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Mamluk Elite on the Eve of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's Death (1341): A Look behind the Scenes of Mamluk Politics

When God made the morning rise and the muezzin announced the hour of prayer, the amir Sayf al-Dīn Qawṣūn left his house with a large retinue of his followers and sat down at his gate, thinking about the loss of his king and *ustādh* which had befallen him. After an hour, the amir Sayf al-Dīn Bashtak left [his house] with some of his companions. The amir Qawṣūn stood up, quickly walked over to him, and met him on the road. He embraced him, wept, and consoled him over his sultan, the like of which time will never ever allow again. After an hour, the sultan's mamluks came out [of their barracks] and the amir Sayf al-Dīn Qawṣūn consoled them over their master, whereupon they sat down for a moment. Then, the gate of the Citadel was opened and out came the *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs, like Yalbughā, al-Ḥijāzī, al-Māridānī, Aqṣunqur, and another, while they were weeping and mourning, and the amirs Qawṣūn and Bashtak consoled them. Then they [all] asked for the veteran amirs, so these entered [the Citadel, came] to them and were informed of the death of the sultan. Then, they [all] wept and they asked [the veterans'] advice on whom to appoint over them. But al-Aḥmadī said: "You, you haven't buried the sultan yet and you are already arguing. Have you forgotten what has been decreed to you and [have you forgotten] the oaths you have sworn? By God, you are not to appoint anyone but his son Abū Bakr; if not, [I swear that I will fight until] my white hair will be colored by my blood and my head will fly from my body." But the amir Sayf al-Dīn Qawṣūn told him: "O lord Rukn al-Dīn, don't be angry; [I swear] we will decapitate anyone who disagrees." And Bashtak said to them: "Whoever disagrees with me will have to make the effort to join us in our agreement to the rule of the son of our *ustādh* [or he will be eliminated]." So the *khāṣṣakīyah*, the mamluks of the sultan, and the *muqaddams alf* all left to fetch the amir Abū Bakr. They brought him, made him sit on the royal throne in the *īwān* and the army

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came by, kissing the ground before him. Then he was given the royal epithet "al-Malik al-Manşūr." Everyone's mind was set at rest and, thank God, contrary to what the people had been thinking, nothing [bad] happened and the issue ended well.¹

This very visual and dramatic picture of the first reactions to the demise of al-Malik al-Nāşir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn (r. 1293–94; 1299–1309; 1310–41) reveals the names of some members of his socio-political elite of the highest-ranking amirs of one hundred at the end of his reign. As highly unlikely as the actual scene may be, it hints not just at the identity of these individuals, but also at the nature of their relationship with the sultan and with each other (some are inside the Citadel, others not; some take counsel on the succession, others give counsel; some take the lead through these events, others follow, etc.). As such, this story, to a certain degree, reflects the approach that will be taken in this article to establish the nature and identity of this Mamluk elite in its most consolidated form, i.e., at the very end of one of the Mamluk empire's longest, most prosperous, and most successful sultanic reigns.

Indeed, this article's central purpose is to identify and define this elite of highest-ranking amirs at al-Nāşir Muḥammad's court. And as it happens, we are very fortunate to have a list of all the amirs that held the highest military rank—that of amir of one hundred—at the time of al-Nāşir Muḥammad's death in June, 1341, left to us by the obscure historian Shams al-Dīn al-Shujā'ī (d. ca. 1354):

There were twenty-five *muqaddams alf* in Egypt on the day of his death: Badr al-Dīn Jankalī ibn al-Bābā, *al-ḥājj* Almalik, Baybars al-Aḥmadī, 'Alam al-Dīn Sanjar al-Jāwulī, Sayf al-Dīn Kūkāy, Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd Wazīr Baghdād—these are the senior outsiders (*barrānīyah kibār*); the rest are his mamluks and intimates: his son Abū Bakr, Qawşūn, Bashtak, Ṭuquzdamur, Aqbughā 'Abd al-Wāhid, Aydughmish, the *amīr ākhūr*, Quṭlūbughā al-Fakhrī, Yalbughā al-Yaḥyāwī, Maliktamur al-Ḥijāzī, Alṭūnbughā al-Māridānī, Bahādur al-Nāşirī, Aqsunqur al-Nāşirī, Qumārī al-Kabīr, Qumārī, the *amīr shikār*, Ṭurghāy, Aranbughā, the *amīr jāndār*, Barsbughā, the *ḥājib*, Bulrughā ibn al-'Ajūz, the *amīr silāḥ*, and Baygharā."²

¹Shams al-Dīn al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh al-Malik al-Nāşir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn al-Şālihī wa-Awlādihī*, ed. B. Schäfer as *Die Chronik Aş-Şuġa'is*, Quellen zur Geschichte des Islamischen Ägyptens, vol. 2a (Wiesbaden, 1977), 1:107.

²Ibid., 111–12. For the individual identification of each of these amirs, see the appendix to this



His son and successor Abū Bakr excepted, these twenty-four individuals were indeed the political and military elite at the end of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's regime, many of whom were to play significant roles in socio-political life in years to come. Rather than dealing with each one of them individually, the approach chosen to engage the issue of their identity and socio-political role (Who were they? What did they do?) in this article is their interaction with their "king," "ustādh," "master," or "sultan." This study will also attempt to establish whether such an analysis of this elite might allow for a behind-the-scenes look at Mamluk political culture at al-Nāṣir's court³ and hence, narrow the wide spectrum of characterizations so far given to al-Nāṣir's rule, from ruthlessly enforced

article. For references to this list, see also Winslow W. Clifford, "State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamluk Syro-Egypt, 648–741 A.H./1250–1340 C.E.," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1995, 262; Mounira Chapoutot-Remadi, "Liens et Relations au sein de l'Élite Mamluke sous les Premiers Sultans Bahrides, 648/1250–741/1341," Ph.D. diss., Aix-en-Provence, 1993, 604–5.

³On the correlation between such interaction, politics, and authority in the Mamluk state, also defined as patronage, household politics, or even factionalism, see also Reuven Amitai-Preiss, "The Mamluk Officer Class during the Reign of Sultan Baybars," in *War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Centuries*, ed. Yaacov Lev, The Medieval Mediterranean: Peoples, Economies and Cultures, vol. 9 (Leiden, 1997), 275; Chapoutot-Remadi, "Liens et Relations," 65; idem, "Liens propres et identités séparées chez les Mamelouks Bahrides," in *Valeur et distance: Identités et sociétés en Egypte*, ed. Chr. Décobert, Collection de l'atelier méditerranéen (Paris, 2000), 179–180; Clifford, "State Formation," 5–6, 47, 65, 244–45, 272; Robert Irwin, "Factions in Medieval Islam," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1986): 228; Amalia Levanoni, "The Consolidation of Aybak's Rule: An Example of Factionalism in the Mamluk State," *Der Islam* 71 (1994): 252; idem, "The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26 (1994): 374–75. A number of studies have already noted the existence of one or more such relationships, never however exhaustively with respect to this specific episode and the elite of amirs involved (see Amalia Levanoni, *A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn, 1310–1341*, Islamic History and Civilization, Studies and Texts, vol. 10 [Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1995], esp. 28–60; Chapoutot-Remadi, "Liens et Relations," esp. 67, 604–6; idem, "Liens propres et identités séparées," 175–88; Peter M. Holt, "Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn [684–741/1285–1341]: His Ancestry, Kindred and Affinity," in *Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras*, ed. U. Vermeulen and D. De Smet, *Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta*, vol. 73 [Leuven, 1995], esp. 319–23; D. S. Richards, "Mamluk Amirs and Their Families and Households," in *The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society*, ed. Th. Philipp and U. Haarmann [Cambridge, 1988], 32–40).



authoritarianism⁴ to spendthrift monarchism⁵ to well-balanced oligarchism.⁶

It will be argued that it actually was a combination of this elite's "mamluk," family, and exchange relationships with al-Nāṣir Muḥammad that largely defined its composition, identity, and socio-political function at the end of his reign; furthermore, it will be suggested that these precise relationships not only characterize this elite, but also shed some light on the actual nature of al-Nāṣir's authority.

