in December 1914. Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*, 2001, 71.

exists a Caliphate."[67] It was not a coincidence that Husayn focused his criticisms of the Turkish government and the Caliphate in their treatment of the pilgrimage. By focusing on the connection between the Caliphate, Islamic law, and the pilgrimage, Husayn implicitly reinforced his opinion of the importance of the Amirate of Mecca to Islamic unity and to the caliphate. As the Amir of Mecca, the maintenance of the pilgrimage was his responsibility; any threat to its religious importance necessarily required a response from the Amir of Mecca.

At the same time that Husayn began to question his ideological commitments to the Ottoman Empire by vacillating on his loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, representatives of Arabist parties began reaching out to him as a possible leader of an Arab nationalist revolt. The drastic measures taken by Ottoman leadership during wartime had the effect of ultimately radicalizing Arab parties critical of the CUP. Even the Arabist parties that had called for various measures of decentralization abandoned their more moderate aims and instead began agitating for outright independence. Underpinning these calls were the perceived Turkifying measures taken by the CUP government. During a reorganization of the army, Arab officers were forced to resign and were conspicuously replaced with Turkish officers. Turkish became the only official language of state, and was mandated to be the only language used in official government offices and reports. In the memory of Arab figures during this period, they reported that the Ottoman schools in Damascus likewise halted teaching Arabic and only permitted the use of Turkish in the classrooms.[68] In political terms, the CUP's policies and the reality that the Ottoman Empire may be defeated, led several Arabist groups to call for revolt and to begin negotiating with British and

[67] BL: "Correspondence with the Grand Sherif of Mecca," Undated, [IOR/L/PS/18/B222]. According to both Kedourie and Tietelbaum, this conversation took place in December 1914.

[68] Bruce Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516–1918: A Social and Cultural History* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 216.

French officials on support their claims to independence.[69] It was the nationalist party *al-Fatat* (founded in 1909) that formally reached out to Husayn directly in January 1915 when Fawzi al-Bakri, a member of Damascus's elite families and newly inducted member, met Husayn in Mecca with a verbal message. Fawzi, who had avoided conscription because his family was able to arrange for him to be assigned a bodyguard to the Amir of Mecca, informed Husayn that Arab nationalist leaders in Syria and Iraq, many who were seniors in the Ottoman army, intended to rebel. When asked whether he would lead their movement, Husayn reportedly stared out a window in silence never offering a comment to the suggestion.[70]

Fawzi al-Bakri's intimation to Husayn took place shortly before Husayn's agents serendipitously discovered documents from the CUP-appointed governor of the Hijaz, Vehip Pasha. These documents, famously taken from an intercepted trunk, confirmed one of Husayn's persistent anxieties: the CUP's intent to replace him.[71] The CUP had in fact many reasons to distrust Husayn's intentions. Despite their frequent appeals, he vacillated in his promises to affirm the Sultan's call for *jihad*.[72] Furthermore, very suspiciously, Husayn never sent reinforcements for Jamal Pasha's attack on the Suez Canal in January-February 1915, as he had promised.[73] Under a cloud of suspicion, Husayn would have been unsurprised most likely to learn that the Ottoman government had designs to remove him.

---

[69] Eliezer Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War I* (London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1993), 10–34.

[70] Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 278.

[71] Amin Sa'id, *Al-Thawrah al-'Arabiyah al-Kubra, Tarikh Mufassal Jami' Lil-Qadiyah al-'Arabiyah Fi Rub' Qarn*, vol. 1 (Misr: Matba'at 'Isá al-Babi al-Halabi, 1934), 105–6; Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973, 28; Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 189–90; Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 279.

[72] Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 277; Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 187–88.

[73] Jamal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919.* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922), 152–53. According to Jamal Pasha, Husayn sent his oldest son 'Ali with a contingent of troops, but by his father's orders remained in Medina never to meet with Sinai offense in Syria.

The steps that Husayn took following this discovery reflected his increasing alienation from the Ottoman system. As a result, Husayn sent his third son, Faysal, to Istanbul and Damascus to confirm the government's aims vis-a-vis the Amirate and to re-establish contact with al-Bakri and the nationalist parties in Damascus. First visiting Damascus in March 1915, Faysal met with Jamal Pasha, promising his father's support for a second attack on the Suez. He likewise visited with key Arab nationalist members of *al-Fatat* in the al-Bakri home, where they shared their plans for Arab national independence. Faysal was subsequently inducted to both *al-Fatat* and *al-Ahd*. Once he visited Istanbul, meeting with both the Sultan and members of the CUP government to air his father's grievances with the situation in the Hijaz, Faysal left the capital in May 1915, he had been "told that the remedy [for the dire situation in the Hijaz] lay in his father's own hands. If only the Sharif were to declare himself openly in favour of the Holy War, the task of redressing the situation in the Hejaz in his favour would be simplified and he could count on receiving the fullest satisfaction."[74] In other words, from the government's perspective, Husayn had only to submit then his troubles would end; such an ultimatum confirmed Husayn's suspicions that the situation in the Hijaz, shortages in food, had been politically calculated to undermine him.

Thus these confluence of events, Faysal's return through Damascus set in motion Husayn and his son's formal relationship with *al-Fatat* and *al-Ahd*, Husayn's disillusionment with the Ottoman Caliphate, and 'Abdullah's outreach with British officials all culminated into the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and can be seen in Husayn's initial terms. It was during his return trip through Damascus that Faysal received the Damascus Protocol. The Protocol was a set of conditions for Arab nationalist cooperation in any action against the Ottoman Empire with Great

[74] As reported in Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*, 157. For a full account of Faysal's journey, see Antonius, 150–59; Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973, 27–30; Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 279–80.

Britain. The document called for Great Britain to recognize the independence of the Arab countries within specified borders (including Greater Syria, Iraq, and the entire Arabian Peninsula, excluding Aden), an end to all foreign capitulations, and the creation of a mutual defense pact in exchange for granting Great Britain economic preferences.[75] When Faysal returned to Mecca at the end of June, his father and brothers deliberated their next steps, which led to ʻAbdullah sending the British Oriental Secretary Ronald Storrs a message with the Damascus Protocol. This communication became formed the basis of the exchange between Amir Husayn and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt from July 1915 to January 1916, which provided the political and material basis for Husayn's revolt.[76]

The McMahon-Husayn correspondence did not only reflect the influence of the Arab nationalists in Damascus, however. It also contained the ideas of Rashid Rida, whose Islamic Arabism concerned Islamic reform by the Arabs. In addition to the conditions of the Damascus Protocol, the initial document also requested that "Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for Islam."[77] With the inclusion of this clause into the Damascus Protocol, an Arab nationalist production, with the call for an Arab caliphate, the influence of the Islamic Arabists like Rashid Rida can be discerned. In the midst of the correspondence, for example, Rida forwarded a copy of his "General Organic Law of the Arab Empire" to British officials in Cairo, after discovering some details about the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence.[78] In his view, the

---

[75] For the text of the Damascus Protocol, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*, 157–58.

[76] BL: For the whole exchange can be found in "Correspondence with the Grand Sherif of Mecca," Undated, [IOR/L/PS/18/B222]; Antonius, 413–27.

[77] Antonius, 414. A more plausible translation is "an Arab caliphate over the Muslims," see Saʻid, *Al-Thawrah al-ʻArabiyah al-Kubra, Tarikh Mufassal Jamiʻ Lil-Qadiyah al-ʻArabiyah Fi Rubʻ Qarn*, 1:131.

[78] TNA: From Lt. Col. Gilbert Clayton with "General Organic Law of the Arab Empire" enclosed, 9 December 1915 [FO 882/15/1]. Also copied in Tauber, "Rashid Rida as Pan-Arabist before World War I."

Arab Empire would be "constitutional and Decentralised [sic]" state that encompassed the Arabian Peninsula and "the Provinces of Syria and Irak and the parts between." As part of this decentralization, each province would be independent in "its Interior Administration," but "subject in its general policy and common interests to the general seat of the Government" that would be in Damascus. Uniting these provinces, however, would be the Caliph, who "should be the house of the Sherifs of Mecca," and would "manage in detail all the religious affairs both in theoretical and in practical." In addition to making his appoint appointments within a special legislative council and his own Shaykh al-Islam, the Organic Law allocate for the Hashemite caliph

> The right of having his name mentioned in religious sermons, and stamped on coins. Treaties or decisions of the Council of Deputies [the legislature out of Damascus] are to be ratified and judgments executed only after his permissions. He can commute sentences or reprieve. He can settle any dispute, litigation or disagreement brought before by any of the authorities of the Empire.[79]

Thus, although not outlining a specific political leadership for the Hashemites over the "Arab Empire," Rashid Rida proposed they serve as Caliph in Mecca. That position entailed overseeing completely the political operations of the Empire with a supreme right to veto all decisions the political leadership in Damascus made.

The inclusion of both political sovereignty as well as a reference to the creation of an Arab caliphate has led scholars to debate the exact nature of Husayn's ambitions, considering that nowhere in the McMahon-Husayn correspondence did Husayn make any personal claims of either political or religious authority. According to Elie Kedourie and Joshua Teitelbaum, Husayn's objective had always been the Caliphate, an idea he inherited and echoed by British and Arabist

[79] TNA: From Lt. Col. Gilbert Clayton with "General Organic Law of the Arab Empire" enclosed, 9 December 1915 [FO 882/15/1].

voices.[80] C. Ernest Dawn rejected this assertion, seeing it as incompatible with Husayn's later proclamations and writings, which he and others have interpreted as well within prevailing Sunni Islamic opinion, had abandoned the idea of a universal caliphate centuries prior. According to Dawn, the fact that Husayn never sought to establish recognition for his claim to the caliphate by claiming it (at least until 1924), indicated that he had no real aims for the position. Instead, Husayn sought to protect and assert his authority in the Hijaz against the centralizing CUP and against his peninsular rivals.[81]

The uncertainty of Husayn's ambitions in his correspondence with McMahon resulted from combining two forms of Arabism: Arab nationalism with Islamic Arabism, in particular Rashid Rida's *salafi* ideology and its desire for the creation of an Arab caliphate. Without back projecting Husayn's later actions, his self-styling as the King of the Arabs (the next chapter) and then his eventual caliphate, the Husayn expressed more modest aims in his initial correspondence. In his first letter, Husayn did not provide any specifics in the form of government that the independent Arab countries would adopt; he merely suggested that the "Arab Sharifian government" (*Hukuma al-Sharif al-'Arabiyya*) would grant Great Britain economic preferences in the "Arab countries" and called for Britain "to assist the Sharifian government in summoning an international congress to decree" the abolition of capitulations in the Arab countries.[82] In his formulation, the "Arab government of the Sharif" must refer back to the Amirate of Mecca. In this way, Husayn repeated

---

[80] Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*, 144–45; Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*, 2001, 52–53.

[81] Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973, 40–53.

[82] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*, 414–15. For the Arabic, I used Amin Sa'id's "unofficial" Arabic text, which Dawn and others believed "must be very close to the official Arabic, which is inaccessible." For the Arabic text see, Sa'id, *Al-Thawrah al-'Arabiyah al-Kubra, Tarikh Mufassal Jami' Lil-Qadiyah al-'Arabiyah Fi Rub' Qarn*, 1:130–44; Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973, 43.

his long-held belief that the Amirate of Mecca represented the Arab people, both historically in submitting to the Ottoman caliphate and presently. Thus, Husayn was not advocating for a change of his title or responsibilities. This perspective confirmed Husayn's seemingly disinterest in the caliphate (as observed by Dawn) but also necessarily tempered any suggestion that he considered for himself to adopt a new titular like "King of the Arabs."[83] For Husayn, the title "Amir of Mecca" captured his political and religious responsibilities as the representative for the Arab peoples in political and religious matters as it pertained to recognizing the caliphate.

Negotiating for Arab independence as the Amir of Mecca, without any explicit suggestion for desiring the caliphate or a new title like "King," Husayn represented a frustrated Arab Hamidian. The Ottoman government, which Husayn had since at least 1913 characterized as Turkish and harmful to Arab interests, no longer represented the multi-national, ethnic community of Muslims. More threatening to Husayn, the current Ottoman government also intended to remove him from the Amirate, thus threatening 'Awn preeminence which Husayn and his ancestors had established during the Hamidian period. Husayn's critique of the current Ottoman government, as an Arab Hamidian Amir of Mecca, accounted simultaneously for his continued negotiations with the CUP in search of a possible solution to their differences while also reaching out to Arabists whose projects likewise promised some sort of elevated place for the Hashemites, both religious and political.

[83] The question of Husayn's treatment of an Arab caliphate is ambiguous. As noted by Dawn, Husayn seemed indifferent towards titles and considered the caliphate a matter for God and the global Muslim community. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973, 42–43.

Husayn's "Awakening"

This liminal space between Ottomanisms and Arabisms that Husayn occupied because of his household's acceptance of Arab Hamidianism formed the basis for Husayn's decision to finally launch the Arab Revolt. By 1916, Amir Husayn could feel confident that he and his sons had created a framework with British officials in Cairo and Arabist figures in Egypt and Syria who backed his leadership, as the Amir of Mecca, over a unified Arab world that included much of the Levant, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula. His decision to raise the banner of revolt on June 10, 1916, however, came about following the deteriorating conditions in Syria and one final appeal to the CUP government to secure his household--and sons--as the Amirs of Mecca.

The catalyst for Husayn's final approach to the CUP government resulted from the actions of Jamal Pasha, the military Governor of Syria, against the Arab nationalists in Syria. Early during his governorship in Damascus, Jamal Pasha discovered proof of Arab disloyalty after Ottoman agents seized the papers of the French consulate in Beirut. Among the trove of documents were correspondences with members of Arab nationalist secret societies, which contained names and membership rolls.[84] At first, Jamal Pasha did nothing that could cause resistance, since he had arrived to Syria to lead an expedition to the Suez Canal and did not want to jeopardize support by alienating the population. After the failure of the Suez campaign in February 1915, however, Jamal blamed the outcome on the lackluster support he had received from the Arabs in the region, which he credited to the presence of these secret societies for sowing disloyalty. By June 1915, Jamal began arresting Arab secessionists, the first of whom were then hanged in August. As more members of Arab secret societies became known, further arrests took place.[85]

---

[84] Jamal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919*, 198.

[85] Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 292–95.

In March 1916, having already established ties with Arab nationalist parties, Husayn sought clemency and pardons for the arrested nationalists. His entreaties, however, naturally stoked the distrust of both Enver and Jamal Pashas who had recently visited Medina in an attempt to call for volunteers directly after the Hashemites suspiciously failed to provide forces during the Suez campaign. In his overture to Enver, Husayn once again revealed his true intentions, rested as they were on a focus on his household's rights to the Amirate through Arab Hamidianism that had now attached itself to the Arabists parties. In a direct communication with Enver, Husayn requested three things in exchange for his support. First he requested that all Arab political prisoners be pardoned. Second, he asked that Syria and Iraq be decentralized from direct Ottoman control. Finally, he demanded that the Amirate of Mecca remain in his family; specifically, that his sons would have hereditary rights to the Amirate, which he claimed had been the original agreement between his ancestors and Sultan Selim I in the 16th century. In short, he sought to decouple the Amirate of Mecca from any interference from Istanbul, including presumably the Caliphate. Enver and Jamal summarily denied all of these requests, with Enver threatening to hold Faysal (who was visiting Damascus as his father's agent) hostage until the end of the war unless Husayn submitted and sent *mujahidin* ("holy warriors") to fight for the Ottomans.[86] Jamal Pasha, according to his memoirs, likewise wrote to Husayn to defend the government's actions against the accused nationalists. He also reportedly explained that any attempt to make the Amirate hereditary to Husayn's sons could only be interpreted as a threat to undermine the war effort.[87]

---

[86] This correspondence can be found in Sa'id, *Al-Thawrah al-'Arabiyah al-Kubra, Tarikh Mufassal Jami' Lil-Qadiyah al-'Arabiyah Fi Rub' Qarn*, 1:110–11; Sulayman Musa, ed., *Al-Thawra al-Arabiyya al-Kubra: Watha'iq Wa Asanid* (Amman: Da'ira al-thaqafa wa al-fanun, 1966), 52–53; Kulayb Sa'ud al-Fawaz, *Al-Marsalat al-Matabadala Bayna al-Sharif al-Husayn Bin 'Ali Wa al-'Uthmaniyyin: 1908-1918* (Amman: Wizarat al-Thaqafah, 1997), 134–36; for a summary, see Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 294.

[87] Jamal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919.*, 217. Specifically, he claimed to have said: "you ought not to put forward such a claim even if you had the right to do so. The entire resources of the nation should be concentrated for one purpose and one purpose alone to-day--to win the final victory. ...Let us assume that the

Despite Husayn and his son Faysal's appeals, on May 6, 1916, Jamal Pasha ordered twenty-one convicted Arab nationalists publicly hanged in Beirut and Damascus. These figures included members of the al-Azam family in Damascus, former members of parliament (Rushdi al-Shamaa and Shukri al-Asali), poets (like Rafi Salloum and George Haddad), and journalists/political activists ('Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, Philippe al-Khazin, Abd al-Ghani al-Arayssi, and Muhammad Shanti). Under the false pretense that his father had succumbed to government pressure, Faysal convinced Jamal Pasha to allow him to leave Damascus in mid-May for the Hijaz in order to rally his father's forces for *jihad*. The ruse suggested that Jamal Pasha in part had intended with the public executions to threaten Husayn to submission, which he wrongly believed had worked.[88] Instead, with Faysal out of harm's way heading towards Medina, Husayn and his sons could now launch the Revolt, which they intended to start in Medina when Faysal arrived on June 5, 1916. Upon his arrival, his eldest brother 'Ali and their tribal supporters attempted to raid the Ottoman fort but failed and fled.[89] With their plans for revolt now public, on June 10, 1916, Amir Husayn stood on the balcony of his palace and fired shots towards the Ottoman garrison stationed in the city to announce that he was in rebellion, thus officially "starting" the Arab Revolt. Perhaps because of its inauspicious start (first failing to take hold in Medina), Husayn remained publically quiet, though his sons 'Abdullah and Faysal took the military reins of the Revolt and began to lead and coordinate among their family's closest tribal supporters to spread the Revolt to

---

Government complied with your demand solely because they wanted to keep you from being troublesome in the difficult times through which we are passing. If the war came to a victorious conclusion, who could prevent the Government from dealing with you with the greatest severity when it is over? The men who form the present Government and dared to rise against Sultan Hamid...would never forgive anyone who had the audacity to hamper them in the war upon which they have entered for the good of the Mohammedan world."

[88] Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 295–96

[89] TNA: A.H. McMahon, High Commissioner Egypt, to E. Grey Bart, London, transmitting "Letter from Sherif Hosayn of Mecca," 10 June 1916 [FO 141/461/2]; "Military Achievements of the Sherif of Mecca, June 1916-October 1916" [FO 882/5/1].

outside Mecca. Their efforts proved difficult as their forces could not yet receive supplies from the British and the Ottoman forces in the region had recently been refreshed with men and supplies in preparation for an Ottoman attack against British Aden. Only later in June did Husayn issue his first public proclamation on June 27th, two weeks after launching the Revolt. The delay undoubtedly reflected the uncertainty of success. For one, despite launching the Revolt in Mecca, the Ottoman forces in Mecca were not completely routed until July 9th, meaning the Ottomans still represented a potential threat to Amir Husayn when the proclamation was issued. While Husayn's position and support were stronger in Mecca than that had been in Medina, which as discussed earlier became an Ottoman outpost, the fear that the second start would be thwarted, as the first no doubt had been a concern. Corresponding to Husayn's decision to finally issue his public proclamation, was the successful conquest of Jeddah by June 16th with the support of the British navy. Having access to Jeddah and the sea meant more than just access to British supplies and support; it also meant that Husayn could now tap into the British colonial network (through Egypt and the Sudan) in order to promote his agenda globally without Ottoman interference. With a non-Ottoman outlet to the Arab and Muslim worlds, Husayn finally issued his proclamation that could then be transmitted globally.

Husayn's proclamations have garnered the attention of historians who have analyzed those he produced over the course of the Revolt for evidence of his personal ideology. In this way, scholars like C. Ernest Dawn have concluded that Husayn's ideology had been essentially Islamic--concerned with Muslim unity along traditional Sunni rubrics as opposed to any Arabist aspirations.[90] As evidence, Dawn examined the preponderance of religious ideology as opposed to Arabist. Husayn's focus on Islamic unity as right political organization, for instance, precluded

[90] Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 1973, 75–86.

any Arab nationalist claims of independence. Likewise, Husayn's use of the terms *qawm* and *umma*, both of which were used by Arabists to refer to modern ideas of the nation, resembled classical usage. According to Dawn, Husayn used *qawm* in reference to people or relatives and *umma* to mean the broader Islamic world.[91] Dawn concluded that "Husayn held fast to traditional Sunnite Islam, while 'Abdullah [his son] joined [Muhammad] 'Abduh, Rashid Rida, and in a general way the Arab nationalists in advocating an Arab revival as the necessary precursor of the restoration of Islam."[92]

A reconsideration of Husayn's first proclamation is necessary. For one, analyzing all four proclamations together, despite the fact that they were written months apart, presupposed that Husayn's ideology remained static over the course of the Arab Revolt and never evolved as circumstances changed. (As the next chapter explores, Husayn's political project created the new title "King of the Arabs" because of his Zayd rival, 'Ali Haydar, being promoted to the Amirate of Mecca following his decision to rebel.) Thus, in order to chart his evolution, it is more appropriate to treat Husayn's first proclamation in isolation and analyze its message in light of Husayn's previous writings (like his letter to his brother or his final appeal to the CUP in spring 1916). For this reason, it became apparent that Husayn's initial proclamation represented a transitional state between his Arab Hamidianism, focused as it was on Arab unity with the Ottoman caliph mediated by the Amirate of Mecca, while beginning to appropriate the language of Arabism.

The timing of Husayn's proclamation accounted for how Husayn framed his message. Able now to reach an international audience, Husayn framed his declaration of independence against the Ottoman state defensively in his proclamation by cataloging CUP crimes. After

[91] Dawn, 85.

[92] Dawn, 86.

addressing "all our Muslim brothers," he began by quoting a passage from the Quran "Our Lord, judge between us and our people in truth, and You are the best of those who judge," then repeating frequently that "we leave the judgment" to the Muslim world.[93] From there, most of his proclamation catalogued the CUP's crimes against the Muslim world and the Arabs in particular. He alleged the "Unionists" have been "led by shameful appetites, which are not for [him] to set forth, but which are open, and a cause for sorrow to the Moslems of the whole world, who have seen this greatest and most noble Moslem power broken in pieces, and led down to ruin and utter destruction."[94] Besides citing being "drawn into this last and most fatal war," he then described how the Unionists had abused "their subjects, Moslems and *dhimmis* [non-Muslims], whose lives have been sacrificed without fault on their part" by entering the war. Husayn then alluded to the wartime exigencies of *safarbarlik*, as he illustrated the dire economic conditions that have led to impoverishment and famine, affecting even the Hijaz where the poor, and "even the families of substance, have been made to sell their doors and windows...even the wooden frames of their houses" for food after they sold their furniture and valuables. Husayn even alluded to massacres and displacement caused during the war by the Unionist governments, arguably alluding to the Armenians, when he mentioned that in addition to impoverishment, "some have been treacherously put to death, others cruelly driven from their homes, as though the calamities of war were not enough."[95]

---

[93] Quran, 7:89 (Sahih International).

[94] TNA: Arab Bureau Papers, HRG/16/25, January to June, 1916 [FO 882/4/3]; TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 9, 9 July 1916 [FO 882/25/1], Arabic translation enclosed; For a French translation, which Dawn may have depended, see "Textes Historiques Sur Le Réveil Arabe Au Hedjaz," *Revue Du Monde Musulman* 46 (Autumn 1921): 1–24.

[95] As explore more in the next chapter, Husayn was aware of the Ottoman policy towards the Armenians, having sent a letter to his allied tribesmen in Syria and the Arabian Peninsula to welcome and protect any Armenian who entered their realms. In addition, his editors of *al-Qiblah* even referenced the Armenians in their proclamation of Husayn as "King of the Arabs" as evidence that the Arabs needed a sovereign representative. An extended analysis of his rhetorical use of the Armenian genocide for his project is provided in the next chapter.

Perhaps more troubling for Muslims, Husayn asserted that beneath the CUP government's oppression and unrestrained pursuit for power had been heresy. He proclaimed that "not even so [in their wartime abuses] was the lust of the Union and Progress fulfilled. They broke the only bond that endured between then and the true followers of Islam. They departed from their obedience to the precepts of the Book," that is, the Quran.[96] He cited as evidence officials and newspapers (*Ijtihad*) associated with the Unionists had "published in Constantinople unworthy things about the Prophet...and spoke evil of him (God forbid)." Moreover, they even abandoned proper *Shari'ah* law by rejecting the Quranic injunction that "'A man shall have twice a woman'[s] share and made them equal" before the law.[97] Just as egregious, the CUP allowed the soldiers in Mecca, Medina, and Damascus (places relatively distant from an active front in the War) to abstain from fasting during Ramadan because of the War, thereby rejecting God's allowance for those to break the fast only when ill or travelling.[98]

In his report of Unionist crimes against peoples and religion, Husayn carefully levelled his allegations against the CUP and not the traditional Ottoman system, which he believed traditionally represented the ideal Muslim unity. For example, not once did he criticize the "Ottomans"; instead, he directed his criticisms to the Unionists and specifically mentions Enver, Jamal, and Talaat (the Minister of the Interior and later Grand Wazir) "who were governing it as they desired and doing what they wanted." In contrast to the Unionists, Husayn depicted the traditional Ottoman system as the ideal Islamic state where they united all Muslims acting "in

[96] TNA: Arab Bureau Papers, HRG/16/25, January to June, 1916 [FO 882/4/3]; TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 9, 9 July 1916 [FO 882/25/1], Arabic translation enclosed

[97] TNA: Arab Bureau Papers, HRG/16/25, January to June, 1916 [FO 882/4/3]; TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 9, 9 July 1916 [FO 882/25/1], Arabic translation enclosed

[98] TNA: Arab Bureau Papers, HRG/16/25, January to June, 1916 [FO 882/4/3]; TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 9, 9 July 1916 [FO 882/25/1], Arabic translation enclosed

accordance to God's book and the Sunnah of the Prophet" under the authority of the Sultan-Caliph. To justify his revolt, Husayn explained that in addition to the aforementioned abuses and had abandoned orthodoxy, the CUP had fundamentally altered the Ottoman state by "striking the power of the Sultan" by stealing his power to appoint his cabinet and advisers and thereby "overthrowing the terms of the Caliphate to which Muslims seek out of obligation."[99]

Specifically targeted for abuse were the Arabs according to Husayn. While general in characterization of the violence and deprivations afflicted by the CUP during the war, Husayn specifically mentioned the names of several "eminent Muslims and greatly distinguished Arabs," who were executed at the hands of the Unionists. These names mirror some of those convicted Arab nationalists who were hanged in March and for whom Husayn had advocated in his communication with Enver Pasha. For Husayn, the deaths of these Arabs resulted from a targeted campaign against them by the CUP government, evidenced by recent events in Mecca:

> We leave the judgment of these misdeeds, which we have touched on so briefly, to the world in general and to Moslems in particular. What stranger proof can we desire of the faithlessness of their inmost hearts to the religion, and their feelings towards the Arabs, than their bombardment of the ancient House, which God had chosen for His House, saying 'Keep my House pure for all who come to it'.....a House so venerated by all Moslems?[100]

Besides the Grand Mosque, Husayn also described damage that affected the Tomb of Abraham and the Black Stone. He even claimed that the *kiswa*, the covering for the *Ka'bah*, caught fire due to Unionist artillery.

These two specific references to the Arabs, the partial list of those nationalists who were hanged and the assertion that the Arab were specifically targeted as shown through the violence

[99] TNA: Arab Bureau Papers, HRG/16/25, January to June, 1916 [FO 882/4/3]; TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 9, 9 July 1916 [FO 882/25/1], Arabic translation enclosed.

[100] TNA: Arab Bureau Papers, HRG/16/25, January to June, 1916 [FO 882/4/3]; TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 9, 9 July 1916 [FO 882/25/1], Arabic translation enclosed

against the Holy Places, are the only two references to the Arabs in the proclamation. Nowhere did Husayn reference Turks or "Turkism" as he had done previously, for example, in the 1913 letter to his brother. In many respects, the argument Husayn constructed fall well within the rubric of most of his previous critiques as an Arab Hamidian. For instance, at the forefront of Husayn's concerns had been the immorality of the Unionist government as if affected the subjects of the Ottoman caliph, who represented Islamic unity globally. Likewise, by connecting the violence against the Holy Places specifically to the challenges the Arabs faced from the Unionists, Husayn reiterated his belief that in as much as the Hijaz was the center of the Muslim world, it also had an intimate connection with the Arabs. Finally, Husayn also repeated his belief that the Amirate of Mecca had a special role in preserving the unity of the Muslim world by virtue of overseeing the Holy Places in the Hijaz, which bring all Muslims together. As such, he began his proclamation by again making the historical claim that his ancestors among the Amirs of Mecca had been the first to recognize the Ottomans as caliphs: "All those who are familiar with history know that the Amirs of Mecca the Blessed were the first among the Muslim rulers to recognize the *al-dawla al-'uliyyat* [the Sublime State], desiring among them the union of Muslims….[101] As testament to this faithfulness to Islamic unity, Husayn briefly cited his conflict with al-Idris in 1909, and how he "with [his] Arabs helped them [the Ottomans] against the Arabs...to save Abha from those who were besieging it…to preserve the honor of the state…."[102]

By relying on his older arguments of Arab Hamidianism that focused on Islamic unity and privileged the Amirate of Mecca, Husayn presented an a-nationalist (if not anti-nationalist)

[101] Translation my own from Arabic text enclosed in Arab Bulletin No. 9, 9 July 1916, 1916 [FO 882/5/1]. In the English translation provided by the Arab Bureau, they render *al-dawla al-'uliyya* as "The Turkish Government."

[102] TNA: Arab Bureau Papers, HRG/16/25, January to June, 1916 [FO 882/4/3]; TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 9, 9 July 1916 [FO 882/25/1], Arabic translation enclosed

proclamation. In fact, despite being considered by British officials and historians as the proclamation for the "Arab Revolt," it was not even clear whether Husayn's declaration of independence referred to all Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire, which seemed unlikely considering that the Syrian, Iraqi, and most of the Hijazi provinces still remained under Ottoman control. When read from this perspective, Husayn's proclamation declared his independence, as the Amir of Mecca, and by extension the independence of the Hijaz. For example, when he first used the word independence (*istiqlal*), he used in reference to the Unionist violence inflicted to the people of Mecca "during when the country arose demanding its independence." Later, again in reference to the Holy Places, he described how God blessed the country "to take its independence...after it was struck by the Unionist officials and their protectors…." Finally, he concluded that the Hijaz (the country), which "is truly independent, separated from countries that are still under the oppressive governance of the Unionists, as separate in every meaning of the word independent," should serve as a model for all Muslims, "east and west" who to do the same as "an obligation to us…." From this usage and associations, Husayn was not declaring all Arabs, like those in Syria or Iraq independent; rather, his declaration of independence ought to serve as a model for them and all Muslims experiencing the oppression of the CUP to declare their independence to pursue Islamic unity. Thus, just as the Amir of Mecca had been the first Muslim leader to submit to the House of Othman thereby leading all other Muslim leaders towards Islamic unity, he was now the first to declare his independence so other Muslim leaders could follow suit in pursuit of that same unity which the CUP had abrogated.

