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THE WORK OF ART AS A MOMENTOUS SITE OF ENCOUNTER IN HEIDEGGER

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YULIA TSUTSEROVA

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INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Introduction

The history of the reception of Heidegger's essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" (over 530 books, articles, and dissertations, including its first and definitive full-length commentary by von Herrmann (*Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst: Eine systematische Interpretation der Holzwege-Abhandlung "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes"* (1980)) and extending all the way into the present decade with a collective commentary by Espinet and Keiling (*Heideggers Ursprung des Kunstwerkes: Ein kooperativer Kommentar* (2011)), has consistently recognized the stakes of the essay as vastly exceeding the domain of aesthetics. In recent years, authors such as William Desmond and Krzysztof Ziarek have sought to inscribe its problematic within the broader critique of the modern Subject and calculative rationality in conversation with the perspectives of Adorno and Benjamin. However, surprisingly few scholars have attempted to interpret the essay from the point of view of Heidegger's sustained engagement with his main opponent in questions of subjectivity and rationality, Emmanuel Kant, and even fewer – from that of space and time as conditions of the possibility of experience and their transformation in Heidegger's thinking throughout the 1930s.

Yet hints suggesting the centrality and validity of such an approach could already be found in contributions by Emmanuel Martineau, Dominique Janicaud, and Sven-Olov Wallenstein : indeed, the striking resemblance between Martineau's criteria of space, time, and object (in his comparison of the different versions of the essay) with the conditions of the possibility of experience in Kant's "Transcendental Aesthetics" could not be reasonably overlooked. It is this resemblance which had initially prompted our inquiry into the relationship

between “The Origin of the Work of Art” and Heidegger’s critique of Kant’s analysis of experience as objectivity conditioned by space and time throughout the 1930s. In order to gain an accurate sense of how “The Origin of the Work of Art” might constitute a key aspect – if not the linchpin – of this critique, we have deemed it indispensable to reconstruct the progression of this critique from Heidegger’s four studies of Kant (1927/28, 1929, 1931, 1935) to *Sein und Zeit*, and to *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. Having thus traced the major stages of Heidegger’s reflection upon space, time, and object throughout the decade of 1927-1938 in the first three chapters of the dissertation, we were finally in a position to both pose and attempt to answer the question of how “The Origin of the Work of Art” might re-define these notions so as to offer a model of the experience of appropriation which would outstrip not only that of calculative rationality and the Kantian Subject, but also that of *Dasein* of the epoch of *Sein und Zeit*.

Chapter Overview

Chapter 1, “Experience as Objectification (*Vergegenständlichung*) : Space, Time, and the Subject in Heidegger’s Turn (and Returns) to Kant,” will trace the rise of the problematic of space and time in relation to the question of the experience of being through Heidegger’s sustained studies of Kant beginning with the 1927/28 course *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (GA 25) and ending with the 1935/36 course *Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (GA 41). This genealogy will serve to demonstrate the legitimacy and necessity of evaluating the proper spatiality and temporality of the work of art in the three elaborations of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* in terms of their contribution to Heidegger’s development of an alternative to Kant’s interpretation of space and time as conditions of objectivity.

Chapter 2, “Existence as Signification (*Besinnung*) : *Dasein* as the Measure of Space and

Time in *Sein und Zeit*,” will approach *Sein und Zeit* as Heidegger’s initial constructive response to Kant’s subjectivization of space and time as pure forms of the intuition. Focusing on §22-24 and §69-72, it will acknowledge the departure of Heidegger’s fundamental analytic of *Dasein* from the transcendental aesthetic of Kant, while insisting upon the fact that in *Sein und Zeit* both space and time remain essentially *Dasein*-commensurate (*daseinsmäßig*). Having thus outlined space and time as possibilities of *Dasein*, it will draw upon §24 and §83 in order to anticipate Heidegger’s trajectory beyond *Being and Time* towards space and time as possibilities of being.

Chapter 3, “Being as Ap-propriation (*Ereignis*): Time-Space (*Zeit-Raum*) as the Rift (*Riß*) of the Abyss (*Abgrund*) of Being (*Seyn*) in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)*,” will provisionally leap over ten years in the development of Heidegger’s reflection upon space and time in order to identify its explicit resurgence in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, §238-242. It will bring spatializing and temporalizing into relief as ways of the grounding of the abyss, their primordial unity and difference. In uncovering their most profound origin in the event of the appropriation of being (*Seyn*), it will mark the latest development in Heidegger’s reflection upon space and time at the close of the decade inaugurated by his confrontation with Kant and thus finally arrive at the vantage point from which it might consider the contribution of the proper spatiality and temporality of the work of art to this trajectory.

Chapter 4, “Poetry as Fusion (*Fuge*): Spatiality and Temporality as Schemata of Relationality in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*,” will advance an interpretation of the work of art as an intermediate vantage point on being, situated between that of *Dasein* in *Sein und Zeit* and that of *Abgrund* in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. It will argue that the work of art can and must be considered in terms of its proper spatiality and proper temporality, not only in acknowledgement of Heidegger’s privileging of space and time in the analysis its “prototype,”

Dasein, in *Sein und Zeit*, but also in anticipation of his recourse to time-space in the conjecture of its “telos ” – the grounding of the abyss in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. In exegeting the proper spatiality and proper temporality of the work of art in the three elaborations of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, it will propose that such an interpretive strategy is uniquely suited to revealing the work of art to be something like a measure of conversion between the space and time of *Dasein* and the time-space of the abyss.

[This chapter will indicate and elucidate any significant changes in the constitutive elements of the proper spatiality and proper temporality of the work of art from one elaboration to the next as they arise. Where appropriate, it will additionally seek to amplify its interpretation of such elements using detail from more extensive treatments in Heidegger’s published writings from the corresponding 1927-1937 period.]

The first section of this chapter, “The Proper Spatiality (*eigentliche Räumlichkeit*) of the Work of Art,” will identify and analyze conceptual elements that may be responsibly interpreted as forming a broad range of the spatiality of the work of art and of its experience in the three elaborations of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*. This range will be provisionally framed, on the one hand, by the literal original setting of the work of art and its “experience” in such a location, and, on the other, by an “archi-spatiality” of being and being there as orientation towards it. The investigation will set out with a humble focus on the commonplace spatiality of the work of art and of its experience, and progressively expand its scope to their proper spatiality. Having distinguished these layers insofar as it is possible and useful, it will trace the transformation of commonplace spatiality into proper spatiality – or, in the final elaboration, into the proper essential space (*eigentlicher Wesensraum*) of the work of art – back to its primordial source, the “im-proper” spatiality of the nothing (*Nichts*) or of the abyss.

The second section of this chapter, “The Proper Temporality (*eigentliche Zeitlichkeit*) of the Work of Art,” will take its point of departure from the following hint found in the first elaboration of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*: “...there are no works conforming to their time that might be considered works of art; rather, only those works are works of art, which are at work in such a way that they transform and make their time conformable to themselves.” It will adopt this glimpse of the relationship between the genuine work of art and “time” as a startling perspective from which the work of art might be perceived as an operation of change from commonplace temporality to proper temporality. Insofar as such an operation would itself need to be understood as an aspect of the greater operation of appropriation (*Ereignis*), this section will attempt to interpret the transformation of “time” by and within the work of art as a means of synchronization between *Dasein* and the abyss, as a measure of conversion between the space and time of *Dasein* and the time-space of the abyss. It will begin with a consideration of the commonplace temporality of the work of art understood as historical provenance, expression of an epoch, and consequence of an efficiently causal sequence of production, the “experience” of which must of necessity be posterior, belated – a sanitized and esteemed form of taxidermy. Having diagnosed these distortions of temporality, this section will proceed to examine two ways of interpreting the proper temporality of the work of art and of its experience: (1) as a chronology traceable in light of the free gift of the possibility of attunement extended to being there through the work of art as institution of being, (2) as a synchrony entailed by the event of appropriation in its actuality, experienced as a suspension of “time” by motion in tandem.

CHAPTER 1 : Experience as Objectification (*Vergegenständlichung*) : Space, Time, and the Subject in Heidegger's Turn (and Returns) to Kant

Introduction

Despite the skewed results of Martineau's comparison of the three versions of "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," its chosen criteria – space, time, and object – cannot be dismissed, for they represent the starting point of a line of inquiry capable of inscribing the questioning and insights of the essay within a philosophical problematic which directs and unifies Heidegger's efforts throughout the decade of 1927-1938, namely : a reckoning with the Kantian heritage of reducing transcendence to the terms of the Subject and the pursuit of an alternative capable of doing justice to the inalienable structural contribution of being (and eventually, being) to the capabilities of Dasein. These criteria extend the possibility of tracing the origins and motifs of Heidegger's ontological elaboration of the work of art directly to his extensive, painstaking, and repeated meditations upon Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (and especially "Die Transzendente Ästhetik") and isolating an Ariadne's thread which runs through the exploratory labyrinth of the 1930s, whose entrance is marked by *Sein und Zeit*, and exit – by the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. Within this labyrinth, Heidegger grapples with the Minotaur of the Subject more than once : in his lecture course *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1927-1928), in his book *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929), in his lecture course *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit : Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1931), and finally in *Die Frage nach dem Ding : Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (1935-1936). Composed in tandem with the three versions of "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," the latter text does not simply stand at the nexus of the

problematic of the transcendence of the Subject and that of the ontological character of the work of art, but rather points to “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” as Heidegger’s first foray into a spatio-temporal ‘between’ which is no longer conflated with a capability either of the Subject or of Dasein. With its sights firmly fixed on this destination, this chapter will attempt to ‘untangle’ the knots of the thread of space-time represented by Heidegger’s four meditations on Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* and unfold the steps it guides Heidegger through on his way towards the ‘exit.’

§1. Space, Time, and Objectivity in Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic

In Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Der Transzendentalen Elementarlehre, Erster Teil (“Die Transzendente Ästhetik”), the notions of spatiality and temporality enter the discussion in connection with the question of intuition as the condition of the possibility of the givenness of objects to thought.¹ All thought requires the medium of intuition, and all intuition, in turn, requires the medium of sensibility: “Thus objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone delivers intuitions to us.”² However, objects are not thought without concepts that “spring forth from reason.”³ Indeed, it precisely in view of the synaptic operation of intuitions that they are further distinguished into empirical and pure, the latter corresponding to the form that orders matter in the object as appearance.⁴ The first example that Kant provides is, in fact, immediately relevant to the subject of spatiality and temporality: thus, in a representation (*Vorstellung*) of a body, impenetrability, hardness, and color belong to sensation, while extension/expansion

¹ Emmanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Erster Teil, Die Transzendente Ästhetik, Vorbetrachtung, 2 : “sich...eine Erkenntnis auf Gegenstände beziehen mag.”

² Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §1, B 33: “Vermittelst der Sinnlichkeit also werden uns Gegenstände gegeben, und sie allein liefert uns Anschauungen.”

³ Ibid.: “durch den Verstand aber werden sie **gedacht**, und von ihm entspringen Begriffe.”

⁴ Ibid., §1, B 34-35.

(*Ausdehnung*) and *Gestalt* belong to pure intuition, constitute the *a priori* of the givenness of the body as an object, and “take place” within the mind “without an actual object of the senses or impression.”⁵ Thus, §1 concludes with an identification of two “pure forms of sensate intuition” or “a priori principles of knowledge” – namely, time and space.⁶

§§2-8 of the first part of “Die Transzendente Ästhetik” are dedicated entirely to the consideration of the notions of space and time in relation to that of object. We represent objects to ourselves as if outside of ourselves, as if in space.⁷ Indeed, the *Gestalt*, size, and relation of these objects are determined or determinable in space, and yet both space and time are something “within us,” and “cannot be seen outwardly: “Time cannot be seen outwardly, as little as [can] space, as something within us.”⁸

The discussion (*expositio*) of space in §2 is ‘metaphysical,’ that is to say, it does not only represent “that which belongs to the concept,” but also contains that which the concept, as “given *a priori*,” presents.⁹ This discussion yields the following conclusions: (1) space is no empirical concept derived from external experiences, but is rather a representation that makes such experience possible in the first place;¹⁰ (2) space is a necessary *a priori* representation which underlies all external intuitions as their ground, in fact, one cannot represent to oneself that there be no space¹¹; (3) space is a pure intuition, represented to oneself as an all-embracing unity

⁵ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §1, B 35: “Diese gehören zur reinen Anschauung, die a priori, auch ohne einen wirklichen Gegenstand der Sinne oder Empfindung... im Gemüte stattfindet.”

⁶ Ibid., §1, B 36: “es zwei reine Formen sinnlicher Anschauung, als Prinzipien der Erkenntnis a priori gebe, nämlich Raum und Zeit.”

⁷ Ibid., §2, B 37: “stellen wir uns Gegenstände als außer uns, und diese insgesamt im Raume vor.”

⁸ Ibid.: “Äußerlich kann die Zeit nicht angeschaut werden, so wenig wie der Raum, als etwas in uns.”

⁹ Ibid., §2, B 38: “...*Erörterung (expositio)...Vorstellung dessen, was zu einem Begriffe gehört; metaphysisch aber ist die Erörterung, wenn sie dasjenige enthält, was den Begriff, als a priori gegeben, darstellt.*”

¹⁰ Ibid.: “Der Raum ist kein empirischer Begriff, der von äußeren Erfahrungen abgezogen worden...äußere Erfahrung ist selbst nur durch gedachte Vorstellung allererst möglich.”

¹¹ Ibid.: “Der Raum is eine notwendige Vorstellung, a priori, die allen äußeren Anschauungen zum Grunde liegt. Man kann sich niemals eine Vorstellung davon machen, daß kein Raum sei...”

(whose parts are derived through its limitation (*Einschränkung*) and are always thought within it), which underlies all concepts of the same such that geometric principles, for example, are derived from this intuition with apodictic certainty¹²; (4) the original representation of space is an *a priori* intuition and not a concept.¹³ In the first edition (A), space is also said to be represented as a given infinite greatness (“als eine unendliche Größe *gegeben*”) and as boundlessness (*Grenzenlosigkeit*).¹⁴

In the subsequent ‘transcendental’ discussion of the ‘concept’ of space, Kant underscores that space is originally an intuition, a ‘principle’ out of which propositions that define space synthetically and *a priori*, such as those of geometry, arise.¹⁵ Specifically in relation to the object, space is here defined as an *a priori* intuition “that must be encountered within us before all perception of an object.”¹⁶ In fact, the concept of the object (*Objekt*) itself must be determined *a priori* by such an intuition, which must itself be understood as “within the subject, as the formal constitution of the same such that it might be affected by an object.”¹⁷ The concluding section of §3 reiterates that space is neither a property of some thing in itself or a determination of something that adheres to the object, but rather the form of all appearances of external sense, i. e. the subjective condition of sensibility.¹⁸ Thus, space is, in fact, given to the subject prior to the object and constitutes the condition of the receptivity of such an object as exterior to oneself, i. e.

¹² Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §2, B 39: “Der Raum ist...eine reine Anschauung. Denn erstlich kann man sich nur einen einigen Raum vorstellen, und wenn man von vielen Räumen redet, so versteht man darunter nur Teile eines und desselben alleinigen Raumes. Diese Teile können...nur in ihm gedacht werden. ... Hieraus folgt, daß in Ansehung seiner eine Anschauung *a priori*...allen Begriffen von *demselben* zum Grunde liegt.”

¹³ Ibid.: “Also ist die ursprüngliche Vorstellung von Raume *Anschauung a priori*, und nicht *Begriff*.”

¹⁴ Ibid., §2, A 25.

¹⁵ Ibid., §3, B 40-41.

¹⁶ Ibid., §3, B 41: “*diese Anschauung muß a priori, d. i. vor aller Wahrnehmung eines Gegenstandes, in uns angetroffen werden, mithin reine, nicht empirische Anschauung sein.*”

¹⁷ Ibid.: “*bloß im Subjekte, als die formale Beschaffenheit desselben von Objekten affiziert zu werden*”

¹⁸ Ibid., §3, B 42: “Der Raum ist nichts anders, als nur die Form aller Erscheinungen äußerer Sinne, d. i. die subjektive Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit.”

the possibility of being affected by an object.¹⁹ This reasoning leads Kant to conclude that one might speak of space only from the standpoint of the human being, apart from which its representation means nothing.²⁰ Indeed, where it comes to what we term ‘external objects,’ space constitutes the form of their representation to us by sensibility and is therefore necessary for their reception as external.²¹

§§4-5 are dedicated to the ‘metaphysical’ and ‘transcendental’ discussion of time. As space, time is not an empirical concept drawn out of experience.²² Thus, the representation of time is itself prior to the coming of “being simultaneous” (*Zugleichsein*) and “one following another” (*Aufeinanderfolgen*) into perception.²³ “Being simultaneous” is then defined in terms of “one and the same time” and “following one another” in terms of “different times.”²⁴ From subsequent ‘metaphysical’ discussion, we learn that time underlies all intuitions as their ground, is given *a priori*, and constitutes the condition of the possibility of apodictic principles, or axioms, of the relations of time in general.²⁵ Time has only one dimension: that is to say, different times may not be not simultaneous (as different spaces), but must follow one after the other.²⁶ This principle is indeed a rule according to which experience in general is possible.²⁷ Just as in the case of space, time is “not a universal concept,” but rather “a pure form of sensate intuition.”²⁸ The original representation of time is given as unlimited (*uneingeschränkt*), and thus

¹⁹ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §3, B 42.

²⁰ Ibid., §3, B 43.

²¹ Ibid., §3, B 45: “was wir äußere Gegenstände nennen, nichts anders als bloße Vorstellungen unserer Sinnlichkeit sein, deren Form der Raum ist.”

²² Ibid., §4, B 46.

²³ Ibid.: “Denn das *Zugleichsein* oder *Aufeinanderfolgen* würde selbst nicht in die Wahrnehmung kommen, wenn die Vorstellung der Zeit nicht *a priori* zum Grunde läge.”

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., §4, B 47.

²⁶ Ibid.: “Sie hat nur eine Dimension: verschiedene Zeiten sind nicht zugleich, sondern nach einander.”

²⁷ Ibid.: “Regeln, unter denen überhaupt Erfahrungen möglich sind.”

²⁸ Ibid.: “Die Zeit ist kein...allgemeiner Begriff, sondern eine reine Form der sinnlichen Anschauung.”

every determinate amount of time is possible only through the limitation of this original representation of time as endlessness (*Unendlichkeit*).²⁹ It is in the ‘transcendental’ discussion of the ‘concept’ of time in §5 that we discover that, in Kant’s view, the concept of motion as an alteration (change) of place is possible only through and within the representation of time.³⁰ The reason for this is that the *a priori* intuition of time resolves the contradiction of the same thing being and not-being at a given place by means of the notion of ‘after.’ The first complication in the ‘concept’ of time arises in §6, where time is conjectured to be “the form of the inner sense, i. e. of intuiting ourselves and our inner state,” that is to say, “it determines the relations of representations in our own inner state.”³¹ The complication of this ‘form’ is precisely that it does not give any *Gestalt*, which leads us to supplement this lack by means of analogy, such as that of a sequence of time (*Zeitfolge*) imagined as a line proceeding into the endless (*unendliche*) upon which the manifold is plotted as a one-dimensional row of one thing following another.³²

It is at this juncture, §6.c.B50-51, that Kant identifies a crucial distinction between space and time: while space, as an *a priori* condition and pure form of all external intuition, is limited to external appearances, time constitutes the *a priori* condition of all appearances in general,³³ including the appearance of the internal to itself as internal. The condition of space is restricted to accommodating the givenness of objects as external things. The condition of time, on the other hand, is not restricted to such givenness and is capable of accommodating objects as internal representations (determinations of the mind that belong to its inner state).

²⁹ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §4, B 47.

³⁰ Ibid., §5, B 48: “...der Begriff der Veränderung und, mit ihm, der Begriff der Bewegung (als Veränderung des Orts) nur durch und in der Zeitvorstellung möglich ist”

³¹ Ibid.: “Die Zeit ist...die Form des innern Sinnes, d. i. des Anschauens unserer selbst und unsers innern Zustandes”; “bestimmt sie das Verhältnis der Vorstellungen in unserm innern Zustande.”

³² Ibid., §6, B 50: “eben weil diese innre Anschauung keine Gestalt gibt, suchen wir auch diesen Mangel durch Analogien zu ersetzen, und stellen die Zeitfolge durch eine ins Unendliche fortgehende Linie vor, in welcher das Mannigfaltige eine Reihe ausmacht, die nur von einer Dimension ist”

³³ Ibid.: “Die Zeit ist die formale Bedingung a priori aller Erscheinungen überhaupt.”

Thus time emerges as the immediate condition of our internal intuition of ourselves, albeit itself intuitable only in relation to objects of our sense (“Gegenstände unsrer Sinne”).³⁴ It is for the sake of the intuitability of time, therefore, that Kant clarifies its particular conditionality in relation to sensibility: “Thus time is plainly a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is each time sensate, i. e. insofar as we are affected by objects) and is in itself, outside the subject, nothing.”³⁵ Within the subject, however, time is that condition without which no object can be given in experience whatsoever and thus the condition of *objectivity as such*.³⁶ What is more, as §7 explicitly states, time must be seen as “not as an object, but rather as a kind of representation of my own self as an object,”³⁷ that is to say, time is a condition of the self being given to the self as an object by means of internal intuition, a condition of the self’s experience of the self as an object. Thus, for Kant, the decisive point consists in elucidating the contingency of time upon the subject even prior to any givennes of that subject to itself as an object.³⁸ In his critique of the Leibnizian-Wollfian hypothesis, Kant concludes that no object can ever be encountered apart from our subjective constitution, for the properties of any such an object must be contributed (*beilegt*) to it by sensate intuition.³⁹ An object cannot appear, or be given within intuition, without a form determined for it by the subjective constitution.

It is at this juncture that Kant’s discussion of time necessitates and introduces an explicit

³⁴ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §6, B 51.

³⁵ Ibid., §6, B 51: “Die Zeit ist also lediglich eine subjektive Bedingung unserer (menschlichen) Anschauung, (welche jederzeit sinnlich ist, d. i. so fern wir von Gegenständen affiziert werden,) und an sich, außer dem Subjekte nichts.”

³⁶ Ibid., §6, B 52: “kann uns in der Erfahrung niemals ein Gegenstand gegeben werden, der nicht unter die Bedingung der Zeit gehörete.”

³⁷ Ibid., §7, B 54: “Sie ist also wirklich nicht als Objekt, sondern als die Vorstellungsart meiner selbst als Objects anzusehen.”

³⁸ Ibid..

³⁹ Ibid., §8, B 62: “so bald wir unsre subjektive Beschaffenheit wegnehmen, das vorgestellte Objekt mit den Eigenschaften, die ihm die sinnliche Anschauung beilegte, überall nirgend anzutreffen ist, noch angetroffen werden kann, indem eben diese subjektive Beschaffenheit die Form desselben, als Erscheinung, bestimmt.”

distinction between external objects (*äußere Gegenstände*), or transcendental objects (*transzendente Objekte*),⁴⁰ and objects of internal sense (“Gegenstände unserer innern Sinnen”), the latter including those of “myself and my state” and being “immediately clear through consciousness.”⁴¹ Both of these kinds of objects, however, belong to appearance (*Erscheinung*), in the sense that they are given to consciousness as ‘double-sided’: (1) as an object observed in itself and (2) as an object observed in terms of its form of intuition (the latter constituting the focal point of the observation).⁴² In view of this ‘double-sidedness’ it becomes possible to distinguish between that, within appearance, which properly belongs to the object and that which belongs to the subject – more specifically, to insist that the form of the intuition is not to be sought in the object in itself, but in the subject.⁴³ Thus it is that objects “observed as appearances” come to be distinguished from objects as “things in themselves,” with space and time conditioning the former rather than presenting the latter as such.⁴⁴ Indeed, in §8 Kant claims, in no uncertain terms, that apart from the receptivity of our sensibility, there can be no explanation of objects ‘in themselves.’⁴⁵ Indeed, the definition of sensibility emerges from this very distinction as “the appearance of something and the manner in which we are affected thereby” and is most stringently set apart from any knowledge of the object in itself.⁴⁶ In the

⁴⁰ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §8, B 63.

⁴¹ Ibid., §7, B 55: “die [Wirklichkeit] des Gegenstandes unserer innern Sinnen (meiner selbst und meines Zustand) unmittelbar durchs Bewußtsein klar ist.”

⁴² Ibid.: “...beide...nur zur Erscheinung gehören, welche jederzeit zwei Seiten hat, die eine, da das Objekt an sich selbst betrachtet wird...die andere, da auf die Form der Anschauung dieses Gegenstandes gesehen wird.”

⁴³ Ibid.: “welche nicht in dem Gegenstande an sich vornehmlichselbst, sondern im Subjekte, dem derselbe erscheint, gesucht werden muß, gleichwohl aber der Erscheinung dieses Gegenstandes wirklich und notwendig zukommt.”

⁴⁴ Ibid., §7, B 56: “sie bloß auf Gegenstände gehen, so fern sie als Erscheinungen betrachtet werden, nicht aber Dinge an sich selbst darstellen.”

⁴⁵ Ibid., §8, B 59: “Was es für eine Bewandnis mit den Gegenständen an sich und abgedondert von aller dieser Rezeptivität unserer Sinnlichkeit haben möge, bleibt uns gänzlich unbekannt.”

⁴⁶ Ibid., §8, B 61: “enthält die Vorstellung eines Körpers in der Anschauung gar nichts, was einem Gegenstande an sich selbst zukommen könnte, sondern bloß die Erscheinung von etwas, und die Art, wie wir dadurch affiziert werden, und diese Rezeptivität unserer Erkenntnisfähigkeit heißt Sinnlichkeit, und bleibt von der Erkenntnis des Gegenstandes an sich selbst...dennoch himmelweit unterschieden.”

same paragraph, Kant terms this understanding a “theory of the ideality of external as well as internal sense” and reiterates its interpretation of space and time as follows: “It is thus undoubtedly certain, and not merely possible, or probable, that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (external and internal) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all of our intuition, in relation to which, therefore, all objects are mere appearances and not things, given on their own in this manner.”⁴⁷

In the closing paragraphs of §7, Kant excludes motion (*Bewegung*) and alteration/change (*Veränderung*) from the pure intuition of space on the grounds that they presuppose something empirical: “In space, observed in itself, there is nothing mobile [and] time itself does not alter/change itself.”⁴⁸ This point is reiterated and amplified in §8: “all that which belongs to intuition in our knowledge...is not to be contained as mere relations of places in intuition (extension), | alteration/change of place (motion), and laws according to which this alteration/change is determined (forces of motion).”⁴⁹ This preclusion of extension, motion, and forces from pure forms of intuition will constitute a crucial point of contrast with Heidegger’s understanding of space, time, and object in the 1930s, in which these constitute precisely the conditions of understanding spatiality as forces of contraction and expansion in motion (or operation).

The stake of Kant’s argument in §8 is the establishment of the mind/soul (*Gemüt*) as possessing its own proper means of operation, precisely the pure intuitions of time and space,

⁴⁷ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §8, B 66: “Es ist also ungezweifelt gewiß, und nicht bloß möglich, oder auch wahrschein|lich, daß Raum und Zeit, also die notwendigen Bedingungen aller (äußern und innern) Erfahrung, bloß subjektive Bedingungen aller unsrer Anschauung sind, im Verhältnis auf welche daher alle Gegenstände bloße Erscheinungen und nicht für sich in dieser Art gegebene Dinge sind.”

⁴⁸ Ibid., §7, B 58: “Im Raum, an sich selbst betrachtet, ist aber nichts Bewegliches [und] die Zeit selbst verändert sich nicht, sondern etwas, das in der Zeit ist.”

⁴⁹ Ibid., §8, B 66-67: “alles, was in unserem Erkenntnis zur Anschauung gehört...nichts als bloße Verhältnisse enthalte, der Örter in einer Anschauung (Ausdehnung), | Veränderung der Örter (Bewegung), und Gesetze, nach denen diese Veränderung bestimmt wird (bewegende Kräfte).”

which are necessarily prior to any contribution of matter (*Materie*) by impressions (*Empfindungen*).⁵⁰ Indeed, in this paragraph Kant insists that it is the representations of external sense that make up the “proper material” (“*eigentliche Stoff*”) of the constitution of our minds/souls, time itself being a condition of any such constitution.⁵¹ In affirming the proper activity (*Tätigkeit*) of the soul/mind to consist in the positing (*Setzen*) of its representations, Kant does not hesitate to take a step further and propose that, in its being affected by an object, the mind/soul is affected precisely through itself, that is, “according to an inner sense of its form.”⁵²

§2. *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: The Limits of Self-Affection

In this lecture course of the Winter semester of 1927/28, given in Marburg, Heidegger seeks to descend anew into “the abyss from which springs all philosophical elucidation,” including Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* itself.⁵³ Already at the outset, he anticipates that its most perplexing difficulties will be shown to stem from Kant’s (as well as his successors’) negligence of the phenomenon of the world.⁵⁴ It is towards the understanding and articulation of this phenomenon, of course, that Heidegger’s efforts are directed in *Sein und Zeit*. And it is with a view to such an undertaking that Heidegger characterizes the “general horizon” of the problematic of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* as “the human being-there in its understanding of

⁵⁰ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §8, B 60.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, §8, B 67: “Nicht allein, daß darin die Vorstellungen äußerer Sinne den eigentlichen Stoff ausmachen, womit wir unser Gemüt besetzen, sondern die Zeit in die wir diese Vorstellungen setzen, die selbst dem Bewußtsein derselben in der Erfahrung vorhergeht, und als formale Bedingung der Art, wie wir sie im Gemüte setzen, zum Grunde liegt, enthält schon Verhältnisse des Nacheinander-, des Zugleichseins, und dessen, was mit dem Nacheinander-sein zugleich ist (des Beharrlichen).”

⁵² *Ibid.*: “die Art, wie das Gemüt durch eigene Tätigkeit, nämlich dieses | Setzen seiner Vorstellung, mithin durch sich selbst affiziert wird, d. i. ein innerer Sinn seiner Form nach.”

⁵³ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Klostermann : Frankfurt am Main, 1977, Vorbetrachtung, 2.

⁵⁴ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, §2.a.α, 20.

being.”⁵⁵ Indeed, what escapes Kant, and what Heidegger sets out to articulate in *Sein und Zeit* is precisely “the relation of the subject, of *Dasein*, to the beingly [*auf Seiendes*] overall as beingly [*als Seiendes*], its relation to being [*Sein*].”⁵⁶

In lieu of Heidegger’s being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*), for Kant, the most fundamental self-conscious relation to the world must remain that of “objectification” (*Vergegenständlichung*),⁵⁷ with the outcome that the beingly must be construed as an object (*Gegenstand*). Indeed, for Kant, transcendence must remain defined as the “a priori constitution of objectivity,”⁵⁸ not in the sense of bringing the object forth in its existence (*Dasein*), but rather in the sense of its “setting-before” (*Vorstellen*) the subject as something that stands across from, opposite, “against” it (*Gegen-stand*).⁵⁹ According to Kant, the possibility of such setting-before is proper to the subject as such and is to be understood as a kind of thinking-of (*Zu-denken*).⁶⁰ It is by taking this path that Kant arrives before the necessity of articulating the conditions of the possibility of experience which “are valid for all experience.”⁶¹ As Heidegger points out, this is the impetus for what is referred to as Kant’s “Copernican turn,” i. e. the claim that “objects must be directed in accordance with our knowledge.”⁶² (Interestingly enough, while Heidegger underscores Kant’s distinction between the “object” and “the *a priori* possibility of relating to an object,” he is careful to point out that although Kant does speak of “relating to an object in general,” he does not thereby intend the same thing as Husserl, i. e. relation “to a formal

⁵⁵ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, §4, 70.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, II.I.1. §24.a.β.334: “Es handelt sich um die Beziehung des Subjekts, des *Daseins*, auf *Seiendes überhaupt als Seiendes, um seine Beziehung auf das Sein...*”

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, §2.a.β, 26.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, II.I.1. §23.b.β.300.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, II.I.1. §23.b.β.320-321.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, II.I.1. §23.b.β.321.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, §3.a.β, 46.

⁶² *Ibid.*, §3.a.δ, 55.

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B XVI.

something in general.”⁶³) Thus, for Kant, the possibility of transcendence is grasped primarily in terms of the possibility of object-related thought, and its sources (*Quellen*) – intuition, understanding, imagination – thus remain profoundly subjective. They are described by Heidegger as ways of “holding oneself” (*Verhaltung*) (typically translated as behavior or comportment) or, slightly further in the text, of “ur-handling” (*Urhandlung*),⁶⁴ which lie within the subject as such⁶⁵ and “found, carry, make possible (“*fundamentieren*, *tragen*, *ermöglichen*”)” objectivity.⁶⁶

Yet Heidegger reproaches Kant precisely for not pursuing “the more radical path” opened up by a question Kant himself poses yet depreciates: “how is the capacity to think itself possible?”⁶⁷ In the thought of Kant, such inquiry into the wellspring – the “ur-depths” (*Urtiefen*) – of subjectivity itself stays out of the spotlight restricted to the question of the understanding prior to and apart from experience.

In tracing Kant’s trajectory towards objectification, Heidegger reaffirms (over against the interpretations of the Marburg School represented by Cohen and Natorp) the centrality of the “Tranzendentale Ästhetik” section and its discussion of space and time as being of utmost significance for the overall objective of Kant’s work as a whole.⁶⁸ In contrast to Newton and Leibniz, Kant sees space and time as original ways of representation proper to the finite essence of the human being – as intuiting (*Anschauend*), as *intendere* rather than *intendum*, as modes of relations of the mind; although, as Heidegger points out, it is not always clear whether such an

⁶³ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, §3.b.β, 64.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, II.I.1. §24.a.β.333.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, II.I.1. §24.a.β.330.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, II.I.1. §24.a.β.334.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, II.I.1. §24.a.β.332.

Cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A XVI f.

⁶⁸ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, I, 77-80.

understanding might not simultaneously elucidate space and time as “intuited” (*Angeschautes*).⁶⁹

The entire second chapter of *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is dedicated to a phenomenological interpretation of Kant’s “Transcendental Aesthetic.” The point of departure for Kant’s analysis is the claim that space is not an empirical concept, i. e. that it is not “abstracted from outer sensations” (*non abstrahitur a sensationibus externis*).⁷⁰ Heidegger’s gloss reads as follows: space is not something at hand (*Vorhandenes*) among other things that are at hand. The same holds true for time: time is not something at hand, in the way one might say two things are at hand simultaneously or otherwise. Both space and time underlie being at hand.⁷¹ As Heidegger explains, “underlying” means “making possible” the appearance of things as “here and there,” “now and then.” Positively speaking, this entails that space and time are ways of “setting-before” (*Vorstellungen, repraesentare*), which come from the mind itself.⁷²

The next point that Heidegger draws out is that space is originally a unity, and that individual spaces are only delimitations or restrictions of this same original whole – and the same goes for time, as Heidegger tirelessly reiterates. As he will repeat in *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, space and time are *quanta*, not *quantitates*, and are infinite or end-less in the sense that the notions of beginnings or ends do not apply to wholes as they do to aggregates. Put in other words, space and time are infinite or unlimited in the sense that they condition all finite and limited spaces and times.

Finally, as wholes, space and time are given, i. e. intuited in intuition, meaning that they

⁶⁹ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, §6.d, 55.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, II. §7, 114.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, II, §7, 114-115.

⁷² *Ibid.*, II. §7, 115.

are, in some sense, intuitable.⁷³ How does Heidegger propose to interpret the givenness of space and time? Such givenness implies that space and time may be understood both as intuiting and as intuited. Heidegger proposes to approach the givenness of space and time through their rootedness in the imagination, wherein they are capable of being approached as *ens imaginarium*.⁷⁴ Another alternative that Heidegger considers is the interpretation of the intuiting as that which is determining or defining, and of the intuitable – as that which is determinable or definable.⁷⁵ Yet, as Heidegger points out, how can something be intuitable and intuited, on Kant’s account, without necessarily becoming an object?⁷⁶ How can space and time be given apart from being given as objects?

The distinction that ultimately points towards a way forward in this regard is that between *intuitus originarius* and *intuitus derivativus*: thus, beginning on the side of the intuiting, Heidegger underscores that it is not a pure creative act and cannot, therefore, be straightforwardly opposed to the intuited: “Space is not an “intuitus originarius,” as the latter does not befit the finite essence of human beings as such. That is, the human being as such is by no means the free creator of space and time, but rather, as a finite essence, s/he is intuitive in the sense of “intuitus derivativus.”⁷⁷ An *intuitus derivativus* gives something directly to itself, without having created it – intuition gives space to itself. Thus, space may be spoken of as a “given” of the intuition, a “given” which, in turn, “gives” the possibility of the “givenness” of objects. Thus, it is intuited not as an “object,” but as a “given.”

⁷³ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.§7, 121.

⁷⁴ Ibid.: “Raum und Zeit sind als Anschauungen nicht ›intuitus originarius‹, aber auch nicht ›intuitus derivativus‹ im Sinne des affektionsbestimmten Begegnenlassens, sondern intuitus derivativus und doch ›ursprünglich‹, von diesem endlichen Subjekt *selbst herkommend*, d. h. in der transzendentalen *Einbildungskraft* verwurzelt – daher wurden der Raum wie die Zeit auch als *ens imaginarium* bezeichnet.”

⁷⁵ Ibid., II.§8, 125.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., II.§8.126.

While the givenness of space and time within intuition is provisionally resolved through this reference to the *intuitus derivativus*, such an account does not yet address the more active role of the understanding in the givenness of the object as an object – that is, the spontaneity (*Spontaneität*) of the understanding in its unifying function (*Funktion der Einigung*).⁷⁸ While the relation of intuition to the object is immediate, that of the understanding is mediated by means of concepts which, in turn, themselves issue out of the categories of the understanding (Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality). The relatedness of the understanding to the object (*Gegenstandsbezogenheit*) means, among other things, that the object cannot be understood as an object without the contribution of the understanding, so to speak, the “handling”⁷⁹ of the object by the subject. For understanding, such “relating-itself-to” an object is always a matter of “unifying,”⁸⁰ and it is precisely this function of which transcendental logic treats. Yet when Heidegger considers the “spontaneity” of the understanding more closely, he discovers that as a “function,” it is governed by “rules” which may be “given” to it by itself (as in the case of the *intuitus derivativus*), but are not “created” for it by itself. Indeed, as Heidegger’s discussion of the understanding apart from its relation to objects makes clear, understanding is itself subject to such rules, which are necessary and not subject to modification (at least by the subject him/herself). It is the rules that “make” thinking into what it is,⁸¹ not thinking that “makes” the rules. Having underscored this point, one is in a position to ask how the understanding applies or employs such rules in its function of unifying. It is in this sense of the application of rules that the understanding is said to be *a priori* “determinative” of the object (*apriorisches*

⁷⁸ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§14.170.

⁷⁹ Ibid., II.I.1.§14.174.

⁸⁰ Ibid., II.I.1.§14.175: “Sich-beziehen-auf ist es immer ein Vereinigen.”

⁸¹ Ibid., II.I.1.§15.177.

Gegenstandsbestimmen)⁸² but this does not necessarily mean that it “produces” or “creates” or “makes” the object. It is limited in its form and, as a consequence, cannot but limit the object.

What is this logic of the object (*Gegenstandslogik*)⁸³ or transcendental logic? Transcendental logic “grounds those relations of thinking to objects, through which the objects are determined with regard to their objectivity in advance of all experience and for all particular ontic knowledge.”⁸⁴ In essence, transcendental logic answers the question of objectivity from the perspective of the understanding, i. e. “What does it mean to be thinking of something?” (*Denken von Etwas*).⁸⁵ Insofar as it is related to an object, such thinking joins pure forms of the intuition, space and time, as a condition of the possibility of experience. Yet precisely how and by what means does pure thinking relate to an object? Kant’s answer, according to Heidegger, is that pure thinking relates to objects by means of concepts and the relation itself may be said to be that of defining, determining, or delimiting (*Bestimmen*).⁸⁶ In contrast to the essential receptivity of intuition, Heidegger underscores that insofar as pure thinking employs concepts, it is most certainly active: “...one must clearly hear the active character of the concept... Within the concept lies, firstly, the active spontaneous grasping-at, secondly, the grasping-of the many, thirdly, the grasping-to itself of the concept.”⁸⁷ In addition to their properly active nature, and unlike rules (discussed earlier), concepts do indeed spring up from the spontaneity of thinking, are “made,” “configured,” “crafted” (*gemacht, gebildet, erzeugt*).⁸⁸

⁸² Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§15.183.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§15.185.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§16.193.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§17.a.β.206.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§18.b.α.223.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§18.b.β.228.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§18.b.γ.228: “Das begriffliche Vorstellen als Handlung des Denkens ist zwar auf Anschauung fundiert, aber in sich ist es spontan, d. h. was den Begriff als Begriff charakterisiert – die “Gemeinheit” –, entspringt der Spontaneität des Denkens. “Die Form eines Begriffes, als einer diskursiven Vorstellung, ist jederzeit gemacht.”¹⁴ “Gemacht” meint: gebildet, erzeugt.” (¹⁴Logik, §4 Anm.)”

Yet, according to Heidegger, it is not immediately clear what such being “made” or “configured” signifies. Kant’s answer to question regarding the origin of concepts states that concepts spring up from reflection (*Reflexion*), which is “an act which constitutes the “universality” of a concept according to its essential form.”⁸⁹ But precisely how is the configuration (*Gebilde*) of the concept “configured” (*gebildet*)? The departure point of Heidegger’s interpretation of the act of reflection is the nature of the configuration, commonality (*Gemeinheit*). Commonality is that singular, unified something (*etwas*) which the many have in common; yet, as it does not as such already lie within each of the many, it must first be “seen,” brought into one’s “look”/gaze (*Anblick*) and held within it.⁹⁰ Thus, the act of reflection is a contemplation and selection of what the many have in common; it compares, notices, and affirms such commonality. Given this focus, the act of reflection is a seeing apart from (*Absehen-von*) the differences – an abstracting (*Abstrahieren*). Thus, in the final analysis, the configuration of concepts as reflection employs comparison and abstraction (*Komparation* und *Abstraktion*) as follows: “comparison prepares for reflection...abstraction fulfills it and concludes it.”⁹¹ Importantly, abstraction in itself does not yet yield a configuration; as Heidegger points out, in contrast to preceding usage, Kant understands abstraction as a primarily negative condition (*negative Bedingung*) of reflection: “We must not say ‘to abstract something (abstrahere aliquid),’ but rather ‘to abstract from something (abstrahere ab aliquo).’”⁹² That from which one abstracts, ‘sees apart,’ ‘looks away’ is differentness (*Verschiedenheit*).

While the structure of the act of reflection has thus acquired greater resolution, the same

⁸⁹ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§18.b.γ.229.

⁹⁰ Ibid..

⁹¹ Ibid., II.I.1.§18.b.γ.233: “die Komparation bereitet die Reflexion...die Abstraktion vollendet sie und schließt sie ab.”

⁹² Ibid., II.I.1.§18.b.γ.235.

must now be achieved for an understanding of its spontaneity. Heidegger's point of departure in pursuit of this objective is the notion of function (*Funktion*), in contrast to that of affection (*Affektion*) which characterizes intuition. The function of unifying (*Einigung*) is proper to judgment (*Urteil*), and it is precisely in this fundamental act that judgment interfaces with reflection's fundamental act of the configuration of concepts.⁹³ In fact, as Heidegger plainly states, this interface consists precisely in judgment's genesis (*Genesis*) of concepts by its function of unifying.⁹⁴ Unification itself can proceed in several different ways, thus accounting for the generation of different categories of concepts.⁹⁵ The four ways of unifying are quantity (*Quantität*), quality (*Qualität*), relation (*Relation*), and modality (*Modalität*). The "mathematical" categories of quantity and quality are categories of essence (*essentia*) pertaining to the question "what," while the "dynamic" categories of relation and modality are categories of existence (*existentia*) and pertain to the question "how."⁹⁶

Yet in order for such ways of unification to be fully understood, Heidegger insists that the function of unification itself must first be reconciled with intuition, such that its different ways might adequately reflect the implications of such a reconciliation, namely – the necessity of their inflection by time, and by extension – by receptivity. The categories, as Heidegger concludes, "have a double origin: qua notiones, they spring up from out of the functions of unification, qua γένη τοῦ ὄντος – from out of the pure figures [*Bilde*] of sensibility, of time."⁹⁷ It is for this reason that unification must ultimately be understood both as synthesis (*Synthesis*) and as syndosis (*Syndosis*), the former "spontaneously generated" and the latter "given": "the theme

⁹³ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1. §18.b.ε.240.

⁹⁴ Ibid.: "Der Begriff...verdankt seine Genesis dem Urteil als Funktion der Einigung."

⁹⁵ Ibid., II.I.1. §19.c.248-249.

⁹⁶ Ibid., II.I.1. §22.300.

⁹⁷ Ibid., II.I.1. §19.c.253.

becomes this synthesis in its relatedness to objects, i. e. this synthesis in its unification with the syndosis of the intuition.”⁹⁸ Kant raises the question of the relation of the categories to objects in §14, “Transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories.” For Heidegger, however, it is imperative that this account be read alongside that of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Introduction, Part II, “Of the domain of philosophy overall.” In the latter, concepts related to objects are analyzed with regard to four aspects: field (*Feld*), grounds (*Boden*), area (*Gebiet*), and domicile (*Aufenthalt*).

For Heidegger, the imperative of the primacy of object-related understanding (of transcendence) entails an inevitable confrontation between the receptivity of the intuition and the spontaneity of the understanding. He discovers both an acknowledgement of this dilemma and a provisional attempt at its resolution in Kant’s alternative notion of synthesis as “a ‘handling’ [*Handlung*], which is neither intuition itself nor yet thinking, but rather lies, as it were, between both of these and, accordingly, sets forth a bonding [*Verbindung*] between intuition and thinking.”⁹⁹ The synthesis in question, its ambiguity and unclarity notwithstanding, does have a name – that of the imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) or, perhaps more precisely put, the ‘power of configuration.’ Indeed, as Heidegger points out, Kant also speaks of the imagination as a “productive” and even “figurative” (*produktive, figürliche Synthesis*), which brings “into a figure [*Bild*],” which gives a “figura.”¹⁰⁰ Even more specifically, insofar as it brings something into view (*Anblick*), such synthesis gives something visible (*sichtbar*) – a species – and is therefore also referred to as *synthesis speciosa*.¹⁰¹ In turn, “figuring” or “figuration” (*Bilden/Bildung*) must

⁹⁸ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§21.a.265: “...Thema wird diese Synthesis in ihrer Bezogenheit auf Gegenstände, d. h. diese Synthesis in ihrer Einigung mit der Syndosis der Anschauung.”

⁹⁹ Ibid., II.I.1.§21.b.270.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., II.I.1.§26.a.γ.415.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

be understood in two senses: (1) setting forth (*herstellen*), shaping (*gestalten*), bringing forth (*hervorbringen*), and producing (*producere*); (2) giving a figure (*Bild*), offering a view (*Anblick*).¹⁰² In relation to time, such figuring is threefold: (1) post-figuring (*Nachbilden*), which makes the absent (*gewesenes*) now visible again, (2) pre-figuring (*Vorbilden*), which lets one catch sight of the not yet presencing (*anwesendes*) now (3) con-figuring (*Abbilden*), which directly figures (*vorbilden*) the presencing now.¹⁰³ As productive, the synthesis of the imagination is, indeed, the *exhibitio originaria temporis* and, incidentally, that which “encapacitates” poetry (*Dichtungsvermögen*).¹⁰⁴ What, then, are the figures of time as synthesized by the imagination? Heidegger identifies these as Kant’s analogies of experience (*Analogien der Erfahrung*) and names three: (1) the principle of the endurance (*Beharrlichkeit*) of substance in all appearances; (2) the principle of the succession of time according to the laws of causality; (3) the principle of being-at-the-same-[time] (*Zugleichseins*) according to the laws of interaction (*Wechselwirkung*) and community (*Gemeinschaft*).¹⁰⁵ The *a priori* synthesis of the productive imagination, i. e. its bringing forth of the categories as “off-shoots” of temporality – the advent of time into figurality – constitutes the focus of Kant’s doctrine of schematism (*Schematismus*).¹⁰⁶

The “receptive spontaneity” or “spontaneous receptivity”¹⁰⁷ of the imagination – its “working” – is formulated by Kant as a “blind, although indispensable function of the soul.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§26.a.γ.415.

¹⁰³ Ibid., II.I.1.§26.a.γ.416.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., II.I.1.§26.a.γ.417.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., II.I.1.§26.b.427-428.

¹⁰⁶ As Pöggeler points out, Heidegger’s first reflections on schematism are to be found in his lecture course on logic in the winter of 1924-25, where Heidegger interfaces the approaches of Aristotle and Kant. (Otto Pöggeler, “Heidegger on Art,” in *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology*, eds. Karsten Harries and Christoph Jamme (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1994), 114).

¹⁰⁷ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§24.b.348.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., II.I.1.§21.c.276.

Heidegger's contention is that when one takes a closer look at the act of reflection, one notices that such an act operates on the basis of something given prior to and requisite for its performance. The giving (*Gebung*) thus set at the very core of spontaneity does not nullify the latter, but rather crucially distinguishes it from the spontaneity of the merely logical function of thinking.¹⁰⁹ Yet, in Heidegger's estimation, the precise significance of such synthesis is "never made clear" by Kant: "Then does Kant say nothing positive at all about this synthesis, such that one might finally come nearer to it? He certainly does say something positive, but all of it is so ambiguous, that not only the interpreters, but also already Kant himself falls victim to such ambiguity, which remains mired in such radical unclarity."¹¹⁰ Despite such "radical unclarity," Heidegger does treat of the three modes of the synthesis of the imagination: apprehension (*Apprehension*), reproduction (*Reproduktion*), and recognition (*Recognition*).

One path that Heidegger briefly hints at in the form of a question is that of a more radical grasp of time: "Perhaps syndosis is a mode of the synthesis in question, perhaps the latter is even identical with syndosis, if we grasp the latter radically enough in relation to time as the most original, because universal, pure intuition?"¹¹¹ In response to a hypothetical question as to whether Kant would have been in a position to articulate such a relation, Heidegger emphatically responds in the negative:

No! For at first, Kant had only made the universal dimension of the place of origin visible; he had not yet shown then how the pure synthesis of the pure imagination related itself to the manifold of time and why it could relate itself to such at all. Just as little had he shown wherein consisted the specific function of the unification of synthesis, where lay the last ground of the possibility of the *multiple* being given to an *I*, and furthermore, it was not shown how such

Cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B103, A 78.

¹⁰⁹ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.1.1. §21.c.275.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II.1.1. §21.c.272-273.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, II.1.1. §21.c.276.

belonging of the manifold to the I was connected to the pure intuition of time.¹¹²

Heidegger himself would elaborate this notion of syndosis in terms of an *a priori* unity of time which springs up from the imagination as a kind of baseline both for the pure forms of the intuition and for the categories of the concepts of the understanding. As such, it would prefigure (*vorgebildet*) the configuration of concepts as such.¹¹³ Gesturing beyond Kant, Heidegger would go so far as to say that “the *imagination* is only possible as time-related,” that the imagination “*is itself time*, in the sense of original time, which we name temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*].”¹¹⁴ Before such temporality can come into view, Kant’s “vulgar” interpretation of time, as Heidegger refers to it, must be circumscribed and set aside. Kant renders time as a succession of “nows” of any duration or span steadily following one after another (*Nacheinander der Jetztfolge*), wherein every “now” borders on a no-longer-now (*Jetzt-nicht-mehr*), i. e. “just now” or a “moment ago” (*Soeben*), and a not-yet-now (*Jetzt-noch-nicht*), i. e. “immediately” or “straightaway” (*Sogleich*).¹¹⁵ For Kant, such a succession determines every “setting-before” (*Vorstellen*) as a “course of occurrences within the subject.”¹¹⁶ As Heidegger points out all of the states (*Zustände*) of the subject are related to this succession of “nows,” which is why everything that is “set-before” the subject is said to be (*innerzeitig*), i. e. to proceed “*within time*” (“*in der Zeit*”). As Heidegger explains, for Kant, time as “now and now and now” constitutes the horizon without

¹¹² Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§21.c.297: “Nein! Denn Kant hat nur erst die allgemeine Dimension des Ursprungsorts sichtbar gemacht; er hat noch nicht gezeigt, wie denn die reine Synthesis der reinen Einbildungskraft sich auf die Zeitmannigfaltigkeit bezieht, und warum sie sich überhaupt darauf beziehen kann. Ebensowenig hat er gezeigt, worin die spezifische Einigungsfunktion der Synthesis besteht, wo der letzte Grund der Möglichkeit dafür liegt, daß *Mehreres für ein Ich* gegeben sein kann, und ferner ist nicht gezeigt, wie diese *Zugehörigkeit von Mannigfaltigem zu einem Ich* zusammenhängt mit der reinen Anschauung der *Zeit*.”

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§21.c.292.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.b.342.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

which no impression could ever register as “following” another.¹¹⁷

The unification of the many by means of such a horizon is precisely what Kant understands by apprehension. The time as a succession of “nows” can accommodate the many precisely the “now” is itself “manifold” rather than an “absolute, isolated, simple element.”¹¹⁸ This horizon is what Kant also refers to as “original receptivity,” the “pure *a priori* self-affection.”¹¹⁹ But to briefly return to the remaining two modes of the synthesis of the imagination: reproduction and recognition. In order to glimpse the succession of the “now” precisely as a manifold of the “no-longer-now,” the “now,” and the “not-yet-now,” the mind must be capable of returning to the “no-longer-now,” of reproducing it in order to see its relation to the “now” and the “not-yet-now.” With regard to recognition, however, Heidegger points out that it is precisely recognition’s relation to time that “does not come to light” in the interpretation of Kant.¹²⁰

Yet the far greater challenge that Kant’s interpretation of time must inevitably confront is, according to Heidegger, the relation between time and the “I-think,” which must presumably underlie the three modes of synthesis of the imagination in order for the latter to be unified at their source.¹²¹ It is with this challenge in mind, that Heidegger aims at superceding Kant’s misnomer and misunderstanding of recognition in favor of a synthesis he would name precognition (*Praecognition*).¹²² Only by working out the full implications of such a revision does Heidegger believe that he would be able to understand the relationship between time and

¹¹⁷ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§24.b.344.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.b.347.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.b.348.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.d.356.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.d.α.358.

¹²² *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.d.β.359.

the “I-think” “more radically.”¹²³ The synthesis of precognition relates to the “not-yet-now” thus and completes the unity of the horizon of time necessary for the givenness of any manifold. The startling implications of Heidegger’s revision of the third mode of the synthesis of the imagination are two: (1) the understanding, interpreted by Kant as time-free spontaneity, can no longer maintain independence from time; and (2) the categories must be acknowledged to spring forth from time itself, rather than from the understanding.¹²⁴

To return, as Heidegger does, to the question of the spontaneity of the subject: how does such spontaneity fare in relation to time? Within the problematic of objectivity, such spontaneity initially takes the form of a unique *a priori* resistance (*eigentümlicher, apriorischer Widerstand*), “a resistance which lies within the subject, *which the subject gives to itself*.”¹²⁵ Unlike ontic resistance, which proceeds from a determinate object at hand and which the subject strikes upon and runs up against, *a priori* resistance is rooted within the center of the subject itself, in its spontaneity as a paradoxical kind of binding (*Bindung*) which is, in essence, freedom.¹²⁶ The freedom of such binding consists precisely in the capacity of the subject to determine all of its intuiting.¹²⁷ As that “original and unchangeable spontaneity,” as self-activity (*Selbsttätigkeit*) which is determined through none other than itself, such freedom lies even deeper than time.¹²⁸ Kant refers to the knowledge of such self-activity, i. e. the subject’s knowledge of itself in its “handling” (*Handeln*), as apperception (*Apperzeption*). More specifically, apperception is the knowledge of oneself in its capabilities (*Vermögen*) and, to that extent, a certain kind of self-possession (*Selbstbesitz*): “The I-can, the capability-character of my handlings, determines the

¹²³ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§24.d.β.359.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.d.β.365: “*auch der Verstand eine im Grunde zeitbezogene Handlung ist und nicht als zeitfreie Spontaneität – wie Kant meint...*”

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.e.370: “...einen Widerstand, der im Subjekt liegt, *den das Subjekt sich selbst gibt*.”

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.e.380.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, II.I.1.§24.e.370.

kind of being of the subject.”¹²⁹ In addition to self-possession, self-activity must be understood as self-constancy (*Selbst-ständigkeit*), the subject’s enduring, continuing as itself. The self-determination of self-activity equally regulates, determines that dimension (*Dimension*) within which all that stands opposite the self can be encountered¹³⁰: “the unifying *subject as such* originally pre-gives itself a horizon of all possible unity overall.”¹³¹ The subject is a capability (*Vermögen*) which “encapacitates” all objectivity, a possibility which makes all objectivity possible. Indeed, Heidegger explains such capability in no uncertain terms as pure possibility (*reine Möglichkeit*): “The I is therefore pure possibility precisely in its actuality, this I-can is precisely the existent existence.”¹³² The subject is defined by freedom in its very being (*seiend*), and such freedom is that of the subject’s capacity to act. Indeed, according to Heidegger, “possibility stands higher than actuality” in Kant’s conception of the subject as “freely handling.”¹³³ Thus, subjectivity emerges as an ur-spring-dimension (*Ursprungsdimension*), or origin-dimension, which originates all other “dimensions,” including those of the categories and of the pure forms of the intuition. According to Heidegger, such “dimensions” are constituted in the *ekstasis* (*Ekstasis*) of the subject, in its stepping outward (*Heraustreten*) as its fundamental character.¹³⁴

How does this newly articulated Kantian conception of the subject relate to time? According to Heidegger, the essential freedom of the subject must at some point rebound onto itself, and, insofar as this is the case, Kant should no longer be able to retain the notion of a time-

¹²⁹ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§24.e.375: “Das Ich-kann, der Vermögenscharakter meiner Handlungen, bestimmt primär die Seinsart des Subjekts.”

¹³⁰ Ibid., II.I.1.§24.e.371.

¹³¹ Ibid., II.I.1.§24.e.377: “...das einigende *Subjekt als solches* sich ursprünglich einen Horizont von möglicher Einheit überhaupt vorgeben kann.”

¹³² Ibid., II.I.1.§24.e.380.

¹³³ Ibid., II.I.1.§24.e.381.

¹³⁴ Ibid., II.I.1.§25.c.390: “Dieses ausgreifende Heraustreten des Subjekts nenne wir seine *Ekstasis*, seinen ekstatischen Grundcharakter.”

free subject. Heidegger suggests that Kant's conception of time as self-affection (*Selbstaffektion*) is introduced as a means of understanding this paradoxical phenomenon of free self-determination, in which time figures as something that both springs up from the self and affects the self.¹³⁵ Here, Heidegger points out the pivotal moment of such a phenomenon – the necessity of the givenness not only of time to the self, but of the self to the self as well.¹³⁶ This moment of the givenness of the self to the self will form the eventual point of departure for the articulation of the work of art as that ur-spring-dimension (*Ursprungsdimension*) from which all other “dimensions,” including time, spring forth; in the artwork essay, it will be the work of art that gives the self to the self, and not the self itself.

For the time being, however, and speaking of Kant, Heidegger explains that the subject comes to itself precisely through its own activity of “timing,” i. e. its anticipatory donation (*Vorgabe*) of the relations of time to itself.¹³⁷ As Heidegger puts it, “time must come out of and through the self itself.”¹³⁸ Indeed, the self must create (*schöpfen*) time from out of itself: “time must spring from the three ecstases which determine the selfhood of the self in its free possession of itself.”¹³⁹ Slightly further, Heidegger describes the subject as “originally time-laden” (*ursprünglich Zeitträchtiges*) – “pregnant” with time, so to speak – as releasing (*entlassen*), delivering time without separating itself from it. As the “parent” of time, the “subject in its

¹³⁵ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§25.c.391.

¹³⁶ Ibid., II.I.1.§25.c.392: “...auch und gerade zur Idee der Gegenständlichkeit überhaupt – nicht nur zu den einzelnen Gegenständen – das Wesensmoment der Gebung, des Angangs gehört, und zwar der Angang a priori, der Selbstangang.”

¹³⁷ Ibid., II.I.1.§25.b.392-393: “...das Selbst aber sich selbst die Zeit vorgibt...”

¹³⁸ Ibid., II.I.1.§25.d.393: “...Zeit, muß aus dem Selbst selbst durch dieses kommen.”

¹³⁹ Ibid., II.I.1.§25.d.394: “...die reine Zeit entspringt den drei Ekstasen, die die Selbstheit des Selbst in seinem freien sich selbst Besitzen bestimmen.”

original selfhood is temporality itself.”¹⁴⁰ Such temporality is not only the outstretching (*Erstreckung*) of the self from out of the future, over the present, and into the past, but also the capacity of the self to identify itself as itself in any given moment precisely as connected to the past and to the future.¹⁴¹ Indeed, the very concept of the self depends on such persistence and continuity through time. According to Heidegger, it is the temporality of Dasein that constitutes the ground of the understanding of being (*Seinsverständnis*) overall.¹⁴² The articulation of this thesis, is, of course, the task of *Sein und Zeit*; in the meantime, Heidegger remains convinced that Kant has not grasped the phenomenon of time as original temporality.¹⁴³

But precisely what is space intuited *as*? Heidegger attempts to describe the whole of space in its givenness as relations of space (*Raumverhältnisse*), as three-dimensionality (*Dreidimensionalität*).¹⁴⁴ Before such givenness can be articulated positively, it must be distinguished from the givenness of an object. “Receiving” the relations of space as such does not mean being directed (*gerichtet*) towards them, well, directly, as one would be in case of “receiving” things given by means of space. Rather, as Heidegger suggests, it might be thought of as being oriented (*orientiert*) towards them as a regard (*Hinblicknahme*).¹⁴⁵ Such spatial orientation is, according to Heidegger, constitutive of our existence as such, and can never be objectified: “Insofar as we exist, we always already exist in space, without making it as such into an object or a theme. Orientation in space is yet free of the objectification of the same.”¹⁴⁶ To be absolutely clear, Heidegger explicitly confirms that he considers such givenness within the

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.: “Was aber so als ursprünglich Zeittächtiges die Zeit aus sich entläßt und zugleich sich zu ihr verhält, was mit der Zeit handelt und sich zugleich an sie bindet, das muß in einem ganz ursprünglichen Sinn selbst zeitlich sein. Das Subjekt ist in seiner ursprünglichen Selbstheit die Zeitlichkeit selbst...”

¹⁴¹ Ibid., II.I.1.§25.e.395.

¹⁴² Ibid., II.I.1.§26.b.425.

¹⁴³ Ibid., II.I.1.§26.b.426.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., II.§8.128.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., II.§8.128.

regard as explanatory of and equivalent to space as intuited (*Angeschaute*).¹⁴⁷ The intuited-ness of space consists in the whereupon (*Worauf*) of such a regard, a whereupon which is neither object, nor nothing, yet is structurally definitive/determinative. It is precisely in this sense that space is to be understood as a pure form of the intuition, hence Heidegger's reference to space and time as prefiguring (*Vorbildung*) all intuiting.¹⁴⁸ Thus, intuiting may be said to fulfill itself in two defining/determining ways, space and time, understood specifically as preceding, non-objectifying regards upon the pure one-beside-another (*Nebeneinander*) and one-after-another (*Nacheinander*), respectively.¹⁴⁹

Having made this crucial distinction between objective and non-objective givenness, Heidegger leaves the discovery of the richness of space as such to geometry. And yet, in the subsequent section, he points out that in geometry, "pure space, i. e. that already glimpsed in intuition initially non-objectively, yet as a *unified whole*, becomes a proper object of grasp."¹⁵⁰ How can both of these be the case? Here, Heidegger is referring to a specific aspect of geometry, namely, the consideration of space as restricted to determinate figures of space; yet, there is no explicit warrant for reducing geometry merely to such an aspect in this passage. The question of the determinacy of space continues to haunt the question of its intuitability, however, and is well attested by Heidegger himself. One of the texts he seeks clarification in is §38 of Kant's *Prolegomena*, which distinguishes between space as uniform and indefinite/indefinite, and space as restricted to a shape or figure.¹⁵¹ In addition to previously discussed insights, this text allows Heidegger to make a distinction between the "derivative" unity stemming from the

¹⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II, §8.129.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, II, §8.130.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, II, §8.129.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, II, §9.135.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, II, §9.136.

understanding in objectification and “original” unity, which is part and parcel of space as a form of pure intuition.¹⁵²

If space can be non-objectively given as a regard oriented towards a whereupon, time can be intuitable and intuited as well. Yet how can time be understood as just such a regard – namely, a regard upon a where? Curiously, throughout the entire paragraph on the space of play (*Spiel-Raum*) that space and time weave in anticipation of objects, Heidegger hardly shrinks from speaking of time as pre-figuring, as being a form.¹⁵³ Yet the field in which time is most intuitable is that of the study of movement. According to Heidegger, for Kant, movement is a certain mode of alteration, namely, the alteration of place in time (“die Ortsveränderung in der Zeit”).¹⁵⁴ Such an alteration of place is only graspable against the horizon of time as the succession/sequence of one-after-another: given time, one is able to claim, of the same thing, that it is both present in and absent from the same place. Without time, such a claim would be a contradiction.¹⁵⁵

At this juncture, Heidegger raises an interesting dilemma with which Kant seems to have been preoccupied for some time before resolving in favor of one option over the other: this dilemma is whether movement should be included in the “Transzendental Ästhetik” alongside space and time, and Kant’s resolution is that it should not. As the notion of movement will be shown to be central to Heidegger’s understanding of the spatiality of the work of art – and of its experience – it is imperative to understand why Kant chose to exclude it from his account of the most basic conditions of experience. Kant’s answer is rather unexpected: rather than arguing that movement is derivative from space and time, he observes that movement contains “an

¹⁵² Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II, §9.138-139.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, II, §8.131.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, II, §10.140.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

intellectual concept” (“intellektueller Begriff”); it is for this reason that it is thematically treated in “Transzendente Logik” rather than “Transzendente Ästhetik.”¹⁵⁶ Thus, Heidegger specifically rejects the notion that movement is a “mixture of space and time” (“eine Mischung von Raum und Zeit”).¹⁵⁷ The “intellectual concept” that is inalienable from the notion of movement is that of substantiality (*Substantialität*) (otherwise understood through time as endurance (*Beharrlichkeit*)) and may, therefore, be traced back to the understanding. Thus, the “conditions” of the phenomenon of movement fall in two different realms, that of the intuition and that of the understanding; as a result, movement cannot be a pure form of the intuition.

As Heidegger points out, however, the resolution of the dilemma with regard to the notion of movement as an alteration of place in time, leaves other notions of alteration unaddressed. Indeed, Heidegger’s claim is that movement “understood more originally plays a much more radical function in the whole of ontology than space and time in Kant’s interpretation of this phenomenon.”¹⁵⁸ What is this “more originally understood movement” and its “more radical function”? And here comes the startling explanation: “Of course, time as pure intuition is the presupposition for the possibility of the experience of an alteration of space; alteration is only experienceable as “within time.” However, inversely, this does not exclude the possibility that movement in the original sense is the presupposition of time in the way that Kant conceives of it. The enigmatic interrelation between time and movement surfaces already in Aristotle, according to whom, on the one hand, time exists only on the basis of movement and, on the other,

¹⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.§10.a.141.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., II.§10.b.141.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., II.§10.b.143: “Mit Absicht mache ich auf diese Phänomene – Wandel, Wechsel, Änderung, Veränderung, Bewegung, Geschehen – aufmerksam; wenn Kant in der transzendentalen Ästhetik die Bewegung der Objekte, die Ortsveränderung usw., ausschaltet, so darf das doch nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß am Ende die Bewegung – ursprünglicher verstanden – eine weit radikaler Funktion hat im Ganzen der Ontologie als Raum und Zeit gemäß der Kantian Interpretation dieser Phänomene.”

movement exists only through time.”¹⁵⁹ With this, the potential “more radical function” of movement is clarified; however, its “more original understanding” is not and remains, therefore, an open question. The other intuitability of time is, of course, its representation as a line proceeding into the infinite, “made up by a row/series of the manifold, which is one-dimensional only”; thus, Heidegger finds it possible to say, together with Kant, that “the representation of time is itself intuition, because all of its relations can be expressed by means of outward intuition.”¹⁶⁰

At its most originary, however, time “belongs to the Subject, to the I.”¹⁶¹ (To reiterate, both space and time are “ways of the finite subject as such, apart from their its factual psychophysical subjectivity.”)¹⁶² As in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, in *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Heidegger similarly arrives at the articulation of time as self-affection (*Selbstaffektion*). The term self-affection refers to the fact that the pure intuition of time involves a certain comportment of the subject in which the latter gives something of itself to itself: “with this sequence/succession, the self encounters something that it, as self, allows to come of itself and to itself, something that it itself is, in a certain way.”¹⁶³ Concisely put, time is the self’s impact upon itself, and this, according to Heidegger, is

¹⁵⁹ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.§10.144: “Gewiß ist die Zeit als reine Anschauung die Voraussetzung für die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung von Ortsveränderungen; nur als Innerzeitiges ist Veränderung erfahrbar. Das schließt aber nicht aus, daß umgekehrt die Bewegung in einem ursprünglichen Sinn die Voraussetzung ist für die Zeit, so wie Kant sie faßt. Schon bei Aristoteles taucht das rätselhafte Wechselverhältnis von Zeit und Bewegung auf, wonach es einerseits Zeit nur gibt auf dem Grunde der Bewegung, andererseits Bewegung nur durch die Zeit.”

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., II.1.§11.a.146: “...stellen [wir] die Zeitfolge durch eine ins Unendliche fortgehende Linie vor, in welcher das Mannigfaltige eine Reihe ausmacht, die nur von einer Dimension ist...”

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 50, A 33.

¹⁶¹ II.1.1.§25.d.394, II.§11.b.150.

¹⁶² Ibid., II.2.§12.159.

¹⁶³ Ibid., II.§11.b.151: “Die reine Anschauung der Zeit ist also ein erfahrungsfreies Vollziehen des Begegnenlassens des Nacheinander, und mit diesem Nacheinander begegnet dem Selbst etwas, was es als Selbst von sich her auf sich zu kommen läßt, etwas, was es selbst in gewisser Weise selbst ist und was es als dieses sich vor-bildet, sich vor-gibt.”

“the most radical understanding of time, which none – neither before nor after him [Kant] – have achieved.”¹⁶⁴ The gravity of such an accomplishment notwithstanding, Heidegger is quick to point out its shortcomings: “...there is a lack of an all-around and conceptually adequate interpretation, and, above all, of a principled basis for the fact that time can be – must be – self-affection. But the latter can only be shown on the basis of a more original explication of the concept of time”¹⁶⁵ – a task Heidegger had set for himself in *Sein und Zeit*.

To return to the parameters of Kant’s “Transzendental Ästhetik,” however, Heidegger for the first time squarely addresses the question of whether time and space are “something objective” (“*etwas Objektives*”) or “something subjective” (“*etwas Subjektives*”). It is also in this volume that Heidegger explicitly characterizes the position of Kant towards Newton and Leibniz as polemical, explaining that for Kant, neither space nor time are not “at hand” within something else that is also “at hand,” as it were.¹⁶⁶ Thus, they are not objective in the sense of being “at hand” (*vorhanden*). On the other hand, neither are they subjective in the sense of being some “process of the soul,” a “something at hand psychologically.” To sum up: “Space and time are neither subjective in the sense of the psychic, nor objective in the sense of the physical, and yet they are ways of intuiting, which lie ready within the mind, and therefore also intuited, and are thus once more “subjective” and “objective”...”¹⁶⁷

Despite its appearance of a solution, this explanation ultimately returns Heidegger to the question of the definition of the subject, the self, the human being in Kant. And it is finitude that distinguishes the human subject in Kant, as Heidegger emphasizes, “space and time are not in the

¹⁶⁴ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.§11.b.151.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, II.§11.b.152.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, II.§11.b.153: “Raum und Zeit sind nichts Subjektives im Sinne des Psychischen, nichts Objektives im Sinne des Physischen, und doch sind sie Weisen anzuschauen, die *im Gemüt* bereitliegen, und dabei auch ein Angeschautes, sind also doch wieder “subjektiv” und “objektiv”...”

horizon of the *intuitus originarius*,”¹⁶⁸ i. e. something akin to divinity. Indeed, for Kant, the question of experience is limited to “that which is accessible to the questioner,” i. e. the human being. Thus space and time must be inherently finite at least to the degree and in the sense that the human being, the human mind is finite – i. e. proper to the human being, but not necessarily to other beings. What is more, the relationship between time and the “I think” must ultimately be resolved in order to ascertain the most original wellspring of subjectivity.¹⁶⁹ As Heidegger warns at the end of Part I of the *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, however, a total break between time and the thinking – and by extension, a chasm within the subject itself – will become evident in the Kantian analysis of pure thinking, and therein necessitate a renewal of the question of their relation. As Heidegger colorfully puts it: “It will become evident that it seems hopeless to unite both of these and that, while both still belong to the subject in the same way, within this latter, a total break lies between time and, according to Kant, timeless and fully extratemporal thinking. The sought union appears to lie even deeper in the realm of the impossible than the attempt to mix fire and water.”¹⁷⁰

Besides the question of finitude, Heidegger raises the question of how it is possible for the subject to self-objectify – that is, to intuit space and time, which are constitutive of itself, as properties of objects (not “things in themselves,” but objects of intuition”). Indeed, he dedicates an entire paragraph to the posing of this question, the answer to which he considers to be yet concealed in Kant’s account:

But should determinations of space and time belong to the matter of the appearance, when they are still ways of the intuiting subject? How might space and time lose their subjectivity in such a way that they turn into determinations of objects – though without being at hand in the sense of

¹⁶⁸ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.2.§12.157.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, II.2.§12.162.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, II.2.§12.163.

objects? Or asked differently: “How might space and time, as determinations of the at hand, come to us from this latter, while the subject attributes them precisely to the appearances? How might space and time remain subjective and thereby also function objectively? How is subjectivity itself ontologically constructed, such that insofar as it exists, the subjective is objectified for the subject as objective?”¹⁷¹

In Heidegger’s initial estimation, Kant’s response to these questions takes a negative form without pointing a way forward: “The Kantian problematic of the interpretation of space and time is securely negative, but we are unable to conjecture the direction of a positive questioning out of his problematic.”¹⁷² In Heidegger’s view, such an outcome is both predictable and inevitable, given Kant’s commitment to the ultimate priority of purely logical understanding over understanding in its relatedness to objects: “It is admittedly peculiar that for Kant the understanding in its purely logical aspect is, as it were, the primary, the more original understanding. The fact that for Kant the purely logical understanding is ‘more a priori’ than the understanding in its relatedness to objects, is grounded in a traditional motive of philosophy: The *cogito* purely for itself is the most original and primarily given, and with the thematization of the relatedness to the object I am already going beyond the originally given. ... This signifies a failure to recognize primary transcendence.”¹⁷³ Unlike he, Heidegger, Kant “did not yet see the essence and the task of a purely phenomenological interpretation of Dasein in the sense of a

¹⁷¹ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.2.§12.161: “Aber wie sollen Raum- und Zeitbestimmungen zur Sachhaltigkeit der Erscheinungen gehören, wenn sie doch Weisen des anschauenden Subjects sind? Wie können Raum und Zeit dergestalt ihre Subjektivität verlieren, daß sie zu Bestimmungen des Objekts werden – ohne doch im Sinne von Objekten vorhanden zu sein? Oder anders gefragt: Wie können Raum und Zeit als Bestimmungen des Vorhandenen und von diesem her entgegenkommen, wo das Subjekt sie doch den Erscheinungen gerade entgegenbringt? Wie können Raum und Zeit subjektiv bleiben und dabei doch objektiv fungieren? Wie ist die Subjektivität selbst ontologisch gebaut, daß, sofern sie existiert, Subjektives dem Subjekt als Objektives objiziert wird?”

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid., II.I.1.§19.b.247: “Merkwürdig ist freilich, daß für Kant der Verstand in rein logischer Hinsicht gleichsam der primäre, der ursprünglichere Verstand ist. Daß der rein logische Verstand für Kant ›apriorischer‹ ist als der Verstand in seiner Gegenstandsbezogenheit, hat seinen Grund in einem traditionellen Motiv der Philosophie: Das *cogito* rein für sich ist das Ursprünglichste und primär gegebene, und mit der Thematisierung der Gegenstandsbezogenheit gehe ich schon über das ursprünglich Gegebene hinaus. ... Das bedeutet die Verkennung der primären Transzendenz.”

fundamental-ontological explication of its fundamental structures [*Grundstrukturen*].”¹⁷⁴

Yet, in Heidegger’s own estimation, such a failure is not as catastrophic as his initial remarks could lead one to believe. In fact, Heidegger is able to conjecture “a way forward” that naturally flows out of Kant’s problematic, with its first and all-important step being a referral of the understanding back to the intuition and a corresponding recognition of the primacy of object-related understanding over purely logical understanding: “The place of the origin of concepts can by no means lie only and primarily in the understanding, but rather in the understanding insofar as it is grounded in the intuition and led by the intuition.”¹⁷⁵ Only thus can the functions of the understanding be fully understood in their relation to time.

The deeper wellspring of such a reversal is Heidegger’s conviction that the “central fundamental lack in Kant’s approach to the problem of the categories” is his “failure to recognize the problem of transcendence,” his “not seeing transcendence as an original determination of the essence of the constitution of the being of Dasein.”¹⁷⁶ The vision that guides Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* is present here in a nutshell as well: “Insofar as it factually exists, Dasein is precisely not an isolated subject, but a being which is essentially outside of itself.”¹⁷⁷ Indeed, Heidegger considers transcendence to be the “presupposition of the possibility of the being of its self.”¹⁷⁸ Yet for Heidegger, such transcendence is not equivalent to the I-you relation (which is itself grounded with the former), but is rather something that *Dasein* is “by itself.”¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§23.b.α.318.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., II.I.1.§19.d.253: “Der Ursprungsort von Begriffen kann überhaupt nicht nur und primär im Verstande liegen, sondern im anschauungsgegründeten und anschauungsgeführten Verstand...”

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., II.I.1.§23.a.γ.315.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., II.I.1.§23.a.γ.315.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

§3. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*¹⁸⁰: The Eclipse of the Transcendental Imagination by “a turning-towards that allows a standing-against” (*eine entgegenstehenlassende Zuwendung-zu*)

As Heidegger’s “Foreword to the First Edition” of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* avows, his interpretation of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* “clarifies...the problematic taken up in the first half of *Sein und Zeit*.”¹⁸¹ As such, it offers a more profound point of departure for uncovering the stakes of a redirection of focus onto the question of space and time in relation to the encounter of the work of art – the most urgent of which remains the origin and measure of transcendence as the very possibility of relation.

As Heidegger points out, Kant renders this possibility in terms of the *a priori* of objectivity as such.¹⁸² On the one hand, the possibility of objectivity lies in the receptivity (*Rezeptivität*) of intuition, and of the other – in the givenness of objects.¹⁸³ It is for this reason that the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* employs the term “object” in two senses: that of appearing (*Erscheinung*) and that of the thing in itself (*Ding an sich selbst*).¹⁸⁴ As the thing in itself, the “object” shows itself from itself; as appearing, however, the “object” is subject to the “manner and breadth”¹⁸⁵ – the measure – of receptivity. It is precisely receptivity that establishes the parameters of intuition as finite.

Kant identifies two of its basic parameters – space and time. Space is a unity, of which all individual spaces are but restrictions; it is an infinite magnitude (*Größe*) which makes

¹⁸⁰ For an exhaustive study of the intellectual context of Heidegger’s *Kantbuch*, see Dieter Henrich, *The Unity of Reason : Essays on Kant’s Philosophy* by Dieter Henrich, ed. Richard Velkley (Cambridge, Mass. : 1994).

¹⁸¹ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 2nd edition, Klostermann : Frankfurt am Main, 2010.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, §3, 15-16.

Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, B 25 (A 11).

¹⁸³ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §5, 26.

Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, A 19, B 33.

¹⁸⁴ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §5, 32.

Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, B XXVII.

¹⁸⁵ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §5, 31.

“quantities” possible.¹⁸⁶ It is the *par excellence* parameter of “encounters of outward sense.”¹⁸⁷ Time, on the other hand, is a pure one-after-another (*Nacheinander*), a parameter of “inward sense,” which conditions the intuition of the self.¹⁸⁸ As such, time emerges as the preeminent parameter of all appearing in general.¹⁸⁹ It is, furthermore, time that gives the horizon of objectivity its coherence.¹⁹⁰ Together, space and time weave what Heidegger calls a horizon of objectivity.¹⁹¹ Insofar as both space and time “belong” to the subject (*Subjekt*),¹⁹² they are ultimately constrained by the givenness of inward sense.

Yet Heidegger insists that such need not be the final frontier of transcendence, if only the subjectivity of the subject is glimpsed as its openness towards the beingly and ultimately towards being. It is for this reason that Heidegger urges a honing (*Verschärfung*) of the problematic of Kant’s “Transcendental Aesthetic,” rather than its eradication.¹⁹³ Indeed, in his treatment of the transcendental imagination, Heidegger argues that Kant’s transcendental deduction is to be approached from two distinct sides: the “objective,” focusing on the objectivity of possible objects, and the “subjective,” focusing, in turn, on the subjectivity of the subject, and more specifically, on the capacities which enable the happening of transcendence within the subject as such.¹⁹⁴ It is the “subjective” side which Heidegger finds to have been under-developed in Kant: “Because Kant did not perform the subjective deduction, the subjectivity of the subject in *the*

¹⁸⁶ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §9, 45-46.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, §10, 48.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, §10, 48.

Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, A 33, B 49.

¹⁸⁹ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §10, 49.

Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, A 34, B 50.

¹⁹⁰ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §23, 108.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, §18, 84.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, §10, 50.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, §10, 51: “Nicht Ausmerzung der transzendentalen Ästhetik als eines vorläufigen Problembestandes, sondern Erhaltung und Verschärfung ihrer Problematik muß das eigenste Ziel der von Kant durchgeführten Grundlegung werden, wenn anders sie ihrer eigenen Aufgabe sicher ist.”

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, §31, 165.

constitution and *the* characterization that was offered to him by traditional anthropology and psychology remained authoritative for him. ...the outcome of the transcendental deduction and of schematism, i. e. the insight into the transcendental essence of pure imagination, was not in itself strong enough to allow him to see the subjectivity of the subject in an entirely new light.”¹⁹⁵ In Heidegger’s estimation, for all of its “darkness” and “strangeness,”¹⁹⁶ even the transcendental imagination did not bring Kant close enough to the edge of the abyss of subjectivity, whose depths Heidegger himself would not begin to plumb in any sustained manner until his own *Contributions to Philosophy*. Indeed, his reservations regarding the reach of the transcendental imagination into the origins of subjectivity found the following expression: “Does the transcendental imagination possess, as a laid foundation, sufficient load-bearing capacity for determining the finite essence of the subjectivity of the human subject precisely originally, i. e. in unity and as a whole, or is the problem of a human pure reason formulated, precisely as a problem, in a more graspable fashion and thus brought closer to a possible solution by means of

¹⁹⁵ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §31, 167: “Weil Kant die subjective Deduktion nicht ausführte, blieb ihm die Subjectivität des Subjekts in *der* Verfassung und *der* Charakteristik leitend, die sich ihm durch die überlieferte Anthropologie und Psychologie anbot. ...das Ergebnis der transzendentalen Deduktion und des Schematismus, d. h. der Einblick in das transzendente Wesen der reinen Einbildungskraft, war für sich nicht stark genug, um die Subjectivität des Subjekts im ganzen in einem neuen Lichte sehen zu lassen.”

This explicit assessment by Heidegger must be registered as a preventative measure from overestimating the reach of Kant’s transcendental imagination, as William Desmond appears to do : the “transcendental imagination is...the place in the ‘subject’ where, as it were, the under-ground stream of being as original breaks surface. Transcendental imagination as ontological is itself an expression of the articulating energy of being that comes out of the darkness of the ultimate origin into the light of articulate selfhood.” (William Desmond, “Art and the Self-Concealing Origin : Heidegger’s Equivocity and the Still Unthought Between,” in *Art, Origins, Otherness : Between Philosophy and Art* (Albany, NY : State University of New York Press, 2003), 224). In doing so, Desmond risks diminishing the significance of Heidegger’s departure from the transcendental imagination and his turn to the priority of art as the ‘between’ which unfolds out of the ‘between’ of being and first extends the possibility of participating therein to the human being, as he does in the following proposal : “Imagination itself, I would argue, is itself a threshold power, an intermediating power that asks us to think, both the irreducible doubleness between the self as origin and the ultimate origin, and their communication in the coming to be of that between.” (Desmond, “Art and the Self-Concealing Origin,” 226.) Such a characterization gives too much credit to the contribution of the self to the ‘between’ of art and does not take into account the various limitations of the capabilities of the self and the role of art in quickening and reconfiguring these capabilities.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, §31, 169.

the expulsion of the transcendental imagination?”¹⁹⁷

In the pivotal §16, entitled “The elucidation of the fundamental purpose of the transcendental deduction as the transcendence of finite reason,” such openness is for the first time expressed in terms of “a turning-towards that allows a standing-against” (*eine entgegenstehenlassende Zuwendung-zu*).¹⁹⁸ Its articulation as a space of play (*Spielraum*), shaped and held out by the finite subject before itself for the sake of relation to beings other than itself, is worth quoting in its entirety: “In this originary turning, the finite essence in general first holds out before itself a space of play within which something can “correspond” to it. Holding oneself within such a space of play in advance, shaping it originally, is none other than transcendence that distinguishes all finite relation to the beingly.”¹⁹⁹

Heidegger insists that such turning-towards should by no means be interpreted as a turning-towards an object, but rather as an originary turning-towards nothing (*das Nichts*) – an “aiming” into nothing (*Sichhineinhalten in das Nichts*), which, far from being a *nihil absolutum*, opens up the very space of play within which something might be encountered precisely as not-nothing (*nicht-Nichts*).²⁰⁰ Such is Heidegger’s answer to the essential question he perceives as inevitably arising from Kant’s transcendental deduction.²⁰¹ In support of this interpretation, Heidegger points to Kant’s usage of “X” to designate the “transcendental object” or the “object in general” at which the turning-towards aims without aiming at something in particular – i. e. an

¹⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §31, 171: “Ist die transzendente Einbildungskraft als gelegter Grund tragfähig genug, gerade das endliche Wesen der Subjektivität des menschlichen Subjektes ursprünglich, d. h. einheitlich und im ganzen, zu bestimmen, oder wird das Problem einer menschlichen reinen Vernunft durch die Ausschaltung der transzendentalen Einbildungskraft schon als Problem faßbarer gestaltet und so einer möglichen Lösung näher gebracht?”

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., §16, 71.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.: “In dieser ursprünglichen Zuwendung hält sich das endliche Wesen überhaupt erst einen Spielraum vor, innerhalb dessen ihm etwas “korrespondiert” kann. Sich im vorhinein in solchem Spielraum halten, ihn ursprünglich bilden, ist nichts anderes als die Transzendenz, die alles endliche Verhalten zu Seiendem auszeichnet.”

²⁰⁰ Ibid., §16, 72.

²⁰¹ Ibid., §16, 73.

“object” that is, in fact, the horizon of objectivity as such.²⁰² In this sense, pure space and pure time are acknowledged by Kant to be “something,” yet judged by Heidegger to approximate “nothing” insofar as they are intuited as forms rather than any given “objects.”²⁰³ In other words, space and time are not imaginary beings (*enta imaginaria*), but rather imaginations (*imaginationes*), in the active sense of the word. As such, they are intuited non-thematically, non-objectively.²⁰⁴

This space of play or horizon of objectivity is spun by the power of imagination (*Einbildungskraft*).²⁰⁵ Its unifying function allows the categories of the understanding (quantity, quality, relation, and modality) to interface with the parameters of intuition in an convergence Kant designates schematism (*Schematismus*).²⁰⁶ By virtue of this synthesis, the categories become schematic – that is, they take shape, acquire contours, become determinate. Thus, for example, as the categories are refracted through time, they both measure and differentiate it, while being rendered intuitable by it as the *schemata* of time-series, time-volume, time-order, and time-paragon (*Zeitreihe, Zeitinhalt, Zeitordnung, und Zeitinbegriff*).²⁰⁷ Through schematism, the horizon of objectivity as such first becomes intuitable to the self and simultaneously anticipates the intuitability of all else.²⁰⁸ As Heidegger concludes, in this manner, schematism is revealed to be instrumental to the happening of transcendence as such.²⁰⁹

At the heart of the question of transcendence thus stands the question of the finitude of

²⁰² Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §25, 121.

Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, A 108 f., A 235 ff., B 294 ff.

²⁰³ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §28, 143.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, §28, 145.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, §18, 89.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, §22, 105.

Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, A 145, B 184.

²⁰⁸ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §19, 91.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, §21, 101.

human subjectivity and the task of ascertaining whether and how such finitude is capable of openness to something other than – and, certainly, greater than – itself. For Kant, such finitude expresses itself through the boundedness of human reason to sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*), in the sense of receiving intuition. As Heidegger points out, this bond does not result from reason’s link to the flesh (*Leib*), but rather, inversely, flesh itself is contingent upon the *a priori* sensibility of transcendence, upon intuition.²¹⁰

Time is the hinge between intuition and understanding insofar as it is conceivable in two modes : as a pure form of the intuition and as the self-affection of the Subject. Thus, Heidegger raises and attempts to resolve the question of the temporality of the “I think” in apperception, as well as that of its unity with the temporality of intuition. Given that for Kant, on Heidegger’s account, the “pure I” should theoretically be opposed to all temporality,²¹¹ in what sense might it be possible to speak of it as temporal? In order to accomplish this, Heidegger traces Kant’s account of the temporality of intuition back to its wellspring, the transcendental imagination, which has by this point already been established as the ground of subjectivity. However, on Heidegger’s account, Kant is not able to take his analysis of the temporality of subjectivity further than its manifestation as the threefold character of imaging carried out by the capacity of the imagination: (1) imaging of the present (*Abbildung* or *facultas formandi*), (2) imaging of the past (*Nachbildung*) or *facultas imaginandi*), and (3) imaging of the future (*Vorbildung* or *facultas praevidenti*).²¹²

While these forms of imaging characterize the temporality of the subject in view of objects, they do not offer any further insight into its temporality in view of itself, i. e. in

²¹⁰ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §32, 173.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² *Ibid.*, §32, 175.

apperception. Despite Kant's recurring insistence upon the subjectivity of time, Heidegger finds that his account falls short precisely at the point of the self ("The constant appeal to the subjectivity of time gives one little to go on"²¹³) and reveals his own intention by means of a rhetorical question: "In the end, might the temporal character of the self be elucidated for the first time from out of the rightly conceived subjective character of time?"²¹⁴ It is, of course, this task which will preoccupy Heidegger throughout *Sein und Zeit*.

For Heidegger, the provisional answer to this question lies in the interpretation of time as pure self-affection (*reine Selbstaffektion*): "...time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity."²¹⁵ As a result of this elaboration of the self, "time and the "I think" no longer stand as irreconcilable and disparate, they are the same."²¹⁶ Thus, rather than in some sense infinite, eternal, and immutable substance, Heidegger proposes that the Kantian self or "I" be interpreted as a horizon of selfhood (*Selbigkeit*) characterized by a constancy (*Ständigkeit*) and endurance (*Bleiben*), within the scope of which any given object might be experienced as changeful yet the same.²¹⁷ The pivotal insight of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is that time as a sequence of "nows" following one after another itself arises from a deeper wellspring, that of time as self-affection. It is only on the basis of this insight that Heidegger is able to conclude that both the transcendental imagination and transcendence as such are ultimately contingent upon original time.²¹⁸

The preeminence of time not only as a pure form of the intuition, but, more importantly, as the defining figure of subjectivity, undoubtedly bears ramifications for Kant's treatment of

²¹³ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §33, 188.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.* : "Läßt sich am Ende erst vom rechtbegriffenen Subjektscharakter der Zeit her der Zeitcharakter des Subjektes aufhellen?"

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, §34, 173.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 191.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 193.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, §35, 196.

space and of the transcendental imagination. Heidegger recapitulates such ramifications as follows: (1) space is no less rooted within transcendental imagination than “time,” where “time” is understood as a sequence of “nows” following one after another; in fact, at this level, they are “in a certain sense, always and necessarily equal”²¹⁹; however, (2) space is indeed contingent upon time as pure self-affection, insofar as such original time constitutes the *par excellence* condition of the possibility of any imaging, and therefore, of the transcendental imagination as such.²²⁰

While such an interpretation does indeed subjugate space to time, Heidegger is intent on drawing out the constructive outcome of such a development: “Rather, it follows only that the positive task be demonstrated: that, in a certain way, space belongs to the self as finite as does time, accordingly, and that the latter – admittedly, on the basis of original time – is “spatial” in its essence.”²²¹ Indeed, Heidegger will reiterate the need of re-thinking space in these terms in footnote b of §45: “how to include the question of space here? “spatiality” of being-there (*Daseins*) (*Sein und Zeit*).”²²²

§4. *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*: From Self-Affection, through Self-Determination as ‘Ontic’ Spontaneity, to ‘Ontological’ Spontaneity

Heidegger’s *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* had already made significant strides in articulating the spontaneity of the Kantian subject. Yet, three years later (*Sommersemester* 1931), Heidegger revisits this question in his lectures *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*. Indeed, at the very outset (Part I,

²¹⁹ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 200.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid. : “Es erwächst vielmehr nur die positive Aufgabe zu zeigen, daß in gewisser Weise entsprechend wie die Zeit auch der Raum zum Selbst als einem endlichen gehört und daß dieses, freilich auf dem Grunde der ursprünglichen Zeit, seinem Wesen nach “räumlich” ist.”

²²² Ibid., §45, 243.

Chapter 1, §3), Heidegger credits Kant with a breakthrough into the proper dimension of the problematic of human freedom.²²³ As in *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, Heidegger recapitulates Kant's definition of human freedom as self-activity (*Selbsttätigkeit*), "determining the 'handling' proper to oneself purely from out of oneself, i. e. by oneself, giving 'handling' a law by oneself," as well as the "capacity...to determine oneself from out of/by oneself."²²⁴

In Kant, such freedom is predicated of the "cosmological understanding" ("kosmologischer Verstand") and "practical understanding" ("praktischer Verstand"). The former is defined as "the capacity to start a state from out of/by itself, the causality of which [state] thus does not stand, according to the laws of nature, under yet another cause, which determines it in accordance with time."²²⁵ Such cosmological understanding is qualified by the following range of terms: "to begin from out of/by itself, spontaneously, *sua sponte*, *spons*, *spondeo*, *spond*, ΣΠΕΝΔ, σπένδω: to dispense, to freely give from out of/by itself, spontaneously, spontaneity, absolute self-activity."²²⁶ In turn, practical understanding ("πρᾶξις, in the sense of moral 'handling'"²²⁷) is defined as "the independence of caprice [as the capacity to will (*Willensvermögen*)] from necessitation by the drives of sensibility."²²⁸

Of more immediate interest to the present undertaking, however, is the spontaneity of the transcendental understanding, or absolute spontaneity (*absolute Spontaneität*). According to Kant, its causality is entirely different from that of natural causality, insofar as the self's being a

²²³ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Klostermann : Frankfurt am Main, 1982, I.1. §3, 17, 20.

²²⁴ Ibid., I.1. §3, 21: "...rein von *sich* aus, d. h. selbst, das eigene Handeln bestimmen, selbst dem Handeln das Gesetz geben"; "Vermögen... sich... von selbst zu bestimmen."

²²⁵ Ibid., I.1. §3, 22: "das Vermögen, einen Zustand von selbst anzufangen, deren Kausalität also nicht nach dem Naturgesetze wiederum unter einer anderen Ursache steht, welche sie der Zeit nach bestimmte."

²²⁶ Ibid.: "... von selbst anfangen, spontan, *sua sponte*, *spons*, *spondeo*, *spond*, ΣΠΕΝΔ, σπένδω: spenden, frei von sich aus geben, spontan, Spontaneität, absolute Selbsttätigkeit."

²²⁷ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit.*, I.1. §3, 23.

²²⁸ Ibid., I.1. §3, 22: "...die Unabhängigkeit der Willkür von der Nötigung durch Antriebe der Sinnlichkeit."

cause (*Ursachesein*) is wholly self-starting.

3 years after *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, 4 years after *Sein und Zeit*, and one-third of the way into *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit* (§11), it is still time that is said to shed light (*Licht*) upon being, to proffer a luminosity (*die Helle*), in which being stands understood as constant presence (*beständige Anwesenheit*).²²⁹ Yet where does this time-as-light emanate from? No longer from Kant's self-affective subject or from Heidegger's own *Dasein*; indeed, Heidegger himself asks, "How does it come about that time lights up as this light?"²³⁰ In fact, Heidegger mentions *Sein und Zeit* here as a kind of spring (*Sprung*) into the abyss (*Abgrund*), out of which time rises as the sun rising out of the ocean, so to speak, at dawn. Being and time are here spoken of as having some kind of an original connection (*der ursprünglicher Zusammenhang*).²³¹ And it is precisely in the light of such a connection that Heidegger questions anew: "What is, overall, time itself, such that it lights up as this light and is capable of illuminating being? ... What does "time" mean? What does "being" mean? Above all, what does "being and time" mean?"²³² At this juncture in the lectures, these questions are hardly rhetorical; as Heidegger himself acknowledges, following his spring into the abyss in *Sein und Zeit*, he is treading water without striking bottom and remaining in the dark, so to speak.²³³ Only in such twilight of the subject – and of *Dasein* – is Heidegger able to tentatively formulate the question of a possible common ground (*Grund beider*) of being and time, or press even further, conjecturing towards the possibility of time as the ground of being.²³⁴ At very least, Heidegger is

²²⁹ Ibid., I.3. §11, 114: "In der Helle, in der das als beständige Anwesenheit verstandene Sein steht, kommt das Licht zum Vorschein, das diese Helle spendet. Es ist die *Zeit* selbst."

²³⁰ Ibid., I.3. §11, 115: "Wie kommt die *Zeit* dazu, als dieses Licht aufzuleuchten?"

²³¹ Ibid..

²³² Ibid.: "Was ist überhaupt die *Zeit* selbst, daß sie als dieses Licht leuchtet und das Sein zu erhellen vermag? ... Was heißt *Zeit*? Was heißt *Sein*? Was heißt vor allem *Sein und Zeit*?"

²³³ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*: "...schreiten ohne Boden und Halt im Dunklen."

²³⁴ Ibid., I.3. §11, 116: "Was ist das *Wesen der Zeit*, daß *Sein* in ihr gründet...?"

able to assert, well beyond Kant, that “being and time seek one another and are interwoven with one another.”²³⁵ Being and time belong together, they have what Heidegger refers to as a “bilateral” (*beiderseitig*) essence.

While considering the possibility of extending time beyond the self-affection of the Subject and beyond the ecstatic temporality of Dasein all the way into being, Heidegger briefly considers the possibility of extending space in a similar way: “Why...not...being and space?”²³⁶ After all, as Heidegger concedes, the being of that which is at hand (*das Sein des Vorhandenen*) is determined not only through the “now,” but also through the “hier” – as “set-here-ness” (*Hergestelltheit*), “standing-there-ness” (*Da-stehendheit*). Recalling the “remarkable” objection of the sophist Dionysodoros in Plato’s dialogue “Euthydemus,” Heidegger points out that spatial characteristics even appear to be emphasized.²³⁷ At this juncture, however, Heidegger does not pursue this possibility further and continues down the path of time as the possibility of transcendence. The question of the alternative path of space, however, will arise with renewed urgency both in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* and in the *Beiträge*, where the paths of time and space will converge as leading to the same destination – being.

A brief review of the history of the philosophical notions of time leads Heidegger to conclude that, whether in Aristotle, Augustine, or Kant, the site (*Stätte*) of time is identified as the human soul, spirit, subject.²³⁸ Yet Heidegger reminds that such a site is not necessarily the final destination, but perhaps more of a half-way house, so to speak, on the journey into the heart of the relation between time and being (*Sein*). “Time and the human? Certainly!” – exclaims

²³⁵ Ibid., I.3.§11, 118: “Sein und Zeit suchen einander und weben ineinander.”

²³⁶ Ibid., I.3.§11, 119.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, I.3.§12, 120.

The references Heidegger gives for Aristotle and Augustine are as follows:

“Aristoteles, *Physica*. Δ 14, 223 a 26” | “Augustinus, *Confessiones*. Lib. XI, c. 27, n. 36”

Heidegger, “But time and the human, they are still not one and the same; the human is still not merely ‘time.’”²³⁹ Furthermore, Heidegger points out that the question regarding the human “experience of time” (“*Zeiterlebnis*”) is not yet a question regarding the essence of time as such.²⁴⁰ And yet, insofar as the question of the understanding of being is inextricably tied to the human being, the question of the relation between the human being and time remains valid and open.

In contrast to what he portrays as the philosophical tradition of Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant, Heidegger renders the relation between the human being and time in terms of the latter being the “condition of the possibility of the ground of the essence” of the former.²⁴¹ In posing the question in this way, Heidegger affirms that “our questioning about the human is a *questioning beyond (Hinausfragen)* the human.”²⁴² And thus the question that is, on the one hand, bound to the human, reaches out into the yet unknown: “Time, this widest width, what is it and where is it? Time, where does it belong? To whom does it belong?”²⁴³ In a decisive break with Kant, Heidegger proposes that temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is first and foremost the essence of time itself, and the human being is endowed with “his” or “her” individual time only derivatively. It is time that “individuates” (*vereinzelt*) itself with regard to each human; human beings do not “possess” time, but rather time “possesses” human beings.²⁴⁴

The question of the wellspring of time thus cannot be restricted to the spontaneity of the human understanding. Neither can such spontaneity itself be understood as auto-affective in the wake of Heidegger’s insistence that freedom “itself is, in its essence, more original than the

²³⁹ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, I.3.§12, 123.

²⁴⁰ Ibid..

²⁴¹ Ibid., I.3.§12, 126.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid., I.3.§13, 129: “Die Zeit, diese weiteste Weite, was ist sie und wo ist sie? Die Zeit, wo gehört sie hin? Wem gehört sie?”

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

human.”²⁴⁵ In fact, such “more original” freedom is said to be the “root” not only of human freedom, but also of “being and time” themselves.²⁴⁶ Yet how can time be understood in terms of freedom? Since Heidegger has chosen to develop this possibility in dialogue with Kant, he believes the proper point of departure to be a critique of the relation between time and causality. As will have become evident from *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* and *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, such would be tantamount to a critique of the second analogy of experience, i. e. time understood in the specific sense of a sequence or succession ordered by the law of causality.

The entire second half of *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* is dedicated to the articulation of an alternative notion of time as free.