"MAMLUK" RELATIONSHIPS

A first aspect of this elite's identity and composition concerns their origin and subsequent status as mamluks or manumitted slaves. For when analyzing this elite's composition in terms of the allegedly basic feature of Mamluk political culture—the relationship between a mamluk, his manumitting *ustādh*, and his peers⁷—a remarkably varied patchwork of mamluk origins and status is revealed. Though an *ustādh*'s basis of power was supposed to be the loyalty and cohesion of his corps of personal mamluks, all acquired, trained, and manumitted in his service and all identifiable by a *nisbah* that was derived from his name,⁸ this group of senior amirs encompassed such a variety of mamluk "categories" in and outside his Nāṣirīyah corps of personal mamluks, that there remain surprisingly few grounds for assuming that such a bond supporting his authority really existed.

BARRĀNĪYAH, NĀṢIRĪYAH, KHĀṢṢAKĪYAH

A first clear mamluk "category" of amirs of one hundred were those six that did not have the *nisbah* al-Nāṣirī at all.⁹ Actually, in his list al-Shujā'ī already identified these six as a separate group, labeling them "senior outsiders" (*barrānīyah kibār*). And this clearly reflects the fact that, as suggested by their *nisbahs*, they had

⁴Most importantly in H. N. al-Ḥajjī, *The Internal Affairs in Egypt during the Third Reign of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad* (Kuwait, 1978, 2000), 96–163, esp. 159–63; Peter M. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517*, History of the Near East (London, 1986), 114; Reuven Amitai-Preiss, "The Remaking of the Military Elite of Mamluk Egypt," *Studia Islamica* 72 (1990): 145–60.

⁵See Levanoni, *Turning Point*, esp. 28–80.

⁶Clifford, "State Formation," esp. 235–40.

⁷On the "mamluk" concept, see the classic study by David Ayalon, *L'Esclavage du Mamlouk*, Oriental Notes and Studies, vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1951).

⁸Ibid.

⁹They are the amirs Jankalī, Almalik, Baybars, Sanjar, Kūkāy, and Maḥmūd.



never been members of al-Nāṣir's corps of personal mamluks.¹⁰ In fact, what most of these outsiders in the Nāṣirīyah-dominated ranks of senior amirs actually had in common was that they had entered the Mamluk empire as young mamluks long before al-Nāṣir's third ascendancy to power in 1310, i.e., they definitely were senior amirs "who had priority in immigration"¹¹ and they were therefore also occasionally referred to in the sources as "the veterans" (*al-mashāyikh*).¹² Almalik, Baybars al-Aḥmadī, Sanjar al-Jāwulī, and allegedly also Kūkāy were all members of the Maṣūriyah, the corps of mamluks trained and manumitted by al-Nāṣir's father al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (d. 1290) more than fifty years earlier.¹³ And the remaining two, Jankalī ibn al-Bābā and Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd, actually were not even mamluks and therefore complete outsiders, yet with a remarkable record of service: both of them had been high ranking officials in the Ilkhanid empire before they had fled

¹⁰According to al-Qalqashandī, the term *barrānīyah* was used for mamluks and amirs who did not belong to the *khāṣṣakīyah*; they were also called *al-kharajīyah* (al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A'shā fī Ṣinā'at al-Inshā'* [Cairo, n.d.], 3:386; 4:56). According to Rabbat, the term should also be taken literally, as the amirs who lived outside the sultan's quarters in the Citadel's southern enclosure (Nasser O. Rabbat, *The Citadel of Cairo: A New Interpretation of Royal Mamluk Architecture*, Islamic History and Civilisation, Studies and Texts, vol. 14 [Leiden, 1995], 289); this may also be derived from the following quote from al-Maqrīzī: "In it, the sultan reviewed the mamluks of the barracks and the outsiders (*al-barrānīyah*)" (al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Ma'rīfat Duwal al-Mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad M. Ziyādah [Cairo, 1956–58], 2:313). Combined with the information in this article's opening story from al-Shujā'ī, these outsiders indeed seem to have lived outside the sultan's quarters, unlike their colleagues.

¹¹On the specific terminology of a "senior amir" (*amīr kabīr*), probably also referred to when al-Shujā'ī called them "*kibār*," see Peter M. Holt, "The Structure of Government in the Mamluk Sultanate," in *Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades*, ed. Peter M. Holt (Warminster, 1977), 55; Abū al-Maḥāsīn Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Kitāb al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-al-Qāhirah* (Cairo, 1963–72), 10:303.

¹²Cf. al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:107; Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān al-'Aṣr wa-A'wān al-Naṣr*, ed. 'Alī Abū Zayd et al. (Beirut-Damascus, 1998), 1:618, 4:162; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi wa-al-Mustawfā ba'da al-Wāfi*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn (Cairo, 1984–2003), 3:85; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, ed. 'Adnān Darwīsh as *Tārīkh Ibn Qāḍī Ṣuhba par Abū Bakr ibn Qāḍī Ṣuhba al-Asadī al-Dimashqī (779/1377–851/1448)*, Tome Second, Premier Partie du Manuscrit, 741/1340–750/1350, Publications de l'Institut Français de Damas, vol. 145 (Damascus, 1994), 487.

¹³Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:81–83, 467–70, 618–20, 4:162–63; al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Mawā'iz wa-al-I'tibār bi-Dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa-al-Āthār* (Cairo, 1996), 3:83, 4:108, 247–48; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Durar al-Kāminah fī A'yān al-Mī'ah al-Thāminah*, ed. H. al-Nadawī (Beirut, 1993), 1:411, 502, 2:170–72, 3:270; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:768; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:85–88, 479–81, 6:74–76. See also Clifford, "State Formation," 262. Kūkāy's claims are rather more dubious, as there exists only one reference linking him to the Maṣūriyah (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:768). On the Maṣūriyah corps, see Linda S. Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan: The Career of al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn and the Consolidation of Mamluk Rule in Egypt and Syria (678–689 AH/1279–1290 AD)*, Freiburger Islamstudien, vol. 18



to Mamluk Syro-Egypt, in 1304 and in 1337 respectively.¹⁴

Mamluk society generally seems to have shown these amirs respect for their long experience, veteran status, and continued loyalty to the sultan. Hence when Damurdāsh, the former ruler of Anatolian Bilād al-Rūm, fled to Cairo in 1329 and was given an official position inferior to one of those veterans, al-Maqrīzī recorded the following telling story:

[Damurdāsh] was so upset about it that the sultan had to send the amir Badr al-Dīn Jankalī to him to apologize and [explain] that he did not want to disrespect his [royal] status, but that . . . the sultan's father had senior mamluks who had brought up the sultan, so that he wanted to honor their status. "Therefore I make you sit next to them."¹⁵

The other eighteen amirs of one hundred are all mentioned in the sources with the *nisbah* al-Nāṣirī, i.e., they actually were members of al-Nāṣir's personal corps of mamluks; yet two different "categories" in terms of mamluk status may be discerned within this group of Nāṣirīyah amirs of one hundred.

There were seven Nāṣirīyah amirs whose relationship with the sultan actually went far beyond the mere formalities of *ustādh*-mamluk loyalty. For all seven—Qawṣūn, Bashtak, Aqṣunqur, Maliktamur, Qumārī, Altunbughā, and Yalbughā—are specifically identified in one or more of the era's sources as members of the sultan's special private retinue of forty favorite mamluks and amirs, the *khāṣṣakīyah*.¹⁶ These were the real "insiders" among the amirs of one hundred. Very often, they had been picked for their good looks and, as such, they were all attached to the sultan by a more personal bond of sultanic favor and affection—often

(Stuttgart, 1998), 189–96.

¹⁴Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:163–66, 5:399; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:539–4,; 4:331–32; Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 5:22–25; Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382* (London, 1986), 108; Levanoni, *Turning Point*, 41; Holt, "An-Nāṣir Muḥammad," 321. Maḥmūd's "priority in immigration" indeed is nonexistent—in his case, *kabīr* probably refers to his long-standing previous career with his Ilkhanid overlords.

¹⁵Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:295.