Although Husayn's proclamation repeated and developed his Arab Hamidian critique in such a way that avoided any overly nationalist connotations, there was evidence that Husayn nonetheless began to appropriate Arabist discourse. While he referenced the deaths of Arab

nationalists and used terms like *qawm* in classical senses, Husayn also used the word *nahda* (renaissance or "awakening").[103] The *Nahda*, as noted, was a term employed by early Arabists, in particular those scholars who considered themselves restoring the Arabic literary tradition, and could be translated as "renaissance" (or rebirth) but more accurately as "awakening." More holistically, the *nahda* became "a stage for negotiating religious and political authority, social norms, and linguistic and literary conventions."[104] As such, it likewise included concepts of civilization (*tamaddun*) and progress (*taraqqi*). For Husayn, the goal of independence was for a *nahda*, and his language reflected the discourse associated with this avowedly Arabist term. In his first usage, Husayn used *nahda* in reference to the independence of "the country," the Hijaz. Specifically, he used it operatively as the enabling power, alongside God, "to take its independence and crown its efforts with prosperity [*taraqqi]* and success…." In his second mention, Husayn considered the action of declaring independence and establishing a society resting on Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy as resulting in not only Islamic rejuvenation but was "the reason [*asbab*] for the true *nahda*." Reflecting his appropriation of this avowedly Arabist term to his Arab Hamidianism, Husayn's application of *nahda* built on the recent connection scholars of the *nahda*

[103] Unfortunately, in the English translations provided by the Arab Bulletin No. 9, the term was translated as "revolution," which while describing Husayn's challenge against the Ottoman state, fails to capture his ideological ties. Dawn overlooked these references, perhaps because he relied on the 1921 French translation which translated its usage in two different ways: "le réveil de ce pays" (the awakening of this country) in the first instance, which nicely connects with the French title of Najib 'Azuri's call for Arab independence in *Le Réveil De La Nation Arabe* (1905). In the second instance, the term is translated as "d'un vrai relèvement" (a true restoration), which may capture the meaning of "renaissance" as "rebirth." See "Textes Historiques Sur Le Réveil Arabe Au Hedjaz." The two different renderings in French and the reliance on the word "revolution" in English nonetheless diluted the significant historical connection Husayn made with the Arabists.

[104] Tarek El-Ariss, *The Arab Renaissance: A Bilingual Anthology of the Nahda*, Texts and Translations (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 2018), xxi. For a recent critical look of the intellectual history of *al-nahda*, in particular reflecting on Albert Hourani's contributions to our understanding, see Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss, eds., *Arabic Thought beyond the Liberal Age : Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

had built between Arab political independence to Islamic rejuvenation.[105] The relative flexibility of the meaning of *nahda*, which was still evolving since the 19th century, allowed Husayn to place himself comfortably within its discourse—according to his emerging political Arabism informed by internal Hashemite household dynamics.[106]

With Husayn's public proclamation of his revolt, it is possible to detect the start of his latest political evolution. As an Arab Hamidian, who supported the traditional Sultan-Caliph direct state over the constitutionally-based one marked by the Committee of Union and Progress, Husayn maintained many of the principles that the 'Awn household had adopted under the terms of the Hamidian compromise. The Amirate of Mecca was a servant of the Ottoman caliph and served as his intermediary to the Arabs of the Peninsula. By overseeing the Holy Places, which brought all Muslims together, they both sought Muslim unity, if not political than certainly spiritual. As such, the 'Awn Amirs and the Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid complimented each other as the Sultan sought to project his religious authority as caliph on Muslims worldwide (i.e. "pan-Islamism"). As the CUP's policies abrogated the terms of the Hamidian compromise, threatening Husayn's standing as the Amir but also his household's preeminence to the Amirate, Husayn needed a new ideology to justify his decision to rebel. Arabism undoubtedly appealed to Husayn and he had sought to incorporate it (both the nationalist and Islamist forms) within his project, as evidenced by the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. With his proclamation that declared his independence as the Amir of Mecca, Husayn began grafting Arabism's essential argument, the need of an awakening for national and religious rejuvenation, to the Amirate of Mecca. For historical and religious reasons, Husayn believed that the first *nahda* had to begin with the Amir of Mecca. While basic

[105] TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 9, 9 July 1916 [FO 882/25/1], Arabic translation enclosed.

[106] For a discussion of the evolution and flexibly meanings assigned to the term, see Hannah Scott Deuchar, "'Nahda': Mapping a Keyword in Cultural Discourse," *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics*, no. 37 (2017): 50–84.

at first, his ideas of the *nahda* provided the basis for his later political evolution once the Hashemite household rivalry re-emerged with the appointment of ‘Ali Haydar from the Zayd to the Amirate of Mecca, thereby stripping Husayn of his coveted title and thus claim to leadership over the Arab and Muslim worlds.

The Specter Amir: ‘Ali Haydar’s Ottomanist Critique

The fear of being deposed and replaced as the Amir of Mecca by the CUP, who had deviated from the Hamidian compromise that guaranteed his household’s dominance, motivated Husayn’s decision to declare his independence. His adoption of some elements of the Arabist discourse of restoration and rejuvenation (*nahda*) in his rebuke of the CUP offered Husayn a post-Ottoman political discourse to justify his declaration of independence. Of course, Husayn’s vision for the Hashemites in a post-Ottoman world was not universally shared by the Hashemites. As observed earlier, among those of the Zayd household, they had cultivated ties with the CUP and had ideologically aligned themselves to the Ottoman liberalizing and reforming project. Thus, because of Husayn’s rebellious actions, the CUP quickly moved to secure his disposition. On July 2nd, after Husayn’s promulgated his first proclamation, the Sultan issued an official *firman* announcing Husayn’s dismissal and the appointment of Sharif ‘Ali Haydar, the grandson of the last Zayd Amir ‘Abdul Muttalib, to the Amirate of Mecca.[107]

[107] According to Antonius’s account, the firman gave no reason for the Husayn’s dismissal, and it was not until the end of July that the newspaper *Tanin* in Istanbul finally reported on Husayn’s uprising. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*, 201. In his recollection, ‘Ali Haydar claimed to have known very shortly after news of Husayn’s revolt reached Istanbul that he would be appointed to the Amirate. Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 160–61.

Having only received a footnote in the history of the Arab Revolt, ‘Ali Haydar became what I am calling “the Specter Amir.” Per the 19th century development that the Amir of Mecca be directly appointment by the Ottoman caliph from Istanbul, ‘Ali Haydar became the last Ottoman-appointed Amir of Mecca. His appointment, while celebrated by ‘Ali Haydar as the restoration of his household to their ancestral right, proved to be a relatively hollow victory.[108] Because of Husayn’s revolt, ‘Ali Haydar never formally took up his position in Mecca, and as such, never oversaw the *hajj* or administered the region. In a very practical sense, ‘Ali Haydar possessed the title but lacked the ability to exercise its function or benefit from its prestige. While never threatening Husayn’s dominance in Mecca, ‘Ali Haydar nonetheless posed an important symbolic challenge by representing a Hashemite alternative to Husayn. Although deprived of his formal responsibilities as the Amir of Mecca, ‘Ali Haydar influenced Husayn’s revolt rhetorically by issuing two proclamations while in Medina (August 1916 - May 1917). Amir ‘Ali Haydar proved an ideal Ottoman figure to challenge Husayn symbolically. He was a Hashemite, who claimed the historical prerogatives and distinctions that Husayn could, but unlike Husayn, he was not currently waging a war against the Ottomans, nor by extension the caliph, through the support of a non-Muslim European power. As the next chapter will explore, Amir ‘Ali Haydar haunted Husayn by threatening the legitimacy of his project thereby forcing him to further embrace and adapt his Arabism in order to assert the legitimacy of his actions.

As mentioned earlier, ‘Ali Haydar had cultivated ties with the CUP after 1908. An ideological ally, ‘Ali had expressed sympathy for the liberalizing reforms that the CUP represented

[108] In his memoirs, for instance, he recalled during his meeting with the Grand Vezir, who happened to be a grandson of Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt, the irony that he, by appointing him the Amir of Mecca, the Vezir was reversing the “crime of your grandfather” who had appointed the first ‘Awn to the Amirate. Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 161–62.

and believed that their success portended favorably to his household's reclaiming the Amirate. After the deposition of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid in 1909, 'Ali Haydar served as a member of the Ottoman parliament and the Minister for Religious Endowments (*awqaf*).[109] Because of his ideological sympathies and willingness to work with the CUP, he was a logical choice to replace Husayn once the Revolt broke out. In fact, the decision to appoint him took place quickly, within a week of Husayn launching the Revolt against the garrison in Mecca. After learning from Enver and Talaat Pasha of his appointment, 'Ali Haydar left Istanbul on June 19, 1916--two weeks before his formal appointment by the Sultan-Caliph--by rail towards Damascus where he would then leave for Medina.[110] On July 2nd, while in Damascus as Jamal Pasha's guest, 'Ali Haydar received news of his formal appointment and used the opportunity to meet with Arab notables and tribal leaders who came to pay him their respects.[111] The new Amir reached Medina on August 1, 1916 and did not waste time to challenge Husayn's actions. On August 9, 1916, 'Ali Haydar issued his first proclamation condemning Husayn's actions and distributed among the Ottoman newspapers in Syria.

'Ali Haydar devised his proclamation for a different audience from Husayn's proclamation. While Husayn had addressed the entire Muslim *umma*, calling them to be the judge of his actions, 'Ali Haydar's proclamation targeted the population of the Hijaz exclusively. He began his proclamation addressing the "people of our fatherland--the Hedjaz and other contiguous countries, the citizens and the bedwins--the far and the near," whom he recognized as specially elect for

---

[109] Sa'id, *Al-Thawrah al-'Arabiyah al-Kubra, Tarikh Mufassal Jami' Lil-Qadiyah al-'Arabiyah Fi Rub' Qarn*, 1:158.

[110] Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 165.

[111] For an Arabic translation of the formal announcement, see al-Fawaz, *Al-Marsalat al-Matabadala Bayna al-Sharif al-Husayn Bin 'Ali Wa al-'Uthmaniyyin: 1908-1918*, 265.

living so close to Mecca and for being from the people of Muhammad. The different audiences served different purposes. Husayn wanted to create global Muslim support for his rebellion; invoking the entire Muslim world was logical. ‘Ali, in contrast, aimed to avert an entire province from rebelling. Nevertheless, the different audiences also implied how the Amirs differed in their understanding of Islamic authority. For Husayn, the ultimate judge of his actions (besides God), was the *umma*--not the caliph, whom he believed had become corrupted by the CUP. For ‘Ali Haydar, being as he was a representative for the caliph, by addressing the Hijazi Arabs specifically, he maintained that hierarchy: the caliph appealing to one region, and one community of Muslims.[112]

This hierarchy, the caliph as the Islamic authority over the rest of the Muslim world, was the basis for ‘Ali Haydar’s claim for obedience. For Husayn, the Hijazi Arabs--led by the Amir of Mecca--had historically led the Muslim world to recognize the Ottoman Caliph. ‘Ali Haydar, however, argued that the region had a special role in obedience. They were, he assured them, “the best of mankind” from whom “the chosen from the pure and prominent Arabs,” that is the Prophet, came. Yet, at the same time, he reminded them of the command from the Prophet “who has compared the obedience of God with the obedience to the Imam [Caliph] in compliance with God’s saying ‘Obey God and obey the apostle and your rulers….’” By quoting this specific *hadith,* ‘Ali Haydar also reminded them that it was through obedience to the caliph that “lawful and the unlawful became clearly evident and the light was distinguished from the darkness.”[113] For ‘Ali Haydar, articulating a classical argument for obedience to the caliph, he reminded his audience

[112] TNA: “Sherif Haidar’s Proclamation,” dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2]; For a brief description of proclamation, see F. De Jong, “The Proclamation of Al-Husayn b. ’Ali and ’Ali Haydar” 57 (1980): 281–87.

[113] TNA: “Sherif Haidar’s Proclamation,” dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2].

that what made them, the Arabs of the Hijaz, unique had been their obedience to Muhammad, the caliph, and their rulers. That obedience mirrored the obedience expected of them by God.

From here, Amir 'Ali Haydar addressed Amir Husayn's recent actions in launching the Arab Revolt as it pertained to the safety of the Holy Places. Further testifying to the Hijaz's unique status in the Islamic world, of all the territories that Islam has lost to non-Muslim powers in the last centuries, 'Ali reminded the Hijazi Arabs that theirs had been the only territory never claimed by foreign powers. He credited the fact that "no conqueror could open it nor any ambitious man could stretch a hand to it" to "God's protection over His grand House and a miracle of His chosen one." The sacredness of this space restrained countries like Great Britain, "the enemy" (he referred to Great Britain since the countries he listed as conquered were all British holdings), from ever threatening the region. To do so would have incited the Islamic world, including its own Muslim subjects. In addition to God's providence and the deep reverence Muslims worldwide held for this territory, the Amirs of Mecca were responsible for ensuring the protection of the Hijaz on behalf of the Muslim world "through the care of the Caliphs and the Sultans." Now, however, Husayn's recent actions threaten the sanctity of the Holy Places. He alleged that Husayn "was making an agreement by himself with the enemy about the Hedjaz and tried to put the House of God, the Caba [sic] which is the Kibla [sic] of Islam with the holy tomb of the Prophet...under the protection of a Christian power which is at war with the Ottoman Empire and which is doing its best to humiliate all the Moslem Community."[114] Husayn had abandoned his responsibility as the Amir of Mecca

[114] TNA: "Sherif Haidar's Proclamation," dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2].

to protect the Hijaz from foreign influence by independently seeking the help of a Christian power.[115]

'Ali Haydar focused heavily on this point by reminding his audience of the history of Great Britain's actions against the Muslim world. He warned that even if Husayn believed he could secure the safety of the region, "his end will be it [sic] like the end of the Khedive of Egypt, the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Amir of Lehej, the Amirs of India and the other Muslim Governments which had fallen into the trap of the English…." Citing these examples, 'Ali Haydar admonished Husayn since "once the example is observed one must have the knowledge." He continued to reprove Husayn's intransigence against history by the fact that he ought to have known that the British did not promise assistance without its own interests in mind. In this case, as a colonizing power, Great Britain will not assist "unless it occupies [the] country." As evidence, he recommended that Husayn "ask those Amirs who preceeded [sic] him" and to examine the treaties they made with Great Britain; their experiences proved the true intentions of the British.

Guiding Husayn's actions had not been historical ignorance, according to 'Ali Haydar, but rather Husayn's own self-rooted "delusions." He explained to the Arabs that Husayn believed that he could work independently of the British or that the British had good intentions.
'Ali Haydar argued that these two premises contradicted one another and merely revealed Husayn's underlying weaknesses to act independently. He explained that Husayn

> Cannot even prove to or content [sic] anyone that he is capable of being an independent Amir by himself, or that he can contend with the Ottoman Empire besides managing the affairs of Islam, which he pretends that he is well qualified

[115] Later in his proclamation, he explained using Quranic precepts: "As we are the household of the Caba [sic] to whom it was entrusted for protection and about whom the following was revealed by God: 'Verily, God wishes to take away filth from you, O household, and sanctify you divinely'....." NA: "Sherif Haidar's Proclamation," dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2].

> to protect. To be able to declare war against a great power like the Ottoman Empire, he had to take refuge towards or under the wing of a foreign great power.[116]

In his observation, ‘Ali Haydar leveled two charges against Husayn. Since Husayn required the aid of Great Britain, this alliance alone proved his inability to be independent and prevent the British from conquering the region as they did elsewhere in the Muslim world. Moreover, if Husayn entertained the notion that he stood above or independent of the Ottoman state, again, the fact that he required British aid in order to confront the Ottomans further revealed his weakness. Husayn thus proved doubly weak as the Amir. By requesting British assistance before launching his rebellion, he already proved his dependency on the British, which only revealed his weakness to even against the Ottomans.

More troubling to ‘Ali Haydar was that any Muslim who fought with the British ceased to be Muslims, even if the British sent Muslim troops to the Hijaz.[117] He explained “whatever proof the Sherif Hussein may bring to show that he will not allow Christian troops to come to Hedjaz [sic], but that England is supplying him with Muslem troops is mere sophism.” He continued: “The troops being sent by the English whether they are Muslem or Christian as long as they are in the service of a Christian power....they will be considered Christians as there will be no difference between the Muslem or the Christian and the result for Islam is one, because the origin is the head and the limbs are the subjects.” [118] No matter what steps Husayn took to preserve the Islamic purity

---

[116] TNA: “Sherif Haidar’s Proclamation,” dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2].

[117] Indeed, in order to bolster Husayn’s forces, which consisted of tribal irregulars and Arab POWs held from the active fronts against the Ottomans in Gallipoli and Iraq, the British had sent Indian Muslim troops, many of whom were reluctant to participate fearing the safety and sanctity of the Holy Sites. See Yuvraj Deva Prasad, “Indian Muslims And The Arab Revolt,” *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* 34 (1973): 32–37; Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War* (Harvard University Press, 2014), 205–32.

[118] TNA: “Sherif Haidar’s Proclamation,” dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2].

of the Hijaz from Christian forces, the fact that those forces were led by Great Britain--as its combatants--against the Ottoman state headed by the Muslim caliph means that they were by extension Christians. In an oblique way, he made the same association to Husayn. Citing a Quranic injunction against making friends with Jews and Christians, since to do so would make Muslims one of them, 'Ali Haydar claimed that "those Moslem troops who are in the service of the Christians and even the Sherif Hussein himself who has joined them are, according to law, considered English…."[119] Although not explicitly said, 'Ali Haydar claimed that any Muslim serving the British, including Husayn himself, became non-believers.

As for the Ottomans, who allied with Germany, 'Ali Haydar prepared an explanation. According to the new Amir, the alliance with Germany, which provided material support and advisors, was fundamentally different from Husayn's alliance with Great Britain. To him, the distinction lies in the fact that the Ottomans made this alliance "in order to use them in smashing other Christian powers and to help in taking revenge for Islam from its enemy seizing the opportunity of their having despute [sic] in order to increase their schism." 'Ali Haydar then proceeded to outline the differences, which rested on his assertion that the Germans had never "possess[ed] a span of land in the Muslem territories" unlike the English who had "condemned 150 million Muslems" and "who stole most of the Muslem regions and deceived their inhabitants, doing their best to annihilate all the Muslem political power and to strip them from all arms to that the Moslems may not have the presentiment [sic] of rebelling against or attacking them."[120] No matter what charges brought to bear against the Ottomans in making an alliance with Germany,

[119] Quoted from Quran 5:51: "O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you - then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people." (Sahih International)

[120] TNA: "Sherif Haidar's Proclamation," dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2].

they did not compare to Husayn's alliance with a power whose colonial holdings included Muslims.

While defending the Hijaz from European intrusions occupied most of 'Ali Haydar's proclamation, he also sought to assert his household's rights to the Amirate of Mecca. He did so by further denouncing Husayn through ancestral claims. Against Husayn's self-aggrandizing actions, 'Ali Haydar contrasted Husayn to their revered ancestor al-Hasan ibn 'Ali ibn 'Abi Talib (d. 670) from whom the Hashemites claim descent to the prophet:

> All men know how our ancestor, [al-Hasan ibn 'Ali], relinquished the Khilafa in order to prevent Moslem bloodshed, and out of sympathy for the religion; therefore he [Husayn], in whose days the Christian powers stretch their hand to [the] Hejaz for the first time in history, is not of us [the Hashemites], and this great trespass should not be recorded in our history after our glorious stand in the past in support of the religion. For this reason and in conformity with the conduct of our ancestors, when the "Emir of the Faithful" our lord Sultan Mohammad Rashad V, has conferred upon me the Imarat of Mecca at a time when the Hejaz is in real danger, I accepted it with the help of God, not because I desire authority and power--for this already pertains to us--but out of sympathy for the Holy Places lest they should fall in the hand of the enemy, who if he once interferes in its affairs and is not opposed, will shortly enter it and tread on its sacred soil that has been sacred for over 1,300 years.[121]

Thus, unlike their illustrious ancestor, Husayn had chosen to cling to his title--as the Amir of Mecca--rather than abandon it for the sake of Islamic unity. By doing so, he can no longer be counted as a Hashemites since he failed to follow their ancestor's example. 'Ali Haydar, in contrast, claimed that the Sultan-Caliph now appointed him to defend the region just as their ancestors had done.

In hearkening back to Hashemite ancestors, it followed that 'Ali Haydar also asserted his household's claim the Amirate. His appointment restored the Zayd household to the Amirate of

[121] TNA: "Sherif Haidar's Proclamation," dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2].

Mecca. The new Amir was not hesitant to evoke the intra-Hashemite rivalry between the ‘Awn and the Zayd in his diagnosis of the threat his predecessor posed and the solution that rested in restoring the proper order to the Amirate. ‘Ali Haydar emphasized the connection between Husayn’s actions that threatened the Holy Cities with his household usurpation of the Zayd right to the Amirate when he first introduced Husayn as “Sherif Hussein ibn Awn,” thereby emphasizing his household affiliation. He therefore drew a line between the injunctions for Muslims to protect the Holy Cities against British control that included his clan: “...we invite you all to obey the calls of both the Koran and the Sultan, and the call of our predecessors the children of Zeid *who are the only Amirs of the Hejdaz* from old that you should, in small numbers and in groups, fight against the troops sent by the Christians, the English and against those who dare to help them of the unjust , the oppressors.”[122] Expectedly for ‘Ali Haydar whose appointment restored his family’s claim to the Amirate, they alone were the rightful Amirs whose leadership Muslims are called to band together to fight against oppression including against those Muslims, like Husayn from the ‘Awn household whose ambitions threatened the Hijaz. Because of these changing circumstances, ‘Ali Haydar used this conflict against the British to reassert his clan’s claims to the Amirate of Mecca.

By declaring Husayn a non-believer and stripping him and his household’s legitimacy to the Amirate of Mecca as Hashemites, ‘Ali Haydar concluded by reiterating the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph’s call for *jihad* to those in the Hijaz. Moreover, the new Amir directed the *jihad* not only against the British but also against Husayn himself:

> If God and His Prophet command a thing we must obey and rise up to the “Jehad.” We must also explain to you clearly how in joining the Christians, the Sherif Hussein has placed the Holy Places under their mercy, that the weak among you may not be deceived by the falsehood that has affected the poor people of the desert,

[122] TNA: “Sherif Haidar’s Proclamation,” dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2]. Italics mine for emphasis.

> and in order that the ignorant, who have been taken in by these falsehoods, may not oblige us to unsheathe our sword in their faces.
> We call you to be united and to rush to fight the troops who are sent by the Christian English, and those who dare to befriend them, and to support the troops of the Sultan who are advancing on Medina and Mecca to cleanse them from the infidels….Fight so that you may shortly enter the Holy Mosque in peace with your heads uplifted. Do not be deceived by the intriguers and the liars, and do not be afraid of their power, for God will make you conquer. May He include you in His Army and support you.[123]

By repeating the Ottoman call for *jihad* and directing it against Husayn, Amir 'Ali Haydar hoped to inspire the Hijazi Arabs to turn against Husayn on the basis of religion. 'Ali Haydar's pronouncements, coming from a fellow member of the Hashemites and a more senior branch, provided the perfect triptych to challenge Husayn: the Ottoman (caliphal), the Hashemite, and the Islamic.

Al-Qibla and the Arabist Adaption of Husayn's Awakening

A week after 'Ali Haydar's proclamation, the first issue of *al-Qibla*, a semi-weekly periodical that served as Husayn's mouthpiece from August 16, 1916 until September 25, 1924, was published. Husayn's newspaper, whose name meant "direction" in reference to the orientation of Muslim prayers towards Mecca, corresponded with the historical emergence of private presses that appeared in the Arab world in the last decades of the 19th century.[124] Created in response to the launch of the rebellion, *al-Qibla* also factored into the state-sponsored propaganda war that also characterized World War I as a way of affecting public opinion. Since the war was fought as a total war, managing public opinion was deemed essential to the war effort.[125] In the front against

[123] TNA: "Sherif Haidar's Proclamation," dated 9 August 1916, [FO 686/11]; Arab Bulletin No. 20, 14 September 1916 [FO882/25/2].

[124] Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 50–72.

[125] Troy R. E. Paddock, ed., *World War I and Propaganda* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 8–17.

Husayn's forces in the Hijaz, the Ottomans used two newspapers *al-Hijaz* (in Medina) and *al-Sharq* (in Damascus), which were both published by the state, as tools in its propaganda war. *Al-Qibla* was Husayn's response to the Ottoman information campaign to discredit him. In particular, Jamal Pasha, who founded *al-Sharq*, distributed the newspaper in Syria and had the prominent Ottoman-Arab authors like Muhammad 'Ali Kurd and Shakib Arslan publish articles to counter Husayn's revolt. They argued that the Arabs ought to remain within the Ottoman Empire so as to safeguard against European imperialism and called for their loyalty to the caliphate--the same arguments presented by 'Ali Haydar in his proclamation. With *al-Sharq* distributed in Damascus, it offered an effective critique of Husayn's rebellion that may have stymied Syrian-Arabs from openly supporting Husayn. The arguments these rival newspapers made focused on Islam and Islamic unity, which has led scholars like Cleveland and Çiçek to conclude that the *al-Qibla* relied primarily on Islamism--and not Arabism--in criticizing the Ottoman state.[126]

Among historians who have examined *al-Qibla*, their analyses have been on its Islamist critique of the Ottoman state, despite recognizing the Arabist editors and contributors.[127] Although Husayn was listed as its "editor in charge," the chief editor was the *salafi* thinker Muhib al-Din al-Khatib (1886-1969) with the Arab poet Fu'ad al-Khatib (1880-1957) frequently contributing

[126] For an excellent analysis of the propaganda war between *al-Sharq* and *al-Qiblah*, see Çiçek, "Visions of Islamic Unity: A Comparison of Jamal Pasha's al-Sharq and Sharif Husayn's al-Qibla Periodicals."

[127] According to Cleveland, the articles from *al-Qiblah* represented a transitional phase between Islamism and Arabism: "The political vocabulary of the contributors of *al-Qibla* reflected a terminology in transition, a blurring of national and religious concepts and a reliance, in the end, on an Islamic ideology. There were no definitions of Arabism because neither the amir of Mecca nor his editor, Muhib al-Din al-Khatib, were comfortable with them; nor were they certain that they constituted the most effective form of propaganda." See William Cleveland. "The Role of Islam as Political Ideology in the First World War" in Ingram, Edward, ed. *National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie*. Routledge, 2013, pg. 91. Çiçek concluded that the rivalry among the Arabists in *al-Sharq* and *al-Qiblah* was not between Arabism or Turkism; rather, "Islam and the struggle between the Central Powers and the Entente shaped this battle much more…" See Çiçek, 465. However, he also concluded that "Islam occupied an important place in *al-Qibla*'s Arabism--in fact, its Arabism was part of the newspaper's Islamist discourse," suggesting that despite his and Cleveland's emphasis on the Islamist arguments, Arabism was nonetheless still a feature of *al-Qiblah*. See Çiçek, 476.

articles. With these two Syrian authors, Husayn could link his rebellion to several different Arabist ideological strands. With Muhib al-Din al-Khatib as chief editor, for example, Husayn connected the ideological articulation of his project with a figure with recognized Arabist credentials from active participation in Arabist secret societies and parties. Muhib al-Din had been the youngest member of the study circle (*halqa*) of Shaykh Tahir al-Jaza'iri (a follower of the famed Algerian Sufi anticolonial activist 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri exiled in Damascus) that had been founded in 1880, which met to discuss Arab history, poetry, and traditions. Muhib al-Din eventually established his own "small circle" in 1903, which studied among other Arab topics the recently published book *Umma al-Qura* by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi.[128] While studying law in Istanbul, he worked with other Arabist figures and his students to create the Society of the Arab Revival (*Jam'iyyat al-Nahda al-'Arabiyyat*) in 1906 that would have branches all over the Arab world. His study circle in Damascus, in fact, became the Society's center. His activities, however, attracted the attention of the Ottoman government, and before they could arrest him, he first fled Damascus and then to Cairo. In Cairo, Muhib al-Din joined Rashid Rida's new party, Society of the Ottoman Council, and even promised to establish a chapter in Yemen, where he was travelling to serve as an interpreter for the British consulate in Hodeida.[129] After the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, which he criticized as a threat to Arab nationalism, he returned to Damascus. When the CUP gained authoritarian power following the 1913 coup, Muhib al-Din fled the country and worked in Cairo. There, he acted as the Cairo representative for *al-Fatat*, which was founded in

[128] Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements*, 43–45. For a fuller biography, see Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, "Muhib Al-Din al-Khatib: A Portrait of a Salafi-Arabist (1886-1969)" (Simon Fraser University, 1991). For a description of his concern for Islamic unity during the interwar period amid political fragmentation of the Arab world, see Amal N. Ghazal, "Power, Arabism and Islam in the Writings of Muhib al-Din al-Khatib in al-Fath," *Past Imperfect* 6 (1997): 133–50.

[129] Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements*, 52–53.

1909 after the Constitutional Revolution that called for Arab independence, and he also served as the second secretary for the decentralization party (*Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya al-Idariyya al-'Uthmaniyya*) that called for greater Arab political autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.[130] At the start of World War I, Muhib al-Din travelled to the Persian Gulf in order to stir up an Arab uprising (under the leadership of Ibn Saud), but British officials in Bushehr arrested him and his companion. Only with the intervention of Rashid Rida were they released, and Muhib al-Din returned to Cairo, where he remained until Husayn launched his revolt.[131] In August 1916, alongside Arab prisoners of wars, Muhib al-Din and Fu'ad al-Khatib (no relation) left Egypt for Jeddah to join Husayn's revolt.[132]

In contrast to Muhib al-Din's direct ties through interactions and memberships with Arabist parties, Fu'ad al-Khatib represented a type of cultural--as opposed to political--Arabist that Peter Wien labelled as a "universalist" in that he was "a politician, a teacher and intellectual, a civil servant, and an acclaimed poet at the same time."[133] He remained a "cultural nationalist" that adhered to ideas of pan-Arabism without joining an Arabist party, being an Arab officer (from either the Ottoman or Arab Revolt), or being from an urban notable family. His background was far more modest: the grandson and son of rural Ottoman officials, he grew up outside of Beirut. His political coming of age and adoption of Arabism resulted from his education, in particular his time at the Syrian Protestant College (now American University of Beirut), an institution accredited by scholars for the promotion of Arab nationalism, which Fu'ad entered in 1904. For

---

[130] Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements*, 53; "Muhib al-Din al-Khatib" in Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli, *al-'Alam*, vol. 5 (Beirut, Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malayyin, 2002), 282.

[131] Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War I*, 17–18.

[132] Tauber, 104.

[133] Peter Wien, *Arab Nationalism: The Politics of History and Culture in the Modern Middle East* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 21.

Fu'ad, he expressed his Arabism through an expansive collection of poetry that praised Arab history and decried Turkification, which he published in Egyptian newspapers.[134] He spent four years teaching at Gordon College in Khartoum (from 1910-1914), and returned to Lebanon shortly before World War I broke out. After the execution of the Arab nationalists in 1915 and 1916, Fu'ad fled Lebanon--at the advice of a cousin who served in the Ottoman army--and found refuge in Cairo. From there, he travelled with Muhib al-Din to the Hijaz to help found *al-Qibla*.

Al-Qibla was established to serve as the main organ of distributing information about Husayn's revolt from Mecca. The British provided funding for the periodical, alongside their Cairo-based publication *al-Kawkab*, and helped in its distribution to promote the rebellion and to spread propaganda against the Ottomans.[135] To describe *al-Qibla* as Husayn's "mouthpiece" may have been an accurate description, considering that Husayn--while at times penning articles--purportedly met with his paper's chief editor, Muhib al-Din, on a daily basis.[136] In regards to any British editorial interference, the editors of *al-Qibla* frequently published articles, telegrams, and reports that came from Egyptian newspapers; meaning, British propaganda did appear in its issues through these republications. Considering the fact that it was published in Mecca, where British colonial officials (who were not Muslim) could not visit and instead relied on a few Muslim agents (like Husayn Ruhi discussed in the next chapter), the editors of *al-Qibla* enjoyed the freedom to publish whatever articles they wished. If British officials found any articles objectionable,

---

[134] Wien, 28–29.

[135] Bruce Westrate, *The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 111; Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History*, 72.

[136] Sulayman Musa, ed., *Wujuh Wa Malamih* (Amman: Da'ira al-thaqafa wa al-Shabab, 1980), 140; Rizvi, "Muhib Al-Din al-Khatib: A Portrait of a Salafi-Arabist (1886-1969)," 37.

however, they "censored" specific issues by not distributing them in Egypt, Sudan, or India.[137] Within Mecca and the conquered towns of the Hijaz, *al-Qibla* was freely distributed through Husayn's agents.

Taking the political ideas of its editors and its distribution--both inside and outside the Hijaz--the message of *al-Qibla* necessarily attempted to address these diverse Arab and Muslim audiences to bolster the legitimacy of Husayn's movement. Although historians have dismissed *al-Qibla* as a medium for Arabism by focusing on the Islamic critiques (see footnote 112), they do so by overlooking how its editors adapted Husayn's initial "awakening" more fully to Islamic Arabism, albeit one that focused on the leadership of Husayn. Thus, in order to speak to its diverse audience in the Arab Muslim world (whether the Hijaz, Egypt, Sudan) or beyond to include non-Arab Muslims in India and even non-Muslims in Syria (next chapter), *al-Qibla* became a vehicle that not only published Husayn's proclamations but also to inform and instruct its readers on the "Arab awakening."