Such an undertaking begins with Heidegger’s analysis of the relation between causality and time-sequence/succession (*Zeitfolge*), expressed in what Kant refers to as the “second analogy of experience.” An explicit relation between time and causality is found in the “B” edition of the *Kritik*; here, the principle in question is entitled “The principle of time-sequence/succession according to the law of causality” and concisely stated as “All alterations happen according to the law of connection between cause and outworking.”²⁴⁷ As Heidegger explains, the very structure of causality presupposes a “before” and an “after.” On the one hand, there is the cause (*Ursache*), “that which goes before” (*Vorausgehendes*); on the other, there is the “worked” (*Gewirktes/Erwirktes*), the outcome, “that which follows” (*Erfolg/Folge*); these are connected by the “working” (*Wirkung*) itself, which Heidegger explains in terms of a “letting-

²⁴⁵ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, I.3.§14, 134.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, I.3.§14, 135.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, II.1.§16, 149: “Alle Veränderungen geschehen nach dem Gesetz der Verknüpfung der Ursache und Wirkung.”

follow” (*folgen lassen*) and “following” (*erfolgen*).²⁴⁸ Thus, the overall relation between cause and outworking can be characterized in terms of “one-following-another” (*Aufeinanderfolgen*), of “one-after-another” (*Nacheinander*), of succession (*Sukzession*), of a sequence or “time-following” (*Zeitfolge*).²⁴⁹ Thus, in fact, time is implicated in causality as something which has the essence of “following,” which is a flowing (*Fließen*). For this reason, the expression *Zeitfolge* might be more efficaciously rendered as “time-flow” or “the flow of time.” As Heidegger points out, however, Kant also explicitly cautions against describing time as a following or flow of one-after-another (*eine Folge nacheinander*), because such would require another, unchanging and enduring time, within which such form of alteration could occur: “Time...itself...[is] unchanging and enduring,” “time itself does not alter itself, but rather than which is within time.”²⁵⁰

Thus one finds oneself in a curious predicament: time must be that which “en-capacitates” a “following” without itself being such a “following”, yet causality, which requires such “following” to be what it is, cannot “follow” unless it does so within time. In these circumstances, it is not, after all, entirely clear to what the “following” might be attributed – to time, to causality, or to some third? As Heidegger points out, Kant’s solution is to speak of “following” merely as a mode (*Modus*) of time, one of three (endurance, flow, simultaneity).²⁵¹ He further clarifies that modes of time do not signify changes within time itself, they are not its fundamental traits; rather, such modes are ways according to which that which appears might be

²⁴⁸ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1. §16, 149.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., II.1. §16, 150.

Cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 144/B 183, A 41/B 58.

²⁵¹ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1. §16, 150.

related to time or might be within time.²⁵² The first mode, endurance (*Beharrlichkeit*), indicates the duration (*Dauer*) of that which appears, i. e. the magnitude (*Größe*) of its being-within-time (*In-der-Zeit-Seins*). The second mode, flow (succession) (*Folge (Sukzession)*), refers to the relationship between multiple appearances as row (*Reihe*). Finally, the third mode, being-at-once (simultaneity) (*Zugleichsein (Simultaneität)*), reflects the relationship of that which appears to time as ? (*Inbegriff*).²⁵³ In this way, time comes to function, for Kant, primarily as that within which something is ordered.

In Heidegger's view, such a function obscures a more original time: "Time, taken in this way, is not the original time and not that within which the essence of time breaks forth."²⁵⁴ The central reason for such a shortcoming is that Kant leaves the inner structural connection between time and "I think" without elucidation or trial.²⁵⁵ Whereas Kant would be satisfied with setting the 'handling' person (*handelnder Person*) 'outside' of time, so to speak, Heidegger would press on towards a proper temporality (*eigene Zeitlichkeit*) of the person (and, as will be shown in the sections on the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* and on the *Beiträge*, even further).

More so than the first and third analogies of experience, the second analogy continues to be a source both of concern and motivation for Heidegger, precisely because in this particular mode, temporality appears to be conflated with causality, and is therein continually denied the expression of its deepest ground, freedom. Unlike in his other discussions of the second analogy, here Heidegger turns directly to "givenness" (*Begebenheit*) and "happening" (*Geschehen*) as pertinent aspects of the problematic. What is the import of this inclusion? Such is to be sought in Kant's contrasting examples of perceiving a standing house and perceiving a ship swimming

²⁵² Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1.§17, 159.

²⁵³ Ibid..

²⁵⁴ Ibid., II.1.§17, 159, ft. 25.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., II.1.§18.b, 168.

upstream (both cited by Heidegger for this purpose).²⁵⁶ Both perceptions entail a kind of flow, sequence, or succession (*Abfolge*); however, in the first case, such a flow has “no determined order”; in the second, such order is clearly determined by the nature of the happening that is being perceived, namely, by the ship’s progress upstream. In order to perceive such progress precisely as progress, its stages must be perceived successively – the position of the ship must increasingly change in a certain direction. Yet Heidegger hesitates to attribute such determination to the happening itself and seeks rather to inquire whether it might not be a contribution of time instead. Indeed, he proposes that such determination may derive from the irreversibility (*Unumkehrbarkeit*) of time itself: the flow of time appears to have a determinate direction, wherein the earlier always precedes the later.²⁵⁷ Thus, in Heidegger’s view, the appearance of a directionality of a given happening might derive from the directionality of time itself. Thus, it is time under the mode of flow (succession) (*Folge (Sukzession)*) that conditions causality, not the reverse: “*What then is causality? A relation which does not merely proceed within time, generally speaking, but rather a relation which is determined in its relation-character as a time-relation, as a mode of being-in-time.*”²⁵⁸ Within this optic, being-a-cause (*Ursachesein*) signifies “*preceding in time as a determining letting-follow.*”²⁵⁹ Moreover, continuity (*Kontinuität*) or consistency (*Stetigkeit*) emerges as essential for this relation.²⁶⁰ Being-in-time makes members of the causal relation subject to the seamlessness (*Unaufhörlichkeit*) of time as a pure form of the intuition; for Kant, there “can be no sudden

²⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1.§19.a, 183.

Cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 192/B 237.

²⁵⁷ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1.§19.c, 186.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, II.1.§19.c, 188: “*Was ist also Kausalität? Ein Verhältnis, das nicht nur überhaupt in der Zeit vorkommt, sondern ein Verhältnis, das in seinem Verhältnischarakter als ein Zeitverhältnis, als ein Modus des In-der-Zeit-seins, bestimmt ist...*”

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*: “*...Vorangehen in der Zeit als bestimmendes Folgenlassen...*”

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, II.1.§20.c, 199.

happening as an outbreak from a formerly (*schlechthinnig*) nothing.”²⁶¹

Yet such recasting of causality in terms of temporality is only the first step towards recasting both of these in terms of freedom. Such an undertaking requires the introduction of another Kantian notion, which has already been discussed in connection with the question of the spontaneity of the understanding – the notion of “handling” (*Handlung*).²⁶² Consistently with his remarks regarding subjectivity up to this point, Heidegger emphasizes that for Kant, “handling” is a term that designates “working” (*Wirken*) overall²⁶³ rather than the specifically human activity of moral practice, for instance. Moreover, Heidegger is insistent upon the fact that working or work (*opus*) is a broader concept than doing (*Tun, facere*) and more closely approximates the concept of *agere – effectus*.²⁶⁴ Such express preference for “*Werk-*” based vocabulary will, of course, figure prominently in Heidegger’s attempt to reach beyond the auto-effectivity of the subject in his articulation of temporality proper to the work of art.

In §22, Heidegger explains Kant’s notion of “free handling” (*freies Handeln*) as that of “unconditioned causality” (*unbedingte Kausalität*), a cause-being (*Ursachesein*) which “as such does not recede to [something] preceding, but rather itself starts the row *per se*.”²⁶⁵ It is “original,” it is “itself the origin of its ‘handling,’” it is an “arising to working from out of itself.”²⁶⁶ For Kant, such unconditioned causality is paradoxically both a concept which transcends experience as a whole and one which is, nevertheless, crafted (*erzeugt*) by the understanding.²⁶⁷ This is the masterstroke that reveals the inner dichotomy (*Zwiespalt*) of reason:

²⁶¹ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1.§20.c, 200: “Es gibt kein plötzliches Geschehen als Aufbrechen aus einem vormaligen schlechthinnigen Nichts.”

²⁶² *Ibid.*, II.1.§20.c, 196 ff.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, II.1.§20.c, 197.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, II.1.§22.b, 214.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, II.1.§22.b-§23, 215.

its simultaneous finitude (*Endlichkeit*) and its widening into the unconditioned.²⁶⁸ It is precisely the concept of transcendental freedom – of unconditioned causality – that lies at the origin of the strife (*Widerstreit*) of pure reason, which Kant designates as “the third antinomy.”²⁶⁹ Unconditioned causality must be that which conditions conditioned causality and that which happens and comes to be within time without a precedent. But the lack of something preceding (*das Vorige*) brings into question the very possibility of something following – as Heidegger puts it, the following (*Folge*) would need to have always been (*immer gewesen*).²⁷⁰ According to what Kant calls “the law of nature,” such should theoretically be impossible, for “nothing happens without a sufficient cause determined *a priori*.”²⁷¹ Yet such is also necessary, if natural causality is to be accounted for as a whole. Thus, unconditioned causality is retained as an apparently contradictory yet necessary concept and entitled absolute spontaneity (*absolute Spontaneität*).²⁷²

Of utmost significance for the present inquiry is the fact that “ontological” scale of absolute spontaneity far outstrips the “ontic” scale of the spontaneity of the understanding: the freedom which characterizes the former may be paradoxically conceivable by the understanding, but it far exceeds the freedom of the latter. For Heidegger, the inner dichotomy of reason is an indication of the philosophical need for a broader horizon – that of the understanding of being.²⁷³ The concept of unconditioned causality cannot be derived from finite reason itself; rather it emerges alongside an awakening to the relation of such finitude to being.

The significance of such realization is that a new possibility of interpreting time (and space) as free – as springing from the freedom of something more vast than the human subject –

²⁶⁸ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1.§23.215.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, II.1.§23.217.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, II.1.§23.a. 217.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*: “...ohne hinreichend a priori bestimmte Ursache nichts geschehe.”

²⁷² *Ibid.*.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, II.1.§25.a.238.

is finally opened up. Indeed, Kant identifies one philosophical precedent of such possibility, namely, that of Aristotle's first unmoved mover (πρῶτον κινουὶν ἀκίνητον).²⁷⁴ While Heidegger emphasizes that at this juncture in Kant's thinking it is not yet clear where such possibility is to be sought (within the essence of the human being or within other essences), he also urges that this glimpse of the capacity of something "at hand" (*Vorhandenes*) to start itself is not to be underestimated. Moreover, he presents the main reason why the human being cannot stand as the paragon of unconditioned causality or absolute spontaneity: while it is true that the human being shapes itself, so to speak, through its own handling and factual being, the human being discovers the proper resolution of its being-there rather than giving it to itself.²⁷⁵ Kant's partial rejoinder to this objection – again, on Heidegger's own account – is the notion of mere apperception (*bloße Apperzeption*). Mere apperception consists of 'handlings' and 'determinations' which cannot be attributed to impressions of the senses or taken in as something discovered, but are rather given to the human being by the human being itself.²⁷⁶ The regulations of reason are thought by Kant to be of such a kind. That which is thus given is not "what" (*was*) the human being is in itself, but rather "that" (*daß*) the human being is, i. e. its being there (*Dasein*) in its that (*Daß*).²⁷⁷

What happens to the mode of time as flow (*Folge*) when it encounters unconditioned causality or absolute spontaneity? In Heidegger's own words: "Are there, with respect to [that which is] "essencing" within time, [that which is] self-giving, causes (among those which are

²⁷⁴ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1.§23.a.221.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., II.1.§25.d.254: "Mit Bezug auf unser Handlung und faktisches Sein aber stellen wir uns durch dieses in gewisser Weise selbst her, wir verschaffen uns uns selbst. Allein, all dieses nicht schlechthin, wir geben uns nicht selbst durch eigenen Beschluß unser Da-sein, sondern finden dieses selbst vor, d. h. wir selbst sind uns zugleich Erscheinung."

²⁷⁶ Ibid., II.1.§25.d.256.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

inner-temporal (*innerzeitig*) that are themselves and *in their being-a-cause outside of time?*²⁷⁸ For Kant, one such cause is human reason, for which there is no “before” or “after,” but which is rather “present and one and the same in all ‘handlings’ of the human being in all temporal circumstances,” without itself being within time.²⁷⁹ Thus, it is possible to speak of reason as a “cause onto itself” (*Ursache an sich*) or “pure causality” (*reine Kausalität*).²⁸⁰ Kant considers another such cause to be human personality (*Persönlichkeit*) or being-answerable-to-oneself (*Selbstverantwortlichkeit*).²⁸¹ What is more, pure reason’s capacity for practical ‘handling’ can be identified as willing (*Willen*), which may then, in turn, be understood as “the capacity to determine oneself in one’s being-a-cause,”²⁸² and in the moral/ethical sense, the capacity to “be a law onto itself,” so to speak.²⁸³ Yet, as Heidegger observes, an examination of the instance of the human being reveals that “the unity of the causality of freedom and the causality of nature...is only one case of the general cosmologically determined unification of both causalities.”²⁸⁴

As the title of Heidegger’s conclusion to these lectures – “The proper ontological dimension of freedom” – indicates, Kant’s identification of free causality or absolute spontaneity with one aspect of the human being or another remains, in Heidegger’s opinion, entirely too narrow. The conclusion itself, §29, is thus wholly dedicated to the exposure of the limitations of Kant’s notion of freedom and to the re-direction of any future discussion of this topic towards the context of the question of being (*Seinsfrage*). Indeed, according to Heidegger, the only fruitful

²⁷⁸ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1.§25.b.243: “Gibt es mit Bezug auf ein in der Zeit Wesendes, sich Begebendes, neben Ursachen, die selbst innerzeitig sind, solche die selbst und *in ihrem Ursachesein außerhalb der Zeit* sind?”

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, II.1.§25.d.258: “Mit Bezug auf diesen gilt kein Vorher und Nachher. “Sie, die Vernunft, ist allen Handlungen des Menschen in allen Zeitumständen gegenwärtig und einerlei, selbst aber is sie nicht in der Zeit.”

Cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 556/B 584.

²⁸⁰ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1.§25.d.258.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, II.1.§26.a.261-262.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, II.1.§27.b.276.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, II.1.§27.d.285.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, II.1.§25.b.246.

approach to the question of freedom lies in its understanding as a fundamental character of the being (*Seyn*) of beings: indeed, “the *problem of being in general* is in itself a *problem of freedom*.”²⁸⁵ The final frontier, so to speak, of the problem of freedom cannot be the freedom of any being in particular, but rather of freedom as freedom (*Freiheit als Freiheit*) (a philosophical premonition which will lead Heidegger’s thinking first beyond the human subject, then beyond the work of art, and finally even beyond being – into the abyss). For the time being – yet already one step beyond the human subject – Heidegger employs the familiar vocabulary of the artwork essay: “Freedom is the condition of possibility of the openness [*Offenbarkeit*] of the being of beings, of the understanding of being.”²⁸⁶

§5. *Die Frage nach dem Ding*: Space and Time as Between Subject and Object

By the time Heidegger revisits Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* in his lecture series *Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*, in the Winter semester of 1935-1936, his point of departure lies well beyond space and time as axes of a coordinate system of objectivity. The new frontier which Heidegger declares in the opening sections is that of the “un-conditioned” (*Un-bedingtes*), in the sense of that which conditions the thinghood of things specifically as “things.”²⁸⁷ Heidegger poses the question of the un-conditioned anew in pursuit of alternatives to its interpretation as (1) “the absolute “I” of German idealism” which conditions the thing conceived as “not-I,” as an object which stands over against the “I,” and (2) “God in the sense of the Old Testament” which conditions the thing conceived as an *ens creatum*.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁵ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1. §29.300.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, II.1. §30.303.

²⁸⁷ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, Klostermann : Frankfurt am Main, 1984, A.3, 7.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, A.11, 36.

From the very outset, Heidegger acknowledges that such inquiry must encompass the problematic of space and time: “Our question, “What is a thing,” must, therefore, include, within itself, the questions of “What is space?,” “What is time?”²⁸⁹ Yet, unlike in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Heidegger immediately frames the problematic of space and time in terms of their unity: “...are they originally united? Do they spring up from a common root, a third, or better yet a first, that is neither space nor time, because it is already, more originally, both?”²⁹⁰ The priority of such “mysterious”²⁹¹ unity is clearly expressed in Heidegger’s designation of the problematic as the “question of time-space” (*die Frage des Zeitraumes*).²⁹² Unlike §35 of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* which ultimately grounds space in time as self-affection, §5 of *Die Frage nach dem Ding* underscores that the designation “time-space” is not meant to demote space to some secondary rank: “The fact that we thereby name time first – say time-space and not space-time – should indicate that time plays a particular role in this question. However, this does not by any means signify that space permits itself to be derived from time, and generally ranks second to time.”²⁹³

While in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* the unity of space and time had been traced back to more original time as self-affection, in *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, their origin is once again brought into question and inscribed within the broader pursuit of the “unconditioned” which, in turn, conditions. Heidegger’s historico-philosophical exposition of its previous conception as $\mu\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ extends as far back as Aristotle’s *Physics* and *Of the Heavens*, passes by

²⁸⁹ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, A.5, 12.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.: “...sind sie ursprünglich einig? Entspringen sie einer gemeinsamen Würzel, einem Dritten, oder eher einem Ersten, das weder Raum noch Zeit ist, weil es beide schon ursprünglicher ist?”

²⁹¹ Ibid., A.5, 13.

²⁹² Ibid..

²⁹³ Ibid.: “Daß wir dabei die Zeit zuerst nennen, Zeitraum sagen und nicht Raumzeit, soll andeuten, daß bei dieser Frage die Zeit eine besondere Rolle spielt. Das heißt jedoch ganz und gar nicht, der Raum lasse sich aus der Zeit ableiten und sei überhaupt gegenüber der Zeit etwas Zweitrangiges.”

its incorporation by the scholastic tradition, and dwells at length on what it considers to be its two preeminent modern expressions – Descartes’ *Meditationes de prima philosophia* (1641) and *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* (1701), as well as Newton’s *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* (1686-1687). He provides a detailed overview of Newton’s treatise, in particular the section entitled *Definitiones*, which concerns “*quantitas materiae, quantitas motus, forces,* and above all the *vis centripeta,*” and the scholium, which covers “absolute and relative time, absolute and relative space, absolute and relative place, and finally, absolute and relative motion.”²⁹⁴ In turn, he interprets Descartes’ “method” – grounded as it is in “the highest principle of the “subject” – as the point of origin of all “mathematical” determination of things.²⁹⁵ For Heidegger, these texts constitute metaphysical renditions of μάθησις as projections (*Entwurf*) over things, which “first open up a space of play in which things might show themselves.”²⁹⁶ Moreover, Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* remains, in Heidegger’s view, moored within the modern “mathematical” outlook in its deference to principles of pure reason: “the mathematical distinguishing characteristic is decisive: the return to the axioms in all determination of the beingly. *Kant remains within this tradition.*”²⁹⁷ In this regard, *Die Frage nach dem Ding* reiterates the judgement of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (in this particular instance, with regard to space):

The fact that there are difficulties in Kant’s metaphysics of space cannot be denied – entirely apart from the fact that any metaphysics which no longer contains any difficulties may no longer be such. Only the difficulties of the Kantian conception of space do not lie where one might prefer to find them most of all, whether on the side of psychology, or on the side of the mathematical natural sciences (theory of relativity). The principal difficulty does not lie in the grasp of the question of space itself, but rather in the referral of space as pure

²⁹⁴ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.I.5.c, 60.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., B.I.5.f.f 2, 81-82.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., B.I.5.e, 71.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., B.II.7.a, 144.

intuition to the human subject, whose being is inadequately determined. (With regard to how the question of space reconstructs itself in the wake of the fundamental overcoming of the subject-relation, cf. *Being and Time*, §§19-24 und §70).²⁹⁸

Although Kant's understanding of the "unconditioned" remains "mathematical," insofar as it fails to extricate itself from the interpretation of the "subject" as the principal of all principles governing its experience,²⁹⁹ Heidegger insists that the *Critique of Pure Reason* significantly modifies the operation of such principles by reconducting them to intuition. However, while in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* the possibility of experience was addressed predominantly in terms of space and time as forms of intuition, *Die Frage nach dem Ding* supplements this account with a renewed focus on its possibility in terms of the principles of pure reason. Thus, while intuition remains clearly defined as immediate and load-bearing relation to an object, the objectivity of the object itself as a "stand-against" (*Gegenstand*) – in its "against" and as a "stand" – is demonstrated, in a distinct way, to be conditioned by the principles of pure reason as well. One of such principles is the principle of causality, which allows a manifold of impressions to be grasped precisely as an object in the form of an "if...then..."³⁰⁰ Thus, the interface of the conditions set by the intuition and those set by the understanding is reconfigured as follows: the "against" of the object is assured by the givenness

²⁹⁸ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.7.d.d₂, 156: "Daß in Kants Metaphysik des Raumes Schwierigkeiten liegen, ist nicht zu leugnen - davon ganz abgesehen, daß eine Metaphysik, die keine Schwierigkeiten mehr enthält, damit auch schon keine mehr ist. Nur liegen die Schwierigkeiten der Kantischen Raumauffassung nicht dort, wo man sie meist finden möchte, sei es von seiten der Psychologie, sei es von seiten der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft (Relativitätstheorie). Die Hauptschwierigkeit liegt nicht in der Fassung der Raumfrage selbst, vielmehr in der Zuweisung des Raumes als reiner Anschauung zu einem menschlichen Subjekt, dessen Sein unzureichend bestimmt ist. (Wie sich aus der grundsätzlichen Überwindung des Subjektbezuges die Raumfrage aufbaut, dazu vgl. *Sein und Zeit* §§19-24 und §70)."

²⁹⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, B.II.5.f, 132: "Gemäß der Überlieferung des neuzeitlichen Denkens, die Kant trotz allem festhält, gründet Erkenntnis in Grundsätzen" and B.II.7.b, 145: "Daß die Dingbestimmung bei Kant auf Grundsätze zurückgeführt wird, nehmen wir als Zeichen dafür, daß Kant in der Überlieferung bleibt."

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, B.II.4.c, 108-109.

of the intuition and its “stand” – by the constancy of the concepts of the understanding.³⁰¹ As Heidegger points out, it is for this precise reason that the latter is called understanding (*Verstand*).³⁰² Thus, in the final analysis, intuition and understanding must be understood as constituting the objectivity of the object cooperatively: “The object stands only when the intuitive is thought conceptually, and the object stands against only when the concept determines something intuitively given as such.”³⁰³

In view of this adjustment of focus, a “one-dimensional” interpretation of space and time as pure forms of the intuition can no longer suffice: along with objectivity itself, space and time must be re-calibrated to reflect not only the receptivity of the intuition, but also the spontaneity (*Spontaneität*) of the understanding. In *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, such an undertaking is carried out without ever losing sight of the principal achievement of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the expansion of the understanding by the interpolation of the notion of synthetic judgments *a priori*, which facilitates a re-orientation of the concept from the subject to the object.³⁰⁴

In the wake of Kant’s introduction of the notion of synthetic judgments *a priori*, the subjective principles conditioning experience (the principle of non-contradiction, the “I”-principle, the principle of sufficient reason) must themselves be transposed into the key of intuition: “objective, synthetic knowledge in general requires a different grounding. Other grounding principles must be set forth.”³⁰⁵ Accordingly, the task that lies before Heidegger is that of articulating Kant’s insight into the “deeper wellspring...which is brought to light by

³⁰¹ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.4.d, 110.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, B.II.4.d, 112.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, B.II.4.d, 110.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, B.II.5.f, 131, B.II.5.g.134.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, B.II.5.i, 137: “...fordern...jede gegenständliche, synthetische Erkenntnis überhaupt eine andere Begründung. Andere Grundsätze müssen aufgestellt werden.”

means of the highest principle of all synthetic judgments,³⁰⁶ namely: “The conditions of the *possibility of experience* in general are simultaneously the conditions of the *possibility of objects of experience*.”³⁰⁷

Heidegger has already established that after Kant’s demonstration of the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*, objects can be said to be subject to “principles” which outstrip “axioms” of the intuition.³⁰⁸ However, insofar as they remain principles, they overdetermine the Subject which had remained underdetermined according to Heidegger’s assessment of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Yet, as Heidegger himself asks, can something like reason’s capability (*Vermögen*) of assembly (*Sammlung*), unification (*Einigung*), or binding (*Verbindung*) be justifiably termed a “principle”? Thus, Heidegger sees Kant as taking two steps back from the notion of “principle” – firstly, towards the notion of capability, and secondly, that of source (*Quelle*).³⁰⁹

In order for something to show itself as constant, i. e. as remaining-within-itself (*Insichstehendes*) and assembled-in-itself (*Insichgesammeltes*), it must be anticipated by a capacity for unity; in other words, constancy manifests itself, in part, by means of unity. The “handling” of such unity is the purview of the understanding.³¹⁰ As a capacity for or the wellspring of unity, the understanding can also be characterized as more or less free, more or less broad; the freer and broader it is, the greater is its capacity for relating to an object in terms of letting it be, rather than governing it *per se*. From Heidegger’s standpoint, the unifying capacity

³⁰⁶ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.6, 143.

³⁰⁷ Ibid..

³⁰⁸ Ibid., B.II.7.a, 144-145.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., B.II.7.b, 147.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

of the understanding should certainly be interpreted in this sense.³¹¹

How does this articulation of the contribution of the understanding inflect the notions of time and space? Beginning with the question of space, Heidegger points out that the understanding can “handle” it in one of two ways: mathematically or dynamically. Mathematical unity “handles” space simply as something within which a body extends, moves, or rests. Dynamic unity, however, is additionally capable of registering space as something that a body fills up, possesses, within which it expands – as something which mediates or conducts its power of resistance (*Widerständigkeit*).³¹² Such a power is only operational in space, thus rendering space as a necessary means of anticipating objectivity. Thus, space as a form of intuition is guided by the following principle of the understanding: “In their appearing, all appearances are extended magnitudes.”³¹³ Space is that which makes it possible for a thing to appear as a certain *quantitas*, because space itself is a *quantum* – it is that dimensionality (above, under, in front of, behind) on the basis of which size (“this high,” “this wide,” “this deep”) is possible in principle. In effect, space as a *quantum* is that dimensionality which supports size as a delimitation of itself; hence, as Heidegger puts it, “*quantitas* is always *quantum discretum*.”³¹⁴ Similarly, extension is an accumulation of successive quantities of space. “Space-hood” (*Raumhafte*) itself, however, cannot be understood in terms of “units.”

While *quantitas* is a pure concept of the understanding, *quanta* are pure forms of the intuition, namely space and time.³¹⁵ In light of the foregoing explanation, then, space as quantum – as a pure form of the intuition – is the condition of possibility of any given quantity of space. It

³¹¹ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.7.b, 147.

³¹² *Ibid.*, B.II.7.c, 149.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, B.II.7.d, 151.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, B.II.7.d₁, 152-153.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, B.II.7.d₂, 153.

is in this way that the pure forms of the intuition “condition” pure concepts of the understanding. As a pure form of the intuition, as a whole, space is infinite (*unendlich*),³¹⁶ and as such, it constitutes the condition of the possibility of limitation, of borders and boundaries. Here Heidegger makes an important distinction between infinite (*unendlich*) and endless (*endloss*), and suggests that space is infinite because it does not presuppose finitude (*Endhaftes*) as its condition, but rather is itself the condition of such finitude.³¹⁷ Thus, Heidegger concludes: “The space-being of space consists in the fact that it makes room for the possibility of that which shows itself to show itself in its expansion. Space makes room, gives location and place, and this making room is its being.”³¹⁸ Approached in this way, space gives itself, is held out before us, is viewable.³¹⁹ It is only such, however, insofar as it defines, determines itself in the synthesis of quantity, wherein it is directed to “this” or “that” appearing spatial figure.³²⁰

While space offers the possibility of the object’s “opposing” or standing “against,” it is first and foremost time that allows it to manifest as “staying,” as “presencing” (*Anwesendes*). In itself, “staying” is only remarkable as a unity of a certain relations between objects, and such relational unities are articulated as analogies of experience precisely in terms of time, such that Kant explicitly names them “rules of the universal determination of time.”³²¹ As Heidegger explains, in the reason for the choice of the term “analogy” is that, in itself, it denotes a “qualitative relation between dissimilars,” namely, the relationship between that which is given

³¹⁶ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, Ibid., B.II.7.d₂, 153.

³¹⁷ Ibid., B.II.7.d₂, 154.

³¹⁸ Ibid., B.II.7.d₂, 156: “Das Raumsein des Raumes besteht darin, daß es dem sich Zeigenden die Möglichkeit einräumt, in seiner Ausbreitung sich zu zeigen. Der Raum räumt ein, gibt Ort und Platz, und dieses Einräumen ist sein Sein.”

³¹⁹ Ibid.: “Der Raum gibt sich nur in diesem reinen Anschauen, worin der Raum als solcher von uns im vorhinein uns vor-gehalten, als Anblickbares vor-gestellt wird, “vor- wiederkehrengelbildet...”

³²⁰ Ibid., B.II.7.d₃, 158.

³²¹ Ibid., B.II.7.f₂, 177.

and that which is not given.³²² Kant identifies three kinds of such relations between “dissimilars”: (1) duration, (2) succession, sequence, or, more literally, “one-following-after-another” (*Aufeinanderfolge*), and (3) simultaneity (*Zugleichsein*).³²³ For Kant, as well as for Heidegger, the justification of the expression of these relations in terms of time is the interpretation of constancy (*Ständigkeit*) as presence (*Anwesenheit*), persistence, endurance, which link directly to the temporal notion of “the present” (*Gegenwart*). The privileging of the temporal aspect of *Ständigkeit* as “staying” power – as opposed to “standing, for instance – is pivotal to the entire subsequent rendition of the analogies in temporal³²⁴ terms.

To briefly review Kant’s broader interpretation of time : time itself is “immutable and lasting,” “time itself does not alter, it is rather something within time that does.”³²⁵ Insofar as time does not change, it enables all other change. Kant distinguishes three modes of time: (1) endurance (*Beharrlichkeit*), (2) sequence/succession (*Folge*), (3) simultaneity (*Zugleichsein*), which are, in turn, expressed in the corresponding analogies: (1) the principle of persistence, (2) the principle of temporal sequence/succession (or chronology), and (3) the principle of simultaneity.³²⁶ The principle of persistence (or the first analogy) renders the object itself in terms of that which persists – or endures – within time, namely, substance (*Substanz*)³²⁷ – and this is one possible “unity” that temporal determination provides. The “staying” aspect of the

³²² Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, Ibid., B.II.7.f₂, 177.

³²³ Ibid..

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 177, B 219.

³²⁴ While such is not our present purpose, it remains to be seen whether notions such as “sequence” or “simultaneity” might be primarily and adequately understood in purely temporal terms.

³²⁵ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.7.f₂, 179.

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 144/B 183, A 41/B 58.

³²⁶ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.7.f₃, 180.

³²⁷ Ibid., B.II.7.f₃, 180.

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 182.

object is assured precisely by substance as a concept of the pure understanding³²⁸ and by the fundamental character of time as persistence. The principle of sequence/succession (or the second analogy) renders the object in terms of alteration subject to the law of causality, or the bond between cause (*Ursache*) and its outworkings (*Wirkung*).³²⁹ Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, the principle of simultaneity (or the third analogy) renders the object in terms of community which is, in turn, articulated through “simultaneous perception in space.”³³⁰ Again, contrary to all expectations – that is, given Heidegger’s interpretation of analogies as expressions of relations – minimal commentary is provided here not only on the surprising reappearance of space within the definition of a purportedly temporal principle, but also on the intimate relation between space and community, by means of which such a temporal principle is articulated.

In the case of space, a significant complication arises once it is established that space as a *quantum* is immediately given in the intuition. The reason for this is that space as a quantum is supposed to be the condition of possibility of any “where” whatsoever; and yet Kant’s insistence upon the location of space within intuition seems to imply a more profound spatiality than even that of space a *quantum*. The brilliance of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s statement consists precisely in his realization that such “spatiality” is precisely the “between” that is inalienable from the definition of intuition as relation to an object. Again, as Heidegger briefly adds towards the end of the paragraph, such is also applicable to time.

Indeed, in the concluding paragraphs of *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, having accounted for

³²⁸ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.7.f₃, 180.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, B.II.7.f₃, 182.

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 232.

Curiously enough, Heidegger dedicates barely two lines to commenting on this law, yet it is precisely the suspension of this law that is decisive for his critique of objectivity and his recasting of cause (*Ursache*) as wellspring (*Ursprung*) in the artwork essay, among other texts.

³³⁰ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.7.f₃, 182-183.

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 211/B 256.

the *Gegen* and for the *Stand* of the *Gegenstand*, Heidegger credits Kant with the capital insight that such remains incomplete without a consideration of the “between” (*Zwischen*), the open (*das Offene*) which opens up between ourselves and the thing in experience.³³¹ Yet it is Heidegger himself that formulates the problem as follows: “[In reading the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*,] we are oriented either towards what is said about the object itself or towards what is discussed with regard to the manner of its experience. The essential, however, is neither to look to only one of these or the other, nor to both of these together, but rather to recognize and to know: (1) that we must always move within the between, between human being and thing; (2) that this between *is* only insofar as we move within it; (3) that this between does not stretch itself out to human beings from the thing as some kind of a rope, but rather that this between as anticipation (*Vorgriff*) reaches beyond the thing and just as well back behind us. Anticipation is throw-back.”³³² Yet the insight of this passage does not terminate with the establishment of a third aspect of objectivity, namely the *Zwischen* between the human being and the thing. Its more profound implication is that the between – and with it, experience – extends both beyond the thing and beyond the human being, in both directions.

Conclusion

In his studies of Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* conducted over the period of 1927-1936, leading up to the composition of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, Heidegger continually seeks out an

³³¹ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.7.g4, 188: “Die Erfahrung ist ein in sich kreisendes Geschehen, wodurch das, was innerhalb des Kreises liegt, eröffnet wird. Dieses Offene aber ist nichts anderes als das Zwischen – zwischen uns und dem Ding.”

³³² *Ibid.*, B.II.7.h, 188: “Wir sind entweder auf das gerichtet, was vom Gegenstand selbst gesagt wird, oder auf das, was über die Weise seiner Erfahrung erörtert wird. Das Entscheidende ist aber, weder nur auf das eine, noch nur auf das andere, auch nicht nur auf beides zusammen zu achten, sondern zu erkennen und zu wissen:

1. daß wir uns immer im Zwischen, zwischen Mensch und Ding bewegen müssen;
2. daß dieses Zwischen nur ist, indem wir uns darin bewegen;
3. daß dieses Zwischen sich nicht wie ein Seil vom Ding zum Menschen spannt, sondern daß dieses Zwischen als Vorgriff über das Ding hinausgreift und ebenso hinter uns zurück. Vorgriff ist Rückwurf.”

aspect of the Kantian Subject which could open up onto robust transcendence conceived as the understanding of being. Despite his ultimate rejection of Kant's interpretation of transcendence as objectification – as the reduction of beings to the terms of the capabilities of the Subject – he takes great care to draw out certain ambiguities in Kant's account of the Subject, the principal one obtaining between 'givenness' and 'origination,' which could be taken as both raising the question of the 'origin' of the capabilities of the Subject and pointing a way towards transcendence beyond objectification. The four texts examined in this chapter trace the progress of Heidegger's pursuit of 'originary' beyond the Subject: (1) from the 'originary' of the Subject's power of configuration³³³ and temporality as self-affection, (2) to the 'originary' of the Subject's 'turning towards' and its unfolded 'space of play,' (3) to the 'originary' of the Subject's 'self-determination' as a 'conditioned cause of itself' revealing the possibility of an 'unconditioned cause,' (4) to the 'originary' of 'time-space' as the 'between' which precedes and conditions the Subject and the object, and springs from an even more profound 'unconditioned' origin.

In the 1927/1928 course *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the ambiguity between 'givenness' and 'origination' is first glimpsed in the 'non-originary givenness' (*intuitus derivativus*) of space and time – pure forms of the intuition, which

³³³ Richard Velkley identifies one locus of spontaneity within the Kantian Subject which Heidegger overlooks with severely distorting consequences: "Rather nature gives the rule to art in works of genius, or 'nature in the subject,' by which Kant means nature in a purposive and inherently indeterminable sense, such as cannot be determined by the legislative or nomothetic power of reason. Works of genius are interpretively inexhaustible, never encompassable by rules and concepts. They provide direct evidence for something supersensible that unites the human subject with what is beyond it, nature both within and without. (...) Kant's characterization of the talent for fine art is not the 'self-sovereign subject' but 'the innate predisposition [*ingenium*] through which nature gives the rule to art.'²⁴ As such it points to the ultimate unity of apparent opposites, nature as transcending the human rational powers and those powers themselves. For this reason one cannot enroll this account of genius under the supremacy of the legislative subject, however strong may be the role of 'subjectivity' in Kant's aesthetics in general." (Richard Velkley, "The Inexhaustibility of Art and the Conditions of Language: Kant and Heidegger," in *The Linguistic Dimension of Kant's Thought: Historical and Critical Essays*, ed. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2014), 297.)

had been described by Kant as both intuiting and intuitable. This ambiguity prompts Heidegger to examine the capabilities of the Subject with a view to identifying its ‘more originary’ – ‘spontaneous’ – aspects which could account for the ‘non-originary givenness’ of others. The first aspect to be considered in this light is the power of configuration (*Einbildungskraft*) as the synthetic capacity of judgment: with respect to the ‘non-originary givenness’ of time, its ‘originary’ power would consist in endowing time with ‘figure,’ yielding the three analogies of experience. However, beyond this advance, Heidegger finds it impossible to clearly establish the power of configuration as the literal ‘origin’ of time, considering it possible to interpret their relation inversely, i. e. to interpret time as the essence of the power of configuration. In this case, while time could be identified as the alternative ‘more originary’ aspect of the Subject, it would lose such ‘originaryity’ in being recast as ‘self-affection,’ the capacity of the Subject to give itself to itself and to be affected by itself. As self-affection, it would certainly locate receptivity at the most fundamental level of the subject; however, such receptivity would only reiterate the ‘non-originary givenness’ of the Subject’s capacities, leaving the question of their origin entirely open. Thus, while lifting up the possibility of identifying ‘timing’ as the most fundamental capability (*Vermögen*) of the Subject in Kant, Heidegger sees himself as remedying the limitations of self-affection in his own model of ecstatic-horizonal temporality in *Sein und Zeit*, a turning point towards genuine transcendence and towards being as the proper ‘origin’ of time.

In the 1929 text *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Heidegger hones the problematic articulated and thoroughly investigated in *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Returning to his insight that Kant had not gone far enough in elaborating the ‘subjective’ side of the transcendental deduction, Heidegger sets himself the task of developing an alternative to the transcendental imagination as the fundamental capacity of the Subject for

transcendence. Working backwards from Kant's notion of the 'transcendental object' or 'object in general,' Heidegger proposes that such presupposes a 'subjective side' which he designates by the compound "a turning-towards that allows a standing-against" (*eine entgegenstehenlassende Zuwendung-zu*). Heidegger envisions such a 'turning-towards' as a kind of space of play (*Spielraum*) which the subject extends from itself and in front of itself. Insofar as this model relies on space in ways more obvious than on time, it compels Heidegger to concede that the Subject is spatial in its very essence, and that the relationship between time and space as constitutive of the Self may not be as straightforwardly hierarchical as he had initially anticipated.

In the 1931 series of lectures *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Heidegger once again takes up his search of 'originary' which extends beyond the Subject (and beyond Dasein). However, to the degree that 'originary' pervades the Subject (and Dasein), Heidegger takes up the challenge of tracing the continuity between the two and pinpointing their divergence. As these series of lectures extend Heidegger's previous engagement of Kant, they seek the continuity in Kant's notion of spontaneity, and the divergence – in the conditioned causality which constraints the spontaneity of the Subject and unconditioned causality which characterizes the absolute spontaneity of that which lies beyond the Subject. With regard to the spontaneity of the Subject, the advance of this series of lectures consists in the shift from self-affection to self-determination. In self-determination, the Subject 'handles itself,' 'works itself,' and not simply 'does' something (*Tun, facere*). Yet such 'handling' and 'working' is a discovery rather than generation per se. Moreover, some of its 'handlings' and 'workings' remain subject to 'conditioned causality,' i. e. temporality conceived as a directional flow of time (*Zeitfolge*). On the other hand, insofar as reason is simultaneously present in all of its 'handlings'

and ‘workings,’ and insofar as the will is not answerable to any natural cause, the spontaneity of the Subject exhibits a continuity with the spontaneity of that which lies beyond the Subject. The latter is ‘originary,’ ‘generative,’ and ‘spontaneous’ in the absolute senses of these terms. It is not explicitly identified by Kant, however, he points to Aristotle’s ‘first unmoved mover’ as a qualified candidate ; Heidegger alternatively proposes being, drawing a distinction between the spontaneity of the Subject (and of Dasein) as ‘ontic,’ and the spontaneity of being as ‘ontological.’

In the 1935-36 text *Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den Transcendentalen Grundsätzen*, Heidegger continues his search for the ‘unconditioned’ beyond the Subject. Having exhausted the resources of the spontaneity of the Subject, and having dismissed the historical precedents of the ‘absolute I’ of German idealism and the ‘God of the Old Testament,’ Heidegger puts forth a new candidate for ‘originary’ – the ‘between’ (*das Zwischen*), which precedes and anticipates both the Subject and the object and conditions their encounter. This ‘between’ is reducible neither to the capabilities of the Subject, nor to the properties of the ‘thing,’ but rather springs from a deeper, as yet unidentified source.³³⁴ In itself, however, it is conceived as a unity of ‘time-space’ (*Zeitraum*), a notion which is taken up in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* and finally inscribed into its ultimate, proper ‘origin’ – being.

³³⁴ We would identify the ‘shattering of immanence’ which Joseph Sadzik associates with ‘the period of “The Origin of the Work of Art” (“[à] l’époque de Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, pour la première fois, l’immanence est brisé”) precisely with this initial glimpse of the ‘between’ which is irreducible to the Subject. (Joseph Sadzik, “Réflexions critiques,” in *Esthétique de Martin Heidegger* (Paris : Éditions universitaires, 1963), 152.)

CHAPTER 2 : Existentiality as Signification (*Besinnung*) : Dasein as the Measure of Space and Time in *Sein und Zeit*

Introduction

The trajectory of Heidegger's critique of Kant plotted in the previous chapter allows us to characterize his project in *Sein und Zeit* as transitional and ambivalent in the following sense : on the one hand, it acknowledges the 'origin' of spatiality and temporality to lie beyond the Subject, yet on the other, it extends the Kantian project of conceiving of these as capabilities (*Vermögen*) of Dasein, even if in an unquestionably different manner. The spatiality and temporality of Dasein constitute a development of the 'subjective side' of Kant's transcendental deduction, an objective which Heidegger does not explicitly formulate until the 1929 *Kantbuch*. However, for all of its intricacies, 'being-in-the-world' extrapolates the fundamental capability of the Subject identified in the *Kantbuch* as 'a turning-towards that allows a standing-against,' which consists in the Subject extending a 'space of play' before itself such that it can enter into a relation with something other than itself. Indeed, in §23, Heidegger goes so far as to qualify such capability as "the 'subjective' *a priori* of 'being-in-the-world,'" The key difference, then, between the Kantian and the Heideggerian models lies less in the distinction between 'subjective' and non-subjective,' and more in the privileging, by Heidegger, of the capability for 'turning-towards' the other over the capability for 'turning-towards' the self as more originally constitutive of the Subject. Insofar as this capability presupposes a structural contribution of the other, it reveals the 'self' of Dasein to be always-already ontologically incomplete, 'insufficient' onto itself, and opens up the question of the extent of this contribution, which surpasses the notion of a fulfillment of a capability which is complete apart from being anticipatory, and conjectures

towards one whose very means and mode of operation (including spatiality and temporality) are directly and actively configured and sustained by the capabilities of the other. The definitive shift to this conception of the self will not take place until “The Origin of the Work of Art” and the *Beitrage zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. However, in this chapter, situating the analysis of Dasein precisely between the subjective capability for ‘turning-towards’ and its non-subjective configuration, will enable our examination of the spatiality and temporality of Dasein to identify and signal the junctures at which these capabilities begin to show signs of deficiency and, more importantly, of supplementation by capabilities other than its own.

§1. Spatiality as a Capability of Dasein

α) The “traditional” philosophical layer: Descartes’s *res extensa* and *cogito*, Kant’s *Gegenstand* and *Subjekt*.

Between its initial tentative sketch in §12 and its reprisal in §22, Heidegger’s notion of “being-in-the-world” as the essential spatiality (*wesentliche Räumlichkeit*) of Dasein¹ is measured against the interpretation of “-the-world” as *res extensa* and of “being-in-” as *cogito* by Descartes, as well as against the interpretation of “-the-world” as *Gegenstand* and of “being-in-” as *Subjekt* by Kant. In Heidegger’s estimation, neither the Cartesian nor the Kantian account have been able to afford a genuinely phenomenological glimpse of “being-in-the-world” as the essential spatiality of Dasein. (However, as §§22-24 abundantly attest, following his extended engagement with Descartes, Heidegger becomes less preoccupied with eschewing the term “spatiality” (*Räumlichkeit*) as such and directs his efforts rather at specifying the precise the sense in which the term “space” and its derivatives might be applied to the “handy,” to “being-

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Klostermann : Frankfurt am Main, 1977, TI.AI.K3.C, 136.

in-the-world,” to Dasein, and indeed, to space (*Raum*) itself.²) The “primarily spatial” significance to which Heidegger alludes here and seeks to avoid at any cost is that arising from the opposition of *res extensa* and *res cogitans* which Heidegger attributes to Descartes.³ Yet it is certainly worth noting that Heidegger prefaces his analysis and critique of Descartes’ “extreme”⁴ notion of the world in §§19-21 by qualifying its outcome as a “negative clue” pointing in the direction of the spatiality (*Räumlichkeit*) of environment and what is more – of *Dasein* itself.⁵

In Heidegger’s estimation, the fundamental determination of Descartes’ notion of the world is that of extension (*extensio/Ausdehnung*), which is co-constituted and identical with that of spatiality.⁶ Insofar as, for Descartes, the term “world” designates the substance (*Substanz*) of a corporeal thing (*res corporea*), the principal attribute of its substantiality (*Substantialität*) is that of “extension in longitude, latitude, and profundity.”⁷ Extension is the means by which all of the other attributes of the world – obdurateness/hardness, *divisio, figura, motus*, and, further, *durities/Härte, pondus/Gewicht, and color/Farbe*⁸ – are accessible to the thinking thing (*res cogitans*).⁹ For example – and such an example is directly relevant to Heidegger’s eventual recasting of objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*) in terms of withstanding/resistance (*Widerständigkeit*) in the artwork essay – the attribute of obdurateness/hardness is experienced,

² Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.C, 136.

³ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.§14, 89.

⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.B, 119.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.: “Sofern Ausdehnung die Räumlichkeit mitkonstituiert, nach *Descartes* sogar mit ihr identisch ist, Räumlichkeit aber in irgendeinem Sinn für die Welt konstitutiv bleibt...”

⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.B.§19, 121.

Cf. Descartes, “Principia I,” in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. VIII (*Principia philosophiae*, n. LIII/53), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Cerf, 1905), 25: “Nempe *extensio* in longum, latum [&] profundum, substantiae corporeae naturam constituit...”

⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§19, 122.

⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.B.§19, 121.

Cf. Descartes, “Principia I,” in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. VIII (*Principia philosophiae*, n. LIII/53), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Cerf, 1905), 25: “Nam omne aliud quod corpori tribui potest, extensionem praesupponit.”

according to the Cartesian account, in terms of a part of an obdurate/hard body withstanding/resisting (*widerstehen*) the movement of the hand toward and against it, i. e. its remaining immobile (not changing its place, that is) in relation to the movement (change of place) of the hand.¹⁰ In fact, Heidegger is willing to go as far as to suggest that *divisio*, *figura*, and *motus* are none other than modes (*modi*) of extension, while extension itself is capable of being understood quite apart from figure or motion, for instance.¹¹ Thus, according to Descartes, both shape/form (*Gestalt*) and movement (*Bewegung*) are modes of extension, and are experienceable (*erfahrbar*) only by way of extension as a “pure change of place” (“*reiner Ortwechsel*”).¹² While retaining its overall extension (*Gesamtausdehnung*), a corporeal thing can nevertheless change its partitioning (*Verteilung*) according to various dimensions and, in so doing, assume manifold shapes/forms while remaining the same.¹³ Thus, Heidegger recapitulates Descartes’ determination of extension as a “omnimodo divisibile, figurabile et mobile” and “capax mutationum” which alters itself by way of its separability/divisibility (*Teilbarkeit*), shaping/formation (*Gestaltung*), and movement (*Bewegung*), yet remains/steadily persists

¹⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§19, 122, §21, 130.

Cf. Descartes, “Principia II,” in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. VIII (*Principia philosophiae*, n. 4/IV), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Cerf, 1905), 42: “Nam, quantum ad duritiem, nihil aliud de illa sensus nobis indicat, quam partes durorum corporum resistere motui manuum nostrarum, cum in illas incurrunt. Si enim, quotiescunque manus nostrae versus aliquam partem moventur, corpora omnia ibi existnetia recederent eadem celeritate qua illae accedunt, nullam unquam duritiem sentiremus. Nec ullo modo potest intelligi, corpora quae sic recederent, idcirco naturam corporis esse amissura; nec proinde ipsa in duritie consistit.”

¹¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§19, 121.

¹² *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K3.B.§19, 122.

Cf. Descartes, “Principia I,” in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. VIII (*Principia philosophiae*, n. 65/LXV), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Cerf, 1905), 32: “...itemque diversos modos extensionis sive ad extensionem pertinentes, ut figuras omnes, & situs partium, & ipsarum motus, optimè percipiemus, si tantùm ut modos rerum quibus insunt spectemus; & quantum ad motum, si de nullo nisi locali cogitemus, ac de vi à quâ excitatur (quam tamen suo loco explicare conabor^a) non inquiramus.”

¹³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§19, 121.

Cf. Descartes, “Principia I,” in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. VIII (*Principia philosophiae*, n. 64/LXIV), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Cerf, 1905), 31: “...[a]tque unum [&] idem corpus, retinendo suam eandem quantitatem, pluribus diversis modis potest extendi...”

(“remanet”/“ständig verbleibt”) throughout all such alteration.¹⁴

In Heidegger’s view, the deficiency of the Cartesian determination of the world in terms of extension is not only that such determination fails to reach the substance of the world itself, but also that such substance is declared to be inaccessible (*unzugänglich*) in principle,¹⁵ with the attribute of extension marking the furthest reach of the thinking thing. For Heidegger, however, such “inaccessibility” of substance is but a symptom of the unclarified and purportedly unclarifiable sense of its being.¹⁶ According to Heidegger’s reading of the Scholastic tradition and its incorporation by Descartes, the Cartesian notion of substance¹⁷ is compromised by the equivocal sense of being which lies at its core: being is predicated¹⁸ of both finite and infinite

¹⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§19, 123.

NB: Heidegger does not provide a specific reference to Descartes’ “Principia I” with regard to these Latin formulations.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K3.B.§20, 125: “...Substanz als solche, das heißt ihre Substantialität, sei vorgängig an ihr selbst für sich unzugänglich.”

Cf. Descartes, “Principia I,” in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. VIII (*Principia philosophiae*, n. 51/LI), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Cerf, 1905), 24: “Verumtamen non potest substantia primum animadverti ex hoc solo, quod sit res existens, quia hoc solum per se nos non afficit.”

¹⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§20, 125.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K3.B.§20, 123.

Cf. Descartes, “Principia II,” in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. VIII (*Principia philosophiae*, n. 51/LI), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Cerf, 1905), 24: “Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum.”

NB: Heidegger renders Descartes’ formulation as “Unter Substanz können wir nichts anderes verstehen als ein Seiendes, das so *ist*, daß es, um *zu sein*, keines anderen Seienden bedarf,” refraining from translating Descartes’ Latin “rem” and “re” as the available German “Ding,” “existit” as “existiert,” for instance, and “existendum” as “um zu existieren.”

¹⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§20, 126: “Sein ist kein reales Prädikat.”

NB: Heidegger does not provide a specific reference for this quotation attributed to Kant, but its source is most likely Part I, Observation 1.1 of Kant’s *The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God*. (Immanuel Kant, *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011) 58-59.) In this treatise, Kant specifically rejects the Cartesian notion of existence as a perfection and proposes the alternative notion of existence as position. (Immanuel Kant, *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), 225, 58-59.) Such a rejection confirms that the Cartesian notion of existence stands in clear contrast to that of Kant, and Heidegger’s claim that Kant’s rejection of existence as a predicate “does no more than reiterate the principle of Descartes” is without warrant. (Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§20, 126). With regard to Descartes’ notion of existence as a perfection, cf. Descartes, “Meditatio V,” in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. VII (*Meditationes de prima philosophia*, Obiectiones, Responsio, Epistola ad Dinet), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Cerf, 1905), 66ff.: “Sed tamen diligentius attendenti fit manifestum, non magis posse existentiam ab essentiâ Dei separari, quàm ab essentiâ trianguli magnitudinem trium ejus angulorum aequalium duobus rectis, sive ab ideâ montis ideam vallis: adeo ut non magis repugnet

substances without definitive means for their differentiation apart from the the notion of “createdness,” which renders the former as “created being” (*ens creatum/Geschaffenes*) and the latter as “uncreated being/creator” (*ens increatum/Schöpfer*).¹⁹ What is more, the Scholastic tradition (and, by extension, Descartes²⁰) insists upon an “infinite difference” (*unendlicher Unterschied*)²¹ between the being of finite substances and that of infinite substances, while endorsing the continued analogical use of the term “being” in reference to both. In Heidegger’s view, the distinction between “created” and “uncreated being” is insufficient to account for the “infinite difference” between finite and infinite substances; furthermore, the impression of resolution given by such a distinction suppresses the far more urgent question of the precise sense in which “being” might be *common* to “uncreated being” and “created being.” The implication of this problematic for the notion of the world as *res extensa* is that the being of the “*res*” component of such a determination – and therefore, of the determination as a whole – must ultimately remain undetermined in the Cartesian scheme.

Heidegger’s evaluation of the Cartesian notion of the world in §21 takes an alternative critical approach, one which takes its point of departure from Descartes’ *cōgitātiō*, characterized by Heidegger as “physico-mathematical.” By definition, the counterpart of “physico-mathematical” *cōgitātiō* – or cognition (*Erkenntnis*), as Heidegger terms it – is that within beings which remains constant. Consequently, when the world is approached from the point of view of such cognition – i. e. as its commensurate counterpart – its being inevitably turns out to be

cogitare Deum (hoc est | ens summe perfectum) cui desit existentia (hoc est cui desit aliqua perfectio), quam cogitare montem cui desit vallis.”

¹⁹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§20, 124.

²⁰ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.B.§20, 125: “*Descartes* bleibt hinsichtlich der ontologischen Durcharbeitung des Problems weit hinter der Scholastik zurück... *Descartes* läßt den in der Idee der Substantialität beschlossenen Sinn von Sein und den Charakter der “Allgemeinheit” dieser Bedeutung unerörtert.”

²¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.B.§20, 123-124.

“prescribed” (*vorgeschrieben*)²² by the principal criterion of such cognition, i.e. constancy. Insofar as such cognition considers its counterparts to be properly (*eigentlich*) existent precisely in virtue of their constancy, it is constitutionally incapable of conceiving of the proper being of the world in any way other than that of “constant at-hand-ness” (“*ständige Vorhandenheit*”).²³ Heidegger attributes such construal of cognition by Descartes to his dissatisfaction with the interpretation of *voεĩv* as intuition (*Anschauung*) in the broadest sense of the term and with the privilege of such intuition over thinking (*δiανοεĩv/Denken*) as within “traditional ontology.”²⁴ While accepting the preeminence of *voεĩv* over *δiανοεĩv* as its derivative form of fulfillment (*fundierte Vollzugsform*) in general terms, Descartes seeks to heighten the contrast between sensation (*sensatio/αĩσθησις*) and intellection (*intellectio*) as two kinds of intuiting, perceiving access to beings.²⁵ Sensation registers that which is changeful (color, taste, hardness, temperature, sound, etc.), while intellection – that which is constant. Insofar as the properly existent is characterized by constancy, the contribution of sensation can be of no import in its intuition: “the senses simply register the usefulness and harmfulness of things with respect to human flesh” without genuinely enriching the phenomenological account of the latter as a particular experience.²⁶ Thus, sensation cedes the decisive role in access to beings to intellection.

²² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.B.§21, 128.

²³ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.B.§21, 128, 133-134. The most immediately accessible modality of “constant at-hand-ness” – “natural thing-ness” (*Naturdinglichkeit*) – sheds little light on the proper existence of things, whether extended or thinking, and must therefore be abandoned as a path which can only lead to an overcoming of the world as an obstacle to proper access to proper existence (or being).

²⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.B.§21, 129: “Descartes hat die Verengung der Frage nach der Welt auf die nach der Naturdinglichkeit als dem zunächst zugänglichen, innerweltlichen Seienden verschärft.”

²⁵ Ibid..

²⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.B.§21, 130: “Die Sinne lassen überhaupt nicht Seiendes in seinem Sein erkennen, sondern sie melden lediglich Nützlichkeit und Schädlichkeit der “äußeren” innerweltlichen Dinge für das leibhaftete Menschenwesen.”

Cf. Descartes, “Principia II,” in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. VIII (*Principia philosophiae*, n. 3/III), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Paris: Cerf, 1905), 41: “Satis erit, si advertamus sensuum perceptiones non referri, nisi ad istam corporis humani cum mente coniunctionem, et nobis quidem ordinarie exhibere, quid ad illam externa corpora prodesse possint aut nocere.”

Contrary to the expected outcome of such numerous and significant reservations, Heidegger's final verdict concerning Descartes' rendition of the world in terms of extension and spatiality is both startling and of tremendous positive consequence for his development of the spatiality of Dasein. As such, it is certainly worth quoting in its entirety:

With the radical proposal of *extensio* as the *praesuppositum* of every determinateness of *res corporea*, Descartes has elaborated a preliminary understanding of an *a priori*, whose content was then more urgently fixed by Kant. The analysis of *extensio* remains, within certain boundaries, independent from the neglect of an explicit interpretation of the being of extended beings. The assertion of *extensio* as the fundamental determinateness of the "world" has its phenomenal right, even if in retreating to it, neither the spatiality of the world, nor the initially discovered spatiality of beings encountering [us] in [our] environment, nor even the spatiality of Dasein itself can be conceived ontologically."²⁷

β) The "Vulgar" Layer of the Spatiality of Dasein: Insideness

Indeed, Heidegger's immediate priority lies in distinguishing "worldly-ness" and "in-ness" from commonplace notions and relations of space (*Raum*), place (*Ort*), and extension (*Ausdehnung*). The commonplace understanding and usage of these terms relies on the interpretation of being as "being-at-hand," as "things proceeding 'within' the world" in the sense of displaying a determinate extension and place within the boundaries (*Grenze*) of another determinate extended being, both the former and the latter being "at hand" in space.²⁸ Heidegger uses the following sequence to illustrate this scenario: "the bench is in the auditorium, the auditorium is in the university, the university is in the city, and so on – all the way to 'the bench

²⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TLAIK3.B.§21, 135: "Mit der radikalen Herausstellung der *extensio* als des *praesuppositum* für jede Bestimmtheit der *res corporea* hat Descartes dem Verständnis eines Apriori vorgearbeitet, dessen Gehalt dann *Kant* eindringlicher fixierte. Die Analyse der *extensio* bleibt in gewissen Grenzen unabhängig von dem Versäumnis einer ausdrücklichen Interpretation des Seins des ausgedehnten Seienden. Die Ansetzung der *extensio* als Grundbestimmtheit der "Welt" hat ihr phänomenales Recht, wenn auch im Rückgang auf sie weder die Räumlichkeit der Welt, noch die zunächst entdeckte Räumlichkeit des in der Umwelt begegnenden Seienden, noch gar der Räumlichkeit des Daseins selbst ontologisch begriffen werden kann."

²⁸ Ibid.

is in the ‘world-space.’”²⁹ The spatiality of “being-at-hand” is more properly called “inside-ness” (“Inwendigkeit”),³⁰ which, when applied to Dasein, may indeed indicate the non-essential spatiality of the latter.³¹ However, as Heidegger underscores, such an interpretation is not ultimately commensurate with Dasein (*daseinsmäßig*).³² Dasein cannot be thought of as some body-thing (*Körperding*) – as human flesh (*Menschenleib*) – that is spatially “being-at-hand” within another being that is “at-hand.”³³ Dasein and the world are not “at-hand” next to each other (“*Nebeneinander*”) with some kind of space obtaining between (*Zwischenraum*) them.³⁴ Neither is the “spatiality” (“*Räumlichkeit*”) of Dasein some kind of spiritual property, constituted through its “fleshly-ness” (“*Leiblichkeit*”) or “bodily-ness” (*Körperlichkeit*),³⁵ which enables Dasein to join other beings in their “being-at-hand,” so to speak.

γ) The ‘Proper’ Layer of the Spatiality of Dasein: Being-in-the World

The point of departure of Heidegger’s inquiry is the notion of “being-in-the-world” (*In-der-Welt-sein*), which is neither explicitly temporal, nor spatial in the commonplace sense of the latter term. The analysis of Dasein (*Analytik des Daseins*) aims at interpreting this phenomenon in its unity and in its structural moments: (1) the “worldly-ness” (*Weltlichkeit*) of the world (*Welt*), (2) the “who” (*Wer*) of that being (*Seiende*), and (3) the “in-ness” (*Inheit*) of “being-in as

²⁹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K2.§12, 72-73.

³⁰ Ibid., TI.AI.K2.§12, 75.

³¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C, 136.

³² Ibid., TI.AI.K2.§12, 73. In footnote b of Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.§45, 311, Heidegger defines “daseinsmäßig” as “thought according to the measure of the essence of Dasein” (“gemäß dem Wesen des Daseins gedacht”).

³³ Ibid..

That which roughly corresponds to “being-at-hand” in Dasein is its facticity (*Faktizität*), articulated in §29 of *Sein und Zeit*, which refers to Dasein’s attachment to being in its fate, which encounters Dasein from within Dasein’s own world: “...so zwar, daß sich dieses Seiende verstehen kann als in seinem “Geschick” verhaftet mit dem Sein des Seienden, das ihm innerhalb seiner eigenen Welt begegnet.”

³⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K2.§12, 74.

³⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K2.§12, 75.

such” (“*In-Sein als solches*”).³⁶ While the unity of this phenomenon is ultimately discovered to lie in temporality, such cannot be approached but through its structural moments, which is sustained in dialogue with various commonplace and philosophical notions of spatiality.

Heidegger approaches the ‘essential spatiality’ of Dasein as Being-in-the-World by interpreting “being-in-” as “going about” (*Umgang*) and “-the-world” as “environment” (*Umwelt*). Insofar as “essential spatiality” enfolds an as-yet-undetermined notion of space (*Raum*),³⁷ Heidegger proposes to reverse the Cartesian and Kantian order of inquiry and begin with the moment of “-the-world” as most immediately adjacent to the problematic of space. Once an aspect of the spatiality of “-the-world”³⁸ has been glimpsed through the distinctive spatiality of the environment (or “environ-hood” (*Umhafte*)), an aspect of the spatiality of “being-in-” might come into view as the distinctive spatiality of “going about” (or “being-[in order] to” (“*Sein-zu*”). Having reached this vantage point, Heidegger may pursue the farther reaches of the essential spatiality of Dasein and an even more original sense of “being-in-the-world”.

α) “being-in” as “being-by”

Heidegger insists that the original meaning of the term “in” is not that of a spatial relation at all³⁹; rather, “in” stems from “innan-, to dwell, *habitare*, to reside,” while “at” (“an”) means “I am used to, entrusted with, I take care of something” and stems from *colo* (cultivate) in the sense of *habito* (inhabit) and *diligo* (esteem).⁴⁰ Thus, Heidegger sees a connection between the German first-person singular form of the verb *sein* – “bin” – and the preposition by (*bei*), which, for

³⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K2.§12, 72.

³⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§22, 136.

³⁸ Cf. Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.footnote a, 136: “Welt also auch räumlich.”

³⁹ In support for this point Heidegger references Jakob Grimm, *Kleinere Schriften*, vol. VII, 247.

⁴⁰ Ibid., TI.AI.K2.§12, 73: “...innan-, wohnen, habitare, sich aufhalten...”, “...ich bin gewohnt, vertraut mit, ich pflege etwas...”

Heidegger, has the significance of “I live, I ‘stick by’ ...the world as [something] entrusted [to me.]”⁴¹ Thus, Heidegger comes to the conclusion that the infinitive of “bin” – “sein” – means “to live by, to be entrusted with.”⁴² Such is the significance of the “in-ness” of “being-in as such”; by extension, the significance of being-in-the-world is thus more accurately reflected by the expression being-by-the-world, “sticking by the world,” as it were. For Dasein, being-there (*Da-Sein*) entails being world-ly, i. e. being equipped for reaching out – for “being-by” – another being from the outset. It is this ontological structure that Heidegger names “concern” (*Sorge*).⁴³ For the purposes of the current study, the crucial point of this discussion is that the distinction between “in-ness” and “inside-ness” does not automatically preclude each and every attempt to speak of the “spatiality” (“*Räumlichkeit*”) of Dasein. On the contrary, as Heidegger himself emphasizes, “Dasein itself has its own “being-in-space” [*Im-Raum-sein*”) its existential spatiality (*existenziale Räumlichkeit*) – which rests upon its “being-in-the-world in general.”⁴⁴

Yet “being-in-the-world” continually eludes the grasp of thought and remains invisible (*unsichtbar*) (as do, for Kant, the categories without time, and time – without space), so long as it is approached from the incommensurate perspective of the subject-object relation (*Subjekt-Object-Beziehung*).⁴⁵ Wherein lies the deficiency of such a perspective? According to Heidegger, its mistaken point of departure is its presupposition that human cognition (*Erkenntnis*) is something “inward” (“*innen*”) or “inside” (“*drinnen*”) the human being, such that the latter is obliged to “come out of its inward ‘sphere’” and spring into “another and outward” one, raising

⁴¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K2.§12, 73: “...ich wohne, halte mich auf bei...der Welt, als dem so und so Vertrauten.”

⁴² Ibid.: “...wohnen bei..., vertraut sein mit...”

⁴³ Ibid., TI.A1.K2.§12, 77.

⁴⁴ Ibid., TI.A1.K2.§12, 75.

⁴⁵ Ibid., TI.A1.K2.§12, 79.

questions as to the very possibility of such a feat.⁴⁶ Yet even prior to this obstacle, Heidegger points to the fact that the supposed “inward sphere” of immanence itself remains positively undetermined.⁴⁷

Heidegger would overcome such an impasse by revealing “cognition” itself to be founded upon an antecedent being-in-the-world: apart from “being-in-the-world” as concern, as preoccupation with the world (as “having-to-do” with the world in its various forms of setting-forth, fiddling-with, etc.), the sole mode of “being-in” which remains is that of simply lingering or tarrying by (*Nur-noch-verweilen bei*) the “being-at-hand,” observing its outward appearance (*Aussehen/εἶδος*), and determining it – the mode of insight (*Hinsehen*).⁴⁸ This is the only plausible sense in which an “in-sight” (or in-side) can be articulated as corresponding to an “out-sight” (or out-side). Insight is an aiming-at (*Anvisieren*), a directing-oneself-towards (*Sichrichten auf*) that which is “at-hand” from the point of view (*Gesichtspunkt*) of Dasein, rather than its interiorizing by the subject by means of creating an inward “representation” (*Vorstellung*) of its outward appearance.⁴⁹ Cognition is no “return with the booty” to the “stores” of consciousness.⁵⁰ In such aiming-at, directing-oneself-towards, Dasein is simultaneously “always already ‘outside’” (immer schon “*draußen*”) and yet “inside” (“*drinnen*”), insofar as “being-in-the-world” constitutes its own proper structure.⁵¹

β) “Worldly-ness” of the “world”

⁴⁶ Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A.I.K2.§13, 81: “...wie kommt dieses erkennende Subjekt aus seiner inneren ‘Sphäre’ hinaus in eine ‘andere und äußerer,’ wie kann das Erkennen überhaupt einen Gegenstand haben, wie muß der Gegenstand selbst gedacht werden, damit am Ende das Subjekt ihn erkennt, ohne daß es den Sprung in eine andere Sphäre zu wagen braucht?”

⁴⁷ Ibid., TI.A.I.K2.§13, 81-82.

⁴⁸ Ibid., TI.A.I.K2.§13, 83. Cf. footnote a regarding the later reversal of the origin of insight (*Hinsehen*): “Dursch Ab-sehen-von word nicht schon das Hinsehen – dieses hat eigenen Ursprung und hat zur notwendigen Folge jenes Absehen; Betrachten hat seine eigene Ursprünglichkeit. Der Blick auf εἶδος verlangt anderes.”

⁴⁹ Ibid..

⁵⁰ Ibid..

⁵¹ Ibid.

As Heidegger himself acknowledges, at the outset, the world seems to be a characteristic of the being of Dasein, an existential (*Existenzial*), its *a priori*, which renders such a notion vulnerable to undesired re-subjectification.⁵² Heidegger's path to the demonstration that such is not the case passes through two stages: (1) an elaboration of the world of everyday (*alltäglich*) Dasein as an environment (*Umwelt*), and (2) an elaboration of the idea of "worldly-ness overall" (*Weltlichkeit überhaupt*).⁵³

As in the foregoing discussion of the notion of "in-ness," Heidegger initially acknowledges that the prefix *um-* in *Umwelt* may give the impression that the notion of the environment is spatial, yet is insistent upon the fact that the significance of the word "*umherum*" (roundabout) is not "primarily spatial," or rather – importantly – its spatial character (*Raumcharakter*) is to be elucidated on the basis of the notion of "worldly-ness."⁵⁴ Indeed, according to Heidegger, such a vantage point should also afford a proper understanding of the notion of the aforementioned "spatiality" (*Räumlichkeit*) of Dasein.

The point of departure for Heidegger's alternative to Descartes' notion of the world as an extended thing is the notion of "everyday being-in-the-world," i. e. the manner in which Dasein "goes about" (*Umgang*) relating to – and more specifically, being concerned with – beings which surround it.⁵⁵ As Heidegger points out, the Greeks would have termed such beings "*πράγματα*," as correlates of *πραξις*, yet "under-determined" them as "mere things" ("bloße Dinge"); Heidegger's own term for such beings is tool (*Zeug*) and their character is that of "tool-hood"

⁵² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.§14, 86-87: "Ist "Welt" gar ein Seinscharakter des Daseins? ... Wird so "Welt" nicht etwas "Subjektives"?"

⁵³ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.§14, 89.

⁵⁴ Ibid.: "Der Ausdruck Umwelt enthält in dem "Um" einen Hinweis auf Räumlichkeit. Das "Umherum," das für die Umwelt konstitutiv ist, hat jedoch kein primär "räumlichen" Sinn. Der einer Umwelt unbestreitbar zugehörige Raumcharakter ist vielmehr erst aus der Struktur der Weltlichkeit aufzuklären. Von hier aus wird die in §12 angezeigte Räumlichkeit des Daseins phänomenal sichtbar."

⁵⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.§15, 90.

(*Zeughaftigkeit*).⁵⁶ How might Dasein’s manner of “going about” in dealing with such tools be understood as “wordly”? As Heidegger himself asks in the concluding lines of §15, dedicated to articulating the being of the tool, “Then does a path lead from the being of this being to the demonstration of the world-phenomenon at all?”⁵⁷ If so, how does such a phenomenon differ from a merely “subjectively colored” world of *res extensa*?⁵⁸ How does Dasein’s “going about” (*Umgang*) differ from the conceiving (*Auffassung*) of a subject? Moreover, what sets “going about” apart from the “handling” (*Handeln*) of a subject on the whole? Indeed, “going about” entails a different kind of sight than that of cognition – that of “circum-spection” (*Umsicht*) in distinction from “in-sight” (*Hinsehen*); yet both of these extend from the point of view of Dasein and characterize its being, so long as “the world” is understood to be an inalienable structural moment of Dasein itself. In such a scenario, the “wordly-ness” of Dasein remains at best a “reference from something to something” (“*Verweisung von etwas auf etwas*”)⁵⁹ – a vector extending from Dasein to a being, which both encounters and renders such a being in terms of its fit with possible functions of Dasein. Indeed, the environment (*Umwelt*) of Dasein is none other than the multiplicity of references characterized as “in order to” (*Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeit des “Um-zu”*).⁶⁰ Thus, in the example Heidegger himself provides, Dasein “goes about” encountering a room not in a “geometrically spatial sense,” but in the sense of a “tool for living.”⁶¹ Indeed, it is the “hand” of Dasein in reference to which the relative “handy-ness”

⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K3.§15, 92.

⁵⁷ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.§15, 97: “Führt denn überhaupt vom Sein dieses Seienden ein Weg zur Aufweisung des Weltphänomens?”

⁵⁸ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.§15, 96: “Die Seinsart dieses Seienden ist die Zuhandenheit. Sie darf jedoch nicht als bloßer Auffassungscharakter^a verstanden werden, als würden dem zunächst begegnenden “Seienden” solche “Aspekte” aufgeredet, als würde ein zunächst an sich vorhandener Weltstoff in dieser Weise “subjektiv gefärbt.”

⁵⁹ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.§15, 92.

⁶⁰ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.§15, 93.

⁶¹ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.§15, 92: “...das Zimmer...nicht als das “Zwischen den vier Wänden” in einem geometrischen räumlichen Sinne – sondern als Wohnzeug.”

(*Zuhandenheit*) and usability (*Verwendbarkeit*) of such a tool for such a “handling” (*Handeln*) is measured.⁶² Indeed, the measure of Dasein’s “work” pervades its “worldly-ness” to such a degree that it renders the tool inconspicuous, if not altogether invisible. In this context, the “worldly-ness” of Dasein signifies its being one that carries something out (*Träger*), a user (*Benutzer*), a consumer (*Verbraucher*).⁶³ Thus, the environment of Dasein – its “open world” (*öffentliche Welt*) – is revealed to be a network of Dasein’s possible operations in reference to which beings are gauged as more or less suitable means. Within such a network, the position of the sun, for instance, registers as a means of calculating time.⁶⁴ Thus it becomes evident that the “spatiality” of the “worldly-ness” of Dasein consists first and foremost in its “referentiality,” i. e. in the capacity of Dasein to orient itself and reach out towards other beings with a view to its own. The much vaunted temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein, on the other hand, appears to be entirely untouched by this approach. Indeed, the “worldly-ness” of Dasein is given non-thematically,⁶⁵ just as space and time are non-thematically intuited in Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, according to Heidegger’s own interpretation in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*.⁶⁶ The path of thematisation, however, leads to the all too familiar and futile *cul de sac* of objectification; in its stead, Heidegger attempts to follow the marker of reference (*Verweisung*), which comes into view in the event of the failure of a tool.⁶⁷ Yet the sight of such a reference is not yet that of the world.

The yield of the discussion regarding Dasein’s “going about” (*Umgang*) and of its environment (*Umwelt*) is that referentiality (*Verweisung*) is shown to be “in some sense

⁶² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K3.§15, 93.

⁶³ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.§15, 95.

⁶⁴ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.§15, 95-96.

⁶⁵ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.A.§16, 97: “...ohne eine thematisch ontologische Interpretation zu fordern.”

⁶⁶ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §28, 2nd edition, 2010, 145.

⁶⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K3.A.§16, 100.

constitutive of worldly-ness itself.”⁶⁸ What specific sense is Heidegger referring to here? First and foremost, referentiality is a kind of relation (*Beziehungsart*),⁶⁹ while relation (*Beziehung*) itself is “a formal determination which is directly readable, by way of “formalisation,” in every kind of “hanging together” of every [*Sachhaltigkeit*] and way of being.”⁷⁰ Yet in Heidegger’s view, it is precisely the formal-universal character of the notion of relation that ultimately renders it incapable of endowing the notion of reference with a higher resolution. The notion of a sign, signal, or indice (*Zeichen*), on the other hand, allows the inquiry to make headway in the direction of understanding referentiality as foresight (*Vorsicht*)⁷¹ (which also brings the dimension of time into play for the first time since the initial announcement of the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein over 75 pages earlier). Referentiality as foresight enables Dasein to see itself in terms of its possible relations with other beings in advance and to set out in the pursuit of their fulfillment. Yet, as the closing question of §17 suggests, even the path of reference does not seem to bring Heidegger sufficiently close to his goal: “...to what extent [can referentiality be] that which constitutes worldly-ness overall?”⁷²

Again, as in the case of Heidegger’s interpretation of the intuition of space and time in Kant by means by the notion of *intuitus derivativus*, the “worldly-ness” of Dasein is something that is freely, *a priori* given (*Freigabe*) to it.⁷³ Similarly, Dasein’s “exercise” of its “worldly-ness” as letting beings meet its “willing-that” (*Worum-willen*) parallels the comportment of the

⁶⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K3.A.§17, 103: “...Verweisung und Verweisungsganzheit in irgendeinem Sinne konstitutiv sein werden für die Weltlichkeit selbst.”

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.: “Beziehung ist eine formale Bestimmung, die auf dem Wege der “Formalisierung” an jeder Art von Zusammenhängen jeglicher Sachhaltigkeit und Seinsweise direkt ablesbar wird.”

⁷¹ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.A.§17, 107.

⁷² Ibid., TI.A1.K3.A.§17, 110: “...inwiefern ist sie...Konstituens der Weltlichkeit überhaupt?”

⁷³ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.A.§18, 111.

Cf. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.§8.126.

understanding of the Kantian subject in letting things be given to it as unities.⁷⁴ As Heidegger concludes: “[T]he freely giving having-already-let-be involved...is an *a priori* perfect, which characterizes the kind of being of Dasein.”⁷⁵ Indeed, the later addition of footnote a indicates that such an *a priori* is to be thought about precisely in reference to “Kant’s teaching on schematism.”⁷⁶ In the light of this footnote, the “wordly-ness” of Dasein might be interpreted as *derivativa* of the preceding or antecedent free gift (“*vorgängige Freigabe*”) of being, requisite for the openness (*Offenbarkeit*) of any given being.⁷⁷ With regard to referentiality, this suggests that, in the final analysis, its point of origin may not be Dasein itself as a self-referring (*Sichverweisen*),⁷⁸ but rather something like being (*Sein*) *originarium*, that “earlier” (*Früheres*) to which Dasein itself must be referred back to (*zurückverwiesen*).⁷⁹

In order to set out, with Heidegger, at the very beginning of this promising path, one must first examine the spatiality which distinguishes “-the-world” as environment (*Umwelt*), namely, its “environ-hood” (*Umhafte*). What makes this environment an “environment” as opposed to an “enclosure”? For Heidegger, the term “enclosure” refers to a scenario wherein one extended being is “en-closed”/“in-cluded” (*umschließt*) within the boundaries of another, both of which beings are additionally understood to be “innerspatial” (*inneräumlich*) or located in space.⁸⁰ The spatiality of such an “enclosure” is best characterized in terms of relative restriction of extension. The spatiality of the environment – or “environ-hood” – is of a vastly different nature (although it may be shown to entail a certain notion of restriction as well). Insofar as the beings involved

⁷⁴ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.7.b, 147.

⁷⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 114: “Das auf Bewandtnis hin freigebende Je-schon-haben-bewenden-lassen ist ein *apriorisches Perfekt*^a, das die Seinsart des Daseins selbst charakterisiert.”

⁷⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 114, footnote a.

⁷⁷ Ibid.: “Im selben Absatz ist die Rede von der “vorgängigen Freigabe” – nämlich (allgemein gesprochen) des Seins für die mögliche Offenbarkeit von Seiendem.

⁷⁸ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 115.

⁷⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 114, footnote a: “...das jeweils Frühere, auf das wir *zurückverwiesen* werden...”

⁸⁰ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C, 135-136.

(*bewandt*) in this environment are “handy” or “next to” (*nächst*) Dasein, the most salient qualification of its “environ-hood” emerges as “nearness”/closeness/proximity” (*Nähe*).⁸¹ However, such “nearness”/closeness/proximity” is not a measure of the small quantity of distance (*Abstand*) obtaining between a given being and a given spot on Dasein’s body.⁸² Rather, it is an index of the regionality of Dasein’s circumspect “going about” things – of its differentiation into regions (*Gegend*) or kinds, each of which constitutes its own “standard of measurement” with respect to which other beings might be “calculated” (“*berechnet*”) as more or less pertinent – and, therefore, more or less “involved” (*bewadnt*).⁸³ Thus, a being is “next to” Dasein not insofar as it occupies a nearby site (*Stelle*) in space, but rather because it “belongs” (*hingehört*) to one of the regions of its “going about,” which designates and vouchsafes its rightful “place” (*Platz*).⁸⁴ The place of the proverbial hammer, for instance, is not reducible to the literal physical location where (*Wo*) it might typically be found in a carpenter’s shop. Rather, it is the hammer’s “place” to hammer – its place is a “place to...” (*Platz zu*), its “there” (“*Dort*”/“*Da*”) is none other than its belonging within the region of carpentry.⁸⁵ The regionality of carpentry underpins the “placeability” (*Plazierbarkeit*) of the hammer as “the wherein overall” (“*das Wohin überhaupt*”), which Dasein circumspectly keeps in view as it “goes about” things.⁸⁶ Beyond the threshold of the carpenter’s shop lies the so-called “natural environment”; yet, according to Heidegger’s altogether remarkable interpretation, its “regional” sense is more

⁸¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K3.C.§22, 136.

⁸² *Ibid.*, TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 143: “...bedeutet das nicht ein Fixieren von etwas an einer Raumstelle, die den geringsten Abstand von irgendeinem Punkt des Körpers hat.”

⁸³ *Ibid.*, TI.A1.K3.C.§22, 137.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*: “Der plazierbaren Hingehörigkeit eines Zeugganzen liegt aber als Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit zugrunde das Wohin überhaupt, in das hinein einem Zeugzusammenhang die Platzganzheit angewiesen wird. Dieses im besorgenden Umgang umsichtig vorweg im Blick gehaltene Wohin des möglichen zeughaften Hingehörens nennen wir die *Gegend*.”

immediately accessible than its “geographic” sense. Thus, the “places” of the sun in the “heavenly regions” (*Himmelsgegende*) – sunrise, midday, sunset, and midnight – are discovered and “calculated” with a view to its variable “involv-ability” (*Verwendbarkeit*) within different regions of Dasein’s “going about” things, such as scheduling, building, living, and dying. The “places” of the sun point to these regions as that which conditions the very possibility of its “placement.” The sunrise, for instance, indicates the region of being born and working, and has its “place” as sunrise only within these respective regions. Such “regionality” of the sun provides the “wherein” (*Wohin*) which, in turn, conditions the formation of increasingly particular regions and their corresponding “place-manifolds.”⁸⁷ The sub-regions of church- and grave-constructing, for instance, descend from the regions of living and dying, with the “heavenly regions” of sunrise and sunset mediating the particularization of the latter into the former. Indeed, Dasein’s discovery of “something like a region” must precede Dasein’s “placement” of any given being within such a region.⁸⁸ The configuration of regions precedes things being “at hand” as well.⁸⁹ It is precisely such regional orientation (*gegendhafte Orientierung*) of the “place manifold” (*Platzmannigfaltigkeit*) – its regionality, so to speak – that constitutes the “environ-hood” of the environment.⁹⁰ The distinctive “dimensionality” of regionality is given to Dasein prior to dimensionality proper, i. e. space as a “three-dimensional manifold of possible sites.”⁹¹ Indeed, “whereabouts” as such are discovered and circumspectly interpreted by way of Dasein’s “going

⁸⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K3.C.§22, 138.

⁸⁸ Ibid.: “So etwas wie Gegend muß zuvor entdeckt sein...”

⁸⁹ Ibid.: “Gegenden werden nicht erst durch zusammen vorhandene Dinge gebildet...”

⁹⁰ Ibid.: “Diese gegendhafte Orientierung der Platzmannigfaltigkeit des Zuhandenen macht das Umhafte, das Um-uns-herum des umweltlich nächst begehenden Seienden aus.”

⁹¹ Ibid.: “Es ist nie zunächst eine dreidimensionale Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher Stellen gegeben, die mit vorhandenen Dingen ausgefüllt wird. Diese Dimensionalität des Raumes ist in der Räumlichkeit des Zuhandenen noch verhüllt.”

about” things, rather than by considered measurement of space.⁹²

And yet, for the time being, Heidegger determines the phenomenon of the world to be “the wherein of the self-referring understanding as the whereupon of the letting-encounter of the being of the kind of being of involved-ness.”⁹³ In turn, the “worldly-ness” of the world consists in “the structure of that whereupon Dasein refers itself.”⁹⁴ It should be noted that the pervasiveness of the language of “where” and “structure” in these determinations makes the spatial aspect of the world and its “worldly-ness” (even if such is far from being understood in terms of the *res extensa*) difficult to downplay. The world clearly emerges from such determinations as a “where,” within the structure of which understanding (*Verstehen*) simultaneously refers to itself and lets other beings become its referents. An analogous structure and dynamic are readily observed in the Kantian notion of self-affection (*Selbstaffektion*), which Heidegger examines on several occasions throughout his lectures and published writings on Kant during this period. In the *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, for instance, Heidegger identifies self-affection as the core of Kant’s notion of “original receptivity,” a horizon which simultaneously accommodates the referring of the subject to itself and to things by means of objectification (*Vergegenständlichung*).⁹⁵ The structure of such a horizon is particularly evident in Heidegger’s discussion of Kant’s notion of free self-determination, in which the self appears to be given to itself – to be giving something of itself to itself⁹⁶ –

⁹² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.C.§22, 138: “...alle Wo sind durch die Gänge und Wege des alltäglichen Umgangs entdeckt und umsichtig ausgelegt, nicht in betrachtender Raumaussmessung festgestellt und verzeichnet.”

⁹³ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 115: “Das Worin des sichverweisenden Verstehens als Woraufhin des Begegnenlassens von Seiendem in der Seinsart der Bewandnis ist das Phänomen der Welt.”

⁹⁴ Ibid.: “Und die Struktur dessen, woraufhin das Dasein sich verweist, ist das, was die *Weltlichkeit* der Welt ausmacht.”

⁹⁵ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§24.b.348.

⁹⁶ Ibid., II.§11.b.151.

Cf. – with regard to the notion of “pure self-affection” – Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §34, 2nd edition, 2010, 173.

alongside admitting things given to it as objects.⁹⁷ Indeed, Heidegger himself voices one possible detrimental implication of interpreting the world in terms of referentiality in the form of a rhetorical question: “If we...determine ‘worldly-ness’ itself as a ‘hanging-together’ of references, then is the ‘substantial being’ of innerworldly beings not volatilised [therein] into a system of relations [*Relationssystem*], and – insofar as relations are always ‘thought’ – [is not] the being of innerworldly beings [therein] dissolved into ‘pure thinking’?”⁹⁸ In a strictly formal sense, “worldly-ness” may indeed be grasped as a system of relations; Heidegger’s criticism of such a formal conception, however, is twofold: (1) within such formalisation (*Formalisierung*) or “mathematical functionalisation” (*mathematische Funktionalisierung*), “worldly-ness” loses its phenomenal content, and (2) “worldly-ness” is neither something “posited” (*Gesetzt*) by “thinking,” nor is it something “thought” (*Gedachtes*) as such.⁹⁹

Beside the vital question of the applicability of Heidegger’s critique of the limitations of Kant’s notion of self-affection to Heidegger’s own notion of the self-referentiality of Dasein, Heidegger’s hesitations regarding the conclusiveness of the determination of the “worldly-ness of the world” as a structure wherein such self-referentiality may obtain must themselves be acknowledged: “The foregoing analysis, however, has liberated only the horizon within which something like world and “worldly-ness” are to be sought.”¹⁰⁰ Indeed, Heidegger’s provisional determination of the “worldly-ness” of the world calls for further elaboration of the scenario in which the understanding of Dasein is said to both (1) hold the structure which facilitates its own

⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§25.c.391.

⁹⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 117.

⁹⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 118.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 116: “Mit den bisherigen Analysen ist aber nur erst der Horizont freigelegt, innerhalb dessen so etwas zu suchen ist wie Welt und Weltlichkeit.”

self-referentiality out before itself by itself, and (2) to hold itself within such a structure.¹⁰¹

The primary reason for the aforementioned hesitation lies in the yet unaccounted for shift from the language of referring (*Verweisen*) to the language of understanding (*Verstehen*), commentary upon which Heidegger defers to §31.¹⁰² However, as early as in §18, Heidegger introduces the notion of *be-deuten* – “signify” in the sense of “endow with significance” – as a means of further specifying the essence of Dasein’s referentiality (and ultimately, its “worldly-ness”).¹⁰³ With this development, referentiality comes to designate Dasein’s understanding of its own being (*Sein*) and “being-able-to-be” (*Seinkönnen*) precisely with regard to its being-in-the-world. Meanwhile, “the worldly-ness of the world” acquires the meaning of “significance” (*Bedeutsamkeit*) which characterizes the original/originary whole of significative relations within which such understanding operates.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, Heidegger himself speaks of such “wordly-ness” – or, as he remarks in the later footnote a, prevailing (*Walten*) – of the world is “the being of the ontic condition of possibility of the discoverability of innerworldly beings overall.”¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, this “condition of possibility” is, indeed, a structural moment – an existential determination (*existenziale Bestimmung*) – of Dasein itself.¹⁰⁶ What is sufficiently clear in this initial sketch is that it is the understanding which holds the disclosedness¹⁰⁷ [*Erschlossenheit*] of potential significative relations out before itself *and* holds itself within such; so long as such

¹⁰¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 116: “Im vertrauten Sich-darin-halten hält es sich diese *vor* als das, worin sich sein Verweisen bewegt.”

¹⁰² Ibid..

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 118. Cf. Kant’s “conditions of possibility of experience” in Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.6, 143 and Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, §3.a.β, 46.

¹⁰⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.A.§18, 118.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Heidegger’s own instructions regarding the interpretation of the term *Erschlossenheit* in Heidegger, Ibid., TI.AI.K3.A.§16, 101: “‘Erschließen’ und ‘Erschlossenheit’ werden im folgenden terminologisch gebraucht und bedeuten ‘aufschließen’ – ‘Aufgeschlossenheit.’ ‘Erschließen’ meint demnach nie so etwas wie “mittelbar durch einen Schluß gewinnen.”

disclosedness “holds,” referentiality may, in turn, move within it – that is, understanding may “let itself” (*sich lassen*) refer within and from out of such relations.¹⁰⁸ The precise identity of the agent which “entrusts” (*vertraut*) Dasein with such an understanding and significance, however, is far from settled: on the one hand, Dasein is said to “give to itself, *a priori*, the understanding of its being-in-the-world,” yet on the other, Dasein is also said to be “given to understand” (“*es gibt sich...zu verstehen*”) “its being and capacity for being precisely from out of its entrustedness (*Vertraulichkeit*) with the greater whole of significative relations.¹⁰⁹ Yet even the interpretation of “worldly-ness” as significance bears further elaboration.

§) The significance of “being-in-” : *Entfernung*, *Näherung*, and *Ausrichtung*

Having achieved a phenomenologically robust account of the distinctive spatiality of “-the-world” as environment – of “environ-hood” as regionality – Heidegger finds himself in an optimal position to consider the distinctive spatiality of Dasein’s “being-in-” as “going about,” or “being-[in order] to” (“*Sein-zu*”). The spatiality of Dasein’s “being-[in order] to” is distinguished by two principal characteristics: (1) “de-furthering”/“de-distantiation” (*Ent-fernung*) or “nearing”/“drawing near”/“approximation” (*Näherung*), and (2) direction/ orientation (*Ausrichtung*).¹¹⁰ These “vectors” weave the “dimensionality” of Dasein’s “going about” things in a concerned fashion – its “being-[in order] to” (“*Sein-zu*”) – and assess beings as more or less “handy” and “handy” in one way or another.

Heidegger specifies that the significance of the first characteristic – “de-furthering”/“de-distantiation” – is “active” and “transitive” (indeed, Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s “being-

¹⁰⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A.I.K3.A.§18, 116: “Das Verstehen läßt sich in und von diesen Bezügen selbst verweisen.”

¹⁰⁹ Ibid..

¹¹⁰ Ibid., TI.A.I.K3.C.§23, 140. Significantly, in the subsequently added footnote a, Heidegger recognizes the unresolved question of the “wherefrom” of the “farness”/distance in question: “Woher die Ferne, die ent-fernt wird?”

[in order] to” as “bringing something into its nearness”¹¹¹ substantiates such a reading; however, it should be noted from the outset that in his articulation of such “being-[in order] to,” Heidegger also employs the more ambiguous formulation of “letting beings encounter it [Dasein]”¹¹²). Furthermore, the “action” which such “de-distantiation” or “approximation” signifies is not that of setting something nearer or farther relative to a certain spot on Dasein’s body (the latter being “only a determinate, factual mode” of the former).¹¹³ Rather, “de-distantiation” or “approximation” is an essential tendency (*wesenhafte Tendenz*),¹¹⁴ an existential (*Existenzial*)¹¹⁵ of Dasein itself: it is Dasein’s very capacity for and inclination towards the encounter of other beings. “De-distantiation” or “approximation” as the spatiality of “being-[in order] to” is not the most profound level at which such an essential tendency holds sway; rather, it characterizes Dasein’s “being-in-“ as such.¹¹⁶ Thus, although “de-distantiation” is most immediately accessible as Dasein’s “circumspect approximation” of beings in its various “involvements” (such as procuring and supplying), Heidegger points out that “approximation” may also be “insightful” (*hinsehend*), as in the case of Dasein’s “approximation” of beings in “purely cognitive” (“*rein erkennend*”) discovery.¹¹⁷

How might “de-distantiation” or “approximation” be assessed (*abschätzt*)¹¹⁸? Firstly,

¹¹¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 144: “...das Dasein im Besorgen sich etwas in seine Nähe bringt...”

¹¹² Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 140: “Dasein ist wesentlich ent-fernend, es läßt als das Seiende, das es ist, je Seiendes in die Nähe^b begegnen.”

¹¹³ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 143: “...bedeutet das nicht ein Fixieren von etwas an einer Raumstelle, die den geringsten Abstand von irgendeinem Punkt des Körpers hat” ; 140: “...nur ein bestimmter, faktischer Modus...”

¹¹⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 140.

Cf. Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 143: “...das Dasein wesentlich räumlich ist in der Weise der Ent-fernung...”

¹¹⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 140.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 141.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.: “Das Ent-fernend ist zunächst und zumeist umsichtige Näherung, in die Nähe bringen als beschaffen, bereitstellen, zur Hand haben. Aber auch bestimmte Arten des rein erkennenden Entdeckens von Seiendem haben den Charakter der Näherung.”

¹¹⁸ Ibid..

rather than some “eternal observer removed from Dasein”¹¹⁹ quantifying the “farness” and “nearness” of beings relative to Dasein in terms of a greater or lesser amount of distance between them, the assessment of the relative “farness” and “nearness” of beings to Dasein reflects the kind and degree of their “involved-ness” (*Bewandtnis*) in Dasein’s own involvements, i. e. its various derivative “de-distantiations” and “approximations.” Indeed, “de-distantiation” must never be understood in terms of Dasein crossing (*kreuzen*)¹²⁰ a given distance between itself and another being; this is impossible in principle, because that which obtains “between” Dasein and another being is not a given stretch of extension, but rather an involvement. Derivative “de-distantiations” and “approximations” are themselves assessed in terms of the specificity of their respective concerns.¹²¹ One of Heidegger’s examples of such an assessment is the equivalence frequently made between the “length” of a walk home and the smoking of a pipe, for instance.¹²² In this case, the “nearness” of a given being (namely, that of “home”) is measured not in terms of the quantifiable “length” of a certain path that leads to it, nor even in terms of the quantifiable “duration” (namely, “half-an-hour”) of a certain amount of time that following such a path might require, but rather in terms of a certain kind of concerned involvement (namely, that of “smoking a pipe”).¹²³ Apart from such measure by circumspection, fixed (*fest*) or exact (*exakt*) measures remain blind (*blind*).¹²⁴

In light of his extensive critique of the Kantian subject and of the Cartesian *cogito*, Heidegger is, naturally, quite aware of the possibility that a related criticism might be leveled at his own notion of assessment: “From the perspective of a preceding orientation towards “nature”

¹¹⁹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 142.

¹²⁰ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 144.

¹²¹ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 141.

¹²² Ibid., TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 141.

¹²³ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 141.

¹²⁴ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 142.

and “objectively” measured distances between things, one is inclined to take such an interpretation of “de-furthering”/“de-distancing” and assessment for a subjective [one].”¹²⁵ However, Heidegger contends that such “subjectivity” has nothing to do with “subjective” capriciousness or a “subjectivist” conception of beings which are “as such” otherwise.¹²⁶ Rather, the “subjectivity” of which Heidegger speaks – if one insists upon calling it “subjectivity” – discovers that which is “most real” (*das Realste*) about the “reality” (*Realität*) of the world, namely, that it is a constitutive moment of Dasein’s own “being-in-the-world.”¹²⁷ Heidegger’s clarification reinforces his interpretation of “de-distantiation” or “approximation” as the distinctive spatiality of “being-[in order] to” (“*Sein-zu*”), which is itself an inflection of the “original spatiality of ‘being-in.’”¹²⁸

In fact, subsequent discussion reconnects “de-distantiation” or “approximation” to Heidegger’s initial interpretation of “being-in” as “being-by” in §12.¹²⁹ It is in light of this original insight that Heidegger is able to further specify that which is “nearest” to Dasein – its “here” (*Hier*), so to speak – as that “whereby” (*Wobei*) Dasein involves beings, rather than a place “where” (*Wo*) Dasein is located as a “body-thing” (*Körperding*).¹³⁰ Although Dasein may indeed be spoken of as “occupying [a] place” (*Platzeinnehmen*), one must take care to understand such a formulation in the transitive sense of Dasein’s “being in a position to place other beings,” so to speak, within regions circumspectly discovered beforehand precisely by

¹²⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 142: “Man ist geneigt, aus einer vorgängigen Orientierung an der “Natur” und den “objektiv” gemessenen Abständen der Dinge solche Entfernungsauslegung und Schätzung für “subjektiv” auszugeben.”

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 142.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 143: “...die ursprüngliche Räumlichkeit des In-Seins.”

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K2.§12, 73-77.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 147: “Sein Hier versteht das Dasein aus dem umweltlichen Dort. Das Hier meint nicht das Wo eines Vorhandenen, sondern das Wobei eines Entfernenden Seins bei...in eins mit dieser Ent-fernung.”

means of “de-distantiation” or “approximation.”¹³¹ In the order of its understanding of being, however, Dasein first encounters its “there” as the regionality of the environment, and only from out of such “there” is it able to come back to its “here” as the “de-distantiation” or “approximation” of its “being-by.”¹³² Such hermeneutical priority of the environmental “there” is a point Heidegger does not hesitate to underscore: “In commensurability with its spatiality, Dasein is never first and foremost “here,” but rather “there,” from out of which “there” it comes back to its “here,” and this only in such a way that it interprets its concerned “being [in order] to...” from out of the “handy” of the there.”¹³³

The second characteristic of the distinctive spatiality of Dasein’s “being-[in order] to” is “direction/orientation” (*Ausrichtung*). Each “de-distantiation” or “approximation” of Dasein’s “being-[in order] to” is always already directional, insofar as it is directed or oriented by a particular region of Dasein’s “going about” things.¹³⁴ Such directionality is the condition of possibility of the familiar fixed directions of “right” and “left”; indeed, Heidegger interprets the spatialization (*Verräumlichung*) of Dasein in its very “fleshliness” (“*Leiblichkeit*”) as an indication of such circumspect directionality.¹³⁵ According to Heidegger, the directions of “left” and “right” are not something Dasein has a “subjective feel” (“*subjektiver Gefühl*”) for, but rather emerge from Dasein’s antecedent “being-oriented” (*Ausgerichtetsein*) within its environment.¹³⁶ (The term “subjective feel” comes from Kant’s consideration of the case of getting one’s bearings within a familiar room whose furniture has been rearranged and which has

¹³¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A.I.K3.C.§23, 144: “...in eine umsichtig vorentdeckte Gegend...”

¹³² Ibid., TI.A.I.K3.C.§23, 144.

¹³³ Ibid.: “Das Dasein ist gemäß seiner Räumlichkeit zunächst nie hier, sondern dort, aus welchem Dort es auf sein Hier zurückkommt und das wiederum nur in der Weise, daß es sein besorgendes Sein zu... aus dem Dortzuhandenen her auslegt.”

¹³⁴ Ibid., TI.A.I.K3.C.§23, 145.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

been darkened.¹³⁷ Contra to Kant, Heidegger insists that a “subject with a “mere feel” for this difference [between “left” and “right”] is a constructive approach” which overlooks the fact that such a “subjective feel” springs from an antecedent “being-oriented” with Dasein’s own “world.”¹³⁸ In considering Kant’s example, Heidegger draws an unexpected parallel between Kant’s attribution of the phenomenon of orientation to the grasp a given object’s “site in thought” and Heidegger’s own notion of “already being in a “known” world.”¹³⁹ Indeed, Heidegger clarifies his intent in drawing this parallel by explaining that the genuine meaning of the psychological interpretation “I have something in [my] thoughts” is the existential phenomenon of “being-in-the-world.”¹⁴⁰ Heidegger believes that Kant simply “does not see this structure” and, therefore, “fails to grasp the full complex of the constitution of possible orientation.”¹⁴¹ In a remarkable concession, however, Heidegger acknowledges that Kant’s notions of “mere feel” and “having a given object in one’s thought” stem from Kant’s conviction of the necessity of a “subjective principle” in orientation – a concern Heidegger is prepared to share to the extent that the expression “subjective principle” denotes the broader necessity of an *a priori*. In a rare gesture of acknowledgement, Heidegger proposes a re-formulation of his position in quasi-Kantian terms: “The *a priori* of oriented-ness according to “left” and “right” is grounded in the “subjective” *a priori* of “being-in-the-world,” which has nothing to do, however, with a determinacy restricted beforehand to a world-less subject.”¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 146.

Cf. Kant, “Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?” [(1786) WW. (Akad. Ausgabe) Bd. VIII, S. 131-147)]

¹³⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 146: “Das Subjekt mit dem “bloßen Gefühl” dieses Unterschieds ist ein konstruktiver Ansatz, der die wahrhafte Verfassung des Subjekts außer acht läßt, daß das Dasein mit diesem “bloßen Gefühl” je schon in einer Welt ist und sein muß, um sich orientieren zu können.”

¹³⁹ Ibid..

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.: “...Ich etwas “im Gedächtnis” habe...”

¹⁴¹ Ibid., TI.A1.K3.C.§23, 147: “Weil *Kant* diese Struktur nicht sieht, verkennt er auch den vollen Zusammenhang der Konstitution einer möglichen Orientierung.”

¹⁴² Ibid.

η) Pure Space and Space of Being

The foregoing analyses have confirmed Heidegger's intuition that the essential spatiality of the kind of being of Dasein must be distinct from that of the kinds of being of both the "at hand" and the "handy": "The spatiality of Dasein, which is essentially no "being-at-hand," can signify neither something like "proceeding at a [given] site within 'world-space,'" nor "being-handy" at a [given] place."¹⁴³ While taking the necessary first step in the direction of articulating the essential spatiality of Dasein, they have also demonstrated that the spatiality of "being-in-the-environment" does not exhaust that of "being-in-the-world," and that the spatiality of "being-[in order] to" does not exhaust that of "being-in." The phenomenological "remainder" of "being-in-the-world" includes, among other things, an as-yet-undetermined notion of the spatiality of space, to which Heidegger has alluded in the introduction to his analysis of "being-in-the-world" and which he now describes as "co-disclosed" (*miterschlossen*) together with the spatiality of "being-in."¹⁴⁴ Such "co-disclosed-ness" (*Miterschlossenheit*) affords Heidegger the long-awaited opportunity to consider the spatiality of space proper.