¹⁶Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-Nāṣir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥuṭayṭ (Beirut, 1986), 130; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:107; al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:605, 4:131, 132, 5:585; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:475; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:515, 537, 538. For this definition of the *khāṣṣakīyah*, see M. Q. al-Baqlī, *Al-Ta'rīf bi-Muṣṭalahāt Ṣubḥ al-A'shā* (Cairo, 1983), 114; Khalīl ibn Shāhīn al-Zāhirī, *Zubdat Kashf al-Mamālik wa-Bayān al-Ṭuruq wa-al-Masālik*, ed. P. Ravaisse as *Zubdat Kashf el-Mamalik* (Paris, 1894), 115–16. Al-Maqrīzī gives even more specific information, as he states that the number of *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs of one hundred at the time of the Nāṣirī *rawk* (1315) was eight (al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:353). For a very explicit reference to this group of amirs, as the "*khāṣṣakīyah*



even referred to as sultanic “infatuation.”¹⁷ Thus, al-Malik al-Nāṣir was said to have been “extremely infatuated and in love with” Qawṣūn,¹⁸ with Bashtak,¹⁹ with Alṭunbughā,²⁰ with Maliktamur,²¹ and with Yalbughā,²² apparently to the extent that when the latter became ill, al-Şafadī says the sultan himself looked after his protegee, meanwhile not administering justice for twenty days and even neglecting his own dying son Ibrāhīm.²³ And al-Şafadī has the following telling story about the amir Maliktamur:

I’ve seen him when he was in Cairo. . . . Because of the sultan’s love for him he would not let him go to the square to play polo on Saturday, rather he allowed him to go down on Tuesday [only] . . . and he used to say to him: “O Maliktamur, cover your head when you play so that the sun cannot harm your face.” And he would only allow him to attend the public service very occasionally, so that no one [ever] saw him.²⁴

Finally, as regards the remaining eleven Nāṣirīyah amirs of one hundred, the sources do not identify them as having a specific in- or outsider status at the time of the sultan’s demise and we may assume they were merely Nāṣirīyah, linked to the sultan by the usual *ustādh*-mamluk relationship.²⁵

In terms of their mamluk origins and status, clearly this elite was made up of three groups: the latter majority of common sultanic mamluks and two smaller groups of out- and insiders with a more defined status and more personal bonds with the sultan. Yet, as is often the case with such categories, they do not necessarily reflect historical realities. On the one hand, none of these groups are ever mentioned

of the mamluks of the sultan [that are] *muqaddams alf*,” see al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:107.

¹⁷See al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:477; al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:60, 222, 266; al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 149, 153, 205; al-Şafadī, *A’yān*, 1:691, 4:131, 137, 445, 5:591–92; al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 4:104; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:409, 477, 4:358, 437; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:184; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:378, 538; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:68.

¹⁸Al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 4:104.

¹⁹Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:477; al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 154

²⁰Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:68; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:385; al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 265

²¹Al-Şafadī, *A’yān*, 5:446; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:358

²²Al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:60; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:477.

²³On Ibrāhīm, see al-Şafadī, *A’yān*, 5:591–92; also Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:437. On justice, see al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:492.

²⁴Al-Şafadī, *A’yān*, 5:446; see also Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:358.

²⁵These eleven remaining amirs were: Aqbughā ‘Abd al-Wāḥid, Aydughmish, Bahādur, Qumārī al-Kabīr, Quṭlūbughā, Ṭuquzdamur, Ṭurghāy, Urumbughā, Barsbughā, Burunlī, and Baygharā.



as having acted as a self-consciously solidary group during the entire length of al-Nāṣir's third reign; on the other, lines between the *khāṣṣakīyah* and non-*khāṣṣakīyah* are sometimes not as clear-cut as might be expected. Both of the so-called common Nāṣirīyah amirs Aydughmish and Quṭlūbughā can be identified fairly early in al-Nāṣir's reign as members of the *khāṣṣakīyah*; it is, however, uncertain whether they retained that status in al-Nāṣir's final years, since there is no explicit reference to it.²⁶ Bahādur's status remains quite undefined as well, because though he was not explicitly identified as a *khāṣṣakī* in any of the sources, he is said to have enjoyed some of the *khāṣṣakīyah* privileges that come with sultanic favor. Thus, all relevant sources agree with Ibn Ḥajar that

[The sultan] favored him so [much] that he came to stay with him to spend the night, as the fourth out of four: Qawṣūn, Bashtak, Ṭughāy Tamur, and Bahādur.²⁷

"VETERANS" AND "STRANGERS"

Moreover, aside from these three very "mamluk" categories, there clearly were some additional distinctive features of mamluk origin and status, which were also known, or at least to some degree noticed, as they did find their way explicitly into the era's sources. They mainly seem to have resulted from the success and length of al-Nāṣir's rule and to some extent from his afore-mentioned personal predilection for certain types of mamluks.

Firstly, since al-Nāṣir reigned for so long, the continuous influx of new sultanic mamluks for thirty odd years resulted in serious generational differences in his final years between freshly appointed amirs and those who had managed to stay at the top for one or more decades. And though there is no clear reference to any sort of tension between those generations during al-Nāṣir's reign,²⁸ the existence of different generations (*ṭabaqāt*) in the ranks of amirs did not go unnoticed. Quṭlūbughā was said to be "from the generation of Arghūn al-Dawādār,"²⁹ and al-Ṣafadī made the following statement, revealing to some extent the contemporary awareness of this aspect of court life:

²⁶Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:165; al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 4:113; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 3:205.

²⁷Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:498; also al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:62; Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:431; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:322.

²⁸There is a reference to generational tension between Bahādur and the younger Alṭunbughā as the former is said to have born the latter a grudge for his quick promotion; in 1342 this tension is said to have caused Alṭunbughā's removal from Cairo (al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 4:105; also to some extent confirmed in Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:323).

²⁹Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 10:82; instead of using the noun *ṭabaqah*, al-Ṣafadī talks about "the high rank (*raf'ah*) of the amir Sayf al-Dīn Arghūn al-Dawādār" (al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 4:113).



[Ṭuquzdamur] continued to be [the most] senior and revered, from the generation of Arghūn and from those after him, until the very end; he saw three or four generations come and go, while he remained as he had been and the sultan never turned against him.³⁰

Thus, looking at these amirs of one hundred in generational terms, a clear distinction may be found between seniors or even “veterans” and rather freshly promoted juniors. Apart from the afore-mentioned revered “veterans” of the *barrānīyah*, the ranks of the common Nāṣirīyah count some amirs who, like Ṭuquzdamur and to some extent Quṭlūbughā, had considerable years of service as amirs of one hundred. Aydughmish had been promoted about thirty years earlier, shortly after the very start of al-Nāṣir’s third reign,³¹ and both Aqbughā and Bahādur are said to have been amirs of one hundred since the late 1320s.³² And though both Quṭlūbughā and Ṭurghāy were only promoted shortly before al-Nāṣir’s demise, neither of them should be considered a newcomer in these ranks either: Quṭlūbughā had been a privileged member of al-Nāṣir’s elite until he had been sent off to Damascus in 1327 and Ṭurghāy had been a long-standing amir of one hundred when he was appointed governor of Aleppo in 1338.³³ On the other hand, the amirs Barsbughā, Burunlī, and Baygharā had only been appointed in 1338 or even later³⁴ and this certainly did not go unnoticed by contemporaries like al-Shujā’ī, for he referred to Baygharā as “the last of the later [amirs of one hundred and] commanders of one thousand.”³⁵

Parallel to these common Nāṣirīyah ranks of amirs of one hundred, there clearly are two generations present among their *khāṣṣakīyah* peers. There is explicit reference to the promotions, often at a very young age, of five of these *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs to the rank of amir of one hundred fairly late in al-Nāṣir’s reign,³⁶ while the

³⁰ Al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 2:611.

³¹ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:165; al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:251.

³² Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 2:480, 3:431; al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 2:62; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:498, 3:250; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:322–23; al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:86, 94 (quote), 249–50, 253; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:508, 514; K. V. Zettersteen, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlükensultane in den Jahren 690–741 der Hīgra nach arabischen Handschriften* (Leiden, 1919), 213.

³³ Al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 2:578; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 2:216; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 6:380; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:383.

³⁴ Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:262, 264; al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:43, 94, 221, 223.

³⁵ Al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:94.