The paper's masthead provided both symbolic and literal description of its purpose that captured its broad agenda. The name of the paper, *al-Qibla*, referenced the direction of prayer for all Muslims globally (towards the *Ka'ba* in Mecca), thus reminding them of Mecca's centrality and signifying that the newspaper acted as a point of reference. Above the title's nameplate, the corresponding verse from the Quran was published: "We did not make the *qibla* which you used

[137] TNA: Copy of "Report on Moslem Propaganda, February 11, 1917" from Arab Bureau, Cairo, to, Arthur James Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, 23 February 1917 [FO 141/817]. A specific example of British ability to regulate distribution followed the reporting of Husayn's coronation and assumption of the title "King of the Arabs" (the subject of next chapter), colonial officials had delayed its distribution in India and Egypt for at least one month until a translation of the relevant article and discussions with the French took place. BL: File "Arab Revolt. Announcement of Grand Shereef's Assumption of royal title in newspaper Kibla. Question of admitted Kibla to India and Egypt," 26-27 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637]; See BL: "Arab Revolt" containing telegram from Viceroy, Foreign Department, Delhi, to Sirdar, Khartoum, repeated to Cairo and Secretary of State for India, 29 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637]; BL: File "Newspaper 'Kibla' admitted to India" 30 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637];

to face except that We might make evident who would follow the Messenger from who would turn back on his heels."[138] This verse conveniently echoed Husayn's argument that his actions were for the sake of the Islam against the CUP who abandoned right belief and practice. Immediately below the nameplate, the editors offered a short description of the newspaper. It read, "A religious, political, and social newspaper produced twice a week for the service of Islam and the Arabs," which indicated its wide scope and broad distribution. Its editors also presupposed global distribution, as suggested by its listed price in the masthead. Offering yearly subscription, the newspaper charged three riyals "in the Hijaz" but asked for "fifteen francs in other regions."[139] Lest its broad audience forgot where the newspaper was published--and by whom--the masthead also published its address for any letters to the editors as the "Amirate's Publishing House" in Mecca thus connecting its publication to the Amirate of Mecca. (In later issues, Muhib al-Din al-Khatib was also listed to receive mail.[140]) Thus, within this masthead, the contours of Husayn's project were visible. It was the Amirate's publication, which contained religious information, pertinent to Muslims, universal as the direction of prayer. Its pricing also revealed its intended distribution to be the Hijaz and other, unnamed, regions, and it aimed to also provide social and political information for Islam and the Arabs as a nation.

The first few issues, carrying this same masthead with only minor modifications, had the special task of introducing the Arab and Islamic world to Husayn's rebellion and to justify it.

---

[138] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 15 August 1916; Quran 2:143 (Sahih International translation): وَمَا جَعَلْنَا الْقِبْلَةَ الَّتِي كُنتَ عَلَيْهَا إِلَّا لِنَعْلَمَ مَن يَتَّبِعُ الرَّسُولَ مِمَّن يَنقَلِبُ عَلَىٰ عَقِبَيْهِ(And thus we have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you. And We did not make the qiblah which you used to face except that We might make evident who would follow the Messenger from who would turn back on his heels.)

[139] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 15 August 1916; in later issues, the prices will change slightly, but starting in the second issue, a "price per copy" of 4 *qirsh* was also advertised.

[140] Beginning with *al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

While Husayn's proclamation indicated the broad contours of his project--the religious critique that he had espoused as his Arab Hamidian critique by also adopting some discursive elements characterizing Arabism (like *al-nahda*) that focused on Mecca. Against the backdrop of Husayn's initial proclamation, the editors of *al-Qibla* used the platform that a periodical afforded to elaborate Husayn's actions. In so doing, they adopted the contours of Husayn's arguments but further couched them within Arabist arguments and discourse.

For instance, in the inaugural issue under the article entitled "The Newspaper's Message" the editors further developed Husayn's arguments against the CUP's irreligion. Like Husayn, they charged the CUP with undermining the Islamic essence of the Ottoman Empire. Describing them as atheists, the editors claimed that the CUP pursued policies that opposed religion by not aligning their actions with Islamic *shari'ah*.[141] They described how they had imprisoned the Sultan-Caliph, taking from him his divine right to govern the Islamic Empire and preserve its faithfulness to religion.[142] The CUP, they continued, threatened the underpinnings of Islam by advocating for the translation of the Quran into Turkish, thus abandoning its original Arabic text. Furthermore, they rejected the *fard*, the religious obligation, of the yearly pilgrimage by discouraging its undertaking while the Empire was threatened by outside powers. As evidence to their wickedness, the country had fallen into *fitna*, or divisiveness, with the manipulation of the Arab amirs against one another--echoing Husayn's 1913 letter to his brother, Nasir ibn 'Ali. Because of all their irreligious actions, the country corroded into parts with the loss of Crete, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Libya, parts of Anatolia, and Southern Iraq--all lost, the editors claimed, as divine retribution by the CUP's un-Islamic actions. Unlike the Arabs that faced the true

[141] "Message from the Newspaper" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 15 August 1916.

[142] "Message from the Newspaper" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 15 August 1916.

"*qiblah*," that is the "ancient house" in Mecca, the CUP's *ka'aba* was Salonica as it unfaithfully spent Muslim money to build churches in Bulgaria.[143]

Judging by these acerbic critiques, the preponderance of religious claims and justifications would naturally support a religious cause for the crux of the Hashemite dispute against the CUP that amounted to the Arab Revolt. It is no wonder that the religious language has garnered the most attention from scholars; however, *al-Qibla* did not simply criticize the CUP based on religion, but it expressed a role for the Arab nation in this conflict that further developed Husayn's incorporation. That is, the religious critiques were not only abstractly framed along lines of irreligion or *shari'a*-mindedness but also along nationalist categories within Islamic Arabist political discourse. For example, the editors charged that in addition to the religious crimes against Islam, the CUP introduced had also introduced "Turkish *'asabiyya*," which could be translated as Turkish ethnic nationalism.[144] *'Asabiyya* was term that can be broadly defined as "solidarity" and was rich in Khaldonian shades of tribal socio-political organization. He and his like-minded Arabist thinkers considered it be a pre-Islamic social, particularly tribal, organization, and was thus counted as characterizing the age of *jahiliyya*, or ignorance.[145]

In addition to these concerns, the editors likewise adapted and mirrored Husayn's anxiety that the CUP government had divided the Arab world, specifically the Arabian Peninsula, by blaming their division from Turkish *'asabiyya*. By abandoning orthodox Islam and promoting ethnic nationalism, the CUP fomented a *fitna*. *Fitna* is a term that possessed several related

---

[143] "The Arab Awakening" in "Message from the Newspaper" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 15 August 1916.

[144] "Message from the Newspaper" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 15 August 1916.

[145] Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 298–99; Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: F. Cass, 1993). pgs. 110-111; Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*, 75–77.

connotations of dissention, affliction, discord, or strife. In Islamic history, it referred to the period following Muhammad's death when various Arab tribes in the Peninsula began to apostate from Islam and splinter away from the community he had created.[146] In this way, by referring to the effects of Turkish *'asabiyya* as causing a *fitna*, the editors of *al-Qibla* charged the CUP government of "stirring up the Amirs" of the Arabs, "each of them against the other, and spreading between them animosity and discord."[147] In both his 1913 letter and his initial proclamation, Husayn expressed a similar sentiment that the CUP had divided the Islamic world by seeking agreements with the Saudis and Idrisis who represented political--and more importantly, religious--challenges to the Sunni order that Husayn had recognized through the Ottoman caliphate. Taken together, these critiques, couched as they were on religious grounds, suggested that the CUP persecuted the Arabs, as an *umma*, while "chanting and shouting" a Turkish *'asabiyya*.

The evidence the editors of *al-Qibla* levied to prove the heresy and dangerous ethnic nationalism of the CUP government rested on rhetorical claims and seemingly sporadic examples. In these initial issues, however, the editors did include one specific evidence: the Ottoman Turkish publication, *al-Qawm al-Jadid*, which it treated as the embodiment of the CUP agenda.[148] The text consisted of several speeches and sermons that Shaykh Ubaydallah, an extreme Turkish nationalist from Afghanistan and member of the CUP, gave at the Hagia Sophia Mosque in Istanbul

---

[146] See L. Gardet, "FITNAH," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, ed. P. Bearman et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (Brill, n.d.), II: 930b, https://referenceworks.brillonline.com:443/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/fitnah-SIM_2389.

[147] "Message from the Newspaper" in *al-Qiblah* (no 1), 15 August 1916.

[148] For the full text seem Shaykh Ubaydallah Afghani, *Qawm al-Jadid: Kitab al-Mua'ath*. Istanbul: Dar Sa'adat, 1331 [1913]. For Arabic translations, see "*Qawm Jadid*" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 15 August 1916; "The Pillars of Islam in the Ideologies of the *Qawm Jadid* and the Old People" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 3), 21 August 1916; "al-Khidr, Angels, and the Saints (and the Prophet conquests) in the Dogma of *Qawm Jadid*" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 5), 28 August 1916; "Who is Ubaydallah, the author of *Qawm Jadid*" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 5), 28 August 1916; "Turkey in the Doctrine of *Qawm Jadid*" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 7), 4 September 1916.

in 1913 and compiled for publication that same year. In them, Shaykh Ubaydallah called for the modernization of Islam, the translation of the Quran into Turkish, and insisted that the Hajj to Mecca was unnecessary anytime the Holy Places were threatened. Instead, any monetary contributions to the pilgrimage, both state-directed and donated by individuals, ought to be suspended and invested in improvements in the military might and prestige of the Ottoman State and its Caliph.[149] According to Shaykh Ubaydallah, the prestige of these Holy Cities did not exist separate from the prestige of the Caliph; if his prestige waned, so did the prestige of the pilgrimage. Before *al-Qibla*, the text *al-Qawm al-Jadid* had also attracted the attention of Arabist parties in Cairo, such as Rashid Rida's *Jam'iyyat al-Jami'a al-'Arabiyya* (The Society of the Arab Association) that had been founded in 1914. Another Cairene Arabist party, *al-Jam'iyya al-Thawriyya al-'Arabiyya* (The Arab Revolutionary Society) headed by Haqqi al-'Azm and founded in April 1914 also had criticized the work.[150] This party considered *al-Qawm al-Jadid* a Turkish nationalist production considered "to be one of the most offensive at that time, and they frequently cited it to illustrate the hostile attitude of the Turks towards them," the Arabs.[151] By including *al-Qawm al-Jadid* through quotations, translations, and analysis, the editors of *al-Qibla* situated their arguments among these Arabist parties.[152] Within the context of Husayn's Arab "Awakening, the writers of *al-Qibla* characterized the ideas of *al-Qawm al-Jadid* as a threat to Islamic *shari'a* and proof of the evils of the CUP directed towards right religion. From Husayn's perspective, the explicit minimizing of the Holy Cities to the Islamic world and subsequent elevation of the

[149] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

[150] Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements*, 109–17.

[151] Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: F. Cass, 1993). pg. 238.

[152] *al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 15 August 1916.

Ottoman Caliph threatened the prestige he and his household received by virtue of managing the Hijaz and the pilgrimage.

The emphasis of *al-Qawm al-Jadid* as explicit proof of the CUP government's intentions included more than just references to Shaykh Ubaydallah or his messages. The editors devoted columns over several issues that provided relevant selections of the text itself in both its original Ottoman Turkish and then translated into Arabic so that all Arabs would learn of the Unionists' "atheism and secularism."[153] Following these selections, the editors then added rejoinders to the quoted sections that allegedly clarified Shaykh Ubaydallah's claims and why they must be challenged. The inclusion of the Ottoman Turkish text and then the Arabic translation with commentary further reinforced the application of Husayn's proclamation. Husayn's proclamation, addressed to all Muslims globally, called for other oppressed groups in the Ottomans to "awaken" just like the Arabs in the Hijaz. This call naturally included the Arabs in Syria and Iraq but could conceivably include other non-Turkish nationalities. For the editors to include the Ottoman Turkish text of *al-Qawm al-Jadid*, they wanted to draw the attention of these groups still within the Ottoman Empire. Since their analysis of the text was in Arabic, they also assumed and educated, bi-lingual readership. The addition of an Arabic translation made possible a wider audience not able to read Ottoman. Such an audience included those who could read Arabic--Arabs and non-Arab Muslims--but who could not read the Ottoman Turkish. In the same way as Husayn addressed the global Muslim *umma* but called for other groups in the Ottoman Empire to awaken, so too did the editors in providing the textual evidence of *al-Qawm al-Jadid* simultaneously address both an Ottoman and non-Ottoman audience.

[153] *al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 15 August 1916.

While articulating the religious crimes of the CUP and proving how their intentions threatened Islam by quoting *al-Qawm al-Jadid*, the editors of *al-Qibla* also articulated a specific role for the Arab Muslims to counter CUP policies. Contrary to other historians who detected only an Islamic argument within the pages of *al-Qibla*, the editors had indeed incorporated Arabist concerns into their critique. These concerns, as already discussed included the religious primacy of Arabic as the language of the Quran and universal reverence for the Holy Cities (as centers of Arab religious life). The centrality of the Holy Cities were of course essential to Husayn's project of raising his--and thus his household's--prestige, but the editors did not limit their Arabist arguments to only the Hijaz. They also expressed concern for Palestine, whose future had become during the constitutional period a specifically Arab issue debated in the restored Ottoman parliament. For example, in an article appearing in the second issue, entitled "Us and Our Enemies," the editors described how the Unionists had promised Palestine to Germany by alluding to the fact that the German Kaiser Wilhelm had visited Jerusalem in 1898 to dedicate the new Lutheran Church there and now German officials controlled the CUP government.[154] In that same issue, the editors also reported that the American ambassador in Istanbul had informed the Egyptian press of Unionists plans to sell Palestine to Jews after the war.[155] The anxiety of the future of Palestine vis-a-vis the Zionist movement had been a concern for Palestinian Arabs that appeared in Palestinian presses and even among their parliamentary representatives in Istanbul when the constitution was restored.[156] As such, the issue of Palestine had been a concern among Arabist thinkers, and now appeared in the initial issues of *al-Qibla*. For the editors, the issue of

[154] Marian Kent, *Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, (Routledge, 1996), 112.

[155] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

[156] Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (Columbia University Press, 2013), 31–34, 80–83, 119–44.

translating the Quran into Turkish, dismissing the importance of the pilgrimage, and threatening the future of Palestine served their rhetorical purpose of demonstrating the effects of Turkish *'asabiyya* that no longer concerned itself with Islamic unity (in part maintained by a common scriptural language) and sought to undermine Arab identity and territory.

The concern for the Arabs was not just out of sympathy, however, but the belief that the Arab *umma* had a unique mission to oppose the policies of the CUP and restore the proper Islamic order. The Arabs, in their opinion, had a special, divinely sanctioned role in restoring Islam. Very early in the article, the editors announced that the Arabs have been charged by God "to overcome the domination...in order to escape from the noose on their necks from which they endured misfortune" at the hands of the CUP.[157] Citing religious justification from verse 17 of Surat al-Isra in the Quran, which explained that God would see to the total destruction of a city that does not accept His word, the editors predicted that "within the Umma" a group of reformers would arise from this destruction to set things right against the present irreligion.[158] Of course, that group of reformers were the Arabs, the Arab *umma*, because they alone hoped for Islamic unity and the preeminence of the sacred Arab language.[159] The Arabs, the writer suggested, will not only save the Empire from decay but also free the "imprisoned" Sultan, who was also the Caliph.[160] In elevating and elucidating a special role for the Arab nation, the author equated right religion with the Arabs in general, none of whom he claimed, supported the CUP. To stray from the right path, makes one simultaneously a traitor to the Arabs and a defector from religion. The "Newspaper's

[157] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

[158] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

[159] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

[160] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

Message," thus ended with a strong condemnation of the Unionists, who "have refused to hear [the Prophet's] voice except from very powerful cannons," but rejoiced that "a part of the *umma*," that is the Arab nation, "still follows the Right and does not deviate from what their Creator commands."[161] Far from only a religious argument, the editors of *al-Qibla* placed the Arab nation at the forefront of the revitalization of Islam.

While mirroring many of the arguments for Islamic revitalization through Arab intervention, the editors necessarily articulated a space for Husayn in this process. The Hashemites, they explained, will restore Islamic unity and the right religious practice by challenging the Unionists and by leading the Arab nation. The authors assured their readership that the the Hashemites would reunite the Arab world because they possessed sovereignty over the Arabs by virtue of being descendants of Muhammad. In *al-Qibla*'s opening paragraph, the editors praise God and the "ancient house" in Mecca, and praises Muhammad for his actions as prophet and for coming "from the best of tribes in the best of nations."[162] Sharif Husayn, whose lineage was traced back to Muhammad, thus also came from the best of tribes and the best of nations. As such, the author explained later in the article, that Sharif Husayn, "Our Lord and Master, Scion of the Prophet's Strain, Offshoot of the Hashemite Family Tree, the Glory of the Islamic *umma*, Genius of the Age, The Miracle or the Time," possessed the special role in reversing the crimes of the Unionists. They write that he "has stood up for his religion, which the Unionists of mocked and for his nation which the oppressors have offended," and in doing so, he will "expunge the atrocity of those atheists and reunite those who were divided by them," that is, he will restore the

[161] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

[162] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

unity of the Arab *umma*.[163] While the editors do not explicitly advocate for Arab unity under the Hashemites, it would follow that the Arabs, as the best of people in the Islamic *umma*, ought to be united under the best of tribes, i.e. the Hashemites. For the sake of Islam, it was framed, the Arabs must be united by a Hashemite, thereby ending the *fitna* that resulted from the Turkish *'asabiyya*.

Conclusion

The events that followed the 1908 Constitutional revolution challenged Husayn's ideological commitment to the Ottoman system. For Husayn, his loyalty to the Ottoman state hinged on his acceptance of the terms of the Hamidian program that emphasized the Islamic character of the state with the absolutism of the Sultan-Caliph. Within this religio-political matrix that had emerged, Husayn located himself as a loyal Arab who would successfully mediate the centralizing politics of Istanbul with the local politics of a largely tribal Arab region whose significance was essential for Ottoman religious legitimacy. Husayn essentially had embedded his cultural Arabism to Hamidian politics. This ideological commitment had evolved as his household consolidated as the Amirs of Mecca during the Hamidian period while Husayn simultaneously asserted his dynastic claims within his household through the intervention of 'Abd al-Hamid.

During the post-revolutionary period as Husayn established his Amirate while the CUP increased their authority against their rivals (which also required deposing Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid in spring 1909), Husayn's continued cooperation with the Ottoman government characterized his administration until at least 1913. For Husayn, so long as the post-Hamidian order upheld the terms of a political framework whereby his household dominated the Amirate of Mecca and the Hijaz, he remained loyal to the Sultan-Caliph. Since the political program of the CUP as it

[163] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 2), 18 August 1916.

pertained to the Arabian Peninsula had empowered Ottoman allies (including Husayn) to suppress threats to the state, Husayn's interests and the Ottoman government's interests aligned. This collaboration continued even as the CUP consolidated central state authority in Medina that essentially severed part of the Hijaz from Husayn and debated extending the Hijaz railway line southward to Mecca. The watershed moment for Husayn was the shift in CUP policy towards his regional rivals, Ibn Saud and al-Idris. These two peninsular tribal leaders posed political challenges to the Ottomans because they sought to expand their territories, which would be at the expense of Husayn, and had even reached out to European powers for aid. Ibn Saud and al-Idris also represented a religious challenge to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph as they represented religious movements that looked beyond the Ottoman caliph as a universal Muslim authority. Just as the CUP sought to make separate agreements with these powers in an effort to reach an accommodation, Husayn began to criticize the Ottoman government because of its policies towards these Arabian powers and for threatening the unity of Islam that the caliph represented. The government's rapprochement with the Ottoman peninsular rivals had even followed conspicuous signs of the CUP connecting with the Zayd household, including 'Ali Haydar and his relatives in Jeddah.

With the terms of the Hamidian compromise now abrogated, Husayn began to look towards new allies, which began his evolution from a cultural Arabist to political Arabism. In this effort, his sons 'Abdullah and Faysal were instrumental in establishing contacts with Arabist parties in Cairo and Damascus as well as British officials in Egypt. During these meetings, communications, and outreach, it remained apparent that Husayn continued to grapple with his political ideology, still wedded to this loyalty to the centrality of the caliphate but anxious for his authority and the dominance of his household. The McMahon-Husayn correspondence that resulted with his

negotiations with the British reflected his interactions with various Arabist parties, both nationalist and Islamic. At the same time, Husayn repeatedly asserted his authority in the Hijaz as a religious and regional leader of the Arabs by citing how the Amirs of Mecca were the first Arab Muslims to recognize the Ottoman caliphate and condemning the subjugation of the Ottoman caliphate by the CUP. As such, he nonetheless continued to try to reach an accommodation with the CUP that would at least secure his household's claims to the Amirate and his regional independence. Taking these negotiations and the nature of Husayn's critiques, it was clear that Husayn's anxiety concerned his continued domination of the Amirate of Mecca against his closest rivals, the Zayd household.

Once negotiations with the CUP failed in the Spring 1916 followed by Jamal Pasha's sharpened hostility towards the Arabists in Damascus, Husayn launched the Arab Revolt on June 10, 1916, assured of British and Arabist support. Although he launched a rebellion, Husayn still had not embraced political Arabism entirely. Rather, his arguments and explanations for the revolt, encapsulated with his initial proclamation, revealed that his ideology was still transitioning. In it, he had repeated many of the same critiques that he levied against the CUP government that reflected his Arab Hamidianism. Yet, also included, however, was elements of the political Arabist project that evoked ideas of Arab "awakening" (or *nahda*) with ideas of national progress and modernity. The cohesiveness of Husayn's political rhetoric resulted from his already present cultural Arabism to which the political Arabist discourse could graft. In summary, Husayn's proclamation, while representing an ideology in transition, had limited itself to the Hijaz and the Amirate of Mecca, which were Husayn's focus--and not the Arab nation per se.

The catalyst for Husayn's wholesale embrace of political Arabism followed with the reactivation of the Hashemite household rivalry as the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph divested Husayn

the Amirate of Mecca and appointed ‘Ali Haydar of the Zayd household as the new Amir. Unable to reach Mecca because of the Revolt, ‘Ali Haydar did reach the Ottoman stronghold in Medina where he issued his counter proclamation. The discourse underpinning Amir ‘Ali Haydar’s proclamation, directed towards the Arabs of the Hijaz, was Ottomanism. In his view, the strength of the Islamic world depended entirely on the restoration of the Ottoman order as opposed Arab independence. In his characterization, Husayn threatened Islamic unity and even the sanctity of the Holy Cities through rebellion, as he argued that Husayn’s alliance with the British would allow for Christian colonization of the Hijaz. According to ‘Ali Haydar, the sanctity of the Holy Cities, which he claimed had never been compromised, depended on loyalty to the Ottoman caliph.

Besides these attacks on Husayn, ‘Ali Haydar had adopted aspects of Husayn’s rhetoric, namely the unique position of the Amir of Mecca to the Arabs and the Islamic world, and then leveraged them to discredit Husayn by associating him with the British colonial project. He then asserted the Muslim--and thus Arab--duty to support the Ottoman state based on religious obligation of loyalty to the Ottoman caliphate. At the same time, ‘Ali Haydar represented himself and his household the Zayd as not only the true and rightful Amirs of Mecca and the true defenders of Islam embodied by the Ottoman order. Unlike Husayn, who pitted Muslims against Muslims and against the caliph, he represented the Muslim cause against Europeans who threaten Islamic civilization. By incorporating the household rivalry to discredit Husayn, ‘Ali Haydar became what I call the “Specter Amir.” According to tradition and precedent, ‘Ali Haydar was the Amir of Mecca. Being appointed by the Ottoman caliph, he represented the continuation and restoration of the Ottoman order, despite never taking up his post in Mecca. As a Hashemite, from an even older branch than Husayn, his claim to the Amirate technically superseded Husayn’s. As such, he

threatened to neutralize and of Husayn's traditional claims to Arab or religious authority. In this way, he "haunted" Husayn from Medina.

With the reactivation of the household rivalry and a new Specter Amir, Husayn necessarily needed a new ideology in which to justify his actions against the Ottoman state and the caliph. In this, he embraced political Arabism. His main platform for translating his ideology into political Arabism was through a revolutionary newspaper that he published in Mecca, *al-Qibla*. The format of *al-Qibla* allowed Husayn to articulate a more Arabist response to 'Ali Haydar's claims by further articulating how Husayn fit into the Arab "awakening" (or *nahda* as the newspaper described it). His newspaper's authors and editors, as established Arabists, used *al-Qibla* as a vehicle to articulate a very specific Hashemite-centric version of political Arabism. They called for the resuscitation of a struggling Islamic world by the empowerment of a unified Arab *umma*, or nation that existed in contrast to irreligion and Turkish *'asabiyya* (ethnic nationalism). That Turkish ethnic nationalism had perverted Islam and dismantled the caliphate which had led to an Arab *fitna* (or disunity) that had been instigated at the hands of the CUP. Only the Hashemites, specifically Sharif Husayn, could reverse Arab disunity and thus save Islam through the restoration of the Arab nation. Through Arabism, Husayn could critique the Ottoman government and simultaneously locate himself as the central agent for Arab unity and national restoration that would restore the proper Islamic order.

Chapter 4- From the Amir of Mecca to the King of the Arabs

Introduction

At the end of June 1916, in his first proclamation to the Muslim world, Husayn urged all Muslims still under Ottoman control to "awaken" and declare their independence from the CUP government, which he claimed had abused its subjects and corrupted the caliphate. With the start of the Revolt, however, he incorporated some elements of Arabism to justify his actions. His adoption of elements of Arabism, like *nahda*, corresponded with his alliance with some Arabist parties, through his sons 'Abdullah and Faysal, in preparing for the Revolt. From this outreach, Husayn had received the Damascus Protocol from the Arab nationalist party *al-Fatat* and support for the creation of the Arab caliphate from Rashid Rida. At the same time, Husayn also negotiated with British officials in Cairo for support in leading a revolt against the Ottomans. Underlying Husayn's adoption of Arabism was his concern for the preservation of the Amirate's privileges against the CUP's centralization measures but also the fear of the Hashemite household rivalry once against being used against him to that end.

Against Husayn's appropriation of political Arabism that he tailored to justify his Revolt, "the Specter Amir" 'Ali Haydar from the Zayd household issued a counter-proclamation in Medina addressing the people of the Hijaz by August 1916. The significance of his appointment and propaganda cannot be understated. According to an early Egyptian historian of the Arab Revolt, Amin Sa'id (1934), by appointing 'Ali Haydar to the Amirate, the Unionists had "struck the Arabs with an Arab by casting between the Arab nation [*umma*] division and hatred, and tore it apart completely by bringing Sharif 'Ali Haydar...to Medina...which he made into the capital of his

Amirate."[1] Besides realizing Husayn's worst fears of the renewal of the Hashemite household rivalry between the 'Awn and the Zayd, 'Ali Haydar as the caliph-appointed Amir of Mecca offered the Arab and Muslim worlds an alternative Hashemite voice. In contrast to Husayn, the rebellious Hashemite supported by European colonial powers, 'Ali Haydar embodied the loyal Hashemite who sought Islamic unity and to prevent further European encroachment in Muslim lands. He emphasized these themes in this proclamation and reiterated the Caliph's call for *jihad* against the Entente powers, which now included Husayn and his allies. Many of the elements of 'Ali Haydar's proclamation mirror those produced by Ottoman propagandists in Damascus writing for *al-Sharq*, but 'Ali Haydar supplemented these anti-Husayn points by emphasizing that the Zayd's were the rightful Amirs of Mecca, and they have finally been restored.[2] Thus 'Ali Haydar had reactivated the Hashemite household rivalry.

Stripped of his title by his Zayd cousin and compounded by the lackluster start of the Arab Revolt and its immediate failure to inspire the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire to actively rebel and join his awakening (discussed below), Husayn was forced to both adapt his message and perform his awakening for Arab and Muslim consumption. Sharif Husayn's next political, ideological, and discursive shift was his creation and articulation of his proclaiming himself the "King of the Arab Lands" (*malik al-bilad al-'arabiyya*), or simply "King of the Arabs" in October 1916. Later historical opinion has concluded that Husayn's decision to assume such a lofty title was a strategic mistake that threatened European, particularly French, support and needlessly alienated Husayn

[1] Sa'id, *Al-Thawrah al-'Arabiyah al-Kubra, Tarikh Mufassal Jami' Lil-Qadiyah al-'Arabiyah Fi Rub' Qarn*, 1:158.

[2] For an overview of the Islamic and anti-Husayn arguments presented in *al-Sharq*, see Çiçek, "Visions of Islamic Unity: A Comparison of Jamal Pasha's al-Sharq and Sharif Husayn's al-Qibla Periodicals."

from potential Arab peninsular allies, specifically Abdul Aziz ibn al-Saud.[3] This chapter argues that Husayn's decision was not only a logical continuation of his shift prompted by the Hashemite household rivalry but also, in terms of the discourses a decision was crucial to the development of a new Arabist political vocabulary. After the appointment of Sharif 'Ali Haydar to the Amirate of Mecca, Husayn lost Ottoman caliphal legitimacy. Husayn had to foster a new image and a new language of legitimacy. The dilemma facing Husayn was to articulate his place in a pivotal moment for the Islamic, the Ottoman, and the Arab world. Thus Husayn crowned himself "King of the Arabs." The Zayd-'Awn rivalry not only prompted Husayn to create the title "King of the Arabs" but it necessarily had to translate it through within the pages of *al-Qibla* and through performance. In this way, the Zayd-'Awn rivalry remained operative during this period as Husayn defined King of the Arabs to embody both political and religious independence. He did so in order to defuse the criticisms of 'Ali Haydar that he was dependent on the British and that he, as a Muslim, has pitted himself against the caliph.

Beyond but including their dueling discourses, however, there was another element of the Zayd-'Awn rivalry during this period. More than just claiming the Amirate of Mecca, 'Ali Haydar and the Ottoman commanders maintained control of Medina. As the second Holy City and the location of the Prophet Muhammad's tomb, a Zayd Ottoman Medina stymied the claims of Husayn's political and religious project that were based in significant part to his claims of leadership over the Holy Cities in the Hijaz and his descent from Muhammad. By leveraging his control of Medina, 'Ali Haydar portrayed himself as an Ottoman, anti-colonial Hashemite while chastising his 'Awn rival as a British, Christian pawn. Husayn's reaction to this liability emerged

[3] For example, Antonius concurred with British and French opinions that the move was "an untimely and injudicious step," that threatened the "acquired position of other Arab rulers…." Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*, 213.

through a yearlong threat in the pages of *al-Qibla* of removing the Sultan's name from the Friday prayers in the Hijaz, especially in Mecca, unless the Sultan intervened to end the purported abuses inflicted on the residents of Medina. Nevertheless, the extent in which 'Ali Haydar in Medina weakened Husayn's discursive project proved real since Husayn could never offer a "complete" pilgrimage with which to bolster his standing. Without control of Medina, Husayn's wartime pilgrimages ended up being attended largely by the poor and destitute--a class of pilgrims that lacked the social or financial capital through which Husayn hoped to benefit. To follow the contours of this discursive rivalry, this chapter will trace the extent in which 'Ali Haydar's criticisms factored into Husayn's anxieties, prompted him to respond by articulating his kingship shortly after the 1916 pilgrimage. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the effects of a Zayd Hashemite in Medina on the continued political articulation of Husayn's project.