In continuity with his approach in §§22-23, Heidegger immediately distinguishes the spatiality of space insofar as it is co-disclosed together with that of "being-in" from the notion of space as a "pure manifold of three dimensions."¹⁴⁵ In such initial "disclosed-ness" ("*nächste Erschlossenheit*"), space as "the pure wherein of a metric arrangement of sites and determination of situation" remains concealed.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, the first intimation of the spatiality of

¹⁴³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.C.§23, 140: "Räumlichkeit des Daseins, das wesentlich kein Vorhandensein ist, kann weder so etwas wie Vorkommen an einer Stelle im "Weltraume" bedeuten, noch Zuhandensein an einem Platz."

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C, 136.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§24, 147-148: "Der so mit der Weltlichkeit der Welt erschlossenen Raum hat noch nichts von der reinen Mannigfaltigkeit der drei Dimensionen."

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§24, 148: "Der Raum bleibt bei dieser nächsten Erschlossenheit noch verborgen als das reine Worin einer metrischen Stellenordnung und Lagebestimmung."

space relative to “being-in” is already perceptible in Heidegger’s notion of region (*Gegend*), and unmistakably so – in his notion of approximation (*Näherung*). It is the elaboration of the latter as a “letting encounter” (*Begegnenlassen*) in §24 which leads Heidegger to understand space not only as an essential tendency of Dasein, but also as something given by Dasein to other beings as the condition of the possibility of their encounter. Indeed, Dasein’s “letting encounter” is a “space-giving” (“*Raum-geben*”), a “making room” (*Einräumen*).¹⁴⁷ In fact, such “making room” is recognized by Heidegger as an existential (*Existenzial*)¹⁴⁸; whether it is a more highly resolved version of the existential of “approximation” or an existential in its own right remains unstated. However, insofar as space is “co-disclosed” together with “being-in-the-world,” Heidegger sees space as being “in” the world, contrary to the inverse commonplace notion that it is the world which is in space.¹⁴⁹ This does not mean, however, that space is somehow “in” Dasein as in some “subject”: “Space is not found in the subject, neither does such consider the world, “as if” it were in a space, but rather the ontologically fully understood “subject,” Dasein, is spatial in an original sense.”¹⁵⁰ It is in this sense that space may be understood as an *a priori*.¹⁵¹ Space belongs to Dasein in virtue of its very constitution as always already “world-ful,” so to speak, and not as an initially “world-less” subject which projects a space from out of itself.¹⁵² For Heidegger, the “apriority” (*Apriorität*) of space means that, as a region, it is encountered prior to any encounter

¹⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A.I.K3.C.§24, 148.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., TI.A.I.K3.C.§24, 149: “*Der Raum ist weder im Subjekt, noch ist die Welt im Raum. Der Raum ist vielmehr “in” der Welt, sofern das für das Dasein konstitutive In-der-Welt-sein Raum erschlossen hat.*”

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.: “*Der Raum befindet sich nicht im Subjekt, noch betrachtet dieses die Welt, “als ob” sie in einem Raum sei, sondern das ontologisch wohlverstandene “Subjekt,” das Dasein, ist in einem ursprünglichen Sinn räumlich.*”

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.: “*...nicht so etwas wie vorgängige Zugehörigkeit zu einem zunächst noch weltlosen Subjekt, das einen Raum aus sich hinauswirft.*”

of the “handy.”¹⁵³

In Heidegger’s foregoing analysis of “being-in-” and “-the world,” space “in itself” comes into view or shows itself only to a certain extent.¹⁵⁴ Heidegger acknowledges that one mode of “being-in-” – that of insight (*Hinsehen*), or “formal intuition” (“*formale Anschauung*”) – is, indeed, capable of discovering “the pure possibilities of spatial relations” (“*reinen Möglichkeiten räumlicher Beziehungen*”).¹⁵⁵ Such discovery might progress through a series of stages, gradually liberating “pure, homogeneous space, from the pure morphology of spatial figures (*Gestalt*) to the analysis of *situs*, all the way to the purely metric science of space.”¹⁵⁶ However, Heidegger limits the extent of his own inquiry to the establishment of phenomenological grounds on the basis of which a “thematic discovery and elaboration of pure space might be attempted.”¹⁵⁷ Such discovery and elaboration themselves, however, fall outside the purview of Heidegger’s inquiry; even so, Heidegger points readers interested in pursuing this trajectory towards a text by O. Becker entitled “Contributions to the phenomenological grounding of geometry and its physical applications” (1923).¹⁵⁸ Besides the matter of self-imposed limits, Heidegger regrets the neutralisation of environmental regions into pure dimensions entailed by “insightful” discovery of pure space.¹⁵⁹ In such discovery, the “places” of the “handy” and their respective “place-manifold” dissolve into a “site-manifold”

¹⁵³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K3.C.§24, 149: “Apriorität besagt hier: Vorgängigkeit des Begegnens von Raum (als Gegend) im jeweiligen umweltlichen Begegnen des Zuhandenen.”

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.: “...kommt der Raum an ihm selbst...in gewisser Weise in den Blick...”

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§24, 150: “Die “formale Anschauung” des Raumes entdeckt die reinen Möglichkeiten räumlicher Beziehungen.”

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§24, 149: “Hierbei besteht eine Stufenfolge in der Freilegung des reinen, homogenen Raumes von der reinen Morphologie der räumlichen Gestalten zur Analysis Situs bis zur rein metrischen Wissenschaft vom Raum.”

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§24, 149-150: “Innerhalb ihrer Problematik sollte lediglich der phänomenale Boden ontologisch fixiert werden, auf dem die thematische Entdeckung und Ausarbeitung des reinen Raumes ansetzt.”

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§24, 149.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K3.C.§24, 150.

(*Stellenmannigfaltigkeit*) of anything whatsoever, and the environment turns into the “natural world” (*Naturwelt*).¹⁶⁰ Thus, in Heidegger’s view, the thematisation and formalisation of space by insight is tantamount to a “de-worlding” (*Entweltlichung*) of the “worldly-ness” of the “handy.”¹⁶¹

Despite these objections, the questions of the kind of being of space (“*die Art seines Seins*”) and of “being-spatial” (*Räumlichsein*) retains Heidegger’s interest: the kind of being of space is evidently not that of the “handy,” of the “at hand,” nor even of Dasein itself.¹⁶² Indeed, Heidegger explicitly underscores this latter point: “The being of space does not have the kind of being of Dasein.”¹⁶³ In the terms of the Cartesian problematic, the being of space may not be equated either with that of the *res extensa* or with that of the *res cogitans*.¹⁶⁴ In fact, the “embarrassing” indeterminacy of the being of space lingers because of a more fundamental indeterminacy – that of the “possibilities of being overall” (“*Möglichkeiten von Sein überhaupt*”).¹⁶⁵ Thus, in order for the problematic of the being of space (as regards the phenomenon itself and various phenomenal spatialities) to be adequately grasped as ontological, it must be properly situated within and oriented towards the clarification of such possibilities.¹⁶⁶

γ) The significance of the ‘Who’

Yet before such possibilities may be glimpsed more vividly, the spatiality of the remaining constitutive moment of Dasein’s “being-in-the-world” – its tacit “who” (*Wer*)¹⁶⁷ –

¹⁶⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A.I.K3.C.§24, 150.

¹⁶¹ Ibid..

¹⁶² Ibid.: “Er [Raum] braucht nicht die Seinsart eines selbst räumlich Zuhandenen oder Vorhandenen zu haben.”

¹⁶³ Ibid.: Das Sein des Raumes hat auch nicht die Seinsart des Daseins.”

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.: “...das Sein des Raumes selbst nicht in der Seinsart der *res extensa* begriffen werden kann...noch gar, daß das Sein des Raumes dem der *res cogitans* gleichgesetzt und als bloß “subjektives” begriffen werden könnte...”

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., TI.A.I.K3.C.§24, 151.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid..

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., TI.A.I.K2.§12, 72.

must be considered in distinction from the spatiality of its “being-in-.” As Heidegger points out in the introduction to the fourth chapter of *Sein und Zeit*, Dasein not simply *is* “-in-the-world,” but also relates itself to (*sich verhält zur*) the world, which relating constitutes a certain kind of being in itself.¹⁶⁸ Its structures, “being-with” (*Mitsein*) and “being-there-with” (*Mitdasein*), and the structures of “being-in-the-world” are equally original (*gleich ursprünglich*) to Dasein.¹⁶⁹ The former structures are the basis of “everyday self-being” (*alltägliches Selbstsein*) and its mode of “one” (*das Man*), the “subject” of everydayness.¹⁷⁰ In order to access the structures of “being-with” and “being-there-with” as such, one must first pass by way of “everyday self-being” and “one,” and subsequently – by way of the “being-with” of others and “everyday being-with.”¹⁷¹

The question of the “who” of Dasein is one of selfhood and its various inflections: myself, oneself, and the selves of others (your-/him-/her-/itself, our-/your-/themselves). Indeed, Heidegger confirms that “the [question of] “who?” is answered in terms of “I myself,” the “subject,” the “self.”¹⁷² Heidegger’s reservation regarding former ontological conceptions of selfhood, however, pertains to the fact that such conceptions have tended to privilege substantiality (*Substantialität*) – “that which holds out as identical throughout changes of relations and experiences” – as the primary determination of the self, and together with such substantiality – an interpretation of the being of the self as “at-hand-ness” (*Vorhandenheit*).¹⁷³ Furthermore, such conceptions have routinely (although perhaps less than wittingly) envisioned the self as being “at hand” in a given enclosed region (“in einer geschlossenen Region”) and as

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., TI.AI.K4, 152.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.: “In dieser Seinsart gründet der Modus der alltäglichen Selbstseins, dessen Explikation das sichtbar macht, was wir das “Subjekt” der Alltäglichkeit nennen dürfen, das *Man*.”

¹⁷¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K4. §25, 153.

¹⁷² Ibid.: “Das Wer beantwortet sich aus dem Ich selbst, dem “Subjekt,” dem “Selbst.”

¹⁷³ Ibid..

being the substrate (*subjectum*) of change. Despite its best efforts to eschew such notions such as the “substance of the soul” (*Seelensubstanz*), the “thingly-ness of consciousness” (“*Dinglichkeit des Bewußtseins*”), and the “objectivity of the person” (“*Gegenständlichkeit der Person*”), in Heidegger’s view, such a trajectory has predictably led to a conflation of the being of Dasein with that of the being of things (*Ding*), instead of providing a means for differentiating between the being of the former and the being of beings which are not commensurate with it (*nicht-daseinsmäßig*).¹⁷⁴

In pursuit of a more productive approach to selfhood in accordance with the phenomenological method, Heidegger selects the “givenness of the I” (*die Gegebenheit des Ich*) as his point of entry into the problematic.¹⁷⁵ Despite its purported undubitability, Heidegger is not convinced that that which is given within this kind of giving – this “simple, formal, reflexive perceiving of the “I” – is altogether self-evident.¹⁷⁶ Rather, Heidegger advances the possibility that the presumably most immediate “givenness” of the self may consist precisely in its “non-givenness” – that “first and foremost, Dasein *is not itself*.”¹⁷⁷ Thus, in subsequently added footnote a, Heidegger distinguishes between “genuine self-ness”/selfhood (*echte Selbstheit*) and “I-ness” (*Ichlichkeit*), wherein “I” formally indicates that which initially discovers itself as its own opposite (*Gegenteil*), the “Not-I” (*Nicht-Ich*), the latter being, in fact, a determinate kind of the being of the “I” itself.¹⁷⁸ Gesturing well beyond this formal indice, however, Heidegger suggests that the most immediate “givenness” of the self is not that of an “isolated self without others” (“ein isoliertes Ich...ohne die Anderen”), but rather that of “being-there-with”

¹⁷⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K4.§25, 153.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§25, 154.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.: “Vielleicht ist in der Tat das, was diese Art der Gebung, das schlichte, formale, reflektive Ichvernehmen gibt, evident.”

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§25, 155: “...das Dasein zunächst und zumeist *nicht es selbst ist*...”

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

(*Mitdasein*) them.¹⁷⁹ Indeed, if the “self” and the “I” are to be understood as in some sense essential to Dasein, they must be interpreted existentially (*existenzial*).¹⁸⁰ For this reason, as Heidegger underscores, “being-with” accurately determines Dasein even when “others” are not factually “at hand” or perceived.¹⁸¹ Even “being-alone” (*Alleinsein*) must be understood as a derivative mode of the more original “being-with.”¹⁸² Indeed, “being-with” constitutes the condition of possibility of recognition (*Erkennung*) and empathy (*Einfühlung*), not the reverse.¹⁸³ Thus, “being-towards-another” (*Sein zu Anderen*)¹⁸⁴ is discovered as an inflection of “being-in”/“being-by” which characterizes Dasein’s relation to “others” in distinction from its relation to the “handy,” designated by the corresponding inflection of “being-[in order] to” (“*Sein-zu*”). Accordingly, the mode of “being-with” which joins previously reviewed “insight” as a mode of “being-in” and “circumspection” as a mode of “being-[in order] to,” is that of consideration (*Rücksicht*) or oversight (*Nachsicht*).¹⁸⁵ Indeed, “being-towards-another” is, for the first time in *Sein und Zeit*, specifically termed an “irreducible relation of being” (*irreduktibler Seinsbezug*), which suggests an interpretation of the kinds of being (*Seinsart*) or possibilities of being (*Seinsmöglichkeit*)¹⁸⁶ in terms of relations of being (*Seinsbezug*), thus revealing the basis of their differentiation.

Although the “others” encounter Dasein by way of its “world,” their kind of being is not

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§25, 156.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.: “Wenn das “Ich” eine essentielle Bestimmtheit des Daseins ist, dann muß sie existenzial interpretiert werden.”

¹⁸¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 161: “Das Mitsein bestimmt existenzial das Dasein auch dann, wenn ein Anderer faktisch nicht vorhanden und wahrgenommen ist.”

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 167: “‘Einfühlung’ konstituiert nicht erst das Mitsein, sondern ist auf dessen Grunde erst möglich...”

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 166.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 164.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 167.

simply that of the “at hand” or the “handy.”¹⁸⁷ On the contrary, the kind of being of the “others” is akin to that of Dasein itself: the “others” are “there” and “with” as well.¹⁸⁸ This is the basis of Dasein’s innate capacity for the understanding of the “other” (“*das Verständnis Anderer*”).¹⁸⁹ However, while Dasein encounters its own being precisely as its own, it encounters the being of other Dasein precisely as other. Such “otherness” signifies neither the “outside-ness” of the “others” with respect to Dasein, nor Dasein’s projection of its own self onto “others” as its “doubles,”¹⁹⁰ but rather Dasein’s lack of differentiation between itself and “others” insofar as both of them are “being-there-also/as well” (*Auch-da-sein*).¹⁹¹ On the basis of this analysis, Heidegger concludes that Dasein’s “being-in” has yet another inflection – that of “being-with” the others.¹⁹² The “otherness” of the “others” – the “whereas” (*Wogegen*) of their difference from Dasein – does not derive from Dasein’s antecedent insight into itself (“*Hinsehen auf sich selbst*”) as its own “subject,” but rather from within Dasein’s “being-with” and its world.¹⁹³ If Dasein’s relationship to the “handy” may be characterized as “concern” (*Besorgen*), its relationship to “other” Dasein may be characterized as that of “concern-for” (*Fürsorge*).¹⁹⁴ Indeed, Heidegger insists that even Dasein’s glimpse of its own self as a self does not stem from introspection, but rather from “looking away” (*Wegsehen*) from the self as some “act-center.”¹⁹⁵

What of the spatiality of such selfhood, of the relationship between self and place, for

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 158: “...die Seinsart des innerweltlichen begegnenden Daseins der Anderen sich von Zuhandenheit und Vorhandenheit unterscheidet.”

¹⁸⁸ Ibid..

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 165.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 166: “Das Seinsverständnis zu Anderen wird dann zur Projektion des eigenen Seins zu sich selbst “in ein Anderes.” Der Andere ist eine Dublette des Selbst.”

¹⁹¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 158.

¹⁹² Ibid.: “Das In-Sein ist *Mitsein* mit Anderen.”

¹⁹³ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 159, 165.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 162.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 159: “Dasein *zunächst* “vorfindlich” wird von ihm selbst im Wegsehen von... ‘Aktzentrum.’”

instance? Indeed, Heidegger interprets adverbial pronouns “here” (*hier*), “there” (*da*), and “over there” (*dort*) as characteristics of the original spatiality of Dasein, rather than pure determinations of place as such.¹⁹⁶ Their significance springs from “the properly spatial significance of Dasein,” that is, its “de-distancing-orienting ‘being-by,’” already familiar from previous discussion.¹⁹⁷ Thus, in using the pronoun “here,” for example, Dasein does not refer to itself, but rather points away from itself towards something “handy” “over there”; it is, among other things, in such use that Dasein’s essential or proper spatiality becomes apparent.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, in its “concern-for” the “others,” Dasein may also be described as “putting itself in their place” (“*sich an seine Stelle setzen*” – literally, “setting itself upon their site”) and “standing in” (*einspringen* – literally, “springing in”) for them.¹⁹⁹ Once again, in this context, the term “site” indicates a particular “concern” or set of “concerns” which Dasein takes onto itself when it “jumps in” for an “other,” so to speak. Dasein may also “jump ahead” to (*vorausspringen* – literally, “spring ahead/in advance/in front of”) a given “concern” of an “other,” if only for the sole purpose of “giving back” (*zurückgeben*) such a “concern” to the “other.”²⁰⁰

However, the most unique and innovative aspect of the spatiality of Dasein as “being-with” – one which Heidegger will preserve well into the thirties as the very core of his notion of the proper spatiality of the work of art – is its bi-directionality as self-opening (*Sichhoffenbaren*) and self-closing (*Sichverschließen*).²⁰¹ The resonance of such “vectors” with those of “de-distantiation” and “approximation” naturally cannot go unnoticed. What is more, Heidegger’s reflection upon the “one” (*das Man*) as Dasein’s “everyday being-self” (*alltägliches Selbstsein*)

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 160: “Das “hier,” “dort” und “da” sind primär keine reinen Ortsbestimmungen...sondern Charaktere der ursprünglichen Räumlichkeit des Daseins.”

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.: “...die eigentlich räumliche Daseinsbedeutung...”

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 163.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K4.§26, 165.

(a mode of Dasein's "being-with" or "who") culminates in an account of the notion of publicity (*Öffentlichkeit*) which will provide the principal foil for openness (*Offenbarkeit*) as a distinguishing characteristic of the spatiality of the work of art as early as in the first elaboration of the artwork essay. Akin to the environment (*Umwelt*), the fabric of publicity is made up of "one's" ways of being (*Seinsweise*), "desistance" (*Abständigkeit*), mediocrity (*Durschnittlichkeit*), and "evening out" (*Einebnung*).²⁰² Thus, the distinctive spatiality of publicity might be characterized as that of flatness, a rejection of "all difference of levels."²⁰³ Accordingly, the spatiality of the "one" may be characterised as that of displacement, wherein "every [one] is an "other," and no [one] is [one-]self."²⁰⁴ The "one" is precisely the "non-given" self or the self as the "Not-I" – notions introduced by Heidegger at the beginning of his critique of the Cartesian givenness of the "I" in §25. The spatiality of the "one" is that of an empty "place" which has been "expropriated," so to speak, from the "proper" (*eigentlich*) self. The term "oneself" (*Man-selbst*), therefore, expresses a "self" which, strictly speaking, is proper to no one.²⁰⁵ And yet the proper "being-a-self" (*eigentliche Selbstsein*) is an existential modification of the "one" by means of "clearing away" the "covering up" and "obscuring" of the former by the latter.²⁰⁶

δ) The significance of 'being-in as such'

At the outset of his analysis of Dasein as "being-in-the-world," Heidegger had identified three of its structural moments as the "world-lyness" of the world, the "who" that is "in the

²⁰² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K4.§27, 170.

²⁰³ Ibid.: "...gegen alle Unterschiede des Niveaus..."

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 170: "Jeder ist der Andere und Keiner er selbst."

²⁰⁵ Ibid., TI.A1.K4.§27, 172.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., TI.A1.K4.§27, 173.

world,” and the “in-ness” of “*being-in as such*” (“*In-Sein als solches*”).²⁰⁷ Up to this point, Heidegger had extensively considered two modes of its third structural moment, “being-in,” namely “being-[in order] to” (“*Sein-zu*”) and “being-towards-another” (*Sein zu Anderen*)²⁰⁸; however, he has not yet approached “being-in as such” directly. It is to this task that Heidegger turns in Chapter 5: “the phenomenal elevation of the *unitary original structure* of the being of Dasein, from out of which its possibilities and ways “to be” determine themselves ontologically.”²⁰⁹ In light of Heidegger’s reference to the original mention of this topic in §13, this “*unitary original structure*” comes into focus as the most fundamental “in-ness” of Dasein, its “inside” (“*Innen*”) or immanence (*Immanenz*), so to speak, which lends the three structural moments of “being-in-the-world” their coherence as a greater whole (*Ganze*).²¹⁰

The term “in-ness” naturally situates the discussion in the vicinity of its historically prevalent interpretation as “subjectivity,” i. e. the “subjective” side of the *commercium* between the subject and the object.²¹¹ However, in Heidegger’s view, such an interpretation fundamentally misunderstands the phenomenon of immanence by overlooking the possibility that the “between,” which conditions any encounter between Dasein and other beings, might be glimpsed as a way of being of Dasein itself. Rather, it continues to cast such a “between” in the role of a gap or, at best, a third party resulting from the opposition between the parties of the

²⁰⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K2.§12, 72.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., TI.A1.K4.§26, 166.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., TI.A1.K4.§26, 174: “Ihr nächstes Ziel ist die phänomenale Hebung der *einheitlichen ursprünglichen Struktur* des Seins des Daseins, daraus sich seine Möglichkeiten und Weisen “zu sein” ontologisch bestimmen.” [italics mine]

²¹⁰ Ibid., TI.A1.K2.§13, 81.

Ibid., TI.A1.K4.§28, 174.

²¹¹ Ibid., TI.A1.K4.§28, 176: “Was anderes stellt sich aber dann mit diesem Phänomen dar als das vorhandene commercium zwischen einem vorhandenen Subjekt und einem vorhandenen Objekt?”

subject and the object.²¹² Heidegger insists, however, that to do so is to irreparably splinter the “scheme” (*Schema*) of the phenomenon of immanence.²¹³ As an alternative, he sets out to demonstrate that the “between,” which is purportedly “there” between the subject and object as two beings which are “at hand,” is, in fact, far more accurately understood as the “there” which always already characterizes Dasein insofar as it a being of this kind. Dasein does not require a “between” in order to encounter other beings, because it does so by means of its “there,” and its “there” is not a separate being to which it has recourse or one of its properties, which it can well do without. Rather, as Heidegger puts it, Dasein *is* always already its own “there.”²¹⁴ Thus, the distinctive spatiality of the “in-ness” of Dasein – of its immanence – consists precisely in its “there-ness.”

How might “there-ness,” or, as Heidegger puts it, the “being of the there” be understood? (Incidentally, in order to distinguish this “being of the ‘there’” from Dasein as a whole, Heidegger will use the hyphenated term “Da-sein” from this point forward.) By the end of Chapter 5, it will have been revealed as the original being of Dasein itself – care (*Sorge*).²¹⁵ However, as his point of departure, Heidegger chooses the most phenomenologically salient inflections of “there-ness” – the ontic possibilities of “here” (*Hier*) and “over there” (*Dort*) – which point to an ontological “there” (*Da*) as their condition.²¹⁶ That is to say, “here” and “over there” acquire their proper significance only in light of proper spatiality disclosed as the very “being of the there.”²¹⁷ Thus, the “there-ness” of Dasein is discovered to be both the wellspring

²¹² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K4.§28, 176: “Das Zwischen ist schon als Resultat der convenientia zweier Vorhandenen begriffen.”

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid. 176: “Das Seiende, das wesenhaft durch das In-der-Welt-sein konstituiert wird, *ist* selbst je sein ‘Da.’”

²¹⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.§28, 174.

²¹⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.§28, 176.

²¹⁷ Ibid.: “‘Hier’ und ‘Dort’ sind nur möglich in einem ‘Da,’ daß heißt wenn ein Seiendes ist, das als Sein des ‘Da’ Räumlichkeit erschlossen hat.”

of spatiality and the source of its determination. The “being” of such “there-ness” is “un-closedness” (*Unverschlossenheit*) or, alternatively put, “disclosedness” (*Erschlossenheit*).²¹⁸ Heidegger’s selection of the term “disclosedness” naturally puts him in dialogue with the venerable tradition he indicates in footnote a by the following impressionistic sequence: “Ἀλήθεια – Offenheit – Lichtung, Licht, Leuchten.”²¹⁹ As will have been abundantly demonstrated in subsequent sections of this study dedicated to the artwork essay, this sequence will continue to fascinate and inspire Heidegger’s thinking about spatiality well into the late thirties. At this particular juncture in his intellectual pilgrimage, it is Heidegger’s articulation of the “there-ness” of Dasein that draws most heavily on the cluster of notions centered around light in such a way as to render “disclosedness” as a kind of “lighting”/enlightenment (*Lichtung*), and, by extension, Dasein itself – as “alit”/“lighted”/“illuminated”/“illuminated” (*gelichtet*) or “enlightened” (*erleuchtet*).²²⁰ However, for the time being, Heidegger will continue to waver between, on the one hand, describing such language as “ontically figurative” and indicative of the “ontologically literal” (if one might be permitted to put it that way) “there-ness,” and, on the other hand, using it to articulate such “there-ness” himself.²²¹ For example, he will define the term “enlightened” as Dasein’s being “‘alit’ in itself *as* being-in-the-world...in such a way that it is itself [that] lighting.”²²²

“There-ness,” “disclosedness,” “enlightenment” – whether modified by the “ontically figurative” language of light or left in its “ontologically literal” form – can and should be articulated from two vantage points: (1) that of its “existential constitution” (*existenziale*

²¹⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A1.K5.§28, 176-177.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, TI.A1.K5.§28, 177.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² *Ibid.*: “Es ist ‘erleuchtet,’ besagt: an ihm selbst *als* In-der-Welt-sein gelichtet^a...so daß es selbst die Lichtung *ist*.^b”

Konstitution) and (2) that of its “everyday” (*alltäglich*) constitution.²²³ As Heidegger makes a special effort to point out, these are equally original, and neither of them may be understood as the “simple ur-ground” (*enfache “Ur-grund”*) of the other.²²⁴ Correspondingly, Heidegger divides their subsequent analysis into two parts: (1) existential ways of being the “there”: (a) Dasein as “found-ness” (*Befindlichkeit*) together with its mode of fear/fright/dread (*Furcht*), (b) Dasein as understanding (*Verstehen*) together with its mode of interpretation/“laying out” (*Auslegung*) and with the latter’s mode of expression/“saying out” (*Aussage*), and finally (c) Dasein as speech (*Rede*) and language (*Sprache*), (2) everyday ways of being the “there”: (a) Dasein as the emotion/“moved-ness” (*Bewegtheit*) of falling (*Verfallen*) and its modes of talk (*Gerede*), curiosity (*Neugier*), and double entendre (*Zweideutigkeit*).²²⁵

Firstly, in what sense can “there-ness” be understood as “found-ness”? Commencing with its ontic aspect, Heidegger correlates “found-ness” with a kind of mood or “tonality”/“intonation” (*Stimmung*).²²⁶ He insists that Dasein always already “finds itself” to be in one “tonality”/“intonation” or another, despite the occasional appearance of “counter-tonality”/“-intonation” (*Verstimmung*) or “atonality”/“-intonation” (*Ungestimmtheit*).²²⁷ In fact, it is precisely in the “tonality”/“intonation” of “counter-tonality”/“-intonation” that Dasein becomes weary (*überdrüßig*) of itself, enters the “tonality”/“intonation” of “atonality”/“-intonation” and therein becomes *wary* of itself – that is, “finds itself” (*sichbefindet*) to be “there”

²²³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A.I.K.5.§28, 177-178: “Außer der Charakteristik der primären Konstitution des Seins der Erschlossenheit bedarf es gemäß dem Zug der Analyse einer Interpretation der Seinsart, in der dieses Seiende *alltäglich* sein Da ist.”

²²⁴ Ibid., TI.A.I.K.5.§28, 175.

²²⁵ Ibid., TI.A.I.K.5.§28, 178.

²²⁶ In anticipation of Heidegger’s term “Bestimmung” and its apt translation as “attunement,” the author of this study has chosen to use the metaphoric term “tonality”/“intonation” instead of “mood” or “disposition” in order to preserve the visibility of the morphological continuity between “*Stimmung*” and “*Bestimmung*” in the original German.

²²⁷ Ibid., TI.A.I.K.5.A.§29, 179.

and encounters such “there-ness” as a kind of onus (*Last*) upon itself, as something to which it is consigned (*überantwortet*).²²⁸ It is in this moment that Dasein “finds itself” to be in a kind of “fright” (*Furcht*) in the face of having been “left to itself,” so to speak.²²⁹ Having been startled by its own simple “being there,” Dasein is encumbered with questions of the wherein (*Wohin*) and wherefrom (*Woher*) of such being for the first time – questions of which it remains blissfully unaware in everyday existence, wherein it is satisfied with the observation “that it is” (“*daß es ist*”).²³⁰ Heidegger designates Dasein’s finding itself to be “there” by the term “thrown-ness” (*Geworfenheit*), which is intended to capture the facticity (*Faktizität*) of Dasein’s consignment (*Überantwortung*) to its “there-ness.”²³¹ Importantly, Heidegger distinguishes such facticity from the “actual-ness” (*Tatsächlichkeit*) of beings “at hand” that are “there” as well: “Facticity is not the “actual-ness” of the *factum brutum* of one of the “at hand” [beings], but rather a character of being of Dasein, taken up in existence, albeit initially pushed away. The “that” of facticity is not discoverable in intuition.”²³² “Found-ness” is equally distinct from cognitive and psychological “findings” (*Vorfinden*), which are themselves only possible in the wake of its disclosure.²³³ Neither does “tonality”/“-intonation” pertain first and foremost to the psychological: “it is itself no ‘inside’ state, which then in some mysterious way goes out and rubs off on things and persons.”²³⁴ The stirring (*rühren*) of affection (*Affektion*) similarly springs from an antecedent

²²⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A.I.K5.A.§29, 179.

²²⁹ Ibid., TI.A.I.K5.A.§29, 188.

²³⁰ Ibid., TI.A.I.K5.A.§29, 179, italics mine.

²³¹ Ibid., TI.A.I.K5.A.§29, 180: “Diesen in seinem Woher und Wohin verhüllten, aber an ihm selbst um so unverhüllter erschlossenen Seinscharakter des Daseins, dieses “Daß es ist” nennen wir die Geworfenheit dieses Seienden in sein Da. ... Der Ausdruck Geworfenheit soll die Faktizität der Überantwortung andeuten.”

²³² Ibid., TI.A.I.K5.A.§29, 180: “Faktizität ist nicht die Tatsächlichkeit des *factum brutum* eines Vorhandenen, sondern ein in die Existenz aufgenommener, wengleich zunächst abgedrängter Seinscharakter des Daseins. Das Daß der Faktizität wird in einem Anschauen nie vorfindlich.”

²³³ Ibid., TI.A.I.K5.A.§29, 182.

²³⁴ Ibid., TI.A.I.K5.A.§29, 183.

“found-ness.”²³⁵ Even the “purest θεωρία,” as Heidegger puts it, presupposes the “tonality”/“intonation” of “restful tarrying/lingering by” (*ruhiges Verweilen bei*) that which is “at hand,” of ease/leisure/rest (ῥοστώνη) and pastime (διαγωγή).²³⁶

Secondly, how might “there-ness” be interpreted as understanding (*Verstehen*)? Insofar as Dasein finds that it is “there,” it also finds itself “standing before” possibilities (*Möglichkeiten*) of how it might be “there.” It is for this reason that Heidegger characterizes understanding as the “disclosing being-able-to-be” (“*erschließendes Seinkönnen*”).²³⁷ The capacity to be in such a way as to disclose both enables and conditions Dasein’s encounter with a variety of beings – and indeed, with “being overall” (“*Sein überhaupt*”)²³⁸ – in a variety of ways. In this respect, Heidegger is prepared to concede that “Kant was perhaps right to presuppose such [a condition of possibility].”²³⁹ The “there-ness” of the understanding might, therefore, be thought of as a kind of draft (*Entwurf*),²⁴⁰ which indicates – “in a few broad strokes,” so to speak – what the understanding is capable of disclosing. Thus, one of the possibilities of being “there” before which Dasein finds itself is that of drafting (*Entwerfen*), i. e. of “understand[ing] itself – always already and as long as it still is – in terms of its possibilities.”²⁴¹ However, the possibilities of Dasein’s being “there” are not exhausted by its understanding of itself; rather, its principal possibility lies in understanding being (*Seinsverständnis*).²⁴²

Insofar as Dasein finds itself standing before its own possibilities, understanding may not

²³⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K5.A.§29, 183.

²³⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§29, 184.

²³⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 191.

²³⁸ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 196.

²³⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 192: “Kant setzt dergleichen vielleicht mit Recht voraus.”

²⁴⁰ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 193.

²⁴¹ Ibid.: “Dasein versteht sich immer schon und immer noch, solange es ist, aus Möglichkeiten.”

²⁴² Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 196: “Seiendes von der Seinsart des wesenhaften Entwurfs des In-der-Welt-seins hat als Konstitutivum seines Seins das Seinsverständnis.”

be interpreted as springing from its proper self as such.²⁴³ Rather, understanding is a sight (*Sicht*) which enables Dasein to glimpse the possibilities of its being, somewhat as circumspection (*Umsicht*) affords Dasein a sense of its potential involvements with the “handy,” insight (*Hinsicht*) – its cognition of beings “at hand,” and consideration (*Rücksicht*) – its concern for beings as “others.”²⁴⁴ As Heidegger cautions, such sight must not be confounded with the notion of “self-cognition” (“*Selbsterkenntnis*”) as a kind of perceptual detection and inspection of the “point of the self” (*Selbstopunkt*). It is also distinct both from perception by means of the “fleshly eyes” and from “purely non-sensate” perception.²⁴⁵ Rather, it but must be understood as a kind of thoroughgoing grasp (*Ergreifen*) of “being-in-the-world” *through* (*durch*) its constitutive moments and as a greater whole.²⁴⁶ It is for this reason that Heidegger also refers to such sight as “see-through-ness” (*Durchsichtigkeit*).²⁴⁷ It is possible for Dasein to see through itself all the way to itself – and ultimately, to “being overall” – because its “there-ness” as the “disclosed-ness of the there” suffuses it with light.²⁴⁸ On the other hand, the notion of sight may also be formalized to the extent where it denotes any phenomenon of Dasein’s access (*Zugang*) to beings as they are – “uncovered,” as it were.²⁴⁹ Thus, all other forms of sight might be seen as inflections of the understanding: indeed, Heidegger interprets not only “intuition” (“*Anschauung*”) and “thinking” (“*Denken*”), but also phenomenological “essential view”

²⁴³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 194: “Das Verstehen ist entweder eigentliches aus dem eigenen Selbst als solchem entspringendes, oder uneigentliches.”

²⁴⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 194-195: “Das Verstehen macht in seinem Entwurfscharakter... das aus, was wir die *Sicht* der Daseins nennen. ... *Sicht ist* Dasein gleichursprünglich nach den gekennzeichneten Grundweisen seines Seins als *Umsicht* des Besorgens, *Rücksicht* der Fürsorge, als *Sich* auf das Sein als solches...”

²⁴⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 195.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid..

²⁴⁸ Ibid..

²⁴⁹ Ibid.: “... es das ihm zugänglich Seiende an ihm selbst unverdeckt begegnen läßt. ... kann man *Sicht* und *sehen* so weit formalisieren daß damit ein universaler Terminus gewonnen wird, der jeden *Zugang* zu Seiendem und zu *Sein* als *Zugang* überhaupt characterisiert.”

(“*Wesensschau*”) as its derivatives.²⁵⁰

In drafting the possibilities of Dasein’s encounters, the understanding “configures” (*ausbildet*) its own possibilities of disclosure by means of a phenomenon Heidegger terms “interpretation” (*Auslegung*): “In interpretation, the understanding does not become something else, but rather itself.”²⁵¹ It appropriates its own possibilities when that which it “foresees” and “aims at” understanding (“*das “vorsichtig” anvisierte Verstandene*”) becomes conceivable for it through interpretation.²⁵² Interpretation approaches this task in one of two ways: (1) either by “scooping” (*schöpfen*) a commensurate concept from out of the being which is to be understood, or (2) by attempting to “squeeze” such a being into a pre-existing incommensurate concept.²⁵³ In its operation, interpretation always reaches out towards a given being from within a tacit preconception (*Vorgriff*) – it is “never a presuppositionless grasp” – and renders beings conceivable *as* something (“*als Etwas*”) or other.²⁵⁴ This “as,” which mediates between the encountered being proper and the sense (*Sinn*) of this being insofar as it is understood, is termed, by Heidegger, the “original “as” of the circumspectly understanding interpretation (ἐρμηνεία)...the existential-hermeneutic “as”...”²⁵⁵ Such tacit preconceptions arise from the reserve of possible significance that beings may acquire for Dasein, i. e. from Dasein’s world as a matrix of significance. Thus, “there-ness” as understanding enfolds some notion of priority

²⁵⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 196: “‘Anschauung’ und ‘Denken’^a sind beide schon entfernte Derivate des Verstehens. Auch die phänomenologische ‘Wesensschau’ gründet im existenzialen Verstehen.”

²⁵¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§32, 197: “Das Entwerfen des Verstehens hat die eigene Möglichkeit, sich auszubilden. Die Ausbildung des Verstehens nennen wir *Auslegung*. ... In der *Auslegung* wird das Verstehen nicht etwas anderes, sondern es selbst.”

²⁵² Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§32, 200: “Das in der Vorhabe gehaltene und ‘vorsichtig’ anvisierte Verstandene wird durch die *Auslegung* begreiflich.”

²⁵³ Ibid.: “Die *Auslegung* kann die dem auszulegenden Seienden zugehörige Begrifflichkeit aus diesem selbst schöpfen oder aber im Begriffe zwängen, denen sich das Seiende gemäß seiner Seinsart widersetzt.”

²⁵⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 200: “*Auslegung* ist nie ein voraussetzungsloses Erfassen eines Vorgegebenen.”

²⁵⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 210: “Das ursprüngliche ‘Als’ der umsichtig verstehenden *Auslegung* (ἐρμηνεία) nennen wir das existenzial-hermeneutische ‘Als’...”

indicated by the prefixes of “fore-” and “pre-” which distinguish its associated terms, such as “pre-conception,” “fore-sight,” “pre-supposition” – indeed, “*ver-stehen*” itself. As a matter of fact, Heidegger’s observation of this pattern leads him to conjecture that the understanding itself is an inalienable “fore-structure” (*Vor-Struktur*) of Dasein.²⁵⁶ This fore-structure is that which makes it possible for Dasein to encounter any being, including being overall, and thus cannot be reduced to the notion of “prejudice” or “vicious circle.” Rather, it must be glimpsed as that very immanence, that very “in-ness” of “being-in as such” which Heidegger had set out to pursue as early as in §12, and in the context of the present discussion, in §28.

Insofar as speech (*Rede*), as the articulation (*Artikulation*) of the understanding, is an existential of Dasein’s disclosedness, Heidegger insists that it must “essentially have specifically worldly kind of being.”²⁵⁷ Namely, speech is a “speaking out” (*aussprechen*) of the understandability (*Verständlichkeit*) of being-in-the-world.²⁵⁸ The principal indication of the distinctive spatiality of speech is its “whereabouts” (*Worüber*), so to speak – its structural moment of addressing (*anreden*) that which is spoken about (*das Beredete*).²⁵⁹ According to Heidegger, speech may indeed be understood as a “speaking out” of the self (*Sichaussprechen*), but such “out-ness” must not be seen as an escape from an “inn-ness” of an encapsulated self.²⁶⁰ Rather, in speaking out, Dasein is “being-outside” (*Draußensein*).²⁶¹ Such a perspective suggests that it is, indeed, no accident that “significances are first and foremost “wordly”...indeed, often

²⁵⁶ Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K5.A.§31, 203: “Dieser Zirkel des Verstehens ist nicht ein Kreis, in dem sich eine beliebige Erkenntnisart bewegt, sondern er ist der Ausdruck der existentialen *Vor-Struktur* des Daseins selbst.”

²⁵⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§34, 214: “...muß auch die Rede wesenhaft eine spezifisch *weltliche* Seinsart haben.”

²⁵⁸ Ibid..

²⁵⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§34, 215.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.: “Redend spricht sich Dasein *aus*, nicht weil es zunächst als “Inneres” gegen ein Draußen abgekapselt ist, sondern weil es als In-der-Welt-sein verstehend schon “draußen” ist.”

²⁶¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.A.§34, 216.

even predominantly “spatial.”²⁶²

This analysis of speech concludes Heidegger’s examination of the “existential constitution” of the “there-ness” or “disclosedness” of Dasein and opens the way for a consideration of its “everyday” constitution, namely, Da-sein as the emotion/“moved-ness” (*Bewegtheit*) of falling (*Verfallen*) and its modes of talk (*Gerede*), curiosity (*Neugier*), and ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*).²⁶³

The most important distinction between speech and talk (*Gerede*) is that the latter facilitates understanding without prior appropriation of the thing.²⁶⁴ In contrast to speech, talk exhibits a tendency towards the closing (*verschließen*) and covering up (*verdecken*) of beings²⁶⁵ – hence, its distinctive spatiality might be characterized as that of “closed-ness” (*Verschlossenheit*). Insofar as it is engaged in talk, Dasein is “closed off” not only from other beings, but also from the original-genuine being-relations to the world, to being-there-with, to being-in itself.²⁶⁶ Thus, such “closing off” entails not only self-containment, but also a “cutting off” of the self from a vast range of its own possibilities. This severance of relations – this uprooting (*Entwurzelung*)²⁶⁷ – is a kind of self-bondage and self-mutilation which prevail in Dasein’s everyday constitution.

A similar distinction holds between sight, granted to Dasein by the “lighting” of its “there-ness,” and, on the other hand, curiosity (*Neugier*), which never reaches the being of

²⁶² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K5.A.§34, 221: “Ist es Zufall, daß die Bedeutungen zunächst und zumeist “weltliche” sind, durch die Bedeutsamkeit der Welt vorgezeichnete, ja sogar oft vorwiegend “räumliche,” oder ist diese “Tatsache” existenzial-ontologisch notwendig und warum?”

²⁶³ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.§28, 178.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.B.§35, 224: “Das Gerede ist die Möglichkeit, alles zu verstehen ohne vorgängige Zueignung der Sache.”

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K5.B.§35, 226: “...Das im Gerede sich haltende Dasein ist als In-der-Welt-sein von den primären und ursprünglich-echten Seinsbezügen zur Welt, zum Mitdasein, zum In-Sein selbst abgeschnitten.”

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

things, but rather skims their “surfaces” – their outward appearances (*Aussehen*) – in the insatiable pursuit of novelty.²⁶⁸ As distraction (*Zerstreuung*), curiosity continually pulls Dasein in every conceivable direction, locking it in a state of vagrancy (*Aufenthaltslosigkeit*): “Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere.”²⁶⁹ Given over to curiosity, Dasein signifies “being-everywhere-and-nowhere” (*Überall-und-nirgends-sein*), with its “there” paradoxically designating “everywhere” and “nowhere” at once.²⁷⁰

Talk, curiosity, and ambiguity spring from the fundamental kind of being of Dasein’s everydayness which Heidegger terms “falling” (*Verfallen*).²⁷¹ Falling designates the inevitable starting point of Dasein’s progress towards its proper “being-able-to-be-itself” (*eigentliches Selbstseinkönnen*) – i. e. its initial state of “being-lost” (*Verlorensein*) in the publicity (*Öffentlichkeit*) of “one” (*Man*): “At first, Dasein is always already fallen away from itself (as proper ability to be itself) and fallen upon the “world.”²⁷² Thus, Dasein may be characterized by “impropriety” (*Uneigentlichkeit*) in the very specific sense of not-being-itself (*Nicht-es-selbst-sein*).²⁷³ However, as Heidegger specifically cautions, his notion of “falling” or “fallenness” (*Verfallenheit*) must not be understood in the sense of a “fall” from some “purer and higher “original state.”²⁷⁴

The pivotal insight that the aspect of “falling” brings to the notion of “being-in-the-world” is that such “being-in-” must no longer be perceived as some “rigid scaffolding” which remains untouched by Dasein’s relations with its world, but rather as a certain kind of “moved-

²⁶⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.A.I.K.5.B.§36, 229.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., TI.A.I.K.5.B.§36, 229: “Die Neugier ist überall und nirgends.”

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid., TI.A.I.K.5.B.§37, 233.

²⁷² Ibid., TI.A.I.K.5.B.§38, 233: “Das Dasein ist von ihm selbst als eigentlichem Selbstseinkönnen zunächst immer schon abgefallen und an die “Welt” verfallen.”

²⁷³ Ibid..

²⁷⁴ Ibid.: “Die Verfallenheit des Daseins darf daher auch nicht als “Fall” aus einem reineren und höheren “Urstand” aufgefaßt werden.”

ness” (“*Bewegtheit*”),²⁷⁵ namely, a kind of “foundering,” “plummeting,” or “dive” (*Absturz*).²⁷⁶ In falling, Dasein rushes headlong into the bottomlessness (*Bodenlosigkeit*) and nothingness (*Nichtigkeit*) of “improper” everydayness, all the while remaining under the impression that it is caught up in an “ascent” (*Aufstieg*) to “concrete life.”²⁷⁷ Thus, in “falling,” Dasein is, in fact, pulled in two different directions: on the one hand, it is wrested from (*losreißt*) its proper possibilities and, on the other, it is dragged into (*hineinreißt*) a complacent presumption of having reached them; together, these opposing forces power a kind of whirlpool (*Wirbel*)²⁷⁸ or vortex, with the latter metaphor being especially apt, as it specifically designates whirlpools with a downdraft. Dasein’s being caught up in such a whirlpool of “falling” hearkens back to its essential “thrown-ness,” the “-riv-” (*Wurf-*) – rip, drift, draft, draw – defining its being through and through.

The “moved-ness” of Dasein leads Heidegger to posit concern (*Sorge*) as the all-embracing unity of the structure of “being-in-the-world.” Yet, as a particular kind of motion, concern or care (*cura*)²⁷⁹ must be distinguished from other, more familiar kinds of motion, which are themselves grounded in concern and are, for this reason, frequently mistaken for it – will (*Wille*), desire (*Wunsch*), tendency (*Hang*), and urge (*Drang*).²⁸⁰ The unique kind of motion that Heidegger has in mind is that of angst (*Angst*), a movement that brings Dasein before its self through its own being.²⁸¹ As such, it is the only force which can counteract the the downdraft of the whirlpool of “falling,” to center it as its axis, at it were. Indeed, this tension is described in specifically spatial terms of flight (*Flucht*) away from (*weg von*), a “turn-away” (*Abkehr*), from

²⁷⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K5.B.§38, 234-235.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K5.B.§38, 237.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K6.§39, 242.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K6.§40, 245: “...wird in ihr das Dasein durch sein eigenes Sein vor es selbst gebracht...”

Dasein's proper possibilities and, in contrast, a "turn-into" (*Hinkehr*) these.²⁸² That which astonishes Dasein in angst is, indeed, the very disclosedness of the "world overall" (*Welt überhaupt*) – of "region overall" (*Gegend überhaupt*) – to the "essentially spatial being-in."²⁸³ That, "wherefore" (*Wovor*) angst arises, cannot be reduced to a "here" ("hier") or "over there" ("dort"); it is, properly speaking, "nowhere" (*nirgends*), and it is precisely such spatial indeterminacy that defies orientation towards any determinate direction (*Richtung*) of flight and thereby casts Dasein entirely upon itself.²⁸⁴ Indeed, angst discloses Dasein as a "*solus ipse*,"²⁸⁵ yet Heidegger insists that such "existential 'solipsism'" does not subsequently set Dasein out into the world as some "isolated subject-thing," but rather discloses to Dasein "the most extreme sense of its world as world" and of itself – as "being-in-the-world."²⁸⁶ In angst, Dasein discovers that what it previously thought of as "home" (*Zuhause*), is not its proper home, and until it moves into its own proper possibilities, Dasein is effectively "not-at-home" (*Un-zuhause*) and is characterized by "homelessness" (*Unheimlichkeit*).²⁸⁷ Thus, the state of being "not-at-home" emerges as a prior phenomenon to that of "being-in-the-world."²⁸⁸ In light of the development of the notion of appropriation (*Ereignis*), it is of capital significance that Heidegger indexes Dasein's being "not-at-home" to expropriation (*Enteignis*).²⁸⁹ Unable to flee, to lose itself in specific relations of insight and circumspection, Dasein finds itself confronted, for the first time,

²⁸² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K6.§40, 245-246.

²⁸³ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§40, 248: " 'Nirgends' aber bedeutet nicht nichts, sondern darin liegt Gegend überhaupt, Erschlossenheit von Welt überhaupt für das wesentlich räumliche In-Sein."

²⁸⁴ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§40, 248, 249: "[Angst] wirft das Dasein auf das zurück, worum es sich ängstet, sein eigentliches In-der-Welt-sein-können."

²⁸⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§40, 250.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.: "Die Angst vereinzelt und erschließt so das Dasein als "solus ipse." Dieser existentielle "Solipsismus" versetzt aber so wenig ein isoliertes Subjekt Ding in die harmlose Leere eines weltlosen Vorkommens, daß er das Dasein gerade in einem extremen Sinne vor seine Welt als Welt und damit es selbst vor sich selbst als In-der-Welt-sein bringt."

²⁸⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§40, 251.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§40, 252: "Das Un-zuhause^a muß existenzial-ontologisch als das ursprünglichere Phänomen begriffen werden."

²⁸⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§40, 252, footnote a: "(Enteignis)."

with its “being-in-” as always already “-in-the-world,” and therefore recovers its “being-free-for” (*Freisein für...*) – or, as Heidegger describes it in terms of motion, *propensio in...* – its own genuine possibilities. The nothing (no particular thing) and nowhere (no particular place) are nevertheless not literally nothing – “no total nothing” (“kein totales Nichts”) – and nowhere, but are, in this indeterminate state, the “most original ‘something’” (“ursprünglichstes ‘Etwas’”) of “the world as such” (“*die Welt als solche*”).²⁹⁰ Thus, the spatiality of the world emerges as profoundly ambiguous: on the one hand, the world appears to negate space insofar as it is “nowhere,” yet, on the other hand, it appears to be space *par excellence* as that most original “somewhere.”

By way of the notion of Dasein’s angst as confrontation of its proper possibilities, Heidegger arrives at the determination of the notion of concern/care (*Sorge*) as “already-being-in (the-world-) ahead-of-itself as being-by ([the] innerworldly encountering being) (“Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seinden)”).²⁹¹ This determination makes clear that concern/care is not “primarily and exclusively an isolated relation of the “I” to itself,”²⁹² although the “self” (*Sich*) in “being-ahead-of-itself” (*Sich-vorweg-sein*) does designate the self in the self of “oneself” (*Man-selbst*).²⁹³ Thus, the term “ahead-of-itself” suggests a paradoxical, yet essential duplication and extension of the self over space and time, wherein oneself must be understood as being always – constitutionally – in pursuit of itself. Thus, in his discussion of the notion of “presupposing” (*Voraussetzen*), Heidegger interprets

²⁹⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K6.§40, 249: “Die Aufsässigkeit des innerweltlichen Nichts und Nirgends besagt phänomenal: *das Wovor der Angst ist die Welt als solche.*”

²⁹¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§41, 256.

²⁹² Ibid.: “Sorge meint daher auch nicht primär und ausschließlich ein isoliertes Verhalten des Ich zu ihm selbst.”

²⁹³ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§41, 257: “Im Sich-vorweg-sein meint daher das “Sich” jeweils das Selbst im Sinne des Man-selbst.”

Dasein as setting itself “in front of,” “ahead of,” “in advance of” itself.²⁹⁴ Such is the most original configuration (*Gebilde*) of Dasein, which renders its being as becoming (*Werden*).²⁹⁵ Its forward motion of self-pursuit is the wellspring of all other motions, including will (*Wille*), desire (*Wunsch*), tendency (*Hang*), and urge (*Drang*).²⁹⁶

Almost ten sections later, in the context of his search for the existential construction of Dasein’s “being towards death” (“*Sein zum Tode*”), Heidegger further specifies this “being-ahead-of-itself” as “being-towards-a-possibility” (“*Sein zu einer Möglichkeit*”).²⁹⁷ Such being consists neither in “a thematic-theoretical consideration of the possible as possible...with respect to its possibility as such,” nor in “concerning [oneself] with its actualization,”²⁹⁸ but rather in “waiting” (*Erwarten*).²⁹⁹ Yet in the case of death, as Heidegger points out, the more Dasein approaches death, the more it understands death as “the possibility of impossibility” – of existence overall, and thus, of any further fulfillment of possibilities.³⁰⁰ On the other hand, the indeterminacy (*Unbestimmtheit*)³⁰¹ of the possibility of death, to which Heidegger points, would seem to render this “end” paradoxically “open-ended,” in such a way as to bring Heidegger’s earlier reservations regarding the possibility of philosophical reflection upon “life after death”³⁰²

²⁹⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K6.§44.c, 302.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§42, 264: “Die perfectio des Menschen, das Werden zu dem, was er in seinem Freisein für seine eigenen Möglichkeiten (dem Entwurf) sein kann, ist eine “Leistung” der “Sorge.”

²⁹⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§41, 257.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., TI.AII. K1. §53, 346.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K1.§53, 346-347: “...nicht in thematisch-theoretischer Betrachtung des Möglichen als Möglichen und gar hinsichtlich seiner Möglichkeit als solcher...Das fragliche Sein zum Tode kann offenbar nicht den Charakter des besorgenden Aus-seins auf seine Verwirklichung haben.”

²⁹⁹ Ibid., TI.AII. K1. §53, 347.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., TI.AII. K1. §53, 348: “...Unmöglichkeit der Existenz überhaupt...die Möglichkeit der Unmöglichkeit jeglichen Verhaltens zu..., jedes Existierens.”

³⁰¹ Ibid., TI.AII. K1. §53, 352.

³⁰² Ibid., TI.AII.K1.§49, 339: “Die ontologische Analyse des Seins zum Ende greift andererseits keiner existenziellen Stellungnahme zum Tode vor. Wenn der Tod als “Ende” des Daseins, das heißt des In-der-Welt-seins bestimmt wird, dann fällt damit keine ontische Entscheidung darüber, ob “nach dem Tode” noch ein anderes, höheres oder niedriges Sein möglich ist, ob das Dasein “fortlebt” oder gar, sich “überdauernd,” “unsterblich” ist. Über das “Jenseits” und seine Möglichkeit wird ebensowenig ontisch entschieden wie über das “Diesseits,” als

into question. If death is a possibility that remains temporally indeterminate, how can it determine, i. e. function as a boundary? Indeed, even by the end of the section, the question regarding Dasein's proper "being-whole" remains "pending" (*schwebend*).³⁰³

Notwithstanding these temporal overtones, Heidegger continues to envisage the configuration in the spatial terms of the figure of a circle (*Zirkel*): as late as §64, the notion of Dasein's self-understanding – its standing in front of itself – is characterized as the circular being (*“das zirkelhafte Sein”*) of Dasein.³⁰⁴

ε) The 'being-out' of the world and its discovery (*Entdeckung*) by Dasein

The discussion of the essential spatiality of Dasein as "being-in-the-world" inevitably raises the question of the former notion of the world as "being-out," as "outside world" (*“Außenwelt”*), which Heidegger addresses in §43. The key features of this notion of the world is its "reality" (*Realität*), i. e. its being "in-itself" (*An-sich*) and its independence (*Unabhängigkeit*). May the world of Dasein, which Heidegger has articulated up to this point, be in some sense characterized as "in-itself" or "independent" from Dasein, or are these notions inextricably bound with the notion of the subject as a self-enclosed "I"? For Heidegger, it is impossible to ontologically speak of "access to the real" from outside of the standpoint of Dasein as "being-in-the-world": "The question of whether there is a world overall and whether its being might be demonstrated, is – as a question which *Dasein* poses as "being-in-the-world" (and who else

sollten Normen und Regeln des Verhaltens zum Tode zur "Erbauung" vorgelegt werden. Die Analyse des Todes bleibt aber insofern rein "diesseitig," als sie das Phänomen lediglich daraufhin interpretiert, wie es als Seinsmöglichkeit des jeweiligen Daseins *in dieses hereinsteht*. Mit Sinn und Recht kann überhaupt erst dann methodisch sicher auch nur *gefragt* werden, was *nach dem Tode sei*, wenn dieser in seinem vollen ontologischen Wesen begriffen ist. Ob eine solche Frage überhaupt eine mögliche *theoretische* Frage darstellt, bleibe hier unentschieden. Die diesseitige ontologische Interpretation des Todes liegt vor jeder ontisch-jenseitigen Spekulation."

³⁰³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K1. §53, 354.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, TI.AII.K3. §64, 418.

should pose it?) – without sense.”³⁰⁵ Thus, contra Kant’s demonstration of the existence of external things, Heidegger asserts that any such attempt is in itself a “scandal”: “The ‘scandal’ of philosophy’ consists not in the fact that such a demonstration is up to now still outstanding, but rather *in the fact that such demonstrations are expected and attempted time and again.*”³⁰⁶

From the standpoint of Dasein as “being-in-the-world,” however, it is possible to articulate reality (*Realität*) as the “being-at-hand” (*Vorhandensein*) of innerworldly beings. Heidegger recognizes one way of understanding such “being-at-hand” – a way he will return to and draw upon to a greater extent in formulating the notion of “thinghood” (*Dinghafte*)³⁰⁷ in the third version of the artwork essay – in Dilthey’s characterization of reality as “resistance” (*Widerstand*) or “resistivity” (*Widerständigkeit*): “The analytical elaboration of the phenomenon of resistance is the positive [yield] of [Dilthey’s] treatise.”³⁰⁸ Yet, as Heidegger points out, Dilthey’s (and, by extension, Scheler’s) approach lacks an ontological basis and therefore leaves the *a priori* of any experience of resistance – “being-in-the-world” – entirely undetermined. In Heidegger’s view, it is not sufficient to describe resistance as a “hindering of willing-to-come-through” (“*Behinderung eines Durch-kommen-wollens*”); rather, a thoroughgoing account of this phenomenon requires an articulation of the ontological *a priori* of its experience: “*The experience of resistance, i. e. the striving-commensurate discovering of that which resists, is only ontologically possible on the basis of the disclosedness of the world...* The “re-” and “ob-” in

³⁰⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K6.§43.a, 268.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§43.a, 272.

³⁰⁷ Indeed, at this juncture in *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger considers the possibility of articulating something like a “pure at-hand-edness of a thing” (“*der puren Dingvorhandenheit*”) or a “thingly-ness of nature” (“*Naturdinglichkeit*”), which might characterize the kind of being of “nature” (“*Natur*”) in distinction from that of “handy-ness” (*Zuhandenheit*) and “at-hand-edness” (*Vorhandenheit*) in general.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., TI.AI.K6.§43.b, 277: “*Realität ist Widerstand, genauer Widerständigkeit. Die analytische Herausarbeitung des Widerstands phänomens ist das Positive in der genannten Abhandlung...*”

their ontological possibility are borne through the disclosed ‘being-in-the-world.’”³⁰⁹ It is for this reason that Heidegger proposes to determine the “sum” of the Cartesian “cogito sum” as “I-am-in-the-world” (“*ich-bin-in-einer-Welt*”) and to introduce thinking into this “first principle” only as one possible way of “being-by” innerworldly beings.³¹⁰

This demonstration of the dependence of “reality” – in the specific sense of the givenness of a certain kind of being to Dasein – on the *a priori* of Dasein’s “understanding of being” (*Seinsverständnis*)³¹¹ in general is central to Heidegger’s interpretation of being (*Sein*) as truth (*Wahrheit*). Indeed, this is the juncture at which Heidegger’s investigation of Dasein’s “there-ness” “takes a new approach.”³¹² Here, the preceding discussion of the essential spatiality of Dasein is recast in terms of the “place” (“*Ort*”) of truth.³¹³ Already in his overview of the traditional concept of truth, Heidegger observes that this concept has been historically envisaged in relation to the question of its “location,” i. e. truth being located “in” the statement (*Aussage*), “in” the judgement (*Urteil*), “in” the soul (*Seele*), etc.³¹⁴ However, Heidegger proposes to speak of Dasein as the “place” of truth insofar as its “being-in-the-world” first makes possible truth as the “dis-covery” (*Entdeckung*) of beings precisely in their “being-dis-covered” (*Entdeckt-sein*): “‘Being-true’ als being-dis-covering is, on the other hand, ontologically possible only on the basis of ‘being-in-the-world.’”³¹⁵ Indeed, Heidegger speaks of Dasein as being true in the primary sense of “being-discovering” (*Entdeckend-sein*), while beings are “true” in the

³⁰⁹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K6.§43.b, 279: “*Widerstandserfahrung, das heißt strebensmäßiges Entdecken von Widerständigem, ist ontologisch nur möglich auf dem Grunde der Erschlossenheit von Welt. ... Das “Wider” und “Gegen” sind in ihrer ontologischen Möglichkeit durch das erschlossene In-der-Welt-sein getragen.*”

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K6.§43.b, 279-280.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K6.§43.c, 280-281.

³¹² *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K6.§44, 283: “Die Untersuchung nimmt einen neuen Ansatz.”

³¹³ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K6.§44.a, 284.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, TI.AI.K6.§44.a, 289-290: “Das Wahrsein als Entdeckend-sein ist wiederum ontologisch nur möglich auf dem Grunde des In-der-Welt-seins.”

secondary sense of “being-discovered” (*Entdeckt-sein*).³¹⁶ Heidegger argues that being can only be understood by someone – dis-cover itself to someone – and therefore, Dasein’s unique kind of being, i. e. the understanding of something, the openness to something, is the condition of the possibility of something like understanding or dis-closure in general. The notion of truth as “being-dis-covering” (*entdeckend-sein*) is the nexus of the self-dis-covering of beings as themselves and of their dis-covering by Dasein as dis-closed-ness. Far from negating the ancient Greek concept of truth, Heidegger’s interpretation claims to be the “necessary interpretation” of what the oldest tradition of philosophy had originally foreseen and phenomenologically understood as well.”³¹⁷ Thus, the significance of Dasein being the “place” of truth consists in the fact that truth as “discovered-ness” happens within the configuration of Dasein’s “disclosed-ness” and cannot happen “outside” of it.³¹⁸

As early as in this discussion of truth as “discovered-ness” (*Entdecktheit*), Heidegger displays a marked concern for the kind of “motion” discovery might entail – namely, that of “ripping from”/“wresting from” (*entrissen*) the “concealed-ness” (*Verborgenheit*).³¹⁹ As will be demonstrated in the section dedicated to the proper spatiality of the work of art, this “motion” – with its variations of drawing, drafting, drifting – will come to play a prominent role in Heidegger’s interpretation of the work of art; however, it is worth noting that here such “wresting” or “ripping” is rendered in the conspicuously violent terms of “robbery” or “rape” (*Raub*).³²⁰ On the other hand, such “ripping” also refers to a kind of “scission” – a κρίνειν –

³¹⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K6. §44.b, 292.

³¹⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K6. §44.b, 290.

³¹⁸ Ibid., TI.AI.K6. §44.b, 292.

³¹⁹ Ibid., TI.AI.K6. §44.b, 294.

³²⁰ Ibid.

which is involved in differentiating (*Unterscheiden*) and deciding (*Sichentscheiden für...*).³²¹ This insight must be retained as forming a crucial context for the interpretation of the aforementioned term “robbery” or “rape,” insofar as it points to Dasein as being, as it were, itself “riven” prior to being restored to some unity through a decision (“de-scission”), as Heidegger’s reference to Heraclitus’s myth of the goddess of truth might suggest.³²² Indeed, on a more profound level, “disclosed-ness” might not be an altogether neutral or static structure, but might rather involve a certain kind and degree of duress consistent with the “ripping” of the *solus ipse* in its self-opening. Thus, the structure of “disclosed-ness” might be interpreted as both essential to and incomplete without Dasein’s at-one-ment with being, eventually articulated in Heidegger’s notion of appropriation (*Ereignis*). This incompleteness – this “non-sufficiency-onto-itself” – appears to be what strikes Dasein in angst, the moment of Dasein’s confrontation of its utter preparedness for – yet lack of – fulfilled relation. Just as truth as “dis-covery” must presuppose a prior “being-covered,” the essential “dis-closedness” of Dasein would seem to suggest the possibility of its “closed-ness,” and the transition between them – a certain kind of “rupture” of the self with a view to its “inosculation” in relation to another being or being as such. This is the original basis of the notion of truth as “correspondence” or “adequation.”

Curiously – and of utmost significance for the expansion of the notion of truth beyond Dasein in the artwork essay – Heidegger ever so briefly considers the possibility of “eternal truths” (“*ewige Wahrheiten*”), which, according to the logic of his present reflection, would have to entail that “Dasein was and will be in all of eternity.”³²³ Naturally, in the absence of evidence

³²¹ Ibid., TI.AI.K6. §44.b, 295.

³²² Ibid.: “Der Weg des Entdeckens wird nur gewonnen im κρίνειν λόγῳ, im verstehenden Unterscheiden beider und Sichentscheiden für den einen.”

³²³ Ibid., TI.AI.K6. §44.c, 300: “Daß es “ewige Wahrheiten” gibt, wird erst dann zureichend bewiesen sein, wenn der Nachweis gelungen ist, daß in alle Ewigkeit Dasein war und sein wird.”

for the latter, Heidegger dismisses this possibility out of hand; however, such a formulation does bring to mind the possibility of an alternative – and more original – “location” of truth as “disclosedness” in the work of art, for instance, or, eventually, in being itself. Leaving aside, for the time being, the question of whether and in what sense such might be “eternal,” it must not remain unobserved that such a possibility would at very least question the polarity of “being-discovering”/“being-discovered” and potentially transform it, such that the event of discovery might emerge as a reciprocal discovering, rather than a unilateral “rape” or “robbery”; ultimately, this polarity might even be reversed, such that Dasein’s very possibility of “discovering” might be seen as springing from a prior self-discovery, or self-“disclosed-ness,” of being.

§2. The Layers of the Temporality of Dasein

α) The shortcomings of “traditional” philosophical conceptions of time

The starting point of Heidegger’s reflection upon the understanding of being is the remarkable observation that such is always already in play³²⁴ in the case of one determinate (*bestimmt*) being, that of Dasein.³²⁵ While the furthest reach of the Kantian understanding consists in its *a priori* relation to an “X” or an “object in general,”³²⁶ that of the understanding of Dasein extends all the way to being, which may well be designated by an “X,” but is certainly no object (*Gegenstand*), specific or general. Being is no precinct of being (*Seinsbezirk*), which can

³²⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” I.§2, 7: “...wir bewegen uns immer schon in einem Seinsverständnis... Dieses durchschnittliche und vage Seinsverständnis ist ein Faktum.”

³²⁵ Ibid., “Einleitung,” I.§2, 9.

³²⁶ Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, §25, 2nd edition, 2010, 121.

Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, §3.b.β, 64.

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 108 f., A 235 ff., B 294 ff.

be thematized as an object,³²⁷ and its understanding – no mathematics or even logic (transcendental though it may be³²⁸). Thus, the understanding of being can never be reduced to the terms of a relation of objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*). By no means can Dasein's understanding of being be reconducted to some form of self-affection – including the temporal³²⁹ – but must, from the very outset, be distinguished by its vector of “other-affection,” so to speak, reflected in Heidegger's chosen term existentiality (*Existenzialität*).³³⁰ And yet it is precisely the temporal cast of Kant's notion of self-affection that Heidegger will attempt to excise, retain, and revise as the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein.³³¹ Indeed, his stated intention is to articulate the structures of Dasein as modes of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*).³³²

Having thus emphasized the inextricability of the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein from the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being, Heidegger finally finds himself in a position to articulate how his conception of the former exceeds Kant's notion of temporality as self-affection of the subject. While Heidegger concedes that Kant was “the first and only [thinker] who had gone a stretch upon the path tending in the direction of the dimension of temporality [*Temporalität*], and who had correspondingly allowed himself to be drawn in by the compulsion of the phenomenon itself,” he is quick to add that ultimately, for Kant, “this area in its proper dimension and its central ontological function has had to remain closed.”³³³ Indeed, for Kant,

³²⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” I.§3, 12: “...zu Gegenständen thematisieren.”

³²⁸ Cf. Ibid., “Einleitung,” I.§3, 14: “So beruht denn auch der positive Ertrag von *Kants* Kritik der reinen Vernunft im Ansatz zu einer Herausarbeitung dessen, was zu einer Natur überhaupt gehört, und nicht in einer »Theorie« der Erkenntnis. Seine *transzendente Logik ist apriorische Sachlogik des Seinsgebietes Natur*.” (italics mine).

³²⁹ Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, II.I.1.§24.b, 348, §25.c, 391, II.§11.b, 151-152.

Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 2nd edition, 2010, §34, 173, §35, 200.

³³⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” I.§4, 17.

³³¹ Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§5, 24.

³³² Ibid.: “Daseinsstrukturen als Modi der Zeitlichkeit”

³³³ Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§6.31: “Der Erste und Einzige, der sich eine Strecke untersuchenden Weges in der Richtung auf die Dimension der Temporalität bewegte, bzw. sich durch den Zwang der Phänomene selbst dahin drängen ließ, ist *Kant*. [...] ...für *Kant* dieses Gebiet in seinen eigentlichen Dimensionen und seiner zentralen ontologischen Funktion verschlossen bleiben mußte.”

“the depth of the human soul”³³⁴ was to remain inaccessible, for Kant had failed to see that such depth ultimately descended into the abyss (*Abgrund*) of beyng (*Seyn*) or, at very least – at the juncture of *Sein und Zeit* – into being (*Sein*). Heidegger’s stated intention for *Sein und Zeit* thus comes as no surprise: “the following treatise seeks to interpret the schematism chapter and from there – Kant’s teaching on time.”³³⁵ (Indeed, Heidegger’s envisioned refraction of being through time may be thought of as strategically analogous to Kant’s refraction of the categories through time, and of time – through space, such that they may be “laid bare before our eyes.”³³⁶) In accordance with what has already been demonstrated in Chapter II on the basis of Heidegger’s writings and lectures on Kant during the 1927-1937 period, Heidegger’s efforts in *Sein und Zeit* are dedicated to remedying what he perceives as a woeful lack of “a thematic ontology of Dasein...of a previous ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject.”³³⁷

Heidegger attributes this lack to Kant’s neglect of the question of being, on the one hand, and to Kant’s dogmatic acceptance of the position of Descartes. It is for these two reasons, in Heidegger’s view, that Kant is unable to elaborate not only a genuinely “transcendental determination of time,” but also a proper “connection between *time* and “*I think*.”³³⁸ How does Kant’s uncritical assumption of the position of Descartes prevent him from developing a fully-fledged temporality (firstly, that of Dasein, and then – that of being)? According to Heidegger, Descartes leaves the specific kind of being of the *res cogitans* – the specific sense of the being of

³³⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§6.32: “in den Tiefen der menschlichen Seele...”

Cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 180ff.

³³⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§6.32: “...versucht die folgende Abhandlung das Schematismuskapitel und von da aus die Kantische Lehre von der Zeit zu interpretieren.”

³³⁶ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 180ff: “...sie unverdeckt vor Augen legen werden.”

³³⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§6.32: “das Fehlen einer thematischen Ontologie des Daseins, Kantisch gesprochen, einer vorgängigen ontologischen Analytik der Subjektivität des Subjekts.”

³³⁸ Ibid.

the “*sum*” in the “*cogito sum*” – undetermined.³³⁹ As a result, the ontological foundation of that which Descartes thinks of as a “sure basis” (“*sicherer Boden*”) remains unexpressed.³⁴⁰ However, Heidegger believes that in the *Meditations* Descartes arrives at such a *fundamentum inconcussum* by way of a medieval scholastic ontology, which renders the being of the *res cogitans* in terms of an *ens creatum*, of being created (*geschaffen*) or set forth (*hergestellt*).³⁴¹ Why does this aspect pose such an impediment to the development of the question of being?

Kant’s takeover of the Cartesian position and, by extension, that of medieval scholasticism, is, according to Heidegger, retrospectively compounded by his even deeper-lying indebtedness to the heritage of the ancient philosophical tradition. Ancient philosophy’s designation of being as οὐσία and its determination in terms of παρουσία.³⁴² Interpreting παρουσία as “presentness” (*Anwesenheit*), Heidegger asserts that being as οὐσία is respectively construed in terms of a single privileged mode of time, that of “the present” (*Gegenwart*).³⁴³ Thus, the being of each being comes to be characterized primarily in terms of “presenting” (*Gegenwärtigen*), of its being “at hand” (*Vorhandenheit*).³⁴⁴ For ancient philosophy, then, the question of the relation between being and time warrants no further elaboration. Thus, beyond

³³⁹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§6, 33.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

And yet Hans-Georg Gadamer insists that it is precisely the understanding of every being, including the Subject, as an *ens creatum* which had assured the basis for a ‘congruity’ between the Subject and nature in Kant: “Basing aesthetics on the subjectivity of the mind’s powers was, however, the beginning of a dangerous process of subjectification. For Kant himself, to be sure the determining factor was still the mysterious congruity that existed between the beauty of nature and the subjectivity of the subject. (...)...but this position presupposes the self-evident validity of the natural order which has its ultimate foundation in the theological idea of creation. With the disappearance of this context, the grounding of aesthetics led inevitably to a radical subjectification in further development of the doctrine of the freedom of the genius from rules.” (Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Truth of the Work of Art,” in *Heidegger’s Ways*, ed. John W. Stanley (Albany, NY: SUNY Press), 101). In the wake of Heidegger’s displacement of such a basis, art would come to the fore as a measure of ‘congruity’ between being and the human being, as a possibility of a continuity sufficient to their mutuality.

³⁴² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§6, 34.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§6, 35.

Descartes, beyond medieval scholasticism, Kant's interpretation of time is thoroughly ensconced in structures articulated in Aristotle's *Physics*, Δ10, 217, b 29-14, 224, a 17.³⁴⁵

Yet, as the original projected outline of *Sein und Zeit* in §8 suggests, one must prepare for reflection upon the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being by first coming to terms with the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein. The first step Heidegger takes in this direction is to dissociate the existence (*Existenz*) of Dasein from existence (*existentia*) understood in terms of a single mode of time, that of "the present," as "being-at-hand" (*Vorhandensein*).³⁴⁶ The existence of Dasein must be equally carefully distinguished from the indeterminate and/or medieval scholastic created *sum* of Descartes: "One of its first tasks will be to demonstrate that the approach of an "I" or subject given at the outset fundamentally mistakes the phenomenological persistence of Dasein."³⁴⁷ Any notion of the subject (*Subjekt, subjectum, ὑποκείμενον*) intended by the familiar placeholders of the "soul" (*Seele*), consciousness (*Bewußtsein*), spirit (*Geist*), person (*Person*), living (*Leben*), human (*Mensch*), must first be positively determined itself.³⁴⁸

Before the temporality of Dasein can emerge into view, it must be liberated from the "traditional" (*tradizional*) conceptions of time from Aristotle all the way to Bergson (and in particular, from the identification of Bergson's notion of time with space).³⁴⁹ Heidegger judges the proposals of Dilthey, Bergson, Husserl,³⁵⁰ and Scheler regarding person-ality/-hood (*Personalität*) to be deficient precisely in this regard, although the negative import of the

³⁴⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, "Einleitung," II.§6, 35, footnote 2.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., TI.AI.K1.§9, 56: "...*Vorhandensein*, eine Seinsart, die dem Seienden vom Charakter des Daseins wesensmäßig nicht zukommt."

³⁴⁷ Ibid., TI.AI.K1.§10, 61-62: "Eine ihrer ersten Aufgaben wird es sein zu erweisen, daß der Ansatz eines zunächst gegebenen Ich und Subjekts den phänomenalen Bestand des Daseins von Grund aus verfehlt."

³⁴⁸ Ibid., TI.AI.K1.§10, 62.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., "Einleitung," II.§5, 24: "Damit wird dem vulgären Zeitbegriff sein eigenständiges Recht zurückgegeben – entgegen der These *Bergsons*, die mit ihm gemeinte Zeit sei der Raum."

³⁵⁰ Cf. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (Husserliana IV), Teil II, Abschnitt 3 ("Die Konstitution der geistigen Welt (die personalistische Einstellung im Gegensatz zur naturalistischen)").

contributions of the latter two is not insignificant. This negative import consists in the rejection of any understanding of the being of the person in terms of a thing (*Ding*), a substance (*Substanz*), or a subject of the acts of reason (*Subject von Vernunftakten*) in the sense of some psychic substrate separable from the acts themselves.³⁵¹ Thus, as Heidegger concedes, Husserl is correct in cautioning against “psychic objectivization” (*psychische Objektivierung*), i. e. the identification of acts (and by extension, of persons) with objects: “It belongs to the essence of the person to exist only in the fulfillment of intentional acts, and thus s/he is essentially *no* object. Every psychic objectivization, that is, every grasp of acts as something psychic, is tantamount to de-personalization. In any case, the person is always given as the fulfiller of intentional acts.”³⁵² Heidegger’s critique of such an otherwise negatively productive formulation is, of course, that it leaves the sense of the term “fulfill” – and, therefore, ultimately, that of the being of the person – undetermined.

As in the case of Descartes and Kant, Heidegger lays the blame for such indeterminacy in the case of Scheler and Husserl at the feet of their orientation towards the “traditional,” “ancient,” and “Christian” anthropology. According to Heidegger, the principal features of such a compound anthropology may be summed up as follows: (1) its reduction of the being of the human as ξῶλον λόγον ἔχον/*animal rationale/vernünftiges Lebenwesen* to “being-at-hand” (*Vorhandensein*) and to “proceeding” (*Vorkommen*), (2) its determination of the being of the human on the theological basis of καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός· ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ὁμοίωσιν/*faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram et similitudinem nostram* (Genesis

³⁵¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, T.I.A.I.K1. §10, 64.

³⁵² Ibid.: “Zum Wesen der Person gehört, daß sie nur existiert im Vollzug der intentionalen Akte, sie ist also wesenhaft *kein* Gegenstand. Jede psychische Objektivierung, also jede Fassung der Akte als etwas Psychisches, ist mit Entpersonalisierung identisch. Person ist jedenfalls als Vollzieher intentionaler Akte gegeben.”

Cf. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (Husserliana IV), Teil II, Abschnitt 3 (“Die Konstitution der geistigen Welt (die personalistische Einstellung im Gegensatz zur naturalistischen)”, 388.

I:26) and the subsequent rendition both of the being of God and that of the human (*ens finitum*) in terms of the handed down means of the ontology of antiquity, (3) the de-theologization of such a rendition during the modern period without the corresponding expulsion of the specifically Christian (and ontologically meager) notion of the being of the human as transcendence (*Transzendenz*) in the sense of surplus beyond reason.³⁵³

As Heidegger acknowledges, this conclusion inevitably lends itself to comparison and contrast with that of Hegel, namely, that “the spirit/mind ‘falls into time’ as history.”³⁵⁴ Hegel’s interpretation of time springs from Aristotle’s mechanical determination of the same in *Physics* in reference to the “poles” of “place” (“*Ort*”) and “motion” (“*Bewegung*”); it is found in the second part of Hegel’s *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Division I.³⁵⁵ According to Heidegger’s interpretation, for Hegel, space “passes into” (*übergeht*) time, or, in Hegel’s own formulation, “space ‘is’ time, which means that time is the ‘truth’ of space.”³⁵⁶ What is this ‘truth’? Hegel understands space as an “unmediated indifference (*Gleichgültigkeit*) of the “being-outside-of-itself” of nature”; Heidegger interprets this formulation as the “abstract multiplicity of differentiable points,” which are not “fused together,” but rather “uninterrupted” – thus, space is undifferentiated, but differentiable.³⁵⁷ Moreover, it is paradoxically capable of

³⁵³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K1.§10, 66: “...Transzendenzidee, wonach der Mensch mehr ist als ein Verstandeswesen...”

³⁵⁴ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§78, 536: “...der Geist als Geschichte ‘in die Zeit fällt.’”

³⁵⁵ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 566.

Cf. Hegel, *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, hrsg. v. G. Bolland, Leiden 1906, §§ 254 ff.

³⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 566.

Cf. Hegel, *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, hrsg. v. G. Bolland, Leiden 1906, § 257, Zusatz.

³⁵⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 566: “Der Raum ist die vermittlungslose Gleichgültigkeit des Außersichseins der Natur... der Raum ist die abstrakte Vielheit der in ihm unterscheidbaren Punkte. Durch diese wird der Raum nicht unterbrochen, er entsteht aber auch nicht durch sie und gar in der Weise einer Zusammenfügung.”

remaining undifferentiated precisely while differentiating.³⁵⁸ That is to say, differentiated points retain the undifferentiated character of space itself.³⁵⁹ The paradox consists in the fact that the point (*Punkt*) both *negates* space and is itself space insofar as it is an *interval*.³⁶⁰ In this sense, space may be legitimately termed punctuality (*Punktualität*).³⁶¹ Insofar as it is initially “for itself,” such punctuality is immobile – it is a “paralyzed rest” (*paralysierte Ruhe*).³⁶² In sublimation (*Aufhebung*), however, the point “sprinkles”/“sprays”/“splashes”/“bursts” forth in relation to all other points, and this phenomenon of the introduction of motion is what Hegel terms “time.”³⁶³ Yet Heidegger insists on interpreting this phenomenon as the manifestation of the point through “the now,” such that time as the condition of possibility of punctuality is brought to the fore as the “truth” of space.³⁶⁴ In either case, temporality comes to be determined by Hegel as intuited/“looked-upon” becoming (*das angeschaute Werden*), that is to say, a change.³⁶⁵ On the basis of this notion of change, the point is capable of being understood as “exterior to itself” (“*sich selbst äußerliche*”).³⁶⁶ Naturally, in this case, change gains the upper hand over time, as in Aristotle.

Heidegger’s critique of Hegel’s position hinges on the former’s identification of the

³⁵⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 566: “Der Raum bleibt, unterschieden durch die unterscheidbaren Punkte, die selbst Raum sind, seinerseits unterschiedlos.”

³⁵⁹ Ibid.: “Die Unterschiede sind selbst vom Charakter dessen, was sie unterscheiden.”

³⁶⁰ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 566-567: “Der Punkt ist aber gleichwohl, sofern er überhaupt im Raum etwas unterscheidet, *Negation* des Raumes, jedoch so, daß er als diese *Negation* (Punkt ist ja Raum) selbst im Raum bleibt.”

³⁶¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 567.

Cf. Hegel, *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, hrsg. v. G. Bolland, Leiden 1906, § 254, Zusatz.

³⁶² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 567.

³⁶³ Ibid.: “Die *Aufhebung* der *Punktualität* als Gleichgültigkeit bedeutet ein Nichtmehrliegenbleiben in der ‘paralyzierten Ruhe’ des Raumes. Der Punkt ‘spreizt sich auf’ gegenüber allen anderen Punkten.”

³⁶⁴ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 568.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ibid..

Cf. Hegel, *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, hrsg. v. G. Bolland, Leiden 1906, § 258, Zusatz.

medium of change as “the now”³⁶⁷; yet it is not evident that such a bond is forged and maintained by Hegel himself. And even if Heidegger is correct in attributing a certain precedence of “the now” to Hegel, the latter’s determination of such a “now” is not that of an appearing and disappearing instant, but rather – according to Heidegger’s own citation – that of a “concrete present [which is] the result of the past and [is] pregnant with the future”; thus, for Hegel, true “present-ness” (*Gegenwart*) is also “eternity” (*Ewigkeit*).³⁶⁸ Despite this “expanded-ness” of Hegelian time, Heidegger maintains that in this conception, the sequence/succession of the now is formalized in the extreme sense and unsurmountably leveled.”³⁶⁹ However, it is not the notion of “the now” that is crucial in Hegel’s conception of time. As Heidegger himself acknowledges, the more urgent import of Hegel’s interpretation of time as “intuited becoming” is that time offers the self a means of appearing to itself.³⁷⁰ Indeed, time here figures as “the form, in which substance is in consciousness.”³⁷¹ And what the self “intuits”/“looks upon” in this self-revelation (*Selbstoffenbarung*)³⁷² is that it hosts difference (*Unterschied*) within itself, and is, therefore, essentially relational.³⁷³

β) The shortcomings of “vulgar” conceptions of time

The “vulgar” conception of time associates the latter with a certain range of “temporal”

³⁶⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 569.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.: “...die konkrete Gegenwart ist das Resultat der Vergangenheit und sie ist trüchtig von der Zukunft. Die wahrhafte Gegenwart ist somit die Ewigkeit.”

³⁶⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 570: “Hier ist die Jetztfolge im extremsten Sinne formalisiert und unüberbietbar nivelliert.”

³⁷⁰ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§82.b, 573: “Denn ‘die Zeit ist der *Begriff* selbst, der *da* ist und als leere Anschauung sich dem Bewußtsein vorstellt; deswegen erscheint der Geist notwendig in der Zeit und er erscheint so lange in der Zeit, als er nicht seinen reinen Begriff *erfaßt*, das heißt nicht die Zeit tilgt. Sie ist das äußere angeschaute vom Selbst nicht *erfaßte* reine Selbst, der nur angeschaute Begriff.’ So erscheint der Geist notwendig *seinem Wesen nach* in der Zeit.”

Cf. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. WW (Glockner) II, S. 612.

³⁷¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§82.b, 574.

Cf. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, a. a. O. S. 613.

³⁷² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§82.b, 572.

³⁷³ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§82.b, 573.

(“*zeitlich*”) beings (such as natural processes and historical happenings), and sharply distinguishes these, on the one hand, from “time-less” (“*zeitlos*”) beings (such as spatial and numerical relations), and on the other, from the “supra-temporal” (“*überzeitlich*”) eternal (*Ewiges*), thereafter preoccupying itself with bridging this cleft (“*Kluft*”).³⁷⁴

Heidegger’s first step towards extricating the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein from the “vulgar” and “traditional” interpretations of temporality is to assert its precedence over the historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of Dasein, and to firmly distinguish the latter itself from conventional notions of historicity. The temporality of Dasein must be seen as the condition of the possibility of Dasein’s historicity, and the latter itself – precisely as one kind of such temporality.³⁷⁵ This particular kind of the temporality of Dasein consists in Dasein’s being a “happening” (*Geschehen*), rather than in its being involved in the happenings of world history per se.³⁷⁶ This “happening,” however, must not be viewed as restricted to the present continuous tense which the morphology of the term would suggest; rather, as Heidegger points out, Dasein as a “happening” includes its past (*Vergangenheit*) within itself – not simply in the sense of such a past trailing behind Dasein and exerting a kind of after-effect (*Nach-Wirkung*), but rather, in the sense of its continually issuing from out its future (*Zukunft*).³⁷⁷ Such a scenario acquires a far greater lucidity when the term “happening” is closely associated, by Heidegger, with the term “generation” (“*Generation*”): “[Dasein’s] own past – and that always means that of its “generation” – does not *follow* Dasein, but rather already precedes it.”³⁷⁸ Once the character of the “elementary” (*elementar*) historicity of Dasein as “generation” is brought into relief, it may

³⁷⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§5, 25.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§6, 27.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

be easily and decisively distinguished from historicity (*Historizität*) as the study of the happenings of world history.³⁷⁹ Yet, as Heidegger underscores, such essential historicity of Dasein remains incomplete without reference to being.³⁸⁰ Such is presumably the case because the “happening” or “generation” of Dasein is not entirely spontaneous or autonomous, but is intimately bound up with being; tradition “uproots” (“*entwurzelt*”) Dasein from this original “source” (*ursprüngliche “Quelle”*) and thereby obstructs all access to its robust understanding.³⁸¹ The encounter between being and Dasein is that “original experience” (*ursprüngliche Erfahrung*)³⁸² which must set the standard for all experience, and to which all questions regarding the conditions of experience, including time and space) and their origins must return.

γ) Heidegger’s alternative

Resuming Heidegger’s own path towards the understanding of being in terms of time, on the basis of §7.A of *Sein und Zeit*, one might rephrase the latter expression as “the understanding of being in the *light* of time.” If being is to show itself (*sich zeigen*) as a phenomenon (*φαινόμενον*), it must do so under some kind of light (*Licht*) or luminosity (*Helle*), as the stem φα-/φῶς- of the term φαινόμενον would seem to suggest.³⁸³ Yet what can it mean to identify time with light? Is time capable of rendering being literally open (*offenbar*), literally visible (*sichtbar*)³⁸⁴ – or must the expression “in the light of time” be taken in a purely metaphorical sense? If being is a phenomenon rather than an appearance (*Erscheinung*) in the specifically

³⁷⁹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§6, 28.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.: “...das Fragen nach dem Sein, das hinsichtlich seiner ontisch-ontologischen Notwendigkeit angezeigt wurde, ist selbst durch die Geschichtlichkeit charakterisiert.”

³⁸¹ Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§6, 29.

³⁸² Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§6, 30.

³⁸³ Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§7.A, 38.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

Kantian sense of “that which shows itself as an object within empirical intuition,”³⁸⁵ at very least it would no longer seem possible to identify the light of time simply and only with time as a pure form of the intuition in Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. As a phenomenon in the sense of “the showing-of-itself-in-itself” (“*das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigen*”),³⁸⁶ could it be possible that being itself radiates the “light” in which it might be seen – that being itself exudes time by means of which it might be understood? Or, does time enter the phenomenological fray from the direction and as an aspect of that “letting see” (“*sehen lassen*”), that receptivity which reciprocates the “showing-of-itself-in-itself” in phenomeno-logy?³⁸⁷ Or, yet again, does the “light” of time issue from an even deeper-lying source than Dasein and being both?

Remarkably, it is only more than half-way through *Sein und Zeit* that Heidegger first takes up an in-depth consideration of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) as the original unity (*ursprüngliche Einheit*)³⁸⁸ of the constitutive structure of Dasein.³⁸⁹ At this juncture, Heidegger turns to temporality as a means of exegeting a more all-encompassing interpretation of Dasein than its previous characterization as concern/care (*Sorge*), or “being-ahead-of-itself.” The latter rests within a whole (*Ganze*),³⁹⁰ which implies a beginning (*Anfang*) and an end (*Ende*), an “in-between” (“*zwischen*”) bracketed by birth and death, respectively.³⁹¹ And yet, such a whole appears to be beyond one’s grasp insofar as Dasein still exists: as long as Dasein has not succumbed to death, certain of its possibilities remain “outstanding,” and in that sense, Dasein

³⁸⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§7.A, 41: “Kant gebraucht den Terminus Erscheinung in dieser Verkoppelung. Erscheinungen sind nach ihm einmal die “Gegenstände der empirischen Anschauung,” das, was sich in dieser zeigt.”

³⁸⁶ Ibid..

³⁸⁷ Cf. Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§7, 46: “Phänomenologie sagt dann: ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα: Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen.”

³⁸⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.§45, 309.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.§45, 307.

³⁹⁰ Heidegger clearly distinguishes the term “whole” – *Ganze*, ὅλον, totum - from that of *Summe*, πᾶν, and *compositum*. (Ibid., TI.AII. K1.§48, 324, footnote 1.)

³⁹¹ Ibid., TI.AII.§45, 310.

“is not yet” (“*noch nicht sein*”).³⁹² The “outstanding” of such possibilities points to Dasein’s constant “inconclusiveness” (*Unabgeschlossenheit*),³⁹³ constant “non-whole-ness”/“un-entirety” (“*Unganzheit*”).³⁹⁴ However, the “outstanding” possibilities of Dasein must not be understood in the sense of missing elements or remainder of a given sum (*Summe*); rather, they must be glimpsed as essentially characteristic of its being as becoming.³⁹⁵ Becoming necessitates a “not yet” by its very definition, and thus Dasein’s “outstanding” possibilities must be seen as part and parcel of its essence in their very “outstanding.” As “being unripe” is quite properly characteristic of a fruit at a given point in its development, so is “being unfulfilled” in some of its possibilities characteristic of Dasein at most points before its “end,” i. e. death.³⁹⁶ Death as the preclusion of further fulfillment of Dasein’s possibilities reveals its fundamental structure – or, one might say, gesture – as “being towards the end” (“*Sein zum Ende*”).³⁹⁷ As Heidegger points out, death is precisely Dasein’s ultimate “not yet,” and thus determines it in the sense of both definition and delimitation.³⁹⁸

With regard to Dasein’s other possibilities, Heidegger further differentiates between “proper” (*eigentlich*) and “improper” possibilities – a distinction which, in turn, necessitates an account of the modification (*Modifikation*) of Dasein’s orientation from the latter to the former.³⁹⁹ The beginnings of Heidegger’s articulation of such a “turn” are already present in his

³⁹² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.§45, 310: “Im Dasein steht, solange es ist, je noch etwas aus, was es sein kann und wird. Zu diesem Ausstand aber gehört das “Ende” selbst.”

³⁹³ Ibid., TI.AII.K1.§46, 314.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., TI.AII. K1.§48, 321.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., TI.AII. K1.§48, 323-324.

³⁹⁶ Ibid., TI.AII.K1.§48, 325: “Die reifende Frucht jedoch ist nicht nur nicht gleichültig gegen die Unreife als ein Anderes ihrer selbst, sondern reifend *ist* sie die Unreife. Das Noch-nicht is schon in ihr eigenes Sein einbezogen und das keineswegs als beliebige Bestimmung, sondern als Konstitutivum. Entsprechend *ist* auch das Dasein, solange es ist, *je schon sein Noch-nicht.*”

³⁹⁷ Ibid., TI.AII. K1.§50, 332.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.: “...des äußersten Noch-nicht, des Daseinsendes...”

³⁹⁹ Ibid., TI.AII. K2.§54, 355.

elaboration of angst as the motion which counteracts Dasein's "turn-away" from its "proper possibilities" in "falling" and facilitates its "turn-into" (*Hinkehr*), its "propensity" (*propensio*) towards these.⁴⁰⁰ However, while "falling" does not involve an "express choice" of improper possibilities on the part of Dasein, in Heidegger's view, the same does not hold true for Dasein's "turn-into" its proper possibilities.⁴⁰¹ Rather than choosing it per se, Dasein "in-tricates" (*verstrickt*) itself into impropriety; in order to extricate itself, Dasein must fulfill that which it has neglected in the case of "falling" – it must exercise selection, choice, decision.⁴⁰² Only in such exercise does Dasein appropriate its existential structure of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*).⁴⁰³

In order to be able to do so, however, Dasein must first be "shown" to itself in its proper possibilities, and it is such "showing" that constitutes the condition of possibility of their avowal. This "showing" of Dasein to itself by itself is something that Heidegger discovers to be inscribed at the core of Dasein's everyday self-interpretation by means of the "voice of conscience" ("*Stimme des Gewissens*").⁴⁰⁴ This "voice" is no simple sound, however, but rather a "call" (*Ruf*), which, by definition, *draws* something *towards* something, and by implication, *away from* something else. It is only within the dynamic of this gesture that Dasein is capable of drawing itself back (*zurückholen*) from "falling" and drawing itself towards its proper possibilities. The existential-ontological dynamic, from which the everyday experience of the "voice of conscience" springs, characterizes Dasein as the "disclosedness of the there" in an even more original way.⁴⁰⁵ Yet in what sense does Heidegger speak of the "call" as a "disclosure tendency"?

⁴⁰⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AI.K6.§40, 245-246.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., TI.AII. K2.§54, 356.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., TI.AII. K2.§54, 358.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., TI.AII. K2.§54, 356.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., TI.AII.K2.§55, 359: "Die Interpretation des Gewissens wird vielmehr die frühere Analyse der Erschlossenheit des Da nicht nur weiterführen, sondern ursprünglicher fassen im Hinblick auf das eigentliche Sein des Daseins."

(*Erschließungstendenz*)?⁴⁰⁶ The “call” understood as a “tendency” reveals that disclosedness features a key element of motion, “the moment of thrust” (“*das Moment des Stoßes*”), a “rattling” (*Aufrütteln*), which rouses Dasein from its “impropriety” and stirs it into “propriety.”⁴⁰⁷ These “states” and the movement from one into another are, in turn, rendered by Heidegger in unmistakably spatial terms of being called “from out of the far into the far” (“*aus der Ferne in die Ferne*”), where the former “far” designates the “improper” self and the latter “far” – the proper self.⁴⁰⁸ Thus, the dynamic of the “call” reveals that Dasein’s disclosedness unfolds – alongside disclosedness of the world – a disclosedness of itself to itself.⁴⁰⁹ Indeed, for Dasein, a response to this “call” constitutes a “going over” (*übergehen*)⁴¹⁰ from the “improper” self to the “proper” self, a traversal of the “distance” of difference between these. In the light of the notion of difference between “improper” and “proper” Dasein, it becomes possible to understand “impropriety” as a “lack” (*Mangel*)⁴¹¹ – an “emptiness” which may be encountered only from the perspective of “propriety” as “fullness.” Thus, for Heidegger, the notion of “guilt” (*Schuld*) might be seen as an everyday index of impropriety “as a missing of something, which should and can be.”⁴¹² Thus, distance-as-difference and encounter as the basis of appropriation are shown to be inscribed in the very existential-ontological constitution of Dasein, thus confirming not only its essential disclosedness, but also its essential spatiality.

The problematic of the essential or proper spatiality of Dasein extends into Heidegger’s interpretation of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) as “situation” (*Situation*),⁴¹³ the determination

⁴⁰⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII. K2. §55, 361.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., TI.AII. K2. §55, 362.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., TI.AII. K2. §58, 375.

⁴¹² Ibid., TI.AII. K2. §58, 376.

⁴¹³ Ibid., TI.AII. K2. §60, 397.

of Dasein's factual proper possibilities. As Heidegger himself acknowledges, "the term "situation" (*Situation/Lage*) resonates with a spatial significance," which Heidegger is unwilling to "eradicate" from the existential concept, for such significance "also lies in the "there" of Dasein."⁴¹⁴ Such a spatial overtone is proper, insofar as it designates the "proper spatiality" ("*eigene Räumlichkeit*") of being-in-the-world, rather than what Heidegger refers to as an "empty 'habitus'" ("*leer 'Habitus'*") or an "indeterminate 'velleity'" ("*unbestimmte 'Velleität'*").⁴¹⁵ Indeed, Heidegger insists that Dasein "makes room" ("*räumt ein*") as long as it factually exists: that is to say, Dasein determines the "place" ("*Ort*") of its existence on the basis of its more original "room-making" kind of being.⁴¹⁶ This "room-making" itself is precisely what Heidegger means by "Dasein-commensurate spatiality" ("*daseinsmäßige Räumlichkeit*"). Thus, "situation" comes to be defined by Heidegger as "that "there," disclosed in resoluteness, as which the existing being is there."⁴¹⁷ Thus, situation does not refer to Dasein's circumstances, but rather to Dasein's "being set on" a determined set of possibilities (as in the phrase "one's heart is set on x..."). Thus, nearly 15 sections later, Heidegger returns to resoluteness in order to describe it as Dasein's loyalty (*Treue*) to its proper possibilities, its steadfastness (*Ständigkeit*) in its stretching between its death and its birth and all that is in-between.⁴¹⁸ As such, it must not be taken to be "actual" only insofar as it is an "act" of a certain duration.⁴¹⁹ Rather, it must be understood as a steadfast readiness – a kind of suspension – which is the wellspring of the

⁴¹⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII. K2.§60, 397: "In dem Terminus Situation (Lage – "in der Lage sein") schwingt eine räumliche Bedeutung mit. Wir werden nicht versuchen wollen, sie aus dem existenzialen Begriff auszumerzen. Denn sie liegt auch im "Da" des Daseins."

⁴¹⁵ Ibid..

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.: "Die Situation ist das je in der Entschlossenheit erschlossene Da, als welches das existierende Seiende da ist."

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§75, 516.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.: "Die Entschlossenheit wäre ontologisch mißverstanden, wollte man meinen, sie *sei* nur so lange als 'Erlebnis' wirklich, als der 'Akt' der Entschliessung 'dauert.'"

possibility of indwelling any given moment.⁴²⁰ Heidegger characterises this original stretched moment – this suspension – as the “forerunning-retrieving moment” (“*vorlaufend-wiederholender Augenblick*”) which constitutes the proper historicity of Dasein.⁴²¹

The element of the “not yet” additionally allows Heidegger to recast the notion of the object (*Gegestand*) in the specifically temporal sense of that which is “set before” Dasein, that which “stands before” (*Bevorstand*)⁴²² it as a yet-unfulfilled possibility. Yet even in this temporal guise, possibility is inscribed within the spatial figure of encounter, which offers the Dasein’ future to Dasein’s present and therein replicates the “ahead-of-itself” structure of concern/care.

In turn, these descriptions – the “already,” the “not yet” – suggest to Heidegger that temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) may constitute the original ontological ground of existentiality and that, for this reason, all of the previously articulated structures must carry a tacit temporal sense (“*zeitlicher Sinn*”), which Heidegger subsequently undertakes to explicate.⁴²³ As in the foregoing discussion of spatiality, Heidegger distinguishes between temporality as the “everyday-vulgar” notion of “within-time-ness” (*Innerzeitigkeit*) and as an “essential possibility of timing” (“*eine wesenhafte Zeitigungsmöglichkeit*”).⁴²⁴ Whether this possibility belongs exclusively to Dasein or lies deeper remains, for the time being, sufficiently ambiguous; however, even at this stage of the development of the problematic of time, Heidegger hints at a “still more original” timing of

⁴²⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§74, 517: “Die Ständigkeit bildet sich nicht erst durch die und aus der Aneinanderfügung von ‘Augenblicken,’ sondern diese entspringen der *schon erstreckten* Zeitlichkeit der zukünftig gewesenden Wiederholung.”

⁴²¹ Ibid..

⁴²² Ibid., TI.AII.K1.§50, 332. Unfortunately, the English language does not seem to have developed an elegant way of rendering this notion, unlike the Russian, in which *Bevorstand* could readily be approximated by something like “предстоящее,” a term commonly used to refer to that which remains to be undertaken.

⁴²³ Ibid., TI.AII.§45, 311: “Der ursprüngliche ontologische Grund der Existenzialität des Daseins aber ist die Zeitlichkeit.”

⁴²⁴ Ibid., TI.AII.§45, 312.

temporality, within which Dasein's own understanding of being might be grounded.⁴²⁵

Thus, in the latter third of *Sein und Zeit*, temporality comes to the fore as Dasein's proper "being-able-to-be-whole" (*Ganzseinkönnen*).⁴²⁶ Heidegger names this greater whole of Dasein "forerunning resoluteness" ("vorlaufende Entschlossenheit").⁴²⁷ Yet "forerunning resoluteness" is only one – if distinguished – mode of temporality, the "timing" (*zeitigen*) of which expresses itself in various other possibilities and ways.⁴²⁸ Indeed, the ontological "timing" of temporality is the wellspring of existence, propriety, and impropriety as its modes, and thus constitutes the principal concern of Heidegger's reflection.

Yet, as in Heidegger's repeated studies of the problematic of temporality in Kant, the question of Dasein's wholeness (*Ganzheit*) is quickly reconducted to one of its unity (*Einheit*),⁴²⁹ and temporality comes to be seen by Heidegger as the condition of the possibility and wellspring of such a unity. As he has already demonstrated in his analysis of the Kantian notion of selfhood in *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the placeholder of the "I" as the *subiectum* or load-bearing ground of unity accounts for such only in a provisional sense. In this regard, Heidegger's assessment in *Sein und Zeit* remains the same: "The "I" appears to "hold together" the wholeness of the whole of the structure."⁴³⁰ Yet what "holds together" the "I" itself, what gives it persistence (*Ständigkeit*)?