³⁶ Alṭunbughā and Yalbughā apparently were born only in the early 1320s (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:379; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:436–37); Aqsunqur was said to have been given a rank of amir of one hundred in 1336 (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:515); Qumārī was promoted amir of one



promotion of the amirs Bashtak and Qawṣūn conspicuously predated them by as much as ten years.³⁷

A final distinctive feature related to the mamluk relationship between this elite and their sultan specifically has to do with the mamluk status of a number of the Nāṣirīyah amirs of one hundred. For like the *barrānīyah* that were explicitly referred to as “outsiders,” there were also some “strangers” among the Nāṣirīyah due to certain doubts about the soundness of their claims to Nāṣirīyah status. Thus, for instance, according to al-Ṣafadī the amir Ṭuquzdamur

only considered himself to be a stranger within the sultan’s household, because he had no peer to affiliate with.³⁸

This was due to the fact that this Ṭuquzdamur, and also Aydughmish, Ṭurghāy, and Bahādūr, had actually entered the ranks of the Nāṣirīyah not directly from the slave markets, but rather from other *ustādhs*’ corps: Sultan al-Mu’ayyad Abū al-Fidā’ of Ḥamāh, an amir called al-Ṭabbākhī, and the afore-mentioned king Damurdāsh respectively.³⁹ Furthermore, Qumārī al-Kabīr allegedly had been an adult shepherd of small cattle in “the land of the Turks” before being brought to Egypt by his brother, the amir Baktamur al-Sāqī (d. 1332), which again is hardly the customary way to enter the sultan’s mamluks’ ranks.⁴⁰ In the case of two of the *khāṣṣakīyah*, this “stranger” status definitely had everything to do with the reason for their being brought into the *khāṣṣakīyah*, i.e., the appeal of their good looks to the sultan. Thus, there is the well-known story about Qawṣūn, who had been a young merchant from the Black Sea region, “a beautiful and tall boy, about eighteen years old,” whose appearance impressed the sultan so much that he made a considerable effort to acquire him as one of his personal mamluks,⁴¹ and secondly, there was Maliktamur, originally a companion of the Baghdadī scholar al-Suhrawardī, but apparently so famous throughout the region for his beauty that

hundred on 10 December 1337 (al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:29); and Maliktamur “was promoted at the end of al-Malik al-Nāṣir’s reign” (Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:358).

³⁷Qawṣūn was promoted in 1326 (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:272), Bashtak apparently in 1327 (ibid., 291).

³⁸Al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 2:611; also in Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 6:420–21.

³⁹Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar wa-Jāmi’ al-Ghurar*, vol. 9, *Al-Durr al-Fākhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*, ed. Hans R. Roemer (Cairo, 1960), 365; al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:252; al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 1:653, 2:62, 578, 611; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:426, 498, 2:216, 225; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:165, 431, 6:380, 420; Ibn Qādī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:322, 383, 465.

⁴⁰Ibn Qādī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:497; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:723.

⁴¹Al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 4:138; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 3:257; al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:222; al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 4:104 (quote).



al-Nāṣir again was determined to acquire him as a mamluk.⁴² There are also the cases of the *khāṣṣakī* amirs Alṭunbughā al-Māridānī, who allegedly had first been a mamluk of the Artuqid ruler of Mārdīn, sent to al-Nāṣir as a gift,⁴³ and Yalbughā, about whom Ibn Ḥajar says that he had been born in Egypt “while his father was in the service of al-Nāṣir, and he grew up with such an extremely beautiful face and fine figure that he got promoted.”⁴⁴ While the latter two especially are more contested stories,⁴⁵ in the case of Qawṣūn the actual fact of a perception of his being a “stranger” among the Nāṣirīyah may be seen from the reports on the political conflicts following al-Nāṣir’s death, where that specific feature was said to have been used to discredit his political appeal and to destabilize his alliances.⁴⁶

This analysis of mamluk relationships, in terms of these amirs’ mamluk origins and status, provides a revealing look at the nature and identity of these elite amirs of one hundred at the end of al-Nāṣir’s reign. At the very least it gives us some insight, both into the background of the individuals, and into the nature of some of the ties that bound them to the sultan. What is striking is the small role traditional mamluk-*ustādh* bonds played in these relationships. Indeed, the general picture that emerges is of a varied elite composed of both intimates and outsiders, veterans and juniors, mamluks and non-mamluks, and real and outsider Nāṣirīyah, every one of them having a different relationship with the sultan due to their different personal histories.

EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS

A second relationship which was inherent in this elite of amirs of one hundred at the end of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s reign was of a far more material character, and consisted of the exchange of benefits between the sultan and his amirs.⁴⁷ As the

⁴²Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:358; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:184.

⁴³Al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:266; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:378.

⁴⁴Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:36–437.

⁴⁵According to Ibn Ḥajar, al-Nāṣir “had bought [Alṭunbughā] as a child” (Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:409); the story about Yalbughā especially seems very doubtful, since it is related regarding Yalbughā’s father Ṭābuṭā—even by Ibn Ḥajar, who claimed the opposite—that “he had come [to Egypt] when he heard about his son’s favored position with al-Nāṣir” (Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 2:213; also al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 2:563; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 6:358).

⁴⁶See al-Shujā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:164.

⁴⁷On the concept of exchange as a major lever of socio-political interaction in the Mamluk state, cf. Clifford, “State Formation,” esp. 6, 46–47, 58; Ira M. Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 48–50, 187–88; Michael Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge, 1995), 38–40; W. W. Clifford, “*Ubi Sumus?* Mamluk History and Social Theory,” *Mamlūk Studies Review* 1 (1997): 60, 62.



head of a highly-centralized state bureaucracy, the sultan was the sole authority that controlled access to the military hierarchy (and its financial resources) and to the military administration, while at the same time the wealth of his treasury allowed him to bestow generous rewards on those he favored. Hence exchange relations not only defined the military, socio-political, and economic status of this Mamluk elite, but were also imperative in the absolute subordination of this elite to the sultan.

PROMOTION

The number of positions for the highest military rank in Egypt was fixed at twenty-four by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad in the course of his 1315 cadastral reform, the *rawk al-Nāṣirī*, when financial resources were allocated for precisely that number of amirs of one hundred.⁴⁸ At the end of 1326, al-Maqrīzī mentions an increase of one extra position and *iqṭā'*, to twenty-five, as a result of the split of the *iqṭā'* of the arrested amir Arghūn al-Nā'ib.⁴⁹ As can be seen from al-Shujā'ī's list, there remained twenty-five amirs up till the very end of al-Nāṣir's reign, though by then this number included one of his own sons, Abū Bakr.

One conspicuous previously-mentioned feature of this elite of amirs of one hundred is that no less than eight amirs, or one third of this elite, had been promoted to this rank within the four final years of al-Nāṣir's reign. Only six amirs of the Nāṣirīyah—Aydughmish, Ṭuquzdamur, Qawṣūn, Bashtak, Bahādūr and Aqbughā—had managed to maintain stability in their careers and retain their rank for more than ten years. Actually, when compared with parallel but less complete lists that are known for the years 1312 and 1332, only three (actually even just two) and twelve names respectively still remained in 1341.⁵⁰

The only political authority that was responsible for these bestowments and deprivations of military rank was al-Nāṣir Muḥammad himself. In his position as the sultan, he was the sole official who was empowered to elevate one into the

⁴⁸ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 4:14; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:221, 3:353; al-Zāhirī, *Zubdah*, 113.

⁴⁹ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:280.

⁵⁰ From the 1312 list in a work by al-Ḥasan ibn Faḍl Allāh al-Ṣafadī, studied in detail by Reuven Amitai, only the names of the amirs Almalik and Baybars remained, while Amitai himself added another one that returned in 1341, Jankalī (Amitai, "Remaking," 161–62; also Chapoutot-Remadi, "Liens et Relations," 605); from the 1332 list of amirs that accompanied al-Nāṣir on his third hajj, the names of the amirs Jankalī ibn al-Bābā, Almalik, Baybars, Sanjar al-Jāwulī, Ṭuquzdamur, Aydughmish, Qawṣūn, Bashtak, Bahādūr al-Nāṣirī, Urumbughā, Aqbughā 'Abd al-Wāḥid, and Ṭurghāy remained (Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz*, 9:366, al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:351–52). On al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's active involvement in the composition of his elite, see also Amitai, "Remaking," 145–46, 151–55; Levanoni, *Turning Point*, 28–30; and Chapoutot-Remadi, "Liens propres et identités séparées," 180.



ranks of amirs of one hundred and whose signature was required to legitimize the *manshūr*, the document conferring an *iqṭā'* upon a new appointee.⁵¹ Therefore promotion to the highest rank was not only a matter of timing and circumstance, it was a result of, first and foremost, this elite's relationship with the sultan, inevitably one of gratitude, loyalty, and subordination.