The 1916 (1334 AH) Hajj and Husayn's Anxieties

Because of 'Ali Haydar's promotion and presence in Medina, Amir Husayn faced a dilemma. By long-held historical precedent that required at least caliphal recognition, the title "Amir of Mecca" no longer rested on Husayn; instead, he now joined the legacy of his recent ancestors who had then lost the title based solely on caliphal prerogative. Since he long feared the return of the active Hashemite household rivalry, Husayn undoubtedly expected that the CUP government would appoint a Zayd rival when he declared an open rebellion. Stripped of his title, Husayn also confronted another factor that hinted at an upcoming crisis: the languid start of the Arab Revolt during its first several months. Despite later nationalist mythologizing that trumpeted the success of his "awakening" to the awakening of the Arab nation, Husayn's initial military

accomplishments proved modest. Husayn logically began the Arab conquest in Mecca against the Ottoman garrison located there, which had surrendered by July 9th. The important summer retreat and elevated entry point overlooking Mecca, the city of Ta'if, however, remained in Ottoman hands until September 22nd. Outside of Mecca and its surrounding areas, Jeddah was the first city to completely surrender on June 16th--but only with the aid of British naval bombardments against Ottoman positions.[4] With Jeddah secured for Husayn, he and his forces could receive supplies and support from the British, who sent military advisers to the city on June 30th.[5] With the aid of the British navy, Husayn's forces proceeded from Jeddah to move north and south along the coast. On June 23rd, the southern port of Lith surrendered. Rabegh and Yambo, chief port cities north of Jeddah, likewise fell to the Hashemites by July 27th, and Um Lejh located further north of Yambo surrendered in early August. Slowly and methodically, with the aid of the British navy, Husayn's forces had progressed away from Mecca to capture key coastal ports to use as waystations for the British navy and as launch pads for further conquest. Medina, however, famously withstood Hashemite attempts to capture the city through the end of the War and became the center of the Ottoman military operations against Husayn's forces until early 1917.

Although his forces made military progress, Husayn proclaimed desire for his *nahda* or "awakening" to inspire the awakening of other Muslim communities to revolt against CUP oppression was ignored. Despite expectations that an uprising led by the Amir of Mecca would incite all Arabs to revolt, the "Arab Revolt" remained only in the Hijaz until Husayn's forces under

[4] TNA: DG Hogarth, Acting Direct of the Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Henry McMahon, High Commissioner in Egypt, "Situation in the Hejaz," 23 June 1916 [FO 141/461/3].

[5] James Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 1916-18* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006). In fact, the June 30th supply drop by the British had been the only one planned. For a detailed description of the inter-bureaucratic confusion by British officials in Cairo and India over the planning, execution, and fate of the Arab Revolt, see Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, 168–87; Westrate, *The Arab Bureau*, 79–100.

the leadership of his son Faysal captured Aqaba on July 6, 1917 (thereby pushing the front into Syria). In fact, the "Arab world" that included Ottoman-controlled Syria and Iraq seemed unmoved by Amir Husayn's actions and remained uncommitted--although perhaps morally supportive of the Amir.[6] Even when Faysal's forces entered Syria, the local groups (tribesmen or urban notables) did not immediately join the cause until after Husayn's forces entered a region.[7] In fact, one of the ironies of the "Arab Revolt" was that contrary to later imaginations, it received little active support from outside the Hijaz.[8] Husayn's forces largely consisted of tribesmen allied to him, but these were irregular, untrained, and only experienced in desert warfare. Eventually, the British sent Arab prisoners of war or deserters from the Ottoman army that they had captured in Iraq to form Husayn's "Arab Army."[9]

The impending pilgrimage (*hajj*) scheduled for 6-10 October 1916 offered Husayn and his European allies an opportunity to promote Husayn's awakening to an Arab and global Muslim audience. Traditionally, the haj signaled Ottoman control as caravans left its major cities (like Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo), while its officials oversaw its performance. In doing so, the Ottoman Sultan depended on the pilgrimage to support Ottoman ideas of the caliphate.[10] the Strategically for Husayn, and his British patrons, having captured Jeddah in June and thus securing

[6] In his analysis and translation of an Arab Ottoman soldier's diary of Ihsan Turjman, for instance, Salim Tamari captured the prevailing attitude of many Arabs in Greater Syria. While they condemned the actions of Jamal Pasha and even praised Husayn's rebellion, their support, like Ihsan Turjman's in Jerusalem, did not extend beyond moral support. See Tamari, *Year of the Locust*, 155–56.

[7] Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 224–29.

[8] For a perspective that highlighted the ways the Revolt had been confined to the Hijaz, see Karsh and Karsh, "Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt."

[9] Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War I*, 102–12.

[10] See Karl K. Barbir, "The Pilgrimage: Centerpiece of Ottoman Rule in Damascus," in *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708-1758* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 108–77.

his position along the Red Sea coast, Husayn created an access point for Mecca to the broader, non-Ottoman world. Because of the political and cultural significant of the yearly pilgrimage to Muslim religious and political identity, both Husayn and the British sought to use it to the advantage of their respective projects.[11] For Husayn, he hoped to promote his independence and his "awakening," whereas British officials intended to use the impending pilgrimage to elevate their status in the Muslim world, particularly in Egypt and India. Having Husayn exclusively overseeing the *hajj* without Ottoman interference also placated British anxiety of the *hajj* being used to promote pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism that they had expected following the declaration of *jihad* in November 1914.[12] The success of the pilgrimage, however defined, was a major test of Britain and Husayn's discursive claims for the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. While British officials in Jeddah marked the pilgrimage as an ultimate success, for Husayn, the first pilgrimage revealed the precariousness of his standing in the Islamic world that required clarification that he attempted with the adoption of the title, King of the Arabs.

[11]For a study of the ways in which the pilgrimage is a form of political and social action, see Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, eds., *Muslim Travellers : Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination*, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1990). In particular, Barbara Metcalf's contributing chapter on South Asian accounts of the *hajj* in memoirs nicely demonstrate the extent in which going on pilgrimage acted as a status and devotional marker for elite public consumption. See "The Pilgrimage Remembered: South Asian Accounts of the *Hajj*" in Eickelman and Piscatori, 85–107. Corresponding with Slight's work on the British empire and the *hajj*, Eileen Kane's exploration analysis of the Russian empire's patronage of the *hajj* for its Muslim subjects allowed it to expand its imperial interests in other Ottoman regions, like Syria. Eileen Kane, *Russian Hajj: Empire and the Pilgrimage to Mecca* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

[12] John Slight, *The British Empire and the Hajj: 1865-1956* (Harvard University Press, 2015), 114–23.

A British Success

The 1916 (1334 AH) pilgrimage was the first since the outbreak of World War I that indirectly involved British officials in Jeddah, whose consulate had been forced to close following the declaration of war between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain in 1914. The absence of a British diplomatic presence in the Hijaz during both the 1914 and 1915 pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina highlighted the fear of pan-Islamism among British policy makers. In an instruction to all governors of districts in the Sudan, for instance, the intelligence department in Khartoum warned them that among the returning pilgrims in 1914, "the propagation in the Sudan of Turkish doctrines and ideas is absolutely forbidden, as such doctrines and ideas are contrary to the generally acceptable traditions of Islam and subversive of all good Governments."[13] The intelligence department thus offered some advice on how to counter any such Turkish doctrines: "In particular they should be reminded that the great Mohammedan religious sheikhs in every part of the world have decided and publicly affirmed that in the present war no religious interest whatever is involved."[14] To that end, in the Sudan, for instance, returning pilgrims underwent what was dubbed "moral disinfection" upon returning from the 1914 *hajj* by being placed in quarantine with a "reliable" religious leader, i.e. someone vetted by colonial officials.[15] By the 1915 pilgrimage, Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire had both formally declared war, making the *hajj* a formal "front" in the war between these two powers.

[13] TNA: Intelligence Department, Khartoum, "Instructions re Returning Pilgrims," 24 December 1914 [FO882/15/3].

[14] TNA: Intelligence Department, Khartoum, "Instructions re Returning Pilgrims," 24 December 1914 [FO882/15/3].

[15] TNA: Sudan Agency, War Office, Cairo, to Cheetham, High Commissioner in Egypt, Cairo, 14 December 1914 [FO 882/15/3].

These anxieties posed a dilemma for British officials in India, Sudan, and Egypt, who desired to restrict pilgrims from subject colonial populations from undergoing the *hajj* but feared criticism of any restrictions as evidence of the threat of European colonialism to Islam.[16] Even the tradition by Muslim rulers of sending charitable donations to Mecca and Medina fell under British scrutiny, fearing that such funds would fall into the hands of the Ottomans.[17] Against these fears, British officials decided the best course of action was to "abstain from any official prohibition of the pilgrimage...while using every effort through unofficial channels to induce pilgrims to abstain from visiting the Holy Places until the general situation has become more normal."[18] In this way, it was suggested for officials to highlight the dangers of a wartime pilgrimage: the unusually high expenses (since transport ships were being used for the global war effort), the intrusive quarantine measures for all returning pilgrims, and the fact that British subjects will have not consular representation if they face any troubles.[19] Finally, even a *fatwa* issued by Egyptian religious leaders was even obtained to discourage the pilgrimage.[20] Amid those efforts to dissuade potential pilgrims from participating in the *hajj*, Great Britain also published its own propaganda to be

[16] In a note about wartime pilgrimages, with specific reference to the 1914 pilgrimage, the Director of Intelligence in Cairo, Clayton remarked that "the difficulties placed in the way of pilgrims last year by the Egyptian Government had been used by Pan-Islamic agitators as a lever to turn Moslem opinion against Great Britain and had been alluded to in almost every Pan-Islamic pamphlet which has come to our notice." See TNA: Clayton, Director of Intelligence, Cairo to Mr. M. Herbert, the Residency, 9 April 1915 [FO 882/15/3].

[17] TNA: "Telegram from the Foreign Department, Government of India, Simla to the High Commissioner, Cairo," 23 April 1915 [FO 882/15/3]; Clayton, Director of Intelligence, Cairo, to Cheetham, The Residency, Cairo, 25 April 1915 [FO 882/15/3].

[18] TNA: Clayton, Director of Intelligence, Cairo, to Cheetham, The Residency, Cairo, 12 June 1915 [FO 882/15/3].

[19] TNA: Clayton, Director of Intelligence, Cairo, to Cheetham, The Residency, Cairo, 12 June 1915 [FO 882/15/3]; Clayton, Director of Intelligence, Cairo, to Cheetham, The Residency, Cairo, 15 June 1915 [FO 882/15/3]; Colonel Clayton Minute to Sir M. Cheethan, 13 June 1915 [FO 882/15/3].

[20] TNA: Clayton, Director of Intelligence, Cairo, to Cheetham, The Residency, Cairo, 15 June 1915 [FO 882/15/3].

disseminated among its Muslim colonial subjects to highlight Britain's superiority in the war and its support of Islam.[21]

With the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1916 and Sharif Husayn in Mecca as a British ally, the hopes of once again taking an active part in the *hajj* were renewed. To oversee a successful *hajj*, as well as ensure their own imperial interests, the British sent Col. Cyril Wilson to Jeddah as the "British representative" and "Pilgrimage Officer" to Husayn.[22] Arriving in late July, before even Mecca had been secured by the surrender of the Ottoman garrison in Ta'if, Wilson had been charged with the immediate task of "guarding the health and comfort of all the pilgrims who are British subjects."[23] While seemingly innocuous, some British colonial officials had even greater ambitions. Those in the Arab Bureau in Cairo advocated for an even greater role of Great Britain in the maintenance of the *hajj* as an imperial tool. They suggested that a successful *hajj*--one better managed than even the Ottomans--could act as propaganda to elevate British standing in the Muslim world, thereby blunting the Ottoman call for *jihad*.[24] Sharif Husayn, as a Hashemite and the leader of Mecca and the Arab Revolt, would likewise benefit from a successful pilgrimage thus

[21] Slight, *The British Empire and the Hajj*, 171.

[22] The title "British Representative" was used throughout the Arab Bulletin and will be used here. Wilson, as the central British official in the Hijaz, wore many hats in his official capacity in Jeddah. He acted as the chief British Representative to Husayn and his sons, as a pilgrimage official, and British consul to British subjects in the region. See Slight, pg. 183-184; Arab Bulletin No. 14, 7 August 1916. For an interesting biography about Wilson, see Philip Walker, *Behind the Lawrence Legend: The Forgotten Few Who Shaped the Arab Revolt* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

[23] TNA: McMahon, Cairo, to Husayn, Mecca, 24 July 1916. [FO 686/33].

[24] For an analysis (from multiple angles) of the Ottoman's decision, application, and promotion of *jihad* and the reactions it spawned, see Erik-Jan Zürcher's edited volume *Jihad and Islam in World War I*. For a useful look at British concerns, see the contribution Léon Buskens, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, 'Holy War' and Colonial Concerns," in *Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje's "Holy War Made in Germany,"* ed. E.J. Zürcher, Debates on Islam and Society (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016), 29–52.

legitimating himself as an independent Muslim leader against critiques, like those from his Hashemite rival in Medina that claimed he threatened Islamic unity.

Not all British officials considered the active encouragement of the *hajj* in 1916 as a wise strategy, however. Contrarian opinions among British officials about whether to promote the Hajj to British Muslim subjects reveal the continued anxieties and the perceived stakes for the British war effort and colonial standing. In a letter from the Counsellor of the British Residency in Egypt to Brig. Gen. Gilbert Clayton at the Arab Bureau in Cairo, he opined that the people of Egypt were not eager for the pilgrimage to resume and thus there was no overriding reason for the Arab Bureau to even consider promoting that year's pilgrimage. In his opinion, to promote the pilgrimage would result in two connected possibilities. Most likely, he predicted from his local sources, very few pilgrims would make the dangerous, uncertain journey which would reveal "distrust both of the government and of the Cherif, and the latter would doubt our [British] good faith."[25] As a result, the British government in Egypt would have to actively encourage the pilgrimage and that the British would have to take a central part in its implementation. Considering the rush of pilgrims this would produce, Graham doubted the British could acquire the ships necessary to transport them all. Any imposed limits of pilgrims due to the lack of available transport ships would elicit complaints and doubts of the British good will towards the pilgrims. Amid the logistical uncertainties underpinning the Residency's concerns directed at the Arab Bureau's eagerness to promote the pilgrimage, Graham warned that

> In encouraging the pilgrimage, the Egyptian Government would be assuming a very serious responsibility. If anything went wrong and the pilgrims had to suffer even half the hardships which they endured in days of Turkish rule, an outcry would certainly be raised against the new régime in the Hedjaz. The idea would be

[25] TNA: R. Graham, Alexandria, to The British Residency, Cairo, 12 August 1916 [FO 882/15/3].

> propagated that a change for the worse had occurred, for which our intervention would be considered responsible.[26]

In his view, the Arab Bureau (the British intelligence office established in Cairo in 1916 to collect and disseminate propaganda and intelligence) was merely pushing the pilgrimage issue because of "its anxiety to assist the Cherif" but ignored the fuller question of the situation in Egypt and whether the threat of an unsuccessful pilgrimage outweighed any potential benefits of a successful one.[27] Regardless of his hesitancy, ultimately this internal debate about a visible British role in pilgrimage became settled following the announcement by French officials to send a delegation of pilgrims (five hundred) from Algeria and Morocco to Mecca.[28] For the French to take such a direct part, by sending a formal delegation, the British had to follow suit and actively promote the pilgrimage among their Muslim subjects in India and Egypt. From the British perspective, a pilgrimage failure could result in affirming Ottoman propaganda of British anti-Muslim agendas.

To ensure a successful *hajj*, the British adopted a very public promotion of the pilgrimage. Their efforts consisted of public announcements through newspapers in Egypt and India to encourage pilgrims to make the journey to Mecca through Jeddah; subsidies on tickets to lower the cost for travel; and most publicly, the highly publicized British transport of the Egyptian *mahmal*.[29] The *mahmal*, an ornate palanquin that traditionally led the pilgrimage caravan became the centerpiece of British propaganda efforts to publicize their role in ensuring the pilgrimage. Traditionally, the Egyptian *mahmal* also provided the *kiswa*, the black, gold embroidered cloth that covered the *Ka'bah* in the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Various news articles in Egyptian

---

[26] TNA: R. Graham, Alexandria, to The British Residency, Cairo, 12 August 1916 [FO 882/15/3].

[27] TNA: R. Graham, Alexandria, to The British Residency, Cairo, 12 August 1916 [FO 882/15/3].

[28] TNA: R. Graham, Alexandria, to Brigadier Gilbert Clayton, 17 August 1916 [FO882/15/3].

[29] Slight, *The British Empire and the Hajj*, 185–87.

newspapers announced its procession from Cairo to the Suez and then its journey by sea with the British fleet to transport it, escorted by two ships on the Khedival line for pilgrims.[30] According to the Arab Bureau, these ships were "offered at a time when all available shipping is required for military and commercial purposes," and were "appreciated by the pilgrims."[31] By taking these steps, British officials felt confident that the 1916 pilgrimage had been a public success that alleviated the concern of Muslims about the Holy City and access to it for pilgrimage.

While the British viewed their contribution to the transporting the *mahmal* and *kiswa* as facilitating and protecting traditional pilgrimage rights, they had in fact usurped the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph's prerogative. The tradition of the *mahmal* began in the 13th century as visible symbols of sovereigns sent to accompany pilgrims coming from their territory. The Mamluks in Egypt had sent the first political *mahmal*, which was then imitated by other sovereigns in Iraq and Yemen. The Ottomans would send theirs from Istanbul through Damascus. With the construction of the Hijaz railway, both sets of palanquins would travel the rail to Medina. During World War I, the Ottoman mahmal from Damascus was no longer sent for the 1914 and 1915 pilgrimage.[32] By laying claim to the transportation of the Egyptian *mahmal* for the 1916 pilgrimage, the British were imitating Muslim sovereigns and in effect announcing their claim over pilgrims.

After the formal pilgrimage season concluded on October 10, 1916, reports generated by the Arab Bureau in Cairo through their agents in Jeddah and Mecca concluded, "the pilgrimage has been most successfully performed."[33] The number of pilgrims estimated at 26,000 (at least

[30] TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 28, 1 November 1916, [FO 882/25/3].

[31] TNA: Captain N.N.E Bray, Cairo, to Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, London, 19 October 1916 [FO 882/15/3].

[32] Buhl, Fr. and Jomier, J., "Mahmal", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs.

[33] TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 28, 1 November 1916, [FO 882/25/3].

three thousand coming from India and Egypt) were higher than expected, though still lower than "normal years."[34] Furthermore, Sharif Husayn's efforts to ensure a successful pilgrimage by protecting the pilgrims with a uniformed police force, through price controls on lodging and food, with banquets with dignitaries and by providing food and cash donations (afforded by British subsidies) to the poor, were lauded and credited for impressing the pilgrims.[35] In a report generated by Indian Muslim officers charged the task "to study the true state of affairs in Arabia and to form their own unbiased opinions" to be disseminated in India, Captain Bray in the Arab Bureau concluded that their report would "be able to educate public opinion in India...to recognise the new regime in Arabia with sympathy…."[36] From a British perspective, the pilgrimage had been a success.

Husayn's Anxieties

While officials in Cairo and India took pains to advertise the British role in facilitating access and successful performance of the *hajj*, Sharif Husayn adopted a similar strategy through the pages of *al-Qibla*. Like British officials, the editors of *al-Qibla*, Muhib al-Din al-Khatib and Fu'ad al-Khatib, highlighted the preparation and public ceremonies leading up to the *hajj*. These included reports on the journey of the Egyptian *mahmal* carrying the *kiswa*, the estimated number of ticket sales, and the arrival of pilgrim ships.[37] For those subscribers outside of Mecca, this

---

[34] TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 28, 1 November 1916, [FO 882/25/3].

[35] TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 28, 1 November 1916, [FO 882/25/3].

[36] TNA: Captain N.N.E Bray, Cairo, to Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, London, 19 October 1916 [FO 882/15/3].

[37] See "The Egyptian *Mahmal*" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 5), 28 August 1916; "*Kiswa* of the Noble *Ka'aba*" in *al-Qiblah*, (no. 7), 4 September 1916.

year's pilgrimage was portrayed as a return of normalcy. Among those in Mecca, given the fact that the pilgrimage was the major source of revenue, the notion of a pilgrimage akin to pre-war conditions and the expectation for thousands of more pilgrims heightened economic expectations after two years of depressed numbers. Amidst these articles in *al-Qibla* that celebrated and promoting the *hajj*, a striking subtext highlighted Husayn's insecurity during the 1916 pilgrimage. Besides providing the name of the ships that arrived with the *mahmal*, the editors and authors naturally made no mention of the role the British played in the pilgrimage. Instead, the articles carefully credit every decision, proclamation, or announcement that involved the *mahmal* to the Sultan of Egypt (*Sultan Misr*)--and not British officials in either Jeddah, Cairo, or India. The omission, to be expected, nonetheless revealed the underlying anxiety for Husayn that plagued his leadership of the Arab Revolt: his alliance with a Christian colonial power and the fear that success may lead to British domination of the holiest places in Islam. Regardless of such anxieties, however, in the articles leading up to and following the *hajj*, the editors of *al-Qibla* (echoing the British) portrayed the *hajj* as a resounding success.

Not every account of the 1916 pilgrimage, however, considered it a success. Reporting from inside Mecca was Colonel Cyril Wilson's Confidential Secretary Husayn Ruhi (c. 1880-1960), who provided a more critical summary of the 1916 *hajj*. Born in Egypt to a Persian father, Ruhi had been before 1914 an educator, English tutor, and outspoken advocate of the Baha'i religion (even self-publishing a bi-weekly magazine promoting the religion). Multilingual in at least Arabic, Persian, and English, which he learned in Chicago as a part of a Baha'i mission, he was hired by the British Oriental Secretary in Cairo Ronald Storrs in 1914 as his confidential secretary. While employed by Storrs, his most notable service had been translating the McMahon-

Husayn correspondence.[38] In 1916, he was sent to serve as the confidential secretary to Colonel Wilson in Jeddah and to provide intelligence of the Hijaz not accessible to British officials.[39] One of his first missions outside of Jeddah was to observe the pilgrimage in Mecca, posing as a Muslim pilgrim.

His report, noticeably absent in intra-British consular communications and the *Arab Bulletin*, highlighted the growing anxieties among those closest to Husayn in Mecca of the British role in the Arab Revolt. Although reporting that the people of Mecca had been pleased with the numbers of pilgrims, and that the pilgrims themselves appreciated the subsidies and amenities provided, there were nonetheless intrigues against Husayn. For instance, among the people of Mecca, he claimed that they were "almost pro-Turks" with only a few thousand (he estimated five thousand) who actually supported Husayn. The most vocal of these anti-Husayn voices, he reported, were from members of the broader Hashemite family, such as those of the Zayd household who lived in Mecca. He described how they were issuing propaganda against Husayn and in support of their relation, 'Ali Haydar, and that one Zayd, Muhammad Abdul Majid had intrigued with a local tribal Shaykh to capture Husayn and imprison him.[40] In fact, Ruhi also reported on the presence of at least three Indian Muslims plastering anti-Husayn propaganda on the walls of the Sharif's house during the pilgrimage season. In response to these threats, Ruhi

[38] Hilary Falb Kalisman, "The Little Persian Agent in Palestine: Husayn Ruhi, British Intelligence, and World War I," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 66 (2016): 66–68.

[39] For his description of his journey to Jeddah, see his rather brief memoir: Husayn Ruhi, *Min Watha'iq al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kurab: Al-Rihala al-Rabi'a*, ed. Salah Jarrar (Amman: n.p., 1997).

[40]It is unclear how Muhammad Abdul Majid may have been related to Ali Haydar whose sons included: Abdul Majid, Muhiddin, Nemet, Muhammad, Emin, and Faysal. See Stitt, *A Prince of Arabia*, 309.

described how Husayn used intimidation (by raiding homes and shops of his critics) and arrests to quell such critiques and silence members of the Zayd household.[41]

In addition to graffiti, placards, and subterfuges emanating within Mecca to undermine Husayn's leadership, Ruhi also described a small conflict that emerged between Husayn and an Arabist figure who was visiting Mecca. That figure was Rashid Rida, the same Islamic Arabist figure that had inducted Husayn's son 'Abdullah to his secret Arabist society in Cairo in 1914, and who sent a memorandum on the future of the Arab world to British officials in the midst of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence in 1915. In it, he called for the creation of an Arab caliphate to be held by a Hashemite in Mecca, perhaps intimating Husayn.[42] As a result of Husayn's revolt, Rashid Rida had decided to go on pilgrimage in 1916, following the Egyptian *mahmal* (which left Cairo in September 1916). Although in his memoirs he claimed to have undergone the *hajj* for purely devotional reasons, some of the details he compiled suggest he also went as a sort of fact finding mission, providing details of the infrastructure, safety, and services of the pilgrimage as an honored guest of Husayn.[43] While in Mecca, Rida used the opportunity to reconnect with old acquaintances, network with Arabist and Islamic intellectuals (including the editors of *al-Qibla*), and to meet with his host, Husayn.[44]

---

[41] H. McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, "Report on Mecca," 3 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/11/113].

[42] Another possibility that Rashid Rida may have had in mind was Husayn's second son. In reporting his visit to the Hijaz in *al-Manar*, Rida described a dream he had before the Revolt where he was visiting the Zubayda well, and how the pilgrims there were discussing 'Abdullah as the next caliph or chief imam. See Yusuf Iaybash, ed., *Rihlat Al-Imam Muhammad Rashid Rida* (Beirut: al-mu'ssat al-'Arabiyya lil-Darasat wa al-Nashr, 1971), 163; *al-Manar* no. 20 (1917-1918), 236-245.

[43] For example, during a series of interactions with aforementioned Indian Muslims sent to Mecca to prepare a report to be published in Indian newspapers, they described how "Rashid Bey Shami, editor, came to me [the author of the report] two or three time [sic] and tried to find out what territories the Sherif would have after the war. I told him I was on a pilgrimage and knew nothing about these matters." TNA: Captain N.N.E Bray, Cairo, to Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, London, 19 October 1916 [FO 882/15/3].

[44] For a brief summary of Rashid Rida's *hajj* using his memoirs, see Richard van Leeuwen, "Islamic Reformism and Pilgrimage: The Hajj of Rashid Rida in 1916," in *Hajj : Global Interactions Through Pilgrimage*, ed. Luitgard E. M.

When the Egyptian *mahmal* arrived to Mecca, Amir Husayn invited Rida to deliver a speech to mark the occasion. According to Husayn Ruhi's reporting, however, Husayn had to interrupt the speech abruptly.[45] In particular, foreshadowing their eventual conflict and slip, Husayn and Rida appeared to have differed on whether a religious conflict was taking place between Islam and Christianity. Describing the ceremony, Ruhi described how

> The Ulema who came with the Mahmal were shown much respect and His Highness was very hospitable to them. Most of them made speeches at [al-Mina'] and Sheikh Rashid Rida made a speech also to the public in the presence of the Sherif. The former spoke politely at first about the movement of the Arabs and the cause of the Sherif, but when he began to deal with religious questions and say that all Mohammedans should do their best to destroy Christianity, etc. His Highness the Sherif stopped him at once by putting his fingers at Rashid Rida's mouth. The Sherif has told me that he was not pleased with Rashid Rida because the latter was a Wahabi [sic], and that he had given a pamphlet to some people in which he stirred the feelings of the Moslems against the Christians.[46]

From this description, only briefly alluded to in the Arab Bulletin, it becomes apparent that the anxiety of a Christian power even tangentially operating in the Hijaz had become a concern for even the supporters of Husayn.[47] Indeed, despite Ruhi's bias against Rida, which undoubtedly factored into his reporting, Rida did indeed leave the Hijaz after the pilgrimage anxious of British

---

Mols and Marjo Buitelaar, Mededelingen Van Het Rijksmuseum Voor Volkenkunde, Leiden (Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2015), 83–93.

[45] Significantly, Ruhi held animosity towards Rashid Rida and had even advocated to Storrs in Cairo to prevent him from attending the pilgrimage, whom he argued would be hostile to the British. He even suggested that Storrs have Rida exiled to Malta. See Ronald Storrs, *The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs* (New York: Putnam, 1937), 179. Also cited in Kalisman, "The Little Persian Agent in Palestine: Husayn Ruhi, British Intelligence, and World War I," 68.

[46] TNA: H. McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, "Report on Mecca," 3 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/11/113]. Ruhi, in his reporting, may have taken liberties in his portrayal of Rida's speech. In the text of the speech Rida provided for his readers in *al-Manar*, which may itself have been modified before being published, there was a reference to British colonialism in Egypt and expressions of his fear of British colonialism in the Islamic World--but nothing sectarian in the sense of a conflict between Islam and Christianity. See Iaybash, *Rihlat Al-Imam Muhammad Rashid Rida*, 178–84.

[47] TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 28, 1 November 1916, [FO 882/25/3].

influence over Husayn, but praised Husayn for a successful pilgrimage citing the efficiency of pilgrim services, security, and even Husayn's hospitality.[48]

Rashid Rida's concerns reveal the extent to which the 1916 pilgrimage, while on the surface a "success" in terms of pilgrim participation and efficiencies of services, was nevertheless plagued by concerns over the role of the British in the future Arab world. In much the same way that 'Ali Haydar suggested that Husayn's movements reflected the attempts of a Christian power to overtake the Hijaz in its pursuit for the entire Islamic world, Rida expressed similar concerns and urged those to wage a religious struggle against the Christian world in response. Reports, even those sympathetic to Husayn, described among Indian Muslim pilgrims that a similar anxiety was prevalent within that community: "the chief reasons for feelings against the Sherif were firstly that though Mohammedans were fighting for Great Britain now Mohammedans were fighting Mohammedans, and that the Sherif had placed his affairs under the control of the Christians who could seize his country."[49] Attuned to the same worries, Rida had spoken in defense of the independence of the Islamic world and considered Arab independence a prerequisite of Muslim independence. His desire to know the extent of Husayn's future territory reflected those ambitions--and anxieties. Such anxieties, publicly leveraged by 'Ali Haydar, were left unreported in the summary articles *al-Qibla* that reported the events of the *hajj* following the end of the pilgrimage season.

[48] For a description of his pilgrimage, impressions, and concerns, see *al-Manar* no. 19 (1916-1917).

[49] TNA: Captain N.N.E Bray, Cairo, to Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, London, 19 October 1916 [FO 882/15/3]. Far from a singular Indian Muslim opinion, it had been observed by British Indian office officials that Indian Muslim opinion was indeed critical of Husayn's revolt, concerned for the safety of the Holy Places. BL: 'The Arab Revolt. Views of an Indian Moslem," 7 July 1916 [IOR/L/PS/18/B235]. Leila Fawaz likewise traced a similar sentiment among not only Indian Muslims but other Muslims outside the Ottoman empire. Fawaz, *A Land of Aching Hearts*, 233–74.

When the *hajj* season formally ended on October 10th, Husayn could feel confident in his success in managing the pilgrimage without Ottoman support (despite relying now on British contributions). For British Officials in the Arab Bureau in Cairo and the editors of *al-Qibla*, they depicted the pilgrimage as a success, citing the increased number of pilgrims from recent years; the rationalization and standardization of pilgrim services; and the fact that the pilgrimage was no longer a center of Ottoman pan-Islamism. For Fu'ad al-Khatib, the pilgrimage became a truly Arab event. The reality as depicted by a Muslim British official in Mecca, however, offered a different picture. In his depiction of the situation, notably absent from reports emanating from Cairo, doubts of Husayn's independence and members of the Zayd household residing in the Sacred City agitating for the Specter Amir 'Ali Haydar in Medina. Worst still, it appeared that a crack appeared between Husayn and Rashid Rida during a public speech given at al-Mina' as part of the pilgrimage rites. Doubts of his independence vis-a-vis, the anxieties of Indian Muslims and Rashid Rida exposed the underlying anxiety among Muslims and supporters alike: that Husayn was indeed wholly dependent on the British and as such was bringing the Holy Cities--if not other parts of the Ottoman Arab world--under British control. With these fears of British domination and the Specter Amir that had manifested both publicly and silently during the pilgrimage, Husayn needed another tool to emphasize his independence and leadership.