For Heidegger, the answer lies in the heightened temporal sense of the notion of

⁴²⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.§45, 312: "Damit bereitet sich das Verständnis für eine noch ursprünglichere Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit vor. In ihr gründet das für das Sein des Daseins konstitutive Seinsverständnis."

⁴²⁶ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§61, 400.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§61, 403.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.: "Die Zeitlichkeit der vorlaufenden Entschlossenheit ein ausgezeichneter Modus ihrer selbst. Zeitlichkeit kann sich in verschiedenen Möglichkeiten und in verschiedener Weise *zeitigen*."

⁴²⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§64, 420.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.: "Das 'Ich' *scheint* die Ganzheit des Strukturganzes 'zusammenhalten.' Das 'Ich' und das 'Selbst' wurden von jeher in der 'Ontologie' dieses Seienden als der tragende Grund (Substanz bzw. Subjekt) begriffen." (italics mine)

concern/care (*Sorge*): that which unifies the elements of the structure of concern/care as “being-ahead-of-itself” – together with its distinct possibility of being able to and being allowed to “come-to-itself”/“come-into-its-own” (“*Sich-auf-sich-zukommenlassen*”) – is the original phenomenon of the future (*Zukunft*).⁴³¹ In distinction from “the now which has not yet become ‘actual,’” Heidegger characterises the future as “that within which Dasein comes into its own in its most proper being-able-to-be.”⁴³² Indeed, the “forerunning” of concern/care renders Dasein as properly “futural” (*zukünftig*).⁴³³

The “already” of Dasein’s “being-able-to-be” and the “not yet” of its “coming-to-be” that which it is able to be reveals the notion of the future to be temporally compound, unlike its exclusive, commonplace guise of the “not yet.” Dasein’s “thrown-ness” (*Geworfenheit*) into its possibilities corresponds to its “having-been” (“*bin-gewesen*”), which constitutes the condition of possibility of Dasein “coming back” to itself (*zurück-kommen*).⁴³⁴ Thus, Dasein’s “future” enfolds its “is,” its “has-been,” and its “will-be” at once. Here, the term “future” designates the mutual necessity of “having-been,” “being,” and “coming to be,” which makes the configuration of concern/care possible as continual “being-ahead-of-itself” and “coming-back-to-itself.” Thus, Heidegger comes to define temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) as the “unified phenomenon of “pasting–presenting future” (“*gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft*”),⁴³⁵ with the proviso that such must be kept far apart from all “vulgar” significations of “future,” “past”/“gone-before-ness” (*Vergangenheit*), and “present” (*Gegenwart*), as well as the “subjective”-“objective” and

⁴³¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K3.§65, 430.

⁴³² Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§65, 431: “‘Zukunft’ meint hier nicht ein Jetzt, das, noch nicht ‘wirklich’ geworden, einmal erst *sein wird*, sondern die Künft, in der das Dasein in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen auf sich zukommt.”

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§65, 432: “Nur sofern Dasein überhaupt *ist* als ich *bin-gewesen*, kann es zukünftig auf sich selbst so zukommen, daß es *zurück-kommt*.”

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

“immanent”-“transcendent” couplets used to characterize time.⁴³⁶ Indeed, the “ahead” (*vorweg*) in the definition of concern/care “does not mean ‘in advance’ in the sense of the ‘not-yet-now – but later,’” and the “already” in the same definition “does not signify a “no-longer-now – but earlier.”⁴³⁷

Insofar as temporality enables (*ermöglicht*) concern/care as the “unity of the wholeness of the manifoldness of structure,”⁴³⁸ it is itself a more original ontological phenomenon. Temporality “times” its own possible modes, including that of concern/care.⁴³⁹ Heidegger defines temporality as the “*ekstatikon per se*” (ἐκστατικόν *schlechthin*), the “original “outside-of-itself” in and for itself” (“*das ursprüngliche ‘Außer-sich’ an und für sich selbst*”). The future, past, and present are “exstases” (*Ekstasen*) of temporality, understood as relations of “onto-itself” (“*Auf-sich-zu*”), “back-onto” (“*Zurück auf*”), and “letting-encounter-of” (“*Begegnenlassens von*”).⁴⁴⁰ The ekstases of temporality are equally original (*gleichursprünglich*), although it is the future that Heidegger sees as “awakening” (*wecken*) the present to propriety.⁴⁴¹ The future offers that which is proper to Dasein and therefore exercises the most profound pull on it; insofar as it is such a pull towards Dasein’s proper “end,” “original time” is finite (*endlich*).⁴⁴² Heidegger perceives the “vulgar” conception of temporality as a “pure, beginning- and endless flow of nows” as a detrimental levelling (*Nievellierung*)⁴⁴³ of the relational dimensionality of time.

In order to demonstrate how this original phenomenon of temporality manifests in Dasein

⁴³⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K3.§65, 432.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§65, 433: “Das ‘Vor’ mein nicht das ‘Vorher’ im Sinne des ‘Noch-nicht-jetzt – aber später’; ebensowenig bedeutet das ‘Schon’ ein ‘Nicht-mehr-jetzt – aber früher.’”

⁴³⁸ Ibid.: “...Einheit der Ganzheit der Strukturmannigfaltigkeit...”

⁴³⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§65, 435: “Zeitlichkeit zeitigt und zwar mögliche Weisen ihrer selbst.”

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid..

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§65, 436.

⁴⁴² Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§65, 438.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§65, 435.

as historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*),⁴⁴⁴ Heidegger begins with its most immediately evident aspect – the specific temporality of impropriety, i. e. everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*).⁴⁴⁵ The task here consists in temporally explicating the trait of “first and foremost” which Heidegger has continually employed to characterize everydayness. In everydayness, Dasein uses time as a measure of calculation (*Rechnung*).⁴⁴⁶ Dasein is capable of encountering beings as “at hand” or “handy,” in part, because it receives them as being “within-time” (*innerzeitig*). Heidegger is particularly insistent, however, on dissociating this “within-time-ness” (*Innerzeitigkeit*) from what he calls the “exteriorization of a ‘qualitative time’ into space” by Bergson.⁴⁴⁷ On the other hand, he proposes to follow the thread of temporality of everydayness as a mode of “being-in-the-world” to the temporality of “worldliness” as the “foundation of the specific spatiality of Dasein.”⁴⁴⁸ Thus, as in the case of his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger’s objective in these late sections of *Sein und Zeit* is to demonstrate that time is the root from which spring the figures and dynamics of spatiality. It is, of course, this very position that will be brought into question in the artwork essay and thoroughly revised in the *Beiträge*.

However, for the time being, Heidegger directs his attention to the articulation of the temporality of disclosedness. In this context, the notion of the “proper present” (*eigentliche Gegenwart*) as a “moment”/“blink-of-an-eye” (*Augenblick*) appears for the first time.⁴⁴⁹ Heidegger insists that this notion must be understood in the active sense of ecstasy (*Ekstase*), i. e. the “re-moval”/rapture (*Entrückung*) of Dasein into the possibilities which encounter it in its

⁴⁴⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K3.§66, 440.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§66, 439.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§66, 441.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.: “...Veräußerlichung einer ‘qualitativen Zeit’ zum Raum...”

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§67, 443: “...um die Zeitlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins zu bestimmen. Das führt erneut auf das Phänomen der Welt und erlaubt eine Umgrenzung der spezifisch zeitlichen Problematik der Weltlichkeit. ... Die dergestalt heraustretende Zeitlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins erweist sich zugleich als Fundament der spezifischen Räumlichkeit des Daseins.”

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§68.a, 447.

situation.⁴⁵⁰ As Heidegger clarifies, the significance of the “moment”/“blink-of-an-eye” does not stem from the notion of the “now,” because the latter is derivative of the interpretation of time as “within-time-ness” (*Innerzeitigkeit*).⁴⁵¹ In contrast, the “moment”/“blink-of-an-eye” as the proper present (*eigentlicher Gegenwart*) is that which allows something to be encountered as being “in time” in the first place.⁴⁵² This insight allows Heidegger to develop the notion of a corresponding proper “having-been” (*eigentliches Gewesen-sein*), which he terms “repetition”/“re-hauling” (*Wiederholung*), because it signifies a return to Dasein’s most proper self.⁴⁵³ Thus, in forerunning (*Vorlaufen*), Dasein “pre-hauls” (*vorholt*) itself out of its most proper “being-able-to-be” (*Seinkönnen*).⁴⁵⁴ On the other hand, “forgottenness” (*Vergessenheit*) signifies Dasein’s preclusion of such “being-able-to” and therefore constitutes improper “having-been-ness” (*uneigentliche Gewesenheit*).⁴⁵⁵ However, when Dasein does “find itself” confronted with the fact of its relatedness to its possibilities in angst, it understands itself as being “on the verge of a spring/leap” (*auf dem Sprung*).⁴⁵⁶ This edge alludes to the determinacy which Dasein embraces in its resoluteness; the further Dasein steps away from this edge, the more fully it succumbs to “the pale ‘atonality’/‘-intonation’ of indifference...which depends upon nothing and presses towards nothing.”⁴⁵⁷

To return to the key possibility of the proper present as the “moment”/“blink-of-an-eye” which allows something to be encountered, Heidegger’s temporal transposition of the notion of

⁴⁵⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§68.a, 447.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Ibid.: “Im Augenblick” kann nichts vorkommen, sondern als eigentliche Gegenwart läßt er *erst begegnen*, was als Zuhandenes oder Vorhandenes “in einer Zeit” sein kann.”

⁴⁵³ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§68.a, 448: “...ein Zurückkommen auf das eigenste...Selbst.”

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.: “Im Vorlaufen *holt* sich das Dasein *wieder* in das eigenste Seinkönnen *vor*.”

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§68.a, 449.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§68.b, 455.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§68.b, 457: “Die fahle Ungestimmtheit der Gleichgültigkeit...die an nichts hängt und zu nichts drängt.”

“falling” brings a crucial new insight into the difference between the perception (*Vernehmen*) characteristic of such an encounter and perception characteristic of curiosity. Indeed, this difference rests precisely upon the distinction between seeing (*sehen*) as lingering/tarrying (*verweilend*) in order to understand and, on the other hand, seeing for the sake of mere “having seen” (*gesehen zu haben*).⁴⁵⁸ Heidegger takes this distinction to be essentially temporal: in the first case, one “waits opposite” (*gegenwärtigt*) that which one encounters, i. e. stands before it so as to understand (*verstehen*) it; in the second case, one does not wait, but rather departs as soon as one has seen.⁴⁵⁹ Such perpetual departure eventually turns into “vagrancy” (*Aufenthaltslosigkeit*), which Heidegger characterizes as the extreme opposite of the moment/“blink-of-an-eye.”⁴⁶⁰ Incidentally, both of these phenomena are characterized by Heidegger in spatial terms: in the state of vagrancy, Dasein is both everywhere and nowhere (“*überall und nirgends*”), while the moment brings Dasein into its situation (*Situation*) and discloses its proper “there.”⁴⁶¹

Apart from the question of whether understanding differs from curiosity merely with respect to the amount of time spent opposite a given being, it is worthwhile to observe that such a temporal interpretation does not necessarily preclude the possibility of proper seeing. Again, quite beside the question of whether such seeing is “fleshly” (“*leibhaftig*”) or not, it would seem that a lingering/tarrying seeing could indeed participate in understanding. Indeed, right up until Heidegger’s dismissal of curiosity on the grounds of a lack of such lingering/tarrying, he speaks of perception “in the broader sense” of “letting the ‘handy’ and the ‘at hand’ be ‘fleshly’

⁴⁵⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§68.c, 458.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.: “Die Neugier gegenwärtigt aber das Vorhandene nicht, um es, bei ihm verweilend, zu verstehen, sondern sie sucht zu sehen, *nur* um zu sehen und gesehen zu haben.”

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§68.c, 459.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.: “In *jener* ist das Da-sein überall und nirgends. *Dieser* bringt die Existenz in die Situation und erschließt das eigentliche ‘Da.’”

encountered in themselves with respect to their external appearance,” as well as of the present (*Gegenwart*) as that within which such an encounter is grounded.⁴⁶² In facilitating the encounter, the proper present “gives the ecstatic horizon within which [a] being can be present in a fleshly manner.”⁴⁶³ Thus, there exists a daylight of difference between seeing “in a fleshly manner” within the horizon of the proper present and seeing “in a curious manner,” which flees away from this horizon as soon as it encounters it.

Heidegger provides a concise overview of the main features of the temporality of disclosedness in its everyday mode towards the end of §68:

Understanding is primarily grounded in the future (forerunning or expecting). Found-ness times itself primarily in the past (repetition/re-hauling or forgottenness). Falling is temporally rooted primarily in the present (presenting or moment). Nevertheless, understanding is also “passing” present. Nevertheless, ‘found-ness’ times itself as “presenting” future. Nevertheless, the present ‘springs from’ – or is held up by – the passing future. Thus the following becomes visible: “Temporality ‘times’ itself wholly in each *ekstasis*, that is to say, the wholeness of the whole structure of existence, facticity, and falling – that is, the unity of the structure of concern/care – grounds itself in the ecstatic unity of the respective full timing of temporality.”⁴⁶⁴

The principal point of this conclusion is that the greater whole of temporality is irreducible to separable, chronologically ordered ekstases: “Timing does not mean a ‘sequence’ of ekstases. The future is not later than the past, and the latter is not earlier than the present.

⁴⁶² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§68.c, 458: “Das Vernehmen im weiteren Sinne läßt das Zuhandene und Vorhandene an ihm selbst “leibhaftig” hinsichtlich seines Aussehens begegnen. Dieses Begegnenlassen gründet in einer Gegenwart.”

⁴⁶³ Ibid.: “Sie gibt überhaupt den ekstatischen Horizont, innerhalb dessen Seiendes leibhaftig *anwesend* sein kann.”

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§68.d, 463: “Das Verstehen gründet primär in der Zukunft (Vorlaufen bzw. Gewärtigen). Die Befindlichkeit zeitigt sich primär in der Gewesenheit (Wiederholung bzw. Vergessenheit). Das Verfallen ist zeitlich primär in der Gegenwart (Gegenwärtigen bzw. Augenblick) verwurzelt. Gleichwohl ist das Verstehen je ‘gewesende’ Gegenwart. Gleichwohl zeitigt sich die Befindlichkeit als ‘gegenwärtigende’ Zukunft. Gleichwohl ‘entspringt’ die Gegenwart aus, bzw. Ist gehalten von einer gewesenden Zukunft. Daran wird sichtbar: *Die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich in jeder Ekstase ganz, das heißt in der ekstatischen Einheit der jeweiligen vollen Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit gründet die Ganzheit des Structurganzen von Existenz, Faktizität und Verfallen, das ist die Einheit der Sorgestructur.*”

Temporality times itself as the passing-presenting future.”⁴⁶⁵ As will be shown in the section treating of the proper temporality of the work of art, this interpretation of temporality as a greater “synchronic” whole of its “ekstases” will remain largely unchanged in the artwork essay. The crucial advance of the latter will consist rather in the broadening of the horizon of Dasein’s self-referential relation to its own possibility as the original “measure” and “unit” of time ultimately to the question of the temporality of the abyss as the wellspring of the temporality of Dasein and to the question of the synchronization of the latter with the *tempo* of the former.

The difficulty of Heidegger’s conception of proper temporality in *Sein und Zeit*, however, is that it remains firmly entrenched in self-referentiality, as does Kant’s interpretation of time as self-affection. A clear indication of this is Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein’s proper temporality as “an ecstatic-temporal *relation of Dasein to the drafted grounds of its self.*”⁴⁶⁶ Naturally, the interpretation of such self-referentiality in *Sein und Zeit* depends on the significance of the expression “grounds” (*Grunde*) – on the question of whether Dasein is to be understood as its own ground or whether such ground is to be identified otherwise. And yet even at this late stage of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger speaks of affection (*Affektion*) as Dasein’s “being brought back to itself as ‘has been.’” This “bringing-back” itself operates as a kind of appeal (*Reiz*) and emotion (*Rührung*)⁴⁶⁷ which are to be properly distinguished from mere feeling. Yet, as Heidegger points out, it is not Dasein itself that stands at the origin of the “throw” (*Wurf*) into the world; neither does its “movedness” (“*Bewegtheit*”) emerge through the fact that it “is

⁴⁶⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§68.d, 463: “Die Zeitigung bedeutet kein ‘Nacheinander’ der Ekstasen. Die Zukunft ist nicht spa4ter als die Gewesenheit und diese nicht früher als die Gegenwart. Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich als gewesende-gegenwärtigende Zukunft.”

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§68.b, 457: “...einem ekstatisch-zeitlichen Bezug des Daseins *zum geworfenen Grunde seiner selbst.*” (italics mine)

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

there.”⁴⁶⁸

As for Kant, so for Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*, temporality constitutes the condition of possibility of “thereness.” Such temporality is defined as an “ecstatic unity,” or “unity of the ‘outside-of-itself’ in the [respective] “raptures” of future, past, and present.”⁴⁶⁹ Or, to return to the language of light employed above, ecstatic temporality is that light which originally enlightens the “there,” which “regulates” the unification of all of Dasein’s structures, which makes “being-in-the-world” as such possible.⁴⁷⁰ Heidegger does not shy away from calling ecstatic temporality the “ground of the possible unity” of the latter phenomenon. In turn, this realization leads Heidegger to a re-examination of the notion of the world and its transcendence in temporal terms. As Heidegger has done in the case of the proper spatiality of Dasein, he makes his approach towards its proper temporality by way of examination of the successive layers of the temporality of circumspect concern (*umsichtiges Besorgen*), of theoretical cognition (*theoretisches Erkennen*), and finally of the transcendence of the world.⁴⁷¹

The point of departure for Heidegger’s notion of the temporality of circumspect concern is an expecting (*Gewärtigen*), which consists in understanding the “what-for” of every involvement with the “handy.”⁴⁷² Circumspect concern is capable of “coming back” to a given possible involvement only from within such understanding. Such an understanding is a kind of “oversight”/“overview”/“survey” (*Übersicht*) of the entirety of Dasein’s possible involvements, a

⁴⁶⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§68.c, 461: “Der Wurf des Geworfenseins in die Welt wird zunächst vom Dasein nicht eigentlich aufgefangen; die in ihm liegende ‘Bewegtheit’ kommt nicht schon zum ‘Stehen’ dadurch, daß das Dasein nun ‘da ist.’”

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§69, 463: “Die ekstatische Einheit der Zeitlichkeit, das heißt die Einheit des ‘Außer-sich’ in den Entrückungen von Zukunft, Gewesenheit und Gegenwart, ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit dafür, daß ein Seiendes sein kann, das als sein ‘Da’ existiert.”

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§69, 464: “Die ekstatische Zeitlichkeit lichtet das Da ursprünglich. Sie ist das primäre Regulativ der möglichen Einheit aller wesenhaften existenzialen Strukturen des Daseins.”

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§69, 465.

⁴⁷² Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§69.a, 467.

reflection (*Überlegung*) which brings beings “closer” to Dasein in the sense of placing them within reach of Dasein’s concern.⁴⁷³ Thus, the distinctive temporality of circumspect concern amounts to Dasein’s approximation of itself to beings – and of beings to itself – by means of reflection. It is for this reason that Heidegger names such temporality “expecting-holding onto presenting” (“*gewärtigend-behaltendes Gegenwärtigen*”).⁴⁷⁴ Rather than “holding itself back” (*sich enthält*) or abstaining (*entsteht*) from involvement with the “handy,” Dasein reaches out towards beings in expectation and holds onto them as possible involvements: such is the significance of “presenting”/ “waiting opposite” (*Gegenwärtigung*) of which Heidegger speaks in this context. However, as Heidegger points out, “presenting” as “expectant holding-onto” characterizes Dasein’s relation to tools as a collective (*Zeugzusammenhang*) – to involvements as a collective (*Bewandtniszusammenhang*) and precedes its relation to any particular tool as such.⁴⁷⁵ Thus, where it comes to the temporality of circumspect concern, the “present” is inextricably rooted in the “future” and in the “past”: “presenting” as “bringing near” is possible only when that which is to be brought near is already available for this purpose, *yet* still remains distant.⁴⁷⁶ The “bringing near” here serves as the “scheme” (*Schema*)⁴⁷⁷ which renders the temporality of circumspect concern articulable.

If not simply in terms of “abstaining” or “holding back,” Heidegger nevertheless finds it possible to speak of a temporality specific to something like “theoretic cognition.” According to Heidegger, such a cognition first arises when the “place” (*Platz*) of a being, previously

⁴⁷³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 475: “Das Wesentliche der Übersicht ist das primäre Verstehen der Bewandtnisganzheit...Die ‘übersichtliche’ Umsicht des Besorgens *bringt* dem Dasein im jeweiligen Gebrauchen und Hantieren das Zuhandene *näher* in der Weise der Auslegung des Gesichteten. Die spezifische, umsichtig-auslegende Näherung des Besorgten nennen wir die *Überlegung*.”

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, TI.AII.K4.§69.a, 463.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 475.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 476.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 447.

understood in reference to its possible involvement, becomes “indifferent” (*gleichgültig*), i. e. turns into a “space-time-site” (*Raum-Zeit-Stelle*), or “world-point” (“*Weltpunkt*”) which can no longer be distinguished from the others by means of its belonging to a particular involvement.⁴⁷⁸ More broadly speaking, the constraining (*umschränken*) of beings by the “place-manifold” constituted by circumspect concern loosens (*entschränkt*) within a “pure site manifold,” within which each being becomes subject to indiscriminate thematization.⁴⁷⁹ Thus, the operative scheme of this temporality is, in fact, that of the spatial phenomenon of contour – of limitation and delimitation, of the concretization and dissolution of boundaries. Indeed, the example Heidegger provides here is that of the emergence of mathematical physics (*mathematische Physik*), i. e. its configuration (*Ausbildung*) as a draft/conjecture (*Entwurf*) of nature itself: “This conjecture/draft...opens the horizon for the leading insight into its quantitatively determinable constitutive moments (motion, force, place, and time).”⁴⁸⁰ What is remarkable in light of the objective of the present inquiry is Heidegger’s inclusion of motion, place, and time in this determination of the conditions of mathematical experience. Apart from bearing distinctive similarities to Husserl’s definition of geometry in “The Ur-Spring/Origin of Geometry” of 1936, such a determination is consistent with the range of Heidegger’s notion of experience as a convergence of spatiality, temporality, and motion with regard to the work of art (to be shown in greater detail in Chapter V). What is of live interest to Heidegger in this determination is that it

⁴⁷⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 478: “...sein Platz...wird gleichgültig. ...wird zu einer Raum-Zeit-Stelle, zu einem ‘Welt-Punkt,’ der sich vor keinem andern auszeichnet.”

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.: “...die umweltlich *umschränkte* Platzmannigfaltigkeit des zuhandenen Zeugs wird nicht allein zu einer puren Stellenmannigfaltigkeit modifiziert, sondern das Seiende der Umwelt wird überhaupt *entschränkt*. Das All des Vorhandenen wird Thema.”

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 479: “Dieser Entwurf...öffnet den Horizont für den leitenden Hinblick auf seine quantitativ bestimmbar konstitutiven Momente (Bewegung, Kraft, Ort und Zeit).”

Let us not forget that such an assessment is voiced in the same volume of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* that contains Oskar Becker’s treatise on the ontology of mathematics. (Otto Pöggeler, “Heidegger on Art,” in *Martin Heidegger : Politics, Art, and Technology*, ed. Karsten Harries and Joseph Jamme (New York : Holmes & Meier, 1994), 108.

traces the contours – the conditions, the *a priori*⁴⁸¹ – of a certain kind of experience. In this, the definition bears unmistakable parallels to Kant’s treatment of the conditions of experience in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, with the exception, most notably, of motion. It is precisely this latter that Heidegger will attempt to integrate into his notions of the temporality, spatiality, and encounter of the work of art. Thus, while dissolving the boundaries – and, therein, interpretations of spatiality, temporality, and relation – characteristic of circumspect concern, mathematical physics and, by extension, theoretical cognition establishes its own distinctive boundaries consisting of its own distinctive interpretations of spatiality, temporality, and relation. Heidegger terms such re-drawing of the boundaries and the resulting configuration thematization (*Thematizierung*).⁴⁸² Such thematization pre-determines beings as possible given objects (*Objekt*), that is to say, it objectivizes (*objektiviert*).⁴⁸³ This is, once again, consistent with Kant’s determination of the conditions of experience as converging in objectivization (*Vergegenständlichung*). The crucial continuity of Heidegger’s notion of thematization with Kant’s notion of objectivization is that the draft/conjecture in question springs either from the subject, in the case of Kant, and from Dasein, in the case of Heidegger. For Heidegger, the “expectation of the ‘discovered-ness’ of the ‘at hand’ is existentially grounded in a resoluteness of Dasein, through which [the latter] ‘throws’/projects itself into ‘being-able-to-be’ in the ‘truth.’”⁴⁸⁴

Indeed, Heidegger renders the temporal inflection of thematization in terms of

⁴⁸¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 479: “Am mathematischen Entwurf der Natur ist wiederum nicht primär das Mathematische als solches entscheidend, sonder daß er ein Apriori erschließt.”

⁴⁸² Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 480.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.: “Diese Gewärtigung der Entdecktheit gründet existenziell in einer Entschlossenheit des Daseins, durch die es sich auf das Seinkönnen in der ‘Wahrheit’ entwirft.”

“presenting”/“waiting opposite” (*Gegenwärtigung*),⁴⁸⁵ a German expression which, on the morphological level, captures the notions of “ob-”/“opposite” and “waiting.” The distinction between the “waiting” of circumspection and that of insight consists in that which is “expected” (*gewärtig*)⁴⁸⁶: in the first case, it is the “handy,” in the second – the “at hand.” Indeed, footnote 10 of §69 expressly notes the centrality of what Heidegger perceives to be a “temporal” compound of opposition and expectation in previous discussions of cognition from Kant to Husserl. He makes specific reference to Husserl’s employment of the term “waiting-opposite” (*Gegenwärtigen*) with regard to sense perception (*sinnliche Wahrnehmung*)⁴⁸⁷ and suggests that his intentional analysis had already realized the necessity of a temporal characterization of this phenomenon. Heidegger’s own proposed advance in this direction thus consists in elaborating such temporality as ecstatic.⁴⁸⁸

Beyond conditioning circumspect concern and theoretical cognition as expectancy, for Heidegger, temporality conditions their more original wellspring – Dasein’s transcendence or “disclosed-ness” as such, i. e. its “non-thematic” (*unthematisches*) understanding of being (*Seinsverständnis*).⁴⁸⁹ In his attempt at the schematization of such profound temporality, Heidegger draws upon the notion of the horizon (*Horizont*) which he finds to be congenial to temporality approached in its unity (*Einheit*).⁴⁹⁰ The raptures (*Entrückungen*) of time do not simply transport Dasein out of something, but also into the “wherein” (“*Wohin*”) which

⁴⁸⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 480.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

Cf. “Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1 Aufl. (1901) Bd. II, S. 588 u. 620.”

⁴⁸⁸ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 480: “Die *intentionale* Analyse der Wahrnehmung und Anschauung überhaupt mußte diese ‘zeitliche’ Kennzeichnung des Phänomens naheliegen. Das und wie die Intentionalität des ‘Bewußtseins’ in der ekstatischen Zeitlichkeit des Daseins *gründet*, wird der foldende Abschnitt zeigen.”

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§69.b, 481.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§69.c, 482.

Heidegger calls the “horizontal scheme” (*horizontales Schema*).⁴⁹¹ The horizontal scheme as a whole is a nexus of the distinctive “horizons” or “schemes” corresponding to the “future,” “past,” and “present”: the scheme of Dasein’s “own sake” (*Umwillen seiner*), the scheme of the “wherefore” (*Wovor*) or “whereupon” (*Woran*) to which Dasein is given over to, and the scheme of “in order to” (*Um-zu*), respectively.⁴⁹² It is, however, the unity of these ecstases that qualifies temporality as the necessary “scope” within which Dasein’s understanding of being might play itself out. Insofar as such unity is ecstatic, it is that, “whereupon” (*woraufhin*) Dasein discloses itself.⁴⁹³ It is Dasein’s ‘timing’ (*zeitigen*) that opens up its horizons – whether that of its “being-able-to-be” or of its “being already,” or of that to which it is related as “presently concerned.”⁴⁹⁴

ε) The Spatiality of Dasein as Grounded in the Temporality of Dasein

It is at this crucial juncture that Heidegger returns to the question of proper or Dasein-commensurate spatiality and seeks to demonstrate that such is itself grounded in Dasein’s proper ecstatic-horizontal temporality. As Heidegger himself acknowledges, the notions of “horizon” and “scheme” might give the reader the impression that spatiality determines Dasein as fundamentally as does temporality.⁴⁹⁵ Yet Heidegger insists that insofar as temporality expresses the sense of the being of concern/care (*Seinssinn der Sorge*), “the specific spatiality of Dasein is grounded in temporality.”⁴⁹⁶ On the other hand, Heidegger expressly clarifies that the privilege of temporality as the condition of possibility of spatiality does not aim at a “deduction” of space

⁴⁹¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§69.c, 482.

⁴⁹² Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§69.c, 483.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§70: “Wenngleich der Ausdruck “Zeitlichkeit” nicht das bedeutet, was die Rede von ‘Raum und Zeit’ als Zeit versteht, so scheint doch auch die Räumlichkeit eine entsprechende Grundbestimmtheit des Daseins ausmachen wie die Zeitlichkeit. Die existenzial-zeitliche Analyse scheint daher mit der Räumlichkeit des Daseins an eine Grenze zu kommen, so daß dieses Seiende, das wir Dasein nennen, in der Nebenordnung als ‘zeitlich’ ‘und auch’ als räumlich angesprochen werden muß.”

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.: “Dann muß aber auch die spezifische Räumlichkeit des Daseins in der Zeitlichkeit gründen.”

from time or a “dissolution” of space into pure time.⁴⁹⁷ Neither is he willing to associate his attempt at articulating temporality as the existential foundation of spatiality with the “precedence of time as opposed to space in Kant.”⁴⁹⁸

In what sense, then, does Heidegger intend the assertion that Dasein’s temporality is the condition of possibility of its spatiality? Heidegger reminds that Dasein is properly “spatial” insofar as it “spatializes” or “makes space” (*einräumt*).⁴⁹⁹ It creates its own “space of play” (*Spielraum*) and determines its own place (*Ort*) insofar as it takes its rightful place (“*Platz*”) which it itself projects.⁵⁰⁰ Such “self-spatializing” (*Sicheinräumen*) goes forth as direction/orientation (*Ausrichtung*) and de-furthering/de-distantiation (*Ent-fernung*). Thus, as Heidegger reminds, the situation (*Situation*) of Dasein “is not a spot of space, but rather the space of play which is opened in by direction/orientation (*Ausrichtung*) and de-furthering/de-distantiation (*Ent-fernung*). In what sense can these modalities of spatialization be said to be rooted in temporality? Heidegger proposes that spatializing proceeds on the basis of an expecting (*Gewärtigen*) of a possible “thither” (*Dorthin*) und “hither” (*Hierher*).⁵⁰¹ In turn, the notion of expecting belongs within the unity of temporality, and thus reveals the ultimate contingency of spatialization on temporalization.⁵⁰²

Dasein’s “stretching” between birth and death cannot be conceived in terms of experiences following one another within time.⁵⁰³ The reason Heidegger cites for the rejection of

⁴⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§70, 486: “Andererseits kann der Nachweis, daß diese Räumlichkeit existenzial nur durch die Zeitlichkeit möglich ist, nicht darauf abzielen, den Raum aus der Zeit zu deduzieren, bzw. in pure Zeit aufzulösen.”

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid..

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid..

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid..

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§70, 487: “Das sichausrichtende Entdecken von Gegend gründet in einem ekstatisch behaltenden Gewärtigen des möglichen Dorthin und Hierher.”

⁵⁰² Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§70, 487-488.

⁵⁰³ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§72, 493: “...eine Abfolge von Erlebnissen ‘in der Zeit’ ...”

such a conception is that within such a series, only one experience is considered to be, properly speaking, “real” (“*wirklich*”) – that which is “at hand” in any given “now” (*Jetzt*) – while experiences which have “gone before” and which are “coming up” are not.⁵⁰⁴ In this context, as Heidegger explains, the continuity between constantly changing experiences and the enduring self is provisionally established through the notion of the self, which itself remains undetermined.⁵⁰⁵ Furthermore, Heidegger rejects the interpretation of such a continuity itself as a sum of momentary actualities filling up some kind of a “stretch” (*Strecke*) of life.⁵⁰⁶ Rather, Heidegger proposes that Dasein itself stretches, that stretching is the manner in which Dasein’s own being is constituted.⁵⁰⁷ Dasein’s birth, death, and “in-between” make up the unity of the figure of stretching.⁵⁰⁸ Yet, as Heidegger points out, the figure of stretching remains inadequately thought without an account of Dasein’s particular “moved-ness” (*Bewegtheit*) and endurance (*Beharrlichkeit*).⁵⁰⁹ Indeed, Dasein’s “moved-ness” is precisely what the term “happening” aims to touch upon: “We name the specific ‘moved-ness’ of the *stretched self-stretching* the *happening* of Dasein.”⁵¹⁰ Thus, the “scientific” study of history turns out to be possible only insofar as it springs from the more original history (*Geschichte*) of Dasein: “for with that the *place [Ort]* of the problem of history is already decided.”⁵¹¹

In turn, such “historicality” (*Geschichtlichkeit*) remains to be ultimately elucidated by

⁵⁰⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§72, 494.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.: “Das Dasein existiert nicht als Summe der Momentanwirklichkeiten von nacheinanderankommenden und verschwindenen Erlebnissen. Dieses Nacheinander füllt auch nicht allmählich einen Rahmen auf.”

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§72, 495: “Das Dasein füllt nicht erst durch die Phasen seiner Momentanwirklichkeiten eine irgendwie vorhandene Bahn und Strecke ‘des Lebens’ auf, sondern erstreckt *sich selbst* dergestalt, daß im vorhinein sein eigenes Sein als Erstreckung konstituiert ist.”

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid..

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.: “der spezifischen Erstreckung, Bewegtheit und Beharrlichkeit.”

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.: “Die spezifische Bewegtheit der *erstreckten Sicherstreckens* nennen wir das *Geschehen* des Daseins.”

⁵¹¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§72, 496.

means of the notion of “proper temporality” (*eigentliche Zeitlichkeit*).⁵¹² As Heidegger concludes, the temporality of everydayness yields an “im-proper/in-appropriate” (*uneigentliche*) historicity, and thus phenomenological analysis must attempt to penetrate further in order to demonstrate that Dasein “is not ‘temporal’ because it ‘stands within history,’ but rather on the contrary, that it exists and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the very ground of its being.”⁵¹³ Heidegger’s claim here is essentially that the condition of the possibility of Dasein’s movement is Dasein’s temporality. Indeed, under the “vulgar” (*vulgäre*) construal of time, “within-time-ness” (*Innerzeitigkeit*), Dasein experiences “happenings” that befall it and processes of nature that encounter it in terms of calendar days and hours.⁵¹⁴ However, such “within-time-ness” is equally original (*gleichursprünglich*) with “historicity” (*Geschichtlichkeit*), and both of these stem, in turn, from a original temporality of Dasein. It is at this juncture that Heidegger once again acknowledges the greater dilemma that confronts his undertaking in *Sein und Zeit*: the further one penetrates into the “original enracination” (“*ursprüngliche Verwurzelung*”) of “within-time-ness,” “historicity,” and even “proper temporality,” the more conspicuous the “uncertainty of primary ontological horizon” of temporality becomes.⁵¹⁵ As will be shown at length in the section on the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, this realization anticipates Heidegger’s reconduction of the “ur-spring”/origin of time (and space) to the abyss (*Abgrund*).

Yet proceeding from what is most evident to what is significantly less so, Heidegger begins his analysis of the “historicity” of Dasein in its “vulgar” rendition and progressively

⁵¹² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§72, 496.

⁵¹³ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§72, 498: “...zu zeigen, daß dieses Seiende nicht ‘zeitlich’ ist, weil es ‘in der Geschichte steht,’ sondern daß es umgekehrt geschichtlich nur existiert und existieren kann, weil es im Grunde seines Seins zeitlich ist.”

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§72, 499: “...die Unsicherheit der primären ontologischen Horizonte...”

makes his way to the “proper” alternative. In “vulgar” use, the term “history” refers both to “historical actuality” (“*geschichtliche Wirklichkeit*”) and to the possibility of its scientific study.⁵¹⁶ Apart from an object of scientific study, the most prominent understanding of the term “history” is “that which has gone,” “that which has passed,” i. e. “the past” (*Vergangenes*).⁵¹⁷ The past as “that which has passed” is considered to be no longer “at hand,” or at very least “without any operative effect on the ‘present.’”⁵¹⁸ On the other hand, human beings are considered to be inextricably bound to their “history,” and insofar as this is the case, “the passed” continues “working” after it has gone.⁵¹⁹ In both cases, the distinction between “working”/“operative” (*wirkend*) and “non-working”/“inoperative” is made with regard to the actual/“working”/“operative” (*wirklich*) “now” and “today” of “the present.”⁵²⁰ Thus, “history” in this sense is paradoxically viewed as “irretrievably belonging to an earlier time” and yet is “at hand” in the now: the example Heidegger provides here is that of a “piece of past-ness” (“*ein Stück Vergangenheit*”) somehow being “present” (“*gegenwärtig*”) together with the Greek temple.⁵²¹ Thus, the term “history” comes to designate the notion of “provenance” (*Herkunft*) from “that which has passed.”⁵²² As such, it also entails an aspect of “becoming” (*Werden*), “development” (“*Entwicklung*”), and making (“*machen*”), as in “epoch-making” (“*Epochemachend*”).⁵²³ As such, “history” is also capable of having an effect on the future (“*Zukunft*”). In order to describe the greater whole of this kind of “history,” Heidegger employs the term “appropriation” (*Ereignis*) for the first time, yet in the sense of the “hanging together of

⁵¹⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§73, 500.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.: “...ohne ‘Wirkung’ auf die ‘Gegenwart.’”

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.: “...Nachwirkende...”

⁵²⁰ Ibid..

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§73, 501.

⁵²³ Ibid.

workings/operations” (“*Wirkungszusammenhang*”) as an overall “event,” and not yet in the sense of the “appropriation of being” which it will predominantly come to designate.⁵²⁴ Finally, the term “historical” in “vulgar” use can also refer to that delivered down through the ages (“*das Überlieferte*”).⁵²⁵

While nature and beings as a whole move “in-time,”⁵²⁶ Dasein moves as time – its very temporality is a specific kind of movement. That is to say, in its proper historicity, Dasein is not simply conceived as a “subject” of which events are predicated,⁵²⁷ but rather as a kind of “happening,” a kind of motion. Indeed, unlike the “at hand” and the “handy,” which are originally “timeless” (*zeitlos*) and only become so when situated within time (“in der Zeit”), Dasein is “originally temporal” (“*ursprünglich zeitlich*”).⁵²⁸

In order to distinguish the notion of proper historicity from that of the vulgar, Heidegger begins his analysis by an examination of the emphasis of the latter on “pastness” (*Vergangenheit*). As he demonstrates on the example of an antique tool preserved and displayed in a museum, the “pastness” of such a tool does not consist in its no longer being “at hand,” but rather in the “pastness” of the world within which it would have been encountered as “handy,” and thus, more fundamentally, the “pastness” of Dasein which would have held such a world out in front of itself as a horizon of significance.⁵²⁹ Heidegger initially takes issue with the exclusive

⁵²⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§73, 501.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

⁵²⁶ Ibid.: “... ‘in der Zeit’ bewegt...”

⁵²⁷ Ibid..

⁵²⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§73, 505: “Der ‘zeitliche Abstand’ vom Jetzt und Heute aber hat wiederum nicht deshalb keine primär konstitutive Bedeutung für die Geschichtlichkeit des eigentlich geschichtlichen Seienden, weil dieses nicht ‘in der Zeit’ und zeitlos ist, sondern weil es *so ursprünglich zeitlich* existiert, wie ein ‘in der Zeit’ Vorhandenes...es nie sein kann.”

⁵²⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§73, 503: “Ob im Gebrauch oder außer Gebrauch, sind sie gleichwohl nicht mehr, was sie waren. Was ist ‘vergangen’? Nichts anderes als die Welt, innerhalb deren sie, zu einem Zeugszusammenhang gehörig, als Zuhandenes begegneten... Was bedeutet aber das Nicht-mehr-sein von Welt? ... [die] ‘Vergangenheit’ des Daseins, dessen Welt sie zugehörten.”

association of Dasein's "historicality" with such "pastness" on the grounds that it stems from an interpretation of Dasein as something "at hand" which is subject to "passing away," rather than as something "existing" which, in ceasing to exist, is properly characterized as "having-been-there" (*da-gewesen*).⁵³⁰ This is the difference between "past-ness" ("*Vergangenheit*") which characterizes the "handy" and "having-been-ness" (*Gewesenheit*) which is a constitutive moment of the ecstatic unity of the temporality of Dasein.⁵³¹

Yet well beyond this clarification, Heidegger rejects the notion that Dasein's historicality is reducible to its "having-been-there" or, more precisely, its "no longer being there."⁵³² Rather, he insists that Dasein is historical in its very existence: it "is has been as presenting-futural" ("*[es] ist...gewesen als gegenwärtigendes-zukünftiges*").⁵³³ Far from considering such an observation self-explanatory, Heidegger sets it forth as the "riddle" of Dasein's historicality, wherein "having-been-ness" "times" itself equally originally with the present and the future.⁵³⁴ In order to properly think this historicality from within the circumference of temporality, Heidegger returns to his previously developed notion of existing as "forerunning resoluteness" (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*) and attempts to interpret it as "the proper happening" (*eigentliches Geschehen*) of Dasein.⁵³⁵ "Forerunning resoluteness" signifies Dasein's moving into its projected possibilities, yet the nature of such a motion cannot be properly considered without at least raising the question of the origin of such possibilities as both "impulse" and

⁵³⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§73, 503: "Offenbar kann das Dasein *nie* vergangen sein... weil es wesenhaft *nie vorhanden* sein kann, vielmehr, wenn es ist, *existiert*. Nicht mehr existierendes Dasein aber ist im ontologisch strengen Sinne nicht vergangen, sondern *da-gewesen*."

⁵³¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§73, 501: "...die Zeitbestimmung 'Vergangenheit' entbehrt des eindeutigen Sinnes und unterscheidet sich offenbar von der *Gewesenheit*, die wir als Konstitutivum der ekstatischen Einheit der Zeitlichkeit des Daseins kennenlernten."

⁵³² Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§73, 503.

⁵³³ Ibid..

⁵³⁴ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§73, 504: "...Gewesenheit sich gleichursprünglich mit Gegenwart und Zukunft zeitigt."

⁵³⁵ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§74, 505.

“destination” of such a motion.⁵³⁶ Indeed, at this juncture Heidegger for the first time introduces the notion of “inheritance/heritage” (*Erbe*) as the horizon within which the possibilities into which Dasein is thrown arise.⁵³⁷ Yet he ultimately concludes that an express knowledge of the provenance of Dasein’s possibilities is not necessary in order for Dasein to be able to resolutely throw itself into these.⁵³⁸ In this respect, Heidegger does not yet make sufficient positive headway beyond Kant’s notion of the givenness and discovery of the possibilities of reason in mere apperception (*bloße Apperzeption*).⁵³⁹ He does, however, point to reflection upon temporality as the only plausible means of explicating Dasein’s “inheritance/heritage”: “Indeed, the possibility of expressly drawing the existential ‘being-able-to-be’ of Dasein, upon which [Dasein] throws itself, from out of the handed-down/delivered understanding of Dasein lies in the temporality of Dasein and only in that.”⁵⁴⁰ The express meaning of inheritance/heritage then lies in the notion of repetition/“re-hauling” (*Wiederholung*): a going back to the possibilities of Dasein’s “having-been-there.”⁵⁴¹ Such a retrieval of the possible entails a choice (*Wahl*) on the part of Dasein and is not a mere re-constitution of that which has passed, but rather a reciprocation (*Erwiderung*) of an existence “having-been-there.”⁵⁴² In making a choice, Dasein momentarily (*augenblicklich*) recants (*widerruft*) from that which appears as “passed” in the

⁵³⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§74, 506: “Soll etwa die Übernahme der Geworfenheit des Selbst in seine Welt einen Horizon erschließen, dem die Existenz ihre faktischen Möglichkeiten entzieht? ... Bevor wir überschnell entscheiden, ob das Dasein seine eigentlichen Existenzmöglichkeiten aus der Geworfenheit schöpft oder nicht, müssen wir und des vollen Begriffes dieser Grundbestimmtheit der Sorge versichern.”

⁵³⁷ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§74, 507.

⁵³⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§74, 509: “Daß die Entschlossenheit *ausdrücklich* um die Herkunft der Möglichkeiten weiß, auf die sie sich entwirft, ist nicht notwendig.”

⁵³⁹ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*, II.1.§25.d.254-256.

⁵⁴⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§74, 509: “Wohl aber liegt in der Zeitlichkeit des Daseins und nur in ihr die Möglichkeit, das existenzielle Seinkönnen, darauf es sich entwirft, *ausdrücklich* aus dem überlieferten Daseinsverständnis zu hōlen.”

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.,: “...der Rückgang in Möglichkeiten des dagewesenen Daseins.”

⁵⁴² Ibid., 510: “Die Wiederholung...*erwidert* vielmehr die Möglichkeit der dagewesenen Existence.”

present now.⁵⁴³ Reciprocation does not collapse either into the past or the future, which are both indifferent to proper existence in the moment.⁵⁴⁴ Reciprocity with and retrieval of possibility in the moment describes Dasein's historicity as destiny (*Schicksal*). However, insofar as possibility is given "in the past" as essentially futural, it is the future (*Zukunft*) which lends the past its weight in historicity.⁵⁴⁵ Yet for Dasein, the ultimate future is its own death, which inflects its historicity as finite (*endlich*).⁵⁴⁶ And it is a glimpse of this ultimate possibility of Dasein that brings Heidegger back to the notion of finite temporality as the ground from which Dasein's historicity as destiny – the reciprocity with and retrieval of possibility – spring.⁵⁴⁷ Interestingly, already at this juncture, Heidegger is not thinking "the moment" simply in temporal terms; rather, he speaks of destiny as Dasein's self-delivery into "the there of the moment" (*das Da des Augenblicks*).⁵⁴⁸ This "there" suggests the capacity of the moment to accommodate Dasein as a kind of setting, and to that degree anticipates the interweaving of space and time witnessed in the notion of the "momentous site" (*Augenblickstätte*) of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*.

ζ) Temporality as motion

The aspect that continues to puzzle Heidegger in this emerging understanding of the historicity of Dasein is what moves or motivates Dasein to reciprocate the call of its possibilities.⁵⁴⁹ Indeed, the question of this original impulse is part of the greater question of the

⁵⁴³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§74, 510.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.: "Die Geschichte hat als Seinsweise des Daseins ihre Wurzel so wesentlich in der Zukunft...und so erst der *Gewesenheit* ihren eigentümlichen Vorrang im Geschichtlichen verleiht."

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.: "*Das eigentliche Sein zum Tode, das heißt die Endlichkeit der Zeitlichkeit, ist der verborgene Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins.*"

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§74, 511.

origin of Dasein as a greater whole, of the ontological horizon which enables its “hanging together.”⁵⁵⁰ As we will endeavor to show in the chapter on the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, finite temporality does not end up being Heidegger’s final word on the subject, but rather itself springs from a much more profound wellspring, indeed, from the abyss (*Abgrund*) itself.

Despite the conspicuous absence of such a “prime mover” at this juncture in Heidegger’s trajectory, he is able, to some degree, to observe and account for certain distinctive traits of motion proper to Dasein. Negatively, Heidegger distinguishes it from, on the one hand, the aggregate of the motion of the alterations of objects, and on the other – from the free-floating sequence of experiences of the “subject.”⁵⁵¹ Indeed, such motion is “not simply alteration of place,” neither can it be grasped from such a point of view.⁵⁵² Were it possible to interpret the motion of Dasein in terms of a chaining/concatenation (*Verkettung*) of the subject and object, the character of such a concatenation would still remain to be elucidated.⁵⁵³ As Heidegger expressly states: “the purpose of this exposition is to lead [the reader] up to the ontological riddle of the movedness of the happening.”⁵⁵⁴ As Heidegger discovers through his thinking of the historicity of Dasein, the riddle of being is, perhaps in its innermost depths, a riddle of motion.⁵⁵⁵ The acknowledgement of the prospect of understanding Dasein’s motion in essentially relational terms constitutes a significant advance in itself. The principal challenge of articulating the proper

⁵⁵⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§74, 511: “...dem *Ursprung* der...Frage nach der Konstitution des Daseinszusammenhangs nachgehen und bestimmen, in welchem ontologischen Horizont sie sich bewegt.”

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§75, 513: “In der Tat ist die Geschichte weder der Bewegungszusammenhang von Veränderungen der Objekte noch die freischwebende Erlebnisfolge der ‘Subjekte.’”

⁵⁵² Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§75, 514: “Die Bewegtheit des Geschehens, in dem etwas ‘mit ihm geschieht,’ läßt sich von der Bewegung als Ortsveränderung aus gar nicht fassen.”

⁵⁵³ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§75, 513: “Wenn man schon das Geschehen der Subjekt-Objektbeziehung zuweist, dann muß auch gefragt werden nach der Seinsart der Verkettung als solcher, wenn sie ist, die im Grunde ‘geschieht.’”

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§75, 514: “die Absicht dieser Exposition ist, vor das ontologische Rätsel der Bewegtheit des Geschehens überhaupt zu führen.”

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§75, 517: “...in allen das *Rätsel* des *Seins* und, wie jetzt deutlich wurde, der *Bewegung* sein Wesen treibt.”

motion of Dasein thus emerges as an account of Dasein's motivation for the retrieval of its possibilities and the manner in which such a retrieval is brought about in the reciprocal gesture of return (*Wiederkehr*) – that of possibility's return to Dasein and of Dasein's openness to such a return.⁵⁵⁶ Springing from such reciprocity, the scientific discipline of history must discover its proper object to be the given possible, rather than the given factual which has passed.⁵⁵⁷

The question of the historicity of Dasein is not limited, however, to Dasein as a “worldless subject” (*weltlose Subjekt*), but rather extends to the historicity, the “happening” of the world.⁵⁵⁸ Unlike in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* and the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, however, in *Sein und Zeit*, the historicity of all beings other than Dasein – such as tools and works (including the work of art) – is rooted in that of the world, and therein, in that of Dasein.⁵⁵⁹ At this stage in the development of the problematic of spatiality and temporality in Heidegger, Dasein and the world are inextricably bound: “[World history] signifies the happening of the world in its essential, existent unity with Dasein.”⁵⁶⁰ Indeed, Dasein “reckons” with its time (“das ‘Rechnen’ des Daseins ‘mit seiner Zeit’”) and directs/orients itself according to it (“*sich nach ihr richtet*”).⁵⁶¹ Such a reckoning cannot be reduced to mere quantification, but must rather be understood as Dasein coming to terms with itself as properly temporal: “in reckoning with itself, Dasein

⁵⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K5.§75, 517: “Die eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit versteht die Geschichte als die ‘Wiederkehr’ des Möglichen, und weiß darum, daß die Möglichkeit nur wiederkehrt, wenn die Existenz schicksalhaft- Augenblicklich für sie in der entschlossenen Wiederholung offen ist.”

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§75, 521: “Die Geburt der Historie aus der eigentlichen Geschichtlichkeit bedeutet dann: die primäre Thematisierung des historischen Gegenstandes entwirft dagewesenes Dasein auf seine eigenste Existenzmöglichkeit. Historie soll also das Mögliche zum Thema haben? Steht nicht ihr ganzer ‘Sinn’ einzig nach den ‘Tatschen,’ nach dem, wie es tatsächlich gewesen ist?”

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§75, 513: “Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins ist wesenhaft Geschichtlichkeit von Welt.”

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid., TI.AII.K5.§75, 514: “Er bedeutet einmal das Geschehen von Welt in ihrer wesenhaften, existenten Einheit mit dem Dasein.”

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§76, 534.

reckons with/accounts for time.”⁵⁶²

Yet even in *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger poses himself the question of where Dasein “gets” (*nimmt*) time and how its temporality is related to this time.⁵⁶³ In order to approach this question, however, Heidegger first examines the manner in which Dasein’s relations with beings “in time” are inflected by its temporality – how such relations constitute modalities of “timing” by Dasein.⁵⁶⁴ Indeed, Dasein “counts on” time as that, whereby it is able to involve and be involved with other beings.⁵⁶⁵ Before Dasein becomes aware of its own “timing,” it discovers time as itself “at hand” by way of beings which are “at hand” and “handy.” Initially, it observes that it “times” other beings in terms of “datability” (*Datierbarkeit*), that is, it renders them in terms of relations between the “now,” “at that time,” and “then.”⁵⁶⁶ Curiously, in Dasein’s self-understanding, the “then” and the “there” arise together: “In saying ‘now,’ we always already also understand – without adding it verbally – a ‘that and that *there*.’”⁵⁶⁷ In this way, “datability” itself discloses the ecstatic character of temporality and opens a way forward. Calendrical dating is but an outworking of this fundamental capacity for arranging beings according to determinate points in time (*Zeitpunkte*).⁵⁶⁸ Positively, datability attests points in time, negatively – intervals, the “in-between” (*Inzwischen*).⁵⁶⁹ In this way, Dasein becomes simultaneously aware of points

⁵⁶² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§79, 544: “Das existenzial-ontologisch Entscheidende der *Zeitrechnung* darf daher auch nicht in der Quantifizierung der Zeit gesehen, sondern muß ursprünglicher aus der *Zeitlichkeit* des mit der Zeit rechnenden Daseins begriffen werden.”

Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 556: “...das Dasein mit *sich* rechnend Zeit berechnet...”

⁵⁶³ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§78, 535.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.: “Es gilt zu zeigen, wie das Dasein als *Zeitlichkeit* ein Verhalten zeitigt, das sich in *der* Weise zur Zeit verhält, daß es ihr Rechnung trägt.”

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§79, 545: “...es *mit* dem und *auf* das ‘rechnet,’ womit es umwillen dieses Seinskönnens eine am Ende ausgezeichnete *Bewandtnis* hat.”

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§79: “Wir nennen diese scheinbar selbstverständliche Bezugsstruktur der ‘jetzt,’ ‘damals’ und ‘dann’ die *Datierbarkeit*.”

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§79, 539: “‘Jetzt’-sagend verstehen wir immer auch schon, ohne es mitzusagen, ein ‘– *da* das und das’...”

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§79, 538.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§79, 541.

(explicitly) and of durations/spans (*Dauer/Spanne*) (implicitly). In turn, the “in-betweens,” “durations,” and “spans” point to the stretchedness (*Erstrecktheit*) of temporality.⁵⁷⁰ The proper temporality of Dasein – its “stretched-ness” in the sense of proper, historical persistence of the self – is but a resolution away from this, its sign.⁵⁷¹

However, a more original temporalization lies deeper still than “datability” – it constitutes, ecstatically-horizontally, the very “being-“alit”/“lighted”/“illuminated”/ “illuminated” of the there of Dasein.⁵⁷² The circumspection, within which Dasein finds itself as thrown, is contingent upon light (*Helle*) as the condition of the possibility of sight (*Sichtmöglichkeit*) as such; and this light first illuminates Dasein as the primordial temporal change between day and night.⁵⁷³ Yet Heidegger claims that even this difference is not observed directly, but rather surmised from the shadows which are signs of the encounter of between sun and other beings. Thus, Dasein itself approaches the sun – the light – by means of registering changes in the placement of shadows, which, in turn, testify to the changing relationship between the sun and the beings that cast them.⁵⁷⁴ Yet, as Heidegger cautions, neither the shadows, nor their spatial

⁵⁷⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§79, 541: “...es dabei *sich* als die ekstatische *Erstrecktheit* der geschichtlichen *Zeitlichkeit*, wenngleich als solche unerkant, erschlossen ist.”

⁵⁷¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§79, 542: “Die augenblickliche Existenz zeitigt sich als schicksalhaft ganze *Erstrecktheit* im Sinne der eigentlichen, geschichtlichen *Ständigkeit* des Selbst.”

⁵⁷² Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§79, 539: “...*die Zeitlichkeit die Gelichtetheit des Da ekstatisch-horizontal konstituiert...*”

⁵⁷³ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 545: “Die alltägliche *umsichtige* In-der-Welt-sein bedarf der *Sichtmöglichkeit*, das heißt der *Helle*... In seiner Geworfenheit ist es dem Wechsel von Tag und Nacht ausgeliefert. Jener gibt mit seiner *Helle* die mögliche *Sicht*, diese nimmt sie.”

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 549: “In gewisser Weise macht sich aber auch schon das ‘primitive’ Dasein unabhängig von einer direkten Ableitung der Zeit am Himmel, sofern es nicht den Sonnenstand am Himmel feststellt, sondern den Schatten mißt, den ein jederzeit verfügbares Seiendes wirft.”

Here Heidegger misses a crucial opportunity to inquire into the relationship between time and light in the theory of relativity, which he misjudges as a mere “axiomatic of the physical technique of measurement.” (Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 552, footnote 3: “Auf das relativitätstheoretische Problem der *Zeitmessung* ist hier nicht anzugehen.”) As will have been demonstrated in section 5 of the present study, however, by the time of the writing of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, Heidegger will discover it to be necessary to return to the question of the speed of light in relation to the lingering/tarrying called for by proper encounter, and will come to see the work of art as a unique means of slowing the light down in order to render beings visible.

relation upon the sun-clock are themselves time as such.⁵⁷⁵ That is to say, such a mode of measuring time does not direct/orient itself towards time thematically.⁵⁷⁶ A more original temporality is the ground of the “publication” of time, so to speak, of its public givenness.⁵⁷⁷ On the other hand, this temporality does schematize itself by means of the structure of appropriateness/in-appropriateness (*Struktur der Geeignetheit/Ungeeignetheit*), which renders time in terms of “time for x...” (“*Zeit zu*”).⁵⁷⁸ Insofar as this structure resonates with the world as a structure of significance, temporality lends itself to being understood as having a worldly character, which Heidegger terms “world-time” (*Weltzeit*).⁵⁷⁹ With this latest development, the determination of “public” temporality is complete: “it is datable, expanded, public, and belongs – structured as it is in this manner – to the world itself.”⁵⁸⁰

Heidegger insists that the distinguishing characteristic of such a schematization of time – its “punctuation,” so to speak, in the form of bonding between certain “nows” (points) and certain purposes or significances – is made possible by concerned temporality rather than spatiality, as one might have expected. He underscores that it is the temporality of factual “being-in-the-world” that enables the disclosure of space and Dasein itself as spatial, for which reason the cardinal point of reference for all of the temporal points (“nows”) of dating must be identified with the place of Dasein itself.⁵⁸¹ This, contrary to appearance, does not mean that time

⁵⁷⁵ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§80, 550: “Aber warum finden wir jeweils an der Stelle, die der Schatten auf dem Zifferblatt einnimmt, so etwas wie Zeit? Weder der Schatten, noch die eingeteilte Bahn ist die Zeit selbst und ebensowenig ihre räumliche Beziehung zueinander.”

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 551: “...ohne daß die Zeitmessung thematisch auf die Zeit als solche gerichtet ist.”

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 544: “...*die Geworfenheit des Daseins ist der Grund dafür, daß es öffentlich Zeit ‘gibt.’*”

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 548.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 548-549: “Die veröffentlichte Zeit hat als Zeit-zu...wesenhaft Weltcharacter. Daher nennen wir die in der Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit sich veröffentlichende Zeit die *Weltzeit*.”

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 548: “...sie ist datierbar, gespannt, öffentlich und gehört als so strukturierte zur Welt selbst.”

⁵⁸¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 551: “Weil die Zeitlichkeit des faktischen In-der-Welt-seins ursprünglich die Raumschließung ermöglicht und das räumliche Dasein je aus einem entdeckten Dort sich ein daseinsmäßiges Hier

itself becomes somehow “pinned down” (*geknüpft*) to a certain place (*Ort*), but rather that the very character of temporality itself somehow makes punctuation possible.⁵⁸² Indeed, Heidegger clearly states: “Time is not initially coupled with space, but rather the supposedly coupling “space” encounters [us] only on the basis of...temporality.”⁵⁸³ And again: “Time, brought into the open/made “public” in the measuring of time, by no means turns into space through ‘dating’ in terms of spatial measure-relations. [Neither] is that which is existentially-ontologically essential to the measuring of time to be sought in the fact that ‘dated’ ‘time’ is numerically determined in terms of stretches of space and changes of place of a spatial thing.”⁵⁸⁴ Time does not undergo “spatialization” (*Verräumlichung*) here.⁵⁸⁵

Why not? According to Heidegger, the explanation lies in the particular kind of “presenting”/“waiting opposite” (*Gegenwärtigung*) which enables measuring in the first place.⁵⁸⁶ The spatial measure (*Maß*) is just that – a measure, and not that which is measured (*das Gemessene*).⁵⁸⁷ The latter is Dasein’s own “beholding” (*Behalten*), which, from the point of view of the “now,” attends to – is open to – both that which has already come and that which is yet to come.⁵⁸⁸ Heidegger acknowledges the uncanny resonance this determination betrays with that of

angewiesen hat, ist die in der Zeitlichkeit des Daseins besorgte Zeit hinsichtlich ihrer Datierbarkeit je an einen Ort des Daseins gebunden.”

⁵⁸² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§80, 551: “Nicht die Zeit wird an einen Ort geknüpft, sondern die Zeitlichkeit ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit dafür, daß sich die Datierung an das Räumlich-Örtliche binden kann...”

⁵⁸³ Ibid.: “Die Zeit wird nicht erst mit dem Raum verkoppelt, sondern der vermeintlich zu verkoppelnde ‘Raum’ begegnet nur auf dem Grunde der zeitbesorgenden Zeitlichkeit.”

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 552: “Die in der Zeitmessung veröffentlichte Zeit wird durch die Datierung aus räumlichen Maßverhältnissen keineswegs zum Raum. Ebenso wenig ist das existenzial-ontologisch Wesentliche der *Zeitmessung* darin zu suchen, daß die datierte ‘Zeit’ aus *Raumstrecken* und dem *Ortswechsel* eines räumlichen Dinges zahlenmäßig bestimmt wird.”

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 555.

Aristotle: “τοῦτο γάρ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.”⁵⁸⁹

Heidegger translates this passage as: “Das nämlich ist die Zeit, das Gezählte an der im Horizont des Früher und Später begegnenden Bewegung.” Yet, even this “waiting opposite” – this attendance upon – is itself only an indication of time, the manner in which time shows itself.⁵⁹⁰

At least in posing the question about this non-apparent origin of time, Heidegger understands himself as being one step ahead of Aristotle, “for whom the origin of time open in this manner does not [even] turn into a problem.”⁵⁹¹

This simultaneous prioritization of temporality over spatiality and the retention of spatiality as a medium for the opening up of temporality was already well noted in Heidegger’s studies of Kant’s notion of schematism (*Schematismus*). Having settled these questions of priority and mediation in a more or less resonant manner, Heidegger still confronts the greater question of the relative “subjectivity”/“objectivity of such temporality. It is precisely at this juncture that Heidegger attempts to make a radical break with Kant, pointing out that, in contrast to Kant, that which he refers to as “world-time” is immediately accessible not only by means of a “detour” through the “psychic,” but also – and initially – through the physical: “‘Time’ shows/indicates itself first and foremost in the heavens, that is to say, where one finds/discovered it in natural directing/orienting of oneself towards it, such that ‘time’ is, indeed, identified with the heavens.”⁵⁹² Yet this does not render temporality “objective” in the sense that it is available in itself (*an sich*) somewhere “outside” of Dasein. Rather, it is “objective” in the sense that it is given to Dasein as every possible object (the “object in general” of Kant), as the condition of

⁵⁸⁹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§80, 556.

Cf. Aristotle, *Physik*, Δ 11, 219 b 1 sq.

⁵⁹⁰ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§80, 556: “*Das in solchem Gegenwärtigen sich Zeigende ist die Zeit.*”

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 556.

⁵⁹² Ibid., TI.AII.K6.§80, 554: “Zunächst zeigt sich ‘die Zeit’ gerade am Himmel, das heißt dort, wo man sie, im natürlichen Sich-richten *nach ihr*, vorfindet, so daß ‘die Zeit’ sogar mit dem Himmel identifiziert.”

possibility of the givennes of every other being.⁵⁹³ In this sense, it transcends not only every possible object, but also every possible subject, insofar as it constitutes the condition of the very possibility of such a subject: “‘Time’ is neither available in the ‘subject’ nor in the ‘object, neither ‘within’ nor ‘without’ and ‘is’ ‘earlier’ than every subjectivity and objectivity, because it posits the condition of this possibility itself.”⁵⁹⁴ Thus, it is the “stretched-ness” (*Erstrecktheit*) of the proper temporality of Dasein that establishes the condition of possibility of the continuity (*Kontinuität*) of “public”/“open” time, its datability, its “expanded-ness” (*Gespanntheit*), and its calculability, and not the reverse.

δ) The Shortcomings of the Ecstatic-Horizontal Temporality of Dasein

Heidegger maintains that Dasein is only capable of “breaking into” (*Einbruch*) space on the basis of ecstatic-horizontal temporality.⁵⁹⁵ He reminds that space is discoverable only from within the world, and the world itself opens up only within the horizon of expectancy. This intricate relationship is hinted at in the suitably ambiguous genitive of the following compound, introduced here by Heidegger for the first time: “the ecstatic temporality of Dasein-commensurate spatiality” (“*Die ekstatische Zeitlichkeit der daseinsmäßigen Räumlichkeit*”).⁵⁹⁶ The ecstatic temporality of Dasein-commensurate spatiality renders intelligible not only the independence of space from time, but also the “dependence” of Dasein on space, which expresses itself in the widely-recognized phenomenon of the self-interpretation of Dasein being

⁵⁹³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§80, 554: “*Die Weltzeit ist ‘objektiver’ als jedes mögliche Objekt, weil sie als Bedingung der Möglichkeit des innerweltlich Seienden mit der Erschlossenheit von Welt je schon ekstatisch-horizontal ‘objeciert’ wird.*”

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 554: “*Die Weltzeit ist aber auch ‘subjektiver’ als jedes möglicher Subject, weil sie im wohlverstandenen Sinne der Sorge als des Seins des faktisch existierenden Selbst dieses Sein erst mit möglich macht. ‘Die Zeit’ ist weder im ‘Subjekt’ noch im ‘Objekt’ vorhanden, weder ‘innen’ noch ‘außen’ und ‘ist’ ‘früher’ als jede Subjektivität und Objektivität, weil sie die Bedingung der Möglichkeit selbst für dieses ‘früher’ darstellt.*”

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, TI.AII.K4.§70, 488: “*Nur auf dem Grunde der ekstatisch-horizontalen Zeitlichkeit ist der Einbruch des Daseins in den Raum möglich.*”

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

thoroughly pervaded by “spatial representations.”⁵⁹⁷ Heidegger attributes the prevalence of the spatial in the articulation of significances and concepts not to some exceptional powerfulness of space, but rather to the very kind of being of Dasein.⁵⁹⁸

Such a concession at the very crux of Heidegger’s argument regarding temporality as the wellspring of Dasein’s spatiality is perplexing, to say the least. All the more startling is Heidegger’s footnote a indexed to this statement, which corrects it by clarifying that there is “no opposition [between the two],” that the powerfulness of space and the kind of being of Dasein “belong together.”⁵⁹⁹ Why speak of the independence of space from time in the self-same moment as he is attempting to demonstrate the utter contingency of the former upon the latter? Why trace spatial terminology to something as basic as Dasein’s “kind of being”? What elicits such a concession if not some unexpected “failure” on the part of temporality? Indeed, according to Heidegger, such a “failing” obtains in the case of temporality’s collapse into the singular “dimension” of the present which “flattens” its ecstatic-horizonal structure, and, by extension, the spatial relations which function as “guidelines for the articulation of that which is understandable and interpretable in understanding overall.”⁶⁰⁰ Thus Heidegger believes to have shown the “dimensionality” of space to be contingent upon the “dimensionality” of time. Yet it remains to be seen whether the figure of voluminosity does not itself fall within the purview of

⁵⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K4.§70, 488: “Die ekstatische Zeitlichkeit der daseinsmäßigen Räumlichkeit macht gerade die Unabhängigkeit des Raumes von der Zeit verständlich, umgekehrt aber auch die ‘Abhängigkeit’ des Daseins vom Raum, die sich in dem bekannten Phänomen offenbart, daß die Selbstausslegung des Daseins und der Bedeutungsbestand der Sprache überhaupt weitgehend von ‘räumlichen Vorstellungen’ durchherrscht ist.”

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§70, 488-489: “Dieser Vorrang des Räumlichen in der Artikulation von Bedeutungen und Begriffen hat seinen Grund nicht in einer spezifischen Mächtigkeit des Raumes, sondern in der Seinsart des Daseins.”

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid., TI.AII.K4.§70, 489, footnote a: “Kein Gegensatz; beides gehört zusammen.”

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid.: “Wesenhaft verfallend, verliert sich die Zeitlichkeit in das Gegenwärtigen und versteht sich nicht nur umsichtig aus dem besorgten Zuhandenen, sondern entnimmt dem, was das Gegenwärtigen an ihm als anwesend ständig antrifft, den räumlichen Beziehungen, die Leitfaden für die Artikulation des im Verstehen überhaupt Verstandenen und Auslegbaren.”

schematization by spatial means, therein bringing the priority of time into question once again.

As Heidegger establishes from the outset, however, the interpretation of Dasein as temporality does not yet fully address the question of the sense of being.⁶⁰¹ Indeed, Heidegger makes a distinction between time as the horizon of the understanding of being and temporality as the being of the being-understanding Dasein, and suggests that the latter must precede the former in the order of interpretation (if not in the order of origination or determination).⁶⁰² What is more, he explicitly acknowledges the phenomenon of time to be rooted in the very center of the ontological problematic.⁶⁰³ Such an admission leaves open the possibility that the wellspring of temporality may “pre-date” Dasein, so to speak: that temporality may manifest in alternate modes well beyond its purview, modes more original and therefore ultimately more determinative for Dasein than its own. If such anterior temporality is to be made visible – “if being is to be grasped from out of time,” as Heidegger puts it – the term “temporal” can no longer signify “within time,” as it does in “vulgar” conceptions of time.⁶⁰⁴ In fact, even expressions such as “un-temporal” (“*Un-zeitliches*”) and “supra-temporal” (“*Überzeitliches*”) must be taken as statements regarding its “temporal” character.⁶⁰⁵ Such will, indeed, require not only a positive redefinition of the term “temporal,” but also a formal change in its morphology: in German, the term “zeitlich” will need to be replaced with the more appropriate “temporal.”⁶⁰⁶

The ultimate goal of *Sein und Zeit*, therefore, would be to elaborate the temporality of being

⁶⁰¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§5, 24.

⁶⁰² Ibid.: “...bedarf es einer *ursprünglichen Explikation der Zeit als Horizont des Seinsverständnisses aus der Zeitlichkeit als Sein des seinsverstehenden Daseins.*”

⁶⁰³ Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§5, 25: “...*im rechtgesehenen und rechtexplizierten Phänomen der Zeit die zentrale Problematik aller Ontologie verwurzelt ist.*”

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.: “Wenn Sein aus der Zeit begriffen werden soll...dann ist damit das Sein selbst...in seinem “zeitlichen” Charakter sichtbar gemacht. “Zeitlich” kann aber dann nicht mehr nur besagen “in der Zeit seiend.”

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§5, 25-26.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., “Einleitung,” II.§5, 26.

(*Temporalität des Seins*).⁶⁰⁷

Anticipating the significant changes that the problematic of space, time, and experience will undergo in the artwork essay and in the *Beiträge*, one cannot overlook the following assessment Heidegger makes of the temporal analysis of Dasein in *Sein und Zeit*: “As long as this [the idea of being overall] has not been won, the repeating temporal analysis of Dasein remains unfulfilled and encumbered with unclarities as well.”⁶⁰⁸ Indeed, this sentiment is confirmed in §80 by Heidegger’s question of “Then does [time] have a ‘being’ at all/overall?”⁶⁰⁹ While the full significance of this acknowledgement will be brought into relief in subsequent chapters of this study, it is sufficiently clear even at this stage of the examination that the principal shortcoming of Heidegger’s model of the spatiality and temporality of Dasein in *Sein und Zeit* consists precisely in the restriction of its originary depths to Dasein itself. While the notion of Dasein temporalizing and spatializing itself has its validity within this narrowed scope, the identification of Dasein as the origin and measure of the phenomena of spatialization and temporalization diminishes in credibility in proportion to Heidegger’s progress towards the idea of being overall⁶¹⁰ and especially that of the abyss (*Abgrund*). The question that Heidegger poses

⁶⁰⁷ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “Einleitung,” II.§5, 26: “Die fundamentale ontologische Aufgabe der Interpretation von Sein als solchem begreift daher in sich die Herausarbeitung der *Temporalität des Seins*.”

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., TI.AII.K3.§66, 441: “Solange diese [Idee von Sein überhaupt] nicht gewonnen ist, bleibt auch die *wiederholende* zeitliche Analyse des Daseins unvollständig und mit Unklarheiten behaftet...”

Otto Pöggeler attributes this lack of resolution to a lack of satisfactory distinction between existence and modern subjectivity: “But because existence was not yet satisfactorily differentiated from modern subjectivity by historical reflection, Heidegger did not find the transition from temporality of existence to the time-character of the sense of Being.” (Otto Pöggeler, “Metaphysics and the Topology of Being in Heidegger,” in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1981), 180).

⁶⁰⁹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§80, 554: “Hat sie denn überhaupt ein ‘Sein’?”

⁶¹⁰ With good reason, Joseph Sadzik sees this impulse to restore the bond between Dasein and being as an echo of the Thomist interpretation of Aristotle, which Heidegger does not truly reach beyond until he broadens the scope of the inquiry to the problematic of the reconciliation of Dasein and being: “Heidegger veut exprimer une idée d’appartenance de l’homme à l’être universel. La tradition a exprimé une idée semblable et, à notre avis, d’une manière plus heureuse et en une terminologie plus juste. L’être est en puissance – *in potentia* – d’être connu, comme l’homme est capable – *in potentia* – de parvenir à l’être.” (Joseph Sadzik, “Réflexions critiques,” in *Esthétique de Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Éditions universitaires, 1963), 179.)

in the last paragraph of *Sein und Zeit* – “How is Dasein-commensurate disclosing understanding of being possible at all?”⁶¹¹ – proves prophetic of the endowment of Dasein with proper temporality and spatiality by the abyss through the work of art in the mid- to late thirties.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have attempted to delineate the threshold which Heidegger’s interpretation of spatiality and temporality as capabilities of Dasein in *Sein und Zeit* must cross in parting with the Kantian heritage of subjectivity and striving towards the vast horizon of being. While assessing the extent to which this interpretation remains indebted to Kant, we have discovered two decisive – yet unanswered – questions at the crux of the problematic of spatiality and temporality which appear to have brought Heidegger’s inquiry to the verge of a breakthrough : that of ‘origin’ and that of ‘motor.’ As the following two chapters on the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* and “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” will aspire to demonstrate, these two guiding threads will have furnished the ‘warp and woof’ of the transfigured weave of spatiality and temporality in these texts through their hallmark notions of ‘ur-spring’ (*Ursprung*), ‘rift’ (*Riß*), ‘rapture’ (*Entrückung*), and ‘illumination’ (*Lichtung*), among many others.

The juncture at which Heidegger’s analysis of spatiality as a capability of Dasein reveals its lingering Kantian cast most vividly lies in his decision to integrate the phenomenon of the ‘between’ into the ‘unitary original structure’ of Dasein’s ‘inness,’ ‘inside,’ or ‘immanence.’ Thus, in §28, he unequivocally identifies the ‘between’ with the ‘there’ as its inalienable structural moment. (Such a decision stands in stark contrast with the subsequent extrication of the ‘between’ from the capabilities of the Subject and its establishment as a capability which

⁶¹¹ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, TI.AII.K6.§82.a, 577: “Wie ist erschließendes Verstehen von Sein daseinsmäßig überhaupt möglich?”

precedes both the Subject and the object and constitutes the condition of the possibility of their relation in *Die Frage nach dem Ding : Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* of 1935-1936.) In continuity with Kant's emphasis on the 'givenness' and 'discovered-ness' of the capabilities of the Subject, Heidegger articulates the 'there-ness' of Dasein as a capability with which Dasein 'finds itself' to be endowed, a kind of 'onus' which startles Dasein and prompts the question of its origin. What is more, in the preceding discussion of Dasein's 'being-[in order] to' as a mode of such 'there-ness,' Heidegger acknowledges that such a conception relies upon – structurally, if tacitly – two other capabilities for spatiality which remain indeterminate in *Sein und Zeit*: that of space (which 'does not have the kind of being of Dasein') and that of being. Finally, in bringing the dynamic character of spatiality as a capability of Dasein into relief, Heidegger not only takes a step further beyond Kant, but also raises the question of the 'motor' of such 'moved-ness' (*Bewegtheit*). (This latter development directly anticipates the articulation of the 'there' as a rift (*Riß*) of time-space which springs from being, which courses through the work of art, and in which Dasein is caught up, carried along, and reconfigured by means of the latter – a scenario intimated both in "The Origin of the Work of Art" and in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*.) These three imperatives of 'origin,' conceptual resolution, and 'motor' lead Heidegger further down the path towards the dynamic spatiality of being as the most original and originary capability which exceeds the derivative capability of Dasein and configures its means and mode of operation at the ontological level.

As in the case of spatiality, the faultline in Heidegger's articulation of temporality as a capability of Dasein runs through its identification with the 'original unity' of Dasein's ontological structure. This 'original unity' – 'being-able-to-be-whole' (*Ganzseinkönnen*) – is Dasein's 'propensity' towards the possibilities of its being, which is characterized, on the one

hand, by its ability to ‘show’ these possibilities to itself by itself as a horizon of expectation by means of a ‘call’ (*Ruf*) issuing from a ‘voice of conscience,’ and, on the other, by its ‘happening’ (*Geschehen*) as a vector of motion both issuing from and oriented towards what it ‘can be’ and ‘is not yet.’ As a capability, ‘being-able-to-be-whole’ is paradoxically ‘incapacitated’ in two ways : firstly, Dasein is factually incapable of avowing all of its possibilities over the course of the ‘between’ bracketed by its birth and death, resulting in a constitutional ‘inconclusiveness’ (*Unabgeschlossenheit*) and ‘non-whole-ness’ (*Unganzheit*), and, more importantly, while it is capable of the selection, choice, and resoluteness that such an avowal requires, it is incapable of the initial turn towards its proper possibilities and requires the impetus of a ‘moment of thrust’ (‘das Moment des Stoßes’) in order to set it on its way. The former limitation is inalienable from Dasein’s finitude ; the question of the ‘mover’ of Dasein’s ‘movedness’ (*Bewegtheit*), however, is recognized by Heidegger as the very ‘ontological riddle’ to which the exposition of temporality in *Sein und Zeit* is meant to lead. It is this latter ‘incapability’ which ultimately opens Dasein up to the intervention of a greater capability – the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being. *Sein und Zeit* offers the reader only two glimpses of what the nature of such a temporality might be : ‘motorization’ and ‘illumination.’ In so doing, however, it directly anticipates Heidegger’s elaboration of the notions of ‘rapture’ (*Entrückung*), ‘spring’ (*Sprung*), ‘rift’ (*Riß*), and ‘illumination’ (*Lichtung*) which are central both to the “The Origin of the Work of Art” and to the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*.

CHAPTER 3 : Ap-propriation (*Ereignis*) : Time-Space (*Zeit-Raum*) as the Rift (*Riß*) of the Abyss (*Abgrund*) of Beyng (*Seyn*) in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)*

“...Raum und Zeit so unerschöpflich sind im Wesen wie das Seyn selbst.”¹

“And behold, the veil of the temple was torn in two from top to bottom; and the earth shook and the rocks were split.”²

Introduction

In the preceding chapters, we have followed the guiding thread of space and time into and out of the labyrinth of the Kantian Subject and have glimpsed the possibility of space-time (*Zeit-raum*) as a ‘between’ which is no longer bound to Dasein as its ‘origin’ and ‘motor’ and which emerges, in the three versions of “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” and in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, as a capability which precedes Dasein, endows it with spatiality and temporality as derivative capabilities, and ontologically configures these. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* takes up the task of articulating this ‘most originary’ capability as the very core of the happening the appropriation of beyng, while “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” elaborates the work of art as the ‘momentous site’ of the transfiguration of Dasein’s ‘incapabilities’ into capabilities ‘com-mensurate’ with the immensity of beyng.³ In order to be able to appreciate the profundity of this contribution of the work of art, however, it is first necessary to come to terms with the ‘im-mensity’ of the potential extended to Dasein by

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, Klostermann : Frankfurt am Main, 1994, V.d).241, 378.

² Matthew 27:51 (NASB)

³ James Magrini similarly sees Heidegger’s writings on art as indicative of his shift of focus away from the capabilities of Dasein: “For it is indeed possible to associate Heidegger’s model with the subject-centered understanding of the human being found in both Kant’s transcendental thought and the traditional metaphysics of Descartes, i. e. the notion of the human subject grounded in the interior-exterior/subject-object dichotomy. Heidegger attempts to address this problem through the ‘de-centering’ of Dasein in the later works on art and poetry...another form of philosophical thinking that ‘abandons subjectivity’...” (James Magrini, “The Work of Art and Truth of Being as ‘Historical’ : Reading Being and Time, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ and the ‘Turn’ (Kehre) in Heidegger’s Philosophy of the 1930s,” *Philosophy Today* 54, no. 4 (2010) : 346-347.)

beyng and with it – with the utter indispensability of an intermediary capable of facilitating the delivery and reception of such an endowment by Dasein.

§1. The self-imposed limits of philosophy and the possibility of thinking from within beyng

The “preview” (*Vorblick*) of Heidegger’s *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* announces the aspiration of its endeavor as the “change of the essence of the human being from [that of] the ‘rational animal’ (*animal rationale*) to that of ‘being-there’ (*Da-sein*).⁴ For philosophical thought, this “change” signifies a certain kind of “conversion” (*Verwandlung*) of the human being previously reduced to understanding.⁵ In fact, it goes so far as to hint towards a “non-beingly” potential of the human being which still awaits mining.⁶ Indeed, the closing sections of the *Beiträge* recapitulate the aspiration of the text as the “ejection of the human being from its previous, modern, Western situation” and its re-setting into a wholly other space of determination.”⁷ By this point in the development of Heidegger’s thought it is sufficiently clear that such a ‘there’ can no longer be exclusively understood as Dasein’s appropriation of its own proper constitutive moment, but must rather be recognized as an aspect of the more far more profound dynamic of beyng’s (*Seyn*) appropriation (*Ereignis*) of itself – and therein, of Dasein – to itself. The “there” must now be understood as the crux of the relation between beyng (*Seyn*) and “being there” (*Dasein*), and – what is even more striking – such a crux must, in turn, be

⁴ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I, 3: “...Wesenswandel des Menschen aus dem ‘vernünftigen Tier’ (*animal rationale*) in das Da-sein...”

Ibid., I.41, 84: “Die Verwandlung des Menschen meint hier das Anderswerden seines Wesens...”

⁵ Ibid., I.5, 14: “In der philosophischen Erkenntnis dagegen beginnt mit dem ersten Schritt eine Verwandlung des verstehenden Menschen und zwar nicht im moralisch-‘existenziellen’ Sinne, sondern da-seinsmäßig.”

⁶ Ibid., III.83.170: “Je unseiender der Mensch, je weniger er sich auf das Seiende, als welches er sich vorfindet, versteift, um so näher kommt er dem Sein.”

⁷ Ibid., VIII.268, 479: “Indem aber die Götter und der Mensch in der Not des Seyns zur Ent-gegnung kommen, wird der Mensch aus seiner bisherigen, neuzeitlich abendländischen Stellung geworfen, hinter sich selbst zurückgestellt in völlig andere Bestimmungsräume...”

articulated in terms of “time-spatiality (*Zeit-Räumlichkeit*).⁸ The essencing/“осуществление” of beyng (*die Wesung des Seyns*) is its own πρόνερον or *a priori par excellence*.⁹ In such a transport, Dasein’s thinking – Dasein’s experience – discovers itself as configured within the shudder/quake (*Erzitterung*) of the appropriation of beyng.¹⁰ The power of the eruption of such a transfiguration surges forth from the mildness (*Milde*) of beyng’s appropriation of Dasein into its own essencing, happening – a most profound mystery, for which Heidegger can find no better word than deification/divinization (*Götterung*).¹¹ The ultimate mystery of history, therefore, is that of the fusion (*Fügung*) whereby beyng (*Seyn*) opens up as and binds itself to being (*Sein*), to *Dasein*, and to every other kind of being.¹² This path leads Heidegger to the realization that the truth of beyng “can no longer be thought from out of beings, but must rather be thought through from out of itself [beyng].”¹³ Indeed, in the *Beiträge*, beyng emerges as the only proper place from which the question of beyng – and, by extension, that of “being there” – might be posed (*Frageort*).¹⁴ Even the path and the motion towards such a place must be unconditionally determined by beyng itself.¹⁵

⁸ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.c).233, p. 361: “Der innigste Bezug von Seyn und Dasein in seiner Kehre wird sichtbar als das, was die Grundfrage ernötigt und zwingt, über die Leitfrage und somit über alle Metaphysik hinaus zu gehen, *hinaus* in der Tat in die *Zeit-Räumlichkeit* des Da.”

⁹ *Ibid.*, III.111, 222: “Das Früheste in der Wesung ist diese selbst als Wesung des Seyns.”

Cf. *Ibid.*, III.112, 223: “Die Wahrheit des Seyns und die Wesung des Seyns ist weder das Frühere noch das Spätere.”

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, I.1, 4: “...dann wird jenes Wesen des Seyns in seiner Erzitterung das Gefüge des denkerischen Werkes selbst bestimmen.”

¹¹ *Ibid.*: “Diese Erzitterung erstarkt dann zur Macht der gelösten Milde einer *Innigkeit* jener *Götterung* des Gottes der Götter...”

¹² *Ibid.*, I.2, 7: “...das inständige Wissen, wie das Seyn west – steht vielleicht nicht einmal den Göttern zu, sondern gehört einzig dem Abgründigen jener Fügung, der selbst die Götter noch unterstehen.”

¹³ *Ibid.*: “Dieses kann daher nicht mehr vom Seienden her gedacht, es muß aus ihm selbst erdacht werden.”

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I.42, 85.

Otto Pöggeler describes this grafting of Dasein into the truth of being as ‘localization’: “These efforts at thought are a single great ‘localization’ which makes it possible to speak from that other and authentic place. [...] Therefore perhaps we may call this thoughtful localization a ‘topology’ in the sense of a saying (*legein*) of the place (*topos*) in European thought, and in this way a self-gathering unto the basic terms of thinking as such.”

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I.42, 86: “Der Weg des Erdenkens wird, je echter er Weg zum Seyn ist, um so unbedingter vom Seyn selbst bestimmt.”

Thus, Heidegger's revised definition of philosophy identifies its cardinal drive (*Drang*) as that will to return to the beginning of history which entails a will to reach over and beyond not only the self, but also the ontological difference – all the way into the “ur-difference” of being, the cleft/cleavage/fissure (*Zerklüftung*).¹⁶ In a concise formulation in §91, Heidegger confirms: “Holding-fast-onto means: asking about the *being* of *beings*. The overcoming, however: first asking about the *truth* of being.”¹⁷ In contrast to one commonplace conception of philosophy – that of the “worldview” (*Weltanschauung*) and its corresponding experience (*Erlebnis*)¹⁸ – the radical and thoroughgoing transformation called for by Heidegger is geared towards “proper experience,” “most intimate experience” (“*die innigste Erfahrung*”)¹⁹ – an expansion of experience heretofore constrained by the determinate, circumscribed, and constricted track of a given way of looking at the world, which “narrows and binds...proper experience.”²⁰ Such an expansion is the culmination of all of Heidegger's reflections on the notion of experience – and, therein, on the problematic of spatiality, temporality, and objectivity – anchored by his sustained engagement of Kant throughout the late twenties and thirties. Indeed, the highest aspiration of the philosophy heralded by Heidegger is to “open” experience up to the immensity of being and, therewith, to its own potential.²¹ Such opening transfigures understanding (*Verstehen*) into a throwing-oneself-outwards (*Sichhinauswerfen*) – a “fore-standing” (*Ver-stehen*), which is precisely the “opposite of ‘subjectivization,’” insofar as it necessitates a 180-degree change in

¹⁶ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.14, 36-37: “Philosophie ist das Zurückwollen in den Anfang der Geschichte und so das Übersichhinauswollen.”

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, III.91, 182: “Das Festhalten besagt: fragen nach dem *Sein* des *Seienden*. Die Überwindung aber: fragen zuvor nach der *Wahrheit* des *Seins*...”

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, I.14, 38.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I.54, 114.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I.14, 37: “Die ‘Weltanschauung’ richtet die Erfahrung in eine bestimmte Bahn und ihren Umkreis ein, so weit immer, daß die Weltanschauung nie in Frage gestellt wird; die Weltanschauung verengt und unterbindet daher eigentliche Erfahrung.”

²¹ *Ibid.*: “Die Philosophie *eröffnet* die Erfahrung...”

direction, a *turn*.²² Heidegger also describes such experience – or “undergoing” (*Erfahrung*) – as “going into”/“journeying into” (*einfahren*) “in order to stand within and withstand the essentialization/осуществление of being.”²³ One of the distinguishing characteristics of such “experiencing” (“*Erfahren*”) is its utter unusualness (*Ungewöhnlichkeit*).²⁴ Precisely because it is extraordinary, such experience cannot be contrived or managed (*bewerkstelligen*); on the contrary, it entails being brought out of the ordinary, and this not of our own capability, but rather that of being.²⁵ The “experience” of being goes well beyond simply being astounded (*Erstaunen*); rather, it is a kind of being “awe-struck” or “terror-struck” (*Entsetzen*) before being.²⁶

Here, Heidegger once again distinguishes such self-projection from “absolute creating” (*absolutes Schaffen*); rather, it is the discovery of one’s abyssal thrownness.²⁷ Finding itself to be situated at the very spring of being – and, moreover, in a position to release its gushing flow – philosophy must rise together with this eruption and ceaselessly draw upon its wealth in its figuration.²⁸ Only such a return to and into the source is capable of circumventing the “totalizing” tendency of “worldviews,” insofar as the “ur-dimensionality” of this source exceeds them both in depth and in height (“*untertieft und überhöht*”): “The total worldview must close

²² Heidegger, *Beiträge*, IV.138, 259: “So ist Ver-stehen...das Gegenteil des ‘Subjektivierung’...”

²³ Ibid., IV.167, 289: “Die Wesung jenes, worin wir *einfahren* müssen. Das meint hier ‘*Erfahrung*’; einfahren, um in ihr zu stehen und sie auszustehen, was geschieht als Da-sein und dessen Gründung.”

²⁴ Ibid., VIII.269, 481: “Die völlige Ungewöhnlichkeit des Seyns gegen alles Seiende verlangt denn auch die Ungewöhnlichkeit des ‘Erfahrens’ des Seyns; die Seltenheit solches Erfahrens und Wissens ist daher auch nicht erstaunlich.”

²⁵ Ibid.: “Solches Wissen läßt sich nicht geradehin bewerkstelligen. ...vermögen wir solches nie von uns aus. Das Seyn selbst muß uns aus dem Seienden heraussetzen...”

As the following chapter will seek to demonstrate, such a ‘bringing out of the ordinary’ is accomplished by art, which thus plays a central role in the ‘revision of experience,’ as Krzysztof Ziarek puts it: “Art ‘has to refashion its poetics to reveal its link to the way experience takes place, and demonstrate how this revision of experience can reorient the practice of thinking.” (Krzysztof Ziarek, “After Aesthetics : Heidegger and Benjamin on Art and Experience,” *Philosophy Today* 41, no. 1 (1997) : 199.)

²⁶ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, VIII.269, 483: “...‘Entsetzen,’ jetzt als Grundstimmung der ‘Er-fahrung’ des Seyns gemeint.”

²⁷ Ibid., V.181, 303: “Das Sich-werfen...ist kein absolutes Schaffen... Es eröffnet sich die Geworfenheit des Sichwerfens und des Werfers abgründlich...”

²⁸ Ibid., I.14, 39: “Philosophie hat als Gründung der Wahrheit des Seyns den Ursprung in ihr selbst; sie muß sich selbst in das, was sie gründet, zurücknehmen und einzig daraus er-bauen.”

itself off from the opening of its ground and the en-grounding of the realm of its “creating”; therefore, its creating can never come into the essence and turn into a creating-over-and-above-itself, because the total worldview would therewith have to put itself into question.”²⁹ Only through reflection/“осмысление” (*Besinnung*) might it hope to discover the sense of the truth of being³⁰ – and therewith, its own sense.

The obsession of modern science with “experimentation” must itself be envisioned anew as properly experimental (*experimentell*).³¹ However conjectural, §77-80 of the *Beiträge* are nevertheless dedicated entirely to the envisioned transfiguration of experiment (*experimentum*) into proper experience (*Erfahrung*). According to Heidegger’s overview, an “experiment” is conceived as a striking upon something which strikes one, which “affects” one, which encounters one without one’s collaboration; on the other hand, it is also a going towards something which does not, insofar as it is itself concerned, come over one immediately and on its own; finally, it is a going towards something in the manner of testing what it looks like and how it is “at hand.”³² The operative concept of experience in the latter two definitions is that of a pursuit of something “sought” (*Gesuchtes*) by means which elaborate mere looking around into observing (*Beobachten*); under the appearance of following that which it encounters (*das Begegnende*), such an experience, in fact, anticipates it by the conditions of the possibility of such an encounter that it lays down for itself: in this case, “we create determined experiences for ourselves through determined interventions and according to the application of determined

²⁹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.14, 40: “Die totale Weltanschauung muß sich der Eröffnung ihres Grundes und der Ergründung des Reiches ihres ‘Schaffens’ verschließen; d. h. ihr Schaffen kann nie ins Wesen kommen und zum Über-sich-hinaus-schaffen werden, weil die totale Weltanschauung damit sich selbst in Frage stellen müßte.”

³⁰ Ibid., I.16, 43: “Besinnung ist Fragen nach dem Sinn...nach der Wahrheit des Seyns.”

³¹ Ibid., II.76, 150.

³² Ibid., II.77, 160: “1. ‘erfahren’: auf etwas stoßen und zwar solches, was einem zustößt; hinnehmen müssen von solchem, was einen trifft und einem etwas antut, was uns ‘affiziert,’ was ohne unser Zutun uns begegnet. 2. er-fahren als *Zugehen auf etwas*, was uns nicht unmittelbar in dem genannten Sinne ‘angeht’... 3. das vorige Zugehen auf etwas aber in der Weise der *Erprobung* darauf, wie es aussieht und vorhanden ist...”

conditions of more precise seeing and determining.”³³ These “conditions” assume the form of commensurability to rules (*Regelmäßigkeit*), including adopted rules and terms of measurability (*Meßbarkeit*), such as space and time.³⁴ However, in the medieval period, the attempt to access the “real” encountered opposition in the form of commitments to the certainty of the holy (*Heilsgewißheit*) and of the “I” (*Ichgewißheit*); the prioritization of these “rules” – which were themselves above reproach as “indemonstrable” (“*nicht Zeigbare*”)³⁵ was further compounded by the subjugation of that which is accessible to the “natural light” (*lumen naturale*) – formerly determined by Aristotle’s notion of ἐμπειρία – to that which is accessible only by the revelation of the “divine word” (*verbum divinum/Offenbarung*).³⁶ The latter turned into the ultimate condition of every possible experience, determining notions as wide-ranging as that of the “I” and those of time and space.³⁷

The futility of im-proper experience (*Erlebnis/Er-leben*) consists in its obstinate pursuit of drawing and “consuming” all beings into itself (*einbeziehen*).³⁸ In contrast to art, im-proper experience manifests itself in the mode of machination (*Machenschaft*).³⁹ Ironically, despite the inevitable constriction of such im-proper experience and machination by the limits of subjectivity, both of these express a voracious hubris towards beings, being, and beyng – one which knows no boundaries.⁴⁰ For Heidegger, machination expresses itself in a great variety of ways, ranging as broadly as objectification, certitude, mathematical system, and reduction of

³³ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, II.77, 160: “Das bloße Sichumsehen...wird zu einem Beobachten, das das Begegnende *verfolgt* und zwar unter wechselnden Bedingungen seines Begegnens und Vorkommens.”

³⁴ *Ibid.*, II.77, 161-162.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, II.80, 165.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, II.78, 163.

³⁷ *Ibid.*: “Aber damit erst nur die allgemeine Voraussetzung für die Möglichkeit des ‘Experimentes.’”

³⁸ *Ibid.*, I.63, 129: “Das Seiende als Vor-gestelltes auf *sich zu* als die Bezugsmittel beziehen und so in ‘das Leben’ einbeziehen.”

³⁹ *Ibid.*, I.66, 131.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*: “Im Wesen beider liegt es, keine Grenzen zu kennen...”

quality to quantity.⁴¹ Together, these entail a “setting-before” and a “bringing-before-the-self” (*Vor-stellen/Vor-sich-her-bringen*) which measure the relation between the self and the being in terms of distance (*Abstand*); such distantiation is then inscribed into the very foundations of the determination of the object and nurtures an obsession with its overcoming.⁴² The quantification of such distance then becomes the primary means of access to beings, an access which amounts to yet another “setting and binding [of beings] into its boundaries by means of determined principles.”⁴³ In this context, space and time are themselves reduced to “forms of quantities.”⁴⁴ *Quantitas* misinterpreted as quantity in the Aristotelian sense of a magnitude divisible into parts (“so and so great”/“*so und so Großes*”) rather than *quantum* (“greatness”/*Größe*), or magnitude as a greater whole,⁴⁵ gives birth to modern science (*Wissenschaft*) as “measure-giving knowing” (“*maßgebende Wissen*”) which is entirely bound up in principles derived from an “ungraspable truth.”⁴⁶ Incidentally, one of the “outcomes”/“results” (*Ergebnisse*) of its causal method, circumscribed by the cause-effect-relation (*Ursache-Wirkungs-Beziehung*), is the account of the work of art in terms of its physico-chemical composition.⁴⁷

Such a reduction might be glimpsed and overturned only from the standpoint which grounds space and time for the first time and anew, by itself and for itself.⁴⁸ Thus, proper

⁴¹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.77, 160: “...verschaffen wir uns bestimmte Erfahrungen durch bestimmte Eingriffe und unter Anwendung bestimmter Bedingungen des genaueren Sehens und Bestimmens.”

⁴² Ibid., I.70, 135: “Das Vor-stellen und das Vor-sich-bringen schließt in sich das ‘wieweit’ und ‘inwiefern,’ das Abstandmäßige in bezug zum Seienden als Gegen-stand... Das Vor-stellen als systematisches macht diesen Abstand und seine Überwindung und Sicherung zum Grundgesetz der Gegenstandsbestimmung.”

⁴³ Ibid., I.70, 136: “Schon hieraus wird klar, daß es sich gar nicht um einen Umschlag des ‘Quantitativen’ in ein Qualitatives handelt, sondern darum, das ursprüngliche Wesen des Quantitativen und der Möglichkeit seiner Vorstellung (die Berechenbarkeit) im Wesen der Herrschaft der *Vor-stellung als solcher* und der *Vergegenständlichung* des Seienden zu erkennen... durch bestimmte Prinzipien in seine Grenzen gesetzt und gebändigt.”

⁴⁴ Ibid.: “...man auch heute noch und heute mehr als vordem Raum und Zeit nicht anders begreifen kann als quantitativ, höchstens als *Formen* dieser Quantitäten.”

⁴⁵ Ibid., II.71, 138.

⁴⁶ Ibid., II.73, 143, II.76.145.

⁴⁷ Ibid., II.76, 146-147: “...die Erklärung eines Gemäldes in physikalisch-chemischer Hinsicht...”

⁴⁸ Ibid., II.72, 140: “Dieser Standort, der sich selbst erst Raum und Zeit neu gründet, ist das Da-sein...”

thinking about spatiality and temporality must aim towards overcoming their “mathematization” (*Mathematisierung*) with a view to glimpsing their “pre-mathematical Gestalt” (*vor-mathematische Gestalt*).⁴⁹ It remains to be seen, however, whether such “de-mathematization” must inevitably entail a wholesale denunciation of the very notion of measure, such that any alternative articulation of spatiality and temporality from this point forward would have to feature the terms “unmeasured” (*ungemessen*) or even “foreign/alien-to-measure” (*maßfremd*). Given Heidegger’s critique of the specifically Cartesian “mathematization” of the *ratio*,⁵⁰ should not the boundaries of the Cartesian notion of mathematics – and, by extension, that of *ratio* – be examined with a view to their expansion? The same question would eventually apply to the Aristotelian notion of λόγος as propositional.⁵¹ Indeed, the term Heidegger selects to describe the

⁴⁹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.d).242, 387.

For a thorough overview of the developments which had led to ‘mathematization’ as the ‘constitution of a seemingly transcendental ‘mathematical reason’ and a comparison with their reconstruction by Heidegger, see Enrico Gianetto, “Heidegger and the Question of Physics, Art, and Technics,” in *Science and Art : The Red Book of ‘Einstein Meets Magritte,’* ed. Diederik Aerts, Ernest Mathijs, and Bert Mosselmans (Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic Publishers), 1999. Gianetto characterizes Heidegger’s attempt to think space and time in indivisible terms as ‘relational’ and radically distinguishes it from the efforts of Neo-Kantians to think the same in ‘absolute terms’: “Given the relativity of space and time measurements, Heidegger tried to conceive them beyond this numerical dimension... This is not the simple shift tried by some neo-kantians (neo-newtonians) considering absolute space and independently absolute time beyond relative measurements : Heidegger moved in a relativistic background. So this ‘indeterminate’ dimension of space-time is individuated by Heidegger in *die Lichtung des Offenen* (‘the openness glade’), in *das Offene des Zeit-Raumes* (the space-time openness)... Indeed, a completely relational formulation of relativity implies a radical non-separability of the world, and so the impossibility of the first step (separability needed for determination) in the rationalization and in the technical domain of nature...” (Enrico Gianetto, “Heidegger and the Question of Physics, Art, and Technics,” in *Science and Art : The Red Book of ‘Einstein Meets Magritte,’* ed. Diederik Aerts, Ernest Mathijs, and Bert Mosselmans (Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 67).

⁵⁰ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, VIII.265, 457: “Die ratio wird ‘mathematisch’ seit Descartes.”