When circumstances and timing are subjected to closer scrutiny, another feature becomes apparent: the absence of any reference to strong competition for this limited number of highly desirable positions. For in those nine cases for which such information exists, three times an amir was promoted to a position left by the demise of his predecessor,⁵² while six times promotion took place after the sultan had sent the previous amir to occupy an office in Syria.⁵³ Only once did this provoke any minor protest, which was resolved peacefully but firmly by al-Nāṣir:

When the sultan sent [the amir of one hundred Tashtamur al-Nāṣirī] to Ṣafad in the year 738, he requested exemption, implored him and demanded to be excused. . . . On Thursday, [the sultan] made him sit before him after the public service, and said to him: "I'm only sending you to Syria to perform a job for me." He made him bow his head, kissed it, and bid him goodbye.⁵⁴

Generally, in the few cases where an actual reason for such promotion is referred to by the sources, it either concerns exchange of promotion for loyalty and services offered to the sultan,⁵⁵ or the sultan's afore-mentioned infatuation with and favoritism towards some of his *khāṣṣakīyah*.⁵⁶ Though the sample is admittedly limited and absence of further data renders the conclusion rather conjectural, overall these elements do seem to confirm the picture of a sultan who was all-powerful and

⁵¹Holt, "Structure," 47–48; idem, "The Position and Power of the Mamluk Sultan," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 38, no. 2 (1975): 246–47.

⁵²Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:177, 437; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:28, 29.

⁵³Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:272; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:43, 94, 253; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:383, 538.

⁵⁴Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:588.

⁵⁵See al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:93 (Quṭlūbughā is re-promoted in 1340 after his active involvement in the arrest of the Syrian governor Tankiz); al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:619; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:411; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:85 (Almalik is taken up in al-Nāṣir's entourage in 710 after his services rendered as a trustworthy and efficient messenger between the deposed al-Nāṣir in al-Karak and the new sultan Baybars al-Jāshinkīr in Cairo).

⁵⁶See al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:253; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:391, 409, 477–78; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 2:497; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:385.



individual amirs who, though high-ranking, had few options but to obey his orders.⁵⁷

The same picture emerges from another example, in which case al-Nāṣir allowed himself to bend the rules of the mamluk military curriculum on a whim, promoting the highly-favored rank-and-file mamluk Bahādūr directly from rank-and-file status to the rank of amir of one hundred.⁵⁸ Again, this act is said to have provoked unsuccessful protest, in particular from the senior *khāṣṣakī* amir of one hundred, Baktamur al-Sāqī (d. 1332).⁵⁹ When the latter was murdered by the order of al-Nāṣir, he is said to have felt himself obliged to promote Baktamur's little brother Qumārī to the highest rank.⁶⁰ Even a sultan's whims had their limits.

APPOINTMENT

Appointment to high offices in the administration was also the sultan's prerogative. This administration was designed to assist the sultan in governing his empire, and its military branch was mainly comprised of positions representing the sultan in the execution of his prerogatives.⁶¹

Again, it is actually very revealing that among those military offices that had executive power in the government, that of viceroy (*nā'ib*), financial minister (*wazīr*), and chamberlain (*hājib*) are explicitly stated to have been abolished or stripped of their authority by the sultan by the end of his reign:

When [al-Nāṣir] died, he did not have a *nā'ib*, a *wazīr*, or a *hājib* with executive authority, except for Barsbughā al-Ḥājib, who rendered justice without having been given the [ceremonial] staff of the office of *hājib*.⁶²

The sultan had simply refused to appoint a new amir in these offices when they had become vacant earlier in his reign. Actually, apart from the office occupied by this Barsbughā, the only offices awarded to high-ranking amirs toward the end of his reign were ceremonial offices of the court that managed certain aspects of

⁵⁷This is absolutely contrary to how Clifford depicted al-Nāṣir, i.e., as a sultan who continuously had to work to balance the wishes and aspirations of the different mamluk units that served him, and whose success stemmed from his great ability to achieve this (Clifford, "State Formation," 235–74, esp. 272–74).

⁵⁸Al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:253.

⁵⁹Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:62.

⁶⁰Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 157; al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 4:132–33; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:497.

⁶¹See, e.g., al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 4:16–28; Walther Bjorkman, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Staatskanzlei im islamischen Ägypten* (Hamburg, 1928), 151–53; David Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army," *BSOAS* 16 (1954): 57–64.

⁶²Al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:111; also *ibid.*, 94.



life in the Citadel, like oversight of the stables and the aviary, access to the public sessions, and management of the barracks and kitchens.⁶³ According to al-Maqrīzī, there was a very specific reason not to invest his most senior amirs with any executive power:

He wanted to be independent in the affairs of his realm and to apply the rules single-handedly; therefore, he even abolished the office of *nā'ib al-salṭanah* so that he alone would carry the burdens of the state.⁶⁴

Though this view is al-Maqrīzī's interpretation rather than an objective observation, in this specific case it supports the information so far adduced: though they were amirs of the highest rank and status, they were explicitly excluded from the formal channels of government, and this again confirmed their absolute subordination to a sultan who was the realm's sole executive authority.

Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad seems to have been wise enough, though, not to isolate himself entirely from his elite in the government of his realm. On more than one occasion, advice was sought from the *mashūrah*, the quite informal court council that was to advise the sultan in state affairs.⁶⁵ Its membership seems to have been limited, though, to those who indeed had enough experience to offer useful advice. A valuable observation in this respect was made by al-Maqrīzī:

In [1318] the sultan made a group of the veteran commanders of the *ḥalqah* sit [with him] during the times of the council with the amirs, and he listened to what they had to say.⁶⁶

⁶³Cf. al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:548, 554, 686, 2:81; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:391, 394, 502; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 2:480, 497, 3:282, 479; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:202, 341, 342, 377, 508, 754; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:101, 178; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz*, 9:298, 374, 380; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:111, 223, 251; Zettersteen, *Beiträge*, 127, 128, 158, 184, 189, 195; al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 230; Ibn Qādī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:262, 319.

⁶⁴Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:534.

⁶⁵E.g., in 1311, two "masters of the council" were among the amirs who attended a military review (Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz*, 9:238–39); in 1312 there is reference to a council when Mongols threatened to attack Syria (ibid., 246); in 1336, rumors of war at the northeast border necessitated the organization of a council (al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 365–66); in 1339 the amirs of the council persuaded the sultan to arrest his financial supervisor, al-Nashw (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:485); in the same year, there was a council on actions to be taken after the arrest of the Syrian governor Tankiz (Zettersteen, *Beiträge*, 210).

⁶⁶Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:182.



This quote implies that there was some connection between seniority of service, including experience in state and military affairs, and membership in the *mashūrah*. Indeed, at the end of his reign four of the *barrānīyah* veterans—Almalik, Baybars, Sanjar and Jankalī—were said to have been members of this *mashūrah*; and in fact, they may well have been the only members.⁶⁷

Secondly, the evidence from al-Maqrīzī also implies that there was some vague regularity in these council meetings, probably linked to the timing of the weekly public sessions in the *īwān* of the Citadel. For when al-Maqrīzī, in his *Khīṭaṭ*, depicts this regular public session in the Citadel (*khidmat al-īwān*) he makes a very specific reference, both to this council and its veteran members:

. . . and at a distance of about fifteen cubits there sat right and left of him [=the sultan] the men of age and standing, belonging to the most senior amirs of one hundred—they are called the amirs of the council. . . .⁶⁸

GRANTS, GIFTS, AND BENEFITS

Apart from promotions in the military hierarchy and appointments in the military administration, there was yet another level of exchange between the sultan and his senior amirs. This indeed was an exchange of a more material, direct, and tangible character, consisting of all sorts of benefits that the sultan dispensed from his apparently abundant wealth to his most senior amirs. And again, this mainly seems to have been one-way traffic. From the abundant income he had allocated to himself after the 1315 *rawk*, exceeding by far any individual amir's share in the empire's resources and collected by very efficient financial supervisors, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad spent enormous amounts on many different things, including some of his amirs.⁶⁹ In terms of defining the elite amirs at the end of al-Nāṣir's reign and their relationship with the sultan, there are a number of remarkable features that appear when one scrutinizes this kind of exchange.