Husayn's Kingship as a Response to the Specter Amir

During an elaborate ceremony on October 29, 1916 on the first day of *Muharram* of the Islamic New Year (1335 AH), *al-Qibla* reported a spontaneous gathering of notables, ulama, and shaykhs from all across the Arab world (Syria and Iraq included). At this gathering, Sharif Husayn agreed to accept the title of "King of the Arab Lands" (*malik al-bilad al-'arabiyya*) or simply

"King of the Arabs." According to the report in *al-Qibla*, these "representatives" for the Arab peoples marched to Husayn's palace with a *bayʿa* (pledge of allegiance), to recognize both his political suzerainty and religious authority until which time Muslims worldwide reach a decision regarding the caliphate.[50] In contrast to this rather private, intimate performance, a week later a public proclamation of Husayn as King was made on November 4, 1916 during which, according to Husayn's son 'Abdullah, sixty-thousand people attended.[51]

The title "King of the Arab Lands" (*malik al-bilad al-'arabiyya*) requires elaboration. Unlike titles like "Sultan" or "Amir," the title "King" in the Islamic world had a "contemptible" history, being associated with the "mundane facet of government--the antithesis of *khalifa* and *imam* which signified piety and righteousness."[52] The usage of the title *malik*, often used to refer to non-Muslim rulers, "carried an unmistakably pejorative connotation," yet had in fact been used by dynasties as late as the Ottomans albeit occassionally and always with a more noble title like "Sultan" or "Caliph."[53] For Husayn to adopt the title exclusively in 1916, however, he did so only because the title had undergone a redefinition over the course of the 19th century and had become prestigious. According to Ami Ayalon's analysis, "Although, like many of his pre-modern kingly predecessors, Husayn continued to acknowledge the religious authority of the Ottoman *khalifa*, he did not see himself as an heir to medieval Muslim *muluk*. Rather, he preferred to regard himself

[50] "The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]" in *Al Qiblah* no. 22 (30 Oct. 1916). An extract had been translated and delivered to the Jeddah office. Unless, otherwise cited, translated segments come from this source but cross referenced with the original Arabic in *Al Qiblah*. See TNA: M. Cheetham, for the High Commissioner, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 26 November 1916 enclosing "Translation of an Extract from 'Kibla', dated 3rd Moharrem, 1335. (30th October, 1916)" [FO 141/679/4088].

[51] Wilson, Jeddah to Sir H. McMahon, Cairo, 6 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

[52] Ami Ayalon, "Malik in Modern Middle Eastern Titulature," *Die Welt Des Islams* 23/24 (1984): 307–8.

[53] Ayalon, 309.

as the counterpart of the British and other European monarchs."[54] By shedding its negative connotations over the course of the 19th century, *malik* was recognizable globally--among Muslims and non-Muslims to denote independence and sovereignty. In this analysis, then, Husayn desired to mimic European monarchs by adopting the title *malik*, the meaning of which increasingly corresponded to European usage in the 19th century.

Husayn's decision to adopt the title of *malik* was indeed peculiar according to Islamic historical precedence, while also reflecting the outcome of recent 19th century trends. But it had not been a simple imitation of European stylings. For Husayn, the title, the performance of his coronation, and its subsequent elaboration had been rooted in a specific context: the Hashemite household rivalry and the anxieties revealed during the recent pilgrimage. Ultimately, for Husayn, the title of King of the Arabs served his household's purpose to assert their legitimacy, now that they no longer held the title of Amir of Mecca. Moreover, it also affirmed not just his political independence, which had been doubted during the pilgrimage by pilgrims and even by his Arabist allies, but also his religious independence from the Ottoman caliph. In this way, Husayn responded to the claims made by his Zayd rival regarding Muslim loyalty to the caliphate. Against these specific needs, Arabist arguments provided the ideological backdrop for the creation and assumption of this new title.

Although Husayn's coronation was portrayed as a spontaneous, organic development among the Arab nation, in reality, its reporting only concealed their anxieties of the Specter Amir in Medina and doubts of Husayn's legitimacy. Husayn hinted at the anxiety in a speech he gave in accepting the title. He explained to the delegates that "the object which has brought you here today will refute any misconception in the minds of those who are ignorant of our real aims and

[54] Ayalon, 316–17.

principles--those principles which are absolutely in accordance [sic] with the dictates of our religion."[55] A week later, as British officials in Jeddah sought an explanation for Husayn's aims in claiming to be the King of the Arabs, his son 'Abdullah confirmed that the decision was motivated by the household rivalry with the Zayd. This admission came about during the initial fallout after the coronation when British and French diplomats debated and investigated the motivations for Husayn's claim of kinship over all the Arabs, which they agreed was illegitimate and inciting to his allies.[56] 'Abdullah specifically credited 'Ali Haydar's proclamation to his father's decision to be crowned the King of the Arabs in a telephone conversation with Col. Wilson dated November 1st. In his list of reasons, he mentioned 'Ali Haydar's proclamation first, followed by other reasons all of which alluded to the criticisms levied by the Specter Amir's proclamation. 'Abdullah described for Wilson how they decided to announce his father the King of the Arabs because the British did not send the necessary supplies for the "Arab Cause," despite the fact that "His Majesty's Government was well aware of H[a]idars [sic] proclamation…"[57] He continued justifying the development stating

> Because all the people here [in Mecca or perhaps more broadly the Hijaz] wanted to show their independence….Because the Emirs of Mecca were not originally under the suzerainty of the Turks but they simply agreed to be under the Turks by themselves and not by war. Therefore the people here have declared him to be the King of the Arabs in order to show that they are not under any other power.[58]

---

[55] TNA: M. Cheetham, for the High Commissioner, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 26 November 1916 enclosing "Translation of an Extract from 'Kibla', dated 3rd Moharrem, 1335. (30th October, 1916)" [FO 141/679/4088]; "The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]" in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916).

[56] For a full picture of the debates that took place over Husayn's title following his coronation as the "King of the Arabs," among British (both Cairo and India) and French officials, see folder in BL: "Arab Revolt- Shereef's Title" 31 October 1916 to 18 December 1918 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

[57] BL: Henry McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, India, 21 Nov. 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

[58] BL: Henry McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, India, 21 Nov. 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

Thus, practically speaking, Husayn's decision to adopt the title of King of the Arabs had been a response to 'Ali Haydar's appointment to the Amirate of Mecca and the political and religious challenge he posed calling for Muslim loyalty to the Ottoman caliph.

Technically denied the political and religious legitimacy afforded as the Amir of Mecca, Husayn and his Arabist allies orchestrated the coronation and the titular *malik al-bilad al-'arabiyya* to communicate Husayn's political and, even more significantly, religious independence. From the outset, the date of Husayn's coronation was peculiar, suggesting symbolic rather than strategic importance. The coronation took place on October 29, 1916 (or 1st *Muharram* 1335). Had the title been planned previously, it would follow that performing the coronation before or immediately after the pilgrimage (October 6-10), could have offered Husayn maximum visibility and a chance to perform his crowning before a global Muslim audience. Missing that opportunity suggested that the date held symbolic importance. Taking place on the Muslim New Year, it suggested a certain new age had dawned--bestowing a temporal significance to his Arab awakening. When considering the Gregorian date for the coronation, it nicely corresponded to his unofficial appointment as the Amir of Mecca following the sudden death of his uncle, 'Abd al-Ilah on October 27, 1908. Husayn received word of his impending appointed just a day or two later with his official appointed by *firman* dated November 1, 1908.[59] For this reason, Husayn's coronation took place on the eighth anniversary of his unofficial appointment to the Amirate of Mecca.

More than just corresponding dates, the coronation itself resembled the ceremony of Husayn's investiture to the Amirate of Mecca. Specifically, by using the description provided by the Persian pilgrim in 1911, Husayn's coronation as the King of the Arabs mirrored his re-

[59] al-Fawaz, *Al-Marsalat al-Matabadala Bayna al-Sharif al-Husayn Bin 'Ali Wa al-'Uthmaniyin: 1908-1918*, 248.

investiture as the Amir of Mecca. Also taking place after the hajj, Shaykh ‘Abdullah Siraj, the head of the *ulama* of Mecca and chief judge entered Husayn’s private apartment and requested his presence to address “certain proposals.” In the reception room of the Hashemite *diwan*, mirroring his 1911 re-investiture, the “men of the nation” (*rijal al-umma*) gathered to present Husayn the petition.[60] After first expressing his surprise and then admitting that he had previously received messages about this request, he swore “by God Almighty that this thing which you ask me to do now has never occurred to me, nor did I ever think of it when you and I started our blessed movement. You and I together had foreseen the danger and the calamity that were to befall us, and in order to avert them, we rose to arms.”[61] He then agreed to become King of the Arabs, at which point, Shaykh ‘Abdullah Siraj handed the petition (*‘araydah*) to another shaykh present to read aloud and then for each person present to repeat its pledges before the now-King Husayn. The description of the ceremony concluded with Husayn consenting to a ceremony in the Grand Mosque, a brief mention of public celebrations in Mecca and Jeddah, and then reports of the arrival of 2,500 telegrams to congratulate the new King.[62]

Although devoid of further details like decoration or a list of those present, the ceremony itself resembled the re-investiture of Husayn that had taken place in 1911, revealing how King of the Arabs was an extension of the title Amir of Mecca. Remarkably, despite the novelty of the title being bestowed upon Husayn, the editors of *al-Qibla* described the process in which the

---

[60] “The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]” in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916) [my translation].

[61] “The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]” in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916) [my translation].

[62] TNA: M. Cheetham, for the High Commissioner, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 26 November 1916 enclosing “Translation of an Extract from ‘Kibla’, dated 3rd Moharrem, 1335. (30th October, 1916)” [FO 141/679/4088]; “The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]” in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916).

petition was presented to him and then read aloud, as "the habit from times of old," thereby suggesting that the event resembled previous customs. Just as the Sultan's firman had been presented to Husayn, now the head of the ulama of Mecca delivered a petition "on behalf of the nation," to Husayn to be read for all present. Absent, of course, were Ottoman or consular officials; instead, the nameless men of the nation were present as witnesses. With Husayn's coronation taking place on the anniversary of his appointment as the Amir of Mecca in a similar venue, the symbolic significance becomes apparent. In a sense, Husayn was being re-invested not as the Amir of Mecca but as the King of the Arabs.

An Arab Performance for National and Religious Independence

Nevertheless, the investiture of "King of the Arabs" was not just a symbolic title change from the Amir of Mecca. It symbolized an Arabist vision of Arab unity that extended beyond the Hijaz. The title of the article announcing the coronation in large, bold print, was "*Nahda al-'Arab*" (The Arab Awakening) and beneath it in smaller print "Because of the oath (*mubay'ah*) to His Majesty and our Great Lord, A King (*malik*) over them [the Arabs]" thus connecting the aspirations of Arabist 19th century discourse to the promotion of Husayn to the King of the Arabs. With his initial acceptance of the petition, for instance, Husayn emphasized the general applicability of the petition to all Arabs by stating that "this sentiment of loyalty does not belong only to the inhabitants of this country, but the Arabs of Syria and Iraq as well, are yearning to be united with us and restore their freedom and glory. I have received messages from their notables to this effect."[63]

[63]TNA: M. Cheetham, for the High Commissioner, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 26 November 1916 enclosing "Translation of an Extract from 'Kibla', dated 3rd Moharrem, 1335. (30th October, 1916)" [FO 141/679/4088]; "The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]" in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916).

Although only a few names of these Arab notables were reported (Shaykh ‘Abdullah Siraj and Shaykh Abdul Aziz Mirdad, two leading ulamas in Husayn’s entourage), only one additional name was specifically mentioned: “Shaykh” Fu’ad al-Khatib, one of the editors of *al-Qibla*. According to the report of the ceremony, after the petition was read and those present made the oath to Husayn, Fu’ad al-Khatib representing the people of Syria “laid before His Majesty the hopes of Arab Syria.” Referencing the Arabs executed by Jamal Pasha, Fu’ad also remarked that “those martyrs...who died did so for the sake of Arab unity and the defense of their Islamic sentiments. He said that the inhabitants of those lands [*al-diyar*] are worthy to be among the independent Arabs who enjoy the protection of His Majesty Lord of the Arabs and their King. He pledged allegiance to him after that along the lines of the rest of the Arabs over the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Messenger.”[64] Thus the impression left on his Arab and Muslim audience, both in terms of the actual ceremony and in Husayn’s own words, was that his assumption of kingship had been an independent development by the representatives of the Arab nation.[65]

The Arab acceptance of Husayn as the King of the Arabs was not limited to political independence, however. While the new title emphasized Husayn political independence from the Ottoman Empire, it likewise also declared his religious independence from the Ottoman caliphate (which he had alluded to in his initial proclamation of the revolt in June 1916). At no point in this coronation, did Husayn or any of the deputies make an explicit case for the ending the Ottoman caliphate or for his assumption of the caliphate. It has been argued that Husayn vied for the caliphate (which he claimed in 1924 after the Kemalists formally ended the position), but it was

[64] “The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]” in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916) [my translation].

[65] “The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]” in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916) [my translation].

not clear even to what extent Husayn even believed the caliphate held real authority in the Islamic world.[66] At this stage, however, the editors of *al-Qibla* merely took the dramatic step to pen articles that delegitimized the Ottoman sultan as caliph for his collusion with the Unionists.[67] Sufficient for Husayn's immediate political project was to formulate the King of the Arabs as not only a political alternative authority to the Ottoman Empire but also a religious alternative to the Ottoman caliph. For this reason, the editors of *al-Qibla* emphasized at the beginning of their article that in addition to recognizing Husayn as the King of the Arabs, the Arab delegates also recognized him as a "*marjaʿ dini*" or "religious source for them."[68] The same formulation likewise appeared in the *bayʿa* itself.[69]

By recognizing Husayn as the alternative religious authority for the Arabs, this Arabist orchestration attempted to sidestep the ambiguities of caliphal authority by articulating a view of Islam that focused on the Hashemites as preeminent Arab leaders and as even arbiters of Islam. Very much in the spirit of 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi and his ideological disciples like Rashid Rida, who claimed that the Arabs possessed a special authority in Islam because of their historical

---

[66] As discussed in this work's introduction, whether Husayn pined for the caliphate is a matter of dispute among historians. See Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*, 148–58. Whereas Kedourie located Husayn's ambitions for the caliphate to British intimations, particularly Lord Kitchener in Egypt, Teitelbaum recognized that the idea of an Arab caliphate predated World War I and even had roots in Muslim tradition. Teitelbaum, "Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman Order: From Chieftaincy to Suzerainty"; Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*, 2001, 42–50; Teitelbaum, "The Man Who Would Be Caliph." Dawn was perhaps the most direct in rejecting the notion by arguing that Husayn "attached no great intrinsic value to the caliphate" as the British had, and that he "showed no great concern with the caliphate during his negotiations with the British" See C. Ernest Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology," *The Review of Politics* 23, no. 3 (July 1, 1961): 43–44.

[67] See the earliest issues of *al-Qiblah* no.1-3 and the discussion in the previous chapter.

[68] The title "marjaʿ" has a very specific and traditional meaning in Shi'ism to refer to one "who is to be considered during his lifetime, by virtue of his qualities and his wisdom, a model for reference, for 'imitation' or 'emulation,'" which served as a prerequisite (in Twelver tradition) for the Ayatollah. See J. Calmard, "MARDJA-I TAKLID," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Encyclopaedia of Islam (Brill, n.d.), VI:548b.

[69] "The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]" in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916) [my translation].

role in its spread, the petition upon which the *bayʿa* was made emphasized the historical role of Arabs to Islam and Islamic civilization. In the preamble of the petition, for example, the role of the Arabs to first accept Islam and departing from the world of ignorance was explicitly mentioned. Later, the petition celebrate the Arabic language proclaiming that it "has astonished the world with its perfection…."[70] More specific to Husayn, the petition also celebrated God's choice in favoring the "descendants of Ismail," i.e. the Arabs, and traced how that preference led eventually to the Bani Hashem and thus to the Prophet himself from which the Quran and true religion came. From this genealogy, the petition made its most radical claim to the religious leadership of the Hashemites in general and then to Husayn in particular:

> Through your forefather, we came out of the darkness into the light. Your sacred house has been our guide after ignorance [*al-jahil*]. Now that house, which drew us from the path of misguidance to the path of the right way is responsible for uniting us together, reforming us, and managing our affairs--no matter how hard it is for you to ensure our happiness. We have no other refuge but your house, the house chosen by God, nor do we have any support except in the people whom God has chosen and loved. It has been confirmed in Sahih al-Bukhari that the Prophet...said: "This matter lies with the Quraysh and nobody can show enmity towards them [or] God will smite him, as long as religion exists." Also: "This matter remains in Quraysh as long as two persons remain living".[71]

For the Hashemites to be a "guide in the path of righteousness," and to be preeminent family of Arabs, God's chosen people, the petition finds historical and hadith-based justifications for Husayn's claim for religious authority in Islam. During the uncertain times for the Islamic world, where territories have been lost to Christian empires and now the last remaining Muslim power is on the verge of collapse--not because of Husayn's actions but because of the actions of the Turkism

---

[70] TNA: M. Cheetham, for the High Commissioner, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 26 November 1916 enclosing "Translation of an Extract from 'Kibla', dated 3rd Moharrem, 1335. (30th October, 1916)" [FO 141/679/4088]; "The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]" in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916).

[71] "The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]" in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916) [my translation].

and the CUP government--the Muslim world needed a guide. For the Arabs, the fact that that they in particular have been "subjected to all sorts of oppression and persecution in the name of Islam," had made them particularly attuned to the need to return to their original guide. It then quotes a further hadith: "If the Arabs are abased, Islam is abased also" to emphasize how the fate of the Islamic world entwined with the fate of the Arabs.[72]

In providing the qualifications of the Hashemites to act as guides for the Islamic world, especially among the Arabs, the authors of the *bayʿa* nonetheless still injected further ambiguities about the caliphate that directly pointed towards the Hashemites. For an educated Muslim familiar with the Islamic tradition and Islamic legal theory they would undoubtedly have recognized that the context of the aforementioned hadiths referred the Quraysh back to the caliphate. In line with the philosophies of ʻAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi who advocated for the caliphate to return to the family of Quraysh, these hadiths had long been discussed in matters pertaining to the identity of the caliphate. Regardless, the conditional "until" (*raythma*) the Muslims world decides on the caliphate allowed Husayn and his sons to deny any allegations from European and Arab supporters that they desired the caliphate while the Ottoman sultan still possessed the title.[73] During interviews with British officials, concerned that they had their sights on the caliphate, the Husayn and his son's repeated pointed to the fact that the question of the caliphate would have be to resolved by the Muslim world after the war (when presumably the Ottoman Empire would have either fallen apart or be greatly reduced in size).

---

[72] "The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]" in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916) [my translation].

[73] "The Arab Awakening: Allegiance to our Great Lord and Majesty, King of Them [Arabs]" in *al-Qiblah* no. 22 (31 October 1916) [my translation].

The question of the caliphate to the proclamation of the King of the Arabs became clearer in subsequent telephone interviews conducted by Wilson in Jeddah to Mecca to ascertain the motivations and aims of Husayn's coronation. In these interviews the question of the full extent of Husayn's sovereignty were addressed, that is, to what extent he claimed authority over his peninsular allies like Ibn Saud and whether Husayn claimed the role of the caliphate to the Islamic world. (On the question of political rule, both figures insisted that their peninsular powers would be independent to govern their own territories, but were beholden to defend one another.[74] In one case, Husayn specifically mentioned that Ibn Saud was his "servant."[75]) On the question of the caliphate, 'Abdullah described how the Arabs had a special role to play. In his first conversation with Wilson, where he succinctly made the case for the coronation of his father, he suggested a link between the creation of the title of "King of the Arabs" as both a political and religious figure and diminution of the Ottoman Sultan's position as caliph. One of the reasons he gave for the coronation was "because the pulpits of Mecca and Hedjaz have the supremacy over all the pulpits of the world i.e. when they mention anyone as the Caliph all people must recognize him."[76]

This claim appeared out of place, considering that only the title or promotion being discussed was that of King of the Arabs and not the caliphate. Subsequent telephone conversations and a letter written by Husayn, however, clarified the matter to suggest that by creating King of the Arabs as both a national and a religious head conferred by the deputies of the Arab nation and by the *ulama* and chief *qadi* of Mecca, Husayn meant that the caliphate no longer existed.

[74] BL: Telephone, 'Abdullah to Wilson, 1 November 1916 in Henry McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, India, 21 Nov. 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

[75] BL: Letter from Husayn, Mecca, to Wilson, Jeddah, dated 4 November 1916 in Henry McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, India, 21 Nov. 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

[76] BL: Henry McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, India, 21 Nov. 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

According to ‘Abdullah, by leaving the question of the caliphate to the Islamic world, Husayn had “declared that there was no presuggested Caliphate,” and that “all that matter is left to the public opinion of Islam and ‘ulama of the Qibla (MECCA) decided not to accept the Turkish Caliphate….”[77] Husayn was more blunt in his telephone conversation: “I have denied the Caliphate entirely and officially leaving it to the opinion of those who know all about its regulations until all Moslems choose one to be their Calipha.” In a letter, he declared “its non-existence and to make it quite clear to the simple minded people who were led by every call and deceit,” Husayn nevertheless promoted the Arabist vision for the caliphate by cutting “the relations which have no root between the Moslems and the Turks by declaring that there is no man called the Caliph.”[78] In his estimation, without as his son mentioned “the pulpits of Mecca and the Hedjaz” and without Arab recognition, the Turkish Ottoman Sultan’s claim to the caliphate ceased.

Considering the articulated ramifications articulated by the editors of *al-Qibla* and by the text of the *bayʿa* made to Husayn, the title “King of the Arabs” was not merely an imitation of the European monarchs. The existence of a “King of the Arabs” signaled political and religious independence for the Arabs. As such, the political program of the Arabists were clearly visible. Whereas Husayn’s initial proclamation had ostensibly limited itself to the awakening of the Hijaz, aspiring to awaken other groups still under Ottoman control, the new position applied to the entire Arab world, including Ottoman-held Syria and Iraq. In so doing, it declared the entire Arab world independent, despite the fact that both territories--and much of the Hijaz--remained under Ottoman control. That independence also included religious independence with the King of the Arabs being

[77] BL: Telephone, ‘Abdullah to Wilson, 3 November 1916 in Henry McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, India, 21 Nov. 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

[78] BL: Letter from Husayn, Mecca, to Wilson, Jeddah, dated 4 November 1916 in Henry McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, India, 21 Nov. 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

the sole religious authority--for at least the Arabs. Taken together--political and religious independence, the King of the Arabs articulated a vision for Arab unity long advocated by Arabists in Syria, Beirut, and Cairo. Yet, the Arabist project had successfully been tailored to Husayn's desire to elevate his household, the 'Awn, against their Zayd rivals. The emphasis of the King of the Arabs on the Hashemites, and specifically on the perceived morality of Husayn, leveraged Arabism to fit Husayn's need to address the propaganda emanating from the Specter Amir in Medina by legitimating his authority.

"The Meaning of the Bayʿa": Arabs, Armenians, Syria, and the Broader Islamic World

In the pages of *al-Qibla*, the idea of a King of the Arabs, bolstered by subsequent articles attesting to Husayn's widespread support and poems singing his praises, however, offered the readers and audiences of *al-Qibla* only a distant rhetorical performance. Besides declaring the independence of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire completely, the title of the King of the Arabs meant very little in real terms except those who attended future pilgrimages or encountered the forces of the Arab Revolt as they left the Hijaz into Syria. Thus having created a new political and religious leadership for the Arabs, the editors of *al-Qibla* in particular Fu'ad al-Khatib felt it necessary to clarify the issue of the *bayʿa* and what having a "King" meant for the Arabs of Syria who were still under Ottoman authority. In a front-page article dated Thursday, November 9, 1916 and entitled "The Meaning of the *Bayʿa*," al-Khatib defended the creation of the King of the Arabs as a tool of national self-preservation for the Syrian Arabs. Desiring to appeal to the non-Muslims and non-Arabs of Syria and the broader Ottoman world, however, al-Khatib also highlighted the position of King of the Arabs as a protector of non-Muslim and non-Arab peoples, too, specifically citing the Armenians. This Syria-centric perspective was ultimately adopted by Husayn to

illustrate how he considered his role of King of the Arabs as transcending the politics of the Hijaz to include non-Muslims and even Muslims outside the Arab world. For Husayn, he accepted that being King included both political and religious dimensions.

Fu'ad al-Khatib justified the *bayʿa* to Sharif Husayn that made him the King of the Arabs by associating the pledge to the awakening of the Arab nation and the revitalization of Islam. He began his article with a short, broad summation of the abuses and violence that has threatened the Arabs in recent centuries and lamented that the Arabs were dispersed and no longer united. He then proceeded to explain how the royal bayʿa to the "Hashemite Lord" (*al-jalalat al-hashimiyya*) had been the best resistance to fight against those forces that had oppressed the Arabs because "whoever made the sign was aroused by nationalist feelings (*al-shaʻur al-qawmiyya*) and the immortality of the spirit of patriotism (*wataniyya*) and the peace of Arab feeling."[79] According to al-Khatib, the bayʿa, while a product of nationalist sentiments by the deputies and notables of the Arab peoples, also now will become the vehicle by which all Arabs will feel the stir of the "patriotic spirit" (*al-ruh al-wataniyya*). By pledging themselves, as Arabs, to King Husayn, through the unity of made with the bayʿa, the Arabs once again found political unity through the King of the Arabs. Connected to this nationalist spirit, however, was the religious spirit of true Islam that Arab national unity would revive. In line with the arguments presented by Islamist Arab nationalists like Rashid Rida, al-Khatib also argued that as the Arabs became disunited, the Islamic world fell into decay that allowed a "group of oppressors" to distort religion. Now, with the unity of the Arabs through the bayʿa, it was time to "renounce that religion" of the oppressors who mock religion and once again bring Islam back to the icon of truth presented by the Hashemite family.[80]

[79] "The Meaning of the Allegiance "Bayʻah" to the King" in *Al-Qiblah* (no. 25), 9 November 1916.

[80] "The Meaning of the Allegiance "Bayʻah" to the King" in *Al-Qiblah* (no. 25), 9 November 1916.

The argument presented by Fu'ad al-Khatib to defend the creation of an independent Arab nation-state united by a king who would defend and revitalize the Arab nation and Islam was obviously claims presented many times over by Husayn and his supporters and by previous Arabist authors, such as Najib 'Azuri and Rashid Rida. This argument focused on an Arab Muslim audience, but Husayn did not limit his ambitions to merely the Arab Muslim world who he hoped to inspire as the descendent of Muhammad. The Syrian and Iraqi countries, largely Muslim but containing non-Muslim Arabs and even non-Arab populations, also factored into Husayn's plans. It was perhaps fitting that the delegate of Syria who had offered the "hopes of Arab Syria" to the King of the Arabs would also articulate how the royal *bayʿa* affected non-Muslims living in the Arab countries, especially since the 19th century *nahda* cultural movement was born in Syria.

Although not mentioning "Syria," the historical--both recent and ancient--references that al-Khatib cited to support the *bayʿa* would have resonated with a Syrian audience. In particular, al-Khatib reflected on the recent experiences of the Armenians and connected them to the Arab world. Historically, the Armenian Christians of the Ottoman Empire had faced previous persecutions during the reign of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II (1877-1909), with particularly violent episodes in 1896 and 1905. With the successes of the Russians against the Ottomans in the Caucasus front and in eastern Anatolia beginning in the spring of 1915, however, the Ottoman authorities adopted wartime measures that ultimately led to massacres and mass deportations of Armenians into Syria. Al-Khatib referenced the suffering and persecution of the Armenians to illustrate that the Arabs still under Ottoman authority faced a similar threat. Those same oppressors "who pushed away or removed the Armenians and others from different sects, to kill women, children, and the unborn in the stomachs of their mothers, are those who slayed the *'ayan* of the Arabs, our innocent martyrs, as reported in the recent Syrian newspapers…" and then proceeded

to list some of those persecuted persons.[81] By suggesting that the experience of the Armenians informed the present Arab experience, al-Khatib connected the force that led to the extermination of the Armenians to that ideology currently attacking the Arabs: Turanism. Turanism was a nationalist ideology that sought a closer connection between the Turkic peoples of the Ottoman Empire with the Turks of Central Asia in a way reminiscent of pan-Germanism or pan-Slavism in Europe. In this way, Turanism was inherently opposed to both pan-Islamism and even Ottomanism by establishing identity based on a shared racial origin.[82] In a direct invocation to the Syrians, not as Muslims, but as the descendants of Arab tribes he called the "sons of Ghassan and [those of] the line of Qahtan" both of which were near-mythical, pre-Islamic tribes of the Arabs who migrated to Syria and northern Arabia. Significantly, Ghassan had adopted Christianity in the Byzantine period, thereby connecting Christians to Arab stock. He called on them to "revive your nation [*qawm*] and preserve your noble lineage before you are dishonored by those who do not have a noble descent or lineage except Turanism."[83]

By connecting the Armenian Christian experience under the Ottomans and the Syrian Arab Muslim experience, al-Khatib defended the applicability of the bayʿa and the creation of the King of the Arabs to the benefit of non-Muslims. As such, he proceeded to compare how the King of the Arabs, as a necessary "spokesman" for the unified nation, mirrored the person of Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second caliph who brought Muslim conquests out of the Arabian peninsula and into Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and beyond. He reminded those in Syria that 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, besides uniting the Arabs and leading the conquests, also protected the non-Muslims communities, both

[81] "The Meaning of the Allegiance "Bay'ah" to the King" in *Al-Qiblah* (no. 25), 9 November 1916.

[82] George G. Arnakis, "Turanism: An Aspect of Turkish Nationalism," *Balkan Studies* 1 (1960), 21-22.

[83] "The Meaning of the Allegiance "Bay'ah" to the King" in *Al-Qiblah* (no. 25), 9 November 1916.

Jews and Christians, by making them protected people who paid the *jizya* (head tax).[84] In particular, al-Khatib drew a direct parallel between the experiences of non-Muslims at the time of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab's conquest and what they could expect from the King of the Arabs. Just as the Jews and Christians who faced the persecutions of "Heraclius" and the "oppression of *Rum* [Rome]," that is, the Byzantine emperor in Constantinople now faced persecution evidenced by the Sultan in Constantinople evidenced by the Armenians, the King of the Arabs the current representative for the Arabs will protect them, just as Umar ibn al-Khattab had purportedly done.[85]

In drawing the comparison between Umar ibn al-Khattab from the 7th century with Husayn's present attempt to unify the Arabs under his political and religious leadership, Fu'ad al-Khatib offered his Syrian audience a historical figure upon which to frame and understand the position of King of the Arabs. In particular, the political and the religious dimensions of the new position were entwined through the early Islamic corollary. Umar ibn al-Khattab was the leader of a state, governed largely by Arabs that had emerged from the Hijaz outside of Syria. He represented the unified Arabs politically but also religiously as the caliph and successor of Muhammad. Husayn, as a result of the nationalist spirit of the Arabs, now became their unified leader. While not yet declaring himself caliph, Husayn nonetheless asserted his and the Arabs' religious independence from the Ottoman caliph. For the residents of Syria, both Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs, and non-Arabs, Husayn as King of the Arabs should be understood as a restoration of the earliest form of Islamic leadership: Arab and protecting of non-Muslims.

---

[84] The memory of the early Islamic period, including the treatment of protected classes of non-Muslims, were tropes and themes in numerous literary productions, including the works of Egyptian Farah Antun. See Orit Bashkin, "My Sister Esther: Reflections on Judaism, Ottomanism, and the Empire of Egypt in the Works of Farah Antun," in *The Long 1890s in Egypt: Colonial Quiescence, Subterranean Resistance*, ed. Marilyn Booth and Anthony Gorman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 332–33.

[85] "The Meaning of the Allegiance "Bay'ah" to the King" in *Al-Qiblah* (no. 25), 9 November 1916.

Fu'ad al-Khatib's rhetorical connection between the Armenian experience and the Arab experience also provided an implicit critique on the religious authority of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. The fact that Umar ibn al-Khattab had represented safety and protection for religious minorities against the oppression of Heraclius in Constantinople offered a useful comparison for the non-Muslim religious minorities. Once again, non-Muslims face persecution from Constantinople, and now their salvation will depend on a Hijazi Arab who will shield them as protected peoples per the dictates of Islam. The fact that the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph failed to protect non-Muslims, and in fact seemed complicit in the brutal massacres of the Armenians, also translated into a failure to truly represent Islam since Islam protects non-Muslims who pay the *jizyah* according to Fu'ad al-Khatib. The reference to the Armenians thus provided a critique of the Islamic credentials of the Ottoman Sultan while providing the Syrian audience comfort that the King of the Arabs, as a true Arab and Islamic leader, would ensure their protection no matter their religious affiliation.