⁵¹ Thus, Frank Schalow chooses to emphasize the common ancestry of *ratio*, *logos*, and *physis*, mourns its fracturation in the modern period, and calls for a rediscovery of their synthetic common origin : “...initially, *logos* occurs in reciprocity with *physis* rather than in separation as subsequently occurs. (...) But with the modern era, *physis* becomes a distant cousin of a truncated form of nature as a mere collection of present-at-hand entities which stands separate from the capacity to represent order ascribed to *ratio*. Likewise, *ratio* harbours only a faint ancestry with *logos*, and points instead to formulate an idea of what is already present, to re-present it according to fixed distinctions or categories.” ((Frank Schalow, “Mimesis, Art, and Truth,” in *Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred : From Thought to the Sanctuary of Faith* (Dordrecht, Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers), 2001, 96). Luce Fontaine-De Visscher, on the other hand, renders Heidegger’s distinction between ‘measure’ and ‘hyper-measure’ in much more rigid terms, which would preclude any inquiry into their possible continuity : “seul donc un *Saut* permet à la pensée de circular dans le toujours déjà et d’abandonner le plan de la linéarité de la *ratio* ; pas de transition possible.” Luce Fontaine-De Visscher, “Ce qui vient en poème. Entre Heidegger et la nouvelle critique,” *Revue*

only “measure” adequate to plumbing – or plummeting into – the depths of being, i. e. poetry, is that of “hyper-measure” (*Übermaß*). Yet does such a notion signal the death of *mathesis* or celebrate poetry as its apotheosis?⁵² Indeed, when Heidegger speaks of the poetry of Hölderlin at the end of Section VI “Die Zu-Künftigen,” it is precisely in terms of approaching “the broadest” and measuring “the greatest” through and through” (*durchmessen*).⁵³ Indeed, as with the notions of spatiality and temporality themselves, the notions of measure and measuring themselves must be transformed from their commonplace restricted meaning to their proper meaning and their proper name, “the measure of ‘being-there’” (“das Maß des Da-seins”).⁵⁴ And yet, as Heidegger yearns for a transfiguration of philosophy, he remains ambivalent about its potential magnitude (*Größe*), precisely because he suspects that the very language of “magnitude” – extricated though it may be from the merely calculative – may in the end prove to be “too small.”⁵⁵ Indeed, how could even poetic language dive deep enough into a magnitude which is a “first beginning” and thus “beyond compare” (“*ohne Vergleich*”)?⁵⁶

Indeed, as Heidegger confirms in the second segment on philosophy (§17): “Therefore,

Philosophique de Louvain 80, no. 47 (1982): 262.) Such a position is based on Fontaine-De Visscher’s interpretation of *ratio* as exclusively preoccupied with causes: “Le sens originaire du Logos...est obnubilé par la *ratio*... Violence oubliée de l’Être (*concept-Begriff*), la *ratio* se saisit de tout ce qui est commun à des choses, c’est-à-dire à des causes, réduisant ainsi le multiple à l’identité de la Cause première.” (Fontaine-De Visscher, “Ce qui vient en poème,” 267.)

⁵² In this wish, we are supported by Otto Pöggeler, who similarly wonders whether it is not perhaps “our task to work out a way of getting beyond this contrast between rationally [sic.] and art.” (Otto Pöggeler, “Art-Myth-Language,” in *The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997), 213).

⁵³ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, VI.252, 401: “Hölderlin ist der Zukünftigste, weil er am weitesten herkommt und in dieser Weite das Größte *durchmißt* und verwandelt.”

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, VII.256, 412.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, VIII.259, 432: “Weil da eine Größe denkerischen Daseins ernötigt ist durch das Seyn selbst, deren Gestalt wir kaum erahnen aus dem dichterischen Dasein Hölderlins und aus der schauerlichen Wanderung Nietzsches, weil im Raum des seinsgeschichtlichen Denkens nur noch dieses Große ist, weshalb auch die Rede von Größe zu klein bleibt...”

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, VIII.259, 434: “...das anfänglich Große, das zufolge seiner ersten Anfänglichkeit in seiner Größe ohne Vergleich bleibt...”

reflection – a spring into the truth of being – is necessarily self-reflection/самоосмысление.”⁵⁷ The notion of self-reflection/самоосмысление must be kept apart from the several historical “precedents,” such as the Cartesian certainty of the “I,” the Kantian “law-onto-itself,” the modern “being-self-conscious” (*Selbstbewußtsein*), as well as the increasingly weaker variants of “personality” and “genius.” Quite in line with Heidegger’s distantiation from both Kant and Descartes, he cautions against the confusion of self-reflection/самоосмысление with any kind of “self-certainty of the ‘I.’”: “...it is far from that *clara et distincta perceptio*, in which the *ego* arises and is certain.”⁵⁸ Although Heidegger concedes Kant’s advance over preoccupations with personality (“*Persönlichkeit*”) and genius (“*Genie*”)⁵⁹ – insofar as Kant acknowledges that “the person is more than the ‘I’ – Heidegger believes the Kantian notion of self-law-giving (*Selbstgesetzgebung*) to be nevertheless mired in Platonism.⁶⁰ Finally, Heidegger judges the “modern” interpretation of self-reflection as “being-self-conscious” (*Selbstbewußtsein*) to be more of a calculation (*Berechnung*), a self-assessment.⁶¹ For Heidegger, the question of the self – of “being-self” (*Selbst-sein*)⁶² – must remain open-ended precisely because it is properly situated within the question of being, which is itself immeasurable and therefore inexhaustible. Insofar as Heidegger provisionally defines selfhood (*Selbstheit*) as a realm of happening (*Geschehnisbereich*), any reflection upon it must go forth within the “space of happening” (*Geschehnisraum*)⁶³ of the open time-space of being.⁶⁴ Thus, he sees the strength of his

⁵⁷ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.17, 44: “Daher ist die Besinnung – Einsprung in die Wahrheit des Seins – notwendig Selbst-besinnung.”

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, I.19, 48: “...unterscheidet sich wesentlich von jeglicher Art der Sicherung der ‘Selbst’-gewißheit des ‘Ich.’ ...ist fern von jener *clara et distincta perceptio*, in der das *ego* aufgeht und gewiß wird.”

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, I.19, 52.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, I.19, 53.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, I.28, 67: “...das mehr eine Berechnung ist...”

⁶² *Ibid.*, I.19, 51.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, I.41, 84.

interpretation of self-reflection as necessarily involving reflection upon – and happening of – an “always-still-other” (*Immer-noch-Andere*).⁶⁵

Such open-ended self-reflection calls for a reflection upon a more original beginning (*Anfang*). As was made evident in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, such a beginning must be thought otherwise than an original, proto-, or ur-cause (*Ursache*). The *Beiträge* confirms that the interpretation of the beginning as an original, proto-, or ur-cause (*Ursache*) inevitably renders beings in terms of their objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*), which ultimately reduces their “beingness” (*Seiendheit*) to the “logical form” (“*logische Form*”) of the thinkable (*Denkbares*).⁶⁶ This approach leads to beings appearing “as though being did not essence.”⁶⁷ However, self-reflection would need to retain key features of this beginning, namely, self-grounding (*sichgründend*) and anticipatory (*vorausgreifend*).⁶⁸ The necessity of such a beginning lies in the impotence of the human being to singlehandedly extricate itself from machinations in which it is mired.⁶⁹ Unlike the human being, the beginning or the origin/ur-spring enfolds a counterforce to such a lapse; its complementary hallmarks are self-release and self-containment, the latter enabling it to continually resist and withdraw (*entziehen*) from dissolution in trade (*Betrieb*).⁷⁰ It can unfold and recoil all the while sustaining its intrinsic tension and can, therefore, offer the only reliable support for the resonant manoeuvre of the human being. It is only by way of

⁶⁴ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.19, 51: “Die Selbstheit des Menschen...ist ein Geschehnisbereich, in dem er sich zugeeignet wird nur, wenn er selbst in den offenen Zeit-Raum gelangt, in dem eine Eignung geschehen kann.”

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, I.19, 52.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, I.52, 111: “...das Seiende nur in seiner Gegenständlichkeit genommen und beherrscht wird. Die Seiendheit des Seienden verblaßt zu einer ‘logischen Form,’ zum Denkbareren eines selbst ungegründeten Denkens.”

Ibid., I.61, 127.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, I.55, 115.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, I.20, 55.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, I.23, 57.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

enracination (*Verwurzelung*)⁷¹ into this soil that the human being is able to acquire the stability necessary for both withstanding and bearing the strife of the counterforces which constitutes the essential dynamic of the turn.⁷²

As proper philosophy, so a proper people (Volk) or people-hood (*das Volkhafte*) may only begin with watchfulness (*Wächterschaft*) over the truth of being.⁷³ Thus, the proper people-hood of a people must come not only from within a people, but also from beyond and across (*über*) a people.⁷⁴ But a people is not only a “watcher” of being (as the truth of being), but also its “thrower”/“drafter”/“drawer” (*Werfer*) or, in less etymologically-bound language, its projector.⁷⁵ As such, it “throws”/“draws” beings – as it is itself “thrown”/“drawn” – towards being.⁷⁶ The capital decision that a people must make is whether or not it would belong to being or not.⁷⁷

§2. Time-space (*Zeit-Raum*) as the Crux of the Transfiguration of Dasein

Thus, Heidegger takes the “essential” aspiration of the *Beiträge* to be a glimpse of the opening of the time-play-space of the truth of being (*Eröffnung des Zeit-Spiel-Raumes der Wahrheit des Seyns*).⁷⁸ Early on in the *Beiträge*, Heidegger still occasionally refers to this time-play-space as “the whole temporality” (*die ganze Zeitlichkeit*), thus privileging the temporal over the spatial.⁷⁹ However, by §32 of the preview (*Vorblick*), he explicitly acknowledges the original belonging together of time and space – a belonging of both to a third, namely, to the origin/ur-

⁷¹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.25, 62.

⁷² *Ibid.*, I.25, 62.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, I.15, 43.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, I.17, 45: “Werfer des Seins (der Wahrheit des Seyns)...”

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, I.46, 100.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, I.1, 5.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, I.6, 22.

spring of truth: “Here, in this original interpretation of time, is encountered for the first time [that] realm, where time reaches utmost difference – and precisely thus, an intimacy of essentialization/осуществления – with space.”⁸⁰ Moreover, it is precisely this “highest difference” (*äußerste Verschiedenheit*) which also refers them back to their common origin of time-space.⁸¹ This relationship hearkens back to Heidegger’s determination of strife in the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*,⁸² which suggests that the unity of time and space within time-space may indeed be productively characterized as a kind of strife. Yet the resolved articulation of the unity of time-space continues to elude Heidegger as late as in §242, where the challenge is once again posed in the form of a question: “Of what kind is the original unity, such that it throws itself apart in this ‘scission,’ and in which sense are the ‘scissioned’ here precisely united as the essencing of abyssality?”⁸³ Indeed, in §255, it is acknowledged as a “mystery”: “the mystery of the unity of the most intimate approximation in the most outward distantiation, the measuring of the widest time-play-space of *beyng*.”⁸⁴ Perhaps this question might be paraphrased as follows: what does it mean to speak of a paradoxical unity essential to separation? As at other

⁸⁰ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.32, 69-70: “Es gilt, im voraus den Bezug von Sein und Wahrheit zu erblicken und zu verfolgen, wie von hier aus *Zeit und Raum* in ihrer ursprünglichen Zugehörigkeit bei aller Fremdheit gegründet sind.”

Ibid., I.34, 74: “Hier erst, in dieser ursprünglichen Auslegung der Zeit, ist der Bereich getroffen, wo Zeit mit dem Raum zur äußersten Verschiedenheit und so gerade Wesungsinnigkeit gelangt.”

⁸¹ Ibid., V.d).241, 377: “Der Raum ist von der Zeit grundverschieden. ...nur kraft dieser äußersten Verschiedenheit weisen sie zurück in ihren Ursprung, den Zeit-Raum.”

⁸² H 35: “Allzuleicht verfälschen wir freilich das Wesen des Streitigen, indem wir sein Wesen mit der Zwietracht und dem Hader zusammenwerfen und ihn deshalb nur als Störung und Zerstörung kennen. Im wesenhaften Streit jedoch heben die Streitenden, das Eine je das Andere, in die Selbstbehauptung ihres Wesens. Die Selbstbehauptung des Wesens ist jedoch niemals das Sichversteifen auf einen zufälligen Zustand, sondern das Sichaufgeben in die verborgene Ursprünglichkeit der Herkunft des eigenen Seins. Im Streit trägt jedes das andere über sich hinaus. Der Streit wird so immer strittiger und eigentlicher, was er ist. Je härter der Streit sich selbständig übertreibt, um so unnachgiebiger lassen sich die Streitenden in die Innigkeit des einfachen Sichgehörens los.”

⁸³ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.d).242, 383: “Welcher Art ist die ursprüngliche Einheit, daß sie sich in diese Scheidung auseinanderwirft, und in welchem Sinn sind die Gteschiedenen hier als Wesung der Ab-gründigkeit gerade einig?”

⁸⁴ Ibid., VII.255, 408: “...das Geheimnis der Einheit innigster Näherung in der äußersten Entfernung, die Ausmessung des weitesten Zeit-Spiel-Raumes des Seyns.”

points in the text,⁸⁵ Heidegger is insistent that such simultaneous unity and difference are not of a ‘dialectical’ nature. In §242, he makes a rather cryptic attempt at articulating it in terms of the dynamic of attraction-rapture (*Berückung/Entrückung*), which loosely correlates the former with space and the latter with time.⁸⁶ The crucial insight of this commentary, however, is that the unity of space and time does not simply consist in something they share “in common” (*kein Gemeinsames*), but rather in their belonging to the unfolding of the essence of truth.⁸⁷

It is precisely this relation of simultaneous similarity and difference which prepares the way for Heidegger’s notion of the spatiality (*Räumlichkeit*) of “being-there,” or undimensionality.⁸⁸ Indeed, by §86, Heidegger characterizes the time-play-space by the language of “stretching-out” or “extension (*Erstreckung*), reserved in *Sein und Zeit* for temporality alone.⁸⁹ Furthermore, in §91 he acknowledges that a focus on time is a focus that must be acknowledged as “underway” (“*unterwegs*”) to another focus: the truth of being.⁹⁰ Such time may be experienced precisely as the ecstatic play-space (*Spiel-raum*) of the truth of being.⁹¹ Indeed, “time-space” (*Zeit-Raum*) is simultaneous (*gleichzeitig*) with beings insofar as they are true, i. e. insofar as they are enfolded within the truth of being.⁹² The most concentrated and potent articulation of this more profound thinking about space and time emerges in §95 and is worth citing in its entirety:

⁸⁵ Cf. Heidegger, *Beiträge*, IV.144, 264-265.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, V.d).242, 385.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, V.d).242, 386: “Sie haben aber auch kein Gemeinsames als Einheit, sondern...der Zeit-Raum ist nur die Wesensentfaltung der Wahrheit.”

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, I.34, 74: “Dieser Bezug vorbereitet in der Darstellung der Räumlichkeit des Da-seins, nicht etwa des ‘Subjekts’ und des ‘Ichs’...”

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, III.86, 174: “...solange wir nicht den Zeit-Spiel-Raum gegründet haben, in dessen Erstreckungen erst zu ermessen ist, was sich in der Geschichte der Metaphysik ereignet hat: das Vorspiel des Er-ignisses selbst als der Wesung des Seyns.”

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, III.91, 183.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, IV.125, 242: “Die ‘Zeit’ sollte erfahrbar werden als der ‘ekstatische’ Spielraum der Wahrheit des Seyns.”

⁹² *Ibid.*, III.112, 223: “Das Da-sein ist die Gleichzeitigkeit des Zeit-Raumes mit dem Wahren als dem Seienden...”

The fact that for us, for the retrieving reflection out of the first beginning, time initially lights up as the truth of being does not mean that the original full truth of being might be grounded only upon time. Indeed, one must initially attempt to think the essence of time in this original way (in its “ecstasy”), such that it is graspable as a possible truth for the being as such. But this thinking through of time already brings it, in the relatedness to the there of being-there, into essential relation to the spatiality of being-there and, therewith, to space (cf. The Grounding). But here time and space are, when measured against their usual representation, more original and fully time-space, which is no coupling, but rather the more original [fact] of their belonging together. The latter, however, points towards the essence of truth as illuminating concealing. The truth of *being* is no less than the essence of truth, conceived and grounded as illuminating concealing, the happening of the being-there, of the turning point in the turn as self-opening middle.”⁹³

Indeed, in Part V (The Grounding) of the *Beiträge*, Heidegger directs his attention to the notion of “being-there” (*Da-sein*) understood specifically as “the being-of-the-there” (“*das Sein des Da*”).⁹⁴ It is a “distinguished” “way of being”⁹⁵ which is uniquely suited to “grounding” truth, insofar as the dynamic of such truth is understood to be a simultaneous opening and closure (or the opening of the self-closing).⁹⁶ As such, “being-there” is also the “ground of possibility” for the transfiguration of the human being effectuated by the latter’s belonging to and instantiation in the abyss of being.⁹⁷ The opening-concealing itself, however, is part and

⁹³ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, III.95, 189: “Daß *uns* aus dem ersten Anfang für die wiederholende Besinnung zunächst die Zeit als die Wahrheit des Seyns aufleuchtet, sagt nicht, daß die ursprüngliche volle Wahrheit des Seyns nur auf die Zeit gegründet werden könnte. Zwar muß zunächst überhaupt versucht werden, das Wesen der Zeit so ursprünglich (in ihrer ‘Ekstasik’) zu denken, daß sie als mögliche Wahrheit für das Seyn als solches begreifbar wird. Aber schon dieses Durchdenken der Zeit bringt sie in der Bezogenheit auf das Da des Da-seins mit der Räumlichkeit des Da-seins und so mit dem Raum in wesentlichen Bezug (vgl. Die Gründung). Aber Zeit und Raum sind hier, an der gewöhnlichen Vorstellung von ihnen gemessen, ursprünglicher und vollends der Zeit-Raum, der keine Verkoppelung, sondern das Ursprünglichere ihrer Zusammengehörigkeit. Dieses aber weist in das Wesen der Wahrheit als lichtende Verbergung. Die Wahrheit des Seyns ist nicht geringes als das *Wesen der Wahrheit*, begriffen und gegründet als lichtende Verbergung, das Geschehnis des Da-seins, des Wendungspunkt in der Kehre als sich öffnende Mitte.”

Cf. *Ibid.*, V.d).239: “Raum und Zeit, je für sich vorgestellt und in der üblichen Verbindung, entspringen selbst aus dem Zeit-Raum, der ursprünglicher ist als sie selbst und ihre rechenhaft vorgestellte Verbundung. Der Zeit-Raum aber gehört zur Wahrheit im Sinne der Erwesung des Seins als Ereignis.”

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, V.173, 296: “Das *Da-sein* ist nicht die Wirklichkeitsweise von jeglichem Seienden, sondern ist selbst das Sein des Da.”

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, V.173, 297.

parcel of the illumination (*Lichtung*) of being itself, which first spatializes the space for every possible here and there, as well as for the orientation of all beings towards itself.⁹⁸ As Heidegger clarifies in the subsequent paragraph, “being-there” unfolds from being itself as a “between,” an open realm within which something may arise.⁹⁹ “Being-there” – and, in its effectuation, the human being – bears (*erträgt*) this illumination.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, “being-there” always both “underpins” (*unter-gründet*) and “exceeds” (*überhöht*) the human being.¹⁰¹ Indeed, “being-there” is said to be no less than the “between” between the human beings and the gods, as well as between being and beings.¹⁰²

This recapitulation establishes the major advance of the *Beiträge* not only over *Sein und Zeit*,¹⁰³ but also over previous attempts at resolving the problematic of space and time going all the way back to Aristotle’s physics. In Heidegger’s estimation, the roots of the consignment of reflection upon space and time to its “found” state reach all the way back to an interpretation of being in terms of constancy (*Beständigkeit*) and presence (*Anwesenheit*), which are, in turn, referred back to and rendered in terms of time.¹⁰⁴ Yet this supposedly elucidating point of reference remains ambiguous: on the one hand, the commonplace experience of time contains a tacit inkling of time as “timing” (*Zeitigung*), as “re-moval”/rapture (*Entrückung*), and as

⁹⁸ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.173, 298: “Das Da bedeutet nicht ein irgendwie jeweils bestimmbares Hier und Dort, sondern meint die *Lichtung* des Seins selbst, deren Offenheit erst den Raum einräumt für jedes mögliche Hier und Dort und die Einrichtung des Seienden in geschichtliches Werk und Tat und Opfer.”

⁹⁹ Ibid., V.175, 299: “...rückt das Da-sein...weg vom Bezug zum Menschen und enthüllt sich als das ‘Zwischen,’ das vom Seyn selbst entfaltet wird als der offene Hereinragensbereich für das Seiende, in welchem Bereich dieses zumal sich auf sich selbst zurückstellt.”

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., V.173, 298.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., V.176, 301: “Da-sein – was den Menschen *zugleich unter-gründet und überhöht*.”

¹⁰² Ibid., V.191, 311: “So ist das Da-sein das *Zwischen* zwischen den Menschen (als geschichtegründenden) und den Göttern (in ihrer Geschichte).”

Ibid., V.c).217, 343: “...das Da-sein das *Zwischen* zwischen dem *Seyn und dem Seienden*...”

¹⁰³ Although, according to Heidegger’s own assessment, *Sein und Zeit* already points in this direction: “‘Zeit’ ist in ‘Sein und Zeit’ die *Anweisung* und der *Anklang* auf jenes, was als Wahrheit der Wesung des Seyns geschieht in der Einzigkeit der Er-eignung.”

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., III.98.

“opening” (*Eröffnung*); on the other hand, it is unable to pursue this hunch because it is obliged – in virtue of the philosophical tradition to which it cleaves – to lead time between the pillars of constancy and presence and under the arch of their unity, which converges in a certain determination of beingness (*Seiendheit*).¹⁰⁵ Ushered through this passageway, time emerges, firstly, as the endurance (*Ausdauer*) of the “re-moval”/rapture into the present and future (with “duration” (“*Dauer*”) following suit as mere “enduring” (*Andauern*)); secondly, it appears under the guise of the present (*Gegenwart*) as the collectivity of endurance (*Gesammeltheit der Ausdauer*) dissociated from the “re-moval”/rapture which continually sustains it, and thus as a kind of time-lessness (*Zeitlosigkeit*).¹⁰⁶

Heidegger observes, however, that even within this ill-fated tradition, time is already linked with space insofar as time is “re-moving”/rapturing-opening: characterized in such a way, time may be understood as spatializing/making room, creating space.¹⁰⁷ What is more, Heidegger insists that within this “belonging together” of time and space, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish between their respective essences. As is time, space is more productively interpreted as “spacing” (*Räumung*): thus, in referring space back to constancy and presence, Heidegger articulates it, respectively, as (1) a spatializing (*Einräumung*), or filling out (*Ausfüllung*) and filling up (*Erfüllung*) of space which is itself not, properly speaking, experienced, and (2) a

¹⁰⁵ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, III.98, 191-192.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., III.98.192: “*Beständigkeit* ist *Ausdauer* der Entrückung in Gewesenheit und Zukunft, und die ‘Dauer’ als bloßes *Andauern* ist erst Folge der *Ausdauer*. *Anwesenheit* ist *Gegenwart* im Sinne der *Gesammeltheit* der *Ausdauer* gemäß ihrem Rückzug aus den Entrückungen, die daher verstellt und somit vergessen werden. So entsteht der Schein der *Zeit-losigkeit* des eigentlichen ‘Seienden.’”

Cf. Ibid., III.113, 223: “Die οὐσία als ‘Substanz’ wird so gleichsam zeit-frei angesetzt, um je nachdem dann als ‘ewige’ (unendliche) oder ‘zeitliche,’ endliche bestimmt zu werden.”

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., III.98, 192: “Die Zeit als entrückende-eröffnende ist in sich damit zugleich *einräumend*, sie schafft ‘Raum.’”

spatializing/making room (*Einräumung*), or giving room (*Raumgeben*) to a given being.¹⁰⁸ Curiously, in this analysis of the problematic of space and time within the Greek tradition, Heidegger already observes its more original, salvageable basis in the experience of simultaneity: “Being is commensurate with that fundamental determination which is ‘at the same time,’ which can bring the possibility of the ‘at the same time’ to fulfillment. The ‘one-after-another,’ the preceding and the following (later the ur-cause and the outworking) determines itself out of the ‘at the same time.’”¹⁰⁹ Secondly, if constancy (*Beständigkeit*) and presencing (*Anwesenung*) are to be thought anew, they must be interpreted from out of remembrance (*Erinnerung*) and preparation (*Bereitung*), which first reveal presentness (*Gegenwärtigkeit*) as unique (*einzig*) rather than fleeting (*flüchtig*).¹¹⁰

Harkening back to his engagement of Kant’s treatment of this problematic in the late 1920s, Heidegger reiterates that Kant’s rendition of space and time as “intuitions” is nothing more than “an attempt to salvage the proper essence of space and time,” which turns out to be futile, for “Kant has no path towards the essence of space and time,” insofar as his approach rests upon the aporias of the “I,” of “being-conscious,” and of “setting-before.”¹¹¹ Indeed, the reduction of encounter to the “objectivity of the object” – the “essential clarification in Kant’s

¹⁰⁸ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, III.98, 192: “*Beständigkeit* ist, raumhaft begriffen, die Ausfüllung und Erfüllung des selbst nicht eigens erfahrenen Raumes, somit eine *Einräumung*. *Anwesenheit* ist *Einräumung* im Sinne des Raumgebens für das in sie zurückgestellte und so ständige Seiende.”

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., III.113, 223: “Seiend ist jener Grundbestimmung gemäß, was *zugleich* ist, was die Möglichkeit des *Zugleich* vollbringen kann. Aus dem *Zugleich* bestimmt sich das Nacheinander, das Vorgehen und Folgen (später die Ur-sache und die Wirkung)...”

¹¹⁰ Ibid., IV.136, 257: “Erinnerung und Bereitung öffnen den Zeit-spiel-raum des Seyns...das Gegenwärtigen des je Anwesenden schon getragen und durchstimmt ist von Erinnerung und Bereitung, aus deren Innigkeit immer nur die Gegenwart aufblitzt. Ursprünglich erfahren kann sie nicht nach ihrer Flüchtigkeit berechnet werden, sondern nach ihrer *Einzigkeit*. Diese ist der neue und wesentliche Gehalt der aus Erinnerung und Bereitung zu bestimmenden Beständigkeit und Anwesenung.”

¹¹¹ Ibid., I.32, 71: “Wenn Kant Raum und Zeit als ‘Anschauungen’ kennzeichnet, dann ist das innerhalb dieser Geschichte nur ein schwacher Versuch, überhaupt das Eigenwesen von Raum und Zeit zu retten. Aber Kant hat keinen Weg zum *Wesen* von Raum und Zeit. Die Ausrichtung auf ‘Ich’ und ‘Bewußtsein’ und das Vor-stellen verlegt ohnehin jeden Weg und Steg.”

determination of the transcendental,” according to Heidegger¹¹² – perpetually frustrates the possibility of glimpsing spatiality, temporality, and experience as anything more than objectification. Proper spatiality and temporality cannot be derived from subjectivity as pure forms of its intuition, but rather, such subjectivity must give itself over to time-space (*Zeit-Raum*) in order to be properly configured.¹¹³

In Descartes, Heidegger observes a similar impoverishment of Plato’s relation (*Beziehung/ζυγόν*) between the soul (*ψυχή*) and the truth (*ἀλήθεια*) into a subject-object-relation (*Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung*).¹¹⁴ In so doing, Descartes forecloses on the possibility of genuine encounter by construing the latter relation as “I-think-something.”¹¹⁵ Thus, in the modern period, proper relation becomes virtually unimaginable as it becomes displaced by the notion of identity (*Identität*), of which the “I” – “the distinguished...identity specifically belonging to itself...which, knowing itself, is in this knowing” – arises as a privileged paradigm.¹¹⁶ Heidegger sees the apogee of this trajectory in the works of Hegel and Schelling, by whom knowing as “self-knowing” is considered to be the highest form of identity and therewith – of properly

¹¹² Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.43, 89: “...vor-stellen der Gegenständlichkeit des Gegenstandes (die wesentliche Klärung in *Kants* Bestimmung des Transzendentalen).”

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, V.d).239, 372: “...es sich ja keinesfalls nur um eine Abänderung des Vorstellens und der Vorstellungsrichtung [von Raum und Zeit] handelt, sondern um eine Ver-rückung des Menschenwesens in das Da-sein.”

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, III.102, 198.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*: “...diese Beziehung selbst, das Denken als das Denken des Ich-denke-etwas, schlechthin zum Grund der Seiendheit des Seienden zu machen...”

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, III.102, 199: “Und sie gewinnt neuzeitlich ihre Auszeichnung im *Ich*, das alsbald als die ausgezeichnete, nämlich als die *eigens sich* zugehörige Identität begriffen wird, jene Identität, die *sich* wissend in diesem Wissen gerade ist.”

As Robert Pippin points out, in seeing art as the possibility of critique of identity thinking Heidegger joins Adorno: “Adorno’s claim that the implicit rejection of conventional aesthetic norms in modernist art involves just thereby a ‘negation’ of a whole regime of sense-making dominated by what he calls ‘identity thinking’ and the totalization of instrumental rationality.” (Robert Pippin, “Art and Truth: Heidegger and Hegel,” in *After the Beautiful: Hegel and the Philosophy of Pictorial Modernism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 97.)

being.¹¹⁷ Such knowing then takes precedence as the condition of the possibility of all objectivity, and this, as Heidegger adds, “not only in relation-commensurate transcendental sense, but rather – as in Schelling – in such a way that the other of the “I” itself becomes determined as the visible spirit/mind, whereby identity in the absoluteness of indifference now arises once again.”¹¹⁸ The telos of this trajectory is the lifting up of “absolute knowing” (*absolutes Wissen*), of “unconditioned thinking” (*unbedingtes Denken*), of reflection (*Reflexion*) as the highest form of identity as the standard and measure for all experience and being.¹¹⁹ Heidegger reconstructs the trajectory itself as follows: (1) in Descartes, the *ego cogito sum* is posited as the “first certainty” and provides the basis for “the knowledge of necessary truths as the condition of the possibility of reflection, the grasp of the “I” as “I”; the “most necessary truth” – or the “essence of the true” – is then defined as “identity,” and it is such identity which is then espoused as an *a priori*, horizon-giving principle both for the grasp of perception and of its perceived, as well as for apperception; (2) such groundwork is then elaborated into the “synthetic unity of transcendental apperception,” (3) when interpreted transcendently as an “I-think-unity,” the identity of the “I” takes on the sense of “belonging to itself insofar as it knows

¹¹⁷ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, III.102, 199: “Das Wissen als Sichwissendes...die höchste Identität, d. h. das eigentlich Seiende...”

¹¹⁸ Ibid.: “Das Wissen als Sichwissendes...die höchste Identität, d. h. das eigentlich Seiende, und ist zugleich als dieses in der Möglichkeit, in seiner Weise als Wissen alle andere Gegenständlichkeit zu bedingen – und zwar nicht nur in verhältnismäßig transzendentalen Sinne, sondern – wie bei Schelling – derart, daß das Andere des Ich selbst als der *sichtbare* Geist bestimmt wird, wodurch nun noch einmal und endgültig die Identität in die Absolutheit der *Indifferenz* gehoben wird...”

¹¹⁹ Ibid., III.102, 200: “Das absolute Wissen, das unbedingte Denken ist jetzt das maßgebende und zugleich alles begründende Seiende schlechthin.”

In this criticism, Heidegger resonates with Adorno’s assessment of ‘autonomous’ art as a counter-measure against ‘identity thinking [which is] a mastering of the Other through the regimentation of conceptual thought into frameworks whose goal just is the construing of the non-identical other in the image of the same.’ (Quoted in Jay M. Bernstein, “Aesthetic Alienation: Heidegger, Adorno, and the Truth at the End of Art,” in *Life after Postmodernism: Essays on Value and Culture*, ed. John Fekete (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 114; original quotation in T. W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. C. Lenhardt (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 144).

itself,” and is finally (4) absolutized as at once “unconditioned” and “all-conditioning.”¹²⁰ Thus, Heidegger traces German idealism to the notion of the self-thinking “I,” which regards itself and every being as an *ιδέα*, a vision or a face (*Gesicht*), which lends itself to being set-before (*vorstellen*) the “I” which sees (an *ego percipio*) in the manner of setting something before itself as an object of thinking.¹²¹ For Heidegger, platonism turns into idealism precisely at the point where *ιδέα* turns from the manner in which a being appears into idea as “the *perceptum* grasped in the *percipere* of the *ego*,” and is situated within reason as a principle.¹²² This gradual absorption of the otherness of the *ιδέα* into the identity of the self reaches its height in Hegel’s notion of idea as the “absolute self-appearing of the absolute as absolute knowing.”¹²³ In a well-veiled reference to Husserl’s notion of intentionality, Heidegger deems its “outward-boundedness” to be similarly deficient, insofar as it ultimately fails to provide a robust account of that “open” towards which intentional “processes” or “acts” are envisaged as extending.¹²⁴

The fullest extent of the proper spatiality and temporality of Dasein may only be glimpsed in the light of Dasein’s primordial belonging and attribution/reference (*Zugewiesenheit*) to this opening – an insight which Heidegger terms “in-stantiation in the

¹²⁰ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, III.102, 201: “Vom ego cogito sum als der ersten Gewißheit, dem maßgebenden certum = verum = ens, zur connaissance des verités necessaires als Bedingung der Möglichkeit der *reflexion*, der Erfassung des Ich als ‘Ich.’ Die notwendigste Wahrheit ist das Wesen des als identitäts, und diese ist *die* entitas entis und als im voraus (qua Principium) gewußte Horizont-gebend für die Erfassung der perceptio und ihres perceptum, für die apperceptio, die ausdrückliche Erfassung der *monas als monas*. Von hier aus ist der Weg gewiesen zur ursprünglich-synthetischen Einheit der transzendentalen Apperception. On hier zum ‘Ich’ als der ursprünglichen, sich wissend gehörigen und deshalb ‘seienden’ Identität. ... Sofern aber das ‘Ich’ transzendental als Ich-denke-Einheit begriffen wird, ist diese ursprüngliche Identität zugleich die unbedingte, alles bedingende, aber trotzdem noch nicht *absolute*, weil Fichtisch das Gesetzte nur als *Nicht-Ich* gesetzt. Der Weg von absoluten Identität erst bei Schelling.”

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, III.103, 202.

¹²² *Ibid.*, III.110, 212: “das im percipere des ego gefaßte perceptum...Und erst in der Auslegung der *ιδέα als perceptio* wird der Platonismus zum ‘Idealismus’...und demzufolge bei Kant dann die ‘Ideen’ gerettet, aber als Vorstellungen und Prinzipien der ‘Vernunft’ als der menschlichen Vernunft.”

¹²³ *Ibid.*: “das absolute Sichselbsterscheinen des Absoluten als absolutes Wissen.”

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, V.193, 316: “Im Vor-stellen zeigt sich die Spur des Da-seins, nämlich hinsichtlich seiner *Entrückung zu etwas*. Das Vor-stellen ist, sich selbst verhüllt, daseinsmäßig ein Hinausstehen ins Offene, wobei dieses Offene selbst sowenig wie die Offenheit in ihrem Wesen und Grund befragt wird. Das Vor-stellen ist zudem ein Hinausstehen, das zugleich doch wieder zurückbleibt in der *Seele* als ein Vorgang und Akt dieser, die selbst schließlich als ‘Ich’ das Gegenüber zum Gegenstand bildet.”

middle of beyng” (“*Inständigkeit in der Mitte des Seyns*”)¹²⁵ and “historical reflection/“making sense”/осмысление (*geschichtliche Besinnung*).¹²⁶ In opening up as history, beyng creates its own realm (*Reich*) – the time-play-space (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*) – within which the opening up of Dasein is inscribed and from out of which it must be brought into light.¹²⁷ As Heidegger confirms in the closing paragraphs of the the *Beiträge*, this realm is “thoroughly non-human, i. e. not determinable and not sustainable through the animal rationale and all the less so through the subject.”¹²⁸ This time-play-space, however, is neither temporal nor supra-temporal (*überzeitlich*) in the commonplace senses of these terms; rather, as the beginning (*Anfang*) of history, it is a kind of thrust (*Stoß*) which spatializes or “makes room for” the opening up of beyng¹²⁹ – the original unfolding which allows beyng to expand, and the human being – to be situated within it. Thus, in its proper sense, time must be understood as the “grounding of the open site of “momentous-ness”/“moment-arity”/“instantaneity” (*Augenblicklichkeit*) for a historical being of the human being.”¹³⁰ Such a “double” opening up is simultaneous, rather than sequential, as Heidegger underscores: “Beyng is not [something] “ealier” – [something] persisting for itself, in itself; rather, appropriation is the temporal-spatial ‘same-time-ness’ for beyng and the being.”¹³¹ The opening up of this time-play-space – this “between” (*Zwischen*), this χωρισμός – is the very moment in which beyng and beings undergo change in such a way as to be revealed in their

¹²⁵ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.5, 12-13.

¹²⁶ Ibid., I.1, 5.

¹²⁷ Ibid., I.1, 6.

¹²⁸ Ibid., VIII.271, 490: “Dieser Bereich jedoch ist durch und durch nicht menschlich, d. h. nicht bestimmbar und nicht tragbar durch das animal rationale und ebensowenig durch das Subjektum.”

¹²⁹ Ibid., I.5, 17: “Alle Anfänge...entziehen sich der Historie, nicht weil sie überzeitlich-ewig, sondern größer sind als die Ewigkeit: *die Stöße* der Zeit, die dem Sein die Offenbarkeit seines Sichverbergens einräumen. Eigene Gründung dieses Zeit-Raumes heißt: *Da-sein*.”

¹³⁰ Ibid., IV.119, 234: “...hat ‘Zeit hier’...eine völlig andersartige Bedeutung, nämlich die der Gründung der offenen Stätte der Augenblicklichkeit für ein geschichtliches Sein des Menschen.”

¹³¹ Ibid., I.5, 13: “Das Seyn aber ist nicht ein ‘Früheres’ – für sich, an sich bestehend –, sondern das Ereignis ist die zeiträumliche Gleichzeitigkeit für das Seyn und das Seiende.”

communion – it is the twin-birth of beyng and beings as historical.¹³²

Indeed, Heidegger speaks of it as a turn (*Kehre*) within which the essentialization/“осуществление” (*Wesung*) of beyng has both a “middle” (*Mitte*) and a width/breadth (*Weite*).¹³³ It is an “outermost realm of swinging” (*äußerster Schwingungsbereich*), wherein the “swing” refers to that monumental “turn” (*Kehre*) which lies at the heart of appropriation.¹³⁴ As such, it is a dimensionality which might be described as “pivotal,” that is, one “around” which the “door” of the opening of beyng swings open to the human being and, on the other hand, the “fold” of the human being “unfolds” towards beyng.¹³⁵

Time-space is a “dimension” within which the moment (*Augenblick*) or momentous site (*Augenblicks-Stätte*)¹³⁶ for the appropriation of beyng may obtain; it is neither ascertainable nor calculable, yet it “sets the time” for the appropriation.¹³⁷ Rather than being reduced to “common formal concepts of space and time,” however, this “sphere of fusion” is both a “timing spacing” and a “spacing timing,” which must be understood in reference to the notion of strife (cf. section on rift/drift/draft (*Riß*) in the chapter on the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*).¹³⁸ Within the *Beiträge*, the notion of strife is addressed at length for the first time at the most profound level of “original

¹³² Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.5, 14: “Zumal im anderen Anfang muß sogleich...der Sprung in das ‘Zwischen’ vollzogen werden. Das ‘Zwischen’ des Da-seins überwindet den χωρισμός, nicht indem es zwischen dem Seyn (der Seiendheit) und dem Seienden als gleichsam vorhandenen Ufern eine Brücke schlägt, sondern indem es das Seyn und das Seiende zugleich in ihre Gleichzeitigkeit verwandelt. Der Sprung in das Zwischen erspringt erst das Da-sein und besetzt nicht einen bereitstehenden Standplatz.”

¹³³ Ibid., I.10, 30.

¹³⁴ Ibid., I.22, 57: “...das Fragen hinfindet in den äußersten Schwingungsbereich, in die Zugehörigkeit zum äußersten Geschehen, das ist die *Kehre im Ereignis*...”

¹³⁵ Ibid.: “Das Hinfinden geschieht im Sprung, der sich entfaltet als Gründung des Da-seins.”

¹³⁶ Ibid., I.10, 30.

¹³⁷ Ibid., I.5, 20: “Dieser Augenblick ist niemals wirklich feststellbar, noch weniger zu errechnen. Er setzt erst die Zeit des Ereignisses.”

¹³⁸ Ibid., IV.139, 261: “Zeitigendes Räumen – räumende Zeitigung (Bestreitung des Streitigen) als nächster Fügungsbezirk für die Wahrheit des Seyns, aber kein Abfall in die gemeinen formalen Raum- und Zeit-Begriffe (!), sondern Rücknahme in den *Streit*, Welt und Erde – Ereignis.”

Cf. Ibid., V.d).242, 386: “Die Zeit räumt ein...Der Raum zeitigt ein...”

strife,” i. e. as the “strife between beyng and not-beyng within the essence of beyng itself.”¹³⁹ It is at this juncture that Heidegger first identifies the origin of the strife within beyng as the inherence of the nothing within it; contrary to the simplicity of beyng, such a proposal appears to render beyng as originally dual, with the interval between the members of such a duality – beyng and nothing – first engendering the dynamic of the counterforces which is strife.¹⁴⁰ Yet Heidegger insists that such “negativity” within beyng is not equivalent to that of Hegel, which serves “only to keep the motion of arising/sublimation going.”¹⁴¹ The difference between the two notions, according to Heidegger, is that a Hegelian duality aims at preserving the respective validity of the adversaries, while his own – at the essencing/*осуществление* of the “between.”¹⁴² While belonging to the essence of beyng, the nothing is simultaneously its “other” yet an “other” still very much of itself: in this way, the beyng may be said to contain “other-ness” (*Andersheit*) within itself.¹⁴³ Contrary to the Hegelian dialectic, then, it would seem that such a “between” would not be meant to be overcome in the arising of a new “thesis,” but rather preserved as the bond of appropriation of being and beings by beyng.

Of capital import for the evaluation of the problematic of spatiality and temporality in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* is the fact that Heidegger characterizes such a moment-site as coming into its essence precisely out of the “strife between earth and world”¹⁴⁴ – a strife which is instigated and borne by none other than the work of art. Indeed, by §246-247, Heidegger explicitly

¹³⁹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, IV.144, 264: “...*ursprüngliche Streit* (Seyn oder Nichtseyn im Wesen des Seyns selbst).”

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.: “Der Ursprung des Streits aus der Innigkeit des *Nicht im Seyn!*”

Luce Fontaine-De Visscher is one of the few scholars to entertain the idea of this original duality of beyng, which she describes as “un tout déjà brisé, une Fracture originaire” (Luce Fontaine-De Visscher, “Ce qui vient en poème. Entre Heidegger et la nouvelle critique,” *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 80, no. 47 (1982) : 253.)

¹⁴¹ Ibid.: “...nicht die Negativität Hegels...die Negativität, nur um...die Bewegung der Aufhebung im Gang zu halten.”

¹⁴² Ibid., IV.144, 265: “*Der Streit* als Wesung des ‘Zwischen,’ nicht als das Auchgeltenlassen des Widrigen.”

¹⁴³ Ibid., IV.146, 267: “Nur weil das Seyn nichthaft west, hat es zu seinem Anderen das Nichtsein. Denn dieses Andere ist das Andere seiner Selbst. *Als nichthaftes wesend ermöglicht und erzwingt es zugleich Anderesheit.*”

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., I.10, 30: “Die Augenblicks-Stätte west aus diesem als der Streit von Erde und Welt.”

acknowledges that the question of the origin/ur-spring of the work of art, and more specifically, of the en-strifing (*Bestreitung*) of the strife stems from and belongs to this juncture in the articulation of appropriation.¹⁴⁵ In a manner perhaps even more resolved than in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, Heidegger here speaks of the earth and the world as the “purest closedness” and “highest clarification/transfiguration,” between “sweetest attraction” and “most fearful repulsion.”¹⁴⁶ However, the *Beiträge* also speaks of the instigation of the strife as effectuated by “being-there” (*Da-sein*),¹⁴⁷ which necessitates a distinction between “being-there” as “being there” (*Dasein*) and “being-there” as a kind of “ur-dimensionality” which might enable the respective dimensionalities of being, of “being there,” and of the work of art to unfold within it. Indeed, it is precisely “being-there” which renders the cleft/cleavage/fissure of being accessible.¹⁴⁸

The “moment/instant/glance of an eye” (*Augenblick*) is a temporally relative term: from the commonplace historical perspective, it may be experienced as a “long space of time,” while from the perspective of the history of being, indeed – “only [as] moments/instants/glances of an eye.”¹⁴⁹ More importantly, it is “immeasurable in its breadth and depth” – intertwined with space, yet in a manner which is not quantifiable.¹⁵⁰

Appropriation is itself a “middle” which gauges its own “mean” and “mediates.”¹⁵¹

The time-play-space is the configuration of the “far-ness/distance” (*Ferne*) which obtains

¹⁴⁵ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.e).247, 392: “Aus diesem Bereich entnommen und deshalb hierher gehörig die gesonderte Frage nach dem ‘Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’ (vgl. Den Freiburger und die Frankfurter Vorträge*).”

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., VII.256.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., I.10, 30: “Die Bestreitung des Streitens ist das Da-sein.”

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., IV.120, 235: “...das Offene bereitzustellen, das als Zeit-Raum (Augenblicksstätte) die Zerklüftung des Seyns zugänglich macht im Da-sein.”

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., IV.116, 227: “Die Seynsgeschichte kennt in langen Zeiträumen, die ihr nur Augenblicke sind...”

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., V.189.309: “Der wesentliche Augenblick, unermesslich in seiner Weite und Tiefe...”

¹⁵¹ Ibid., I.34, 73: “Das Ereignis ist die sich selbst ermittelnde und vermittelnde Mitte...”

between beyng and beings,¹⁵² a configuration which first makes it possible for the human being to make the decision to give itself over to beyng's coming out of itself. It is that illumination (*Lichtung*) in the light of which the self-concealing beyng can be perceived as such.¹⁵³ This "farness" or "illumination" is no void/emptiness (*Leere*), but rather the essentialization/"осуществление" (*Wesung*) of appropriation,¹⁵⁴ the suspended moment and site of the first decision that inaugurates the interval from which all other intervals spring forth, and which flowers in the experience of the human being most intimately despite its utmost remove, which has been historically named "transcendence."¹⁵⁵ In fact, Heidegger insists that the human being belongs to transcendence insofar as s/he is appropriated by it, such that appropriation reunites human beings and god, to use even stronger language – and the reverse.¹⁵⁶ Neither is this 'between' an indifferent interfield (*Zwischenfeld*), but is rather an opening of the cleft (*Eröffnung der Zerklüftung*) used by god.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, in the shudder/quake of the procession of the god, the fabric of being gives way and opens up as an abyssal middle.¹⁵⁸ This abstract spatial notion of the "between" is elucidated by Heidegger by means of the metaphor, once again spatial, of the "land": "The land, which becomes through the path and as the path of thinking beyng, is the 'between' which ap-propriates 'being-there' to god, in which ap-propriating the human being

¹⁵² Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.7, 23: "Und diese Ferne selbst in ihrer Wesung voll erdenken als den Zeit-Raum der höchsten Entscheidung...nach dem Wahrheit des Seyns fragen..."

¹⁵³ Ibid..

¹⁵⁴ Ibid..

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., I.7, 24: "...dessen Wesung dennoch am innigsten zur Erfahrung kommt..."

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., I.7, 26: "Dieses 'Zwischen' aber ist keine 'Transzendenz' mit Bezug auf den Menschen, sondern ist im Gegenteil jenes Offene, dem der Mensch als Gründer und Wahrer zugehört, indem er als Da-sein er-eignet ist vom Seyn selbst..." "Das Ereignis übereignet den Gott an den Menschen, indem es diesen dem Gott zueignet."

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., I.7, 27: "Aber nicht das gleichgültige Zwischenfeld, sondern der Bezug zum Vorbeigang ist die vom Gott gebrauchte Eröffnung der Zerklüftung..."

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., V.c).208, 331: "Wahrheit...ist die abgründige Mitte, die erzittert im Vorbeigang des Gottes..."

and god first become “knowable” to themselves.”¹⁵⁹ Much further in the text, in §214, Heidegger offers another metaphor for this “between”: that of the “hollow middle” of a pitcher.¹⁶⁰ Far from a mere emptiness/void existing only in virtue of the walls enclosing it, such a “hollow middle” “molds” the walls and their edges itself: “The latter are only the radiation of that original open, which allows its openness to essence, insofar as it calls for such a walling (the form of the receptacle/vessel) around itself...”¹⁶¹ In this sense, the void/empty of the “between” is, indeed, determinate (*bestimmt*).¹⁶²

The cleft/cleavage/fissure (*Zerklüftung*) of beyng refers to that original division which lies deeper than the distinction between the possibility of the possible and the actuality of the actual, and deeper still than the ontological difference between being and beings.¹⁶³ It is within this division that the beingly undergoes a kind of “splitting” (*Entzweiung*).¹⁶⁴ Where it comes to the truth of beyng, were it to be expressed in “metaphysical” language, Heidegger would render it as “the highest actuality of the highest possible as possible and therewith the first necessity, the

¹⁵⁹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.42, 86: “Das Land, das durch den Weg und als Weg des Er-denkens des Seyns wird, ist das *Zwischen*, das *er-eignet* das Da-sein dem Gott, in welcher Er-eignung erst der Mensch und der Gott sich ‘erkennbar’ werden...”

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, V.c).214, 339: “...so etwas wie eine *hohle Mitte*, z. B. die des Kruges.”

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*: “...nicht eine beliebige Leere nur durch die Wände umschlossen...ist, sondern...die hohle Mitte ist das Bestimmend-Prägende und Tragende für die Wandung der Wände und ihrer Ränder. Diese sind nur die Ausstrahlung jenes ursprünglichen Offenen, das seine Offenheit wesen läßt, indem es solche Wandung (die Gefäßform) um sich herum und auf sich zu fordert.”

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, V.d).242, 380: “...*jener* Leere, die somit eine bestimmte ist.”

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, I.34, 75: “‘Das Seyn’ meint nicht nur die Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen, auch nicht nur die Möglichkeit des Möglichen, überhaupt nicht nur das Sein vom jeweiligen Seienden her, sondern das Seyn aus seiner ursprünglichen Wesung in der vollen Zerklüftung, die Wesung nicht auf ‘Anwesenheit’ angeschränkt.”

Michel Haar expresses an awareness of the differentiation of beyng which lies deeper than the ontological difference in the following way: “But how are such distinctions possible at all, in the un-manifest, the secret? The differences anterior to the ontico-ontological difference itself, between Ur-Streit, Streit, Riss, as well as the passing from one degree of depth to another...?” (Michel Haar, “Heidegger and the Nietzschean ‘Physiology’ of Art,” in *Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Interpretation*, ed. David Farrell Krell and David Wood (London, New York: Routledge, 1988), 86).

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, V.c).208, 331: “Wahrheit ist...die abgründige Zerklüftung, in der das Seiende zur Entzweiung kommt und im Streit stehen muß.”

provenance of ‘modalities’ out of the οὐσία [abgerechnet].”¹⁶⁵ In §267, however, Heidegger insists that the “deepest cleavage” of beyng constitutes precisely the “essencing of the possible,” where beyng itself is thought “in the gestalt of the possible,” indeed: “beyng is possibility.”¹⁶⁶ This division is more than a simple duality: it is the dynamic greater whole of the vectors of self-containment and self-releasement – an openness and inclination towards the other – the original figure of all reverberating choreographies.¹⁶⁷ As such, this dynamic figure – the paradigmatic tear (*Riß*)¹⁶⁸ which characterizes cleaving – is lifted up by Heidegger as the origin of time-space.¹⁶⁹ This “fusion” (*Fügung*) at once stays within itself and sustains that “swinging-into-one-another” which characterizes the site or dimension of its opening up and of the transformation of the human being.¹⁷⁰ Heidegger provides the following concise formulation in §127: “It is the unfolding while remaining in itself of the intimacy of beyng itself, insofar as we “experience” it as the denial and “all-around” denial.”¹⁷¹ Insofar as it preserves the vector of self-containment and denial, Heidegger deems it to be superior to the Platonic notion of truth as “open-ability”

¹⁶⁵ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, IV.127, 244: “Die Verweigerung (die Wesung des Seyns) ist die höchste Wirklichkeit des höchsten Möglichen als des Möglichen und damit die erste Notwendigkeit, doch abgerechnet die Herkunft der ‘Modalitäten’ aus der οὐσία.”

Cf. *Ibid.*, V.169, 294: “Die Verweigerung als Wesung des Seyns ist die höchste Wirklichkeit des höchsten Möglichen als des Möglichen und ist damit die erste Notwendigkeit.”

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, VIII.267, 475: “Im Seyn allein west als seine tiefste Klüftung das Mögliche, so daß in der Gestalt des Möglichen zuerst das Seyn gedacht werden muß... das Seyn ist Möglichkeit...”

¹⁶⁷ Michel Haar identifies a crucial parallel to this conception in Nietzsche’s conception of chaos: “an infinite play of forces dispersed in a multitude of perspectives... a living universal medium common to all beings. Perhaps it is difficult to understand how the infinite difference, which is the Will to Power as chaos, can be also the infinity unity of the vital flux.” (Michel Haar, “Heidegger and the Nietzschean ‘Physiology’ of Art,” in *Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Interpretation*, ed. David Farrell Krell and David Wood (London, New York: Routledge, 1988), 26).

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, VIII.281, 510: “*Streit*, die ursprüngliche Bergung der Zerklüftung, weil der innigste *Riß*. Die *offene Stelle*.”

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, V.311: “*Diese...Erklüftung der Nahung und Fernung ist der Ursprung des Zeit-Raums und das Reich des Streitens*.”

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, I.39, 82: “Jede Fügung steht jeweils in sich, und dennoch besteht ein verborgenes Ineinanderschwingen und eröffnendes Gründen der Entscheidungsstätte für den wesentlichen Übergang in die noch mögliche Wandlung der abendländischen Geschichte.”

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, IV.127, 244: “Sie ist in sich bleibende Entfaltung der Innigkeit des Seyns selbst, sofern wir es als die Verweigerung und Umweigerung ‘erfahren.’”

(*Offenbarkeit*) and “making-openable” (*Offenbarmachen*).¹⁷² It unfolds in this manner because being is “not the most empty and most general, but rather the richest and highest.”¹⁷³ This is the original “work” (*Werk*) properly called “appropriation” (*Ereignis*), which Heidegger articulates as the “structure self-developing in the self-turning-back into the arising ground.”¹⁷⁴ The work of art as a work both performs and points towards this gesture as “a kind of grounding of the truth” of being, rather than an object of cultural use blind to its essential core.¹⁷⁵

The essentialization/“осуществление” of being as historicity is not the same in every age; indeed, Heidegger underscores that as a sphere/domain of decision (*Entscheidungsbereich*), each opening – each ‘between’ – offers the possibility of an essential change/transformation (*wesentliche Wandlung*) of history.¹⁷⁶ Naturally, such a change/transformation entails a certain kind of relinquishing (*Entäußerung*), yet not a giving-up of oneself (*Selbstaufgabe*), because it is only through a restored relation to being – and through a prevenient “courage for the abyss” (*Mut zum Ab-grund*) – that the human being genuinely comes back to itself, comes into its own.¹⁷⁷ This sphere/domain grounds itself, and in grounding itself sets human beings and god

¹⁷² Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.c).209, 332: “...dann kann diese Zugänglichkeit auch *Offenbarkeit* heißen und das Vernehmen *Offenbarmachen*.” Curiously, the Greek term Heidegger selects as corresponding to *Offenbarkeit* is *δηλούμενον*, “rendre visible, montrer, faire voir, manifester, révéler” Bailly (Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.c).209, 333).

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, I.56, 118: “...nicht das Leerste und Gemeinste, sondern das Reichste und Höchste ist...”

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, I.35, 77: “‘Das Ereignis’ wäre der rechte Titel für das ‘Werk’... Das ‘Werk’: der sich entwickelnde Bau im Sichzurückwenden in den aufragenden Grund.”

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, I.56, 117: “Die Kunst wird einer Kulturnutzung unterworfen und im Wesen verkannt; die Blindheit gegen ihren Wesenskern, die Art der Gründung von Wahrheit.”

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, I.8, 28.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

James Magrini sees this imperative as having profoundly ethical implications : “In the 1930s, Heidegger considers our potential for historicity through the renewed and intimate relation to Being that undergoes a change and rejuvenation in light of the numerous philosophical encounters with art and poetry, a relationship bound up with the important issue of authentic ethics and legitimate interpersonal relationships. (...) When Levinas criticizes Heidegger’s philosophy for failing to establish a platform for authentic ethical discourse, this critique is focused on the work of 1927, and not the ‘poetic’ philosophy Heidegger produced during the so-called ‘turn.’ Whereas Being and Time does not produce a legitimate account of the manner in which Dasein historicizes as a genuine member of a community, it is Heidegger’s writing on the work of art and the truth of Being that rectifies this problem by locating the source of history within the unifying force of great art and the creative moment of the work of art, which affords the potential to bring a living community into existence.” (James Magrini, “The Work of Art and

against and towards each other, and appropriates them to each other.¹⁷⁸ Crucially, this sphere/domain, this ‘between’ is not simply an “over-against,” but rather something like a pivot – as Heidegger puts it, a “point of revolution” (*Wendungspunkt*)¹⁷⁹ – around which being and human being, god and human being turn towards and away from each other. Thus, in §256, Heidegger will explicitly refer to the turn as a whirlpool (*Wirbel*), a metaphor already discussed at length in the chapter on spatiality, temporality, and objectivity in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*.¹⁸⁰

The “time-play-space” (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*) is articulated by Heidegger as a realm of decision (*Entscheidungsbereich*), precisely because it is a “dimensionality” proper to a decision. In §242, Heidegger specifies that what is here mistaken for a “void/empty” (*die “Leere”*) is, in fact, “the fullness of the not-yet-decided” (“*die Fülle des Noch-unentschiedenen*”).¹⁸¹ Yet this fullness of the not-yet-decided seems to recede into still another fullness – that of “undecidability” as such, which is prior to all dimensionality, including, presumably, that of the time-space itself.¹⁸² It is the preparatory spatialization/“making room” (*vorbereitende Einräumung*), which springs from the “outbreak” of the clefing of being itself.¹⁸³ Naturally, the senses of both of these terms are defined by Heidegger in a very specific way. Firstly, “decision” (*Ent-scheidung*) is differentiated from an “act of the human being” (“*ein Tun des Menschen*”), from “fulfilling” (*das Vollziehen*), and from a “process” (*Vorgang*).¹⁸⁴ Neither is it

Truth of Being as ‘Historical’ : Reading Being and Time, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ and the ‘Turn’ (Kehre) in Heidegger’s Philosophy of the 1930s,” *Philosophy Today* 54, no. 4 (2010) : 361.)

¹⁷⁸ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.8, 29: “...sich selbst erst gründend, den Menschen und den Gott auseinander- und zueinander-setzt und einander eignet.”

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*: “...der lichtend-verbergende Wendungspunkt in dieser Kehre...”

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, VII.256, 413.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, V.d).242, 382.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*: “Diese ‘Ferne’ der Unentscheidbarkeit ist vor jedem ausgesonderten ‘Raum’ und jeder abgehobenen verlaufenden Zeit. Sie west auch vor aller Dimensionalität.”

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, I.49, 103: “Das Zeit-raum-hafte der Entscheidung als aufbrechende Klüftung des Seyns selbst...”

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, I.43, 87: “Wenn da von der Ent-scheidung die Rede ist, denken wir an ein Tun des Menschen, an das Vollziehen, an einen Vorgang. Aber weder das Menschliche eines Aktes noch das Vorgangsmäßige ist hier wesentlich.”

a simple capacity (*Vermögen*) of freedom (in which case decision is interpreted in causal terms).¹⁸⁵ Rather, exploration of “de-cision” must pursue the trajectory already charted by *Sein und Zeit*, namely, that of “dis-closedness” (*Ent-schlossenheit*) as “the timing spatialization of the time-play-space of beyng.”¹⁸⁶ Indeed, decision creates that space-time, which serves as the site for the essential moment in which beyng opens up and ushers “being there,” the human being, the people into itself.¹⁸⁷ “De-cision” must finally be glimpsed as the innermost middle of the essence of beyng itself: that “treading-apart-from-one-another” which “scissions,” and in “scissioning” first makes “ap-propriation” possible.¹⁸⁸

The “between” which Heidegger names “time-space” (*Zeit-Raum*) also figures as the abyss (*Ab-grund*), which is also the site of the moment of strife between beyng and not-being.¹⁸⁹

While the imperative for emerging into being surges from beyng itself, it is the vocation of the human being to host such a transfiguration, to be its bearer and deliverer: “...a goal for the the historical human being: *to become the founder and be-truer of the truth of beyng, to be* there as the ground needed by the essence of beyng itself.”¹⁹⁰ Indeed, Heidegger confirms that beyng needs the being (*das Seiende*) – needs “us”¹⁹¹ – in order to essentialize/*осуществить* itself.¹⁹² More specifically, it “needs” a self (*Selbst*), which is constituted by the human being in

¹⁸⁵ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.49, 103.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., I.43, 87: “...die Ent-schlossenheit als die zeitigende Einräumung des Zeit-Spiel-Raumes des Seyns...”

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., I.45, 98: “Die Entscheidung muß *jenen Zeit-Raum*, die Stätte für die wesentlichen Augenblicke schaffen...”

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., I.43, 88: “...was hier Ent-scheidung genannt ist, in die innerste Wesensmitte des Seyns selbst...das Auseinandertreten selbst, das scheidet und im Scheiden erst in das Spiel komme läßt die Er-eignung...”

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., I.9, 29: “Der Ab-grund als der *Zeit-Raum*”; “Der Zeit-Raum die *Augenblicks-stätte* des Streitens (Seyn oder Nichtsein).”

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., I.5, 16: “...dem geschichtlichen Menschen noch einmal ein Ziel zu geben: Der Gründer und Wahrer der Wahrheit des Seyns zu werden, das Da zu sein als der vom Wesen des Seyns selbst gebrauchte Grund...” Cf. Heidegger, *Beiträge*, II.72, 140: “...der Mensch als Gründer des Da-seins *gebraucht* wird von der Gottheit des anderen Gottes...”

¹⁹¹ Ibid., I.17, 44: “...*uns braucht*...”

¹⁹² Ibid., I.10, 30: “Das Seyn (als Ereignis) braucht das Seiende, damit es, das Seyn, wese.”

instantiation.¹⁹³ The notion of selfhood inevitably comes into play at this juncture insofar as, for Heidegger, it ultimately stems from the notion of “proper-ty” (*Eigen-tum*) and is thus inextricably linked with ap-proprietion (*Er-eignis*).¹⁹⁴ Indeed, one of the challenges of disentangling spatiality and temporality from subjectivity is avoiding the pitfall of their simple transfer from “being there” to “being-there” as an alternative form of selfhood (*Selbstheit* (*Eigentum*)).¹⁹⁵ However, as Heidegger insistently clarifies in §120, appropriation “is only apparently fulfilled through the human beings; in truth, being-human happens as historical through ap-proprietion requiring being-there in this way or that.”¹⁹⁶ In §133, Heidegger further specifies that such “needing” itself creates the “needed.”¹⁹⁷ Further, in §135, Heidegger adds that being makes its “opposite” precisely in ap-proprietion it, such that the relation which obtains between the two first obtains only within such appropriation.¹⁹⁸ On the other hand, in springing into such being-there, the human being “allows” the former to spring up as the “momentous site of the somewhere and when.”¹⁹⁹ Although in this scenario the human being is itself the “springer of the spring,” or the “thrower” of the “throw,” it paradoxically experiences such a spring or throw as “being thrown” – the experience of being situated within the opening

¹⁹³ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, IV.128, 245: “...die Er-eignung erst ein Sich-eigenes braucht, ein *Selbst*, welche Selbstheit der Mensch zu bestehen hat in *der* Inständigkeit...”

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, V.197.320: “Das Eigentum als Grund der Selbstheit gründet das Da-sein. Eigentum aber ist selbst wieder das Beständnis der Kehre im Ereignis.”

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, V.d).239, 375: “Weil das Da-sein wesentlich Selbstheit (*Eigentum*) ist und Selbstheit ihrerseits der Grund des Ich und Wir und aller niederen und höheren ‘Subjektivität,’ deshalb ist die Entfaltung des Zeit-Raumes aus der Augenblickstätte keine Subjektivierung, sondern deren Überwindung, wenn nicht schon die grundsätzliche, vorgängige Abstoßung.”

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, IV.120, 235-236: “Nur scheinbar wird das Ereignis durch den Menschen vollzogen, in Wahrheit geschieht das Menschsein als geschichtliches durch die das Da-sein so oder so fordernde Er-eignung.”

¹⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, IV.133, 251: “...dieses Brauchen gerade das Gebrauchte in seinen Grund umschafft...”

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, IV.135, 254: “Die Rede vom Bezug des Da-seins zum Seyn macht das Seyn zweideutig, zum Gegenüber, was es nicht ist, sofern es je *das, dem* es als Gegenüber wesen soll, selbst erst er-eignet.”

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, IV.120, 236: “Das Seyn...ist daher nicht ein leeres, unbestimmtes Meer des Bestimmbaren...sondern der Sprung läßt erst das Da, als zugehörig im Zuruf, als die Augenblickstätte des Irgenwo und Wann entspringen.”

of being is, indeed, the “experience of thrownness” (“*Erfahrung der Geworfenheit*”).²⁰⁰ Thus, the posture of the human being in this opening up emerges as essentially Marian: the human being voluntarily offers itself up to be “used in the opening of this open,”²⁰¹ such that being in its simplicity might unfold²⁰² and become perceptible (*vernehmbar*) in appropriating this self-sacrifice.²⁰³ As in the three versions of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, so in the *Beiträge*, appropriation is borne humanly – it is supported by the human standing-in-the-gap, human paving-the-way, human “in-stantiation” (*Inständigkeit*).²⁰⁴ It is for this reason that the dimensionality of “being there” (*Dasein*) is able to instantiate the ur-dimensionality of “being-there” (*Da-sein*). What is more, such instantiation is said to take the specific forms of art, thinking, poetizing, and acting.²⁰⁵ There is nothing more natural than this convergence of being’s tendency towards actualization (*Verwirklichung*) and *Dasein*’s capacity for figuration (*Einbildung*); yet, as Heidegger points out, such has long been obscured by the historical interpretation of figuration as imagination (*imaginatio*) and its exclusive restriction to the capacity of the human soul.²⁰⁶ In order to recover the fullest potential of art, figuration must rather be glimpsed as the lifeblood of

²⁰⁰ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, IV.122, 239: “...der Werfer des Entwurfs als geworfener sich erfährt...”

²⁰¹ Ibid., I.5, 18: “Und fügend in die Fuge des Seyns stehen wir den Göttern zur Verfügung. ... für das Gebrauchtwerden in der Eröffnung dieses Offenen.”

²⁰² Ibid., IV.123, 241: “Es muß die Wahrheit des Seyns einrichten und bergen im ‘Seienden’ selbst, das so erst wieder – einrückend in das Seyn und dessen Befremdung – die berückende Einfachheit seines Wesens entfaltet...”

²⁰³ Ibid., I.6, 23.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., I.10, 31: “...menschhaft erharrt und getragen in der das Da ausstehenden, dem Ereignis zugehörigen Inständigkeit.”

Ibid., V.201, 323: Der Mensch ist das *Weg*”; cf. the portrayal of John the Baptist in the New Testament as fulfilling the prophecy of Isaiah (40:3, NASB): “Clear the way for the Lord in the wilderness; make smooth in the desert a highway for our God,” as well as the words of Jesus Christ himself in the Gospel of John (14:6): “I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.”

²⁰⁵ Ibid., IV.136, 256: “...*die* Wahrheit selbst, west nur in der *Bergung* als Kunst, Denken, Dichten, Tat...”

²⁰⁶ Ibid., V.192, 312: “*Das Dasein ist als die entwerfend-geworfene Gründung die höchste Wirklichkeit im Bereich der Einbildung*, gesetzt, daß wir damit nicht nur ein Vermögen der Seele und nicht nur ein transzendentes verstehen (vgl. Kantbuch), sondern das *Ereignis* selbst, worin alle *Verklärung* schwingt. ... Die ‘Einbildung’ als Geschehnis der *Lichtung* selbst. Nur ist ‘Einbildung,’ *imaginatio*, der Name, der nennt aus der Blickstellung des unmittelbaren Vernehmens des öv und Seienden. Von da aus gerechnet ist alles Seyn und dessen Eröffnung ein zum vermeintlich Handfesten hinzukommendes *Gebilde*. Aber alles ist hier umgekehrt, ‘eingebildet’ im gewöhnlichen Sinne ist immer das sogenannte ‘wirkliche’ Vorhandene, hereingebildet, zum Scheinen gebracht in die *Lichtung*, in das Da.”

appropriation itself, such that both being and human beings might come into their proper figurality by being illuminated within such a happening.²⁰⁷

The key to understanding Heidegger's notion of grounding (*Gründung*) lies in the fact that it takes its point of departure in the previously developed notions of truth and time-space (*Zeit-Raum*), and not the reverse.²⁰⁸ Such an order of reflection makes the determination of the notion of grounding contingent upon the determination of the notions of spatiality, temporality, and objectivity. Concretely speaking, in order to understand what it means to set something upon a ground (the commonplace sense of grounding), one must first understand what it means to ground (a transitional figure functioning as a question), with the latter emerging only in the light of the meaning of truth and time-space.²⁰⁹ And insofar as the notions of truth and time-space ultimately rehearse the gesture of tearing, Heidegger's insistence on the transformation of the notion of ground into that of the abyss becomes perfectly intelligible: indeed, while being vertically indeterminate, an abyss is horizontally held together precisely by those which it holds apart. Thus, one cannot reasonably look to the notion of grounding to further elucidate the problematic of spatiality, temporality, and objectivity. On the other hand, as Heidegger points out, the full import of the relationship between space and time only comes to the fore "in the vicinity of *grounding*."²¹⁰ What is more, by §239, he establishes a similar determinative progression between truth and time-space, where the articulation of time-space must facilitate the

²⁰⁷ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.192.

Gabriel Riera focuses on the transformation of the notion of figuration in "The Origin of the Work of Art," describing figuration as the 'schematism' of the 'incomparable immensity' of being: "If traditionally figuration was conceived as substitutive, it is now transformed into a constitutive or institutive operation. (...) Exposing the site of the open is the essence of figuration as it occurs in the work of art..." (Gabriel Riera, "The Enigma of Manifestation (Figuration in Heidegger)," in *Intrigues : From Being to the Other* (New York : Fordham University Press, 2006).

²⁰⁸ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.188, 308: "...das Wesen des Grundes ent-fügt sich zeit-räumlich."

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, V.b).187, 307.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, V.188.308: "Hier im Umkreis der Gründung und ihrer denkerischen Bewältigung ist *der Zusammenhang*, in dem *Zeit und Raum* zu ihrem Wesensbegriff kommen."

articulation of truth: “What truth itself is cannot be adequately said prior to, but rather precisely within the grasping of the time-space.”²¹¹ Retreating another step, Heidegger insists that time-space itself must, in turn, be understood from out of the vicissitudes of appropriation – from out of the recurrent motifs of, on the one hand, “opening,” and on the other, of “turning,” “twisting,” and “pivoting.”²¹² Thus, for Heidegger, “grounding” signifies a bi-lateral happening: from one direction, a self-opening of the open, and, from the other – a throwing of oneself into its midst.²¹³

Crucially, Heidegger differentiates between “grounding” (*Gründung*) and “creation” (*Erschaffung*) in such a way that “being there” and the human being only “ground” the appropriation of being rather than “creating” it as such: the former is a letting oneself be the ground (“*Grund-sein-lassen*”) upon which being “treads” or out of which it springs up.²¹⁴ In contrast, it is the truth of being which must itself “create” (*schaffe*) the fundamental traits of the site upon which it happens – namely, “being-there” – out of its own essence.²¹⁵ Thus, while “being there” may be spoken of as a “ground,” Heidegger is careful to reserve the more profound – or rather, truly “bottomless” – notion of the “abyss” to being, such that any “grounding” of being must always be understood in the infinitely broader and deeper context of its continual upending as a “re-moval/rapture into the incalculable and unique...which makes up the ‘along’

²¹¹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.d).239, 372: “Was Wahrheit selbst ist, läßt sich nicht zuvor zureichend für sich sagen, sondern gerade im Begreifen des Zeit-Raumes.”

²¹² Ibid., V.d).239: “Der Zeit-Raum ist die ereignete Erklüftung der Kehrungs-bahnen des Ereignisses, der Kehre zwischen Zugehörigkeit und Zuruf, zwischen Seinsverlassenheit und Erwinkung (das Erzittern der Schwingung des Seyns selbst!) Nähe und Ferne, Leere und Schenkung, Schwung und Zögerung, all dies darf nicht zeitlich-räumlich begriffen werden von den üblichen Zeit- und Raum-Vorstellungen her, sondern umgekehrt, in ihnen liegt das verhüllte Wesen des Zeit-Raumes.”

²¹³ Ibid., V.183.304: “...der Werfer des Entwurfs *sich* wesenhaft loswirft in das Offene der entwerfenden Eröffnung, um in diesem Offenen als Grund und Abgrund erst er *selbst* zu werden.”

²¹⁴ Ibid., I.11.5, 31: “Die Gründung – nicht Erschaffung – ist Grund-sein-lassen von seiten des Menschen...”

²¹⁵ Ibid., IV.125: “...diese Wahrheit selbst aus ihrem kaum anklingenden Wesen doch schon die Grund-züge ihrer Stätte schaffe (das Da-sein), in deren Erbauer und Wächter das Subjekt des Menschen sich verwandeln muß.”

of the a-byss of the nothing and grounds even the abyss.”²¹⁶

It is for this reason that the fundamental “tonality”/“intonation” (*Grundstimmung*) of “being there” must be that of restraint (*Verhaltenheit*).²¹⁷ Such a “tonality”/“intonation” is adopted by Heidegger as the measure (*Ausmaß*) or scale according to which the extent of the “removal”/“rapture” of “being there” is measured and the simplicity of its “motivation” (*Berückung*) is “measured out.”²¹⁸ That which reciprocates the self-restraint and self-containment of being within the human being is a certain kind of relinquishment (*Verzicht*), which – contrary to its commonplace overtone of giving up – is a readiness for the denial of being, a holding fast onto the alienness of its essencing.²¹⁹ It is a “great spring-off” (“*der großer Ab-sprung*”) which “takes off” or “launches” in the wake of the opening up of being, an opening up which unfolds without leaving behind its impulse in such a way as to span its point of departure and all of its possible “points of arrival.”²²⁰

Indeed, it may be possible to interpret the term “ab-ysse” (*Ab-grund*) as this kind of non-creative ground.²²¹ Such an interpretation would be consistent with Heidegger’s insistence that original history as the “happening” of the cleft of being is no longer to be understood simply as a deed/act (*Tun*) or a will (*Wille*)²²²; similarly, the grounding of such a “happening” by “being there” (*Dasein*) may not be reduced to a way in which its will might hold itself (*Willenshaltung*)

²¹⁶ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, IV.120, 236: “...die Entrückung in das Un-erreichbare und Einzige...der das Entlang dem Ab-grund des Nichts ausmacht und selbst den Abgrund gründet.”

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I.12, 33.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, I.13, 34: “...durch die Stimmung erst wird das Ausmaß der Entrückung des Daseins ermessen und ihm die Einfachheit der Berückung zugemessen.”

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I.25, 62.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, III.90, 179: “Solche Verneinung freilich genügt sich nicht mit dem Absprung, der nur hinter sich läßt, sondern sie entfaltet sich selbst, indem sie den ersten Anfang und seine anfängliche Geschichte freilegt und das Freigelegte zurücklegt in das Besitztum des Anfangs...”

²²¹ *Ibid.*, I.12, 32.

²²² *Ibid.*

or be otherwise traced back to a capability of the soul (*Seelensvermögen*).²²³ It is this interpretation that would also account for Heidegger's characterization of time-space as the "abyss of ground" (*Abgrund des Grundes*).²²⁴

β) Measure, Im-Measure, Hyper-Measure

However, the light that enlightens the field of vision of such a "stoical" human being to its outermost reaches is precisely the light of the essentialization/*осуществление* of being.²²⁵ It is being which most originally necessitates the "highest possibilities" which pave the way for the human being to go over and above itself and to go back to itself as the possibility of "being-there" (*Da-sein*).²²⁶ This need is that "might" (*Macht*) or "power" (*Kraft*) which "works" (*wirkt*) or "carries out" (*durchsetzt*) the transformation from "capacity" (*Vermögen*) to steadfast essence.²²⁷

The cardinal transformation of thinking by its implication in the appropriation of being is its renunciation of the "method" of measurement, compartmentalization, and systematization.²²⁸ It entails putting into question the very notion of the human being as *animal rationale* and the notion of thinking as "λόγος – ratio – intellectus."²²⁹ Such a transformation entails an

²²³ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.13, 35.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, I.12, 32.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, I.11.1, 31: "...das sichere Licht der Wesung des Seyns im äußersten Gesichtskreis der innersten Not des geschichtlichen Menschen."

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, I.17, 46: "Diese Not gehört zur Wahrheit des Seyns selbst. Am ursprünglichsten ist sie Not in der Nötigung zu der Notwendigkeit der höchsten Möglichkeiten, auf deren Wegen der Mensch schaffend – gründend über sich hinaus und in den Grund des Seienden zurückgeht. Wo diese Not ins Höchste steigt, ernötigt sie das *Da-sein* und seine Gründung."

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, I.18, 47: "...die Kraft der unmittelbaren Wirkung und Durchsetzung. ..Grundung und Festigung ins Wesen aus dem 'Vermögen' zur Verwandlung..."

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, I.23, 59.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, III.91, 180.

In re-considering the treatment of the question of rationality in Heidegger, John Macquarrie identifies alternative construals of reason in the philosophical tradition (Pascal's 'reasons of the heart' being one example) and, more importantly, calls for a reconciliation between 'mathematizing' and other kinds of *ratio*. (John Macquarrie, "Thinghood, Technology, Art" and "Thinking, Language, Poetry," in *Heidegger and Christianity: The Hensley Henson Lectures, 1993-94* (New York: Continuum, 1994), 83).

interrogation of categoriality and conceptuality (*Begrifflichkeit*) which have determined the contours of thinking from the time of Plato and Aristotle.²³⁰ More profoundly, it aims at the foundation of such notions and their outworkings: the idea that the *ratio* proper to the human being furnishes an assured measure for the measurement of all beings.²³¹ In a nutshell, such a view of the human being ushers the hubris of “absolute thinking,” a thinking that converts everything to its own standard.²³² Heidegger’s alternative to conceptuality is that of “inceptuality” (*Inbegrifflichkeit*), in the specific sense of being “in-fused” (*eingefügt*) into the “fusion” (*Fügung*) of appropriation: “the most intimate of the ‘in-cept’ lies in the grasping/seizing of the turn itself.”²³³ “In-ceptual” thinking is immeasurable (*unermeßlich*): that is to say, it cannot be measured “mathematically,” where “mathematically” refers to the limited reach of a calculating²³⁴ system; “in-ceptual” thinking is precisely “without system,” it is “a-systematic.”²³⁵ By extension, rather than conceiving of essentiality (*Wesentlichkeit*) as “that which is common to all” (das *Allgemeine*), Heidegger terms it “essentialization”/осуществление (*Wesung*) and explores the possibility of understanding it from the vantage of the originality (*Ursprünglichkeit*) and uniqueness (*Einzigkeit*) of being.²³⁶

The immediate challenge which arises in attempting to recommence thinking from out of being is that the fullness of the relationship between being and Dasein is immeasurable

²³⁰ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.28, 64.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, III.91, 181: “Warum soll nicht auch die *ratio*, zunächst noch im Verein mit der *fides*, *dasselbe* für sich selbst beanspruchen, ihrer selbst sich versichern und diese Sicherheit zum Maßstab aller Verfestigung und Be-‘gründung’ (*ratio* als Grund) machen?”

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Ibid.*, I.28, 64: “...liegt das Innigste des *Inbegriffs* im Begreifen der Kehre selbst.”

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, I.58, 120.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, I.28, 65: “Dieses Denken...steht außerhalb der Frage, ob zu ih ein System gehöre oder nicht. ‘System’ ist nur möglich im Gefolge der Herrschaft des mathematischen (im weiten Sinne) Denkens...Ein Denken, das außerhalb dieses Bereiches...ist daher wesentlich ohne System, un-systematisch.”

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, I.29, 66: “Wo dagegen das Seyn als Ereignis begriffen wird, bestimmt sich die Wesentlichkeit aus der Ursprünglichkeit und Einzigkeit des Seyns selbst. Das Wesen ist nicht das Allgemeine, sondern die Wesung gerade der jeweiligen Einzigkeit und des Ranges des Seienden.”

(*unausmeßbar*), incalculable (*unerreichenbar*)²³⁷; it is an abyssal inexhaustibility (“*ab-gründige Unerschöpfung*”).²³⁸ The paradox of this relationship, then, consists in the fact that Dasein must somehow lend itself to being “measured” by “im-measure” (or by the measure which beyng “carries within itself”²³⁹) without ever fully coming to terms with its excess – without ever reaching its limits, its boundaries, its contours.²⁴⁰ The most robust formulation of such “im-measure” as “hyper-measure” is found in §256: “...beyng...as that turning middle...as appropriation, which happens out of this turning hyper-measure of itself...”²⁴¹ How might such transcendence be determined from the standpoint of the standard measure (*Maßstab*) of Dasein without turning into presumption (*Anmaßung*) of giving measure (*Maßgabe*) to the immeasurable?²⁴² Or, as Heidegger puts it in Section IV, “The Spring”: “Who...weighs the unweighable?”²⁴³ It is towards this outstripping of Dasein by beyng that Heidegger points when he speaks of a necessary concealment of the truth of beyng in beings.²⁴⁴ Beyng, as Heidegger characterizes it in §131, is precisely the “self-withdrawing from all estimation and measurement.”²⁴⁵ Thus, at its most extreme, the challenge lies in glimpsing the possibility and sustainability of the bond between a being and the denial (*Verweigerung*) or the “nothing-hood”

²³⁷ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.2, 7: “Unausmeßbar ist der Reichtum des kehrigen Bezugs des Seyns zu dem ihm ereigneten Da-sein, unerreichenbar die Fülle der Ereignung.”

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, I.9, 29.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, I.5, 12: “Das Beständnis des Seyns selbst trägt sein Maß in sich, wenn es überhaupt noch eines Maßes bedarf.”

²⁴⁰ Luce Fontaine-De Visscher speaks of this as “l'accueil de la Dimension.” (Luce Fontaine-De Visscher, “Ce qui vient en poème. Entre Heidegger et la nouvelle critique (suite et fin),” *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 80, no. 47 (1982): 451.)

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, VII.256, 413: “...das Seyn...als jene kehrige Mitte...das Seyn als Er-eignis, das aus diesem kehrigen Übermaß seiner selbst geschieht...”

²⁴² *Ibid.*, I.7, 25: “Wenn er [der Mensch] dieses von sich aus vollziehen muß, ist dann nicht die Anmaßung der Maßgabe *noch* größer als dort, wo er einfachin als der Maßstab angesetzt bleibt?”

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, IV.121, 235-238: “Wer überspringt dieses Wägen und wagt das Unwägbare und stellt das Seiende in das Seyn zurück?”

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, I.2, 7: “Dieses denkerische Sagen ist eine Weisung. Sie zeigt das Freie der Bergung der Wahrheit des Seyns in das Seiende als ein Notwendiges ein, ohne ein Befehl zu sein.”

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, IV.131, 249: “Das Übermaß [im Wesen des Seyns] is kein bloßes mengenhaftes Zuviel, sondern das Sichentziehen aller Schätzung und Ausmessung.”

(*Nichthafte*) of beyng.²⁴⁶

For “being there” (*Dasein*), plumbing its depths must mean plummeting into them in a leap of the only kind of “hyper-measure” (*Übermaß*) of which it is capable, i. e., that of the “seeking power of the poet” which “institutes” beyng²⁴⁷ – and that with the help of beyng itself. The distinction of such a power consists precisely in the fact that it is a “going-over-and-above-oneself” into that which is higher than it, which towers over it.²⁴⁸ As in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, so in the *Beiträge*, Heidegger insists that the verbalization, the naming of beyng is fundamentally “poetizing” (*dichtend*) and that the leap of the human being into beyng is fundamentally “creative” (*schaffend*).²⁴⁹ Such “verbalizing” and “naming” goes forth by means of signs (*Zeichen*) and figures (*Bilder*).²⁵⁰ What such signs and figures make visible/seeable (*sichtbar*) is the “style” (*Stil*) of that transformed thinking which is enracinated within the appropriation of beyng; such an interpretation, however, stems from an antecedent understanding of thinking as in-ception, rather than from any “extension of a broadened [notion] of art onto... ‘being-there as such.’”²⁵¹ It is transformed thinking that casts the farthest gaze into the most concealed essence of beyng and brings into view the shapes (*Gestalten*), which shelter its

²⁴⁶ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.2, 8: “...kann die Verweigerung (das Nichthafte des Seyns) im Äußersten zur fernsten Ereignung werden, gesetzt, daß der Mensch dieses Ereignis begreift und der Schrecken der Scheu ihn in die Grundstimmung der Verhaltenheit zurück- und damit schon in das *Da-sein* hinausstellt?”

²⁴⁷ Ibid., I.4, 11: “Die Seinsfrage ist *der* Sprung in das Seyn, den der Mensch als der Sucher des Seyns vollzieht, sofern er ein *denkerisch* Schaffender ist. Sucher des Seyns ist im eigensten Übermaß sucherischer Kraft der Dichter, der das Seyn “stiftet.”

²⁴⁸ Ibid., I.4, 10: “...im Fragen ist der treibende Ansturm des Ja zum Unbewätigen, die Weitung in das noch unausgewogene Zuerwägende. Hier waltet das Übersichhinausfahren in das uns Überhöhende.”

²⁴⁹ Ibid., I.13, 36: “...die sich entfaltende Möglichkeit einer ursprünglichen – dichtenden – Nennung des Seyns.”
Ibid., I. 54.114.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., I.23, 60: “Zeichen und Bilder dürfen ihm das Innerste sein, und die übersehbare Gestalt des ‘Gedichtes’ vermag je sein Wesentliches in sich hineinzustellen.”

²⁵¹ Ibid., I.31, 69: “Weil Kunst z. B. ist das *Ins-Werk*-setzen der Wahrheit und im Werk die Bergung *in sich selbst* zu sich selbst zu stehen kommt, deshalb ist der ‘Stil’... besonders im Felde der Kunst sichtbar. *Nicht* jedoch wird hier von der Kunst her der Stilgedanke auf das *Da-sein* als solches erweitert übertragen.”

essencing/осуществление.²⁵²

However, such figuration is far from simply positive; rather, it is thoroughly pervaded by silencing (*σιγᾶν*, *Erschweigen*) properly due to the self-withdrawal of *beyng*.²⁵³ Indeed, in §267, Heidegger goes as far as to explicitly characterize *beyng* as “figure-less” (*bildlos*).²⁵⁴ Curiously, the very last paragraph of the *Beiträge* reveals that it is precisely silence which both harbors and bestows measure: “Keeping silence is the most concealed measure-holding. It holds the measure insofar as it first sets the measure/standard. And thus, speech is the measure/standard-setting in the most inward and broadest, measure/standard-setting as the essencing of the fuse and its fusing (appropriation).”²⁵⁵ The reason that “poetizing” holds this distinguished position is because its very nature is that of the projection – throw/draft/draw (*Entwurf*) – of the self into that dimensionality which was opened through it.²⁵⁶ Despite the morphological overtones of *ent-*, Heidegger clarifies that such a throw/draft/draw is not a “throwing away” of the self, but rather its unfolding (*entfalten*) which reaches towards *beyng* and allows itself to be grasped (*einfangen*) by it.²⁵⁷ Indeed, in the very last section of the *Beiträge*, Heidegger underscores this crucial point by saying that the human being’s “being-outside-of-itself” does not amount to its becoming selfless (*sichlos*).²⁵⁸ Rather, in this way, the self of the human being breaks through to a new determination: “to be *properly*...and to instantly constitute and not constitute this propriety

²⁵² Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.31, 72.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, I.37, 78.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, VIII.267, 470: “So reich gefügt und bildlos das Seyn west, es ruht doch in ihm selbst und seiner *Einfachheit*.”

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, VIII.281, 510: “Das Schweigen ist das verborgenste Maßhalten. Es *hält* das Maß, indem es die Maßstäbe erst setzt. Und so ist die Sprache Maß-setzung im Innersten und Weitesten, Maß-setzung als Erwesung des Fugs und seiner Fügung (Ereignis).”

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, I.21, 56.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, VIII.271, 488: “Überall jedoch bleibt hier kein Platz für die Deutung des Menschen als ‘Subjekt’, weder im Sinne des ich-haften noch im Sinne des gemeinschaftlichen Subjekts. Die Entrückung ist aber auch kein Außersichsein des Menschen in der Form eines Sichloswerdens.”

according to the ab-yssality of the ap-proprietation.”²⁵⁹

γ) Time-Space and Motion

As will become evident from the analysis of the proper spatiality and temporality of the work of art in Chapter 5, the question of the kind of motion that “propels” transfiguration is central to Heidegger’s reflection upon appropriation by the late thirties. One possible interpretation of such a motion is introduced in §5 in the *Beiträge*, namely, that of believing (*Glauben*): “The truth of beying only turns into a necessity through those who question. They are those who properly *believe*...”²⁶⁰ The crucial feature of such belief-as-motion is that it is carried out “without the help of an enchantment” – that is to say, spontaneously, without determination by an external motor.²⁶¹

However, in the later sections of the *Beiträge*, the focus of the Heidegger’s determination of believing shifts to self-transformation in accordance with the essence of truth²⁶²; if this is the case, and if the essence of truth is expressed in the gesture of tearing, for Dasein, believing may entail a giving of oneself over to a certain kind of being “rent in twain” (*Zertrümmerung*).²⁶³

When Dasein stands in the midst of the cleft/cleavage/fissure of beyng, what kind of a radical

²⁵⁹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, VIII.271, 489: “der Ereignete (in das Seyn Entrückte)... .. Eigentlich, des Wesens eigens Eigentümer, sein und diese Eigentlichkeit je nach der Ab-gründigkeit der Er-eynung inständig bestehen und nicht bestehen, das macht das Wesen der Selbstheit aus.”

²⁶⁰ Ibid., I.5, 12: “Die Wahrheit des Seyns wird nur zur Not durch die Fragenden. Sie sind die eigentlich *Glaubenden*...”

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid., V.c).237, 368: “...sich wandeln...nach der Wahrheit und ihrem Wesen...”

²⁶³ Ibid., VIII.264, 456.

In his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger speaks of such ‘rapture’ as an “explo[sion] of the very subjectivity of the subject.” (Cited in Michel Haar, “Heidegger and the Nietzschean ‘Physiology’ of Art,” in *Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Interpretation*, ed. David Farrell Krell and David Wood (London, New York: Routledge, 1988), 16; original quotation in Martin Heidegger, “The Will to Power as Art,” trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 123). Luce Fontaine-De Visscher similarly reads Heidegger’s interpretation of the poem of St. George as a ‘fracture’ of and an ‘infracture’ into our rationality: “Tel que nous le lit Heidegger, le poème de St. George crée une percée en quelque sorte irrésistible – il a la douceur de l’irrésistible – vers un dehors d’où tout le paysage familier de notre rationalité se trouve ébranlé et vacille: c’est une fracture, une ‘effraction,’¹³ qui pourrait bien être celle de la Différence.” (Luce Fontaine-De Visscher, “Ce qui vient en poème. Entre Heidegger et la nouvelle critique (suite et fin),” *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 80, no. 47 (1982): 457.)

reconfiguration might it undergo? Is this what it means “to experience the necessity of the abyss”²⁶⁴ – to be conformed to the abyss by being, in a certain sense, torn asunder? Indeed, in §272, Heidegger specifically speaks of the proper human being as one which is “torn together with beyng.”²⁶⁵ In an oblique reference to Descartes in §261, Heidegger speaks of a “shaking up” (*Erschütterung*) of the “Subjektum,” a “concussion” of the *fundamentum inconcussum* of the *cogito*.²⁶⁶ A few paragraphs further, Heidegger speaks of the human being “breaking itself” on beyng.²⁶⁷ The metaphor of beyng as the “hearth in the middle of the house of the gods” suggests that experiencing beyng may additionally mean something like being burnt, as is the prophet Isaiah, whose lips are touched by the burning coal raised from the altar of God by the seraphim.²⁶⁸ When the human being is “torn asunder,” “shaken up,” “broken,” or “burnt” in this way, its resulting condition, as described by Heidegger, is that of “belonging neither to itself nor to its opposite and yet to both, but not as object and subject” – that of an “between.”²⁶⁹ This provisional conclusion is strikingly similar to the one Heidegger reaches in *Die Frage nach dem Ding*²⁷⁰; the advance of the *Beiträge* over the former text, however, consists in the fact that the “between” is now runs through the very core of Dasein in such a way as to mediate not only

²⁶⁴ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, V.c).237, 370.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., VIII.272, 492: “...in das Seyn Mitgerissene...”

²⁶⁶ Ibid., VIII.261, 444.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., VIII.270, 486: “...der Mensch...am Seyn sich bricht...”

²⁶⁸ Isaiah 6:6-7: “Then flew one of the seraphims unto me, having a live coal in his hand, which he had taken with tongs from off the altar, and he laid it upon my mouth, and said, Lo, this hath touched thy lips; and thine iniquity is taken away, thy sin purged.”

²⁶⁹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, VIII.263, 454: “...weder einem Gegenüber noch sich gehören und doch beides, aber nicht wie Objekt und Subjekt...Die Ent-gegnung ist das Aufreißen des Zwischen, in das zu das Gegeneinander, als eines Offenen bedürftiges, geschieht.”

²⁷⁰ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, B.II.7.h, 188: “Wir sind entweder auf das gerichtet, was vom Gegenstand selbst gesagt wird, oder auf das, was über die Weise seiner Erfahrung erörtert wird. Das Entscheidende ist aber, weder nur auf das eine, noch nur auf das andere, auch nicht nur auf beides zusammen zu achten, sondern zu erkennen und zu wissen:

4. daß wir uns immer im Zwischen, zwischen Mensch und Ding bewegen müssen;

5. daß dieses Zwischen nur ist, indem wir uns darin bewegen;

daß dieses Zwischen sich nicht wie ein Seil vom Ding zum Menschen spannt, sondern daß dieses Zwischen als Vorgriff über das Ding hinausgreift und ebenso hinter uns zurück. Vor-griff ist Rück-wurf.”

between Dasein and things, but also between Dasein and itself, and, ultimately, between Dasein and the gods. This “between” is the abyss of being, which is paradoxically bridged by the very opposition (*Ent-gegnung*) of the most extreme opposites – human beings and gods.²⁷¹ As Heidegger insists in §267, however, such an interpretation does not reduce being to a mere “relation” (*Bezug*) which is nothing but a consequence and outcome of the “relation of the related” (*Beziehung des Bezogenen*); rather, as appropriation (*Er-eignis*), this relation is precisely what first brings the related to themselves or into their own.²⁷² Thus, the “between” spatializes the possibility of the essence of both gods and human beings.²⁷³ As an abyss, this “between” essences immediately (of its own) as the ground of that which is opposed by its means.²⁷⁴

The second kind of motion (which emerges out of Heidegger’s analysis of “scaring” (*Erschrecken*) is that of “holding-back”/restraint (*Verhaltenheit*); as Heidegger clarifies, such restraint is far from a “helpless giving up of ‘willing,’” but rather expresses a self-refusal/-denial (*Sichversagen*) that runs through beings all the way into the hidden depths of being.²⁷⁵ The awe (*Scheu*), which composes premonition (*Ahnung*) together with scaring and self-refusal/-denial, bears a similar vector of self-imposition, yet the purpose of such self-retention is not the rejection, but rather the intimacy with “that which is farthest as such,” i. e. being.²⁷⁶ Moreover, restraint is simultaneously a kind of fore-sprung (*Vorsprung*) into the turn of the appropriation –

²⁷¹ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, VIII.267, 470: “Die Er-eignung als Ent-scheidung bringt den Geschiedenen die *Ent-gegnung*: daß dieses Zu-einander der weitesten nothaften Entscheidung im äußersten ‘Gegen’ stehen muß, weil es den Ab-grund des gebrauchten Seyns überbrückt.”

²⁷² Ibid.: “...das Er-eignis ist ja doch...dieses Beziehen, das die Bezogenen erst zu ihnen selbst bringt.”

²⁷³ Ibid., VIII.267, 476: “Das Seyn west als das Zwischen für den Gott und den Menschen, aber so, daß dieser Zwischenraum erst dem Gott und dem Menschen die Wesensmöglichkeit einräumt...”

²⁷⁴ Ibid., VIII.267, 471: “Unvermittelt west das Zwischen als der Grund der in ihm Ent-gegneten.”

²⁷⁵ Ibid., I.5, 15.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., I.5, 15-16: “Die Scheu ist die Weise des Sichnahens und Nahebleibens dem Fernsten als solchem...”

it is a “creating sustaining in the ab-ysse.”²⁷⁷ Such a motion could not be further removed from the “total mobilization” (“*totale Mobilmachung*”) of a people for service.²⁷⁸ Indeed, such renunciation (*Verzicht*) is, according to Heidegger, “the highest form of possession.”²⁷⁹ In accord with these qualifications, the paradoxical movement that characterizes the “happening” of the history of being is that of “greatest stillness” (*große Stille*).²⁸⁰ The stillness of such a restraint “pervades the intimacy of the strife between the world and the earth” – a way of speaking which hearkens back to the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, once again reinforcing the bond between the happening of being and the work of art at the very point of their determinant features.²⁸¹

As with space and time, Heidegger seeks to re-examine the origins of the interpretation of motion in Greek philosophy: namely, motion (*Bewegung/κίνησις*) insofar as it is enfolded within becoming (*Werden*), which is, in turn, understood as a change of presencing (*Wechsel des Anwesens*), a transformation (μεταβολή).²⁸² Admittedly, here motion remains hemmed in by the imperatives of constancy and presence.²⁸³ Not only so, but it remains thought from out of ὄν as οὐσία even when it is rendered in terms of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια.²⁸⁴ Thus, the principal deficiency of the available notions of motion appears to consist in their derivation from a certain interpretation of being, rather than with the possibility of thinking motion as such. Indeed, in emphasizing the bond between motion and becoming, Heidegger sees himself as remedying a retroactive projection of the modern notion of motion as a “change of place in time” onto the

²⁷⁷ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, I.13, 36.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, II.74, 143.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, I.6, 22: “...die höchste Form des Besitzes...”

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, I.13, 34.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*: “Sie [Verhaltenheit] durchstimmt als Grundstimmung die Innigkeit des Streites zwischen Welt und Erde und damit die Bestreitung des Anfalls der Ereignung.”

²⁸² *Ibid.*, III.99, 193.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, IV.157, 280: “Desgleichen können Vorbeigang und Ereignis und Geschichte niemals als Arten von ‘Bewegungen’ gedacht werden, weil *Bewegung* (selbst als μεταβολή gedacht) immer auf das ὄν als οὐσία bezogen bleibt, in welchen Bezug auch δύναμις und ἐνέργεια und ihre späteren Nachkommen gehören.”

Aristotelian notion of motion as *φορά*, or “fulfilled-ness” (*Vollendetheit*).²⁸⁵ Such would be the “fulfilled-ness” of “being-capable/-able” (*Vermögen*), respectively – rather than a simple actualization/effectuation (*Verwirklichung*) of a possibility (*Möglichkeit*).²⁸⁶ Additionally, on occasion, Heidegger speaks of appropriation as “pure swinging/oscillation itself,” which would certainly lend itself to being interpreted as a certain kind of motion.²⁸⁷ In the former, “physical” account, the moved (*Bewegtes*) is no more than a spatio-temporal point mass (*raum-zeitlicher Massenpunkt*). However, in the latter, “metaphysical” account, motion is thought in constant reference to rest (*Ruhe*) as the “highest gathering/collection of moved-ness...as the ‘at once’ of possibilities in their most steady/constant and fulfilled preparedness.”²⁸⁸ It is at this pivotal point that modern physicalist interpretations of Aristotle turn a blind eye to rest as potently active – to the “elucidation of motion with a view to *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*” – and foreclose upon its dynamic possibilities by characterizing it as “unmoved,” as “object,” as “substance.”²⁸⁹ However, even with this adjustment, it is unclear whether the “category” of motion should be retained or whether an attempt must be made to think its core on a more profound level. The categories of quality, quantity, and modality receive abundant treatment in the writings and lectures reviewed in the present study, yet it is the category of relation which seems to hold out the most promise in terms of thinking appropriation and its alternatives.

§3. The Time-Space of Beyng: Between Human Beings and Gods

Insofar as Heidegger himself introduces the language of “god” (*Gott*) and “divinization”

²⁸⁵ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, III.99, 193: “Bewegung darf hier nicht neuzeitlich als Ortwechsel in der Zeit gefaßt werden...”

²⁸⁶ Ibid., IV.159, 281: “Eine wesentliche Kluft ist das Sein in der *Zurückgebogenheit* (Vermögen, aber nicht von *Möglichkeiten* her, die immer nur bisher aus dem Seienden als Vorhandenem gedacht wurde).”

²⁸⁷ Ibid., IV.164, 286-287: “...das Er-eignis, jenen Gegenschwung von Seyn und Da-sein, in dem beide nicht vorhandene Pole sind, sondern die reine Erschwingung selbst.”

²⁸⁸ Ibid., III.99, 194: “*Metaphysisch* aber ist Ruhe im eigentlichen Sinne die höchste Sammlung der Bewegtheit, Sammlung als das *Zumal* der Möglichkeiten in der ständigsten und erfüllten Bereitschaft.”

²⁸⁹ Ibid.: “Was leistet die Aufhellung der Bewegung im Hinblick auf *δύναμις* und *ἐνέργεια*?”

(*Götterung*) into his reflections upon the essencing/“*осушествление*” of being (*die Wesung des Seyns*), and insofar as certain aspects of this language bear upon the spatio-temporal characterization of such an essencing/“*осушествление*” (namely, the interval of the cleft/cleavage/fissure (*Zerklüftung*) and broadening of the shudder/quake (*Erbreitung der Erzitterung*)²⁹⁰ – and, by extension, upon that of the work of art and of its experience – the distinction and relationship between the essencing/“*осушествление*” of being (*die Wesung des Seyns*) and the divinization of god must be made sufficiently clear. The fact that being and god are distinct is attested by Heidegger in Section IV, §123. From this point of departure, Heidegger further specifies that “being is not a determination/definition of god”; rather, “being is that which the divinization of god needs, in order to still and fully remain distinct from it.”²⁹¹ Heidegger further specifies that being is the “between” (*das Zwischen*) in the midst of beings and gods and is entirely and in every respect incomparable (*unvergleichlich*) with either of these.²⁹² At the same time, it is only with respect to the “need” of the gods and the “belonging” of human beings to being that such a “between” might be “measured.”²⁹³ In terms even closer to the central concern of the present study, what such divinization “needs” is that “time-play-space” (*Zeit-Spiel-raum*) which breaks open within the shudder/quake of the cleft/cleavage/fissure, and why it needs it “for its own decision.”²⁹⁴ Indeed, as Heidegger proposes in §259, the being of the

²⁹⁰ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, IV.123, 240.

²⁹¹ Ibid., IV.123, 240: “Denn niemals ist das Seyn eine Bestimmung des Gottes selbst, sondern das Seyn ist Jenes, was die Götterung des Gottes braucht, um doch und vollends davon unterschieden zu bleiben.”

Ibid., VII.255, 408: “Der äußerste Gott bedarf des Seyns.”