First of all, there was one type of payment every sultan had to make to his amirs because it was part of state ceremonial. Among several other payments in kind, it consisted of the payment of certain sums of money (*nafaqah*) and the

⁶⁷Al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:104; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:485, 523; al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:618, 2:467, 469; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:85, 6:74; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:411, 2:171. Moreover, if Ibn Taghrībirdī is to be believed, other senior amirs were explicitly excluded from this council ("He [=al-Nāṣir] did not incorporate them [=the amirs] in the advisory council, not even Baktamur al-Sāqī, Qawṣūn, Bashtak, nor anyone else; rather, he would only be guided by the elderly among the amirs" [Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 9:174]).

⁶⁸Al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:339.

⁶⁹See, e.g., Levanoni, *Turning Point*, 53–60.



bestowal of robes of honor and the like, the value and elaborate decoration of which were related to the rank of each amir.⁷⁰ They were bestowed by the sultan on his amirs on specific occasions or in return for specific services, like the finishing of a polo ground in 1330, when "robes of honor and golden sashes were granted to the amirs and the commanders, and a robe of honor was bestowed upon the amir Sayf al-Dīn Aqbughā 'Abd al-Wāḥid . . . and the amir Sayf al-Dīn Almalik al-Jūkandār . . .";⁷¹ the promotion of his son Aḥmad to the rank of amir in the same year;⁷² the marriage of another son in 1331, when "a robe of honor was bestowed upon . . . the amir Baybars al-Aḥmadī, upon Aydughmish, Amir Ākhūr, and also upon the remaining state officials . . .";⁷³ or in 1339, when he had the oath of allegiance to his rule renewed by the amirs, and "handed to every *muqaddam alf* the amount of 1,000 dinars."⁷⁴ These grants clearly were a ceremonial expression and confirmation of an amir's rank, status, and office, as well as a consideration for his loyalty and service to the throne, and their value was therefore quite formally weighed and determined.

There was another area of sultanic largess, however, of a completely informal and personal character and quite unrelated to any specific occasion or service. It was clearly directed to one specific group of amirs within the elite, those who, as mentioned earlier, for very personal reasons, had managed to attract the sultan's attention and had come to enjoy the sultan's favor: the *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs of one hundred. This personal expenditure by the sultan upon his *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs was already quite notorious in its time; in his own engaging style, al-Maqrīzī vividly describes it as "exceeding all bounds."⁷⁵ Those *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs that are explicitly mentioned in the sources are Qawṣūn, Bashtak, Maliktamur, Alṭunbughā, and Yalbughā, and they were involved in four different sorts of material exchange with their sultan, all of which made them extremely wealthy.

A *khāṣṣakī* amir might be granted an enlargement of his amiral *iqṭā'* by the income from additional villages. Thus, for example, in 1332 Bashtak was given the *iqṭā'* (and personal properties) of the murdered senior amir Baktamur al-Sāqī;⁷⁶

⁷⁰Cf. David Ayalon, "The System of Payment in Mamluk Military Society," *JESHO* 1 (1958): 37–65, 257–96.

⁷¹Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz*, 9:357.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., 360; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:343.

⁷⁴Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:499; for other examples of this kind of official expenditure, on the occasion of the marriages of his sons, his return from the Hijaz in 1332, the completion of large construction works, and a state visit by the "daughter of the sultan of Fez," see al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:345–46, 357, 432, 435, 447–48, 453.

⁷⁵Ibid., 535.

⁷⁶Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 157; al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:690. On the evolution of his colleague Qawṣūn's



when Maliktamur was promoted in 1338, to the *iqṭā'* he inherited from his predecessor was added the village of "al-Naḥrāwīyah, with an estimated monthly tax revenue of 70,000 dirhams";⁷⁷ and to the amir Yalbughā's *iqṭā'* were added the village of al-Manzilah in 1338, and "the village of Sūhāy, in the Ṣa'īd, with an estimated tax revenue of 15,000 dinars" the next year.⁷⁸ Eventually, the *iqṭā'*s of the most senior *khāṣṣakīyah* colleagues, Qawṣūn and Bashtak, were said to have exceeded 200,000 dinars in value.⁷⁹

Some *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs are also reported to have been fortunate recipients of al-Nāṣir's extravagance, much to the despair of his financial managers. Thus al-Maqrīzī relates how Bashtak one day got 1,000,000 dirhams in return for a lost tax district⁸⁰ and how in the year 1337 he, Qawṣūn, Alṭunbughā, and Maliktamur were given 200,000 dinars each on the same day.⁸¹ Another well-known story of al-Nāṣir's generosity is the following:

The *ḥājj* Ḥusayn, his *ustādār*, said: "One day, [an amount] of 20,000 dinars was mentioned before the sultan, and Yalbughā said: 'By God, O lord, [I swear that] I have never seen 20,000 dinars.' So when he left from [the sultan], he [the sultan] summoned . . . the financial inspector and said: 'Bring me at once 25,000 dinars and five honorary presents.' . . . When he brought that, [the sultan] said: 'Carry the honorary presents to Yalbughā and tell him to bestow them upon the *jamdārīyah* when they come with the gold.' He summoned five from the *jamdārīyah* and made each one of them carry 5,000 dinars, saying: 'Take this gold to Yalbughā.' So they took it, and he bestowed those robes of honor upon them."⁸²

Even in the financial disputes between the sultan and his financial inspector al-Nashw on the one hand and these amirs on the other, from time to time sultanic

iqṭā', see Shihāb al-Dīn al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab* (Cairo, 1931–98), 33:202, 292; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:314.

⁷⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:467; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:358.

⁷⁸ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:463, 493.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 525; also al-Kutubī, "Uyūn al-Tawārīkh," Cambridge University Library MS Add. 2923, fol. 59. Amirs of one hundred were said to have been granted *iqṭā'*s with annual incomes that ranged from 80,000 to 200,000 dinars (Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-Aḥṣār fī Mamālik al-Aḥṣār*, ed. Ayman Fu'ād Sayyid, *Textes arabes et études islamiques*, vol. 23 [Cairo, 1985], 29; al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 3:453–54; al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:350–51).

⁸⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:535.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 432.

⁸² Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 5:585–86; also in Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:437; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:535.



decisions tended to favor the latter. For instance, in the year 1336 a private sugar factory that was connected to Qawṣūn was targeted by al-Nashw's new fiscal policies to enhance the sultan's ever-insufficient income. In the end, however, after the confiscation of its proceeds, these were immediately forwarded by al-Nāṣir to Qawṣūn, leaving the latter perhaps even better off than he otherwise might have been.⁸³ In all, the high *iqṭā'* incomes these amirs already had been awarded occasionally seem to have been augmented by such huge sultanic cash gifts and benefits.

Even more than cash benefits, all sorts of valuable presents like horses, mamluks, robes of honor (and in the case of Bashtak even the wife of a murdered colleague) were quite regularly directed by the sultan to amirs like Qawṣūn, Bashtak, Maliktamur, and Yalbughā.⁸⁴ In the case of the latter, al-Ṣafadī said that:

No one was delighted like him by the bestowals that came to him. Horses were offered to him with saddles, equipment, and accoutrements: fifteen saddles decorated with brocade and gold and inlaid with precious jewels for fifteen horses, and two hundred [trappings] for two hundred cart horses; and there were sent to him honorary presents: satin, golden sashes, brocaded embroidery, etc., which he had to give to those who brought those [presents] to him. . . . In all, [the sultan's] grants and bestowals upon him were beyond [normal] bounds.⁸⁵

And finally, an extravagant example of his unbounded generosity is the huge buildings he had constructed for some of these amirs. Though these were very limited in number, the amount of money spent, the efforts made, and the groundbreaking splendor that resulted again highlight the often outlandish behavior the sultan displayed towards the handful of amirs with whom he was really infatuated. There is passing reference to some sultanic involvement in the construction of Qawṣūn's mosque and of Bashtak's palace,⁸⁶ but actually, it was the amirs Alṭunbughā al-Māridānī and Yalbughā al-Yaḥyāwī who were the focus of this sultanic extravagance.⁸⁷ He had a mosque built for Alṭunbughā in 1334 (even before he

⁸³ Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 369–70.