The interest in Ottoman policies towards the Armenians mentioned in al-Qibla was not just an isolated interest by Fu'ad al-Khatib. In fact, the treatment of Armenians had been an interest in the broader Arab world since a renewed wave of violence affected those in Adana in 1909. That year, the conservative Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar (the famed religious institution for Sunni Muslims in Cairo) Salim al-Bishri had penned a condemnation for the violence against Armenians in a Cairene newspaper.[86] In it, he denounced "racism" (*al-jinsiyya*) and "racial loyalties" (*al-'ansar*) and called for Muslims to defend the "protected peoples" (*ahl al-dhimma*). By 1915, the

[86] An image of the original text and a translation generously provided by Mohammad Balland from his blog. See Muhammad Balland, "Condemnation of the Adana Massacre (1909) by Shaykh al-Azhar Salim al-Bishri (d. 1916)," *Ballandalus* (blog), April 22, 2015, https://ballandalus.wordpress.com/2015/04/22/condemnation-of-the-adana-massacre-1909-by-shaykh-al-azhar-salim-al-bishri-d-1916/.

widespread massacres and forced migrations of Armenians into Syria prompted the Syrian Fa'iz al-Ghusein (1883-1968) to publish a book in 1916 entitled *al-Madhabih fi Arminiya* that detailed the atrocities the Armenians and the Assyrian Christians faced which he credited to "Turkish fanaticism." He witnessed the genocide because while imprisoned in Diyarbakir in early 1916 for his nationalist activities. His book was published while he was in the Hijaz, having fled Ottoman rule, and had then joined Husayn's revolt.[87]

While Fa'iz al-Ghusein witnessed the genocide, the violence against the Armenians had been a concern for Husayn since at least April 1916 after he had covertly allied himself with the British. The extent in which the Armenian question, as it pertained to both the Armenians and the Muslim world, concerned Husayn further revealed the extent in which he saw himself as an independent Muslim leader. For example, in April 1916, in a verbal message to Sir Reginald Wingate, the Governor-General of Sudan, Husayn expressed sympathy for the Armenians and concern for the Muslims of Anatolia who faced potential Russian retribution. Hearing a report from a Hijazi of the deportations and marching in the "Kurd country of Asian minor," Husayn asked the British agent to ask that "the Russians stop killing the children and those whom human feelings abstain from killing," that is, the innocent Muslims.[88] He admitted that "it is true that our friends in question have done what they have done to the Armenians (God will deal with them); let them not follow their example, as this will create hatred in the hearts of the people, which the

[87] For an English translation, published in the midst of the Arab Revolt: Fa'iz Ghusayn, *Martyred Armenia* (London: C. A. Pearson, Ltd., 1917). The original was published in 1916 with the title al-Madhabih fi Arminiya [Massacres in Armenia]. Mohammad Balland likewise provided a short description of this work on his blog. See Muhammad Balland, "Fa'iz al-Ghusein (1883-1968): An Arab Eye-Witness to the Armenian Genocide," *Ballandalus* (blog), April 24, 2015, https://ballandalus.wordpress.com/2015/04/24/faiz-al-ghusein-1883-1968-an-arab-eye-witness-to-the-armenian-genocide/.

[88] TNA: Governor General Reginald Wingate, Sudan, to Clayton, Cairo, 16 April 1916 [FO141/461/2].

British Government is the first to abhor."[89] Besides revealing his sympathy for the Armenians by recognizing their plight and assuring the British that God will punish those who have victimized them, Husayn demonstrated advocacy for Muslim interests among foreign powers. In this way, Husayn's ambitions as an independent Muslim leader on the world stage became apparent by April 1916.

Looking ahead, as the Arab Revolt finally left the Hijaz with the capture of Aqaba in July 1917 and as it marched northward to Damascus, King Husayn again expressed concern for the Armenians that offers an insight into how he understood and projected his authority as King of the Arabs. He wrote the letter on April 29, 1918 to tribesmen among the Shamar in northern Arabian and on the frontiers of Syria and Iraq. When he wrote this letter, the Shamar was still dominated by an Ottoman-allied tribal confederacy, Al-Rashid led by Saʿud bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn al-Rashid in Central Arabia. For British officials looking to make deeper gains into Iraq, Ibn Rashid posed a dangerous threat. At the same time, as the competition between Husayn and Ibn Saud began to become more confrontational and a war increasingly inevitable between the two peninsular powers, the tribes in Shamar became a potential arena for which Husayn or Ibn Saud to extend their influence. (By August 1918, the British will succeed in convincing Ibn Saud to begin attacking Ibn Rashid in Hail until he was ordered to retreat.)[90] Thus, for Husayn to write this letter in April to the tribesmen of Shamar who were allied to Al-Rashid, he was trying to circumvent ibn

[89] TNA: Governor General Reginald Wingate, Sudan, to Clayton, Cairo, 16 April 1916 [FO141/461/2]. His label for the Armenian persecutors as "friends in question" is odd and unclear to whom it referred. "Friends" may not suggest that he talked about the CUP or the Ottomans. Rather, he referred to the Kurds who may have participated in the violence against the Armenians. For a history of Kurdish militias in the Ottoman "tribal zone", which began under Sultan Abdülhamid, see Janet Klein, *The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). For a history of the Kurdish role in the genocide, see Vicken Cheterian, *Open Wounds: Armenians, Turks and a Century of Genocide* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 263–78.

[90] Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in An Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Saudi Arabia* (I.B.Tauris, 1997), 218–19.

Rashid and exert his authority into the region. By doing so and addressing himself as the "King of the Arab Lands and Sharif of Mecca and its Amir to the Honorable and Admirable Amirs," Husayn demonstrated in the formulation of the letter his expansionist aims and that his kingship was not just limited to the Hijaz or territories already under his control by included the entire Arab world. Like those other Amirs, he too was an Amir, the Amir of Mecca, which offered him a particularly singular honor. Furthermore, his claim to kingship over the Arabs granted him added authority and honor in which he could address and instruct them.[91]

The content of the letter instructing the Arab Muslim tribes to protect the Armenians likewise voiced Husayn's ideological vision for his role as King of the Arabs. In the letter, he instructed the Amir Faysal, his son who was now operating in Syria, and the leading shaykh of Jabal Shamar Amir Ajil Al-Yawar Abd al-'Aziz al-Jarba that

> What is requested of you is to protect and to take good care of everyone from the Jacobite Armenian community living in your territories and frontiers and among your tribes; to help them in all their affairs and defend them as you would defend yourselves, your properties and children, and provide everything they might need whether they are settled or moving from place to place, because they are the Protected People of the Muslims (*ahl dhimmat al-Muslimin*)--about whom the Prophet Muhammad...said: 'Whosoever takes from them even a rope, I will be his adversary on the day of Judgement.' This is among the most important things we require of you to do and expect you to accomplish, in view of your noble character and determination.[92]

In calling for the Arab amirs to protect the non-Muslim community of Armenians fleeing persecution, Husayn indicated that his political authority as the King of the Arabs likewise included a religious authority. Coupled with his April 1916 call for the British to prevent Russian retaliation against the Muslims for what happened to the Armenians and the later rhetorical use of

---

[91] Translation fromes from Harut Sassounian, *The Armenian Genocide: Documents and Declarations, 1915-1995* (Glendale: 80th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide Commemorative Committee, 1995), 62–63. For the Arabic, see a text published in a Jordanian newspaper: "al-Sharif Husayn Hafiẓu 'ala al-Arman kama Tuhafaẓun 'ala Anfiskum," *Jarida al-Dustur*, April 25, 2016, https://www.addustour.com/articles/38391.

[92] Translation fromes from Sassounian, *The Armenian Genocide*, 62–63.

the Armenians to explain the meaning of his kingship, Husayn placed himself as an alternative to the Ottoman sultan in his political, ethical, and Islamic-*caliphal* authority. An important function of the caliphate, according to the editors of *al-Qibla* was his protection of non-Muslims, the *dhimmi* or protected peoples. The recent atrocities inflicted upon the Armenians, inspired by the same nationalist "Turanism" that also executed the Arab martyrs of Damascus, was the failure of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph to uphold his responsibility for protecting and defending the protected peoples. Husayn's order to his Arab subjects to protect the Armenians thus fulfilled the religious authority that he superseded as the King of the Arabs until which time the Muslim world made a decision regarding the caliphate. Whereas the Ottoman Sultan-Caliphate failed in his duty to protect non-Muslims, Husayn as the King of the Arabs that conferred on him both political and religious sovereignty he fulfilled that prophetic task by ordering the protection of the Armenians.

The significance of Fu'ad al-Khatib's articulation of the meaning of the *bayʿa* was his simultaneous translation of the "King of the Arab" as an expression of political Arabism (both national and Islamic) and its applicability to non-Muslim populations in the Arab world, looking towards Syria. By emphasizing the national and religious independence accorded to the Arabs through its creation and describing it as the product of *wataniyya* and *qawmiyya*, al-Khatib situated the King of the Arabs within the political Arabist discourse. Furthermore, by drawing parallels to a unified Arab political and religious body to the conquests of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab and his protection of the non-Muslim peoples, he assured Christians and Jews in the Arab world their protection. His linking the recent Ottoman violence against the Armenians and their lack of a unifying national king as an additional rationale for the need for the King of the Arabs also framed Husayn's new title with a history of Muslim leaders charged with protecting its non-Muslim subjects. Husayn's concern for the Armenians pre-dated the Arab Revolt and even appeared again

as he called his tribal allies near Syria to protect them. Husayn's concern for non-Muslims as the King of the Arabs revealed how his program evolved to include non-Muslims and non-Arabs alike.

Medina as a Site of the Hashemite Household Rivalry

Husayn's project for Kingship over the Arabs with independent religious authority represented his adoption of the prevailing Islamic Arabist discourses that believed that the revitalization of the Islamic world depended on the rejuvenation of the Arabs, who possessed a specific religious legitimacy as Muhammad's first community. His and his agent's adaptation that focused on Husayn's person as the ultimately unifying and authoritative force for the Arabs (as King) represented a strategic response to 'Ali Haydar's physical and rhetorical presence in Medina. In fact, despite Husayn and his sons' best efforts to project the King of the Arabs, any success proved limited. Immediately after the announcement, as the British and French debated the political consequences of recognizing Husayn as the King of the Arabs, 'Abdullah had sent telegrams announcing his father's coronation and claimed to have received favorable responses from officials from around the Muslim and European worlds.[93] Among his allies, the British and the French, they settled on recognizing Husayn as "King of the Hijaz," reasoning that "King of the Arabs" was too lofty a title that threatened their interests in the region and alienated their regional allies.[94] Out of diplomatic necessity, Husayn accepted the regional kingship, but nonetheless

[93] Some of prominent telegrams of "recognition" came from Russia, Italy, Afghanistan, and notables from India. See TNA:"Sherfian Propaganda among Indian Moslems," 30 July 1916 - 22 January 1917 [FO 141/682/1]; BL: "Arabia: Grand Shereef's Assumption of Royalty," 2-3 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637]; BL: "Arab Revolt: Grand Shereef's Title. Question of Recognition. Telegram from Shereef to Amir of Afghanistan held up by G of I [Government of India]," 7-8 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

[94] To chart the intricacies of the debate among British and French officials, that debated the effects of Husayn's title on other regional powers in Arabia and even colonial interests--even debating Arabic grammar and syntax- see BL: "Arab Revolt Shereef's Title, P5235 1916" 31 October 1916 - 18 December 1918 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

within the pages of *al-Qibla* and his personal communications, he nonetheless continued to promote himself as the King of the Arabs.

The primary motivation for Husayn's allies to reject his claims to Kingship over the Arabs rested in their respective political interests that they believed the claim of universal Arab sovereignty threatened. Significantly, however, the fact that Husayn did not control Medina alongside Mecca became a tool to justify rejecting his claims to be King of the Arabs. For example, in a fury of correspondences in November 1916 debating the relative merits and prudence of Husayn's assumption of King of the Arabs, both French and British agents used the fact that Husayn had yet to capture Medina as a reason to refuse recognizing his title "King of the Arabs."[95] (In an ironic inconsistency, both European powers concluded that the most fitting title for Husayn, and the one in which they agreed to address him, would be "King of the Hijaz"--despite the fact that he neither controlled Medina nor much of the Hijaz by the start of November 1916). Despite the inroads Husayn's forces made throughout the Hijaz and eventually into Syria over the course of the Arab Revolt, Medina remained in Ottoman hands throughout World War I and even post-armistice. Technically, the Ottoman commander charged with defending the city since the start of the Arab Revolt in 1916, Fahreddin Pasha, only surrendered to Husayn's forces on January 13, 1919--months after British, Ottoman, and Husayn's attempted to secure a surrender and after the Mudros armistice formally ended Ottoman hostilities.[96]

---

[95] For example, Sir Henry McMahon, who had previous negotiated with Husayn, advised that "in face of 'fait accompli' [of Husayn's coronation] it would not be wise to prejudice our future relations with the Shereef by withholding a measure of formal recognition, at the same time expressing our opinion that his proclamation would have been better timed if it had been made after expulsion of Turks from his territory" as a reference to Medina and other parts of the Hijaz. BL: H. McMahon, Cairo, to Under-Secretary of State for India, New Delhi, 3 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

[96] For an account of the "defense of Medina" from the Ottoman perspective, see S. Tanvir Wasti, "The Defense of Medina, 1916-19," *Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 4 (1991): 642–53.

Medina was not just simply an Ottoman outpost, however. It became the center of the Specter Amir's rhetorical offensive against Husayn by August 1916 and then again in January 1917 when 'Ali Haydar issued his second proclamation before returning to Damascus. Thus, in the household rivalry between 'Ali Haydar and Husayn, Medina became a site of contention between the two because of its historic and religious importance. As the site of Muhammad's first community, mosque, and burial site, Medina represented a genealogical connection for the Hashemites to their revered ancestry from whom their prestige derived. Religiously, although Medina was not a prescribed location for pilgrimage, the Prophet's tomb attracted pilgrims from around the world who visited it alongside Mecca and thus became an important draw for Muslims worldwide. As much as he emphasized his lineage and authority in the Hijaz and the region's centrality to Arab and Muslim identity, Husayn's inability to also claim and materially incorporate Medina into his discursive project represented a perpetual liability to the promotion of his national and religious authority even when the strategic threat of the Ottomans in the city waned. His Ottoman rivals, including the Specter Amir, capitalized on that fact, realizing the city's significance to their own religious war against Husayn.

Medina as a Strategic Focus

Although Mecca became the center of Husayn's project, separating Medina from the Ottomans had been his original intent. In fact, the catalyst for launching the Arab Revolt, according to an undated letter from Faysal (but enclosed in a packet from April 1916), was fear that the Ottoman government planned to secure Turkish Anatolia at the expense of the rest of the empire. In a letter to his father, Faysal speculated how the Russians appeared poised following the capture of Erzurum to "take possession of the Islamic countries which are deprived of men and

arms," which he claimed included the Hijaz, if they obeyed Ottomans demands for Hijazi volunteers.[97] Faysal suspected that the Ottoman officials in Damascus, who had been lobbying Husayn to send "*mujahidin*" (holy war fighters) from the Hijaz to Syria, did so not for the defense of the Arab countries but only for the defense of Anatolia thereby leaving the Hijaz vulnerable to foreign control.[98] As a result, he argued for the necessity of maintaining an Arab force in Syria "with which we may be able to defend the main Arab countries and the key to the Haramain [Mecca and Medina]."[99]

In order to safeguard a united Hijaz from Ottoman or Russian threat, Husayn had originally planned for his eldest son 'Ali to cut the Hijaz Railway and telegraph lines that connected Medina to Syria while Faysal launched the Revolt in Syria with the help of Arab nationalists and tribesmen, like Nuri Sha'alan of the Rawalla confederacy.[100] From the British interpretation of Husayn's intentions, they concluded that it was "considered certain," by both their experts and by Husayn's reports, "that the Turkish troops in the Hedjaz and other Arabian Provinces were incapable of resistance and will be faced with the alternative of surrender or extermination."[101] Whatever promises for rebellion that Syrian Arab leaders had made to Faysal, however, did not in fact materialize. Their reluctance forced Husayn to conclude that his movement would have "to depend

[97] TNA: Letter from Faysal enclosed in "List of Documents brought in by Shaykh Orayfan" to Clayton, Cairo, 16 April 1916 [FO141/461/2].

[98] TNA: Letter from Faysal enclosed in "List of Documents brought in by Shaykh Orayfan" to Clayton, Cairo, 16 April 1916 [FO141/461/2].

[99] TNA: Letter from Faysal enclosed in "List of Documents brought in by Shaykh Orayfan" to Clayton, Cairo, 16 April 1916 [FO141/461/2].

[100] TNA: Governor General Reginald Wingate, Sudan, to Clayton, Cairo, 16 April 1916 [FO141/461/2].

[101] TNA: Governor General Reginald Wingate, Sudan, to Clayton, Cairo, 16 April 1916 [FO141/461/2].

upon the natives of the Hijaz for starting the local movement or seizing the railway lines or any other movement."[102]

With the hope to begin the Revolt in Syria squashed, Husayn nonetheless continued his plan to secure Medina from Ottoman control to preserve the unity of the Hijaz. This focus on Medina was revealed by the "false start" of the Arab Revolt several days before June 10, 1916 when Husayn fired his dramatic shots against the Ottoman garrison in Mecca. According to reports, 'Ali and Faysal, who recently arrived to the city after fleeing potential arrest by Jamal Pasha, tried to raise the Revolt first in Medina on June 5th. British reports described with uncertainty that Faysal had "captured" the city and that 'Ali was heading up the railway, destroying tracks.[103] In reality, however, Faysal had indeed attempted to foment riots against the Ottomans but was forced to abandon Medina. Several days later, Husayn formally announced the start of the Revolt in Mecca--without the second Holy City.

Husayn's failure to capture Medina was a combination of the fact that the Ottomans had recently bolstered its forces there and the relative secure position the Ottoman garrison enjoyed in Medina compared to other cities in the Hijaz that protected it from Husayn's tribal forces. Leading up to the Arab Revolt, the Ottomans had fortified their position in Medina as a staging ground to send forces to Yemen where British forces had landed to maintain control over Aden and thus access to the Red Sea Strait of Bab al-Mandab.[104] An early Ottoman strategy in the war effort against Great Britain was to attempt to disrupt the British in Egypt to inspire the Egyptian Muslims

[102] TNA: Verbal Message to High Commissioner in communicated by Governor General Reginald Wingate, Sudan, to Clayton, Cairo, 16 April 1916 [FO141/461/2]. It should be noted that Husayn's failed plan to launch the Revolt in Syria, thereby capturing Medina, translated into a frequent lamentation against the British for not landing troops in Syria to cut off Medina.

[103] Arab Bulletin No. 5, 18 June 1916 [FO882/25/1].

[104] Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 88–90.

to rise up against the British. The most dramatic effort, led by Jamal Pasha, was the Ottoman assault on the Suez Canal (January-February 1915) from Beersheba in Palestine. The Suez Canal was a vital waterway for the transportation of Indian and ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand) forces to the European and Mediterranean theaters. The Ottomans hoped that by attacking the canal, the Egyptians "would rise *en masse*, and Egypt would be freed in an unexpectedly short time…" according to Jamal Pasha.[105] The campaign failed and the Egyptians never rose up against the British during the war.[106] Despite the unsuccessful campaign, the Ottomans nevertheless sought to strengthen their position in the Hijaz for an assault in Yemen--and perhaps because Jamal Pasha increasingly suspected Husayn in Mecca of treachery to the Ottoman cause.[107] By the start of the Arab Revolt in June 1915, about 11,000 Ottoman soldiers were thus garrisoned in Medina awaiting to be deployed in the Arabian Peninsula, creating a formidable defense of the city.[108]

In addition to having recently reinforced their position there, the natural geography and military defenses of the city gave the Ottomans a strategic advantage over their other positions in the Hijaz. The Arab Bureau in Cairo summarized its relative advantage once it was realized that Faysal had failed to secure the city thus:

> Medina is rather a different problem. There are four forts and the town is strongly walled. The townspeople are accustomed to take the part of the Turk against the Arabs, and fight hard. If they have done so this time, then the Sherifial forces may

[105] Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman-1913-1919* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922), 154.

[106] Eugene L. Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East* (New York, NY: Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group, 2015), 115–28.

[107] Jamal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman-1913-1919*, 153.

[108] Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 335. At the same time, Jamal Pasha in Damascus claimed in his memoirs to have suspected Sharif Husayn of planning a rebellion as early as January 1916 when confronting the frustration of Husayn's sons delaying tactics to support the Ottoman campaign in the Suez. Jamal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman-1913-1919*, 168.

> well be blockading a superior force in a town with enough water and food for a very considerable period.[109]

Contrasting the Arab force's recent experiences in Mecca and Jeddah where water sources were located outside the city walls, meaning those cities could be successfully besieged in order to secure a surrender. In Medina, water tributaries could be found in each of the city's quarters; the city was entirely walled; and unlike Mecca, Medina had historically been a productive agricultural area with date palms both inside and immediately outside the city walls.[110] Thus, the Ottoman garrison had ample access to water and food within the city, meaning a siege would not help capture the city. Indeed, despite attacks on the Hijaz Railway and eventual removal of Ottoman troops from the city, the defended city became the last Ottoman holdout to surrender.[111]

Husayn was not alone in his appraisal of the strategic importance of Medina. At the start of the Arab Revolt, for instance, Medina allowed the Ottomans to challenge Husayn's advances, limited as they were in 1916, by maintaining a military presence in the Hijaz. The "Rabigh Crisis" that began in November 1916 and lasted until January 1917 when Husayn's forces captured the port city of Wajh, exemplified the military threat Medina posed to Husayn's Revolt. The crisis erupted when Shaykh Mubarak of the Harb tribe, a supporter of Husayn who captured the port city of Rabigh, seemed poised to revert to the Ottomans who offered him a new title (*Pasha*) and a monthly retainer.[112] With Rabigh once again in Ottoman hands and the Harb tribe as allies, the

---

[109] Arab Bulletin no. 6, 23 June 1916 [FO 882/25/1].

[110] BL: *Handbook of the Hejaz* 2nd Edition (Cairo: Government Press, The Arab Bureau: 1917), 21-24. [IOR/L/MIL/17/16/12].

[111] Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 2015, 396.

[112] Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire*, 74–85. Before his reversion, Shaykh Mubarak appeared to have been wavering in his confidence of the Arab Revolt, having only declared his allegiance to Husayn on September 8, 1916. Before British officials, Faysal had suspected that Mubarak intended to join the Ottomans if the moment presented itself. He even advised that "a few British troops" be sent to Rabigh in order "to reassure and give confidence to the Arabs." See TNA: Arab Bulletin No. 23, 26 September 1916 [FO 882/25/1].

Ottomans in Medina could march against Jeddah and Mecca and thereby end the Revolt completely. Fortunately, for Husayn, Fahreddin Pasha never attempted to retake Mecca; in fact, Jamal Pasha actually recalled some of the men stationed in Medina back to Damascus. When Husayn's son Faysal captured Wajh in January 1917 further north up the Hijazi coast, he successfully created another staging ground for attacking the Hijaz railway with British aid and thus further isolated Medina, though never able to capture it.[113]

In his memoirs, Jamal Pasha suggested that defending Medina had been a strategic mistake in terms of military actions, especially after January 1917 when troops began to leave the city until their numbers were greatly reduced. Although Ottoman Medina perpetually frustrated the efforts of Husayn, the British, and the French, he admitted that "the sacrifices necessarily involved in feeding the garrison in Medina and supplying the troops echelonned [sic] between Medina and Maan [north of Aqaba] with food and ammunition compelled us to halve the supplies provided for Palestine and Sinai and prevented us from reinforcing our Sinai front when and how we liked."[114] Moreover, as for the remaining forces in Medina under the command of Fahreddin Pasha--stranded and isolated by the Arab attacks on the Hijaz railway--they coped with extreme hot weather and were forced to subsist on increasingly restricted rations supplemented by fruit from the city's date groves and even reports of the inhabitants eating locusts.[115]

---

[113] Besides the strategic threat, the Rabigh crisis also highlighted the precariousness of Husayn's independence. During these uncertain months as the crisis unfolded, British officials urged Husayn to allow the landing of British, necessarily British Christian troops, in Rabigh to prevent it from reverting to the Ottomans. Husayn vacillated on permitting the landing of British troops because the prospect of allowing Christians in the Hijaz would feed into the Ottoman propaganda efforts. Fortunately for Husayn, his indecisiveness paid off with the crisis becoming a moot point, and he was able to avoid landing British troops to hold Rabigh. This experience, however, led to British frustration and ultimately undermined their support for him. It seems clear that with the success of Faysal, the center of the Revolt moved away from Husayn. See Scott Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, First edition. (New York: Doubleday, 2013), 190–91.

[114] Jamal Pasha, 170.

[115] For a fuller account of the trials of the Ottoman forces in Medina, see S. Tanvir Wasti, "The Defence of Medina, 1916-19."

For Ottoman officials, including Amir ‘Ali Haydar, the true value in maintaining Ottoman control over Medina was its symbolic value as the site of Muhammad’s tomb. The city held strategic and symbolic importance to the Ottoman war effort, both against Husayn and for Ottoman religious claims to legitimacy. For example, a march that was sung in Ottoman schools during the war captured the importance of Medina to Ottoman war propaganda: “We will not leave the one who rests in Medina [the Prophet Muhammad], we will rather die and rescue the motherland.”[116] For military commanders in Syria and Medina, holding the city was a matter of protecting the Prophet’s tomb. Jamal Pasha recognized the symbolic importance of the city when he commended Fahreddin, “who was assailed by hostile forces and influences on all sides and yet managed to perform miracles with his force...as he defended the Sacred Tomb against the troops of the renegade Sherif Hussein and the rebellious Beduins….”[117] Remarkably, Jamal Pasha did not characterize Husayn’s revolt and his “rebellious” bedouins as only against the Ottoman state; rather, he remembered their actions as a threat to the Sacred Tomb that required Ottoman protection and miracles.

The symbolic and religious significance of defending Muhammad’s tomb appeared likewise in the writings and memories of ‘Ali Haydar and the Ottoman commander Fakhri al-Din Pasha. After his arrival to Medina in August 1916, ‘Ali Haydar claimed to have continually lobbied Jamal Pasha in Damascus against abandoning the city for strategic reasons by emphasizing the religious significance of the city to Islam.[118] When Fahreddin, the commander of the garrison

---

[116] Quoted from Martin Strohmeier, “Fakhri (Fahrettin) Paşa and the End of Ottoman Rule in Medina (1916-1919),” *Turkish Historical Review* 4, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 208.

[117] Jamal Pasha, 169,

[118] Stitt, 177–78.

in Medina, reported that an evacuation was imminent in order to better defend Palestine, ‘Ali Haydar allegedly wrote to Damascus to say “the very idea of deserting the Holy Tomb [of Muhammad] was utterly shameful, and that it should be protected to the last man, if necessary.”[119] When recalled to establish his residency in Damascus in January 1917 to work with the Syrian tribesmen on behalf of the Ottoman government, ‘Ali Haydar’s farewell to Fahreddin also informed him that “the protection of this Tomb is in the hands of God, but you are His instrument. I leave it in your care. Be worthy of the trust.”

To that end, ‘Ali Haydar found an ally with Fahreddin whose “deep religious faith” similarly inspired him to defend Medina to the very end.[120] In a declaration dated 12 April 1917, Fahreddin based his refusal to surrender the city to Husayn’s sons on the religious significance of the city:

> O people! Let it be known to you that my brave and heroic soldiers, with the moral support of all Islam, are duty bound to protect and defend the apple of the eye of the Caliphate, Medina, to the last bullet, the last drop of blood and the last soldier. As soldiers and as Muslims, they have pledged themselves to this task with determination.[121]

Facing the logical strategic exigencies by Ottoman war planners like Jamal Pasha who argued for abandoning the city to concentrate forces in Syria and Palestine, ‘Ali Haydar could only offer a religious motivation for defending Medina. The goal of Ottoman policy in Medina rested in defending and holding Muhammad’s tomb as a symbolic strategy.

---

[119] Stitt, 177–78.

[120] Stitt, 178-179.

[121] As quoted by S. Tanvir Wasti, “The Defence of Medina, 1916-19,” 643.

Medina as a Discursive and Political Threat for Husayn

Although neutralized as a military threat by January 1917, Medina nevertheless posed a symbolic threat to Husayn and affected his discursive project to elevate himself the King of the Arabs and a global Muslim leader throughout the course of the Arab Revolt. The determination of Fahreddin and ‘Ali Haydar to maintain Ottoman control of the city created a very compelling and powerful image within the Muslim and Ottoman worlds with which to contrast Husayn in Mecca. In his final proclamation issued in Medina before leaving for Damascus, ‘Ali Haydar had capitalized on the optics of this discursive rivalry that emerged between Mecca and Medina by emphasizing the need for the Arabs of the Hijaz to defend the Holy Cities from European conquest and to be loyal to the caliphate. In January 1917, as some Ottoman forces left the city to take up posts in Damascus, ‘Ali Haydar joined them ostensibly to support the Ottoman cause among the Syrian tribes. Before leaving Medina, he issued a second proclamation against Husayn, which British sources found disseminated in the Hijaz--presumably by tribes still loyal to the Ottomans or in contact with them in Medina. The copy translated by British officials, in fact, had been confiscated from Rabigh--deep into the Hijaz.[122] This final proclamation from Medina reiterated many of the same themes of his initial proclamation: that Husayn had allied himself to a Christian power, the British and who sought to conquer the Holy Places of the Hijaz which had never been conquered by a non-Muslim power, and that Husayn was dividing the Muslim world against the legitimate caliphate. These critiques appeared in the initial proclamation but with his final proclamation, ‘Ali Haydar outlined more cogently the role of the Amir of Mecca within the Islamic world and its relationship to the sanctity of the holy sites in the Hijaz. In this latter point, ‘Ali

[122] TNA: Telegram from Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

Haydar made a point of stressing Medina alongside Mecca. His rhetorical strategy aimed to highlight the differences between him and Husayn because of Muslim obedience and to assert his legitimacy as the true Amir of Mecca by virtue of guarding the Prophet's tomb.

'Ali Haydar began and frequently repeated in his proclamation that the holiness of the Hijaz and the specialness of its inhabitants rested solely on its association with Muhammad and for "being the near neighbours of the Ka'abah."[123] As such, references to Muhammad and the Ka'abah abound in the proclamation, heralded to remind his audience of what was at stake if the British take command of the Hijaz through Husayn's actions. Unlike his previous proclamation, now 'Ali Haydar conspicuously mentioned alongside references to the Ka'abah in Mecca, the Prophet's tomb in Medina. When castigating Husayn for allowing British entrance into the Hijaz, he argued that Husayn has "schemed to place the Holy '*Bayt Allah*', the cynosure of all Moslem eyes, the resting place of the Prophet...under the protection of a Christian power…."[124] Later, when he described how Husayn's victory amounted to "Christian England" overtaking the "Islamic Ottoman Empire," he equated such an outcome with "the exaltation of Christianity over Islam, and that in the very cradle of Islam, and in the home for Mohammed."[125] Finally, as he concluded his proclamation calling emphatically for *jihad* against Husayn and the British, he assured faithful Muslims that "we have no doubt that God specifically protects those Spots which contain His Holy

[123] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing "Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917" 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

[124] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing "Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917" 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

[125] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing "Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917" 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

Places and the acre in which lies buried the most precious skeleton, and God will prosper you in his Holy Jehad…."[126]

While 'Ali Haydar had many of these same claims and predictions as they related to Husayn's actions that threaten British conquest of the Hijaz, new to his proclamation were the abundance--and at times colorful--references to Medina, in particular the sites specific to the home of the Prophet Muhammad. While the sanctity of the Ka'abah was of universal importance to Muslims, the repeated references to Medina in this proclamation stand out by their absence in the first proclamation. By emphasizing how the threat to the Hijaz now included Medina, where he resided, he juxtaposed himself from Husayn in Mecca.

The most important rhetorical tool 'Ali Haydar used to contrast Husayn from himself was by defining the responsibility of the Amir of Mecca. To do so, he measured his legitimacy because of obedience to the Caliphate, but now emphasized that he, unlike Husayn, protected the Holy Places thereby drawing attention to his role as guardian of Medina. The role of obedience played heavily in 'Ali Haydar's critique of Husayn. He praised Muhammad, his ancestor, for being the "best of all mankind," and who "ordained that obedience to authority is equivalent to obedience to God."[127] Husayn's recent actions, as the Amir of Mecca, had ultimately amounted to the most serious act of disobedience: it pitted otherwise faithful Muslims against the last Islamic empire (which 'Ali Haydar reminded his audience with its victory against ally forces in Gallipoli near Istanbul "has restored its former prestige) by threatening to handover the Holy Cities to a Christian

[126] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing "Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917" 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

[127] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing "Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917" 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

empire.[128] His heretical behavior was made worse by the fact that he had been entrusted, as the Amir of Mecca, to safeguard Mecca and Medina. Speaking of the British whose empire had conquered other Muslim regions wherever it went, he explained that now

> They found what they sought, alas! alas!, in one who should have been the first to protect [the] Hejaz, seeing that he was the man to whose care the Turkish Government had entrusted Her, and supplied for this purpose men and treasure, and seeing that all we people of the Ka'abah have been deputed for the purpose of its protection, and that we are they for whom the Word of God was down saying, 'verily God wills that pollution be far removed from you people of the Ka'abah, and will purify you absolutely.'[129]

Thus, according to 'Ali Haydar, the role of the Amir of Mecca--as well as all faithful Muslims--was to protect the Hijaz from "pollution." In this task, Sharif Husayn abrogated his responsibility by allying with a foreign Christian power against the Ottoman state. By drawing attention to Husayn's polluting the Holy City, 'Ali Haydar hoped to inspire the people of the Ka'abah to rebel against Husayn from within Mecca and framed such an act as local repentance for siding with Husayn's rebellion.