²⁹² Ibid., IV.126, 244: “Das Seyn ‘ist’ das Zwischen inmitten des Seienden und der Götter und ganz und in jeder Hinsicht unvergleichlich, von diesen ‘gebraucht’ und jenem entzogen.”

Ibid., VII.256: “...das Seyn als das innigste Zwischen gleich dem Nichts, der Gott übermächtig den Menschen und der Mensch übertrifft den Gott.”

²⁹³ Ibid., IV.157, 279: “Die Zerklüftung hat ihre erste und weiteste Ausmessung im Bedürfen des Gottes in der einen und in der Zugehörigkeit (zum Seyn) des Menschen nach der anderen Richtung.”

²⁹⁴ Ibid., IV.123, 240: “Diese Er-eignung aber hat den Zug ins Eigene als Er-zitterung des Götterns, das den Zeit-spiel-raum für seine eigene Entscheidung braucht.”

gods is distinguished by a kind of “undecidedness,” and it remains to be seen whether divinity may not undergo a kind of “destruction” in “decidedness.”²⁹⁵ This “decision” is a kind of struggle (*Kampf*) of the gods, in which gods set up a god for decision and thus divinize.²⁹⁶ Time-space (*Zeit-Raum*) is part and parcel of the net/web (*Netz*) of appropriation, within which god “hangs” or suspends itself in order to rip (*zerreißen*) it and arise in the midst of being and beings as that which is “most foreign” (*das Fremdeste*) to both.²⁹⁷

Conclusion

By 1936, in *Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*, Heidegger has already developed the notion of a ‘between’ – a unity of ‘time-space’ – which is not reducible to the capabilities of the Subject or Dasein, but rather conditions them ontologically. In the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, this ‘time-space’ finally recovers its ‘origin’ and ‘motor’ – the ‘truth of beyng,’ the happening of appropriation (*Ereignis*), the coming of beyng into its own as the original and originary capability for transcendence. On the basis of recurrent motifs stemming from the root metaphor of cleaving (*Zerklüftung*), we have interpreted this ‘truth of beyng’ as the happening of differentiation within its oneness, as its opening up and coming out of itself (*ekstasis*), set in motion by the distinction – and therein, original strife (*Urstreit*) – between ‘beyng’ and ‘non-beyng’ (nothing) within it. From this scenario, ‘time-space’ has emerged as the ‘between’ – the rift (*Riß*) – of the difference which runs through the ‘middle’ of beyng and unfolds as the ‘dimension’ of ‘being-there’ (*Da-*

²⁹⁵ Heidegger, *Beiträge*, VIII.259, 437: “Diese Unentschiedenheit begreift in sich die Fragwürdigkeit, ob überhaupt dergleichen wie Sein den Göttern zugesprochen werden darf, ohne alles Gotthafte zu zerstören.”

²⁹⁶ Ibid., IV.127: “...aus jenem Grundwesen des Seyns, kraft dessen es das Entscheidungsbereich für den Kampf der Götter ist. Dieser Kampf spielt um ihre Ankunft und Flucht, in welchem Kampf die Götter erst göttern und ihren Gott zur Entscheidung stellen.”

²⁹⁷ Ibid., IV.142, 263: “Das Er-eygnis und seine Erfügung in der Abgründigkeit des Zeit-Raumes ist das Netz, in das der letzte Gott sich selbst hängt, um es zu zerreißen und in seiner Einzigkeit enden zu lassen, göttlich und seltsam und das Fremdeste in allem Seienden.”

sein). Making significant headway in overcoming the philosophical heritage of rendering space and time in static terms, Heidegger has explicated the ‘truth of being’ as a dynamic which weaves space and time into a unity-within-difference most palpably represented by the analogies of the whirlpool (*Wirbel*) and the pivot (*Wendungspunkt*). By means of these analogies, the ‘original’ capability for transcendence has finally been glimpsed as sustained tension between the vectors of self-containment and self-extension,²⁹⁸ and set before Dasein as the ‘prototype’ which prefigures and transfigures its capabilities for spatiality and temporality into the greater whole of unity-within-difference.

Thereby, Heidegger has cleared the path towards the final objective of his project : an account of the ‘transfiguration’ of Dasein into its most proper original ‘configuration.’²⁹⁹ The final complication which Heidegger must resolve in this undertaking consists in the lingering ‘incapability’ of Dasein to bring such a transfiguration about on its own : a catalyst remains to be identified and elaborated precisely in its intervention into the quickening of Dasein’s latent

²⁹⁸ Despite Heidegger’s critique of Schelling’s ‘identity thinking,’ Andrew Bowie suggests that Heidegger’s notion of tension between the vectors of self-expansion and self-containment is unwittingly inspired by Schelling : “...the relationship between ‘earth’ and ‘world.’ Heidegger derives this contrast (with no real acknowledgement) from the work of Schelling, which he was studying at the time he wrote the essay on art. Schelling thinks in terms of the relationship between ‘ground’ and ‘existence,’ which he also sees in terms of contractive and expansive forces. If the former dominates, there can be no world, but a world of pure expansion would just dissipate into formlessness. There is therefore a constant tension in how the world is manifest...” (Andrew Bowie, “Art,” in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, ed. François Raffoul (London : Bloomsbury, 2013), 261).

²⁹⁹ Krzysztof Ziarek similarly reads appropriation as re-configurative, yet with a specific focus on extending the reach of its power to socio-historical contexts : “I will remain here concerned only with that specific mode of relation in which art is encountered as a work, in which, according to the definition I have been developing, art comes to be constituted as a figure that reworks the forces that bring it into existence and make up its social and historical context. I would suggest that such a relation could be described as a thinking or a knowing, but a knowing that needs to be carefully delimited and defined in terms of a certain alternative (to) praxis.” (Krzysztof Ziarek, “Radical Art : Reflections after Adorno and Heidegger,” in *Adorno : A Critical Reader*, ed. Nigel C. Gibson and Andrew Rubin (Malden : Blackwell, 2002), 225). Thus, he comes to see the work of art as a potential agent of social change : “define the figure in art as a kind of *forcework*, which might be thought of as producing an alternative disposition of forces, a different, poetic modality of being-in-the-world. I would suggest that, opening up the historicity of experience, the figure loosens and disrupts social objectivization of forces into forms of power.” (Krzysztof Ziarek, “The Social Figure of Art : Heidegger and Adorno on the Paradoxical Autonomy of Artworks,” in *Between Ethics and Aesthetics : Crossing the Boundaries*, ed. Dorota Glowacka and Stephen Boos (Albany : SUNY Press, 2002), 234).

capability for transcendence as unity-within-difference. The principal impediment of Dasein is its self-imposed measurement of itself – and of all other beings, being, and beyng – by its own measure of quantity, i. e. unity-in-difference reduced to a divisible sum. This reduction is precipitated by an even more fundamental collapse of otherness into identity. Such measurement falls short of the ‘excess’ of greater whole and suppresses Dasein’s latent capability for a ‘higher measure’ which would correspond to it. Despite this impediment, Dasein is capable of contributing the following to the process of its transfiguration : (1) a ‘willing’ for going ‘over-and-above-itself’ and for returning to its origin (*Zurückwollen in den Anfang* and *Übersichhinauswollen*), (2) an overcoming (*Überwindung*) as an ‘asking’ about the ‘truth of beyng,’ (3) a ‘throwing-oneself-outwards’ (*Sichhinauswerfen*), (4) a ‘fore-standing’ (*Verstehen*), (5) a ‘getting-a-sense-of’ (*Besinnung*), and (6) an anticipatory ‘watchfulness’ (*Wächterschaft*) for its delivery. All of these ‘capabilities’ converge in the single imperative of ‘giving oneself over’ to the intervention of a ‘catalyst.’ In order to bring these inclinations on the part of Dasein to fruition, the ‘catalyst’ must wrest Dasein out of its self-imposed ‘incapability’ and ‘graft’ it into time-space as the sphere within which its ‘transfiguration’ might take place. Once implanted within this medium, Dasein must undergo a simultaneous ‘rupture’ and ‘suture’ of its very being such that it can recover its capability for transcendence precisely as a unity-within-difference,³⁰⁰ the self as the greater whole of the sustained revolution of the counterforces

³⁰⁰ Ziarek’s characterization of appropriation and its experience is exceptional in the attention it pays to the negotiation of identity, difference, and relation : “It would be tantamount to remaining or standing in the temporalization of the appropriating and disappropriating folds of *Ereignis* which draw out (*austragen*) and dispose the vectors and valencies of relations. (...) *Ereignis*, that disposes relations as a bind that unbinds, that relates and appropriates by way of freeing something to be properly what it is... The bind of relation here appropriates, that is, frees and enables something to be what it is and to unfold into its own way of relation to what is other. As such, *Ereignis* is the relation of all relations, the very scission or drawing out of relationality... (...) *Ereignis* releases and carries relations in the sense that it decides them, that is, draws them out by separating and holding beings in relation to one another.” (Krzysztof Ziarek, “Reproducing History : Benjamin and Heidegger on the Work of Art in Modernity,” in

of self-containment and self-extension. Thus, we come to see that the problematic of space and time is, at its basis, a problematic of identity and difference as two vectors which must converge in transcendence without the latter collapsing either into the former or into the latter.

The fulfillment of Dasein's capability for transcendence far exceeds any project of self-completion ; rather, it reveals the very fact that Dasein remains ontologically incomplete apart from its 'instantaneity' (*Inständigkeit*) in the middle of being. Indeed, the definition which Heidegger gives to this capacity includes both terms within itself: transcendence as 'hyper-measure' (*Übermaß*) is a 'going-over-and-above-oneself into that which is high over-and-above us' (*Übersichhinausfahren in das uns Überhöhende*). However, such a juncture or fusion cannot take place while hyper-measure languishes in its abased form of calculating measure, for the latter is incommensurate with the immensity of being. Thus, Dasein's latent capability for hyper-measure must first be quickened by happenings – or works – which set it to work. It is in view of this imperative that art comes into prominence as one kind of happening which can 'shift' Dasein into the 'higher gear' of hyper-measure and restore its bond with the immensity of being, in which the very being of Dasein as transcendence consists.

CHAPTER 4 : Poetry as Fusion (*Fuge*) : Spatiality and Temporality Reconfigured in accordance with the ‘Hyper-Measure’ of Art

Introduction

Our selection of the problematic of space and time as the guiding thread for understanding the contribution of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* to Heidegger’s work throughout the thirties has allowed us to situate the essay between two precise developments : the discovery of the ‘between’ irreducible to the Subject and the thing in *Die Frage nach dem Ding : Zur Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* and the elaboration of such a ‘between’ as the ‘time-space’ of the ‘middle’ of beyng in its appropriation in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. On the basis of our analysis in the preceding chapter, we have proposed to interpret such a ‘between’ as a ‘hyper-measure’ (*Übermaß*) which originates within beyng, is open to participation by the human being, and constitutes the basis of their ‘com-mensurability’ – of the bond in which the human being’s capability for transcendence consists. In thinking about this bond in terms of ‘measure,’ ‘im-mensity,’ and ‘com-mensurability,’ we have been able to observe the gradual, tacit release of the notion of *ratio* from the self-referential capability of the Subject to the capability of beyng for mediating the unity and difference between its ‘im-mensity’ and the ‘measure’ of the human being.

The identification of this ‘hyper-measure’ with art has finally brought us to the very vantage point from which the three versions of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ might now be considered : that of art as the ‘between’ shared by beyng and the human being in such a way as to afford the possibility of the ‘re-configuration’ of the latter in accordance with the ‘figure’ of the former. Insofar as such ‘mediation’ is persistently rendered in spatio-temporal terms as late

as the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, we believe ourselves to be justified in asking, ‘How does the figure of art as ‘hyper-measure’ – as the *ratio* that mediates the commensurability of being and the human being – reconfigure the spatiality and temporality of the work of art and of its experience?’¹ In this chapter, we will explore the three versions of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ with a view to : (1) identifying and ‘peeling back’ the ‘commonplace’ layers of spatiality and temporality which unfailingly reduce art to *ratio* as a capability of the Subject, and (2) reconstructing the ‘proper’ layers of spatiality and temporality which elevate art to *ratio* as the mediating ‘fuse’ between being and the human being.

§1. The Proper Spatiality (*eigentliche Räumlichkeit*) of the Work of Art

“With difficulty does that which dwells near the ur-spring, leave the *place*.”

(Hölderlin, *The Wandering*, vol. IV (Hellingrath), p. 167)²

This section of the study will consider whether (and in what sense) spatiality might be understood as a condition of the possibility of the work of art and of its experience across the

¹ In his study of Heidegger’s Hölderlin lectures, Dominique Janicaud insists upon the urgency of such an endeavor in the following terms: “...what does not change through all the Hölderlin lectures [is] the assumption that Hölderlin’s poetry...offers a radically new experience, i. e., a new world and, first a new space-time relationship (a new *Zeit-Raum*). To experience it, we have to perform a massive methodological change in our approach to space and time : we have to pass from combining geography and historiography to coupling topology and historicity.” (Dominique Janicaud, “The ‘Overcoming’ of Metaphysics in the Hölderlin Lectures,” in *Reading Heidegger : Commemorations*, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1993), 384.) It is precisely such a “methodological change” which we have set out to pursue in the present study. Sven-Olov Wallenstein acknowledges the centrality of such an undertaking in understanding the transfiguration of *Dasein* during Heidegger’s writings in the 1930’s, however, makes only a ‘brief detour’ through “The Origin of the Work of Art” : “...a brief detour through the first appearance of the work of art on a grand scale in Heidegger’s œuvre, namely in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (1936), and attempt to analyze how this text transforms the site of the work of art, or rather for the first time opens this site by implicitly recasting the structural hierarchy between temporality and spatiality in fundamental ontology [sic.]” (Sven-Olov Wallenstein, “The Site of the Work of Art,” *MLN* 109, no. 3 (1994) : 487). Our analysis extends far beyond such ‘recasting,’ in not only reconstructing the vast range of the significance of spatiality in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” but also interpreting it as the missing link between the ‘between’ of *Die Frage nach dem Ding* and the *Zeit-Raum* of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*.

² Martin Heidegger, “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” *Heidegger Studien* 5 (1989): 22 [hereafter designated by “HS”] | H Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Mein: Klostermann, 1977), 63. [hereafter designated by “H”]

three versions of Martin Heidegger's *Kunstwerkaufsatz*.³ It should be noted at the outset that the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* suite does not contain any explicit, in-depth discussions of the notion of spatiality as such. Thus, in order for such a discussion to take place, the present study will first need to make room for it – “den eigentlichen Ort der Erörterung”⁴ – following the hint provided by the third version itself: “Only such a knowing prepares space for the work, a path for those who create, a standpoint for those who preserve.”⁵ It will first seek to identify and analyze conceptual elements within the suite that may be responsibly interpreted as forming a broad range of such a notion – framed, at one extreme, by the literal original setting of the work of art and travel to such a location, and, at the other, by the archetypal structure of being (*Sein*) and orientation towards it as being-there (*Dasein*). As will become evident over the course of the present study, its findings resonate with the definition of geometry provided by Edmund Husserl in his treatise “The Origin of Geometry” composed in the same year as “The Origin of the Work of Art”: “Geometry and its closely related sciences have to do with spatio-temporality and with

³ Whitney Davis' article “‘Sein und Zeit im Raum’ : Perspective as Symbolic Form,” provides an excellent overview of the profound influence of the problematic of space on German aesthetics at the turn of the 20th century and in the decades leading up to the composition of Heidegger's essay. (Whitney Davis, “‘Sein und Zeit im Raum’ : Perspective as Symbolic Form,” in *Heidegger and the Work of Art History*, ed. Amanda Boetzkes and Aron Vinegar (Farnham : Ashgate, 2014). Among contributions which would have formed the art-historical context of Heidegger's thinking about the spatiality of the work of art, he cites, notably, Ernst Cassirer's reflections on ‘symbolic forms of spatiality’ in his lecture “Mythischer, ästhetische und theoretischer Raum” (given at the *Vierter Congress für Ästhetik und Kunstwissenschaft* in Hamburg on 7-9 October, 1930) and Erwin Panofsky's lecture “Die Perspektive als ‘symbolische Form’” (featured in the *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg, 1924-1925*), which had taken up and extended the problematic articulated by Adolf von Hildebrand and Alois Riegl. Reconstructing the evolution of this problematic, Davis traces Cassirer's reflections to von Hildebrand's insistence upon the direct dependence of the understanding of artistic form upon a prior understanding of ‘the nature of space and spatial presentation’ as early as in his *Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst* (1893), as well as to Alois Riegl's account of ‘concrete pictorial images of space made for spatialization by their beholders’ in his *Die spätromische Kunst-Industrie nach den Funden in Österreich* (1901). According to Davis, it was Cassirer who had called the attention of art historians and philosophers to the significant shift which was taking place between 1893 and 1930 from physical conceptions of space (operative in von Hildebrand and Riegl) to ‘a new conception of space-time’ as a ‘system of occurrences of events’ influenced by Einstein's relativity theory, which would have informed Heidegger's approach to the spatiality of the work of art.

⁴ H, 74.

⁵ H, 66: “Nur solches Wissen bereitet dem Werk den Raum^a, den Schaffenden den Weg, den Bewahrenden den Standort.”

the shapes, figures, as well as forms of motion, changes of deformation and the like, possible therein, especially as measurable quantities.”⁶ At this serendipitous nexus, the present study will also confirm Husserl’s own intuition regarding the crucial corollary of such a definition precisely at the point of measurability – the opening of such measurability onto immeasurability due to a dawning awareness that “[the] finitely known and and unknown spaces and times” must ultimately be construed as “finitudes within the horizon of open infinity.”⁷ While setting its sights on the overarching horizon of the archi-spatiality of being and of being-there, the investigation will set out with a more humble focus on the most rudimentary, or commonplace,⁸ notion of the spatiality of the work of art and of its experience, and progressively expand its scope to its more essential, or proper, understanding, which will, in turn, direct it towards an underlying proto-spatiality of art and of humanity. Having distinguished these levels of spatiality insofar as it is possible⁹ and useful, the inquiry will return to the task of tracing the

⁶ Husserl, Edmund. *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendente Phänomenologie*, Beilage III, zu §9a (Husserliana VI), herausgegeben von Walter Biemel. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954, 383: “Geometrie und die mit ihr nächst verschwisterten Wissenschaften haben es mit der Raumzeitlichkeit und den darin möglichen Gestalten, Figuren, auch Bewegungsgestalten, Wandlungen der Deformation u. dgl. zu tun, insbesondere als meßbaren Größen.” The author of this study is profoundly grateful to Jean-Luc Marion for the identification of this vital parallel and for his invaluable observation regarding the necessity of re-inscribing any reflection upon determinate spatiality within the horizon of indeterminate, or infinite, spatiality. For the sake of methodological clarity, however, she would also humbly register that the conceptual architecture of this study emerged entirely apart from and well prior to her awareness of Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry.”

⁷ Husserl, *Krisis*, 384: “...die endlich bekannten und unbekanntenen Räume und Zeiten als Endlichkeiten im Horizont einer offenen Unendlichkeit.”

⁸ Here and throughout this study the term commonplace will be employed to collectively designate Heidegger’s terms *gewöhnlich*, *geläufig*, *alltäglich*, etc.

⁹ The present study does so in full cognisance of the fact that such an attempt goes directly against the grain of the project of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* as a whole: that of demonstrating that the essence and experience of the work of art cannot and should not be extricated from its origin and its lifeblood – the fundamental relation of the work and the human being to the truth as the turning of nothing into something. Indeed, the *Addendum* to the third version could not be more clear about this point:

The whole treatise “The Origin of the Work of Art” wittingly, and yet in an unspoken manner, moves along the path of the question about the essence of being [des Seins]. The reflection upon what *art* may be is to be determined wholly and decisively only out of the question about *being* [*Sein*]. Art counts neither as the precinct of the accomplishment of culture, nor as an appearing of the spirit/mind; it belongs within the *appropriation/at-one-ment* [das *Ereignis*], out of which the “sense of being” (cf. *Being and Time*) determines itself for the first time. [H, 73]

transformation of commonplace spatiality into proper spatiality – or, in the final version, into proper essential space (*eigentlicher Wesensraum*)¹⁰ – back to its most originary (*ursprünglichste*) source: the im-proper spatiality of the nothing (*des Nichts*). In analyzing and integrating these levels of spatiality, the foregoing account will indicate and elucidate any significant changes in their constitutive elements from one version to the next as they arise.

a) The Commonplace Spatiality of the Work of Art as Conversion to the Measure of the Subject

The commonplace notion of the spatiality of the work of art and of its aesthetic experience is structured around the processes of its production (*Erzeugung*),¹¹ consumption (*Genuß*),¹² and of exchanges that link (*verkoppeln*)¹³ the two. As the final version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* concludes, all such processes are ultimately reducible to experience (*Erlebnis*) in some way or another and, on this commonplace plane, experience towers as “the authoritative source^a not only for the consumption of art, but just as much for the creating of art as well.”¹⁴

Die ganze Abhandlung »Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes« bewegt sich wissentlich und doch unausgesprochen auf dem Weg der Frage nach dem Wesen des Seins.⁹ Die Besinnung darauf, was die *Kunst* sei, ist ganz und entschieden nur aus der Frage nach dem *Sein* bestimmt.⁹ Die Kunst gilt weder als Leistungsbezirk der Kultur, noch als eine Erscheinung des Geistes, sie gehört in das *Ereignis*, aus dem sich erst der »Sinn vom Sein« (vgl. »Sein und Zeit«) bestimmt. [H 73]

Such a relation far outstrips the superficial distinction between the aesthetically pleasing and the scientifically true as proper domains of art and philosophy, respectively; as the primordial non-theoretical comportment (*nichttheoretisches Verhalten*), such a relation facilitates the enracination and transfiguration of both thinking and making as its hypostases. As the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* elucidates to the fullest extent: “Beauty does not come forth besides this truth. When truth sets itself to work, it appears. Appearing – as this being of truth in the work and as work – is beauty. Thus the beautiful belongs to the self-appropriation or self-atonement of truth.” (Die Schönheit kommt nicht neben dieser Wahrheit vor. Wenn die Wahrheit sich in das Werk setzt, erscheint sie. Das Erscheinen ist – als dieses Sein der Wahrheit im Werk und als Werk – die Schönheit. So gehört das Schöne in das Sichereignen der Wahrheit.) [H, 69]

¹⁰ H, 26.

¹¹ HS, 6 and ff. | Martin Heidegger, “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” in *De l’origine de l’œuvre d’art: première version*, trans. Emmanuel Martineau ([S.l.]: Authentica, 1987), 22 and ff. [hereafter designated by “M”]

¹² HS, 6 | M, 22.

¹³ HS, 8.

¹⁴ H, 67: “Das Erlebnis ist nicht nur für den Kunstgenuß, sondern ebenso für das Kunstschaffen die maßgebende Quelle^a. Alles ist Erlebnis.”

α) Craftsmanship (*Anfertigung*) and Aesthetic Experience (*Aesthetische Erlebnis*)

Its point of departure is the “more originary” (*ursprünglicher*) process of bringing-forth or production (*Hervorbringung*), in which the artist is understood to experience (*erleben*) the work in the sense of grasping (*fassen*) it – containing it – as a thought (*Gedanke*) within his or her own imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) and then transposing (*umsetzen*) it into – “laying it inside” (*hineinlegen*), as the third version puts it,¹⁵ – a product (*Erzeugnis*) or a piece of art (*Kunststück*). In this process, the spatiality of the work of art consists, firstly, in its being brought forth (*hervorgebracht*) out of its passive interiority as an object of the mental or spiritual (*geistig*) activity of the artist’s imagination, secondly, in its projection or transfer as a kind of template or form onto some suitable material (*Stoff* (or *Werkstoff*, as the second version terms it,¹⁶)), and, finally, in the “setting” of such a material into such a form¹⁷ – to use an expression from the second version, the “transposition [of the thought] into the work” (*Umsetzung ins Werk*).¹⁸ Such is the commonplace spatiality of the process of production and the corresponding createdness (*Beschaffenheit*) of the work of art¹⁹ (which, in the second version, comes to be explicitly contrasted with its proper being created (*Geschaffensein*)). The third version further distinguishes between commonplace production and proper creation of the work of art by means of designating the former as the work’s being-crafted (*Angefertigtsein*), and the latter – as its being-created (*Geschaffensein*).²⁰ The *commonplace* activity of the artist that corresponds to the work’s being-crafted is, of course, crafting (*anfertigen*), which, in turn, renders him or her a craftsman/-woman – a “handyman/-woman” that crafts a handywork (*Handwerk*) – terms which

¹⁵ H, 21.

¹⁶ M, 30.

¹⁷ HS, 10.

¹⁸ M, 20.

¹⁹ HS, 14: “sinnliche Beschaffenheit” | M, 48: “ein Geschaffenes.”

²⁰ H, 44.

the third version for the first time puts into dialogue with the Greek notions of τέχνη and τεχνίτης.²¹ What does the commonplace spatiality of crafting or handywork consist in – i. e., how is it experienced by the craftsman/woman or “handyman/-woman”? The craftsmanship of handywork is an expression of a craftsman/-woman’s *capacity* (*Können*)²² for transforming (*verwenden*)²³ a given material – its actualization and habituation by means of its practice. Such practice is, first and foremost, a formation of oneself, whose ultimate purpose is the fulfillment of one’s own potential; in such an operation, handywork as the forming of a suitable material into a desired shape figures merely as a necessary exterior means for the implementation – actualization – of an inward capacity. The “product” of such practice is an honed mastery of oneself – an ever-increasing ability to employ a given capacity in its optimal function at will. It involves precisely the kind of striving (*streben*) and achievement (*Leisten*) that the third version denounces as “the action of a subject who sets his/her own self as an end (*Zweck*).”²⁴ As the third version underscores, even the practice of crafting as such does not constitute its own final product or its own final end – as a mere instantiation of the human being’s capacity for making (*Machen*), a practical achievement (*praktische Leistung*) – it falls quite short of τέχνη, which must rather be understood as a kind of knowing (*Weise des Wissens*), a transformation entirely interior to the craftsman/-woman’s person.²⁵ It is for this reason that the commonplace reaction to a skillfully executed handywork is its acknowledgement and praise as an outward display of the inward greatness of its craftsman/-woman, the “N. N. *fecit*,”²⁶ of the “ingenuity of the self-

²¹ H, 46.

²² Ibid.

²³ H, 52.

²⁴ H, 55.

²⁵ H, 46.

²⁶ H, 52.

mastery of [his or her own] subject.”²⁷

In the third version, the notion of the combination of form and material in artistic creation is initially traced back to the Thomistic interpretation of the biblical belief that, as something created (*ein Geschaffenes*) – as an *ens creatum* – every existent is brought into existence precisely by means of the unity of *forma* and *materia*.²⁸ In the second version, an act (*Tun*) – and in the third version, a subjective act (*subjectives Tun*)²⁹ and an *activity (Tätigkeit)*³⁰ – of the artist produces, as its outcome (*Ergebnis*),³¹ an equally passive exteriority of the work of art understood as “formed material” (*ein geformter Stoff*),³² wherein the vehicle of such exteriority – its materiality – is seen in merely instrumental terms, ultimately rendering such exteriority itself provisional and superficial. Indeed, the third version calls the materiality of the work of art in such a scenario a mere “underlay” (*Unterlage*) and “field” (*Feld*) for artistic forming – one whose suitability waxes in inverse proportion specifically to its resistance (*Widerstand*) and is, indeed, optimal when it altogether “vanishes” (*verschwindet*) into its purpose.³³ The work of art as commonplace formed materiality operates as a mere instrument (*Werkzeug*) of work proper, but does not itself constitute either work or art, but rather, as the second version puts it, something intermediate (*Mittleres*) – though not an intermediary (*Vermittleres*)³⁴ – between a tool (*Zeug*) and a work (*Werk*), a crafted thing (*angefertigtes Ding*) of a kind of pre-art (*Vorkunst*).³⁵ At best, as the third version acknowledges, such commonplace formed materiality

²⁷ H, 64: “der genialen Leistung des selbstherrlichen Subjektes”

²⁸ H, 14.

²⁹ H, 21.

³⁰ H, 1.

³¹ M, 20.

³² HS, 13 | M, 52 | H, 11.

³³ HS, 11 | H, 11, 31-32.

³⁴ M, 50, 52.

³⁵ Ibid.

of the work serves as a medium (*Medium*) in its being-created (*Geschaffensein*).³⁶ As the second version makes clear, the commonplace spatiality of the work of art as material exteriority is perceived by the commonplace spatiality of the experience of the work of art as an obstacle to be overcome (*bewältigt*) on the way to an intrusion (*Eindringen*) into the work's immaterial interiority³⁷ with a view to an "excavation" of the artist's original thought lodged within it in some form or another – the "much vaunted *aesthetic experience*" (*das vielberufene ästhetische Erlebnis*),³⁸ as the third version explicitly identifies it for the first time. (Incidentally, the third version draws a parallel between such an intrusion of aesthetic experience into the work of art and the assault (*Überfall*) of commonplace thinking upon a thing.)³⁹ Hence, the second version's comical example (which the third version retains) of a hypothetical commonplace attempt to reach the interior of the work of art carved out of stone by shattering (*zerschlagen*) its material: as a result of such a tactic, commonplace experience acquires nothing but "pieces" (*Stücken*) – "never something inward and open" (or "opened," as the third version puts it).⁴⁰ This approach having failed it, commonplace experience turns to calculation – weighing the stone in a balance – as an alternative way of "converting" the material exteriority of the work into something it might appropriate.⁴¹ Even something as ephemeral as a thin film of paint seeming to exude colored light from within is broken down (*zerlegt*) into calculable frequencies of oscillation.⁴² Such failure of analysis and calculation resonates with the second version's unique conjecture regarding a certain lack of understanding (*unverstehen*) as proper to the experience of the work

³⁶ H, 43.

³⁷ M, 30.

³⁸ H, 3, 67.

³⁹ H, 10, 57.

⁴⁰ M, 30, 32: "nie ein Inneres und Offenes" | H, 33: "ein Inneres und *Geöffnetes*" (italics mine)

⁴¹ M, 32 | H, 33.

⁴² Ibid.

of art, where understanding is interpreted as intrusion.⁴³

According to the first version, this commonplace understanding models itself upon a Platonic and Aristotelian interpretation of being, wherein a form is defined as that within which the proper “look” (*Aussehen*) of a being may show itself (*sich zeigen*).⁴⁴ The third version calls this “look” *Anblick* and explicitly identifies it with the Greek term and notion of εἶδος.⁴⁵ Such a form itself is then understood to be structured or crafted in accordance with the end of a given being – whether natural or instrumental (although, in the opinion of the first version, the very idea of an end is essentially instrumental and therefore inaccurately applied to a being’s nature). While the first version readily concedes – twice in the same paragraph – that, with regard to the work of art, the terms material and form are “possible every time” and “applicable...every time,”⁴⁶ it undertakes to demonstrate that the interpretation of form as an amalgamation of particles of matter or various quantities and types of material with a view to a given purpose, extraneous to these constituent parts themselves – something to be “used” (*gebraucht*) and “used up” (*verbraucht*)⁴⁷ – is insufficient to accounting for the formation (*Formung*) of the work as a fulfilled whole.⁴⁸ For example, in the case of the commonplace understanding of setting-forth (*herstellen*) as a “setting-there”/“positing”/“representation of something” (“*Darstellung von etwas*”), formation is misunderstood precisely as conformation of a certain material to an already existing visible or invisible entity (whether Platonic *idea* (*Idea*) or “*spiritual/mental*” content (“*geistiger*” *Gehalt*),⁴⁹ the purpose or end of such conformation being relation to the original by

⁴³ M, 32.

⁴⁴ HS, 10, 16.

⁴⁵ H, 11.

⁴⁶ HS, 10-11.

⁴⁷ HS, 11 | M, 30 | H, 52.

⁴⁸ HS, 11 | M, 30.

⁴⁹ HS, 14 | M, 52.

means of imitation.⁵⁰ The example provided by the second and third versions here is that of an image (a copy) – of a god consecrated by the winner of a tournament, an image that, on a superficial level, presumably represents what this god looks like and allows one to know (*wissen*) such, in the second version, and to take cognizance of it for oneself (*an sich zur Kenntnis nehmen*), in the third version.⁵¹ The example provided by the third version is that of the – by now – infamous painting of van Gogh, which supposedly represents – offers an immediate description (*unmittelbare Beschreibung*) – of a pair of peasant shoes.⁵² Again, in the commonplace sense of portrayal, such a painting is looked to as an instrument of facilitating mental visualization (*Veranschaulichung*) or mental representation (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of something that, in actuality, exists quite apart from the painting itself.⁵³ As the third version points out, in such cases the authentic “artistic” element – whether the Greek god or the actual pair of peasant shoes – is thought to be “something still other than and beyond”⁵⁴ the commonplace thinghood of the work as formed material. As the third version readily acknowledges, a pair of peasant shoes is quite a different “thing” from a Greek god: naturally, there are (*es gibt*) actual, extant (*wirkliches, vorhandenes*) pairs of such peasant shoes, whose “giving again” (*Wiedergabe*) by the painting is utterly redundant to that of their original being “given” in actuality and is, therefore, of the lowest order of imitation – that of mimickry (*Nachahmung*) and depiction (*Abschilderung*).⁵⁵ In this case, the form of the work of art

⁵⁰ HS, 13.

⁵¹ M, 26: “Und so das Bildwerk des Gottes, das der Sieger im Kampfspiel ihm weiht. Kein Bild, damit man nur wisse, wie der Gott aussieht.” | H, 29: “So steht es auch mit dem Bildwerk des Gottes, das ihm der Sieger im Kampfspiel weiht. Es ist kein *Abbild*, damit man *an ihm leichter zur Kenntnis nehme*, wie der Gott aussieht...” (italics mine)

⁵² H, 3, 18.

⁵³ H, 18, 21.

⁵⁴ H, 4: “...das Kunstwerk über das Dinghafte hinaus noch etwas anderes ist. Dieses Andere, was daran ist, macht das Künstlerische aus.”

⁵⁵ H, 22.

constitutes a mere conformation to the measure of (*Anmessung*) or an Aristotelian ὁμοίωσις or a medieval *adequatio* with an extant, actual being – for example, Hölderlin’s hymn “The Rhine” and C. F. Meyer’s poem “The Roman Fountain” supposedly depicting, respectively, the titular river and fountain.⁵⁶ While formation as conformation of the work to such “something else” – whether universal essence (*allgemeines Wesen*) or its particular instantiation (*Einzelnes*)⁵⁷ – is, indeed, central to conceptions of the commonplace spatiality of the work as allegory, symbol,⁵⁸ and Platonic copy (*Abbild*)⁵⁹ or “after-image” (*Nachbild*),⁶⁰ it is entirely inadequate as a model of its proper spatiality.

An expanded section on the nature of poetry within the second version reminds of another model of the work of art – that of communication (*Mitteilung*) – wherein its exterior form (the “phonetic and written expression”⁶¹) is, once again, understood to merely relay an interior content. The spatial dynamic of such a model and of its experience, however, largely reflects that of the economy of representation. Having extensively dealt with representational models of the work of art in the first two versions, the third version for the first time explicitly addresses the possibility of formalism and its apparent proximity to the proper spatiality of the work of art. As early as in the first version, the notion of the self-sufficiency of the work of art is established precisely through the critique of its representational models. Thus, the first version tirelessly reiterates that the work of art as formation proper “never proceeds from something already extant and objective” which it then comes to “represent,” that it “represents nothing,” precisely because “it has nothing that it should “represent” – quite on the contrary, the work “is

⁵⁶ H, 22.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ HS, 13 | M, 52 | H, 4.

⁵⁹ H, 22.

⁶⁰ HS, 14.

⁶¹ M, 38 “ein lautlicher und schriftlicher Ausdruck” | H, 61.

simply and only itself – and nothing else.”⁶² Recognizing that such self-sufficiency may figure even at the commonplace level of the work, the third version names and quickly dismisses its experiential corollary – that of a connoisseurship of taste (*geschmäcklerische Kennerschaft*), which supposedly preoccupies itself with the formal (*das Formale*) of the work as such. In terms of experience, such connoisseurship immediately associates the formal with the work’s particular appeal (*Reiz*) and initially traces such an appeal back to its formal beauty (*Schönheit*); in so doing, it keeps it well within the connoisseur’s grasp as an object (*Gegenstand*) his or her pleasure (*das Gefallen*), thereby reducing the “objective” beauty of the work to a certain quality of a purely “subjective” experience of pleasure.⁶³ The question of formalism is once again raised – on this occasion, specifically in relation to modern art – in an *Addendum* footnote of the *Reclam* edition of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* of 1960. The focus of this footnote remains upon “subjective” experience (*Erlebnis*) as the “*par excellence* element of art”⁶⁴ in commonplace conception. Its commentary hearkens back to the very first description of the commonplace experience of production as an ordeal of the soul (*seelische Erlebnis*) of the artist⁶⁵ and here follows such commonplace line of reasoning to its logical conclusion – to the experienced (*Erlebtes*) itself becoming a medium – “the how of making and discovering” – thus superceding even skill in craftsmanship as a novel means of production.⁶⁶ The ability of the artist to subjugate material to a given form as a consequence of his or her mastery of him-/herself is no longer of any relevance in such a mode of production: hence, the footnote’s reference to the Informel and

⁶² HS, 14: “...nie auf ein schon Stehendes und Gegenständliches geht”; “...stellt nichts dar...weil es nichts hat, was es darstellen soll”; “...*ist* einfach nur es selbst – und sonst nichts.”

⁶³ H, 56, 69.

⁶⁴ H, 67, footnote b: “das Erlebnis das Element schlechthin für die Kunst”

⁶⁵ HS, 6 | M, 20.

⁶⁶ HS, 67, footnote a: “das Wie des Machens und Erfindens”

its fondness for the “symbolism” of indeterminacy and the *void*.⁶⁷ Indeed, within such an approach, the formal itself risks being perceived as a container without contents, primitive in its inability to “releas[e] anything further outside of itself, because it does not contain anything other than that wherein it is held.”⁶⁸ Thus, its interior emptied and its exterior reduced to a mere shell, the work of art dissolves within a certain manner of experience (*Erlebnis*), as the third version puts it: “The manner in which the human being experiences art is supposed to give information about its essence.”⁶⁹

The spatiality of the artist’s experience of the work of art that corresponds to the process of its production as commonly conceived, in truth, amounts rather to a certain spatiality of his or her own “ordeal of the soul” (*seelisches Erlebnis*) – a “mental or spiritual struggle” (*geistige Ringen*) of his or her personality (*Persönlichkeit*), wherein such a personality wrestles against and wrings itself free from the limitations of its interiority – riding a “storm of emotions” (*Gefühlssturm*), as it were, – in order to “live out” (*ausleben*) its life to exteriority’s fullest extent. Within the process of production understood in this way, the work of art turns out to be a mere by-product or consequence of the greater cause (*Ursache*)⁷⁰ of the artist’s will (*Wille*) to self-expression, and its spatiality is therein reduced strictly to serving as a kind of instrument – a makeshift “duct” (*Durchgang*) – for the “procession” (*Vorgang*) of the artist’s personality from its interiority to its expansivity. In this scenario, the artist experiences the spatiality of the work only as that of a bridge crossed and burnt.

β) Extancy (*Vorhandensein*), Constancy (*Standhaftigkeit*), and Resistance (*Widerstand*)

⁶⁷ H, 67, footnote a: “»Informal« und die entsprechende Unbestimmtheit und Leere des »Symbolischen«”

⁶⁸ H, 64: “Es vermag nichts weiter aus sich zu entlassen, weil es nichts anderes enthält als das, worin es gefangen ist.”

⁶⁹ H, 67: “Die Art, wie der Mensch die Kunst erlebt, soll über ihr Wesen Aufschluß geben.”

⁷⁰ HS, 6.

Once the work of art fulfills its role in the artist's quest for self-expression by conducting the artist's personality outwards, it becomes superfluous to his or her newly-discovered exteriority and simultaneously obtains a multifaceted interiority and exteriority of its own. Before the work slips further into the commonplace spatiality of entanglement within the web of exchanges called the art trade (*Kunstbetrieb*), it undergoes an extrication (*Loslösung*) from the process of its production (or, as the third version puts it, the artist looks away (*sieht ab*) from it and releases (*entläßt*) it⁷¹) and acquires the provisional status of a thing that is extant or at hand (*vorhandenes*),⁷² as well as of a thing that is as such or in itself (“*als solcher*” or “*an sich*”).⁷³ The second version terms this compound state of the work a standing-there-in-itself (*In-sich-Dastehen*).⁷⁴ The third version further emphasizes, for the first time in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, that the work in such a state constitutes that “which...is *actual* in art” or, at least, that which appears as the proximate actual (*das nächste Wirkliche*).⁷⁵

In common parlance, the work's being at hand (*Vorhandensein*) signifies its being there (*Dasein*) in the most commonplace sense of the sheer fact of its existence, aptly expressed by the phrase “there is (*es gibt*) a work of art....” – or, in the broadest sense, indicated by the third version, the work of art “is not purely nothing” (“*nicht schlechthin nichts ist*”) or “is something that is beingly” (“*etwas Seiendes ist*”).⁷⁶ The third version confirms that, in this capacity, the work of art is “as naturally at hand as things otherwise are.”⁷⁷ The third version introduces a plethora of examples of such commonplace thinghood (*Dinghafte*), including that of “an image hang[ing] on a wall like a hunting rifle or a hat,” of a painting of van Gogh cropping up in one

⁷¹ H, 26.

⁷² H, 3.

⁷³ HS, 6 | M, 22 | H, 26.

⁷⁴ M, 28.

⁷⁵ H, 2: “was... von der Kunst wirklich ist”; 23, 43.

⁷⁶ H, 5.

⁷⁷ H, 3: “Die Werke sind so natürlich vorhanden wie Dinge sonst auch.”

exhibition or another, of works rattling in train cars “like coal from the Ruhr region and logs from the Black Forest,” of Hölderlin’s hymns sharing a soldier’s backpack with ammunition cleaning gear, of the score for Beethoven’s quarters gathering dust in a storeroom of the publishing house “like potatoes in a cellar.”⁷⁸ In a similar manner, a temple “simply stands there in the middle of the fissured cliff.”⁷⁹ Palpable (*greifbar*)⁸⁰ and – as the third version qualifies it for the very first time – perceptible (*vernehmbar*)⁸¹ as extant things are, a work is a newly extant (*vorhandenes*) thing alongside already extant things, yet *within* their multitude. In the first version, this multitude is described, in the commonplace sense of the word “world,” as a “sum” or “assembly of extant things...a yield of a carried out or only imaginary counting up of the same,” which provides an “only imaginary or thought-up frame for the extant (*Vorhandene*).”⁸² In the second version, such a commonplace notion of the “world” is similarly characterized as an “assembly of extant things,” yet here “things” come to include the “uncountable” in addition to the “unalterable and known things” such as “human beings and animals, plants and others”; to these, the third version adds things that are “unknown” as well.⁸³ All of these make up an environment (*Umgebung*) for the extant work of art that is not simply a *static* frame, as in the first version, but also a kind of onrush (*Andrang*).⁸⁴ Within this *commotion*, the work of art as an extant thing, once again, does not properly move itself, but is rather tossed about by the waves of

⁷⁸ H, 3: “Das Bild hängt an der Wand wie ein Jagdgewehr oder ein Hut. Ein Gemälde, z. B. jenes von van Gogh, das ein Paar Bauernschuhe darstellt, wandert von einer Ausstellung in die andere. Die Werke werden verschickt wie die Kohlen aus dem Ruhrgebiet und die Baumstämme aus dem Schwarzwald. Hölderlins Hymnen waren während des Feldzugs im Tornister mitverpackt wie das Putzzeug. Beethovens Quartette liegen in den Lagerräumen des Verlagshauses wie die Kartoffeln im Keller.”

⁷⁹ H, 27: “[Der Tempel] steht einfach da inmitten des zerklüfteten Felsentales.”

⁸⁰ HS, 9 | M, 28 | H, 30.

⁸¹ H, 30.

⁸² HS, 9: “...die Ansammlung vorhandener Dinge als Ergebnis einer ausgeführten oder nur gedachten Durchzählung derselben.” | “...ein nur eingebildeter und hinzugedachter Rahmen für das Vorhandene.”

⁸³ H, 30.

⁸⁴ M, 26, 28, 30 | H, 28, 30.

the sea of extant things all around it – and, by the time of the third version, hangs on for dear life (*hineinhängt*), as it were.⁸⁵ As the third version points out – in all due respect – its matter-of-fact shifting around by the cleaning ladies (*die Putzfrau*) and delivery men (*die Güterbestätterei*) at the museum is precisely of this sort.⁸⁶

It is certainly worth noting, however, that towards the end of the third version even this “factum est” of the work – “that such a work *is*, and no longer is not” – acquires a more profound dimension to be fully addressed in the corresponding section on the proper spatiality of the work below.⁸⁷ In the context of the commonplace spatiality of the work of art, the “miracle of miracles” of it being “something rather than nothing” remains rather unremarkable (*unbemerkt*) and forgotten (*vergessen*).⁸⁸ Afterall, as the third version puts it, “But what is more commonplace than the fact that a being is?”⁸⁹ – and, by extension, than the fact that a work of art *as a being* is? Within *commonplace spatiality*, the “silent thrust of the “that” of the work”⁹⁰ – of its actuality – remains just that – silent. Yet the very silence of the work of art – its self-seclusion (*Einsamkeit*) – causes it to appear tremendous (*ungeheuer*) in comparison with other beings and, therefore, to be noticed precisely as extant for the first time.⁹¹ Even in such silence, it anticipates what will eventually become the distinguishing feature of the work of art “as such” or “in itself” – its resistance (*Widerstand*),⁹² the self-preservation of its core within its impermeable exterior

⁸⁵ H, 31.

⁸⁶ H, 3.

⁸⁷ H, 52-53: “...daß solches Werk *ist*, und nicht vielmehr nicht ist”

⁸⁸ H, 53.

⁸⁹ H, 53: “Was aber ist gewöhnlicher als dieses, daß Seiendes ist?”

⁹⁰ H, 53: “...der stille Stoß [seines] »Daß«...”

⁹¹ H, 54.

⁹² Beatrice Han-Pile both refers to and distinguishes Heidegger’s interpretation of resistance from that of Schopenhauer: “The example of resistance is interesting because it was already used by Schopenhauer with the same aim in mind, namely to try to identify positively the thing-in-itself as will (an identification that both Kant and Heidegger reject). (...) Thus, ‘the experience of resistance...is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of the world. The character of resisting is one that belongs to entities within-the-world.’” (Beatrice

shell and the deflection of all attempts at intrusion by anything outside of itself. However, as the third version points out, the silent thrust of the work is intercepted (*angefangen*) precisely by the commonplace.⁹³ Its self-preservation (*Selbsterhaltung*) is emptied into its conservation (*Erhaltung*) within tradition, which – at its best – offers the work of art a site (*Stätte*) within recollection (*Erinnerung*), “from out of which [the work] might co-form history.”⁹⁴ Yet, so long as the work and its experience continue to be understood at the level of the commonplace, they remain sequestered within a mental interior as a process of recollection and as its object – a memory.

The discourse on the thinghood (*Dinghafte*) of the work of art is a remarkable new development in the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, and the notion of thinghood can naturally be interpreted in both commonplace and proper senses (with the latter to be taken up in the corresponding section below). Even in its commonplace sense of the “material” out of which a work of art is made/crafted (*angefertigt*)⁹⁵ – stone, wood, color, sound – thinghood is the first trait of the work of art in all three versions to be called irremovable (*unverrückbar*).⁹⁶ That is, it is said to be “within” the work in such a profound way that one “might sooner say the reverse” – that the work of art is “within” thinghood: that the work of architecture is “within” the stone, the carving is “within” the wood, the painting is “within” the color, etc.⁹⁷ Quite in contrast with the commonplace extancy (*being at hand*) of the work and with its commonplace instrumental exteriority as “formed material” that must be “overcome,” such thinghood appears uniquely

Han-Pile, “Early Heidegger’s Appropriation of Kant,” in *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Malden : Blackwell Publishers, Credo Reference, 2013, 210).

⁹³ H, 56.

⁹⁴ Ibid.: “von der aus es Geschichte mitgestaltet”

⁹⁵ H, 44.

⁹⁶ H, 4 | M, 30.

⁹⁷ H, 4: “Das Dinghafte ist so unverrückbar im Kunstwerk, daß wir sogar eher umgekehrt sagen müssen: Das Bauwerk ist im Stein. Das Schnitzwerk ist im Holz. Das Gemälde ist in der Farbe,” etc.

intimate to the interiority of the work and surprisingly resistant to any intrusion of commonplace experience. Indeed, the third version goes so far as to suggest that thinghood appears to be a kind of hinge or seam between the work of art as formed material and as content, bringing them together and ushering the latter through the former.⁹⁸ Yet even in this case, in its commonplace sense, thinghood is still conceived as a kind of “exterior,” “material,” sensate substructure (*Unterbau*)⁹⁹ subservient to a “higher,”¹⁰⁰ “spiritual or mental,” “properly artistic” superstructure (*Oberbau*)¹⁰¹ – as in the models of allegory and symbol discussed above. In such models, the base level of the work as a *mere αἰσθητόν* – a “manifold of that given in the senses” – still “interposes” (*sich zwischenstellt*)¹⁰² between its lofty level of non-sensate overstructure and aesthetic experience, “scrambling” the unity of the original grasp (*Fassung*) of the artistic thought in the imagination of the artist by its dispersal into sensations (*Empfindungen*), which experience must then “unscramble” in order to reconstitute it as a conception (*Auffassung*). Such an experience, for its own part, must rise above the base exteriority of its sensuousness (*Sinnlichkeit*) and ascend into the lofty interiority of its spiritual or mental capacity – moving upwards from perception (*Vernehmung*),¹⁰³ or αἴσθησις,¹⁰⁴ towards conception (*Auffassung*). In such models, the unity of a formed material is still somehow considered to be at odds with the unity of a concept, and the latter may only be obtained through a taking apart of the former and its re-assembly within the mind. Thus, formed material figures as more of an interference than a mediator in such a scenario. Ideally, the unity of the work as a formed idea would be given directly by one imagination to another, without resorting to the faulty delivery system of formed

⁹⁸ H, 4.

⁹⁹ H, 4, 23.

¹⁰⁰ HS, 14 | M, 52 | H, 4.

¹⁰¹ H, 24.

¹⁰² H, 10: “Mannigfaltigkeit des in den Sinnen Gegebenen”; 57.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ H, 67.

material, and naturally, the commonplace aesthetic experience devotes all of its efforts to jettisoning the latter as soon as and insofar as it is possible. For such models, “whether this unity is grasped as a sum or wholeness or *Gestalt*” is of no concern, as long as such unity is grasped – conceived rather than perceived.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, in the example of van Gogh’s painting of a pair of peasant shoes from the third version, sensate perception of the painting is ultimately questioned as redundant not only to the sensate perception of an actual pair of peasant shoes, but also – and more importantly – to the knowledge of the concept of such shoes, i. e. their form and their function.¹⁰⁶ As the third version points out, the notion of form may further be associated with the “rational,” dissociating it from the notion of material as “irrational,” and thus granting it unimpeded entry into conceptuality. However, should it persist in its affiliation with sensation, the notion of form must itself be denigrated to the level of a merely outward arrangement of the work of art, and be contrasted anew with the notion of content (*Inhalt*),¹⁰⁷ such that the distinction between the superficial exteriority of the work of art and its authentic interiority may be preserved.

Alongside extancy (*being at hand*), the work of art acquires a constancy (*Standhaftigkeit*) – which is, on the one hand, explicated in terms of a peculiar exteriority which secures the work its own proper interiority. The third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* once again traces the constancy and consistency (*Konsistenz*) of the work of art to its thinghood in the sense of its formed materiality, which it for the first time identifies with the synthesis of μορφή and ὕλη.¹⁰⁸ Thus, at the most superficial level, the constancy of the work signifies the fixedness

¹⁰⁵ H, 10: “Ob diese Einheit als Summe oder als Ganzheit oder als Gestalt gefaßt wird...”

¹⁰⁶ H, 18.

¹⁰⁷ H, 11.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

(*Festgestelltheit*) of its material within its form – the former being set fast (*festgestellt*)¹⁰⁹ in accordance with the latter in order to constitute their relatively stable and enduring *Gestalt*. As the third version observes for the first time, however, such exteriority of the work of art stems from its thinghood, understood in the specific sense of its resting-in-itself (*Insichruhen*) or its steadfastness (*Standhaftigkeit*).¹¹⁰ As such, the work of art is something resting-upon-itself (*auf-sich-beruhen*) and standing/remaining-in-itself (*in-sich-stehen*, with the third version variant being pure standing/remaining-in-itself (*das reine Insichselbststehen*))¹¹¹ – something with its own “inner world,” so to speak. In its resting-upon-itself and in its standing/remaining-in-itself, the work of art eludes all grasp, possession, and containment by anything outside of itself and, as the third version underscores, any relation to anything other than itself¹¹² – strictly speaking, as a “pure relation-free essence” (an expression from the second version),¹¹³ it eludes experience altogether or offers it only its impenetrable exterior. It rests upon itself (“auf sich selbst beruh[t]”),¹¹⁴ containing itself within itself and expanding only up to its own limits. Such self-containment of the work of art is protected within a material exteriority startlingly akin to that of a block of granite (an example of a mere thing from the third version), which rests-in-itself as a material in a certain “determinate if unstructured form,” where the term “form” simply signifies an outline (*Umriß*) resulting from the spatial distribution and arrangements of the material parts.¹¹⁵ Indeed, the third version explicitly acknowledges this affinity between mere things and works of art – at this commonplace level of spatiality – insofar as they can both be understood in

¹⁰⁹ H, 57.

¹¹⁰ H, 9, 11.

¹¹¹ HS, 6 | M, 20, 22 | H, 16, 25-26.

¹¹² H, 26.

¹¹³ M, 23: “das reine bezugfreie Wesen”

¹¹⁴ HS, 6.

¹¹⁵ H, 13: “Der in sich ruhende Granitblock ist ein Stoffliches in einer bestimmten, wenngleich ungefügten Form”; “Form meint hier die räumlich örtliche Verteilung und Anordnung der Stoffteile, die einen besonderen Umriß, nämlich den eines Blockes, zur Folge hat.”

terms of their self-sufficiency (*Selbstgenügsamkeit*) and its “not being prodded into anything” (*Zunichtsgedrängtsein*).¹¹⁶ More specifically, the self-sufficiency of the work consists in its self-sufficient presencing (*selbstgenügsames Anwesen*), both in the sense of its capacity to hypostasize its essence of its own accord and in the sense of its being complete in itself (although, importantly, without the connotation of its being preclusive of relation).

The cardinal importance of this thinghood of the work comes to the fore for the first time in the second version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*: it is precisely this aspect that the work is said to lose when it is “ripped out” of its “most proper/ownmost space.”¹¹⁷ Thus, in the second and third versions, the aspect of self-sufficiency and rest within the commonplace spatiality of the work appears to overlap or coincide with the aspect of the world within its proper spatiality; indeed, it stands in direct proportion to the proper spatiality of the work of art. As the second version puts it: “The more properly [works] stand there in themselves, the more immediately *are* they the middle of the being there of a people.”¹¹⁸ But it is not until the third version that the reason for the privileging of the self-sufficiency and, so to speak, reticence of the work of art becomes evident: both self-sufficiency and reticence are modes of self-containment (*Sichverschließen*) which is urgently necessary in order for the work to escape being embroiled in trade, whether literal or conceptual. Holding-itself-back (*Sichzurückhalten*), or recoil, is the work’s most natural mode of resistance (*Widerstand*) both to the intrusion of aesthetic experience and the assault of thought.¹¹⁹ Indeed, as the second version uniquely remarks, it would seem that proper experience of the work of art must be characterized by a certain kind of lack of understanding (*unverstehen*),

¹¹⁶ H, 14, 17.

¹¹⁷ M, 22: “aus ihrem eigensten Raum herausgerissen” | H 26: “aus ihrem eigenen Wesensraum herausgerissen”

¹¹⁸ M, 28: “Je eigentlicher ...werke in sich dastehen, umso unmittelbarer *sind* sie die Mitte des Daseins eines Volkes.”

¹¹⁹ H, 17, 33.

if understanding is mistakenly conflated with thoroughgoing comprehension as intrusion.¹²⁰ Thus, once the third version has traced the extancy and constancy of the work of art to its formed materiality, it brings into the light the final and most important tendency of the latter – hinted at using a plurality of verbs such as move backwards, retreat, pull back, withdraw, deny, reject – a tendency to distance oneself from another while distancing the other from oneself. This capacity for self-seclusion is precisely that which enables the work to preserve its own integrity precisely in order to preserve its proper relation with the other.

The unity of the interior and exterior tendencies of the work of art as such, in relation to itself – that is, quite apart from its relation to production and consumption – consists in what the third version calls its “closed unified rest of resting-upon-itself” (“geschlossene einige Ruhe des Aufsichberuhens”).¹²¹ Initially, there appears to be a contradiction between interior and exterior tendencies of the work of art as directions of motion and their proposed unity as rest: indeed, “for what is rest, if not opposition to movement?,” third version concedes.¹²² The third version resolves this apparent contradiction by explicating the notion of rest itself in terms of a happening (*Geschehen*) which is an in-clusion (*einschließen*), or a co-position, of these vectors of movement, rather than their ex-clusion (*ausschließen*), or their op-position.¹²³ As such, it sets interior and exterior tendencies of the work opposite each other precisely with a view to their rapprochement – their intimate composure (*innige Sammlung*).¹²⁴ This commentary on the nature of rest and movement and its relation to the spatiality of the work of art is a late addition unique to the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, yet its importance for understanding the more

¹²⁰ M, 32.

¹²¹ H, 34.

¹²² H, 34: “denn was ist Ruhe, wenn nicht der Gegensatz zur Bewegung?”

¹²³ H, 34.

¹²⁴ H, 34.

familiar notions of the *Riß* and the *Entwurf* (to be discussed in the corresponding sections on proper and proto-spatiality below) is paramount. In contrast with the commotion (*Andrang*) that engulfs the work of art as an extant thing within the world of other extant things, this particular motion (*Bewegung*) is the work's own constant – it is that which assures the constancy (*Standhaftigkeit*) of the work as a kind of equilibrium in the midst of its relations. Indeed, in light of such highest motility (*höchste Bewegtheit*),¹²⁵ the notion of movement “as a mere alteration of the place of a body” appears commonplace – and for the latter, rest constitutes a mere boundary of motion.¹²⁶ In its proper sense, however, rest as the highest motility must be seen as the foundation of the notion of strife (*Streit*) which characterizes the proper spatiality of the work of art, the discussion of the transition to which must be reserved for the corresponding section below.

The elaboration of the *proper spatiality* of the work of art in terms of *rest as highest motility* belies the remarkable change of phraseology used to designate the work of art apart from relation to all else: in the precisely parallel passages where first two versions privilege the vocabulary of “in itself” (*an sich*), the third version makes a dramatic shift to the language of the “what and how” (“*was und wie*”).¹²⁷ It is certainly no accident that the third version anticipates the discovery of the *work-hood* (*Werkhafte*) of the work at the hinge between its *what* and its *how*: the very turn from the *what* as *potentiality* to the *how* as *actuality* constitutes *motion*. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the third version approaches the work of art in its *actuality* (*Wirklichkeit*) with a view to rendering such motion visible and tracing it back to its origin in the *potentiality* (*Möglichkeit*) of the work of art, or its *essence*. In this way, the essence of the work

¹²⁵ H, 35.

¹²⁶ H, 34: “In der Bewegung als bloßer Ortsveränderung eines Körpers ist die Ruhe freilich nur der Grenzfall der Bewegung.”

¹²⁷ HS, 6 | M, 22 | H, 2.

of art is revealed to be a *power*, a *force*, rather than a static “aggregate of characteristics” (“*Aufsammlung von Merkmalen*”), so to speak.¹²⁸ Thus, the work of art apart from relation to all else turns out to be precisely the *capacity for self-actualization* through *motion*. However, in order for reflection to be able to perform the turn of the work of art from potentiality to actuality *in reverse order*, it must not confuse *actuality* (*Wirklichkeit*) as *potentiality in motion* with the opaque “inviolable actuality” (“*ungetastete Wirklichkeit*”) of *extancy* or *being at hand* (*Vorhandensein*).¹²⁹ The qualification of actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) by the adjective “full” in the former case is no mere rhetorical flourish: “We wish to encounter the unmediated and full actuality of the work of art; for only thus do we discover the actual art within it.”¹³⁰ In the language of *potentiality* and *actuality*, this rationale points to the fact that the work of art as *actual potentiality* directs reflection beyond itself, to art as *potentiality as such*. The latter is precisely that “still something else” that “inheres” in the “almost palpable actuality” of the work.¹³¹ The characterization of the work by the former notion of actuality does indeed set it *apart* from mere things, characterized by the one-dimensional actuality of self-sufficiency (*Selbstgenugsamkeit*) as mere self-containment.

However, in commonplace spatiality, the work of art does not retain its impermeability, self-sufficiency, and rest in any absolute sense: the first version abandons the formulations “as such” and “in itself” almost immediately, while the second version explicitly describes the deterioration of the work’s standing-towards-itself (*Zu-sich-Stehen*) (and the third version, of its standing/remaining-in-itself (*Insichstehen*)) into its standing-against (*Entgegenstehen*): “this

¹²⁸ H, 2.

¹²⁹ H, 3.

¹³⁰ H, 4: “Wir möchten die unmittelbare und volle Wirklichkeit des Kunstwerkes treffen; denn nur so finden wir in ihm auch die wirkliche Kunst.”

¹³¹ H, 4: “fast handgreifliche Wirklichkeit der Werke... worin dann noch etwas Anderes steckt.”

standing-against is yet only a consequence of that former standing-towards-itself – no longer this itself.”¹³² Yet even at this juncture, as the *Addendum* to the third version makes clear, the standing/remaining-in-itself of the work of art (a statue, for instance), is “other than the standing of the object [*des Gegenstandes*] in the sense of the object [*des Objektes*].”¹³³ However, it is at this point that the second version indicates the onset of a divergence between being at hand (*Vorhandensein*) and being in itself (*an sich*): in its submersion into the art trade, the work of art may retain the former, but is utterly bereft of the latter – it may remain “there,” but is no longer “itself” or “in itself.”¹³⁴ While preserving a mere vestige of an exteriority, the work will inevitably lose its self-sufficiency – the “most proper/ownmost space” that is its interiority – and with it, its rest. Thus, in terms of *commonplace* spatiality, the second version describes the temple of Zeus as merely standing there (*dastehend*), resting upon (*aufruhend*) the bedrock (*Felsgrund*) as upon some “sedimented quantity of matter” (“abgelagerte Stoffmasse”) – its standing-in-itself and its resting-upon-itself inaccessible to commonplace experience.¹³⁵ Simultaneously with this loss, the work of art re-enters the domain of experience once more – this time, as an *encounter* of the work of art as something other than the self, existing apart from, “outside” of, and alongside the self. In the example of the pair of peasant shoes, the third version refers to this kind of situation as a *Vorlage* – as some actual piece (*wirkliches Stück*) experienced only in terms of its position in front of some viewer.¹³⁶

γ) Objectivity (*Gegenstandsein*) and the Art Trade (*Kunstbetrieb*)

¹³² M, 22: “dieses Entgegenstehen ist nur noch eine *Folge* jenes vormaligen Zu-sich-Stehens – nicht mehr dieses selbst” | H 27: “Ihr Entgegenstehen ist zwar noch eine Folge jenes vormaligen Insichstehens, aber es ist nicht mehr dieses selbst.”

¹³³ H, 71: “...anderes als das Stehen des Gegenstandes im sinne des Objektes.“

¹³⁴ M, 22.

¹³⁵ M, 24, 26 | H, 27, 28.

¹³⁶ H, 18, 20, 55.

Thus, the work is drawn into the network of activities (*Umtriebe*) collectively known as the art trade – wherein it turns into an object (*Gegenstand*) of manipulation, including its scholarly, mercantile, and recreational privatization.¹³⁷ Such activities shuttle the work back and forth – “here and there” (“hier und dort”) – between various “official places” (“*amtliche Stellen*”): research and restoration facilities, “public spaces” (“*öffentliche Plätze*”) (such as art collections, museums, public squares, and, as the third version adds, churches¹³⁸), markets and shops, and “private residences” (“*Wohnhäuser einzelner*”). By means of alternating its “location” and “dislocation” – its installation (*Anbringung*) or accommodation (*Unterbringung*) and its exhibition (*Aufstellung*) – the agencies and agents of the art trade wrest the work out of its staying/remaining and repose within itself precisely with a view to its reabsorption within themselves in one way or another – whether intellectually, financially, or emotionally.¹³⁹ As a result of such upheaval, the self-containment of the work of art is perforated by the inroads of access (*Zugang*)¹⁴⁰ carved out by the activities of the art trade, and the work of art succumbs to something like a methodical invasion, occupation, and evacuation of whatever interior resources are deemed “digestible” in one way or another. The work of art is thus emptied of its own interiority and “converted” into the interiority of its consumers. In turn, the spatiality of the experience of such agencies, agents, and activities is complex in its execution, yet simple in its

¹³⁷ HS, 6-7 | M, 24 | H, 26.

As Anne Fernihough reminds in her Heideggerian reading of D. H. Lawrence, such ‘commodification’ is, of course, the principal object of critiques by Clement Greenberg and the Frankfurt School of Marxist thinking, represented by Horkheimer and Adorno (Anne Fernihough, “Lawrence and Heidegger,” in *D. H. Lawrence : Aesthetics and Ideology* (London, New York : Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1993), 159 ft. 7).

¹³⁸ HS, 6 | M, 22 | H, 3.

¹³⁹ H, 55, here formulated in negative form in order to demonstrate the contrast between commonplace and proper experience, where the latter “nimmt das Werk nicht aus seinem Insichstehen heraus, zerrt es nicht in den Umkreis des bloßen Erlebens.”

¹⁴⁰ HS, 6 | M, 22 | H, 26.

purpose – the subsumption of the interiority of the work of art within their own. Thus, lovers, connoisseurs, and merchants of art may willingly exert themselves in traveling far and wide in order to gaze upon the temple upon its original mound in Paestum or the cathedral upon its original square in Bamberg. Yet such bringing-forth of the self (*sich vorbringen*)¹⁴¹ before the work of art, such “displacement” of the self for the sake of entering the “place and space” (“Ort und Raum”) of the work of art (whether its original literal setting or a specially set aside public space into which the work of art is “transplanted” (*verzetzt*)¹⁴²) is performed merely as a technique for obtaining an “impression” (*Eindruck*), for being inwardly affected by such a work, for taking it in by means of the understanding (*Verstand*).¹⁴³ As the third version poignantly remarks, in such a scenario the work of art is abased to little more than a stimulus of some kind of an ordeal (*Erlebniserreger*)¹⁴⁴ – an object (*Gegenstand*) which is “supposed to work us up into some kind of a state.”¹⁴⁵ Thus, in the end, the self-displacement of cultural tourism paradoxically serves for the displacement of the work of art – if not the literal transportation and “placement” of the *Elgin Marbles* within the Munich Collection, or of the *Little Barbara* within the Liebighaus Museum in Frankfurt, then their “transposition” (*Versetzung*) into and acquisition by means of some sort of a mental operation – a conversion only in the sense of an appraisal of the worth (*Wert*)¹⁴⁶ of art in terms of “units of currency” valid within the exchange network of the art trade, whether conceptual, monetary, or affective (no genuine “experience of the soul” or “inspiration,” one might add).¹⁴⁷ In this way, the journey of the emergence of the work of art from the imagination of the artist terminates within the imagination of one consumer of the art

¹⁴¹ HS, 7.

¹⁴² HS, 7.

¹⁴³ HS, 7, 9 | M, 22 | H, 26.

¹⁴⁴ H, 55

¹⁴⁵ H, 56: “der in uns irgendwelche Zustände bewirken soll”

¹⁴⁶ H, 24.

¹⁴⁷ HS, 6.

trade or another – and, in so doing, merely contributes to the expansion of his or her interior world, in a remarkable and ironic reversal of the artist’s original struggle for self-expression.

As the foregoing reflection has attempted to demonstrate, it is indeed possible to speak of the spatiality of the work of art and of its experience in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* suite in a kind of commonplace sense. For example, as the second version points out for the first time: “Indeed, the individual work of art is always also [its] bringing forth by an artist.”¹⁴⁸ However, insofar as such a sense stems from the work’s being an object (*Gegenstandsein*) in the art trade and from its being produced (*Erzeugtsein*) by the artist, it necessarily falls short of the spatiality proper to the work of art as a work (and, by extension, of the spatiality proper to its experience as an experience of a work). The first version underscores that both being an object (*Gegenstandsein*) in the art trade and being produced (*Erzeugtsein*) by the artist obscures that which is proper to the work as a work, for “the former is a consequence, [and] the latter – a condition of [its] being a work.”¹⁴⁹ It might be similarly observed that the spatiality of the experiences of production and consumption of the work of art explicated above cannot constitute the origin of its proper spatiality, but must rather be recognized for what it truly is – respectively, a consequence and a condition of the same. The second version makes this clear by means of the example of the cobbler and the shoe¹⁵⁰: in light of this analogy, it becomes evident that the work of art – and its proper spatiality as a work – comes from the possibility and necessity of such spatiality as such (something this study will term the proto-spatiality of art and review in a corresponding section), rather than from the commonplace spatiality of the experience of its producer or consumer. The idolization of such experience (*Erlebnis*) in commonplace reflection upon art constitutes the first

¹⁴⁸ M, 20: “Zwar ist immer das einzelne Kunstwerk auch die Hervorbringung eines Künstlers...” Incidentally, this is the first time in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* suite that the work of art is explicitly referred to as *individual* or *particular*.

¹⁴⁹ HS, 7: “...jenes ist eine Folge, dieses eine Mitbedingung des Werkseins.”

¹⁵⁰ M, 22.

object of critique in the *Afterword* of the third version of the *Kunstverkaufsatz*: here, it is, in fact, suspected of being “the element in which art dies.”¹⁵¹ Therefore, commonplace spatiality must itself be understood as originating from the possibility and necessity of the proper spatiality of the work (again, from the proto-spatiality of art) – and never the reverse. For this reason, the commonplace spatiality of the work of art derived from the commonplace spatiality of its production and consumption will never suffice as “an adequately assured approach”¹⁵² – which the investigation must now pursue in earnest.

b) The Proper Spatiality of the Work of Art and of Its Experience

The third and final version of the *Kunstverkaufsatz* definitively establishes the work of art as essentially relational: “Is it not proper to the work to stand in relation? To be sure, it remains only to ask which [relations] it stands in.”¹⁵³ With this destination in mind, this section of the study proposes that at the very heart of the elaborate construct of the proper spatiality of the work of art in the *Kunstverkaufsatz* lie two elegantly simple modalities – that of relation to the self and that of relation to an other. In their union, these modalities condition and fulfill the essence of the work of art so as to render it proportionate to experience as proper relation rather than mere consumption. What is more, it is precisely this bi-directional essence of the work of art that is understood to facilitate a transfiguration of commonplace *Erlebnis* (in the sense of “taking it all in,” as it were) into proper *Erfahrung* (in the sense of communion as a mutual offering and reception of the respective selves, wherein the latter are released at once from inordinate self-absorption and from self-dissipation). Transposing this fundamental dynamic into terms of proper spatiality, this section will articulate it in reference to three key categories –

¹⁵¹ H, 67: “Doch vielleicht ist das Erlebnis das Element, in dem die Kunst stirbt^b.”

¹⁵² HS, 7: “den zureichend gesicherten Ansatz”

¹⁵³ H, 27: “Gehört nicht zum Werk, das es in Bezügen steht? Allerdings, nur bleibt zu fragen, in welchen es steht.”

dimensionality, formation, and motion – and conclude with a recapitulation of their greater whole.

α) The World (*Welt*) and the Open (*Offene*)

In the first version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, the initial appearance of explicit spatial language – “place and space” (“Ort und Raum”)¹⁵⁴ – occasions the introduction of an alternative model of spatiality, that of the world (*das Welt*). In this context, the expression “place and space” initially refers to the literal original setting of four works of art – the Elgin Marbles, the Strasbourg “Bärbele,” the Greek temple, and the Bamberg Cathedral. The first two works are said to have been quite literally removed from their original settings and transported, respectively, to a collection in Munich and to the Liebighaus museum in Frankfurt; in contrast, the second two remain – again, quite literally – in their original settings in Paestum and the city square. Far from thus settling the question of the works’ “proper place and space” (“ihr[e] eigentlich[e] Ort und Raum”), however, this contrast suggests that the original literal setting of the work – integral though it may be to its preservation and encounter – can by no means adequately account for its work-being (*Werksein*). It is precisely at this juncture that the expression “place and space” becomes decisively yoked with the term and concept of the world (*Welt*): the “proper place and space” of the work is identified with “entirely and solely its [own] world” (“ganz nur seine Welt”).¹⁵⁵ This pairing leads to an understanding of the work of art as, indeed, properly spatial, such that the work’s loss of such spatiality must inevitably entail an irretrievable loss of its very work-being.¹⁵⁶ Although on the superficial level removing the work from its “proper place and space” can continue to mean its physical extraction from its literal

¹⁵⁴ HS, 7.

¹⁵⁵ HS, 10.

¹⁵⁶ HS, 7.

original setting, the more profound sense of the “de-setting” (*Versetzung*) of the work is understood to be that of the dis-integration or de-composition of its essence. In what sense is the world of the work to be interpreted as proper spatiality? And what would it mean for this peculiar spatiality as world to fall apart (*zerfallen*) or be withdrawn (*entzogen*),¹⁵⁷ especially in the cases of works remaining in their literal original settings (as with the temple “in its place” in Paestum and the cathedral “on its square” in Bamberg)?

The first of these questions necessitates a closer examination of the concept of the world (*Welt*). In this regard, it is hardly coincidental that the preliminary reflections leading up to the first explicit definition of the term “world” pinpoint relation (*Bezug*) and the prospect of its severance as a singular concern. Heidegger cautions: “In view of our task, another question is more essential now: in general, does not the attempt to *extricate* the work from all relation to another beyond it go precisely against the essence of the *work itself*?”¹⁵⁸ This reservation evidently acknowledges the work’s “relation to another beyond it” as being in accordance with its essence; yet the full significance of this distinctive language of relationality for the emerging conception of the world – and with it, for that of spatiality – does not come into full relief until the second version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, where the world finally acquires its mature formulation of a “fugue” or “fuse” (*Fuge*) of “relations” (*Bezüge*).¹⁵⁹ However, unmistakable clues for understanding spatiality in terms of relationality are already in place in the first version: for example, reflections leading up to the first extensive treatment of the conception of the world firmly reject two kinds of relations as non-essential – (1) the relation of the work of art as object

¹⁵⁷ HS, 7.

¹⁵⁸ HS, 8: “Wesentlicher ist jetzt im Hinblick auf unsere Aufgabe eine andere Frage: Handelt nicht überhaupt der Versuch, das Werk aus allem Bezug zu anderem außer ihm *herauszulösen*, gerade dem Wesen des *Werkes selbst* entgegen?”

¹⁵⁹ M, 26, 34.

(*Gegenstand*) to the representative of the art trade (*Kunstbetrieb*) as agent, and (2) the relation of the work of art as product or “manu-fact” (*Erzeugnis*) to the artist as cause (*Ursache*).¹⁶⁰

Having set these derivative modes of relationality aside, the first version lifts up the only mode it considers to be essential, insofar as it both proceeds from “the work itself” and extends to “another beyond it,” – the mode of being-open (*Offenbarsein*) in the specific sense of being-manifest.¹⁶¹ Though this language may initially seem rather remote from the project of translating spatiality into the terms of world and relation, in fact, it hearkens back directly to the starting point of perplexity regarding the “where” of the work and specifically to the dismissive remark typically issued in the face of such perplexity: “Die Werke stehen im Klaren,” i. e. (1) “It’s clear/we’re clear about what works are,” and (2) “The works are right out in the open,” including “in public squares” (“auf öffentlichen Plätzen”).¹⁶² Indeed, on a superficial level, the terms “offenbar” and “im Klaren” share the meaning of “obvious” or “plain to see”; similarly, the commonplace meaning of the term “öffentlich” is simply that of “public,” in this case referring specifically to instances of “public space.”

Naturally, it is rather the significative excess of the term “offenbar” that preoccupies the first version in connection with the question of the proper spatiality of the work of art, for which reason the first appearance of the term “offenbar” is swiftly followed by a re-consideration and fine-tuning of the term and concept of openness (*Öffentlichkeit*) as publicity. Being-open (*Offenbarsein*) or openness (*Öffentlichkeit*) cannot simply mean “being open to the public” (*das Publikum*), because such publicity would fall precisely into the inferior mode of relationality

¹⁶⁰ HS, 7-8.

¹⁶¹ HS, 8.

¹⁶² HS, 6.

endemic to the art trade.¹⁶³ Neither is the open (*das Offene*) – which makes its first appearance in the first version precisely at this juncture – by any means equivalent to some dedicated (*beabsichtigt*) “public space” into which the work is brought out and within which it is “unveiled” somewhat “after the fact” (*nachträglich*), so to speak.¹⁶⁴ Indeed, this open is precisely not any kind of an extant (*vorhandene*) space which the work merely happens upon as a fitting receptacle (*angebrachter Empfänger*) for itself.¹⁶⁵ Rather, it is the work itself that must first “work out” its own openness (*Öffentlichkeit*) – that is, “work out” something within which it might “work” or “operate,” institute some kind of an “open” into which it might extend (*hinausstehen*) and expand. Thus, the being-open of the work consists precisely in the unfolding of such an open as its own proper dimensionality and in the repletion of this dimensionality by means of its own proper extension or expansion, wherein beings may, in turn, acquire their proper openness, i. e. properly form (as discussed in more detail in §1.b.β below). Indeed, the second version speaks of the openness of beings within the openness of the world in unmistakably spatial terms as “com[ing] into their distance and nearness, their breadth and narrowness” – as acquiring proper spatiality.¹⁶⁶

The dimensionality and expansivity proper to the work are related in such a way that the former constitutes the condition of the possibility of the latter, serving as its enabling ground.¹⁶⁷ In light of this hierarchy, it is no longer surprising that the first version selects the term setting-up (*Aufstellung*) in order to designate the work’s “working out” of its proper dimensionality: in the process of plotting a function within a coordinate system, no function can begin to unfold within

¹⁶³ HS, 8.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ M, 30: “...ihre Ferne und Nähe, ihre Weite und Enge.”

¹⁶⁷ HS, 8.

the parameters of such a system, taking the shape of a graph, before such parameters are “set up” precisely by means of drafted and designated dimensional axes.

The first version seeks to employ the term “setting-up” in a sense quite deliberately alternative to its commonplace meaning of “accommodation of the work in an appropriate place” (“Unterbringung des Werkes an einem geeigneten Platz”).¹⁶⁸ Clearly, the term “setting-up” acquires its alternative depth, in large part, due to this contrastive juxtaposition with its explicitly and literally spatial interpretation of “exhibiting” in the sense of “mounting on the walls of an exhibition hall.” Unlike this latter scenario of works being set up within a pre-existing, dedicated space in order to be extended to the public, so to speak, “setting-up” in the properly spatial sense insists that exhibition – both as a space and as an activity – proceeds from the work itself. Indeed, the first version reiterates that the work “has the essential trait of setting-up *already within itself*, is itself most properly *setting-up*...” (“*in sich schon den Wesenszug der Aufstellung hat, selbst im Eigensten aufstellend ist*”).¹⁶⁹ In tracing the conceptual derivation of the setting-up of the work as intrinsic, however, it is crucial not to mistake the provisional contrast between the dimensionality and expansivity of the work itself and the factual exhibition space for a systematic mutual exclusion between the two: “Every setting-up in the sense of consecrating-exalting/praising erection is also always construction as a kind of putting up of the edifice and the statue... On the other hand, not every putting up and accommodation of the “products/“manufactures” of art” is also a setting-up in the sense of the constructing erection.”¹⁷⁰

In addition to “working out” the distinctive dimensionality proper to the work itself,

¹⁶⁸ HS, 8.

¹⁶⁹ HS, 9 | M, 28: “das Werk ist in sich seinem Wesen nach *aufstellend*”

¹⁷⁰ HS, 9: “Jede Aufstellung im Sinne der weihend-rühmenden Errichtung ist immer auch Erstellung als eine Art Anbringung des Baues und des Standbildes... Nicht aber ist umgekehrt schon eine Anbringung und Unterbringung eines “Kunsterzeugnisses” eine Aufstellung im Sinne der erstellenden Errichtung.”

setting-up has a second vital meaning – that of exaltation: in precise spatial terms, the positioning of the work upright and above the self (examples here include a certain temple of Zeus, a statue of Apollo, and a tragedy).¹⁷¹ The significance of this spatial arrangement – its undeniable privilege of the upward orientation of both the work and the “viewer,” such that they are both conformed or attuned to a single gesture of elevation – seems to be its unique proportionality to the configuration of the open (*das Offene*) and the event of the opening (*Eröffnung*) itself. Indeed, the first version goes so far as to suggest that this particular spatial arrangement is a prerequisite for divine revelation and its experience in religious worship – which are consistently described in terms of the open and of opening: “Such setting-up as erection is consecration and exaltation/praise. ...in the workhoodly offering, the holy opens as holy, and the god is wrested into the open of his presence. ... Honor and glory, which are opened in the workhoodly exalting/praising, are not properties beside and behind and in addition to which the god stands/is, but rather he is present/presences in the honor and in the glory.”¹⁷² (Incidentally, in the second version, the greek god is said to be “compelled” (*hereingezwungen*) rather than “wrested” (*hereingerungen*) into the open of his presence.) In an even more pronounced retreat from the language of force with regard to divinity, the third version speaks simply of the greek god being “called” (*hereingerufen*).¹⁷³ In light of these remarks, it does not seem unreasonable to observe, furthermore, that the second meaning of the term “setting-up” may, in fact, be interpreted as a specification of the dimensionality of the work as distinguished by the vector of verticality. Indeed, the opening lines of the paragraph succeeding the discussion of setting-up, the work is

¹⁷¹ HS, 8-9.

¹⁷² HS, 9: “Solche Aufstellung als Errichtung ist Weihung und Rühmung. ...in der werkhafte Darbringung das Heilige als Heiliges eröffnet und der Gott in das Offene seiner Anwesenheit hereingerungen wird. ... Würde und Glanz, die im werkhafte Rühmen eröffnet werden, sind nicht Eigenschaften, neben und hinter denen außerdem noch der Gott steht, sondern in der Würde und dem Glanz west er an.” | M 28: “...hereingezwungen...”

¹⁷³ H, 30.

plainly identified as an “arising” (*Aufragen*).¹⁷⁴

The setting-up of the work’s proper dimensionality creates a kind of matrix within which any given phenomenon may then extend or expand, a kind of *range* of possible configurations it may assume (somewhat as the axes of a given coordinate system anticipate the scope of functions it is capable of accomodating in the form of graphs). The first version terms this matrix or range of possibilities the world (*die Welt*). It initially expresses the concept of the world in terms of a structure – or, more accurately, a “fusion,” a “fabric” (*Gefüge*), a “weave,” so to speak, – of reference (*Verweisung*),¹⁷⁵ something akin to the English expression “frame of reference” (which, incidentally, is matter-of-factly defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “an arbitrary set of axes with reference to which the position or motion of something is described” and, additionally, may be translated into German as *das Bezugssystem*). As anticipated above, in the early pages of the second version the initial definition of the world as “a fusion/fabric/frame of reference” is adjusted to that of “the governing unity of relations” (*die waltende Einheit [der] Bezüge*) and about ten pages further – to that of a “fugue/fuse [*Fuge*] of relations [*Bezüge*].¹⁷⁶ Retaining this language of relationality, the third version additionally amplifies the language of spatiality in characterizing the world specifically as a width or expanse (*Weite*) of open relations.¹⁷⁷ Not only so, but just several pages later, the “worlding of the world” is characterized, in no uncertain terms, as the locus of a kind of assembly of spatiality/spaciousness (*Versammlung der Geräumigkeit*) during which all things acquire their “distance and nearness,” their “breadth and their narrowness.”¹⁷⁸ This spatializing of spatiality is

¹⁷⁴ HS, 9.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ M, 26, 34.

¹⁷⁷ H, 28.

¹⁷⁸ H, 31: “Indem eine Welt sich öffnet, bekommen alle Dinge...ihre Ferne und Nähe, ihre Weite und Enge. Im

perhaps better understood in terms of making room (a translation which also more etymologically consistent with the original German *einräumen*).

It is in the second version's expanded commentary on the temple of Zeus that the cardinal meaning of fusion as integration becomes apparent: not only are the work's operations of fusing (*fügen*) and assembling (*sammeln*) italized, but they are also characterized as ushering a unity (*Einheit*) of relations into which everything within its scope – including the god and the people – is “infused” (*eingefügt*).¹⁷⁹ Indeed, the passage identifies the work itself as “the fusing middle of all of the fuses of the respective world”¹⁸⁰ – a kind of master-fuse that imbues all of its constituent fuses with its fusing potency, its capacity for integration and unification. The first version designates this feature by the flexible formulation of “the directing guide” (*das weisende Geleit*)¹⁸¹ and the second as “the governing, guiding fuse” (*die umwaltende, weisende Fuge*),¹⁸² whose twofold function is described at some length in the following passage: “World worlds – it guides our Dasein in a roundabout way as a guide within which the while and hurry, the distance and nearness, the breadth and narrowness of all beings remain open to us. ...directing, it holds our doing and letting rapt within a frame of reference, out of which the beckoning favor and striking doom of the gods come forth – and remain at bay.”¹⁸³ Having been distinguished by its vector of verticality, the dimensionality proper to the work of art thus acquires a further layer of nuance – it emerges as determinative of something like a field, and, by extension, determinative of every occurrence possible within its scope. Indeed, by the time of the third version, a crucial

Welten ist jene Geräumigkeit versammelt...”

¹⁷⁹ M, 26.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.: “Das Tempelwerk ist die fügende Mitte aller Fügen der jeweiligen Welt.”

¹⁸¹ HS, 9.

¹⁸² M, 30.

¹⁸³ HS, 9: “Welt weltet – sie umleitet unser Dasein als ein Geleit, worin uns die Weile und Eile, die Ferne und Nähe, die Weite und Enge alles Seienden offenbleibt.¹⁸³ ...weisend hält es unser Tun und Lassen entrückt in ein Gefüge von Verweisungen,¹⁸³ aus denen winkende Huld und schlagendes Verhängnis der Götter ankommt und – ausbleibt.”

distinction emerges between dimensionality without limit, or space proper, and limited dimensionality, or the proper spatiality of the work. Without question, dimensionality as indeterminate space (*unbestimmter Raum*)¹⁸⁴ infinitely outstrips dimensionality as a determinate sphere, realm, region, precinct, or domain (all possible translations of terms such as *Bezirk* and *Bereich* employed in describing the proper spatiality of the work), and yet the latter constitutes a species of the former by way of its limitation and particularization. Indeed, speaking of this dependence of the finite space of the world upon infinite space in even more analogical terms, the third version concedes: “In the reflection of this splendor resplends, lights up that which we call the world.”¹⁸⁵ Of course, the most intriguing question here pertains to the manner of and reason for such limitation and particularization of indeterminate space; however, the posing of such a question in all the fullness of its implications will need to await its optimal context – the consideration of the im-proper spatiality of the nothing in §1.d below. For the time being, it is sufficient to establish that the world of the work as dimensionality is, indeed, determinate – that is to say, it may be characterized as an expansion that paradoxically “contracts” at the point of its limit. This definition of indeterminate space in the proper spatiality of the work could hardly be expressed better than in the words describing the sanctification of the precinct of the Greek temple – the “expanding and delimiting of the precinct as holy,” in which “the precinct [does] not, however, slide into the indefinite/indeterminate.”¹⁸⁶

Not only so, but these metaphorical and mathematical approximations of the concept of the world are in concert regarding one defining feature: the world is something that conditions

¹⁸⁴ H, 18-19.

¹⁸⁵ H, 30: “Im Abglanz dieses Glanzes glänzt, d. h. lichtet sich jenes, was wir die Welt nannten.” | Cf. Psalm 36:9: “For with you is the fountain of life; in your light we see light.”

¹⁸⁶ H, 27: “die Ausbreitung und Ausgrenzung des Bezirkes als eines heiligen. Der Tempel und sein Bezirk verschweben aber nicht in das Unbestimmte.”

the manner in which any given phenomenon might manifest, something that both facilitates and regulates such manifestation. Thus, the third version, for the very first time explicitly refers to the world as the “opening of the right” (*Öffnen das Rechte*), as a guiding measure (*weisendes Maß*).¹⁸⁷ Indeed, as the foregoing analysis suggests, its governance appears to consist in the promulgation of order, consistency, and integrity of its constituent relations with a view to hosting the god’s and the people’s coming into their respective proper selves and presence. Thus, the second version for the first time underscores this anticipatory dimension of the world in speaking of it as being given up (*aufgegeben*) to a people in a peculiar premonition (*Ahnung*) and self-sacrifice (*Opfermut*).¹⁸⁸ As will shortly become evident from the discussion of the rift (*Riß*) below, the self-sacrificiality of the world consists in the fact that, already in its opening, the world foresees its own relative closing – in its expansion as dimensionality, it readies itself precisely for a certain kind of contraction, a delimitation that is part and parcel of the earth. Indeed, in the third version, the question of the limitation of the world as an expanse rather than an indefinite, infinite space as such – is accompanied by a corresponding concern for the definition (*Bestimmung*) – the formation of the being-there (*Dasein*) into a people.¹⁸⁹

While such definition – whether of space into an expanse, or of *Dasein* into a people – may strongly suggest a unilateral determination of the latter, in fact, it features two key moments which are fundamentally inscribed with freedom. Firstly, the governance or guidance of the world as a field of possible choices does not preclude, but rather requires decision – although everything “fused” around *Dasein* is so “fused” in conformity with the direction of the world, and although *Dasein* itself is “infused” with this “master-fuse,” the ultimate fulfillment of the

¹⁸⁷ H, 30.

¹⁸⁸ M, 36.

¹⁸⁹ H, 28.

relations of the world lies with Dasein, it “must be decided by us.”¹⁹⁰ Thus, in a curious reversal, the selectivity structuring the very notion of decision-making, entails an inevitable “narrowing” of the world (in the transition of its relations from possibilities to actualities) from an *Allerweltswelt* into the world of a people, into their world (“*seine Welt*”).¹⁹¹ Such instances of fulfillment are, in fact, instances of decisions (*Entscheidungen*)¹⁹² taken in response to choices set up by the world – relations entered into freely, if under supervision, rather than mechanically actualized potentialities. Secondly, the third version takes special care to establish, for the very first time, that the spatiality that the world spatializes – the room that it makes – is, in fact, something it refers to as the free of the open (*das Freie des Offenen*).¹⁹³ In light of this significant qualification, the worlding of the world – the spatializing of spatiality – may finally be understood as a setting-free – namely, a setting-free from the relations of production and consumption for the sake of a setting-free for the relation to being and, ultimately, to the nothing. Thus, already at the level of the work, the spatializing of spatiality shows its core to be the freeing of freedom – a restoration of the very possibility of being-free precisely while being-in-relation. A relation that both frees and binds holds between the nothing and all else, including the work of art.

As in the case of setting-up, the proper spatiality of the world comes into relief through juxtaposition with and progressive differentiation from commonplace notions of the latter. For example, the spatiality of the world may not be simply equated with a “sum” or “assembly of extant [*vorhandener*] things as a yield of a carried out or only imaginary counting up of the

¹⁹⁰ M, 30: “von uns entschieden werden muss”

¹⁹¹ M, 34-36.

¹⁹² M, 30.

¹⁹³ H, 31.

same.”¹⁹⁴ Besides the obvious difference between extant (*vorhandene*) things and references, the arrangement of the latter within the world of the work is characterized as a “fusion” or “fabric” (*Gefüge*) – some kind of a configuration or pattern, a greater whole – rather than an undifferentiated numerical sum. Equally noteworthy is the stark difference in the coming about of these respective worlds: the world as a sum may trace its origin to the cause of calculation (whose yield it is), while the work and its world are from the outset extricated from relating to production/manufacture as a cause. In the next example, the spatiality of the world is distinguished from that of an “only imaginary or thought-up *frame* for the extant (*Vorhandene*).”¹⁹⁵ The latter definition certainly bears a strong resemblance to the newly derived definition of the world as a frame of reference, yet the frame as a *Gefüge* is neither imaginary nor contrived as an afterthought, but rather precedes both the extant (including “the gods”) and its conception insofar as it fundamentally conditions their very possibility – it is not the siding of the house, so to speak, but rather its structural frame, which undergirds it and holds it together. It is, in fact, “always...more beingly [*seiender*] than each of the palpable [and, the second version adds, enumerable (*berechenbar*)] extant [*vorhandenen*] things among which we routinely believe ourselves to be at home.”¹⁹⁶ It is because of this precedence of the world of the work that its spatiality can “never [be] encountered as an object [*Gegenstand*],”¹⁹⁷ i.e. circumscribed by or absorbed into a supposedly superior spatiality of the subject (cf. §2.α). To do so would be to posit (*Stellen*) the world as an object “within the sphere of the subjectivity of consciousness,” as the *Addendum* to the third version explains, quite in accordance with “the dialectic of Kant and

¹⁹⁴ HS, 9: “Welt is nicht die Ansammlung vorhandener Dinge als Ergebnis einer ausgeführten oder nur gedachten Durchzählung derselben.”

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.: “Sowenig wie...ist aber die Welt ein nur eingebildeter und hinzugedachter Rahmen für das Vorhandene.”

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.: “...immer bleibt dieses weisende Geleit [die Welt]...seiender als jedes der greifbaren vorhandenen Dinge, in denen wir alltagshaft heimisch zu sein glauben.” | M, 28.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.: “Dieses Geleit [Welt] begegnet nie als Gegenstand...”

German idealism.”¹⁹⁸ Yet it is impossible to situate oneself in front of or over against the world of the work, as one would in confronting an object (*Gegenstand*): “[The] world never as an object, which stands before us, but rather the un-object, which we explore [*untersuchen*].”¹⁹⁹ In an English translation of the first version, the crucial hint provided by the “*unter-*” prefix of the German term *untersuchen* here must unfortunately remain covered up by unsatisfactory translation options of inquire, investigate, explore, etc. The significance of this hint, however, for the first version’s conception of the spatiality of the work must not be underestimated, as by the time of the second version and on into the third, it will not only persist, but also acquire the more poignant form of *unterstehen* – standing under²⁰⁰ – which will offer a more direct contrast with *gegenstehen*, while effortlessly evoking the reverential overtone of the English term understanding as an alternative to the presumption of a knowing (*wissen*) that would seek to objectify the world by absorbing it into itself. Indeed, in “knowing” the world, “we do not know what we know.”²⁰¹ Rather, as in the case of setting-up, the only position and posture it appears possible to assume in relation to the world of the work is that of standing under it – of raising one’s gaze towards it as it arises, the world and the gaze bound together in exaltation.

The reviewed differentiation of the world of the work from the “commonplace” world is not limited to a mere conceptual technique, but rather rapidly develops into a distinct feature of its proper spatiality: the world of the work is genuinely otherworldly – literally translated, it “does not feel like home” (*unheimisch*).²⁰² The passages of the first version that dwell upon this feature are exceedingly cryptic and replete with language that is exceptionally difficult to

¹⁹⁸ H, 71: “...innerhalb der Dialektik Kants und des deutschen Idealismus ein Stellen innerhalb der Sphäre der Subjektivität des Bewußtseins.”

¹⁹⁹ HS, 9: “...Welt nie ein *Gegenstand*, der vor uns *steht*, sondern der *Ungegenstand*, den wir untersuchen.”

²⁰⁰ M, 29 | H, 30: “Welt ist das immer Ungegenständliche, dem wir unterstehen...”

²⁰¹ HS, 9: “...indem wir es [der Welt] wissen, wissen wir nicht, was wir wissen.”

²⁰² Ibid.

translate and interpret. The otherworldliness of the world seems to be spoken about as a kind of margin that surrounds (*umwittert*) the field of the world somewhat like the lining of a hollow or niche, within which the world is then “kept in reserve” (*aufspart*): “The otherworldly which surrounds every work is that seclusion into which the work – setting-up a world entirely and solely [its] own – sets itself back.”²⁰³ This otherworldliness as seclusion (*Abgeschiedenheit*) thus includes the world within itself as a margin; on the other hand, the same seclusion also excludes the commonplace extant (*das übliche Vorhandene*)²⁰⁴ without itself as a barrier. Indeed, the primary meaning of *Abgeschiedenheit* is *separation* rather than seclusion as such – a meaning which allows otherworldliness to be more clearly understood as something like a dividing line or a threshold between the world and everything else. Such separation preserves the integrity of the world as a “fusion” of references (*Gefüge von Verweisungen*) precisely by means of a deference (*Abweisung*) of non-references – of the commonplace extant.²⁰⁵ From this point forward, in becoming related (*einbezogen*) to the sphere/domain (*Bereich*) included within the margin of otherworldliness all things must cross this threshold and be therein overcome by an ineluctable-inexhaustible (*ein Unershöpflich-Unumgangliches*).²⁰⁶ What is the significance of this concept of margin, barrier, dividing line, separation, threshold for the proper spatiality of the work of art? As proper spatiality requires the establishment of its own proper dimensionality, so does this dimensionality itself seem to require a protected sphere/domain of integrity within which it can host the expansion of a greater whole; the margin-barrier accomplishes the protection and preservation of such a sphere/domain. Harkening back to the setting-up of the world as

²⁰³ HS, 10: “Das Unheimische, was jedes Werk umwittert, ist jene Abgeschiedenheit, in die das Werk – ganz nur seine Welt aufstellend – sich zurückstellt.”

²⁰⁴ Ibid.: “Indem das wirkliche Werk aufragend eine Welt ausspart und aufspart, ist in ihm jene überlegene Abweisung des üblichen Vorhandenen am Werk.”

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

exaltation, the otherworldliness of the world may thus be understood as something that sets it apart – incidentally, the original significance of the term “sanctify” in the example of religious worship discussed above, is precisely that of “setting apart.”

The opposite of the integrity of the sphere/domain of the world is dis-integration, and of its setting-apart – a falling-apart (*zerfallen*), whence the designation of the collapse of the world as *Weltzerfall* in the earliest pages of the first version. If the proper spatiality of the work consists, among other things, in the integrity of its world as a structure of references (*Gefüge von Verweisungen*), its collapse must consist precisely in its de-struction, its “coming apart at the seams” (*Füge*), as it were. Using an alternative English translation, one may also speak of the world’s “fusion” (*Gefüge*) as “falling victim to confusion” and thus turning into an un-world (*Unwelt*)²⁰⁷; after all, one of the definitions of confusion is precisely that of “a state or situation in which many things are happening in a way that is not controlled or orderly” (Merriam-Webster), controlled order being a distinguishing characteristic of the world of the work. Such controlled order falls apart, when it is denied a setting-apart – an “evacuation” (*Aussparung*) into a sphere/domain of integrity explicated in the previous paragraph. In this case, the work is unable to achieve its proper spatiality in the first place and must remain mired in commonplace spatiality as “accommodation of the products/“manu-facts” of art” (“Anbringung von Kunsterzeugnissen”).²⁰⁸ However, even works that have succeeded in fulfilling their proper spatiality are ever vulnerable to its loss: if they are “withdrawn” from the sphere/domain of integrity into which they have previously been “evacuated,” they too “can fall to the fate of...the

²⁰⁷ HS, 9: “Dieses weisende Geleit kann der Wirrnis verfallen und so eine *Unwelt* sein,” italics in the translation mine.

²⁰⁸ HS, 10.

falling-apart of the world.”²⁰⁹ As in the previous case, in this scenario the work retains its artificial spatiality – it remains at hand (*vorhanden*), perhaps even in its original literal setting or in a public exhibition space, but is no longer there (“ist nicht mehr *da*”)²¹⁰ in the proper sense. In its withdrawal from the sphere/domain of integrity, the greater whole of the world of the work is shattered into fragments (*im Bruchstück*),²¹¹ the fabric of its references unraveling instead of being woven together – until finally, the work can no longer refer even to its own self, but simply stands there, less than a mere thing in its presence.

β) Earth, Formation (*Formung*), Gestalt

In addition to setting-up and setting-apart (and setting-free, one might add), the proper spatiality of the work also consists in a setting-forth/producing (*Herstellen*). As in the case of the first two aspects, the first version takes the commonplace meaning of setting-forth as its point of departure in the manner discussed at length in section α) above. However, proper work does not perform a given form, but rather is form – that is, its formation is not derivative, but originary. It is thus by no happenstance that the second version comes to identify proper formation with the proper being-created (*Geschaffensein*) of the work of art – in contrast with its commonplace createdness (*Beschaffenheit*),²¹² which corresponds to its being produced (*Erzeugtsein*). Yet, as with the relationship between the commonplace and the proper with regard to dimensionality, the second version makes clear that commonplace createdness may coincide with proper being created as its consequence, even if it can never be identified with it as such (as the gap between them is not that of a mere degree of quality (“*Grad von « Qualität »*”)²¹³): “Within the domain of

²⁰⁹ HS, 10: “Das errichtete Werk aber kann dem Schicksal des Weltentzugs und Weltzerfalls anheimfallen.”

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² H, 14 | M, 48.

²¹³ M, 50.

art, each created is always also something produced – not the reverse, however.”²¹⁴ Indeed, in a newly added passage, the second version seizes upon this simultaneous overlap and gap as a potential locus of the redemption of the commonplace materiality of the work of art and of its transfiguration into its proper materiality: although proper form is, strictly speaking, “born” in proper formation, the essence of the latter as creation somehow requires a material and a work of the hands: “The forming of the material by handywork, making/crafting is not immaterial [pun intended], however, precisely because producing is called for by the essence of creation.”²¹⁵ According to the second version, with regard to the proper formation of the work of art, the “proper greatness” of working the material by hand consists in that it “silences [not only] its toil and desperation, but also its duress and its joy” within the work that stands there.²¹⁶ The third version initially contents itself with repeating the laconic rationale from the second version: “setting-forth [from a given material] is necessary, because the work-being of the work itself has the character of setting-forth.”²¹⁷ (Curiously, the second version’s justification of the “proper greatness” of manual craftsmanship is here suppressed.) Yet some twenty pages later, the third version returns to the question of the being-created (*Geschaffensein*) of the work, having developed a more effectual term for its having been made or crafted by hand – that is, worked or worked out (*Gewirkt*).²¹⁸ At this juncture, the third version reiterates that commonplace materiality is required by the being-created of the work and adds that even proper creation

²¹⁴ M, 48: “Jedes Geschaffene ist im Bereich der Kunst immer auch ein Erzeugtes, jedoch nicht umgekehrt.”

²¹⁵ M, 50: “Das handwerkliche Formen des Stoffes, das Verfertigen ist aber nichts Gleichgültiges, gerade weil das Erzeugen aus dem Wesen des Schaffens gefordert ist.”

²¹⁶ Ibid.: “Dieses Werken mit dem sogenannten Stoff hat seine eigene Größe und diese besteht darin, dass es im dastehenden Werk seine Mühsal und Verzweiflung, aber auch seinen Sturm und seine Lust verschweigt.”