⁸⁴ Cf., e.g., al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:690, 4:138, 5:445; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:222; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:451–52, 471–72, 491, 535; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:358, 478; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:367.

⁸⁵ Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 5:585, 586; also Ibn Qādī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:438; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:437.

⁸⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:320, 501.

⁸⁷ On the sultan's architectural patronage, see Howayda al-Harithy, "The Patronage of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn, 1310–1341," *MSR* 4 (2000): 219–44.



became an amir), as well as a luxurious palace for each of Alṭunbughā and Yalbughā in 1337.⁸⁸ And according to al-Shujā‘ī, for the palace of Yalbughā alone an incredibly huge sum of money—he mentions the highly unlikely amount of 40 million dirhams—was set aside.⁸⁹

To sum up, five of the seven *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs of one hundred identified before are mentioned by the sources as recipients of occasional additional benefits in cash and kind from the sultan, who awarded them unprecedented wealth. Nowhere is it recorded that they had to return anything to their generous patron, and no mention is made of any specific reason why such lavish patronage was bestowed upon these amirs, apart from the fact that in the case of the construction of buildings, there are some faint hints of a link between sultanic infatuation and these building projects. However faint these references, it does seem very plausible to assume that in this extravagant patronage and favoritism of his *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs of one hundred, al-Nāṣir’s infatuation with them again had an important role to play.

FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS

Apart from “mamluk” and exchange relationships, there remains one small but fundamental issue that also conspicuously characterized a great number of the amirs of one hundred at the end of al-Nāṣir’s reign—their familial relationship with the dying sultan. By an active marriage policy al-Nāṣir had managed to establish links between himself and a great number of his amirs that incorporated an important part of the empire’s socio-political elite into his own family.⁹⁰

Eight of the amirs of one hundred at the end of al-Nāṣir’s reign are mentioned at least once in the sources as married to one of al-Nāṣir’s daughters. Six of these sultanic sons-in-law were again his favorites from the *khāṣṣakīyah*: Qawṣūn, Bashtak, Maliktamur, Aqsunqur, Qumārī, and Alṭunbughā,⁹¹ and number seven

⁸⁸ Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 265–68; al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 5:586; al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:25; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:385, 438–39, 453; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:437; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:538; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:185; idem, *Al-Manhal*, 3:68–69.

⁸⁹ Al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:25.

⁹⁰ The issue of al-Nāṣir’s family and marriage policy has been noted and dealt with in great detail by Peter Holt (Holt, “An-Nasir Muhammad,” 313–24, esp. 319–23).

⁹¹ Qawṣūn was married in 1326 (al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 436; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:272, 283; al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 4:137; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 3:257; al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:222; al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 4:104); on Maliktamur, see al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 5:444; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:358; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:184; on Aqsunqur, see al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 1:554; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:394; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 2:497; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:754; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:178; on Qumārī, see al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 4:131; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 3:256; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:431; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:101; on Alṭunbughā, see al-Ṣafadī, *A’yān*, 1:604; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:409; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*,



was the afore-mentioned probable *khāṣṣakīyah*-nominee Bahādur.⁹² Number eight, Urumbughā, actually is a rather more doubtful case, as it was only the later historian Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah who stated that he had been married to one of his *ustādh*'s daughters.⁹³ Apart from these eight, there also was the amir Aqbughā 'Abd al-Wāḥid, whose sister Ṭughāy was married to the sultan,⁹⁴ and there are two more senior or even veteran amirs, in terms of years of service—Jankalī ibn al-Bābā and Ṭuquzdamur—that came to be father-in-law of one or more of al-Nāṣir's sons.⁹⁵ So in all, ten or even eleven members of this elite were related to the sultan by ties that went beyond "mamluk" or exchange relations and actually linked them to his family, hence—as the history of the years between 1341 and 1382 shows—firmly connecting his family's future to his military and socio-political elite's fate.

Direct reasons, however, for this marriage policy again remain largely unmentioned (or unnoticed). Only in the case of his brother-in-law Aqbughā 'Abd al-Wāḥid is there unambiguous information that al-Nāṣir's marriage to Ṭughāy actually predated Aqbughā's military career and was "the cause of his promotion by al-Nāṣir. . . ."⁹⁶ Gaining political experience and guidance may well have been a key element in linking some of his sons to the dyed-in-the-wool amirs Jankalī and Ṭuquzdamur, though there exists no evidence for such an assumption, and more personal or even other as yet unknown reasons may equally have been involved. The same goes for his *khāṣṣakīyah* sons-in-law, for it remains unclear whether he tried to enhance the loyalty to his reign and family of those men he himself had chosen to be at the very top of Mamluk society, or whether his grounds were less intentionally political, perhaps even more personal or emotional. In any event, at this point information remains too indefinite to allow any conclusive statement on al-Nāṣir's marriage policy, except that there is a conspicuous uniformity

3:68; al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 4:105; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:378; in general, also al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 111; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:536. So from the seven *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs of one hundred, only Yalbughā was not a son-in-law of al-Nāṣir (there was a—rather distant—link though, as he was married to a sister of one of the sultan's wives [al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 5:591; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:473]).

⁹²See al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 111, 253; al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:62; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:498; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:431; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:323.

⁹³Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:319.

⁹⁴Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:548; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:391; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 2:480.

⁹⁵Zettersteen, *Beiträge*, 195, 199, 210, 218; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:3, 18, 29; al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:165, 611; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:540, 2:225; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 5:24, 6:422; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:407, 417, 432, 436. Jankalī's daughter actually already died in 1339 and the sultan had her son—his grandson—sent to Jankalī to be brought up in his household.

⁹⁶Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:391; also in al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:548; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 2:480.



between the list of *khāṣṣakīyah* amirs of one hundred and that of the sultan's sons-in-law.⁹⁷

CONCLUSION

If we look back on this reconstruction of the Mamluk elite on the eve of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's death, it becomes clear that variety rather than any sort of uniformity is the keyword: there is an enormous variety in this elite's histories, in their mamluk status, and in their years of service. Though all were promoted to the highest rank, reasons for this were dissimilar, and their involvement in state administration—if any—was not uniform; even in terms of financial benefit from al-Nāṣir's renowned expenditures, it was only the *khāṣṣakīyah* who benefited so handsomely, while at the same time, their ranks alone were additionally characterized by close and inclusive family connections with their benefactor, the sultan.

We have been able to show that just as this variety characterized the nature and composition of this Mamluk elite on the eve of al-Nāṣir's death, it equally defined their relationships with the sultan. He showed some of them respect and others personal affection; he employed some to render him specific services and asked others for their advice; he bestowed regular formal benefits upon most of them, and elected others on whom to lavish occasional grants and gifts; and finally, two were chosen to be his sons' fathers-in-law, while others were chosen to consider the sultan himself as their father-in-law.

Clearly, in dealing both with the nature of this elite and with the nature of al-Nāṣir's socio-political relationships, these features warn us not to generalize and consider groups of people where we actually should be considering individuals. Even with a small group like the *khāṣṣakīyah*, differences are noted when we take into account concepts like generations and "strangers." The individual amir and his personal history define the socio-political context far better than any other conceptual device.

Is it then at all possible to derive from this very specific cross section of the Mamluk elite a better understanding of al-Nāṣir's successful rule? Apart from the retrospective observation of their success, there seems to be no conclusive evidence at all on the largely invisible policies and political behavior that contributed to al-Nāṣir's long, stable, and prosperous reign. This article rather suggests circumstantial evidence. First of all, it is clear from the varied nature of this elite that the basis of al-Nāṣir's authority over them could not have been any cohesion resulting from his mamluks' loyalty to their *ustādh*. For membership in his Nāṣirīyah was hardly a compelling argument for promotion, and certainly not for sultanic

⁹⁷There is only one son-in-law of the sultan mentioned who was not an amir of one hundred at all: Abū Bakr ibn Arghūn al-Nā'ib (al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:111; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:536).



favor. Moreover it was not exchange of financial benefit for loyalty either that bound this elite to their sultan, as this exchange has been shown to affect the *khāṣṣakīyah* only. Rather, as already suggested, many of this elite's features imply that it was his solid, engaged, and independent position at the very top of the military hierarchy and of the government's administration that account for the continuous subordination of this elite, which was left with no real alternative but to accept and gratefully return his patronage. There exist occasional references to plans to create an alternative order, but in an almost paranoid way the sultan always managed to have them firmly nipped in the bud.⁹⁸ Clearly it was this "pro-active" policy of al-Nāṣir that was referred to when al-Ṣafadī stated that—as mentioned earlier—the amir Ṭuquzdamur "saw three or four generations come and go, while he remained as he had been and the sultan never turned against him."⁹⁹ Moreover, observations regarding the sultan's often harsh treatment of his amirs are recorded by al-Yūsufī and al-Shujā'ī,¹⁰⁰ and according to the latter, seconded by al-Maqrīzī, on many an occasion awe or even fear determined the amirs' attitudes towards their sultan.¹⁰¹ All in all, these elements taken together make a very strong case—at least as far as his elite is concerned—for considering al-Nāṣir Muḥammad a sultan whose firm hold on his office, combined with his political experience (and even paranoia), allowed him to dominate Mamluk society's elite. For this elite of individual amirs, with their various backgrounds, lacked any strong sense of solidarity and could pursue their self-preservation only within the parameters their sovereign set for them.