History provided 'Ali Haydar justification for the rehabilitation of Mecca. By boasting how he and his forces in Medina were "slowly advancing from Medina to Mecca to cleanse her of heretics," he drew a historical parallel with Muhammad's biography.[130] Like his revered ancestor, 'Ali Haydar had also been rejected by his family in Mecca but found refuge in Medina. Just like Muhammad's struggle and war against the people of Mecca, who had rejected Islam, he too would reclaim the city and restore it with his supporters in Medina.

---

[128] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing "Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917" 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

[129] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing "Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917" 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

[130] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing "Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917" 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

Finally, ‘Ali Haydar framed his task for protecting the Holy Sites by referring back to the household rivalry between the Zayd and the ‘Awn. For one, when he first mentioned Husayn’s name, ‘Ali Haydar made sure to include that Husayn was the son of ‘Awn. In doing so, it allowed him to distinguish his own familial line when he re-asserted the Zayd-‘Awn rivalry over the Amirate of Mecca. He explained that his appointment came as the safety of the Hijaz had reached its nadir under Husayn’s administration, so he “decided to accept the Amirate, not through any love of power, for this power is, as you will know inherent in our family,” that is the Zayd Hashemites.[131] It was his family who had an

> Intense affection for the two Holy Spots, stirred by the prospect of contamination by enemy interference, of which the only possible consequence, were they left to their own devices, would be the entry of persons, and the treading under-foot of a soil which has remained religiously pure for more than thirteen centuries.[132]

To that effect, after rearticulating the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph’s call for *jihad*, he brought his argument back to the question of obedience by calling all Muslims to “allegiance in the name of the Koran, in the name of the Sultan and of our ancestors, the people of Zeid, who have from time immemorial ruled the Hejaz unchallenged.”[133] By summoning Muslims to allegiance to not only the Koran and the Sultan but also his specific Hashemite household, ‘Ali Haydar leveraged the Zayd-‘Awn rivalry as he denounced Husayn’s actions while re-emphasizing himself as a Hashemite alternative.

---

[131] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing “Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917” 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

[132] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing “Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917” 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

[133] TNA: Kinahan Cornwallis, Director of Arab Bureau, Cairo, to Col. Symes, Cairo, containing “Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic from a Copy Received in Rabigh, January 1917” 15 February 1917 [FO 141/740/1].

The contrast ‘Ali Haydar articulated to distinguish himself from Husayn, bolstered by the need to protect the Holy Cities each in their separate control, and provided a compelling Hashemite alternative for Muslims suspicious of British aims in the region, which had been present from the onset of the Arab Revolt. In this way, ‘Ali Haydar could ultimately portray himself through his Ottomanism as a Muslim anti-colonial figure--though this was language absent in his proclamation. Whereas both Hashemites presented arguments that they alone were defending true Islam, Husayn with his British sponsorship appeared to make gains in the region for his British ally on whose funding and supplies he depended. In his proclamation, ‘Ali Haydar did not hesitate to make this connection. In contrast to Husayn, ‘Ali Haydar represented a fellow Hashemite--from an even older line--who had now been newly appointed the Amir of Mecca by the Sultan and Caliph. Unlike Husayn, he remained loyal to the Ottoman system and sought to defend Medina where the Prophet Muhammad was entombed, from British conquest. The optics of the situation, of two dueling Hashemites each operating from separate Holy Cities, ultimately diluted Husayn’s assertion to exclusive leadership in the Arab and Islamic worlds by virtue of his prophetic ancestry and command of Mecca.

Husayn’s Rhetorical Response

Not controlling Medina threatened Husayn’s discursive claim that he was both a national and religious leader in the Arab--and even Muslim--world based on his lineage and control over Mecca. As long as the Ottomans controlled Medina, with their own loyal Hashemite operating from the city, Husayn’s claims of national and religious sovereignty over the Hijaz and the Arabs seemed rhetorically hollow. Even his British allies dismissed Husayn’s claims to kingship on the

basis that he failed to capture Medina. For example, during the European discussion of Husayn's self-styled title as the King of the Arabs, Colonel Wilson, who was closest to Husayn in Jeddah, remarked that "as it is, I fear that the Proclamation [of Kingship] will be a subject for derision by many, as MEDINA and a large part of the HEDJAZ is [sic] still held by the Turks."[134] These concerns were not limited only among British officials, however. The fate of Medina likewise occupied Husayn, even as his forces under the leadership of Faysal left the Hijaz for Syria after the conquest of Aqaba in July 1917 thereby taking the military center of the Revolt further away from Mecca and the Hijaz towards Damascus.

With a relative in Medina countering his claims to universal sovereignty over the Arabs and religious authority because of his Hashemite lineage, Husayn necessarily had to respond. For that purpose, Husayn relied on the editors and pages of al-Qibla to account for Ottoman control of Medina. For that purpose, frequent articles were written that discussed the political and social situation in Medina. These articles, purportedly based on accounts provided by tribesmen or by Husayn's sons, like 'Ali, who was tasked with besieging the city, reported widespread abuse against the population of Medina. They described Turkish violence against persons and properties, intimidation on the cities inhabitants, and even famine affecting the region. These abuses, according to the editors of *al-Qibla*, accounted for why the population of Medina did not participate in the Arab Revolt. In effect, Turkish oppression had effectively subdued them. In a rhetorical sense, the city became a microcosm of the Arab struggle, typifying the abuses and tyranny that the Arabs as a nation faced against the oppressions of Turanism and provided an example of the future the Arabs faced under Turkish leadership. Discursively, the situation in

[134] BL: Sir. McMahon, Cairo, to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, transmitting despatch dated 31 October 1916 from Colonel Wilson, Jeddah, 9 November 1916 [IOR/L/PS/10/637].

Medina, according to *al-Qibla*, mirrored the situation of the Arabs in Syria and elsewhere still under Ottoman Turkish control.[135] In effect, a distinct impression was left on its readership: Medina remained in Ottoman hands not because its Arab inhabitants were unsupportive of Husayn but because they were terrorized to remain loyal.[136]

Besides propagandizing stories of Turkish aggression against the Arab inhabitants of Medina to account for Ottoman resilience there, Husayn also had another tool with which to use to address the question of Medina: the fact that the Sultan was still being prayed for in mosques in the Hijaz during the *khutbah* or sermon during Friday prayers. In Islamic history, it had become customary to mention the name of the ruling sovereign during the *khutbah*. As such, Islamic history is replete with examples of its contested nature by different political leaders.[137] At the start of the Arab Revolt, the *khutbah* in the Arab world had not essentially changed, but continued to mention the Ottoman sultan. In a letter written shortly after his return from the 1916 pilgrimage, for example, Rashid Rida advised Husayn to remove any mention of the Sultan from the prayers

---

[135] For examples of al-Qiblah's reporting of the situation in Medina, see "Condition of Medina" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 1), 14 August 1916; "On Medina" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 5), 28 August 1916; "Conditions of the Soldiers of Turkey Around Medina" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 8), 7 September 1916; "Concerning Medina" and "Horrors of the Unionists in the Prophet's Mosque (in Medina)" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 20), 23 October 1916; "Solidarity of the Allies and the Future of Medina" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 22), 23-30 October 1916.

[136] Rhetoric aside, the situation in Medina did, however, mirror the general wartime conditions for the Ottoman empire, known collectively in the Arab context as *Seferberlik*, that included faminine, confiscations, and displacement. For descriptions of the seige of Medina, its defense, and its surrender, see Kedourie, Elie, "The Surrender of Medina, January 1919," in *Islam in the Modern World and Other Studies* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), 277–324; S. Tanvir Wasti, "The Defence of Medina, 1916-19"; Martin Strohmeier, "Fakhri (Fahrettin) Paşa and the End of Ottoman Rule in Medina (1916-1919)," *Turkish Historical Review* 4, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 192–223; Alia El Bakri, "'Memories Of The Beloved': Oral Histories From The 1916–19 Siege Of Medina," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 46, no. 4 (2014): 703–18.

[137] A.J. Wensinck, "Khutba," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden; Boston: Brill, n.d.), http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/khutba-SIM_4352. For an in depth study of the *khutbah* from its pre-Islamic to contemporary history, see Tahera Qutbuddin, *Arabic Oration : Art and Function* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2019).

in Mecca, thereby suggesting that even in October the *khutbah* still mentioned the Sultan.[138] Among British officials, they reported many different examples of formulations of prayers to the Sultan that were still in use. In mosques in Egypt, the Hijaz, and in Iraq (Basra), the Ottoman Sultan was mentioned as the caliph, but not by name, but that in Mecca he was only referred to as "Sultan and son of Sultan, Mohammed Rashad" but without reference to the caliphate.[139] These stylings in the Hijaz and Mecca, since the start of the Arab Revolt, nevertheless had also included Sharif Husayn's name during Friday prayers as he was called the "Amir of Mecca and King of Arab countries."[140]

Husayn tied the political and religious authority of the *khutbah* with his propaganda in *al-Qibla* regarding Medina. Beginning with a proclamation published in *al-Qibla* dated in March 5, 1917, Husayn threatened to remove the Ottoman caliph's name entirely from prayers in Mecca and the Hijaz.[141] By doing so, Husayn was encouraging the entire region to not only reject the Sultan's political sovereignty but also his religious authority as caliph. To justify this undoubtedly inevitable decision (considering the fact that Husayn was already rebelling against the Sultan), Husayn used his newspaper's reporting on Medina. That is, he conditioned whether the Sultan stopped his "Turanian" government's actions in Medina that maltreated its inhabitants and even despoiled the tomb of Muhammad on whether the Sultan would be mentioned during the

---

[138] "From al-Shaykh Rashid Rida to King Husayn," in Musa, *Al-Marasalat al-Tarikhiyya, 1914-1918: Al-Thawra al-'arabiyya al-Kubra*, 88–89.

[139] TNA: Percy Cox, Basra, to Reginald Wingate, Cairo, 30 March 1917 and Wingate, Cairo, to Cox, Basra, 9 April 1917 [FO 141/145/3].

[140] TNA: Reginald Wingate, Cairo, to Percy Cox, Basra, 9 April 1917; Reginald Wingate, Cario, to Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, London, 19 January 1918 [FO 141/145/3].

[141] *Al-Qiblah* (no. 58), 5 March 1917.

khutbah.[142] In his proclamations published in *al-Qibla*, Husayn now threatened to remove the Sultan's names from prayers unless Ottoman forces abandoned Medina and surrender the city to the Arabs. By making this conditional threat, one he knew would not be met, Husayn began removing all references to the Sultan while justifying his decision by drawing attention to purported crimes against the residents and sacred sites in Medina.

Once the decision was made to strip references of the Sultan from Friday prayers, it slowly preceded first in Mecca and then in surroundings locales and regions. By the summer of 1917, it had been reported from Wilson in Jeddah that no reference to the Sultan was being made in mosques in Mecca, but that the formulation "May God prolong the life of the Sultan the Protector of the Community and the religion" still appeared in Jeddah.[143] While seemingly erratic, the transition took place in time for the 1917 pilgrimage scheduled for September 26-30, 1917, making it the first pilgrimage where all references of the Ottoman Sultan had been removed. The remaining confusion outside of Mecca was credited to the fact that no prayer formula had been provided, which meant that local mosques continued to vary in their formulations with some referencing the Sultan and others limiting their references to Husayn by name but also mentioning the caliphate.

Thus, after the 1917 pilgrimage ended, Husayn finally issued a standardized *khutbah* to be used throughout the Arab world in January 1918 to standardize a prayer formula that mentioned his name but excluded any reference to the Ottoman Sultan as he had spent a year threatening to do:

---

[142] The question of Turkish violating the tomb of its some of its contents was an issue that Husayn returned to after the Mudros Armistice, where lists of missing relics were prepared both before and after his forces took the city. See TNA: Bassett to Arab Bureau, Cairo, forwarding Sadiq Yahya's Report, 27 May 1919 [FO 882/23].

[143] TNA: Reginald Wingate, Cairo, to Percy Cox, Basra, 18 July 1917 [FO 141/145/3].

> O God, sanctify the souls of *al-mujtahidin* and those who ruled with the truth and those who are working in it. O God, continue your victory and assistance, your protection and security for your servant and sons of your servants the one who is submissive to your grandeur and your majesty, the protector of your blessed town [Mecca] and Medina of his forefather the Lord of the Apostles, the King of the Arab countries and Sherif and Amir of Mecca, the delight of all eyes, our Lord and Master Sharif Husayn--son of our Lord the late Sharif 'Ali son of the late Sharif Muhammad ibn Abdul Muin ibn 'Awn. May God protect him, safeguard him and grant him victory and success. O God, guide him to do all that which will lead to the victory of the country and the people and lead him to do that which you love and what pleases you.
>
> O God, correct the disunion existing amongst the Muslim leaders and destroy the unbelievers and those who have turned innovators, and all those who wish evil for, or fight against the True Muslims in the east (*mushariq al-ard*) and the west (*mugharibiha*).
>
> Amen. O God. Amen.[144]

The prayer served at least two functions: the first was to promote Husayn and represented a political project, being that the Friday *khutbah* had a long legacy in the Islamic world of establishing, mirroring, and disputing religious or political legitimacy. In that regard, Husayn's prayer intended to promote his political and religious vision. In it, Husayn was addressed with both his old and new titles as the Amir of Mecca and the King of the Arabs and all invoked for his success. That success translated into both political and religious project. As a political project, success meant the victory of the "Country and people," that is the victory of the Arabs. Religiously, Husayn's success extended beyond the Arab world but included the broader Islamic world to which he claimed to represent. Alongside the prayer for Husayn, the final invocation called for an end to the religious discord that had emerged between those who denied God, those who instituted innovations into religion, and those who fight against Muslims who opposed irreligion--all implicit references to the un-Islamic practices Husayn blamed the Unionists for instituting at the start of the Arab Revolt. For Husayn's project to be associated with the

[144] "Prayer in the Friday *khutbah*" in *al-Qiblah* (no. 148), 21 January 1918; TNA: Translation enclosed in Reginald Wingate, Cairo to Arthur Balfour, London 31 January 1918 [FO 141/451/3].

reunification of the Islamic world, the prayer revealed how his political project likewise translated into a religious project.

The context of Husayn's prayer, however, placed it within the continued discursive rivalry that had emerged with 'Ali Haydar. Husayn had finally issued the standard prayer after a yearlong ultimatum that threatened to remove the Sultan's name due to his complicity in the purported crimes against the residents and holy sites in Medina. For this reason, the prayer's issuance in the pages of *al-Qibla* was a reaction against 'Ali Haydar's use of Medina to counter Husayn's claims of Islamic and political leadership. Within the prayer, Husayn claimed to be the protector of both Mecca and Medina--despite the fact that even by January 1918, he had failed to capture the second Holy City. His reference to being the protector of Medina would not have made sense absent the fact that he had threatened to remove all references to the Sultan in the Friday prayers unless he intervened against the abuses of his government towards the Prophet's city. For Husayn, his protector status of the city rested ultimately in his defense of the Arab Revolt as the means to end the abuses of the Turkish government against the Arab subjects of the Ottoman state. In this way, then, Husayn hoped to neutralize 'Ali Haydar's use of Medina and his warnings that his 'Awn Meccan rival ushered British domination of the Hijaz.

Finally, the explicit mentions of Husayn's genealogy of 'Awn preeminence to the Amirate of Mecca also placed this new Friday prayer within the Zayd-'Awn rivalry. Within the text of the mandated Friday prayer, Husayn based his authority as protector of both cities and on his prophetic lineage to Muhammad. However, he also countered 'Ali Haydar's emphasis on the legitimacy of the Zayd by highlighting his own Hashemite household. In particular, he mentioned his descent from his father and grandfather. His grandfather, as explored earlier, was the first 'Awn to hold the office of Amir of Mecca and established the 'Awn household's legacy to the Amirate. In this

way, by articulating his ‘Awn lineage, he explicitly associated his current efforts with ‘Awn leadership over the Amirate of Mecca, thereby responding to ‘Ali Haydar’s invocation of the rivalry and insistence of the Zayd household’s legitimacy.

Husayn’s audience reflected his ambitions and augmented the message of his prayer. In the associated *al-Qibla* article, it described how the text of this prayer was to be used in the Hijaz, thus seemingly mandating it to one region. Yet, since *al-Qibla* was disseminated through British networks in Egypt and India, and was often referenced in other propaganda newspapers, it was expected that the new prayer formula to be exported to Arab and other Muslims outside the Hijaz.[145] This consequence confirmed another claim often repeated in Husayn’s proclamations and in articles from his newspaper: that the center of the Islamic world was the Hijaz and what took place in Mecca established the precedence for the rest of the Muslim world. Husayn’s ambitions were not limited to the Hijaz, but he intended the new *khutbah* to be said throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds.

The “Incomplete” Pilgrimage

Through his media campaign in *al-Qibla* and his decision to issue a new text for the Friday prayers that articulated his political and religious project, Husayn attempted to respond to ‘Ali Haydar’s rhetorical use of Medina to undercut Husayn’s claims in Mecca. It is difficult to discern to what extent ‘Ali Haydar’s efforts to promote himself as an alternative Hashemite Amir of Mecca proved effective. In terms of military success, with British aid, the Arab forces made headway

[145] “Prayer in the Friday *khutbah*” in *al-Qiblah* (no. 148), 21 January 1918; TNA: Translation enclosed in Reginald Wingate, Cairo to Arthur Balfour, London 31 January 1918 [FO 141/451/3].

into Syria and even to Aleppo by the time of the signing of the Mudros Armistice on October 30, 1918, which ended hostilities between the Allies (including Husayn) and the Ottomans. In symbolic terms, however, it has been observed that Ottoman propaganda efforts in Syria and Iraq--and Jamal Pasha's change in policies vis-a-vis Arabism--had been successful in stymying public support for Husayn's revolt.[146] In terms of the discursive or rhetorical effects at the time of the Arab Revolt, however, the question becomes more nuanced and difficult to answer. The new Friday prayer formula devised by Husayn, for instance, ended up by June 1918 to be very limited in scope--only being recited in Mecca and its immediate environs. British officials reported that various forms of the Friday prayer in the Hijaz, Yemen, and Iraq still mentioned the Ottoman Sultan.[147]

Another way to evaluate the success of Husayn's rhetorical and symbolic efforts would be to consider the effects of the pilgrimage. For Husayn, the pilgrimage offered him one of the best, most direct ways to promote his message directly to the Arab world (particularly among Egyptian pilgrims) and among Muslims worldwide. As examined earlier, the British and Husayn had different definitions of success when it came to the pilgrimage. For the British, so long as pilgrims were treated well and unaffected by Ottoman pan-Islamist, anti-British propaganda, the pilgrimage was a success. Likewise, for Husayn, a successful pilgrimage entailed the aforementioned goals, but also required that the pilgrimage provided a platform for his political and religious authority: the creation of elite networks, exposed to Husayn's propaganda and authority that could project his standing globally. Materially, a pilgrimage that could replace Husayn's lost Ottoman subsidies

[146] See Çiçek, "Visions of Islamic Unity: A Comparison of Jamal Pasha's al-Sharq and Sharif Husayn's al-Qibla Periodicals."

[147] TNA: Clayton, Arab Bureau, Cairo, to High Commissioner for Egypt, Ramleh, 20 June 1918 [FO 141/451/3].

(now covered by British funding) could offer Husayn a source of revenue in which to act independently. In both these measures, an Ottoman Medina once again thwarted Husayn's goals of promoting his political and religious project among pilgrims.

Although Mecca was the center of the pilgrimage rites and rituals, Medina was also a destination for pilgrims because it housed Muhammad's tomb and mosque as well as the tombs of many revered figures in Islamic history for the Sunni, Sufi, and Shi'i worlds. Without Medina, the pilgrimage was "incomplete" and appeared to dissuade pilgrims, especially richer pilgrims from participating. The issue was first noticed during Husayn's first non-Ottoman sponsored pilgrimage in October 1916. Although hailed as a success by British officials charged with overseeing the pilgrimage for the first time, the pilgrimage did not necessarily represent a success for Husayn. Tangibly, Husayn, in his own words, was overwhelmed by comparatively more destitute pilgrims who took advantage of British subsidies and who relied on Husayn's charity to travel to and reside in Mecca. In one British report it announced that price controls were in place for everything from food, housing, and transport all to the satisfaction of the pilgrims. These price controls, however, limited Husayn's potential for revenue. As a result, he was forced to spend British subsidies in order to make up the difference for guides and vendors. In addition to any price controls, it was also reported that Husayn "was greatly struck with the large numbers of poor in the city. The Sherif distributes 7,000 loaves of bread (bedouin loaves) and £10 in case daily to the poor" all of which buoyed his reputation but cost him money.[148]

[148] TNA: Bray to War Office, 19 October 1916 [FO 882/15/3].

Husayn was fully cognizant of this dilemma that raising his profile among the destitute pilgrims through charity also greatly reduced his income. In an interview on October 4th, he mentioned the issues to the Indian agents who came to report on the pilgrimage:

> [Husayn] asked especially after our comfort and expressed regret that the pilgrimage was a small one. I replied: 'Many Mohammadans are fighting all over the world their affairs have to be looked after by those relations not fighting, on account of the fighting many are nervous to make the venture but after the war I hope you will have the large numbers you are used to.' He said: 'I have the intention of asking the authorities of outside countries not to allow pilgrims to come totally unprovided with money or any means of subsistence, they give endless trouble both to us and the other pilgrims. It is also written in the Koran that the Haj is only compulsory for those that can afford it the poor are excused [sic].[149]

Even the 1916 pilgrimage, lauded as a success for the British, proved disappointing to Husayn because of the fact that the numbers of pilgrims were too few, and those that did arrive were too poor. The Indian reporter rationalized the dilemma by blaming the war which dissuaded pilgrims from attending.[150]

The war was not the only factor, however. After the next pilgrimage season in September 1917, the situation had not improved. In fact, even fewer pilgrims attended. For that, British officials realized that without Medina richer pilgrims refrained from the pilgrimage all together. According to Colonel Cyril Edward Wilson, the chief British official in Jeddah, reported that

> The arrivals of sea via Jeddah-with the exception of those from Suakin-were much less than last year. This was principally due to the scarcity of tonnage but even had the means of passage been available it is doubtful if, *with Medina still in the hands of the Turks*, the Pilgrimage this year would have offered sufficient attraction for the better class of Indians. The who few who came were chiefly of

[149] TNA: Bray to War Office, 19 October 1916 [FO 882/15/3].

[150] The issue of "pauper" pilgrims arriving to the Hijaz had a decades long history and was a product of the globalization of the pilgrimage. With modern transportation and subsidies--particularly European subsidies, the pilgrimage had become more accessible to the impoverished who relied on charity when they arrived. Often, their presence represented a supposed failure of adequately regulating the pilgrimage. See Slight, *The British Empire and the Hajj*, 84–105; Michael Christopher Low, "The Mechanics of Mecca: The Technopolitics of the Late Ottoman Hijaz and the Colonial Hajj" (Ph.D., Columbia University, 2015), 263–83.

> the poorer classes and had little more than their return passage ticket and the bare sum necessary for getting them to Mecca, Arafat and back.
>
> The Javanese...who in pre-war days numbered as many as 25,000 amounted to less than 1,000, and these came from Bombay with the Indians. This is a particular loss to the Hedjaz, as the Javanese pilgrims, who are for the most part affluent, leave a considerable amount of money behind them annually to the benefit of the country generally.[151]

Without Medina and the attraction it afforded as part of a whole pilgrimage that would include a visit to the Prophet's tomb there, richer pilgrims avoided the journey. Besides their absence, those few that did make the journey were poorer and required Husayn's charity--a fact confirmed by Wilson later in his report.[152] The situation did not improve during the 1918 pilgrimage, which was marked by even fewer pilgrims coming from abroad and a surge of Ikhwan, Wahhabi tribesmen who supported ibn Saud, desiring to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.[153]

Absent Medina combined with uncertainty and restrictions of a wartime pilgrimage, the wealthy pilgrims with whom Husayn depended for revenue abstained from making the pilgrimage. Money was always a perpetual concern for Husayn, so the fact that the pilgrimages most likely cost him money did not help him generate his own independent wealth but instead further placed him financially beholden to British subsidies. Besides financial concerns, Husayn no doubt hoped that pilgrims returning from safe, well-managed pilgrimage to Mecca would also raise his profile and reputation in their home countries. For this strategy to be most effective, however, it necessitated wealthier and thus more influential and connected Muslims to make the pilgrimage. With them, Husayn's opportunity to promote himself as King of the Arabs in both a political and

---

[151] Italics added for emphasis, TNA: Cyril Wilson, Jeddah, to Reginald Wingate, Cairo, 27 November 1917 [FO882/15/3].

[152] TNA: Cyril Wilson, Jeddah, to Reginald Wingate, Cairo, 27 November 1917 [FO882/15/3].

[153] For an account of the 1918 pilgrimage and the presence of rival Arab tribesmen in attendance, see Arab Bulletin (no. 104), 24 September 1918; Arab Bulletin (no. 105), 8 October 1918; Arab Bulletin (no. 107), 6 December 1918 [FO 882/27].

religious capacity fell only on impoverished ears thereby minimizing his rhetorical and symbolic impact. Once more, an Ottoman Medina--divorced from Husayn's political and religious project--represented another liability that had prevented him from effectively projecting his political and religious independence.

Conclusion

Despite Husayn's rebellion and adoption of political Arabism, which was articulated in the pages of *al-Qibla*, the upsurge of Arab nationalist sentiments and support that Husayn and his allies had hoped to inspire never came to fruition. During the first six months of the Revolt, Husayn's project struggled to consolidate their gains militarily and to attract supporters from beyond the immediate vicinity of Mecca. Outside the region, Muslims--both Arab and non-Arab--had met news of Husayn's revolt with suspicion. Concerns of Islamic disunity, of the safety to the Holy Cities, and of fears the British intended to expand their colonial presence in the Hijaz tainted Husayn's project for independence. These anxieties were on full display during the 1916 pilgrimage, Husayn's first non-Ottoman subsidized one. Despite British reports and memorandum heralding the pilgrimage a success, the penumbra of their diplomatic records told a different story. Reports of the city inhabitants, interviews with pilgrims, and reports of concerns from Husayn's influential allies (like Rashid Rida) further highlighted the uncertain support for Husayn's project fully displayed at a time when Husayn hoped to raise his profile among the global pilgrims. While not publicly admitted, the 1916 pilgrimage left much to be desired as a political opportunity for Husayn.

Threatened by that anxiety, Husayn had to further adapt his project. His coronation as the King of the Arabs on October 30, 1916, a title and post that never existed in history, promised to

provide Husayn with political and religious legitimacy that his Zayd cousin seemingly denied him. Among the reasons for creating the position, Husayn's son 'Abdullah cited 'Ali Haydar's proclamation as a catalyst for their decision. At his coronation, delegates and deputies representing the Arab peoples, including Syria (represented by Fu'ad al-Khatib, an editor and contributor to *al-Qibla*), pledged their allegiance to Husayn and his family, declared their political independence from the Ottomans, and then recognized Husayn as their "source for religion." The coronation and subsequent *bayʿa* (pledge of allegiance) were not the product of colonial insinuations or impromptu imaginations but was dripped in symbolism. It occurred on the anniversary of his appointment to the Amirate of Mecca and the Islamic New Year, and even mirrored his re-investiture in 1911 but without Ottoman representation. Moreover, the performance and the title filled a specific and strategic need: to confront the challenge his Zayd rival in Medina, the "Specter Amir," represented. Stripped of his title and suspected of European collusion, Husayn needed to take a dramatic step to assert his independence and symbolize his new authority over the Arabs.

Husayn's editors and supporters were quick to clarify the significance of Husayn's coronation in the pages of *al-Qibla*. By creating a title and position that had no antecedent, it was necessary to translate and describe the new title to their readership, both the Arab and the broader Islamic world. Fu'ad al-Khatib, who represented the Syrians, took up that challenge through a clarifying article that explained the "meaning" of the *bayʿa*, and in so doing further tied Husayn's project to political Arabist trends. According to al-Khatib, the coronation had represented the purity of patriotic and nationalist sentiments, which he described using 19th century Arabist discourse like *wataniyya* and *qawmiyya*.

In addition to translating the King of the Arabs as a political Arabist project, Fu'ad al-Khatib also made the position applicable to non-Muslim groups by reminding his readers how the

early Arab Muslim conquerors, like ‘Umar ibn Khuttab, had protected the Christians when the Emperor of Rum (or Constantinople/Istanbul) had threatened them. Furthermore, undoubtedly already casting his sights on Syria with its more diverse population, Fu’ad al-Khatib connected the decision for the creation of the King of the Arabs to the recent Armenian experience in Syria. The violence directed against the Armenians was the same animus now directed at the Arabs. To ensure Arab protection, they need to a King to represent them and to rouse them against the Ottoman Turks who threaten them. This allusion to the Armenians was not an isolated reference, however, as Husayn expressed concern for the Armenians before the outbreak of the Revolt (in April 1916) and continued to advocate for their protection through the conflict with the Ottomans. Husayn’s concern represented the performance of Arab Kingship that looked beyond just the Arab Muslim world but included all groups within the Arab world, non-Muslims and non-Arabs alike.

Against the backdrop of the formulation and performance of the King of the Arabs, however, remained the Specter Amir in Medina. Over the course of the entire war effort (until January 1919), Medina remained in Ottoman hands--though ‘Ali Haydar eventually left the city in January 1917. With thousands of Ottoman forces in Medina under the command of Fahreddin Pasha, during the critical early months of the Arab Revolt, their presence there threatened to undue Husayn’s Revolt. Part of that threat was military, but another aspect of the threat Medina posed as discursive or rhetorical. Medina, because of its strategic and symbolic value (the Prophet Muhammad was entombed there), became a site of the Hashemite household rivalry. ‘Ali Haydar and the Ottomans used their control of the city as a rallying cry against Husayn who they claimed threatened the Prophet’s tomb and would allow the British, a Christian power, control over the holy cities. ‘Ali Haydar likewise couched his defense of the city to the household rivalry, likewise proclaiming that the Zayd were the rightful defenders of the Hijaz.

Realizing Medina was the missing piece to his political claims to Arab and Muslim legitimacy, but militarily unable to take the city, Husayn responded through a rhetorical campaign in the pages of *al-Qibla* that emphasized the Ottoman Turkish violence against the city, the damage the Ottomans did to the holy sites by looting relics. For his writers at *al-Qibla*, the violence directed against the Arab inhabitants of Medina was emblematic of the Arab national struggle for independence. In addition to these articles, Husayn also justified his attempts to excise all references to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph because of the treatment of the Arabs in Medina. Just as his Zayd rival, Husayn likewise couched his rhetorical claims to Medina by emphasizing his household lineage, the ‘Awn.

The cost of never capturing Medina was not just symbolic for Husayn, however. There was a material cost as well as a lost opportunity for Husayn to assert his independence without British mediation. While the wartime pilgrimages posed unique challenges, both for transporting and securing the safety of pilgrims, more difficult of course was attracting pilgrims to undergo the pilgrimage. For Husayn, interested in promoting himself as a national and religious leader, the annual arrival of pilgrims promised an opportunity to elevate his standing, to network among Muslims globally, and to provide a source of independent wealth. However, compounded by wartime, the fact that pilgrims could not visit Medina and the Prophet’s Tomb as part of their pilgrimage rite, dissuaded richer and more influential pilgrims from undergoing the journey. Left were “pauper pilgrims” who took advantage of the subsidies the British offered to visit Mecca about whom Husayn complained since they required her charity during their visit. Husayn himself recognized this dilemma and protested vigorously to the British, hoping they would prevent those financially unfit to travel from arriving. More than just a symbolic cost, Husayn’s failure to capture Medina had a real material and opportunity cost that crippled his political program.