²¹⁷ H, 31: “...wird die Herstellung nötig, weil das Werksein des Werkes selbst den Charakter der Herstellung hat.” | M, 30: “...wird die Herstellung als Anfertigung aus einem sogenannten Werkstoff notwendig, weil das Werk in sich, ob es ausgeführt oder nicht, *herstellend* ist.”

²¹⁸ H, 43, 45.

requires a medium (*Medium*)²¹⁹ – a carrier or vehicle (*Träger*)²²⁰ for the happening of truth, which is set to work in the work of art. Indeed, as it makes a point of undescoring, “what is thus at work, is still in the work.”²²¹ Thus, the third version makes clear that, in this manner, the thinghood of the work of art – even in its commonplace sense of formed materiality – transitions from being something merely intermediate (*ein Mittleres*)²²² to being a proper medium for the happening of truth.

Proper materiality thus emerges precisely as the anchor of the actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) of this happening, a guarantor of the fact that it actually happens (a redundant expression in itself) – that the well-spring of the nothing, quite literally, reaches all the way to the surface of the work, that its indefinite space pervades and transpierces the supremely definite space of the work of art. The proper materiality of the work of art thus emerges as the precise point at which the *χώρα* becomes a *τόπος*, the point at which it constrains itself into the embrace of appropriation or at-one-ment (*Ereignis*). In fact, it is precisely the actuality of the work – due to the very compression exerted by its circumscription – that is most perfectly suited for the concentration of the infinite dispersion of space and for its honing into a point fine enough to rend the veil of its self-containment and bring itself forth out of itself. Only in virtue of the work’s proper materiality – that is, its infinite particularity as a being – can space actually take place, and nothing can become something. The actuality of the work is the precise standpoint (*Standort*) upon which the nothing can take its stand (*Stand nehmen*) and assert itself as *θέσις*.²²³ Thus, the “highest resistance” (*“höchste Widerstand”*) that the earth as proper materiality offers the truth,

²¹⁹ H, 43.

²²⁰ H, 45.

²²¹ Ibid.: “Aber was so *am* Werk ist, ist es doch *im* Werk,” italics mine.

²²² M, 50, 52.

²²³ H, 48.

in fact, affords the latter a site (*Stätte*) upon which it can take a steady stand (*ständiges Stand*).²²⁴ The rift within the work is the perfect hollow into which the rivet around which the nothing may turn into something can sink itself and thus stand upright, “right itself” (*sich richten*).²²⁵ This is how truth can be “fastened” or set fast (*festgestellt*) precisely within the *Gestalt* of the work.²²⁶ That which perforates the *punctum* in the first place, must remain rooted within this punctum so as to retain support for its opening up.

Truth – as something coming out of nothing – requires a place into which it can come in, “a somewhere and...a site [to be] filled up by the presencing.”²²⁷ In its very happening, truth itself opens up the possibility of such a place, yet it is the work in all of its particularity that ultimately fulfills it. Truth as the counter-turning (*das Gegenwendige*) between quintessential containment (the nothing) and quintessential release (being) must be, in virtue of this very nature, an arrangement (*Einrichtung*);²²⁸ and while the third version does not explicitly specify this arrangement, perhaps the present study would not be too far off the mark in suggesting that it might be one of counterpoint. The distinguishing feature of a counterpoint arrangement is precisely that, as a greater whole – as a *Gestalt* – it is arranged in reference to a specific point, it turns on it and revolves around it; without such a *punctum*, its motion and the resulting pressure would simply disintegrate and peter out. Thus the work as a *Gestalt* recalls the centrifuge, where the operation of rotation or revolution is understood in terms of an arrangement of two fields of contrasting force, centripetal and centrifugal, around a fixed axis – a vertically extended point. This metaphor would seem entirely far afield, were it not for the second version’s explicit

²²⁴ H, 57.

²²⁵ H, 50.

²²⁶ H, 51.

²²⁷ H, 49: “...die Möglichkeit eines Irgendwo und einer von Anwesendem erfüllten Stätte”

²²⁸ Ibid.: “Weil die Wahrheit das Gegenwendige von Lichtung und Verbergung ist, deshalb gehört zu ihr das, was hier die Einrichtung genannt sei.”

identification of the work as “the fusing middle of all fuses,”²²⁹ a centrifuge *par excellence*.²³⁰ As such an arrangement, the work constitutes the ideal constitution of truth in virtue of its very constitution: the work is truth *in actu*. In order for truth to happen as the turn from nothing to something, it must be set in rotation, as it were, within the centrifuge of the work. And thus the following pronouncement of the third version finally rings clear as a bell: “Because it belongs to the essence of truth to arrange itself within the being in order to first become truth, the *trait of work* lies in the essence of truth as a distinguished possibility of truth to be itself beingly in the midst of beings.”²³¹

However, ultimately, it is not only the actuality of the work of art that its proper materiality must anchor, but also the actuality of the nothing itself. Indeed, the following claim is found within the last quarter of the third version: “The poetizing draft of the truth that stakes itself within the work as *Gestalt*, is...never *fulfilled* within the empty and the indefinite.”²³² This implication leads to the underlying question upon which the entire edifice of the work of art rests: what reason, if any, might there be for the nothing to actualize at all? Indeed, echoing the formulation of the “miracle of miracles” by Leibniz, the third version asks – and attempts to answer – not only the question of why the work is rather than is not, but also, why the nothing itself would become rather than remain nothing. In keeping, as dilligently as possible, with the

²²⁹ M, 26: “...die fùgende Mitte aller Fùgen...”

²³⁰ Michel Haar helpfully draws our attention to the prominence given to force over form in Nietzsche’s aesthetics, which could be identified as a contributing source to Heidegger’s model of the work : “...Heidegger purposefully underestimates the importance of force. Form is only a temporary guise or visage of the ever-changing strife of forces. Forms are fictions...that serve like values to uphold momentarily one bundle of forces or another. Form is a momentary point of equilibrium at which the expansion of a force as paused. Creation for Nietzsche, as *Schöpfung*, consists of dipping down into a reservoir of forces, not of forms.” (Michel Haar, Michel Haar, “Heidegger and the Nietzschean ‘Physiology’ of Art,” in *Exceedingly Nietzsche : Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Interpretation*, ed. David Farrell Krell and David Wood (London, New York : Routledge, 1988), 26).

²³¹ H, 50: “Weil es zum Wesen der Wahrheit gehört, sich in das Seiende einzurichten, um so erst Wahrheit zu werden, deshalb liegt im Wesen der Wahrheit der *Zug zum Werk* als einer ausgezeichneten Möglichkeit der Wahrheit, inmitten des Seienden selbst seiend zu sein.”

²³² H, 63: “Der dichtende Entwurf der Wahrheit, der sich ins Werk stellt als *Gestalt*, wird auch nie ins Leere und Unbestimmte hinein *vollzogen*,” italics mine.

strategy of keeping the scales of spatiality distinct for purposes of analysis, a closer look at this question must be deferred to its proper context in §1.e.

In all three versions of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, proper formation has three intimately related and not always clearly differentiated senses: (1) that of φύσις, (2) that of phenomenality, and (3) that of transformation (or perhaps, reformation). The first sense is explicitly identified as such both in the second and third versions, and is articulated as that primordial “coming out” (*Herauskommen*), “that going up from out of itself” (“*das von sich her Aufgehende*”), “that stepping into the light” (“*das ins Licht Tretende*”) – that whole (*das Ganze*) which “carries, embraces, and pervades all things.”²³³ Without naming it φύσις as such, the first version already speaks of such a whole as the earth in its modality of the streaming consonance (*Einklang*), or as the second and third versions put it, alternating consonance (*wechselweiser Einklang*)²³⁴ – a continual unfolding of an “unsurpassable” (*unüberbietbare*), “steady fullness” (*ständige Fülle*)²³⁵ which never exhausts its reserve. As the third version adds, this reserve unfolds into “simple ways and shapes” (“*einfacher Weisen und Gestalten*”).²³⁶ The first version further specifies that within this consonance, beings are “able to offer themselves as beingly” (“*sich als seiend bekunden kann*”) for the first time,²³⁷ that therein “the being as such encounters us as if on the first day...”²³⁸ The second version adds that within such consonance beings “move into their uplifted *Gestalt* and thus come out in that which they are for the first time.”²³⁹ What thus becomes sufficiently clear is that, in one respect, proper formation has to do with the appearing

²³³ M, 26: φύσις | H, 28: Φύσις

²³⁴ M, 32 | H, 33.

²³⁵ HS, 11.

²³⁶ H, 34.

²³⁷ HS, 15.

²³⁸ HS, 14: “...das Seiende als solches uns wie am ersten Tag oder – wenn alltäglich geworden – verwandelt begegnet.”

²³⁹ M, 26: “...rücken erst ein in ihre abgehobene Gestalt und kommen so heraus in dem, was sie sind”

(*Erscheinen*)²⁴⁰ or opening (*Offenbaren*)²⁴¹ of essences and beings – with their phenomenality. Thus, the second version speaks of the work as “letting beings into the “open constant” (?) [*das Offenständige*] of their essence.”²⁴² Indeed, in their usage of the verb “to show oneself” (*sich zeigen*), all three versions hearken back to the classical definition of the phenomenon in §7 of *Sein und Zeit*. What is more, the second version for the first time explicitly associates phenomenality with visibility by virtue of characterizing the work as giving things their “sight” (*Gesicht*) “whereby they become visible [*sichtbar*] in the future and remain visible [*sichtbar*] for a time.”²⁴³ The third version here adds the poignant example of the invisible space (*unsichtbarer Raum*) of the air being made visible (*sichtbar*) by the secure rising of the temple.²⁴⁴ (Such invisibility being made visible, of course, parallels indefiniteness becoming definite in the case of the nothing as indefinite space ushering the world of the work as definite space). But it is not only things to which the world of the work gives “sight”; crucially, the third version adds that it is also human beings to whom the world gives an outlook upon or “insight into themselves” (“*Aussicht auf sich selbst*”).²⁴⁵ In light of the immediately following example of the image of a Greek god, however, it is far from self-evident that such visibility is to be taken literally; according to the commentary accompanying this example, visibility may not signify outward appearance (*Aussehen*) at all, but rather the striking presence of something “as that which [it] is” within the work itself (in this case, an identification of the image of the Greek god with the Greek god himself in no uncertain terms).²⁴⁶ What significantly less clear, however, is whether

²⁴⁰ HS, 15.

²⁴¹ HS, 8.

²⁴² M, 28.

²⁴³ M, 26: “...der Tempel gibt in seinem Dastehen den Dingen erst das Gesicht, mit dem sie künftig sichtbar werden und auf eine Zeit sichtbar bleiben.”

²⁴⁴ H, 28: “Das sichere Ragen macht den unsichtbaren Raum der Luft sichtbar.”

²⁴⁵ H, 29.

²⁴⁶ M, 26: “ein Werk, das der Gott selbst « ist », das ihn anwesen lässt und jeden trifft und den weihenden Mann

the appearing or manifesting of beings is, in fact, tantamount to their becoming – whether phenomenality can also signify change, a becoming either in the sense of coming into existence (a change from potentiality to actuality) or in the sense of being transformed (a change from one mode of existence to another). As the first version points out, proper formation can mean precisely transformation “in the case of [beings] having become mundane.”²⁴⁷ In order to relate these various meanings while keeping them sufficiently distinct, it seems optimal to provisionally identify proper formation with the broad category of phenomenality and then to distinguish between phenomenality as (1) formation, (2) reformation, (3) the respective experiences of these events.

As they become “tributaries” of this streaming consonance, beings stream forth/flow (*verströmen sich*) within it – as the first version expresses it, the stream of consonance itself “always accepts the unfolded into itself [i.e., “takes it back”] and retains it” (“das Entfaltete immer in sich zurücknimmt und einbehält”).²⁴⁸ And so, evidently, it must, in order for the “unfolded” to “hold its form,” as it were, – insofar as the ground of the possibility of this form remains proper formation itself. From the point of view of beings that flow into the stream of proper formation, “holding their form” further requires that they “close themselves” (*sich verschließen*)²⁴⁹ – that they become self-contained. The first version gives several examples of this aspect of formation as self-containment: “The stone weighs, shows its heaviness, and thus draws itself back precisely into itself; color lights up and yet remains closed; a tone rings out and yet does not step into the open. What steps into the open is precisely this self-closing, and that is

herausstellt als den, der er ist.

²⁴⁷ HS, 14: “...wenn alltäglich geworden – verwandelt...”

²⁴⁸ HS, 11.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

the *essence of the earth*.”²⁵⁰ In the second version, the earth in its modality of self-containment is for the first time identified with the peculiar aspect of the phenomenality of φύσις – its drive to close itself, or, quoting Heraclitus, “Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.”²⁵¹ The earth is characterized by this tendency not only on the whole (“sie selbst im Ganzen”), but also in its preservation of the individual integrity of each being within itself in the sense of its interior wholeness and completeness, and, in particular, its ability to maintain its distinctness from other beings. Indeed, the third version explicitly states that the streaming (*Verströmen*) of the earth is no blurring (*Verwischen*), but rather a delimitation (*Ausgrenzen*) which delimits (*begrenzt*) every presence.²⁵² In this way, the form of a being can be understood as an outline that at once determines its shape, retains its every constitutive part within its boundary, and, in so doing, sets it apart from every other being, reflecting the broader dynamic of the setting-apart of a domain/sphere of integrity discussed above. On the whole, proper formation as the drive of self-containment is steady (*ständig*) but not stiff (*starr*) – that is to say, it must not be understood in the sense of some kind of an opaque screen, but rather as the host of that fullness which erupts in a streaming/alternating consonance that is the drive of self-showing. Thus it becomes evident that, as proper formation, the earth itself holds two reciprocal tendencies in tension – that of self-closing and that of self-showing, both necessary conditions of the very possibility of phenomenality.

The notion of the earth as the modality of self-containment naturally recalls the ever-so-ephemeral and vulnerable state through which the work of art passes immediately after its

²⁵⁰ HS, 11: “Der Stein lastet, zeigt seine Schwere und zieht sich so gerade in sich zurück; die Farbe leuchtet auf und bleibt doch verschlossen; der Ton klingt auf und tritt doch nicht ins Offene. Was ins Offene tritt, ist gerade dieses Sichverschließen, und das ist das *Wesen der Erde*. | M 32: “Und das ist das *Wesen der Erde* : das wesenhaft sich Verschliessende.”

²⁵¹ M, 32.

²⁵² H, 33.

production and immediately prior to its consumption – the state of self-possession, which is itself composed of three principal elements: self-reliance (self-sustenance), self-reference (reflexivity), which, in turn, presuppose some kind of a self. As early as in the first version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, these elements appear in the form of resting-upon-itself (*auf-sich-beruhen*), standing/staying-in-itself (*in sich stehen* | *Insichstehen* in the second version | *Insichselbststehen* in the third version).²⁵³ This notion of self-possession constitutes the commonplace platform for the development of the proper notion of the earth as the modality of resistance. In fact, as is the case with most proper notions in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, the characterization of the work of art as “resi-stance” or “withstanding” (*Widerstand*) emerges precisely out of a critique of the characterization of the mere thing as an “ob-stance” or “obstacle” (*Gegenstand*) in the specific sense of object (*Objekt*). Before attempting to delve any further into the details of this distinction, it should be noted that none of the three versions of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* offer a sufficiently resolved analysis of such; they do, however, contain directly relevant remarks that invite plausible conjecture or, at very least, simply cannot be passed over in silence. The second version, for example, for the very first time refers to the work that has lost its self-possession as a “has-been” (*Gewesenes*) – as something, the very essence or “self” of which has come and gone – “flown away,” as it were – leaving behind a mere husk of a thing, no longer constitutionally capable of being “in itself” insofar as it no longer has a self to speak of, let alone to possess.²⁵⁴ This kind of an empty container has the commonplace spatiality of an object (*Objekt*) – a thoroughly irrelative ob-stacle (*Gegenstand*) which may only be related to in terms of its removal for the sake of clearing a path towards something else. The work as such an ob-stacle cannot even be thought of as self-reliant or self-referential, as it no longer has a “self” to rely on or refer

²⁵³ HS, 6 | M, 20, 22 | H, 16, 25-26.

²⁵⁴ M, 22.

to. It simply stands opposite (*Entgegenstehen*).²⁵⁵ In contrast, a work that has been fortunate enough to escape this fate retains a “self” towards which it orients itself (*Zu-sich-stehen*),²⁵⁶ to which it keeps (*In-sich-stehen*), and upon which it rests (*Auf-sich-beruhen*). As a direct outworking of such self-possession, the work displays the proper spatiality of a “resistor” (*Widerstand*) that is capable of withstanding something like a current in a manner essential to its proper conduction (speaking in electrical terms). As a resistor, the work is paradoxically able to counter and encounter simultaneously – to retain its own self while extending it to an other and to receive this other without being consumed by it. Unlike the obstacle, whose being there is limited to extancy/being at hand (*Vorhandensein*) alone, the being there of the work as a resistor in its sustained tension between *entasis* and *ekstasis* begins to approximate the being there of the human being.

In all three versions of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, the precise relationship between the work and the earth as proper formation is exceedingly difficult to ascertain and articulate. On the one hand, the work is said to set-forth/produce (*herstellen*) the earth in the sense of setting the self-closing, the self-contained into the open²⁵⁷ – in spatial terms, of establishing the coincidence of the integrity of proper formation as extension/expansion and the integrity of the broader sphere/domain of dimensionality as such. Thus, the work may be understood as a kind of riverbed – essentially a channel or a conduit – that “stands up to” (*besteht*) and “holds up under” (*aushält*) the stream of proper formation, that “sets [it] out within itself” (“in sich...beistellt”), “allows [it] to surge/rush forward” (“andrängen läßt”).²⁵⁸ On the other hand, the very same paragraph in turn speaks of the earth as being the ground (*Grund*) of the work: “...it [the work]

²⁵⁵ M, 22.

²⁵⁶ M, 20.

²⁵⁷ HS, 11: “Das Werk stellt die Erde her, stellt sie als das Sichverschließende ins Offene.”

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

sets itself back into the earth as into its self-closing ground, upon which it rests; a ground which is an “a-ground”/abyss because [it is] essentially and always self-closing.”²⁵⁹ The second version expands upon this relationship slightly – though not less cryptically – such that it becomes clearer, at very least, that the earth is, in some sense, “within” and “becomes present through” the work, and that the work, in some sense, “rests upon” the earth and “belongs to it.”²⁶⁰ Thus it appears that the earth somehow enables the work to *contain itself* – to bolster its *self-possession*, and the work, in turn, enables the earth to *show itself* – to un-dam the stream of its alternating consonance, as it were. The operation of the earth within the work becomes clearer if the *setting-back* (*zurückstellen*) of the earth is understood as *restitution*. Indeed, this translation choice reinscribes the notion of the earth within its original definitional dyad of *formation* and *reformation*, wherein the latter is understood as the restoration of a given being to its original form. To speak of the self-setting-back of the work then amounts to speaking of it as a restitution to the *situation of reformation*, as a re-arrangement into the original arrangement; accordingly, to speak of the *setting-forth* of the earth by the work amounts to speaking of the work as *propagating* the situation of reformation *even as* – and precisely *because* – it is itself situated well within it. Although seemingly far-fetched, such an interpretation appears to gesture in the same direction as the otherwise undecipherable reference to *appropriation* (*Ereignis*) in Footnote D of the Reclam-Ausgabe (1960) of the *Kunstverkaufsatz* after the following sentence: “The work lets^d the earth be an earth.”²⁶¹

Fortunately, the first version quickly moves on to the concept of *strife* (*Streit*) between the earth and the world – a concept which yields a fascinating spatial dynamic, consistent with

²⁵⁹ HS, 11: “stellt es sich selbst in die Erde zurück als in seinen sich verschließenden Grund, auf dem es aufrucht; ein Grund, der, weil wesentlich und immer sich verschließend, ein Ab-grund ist.”

²⁶⁰ M, 32.

²⁶¹ H, 32: “Das Werk läßt die Erde eine Erde sein^d.”

the preceding interpretation of the earth as formation and of the world as dimensionality. Indeed, the turning of the world towards the earth as an opening guide²⁶² can be identified with the anticipatory role dimensionality must play in formation as extension or expansion. On the other hand, formation also constitutes a certain contraction or self-containment; thus, it does not come as a surprise that the world is said to “tolerate nothing closed”²⁶³ or self-contained: as dimensionality, it appears to be essentially configured only for extension or expansion, and the tension between self-containment and self-extension or self-expansion within proper formation has not yet been addressed or resolved by this point in the text. Somehow, formation as extent must also be understood to have an extent. From one perspective, the extension or expansion of the earth as a stream of proper formation threatens to “wash away the banks of the riverbed,” so to speak, – to erode dimensionality itself. From another, the same stream “intends in its self-closing to be everything,” i. e. to absorb and contain dimensionality within itself. As within formation itself, so within the relation between formation and dimensionality, these contrasting spatial modalities – dis-tent (or a spreading in different directions) and con-tent (or concentration) – are, paradoxically, mutually necessary. Indeed, the first version speaks of strife as “the intimacy of their averting belonging-to-themselves.”²⁶⁴ The second version employs an even more explicitly spatial language: “In strife, world and earth move *apart* from each other, but in such a way as to first move right *towards* each other.”²⁶⁵ These opposing vectors of movement – apart and towards – are reiterated once more in the compound verb defining strife as the “standing-towards-each-other stepping-apart-from-each-other” (*zueinanderstehenden*

²⁶² HS, 12: “Die Welt...wendet sich als eröffnendes Geleit zur Erde...”

²⁶³ Ibid.: “...duldet kein Verschlussenes...”

²⁶⁴ Ibid.: “...die Innigkeit ihres widerwendigen Sichzugehörens.”

²⁶⁵ M, 34: “Im Streit rücken Welt und Erde *auseinander*, aber so, dass sie erst recht aufeinander *zurücken*.”

Auseinandertreten).²⁶⁶ The third version clarifies this relationship by speaking of the world and the earth as being “*essentially different* from each other, yet *never separate*.”²⁶⁷ Indeed, it takes great care to distance this relationship of unity (*Einheit*) from, on the one hand, that of an “empty unity of unbecoming [неподходящих] opposites,” and, on the other, an “insipid agreement.”²⁶⁸ To this end, the third version here incorporates a clarification of their contrast – namely, the contrast between strife and discord (*Zwietracht*) or being at odds (*Hader*).²⁶⁹ Such consists precisely in the fact that the rupture (*Riß*) that lies at the heart of strife is no disruption (*Störung*) in the sense of destruction (*Zerstörung*).²⁷⁰ Rather, it is the self-affirmation (*Selbst-Behauptung*) of these respective essences – not in the sense of a kind of self-satisfied confirmation of one’s own state to oneself, but precisely in the sense of a giving of oneself over (*Sichaufgeben*) to another – and no superficial giving over at that, but rather a giving over of the most profound depth of the self, namely, a giving over of its own being in the very originarity of its provenance.²⁷¹ It is only in giving oneself over to another that the one is capable of rising out of such depth and of bringing it to the surface: in strife, the one and the other draw each other out of – and simultaneously into – themselves.²⁷² At its “highest” pitch, however, such intimacy comes dangerously close to identity – and perhaps rather too close in the third version’s denotation of such intimacy as simple (*einfache*).²⁷³ Terminological criticism notwithstanding, the most profound aspect of the proper spatiality of the work of art remains not only to “spark” or “ignite” (*bestreiten*) and sustain (*aushalten*), but also to be (*sein*) such a reciprocity – to be a bond or

²⁶⁶ M, 34.

²⁶⁷ “Welt und Erde sind *wesenhaft* von einander *verschieden* und doch *niemals getrennt*,” italics mine.

²⁶⁸ H, 35: “d[ie] leer[e] Einheit des sich nichts angehenden Entgegengesetzten”; H 36: “fade[s] Übereinkommen”

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid.: “Die Selbstbehauptung des Wesens ist jedoch niemals das Sichversteifen auf einen zufälligen Zustand, sondern das Sichaufgeben in die verborgene Ursprünglichkeit der Herkunft des eigenen Seins.”

²⁷² Ibid.: “Im Streit trägt jedes das andere über sich hinaus.”

²⁷³ H, 36.

yoke between these vectors of motion (both terms Heidegger particularly favors in his commentaries on Plato's "Allegory of the Cave"²⁷⁴). At this juncture, in the first two versions of the *Kunstwerksatz* the discussion shifts to the deeper scale of proto-spatiality – that of art as a proto-spring (*Ursprung*), and that of the proto-spring as an institution (*Stiftung*) of being. The third version, however, for the very first time introduces the term instigation (*Anstiftung*),²⁷⁵ such that the proto-spatiality of art as institution is rendered more clearly visible at the level of the proper spatiality of the work of art as instigation. (As will become more clear from the immediately following paragraphs, this addition also serves to confirm the notion that the work's tendencies of extension and collection are, in fact, types of motion which are assembled within instigation as a kind of overdrive.²⁷⁶

It hardly seems a coincidence that the first version speaks of this bond or yoke of strife as a clearing (*Lichtung*) whose light conditions the very possibility of formation. Indeed, sustained tension between di-vergence and con-vergence lies at the very heart of the proper spatiality of the work of art as proper formation. The first version explicitly confirms this: "Here, in the fundamental trait of work-being as en-strifing/"sparking"/"igniting" lies the ground of the necessity of that which we call "form."²⁷⁷ Only through the articulation of the concept of strife does the first version come to accept the terminology of "form" prevalent within the practice of drawing: "drawing-around" or outline sketch (*Umriß*), "drawing-onto" or built-up sketch (*Aufriß*), and "drawing-under" or underdrawing (*Grundriß*).²⁷⁸ The common German stem of these terms – *-riß* – comes to be the perfect model for the paradoxical bond between expansion

²⁷⁴ HS, 14 | M, 32.

²⁷⁵ H, 36.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.: "Die Bestreitung des Streites ist die ständig sich übertreibende Sammlung der Bewegtheit des Werkes."

²⁷⁷ HS, 12: "Hier, im Grundzug des Werkseins als Bestreitung, liegt der Grund der Notwendigkeit dessen, was wir "Form" nennen."

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

and contraction, insofar as it represents a boundary (*Grenze*) that is simultaneously a rupture and a trace: “While the self-closing must be wrested/“torn out” into [*hereingerissen*] the open, this rupturing/tracing [*Reißendes*] itself must turn into a rupture/trace [*Riß*], into a pulling boundary [*Grenze*] and fuse [*Fuge*].”²⁷⁹ Regrettably, apart from something like “rupture,” it does not seem possible to find a straightforward translation for the term *Riß* – one that would preserve the equivocation which renders it uniquely suitable as a model for the bond between expansion and contraction.²⁸⁰ After all, as the third version makes clear for the first time, the *Riß* is not the ripping apart of a mere cleft (*das Aufreißen einer bloßen Kluft*), but rather a drawing of counterforces, so to speak, together in the provenance of their unity out of a united ground.²⁸¹ However, at this juncture in the first version, the *Riß* may be productively understood as a rift – an interval, which allows differing spatial modalities to “drift” into one another. When the term *Riß* is interpreted in this manner, the language of a middle (*Mitte*) and of movement (*rücken* in combination with various prefixes) appears as a natural development of the idea of the work as a bond. Interface between expansion and contraction, for instance, requires transition – i. e., change precisely in the sense of movement of and among spatial modalities. The first version articulates this movement as follows: “...[the work] re-moves the earth, opening it, into a world. The latter itself never moves-in to the earth as a directing guide. [rather, as the second version

²⁷⁹ HS, 12: “Indem das Sichverschließende hereingerissen werden muß ins Offene, muß dieses Reißende selbst zum Riß, zur ziehenden Grenze und Fuge werden.”

²⁸⁰ In this regard, Sandra Lee Bartky detrimentally overstates the case in claiming that the metaphor of strife is ‘wholly dispensable and the metaphors of co-operation and accommodation would have served as well.’ (Sandra Lee Bartky, “Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art,” *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 9, no. 4 (1969) : 361.) The metaphors of co-operation and accommodation do not capture the nuance of tension which is indispensable to the preservation of differentiation and otherness at the heart of the unity of appropriation from which art springs. Hans Jaeger provides a more realistic assessment of the complexity of the term *Riß*: “This [*Riß*] cannot be adequately rendered into English. ...the term ‘tension’ for *Riß* can only indicate the German implication of the full ‘outlines’ of the strife.” (Hans Jaeger, “Heidegger and the Work of Art,” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 17, no. 1 (1958) : 66.)

²⁸¹ H, 50: “Dieser Riß reißt die Gegenwendigen in die Herkunft ihrer Einheit aus dem einigen Grunde zusammen.”

adds: “it draws the world back into itself and moves it into its dark ground”]²⁸² But the work moves this moving-in re-moval forward and opens an open. That is the middle of the space of play within which the earth is worldly closed and the world is earthly open.”²⁸³ The middle of the space of play (*Spielraum*) is precisely the rift, or interval, within which expansion and contraction, dimensionality and formation are transported or transition into one another.²⁸⁴

In the first version, it is still the work that propels the drift of spatial modalities through this rift in a forward motion that spatially embodies the “going on” of the transition between them. Yet in the account of the second version, a paradoxical relationship appears to emerge between the opening of the open as a happening (*Geschehen*) in its own right that is “at work in the work” (“in ihm als Werk...am Werk”)²⁸⁵ – that animates the work, so to speak, – and the setting of this self-same happening in motion – its “setting-to-work” (*Ins-Werk-Setzung*) – by the self-same work that it supposedly animates.²⁸⁶ However, upon closer examination, it becomes clearer that the expression setting-to-work is not predicated of the work as though it were an operation that the work itself effectuates; rather, the opening of the there, the happening of truth is spoken of as being set into motion in the work, rather than by the work as such. Indeed, the second version takes particular care to reserve the effective agency of the open to the open itself and to identify the work as its locus, rather than its engine: “*Within* strife...an open *opens*

²⁸² M, 34: “zieht die Welt in sich zurück und rückt sie ein in ihren dunklen Grund.”

²⁸³ HS, 12: “...[das Werk] entrückt...die Erde, sie eröffnend, in eine Welt. Diese selbst rückt als weisendes Geleit nie in die Erde. Aber diese einrückende Entrückung rückt das Werk vor und eröffnet ein Offenes. Das ist die Mitte des Spielraums, in dem die Erde welthaft verschlossen und die Welt erdhaft offen ist.”

²⁸⁴ Klee, whose work Heidegger had closely examined and commented upon, had characterized the picture plane in similar terms, as Stephen H. Watson points out: “Klee refigures the concept of chaos and the cosmological figure of the picture plane by what he calls a ‘nonconcept,’ both become schematized mathematically as a field of disequilibrium in terms of dynamics. Indeed, the whole field of the picture plane became conceived as an interplay of dynamic forces, generated in the dynamics of line.” (Stephen H. Watson, “Heidegger, Klee’s turn, and the Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Crescent Moon over the Rational: Philosophical Interpretations of Paul Klee* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 74).

²⁸⁵ M, 34.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

itself.”²⁸⁷ It further establishes that the happening of truth conditions the very possibility of reciprocity between the world and the earth within the work, and not the reverse.²⁸⁸ Indeed, the third version takes a decisive step to clarify the effective priority of the truth in its own happening, as it adjusts the formulation “setting-to-work of truth” (“*Ins-Werk-Setzung der Wahrheit*”) to the “self-setting-to-work of the truth” (“*das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit*”),²⁸⁹ and reiterates it once again several pages later: “Within the work of art the truth of beings has set itself to work.”²⁹⁰

The question of its proximate cause notwithstanding, the central insight of the first and second versions regarding the interval of the *Riß* is clear: the *Riß* is not spatially neutral, but rather itself constitutes a dynamic modality of spatiality known as motion. It is, therefore, ideally suited for mediation between dimensionality and formation, expansion and contraction, because the directionality of the latter – their outward-ness and inward-ness – is nothing if not a qualification of their shared dynamism. Naturally, such dynamism must never be confused with its commonplace counterpart of motion understood as a “mere alteration of place of a [given] body,”²⁹¹ such as occurs in the literal shipping of the work of art from gallery to gallery. Rather, as the third version finally makes unambiguously clear, motion proper to the work of art must be understood as ἐνέργεια, and the work itself – as an ἔργον: “the work in the Greek sense of ἔργον, whose “being” [Sein] is ἐνέργεια, which assembles within itself endlessly more motion than all modern “energies.”²⁹²

²⁸⁷ M, 34: “*In dem zueinanderstehenden Auseinandertreten des Streites öffnet sich ein Offenes,*” italics mine.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.: “*In dem zueinanderstehenden Auseinandertreten des Streites öffnet sich ein Offenes,*” italics mine.

²⁸⁹ H, 21, 25.

²⁹⁰ H, 25: “Im Kunstwerk hat sich die Wahrheit des Seienden ins Werk gesetzt.”

²⁹¹ H, 34: “bloßer Ortsveränderung eines Körpers”

²⁹² H, 71: “Die festigende Grenze ist das Ruhende – nämlich in der Fülle der Bewegtheit – dies alles gilt vom Werk im griechischen Sinne des ἔργον; dessen »Sein« ist die ἐνέργεια, die unendlich mehr Bewegung in sich versammelt als die modernen »Energien«.”

In the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, the notion of strife as an aspect of the proper spatiality of the work of art undergoes an astonishing metamorphosis: using the term proto-strife (*Ur-Streit*) to herald this change, the third version finally confronts the persistent necessity of elaborating the fact that the rift at the center of the work of art by no means “bottoms out” within the work itself, but rather runs all the way through being (*Sein*) and, what is more, – runs between being and the nothing (*das Nichts*), serving as a kind of “hinge” upon which the latter turns into the former, wherein consists the very essence of truth as becoming. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether in such a primordial becoming, the nothing itself might not be “rent in twain” as it gives rise to being as a triunity. Indeed, the third version clearly speaks of a kind of ground-rift (*Grundriß*): “This rift draws those counter-forces together in the provenance of their unity out of their united ground. It is a ground-rift.”²⁹³ Yet this ground-rift must also be seen as a kind of ground-rivet, in the sense that it does not simply split the unity of the ground apart but also fastens it together by means of measure (*Maß*) and limit (*Grenze*) – as a kind of contour (*Umriß*).²⁹⁴ The *Addendum* to the third version returns to this relationship between limit and contour in order to clarify it by means of the Greek notion of *πέρας* (*boundary*), which “does not seal off, but rather brings...the presencing to appearing/shining out for the first time. The limit freely gives into the unconcealed.”²⁹⁵ With strife thus rushing headlong into the abyss of the nothing – or, rather, welling up from it – its consideration may no longer remain within the limits of the proper spatiality of the work of art and must be taken up once more in its vastly expanded context of proto-spatiality, archi-spatiality, and even im-proper spatiality of the nothing in the

²⁹³ H, 51: “Dieser Riß reißt die Gegenwendigen in die Herkunft ihrer Einheit aus dem einigen Grunde zusammen. Er ist Grundriß.”

²⁹⁴ Ibid.: “Dieser Riß läßt die Gegenwendigen nicht auseinanderbersten, er bringt das Gegenwendige von Maß und Grenze in den einigen Umriß.”

²⁹⁵ H, 71: “Die Grenze im griechischen Sinne riegelt nicht ab, sondern bringt als hervorgebrachte selber das Anwesende erst zum Scheinen. Grenze gibt frei ins Unverborgene.”

corresponding sections below (§1.c-e).

A further complication with regard to the notion of the rift (*Riß*) – of the there (*das Da*) – is that although its possibility – its capacity – may be traced back to art as a catalyst of this particular way of the happening of truth, its actuality – its how (*wie*) or its being (*sein*) – calls for something like carriers, beings capable of undertaking it or taking it on (*übernehmen*) – beings the specific mobility of which expresses itself, among other things, as deciding, i. e. inclining towards and implementing one course of action or another.²⁹⁶ The reason for this is because, in its deepest ground, the rift is characterised not simply by propulsion, but rather by propensity. Propensity requires simultaneous forward motion and a certain kind of narrowing of relational possibilities as a result of the implementation of one of such possibilities or another in the making of a decision. Thus the unclarity regarding the question of the efficient cause of the work returns and is, in fact, not entirely resolved even in the *Addendum* to the third version. What the *Addendum* does accomplish is trace this ambiguity of causality to the fundamental ambiguity of the relation between being (*Sein*) and being-there (*Dasein*): “Within the title “setting-to/into-work of truth,” wherein it remains undetermined, but determinable, who or what “sets” in what way, conceals itself a persistent difficulty in the *relation between being [Sein] and human essence* (which relation is inadequately thought even in this version), which was clear since *Being and Time*...”²⁹⁷ Although it must be noted that even in the midst of such uncertainty, the *Addendum* does insist upon the necessity of being there to being as existent: “Being, however, is an address to humanity and is not without the latter.”²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ HS, 19 | M, 34.

²⁹⁷ H, 74: “In dem Titel: »Ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit«, worin unbestimmt aber bestimmbar bleibt, wer oder was in welcher Weise »setzt«, verbirgt sich der *Bezug von Sein und Menschenwesen*, welcher Bezug schon in dieser Fassung ungemäß gedacht wird, - eine bedrängende Schwierigkeit, die mit seit »Sein und Zeit« klar ist...”

²⁹⁸ Ibid.: “Sein aber ist Zuspruch an den Menschen und nicht ohne diesen.”

γ) The Openness of the There (*Die Offenheit des Da*)

With the final element of the *Riß*, the global vision of the proper spatiality of the work in the first version is complete and may henceforth be understood as a unity of dimensionality and formation through motion. It seems quite fitting, then, that at this juncture, the text also for the first time introduces the expression “the openness of the there” (“*die Offenheit des Da*”)²⁹⁹ – which is, in effect, the greater whole of the proper spatiality of the work of art. The openness of the there is a space of play (*Spielraum*)³⁰⁰ – specifically, an illuminated space of play (“gelichteter Spielraum”),³⁰¹ a clearing (*Lichtung*)³⁰² – in which things [as the second version specifies, the “individual being” (*das einzelne Seiende*)³⁰³] can, as it were, “play themselves out,” enact themselves, i. e. transition from potentiality into actuality. The second version links this “enactment” back to proper formation as phenomenality, speaking of it in terms of the individual being appearing (*erscheinen*), becoming open (*Offenbarwerden*), stepping into the there “open as such and such” (“*als so und so Offenbares*”).³⁰⁴ In fact, the third version speaks specifically of the openness of a given being “in what and how it is” (“in das, was und wie es ist”).³⁰⁵ It is also at this juncture that the second version for the very first time identifies the openness of the there with the essence of the truth as expressed by the Greek notion of ἁ-λήθεια, which it translates as un-concealment (*Un-Verborgenheit*).³⁰⁶ The third version retains this identification, while adjusting the spelling ἁ-λήθεια to the grammatically standard ἀλήθεια.³⁰⁷ Only once such spatiality is initially grounded within the work of art, can “things and human beings situate

²⁹⁹ HS, 12.

³⁰⁰ HS, 12, 18.

³⁰¹ HS, 15 | M, 34.

³⁰² HS, 16.

³⁰³ M, 34.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ H, 21.

³⁰⁶ M, 34.

³⁰⁷ H, 21.

themselves” within it “in order to undergo/go through it”³⁰⁸ – only through situation within proper spatiality can things and human beings themselves spatialize, i. e. expand and contract in relation to dimensionality, authentically form. It is thus by no means a coincidence that the first version explicitly contrasts the work as a *gelichteter Spielraum* with the cinema as a *Lichtspiele*³⁰⁹ – the former constitutes proper spatiality within which the literal space of the latter must find its ground. As the first version remarks with regard to the poetry of Hölderlin, its proper spatiality as poetry is “more actual...than all theaters, cinemas...and houses in which, for example, bookstores and libraries are accommodated, within which the extant volumes of his collected works are featured.”³¹⁰ Importantly, as in the case of the relationship between proper expansion and factual exhibition space discussed above, the first version similarly rejects any simplistic notion of mutual exclusion between the proper actualization (“*Wirkung*”) of the work and the literal actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) of locations where such might take place: “This does not mean, however, that the work is to be taken out of *commonplace* actuality; that is impossible, because it is moved forward precisely within the latter as its shaking up and refutation.”³¹¹ As the ground of literal actuality, proper actualization may thus be understood as an event somewhat akin to an earthquake, wherein a “rupture” (*Riß*) at a “hypocenter” sends shockwaves throughout its surrounding extant formations in a surge of energy which re-forms the latter. The second version, however, makes a more rigid distinction between that “known up till now” (*das bislang Bekannte*) and proper formation, such that the former “turns out to be mere surface, appearance,

³⁰⁸ HS, 12: “...die Dinge und die Menschen zu stehen kommen, um es zu bestehen.”

³⁰⁹ HS, 15.

³¹⁰ Ibid.: “...wirklicher...als alle Theater, Lichtspiele und...Häuser, in denen zum Beispiel Buchläden und Büchereien untergebracht sind, darin die handgreiflichen Bände seiner gesammelten Werke vorkommen.”

³¹¹ Ibid.: “Das heißt jedoch nichts, das Werk sei aus der gemeinen Wirklichkeit herausgenommen; das ist unmöglich, weil es gerade in diese vorgerückt ist als ihre Erschütterung und Widerlegung.” Cf. HS, 17: “Woher kommt die Eröffnung der Offenheit des Seienden? Etwa aus dem Nichts? In der Tat, wenn mit dem Nichtseienden gemeint ist jenes Vorhandene, was dann durch das Werk gleichsam als das vermeintliche wahre Seiende widerlegt und erschüttert wird.” | M, 38.

and confusion.”³¹² However, precisely as such, it maintains an essential relationship to proper un-concealment as its counterpart spatial gesture of concealment understood as obstruction (see §1.b.γ).

The temple as a model of the openness of the there exhibits all three aspects of proper spatiality, two of which – the setting-up as the expansion of dimensionality and the setting-apart as the contraction of formation – have already been discussed above. The third aspect – motion – now comes into view in terms of the scenario of the manifestation of a god: “The work of architecture, which, as [a] temple, retains/contains the *gestalt*/figure of [a] god, at the same time allows the latter to stand out through the open colonnade into the precinct, which is thus first grounded/established as holy. Arising into a world and receding into the earth, the temple opens the there...”³¹³ Unlike in the first description of the temple (whose focus rested upon the verticality of the spatial configuration of exaltation), this second description draws attention to the fact that it is ultimately the “drift” of the statue through the “rift” of the colonnade that inaugurates the holiness of the temple as a whole. The second version is even more emphatic in this regard: “In the temple and through the temple, the god becomes present and thus first allows the precinct to *expand* and *delimit* itself as holy,”³¹⁴ with the imperative of *delimitation* informing the very presence of the god himself insofar as the temple’s matrix of the world prevents such from “slid[ing] into the indefinite/indeterminate [ins Unbestimmte].”³¹⁵ It is certainly worth noting that this revised passage from the second version characterizes the operation of the work – in this case, the sanctification of the precinct – in the explicitly spatial

³¹² M, 34: “...bloße Oberfläche, ...Schein und Verwirrung”

³¹³ HS, 12: “Das Bauwerk, das als Tempel die Gestalt des Gottes einbehält, läßt diese zugleich durch die offene Säulenhalle hinausstehen in den Bezirk, der so erst als ein heiliger gegründet ist. Aufragend in eine Welt und zurückreichend in die Erde eröffnet der Tempel das Da...” | M 24

³¹⁴ M, 24-26: “Im Tempel und durch den Tempel west der Gott an und läßt so erst den Bezirk als einen heiligen sich *ausbreiten* und *ausgrenzen*,” italics mine.

³¹⁵ M, 26.

terms of expanding (*ausbreiten*) and delimiting (*ausgrenzen*), in accordance with the already noted vectors of expansion and contraction, dimensionality and formation. It is this interplay between containment within the interior of the colonnade and release into its surrounding precinct that completes the essence of the temple as a spatiality proportionate to manifestation. The “drift” of the statue through the “rift” of the colonnade is the linchpin of the space of play (*Spielraum*) which the temple subsequently offers a people (*Volk*), wherein they may “come into their own” (“zu sich selbst komm[en]”) precisely by “coming into the “fusing” power of their god” (“in die fùgende Macht seines Gottes komm[en]”),³¹⁶ i. e. by situating themselves within the spatiality of the temple – and, in particular, by passing through the colonnade themselves.

In light of these developments, the coming about of the proper spatiality of the work as a greater whole – as the openness of the there – comes to be explicitly identified, for the very first time in the first version, with the happening of truth as manifestation: “what thus happens in the en-strifing/“sparking”/“igniting” of the strife...this happening, fused within itself, is the happening of that which we call *truth*.”³¹⁷ It is also certainly noteworthy that this groundbreaking innovation is immediately preceded by the very first appearance of the language of unconcealment.³¹⁸ What does this shift in terminology signify for the understanding of the proper spatiality of the work? Does it entail that such spatiality must cease to be understood in spatial terms and must instead be re-intepreted in some alternative vocabulary of truth and knowledge? Or does it suggest, rather, that the essences of truth and knowledge themselves are only intelligible in spatial terms?

The first version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* is unequivocal in expressing its commitment to

³¹⁶ HS, 12.

³¹⁷ HS, 16: “Was so in der Bestreitung geschieht...dieses in sich gefùgte Geschehen ist das Geschehen dessen, was wir *Wahrheit* nennen.”

³¹⁸ Ibid.: “...die Welt wird *unverborgen*...,” italics mine.

the latter: “For the essence of truth does not consist in *conformity* between a statement and a thing/case, [but] rather truth is this grounding/fundamental happening of the opening of the openness of beings as such.”³¹⁹ In turn, the second version for the first time goes so far as to make the startling claim that the truth as the opening of the there has a *width* (*Weite*), a *depth* (*Tiefe*), and a *direction/trajectory* (*Bahnrichtung*),³²⁰ and reiterates this claim two pages later in the phrase the “scope of nearness and distance” (“*Spielraum der Nähe und Ferne*”).³²¹ Altogether consistently with its earlier dismissal of the definition of the proper formation of the work as conformation to or conformity with “something else,”³²² the first version calls for a parallel displacement of the articulation of truth in terms of conformity (*Übereinstimmung*). It is equally firm in its rejection of the characterization of the relationship between truth and the work of art as the latter’s setting there/positing/representing of the former as ““*a*” truth, a singular/individual “true,” such as a thought and a statement, an idea or a value,”³²³ previously extant somewhere apart from the work (“in the stars” (“in den Sternen”), as the third version adds).³²⁴ In lieu of resorting to either of these approaches, the first version sets out upon an elaboration of truth in terms that are properly spatial: the gestures of self-concealing (*Sichverbergend*) and self-unconcealing (*Sich-unverbergend*), the three epithets of un-truth (*Un-Wahrheit*) – cover-up (*Verdeckung*), obstruction (*Verstellung*), and distortion (*Verdrehung*) – and, most importantly, the decisive re-configuration of the relationship between truth and art as

³¹⁹ HS, 16: “Denn das Wesen der Wahrheit besteht nicht in der Übereinstimmung eines Satzes mit einer Sache, sondern Wahrheit ist dieses Grundgeschehen der Eröffnung der Offenheit des Seienden als solchen.”

³²⁰ M, 36: “Das Da kann jedoch nur übernommen und bestanden werden, wenn seine Offenheit erwirkt ist und je nach der Weite und Tiefe und Bahnrichtung der Eröffnung.”

³²¹ M, 40.

³²² HS, 13.

³²³ HS, 16: “...nicht irgendeine Wahrheit, ein einzelnes Wahres, etwa einen Gedanken und Satz, eine Idee oder einen Wert, die etwa durch das Werk “dargestellt” werden...”

³²⁴ HS, 17: “irgendwo zuvor vorhanden” | M, 38 | H, 49.

the latter's "setting-into-the-work" (*Ins-Werk-Setzung*) of the former.³²⁵ This constellation of newly-minted terms is specifically suited to the rendition of truth as "the openness of every open" ("*die Offenheit jedes Offenen*"),³²⁶ i. e. as proper spatiality. The scenarios of the cover-up, obstruction, and distortion all involve a certain manipulation of spatial configuration: in the first case, something is placed around something else in order to conceal it, in the second, something is placed in front of something else in order to prevent access to it, and in third, the form of something is deformed such that it loses its proper "sight" (*Anblick/Gesicht*) and thus becomes "unsightly" (*unsichtbar*). As modes of interposition, cover-up, obstruction, and distortion are crucially distinct from proper concealment as self-possession, the pre-requisite for a being's phenomenality, discussed in §1.b.β, and yet the first two versions categorize all of these as modalities of un-truth (*Un-wahrheit*). The latter is, in turn, said to belong to truth (*Wahrheit*) "as the valley to the mountain," pointing to the fact that manifestation always presupposes a certain sense of spatial delimitation both in its line of advance and in its reserve, the latter itself functioning as a kind of lining or boundary (*Grenze*) for the frontline. Truth as un-concealment can thus be thought of as a kind of "weather front," so to speak, - as it "passes," it shows the onlooker its "face" of the squall line or the fog, which conceals its invisible "back" of air. Thus, the second version for the first time provides a full continuum of un-concealment and concealment which constitutes the greater whole of truth: "Only when we see all of this together in unity – the unconcealedness of the just opened, the cover-up and obstruction, the self-closing and the concealed as such – do we grasp the essential relations of that which belongs to an openness, i.e. to the essence of the truth."³²⁷

³²⁵ HS, 16 | M, 34.

³²⁶ HS, 16.

³²⁷ M, 34: "Nur wenn wir all dieses in eins zusammensehen : die Unverborgenheit des jegerade Offenen, die

δ) Proper Experience, Creation, Knowledge

As hinted at in the discussion of the term “otherworldly” (*unheimisch*) above, in passing through the colonnade – in “drifting” through the “rift” – human beings and things can be said to no longer be “of this world.” By virtue of the forward motion (*Vorrück*) of the “drift,” they are re-moved (*entrückt*) from extant things, “among which [they] routinely believe [them]selves to be at home,”³²⁸ and are moved-into (*ingerückt*) into the world of the work – are transformed into accordance with its dimensions and indwell it as their recovered home/habitat (*Heimat*).³²⁹

The second version intimates such rapture by the work, albeit non-explicitly: “Standing there, the temple work brings [a] people into the fused relation of their world.”³³⁰ The third version concludes its commentary on van Gogh’s painting of the peasant shoes precisely with the distinction between the commonplace and the elsewhere, and the transport between the two: “In proximity to the work, we were suddenly elsewhere than we are usually accustomed to be.”³³¹

However, it is not until over thirty pages later that the language of rapture emerges in its full force: “the purer the work itself is re-moved [*entrückt*] into the openness of beings, opened through itself, the more simply it moves us into [*einrückt*] this openness and thus, at the same time, out of the usual. To follow this re-moval/rapture [*Verrückung*] means to transform the usual relations to the world and the earth and from then on to arrest all commonplace doing and valuing, knowing and looking, in order to tarry in the truth happening within the work.”³³²

Verdeckung und Verstellung, das Sichverschliessende und das schlechthin Verborgene, fassen wir die wesentlichen Bezüge dessen, was zu einer Offenheit d.h. zum Wesen der Wahrheit gehört.”

³²⁸ HS, 9: “in denen [sie] alltagshaft heimisch zu sein glauben.”

³²⁹ HS, 13.

³³⁰ M, 26: “Das Tempel-werk bringt dastehend das Volk in den gefügten Bezug seiner Welt.”

³³¹ H, 21: “In der Nähe des Werkes sind wir jäh anderswo gewesen, als wir gewöhnlich zu sein pflegen.”

³³² H, 54: “...je reiner das Werk selbst in die durch es selbst eröffnete Offenheit des Seienden entrückt ist, um so einfacher rückt es uns in diese Offenheit ein und so zugleich aus dem Gewöhnlichen heraus. Dieser Verrückung folgen, heißt: die gewohnten Bezüge zur Welt und zur Erde verwandeln und fortan mit allem geläufigen Tun und Schätzen, Kennen und Blicken ansichhalten, um in der im Werk geschehenden Wahrheit zu verweilen.”

Thus, the proper spatiality of the work endows human beings both with their proper form and their proper home, i. e. Hölderlin's "place near the origin" ("den Ort nahe dem Ursprung").³³³ It is for this reason that the first version eventually identifies the openness of the there with "the opening middle of the historical being-there of Dasein" ("die eröffnende Mitte des Daseins geschichtlicher Da-seins"),³³⁴ and the second speaks of the earth as "that whole upon which the human being grounds its living" and "the native/home ground upon which Dasein rests."³³⁵ The proper situation of the work inserts human beings into their authentic standpoint (*Standort*)³³⁶ – a vantage point in relation to the horizon of the world that specifies their perspective, i. e. their reference to all other references within its framework. Not only so, but, as the third version adds, such situation gives the human being an "outlook upon" or "insight into" itself (die Aufsicht auf sich selbst).³³⁷ In their integration into proper spatiality, human beings are "overcome by an ineluctable-inexhaustible (*ein Unershöpflich-Unumgägliches*)"³³⁸ precisely in order that they may, in turn, "grapple with the "otherworldliness" of being in earnest" ("um mit dem Unheimlichen des Seyns Ernst zu machen").³³⁹ What is more, the third version for the very first time speaks of the rapture of the work precisely as of being rapt in being (*in das Sein*

Eva Geulen argues that this 'enrapturing' capability of the work of art – its capability for 'displacing' and 'dislocating' stems from its own 'placelessness' : "Because it can displace other places, art itself is without a place. That art, in order to render us siteless and to dislocate us, must itself be without a site can be argued in analogy with Heidegger's suggestion that art is produced because it produces (earth), that is displayed because it is displayed (world). Art displaces and dislocates, it follows, because it is itself displaced and without a proper place." (Eva Geulen, "The Same End and the Other Beginning : Heidegger," in *The End of Art : Readings in a Rumor after Hegel* (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2006), 131.) Yet in Heidegger's account, art is by no means placeless – its proper 'site' and 'place' is the 'between' of 'time-space' which springs forth from being while remaining firmly rooted in this source. Neither does art render the human being 'siteless,' but rather 'dislocates' it from the 'commonplace' precisely in order to situate it within itself as the proper 'site' or 'place' of its reconfiguration.

³³³ HS, 22.

³³⁴ HS, 15.

³³⁵ M, 26: "worauf und worinnen der Mensch sein Wohnen gründet" + "den heimatlichen Grund, dem sein Dasein aufruht" | H 28, 32: "Auf die Erde und in sie gründet der geschichtliche Mensch sein Wohnen in der Welt."

³³⁶ HS, 13.

³³⁷ H, 29.

³³⁸ HS, 10.

³³⁹ HS, 13.

entrückt).³⁴⁰ With this crucial development, the third version plumbs an entirely new depth in the question of spatiality, insofar as proper spatiality comes to be understood as right relation to being. It is precisely in connection with this development, that the full implications of the qualification of the open (*das Offene*) as the free (*das Freie*)³⁴¹ come to the fore. The combination of these two adjustments ushers an understanding of the truth as more than manifestation, more than phenomenality as such; rather, it points to the fact that unconcealment itself does not play itself out in a mere display, but rather entails a fundamental reconfiguration of relations between being and being-there precisely by means of a freeing from relations of production and consumption and a freeing for the relation to being.

* A Note on the Proper Spatiality of the Work and the Reliability (*Verlässlichkeit*) of the Tool

Approximately one third of the way into the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* (p. 19), the reader comes across a rather perplexing development: the reliability (*Verlässlichkeit*) of the tool (*Zeug*) – in this particular case, a pair of peasant shoes – is suddenly characterized in terms up to this point reserved for the proper spatiality of the work of art. Due to the startling nature of its claim, the corresponding passage is worth quoting in its entirety:

“...the fullness of an essential being of the tool. We name it reliability. By virtue of it, the peasant woman is, though this tool, let into the reverberating call of the earth; by virtue of the reliability of the tool, she is certain of her world. Only thus – within the tool – are world and earth there for her and for those who are with her in their way. ...the reliability of the tool first gives the simple world its security and assures the earth the freedom of its steady onrush. The tool-being of the tool, reliability, keeps all things assembled within itself according to its way and breadth.”³⁴²

Having only just traced the rapture of the human being by the forward motion of the drift

³⁴⁰ H, 31.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² H, 19-20: “...[die] Fülle eines wesentlichen Seins des Zeuges. Wir nennen es die Verlässlichkeit. Kraft ihrer ist die Bäuerin durch dieses Zeug eingelassen in den schweigenden Zuruf der Erde, kraft der Verlässlichkeit des Zeuges ist sie ihrer Welt gewiß. Welt und Erde sind ihr und denen, die mit ihr in ihrer Weise sind, nur so da^a: im Zeug. Wir sagen »nur« und irren dabei; denn die Verlässlichkeit des Zeuges gibt erst der einfachen Welt ihre Geborgenheit und sichert der Erde die Freiheit ihres ständigen Andranges.”

of the work and of its subsequent settling down upon the ground of its earth and acquiring the horizon of its world, the present study encounters the above formulation of the reliability of the tool somewhat as a wrench thrown into the relatively smooth workings of the work. Some of the most problematic aspects of this formulation include its identification of (1) reliability (and not the drift) as the vehicle of the peasant woman's transition into the world and the earth, (2) the tool (and not the work) as the locus of the proper position of the world and the earth, (3) the tool (and not the constancy (*Standhaftigkeit*) of the work) as the assurance of the stability of the earth and the world, and (4) reliability (and not the world or the earth themselves) as a hybrid amalgam of dimensionality, integration, and containment. Far from claiming to provide a definitive resolution of the conspicuous conflation of the work and the tool in this passage, the present study nevertheless proposes the following two conjectures regarding its significance: (1) such a conflation may be an indication of Heidegger's attempt, in this final version, to put the maturing account of the workhood of the work in conversation with the account of *Zuhandenheit* in *Being and Time*, and/or (2) it may signal an inconspicuous, but momentous shift in the third version's interpretation of the shoes as a tool (*Zeug*), the activity of the peasant woman as being at labor (*bei der Arbeit*), and farming in general as a trade, to their respective interpretations as work (*Werk*), as being at work (*am Werk*), and as an additional "way in which truth happens." Thus, when almost ten pages later, the third version returns to the subject of the reliability of the tool, it speaks oddly out of turn, as it were – in that the context of such return happens to be the very midst of the discussion of the "worlding" of the world, and not at all of the "tooling" of the tool.³⁴³ And yet, the third version matter-of-factly insists that the peasant woman is able to sojourn within the open of beings because the reliability of the tool "shores up" its proper

³⁴³ H, 31.

necessity and proximity. How may this connection between the working of the work and the tooling of the tool be interpreted?

Having reflected upon proper alternatives to the commonplace spatiality of the work of art itself, the second and third versions eventually reach all the way back towards the original starting point of the latter – the process of production understood in terms of the experience (*Erlebnis*) of the artist – precisely with a view to redefining this experience in terms of creation (*Schaffen*) and knowledge (*Wissen*) in their proper sense. As intimated in §1.b.β above, prior to its “undertaking” by *Dasein*, the openness of the there – the proper spatiality of the work of art – is possible, but not yet actual, and it is none other than creation in the proper sense of the term that serves as a vehicle for this change. Such creation is certainly no mere production; rather, it is experience (*Erfahrung*) as “standing in the gap” of possibility, so to speak, not primarily for the sake of perfecting one’s capacity for manipulation of a given material through the exercise of such, but rather, first and foremost, for the sake of bringing the capacity of the there for openness to fruition. In such “standing in” (*Innestehen*)³⁴⁴ or “jumping in” (*Einspringen*) for the there, proper creation makes way or paves the way (“macht sich zu der Bahn”) for its transition from possibly open to actually open. Unlike in the commonplace experience of production, wherein the work is thought to function as a platform for the spiritual/mental ordeal (*erleben*) of the artist, the proper experience of creation suffers (*erlittert*) the fulfillment of an other – it offers itself up as a support that bears (*erträgt*) the opening of the there and holds up (*aushält*) under it.³⁴⁵ It is only in light of this elucidation that the dramatic characterization of the intention of the artist as a “passageway that annihilates itself in creation”³⁴⁶ (which appears in the early pages of every

³⁴⁴ M, 48.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ HS, 6 | M, 20 | H, 26.

version) finally acquires its full relief. Paradoxically, in bracing – in embracing – the possibility of the openness of the there, *Dasein* as the most profound archi-spatiality of experience as being there for the first time determines itself (*sich bestimmt*)³⁴⁷ as the proper spatiality of the particular experience of the work of art. The second version for the first time acknowledges this particularization to be indispensable to the actualization of the openness of the there through creation: “Creating happens only in the seclusion of the singular individual.”³⁴⁸ The seclusion that the second version speaks of at this juncture is a self-definition that is part and parcel of actualization as manifestation of a commitment, so to speak, to its own possibility. In the case of the particularization of the archi-spatiality of *Dasein* as the most profound possibility of being there, self-determination or seclusion signifies the fulfillment of one particular aspect of such possibility, namely, proper spatiality as the experience of the work of art. Thus, when the texts speak of the annihilation of the intention of the artist in proper creation, they are referring neither to the erasure of the proper spatiality of the experience of the work of art nor that of the archi-spatiality of *Dasein* as the deeper ground of such experience; rather, they are drawing a sharp distinction between commonplace production, wherein the artist tolerates the work as a mere conduit or “duct” for his/her flight from interiority, and proper creation, wherein it is the artist that lays him- or herself down as a bridge for the crossing of the there from the possibility of its openness over to its actuality. The only dross that is burnt up in creation as such self-abasement, so to speak, is the artificial limitation of the possibility of creation – of the experience of the artist – simply and only to the imposition of a given idea upon a given material. Such exercise may indeed fulfill a certain capacity within the artist, yet it is thoroughly incapable of expanding such a capacity by drawing the artist ever further back – by way of proper τέχνη as a capacity for

³⁴⁷ M, 48.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.: “Das Schaffen geschieht nur in der Einsamkeit der einzelnen Einzigen.”

knowledge – to his or her most profound capacity for being there as a relation to being. The proper spatiality of the experience of the artist as prostration (προσκύνησις) is the only gesture proportionate to the gesture of elevation that pervades the proper spatiality of the work of art through and through.

What of the proper alternative to the commonplace spatiality of the experience of the work of art as consumption? Indeed, the second version identifies the proper correlate of creation as knowledge: “Therefore, the grounding relationship is not one of consumption, not one of excitement, but rather one of *knowledge* of this truth set-to-work in the work in all of its relations.”³⁴⁹ In what does the proper spatiality of the experience of the work of art as knowledge consist? It has been made sufficiently clear in §1.a.α and especially §1.a.γ above, that such cannot be reduced simply and only to an appropriation of the work of art by experience as its object (*Gegenstand*). Yet if knowledge is to be interpreted neither as connoisseurship (the storage of a certain number of facts in a certain archive) nor as some kind of a transmutation of the work into the medium of thought (specifically by way of the mind’s intrusion into the work’s “interiority” and its evacuation of some “idea” contained therein, or a “taking in of its characteristics,”³⁵⁰ an appropriation of its properties – an example the third version provides), what means for the articulation of knowledge remain at the text’s disposal? The second version already contains a brief estimation of the challenge and significance of such a task: “However, what we are dealing with here are not at all “theories” about the art, but rather right knowledge of the work of art. Only where a people define/determine such a knowledge, are they strong enough to bear art and to deny themselves the appearance of art. Where, however, such a

³⁴⁹ M, 50: “Deshalb ist das Grundverhältnis nicht ein Genuß, nicht eine Erhitzung, sondern ein *Wissen* dieser ins Werk gesetzten Wahrheit in allen ihren Bezügen.”

³⁵⁰ H, 7: “Wir nehmen so seine Merkmale zur Kenntnis.”

genuine knowledge is held back and misguided through a knowledge of appearance, there it can...never [give] a clear and grounded scope of decision regarding the possibility and necessity of art.”³⁵¹ In the few remaining pages, however, the second version adds little to this initial foray, with the exception of its closing phrase: “This knowing or not-knowing decides, together *with* itself, *who we are*.”³⁵² Thus, at very least, already in the second version it is possible to speak of this knowing as a kind of relation that enfolds some notion of decision and is therein constitutive of the very identity of the knower. As the third version makes clear, the constitution of such an identity is precisely what is at stake in the proper understanding of knowing as a particular kind of behavior or comportment (*Verhalten*) towards the beingly (*zum Seienden*).³⁵³

The third version returns to the problematic of the potential violence (*Gewaltsamkeit*) of thinking (*Denken*), and while repudiating its historic complicity in such violence, it provisionally retains the term and calls for thinking to “become more thoughtful.”³⁵⁴ However, while preserving the possibility of non-violent, amplified thinking, the third version nevertheless christens it with the new name of attunement (*Stimmung*), both in order to distinguish it from commonplace thinking and to hint at its proper spatiality: “...perhaps that which we here and in similar cases call feeling or attunement, is more reasonable, that is to say, perceptive, because more open to being than all reason, which, turned in the meantime into *ratio*, would be misinterpreted as rational.”³⁵⁵ At the heart of this attempt at the redemption of thinking lies the

³⁵¹ M, 52: “Allein es handelt sich hier ganz und gar nicht um « Theorien » über die Kunst, sondern um das *rechte Wissen vom Kunstwerk*. Nur wo ein solches Wissen ein Volk bestimmt, ist es stark genug, eine Kunst zu ertragen und dem Schein von Kunst sich zu versagen. Wo aber ein echtes Wissen durch ein Scheinwissen hintangehalten und mißleitet wird, da kann es...niemals einen klaren und begründeten Entscheidungsraum über die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer Kunst [geben].”

³⁵² M, 54: “Dieses Wissen oder Nichtwissen entscheidet *mit* darüber, *wer wir sind*.”

³⁵³ H, 47

³⁵⁴ H, 9: “statt sich darum zu mühen, daß das Denken denkender werde.”

³⁵⁵ Ibid.: “Vielleicht ist jedoch das, was wir hier und in ähnlichen Fällen Gefühl oder Stimmung nennen, vernünftiger, nämlich vernehmender, weil dem Sein offener als alle Vernunft, die, inzwischen zur *ratio* geworden,

vast difference between, on the one hand, *ratio* as imposition of measure and, on the other, *ratio* as openness to measure – and in the specific case of the work of art, as the third version finally acknowledges in an explicit manner, to the world as the “opening of the right” (*Öffnen das Rechte*) as a guiding measure (*weisendes Maß*).³⁵⁶ As the first version already points out, the work of art is here seen as “the right measure of beings and un-beings”³⁵⁷ (presumably including itself as well as being-there) or a means for such measurement. In the former case, thinking as a measure imposes itself on the other and seeks to render it commensurate with itself; in the latter, thinking opens itself up to being measured by the other and aspires to measure up to it. The proper spatiality of such thinking – of the experience of the work as knowledge – begins with the preservation of a field (*Feld*) in which the work might show itself without mediation.³⁵⁸ In this particular case, such preservation specifically entails a bracketing of the interposition (*zwischenstellen*) of the measure of thinking – of the preconception (*Vorgriff*)³⁵⁹ – between itself and the work. In lieu of such interposition, attunement calls for a broadening of the measure of thinking out into the farthest reaches of the proper dimensionality of the work – into the field of its world – by giving itself over to its measure.³⁶⁰ Such an expansion of of thinking – as opposed to its encroachment (*übergreifen*) – suspends its interference with the self-sufficient operation of the work in its manifestation. Yet, as the third version points out, the “giving over” of thinking to the work is the opposite of “giving up” on the work – “the opposite of that indifference which turns its back to beings.”³⁶¹ Deference to the self-sufficiency of the work does not entail “leaving

rational mißdeutet wurde.”

³⁵⁶ H, 30.

³⁵⁷ HS, 15: “...das eigenste Wesen des Werkseins, daß es nie am jeweils Vorhandenen und vermeintlich eigentlich Wirklichen gemessen werden kann, sondern selbst das Richtmaß des Seienden und Unseienden ist.”

³⁵⁸ H, 10.

³⁵⁹ H, 16.

³⁶⁰ H, 10.

³⁶¹ H, 16: “...das Gegenteil darstellt von jener Gleichgültigkeit, die dem Seienden...den Rücken kehrt.”

it alone” or “leaving it to itself,” but rather letting it operate by itself, letting it exercise its proper capacity. It is only within this kind of setup that the work may entrust itself to thinking, rather than being wrested out of itself by force.³⁶²

A full thirty pages later, the third version returns to the question of the precise nature of knowing as a behavior or comportment towards the beingly. Initially, this behavior is considered in terms of seeing in the broadest sense of perceiving (*vernehmen*); however, in Greek thought (according to the third version), such perceiving is no neutral observation, but rather a bringing – a “wringing” – of the beingly out of its hideness and into its visibility.³⁶³ The third version’s emendation of such bringing consists in recasting it as a letting (*lassen*) – as participating in the greater bringing-forth which allows the being to come forth into its presence in accordance with its proper “sight.”³⁶⁴ The mature formulation of this adjustment reads as follows: “we can characterize creating as the letting-go-forth into a brought-forth.”³⁶⁵ Indeed, creating as knowing here emerges as a kind of participation in φύσις³⁶⁶ – yet not as its producer, but rather as its observer, who performs the act of creating only as a bonafide act of serving in the delivery of the nothing within being, and of being – within beings. Indeed, such creating stems from “first being brought into relation with nature,” with φύσις.³⁶⁷ Such enraccination of τέχνη within φύσις is exemplified in Albrecht Dürer’s remark regarding the nature of art: “For, truly, art inheres in nature, and whoever can draw it out, has it.”³⁶⁸ The line drawn on a drawing board with a drawing implement is thus simultaneously a rip (*Riß*) in the indefinite space of the page and a

³⁶² H, 17.

³⁶³ H, 47.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.: “...in jenem Her-vor-bringen geschieht, das im vorhinein das Seiende von seinem Aussehen her in sein Anwesen vor-kommen läßt.”

³⁶⁵ H, 48: “können wir das Schaffen als das Hervorgehenlassen in ein Hervorgebrachtes kennzeichnen.”

³⁶⁶ H, 47: “Dies alles geschieht jedoch inmitten des eigenwüchsig aufgehenden Seienden, der φύσις.”

³⁶⁷ H, 58.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.: »Denn wahrhaftig steckt die Kunst in der Natur, wer sie heraus kann reißen, der hat sie.«

limit (*Grenze*) of the form that emerges onto the page precisely through this rip. Such a line epitomizes the strife (or intimacy) of measure and im-measure³⁶⁹ inherent within nature itself and in so doing brings such strife into the open: thus, τέχνη reveals the most fundamental, hidden law of φύσις. Supposing that “there are no lines in nature,” as Edouard Manet has put it³⁷⁰ – or, rather, that they are invisible – the lines in art make such absent lines present, make the invisible lines visible. In this way, artistic creation comes to be understood as natural creation made manifest. And yet artistic creation, as the very capacity for bringing into the open – for revelation, is itself set within nature³⁷¹; however, this is no impediment, but precisely the reason why art can be the *par excellence* phenomenon of nature – art as nature showing itself from itself.

Thus it becomes clear that the role of the artist in such a scenario is rather that of a servant. Admittedly, the third version itself does not employ the language of service; however, insofar as at the core of the activity of service lies in a certain degree of self-constraint, such language appears optimally suited for describing the behavior or comportment the artist might assume in relation to the quintessentially creative ground of φύσις, that of its usher. Such service is self-evident in the work insofar as “such a work is, rather than is not.”³⁷² Its simple “factum est” is, in fact, more than sufficient testimony to the fact that truth, as the turn from nothing to something, did, in fact, take place.³⁷³ Such is the createdness of the work at its most salient: “this thrust, this “that” (*dieser Stoß, dieses »Daß«*)³⁷⁴ is the ultimate evidence of the possibility

³⁶⁹ H, 58.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Ibid.: “Gewiß steckt in der Natur ein Riß, Maß und Grenze und ein daran gebundenes Hervorbringenkönnen, die Kunst. Aber ebenso gewiß ist, daß diese Kunst in der Natur erst durch das Werk offenbar wird, weil sie ursprünglich im Werk steckt.

³⁷² H, 53: “...daß solches Werk *ist*, und nicht vielmehr nicht ist.”

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

actualized within it. Finally, what sets the “that” of the work apart from the “that” of other beings (such as tools), is that the very fact of its existence is unusual (*ungewöhnlich*) and singular (*einzig*) in itself.³⁷⁵ Indeed, it is truly unique: “The arrangement of truth into the work is the bringing-forth of such a being, that, prior to that, *was* not yet, and will nevermore *become* again.”³⁷⁶ And again, several pages later: “truth is present only as it arranges itself within *a* being.”³⁷⁷

The thrust of the work is precisely the trait in virtue of which the work is capable of pushing human beings out of the usual and thrusting them into the unusual – of rapturing them out of usual relations and transporting them into proper relations.³⁷⁸ Indeed, the third version clearly speaks of creation as preservation (*Bewahrung*)³⁷⁹ – a translation that is, despite its morphological incongruity, a most accurate reflection of what the term *Bewahrung* denotes. The service of preservation consists precisely in the behavior or comportment (*Verhaltenheit*) of self-restraint, a slowing of oneself down in a kind of tarrying (*verweilen*) within the happening of the truth so as to let truth pass and to witness its passing.³⁸⁰ Thus the third version comes full circle

³⁷⁵ H, 53.

³⁷⁶ H, 50: “Die Einrichtung der Wahrheit ins Werk ist das Hervorbringen eines solchen Seienden, das vordem noch nicht war und nachmals nie mehr werden wird.”

³⁷⁷ H, 57: “...Wahrheit nur west, indem sie sich in *ein* Seiendes einrichtet,” italics mine.

³⁷⁸ H, 54: “...rückt es uns in diese Offenheit ein und so zugleich aus dem Gewöhnlichen heraus.”

Insofar as Heidegger considers ‘rapture’ to be a distinctive capability of the work, his conception constitutes an alternative to ‘rapture’ interpreted (by Clive Bell, among others) as the ‘transporting character of aesthetic feeling’ : “Bell, indeed, regards the transporting character of aesthetic feeling as akin to religious ecstasy – but without explaining *how* this is possible.” (Cited in Paul Crowther, “Heidegger and the Question of Aesthetics,” *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 19, no. 1 (1988) : 41.) We would be remiss, furthermore, not to point out the powerful Nietzschean overtone of the notion of rapture, given Heidegger’s extensive engagement of Nietzsche during the period of the composition of “The Origin of the Work of Art.” James Magrini points out this parallel as follows : “The scintillating transfiguration of existence occurs when artist and spectator are attuned within the aesthetic mood (*Stimmung*) of *Rausch*, or, as David Krell translates this term, the ‘attunement of rapture.’ This is the intoxicated ‘feeling of plenitude and enhancement of force,’⁴⁷ which influences and determines one’s stance to Being as a whole. *Rausch* awakens the capacity in beings to extend, or project, their Being out beyond itself in transcendence, experiencing a ‘relation to Being in which beings themselves are experienced as being made more full in Being, richer, more perspicuous, more essential.” (James Magrini, “Truth, Art, and the ‘New Sensuousness’ : Understanding Heidegger’s Metaphysical Reading of Nietzsche,” *Kritike* 3, no. 1 (2009) : 48.) Many of these themes strongly resonate with Heidegger’s vision of art as ‘rapture,’ with the exception of that of ‘intoxicated feeling.’

³⁷⁹ H, 54

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

to defining the experience of the work of art as knowing in the sense of the service of preservation, of rendering truth the service of letting it in. However, astonishingly, the service of opening the door to truth, so to speak, is not done simply for the sake of letting it in, but – what is more – for the sake of the truth letting such a servant out: thus, the work “first only waits upon those that preserve and whose turn into its truth it anticipates and affirms.”³⁸¹ The “turn into the truth” through the turning of the door of the work is the reward for such rendered service in itself. Thus, the experience of the work of art as a letting-in and being-let-out constitutes the ultimate triumph of this way of thinking about the work over the commonplace spatiality of the experience of the work of art as production and consumption (examined in detail in §1.a.α). The proper spatiality of the experience of the work of art as knowing – that is, of preserving – “does not take the work out of its standing-in-itself, does not wrench it into the realm of mere experience and does not degrade the work to the role of a stimulus of experience.”³⁸² On the contrary, the proper spatiality of the experience of the work of art as knowing – as perceiving or having-seen (*gesehen-haben*) – is precisely that of being-decided (*Entschiedensein*) to let oneself be decided by something other than the self, namely, by the happening of truth itself.

At this juncture in the articulation of the proper spatiality of the experience of the work of art, the present study suddenly finds itself at a much lower rung of spatiality than expected – it is as if the spiral staircase itself has collapsed into a series of concentric circles, and, in speaking of proper spatiality, the study has inadvertently touched upon the proto-spatiality of humanity and the archi-spatiality of being-there itself. Clearly, speaking of the proper spatiality of the experience of the work of art has turned out to be impossible without reference to its deepest

³⁸¹ H, 54: “...es auf die Bewahrenden erst nur wartet und deren Einkehr in seine Wahrheit erwirbt und erharrt.”

³⁸² H, 55: “nimmt das Werk nicht aus seinem Insichstehen heraus, zerrt es nicht in den Umkreis des bloßen Erlebens und setzt das Werk nicht herab in die Rolle eines Erlebniserregers.”

root, insofar as in properly experiencing the work of art, one must necessarily experience the root of all such experience – namely, the experience of being by being-there. The *Addendum* to the third version speaks of this in no uncertain terms: “the setting fast or “fastening” of the truth [within the work of art] is a “working” and “willing” which was characterized on page 55 of the preceding treatise as the “ecstatic self-letting of the existing human being into the unconcealedness of being.”³⁸³

Nevertheless, the present study must now make an artificial break and reserve the discussion of the transition from knowing (*Wissen*) to willing (*Wollen*) to corresponding sections on the proto-spatiality of humanity and the archi-spatiality of being-there, §1.c-e).

ε) Recapitulation

From its initial to its final version, the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* suite is consistent in taking the commonplace spatiality of the work of art (its “place and space” (“Ort und Raum”)³⁸⁴) as a foil for the articulation of its proper spatiality (its “proper place and space” (“ihr[e] eigentlich[e] Ort und Raum”) or, in the second version, its “ownmost space” (“eigenster Raum”), and, in the final version, its “proper essential space” (*eigentlicher Wesensraum*).³⁸⁵ The vocabulary of proper (*eigentlich*) and space (*Raum*) thus remains one of the major means by which the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* articulates the essence of the work of art as relationality throughout the entire suite and establishes the baseline for the gauging of something like the relationship between space (*Raum*) and realm (*Bereich*), among other things. Indeed, the final version plainly speaks of the workhood of the work as a the spatializing of spatiality”: “Insofar as a work is work, it

³⁸³ H, 71: “...ein »Wirken« und »Wollen«, das in der vorliegenden Abhandlung S. 55 als das »ekstatische Sicheinlassen des existierenden Menschen in die Unverborgenheit des Seins«.”

³⁸⁴ HS, 7.

³⁸⁵ HS, 7 | M, 25 | H, 26.

spatializes that spatiality.”³⁸⁶ Indeed, as late as in the 1960 Reclam-Ausgabe, the footnote indexed to the expression “the space for the work” (“dem Werk den Raum”) contains a brief, but poignant remark – “place of dwelling” (“*Ortschaft des Aufenthaltes*”).³⁸⁷ Thus, having articulated the distinction between commonplace spatiality and proper spatiality, the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* is able to render the essence of the work of art in explicitly spatial terms without danger of being grossly misunderstood.

However, in light of this conclusion, it also becomes evident that the question regarding the spatiality of the work extends well beyond the mere binary of whether or not it is spatial (with the appropriate response being “yes, and in many senses”) to the matter of the origin of such spatiality, namely the proto-spatiality of art, the archi-spatiality of being, and ultimately, the im-proper spatiality of the nothing. To review, in the first version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, it is the work itself that “creates, by itself [and] for the first time, the space [*Raum*] which it pervades,” and, equally, that it “for the first time defines the place [*Ort*] for itself...”³⁸⁸ In contrast, the third version makes the clarification that while the proper sphere/domain (*Bereich*) of the work is, indeed, “opened *through* it itself,”³⁸⁹ it does not ultimately originate from within the work, but is rather something to which the work stands in relation (*Bezug*), to which it belongs (*gehört*) even as it hosts it.³⁹⁰ Indeed, the strife of the world and the earth ultimately belongs within the greatest possible strife – that between being (*Sein*) and nothing (*das Nichts*) (and perhaps even within the nothing itself), and can only be authentically glimpsed from this perspective. The third version confirms: “...the work is the enstrifing of that strife in which the

³⁸⁶ H, 31: “Indem ein Werk Werk ist, räumt es jene Geräumigkeit ein.”

³⁸⁷ H, 66, Footnote “a.”

³⁸⁸ HS, 10: “...schafft es selbst erst den Raum, den es durchherrscht, bestimmt es selbst erst den Ort, an dem es zur Errichtung kommt.” | M, 30 | H, 27.

³⁸⁹ H, 27: “Das Werk gehört als Werk einzig in den Bereich, der durch es selbst eröffnet wird.”

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

unconcealedness of beings as a whole, the truth, is enstrifed.”³⁹¹ And again, on the following page: “The picture...manifest[s] not only what this single being is as it is, if it manifests [it] at all, but rather it allows unconcealedness as such to happen in relation to the being as a whole.”³⁹² It is important to emphasize that this clarification only explicates a dynamic that was already in place in the earliest version. Nevertheless, such an evident adjustment provides this study with a sound textual basis for expanding the question of the spatiality of the work well beyond the work of art as such – and for attempting to articulate this beyond in terms of the respective spatialities of art, being, and ultimately, the nothing.

c) The Proto-Spatiality of Art and of the Experience of Historical Humanity

α) Art

The question of the distinctive spatiality of art in general (*Kunst*) is one which the present study approaches with great trepidation; after all, the starting point of any plausible answer to this question must inevitably be the following estimation of the accomplishment of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* in this regard from the *Addendum* to the third version: “What art might be, is one of those questions to which no answers are given in the treatise. What gives the impression of such are directions for questioning.”³⁹³ The first of such directions is the reforging of the bond between art and truth (*Wahrheit*), out of which the essence of art is proposed to be thought. Such a bond is no mere equivalence that would render truth as the essence of art, and art – as its mere

³⁹¹ H, 42: “...ist das Werk die Bestreitung jenes Streites, in dem die Unverborgenheit des Seienden im Ganzen, die Wahrheit, erstritten wird.”

³⁹² H, 43: “Das Bild, das die Bauernschuhe zeigt, das Gedicht, das den römischen Brunnen sagt, bekunden nicht nur, was dieses vereinzelt Seiende als dieses sei, falls sie je bekunden, sondern sie lassen Unverborgenheit als solche im Bezug auf das Seiende im Ganzen geschehen.”

³⁹³ H, 73: “Was die Kunst sei, ist eine jener Fragen, auf die in der Abhandlung keine Antworten gegeben sind. Was den Anschein von solchen bietet, sind Weisungen für das Fragen.”

appearance. To be sure, art is “a way in which truth happens,”³⁹⁴ but it is only one such way, and thus its essence cannot be reduced to the happening of truth in general. Rather, its essence – and, by extension, its distinctive spatiality – must be sought in the specificity of this singular way, the pursuit of which the present study now takes up. Indeed, despite its unpromising start, the first prospect that opens up along this path is the definition of art as “the setting-itself-to-work of the truth of beings” (“*das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit des Seienden*”)³⁹⁵ with its distinguishing feature of setting-to-work; in a manner to be considered in the following paragraphs, this feature yokes the essence of art with actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) and thinghood (*Dinghafte*). A comparison of the three versions opens up a second prospect: the progressive elaboration of the essence of art as poetry (*Dichtung*). And thus the question is posed anew: What does the distinctive spatiality of setting-to-work and of poetry consist in?

The second version insists that the happening of truth within the work is not the happening of truth in its generic form, but rather the happening of truth in one of its particular ways – that of art (*Kunst*).³⁹⁶ It is easy to see how close this definition of art comes to that cited by Hegel and used as a point of reference in the closing pages of the third version: “For us, art no longer counts as the highest way in which truth creates itself into existence.”³⁹⁷ “Creating itself into existence” is a phrase which refers precisely to the change of truth from potentiality to actuality – a change that is in itself a happening insofar as it is understood as transition or motion from one into the other. With regard to this particular way, then, one may properly speak of art as setting the happening of truth into motion, even if the same cannot be said of all of the ways in

³⁹⁴ HS, 21-22 | M, 34, 36, 38, 42, 44 | H, 42.

³⁹⁵ HS, 17, 21 | M, 36, 38, 44 | H, 21-22, 25, 44, 49, 59, 62-63, 65

³⁹⁶ M, 34.

³⁹⁷ H, 68: “»Uns gilt die Kunst nicht mehr als die höchste Weise, in welcher die Wahrheit sich Existenz verschafft«.”

which truth happens. Indeed, the third version for the very first time explicitly warrants such an interpretation of the expression *Ins-Werk-Setzen*: “setting-to-work at the same time means the bringing of work-being into “going” and happening.”³⁹⁸ What, however, is the precise significance of the expression set in motion in this particular context? The happening of truth begins with the opening of the there, but what does the opening of the there begin with? The opening of the there begins with the possibility of the there itself, or, to be even more precise, with the possibility of this possibility of the there being actualized through its undertaking by a people (“die Möglichkeit, dieses Da zu sein”).³⁹⁹ Thus, when the second version speaks of art as setting the happening of truth into motion, it is referring to art as establishing the beginning of the opening of the there in the specific sense of establishing its possibility (*Möglichkeit*). This notion gains resolution as it reappears just one page after its initial mention: here, the second version employs the term “pre-draft” (*Vorauswurf*) precisely with regard to a preparation “for that which the there is”⁴⁰⁰ – that is, preparation as the establishment of the universal (*allgemeine*) possibility that the there might become, might become open, might become particular, unique, singular (*einziges*).⁴⁰¹ Insofar as the notion of possibility also contains the notion of power, in this case, it is most helpfully understood as that which enables motion – as a capacity which sets motion proper in motion.

But what does it mean to say that the essence of art is the very possibility of the opening of the there? As one might plausibly gather from the example of the Greek temple, the essence of art epitomizes the paradox of disclosure (*Unverschließung*) by means of enclosure (*Umschließung*) – the astounding possibility of rendering three-dimensional volume in terms of

³⁹⁸ H, 59: “Ins-Werk-Setzen heißt aber zugleich: in Gang- und ins Geschehen-Bringen des Werkseins.”

³⁹⁹ M, 36.

⁴⁰⁰ M, 40: “...dem der das Da ist”

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

two-dimensional shape, of infinite distance – in terms of a horizon line, of an abyss – in terms of the shallowest possible surface area entirely filled in with dark color. The true miracle of art as reduction – of three dimensions to two, of infinity to absolute limit, of profundity to surface – is that it is precisely this concentrated form that renders the inner workings of the perception of volume, infinity, and profundity intelligible. According to the reasoning of the third version, the im-measurable is, in fact, fundamentally incommensurate with experience; thus, in order for experience to glimpse something of such immeasurability, the latter must condescend to measure (*Maß*), and this is precisely the juncture at which art comes in. Insofar as the happening of truth as the opening of the there is, in fact, tantamount to the inauguration and/or restoration of the relation between the nothing and human being, such a happening must entail a kind of reconciliation between the immeasurability of the former and the measurability of the latter, and art as the possibility of such a conversion thus finds its proper place at the very heart of the happening of truth.

The essence of art as circumscription (*Umriß*) is its very capacity to divide and unite in the self-same stroke – for such a stroke to constitute the contour of one thing precisely while countering another. While rendering the invisible visible, art also renders the visible itself more visible – as quintessential mark, it renders the visible remarkable, that is, capable of making a mark upon its viewer. The essence of art is the very possibility of such a mark – a possibility which comes to be actualized by an artist and which actualizes truth even as the coming of something out of nothing. Such remarkability is far from that of a “signature style” of a given artist,⁴⁰² but rather that of the mark itself as testimony to the fact that it stands as one particular instance of art’s possibility actualized. Such remarkability of the work is also said to be its

⁴⁰² H, 52: “...meint nicht, am Werk soll merklich werden, daß es von einem großen Künstler gemacht sei.”

appropriation-hood (*das Ereignishafte*), a term used for the very first time in the third version: within the work, the possibility of art as quintessential mark is fulfilled, and therewith – the possibility of being (and perhaps of the nothing) to become mark so as to make its mark upon beings, including being-there.

The foregoing investigation has discovered that within the first version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, the question of the “where” of the work must inevitably flow in and out of the question of its “what” – the question of its essence: “The” art? Where and how is it? Does “the” art, then, exist sometime and somewhere in itself? Yet before we ask whether and how “the” art may be, it is necessary to clarify *what* it might then be.”⁴⁰³ In fact, for the work of art as conceived in the first version, the two questions are virtually inextricable: the answer to the question of the “where” of the work simultaneously provides the answer to the question of its “what” – the spatiality of the work of art here emerges as its very essence. At this juncture, however, the proper spatiality of the work of art and of its experience must be carefully distinguished from what might be called the proto-spatiality of art and of specifically human experience. The following passage from the second version is indispensable in discerning and bringing out this vital difference: “...the proto-spring is that very ground which makes possible and necessitates the essence of the work. This ground is evidently something other than that which is grounded in it. Hence it is necessary to first of all find this “other” – that, to which the work as work belongs. Therefore we ask: *what is at work in the work itself, but at the same time beyond it?*”⁴⁰⁴ The third version opens with a definition of origin, or proto-spring (*Ursprung*) as

⁴⁰³ HS, 16: “Die” Kunst? Wo und wie ist sie? Besteht denn “die” Kunst irgendwann und -wo an sich? Doch bevor wir fragen, ob und wie “die” Kunst sei, gilt es zu klären, *was* sie denn sei.”

⁴⁰⁴ M, 34: “ist der Ursprung derjenige Grund, der das Wesen des Werkes ermöglicht und ernötigt. Dieser Grund ist offenbar etwas anderes als das in ihm Gegründete. Daher gilt es, zunächst dieses Andere aufzusuchen, jenes, wohin das Werk als Werk gehört. Wir fragen deshalb: *was ist im Werk selbst aber zugleich über es hinaus am Werke?*”

“that wherefrom and whereby a thing is what it is and how it is.”⁴⁰⁵ With remarkable concision, this definition capitalizes upon the cardinal insight of the second version – namely, the fact that the proto-spring of the work of art may not be identified simply with its essence or possibility – i. e. with art – but rather lies beneath and precedes such essence or possibility as its condition. If the work of art corresponds to the how, and art itself – to the what, neither one of them may be identified as the proto-spring. Indeed, when the question of the proto-spring (*Ursprung*) of art returns some forty-four pages later, the third version once again defines the proto-spring as the provenance (*Herkunft*) of the essence, not the essence itself.⁴⁰⁶ Another fifteen pages later, despite valiant efforts to pin down the essence of art, the third version still wonders: “But what is art itself, such that we rightfully call it a *proto-spring (Ursprung)*?”⁴⁰⁷ As the present study will attempt to demonstrate in subsequent sections, this persistent difficulty points to the fact that the proto-spring must ultimately be sought on a deeper level – at very least on the level of being (*Sein*), but precisely therein – on the deepest level of the most radical kind of change, that from nothing to something, from the nothing (*das Nichts*) to being (*Sein*). Thus, the miracle of the proto-spring transcends even that of the ontological difference – it is part and parcel of the miracle of miracles of there being “something rather than nothing.” In time, the third version will come to the self-same conclusion; however, for the time being, it conflates the “what” and the “how” under the category of essence, identifies such essence with the *work* of art rather than with art in general, and provisionally designates *art* in general as the condition of the possibility of the work – as the proto-spring. Thus it speaks of art (*Kunst*) as that “third which is indeed the

⁴⁰⁵ H, 1: “Ursprung^b bedeutet hier jenes, von woher und wodurch eine Sache ist, was sie ist und wie sie ist.”

⁴⁰⁶ H, 44: “Der Ursprung ist die Herkunft des Wesens...”

⁴⁰⁷ H, 59: “Was aber ist die Kunst selbst, daß wir sie mit Recht einen Ursprung nennen?”

first,⁴⁰⁸ “wherefrom and whereby” both works of art and artists derive their essence. As the third version quickly observes, however, if art is itself an essence, “how can [it] be a proto-spring at all?”; for as an essence, it requires a “wherefrom and whereby.”⁴⁰⁹ This caveat notwithstanding, the third version provisionally accepts art as the proto-spring of artists and works of art and attempts to explicate it as the proto-spatiality that determines (*bestimmt*) and delimits or circumscribes (*umgrenzt*) the proper spatiality of the work and the artist.

Before delving into the nuances of such proto-spatiality, however, let us briefly address the basis for selecting the prefix *proto-* as a hallmark for the range of its constituent elements and dynamics. Its increased level of abstraction notwithstanding, this scale of spatiality, in fact, draws its character specifically from the contrast between two models of ground – that of *Ursache* and that of *Ursprung* – both of which feature the prefix *ur-*, signaling their shared participation in the category of ground broadly construed. The default English translation for the prefix *ur-* is, indeed, that of *proto-*; thus, for purposes of referring to a conceptual range structured around the contrast of two notions equally marked by the prefix *ur-*, the term proto-spatiality appears most apropos. What is more, insofar as it also connotes something obtaining “in advance” of something else, it strongly resonates with an entire constellation of terms which come into play at this particular juncture and that consistently employ prefixes such as *vor-* and

⁴⁰⁸ H, 1: “...ein Drittes, das wohl das erste ist...”

⁴⁰⁹ H, 1-2: “Aber kann denn die Kunst überhaupt ein Ursprung sein? Wo und wie gibt es die Kunst?”

It seems that part of the challenge of distinguishing between essence (*Wesen*) and proto-spring (*Ursprung*) here stems from the interpretation of essence that Heidegger outlines in his course *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Sommersemester 1930), in §1.c.12: “Zur Wesenserhellung gehört ein Dreifaches: 1. Wassein, was [etwas] als solche[s] ist. 2. Wie dieses Wassein in sich möglich ist. 3. Wo der Grund dieser Möglichkeit liegt.” The “circle” here appears to result from a kind of folding back of “the ground of the possibility of the essence” into the essence itself. (Martin Heidegger. Gesamtausgabe, II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923-1944, Band 31, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Mein, 2., durchgesehene Auflage 1994, herausgegeben von Hartmut Tietjen, 12).

voraus- (including *vorprägen*, *vorauswerfen*, *Vorauswurf*).⁴¹⁰ The second legitimate option for translating and employing the prefix *ur-* in the designation of this scale of spatiality will have been the prefix *archi-*. However, given that the scale of proto-spatiality is itself rooted in a still more profound scale (that of being and being-there), it was deemed necessary to reserve the prefix *archi-* for the latter and employ the prefix *proto-* in order to carve out a meaningful space of difference between the proper spatiality of the work of art and the proto-spatiality of art as such. Incidentally, one of the passages in which the insistence on making and preserving this space of difference – both conceptually and terminologically – finds support is the discussion of the narrower and broader sense of poetry in the latter half of the second version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, the outcome of which is precisely a distinction between “proper ways” (*eigene Wege*) of art and art as such, between its narrower and broader senses – corresponding, respectively, to proper spatiality and proto-spatiality. Admittedly, for reason of the latter constituting the ground of the former, the space of difference between them is frequently difficult to maintain, and the foregoing analysis will attempt to signal the blurring of their conceptual boundaries when such is observed.

Thus, as briefly intimated in §1.b.β above, the proto-spatiality of art as possibility entails an impulse (or *propulsion*) towards change in the sense of transition from power to act. Thus, the second version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* for the very first time – and twice in the same paragraph – explicitly speaks of art (and not just the work, as in the first version)⁴¹¹ as that in which truth as un-concealment becomes (*wird*): “Art is a *becoming* of truth.”⁴¹² In concert with its thoroughgoing critique of representational models of the work of art, the second version

⁴¹⁰ M, 40.

⁴¹¹ HS, 17.

⁴¹² M, 38: “In der Kunst *wird* erst Wahrheit” and “...die Kunst ist ein *Werden* der Wahrheit,” italics Heidegger’s.

reiterates that, as such becoming, art is no more representational than are its works. Where the first version already rejects the notion that a work of art corresponds to and represents “a” truth, which is previously extant somewhere apart from the work (as discussed in §1.b.γ), the second version goes even further to say that truth as such precisely “is” (“ist”) not extant/at hand somewhere (*irgendwo vorhanden*), but rather acquires its very is-ness in art for the very first time – it becomes in the specific sense of comes to be, not in the sense of merely being changed from one state into another. Truth cannot be said to be extant/at hand somewhere apart from art for the very reason that, apart from art, it is not at all, it does not exist. Indeed, the second version insists that truth “can *never* be “read off” of that which is already extant/at hand.”⁴¹³ How might coming to be be understood in terms of spatiality? As a vehicle of this fundamental kind of change, art does not represent (*darstellen*), but rather posits (*stellt*) – it is position *par excellence*. This insight suddenly renders visible the underlying affinity of the cardinal traits of the work – *Herstellung* and *Aufstellung* as most natural outworkings of *Stellung* proper. Thus, in speaking of art, the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, in fact, delves into a most profound kind of question – that of the nature of something like position in general or proto-position, that is to say, the nature of transition from potentiality to actuality, from essence to existence. What is more, following the hint discovered in the discussion of phenomenality in §1.b.β above, one must not overlook the fact that such proto-position, so to speak, is not limited to these two kinds of change, but also enfoldes the notion of reformation (hence the image of the shaking-up and way-laying of the extant, discussed at length in §1.b.γ). It is of utmost importance to underscore that this latter modality of position cannot be accurately conceived without direct reference to the first two modalities, insofar as it pertains to a certain kind of restoration (*Wiederherstellung*) to an original

⁴¹³ M, 38: “Aus dem schon Vorhandenen wird die *Wahrheit niemals* abgelesen.”

position – not the transposition of a given being into an substantially different kind of being, but rather its recomposure according to the full extent and measure of its own greatest possibility. (Although it must also be acknowledged that, in the same breath, both the first and the second versions speak of the negative extreme of position as reformation – that of deposition as deformation: thus, in its being shaken-up (*erschüttert*) by art’s setting the happening of truth into motion, the former (*das Bisherige*) is confronted with the prospect of “turning into unbeing” (*zum Unseienden werden*) – that is, the prospect of unbecoming, coming out of being, going out of existence.⁴¹⁴ Whatever the ultimate reconciliation of these notions of position (including that of *deposition*) turns out to be, it is sufficiently clear even at this stage of examination that position *par excellence*, or proto-position, is not simply an opaque constation of the fact that something that was not there before *is* now there (*Dasein*), but is rather replete with inner workings that come to light by way of a core metaphor that emerges in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*’ search for a glimpse of its nature – that of the *Ursprung*, to which our inquiry now turns.

The claim that spatiality constitutes the essence of the work of art signifies, in part, that it is identified as the ground of its possibility (*Grund für die Möglichkeit*)⁴¹⁵ – and quite a distinctive kind of ground (*Art von Grund*) at that: namely, an *Ursprung*, typically translated as “origin,” yet more accurately conveyed by means of the image of a spring as a source of a river.⁴¹⁶ As its “necessitating necessity” (*ernötigende Notwendigkeit*), the *Ursprung* – or “proto-spring” – determines the proper spatiality of the work and must therefore itself constitute a kind of proto-spatiality. This is the juncture at which the second version’s heightened distinction between the work of art and art proper is indispensable in maintaining a daylight of difference

⁴¹⁴ HS, 17 | M, 38.

⁴¹⁵ HS, 20.

⁴¹⁶ HS, 17.

between “that which is at work in the work itself” – spatiality as proper spatiality – and that which is “at the same time beyond it” – spatiality as proto-spatiality, or *Ursprung*. Naturally, insofar as they are both rooted in a still deeper ground, these notions are ultimately inextricable from each other. However, they do operate on different scales, each successive one descending deeper and expanding vaster as it nears its ultimate origin. Thus, the foregoing examination of the operations of spatiality on the scale of the work of art paves the way for an examination of such operations on the scale of art as such, and, in so doing, informs and amplifies those of the former scale.

Over the course of the first two versions, such proto-spatiality emerges as distinct from that of the kind of ground commonly referred to as a cause (*Ursache*). The “proto-spring” (*Ursprung*) must differ from the “proto-thing” (*Ursache*) precisely with regard to their respective spatiality – or lack thereof. And indeed, the first indication of the proto-spatiality of the ground of the work as a proto-spring follows shortly thereafter: this is the juncture at which the first version employs the terminology of the draft/draw/throw (the stem *-werf/-wurf* in combination with a variety of prefixes) for the very first time – namely, it identifies the essence of the work of art as a draft (*Entwurf*).⁴¹⁷ The profound implications of the selection of this term for the proto-spatiality of the ground of the work emerge only in the light of the observation that the term *Entwurf* descends from the same Proto-Indo-European stem as the term *Riß* – namely, **(e)reip-* (WP II 345 f) – by way of the same Proto-Germanic stem **rī[f]an-*, **rī[f]=*, **rai[f]a-z* and Germanic stem **rī[f]-a-*, **rī[f]=*, **rai[f]-a-*. As explicated above, the *Riß* is a rift which allows the spatial vector of contraction to “drift” into that of expansion – much in the same way that a spring is said to “draw” water from an underground reservoir and to “throw” it upwards

⁴¹⁷ HS, 17.

(*aufschlagen* is the precise synonym that the first version employs here for *entwerfen*), “erupting,” as it were, through a “rupture” in the ground. This is what the first version refers to as the “originary sense” (“ursprünglicher Sinn”) of the ground as “origin” (*Ursprung*).⁴¹⁸ In light of this etymological analysis, the remarkable resonance between the “drift through the rift” and the spatial dynamic of the ground as a proto-spring readily comes to the surface (pun intended). Moreover, henceforth the proper spatiality of the *Riß* may be understood as “springing from” rather than being “grounded in” the proto-spatiality of the *Entwurf* – and the work of art as “springing from” art as such.

Finally, the present study arrives at the third definition of the essence of art already established in the first two versions and substantively elaborated in the third: “*All art...is in essence poetry.*”⁴¹⁹ The unique contribution of the language of poetry appears to be its emphasis on one particular meaning of the Germanic stem [**rī[f]-a-*, **rī[f]=*, **rai[f]-a-*] – that of « to throw » (*werfen*). In the third version, poetry is indeed said to “pitch” (*aufschlagen*) an open site (*Stelle*), to be in itself a draft (*Entwurf*).⁴²⁰ Yet what does the specificity of the notion of the draft consist in? As a certain kind of throwing, perhaps poetry may be productively understood as the projection of a spotlight in preparation of the arrival of the truth precisely as unconcealment within illumination. But how is this projection different from the projection of all other kinds of poetry in the broad sense, which are said to include, among others, architecture and the visual arts⁴²¹? And, what is more, how might the spatiality of a spotlight be described? In a theatrical setting, a spotlight is an instrument that is used to project a beam of light onto the flat surface of the stage, thereby highlighting a chosen sector of the overall space of play, by entering which a

⁴¹⁸ HS, 21.

⁴¹⁹ HS, 17 | M, 38 | H, 59: “*Alle Kunst ist ...im Wesen Dichtung.*”

⁴²⁰ H, 60.

⁴²¹ H, 62.

given actor or actress come to benefit from heightened visibility. Additionally, in a cinematic setting, such a beam of light is cast by a projector (naturally, the vintage overhead model) through the translucent image on film in order to render it visible upon the screen. Notwithstanding their differing mechanics, the basic purpose of projection in these two cases is the same – to amplify the visibility of something already visible, albeit inadequately. Following the present study’s experimentation with the notion of art as a *camera clara*, the leap to the notion of art as a spotlight is not that difficult to make. Indeed, cameras and projectors descend from the same ancestor – the *camera obscura* – and owe their operation to the same phenomenon, namely, focused light. Projection of light already entails its focus, and thus, in light of the metaphors of the spotlight and the projector, art may be understood as the focusing of light requisite to the appropriation of being through illumination.