One final question needs to be asked: what was the nature of al-Nāṣir's involvement in creating this quite successful varied composition of his elite? In a previous study on the amir Qawṣūn,¹⁰² I agreed with Reuven Amitai that indeed al-Nāṣir Muḥammad seemed to have "created a system of balances and counter

⁹⁸ Among many such references, there is the sudden eviction of the *khāṣṣakī* amir Quṭlūbughā in 1327 (esp. Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 3:250) and of the *nā'ib* Arghūn in 1326 (e.g., al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:279), the murder of the *khāṣṣakī* amir Baktamur al-Sāqī in 1332 (e.g., al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 135) and of the long-standing governor of Syria Tankiz in 1339 (e.g., Zettersteen, *Beiträge*, 210), and there are a number of allegedly false rumors that, regardless of their high positions, time and again endangered the amirs Bashtak, Aqbughā, and Qawṣūn in the period 1339–40 (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:483–84).

⁹⁹ Al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:611. For a similar, though more general, remark, see al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:113.

¹⁰⁰ See al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhah*, 153; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:113.

¹⁰¹ Al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:61, 112; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:447, 449, 478, 483, 532.

¹⁰² J. Van Steenbergen, "The Amir Qawṣūn, Statesman or Courtier? (720–741 AH/1320–1341 AD)," in *Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras III*, ed. U. Vermeulen and J. Van Steenbergen, *Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta* 103 (Leuven, 2001), 451–68.



balances that prevented and disabled the rise of any powerful faction against his rule.”¹⁰³ On the basis of many features mentioned above, such a foregone conclusion may be perhaps a bit audacious. Clearly, the process of selecting his “lieutenants” and favoring some of his mamluks had as much to do with al-Nāṣir’s personal and emotional predilections as with his political insights. Actually, a combination of both may well have been responsible for the (accidental?) origin of this elite’s divergent composition and interaction with him, though again, due to its private nature this is an argument that remains conjectural.

Even though the origin of such policies remains obscure, their result is undeniable: al-Nāṣir’s success for more than thirty years is aptly epitomized in the subordination of his elite at the very end of his reign and confirmed by the succession of his son Abū Bakr. And this situation was actually very convincingly depicted at the beginning of this article in al-Shujā’ī’s highly dramatical story: one by one the elite’s many different categories of mourners enter the scene; tension rises between the lead characters; the late sultan’s will is executed; and in an overwhelming final chord of unanimity the new sultan is enthroned as al-Manṣūr Abū Bakr. Al-Nāṣir had been “victorious” one last time.

¹⁰³Ibid., 466, referring to Amitai, “Remaking,” 162.



APPENDIX: LIST OF AMIRS OF ONE HUNDRED AT THE END OF AL-NĀSĪR MUḤAMMAD'S REIGN

- Abū Bakr ibn Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn (1322–41)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:720–23; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:462–64; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:254–55; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:17–18
- Almalik al-Jūkandār, al-Ḥājj, Sayf al-Dīn (ca. 1277–1346)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:618–20; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:411; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:85–88; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 4:108; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:175–76; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:487–89
- Alṭunbughā al-Māridānī al-Sāqī al-Nāṣirī, 'Alā' al-Dīn (ca. 1320–43)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:604–7; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:409; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:67–70; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:266; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 4:104; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:105; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:378
- Aqbughā 'Abd al-Wāhid al-Nāṣirī, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1344)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:548–49; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:391; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 2:480–82; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:267; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 4:225; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:107; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:377–78
- Aqsunqur al-Nāṣirī, Shams al-Dīn (d. 1347)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:554–56; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:394; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 2:496–99; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:178–80; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:515
- Aydughmish al-Nāṣirī al-Ṭabbākhi, 'Alā' al-Dīn (d. 1342)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:652–53; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:426–28; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:165–68; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:251; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:99–100; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:320–22
- Bahādur al-Damurdāshī al-Nāṣirī, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1343)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:62–63; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:498; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:431–32; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:252; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:104; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:322–23
- Barsbughā al-Nāṣirī, al-Ḥājjib, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1342)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:686–88; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:474; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:282–83; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:223; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:316; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:262
- Bashtak al-Nāṣirī, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1341)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:690–94; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:477–79; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 3:367–72; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:54–56; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:18–20; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:264–65
- Baybars al-Aḥmadī al-Jarkasī, Amīr Jāndār, Rukn al-Dīn (ca. 1262–1345)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:81–83; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:502; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*,



- 3:479–81; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:83; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:143; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:459–60
- Baygharā al-Nāṣirī al-Manṣūrī, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1353)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:100; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:514–15; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:294
- Burunlī (Bulurghā) al-Nāṣirī, Ibn al-‘Ajūz, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1342)
al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:175, 221; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:263–64
- Jankalī ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Bābā ibn Jankalī ibn Khalīl ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-‘Ijlī, Badr al-Dīn (1276–1346)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:163–66; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 1:539–40; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 5:22–25; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:218–19; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:143–44; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 3:460–61
- Kūkāy al-Silāḥdār al-Manṣūrī, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1348)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 4:162–63; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 3:270; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:241; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:625
- Maḥmūd ibn ‘Alī ibn Sharwīn al-Baghdādī, Wazīr Baghdād, Najm al-Dīn (d. 1347)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 5:399; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:331–32; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:80; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:183; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:536–37
- Maliktamur al-Ḥijāzī al-Nāṣirī, Sayf al-Dīn (ca. 1310–47)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 5:444–46; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:358–59; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:184; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:537–38
- Qawṣūn al-Nāṣirī, al-Sāqī, Sayf al-Dīn (ca. 1300–42)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 4:136–41; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 3:257–58; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 4:104; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:278–81
- Qumārī al-Ṭatarī al-Nāṣirī al-Ḥasanī, Amīr Shikār, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1342)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 4:131–32; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 3:256; al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:250; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:101; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:341
- Qumārī al-Nāṣirī al-Kabīr, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1346)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 4:132–33; al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:238; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:177; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:497
- Quṭlūbughā al-Fakhrī al-Ashrafī al-Nāṣirī, al-Silāḥdār al-Sāqī al-Ṭawīl, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1342)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 4:112–20; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 3:250–52; al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:249–50; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 3:77; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:103; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:275–78
- Sanjar al-Jāwulī, ‘Alam al-Dīn Abū Sa‘īd (1255–1345)
al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:467–70; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 2:170–72; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 6:74–76; al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 4:247–48; al-Shujā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:276; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:109; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:426–29



- Ṭuquzdamur al-Ḥamawī al-Nāṣirī, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1345)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:610–13; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 2:225; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 6:420–22; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:142; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:463–65
- Ṭurghāy al-Nāṣirī al-Ṭabbākhī, al-Jāshinkīr, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1344)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 2:578–79; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 2:216; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 6:379–80; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz*, 9:366; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:107; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:383
- Urumbughā al-Nāṣirī, Amir Jāndār, Sayf al-Dīn (d. 1342)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 1:480–81; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal*, 2:335; al-Shujā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 1:251; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:99; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:319–20
- Yalbughā al-Yaḥyāwī al-Sāqī al-Nāṣirī, Sayf al-Dīn (1319–47)
 al-Ṣafadī, *A'yān*, 5:584–92; Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar*, 4:436–37; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 10:185; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 2:538–40