Conclusion

In 1981, the Middle East historian Albert Hourani wrote a review entitled "*The Arab Awakening* Forty Years Later" that analyzed and contextualized George Antonius's famed history of the Arab nationalist movement nearly four decades after its publication.[1] Drawing attention to its literary merit and the impact it had on the political climate when it was first published, Hourani concluded that it was as much "a work of historical narrative, but also of political advocacy" that served as a commentary on the present political situation of the Arab world under colonialism.[2] As a starting point, Antonius's work provided the wellspring of knowledge, wide reading, and political connections that Antonius enjoyed on which future historians could then build. As Hourani went on to describe, subsequent generations of historians have taken up that challenge to build on Antonius' conclusions or to challenge his narratives of events (in particular those pertaining to Palestine or British promises to the Arabs).[3]

One of the shortcomings of *The Arab Awakening* to which Hourani directed our attention was Antonius' failure to recognize the resilient connection the elite families in the cities of the Arab provinces, who were the advocates of Arab nationalism, still maintained with the Ottoman system. According to Hourani, this omission was "indeed one of the most serious defects in Antonius's book."[4] He credited C.E. Dawn for being the first scholar to highlight this defect and to offer a thesis that postulated that Arab nationalism emerged because of an "inter-élite conflict

---

[1] Albert Habib Hourani, "The Arab Awakening Forty Years Later," in *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 193–215.

[2] Hourani, 199.

[3] See Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East.* ([London]: Bowes & Bowes, 1956); Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914-1939*, Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

[4] Hourani, "The Arab Awakening Forty Years Later," 202.

defined in terms of ideologies'" where articulations of Arabism developed not from ingrained ideological sympathies but through families and factions competing for influence.[5] For this reason, Dawn and others concluded that Husayn could not have been an Arabist, considering that he already had a privileged position within the Ottoman system but that he emerged as one in the post-Ottoman Arab Middle East.

While praising Dawn's intervention, Hourani also concluded that Dawn's critique was "a good starting point, but it may be that Dawn's view needs to be further refined."[6] To that end, this project sought to look more intimately at the Hashemite family, as beneficiaries of the Ottoman system through the Amirate of Mecca, in order to track how an internal rivalry among households within an Arab Ottoman family translated into the adoption and promotion of political Arabism. Thus, I looked beyond Dawn's analysis of "inter-élite conflict" to analyze an *intra*-elite conflict. The Hashemites, because of their privileged standing as Amirs of Mecca and descendants of Muhammad, as well as their closeness--if not dependency--to the Ottoman state made them prime examples to consider how internal rivalries *within* an elite family led to the adoption of political Arabism.

My methodological intervention sought to uncover how the rivalry between Hashemite households emerged, evolved, and ultimately split the dynasty between the more senior Zayd household, represented by Sharif 'Ali Haydar from the 'Awn household, led by Sharif Husayn ibn 'Ali who eventually adopted political Arabism that emphasized Islam and the Hashemite role in Arab and Islamic rejuvenation. The catalyst for the ideological bifurcation had been the Hashemite household rivalry for the Amirate of Mecca, the coveted Hashemite position that required

[5] Hourani, 202.

[6] Hourani, 202.

appointment by the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph in Istanbul. That rivalry had emerged as a tool to administer the region in the midst of 19th century Ottoman internal consolidation and centralization that laid the foundation for one of its Hashemite agents that thus led Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali to seek out a new ideology to justify his continued leadership over the Amirate when the traditional avenue of legitimacy was threatened. That legitimacy was first threatened by a shift in Ottoman political leadership, to which the Zayd household was more attuned, and finally when the rival Zayd Hashemite was appointed as the Amirate of Mecca at the start of the Arab Revolt. Thus, the most dramatic expression of the Arab nationalist aspirations, Husayn’s 1916-1919 Arab Revolt and his subsequent self-crowning as the King of the Arabs that promised complete political and religious independence for the Arab nation from the Ottomans, had resulted in part from the intra-household rivalry among the Hashemites.

From the perspective of household rivalries, the Arab Revolt had two fronts: the military and the rhetorical. The military front primarily concerned tribal and armed forces and their subsequent capturing of territory and repelling attacks from Ottoman forces. This front attracted the greatest share of the attention from British advisers and officials who focused on the strategic externalities of the war: the occupation of Ottoman forces and resources away fronts in Palestine or Iraq, where the British entered the fray. As Husayn’s armies--and victories--left the Hijaz and entered Syria, despite not capturing Medina, the direct association of these victories left Husayn and were attached to Faysal, his son who ostensibly fought beneath Husayn’s banner, but whose exploits more accurately resembled the nationalist war for independence that enamored early historians of Arab nationalism. Furthermore, the legend and dramatic exploits of Colonel T.E. Lawrence “of Arabia” that garnered international attention for the Arab Revolt likewise eclipsed

Husayn, whom Lawrence somewhat dismissed in his memoirs the "old man of Mecca."[7] As attention and resources followed Faysal's forces as they entered Syria in July 1917, a shadow was cast on Husayn's role in the Arab Revolt as he remained in Mecca.

In Mecca, Husayn focused on what could be described as the second front, the rhetorical or political. His priority was to convince the world, particularly the Arab and the broader Muslim world of his authority and legitimacy as the King of the Arabs. For his Arabist supporters, to do so amounted to affirming their national independence against the Ottoman Empire--and, increasingly, against European colonial ambitions. For Husayn his attempts to legitimate his political authority in part may have looked towards the future of the region and his place in a post-Ottoman Middle East that he hoped would include expanded territory and perhaps even the caliphate, which he claimed in 1924 after the Ottoman caliphate was destroyed. Amid these ambitions, however, which were yet to be realized, was the more concrete threat that the Specter Amir posed. As this work asserted, Husayn's rhetorical front during the Arab Revolt was directed at neutralizing his Zayd rival's claims, which threatened his immediate project and carried the potential to undermine his future ambitions.

From the perspective of Husayn's rhetorical war, the Arab Revolt looked very different than the gradual--at times dramatic--military victories his forces obtained. As observed in this work and by other historians, the Ottoman propaganda war--which included 'Ali Haydar--proved effective in hindering active Arab support outside the Hijaz for Husayn. This had the effect of limiting Husayn's appeal outside the Arab world by Muslims who feared for the safety and security

[7] T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (London: Penguin Books, 1988), 66. The popular histories of the Arab Revolt focus largely on the legend of Lawrence. For a selection see, James Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 1916-18* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006); Michael Korda, *Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia* (New York: Harper Collins, 2010); Scott Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, First edition. (New York: Doubleday, 2013). For an Arab critique of T.E. Lawrence, see Sulayman Musa, *T.E. Lawrence: An Arab View* (London: Oxford U.P., 1966).

of the Holy Cities from damage or European encroachment. When analyzing Husayn's attempts to respond against Ottoman propaganda, the presence of his Zayd rival in Medina factored heavily in his responses, revealing the extent to which the presence of an alternative Hashemite Amir threatened Husayn's plans. As this project explored, Husayn attempted to use whatever rhetorical tools at his disposal, such as *al-Qibla*, the Friday *khutbah*, and even the annual pilgrimage to elevate his message. This message was not only aimed to elevate his political standing but also to weaken the threat his Zayd rival posed.

Moreover, unexamined here, were the revelations made during the Arab Revolt, like the details of competing promises like the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) between Britain and France to divide Syria and Iraq or the Balfour Declaration (1917) that promised the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine which also weakened Husayn's rhetorical project. Among his allies, including the British but also influential Islamic Arabists like Rashid Rida, Husayn's emerging conflict with Ibn Sa'ud in the Nejd which translated into Husayn's politicizing the pilgrimage to keep Sa'udi supporters from Mecca and then led to open conflict over the Khurma Oasis in 1919 also weakened Husayn's claims to represent the Arab world. In this way, the notion that British colonial interests exclusively determined the political trajectory of the Arabian Peninsula becomes overstated. While involved and applying pressure, internal dynamics within the region—whether tribal or dynastic in the case of the Hashemites—likewise affected the region's development.

Although this project does not explore these non-Hashemite household factors to Husayn's political program, by re-emphasizing the intra-Hashemite conflict, a new path of inquiry is opened. For example, since Husayn's motivations for adopting political Arabism rested on confronting and addressing a rival Hashemite threat, and not necessarily a philosophical alliance to Arabism, then when that threat was neutralized with the Ottoman defeat and subsequent dismantling, he

necessarily had to redefine his project again. Without the Hashemite household rivalry motivating his adoption of the Arabist ideology, he no longer had the Hashemite paradigm for him to comprehend Arabism, which had become a tool to defend his household's dominance. In a sense, without that rivalry with the Zayd, Arabism did not have meaning for Husayn. With this in mind, Husayn's Arabism during the Revolt necessarily was expressed differently after the Revolt to account for the absence of a Hashemite rival and the emerging weight of the colonial realities and the rise of the Sa'udi threat that eventually captured the Hijaz in 1924 and ended Hashemite control there. Husayn's failure to secure continued Arabist support after the war among his Arabist allies in Syria and Egypt may not have just been a consequence of his allies' disappointment with his leadership, but also his inability to persuasively perform Arabism without a Hashemite rival and then again without controlling the Holy Cities in the Hijaz.

Furthermore, while the Zayd branch as a Hashemite threat faded into the background of history as Husayn and his sons arose in prominence, the fact that an intra-Hashemite had affected their political evolution opened the possibility of seeing its effects elsewhere: for instance, when Husayn and his sons, most notably 'Abdullah and Faysal, left the Hijaz to establish dynasties for themselves first in Syria, then in Iraq and Transjordan. Instead of seeing these figures, now the exclusive faces of the Hashemite family as one unit, they, too, may have evolved into semi-differentiated households as each member cultivated their own sources of patronage, support, and allies to ensure their post-Ottoman prospects. Thus considering how Arabism factored into their father's discourse during an intra-Hashemite conflict, the same could be true for the sons as they sought to legitimate their separate political projects on the basis of continuing their father's project, deviating from it, or offering a different ideology entirely.[8] Just as Arabism did not represent just

[8] Recent work examining the constellation of figures that surrounded Faysal in Syria and Iraq, and then 'Abdullah at the creation of Transjordan and later during his bid for the "Greater Syria" project testified to multi-faceted ways

one ideology, as a tool, it too may have been expressed differently among the other, future Hashemites to support their personal interests.

In reflecting on this project and considering possible avenues for future analysis, this project has sought to accomplish two integral tasks for enriching our understanding of a region in transition. The first was to complicate the Hashemite family. Instead of considering them a unified body, indisputably led by Husayn ibn ‘Ali who had emerged as the Amir of Mecca, the family actually exhibited more texture: rival households, disputed claims, and different ideologies. These facets of the Hashemite dynasty did not exist ancillary to the political challenges Husayn faced as the Ottoman Amir of Mecca and through his decision to launch the Arab Revolt, but had in fact informed and guided his actions. Likewise, Arabism (in various forms) represented more than just a political ideology or program, but was also a strategy. In the midst of the Hashemite household rivalry between the Zayd and the ‘Awn, it became Husayn’s strategy to justify his independent action and to confront his internal Hashemite rival. For this reason, in order to comprehend the full effects of Arabism as a political project, it is not enough to understand its ideological contours or thinkers. It is essential to understand why and how it is wielded as an instrument of power.

Hashemite Arabism became translated, transmuted, or distorted based on the political context facing the Hashemite family. For example, see Y. Porath, “Abdallah’s Greater Syria Programme,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 2 (April 1, 1984): 172–89; Elizabeth Thompson, “Rashid Rida and the 1920 Syrian-Arab Constitution: How the French Mandate Undermined Islamic Liberalism,” in *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates*, ed. Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2015), 244–54.

Appendices

Appendix I: Hashemite Households, Zayd and ‘Awn



Appendix II: ‘Awn Amirs of Mecca from among the Hashemites

With order by succession numerically marked
(Years as Amir of Mecca in parentheses)



Based off the chart from MH 1/3 from the National Library of Jordan in Amman, Jordan. In horizontal siblings, from left to right, order is presented based on age. In vertical siblings, from top to bottom, age is listed in declining order.

Appendix III: Amirs of Mecca in the 19th and 20th Centuries

- 1816	Ghalib ibn Massad	Zayd
1816 - 1827	Yahya ibn Surur	Zayd
1827	Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib	Zayd
1827 - 1851	Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Muin	‘Awn
1851 - 1856	‘Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib	Zayd
1856 - 1858	Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Muin	‘Awn
1858 - 1877	‘Abdullah ibn Muhammad	‘Awn
1877 - 1880	Husayn ibn Muhammad	‘Awn
1880 - 1882	‘Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib	Zayd
1882 - 1905	‘Awn al-Rafiq ibn Muhammad	‘Awn
1905 - 1908	‘Ali ibn ‘Abdullah	‘Awn
1908	‘Abd al-Ilah ibn Muhammad	‘Awn
1908 - 1916	Husayn ibn ‘Ali	‘Awn
1916-	‘Ali Haydar ibn Jabir (ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib)	Zayd

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives

The National Archives (TNA) at Kew, London, United Kingdom

FO 78: Foreign Office and predecessor: Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, Ottoman Empire
/3131; /3415; /3532; /4493

FO 141: Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Embassy and Consulates, Egypt, General Correspondence, 1815-1973.
/145; /451; /461; /679; /682; /740; /817

FO 195: Foreign Office. Embassy and Consulates, Turkey (formerly Ottoman Empire), General Correspondence, 1808-1962.
/1313; /1415; /1767; /2061; /2174; /2198; /2224; /2286; /2320; /2376

FO 198: Southern Department and Foreign Office. Embassy and Consulates, Turkey (formerly Ottoman Empire), 1775-1944
/2286

FO 686: Foreign Office. Jeddah Agency, 1913-1925
/11; /33

FO 882: Foreign Office. Arab Bureau, Correspondence and Reports, 1911-1920.
/4; /5; /15; /23; /25; /27

The British Library (BL), London, United Kingdom

IOR/L/PS/10/637

IOR/L/PS/11/113

IOR/L/MIL/17/16/12

IOR/L/PS/18/B222

IOR/L/PS/18/B235

The National Library of Jordan (NLJ), Amman, Jordan

M-H-1: 1-4

M-KH-109

Periodicals

al-Qibla (Mecca)
al-Manar (Cairo)

Unpublished Dissertations

Low, Michael Christopher. “The Mechanics of Mecca: The Technopolitics of the Late Ottoman Hijaz and the Colonial Hajj.” Ph.D., Columbia University, 2015.

Rizvi, Sayyid Muhammad. “Muhib Al-Din al-Khatib: A Portrait of a Salafi-Arabist (1886-1969).” MA, Simon Fraser University, 1991.

Rudd, Jeffery. “Abdallah Bin Al-Husayn: The Making of an Arab Political Leader, 1908-1921.” D.Phil., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1993.

Stebbins, H. L. "British Consuls and “local” Imperialism in Iran, 1889-1921." Ph.D. The University of Chicago, 2009.

Published Primary and Secondary Sources

A.J. Wensinck. "Khutba." In *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*. Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leiden; Boston: Brill, n.d. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/khutba-SIM_4352.

Akarli, Engin Deniz. "Abdulhamid II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System." In *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social, and Economic Transformation*, by David Kushner. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1986.

Akin, Yigit. *When the War Came Home : The Ottomans' Great War and the Devastation of an Empire*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018.

Aksakal, Mustafa. "Not 'by Those Old Books of International Law, but Only by War': Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 507–44.

———. "The Limits of Diplomacy: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, no. 2 (2011): 197–203.

Al-Amr, Saleh Muhammad. *The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914: Ottoman Vali, the Sharif of Mecca, and the Growth of British Influence*. Riyad University Publications, 1978.

"al-Sharif Husayn Hafaẓu 'ala al-Arman kama Tuhafaẓun 'ala Anfaskum." *Jarida al-Dustur*. April 25, 2016. https://www.addustour.com/articles/38391.

Anderson, Scott. *Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. First edition. New York: Doubleday, 2013.

Anscombe, Frederick F. *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar*. Columbia University Press, 1997.

Antonius, George. *The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab National Movement*. London: H. Hamilton, 1938.

Ayalon, Ami. "Malik in Modern Middle Eastern Titulature." *Die Welt Des Islams* 23/24 (1984): 306–19.

———. *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Baker, Randall. *King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz*. Cambridge: Oleander Press, 1989.

Balland, Muhammad. "Condemnation of the Adana Massacre (1909) by Shaykh al-Azhar Salim al-Bishri (d. 1916)." *Ballandalus* (blog), April 22, 2015. https://ballandalus.wordpress.com/2015/04/22/condemnation-of-the-adana-massacre-1909-by-shaykh-al-azhar-salim-al-bishri-d-1916/.

———. "Fa'iz al-Ghusein (1883-1968): An Arab Eye-Witness to the Armenian Genocide."

Ballandalus (blog), April 24, 2015. https://ballandalus.wordpress.com/2015/04/24/faiz-al-ghusein-1883-1968-an-arab-eye-witness-to-the-armenian-genocide/.

Bang, Anne K. *The Idrisi State in 'Asir, 1906-1934: Politics, Religion and Personal Prestige as Statebuilding Factors in Early Twentieth-Century Arabia*. Bergen: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1996.

Barnes, John Robert. *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986.

Barr, James. *Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 1916-18*. London: Bloomsbury, 2006.

Bashkin, Orit. "My Sister Esther: Reflections on Judaism, Ottomanism, and the Empire of Egypt in the Works of Farah Antun." In *The Long 1890s in Egypt: Colonial Quiescence, Subterranean Resistance*, edited by Marilyn Booth and Anthony Gorman. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014.

Buskens, Léon. "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, 'Holy War' and Colonial Concerns." In *Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje's "Holy War Made in Germany,"* edited by E.J. Zürcher, 29–52. Debates on Islam and Society. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016.

Cheterian, Vicken. *Open Wounds: Armenians, Turks and a Century of Genocide*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Choueiri, Youssef M. *Arab Nationalism, a History : Nation and State in the Arab World*. Oxford ; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000.

Çiçek, M. Talha. "Negotiating Power and Authority in the Desert: The Arab Bedouin and the Limits of the Ottoman State in Hijaz, 1840–1908." *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no. 2 (March 3, 2016): 260–79.

———. "The Tribal Partners of Empire in Arabia: The Ottomans and the Rashidis of Najd, 1880–1918." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 56 (2017): 105–30.

———. "Visions of Islamic Unity: A Comparison of Jamal Pasha's al-Sharq and Sharif Husayn's al-Qibla Periodicals." *Die Welt Des Islams* 54, no. 3–4 (2014).

———. *War and State Formation in Syria : Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917*. London: Routledge, 2016.

Cleveland, William L. *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' al-Husri*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971.

———. "The Role of Islam as Political Ideology in the First World War." In *National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie*, edited by Edward Ingram, 84–101. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 1986.

Dawn, C. Ernest. *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*.

University of Illinois Press, 1973.

———. “From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology.” *The Review of Politics* 23, no. 3 (July 1, 1961): 378–400.

De Jong, F. “The Proclamation of Al-Husayn b. ‘Ali and ‘Ali Haydar” 57 (1980): 281–87.

Deringil, Selim. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*. New ed. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011.

Deuchar, Hannah Scott. “‘Nahda’: Mapping a Keyword in Cultural Discourse.” *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics*, no. 37 (2017): 50–84.

Dickson, H. R. P. *Kuwait and Her Neighbours.* London: Allen & Unwin, 1956.

Pasha, Jamal. *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919.* New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922.

Eickelman, Dale F., and James P. Piscatori, eds. *Muslim Travellers : Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination*. Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1990.

El Bakri, Alia. “‘Memories of the Beloved’: Oral Histories from the 1916–19 Siege of Medina.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 46, no. 4 (2014): 703–18.

El-Ariss, Tarek. *The Arab Renaissance: A Bilingual Anthology of the Nahda*. Texts and Translations. New York: Modern Language Association of America, 2018.

Erickson, Edward J. *Ordered to Die : A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001.

———. “The Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy, 1915.” *War in History* 15, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 141–67.

Fawaz, Kulayb Sa’ud al-. *Al-Marsalat al-Matabadala Bayna al-Sharif al-Husayn Bin ‘Ali Wa al-’Uthmaniyin: 1908-1918*. Amman: Wizarat al-Thaqafah, 1997.

Fawaz, Leila Tarazi. *A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War*. Harvard University Press, 2014.

Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. Henry Holt and Company, 2001.

Gaury, Gerald de. *Rulers of Mecca*. London: Harrap, 1951.

Gelvin, James L. *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

Gershoni, Israel, and James P Jankowski. *Commemorating the Nation: Collective Memory, Public Commemoration, and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Egypt*. Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2004.

Ghazal, Amal N. “Power, Arabism and Islam in the Writings of Muhib al-Din al-Khatib in al-Fath.” *Past Imperfect* 6 (1997): 133–50.

Ghusayn, Fa’iz. *Martyred Armenia*. London: C. A. Pearson, Ltd., 1917.

Goldberg, Jacob. “The 1914 Saudi-Ottoman Treaty — Myth or Reality?” *Journal of Contemporary History* 19, no. 2 (April 1, 1984): 289–314.

Graves, Philip P. *Memoirs of King ‘Abdullah of Transjordan*. Jonathan Cape, 1950.

Haidar, Musbah. *Arabesque*. London: Hutchinson, 1945.

Haim, Sylvia. *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962.

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton University Press, 2010.

———. *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*. Oxford University Press, 2001.

Hanssen, Jens, and Max Weiss, eds. *Arabic Thought beyond the Liberal Age : Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Hathaway, Jane, and Karl K. Barbir. *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800*. 1st ed. Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2008.

Herb, Michael. *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies*. New York: SUNY Press, 1999.

Hourani, Albert. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939*. Cambridge University Press, 1983.

———. “The Arab Awakening Forty Years Later.” In *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, 193–215. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.

Iaybash, Yusuf, ed. *Rihlat Al-Imam Muhammad Rashid Rida*. Beirut: al-mu’ssat al-’Arabiyya lil-Darasat wa al-Nashr, 1971.

Ibn Husayn, ‘Abdullah. *Mudhakkarti*. Amman: Maktabah al-Ahliyya, 1998.

Ismail Kemal Bey. *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey*. Edited by Sommerville Story. London: Constable, 1920.

Jacobson, Abigail. *From Empire to Empire : Jerusalem between Ottoman and British Rule*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2011.

Kalisman, Hilary Falb. “The Little Persian Agent in Palestine: Husayn Ruhi, British Intelligence, and World War I.” *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 66 (2016): 65–74.

Kane, Eileen. *Russian Hajj: Empire and the Pilgrimage to Mecca*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 2015.

Karateke, Hakan T. “Who Is the Next Ottoman Sultan? Attempts to Change the Rule of Succession during the Nineteenth Century.” In *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration*, edited by Butrus Abu Mannah, Itzchak Weismann, and Fruma Zachs, 37–53. London: I.B.Tauris, 2005.

Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Karsh. *Empires of the Sand : The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.

———. “Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 33, no. 2 (1997): 267–312.

Kayalı, Hasan. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*. University of California Press, 1997.

Kazem Zadeh, Hossein. “Relation d’un Pèlerinage a La Mecque En 1910-1911.” *Revue Du Monde Musulman* 19 (1912): 144–227.

Kedourie, Elie. *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*. London: Cass, 1974.

———. *England and the Middle East.* [London]: Bowes & Bowes, 1956.

———. *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914-1939*. Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

———. “The Surrender of Medina, January 1919.” In *Islam in the Modern World and Other Studies*, 277–324. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980.

Kerr, M.H. *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1966.

Khalidi, Rashid. *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*. Columbia University Press, 2013.

———. ed. *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Khalidi, Rashid, and C. Ernest Dawn, eds. “The Origins of Arab Nationalism.” In *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, 3–30. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Khoury, Philip S. *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*. Cambridge Middle East Library. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Klein, Janet. *The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Korda, Michael. *Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia*. New York: Harper Collins, 2010.

Kostiner, Joseph. *The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State*. Oxford University Press, 1993.

Lawrence, T. E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*. London: Penguin Books, 1988.

Leeuwen, Richard van. "Islamic Reformism and Pilgrimage: The Hajj of Rashid Rida in 1916." In *Hajj : Global Interactions Through Pilgrimage*, edited by Luitgard E. M. Mols and Marjo Buitelaar, 83–93. Mededelingen Van Het Rijksmuseum Voor Volkenkunde, Leiden. Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2015.

Lovejoy, Paul E. "Autobiography and Memory: Gustavus Vassa, Alias Olaudah Equiano, the African." *Slavery & Abolition* 27, no. 3 (December 1, 2006): 317–47.

Lüdke, Tilman. "(Not) Using Political Islam: The German Empire and Its Failed Propaganda Campaign in the Near and Middle East, 1914–1918 and Beyond." In *Jihad and Islam in World War I*, edited by E.J. Zürcher, 71–94. Debates on Islam and Society. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016.

Makdisi, Ussama. "Ottoman Orientalism." *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 1, 2002): 768–96.

Maksudyan, Nazan. *Women and the City, Women in the City: A Gendered Perspective on Ottoman Urban History*. New York: Berghahn Book, 2014.

Masters, Bruce. *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516–1918: A Social and Cultural History*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Matossian, Bedross Der. *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Stanford University Press, 2014.

McMeekin, Sean. *The Ottoman Endgame : War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923*. New York, New York: Penguin Press, 2015.

Minawi, Mostafa. "Beyond Rhetoric: Reassessing Bedouin-Ottoman Relations along the Route of the Hijaz Telegraph Line at the End of the Nineteenth Century." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 58, no. 1–2 (2015).

Minawi, Mostafa Minawi. *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz* |Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016.

Mumini, Nidal Dawud al-. *al-Sharif al-Husayn ibn 'Ali wa al-khilafah*. 'Amman: al-Matba'ah as-Safadi, 1996.

Musa, Sulayman. *al-Harakah al-'Arabiyah: sirat al-Marhalah al-ula lil-Nahdah al-'Arabiyah al-Hadithah, 1908-1924*. 'Amman: Dar al-Ward, 2013.

———. *Al-Marasalat al-Tarikhiyya, 1914-1918: Al-Thawra al-'arabiyya al-Kubra*. Amman, Jordan: Sulayman Musa, 1973.

———. ed. *Al-Thawra al-Arabiyya al-Kubra: Watha'iq Wa Asanid*. Amman: Da'ira al-thaqafa

wa al-fanun, 1966.

———. *T.E. Lawrence: An Arab View*. London: Oxford U.P., 1966.

———. *Thawrah Al-'Arabiyah al-Kubra : Al-Harb Fi al-Hijaz, 1916-1918*. Tab'ah 1. 'Amman: S. Musa, 1989.

———. ed. *Wujuh Wa Malamih*. Amman: Da'ira al-thaqafa wa al-Shabab, 1980.

Nevo, Joseph. "'Abdullah's Memoirs as Historical Source Material." In *The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World: Essays in Honour of the Late Professor Uriel Dann*, edited by Uriel Dann, Aryeh Shmuelevitz, and Asher Susser. Routledge, 2013.

Ochsenwald, William. "Ironic Origins: Arab Nationalism in the Hijaz, 1882-1914." In *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, edited by Rashid Khalidi, 189–203. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

———. *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984.

———. *The Hijaz Railroad: A Study in Ottoman Political Capacity and Autonomy*. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1980.

Paddock, Troy R. E., ed. *World War I and Propaganda*. Leiden: Brill, 2014.

Parsons, Laila. *Commander: Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the Fight for Arab Independence 1914-1948*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016.

Peters, F. E. *Mecca: A Literary History of the Muslim Holy Land*. Princeton University Press, 2017.

Porath, Y. "Abdallah's Greater Syria Programme." *Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 2 (April 1, 1984): 172–89.

Prasad, Yuvraj Deva. "Indian Muslims And The Arab Revolt." *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* 34 (1973): 32–37.

Provence, Michael. *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Prüfer, Curt. *Germany's Covert War in the Middle East: Espionage, Propaganda and Diplomacy in World War I*. Translated by Kevin Morrow. 20171211. London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2018.

al-Qattan, Najwa. "Safarbarlik: Ottoman Syria and the Great War." In *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon*, edited by Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann, 163–74. Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 2004.

Qutbuddin, Tahera. *Arabic Oration : Art and Function*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2019.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi. *Politics in An Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Saudi Arabia*. I.B.Tauris,

1997.

———. *A History of Saudi Arabia*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Reynolds, Michael A. *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918*. Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Rogan, Eugene. *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East*. Basic Books, 2015.

Rogan, Eugene L. "Aşiret Mektebi: 'Abd al-Hamid II's School for Tribes (1892–1907)." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 01 (February 1996): 83–107.

———. *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

———. *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East*. New York, NY: Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group, 2015.

Ruhi, Husayn. *Min Watha'iq al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kurab: Al-Rihala al-Rabi'a*. Edited by Salah Jarrar. Amman: n.p., 1997.

S. Tanvir Wasti. "The Defence of Medina, 1916-19." *Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 4 (1991): 642–53.

Sa'id, Amin. *Al-Thawrah al-'Arabiyah al-Kubra, Tarikh Mufassal Jami' Lil-Qadiyah al-'Arabiyah Fi Rub' Qarn*. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Misr: Matba'at 'Isá al-Babi al-Halabi, 1934.

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. 1st Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

Sassounian, Harut. *The Armenian Genocide: Documents and Declarations, 1915-1995*. Glendale: 80th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide Commemorative Committee, 1995.

Slight, John. *The British Empire and the Hajj: 1865-1956*. Harvard University Press, 2015.

Slot, B. *Mubarak Al-Sabah: Founder of Modern Kuwait 1896-1915*. Arabian, 2005.

Stitt, George Marquis Stewart. *A Prince of Arabia, the Emir Shereef 'Ali Haider*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1948.

Storrs, Ronald. *The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs*. New York: Putnam, 1937.

Strohmeier, Martin. "Fakhri (Fahrettin) Paşa and the End of Ottoman Rule in Medina (1916-1919)." *Turkish Historical Review* 4, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 192–223.

Subul, Khalid. *al-Hashimiyun: min hukm al-imarah al-'Uthmaniyah ilá ta'sis al-mamalik al-'Arabiyah*. Al-Tab'ah al-'Arabiyah 1. Tarikh. 'Amman: al-Ahliyah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi', 2011.

Tamari, Salim. *Year of the Locust: A Soldier's Diary and the Erasure of Palestine's Ottoman*

Past. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

Tauber, Eliezer. "Rashid Rida as Pan-Arabist before World War I." *The Muslim World* 79, no. 2 (April 1989): 102–12.

———. *The Arab Movements in World War I*. London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1993.

———. *The Emergence of the Arab Movements*. London: F. Cass, 1993.

Teitelbaum, Joshua. "Sharif Husayn Ibn 'Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman Order: From Chieftaincy to Suzerainty." *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 1 (1998): 103–22.

———. "The Man Who Would Be Caliph." In *Jihad and Islam in World War I*, edited by E.J. Zürcher, 275–304. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016.

———. *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia*. London: Hurst & Company, 2001.

Tell, Tariq. "Guns, Gold, and Grain: War and Food Supply in the Making of Transjordan." In *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East*, edited by Steven Heydemann, 33–58. Berkeley, Calif.: Regents of the University of California, 2003.

"Textes Historiques Sur Le Réveil Arabe Au Hedjaz." *Revue Du Monde Musulman* 46 (Autumn 1921): 1–24.

Thompson, Elizabeth. *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon*. Columbia University Press, 2013.

———. "Rashid Rida and the 1920 Syrian-Arab Constitution: How the French Mandate Undermined Islamic Liberalism." In *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates*, edited by Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan, 244–54. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2015.

Walker, Philip. *Behind the Lawrence Legend: The Forgotten Few Who Shaped the Arab Revolt*. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Westrate, Bruce. *The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992.

Wien, Peter. *Arab Nationalism: The Politics of History and Culture in the Modern Middle East*. New York: Routledge, 2017.

———. "Preface: Relocating Arab Nationalism." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 2 (2011): 203–4.

Wilson, Mary Christina. *King 'Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*. Cambridge University Press, 1990.

———. "The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism." In *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, edited by Rashid Khalidi, 204–21. New York: Columbia University Press,

1991.

Zeine, Zeine N. *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism; with a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East*. [3d ed.]. Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1973.