Yet “throwing” (*werfen*) does not exhaust the contribution of the language of poetry to the understanding of the proto-spatiality of art. The essence of poetry – and therein, the essence of art – also consists in a “staking” (*stiften*); more specifically, in the first version, “the staking of being” (“*Stiftung des Seyns*”),⁴²² and in the second and third versions – the “staking” of truth (“*die Stiftung der Wahrheit*”).⁴²³ The present study translates *Stiftung* as “staking” instead of the expected “institution” in expectation that such a return to the stem from which *Stiftung* as a nominalization is derived – *Stift*, or “stake” – will ultimately prove more revealing of the underlying dynamic than “institution”; among other things, it will render the parallel between the work of art as a rivet and art itself as a stake more immediately accessible. Serendipitously, the verb “to stake” also signifies “to mark an area...so as to claim ownership of it” (*Oxford Dictionary*), thus being ideally suited for the expression of the notion of art as the mark of

⁴²² HS, 18, 20-21.

⁴²³ M, 40 | H, 63-64.

appropriation (*Ereignis*) *par excellence*. With this strategic modification, the present study would seem to situate itself in the optimal position to examine the specificity of art's proper stake. However, before embarking upon this trajectory, it must settle upon a decision regarding the following question: are the modes of staking about to be addressed – gifting, grounding, and starting – proper to art, to truth, or to being (*Sein*)? Such a decision is, strictly speaking, at very least premature, given the predicament the *Addendum* of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* describes as follows:

“Within the title “setting-to-work of truth,” wherein it remains undetermined, but determinable, who or what “sets” in what way, conceals itself a persistent difficulty in the *relation between being and human essence* (which relation is inadequately thought even in this version), which was clear since *Being and Time* and came to be spoken about in various versions (cf. lastly “Zur Seinsfrage” and the extant treatise p. 49: “Let only this be remarked, that...”)”⁴²⁴

Nevertheless, if, as the second and third versions suggest, being in general ultimately makes its own stake, as it “desires to be brought into openness” or “demands grounding within openness,”⁴²⁵ the stake of art appears inconceivable apart from it being an activity of being in general, in which case its proper context of discussion would be that of the archi-spatiality of being (*Sein*) (section §1.d below). Yet the third version insists that “staking” is the “essential structure of art,”⁴²⁶ and thus the present study must persevere in attempting to glimpse its uniqueness. Returning to the first meaning of poetry, that of “throw,” and considering it alongside its second meaning, that of “stake,” it proposes that if “staking” is something art

⁴²⁴ H, 74: In dem Titel: »Ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit«, worin unbestimmt aber bestimmbar bleibt, wer oder was in welcher Weise »setzt«, verbirgt sich der *Bezug von Sein und Menschenwesen*, welcher Bezug schon in dieser Fassung ungemäß gedacht wird, - eine bedrängende Schwierigkeit, die mit seit »Sein und Zeit« klar ist und dann in vielerlei Fassungen zur Sprache kommt (vgl. zuletzt »Zur Seinsfrage« und die vorliegende Abhandlung S. 49: »Nur dieses sei angemerkt, daß...«).”

⁴²⁵ M, 46: “...das Seiende im Ganzen und *als* ein solches in die Offenheit gebracht werden will...” | H 64: “wenn das Seiende im Ganzen als das Seiende selbst die Gründung in die Offenheit verlangt...”

⁴²⁶ H, 63.

clearly shares with being in general, then perhaps art may be thought of as the “throw” or projection of the stake of being as a potential gain that it offers being-there (*Dasein*). In response, being-there may be understood as “making a stake” in response by making a decision (*Entscheidung*) and in so doing appropriating what was “at stake” in such a decision. Support for such an interpretation comes, among other sources, from the following remark of the third version: “that which is thrown-to through it [through the poetizing draft or throw] is only the up til now withheld determination of historical being-there itself.”⁴²⁷

β) Historical Humanity: Stance towards Being, Taken; Decision, Made

As early as in the first version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, the work of art is already described as “the opening middle of the historical being-there of being there,” which “turns into the possession of the human being there in general.”⁴²⁸ In the second, it is similarly described as “the middle of the being there of a people.”⁴²⁹ By themselves, these statements evidently tell the reader little about the nature of such historical being-there, let alone about its spatiality. However, several pages further on, the reader comes across a substantial passage that does provide a number of helpful clues. In this passage, historical being-there signifies precisely the assumed (and therein, actualized) possibility of being there as such, namely, that of “a stance toward being as such.”⁴³⁰ Such *assumption* takes place when humanity (*der Mensch*) undertakes the there,⁴³¹ when being there hypostasizes as being human. Such an assumption does not forsake the fundamental nature of being there as orientation towards being, quite on the contrary, it fulfills it. In fact, as the first version underscores, the undertaking of the there constitutes

⁴²⁷ H, 64: “das durch ihn Zugeworfene nur die vorenthaltene Bestimmung des geschichtlichen Daseins selbst ist.”

⁴²⁸ HS, 15: “das Werk als die eröffnende Mitte des Daseins geschichtlichen Da-seins”; HS 18: “...dem menschlichen Dasein überhaupt *das* Offene...zu Besitz wird”

⁴²⁹ M, 28: “die Mitte des Daseins eines Volkes”

⁴³⁰ HS, 19: “...zum Seyn als solchen steht”

⁴³¹ HS, 19 | M, 34, 36.

undertaking being itself historically.⁴³² Thus, historical being-there becomes increasingly intelligible as the stance towards being, insofar as it is taken.

In light of this distinction between the possibility and the actuality of being there, it becomes possible to glimpse the essence of art, as articulated in the following passage, as humanity's encounter with and embrace of its own possibility: "In the [poetic] draft, that "otherwise than formerly" steps into the open, but this "otherwise" is, in its very ground, no stranger, [but] rather only the up-till-now concealed most proper of historical being there."⁴³³ Indeed, the second version explicitly speaks of art as setting the openness (*Offenbarkeit*) of being there into work.⁴³⁴ To attempt a clarifying paraphrase: as humanity steps into the openness at the very core of the work of art, its possibility of being otherwise – of being in a way that is most proper to it – is opened up, revealed, and humanity is invited to seize this possibility such that it may come into its own, become all that it was given to it to be. It is only in taking such a stance towards being – situating itself "close to this ur-spring" within the work of art – that humanity is able to turn into a people (*Volk*).⁴³⁵ It does so, in part, as "its being there" rests upon the ground that the work of art allows to arise, i. e. upon the earth (*Erde*).⁴³⁶ The second version confirms and expands this account of the first version, in speaking of the earth as that which rises up to meet being there within the projection (*Vorauswurf*) of poetry; yet, at this juncture in the text, the notion of the earth carries two very specific and distinct senses: (1) that of the ground of being there, i. e. of its the possibility, and (2) that of the earth upon which a people may settle.⁴³⁷ In

⁴³² HS, 20: "[Das Werk] den Menschen das Seyn geschichtlich übernehmen läßt."

⁴³³ Ibid.: "Im Entwurf tritt jenes "Anders wie sonst" ins Offene, aber dieses Anders ist im Grunde kein Fremdes, sondern nur das bislang verborgene Eigenste des geschichtlichen Daseins." | M, 42.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ HS, 19: "Indem der Mensch das Da ist, d. h. geschichtlich ist, wird er ein Volk"; HS, 22: "Solche Nähe allein verbürgt ein wahrhaft gegründetes geschichtliches Dasein als echte Bodenständigkeit auf dieser Erde."

⁴³⁶ M, 26: "...den heimatlichen Grund, dem sein Dasein aufruht."

⁴³⁷ M, 42.

fact, it appears that it is precisely the settling of a people upon their earth that effectuates a kind of “fetching” of the possibility of being there out of the hidden depths of its ground and its becoming an actuality in a singular historical people. Thus, historical being-there is spoken about precisely as “the *re-moval* of the being there of a people into their given-up as [their] move-in into their co-given.”⁴³⁸

The taking of the stance towards being on the part of being there consists in the making of a decision (*Entscheidung*),⁴³⁹ and such a decision is made upon that put up for decision within the work⁴⁴⁰ – hence the second version’s description of the world of the work as the “fusing middle of all witting deciding.”⁴⁴¹ As the second version clarifies, the greatest possibility that is put up for decision – put up for the taking – within the work is precisely the possibility of the there; in taking up this possibility, thrown-to (*zu-geworfene*) it, being there may first come into its own, somewhat as the nestlings of the eagle must seek out prey in the field having been thrown out of the nest by their father (an example that appears in the second version for the first time).⁴⁴² The making of such a decision constitutes what the second version terms a seizing fore-spring (*der zugreifende Vorsprung*) on the part of being there into that which is “given up” to it for decision.⁴⁴³ In such springing forth and seizing of a given option, the uniformity of being there may for the first time differentiate into “clans and “stalks” [that] spring up and coalesce into the unity of a people.”⁴⁴⁴ In such a way, the very “middle” of being there itself may define

⁴³⁸ M 46: “*Entrückung* des Daseins eines Volkes in sein Aufgegebenes als Einrückung in sein Mitgegebenes”

⁴³⁹ M 30

⁴⁴⁰ HS 15 | M 28, 30

⁴⁴¹ M 32: “die fügende Mitte alles wissenden Entscheidens”; M 34: “Welt ist die weisende Fuge jener Bezüge, in die alle wesentlichen Entscheidungen... eines Volkes eingefügt sind.”

⁴⁴² M 40

⁴⁴³ M 36

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*: “Sippen und Stämme schießen erst in die Einheit eines Volkes auf und zusammen, wenn sie das Aufgegebene ergreifen d.h. als zukünftig geschichtlich werden.”

or determine itself for the first time.⁴⁴⁵ Indeed, it seems impossible for historical humanity to be without being, well, there – that is, without staking out and appropriating its there as its own, and in so doing, appropriating itself to itself.

The notion of decision itself undergoes further elaboration in the third version of the *Kunstwerksatz*, where it is rendered as “knowing what one wants.”⁴⁴⁶ The third version connects this capacity back to determination (*Entschlossenheit*) as a fundamental aspect of being there developed in *Being and Time*, which, in the historical sense, signifies “the ecstatic self-letting of existing humanity into the unconcealedness of being.”⁴⁴⁷ As in *Being and Time*, so in the third version of the *Kunstwerksatz*, this aspect must not be reduced to “a decided action of a subject,” but must be understood in its proper sense of “an opening of being there from out of being caught up in beings onto the openness of being.”⁴⁴⁸ At thus juncture, such an open pose and orientation towards being must, of course, be traced back to the archi-spatiality of being there as the *a priori* condition of the possibility of historical being there (to be addressed in §1.d.β below). With regard to the specific spatiality of historical being there as existing, however, the third version does clarify that such spatiality cannot be understood in terms of a movement from humanity’s “inside” to its “outside,” but must rather be seen as stemming from the very essence of existence (*Existenz*) as “the *ecstatic enstasis* within the essential *separation* of the illumination of beings”⁴⁴⁹ (a separation discussed as difference in the corresponding §1.d.α below; incidentally, the role existence (*Existenz*) plays with regard to being there may be said to parallel that which actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) plays with regard to being, insofar as both existence

⁴⁴⁵ M, 48.

⁴⁴⁶ H, 55: “Wer wahrhaft das Seiende weiß, weiß, was er inmitten des Seienden will.”

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.: “...das ekstatische Sicheinlassen des existierenden Menschen in die Unverborgenheit des Seins.”

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.: “nicht die decidierte Aktion eines Subjekts, sondern die Eröffnung des Daseins aus der Befangenheit im Seienden zur Offenheit des Seins.”

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.: “In der Existenz geht jedoch der Mensch nicht erst aus einem Innern zu einem Draußen hinaus, sondern das Wesen der Existenz ist das ausstehende Innestehen im wesenhaften Auseinander der Lichtung des Seienden.”

and actuality have to do with the *ekstasis* of being there and being, respectively.) Thus the self-determination of historical being there – of humanity – in accordance with such an ecstatic *enstasis* is termed urgency (*Inständigkeit*): (1) the constitutional capacity to follow the *urge* to go “over and beyond” oneself (*Übersichhinausgehen*), (2) the constitutional capacity to acquiesce to rapture (*Einrückung*) by being in the event of appropriation.⁴⁵⁰ Such convergence of urge and rapture is the very fount of humanity’s wanting, determining, and deciding – insofar as it exists. As the third version confirms, the ground of the historical *ekstasis* of being-there (*das geschichtliche Ausstehen des Da-seins*) is precisely the “synapse” of being there as an urge towards being and being as rapture of being there in the event of appropriation. Indeed, rather than thinking of history as a sequence of events, the third version insists upon understanding the historicity of being there in terms of “the re-moval of a people into their given-up as move-in into their co-given”⁴⁵¹ – in terms of an “evacuation” and “re-settlement” of sorts. As the third version reiterates, the world and earth of historical humanity “govern from out of relation of being there to the unconcealedness of being.”⁴⁵² Indeed, it is only out of this “synapse” that being there may differentiate into the being for one another (*Füreinandersein*) and being with one another (*Miteinandersein*)⁴⁵³ of historical being there, of humanity.

d) The Archi-Spatiality of Being (*Sein*) and of Being-There (*Dasein*)

The groundbreaking feature that sets the “proto-spring” (*Ursprung*) apart from the “proto-thing” (*Ursache*) is the distinctively ecstatic “archetype” (*Grundgestalt*)⁴⁵⁴ of its spatiality. As the first version concedes, even the pedestrian definition of art as expression (*Ausdruck*) evokes

⁴⁵⁰ H, 55.

⁴⁵¹ H, 65: “Geschichte meint...nicht die Abfolge irgendwelcher und sei es noch so wichtiger Begebenheiten in der Zeit. Geschichte ist die Entrückung eines Volkes in sein Aufgegebenes als Einrückung in sein Mitgegebenes.”

⁴⁵² H, 63: “...aus dem Bezug des Daseins zur Unverborgenheit des Seins.”

⁴⁵³ H, 55.

⁴⁵⁴ HS, 18.

this archetype, however maladroitly.⁴⁵⁵ What is more, in this respect, the proto-spatiality of art must, in turn, itself come to be understood as an extension or outworking of the ecstatic nature of the being (*Sein*) of beings as such. This appears to be the reason why the closing pages of the first version find it necessary to modify the initial characterization of the proto-spring (*Ursprung*) as a “throwing upwards” (*aufschlagen*) of water into a letting-spring-up (*Entspringenlassen*),⁴⁵⁶ the word “letting” being a more accurate reflection of the intermediate role of the proto-spring in the conveyance of something running deeper still. The first hint of such archi-pelagic “groundwater,” so to speak – from which the proto-spring must itself spring up – appears in the form of an enigmatic reference to “the openness of non-beings and un-beings and the void.”⁴⁵⁷ However, it is not until the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* that the necessity of understanding the spatiality of art and truth from out of the spatiality of being itself is explicitly acknowledged:

“With the hint of the self-arranging of the openness into the open, thinking touches upon a precinct which cannot yet become laid out here. Let only this be remarked: that if the essence of unconcealedness of a [given] being in some way belongs to being [*Sein*] itself (cf. *Being and Time*, §44), this allows the space of play of the openness (the illumination [*Lichtung*] of the there) to happen out of its essence, and brings it in as *such*, wherein each being arises in its [own] way.”⁴⁵⁸

Additionally – as has already been pointed out in a footnote to the opening paragraph of §1, but certainly bears repeating – the *Addendum* to the third version inscribes the question of the work of art squarely within the question of being: “The whole treatise “The Ur-spring of the Work of Art” wittingly, and yet in an unspoken manner, moves along the path of the question

⁴⁵⁵ HS, 18.

⁴⁵⁶ HS, 20.

⁴⁵⁷ HS, 18: “[Offenheit] des Nichtseienden und Unseienden und der Leere.”

⁴⁵⁸ H, 49: “Mit dem Hinweis auf das Sicheinrichten der Offenheit in das Offene rührt das Denken an einen Bezirk, der hier noch nicht auseinandergelegt werden kann. Nur dieses sei angemerkt, daß, wenn das Wesen der Unverborgenheit des Seienden in irgendeiner Weise zum Sein selbst gehört (vgl. Sein und Zeit § 44), dieses aus seinem Wesen her den Spielraum der Offenheit (die Lichtung des Da) geschehen läßt und ihn als *solches* einbringt, worin jegliches Seiende in seiner Weise aufgeht.”

about the essence of being. Art ... belongs within the *appropriation*, out of which the “sense of being” (cf. *Being and Time*) determines itself for the first time.”⁴⁵⁹ Such textual evidence makes clear that the proposed incursion into the spatiality of being is not only justifiable, but also inevitable, should the proper spatiality of the work of art be understood in its most profound sense.

α) Being: Phenomenon of Triunity, Differentiation, Propensity

In order to accurately glimpse the distinctness of the archi-spatiality of being, insofar as such is accessible through the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, let the present study begin by delineating and setting aside what the treatise understands and rejects as the interpretation of being established by Plato and Aristotle. The most conspicuous feature of such an interpretation, however, is precisely a lack thereof – that is to say, a lack of the interpretation of being (*Seyn*) compensated for by the interpretation of the beingly (*das Seiende*) as the inherence of its proper εἶδος within its proper form.⁴⁶⁰ As the first version points out, within such an understanding of the beingly, the εἶδος or “idea” (“Idea”) is most properly beingly, while its instantiation in natural or artistic form is beingly only derivatively.⁴⁶¹ The second version takes this history two steps further: initially to the medieval interpretation of being in general (*das Seiende im Ganzen*) in the sense of “god-created” (*Gottgeschaffenen*), and subsequently to the modern interpretation of the beingly as “quantitatively controllable and...comprehensible,”⁴⁶² as an object (*Gegenstand*), as the third version adds.⁴⁶³ The third version extends the medieval interpretation into the Thomistic,

⁴⁵⁹ H, 73: “Die ganze Abhandlung »Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes« bewegt sich wissentlich und doch unausgesprochen auf dem Weg der Frage nach dem Wesen des Seins.⁴⁵⁹ Die Kunst...gehört in das *Ereignis*, aus dem sich erst der »Sinn vom Sein« (vgl. »Sein und Zeit«) bestimmt.”

⁴⁶⁰ HS, 10-11 | H, 11.

⁴⁶¹ HS, 14.

⁴⁶² M, 46: “rechnerischen Beherrschbaren und Durchschaubaren”

⁴⁶³ H, 65.

“theological interpretation,” where the *whole of beings* (*das Ganze des Seienden*) is “thought out of the unity of *materia* and *forma*.”⁴⁶⁴ It additionally traces the modern interpretation up to Kant, naming it “Kantian-transcendental.” The 1950 impression of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* confirms three historical interpretations of the beingly: (1) the Aristotelian interpretation of the *ōv*, (2) the Thomistic causal-ontic interpretation, and (3) the biblical interpretation of creation.⁴⁶⁵

Yet, as the first version suggests, it is precisely “the being of things” (“*das Seyn der Dinge*”), “the otherworldliness of being” (“*das Unheimliche des Seyns*”) that is ultimately at stake in the work of poetry, architecture, and the visual arts.⁴⁶⁶ Indeed, it plainly speaks of the essence of poetry – of art – as “the institution of being” or, more literally, the “staking” of being (*Stiftung des Seyns*).⁴⁶⁷ It is precisely at this juncture in the text that the reader encounters the very first explicit mention of the ontological difference in the form of a question, “But what does being mean in distinction from the beingly..?”⁴⁶⁸ In the example provided by the passage, the grasp of the difference (*Unterscheid*) between an organ and a cat does not take one very far in glimpsing the difference between what either of these beings are and that either of them are – the difference between the beingly (*das Seiende*) and the being (*Seyn*) of that beingly.⁴⁶⁹ The second and third versions progressively introduce the notion of the kind of being (*Seinsart*)⁴⁷⁰ and of the character of being (*Seinscharakter*)⁴⁷¹ – for example, tool-being (*Zeugsein*) and thing-being (*Dingsein*)⁴⁷² – such that the beingly (*das Seiende*) is said to belong to one type or another. In the third version’s newly added section on thinghood (*Dinghafte*), the kinds or types of being are

⁴⁶⁴ H, 14: “das ens creatum aus der Einheit von materia und forma gedacht wird”

⁴⁶⁵ H, 15, footnote a.

⁴⁶⁶ H, 13.

⁴⁶⁷ HS, 19.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.: “Was aber heißt Seyn im Unterschied zum Seienden...”

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ M, 46 | H, 5.

⁴⁷¹ H, 15.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

spoken of as occupying distinct spheres, realms, regions, or domains (*Bereiche, Bezirke*).⁴⁷³ In itself, such classification suggests a certain differentiation within being as the broader category to which such types might themselves belong. Not only so, but it also vividly points towards a kind of porous compartmentalization of being into sub-spaces within which its kinds or types might be accommodated. It expresses concern over how reflection upon the being of the respective beings (*das Sein des jeweilig Seienden*) might go forth⁴⁷⁴ and insists that it is precisely the being (*Sein*) of such beings that steps forth within the unconcealedness of their kind (or character) of being: “Van Gogh’s painting is the opening of that, which the tool, the pair of peasant shoes, in truth *is*. This being steps out into the unconcealedness of its being. In the work, a being – a pair of peasant shoes – comes to stand in the light of its being. The being of beings comes into the steadiness/constancy of its shining.”⁴⁷⁵ And again, twice, a few pages further: “...what is at work

⁴⁷³ H, 12: “...wie sollen wir dann noch mit ihrer Hilfe den besonderen Bereich der bloßen Dinge im Unterschied vom übrigen Seienden fassen?”

⁴⁷⁴ H, 16.

⁴⁷⁵ H, 21: “Dieses Seiende tritt in die Unverborgenheit seines Seins heraus”; “Ein Seiendes, ein Paar Bauernschuhe, kommt im Werk in das Lichte seines Seins zu stehen. Das Sein des Seienden kommt in das Ständige seines Scheinens.”

This interpretation is, of course, directly opposed to Meyer Schapiro’s reading of the painting as a quintessential embodiment of the self of the Subject, which is directly and powerfully opposed to Heidegger’s flight from the Subject in his own interpretation – a contrast the philosophical implications of which far surpass an art-historical disagreement about the specificity of the work in question: “We come closer, I think, to van Gogh’s feeling for these shoes in a paragraph written by Knut Hamsun in the 1880s in his novel *Hunger*, describing his own shoes: ‘(...) Something of my own nature had gone over into these shoes; they affected me, like the ghost of my other I – a breathing portion of my very self.’” In selecting Hamsun’s quotation to characterize van Gogh’s painting, Schapiro assumes a complex perspective in which the Subject becomes its own object in ‘transmigrating’ into the shoes; in so doing, he inscribes the encounter between the viewer and the painting of the shoes in terms of dialectical identity, which constitutes the very object of Heidegger’s critique of Hegel and Schelling. (Meyer Schapiro, “The Still Life as a Personal Object – A Note on Heidegger and van Gogh,” in *Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society* (New York: George Braziller, 1994), 139.) The centrality of identity thinking to Schapiro’s interpretation of van Gogh’s shoes comes through even more vividly in his “Further Notes on Heidegger and van Gogh”: “One can describe van Gogh’s painting of his shoes as a picture of objects seen and felt by the artist as a significant part of himself – he faces himself like a mirrored image – chosen, isolated, carefully arranged, and addressed to himself.” (Meyer Schapiro, “Further Notes on Heidegger and van Gogh,” in *Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society* (New York: George Braziller, 1994), 146.) In an unexpected and brilliant twist, this ‘identity reading’ reveals a Subject which is “deviant and absorbing [and] deformed” – and thus paradoxically aligns with Heidegger’s overarching critique.

in the work: *the opening of the being in its being: the happening of truth,*⁴⁷⁶ as well as “[t]he work of art *opens, in its way, the being of beings.*”⁴⁷⁷ Thus, being shines forth from within the kind of being that a given being is. Indeed, the third version goes so far as to identify the unconcealment of beings with being in the following formulation: “the unconcealment of beings (being^a),” with footnote a relating this identification to appropriation (*Ereignis*) in the *Reclam* edition of 1960.⁴⁷⁸ One discovers a definitive confirmation of the openness of being within the openness of beings just a few pages later: “In this way, self-concealing being is illuminated.”⁴⁷⁹ And even more plainly and emphatically a mere six pages further: “...if the essence of the unconcealedness of the beingly in some way belongs to being itself (cf. *Being and Time* §44), the latter allows the space of the play of openness (the illumination of the there) to happen from out of its essence.”⁴⁸⁰ With this statement, the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* arrives at the possibility that the origin of the work of art lies within being itself, and more specifically, within the event of its appropriation. But is the broader category of being thus illumined to be identified with the beingly overall (*das Seiende überhaupt*), with the beingly in general (*Seiende im allgemeinen*), with the being of beings (*das Sein des Seienden*), or simply with being (*Seyn/Sein*)? Are these sufficiently distinguished within the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* suite and if not, where might one turn in search of such a distinction?

It is, in fact, the core of the work of art – “that openness named over and over” – that

⁴⁷⁶ H, 24: “...was im Werk am Werk ist: die Eröffnung des Seienden in seinem Sein: das Geschehnis der Wahrheit.”

⁴⁷⁷ H, 25: “Das Kunstwerk eröffnet auf seiner Weise das Sein des Seienden.”

⁴⁷⁸ H, 39: “die Unverborgenheit des Seienden (das Sein^a)” > footnote a: “d. h. das Ereignis”

⁴⁷⁹ H, 43: “Dergestalt ist das sichverbergende Sein gelichtet.”

⁴⁸⁰ H, 49: “wenn das Wesen der Unverborgenheit des Seienden in irgendeiner Weise zum Sein selbst gehört (vgl. *Sein und Zeit* § 44), dieses aus seinem Wesen her den Spielraum der Offenheit (die Lichtung des Da) geschehen läßt.”

allows for an “anticipation of being and of its concept.”⁴⁸¹ Indeed, following this hint of openness, the first version speaks of being as follows: “Being is that, what and how the beingly is each time open to and concealed from us. The beingly is only *in itself* by virtue of the fact that *we* are essentially *for* being.”⁴⁸² It is truly difficult to see what either of these statements contributes to an understanding of being (*Seyn*) operative at this point in the suite. What is it about being that the openness is supposed to facilitate glimpsing? Is it that the line between openness and concealment runs right through being itself, and that it is therefore marked by difference at its very core? The third version does contain an intriguing remark along these lines, which speaks of a kind of veiled drapery that runs through being and is interposed between the godhood and the ungodly: “There runs through being a veiled drapery that is interposed between the godhood and the non-godly.”⁴⁸³ This is the very first time in the entire *Kunstwerkaufsatz* that being is suggested to have some kind of a partition within it, such that it appears to stand with one foot, so to speak, in godhood and with the other – in the non-godly. The same passage makes clear the that beingly stands within being,⁴⁸⁴ yet where does being itself stand? In light of this remark, is being to be understood as simultaneously godly and non-godly, divine and non-divine? Is the drapery that runs through being to be interpreted as the difference between these, a difference that is nevertheless accommodated within being as a unity? And, as an extension of such an interpretation, is unconcealment of being – the parting of this partition – to be understood precisely as a change (*Wandel*)⁴⁸⁵ from being to beings, thus identifying the

⁴⁸¹ HS, 19: “Wir ahnen das Seyn und dessen Begriff, wenn wir jene immer wieder genannte Offenheit fassen, die im dichtenden Entwurf erscheint.”

⁴⁸² Ibid.: “Seyn ist jenes, was und wie Seiendes uns jeweils offen *und* verborgen ist. Seiendes ist nur *an sich* kraft dessen, daß *wir* wesentlich *für* das Seyn sind.”

⁴⁸³ H, 39: “Durch das Sein geht ein verhülltes Verhängnis, das zwischen das Gotthafte und das Widergöttliche verhängt ist.”

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.: “Das Seiende steht im Sein.”

⁴⁸⁵ H, 60.

happening of truth with the very happening of the ontological difference? Or, rather, is the divine aspect of being to be associated with the nothing (*das Nichts*), and its non-divine aspect – with the beingly (*das Seiende*), with being itself hanging as a kind of double-sided panel between the two? In this case, one would be obliged to speak of a change that would be antecedent even to that of ontological difference – the miracle of miracles that is the change from nothing to something? The third version does contain the highly suggestive definition of Ur-spring as “bringing out of the provenance of the essence into being,” which makes a remarkable distinction between being (*Sein*) and such “provenance of the essence” (*Wesensherkunft*).⁴⁸⁶ In either case, in light of this remark, it would seem that being may no longer be thought of as simple and monolithic, but must rather be acknowledge to contain a plane of difference within itself or perhaps *be* such a plane of difference. Yet is such heterogeneity to be understood as difference or as separation, as the expression “essential apart-from-one-another of the illumination of beings” (“*wesenhaftes Auseinander der Lichtung des Seienden*”) seems to suggest?⁴⁸⁷ Or, is *separation* meant to be understood in the ontic sense as occurring in the wake of difference understood in the ontological sense? In other words, should ontological difference be understood as prior and necessary to ontic separation?

Perhaps this veil running through being may even be straightforwardly identified with truth. Indeed, in the corresponding passage, the “curtain” of being seems capable of being parted in the event of appropriation, as footnotes a-c (referring to the impression of 1957 and the Reclam edition) suggest by their constant reiteration of the terms *Ereignis* and *Er-eignen*.⁴⁸⁸ The event of which this passage speaks is that of the occurrence of an open site (*offene Stelle*) and of

⁴⁸⁶ H, 65.

⁴⁸⁷ H, 55.

⁴⁸⁸ H, 39.

illumination (*Lichtung*) in the midst of beings as a whole – a site and illumination that is, tellingly, “more beingly than the beingly” and that “surrounds all beingly as the nothing that we hardly know.”⁴⁸⁹ This event of appropriation suggests a kind of dehiscence of being – a parting or even tearing of the veil that runs through it – such that the light of the divine side of being, perhaps even the “dark” light of the nothing, may be let into the non-divine side of being, perhaps into the beingly, such that (1) the beingly may come to be beingly by means of measure (*Maß*)⁴⁹⁰ and (2) humanity may gain access to the beingly, including itself.⁴⁹¹ Indeed, it seems plausible to interpret the event of appropriation in this way given the immediately following contrast of the open site – of illumination – with a theater stage whose curtain is always raised.⁴⁹² Certainly, the play of beings plays itself out within the open site of illumination, but so does the play of light and shadow, concealment and unconcealment.⁴⁹³ Unlike the perpetually raised curtain of the theater, the veil that runs through being is a counterpoint (*das Gegenwendige*) of illumination and obscurity – a primordial chiaroscuro which the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* for the very first time terms *ur-strife* (*Urstreit*) and the *Reclam* edition of 1960 – appropriation (*Ereignis*). In spatial terms, such a formulation is perfectly consistent with that already articulated at the level of the work in terms of contraction, expansion, and motion: brightness is the emission of light, and darkness – its absorption, while light itself is pure motion. The combination of these aspects in chiaroscuro constitutes the archi-spatiality of contrast that

⁴⁸⁹ H, 39-40: “Inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen west eine offene Stelle. Eine Lichtung ist. Sie ist, vom Seienden her gedacht, seiender als das Seiende. Diese offene Mitte ist daher nicht vom Seienden umschlossen, sondern die lichtende Mitte selbst umkreist wie das Nichts, das wir kaum kennen, alles Seiende.”

⁴⁹⁰ H, 40: “Das Seiende kann als Seiendes nur sein, wenn es in das Gelichtete dieser Lichtung herein- und hinaussteht.”

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.: “Nur diese Lichtung schenkt und verbürgt uns Menschen einen Durchgang zum Seienden, das wir selbst nicht sind, und den Zugang zu dem Seienden, das wir selbst sind.”

⁴⁹² H, 41: “die offene Stelle inmitten des Seienden, die Lichtung, ist niemals eine starre Bühne mit ständig aufgezoogenem Vorhang, auf der sich das Spiel des Seienden abspielt.”

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

stands at the origin of the proper spatiality of the work of art as a centrifuge. Indeed, chiaroscuro as ur-strife is specifically said to be the origin of “the open of the *space* of the strife,” which then arranges itself within a singular being – a work of art – in order to stake such a space out, to sustain it.⁴⁹⁴ It is the primordial contrast, out of whose opposition the very space of difference springs up for the first time. Thus it comes as no surprise that, according to the *Reclam* edition, the veil of chiaroscuro that runs through being (perhaps truth itself) is directly related to the ontological difference itself.⁴⁹⁵

In distinction from the divine, illuminating, appropriating “side” of being, its non-divine, illuminated, appropriated “side” may also be understood as actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) in its remarkability or salience. This crucial nuance may be gathered from the third version’s insistence upon the fact that the essence of the work of art as created consists in its very existence, its *factum est*, which is, in turn, conceived precisely as a testament to the occurrence of the event of appropriation on the specific spot of such a singular existent: “The appropriation of its being-created does not simply quiver within the work afterwards, but rather, the appropriation-hood [of the fact] that the work is as this work projects the work before itself and constantly has it projected around itself.”⁴⁹⁶ Thus, in its actuality, the work as appropriated, illuminated, non-divine always already points back to the appropriating, the illuminating, the divine “side” of being which makes its very possibility possible.

How differently does the commentary of the *Kunstverkaufsatz* on the Greek temple appear in light of the tearing of the veil between the “divine” and the “non-divine” sides of

⁴⁹⁴ H, 48: “das Offene des *Streitraumes*,” italics mine; “...ein Seiendes sein, worin die Offenheit ihren Stand und ihre Ständigkeit nimmt. Indem die Offenheit das Offene besetzt, hält sie dieses offen und aus.”

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., footnote “a”: “Reclam-Ausgabe 1960: Dazu die »ontologische Differenz«, vgl. »Identität und Differenz«, S. 37 ff.”

⁴⁹⁶ H, 53: “Das Ereignis seines Geschaffenseins zittert im Werk nicht einfach nach, sondern das Ereignishafte, daß das Werk als dieses Werk ist, wirft das Werk vor sich her und hat es ständig um sich geworfen.

being. Its “opening of the Holy as Holy” such that god may come into his presence begins to sound increasingly like the exposure of the Holy of Holies within the Jewish temple in Jerusalem – the very locus of the presence of God upon the earth – at the very moment of the death of Christ upon the cross, the moment at which “the curtain of the temple was torn in two from top to bottom.”⁴⁹⁷ Indeed, in light of this astounding parallel, it is difficult not to see Heidegger as rendering being in essentially Judaic and then Christic terms – whether in its simultaneously “divine” and “non-divine” nature, on in its revelatory self-sacrifice for the sake of the appropriation of beings back onto itself.

Perhaps the most illuminating commentary on the *ekstasis* or differentiation of being is found in the afterword to the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*. In a passage examining the relationship between being, truth, and beauty, and in the corresponding footnote “a” from the 1960 *Reclam* edition, the notion of truth as the “unconcealedness of beings as beingly” (“*die Unverborgenheit des Seienden als des Seienden*”) is initially traced back to its deeper source – to truth as “the self-illuminating being of the beingly” (“*das sichlichtende Sein des Seienden*”).⁴⁹⁸ In turn, such self-illumination itself springs from a deeper ground still – namely, from that of difference (*Unter-schied*) specifically understood as outcome (*Austrag*).⁴⁹⁹ Thus, in footnote “a” one reads: “Truth is the self-illuminating being of the beingly. Truth is the illumination of the difference (outcome), whereby illumination already determines itself out of difference.”⁵⁰⁰ Thus, on the basis of footnote “a,” it becomes possible to trace the progression of truth in the following manner: difference (outcome) > self-illumination > unconcealment. Beauty springs up in the

⁴⁹⁷ The Gospel of Matthew, 27: 51.

⁴⁹⁸ H, 69

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid., footnote “a.”

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid.: “Die Wahrheit ist das sichlichtende Sein *des* Seienden. Die Wahrheit ist die Lichtung des Unter-Schieds (Austrag), wobei Lichtung schon aus dem Unterschied sich bestimmt.”

midst of this happening – to be more precise, at the threshold between difference (outcome) and self-illumination of being. As the passage explains: “While the beautiful rests within the form, it does so only for the reason that the *forma* at some point illumined itself out of being as the being-ness of beings.”⁵⁰¹ (As the second version points out, such an emergence of “being in general...as such” (“*das Seiende im Ganzen...und als ein solches*”) happened for the first time in Hellenism).⁵⁰² To attempt a “translation,” as it were: beauty as the resplendence (*Erscheinen*) of form springs from the self-illumination of form, which, in turn, springs up from the differentiation – from the coming out or *ekstasis* – of being into being-ness. Incidentally, the *Addendum* to the third version additionally confirms that such a “self-arranging of...being... in beings then touches upon the question-worthy [subject] of the ontological difference.”⁵⁰³ In this manner, being (*Sein*) self-appropriates (*ereignet*) as εἶδος, as ἔργον, as *ens actu*, as *das Wirkliche*.⁵⁰⁴ Following the progression of the passage, one observes that it is only at this juncture that the self-appropriation of being collapses, within the history of Western philosophy, into its appropriation as an object of experience: “Actuality turns into objectivity. Objectivity turns into experience.”⁵⁰⁵ As has by now become evident from the foregoing sections, the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* works towards the reversal of this degradation of both being being and beauty by extricating the work of art from appropriation as an object of experience and grafting it – as *das Wirkliche*, *ens actu*, ἔργον, εἶδος – back into its proper genealogy, namely, that of the self-appropriation of being. The *Addendum* to the third version further confirms this intention in

⁵⁰¹ H, 69: “Das Schöne beruht indessen in der Form, aber nur deshalb, weil die forma einst aus dem Sein als der Seiendheit des Seienden sich lichtete.”

⁵⁰² M, 46.

⁵⁰³ H, 73: “Bedenken wir, inwiefern Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit des Seienden nichts anderes besagt als Anwesen des Seienden als solchen, d. h. *Sein*...dann rührt die Rede vom Sicheinrichten der Wahrheit, d. h. des Seins, im Seienden an das Fragwürdige der ontologischen Differenz...”

⁵⁰⁴ H, 69.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*: “Die Wirklichkeit wird zur Gegenständlichkeit. Die Gegenständlichkeit wird zum Erlebnis.”

speaking of the motility of the work “in the Greek sense of ἔργον, whose “being” is ἐνέργεια, which assembles within itself endlessly more movement than all modern “energies.”⁵⁰⁶

According to the first version, the difficulty in stating the nature of being directly is due to the fact that it “can never be *shown forth* as some extant being,⁵⁰⁷ but may only be recognized through its institution – and thus it is to this phenomenon that the present study now turns. The phrase *Stiftung des Seyns* may be translated both as institution and as a kind of “*staking*” of being in the senses of donation, foundation, and instigation.⁵⁰⁸ Firstly, institution is said to be a “*trinity*” in itself (“*ein einiges Dreifaches*”) – that is, a unifying joint of differentiated relations of gifting (*Schenkung*), grounding (*Gründung*), and starting (*Anfang*).⁵⁰⁹ Insofar as institution is not a monolith, but rather the joint *par excellence*, it is marked by something like an interval – and thus, a predilection for spatialization – at its very core. In fact, the “*staking*” (*Stiftung*) of being in the sense of a gifting or donation (*Schenkung*) may best be understood precisely as its ecstatic tendency: indeed, the first version explicitly defines donation in the already familiar spatial terms of “the drafting of the open as of that which is “otherwise than formerly” (“*das Entwerfen des Offenen als des “Anders wie sonst”*”).⁵¹⁰ Thus, institution as donation may be interpreted as inaugurating a primordial space of difference, from out of which the extant (*Vorhandenes*) may be subsequently understood as “the former” (*Sonstiges*) in contrast with “that which is otherwise.”

In order to prevent such an ecstatic tendency from being misinterpreted as a kind of “draining” of being into beings without difference or remainder, the first version insists that the

⁵⁰⁶ H, 71: “Werk im griechischen Sinne des ἔργον; dessen »Sein« ist die ἐνέργεια, die unendlich mehr Bewegung in sich versammelt als die modernen »Energien«.”

⁵⁰⁷ HS, 19: “...das Seyn nie wie irgendein vorhandenes Seiendes vorgezeigt werden kann.”

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

institution of being be further qualified in terms of a grounding or foundation (*Gründung*) – an “enstatic” tendency of spatialization quite literally expressed by the German term *Insichzurückstehen*, or “standing/staying-back-in-itself.”⁵¹¹ As “groundwater,” being must continually fill up its “subterranean reservoir” precisely in order to spring up as the proto-spring of art. As it “overflows,” however, being as such may never “flow away” from itself – i. e. cease being “groundwater” by abandoning its “subterranean reservoir.” This is all the more true as such a “reservoir” should not, in fact, be thought of as some finite container, but rather as a bottomless abyss (*Abgrund*),⁵¹² whose slopes being is perpetually constrained yet never contained by.

Yet how might these terms be understood as articulating the archi-spatiality of being (*Seyn*)?

As in the case of the work, wherein the contrasting vectors of spatiality, expansion and contraction, were understood to be sustained in tension through motion, so in the case of the institution of being, the contrasting tendencies of *ekstasis* and *entasis* find their “yoke” in a corresponding third tendency – namely, that of instigation or starting (*Anfang*). Only in the third version will this correlate of strife within the work come to be identified as proto-strife (*Urstreit*) within being.⁵¹³ However, the first version already contains an initial conjecture regarding the essence of the start as a kind of synapse between the abyss and the differentiation of being, all the while acknowledging that it must ultimately elude comprehension insofar as it is a mystery (*Geheimnis*): unlike the derivately free motion of the drift (*Riß*) and draft (*Entwurf*), the motion that constitutes the start must be entirely free – a concept that has historically run into paradox at

⁵¹¹ HS, 15, 20.

⁵¹² HS, 19.

⁵¹³ H, 42.

best (as in cases of the attempted rehabilitation of the *causa sui* by Descartes and Spinoza, for instance).⁵¹⁴

The particular challenge of articulating a bond or “yoke” between the *ekstasis* and *entasis* of being as some kind of motion lies in the fact that any such model would need to be capable of bridging the gap between the two precisely while preserving it – of maintaining continuity between *entasis* and *ekstasis* in order to affirm that they are indeed spatializing tendencies of the self-same being (*Seyn*), while amplifying the interval between them – their discontinuity – in order to distinguish *ekstasis* as an entirely free procession from departure as an entirely determined consequence of a cause (*Ursache*). Thus the first version must venture towards an understanding of the motion of the start as a kind of “quantum mechanics,” so to speak, beginning with the notion of the spring (*Sprung*)⁵¹⁵ – a term charged with a multiplicity of possible significant meanings in English, including those of a fault or fissure (in the geological sense), a leap, throw, or surge (in the kinetic sense), a seam (specifically in its role as a synonym for *Fuge*), as well as a coil. Each of these aspects is instrumental in the development of the inkling of the spring into the fully-fledged model of the fore-spring (*Vorsprung*).⁵¹⁶

As the progenitor of the spatial dynamic of the proto-spring (*Ursprung*), the fore-spring (*Vorsprung*) must be capable of releasing “something that follows” (*Folgendes*) out of itself – an “outflow” – both entirely of its own accord and spontaneously.⁵¹⁷ The obvious candidate for modeling such a spatial dynamic – the notion of a process (*Vorgang*) – must be dismissed out of hand on the grounds that it reifies the continuity of causality and privileges an affective intentionality at the expense of spontaneity. Thus, in the first version, the pitfalls of bringing-

⁵¹⁴ HS, 21.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

forth (*Hervorbringung*) through the artist are exposed when such is revealed to be a process (*Vorgang*) of which the artist is a cause (*Ursache*), the work – merely a product (*Erzeugnis*), and the yoke or vehicle of motion – the artist’s thought (*Gedanke*), soul (*Seele*), or will (*Wille*) reduced to and conflated within feeling (*Gefühl*).⁵¹⁸ The second version follows largely the same reasoning, further specifying and rejecting the conception of the work as “an outcome of [the artist’s] act” (*Ergebnis seines Tuns*), and the vehicle of motion – as the artist’s “lived experiences” (*Erlebnisse*).⁵¹⁹ Thus it becomes clear that however else the spatial dynamic of the *Vorsprung* might be conceived, it is unlikely to resemble a process (*Vorgang*) whose constituent elements of human emotion and act are bound by a merely causal continuity. In contrast, the kind of spontaneous motion at stake in the term *Vorsprung* might begin to be approximated by the English term propensity – a tendency that is necessary insofar as it is innate, yet free in its expression insofar as such is intentional.⁵²⁰ It is contained within itself as a capacity for motion, expands beyond itself as actual motion, and transitions from the former tendency to the latter precisely by means of the “punctuation” of a decision. It is thus by no accident that the first version speaks of the fore-spring of being – and, by extension, of the proto-spring of art – as involving a decision (*Entscheidung*).⁵²¹

It is, therefore, in this manner that the first version proposes to ground the proto-spring of art within its proto-ground of grounding as a mode of the institution of being: “The most concealed ground for the necessity of the work of art, its most proper proto-spring, is the essence of truth itself. If truth is to happen... a work must be, i. e. it must be art as institution of being.”⁵²²

⁵¹⁸ HS, 6.

⁵¹⁹ HS, 6, M 20, 22.

⁵²⁰ HS, 21.

⁵²¹ HS, 22.

⁵²² HS, 21: “Der verborgenste Grund für die Notwendigkeit des Kunstwerks, sein eigentlichster Ursprung, ist das

The institution of being as grounding is also termed the “un-essence of the essence” (“Unwesen des Wesens”) of the work of art – and is said to ultimately be as inaccessible (unzugänglich) as it is bottomless.⁵²³

β) Being There: Orientation, Pose, Rapture

In retrospect, the initial hint towards a reformation of the aesthetic experience of the work of art into a distinct mode of fundamental attunement (*Grundstimmung*) becomes difficult to miss: the very first page of the first version explicitly identifies “the one thing” (*das Eine*) the treatise is after as “something to prepare with for the transformed fundamental position of our being-there towards art.”⁵²⁴ It is the hope of this study that by the end of this section, the distinctive spatiality of such a position – such an attunement – will emerge into full relief as that of turning towards being, that of laying down of one’s being so as to make way for being as such,⁵²⁵ and finally, that of being rapt into being in appropriation.⁵²⁶ Of course, the first premonition of such a pose already pervades the characterization of the artist “almost as passageway that annihilates itself in creation,”⁵²⁷ which was explicated by means of the notion of prostration (προσκύνησις) in the corresponding section on the proper spatiality of the experience

Wesen der Wahrheit selbst. Soll Wahrheit geschehen...dann muß ein Werk sein, d. h. es muß Kunst sein als Stiftung des Seyns.”

⁵²³ HS, 21.

⁵²⁴ HS, 5: “...eine gewandelte Grundstellung unseres Daseins zur Kunst.”

As Alison Ross rightly points out, such a reformation entails a consideration of the ‘aesthetic’ not from the point of view of a ‘specific sphere of experience’ but from that of a ‘general comportment towards ‘what is.’ (Alison Ross, “Heidegger’s Reading of Kant and His Historicization of Relations of Presentation,” in *The Aesthetics Paths of Philosophy: Presentation in Kant, Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 61).

⁵²⁵ This conjecture is made on the basis of the interpretation of the verb *stellen* – and by extension, of *position* (*Stellung*) – in terms of the Latin verb *ponere* in the *Addendum* to the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*: “‘Laying’ belongs together with ‘setting’ and ‘positing’ as well, and all three are uniformly intended by the Latin *ponere*.” “Mit »stellen« und »setzen« gehört auch »legen« zusammen, die alle drei noch einheitlich im lateinischen *ponere* gemeint sind.” (H 70)

⁵²⁶ H, 30-31: “in das Sein entrückt.” Indeed, the Reclam edition of 1960 connects this formulation precisely with being-there (*Da-Sein*), and the impression of 1957 broadens its proper context to *appropriation* (*Ereignis*) (H 31, footnote a).

⁵²⁷ HS, 6: “...fast wie ein im Schaffen sich selbst vernichtender Durchgang...” | M, 20 | H, 26.

of the work of art above (§1.b.δ). The second aspect of being there is, of course its orientation – namely, that towards being. The third version contains a unique passage dedicated entirely to its articulation: “We should turn ourselves towards the being, think about its being in itself, but at the same time let it therein rest upon itself in its essence.”⁵²⁸ In orienting itself towards a given being, being there is here said to orient itself towards the being of this being as well, so long as such orientation does not escalate into violence. The third version does see this orientation towards being as developing out of and being quite consistent with that of *Being and Time*: “an opening of being there from out of being caught up in beings onto the openness of being.”⁵²⁹ As discussed at length in §1.c.β above, this mutual openness is a convergence of being there as an urge towards being and of being as rapture of being there.

As the foregoing analysis has shown, the proper spatiality of the experience of the work of art stems from the proper spatiality of the work of art itself as a condition of its very possibility. Humanity (*die Menschen*) must assume its place within the spatialization of the work of art precisely in order to acquire such proper spatiality – to differentiate into individuals (*Einzelne*) and communities (*Gemeinschaften*) or peoples (*Völker*).⁵³⁰ As the first version clarifies: “both of these ways of being human are at all possible only when humanity undertakes the there beforehand.”⁵³¹ Indeed, as the second version makes clear, before its undertaking of the there, humanity remains only universal (*allgemeine Menschheit*), only a general capacity for differentiation.⁵³² When humanity undertakes the there, it is integrated into the proper spatiality

⁵²⁸ H, 16: “Wir sollen uns dem Seienden zukehren, an ihm selbst auf dessen Sein denken, aber es dadurch zugleich in seinem Wesen auf sich beruhen lassen.”

⁵²⁹ H, 55: “nicht die decidierte Aktion eines Subjekts, sondern die Eröffnung des Daseins aus der Befangenheit im Seienden zur Offenheit des Seins.”

⁵³⁰ HS, 19.

⁵³¹ Ibid.: “Diese beiden Weisen des Menschseins sind überhaupt nur möglich, wenn der Mensch zuvor das Da übernimmt.”

⁵³² M, 34.

of the work – and by extension, moved or drawn deeper through the proto-spatiality of the proto-spring (*Ursprung*) well into the “archetype” (*Grundgestalt*) of being itself. It is the ecstatic tendency of such “archetype” of being – its institution as gifting or donation (*Schenkung*) – that constitutes the deepest proto-ground of the possibility of the ecstatic tendency of humanity itself: that is, being as differentiation ultimately conditions and enables the differentiation of humanity precisely into a “self” and an “other,” an “individual” and a “community.” It is this fundamental affinity that the first version hints at in the otherwise cryptic remark: “Within the draft, that “otherwise than formerly” steps into the open, but this “otherwise” is, in its very ground, no stranger, [but] rather only the up-till-now concealed [something] most proper to the historical Dasein.”⁵³³ Thus, having been drawn into the very depths of the archetypal ground of its differentiation, humanity can draw upon this ground and draw itself back upward into its own proper differentiation – somewhat as a vessel is first lowered into, filled, and then drawn up (*heraufholt*) from a well. This is the precise analogy that appears in the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* for the very first time: “Because [it is] such a “hauling,” all creating is a hoisting (hauling water from a source).”⁵³⁴ Humanity is “thrown” into the well of being somewhat like a bucket with the capacity to hold water and then withdrawn from it filled up to the brim. However crude, this example might nevertheless serve the purpose of explicating another famously obscure statement from the first version: “[the draft] fetches its open from out of the concealed ground, when that which is given-up within it is co-given as concealed in its very ground and thence – to un-concealing definition.”⁵³⁵ Such a capacity for differentiation

⁵³³ HS, 20: “Im Entwurf tritt jenes “Anders wie sonst” ins Offene, aber dieses Anders ist im Grunde kein Fremdes, sondern nur das bislang verborgene Eigenste des geschichtlichen Daseins.”

⁵³⁴ H, 63: “Weil ein solches Holen, ist alles Schaffen ein Schöpfen (das Wasser holen aus der Quelle).”

⁵³⁵ HS, 20: “Der Entwurf, der wesenhaft Zuwurf ist, *entwirft* nur, wenn er sein Offenes aus dem verborgenen Grund heraufholt, wenn das, was in ihm aufgegeben ist, im Grunde als verborgene und daher zu entbergende Bestimmung

might then be called an aspect of the proto-spatiality of human experience – a spatiality that naturally lies “deeper” than the proper spatiality of the experience of the work of art, yet may only be actualized through the latter. Indeed, this is confirmed by Footnote “b” of the 1960 *Reclam* Edition, which insists on drawing experience (*Erlebnis*) all the way back into being-there (*Da-sein*): “...it all lies precisely in reaching out of “experiencing” into being-there.”⁵³⁶ The reason for this is that in order to be actualized, humanity’s capacity for differentiation must itself be situated within the *ekstasis* of being, and only the proper spatiality of the work of art as a “frame of reference” (*Gefüge von Verweisungen*) or a fuse of relations (*Gefüge von Verweisungen*) is capable of serving as a vehicle for such proper orientation of humanity “towards being as such” (“zum Seyn als solchen”).⁵³⁷ Humanity’s assumption of the there as the proper standpoint for its proper perspective on being is termed history (*Geschichte*) for the first time in the first version. And it is only through history – through the assumption of its proper standpoint in relation to being – that humanity can hypostasize as individuals and communities. The proper transposition of humanity into its proper standpoint is infinitely more profound than any commonplace transposition (*Umsetzung*) of a thought into a product/“manufact” of art, which both the first and the second versions reject as potential models of origination.⁵³⁸

On the other hand, the “how” (*wie*)⁵³⁹ of the there of the work – its actual (*wirkliche*) spatialization – is hypostasized only through humanity’s “undertak[ing] *to be* this “there.”⁵⁴⁰ While humanity discovers its most expansive potential (*mögliche*) spatialization as springing from being, it appears that being itself may ultimately reach the apogee of own actual (*wirkliche*)

mitgegeben ist.”

⁵³⁶ H, 67, Footnote “b”: “...es liegt gerade alles daran, aus dem Erleben ins Da-sein zu gelangen...”

⁵³⁷ HS, 19.

⁵³⁸ HS, 6, M, 20.

⁵³⁹ HS, 19.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.: “[Der Mensch] übernimmt es, dieses “Da” zu sein.”

spatialization only through the human being and the individual work. Thus, as being extends in *ekstasis*, it also extends the same possibility to humanity – “throws” it “toward” (*zuwerfen*) humanity, so to speak, not only as the latter’s capacity for the archi-spatiality of being there (*Dasein*),⁵⁴¹ but also as an extraordinary appeal to actualize such with a view to, in so doing, actualizing the most profound potentiality of being itself. The significance of such mutual dependence between being and the human being (whether an individual or a community) for the understanding of the proper spatiality of the work and of its experience in the first version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* can hardly be overestimated. If, as the first version underscores, “the there in its openness *is* only when a people undertakes *to be* the there,”⁵⁴² then the proper spatiality of the work as the openness of the there must, indeed, *be* specific or concrete: as the first version puts it, “[the] there itself *is* never [something] general/universal, but [*is*] rather every time “this” and unique/singular.”⁵⁴³ Thus, in its actualization, even the most “archetypal” spatiality – such as that of being itself – must undergo particularization – must be fulfilled as a determinate space (*bestimmter Raum*) or a determinate place (*bestimmter Ort*).⁵⁴⁴ This principle is, indeed, consistent with the first version’s recurring remarks regarding the coincidence of the proper expansion of the work and its literal exhibition space, of its proper actualization (“*Wirkung*”) and the literal actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) of locations where such might take place (to give a concrete example, of the “illuminated space of play” (*gelichteter Spielraum*) and of the cinema

⁵⁴¹ HS, 19.

⁵⁴² HS, 20: “Das Da *ist* nur, wenn ein Volk das Da *zu sein* übernimmt,” italics mine.

⁵⁴³ HS, 20.

⁵⁴⁴ Françoise Dastur interprets this thrust towards actualization (or, ‘effectuation,’ *Verwirklichung*) as Heidegger’s re-casting of schematism: “For Heidegger, knowledge itself can be understood as an effectuation, a bringing about of Being, and consequently, I think that it is possible to consider this interpretation of the essence of the work along the lines of an understanding of schematism.” (Françoise Dastur, “Heidegger’s Freiburg Version of the Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Heidegger towards the Turn : Essays on the Work of the 1930s*, ed. James Risser (Albany : SUNY Press, 1999), 121).

(*Lichtspiele*)).⁵⁴⁵

It is not until the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, however, that the relationship between the individual work of art and being (*Sein*) approaches final resolution: (1) art is a particular mode of the illumination (*Lichtung*) of being, and (2) the fixation of this illumination within the individual work of art is beauty (*Schönheit*). Truth as art is the illumination of being (*Sein*), its exposure to light. The individual work allows such illumination to happen, because it hosts and focuses the shining of the light and thus becomes beautiful, i. e. full of the shining of the light, thoroughly suffused by it. In so doing, it effortlessly accomplishes something that physicists have only managed to achieve in 2013 at the Technische Universität Darmstadt (and even then, for a fleeting full minute) – namely, the slowing down and harnessing of the closest thing to *perpetuum mobile* known to humankind – of light itself. What does it mean to say that such “allows illumination to happen”? In order for illumination to happen, light must remain within a certain area so as to shine down upon everything that enters such a realm, yet the natural tendency of light is precisely to flee – and at the highest known rate at that. Thus, the work of art itself may be thought of as a kind of *camera obscura* that “catches” the light and retains it, providing the individual being (*vereinzeltes Seiende*) – and more importantly, the beingly as a whole (*das Seiende im Ganzen*) – a kind of *camera clara*, within which they may be simultaneously exposed to the light and fixed, somewhat as a photographic plate. Thus the metaphor of the photographic camera appears to shed some light (pun intended) on a most cryptic, yet clearly vital pronouncement regarding the relationship between being, truth, light, beauty, and the work: “In this manner self-concealing being is illuminated. Light disposed in this way infuses its shining into the work. The shining infused into the work is the beautiful. Beauty

⁵⁴⁵ HS, 15.

is a way in which truth presences as unconcealment.”⁵⁴⁶ To do justice to the first two versions of the *Kunstverkaufsatz*, this passage from the third version is not the first time that the language of light appears in the suite. The first version already speaks of the work as enstrifing a *Lichtung* (typically, but misleadingly translated into English as a clearing) “in whose light the beingly as such encounters us,”⁵⁴⁷ of an illuminated space of play (*gelichteter Spielraum*), and of the cinema as a play of light (*Lichtspiele*).⁵⁴⁸ The second version similarly speaks of an illuminated space of play (*gelichteter Spielraum*) and of a *Lichtung*.⁵⁴⁹ However, it is only in the third version that all of this light-related language comes together in the work as the nexus of light, being, and being-there. What is more, this single stroke also completes the picture of the work as a locus of change from possibility to actuality: given that light is the purest and most concentrated form of energy, it makes ample philosophical sense to understand the change from δύναμις to ἐνέργεια as a kind of infusion of δύναμις with light or something akin to it. Furthermore, in light of the mass-energy equivalence, the problematic of the “material” aspect of the thinghood of the work suddenly appears less problematic. Thus, on both fronts – that of phenomenality and that of actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) – the notion of light as quintessential motion and quintessential energy appears to provide the very impetus for the happening of truth both as appearing and as becoming. And it is precisely the notion of the beautiful (*das Schöne*) as the shining (*Scheinen*) of the light within the work that furnishes the final locking piece for the understanding of the work of art as that space within which truth as the illumination of being can take place.

⁵⁴⁶ H, 43: “Dergestalt ist das sichverbergende Sein gelichtet. Das so geartete Licht fügt sein Scheinen ins Werk. Das ins Werk gefügte Scheinen ist das Schöne. *Schönheit ist eine Weise, wie Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit west.*”

⁵⁴⁷ HS, 14: “...die Lichtung, in deren Licht das Seiende als solches uns wie am ersten Tag oder...verwandelt begegnet.”

⁵⁴⁸ H, 15.

⁵⁴⁹ M, 34, 50, respectively.

e) The In-appropriate Spatiality of the Nothing and of its In-Experience

α) The Nothing: Indefinite Space, Unmoved Mover, Freedom

The first version of the *Kunstverkaufsatz* tells us very little about the nothing. At the very moment that it asks the pointed question of “Where does the opening of the openness of beings come from? Out of nothing, for instance?”, it shies away from the nothing as such and answers in terms of the nullity of the commonplace (a strategy employed by the second and third versions as well).⁵⁵⁰ Similarly, passing references to the “openness of the void” (“Offenheit...der Leere,” repeated in the second and third versions)⁵⁵¹ and to the dark abyss (*dunkel Abgrund*) go without comment. Yet, precisely where it comes to nothing, the first version contains one of the most promising formulations in the entire suite, one the implications of which continue to come into relief in subsequent elaborations: “However, the spring of the ur-spring remains in its essence a mystery, for the ur-spring is a mode of that ground the necessity of which we must name freedom.”⁵⁵² In this formulation not only is the ur-spring of art acknowledged spring from yet another mysterious source, but this source also said to be free – and in the language of sources and grounds, this means, among other things, non-contingent, necessary in its own right, self-sufficient. Such terms describe what amounts to a first cause, the paradigmatic example of which is found in Aristotle’s *Physics* VIII, 4-6: “an unmoved mover whose necessary existence underpins the ceaseless activity of the world of motion”⁵⁵³ Incidentally – and crucially, for our current purposes – for Aristotle, such unmoved movers were associated with an indeterminate

⁵⁵⁰ HS, 17: “Woher kommt die Eröffnung der Offenheit des Seienden? Etwa aus dem Nichts?” | M 38: “Dann kommt diese aus dem Nichts ?” | H, 59: “Dann entsteht die Wahrheit aus dem Nichts? In der Tat, wenn mit dem Nichts das bloße Nicht des Seienden gemeint...”

⁵⁵¹ HS, 18 | M, 40 | H, 61.

⁵⁵² HS, 21: “Der Sprung des Ursprungs bleibt aber seinem Wesen nach Geheimnis, denn der Ursprung ist eine Weise jenes Grundes, dessen Notwendigkeit wir Freiheit nennen müssen.”

⁵⁵³ [+ Greek]

somewhere quite beyond both space and place:

It is clear then that there is *neither place, nor void*, nor time, outside the heaven. Hence *whatever is there*, is of such a nature as *not to occupy any place*, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outermost motion; they continue through their entire duration unalterable and unmodified... From [the fulfilment of the whole heaven] derive the being and life which other things...enjoy.”⁵⁵⁴

The second version speaks of the abyss (*Abgrund*) as well, identifying it with the earth (*Erde*) in the broad sense of the principle of self-containment, including its most extreme variant of the concealed *per se* (*das schlechthin Verborgene*), which appears here for the very first time in the entire suite.⁵⁵⁵ The curious disappearance of the comparison between the spring of the uprising of art and the necessity of freedom in the second version might tempt the reader to imagine that this promising parallel has been dismissed for lack of profound significance, yet nothing could be further from the truth: it is precisely in the second version that this tacit connection “goes to ground,” as it were, such that it might be incorporated into the vision of the treatise at the most profound level.

It is only in the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* that the fruit of such integration become visible for the first time. Already in the early pages of its added discourse on thinghood, the third version reminds the reader of the distinction not simply between things and other beings, but between things and nothing; indeed, among other potential definitions of the thing, it considers the broadest to be the following: “In general, the word “thing” here means whatever is not nothing *per se*...insofar as it is some being at all.”⁵⁵⁶ In this formulation, nothing *per se* (*schlechthin nichts*) is already contrasted with somewhat beingly overall (*überall etwas*

⁵⁵⁴ [+ Aristotle, *De Caelo*, I.9, 279 a17–30]

⁵⁵⁵ M, 32, 34.

⁵⁵⁶ H, 5: “Im Ganzen nennt hier das Wort Ding jegliches, was nicht schlechthin nichts ist...sofern es überhaupt etwas Seiendes ist.”

Seiendes), anticipating the most profound difference of all – that between the nothing (*das Nichts*) and being (*Sein*).

In its its commentary upon van Gogh’s painting of a pair of peasant shoes, the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* for the very first time makes use of the notion of indefinite space (*unbestimmter Raum*) in conjunction with nothing (*nichts*). In contemplating the painting, Heidegger writes: “Around this pair of peasant shoes there is nothing to which or wherein they could belong, only an indefinite space.”⁵⁵⁷ At first glance, this remark seems to be a mere constation of the fact that the painting does not feature a setting for the shoes – whether some generic location (an interior, a landscape) or some hint pertaining to their proper environment (the labor and life of farming). Indeed, the commentary continues: “According to the painting by van Gogh, we cannot, for one thing, even state where these shoes are standing.”⁵⁵⁸ The reader is, of course, quickly disabused of this notion by a conjecture as to how this indefinite space – and all of the gaps, silences, and absences in the painting (including the “openings” of the shoes) – is replete precisely with the specific “world” and “earth” of the peasant woman, i. e. the entire scope and configuration of her life as a being that farms. However, in light of all of the modes that spatiality takes on throughout the three versions of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*, the present study would offer an interpretation which it takes to be fully consistent with the trajectory of Heidegger’s commentary, while taking the later one step further. This proposed “step further” consists in the possibility that the indefinite space surrounding the unused (*ungebraucht*) shoes within the painting ultimately constitutes a repudiation of the environment (*Umgebung*) of their service as too commonplace – and even too proper! – a context to reveal the full extent of the

⁵⁵⁷ H, 18-19: “Um dieses Paar Bauernschuhe herum ist nichts, wozu und wohin sie gehören könnten, nur ein unbestimmter Raum.”

⁵⁵⁸ H, 18: “Nach dem Gemälde von van Gogh können wir nicht einmal feststellen, wo diese Schuhe stehen.”

roots of their spatiality (and together with it, that of the peasant woman herself). Perhaps the fact that the peasant shoes lack their expected proper setting – i. e. a scene from farm life, for instance – within the painting allows the reader to glimpse that they ultimately arise (*erstehen*) not from standing (*stehen*) on a field, but from standing-in (*Innestehen*) a ground of an altogether different kind. To be clear, the claim that is being made about the indefinite space in question is, indeed, that it reveals both the shoes and the peasant woman to be infinitely more than a tool and a being defined by a tool. The indefinite space surrounding the shoes in the painting confronts the viewer-thinker as a stark reminder that the origin of the proper setting of the tool lies far beyond the environment of its use, which such a tool makes possible and holds together. Exactly how far down does this origin lie? The conjunction of indefinite space and nothing in Heidegger's initial characterization of the situation of the shoes in the painting invites the reader to consider the possibility that their situation of use ultimately reaches all the way back to and unfolds from the original impossibility of use – not in the sense of the brokenness of a given tool, but rather in the primordial sense of *Dasein's* confrontation of something – or rather, of the nothing (*das Nichts*) – somehow within and yet quite beyond *Sein*, that is unequivocally resistant to use and, on a broader scale, to usurpation in general. In this case, the answer to the question of “Where are these shoes standing?” is neither “in the field” or “in the painting,” but rather – in the ground of the possibility of use as such. Admittedly, the aforementioned phrase from the commentary does not employ the specific term the nothing (*das Nichts*); however, it introduces a tantalizing contrast between a commonplace understanding of indeterminate space as a certain nothingness within a painting – and indeterminate space as something that might be called the in-appropriate or im-proper spatiality of the most profound scale, that of the abyss (*Abgrund*), that of the nothing (*das Nichts*).

As the focus of the present study turns to the notion of the nothing (*das Nichts*), it reaches out towards the most profound wellspring of the spatiality of the work – indefinite space as such, the spatiality of which may only be approximated by something like the terms in-essential (*unwesentliche*) or im-proper (*un-eigentliche*) spatiality. Indeed, insofar as the third version distinguishes between the essence of being (*Sein*) and the provenance of such essence (*Wesensherkunft*), the use of the term in-essential with regard to the latter appears quite justified.⁵⁵⁹ What is more, however, the use of the term in-essential in reference to the spatiality of the nothing would stand in the starkest possible opposition to its use in reference to the commonplace spatiality of the work of art, which is repeatedly referred to as inessential (*unwesentlich*) in the sense of being superficial (as in the case of the second version’s characterization of the definition of the work of art as a product of the artist as “inessential”⁵⁶⁰). Rather, the term in-essential must be understood as an attempt to reflect the precedence of the spatiality of the nothing with regard both to the essential (or *proper*) and the inessential (or commonplace) spatiality of the work of art. Thus, the in-essence of the nothing might truly be seen as the condition or ground of the very possibility – precisely of the essence – of the work of art. Similarly, the use of the term im-proper in reference to the spatiality of the nothing would need to be kept distinct from the use of the term improper in the sense of unsuitable (as in the case of the first version’s critique of the preconception of art as “improper”⁵⁶¹). Rather, the term im-proper would need to be understood as, once again, pointing to a way of thinking about the nothing beyond the notion of property. With the stakes of the denomination of the exceptional spatiality of the nothing thus made explicit, such denomination must consider whether, in the

⁵⁵⁹ H, 65-66.

⁵⁶⁰ M, 48: “Ja, haben wir denn aber nicht zu Beginn alle Mühe darauf verwendet, das Erzeugtsein durch den Künstler als eine unwesentliche Bestimmung vom Werk selbst gerade fernzuhalten?”

⁵⁶¹ HS, 22, footnote to p. 20.

final analysis, the precedence of the nothing vis-à-vis essentiality and property is of the nature of pure opposition to these or of their consummation. In the former case, the present study would be justified in retaining the terms in-essential or im-proper, and in the latter, it would need to espouse such alternatives as hyper-essential (or quintessential) and ap-pro-priate. For the time being, the study will proceed with the terms in-essential and im-proper following the pattern Heidegger himself establishes in articulating the notion of un-truth (*Unwarheit*) as part and parcel of the truth both in the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* suite and in his lectures on the essence of truth during the winter semester of 1931-1932 (GA 34) and of 1933-34 (GA 36/37). That is to say, it will acknowledge a relation between the in-essentiality or im-propriety of the nothing and the essentiality/propriety of being, art, and the work, while retaining the negative prefix of the term designating the spatiality of the nothing itself (incidentally, quite in parallel with the negative prefix of in-definite space).

Thus, having at very least articulated the majors challenges of denominating the spatiality of the nothing, the present reflection permits itself to turn to its real crux: if the spatiality of the nothing, in fact, turns out to be that of indefinite space – or space *par excellence* – what would be the manner in which, and far more importantly, the reason for which such spatiality would ever carry out or submit itself to limitation? What is this “hidden necessity of measure” of which the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* speaks for the first time?⁵⁶² The fact is that commonplace spatiality, proper spatiality, proto-spatiality, and even the archi-spatiality of being entail some notion of limitation upon the pre-existing spatiality of the nothing – on space without limit – and

⁵⁶² H, 50: “...die verborgene Notwendigkeit von Maß...”

This ‘hidden necessity of measure’ finds an interesting parallel in the notion of the hidden order of chaos, pointed out by Michel Haar in Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche: “for Heidegger, chaos is the ‘pulsional’ element, the multitude of elementary forces, but in no sense the un-ordered: chaos is ‘that whose order is hidden, whose law is not immediately known to us.’” (Michel Haar, “Heidegger and the Nietzschean ‘Physiology’ of Art,” in *Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Interpretation*, ed. David Farrell Krell and David Wood (London, New York: Routledge, 1988), 16.)

would neither be nor be comprehensible apart from it. And, returning to the language of relationality, why would the nothing – whether as pure ir-relativity or self-as-relation par excellence – either undergo an internal schism and open itself up to relation with something other than itself? What could possibly motivate the nothing – or, perhaps, what motive could the nothing possibly have – to move itself or to be moved as such, and in so doing give rise to its own spatiality and all existing spatialities?⁵⁶³ In the final analysis, does the nothing remain for Heidegger – as it does for Husserl – an indefinite, infinite space that is as “the against in general” (*das Gegen überhaupt*)? If it does, does it not therein expose itself not as the ultimate power that gives rise to all else, but rather as impotence *par excellence*? In other words, does this nothing not ultimately betray – not the impotence of wanting (*die Ohnmacht des Wollens*) – but precisely the impotence of its lack?⁵⁶⁴ Does its silence not conceal an abnegation – a self-annihilation? If it does, then the third version’s prophecy must stand: “The mere turning around, fulfilled for its own sake, gives nothing.”⁵⁶⁵ Indeed, pure standing-in-itself, a definitive turning of the back – among other things, on being – gives nothing, “es gibt nichts.” And if it does not, would it not ultimately embrace being – and with it, the work of art – rather than repudiating it? The final version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* speaks of distinctive kinds of rest that accord with their

⁵⁶³ J. Anderson suggests a possible parallel between Heidegger’s account of ‘origins’ and that of Hesiod, in which creatures arise ‘out of a gap’ and ‘without the act of love,’ pointing to a genealogy alternative to the Judaeo-Christian account of creation in which God creates creatures *ex nihilo* yet for the sake of love. (Anderson, John M., “Truth, Process, and Creature in Heidegger’s Thought,” in *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth*, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Chicago : Quadrangle Books, 1968), 37.) Given Heidegger’s extensive work on Nietzsche during the period of the composition of “The Origin of the Work of Art,” such a love-less origination should also be contrasted with Nietzsche’s identification of love as the ‘power of art’ : “Nietzsche identifies the embellishing power of art as ‘Love.’ (...) ...Nietzsche describes the aesthetic enthusiasm of Love’s attunement as a form of “divination”... “the sensations of time and space are altered” ...as the power of understanding is immeasurably enhanced. Such an ecstatic experience directs ‘life out beyond itself,’ creatively communicating to life a new possibility of its higher law.”⁵¹ ...it is for Nietzsche art that reveals life’s highest possibilities...” ((James Magrini, “Truth, Art, and the ‘New Sensuousness’ : Understanding Heidegger’s Metaphysical Reading of Nietzsche,” *Kritike* 3, no. 1 (2009) : 126.)

⁵⁶⁴ H, 33.

⁵⁶⁵ H, 29: “Das bloße Umkehren, für sich vollzogen, ergibt nichts.”

corresponding kinds of motion.⁵⁶⁶ Thus, if the nothing may be thought of as the most profound rest that accords with the most profound motion, may not this motion be understood as an emotion, in the most serious sense of the word, and even more specifically, as the emotion of love?⁵⁶⁷

§2. The Proper Temporality (*eigentliche Zeitlichkeit*) of the Work of Art

“Therefore, there are no works conforming to their time that might be [considered] works of art; rather, only those works are works of art, which are at work in such a way that they transform and make their time conformable to *themselves*.”⁵⁶⁸

This fleeting glimpse of the relationship between the genuine work of art and ‘time’ in the initial elaboration of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* indicates a startling perspective from which ‘time’ might to be properly understood within these texts – that of the work of art as an operation of change with regard to commonplace ‘time’ and to its significance. Yet insofar as such an operation must itself be understood as an aspect of the greater operation of attunement (*Stimmung*) between being-there and being, i. e. of the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*), the present section of the study will attempt to interpret the transformation of ‘time’ by and within the work of art as a means of synchronization between being-there and being – and proper temporality of the work of art as a modality of this relation. It will begin, as in the case of the question of the proper spatiality of the work of art, with a consideration of its commonplace

⁵⁶⁶ H, 34: “Je nach der Art der Bewegung ist die Weise der Ruhe.”

⁵⁶⁷ Although such a question may seem far afield at first glance, William Desmond characterizes the origination of the ‘between’ of ‘time-space’ within being as ‘erotic’: “If origin is an erotic source, it is unclear how we can see further than a giving that must finally be for itself, even if the giving passes through the other. I do not find in Heidegger resource enough to make sense of being beyond this circle, a circle we found in Hegel and, differently, in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. He had intimations of that “being beyond,” but these intimations are articulated in language not true to the possibility of the good of the “to be,” beyond the equivocations of erotic self-origination.” (William Desmond, “Art and the Self-Concealing Origin: Heidegger’s Equivocity and the Still Unthought Between,” in *Art, Origins, Otherness: Between Philosophy and Art* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), 240.)

⁵⁶⁸ HS, 15: “Daher gibt es keine zeitgemäßen Werke, die Kunstwerke wären, sondern nur jene Werke sind solche der Kunst, die so am Werk sind, daß sie ihre Zeit *sich* gemäß machen und verwandeln.”

temporality, understood as historical provenance, expression of time, and consequence of an efficiently causal sequence of production, the ‘experience’ of which must of necessity be posterior, belated – essentially, a sanitized and esteemed form of taxidermy. Having diagnosed these distortions of ‘temporality,’ the study will proceed to examine two ways of interpreting the proper temporality of the work of art and of its experience: (1) a chronology traceable in light of the free gift of the possibility of attunement extended to being-there through the work of art as institution of being, (2) a synchrony entailed by the event of appropriation in its actuality, experienced as a suspension of ‘time’ by virtue of motion in tandem.

a) The commonplace temporality of the work of art and of its experience

α) The commonplace temporality of the work of art

The simplest commonplace notion of the temporality of the work of art is that the work of art springs from a given historical epoch – from “the most diverse ages” (“den verschiedensten Zeitaltern”),⁵⁶⁹ as the first version puts it – that it originates at a given moment or period in time, which is ascertainable with sufficient ease using traditional methods of art history.⁵⁷⁰ This simple quantitative correlation between a work of art and a moment in time forms the basis for a further qualitative claim: that the work of art is an expression of its time (“Ausdruck” ihres Zeitalters”),⁵⁷¹ a claim wherein the term ‘time’ denotes, among other things, “the glory and power of a people” (“Pracht und Macht eines Volkes”).⁵⁷² According to this model, the work of art derives its form from its ‘time’ – it is but an epiphenomenon of actions and events occurring prior to and quite independently of it, whose highest aspiration is to approximate the latter with

⁵⁶⁹ HS, 5.

⁵⁷⁰ HS, 6: “...die Kunstgeschichtsforschung bestimmt ihre geschichtliche Herkunft”

⁵⁷¹ HS, 7.

⁵⁷² Ibid.

the highest degree of accuracy. Thus, the first version explicitly rejects the conception of the work of art as an imitation (*Nachachtung*) of something previously extant – as an ‘offprint’ (*Abbild*) of an original,⁵⁷³ for instance, of nature.⁵⁷⁴ Such an imitation is but an after-image (*Nachbild*) and an echo (*Nachklang*)⁵⁷⁵ of something prior, something which the imitation can’t quite catch up to and keep up with.

Another point of entry into the commonplace temporality of the work of art is its interpretation as a *terminus* of an efficiently causal sequence of the process of production (*Hervorbringung*).⁵⁷⁶ As the result of such a process, the work of art is doubly posterior to its origin: “firstly” (*einmal*), to the more originary (*ursprünglicher*) grasp of an artistic thought in the imagination, “and then” (“*und dann*”), to its transposition into something like a ‘manu-fact’ (*Erzeugnis*).⁵⁷⁷ The order of the elements of this chronology is set fast by the bond of efficient causality, which inflects temporality in terms of the role of each of its elements: the act of the imagination as the original cause (*Ursache*),⁵⁷⁸ the act of handicraft as the secondary cause, and finally, the work of art as the effect of these two causes – necessarily posterior only in virtue of its role as effect. Thus it becomes clear that this conception of commonplace temporality of the work of art is thoroughly contaminated by a mechanics of efficient causality, apart from which the full import of its ‘before’ and ‘after’ falls short of realization. What is more, the posteriority of the work of art as an effect renders it *a priori* incapable of operating as a work, because its functional role – as that which effectuates – would necessitate its temporal priority. The commonplace temporality of efficient causality thus falls short of the work of art in two ways:

⁵⁷³ HS, 13.

⁵⁷⁴ HS, 14: “Gegenüber dem von sich aus Vorhandenen und “von Natur” Gewachsenen ist das von Menschenhand Verfertigte allemal etwas Nachträgliches, vollends dann, wenn es Naturdinge nachbildet.”

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ HS, 6.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

(1) it determines the work of art *a priori* and/or (2) it renders the work of art inoperative by definition.

Demoted and incapacitated in this way, the work of art then falls into the hands of “official places” (*amtliche Stellen*) which conserve it⁵⁷⁹ somewhat as a specimen in a jar – immobile, unchanging, timeless. Such “takeover in traditional conservation” (“die Übernahme in die überliefernde Bewahrung”)⁵⁸⁰ cannot but underscore the double temporal destitution of such a ‘specimen’: on the one hand, the irretrievability and relentless regression of its literal temporal ‘origin,’ and on the other, the preclusion of the very possibility of its manifesting as anything other than a memory at the point of its temporal ‘destination,’ the self-conscious “now” of the archivist vocationally predisposed against relating to the the work of art as anything other than a “then.”

β) The commonplace temporality of the experience of the work of art

The experiential correlate of the conservation of the work of art is what the first version calls “historical recollection” (“geschichtliche Erinnerung”), a “tracing-after” (*nachzeichnen*) and “thinking-about” (*hinzudenken*),⁵⁸¹ which do not commence until the work has already long departed. As in the case of the work of art conceived as a consequence of the sequence of production, the experience of work as historical recollection comes entirely too late and thus misses the work in its operation.

b) The proper temporality of the work of art and of its experience

α) The *proper* temporality of the work of art

⁵⁷⁹ HS, 6.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁸¹ HS, 7.

The possibility of glimpsing the proper temporality of the work of art dawns with its extrication (*Loslösung/Ablösung*) from commonplace temporality understood as a relation (*Bezug*) of efficient causality characteristic of the process of production.⁵⁸² Such extrication is no small task, as it calls for a thoroughgoing re-thinking of the origin – the ground (*Grund*)⁵⁸³ – of the work of art in such a way that their relation is no longer determined by the temporal couplet of priority-posteriority. In other words, in order to approach the proper temporality of the work of art, one must first overcome the presumption that the origin of the work and the work itself lie at opposite ends of a temporal ‘segment,’ that they are at a temporal remove from each other. Indeed, the necessity (*Notwendigkeit*) of such a ground may no longer be understood as a determinative relation to something that follows, but first and foremost to itself in the very happening (*Geschehen*) of this self.⁵⁸⁴ The first version could not be more clear on this point: “While the work *is* work, [while it] brings its world to the opened rising, it first itself works out a purpose which it serves, it first itself creates the space over which it reigns, it first determines the place for itself within which it accomplishes erection.”⁵⁸⁵

It is this contemporaneity of the ground and being of the work of art which sets philosophical questioning in circular motion (“bewegen...im Kreis”),⁵⁸⁶ a temporal loop which becomes productive only by means of a temporal leap (*Sprung*). Such a leap delivers the questioner from the futile position of questioning “after” the origin (*nachfragen*) from the perspective of being, and into the only viable position of questioning about both at once – that

⁵⁸² HS, 6.

⁵⁸³ HS, 7.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁵ HS, 10: “Indem das Werk Werk *ist*, seine Welt zum eröffneten Ragen bringt, erwirkt es selbst erst den Auftrag, dem es dient, schafft es selbst erst den Raum, den es durchherrscht, bestimmt es selbst erst den Ort, an dem es zur Errichtung kommt.”

⁵⁸⁶ HS, 7.

epistemological contemporaneity, of knowing-with (*Mitwissen*) the origin.⁵⁸⁷ The paradox of such a question consists in the inevitable simultaneity of its starting and ending points,⁵⁸⁸ which puts pressure upon the questioner to give up sequence both as a primary mode of questioning and as a primary model for the relationship between ground and being. The being of the work of art is its being-open (*Offenbarsein*).⁵⁸⁹ This being-open works itself out for the very first time precisely as and within such being-open. There is no temporal delay in this self-determination: the openness within which the work “works” is within itself, is itself. Indeed, the work of art is not something that is brought out into the open “after the fact” (*nachträglich*), so to speak; rather, being-work means being-open.⁵⁹⁰

The notion of strife, definitive of the work-being of the work, exhibits a similar lack of chronological order, and is best understood in terms of a sustained tension. When the first version speaks of the work of art as enstrifing (*Bestreitung*) such strife, it specifically cautions against misinterpreting such enstrifing as a quelling or overcoming – as an action of bringing a certain progression to its logical end.⁵⁹¹ Rather, it speaks of enstrifing as sustaining (*aushalten*) strife – and in even stronger terms, of being strife “entirely by itself” (“ganz bei ihm selbst”), and specifically not as a consequence (*Folge*) of the counterpoint of the world and the earth.⁵⁹² Such temporal suspension intrinsic to the operation of the work of art as a work is the exact opposite of temporal destitution intrinsic to the operation of conservation of the work of art as a specimen.

⁵⁸⁷ HS, 8.

⁵⁸⁸ HS, 7.

⁵⁸⁹ HS, 8.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁹¹ HS, 12.

⁵⁹² Ibid.: “...ist das Werk die Bestreitung dieses Streites. Bestreitung meint hier nicht Niederschlagen und Überwindung des Streites, sondern im Gegenteil den Streit als solchen aushalten, ja dieser Streit selbst *sein*. Der Streit jedoch ist nicht erst die *Folge* dessen, daß in der Aufstellung und Herstellung Welt und Erde gegeneinandergeraten, sondern weil das Werk im Grunde seiner Bestimmung solche Bestreitung ist, deshalb entfacht und bewahrt es den Streit.”

As strife, the work dilates time, sustains time, keeps time – it is an abode (*Verbleib*) wherein time may persist, continue, remain.

Yet this general suspension of chronological sequence for the sake of the work's operation of making time – of synchronizing being and being-there as a means of relating them⁵⁹³ – itself occurs within a temporal horizon marked by the priority of the possibility of such relation to its actuality in the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*). The space of play (*Spielraum*) which the work opens up by itself and within itself – which the work itself is – is both an extension of space-time and an extension of an invitation to all beings, including being-there, to indwell this abode so as to relate to being. As an invitation, this middle (*Mitte*) must 'pre-date' the history of beings that accept it; indeed, such beings are said to be first capable of manifesting themselves as beingly only within this middle.⁵⁹⁴ As an invitation only, such a middle is prepared (*bereitet*), "yet untrodden" ("noch unbetretene").⁵⁹⁵ Once accepted, however, such an invitation becomes the 'year zero,' so to speak, of a new "historical living" (*geschichtliches Wohnen*),⁵⁹⁶ measured not in terms of a beginning and an end, but rather in terms of the degree of synchrony or lack thereof with the *tempo* maintained by the metronome of this middle. Thus, in the case of the human being, being-there becomes historical only through stepping into the middle, the there (*das Da*), wherein it can acquire its proper *tempo* precisely through "standing towards being as such" ("zum Seyn als solchen steh[en]").⁵⁹⁷ The metronome of the middle sets the proper *tempo* for each being that enters its temporal realm and keeps it as a point of reference for each being which reverts, for one reason or another, to the commonplace *tempo*. It is for this reason that the

⁵⁹³ HS, 13: "...in der und aus der ein Volk sein geschichtliches Wohnen gründet – unheimisch wird im Seienden, um mit dem Unheimlichen des Seyns Ernst zu machen."

⁵⁹⁴ HS, 15: "deren jedes erst in dem durch Werk erstrittenen Offenen sich als seiend bekunden kann."

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁶ HS, 13.

⁵⁹⁷ HS, 19: "Diese Weise, das Da zu sein, nennen wir Geschichte."

first version speak of the work of art as a measure of time:

That is precisely the most proper essence of work-being: that it can never, at any time, be measured according to the extant and supposedly properly effective, but is itself the correct measure of beings and un-beings. Therefore, there are no works conforming to their time that might be [considered] works of art; rather, only those works are works of art, which are at work in such a way that they transform and make their time conformable to *themselves*.

How do works of art transform and make time conformable to themselves? In its essential operation of strife, the work opens up a spatio-temporal rift, so to speak, which inaugurates and accommodates the counter-strife between the unconcealed and the concealed. This counter-strife, however, is no mutual exclusion, but rather a bond which holds together the supposedly incommensurable in the intimacy of “a happening fused within itself” (*in sich gefügte Geschehen*), the happening of truth.⁵⁹⁸ It is this happening that is “set to work” – or, in colloquial terms, set in motion – by the work of art.⁵⁹⁹ The temporality of this “setting to work” or “setting in motion,” however, is itself of a double nature: on the one hand, as such an operation, the work is a happening which inaugurates the happening of truth, yet on the other, these two happenings happen simultaneously. The first version could not be more clear on this point: firstly, truth as becoming (*werden*) “is not extant somewhere beforehand,” but rather “comes to work for the first time *with* the work and *within* the work,”⁶⁰⁰ and secondly, “neither the work exists prior to truth, nor the latter – prior to the work; rather, as it comes to the work, truth happens.”⁶⁰¹ If the work of art is not prior to truth, in what sense can it be understood as a happening that “sets it to work” or sets it in motion? Indeed, the first version already offers a significantly qualified

⁵⁹⁸ HS, 16

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid.: “Im Werk als solchem ist das Geschehen der Wahrheit am Werk, d. h. die Wahrheit ist im Werk ins Werk gesetzt.”

⁶⁰⁰ HS, 17: Wenn die Wahrheit erst *mit* dem Werk und *im* Werk ans Werk kommt und nicht irgendwo zuvor vorhanden ist...

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.: “So ist es keineswegs; denn das Werk besteht weder vor der Wahrheit noch auch diese vor dem Werk, sondern: indem es zum Werk kommt, geschieht Wahrheit.”

characterization of the ‘operation’ of the work as a “letting-spring-up,”⁶⁰² rather than “setting into motion” in a fully active sense. And in turn, what sets the work itself, as a happening, in motion? The kind of happening that the first version has in mind here is that of becoming, yet the origin of this becoming is for the time being occluded, such that its temporal configuration cannot be thought all the way through. The temporality of a happening whose beginning is another happening without a beginning appears to be a fragment, the ultimate significance of which is hardly possible to ascertain without expanding the borders of the frame. And thus, for the time being, the interpreter must attempt to glimpse the temporality of the essential operation of the work of art as the transitional temporality of a draft (*Entwurf*).⁶⁰³

Yet it is precisely at the point of the happening of truth – its actualization – that another operative candidate offers itself for consideration, namely, that of the being-there as humanity. In the first version, the happening of the truth is inextricably linked with the there, and the there plainly cannot be without humanity “undertaking” and “constituting” it.⁶⁰⁴ From this perspective, the becoming of the there, the becoming of truth – indeed, the becoming of the work of art – are all contingent upon a certain operation performed by being-there as humanity, the operation of decision. Thus, a curious temporal predicament reveals itself: the essential operation of the work of art – the happening of the spatio-temporal rift of the there – must be thought of as ‘existing’ in two modalities at once, as happening potentially and as happening actually. The there must be there in advance, yet it cannot be there until it is there, i. e. until its assumption by being-there: “The there in its openness only is, when it is undertaken and constituted out of the re-moval into

⁶⁰² HS, 20: “Die Kunst läßt in ihrer Weise die Wahrheit entspringen, ist ein Entspringenlassen, ein Ursprung.”

⁶⁰³ HS, 17.

⁶⁰⁴ HS, 20.

a given-up and the “be-true-al” of the co-given, i. e. history.”⁶⁰⁵ The first version’s provisional resolution of this temporal predicament consists in the interpretation of the operation of the work of art as that happening within which that which has already been prepared for being-there as its proper possibility – “the up till now concealed most proper of the historical being-there”⁶⁰⁶ – is opened up to being-there and undertaken by it. Indeed, several lines later within the same paragraph, the essential operation of the work of art is defined as “work[ing] out the openness of the there and allow[ing] humanity to undertake being historically.”⁶⁰⁷

With regard to the receiver – the being-there before such becomes human or historical – the transformative middle of the there is drafted in advance (*vorausgeworfen*) and thrown-towards (*zugeworfen*)⁶⁰⁸ precisely as the possibility of becoming human, historical, a people. This possibility is what is “given-up” (*Aufgegebenes*) and “co-given” (*Mitgegebenes*) to being-there, such that it may actualize it as a “this” and a “singular.”⁶⁰⁹

However, a certain priority of the work of art as an operation is reintroduced when the essence of art is identified as an institution of being (*Stiftung des Seyns*).⁶¹⁰ Indeed, all three senses of such institution – gifting (*Schenkung*), grounding (*Gründung*), and starting (*Anfang*) – are unmistakably marked by the notion of precedence, whether to the receiver, to that which is grounded, or to that which continues.⁶¹¹

* A Note on Martineau’s *a-chronique*:

In his “Avant-propos de l’éditeur,” Emmanuel Martineau identifies non-temporality as

⁶⁰⁵ HS, 20: “Das Da in seiner Offenheit ist nur, wenn es übernommen und bestanden wird aus der Entrückung in ein Aufgegebenes und der Bewahrung des Mitgegebenen, d. h. die Geschichte.”

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.: “das bislang verborgene Eigenste des geschichtlichen Daseins.”

⁶⁰⁷ HS, 21: “der Offenheit des Da erwirkt und den Menschen das Seyn geschichtlich übernehmen läßt.”

⁶⁰⁸ HS, 19.

⁶⁰⁹ HS, 20.

⁶¹⁰ HS, 18.

⁶¹¹ HS, 19.

one of three principal philosophical perils to which the interpretation of the work of art exposes itself in the third version of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz*. He insists that while the third version contains the “same teaching” as the second version – indeed, that “all of this is to be found there under a certain form” – the “tone” of the second version is that of “quiet strength” (“force tranquille”), while that of the third – of a “sobriety which is disarming, because disarmed” (“la sobriété désarmante, parce que désarmée”).⁶¹² It is on the basis of this supposed change of “tone” that Martineau takes the third version’s view of history to be “*a-chronique*.”⁶¹³ However, even if the question of “tone” were posed in properly philosophical terms vis-à-vis the texts in question, how would the reader go about searching for conclusive evidence of something as indeterminate as “quiet force” or “disarmed sobriety”? There is certainly no such evidence in the one sequence of questions that Martineau cites in support of his claim: “Mais ce Là, comment est-il? ... Qui assume-t-il charge d’être ce Là?”⁶¹⁴ The only “tone” these questions are evidently marked by is the inquisitive. As Martineau’s analysis in successive paragraphs plainly demonstrates, the question of “tone” is a red herring even for himself, and therefore hardly warrants further comment in the present study.

The far more interesting question that may be salvaged from the shipwreck of the “Avant-propos” is that of what it might mean to speak of the work of art and of its experience as temporal in the context of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* suite. Indeed, Martineau himself evinces a premonition of this track when he insists that “time continue to *manifest itself* in

⁶¹² M, 7-8: “Au péril du *non-temps*, enfin, et je songe ici au problème de l’*histoire*. En 1935, quelle est l’essence de l’oeuvre? Réponse de Heidegger: laisser provenir (*geschehen*), c’est à dire, advenir historiquement la vérité en la mettant-en-oeuvre. Et en 1936? Quoi! Ne retrouve-t-on pas, dans le *Holzwege*, le même enseignement, et sur tous les tons? Voire, mais sûrement pas sur le «ton» où cette thèse centrale avait été énoncée an un auparavant! ... Non ! Rien de tout cela n’y est dit avec la même force tranquille, quand bien même tout cela «s’y retrouve» sous une certaine forme.”

⁶¹³ M, 8.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

phenomenology,” indeed, beyond its acquisition as a horizon in *Being and Time*.⁶¹⁵ In fact, Martineau’s term “*a-chronique*” unwittingly suggests a very specific formulation of this question: how might time be understood in relation to the work of art and to its experience if not as their chronological horizon? In so doing, it will demonstrate, contra Martineau, that it is not only not “absurd,”⁶¹⁶ but, on the contrary, necessary for a “heideggerian” to speak of the work of art and of its experience – in all three versions of the *Kunstwerkaufsatz* – precisely in terms of temporality and history. Indeed, contra Martineau, the present study would argue that within temporality, history happens as synchrony, a modality of reciprocal necessity.

However, it is not necessary for such a “heideggerian” to speak of either of these in terms of chronology as a condition of the experience of being interpreted either as an aspect of the constitution of being-there or as some third, independent of both being and being-there and thus capable of operating as a neutral horizon.⁶¹⁷ Indeed, that which Martineau calls the “fainting of temporality” (“l’évanouissement de la temporalité”)⁶¹⁸ is but a fainting of an overly narrow interpretation of time as chronology. Insofar as one of the limitations of the chronological conception of time is its unfortunate history of embroilment with efficient causality, it does indeed warrant the pursuit of a “more radical *temporal* dimension,”⁶¹⁹ which must not be mistaken, as it is by Martineau, for a retreat from either temporality or history proper.

⁶¹⁵ M, 8: “ce souhait que le temps continue de *se manifester* dans la phénoménologie”

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.: “Bien entendu, à celui qui considère que le phénomène même *de* la temporalité peut et doit être « dépassé » au profit d’un temps plus « authentique », autrement dit que le temps n’est « pas encore lui-même » tant qu’il provient, rien ne saurait apparaître plus absurde, rien moins heideggérien que cette requête de la *temporalité* de l’histoire. Rien plus ridicule que ce souhait que le temps continue de *se manifester* dans la ‘phénoménologie, quand chacun sait que, depuis Être et Temps, l’horizon du temps et « acquis »...”

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

⁶¹⁸ M, 9.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

Conclusion

In this final portion of our study, we had set out to investigate the ways in which Heidegger's elaboration of the work of art in the three versions of his essay "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" might shed light on the transition of his thinking from the milestone of the 'between' irreducible to the Subject (brought into relief in *Die Frage nach dem Ding : Zur Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*) to that of 'time-space' (articulated as the 'middle' of being in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*). In order to do so, we had reconstructed an extensive range of senses – from 'commonplace' to 'proper' – in which the work of art may be understood as spatial, temporal, and 'intermediate.' We had subsequently narrowed our focus to the 'proper' sense of the spatiality and temporality of the work of art as a 'hyper-measure' (*Übermaß*) uniquely capable of facilitating a kind of 'com-mensurability' between the 'im-mensity' of being and the 'measure' of the Subject – insofar as it can be interpreted as a kind of *ratio* between the latter and the former. For Heidegger's project in the 1930s, this development signals not only the elevation of *ratio* into a non-calculative register,⁶²⁰ but also – and far more importantly – its 'dislocation' from the Subject and its identification with the 'fold' of 'time-space' which unfolds out of being and enfolds the human being into it with a view to 're-

⁶²⁰ At first glance, our claim may appear to be entirely in line with the following assessment by Robert Bernasconi: "These essays represent one further step in his longstanding attempt to break the grip of the so-called rational or calculative thinking of modern philosophy, and return to the 'poetic thinking' characteristic of early Greek thinkers." (Robert Bernasconi, "Heidegger, Martin," in *A Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Stephen Davies (Chichester, Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 323.) However, in distinction from characterizing Heidegger's accomplishment as a complete break with 'rational' thinking, we have sought to preserve a meaningful daylight of difference between 'rational' and 'calculative' and to interpret Heidegger's notion of 'hyper-measure' as an indication of the possibility of re-casting 'rationality' in terms of a negotiation of 'compatibility' or 'proportion' between being and the human being in the event of their reconciliation. Interpreted in this way, Heidegger's project emerges as a more nuanced alternative to Adorno's pronouncement that "art is rationality criticizing itself without being able to overcome itself." (Quoted in Jay Bernstein, "Aesthetic Alienation : Heidegger, Adorno, and the Truth at the End of Art," in *Life after Postmodernism : Essays on Value and Culture*, ed. John Fekete (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1987), 114 ; original quotation in T. W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. C. Lenhardt (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 81). For Heidegger, the 'overcoming' of rationality through the 'hyper-measure' of art signifies its opening up to its tacit potential – opening up onto the 'im-measure' of being.

configuring' it in accordance with its own 'figure.'⁶²¹

What does the 'proper' spatio-temporal sense of the work of art consist in such that it lends itself to being interpreted in this manner? Firstly, the spatio-temporality of art expressed in the figure of 'strife' (*Streit*) is ontologically derivative of and, therefore, analogous to that of 'time-space,' or 'ur-strife' (*Urstreit*): the descriptions of strife as 'the intimacy of their averting belonging-to-each-other' (*die Innigkeit ihres widerwendigen Sichzugehörens*) and as the 'standing-towards-each-other stepping-apart-from-each-other' (*zueinanderstehendes Auseinandertreten*) reiterate the dynamic of 'time-space' as differentiation within oneness⁶²² or tension between vectors of self-containment and self-expansion. As in being, so in art, this figure turns upon the possibility of the paradoxical duality or liminality of the rift (*Riß*) as a simultaneous rupture-suture. This duality or liminality is precisely what reveals the rift – and with it, strife – to be the 'middle' par excellence. Secondly, the rift is characterized by motion, which renders it ideally suited for 're-moving' the Subject from its self-referential 'between' of identity and 'moving [it] in' to the 'between' of 'time-space.' The language of 're-moving' and 'moving-in' converges in the notion of art as 'rapture' (*Entrückung*), wherein human beings can 'drift through the rift,' so to speak, wrested from their own measure and transported into a 'dimension' contiguous with being. It is precisely in this 'dimension' that the human being is

⁶²¹ Indeed, such a rendition resonates with Dominick LaCapra's reservations regarding radical transcendence in Heidegger: "There is a pronounced sense of transcendence (or being beyond) in Heidegger, but one may doubt whether it does to the extreme limit of 'the totally other' – the *ganz anders* or *tout autre*." (Dominick LaCapra, "Heidegger, Violence, and the Origin of the Work of Art," in *History and its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 124).

⁶²² Frank Schalow rightly identifies this notion as a classical criterion of beauty in Schelling, among many others: "Schelling acknowledges the same connection in discovering within nature the prefigurement of the self-organizing process of creativity; this creative process finds its consummate form in art, in the intuition gauging the compatibility of sameness in difference vis-à-vis beauty." (Frank Schalow, "Mimesis, Art, and Truth," in *Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred: From Thought to the Sanctuary of Faith* (Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 2001, 82). Hans Jaeger points to this imperative in more general terms: "With the concept of beauty we associate the idea of harmony, balance, repose. And this presupposes two complementary opposites which have come to rest because they are in balance." (Hans Jaeger, "Heidegger and the Work of Art," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 17, no. 1 (1958): 66.)

‘overcome by an ineluctable-inexhaustible’ and may ‘grapple with the ‘otherworldliness’ of beyng in earnest’ (‘mit dem Unheimlichen des Seyns Ernst zu machen’). Thirdly, art as a ‘dimension’ is ‘configurative’ in its very being : as a ‘guiding measure’ (*weisendes Maß*) which lies beyond the ‘sphere of the subjectivity of consciousness,’ art is capable of orienting and proportioning the measure of subjectivity to its own ‘measure,’ the ‘hyper-measure’ which it shares with beyng. In the three version of the “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” such configurative proportioning is expressed in the terms of ‘consonance’ (*Einklang*) and ‘tuning’ (*Stimmung*) – scenarios which reveal the operation of art as that of ‘adjustment’ of the human being in accordance with a ‘standard’ which is set out before it by beyng as its own ‘proper’ possibility.⁶²³ In temporal terms, in the wake of Heidegger’s dismissal of chronology and constancy as deficient modes of temporality, such an ‘adjustment’ takes the form of synchronization by means of the *tempo* set by art. These three aspects of art’s way of being – its liminality as ‘rift,’ its motility as ‘rapture,’ and its adjust-ability as ‘tuning’ – uniquely qualify it as an intermediary between beyng and the human being.

⁶²³ In this conclusion, we disagree with William Desmond’s interpretation of Heidegger’s construal of the relationship between beyng and the human being through the ‘hyper-measure’ of art as dichotomizing : “Heidegger’s noted proclivity to think in terms of doubles, where the one seems to be what the other is not, does not always help us in thinking the between as the milieu where one is porous to the other, where one passes into the other, and where the other gives signs suggestive of what the source offers.” As we have argued in this chapter, it is precisely such porosity that the ‘hyper-measure’ of art represents – a ‘between’ where measure of the human being can pass into the im-measure of beyng.

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